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Political institutions, credible commitment, and sovereign debt in advanced economies

Breen, Michael and McMenamin, Iain (2011) Political institutions, credible commitment, and sovereign debt in advanced economies. Working Papers in International Studies. (Paper No. No 7/2011). Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland.

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Abstract

This article tests systematically the effect of political structures on the credibility of sovereign debtors in advanced economies. It argues that power sharing and party system polarisation have important effects on long-term interest rates. Where collective responsibility is high and polarisation is low the market perceives a more credible commitment on the part of sovereign debtors. These arguments derived from the theory of credible commitments perform much better than alternative accounts of the politics of sovereign debt, namely a market preference for right-wing governments and more flexible polities. The principal data consists of a panel of twenty three rich countries between 1970 and 2009. There are tests for robustness to a wider sample and a variety of different measurements.

Item Type:Working Paper (No. No 7/2011)
Refereed:No
Uncontrolled Keywords:economics; sovereign debt
Subjects:Social Sciences > International relations
Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS) > Working Papers in International Studies Series
Publisher:Dublin City University
Copyright Information:© 2011 Dublin City University.
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:16652
Deposited On:18 Oct 2011 10:55 by Shane Martin. Last Modified 18 Oct 2011 10:55

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