Introduction to Volume 1

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Whatever our perspective on the world around us, we cannot help wondering whether globalization and the end of the Cold War has actually brought us greater insecurity, rather than the increased security promised. The processes of internationalization unleashed by globalization have undermined the once dominant national security model. But the globalization paradigm has not itself been too concerned to map out the new global (in)security dilemmas. We have only rather generalized theories of “global risk” (Beck 1999) and wishful aspirations for a “global civil society” (Kaldor 2003). This general introduction thus seeks to develop a fruitful encounter between the globalization paradigm and the new (and old) forms of security and insecurity now becoming manifest across the world with greater intensity.

The security dilemmas we all face in the post–Cold War era can be dealt with in various ways. We could just be fatalistic and accept security concerns as an inevitable part of the human condition read in Hobbesian terms. We could also seek to mitigate security and risk challenges through amelioration and conflict containment. Or, finally, as Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler argue, we can pursue a “transcender logic [which] argues that human society on a global scale can construct a radically new world order, and in so doing escape the dangers of the past” (2008, 18). Whether this view is overly optimistic is a matter of opinion, but it at least offers a framework to pursue postconflict security strategies. Nor does this view deny that world politics in the twenty-first century will be characterized by deep uncertainties, growing and unpredictable risks, as well as generalized turmoil. Indeed, Booth and Wheeler point to how “the global agenda will be uniquely dominated by an era of converging global challenges, with potentially catastrophic global and local impacts” (268). There will be new challenges overlaid on old ones, combining in new and unsettling modalities. The point is, can we deal with the era of uncertainty and risk by denying it or hiding from it or simply coping with it, or should we seek to address its root causes? This encyclopaedia seeks to address the complex cluster of security challenges in the era of globalization. Our focus is particularly on what is new, and our lens is a critical one that avoids facile orthodoxies. The challenges are very serious, and so our thinking must be equally serious and
focused on a critical understanding of current reality and, wherever possible, on seeking mechanisms for transcending the security dilemma.

We start this introductory chapter by examining the diverse ways in which globalization has redefined the nature of security. Security threats are now increasingly global—from global warming to global hunger, to global terrorism—and thus the national or statist security paradigm is inadequate. We expand on this theme in the next section dealing with the simultaneous “widening” of security (to take in non-military threats) and its “deepening” (to go further than the nation-state into society). This leads us to a sustained review of the new human security paradigm seen by its supporters as the replacement for the national security paradigm and by its detractors as vague and unable to be operationalized. Turning to more recent dramatic events in world affairs since 2001, we consider the notion that we are entering a new era of permanent war or permanent insecurity. Finally, we turn to the broader picture of globalization with its winners and losers and ask whether a global civil society can be constructed to take us beyond the current state of seemingly limitless insecurity as the dominant human condition.

**GLOBAL SECURITY**

Globalization creates greater economic, political, social, and cultural interactions across the globe and is thus a source of great dynamism. However, security analysts argue that “many different aspects of globalisation now combine to increase the dangers of a variety of transnational threats from weapons proliferation, cyber attacks, ethnic violence, global crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation and the spread of infectious disease” (Davis 2003, 1–2). From this rather wide range of perceived threats, it is clear that two in particular are at the top of the list. The first is the environment and the cluster of issues under the label of global warming that clearly pose transnational risks (see Environmental Insecurity entry). The second is the issue of global terrorism (see Terrorism entry) with the likes of Al Qaeda being “able effectively to exploit new communications technologies, global financial networks, and the ease of movements of people” (Davis 2003, 1). Between them these twin perils are creating great turbulence by posing security threats in a conventional sense and undermining human security in a broader sense.

Globalization’s security implications have led to a number of attempts at “redefining security” (Mathews 1989). Since the end of the Cold War, a narrow military conception of national security has seemed not only redundant but also inadequate. Jessica Mathews was already arguing in 1989 that “global developments now suggest the need for [a] broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues” (162). National sovereignty had already been undermined by the increased freedom of financial flows in the 1980s and by the information and communications technology revolution (see Internet and Human [In]Security entry in volume 2). Environmental strains now clearly transcended national borders. From a global development perspective, there was a simultaneous move to broaden the definition of security to
include economic vulnerability and dependency in the global South (Thomas 1987). External military threats were seen as less important in the South than economic vulnerability and state weakness. The issue of external dependence, becoming more accentuated rather than less in the era of globalization, is seen as the main context-setting element for the majority of the world's population.

Taking a broad overview of the globalization and security field, we note a fairly general recognition that there are now new security challenges that cannot be dealt with on the basis of national security or by purely military means. Even the proponents of traditional military conceptions of security accept a tendency toward the internationalization of security. Notions of collective security now come to the fore, whether dealing with global warming or global terrorism. The old binary opposition between the external (international) and the internal (national) can no longer be credibly sustained. Crime, drugs, people trafficking, and terrorism are as much inside as outside the national borders (see Crime entry in volume 2). State security is no longer effective even in its own terms, never mind from the perspective of the many millions across the world for whom their own state is the main source of insecurity. While state security is clearly an urgent issue in relation to the real or perceived terrorist threat as an overall paradigm, it is, we argue, of declining effectiveness.

Whether globalization has increased or diminished global security is not entirely or easily decidable. Jan Aart Scholte systematically goes through all the main issues at stake and finds arguments for and against on all counts (2005, chap. 9). While global connectivity may disincentive war in the global North, the increasingly global reach of armed forces has facilitated military intervention in the global South. While global consciousness has promoted ecological awareness, many global activities are heavily polluting. Globalization's impact on security is clearly contradictory across and at all levels. Likewise, while globalization has brought to the fore global threats and the need for transnational responses, the national security paradigm is far from defunct in practice. As David Held and others put it, "The doctrine of national security remains one of the essential defining principles of modern statehood . . . For if a state does not have the capacity to secure its territory and protect its people, then its very raison d'etre can be called into question" (1999, 145). This verdict is clearly reflected in the U.S. response to the attack on the symbols of national political, economic, and military power in September 2001.

Critical security theorists now argue for the need "to develop a new [security] paradigm around the policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict" (Rogers 2000, 119). This is a broad agenda indeed insofar as true global security would entail a reversal of current socioeconomic polarization, unsustainable growth patterns, and unbridled global military aggression. While this transformative view of security in the era of globalization is unlikely to be mainstreamed, there is still a considerable widening of traditional notions of security. The U.S. National Security Strategy statement of 1994 thus declared unambiguously that "not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications" (cited in Hough 2004, 14). The broadening of security from this state perspective
relates to the understanding that soft power can often complement hard power. It is indeed the rise of soft power that could be seen as the defining characteristic of the era despite the more traditional hard power response to 9/11.

DEEPER SECURITY

The widening security agenda can be seen as simply increasing the state's securitization of such issues as migration, health, and food in a way that does not essentially challenge the traditional security paradigm in its essentials (see entries for Migration and Health in volume 2, and Food Security/Fisheries entry in this volume). But we might ask, what would be the implications of a deeper conception of security? In 1993 the UN Development Programme (UNDP) declared paradigmatically that “the concept of security must change—from an exclusive stress on national society to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial to food, employment and environmental security” (cited in Hough 2004, 13). This move by the UN was congruent with its concern to promote the “human face” of globalization in contrast with the dominant powers’ then-prevailing adherence to free and unrestricted market mechanisms and the multilateral economic organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The step was part of the broader move toward a post-Washington Consensus on economic matters.

It was not only the soft power approach of the UN, though, that sought to deepen the traditional concept of security. From the mid-1990s onward, such nation-states as Canada and Ireland, as well as the Scandinavian countries, also began, at least rhetorically, to advance the notion of human security (see next section). Canada’s foreign minister from 1996 to 2000, Lloyd Axworthy, consistently argued for human security in the UN and forcefully advocated the creation of the International Criminal Court. Critics could easily argue that this move was simply a middle-ranking power’s bid to gain exposure in the international arena through a distinctive foreign policy. Furthermore, the policy was couched in the language of soft power in the sense of the pursuit of state interests by other means, rather than a pursuit of global interest however that might be defined. Nevertheless, despite these reservations, it has been noted, “the Canadians . . . have been in the forefront of campaigns to ban the use of land mines, and reform the UN Security Council so that it is less constrained by power politics” (Hough 2004, 14).

In the academic domain there occurred around that same time a parallel process of deepening of security as a theoretical paradigm. In the early 1980s, the influential work of Barry Buzan had already begun the process of widening security, with his People, States and Fear (1983) adding the categories of economic, societal, and ecological security to that of military security. It was the state and not the individual, however, that remained the reference point for security insofar as the state was seen as the primary agent for the reduction of insecurity. By the early 1990s, this view proved unsustainable, particularly in Europe. With Ole Weaver, Buzan developed the concept of societal security, a
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notion that effectively deepened the traditional idea of state security (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde 1998). In post-Cold War Europe, sovereignty was less important than issues of identity (including culture, religion, and language) in societies changing rapidly, not least through the increase of mass migration. Societies were seen as complex organizations, and the challenges they faced were conceived as much more diffuse and less easy to categorize than were, for example, the traditional security challenges made by other powers.

The deepening of security through the development of a concept of societal security was designed, however, not to replace state security but to complement it. The reconceptualization of security is thus incomplete here. There is here a reified understanding of identity as an objective given and little understanding of security as a social construction. Also at play here is an implicit Eurocentrism insofar as it quite uncritically privileges a Western conception of security and securitization (of, say, Islam). Above all, the deepening of the security paradigm by what has become known as the Copenhagen School seems to ignore the gendered nature of security as concept and practice. A gender perspective (see entry for Gender in volume 2) entails not just adding new issues (widening) but also genuinely reconceptualizing (deepening) security. To understand globalization, conflict, and security today we require a gendered approach that can deconstruct the patriarchal state, unpack the gendered nature of identity, and explore the links between militarism and patriarchy (see Tickner 2001). Social relations and processes on a global scale are all inherently gendered, and thus security challenges affect men and women differently.

From a critical security perspective, the widening and deepening operations carried out within the mainstream paradigm since the end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization have clear limits. It has been argued that the events of 2001–2003 (9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have in fact taken us back to the days when state security reigned supreme—when state security trumped the security of the individual, and state-led military power rendered soft power irrelevant. Still, Steve Smith makes a strong contrary argument that “the events of September 11 support those who wish to widen and deepen the concept of security” (2006, 57). After all, it was not a state that declared war on the United States but, rather, a transnational network reflecting a very different conception of identity, of community, and, indeed, of security itself. What this tells us, of course, is that security is a conceptual battlefield with no agreed-on definition or parameters. That security as a concept is itself a contested discourse is hardly surprising given what is at stake in terms of how we define the problems and the responses to global security risks.

HUMAN SECURITY

We could argue that the simultaneous widening and deepening of security comes to a logical conclusion with the concept of human security now seen as a full-blown alternative to state security. The concept of human security is inseparable from the optimistic Western view following the end of the Cold War, namely, that globalization would lead to democratization and that conflict over
fundamentals would become a thing of the past (see Geopolitics entry). In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance published its influential report Our Common Neighborhood, arguing that “the concept of global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states, to include the security of people and the security of the planet” (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 338). At the same time, the concept of human security was coming to the fore in the work of the UNDP, which launched the human development index (HDI) focused on the welfare of individuals rather than the economy.

Economic development and military security now became intertwined in the dominant conceptual discourses (see Development entry). The basic underlying principle seems straightforward enough: “Since the idea of human security is to improve the lives of people rather than improve the security of national borders and key issues cross these borders, coordinated action by the international community seems essential” (King and Murray 2001–2002, 607). Human security is a move in the realm of security that parallels the discursive shift in development theory toward sustainable development, and in international law to human rights as an overarching principle. It is a people-centered approach to security that seeks to create a situation where all will enjoy “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” It is assumed to be the raison d’être of the United Nations, and many national governments have adopted it as a progressive foreign policy slogan.

Recently, considerable effort has been put into developing and operationalizing the concept of human security (Aikire 2003). Nevertheless, the effort remains quite vulnerable to the charge that “human security is like ‘sustainable development’—everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means” (Paris 2004, 250). From the perspective of the national security advisor, human security looks very much like a laundry list of desirable but utopian goals: a laudable ideal rather than a relevant policy category. It is also open to many, often conflicting interpretations. We might, for example, agree that to bring peace to a region we need to address the root causes of conflict, but then the remedies suggested might vary hugely. From a traditional state security perspective, the human security approach can only dilute the analytical power of security and presents such a vast array of different threats and complex ambitious solutions, that nothing gets done.

Beyond its vagueness, the concept of human security can also be interrogated in terms of its assumed unproblematic notion of human security itself. In 2003, the Commission of Human Security issued the landmark report Human Security Now. The report argued that when a state is neither willing nor able to ensure the human security of its citizens, “the principle of international non-interference yields to the international responsibility to protect” (Commission of Human Security 2003, ix). States or the state systems are still expected to ensure human security by intervening where “fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities” (p. 8) do not protect human security. This approach enlists the concept of human security in a radical way to support the global governance agenda. As Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell put it, “Human Security Now” argues for a bio-politics of human population based upon global
forms of coordination and centralisation . . . collectively having the ability and legitimacy to support the efforts of weak and ineffective states” (2006, 15). In other words, human security can be yet another form of human control.

From this perspective, the resilience of global populations can be improved through regulatory networks, including aid programs, to ensure biopolitical regulation. This critique of the concept of human security as a form of biopolitical regulation draws on the work of Michel Foucault. Biopolitics and biopower can be seen as the appropriate regulatory mechanism for the era of global governance. As Foucault put it, “Regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis . . . security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings, so as to optimise a state of life” (2003, 246). Human security is ultimately about the security of the modern state. It is a hugely ambitious project to establish through biopower a disciplinary power over the human-as-species. In this sense, it is complementary to, rather than a radical alternative to, traditional conceptions of state security.

PERMANENT SECURITY

The benign version of human security did ultimately come to pass, however, as the optimistic global security mood of the 1990s gave way to the post-2001 moves toward what we might call an enhanced permanent security state. The modern “state of emergency” emerges when a state declares that military methods are necessary to deal with disorder that cannot be dealt with by normal political means. The panoply of counterterrorism measures declared by the president of the United States of America after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have been wide-ranging and designed to last. As Michael Dillon argues, “On September 11th 2001, the United States found itself subject to the recoil of the violence of globalisation. Declaring war on the terror to which New York had been subjected, the Bush administration invoked a global state of emergency to wage indefinite war on an indefinite enemy. The outcome has been a radical suspension of the law to save the law” (2002, 77). The logic of modern power is articulated most clearly by Giorgio Agamben (2005), who argues that the “state of exception,” which was once a provisional measure in the West, has now become a working paradigm for government.

Globalization and security set the parameters of events prior to and since 2001. One asymmetric attack by a relatively small organization is clearly not the cause of this transformation in world affairs. Nor can it explain how or why an emergency extrapoliitical regime has now become the new normality. The traditional divide between war and peace has now disappeared as the world embarks on a long war (see Information Wars and New Wars entries). President George W. Bush declared, “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (cited in Gross 2006, 75). The global War on Terror declared in 2001 has since transmuted in White House and Pentagon discourse into the “Long War.” The change in terminology reflects a
growing recognition that one cannot declare war on a form of war. But there is still no recognition that this Long War cannot be won by military means. As John Arquilla puts it, “In terms of the Long War thus far, and in what is likely to come, ideas and beliefs have, in important ways, begun to trump traditional war-fighting” (2007, 384).

The Long War, like the Cold War before it, seeks a clearly identifiable enemy that fits conventional geopolitical and military thinking (see Münkler 2005 for an overview). It does not respond to the complex array of factors creating global insecurity but, in fact, adds to them. It is not even sustainable security in conventional terms: “The current U.S. security paradigm is essentially one of ‘control’—a matter of responding to current and potential threats primarily by the use of military force” (Rogers 2007, 136). This exposes the severe limitations in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that was meant to transform U.S. military strategy after the Cold War ended. The use of weapons, high technology, and information and communications technology would put an end to war as we know it (Hirst 2001). The American way of life was now joined by an American way of war. But the RMA was disrupted by the asymmetric attacks of 2001 and their global dissemination by global information and communications technology.

The RMA and the Long War are of dubious efficacy as security drivers even in their own terms because they rest on an outdated modernization theory perspective on development—on the notion of regime change, for example—and on a technological determinism that ignores the social, political, and cultural determinants of conflict. More specifically, by demonizing the likes of Al Qaeda, the dominant security discourses cannot comprehend its nature. A quite different approach would be to examine this type of organization in terms of social movement theory and as a part of global civil society. Victor Asal and his colleagues make a coherent argument that such organizations as Al Qaeda can be viewed as “transnational advocacy networks,” a theoretical approach mainly applied to human rights movements (2007). After all, Al Qaeda has embraced a localized and networked form of organization, and like humanitarian networks it is alert to the importance of symbolic political action. It also works on public opinion through an adept use of the new communications technology.

The notion of a Long War against Islam as a consequence of an underlying clash of civilizations is based on no clear historical understanding of the relationship between globalization and war (on which see Barkani 2006). That globalization meant peace and that war was now a thing of the past was an illusion of the 1990s and reflected the era’s “the end of history” mood (Fukuyama 1992). It is not so much that globalization itself causes war but that we need an understanding of how “war is itself a form of interconnection, and a historically pervasive and significant one at that. War in this sense is a globalizing force, and it has been for a long time” (Barkani 2006, xii). We can then go on to explore how the West and Islam are interconnected and have a mutual constitution. The modernity and hybridity of a movement such as Al Qaeda precludes any simplistic model based on Islamic fundamentalism and shows how the Long War on Terror is a recipe only for the deepening and broadening of insecurity.
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BEYOND SECURITY?

We argue that to understand and deal with the issue of (in)security in the era of globalization, we need to move beyond the security paradigms explored in this introduction. The various theoretical approaches to security—from realism through poststructuralism—are also constantly constructing the political meaning of (in)security. We have examined in particular the broadening and deepening of the security problematic and the highly ambiguous concept of human security seen by some as liberal wishful thinking and by others as a Foucauldian control mechanism. What Booth advocates, from the perspective of the new critical security studies, is not just to turn all political problems into security issues ("securitising politics") but to "turn every security issue into a question of political theory (what might be called politicising security)" (2005, 14). Security is too important to all of us to be left to the so-called securocrats or, for that matter, to the academic specialists in security studies.

Clearly, from a globalization perspective, security cannot be divorced from the global political economy. Security and insecurity issues do not arise in sterile apolitical environments or as part of some military strategist’s abstract scenario planning. To a large extent, the political economy of globalization dictates life chances, affecting whether we lead comfortable lives or suffer social exclusion (Munck 2005). As Roger Tooze argues, "It is the apparently increasingly arbitrary, random, sudden and unpredictable nature of the workings of the global economy that have heightened the sense that these matters concern our security" (2005, 143). We could go further to argue that the currently dominant neoliberal market-friendly globalization not only generates but even depends on insecurity. Competitiveness—which applies as much between people, communities, cities, nation-states, and regions as between enterprises—is explicitly creating insecurity and rejecting any notion of social protection or solidarity.

Neither can we approach security in a global context without clearly understanding the complexity and tensions in the real world. Certainly, globalization did not do away with what are mistakenly seen as premodern forms of conflict derived from racial, ethnic, tribal, or national identities. Paul James (2006) directs our attention to the complexities and contradictions that structure people’s lives and social relationships in the era of globalization. There is not an abstract contest between globalization (good) and tribalism (bad), as many proponents of globalization have argued. James develops instead a counterposition "that allows us to make decisions about political-ethical directions, on the basis of an understanding about the complexities of different forms of community and polity, rather than on the basis of ideologically-driven prejudice about the essential virtues of savage globalisation" (2006, 9).

One seemingly attractive response to global insecurity would be to foster the development of a global civil society (see Global Civil Society entry in volume 2), which would counter the state and other forms of violence and insecurity. Such a society is defined as "the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, politics and economies" (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001, 17). This broad definition
would embrace many forms of globalization-contesting movements throughout the world, including Al Qaeda. But the proponents of global civil society clearly do not wish to see global terrorism, or global crime, for that matter, included in their cosmopolitan sphere of civilized dialogue. Indeed, they have gone so far as supporting wars they deemed humanitarian, such wars, for example, as the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces in 1999.

Whether there can be such a thing as a humanitarian war goes to the heart of the relationship between globalization and security. For Mary Kaldor and others, the nature of the new wars, where criminalism and tribalism prevail, necessitates a cosmopolitan response that will likely include military force (2003). Likewise sympathetic to the view that outside agencies should intervene when a state cannot save its own citizens from violence, Iris Marion Young also argues that she finds it “disturbing that some international actors appear to assume that such commitments to human rights themselves legitimate some states making war on others” (2007, 100). The contradictions between the notion of humanitarian wars and the specter of human rights imperialism point us to the main limitation of global civil society theory, namely, that it fails to address and understand the nature of contemporary postmodern violence (Delany 2001).

To effectively go beyond even critical security studies (see Fierke 2007 for an overview), we need to start with the so-called theory-practice nexus. We must accept that theory is “for some one and for some purpose,” as Robert Cox famously put it. An emancipatory theory would need to explore the sources of human insecurity over and above the challenges to state security. There is today a global anxiety, or what Zygmunt Bauman calls “liquid fear” (2006), that permeates all areas of our life, creating insecurity around many of the facets of globalization and not just the new global terror that the security literature concentrates on. There are regressive structures and processes in today’s global society that clearly create ever greater insecurity. These range from inequitable trade arrangements and unjust wars to polluting, sexist, and racist social practices. There are also progressive structures and processes striving to knit together the local communities and global networks in pursuit of a better life for all. Certainly a gap exists here, as Richard Wyn Jones argues, because “international relations specialists on the whole have been remarkably ineffective on the relationship between their work—their theories—and political practice . . . . There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel” (1999, xx). To once again marry a critical understanding of the world around us with the enduring human capacity to imagine and construct a better life would indeed be a task worth developing to ensure that the era of globalization does not become the era of insecurity it threatens to be.

GLOBALIZATION

Globalization—variously defined or not at all—is the obligatory point of reference for any discussion of contemporary economic, political, social, and cultural
transformation including the critical issue of security and insecurity. Globalization is, in short, the new matrix for our era, the framework for what is and for what might be (see Castells 1996a). The next section of this introductory chapter examines the contested and often contradictory meanings that globalization takes on as dominant paradigm for our time. This is followed by a summary of the main economic transformations globalization has generated in the world around us. How this new world order might be governed politically is the subject of the final section that sets the parameters for many of the contributions to this volume.

Globalization is currently the dominant paradigm or way of seeing the world around us, both for supporters of this phenomenon and for its detractors. It is a grand narrative as powerful, all embracing, and visionary as any that may have preceded it, including those of classical capitalism, colonialism, or socialism. It is seen as an epoch-making moment in human history, a transition to a brave new world whether that is viewed positively or negatively. Recently, substantive and seriously researched books have been published arguing for “the truth about globalization” (LeGraim 2003) or “in defence of globalization” (Bhagwati 2004) and on “why globalization works” (Wolf 2004). These works are as passionate and as important as those seeking to defend an earlier model of capitalism from the ideological challenge posed by the rise of the Soviet planned economy in the 1920s. So, what is the neoliberal case for a global market economy?

For the liberal globalizers the essence of the phenomenon in question is the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor “so that, economically speaking, there are no foreigners” (Wolf 2004, 14). They believe, quite literally, in the “magic of the market,” a market they see as not only the source of material wealth but “also the basis of freedom and democracy” (Wolf 2004, 57). Liberal globalization is seen as something that encourages moral virtues. While it indeed “makes people richer,” it also, according to Martin Wolf, makes people “more concerned about environmental damage, pain and injustice” (Wolf 2004, 57).

Be that as it may, clearly the liberal globalizer worldview goes beyond simple economics and offers an alternative to all collectivist or social views of the world. Corporations are seen as virtuous as well as dynamic agents of progressive change. Globalization will, according to this view, lead to a decline of inequality and poverty worldwide as the market works its magic. While it might have some downsides—it is accepted that no market is perfect—overall there is simply no alternative. Freedom itself—variously defined or not at all—depends on the continued expansion of the global free market.

The case against globalization is equally passionate and categorical. Globalization, from this perspective, is seen as an economic process leading to the commodification of life itself. There is nothing that is not for sale, from health to education, from knowledge to our genes. Behind the rhetoric of free trade supposedly lies a sinister move toward introducing barriers around privatized technology, resources, and knowledge to keep them safe for capitalist exploitation. The result, as Naomi Klein puts it, is that “globalization is now on trial because on the other side of all these virtual fences are real people, shut out of schools, workplaces, their own farms, homes and communities” (2002, xxi). The
“silent takeover” (Hertz 2001) by the transnational corporations (see entry on Transnational Corporations) is seen by others to be an imminent threat to the very possibility of Western democracy as we have known it (see entry on Democracy). Corporations are taking over social functions previously carried out by the state, pressuring governments to follow their neoliberal global agenda, and leaving the political system devoid of any real choices.

It is probably impossible to adjudicate between the pro- and antiglobalization cases, especially when stated in such a polemical and absolutist manner. It might, anyway, be more productive to avoid such binary opposition and instead start from an assumption around the sheer complexity of the globalization processes. As John Urry puts it, “Global ordering is so immensely complicated that it cannot be ‘known’ through a simple concept or set of processes” (2003, 15). The global era cannot be reduced to a simple logic of the market, or of so-called network society or of empire. The complexity approach allows us to move beyond such counterpositions as those between structural determinism and pure chance or, put another way, between frozen stability and ever-changingness as dominant trends. Complexity refuses all static and reductionist readings of globalization that should, in preference, be seen as “neither unified nor... acting as a subject nor should it be conceived of in linear fashion” (Urry 2003, 40). It is understandable that first-generation globalization studies should have conceived of this complex process as more powerful and unified than it actually was, but from now on an approach that foregrounds the complexity approach will be more productive whatever political choices we ultimately make.

Another common opposition in the vast literature on globalization now available is between those who stress the novelty of the situation and those who stress continuity with earlier periods of capitalism’s internationalization. Among the popularizers of the first position must be counted management consultant Kenichi Ohmae, who in a series of books with such titles as The Borderless World (1990) and The End of the Nation State (1995) articulated a vision of modernity’s nation-state era coming to an end as the liberating forces of the global market became dominant in the 1990s. The traditional order of national economics, industrial production, welfare states, and so on, would be swept away by the new wind of free market dynamism. Ohmae stresses the revolutionary break with the past and the short time span, say, 25 years, in which these world revolutionary events took place.

Academic promoters of the globalist case are more nuanced; nevertheless, emphasis is laid very much on the novelty of the phenomenon described. Thus Anthony Giddens finds himself essentially agreeing with those for whom “the new communications technologies, the role of knowledge as a factor of production, and the new discoveries in the life sciences, signal a profound transition in human history” (2001, 4). The whole mood or tone of this discourse is revolutionary in that it conceptualizes globalization as a fundamental shift in the human trajectory that is now in full flow. There are, of course, optimistic and pessimistic renderings of the globalizing scenario, but the unifying strand is that the shifts involved in all areas of human life are irreversible and of global significance, whether we view them as benign or not.
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Against the globalizers, who believe in globalization, and the antiglobalizers who believe it is real too, even if they do not like its effects, we can posit the sceptics, for whom the death of the traditional order is at best overstated. None are clearer or more evidence based than the arguments of Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson in their aptly titled *Globalization in Question* (1999), which challenges what they call the "necessary myth" that globalization represents a qualitatively new stage of capitalist development. For these authors, the globalization of production has been exaggerated, as have the forecasts of the death of the nation-state. While accepting that there is a growing international economy, they reject as fanciful the idea that multi- or transnational corporations are footloose and fancy-free. They even turn the tables on the decline-of-the-nation-state arguments by showing how in many ways the nation-state has gained in importance by managing or governing the processes of internationalization. While arguably marked by a tinge of nostalgia for a preglobalization era when so-called normal national politics prevailed, this approach is a healthy sceptical antidote to out-and-out globalizers.

Globalization today certainly shows many new traits, but one can also discern continuities with previous expansionary phases of capitalism. One way of putting it, albeit allegorically, is that "one-third of the globalization narrative is over-sold; one-third we do not understand; and one-third is radically new" (Drache 1999, 7). From a complexity theory standpoint, we might challenge this separation between being and becoming, but the drift of the argument is well taken. There is a big difference between globalization as mutually reinforcing and causally related transformations following a preestablished path, and a conception based on the notion of "contingently related tendencies" (Dicken, Peck, and Tickell 1997, 161). There are also extremely diverse economic, political, social, and cultural tendencies that vary widely across regions and time. There is simply no unified coherent and unilinear globalization strategy waiting to be applied comparable to the 1950s *modernization theory*, which for that era served as a widely accepted overarching paradigm for social change (see Development entry). Now occurring around us all the time is a complex restructuring and recomposition of the world order, an order the concept of globalization might point toward in different ways and even partially explain, but the concept cannot serve as a master framework to understand and explain it totally.

Having briefly analyzed what globalization is not, what can we say about what it is over and beyond the obvious complexity and uneven development of the phenomenon? Clearly, it is no one thing and has various interconnected economic, political, ideological, social, and cultural facets. But if there is one overarching theme, it is that of connectivity or interconnectedness. Following Ash Amin, we could argue that "the most distinctive aspect of contemporary globalization" is the "interconnectedness, multiplicity and hybridization of social life at every level" (1997, 129). This means we can no longer draw clear and firm boundaries between local and global spheres or between national and international spheres of social life. We cannot separate the "in here" of the city, community, or locality in which we live from the "out there" of global flows of money, capital, people, power, and dominance. Thus globalization should be seen not as an entity but, rather, as a set of complex interacting relationships.
Our daily activities are all influenced by those complex and interrelated facets that are stretching our social relationships to an unprecedented degree.

Another useful image to understand globalization is that of time-space compression. Spatial barriers—for example, in trade or communications—have fallen away to a considerable degree. Space does not even matter any more, according to some pundits. Time has also changed from being a reflection of natural processes to become instantaneous. The world has been shrinking for a long time, but this process has taken a qualitative leap forward in the last quarter of the twentieth century. We may not yet have achieved the distanceless world that Martin Heidegger once foretold, but as David Harvey puts it, we are now living through "processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves" (1989, 240). The elimination of spatial barriers and the compression of time will not, however, necessarily lead to a homogeneous spatial development. The changing spatiality of global capitalism is, if anything, more heterogeneous, differentiated, and fragmented (see two entries under Regionalism).

Above all else, we must stress that globalization signifies a much greater interconnectedness of social fates. As David Held and Anthony McGrew put it, "Globalization weaves together, in highly complex and abstract systems, the fates of households, communities and peoples in distant regions of the globe" (2003, 129). Our own daily lives are becoming increasingly globalized in terms of their references points, our consumption patterns, and our mental maps. We imagine the world in a different way than our ancestors did at the last turn of the century. Today for many individual and collective subjects, be they governments, companies, intellectuals, artists, or citizens, globalization is the "imagined horizon" (García Canclini 1999, 32). The repercussions, both positive and negative, of the 2004 New Year’s Eve East Asian tsunami demonstrated most clearly how real the weaving together of fates across the world now is. Whichever view is taken, clearly globalization has transformed the world around us, as well as the way in which we understand it and seek to change it.

So in terms of competing paradigms, it might be premature to choose one particular rendition of globalization theory to guide us. Held and his colleagues usefully distinguish between the globalizers, the sceptics (who doubt there is much new in it), and the transformationalists. The latter stress the changes taking place and how an open-ended explanation of this arena may help us in getting to know the one-third of globalization that is as yet unknown. As against fixed ideal-type paradigms of a new global market, global democracy, or global civilization, Held and his colleagues prefer the "transformationist accounts [that] emphasize globalization as a long-term historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is significantly shaped by conjunctural factors" (1999, 7). A good example of the latter are the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States and their sequel of unfolding conflicts across the world that effectively put an end to prevailing optimistic views of globalization as a new peaceful era of harmonious global development.

A transformationalist approach to globalization starts from the premise that the world is changing rapidly and in fundamental ways, even if the direction of
change is not yet fully discernible. An underlying question is whether a new sense of globality means we should abandon methodological nationalism, that is, the nation-state as an obvious and self-sufficient frame of reference for understanding the changing worlds we live in. A closely associated issue is the viability of methodological nationalism, that is, the forms of social enquiry that precede the rise of supraterritoriality (e.g., the Internet and global financial markets). While accepting that a new global optic is necessary to comprehend the changing worlds around us, we cannot accept that the nation-state does not matter or that territorial forms of consciousness might not have a continuing or even increasing relevance. The point is, simply, that we now live in the era of globalization, immersed in a rapidly changing world that clearly has an impact on all the facets and levels of our lives.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE ECONOMY

It is not a belief in economic deterministic that leads us to start with the economic world but, rather, an understanding that how people produce is crucial to social development. Early debates revolved around whether economic internationalization was indeed new at all and whether it was, in fact, even global in the true sense of the word. Certainly, there were earlier periods of capitalist development when trade and finances were truly international. Nor is there any doubt that globalization is primarily a phenomenon affecting the richer and more powerful nation-states of the West, or global North, even though its effects are as significant as any tsunami on what was once known as the developing world. The underlying political question is whether economic internationalization and the operation of freer markets is spreading development or concentrating it in ever fewer hands (see Inequality and Social Exclusion entries in volume 2). The supporters of globalization and the antiglobalization movement are predictably at opposite ends of this debate. While economic growth in China and India has accelerated along with increased integration with the global economy, overall the global South, as the developing world is now called, has suffered from neoliberal policies favoring the free market.

The traditional, modern world of production is now joined by the virtual or new economy (see New Economy entry) characteristic of the Information Age, with greatly enhanced communications and transportation systems. As Jan Aart Scholte puts it, "Globalization has played an important role in redistributing the relative weights of accumulation away from "merchandise" (commercial and industrial capital) towards "intangibles" (finance, information and communications capital)" (2000, 125). This new economy is not really a postcapitalist era in any real sense of the word; it is simply the latest manifestation of a dynamic and plastic economic system. This new economy is less bound to territory, however, and is a harbinger of a more transnational order. Multinational corporations become truly transnational corporations. The "death of space" is not just a clever business logo. This major transformation in how capitalism works has led to huge changes in the world of work and has also generated considerable opposition from social movements concerned with comodification,
consumerism, effects on the environment, and the social situation of workers and agriculturalists.

Whereas the promoters of globalization in the 1990s sought to present this phenomenon of economic internationalization as something novel and breathtaking, the sceptics were quick to point out that it was really not that unprecedented. Hirst and Thompson, for example, argued that “in some respects, the current international economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914” (1999, 2). Indeed, in that classical gold standard era there was a huge expansion of trade and a veritable revolution in transportation and communications. Global markets emerged for many products, and the gold standard ensured a stable financial and payments order (see entry for Finance). This was largely a European world order, however, and the rest of the world was simply not included within its parameters. Furthermore, the disruption to trade caused by World War I and the Great Crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s put paid to the illusion that a dynamic and stable world capitalist order could be achieved easily.

While it is indeed important to place the current phase of economic internationalization in historical context, we do need to recognize the massive socioeconomic transformations that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. The golden age of capitalism stretching from 1950 to around 1973 saw a remarkable flourishing of productivity and a gradual move toward a genuinely global free trade order. The Bretton Woods international financial order, agreed to by the main powers after the World War II, was premised on fixed exchange rates and closed capital accounts. This provided the legal underpinning for the multilateral trade order, and a long era of stability and legitimacy ensued. While this trading regime was clearly stratified and incorporation into it was uneven, it did set the basis for expanded production and consumption across the globe. In a somewhat stylized manner we will now explore the various facets of economic internationalization in terms of trade, production, and finance.

From 1945 to 1985, global free trade predominated among the rich oil-exporting countries (see Trade entry). Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, most of the developing countries in the South followed suit and dismantled protectionist barriers. Then, in the early 1990s, they were joined by the once communist countries in the East that had to varying degrees been isolated from the capitalist market. A global market on this scale was simply unprecedented and signaled a massive expansion of capitalist relations and capitalist production and consumption patterns. Based on data for 68 countries, it was found that in 1950 the intensity of trade links was 64 percent (out of a possible 100 percent, meaning all countries traded with all), which rose to 95 percent in 1990 (Held et al. 1999, 167), marking a major increase in the intensity of trade. We can see that trade has been not only much more extensive than in the past but also much more intensive. Foreign trade is now a much more important element in most countries in terms of its overall economic significance.

With increased national enmeshment within a global trading order came a need to regulate and institutionalize that regime. The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was a central element in creating a stable international trading regime following World War II, in spite of its weaknesses. With
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Trade tariffs already reduced to a minimum by the 1990s, interest shifted to the domestic regulations governing competition. This led to the creation in 1995 of the WTO (World Trade Organization), charged with harmonizing competition and business rules across nations to promote global free trade in ever more sectors (to include, for example, services). The WTO is considerably more powerful than GATT was, and it has various sanctions it can apply. Although the WTO failed to reach agreement on an agenda for future trade talks in Seattle in 1999, it has since moved forward, albeit conflictually at times, to ensure a rules-based intensification of trade liberalization for its 132 member countries. The setback to the WTO’s plans at the 2003 Cancun meeting and the 2008 trade round highlights how difficult this process will be and how little genuine consensus exists across the globe for this vital plank in the globalization project.

Along with the extension of trade went an enormous leap in production-level integration at a global level based on foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular. Perhaps the major characteristic of the postwar period was the rise of the multinational corporations (MNCs) that now account for the vast majority of the world’s exports. Already in the 1970s a new international division of labor had emerged, with many developing countries achieving significant levels of industrialization. However, by the 1990s a much more marked global production and distribution system was emerging based on the estimated 650 MNCs and their nearly 850,000 affiliates across the globe. With foreign investment regulations a thing of the past, the main issue now was how to attract and retain FDI, usually through national governments offering increasing concessions. The MNCs have shifted from their 1970s concern with natural resources (see Natural Resources for a case study on diamonds) and labor costs to an emphasis on efficiency and strategic asset seeking. As John Dunning explains, “The strategic response of MNCs to the emerging global economy has been increasingly to integrate their sourcing, value-added and marketing activities, and to harness their resources and capabilities from throughout the world” (2000, 48).

Globalization of production can be assessed in terms of increasing FDI flows and the growing importance of the MNCs in global production. It goes further, though, insofar as the global production networks are the key technological drivers of capitalist development. The impact of these worldwide networks of innovation, production, and distribution reaches deep into domestic economies right down to the local level. It is estimated that the MNCs today account for nearly one-third of world output and are approaching three-quarters of total world trade (UNCTAD 1995). Without minimize their importance or weight in the global economy, we need to recognize that the MNCs are not footloose, as many of their critics allege. In fact, the MNCs tend to be strongly embedded both nationally and socially, and in many ways they seek stability rather than risk the uncertainties prevailing in unfettered financial markets, for example.

Apart from trade and production, it is the development of a global financial market that, of course, best symbolizes the advent of globalization. In the 1980s, financial deregulation (see entry on Regulation) was accompanied by the growth of private international banks (see entry for Finance). The classical gold standard era (1870–1914) had already seen the emergence of an international financial order, but this was largely confined to Europe. The post-1945 Bretton
Woods era then saw a veritable reinvention of a global financial order. Consistent with national Keynesian economic policies, this financial order was designed not to interfere with such domestic economic objectives as full employment. This system collapsed, however, when in 1971 the United States decided no longer to allow the U.S. dollar to be freely convertible into gold, thus undermining the system of fixed exchange rates. As Held and his coauthors put it, “This ushered in an era of floating exchange rates in which (in theory) the value of currencies is set by global market forces, that is, worldwide demand and supply of a particular currency” (1999, 202). Henceforth, foreign exchange markets would blossom and become a linchpin of the globalization strategy. With internationalization came deregulation of financial activities as the restrictions on capital accounts and exchange rates of the Bretton Woods order were cast aside in 1973 after a vain attempt to patch up the old system.

Global financial flows increased dramatically in the 1990s in their extension across the world and in their intensity. In the mid-1990s some $200 million per day flowed across the globe; by the late 1990s the figure had risen to a staggering $1.5 trillion. Deregulation of national financial markets and the removal of capital controls in the monetarist 1980s facilitated this move toward greater financial fluidity. Unlike the situation that prevailed during the early Bretton Woods era, now the international financial order would take precedence over domestic economic policies. For many commentators, as Geoffrey Garrett puts it, “the potential for massive capital flight acts as the ultimate discipline on governments that may want to pursue autonomous economic policies” (2000, 111). Finance capital is fluid and mobile, increasingly removed from any form of control despite the volatility and potential for disorder inherent in today's global financial order, dubbed “casino capitalism” by Susan Strange (1986). In itself this element will induce insecurity into the global order.

The question we now need to ask is whether the combined impact of trade, production, and financial internationalization adds up to a qualitatively new era of capitalism we can call globalization. The globalizers who referred to a new “borderless world” (Ohmae 1990) and the “death of the nation state” (Ohmae 1995) were undoubtedly confusing tendencies, or even wishes, with reality. We are now in the midst of massive economic transformations the outcome of which is by no means certain. In spite of these provisos, however, we need to consider carefully Held and his coauthors’ conclusion, based on meticulous empirical research, that “in nearly all domains contemporary patterns of globalization have not only quantitatively surpassed those of earlier epochs, but have also displayed unparalleled qualitative differences— that is in terms of how globalization is organised and reproduced” (1999, 425). Economic internationalization, in particular, has achieved a depth and extension that is simply unprecedented. Does this mean globalization is inevitable in some sense?

Certainly, nothing about economic internationalization is inevitable, and we need to avoid teleological interpretations that see it moving toward a predefined end, whether benign or the opposite. We have been describing not an act of God or a natural event but, rather, a process driven by particular social groups that are clearly defined. Globalization does not just happen. It is a strategy for capitalist expansion on a global scale that began under the Thatcher
(UK) and Reagan (U.S.) regimes in the 1980s. Global economic integration is today driven by powerful governments and corporations that think, design, and manage the new global order. These managers of globalization are now quite aware that free market economics has definite social and political limits and that it exacerbates risk, even for those who benefit from its unprecedented productivity. A degree of social regulation is thus increasingly seen as necessary if the free or unregulated market approach is not to end up in a state of social anarchy.

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICS

In the political domain, the early globalization debates focused around the so-called decline—even death—of the nation-state (see entry on Nation-State). The national-global relationship was interpreted as a zero-sum game, where the gain of one was seen as loss for the other. By the mid-1990s, however, it was widely acknowledged that “states have significantly more room to manoeuvre in the global political economy than globalisation theory allows” (Weiss 2003, 26). This was the case not least because globalization’s critics, as much as its supporters, were beginning to understand globalization as a process that could be enabling or empowering to some. Clearly, globalization was not some form of nebula hanging over the world as benign or malignant presence depending on one’s point of view. The phenomenon called globalization in the 1990s could be traced back to specific economic policies developed by the rich and powerful nation-states of the West going back most immediately to the neoliberal (anti-statist, pro-privatization) policies dominant in the 1980s (see entry on Imperialism).

Thus a powerful image developed around the decline-of-the-nation-state thesis. It seemed logical that increased economic internationalization would lead to a decrease of political sovereignty. The new global market form of capitalist development certainly weakened statist or nationalist development models. The levers of economic power were no longer, straightforwardly, in the hands of national governments. Nor do governments control the national territory in quite the same way as they did in the era of the nation-state. Even on the purely economic policy side, however, states may still steer the economy through such supply-side measures as technological innovations and training or education. Nor does the development of such pooled sovereignty as that of the EU or NATO or the WTO prove any less powerful a means to pursue the objectives of the rich nation-states. Finally, we must reject economistic visions of nation-state decline insofar as different states may clearly use their power in different ways and the different varieties of capitalism have markedly different political effects.

The changing worlds described herein need to be governed, of course. Until quite recently, the regimes of national sovereignty set the main parameters of governance. Today, global governance is required, and it sets the terms of regional, national, and even city-level governance. Nation-states had national governments ruling over the sovereign national territory through executive, legislature, and judicial branches. Political parties expressed or represented the
views of the citizens (see entry on Citizenship). In the era of globalization, government, in the traditional sense, is being superseded by what we call governance—that is, by the way in which a state steers, rather than commands, society and where the market is allowed to play a full role in allocating resources. Less hierarchical or bureaucratic than traditional governments, contemporary governance is achieved through coordination, consultation, and community involvement, with its favored form of organization being the network. This paradigm shift from government to governance had been completed in most countries by the end of the twentieth century.

The traditional state and government were challenged as effective modalities for the new capitalism (see New Economy entry) primarily because as territorial-based bodies they were ill-equipped to deal with such supraterritorial phenomena as the Internet or offshore banking. The proliferation of supraterritorial issues has led to connections being formed above the national government level (e.g., the WTO), but also below the national government level as transnational connections flourish between cities and regions in pursuit of diverse interests that may or may not coincide with those of national governments. As Scholte explains, “As a result of this multiplication of substate and suprastate arrangements alongside regulation through states, contemporary governance has become considerably more decentralized and fragmented” (2000, 143). As with other issues or facets of globalization explored in this introduction, hybridity of organizational forms is growing in keeping with the complexity of challenges faced by contemporary capitalist development.

“The world is now more than ever enmeshed in a process of complex globalization,” as Phil Cerny puts it, and “the most urgent research agenda . . . is to identify the myriad dimensions of this complex process and evaluate the structure of the intersections and interactions among them” (1999, 209). There is no neat hierarchy of spatial levels from the local to the global, through the national to the regional. Rather, all issues are multilayered, as are the strategies and structures to deal with them. In social policy, for instance, we have the term “wicked issues” to describe such social problems as youth crime that cannot be assigned to any one government department because the issue is multidimensional. Likewise, global warming can be seen as a wicked issue that requires a multilayered response. Since at least the end of the Cold War economic, political, and social issues and ideologies have grown more complex and less easily amenable to simple solutions. It is this move to a world beyond slogans that explains the recent paradigm shift away from the once dominant Washington Consensus.

During the first wave of neoliberal-led globalization in the 1980s and 1990s, a quite fundamentalist economic doctrine and political philosophy prevailed. This was codified around 1990 in the so-called Washington Consensus, centered upon the key tenets of trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and financial liberalization. The doctrine was applied with particular rigor and fervor in Latin America, where it became known widely as neoliberalism, a form of free market economics pledged to the removal of the state from any areas where it might interfere with the free workings of the market. Against all forms of national protectionism—which had been essential for industrialization in the
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developing world—the Washington Consensus called for removal of all tariff and other barriers so that international trade could be free. Removal of such trade barriers was intended to overcome the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America, and the Washington Consensus policies were imposed on debtor nations as forms of macroeconomic conditionality for further loans.

The free market silent revolution, as its supporters called it, was to meet internal contradictions and external limits. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s began in Thailand in 1997 but rapidly spread to the Philippines and Indonesia and later Russia and Brazil, among others. Financial deregulation created the volatile hot money markets where a collapse of confidence could spread like wildfire. Henceforth, even such fervent supporters of free market economics as Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) would also call for renewed financial controls and regulation. Then in Latin America came another financial crisis in Mexico in 1997–1998; and most dramatically of all, the economy of Argentina virtually collapsed at the end of 2001—and Argentina had been the country where the Washington Consensus was so faithfully implemented that the peso was even tied to the U.S. dollar. Finally, around the same time a number of corporate scandals in the United States—the mostly notably newsworthy being Enron—showed that free market neoliberalism had to be saved from itself.

Toward the turn of the century the contradictions of the Washington Consensus as the political economy paradigm of the era became apparent. According to Robin Broad, “While some tenets of the old Consensus have been transformed more than others, we are unquestionably in the midst of a paradigm shift and a period of continued debate” (2004, 148). The rejection of full capital market liberalization opened the door for further questioning of key tenets of the Washington Consensus. Far from rejecting the role of the state in economic affairs, the new economic wisdom sought to restructure the state and created the “new public management” approach. The global governance agenda as a whole can be seen as a response to the failings of free market liberalism as well as a response to the counterglobalization movements of the late 1990s and beyond. Beyond the economic debates there seemed to be a recognition that the moral acceptance of capitalism mattered. The new consensus was a pragmatic adaptation to new conditions, but it had a distinct moral undertone.

We could say, following Richard Higgott, that “the global market place of the 1980s and the first 6–7 years of the 1990s was an “ethics free zone”’ (2000, 138). Poverty was seen as an unfortunate side effect of globalization, an adjustment pain that did not cause any moral dilemmas. But by the late 1990s, there was “in some quarters a genuine recognition of the importance of tackling ethical questions of justice, fairness and inequality” (Higgott 2000, 139). A small but probably not insignificant sign of this mood swing was the conversion of George Soros from financial speculator par excellence to caring, far-sighted articulator of third-way politics to save global capitalism from itself (see Soros 1999). More broadly, this was an era when the corporate social responsibility agenda took off. Perhaps the trend came about only because Nike shares plummeted when conditions in the company’s overseas plants were exposed, or perhaps it was because in 1999 protestors in Seattle targeted Starbucks; even so, the
swing toward a more socially responsible capitalism had begun (see Human Rights entry).

The shift to social responsibility does not imply that global governance is simply benign compared with the Washington Consensus. Indeed, following Ian Douglas, perhaps we should be “rethinking globalization as governance” (1999, 151). The contemporary transformations in the modalities of political rule beyond traditional government models can simply be seen as more effective ways to control global society. While the state may well have been hollowed out as an effect of economic internationalization and the traditional models of political sovereignty have been rendered void, the replacement is by no means progressive. Rather than simply accept at face value the concerned humanitarian message of the Commission on Global Governance (1995), Douglas asks us to first confront the interesting question, “To what problem is global governance the solution?” (1999, 154). The move toward networks of governance that are largely self-reliant and the emergence of the self-organizing individual may be positive in a general sense, but they may also reflect a Foucauldian drive for order and may well create new inequalities and hierarchies.

Global governance as reform and repression at the same time simply poses a more general dilemma that goes back to early 1900s debates on reform versus revolution and the 1960s notion of repressive tolerance. For Foucault, for example, governance can be seen as a more effective, because more totalizing, form of control in terms of biopower. However, while it is easy to see how a nongovernmental organization (NGO) or social movement might be co-opted through engagement with the global economic agencies, their interaction is nonetheless real. Foucault might respond that this engagement and even protest against globalisation is beneficial to the established order because it creates reform (the better to govern), but inaction is a totally more progressive option. Many critical thinkers now accept that globalization might open some doors for progressive social transformation as well as close others. Global governance may well be a reform of “repressive tolerance” or just a simple modernization or rationalization of control mechanisms, but it is still different from government as previously understood.

A fundamental point about the global governance paradigm or problematic from the point of view of this text is that it allows the social movements back in. The NGOs (see entry on Nongovernmental Organizations), the global social movements, and assorted advocacy or protest networks all play a role in the governance of the global economy. These nonstate or nontraditional sectors have, at least since the 1999 Seattle WTO debacle, been at the forefront of debate on how global governance can be ensured. At its most official level this shift can be seen in the attempt by the United Nations to develop a global compact bringing together the corporate sector and issues such as human rights as well as labor and environmental standards. For Higgott, “While it sits firmly within a neo-liberal discourse for developing an interaction between the international institutions and the corporate world, it is an important recognition of the need to globalize some important common values” (2000, 140). Effectively, this initiative seeks to globalize the socially embedded liberalism of the postwar era that served to create capitalist growth and social cohesion at the same time.
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As the protests against globalization grew in the late 1990s, so did the role of the NGOs or what others call civil society organizations (CSOs). Yet they faced the dilemma of either joining protesters in the streets or taking their critique into the conference halls and boardrooms of global governance and the corporate sector. Of course, in practice they could do both, but many more mainstream NGOs chose to seek influence policy from within, as it were. There are signs that they were often welcomed into the capitalist tent even if their influence was not always significant. There was also a strong move toward organizing parallel or unofficial summits alongside those of the WTO and other such organizations. Although evidence is scanty because it is difficult to assess, one well-researched study concludes that in the early 1990s only 20 percent of unofficial summits had an impact on the official event, but by the year 2000 this proportion had risen to 40 percent (Pianta 2001, 186–87). Civil society was at least having some impact on the leading bodies of global capitalism (see Global Civil Society entry in volume 2).

The move toward global governance also allowed for more space to be created where social movements could intervene (Castells 1996b). To differing degrees the likes of the World Bank and other economic institutions became more porous to the demands of some social movements. The international women’s movement and the environmental movement had significant successes, but the labor movement, in a less public way, was also at least able to place its perspective on the negotiating table of the global corporate sector. One of the more systematic studies that has been carried out concludes that “there is a transformation in the nature of global economic governance as a result of the MEI (multilateral economic institutions) – GSM (global social movements) encounter” (O’Brien et al. 2000, 3). Whatever the particular verdict on each case of engagement (and there is always a sceptical view to match any optimism), there is undoubtedly a transformation in terms of the range of economic and political institutions engaged with social movements and their demands.

CONCLUSION

The economic, political, social, and cultural transformations of the world around us have one common feature we could arguably name reflexivity. When referring to “reflexive modernization,” Ulrich Beck sets it in terms of a “subversive, unintended and unforeseen self-questioning of the bases of political life” (2000, 101), which is created by the perception of risk that now prevails after the age of innocence. Rather than living through the “end of history,” as Francis Fukuyama optimistically predicted at the end of the Cold War, we are moving into a new era of global civilization where we all have a common destiny, albeit threatened by old and new forms of global risk, whether from famine to AIDS or from global terrorism to the perils of genetic engineering. The point is that the era of globalization is characterized by intense reflexivity as individuals and institutions reflect on transformation, risks, and how to construct a better future. This does not spell an era of consensus necessarily; but all bets are off, and the rationality of modernity (see entry for Modernity in volume 2) does not imprison our minds and lives as it once did.
Globalization cannot explain everything or even anything on its own. The emergent global risk society, to use Beck’s terminology, is neither unified, nor all-powerful, nor uncontested (even at the level of meanings). Lury quite correctly takes to task simplified and static conceptions neglected in statements that “‘globalization’ is γ or alternatively that ‘globalization’ does γ” (2003, 40). In reality, nothing is linear about the development of globalization, as if it were some rerun of the teleological 1950s modernization theories based on an unproblematic expansion of a conception of modernity based on a stylized rendering of the U.S. experience. While globalization cannot, therefore, be treated as the subject of history, it can be conceived as a new matrix for global development. Thus globalization can be taken as a shorthand label for the complex economic, sociopolitical, and cultural parameters that set the terms of reference and establish a matrix for the development of human societies.

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