Indian Approaches to Security and Conflict Resolution

John Doyle
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John Doyle, Dublin City University
Introduction

India’s growing economy, new Indian government approaches to foreign policy and in particular its new relationship with the United States have created a new context for and a new focus on India’s perspective on geo-politics and security matters, both domestically and internationally. There has been a developing literature over recent years on the tensions within Indian foreign policy between what is sometimes characterised as a Ghandian or Nehruvian approach, seen in non alignment and a commitment to United Nations peacekeeping and an alternative vision more grounded in realpolitik and state interests.\(^1\) There has been however a quite limited analysis of the implications of these tensions for India’s perspectives on peace-building and conflict resolution either within South Asia or at a more global level. This is not simply of interest to scholars of South Asia. As India’s global role increases it will be increasingly necessary to situate India’s perspective on security matters, both domestic and international, within a wider context.

India has not, to date, produced a single security strategy document which can be directly compared to others such as the US national security strategies or the 2003 EU security strategy\(^2\). There are reports that such a document is in the drafting stage, but it was not available at the time of writing.\(^3\) This chapter uses the EU and US documents as a backdrop – representing in rhetorical terms different approaches to international security, as discussed further below, and analyses the approach taken by India within this context.

The starting point of this chapter is informed by the author’s involvement in two separate EU funded projects\(^4\) dealing with comparative studies of peace processes,

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\(^3\) See [Indian Ministry of Defence website](http://mod.nic.in/aboutus/welcome.html), accessed on 26 September 2011.

\(^4\) The first project was led by Prof Radha Kumar of the Delhi Policy Group. The second was led by the Nelson Mandela Centre for Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, first of all by Prof Kumar and later by Prof. Tasneem Meenai. The author wishes to acknowledge support of the Asia Link fund of the Europe Aid cooperation Office and the earlier EU-India Economic Cross Cultural programme for financial support received for these two projects.
conflict resolution and wider peace building – one focused exclusively on EU - India comparisons and the other on the wider South Asia region. Those two projects collectively involved a range of innovative interactions between European and Indian universities and included six high profile closed door seminars with policy-makers, military and security actors, diplomats and academics; 35 student-simulation exercises in seven Indian cities where international experts facilitated 2-day sessions, each with about 40 postgraduate students; faculty exchanges; six academic workshops (of 3 to 4 days each) which focused on how each region can best be ‘taught’ to students in the other and the production of a range of curricular materials from leading experts in each region to assist the development of teaching of the EU within India and vice versa.⁵

This chapter seeks to situate Indian state perspectives on security and conflict resolution within the extensive international debate on the US and EU security strategies. It is commonly asserted, and was often repeated during the seminars referred to above, that Indian security policy – especially that related to internal conflicts and conflicts with neighbours – reflects a much more traditional view of security than is often assumed by those whose focus is on Indian foreign policy at the United Nations or India’s high level of participation in UN peacekeeping operations.⁶ This ‘traditional’ view of security emphasises both a high degree of traditional external threat (compared to Europe for example) and also a high degree of fear of internal secession by states ‘on the margins’ of the Indian Union. The debates on Indian security generally focus on a few key factors in explaining Indian state perspectives on security and its supposed different character from Europe. Firstly it is asserted that as Indian independence is still a relatively recent event, compared to other large states with which it is compared, that Indian policy makers ‘naturally’ hold a more Westphalian vision of state sovereignty.⁷ The recent nature of state sovereignty and the particular circumstances of the partition settlement and its aftermath, also, it is commonly argued make Indian policy-makers hyper-conscious about the dangers of state-disintegration and the possible domino-effect of the loss of state territory or state control, even in very small and marginal (to New Delhi) areas such as Nagaland. The focus on a strong version of Westphalian state sovereignty is said to be

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⁵ The outputs of the first of those projects, coordinated by the Delhi Policy Group can be seen at http://www.partitionconflicts.com/partitions/peaceprocesses/overview/, accessed on 26 September 2011.

⁶ For a good review see Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign Policy’, India Review, vol. 8, no. 1, 2009, pp. 4-19.

re-enforced by the relative weakness of regional cooperation and the regional organisation SAARC.

Historic events since independence have strengthened rather than diminished these early tendencies in state security policy. The 1962 border war with China, not only ended the potential for a common ‘non-aligned’ intervention in global affairs and ended all practical talk of Chini-Hindi Bāi-Bāi, but it also set up a security complex in South Asia between India, China and Pakistan that ultimately went nuclear and added a further level of complexity to the conflict in Kashmir. Most Indian discourse on ‘internal’ conflicts has utilised a strong ‘external’ dimension – the conflict in Kashmir and before it Punjab is analysed through a lens of Pakistani interference and agitation and the conflicts in the north east have been linked to ‘training camps’ in Bangladesh and Myanmar. This discourse has been challenged somewhat in the contemporary period as the ability to explicitly link the ‘Naxalite’ uprisings to external actors is much weaker and relations with Bangladesh have improved.

Indian discourse also, at least partly, explains internal conflicts through the lens of modernisation theory, as a product of low levels of development (and by implication low levels of education) which will only be resolved over time though economic growth and investment. Critical voices within India also focus their analysis in this area however such groups and individuals focus on state actions which increase inequality, land and food scarcity, whereas state discourses focus on the historic legacy of underdevelopment which the state claims to be rectifying.

In summary, the starting point (rather than the conclusion) for many analyses of contemporary Indian security policy it is that is more focused on external threats by other states and on threats to India’s territorial integrity than other major states and that therefore India’s approach to security challenges and conflict resolution tends to focus on military dimensions and territorial control with very limited official focus on what might be broadly characterised as human security. However such summaries of Indian policy, often assume an international perspective and especially a European view on

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security matters which is more focused on human security concerns and more open to post Westphalian perspectives than is justified by an analysis of European actions – whatever the rhetoric of the EU security policy.

**Contextualising Indian state perspectives on security and terrorism**

While many international comparisons for India’s security strategy might be chosen, this chapter utilises the 2002 and 2003 documents issued by the US and the EU. The documents and their relationship to the post 9-11 US led war on terror and the transatlantic divisions on Iraq sparked a large and significant academic debate not only on the depth of the dispute between the US and some of its former European allies but also on the nature of the US and European security policies. This literature on transatlantic tensions includes a range of frames of reference. Cox and Pouliot debate presumed differences of ideology and emphasis; Boniface argues that the EU perspective on international order prioritises multilateralism in contrast to the US unilateralism; Den Boer and Monar on the other hand see a largely positive relationship on the issue of terrorism in the period immediately after the 9-11 attacks, while Doyle and Connolly discuss the limitations to US unilateral use of power, even with their military dominance over Europe.\(^\text{10}\) The range of material and the diversity of interpretations makes a further comparison with India challenging but this is made somewhat clearer when the analysis is focused on the strategy papers of 2002 and 2003, rather than wider international discourse. Alyson Bailes for example compares the policy focused US strategy with the EU’s ‘inspirational sketch’ designed to draw EU members back together after the divisions over Iraq and to ‘show the world that they mean business’.\(^\text{11}\) Simon Duke acknowledges the limitations of a comparison of the documents but argues that a

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significant justification for a comparative approach is that events since then have focused more attention on basic questions of strategy, mission and purpose.  

The United States issued its National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002 just after the anniversary of the 9-11 attacks and in a clear context framed by those attacks, the overthrow of the Taliban and the increasing talk of an invasion of Iraq. This document, the first of two issued by the Bush administration, drew heavily, however, on the policy positions articulated during the 2000 election and was not simply a response to the 9-11 attacks.  

*A Secure Europe in a Better World*, the European Union Security Strategy (EUSS) agreed by the European Council on 12 December 2003 is in many ways a self conscious attempt to respond to the US National Security Strategy of 2002. The EU strategy was clearly written with the perspective of the Bush administration in mind and conceptualising it in that context allows the differences in the two documents to be clarified. It also then allows contemporary Indian strategy to be situated between these two much debated papers – often construed as alternative visions for contemporary security policy from otherwise close democratic allies.

**US National Security Strategy 2002**

The 2002 US National Security Strategy begins by setting out a vision based on a clear duality in international politics

> The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success.  

There is a studied refusal to address the causes of terrorism in the NSS, terrorism is simply seen to exist and must be defeated, but its causes are not analysed. While the document acknowledges that a ‘world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable,’ it then goes on to assert that ‘Decades of massive development assistance have failed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries. Worse, development aid has often served to prop up

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13 See for example, Condoleezza Rice ‘Promoting the National Interest’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol., no. 1, 2000, p. 45 – 62, for a good example of the election campaign foreign policy.  
failed policies, relieving the pressure for reform and perpetuating misery.\textsuperscript{15} There is no sense that poverty or injustice need to be specifically addressed to deal with security threats. It is also noteworthy that there is no focus in the document on internal security threats in the United States - the focus is exclusively on securing borders and external threats.

The NSS talks about a multidimensional approaches to counter-terrorism – ‘To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal’ but then the following list of ‘tools’ are very narrowly based - ‘military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.’\textsuperscript{16} They do not even include public diplomacy in this high level summary list, much less action through the UN or even bilateral action on issues such as underdevelopment or injustice. Later the document does seem to offer a role for at least a one sided public diplomacy when it says that the US ‘will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. This includes: using the full influence of the United States, and working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate.’ There is little sense however of dialogue or according any value to negative perceptions about US foreign policy, or any acknowledgement that there is no international consensus on who should be labelled a ‘terrorist’. The document simply assumes that the US perspective is unproblematic and uncontested and the role of strategy is simply one of using power to achieve objectives. The only hint at dealing with clashes of perception is a vague reference that ‘In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror’.\textsuperscript{17} In the discussion on counter-terrorism, military resources are continually prioritised in the document. Diplomacy only plays a supporting role. In a typical phrasing from the NSS it says, ‘As the United States Government relies on the armed forces to defend America’s interests, it must rely on diplomacy to interact with other nations’ – diplomacy is not explicitly seen as ‘defending American interests’ – that is the role of military power.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} National Security Strategy, p.21.  
\textsuperscript{16} National Security Strategy, p.3, introduction.  
\textsuperscript{17} National Security Strategy, p.5, introduction.  
\textsuperscript{18} National Security Strategy, p.30
Though the NSS clearly states that international terrorism is the greatest security threat to the USA, this threat, particularly from non-state actors, is situated strongly within a wider state-focused geopolitics, which focuses not only on the so-called ‘axis of evil’ but also on large rivals and potential rivals. There is therefore considerable emphasis on maintaining US military superiority over all other states in the world or any likely combination of them. This focus on military resources intensified in the following years with major increases in military expenditures compared to other states and a further strengthening of the US military’s dominance over all counter-terrorism strategy. US military expenditure grew by over 7% annually from 2000 to 2010 and by the end of the decade represented over 42% of global military expenditure and by far the largest percentage of GNP devoted to the military by a large state.  

International organisations and international law play a very marginal role in the security strategy. International law is only invoked in the context of terrorist finances and international criminal investigations. The United Nations is totally marginal, referred to only in lists of other organisations and not given any serious role either as a source of legitimacy or an institutional actor. For example, it says in the introduction that the ‘United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO.’ Later the UN is placed on a par with NGOs - ‘we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations’.

Failed or weak states are seen as a particular security threat. ‘Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.’ Yet the focus again is on a policing and intelligence response rather than support for state-building. – for example ‘Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny

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21 For example, National Security Strategy, p.6.
havens for terrorists.\textsuperscript{24} When dealing with non state threats in weak states the strategy states that the USA ‘will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task.’\textsuperscript{25}

The US security strategy of 2002 is of course just one of many such documents issued by the US administration over the years and other later editions were issued by the Bush and Obama administrations. There are both significant differences and continuities across all recent strategy documents. However the focus of this paper is to situate the Indian security approach rather than analyse US policy per se. The 2002 NSS has been chosen for this purpose as it is a conceptually useful pole, often seen as a particularly hard-line and militarily focused take on a US security perspective – though most of its key tenets are repeated in the later security strategies. The 2002 NSS in this context offers a conceptually clear and well known international example with which to compare recent Indian government perspectives.

\textbf{A Secure Europe in a Better World, the European Union Security Strategy}

The EU Security Strategy, written just over one year after the US document and after the European splits on the issue of the invasion of Iraq, is in many respects an attempt by the EU to create some credibility on foreign and security policy but also to offer an alternative security strategy to that articulated by the administration of US President George W. Bush. The EU represents just one element of the ‘European’ response to conflict and terrorism. Member states, for example, retain exclusive responsibility for internal conflict. While there was significant external involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process, the most significant external actors were American, with South Africa and Canada involved at times.\textsuperscript{26} The EU provided some limited funding but its direct role in the conflict resolution process was negligible. Likewise Spain has rejected any international or EU involvement in the conflict in the Basque Country, to the extent of even refusing to consider allowing international observers to oversee ETA’s destruction of its armaments. On international security and conflict resolution while

\textsuperscript{24} National Security Strategy, pp.10-11.
\textsuperscript{25} National Security Strategy, p.6.
much activity on diplomacy, post-conflict supports and peace-building is coordinated through the EU, most EU member states are also members of NATO and use it as their primary vehicle for military cooperation and even within NATO they have divided politically in their attitudes to recent NATO interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

The EU strategy therefore is much more of an ideal type, representing what is sometimes summarised as a human security approach – which sits within a wider European security strategy composed of the member state’s security doctrines, and NATO. In the actions and security doctrines of member states, and within NATO, there are obviously much stronger representations of a traditional state-centred and military-focused security strategy all of which combine to create the overall ‘European’ security strategy. However, notwithstanding the fact that the EU security strategy does not encapsulate all of ‘Europe’s’ security strategy it is still a useful document – agreed to by all the then EU member states and representing to some degree at least a collective view in the aftermath of divisions on the invasion of Iraq. The EUSS is therefore, in this context, a useful conceptual reflection of a particular sort of security policy – a conscious contrast to that of President Bush.

The differences in the discourse used in the two documents are clear from the beginning when the ‘complex causes’ of terrorism are acknowledged and the EU also acknowledges (before the Madrid and London attacks) that such causes are internal to Europe as well as external - ‘the most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society’.27 The complexity of terrorism is also seen in the way the document deals with weak states as the causal direction is almost reversed. Whereas the US document sees failed states as a threat with no discussion on why they fail, the EU document see conflict leading to state failure – not the other way around, ‘Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within…. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism’.28

27 A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 4.
28 A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 5.
The EU strategy is much stronger on the multi-layered approach needed to combat terrorism. ‘In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments’. The EU explicitly links other aspects of international action to conflict resolution and counter-terrorism - aid, trade etc, asserting that Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order. … Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals. … A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

The EU security strategy is clear that it sees no credible traditional territorial threat to the Union or its member states. It calls for improved EU military capacities, but for deployment exclusively outside the territory of the EU (a provision later legally enshrined in the EU Treaty of Lisbon). EU member states collectively, spend significantly less than the USA, about €275 billion, compared to the US €700 billion, but the real gap in capacity is even greater. Firstly there is limited collective political will by EU member states (or even those who are NATO members) to deploy military power, either in major operations such as Afghanistan or minor EU led operations. The EU’s ‘battle groups’ of 1500 troops for rapid deployment have been on standby since 2007 and have never been used, despite strong pressure to send them to the DRC in 2008, for an operation which would not have been politically controversial. Secondly the lack of coordination of military expenditure and the slow base of military reform is typified by the EU continuing to possess nearly 10,000 main battle tanks as a legacy of defence planning against the USSR, while struggling to provide air support for its operation in Chad. The EU strategy is clear that responses to security threats need to be multi-dimensional and it

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30 A Secure Europe in a Better World p. 11.
32 Rory Keane, EU Battle group Must Be Deployed to Conflict in Congo. The Irish Times, 1 November 2008, p.10.
distinguishes itself strongly from the USA in this regard. However it remains a challenge for the EU to put this into practice.

The EU’s strength is asserted to be one based on its own experience of multilateralism internally, while recognising that it needs to strengthen its coherence in expressing itself externally.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development …Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command. Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime. … Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member state.33

The EU document also accords the United Nations and international law a central place – ‘Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. … The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.34

Though the language is generalised a number of themes are clear, which differ considerably in focus from the US document. Terrorism is seen to have has complex causes, including poverty, injustice, state collapse (not state ‘failure’) and human rights abuses and not just religious extremism. It acknowledges that the sources of conflict and terrorism exists within European society, it is not simply an ‘external’ threat originating in other countries and is very clear that responses must be multi-dimensional and include development, trade, diplomacy and criminal justice as well as military capacity, which it acknowledges the EU needs to develop. It argues that the EU is well placed to offer multidimensional responses within its own institutions and by coordinating member state

34 A Secure Europe in a Better World p. 10.
responses while also affirming that international law and the role of the United Nations is crucial

The differences in the EU and US documents are summarised in the following table,

Table 1, Comparison of EUSS and NSS, on key concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of the debate</th>
<th>EU SS</th>
<th>US NSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explicitly Defining causes</td>
<td>Complex, and recognise EU is source as well as target of terrorists</td>
<td>Not analysed, threats are external and focus is border security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link to poverty and injustice</td>
<td>Listed as specific causes</td>
<td>Linked to instability but rejected as 'justification'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>multi-dimensional responses are EU strength development, trade diplomacy, military, criminal justice. Trade and development policy highlighted.</td>
<td>Military superiority is US strength focused on intelligence, threat assessment and the military and using diplomacy only to build alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of international law</td>
<td>Crucial in building norms and legitimacy</td>
<td>Only mentioned in arrest warrants, financing etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of UN</td>
<td>primary responsibility, EU priority</td>
<td>Mentioned in same context as NGOs and OAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is in making this comparison that the EU Security Strategy becomes a more meaningful document. It is stripped of some of its generalities and its purpose in setting out an image of a different analysis of threats and a different analysis of appropriate responses is clear. However this is after all a document in many ways designed to assert a view of the EU rather than as a guide to action. Lacking credible military resources and internally divided among its member states on some crucial issues the EUSS was not a policy framework in quite the same way as the US NSS. Nonetheless it does offer a different strategic vision and it is between these two competing strategic visions that the following section analyses the contemporary Indian position on security, terrorism and conflict.
Indian security strategy

The following analysis of Indian state perspectives, in the absence of a single equivalent document draws on recent government level statements on security, terrorism and conflict resolution from the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and Minister of Home Affairs. The analysis is framed around the key issues set out in table one, with the addition of an explicit discussion on regionalism as part of the international response, which is not so relevant for the USA, but is central to the EU approach and which has been raised as a key issue for India.

Causes

Indian has traditionally sought to portray its most serious internal and regional conflicts as being caused primarily by external action by neighbouring states. The conflicts in Punjab and the North East and above all in Kashmir were almost exclusively described as being stoked and intensified by Pakistan, whom India regularly accuses, not only of giving diplomatic support to insurgent groups within India, but also of smuggling fighters across the Line of Control and of organised direct assaults such as the 2008 attacks in Mumbai.35

While India’s poor relations with Pakistan are universally acknowledged, the importance of China for Indian security strategy is often minimised in western analysis. Indian nuclear posture and maritime security in particular, are always framed in terms of the relationship with China rather than Pakistan.36 For ‘internal’ conflicts however Pakistan remains the state most often seen as offering a serious threat to Indian security.37 There have some interesting developments in very recent times. The criticisms of Pakistan and the fear of China remain of course but the Naxalite insurgency is increasingly described as the most serious internal conflict by senior Indian politicians and the discourse of Indian officials has been much less likely to seek to link it to other states than the Kashmir conflict. This shift of focus to a greater acceptance of the internal dynamics of conflict is now strongly reflected in government statements. Two recent high profile

37 For example statement by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony, is headed ‘Pakistan an Epicenter of International Terrorism’, 3 February 2009.
contributions by the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh use an identical phrase in describing security threats – ‘left-wing extremism, cross border terrorism and religious fundamentalism’, explicitly acknowledging the internal dimensions of conflict, which was often absent in earlier periods.\textsuperscript{38} Even more strikingly India’s Home Minister Chidambaram said, in a statement to the BBC in the immediate aftermath of the September 2011 attack on the Delhi High Court that the assault was carried out by militants based in India and went to say that ‘we can no longer point to cross-border terrorism as a source of terror attacks in India’.\textsuperscript{39} Contemporary security policy therefore seems to point to a more nuanced understanding of causes and a greater balance between internal and external causes.

\textit{Linkages with poverty and injustice}

Indian discourse on causes of conflict is certainly much more focused on analysing underlying causes than the US National Security Strategy and public statements frequently deal with issues such as poverty and political grievances. However India government strategy is often unclear as to whether there is an acceptance that conflict is sparked and escalated by underlying issues such as inequality and injustice or whether the state simply sees conflict as arising out of conditions of poverty and lack of education, in a sense as an extension of classic modernisation theory, rather than a grievance focused theory of conflict.

When speaking of the end of the Sri Lanka war Prime Minister Manmohan Singh welcomed the ‘decimation’ of the LTTE, but also said that the ‘problem does not disappear with the defeat of the LTTE. The Tamil population has legitimate grievances ... have been reduced over the years to second class citizens’.\textsuperscript{40} However when discussing conflicts within India, the use of public expenditure has been seen as a hearts and minds strategy or an attempt to lift people out of ignorance, rather than a recognition of prior wrongs. When speaking about the Naxalite insurgency Prime Minister Singh says

One emphasis is on intelligence so that they [the police] match them in actual combat. The other is on development. Development is the master remedy to win

\textsuperscript{38} PM’s address at the second Annual Conference of Chief Secretaries, 4 February 2011 and PM’s address at the CMs’ Conference on Internal Security, 1 February 2011. both on PMs website \url{http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm}, accessed on 22 September 2011.

\textsuperscript{39} BBC news website, 9 September 2011.

\textsuperscript{40} Interaction between PM and Newspaper editors 29 June 2011. \url{http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm}, accessed on 22 September 2011.
over people. If my children are in school, better health facilities are available, if forest rights of tribals are respected, ---- implemented, it should win over people. In the short run, government’s writ must run.\footnote{Interaction between PM and Newspaper editors 29 June 2011. http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm, accessed on 22 September 2011.}

While the comments on forest rights might be taken as accepting that such rights are not currently respected the commitment to ‘development’ includes no such acceptance. The need for dialogue is accepted but there is a limited acknowledgement of the legitimacy of protest groups. The PM, referring to Kashmir said somewhat condescendingly that ‘The dialogue can embrace all the issues that agitate the minds of the people of Jammu & Kashmir, especially the youth. The dialogue can address issues such as the trust deficit and the governance deficit’.\footnote{PM comments 13 September 2010. http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm, accessed on 22 September 2011.}

This duality of recognition and denial is also seen in the recent peace talks in Assam in the Indian North East, with the ULFA group (United Liberation Front of Assam). The Home Minister Shri P. Chidambaram stated that ‘the steps taken by the ULFA leaders for restoration of peace and normalcy in the area would yield speedier socio-economic development of the people of Assam. He stated that the concerns expressed by ULFA leaders are of concern to the State and Union Government. He assured the delegation that there is no problem which cannot be resolved with in the framework of the Constitution of the India.’\footnote{Statement on 5 August 2011. http://pib.nic.in , accessed on 26 September 2011.} Yet after the ceasefire a statement announcing it used the phrase, ‘ULFA had earlier agreed to abjure violence and find a solution to the \textit{problems as perceived by them} (author’s emphasis)’, which tends to minimise the degree of Indian government acceptance of underlying problems.

On many occasions the Indian government hints at more substantial recognition of grievances, such as in the first ULFA related statement above. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said earlier this year that ‘I have repeatedly stated that the Indian Constitution is a remarkably flexible instrument, capable of accommodating a diverse range of aspirations’.\footnote{PM comments 1 February 2011. http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm, accessed on 22 September 2011.} Yet the overall emphasis is to treat protestors claims as misunderstandings or the anger of unemployed and uneducated people. A more substantial acceptance of the need to take claims of inequality and injustice seriously on
their own terms as underlying causes of conflict is much less evident in situations of
internal conflict than when commenting on the region. This is at one level to be
expected. No government likes to accept responsibility for grievances over which it has
control. The EU security strategy focus on underlying causes is after all speaking of
conflicts outside the EU. The British and Spanish governments, during the conflicts in
Northern Ireland and the Basque region, did not accept responsibility for underlying
causes or for human rights abuses which escalated the conflict. This changed to some
degree ultimately in Northern Ireland, where from the late 1980s there was a more
serious attempt to deal with inequality, even if primarily driven by a ‘hearts and minds’
strategy to reduce support for the IRA within disadvantaged nationalist communities.

There is a more substantial engagement with linkages between conflict / terrorism and
underlying grievances by the India government that that suggested by the US National
Security Strategy. At times the language even goes further than the European Union, in
so far as it is also accepting some responsibility itself, for conflicts within its own
territory. However there is an inconsistency in the Indian position, an oscillation
between what at times seems like a long term commitment to deal with underlying issues
of inequality, land tenure, corruption and injustice and a tendency to see insurgents as
uneducated, a problem which will simply be dealt with by a more generalised process of
modernisation and economic development. This ambiguity causes real problems for
India as even large scale economic investment in ‘disturbed’ areas often makes no real
contribution to conflict resolution, or makes local corruption worse, as it occurs in a
political vacuum where other issues and underlying power relationships are not being
addressed

The Role of international law and the United Nations

India has a longstanding record of support for and high level of engagement in the
United Nations. When focused on international conflicts, this is the area where the
Indian position is at greatest distance from the USA. Two recent high level statements
reiterate the long-standing commitment to the organisation. The Joint India-EU
declaration on terrorism in 2010 states that both parties ‘Attach great importance to
counter terrorism cooperation in the framework of United Nations and share a
commitment to universal ratification and full implementation of all UN Counter
Terrorism conventions’. The 2011 Sanya declaration, signed by the Heads of State and Government of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa also asserted that ‘the United Nations has a central role in coordinating the international action against terrorism within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and norms of the international law’.

India’s commitment to UN peacekeeping, far exceeds that of European Union states in its commitment to UN-led peace keeping, where EU member states, with few exceptions have played a relatively small role in recent years. India had 8400 police and soldiers on UN led missions in July 2011. (Pakistan interestingly has slightly more with 10626 and Bangladesh had the highest number of any country at 10654). These South Asian states make up the top three contributors. No EU member state reached a figure of 2000 police and troops and all the battalion sized EU member state contributions were on the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon – a very specific UN deployment.

India’s opposition to the International Criminal Court, however, places it with the US position on this question and at odds with Europe, where despite intense US pressure all EU member states endorsed the founding Treaty. Bendiek and Wagner argues that India’s attitude to multilateralism is different form the EU’s (and by implication closer to the USA). They argue that India seek to pursue ‘a more traditional great power approach in contrast to the EU’ and in support of this they cite the ICC decision, India’s refusal to join the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and India’s long standing position of opposition to international involvement in any mediation attempts over Kashmir, despite an early acceptance of a UN supervised plebiscite. Without denying India’s ambitions to be recognised as a global and regional power, this is to misunderstand the strategic advantages India’s perceives from a more multilateral world order, which gives it greater freedom of manoeuvre between other powers. India has opposed the development of the doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’ seeing it as giving licence to the US and others to intervene in what it considers the internal affairs of states. This was India’s position at

the start of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya in 2011.\textsuperscript{50} Fear of external intervention on Kashmir and its perception of a threat from China certainly puts India firmly with the USA on the priority accorded to state interests and territorial security, however if the comparison is with ‘Europe’, including NATO and EU member states national security doctrines, rather than the EU per se the differences are not strong. If the question is one of support for the UN and opposition to unilateral military action by the USA and its allies then the Indian position on multilateralism is much closer to EU norms that US. Fundamentally Indian governments have seen their state interests as better secured in a world where US unilateral power is constrained by a mix of traditional multilateralism and in recent years a more assertive global position by emerging powers such as India, which can lead to cooperation with the USA on issues such as its nuclear deal, as well as balancing against the US on other occasions.

The question of the ICC is better explored within India’s position on the role of international law and in particular human rights law, which has on occasion been a source of some tension between the EU and India, with some Indian officials and politicians, at least in private, objecting to what they see as preaching from EU leaders. Without diminishing the very serious questions raised by Indian civil society and a very critical statement on Indian government treatment of human rights activists by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekagyya,\textsuperscript{51} the Indian government public position is no different to European states with internal conflicts. The EU position on the central role played by human rights violations in conflict escalation can only be realistically understood as referring to contexts outside of the EU. Certainly the Indian government has some serious issues to address and it needs to acknowledge to a much greater degree the role of human rights violations by security forces in deepening conflict. However in its public security strategy, its position is at least comparable to EU norms.

\textit{Regionalism}

Though not addressed in the US security strategy, the EU document rests implicitly on a certain understanding of regional integration playing a key role in building peace in Europe. The EU itself promotes this vision strongly for other regions in its external

\textsuperscript{50} For example, \textit{The Times of India}, 18 March 2011.

relations. A recent article by the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle is typical of the type of argument made by many senior European figures over the past 20 or 30 years: ‘The European Union is the most successful peace project in the history of our continent’. Despite a healthy scepticism about the external foreign policy capacity of the EU, its role in creating inter-state peace is often left uncontested in comparative discussions about SAARC. Even while the EU’s external reach is dismissed, it is assumed to have played a central role in the sustaining of inter-state peace within its own borders.

The EU experience in the two major conflicts on its own territory, Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, suggests that we should not set too high an ambition for SAARC in regional conflicts such as that in Kashmir. Certainly a better bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan will be essential if either SAARC is to develop or if the Kashmir dispute is to be resolved. The fringes of SAARC meetings may provide a useful informal meeting point for India and Pakistan. This was useful between Ireland and Britain for the Northern Ireland conflict. The EU experience suggests that SAARC is unlikely to play a significant role as an institution, but also that the strong focus on state sovereignty from India and Pakistan is not necessarily a barrier to progress. The UK was equally strong on the issue of state sovereignty and non-interference up until the 1990s, when some international (but not EU) interventions were accepted in the Northern Ireland case. Neither was the UK’s traditional view on sovereignty an insurmountable barrier to innovative institutional solutions and the use of international commissions in the 1998 agreement. More generally the Northern Ireland case suggests that external intervention was essential at various points in the process to make progress. That external intervention was however almost always from outside the EU, and probably needed to be.

Responses
The role of military force in Indian security responses clearly places India closer to the Bush administration, than the EU. With a large military, a nuclear arsenal and record of

55 See Doyle, “Re-examining the Northern Ireland conflict”, pp. 132-46.
deployment of very large numbers of troops – over 600,000 in Kashmir for example, armed force plays a leading role in security responses. Indian defence expenditure was US$41b in 2010 – a fraction of the expenditure by EU member states, but a greater proportion of GDP at 2.7%, compared to about 1.7% for the EU 27. The Military, paramilitary police units and armed local militias have also been used extensively against armed Maoist / Naxalite groups.

It would be wrong however to characterise India’s total response to insecurity as a military one. As the above discussion on links to underlying causes shows there are significant social and economic programmes aimed at winning ‘hearts and minds’ and occasionally at dealing with underlying problems, with all the limitations of their approach discussed above. The Indian state has also been very active in seeking to open negotiations with armed groups, in Nagaland and Assam, for example. The India state has called for discussions with Kashmiri militants and has appointed interlocutors. However such talks have not progressed as Kashmiri militants seek tri-party talks including Pakistan and India rejects that approach, on the grounds that it will not discuss internal affairs with Pakistan, while of course having a separate ‘composite dialogue’ with Pakistan on a range of issues including Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian state shows a strong military resolve, has used inappropriate levels of force on many occasions and has serious questions to address on human rights issues, however taken as a whole Indian public discourse on internal security matters sees more important roles for economic interventions and negotiations, than is suggested by the 2002 US document even if it has fallen down on the delivery and implementation of both.

On a global level the differences in approach between India and the USA are even stronger. Notwithstanding a major effort to build a close relationship with the US after 9-11 the Indian parliament unanimously ‘deplored’ the US invasion of Iraq. The then opposition Congress wanted an even stronger wording. India remains a strong supporter of the UN, even if this is partly driven by a desire for non-interference in states’ internal affairs, this is balanced by a major commitment of troops to peacekeeping.

58 The Times of India, 9 April 2003.
Conclusion

Indian approaches to security and conflict, contextualised by the well known US and EU security strategies offer a more nuanced view of security strategy than that which is commonly ascribed to India. The comparisons are not direct. While the US has suffered serious attacks conducted by its own citizens such as the Oklahoma bombing and individual attacks such as that in Fort Hood in 2009, it has not faced a sustained and organised armed campaign for political change. The focus on external threats and international security is therefore understandable. Likewise the EU as an institution has little competency and little experience dealing with the major armed conflicts within its member states – in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country in recent years and the Red Army Faction and Red Brigades in previous decades. The EU security strategy is therefore primarily driven by its external roles, while acknowledging the internal factors. India is simultaneously dealing with both sets of security challenges.

India security strategy reflects the simultaneous internal-external focus to a far greater extent that the US or the EU. It is both dealing with sustained armed conflicts within its borders and a volatile region with difficult relationships between neighbouring states. India also deals with far greater internal political and social diversity than the USA. Its internal diversity has been compared to that facing the EU in scale and complexity, but of course as a single state India has ultimate responsibility for the entire range of security strategies which are divided between state, the EU and NATO in Europe.

India’s view of external security is more nuanced than often assumed. It aspires to have influence as a large state and is very wary of according the international system any authority to intervene in internal security matters. Nonetheless the Nehruvian tradition of non-alignment and support for the UN retains some power. A pragmatic approach has seen much improved relations with the USA in the face of a strong domestic discourse opposing US foreign policy.

The comparison of India with the US and Europe brings some clarity. India retains some of the external focus on threats associated with the Bush administration in the USA, but its public discourse reflects a much greater priority given to understanding the underlying causes of conflict rather than simply seeing it as an evil to be defeated. Of course in identifying those causes there are differences within Indian discourse on issues
such as inequality and human rights but those differences also exist in Europe. India’s responses have been heavy handed at times and counter-productive but they do not, even internally, have the exclusive military focus of the 2002 US strategy.

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