Pirates, Failed states and the EU - Security practice and European Identity

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Since the end of the Cold War the narrative of Europe has had to change in terms of defining what had hitherto been externally defined limits to defining Europe's role in what President Bush identified as a 'New World Order'. The early results of this process were mixed, on the hand there were the successful transitions in central and Eastern Europe culminating in accession in 2004. While on the other there was the inability of the EU to prevent ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Even accession posed difficulties in terms of Europe's identity as a global actor with divisions apparent over the US decision to go to war in Iraq and the conduct of the War on Terror. This paper argues, following Campbell, that security practices are performative, that is to say they play an active role in constructing the 'selves' which they claim to protect and indeed the 'others' whom are deemed threatening. This paper seeks to examine 21st century European security practices in order to examine what, if any, security identity is being constructed by the EU. The particular focus will be on the recent EUFOR mission in Chad and the EUNAVFOR mission in the Gulf of Aden.

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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War both the EU and Security studies have been undergoing something of a transformation. For the EU, the end of the bipolar system was accompanied by institutional and rhetorical reform involving the deepening and widening of the Union. The narrative of Europe though had to change in terms of defining what had hitherto been externally defined limits, vis a vis the Eastern Bloc, to defining Europe's role in what the first President Bush identified as a ‘New World Order’. The early results of this process were mixed, on the hand there were the successful transitions in central and Eastern Europe to market economies and Liberal democracies culminating in the ‘big bang’ accession in 2004. While on the other there was the inability of the EU to act in concert to prevent the violence and ethnic cleansing in the Southern Balkans. Indeed, even the accession posed difficulties in terms of Europe’s identity as global actor with apparent division over the US decision to go to war in Iraq and the conduct of the War on Terror more generally. On the Security Studies side of the equation debates centred on the redefinition and broadening of the concept of security. In particular, though evident previously, a greater concern emerged with the constructed aspects of both security and security actors. Security practices, following Campbell, are performative, that is to say they play an active role in constructing the ‘selves’ which they claim to protect and indeed the ‘others’ whom are deemed threatening. This paper seeks to examine 21st century European security practices in order to examine what, if any, security identity is being constructed by the European Union. The first section of the paper discusses the relationship between intervention, sovereignty, security and identity. This is followed by a discussion of the development of and, indeed, the extent to which the EU can be said to have an emerging security identity or identities. The final section discusses
these developments in light the recent EU led missions in Chad and the Gulf of Aden before concluding with a discussion of directions for further research.

**What is identity?**

The term identity has proven to be a difficult and complex one to incorporate into analyses of the social world, and yet also an indispensable one. One’s identity is something which on the individual level one may feel quite certain about and yet it is difficult to define. Furthermore, the components of one’s identity are a complex mix of natural or brute facts such as race or biological sex and social facts both chosen and inherited such as religion, language, and even your favourite football team.¹ One of the basic starting points for thinking about identity in contemporary social science is the assumption that:

“our identities, whether group or individual, are not ‘natural facts’ about us, but are things we construct – fictions, in effect”²

Although the term ‘fiction’ is provocative, and perhaps deliberately so, it does get at the heart of the socially constructed nature of identity. That is, even when based upon ‘brute facts’ as markers of identity, the content and significance of identities only emerge through social interaction. The question is how then can we incorporate identity into our understanding of the social world in an intelligible and useful manner?

A common approach in the Discourse Theory literature has been to focus upon identity as being predicated on the articulation of difference. Such approaches are particularly focussed on the construction of binaries and the attendant normative implications outlined by Milliken above. Within the poststructuralist tradition identity

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is viewed as being both a product of and constitutive of political practice.\(^3\) The complexity of dealing with identity can be explained in terms of its inherent instability. As Waever has noted, with reference to Campbell:

“Those paradoxical features of identity stem from the general property that identities are never completely closed, never fully satiated, one is never simply that which one is.”\(^4\)

Identities then are conceived as social phenomena that are constituted “relationally and discursively”.\(^5\) They are a product of political practices but also act as a constraint on such practice in that they legitimate or make possible certain course of action or argument while excluding others.\(^6\) In relation to Foreign Policy practice this process of identity construction may involve a process of radical othering. Campbell argues that the US government has a need to construct and reconstruct US national identity through a process of radical othering where a rational, civilised self is threatened by a pathological, evil other that must be resisted as at all costs and that this drive to police the boundaries of identity is more relevant to the conduct of Foreign Policy than the existence of objective threats.\(^7\) Whereas for Campbell security is written in relation to an external enemy, Waever has argued that the ‘other’ may be temporal. For example, he argues that the EU is constructing its identity in relation to Europe’s own violent past:

“’Europe’ is not primarily built as a political category through nation-state imitating rhetorics of cultural identity and shared ancestry, but rather through a


\(^{6}\) This issue is often explored under what Milliken terms as the play of practice aimed at studying ’subjugated knowledge’. That is knowledge that is excluded or rendered unintelligible in terms of a dominant or hegemonic discourse. See Jennifer Milliken (1999), ‘The Study of discourse in International Relations: A critique of research and methods’ *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 5 No 2, p. 230

\(^{7}\) See Campbell op. cit 1998
peculiar security argument. Europe’s past of wars and divisions is held up as the other to be negated, and on this basis it is argued that ‘Europe’ can only be if we avoid renewed fragmentation.”

A third form of ‘othering’ has been outlined by Burke in relation to the beginnings of Australia as penal colony, a product of a desire to construct:

“a healthy ‘Commonwealth’ against the virulent Other of the criminal, which could, it seemed, be excised from the social body like a cancer. Whether it be in the figure of the non-economic savage or the morally debased, criminal poor, the Other was already a vast, enabling shadow across Australia’s future.”

Critical here is the role that a process of ‘Othering’ is linked to the legitimation of certain political outcomes or practices. For Campbell in the US these practices include the McCarthy trials and the Cold War in general, for Waever and Europe the creation of European institutions, and for Burke the transportation of criminals and other miscreants that formed the basis of the new colony of Australia. In each case, what this Paper would term the discursive construction of identities ascribed to the ‘other’, and by default relationally to the self, made possible certain courses of action in terms of how the state would deal with this other. The argument in relation to the EU is whether or not the EU is undergoing a transformation in it’s identity as global actor as it turns outward and if the memory of a dysfunctional past recedes as a legitimising narrative for action what takes its place?

In terms of the possible answers to this question two issues need to be addressed; the first relates to whether or not identity is necessarily defined in terms of a radical other and the second relates to the role of identity in relation to interests in terms of determining policy. In each of the cases outlined above the ‘other’ is defined as radically different to the self, the question is whether this form of radical othering

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is a necessary feature of the construction of identity. Hansen argues strongly that such a proposition would unnecessarily limit the scope of accounts of Foreign Policy that investigate the role of identity. She argues that identity can be and is constructed in more ambiguous and complex constructions of difference in practice and that the degree and mode of difference should be a question for research carried out in this vein rather than an a-priori assumption.\textsuperscript{11} This Paper agrees with this formulation of how to deal with identity as a feature of Foreign Policy practice and adopts:

“an ontology of identity that is flexible as to the forms of identity that one might encounter in concrete foreign policies.”\textsuperscript{12}

Thus a range of othering is possible from recognising neighbourly difference to outright hostility to alien forms.

This brings us to the second point of concern: How do constructions of identity make possible certain courses of action? As mentioned above McSweeney has argued that what he terms the identity thesis overstates the causal role of identity in influencing practice:

“The opportunity is missed to explore the extent to which Yugoslavia, far from exemplifying the autonomy of identity as a social fact, is perhaps an outstanding example of the manipulation of identity by political elites in an area remarkable for its historical forgetfulness”\textsuperscript{13}

McSweeney has identified a number of key points that need to be addressed by proponents of this ‘identity thesis’. First to what extent is identity manipulated by elites, second does identity exist independently of such manipulation, thirdly what role does identity play in making possible political action, and finally he raises the point of historical forgetfulness which lies at the heart of much of national identity constructions. The first two are related points that identity does not exist as a social


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p. 41

\textsuperscript{13} Bill McSweeney (1996) “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School” in \textit{Review of International Studies} Vol 22 No 1, p.87
fact and to some extent political elites are responsible for manipulating identity narratives to pursue pre-chosen political ends. Underlying these two related points is McSweeney’s proposition that interests exist independently of claims of identity and that the latter is largely a product of the former, or at least that proponents of the identity thesis need to take such a proposition seriously and give reasonable grounds for rejecting it. Fierke argues that there is more ambiguity to McSweeney’s position:

“McSweeney emphasizes the failure of identity theorists to take interests seriously, and sometimes suggests that the latter are prior to identity. But the notion that leaders and others are always ‘jostling’ with the two reinforces that identity and interests cannot be separated and dealt with as a causal relationship, in one direction or another.”14

Rather what she terms a constitutive discourse analysis is required so that we examine the complex matrix of identities and interests and how they are transformed over historical time. In this case neither identity nor interests are given ontological priority but the empirical challenge is to explore how the two interact to produce policy outcomes. The example she gives is relates to US foreign policy post-9/11:

“while the American interest in invading Iraq preceded the attacks of 11 September 2001, the change in identity, or the consolidation of identity rendered by the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, made the invasion in 2003 possible.”15

In other words, it was the interplay of identity and interests after 9/11 that produced necessary enabling conditions for the invasion of Iraq.

This brings us to the third point – what role does identity play in making political action possible? In Fierke’s example the construction of 9/11 in terms of an attack against American national identity as articulated by the administration created one of the conditions of possibility for the invasion of Iraq. Hansen uses a similar argument in relation to the divergent identity discourses proposed by Las Casas and

15 Ibid. p81
Cortés in Todorov’s account of their encounter with native Americans. In both cases
the identity ascribed to the natives was one of ‘savages’ and both Las Casas and
Cortés shared an interest in the incorporation of the new lands to Christendom and the
Spanish empire. However for Cortés the term ‘savage’ equated with non-human and
therefore implied that the ‘savages’ should and could be annihilated whereas for Las
Casas the term ‘savage’ was constructed to include the natives as humans and
therefore capable of conversion and redemption. Thus the interplay of identity
discourses and interests has the potential to produce radically different results that go
beyond mere manipulation of identity for the pursuit of pre-given interests. In the
European case, as discussed in relation to Waever above, the narrative of othering
relating to Europe’s past has enabled the strengthening and deepening of cooperative
European institutions and enlargement post-1989. But this narrative was largely
inward looking, as the EU emerges as a potential global actor what kind of identity is
emerging from the practice of security in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond?
Before turning to examine the EU as a security actor in more detail we will first
address the other side of the identity/security nexus.

What is Security?

It has become a commonplace to suggest that how security should be defined
has been debated ad nauseum in the aftermath of the Cold War. Baldwin even goes so
far as to suggest that redefining security has become something of a “cottage
industry.” However he goes on to reject the proposition that security has become an
‘essentially contested concept’ in Gallie’s sense. Rather, he argues, it is the referent to
which security properly applies that has become contested in the post Cold War era.

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16 Hansen, op cit. p42-3
Instead Baldwin argues for a definition of security, following Wolfers, that suggests security is:

“a low probability of damage to acquired values”\textsuperscript{18}

Following from that, the question is what acquired values are properly the domain of security and how do we define the level of probability? Thus although security as a concept is not contested in the sense Gallie intended, being neither appraisive nor actually contested\textsuperscript{19}, accepting this proposition does not get us very far in understanding what security is in a political sense or rather, and more pertinent to this paper what it means to claim something is a security issue in terms of the identity of the actor(s) involved.

In order to address this, we can turn to the Copenhagen School. This school’s approach to security can be situated within the broadening of security after the Cold War. For the Copenhagen School, security is the product of a social process through which a particular issue or set of issues is ‘securitized’ via a speech-act naming a particular issue as a security issue.\textsuperscript{20} The concept of security, conceived as a low probability of damage to acquired values, is less important than the referent – that is the definition of the values that need to be protected. This conceptualisation of how security works in practice seems to suggest that the potential for something to be a security issue is almost infinitely broad. For the Copenhagen school what is interesting in securitizing acts is the attendant practices that are deemed to be justified once an issue has been successful transported into the realm of security.\textsuperscript{21} However,

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p13 and passim, see also Arnold Wolfers (1952) “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol” in Political Science Quarterly Vol 67 No 4, pp. 481-502

\textsuperscript{19} See Baldwin, 1997, op. cit. passim for discussion


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
constraints are placed by the theory in terms of what may or may not be properly
considered to be effective securitization:

“As a speech-act, securitisation has a specific structure which in practice limits
the theoretically unlimited nature of ‘security.’ These constraints operate along
three lines. First...in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of
actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which
these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing
by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors...to which these actors
can make reference...the claims that are likely to be made, the forms in which
they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from
which they can be effectively spoken are usually deeply ‘sedimented’...finally
empirical contexts and claims...provide crucial resources and referents upon
which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue”

Thus any study of securitization needs to take into account both the internal logic and
consistency of securitizing speech-acts and the context external to that act including
events and sedimented discourses and institutions. Crucial to the success or otherwise
of such acts is the role of the audience in receiving and accepting that a particular
issue be securitized.

However, the Copenhagen School has been criticised, and correctly so in my
view, for under-developing its theory of audiences and how or when a securitizing act
is deemed to be or is likely to be successful. This is particularly problematic given
that, as Hansen has noted:

“ ‘Security’, as defined by the Copenhagen School, is not only about survival, it
is, as a general rule, about collective survival”

For Buzan et al. a securitising speech act must follow the security form or the
grammar of security. This involves the construction of a plot that identifies something
as an existential threat, a point of no return looming that demands some form of

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International Studies Quarterly Vol 47 No 4, p.513-4
23 See for discussion Matt McDonald “Securitization and the Construction of Security” in European
theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’ European Journal of International Relations Vol 13
No 3, pp.357-383; and Thierry Balzacq “The three faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience
and Context” in European Journal of International Relations Vol 11 No 2, 2005, pp.171-201
24 Lene Hansen “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma” in Millennium: Journal of
action, and a possible way of dealing with this threat. The success of such a speech-act depends upon two external conditions – the position of the securitizing actor in terms of her credibility, social capital and/or official position and secondly, the threat itself:

“It is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally threatening.”

However for such an act to be successful, the securitizing move needs to be accepted by the audience which in turn is dependent, according to Balzacq, on three facilitating conditions – the audience, context and securitizing agent. For the audience we need to be aware of its frame of reference, how it perceives the securitizing actor, and its ability to influence or permit the actor’s actions. In other words does it have a formal or moral role in facilitating the security actions. In terms of context, Balzacq refers to the zeitgeist and the immediate situation that the audience finds itself in and through which it interprets the securitiser’s arguments. And finally, the securitizing actor must be able to use the appropriate words and frames of reference to convince an audience. A further concern in this regard is, as pointed out by Roe, that this relationship between actor and audience is what precisely the audience is being asked to accept. Is it merely to accept that a particular thing is a threat or that:

“given that this is a threat, this is what I propose we do about it”

This differentiation between the acceptance of something as a threat and the acceptance of the proposed action adds an important nuance to the securitization framework in that it allows audiences, or parts of audiences, to accept that an issue is

25 Buzan et al, op. cit. 1998 p.33
26 Balzacq. op. cit., 2005 p.192
27 Paul Roe (2008), ‘Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s decision to invade Iraq’ Security Dialogue Vol 39 No 6, p.622
a security threat but to argue that it is best dealt with through other means.\textsuperscript{28} Such a distinction allows us to explore debates that occur within an accepted security frame on the possible course of action available to deal with the securitized threat.

Thus for an adequate account of securitization we need as outlined by Stritzel a more “comprehensive awareness of the existence of social sphere.”\textsuperscript{29} In similar terms Hughes argues that:

“security is conceived as inescapably political, that it ultimately resides in the perception of an audience and has little to do with the avoidance of harm. Analysis then is about ‘who can ‘do’ security in the name of what?’”\textsuperscript{30}

However in order to understand how a particular securitization is successful we need to go beyond the internal logic of the speech act itself and examine the context in which the act occurs in order to explore the nascent identity invoked and to a degree constructed by securitizing speech acts and the practices which they enable. This paper aims to:

“focus more on the understanding or discourse of security underpinning particular representations and practices rather than the act of ‘securitizing’”\textsuperscript{31}

And then to draw out the implications of these practices for the nature of the EU’s security identity.

**The EU as a Security Actor**

Before turning to discuss the cases at hand, a further point needs to be made regarding the appropriateness of seeking to examine or establish even an emergent security identity for the EU as a global actor. Much of the literature on security and identity understandably focuses on the national level, with US foreign policy particularly

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid. p.622 and Ronald R Krebs & Patrick Thaddeus Jackson “Twisting tongues and Twisting arm: the power of political rhetoric” in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 13 No 1, 2007, pp.35-66
\textsuperscript{29} Strizel, op. cit. 2007, p.365
\textsuperscript{31} Matt McDonald, op. cit., 2008 p.582
prominent. The question is to what extent can a similar analysis be extended to a complex multilateral institution such as the European Union, particularly an argument that seeks to suggest that EU security identity is not solely constituted by nor reducible to the sum of its member state parts. Indeed, this diversity of opinion is also reflected in the debate on whether or not the EU is gaining the strategic coherence to become an effective military actor with strong arguments on both sides. Likewise Burgess has argued that we need to speak of European Securities rather than a European security identity, albeit though these are rooted in:

“the presumption of a distinct set of European values…that… are to be defended; indeed, defending Europe is identical to defending these values.”

Picking up from the above discussion, the question then is what are these values and how are they to be defined. Is Diez correct to identify a shift away from the temporal othering of Europe’s past towards a more geopolitical and culturally rooted sense of self and other? Or do European leaders, following Manganas argument as to why Europe’s response to 9/11 was less robust than their American counterparts, recognise that:

“It would be reckless to abandon this [perpetual peace] narrative in the name of fighting terrorism. Perhaps something nastier lurks beneath the mythologies of peace. Europeans know this very well. And perhaps this is why they are so scared to let the narrative of perpetual peace go.”

In order to examine this question we need to think about European security identity not just as the product of competition among member states but also as constituted by

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34 See Diez, op. cit. 2004, passim
it’s interactions with the wider world.\textsuperscript{36} Therefore this paper aims to take seriously the challenge by the C.A.S.E. collective to re-examine the question of European identity:

“where identities are not givens and the nature and outcome of the processes at stake are not taken for granted. The aim would be to reflect on how identities are re-produced through social practices and how these practices are transformed, categorized and labelled as European”.\textsuperscript{37}

The challenge then is to treat foreign policy practice as both constitutive of as well as constituted by the emergent EU security identity.

This picture is further complicated by the nature of a European security identity itself, which as Waever has outlined exists as a concept in discussions of the EU’s role in security affairs. He dismisses the argument that this is merely a reflection of a weak institutionalism and instead argues that its presence is implicated in the way in which the European project as a whole seeks to establish its political identity.\textsuperscript{38}

Therefore we end up with a complex situation where:

“identity cannot be something we ‘have’ as a thing, or some inner quality of our own which we are called upon to realize in optimum purity. Instead we have to view identity simultaneously as something impossible to fill, always incomplete due to the presence of the outside in the inside, but also as defined by this impossibility.”\textsuperscript{39}

European security identity, then isn’t something fixed nor is it readily definable rather it is best viewed as the product of a process of becoming that is never complete, never closed but always sought out and pursued. Until the 1990’s this pursuit has largely been focussed inwards on further integration, it then shifted Eastwards towards the post-Warsaw Pact and former Soviet emerging democracies.\textsuperscript{40} In the 21\textsuperscript{st} century this

\textsuperscript{38} See Waever, op cit., 1996 p.124
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. p.127
\textsuperscript{40} See Atsuko Higashino (2004) ‘For the sake of ‘peace and security’? The role of security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards’ Cooperation and Conflict Vol 39 No 4, pp.347-368
focus has increasingly shifted beyond the immediate European neighbourhood, the question is what kind of emergent security identity does this latest shift represent?

**The EU as an External Actor: EUFOR-Chad and EU-NAVFOR**

As discussed above, the emergence of an EU security identity has been deeply entangled with debates about the depth and nature of European cooperation. A number of cross-cutting divisions need to be taken into account in relation to the process of reforming the EU as a global rather than a regional actor. We’ve already discussed the divergence between optimists and pessimists in relation to the possibility of a coherent EU strategic identity. A second dynamic is the debate between the nature of that identity, namely, would it continue to be defined against a fractious and violent European past or would it turn to a more geopolitical or even cultural base as the memory of war recedes in the new generation of European leaders. A third dynamic, this time specifically related to matters conventionally considered to be the subject of security, is the split between those who view NATO as the appropriate forum for developing the ESDP and those who seek to construct a distinct European alternative. It is in this context that the European Security Strategy (ESS) emerged. The ESS was drafted as part of the ongoing process of defining the external role of the Union. For some it was seen as a counterpoint to the NSS that set out a distinct European approach to the question of security and it to some extent it was, but it was also a reflection of the internal strains and negotiations that marked the debate over the Iraq war and the longer standing debate that had resisted the creation of a separate, if complementary to NATO, European defence community. Therefore the EU missions in Chad and the Gulf of Aden will reflect the product of these tensions in their design and delivery but also go some to answering the
questions raised by the debates highlighted above, even if this is as an unintended consequence of the reality of EU missions abroad.

The EU mission is Chad is worth examining for a number of reasons, it represents a good example of the kind of out of region mission identified in the European Security Strategy that, although it doesn’t directly affect EU interests, should concern the Union as part of its broad security policy.\(^{41}\) It also demonstrates the complex process through which an issue emerges on the security agenda of the EU and the interaction between the national, regional and global level. France were pushing for involvement in Chad from as early as 2007. France, as the former colonial power, were to prove to be both the engine and main complicating factor of the mission.\(^{42}\) Indeed, it was French prompting at the Security Council that played a large part in passing UNSC 1778 under which the mission ultimately deployed.\(^{43}\) The structure of the mission which was placed under a commander from the Irish Defence Forces, General Pat Nash, was designed to try to minimise the perception of overt partiality and particularly too much French influence. Despite this the perception remained complicated. As Ploch noted:

“\textit{At least one rebel group warned that it considered the EU force a ‘foreign occupational army’ because it included French forces, whom the rebels did not see as neutral.}”\(^{44}\)

Indeed, it is in this light that we can understand the connection between the rebel assault on the Chadian capital, N’djamena, immediately prior to the deployment of EUFOR-Chad as the rebels sought to press home their advantage prior to the

\(^{43}\) Ibid. p.14
deployment of what they perceived as reinforcements for the Chadian government.\textsuperscript{45} Likewise this perceived lack of neutrality hindered the mission’s ability to protect aid groups.\textsuperscript{46} Furthermore, at the end of the bridging mission many of the EUFOR forces simply ‘re-hatted’ to serve under the new UN mission, MINURCAT, which meant that the taint of impartiality continued to hinder international efforts complicated further by the reduced capacity for the use of force under the UN mission.\textsuperscript{47} In an editorial, the then EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solano argues that the Chad mission demonstrates that:

“the EU has become a global provider of security and stability”\textsuperscript{48}

Although this statement does give an insight to a particular view of the EU’s emerging role in the world, it is generally accepted as being something of an overstatement of the achievements of EUFOR-Chad. Rather, as Vines has noted:

“It is probably more accurate to credit this EUFOR operation with increasing European learning and coordination on how to conduct such a bridging exercise successfully than with fulfilling a meaningful humanitarian mandate”\textsuperscript{49}

For the purposes of this paper, the mission serves to highlight the problems of carving out a distinct EU security identity separate from its more powerful member states. EUFOR-Chad (and even the UN-led MINURCAT) continued to be dogged by the perception that they were French inspired, French led missions rather than representing the emergence of new global actor. One reason for this is the ad-hoc and limited nature of the mission, the lack of a clear strategic vision that could explain why the EU was in Chad in 2008 and not in one of any number of other hotspots

\textsuperscript{45} Alex Vines (2010) ‘Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa’ \textit{International Affairs}, Vol 86 No5, p.1094
\textsuperscript{46} Ploch, op. cit. 2010, p.5-6
\textsuperscript{47} Vines, op. cit., 2010, p.1096
\textsuperscript{48} Javier Solano “Chad mission shows EU is effective in giving stability” \textit{The Irish Times} 13/03/2009
\textsuperscript{49} Vines, op. cit. 2010, p.1096
either regionally or global. This lack will be returned to in the conclusion but first we
turn to the other case in hand – EUNAVFOR – ‘Operation Atalanta.’

Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a complex security issue. On the one hand it
has a negative economic effect by raising the cost of transporting goods through a
vital global trade route. There is also the potential link to such piracy as either a
source of funding or tactical innovation for terrorist organisations such as Al-Shabab
and Al-Qaeda. While on the other hand, the ongoing humanitarian aspects of the
crisis demand a global response and securitizing the problem on the above terms also
obscures the role of external actors in destabilising the Somali economy and polity via
illegal dumping in Somali waters, destroying fish stocks, and the destruction of the
Al-Barakaat informal transmission network as part of the financial war on terror. In
other words, the Somali situation is precisely the kind of nuanced emergency the ESS
anticipated as facing the EU in the 21st Century. However a complicating factor in the
response was the lack of attention to Naval aspects of the ESDP prior to 2008, albeit
with a backdrop of some naval cooperation emerging in a Mediterranean context.

The initial EU response was the creation of a coordination cell, EU NAVCO, to
enable coordination and support of surveillance and protection activities in the region.
This was subsequently extended to an additional EU naval force to be deployed in the
region, EUNAVFOR – Operation Atalanta. The force operates under a UN mandate

50 Anja Shortland & Marc Vothknecht (2010) ‘Combating ‘Maritime Terrorism’ off the Coast of
Somalia’ DIW: Discussion Papers 1079, p.1
51 See report by Johann Hari “You are being lied to about pirates” The Independent 05/01/2009
52 See Maryam Razavy “Hawal: an underground haven for terrorists or social phenomenon?” Crime,
Law & Social Change Vol 44 No 3, 2005 pp.277-278
European Naval Operations in the Wider Mediterranean Area’ International Relations Vol 22 No 2,
pp.173-191
Explaining the first ESDP Anti-Piracy naval operation’ Contemporary Security Policy Vol 30 No.3,
p.574
from resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 & 1851\textsuperscript{55} and has had it’s mission extended twice by the EU, first until December 2010 and then for a further 2 years until December 2012.\textsuperscript{56} The mission also serves a dual purpose: to protect vulnerable international shipping from piracy and to protect ships operating under the World Food Programme mission in Somalia and the African Union’s reconstruction mission, AMISOM.\textsuperscript{57} The EU however is not acting alone in the region, NATO has a separate but parallel mission ongoing as do a number of other states including the USA, Russia and China.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, as Germond argues:

“As with previous ESDP Missions, the EU’s decision to launch Atalanta was clearly motivated by common perceptions of not just the interests but also the grandeur of the EU and the affirmation of its values.”\textsuperscript{59}

The importance of EUNAVFOR may not then be for what it achieves but rather for what it represents in terms of the emerging role of the EU as a global actor.

**Preliminary Conclusions and further research**

Although the above discussion is very much a first draft, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. The first is that more work needs to be done to link together the various strands of research examining EU Homeland Security and the increasing global aspects of EU security policy. Extending to but not limited to other aspects of EU security policy, particularly aspects of migration policy and counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{60} The processes shifting the EU from a temporal to a geopolitical form of

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\textsuperscript{55} Eva Strickman (2009) ‘EU and NATO efforts to Counter Piracy off Somalia’ *ISIS Europe*, p.2


\textsuperscript{57} Strickman, op. cit.,2009 p.3

\textsuperscript{58} Germond op. cit. 2009 p.3

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid p.4

‘othering’ are not just externally oriented but also linked to policing what it means to
be European within the boundaries of the EU. Secondly, as highlighted in the case of
Chad in particular, the need for a coherent strategy at the EU level is required if the
EU is ever to be seen as more than an extension of the interests of its more powerful
members. The EU successfully reconciled itself to eastern expansion in the 1990’s,
the question now turns to what kind of Actor is the EU going to be in its neighbouring
regions whether that is the former Soviet Union, the Middle East or the Maghreb. Or
indeed beyond its regional role in Sub-Saharan Africa. ‘Operation Atalanta’ points to
a more robust EU role than in the past, but one that is not entirely devoid of
humanitarian sensibilities, the question is whether the EU can (or wishes to)
successfully resist the increasingly securitised view of the Somalian piracy problem.
In light of recent events in the Maghreb from the outside and in Ireland and Greece
from the inside, the time is short for the EU to find itself a voice that would allow it to
pursue a unique line in global politics, failure to seize this window of opportunity may
also have repercussions for the EU project as a whole.

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