

**From conflict to ownership:
Participatory approaches to the reintegration
of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone and Liberia**

Walt Kilroy, MA, Graduate Diploma in Journalism

Presented for the qualification of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

School of Law and Government
Dublin City University

Supervisor: Dr John Doyle

January 2012

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of PhD is entirely my own work, that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed: _____ (Candidate)

ID No: 86901907

Date: _____

**From conflict to ownership: Participatory approaches to the reintegration
of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone and Liberia**

Abstract

Programmes for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants have become a standard tool in peacebuilding. Empirical data on their effectiveness suggest varying degrees of success. The need for a more holistic, integrated approach has long been recognised, but rarely achieved. The reintegration of ex-combatants takes place in the community, and merges with development and post-conflict reconstruction. This study uses the concept of “participation” from development discourse, to look at reintegration in Sierra Leone and Liberia. A participatory approach allows potential stakeholders to have a say in how interventions are conceived and implemented. Participation is largely unexplored in the context of DDR. The study looks at the extent to which the programmes were participatory. It also seeks to identify the constraints and enabling factors in taking a participatory approach, and the impact on stakeholders. It is based on focus group discussions and surveys of ex-combatants, and semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders.

It finds that participation and ownership are only seen to a limited extent. Many ex-combatants felt they did not receive adequate or accurate information, that they had been misled, and that programmes did not meet their expectations. Opportunities to have a say in the process were limited. Women in particular were more likely to be excluded. More participatory processes were however noted in specific areas, such as the programmes for children.

Constraints included short timescales for implementation, security concerns, differing agendas, and post-war disruption. Participation proves to be a useful framework for assessing reintegration programmes, and for planning the more integrated approach which has long been advocated. More participatory approaches were also linked with better programme outcomes for ex-combatants, in terms of employment, relations with the community, and living conditions. They are also seen as helping to rebuild social capital, which is itself a contributory factor in terms of how participatory reintegration can support the broader objectives of peacebuilding. This wider agenda of peacebuilding, which is ultimately what DDR is supposed to be part of, is supported by a participatory approach to reintegration, and undermined by one in which there is little ownership by those directly involved.

Contents

Abstract	iii
Contents	iv
List of Figures	viii
List of Tables	x
Acknowledgements	xii
Abbreviations	xiii
 Introduction	 1
 Chapter 1: Analysing participation in DDR schemes	 4
Participation	17
Participation and DDR	34
Social capital and partnership	41
Conclusion	46
 Chapter 2: Methodology	 49
Ontology and epistemology	49
Mixed methods	52
Case selection	53
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	55
<i>Liberia</i>	57
Researcher bias	59
Field work	62
Qualitative data analysis: focus groups	72
Quantitative analysis: survey	74
Conclusion	75
 Chapter 3: Accessing information on reintegration programmes	 76
Receiving information about DDR	77
Accuracy	84
Conclusions	114

Chapter 4: Consultation and shared decision-making	116
Being asked for an opinion	117
<i>Who asked for your opinion on reintegration?</i>	<i>119</i>
Being listened to	120
<i>Were your views listened to?</i>	<i>120</i>
<i>Did they know your needs?</i>	<i>121</i>
<i>Being listened to (focus groups)</i>	<i>125</i>
<i>Did what you say have any effect?</i>	<i>128</i>
Lobbying for benefits	132
Participatory aspects in general	136
Making choices within DDR	136
Having a say in decisions and the Ladder of Participation	139
Suggested improvements, and why that might help	141
What would you avoid doing?	144
Conclusions	148
 Chapter 5: Effects of participation – quantitative measures	 151
Links between participatory indicators and programme outcomes	157
<i>Official advice</i>	<i>163</i>
<i>Being asked for one's opinion about reintegration</i>	<i>165</i>
<i>Having one's views listened to</i>	<i>167</i>
<i>Whether one's needs were known</i>	<i>168</i>
<i>What one said having any effect</i>	<i>169</i>
<i>Reintegration being explained</i>	<i>171</i>
<i>Right language being used</i>	<i>172</i>
<i>Enough information being provided</i>	<i>173</i>
<i>Information being accurate</i>	<i>176</i>
<i>Knowing where to get more information</i>	<i>179</i>
Endogeneity	180
Control Variables which were significant	182
Conclusions	182
 Chapter 6: Effects of participation – qualitative measures	 185
Programme outcomes	186
School and education	187
Stipends	188
Training	191
Corruption	202
Livelihoods	211

What elements were participatory?	212
Conclusions.....	217
Chapter 7: Conclusions	223
Participation as a lens for analysing reintegration	223
How participatory was reintegration?	224
Effects of participation.....	228
Social capital.....	231
Is participation possible in DDR?	239
Future research.....	242
In conclusion.....	243
Bibliography	245
Dates and locations of focus groups	256
List of interviewees.....	257
Appendix A: Statistical analysis of significant associations	A-1
Sierra Leone and Liberia together.....	A-1
<i>Regression/Logit</i>	A-2
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	A-7
<i>Fisher's exact/ANOVA: p values</i>	A-7
<i>Regression/Logit</i>	A-8
Liberia (Rural)	A-12
<i>Fisher's exact/ANOVA: p values</i>	A-12
<i>Regression/Logit</i>	A-13
Liberia (Urban)	A-17
<i>Fisher's exact/ANOVA: p values</i>	A-17
<i>Regression/Logit</i>	A-18
Appendix B: Statistical analysis of significant associations	B-1
Text of questions and translation into variables.....	B-1
Sierra Leone and Liberia combined.....	B-4
<i>Days worked (A14a)</i>	B-4
<i>Work status (A15)</i>	B-7
<i>Living conditions (A17)</i>	B-14
<i>Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)</i>	B-18
<i>Negative community view of ex-combatants (A22)</i>	B-20
Sierra Leone.....	B-24
<i>Days worked (A14a)</i>	B-24
<i>Work status (A15)</i>	B-26

<i>Living conditions (A17)</i>	B-28
<i>Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)</i>	B-29
Liberia (Rural)	B-31
<i>Days worked (A14a)</i>	B-31
<i>Work status (A15)</i>	B-34
<i>Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)</i>	B-38
<i>Negative community view of ex-combatants (A22)</i>	B-40
Liberia (Urban)	B-43
<i>Living conditions (A17)</i>	B-43
 Appendix C: Questionnaire used in field work	C-1
 Appendix D: Evolution of coding framework for analysis of focus group transcripts	D-1
Screenshots relating to coding process in NVivo	D-5

List of Figures

0.1: Representation of the word frequencies in focus group transcripts	xv
1.1: Flow chart for analysing whether problems relating to participation are inherent, inevitable, and resolvable.	32
3.01: Was reintegration explained?	79
3.02: How much information was provided by various sources.	81
3.03: Which three sources were the most helpful?	82
3.04: Amount, accessibility, and accuracy of language used.....	83
3.05: Reasons for discrepancies between what ex-combatants feel was promised to them, and what was actually delivered.	85
3.06: Was the information received accurate?	87
3.07: NCDDR reintegration identity card from Sierra Leone	91
3.08: How would ex-combatants include people, if asked to run a DDR programme?	106
3.09: Why would the suggested action help?.....	107
3.10: What would respondents avoid doing?	108
3.11: Why would it help to (as they suggest) avoid doing something?	110
3.12: What advice would ex-combatants have for some one else entering a DDR programme?	111
4.1: Being asked for an opinion about reintegration by country.....	118
4.2: Who asked you for your opinion during reintegration?	119
4.3: Were your views listened to?	120
4.4: Who listened to your views.....	121
4.5: Did the people running the programme know your needs?	122
4.6: How did they know your needs?.....	123
4.7: Did what you say have any effect?	129
4.8: Examples of what ex-combatants said having an effect on implementation .	130
4.9: Reasons why ex-combatants lobbied for benefits (focus groups).....	134

5.01: Predicted probability of work status, according to whether ex-combatants were asked for their opinion.....	166
5.02: Predicted probability of work status, according to whether what ex-combatants said had any effect	170
5.03: Mean number of days worked in the last month, according to whether the right language was used to explain reintegration.....	173
5.04: Predicted values for number of days worked in last month, according to whether enough information was received	174
5.05: Predicted probability of work status, according to whether enough information was received.....	175
5.06: Predicted probability for living conditions, according to whether enough information was received	176
5.07: Days worked in the last month according to accuracy of information received	177
5.08: Work status, according to accuracy of information received.....	178
5.09: Whether a positive view of the community is reported, according to whether the information received was accurate.....	179
5.10: Responses to four measures of information received on reintegration.....	181
 6.1: Interactions between livelihood, attitude to DDR, and experience of training.	191
6.2: How participation and programme outcomes affect attitudes.	220
6.3: The vicious circle of negative experiences and attitudes.....	221
 7.1: From reintegration to peacebuilding, mediated by participation and social capital.....	230
7.2: Some of the processes at work during reintegration which link participation and social capital	232
7.3: Participation and social capital	234

List of Tables

1.1: Pretty's typology of participation: how people participate in development programmes and projects	22
1.2: A Typology of Interests: Cornwall's of White's typology	24
2.1: Ongoing DDR programmes in 2006	54
2.2: Sub-groups within survey sample, compared with figures for those who participated in DDR.....	66
2.3: Dates and locations of focus group discussions.....	68
2.4: Themes highlighted in response to the open-ended question "What would you avoid doing?"	71
3.1: Amount of information, by rank	78
3.2: Whether information was received about reintegration.....	78
3.3: Whether reintegration was explained.....	79
3.4: How was reintegration explained?.....	80
3.5: Did ex-combatants know where to go for more information?	83
3.6: Accuracy of information received	88
3.7: Accuracy of information received, by child status	89
3.8: Sources of expectations mentioned in focus groups	95
3.9: Responses when ex-combatants were asked if they had anything else to add at the end of the survey	113
4.1: Being asked for an opinion about the reintegration phase	118
5.01: Differences between Sierra Leone and Liberia in survey results.....	154
5.02: Reintegration options chosen, broken down by urban/rural status	156
5.03: Measures of association for participatory and outcome variables (both countries combined)	158
5.04: Measures of association for participatory and outcome variables (Sierra Leone)	160
5.05: Measures of association for participatory and outcome variables (rural Liberia)	162

5.06: Measures of association for participatory variables and official advice	163
5.07: Receiving official advice and perception that the community has a positive view of ex-combatants	164
5.08: Measures of association for participatory variables and being asked for one's opinion	165
5.09: Measures of association for participatory variables and having one's views listened to.....	167
5.10: Measures of association for participatory variables and feeling one's needs are known	168
5.11: Measures of association for participatory variables and what one said having any effect	169
5.12: Predicted number of days worked and whether what one said had any effect.....	169
5.13: Measures of association for participatory variables and whether reintegration was explained	171
5.14: Measures of association for participatory variables and whether the right language was used.....	172
5.15: Measures of association for participatory variables and whether enough information was provided	173
5.16: Measures of association for participatory variables and whether the information was accurate.....	176
5.17: Measures of association for participatory variables and knowing where to get more information	179
5.18: Types of association between participatory variables and outcome indicators	184
6.1: Reintegration options selected by survey respondent	186
6.2: Whether training was completed	187
6.3: References to difficulties in school (focus groups).....	187
6.4: References to problems with stipends (focus groups)	189
6.5: References to problems with training (focus groups)	192

Tables in the Appendices are not included in this list.

Acknowledgements

If it takes a village to raise a child, this thesis has been nurtured by a wide network of villages across a few continents. To try to thank all those involved is a truly humbling task. None of this would have been possible, of course, without the help, openness and honesty of all those whose stories I have tried to include here. It was both a privilege and a responsibility to hear these accounts, wherever we talked – whether it was through survey instruments, focus groups, interviews, or personal conversations. This thesis is dedicated to all those involved in building a future for Sierra Leone and Liberia, be they former combatant, community members, or someone involved in the enormous and complex task of reconstruction and development.

My time in these countries was made fascinating and fruitful by many people, who are too numerous to mention. The research assistants and translators who worked with me and guided me include some very fine people who give me great hope for the future: Lynton Jones, Prince Scott, Marcus Jones, Samuel Kpanbayeazee Duworko, Santo Gonzeh, and Gonyeyee Bartuah. So many others in NGOs, agencies, and community groups small and large helped in countless ways.

Trócaire's staff were generous with their time, expertise, and vision, as always, including Aongus O'Keeffe in Sierra Leone, Róisín Gallagher and Liam Gilmore in Liberia, and Mark Cumming in Maynooth. The organisation's practical support and its interest in the project was invaluable.

The Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice in Dublin, which provided a three-year doctoral Solidarity Scholarship, was fundamental in seeing this project through. It was not just the financial and practical support, and the belief in the project which mattered. The friendship and heated debates in the kitchen did more to retain my sanity than might have been apparent. My thanks go to Fr Tony O'Riordan SJ and others at the Centre, including Berna, Cathy, Eoin, Gerry, Lena, Mags, and Margaret.

In Dublin City University, my supervisor, Dr John Doyle, provided the kind of support and encouragement on so many levels that most PhD students can only dream of. I have been so lucky to have had an adviser, collaborator, co-worker, supporter, and friend throughout this long project.

Dr David Doyle in DCU – classmate, friend, and adviser – was one of many people who helped me with specific aspects of this research. In this case, many hours generously given meant that regression analysis was made possible.

I was also privileged to attend two excellent and thought-provoking training courses on the reintegration of ex-combatants. I am most grateful to the organisers, trainers, and fellow participants. They were the DDR Planning Course run by Nodefic in Oslo in January 2007, and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants Advanced Training Course in Landgraaf in June 2009, run by International Alert and Irma Specht's Transition International.

Friends and family were simply that: friends and family. They also provided support in many ways as fellow researchers, guides, proof-readers, and more. This incomplete list includes those who helped by doing things, and those who helped by being who they are: Aurelie Sicard, Aurélien Tobie, Azra Naseem, Chris (who provided encouragement when it was needed), Des Molloy, Helen Basini (joint president of the IDRA), Hilke Linnartz, Ibrahim Bangura, Jim Rogers, Julia Mercier, Katie (whose quiet sleeping presence my study I still miss), Melanie Hoewer, Michael Cronin, Moire O'Sullivan, my mother Patricia Kilroy, Quique Bellver-Roses, Sinead Walsh, and many more.

The input of these and countless others has made the impossible possible. I will take responsibility for any mistakes in the final product. For me, the greatest gift is that I have made countless new friends and had so many opportunities to learn.

The support of the Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice and of Trócaire are gratefully acknowledged.

Abbreviations

AfD	Arms for Development
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
CAAFFG	Children Associated with Armed Forces and Fighting Groups
CAFF	Children Associated with Fighting Forces
CBR	Community-Based Reintegration
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CDF	Community Defence Forces
CEIP	Community Education and Investment Programme
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation [Liberia]
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Military Observer Group
ICC	Interim Care Centres
IDDRS	Integrated DDR Standards
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organisation
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NCDDR	National Commission on DDR
NCDDRR	National Commission on DDRR [Liberia]
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
PAR	Participatory Action Research
PM&E	Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation

PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RDS	Respondent-Driven Sampling
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SIDDR	Stockholm Initiative on DDR
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TSA	Transitional Support Allowance
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
WAAFFG	Women Associated with Armed Forces and Fighting Groups
XC	Ex-combatant (informal abbreviation used in some data analysis in this thesis)

Note: The process most commonly known as DDR was in Liberia designated DDDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation). For the purposes of consistency, this is referred to as DDR in this study, rather than using both names repeatedly when referring to the programmes in general.

Introduction

Programmes for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants have become an important part of the package of measures carried out under the heading of “peacebuilding”. They deal with a wide variety of aims in support of a peace process, from security concerns, stabilisation, and management of spoilers, to social and economic recovery of the country involved. If anything, they have been a victim of their own success, in the sense that they can be seen as something to be applied in most situations, although many voices warn that each DDR programme must relate to its particular context and conflict (for example, Stockholm Initiative on DDR 2006: pp. 41–45; Integrated DDR Standards 2006). The lessons learned have led to discussion of “second generation DDR”, which proposes a wider range of options, so that programmes can be more flexible and responsive to the local context and to input from the communities involved (Specht 2010; Colletta and Muggah 2009; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010).

The results of DDR have also been mixed. Some studies show real benefits for those ex-combatants who took part in reintegration programmes, in terms of their social and economic well-being (Pugel 2007). Others have failed to measure any significant benefit (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004), or have highlighted significant difficulties in trying to bring about social and economic reintegration (Jennings 2007), especially for women. One of the difficulties with reintegration programmes is that they interact with a wide range of issues, from security sector reform (Nathan 2007) and transitional justice (Cutter Patel 2009), to political and economic reconstruction. Sometimes the boundaries and lines of responsibility are not clear. The need for a holistic, integrated approach has long been recognised (Berdal 1996; Muggah 2005; Integrated DDR Standards 2006), but putting this into practice remains a challenge.

The conceptualization and practice of DDR has evolved since the early 1990s, as it increasingly became accepted as a standard programme to be included in comprehensive peace agreements. While there may still be lingering perception that it is a “cash for guns” deal, DDR has become a sophisticated and multi-faceted operation, often involving a dozen or more agencies.

The accepted definition of DDR within the UN system is:

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. ...

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

UN Secretary-General (2006a: p. 8)

The context in which DDR is supposed to take place can include destroyed infrastructure, economic disruption, population movement, trauma, and loss of social capital, amounting to a fragile or barely-existent state. Positive outcomes clearly will be difficult to achieve and many factors will interact with each other to provide both good and bad outcomes, not to mention disputes about whether any particular outcome is indeed “good” or “bad”. Nonetheless there have now been over 20 such schemes organised in the post Cold War period, most of them with international involvement. The literature as discussed in Chapter 1 has highlighted the inadequacies of early schemes and the need for holistic planning and operations, with broadly participatory approaches. It is fair to expect therefore that later schemes should have been informed by these earlier assessments: participation ought to be visible and its impacts should be capable of assessment. This thesis seeks to make such an assessment in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Since post-conflict reconstruction and recovery is the context, the framework used for this study is taken from the discourse within development: namely, a participatory approach to designing and implementing programmes. The term “participation” in this study is taken from the development context, as explained by Robert Chambers (1997; 1998), and as promoted by those agencies committed to a partnership approach to development work through nationally-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This requires, among other things, that the intended beneficiaries of a development programme are genuinely involved in, consulted on, and make input to, the main stages of its planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This study

considers the difficulties and shortfalls in implementing DDR, and asks to what extent a participatory approach was taken in the case study countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone). It also asks whether those ex-combatants who experienced a more participatory approach during reintegration have had better outcomes in social and economic terms.¹

This thesis explores the DDR schemes in two cases which share some important characteristics – they are both small post-conflict West African states and the schemes took place in a similar time frame (1999 to 2002 in Sierra Leone and 2003 to 2009 in Liberia). It is based on fieldwork, including interviews, surveys and focus groups carried out with ex-combatants, people in communities in which ex-combatants sought re-integration, and those involved in running the DDR schemes. The thesis seeks to analyse the extent to which the DDR programmes were participatory, the type, level and context of participation, and the effects of participation on programme outcomes in those places where participatory approaches were found.

Chapter 1 contextualises this work within the existing literature on DDR, it explores the concept of participation in a development and post-conflict context, and explores a typology, based on the work of Pretty (1995) through which levels of participation might be analysed. Chapter 2 discusses the methodological approach. Chapters 3 to 6 set out and discuss the evidence gathered in fieldwork. Chapter 3 explores the way in which information about DDR was passed to ex-combatants, the amount of information, and its accuracy or quality. Chapter 4 analyses the two-way information flow: the extent to which the views of ex-combatants were passed on, sought, or considered by those designing and running the programmes. Chapter 5 considers the effects of a participatory approach (such as it existed) on programme outcomes, based on quantitative data. Chapter 6 considers the same question, based on the qualitative data. Finally, the Conclusions (Chapter 7) seek to both evaluate the evidence in this particular study, and also draw broader conclusions about the way in which DDR interacts with the peace process, which can be generalised to the wider debates.

¹ The term “ex-combatant” is used throughout this thesis to mean all those who were associated with armed forces or fighting groups. It is not limited to those who actually fought, carried a weapon, or had a gun to ensure their entry to a DDR programme. It therefore covers those whose roles included cooks, porters, intelligence gatherers, and “bush wives” who may have been subjected to forced marriage with combatants or commanders. Also, for the sake of simplicity, the abbreviation “DDR” is used throughout this work to mean the programmes of both countries, even though it was known as DDDR in Liberia (where the additional “R” referred to “rehabilitation”). Similarly, the term “post-conflict” is used at times in place of “post-war”. It indicates the period after armed conflict; the conflict itself may in fact persist to some degree, but is not expressed in terms of organised political violence.

Chapter 1: Analysing participation in DDR schemes

An annual overview of all DDR processes currently underway has been produced since 2006 at the Escola de Cultura de Pau at Barcelona Autonomous University (Caramés, Fisas and Luz 2006; Escola de Cultura de Pau 2007 and 2008; Caramés and Sanz 2009). The 2008 version compares 19 different programmes, using a very broad definition of DDR which includes schemes which are not generally active (such as Chad or Côte d'Ivoire), or which deal with just one participant in the conflict (such as the AUC militia in Colombia). Of these 19 cases, three were in Asia (Nepal, Indonesia and Afghanistan); two in the Americas (Colombia and Haiti); and the rest in Africa. The review estimates that these programmes involved 1.1 million ex-combatants at some stage in the processes, although not all in that particular year. The total cost of these programmes over their lifetimes is estimated at US\$1.599 billion.

The importance of a holistic approach for DDR was recognised as early as the mid 90s, at the level of planning, funding, and ensuring that there is effective transition from demobilisation to reintegration (for example, by Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996). However, the reality is that while a holistic approach has often been advocated, putting this into practice involves considerable challenges. The difficulties include the short time frames demanded for starting DDR when an agreement is imminent; the large number of actors involved, often with different organisational cultures and agendas; and the fact that funding is more likely to be available for dealing with the hardware (disarmament), rather than for the longer term work of reintegration.

DDR is best viewed as an integrated *set* of processes, which are themselves a part of the wider peace process. It has the capacity to provide positive or negative feedback into the peace process. The possible feedbacks arise from confidence building between parties, opening lines of communication, addressing interests, and providing incentives at a number of levels. It can also bring tensions to the surface, especially when resources or jobs are to be divided up, or where local commanders' interests diverge from those of their leaders or the combatants. Clearly, the relationship between ex-combatants and the communities where they settle can also be a difficult one.

Berdal describes “an interplay, a subtle interaction, between the dynamics of a peace process” and how DDR is implemented (1996: p. 73). DDR cannot bring political agreement on its own, and a peace process which collapses will leave a DDR programme in an untenable position, as seen in the failure of the first DDR programme in Angola (Gomes Porto and Parsons 2003). Kingma (1997) says that DDR can contribute to peacebuilding and human security – and indeed had been “critical in making the peace hold” in Mozambique (Kingma 2000: p. 241). He is among several authors to emphasize that demobilisation on its own cannot guarantee the success of a peace process. It is a political enterprise, and ultimately depends on the political will to reach and implement a settlement.

Peacebuilding goes beyond the narrow conception of DDR in a number of respects: it considers what constituencies are supporting the implementation of a peace agreement, as well as those who oppose it. Underlying causes are also considered, and the role of issues besides DDR such as security sector reform (SSR), and rule of law is acknowledged. These related areas are in fact considered also by the broader, holistic, integrated conceptions of DDR which a number of authors have called for.

Some of the challenges faced by a peacebuilding approach parallel those faced by integrated DDR: the agenda is broader, but is consequently more diffuse. Also, because a wider range of actors is involved, engagement with a highly diverse group of organisations and constituencies is implied. In addition, longer timeframes are called for, even though attention spans and funding cycles may be relatively short, in supporting the implementation of an agreement (rather than just deploying peacekeepers to monitor a ceasefire). This is a parallel of the way that sustainable economic and social reintegration is a longer term process which merges into reconstruction and development. Finally, peacebuilding, human security and DDR all have a fundamental relationship with development, and its role in underpinning a peace process. It is not just a matter of adding one more ingredient to the mix: policy coherence and interaction effects mean that DDR must not only be approached in a holistic way. Its real contribution is the “interplay” between DDR implementation and the peace process referred to by Berdal (1996: p. 73). For all of these reasons, DDR’s conceptual home is in many ways the emerging model of peacebuilding, with which it has co-evolved since the early 1990s.

DDR is generally credited with positive interactions with the peace process, and possible handling of potential spoilers and interest groups. It is seen as a way of building confidence, when it runs well. On the question of reducing the number of guns in circulation, there is no

assumption that all the weapons used in a conflict can be gathered in a DDR process. However, tens of thousands of weapons are typically taken in, and an apparent reduction in weapons circulating has been noted, for example, in Sierra Leone (Berman and Labonte 2006).

On the other hand, a number of recurrent shortcomings have been identified. These problems include the exclusion and marginalization of women and of girls, who have had different experiences than male fighters, generally suffer more abuse, and who can face greater problems when it comes to reintegrating. In Sierra Leone – one of the countries which is often cited as a more successful DDR programme – women were under-represented among those demobilising. There are several reasons for this, including stigma and fear of being identified as an ex-combatant; being excluded from the programme by commanders who wanted others to benefit instead from registering as an ex-combatant; and not qualifying for the programme, as they did not have a weapon to hand in. There can be real difficulties in setting the “entry price” to a DDR programme – the amount of hardware to be handed in. Setting it too low (as happened in Liberia) means the system has to cater for many who were not in fact ex-combatants, while setting the type or amount of arms at too high a level excludes those who did not have access to these at the time of disarmament. In Liberia’s final programme, 28,314 weapons were surrendered, although this gives a ratio of just 0.26 when compared with the 107,000 supposed ex-combatants who demobilised. In Sierra Leone, the ratio was higher, at 0.58, based on 42,300 weapons for 72,500 ex-combatants by 2002 (Caramés, Fisas and Luz, 2006: 22).

Besides the growing recognition of the importance of an integrated approach, DDR’s essential link with recovery programming and development is also more widely acknowledged now. The UNDP (2005a: p. 5) describes it as “a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic dimensions”, and says that while much of the programme focuses on ex-combatants, “the main beneficiaries of the programme should ultimately be the wider community” (2005a: p. 11). DDR must therefore be “conceptualized, designed, planned and implemented within a wider recovery and development framework.” (2005a: p. 6). The real challenge, as mentioned already, remains the problem of economic reintegration, in a situation where the labour market offers few opportunities for those who have been trained as part of DDR. Many ex-combatants will judge the entire programme on the basis of whether they can find a livelihood after they have handed in their guns, or end up without work and living in desperate poverty. The evaluation and design of DDR programmes is therefore not just a technical matter or the removal of guns, rather it is central to the entire peacebuilding project.

The evolution of DDR literatures

As the practice of DDR has developed in the field, so too has the policy literature which reflects and facilitates this process of exploration. Berdal (1996) was among the early writers on DDR, drawing on the small number of cases underway at the time. He comes to definite conclusions about the best way to approach DDR: that it should be agreed during the main peace talks; that an integrated, holistic approach to the various elements of DDR is needed; that local capacity and credibility must be built; and that reintegration is linked with the development of the local economy and capacities. It is interesting to note how early on in the experience of DDR the need for a holistic approach to DDR was recognized; the reality is that while it has often been advocated, putting it into practice involves considerable challenges. The difficulties include the short time frames demanded for starting DDR when an agreement is imminent; the large number of actors involved, often with different organizational cultures and agendas; and the fact that funding is more likely to be available for dealing with the hardware (disarmament), rather than for the longer term work of reintegration.

Best practice and Assessment

A growing body of guidelines, manuals, and best practice on DDR has been developed in recent years, which attempt to set out the “lessons learned”. They generally recognise the importance of considering relations with stakeholders, and the sense of inclusion in the process by the community and ex-combatants. Again, participation may not necessarily be explicitly mentioned, but this in essence what is being referred to, for example in the UNDP’s *Practice Note* (2005a), the *Final Report* (2006) of the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR). The UN’s Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) (2006) says that the involvement of ex-combatants, communities, and other stakeholders in DDR is implicit in the guiding principles of the IDDRS: its associated Operational Guide (2006: p. 26) says that the process should be: people-centred; flexible, transparent and accountable; nationally-owned; integrated; and well planned.

Most of the reviews of DDR programmes have been largely qualitative in nature, in the attempt to tease out causal mechanisms and assess their impact. A more explicitly quantitative approach has also emerged, mainly using two large datasets. These relate to Sierra Leone, where more than 70,000 ex-combatants eventually went through DDR up to 2004, and for neighbouring Liberia, whose main DDR programme started in 2003. Humphreys and Weinstein (2005, 2007 and 2009) based their work on a sample of 1,043 ex-combatants conducted in 2003, shortly after

Sierra Leone's 11-year war had ended, while reintegration was still underway. In a finding they describe as surprising, the regression analysis showed no evidence that ex-combatants who took part in DDR fared any better, compared to those who did not go through the programme. They note that these results should be treated with caution (2007: p. 563), and acknowledge that the longer-term effects of DDR are not explored in the study (2009: p. 67).

It is also important to note that even though 87% of the respondents had entered the DDR programme, less than half of the total sample (46%) had actually completed it at the time the survey was carried out (2009: p. 57). A comparison however between those who did not take part in DDR at all, and those entered and completed the programme, does not show any significant difference, on the basis of the measures of reintegration which they have come up with (2009).

Molloy (unpublished), who was involved in implementing the programme and assisted in the logistical arrangements for the data-gathering field work for the study in 2003, suggests that those ex-combatants who did not go through DDR may have had additional coping mechanisms or support, which the others did not, and that this may be why no effect is detected. He suggests that despite the considerable rigour with which the survey was devised, error may have arisen from the way in which measures of complex variables such as reintegration were operationalised in the study. Humphreys and Weinstein return to these questions of possible selection effect and sample bias (2009), but say the effect could go in either direction – to underestimate the impact of DDR, or indeed to overstate it.

In Liberia, Pugel (2007) carried out a complementary large-N survey in 2006, using randomized sampling methods. In contrast to the Sierra Leone study, he found that those who went through the full DDR programme were significantly better off in terms of their economic and social situation, compared with those who did not enter DDR:

In almost every sub-facet of the dimensions of reintegration (social, economic, and political), the DDRR program completers were decisively more advanced in their efforts to reintegrate than those combatants that chose self-reintegration or any other category, for that matter.

(Pugel 2007: p. 64)

Pugel argues that further work is required to develop accurate measures of reintegration, so that the impact of DDR can be quantified (Pugel 2009).

Hill, Taylor, and Temin confirmed the importance of economic marginalization in undermining a peace process, in their survey of ex-combatants in Lofa County in Liberia (2008). It found that the most commonly cited reasons for considering a return to combat included poverty and economic disadvantage, followed by a lack of jobs, benefits, or training and this is confirmed by a study of the re-recruitment of former child soldiers from Sierra Leone and Liberia following a failure to complete DDR, by Human Rights Watch (2005). From the point of view of participatory programming, the Human Rights Watch report usefully highlights three weaknesses, especially in the Sierra Leonean experience: (1) corruption, in which commanders or DDR staff misappropriated or sold on the benefits or places intended for ex-combatants, or demanded a percentage of the allowances paid out; (2) the lack of an effective grievance procedure for ex-combatants to seek redress for these problems; and (3) no job opportunities in the field for which they had received training. The lack of both accountability and a grievance procedure are particularly relevant, and reveal a failure to meet the most basic participatory criteria. It says that while monitoring mechanisms focussed on the risk of high-level misappropriation, “the commanders’ participation in the implementation of the programme was not sufficiently monitored to stamp out corruption at the lower level.” (p. 50).

Utas (2005) takes an ethnographic approach to the study of ex-combatants in Liberia, mainly in the relatively peaceful interlude around 1998 which followed the election of Charles Taylor as president the previous year. He focuses on the marginalisation of youth, both before and after their involvement in war, and how taking up arms was a way of overcoming the social and economic exclusion which they faced. This raises the question of how they might be meaningfully engaged in participatory reintegration, if their experience is one of disempowerment by returning to civilian life. The way in which some were “enmeshed in patron networks” (p. 145) involving their former commanders is highlighted, as is the persistence of the “war-friend network” (p. 148), which might see ex-combatants living and working together after demobilisation. This is relevant to the question of inclusion and ownership of the process of reintegration, while the explicit recognition of disempowerment represents an extreme example of non-participatory practices.

Utas emphasises the very different experience of ex-combatants in rural, semi-urban, and urban areas. In one rural area studied, the “process of spontaneous social reintegration was remarkably rapid”, with ongoing “discourses of reconciliation” (p. 145). Some of those in the city, however, were unlikely to be reintegrated, despite taking part in programmes from time to time to assist them. The importance of context for the success of reintegration (in this case, urban versus

rural) is interesting. His perspective is one which fundamentally questions the appropriateness of outside agencies' interventions to assist the process, and highlights situations where the approach was inflexible, unreceptive to knowledge from the field, destined to fail, and possibly counterproductive. The image he presents of these earlier phases of Liberia's DDR is, by implication, that of a non-participatory programme, which was insensitive to the realities of the situation and the needs of the supposed beneficiaries. It should be noted that the analysis does not address the principal DDRR programme, which began later.

One interesting challenge when it comes to a participatory approach which is mentioned relates to involving participants in identifying their own needs, rather than establishing them without consultation. Utas cites an example where only three cars were registered in one county, yet half of all youth surveyed there wanted to be mechanics. Despite being informed of the labour market realities, the agency "rushed the programme... and began to educate youth in just those trades for which there was no demand." (p. 145). The dilemma is that the unsustainable projects were the ones which participants themselves said they wanted; it suggests that needs assessment and consultation are subtle and perhaps time-consuming processes, which call for effective information sharing, reconciling the perspectives of different actors, and building local capacity.

The inclusion of intended beneficiaries' views which is called for by participation is not limited to ex-combatants. Gamba (2006) looks at the contribution of recent African initiatives such as the AU and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) to the conceptualisation of DDR. She says the traditional view is of DDR as being "a conflict resolution at the end of a process" (p. 73). She contrasts this with an African understanding of it being a means of conflict prevention at the beginning of a process; it is a broader and longer-term perspective, which includes more actors (such as communities) and aspects (such as reconciliation). She also highlights the importance of a regional umbrella of supportive states assisting the implementation of a peace agreement. While not explicitly addressing participation, her vision of DDR is one which is closely linked to the essential elements of a participatory approach: she advocates an approach which is more inclusive, enjoys a greater degree of ownership, and is more closely integrated into the wider processes of reconstruction and development: "Ultimately, DDR is the first step in construction of the new order, rather than the last step of something that has ceased to be." (p. 74).

Initiatives later on in the process, and indeed even after formal DDR has ended, can offer more potential for a participatory approach, as time constraints ease. Miller, Ladouceur and Dugal

(2006) look in detail at the community weapons collection programmes in Sierra Leone which followed DDR, such as the Arms for Development (AfD) initiative. While these are distinct programmes, some of the issues involved in asking communities to voluntarily surrender weapons after a conflict, in return for a collective incentive, are similar to challenges in implementing DDR. Having critically reviewed the history of DDR in its three phases in Sierra Leone, they went on to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the AfD. In terms of a participatory approach to the sensitive question of voluntarily surrendering weapons, one of the four key concepts underlying the programme which they identify is a grassroots approach. Success was enhanced by a community-led approach, in which the community chose the development project which would be funded in return for the surrender of weapons remaining after the war:

Broad-based consultations were held for the choice of the community project [to be funded] in each chiefdom. The final selection was made by secret ballot by representatives of all sections of the chiefdom, including the various social groups (women, youth, elders and so on). The implementation of the project was the responsibility of the community, with the support of the UNDP and the DDR section of UNAMSIL.

(Miller, Ladouceur and Dugal 2006: p. 18)

They say the knowledge that the community stood to gain or lose, depending on whether it was certified as “weapons free”, meant there was pressure on individuals who had still not surrendered a weapon, in a close-knit community with few secrets. The model here is one of active participation in determining how the programme would be run, with a high level of community ownership of the scheme. When comparing it with the disarming of ex-combatants immediately after a ceasefire, it is worth pointing out that this inclusive approach emerged after three phases of DDR, and one earlier version of community weapons collection, over a number of years in Sierra Leone.

Cock (2004) argues that there is a major gap in the literature on peacebuilding and demobilisation: it is the absence of a sociological lens, focussing on the social interaction between groups and individuals involved in the process. She describes demobilisation and reintegration as “a microcosm of peace-building as a social process” (p. 119). This highlights the need for an approach such as participatory methods, which values the means (a social process) by which the ends are achieved. Knight and Özerdem (2004: p. 512) refer to the importance of belief in the process, and how this can be undermined by bad practices. They

stress the importance of setting up a non-corruptible identification system, in order to create and maintain confidence in the distribution of benefits, on the part of both the beneficiaries and the donors contributing towards the programme.

One of the key aspects of participation is effective two-way communication, including information campaigns for ex-combatants and local communities. The need to communicate effectively has been highlighted in Liberia, where significant proportions of these groups were labouring under misapprehensions about the benefits they were entitled to, with all the attendant dangers of resentment over timing or unrealistic expectations (UNDP 2005b).

Resentment can be driven by the perception of what incentives are available for other groups, even more than the reality. DDR without an effective communications or public awareness strategy can have “disastrous” consequences, according to Muggah (2005):

The pursuit of DDR in West Africa and the Philippines has shown how the mismanagement of expectations and inadequate preparation for disarmament generated counterproductive, even lethal, outcomes. In Liberia more than three times the anticipated number of claimants demanded ‘reintegration’ benefits and rioted when turned away. Similarly, a reintegration industry has been spawned in Mindanao, where international agencies such as the UNDP and USAID continue to support tens of thousands more MNLF excombatants and dependants than are believed to exist.

(Muggah 2005: pp. 246–247)

Jennings (2009) refers to the “securitisation” of the project of reintegration in Liberia. Rather than aiming to transform ex-combatants into productive citizens, the real aim is “the temporary removal of idleness from a presumably fractious and discontented ex-combatant population in order to buy time for the transitional and elected governments and UN mission in Liberia” (2009: p. 477). She also highlights the highly gendered impact of this approach, which sees male idleness as a problem, and undervalues female reintegration.

Batchelor and Kingma’s edited three-volume study (2004a; 2004b; 2004c) looks at demobilisation and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, during the significant reduction in armed conflict which followed the end of the Cold War and of the apartheid regime. Its definition of the rather broad concept of peacebuilding includes demobilisation and reintegration (Batchelor and Kingma 2004d, pp. 8–9). The use of the term “demobilisation” by Kingma especially (2004; 1997), includes the general process of downsizing of state military forces, leaving the

institutions in place even if their post-conflict role is different. This is very different to the demobilisation which is part of “classic” DDR, and is not a part of this thesis. Two of the cases which Kingma considers fall into this category: in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the original state forces and several liberation paramilitary groups were merged in a new entity, which was then reduced in size by up to a third within a few years. While the process of demobilising these combatants was not DDR, it is worth noting how ineffective measures to reintegrate veterans in Zimbabwe were a cause of unrest 17 years after the war had ended. Compensation payments to ex-combatants in 1997–98 which followed these protests were estimated to amount to about three per cent of GDP, possibly contributing to the country’s economic crises (p. 148).

Namibia’s DDR was a very early example in which about 50,000 fighters from both main groups were demobilised by 1989. The programme ran relatively smoothly at first, but did not have a coherent plan for their economic reintegration. The veterans remained a coherent political force: for several years, there were demonstrations, and government announcements about new aid packages for them (pp. 142–144). In terms of participation, there was a clear failure to plan for their needs as the country became independent.

Angola’s first two DDR programmes, which were written into the Bicesse (1991) and Lusaka (1994) peace agreements, were failures. Lack of political will on the part of the belligerents, and ultimately a return to war, made DDR impossible. However, it is worth noting that even at the initial stage of running disarmament camps, the basic needs of those turning up to hand over their weapons were not provided for. By early 1997, 26,400 UNITA fighters had left the camps, many of them with their weapons, after waiting for months without basic services (Kingma 1997). The first disarmament process “was also unable to account for most of the weaponry.” (Kingma 2004, p. 138). These DDR programmes could not have survived the reverses and ultimate collapse of the peace process; however, their failure to provide for the ex-combatants’ basic requirements was far from the beneficiary-driven needs assessment called for by a participatory approach.

Kingma’s analysis of whether these demilitarisation programmes contributed to peacebuilding in the region contains some points which are relevant to participation. He says that if there is no definite process to increase civilian involvement in decision-making and democratisation, new conflicts can emerge or old ones reignite. Opportunities for ex-combatants to establish new livelihoods “have a crucial bearing on the threat of conflict in the region” (p. 152). High

expectations about a new life can be followed by frustration when they are not met, or when others are perceived to be receiving better treatment. Generous demobilisation packages were offered to Renamo leaders in Mozambique, for example, as an incentive for them to follow through on their commitment. “Providing clarity about assistance at an early stage is important. In several cases, ex-combatants have demonstrated their potential for violence in order to put pressure on donors to commit more resources to reintegration programmes” (p. 155). The relevance of this is that the management of expectations is an outcome of participatory planning, through the process of communication and consultation.

Kingma says that by subjecting ex-combatants to confusing delaying tactics over reintegration, problems are simply created for the future. Without actually using the term “participation”, he refers to one of its core principles when advocating more appropriate reintegration assistance:

In order to respond to the real needs of the ex-combatants, reintegration assistance programmes might best be designed (and if need be, amended) through a process of continuing dialogue with the ex-combatants and their communities – particularly women. ‘Top down’ assistance does not nurture self-reliance and initiative.

(2004: p. 156)

More recent developments point to greater flexibility in the approach to DDR, in which a menu of options is available at the reintegration phase rather than a model which is treated as a standardised blueprint. These approaches have been termed “second generation DDR” (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010). In principle, they involve the receiving community to a greater extent, and address the economic and social context into which ex-combatants are reintegrating. Colletta and Muggah (2009) and Muggah (2010a) have highlighted the way in which DDR should be seen as just one of several initiatives, which are now being incorporated into a broader range of stabilisation options.

Brethfeld’s (2010) review of the ongoing DDR programme in Southern Sudan highlighted the importance of involving communities and local administration at all stages of the planning process, including decision-making. She says that they know the local context best; that they will be at the forefront of reintegration efforts, even if they are not formally involved; and that they will also end up providing resources for returnees and dealing with any tensions which arise. She suggests including local community committees to monitor reintegration, public forums for ex-combatants and communities to talk together, and reconciliation activities where necessary. Specht’s (2010) description of Community-Based Reintegration (CBR) is another

emerging concept which has not been widely implemented, but which shows significant potential because of its more participatory approach, among other things. It too involves a range of options, where activities are not only carried out in the community, but are implemented and even chosen with much greater consultation and shared decision-making than in traditional DDR. The distinguishing feature of these new approaches is not only their built-in flexibility, which is intended to adapt to local contexts, but the participatory aspects of making choices in light of community views, with the decision sometimes even being made directly by the community.

Gender

The question of gender is significant at many levels when considering DDR. Combatants' experiences are a function of gender even before they become participants in the war, during it, at the DDR stage, and in post-war society. During the war, women are more vulnerable to sexual- and gender-based violence, and the presumption that they have been subjected to this can follow them after the war, along with the attendant stigma which can go with that. The question of stigma in general may make women more reluctant to enter a DDR programme, for fear of being identified as an ex-combatant. This can be compounded by the question of photographs being taken for identity cards issued to ex-combatants so that they can claim benefits such as training allowances. Generally, women and girls have not benefited from DDR programmes to the same extent as men, and have often experienced lower participation rates than men (Specht 2006; de Watteville 2002; McKay and Mazurana 2004; Bouta 2005; Brett and Specht 2004; Jennings 2009). They may be excluded by non-inclusive programming, or a requirement to hand in a weapon as the entry price for DDR – something they are less likely to have, given the roles assigned to them during the war. Furthermore, there is much less recognition of the identity of female war veteran, compared with the same role for men. The economic challenges faced by ex-combatants are also a function of gender.

However, it is important to note that Coulter (2008) underlines the importance of challenging the stereotype that women associated with armed groups were inevitably victims. This reification conceals the full range of roles they may play as social and political actors. Their choices in war were at best circumscribed, and they were indeed more vulnerable to sexual abuse and forced labour than men. But the victim-perpetrator dichotomy does not help us to understand the situation – an observation which is indeed useful to bear in mind in all our

considerations. Coulter points out that war also provided women with some alternatives to local feminine conventions.

The exclusion and under-representation of women and girls in DDR programmes is in itself a measure of participation, given that all sections of the community would be expected to be involved in a participatory process. Failure to include members of these groups in a programme, or the fact that their views and needs were overlooked, indicates the absence of a participatory approach. The fact that the exclusion coincides with a cleavage in society which has a significant power aspect to it compounds the problem. The difference in the experiences faced by women is not simply a question of a group which faces a degree of marginalisation: it is a question of gender itself. This means that we cannot consider the matter without looking at the social constructs which form the context. It is not just about “women’s roles” in society, but is also about how men’s roles are constructed, and the types of masculinity which are recognised and endorsed.

Children

Others who have had specific experiences of war, DDR, and post-war life are of course those often referred to informally as “child soldiers”, who are more properly called Children Associated with Armed Forces and Fighting Groups (CAAFFG). (This term recognises the fact that despite the popular image, many were not actually carrying guns, but were part of the armed groups nevertheless in another role.) An understanding of their experiences, motivations, and needs is important when it comes to designing the distinct process of demobilisation and rehabilitation for them (McConnan and Uppard 2001; Verhey 2001; Brett and Specht 2004). Generally, the practice is that they would be separated from adult combatants on arrival at a demobilisation camp, and moved shortly after to a specialised centre catering for their needs. Their experience is different in many respects, to state the obvious. In terms of participation, they face a different prospect when it comes to having their voices heard, or being consulted on their wishes. While their age may work against them in some respects, they are more likely to be dealt with an entirely different agency than adults, with a more child-centred approach.

As the above discussion of the development literature to date shows, many authors have highlighted the inadequacies of DDR programmes and the difficulties caused by a lack of consultation or participation. However even when this is recognised, there seems to be little progress in achieving it in practice. Many factors can explain such limited progress including a

shortage of finance, organisational inertia and a lack of institutional learning processes. However it also needs to be acknowledged that “participation” or “participatory approaches” are not uncontested and are difficult to conceptualise, define and operationalise. The very concept of participation therefore needs to be explored.

Participation

The degree to which communities and ex-combatants are effectively engaged in DDR, and have any sense of ownership or long-term inclusion in the process, has been raised repeatedly in the literature on DDR. The way in which outside agencies operate has also been identified as a persistent difficulty, along with the failure to take an integrated approach to reintegration and development, despite the broad recognition given to these as factors for success. Some of these difficulties parallel the experience of development interventions in general, where the interaction between outside actors and intended beneficiaries has been seen as part of the problem (as well as the solution). One of the responses from both development discourse and practice has been to promote participatory approaches, in which previously excluded stakeholders are given more opportunity to influence the process. The concept is multifaceted, and is not uncontested. However, it offers much as a way of analysing similar difficulties which continue to arise in DDR programmes. It is therefore proposed as a framework for looking at reintegration programmes in particular, with particular emphasis on the “ladders” or typologies of participation which have been drawn up.

Emergence of participation as a concept and definitions

To put them in their historical context, ideas promoting popular involvement in decision-making have found their place in the discourse on political structures since the 1960s. Radical alternatives to traditional representative democracy were discussed, and more accountable democratic structures were also considered. Exclusion on the basis of gender, race, or other status was firmly on the agenda. In the area of development, simplistic ideas such as modernisation theory were losing credibility; development could no longer be seen as a technical issue, to be dealt with in terms of macro-economics and physical infrastructure. It was recognised as an essentially political process, in which the governments and even peoples of poorer countries would have to be recognised as agents of change, rather than the recipients of Western (or Soviet) goods and enlightenment. Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) made

the conscientisation and empowerment of a previously voiceless group not just a means of carrying out development, but an end in itself. In this context, it now seems inevitable that questions would arise about exactly how the supposed beneficiaries of outside intervention should be involved in decision-making processes, once the power dynamic of such engagements had been placed on the agenda.

Although it has many manifestations, participation is most closely associated with Robert Chambers, (1983, 1994, 1997 and 1998). However, the idea appears in a number of different contexts within development, and is still regarded as an emerging and sometimes nebulous concept. This polyvalence can present a problem, as noted by Cornwall (2008): “An infinitely malleable concept, ‘participation’ can be used to evoke – and to signify – almost anything that involves people. As such, it can easily be reframed to meet almost any demand made of it. So many claims to ‘doing participation’ are now made that the term has become mired in a morass of competing referents.” (p. 269). This is significant regarding any discussion of participation; some critiques of participation are responding to a failure to realise participation, rather than the essentials of the concept itself.

Edwards, as early as 1989, noted that participation “has become a vogue word, generating a great deal of sloppy thinking in the process. We now use the word to cover a wide variety of situations without specifying who is participating in what, and why” (p. 126). For him, the real significance is the *way* in which solutions are found, and that “a genuine understanding of these problems can come about only through listening and learning ‘from below’.” (p. 126). The variety of ways in which the term is used does not however render the concept useless, provided there is clarity about the intended meaning. Some writers are clear about the term, and show internal consistency. The process of disambiguation is greatly helped by the typologies or ladders of participation which have been developed, and which are discussed in more detail later.

Long (2001) defines participation within the somewhat restricted context of development projects which are implemented with outside support. Central to it are primary stakeholders, for whom participation means “involvement of poor and marginalized people in decision-making roles regarding all important aspects of donor-funded projects or policies” (p. 2). Cooke and Kothari describe it thus:

The ostensible aim of participatory approaches to development was to make ‘people’ central to development by encouraging beneficiary involvement in

interventions that affect them and over which they previously had limited control or influence. ... This recognition and support for greater involvement of 'local' people's perspectives, knowledge, priorities and skills presented an alternative to donor-driven and outsider-led development and was rapidly and widely adopted by individuals and organisations. Participatory approaches to development, then, are justified in terms of sustainability, relevance and empowerment.

(Cooke and Kothari 2001b: p. 5)

Fundamentally, it involves input into designing and implementing a programme, and a degree of ownership, by those whom it is intended to benefit, and by other affected stakeholders. What is also fundamental to the idea of participation is that the power relationships involved in development are openly recognised, and in some cases are directly addressed (Nelson and Wright 1995; Guijt and Shah 1998; Cornwall 2004; Kelly 2004). It goes beyond consultation and tokenism to joint decision-making, and not just by those within the community who have the strongest voices. It values indigenous knowledge, and seeks to allow communities to carry out their own analysis (rather than simply provide answers to closed questions posed by outsiders). It is seen as an end in itself, as well as a means of carrying out projects more efficiently and sustainably. While the term may be used in a number of senses, these are the core attributes of participation, and the solution to malleability of the term is to construct typologies or matrices of participation to distinguish the different meanings associated with it. Such typologies can also be useful in distinguishing aspirational or tokenistic use of the term from more transformative participation.

Going beyond the definitions of participation, a number of training manuals spell out more explicitly what it is – and is not – in practice. For example, Chambers's manual for participatory workshops (2002), and Pretty et al's guide for trainers (1995), do not just discuss the ideal of participation: they also deal with the pitfalls and realities which may be encountered in trying to realise it. Pretty et al highlight the danger of simply going through the motions. In the context of training, they say a major concern should be "to ensure that trainees are aware that participation does not simply imply the mechanical application of a 'technique' or method, but is instead part of a process of dialogue, action, analysis and change." (1995: p. 54).

In many ways the real meaning of participation is seen more clearly in its operationalisation in a particular context. It tends to show up near the start of the process, such as the consultation or engagement with the community, and also at the end, especially in Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E). Holmes (2001) notes that development agencies have sought to

institutionalise the changes which a participatory approach would require, as a way of narrowing the gap between rhetoric and the reality of their operations. The institutional changes include dealing with hierarchy, accountability, planning procedures, and organisational culture. He adds that in addition to organisational structures, the agency of field workers and of communities must also be considered: the attitudes and background of field workers is a significant factor, as is the question of which groups within “the community” are involved.

One of the more specific manifestations of participatory methodologies is Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). The term was applied for the first time in 1988, and grew out of Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) which had itself emerged in the 1970s and 80s as an information-gathering approach by external professionals (Holmes 2001), that paid greater attention to indigenous knowledge than to extraction of data by outsiders. PRA moves beyond this, from indigenous knowledge to actual analysis by rural people. Chambers (1994) describes the transition to PRA as one which pays greater attention to rural people’s analysis, planning and action, rather than outsiders simply extracting the information and then conducting their own analysis and decision-making. The learning is done “by, with and from” local people, with a view to planning and action (p. 953). While it is a family of methods rather than a single approach, PRA remains the most popular operationalisation of participation. In general, these participatory approaches are more commonly seen in rural, stable populations, rather than in post-conflict situations, where it is harder to identify a shared vision by the community, and where much shorter timescales exist for recovery and rehabilitation.

Typologies of participation

Given the variety of meanings and contexts associated with participation, a number of typologies or “ladders” of participation have been developed which usefully distinguish between various senses in which the term is used, and to highlight the degrees of sincerity with which the concept may be employed. One of the advantages of these typologies is that it allows certain arguments about participation to be resolved, in the cases where these are in fact based on the term “participation” being used in different senses by different authors. For example, one may use the word to describe a perfect situation, or the ideal to which they aspire; another may use the same term to describe a tokenistic, insincere version of participation, which is being used in an attempt to add some kind of legitimacy to an outsider-controlled process; while another author may speak of “participation” when they mean the reality of sincere intentions interacting with serious power asymmetries and short time frames. By separating out these very

different meanings, some of the apparent conundrums disappear, while others come more sharply into focus. Placing these different meanings on a spectrum (from tokenism to utopia) adds to the usefulness of the typology, and opens the way to ordinal measurement. The question of developing these scales into some form of measure is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

One of the typologies most frequently cited is that of Pretty (1995), which is itself a development of earlier ideas. The most inadequate of the seven categories is described as “passive participation” in which people are told what will or has happened: “It is a unilateral announcement by an administration or project management without listening to people’s responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.” (Pretty et al 1995, p. 61). Other sub-optimal manifestations include the involvement of communities in return for material incentives, but with decision-making still retained by powerful outsiders; there are restricted agendas or frameworks within which issues are raised.

Typology	Characteristics of each type
1. Manipulative participation	Participation is simply a pretence, with “people’s” representatives on official boards but who are unelected and have no power.
2. Passive participation	People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. It involves unilateral announcements by an administration or project management without any listening to people’s responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.
3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External agents define problems and information gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision making, and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people’s views.
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by contributing resources, for example, labor, in return for food, cash or other material incentives. Farmers may provide the fields and labor, but are involved in neither experimentation nor the process of learning. It is very common to see this called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging technologies or practices when the incentives end.
5. Functional participation	Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made by external agents. At worst, local people may still only be coopted to serve external goals.
6. Interactive participation	People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means to achieve project goals. The process involves interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systemic and structured learning processes. As groups take control over local decisions and determine how available resources are used, so they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7. Self-mobilization	People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-mobilization can spread if governments and NGOs provide an enabling framework of support. Such self-initiated mobilization may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power.
From Pretty (1995: p. 1252), who cites several earlier sources from which it was adapted.	

Table 1.1: Pretty’s typology of participation: how people participate in development programmes and projects

Fundamental concerns which are explored in this typology include who sets the agenda, controls access to resources, and ultimately exercises power. That fact that practitioners are alerted to these potential shortcomings indicates that “fake” participation is well-understood by

those advocating it as a strategy. The difficulties lie with the inadequate or tokenistic implementation of the idea, and failure to address the reality of power asymmetries, rather than with the concept of full participation itself. Only the top three of the seven categories will suffice, according to Pretty et al. At the final point on the scale, which is described as “self-mobilisation”, communities are not only carrying out their own analysis and setting the agenda, they are also independently accessing outside resources or assistance, while retaining control over how these are used.

While it usefully differentiates between the various manifestations of participation, Pretty’s typology itself does not address the question of who it is within “the community” who participates. White (1996) has further developed the notion of a continuum of participation by separating out what it might mean for outsiders and for the community. She says the key questions are both the level of participation (similar to Pretty’s categories) and that of *who* actually participates: “This recognises that ‘the people’ are not homogeneous, and that special mechanisms are needed to bring in relatively disadvantaged groups” (1996: p. 7). Her four-point scale for participation itself runs from “nominal” to “instrumental” on to “representative” and ultimately “transformative” (p. 7). She adds a second dimension, thereby converting a scale into a matrix. Cornwall (2008) has further elaborated on White’s original schema, by filling out the cells in the matrix with more detail:

Form	What ‘participation’ means to the implementing agency	What ‘participation’ means for those on the receiving end	What ‘participation’ is for
Nominal	Legitimation – to show they are doing something	Inclusion – to retain some access to potential benefits	Display
Instrumental	Efficiency – to limit funders’ input, draw on community contributions and make projects more cost-effective	Cost – of time spent on project-related labour and other activities	As a means to achieving cost effectiveness and local facilities
Representative	Sustainability – to avoid creating dependency	Leverage – to influence the shape the project takes and its management	To give people a voice in determining their own development
Transformative	Empowerment – to enable people to make their own decisions, work out what to do and take action	Empowerment – to be able to decide and act for themselves	Both as a means and an end, a continuing dynamic

Table 1.2: A Typology of Interests: Cornwall’s adaptation (2008: p. 273) of White’s typology (1996: p. 7–9)

White’s additional axis lists outsiders promoting participation, participants themselves, and the functions of participation. The cells at the intersection of various points on these axes show the interests of the groups, according to the type of participation. At the lower end of the “participation” axis, interests diverge considerably, with outsiders seeking legitimation and efficiency; communities on the other hand wish to be included in the process, and to gain some access to resources. The “function” of participation at this end is for a “display”, or as a means to something which is usually not openly articulated. At the highest level, however, both groups’ interests converge, with “empowerment” being the objective.

White explores the question of who exactly within the community participates by linking it to the questions of interests and of power. As she points out, participatory development “cannot escape the limitations on this process that derive from the power relations in wider society” (1996: p. 13). It follows that “participation, while it has the potential to challenge patterns of dominance, may also be the means through which existing power relations are entrenched and reproduced” (1996: p. 14). Analysing how communities negotiate their engagement with outsiders, and the terms on which “participatory” projects are offered, involve power relations, and the recognition that participation is a political issue.

To sum up: there is much on why participation might be useful, its advantages and pitfalls, and on how it might be implemented. The latter tend to be specific to a particular situation or task, such as monitoring and evaluation, or natural resource management. Operational definitions are not always specific, but the ladders or typologies of participation provide a detailed, realistic and critical framework for analysing participation without engaging in wishful thinking.

Who participates?

The question of who exactly gets to participate has been raised by a number of other authors, such as Jackson and Ingles, who warn of a bias towards community members who have the “time and motivation to talk to field workers” (1998: p. 15). They emphasise the need to seek out the views of less powerful groups, of being self-aware, and of scheduling events to suit people’s routines. Eyben and Ladbury (1995) also warn about treating communities as homogenous, and ignoring internal power disparities (especially in terms of gender) which participatory processes can end up reinforcing, if they are not taken into account. The question of who participates, and who is excluded, is described as “crucial” by Cornwall (2008: p. 275), who notes that participatory processes can actually deepen the pre-existing exclusion of particular groups.

The question of who is excluded depends on the context, but can include ethnic or caste groups, youth, or religion. Gender is one of the most significant cleavages, and failing to address it can compound the exclusion (Crawley 1998; Chambers 1997; Welbourn 2007). The naïve use of the term “community” can mask real power inequalities, according to Guijt and Shah, who point out that failing to explicitly address the challenges to women’s participation can defeat the stated purpose of inclusion:

Community-based action remains a powerful and essential vehicle for development, as long as it addresses gender and other dimensions of social difference explicitly. Making false claims to empowerment and inclusion when this is not the case will only undermine the current interest in participation for development.

(Guijt and Shah 1998: p. 2)

An area which is related to participation is that of partnership. This deals primarily with relations between donor and “implementing” NGOs, rather than with beneficiaries. It aims to move beyond a relationship where national NGOs are simply sub-contracted to implement projects, and are seen as “recipients” of funding, to one where they jointly develop programmes

and set priorities. The sharing of actual goals (as opposed to stated ones), and of the vision which is being worked towards, is a defining feature. Like participation, recognising that there are asymmetric power relationships is a key part of the equation, (Franklin 2009; BOND 2004), along with the valuing of indigenous or tacit knowledge. Another similarity is that the term can sometimes be used loosely, and insincere rather than “‘authentic’ trust-based partnerships” may also be seen (Fowler 1998: p. 139).

Critique of participation

The critique of participation is sometimes ascribed to a number of writers who clearly place themselves outside of what they see as an orthodoxy (such as Cooke and Kothari 2001a). Any assessment of the critique should, however, begin with the many questions raised from the very start by those writers who have explored, and to an extent advocated, the development of participatory approaches. It is in the nature of participation, and of its practice-based evolution, that robust self-questioning and scepticism would be an inherent part of the process. The methods arise largely through critical self-appraisal of field experience, in an iterative process of practice and generalisation (for example, Holmes 2001; and Thompson 2003).

Chambers (1974) cautioned early on in the discourse on participation that its inappropriate use could be counterproductive:

All too often participation proclaimed on the platform becomes appropriation and privilege when translated into action in the field. This should scarcely be surprising, except to those who, for ideological reasons or because they are simple-minded, or more commonly from a combination of these causes, reify ‘the people’ and ‘participation’ and push them beyond the reach of empirical analysis.

(Chambers 1974: p. 109, quoted in Cornwall 2008: p. 276)

Kelly notes the dangers of over-ambitious claims being made in discourses about participation and empowerment: “they claim more than they can deliver, and thus risk being criticized for not doing what they cannot be expected to do” (2004: p. 214). Hickey and Mohan refer to the “empowering potential of participation”, suggesting it can be a contributory factor, rather than a guarantee of success (2004b: p. 170).

Gaynor (2010a; 2010b) looks at the complex way in which participation as a normative concept, imported with donor backing, interacts with indigenous political culture and practice. Taking Malawi as one of the case studies, a complex mixture of imported and national concepts emerges. Civil society within the country is seen to have appropriated Western ideas about democracy and participation, and used them in the struggle for action and accountability from their own elites. This highlights the adaptive capacity and agency of empowered actors, and the fact that participation is not something which can simply be imported from outside, even with the best of intentions.

Participation as tyranny

Cooke and Kothari's edited collection (2001a) represents the most sweeping critique of participation, in the sense of the conclusions to which they take their criticisms. The book is based on a conference, with what they admit is a deliberately provocative title of *Participation: The New Tyranny?* For them, "tyranny is the illegitimate and/or unjust exercise of power" (2001b: p. 4), and they are highlighting how participatory development facilitates this. They say that other critiques of participation have been limited, and ask whether these have legitimised rather than genuinely challenged participation. They also ask how many concerns must be raised "before participatory development itself comes to be seen as the real problem" (2001b: p. 7).

Cooke returns to the theme in 2004, even more convinced "that participatory development should consider closing itself down" (p. 42). He criticises the "managerialistic participatory tradition", the extent to which its apparent benefits are "frequently delusional" (p. 42), and the way in which its manipulative aspects are concealed. He sets out a number of rules for those who might want to engage in "non-delusional participatory activity" (p. 42), while making clear he does not claim they address all of his concerns. He is also doubtful that those working in this tradition would have the will or capacity to follow them. The rules include not working for the World Bank, being cautious about co-optation (cooption), working only in languages which one understands as well as one's own, and only working for local rates or for free. He seeks to "deliberately challenge and reveal the entrenched interests and attitudes of the participatory development establishment" (p. 53).

As part of the argument, Kothari (2001) analyses power in participation, using a Foucaultian perspective. The idea is that power is exercised most effectively when it remains hidden, which is what happens when participatory methods are invoked, thereby giving the impression that the

issue has been dealt with. The very act of inclusion “can symbolize an exercise of power and control” (p. 142), and participatory forms of control are harder to challenge. Participation methods are described in terms of being a public performance, which comes to be mistaken for reality. Some of these points are useful reminders of how the issue of power never goes away, and cannot be dealt with by limited exercises in consultation, as has been pointed out repeatedly by many other writers on participation (such as White 1996, Chambers 1983; and Nelson and Wright 1995). Edwards, for example, says that some participatory projects have failed because “some, but not enough, control has been handed over to the subjects of the programme. Surrendering power in this way is a painful process for academic and practitioner alike.” (1989: p. 129). However a separate and more contentious question is the extent to which this undermines participation *per se*, even in its aspirational form, as a problem which is inherent or inevitable; or whether these are pitfalls to which it is prone when put into practice, and which are functions of its implementation.

Cooke and Kothari’s analysis does not ask to what extent this is inherent in *all* interactions between the powerful and marginalised in development, and not just those which claim to be participatory. That such an imbalance remains is not in dispute; the difficulty is the extent to which this is attributed to *participatory* development. The same imbalance can be found in all outsider-resourced development interventions, and the imbalance is arguably much greater in non-participatory initiatives. The issue of power is not one which is created by participation, and it not is unique to it. The issue is in fact a function of existing power asymmetries throughout development, which have simply been highlighted by participation, and imperfectly addressed. It arises through unequal access to resources, or their control; through cultural and organisational ascendancy; through differences in organisational capacities; and through proximity to authority in both donor and receiving countries. Power remains an issue even if outside interventions (be they DDR or other development initiatives) are carried out in a non-participatory way. Dispensing with participatory development does not free us from the problem of how one might engage in “non-tyrannical” development, unless of course the implied solution is not to engage in development initiatives at all. In many respects, the problem of power affects non-participatory approaches to an even greater extent. The power asymmetry, differing access to resources, need to please powerful donors, and danger of “group think” are just as relevant to non-participatory development, and in many cases more so.

It could be argued that there is a danger which is specific to participatory development, namely that the illusion could be created that the issues of power and resources have all been dealt with

and do not need further consideration, on the basis that participation has been invoked. This would indeed be delusional, and would ignore the warnings made repeatedly in the literature on participation: Bebbington, for example, says it is “critical to understand how power operates” (2004: p. 281; see also Kelly 2004). The development of a number of typologies of participation shows a clear awareness of the possibility that what is put forward as participation may only be a pretence at consulting people, while power and information are retained by the usual stakeholders. Chambers (1994) notes that some may be tempted to label their work as Participatory Rural Appraisal “when it is still extractive rather than participatory, and when their behaviour and attitudes are still dominant, top-down and unchanged” (p. 959). Jackson and Ingles (1998) are among many authors pre-dating Cooke and Kothari who warn against using participatory techniques in a highly formalised, rigid way. They say a range of techniques must be used appropriately, as they can be “misused through superficial adoption of methods in the absence of complete understanding and adequate training” (p. 15). Pretty refers to the incomplete attempts at participation highlighted in his earlier typology, and says that most professional agencies would prefer to keep to the “consultative” end of the spectrum, as this means retaining power: “Making participation really work means giving up personal and institutional power, and we all know that this is very difficult indeed. Such power, I believe, often has to be taken — it is rarely granted.” (2003: p. 171).

If those aspiring to participatory methods were naïve enough to ignore the power issue, despite the many references to it in the policy literature, then the difficulty is really a reflection of the simplistic and incomplete way in which the ideas are adopted. Such an approach would probably create difficulties no matter what type of development intervention was being implemented, participatory or otherwise.

The argument could be made that Cooke (2004) is not comparing participatory versus non-participatory interventions, but that he is really contrasting participatory approaches with an unspecified “post-development” scenario in which interventions by outsiders do not take place. But in this situation the problem of the power imbalance still remains, even if no development initiatives are made. Given the multifaceted reality of a globalised world, interactions between rich and poor countries continue outside of the development context, even if the neo-liberal aspects of globalisation are somehow attenuated. The existence (or absence) of trade flows, migration, foreign direct investment, income inequalities, and resource imbalances mean that the structural power asymmetries persist. They underlie development initiatives; these initiatives have the potential to change the degree and the way in which the imbalances are manifested,

possibly disguising some of them at times. But the initiatives do not *create* the underlying power imbalance in the first place. This aspect is not dealt with by Cooke, as his critique of participatory development does not adequately explore whether it is “worse” or “better” than either non-participatory approaches; the alternatives (be they traditional top-down methods, a new model, or simply not making any interventions at all) are not assessed by the same standards as are applied to participation.

Throughout the collection, there is an element of *ignoratio elenchi*: sweeping claims about participation’s ability to resolve many issues are refuted. These claims, however, are in fact rarely (if ever) made in the literature on participation. To a degree, their critique is of a somewhat caricatured version of participation, implemented naïvely or with bad faith. It is not a version which would be advocated or perhaps even recognised by those promoting the idea.

Beyond tyranny

Hickey and Mohan’s (2004a) edited collection, entitled *Participation: from Tyranny to Transformation* attempts to deal with the criticisms of participation by Cooke (who is among the authors) and by others. They look at ways in which participation has failed to deliver what was intended, or has fallen victim to wider forces such as inequality within communities which were treated as homogenous. What is particularly useful is that they are specific about the way in which transformatory participation differs from its co-opted, bogus, or failed versions. Participatory approaches are more likely to achieve social transformations where they (1) are “part of a wider (radical) political project”, (2) are “aimed specifically at securing citizenship rights and participation for marginal subordinate groups”, and (3) seek to engage in “development as an underlying process of social change” rather than a series of discrete technocratic interventions (2004b: p. 159). They give examples of processes which meet these criteria, such as certain NGOs which used the practice of REFLECT², adopted a rights-based approach, and engaged in wider advocacy. They also say that transformation is a proper objective of participation, with regard to development practice, and also to the social relations, institutional practices, and capacity gaps which contribute to social exclusion.

The idea that there is a fundamental problem with a vaguely-defined idea of participation as a whole tends to be posed by Cooke and Kothari as a question, or suggested as an implication

² REFLECT is a literacy generation project which merges the ideas of Paulo Freire with PRA, as informed by a gender perspective (Hickey and Mohan, 2004b).

arising from otherwise valid criticism. Rather than taking such a broad approach, a more useful critique can be found in the typologies (such as Pretty 1995), which also expose shortcomings, insincerity, and problems with the concept, both in theory and in practice. They allow for a sophisticated distinction between different degrees of participation, and different reasons for failure. They allow fundamental questions to be asked, recognise the tokenistic and manipulative ways in which participation can be invoked, allow for impure motives, and include power in the analysis. The typologies cannot therefore be dismissed as internal critiques which “have served to legitimize the participatory project rather than present it with a real challenge” (Cooke and Kothari 2001b: p. 7). Rather than creating a false dichotomy between a fundamentally emancipatory versus tyrannical nature of participation, the typologies’ nuanced approach is a much more sophisticated tool for assessing the motivations and realities of participation in practice.

One way of assessing whether the criticisms reveal something inherent in the nature of participation, rather than their implementation or underlying structures, might be to use the following flow-chart to clarify the process:




Figure 1.1: Flow chart for analysing whether problems relating to participation are inherent, inevitable, and resolvable.

Implications for this thesis of the critique of participation

Cooke (2004) accepts that his warnings about what might be called pseudo-participation are deliberately provocative. Whether or not one agrees with the conclusions which he takes them to (such as participation's abusive or tyrannical nature), many of the criticisms are useful, and often reflect difficulties already highlighted from "within" participation. If the argument was being made in this thesis that participation would guarantee a radical transformation of reintegration programmes into an essentially emancipatory project for all, then Cooke's arguments would indeed be a serious and effective refutation of such a claim. The argument that participation is often prescribed by unacknowledged limits, which somehow prevent more fundamental questions about power and structure being asked, would indeed counter any assertion that participation is a panacea. But this thesis is not making such grand claims about participation's potential to automatically transform DDR; it is attempting to explore its interaction with DDR, and to use it as a measure for assessing reintegration programmes. For the purpose of this thesis, it is important therefore to ask the following questions:

(a) Do the critiques amount to a rejection of participation as a whole? It can, for example, be useful to highlight the ways in which naïve or unquestioning attempts at participatory planning can create new dangers, especially if those advocating it see participation as a panacea which is inherently liberating. But the existence of these potential pitfalls, which can affect many innovations which are applied in an inappropriate or over-zealous manner, does not mean that a reflective, considered approach would not minimise these dangers.

(b) Are these problems specific to participation, and inherent in it? Or are they a further manifestation of the same problems which arise when there are power asymmetries in development? Also, do these problems arise to a greater or lesser extent in participation, than in more conventional, top-down approaches?

(c) Does appropriation of the term as a means of seeking legitimacy invalidate the original intention, or exclude the possibility that it can be used constructively by those whose motives are sincere?

The most important implications for this study of the critique of participation by all authors is (a) to ensure that the concept is operationalised in a way which can distinguish between “real” and “pseudo” participation, (b) that it is not regarded as a binary “all-or-nothing” measure; and (c) that the question of “who” participates is considered.

Ultimately, the objective of this study is not to divide writers on participation into simplistic categories of “advocates” and “critics”, and then determine which of these groups has a monopoly on wisdom. It is also not proposed that these positions be presented as some kind of irreconcilable dichotomy on which one should take a position. Rather than coming to a definitive answer on whether participation is inherently emancipatory, the real question is whether the concepts introduced by participation are relevant to reintegration, and whether they can be usefully applied as a means of assessing these programmes. What is relevant is to recognise both the strengths and weaknesses of a participatory approach, and the difficulties in implementing it; to compare these with the realities which similarly affect non-participatory approaches; and to assess the potential interactions (both positive and negative) of a participatory approach with reintegration programmes. To be able to do this, we do not need to have a system (such as participation) which can be shown to provide all the answers to the

problems of development. The ladder of participation in particular is the type of conceptual tool which will be explored in more detail in the next chapter as a framework for looking at reintegration. This is because it explicitly recognises the dangers of tokenistic approaches, and the realities of “incomplete” participatory methods, where there is consultation but no decision-making, or there is sub-contracting rather than shared ownership. The critics of participation, both internal and external, highlight some real problems, and this is useful in helping to draw up a realistic framework for assessing the interaction between participation and reintegration. Their analysis has not however exposed any inherent contradiction which is specific to participation (as opposed to development initiatives in general) which would make it unusable as a framework for looking at reintegration.

The matter of all stakeholders having an input to analysis and decision-making raises the question of indigenous knowledge, and the extent to which this is recognised by the programmers. The key question is whether indigenous and tacit knowledge is recognised at all, by whom, at what level, and at what stage in the planning or implementation process. The risk is that it will be missed, or undervalued. There is also the question of ownership and control of such knowledge, if the agencies involved have an extractive approach rather than a participatory one. Besides existing knowledge, a genuinely participatory approach would also entail communities having (or taking) the opportunity to develop and communicate their own analysis, bearing in mind the power dynamics and asymmetries which exist in these communities. It may well be that less senior workers in agencies can gain insights and understanding from participants, and this may be taken on board informally. This will tend to be later in the programme cycle, which may or may not have the necessary flexibility to respond to the “new” information.

Participation and DDR

The ideas which are central to participation are often implicit in the general literature on DDR, as already indicated in earlier sections of this chapter, and there is growing acceptance of the importance of more inclusive policies. Participation is in fact a useful crystallisation of those ideas, and our understanding of the process benefits from it being made explicit, and regarded as being a matter of degree. Yet participation is rarely referred to overtly as a concept: very little has in fact been written explicitly about DDR and participation. One exception is Dzinesa’s journal article (2006), whose title is *A Participatory Approach to DDR: Empowering Local Institutions and Abilities*. While the term does not in fact occur in the text, he deals extensively

with the need to engage with communities in order to improve DDR programmes, and to build their capacity in the aftermath of conflict:

Local institutions and abilities should be provided with optimal capacity to unlock their unquestionable potential to assist in DDR. This is crucial for the long-term success of the process against the backdrop of the usually time-specific external engagement with the process.

(Dzinesa 2006: pp. 41–42)

He focuses in turn on communities, groups representing ex-combatants, religious institutions, and civil society in general, as valuable resources whose engagement can have a positive impact. Dzinesa does not refer explicitly to any of the usual elements associated with participation, such the typologies or PRA. But the ideas are clearly aligned with participation, such as the need for consultation at an early stage with stakeholders, and their role in decision-making: “Engaging the local population and structures from the outset also affords them the chance to give their input and influence the process and its outcomes” (p. 42). He adds that engaging civil society, which has a better understanding of local realities, can ensure that specific issues such as gender are addressed. Also, “local ownership” supports the legitimacy of the process (p. 42).

Bell and Watson (2006) also refer to the way in which DDR is implemented as being significant:

Maintaining a focus on participatory process and recognising that the ‘how’ is often more important than the ‘what’ – Participatory processes can render civilian and co-operative life within communities a more attractive option than engaging in war and violence.

(Bell and Watson 2006: p. 5)

The *Integrated DDR Standards* (IDDRS) (2006) do refer explicitly to the need to engage in participatory planning throughout the document. However, this is an extensive set of guidelines, rather than a manual on how to carry out DDR, so it is sometimes short on the specifics. The guiding principles of the IDDRS relate closely to participatory programming. They include “national and local ownership fostered through participatory approaches to planning, design and implementation” (Module 2.30, p. 2). They also require community participation, and say that reintegration programmes must be designed through a participatory process which involves communities and ex-combatants in decision-making from early on:

One of the reasons why DDR operations have failed in the past is a lack of local ownership, resulting in the perception that DDR is imposed from outside. The participation of a broad range of stakeholders in the development of a DDR strategy is essential to its success, as it provides a basis for effective dialogue among national and local authorities, community leaders, and former combatants, and helps define a role for all parties in the decision-making process. These actors should be fully involved in planning and decision-making from the earliest stages.

(IDDRS 2006, Module 4.30, pp. 11–12)

In conducting field assessments at the planning stage of DDR, one of the seven methodologies listed are participatory assessments. These are described as “using the tools and methodology of participatory rural assessment” (Module 3.2, p. 9). This unusual wording highlights the fact that it is only the techniques which are employed, and distinguishes the approach from PRAs in their fullest sense, of a locally-owned process for action-oriented analysis by the community itself.

The IDDRS sets out the benefits of a participatory approach to planning, saying it will significantly improve DDR by:

- providing a forum for testing ideas that could improve programme design;
- enabling the development of strategies that respond to local realities and needs;
- ensuring local ownership;
- encouraging DDR and other local processes such as peace-building or recovery to work together and support each other;
- encouraging communication and negotiation among the main actors to reduce levels of tension and fear and to improve human security;
- recognizing and supporting the capacity of women, especially in security-related matters ... and building respect for women’s and children’s rights ...
- involving youth in decision-making processes ...
- helping to ensure the sustainability of reintegration by developing community capacity
- to provide services and establishing community monitoring, management and oversight structures and systems.

(IDDRS 2006, Module 4.30, p. 12)

The needs of young people are dealt with in some detail, along with the warning that even participatory processes may not allow for the views of young people (and especially young women) to emerge, in some circumstances. Annex C of the IDDRS sets out a number of draft job descriptions. Those for DDR Officer and for Reintegration Officer specify experience of participatory approaches as an essential requirement. In summary, the IDDRS repeatedly emphasises the need for participatory and inclusive approaches, but since these are a set of standards, the reality of how they might be operationalised is not explored in detail.

The higher rungs on the ladder of participation relate to activities that take place over a more extended timeframe than most reintegration projects, and involve the open-ended process of building relationships with and between community-based organisations. It also presumes the presence, or development of, social capital. There can be real obstacles to developing this approach in an immediate-post conflict environment, which may involve population movement, disruption of social relations, trauma, and security concerns. However, there is more scope for higher levels of participation when it comes to the more open-ended approach of integrating DDR with development and post-conflict recovery in general, as seen with “second generation DDR”. The UN definition of reintegration makes clear that it is in fact linked with these endeavours (UN Secretary-General 2006a: p.8).

Relevance of participation for DDR

The argument being addressed in this thesis is that greater participation is associated with better outcomes in reintegration programming. This is based on the persistent difficulties which continue to recur in DDR programmes, as identified in the literature. Taking a more participatory approach is clearly a complex and ongoing task; it is more than simply adopting a few techniques and methods while retaining the same decision-making processes and power structures.

The sense in which “participation” is used, when applied in this study to reintegration programmes, is Pretty’s typology. This allows for a more subtle consideration of the concept, in terms of ordinal scale measurement, rather than a simplistic binary categorisation. In this way, “greater participation” or “more participatory approaches” are signified by a higher point in the typology, moving from Manipulative Participation (point 1) to Self Mobilisation (point 7).

The other concept requiring disambiguation is that of “who” participates. Stakeholders whose interests and role should be treated separately include: ex-combatants as a whole; sub-groups

within them, women, children, commanders, and war-wounded; receiving communities; local community groups; local civil and religious leaders; local authorities; schools; local and national implementing NGOs; national government; media; and other civil society actors.

The areas in which it is proposed that greater participation improves the nature and sustainability of outcomes are:

- Building long term national capacity for reintegration and therefore development;
- More relevant and sustainable services for all, including marginalised groups such as children, women, and youth.
- Enhancing a sense of ownership at national and community level, rather than dependency;
- Reducing the scope for spoilers in reintegration and peace processes, who feel their interests are not being met;
- Facilitating dialogue and ultimately reconciliation and acceptance of ex-combatants, where the whole community can see that it benefits from the process in its entirety;
- Dealing with community perceptions that those with guns are being rewarded, and the poor example which that sets in terms of governance and accountability in the post-conflict era;
- Managing expectations of ex-combatants and communities, through clear and effective consultation and communication;
- Helping to restore and create social capital.

Ownership

The term “ownership” occurs from time to time in discussions about DDR and post-conflict recovery. It arises in the context of participation, where it is mentioned at times as an indicator, and also at times as an objective, of participation. It is much more loosely defined, and the distinction between ownership and participation also tends to be unclear. For example, Hansen et al (2007) deal with the concept of ownership in the context of reform of the rule of law in a post-conflict situation. This practitioner’s guide notes that the absence of local ownership may be both a cause and a consequence of armed conflict. It is essential in order to make the reforms sustainable and legitimate. The term ownership includes:

[T]he recognition that a justice and security sector reform process is of integral concern to the local population and that local actors should have a say in formulating the outcomes of the process. ... Local ownership can be

implemented to different degrees and range from local acceptance or tolerance to local control over decision-making.

(Hansen et al 2007: p. 4)

It notes that there are significant difficulties in producing indicators and mechanisms to assess the extent to which progress is being made towards local ownership, but that progress has been made “when local stakeholders substantially influence the conception, design, implementation and review of reform strategies” (p. 59). The authors say that as much authority as possible should lie with local stakeholders, depending on the context, local capacity, and the degree of accountability. This definition is in fact quite close to participation, in its recognition of power and shared decision-making, its specific reference to legitimacy and sustainability, and the fact that these are a matter of degree. What it adds explicitly is the idea of support or opposition to reforms or initiatives among the local stakeholders.

Nathan (2007) deals with ownership in the context of the security sector reform (SSR), which is related to DDR. He says that local ownership of SSR should not simply be treated as a romantic concept, but has very real implications for the way programmes are run:

In practical terms it means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors. ... The principle is misconstrued if it is understood to mean that there must be a high level of domestic support for donor activities. What is required is not local support for donor programmes and projects but rather donor support for programmes and projects initiated by local actors.

(Nathan 2007: p. 4)

His definition is again similar to participation, in the sense that it confronts the question of whether donors and decision-makers share power, and it recognises the possibility that the term can be used merely in an aspirational or tokenistic way. Ebnother and Fluri (2005) also write about local ownership in the context of SSR, but are much more wary about the wide range of meanings attributed to it. They say that, to an extent, it is about “political control over the post-conflict reconstruction processes, the ability to influence the political decisions made about SSR and reconstruction” (p. 383).

The term ownership can sometimes be applied indiscriminately to both local and national institutions of the country, although these are not the same thing at all. The definition used by de Carvalho and Nagelhus Schia (2011) sounds similar to participation or partnership, although the

power asymmetry between the funder and funded is not recognised explicitly. They say that ownership is about who guides the processes whose preferences are taken into consideration:

In essence, local and national ownership emphasizes that, whatever the policy, it should be formulated by locals or nationals, reflect the preferences of locals or nationals, and be put into work through local or national institutions. In practice, however, the implementation of strategies emphasizing the primacy of local and national ownership is a lot messier

(de Carvalho and Nagelhus Schia 2011: p. 7)

In this study too, the term ownership will be used quite extensively. However a more specific meaning is intended, and this relates to the stakeholders' *perception* of the intentions and reality of the programmes which affect them. As always, different stakeholders will have different perspectives. A working definition of ownership is offered here, and this is the sense in which the term will be used in this thesis:

Ownership involves an identification by participants with the project, manifested by the belief or confidence at an individual or group level by intended beneficiaries in some or all of the following:

- That the goals of the project, and of the stakeholders who control resources and decision-making, are shared with oneself or one's group, or are not incompatible;
- That one can influence the goals, the process and the outcomes, especially in those areas where one's interests differ from others;
- That other stakeholders (especially those with more power) are acting in good faith and are credible;
- That the programme will bring sustainable benefits for oneself or one's family, community or interest group;
- That the degree of influence over the project will increase with time, especially after donors reduce their involvement;
- That the project or its benefits will last after donors exit.

These perceptions are of course fluid, and are formed by a process of induction which is iterative and permanently open to review. Negative impressions, however, can influence how further evidence of goodwill (or otherwise) is perceived, becoming a vicious circle, just as positive impressions are also part of a feedback loop. In a broader sense, ownership also involves going beyond an instrumentalist approach, such as "food for work", or a community's

involvement in a project (whose purpose is not clear or seen as important) in order to access resources, or to maintain good relations with those who control resources.

Social capital and partnership

The social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants is ultimately about re-creating relationships. A concept which is relevant to this complex and dynamic process is social capital, both as a result of participatory approach, and also as a means of facilitating it. Robert Putnam is known for popularising the term social capital, although he credits several other authors with introducing and exploring the concept. He defines it as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993: p. 167). He later refined this by saying these features “enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” which may or may not be regarded as praiseworthy (Putnam 1995, p. 664–665). The question of whose interests are being served by the collective action which is facilitated by these types of relationships is another matter. There are often generally positive normative overtones in the way social capital is discussed: it may be assumed that it is the common good which is advanced. However, negative or interest-group based social capital has also been recognised. Urban gangs, organised crime, and non-state militias can also undertake collective action in pursuit of their goals more effectively when they have greater social capital, consisting of their own particular norms, networks and level of trust. Social capital can even help the elites which exploited Sierra Leone’s natural resources before the war to function more effectively. One of the ways of addressing whose interests are being promoted is to distinguish between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital. Bonding social capital strengthens the ties between members of a group, and places their interests above those of the community as a whole. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, is inclusive rather than exclusive, unites people across cleavages, and serves the community as a whole (Putnam 2000).

One unusual case of bonding social capital which may ultimately benefit the whole community – even though it is the immediate needs of its members which are being addressed – is in fact that of ex-combatants. The bonding social capital and support which ex-combatants can provide for each other in a network can in fact be positive, as they face particular challenges. They may face untreated post-traumatic stress disorder (along with many non-combatants), and feel that certain war experiences can only be understood or shared by their peers (leaving aside here simple dichotomies about who might be a victim or a perpetrator). Like any group which has

been through what we might term a “formative experience” together, something is often shared between these individuals, even if they never see each other again. Understandably, they may face stigma, low self-esteem, personal shame, and marginalisation as they attempt to forge a livelihood and new identity in the difficult post-war situation. Stigma and lack of recognition for the role of “war veteran” is particularly relevant in the case of women.

There are possibilities for mutual support of various kinds, and the creation of the identity of “veteran”, in both formal and informal groupings of ex-combatants. Some of these arise when ex-combatants come together to form business ventures. Those who benefit from the mutual psychosocial support, and are more at ease with themselves, may in fact be much better placed to integrate into the community socially, and be less likely to engage in anti-social behaviour. Mutual support and greater bonding social capital within the group does not necessarily undermine the interests of the community, and may in fact promote those interests. It is not a zero-sum game, nor is mutual support synonymous with impunity or failure to acknowledge wrongdoing; it may in fact involve making that acknowledgement, in private at least.

Cox (2008) notes the ongoing debate in defining and measuring social capital, but says that it usually refers to “the extent and quality of relationships between people or groups, with levels of interpersonal trust as one frequent indicator” (p. 24). These concepts – relationships and trust – are also integral to the processes of reintegration, and in particular to participatory approaches. Trust is fundamental to the establishment of virtuous (as opposed to vicious) circles, and it depends on relationships and norms of reciprocity, according to the proponents of social capital (Micolta 2008).

Another important distinction is between horizontal and vertical networks. The former involves relationships between actors of similar status and power, whereas vertical networks link those in asymmetrical relationships in terms of hierarchy, power, and reciprocation (World Bank 2011; Putnam 1993). Both types are relevant to reintegration and peacebuilding, but vertical social capital is particularly significant when considering participatory approaches: here, relations with programme planners, implementers, and the new structures of national and international governance are being formed, tested, and assessed by all the stakeholders.

The concept of social capital has been invoked in the discourse on development, especially as the importance of a grassroots approach received greater recognition during the 1990s (Willis 2011). It has been adopted by the World Bank (World Bank 2011) and authors from a variety of

backgrounds (such as Fukuyama 2002). Although it is more closely associated with a “bottom up” perspective which recognises power asymmetries, the term is far from uncontested. It has more recently been applied to peacebuilding (Cox 2008; Micolta 2008; Bowd 2011). Paffenholz (2008) proposes a framework for understanding the way in which social capital can contribute to peacebuilding. However she points out that its role is not universally positive, as bonding social capital can further the process of defining members of a group in contrast to the “other” (p. 197). Bowd (2011) underlines the interplay between social capital and social reintegration in a post-conflict environment, and their importance to both reconciliation and peacebuilding. He notes the possibility that “discriminatory vertical social capital” (p. 57) may be strong for one group which is favoured by the state, and weak for another. The strengthening of bridging social capital in particular can offset the strong bonding capital within those groups which were antagonistic to each other.

Social capital has been applied to DDR by a very limited number of authors. One of the ways in which this is important for this study is that the use of social capital as a lens foregrounds some important underlying concepts which are also essential to a participatory approach. These factors usually remain hidden, unexplored, or are left as implicit. They include the quality and the dynamic nature of relationships; the importance of trust as an enabling factor; power; agency; communication; and the way in which notions of reciprocity are inferred and maintained. While these and other factors are combined in a different way when applied to a participatory analysis of DDR, one of the contributions of social capital as a concept is to make these elements explicit. Another contribution is the possibility of exploring the way in which participation develops and functions – something which both depends on social capital, and is also affected by it. Bearing social capital in mind when conducting this study also encourages analysis at a group level, as well as at an individual level, which can be missing in some approaches to DDR which tend to deal with ex-combatants as if their social environment has been atomised and they operate primarily as individuals.

Colletta (1999) describes the restoration of social capital as being one of three “critical enabling conditions” (p. 212) for social reconstruction and sustainable development in the aftermath of war. He notes that:

It is the interplay of a community's physical and social capital and the excombatant's financial and human capital that ultimately determine the ease and success of reintegration. Efforts to strengthen social capital—for example, by using existing community organizations and channels of communication—enable communities to take development into their own hands and facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants.

(Colletta 1999, p. 208)

More recently, the *Integrated DDR Standards* (IDDRS 2006) includes social capital in its glossary of terms used in the guidelines, noting that there are multiple and nuanced definitions of the term. Its own version is:

The existence of a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among them. The sharing of values and norms does not in itself produce social capital, because the values may be the wrong ones: the norms that produce social capital must substantively include virtues like truth-telling, the meeting of obligations and reciprocity.

(IDDRS 2006 (Section 1.20): p. 23)

However, it is only mentioned in passing in the subsequent 700 pages. It is referred to as something which would facilitate reintegration by ex-combatants; and a list of possible questions to guide a conflict and security analysis includes one on whether ex-combatants have lost social capital during the conflict.

Leff (2008) used the concept of social capital as a way of assessing Sierra Leone's reintegration programme. He argued that "without a community-focused approach that fosters new, and nurtures pre-existing, forms of social capital, ex-combatants will be less likely to secure sustainable livelihoods in post-conflict environments" (p.14). Bowd's PhD thesis (2008) looked at the implications of social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda for both social capital and for reconciliation. The situation in Rwanda was particularly difficult, with all forms of social capital "distorted out of all recognition as a result of the genocide" (p. 238). He makes a useful distinction between the way in which vertical, bridging, and bonding social can have different effects on the process of reconciliation, as well as their interrelatedness. The rebuilding of bridging social capital between distinct groups – something particularly important after the genocide – was assisted by the government avoiding "discriminatory social capital" (p. 235), in which one group was favoured over another by the state. The reintegration of ex-combatants from all groups was a government-managed process. Successful reintegration of ex-combatants contributed to the establishment of vertical social capital, but its most significant impact was in promoting bridging social capital. This in turn facilitated the process of reconciliation. Bonding

social capital within groups has been evolving from an ethnic to a geographic basis, again assisted by the reintegration process. Like participation, the essential concepts involved in this process of restoring social capital are relationships, communication, and trust, built up over time through experience.

A nuanced understanding of social capital, which distinguishes between its various forms and functions, is relevant to reintegration. More importantly for this study, it is closely related to participatory approaches, especially in relation to vertical social capital, trust, inferred norms, and the experience of reciprocity. The concept is useful for understanding how participation can support virtuous cycles as reintegration progresses, and how the absence of a participatory approach undermines social capital in a vicious cycle. As suggested by the term “cycle”, these concepts interact with each other, so that social capital itself can be both a means through which participation interacts with reintegration, while it is also a product of participatory approaches.

Social capital is also important in highlighting the role of reciprocity, when considering the way in which DDR is considered to be a “deal”, which can be adhered to or broken, with real consequences for ex-combatants’ sense of ownership of both reintegration and ultimately the whole peace process. DDR is in fact framed as a “new social contract” between the ex-combatants and the government and international community by Knight and Özerdem (2004: p. 504). They say that if the former fighters are given any reason to doubt the effectiveness of the programme, this could undermine their belief that the peace agreement will be implemented impartially.

By disarming, the combatants are forging a new social contract with the government and the international community, which act as impartial mediators; the combatants surrender the security and economic surety that their weapons provide, in exchange for opportunities and assistance in finding new peaceful livelihoods.

(Knight and Özerdem 2004: p. 506)

They also say that if the DDR programme is inefficient and badly implemented, and does not see itself as a social contract, this can affect the wider peace process. They advocate viewing DDR as a social contract, in order to move beyond a narrow security-focused approach. This view also opens the way to the more holistic DDR which has long been sought, and it would embed reintegration more positively in the peacebuilding process.

In exploring the extent, type and impact of participation, this thesis is therefore seeking to explore more fundamental questions than the management of DDR (important though that is). Rather, what is being analysed is the degree to which the planning and implementation of DDR programmes within a peacebuilding process impacts on the building or destruction of reintegrated communities with social capital in a post conflict society.

Conclusion

In conclusion, despite the sometimes frustratingly nebulous descriptions of participation, and its many manifestations, certain underlying themes can be discerned. These include (1) communication and engagement with beneficiaries and non-institutionalised stakeholders; (2) their input into planning, implementing or reviewing a project or programme; and (3) recognition (at least) of the power relationships involved, in which outside agencies often control resources, possess technical or other expertise, or have access to decision-makers. The common currency of participation is information, resources, decision-making processes, and power. The concept helps to foreground these ideas, which can otherwise be referred to only in passing; their existence and their impact on the process is implied rather than directly addressed, which ultimately undermines our understanding of how and why reintegration programmes function the way they do. Participation is therefore an essential conceptual tool if we are to effectively analyse DDR programmes. The many forms which participation takes – such as participatory planning tools – may be confusing, but the key idea is not just *what* is done, but also *how* it is done. These are the key ideas in assessing how reintegration programmes are conceptualised and implemented.

DDR is clearly an important initiative with the potential to make a significant contribution to stabilisation and peacebuilding. It may even contribute to the finalising of a peace agreement, as it arises during the negotiations as a kind of exit strategy for some of the key stakeholders. Its significance is that rather than being a “bolt on” module, it is in fact embedded in the peacebuilding project: it touches on a range of important issues from economic recovery and statebuilding to transitional justice and reconciliation. The reality of its implementation is however less than ideal. There have been many calls for greater inclusiveness, better planning, and a holistic approach since early days of writing on DDR. Nichols (2005) says the identification and application of lessons learned appears to be “perpetually and painfully difficult”, partly because it is a highly complex process which can easily be undermined by a number of factors (p. 135). The critiques, the suggested remedies, the guidelines, and best

practice have become increasingly specific. They have also become increasingly relevant to the question of participation. Yet the overall framework of participation is largely missing from the analysis so far: is it rarely – if ever – referred to explicitly. This thesis aims to address that gap, by using participatory planning as the framework for critically assessing DDR.

The ladder of participation is a useful analytical tool, not least because it measures the situation on a spectrum, rather than in binary form. It is particularly useful in foregrounding important concepts which are sometimes overlooked. These include power, agency, trust, and communication. It helps us to understand the interrelated nature of post-war recovery processes and the creation of social capital, both as a means for participation and a result of it.

The research therefore asks, firstly, to what degree the reintegration programmes in Sierra Leone and Liberia were conducted in a participatory fashion. This is not just a question of placing the overall programmes on a single point on a spectrum, but of discerning when and where participatory engagement arose, was absent, and was undermined. This disaggregation opens the way to understanding some of the causal processes at work. The research therefore also looks at the effects of participation, to the degree that it can be found. More particularly, what impact did it have on the specific objectives of social and economic reintegration, in terms of employment, livelihoods, and relations with the community? The wider question of the approach's possible impact on the overall objective of DDR, namely supporting the peacebuilding project, is not directly measured, but remains an important ultimate outcome of the programmes.

In all of these questions, the nature of the causal processes at work must be respected. There are interactions and feedback loops at work, and some of the factors have to be looked at using a process of triangulating several different measures. The process is in fact strengthened by seeking diversity in the range of stakeholders whose perspectives are sought, from ex-combatants and community members, to agencies and state bodies at local, national, and international level. Although it brings with it causal complexity and a range of different voices, the concept of participation exposes structures, processes and factors which up to now have normally been referred to in passing, rather than being adequately recognised for their role in shaping how DDR plays out.

The next chapter discusses the methodologies employed to seek answers to these questions – the role of the researcher, the case selection process, and the methods employed in the fieldwork and the analysis.

Chapter 2: Methodology

We seek to tell some one else's story, but we must listen before we can understand. Analysis begins with careful listening.

(Krueger 1997: p 3)

Ontology and epistemology

The basis of any research is the ontological position adopted by the writer, and their epistemological approach. These precede any question of research methods, data collection, or conclusions drawn. There are no neutral positions, and failing to make these positions explicit does not mean that their fundamental influence on the work is in some way negated; it remains, as an unacknowledged force which has shaped the conclusions reached. Those trying to engage with the research may argue with specific aspects, when the real differences may in fact be rooted in ontology and epistemology. When these are implied or unacknowledged, they create problems in the same way that any other unstated but relevant assumption can confuse the issue. The solution is therefore to be explicit, and make clear the basis on which one proceeds. Grix (2002) underlines the importance of understanding, acknowledging, and defending one's own ontological position.

The intention is therefore to set out this position briefly, as a personal statement which is of course open to challenge, but which is intended as a point of departure for the research itself. It is not an end in itself, and is not presented as a comprehensive defence of the position taken, as all of these positions have been debated by others in much greater detail. In the end, a choice must be made explicitly and acknowledged.

By recognising the role of ontology, we make clear what we believe is the nature of the universe we are attempting to understand – in this case, the world of human interactions. While this may seem to be starting at the point where one should be ending up, it is not really possible to move forward without certain assumptions, although one should be open to evidence which contradicts them, and be prepared to revise them. In this case, the social world which this study attempts to describe in part is one which is seen as containing real patterns and continuities over space and time in the area of human interaction. These may be difficult to pin down, but they do

exist, and are not simply a matter of interpretation. Some of them are straightforward enough to identify, while others are multi-faceted and may be viewed from many different perspectives, making even description difficult at times. One of the difficulties is that even attempting a basic description involves the use of social constructs, which brings the researcher, their culture, their audience, and their experience into the picture. Again, one cannot simply control for this or rule it out of the equation as being “one variable too many” to be able to deal with. Rather, it can be acknowledged and questioned as one proceeds. In terms of ontology, it is important to underline that social constructs are seen as tools which we cannot avoid using, but it does not mean that there is “nothing there” behind the constructs. The study of constructs is not an end in itself. Even if we have to make use of them, they are not the story we have come to look at. We should acknowledge the difficulty of the “observer effect” and the way in which we influence the thing we are trying to study, but we should also be clear that the phenomena beyond ourselves which we want to understand have a life of their own, and exist whether or not we try to engage with them.

Staying with ontology, an essential element is the model of causality: this study accepts that causal complexity in human relations is the norm. Interaction, feedback loops, and endogeneity are inherent in much of what we try to study, and cannot be ignored. Ecologies, dynamic equilibria, and co-evolution are at least as likely to be found as straightforward one-way causal relationships. Multiplier effects, thresholds, and gating variables are to be expected as much as additive effects between variables. Only certain causal factors can be assigned to the discrete categories of treatment, outcome, and control variables. In many situations, variables which affect the process being studied are so closely bound up that they cannot be controlled for. Endogeneity is endemic in human relations, and causal complexity is the norm (Ramalingam and Jones 2008).

Our epistemology, which is intimately linked with ontology, needs to recognise and take account of this causal complexity. Our understanding of how we know anything about the human universe is based on the possibility that the relationships we study may not be straightforward ones. It is therefore essential that the research methods proposed do not blind us to interactions and relationships which cannot easily be separated from each other.

The influential text on social science research by King, Keohane and Verba (1994), sets out a clear and effective logic for research. It is most effective for situations where variables and processes can actually be separated out. It provides us with an effective framework for

formulating these as testable hypotheses, and setting out how that can be done. For this scenario, it provides us with a useful and appropriate model, which has proven extremely valuable in many areas of both natural and social sciences. But what of those situations which are worthy of being studied, but where endogeneity cannot be ruled out? There are many circumstances where interactions between the variables and feedback mean that they cannot be divided into “causal” and “dependent” variables. The question is what we should do, and the options include:

- (1) Try to deal only with those factors which we feel can in fact be separated out. This can be useful, but only where we remain clear that these are part of a larger picture, and may interact with that “whole”;
- (2) Assume that the endogeneity or interactions are not happening, or are not significant, and that our causal model accounts for most or all of the variation in the dependent variable. While this may be a working assumption, it must ultimately be tested, or at least declared;
- (3) Decide that the wider picture is beyond measurement by traditional means, and consign it to realms of speculation, interpretation, and anecdote. This is at least open about the limitations being placed on our explanatory endeavour. But it must be accompanied by an acknowledgement that the methods being used are at best incomplete, and at worst misleading, if they claim to be a description of the causal processes as a whole which are at work;
- (4) Recognise and if necessary embrace the interactions and endogeneity, and try to tease these out using analysis which is more than speculation, but may not be as definitive as rejecting a clearly-defined null hypothesis. This is not to say that testable hypotheses cannot be identified within the overall process, and tested conventionally. The key element is that these hypotheses are seen as being part of the whole – sometimes a difficult task. It begins with recognising that this whole exists, and that it cannot be wished away. This is the approach to be taken in this study.

The cost of taking such an approach is that the certainty with which conclusions are reached may be diminished. The generalisability of those conclusions may also be limited, as we are not uncovering universal laws about the way variable x affects variable y : we have already accepted

that even those two variables have been looked at in a particular context, time sequence, and in combination with other possibly interacting variables: in different circumstances, the same x may well result in a different amount of y (or vice versa). This approach is best described in terms of case studies, which seek to recognise the whole, while studying identifiable factors within the process (Gillham 2000; Simons 2009).

The question remains, then: which is the correct approach? Having opened the door to methodological pluralism, we can only take it to its logical conclusion: the correct method is determined by the research question we ask, the nature of the subject we wish to study, the limitations within which we operate, and the type or generalisability of the inferences we are hoping to draw. From this will flow consequences in terms of what we can conclude, the degree of certainty which can be claimed, and the progress made in attempting to describe the wider causal process, as opposed to understanding isolated elements within it. What is required, though, is clarity about what approach is being taken for each of the various elements of the study, why it is taken, and their consequent limitations. This is preferable to simply mixing together approaches with no clear rationale, hoping that in doing so we have covered all the bases in the process.

These choices are not a question of positivism versus post-positivism, or an empirical approach as opposed to interpretation. Both approaches are actually grounded in evidence; they differ however in the types of causal models for which they are most appropriate.

Mixed methods

The research question in this thesis is examined using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods, on the basis that both are appropriate, and in fact complementary. Mixed methods not only have a long history, but they are increasingly common, and do not need justification *per se*. For example, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) recommend contingency theory for selection of research approach, as it “accepts that quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods research are all superior under different circumstances and it is the researcher’s task to examine the specific contingencies” and decide which approach or combination of them is most appropriate (pp. 22–23).

In fact, the weakness in any argument for purely quantitative or qualitative approaches is the often implicit claim to universality. This claim is sometimes made, or implied, by the

originators of a theory or approach; it may also be made subsequently by its more enthusiastic proponents, who go beyond original idea in its application. It may also be implicit or assumed in those who refute the theory, possibly thereby committing the informal fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi*, in refuting an argument that was not made (i.e. a claim that the particular method can explain all situations).

The particulars of this case are that the concepts of participation, ownership, and social and economic reintegration cannot easily be operationalised, and must be seen in a more holistic fashion. A quantitative approach is extremely useful at a descriptive level, and also when attempting to tease out the causal relationships. But even where measures of association are clear, one must always return to the qualitative data in order to begin the process of inferring and testing a causal hypothesis. Similarly, the qualitative data can be extremely rich – sometimes overwhelming – and raise many questions of a quantitative nature. There is in fact no incompatibility between the methods, once it is recognised that neither is claiming to be the answer to everything. If we use the metaphor about “walking around with a hammer makes every problem look like a nail”, then using mixed methods means we have a wider set of tools. Bringing them together – for example to produce both quantitative and qualitative data from the focus group transcripts – means that the whole can indeed be even greater than the parts.

Case selection

DDR programmes come in a variety of forms, and some do not actually use the title. According to the review of the 22 programmes underway in 2006 produced by the Escola de Cultura de Pau (2007), about a third come under the authority of national bodies, though nearly all rely on international funding. Most (16) include specific programmes for children. An excerpt of the details is given in the following table.

Country	Period (beginning and end dates)	Combatants to be demobilised		Total budget (million \$)
		Armed Forces (AF)	Other Armed Groups (OAG)	
Afghanistan	10/03 - 06/06	-	63,000	140.90
Angola	08/02 - 06/06	33,000	105,000	255.80
Burundi	12/04 - 12/08	41,000	37,000	84.40
Cambodia	10/01 -	30,000	-	42
Chad	12/05 - 12/10	9,000	-	10
Colombia (AUC)	11/03 - 02/06	-	31,761	302.60
Côte d'Ivoire	-	4,000	41,000	150
Eritrea	10/02 -	200,000	-	197.20
Filipinas (Mindanao)	97/06	25,000	-	254
Guinea-Bissau	01/01 -	10,544	2,051	26
Haiti	08/06 -	-	6,000	15.75
Indonesia (Aceh)	09/05 - 06/06	-	5,000	35
Liberia	12/03 - 12/06	12,000	107,000	71
Nepal	12/06 -	12,000	-	5.90
Niger	03/06 - 12/07	-	3,160	2.40
Central African R.	12/04 - 12/07	-	7,565	13.30
DR Congo	01/04 - 12/07	23,000	127,000	200
Rep. Congo	12/05 - 12/08	-	30,000	25
Rwanda	12/01 -	15,000	30,000	57.30
Somalia	01/05 - 06/06	-	53,000	32.80
Sudan	01/05 - 12/07	121,000	57,500	69.40
Uganda	-	-	15,310	6.74
TOTAL (22)		513,544	741,966	1,996.75

Table 2.1: Ongoing DDR programmes in 2006 (From Escola de Cultura de Pau 2007: p. 38.)

The case studies needed to be selected from programmes which were completed or almost complete. (Liberia is listed the table above because a number of ex-combatants who had entered the programme but had not completed reintegration were still on the books.) From the possible candidates, Sierra Leone and Liberia were the most appropriate countries for case studies for a number of reasons. The wars had ended in 2002 and 2003 respectively, so the formal DDR programmes had been completed reasonably recently. Enough time had passed for the longer-term effects of the reintegration programmes to be assessed, but not so much that other factors masked reintegration entirely. They shared a number of useful similarities, quite apart from the fact that their conflicts were related. One was the regional setting, which can affect arms flows and conflict dynamics. The other was the fact that both countries had enjoyed a reasonably secure environment, once the final peace agreement was reached (although several earlier attempts took place in both countries). This meant that most of the DDR took place after the war had ended, in a gradually improving security environment.

Both countries received more attention from the international community at the end of the war than some other conflicts, with significant engagement by UN and other multilateral agencies. This means that the chronic under-resourcing of peacebuilding operations which can hamper their effectiveness was not as significant a factor as in other cases.

In terms of chronology, it is also important that DDR took place after more than a decade of growing experience internationally of such programmes. While institutional memory is often lost and staff turnover can be high, the growing experience within this field and the development of best practice meant that a slowly-maturing version of DDR was being examined. The version implemented was an archetype of “classic DDR”, rather than the atypical cases such as DDR carried out during a conflict (in Colombia), or where the main elements being demobilised were state forces (Ethiopia and Eritrea). Finally, both countries are reasonably small and secure, so that a wide variety of urban and rural locations could be accessed by a researcher travelling alone or with one other person.

Sierra Leone and Liberia, therefore, share some key characteristics which make them good choices for the case studies, while also increasing the range of potential variation in both the operationalisation of DDR programmes and in the political and social context.

Sierra Leone

The territory which was to become Sierra Leone was a significant departure point for the Atlantic slave trade during the eighteenth century. Following the American War of Independence, a colony for freed slaves was set up with backing from British philanthropists in 1787. After a difficult beginning, it continued to receive freed slaves from the trade, especially after the slave trade was outlawed in Britain in 1807. This group made up the Krio (Creole) population, which remained very small but privileged, laying the foundations for Sierra Leone’s cleavages and zero-sum game politics (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). Sierra Leone later became a fully-established British colony, achieving independence during the great wave of African decolonisation in 1961.

Following independence, the country moved gradually from an open system dominated by two political parties towards one-party, autocratic rule. It was increasingly divided along ethnic lines and dominated by patronage (Keen 2005). Services for citizens declined, and elites combined to

exploit both state and natural resources. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission blamed the war on:

[Y]ears of bad governance, endemic corruption and the denial of basic human rights that created the deplorable conditions that made conflict inevitable. Successive regimes became increasingly impervious to the wishes and needs of the majority.... Institutional collapse reduced the vast majority of people into a state of deprivation. Government accountability was non-existent. Political expression and dissent had been crushed. Democracy and the rule of law were dead. By 1991, Sierra Leone was a deeply divided society and full of the potential for violence. It required only the slightest spark for this violence to be ignited.

(Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004a: p. 10)

The exploitation of diamonds, rather than being the primary cause of the war, was an example of the failure of the political system, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004b). It was the collapse of the state and its inability to provide basic services for its citizens which contributed to the conditions for war (Keen 2005; 2009). The exclusion, for many reasons, of young people – who made up a large and underemployed section of the population – was particularly significant in providing a pool of alienated youth who felt they had no stake in the future: they were ripe for recruitment by political and paramilitary movements (Peters and Richards 1998). In fact, intergenerational tensions remain even after the war, with elders still holding power over land in rural areas (Peeters et al 2009).

The armed conflict started in March 1991 with an incursion from Liberian territory (whose own war had started just over a year before). The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), whose broadly democratic rhetoric was quickly replaced by financial motives (Hough 2007), was backed by Liberia's Charles Taylor, and soon took control of half the country, especially the diamond mining areas (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). Diamond exploitation became more important as a motivation as the war progressed, with fighting for control of the areas where they could be found by artisanal methods. Much of the gains were in fact passed up through the hierarchy, and rebel groups and state forces sometimes colluded to share the spoils and other economic opportunities of war (Keen 2005; 2009). The Community Defence Forces (CDF) were formed as a self-protection militia in the face of RUF attacks, since government forces were unable to fulfil this role. Outside actors included private military operators hired by the government to regain control; the West African peace enforcement mission, ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group), and a British intervention force in 2000.

The Lomé peace agreement was signed with the RUF in 1999, under which they were included in a power-sharing government, and the UN peacekeeping mission started to take over from ECOMOG later that year. However the situation remained unstable, with the capture of UN peacekeepers by RUF forces, and later intervention by British troops to put pressure on the RUF, which retained control of large parts of the country. But as the RUF was further weakened, it signed a series of agreements in 2001 allowing for DDR, freedom of movement for UN peacekeepers, and eventually cessation of all hostilities (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). The war was over by early 2002. An estimated 50,000 people had lost their lives, and more than two million people had been displaced (Solomon and Ginifer 2008). Elections were held in May 2002, in which the party arising from the RUF won just two per cent of the vote and failed to secure any seats in parliament (Mitton 2008). Shortly afterwards it merged with an existing party.

A preliminary disarmament programme started in 1998 but only ran for a short time. The Lomé peace agreement of 1999 made provision for a DDR programme, but implementation of the agreement in general quickly unravelled (Keen 2005) and disarmament was interrupted several times. It was reaffirmed in the Abuja agreements, and DDR only began in earnest in 2001 once the RUF was weakened and the security situation improved. This phase lasted just over two years, accounting for most of the 72,500 people in total who went through demobilisation. The final figure was considerably more than originally estimated. This included 6,845 children, amounting to 9.4% of the total. In all, 42,300 weapons were collected, representing 0.58 weapons per person demobilised. The cost of the programme is estimated to have been US\$45.2 million (Caramés Fisas and Luz 2006). A total of 4,751 of those demobilised were women (amounting to 6.5%) (Solomon and Ginifer 2008).

Liberia

Like Sierra Leone, Liberia's origins lie in the attempt to create a homeland for freed African slaves coming from the Americas. It was founded in 1822 by Americo-Liberian settlers. They too formed a small percentage of the population, but dominated the indigenous peoples, controlling social, economic and political institutions (Olonisakin 2003). The ruling elite was overthrown by a coup which brought Samuel Doe to power in 1980, but his repressive policies, ethnic favouritism, and gross human rights abuses simply intensified the preconditions for war (Cleaver and Massey 2006). Ellis (2007) describes the state as highly centralised, but incorporating local systems of power, such as kinship networks, which were subsumed into the

system of patronage. The structure was complex, with a combination of formal and informal methods of operation, and little provision for rational power sharing.

The war was a struggle by rival warlords for control of a state which had come under new ownership in 1980. The most important actors in the war were politicians and technocrats who had emerged in the 1970s, when True Whig Party rule was crumbling, unable to adjust to the emergence of new social groups or to maintain its patronage networks under adverse economic conditions.

(Ellis 2007: p. 304)

The move against Doe's regime came at the end of 1989, in the form of an uprising by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). When ECOMOG entered Liberia in 1990, less than a year after the conflict began, there were three armed groups (one of them being the remnants of the national army). Taylor's NPFL held 98% of the country, with a breakaway faction and the army each holding a part of the capital, Monrovia. The number of factions grew over the years, but the NPFL still held the largest area (Nass 2000). It was also deeply involved in Sierra Leone's conflict, through the RUF.

The first phase of the civil war came to an end (after 16 ceasefire agreements) in 1996. Taylor won a landslide victory in presidential and parliamentary elections the following year, but the war had resumed by 2000 (Bekoe 2008). In the end military pressure by the two main rebel groups forced Taylor's hand, while talks took place in Accra, resulting in his resignation in August 2003. After a time in exile in Nigeria, he was sent back to Liberia, and from there directly to Sierra Leone to face war crimes charges relating to his role in the conflict there. As usual, the highest price was paid by civilians: it is estimated that the war in Liberia had cost more than 200,000 lives, along with massive displacement (Olonisakin 2003).

The DDR programme in Liberia started prematurely, and inauspiciously. Under pressure to show results quickly, the disarmament phase began as early as December 2003, despite warnings that this was too soon. Many more combatants turned up than expected, leading to chaotic scenes and violence, and the programme was suspended within a few days. After consultations with the rebel groups, it was restarted the following April (Paes 2005). In all, 102,193 people entered the programme, though a proportion of these were not ex-combatants. A total of 27,804 weapons were collected, representing one for about every four people (Nichols 2005). The programme cost an estimated US\$160 million, which is considerably less than the annual budget for the peacekeeping operation in Liberia. Of those entering DDR, 11,000 were

children (i.e. were under 18 years of age), amounting to 10.3%, while 24% were women (Caramés Fisas and Luz 2006).

Researcher bias

It is usual in a thesis of this nature to write the researcher out of the picture, as if their approach, worldview, interests, and experiences have been replaced entirely by an objective methodology and intellectual rigour. In fact, it is not possible to claim that these human factors have had no effect on the research project. While it is hoped that they have not lead to selection of evidence or other bias, even unconsciously, it cannot be claimed that in all the choices to be made along the way, a researcher is equally open to all data. The research ultimately involves perceiving the potential evidence, selecting from it, organising and structuring it, and ultimately interpreting it. At a more fundamental level, the choice of methodology is also in part a function of these human factors. As Gillham points out, it is “bad ‘science’” to ignore the fact that each study has its own dynamic in which the researcher is an actor”. He says they are “a participant observer who acknowledges (and looks out for) their role in what they discover” (2000: p. 7). This declaration is not intended to justify in any way some kind of pseudo-research which is in reality an exercise in circular reasoning, in which evidence is generated which supports conclusions or beliefs which were held from the start. It is rather an attempt at greater honesty, and to allow the reader to assess the extent to which the researcher’s background and subjectivities may have had any influence on the conclusions drawn. In these paragraphs, I will therefore depart from the convention of avoiding the use of the first person singular, since this section is not masquerading as anything other than a subjective statement.

First of all, when I set out on this research, my personal worldview, based on my life experiences, intuition, and personality, was that ownership and participatory approaches, in the broadest sense of those words, can be difficult to achieve, but are more likely to lead to useful outcomes which are more sustainable and relevant to the supposed beneficiaries. I saw power, communication, and the alignment of interests as key factors in this complex process. There was quite clearly a normative element, in that the approach was seen as intrinsically “better”, in addition to better outcomes, which may or may not be easily measurable.

Secondly, at a fundamental level, I cannot deny that I felt a moral imperative for outsiders with influence, power, and resources to assist and facilitate those struggling with armed conflict, under-development, and their consequences. This is said with great awareness of the dangers of

paternalism, dependency, and manipulation, as well as a painful appreciation of the long track record of unfortunate unintended consequences arising from even the best of intentions. Both before and during this research, I became increasingly alert to the practice of claiming that beneficiaries' interests were being addressed, when in fact it was as much the psychological, moral, commercial, or career interests of the powerful which were being met.

Thirdly, I felt an underlying commitment to what I can only describe as "truth-seeking" (however much that "truth" may be contested). This included questioning deeply, by which I mean being honestly open to all possibilities, including the possibility that establishment practices may indeed be right as well as wrong. It requires absolutely that my own beliefs and perceptions are subject to the same ruthless examination, even when this is uncomfortable or troublesome. If evidence which does not accord with what has already been inferred is not considered, one loses an important basis for making any statement: intellectual honesty. This abhorrence of circular reasoning means one must be comfortable with the confusion and lack of clarity which sometimes result from outliers and contradictory evidence – things which must be accepted and indeed embraced as part of the process.

Fourthly, I felt an obligation to be searching but fair in my assessment. That meant considering the situation of all actors at the time. It meant not idolising any of them, and also not engaging in shallow, easy criticism from my comfortable position, which might be self-satisfying but would not take account of the circumstances and very real constraints at the time. Whether considering community perceptions of ex-combatants or interventions by international agencies, I felt required to distinguish between actions (which may have been flawed or unsuccessful) and motivations (which may have been well-intentioned even if the effects on others were disappointing), rather than glibly ascribing motives to actors which they may not have had.

The second, third, and fourth elements mentioned above have not changed fundamentally in the course of the research, and have in fact become clearer to me. The first part – a predisposition to participatory practices – did however evolve over time. I became even more aware of the complexity of the many causal processes underway in a post-war situation, and of the diversity of sometimes competing interests within the community. I became more aware of the greater difficulty of working in a participatory way in such situations. I came to see a complex variety of motivations, ranging from naked self-interest to profound concern for the well-being of others. As a researcher, I also faced the confusion and disorientation of often feeling that clear evidence (and indeed signs of participation) could not always be found, and the very long

timeframes over which causal processes sometimes operate. That meant having to change my research question to a less ambitious one, but where I felt I could stand over the attempt to answer it, while pointing out the degree of uncertainty involved. The process has left me slower to judge those who fail to find a participatory approach, and aware that a desire for participation may not necessarily be expressed explicitly by stakeholders. I became more conscious of both the difficulties of participation, and danger of merely paying lip service to it. But having really questioned as I went, based on all the evidence, I remain certain that where it is possible, participation is intrinsically better as both a means and an end in itself.

I have attempted to question all of these views as I went, while remaining aware that this was done from the perspective of a privileged European man who would always have the option of returning from the field to live in a rich country.

Strategies for dealing with researcher subjectivity

A number of strategies were used during the research in order to address researcher subjectivity. These included the use of a reflective research journal while engaged in field work. This helps to limit the danger of circularity in the cycle of perception, informal hypothesis formation, and the subsequently-influenced perceptions. It does this by exposing the cycle to scrutiny as it is happening. It also allows the questioning of assumptions as they become relevant, by bringing them to the surface. The use of the diary is in ways similar to the writing of memos during coding of focus group transcripts, which is described later.

Respondent validation is another way of testing impressions and latent hypotheses as they form, by discussing emerging impressions not just with respondents but in fact with a variety of actors. That includes discussions with a wide range of people who have lived through the experience of post-war Sierra Leone or Liberia. The important thing is the diversity of voices that are heard, and it goes beyond the direct interviewees themselves: from chance encounters on the street to discussions with people who have a coherent and previously articulated historical view of events (who may or not be encountered on the street, in fact).

Peer validation is also useful, including research assistants and translators from the country. They will often have taken part in the same interview or focus group discussion; can mediate between worlds; and can provide a useful unprompted opinion as to whether saturation is being achieved and about the degree of coherence where triangulation is being used. Useful validation

(or its absence, which is just as important) is also possible through other researchers, ranging from first-timers in the region to those with many years of experience. In all of these exchanges, one element is essential: the honesty and openness of the dialogue in both directions.

Ultimately, overcoming any of the limitations arising from one's personal stance relies on the willingness to question new and old assumptions and hypotheses. This is best done in the manner of a "critical friend" who seeks neither to endorse automatically nor to undermine, but to probe and test in a collaborative attempt to constantly improve the representation of an external reality. To draw on the Popperian philosophy of science (which does not just apply to the natural sciences), all knowledge is treated as permanently provisional.

Field work

Field work for the study was carried out in Liberia and Sierra Leone in November 2007 (both countries), September 2008 (Sierra Leone), and February 2010 (Liberia). Data for the case studies were gathered in a variety of geographical locations, in order to cover a range of urban, semi-urban, and rural settings; different ethnic and language groups (such as Mende, Kpele and Loma); and varying economic environments. In Liberia, the locations included the capital (Monrovia), and the counties of Lofa (which was one of the areas most affected by the war) and Bong. Research was conducted in the principle towns in these counties (Voinjama and Gbarnga respectively), the village of Lawalazu (about 10 miles WNW of Voinjama), and the small town of Zorzor in Lofa, close to the border with Bong county. As it happens, there has been considerable population movement in Liberia during and after the war, which increases the diversity within the areas selected for field work; 72% of respondents in the survey indicated that they had settled in an area they did not originally come from. In Sierra Leone, data was gathered in the capital (Freetown), and in and around three main towns (Bo, Kenema, and Makeni).

The data were gathered using:

- (1) Semi-structured interviews with key informants from civil society organisations; ex-combatants; staff and former staff from local, national, and international implementing agencies; staff and former staff from other development agencies who were not directly involved in DDR; government officials; and staff of a number of UN agencies;

- (2) A questionnaire for ex-combatants, which was piloted in Sierra Leone (with 32 respondents) and then used in Liberia (95 respondents); and
- (3) Focus group discussions of ex-combatants (five in Liberia, two of which were all-female, and six in Sierra Leone).

At most stages in the field work, a translator/research assistant from the country or indeed locality was employed. A research journal was used to note key themes as they emerged during the field trips. This recorded and reflected on patterns which became apparent at an impressionistic level, and key learning moments, rather than attempting to carry out conscious and replicable analysis. It was an attempt to freely record these impressions in an uninhibited way as they surfaced, during this “first pass” of the data, and to capture experiential learning so it could be brought together with other forms of knowledge. This was done in the full knowledge that it was just one element in an iterative process, which would include other steps where the data are explicitly analysed in a way which is independently verifiable. Journal writing does not amount to contaminating the data or predisposing the researcher to hearing only what was consistent with an emerging hypothesis. Whether or not they are consciously acknowledged and recorded, these first impressions are formed in the field, and noting them does not give them special status or validity. What is important is that they are recognised as first impressions, and are never conflated with the survey forms, verbatim transcripts and recordings of the focus groups, and interview notes, which are all retained separately as primary data sources, and which are available for review.

Sampling methodology

For the survey and focus group participants, the snowball sampling method was used (Fink, 1995), based on several initial introductions in each locality. There was therefore a number of entry points to the population, based on geographical location and local networking. The rationale for this was dictated partly by the question of building trust with potential participants, who might otherwise be reluctant to talk to outsiders. Purposive sampling, as opposed to random sampling, is called for due to possible reluctance among the population of ex-combatants to come forward or be associated with their former identity as participants in the war. While random sampling will in many situations appear to produce more representative results, the fact that outside researchers may not be known or trusted can itself lead not just to low participation rates, but an unrepresentative sample, when particular sub-groups feel they

have more to fear. Suspicion of outsiders asking about ex-combatants arose in the context of investigations into war crimes, and the truth and reconciliation processes. This concern was heightened by the activities of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which has prosecuted commanders in both the Community Defence Forces (CDF) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), leading to a reticence on the part of some ex-combatants. It was necessary to make clear that this research project was not associated in any way with these processes. Introductions to ex-combatants from trusted community members or other ex-combatants were therefore needed in order reach enough participants in the right proportions.

The need to overcome ex-combatants' possible reluctance to take part informed not only the sampling methodology, but also the type of introduction to participants, the location of focus group discussion or interviews, the selection and briefing of the moderators or interviewers, and the general approach and communication with the group. These issues are captured in this excerpt from the reflective research journal from Sierra Leone:

The act of writing things down, having forms or paperwork, or recording them, is linked to power and status in these situations. It also raises questions about being seen as [a] representative of the international community, the government, [or] the UN, so people may respond to you as a potential provider of resources, or a target for their anger. Or one may be seen as linked the Special Court, raising suspicion and reticence, especially since the arrest of Chief Hinga Norman. Introducing ourselves as students is important in trying to overcome these perceptions, but they can persist despite stating several times that we are not NGO or government employees.

(Excerpt from contemporaneous research journal for 9th September 2008)

The rationale of using peer introductions for populations who are difficult to access (such as minorities, drug users, or others living on the margins) is laid out more explicitly in the method known as Respondent-Driven Sampling (RDS). The method differs slightly from snowballing in that small incentives are used to encourage participants to recruit others for the survey, and checks are introduced to ensure that members of the group do not participate more than once and that they are genuinely from the target population (Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004; Bøås and Hatløy, 2008). These checks were not required due to the small sample size, which would have made any such problems more immediately apparent, and the lack of systematic incentives. What is useful in the RDS approach, however, is the more explicit rationale in using the method of participant referral for dealing with such populations.

Other in-depth, qualitative research of former fighters has addressed this issue of random sampling, especially where intermediaries were required in order to gain the trust of ex-

combatants. Specht (2006), for example, makes clear that her sample cannot be claimed to be representative of all girl combatants in Liberia, but that the project made “deliberate efforts to gather information beyond the situations and areas commonly reported” (p. 114).

Truly random sampling was also not possible for this study due to the considerable amount of resources required. A team of enumerators would have had to be hired and trained, as detailed in some of the surveys of ex-combatants. Humphreys and Weinstein (2004), for example, provided three weeks of training for enumerators they sought to use for their survey of 1,043 ex-combatants in neighbouring Sierra Leone. The number of potential enumerators was narrowed through exams and pre-survey tests, before nine were ultimately hired. They were joined by other staff, for four months of intensive data collection in scores of different locations across the country. (Even with this level of resources, the help of local community members from the selected locations was still required to identify and recruit ex-combatants for the study.) This amounts to more than four person-years just for data collection, and is beyond the financial and time constraints of this PhD research. While a representative sample of ex-combatants was sought for this study, non-random sampling means that a lower level of confidence must be used in drawing statistical inferences. The inferences drawn can be said to apply to the sample, but generalisation about the population of ex-combatants as a whole must however be made with less certainty. Once these limitations are clearly expressed, a useful exploration using non-random sampling can nevertheless proceed.

As an approximate test of the representativeness of the sample of survey respondents in Liberia, the proportions of those in various sub-groups has been calculated. These are compared in Table 2.2 below with the proportions reported for the whole population of those who registered for DDR. The proportions along gender lines are similar; the survey sample appears to over-represent those who were children at the time of demobilisation; and membership of fighting groups matches some but not all factions.

	Survey in this study		DDR in 2007	Notes
	Number	%	%	
Gender				
Female	28	29%	24%	The proportions are similar Chi-square= 0.6418
Male	67	71%	76%	
Age at DDR				
Child	29	32%	11%	Those who were children at DDR appear to be over-represented in the survey Chi-square=0.000
Adult	62	68%		
Fighting group				
LURD	34	36%	33%	The proportions are similar, except for Govt of Liberia and “Other”. Respondents associated with “Other” groups (NPFL) may have associated themselves with Govt/AFL forces. Chi-square=0.000
MODEL	5	5%	13%	
Govt of Liberia and AFL	56	59%	27%	
Other	0	0%	27%	

Table 2.2: Sub-groups within survey sample, compared with figures for those who participated in DDR (as listed by Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2008, *DDR in 2007*: pp. 121-122).

The importance of working within local protocol became clear during the research, and in particular adapting to the expectations of visitors and newcomers to smaller, less anonymous communities. In this situation, the advice and sensitivity of the translator/research assistant was invaluable. The situation was recorded in the research journal at the time in this way:

The welcoming and open nature of the community at New Gerihun (Bo) has had a significant and positive impact on our efforts. It was certainly affected by adherence to local protocol, and in particular the approach to the Section Chief and his unequivocal endorsement. It may have been a function of the community's experience in having been consulted by NGOs in the past, and the fact that certain community members had worked for or interacted with NGOs, so they were familiar with engaging with them or being consulted.

... In fact, Hennink (2007) sets out a multitude of reasons for doing this (describing it in terms of local hierarchies, and respecting local protocol). Not least is the fact that they may provide some one to assist you in their area, a role which [a local teacher] and his wife effectively filled, in the knowledge that our work had the blessing of the Section Chief. LJ [research assistant] made sure to mention the chief's approval of our work when we were subsequently meeting people and asking them to help us or take part in groups or interviews.

As our meeting [with him] was carried out in front of an audience, and met with his approval, word spread quickly in the community about the research project.

(Excerpt from contemporaneous research journal for 9th September 2008)

Naturally, introductions via intermediaries can result in an unrepresentative section of the community being encountered, whether deliberately or not. A researcher must be alive to this possibility, by checking if a diversity of views is being expressed, and seeking out alternative view points. Another aspect of local protocol which was both important and appreciated in this

particular situation was to pay one's respects when leaving the area. The norms are of course different in every location, depending especially on whether it was rural or closely-knit.

Questionnaire

The survey instrument was initially piloted and then carried out in Sierra Leone (n=32). Minor alterations were subsequently made to localise it to the Liberian context, such as the fighting groups which respondents could indicate they had belonged to, and changing all references from “DDR” to “DDRR”, which was the term used in Liberia. After a small pilot survey there, several questions were removed, in order to reduce the time taken to carry out the survey. The questionnaire is in Appendix C. The introductory text read to participants emphasises that this was a research project undertaken by students, rather than by an NGO. This was important in attempting to reduce any of the expectations which are often associated with people in authority or an official role, who can be seen as a source of income or resources, especially if they are affiliated to an NGO. A total of 95 people were surveyed in Liberia, in all of the locations listed in the introduction to this section. The survey was completed by one of a number of Sierra Leonean or Liberian researchers (as appropriate) who had been fully briefed on the process, who read out the questions in the most appropriate language and recorded the answers in English. This was intended to overcome the exclusion of the those who could not read or write (which affects women and girls disproportionately), or may have had difficulty in understanding the language used. Each questionnaire in Liberia took on average 27 minutes to complete, and included a mixture of nominal and ordinal scale options, Likert scale selections, and open-ended questions.

Focus groups

A total of eleven focus groups were run in ten different locations (listed below), and were moderated by one or two researchers from the locality or country. Times of day were chosen which would suit the respondents, and reduce the possibility of selection bias due to certain population groups being under-represented because they were not available at particular times. This is especially relevant given the way agricultural and household tasks are allocated according to gender. For example, participants in the most rural setting (Lawalazu) gathered in the village before 08.00 in the morning, before they had left for the day to work in the surrounding fields. In this case, two separate groups were convened, one for men and the other for women, in order to allow the women's perspective and own particular group dynamic to

come to the fore. The importance of convening specific focus groups for women, whose voices may not be heard in a mixed setting, has been highlighted by Madriz (2003). For this reason, a second female-only focus group was held in Monrovia, at which the moderators were also women.

Dates and locations of focus group discussions		
Group	Date	Location
		Sierra Leone
A	10 September 2008	New Gerihun Road, Bo
B	11 September 2008	NTC training centre, Bo
C	11 September 2008	Methodist Primary School, Bo
E	11 September 2008	Carpentry workshop, Bo
F	13 September 2008	Kenema
G	25 September 2008	Makeni
		Liberia
H	09 February 2010	William V S Tubman-Gray High School, Gbarnga, Bong County
J	12 February 2010	Lawalazu, Lofa County
K	12 February 2010	Lawalazu, Lofa County
L	17 February 2010	Cuttington University, Gbarnga, Bong County
M	27 February 2010	NEPI offices, Monrovia
<i>Note: There was no Group D (letter originally assigned to an incomplete translation of what became Group E, now replaced by the full transcript). The letter "I" was also not used to avoid confusion with figure "1".</i>		

Table 2.3: Dates and locations of focus group discussions.

One of the most significant choices in running the focus groups was the selection and briefing of the moderator. The importance of using a moderator who is familiar with the culture and has the appropriate social skills is stressed by several writers on focus groups (for example, Madriz 2003). Hennink (2007) in fact highlights the value of using a variety of moderators, according to the particular situations encountered, and the fact that participants should feel at ease with the moderator. Barbour (2007) mentions pairing moderators in order to find the right mix of qualities, and taking the possible impact of the moderator into account during data analysis, since the effect cannot be discounted completely.

Smyth's (2005) discussion of "insider" versus "outsider" research highlights some of the issues involved, although this concerns a more general level than focus group moderation. Her list of the advantages an insider enjoys closely parallels those of a locally engaged moderator, such as intimate knowledge of the terrain, and cultural competence. Disadvantages include possible partiality (such as coming from a particular ethnic group or social class), or being unable to "see" certain patterns because of over-familiarity with the environment or enculturation. Outsiders, on the other hand, may bring knowledge of other conflicts and societies to the situation (which is both a risk as well as an advantage). They may be able to see patterns which

are not visible to others who are over-familiar with the society, while at the same time this lack of cultural competence can lead to misinterpreting or simply missing the significance of events or information. Her recommendations for researchers in general are relevant to moderation of focus groups: she calls for “respectful partnerships” which acknowledge the differences in access to resources and distribution of knowledge (2005: p. 22).

The moderators were therefore recruited in country, and had in nearly all cases also been involved in carrying out the survey. They were briefed on the needs of the research project, how to conduct the focus group, and techniques for enhancing participation by all members of the group. They were provided with guidelines for the discussion, and mutual de-briefing and feedback took place after each group, in order to monitor and refine the process.

The author was also present in most groups, sometimes acting as an assistant moderator, so that written notes could be made on who was speaking (coordinated with the audio recording by timecode) so that participants could be distinguished in the transcription. Non-verbal communication was also noted, such as pointing, standing up, gestures, and indications that comments were being addressed to specific people. In some cases, one or two questions were suggested by the assistant moderator, who otherwise remained in the background, once introductions had been made. While the assistant moderator kept a low profile, they did not however remain anonymous and there was no pretence that they were invisible. It was felt that some one who was clearly an outsider should be introduced to the group, as their presence without an introduction could have created discomfort for participants.

One exception to this was the all-female focus group convened by an association for ex-combatants in the capital, Monrovia. The dynamic would have been altered by the presence of a male assistant moderator, so in this case, a female researcher who is also looking at DDR in Liberia was asked to take on the role. In order to facilitate a more open and non-threatening environment for a group which faces particular problems of stigma, a member of the organisation was asked to act as moderator. While this departure from the standard approach may be seen as unusual, it was a response to the perceptions and dynamics of a specific subgroup within the population of ex-combatants. The verbatim transcript and assistant moderator's notes still allow for direct access to the discussion, so the process remains open to scrutiny.

The discussions were recorded simultaneously on two separate digital audio recorders, in order to reduce the chance of data loss, and to capture contributions from all locations in the group.

Permission to record the discussion was explicitly requested, and the start and end of recording was indicated. Participants could not be guaranteed confidentiality, as other members of the group hearing the discussion could not be held to such a commitment, and it was always intended to quote excerpts from the discussion in this research. A commitment was however made that in any use of their contributions, they would not be identified by name or otherwise.

Full verbatim transcripts were produced after each discussion, with notations on additional non-verbal info, identification of participants where possible, and other information noted by the moderators, to ensure that as much of the data and cues were captured. The translation and transcription were carried out in-country, normally within a few hours or days of the discussion. By combining the process of transcription and translation, the loss of data and the risk of misunderstandings were minimised, when compared with translation based on a transcript. Compared with the original recording, there is inevitably some loss of meaning in a transcript, due to the failure to completely capture tone of voice, hesitation, emphasis, or other important cues. This would be compounded when the discussion goes through a subsequent process of translation. The possibility of replaying unclear sections of a recording, together with the moderators' notes and recollection, meant the translation was based as closely as possible on the original event. The translation was generally done by the moderator and assistant moderator, who could contribute their understanding of what was meant, in the case of ambiguous phrasing or references to others present in the room. It also provided a useful opportunity for reviewing and improving the running of focus groups. The moderators could also provide cultural guidance, and bring local knowledge to bear in order to clarify references to geographical locations, past events, or entities. This kind of data could have been lost by subsequent translations by other native speakers who did not come from the area.

In accordance with the guarantee for participants of anonymity, the first versions of the transcripts were password protected. Subsequent versions of the transcript were "cleaned", anonymised and saved separately.

The saturation point, when no new themes are seen to be emerging from repeated focus group discussions, came remarkably quickly in both countries. It was in some cases commented on without prompting by the translator/research assistant. There was also a marked consistency between the views and themes arising spontaneously in interviews, focus groups, and questionnaires. A number of issues which had not been mentioned in the questionnaire were

raised spontaneously by respondents in the open ended question. These responses overlapped significantly with the focus group themes.

For example, a total of 87 people responded to the open-ended question about what they would avoid doing if running a DDR programme themselves, in order to promote inclusion. It is interesting to note that corruption and mismanagement were not mentioned in any of the survey questions, so the theme arose spontaneously. It coincides with similar concerns raised consistently in the focus group discussions, again without prompting.

Theme	Number	Percentage
False promises, lying, promising too much, or creating unrealistic expectations	30	35%
Corruption or being corrupt	26	30%
Excluding people or their views	14	16%
Duration of the programme being too short	7	8%

Table 2.4: Themes highlighted in response to the open-ended question (J3) “What would you avoid doing?”, (if you were running a DDR programme now, to help people feel included in the process, and have their views listened to.)

Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders in the process. This includes a number of ex-combatants, who had a particular story to tell. Office holders from organisations representing ex-combatants were also interviewed. It also gave an opportunity to see the perspective of those implementing the programme. This ranged from senior policy-makers to those working directly with the target population. It includes those responsible in UN agencies such as the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP); those working for state bodies such as the National Commission for DDRR (NCDDRR); former staff of the demobilisation camps; employees of NGOs and agencies who provided vocational training for ex-combatants; teachers; officials of national ministries and local government; and community representatives. In some cases the interviewees were still employed by the same body which had been responsible for implementing DDR, and in others, they were able to reflect on their experiences as ex-employees.

Qualitative data analysis: focus groups

The focus group transcripts came to approximately 32,000 words. They were coded in order to identify key themes using the software package NVivo. This allowed for easier management of the data than by manual methods. It also provides an audit trail, showing the path taken from raw transcripts through to themes and the relationships between these themes (Bazeley, 2007). It therefore allows for replication of the process of analysis by other researchers. All questions of meaning and interpretation of transcripts were decided manually by the researcher, while the software's real contribution was to allow the data to be organised, structured, interrogated, and retrieved in a manageable way. When the risk is that one will drown in data, the database is an effective lifeboat which allows the researcher to float around and look at what there is to be seen, rather than something which crudely drains the sea.

The development of coding frames in general is discussed in more detail by Krueger (1997) and Richards (2005), and (with specific reference to NVivo) by Bazeley (2007). It is essential to recognise the iterative nature of focus group research and analysis, especially in the coding process (Barbour 2007; Hennink 2007). The writing of "memos" during the coding process, recording initial thoughts on emerging themes and identifying how well the coding scheme fits the data, is very helpful in encouraging this process of reflection. It also helps to ensure that the frame continues to be regarded as something provisional, open to revision, and fluid, rather than sacrosanct. (Bazeley (2007) cites the example of one researcher who printed out and laminated the coding the frame, as a cautionary tale). The NVivo software in fact facilitates the process, not only with its section for memos, but the possibility to link them to particular sections of transcript. Of course, any changes to the framework which means that those themes must be revisited and re-coded, whether the new "node" (the term used by NVivo for a theme) is a disaggregation of an existing node, the amalgamation of two which have already been used, or an entirely new theme which has emerged during the process.

In order to record this process itself, screen shots of the coding frame at various points in the process are taken, to show how it has evolved. This ensures an effective audit trail for the data analysis, and they are shown in Appendix D. The entire process, whose subjective elements may be regarded as a problem for some, is in fact replicable, as another researcher could take the same anonymised raw transcripts and code them "blind". Their coding frame may of course differ, as it would be produced in the light of different experiences in the field, but the degree to

which these differences are significant is what matters. The process is in fact transparent, open, and rigorous.

NVivo was also used to code the open-ended answers from the survey. This is perhaps best explained by the “process memo” written at the time, which helped to clarify and indeed formalise the process:

In a separate process, the answers to the open-ended questions in the surveys from Liberia (n=95) and Sierra Leone (n=32) were imported. They amounted to about 7,600 words, and were coded according to the question, so that the original meaning [i.e. context] would not be misunderstood. The respondents were coded as case nodes [i.e. broken down by individual survey respondent], and relevant data from the survey were imported and linked individually to these cases. The data came from just over 30 questions in the survey such as age, gender, location of interview, armed faction they had belonged to, and some of the more important answers to closed questions such as whether they had received enough information on the reintegration process.

The responses to the open-ended questions were then coded according to a separate frame to focus groups. This effectively turned the open-ended answers into closed ones, but with the benefit of categories which were more likely to reflect the range of views, since they were created after respondents had given unprompted responses. This allowed issues to emerge in their own way, and to provide original quotations from respondents, while also permitting further data analysis using the discrete categories, which could then be cross-referenced with other responses.

(Excerpt from author’s process memo in NVivo)

Each of the responses could be in fact be coded at several nodes if necessary, as if the original question had been a closed one with the instruction “tick as many as apply”.

Reflective memos about the content of the transcripts were also written as ideas arose from the data, as a well as about the process. These “project memos” written on the hoof provided a useful opportunity to combine immediacy and perspective, in a form which could later be reviewed. As Bazeley (2007) says, the process is about achieving both distance and closeness to the data. She says that after working through a document, a researcher should be:

surprised and excited and informed by nuances in the text, but also able to stand back and see the whole... Detailed coding and associated memoing will take you closer to an intimate knowledge of both the case and the ideas you are working with.

(Bazeley 2007: p 60)

The process involves a fine-grained analysis to see things which may not be immediately apparent, while being able to see larger patterns which are usually visible only with distance.

Quantitative analysis: survey

The survey data was analysed using a number statistical tests including Fisher's exact test, and logit and ordered logit regression. The software used was Stata, and the raw data, "do files" and log files are available, allowing for replication of the analysis by other researchers. The details of which test was used where are discussed in the data chapters, where the reader will have a better opportunity to see the survey questions being analysed.

Some limitations regarding the quantitative analysis exist, which reduce the potential for generalising the conclusions about this sample, and projecting them onto the population of ex-combatants. Firstly, the sampling methodology does not permit such generalisation, since it was not possible to use genuinely random sampling of ex-combatants. The purposive sampling was spread across a number of locations, both urban and rural, in the two countries. It did result in diverse samples from all the main armed groups, a range of ages (including those who were children at the time of demobilisation), both men and women, and individuals who had chosen a variety of reintegration options. This, however, is not enough to guarantee that the samples are truly representative of the wider population, and may account for some of the unexpected results.

The sample size is also a limitation. A total of 32 people were surveyed in Sierra Leone, and 95 in Liberia. These figures are reduced once there is any disaggregation, such as country, gender, or those living in cities. This means that when associations between variables are detected, it is harder to attribute this to a real effect, since the chance of it being due to sampling error is much higher with a smaller sample. Real differences are therefore more likely to be rejected than with larger samples. Despite these limitations, the analysis is a useful exercise in drawing both descriptive and causal inferences, which apply to those sampled and may be also considered in relation to the wider population.

Ultimately, a mixture of methods has been used as appropriate for the collection and analysis of data, with the intention of making micro- and macro-level inferences about the complex set of processes underway during DDR.

Conclusion

The approach adopted in this thesis is grounded in an awareness of the inevitable impact of the researcher's own position. This is heightened when the researcher is (and is perceived to be) from a wealthier more powerful state, conducting field research in a post-conflict development context. The methodological approaches adopted in the following four chapters are an appropriate attempt to gather and analyse data in a transparent and objective manner within these boundaries. The use of interviews, surveys and focus groups as described above generated a rich range of material which provided compelling and relatively consistent evidence.

Chapter 3:

Accessing information on reintegration programmes

Introduction and justification

This chapter looks at the way in which information about DDR was passed to ex-combatants, the amount of information, and its accuracy or quality. This is distinct from the question of ex-combatants being consulted or asked for information or their opinions, which is dealt with later. It is therefore the very lowest of the “rungs” on the ladder of participation (discussed in Chapter 1) in which information is merely provided about options or policies which are decided by others, without the benefit of any input from intended beneficiaries. The two lowest stages on the ladder (in ascending order) are described thus:

Manipulative participation: Participation is simply a pretence, with ‘people’s’ representatives on official boards, but who are un-elected and have no power.

Passive participation: People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. It involves unilateral announcements by an administration or project management without any listening to people’s responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.

Cornwall (2008: p 272, after Pretty, 1995)

In some cases, information was provided, but there was a problem with it, in the eyes of respondents. It was frequently perceived as not being borne out by events; that it was inaccurate; or even that it was deliberately misleading, involving lies and deception. In addition to these forms of miscommunication, there is the related question of unrealistic expectations being created, whether inadvertently or not. These matters of problematic communication need to be explored, rather than simply taken at face value. The possible explanations of what actually happened range from ex-combatants being deliberately misled by a range of actors, to misunderstandings based on poor communication or an inflated sense of entitlement. These issues are separated out later in this chapter. It should be noted at this stage, however, that the worst case scenarios could reasonably be seen as an even lower than the bottom two rungs on the ladder, taking us into “minus” territory.

Some of the situations referred to involve ex-combatants being given information about options for reintegration which they would choose between, such as specific types of training or a return to education. The individuals were therefore central to decision-making, in selecting from a list of pre-determined choices. This too is dealt with in Chapter 4, where it relates to the more participatory matter of having an input to decision-making. But before decision-making is considered, the question of quite simply receiving accurate information must be dealt with, as it is fundamental to the ladder of participation. If the lowest rungs about being provided with information are not reached, then any attempt at consultation or even having an input to decisions is not based on anything real. The ladder of participation contributes to our understanding of DDR by foregrounding these issues of power, control, and agency – three areas where accurate information is a key element.

Receiving Information about DDR

The question of receiving information is broken down into a number of elements, in order not to conflate different concepts. The survey of ex-combatants deals with the amount of information, its clarity, the source (and the degree of reliability and usefulness of these different sources), and indeed its accuracy. Similar ideas emerged in the focus group discussions, although obviously it was not as clearly structured as this at the time it was expressed. It should be noted that all references to the surveys and focus group discussions of ex-combatants in this chapter relate to data from both countries unless otherwise stated.

Amount of information

The first issue is the amount of information about reintegration which was received by ex-combatants, as opposed to its accuracy. Ordinary ex-combatants surveyed in Liberia generally felt they received enough information about the process (87%), whereas officers were more evenly divided on the question. (Fisher's exact test³: $p=0.033$). The same effect is observed for both countries combined ($p=0.041$).

³ Fisher's exact test is used as an alternative to the more common Chi Square test, where cell contents are five or less. It is used extensively in this chapter, as the small sample size means that $n<5$ in many cells.

Enough information (F5)	Ordinary	NCO	Officer	Total
Yes, definitely	54	3	7	64
	87.1%	100.0%	53.9%	82.1%
More or less	7	0	6	13
	11.3%	0.0%	46.2%	16.7%
No	1	0	0	1
	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%
Total	62	3	13	78
	79.5%	3.9%	16.7%	100.0%

Table 3.1: Amount of information, by rank (Question F5, Liberia).

When both countries are combined, women are more likely to say they received enough information ($p=0.015$).

Receiving official advice about reintegration options (B3)

To narrow down the source of the information, they were asked (Question B3): “In the last DDRR process you went through, did you meet with an official person who gave you advice about your options for reintegration?” Just over half said they did; when “don’t knows” and those who did not reply are excluded, this becomes two-thirds.

Receiving information about reintegration options (Liberia)		
Response	Number	Percentage
Yes	50	54%
No	23	25%
Don’t know	6	7%
No reply	13	14%
Total	92	100%

Table 3.2: Whether information was received about reintegration (Question B3, Liberia).

Was reintegration explained? (F1)

In Question F1, they were asked more specifically if the process was explained, this time on a three-point Likert scale. The question was asked: “Was the reintegration process explained to you, so you would know what was going to happen, before or during reintegration?” This showed that while a majority said they felt they had received *enough* information, and had met

an official who gave them advice, much fewer of them felt they had the clearer understanding which an explanation would have provided.

Was reintegration explained (Liberia)		
Response	Number	Percentage
Yes, definitely	27	30%
A bit, to some extent	15	17%
Not at all	47	53%
Total	89	100%

Table 3.3: Whether reintegration was explained (Question F1, Liberia).

There was a significant difference on this question between countries (Fisher's exact test: $p=0.003$). Respondents in the much smaller Sierra Leonean survey ($n=32$) were much more positive. This appears to be explained by the distinct nature of the urban sub-sample in Liberia, which affected the overall figure for that country: 76% of urban Liberian ex-combatants (25 out of 33 respondents) said it was not explained "at all".




Figure 3.01: Was reintegration explained? (Question F1).

Those who progressed further in DDR felt that reintegration was somewhat better explained, although the overall proportion of those who felt it was not explained at all was 53%. This negative view was held even more strongly by those who had only completed the disarmament and demobilisation stages, only one of whom felt it had been explained to any extent.

How was the information given, and by whom? (F2)

Information was received from a number of sources, ranging from official communication to second-hand accounts circulating on the grapevine among ex-combatants. In assessing the quality and amount of information, it is therefore important to look at its source. An open-ended question in the survey (F2) was put to those who said in F1 that information had been received on reintegration. It asked participants about the way they received the information, with the intention of teasing out whether their expectations were built on official communication, or on indirect version from others such as their commanders. There were asked “How was it [reintegration] explained, and by whom?” The open-ended answers, as transcribed and translated by the interviewer, were subsequently coded, according to a coding frame based on an overview of the responses. The rationale is to see if any sources were used which might not have been anticipated when the questionnaire was drawn up, especially unofficial ones. An answer could be assigned to more than one category, which would be the equivalent of tick-boxes with the instruction “tick as many as apply”. (The process is described in Chapter 2, and was used for a number of open-ended questions.) The responses show that most sources of information mentioned are official ones, although a significant proportion were unofficial, such as commanders or other ex-combatants. The commanders’ input tended to be early on in the process, prior to actual disarmament, whereas official sources accounted for most of the information at later stages.

How was reintegration explained, and by whom? (Open ended, F2)	<i>Number of references</i>
Reference to language used or translation	<i>12</i>
By DDR officials or staff	<i>7</i>
By UN staff or peacekeepers	<i>5</i>
By commanders	<i>5</i>
By ex-combatants or trainees	<i>2</i>
Other	<i>2</i>

**Table 3.4: How was reintegration explained?
(Question F2 - open-ended question).**

In the focus group discussions, the sources of information mentioned were mainly the NCDDR(R), its staff, or local offices; the UN and peacekeepers; “white people”; friends, other ex-combatants or “brothers” (meaning close friends); the radio in general and people appearing on radio; and their commanders.

The open-ended responses (F2) were largely in line with a subsequent matrix (Question G1), in which respondents were asked to select as many categories as applied, from a predetermined list of possible sources of information on reintegration. This showed that official sources were mentioned most frequently, under the category of “a lot” of information being received, although “other ex-combatants” did feature much more strongly. (In subsequent questions, however, problems with accuracy were attributed to those running the programme, rather than to ex-combatants.) The options available to respondents for each of the sources about the amount of information received included “None”, which is not shown in the chart for reasons of clarity. They were also asked whether the information was helpful (on a three-point scale), and which of the sources from the same list was the most helpful to them (G2). One notable difference is that “other ex-combatants” featured much more significantly in terms of *helpfulness*. Other sources such as international NGOs or family members featured quite strongly in terms of the amount of information, but not to the same degree when the respondents were asked to identity the three most helpful sources.




Figure 3.02: How much information (A lot, some, or none) was provided by various sources (Question G1, Liberia).




Figure 3.03: Which three sources were the most helpful? (Question G2, Liberia).

Language used in explaining DDR

One of the issues is whether information was made available in an accessible way, particularly in relation to language. This is significant where ex-combatants felt that their expectations were not met, possibly arising from a communication failure, and raises the question of whether the appropriate language was used, and whether it was explained to them in jargon-free terms which was not open to being misunderstood. Both surveys and the focus groups indicated that the language was thought to have been accessible. Focus group participants said that the appropriate language was used, and that information was delivered in Krio, Temne, Mende, and so forth, according to the region. They indicated that interpreters were available. The question seems to have been understood in terms of actual language (such as Krio), rather than its clarity or understandability; the survey responses indicate that both of these aspects were widely regarded as being adequate. Both survey countries concur with the views expressed in focus groups about language. When asked if the right language had been used in explaining the reintegration programme, 93% of respondents said “Yes”, with the remainder saying “More or less” (4%) or “No” (2%).




Figure 3.04: Amount, accessibility, and accuracy of language used.

This indicates that people are not just responding on the basis of generalised disaffection, or because of their current economic circumstances, which in many cases were very difficult. It shows they can differentiate between the amount or clarity of the information, and its accuracy. They clearly respond differently on the basis of the question, and are not giving a blanket “yes” or “no” to questions relating to how positive their overall experience was.

Knowing where to go for more information (F7)

As a way of probing the amount of information and its accessibility, Question F1 asked “Did you know who or where you could go to get information about DDRR, once you were involved in the process?” A large majority felt that they did know.

Know where to get more info (F7)	Number	Percentage
Yes, definitely	35	92%
More or less	2	5%
No	1	3%
Total	38	100%

Table 3.5: Did ex-combatants know where to go for more information? (Question F1).

Information or help from commanders

The emphasis on commanders was greater in the focus groups than in the surveys. This was due in part at least to the fact that the moderator asked if commanders had been involved in disseminating information about DDR, and in most cases participants said they had played a role. For example:

Our commanders told us about the process. Friends and ex-combatants also told us about the process. But my commander gave me more information, even about where I could get [more] DDR information.

Participant 7, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

The role of commanders is significant, in terms of the way information was passed on, not least because this is the stage at which expectations might have been raised, for whatever reason. Given the fact that the armed elements being communicated with had not yet disarmed, and that the security situation was sometimes not at all clear, it is not surprising that commanders were an initial point of contact for DDR officials, (although as soon as demobilisation began, the combatants were dealt with as individuals):

Well, I heard it from two of them, because when the information did come, they would call our commanders. When the UN officials came, they would call the commanders, who are above us, give them information, and they in turn would give us information. So this is the chain of command.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group C, Bo, Sierra Leone

Although commanders were mentioned as a source of information, they did not feature when it came to discussing the way expectations were raised, or the inaccuracies or deceit about which ex-combatants felt so strongly. It may be that even if they were the source of information which was not borne out by events, they were not held responsible in the same way that DDR officials or UN personnel were blamed.

Accuracy

The problems with the information-giving process need to be disaggregated, as the perceived inaccuracies can arise in a number of ways. At the most fundamental level, that means looking at the information-giver's accuracy (as distinct from whether false impressions were intended); at the information-receiver's understanding; and at whether the discrepancy arises from the

failure to deliver what was promised, rather than it being a communication problem. The following diagram shows the relationship between these.




Figure 3.05: Reasons for discrepancies between what ex-combatants feel was promised to them, and what was actually delivered.

In fact, an alternative conceptualisation which highlights the degree of intentionality is to place these elements on a spectrum, to indicate different levels of foreknowledge or motivation on the part of the information-provider. In this case, this refers to information given directly by those involved in administering the DDR programme, rather than second-hand information passed on by commanders, friends, and other ex-combatants. As in all communication processes, both the sender and the receiver of the message play a role in possible problems; here, those administering DDR should have been taking into account the possibility of their words being misunderstood or taken up incorrectly, such as an expression of intention to provide certain benefits, or a possibility of certain benefits, being taken as a firm commitment. The possibilities for misunderstanding on the part of the receiver are of course considerable, since some ex-combatants may have difficulties in dealing with the authorities or with forward planning; others were receiving the information second-hand, possibly via commanders who simplified or exaggerated the promised benefits for their own purposes; some would have missed out on basic education during the conflict; and some were still dependent on drugs, and might not have been able to focus on complex explanations or long-term gains.

The spectrum then begins with poor communication, inadequate information, and unintentional creation of unrealistic expectations. (These may include suggestions made to ex-combatants in Liberia, which many understood to be a commitment that a workshop would be set up for them after the training, where they could work using their newly-acquired skills). Further along the spectrum, there is inaccurate information which was given in good faith. At this point in the spectrum, these problems amount to unfulfilled commitments and broken promises: the incorrect information was actually given, rather than it being an incorrect perception arising from poor communication. The furthest end of the spectrum amounts to knowingly misleading the ex-combatants, or giving information which was known at the time to be incorrect; or making commitments which the information-provider knew were not going to be fulfilled.

The scale could be summarised as follows:

- (1) False impressions created by non-DDR sources (family, friends, or other ex-combatants), either deliberately or unintentionally, but excluding commanders;
- (2) False impressions created by commanders, either deliberately or unintentionally;
- (3) Misunderstandings by ex-combatants, based on genuine and correct information from the DDR programme which was properly communicated. This may be exacerbated by ex-combatants' experiences of dealing with people in authority, alienation from those in power, high expectations, lack of education, drug dependency, or lack of trust;
- (4) Poor communication from the DDR programme, in which statements which were poorly expressed or open to a number of reasonable interpretations, or suggestions about possibilities were vaguely worded and understood to be a certainty, resulting in ex-combatants arriving at the wrong conclusion about just how much was being promised;
- (5) Genuine information, properly expressed and understood, about how the programme would be run, but which subsequently did not come about due to failures or shortcomings in its implementation. These failures may have arisen due to problems with different agencies (such as implementing NGOs) than those originally providing the information. This may be interpreted ultimately as broken promises, false information, or deliberate deception;

- (6) Deliberate vagueness by those providing information, knowing that this would create a false impression; deliberately misleading ex-combatants; and deception.

When it comes to inaccurate information (at the mid-point of the spectrum), it is important to clarify that the discrepancy between the commitments and the actual outcome can arise for two reasons. The first is that the information was incorrect (i.e. a commitment being given that payments would continue for a certain period, when in fact this was subject to certain conditions, or was supposed to be for a shorter period). The second reason is that the information was correct, but that the problem arose with fulfilling the commitment. An example of this might be the situation mentioned repeatedly in focus group discussions, where six months' training with a monthly stipend of a certain amount was announced; but in reality, the training course ended early, or payments were reduced or missed entirely. From the perspective of the ex-combatants, it may be difficult to distinguish between false information (given deliberately or not) and a failure to deliver on benefits which had genuinely been intended. The discrepancy may be ascribed to either category. These categories are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and problems may arise through a combination of poor or inaccurate communication, and also a failure to deliver on benefits which they were in fact supposed to receive.

The dissatisfaction with the accuracy of information is in fact much greater among rural ex-combatants, only 9% of whom said that the information was definitely accurate.




Figure 3.06: Was the information received accurate? (Question F6).

There was a significant difference on the basis of gender among Liberian ex-combatants (Fisher's exact test = 0.042). Men were more likely than women to feel that information was accurate. This contrasts with the same test when urban respondents are excluded, where women were in fact more likely to say the information was accurate.

Info accurate (Liberia) (F6)	Male	Female	Total
Yes, definitely	29	8	37
	46.0%	32.0%	42.1%
More or less	23	6	29
	36.5%	24.0%	33.0%
No	11	11	22
	17.5%	44.0%	25.0%
Total	63	25	88

Table 3.6: Accuracy of information received (Question F6), by gender.

There was also a significant difference on the basis of age, indicating that adults were more likely to say that the information received was accurate (Fisher's exact test = 0.001 for Liberia, and $p=0.029$ for both countries combined). Those who were children (age<18) when demobilised in Liberia were much less likely to say the information was accurate (just 12%) than those who were adults (52%). In looking at these differences, it is important to note that a complex process is being measured: it relates not just to the information itself, but also to their particular experiences of the programme (which may or may not have matched what they were told). Children, for example, underwent a separate programme, and were much more likely to enter education rather than vocational training. Reported accuracy is also a function of expectations, and of the unofficial sources of information from which some of these expectations arose. Children and women may have had a different social network, or way of interacting, when compared with male combatants who were about to demobilise. These particular experiences may account for some of the age and gender differences for accuracy of information.

Info accurate (Liberia) (F6)	Adult	Child	Total
Yes, definitely	30	3	33
	51.7%	11.5%	39.3%
More or less	15	14	29
	25.9%	53.9%	34.5%
No	13	9	22
	22.4%	34.6%	26.2%
Total	58	26	84

Table 3.7: Accuracy of information received (Question F6), by child status.

There is an underlying sense of the power relationship, and perhaps a difficulty in dealing with officials:

That time you know people were not mature, so they tell you anything they want you to do. That's the life we were living at that time.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

It is also clear that it was not simply a case of the ex-combatants having become passive, institutionalised, or dependent. The sense of powerless was seen even when they made attempts to assert themselves:

I don't really know because what they told us they were going to do, they didn't do all. We didn't get any further information from them even when we tried asking what they were going to do for us, they didn't tell us.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone

The question of intermediaries and communication flows is also significant. Of course, participatory approaches at all levels of the ladder can be undermined by poor communication, for which a number of parties may be responsible. It is also a question of effective channels being put in place: an intermediary or representative structure for ex-combatants might facilitate communication, or indeed block it. The intention behind putting them in place and the actual outcome may also be different.

They just said nothing to us because the guy who was suppose to act between we the student and the office, we tried to ask him so many question but said he has no information from the office.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone

In terms of the ladder of participation, it is important to note the way in which experiences of poor communication and disempowerment affected overall views of the process. Judgements about implementing agencies and the way in which things are run in general are based on these important experiences, rather than the public discourse about DDR. The sense of disempowerment was shared by women as well as men, as shown in this contribution to an all-female focus group:

The ID cards they gave us during the disarmament, that was the only time we received money. Besides that, we could just be used by NGOs, they can't give us anything.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

This participant's direct respond to the question of whether the information provided was accurate is typical of the general view which was formed on the basis of the experience:

No. There lies difference between the information we got and what we underwent.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

Identity cards and benefit letters

There were repeated references to benefits which ex-combatants felt had been promised but not received. In Sierra Leone, these included many references to the reintegration identity card issued to them. This contained four letters, from A to D, each of which was supposed to be punched when the benefit was received. But participants complained that some parts of the benefit package were not provided despite this, and others said that sometimes two letters were punched when only one element was actually provided:

A lot of information but they did not apply to them accurately. For instance, the card has "A, B, C, and D" and each should be perforated at each stage. But this was not so.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone




Figure 3.07: NCDDR reintegration identity card from Sierra Leone with three of the letters punched out to indicate benefits had been provided. (Author's photo; owner's identity subsequently obscured).

The problems associated with documentation showing that benefits had been received was experienced by several participants in the same group:

- During that time they took our ID card and bored [punched] it, and told us that they would bring our money.
- We didn't even see them.
- The next thing to that is the ID card we have, when we carry it anywhere, they would tell us, you have received your money [already].
- They wrote on the paper that we have received our money, and the truth is that we received anything [nothing] from them, so when we carry our ID card, it's always rejected.

Four unidentified participants, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

The experience with the identity cards left many ex-combatants with the impression that their benefits were being siphoned off by people working in the agencies. The effect which this has on their faith in the system, and in the new dispensation in general, is hard to overstate. It is reflected in the number of times that this kind of issue came up and was returned to spontaneously during the focus groups, and the depth of feeling associated with it. Whether or not it was due to misappropriation (for which there was specific evidence), mismanagement, or a misunderstanding, the effect in terms of participation was both potent and very negative.

In some cases they would perforate A to C independently. In other cases, they would perforate both A and B, for just A's benefits. The D was never perforated, that had huge benefits [attached]. Some were as lucky as not to have C perforated. We have rallied around, yet to no avail, especially in my case, two holes were perforated for one, so that the benefits would be siphoned off. Complaints were made several times to the police, but to no avail. They would even call [to the DDR programme], but nothing would come out of it.

Participant 1, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

The experience was reported in a number of focus groups in both countries, suggesting that the perception that this was a real problem was not isolated.

I remember the day we went to disarm, they told us they were going to give us a card that has the letters from the alphabet, A, B, C and D printed on it, signifying different benefits for each level or stage. But to our surprise it reached the point they merged both A and B for our benefits. When you are there, they would give you a small handy package for both A and B, instead of one [letter]. This is how they treated us. After the A and B, from there you come to the C. Even C was a problem also for some, while D was not even considered.

Participant 1, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

This participant was followed by three others agreeing with him. The question of problems arising in the training or educational programmes is dealt with in more detail in later chapters, but certain cases are mentioned here since they relate directly to the accuracy of information which was provided, or the discrepancy with participants' expectations.

(A)t the end of the programme they said they were going to give us tool kits, and it passed about three months before getting the tool kits, and even getting the tool kits, the things that were meant to do the job were not in the tool kit.

Participant 2, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

It is important to note the disappointment experienced over toolkits is not simply about a sense of entitlement. They could also hold great symbolic value, both in themselves and in the actual process of handing them over: they were a way of signalling the transition from combatant to useful member of society. They had the potential to help define a new identity for ex-combatants, in terms of their particular trade, their self-sufficiency, and also their relationship with the rest of the community. This participant responded to a question from the moderator about whether they were told they would receive anything after the training:

Yes. After the training we will give you zinc [corrugated sheets for roofing], cement, and cooking utensils. The reason [was that] the war came and destroyed all of your houses. But regrettably they even give us a stipend, neither the zinc nor cement. The people that came and gave us this information, I know them, in fact, I have one a photo of them.

Participant 4, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

Delays in payment of stipends, or non-payment, were among the biggest complaints, along with missing start-up toolkits which were supposed to be part of the vocational training, as explained by this former commander:

At the end of the day, we were promised that every month we going to earn a token of 60,000 Leones. But this was not so in practice. At times it would be five months before a month's allowance came. This made the process unworkable with us, because it did not go down well [with us], because they actually explained to us that at the end of the six months' skills training, we would have to graduate with a certificate and benefits like start up kits and equipment.

Participant 1, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

Rumours

The importance of rumours, incorrect information, and unofficial sources must not be overlooked. Where false information is received second-hand from those not involved in the DDR programme, it can affect ex-combatants' overall perceptions of the adequacy of information, including that received from official sources. One example of this was the belief that the photographs of ex-combatants taken at registration in Liberia would be circulated and entry to the United States or other countries would be prevented. This resulted in some (especially women) refusing to join the DDRR process due to the fear that they would be publicly identified as ex-combatants:

I think one of the main issues was the awareness which people told us not to disarm, not to go there, because if you disarm, you will have stigma on you, that you will not likely travel anywhere. And some of our brothers who fought the war, some of them did not disarm just for [because of] that.

Participant 1, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

Unofficial, inaccurate information and rumours do not form part of the ladder of participation. However, rumours are of course more likely to circulate and be given credence when official information is scarce, or is not believed.

Expectations and promises made

The perception of "broken promises" arises partly from the expectations. In one case, a participant in Focus Group E was unhappy that his preferred training option, of driving, was not available, so he had to opt for training as an auto mechanic instead. To him, this was an example of an unfulfilled promise, whereas only a limited number of people could in fact be trained for

the most popular options, such as driving, as the labour market could only absorb a limited number of drivers.

Perceived inaccuracies are, of course, a function of the participants' expectations, and how these came about. This raises the question of whether the expectations arose from information which came directly from the programme, or indirectly via commanders, friends, or others. The sources of information, in terms of both amount and usefulness, are discussed above, and it indicates a preponderance of direct information, although "Other ex-combatants" do feature strongly as a source. So before looking in more detail at the question of "broken promises", it is worth seeing how expectations were generated.

Before I took the training... before we started training we gathered together and we were told that we would be trained.

Participant 4, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

Not only that, some of us said we wanted to do business and soap-making. They said, especially you women, we will help you, even the widow, we will give you assistance. But we didn't see any.

Participant 8, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

They really explained to them about DDR, but they were not consistent with the programme. All we had expected was not seen as it went [progressed], and that is why or us, especially myself, I had forgotten about this DDR something.

Participant 1, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

One participant responded to the question of whether he had received any information about the programme:

Yes sir, I had information from those who worked there. While undergoing [guidance] counselling, they told us what we were going to expect. However, at the end, I received nothing.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group G, Makeni, Sierra Leone

This participant said he was too young to carry a weapon, and had ended up in hospital in Makeni. This was where he joined the programme and received information about it:

At the end of the day I heard of DDR programme and Caritas. I went there explaining myself that I am a victim of the war left unattended in the hospital.

They then called me and register my name. They then told me they were going to supply me things later especially when I am victim of the war.

Participant 2, Focus Group G, Makeni, Sierra Leone

In all, there were 63 separate references to the creation of expectations, spread across 10 of the 11 focus groups. Some of these were general references, but in several cases it was made clear where the expectations originated. Implementing NGOs were the source most frequently mentioned, followed by the UN and then the NCDDR(R).

Expectations created by	Number of references in focus groups
NGOs	7
UN	3
NCDDR(R)	2
Others	1
Commanders	0

Table 3.8: Sources of expectations mentioned in focus groups.

DDR as part of a deal

There is a strong sense that these expectations were created in the context of what was clearly understood to be a “deal”, in which benefits would be provided in return for handing over weapons. This is significant in terms of the two-way commitment which is implicit in participation: each side brings something to the relationship, and it proceeds on an agreed basis. When that basis fundamentally changes, without consultation or even open acknowledgement, the relationship at the heart of participation can be disrupted or even destroyed.

Before I say anything, I have to bring out my view: I *deeply regret* [very emphatic] that I handed over my gun. If I had known that such was going to be, I would not have given my gun. I would be in the jungle still. Just as my brother was saying the tool was not sufficient for us. Yes. I was trained as a carpenter. Right now, I am dis... I don't even know what to say.

Participant 4, Focus Group C, Bo, Sierra Leone

While continuing to fight as an organised unit was not generally an option, it must be remembered that ex-combatants did have a number of other possibilities, which some people took. These included retaining their weapon, self-demobilising, and recruitment to fight in other regional wars (going from Sierra Leone to Liberia, or from Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire). The

decision to enter DDR was therefore sometimes based on the information provided and the understanding of reciprocity.

Somebody explained to me how the disarmament was going to be, and the benefits, that was what encouraged me to go through the process.

Participant 2, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

The feeling was encountered in both countries, where information given has clearly been taken as a solemn commitment – with real consequences for relationships if that commitment is broken. It is interesting to note that, as in a genuinely participatory situation, there was a sense that they were entering the arrangement willingly:

The white people even had photo taken with us for our cooperation. We really showed them that we were ready to disarm. And they promised us that what was due to us would be given, since they were moved by our response to cooperate [obey].

Participant 2, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

Some participants also said that those encouraging them to take part in DDR talked of peace and a better future for their country, apart from benefits. In Liberia, it was explained in terms of becoming self-reliant when back in the community. Participants made it clear that the terms of this “deal” were set out *before* disarmament took place:

Before the disarmament, [when] they took the arms from us, they told us they’re going train us to be self-reliant in the community.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

There was also a sense of building something for the future, and of disarming in order to make a better life for themselves and others.

Some people came prior to the DDDR and told us that to disarm is good, that war has destroyed us, most of us are in the displaced camp. If we disarm, we will now go back [in the refugee life], we can become self-reliant.

Participant 1, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

We were told that as soon as, after Charles Taylor left, I think August 11th, that we should do voluntary disarmament in Camp Shefflin, to support peace in Liberia. We did this with our willing mind [freely]. We took our arms and guns to Camp Shefflin, and the arms were taken from us.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

Another comment indicating a sense of having a shared commitment to the future said that ECOMOG had talked about disarming, and that “we wanted peace in the country” (Participant 8, Focus Group M, Monrovia). The importance of clear, accurate and timely information emerges once more when participants were asked what they would do if they were running a DDR programme:

For me, in my opinion, before you get people to do something, you need to let them know as to what you are doing. I would first gather them, or call a meeting, and tell them, this is the money they brought to us. What are we doing? Then from that, I would start to bring my idea as to how we would use the money.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

It was not a case of maximising possible benefits for themselves, but of keeping a commitment. Some of the suggestions about how they might run a DDR programme themselves reflect elements in the ladder of participation.

The only thing is, what people need and what we promise them is what I will do.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

This participant was also speaking in the context of how they would run a DDR programme, in the light of their own experiences. Rather than reflecting dependency, the underlying idea is self-sufficiency and empowerment, as envisaged in participation:

Like for instance when they told us to take skills training, i.e. carpentry, mason, and as they promised after completion they were to have granted certificate and start-up kits. Had they done that, they should have done good for the people and at anytime they will have job to do.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

Promises not being kept

For many ex-combatants, the failure to provide expected benefits was clearly seen as a broken promise. In terms of participation, this breach of trust is worse than receiving no information at all, and it came to define their relationship with those running the reintegration programmes.

Oh, I felt bad, in that those that encouraged me to disarm, those that encouraged me to learn this trade, I could no longer see them again. So, I just have to be myself and live along with the community people.

Participant 4, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

One of the worrying aspects is how broken promises are interpreted. All this was happening at a time when key relationships within society were being formed anew, and highly sensitive issues being explored. This delicate, sometimes tentative, process takes place at a time when trauma, resentment, fear, and guilt could be expected. If the broken promises are taken as a reflection of the ex-combatants' own worthiness and difficult status in society, it is not only a missed opportunity to rebuild those relationships; it further damages them, and makes future efforts much more difficult.

People said they were going to open a [work]shop where they can group us and work, and you know, to gain money for ourselves that we won't be a waste to the community. But it was not done, it was just a saying, and did not come to reality.

Participant 2, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

While the comments focus on the missing benefits which they expected, what is just as important is the impact on relationships which breaches of trust have. This might be the first time that some of the ex-combatants would have had dealings with officials or non-military organisations who had power over their lives. The negative experience appears to have been a formative one, with unfortunate consequences for future dealings. It further complicates communication in the future, because one of the lessons is that when dealing with authorities, words and actions are not necessarily the same thing:

There should be an organisation with one word, if they say this, they should do it. If they say they will carry us back to our community, they should do [it], it should not be like the first one where they said they would carry us to the community and give us our own [work]shop to be for us not to be involved in bad activities, but they did not do. A good approach should be what they will say, they should do, because actions speak louder than words.

Participant 1, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

Yes, it was explained to [us], but it was not implemented.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

Again and again, the same issues were raised by men and women in both countries: unpaid stipends, and the failure to provide start-up toolkits or certificates. These were clearly understood to have been commitments made at the start of the programme, and often even before disarmament took place.

Yes, it was not implemented, because some received money, and some did not. Even those that received money did not get their tool kits. They didn't get their certificates, and you know, those are things that would qualify you tomorrow, that will show you have gone through the process, and also to show that you are a graduate.... They told us that they were going to give us our tool kits, so that we could put our practice into use. Since then, I have not received [the tool kit].

Participant 3, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

And when asked whether the outsiders gave them any information:

No. As for me, I'm an ex-fighter. I fought for seven years. When we got to the cantonment site after the disarmament, they said to us: those of us that got hurt, we were going to be treated and given something to help ourselves and our family. Up to now, we did not get anything. It's a hard thing to do, for me, I disarmed in Ganta, they said our benefits were going to be \$300, but there is no benefits, no encouragement, and some of us we've got bullet wounds. I can show you my bullet wound on my back. [stands up and shows bullet wound on lower back] Look at it.

Participant 9, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

The risk is that after a series of perceived failures, faith is lost in the entire process, and a general judgement is made. This makes further initiatives even more problematic, as trust has been undermined.

Nothing of what they promised, did they give us.

Participant 3, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

So we are trying to tell you people that according to the DDR programme, what was said [promised] to us, was not given.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

They told us some things that they failed to do.... They said they were going to place us somewhere where we would be, to earn money for ourselves. But later

we didn't see them, the RR component, we didn't see the last of it, so some of us [are/were] just managing now to come to school and see [make] ourselves better.... For me, they never implemented what they said they were going to do in the RR component: building the [work]shop, being with us in the community, living the right way with the community people, to tell the community people that this man is not a bad man again [i.e. promoting community acceptance of ex-combatants].

Participant 4, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

Women's experience was similar, as seen in the following examples, where a judgement is made not just about actions, but about the very nature of the people being engaged with:

What you say makes you who you are [i.e. live by your word]. For example, the people told us that after the swamp project we will give you benefits, so if I'm doing that, I will make sure the people receive those things that I promised.

Participant 4, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

After the disarmament, the \$30 supposed to use, it can't come [wasn't paid]

Participant 5, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

For some of those living in particularly difficult situations, real consequences are attributed to the perceived failures of the programme. But again and again, participants are driven by the idea of promises which have not been fulfilled, rather than simply saying that they have unmet needs or feel entitled to assistance.

No, they have more things to do, even they promises they made. After the disarmament, they would provide education, they find places for those fighting. It never happened, and we are staying in the streets, we have to sell water to sustain ourselves and family. We are staying in the streets, it is not to be [should not be] that way.

Participant 8, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

And in response to the question of whether everything that had been promised was done, ex-combatants could sometimes come to definitive conclusions.

No, they never did it, nothing.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

These judgements have real consequences for a society which is now struggling to rebuild trust and solidarity, in order to face the considerable challenges of replacing destroyed physical,

human, and social capital. Focus group participants were also asked how they would go about running a reintegration programme. The issue of making unfulfilled promises came up again:

As my colleague said, if they say anything, they should be exact. They should do away with lots of promises, they should be people whose word, so that tomorrow we are able to benefit from it and live with people in the community, or elsewhere.

Participant 6 or 7, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

Again, avoiding commitments which would not be carried was underlined: it was not about the benefits, but about the failure to keep one's word:

I will make sure everybody has his or her own share in the programme what is meant for them. I will not tell them of what is not in the programme.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone

When it came to advice for anyone who might be entering a DDR programme, the comments again brought up the question of unfulfilled expectations.

I will tell him about my experience and about the failed promises.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone

Another participant in Focus Group E, said he would encourage some one to take part, but that they should not to react negatively if those running the programme did not do the things they promised, as if this was an experience which would normally be expected. He would advise them to "forget about the disappointment" and be peaceful, if commitments genuinely given by the government cannot be fulfilled in the end.

Education

In the area of education, a recurring complaint was that their support for return to education did not last as long as they had understood it would, so that some people's fees stopped being paid before they had completed their education. One participant referred to the "so-called" DDRR programme in Liberia, and explained why he used this term:

The name is "so-called" because you plan something and then it is not achieving its goal, so we term it that way.... you find 100 people yearning for education and you tell them, say, "go for it", and later you close it. So it also caused harm

for the Liberian society in that, they increase the criminal rate, you took people and carried them for training, you did not train them well.

Participant 5, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

(W)hen we went in the camp, they told us we should select university or any college to attend, and they will be able to sponsor you up to the time you will finish the university. But unfortunately for us, some of us did not graduate and the programme got closed, and we were left in [an] unfortunate situation.... They put us under false impression, they got the arms from us and they are not doing anything, so it is not beneficial to us, we, the Liberians.

Participant 6, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

Deceit

There is one step beyond that of broken or unfulfilled promises, and that would be premeditated deception of the ex-combatants by those running the programmes. While many focus group participants mentioned inaccurate or inadequate information in general, a smaller proportion talked of promises being made and broken (about 50 references). A much smaller group again attributed this to a deliberate act of lying or deceit (seven references).

Up to now we are in great darkness, so for that particular training I will not tell you that I have been trained. You have been trained, there is nothing to show like a certificate. I think they just came to fool us in the bush.

Participant 3, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

That perceived deception was given a very blunt name by some:

Some of it was lies because what they told us, some was true, some was not true. They told us that during the training we would be given soap money [stipend]. As for me, the place I took my training, they didn't give a cent for soap money.

Participant 4, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

The people lied to us. The people lied.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

So really the disarmament process did not go down well [with us], because they cheated us: what was meant for us was not given to us. But since we are lovers of peace, we do not have problems with it, we have forgotten about it.

Participant 1, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

The accusation of deliberate deception is, needless to say, a fatal blow to any suggestion of a participatory approach. Whether or not there is a basis for it, the idea that those in a position of strength would willingly deceive those who have less power is antithetical to every aspect of participation. One participant highlighted the fact that civilians received benefits intended for ex-combatants as one of the ways in which the programme was undermined by deception:

The DDR idea is a very salient one. And even for the ex-combatants who had been a wanderer in the bush, to now have to give up the guns for 60,000 [Leones] is fine. That gun was the weapon he would threaten people with, now he had decided to hand it over so he can live a liberated life. Such an idea is really good. But the implementation is poor, because it's mixed up with deceit and theft. For what was promised to us was not given.

Participant 3, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

The same idea comes again when the question is raised of advice for someone who might take part in a reintegration programme:

Well if it is my own brother who is to partake, I will advise him not to do so because they did not do what they promised us. I will advise him not to go because they lied to us.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

The real effect of the perception is that relationships and trust are undermined, making future dealings extremely difficult at a time when reconciliation and acceptance are being called for.

New identities and forgetting the past

A number of participants said the reintegration programme had been explained to them not just in terms of benefits, but as a way for them to “forget” about the past or what they might have done or seen in the war, in order to move on psychologically. It is also important in terms of a window of opportunity to create a new identity and to restore one's self-image, especially in the context of stigma – something faced by female ex-combatants in particular. As one participant in Focus Group G put it when asked if they had been provided with information about the programme: “They said let us forget and make all be over, that is why we have forgotten.” This

was an implicit part of the “deal”, and indeed ties in with the broader definition of social reintegration of ex-combatants. The idea of “forgetting” is also significant in terms of creating a new identity, and having a new role in society. Reintegration was an opportunity to recreate the relationship with community – not to mention one’s role and status – and also to forge a new relationship with oneself. This female ex-combatant, who ended up working on the streets as a prostitute, said she joined the rebels after her brother was killed in Lofa county because of his ethnicity, and she felt she had to do something, and was subsequently wounded. The opportunity to move on from her trauma was part of what she understood would be done:

I went in the camp and they told us after we disarm, we would get benefits, send us to school. They kept us in camps to go to school and learn other things. They would build something for us, keep us in fence [inside], and they would open a place [business] for us, so we can forget about all that we did before. They did not do it, they just made things worse for us, because they did not do what they told us. So this made most of us in the streets.

Participant 5, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

The term “forget” was one which was repeatedly used in relation to the past, when participants were asked how they might go about running a DDR programme. Another female participant linked the broken promises, rejection by her community, and failure to find work in the city, with the fact that she ended up working on the streets.

The people came to us, they said we should give [in] arms. We will make you to leave the streets. Since you were born, you have not sat in class, you have to put pen and paper together, you plait hair, fix bread, and do other things up to now. You that know yourself, you go back home and leave the city. But if your home is not correct for you, you will live in the city and work for friends. If you can’t do anything, you will give yourself to men for free. That’s the life we find ourselves in this country because all the promises they made to us, today, today, that’s zero for us. We [have] gone almost five, six, years. We still have ex-combatants’ ID cards with us. It’s not supposed to be, it’s not supposed to be, keeping ID cards, it’s not supposed to be.

Participant 9, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

The reference to still holding a reintegration identity card means that all the benefits allowed for on the card were not provided. Participant 6 in Focus Group L described these cards which should have entitled their holders to benefits as “a decoration”, which were still being held “for nothing”. One participant thanked the moderator “a lot” for asking about how things were between him and his family. He felt bad that due to his economic situation, he “was not a father” to his children, because he was unable to provide for their needs, such as education. He

felt his role in the new Sierra Leone as a parent and provider was undermined by the unfulfilled promises of DDR:

The problem lies with those who promised things to us but did not fulfil. Benefits were expected which we would have used to ensure support for our families, and these were not provided. That is why my kids are all in the streets, so you can see that my condition is terrible, I swear to God.

Participant 4, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

Survey open-ended questions

An overview of ex-combatants' attitudes to information emerges in an unprompted way from the survey. The final part starts with the open-ended question "If you were running a DDRR programme now, what things would you do to help people feel included in the process, and have their views listened to?" (Question J1). A number of responses focus on improving the actual training programmes or education, paying benefits, and on meeting their needs in general. However, as requested, a significant proportion effectively deals with participation. The open-ended responses were subsequently coded, and the categories (or nodes) which relate to participation are worth highlighting. They are shown in descending order, in terms of the ladder of participation, from joint decision-making to simply providing information:

- Share decision-making
- Take people's views into account
- Include women or girls
- Be participatory, let them feel part of process
- Listen to people's views or allow them to speak
- Keep commitments or promises
- Give info to people

The frequency with which these and other aspects were mentioned in question J1 is shown below (combining data from both countries).




Figure 3.08: How would ex-combatants include people, if asked to run a DDR programme? (Question J1).

The higher levels on the ladder, such as shared decision-making, are generally dealt with in later chapters. However, some of the answers to this question illustrate the importance attached to the issue. Comments which were later coded as relating to giving information to people include:

I will make announcement and tell them the detail about the process and try to implement accordingly.

I will make sure to inform all the people about the process and try to implement what ever they say.

I would be open with them and give them the opportunity to express their thoughts.

Selected responses to Question J1

The approach advocated in these responses equates to the mid-point (fourth or fifth rung out of seven) on Pretty's ladder, which he describes respectively as "participation for material incentives" and "functional participation" (1995: p. 1252). At these stages, there is consultation, and perhaps some shared decision-making, but usually only after the major decisions have been made. In terms of the lower rungs, and the recurring theme of inaccurate information, the following responses were among those subsequently categorised as "keep commitments or promises":

They should not promise to anyone things that would not happen. It can make people feel bad.

Be committed to promises, improve training.

They should learn to fulfil their promises. It's a serious issue: they agreed to disarm fully, but some have been abandoned.

Selected responses to Question J1

While the ladder refers to information sharing, the implicit issue highlighted here is in fact more serious: it is about trust, arising from the failure to provide accurate information and keep promises. When asked the open-ended question “How or why would that help” (J2), most referred to improvements in the programme or its implementation, or in the outcomes for ex-combatants or the community. The third most featured category was a participatory approach (sometimes using that term itself), followed by inclusion, and having a chance to speak or to be heard. The focus therefore remains on rectifying inadequacies in programme implementation, and on its effect on participants, but participation is also recognised in its own right.




Figure 3.09: Why would the suggested action help? (Question J2).

Examples of open-ended answers given for Question J2 which relate to the provision of information (at the most basic level in terms of participation) include:

Being transparent, and it will alleviate grievances.

Because once the information is shared everything will be fine.

Because they will be aware of everything.

Selected responses to Question J2

They were also asked “What would you *avoid* doing?” (J3). This is again revealing, as its open-ended nature allows the ex-combatants’ primary concerns about the inadequacies of the programme to surface. Unlike other “takes” of their perception, there is much less focus on the actual benefits and outcomes of the programme, and a great deal on the process itself and on its integrity. In subsequent coding of the responses, corruption and theft by those running the programme surfaced as the main pre-occupation, in terms of what they would avoid if running such a programme themselves. This was mentioned almost twice as often as any other topic. (The issue of corruption is dealt with in detail in Chapter 6.) Creating false expectations was the next most common fault which they would avoid, followed by false promises and lying (which is distinct in that it implies deliberate deception, rather than poor communication or problems with implementation).




Figure 3.10: What would respondents *avoid* doing?(Question J3).

The following are examples of responses to Question J3 which were subsequently categorised as “Creating false expectations”:

Do not create high hopes and expectations.

Avoid saying [promising] everything. [Many identical comments]

Building up false hopes.

Avoid empty promises.

Selected responses to Question J3

Some of these responses came up repeatedly. Within the category “False promises, lying”, the following examples indicate that ex-combatants were keen to avoid the repeating the experience of being deliberately misled or deceived, as they saw it. In this and other examples, the term “will” is used as a direct translation, indicating in fact what they “would” do (or not do) if placed in such a situation:

I will stop fake promises.

Lying to people, false impression.

Making bogus promises.

Avoid deceit.

Marginalising and duping the target group[s].

False promises, dishonesty, corruption.

Selected responses to Question J3

The next open-ended question (which was again subsequently coded) was why their suggestions (for what they would avoid doing) would help (J4). The most common theme was a straightforward, utilitarian one of improving the programme or its implementation. However, the next most frequently-occurring categories were “Trust, confidence in programme, fewer grievances” (13 responses), and “Accountability and transparency” (12 responses). This indicates the effect which poor communication has had on undermining ex-combatants’ faith in the process. Other responses relate to a participatory approach itself or inclusion/feeling part of the process (9 responses), or having a chance to speak up or be heard (7 responses).




Figure 3.11: Why would it help to (as they suggest) avoid doing something? (Question J4).

Some typical responses under the heading of “Trust, confidence in programme, fewer grievances” included:

Because it make the people to trust me.

Trust and confidence.

People will build trust and respect for the programme.

Selected responses to Question J4

In the category “Accountability and transparency”, these were typical:

Because there will be accountability.

All the money will be used correctly.

Transparency leads to accurate things.

It will be done properly.

It would bring about transparency.

Selected responses to Question J4

Open-ended question J5 asked “If you knew someone who was about to take part in a DDR programme somewhere, what advice or information would you give them?” The largest proportion of responses by far encouraged other ex-combatants to take part in DDR; the next largest suggested that they behave appropriately and take the training seriously, and that they complete the programme. This is significant in that it shows that despite the considerable unhappiness with how the programmes were run, most were very favourable towards the idea of DDR itself. It also shows a nuanced understanding, in that they were able to distinguish between their particular experience and the general idea, despite the clearly expressed lack of trust in some cases. This capacity to hold a balanced view is also important when it comes to interpreting ex-combatants’ responses: the ability to see some aspects as positive and others as negative means that the opinions expressed can be taken at face value with more confidence, rather than being seen merely as a function of generalised discontent and disaffection with DDR.




Figure 3.12: What advice would ex-combatants have for some one else entering a DDR programme? (Question J5).

Examples of those responses from the largest category, encouraging others to participate, include:

I [would] tell the person to hand the gun over so that he/she can be a change[d] person in his/her community.

I will advise the person to go through the process from start to end.

My only advice will be encouragement.

I will tell the person to forget about war [and] to go and disarm.

I will encourage the person because knowledge is our future.

I would suggest heartily [strongly] to him to take such a step.

Selected responses to Question J5

Two respondents said their advice would be not to disarm, saying in one case that they should find a job for themselves by other means instead.

When asked at the end of the survey if they had anything else to add (K1), it was striking to see how many people sought a better-run reintegration programme, or more training or education. Specifically, the third-most frequently mentioned comment was to call for the DDR or reintegration programme to be extended or re-started, sometimes in order to cater for those who had missed out on the expected training or benefits. This is significant, as it indicates that the ex-combatants do not seem to have a problem with the concept of a DDR programme, despite being dissatisfied with how the programme was run. The discrepancy between their experience and their expectations does colour their view, but they are still supportive of what they feel would be a well-run programme which met more of their needs. The criticisms were often quite specific, in terms of unpaid benefits, longer duration of programme, or missing toolkits. This coincides with Question J5, where the advice given to those thinking of entering a reintegration programme was overwhelmingly in favour of encouraging them to take part and benefit from the opportunity as fully as possible, even though it was felt by many to have been a flawed programme.

The comments relating to reintroducing the reintegration programme (often referred to in Liberia as the “RR component”) include the following, some of which specify that it should be for those were seen to have missed out on the first opportunity:

I will like for the UN or other agencies come back with RR components.

Reintroduce the programme so people that were not part could participate.

Provide scholarship, and bring back the RR component.

I will suggest that the RR component be re-launched so that everybody can get the education.

Selected responses to Question K1

Question K1: Do you have anything else you would like to add? (Final question in survey)	Number
Provide further educational support now	19
Provide further training in general now, or tools	19
Re-start reintegration programme, deal with those who were excluded	14
Other	13
Poverty, lack of jobs, suffering, being in the streets	12
Improve programme planning	7
Meet needs of youth or children	7
Improve training quality	6
Provide job opportunities now	6
Increase duration of programme, training or education	5
Keep promises, be fair and transparent	5
Meet needs of girls or women	5
Problems with payment, financial support should be provided	4
Advice for other ex-combatants (relates to previous question)	22

Table 3.9: Responses when ex-combatants were asked if they had anything else to add at the end of the survey (Question K1).

It is possible that the positive attitude towards reintegration is influenced by a degree of dependency which may have been generated among ex-combatants whose first experience of outsiders was the provision of resources and benefits. This could perhaps help to generate a mindset in which stipends or toolkits were seen as an end in themselves. However, the responses contain repeated references to self-sufficiency, independence, the ability to provide for one's children, having necessary skills for the jobs market, and being productive members of society. The calls for further educational support mention scholarships rather than stipends; this correlates with the experience of ex-combatants who completed their courses successfully but whose diplomas or certificates were withheld because their college fees had not been paid. Another interpretation of this question and J5 which should be considered is a possible response bias, in which the survey might be perceived as a needs assessment in advance of a further possible reintegration programme. This perception could have been encouraged by the presence of an outsider from Europe. In most cases, however, the questionnaire was administered by local researchers. The research was also introduced as being a student project, rather than an NGO initiative, for focus groups, interviewees, and the survey. The introductory text in the survey states clearly: "We're not linked to any organisation which is providing assistance for former combatants, so this survey is not about offering extra support to you. But I'd be grateful if you could help us anyway." If there was a widespread perception that the research was linked to a provider of further reintegration benefits, it would be surprising that such outspoken

criticism of the programme was given. It is argued, therefore, that while a response bias of this kind must be considered, it is unlikely to have had a significant effect on these questions.

Conclusions

Overall, the data in this chapter indicate that there were significant problems with even the most elementary matters in taking a participatory approach, namely the provision of information. This relates to the very bottom rungs on the ladder of participation, and precedes any question of being asked for one's opinion, being listened to, that view being acted on, or any degree of shared decision-making. (These questions are dealt with in subsequent chapters). The problems with the provision of information do not relate so much to the amount, which many felt was adequate in as far as it went. It also came from a variety of sources, but this does not explain the problems in terms of its validity. The real problem was its perceived inaccuracy. The nature of this inaccuracy is important to consider, as it arises from the discrepancy between what was believed to have been promised, and what actually came about. As discussed above, this discrepancy can be due to imperfect information, or information given in good faith but which turned out to be inaccurate because programme implementation did not go according to plan. There were many actors, and those who explained the programme to ex-combatants were not always the same people who were involved in implementing it later. However, in terms of trust, faith in the process, and a sense of ownership by key stakeholders were seriously undermined by the significant problems they saw with the information. The fact that that this was sometimes attributed to deliberate deception shows the depth of feeling.

While the problems highlighted here relate directly to information, the impact of this loss of faith goes well beyond the DDR programme. Disarmament and demobilisation took place at a key juncture in the remaking of Sierra Leone and Liberia. It is not a moment in time which can be repeated. It was an opportunity for all parties to start the difficult, long-term process of rebuilding relationships, of forging new identities, and of finding a place for all categories of citizens. Ultimately, it is at this point that foundations begin to be laid – or not – for the multi-level dialogue which is needed in order to make any attempt at reconciliation or address the issues of transitional justice. When this opportunity is marred by a sense of mistrust and having been deceived, serious damage is done to the fragile process of what might be termed psycho-social reconstruction at a national level. Social capital, which is so badly affected by civil war, relies on trust and relationships, and this is what is undermined by failures at the most basic levels of the ladder of participation. Ownership too – in the sense that goals and interests are

seen as shared – also suffers. Ex-combatants learn from actions rather than words – or indeed the inconsistency between them – about the nature of the new dispensation.

It should also be mentioned that while ex-combatants did not hold back when describing problems with DDR, they were in favour of the idea in principle of such a programme. A number of those encountered were in fact working in the trade for which they had been trained, such as tailoring or plumbing, and many others had returned to education with the support of the programme.

A participatory approach is not necessarily measured by the degree of satisfaction which stakeholders express with a programme's outcomes, which is a function of many different factors besides participation. This is especially so when endeavouring to be participatory in a complex, fluid and difficult post-war environment such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, where capacity constraints, population movement, and security concerns can make it more difficult to take a participatory approach. The situation is further complicated by the fact that programmes for ex-combatants can be seen by the wider community as favouring those who persecuted them – and these communities had enormous needs and challenges of their own after more than a decade of civil war. So while generalised disappointment with the programme outcome was expressed by many ex-combatants, particularly in terms of poverty, employment and livelihoods, the data presented here indicate that the provision of information was seen as a problem in itself, and is not just a manifestation of broad-based discontent. While these problems indicate that the lower rungs of the ladder of participation were not properly reached as far as many stakeholders were concerned, the next chapter looks at the more demanding test of whether they felt their views were listened to by those running the programmes.

Chapter 4:

Consultation and shared decision-making

Introduction and justification

This chapter looks at the next stages in the progression towards self-mobilisation as one moves up the ladder of participation. Having considered ways in which information was transmitted and understood by ex-combatants – or not – we now look at a two-way information flow: the extent to which their views were passed on, sought, or considered by those designing and running the programmes. The rungs of the ladder which we are concerned with here are largely related to consultation, rather than actually sharing decision-making to any considerable extent in terms of programme design. (This is distinct from choices by individuals about their own future, from a predetermined list of options). It does, however, begin to touch on stakeholders' views being taken into account, when it comes to any modification of how specific details in the programme were implemented, especially after representations were made or views expressed.

This degree of participation equates with the third, fourth, fifth stages of the ladder of participation.

The third rung is described as “participation by consultation” by Pretty (1995: p. 1252), and involves people being consulted or answering questions, but decision-making is not shared and there is no obligation to take on board people's views. As will be seen, this is as far as much of the reintegration programme went in terms of participation, apart from the actual choice of vocational training or education which each ex-combatant made for themselves.

The fourth rung would see some practical involvement by stakeholders in implementing a programme, which is not so relevant in terms of reintegration, and applies more to the rural development setting envisaged by Pretty. People have no real stake in prolonging the practices once the programme ends. The fifth rung is more relevant to reintegration, but is even less common. It envisages some interaction and shared decision-making, but generally after the major decisions have already been made.

In terms of the reintegration programme, the specific ways in which possibilities for participation might manifest themselves include the following:

- Expressing an opinion.
- Being asked for one's view.
- Being listened to.
- Those running the programme knowing what ex-combatants' needs were.
- Choices being available from a list of reintegration options (education, training, etc) and their location.
- Consultation with children about where they would return to (original community, which relative, etc).
- Input to decisions on how the programme was run (as opposed to individual choices).
- Lobbying for benefits (stipends, toolkits, etc).

Most of the definitions of participation operate at the group rather than the individual level. They also deal with communities, which are usually stable, and which may have community based organisations or other structures for conducting analysis, expressing views, or making decisions. The participatory elements in reintegration are often at the individual level rather than being done in groups, partly because the demobilisation phase aimed to break the ex-combatants' link with commanders and to help them forge a non-military identity. (This is despite the fact that, as a means to an end, commanders are engaged with at the earlier disarmament phase, in order to initiate the process.) Participation usually depends on social capital and group structures, which are more problematic during DDR. Participatory aspects are more common when it comes to engaging with communities rather than ex-combatants, as seen with the children's programme; this is also a useful way to engage all stakeholders and allow them to interact and rebuild relationships.

Being asked for an opinion

One of the most basic measures is the extent to which ex-combatants felt that their views were sought during the process. They were asked in the survey: "Were you ever asked for your opinion about the way rehabilitation/reintegration was being done?" (Question D1). When aggregated, a majority indicated that they were asked:

Asked for opinion on reintegration (D1)	Frequency	Percent
Yes	48	53.3
No	42	46.7
Total	90	100.0

Table 4.1: Being asked for an opinion about the reintegration phase (Question D1).

There is in fact a clear difference between the two countries, with a large majority in Liberia saying they were asked, while an even larger proportion in Sierra Leone said they were not. (Fisher's exact, $p=0.000$). The contrast is stark, and may quite simply be a function of the different programmes, which were similar but not identical. What it tells us is that Sierra Leonean ex-combatants had a very strong perception that their views were not sought, at any stage of the programme. As a rudimentary test of participation, the programme here is found wanting, based on the self-reported perceptions of the primary stakeholders. It does not actually preclude a more positive view of the higher levels of participation, such as input to decision-making, but any actual failure by programmers to take their views into consideration would undermine the quality of such participation.




Figure 4.1: Being asked for an opinion about reintegration (Question D1), by country.

There are no significant differences for gender, child status on demobilisation, or rank. There is a difference based on location (urban ex-combatants are less likely to say their opinion had been

sought), but this apparent effect ($p=0.005$, Fisher's exact test) disappears when the results are disaggregated by country.

Who asked for your opinion on reintegration?

When it comes to who it was who had asked for the ex-combatants' opinions on reintegration (Questions D2 and D2a), the group mentioned more than any other is the staff of national NGOs. This is consistent with the longer period of engagement which they would have had with implementing agencies from the country, rather than with UN staff who were most involved with the initial disarmament and demobilisation stages.




Figure 4.2: Who asked you for your opinion during reintegration? (Question D2).

The results for Sierra Leone are included in the graph even though the sample size is small, and the relative importance attached to UN peacekeepers is much higher. Although the proportions assigned to each source are different, the inclusion of the Sierra Leonean sample does not in fact change the rank order of the Liberian and the overall results.

Being listened to

Were your views listened to? (E1)

Going beyond the matter of whether ex-combatants' opinions were solicited, they were surveyed on the extent to which their views were in fact taken on board during DDR. Question E1 asked: "Did you feel your views in general were listened to by those running the programmes?" Those in Sierra Leone were much more negative about their experience, while opinion was much more evenly divided in Liberia. The difference between the countries was not significant.




Figure 4.3: Were your views listened to? (Question E1).

There are some significant differences within the survey sample on the basis of gender and of child status at the time of demobilisation, indicating that both women and children had a more positive view. Women were less likely to say their views were not listened to ($p=0.000$), while children were more likely to say their views were listened to ($p=0.006$). Those living in urban areas felt they had not been listened to in general ($p=0.000$).

Listened to by whom? (E2)

The ex-combatants' impressions about being heard can be understood better by looking at which actors they considered to have listened to their views. For those answering “yes” to whether their views were listened to, Question E2 asked “By whom?”, indicating that they could tick as many categories as they felt applied. Those in Liberia felt the staff of national NGOs listened most to their views, followed by UN peacekeepers, and then other UN agency staff. Staff of international NGOs are listed fourth. The predominance of national NGO staff is consistent with the greater engagement which these agencies had with ex-combatants during reintegration. This was longer in duration, required more interaction, and had more choices and options than the disarmament phase, during which UN peacekeepers were the initial point of contact. The sample size for this particular question in Sierra Leone was too small to be analysed usefully (n=10).




Figure 4.4: Who listened to your views (Question E2, Liberia).

Did they know your needs? (E3)

A slightly different measure of the extent to which they felt their views were taken on board was explored in Question E3: “Did you feel that people running the programmes knew what your needs were?” This goes beyond consultation to a higher level of participation, in terms of

programming being more closely shaped to their needs. However, it also brings us back to the question of expectations – realistic or not – and this is explored in more detail in the subsequent question: it appears that views are based on the implementing agencies’ actions as well as the process of communication. Overall, Question E3 indicates that a clear majority in both countries felt that their needs were not known at all by those running the programmes.




Figure 4.5: Did the people running the programme know your needs? (Question E3).

In both countries, those who were children at the time of demobilisation were more likely to say their needs were known. This difference is significant in Sierra Leone ($p=0.024$), where two thirds of them said their needs were known “a bit, to some extent”, whereas just over three quarters of adults said their needs were not known “at all”. The difference remains significant ($p=0.021$) when the results from both countries are aggregated. There are no significant differences between respondents on the basis of country, gender, rank, or urban/rural location, for the aggregated results. Those in urban areas in Liberia, however, were much more likely than rural dwellers to say their needs were not known at all (81.3% compared with 46.4% respectively; $p=0.004$). Also in Liberia only, women were much less negative about their needs being known ($p=0.009$): less than half of them said their needs were not known “at all”, compared with almost two out of three men who took this view.

How did they know your needs? (E4)

The basis of the perception that their needs were known (at least to some extent) is explored in Question E4, which asked as a direct follow up: “How did they know?” This provides an insight in to the ways in which interviewees felt that those running the programmes had actually engaged with them and understood their views.




Figure 4.6: How did they know your needs? (Question E4).

The largest category relates to examples of specific needs being met, which is taken as an indication that their needs were known. In fact, this is a more stringent test of the implementing agencies, as it requires them not just to know the ex-combatants’ needs, but to have acted positively on that understanding. The ability to respond in line with these needs might not always be possible for an agency, if it did not have the authority, resources, or permission to vary the programme. Examples of this test of needs being known include:

Because they provided me with quality education.

They use[d] to give us stipend every month.

Because they did some of what I need.

They provided us some training materials.

Because they used to provide some of the things I needed.

Selected individual responses to Question E4 in survey

In the second most numerous category, examples of needs being known are based on having been asked or interviewed. This relates more directly to the level of participation which is being considered, namely seeking out the views of the intended beneficiaries and attempting to understand their situation.

They asked our views and we told them what we wanted.

Through questions and answers.

They asked for my view about the program.

Selected individual responses to Question E4 in survey

What is interesting about this category is that many of those responding indicated that this information was sought early on in the process, or before the training had begun. The significance is that while consultation later on in a process may be useful in influencing the way a programme is implemented, it is less likely to affect its overall design. The consultation in question mainly refers to the “guidance counselling” stage of demobilisation, when ex-combatants were given information about options for vocational training, during which they were to have been asked about their skills, abilities, and what job they wanted to train for. Examples of this kind of consultation included:

Because before the training I was interviewed and I told them what I need.

Before we start[ed] the training they ask us what we will need for the training.

Because I was interviewed before the training.

Because they asked us first before the program start[ed].

Selected individual responses to Question E4 in survey

This was also clear from some of the comments in the focus group discussions about being listened to, which referred to individual consultations:

They talked to us about all and enquire from us our needs. We chose what we wanted; some carpentry, tailoring, mason and a lot more. I chose carpentry.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

Some responding to Question E4 were also clear that they told those running the programme what they wanted, or indeed reminded them of what they had said when initially interviewed, showing that some felt they had to make their views known; it was not all based on the initiative

of the implementers. This area is dealt with in more detail later, when the question of having to lobby for expected benefits is considered.

While these types of choices are of great importance for the individuals concerned, and are a valid test from their personal point of view, it still does not equate to input to programme design as envisaged in the ladder of participation. The element of choice is largely a matter of selecting from a pre-determined list of options, rather than helping to design a programme to meet their needs. The more radical level of choice is of course much more feasible when dealing with a stable, peacetime community with its own civil society structures and social capital.

Being listened to (focus groups)

The issue of whether their opinions had been sought was raised in the focus group discussions. The responses again point to an understandable focus on livelihoods and self-sufficiency after the war, given the extreme economic conditions at the time and subsequently. This was a typical response to a question from the moderator on whether they had been asked to give their views:

Yes, they asked us, and our view was, after the training, they should give us something so that we could be able to do something for ourselves. With that, you know, we will not be thinking about guns.

Participant 3, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia.

Another example indicated that the consultation which came to mind was at the early stages of the process, when choices were to be made about training and where to live:

Yeah, the trade was explained to us... and [if] you have interest in it, and you go there. ... they were not just demanding “you go so, you go so”, no. OK, so, they explained to you, if you wish to take this other department as your career, you go there. Yes, that afterwards they give you your tools, later they assign you to the area that you are to go.

Participant 4, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

Failure to be heard

A number of focus group participants were clear in saying their views were not taken on board. One woman in Monrovia said that in her experience, the consultation was really scant:

They only said, we should go to school, and they were giving us \$30.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

Another highlighted the difference between being asked for one's view, and seeing the desires which they expressed being fulfilled. They were able to distinguish between these two elements:

Yes they did asked us how we would want to see the programme. They did ask us. ... But, our own view that we gave them, some of them were not considered.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone

The distinction is again made between consultation early on (and the expectations which that creates) on one hand, and the reality in terms of programme implementation on the other. This participant was responding to a question about being asked for his views before the training:

Yes, they asked us. For me, they asked me as to what I want to do, and I said, I want to sewing clothes, and they said to me, they would bring a sewing machine and a certificate after the training. But I didn't see any.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

Writing as power

The significance of something being written down is a recurring theme, both as an indicator that something was heard, and also that the person had power and authority. One example in relation to their dealings with the NCDDRR is this response to the focus group moderator, who asked if the staff ever listened to their opinion:

Yes, they listened to me, and everything was written on paper.

Participant 3, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia.

Some other examples include:

The NGO came to us and gave us the information. They used to come, write our name, and ask us all what work we wanted to do.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

They even came and wrote down our names, and they carried those names [away].

Unidentified participant, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

This underlines the divisions which exist within society in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and also between people from the country and those associated with international agencies. The divisions reflect disparities in power, access to those with authority, a centre-periphery distinction, and differences in access to education and literacy. It also highlights the way some of those who feel disempowered expect to interact with people in authority. This context is relevant when it comes to participation, which ultimately engages with power relationships, information flows, and decision-making.

It has to be said that the status accorded to someone who was writing down what was said, whether or not they had any official standing, was also sensed from the very start by this researcher during interviews and focus group discussions. The experience had both methodological and substantive lessons. In terms of methodology, it highlighted once again the need to make clear that the research project was not in any way connected with an NGO or international agency which would provide resources, and was not part of a needs assessment exercise. The explanation given to interviewees and participants in this regard was made even more explicit – both before and after their views were sought – in order to avoid misunderstandings. This was essential first of all in terms of methodology, and avoiding response bias, where interviewees' stories might be shaped according to expectations about their needs being met as a result of the exercise. Secondly, it was critical from an ethical perspective: they were entitled to fair and honest dealings, including the avoidance of statements which were accurate but likely to be misinterpreted.

In terms of substantive lessons from this experience, these related to the issues of power (as discussed above), communication, and expectations. Regarding communications, it made clear how statements could be misunderstood, even though they were quite clear in themselves. The context was as important as the face value of the message: ex-combatants had been used to dealings with outsiders and people in positions which fell into a particular category, especially in terms of the reintegration programme. They had had the experience of having to lobby for benefits which they felt they had been promised, and any further dealings with outsiders touching on the adequacy of the reintegration programme could be coloured by this experience. Closely linked to the issue was the ease with which expectations could be created, even though

these were quite unrealistic in terms of a research project undertaken by a graduate student and his research assistant. It was clear that in stating that something was the case, it was also necessary to spell out what it did *not* amount to. That means in practice being clear that this was a research project, and to state explicitly that it was not a needs assessment. Without making this clear, there was a definite risk that expectations would arise which were never intended. This is important in terms of understanding how many of the ex-combatants' unrealised expectations arose from similar dealings with DDR staff who had been clear in what they said, but whose words were taken to mean more than was intended.

Did what you say have any effect? (E5)

As a more specific measure of the degree to which they felt their views had been taken into account, Question E5 in the survey asked: "Did anything you said have any effect on how things were done?" This kind of question again risks conflating the matter of being heard with that of specific needs being met. (It is why examples were asked for in the question which followed immediately afterwards.) The negative responses may include individuals who did not in fact make any particular representations (perhaps because they felt this was not worthwhile doing), and who would not therefore have been able to point to examples of having an effect on the programme. Bearing in mind the specific nature of the question, the response was overwhelmingly negative in both countries. Overall, only one respondent in 15 felt that what they said "definitely" had an effect; they were outnumbered almost 11 to one by those saying it had no effect "at all".




Figure 4.7: Did what you say have any effect? (Question E5).

Examples (E6)

To explore what was behind the answers to the previous question, an open-ended question (E6) asked: “Can you think of any examples?” The responses indicating a positive outcome were overwhelmingly oriented towards having individual needs met, or to having a choice of training option. This is not surprising, given that views they expressed during the reintegration process which were “measurable” against a specific outcome would have included representations about a particular need, in the precarious post-war environment. It would be these views which would to come to mind when asked a question like this about their input resulting in a noticeable response.




Figure 4.8: Examples of what ex-combatants said having an effect on implementation (Question E6).

Under the category of practical support, the following answers give an indication of the process of making representations and having those needs taken on board:

One example is we told the administration to make sure that our allowance be on time and it happened.

The NGO that was training us provided us with recipes for our baking.

We as former combatants in general told the institution to provide us with uniform and it happen[ed].

They provide books for me.

Some examples are tools, care.

The provision of training, promotion of sports activities.

They provided me with cement, zinc, nails, for my poultry house.

Some examples would be copy books, uniform, etc.

They provided us practical, certificate and machines for us at the end of the training.

Selected responses to Question E6

For some, the example of being heard was quite simply a matter of receiving their choice of education or training (the third most popular category):

I told them I wanted to go back to school and they did.

One example is I was sent for job training to WFP for eight months.

The example is they provided me [with] the course I chose to do.

Selected responses to Question E6

The choice of reintegration training or education is for many ex-combatants the most significant way in which they had a say on how the programme would benefit them. In this sense, it is of course something which touches on participation. Yet it is not necessarily participation *per se*: even a non-participatory programme would still have offered them a choice in the matter, if only for the sake of matching people's skills and aptitudes to the relevant options. The choices available were from a list of options, not least because there could only be training capacity in certain areas, and ultimately labour market demand was restricted to a certain number of people in each sector. So while this choice is a significant moment in the life of each ex-combatant, in which their decision could have far-reaching consequences, it is not the same as full participation in its most developed sense, as seen in the ladder of participation. However, one example from Bo in Sierra Leone appears to indicate real imagination and flexibility on the part of those implementing the programming. The participant had said earlier that he "did not take any training because it was boring and I was born a dancer", and in response to this question:

When I said I cannot go through training they brought me to the Sierra Leonean national dance troupe to become a better dancer. Now I have been to Europe, America and some African countries through dancing.

Selected response to Question E6

A proportion of the examples indicate a negative experience (the second and fourth most numerous categories). These examples are however a much smaller proportion than the overwhelming majority reporting they had not been heard at all, in the preceding linked question (E5):

School program ended soon [early].

Training twice a week was not enough. I said that to the trainer, but it was not changed.

I decided to do tailoring but I was sent to do agriculture.

Training was not done to expectation.

I left the training because it was not effective.

Training was not improved.

Program ended soon [early].

Training was not effective, training materials not provided.

Selected responses to Question E6

Overall, these answers indicate that the question can be approached at three levels: (1) at an individual level, where a person's benefits or treatment were changed (or not); (2) at a group level, such as the provision of tools or uniforms for trainees, or (3) at the policy or implementation level. An example of a change of policy such as this was cited by one respondent, who mentioned that the practice of excluding primary education as an option was reversed following representations:

One example is the school administration said the elementary section was not accepted on the program, we went together and talked to them, from there they began to accept the elementary students.

Response to Question E6

Participation is traditionally seen as being more relevant to the group or policy level. It is interesting to note that most respondents made the judgement on whether anything they said had had any effect by pointing to changes in their personal circumstances, or indeed failure to meet individual needs which they considered should have been met (such as toolkits, stipends, or the availability of a training option) rather than at a community level. This is not to say that representations were not made jointly, as the open-ended answers indicate that the initiative was sometimes made as a group.

Lobbying for benefits

Ex-combatants frequently mentioned having to lobby or campaign in an organised way for the benefits they felt they were entitled to. This came up spontaneously in different focus groups, and again it underlines the sense of disempowerment which many felt – a feeling which often contributed to disillusionment with the process, when they sensed their petitions were not heard. Some members of the group would have been in a position during the war where they had the

upper hand, as a person bearing arms but little accountability. The role reversal, loss of status, and identity shift would have been quite disorientating for some, especially in the context of largely unaddressed post-traumatic stress disorder.

In some cases, the issue of lobbying for benefits is linked to expectations, which may or may not have been in line with what was officially supposed to have been promised to the ex-combatants. The discrepancy between these expectations and official policy can have many reasons, including poor communication or deliberate misinformation by officials or other parties. It can also arise when benefits which were genuinely promised do not in fact materialise, for any number of reasons.

In the focus groups, the reason most frequently mentioned for having engaged in lobbying for benefits was payment of stipends, accounting for nearly half of the references. This included late payment, non-payment, or the amount being less than had been understood was due to them. This woman complained of having to pay for public transport to the training centre, and yet not being paid:

Then, they can't give you the \$30 when [the] month ends, nothing [is] coming to you. You aren't getting no benefit. At the end, that's grumble have to come [complaint you have to make] before you get your money. It's not right like that.

Participant 5, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

Extension of scholarships for education was also an issue on which they lobbied, as well as tools during training or for their own use after.




Figure 4.9: Reasons why ex-combatants lobbied for benefits (focus groups).

Sometimes the attempts to lobby and to be heard were associated with real anger, especially among ex-combatants who felt they had in fact served in defence of their community. Their new role in petitioning for what they felt they had been promised underlined their diminished status, as impoverished war veterans. This participant was a former member of the Community Defence Forces in Sierra Leone, and his community had in fact welcomed them back after the war:

[Y]ou know that an angry lion is a fierce lion which can do anything. We were not even earning any money on time, except we had to go to the police. From the there we started striking in some parts of Bo

Participant 1, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

In other cases the sense of disempowerment arose from what they felt was a failure to receive adequate or accurate information:

They just said nothing to us because the guy who was suppose to act between we the student and the office, we tried to ask him so many question but said he has no information from the office

Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone

Efforts to lobby for benefits continued at various levels, and continued with NGOs working in the area even after the formal DDR programme had finished. For some, the issue was a place to

carry out the trade they had been prepared for during the vocational training, such as this village in Lofa where there was training to work as beauticians and bakers:

One example was, we told the people that we needed the building to be here. And that's the building that they brought here. And this was cosmetology and pastry. After we did the training, there was no place for the children to be baking their bread and fixing their hair. That's why we told them we need a building. That's how come Samaritan's Purse came out with this building for us to be there.

Participant 1, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

Ex-combatants as intermediaries

One of the many complexities in this network of relationships is the fact that representatives of the ex-combatants were sometimes used as intermediaries or contacts. They may have been appointed as a liaison person, or ended up lobbying for benefits on behalf of their peers. This function can potentially enhance communication in both directions, and also build a sense of having been listened to. But when information was not available or to the liking of the wider group, the intermediary can come to be seen as part of the problem. Those representing their fellow ex-combatants had to defend themselves from accusations of having stolen the benefits, or ended up in conflict with their peers when programmes did not deliver what was expected, as explained by this contributor who said the failures “made us argue among ourselves”, when he dealt with the UNDP after the implementing NGO failed to pay their stipends:

They told us they were going to pay us for eight months, and we did nine months' work. Those that were with us in our group that didn't receive money, some of them got vexed [with me], and said they wanted to kill me. They said I was a curse for them not receiving their money, forgetting that I am not the donor. ... Some of them started hunting for me, [as if] I am the one stopping the people being paid. But later on we fixed the situation among ourselves, to avoid conflict.

Participant 3, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

In a number of cases, the ex-combatant appointed as the liaison person was seen as corrupt, and as one of those involved in diverting benefits intended for others. One of the situations described arose from not being paid on time, which led to a complaint to the police, and later a strike:

From there would go to DDR office, and there we would attack the liaison officer, who is also part of us who disarmed. Especially when we all came together and appointed him to be our liaison officer. He was treating us like bastards, and at the end of the day we were all part of the course they were running for us. By then he had already achieved what he wanted, i.e. corrupt benefits. Those who were appointed to be a go-between for us were not good stewards. Some of them have built houses while we are suffering.

Participant 1, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

It is important to bear in mind the complexity of the relationships and the range of actors on each side, when attempting to analyse power and information flows which are more multi-dimensional than a simple two-way relationship.

In fact, I was the first to reach Freetown, before other DDR staff and even OIC members. I was there, waiting for them, because my colleagues were waiting for me, they were relying on me to tell them. Since I undertook the move, I had to pile on the pressure. It was not an easy one. Even the allowance and other things were difficult. When you insist, they will bullshit you. Some of my colleagues will flare up and be very angry, but since I was leading them I was able to coax them.

Participant 2, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

Participatory aspects in general

Making choices within DDR

The issue of making choices from the available options for training and education is one which recurs in the focus group discussions. Although the sense in which it is significant and yet not necessarily an indication of full participation, the detail given in the discussions makes it worth returning to. The way in which decisions were made – whether or not they met the expectations of the ex-combatants – is as important as the decisions themselves.

When we went, they told us that, what do you guys want us to do for us [the ex-combatants]. Some of us took driving, some took machinery [mechanic], some took agriculture which is farming, etc.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

This participant was asked by the moderator whether they had been given enough time and information to make their decisions:

Yes, because you went to the office they ask you, do you want to back to school? You say yes. They will prepare a form for you, the school which you will like to attend, you go to the principal and if you are allowed in the school, then will go through the process for you, If you want to do carpentry, they will do everything for you the only thing, they will give you the information that next week or tomorrow you start going to class or school.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone

This participant, who said he was dealing with local people working for the NCDDRR, was clear that he wanted to go back to school. He was asked by the focus group moderator if everything had been explained clearly:

Yes. The time I disarmed [they] asked me what type of job I am interested in. I told them I want to educate.

[Moderator]: So they asked you about your need?

Yes. ... Then I told them I want to go to school because I was a school-going chap.

Participant 3, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

He added that he was told they would be responsible for three years of education, but only one year was paid for. But he has managed to continue into secondary school despite this. Another participant in the same group, who also chose to go back to school, was asked in the focus group whether various options had been made available:

Yes sir. They said the various courses offered were vocational and academic. Those who wanted to continue schooling back were also provided for. So I made sure that my selection was my right choice. They said those who want carpentry, tailoring, mason etcetera can opt as all were available. So, I made my choice.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

The distinction between the principle of genuinely having a say in your own future training after the war, and whether that choice is in fact available, seems to be understood by some. The course which was among the most popular was driving. However, with only limited numbers of jobs for drivers, this is the one mentioned most often as being chosen or hoped for, but not being available:

The people [DDRR staff] really want for us to be happy, to go through our training, and get our certificate. Like for me, I took driving, but when I came here there was nobody to come to our aid to teach us driving. This is why I involve myself in agriculture. The agriculture that I went under again, the people frustrated us.

Participant 3, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

A similar situation of over-subscribed driving courses happened in Sierra Leone as well:

Like they came up with driving, when they said they were going to look into the programme, some people went in for that. They also talked of auto-mechanic, which some went through, welder, carpentry etc.

[Another voice]: But the jobs that were intact [still available] for people to do were, carpentry, tailoring and mason. For the driving, people went and those who had luck in the early batch were able to complete the course, but those who applied for the course late, were unable to complete it.

Unidentified participants, Focus Group E, Bo, Sierra Leone

In some cases, it was quite simply a case of not having the choice they wanted, even though education was supposed to be available generally:

I wanted to go to college. There was no option for me to go to college.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group C, Bo, Sierra Leone

The issue of a training choice not being available is not necessarily the same as lack of participation. The experiences described in Group E are a good example of dissatisfaction being expressed with the DDR programme, on the basis that a preferred training option was not available. In this case, some ex-combatants wanted to train as drivers, but by the time they reached that stage in the process, no more places were available on this training course. This is not in itself an indication of non-participatory programming: the courses provided must bear some relationship with the potential demand for labour. If many more drivers were trained than were needed (as happened with some options), the course would be of little use to those taking part in it. So some courses will inevitably attract more applicants than they can accommodate, even in a participatory programme. In this situation, expression of dissatisfaction with the reintegration programme is not necessarily a measure of participation. However, a relevant question here is how applicants are selected for those courses which are over-subscribed; dealing with them on a “first come first served” basis is at least transparent, but it is also somewhat arbitrary.

The questions of training choice and practical needs may appear to be a micro-scale level of analysis, and too focused on individual rather than group or community level expressions of participation. It is certainly valid to say that where power is to be shared and the voice of all stakeholders heard, those with less power will often need to act or speak together, rather than at an individual level. It is perhaps significant that group action – other than representation by some ex-combatants on behalf of their peers – does not feature significantly in their discussion of participatory practices. But it is understandable that the very difficult economic environment, and the heightened level of expectations and sense of entitlement, have lead many ex-combatants to assess communication and decision-making in terms of whether their immediate, individual practical needs were met.

Having a say in decisions and the Ladder of Participation

The idea of having a say in decisions did also come up in ways that were not linked to meeting a specific need. These throw some light on how the process of influencing implementation of the programme is perceived. One aspect in particular was the possibility of coming together as a group in order to be heard. This is not just a matter of addressing the power imbalance which exists between implementer and intended beneficiary; it also moves the focus to one where the collective views of a community or group are entered into the equation, as envisaged in the ladder of participation:

Yes, making your own decision of how you want to run the programme, maybe your one voice can't make it, it has to be a group thing, to put together and tell the people, this is how we want the programme to be. But if you come up, you're one, to go to the head, maybe they might overlook you, and downsize your voice. So it has to be a group thing that will go there and tell the people, we want it like this. I'm sure that's the way it works.

Participant 2, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

It therefore raises the question of representation and power structures within communities, as highlighted in the literature on participation, and whether youth, women, and non-commanders are sidelined by those ex-combatants in more powerful positions. Another way in which the idea of participation in decision-making emerged was when the question was raised of how the ex-combatants might run a DDR programme, if they were in charge. Again, the ideas of a community approach, existing structures within civil society, and the participation of under-represented groups came to the surface:

– It's by calling upon everybody to let them know that people came to our aid, in that, we will tell them, you are our people, you cannot be left out. So, please come, or send representatives, so that whatever discussion we will have, you will get to know about it. That's what usually we do. We get some elders so that the discussion that we will have, they will be our witness.

– The youth leaders, the women leaders, all will be involved, and we will know how to do this.

Two unidentified participants, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

The lack of participation was specifically mentioned as well by ex-combatants who were students at Cuttington University in Gbarnga, Liberia. They highlight the role that their compatriots played, making clear again the complexity of power relationships within communities and the network of accountabilities:

There were no assessment or survey made. Decisions were just made up there, and imposed on us. It was not [a] bottom-top approach, but top-bottom approach. Our issue is that our brothers [fellow Liberians] that took part in the decision-making were not honest to us, so we cannot actually blame those expatriates that took part in the planning, because our brothers know our situation, they know our environment.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

In another account of negative experiences in this group, a direct link was made between lack of participation and poor outcomes. The person was referring to the demobilisation card which indicates that they are entitled to benefits, and which of these they have yet to receive:

Even as I speak to you now, some people have their DDDR card, because the programme was not planned with the people.

Participant 6, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

An idea of what the ex-combatants would like in terms of programme management is apparent when they were asked if it was being run again, how could it be done to include people. It extends as far as including participants' views and experiences, rather than the higher levels of joint decision-making, or independent analysis and action by communities. But even these lower levels are seen as being linked to better programming, at a utilitarian level:

Yeah. Eh, you know, in planning a programme, you need to first make a survey to see what is needed, and you have to involve the people's opinion into consideration. And you should also look at the culture that is existing in that place, and you should look at the effect of the war. So, if you look at all of these,

and get the people's opinion, then you will be able to plan a better programme; in any part of Africa that DDRR programme has taken place, then that mistake will not exist.

Participant 5, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

Overall, there is a clear understanding by ex-combatants of the power relationships at play, and of the mechanisms available to them to influence events. This understanding is of course influenced by expectations and by a concern for economic survival. But the essential elements of participation are clearly relevant in all these matters – power, outcomes, and perceptions – and this is understood by ex-combatants, even if they do not explicitly use the language of participation to express this view.

Suggested improvements (J1), and why that might help (J2)

The open-ended questions in the survey prompted responses that referred more directly to participation, although (as already discussed) this may also be a function of the way in which these comments were recorded by the interviewer. Question J1, which is reported in detail in Chapter 3, asked what they would do to make people feel included in a DDR programme, if they were running it. Those response categories relevant to this chapter's focus on listening to ex-combatants and their role in decision-making are dealt with in more detail below, starting with the lower end of the participatory ladder.

The most frequent category, which includes almost twice as many responses as the next most common grouping, was “listen to people's views or allow them to speak”. This has been combined below with the fourth most common category of “take people's views into account”, which, while related, implies that ex-combatant's views not only be expressed and heard, but should also be actually taken on board. Some examples of these responses include the following:

Allow them express their feelings and views.

I will call everybody and ask for their opinion and open training centre.

Ask people about their views and options and try to do them.

I will make an announcement and collect people's views to include it in the running of the program.

Listen to what they have to say.

Organise monthly meetings with communities and beneficiaries for the view[s] and feelings about DDRR.

I would make them tell me what can be done to make them develop themselves and the nation.

Selected responses to Question J1

A number of responses referred more explicitly to the concepts of inclusion, in the fifth most common category of “be participatory, let them feel part of the process”:

I will allow people to feel part of the process.

I will do it through announcement and make the decision participatory and make sure to implement it.

I will make the whole process participatory.

Selected responses to Question J1

Moving higher up the ladder of participation, a small number of responses were coded as “share decision-making”, which of course implies a great deal more than the previous categories of simply providing an opportunity to speak or listen to those comments:

I will tell others so that they can be part of the decision-making process of the program.

I will call people to have them informed about all I am going to do so that they can be part of the decision-making.

I would allow the people to say what they want and direct their affairs.

I will create awareness and get people[’s] opinions so that they can be involve[d] in making the decision.

Selected responses to Question J1

Taken together, these responses indicate that despite an understandable focus on unmet needs, ex-combatants are well aware of the distinction between the concepts of consultation and of control over the process of designing and implementing a programme. It might be argued that the wording of Question J1 to some extent suggested responses attaching importance to participation, by asking them how ex-combatants might be made to feel part of the process. To explore the thinking behind these responses, the next question asked “How or why would that help?” (J2). This again revealed an understanding of the different levels of participation; the

categories for these responses are described in the previous chapter. The responses which are relevant here are categorised in ascending order in terms of the ladder, starting with “Having a chance to speak up or be heard”:

As they are mature, they know what is best.

Because their views will be listened to.

It will make people to be part of the decision making.

People will speak on issues affecting them.

They will say exactly what they want.

Selected responses to Question J2

The next level involved responses categorised as “Inclusion, feeling part of process, transparency”. It again reveals an understanding that the way ex-combatants are dealt with does in fact have an impact on the extent to which they feel included or excluded. (This and the previous category were jointly the fifth most common responses.)

Being transparent, and it will alleviate grievances.

Everybody will be happy and feel that they're part.

It make the community to feel that they are part.

People will be included.

Selected responses to Question J2

Moving further up the ladder, the third most common category was “Participatory approach”, where the concept is alluded to directly.

People will take ownership and have interest.

Because anything that is participatory is fair.

It would be interesting starting at the grassroots level.

That is the only way to know what they want.

To make the process people-centred.

Selected responses to Question J2

The most common category was “Improve empowerment, training, education, independence, or self-sufficiency”. Most of these responses refer to the instrumental benefit of closer engagement with participants, in terms of better programming outcomes, and their needs being taken into account. But several of them refer explicitly to the empowerment of people, in the original sense of the word:

Empower young people.

It would ensure self-reliance.

It will empower people to be independent.

Selected responses to Question J2

What would you avoid doing? (J3 and J4)

There was also an open-ended question (J3) asking “What would you *avoid* doing?” The responses are dominated by concerns about corruption, theft, false promises, and exclusion of ex-combatants from benefits. A number also relate to the duration and quality of the training. Out of nine categories, the two least numerous were “Preventing people from expressing views” and “Ignoring people’s views”. This would suggest that while clear views were expressed about participatory issues when people were asked, other concerns about theft and mismanagement predominated. It is worth noting however that the climate of mistrust which this reveals is not just a function of bad experiences (although these would be a major factor in influencing people’s views); it is also a function of the way in which people were communicated with and the credibility of those in power. When it comes to decisions which ex-combatants were not happy with, the motives ascribed to those making these decisions can be very different: one person who has had certain experiences may accept the outcome, while another faced with the same outcome may attribute it to poor management, indifference to their plight, or straightforward theft of their benefits. The question of communication and shared decision-making is, therefore, still relevant. Some typical answers in these last two categories relating to their views being heard include the following:

Avoid people keep their feelings [to themselves].

Avoid ignoring their views.

Excluding people in decision-making.

Avoid impose will on others.

Selected responses to Question J3

The following question asked how or why those suggestions of what they would avoid doing might help. The largest proportion by far pointed to straightforward improvements in the programme or its implementation. About halfway between this and the least common category are two classifications which relate to this chapter. They are: “Having a chance to speak up or be heard” and a “Participatory approach, inclusion, feeling part of process”. Some examples of the ideas expressed under these headings are:

By them speaking you could know what to do.

Their feelings and views could be of great help.

People will feel fine about the programme.

Selected responses to Question J4

Terminology of participation

One thing which is noticeable is that the terminology of participation appears to be missing from the views expressed by ex-combatants in the focus groups. (This is less obvious in the open-ended questions in the survey, but these were translated into English “on the fly” by the interviewer as the questionnaire was being completed, and they may have introduced any terminology relating to participation; in contrast, the focus groups were translated from the recordings, with the opportunity to listen back to passages to ensure a more accurate translation.) On one level, this is not surprising, as it is in many ways the jargon of outsiders and those in control of resources. However, it is not unusual to find that this technical jargon is adopted by those who are used to dealing with NGOs and agencies on whom they rely, as part of the engagement of groups seeking to fulfil their overlapping interests. An example of this is the way the term “empower” has been widely adopted in Liberia, but is in fact often used in the sense of “to be provided with resources”. There is an irony in the way in which some community members might say that someone from outside their group or country should come and “empower them” so that they would have a workshop, or have certain resources. An example of how the concept of participation is not part of the discourse between participants and agencies, but yet is understood, is the way it was explained by one moderator to a group of

ex-combatants, as he was trying to clarify comments about being consulted by programme implementers:

Participant 3: There was no time for that. They had no time for that, even if you grumble they will seize the little you were supposed have [the benefits].

Moderator: So in other words, the term the white people use, “participatory approach”, was lacking, right?

Several participants: Yes, yes, yes.

Several participants: Not at all, not at all.

Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

The absence of the specific jargon of participation is in fact taken as a positive sign, indicating that the views expressed are less “contaminated” by a desire on the part of participants to say what might be thought to be expected by outsiders. It would be a matter of concern if the terminology cropped up regularly in the ex-combatants’ accounts, suggesting perhaps that their views were not spontaneous but were influenced by expectations and the relationship with donor agencies. This absence does mean that participatory approaches (or their absence) have to be inferred from ex-combatants’ descriptions of their experiences, but if this is done explicitly and with care, it is more likely to be a valid measure of the concept than taking at face value the language of outsiders which communities have learned to use.

Views of agencies and staff implementing DDR

Interviews were conducted with the agencies implementing DDR, and the staff interviewed (some of whom no longer work for the same organisations) give an important insight into both the hurdles faced and the nature of the process. In many cases, they faced real difficulties in implementing the programme in the post-war environment, as has been highlighted elsewhere, even before any consideration is made of the extra time, resources, and commitment which can be required for participatory methods. Many could point to real efforts which had been made to engage with the ex-combatants and to communicate effectively with them⁴, and also to deal with the heightened expectations with which they might arrive at disarmament centres⁵. The educational or training options in themselves amounted to handing control over their own future

⁴ Joint interview with Koliab Nahataba, UNMIL, and Aderemi Aibinu, Chief Technical coordinator for DDRR, UNDP (Monrovia, Liberia, 26 February 2010); telephone interview with Francis Kai Kai, former head of Sierra Leone NCDDR, (25 February 2010).

⁵ Former reintegration worker (Makeni, Sierra Leone, November 2007).

to the ex-combatants, albeit at an individual level. More opportunities were available as the programme matured, and as the time and security constraints eased. For example, the National Information and Sensitization Campaign in Liberia which took place in 2005, a year after DDR was begun in earnest, involved an ambitious programme across the country to communicate with both ex-combatants and community stakeholders about the process, using a variety of means. This is documented in detail in its report, *Taking RR to the People* (UNDP 2005b). A later reintegration programme in Liberia in 2008–09 dealt with what was referred to as the “residual caseload” of ex-combatants who had not completed the process when the original programme was concluded involved a slower and more consultative approach. (This is discussed briefly in Chapter 6.)

The considerable efforts which were in fact made indicate that participatory approaches can be complex, and require a genuine commitment and consistency of approach. The effort may not always translate into intended results. The central role which communication plays is also clear, as a gap is apparent between the intended messages and perceptions of the ex-combatants. The possible reasons for miscommunication have been discussed in Chapter 3. A certain level of misunderstandings is to be expected, given the circumstances and the population being dealt with. Unfortunately, whatever the basis for any divergence between what was explained, understood, and eventually delivered, it is the ex-combatants’ *perception* of the discrepancies which has an impact on the entire process.

At the implementing level, some individuals made particular efforts which went beyond what had been expected of them, perhaps because of their background in participatory NGOs, or their personal disposition. In one case, the official who built up trust and good communication with the ex-combatants found himself being called to the camp at night to resolve difficulties, as they only wanted to deal with him⁶. Another trainer who was providing courses in computers offered additional classes on citizenship and dialogue, on his own initiative after the formal classes were over⁷. Some agencies and individuals at the implementation level share the view that the programmes were rushed and lacked proper consultation⁸. One said that suggestions that psychosocial issues and drug dependency be dealt with in the demobilisation phase were

⁶ Interview with Sekou W Konneh, who was in charge of cantonment site (Monrovia, Liberia, 27 February 2010)

⁷ Interview with Marcus Dainsee, former vocational trainer, (Gbarnga, Liberia, 16 February 2010).

⁸ Interview with David Konneh, director of Don Bosco Homes (near Monrovia, Liberia, November 2007).

rejected by those in charge of the programme, on the basis that funding was not available for them⁹.

Conclusions

The data in this chapter show that the ladder of participation is a useful way of analysing the experiences of ex-combatants and understanding their relationship with the reintegration programmes. Within the multi-faceted model called “participation”, it exposes key concepts of power, communication, expectations, consultation, inclusion in decision-making, and trust. These concepts are not just additive: they are a process in their own right, combining to form an essential part of the relationship between ex-combatants and those with power, be they staff from local authorities or international agencies. Judgments are made about actors and their motivation or reliability, and about the way their own actions are likely to improve their situation. The ideas mentioned throughout this chapter may or may not be part of the everyday language of ex-combatants. They are however the basis which is used to infer the rules of the game, to quickly form a model of “how things work”, using an intuitive process of induction based on how things played out. Their experiences in relation to credibility, accuracy of information, diversion or non-payment of benefits, being listened to, and sense of actually having been heard during any consultation process, are vital in determining this important relationship. It affects not just the level of trust, but also the whole idea of a new “social contract” which DDR involves, and their notion of governance in the post-war situation. This understanding of their relationship therefore influences ex-combatants’ actions and behaviour towards society and the reconstruction project, arising from their sense of inclusion and ownership (or otherwise). Ultimately, it underpins the way they see themselves in society, both now and in the future, which is one of the key elements in social reintegration.

The terms used to describe their experiences often focus on their immediate concerns about livelihoods, access to education (as a means to a better life), and meeting their basic needs. These remain enduring concerns, for understandable reasons, as much as war legacies such as identity, resentment, or a reiteration of the conflict. However, the persistence of these day-to-day concerns about basic needs does not negate the struggle which ex-combatants and

⁹ Interview with Sekou W Konneh, who was in charge of cantonment site (Monrovia, Liberia, 27 February 2010).

communities face, as they come to an understanding (or not) of what place the former fighters now have in society.

The needs of ex-combatants were often mentioned when questions of consultation or programme quality came up; it is worth considering what is at play here. On one hand, the sense that one's needs were known can be based on being asked for one's view, or treated in a certain way; on the other, it can be measured by the extent to which any requests were actually met. These are not the same: an organisation might listen to and understand someone's needs, but yet those needs might not be met, for a variety of reasons. (An example from another area is where disappointment was due to the fact that training as a driver was not available; yet only a certain number could be trained for this popular choice, given the limited demand for those skills in the labour market). The manner in which these two measures are used is highlighted by the fact that many interviewees responded to the question of how those running the programme *knew* their needs, by referring to ways in which their needs were or were not actually *met*. This conflates the question of being listened to, with that of whether their requests were complied with.

Besides those indicating that they were explicitly asked about their needs, some referred to the nature of the relationship or the way they were listened to in a positive way. Again, this is at variance with the overall sense in the focus group discussions of not having their needs met. While it is in some ways less tangible, the ex-combatants' assessment of the nature of the relationship with those implementing the programme is at the heart of a participatory approach. Benefits and specific assistance are what mattered to many former fighters, and are the basis for some of their judgements. Communication and listening skills come closer to the real question of participation, once this is genuine and views are taken on board. But the real question is the extent to which the power imbalance between both sides is recognised and addressed, and the quality of the relationship. Examples cited of how they felt their needs were known included:

By the way they talked to us

The way we were treated with respect

By the way they took time to speak to us

It looked like they knew our needs from the beginning

They value[d] us and listen to us

By they way they explained the whole DDRR process

Selected individual responses to Question E4 in survey

A direct relationship is once again seen between the degree of participation – this time measured a little higher up the ladder than in the last chapter – and the crucial issue of ownership of the process. Using the working definition of ownership offered in Chapter 1, the difficulties exposed by the survey and focus group discussions suggest that it is hard for some ex-combatants to believe they really do share the interests and vision of the people designing the programme. When so few of them believed that the programmers knew their needs (less than one in five), the idea of shared objectives is hard to imagine. Social capital too is at stake: the limited degree of participation evident here means that an important opportunity to build on the diminished post-war social capital has not been used to good effect.

The experiences reported in the survey in Sierra Leone were more negative than Liberia, when it comes to the perception of having been listened to. A substantial majority in Sierra Leone said they had not been listened to, and their opinion had not been asked. But the real problems with participation – seen in both countries – show up when it comes to ex-combatants' sense that those running the programme did not know their needs, and that views they expressed made no difference at all to the process. Substantial majorities in both countries were very negative on these questions. The diversity of views, and the more detailed explanation in the focus groups and open-ended questions, indicate that this is not simply a function of dissatisfaction, poverty, or a sense of exclusion. There is a real understanding by ex-combatants of the power dynamics at play, in their description of having lobbied for benefits they felt were due to them, the way in which individual choices were made about reintegration options, and the sense in which unstated rules were felt to be significant alongside the official announcements about what was going to happen. Their descriptions about how they would run a programme if put in charge, and what they would avoid doing, show a clear awareness of the roles being played by each actor and the way relationships are built on trust, credibility, inclusion, and control. Perceptions about these important factors have a significant bearing on how ex-combatants relate to their new environment, to the community in general, and to the physical, economic, social, political, and moral reconstruction project in the aftermath of war.

Chapter 5:

Effects of participation – quantitative measures

Introduction and Justification

This chapter uses the quantitative data from the survey to investigate measures of association between certain variables. It looks at variables which are related to participatory methods, such as receiving information or being consulted, and relates them to programme outcomes such as employment and perception of community acceptance. Measures of association between participatory approaches and programme outcomes are used, to see if there was any correlation between the two.

Operationalisation of concepts

The independent variables in the quantitative analysis relate to the lower rungs of the ladder of participation, and are all derived from the survey of ex-combatants. They all indicate some basic level of participation, such as receiving information, being consulted, and having some input into the way the programme was run. They include whether advice on reintegration was received from officials; the quality, amount, and accuracy of the information received (such as whether the right language was used), and whether reintegration was explained. Moving a little further up the ladder to consultation, participatory variables include whether they were asked for their opinion, and if those implementing the programme knew their needs. The highest level of participation reached in this analysis begins to touch on shared decision-making, at its most basic level. That includes whether their views were listened to, and if any views they expressed had any effect on the programme. Open-ended questions interlaced among these ordinal or categorical measures are a useful enrichment of the qualitative data, and are reported in other chapters where they are most relevant. The qualitative data must also be relied upon for the higher levels of participation, which was in fact conspicuous by its absence, since the middle- and higher-level rungs of the ladder were not operationalised in the survey. The text of the survey questions, and the possible responses, are listed at the start of Appendix B. To see them in context, the actual survey instrument is carried in Appendix C.

The dependent variables are all related to programme outcomes in terms of social and economic reintegration. They include work (current employment status, and the number of days they worked for someone else or self employed) in the last month. Their reported living conditions were also used as a measure of well-being and economic reintegration: this was based on how they would describe their own situation, rather than that of the country in general. An indirect measure of how they feel the community views them was also constructed after the survey was conducted. This was “Positive [or Negative] community view of ex-combatants”, based on Question A22. It is an attempt to explore the complex question of social reintegration, which is of course a function of many factors including stigma, trust, and reconciliation. Respondents were asked how they thought their community looked upon them, and could choose as many of the options as they wished from a list, and add their own description under the heading “Other”. Responses were subsequently categorised as “Negative community view of ex-combatants” if the options selected included “With fear”, “With anger” or “With jealousy”. Those including “With acceptance” or “With respect” were categorised as “positive”. No assignment was made on the basis of the options “Watchful/distrustful” or “Other”. A total of 10 respondents (all of whom were from rural Liberia) were in fact categorised as indicating both positive and negative community views. This does indeed reflect reality, but may also create difficulties in making comparisons which presume that these categories are mutually exclusive. The variable is therefore offered with the qualification that it is an imperfect attempt to create a measure which has validity and also utility for carrying out statistical analysis.

The data from a number of other questions were processed before actual statistical analysis took place. For example, the variable for child status is derived using the self-reported age of the respondent and the year in which they said they entered DDR, from which their age at the time of demobilisation is calculated. If under 18 at this point, they are classified as a child when entering DDR, for the purposes of the survey. For the number of days employed or self-employed in the last month, the reported days for both these figures is totalled. In comparing this variable (A14), and their reported work status (A15) with others, those who selected education as their reintegration option are excluded from the analysis. This is because some of these are still in education, and this could affect the number of days they would normally be able to work. If they were included in the tests involving current employment, the results would be skewed. As expected, there is in fact a significant difference between those choosing education as opposed to vocational training, in terms of current employment.

The limitations affecting this study such as sampling methodology and sample size have been discussed in Chapter 2. The other limitation is that the operationalisation of variables is always imperfect, especially in relation to participation. The respondents were asked in various ways about the information they received, its accuracy, and any possibilities for input to decisions about their future. In reality, these only relate to the lower rungs on the ladder of participation. Taken together, they do mean something. But the analysis requires us to treat each question separately, rather than aggregating them an additive measure of participation. For example, an individual may have received adequate information; it may not have been accurate; and while they may have had an opportunity to talk to the implementers, that might not have brought about the particular outcome they wanted. Attempting to combine these distinct elements into some kind of unified one-dimensional measure of participation would really do injury to the multifaceted nature of the concept. Its validity would be open to question. The independent variables which have been identified are imperfect representations of even these aspects of participation, and are at best proxies for the underlying concepts.

It is also important to note that the causal model which is proposed does not posit a direct relationship between these variables and the outcomes which have been measured. The hypothesis does indeed hold that greater participation should be associated with better and more sustainable programming, and ultimately more favourable outcomes. But there are many intervening variables through which the process is played out, and these are not possible to quantify. These intervening variables, which come in between having one's voice heard and the ability to find a livelihood, are not measured directly. Their effect on the final outcome is not necessarily straightforward, and may well operate in complex functions, and interact with other variables. Causal complexity is the norm, yet we are restricted to making inferences on the basis of what can be reliably measured with validity. The "missing" or intervening variables are apparent in the qualitative data – where the issues of trust, expectations, fulfilment of undertakings, and corruption clearly surface – but they do not appear in the causal model which is described by the quantitative data. Ultimately, the two ways of looking at this social process must be taken together, to describe a whole which is only imperfectly represented by its parts.

The statistical tests include regression, logit, and ordered logit, and also Fisher's exact test. The latter is an alternative to the chi square test, which can be used when the number of observations in each cell falls to five or less. In a small number of examples, where sample sizes were large enough, the chi square test itself was used. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used where the number of days worked in the last month was being compared between discrete groups. The full

anonymised dataset from the survey is available, as well as the log files and do files from the analysis. In this thesis, the probability of a result being solely due to sampling error (the p value) is reported exactly as returned by Stata. In some cases, this is $p=0.000$ or $p=0.0000$. In fact, due to rounding, the figure may not actually be zero. These should be read respectively as $p<0.0005$ and $p<0.00005$.

Disaggregation of data: differences between countries

One of the most significant questions is the degree of disaggregation when analysing the survey. Breaking it up reduces the number of observations, making it harder to identify genuine effects which might be hidden because they are not statistically significant in smaller samples. On the other hand, aggregating data runs the risk of throwing up spurious effects, or diluting real differences, because groups have been placed together which do not share important properties, which could affect how they respond to differences how the programme was implemented. For this reason, the tests have been run on the full survey, covering both Sierra Leone and Liberia, and subsequently for each country individually. The differences between the countries which are statistically significant are shown in Table 5.01 below, with p values for Fisher's exact test.

Variable	Difference between Sierra Leone and Liberia	p (Fisher)
Asked for opinion on disarmament (C1)	Much less likely to be asked opinion in Sierra Leone. (Same direction, but non-significant, when disaggregated for Urban.)	0.045
Asked for opinion on reintegration (D1)	Much less likely to be asked opinion in Sierra Leone.	0.000
Reintegration explained (F1)	Much more likely in Liberia to say reintegration was not explained.	0.003
Enough information (F5)	Much more likely in Liberia to say they did receive enough information.	0.001
information accurate (F6)	Much more likely in Liberia to say information was accurate.	0.000
Gender (A2)	Many more females in Liberia sample (29%) than Sierra Leone (6%).	0.007
Child when demobilised (estimated)	More children at entry to DDR (estimated) in Liberia sample (32%) than Sierra Leone (10%).	0.018
Rank (A7)	More officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in Sierra Leone sample (47%) than Liberia (21%).	0.015
How far in last DDR (B2)	More likely to complete all stages in Sierra Leone (59%) than Liberia (39%).	0.000

Table 5.01: Differences between Sierra Leone and Liberia in survey results.

These differences may account for some of the results in the two-country analysis, and it is for this reason that the tests have been run once more in disaggregated form.

Disaggregation of data: urban-rural difference in Liberia

Significant differences emerged during initial data analysis between the urban and rural sub-samples within Liberia. The Liberian sample was itself therefore disaggregated on the basis of where the interview took place. Those surveyed in the capital, Monrovia ($n=35$) were classified as urban, while others are regarded as rural ($n=60$). The rural sample consists of respondents interviewed in a range of settings, from medium-sized towns to small villages. This breakdown resulted in a smaller sample size for the urban group, where there was also much less variation on some important independent variables. For this reason, most of the tests failed to return any significant differences, when they were analysed separately. The only association found was that those who felt that reintegration had been explained reported that their living conditions were better than those who felt it had not been explained adequately ($p=0.01$, Fisher's exact test). For this reason, the urban sub-sample has been included in the overall analysis of both countries together, but has not been reported in this chapter in its own right. It is however included separately in Appendix A.

The differences between urban and rural respondents in Liberia include the fact that Monrovia residents are much better off economically than their counterparts in rural areas or towns. The number of days that they were employed or self-employed during the last month differs significantly (Urban=26.8 days, Rural =16.5 days, $p=0.000$, analysis of variance). They were much more likely to be in employment ($p=0.000$, Fisher), and were also much more likely to describe their living conditions as being "good" ($p=0.000$, Fisher).

Apart from employment status, the urban sub-sample is significantly different in a number of other regards. One important aspect which may explain some of the differences is that those in the urban group were much less likely to be living in the same community than the one in which they grew up. This is consistent with displacement and migration to the city; the urban dwellers may also have had greater reason to seek a new place rather than return to their original communities. While most interviewees in both countries had relocated, when it came to urban dwellers in Liberia, the vast majority said they had moved from their original community (94%), compared with just over half (59%) for non-urban interviewees ($p=0.000$, Fisher). Even if this disparity does not signify important underlying differences between the groups, its impact

could include relevant outcomes such as work status, perception of living conditions and of the economy, and their sense of how the community (in the city) views ex-combatants.

Urban respondents were also much less likely to have been a child (aged less than 18) when demobilised ($p=0.000$, Fisher), although 38% of the urban sub-sample were in fact children when they were recruited (indicating they had reached 18 by the time they were demobilised). This again would be consistent with the separate programming for children, which attempted to reintegrate them into their original communities and families, whereas adult ex-combatants chose their own location to re-settle. In addition, urban ex-combatants were less likely to have spoken to the community where they re-settled as part of the process, which once more matches the pattern of urban re-settlement in a more anonymous environment ($p=0.000$, Fisher).

The urban ex-combatants were also less likely to have chosen education (17%) rather than vocational training. In comparison, 40% of rural interviewees opted for education ($p=0.000$, Fisher).

Reintegration Option	Urban	Rural	Total
Vocational training	16	35	51
%	45.7%	58.3%	53.7%
Education	6	24	30
%	17.1%	40.0%	31.6%
None	13	1	14
%	37.1%	1.7%	14.7%
Total	35	60	95

Table 5.02: Reintegration options chosen, broken down by urban/rural status.

When it comes to their experience of the programme, urban ex-combatants were less likely to feel that what they said had had any effect on the programme ($p=0.000$, Fisher) or that their views had been listened to ($p=0.004$, Fisher). They were also less likely to feel that those running the programme knew what their needs were ($p=0.004$, Fisher). Since these are important independent variables indicating elements of a participatory approach, the urban and rural sub-samples had to be analysed separately, although this resulted in smaller samples.

Links between participatory indicators and programme outcomes

The overall set of relationships which were detected are set out in the following tables, to give an overview of the measures of association between variables. Each association in the matrix is then discussed individually, broken down by independent variable. It is clear that most of them indicate that greater participation is associated with more positive outcomes in terms of days worked, reported work status, or perceptions of how the community views them. The direction of the causal mechanism is explored on a case-by-case basis. A small proportion of associations, however, show that greater participation (as depicted by the operationalisation of the concept) is in fact linked with poorer outcomes, and these too must be taken into account. In some cases, the relationship is statistically significant, but the direction is unclear, such as when the mid-point of a Likert scale shows a distinct association rather than either end.

Taken as a whole, a total of six independent variables are entirely or mainly linked to more positive outcomes. This contrasts to two which are only linked to more negative outcomes. Two others showed mixed results.

Notes relating to tables showing relationships

- Blank cells: No significant effect observed
- “Fav(ourable)”: Greater participation associated with better programme outcomes
- “Unfav(ourable)”: Greater participation associated with less positive programme outcomes
- Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$
- For control variables, the group with more favourable outcomes is noted
- Tests used
 - I: Individual regression analysis (variable on its own, with control variables)
 - G: Grouped regression analysis (together with all other dependent variables)
 - F: Fisher’s exact test, or in the case of Days Worked, analysis of variance (ANOVA).

The levels of significance shown for Fisher’s exact test are $p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$. For the ordered logit and logit regression, these levels are used along with $p < 0.10$.

		SIERRA LEONE and LIBERIA				
		DEPENDENT VARIABLES				
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Official advice (B3)	I					
	G		Unfav*			
	F	Fav**		Fav***	Fav***	
Asked for opinion (D1)	I					
	G		Fav**			
	F				Unfav***	
Views listened to (E1)	I				Unfav***	
	G		Unfav**			
	F				Unfav***	
Knew your needs (E3)	I					
	G					
	F					
What you said have any effect (E5)	I					
	G		Fav***			
	F		Fav**			Unclear**
Reintegration explained (F1)	I					
	G					
	F		Unfav***			Unfav***
Right language (F3)	I					
	G					
	F	Fav***				
Enough info (F5)	I	Fav***	Fav***			Fav***
	G					
	F	Fav**	Fav***	Fav**		Fav***
Info accurate (F6)	I	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***
	G		Fav**			
	F	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***
Know where to get more info (F7)	F	Fav***	Fav**			Fav**
CONTROL VARIABLES which were significant					Gender	Gender
Group which had better outcomes					Male	Female
Test used		Regress/ANOVA	Ordered Logit/Fisher's exact	Logit/Fisher's exact	Logit/Fisher's exact	Logit/Fisher's exact

Table 5.03: Measures of association for participatory and outcome variables (both countries combined).

At the rather basic level of balancing whether positive or negative outcomes are associated with greater participation, most of relationships are positive. Four out of five of the associations are positive, and this ratio is slightly higher (28:6) when the level of significance is taken as $p < 0.05$. While these ratios are not a definitive test in themselves, they are relevant in terms of an overview of the relationships, and suggest that greater participation is associated with better outcomes, as proposed in this thesis. It also corresponds with the views of ex-combatants spelled out in other chapters.

SIERRA LEONE						
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Test	DEPENDENT VARIABLES				
		Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Official advice (B3)	I	Fav*				
	G					
	F					
Asked for opinion (D1)	I					
	G					
	F					Fav**
Views listened to (E1)	I					
	G					
	F					
Knew your needs (E3)	I					
	G					
	F					
What you said have any effect (E5)	I					
	G					
	F					Fav**
Reintegration explained (F1)	I	Fav**	Fav*			
	G					
	F	Unclear**				
Enough info (F5)	I	Fav***	Fav***	Fav*		
	G					
	F					
Info accurate (F6)	I					
	G					
	F			Fav**		
CONTROL VARIABLES which were significant			Gender*			
Group which had better outcomes			Men			
Test used		Regress/ANOVA	Ordered Logit/ Fisher's exact	Logit/ Fisher's exact	Logit/ Fisher's exact	Logit/ Fisher's exact

Table 5.04: Measures of association for participatory and outcome variables (Sierra Leone).

The picture is much more straightforward when it comes to looking at Sierra Leone on its own, despite the small sample size. All nine definitive relationships are associated with more favourable outcomes. This falls to six at the $p < 0.05$ level. For Liberia (see table below), a ratio

of six out of seven associations are positive (18:3). At the $p<0.05$ level, the ratio of favourable to unfavourable outcomes is even more marked, with 16 positive associations and only one negative one.

LIBERIA (Rural)					
		DEPENDENT VARIABLES			
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)
Official advice (B3)	I			Fav**	Fav**
	G				Fav***
	F	Fav**		Fav***	Fav***
Asked for opinion (D1)	I				Unfav**
	G	Fav**	Fav**		
	F				
Views listened to (E1)	I				
	G				
	F				
Knew your needs (E3)	I				
	G		Unfav*		
	F				
What you said have any effect (E5)	I		Fav*		
	G	Fav**	Fav***		
	F		Fav**		
Reintegration explained (F1)	I				
	G	Unfav*			
	F				
Enough info (F5)	I				
	G				
	F				
Info accurate (F6)	I				
	G	Fav**	Fav*		
	F	Fav**	Fav**	Fav***	Fav***
CONTROL VARIABLES which were significant		Rank*		Child status*	Gender**
Group which had better outcomes		Officers		Children	Men
Test used		Regress/ ANOVA	Ordered Logit/ Fisher's exact	Logit/ Fisher's exact	Logit/ Fisher's exact

Table 5.05: Measures of association for participatory and outcome variables (rural Liberia).

These overviews support the hypothesis that greater participation is associated with better outcomes. The question of possible endogeneity is dealt with later, and each independent variable is now discussed in turn.

Official advice (B3)

Official advice (B3)	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	I					
	G		Unfav*			
	F	Fav**		Fav***	Fav***	
Sierra Leone	I	Fav*				
	G					
	F					
Liberia (Rural)	I			Fav**	Fav**	
	G				Fav***	
	F	Fav**		Fav***	Fav***	

Table 5.06: Measures of association for participatory variables and official advice (B3).

Interviewees were asked whether they had met with an official person who gave them advice about options for reintegration, during the DDR process (Question B3). Those answering “yes” generally fared better in terms of days worked, their work status, and reported community perceptions of ex-combatants. In terms of days worked, those from both countries who said they met with an official worked on average 21.0 days in the last month, compared with 14.6 days for those who did not ($p=0.0118$, ANOVA). The substantive difference was slightly more marked for rural Liberians ($p=0.0155$, ANOVA). The effect was also seen in Sierra Leone, when regression analysis was carried out, along with the standard control variables of gender, rank, and child status at DDR. The p value is 0.059, and the predicted values for days in work (with all other variables held at their means) is 21.7 days for those who said they met with an official, and 8.8 days for those who did not¹⁰.

The effect is seen in the other direction, however, when it comes to respondents’ reported work status. This only shows up at the $p<0.10$ level, for the amalgamated sample of both countries. The predicted values for those saying “yes” are 8.7% in fulltime employment, and 36.0% with no job. In contrast, those replying “no” were predicted to have a 42.1% chance of fulltime employment, and only 6.9% of no work ($p=0.097$, ordered logit). This single negative association for B3 is directly at variance with the other observations, and may point to a

¹⁰ The “predicted values” (“prtab” in the Stata statistical software) predicts the probabilities from the regression model. The probabilities of various outcomes for the particular variable being analysed are predicted, while holding all other variables in the model at their means. It is therefore useful in isolating the effect of the independent variable in question from other possible factors.

problem with sampling, response bias, or the validity of the measures. In effect, it highlights the need to take all these tests as a whole, rather than using an single one as a definitive test of a hypothesis.

When it comes to how ex-combatants feel the community sees them, all seven of the relationships which emerged showed more favourable results for those who said they had met with an official who gave them advice. The significance of the effect is generally at the highest level. For both countries combined, 65% of those saying “yes” also reported positive community perceptions, while the proportions were perfectly reversed for those saying “no”, with 65% not reporting positive views of themselves ($p=0.005$, chi square).

Positive view of ex-combatants	Received official advice		Total
	Yes	No	
Yes	23	22	45
%	35.4	64.7	45.4
No	42	12	54
%	64.6	35.3	54.6
Total	65	34	99

Table 5.07: Receiving official advice and perception that the community has a positive view of ex-combatants.

The pattern is similar, but even more marked, for rural Liberia ($p=0.002$, Fisher’s exact). It also shows up in the logit regression analysis for this group ($p=0.031$). The predicted values for positive community views are 68.6% for those saying “yes”, and only 33.7% for those saying “no” to the question of meeting an official for advice.

The same relationship is seen in terms of reported negative views among the community. It is particularly stark in Liberia ($p=0.000$, Fisher’s exact), where a third of those saying “yes” reported negative views, compared with nine tenths of those who said “no”. When this group is tested using logit regression, the p value is again 0.000, with predicted outcomes of 21.2% seeing negative views for those saying “yes” to B3, and 100.0% for those saying “no”.

The pattern was similar, though not as marked, for both countries together ($p=0.004$, Fisher). Taken together, those who said they had met with an official appear to be doing significantly better both in terms of work and social reintegration.

Being asked for one's opinion about reintegration (D1)

Respondents were asked a “yes/no” question about whether they had ever been asked for their opinion about the way reintegration was being done (D1). Positive associations are seen in relation to days worked, work status, and living conditions, but the relationship is negative when it comes to community views of ex-combatants.

Asked for opinion (D1)	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	<i>I</i>					
	<i>G</i>		Fav**			
	<i>F</i>				Unfav***	
Sierra Leone	<i>I</i>					
	<i>G</i>					
	<i>F</i>					Fav**
Liberia (Rural)	<i>I</i>				Unfav**	
	<i>G</i>	Fav**	Fav**			
	<i>F</i>					

Table 5.08: Measures of association for participatory variables and being asked for one's opinion (D1).

In rural Liberia, regression analysis of days in work in the last month returned a *p* value of 0.023. The predicted values for those whose views had been sought was 20.3 days, compared with 6.0 for those whose views were not sought. For work status, ordered logit regression shows the pattern is similar for both countries and for rural Liberia, with a positive result in both cases (*p*=0.037 for both countries).




Figure 5.01: Predicted probability of work status, according to whether ex-combatants were asked for their opinion (D1).

Respondents' assessment of their own living conditions (on a four-point scale from "excellent" to "terrible") was positively associated with having had one's views sought, in the case of Sierra Leone ($p=0.047$, Fisher's exact). The sample size was small, however, in this case. A majority of those whose views were sought considered their situation to be "good", while most of those whose views were not sought said their living conditions were "terrible".

One association which suggested poorer outcomes for those whose views were sought was community perception. For both countries, ex-combatants whose opinions were asked for were evenly divided when it came to reporting negative community perceptions, but when it came to those whose own views had not been sought during the process, only a fifth reported these negative experiences ($p=0.008$)¹¹. The same unfavourable outcome for this measure of participation was seen in rural Liberia: when tested along with the control variables in a regression analysis, having had one's opinion asked for was linked to more negative community views ($p=0.041$). Besides the matter of amalgamating the two countries' data, it should be borne in mind that this measure is an indirect one, and is produced by combining several responses as described earlier. The qualitative data in the survey and also the focus group discussions point in fact to a positive reaction to having been consulted, and a negative reaction which was even more marked when the ex-combatants felt they were not consulted. Taking all the data on

¹¹ The amalgamation of the two countries for this question may account for the effect, as there is a significant difference between them on this independent variable, with Liberians much more likely to say their opinion was asked ($p=0.000$, Fisher).

community perceptions as a whole, the qualitative measure would appear to have great internal validity and to be more reliable than the scale constructed for the survey data.

Having one's views listened to (E1)

The question of whether one's views were listened to (as opposed to them simply being sought) is consistent among the three associations found. All of them, however, indicate a less favourable outcome for those reporting their views were heard to a greater extent. It is worth noting that all of the statistically significant associations are for the aggregated sample in which both countries were included, but do not arise at the level of either Sierra Leone or Liberia.

Views listened to (E1)	<i>Test</i>	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	<i>I</i>				Unfav***	
	<i>G</i>		Unfav**			
	<i>F</i>				Unfav***	
Sierra Leone	<i>I</i>					
	<i>G</i>					
	<i>F</i>					
Liberia (Rural)	<i>I</i>					
	<i>G</i>					
	<i>F</i>					

Table 5.09: Measures of association for participatory variables and having one's views listened to (E1).

For work status in both countries, 65.4% of those whose views were listened to “a lot” were predicted by the regression to have no job, while 93.5% those whose views were not listened to “at all” were predicted to be in fulltime work ($p=0.011$, ordered logit). The relationship is similarly negative when it comes to community perception ($p=0.003$, logit). This variable is in fact a function of several factors, so it cannot be treated as a one-dimensional measure. At face value, it reflects how the community feels about them; but it is also a measure of how the ex-combatants behave, how well integrated they are socially, and any anti-social problems which may have arisen. Furthermore, it is a function of how the ex-combatants feel about the community, their sensitivity to rejection or perceived stigma, and indeed their feelings about themselves (individually and as a group). This concept is therefore rich and multifaceted, but its complexity makes it less useful as a measure, and something which must be interpreted with

caution. No significant effect is seen in terms of positive community relations. More importantly, the way in which ex-combatants react to the impression of having been listened to (or not) is clearer in the focus group discussions and the open-ended survey questions. It is clearly seen to be something which they appreciated.

Whether one's needs were known (E3)

Only one association was seen in relation to whether ex-combatants felt that people running the programmes knew what their needs were. It was weakly negative ($p=0.076$, logit), in rural Liberia, for work status. The qualitative data in other chapters show that some ex-combatants appear to respond to this question on the basis of whether their particular needs were met. Also, this question was only put to those who did not reply negatively to Question E1 about whether their views had been listened to. These factors render this question a rather indirect assessment of participatory methodology.

Knew your needs (E3)	<i>Test</i>	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	<i>I</i>					
	<i>G</i>					
	<i>F</i>					
Sierra Leone	<i>I</i>					
	<i>G</i>					
	<i>F</i>					
Liberia (Rural)	<i>I</i>					
	<i>G</i>		Unfav*			
	<i>F</i>					

Table 5.10: Measures of association for participatory variables and feeling one's needs are known (E3).

What one said having any effect (E5)

What you said have any effect (E5)	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	I					
	G		Fav***			
	F		Fav**			Unclear**
Sierra Leone	I					
	G					
	F					Fav**
Liberia (Rural)	I		Fav*			
	G	Fav**	Fav***			
	F		Fav**			

Table 5.11: Measures of association for participatory variables and what one said having any effect (E5).

Ex-combatants were asked about having an input into decision making, in an attempt to examine some of the mid-level rungs of the ladder of participation. Question E5 enquired whether anything they said had any effect on how things were done in the programme. The associations with outcomes are all positive, and are mainly in relation to work. For the number of days worked by rural Liberian respondents, regression analysis ($p=0.025$) leads to a prediction of significantly more days worked for those who felt what they said did have an impact Table 5.12 below for predicted days in work per month.

	Predicted number of days in work
Did what you say have any effect? (E5)	
Yes, definitely	38.19 days
A bit, to some extent	24.40 days
Not at all	10.62 days

Table 5.12: Predicted number of days worked and whether what one said had any effect (E5).

For work status in the aggregated tests, the direction of the effect is not entirely clear when it comes to simple tabulation and Fisher's exact test. The result appears closer to a U-shaped curve, rather than consistently favour one end of Likert scale or another ($p=0.022$). This may be because urban and rural ex-combatants from both countries are all taken together. There is also

not much variation on the independent variable (E5), so while the effect is statistically significant, its substantive effect is not entirely clear. The ordered logit analysis, however, is more useful, as it assesses all the independent variables together, so that the effect of E5 on its own can be measured. It is also much clearer in terms of significance ($p=0.004$) and direction. The predicted values for those reporting that what they said definitely had an impact point to much better outcomes for this group, compared with those who felt their comments did not (see Figure 5.02 below):




Figure 5.02: Predicted probability of work status, according to whether what ex-combatants said had any effect (E5).

The effect is similar in rural Liberia, with both types of regression and also Fisher's exact test. It is strongest when tested with other independent variables ($p=0.007$).

One test which was unclear and for which there is little further evidence is the association with reported living conditions (A17). It is statistically significant ($p=0.031$, Fisher) when the responses from both countries are aggregated. While a majority of those whose views did not have any impact "at all" described their situation as "good", there is not much variation on the independent variable. When both countries are tested separately, a positive association emerges: most respondents in Sierra Leone whose views did not have any effect reported that living conditions were "terrible" ($p=0.013$, Fisher).

Reintegration being explained (F1)

Reintegration explained (F1)	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	I					
	G					
	F		Unfav***			Unfav***
Sierra Leone	I	Fav**	Fav*			
	G					
	F	Unclear**				
Liberia (Rural)	I					
	G	Unfav*				
	F					

Table 5.13: Measures of association for participatory variables and whether reintegration was explained (F1).

The evidence is mixed when it comes to respondents' sense of whether reintegration had been explained, which is in a fact a return to the lower rungs of the ladder of participation. In terms of days worked in the last month, the evidence is favourable in Sierra Leone ($p=0.011$, regression) and weakly unfavourable in Liberia ($p=0.081$, regression). In Sierra Leone, the outcome predicted by the regression model is 23.4 days worked for those who felt reintegration had been explained, and only 1.8 for those who said it was not. Those in the mid-point of the scale, who felt it was explained "a bit, to some extent", fell half way between. However, this group in fact worked the most days, according to the simple tabulation and Fisher's test, which does not take account of other variables. The pattern showing a favourable outcome for those reporting better explanations is reversed for the predicted probabilities for rural Liberia, though it is not a strong, and its statistical significance is weaker.

For reported work status, the results are again mixed. The divide is this time between the two-country amalgamation (unfavourable, $p=0.009$, Fisher) and the positive outcome in Sierra Leone ($p=0.070$, regression). The aggregated unfavourable result may be due to the country effect, as those in Sierra Leone were significantly less likely to say there was little explanation, and were also working less. The final comparison was with reported living conditions, where results were again inconsistent between countries. The association appeared to be negative in Sierra Leone, although it was those on the mid-point of the scale who reported they were faring the worst in terms of living conditions ($p=0.000$). In contrast, a positive correlation was seen

between receiving an explanation and current living conditions, in urban Liberia ($p=0.010$, Fisher). This was the only clear association seen for this particular sub-sample.

In general, therefore, the inconsistent results suggest problems with the validity of this survey question as a measure of participation, or with the aggregation of the two countries' data for the purposes of analysis. There is in fact a significant difference between respondents in Sierra Leone and Liberia, with the latter much more likely to say that reintegration was not explained ($p=0.003$, Fisher).

Right language being used (F3)

All the remaining independent variables show more favourable outcomes for respondents indicating they experienced a more participatory approach. On whether the right language was used when reintegration was explained, those who felt that it was also reported many more days' employment ($p=0.0011$, analysis of variance).

Right language (F3)	<i>Test</i>	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	<i>I</i>					
	<i>G</i>					
	<i>F</i>	Fav***				

Table 5.14: Measures of association for participatory variables and whether the right language was used (F3).




Figure 5.03: Mean number of days worked in the last month (excluding those who opted for education), according to whether the right language was used to explain reintegration (F3).

Enough information being provided (F5)

Those saying they had received enough information (using a three-point Likert scale) showed better outcomes on nearly all measures in Sierra Leone, and for both countries together, but not in rural Liberia. The effects of this independent variable, most of which are at the $p < 0.01$ level of significance, were seen terms of more days in employment, better work status, a more positive community view, and better reported living conditions.

Enough information (F5)	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	I	Fav***	Fav***			Fav***
	G					
	F	Fav**	Fav***	Fav**		Fav***
Sierra Leone	I	Fav***	Fav***	Fav*		
	G					
	F					
Liberia (Rural)	I					
	G					
	F					

Table 5.15: Measures of association for participatory variables and whether enough information was provided (F5).

For both countries, the most days in work was in fact reported by those on the mid-point of the Likert scale for whether enough information was received, but the overall trend is still favourable ($p=0.0178$, analysis of variance). When other variables are controlled for using regression analysis, a more straightforward positive association is seen. The predicted number of days in work increases directly in line with the amount of information on reintegration which they said was received ($p=0.004$ for both countries, and $p=0.009$ for Sierra Leone).




Figure 5.04: Predicted values for number of days worked in last month, according to whether enough information was received (F5).

A positive correlation is again seen for the same groups (both countries together, and Sierra Leone) when employment status is considered: more information is linked to greater likelihood of work. The level of significance is high: $p=0.000$ (both countries, Fisher), $p=0.001$ (both countries, ordered logit), and $p=0.005$ (Sierra Leone, ordered logit).

Predicted values (ordered logit), both countries, F5 with control variables:




Figure 5.05: Predicted probability of work status, according to whether enough information was received (F5).

A positive view of ex-combatants was more likely to be reported by those saying they had received enough information. The effect was seen more strongly in the aggregated analysis for both countries ($p=0.028$): two-thirds of those saying they received enough information also reported positive community views, compared with only one out of seven for the others. The effect was also seen in Sierra Leone, but more weakly ($p=0.099$, ordered logit).

Finally, in relation to the amount of information received, living conditions were reported to be markedly better for those with more information when both countries were analysed together ($p=0.000$, ordered logit, and $p=0.000$ Fisher's exact).




Figure 5.06: Predicted probability for living conditions, according to whether enough information was received (F5).

Information being accurate (F6)

Information accurate (F6)	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	I	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***
	G		Fav**			
	F	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***	Fav***
Sierra Leone	I					
	G					
	F			Fav**		
Liberia (Rural)	I					
	G	Fav**	Fav*			
	F	Fav**	Fav**	Fav***	Fav***	

Table 5.16: Measures of association for participatory variables and whether the information was accurate (F6).

Ex-combatants' perception of the accuracy of the information they received is seen repeatedly to be an important factor when assessing participation and their sense of whole DDR project. So it is not surprising to find that it is strongly correlated with better outcomes. When both countries are tested together, it is positively associated with all measures of how they had fared,

and for most measures in the case of rural Liberia. For both these groups, it was strongly associated with more days worked, more secure employment status, and positive community views.

For both countries, those who received more information had more days' employment ($p=0.0001$, Fisher; $p=0.002$, regression). The same pattern was seen in rural Liberia, though with lower statistical significance ($p=0.0276$, Fisher; $p=0.034$, regression).




Figure 5.07: Days worked in the last month (excluding those opting for education), according to accuracy of information received (F6).

Work status was also positively correlated with receiving adequate information for both countries, where the significance was particularly high ($p=0.000$, Fisher; $p=0.000$, ordered logit) and in rural Liberia ($p=0.027$, Fisher; $p=0.058$, ordered logit). The trend is shown in Table 5.17 below:




Figure 5.08: Work status, according to accuracy of information received (F6).

Both positive and negative community views showed an association with information accuracy pointing to more favourable outcomes for this basic measure of participation. For both countries together, and for rural Liberia, this was all at the $p < 0.01$ significance level, and at the $p < 0.05$ level for Sierra Leone.

In the logit regression for both countries ($p = 0.001$) the predicted result for positive community views was almost twice as high for those saying the information was accurate (82% predicted value) as for those who said it was not (42%). For the observed results, the same trend is clear ($p = 0.000$, both Fischer and chi square):




Figure 5.09: Whether a positive view of the community is reported, according to whether the information received was accurate (F6).

The pattern is repeated for ex-combatants' sense of negative community perceptions in the two countries. It is again highly significant ($p=0.000$, Fisher; $p=0.000$, logit). Those who said the information they received was not accurate were more than seven times more likely to report negative community views of themselves.

Knowing where to get more information (F7)

Know where to get more information (F7)	Test	Days worked (A14a) (excl education)	Work status (A15) (excl education)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)	Living conditions (A17)
Both countries	<i>F</i>	Fav***	Fav**			Fav**

Table 5.17: Measures of association for participatory variables and knowing where to get more information (F7).

One final test of association between participatory variables and programme outcomes was whether ex-combatants knew where they might get further information (F7). This was an attempt to assess the extent of the engagement between those being reintegration and the agencies running the programmes. It is again an indirect measure of this phenomenon, so it must be interpreted conservatively rather than taken at face value. There was a positive association with work and living conditions, for both countries. Those who know where to get more

information worked more than twice as many days as who said they did not (22.9 days as opposed to 8.6 days; $p=0.0006$, analysis of variance). They were also much more likely to be in work ($p=0.013$, Fisher). Most of them reported that their living conditions were “good”, the majority of the others described them as “terrible” ($p=0.027$, Fisher).

Endogeneity

In all the relationships listed so far, the question of possible endogeneity must be dealt with. While the results are largely consistent with more participation leading to better outcomes, the data could also be pointing to a causal relationship in the opposite direction. This would apply to subjective assessments which the ex-combatants are asked to make, such as the amount or quality of information they received, or the degree of input to decisions. These perceptions could in theory be coloured by the subsequent experiences: those out of work or unhappy with their circumstances could be more negative in their assessment than those who were doing well. This counterfactual is therefore proposed as a hypothesis: that ex-combatants’ views about reintegration are a result of their current circumstances, leading to a generalised, non-specific negativity about the programme for those are faring badly. Unlike other assessments in this chapter, the hypothesis is one can be tested directly, since the measures used are the actual variables themselves, rather than being proxies.

Of the dependent variables, the most suitable one is reported work status (A15). This is one which would be open to influence, as the respondents were asked to choose one of four options ranging from fulltime employment to not being able to find a job. It is also a more direct measure than the variables for community perceptions (A22), which were created by categorising their responses. The comparison is made using a series of short questions which appeared as group in the survey. They were asked one after the other, and without instructions being given or other issues raised, which might have changed the focus or context. They can therefore be compared with confidence. Respondents were asked in succession if, when being told about reintegration, the right language was used, was the language clear, whether there was enough information, and was it accurate (F3 to F6 respectively). The result shows clearly that they were able to differentiate between the questions asked, and there was no sign of a generalised tendency to see things positively or negatively. Those with no work – the overwhelming majority, in fact – were able to say the language was *clear*, for example. On the other hand, even those in fulltime work were prepared to say the information was not *accurate* – again, a large majority of them. This pattern holds true regardless of whether there is any

disaggregation: it is seen when all respondents are compared, and also when it is broken down by urban status, by country, and by both. No statistically significant association was seen between work status and language (F3) or its clarity (F4). The association was however highly significant when it came to the amount¹² (F5) and accuracy¹³ (F6). The data, therefore, force us to reject the hypothesis that those poor circumstances lead ex-combatants to give a generalised negative account of reintegration.

The pattern is seen quite clearly when the responses of those who reported having no job are displayed in the following bar chart. It is for both countries, with the results shown as percentages, in order to make the proportions clearer. The divergence in their responses is of course statistically significantly ($p=0.000$, Fisher).




Figure 5.10: Responses to four measures of information received on reintegration.

A similar pattern was seen when the responses of those describing their own living conditions as “terrible” were analysed. An overwhelming majority were able to say that the correct language was “definitely” used, and also that it was clear. They were just as emphatic about it not being accurate, however. This shows that they could make either positive or negative assessments depending on the specific question asked, regardless of unhappiness with their personal situation.

¹² F5: all respondents, $p=0.007$; Liberia $p=0.008$; Fisher’s exact test.

¹³ F6: $p=0.000$ for all respondents, for all Liberians, and also for rural Liberians; Fisher.

Control Variables which were significant

A number of control variables emerged as significant, depending on the aggregation and the test. While they do not directly relate to the issue of participation and its effect on the programme outcomes, they are important in themselves. The details are shown in full in Appendix B, and they are summarised in this section. Gender was significant in a number of situations, in relation to work, reported living conditions, and community perceptions. Men had more work than women, when the responses from all countries were tested with the amount of information as the dependent variable ($p=0.022$, regression). The predicted values based on this regression 23.7 days for men and only 17.0 for women. The reported work status was again worse for women in Sierra Leone, when tested with the same variable ($p=0.096$, ordered logit).

When tested with question F1 as the dependent variable, gender is again significant for both countries in terms of reported living conditions ($p=0.005$, ordered logit). The direction this time sees women as faring better. The predicted values show them as far more likely than men to describe their situation as “excellent”, while men are much more likely to say it is “terrible”. But when it comes to negative perceptions about ex-combatants among the community, such as fear or mistrust, this is much more likely to be reported by women. This is consistent with greater levels of stigma among the community, for a variety of reasons. It is seen when tested together with a number of other variables, in some cases at $p<0.01$, for both countries and in rural Liberia.

Rank is seen as significant in rural Liberia for employment, when tested with question E5 (about ex-combatants’ comments having an impact on the programme). However the effect was not highly significant ($p=0.081$, regression). Officers were in a better situation, with predicted values of 28.5 days in work in the last month, compared with 16.9 days for ordinary ex-combatants. Child status was significant for community attitude, showing a more positive experience in rural Liberia in the same test. The significance again is not considerable ($p=0.091$).

Conclusions

The results of this statistical analysis must be seen as a whole, rather than a discrete series of definitive tests (which would in fact be at best inconclusive, and perhaps even contradictory). They must also be considered together with the qualitative data in other chapters, which reveal

something of the complex nature of the relationship between participation and other factors. The qualifications already detailed about sampling methodology, sample size, aggregation, and operationalisation are of course integral to forming an overall view.

Taken as a whole, the data point to a positive relationship between greater participation and more favourable outcomes for the ex-combatants in terms of work, community perception, and living conditions. This is despite some contradictory evidence. Some of the negative outcomes may be due to operationalisation of the variable and aggregation of both countries' data, and they are in case far out-numbered by positive associations. They cannot however be dismissed entirely, but must be seen as a part of the larger and imperfect attempt to explore the causal process.

At the 0.10 level of significance, all ten of the independent variables (which are indirect measures of participation) show an association with the dependent variables, which indicate how ex-combatants are faring. The relationships are shown in Table 5.18 below. For half of these independent variables, the influence is entirely favourable for the ex-combatants. Some others are mainly favourable, or mixed, while two show only unfavourable outcomes in association with greater participation. In this last category, one of the two variables shows only one such unfavourable association, which is weak. While the evidence is not unequivocal, the bulk of it is consistent with the proposition that greater participation leads to better outcomes for ex-combatants. Some of the inconsistencies and negative associations may in fact arise from the fact that only the lower rungs of the ladder have been measured in the survey, as the higher ones cannot easily be operationalised and were dealt with in the qualitative data (where there was in fact little sign of participation at this level). It is possible therefore that the existence of more participatory methods at the lower rungs which shows up in the survey (such as receiving information or being listened to) is in fact overshadowed by *less* participation when it comes to more important aspects of participation higher up, such as shared decision-making.

Type of association between participatory variables and outcome indicators				
Independent variables				
All favourable	Mainly favourable	Mixed	Mainly unfavourable	All unfavourable
What you said have any effect (E5)	Official advice (B3)	Asked for opinion (D1)		Views listened to (E1)
Right language (F3)		Reintegration explained (F1)		Knew your needs (E3)
Enough information (F5)				
Info accurate (F6)				
Know where to get more information (F7)				

Table 5.18: Types of association between participatory variables and outcome indicators.

The qualifications mean that the results from these limited samples are not fully generalisable to the whole population of ex-combatants, but they inform the qualitative data. They are consistent with a complex causal relationship, involving interactions and intervening variables which are not seen in this model. Evidence from qualitative data further suggest that these complexities include the way in which loss of trust or faith in the process has an impact, and also the sense of ownership (which has not been measured here even indirectly). The desire to run a useful programme which is seen in the open-ended questions in the same survey (when respondents were asked how they were run a reintegration programme if placed in charge of one) matches ex-combatants' willingness seen in the quantitative data to give credit for those occasions where the information was seen to have been adequate, or where consultation did take place.

While the data may not be regarded as conclusive when it comes to causal inference, the weight of evidence is in favour of participation having a positive impact. The effect may in fact be clearer when it comes to the higher rungs on the ladder, since only the lower ones could be operationalised with any confidence, given the multifaceted nature of participation. One of the most important understandings to emerge is in fact the very complexity of the causal processes at work during reintegration.

Chapter 6:

Effects of participation – qualitative measures

Some of us, if we were not smart, we were not going to get anything from the process.

Participant 5, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

You have been trained, [but] there is nothing to show like a certificate. I think they just came to fool us in the bush.

Participant 3, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

Introduction and justification

This chapter looks at some of the outcomes of the reintegration programmes, from the point of view of participatory methodologies for planning and implementing such work. The point of reference remains the ladder of participation, as outlined in previous chapters. The aim is to see what these processes and outcomes tell us about participation, and how the concepts may interact. It is not an assessment of DDR as such, on the basis of these outcomes, as that is not the purpose of the study. Such assessments are a considerable undertaking, and have been made by a number of authors, albeit with differing conclusions, and an imperfect replication would serve no purpose. The well-being of ex-combatants who took part in DDR, as opposed to those who did not, is something which can be measured using many different dimensions, such as livelihoods, employment status, degree of integration into the community (which may or may not be an entirely new location, for various reasons), their perception of community suspicion or acceptance, and who they spend their free time with. The point in time at which the assessment is made is also relevant, as the process will have its own trajectory for each individual, raising questions of sustainability, and also of the time required for new arrangements to mature. The multi-dimensionality of programme assessment means therefore that attempting to undertake it in passing, while conducting another study, is not only a duplication of others' work, it risks coming up with superficial or spurious results.

While the link between programme outcomes and participatory approaches is explored, it is the process of reintegration itself which is the focus of this study. So, better outcomes cannot be taken as a simple proxy for participation because many other variables are in play. The *way* in which a result is reached matters, as well as the result itself. The effectiveness of the programme – or its shortcomings – are therefore not a measure of participatory planning. Rather than trying to assess the programme outcomes comprehensively, this chapter looks at the nature of stakeholders' satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and the relationship between this and participatory approaches. Indeed, if all ex-combatants were happy with economic reintegration, this would in fact raise serious questions about DDR's role in supporting peacebuilding, as this would leave them far better off than their surrounding communities, possibly promoting resentment and undermining reconciliation.

Programme outcomes

The process and outcomes of reintegration are in this study considered in relation to participation, which in this particular context mainly amounts to communication, consultation, input to decision-making, and ownership. Many of the problems identified by ex-combatants have already been mentioned, as they came up when questions of communication or decision-making were covered in earlier chapters. Here, we look at these problems in their own right in relation to participation, and explore the themes identified by ex-combatants as being important, such as the quality of training, duration of educational support, payment stipends, and livelihood issues. To give an idea of the ex-combatants accessed in the survey, just over half of the respondents opted for vocational training; a little over a quarter selected education; the remaining 15% ended up not going for either option.

Reintegration Option	Number	Percentage
Vocational training	70	56.9%
Education	34	27.6%
None	19	15.4%
Total	123	100.0%

Table 6.1: Reintegration options selected by survey respondent.

Looking at all respondents in the survey, only half indicated that they completed vocational training. Some of those of course had opted for education, or ended up not taking up any

reintegration option. When these are excluded, two-third of the ex-combatants who selected vocational training completed it.

Completed training (Q B5), of those choosing vocational training	Number	Percentage
Yes	43	67.2%
No	20	31.2%
Didn't start training	1	1.6%
Total	64	100.0%

Table 6.2: Whether training was completed (out of those who opted for vocational training).

School and education

A range of topics was raised by those who opted for education. In general, fewer problems were raised by those in education, compared with vocational training. One of the most common was scholarships ending earlier than they expected, or than they felt was justified, given the length of the war, the movement of population, and disruption to education in general over those years.

School and education	Number of references	Number of groups in which it was mentioned
Problems in general	13	4
School (non reintegration issues)	12	6
Scholarship ending	7	3
Paperwork or certificates	3	3
Providing scholarships in general	2	2
Usefulness or adequacy	1	1

Table 6.3: References to difficulties in school (focus groups).

The consequences of scholarships ending and fees going unpaid lead to a difficult situation at Cuttington University, a long-established private college in Gbarnga, Liberia. The students were pressing the government to extend their scholarships after the DDRR programme ended, so they could complete their degrees, while the college sought assurances that the fees would eventually

be paid. Several participants spoke of the embarrassment or shame felt when those whose fees were still outstanding were excluded from the book of graduates, and shown instead on loose sheets inserted in the book at the graduation ceremony:

It happened last year that our friends and some of our brothers ... received some bad feeling and they could have take it out of issue, their names were not placed in the souvenir [booklet of graduates]. Their parents came and their names were [on] flysheets [loose sheets rather than the book], you see that's a disgrace that this [reintegration] component brought to us. So actually the policy was made, I mean, the programme was designed to disgrace these Liberians, to disgrace us, to send us back in the bush. It was not really made to help us, and to regain our value.

Participant 4, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

In Sierra Leone too, a number of participants complained about the support for education running out before their schooling was completed:

So they told me they can only be responsible for my schooling for three years. But during my attendance, they were only responsible for a year. The balance two years I received nothing from them. Since then I have undergone constraints until I am now in the secondary level.

Participant 3, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

Stipends

Complaints about delays and shortcomings in the payment of stipends during vocational training were a recurring theme in the focus groups. It is significant that while many complaints centred on incomplete payment, the amount or adequacy of what was due to them not raised. This indicates that the problems which ex-combatants saw in the programme were not simply a desire to maximise their benefits; it was about receiving what they believed was due to them. If their views were based only on wanting to receive as much as possible from the programme, then the adequacy of the full amount would have featured among the grievances. When the coding frame for the transcripts was being developed, a category for adequacy of payments was created in anticipation of such complaints, but in fact none of these arose.

Stipends	Number of references	Number of groups in which it was mentioned
Non-payment or different to stated amount	23	7
Non-ex-combatants receiving benefits	5	4
Amount or adequacy	0	0
<i>Categories within "non payment"</i>		
<i>Early cessation or no final payments</i>	5	
<i>Complete non-payment</i>	3	
<i>Delays in payment</i>	3	
<i>Reduced stipend</i>	1	

Table 6.4: References to problems with stipends (focus groups).

The most common specific complaint was that payments stopped before the training course ended. This suggests that the cause of the problem may have been cash flow, funding shortfalls, or administrative difficulties. It may even have involved mismanagement or misappropriation of resources. Whichever causes were at play, they relate to programme implementation, rather than the initial communication about what benefits the ex-combatants were entitled to. The impact, however, was to change the perception of both the programme implementation and also the initial “promises” made to them as they disarmed; the whole programme and its credibility was tarnished by these particular shortcomings.

It was difficult because we had problems on the way for our allowances. And we had been training for our 60,000 [Leones per month] allowance, only to find out that we had not been receiving it. The resident minister, who is Foday Sesay, can bear us witness, because he was the one stepping in to ensure they could have their allowances. Some of us – in the camp where we were trained – especially myself, I received allowances for four months. The remaining two months were not paid.

Participant 1, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

Others in the same group made clear they felt it was a generalised problem:

Participant 3: If you are supposed to have an allowance for six months...

Participant 2 (completing sentence of other contributor): They will reduce it to three or four months.

Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

Some ex-combatants had long and tortuous accounts of efforts made to secure missing payments, of new arrangements being made (sometimes by the UNDP in place of the original implementing NGO), or even of officials promising payments and then leaving town. The bottom line is that frustration, weariness, mistrust, conflict, and sometimes anger were clearly experienced during this process. It was too much for one combatant:

For the money, I was able to collect for four months. Those were the only money I was paid. Problems were seen for the balance money and I eschew palaver [in this context, reject empty talk]. Therefore I had to forgo my remaining benefits.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group G, Makeni, Sierra Leone

The problem caused by delays in payment was also explained in terms of opportunity cost: while taking part in training, but not being paid, it wasn't possible to pursue other income-generating work. It resulted in this participant leaving the training course:

There is farm land to be farmed, and you have to do this learning for up to two or three months before you would be given (your) allowances. Where will you be, when you will be struggling without any money in your hand? [Others laugh] So that means I have to quit.

Participant 14, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

In some accounts, it was a question of complete non-payment. One such experience relates to a participant who said he joined a project after he had returned to school, suggesting it may have been a private, follow-up initiative after the formal reintegration programme:

The man who came to ask that question is called Uncle [name], he was the coordinator for the programme here. He came and took my name. I worked for ... nine good months. I was serving as classroom president, but pastry and carpentry, that's what I specialised in ... [T]he people came with our money and tool kits, but they told me that my name was not on the paper. I didn't receive my tool kit, I didn't get money, I didn't get my certificate.

Participant 1, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

In at least one case, the payments did continue, but at a reduced rate:

I sat there for six months, and I was doing carpentry. Out of the six months, the \$30 a month was not really coming, sometimes we received 25, sometimes 20.

Participant 2, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

In some cases, the link was clearly made between non-payment of stipends, and the fact that these benefits were going instead to family members of commanders or those implementing the programme who were not ex-combatants. Again, the focus was the non-delivery of what had been promised, and not simply the adequacy of the programme or payment.

Training

The accounts of those who underwent vocational training include a range of negative experiences. These experiences are linked to both their attitude to the programme as a whole, and also to their livelihood status. The issues raised can be categorised into those arising during the training, such as its usefulness or the way it was carried out, and also those on completion, such as start-up toolkits or certificates.




Figure 6.1: Interactions between livelihood, attitude to DDR, and experience of training.

While many of the references point to negative aspects, it would be misleading to suggest that the experience was largely an unfortunate one or a missed opportunity. Most did benefit to some extent at least from training or education, and many refer to it being a chance to become self-reliant and a part of the community.

They asked us, and our view was, after the training, they should give us something so that we could be able to do something for ourselves. With that, you know, we will not be thinking about guns.

Participant 3, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

It is not that there was no benefit from the training; the fact is that many ex-combatants were keen to see the programme restarted, when asked about how it might be run in a more participatory way. Rather, the point is that some of those possible gains for the individual and the community failed to materialise (or were even reversed) because of negative associations, loss of trust, and disappointments. The topics mentioned – not all of which were actual complaints – are enumerated below.

Training	Number of references	Number of groups in which it was mentioned
Problems in general	67	10
Start up toolkits (on completion of training)	30	8
Usefulness or adequacy	28	8
Paperwork or certificates on completion	27	9
Training NGOs	21	5
Duration	20	7
Trainers	11	4
Tools or resources during training	4	3
Training choice not available	6	5
Lack of workshop to start business (post training)	9	4

Table 6.5: References to problems with training (focus groups).

Problems during training

Adequacy and duration

The problems listed by ex-combatants can be roughly divided into those arising during the training, and after. The adequacy or usefulness of the training was questioned in the focus

groups on many levels, including the training itself and also the duration. It left an impression that they were not able to carry out the trade they were supposed to have learned:

[M]ost of our brothers were trained a half-way. Some did construction, and they are going around damaging people's houses. They just go and travel, level, and they go to construct people's houses and damage them, at last [in the end] they disqualify them. So we see some of them around, even to [in] my area, you see some of them there. In getting people so, and training people, you should train them to equip them in a way when they should go, they should be qualified to do the job.

Participant 5, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

One of the most significant complaints in terms of the training itself was that the course was too short. Sometimes this was because the person did not receive the full training as planned, but even courses which ran for their planned duration. The link between duration and the ability to do the job afterwards was made repeatedly, and was seen as essential to the quality of the course. This participant chose to train as a plumber:

[T]hat trade is a trade of year-plus. The time allotted for the training was very short, I did not get the duty [skill] of plumbing that I can stand to argue with anybody about plumbing. It was just something done on the face [surface], and later they say, "you can go, if you have interest in the course, you can advance yourself".

Participant 4, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

Another participant later on in the same group make a similar point. He was agreeing with those immediately before him who had emphasised the importance of fulfilling promises about the training, if they were asked to run a DDR programme:

Just to buttress what my colleague has said, if this cycle is coming back, I would suggest that people extend the time, bring qualified instructors because, when we learn this trade, it is the trade we will live by in the community to be good citizens.

Participant 1, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

And if you just give me three months' training and tell me "go", where am I going? I don't know how to engage people for jobs [find work]. So, I end up carrying that machine [start up toolkit], packing up my house, I don't know how to go about to establish ... [If running a programme I would] empower you, I monitor you three times a month, instead of just graduating people and letting them to go.

Participant 5, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

One participant in Sierra Leone, who had earlier made the point that “we are not RUF” (Participant 2, Focus Group A) but had been responding to the call to join the CDF to defend his community, was angry at the way the whole programme went despite their cooperation in handing in arms. That included delays in starting the training, and its duration. He said the course for an electrician should take three years, but his training lasted six months. Because this would have left him as “a quack”, he has had to pursue his training privately since DDR. The understanding shared by the contributors was clearly that they would be qualified and able to pursue their trade on completion of training, and there was disappointment when they felt they were not properly trained for the job. A former RUF member in another group underlined the question of duration:

DDR was a fine programme that came after the war, by taking the guns from our hands and giving us small packages – 300,000 Leones. After that was training, which some completed and others didn’t. But we have problems with this training which we did. If any ex-combatant is to get a trade he will be termed as a quack DDR trainee. The [results] are not appreciated by the people. All this is because the time was too short for the training. So if any ex-combatant is to search for a job – let me say, a mechanic – he will be looked at as lacking proper training because of the tag: “This is a DDR trainee”.

Participant 1, Focus Group C, Bo, Sierra Leone

Another participant in the same group, who was originally from Kenema said he was forced to join up during the war, had just three months’ training. The sense of being left labelled as only partly trained seems to add to the sense of marginalisation and stigma which some perceive:

The training I did was insufficient. Like, the tailor training I given was just for three months, whereas others [non ex-combatants?] would have it for one year and some months. Even the [sewing] machines, they did not give us one. We were starved to the extent of being unskilled, but at the end of the day, they will call us “NCDDR trainees”, these tailors.

Participant 9, Focus Group C, Bo, Sierra Leone

Some participants said they did benefit from the training, because they had been studying the trade before becoming involved in the war. However, many participants reported that the training courses were too short, did not meet their needs, or did not equip them to work in their new role.

Implementing NGOS and trainers

The trainers and implementing NGOs came in for criticism from some, in terms of lack of capacity, motivation, or honesty. For this participant, the trainers he experienced were deficient:

[Y]ou find out that the man who is [giving the] training is not even trained. The man who is training is not trained. ... So, unqualified people really took part in the process. UNDP funding programme did not achieve its goals, because you fund [a] programme that did not achieve anything. You never even evaluate [the] organisations that went, that you gave them contract to go and train.

Participant 5, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

In the survey too, the standard and duration of training were recurrent themes in the open-ended questions, when participants were asked what they would do to make people feel included in the process if they were running a programme (Question J1)¹⁴. A recurring theme was to standardise the training, and to employ qualified trainers for the job, reflecting a clear belief that unqualified staff had been doing the job:

Do what you say, improve training and education, extend training and education time.

I will ... recruit qualified trainers.

Make training standard, provide qualified teachers and staff, extend training time.

Selected individual responses to Question J1 in survey

Similar themes came up in response to Question J3, when they were asked what they would avoid doing. The duration of training was once more a concern which came up many times, and this was closely linked to ideas of fairness and false promises:

Avoid short duration of training.

People were not fair, programme time was short.

Short duration of program, false promises.

Selected individual responses to Question J3 in survey

¹⁴ The subsequent categorisation of these responses, and the numbers of responses in each category, are described in detail in Chapter 3.

When asked how or why the suggestions for what they would do would help, the most frequently motioned reason by far was that it would lead to better training or programming (Question J2). The notion of self-reliance and gaining new skills emerged, indicating that this was not about prolonging a programme for the sake of the stipend paid during it. It suggests that it goes to the heart of their self-confidence and ability to find a new role as a useful member of society, possibly in the face of stigma, guilt, or trauma:

Give people the courage to learn and be skilful.

Because it will make the former combatants productive citizens.

It would ensure self-reliance.

It will empower people to be independent.

Selected individual responses to Question J2 in survey

As it happens, the immediate post-war environment was of course a difficult one, with major disruption to civil society, a shortage of local groups or institutions which could deliver training, and even a lack of physical infrastructure where courses could be held. The practice in Liberia of bringing in NGOs from Sierra Leone which had previously been involved in that country's reintegration programme also created problems, with criticism that it was a rapidly-implemented "cut and paste" operation which did not take account of Liberia's particular situation. Naturally, many of these difficulties are related the resources made available for DDR. However, participants felt that their views, needs, and the level of training required to be able to work were not taken into account. From their perspective, the programme therefore did not seem to have taken on board local knowledge of needs which would have been available to planners. This is one of the most basic objectives of participatory planning.

Problems after training

Toolkits

Other problems arose on completion of the training. One of these was the failure to provide some with start-up toolkits, such as sewing machine or set of tools, which were given to ex-combatants to help them start up their trade. The conception shows that DDR planners were not simply "buying" the ex-combatants' cooperation or keeping them busy, but intended to help them establish themselves sustainably in a trade. However, in those cases where the toolkit was not provided, this fed back into the sense of resentment and broken promises. Participatory

consultation is based on the exchange of accurate information, and these instances were seen as another discrepancy between what they had been told about as part of the “deal”, and the reality. Examples include part of the of the kit being missing or misappropriated, or several trainees being provided with just one toolkit between them.

Make a survey from the day the DDRR process ended to [the] present. Half of the boys that are in jail, they are all ex-combatants that underwent the so-called vocational programme. How will you train some one for six months and just tell him, say, this is your machine, one, two, three, four [indicating four people]. One sewing machine, what [do] you expect those four guys to [do], four men should use one machine? In case I have my contract [job], and the other man has his contract, who uses the machine first? At the end of the day, we will sell the machine and share the money, and go on and do our own thing.

Participant 4, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

A former commander in the CDF in Sierra Leone, recalled all they had been told when they went to disarm, how they later had to ask a clergyman to intervene to have their allowances paid, before finding out there were not enough toolkits to go around.

The tools which came, they would pair us up: six people to two kits. Six people. When each man should have a toolkit. Especially when we were the first ex-combatant in Bo to enter the training institution.

Participant 1, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

He was deeply disillusioned with the entire DDR process, and felt cheated, but had decided to put it behind him and not think about it. A participant in another group said he did not complete his training because of the tools were not adequate.

As for me, I didn't ended [complete] the programme because, due to the tool kits given. The tools kits was not really something for carpentry. You need tools to do the work, but the box was empty. They took all the tools out. That's what I experienced there.

Participant 2, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

For some, it was a case of part of the kit being missing, and for others there was nothing:

I did tailoring. I completed my tailoring, but I was not given a sewing machine.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

Again, the comparison was often drawn with what had been promised to them, and how that discrepancy left them feeling.

Well, they [the organisers] promised to do a lot of things, like our benefits, which we only received parts of them. Even our tools we were talking about, some of us that underwent carpentry training could not lay hand on start-off kits.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group F, Kenema, Sierra Leone

A number of participants referred to commitments having been given that a workshop would be established after training, where they could set themselves up in business. In their accounts of what they were told, and of how they might run things themselves if organising a DDR programme, this involved support and mentoring of some kind, and would help with their reintegration into the community on a number of levels. Despite the sometimes chaotic nature of civil war, many of the ex-combatants had been living and working in hierarchies, often at a highly formative age, and some could probably be said to be institutionalised as well as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. It was not just seen as an economic opportunity; the supportive element of the proposed workshops seems to have been an important part of the prospect too, amid the chaotic world in which many felt marginalised and without a defined or respected role. This participant spoke about not being trusted by the community, and how trust could be built by being seen as productive and responsible in a work setting:

So they say, since it's like this, after graduation, we are going to find [an] area for you, like a [work]shop [placement], to guard you so that you will not be floating in the community again to remember the bad things that we were doing.

Participant 4, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

The references to commitments having been made were all in Liberia. The idea however also surfaced in Sierra Leone, when the ex-combatants were asked how they would make people feel included if they were organising a reintegration programme.

Like the past programme, I would give them training, and – of much importance – after the training, not just leaving them like to go away, if it is a workshop for those who do carpentry, I would make the workshop for them. I would make sure every skill training has a workshop in groups working together. This person (for example) has its own group.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group C, Bo, Sierra Leone

Certification

The failure to provide certificates on completion of training came up frequently in the focus groups. It points to a real desire to be able to show something for their training, and a genuine disappointment when it was not provided. It suggests an important connection with the underlying processes, which amount to more than just the immediate benefits and livelihood. These include the transition to a new identity, recognition or affirmation of that new identity, being able to take up a new and useful role in the community, the self-esteem associated with their place in the community, and stigma. These processes are complex, and the disappointment at not receiving a certificate interacts with their general sense of ownership or inclusion in the programme, as determined by the degree to which a participatory approach was taken.

The reputation for graduates of reintegration training was not always good, and it is not a compliment to be associated with the driving programme, for example:

Participant 3: In fact, see those drivers who were not well-trained and have been responsible for accidents, people say “Look at the DDR drivers”. These were villagers who came out for disarmament, they said they wanted something else which they were not given, and rather were forced to do driving, they had to take driving. And you know what, after you would have collected your two months’ 60,000 [Leones stipend], it would not have even reached the full period, and you now go for the [driving] licence, it would be given to you, without even going through any test.

Participant 2: Just to go and cause damage [Laughter].

Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

The epithet does not just apply to driving, and was mentioned in a different focus group:

The courses were run for a *very short* time... and this has resulted in many “quack” workers... whom society will label “these unskilled DDR workers”.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

This was more than a matter of ongoing mistrust of ex-combatants (although that was indeed part of the problem): it was clear that some ex-combatants themselves lack confidence in their own ability to carry out a job. They were aware of the stigma still attached to ex-combatants, and the reputation they had for not being well trained or good workers. They were also aware of how relations with the community would be affected if they undertook some work, such as repairing a building, and ended up causing damage instead:

Yes, for me, I suggest that if they are to bring the cycle back [re-run DDR], they should make it standard that if you say this man is a graduate, he should be capable of doing his work, in that he should have the required material – that is, the tools. But if you don't make the training to be standard, and the man only do the introductory part, then he will come about to spoil people's things. He himself will [be] afraid to take somebody's job, that's happening to us. So, they just went around telling people that "this man is trained, he is capable and they are people with skills", which of course is not the case. The materials [tools] they even talk about is not proper.

Participant 4, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

His point was echoed by another person in the same group, who returned to education after vocational training as he didn't feel able to carry on the trade for which he was trained:

Yes, as for the training we did, we found out that we couldn't go no longer within it [the trade], because I can't take some one's job, sign for it, and I don't know the job. Maybe if I am to spoil the job, I don't know what you will do to me. So we decided that we should forget about the course, and go to school. I think that's the only way out, and that's why we have been there, we have been fighting by all means to pay our fees, to keep ourselves in school.

Participant 2, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

In other contexts, the lack of implementable skills was given as the reason why some ex-combatants sold their tool kits after training. The poor level of training provided, which left many without the skills or confidence to search for work, can be seen as a consequence of not taking on board people's needs. The ex-combatants' understandable preoccupation with being able to earn a living in the community without provoking further resentment shows, however, that their concerns about training are not in any way limited to a desire to maximise benefits, or simply to find a viable livelihood. They are in fact fundamental to issues of identity, self-esteem, usefulness in society, and how they see themselves in relation to the rest of the community. These questions are highly significant in terms of social reintegration, recovery from trauma, guilt over abuses during the war, and acceptance by and reconciliation with the community. These are parts of the peacebuilding and recovery process which DDR is supposed to facilitate, if it is the holistic and integrated programme which its planners aspire. Boersch-Supan (2009) notes the way in which employment within the community is an important part of the process of reconciliation, as well addressing one of the enabling factors for the war. She also notes the way in which the subtle discrimination against ex-combatants is a discreet form of punishment by the community, and the quiet acceptance of this by the ex-combatants is a form of repentance.

[D]iscrimination serves as a form of subtle punishment. It expresses mundane, local justice within a society that for the most part is overwhelmed by the request to “forgive and forget” and needs pathways for venting feelings about the past. In this interpretation, the reaction of former combatants who for the most part quietly accept discriminating acts is seen as a subtle form of repentance.

Boersch-Supan, (2009: p 44)

There are in fact repeated references in the focus groups to the overall well-being of the community, the future of the country, and their role in that future. This goes beyond any adopted narrative or internalised norm to which they may have been exposed during demobilisation. Many of the combatants were forcibly recruited, after all. There are references to playing a productive role and trying to build trust, in order to move on from the past, and avoiding behaviour which makes the community fearful of them. The self-awareness in terms of community relations shows that ex-combatants are not simply assessing programmes on the basis of the degree to which their own needs were met (although this is a salient feature). It shows that there is an openness to seeing things from a community-oriented perspective, and that ex-combatants are ready to play a role in taking ownership and participating, and seeing a group perspective beyond their individual needs, where this is allowed. These people may of course only be a minority of ex-combatants, and others who remain focussed solely on improving their own situation may make it difficult to engage with the entire population of ex-combatants. But it cannot be said that none of them was willing to play a constructive role as participating citizens.

A small number also referred to the effect of trauma, the need for counselling and support to deal with this, and how the trauma might affect their relations with the community. This again indicates self-awareness, although many of the references highlighted the lack of psycho-social support in the brief time spent in demobilisation.

Some of the ex-combatants' complaints about reintegration can be seen in certain quarters as a sign of dependency or an inflated notion of entitlement. This view is sometimes expressed by community members who see the programme as giving unjustified privileges to their former tormentors, while the rest of the community is left to fend for itself. In this context, it is worth highlighting the widely-occurring phenomenon of motorbike taxis in both Sierra Leone (where they are known as *okadas*) and Liberia. Many of these self-employed taxi drivers are ex-combatants, who hire or buy a motorbike and carry passengers in cities and towns. Their desire to get ahead with creating a livelihood is clearly seen in this self-organised activity, which arose

only after the war. Interestingly, these schemes were not part of the reintegration programme, but are an example of enterprising initiative created by small groups and individuals, which has successfully generated a livelihood and a place in the community.

Corruption

Why corruption is relevant

Corruption is not generally mentioned in the literature on participation, yet it is relevant to this study. Raising the topic does not in fact lend support to any of the discourse about corruption which forms part of another agenda, or which implies that it is only found in developing countries. Corruption is relevant to this study because it recurs continually in the focus groups, survey, and interviews, as a topic which is brought up spontaneously by participants when the integrity, honesty, or effectiveness of the programme is being discussed. It is also relevant as both the reality and the perception of corruption and poor governance fundamentally undermine the social contract which is at the heart of DDR, and of any participatory approach. A number of the principles on which participation is based are directly affected by corruption and misappropriation, or even on mismanagement. These include: (1) that the interests of the beneficiaries rather than just the donors or those implementing the programme are addressed; (2) honest communication in both directions; and (3) shared decision-making, to whatever extent. These essential aspects are negated when the interests or voice of another group – those mismanaging the programme or diverting resources – replace the perspective of the beneficiaries. Corruption and diversion of resources are also fundamentally at variance with even the lower rungs of the ladder of participation, relating to the sharing of accurate information about how the programme is to proceed. It is particularly problematic when its influence is hidden or unstated, as it supplants any attempts at open dialogue and consultation carried out in good faith.

Finally, while participation is ultimately about addressing asymmetrical power relationships and attempting to frame them in a way which makes them more amenable to being challenged, corruption and the diversion of benefits intended for ex-combatants is a function of a power imbalance, manifested in a way which avoids even the pretence of consultation or accountability. Power relationships are particularly difficult to challenge when they are hidden in this way; they are not open to any kind of scrutiny until their existence has been established. Having said this, it must be acknowledged that references to corruption and poor governance

can sometimes be seen as a hidden attempt to advance other arguments such as a neo-colonial questioning of countries' capacity to manage their own affairs. This, however, is a very different use of the concept, which does not apply here. Citing mismanagement in the context of participation does not in itself lend credence to such arguments, especially when the issue has been raised spontaneously by the supposed beneficiaries themselves. Corruption and poor governance have been identified as factors in creating the environment for war, if not one its direct causes, in both Sierra Leone and Liberia (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004a; de Koning 2008; Ellis 2007). The final peace agreements of both countries mention the avoidance of corruption as a goal.

The evidence of corruption cited in this chapter is largely based on the views and perceptions of ex-combatants. While these views have an impact on the process, regardless of their veracity, it is worth assessing whether they might simply be groundless suspicions. There is in fact further evidence from both countries of corruption, which is cited here to disprove the hypothesis that the ex-combatants' perceptions have no basis in reality. One of the most detailed accounts is the Human Rights Watch report (2005) on the experience of young combatants, which addressed the risk of them being re-recruited following incomplete reintegration. The role of their commanders was highlighted, whose control over their weapons was a key factor in whether the young fighters could enter the DDR programme:

Many of those interviewed discussed the low-level corruption pervasive in the DDR/ DDRR processes in Sierra Leone and Liberia, focusing in particular on the corrupt behavior of former commanders. The commanders exercised undue control over the DDR / DDRR processes by manipulating the combatant's enrollment in and access to program benefits. This type of corruption which involved the fraud, embezzlement, diversion or misuse of disarmament benefits was not always immediately visible and evident, and was not directly addressed by those individuals responsible for managing either program.

Human Rights Watch (2005: p 50)

The evidence is not confined to the ex-combatants' accounts. One former commander is quoted as admitting that he provided arms to allow 12 non-combatants to enter DDR, in order to assist them, and in return for a percentage of their benefits (2005: p 54). The report also quotes a UNDP description of improved controls in Liberia, following the experiences of the Sierra Leonean programme. Internal documents, including one memo from UNMIL, are also quoted directly, highlighting the problem of commanders appropriating benefits or corruption by local officials in Liberia. In a separate report published jointly by UNICEF and government ministry in Sierra Leone, the problem is noted once more:

Corruption continues to impede development, causing ineffectiveness in the implementation of development plans. Rampant corruption also affects the perception of communities towards the Government and can have an adverse affect on community participation in programmes.

UNICEF and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs,
Sierra Leone, (2006: p 34)

The problem has been noted in other countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).¹⁵ Overall, it is clear that corruption is not simply one of perception or unsubstantiated allegations.

Types of corruption

Some distinctions must be drawn between types of corruption or mismanagement, when dealing with the perception that these were problems within the reintegration programme. Firstly, patent mismanagement of a programme, its under-resourcing, or failure to receive expected benefits, may have effects which are consistent with corruption or misappropriation. But they are not necessarily the same as corruption. The danger is that they will be seen as such by ex-combatants, given their suspicions, experiences, and the political culture both before and during the war. What we can access directly through this research is their perception, both of specific events, and of “how things work” in general. We also have a clear indication that they feel strongly about it, and that in some cases it is uppermost in their minds. The reality is that these perceptions – whatever they may be based on – are an important factor in themselves, in how they feel about the peace process, the “deal” of DDR, and any notion of ownership or participation.

Secondly, we can disaggregate the various forms which actual corruption may take, and those who may be players. The following are some examples:

- Non-combatants joining the programme, with the knowledge and perhaps assistance of those running it. This would normally happen at the disarmament stage. Significantly, they

¹⁵ In the DRC programme, Amnesty International (2006) cites serious problems with basic accounting, and alleged corruption, by the national agency responsible for reintegration, resulting in new accounting arrangements and oversight being required. The UN Secretary-General also noted in his report to the UN Security Council that there were problems with this agency: “Serious shortcomings in the management of CONADER [the agency], including the alleged misappropriation of funds, continue to hinder the effective implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.” (2006b: p 11, par 50).

may be taking the place of those who were due to enter, possibly depriving them of their benefits, such as guns being taken off combatants and given to others so they could “disarm”.

- Non-combatants joining the programme through different means to the previous example. This can include their own initiative, with the assistance of others such as combatants, commanders, or family members.
- Diversion of resources within the programme by those running it (which may or may not lead indirectly to others missing out on their benefits).
- Diversion of benefits or resources, normally leading directly to loss by others. Examples of this may be stipends or toolkits which ex-combatants suspect never reached them for this reason.
- Having to share benefits or bribe in order to receive what they were entitled to.

In terms of the actors, it is important to note that some of these actions may have been done by ex-combatants who were appointed as representatives or contact people, as mentioned in focus group contributions cited in Chapter 4. It could also involve commanders, staff of local, national, or international implementing agencies, or officials of the programme such as those working for the NCDDR.

Examples of corruption or misappropriation

Corruption has been mentioned in previous chapters, as it has come up organically whenever questions of trust, promises, and missing benefits were raised. For example, the matter of entitlements listed on demobilisation identity cards not being provided, while the card was punched nevertheless, was attributed to those benefits being siphoned off. The issue of corruption is dealt with directly in this chapter. In the survey, open-ended question J3 asked participants what they would avoid doing if running a programme. It is analysed in more detail in Chapter 3, where the chart shows that the most frequent response by far was avoiding corruption or theft by those implementing the programme was. It accounted for almost twice as many responses as the next most common category. Examples of these responses include:

Stop corruption and do qualify job.

I would not eat [steal] people's benefits.

I will avoid corruption.

No theft.

Corruption, misuse of training materials.

I will avoid corruption so as to succeed.

Not to take bribe.

Corruption, self-interest.

Selected responses to Question J3

When asked why these suggestions would help (J4), corruption and the provision of benefits to others appeared to be linked to basic questions of fairness, or consistency with the deal they felt they entered into:

The actual ex-combatants didn't participate.

It will make it beneficial for only ex-combatants.

In order to have the right victims and beneficiaries.

Selected responses to Question J4

The idea that ex-combatants were excluded, or that the benefits were diluted, came up here, having been raised in a number of other points in the survey and focus groups. It also came up in the question about what they would do to make people feel included, if they were running a programme (J1), where one participant said he would "help the real people" and not bribe. In the focus groups, the specific examples cited often centre on missing benefits whose absence is attributed to corruption, with evidence sometimes being cited. The benefits which were suspected of being directly diverted were mainly stipends and start-up toolkits, although a general degrading of the programme was also attributed to misappropriation.

Participant 14: We ourselves here, some of our colleagues went to learn tailoring after they had gone through the process. We had about five people – three women, two men – who were not part of the trainees, [who] collected the [sewing] machines. The ones who were in their houses were given the machines. This really brought conflict.

Unidentified participant: Yes! They gave it to their girlfriends. They made them [into] students.

Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

The question of ID cards with letters to indicate entitlement for particular benefits has been described in more detail in an earlier chapter. This quote illustrates the understanding of how certain letters were punched out even though nothing was received:

[The letter on the card] D has a lot of packages, a huge package for our benefit, therefore the others [DDR staff] decided to share it among themselves. And for us, some of the ex-combatant have not received all our benefits, especially our D benefits.

Participant 1, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

There was no question for some as to why their benefits were missing:

You see, this is the problem. While the organisers will siphon the money, most of these people which you see [around] as drivers are DDR ex-combatants.

Participant 3, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

They sat on our money and squandered it.

Participant 5, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

Corruption by commanders

Commanders were sometimes specifically mentioned as being responsible, which would accord with the complex relationship of patronage, protection, and abuse which sometimes existed – and which could in fact persist after disarmament. But they were in a particular position of power as the time for disarmament came, and people had the opportunity to enrol in the programme:

I did not disarm. Just as my colleagues have told you initially, our bosses took our weapons from us, give them to their own people who will receive our benefits, so that made me not disarm. [i.e. got discouraged and decided not to participate, rather than actually had his weapon taken] So this was a problem. They will ask for our ammunition to be assembled, as this is an order from the boss. Everybody has to comply. He [the commander] had collected these weapons long before the disarmament process. Then for the disarmament process I would go and say to my boss, it's time for us to disarm, so I want my weapon, to go and disarm, and he would say "Ah! Forget about those weapons, they've collected them."

Participant 12, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

Then some of our commanders took our arms and gave them to civilians who went to disarm, and gave them the money. That was what they were doing.

Participant 7, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

The elders were the ones doing this, not the whites, but the elders. *[Various voices in agreement]* Like, for some of... even the commanders. For instance, like I would be the commander for this whole group, and when the time comes for disarmament, I have my children, and I want to make more money. Instead of giving them [the fighters] the weapons to disarm, it is my children, who knew nothing about the war, I would give them weapons to go and disarm, so that the benefit which the fighters should get, my children will get [instead]. So these dubious games were being played.

Participant 5, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

The question of non-combatants entering the programme is well supported by the final figure for those who “disarmed” and the number of weapons handed in, especially in Liberia. It was clearly a source of resentment. Women were more prone to this kind of exclusion, even when they had been bearing arms:

Participant 7: Let me tell you something, Sis [name deleted] [referring other participant by name, for emphasis]. You know the people – our own people – that were heading the DDDR programme. They were bringing civilians and forgetting about those that fought.

Participant 5: Thank you [showing that Participant 7 has confirmed what she said].

Participant 7: They liked money business. They would take arms and ammo and give it to the civilians for them to disarm for them, and we suffered and did the thing. Because of that, most of us did not disarm. Plenty of us [were] left behind.

Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

However, resentment of non-combatants in the programme was not universal. One of the interesting aspects which emerged was the possibility of sharing access to benefits within a family, or selling it on. Some ex-combatants [in Group L, in Cuttington University in Gbarngba, Liberia] said they did not have a problem with this, saying that sometimes people did not want to disarm because of fear of stigma, they could sell it to some one else. It would also be possible that a family member who benefit most from education was the one sent to “disarm” and receive free schooling. This view was at variance with other focus groups, where real resentment was expressed.

Some of them were afraid to disarm, some of them gave arms out, they had their arms but they were afraid to disarm, so they gave it to other people to go [and] benefit. They said, I don't want to go, because my parents have already told me when I go, I will not travel [i.e. would not be granted a visa if identified as an ex-combatant]. I would not go this way, or that way [i.e. travel internally or externally], so, go and benefit [as if said to some one else who should benefit]. I think that people never have [a] problem with it.

Participant 1, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

Having to share benefits or pay bribes

Sometimes the evidence of corruption reported by ex-combatants is quite specific: it is not just a matter of non-combatants enrolling with the help of others, or of expected benefits not materialising. In some instances, they report having to pay bribes in order to receive what they were entitled to:

You have to bargain with the facilitators for their commission, i.e. their own part of the package, before you will receive your allowance.

Participant 2, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

Unless you bribe, you will not get your allowances. Even your papers to show you are qualified for driving, you have to bribe, otherwise they will be given to you. So instead of that, I had to leave my own certificate there, and I fucked off from there.

Participant 4, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

Even the lecturers who were supposed to teach us got jealous of us, that they would not turn up when they were supposed to. If you take your allowance, you just have to share it with the lecturer, and if you fail to, they will strike and say “no learning for today”.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

Diversion by implementing agency staff

The understanding that shortfalls in the programme were due to misappropriation was clear when the topic was raised of what should be avoided in running a DDR programme. The willingness to attribute poor performance to corruption indicates the low level of trust and social

capital in this environment. Unfortunately, social capital appears to have been lost during the programme, due to the disappointments experienced by the ex-combatants. Many of the allegations were quite specific, in fact. One contributor said that the toolkits should come in sealed boxes, so that people running the programme could not take out the useful tools and leave the less valuable ones for the trainees (Participant 2, Focus Group H). In other cases, the benefits believed to be diverted were stipends and the funding to run the training programme itself. Their own experience was cited, when asked how they would improve a programme:

The money that the NGO bring in for the training and to be given to them [trainees], you *give* them their money! You give it to them and train them. But if you sit on it and “eat” it [steal it], that means the same thing ADA [implementing NGO in Liberia] did to you, or others did to you, that’s the same thing that you’re doing.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group J, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

An indirect effect of corruption and mismanagement was programme quality, quite apart from diversion of benefits. Again, there is a clear belief about how the new order was functioning, and that it was not very different from before the war:

What we are saying, the programme failed in Liberia, is because those local NGOs that implemented these programmes, they were not, eh, honest. They only did things for their own gain. You see it, so, you should avoid the kinds of people from coming into the system. If you take somebody to be an employee or [a] UNDP project coordinator, he should not partial in selecting partners. That is very important because people went and bribed these project officers and they gave projects to people to implement, and at the end, they failed.

Participant 5, Focus Group L, Gbarnga, Liberia

The accusations of corruption are not simply an angry response to a feeling of exclusion. Some participants had a clear understanding of the way in which the process was run, and seemed to distinguish between mismanagement and diversion of resources at various levels. The reaction in terms of alienation is clear, however, whatever the cause:

This was a government which did not have any monitoring system of the process. It’s like, what I saw, there was a battle between the receiving country and the donor countries. In other words, the money which the international community sent, the government has [taken?] a percentage. How the money was distributed, they did not want to know, they were careless. The government was careless. But if ex-combatants show their dismay by going on the rampage, the government will intervene. The government did not even come to see what the ex-combatants are saying, if it’s true or not, so they would know what to do, whether to change or to continue their policies.

Participant 3, Focus Group A, Bo, Sierra Leone

The same speaker went to say that if a DDR programme was being run again, it should be “transparent and accountable”, because if it was not accountable, it could be run in any way. It was interesting to note that both these concepts and the precise language used to describe them were introduced by the participant, and not by the moderator of the group.

Livelihoods

The ability to find a livelihood at the end of the DDR process is just one of several objectives for social and economic reintegration. It is not a measure of participation *per se*. However, poverty, lack of work after training, and “being in the streets” were constantly raised in the focus groups when it came to the ex-combatants’ view of the vocational training. Linked with it was a clear sense of disappointment. In the all-female focus group in Monrovia (where no men were present, as the moderators were also women), two of the women talked frankly about working as prostitutes, while still feeling the stigma associated with what they were doing out of economic need.

As for me, I can’t lie to you. I’m on the streets, now, because my mother is not around here, I don’t have a stable place. Anywhere night grabs me, I sleep there. ... Some of us are living poverty life, and some of us, we don’t want to live like that. Some of us, we know ourselves, we know how we were living before. This kind of life, you know how we can think? Every day I can shed tears, tears drop from my face. Every day, tears from my face when I sit down and think. I was going to school in Guinea, both Arabic and English. My parents sent me there. Here I am today. I can go from man to man, that’s me supposed to do it.

Participant 5, Focus Group M, Monrovia, Liberia

Participants in a variety of locations talked about “being in the streets”, in the sense that they had no formal work or were trying to get by in whatever way they could. But was also linked with being idle and vulnerable. In one group, the participant said was “not a father” to his children, as he was unable to provide for them (participant 4, Focus Group B). The descriptions of poverty, the effects of being without work, and the struggle to survive are powerful testimony. They mirror the many stories which could be told by non-combatants from Sierra Leone and Liberia who also struggle every day, some of whom also feel abandoned or resent the benefits given to former fighters. To try to neatly assign everyone to the role of either “perpetrator” or “victim” would not only be impossible, it would not even be an attempt to take us any closer to truth, so discrete categories and easy judgements are to be avoided in comparing groups. One distinction which should be made, however, is that the combatants felt they were entering a deal, and their particular social contract had an additional clause. Despite

this, even those ex-combatants expressing bitter disappointment or regret did not see organised violence as the solution, as seen in a rare reference to the fundamentals of the deal:

So as it like that, and as I am telling, we do not have the guns, and even if we have [had?] the guns, we will not do that, because we have plans for our country. And this is where our mothers are, and our fathers are, and our children are also here, so we do not have any plans for that again, and this why we have gathered ourselves to come here to make ourselves useful to anybody who will come and provide a job for us. Even if you don't have a job for us today, but you give us a cutlass [machete] to go and brush [clear] a portion of land, we will do it. We will work at that until something better comes for us. So this is our plight, and the DDR programme, the benefits they promised us, they did not fulfil.

Participant 4, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

What elements were participatory?

Most of the accounts in this thesis are those of the ex-combatants, and it therefore reflects their perception of the programmes. It should be pointed out that some of those designing or organising the programme would point to ways in which efforts were made to include non-institutional stakeholders in the decision-making process¹⁶. The act of entering DDR is course a voluntary one, and the choice of training or education from the list of available options is one made by the ex-combatants themselves. The very real constraints, time pressures, and communication difficulties faced by programmers in the post-war environment have been mentioned several times already. It should also be noted that despite the impression which may have been given in the ex-combatants' comments about training, many of them are now pursuing livelihoods as tailors, drivers, or mechanics, or alternatively are in education.

Children's reintegration approach

It should be noted that some elements were much participatory than others, and that is true especially of the children's reintegration programme. The general approach was that anyone who was found to be under 18 years old on initial screening at the disarmament centre would be diverted to a separate part of the demobilisation camp, and would be off that site within 72 hours. The next stage was to spend time in an Interim Care Centre (ICC) for children. These

¹⁶ For example, telephone interview with former head of Sierra Leone NCDDR (25 February 2010); interview with current UNMIL and UNDP officials (Monrovia, 26 February 2010).

programmes were generally run by agencies with experience of dealing with children, and who had a child-centred approach. The ratio of staff to ex-combatants was much higher, and there were more opportunities for psychosocial support. The approach was that reintegration of children would take place in the community, rather than them becoming long term residents of such Centres. That meant helping to trace their original families, negotiating and organising their return, and supporting both the child and the community in the reintegration process¹⁷. Sometimes it was difficult to trace a family, if a child had been abducted at a young age and could not recall places or names; considerable work was required to trace relatives, and the child might end up being fostered by relatives if their parents had been killed during the war¹⁸. In all of this, close collaboration and shared decision-making was required, often involving several stakeholders: in essence, it was a much more participatory approach.

The question of negotiating the return to the community was a vital one, as some communities had come to fear children who had spent time with armed groups. They might be regarded as wild or violent, and it could take some time and consultation within the community before a decision was made. Imaginative ways could be found to deal with these fears: in one instance in Sierra Leone, a video recording of a girl was shown to her family, and their response to her video message was shown to her, in order to facilitate the process¹⁹. All this was underpinned by the child-centred, rights-based approach, in that the child's welfare back in the community had to be considered. Again, it is interesting from the point of view of participation that the relationship was not simply between a donor controlling resources and a recipient: a number of stakeholders with different interests or positions could be involved in each situation, and they held not only different amounts of power, but different types of power as well. As with any participatory process, its success lay in recognising those power and informational asymmetries, and working with them.

Support for both the child and the community was also seen as important, especially as benefits for the ex-combatants (such as school books and uniforms) could fuel resentment. A Community Education and Investment Programme (CEIP) was set up, so that the school in the receiving community would also receive support. That could come in the form of basic sports

¹⁷ Interviews with Child Protection Officer, UNICEF (Freetown, 5 November 2007); three former social workers involved in tracing children's families (Makeni, 7 and 8 November 2007); head of Caritas Kenema (Kenema 15 September 2008); and staff member, UNICEF (Monrovia, 17 February 2010).

¹⁸ Interviews with staff of Don Bosco Homes, who had previously worked as social workers at the Interim Care Centres (near Monrovia, 15 November 2007).

¹⁹ Interview with Child Protection Officer, Caritas Kenema (Kenema, 15 September 2008).

equipment, books, stationary, or classroom equipment²⁰. The important issue from the point of view of participation is that it was the community which chose what type of support they would receive.

Child Welfare Committees (CWCs) were also established in receiving communities, to consider the rights of all children in the community. These specifically included representatives of a number of sections of the community – in line with the concept of ownership and shared goals – including some children themselves. This is especially interesting in terms of the question of “who” participates, and of ensuring that marginalised groups in society are not in fact further excluded by the formalisation of “participatory” structures. The committees can be seen as an example of building on existing social capital of both a bonding and a bridging nature. There is a normative impact by framing issues in terms of rights and welfare. They provided a space for dialogue when problems arose with returnees, and provided a space where fear or misunderstandings could be transformed into communication and acceptance²¹. Some of these Committees or communities came up with the idea of adapting a local ritual so that it could be used a type of cleansing rite to ease the child’s return and foster acceptance by the community²². The important point, once more, is that in some cases it was the communities which came up with these rituals²³. It was only with indigenous knowledge (often specific to a particular ethnic group) and a participatory approach that an implementing agency was able to support, adopt, and encourage this kind of activity, in situations where backing from outside the community was a help.

Another interesting example of participatory practices being introduced at a local level was the use of what is sometimes referred to as “theatre for development”²⁴ by one children’s agency. Stakeholders devise and stage a performance, to understand and explain their own situation. This was used when young ex-combatants at a centre came into conflict with the local community over their behaviour. The performance for the community, with discussion

²⁰ Interview with Child Protection Officer, UNICEF (Freetown, 5 November 2007).

²¹ Interviews with chair of Child Welfare Committee, Kpetema, near Kenema (Kpetema, 16 Sept 2008); and head of Gbanti section of Makari-Gbanti Child Welfare Committee (Makeni, 23 September 2008).

²² Interview with Chair of Child Welfare Committee, Nyandayama, Kenema (Nyandayama, 16 Sept 2008).

²³ Interview with Social Development Officer, Ministry for Gender and Children’s Affairs (Kenema, 15 September 2008).

²⁴ This is a type of participatory theatre which has many forms, and is related to Augusto Boal’s “Theatre of the Oppressed”.

afterwards, helped each to understand the perspective of the others, and to reduce tensions²⁵. Receiving communities could also take their own actions, in order to indicate that ex-combatants were welcome²⁶. This was more likely to be the case where they were seen as veterans of a group which had been formed to protect their community in response to a threat, such as the Community Defence Forces in Sierra Leone.

The impact of these more participatory approaches could be studied using a longitudinal approach, or detailed ethnographic portrait of one or two communities over time. The effect of greater participation in these examples (as opposed to the much more limited approach for adults) is difficult to assess after the event, using the methods employed in the current research. There are too many other differences besides the question of participation, such as age, the different impact of war experiences, stigma, and the type of reintegration (education as opposed to vocational training). While the causal process arising from this more participatory approach cannot be unravelled here, it is essential to at least note that there is a difference in how things were done for the children's programme.

Indigenous NGOs and knowledge

In general, some of the implementing bodies were indigenous NGOs with experience and commitment to participatory methods, whether or not this was expressed in precisely those terms. One of the advantages which they brought was an understanding of the context and culture; this contribution is only of use, however, if those with greater power are willing to engage with them. A number of those involved in Liberia's DDR said they found the approach at initial briefings to be very "top down", with little opportunity for them to make any real input by the time they were being consulted. The speed with which the programme was designed (in the face of both security and donors concerns) seems to have been a factor here, as well as the ease with which the programme from Sierra Leone could be borrowed from²⁷. The premature

²⁵ Interview with staff member, UNICEF (Freetown, 9 November 2007).

²⁶ Interview with Section Chief, Fagoya, Bo (Fagoya, 9 September 2008). He said that he had sent messengers into the bush to tell former CDF fighters they should not be afraid to return home, and that they would be made welcome. This is an unusual situation, which indicates that fighters do not always face stigma, especially if their role or group was seen as that of a protector.

²⁷ One frequently-repeated account, which could not be verified and is therefore presented as an unconfirmed anecdote rather than clear evidence, concerns the use of "cut and paste" as a means of adapting Sierra Leone's programme for Liberia. The story goes that when the ready-made plan was presented to implementing partners, place names from Sierra Leone cropped up in the Liberian plan: anatopical remnants which betrayed the plan's origins.

start of disarmament at Camp Shefflin near Monrovia in December 2003, which resulted in chaos and violence before it was suspended, is one example of speed being antithetical to participatory approaches. At least one implementing NGO says that it warned that the rushed plan would be a disaster, but that it went ahead anyway²⁸.

The style of leadership at the top of this particular programme, which seems in fact to have been quite untypical, has been portrayed by those within the programme as unusually autocratic, and it created resentment at a number of levels within the programme as well as among implementing partners²⁹. It appears to have been compounded by the desire to show quick results, possibly in time for an imminent donor conference. Both implementing partners at the demobilisation centres and organisations delivering the training say that they had proposed psychosocial support, or even a module in the training course in the form of counselling, but that this had been rejected as funding was unavailable or donors would not be interested³⁰. Untreated trauma, drug withdrawal symptoms, and difficulty in adapting to dealing with civilian authority were behind some of the problems which ex-combatants experienced during reintegration, and meant they could not benefit from the programme fully.

It should also be noted that “catch up” programmes designed to fill the gaps in the main programme tended to be done in a more participatory way. There a number of reasons for this, some of which arise from the fact they were carried out later on. This meant they were not devised under the same time pressure, and security concerns had diminished. They were also more likely to be designed to meet the needs of a specific group, and in a particular locality. All of these make participatory planning easier and also more likely to show clear benefits, since the positive feedbacks associated with greater ownership were more visible. The programmes involved include the Stopgap programme in Sierra Leone (Molloy, 2008), and the Arms for Development weapons collection programme (which is not strictly DDR, but which shows significant participatory engagement with the community). Liberia’s programme for the “residual caseload” of approximately 5,000 ex-combatants who registered at the disarmament

²⁸ Interview with several staff of Don Bosco Homes (November 2007), including its director near Monrovia (19 November 2007). Their version is that they stayed in place to try to calm the situation in extremely difficult conditions, amid large crowds of angry and disappointment combatants who were discovering the promised benefits were not available, while the UN had been forced to withdraw from the location due to security fears.

²⁹ Interview with former UN staff member in Liberia (Dublin, 29 October 2008).

³⁰ Interviews with former manager of Carysburg cantonment site in Liberia, (Monrovia, 27 Feb 2010); and former coordinator of reintegration training programme (Gbarnga, 17 February 2010). In this situation, the concept of “capacity building” can be usefully applied to donors as well as implementing organisations.

stage but had not completed reintegration also showed more participatory elements, including a longer consultation period of approximately two weeks during which ex-combatants were engaged with and chose a training option³¹. Unlike the main DDR programme, it also included psychosocial support, and literacy classes after training.

Taken as a whole, these cases are useful in helping our understanding of how participatory approaches may be taken in DDR. They show that, in the right situations, participation is possible, and can have useful benefits in terms of social reintegration especially. The work with reintegrating children is a good example of how horizontal social capital can be built by a participatory approach, and how this helps the ultimate goals of reintegration and peacebuilding. The use of indigenous knowledge and organisations clearly plays a role in programmers taking a more “listening” approach, which is of course a key element in participation. Programmes which run later, when security and time pressures have subsided, seem to offer more scope for participation. The lesson here is that where time is not a luxury available to those designing a specific DDR programme, training and general forward planning in relation to participatory approaches is even more important. Finally, running a DDR programme involves many different agencies interests, capacities, and experience may be very different. The way they interact with each other is relevant to the type of programming they produce: “internal” participatory approaches among planners and implementers has an effect. If those working close to the intended beneficiaries see a need or an opportunity, what matters is the listening skills of those “higher up” (which often means being closer to resource allocation). Without this, participatory approaches by enlightened implementing organisations will be constrained by the latitude which they have been allowed or are willing to take.

Conclusions

The impression of the reintegration programme given in this chapter is skewed towards the negative experiences reported by some of the ex-combatants, many of whom did in fact genuinely benefit from the programme. The imbalanced nature of the account is not the failing that it may appear to be, even if it does not do justice to those attempting to draw up and implement a programme in what were often very difficult circumstances. This is because the analysis is not intended as an assessment of the programme as such – or of those responsible for

³¹ Interviews, Deputy Resident Representative of UN Development Programme (UNDP) (Monrovia, 18 November 2007 and 22 February 2010).

it – but is instead intended to highlight the interaction between how it was experienced by the ex-combatants, and the degree of participatory programming.

The shortcomings, in the eyes of the participants, have been outlined in detail. They include the quality and duration of the training, disappointment with their employability at the end of the course, problems with unpaid or delayed stipends, and duration of scholarships. It is a great deal more than a desire to maximise their benefits: it is about rebuilding relationships. In all these cases, the interface between their experiences and their expectations (even if these were based on a misunderstanding) is where the real impact of any shortcomings are felt, in terms of the wider community and the overall aim of DDR. The most potent examples of this arises from perceptions of having been deliberately misled, of mismanagement, and of corruption.

The way in which examples of corruption and misappropriation are recounted show that it is about more than the benefits: the language used it indicates that it has resulted in an understandable resentment, and mistrust of the programme. The danger is that that this disaffection seeps into the ex-combatants' views of peace process and the new governance put in place after the war. Let us not forget that corruption and alienation (on the basis of bad governance as well as inter-generational issues) were underlying factors in the war, and therefore in the peace. A DDR programme which is seen as tainted and inequitable is less able to contribute to peacebuilding and the creation of new and fairer political order, to replace the power structures created by the gun and threat of organised violence. In the worst instances, it reduces DDR to even less than a “cash for guns” programme, as even these cannot be guaranteed. The “deal” which binds together all the stakeholders and creates common interests falls apart.

If you “eat” the money [siphon it off] and don’t do the job, that will bring commotion.

Unidentified participant, Focus Group K, Lawalazu, Lofa County, Liberia

Failures and disappointment in the reintegration programme are not in themselves a measure of participatory programming. The shortcomings may arise in the implementation of reintegration, and can occur even where there was genuine consultation, shared decision-making, and empowerment in the planning stage. Inadequacies are of course more likely when programmes are planned without the knowledge or views of key stakeholders, or when monitoring of implementation is undermined by the failure to include a “feedback loop” to transmit views of the intended beneficiaries. At the most basic level, the need to properly understand

beneficiaries' needs is one of the utilitarian arguments for participatory planning, quite apart from the issues of power and marginalisation which have been spelled out clearly in the comments quoted in this chapter. However, whether the failures are rooted in the inclusion of stakeholders early on, or solely in the implementation phase, the impact of these problems on the ultimate goal of DDR is one which is bound up with participation. While the effects of inadequate training or missing benefits is very real for the ex-combatants, the impact on the wider community includes a failure to generate the goodwill and "buy in" of former fighters for the new governance of Sierra Leone or Liberia. One of the objectives of DDR is to handle the threat posed to the peace process by disillusioned and demoralised ex-combatants who have no livelihood, and have an uncertain identity and role in the new dispensation. Programme failures can even worsen these negative aspects, in terms of the breakdown of trust and sense of broken promises. The key point, however, is that this disillusionment is exacerbated in situations where there was no sense of participation, or ownership in the programme. Disappointments can, on the other hand, be mitigated by a sense of having been treated fairly and included in the process. Those taking an entirely minimalist approach to DDR programmes may see the primary goal as disarming potential troublemakers and keeping them busy for a while just after a peace agreement has been signed. The lasting effect on the peace process, however, stems from whether there is disappointment or buy-in, as well as the more immediate question for ex-combatants of whether they have a viable livelihood. Their attitude is a function of both the direct outcome of their vocational training or education, combined with the underlying sense of participation, through which the attitude is mediated (see Figure 6.2 below).




Figure 6.2: How participation and programme outcomes affect attitudes.

Where the perceived failures are based solely on unrealistic expectations, or a misunderstanding of what the “new social contract” consisted of, this suggests that inclusion, ownership, and communication in the earlier stages play a role. In short, it points to participation.

The way in which these variables are related can be seen in the comments about community, society, and the future of the country, indicating that these norms and sense of a new social contract are closely bound up with the programme and the way it was explained and implemented. This realisation brings us to consider the role of social capital – especially in relation to norms and trust – as an essential part of the process. As the final chapter will explore, social capital is not just the context in which new post-war relationships evolve; it can facilitate that growth, and also be built up or eroded by the way in which those relationships progress. In the case of a negative experience, the process is depicted in Figure 6.3 below.




Figure 6.3: The vicious circle of negative experiences and attitudes.

The problems which programme planners faced in trying to draw up and implement reintegration should not be minimised. They include well-founded security concerns, capacity constraints, and pressure to show immediate results in order to shore up the peace agreements. It can be argued, however, that a programme built on the principles of participation would have paid more attention yet another demand: the powerful impact which the ex-combatants' disappointment or disillusionment would have on the overall objective of DDR. Ongoing communication and consultation during implementation – even if it is to proactively explain why a problem has arisen before it becomes clear to the participants – are the lower rungs of the ladder, but could mitigate the resulting dissatisfaction.

Most important of all is the understanding that even if shortcomings in the programme are considered unavoidable, and regarded for the purposes of argument as a given, participatory processes – or the lack of them – are an important factor in determining how those disappointments are translated into attitudes to the peace and reconstruction process, and the peacebuilding in and of a new country.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

This study exposes the complex nature of the causal relationships at work in post-war peacebuilding and recovery from conflict, and the reality that interaction between the factors is significant in shaping the outcome. Reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction are open systems, where causal complexity is the norm, rather than a closed system where all the variables are accounted for and where endogeneity and interactions can be disregarded. Any attempt to deal with the causal connections as an ecology is, of course, more difficult than looking at a series of distinct one-way relationships. As a result, given the constraints of this study, the conclusions reached here are tentative. They are, nonetheless, the best analysis available within these constraints, and are strongly supported by the evidence. Recognising causal complexity at the very least reduces the risk of producing generalisations which are satisfying but are over-simplifications. Having said that, this study concludes that taking a participatory approach does indeed influence the process of reintegrating ex-combatants in a number of significant ways, and that participation is an appropriate and useful way of analysing that process.

Participation as a lens for analysing reintegration

The views which emerged in the course of the study show that a ladder of participation is a useful way of analysing the experiences of ex-combatants and understanding their evolving relationship with the reintegration programmes. Within the multi-faceted model covered by the term ‘participation’, key concepts are exposed which might not appear when other forms of analysis are used. These include power, communication, expectations, consultation, inclusion in decision-making, ownership, and trust. In addition to the power asymmetries, the roles played by various actors are also made more explicit. One of the most useful aspects of the ladder is its nuanced approach to participation. It separates out the desire to create certain impressions, identifies underlying motivations, and highlights cooperation or acquiescence in order to gain access to resources. Utilitarianism and opportunism are distinguished from rhetoric and good intentions. These subtleties are particularly useful in attempting to understand the evolving relationships which are seen during DDR.

The ladder of participation also highlights ex-combatants' agency, as well as the structures and processes with which they and other stakeholders engage. These variables are not just additive: they are a process in their own right, combining to form an essential part of the relationship between ex-combatants and those with power, be they staff from local authorities or international agencies. Judgments are made by ex-combatants about the reliability, credibility, and motivation of other actors, and about the way their own actions are likely to improve their situation. The ideas mentioned may or may not be part of the everyday language of ex-combatants. They are however the basis used to infer the rules of the game, to quickly form a model of 'how things work' using an intuitive process of induction based on the way things played out. Their experiences in relation to credibility, accuracy of information, diversion or non-payment of benefits, and a sense of actually having been heard during any consultation process, are vital in shaping this important relationship. It affects not just the level of trust, but also the whole idea of a new social contract which DDR involves, their notion of governance in the post-war situation, and how they see themselves in this picture. This understanding of their relationship therefore influences ex-combatants' actions and behaviour towards society and the reconstruction project, arising from their sense of inclusion and ownership (or otherwise). Ultimately, it underpins the way they see themselves in society, both now and in the future, which is one of the key elements in social reintegration. An effective DDR programme in which the participants share a sense of ownership is also one which is more likely to be truly embedded in a holistic process of peacebuilding, rather than being just another intervention.

How participatory was reintegration?

A clear picture has emerged of how ex-combatants see the DDR programmes, in relation to a participatory approach. This clarity is all the more striking because the language of participation is not part of their everyday vocabulary – meaning that their stated views are much more likely to reflect what they really feel, rather than being an adopted narrative repeated back to donors. Although the term “participation” is used only very rarely, the concept is referred to continuously in terms of trust, truth, communication, ownership, corruption, and alignment of interests. At the lowest rungs of the ladder of participation, which simply involve providing information in a one-way process without attempting consultation, there were major shortcomings. The amount of information was not a problem, nor was its clarity; accuracy was the major issue. For example, when ex-combatants in rural areas were surveyed about whether the information they received was accurate, they said it was inaccurate by more than four to one.

The discrepancy between what was understood to have been promised, and what was delivered, emerged time and again.

This was not simply a case of generalised disaffection among people who were struggling economically: they were quite prepared to say that there was no problem with the amount or clarity of the information they received, while also making very specific criticism of its accuracy. Nor were their negative views simply due to a desire to maximise possible benefits: there was almost no complaint about the amount of the stipends during vocational training, or about start-up toolkits which were actually received. The major complaint was when this was different to what was promised, as they saw it, especially when payments and training were curtailed, stopped early, or were delayed. The significance of the discrepancies or broken promises went far beyond the material shortcomings; the impact extended to trust, confidence in the process, and perception about fulfilling the deal of disarmament. When asked in the survey what they would avoid doing if running a DDR programme themselves, creating false expectations was the second-most often cited action (Question J3).

The ex-combatants' ability to make specific and sometimes nuanced criticism (if it was also sometimes trenchant) is significant in terms of addressing the question of endogeneity. It makes clear that the measures of participation, which show that in many cases there was very little participatory planning, are not simply a reflection of dissatisfaction with their quality of life. It is more than a manifestation of disappointment about not having work in the area in which they trained, or about starting with inflated expectations and ending up in poverty. Even those who did not have any fulltime or part-time work, and who said overwhelmingly that the information they received about reintegration was not accurate, were able to say by an even larger majority that the information was clear, presented in the right language, and of sufficient quantity.

The source of the discrepancy between what was expected and what was delivered is complex. Commanders, ex-combatants, and other unofficial sources of information were identified by some as where they learned about DDR. But most of the specific complaints related to DDR officials or implementing agencies. Discrepancies may arise due to problems of whatever nature with communicating the information, or with delivering on the commitments made. Unfortunately, whatever the motivation and wherever responsibility lies, the effects in terms of trust and credibility are the same.

Communications problems and inflated expectations are an issue in this process, and do account for some of the disappointment – but by no means for all of it. The most extreme examples arise when the discrepancy is attributed to deliberate deception by those explaining how the programme would run, or to corruption. The effect of both of these are particularly corrosive in terms of participation. They are more than an absence of an important element; they actively undermine everything that participatory processes stand for.

Moving up the ladder, when it comes to their views having been taken on board, many ex-combatants felt that those running the programmes did not know their needs. There was also a strong sense that what they said had little effect. Survey respondents said those running the programmes did not know their needs by more than four to one. Those in Sierra Leone were particularly negative about being listened to. They show a clear understanding of the power dynamics at play, and there was also a strong sense of disempowerment, and of having made representations in vain. This relates closely to the ladder of participation, where the mid-level rungs start to include some degree of input by intended beneficiaries, even if the larger decisions are retained by donors and programme implementers. When asked if what they said had any effect, survey respondents saying it had no effect outnumbered those who said it did have an effect by more than ten to one. The ex-combatants understand well how input from supposed beneficiaries might be gathered, as became clear when they were asked how they would go about running a programme in a more inclusive way. It is interesting to note that despite their criticisms, they were very positive about the concept of DDR programmes in general, and in some cases were keen to see the programme re-started. Their problem was with how it had been run, not with the concept of reintegration programmes *per se*.

In terms of the programming itself, problems were seen with the payment of stipends during the vocational training. The complaints mainly related to delayed, missing, or reduced payments. This had a significant effect in undermining the ex-combatants' trust in the process, and their sense that having fulfilled their part of the compact, the other side did not. The immediate outcomes of the programme which were envisaged were directly affected, with some ex-combatants leaving training courses before they were finished when the approach was clearly non-participatory. In its more extreme form, problems with receiving benefits to which they were in fact entitled were attributed to corruption and misappropriation of resources by those running the programme. For example, when asked in a general sense what they would *not* do, if running a DDR programme themselves, almost a third of survey respondents (32%) spontaneously mentioned corruption or theft by programme implementers as something they

would avoid doing (Question J3 in the survey). This was by far the most frequently cited action which they said they would avoid.

Sometimes this assessment was based on specific information, such as the provision of benefits to non-combatants who were family members of those running the programme. Others saw it as deception by those who explained the deal in the first place. Their problem was with the discrepancy between what was promised and what was delivered. The failure to provide adequate start-up toolkits was also cited repeatedly, again with some of this being attributed to misappropriation. Specific allegations were also made in Liberia about benefits records on their identity cards being incorrectly marked, to show that certain benefits had been provided even though they were not. Again, this came to define their relationship with the programme.

The duration, quality, and usefulness of the vocational training courses was an issue for many ex-combatants, as was the failure to provide certificates at the end of the training. The competency of the trainers themselves was also mentioned repeatedly. This once again raised the discrepancy between what was expected and what was delivered, which is a serious problem when assessed against the ladder of participation's standards for passing on accurate information. In addition to the direct impact of these shortcomings, ex-combatants' self-esteem and sense of being useful to the community were affected, especially where they felt they did not have the skills to do a reasonable job. It compounds the stigma and marginalisation felt by some. The certificates have powerful symbolic value, and the sense of being competent in a new and useful skill can be an important part of "forgetting the past" and embracing a new identity – an identity defined both by oneself and by community perceptions.

What elements were participatory?

Having pointed to the shortcomings, it is worth noting that more participatory approaches were seen in a number of situations. This includes the programmes for dealing with children, which were sometimes run by child protection agencies whose philosophy and experience was much more closely aligned to a child-centred (and therefore more participatory) approach. They prioritised extended interaction and consultation with children and with communities to a much greater extent than adult programmes. In particular, they had a more intense and focused interaction with them while they helped to trace families and negotiate the reuniting of children with their original communities. Real choices were made about how and where they would reintegrate, after contact had been made with the receiving community to assess whether they

would be accepted – something which was a priority from a child safety point of view. The communities themselves were engaged with as primary stakeholders, and support was provided for the establishment of structures to facilitate both the ongoing reintegration and engagement with the community.

It is hard to use this difference in approach to test for the effects of participatory programming, because the beneficiaries involved were also a distinct group, due to the fact they were children. Any differences observed could therefore be attributed to several other factors besides participation, such as their age, distinct war experiences, and the fact that they underwent a different type of programme which was more focused on education within their original community.

More generally, initiatives later on in the programme, when security concerns and time pressures had decreased, provided more opportunities for the consultation and engagement often missing in the initial DDR. In some cases, these were established to fill the gaps left by the main programme, and could be drawn up with the benefit of experience, when capacity was also greater. A number of indigenous NGOs with experience of participatory development showed a distinct approach when they were engaged to implement the reintegration programme, and their reflections and criticism of the shortcomings of the main DDR project provide a valuable insight into what was going on at the time.

Effects of participation

The effects of participation can first of all be seen by its absence, as was especially clear in the qualitative data. Loss of trust and credibility were apparent, as was a sense of disempowerment and marginalisation, when clearly non-participatory processes were identified in the focus groups and open-ended questions in the survey. The actual outcomes were also poorer when the views of ex-combatants were not taken on board. On the more positive side, although participatory processes were only seen to a limited extent, thereby limiting the variation on the independent variable, there is clear evidence that they were associated with better direct outcomes for the reintegration programme. The evidence is based on the survey of ex-combatants, using measures of association between two sets of variables. The independent variables used a number of proxies for the lower rungs of the ladder of participation (such as provision of information or having an input to decisions) while the dependent variables covered measures of social and economic reintegration. Overall, greater participation was linked with

more days in work, more positive employment status, better relations with the community, and better reported living conditions. For Sierra Leone, all nine statistically significant measures of association (at $p < 0.10$) showed better outcomes for more participatory approaches. In Liberia, 18 associations were positive and three negative, which gives a ratio of six out of seven associations being consistent with participation having a beneficial effect.

The measures of participation for which the associations were entirely positive included indications at the lower end of the ladder, such as the correct language being used, receiving sufficient information, knowing where to get more information, and (especially) its accuracy. In addition, receiving official advice on DDR was largely associated with participatory practices at this level. At a higher level on the ladder, ex-combatants who reported that what they said had an effect on how the programme was run also fared better: all the statistically significant relationships with outcomes were positive ones. These quantitative measures can only be interpreted in the light of the detailed qualitative data, which again pointed to a positive association between the two. Taken together, the data as a whole point clearly towards participatory approaches leading to enhanced outcomes. This is something which could be explored better in situations where there is greater variation in the degree of participatory programming.

Inevitably, the operationalisation of complex factors such as participation and programme outcomes is imperfect, and runs the risk of oversimplification when they are turned into nominal or ordinal scale measures. The sampling methodology and size is also less than ideal, given the constraints within which this study was conducted, making it harder to generalise the findings. It is perhaps for these reasons that the evidence is not unequivocal: a number of measures of participation were actually associated with poorer outcomes. The principle example of this was the question of whether ex-combatants felt their views had been listened to. However, the negative correlations were far outnumbered by positive ones, showing that more participation resulted in better social and economic reintegration.

The relationship between participation and direct measures of social and economic reintegration is important in itself. But what is even more significant – although it is harder to measure – is the impact which ownership and participation have on the wider objectives of the DDR programme. In some ways, although harder to measure, the effects of participation (or its absence) are at least as important at this fundamental level. It is not just a question of participation facilitating better social and economic reintegration, which are clearly long term

and complex processes involving the community and the state. It is a matter of how DDR can contribute to the wider peacebuilding project of which it is part, and to the creation and acceptance of a new social contract which goes beyond ex-combatants' problematic transition, but which involves all stakeholders in a new and agreed form of governance. Reintegration is ultimately about rebuilding relationships, and this is where its significance lies in terms of peacebuilding and supporting the implementation and durability of a peace agreement. Participation is fundamental to the building of those relationships, making a contribution which works together with the measurable outcomes such as livelihoods and education for the ex-combatants. Its role is just as important, although it is hard to separate because of the interaction effect between participatory processes and the actual outcomes. The process is described in the following Figure 7.1 below.




Figure 7.1: From reintegration to peacebuilding, mediated by participation and social capital.

We can see here something of the context or thought processes involved, during which a participatory approach can affect attitudes and outcomes. It is clear that ex-combatants are continuously forming and reviewing their judgement of both the programme and the way their interests were addressed. This judgement is indeed affected by the degree to which they are listened to, given accurate information, and their views (and in some cases needs) are taken on board – in short, participation. There is an interaction between attitude and outcomes: ex-combatants' views about reintegration are a function of both participation and of the tangible “result” delivered for that individual. Going beyond this, the resulting attitude may be

considered a “gating variable” which helps to determine the more general attitude to the peace process and governance of the new country. The sense of participation, ownership, and goodwill towards the programme is as relevant as the more tangible programme outcomes, when it comes to the impact which the programme has on the larger question of buy-in to the peace process. Participation is fundamental to mediating the positive or negative impact of the DDR programme on its ultimate goal of peacebuilding. The way in which these elements relate to each other can be usefully analysed using the concept of social capital.

Social capital

As the varying accounts of a diversity of stakeholders were being listened to during the field trips for this study, and while the data were being analysed, certain themes emerged again and again. In some cases, these are the ideas which have already been outlined in the data chapters, especially those which relate directly to participation. Certain others, which might be considered as underlying concepts, were clearly essential to the process even if they were not explicitly mentioned. They include trust (and lack of it), credibility, the notion of a “deal”, the constant forming and reviewing of assumptions about how other parties will behave, and the inferring of unwritten “rules” about how things are run in the post-war environment.




Figure 7.2: Some of the processes at work during reintegration which link participation and social capital.

These elements all point to a role for the concept of social capital in affecting how reintegration and participatory processes interact. Social capital's defining elements of trust, networks, and norms in facilitating collective action (Putnam 1993) are all relevant to the questions being addressed in this study. The intention of this research is not to replicate the very limited number of studies which have looked at the role of social capital in DDR programmes (for example, Bowd 2008; Leff 2008; Colletta and Cullen 2000). What is being highlighted, rather, is not simply that social capital plays an important role in DDR (which has been explained in more detail by other authors), but that its significance lies in its interaction with participation and ownership of the reintegration process.

Participatory processes – or their absence – are inherently linked to the question of regenerating social capital in a post-war society. A poorly conceived or administered reintegration can actually destroy social capital, and even take away from the “opening balance” which may exist in the relationship between its implementers and the key stakeholders. This is particularly so when the failings relate to the ladder of participation. Failure to consult, discrepancies between what was promised and delivered, and exclusion from decision-making, can leave participants alienated from any sense of trust or of shared norms. This can apply to the relationship between implementers and intended beneficiaries (affecting vertical social capital), and also between the stakeholders themselves (where the impact is on horizontal social capital). Low levels of participation can leave a gap for patronage, exploitation, disempowerment, or dependency to prosper, and these elements can in turn hamper the creation of social capital.

Participatory approaches are more open to recognising and building on existing social capital, whether that is to be found in communities, at national level, or among the ex-combatants. A programme which ignores existing social capital can undermine it, by ignoring, supplanting or by-passing the norms or networks which exist, some of which could contribute to peacebuilding. This can be an enduring effect which lasts after the programme has finished.

Social capital is at once the context, a means, and also an objective for reintegration. Furthermore, social capital is all three things for the wider peacebuilding project. And it is not simply that social capital and participation are key factors in reintegration and peacebuilding: their importance is that they are also the means through which positive experiences of reintegration can be translated into peacebuilding and reconciliation. Social capital is closely related to questions of governance, which is particularly relevant in the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, where poor governance, exclusion, and lack of trust in the political system created the ideal environment for violent conflict as politics by other means was not a realistic option for bringing about the change sought by the marginalised majority. The creation of social capital by means of a participatory reintegration process is therefore significant in terms of peacebuilding and reducing the pressures which originally led to war.

An analogy for the relationship between social capital and the other variables might be the interdependency between plants and the soil in which they grow. The soil (social capital) is fundamental to their life cycle, and it also changes the relationship *between* the plants by favouring some over others, in terms of acidity, moisture retention, and fertility. Yet the soil, too, is changed by what is taken out and put back by vegetation in terms of nutrients, nitrogen,

and organic matter, and the protection from erosion it provides. Rather than being part of a linear relationship, it is an essential and evolving part of an ecosystem, which may appear static but is in fact part of a dynamic equilibrium. At the risk of appearing to mix metaphors, an alternative parallel can be drawn with the evolution of the Earth's atmosphere, which is far from constant. The earliest forms of life separated oxygen from other compounds, allowing this essential ingredient for life to build up in the atmosphere. Over periods of time which are hard to imagine, the level of oxygen built up to allow other forms of life to evolve, which in turn influenced the proportions of oxygen, carbon dioxide, and other gases in the atmosphere. While the timeframe is radically different, the aspects of both soil and atmosphere analogous to the link between reintegration and other variables are the nature of their relationships: co-evolution, interdependence, ecosystems, and dynamic equilibrium, rather than discrete, linear, one-way causal relationships.




Figure 7.3: Participation and social capital

Negative social capital

It is important to recognise that social capital can be negative as well as positive: the aims pursued on behalf of a group acting collectively may not be in accordance with the interests of the wider community. The example sometimes cited in this context is organised crime, which has its own norms, networks, and requirement for trust in order to engage in collective action to

pursue shared aims. In the context of civil war, this could apply to armed factions as well (Micolta 2008), although the role of trust could in some cases be partly replaced by coercion, threats, or institutionalisation. Recognising the existence of this negative form of social capital, which addresses the interests of one section of society, allows us to distinguish it from the sense in which the term is intended here. Having said that, the social capital which exists between ex-combatants can play a significant role in their social and economic reintegration: transforming this capital, rather than ignoring or trying to suppress it, can facilitate the formation of new identities (such as that of ex-combatant or war veteran). It touches not just on ex-combatants' self image, but on their self-esteem, and how they feel they are perceived by the community. It can also have real economic potential, as seen with the self-organised groups of motorcycle taxis in many Liberian and Sierra Leonean towns.

Corruption, ownership, and social capital

One of the most significant factors in undermining the effectiveness of programming, the way in which those outcomes feed into the wider peacebuilding process, and the creation of social capital, was the corruption reported by ex-combatants in the survey and focus groups. Its significance is underlined by the fact that it was raised spontaneously many times, in a wide range of settings and circumstances, by the ex-combatants themselves without any kind of prompting or suggestion. The types of problems mentioned include allowing those who were not linked with armed groups into the DDR programme, sometimes in return for a share of their benefits; diversion of programme resources, especially stipends and start up kits; and having to share benefits with programme staff who were paying or transferring them to the ex-combatants. It could arise at all levels, from implementers and NGOs, to the ex-combatants employed by agencies or appointed as a liaison between the programme and their peers.

Corruption or diversion of resources fundamentally undermines any attempt to run DDR in a participatory way, and the ladder of participation is once again a useful measure. In terms of information and communications with stakeholders, there is a clear difference between what was said and what was ultimately intended by those in control of resources, so even the lowest rungs of the ladder have been broken. The question of whose interests are in reality being met – which is addressed at all levels of the ladder – is also definitively answered whenever corruption occurs: it is the interests of those who hold power which ultimately prevail. Diverted resources show how power is exercised, even if it happens at a relatively low level within the programme. The ladder is also relevant as a way of highlighting the role of decision-making by those

designing and implementing the programme, especially when decisions are made to “eat” the benefits intended for ex-combatants.

The many examples of such practices given by ex-combatants in both countries show that corruption and misappropriation defeat all attempts to engender participatory practices and any sense of ownership. Even if only a proportion of these perceptions are accurate (and there is little evidence to contradict the specific allegations which were made), the negative effect of such actions is both disproportionate and enduring. One of the reasons for this is the way in which opinions are formed and official narratives are interpreted. We might consider these to be the norms and the institutions in relation to stakeholders’ views about the new dispensation. It is important to recognise that the “rules” which really matter in peacebuilding are not only the formalised, official positions (although these are indeed relevant). What is at least as significant is the unwritten set of rules which stakeholders have inferred on the basis of their experience of what is done, as well as what is said. This is an iterative process, and the working draft of this set of sometimes contradictory rules is continually open to review. It is linked to the process of making assumptions about the credibility and motivation of others.

Reciprocity, trust, and transitional justice

A fundamental element in the social contract of DDR is reciprocity: that while guns, status, identity, access to an income, patronage, and possibly protection may be “traded in” (along with other more negative aspects of the combatants’ lives), something is promised in return. This deal, which may amount to a leap of faith, or indeed a cherished opportunity, reflects the larger transactions which are made by the nation and its communities, as part of the peace process. These may include questions of transitional justice, inclusion of former faction leaders in a new government and, of course, accepting that benefits and training are being provided to ex-combatants whose actions brought terrible suffering. The term “forgetting” came up several times in the focus groups and survey responses, as something which ex-combatants should aspire to. Central to these compacts – which may be presented as a *fait accompli* rather than negotiated – are the related ideas of reciprocity, and also of trust. However, the forging of a social contract has a significance which goes beyond its pragmatic or utilitarian value, or even the sense that each side’s interests are being addressed: it has a symbolic function, which marks the process through which an old identity is shed and a new one is gained, along with a new set of norms. That symbolic value can be lost or undermined when the perception arises that the contract has not been fulfilled, or even that it was entered into in bad faith. Participatory

approaches are weakened by such a perception; on the other hand, a strong sense of participation or ownership can reduce the extent to which these negative perceptions are formed when difficulties arise during implementation.

The question of transitional justice may seem an unusual one in this context, since it is usually ordinary community members who have to deal with perpetrators in the military or paramilitary groups and their leaders. Disappointment and a lack of participation among ex-combatants may not seem as problematic for transitional justice as the same problems do among the general community. However, transitional justice involves a full range of options, from prosecution and compensation to truth-telling, reconciliation, or even amnesty. The answers are seldom as clear cut as may be wished. For example, if a combatant is forgiven because they were under 18 at the time and therefore a child, what responsibility is borne by some one who was few days older? Ideas about who was a victim and who was a perpetrator may not therefore be neat as they first appear to outsiders. Combatants may have been forcibly recruited, abducted, or quite simply joined an armed group in order to survive when the war came to them (Bøås and Hatløy 2008): quite apart from child status, some were both victim and perpetrator³². The question is not one to be decided by outsiders passing judgement from a position (in time or space) of comfort. What is relevant to this study is that a “broken social contract”, which can arise from a complete failure of participation and ownership, is a much more difficult basis on which to deal with the difficult questions of transitional justice and reconciliation. Such an attempt requires trust, social capital, reciprocity, and psychosocial healing – all of which can be enhanced by participation and undermined by its absence.

Links to wider peacebuilding project

The implications of trust, and perceived breaches of it, are fundamental to the whole process of rebuilding relationships after war. The key relationships are not just bilateral, but include their sense of wellbeing in the community and in society as a whole. This is evidenced in the sadness and lack of self-confidence which was clearly expressed by those who felt they had not been adequately trained for work, which has already been discussed. Some felt they had lost out on a chance to prove themselves to be useful citizens, especially given the stigma often associated

³² One of the locally-developed ceremonies to assist the acceptance of ex-combatants by the Acholi community in northern Uganda specifically addressed the question of child status and forced recruitment. The community forgave the former child combatant for their actions after they had been abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army, while at the same time asking the child to forgive the community for failing to protect them from abduction. [Source: Interview with Paramount Chief Onen David Acana, Gulu, Uganda, 12 August 2004.]

with being an ex-combatant. A poignant understanding of this two-way process of building trust is clear when discussing the attitude of the community to them:

[A]t that time for some one to even trust you, it was hard. To even call you to say, I have a job, it was hard. Because they feel that, if you go [and] work for them, you [will] likely harm them, so we just learn and just sit down, nothing doing.

Participant 4, Focus Group H, Gbarnga, Liberia

In the open-ended questions in the survey, ex-combatants were asked what they would avoid doing if they were running a programme. After corruption and theft, the most prominent type of response included creating false expectations or making promises which would not be kept. It is revealing to note the reasons given in the following question, as to why their suggestions would help (Question J4). Apart from those responses relating to generally improving the programme, the most frequent type of reply pointed to questions of trust and confidence:

It would make people trust the programme

They will feel relax to complete the programme

Selected responses to Question J4

While this refers to DDR, it is the ex-combatants themselves who are seen here to make a very explicit link, where communication failures or broken promises lead to a lack of trust. Given that they also speak of being useful in society, of not wanting to “be on the streets”, and of wishing they had a trade or function which could generate the trust of the community, they clearly see the whole process as a continuum – one where relationships are based on their experiences of dealing with others. The sense in which their immediate experience of DDR translates into attitudes to the newly-made governance of their country is also clear in their understanding of the process having been a “deal”. International agencies were indeed players in this deal, but it was ultimately one between the ex-combatants and society as a whole:

We are trying to tell people that if we had not planned to make this country move forward, we should not have laid down the guns. And if we had (not) laid down the guns, we would have started another chaos, because there was no encouragement. Today, as it is, we are the ones suffering.

Participant 4, Focus Group B, Bo, Sierra Leone

Ex-combatants do not compartmentalise their experiences, especially when they learn that those in power making promises and statements are not to be trusted. Ultimately it is a network of

relationships which is being rebuilt, as well as one-to-one relationships, and this process is one of the most fundamental contributions which DDR has to make.

Is participation possible in DDR?

The ladder of participation makes clear that we are dealing with something which is a matter of degree, rather than an absolute. Like any relationship, it is dynamic and evolves, especially as circumstances change and difficulties are overcome. One of the fundamental constraints is the extent to which the many planning and implementing organisations and other stakeholders share a vision, and are ready to share power. But even before these limits are reached, many other obstacles to a participatory approach exist, and can usefully be explored. Some of them form a possible research agenda in themselves for future work. They include:

- Difficult post-war environment, such as damaged or destroyed infrastructure, a fragile state and lack of state services, population movement (as people return to their areas of origin);
- Security concerns, especially fears that the Liberian peace agreement of August 2003 would not hold, and the changing security landscape as armed groups move, realign, and position themselves for a future which may or may not include disarmament or travel to neighbouring conflict zones;
- Low human and social capital after the experience of war, and disruption to education;
- Lack of capacity in a post-war environment at the level of the state, civil society organisations, and potential partners for implementing reintegration;
- Lack of capacity in international agencies, international NGOs, and donors, with varying levels of ability to understand the context and the perspective of other stakeholders;
- Donors' agendas and donor-driven planning (as opposed to local interests), and the sourcing of funding from disparate donors, who themselves have a variety of perspectives. Also, donors' need for quick, measurable results and a definite exit strategy;
- The diversity of actors, with varying agendas, capacities, organisational cultures and interests, ranging from foreign military organisations to local community-based NGOs;
- Short time frame for starting DDR programmes (especially due to security concerns in Liberia and the desire to show results), the speed of implementation generally, and time constraints, especially when combined with lack of forward planning;
- "Cutting and pasting" of programmes without adapting them sufficiently to the particular environment, often for the reasons outlined above (as seen in Liberia, where Sierra Leonean programmes and implementers were sometimes transferred across);

The early stages of DDR – especially disarmament – do not lend themselves to consultation, particularly when there are security concerns, and there has been little opportunity to build up trust or establish relationships between stakeholders. In the case of combatants who are about to disarm, there may be understandable anxiety and uncertainty, not to mention drug dependency or trauma, and the sensitive process of handling weapons. Dealing with foreign armed forces who are acting as peacekeepers is also not usually associated with shared decision-making, even though they may have developed excellent skills in handling situations of potential conflict. Yet this is a formative time in establishing relationships and setting the tone for the several new dispensations which the ex-combatants will be dealing with. The clear perception of the ex-combatants in the survey and focus groups is that information was not accurate, and that their views were not listened to, with all the consequences for trust and credibility which have been mentioned. The risk is that as time passes and the opportunities for a participatory approach increase, patterns have already been established among the programme implementers and the ex-combatants, meaning that participation will not prosper or is harder to initiate in later stages as well.

Engagement with commanders by programme implementers may be necessary but can be problematic. There are complex relationships between commanders and combatants, which can include apparently contradictory elements of exploitation, protection, patronage, and dependency. These relationships can in fact persist long after demobilisation, with former commanders playing a role in the welfare of those who used to be under their command, or organising business schemes. As a point of engagement for the DDR programme, commanders can be potent advocates, but they can also exploit the ordinary ex-combatants. Even ordinary ex-combatants who were appointed to represent their peers can misappropriate benefits intended for the people whose interests they are supposed to represent. In the earliest stages, however, the commanders are at least a point of contact, whose role may or may not be a constructive one. Population movement also restricts who one might engage with.

Thus in response to the question of whether a participatory approach is possible and appropriate for DDR: it is both possible and appropriate, although it is very much a matter of degree, as suggested by the ladder of participation. There are greater possibilities in the later stages, although early commitments and relationship-building can be highly significant, even if the formative impressions were created unintentionally. As with all participatory processes, the question of “who participates” will always be an important one, with a variety of distinct

stakeholders at risk of being overlooked, from female ex-combatants who self-demobilise to receiving communities struggling to deal with their own trauma and that of the former fighters living alongside them. All of these challenges play out in a dynamic and interactive process, where relationships are continuously being formed and remade.

In terms of policy implications, an assessment of reintegration from the point of view of participation is consistent with the more innovative approaches being discussed in second-generation DDR, and the ideals expressed in the Integrated DDR Standards. It goes beyond the ‘minimalist’ versus ‘maximalist’ dichotomy in some DDR thinking. There is already a large body of guidelines and best practice for practitioners and planners, as well as research which makes policy suggestions. The implications of additional areas continue to be explored, such as transitional justice and security sector reform, while the ongoing difficulties such as gender-sensitive programming and livelihoods remain a challenge. As new areas of policy recommendations are added, reminders are given of the need to take an integrated, holistic approach, which is inclusive of stakeholders and is effective and accountable. None of this is easy or straightforward.

Some of the recent iterations of DDR show much more promise in terms of taking on board the importance of participatory processes, even if it is not explicitly described in these terms. These include initiatives which fall under the emerging term of “second generation DDR”, community-centred DDR, and community security (Muggah 2010a; Muggah 2010b). The lessons learned by looking at reintegration from a participatory viewpoint complement the longstanding calls for a holistic, integrated approach to reintegration. Framing DDR in terms of participation is one of several important practical ways to pursue these goals.

Incorporating participation involves integrated planning, joined-up-thinking, and policy coherence, rather than requiring programmes to mushroom into unmanageable processes which attempt to address all needs but achieve none of them. In many cases, additional considerations for reintegration programmes do not necessarily demand an extra aspect to the programme. They may instead require consideration early on in the planning process of timely coordination with those who may be responsible (possibly involving actions at a much later stage, but which can be anticipated well in advance); identification of ways in which the additional priority or action may be undermined by the main reintegration in the meantime; and avoidance of the same. Other policy implications include the following:

- Training of actors at all levels in participatory methods (especially prior to deployment, in the case of international staff);
- Committing of resources (both financial and human), so that this does not become a constraint;
- Incorporation of participatory methods into guidelines such as the IDDRS (which frequently mentions the importance of participation but does not spell out what that would mean or how it might be advanced);
- Forward planning to allow for more time to focus on participatory approaches;
- Endorsement of participation in policy statements in order to facilitate the work of those attempting to advance a participatory approach at the implementation level;
- Development of communications strategies which takes into account the lessons highlighted in terms of miscommunication and its deleterious effects on the entire project;
- Assessment of existing and potential social capital while DDR is being planned, in order to facilitate participatory processes in the more challenging post-war environment;
- Incorporation of participation into the planning of monitoring and evaluation, so that problems can be identified and addressed as they arise;
- Education of donor agencies about the need for participatory approaches, since their influence in determining outcomes is so significant;
- Creation of a specific forum for discussing participatory approaches among different actors in the field at both the planning and implementation stage, some of whom will have more experience than others in taking this approach.

Focus groups, initially selected according to the stakeholders' roles but later perhaps involving mixed groups, could be useful in identifying objectively verifiable indicators for the various rungs of the ladder of participation, to adopt the language of the log frame. This could even amount to adapting the ladder of participation itself to relate more specifically to the process of reintegration. With agreed measures of "success" between planners, ex-combatants, and communities, a different idea of what is being aimed at can emerge. Even if those goals are not achieved, the impact of reaching or missing those goals would itself evolve.

Future research

The constraints under which this study was completed have been set out, and it is useful to bear these in mind in terms of identifying further research in the area of participatory reintegration. Possibilities include:

- A longitudinal study, following a number of groups as they go through the process, in order to identify the temporal aspects of certain variables, and explore the way in which attitudes and experiences evolve. This could also clarify the causal processes at play, since the sequence in which certain phenomena occur may become apparent;
- Studies which commence earlier on in the process, rather than beginning several years after DDR has been completed;
- Cases where there is more variation in the degree of participation, which may even amount to a “natural experiment” allowing for a more direct comparison of groups whose main difference is their experience of participation.

Such research may involve working closely with funding or implementing agencies from the start of the planning process. This may, of course, raise particular issues, but it could be worthwhile in terms of access, establishing baselines, and developing a robust sampling methodology. The research could be incorporated into the planning of monitoring and evaluation, which is normally part of any well-organised intervention. The ladder of participation remains a useful framework for doing this.

Focus groups remain an important means of assessing participation. This could be extended to focus groups of implementers and also of planners, especially when these explore the same aspects of communication and programming from different perspectives.

In conclusion

Reintegration is a complex process which raises many moral, practical, and operational questions. It is ultimately about the remaking of relationships on many levels: not only between individuals, communities, and states, but within all of these entities as well. This research shows that participatory approaches in the Sierra Leone and Liberia DDR programmes were only seen to a limited extent. Lack of participation had negative consequences for the specific programme objectives, and also for the wider peacebuilding project to which DDR is meant to contribute. Inaccurate information, lack of consultation, failures in programme delivery, and misappropriation – all of which are closely linked to the lower rungs of the ladder of participation – had negative consequences for the rebuilding of social capital and identification with the new system of governance and accountability which is part of these countries’ transition from armed conflict to peace. Where more participatory processes were seen,

however, positive effects on programme outcomes were noticeable such as the ex-combatants' employment, relations with the community, and living conditions.

The benefits in terms of trust and social capital, which a more participatory approach to reintegration programming could bring, do not simply affect the outcomes of the programme. In a sense which is just as significant, but harder to measure, these benefits are fundamental to the way in which the DDR programme relates to the wider peace process. The degree of participation and resultant confidence in and ownership of the programme can influence how reintegration helps to build – or undermine – trust in a new political and economic order or an emerging state. A DDR programme which has observable positive outcomes in terms of livelihoods and social reintegration may still have been implemented in such a way that it teaches stakeholders new “rules of the game” about governance which undermine social capital and trust. This challenges the new social contract which was entered into, and means that the benefits received by ex-combatants and the programme itself do not have a positive interaction with the peace process and the wider task of peacebuilding. Corruption, broken promises, failure to deliver on benefits, and the damaged credibility of local, national and international institutions all lead to particular rules being inferred about how the new order will operate, and the nature of the actors in it. Instead of the benefits received by ex-combatants having an added value or a multiplier effect in terms of social reconstruction, they become part of a zero-sum game, in which interest groups learn that they must fight their corner if they are not to end up being marginalised. Such an out-of-synch DDR programme can actually undo the other work of peacebuilding rather than enhance it.

In the end, DDR programmes are, at best, only facilitators of the process of reintegrating ex-combatants³³. Former fighters and their communities have been dealing with this question for millennia, and will continue to face it whenever there is war, whether or not outsiders get involved to try to help the process. Deciding that DDR programmes are of no use, or must be changed radically, does not mean that the difficult questions about reintegration, which challenge all stakeholders, simply go away. But the way in which the programmes are run can affect how these problematic questions are approached by each of the parties, and what reintegration can contribute to the wider peace process.

³³ I am indebted to Irma Specht of Transition International for highlighting this perspective, through the training courses run by her organisation jointly with International Alert.

Bibliography

B

- Barbour, Rosaline, 2007, *Doing Focus Groups*, London: Sage.
- Batchelor, Peter, and Kees Kingma, 2004a, *Demilitarisation and peace-building in Southern Africa, Vol. 1: Concepts and processes*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Batchelor, Peter, and Kees Kingma, 2004b, *Demilitarisation and peace-building in Southern Africa, Vol. 2: National and regional experiences*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Batchelor, Peter, and Kees Kingma, 2004c, *Demilitarisation and peace-building in Southern Africa, Vol. 3: The role of the military in state formation and nation-building*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Batchelor, Peter, and Kees Kingma, 2004d, 'Introduction', in: Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma (eds), *Demilitarisation and peace-building in Southern Africa, Vol. 1: Concepts and processes*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bazeley, Pat, 2007, *Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo*, London: Sage.
- Bebbington, Anthony, 2004, 'Theorizing Participation and Institutional Change: Ethnography and Political Economy', in: Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds), 2004, *Participation: from tyranny to transformation?* London and New York: Zed Books.
- Bekoe, Dorina A, 2008, *Implementing peace agreements: lessons from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bell, Edward and Charlotte Watson, 2006, *DDR: Supporting Security and Development: The EU's added value*, London: International Alert.
- Berdal, Mats R, 1996, *Disarmament, and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 303, Oxford: Oxford University Press (for the International Institute for Strategic Studies).
- Berman, Eric G and Melissa T Labonte, 2006, 'Sierra Leone', in: Durch, William J (ed), *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Bøås, Morten, and Anne Hatløy, 2008, "'Getting in, getting out': militia membership and prospects for re-integration in post-war Liberia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 46, No 1 (2008), pp. 33–55.
- Boersch-Supan, Johanna, 2009, *What the Communities Say: The Crossroads Between Integration and Reconciliation: What Can Be Learned from the Sierra Leonean Experience?* CRISE Working Paper No. 63, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity.
- BOND, 2004, *Learning in Partnerships*, London: BOND and Exchange.
- Bouta, Tsjeard, 2005, 'Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Building Blocs for Dutch Policy', The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael.

Bowd, Richard, 2008, *From Combatant to Civilian: The Social Reintegration of ex-Combatants in Rwanda and the Implications for Social Capital and Reconciliation*, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of York, Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU). (ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.516644 [Accessed 3 June 2011].

Bowd, Richard, 2011, 'Burning the Bridges and Breaking the Bonds: Social Capital and its Transformative Influence in Relation to Violent Conflict', *Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security*, Vol 1, No 1, pp. 37–62.

Brethfeld, Julie, 2010, *Unrealistic Expectations: Current Challenges to Reintegration in Southern Sudan*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Brett, Rachel and Irma Specht, 2004, *Young Soldiers: Why They Choose To Fight*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

C

Caramés, Albert, Vincenç Fisas and Daniel Luz, 2006, *Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes existing in the World during 2005*, Barcelona: Escola de Cultura de Pau, Barcelona Autonomous University. Available from: www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf [Accessed 1 November 2006].

Caramés A and E. Sanz, 2009, *DDR 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008*, Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace. Available from: escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr/ddr2009i.pdf [Accessed 2 June 2010].

Chambers, Robert, 1974, *Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from East Asia*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies; [quoted in Cornwall (2008: p. 276)].

Chambers, Robert, 1983, *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*, Harlow: Longman.

Chambers, Robert, 1994, 'The origins and practice of participatory rural appraisal', *World Development*, Vol 22, 7, July 1994, pp. 953–969.

Chambers, Robert, 1997, *Whose reality counts? Putting the first last*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Chambers, Robert, 1998, *Challenging the professions: frontiers for rural development*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Chambers, Robert, 2002, *Participatory workshops: a sourcebook of 21 sets of ideas and activities*, London: Earthscan.

Cleaver, Gerry and Simon Massey, 2006, 'Liberia: A Durable Peace at Last?', in: Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds), *Ending Africa's Wars: Progressing to Peace*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Cock, Jacklyn, 2004, 'The Sociology of Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in Southern Africa', in: Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma (eds), *Demilitarisation and peace-building in Southern Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Colletta, Nat J, 1999, 'The World Bank, Demobilization, and Social Reconstruction', in: Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (eds), *Light weapons and civil conflict: controlling the tools of violence*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Available from: wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/light/14.pdf [Accessed 9 January 2008].

- Colletta, Nat J, and Michelle L Cullen, 2000, *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Colletta, Nat J, Marcus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, 1996, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Colletta, Nat J and Muggah, Robert, 2009, 'Context matters: interim stabilisation and second generation approaches to security promotion', *Conflict, Security and Development*, 9 (4), pp. 425–453.
- Cooke, Bill and Uma Kothari (eds), 2001a, *Participation: the new tyranny?* London and New York: Zed Books.
- Cooke, Bill and Uma Kothari, 2001b, 'The Case for Participation as Tyranny', in: Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds), *Participation: the new tyranny?* London and New York: Zed Books.
- Cooke, Bill, 2004, 'Rules of Thumb for Participatory Change Agents', in: Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds), 2004, *Participation: from tyranny to transformation?* London and New York: Zed Books.
- Cornwall, Andrea, 2004, 'Spaces for Transformation? Reflections on Issues of Power and Difference in Participation in Development', in: Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds), 2004, *Participation: from tyranny to transformation?* London and New York: Zed Books.
- Cornwall, Andrea, 2008, 'Unpacking 'Participation': models, meanings and practices', *Community Development Journal* Vol 43 No 3 July 2008 pp. 269–283.
- Coulter, Chris, 2008, 'Female fighters in the Sierra Leone war: challenging the assumptions?', *Feminist Review*, 88, pp. 54–73.
- Cox, Michaelene, 2008, 'Reporting the greater odds: Dissent and militancy among trusting East-Central European Citizens', in: Michaelene Cox (ed), *Social capital and peace-building: creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks*, London: Routledge.
- Crawley, Heaven, 1998, 'Living Up to the Empowerment Claim? The potential of PRA', in: Irene Guijt and Meera Kaul Shah (eds), *The Myth of Community: Gender issues in participatory development*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Cutter Patel, Ana, 2009, 'Transitional Justice, DDR, and Security Sector Reform', in: Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf (eds), *Disarming the past: transitional justice and excombatants*, New York: Social Science Research Council.

D

- de Carvalho, Benjamin and Niels Nagelhus Schia, 2011, *Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia: Foreign and Domestic Inside Out?* NUPI Working Paper 787, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
- de Koning, Ruben, 2008, *Resource-conflict links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 2008/2, Stockholm: SIPRI.
- de Watteville, Nathalie, 2002, 'Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs', Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 33, Washington DC: World Bank.

- Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert, 2006, 'A Participatory Approach to DDR: Empowering Local Institutions and Abilities', *Conflict Trends*, 3, pp. 39–43.

E

- Ebnöther, Anja and Philipp Fluri, 2005, *After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership*, PfP Consortium Working Group "Security Sector Reform", Vienna: Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence; and Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
- Edwards, Michael, 1989, 'The Irrelevance of Development Studies', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 11, No 1, Jan 1989, pp. 116–135.
- Ellis, Stephen, 2007, *The mask of anarchy: the destruction of Liberia and the religious dimension of and African civil war*, 2nd edition, New York: New York University Press.
- Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2007, *Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programs existing in the World during 2006*, Barcelona: Escola de Cultura de Pau, Barcelona Autonomous University. Available from: www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/ddr004i.pdf [Accessed 2 August 2008].
- Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2008, *DDR 2008: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in the World during 2007*, Barcelona: Escola de Cultura de Pau, Barcelona Autonomous University. Available from: www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/ddr005i.pdf [Accessed 18 July 2008].
- Eyben, Rosalind and Sarah Ladbury, 1995, 'Popular participation in aid-assisted projects: why more in theory than practice?', in: Nici Nelson and Susan Wright (eds), *Power and Participatory Development: Theory and Practice*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

F

- Fink, Arlene, 1995, *How to Sample in Surveys*, Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Fowler, Alan, 1998, 'Authentic NGDO Partnerships in the New Policy Agenda for International Aid: Dead End or Light Ahead?' *Development and Change*, 29, 1, pp. 137–159.
- Franklin, Thomas, 2009, 'How partnership works', *Development in Practice*, Vol 19 (6), Aug 2009, pp. 789–792.
- Freire, Paulo, 1970, *Pedagogy of the oppressed*, New York: Herder and Herder [Also London: Sheed and Ward, 1972].
- Fukuyama, Francis, 2002, 'Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda', *SAIS Review*, Vol 22, No 1, Winter-Spring 2002, pp. 23–37.

G

- Gamba, Virginia, 2006, 'Post-Agreement Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: Toward a New a New Approach', in: John Darby (ed), *Violence and Reconstruction*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Gaynor, Niamh, 2010a, 'Between Citizenship and Clientship: The Politics of Participatory Governance in Malawi', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 36 No 4, pp. 801–816.
- Gaynor, Niamh, 2010b, *Transforming Participation? The Politics of Development in Malawi and Ireland*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gillham, Bill, 2000, *Case study research methods*, London: Continuum.
- Gomes Porto, João and Imogen Parsons, 2003, *Sustaining Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration*, (Paper 27), Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion.
- Grix, Jonathan, 2002, 'Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research', *Politics*, Vol 22 No 3, pp. 175–186.
- Guijt, Irene and Meera Kaul Shah, 1998, 'Waking up to Power, Conflict and Process', in: Irene Guijt and Meera Kaul Shah (eds), *The Myth of Community: Gender issues in participatory development*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

H

- Hansen, Annika S, and Sharon Wiharta, with Bjørn R. Claussen and Stian Kjeksrud, 2007, *The Transition to a Just Order: Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict – A Practitioners' Guide*, Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy
- Hennink, Monique M, 2007, *International focus group research: a handbook for the health and social sciences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hickey, Samuel and Giles Mohan (eds), 2004a, *Participation: from tyranny to transformation?: exploring new approaches to participation in development*, London and New York: Zed Books.
- Hickey, Sam and Giles Mohan, 2004b, 'Relocating Participation within a Radical Politics of Development: Insights from Political Action and Practice', in: Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds), 2004, *Participation: from tyranny to transformation?* London and New York: Zed Books.
- Hill, Richard, Gwendolyn Taylor, and Jonathan Temin, 2008, 'Would You Fight Again? Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration', Special Report 211, Sept 2008, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Holmes, Tim, 2001, *A participatory approach in practice: understanding fieldworkers' use of participatory rural appraisal in Actionaid the Gambia*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
- Hough, Leslie, 2007, 'A study of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and private military companies in Sierra Leone', *African Security Review*, Vol 16 No 4, pp. 8–20.

- Human Rights Watch, 2005, *Youth, poverty and blood: the lethal legacy of West Africa's regional warriors*, (Vol 17, No 5, March 2005), New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M Weinstein, 2004, *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone, June-August 2003*, New York: Columbia University and Stanford: Stanford University.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M Weinstein, 2005, *Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2005; Working Paper Number 69, Center for Global Development.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M Weinstein, 2007, Demobilization and Reintegration, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, August 2007, 51, 4, 531–567.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M Weinstein, 2009, 'Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone: assessing progress, in: Robert Muggah (ed), *Security and post-conflict reconstruction: dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war*, Abingdon; New York: Routledge.

I

- Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)*, 2006, New York: United Nations (1 August 2006 version). Available from: www.unddr.org [Accessed 2 Feb 2007].

J

- Jackson W J and A W Ingles, 1998, *Participatory techniques for community forestry: a field manual*, Cambridge: IUCN.
- Jennings, Kathleen M, 2007, 'The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex-combatants in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 14, No 2, April 2007, pp. 204–218.
- Jennings, Kathleen M, 2009, 'The political economy of DDR in Liberia: a gendered critique', *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol 9, No 4, pp. 475–494.
- Johnson, R Burke and Anthony J Onwuegbuzie, 2004, 'Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come', *Educational Researcher*, Vol 33 No 7, pp 14–26.

K

- Keen, David, 2005, *Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone*, Oxford: James Currey.
- Keen, David, 2009, 'A tale of two wars: great expectations, hard times', *Conflict, Security and Development*, 9 (4), pp. 515–534.
- Kelly Ute, 2004, 'Confrontations with Power: Moving beyond the 'Tyranny of Safety' in Participation', in: Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds), 2004, *Participation: from tyranny to transformation?* London and New York: Zed Books.

- King, Gary, Robert O Keohane and Sidney Verba, 1994, *Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kingma, Kees, 1997, 'Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their reintegration into civilian life', *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 30 Issue 3, Aug 1997, 151–166.
- Kingma, Kees, 2000, 'The Impact of Demobilization', in: Kees Kingma (ed), *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: the development and security impacts*, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kingma, Kees, 2004, 'Demobilisation, Reintegration and Peace-Building in Southern Africa', in: Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma (eds), *Demilitarisation and peace-building in Southern Africa*, Vol. 1: Concepts and processes, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Knight, Mark, and Alpaslan Özerdem, 2004, 'Guns, camps and cash: Disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of former combatants in transitions from war to peace', *Journal Of Peace Research*, 41 (4), July 2004, 499–516.
- Kothari, Uma, 2001, 'Power, Knowledge and Social Control in Participatory Development', in: Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds), *Participation: the new tyranny?* London and New York: Zed Books.
- Krueger, Richard, 1997, *Analyzing and reporting focus group results*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

L

- Leff, Jonah, 2008, 'The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration of Ex-combatants: A Case for Sierra Leone', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol 8, No 1, pp. 9–38.
- Long, Carolyn, 2001, *Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives: Taking Their Rightful Place*, London: Earthscan Publications.

M

- Madriz, Esther, 2003, 'Focus Groups in Feminist Research', in: Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds), *Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials*, 2nd edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- McConnan, Isobel and Sarah Uppard, 2001, *Children Not Soldiers: Guidelines for Working with Child Soldiers and Children Associated with Fighting Forces*, London: Save the Children Fund.
- McKay, Susan and Dyan Mazurana, 2004, *Where are Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War*, Montreal: Rights & Democracy (International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development).
- Micolta, Patricia H, 2008, 'Illicit interest groups, social capital, and conflict: A study of the FARC', in: Michaelene Cox (ed), *Social Capital and Peace-Building: Creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks*, London and New York: Routledge.

- Miller, Derek, Daniel Ladouceur and Zoe Dugal, 2006, *From Research to Road Map: Learning from the Arms for Development Initiative in Sierra Leone*, (UNIDIR/2006/2), Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).
- Mitton, Kieran, 2008, 'Engaging disengagement: The political reintegration of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front', *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol 8 No 2, pp. 193–222.
- Molloy, Desmond, unpublished, 'The Qualitative /Quantitative Dilemma: Analysis of DDR in Sierra Leone' (unpublished paper).
- Molloy, Desmond, 2008, *DDR: A Shifting Paradigm and the Scholar/Practitioner Gap*, Occasional Paper 1, Ottawa: Canadian Peacekeeping Press of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.
- Muggah, Robert, 2005, 'No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts', *The Round Table*, Vol. 94, No. 379, Apr 2005, p. 239–252.
- Muggah, Robert, 2010a, *Innovations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy and research: Reflections on the last decade*, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
- Muggah, Robert, 2010b, 'The effects of stabilisation on humanitarian action in Haiti', *Disasters*, Vol 34 (S3), pp. S444–S463.

N

- Nass, I. A., 2000, *A study in internal conflicts: the Liberian crisis and the West African peace initiative*, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
- Nathan, Laurie, 2007, *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform*, (Revised Second Edition), Birmingham: University of Birmingham.
- Nelson, Nici and Susan Wright (eds), 1995, *Power and Participatory Development: Theory and Practice*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Nichols, Ryan, 2005, 'Disarming Liberia: Pitfalls and Progress', in: Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman (eds), *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

O

- Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., 2003, 'Sierra Leone', in: Jane Boulden (ed), *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organisations*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Olonisakin, Funmi, 2003, 'Liberia', in: Jane Boulden (ed), *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organisations*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), 2006 New York: United Nations, (1 August 2006 version). Available from: www.unddr.org [Accessed 29 Jan 2007].

P

- Paes, Wolfgang-Christian, 2005, 'The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 12 No 2, pp. 253–261.
- Paffenholz, Thania, 2008, 'Exploring opportunities and obstacles for a constructive role of social capital in peacebuilding', in: Michaelene Cox (ed), *Social Capital and Peace-Building: Creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Peeters, Pia, Wendy Cunningham, Gayatri Acharya and Arvil Van Adams, 2009, *Youth employment in Sierra Leone: sustainable livelihood opportunities in a post-conflict setting*, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Peters, K and Richards, Paul, 1998, "'Why We Fight': Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone", *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 68 (2), pp. 183–210.
- Pretty, Jules N, 1995, 'Participatory Learning For Sustainable Agriculture', *World Development*, Vol. 23, No. 8, pp. 1247–1263.
- Pretty, Jules, 2003, 'What have we learned about participatory methods? Some thoughts on the personal and professional', in: Andrea Cornwall and Garrett Pratt (eds), *Pathways to participation: reflections on PRA*, London: ITDG Publications.
- Pretty, Jules, Irene Guijt, John Thompson and Ian Scoones, 1995, *A Trainer's Guide for Participatory Learning and Action*, London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Pugel, James, 2007, 'What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia, February–March 2006', Monrovia: UNDP Liberia Joint Implementation Unit (JIU).
- Pugel, James, 2009, 'Measuring reintegration in Liberia: assessing the gap between outputs and outcomes', in: Robert Muggah (ed), *Security and post-conflict reconstruction: dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war*, Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
- Putnam, Robert D, 1993, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D, 1995, 'Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America' *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 664–683.
- Putnam, Robert D, 2000, *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*, New York: Simon and Schuster.

R

- Ramalingam, Ben and Harry Jones, 2008, *Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and implications for development and humanitarian efforts*, Working Paper 285, London: ODI

Richards, Lyn, 2005, *Handling qualitative data: a practical guide*, London; Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

S

Salganik, Matthew J and Douglas D Heckathorn, 2004, 'Sampling and Estimation in Hidden Populations Using Respondent-Driven Sampling', *Sociological Methodology*, 34 (4), pp. 193–239.

Simons, Helen, 2009, *Case study research in practice*, Los Angeles; London: Sage Publications.

Smyth, Marie, 2005, 'Insider–outsider issues in researching violent and divided societies', in: Elisabeth Porter, Gillian Robinson, Marie Smyth, Albrecht Schnabel and Eghosa Osaghae (eds), *Researching conflict in Africa: insights and experiences*, Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press.

Solomon, Christiana and Jeremy Giniifer, 2008, *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone*, Contribution to the Project on DDR and Human Security, Bradford: Centre for International Security and Cooperation, University of Bradford.

Specht, Irma, 2006, *Red Shoes: Experiences of girl-combatants in Liberia*, Geneva: International Labour Office.

Specht, Irma, 2010, *Practice note 4: Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants*, London: International Alert.

Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR), 2006, 'Final Report', Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden. Available from: www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/43/56/cf5d851b.pdf [Accessed 24 April 2006].

T

Thompson, John, 2003, 'Learning from mistakes: reflections on improvisational participation', in: Andrea Cornwall and Garrett Pratt (eds), *Pathways to participation: reflections on PRA*, London: ITDG Publications.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone, 2004a, *Witness to the Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 1*, Freetown: Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Available from: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume1.pdf> [Accessed 18 October 2007].

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone, 2004b, *Witness to the Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 2*, Freetown: Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Available from: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume2.pdf> [Accessed 19 October 2011].

U

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010, *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations*, New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

- UN Secretary-General, 2006a, *Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*, Report of the Secretary-General to UN General Assembly, A/60/705, 2 March 2006.
- UN Secretary-General, 2006b, *Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Report of the Secretary-General to UN Security Council, S/2006/390, 13 June 2006.
- UNICEF and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Sierra Leone, 2006, *Child Protection Situation Analysis in Sierra Leone*, March 2006.
- UNDP, 2005a, *Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants*, New York: UNDP.
- UNDP, 2005b, *Taking RR to the People*, National Information and Sensitization Campaign Field Report, Monrovia: Information and Sensitization Unit, UNDP Liberia.
- Utas, Mats, 2005, 'Building the Future: The Reintegration and Marginalisation of Ex-combatant Youth in Liberia,' in: Paul Richards, (ed), *No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*, Oxford: James Currey.

V

- Verhey, Beth, 2001, *Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating*, Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 23, Washington DC: World Bank. Available from: www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp23.pdf [Accessed 26 January 2005].

W

- Welbourn, Alice, 2007, 'HIV and AIDS, the global tsunami: the role and Stepping Stones as one participatory approach to diminish its onslaught', in: Karen Brock and Jethro Pettit (eds), *Springs of Participation: Creating and Evolving Methods for Participatory Development*, London: Practical Action Publishing.
- White, Sarah, 1996, 'Depoliticising development: the uses and abuses of participation', *Development in Practice*, Vol 6, No 1, Feb 1996.
- Willis, Katie, 2011, *Theories and practices of development*, 2nd edition, London: Routledge.
- World Bank, 2011, *Social Capital* [Online]. Available from <http://go.worldbank.org/C0QTRW4QF0> [Accessed 10 November 2011].
- Wright, Susan and Nici Nelson, 1995, 'Participatory research and participant observation: two incompatible approaches', in: Nici Nelson and Susan Wright (eds), *Power and Participatory Development: Theory and Practice*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Dates and locations of focus group discussions

Sierra Leone

10 September 2008	New Gerihun Road, Bo
11 September 2008	NTC training centre, Bo
11 September 2008	Methodist Primary School, Bo
11 September 2008	Carpentry workshop, Bo
13 September 2008	Kenema
25 September 2008	Makeni

Liberia

09 February 2010	William V S Tubman-Gray High School, Gbarnga, Bong County
12 February 2010	Lawalazu, Lofa County
12 February 2010	Lawalazu, Lofa County
17 February 2010	Cuttington University, Gbarnga, Bong County
27 February 2010	NEPI offices, Monrovia

Interviewees

The list does not include individual ex-combatants, who were interviewed in a variety of locations in both counties. In some cases, the names of the interviewees are not shown, where confidentiality was requested or where it is considered advisable.

Sierra Leone	<i>November 2007 and September 2008</i>
Freetown	
Philip Kamara	Caritas
Raphael Williams	Caritas
Ibrahim Bangura	Director, PRIDE (Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment)
Mohamed Kamara	UNDP Arms for Development project
Wurie Bah	UNDP Arms for Development project
Donald Robertshaw	Child Protection Officer, UNICEF
Mike Charley	UNICEF
Josephine Saccoh	Formerly worked on children's reintegration with Norwegian Refugee Council
Francis Kai Kai	Former head of Sierra Leone NCDDR (by telephone, February 2010)
Bo	
Joe A Sogbandi	Section Chief
Kenema	
Patrick Jamiru	Director, Caritas Kenema
Momoh Kpaka	Child Protection Officer, Caritas Kenema
Patrick Bangura	Principal Social Development Officer (Eastern Province), Ministry for Gender and Children's Affairs
Foday K Mansaray	Chairman, Child Welfare Committee, Nyandayama
Al Haji S M Sheriff	Chairman, Child Welfare Committee, Kpetema, and acting town chief
Makeni	
Two former Caritas employees working with ex-combatants	
Sunkarie Kamara	UNICEF (Makeni)
Alhaji Andrew B. Knu	Mayor of Makeni

Abdul Kamara	Ministry for Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs
Isaac Koroma	Makari-Gbanti Child Welfare Committee
Four members, Children's Forum Network	
Liberia	<i>November 2007 and February 2010</i>
Monrovia	
David Konneh	Don Bosco Homes
Joe Wiah	Don Bosco Homes
John Dennis	NCDDRR
Sofia Warttmann	UNMIL
Maria-Threase Keating	UNDP Deputy Resident Representative
Edwin Dorbor	UNICEF
Paul James-Allen	Program Associate, International Centre for Transitional Justice
K Johnson Borh	Executive Director, National Ex-Combatant Peacebuilding Initiative (NEPI)
Prince Nyentan	National Ex-Combatant Peacebuilding Initiative (NEPI)
Mabel O Zawoo	National Ex-Combatant Peacebuilding Initiative (NEPI)
Aderemi Aibinu	Chief Technical coordinator for DDRR, UNDP
Koliab Nahataba	UNMIL
Staff member	DDR residual caseload programme
Rev Bartholemew Colley	
Sekou W Konneh	Former manager at Carysburg cantonment site
Gbarnga	
Joe-Joe Zubahyea	Country Director, Development Education Network Liberia (DEN-L)
James Tellewoyan	Peacebuilding officer, Development Education Network Liberia (DEN-L)
Danny Giwlay	Former DDR employee; Development Education Network Liberia (DEN-L)
Mogana S. Flomo Jr	Cuttington University; former reintegration trainer
Marcus Dainsee	Former reintegration trainer

Appendix A: Summaries of measures of association in survey

Sierra Leone and Liberia together

Fisher's exact/ANOVA: p values

SIERRA LEONE and LIBERIA					
VARIABLE	Days (self) employed (A14a)	Work status (A15)	Living conditions (A17)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)
<i>Notes</i>	<i>Excludes those choosing education for reintegration</i>	<i>Excludes apprentices and those choosing education for reintegration</i>			
B3 Official advice	0.0118	0.190	0.760	0.006	0.004
C1 Asked for opinion (DD)	0.4965	0.644	0.149	0.049	0.697
D1 Asked for opinion (R)	0.6472	0.151	0.229	0.137	0.008
E1 Views listened to	0.0856	0.128	0.183	0.563	0.000
E3 Knew your needs	0.2641	0.066	0.052	0.736	0.709
E5 What you said have any effect	0.6831	0.022	0.031	1.000	1.000
F1 Reintegration explained	0.3713	0.009	0.009	0.670	0.270
F3 Right language	0.0011	0.258	0.201	0.108	0.308
F5 Enough info	0.0178	0.000	0.000	0.028	0.726
F6 Info accurate	0.0001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
F7 Know where to get info	0.0006	0.013	0.027	0.358	0.108
Test	Oneway ANOVA	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact

Grey shading: outcome unclear

Yellow shading (in this table only): greater participation linked to better outcome

Red shading: greater participation linked to less favourable outcome

Regression/Logit

Days Worked
(excl those selecting education)

BOTH COUNTRIES

Days worked (A14a)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES									
Gender	-2.498 (3.896)	-4.588 (4.282)	-4.808 (3.260)	-5.538 (3.381)	-6.204** (3.080)	-3.225 (3.392)	-6.724** (2.850)	-2.668 (2.842)	
Child during DDR	0.188 (3.494)	0.420 (4.018)	-0.687 (3.124)	0.269 (3.141)	-2.175 (3.149)	0.148 (3.120)	-0.436 (2.661)	-1.004 (2.608)	
Rank	0.189 (1.911)	0.315 (2.109)	0.0182 (1.451)	0.0466 (1.677)	-0.243 (1.528)	0.127 (1.523)	0.548 (1.370)	0.879 (1.358)	
Official advice (B3)	-6.413** (3.093)								-7.276 (5.875)
Asked for opinion (D1)		-1.303 (3.571)							-9.093 (5.444)
Views listened to (E1)			0.989 (0.892)						2.793 (2.394)
Knew your needs (E3)				1.518 (1.933)					4.003 (3.390)
What you said have any effect (E5)					-1.568 (2.512)				-8.148 (5.196)
Reintegration explained (F1)						1.930 (1.524)			4.257 (2.910)
Enough information (F5)							-5.471*** (1.839)		-2.262 (3.478)
Information accurate (F6)								-4.322*** (1.314)	-4.864 (4.580)
Constant	32.09*** (7.485)	27.39** (10.78)	24.79*** (7.044)	24.38*** (7.916)	35.10*** (9.010)	21.35*** (6.971)	37.02*** (5.229)	32.97*** (4.499)	52.17*** (11.45)
Observations	46	38	52	56	50	60	56	56	26
R-squared	0.122	0.041	0.127	0.072	0.105	0.063	0.202	0.227	0.508

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Work Status
(excl those selecting education)

BOTH COUNTRIES

Work status (A15)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES									
Gender	0.0302 (0.750)	0.116 (0.792)	0.404 (0.747)	0.543 (0.718)	0.624 (0.723)	0.0436 (0.697)	0.952 (0.750)	-0.195 (0.761)	
Child during DDR	0.399 (0.602)	0.450 (0.699)	0.550 (0.694)	0.712 (0.578)	1.215* (0.660)	0.597 (0.571)	0.878 (0.598)	0.972 (0.598)	
Rank	0.136 (0.344)	-0.0358 (0.379)	0.0175 (0.341)	0.244 (0.325)	0.201 (0.336)	0.141 (0.304)	-0.0479 (0.325)	-0.244 (0.357)	
Official advice (B3)	0.493 (0.557)								-2.026* (1.221)
Asked for opinion (D1)		0.257 (0.611)							3.330** (1.595)
Views listened to (E1)			-0.218 (0.198)						-1.556** (0.609)
Knew your needs (E3)				-0.173 (0.366)					-1.221 (0.750)
What you said have any effect (E5)					0.383 (0.512)				3.661*** (1.269)
Reintegration explained (F1)						-0.388 (0.309)			-0.368 (0.736)
Enough information (F5)							1.267*** (0.391)		-0.561 (0.751)
Information accurate (F6)								1.286*** (0.368)	1.902** (0.960)
cut1									
Constant	0.735 (1.336)	0.173 (1.841)	0.196 (1.549)	0.843 (1.560)	2.616 (1.904)	-0.226 (1.386)	3.292** (1.333)	2.569** (1.288)	5.497** (2.527)
cut2									
Constant	1.061 (1.334)	0.581 (1.833)	0.352 (1.546)	1.111 (1.559)	2.917 (1.905)	0.0368 (1.382)	3.634*** (1.347)	2.937** (1.297)	5.921** (2.560)
cut3									
Constant	2.013 (1.352)	1.636 (1.835)	1.324 (1.553)	1.934 (1.571)	3.803** (1.929)	0.829 (1.385)	4.651*** (1.394)	4.052*** (1.339)	8.419*** (2.869)
Observations	50	41	60	64	59	67	63	62	30

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Living Conditions
BOTH COUNTRIES

Living conditions (A17)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES									
Gender	-3.321** (1.441)	- 3.753*** (1.440)	- 3.813*** (1.376)	-2.860** (1.458)	-3.455** (1.342)	- 3.826*** (1.349)	-3.031** (1.350)	-2.817** (1.285)	
Child during DDR	-0.306 (0.739)	-0.993 (0.877)	0.139 (0.842)	0.477 (0.728)	0.300 (1.147)	0.252 (0.736)	0.704 (0.889)	1.669* (0.921)	
Rank	0.0167 (0.384)	-0.692 (0.454)	0.0453 (0.343)	0.0638 (0.385)	-0.158 (0.401)	0.0194 (0.335)	-0.599 (0.420)	-0.441 (0.434)	
Official advice (B3)	0.349 (0.622)								-0.429 (2.291)
Asked for opinion (D1)		0.823 (0.818)							4.733* (2.778)
Views listened to (E1)			-0.153 (0.224)						0.363 (1.257)
Knew your needs (E3)				0.184 (0.411)					1.784 (1.294)
What you said have any effect (E5)					-0.417 (1.077)				-3.224 (2.620)
Reintegration explained (F1)						-0.376 (0.312)			0.291 (1.985)
Enough information (F5)							2.152*** (0.552)		-1.431 (1.858)
Information accurate (F6)								2.189*** (0.459)	3.927* (2.005)
cut1									
Constant	- 6.669*** (2.428)	- 7.576*** (2.904)	- 8.383*** (2.591)	-6.295** (2.793)	-8.702** (4.028)	- 8.682*** (2.446)	-5.252** (2.343)	-4.444* (2.274)	4.677 (4.794)
cut2									
Constant	-3.566* (1.829)	-4.902** (2.428)	-4.123** (1.951)	-2.028 (2.273)	-4.384 (3.650)	- 4.487*** (1.742)	-0.542 (1.655)	1.067 (1.744)	7.846 (5.169)
cut3									
Constant	-2.713 (1.812)	-3.894 (2.405)	-3.355* (1.950)	-1.385 (2.275)	-3.696 (3.640)	-3.763** (1.733)	0.665 (1.723)	2.408 (1.838)	10.15* (5.530)
Observations	40	30	56	56	51	58	54	53	17

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Positive View

BOTH COUNTRIES

Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES									
Gender	0.196 (0.566)	-0.0250 (0.577)	0.0138 (0.587)	-0.166 (0.547)	0.0457 (0.572)	0.0425 (0.527)	-0.437 (0.548)	0.154 (0.563)	
Child during DDR	0.816 (0.536)	0.896 (0.577)	0.633 (0.584)	0.578 (0.535)	0.905 (0.606)	0.715 (0.524)	0.644 (0.550)	0.673 (0.556)	
Rank	-0.0603 (0.298)	-0.0870 (0.319)	-0.206 (0.274)	-0.308 (0.279)	-0.144 (0.287)	-0.248 (0.264)	-0.0397 (0.289)	0.0426 (0.300)	
Official advice (B3)	-0.868* (0.483)								-0.208 (0.829)
Asked for opinion (D1)		-0.775 (0.490)							-0.134 (1.013)
Views listened to (E1)			0.0131 (0.147)						0.198 (0.399)
Knew your needs (E3)				-0.1000 (0.301)					0.109 (0.445)
What you said have any effect (E5)					0.0666 (0.406)				-0.801 (0.656)
Reintegration explained (F1)						0.189 (0.237)			0.136 (0.435)
Enough information (F5)							-1.038** (0.405)		-0.198 (0.634)
Information accurate (F6)								- 0.905*** (0.283)	-0.675 (0.561)
Constant	0.964 (1.105)	1.246 (1.404)	0.532 (1.184)	1.203 (1.327)	0.423 (1.502)	0.115 (1.032)	2.346** (1.094)	1.988* (1.019)	3.539* (1.891)
Observations	86	77	91	100	91	102	98	97	50

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Negative View

BOTH COUNTRIES

Negative community view of ex-combatants (A22)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES									
Gender	1.370** (0.575)	1.179** (0.588)	1.309** (0.610)	1.918*** (0.592)	1.613*** (0.567)	1.573*** (0.536)	1.744*** (0.567)	1.831*** (0.630)	
Child during DDR	0.423 (0.559)	0.331 (0.600)	0.310 (0.614)	0.809 (0.561)	0.474 (0.594)	0.567 (0.534)	0.807 (0.545)	1.007 (0.627)	
Rank	0.0162 (0.334)	0.0953 (0.355)	0.379 (0.334)	0.524* (0.313)	0.502 (0.323)	0.137 (0.312)	0.413 (0.312)	0.449 (0.339)	
Official advice (B3)	1.041** (0.509)								0.648 (1.108)
Asked for opinion (D1)		-1.185** (0.526)							-2.358 (1.679)
Views listened to (E1)			- 0.531*** (0.181)						-0.333 (0.621)
Knew your needs (E3)				0.478 (0.348)					0.473 (0.539)
What you said have any effect (E5)					0.0453 (0.429)				1.037 (0.752)
Reintegration explained (F1)						-0.294 (0.265)			0.623 (0.561)
Enough information (F5)							0.218 (0.415)		-0.797 (0.811)
Information accurate (F6)								1.348*** (0.366)	1.049 (0.682)
Constant	- 3.862*** (1.262)	-0.599 (1.427)	-1.567 (1.274)	- 5.327*** (1.612)	-3.908** (1.669)	-2.566** (1.126)	- 4.095*** (1.228)	- 6.939*** (1.598)	-2.963 (2.216)
Observations	86	77	91	100	91	102	98	97	50

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sierra Leone

Fisher's exact/ANOVA: p values

SIERRA LEONE					
VARIABLE	Days (self) employed (A14a)	Work status (A15)	Living conditions (A17)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)
Notes	Excludes those choosing education for reintegration	Excludes apprentices and those choosing education for reintegration			
B3 Official advice	0.1483	0.730	0.534	0.169	0.574
D1 Asked for opinion (R)	0.3729	0.270	0.047	0.133	0.648
E1 Views listened to	0.7258	0.751	0.374	0.443	0.304
E3 Knew your needs	0.8340	0.643	0.117	0.299	0.457
E5 What you said have any effect	0.4123	0.549	0.013	0.262	1.000
F1 Reintegration explained	0.0257 (n=21)	0.897	0.756	0.281	0.281
F5 Enough info	0.1764	0.563	0.327	0.124	0.793
F6 Info accurate	0.7671	0.902	0.057	0.027	0.747
Test	Oneway ANOVA	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact

Grey shading: outcome unclear

Yellow shading (in this table only): greater participation linked to better outcome

Grey text: n<20, or insufficient variation on independent variable

X: Test not possible

Regression/Logit

Days Worked
(excl those selecting education)

SIERRA LEONE

Days worked (A14a)								
VARIABLES								
Gender	4.482 (12.79)	-15.67 (16.46)	-7.772 (18.04)	-2.635 (14.23)	-4 (11.72)	-12.96 (11.37)	-14.59 (9.943)	-3.021 (12.20)
Child during DDR	0.150 (8.946)	-3.139 (10.06)	-5.856 (12.85)	-1.609 (11.58)	-11 (10.09)	-10.48 (8.370)	-12.77 (7.379)	-15.89 (12.52)
Rank	-3.193 (3.516)	-4.778 (4.148)	-1.978 (3.662)	-1.031 (4.326)	-1 (3.870)	-3.960 (2.908)	-2.635 (2.702)	-2.800 (3.627)
Official advice (B3)	-12.86* (6.111)							
Asked for opinion (D1)		-9.639 (10.06)						
Views listened to (E1)			-0.428 (3.560)					
Knew your needs (E3)				0.00684 (4.902)				
What you said have any effect (E5)					-8 (4.957)			
Reintegration explained (F1)						-10.82** (3.677)		
Enough information (F5)							-10.45*** (3.270)	
Information accurate (F6)								-7.385 (5.404)
Constant	34.95* (17.09)	60.75 (34.92)	32.95 (34.70)	21.28 (21.33)	48* (21.52)	55.70*** (17.69)	57.27*** (15.59)	46.00* (21.50)
Observations	16	13	14	16	11	18	16	16
R-squared	0.309	0.196	0.065	0.009	0.335	0.411	0.495	0.168

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Work Status
(excl those selecting education)

SIERRA LEONE

Work status (A15)								
VARIABLES								
Gender	-0.235 (1.715)	21.40 (0)	2.258 (2.790)	0.191 (1.600)	0.579 (0)	1.559 (1.769)	3.623* (2.178)	0.246 (1.672)
Child during DDR	-1.245 (1.622)	-1.372 (0)	0.809 (2.178)	-0.368 (1.557)	18.79 (0)	0.552 (1.651)	1.978 (1.802)	2.054 (2.469)
Rank	0.0853 (0.561)	0.641 (0)	-0.110 (0.575)	-0.252 (0.533)	-0.182 (0)	0.103 (0.521)	0.0995 (0.584)	-0.465 (0.601)
Official advice (B3)	0.375 (1.015)							
Asked for opinion (D1)		20.77 (0)						
Views listened to (E1)			0.463 (0.598)					
Knew your needs (E3)				0.0461 (0.601)				
What you said have any effect (E5)					19.34 (0)			
Reintegration explained (F1)						1.363* (0.753)		
Enough information (F5)							2.512*** (0.901)	
Information accurate (F6)								1.232 (1.097)
cut1								
Constant	-0.848 (2.274)	62.37 (0)	3.476 (5.609)	-0.836 (2.586)	57.27 (0)	3.414 (3.086)	7.883** (3.952)	2.299 (3.739)
cut2								
Constant	-0.270 (2.257)	63.33 (0)	4.072 (5.613)	-0.342 (2.577)	58.12 (0)	3.947 (3.118)	8.741** (4.080)	2.903 (3.746)
cut3								
Constant	1.001 (2.253)	65.09 (0)	5.668 (5.671)	0.880 (2.567)	59.89 (0)	5.222 (3.197)	10.97** (4.451)	4.543 (3.791)
Observations	17	13	15	18	13	19	17	16

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Positive View

SIERRA LEONE

Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)								
VARIABLES								
Rank	-0.327 (0.605)	-0.754 (0.708)	-0.456 (0.605)	-0.192 (0.584)	-0.421 (0.671)	-0.454 (0.570)	-0.496 (0.660)	-0.316 (0.637)
Official advice (B3)	1.186 (1.090)							
Asked for opinion (D1)		-1.675 (1.700)						
Knew your needs (E3)				0.766 (0.925)				
What you said have any effect (E5)					-0.284 (1.255)			
Reintegration explained (F1)						-0.780 (0.758)		
Enough information (F5)							-1.430* (0.866)	
Information accurate (F6)								-0.424 (0.936)
Views listened to (E1)								
Constant	-2.281 (1.861)	3.561 (3.783)	0.125 (1.180)	-2.604 (2.840)	0.762 (3.936)	1.086 (1.630)	2.608 (2.063)	0.955 (3.072)
Observations	20	15	15	20	13	22	19	18

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Negative View

SIERRA LEONE

Negative community view of ex-combatants (A22)								
VARIABLES								
Official advice (B3)	1.099 (1.291)							
Rank		-0.0912 (0.769)	-0.297 (0.715)	-0.419 (0.681)	-0.127 (0.695)	-0.653 (0.638)	-0.291 (0.657)	0.144 (0.700)
Views listened to (E1)			-0.521 (0.659)					
What you said have any effect (E5)					-0.284 (1.255)			
Reintegration explained (F1)						0.626 (0.733)		
Enough information (F5)							0.109 (0.754)	
Constant	-2.197 (1.915)	-1.518 (1.730)	1.284 (3.445)	-0.0481 (1.150)	-0.120 (3.974)	-1.323 (1.669)	-1.067 (1.911)	-1.125 (1.186)
Observations	12	13	18	15	13	22	19	14

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Liberia (Rural)

Fisher's exact/ANOVA: p values

LIBERIA (Rural)					
VARIABLE	Days (self) employed (A14a)	Work status (A15)	Living conditions (A17)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)
<i>Notes</i>	<i>Excludes those choosing education for reintegration</i>	<i>Excludes apprentices and those choosing education for reintegration</i>			
B3 Official advice	0.0155	0.105	1.000	0.002	0.000
D1 Asked for opinion (R)	0.7492	0.122	0.500	0.785	0.100
E1 Views listened to	0.9330	1.000	1.000	0.336	0.056
E3 Knew your needs	0.5452	0.651	1.000	0.625	0.062
E5 What you said have any effect	0.092	0.023	0.500	0.555	0.093
F1 Reintegration explained	0.6614	0.134	0.600	0.518	0.839
F5 Enough info	0.1076	0.056	0.800	0.078	0.074
F6 Info accurate	0.0276	0.027	1.000	0.004	0.000
Test	Oneway ANOVA	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact

Yellow shading (in this table only): greater participation linked to better outcome

Grey text: n<20, or insufficient variation on independent variable

Regression/Logit

Days Worked
(excl those selecting education)

LIBERIA (Rural)

Days worked (A14a)										
VARIABLES										
Gender	-3.912 (4.337)	-3.912 (4.337)	-5.136 (4.566)	-7.343 (5.245)	-5.568 (4.454)	-3.923 (4.639)	-5.230 (4.259)	-5.140 (4.577)	-3.418 (4.773)	
Child during DDR	1.858 (4.374)	1.858 (4.374)	2.794 (4.542)	5.482 (5.333)	3.229 (4.615)	7.467 (4.960)	1.815 (4.518)	2.224 (4.872)	2.673 (4.500)	
Rank	3.399 (2.645)	3.399 (2.645)	2.992 (2.761)	4.549 (3.379)	3.162 (2.932)	5.821* (3.091)	1.833 (2.899)	2.751 (2.964)	3.777 (2.901)	
Official advice (B3)	-5.331 (3.820)	-5.331 (3.820)								9.117 (8.518)
Asked for opinion (D1)			1.443 (3.966)							- 14.31** (5.437)
Views listened to (E1)				-1.420 (2.063)						3.946 (2.469)
Knew your needs (E3)					-1.606 (2.664)					8.733 (5.035)
What you said have any effect (E5)						-4.510 (2.708)				- 13.78** (5.300)
Reintegration explained (F1)							2.764 (2.557)			5.643* (2.938)
Enough information (F5)								1.810 (3.610)		1.168 (3.987)
Information accurate (F6)									-4.578 (4.084)	- 18.29** (7.546)
Constant	27.62** (10.36)	27.62** (10.36)	20.38 (12.31)	24.36* (12.59)	26.10** (11.69)	24.07* (12.73)	19.70* (10.40)	20.51* (11.52)	29.86** (12.02)	59.87** * (15.17)
Observations	23	23	23	18	22	19	23	22	22	20
R-squared	0.324	0.324	0.256	0.326	0.248	0.464	0.296	0.252	0.293	0.716

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Work Status
(excl those selecting education)

LIBERIA (Rural)

Work status (A15)									
VARIABLES									
Gender	-0.309 (1.052)	0.162 (0.994)	0.427 (1.023)	0.131 (0.992)	-0.535 (1.112)	0.158 (0.986)	0.165 (1.011)	-0.326 (1.057)	
Child during DDR	0.592 (1.072)	0.300 (1.055)	-0.204 (1.107)	0.268 (1.071)	-1.142 (1.274)	0.368 (1.076)	0.244 (1.108)	0.309 (1.058)	
Rank	- 0.0752 (0.640)	-0.122 (0.642)	-0.708 (0.781)	0.0120 (0.655)	-1.241 (0.801)	- 0.0530 (0.674)	-0.371 (0.680)	-0.453 (0.671)	
Official advice (B3)	1.525 (1.004)								-3.678 (2.781)
Asked for opinion (D1)		0.0829 (0.809)							4.504** (2.227)
Views listened to (E1)			0.143 (0.405)						-1.405 (0.859)
Knew your needs (E3)				0.423 (0.534)					-2.558* (1.443)
What you said have any effect (E5)					1.090* (0.625)				5.328*** (1.965)
Reintegration explained (F1)						-0.148 (0.547)			-1.618 (1.055)
Enough information (F5)							0.0960 (0.662)		-0.348 (1.056)
Information accurate (F6)								1.055 (0.873)	4.828* (2.547)
cut1									
Constant	1.146 (2.551)	-0.206 (2.542)	-0.710 (2.477)	0.682 (2.573)	-1.495 (3.022)	-0.432 (2.362)	-0.520 (2.471)	1.079 (2.726)	10.50** (4.576)
cut2									
Constant	1.499 (2.556)	0.119 (2.537)	0.509 (2.477)	1.024 (2.572)	-1.073 (3.005)	-0.106 (2.356)	-0.174 (2.468)	1.431 (2.726)	13.64*** (5.243)
cut3									
Constant	2.572 (2.596)	1.098 (2.537)		2.052 (2.600)	0.299 (3.010)	0.882 (2.360)	0.898 (2.471)	2.575 (2.772)	
Observations	26	26	22	25	23	26	25	25	24

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Positive View
LIBERIA (Rural)

Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)									
VARIABLES									
Gender	-0.278 (0.731)	-0.739 (0.672)	-0.641 (0.787)	-0.632 (0.705)	-0.481 (0.780)	-0.848 (0.721)	-0.669 (0.714)	-0.548 (0.722)	
Child during DDR	0.542 (0.734)	0.699 (0.691)	1.178 (0.818)	0.608 (0.709)	1.303* (0.772)	0.877 (0.720)	0.667 (0.719)	0.689 (0.704)	
Rank	0.0225 (0.467)	-0.105 (0.432)	0.174 (0.482)	-0.172 (0.443)	0.144 (0.463)	-0.130 (0.450)	-0.0169 (0.458)	0.0568 (0.455)	
Official advice (B3)	- 1.458** (0.676)								-0.690 (1.024)
Asked for opinion (D1)		-0.311 (0.613)							-1.070 (1.371)
Views listened to (E1)			-0.102 (0.283)						0.620 (0.538)
Knew your needs (E3)				-0.307 (0.408)					-0.559 (0.588)
What you said have any effect (E5)					-0.0497 (0.453)				-0.806 (0.731)
Reintegration explained (F1)						0.482 (0.361)			0.518 (0.510)
Enough information (F5)							0.0766 (0.673)		0.582 (0.857)
Information accurate (F6)								-0.408 (0.486)	-0.220 (0.692)
Constant	2.330 (1.723)	1.608 (1.656)	0.554 (1.663)	1.890 (1.951)	0.515 (1.869)	0.304 (1.602)	0.940 (1.717)	1.695 (1.709)	3.075 (2.411)
Observations	52	53	41	50	46	50	50	50	39

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Negative View

LIBERIA (Rural)

Negative community view of ex-combatants (A22)									
VARIABLES									
Gender	1.585** (0.794)	2.092*** (0.786)	2.399** (0.982)	1.949** (0.782)	2.074** (0.866)	2.329*** (0.838)	2.054** (0.806)	1.994** (0.813)	
Child during DDR	0.0353 (0.830)	-0.0275 (0.761)	-0.913 (0.955)	-0.113 (0.759)	-1.021 (0.877)	-0.556 (0.792)	-0.0221 (0.791)	-0.128 (0.792)	
Rank	0.155 (0.506)	0.338 (0.457)	0.186 (0.514)	0.362 (0.457)	0.154 (0.491)	0.0792 (0.466)	0.463 (0.478)	0.305 (0.479)	
Official advice (B3)	2.258** (0.877)								19.12*** (2.581)
Asked for opinion (D1)		-1.417** (0.695)							-20.62 (0)
Views listened to (E1)			-0.270 (0.325)						-1.140 (1.185)
Knew your needs (E3)				0.419 (0.436)					0.209 (1.122)
What you said have any effect (E5)					0.606 (0.468)				1.968 (1.315)
Reintegration explained (F1)						-0.538 (0.398)			0.486 (0.931)
Enough information (F5)							-0.331 (0.678)		-0.996 (1.197)
Information accurate (F6)								0.785 (0.522)	1.552 (1.361)
Constant	-5.012** (2.058)	-1.243 (1.660)	-1.940 (1.723)	-3.867* (2.115)	-3.793* (2.014)	-1.705 (1.628)	-2.740 (1.774)	-4.574** (1.966)	-3.383 (3.002)
Observations	52	53	41	50	46	50	50	50	39

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Liberia (Urban)

Fisher's exact/ANOVA: p values

LIBERIA (Urban)					
VARIABLE	Days (self) employed (A14a)	Work status (A15)	Living conditions (A17)	Positive community view of XCs (A22)	Negative community view of XCs (A22)
<i>Notes</i>	<i>Excludes those choosing education for reintegration</i>	<i>Excludes those choosing education for reintegration</i>			
B3 Official advice	X	1.000	1.000	0.066	X
D1 Asked for opinion (R)	X	0.444	1.000	X	X
E1 Views listened to	X	0.315	0.198	1.000	X
E3 Knew your needs	X	1.000	0.083	1.000	X
E5 What you said have any effect	X	1.000	0.118	X	X
F1 Reintegration explained	X	0.254	0.010	0.302	X
F5 Enough info	X	X	X	X	X
F6 Info accurate	X	X	X	X	X
Test	Oneway ANOVA	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact	Fisher's exact

Yellow shading (in this table only): greater participation linked to better outcome

Grey text: $n < 20$, or insufficient variation on independent variable

X: Test not possible

Regression/Logit**Days Worked (excl those selecting education)****LIBERIA (Urban)**

Days worked (A14a)		
VARIABLES		
Gender	-0.476 (0.487)	-0.367 (0.493)
Child during DDR	2.024*** (0.626)	1.950*** (0.623)
Rank	0.770*** (0.255)	0.817*** (0.246)
Official advice (B3)		
Asked for opinion (D1)		
Views listened to (E1)	0.00858 (0.181)	
Knew your needs (E3)		
What you said have any effect (E5)		
Reintegration explained (F1)		0.183 (0.246)
Enough information (F5)		
Information accurate (F6)		
Constant	26.87*** (0.952)	26.23*** (1.063)
Observations	20	19
R-squared	0.689	0.699

Positive View**LIBERIA (Urban)**

Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)	
VARIABLES	
Views listened to (E1)	0.187 (0.450)
Constant	0.320 (2.076)
Observations	21

Standard errors in parentheses – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix B: Statistical analysis of significant associations

Key/abbreviations	
<i>Italics:</i>	Stata command
XCs:	Ex-combatants

The tables included in this Appendix cover all measures of association in the data from the survey which are statistically significant. For regression, significance is $p < 0.1$, and for Fisher's exact test, it is $p < 0.05$.

Text of questions and translation into variables

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	WORDING AND OPTIONS IN SURVEY
Official advice (B3)	"In the last DDDR process you went through, did you meet with an official person who gave you advice about your options for reintegration?"
<i>Options</i>	Yes No Don't Know/No reply
Asked for opinion (D1)	"Were you ever asked for your opinion about the way reintegration was being done?"
<i>Options</i>	Yes No Don't Know/No reply
Views listened to (E1)	"Did you feel your views in general were listened to by those running the programmes?"
<i>Options</i>	Yes, a lot Yes, a bit Neither listened to nor ignored Not much Not at all
Knew your needs (E3)	"Did you feel that people running the programmes knew what your needs were?"
<i>Options</i>	Yes, definitely A bit, to some extent Not at all
<i>Note</i>	By-passed for those answering "no" to Question E1 about their views being listened to
What you said have any effect (E5)	"Did anything you said have any effect on how things were done?"

<i>Options</i>	Yes, definitely A bit, to some extent Not at all
Reintegration explained (F1)	“Was the reintegration process explained to you, so you would know what was going to happen, before or during reintegration?”
<i>Options</i>	Yes, definitely A bit, to some extent Not at all
Right language (F3)	“Did they communicate with you in the right language (English, etc)?”
<i>Options</i>	Yes, definitely More or less No Not applicable
Enough info (F5)	“Did you have enough information about the process?”
<i>Options</i>	Yes, definitely More or less No Not applicable
Info accurate (F6)	“Generally speaking, was the information accurate?”
<i>Options</i>	Yes, definitely More or less No Not applicable
Know where to get info (F7)	“Did you know who or where you could go to get information about DDR[R], once you were involved in the process?”
<i>Options</i>	Yes, definitely More or less No
DEPENDENT VARIABLES	WORDING AND OPTIONS
Days worked (A14a)	“In the last month, how many days were you employed by some one else [or worked for yourself]?”
<i>Note:</i>	<i>A14a excludes those who opted for education as their reintegration option, as their inclusion would have skewed the results.</i>
Work status (A15)	“Which of these best describes your work situation?”
<i>Options</i>	1. Full time employment 2. Consistent part time/contract work 3. Some part time/contract work 4. No job(s) to be found 5. Apprentice (fulltime)
<i>Note:</i>	<i>This excludes those who opted for education as their reintegration option, as their inclusion would have skewed the results.</i>
Living conditions (A17)	“How would you describe your living conditions right now?”

<i>Options</i>	Excellent Good Bad Terrible Don't Know / Refused to answer
Positive community view of ex-combatants and Negative community view of ex-combatants (A22)	"Today, in your opinion, how does your community look upon ex-combatants?"
<i>Options (tick as many as apply)</i>	1. With fear 2. Watchful/distrustful 3. With acceptance 4. With respect 5. With anger 6. With jealousy 7. Other [open ended]
<i>Note:</i>	<i>Those selecting options 1, 5, or 6 were subsequently categorised as "Negative community view of ex-combatants". Those selecting options 3 or 4 were categorised as "positive".</i>
<i>Note:</i>	<i>This is appears as Question number A19 in the slightly shortened Liberian version of the questionnaire.</i>
CONTROL VARIABLES	WORDING AND OPTIONS
Gender (A2)	Male or female
Child status	Aged less than 18 at the time of demobilisation. Calculated from the responses to questions on age at time of survey (A4) and year of demobilisation (B1).
Rank (coded) (A7a)	Open-ended question A7 ("Did you have a special rank or title?") subsequently categorised as Ordinary, NCO Equivalent (Non-Commissioned Officer), and Officer.
Urban	Urban: Monrovia or Freetown (capital cities) Rural: Elsewhere

-----+
Key (all tables)
-----+
frequency
column percentage
-----+

Sierra Leone and Liberia combined

Days worked (A14a)

Official advice (B3)

```
oneway a14daysinwork b3officialadvice, tabulate
```

B3 Official advice	Summary of A14a Days worked excl those choosing education		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Yes	21.969697	9.0880583	33
No	14.565217	12.187274	23
Total	18.928571	10.998937	56

Source	Analysis of Variance			F	Prob > F
	SS	df	MS		
Between groups	743.092415	1	743.092415	6.79	0.0118
Within groups	5910.62187	54	109.455961		
Total	6653.71429	55	120.976623		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: $\chi^2(1) = 2.2517$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.133$

Right language (F3)

```
oneway a14daysinwork f3rightlanguage, tabulate
```

F3 Right language	Summary of A14a Days worked excl those choosing education		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Yes, definitely	22.839286	8.3116059	56
More or less	16	13.856406	3
No	0	0	2
Total	21.754098	9.3944234	61

Source	Analysis of Variance			F	Prob > F
	SS	df	MS		
Between groups	1111.7579	2	555.878952	7.71	0.0011
Within groups	4183.55357	58	72.130234		
Total	5295.31148	60	88.2551913		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: $\chi^2(1) = 1.2062$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.272$

note: Bartlett's test performed on cells with positive variance:
1 multiple-observation cells not used

Enough info (F5)

```
oneway a14daysinwork f5enoughinfo, tabulate
```

F5 Enough info	Summary of A14a Days worked excl those choosing education		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Yes, definitely	21.96	9.3415027	50
More or less	23.928571	7.9272101	14
No	9	10.677078	4
Total	21.602941	9.5825396	68

Source	Analysis of Variance			F	Prob > F
	SS	df	MS		
Between groups	717.43084	2	358.71542	4.29	0.0178
Within groups	5434.84857	65	83.6130549		
Total	6152.27941	67	91.8250658		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: $\chi^2(2) = 0.6442$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.725$

```
regress a14daysinwork a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded f5enoughinfo
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	56
Model	847.869758	4	211.96744	F(4, 51) =	3.22
Residual	3354.98738	51	65.7840664	Prob > F =	0.0196
Total	4202.85714	55	76.4155844	R-squared =	0.2017
				Adj R-squared =	0.1391
				Root MSE =	8.1107

a14daysinw~k	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-6.724029	2.84989	-2.36	0.022	-12.44542	-1.002637
childwhend~d	-.4361513	2.660841	-0.16	0.870	-5.778012	4.90571
a7arankcoded	.5480769	1.369563	0.40	0.691	-2.201435	3.297589
f5enoughinfo	-5.471353	1.838605	-2.98	0.004	-9.162508	-1.780199
_cons	37.01859	5.229205	7.08	0.000	26.52052	47.51666

```
prtab f5enoughinfo
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

F5 Enough info	Prediction
Yes, definitely	24.2135
More or less	18.7421
No	13.2708

Gender (control variable)

```
prtab a2gender
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

A2 Gender Prediction	
-----+	
Male	23.6779
Female	16.9539

Info accurate (F6)

```
oneway a14daysinwork f6infoaccurate, tabulate
```

F6 Info accurate	Summary of A14a Days worked excl those choosing education		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Yes, definitely	26.230769	4.1502549	26
More or less	22.85	7.9622464	20
No	15	11.892375	22
Total	21.602941	9.5825396	68

Source	Analysis of Variance			F	Prob > F
	SS	df	MS		
Between groups	1547.11403	2	773.557014	10.92	0.0001
Within groups	4605.16538	65	70.8486982		
Total	6152.27941	67	91.8250658		

```
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(2) = 22.4824 Prob>chi2 = 0.000
```

```
regress a14daysinwork a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded  
f6infoaccurate
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	56
Model	954.321343	4	238.580336	F(4, 51) =	3.75
Residual	3248.5358	51	63.6967804	Prob > F =	0.0095
Total	4202.85714	55	76.4155844	R-squared =	0.2271
				Adj R-squared =	0.1664
				Root MSE =	7.981

a14daysinw~k	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-2.668128	2.842135	-0.94	0.352	-8.373953	3.037696
childwhend~d	-1.00427	2.608022	-0.39	0.702	-6.240092	4.231552
a7arankcoded	.8791395	1.358429	0.65	0.520	-1.848021	3.6063
f6infoaccu~e	-4.322316	1.314211	-3.29	0.002	-6.960705	-1.683927
_cons	32.96976	4.49879	7.33	0.000	23.93806	42.00145

```
prtab f6infoaccurate
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

F6 Info		Prediction
accurate		
Yes, definitely		26.5251
More or less		22.2028
No		17.8805

Know where to get information (F7)

```
oneway a14daysinwork f7knowwheretogetinfo, tabulate
```

F7 Know where to get info	Summary of A14a Days worked excl those choosing education		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Yes, definitely	22.921053	9.1100823	38
No	8.5714286	11.012979	7
Total	20.688889	10.6767	45

Source	Analysis of Variance			F	Prob > F
	SS	df	MS		
Between groups	1217.167	1	1217.167	13.78	0.0006
Within groups	3798.47744	43	88.3366847		
Total	5015.64444	44	113.991919		

```
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(1) = 0.3847 Prob>chi2 = 0.535
```

Work status (A15)

Official advice (B3)

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice b3officialadvice dlaskedforopinionr
elvewslistenedto e3knewyourneeds e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
flreintegrationexplained f5enoughinfo f6infoaccurate if Option!=13
b3official~e -2.026321 1.220511 -1.66 0.097 -4.418479 .3658362
[all independent variables]
```

```
prtab b3officialadvice
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
Official advice (B3)	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes	0.0873	0.0402	0.5124	0.3601
No	0.4206	0.1053	0.4051	0.0690

Asked for opinion (D1)

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice b3officialadvice dlaskedforopinionr
elviewslistenedto e3knewyourneeds e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
flreintegrationexplained f5enoughinfo f6infoaccurate if Option!=13
prtab dlaskedforopinionr
dlaskedfor~r 3.330322 1.594516 2.09 0.037 .2051273 6.455516
[all independent variables]
```

ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice

	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
Asked for opinion (D1)	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes	0.3188	0.0982	0.4798	0.1032
No	0.0165	0.0085	0.2123	0.7627

Views listened to (E1)

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice b3officialadvice dlaskedforopinionr
elviewslistenedto e3knewyourneeds e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
flreintegrationexplained f5enoughinfo f6infoaccurate if Option!=13
elviewslist~o -1.556164 .6093987 -2.55 0.011 -2.750564 -.3617647
[all independent variables]
```

prtab elviewslistenedto

ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice

	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
Views listened to (E1)	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, a lot	0.0277	0.0140	0.3042	0.6542
Yes, a bit	0.1189	0.0521	0.5439	0.2852
Neither listened to nor ignored	0.3901	0.1042	0.4281	0.0776
Not much	0.7520	0.0705	0.1601	0.0174
Not at all	0.9350	0.0215	0.0398	0.0037

What you said have any effect (E5)

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice b3officialadvice dlaskedforopinionr
elviewslistenedto e3knewyourneeds e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
flreintegrationexplained f5enoughinfo f6infoaccurate if Option!=13
    e5whatyous~t 3.660912 1.26861 2.89 0.004 1.174482 6.147343
    [all independent variables]

prtab e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

E5 What you said have any effect	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.9731	0.0091	0.0163	0.0015
A bit, to some extent	0.4820	0.1051	0.3582	0.0547
Not at all	0.0234	0.0119	0.2724	0.6923

```
tab a15work_no_apprentice e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect if Option!=13, exact chi2
column
```

A15a Work status excl Apprentices	E5 What you said have any effect			Total
	Yes	A bit	Not at all	
Full time employment	2 50.00%	5 35.71%	33 61.11%	40 55.56%
Consistent part time work	0 0.00%	2 14.29%	2 3.70%	4 5.56%
Some part time work	1 25.00%	6 42.86%	5 9.26%	12 16.67%
No job(s) to be found	1 25.00%	1 7.14%	14 25.93%	16 22.22%
Total	4 100.00%	14 100.00%	54 100.00%	72 100.00%

```
Pearson chi2(6) = 13.2766    Pr = 0.039
Fisher's exact = 0.022
```

Reintegration explained (F1)

tab a15work_no_apprentice flreintegrationexplained if Option!=13, exact chi2 column

A15a Work status excl Apprentices	F1 Reintegration explained			Total
	Yes	A bit	Not at all	
Full time employment	13 50.00%	5 26.32%	24 70.59%	42 53.16%
Consistent part time work	1 3.85%	2 10.53%	1 2.94%	4 5.06%
Some part time work	4 15.38%	7 36.84%	1 2.94%	12 15.19%
No job(s) to be found	8 30.77%	5 26.32%	8 23.53%	21 26.58%
Total	26 100.00%	19 100.00%	34 100.00%	79 100.00%

Pearson chi2(6) = 15.5792 Pr = 0.016
Fisher's exact = 0.009

Enough info (F5)

tab a15work_no_apprentice f5enoughinfo if Option!=13, exact chi2 column

A15a Work status excl Apprentices	F5 Enough info			Total
	Yes	More or less	No	
Full time employment	36 66.67%	5 33.33%	0 0.00%	41 54.67%
Consistent part time work	1 1.85%	3 20.00%	0 0.00%	4 5.33%
Some part time work	5 9.26%	5 33.33%	3 50.00%	13 17.33%
No job(s) to be found	12 22.22%	2 13.33%	3 50.00%	17 22.67%
Total	54 100.00%	15 100.00%	6 100.00%	75 100.00%

Pearson chi2(6) = 24.0474 Pr = 0.001
Fisher's exact = 0.000

ologit a15work_no_apprentice a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated
a7arankcoded f5enoughinfo if Option!=13

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	63
	LR chi2(4)	=	14.24
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0066
Log likelihood = -64.195206	Pseudo R2	=	0.0998

a15work_no~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	.9518842	.7504089	1.27	0.205	-.5188902	2.422659
childwhend~d	.8777446	.5976305	1.47	0.142	-.2935897	2.049079
a7arankcoded	-.0478674	.3250772	-0.15	0.883	-.685007	.5892721
f5enoughinfo	1.267156	.3913971	3.24	0.001	.5000318	2.03428
/cut1	3.29171	1.333138			.6788073	5.904612
/cut2	3.633543	1.347315			.9928538	6.274231
/cut3	4.651054	1.394479			1.917926	7.384182

```
prtab f5enoughinfo
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

Enough information (F5)	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.6861	0.0686	0.1402	0.1051
More or less	0.3811	0.0832	0.2414	0.2944
No	0.1478	0.0484	0.2069	0.5970

Info accurate (F6)

```
tab a15work_no_apprentice f6infoaccurate if Option!=13, exact chi2 column
```

A15a Work status excl Apprentices	F6 Info accurate			Total
	Yes	More or less	No	
Full time employment	25	8	8	41
	89.29%	38.10%	32.00%	55.41%
Consistent part time work	1	2	1	4
	3.57%	9.52%	4.00%	5.41%
Some part time work	0	8	5	13
	0.00%	38.10%	20.00%	17.57%
No job(s) to be found	2	3	11	16
	7.14%	14.29%	44.00%	21.62%
Total	28	21	25	74
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

```
Pearson chi2(6) = 29.4012    Pr = 0.000
Fisher's exact = 0.000
```

Info accurate (F6)

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated
a7arankcoded f6infoaccurate if Option!=13
```

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	62
	LR chi2(4)	=	18.00
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0012
Log likelihood = -60.704272	Pseudo R2	=	0.1291

a15work_no~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-.1953427	.7612921	-0.26	0.797	-1.687448	1.296762
childwhend~d	.971867	.5983281	1.62	0.104	-.2008345	2.144569
a7arankcoded	-.243657	.3570328	-0.68	0.495	-.9434285	.4561144
f6infoaccu~e	1.285933	.3676944	3.50	0.000	.565265	2.006601
/cut1	2.568539	1.288196			.0437215	5.093356
/cut2	2.937024	1.296834			.3952766	5.478771
/cut3	4.052144	1.338822			1.428101	6.676186

```
prtab f6infoaccurate
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

Information accurate (F6)	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
	Full time employment	Consistent part time/ contract work	Some part time/ contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.8385	0.0439	0.0757	0.0419
More or less	0.5893	0.0854	0.1888	0.1365
No	0.2839	0.0804	0.2718	0.3639

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice b3officialadvice dlaskedforopinionr
elviewslistenedto e3knewyourneeds e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
flreintegrationexplained f5enoughinfo f6infoaccurate if Option!=13
```

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	30
	LR chi2(8)	=	18.69
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0166
Log likelihood = -28.729798	Pseudo R2	=	0.2454

a15work_no~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
b3official~e	-2.026321	1.220511	-1.66	0.097	-4.418479	.3658362
dlaskedfor~r	3.330322	1.594516	2.09	0.037	.2051273	6.455516
elviewslist~o	-1.556164	.6093987	-2.55	0.011	-2.750564	-.3617647
e3knewyour~s	-1.220613	.7497582	-1.63	0.104	-2.690112	.2488862
e5whatyous~t	3.660912	1.26861	2.89	0.004	1.174482	6.147343
flreintegr~d	-.3677252	.7357858	-0.50	0.617	-1.809839	1.074389
f5enoughinfo	-.5613637	.7513017	-0.75	0.455	-2.033888	.9111606
f6infoaccu~e	1.901848	.9601479	1.98	0.048	.0199929	3.783704
/cut1	5.497296	2.526914			.5446364	10.44996
/cut2	5.921359	2.559554			.9047265	10.93799
/cut3	8.419115	2.868695			2.796575	14.04165

Info accurate (F6)

```
prtab f6infoaccurate
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

Information accurate (F6)	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.7667	0.0672	0.1499	0.0161
More or less	0.3291	0.0993	0.4726	0.0989
No	0.0682	0.0324	0.4757	0.4236

Know where to get information (F7)

```
tab a15work_no_apprentice f7knowwheretogetinfo if Option!=13, exact chi2 column
```

A15a Work status excl Apprentices	F7 Know where to get info		
	Yes, definitely	No	Total
Full time employment	28 66.67%	1 12.50%	29 58.00%
Consistent part time work	1 2.38%	1 12.50%	2 4.00%
Some part time work	5 11.90%	3 37.50%	8 16.00%
No job(s) to be found	8 19.05%	3 37.50%	11 22.00%
Total	42 100.00%	8 100.00%	50 100.00%

```
Pearson chi2(3) = 8.9112 Pr = 0.030
Fisher's exact = 0.013
```


Living conditions (A17)**What you said have any effect (E5)**

```
tab a17livingconditions e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect, exact chi2 column
```

A17 Living conditions	E5 What you said have any effect			Total
	Yes	A bit	Not at all	
Excellent	0 0.00%	1 10.00%	2 4.17%	3 5.08%
Good	0 0.00%	3 30.00%	32 66.67%	35 59.32%
Bad	1 100.00%	3 30.00%	4 8.33%	8 13.56%
Terrible	0 0.00%	3 30.00%	10 20.83%	13 22.03%
Total	1 100.00%	10 100.00%	48 100.00%	59 100.00%

Pearson chi2(6) = 12.0952 Pr = 0.060
 Fisher's exact = 0.031

Reintegration explained (F1)

```
tab a17livingconditions f1reintegrationexplained, exact chi2 column
```

A17 Living conditions	F1 Reintegration explained			Total
	Yes	A bit	Not at all	
Excellent	3 12.50%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	3 4.48%
Good	9 37.50%	2 15.38%	24 80.00%	35 52.24%
Bad	5 20.83%	4 30.77%	2 6.67%	11 16.42%
Terrible	7 29.17%	7 53.85%	4 13.33%	18 26.87%
Total	24 100.00%	13 100.00%	30 100.00%	67 100.00%

Pearson chi2(6) = 23.4470 Pr = 0.001
 Fisher's exact = 0.000

Enough info (F5)

```
ologit a17livingconditions a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
f5enoughinfo
```

```
Ordered logistic regression      Number of obs   =      54
                                LR chi2(4)           =     32.50
                                Prob > chi2           =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -45.835813      Pseudo R2        =     0.2617
```

a17livingc~s	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-3.031217	1.349866	-2.25	0.025	-5.676906	-.3855294
childwhend~d	.7042068	.8888384	0.79	0.428	-1.037884	2.446298
a7arankcoded	-.5986885	.4198771	-1.43	0.154	-1.421632	.2242554
f5enoughinfo	2.152357	.5519803	3.90	0.000	1.070495	3.234218
/cut1	-5.251687	2.343248			-9.84437	-.6590045
/cut2	-.5421439	1.654537			-3.784977	2.70069
/cut3	.6652806	1.722897			-2.711535	4.042097

```
prtab f5enoughinfo
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a17livingconditions
```

	Predicted probability of Living Conditions (A17)			
	Excellent	Good	Bad	Terrible
Enough info (F5)				
Yes, definitely	0.0353	0.7673	0.1289	0.0685
More or less	0.0042	0.3166	0.2916	0.3875
No	0.0005	0.0516	0.1031	0.8448

Enough Info (F5)

```
tab a17livingconditions f5enoughinfo, exact chi2 column
```

A17 Living conditions	F5 Enough info			Total
	Yes	More or less	No	
Excellent	3	0	0	3
	6.67%	0.00%	0.00%	4.84%
Good	32	2	0	34
	71.11%	18.18%	0.00%	54.84
Bad	6	2	2	10
	13.33%	18.18%	33.33%	16.13
Terrible	4	7	4	15
	8.89%	63.64%	66.67%	24.19
Total	45	11	6	62
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00

```
Pearson chi2(6) = 26.5437    Pr = 0.000
Fisher's exact = 0.000
```

Info accurate (F6)

```
ologit a17livingconditions a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
f6infoaccurate
```

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	53
	LR chi2(4)	=	44.28
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -38.107114	Pseudo R2	=	0.3675

a17livingc~s	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-2.81652	1.284714	-2.19	0.028	-5.334513	-.2985272
childwhend~d	1.669103	.921472	1.81	0.070	-.1369489	3.475155
a7arankcoded	-.4410998	.4337216	-1.02	0.309	-1.291179	.408979
f6infoaccu~e	2.188859	.4594593	4.76	0.000	1.288336	3.089383
/cut1	-4.443968	2.273963			-8.900854	.0129176
/cut2	1.066967	1.744223			-2.351647	4.48558
/cut3	2.408201	1.837984			-1.194182	6.010584

```
prtab f6infoaccurate
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a17livingconditions
```

	Predicted probability of Living Conditions (A17)			
Information accurate (F6)	Excellent	Good	Bad	Terrible
Yes, definitely	0.0420	0.8736	0.0609	0.0235
More or less	0.0049	0.5437	0.2743	0.1771
No	0.0006	0.1193	0.2226	0.6576

Info accurate (F6)

```
tab a17livingconditions f6infoaccurate, exact chi2 column
```

A17 Living conditions	F6 Info accurate			Total
	Yes	More or less	No	
Excellent	3 8.57%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	3 4.92%
Good	29 82.86%	2 25.00%	3 16.67%	34 55.74%
Bad	3 8.57%	3 37.50%	3 16.67%	9 14.75%
Terrible	0 0.00%	3 37.50%	12 66.67%	15 24.59%
Total	35 100.00%	8 100.00%	18 100.00%	61 100.00%

```
Pearson chi2(6) = 38.9979   Pr = 0.000
Fisher's exact = 0.000
```

Know where to get information (F7)

```
tab a17livingconditions f7knowwheretogetinfo, exact chi2 column
```

A17 Living conditions	F7 Know where to get info			Total
	Yes	More or less	No	
Excellent	3	0	0	3
	5.56%	0.00%	0.00%	4.69%
Good	31	1	1	33
	57.41%	50.00%	12.50%	51.56%
Bad	10	0	1	11
	18.52%	0.00%	12.50%	17.19%
Terrible	10	1	6	17
	18.52%	50.00%	75.00%	26.56%
Total	54	2	8	64
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Pearson chi2(6) = 12.5786 Pr = 0.050
 Fisher's exact = 0.027

Gender (control variable)

```
ologit a17livingconditions a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded  

flreintegrationexplained
```

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	58
	LR chi2(4)	=	12.25
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0156
Log likelihood = -60.492695	Pseudo R2	=	0.0920

a17livingc~s	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-3.826409	1.348968	-2.84	0.005	-6.470338	-1.18248
childwhend~d	.2524775	.7364579	0.34	0.732	-1.190953	1.695909
a7arankcoded	.0194396	.3352595	0.06	0.954	-.637657	.6765362
flreintegr~d	-.3762733	.3117672	-1.21	0.227	-.9873258	.2347792
/cut1	-8.681532	2.446214			-13.47602	-3.887041
/cut2	-4.487327	1.741739			-7.901072	-1.073581
/cut3	-3.763051	1.732863			-7.159401	-.3667011

```
prtab a2gender
```

ologit: Predicted probabilities for a17livingconditions

Gender (control variable) (A2)	Predicted probability of Living Conditions (A17)			
	Excellent	Good	Bad	Terrible
Male	0.0159	0.5007	0.1714	0.3121
Female	0.4251	0.5549	0.0102	0.0098

Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)**Official advice (B3)**

```
tab a22positive b3officialadvice, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Positive comm view of XCs	B3 Official advice		
	Yes	No	Total
No	23 35.38%	22 64.71%	45 45.45%
Yes	42 64.62%	12 35.29%	54 54.55%
Total	65 100.00%	34 100.00%	99 100.00%

```

Pearson chi2(1) = 7.7408 Pr = 0.005
Fisher's exact = 0.006
1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.005

```

Asked for opinion about disarmament (C1)

```
tab a22positive claskedforopiniondd, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Positive comm view of XCs	C1 Asked for opinion		
	Yes	No	Total
No	4 28.57%	18 64.29%	22 52.38%
Yes	10 71.43%	10 35.71%	20 47.62%
Total	14 100.00%	28 100.00%	42 100.00%

```

Pearson chi2(1) = 4.7727 Pr = 0.029
Fisher's exact = 0.049
1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.031

```

Enough info (F5)

```
tab a22positive f5enoughinfo, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Positive comm view of XCs	F5 Enough info			Total
	Yes	More or less	No	
No	28 34.15%	8 33.33%	6 85.71%	42 37.17%
Yes	54 65.85%	16 66.67%	1 14.29%	71 62.83%
Total	82 100.00%	24 100.00%	7 100.00%	113 100.00%

```
Pearson chi2(2) = 7.5359 Pr = 0.023
Fisher's exact = 0.028
```

Info accurate (F6)

```
logit a22positive a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
f6infoaccurate
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	97
	LR chi2(4)	=	12.74
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0126
Log likelihood = -57.606599	Pseudo R2	=	0.0996

a22positive	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	.1540781	.5627314	0.27	0.784	-.9488553	1.257011
childwhend~d	.672965	.55572	1.21	0.226	-.4162261	1.762156
a7arankcoded	.0425627	.3002624	0.14	0.887	-.5459407	.6310661
f6infoaccurate	-.9052304	.2830125	-3.20	0.001	-1.459925	-.3505362
_cons	1.988133	1.019369	1.95	0.051	-.0097938	3.98606

```
prtab f6infoaccurate
```

```
logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22positive
```

F6 Info accurate	Prediction
Yes, definitely	0.8185
More or less	0.6459
No	0.4246

Info accurate (F6)

```
tab a22positive f6infoaccurate, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Positive comm view of XCs	F6 Info accurate			
	Yes	More or less	No	Total
No	7 17.50%	10 30.30%	24 63.16%	41 36.94%
Yes	33 82.50%	23 69.70%	14 36.84%	70 63.06%
Total	40 100.00%	33 100.00%	38 100.00%	111 100.00%

Pearson chi2(2) = 18.3272 Pr = 0.000
 Fisher's exact = 0.000

Negative community view of ex-combatants (A22)**Official advice (B3)**

```
tab a22negative b3officialadvice, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Negative comm view of XCs	B3 Official advice		
	Yes	No	Total
No	49 75.38%	15 44.12%	64 64.65%
Yes	16 24.62%	19 55.88%	35 35.35%
Total	65 100.00%	34 100.00%	99 100.00%

Pearson chi2(1) = 9.5488 Pr = 0.002
 Fisher's exact = 0.004
 1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.002

Asked for opinion (D1)

```
tab a22negative d1askedforopinionr, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Negative comm view of XCs	D1 Asked for opinion (R)		
	Yes	No	Total
No	24 50.00%	33 78.57%	57 63.33%
Yes	24 50.00%	9 21.43%	33 36.67%
Total	48 100.00%	42 100.00%	90 100.00%

```
Pearson chi2(1) = 7.8742 Pr = 0.005
Fisher's exact = 0.008
1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.004
```

Views listened to (E1)

```
tab a22negative elviewslistenedto, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Negative comm view of XCs	E1 Views listened to					Total
	Yes, a lot	Yes, a bit	Neither	Not much	Not at all	
No	7 41.18%	19 59.38%	5 71.43%	2 33.33%	42 95.45%	75 70.75%
Yes	10 58.82%	13 40.63%	2 28.57%	4 66.67%	2 4.55%	31 29.25%
Total	17 100.00%	32 100.00%	7 100.00%	6 100.00%	44 100.00%	106 100.00%

```
Pearson chi2(4) = 26.2249 Pr = 0.000
Fisher's exact = 0.000
```

Views listened to (E1)

```
logit a22negative a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
elviewslistenedto
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(4)	=	22.08
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0002
Log likelihood = -45.130035	Pseudo R2	=	0.1965

a22negative	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	1.309422	.6097056	2.15	0.032	.1144211	2.504423
childwhend~d	.3103126	.6136841	0.51	0.613	-.8924863	1.513111
a7arankcoded	.3787975	.3344725	1.13	0.257	-.2767566	1.034352
elviewslist~o	-.5306632	.1805957	-2.94	0.003	-.8846243	-.176702
_cons	-1.567136	1.273742	-1.23	0.219	-4.063625	.9293533

```
prtab elviewslistenedto
```

logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22negative

Note: "Positive outcome" means respondents did sense a negative view of them amongst the community

El Views listened to		Prediction
Yes, a lot		0.5351
Yes, a bit		0.4037
Neither listened to nor ignored		0.2848
Not much		0.1898
Not at all		0.1211

Info accurate (F6)

```
logit a22negative a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
f6infoaccurate
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	97
	LR chi2(4)	=	30.25
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -45.649144	Pseudo R2	=	0.2489

a22negative	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	1.831102	.6298506	2.91	0.004	.5966177	3.065587
childwhend~d	1.00724	.6266464	1.61	0.108	-.2209639	2.235445
a7arankcoded	.4494534	.3387004	1.33	0.185	-.2143871	1.113294
f6infoaccu~e	1.347943	.3655838	3.69	0.000	.6314123	2.064474
_cons	-6.93855	1.598358	-4.34	0.000	-10.07127	-3.805827

```
prtab f6infoaccurate
```

logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22negative

F6 Info accurate		Prediction
Yes, definitely		0.0801
More or less		0.2511
No		0.5635

Info accurate (F6)

```
tab a22negative f6infoaccurate, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Negative comm view of XCs	F6 Info accurate			
	Yes	More or less	No	Total
No	36 90.00%	26 78.79%	15 39.47%	77 69.37%
Yes	4 10.00%	7 21.21%	23 60.53%	34 30.63%
Total	40 100.00%	33 100.00%	38 100.00%	111 100.00%

```
Pearson chi2(2) = 25.3738    Pr = 0.000
Fisher's exact = 0.000
```

Gender (control variable)

```
prtab a2gender
```

```
logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22negative
```

A2 Gender	Prediction
Male	0.1813
Female	0.5801

Sierra Leone

No disaggregation for rural v urban in Sierra Leone

Days worked (A14a)

Official advice (B3)

```
regress a14daysinwork a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
b3officialadvice if country==2
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	16
Model	678.261553	4	169.565388	F(4, 11) =	1.23
Residual	1516.73845	11	137.885313	Prob > F =	0.3535
				R-squared =	0.3090
				Adj R-squared =	0.0577
Total	2195	15	146.333333	Root MSE =	11.742

a14daysinw~k	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
a2gender	4.48244	12.79169	0.35	0.733	-23.67188 32.63676
childwhend~d	.1497227	8.945924	0.02	0.987	-19.54012 19.83957
a7arankcoded	-3.193161	3.515857	-0.91	0.383	-10.93151 4.545189
b3official~e	-12.8586	6.110534	-2.10	0.059	-26.30779 .5906001
_cons	34.94547	17.08669	2.05	0.066	-2.662078 72.55302

```
prtab b3officialadvice
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

B3	Prediction
Official advice	
Yes	21.6793 days
No	8.8207 days

Reintegration explained (F1)

```
oneway a14daysinwork flreintegrationexplained if country==2, tabulate
```

F1	Summary of A14a Days worked excl those choosing education		
Reintegration explained	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Yes	15.909091	11.962061	11
A bit	19.5	10.691118	6
Not at all	0	0	4
Total	13.904762	12.263379	21

Source	Analysis of Variance			F	Prob > F
	SS	df	MS		
Between groups	1005.40043	2	502.700216	4.52	0.0257
Within groups	2002.40909	18	111.244949		
Total	3007.80952	20	150.390476		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: $\chi^2(1) = 0.0760$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.783$

note: Bartlett's test performed on cells with positive variance:
1 multiple-observation cells not used

*regress a14daysinwork a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
flreintegrationexplained if country==2*

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	18
Model	957.131111	4	239.282778	F(4, 13) =	2.26
Residual	1373.98	13	105.690769	Prob > F =	0.1181
Total	2331.11111	17	137.124183	R-squared =	0.4106
				Adj R-squared =	0.2292
				Root MSE =	10.281

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a14daysinw~k						
a2gender	-12.96	11.36858	-1.14	0.275	-37.52033	11.60033
childwhend~d	-10.48	8.370059	-1.25	0.233	-28.56241	7.602412
a7arankcoded	-3.96	2.907793	-1.36	0.196	-10.24191	2.321905
flreintegr~d	-10.82	3.677188	-2.94	0.011	-18.76408	-2.875919
cons	55.7	17.68836	3.15	0.008	17.48661	93.91339

prtab flreintegrationexplained

regress: **Predicted values for a14daysinwork**

Fl Reintegration explained	Prediction
Yes, definitely	23.4356 days
A bit, to some extent	12.6156 days
Not at all	1.79556 days

Enough info (F5)

*regress a14daysinwork a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
f5enoughinfo if country==2*

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	16
Model	861.386551	4	215.346638	F(4, 11) =	2.70
Residual	877.613449	11	79.7830408	Prob > F =	0.0866
Total	1739	15	115.933333	R-squared =	0.4953
				Adj R-squared =	0.3118
				Root MSE =	8.9321

a14daysinw~k	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-14.59241	9.943396	-1.47	0.170	-36.47767	7.29286
childwhend~d	-12.77493	7.379291	-1.73	0.111	-29.01664	3.466778
a7arankcoded	-2.63495	2.70175	-0.98	0.350	-8.581462	3.311563
f5enoughinfo	-10.45334	3.270123	-3.20	0.009	-17.65083	-3.255848
_cons	57.2731	15.58959	3.67	0.004	22.96064	91.58556

```
prtab f5enoughinfo
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

F5 Enough info	Prediction
Yes, definitely	25.4367 days
More or less	14.9833 days
No	4.52999 days

Work status (A15)

Note: This excludes those who opted for education as their reintegration option, as their inclusion would have skewed the results.

Reintegration explained (F1)

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated  
a7arankcoded flreintegrationexplained if country==2 & Option!=13
```

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	19
	LR chi2(4)	=	3.84
	Prob > chi2	=	0.4280
Log likelihood = -23.089585	Pseudo R2	=	0.0768

a15work_no~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	1.559333	1.768827	0.88	0.378	-1.907505	5.026171
childwhend~d	.5519904	1.650735	0.33	0.738	-2.683391	3.787372
a7arankcoded	.1032628	.5207724	0.20	0.843	-.9174325	1.123958
flreintegr~d	1.362598	.7526375	1.81	0.070	-.1125447	2.83774
/cut1	3.413621	3.085984			-2.634797	9.462039
/cut2	3.947272	3.118354			-2.16459	10.05913
/cut3	5.221781	3.19657			-1.043382	11.48694

prtab flreintegrationexplained

ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice

	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
Reintegration explained (F1)	Full time employment	Consistent part time/ contract work	Some part time/ contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.5501	0.1257	0.2059	0.1182
A bit, to some extent	0.2384	0.1096	0.3083	0.3437
Not at all	0.0742	0.0460	0.2081	0.6717

Enough info (F5)

*ologit a15work_no_apprentice a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated
a7arankcoded f5enoughinfo if country==2 & Option!=13*

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	17
	LR chi2(4)	=	11.59
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0207
Log likelihood = -16.642114	Pseudo R2	=	0.2582

a15work_no~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	3.622739	2.17835	1.66	0.096	-.6467497	7.892227
childwhend~d	1.977519	1.802142	1.10	0.273	-1.554614	5.509651
a7arankcoded	.0995196	.584482	0.17	0.865	-1.046044	1.245083
f5enoughinfo	2.512442	.9005312	2.79	0.005	.7474338	4.277451
/cut1	7.882869	3.951639			.1377981	15.62794
/cut2	8.740609	4.079985			.7439844	16.73723
/cut3	10.97427	4.450515			2.251421	19.69712

prtab f5enoughinfo

ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice

	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
Enough information (F5)	Full time employment	Consistent part time/ contract work	Some part time/ contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.7770	0.1145	0.0956	0.0129
More or less	0.2203	0.1795	0.4616	0.1385
No	0.0224	0.0288	0.2839	0.6649

Gender (control variable)

```
prtab a2gender
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

Gender (A2)	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Male	0.3197	0.2059	0.3862	0.0882
<i>Female</i>	0.0124	0.0163	0.1877	0.7836

Living conditions (A17)**Asked for opinion (D1)**

```
tabulate a17livingconditions d1askedforopinionr if country==2 , exact chi2 column
```

A17 Living conditions	D1 Asked for opinion (R)		Total
	Yes	No	
Good	3	2	5
	75.00%	11.76%	23.81%
Bad	0	6	6
	0.00%	35.29%	28.57%
Terrible	1	9	10
	25.00%	52.94%	47.62%
Total	4	17	21
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

```
Fisher's exact = 0.047
```

What you said have any effect (E5)

```
tabulate a17livingconditions e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect if country==2 , exact
chi2 column
```

A17 Living conditions	E5 What you said have any effect			Total
	Yes	A bit	Not at all	
Good	0 0.00%	2 50.00%	2 14.29%	4 21.05%
Bad	1 100.00%	2 50.00%	2 14.29%	5 26.32%
Terrible	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	10 71.43%	10 52.63%
Total	1 100.00%	4 100.00%	14 100.00%	19 100.00%

Fisher's exact = 0.013

Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)**Enough info (F5)**

```
logit a22positive a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
f5enoughinfo if country==2
```

note: a2gender != 1 predicts success perfectly
a2gender dropped and 1 obs not used

note: childwhendemobilisedestimated != 0 predicts success perfectly
childwhendemobilisedestimated dropped and 2 obs not used

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	19
	LR chi2(2)	=	3.89
	Prob > chi2	=	0.1428
Log likelihood = -9.902962	Pseudo R2	=	0.1643

a22positive	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a7arankcoded	-.4955049	.6595122	-0.75	0.452	-1.788125	.7971153
f5enoughinfo	-1.429698	.8662078	-1.65	0.099	-3.127434	.2680381
_cons	2.607567	2.062838	1.26	0.206	-1.435521	6.650655

```
prtab f5enoughinfo
```

logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22positive

F5 Enough info	Prediction
Yes, definitely	
More or less	
No	

Note: Prediction not made by regression, but tabulation of results shows those receiving enough information were much more likely to experience a positive perception by the community.

Info accurate (F6)

tabulate a22positive f6infoaccurate if country==2 , exact chi2 column row

A22	F6 Info accurate			
Positive				
comm view				
of XCs	Yes	More or less	No	Total
No	0	4	10	14
	0.00%	28.57%	71.43%	100.00%
Yes	3	0	6	9
	33.33%	0.00%	66.67%	100.00%
Total	3	4	16	23
	13.04%	17.39%	69.57%	100.00%

Fisher's exact = 0.027

Liberia (Rural)

Days worked (A14a)

Note: A14a excludes those who opted for education as their reintegration option, as their inclusion would have skewed the results.

Official advice (B3)

`oneway a14daysinwork b3officialadvice if country==1 & Urban==1, tabulate`

B3 Official advice	Summary of A14a Days worked excl those choosing education		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Yes	23.777778	7.2319191	18
No	14.8	11.153475	10
Total	20.571429	9.674053	28

Source	Analysis of Variance			F	Prob > F
	SS	df	MS		
Between groups	518.146032	1	518.146032	6.71	0.0155
Within groups	2008.71111	26	77.2581197		
Total	2526.85714	27	93.5873016		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: $\chi^2(1) = 2.2468$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.134$

Asked for opinion (D1)

`regress a14daysinwork b3officialadvice d1askedforopinionr e1viewslistenedto
e3knewyourneeds e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect f1reintegrationexplained
f5enoughinfo f6infoaccurate if Urban == 1 & country==1`

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	20
Model	1510.78137	8	188.847671	F(8, 11) =	3.46
Residual	600.418631	11	54.5835119	Prob > F =	0.0302
				R-squared =	0.7156
				Adj R-squared =	0.5088
Total	2111.2	19	111.115789	Root MSE =	7.3881

a14daysinw~k	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
b3official~e	9.117077	8.518334	1.07	0.307	-9.63165	27.8658
dlaskedfor~r	-14.30581	5.436898	-2.63	0.023	-26.27234	-2.339274
e1viewslist~o	3.945582	2.468594	1.60	0.138	-1.487756	9.378921
e3knewyour~s	8.733045	5.034541	1.73	0.111	-2.347904	19.81399
e5whatyous~t	-13.78317	5.299897	-2.60	0.025	-25.44816	-2.118174
f1reintegr~d	5.643287	2.937729	1.92	0.081	-.8226109	12.10919
f5enoughinfo	1.168116	3.987163	0.29	0.775	-7.60757	9.943803
f6infoaccu~e	-18.2946	7.546423	-2.42	0.034	-34.90416	-1.685032
cons	59.87305	15.17204	3.95	0.002	26.4796	93.26649

```
prtab dlaskedforopinionr
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

D1 Asked for opinion	Prediction
Yes	20.3459 days
No	6.04006 days

What you said have any effect (E5)

```
prtab e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

E5 What you said have any effect	Prediction
Yes, definitely	38.1856 days
A bit, to some extent	24.4024 days
Not at all	10.6193 days

Reintegration explained (F1)

```
prtab flreintegrationexplained
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

F1 Reintegration explained	Prediction
Yes, definitely	13.4032 days
A bit, to some extent	19.0465 days
Not at all	24.6898 days

Info accurate (F6)

```
prtab f6infoaccurate
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

F6 Info	
accurate	Prediction
More or less	26.4326 days
No	8.13797 days

```
oneway a14daysinwork f6infoaccurate if country==1 & Urban==1, tabulate
```

F6 Info accurate	Summary of A14a Days worked excl those choosing education		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
More or less	23.75	6.4135274	16
No	15.454545	11.961301	11
Total	20.37037	9.7985405	27

Source	Analysis of Variance				
	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	448.569024	1	448.569024	5.48	0.0276
Within groups	2047.72727	25	81.9090909		
Total	2496.2963	26	96.011396		

```
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 4.5618 Prob>chi2 = 0.033
```

Rank (control variable)

***Control variable (rank) only significant when tested with E5**

```
regress a14daysinwork a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded  
e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect if Urban == 1 & country==1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	19
Model	759.218421	4	189.804605	F(4, 14) =	3.03
Residual	877.413158	14	62.6723685	Prob > F =	0.0541
Total	1636.63158	18	90.9239766	R-squared =	0.4639
				Adj R-squared =	0.3107
				Root MSE =	7.9166

a14daysinw~k	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-3.922909	4.638857	-0.85	0.412	-13.87227	6.026451
childwhend~d	7.467469	4.960134	1.51	0.154	-3.170961	18.1059
a7arankcoded	5.820576	3.091032	1.88	0.081	-1.8090291	12.45018
e5whatyous~t	-4.509568	2.707934	-1.67	0.118	-10.31751	1.298373
_cons	24.06843	12.72537	1.89	0.079	-3.224769	51.36164

```
prtab a7arankcoded
```

```
regress: Predicted values for a14daysinwork
```

A7a Rank (coded)	Prediction
Ordinary	16.9028 days
Officer	28.5439 days

Work status (A15)

Note: This excludes those who opted for education as their reintegration option, as their inclusion would have skewed the results.

Asked for opinion (D1)

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice b3officialadvice dlaskedforopinionr
elvwslstenedto e3knewyourneeds e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
flreintegrationexplained f5enoughinfo f6infoaccurate if Urban == 1 &
country==1 & Option!=13
```

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	24
	LR chi2(8)	=	23.70
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0026
Log likelihood = -14.393489	Pseudo R2	=	0.4515

a15work_no~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
b3official~e	-3.678418	2.781086	-1.32	0.186	-9.129247	1.772411
dlaskedfor~r	4.504314	2.22728	2.02	0.043	.1389262	8.869702
elvwslst~o	-1.404559	.8591802	-1.63	0.102	-3.088521	.2794031
e3knewyour~s	-2.557753	1.442608	-1.77	0.076	-5.385212	.2697064
e5whatyous~t	5.327615	1.964589	2.71	0.007	1.477091	9.178139
flreintegr~d	-1.618324	1.055271	-1.53	0.125	-3.686617	.4499685
f5enoughinfo	-.3475351	1.055668	-0.33	0.742	-2.416606	1.721536
f6infoaccu~e	4.828249	2.547025	1.90	0.058	-.1638281	9.820327
/cut1	10.50394	4.576063			1.535026	19.47286
/cut2	13.64484	5.243162			3.36843	23.92125

```
prtab dlaskedforopinionr
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

Asked for opinion (D1)	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
	Full time employment	Consistent part time/ contract work	Some part time/ contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes	0.1818		0.6553	0.1629
No	0.0025		0.0513	0.9462

Knew your needs (E3)

```
prtab e3knewyourneeds
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

Knew your needs (E3)	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
	Full time employment	Consistent part time/ contract work	Some part time/ contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.0057		0.1117	0.8826
A bit, to some extent	0.0691		0.5629	0.3680
Not at all	0.4894		0.4674	0.0432

What you said have any effect (E5)

```
tabulate a15work e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect if Option!=13 & country==1 & Urban==1 & a15work!=5 , exact chi2 column
```

A15 Work	E5 What you said have any effect			Total
	Yes	A bit	Not at all	
Full time employment	2 66.67%	4 33.33%	3 23.08%	9 32.14%
Consistent part time/ contract work	0 0.00%	1 8.33%	1 7.69%	2 7.14%
Some part time/ contract work	1 33.33%	6 50.00%	1 7.69%	8 28.57%
No job(s) to be found	0 0.00%	1 8.33%	8 61.54%	9 32.14%
Total	3 100.00%	12 100.00%	13 100.00%	28 100.00%

Fisher's exact = 0.023

```
ologit a15work_no_apprentice a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated  
a7arankcoded e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect if Urban == 1 & country==1 &  
Option!=13
```

```
prtab e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
```

ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
Tested with other independent variables

	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
What you said have any effect (E5)	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.9935		0.0062	0.0003
A bit, to some extent	0.4277		0.5176	0.0547
Not at all	0.0036		0.0738	0.9226

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	23
	LR chi2(4)	=	6.42
	Prob > chi2	=	0.1700
Log likelihood = -26.513216	Pseudo R2	=	0.1080

a15work_no~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-.5346213	1.111631	-0.48	0.631	-2.713377	1.644135
childwhend~d	-1.142051	1.274019	-0.90	0.370	-3.639083	1.35498
a7arankcoded	-1.241344	.8012512	-1.55	0.121	-2.811767	.3290796
e5whatyous~t	1.090378	.6251666	1.74	0.081	-.1349263	2.315682
/cut1	-1.494604	3.022187			-7.417983	4.428774
/cut2	-1.073411	3.005031			-6.963164	4.816342
/cut3	.2991999	3.01045			-5.601174	6.199574

```
prtab e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect
```

ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
Tested only with control variables

	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
What you said have any effect? (E5)	Full time employment	Consistent part time/contract work	Some part time/contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely	0.6573	0.0878	0.1751	0.0798
A bit, to some extent	0.3919	0.1036	0.2994	0.2051
Not at all	0.1781	0.0701	0.3175	0.4343

Info accurate (F6)

```
tabulate a15work f6infoaccurate if Option!=13 & country==1 & Urban==1 &
a15work!=5 , exact chi2 column
```

A15 Work	F6 Info accurate		Total
	More or less	No	
Full time employment	7 38.89%	4 33.33%	11 36.67%
Consistent part time/	2 11.11%	0 0.00%	2 6.67%
Some part time/contra	7 38.89%	1 8.33%	8 26.67%
No job(s) to be found	2 11.11%	7 58.33%	9 30.00%
Total	18 100.00%	12 100.00%	30 100.00%

Fisher's exact = 0.027

```
prtab f6infoaccurate
```

```
ologit: Predicted probabilities for a15work_no_apprentice
```

Information accurate (F6)	Predicted probability of Work Status (A15)			
	Full time employment	Consistent part time/ contract work	Some part time/ contract work	No job(s) to be found
Yes, definitely				
More or less	0.4862		0.4701	0.0437
No	0.0075		0.1415	0.8510

Positive community view of ex-combatants (A22)**Official advice (B3)**

```
tabulate a22positive b3officialadvice if country== 1 & Urban==1, exact chi2
column
```

A22 Positive comm view of XCs	B3 Official advice		
	Yes	No	Total
No	11 27.50%	14 73.68%	25 42.37%
Yes	29 72.50%	5 26.32%	34 57.63%
Total	40 100.00%	19 100.00%	59 100.00%

```
Fisher's exact = 0.002
1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.001
```

```
logit a22positive a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
b3officialadvice if Urban == 1 & country==1
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	52
	LR chi2(4)	=	7.44
	Prob > chi2	=	0.1143
Log likelihood = -31.704662	Pseudo R2	=	0.1050

a22positive	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-.2778561	.7312225	-0.38	0.704	-1.711026	1.155314
childwhend~d	.5422513	.7336307	0.74	0.460	-.8956384	1.980141
a7arankcoded	.0225346	.4665009	0.05	0.961	-.8917904	.9368596
b3official~e	-1.457939	.6762857	-2.16	0.031	-2.783434	-.132443
_cons	2.329628	1.722749	1.35	0.176	-1.046897	5.706153

```
prtab b3officialadvice
```

logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22positive

Note: "positive outcome" means a response indicating there is a positive perception within the community regarding ex-combatants

B3 Official advice	Prediction
Yes	0.6861
No	0.3371

Child status

* Control variable - only significant with E5

```
logit a22positive a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
e5whatyousaidhaveanyeffect if Urban == 1 & country==1
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	46
	LR chi2(4)	=	3.76
	Prob > chi2	=	0.4392
Log likelihood = -28.420282	Pseudo R2	=	0.0621

a22positive	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	-.481098	.7798901	-0.62	0.537	-2.009655	1.047459
childwhend~d	1.302877	.7715459	1.69	0.091	-.209325	2.815079
a7arankcoded	.1444086	.4634578	0.31	0.755	-.7639521	1.052769
e5whatyous~t	-.0496982	.4533561	-0.11	0.913	-.9382598	.8388634
_cons	.5146247	1.868771	0.28	0.783	-3.1481	4.177349

```
prtab childwhendemobilisedestimated
```

logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22positive

Child when	
demobilised	
(estimated) Prediction	
No	0.4965
Yes	0.7839

Info accurate (F6)

```
tabulate a22positive f6infoaccurate if country== 1 & Urban==1, exact chi2
column
```

A22	F6 Info accurate			
Positive				
comm view				
of XCs	Yes	More or less	No	Total
No	3	6	14	23
	60.00%	20.69%	63.64%	41.07%
Yes	2	23	8	33
	40.00%	79.31%	36.36%	58.93%
Total	5	29	22	56
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Fisher's exact = 0.004

Negative community view of ex-combatants (A22)**Official advice (B3)**

```
tabulate a22negative b3officialadvice if country== 1 & Urban==1, exact chi2
column
```

A22 Negative comm view of XCs	B3 Official advice		
	Yes	No	Total
No	26 65.00%	2 10.53%	28 47.46%
Yes	14 35.00%	17 89.47%	31 52.54%
Total	40 100.00%	19 100.00%	59 100.00%

Fisher's exact = 0.000
1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.000

```
logit a22negative a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
b3officialadvice if Urban == 1 & country==1
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	52
	LR chi2(4)	=	16.23
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0027
Log likelihood = -27.776419	Pseudo R2	=	0.2261

a22negative	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	1.585229	.7935566	2.00	0.046	.0298862	3.140571
childwhend~d	.035288	.8301181	0.04	0.966	-1.591714	1.66229
a7arankcoded	.1552289	.5063763	0.31	0.759	-.8372505	1.147708
b3official~e	2.257877	.8774094	2.57	0.010	.5381862	3.977568
_cons	-5.012411	2.057873	-2.44	0.015	-9.045768	-.9790541

```
prtab b3officialadvice
```

logit: **Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22negative**

Note: "positive outcome" means a response indicating there is a negative perception within the community regarding ex-combatants

Official advice (B3)	Prediction
Yes	0.4082
No	0.8683

```
logit a22negative b3officialadvice dlaskedforopinionr elvewslistenedto
e3knewyourneeds e5whatyousaidhaveaneffect flreintegrationexplained
f5enoughinfo f6infoaccurate if Urban == 1 & country==1
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	39
	LR chi2(8)	=	27.59
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0006
Log likelihood = -11.665488	Pseudo R2	=	0.5418

a22negative	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
b3official~e	19.11802	2.580784	7.41	0.000	14.05978	24.17626
dlaskedfor~r	-20.62477
elvewslist~o	-1.139899	1.185453	-0.96	0.336	-3.463343	1.183546
e3knewyour~s	.2090179	1.122477	0.19	0.852	-1.990996	2.409032
e5whatyous~t	1.967677	1.314676	1.50	0.134	-.6090402	4.544394
flreintegr~d	.4858871	.9314462	0.52	0.602	-1.339714	2.311488
f5enoughinfo	-.9958604	1.197367	-0.83	0.406	-3.342657	1.350936
f6infoaccu~e	1.551613	1.361278	1.14	0.254	-1.116443	4.219669
_cons	-3.382641	3.002464	-1.13	0.260	-9.267363	2.502081

Note: 2 failures and 13 successes completely determined.

```
prtab b3officialadvice
```

logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22negative

Official advice (B3)	Prediction
Yes	0.2124
No	1.0000

Asked for opinion (D1)

```
logit a22negative a2gender childwhendemobilisedestimated a7arankcoded
dlaskedforopinionr if Urban == 1 & country==1
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	53
	LR chi2(4)	=	12.71
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0128
Log likelihood = -30.29573	Pseudo R2	=	0.1734

a22negative	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
a2gender	2.092131	.7864008	2.66	0.008	.5508143	3.633449
childwhend~d	-.0275086	.7612066	-0.04	0.971	-1.519446	1.464429
a7arankcoded	.337611	.4574605	0.74	0.461	-.5589951	1.234217
dlaskedfor~r	-1.417189	.6946434	-2.04	0.041	-2.778665	-.0557126
_cons	-1.242843	1.659771	-0.75	0.454	-4.495934	2.010249

```
prtab d1askedforopinionr
```

```
logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22negative
```

D1 Asked for opinion		Prediction
Yes		0.6533
No		0.3135

Info accurate (F6)

```
tabulate a22negative f6infoaccurate if country== 1 & Urban==1, exact chi2 column
```

A22 Negative comm view of XCs	F6 Info accurate			
	Yes	More or less	No	Total
No	1 20.00%	22 75.86%	3 13.64%	26 46.43%
Yes	4 80.00%	7 24.14%	19 86.36%	30 53.57%
Total	5 100.00%	29 100.00%	22 100.00%	56 100.00%

```
Fisher's exact = 0.000
```

Gender (control variable)

```
prtab a2gender [When tested with B3]
```

```
logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22negative
```

A2 Gender	Prediction
Male	0.4439
Female	0.7957

```
prtab a2gender [When tested with D1]
```

```
logit: Predicted probabilities of positive outcome for a22negative
```

A2 Gender	Prediction
Male	0.3639
Female	0.8225

Liberia (Urban)

Living conditions (A17)

Reintegration explained (F1)

tabulate a17livingconditions f1reintegrationexplained if Urban==0 &
country==1, exact chi2 column

A17 Living conditions	F1 Reintegration explained		Total
	Yes definitely	Not at all	
Excellent	3 37.50%	0 0.00%	3 9.09%
Good	5 62.50%	24 96.00%	29 87.88%
Bad	0 0.00%	1 4.00%	1 3.03%
Total	8 100.00%	25 100.00%	33 100.00%

Fisher's exact = 0.010

Appendix C: Questionnaire used in field work

This Appendix contains the survey instrument used in Sierra Leone. The version used in Liberia contained some minor variations, such as references to the name of the country in which it was taking place, and using the term “DDRR” instead of “DDR” (as the programme was called in Liberia). The pagination and some of the alignment has changed, as the page breaks here are dictated by margins required in the regulations for this thesis.

The response option for certain questions of “DK” means “Don’t Know” and “R” means “Refused” (to answer the question).

Questionnaire about participation and DDR in Sierra Leone Dublin City University, Ireland

Version 2.12

Key:	<i>Italics:</i>	Instructions for interviewer only
	TEXT:	Text which follows to be read out to interviewee

Interviewer __ _____	Interview no: _____	How interviewee was found _____
Location _____		Date: _____ Sept 2008 Times (start + finish):
Ended early? _ _____	Why? _____	Language _____

TEXT:

- I'm doing a survey to find out what people think of the DDR process in Sierra Leone. I'm interested to know what your experiences were like, and what you think of it.
- We're not linked to any organisation which is providing assistance for former combatants, so this survey is not about offering extra support to you. But I'd be grateful if you could help us anyway.
- So I have a list of questions. It will take a while to go through them, but it would really help me if you could answer these as accurately as possible. If you don't want to answer something, just say so.
- The information won't be shared with anyone outside the project, in a way which is linked to your name. You can ask me any questions you have at any stage.
- Is that alright? Y/N (*Circle one*)
- Did you take part in DDR? Y/N (*Circle one*) *If both "Y", then proceed.*

Section A: Personal details

A1. Name _____

A2. Gender ☐ Male ☐ Female

A3. Where did you grow up (location)? _____

A4. Age (years) _____

A5. Which overall group did you **last** belong to (e.g. CDF, RUF, etc)? _____

A6. What year did you join this group? _____

A7. Did you have a special rank or title? _____

A8. If you were part of any other groups before the last one, what were they? _____

A9. What year(s) did you join the group(s)? _____

A10. What was the highest educational level which you reached **before** the war?

- ☐ None/informal ☐ Started primary, but did not complete it ☐ Completed primary
☐ Started secondary, but did not complete it ☐ Completed secondary ☐ Above secondary

A11. What is the highest educational level which you have reached **now**?

- ☐ None/informal ☐ Started primary, but did not complete it ☐ Completed primary
☐ Started secondary, but did not complete it ☐ Completed secondary ☐ Above secondary

A12. What was your job before the war?

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Masonry | 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Carpentry | 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Plumbing | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Tailoring |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Business | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Shoe making | 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Electronics | 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Mechanics |
| 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Soap | 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Baking | 11. <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture | 12. <input type="checkbox"/> Teaching |
| 13. <input type="checkbox"/> Student | 14. <input type="checkbox"/> No Job | 15. <input type="checkbox"/> Other_____ | |

A13. What is your job now?

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Masonry | 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Carpentry | 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Plumbing | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Tailoring |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Business | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Shoe making | 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Electronics | 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Mechanics |
| 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Soap | 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Baking | 11. <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture | 12. <input type="checkbox"/> Teaching |
| 13. <input type="checkbox"/> Student | 14. <input type="checkbox"/> No Job | 15. <input type="checkbox"/> Other_____ | |

A14. (a) In the last month, how many days were you employed by some one? _____

(b) In the last month, how many days did you work for yourself (were self-employed)? _____

A15. Which of these best describes your work situation?

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Full time employment | 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Consistent part time/contract work |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Some Part/time contract work | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> No job(s) to be found |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Apprentice (fulltime) | |

- A16. How would you describe the economic condition of **Sierra Leone as a whole** right now?
☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Bad ☐ Terrible ☐ DK ☐ R
-
- A17. How would you describe **your** living conditions right now?
☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Bad ☐ Terrible ☐ DK ☐ R
-
- A18. Today, do you face problems being accepted by your family?
 1. ☐ Yes, big problems 2. ☐ Some problems 3. ☐ No problems
 4. ☐ Not in contact with family ☐ DK ☐ R
-
- A19. Today, do you face problems being accepted by your neighbours or community where you live?
 1. ☐ Yes, big problems 2. ☐ Some problems 3. ☐ No problems ☐ DK
-
- A20. *If yes to either:* Do you think this hurts your ability to find a job?
 1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ DK
-
- A21. Are you living in the same community as you were before you joined the faction?
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ DK ☐ R
-
- A22. Today, in your opinion, how does your community look upon ex-combatants (*tick as many as apply*)
 1. ☐ With fear 2. ☐ Watchful/distrustful 3. ☐ With acceptance
 4. ☐ With respect 5. ☐ With anger 6. ☐ With jealousy
 7. ☐ Other_____
-
- A23. Who do you spend the most of your free time with? Second most? Third most? [*Place 1 in front of most, 2 in front of second most, etc.*]
☐ Family ☐ Friends from my job ☐ Friends from the faction
☐ Friends from the community ☐ Alone ☐ DK ☐ R

Section B: Participation in DDR

- B1 Did you go through DDR more than once? Y/N (*Circle one*)
If "No", then: What year did you go through disarmament and demobilisation?
 _____(year)
If "Yes", then: What years did you go through disarmament and demobilisation?
 First time _____(year)
 Second time _____(year)
 Third time _____(year)

B2 How far did you get in the DDR process? (*tick furthest stage reached*)

	<i>If they went through it more than once, add: The last time you went through it.</i>	<i>If they went through it more than once, also ask: And how far the time before that when you went through it?</i>	<i>If they went through it more than twice, also ask: And how far the time before that when you went through it?</i>
1. Disarmament only			
2. Partly through demobilisation			
3. Completed demobilisation			
4. Partly through reintegration			
5. Completed all stages, including reintegration			

B3 In the **last** DDR process you went through, did you meet with an official person who gave you advice about your options for reintegration ?

☐ Yes☐ No☐ Don't Know☐ No reply

B4 What kind of training did you end up doing?

1. ☐ Masonry2. ☐ Carpentry3. ☐ Plumbing4. ☐ Tailoring5. ☐ Business6. ☐ Shoe making7. ☐ Electronics8. ☐ Mechanics9. ☐ Soap10. ☐ Baking11. ☐ Agriculture12. ☐ Tie dye13. ☐ School/Education14. ☐ Hairdressing15. ☐ Other _____16. ☐ None

B5 If you took part in the training, did you complete all of it?

☐ Yes☐ No☐ Don't Know☐ No reply☐ Didn't start training

B6 IF "NO" or "DIDN'T START", then: Why not? (*tick as many as apply*)

1. ☐ Programme was cancelled or stopped early2. ☐ Training took place too far away3. ☐ Allowance was not sufficient4. ☐ It wasn't useful or interesting5. ☐ I found work before it finished6. ☐ I changed my mind7. ☐ Other _____

Section C: Consultation about disarmament and demobilisation phase

TEXT: I'd like to ask you now about the **disarmament and demobilisation phase** – we'll talk about reintegration just after this.

C1. Were you ever asked for your opinion about the way disarmament and demobilisation was being done?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't Know ☐ No reply

C2. If "yes": By whom? (tick as many as apply)

☐ UN Peacekeepers ☐ Other UN agency staff ☐ Staff of International NGO
☐ Staff of Sierra Leonean NGO ☐ Other (please specify):

Section D: Consultation about reintegration phase

TEXT: Talking now about **reintegration**, as opposed to the disarmament and demobilisation phase:

D1. Were you ever asked for your opinion about the way **reintegration** was being be done?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't Know ☐ No reply

D2. If "yes": By whom? (tick as many as apply)

☐ UN Peacekeepers ☐ Other UN agency staff ☐ Staff of International NGO
☐ Staff of Sierra Leonean NGO ☐ Other (please specify):

Section E: Being listened to (D and R)

TEXT: Talking now about all three phases (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration):

E1. Did you feel your views in general were listened to by those running the demobilisation programmes?
 [If "no", go to Q E5]

☐ Yes, a lot ☐ Yes, a bit ☐ Neither listened to nor ignored ☐ Not much
☐ Not at all

E2. If "yes": By whom? (tick as many as apply)

☐ UN Peacekeepers ☐ Other UN agency staff ☐ Staff of International NGO
☐ Staff of Sierra Leonean NGO ☐ Other (please specify):

E3. Did you feel that people running the programmes knew what your needs were?

☐ Yes, definitely ☐ A bit, to some extent ☐ Not at all

E4. How did they know?

E5. Did anything you said have any effect on how things were done?

☐ Yes, definitely ☐ A bit, to some extent ☐ Not at all

E6. Can you think of any examples?

.....

Section F: Getting information about reintegration

F1. Was the reintegration process explained to you, so you would know what was going to happen, before or during reintegration? *[If "no", go to Q F5]*

☐ Yes, definitely ☐ A bit, to some extent ☐ Not at all

F2. *If "yes":* How was it explained, and by whom? _____

F3. Did they communicate with you in the right language (Krio, English, etc)?

☐ Yes, definitely ☐ More or less ☐ No ☐ Not applicable

F4. Was the kind of language they used clear and easy to understand?

☐ Yes, definitely ☐ More or less ☐ No ☐ Not applicable

F5. Did you have **enough** information about the process?

☐ Yes, definitely ☐ More or less ☐ No ☐ Not applicable

F6. Generally speaking, was the information **accurate**?

☐ Yes, definitely ☐ More or less ☐ No ☐ Not applicable

F7. Did you know who or where you could go to get information about DDR, once you were involved in the process?

☐ Yes, definitely ☐ More or less ☐ No

Section G: Quality and amount of information

G1. How much information did you receive about DDR from the following sources, and how helpful was it?

Source	A lot of information	Some information	No information	IF "YES" OR "SOME": Was it helpful?		
				Yes	A bit	No
1. National or local NGOs running programmes						
2. International NGOs running programmes						
3. UN (peacekeepers or other staff)						
4. Former commanders						
5. Other ex-combatants						
6. Local community						
7. Friends (who are not ex-combatants)						
8. Family members						
9. NCDDR or other govt agencies						
10. Radio						

				IF "YES" OR "SOME": Was it helpful?		
11. Print media						
12. Other sources (please list)						

G2. Which one or two of these was the most helpful in providing information? *(Circle up to two, in above list)*

Section H: Exchanges with the community

H1. During the process, did you have a chance to talk to representatives of the community where you were going to move or do your reintegration training?

- ☐ Yes, before I went to live there
 ☐ Yes, but only once I had got to live there
☐ Not much
 ☐ No, not at all

H2. *If "no", go to Q H7; otherwise, ask:* Was that useful for you?

- ☐ Yes, definitely
 ☐ More or less
 ☐ No

H3. Why?

H4. Do you think that was useful for them? ☐ Yes, definitely ☐ More or less ☐ No

H5. Why? _____

H6. How did it come about? _____

H7. *If answer to H2 is "no":* Would you have found it useful (to have a chance to talk to representatives of the community where you were going to move or do your reintegration training)?

- ☐ Yes, definitely
 ☐ More or less
 ☐ No

H8. Why? _____

Section J: Improvements [Only if time permits] *(Use extra sheet of paper if necessary)*

J1. If you were running a DDR programme now, what things would you do to help people feel included in the process, and have their views listened to? _____

J2. How or why would that help? _____

J3. What would you **avoid** doing? _____

J4. How or why would that help? _____

J5. If you knew some one who was about to take part in DDR, what advice or information would you give them?

Section K: Other

K1. Do you have anything else you like to add? -----

TEXT: Thank you for your time.

K2. Time taken to complete survey: -----

Appendix D: Evolution of coding framework for analysis of focus group transcripts

This Appendix shows the evolution of the coding framework used for analysing the transcripts of the focus group discussions. The initial scheme was developed in the course of making a “first pass” of the data, while transcribing, cleaning, and anonymising the transcripts. This scheme, which is shown in the first table below, evolved in a number stages, as the data was imported and later coded in the analysis software, NVivo. These later iterations appear as “screenshots” from NVivo, which are dated to show when they were taken.

Draft coding scheme, at start of process (1 July 2010)

Codes (Updated and coordinated with NVivo 1st July 2010)		
Disarmament		
	Weapons taken by commanders	
	Weapons used by others to get benefits	
	Completed	
	Not completing it	
	Being excluded	
Arms		
Camps		
	Management of camp	
	Activities or events during camp	
Demobilisation		
Reintegration		
	Information about	
	Completed	
	Not completing it	
	Being excluded	
	Records of benefits received (ID card etc)	
Training		
	Adequacy	
	Problems	
	Usefulness	
	Tools or resources during training	
	Trainers	
	Training NGOs	
	Toolkits	
	Paperwork or certificates	

Codes (Updated and coordinated with NVivo 1st July 2010)		
School and education		
	Adequacy	
	Problems	
	Usefulness	
	Paperwork or certificates	
	Scholarship ending	
	School (non reintegration)	
	Providing scholarships in general	
Stipends		
	Non-payment	
		Reduced stipend
		Complete non-payment
		Early cessation or no final payments
		Delays in payment
	Amount - adequacy	
	Amount - different to what was promised	
	Non-XCs receiving benefits	
Lobbying for benefits		
	Payments	
	Training	
	Tools	
	Certificates	
	Scholarship extension	
	Other lobbying	
Geographic Areas		
	Return to area	
	Resettlement area	
	Area of origin	
	Settling in different area to home	
Commanders		
	Recuiting commanders	
	Info or help from commanders	
	Giving orders re disarmament	
	Being a commander	
Other combatants or XCs		
People outside armed groups		
	Non XC friends	
	Family	
		Parents
		Siblings
		Children
		Extended family
	Community	
	Elders	

Codes (Updated and coordinated with NVivo 1st July 2010)		
Promises		
	Promises made	
	Promises not kept	
	Deceit	
Expectations		
	Created by commanders	
	Created by UN	
	Created by NGOs	
	Created by NCDDR	
	Created by others	
Corruption		
	By commanders	
	By DDR or NGO staff	
	By UN	
	By self	
	By non XCs	
	By others	
	Having to share benefits or pay bribes	
Joining up		
	Forcible recruitment	
	Changing group	
	Leaving group	
Fighting groups		
	GoL or AFL	
	NPFL	
	LURD	
	MODEL	
	Other (Liberia)	
	RUF	
	CDF	
	SLA [SL army]	
	Other (S Leone)	
Information		
	Gaps	
	Receiving info	
	Amount	
	Accuracy	
Being listened to		
	By UN	
	By NCDDR etc	
	By implementing NGOs	
	By trainers	
	By others	

Codes (Updated and coordinated with NVivo 1st July 2010)		
Having a say in decisions		
	By UN	
	By NCDDR etc	
	By implementing NGOs	
	By trainers	
	By others	
Re-running Reintegration or DDR		
Psycho-social issues		
	Psycho-social recovery	
	Counselling	
	Trauma	
	Bad behaviour	
Along the way		
	Laughter	
	Interruption	
	Clarification sought	
	Correction	
	Affirming what others have said	
Assistance		
	Sought	
	Denied	
Ladder of Participation		
	-2 or worse	
	-1	
	0	
	1	
	2	
	3	
	4	
	5	
	6	
	7	
Foreigners/white people		
Advice for others taking part in DDR		
	Positive	
	Negative	

Screenshots relating to coding process in NVivo

Initial coding structure in tree form, with minor adjustments (see column headed “Modified On” for date of any changes) (20th July 2010):

The screenshot displays the NVivo software interface. The left sidebar shows a tree view of the coding structure, with 'Nodes' selected. The main window displays a table of nodes with the following columns: Name, Sources, References, Created On, Created By, Modified On, and Modified By.

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Foreigners or white people	2	5	01/07/2010 14:52	wk	07/07/2010 11:18	w
Geographic Areas	2	5	01/07/2010 14:45	wk	05/07/2010 08:42	wk
Having a say in decisions	4	11	01/07/2010 14:50	wk	07/07/2010 11:08	w
Information	2	2	01/07/2010 14:50	wk	05/07/2010 14:57	w
Joining up	0	0	01/07/2010 14:49	wk	01/07/2010 14:49	wk
Ladder of Participation	4	9	01/07/2010 14:51	wk	08/07/2010 19:59	wk
Lobbying for benefits	2	6	01/07/2010 14:44	wk	05/07/2010 11:22	w
Other combatants or VCs	1	2	01/07/2010 14:45	wk	05/07/2010 08:35	wk
People outside armed groups	0	0	01/07/2010 14:47	wk	01/07/2010 14:47	wk
Promises	0	0	01/07/2010 14:49	wk	01/07/2010 14:49	wk
Psycho-social issues	3	5	01/07/2010 14:51	wk	08/07/2010 19:59	wk
Reintegration	4	16	01/07/2010 14:44	wk	08/07/2010 19:46	wk
Re-joining Reintegration or DDR	3	14	01/07/2010 14:50	wk	05/07/2010 15:12	w
School and education	0	0	01/07/2010 14:44	wk	01/07/2010 14:44	wk
Stipends	2	4	01/07/2010 14:44	wk	05/07/2010 14:45	w
Training	4	16	01/07/2010 14:44	wk	08/07/2010 19:35	wk

As above, but with all nodes expanded (20th July 2010) (five screens):

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Advice for others taking part in DDR	0	0	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	01/07/2010 19:45	WK
Along the way	0	0	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	01/07/2010 14:51	WK
Affirming what others have said	0	0	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	01/07/2010 15:11	WK
Clarification sought	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Correction	0	0	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	01/07/2010 15:11	WK
Interruption	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Laughter	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Arms	2	8	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	08/07/2010 19:31	WK
Assistance	0	0	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	01/07/2010 14:51	WK
Denied	2	4	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	02/07/2010 17:03	WK
Sought	2	5	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	05/07/2010 11:22	W
Being listened to	4	9	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	07/07/2010 11:02	W
By implementing NGOs	2	2	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	05/07/2010 13:46	W
By NCDOR etc	2	2	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	05/07/2010 08:54	WK
By others	0	0	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	01/07/2010 15:08	WK
By trainers	0	0	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	01/07/2010 15:08	WK
By UN	1	1	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	05/07/2010 11:22	W
Camps	3	8	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	05/07/2010 17:06	W
Activities or events during camp	1	7	01/07/2010 14:43	WK	07/07/2010 11:02	W
Management of camp	0	0	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	01/07/2010 14:42	WK
Commanders	1	1	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	02/07/2010 09:54	WK
Being a commander	0	0	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	01/07/2010 15:02	WK
Giving orders re disarmament	1	1	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	05/07/2010 15:20	W
Info or help from commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	01/07/2010 15:02	WK
Recruiting commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	01/07/2010 15:01	WK
Corruption	1	1	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	05/07/2010 15:03	W
By commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	01/07/2010 15:04	WK
By DDR or NGO staff	2	2	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	05/07/2010 11:58	W
By non-XCs	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
By others	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
By self	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
By UN	0	0	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	01/07/2010 15:04	WK
Having to share benefits or pay bri	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
Demobilisation	2	3	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	07/07/2010 11:02	W
Disarmament	4	13	01/07/2010 14:40	WK	07/07/2010 11:15	W
Being excluded	1	2	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	07/07/2010 11:26	W
Completed	1	1	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Not completing it	0	0	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	01/07/2010 14:42	WK

20th July 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Completed	1	1	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Not completing it	0	0	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	01/07/2010 14:42	WK
Weapons taken by commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	01/07/2010 14:41	WK
Weapons used by others to get b	1	1	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	07/07/2010 11:26	W
Expectations	4	24	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	08/07/2010 19:59	WK
Created by commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	01/07/2010 15:03	WK
Created by NCDOR	1	2	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Created by NGOs	3	7	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	05/07/2010 14:43	W
Created by others	0	0	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	01/07/2010 15:04	WK
Created by UN	1	3	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	05/07/2010 12:50	W
Fighting groups	0	0	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	01/07/2010 14:49	WK
CDF	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
GoL or AFL	1	1	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	02/07/2010 16:18	WK
LURD	1	2	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	02/07/2010 16:23	WK
MODEL	1	2	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	02/07/2010 16:23	WK
NPFL	0	0	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	01/07/2010 15:06	WK
Other (Liberia)	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
Other (S Leone)	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
RUF	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
SLA [SL army]	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
Foreigners or white people	2	5	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	07/07/2010 11:18	W
Geographic Areas	2	5	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	05/07/2010 08:42	WK
Area of origin	2	2	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	05/07/2010 08:32	WK
Resettlement area	1	3	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Return to area	1	1	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	05/07/2010 08:32	WK
Setting in different area to home	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	01/07/2010 15:01	WK
Having a say in decisions	4	11	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	07/07/2010 11:08	W
By implementing NGOs	2	4	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	05/07/2010 14:43	W
By NCDOR etc	1	1	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
By others	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	01/07/2010 15:09	WK
By trainers	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	01/07/2010 15:09	WK
By UN	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	01/07/2010 15:09	WK
Information	2	2	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	05/07/2010 14:57	W
Accuracy	4	20	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	05/07/2010 17:01	W
Amount	2	4	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	02/07/2010 16:25	WK
Gaps	2	2	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	05/07/2010 15:20	W
Receiving info	4	23	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	05/07/2010 16:57	W
Joining up	0	0	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	01/07/2010 14:49	WK

20th July 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Joining up	0	0	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	01/07/2010 14:49	WK
Changing group	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
Forcible recruitment	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
Leaving group	0	0	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	01/07/2010 15:06	WK
Ladder of Participation	4	9	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	08/07/2010 19:59	WK
0	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
1	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
-1	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
2	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
-2 or worse	0	0	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	01/07/2010 15:11	WK
3	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
4	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
5	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
6	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
7	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
Lobbying for benefits	2	6	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	05/07/2010 11:22	W
Certificates	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	05/07/2010 08:54	WK
Other lobbying	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	01/07/2010 15:01	WK
Payments	1	3	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	05/07/2010 08:54	WK
Scholarship extension	1	2	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	07/07/2010 11:20	W
Tools	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	02/07/2010 16:45	WK
Training	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Other combatants or XCs	1	2	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	05/07/2010 08:35	WK
People outside armed groups	0	0	01/07/2010 14:47	WK	01/07/2010 14:47	WK
Community	4	14	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	05/07/2010 16:45	W
Elders	2	2	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	05/07/2010 11:56	W
Family	1	1	01/07/2010 14:46	WK	02/07/2010 09:39	WK
Children	1	1	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	06/07/2010 19:53	WK
Extended family	0	0	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	01/07/2010 14:48	WK
Parents	2	2	01/07/2010 14:47	WK	07/07/2010 11:05	W
Siblings	1	1	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	05/07/2010 08:51	WK
Non-XC friends	0	0	01/07/2010 14:46	WK	01/07/2010 14:46	WK
Promises	0	0	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	01/07/2010 14:49	WK
Deceit	2	2	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	05/07/2010 13:37	W
Promises made	4	10	01/07/2010 15:49	WK	08/07/2010 19:31	WK
Promises not kept	4	24	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	08/07/2010 19:59	WK
Psycho-social issues	3	5	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	08/07/2010 19:59	WK
Anti-social behaviour	1	1	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	02/07/2010 10:38	WK

20th July 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Psycho-social issues	3	5	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	08/07/2010 19:59	WK
Anti-social behaviour	1	3	01/07/2010 19:50	WK	02/07/2010 10:38	WK
Counselling	1	1	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	07/07/2010 11:02	W
Psycho-social recovery	2	3	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	07/07/2010 11:02	W
Trauma	1	2	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	07/07/2010 11:02	W
Reintegration	4	16	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	08/07/2010 19:46	WK
Being excluded	0	0	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	01/07/2010 14:53	WK
Completed	1	2	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Information about	3	19	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	05/07/2010 14:57	W
Not completing it	2	4	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	08/07/2010 19:24	WK
Records of benefits received (ID c	2	3	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	05/07/2010 14:45	W
Re-running Reintegration or DDR	3	14	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	05/07/2010 15:12	W
School and education	0	0	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	01/07/2010 14:44	WK
Adequacy	0	0	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	01/07/2010 14:56	WK
Paperwork or certificates	2	2	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	07/07/2010 11:21	W
Problems	1	4	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	08/07/2010 19:32	WK
Providing scholarships in general	0	0	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	01/07/2010 14:57	WK
Scholarship ending	1	4	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	08/07/2010 19:31	WK
School (non reintegration)	2	4	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	05/07/2010 12:30	W
Usefulness	1	1	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	05/07/2010 11:12	W
Stipends	2	4	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	05/07/2010 14:45	W
Amount - adequacy	0	0	01/07/2010 14:59	WK	01/07/2010 14:59	WK
Amount - different to what was pr	1	2	01/07/2010 14:59	WK	05/07/2010 11:14	W
Non-payment	2	8	01/07/2010 14:58	WK	05/07/2010 15:15	W
Complete non-payment	2	3	01/07/2010 14:58	WK	05/07/2010 13:37	W
Delays in payment	1	1	01/07/2010 14:59	WK	05/07/2010 11:15	W
Early cessation or no final paym	1	2	01/07/2010 14:58	WK	05/07/2010 11:15	W
Reduced stipend	1	1	01/07/2010 14:58	WK	05/07/2010 11:15	W
Non-XCs receiving benefits	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	05/07/2010 11:15	W
Training	4	16	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	08/07/2010 19:35	WK
Adequacy	3	9	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	08/07/2010 19:56	WK
Duration	2	5	02/07/2010 08:18	WK	08/07/2010 19:59	WK
Paperwork or certificates	4	15	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	08/07/2010 19:36	WK
Problems	4	28	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	08/07/2010 19:59	WK
Toolkits	3	12	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	08/07/2010 19:53	WK
Tools or resources during training	3	4	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	05/07/2010 14:39	W
Trainers	3	8	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	08/07/2010 19:37	WK
Training NGOs	4	16	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	08/07/2010 19:35	WK

20th July 2010 continued:

The screenshot shows the NVivo software interface with the 'Tree Nodes' table. The table has columns for Name, Sources, References, Created On, Created By, Modified On, and Modified By. The 'Nodes' pane on the left shows a tree structure with 'Free Nodes' selected. The 'Tree Nodes' table contains the following data:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Training NGOs	4	16	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	08/07/2010 19:35	WK
Usefulness	2	11	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	08/07/2010 19:47	WK

Free Nodes added in first week or so of coding, in response to the data (20th July 2010):

The screenshot shows the NVivo software interface with the 'Free Nodes' table. The table has columns for Name, Sources, References, Created On, Created By, Modified On, and Modified By. The 'Nodes' pane on the left shows a tree structure with 'Free Nodes' selected. The 'Free Nodes' table contains the following data:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Bring in the streets	1	1	02/07/2010 09:29	WK	02/07/2010 09:57	WK
Belief in future	2	3	02/07/2010 09:28	WK	07/07/2010 11:05	W
Country, community or socie	4	16	02/07/2010 09:28	WK	08/07/2010 19:59	WK
Livelihood	4	18	02/07/2010 09:29	WK	08/07/2010 19:55	WK
Making choices within DDR	3	6	02/07/2010 16:17	WK	05/07/2010 14:43	W
Poverty	0	0	02/07/2010 09:29	WK	02/07/2010 09:29	WK
Resentment or mistrust from	2	4	01/07/2010 15:27	WK	05/07/2010 11:23	W
Rumours	1	1	01/07/2010 15:32	WK	02/07/2010 09:45	WK
Tension between XCs over l	1	2	05/07/2010 09:00	WK	05/07/2010 09:06	WK
Training choice not availabl	2	2	05/07/2010 12:22	W	05/07/2010 14:43	W
Unemployment	2	2	02/07/2010 09:29	WK	08/07/2010 19:57	WK
Women	2	3	05/07/2010 11:57	W	05/07/2010 14:39	W
Work after training	4	22	02/07/2010 09:28	WK	08/07/2010 19:57	WK
Workshop (post training)	1	4	02/07/2010 09:28	WK	02/07/2010 10:11	WK
Youth	1	1	05/07/2010 11:56	W	05/07/2010 11:57	W

Coding scheme as of 6th August 2010 (six screens)

The screenshot shows the NVivo software interface with the 'Sources' view selected. The left sidebar shows a tree structure with 'Internals' expanded, containing 'FGs Liberia', 'FGs Sierra Leone', 'Test', 'Externals', 'Memos', 'Search Folders', 'All Sources', and 'All Sources Not Embedded'. The main pane displays a table of sources for 'FGs Liberia'.

Name	Nodes	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
TS3 Group H Lib FGD 1 (Gbangba Liberia)	73	274	22/06/2010 20:47	W	05/07/2010 13:32	W
TS3 Group J Lib FGD 2 (Lawalazu Liberia)	71	207	22/06/2010 19:54	W	05/07/2010 12:51	W
TS3 Group K Lib FGD 3 (Lawalazu Liberia)	42	94	22/06/2010 19:55	W	05/07/2010 15:15	W
TS4 Group L Lib FGD 4 (Cuttington U Liberia)	65	230	24/06/2010 22:19	WK	12/07/2010 16:42	W
TS4 Group M Lib FGD 5 (NEPT women Monrovia)	78	256	24/06/2010 20:43	WK	30/07/2010 10:03	W

The bottom status bar shows 'W 5 Items'.

6th August 2010 continued:

The screenshot shows the NVivo software interface with the 'Nodes' view selected. The left sidebar shows a tree structure with 'Free Nodes' expanded, containing 'Tree Nodes', 'Cases', 'Relationships', 'Matrices', 'Search Folders', and 'All Nodes'. The main pane displays a table of free nodes.

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Bring in the streets	2	10	02/07/2010 09:29	WK	30/07/2010 09:42	W
Belief in future	3	7	02/07/2010 09:28	WK	30/07/2010 10:04	W
Benefits in general	1	14	21/07/2010 19:08	W	26/07/2010 10:12	W
Country, community or s	5	26	02/07/2010 09:28	WK	30/07/2010 10:05	W
Livelihood	5	37	02/07/2010 09:29	WK	30/07/2010 10:00	W
Making choices within D	4	9	02/07/2010 16:17	WK	22/07/2010 18:07	WK
Mutual support among X	1	2	26/07/2010 10:16	W	30/07/2010 10:06	W
Poverty	1	8	02/07/2010 09:29	WK	30/07/2010 09:42	W
Resentment or mistrust fr	3	6	01/07/2010 15:27	WK	30/07/2010 10:05	W
Rumours	1	1	01/07/2010 15:32	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Tension between X/Cs ov	1	2	05/07/2010 09:00	WK	05/07/2010 09:06	WK
Training choice not avail	2	2	05/07/2010 12:22	W	05/07/2010 14:43	W
Unemployment	3	5	02/07/2010 09:29	WK	30/07/2010 09:42	W
Women	4	6	05/07/2010 11:57	W	26/07/2010 10:01	W
Work after training	5	30	02/07/2010 09:28	WK	22/07/2010 18:21	WK
Workshop (post training)	3	8	02/07/2010 09:28	WK	21/07/2010 19:31	W
Youth	1	1	05/07/2010 11:56	W	05/07/2010 11:57	W

The bottom status bar shows 'W 17 Items'.

6th August 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Advice for others taking part in DD	0	0	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	01/07/2010 19:45	WK
Along the way	0	0	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	01/07/2010 14:51	WK
Affirming what others have said	1	4	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	22/07/2010 18:53	WK
Clarification sought	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Correction	0	0	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	01/07/2010 15:11	WK
Interruption	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Laughter	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Arms	3	13	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	21/07/2010 19:26	W
Assistance	0	0	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	22/07/2010 18:44	WK
Denied	2	4	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	02/07/2010 17:03	WK
Sought	3	6	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	22/07/2010 18:09	WK
Being listened to	5	15	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	22/07/2010 18:11	WK
By implementing NGOs	2	2	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	05/07/2010 13:46	W
By NCDOR etc	2	2	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	05/07/2010 08:54	WK
By others	0	0	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	01/07/2010 15:08	WK
By trainers	0	0	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	01/07/2010 15:08	WK
By UN	1	1	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	05/07/2010 11:22	W
Camps	4	12	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	21/07/2010 19:27	W
Activities or events during camp	2	12	01/07/2010 14:43	WK	22/07/2010 19:08	WK
Management of camp	0	0	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	01/07/2010 14:42	WK
Commanders	2	2	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
Being a commander	0	0	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	01/07/2010 15:02	WK
Giving orders re disarmament	1	1	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	05/07/2010 15:20	W
Info or help from commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	01/07/2010 15:02	WK
Recruiting commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	01/07/2010 15:01	WK
Corruption	2	2	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	21/07/2010 19:17	W
By commanders	1	1	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
By DDR or NGO staff	4	4	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	21/07/2010 19:15	W
By non-VCs	1	3	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	12/07/2010 16:42	W
By others	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
By self	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
By UN	0	0	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	01/07/2010 15:04	WK
Having to share benefits or pay b	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
Demobilisation	3	4	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	21/07/2010 18:21	W
Disarmament	5	20	01/07/2010 14:40	WK	21/07/2010 19:02	W
Being excluded	2	5	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
Completed	3	4	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	21/07/2010 19:26	W
Not completing it	2	2	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	21/07/2010 19:02	W
Weapons taken by commanders	1	2	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W

6th August 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Being excluded	2	5	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
Completed	3	4	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	21/07/2010 19:26	W
Not completing it	2	2	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	21/07/2010 19:02	W
Weapons taken by commanders	1	2	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
Weapons used by others to get b	2	3	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
Expectations	5	32	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	30/07/2010 09:38	W
Created by commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	01/07/2010 15:03	WK
Created by NCDOR	1	2	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Created by NGOs	3	7	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	05/07/2010 14:43	W
Created by others	1	1	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	19/07/2010 18:22	W
Created by UN	1	3	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	05/07/2010 12:50	W
Fighting groups	1	3	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	30/07/2010 09:53	W
CDF	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
GoL or AFL	2	3	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	30/07/2010 09:53	W
LURD	1	2	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	02/07/2010 16:23	WK
MODEL	1	2	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	02/07/2010 16:23	WK
NPFL	0	0	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	01/07/2010 15:06	WK
Other (Iluella)	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
Other (S Leone)	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
RUF	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
SLA (SL army)	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
Foreigners or white people	3	7	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	21/07/2010 19:10	W
Geographic Areas	3	6	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	12/07/2010 14:43	W
Area of origin	2	2	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	05/07/2010 08:32	WK
Resettlement area	1	3	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Return to area	1	1	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	05/07/2010 08:32	WK
Setting in different area to home	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	01/07/2010 15:01	WK
Having a say in decisions	5	15	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	22/07/2010 18:06	WK
By implementing NGOs	2	4	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	05/07/2010 14:43	W
By NCDOR etc	1	1	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
By others	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	01/07/2010 15:09	WK
By trainers	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	01/07/2010 15:09	WK
By UN	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	01/07/2010 15:09	WK
Information	3	3	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	12/07/2010 14:52	W
Accuracy	5	23	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	21/07/2010 19:30	W
Amount	3	5	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	21/07/2010 19:04	W
Gaps	3	4	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	30/07/2010 09:07	W
Receiving info	5	27	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	30/07/2010 09:07	W
Joining up	1	1	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	21/07/2010 19:24	W

6th August 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Joining up	1	1	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	21/07/2010 19:24	W
Changing group	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
Forcible recruitment	1	1	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	30/07/2010 09:53	W
Leaving group	0	0	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	01/07/2010 15:06	WK
Ladder of Participation	5	15	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	22/07/2010 18:06	WK
0	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
1	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
-1	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
2	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
-2 or worse	0	0	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	01/07/2010 15:11	WK
3	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
4	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
5	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
6	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
7	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
Lobbying for benefits	2	6	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	05/07/2010 11:22	W
Certificates	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	05/07/2010 08:54	WK
Other lobbying	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	01/07/2010 15:01	WK
Payments	2	5	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	22/07/2010 18:11	WK
Scholarship extension	1	2	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	07/07/2010 11:20	W
Tools	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	02/07/2010 16:45	WK
Training	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Other combatants or XCs	2	3	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	26/07/2010 10:15	W
People outside armed groups	1	1	01/07/2010 14:47	WK	21/07/2010 19:15	W
Community	5	18	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	30/07/2010 10:05	W
Elders	2	2	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	05/07/2010 11:56	W
Family	2	4	01/07/2010 14:46	WK	22/07/2010 18:35	WK
Non-XC friends	1	2	01/07/2010 14:46	WK	12/07/2010 16:38	W
Promises	0	0	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	01/07/2010 14:49	WK
Deceit	3	3	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	22/07/2010 18:52	WK
Promises made	5	17	01/07/2010 15:49	WK	30/07/2010 09:09	W
Promises not kept	5	34	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	30/07/2010 09:09	W
Psycho-social issues	4	8	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	30/07/2010 10:06	W
Anti-social behaviour	2	4	01/07/2010 19:50	WK	20/07/2010 18:46	W
Counselling	2	7	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	30/07/2010 10:06	W
Psycho-social recovery	2	3	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	07/07/2010 11:02	W
Trauma	2	5	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	22/07/2010 19:08	WK
Reintegration	5	20	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	30/07/2010 09:43	W
Being excluded	1	2	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	22/07/2010 18:26	WK

6th August 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Reintegration	5	20	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	30/07/2010 09:43	W
Being excluded	1	2	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	22/07/2010 18:26	WK
Completed	1	2	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Information about	4	21	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	30/07/2010 09:07	W
Not completing it	2	4	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	08/07/2010 19:24	WK
Records of benefits received (ID)	2	3	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	05/07/2010 14:45	W
Re-running Reintegration or DDR	5	28	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	30/07/2010 09:41	W
School and education	2	5	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	22/07/2010 18:06	WK
Adequacy	0	0	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	01/07/2010 14:56	WK
Paperwork or certificates	2	2	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	07/07/2010 11:21	W
Problems	1	6	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	12/07/2010 14:40	W
Providing scholarships in general	1	2	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	12/07/2010 15:26	W
Scholarship ending	1	5	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	12/07/2010 14:35	W
School (non reintegration)	4	11	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	30/07/2010 10:01	W
Usefulness	1	1	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	05/07/2010 11:12	W
Stipends	3	5	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	22/07/2010 18:07	WK
Amount - adequacy	0	0	01/07/2010 14:59	WK	01/07/2010 14:59	WK
Amount - different to what was pr	2	3	01/07/2010 14:59	WK	22/07/2010 18:02	WK
Non-payment	1	11	01/07/2010 14:58	WK	22/07/2010 18:11	WK
Non-XCs receiving benefits	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	05/07/2010 11:15	W
Training	5	23	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	30/07/2010 09:09	W
Adequacy	3	10	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	12/07/2010 15:31	W
Duration	2	9	02/07/2010 09:18	WK	12/07/2010 16:34	W
Paperwork or certificates	4	15	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	08/07/2010 19:36	WK
Problems	4	31	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	12/07/2010 16:34	W
Toolkits	3	16	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	12/07/2010 16:32	W
Tools or resources during trainin	3	4	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	05/07/2010 14:39	W
Trainers	3	10	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	12/07/2010 15:31	W
Training NGOs	4	20	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	12/07/2010 16:06	W
Usefulness	2	12	01/07/2010 14:54	WK	12/07/2010 15:31	W

Coding scheme as of 24th August 2010 (seven screens):

The screenshot shows the NVivo software interface with the following components:

- Nodes Pane (Left):** A tree view showing the hierarchy of nodes: Free Nodes, Tree Nodes, Cases, Relationships, Matrices, Search Folders, and All Nodes.
- Tree Nodes Table (Main):** A table listing nodes and their associated sources, references, and creation/modification dates. The table is organized into sections for different categories of nodes.
- Bottom Status Bar:** Displays '157 Items'.

Tree Nodes Table Data:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Along the way	0	0	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	01/07/2010 14:51	WK
Affirming what others have said	1	4	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	22/07/2010 18:53	WK
Clarification sought	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Correction	0	0	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	01/07/2010 15:11	WK
Interruption	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Laughter	0	0	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	01/07/2010 15:10	WK
Community	5	18	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	20/08/2010 17:01	W
Belief in future	3	7	20/08/2010 17:01	W	24/08/2010 12:32	W
Country, community or society as a whole	5	26	20/08/2010 17:01	W	24/08/2010 12:32	W
Resentment or mistrust from community or others	3	6	20/08/2010 17:01	W	20/08/2010 17:01	W
Corruption	2	2	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	20/08/2010 17:01	W
By commanders	1	1	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
By DDR or NGO staff	4	4	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	21/07/2010 19:15	W
By non-XCs	1	3	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	12/07/2010 16:42	W
By others	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
By self	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
By UN	0	0	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	01/07/2010 15:04	WK
Having to share benefits or pay bribes	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
Demobilisation	4	6	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	24/08/2010 12:33	W
Camps	5	14	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	24/08/2010 12:33	W
Activities or events during camp	2	12	01/07/2010 14:43	WK	24/08/2010 12:34	W
Management of camp	0	0	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	01/07/2010 14:42	WK
Disarmament	6	23	01/07/2010 14:40	WK	24/08/2010 12:34	W
Arms	3	13	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	23/08/2010 15:03	W
Being excluded	2	5	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	24/08/2010 12:34	W
Completed	3	4	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	21/07/2010 19:26	W
Not completing it	2	2	01/07/2010 14:42	WK	21/07/2010 19:02	W
Weapons taken by commanders	1	2	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
Weapons used by others to get benefits	2	3	01/07/2010 14:41	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
Fighting groups	1	3	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	30/07/2010 09:53	W
CDR	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
GoL or AFL	2	3	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	30/07/2010 09:53	W
Joining up	1	1	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	21/07/2010 19:24	W

24th August 2010 continued:

DDR.nvp - NVivo

File Edit View Go Project Links Code Tools Window Help

Nodes

- Free Nodes
- Tree Nodes
- Cases
- Relationships
- Matrices
- Search Folders
- All Nodes

Sources

Nodes

Sets

Queries

Models

Links

Classifications

Folders

Code Alt

W 157 Items

Tree Nodes

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Fighting groups	1	3	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	30/07/2010 09:53	W
CDF	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
Gol. or AFL	2	3	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	30/07/2010 09:53	W
Joining up	1	1	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	21/07/2010 19:24	W
Changing group	0	0	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	01/07/2010 15:05	WK
Forcible recruitment	1	1	01/07/2010 15:05	WK	30/07/2010 09:53	W
Leaving group	0	0	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	01/07/2010 15:06	WK
LURD	1	2	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	02/07/2010 16:23	WK
MODEL	1	2	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	02/07/2010 16:23	WK
NPL	0	0	01/07/2010 15:06	WK	01/07/2010 15:06	WK
Other (Liberia)	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
Other (S Leone)	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
RUF	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
SLA (SL army)	0	0	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	01/07/2010 15:07	WK
Geographic Areas	3	6	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	12/07/2010 14:43	W
Area of origin	2	2	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	05/07/2010 08:32	WK
Resettlement area	1	3	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Return to area	1	1	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	05/07/2010 08:32	WK
Settling in different area to home	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	01/07/2010 15:01	WK
Livelihood...	5	37	20/08/2010 16:57	W	23/08/2010 15:13	W
Being in the streets-	2	10	20/08/2010 16:57	W	23/08/2010 15:14	W
Poverty-	1	8	20/08/2010 16:57	W	24/08/2010 12:35	W
Unemployment-	3	5	20/08/2010 16:57	W	24/08/2010 12:35	W
Work after training-	5	30	20/08/2010 16:57	W	24/08/2010 12:35	W
Participation	0	0	19/08/2010 19:29	WK	23/08/2010 14:58	W
Assistance...	0	0	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	23/08/2010 15:01	W
Denied-	2	4	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	23/08/2010 15:01	W
Sought-	3	6	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	23/08/2010 15:01	W
Being listened to...	5	19	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	24/08/2010 12:36	W
By implementing NGO's-	2	2	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By NCDOR etc-	2	2	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By others-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By trainers-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By UN-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
Having a say in decisions...	5	18	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By implementing NGO's-	2	4	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By NCDOR etc-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By others-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By trainers-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By UN-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
Ladder of Participation	5	15	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	22/07/2010 18:06	WK
0	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
1	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
-1	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
2	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
-2 or worse	0	0	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	01/07/2010 15:11	WK
3	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
4	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
5	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
6	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
7	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
Lobbying for benefits...	4	14	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Certificates-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Other lobbying-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Payments-	2	5	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Scholarship extension-	1	2	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Tools-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Training-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Making choices within DDR	4	9	20/08/2010 17:02	W	24/08/2010 12:36	W
People	0	0	19/08/2010 19:31	WK	19/08/2010 19:31	WK

24th August 2010 continued:

DDR.nvp - NVivo

File Edit View Go Project Links Code Tools Window Help

Nodes

- Free Nodes
- Tree Nodes
- Cases
- Relationships
- Matrices
- Search Folders
- All Nodes

Sources

Nodes

Sets

Queries

Models

Links

Classifications

Folders

Code Alt

W 157 Items

Tree Nodes

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Being listened to...	5	19	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	24/08/2010 12:36	W
By implementing NGO's-	2	2	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By NCDOR etc-	2	2	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By others-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By trainers-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By UN-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
Having a say in decisions...	5	18	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By implementing NGO's-	2	4	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By NCDOR etc-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By others-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By trainers-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
By UN-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:09	WK	23/08/2010 15:05	W
Ladder of Participation	5	15	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	22/07/2010 18:06	WK
0	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
1	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
-1	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
2	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
-2 or worse	0	0	01/07/2010 15:11	WK	01/07/2010 15:11	WK
3	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
4	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
5	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
6	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
7	0	0	01/07/2010 15:12	WK	01/07/2010 15:12	WK
Lobbying for benefits...	4	14	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Certificates-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Other lobbying-	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Payments-	2	5	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Scholarship extension-	1	2	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Tools-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Training-	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	WK	23/08/2010 15:00	W
Making choices within DDR	4	9	20/08/2010 17:02	W	24/08/2010 12:36	W
People	0	0	19/08/2010 19:31	WK	19/08/2010 19:31	WK

24th August 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
People	0	0	19/08/2010 19:31	WK	19/08/2010 19:31	WK
Commanders	2	2	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	21/07/2010 19:18	W
Bring a commander	1	1	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	06/08/2010 17:37	W
Giving orders re disarmament	1	1	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	05/07/2010 15:20	W
Info or help from commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:02	WK	01/07/2010 15:02	WK
Recruiting commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:01	WK	01/07/2010 15:01	WK
Foreigners or white people	3	7	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	21/07/2010 19:10	W
Other combatants or XCs	2	3	01/07/2010 14:45	WK	26/07/2010 10:15	W
Mutual support among XCs	1	2	20/08/2010 17:03	W	20/08/2010 17:03	W
Tension between XCs over lack of benefits (R)	1	2	20/08/2010 17:04	W	20/08/2010 17:04	W
People outside armed groups	1	1	01/07/2010 14:47	WK	23/08/2010 15:07	W
Elders	2	2	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	05/07/2010 11:56	W
Family	4	11	01/07/2010 14:46	WK	23/08/2010 15:07	W
Children	2	3	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	23/08/2010 15:07	W
Extended family	0	0	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	23/08/2010 15:07	W
Parents	3	3	01/07/2010 14:47	WK	23/08/2010 15:07	W
Siblings	2	3	01/07/2010 14:48	WK	23/08/2010 15:07	W
Non-XC friends	1	2	01/07/2010 14:46	WK	12/07/2010 16:38	W
Psycho-social issues	4	8	01/07/2010 14:51	WK	24/08/2010 12:37	W
Anti-social behaviour	2	4	01/07/2010 19:50	WK	24/08/2010 12:37	W
Counselling	2	7	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	24/08/2010 12:37	W
Psycho-social recovery	2	3	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	24/08/2010 12:37	W
Trauma	2	5	01/07/2010 15:10	WK	24/08/2010 12:37	W
Receiving info re DDR	6	36	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	24/08/2010 12:38	W
Accuracy	5	23	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	19/08/2010 21:22	WK
Amount	4	8	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	24/08/2010 12:38	W
Expectations	5	52	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	24/08/2010 12:38	W
Created by commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	01/07/2010 15:03	WK

24th August 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Receiving info re DDR	6	36	01/07/2010 14:50	WK	24/08/2010 12:38	W
Accuracy	5	23	01/07/2010 15:08	WK	19/08/2010 21:22	WK
Amount	4	8	01/07/2010 15:07	WK	24/08/2010 12:38	W
Expectations	5	52	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	24/08/2010 12:38	W
Created by commanders	0	0	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	01/07/2010 15:03	WK
Created by NCCDR	1	2	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Created by NGOs	3	7	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	05/07/2010 14:43	W
Created by others	1	1	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	19/07/2010 18:22	W
Created by UN	1	3	01/07/2010 15:04	WK	05/07/2010 12:50	W
Deceit	3	18	18/08/2010 18:42	WK	23/08/2010 14:50	W
Promises made	5	39	01/07/2010 14:49	WK	24/08/2010 12:38	W
Promises not kept	5	35	01/07/2010 15:03	WK	23/08/2010 14:52	W
Rumours	2	2	20/08/2010 16:54	W	24/08/2010 12:38	W
Reintegration	5	20	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	30/07/2010 09:43	W
Being excluded	1	2	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	24/08/2010 12:39	W
Completed	1	2	01/07/2010 14:52	WK	02/07/2010 08:45	WK
Not completing it	2	4	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	08/07/2010 19:24	WK
Records of benefits received (ID card etc)	2	3	01/07/2010 14:53	WK	05/07/2010 14:45	W
School and education	2	5	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	24/08/2010 12:39	W
Paperwork or certificates	2	2	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	07/07/2010 11:21	W
Problems	1	6	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	12/07/2010 14:40	W
Providing scholarships in general	1	2	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	12/07/2010 15:26	W
Scholarship ending	1	5	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	24/08/2010 12:47	W
School (non reintegration)	4	10	01/07/2010 14:57	WK	24/08/2010 12:47	W
Usefulness or adequacy	1	1	01/07/2010 14:56	WK	24/08/2010 12:48	W
Stipends	3	5	01/07/2010 14:44	WK	23/08/2010 15:10	W
Amount - adequacy	0	0	01/07/2010 14:59	WK	24/08/2010 12:48	W
Non-payment or different to stated amount...	4	15	01/07/2010 14:58	WK	23/08/2010 15:11	W
Complete non-payment	2	3	01/07/2010 14:58	WK	23/08/2010 15:11	W
Delays in payment	1	1	01/07/2010 14:59	WK	23/08/2010 15:11	W
Early cessation or no final payments	1	2	01/07/2010 14:58	WK	23/08/2010 15:11	W

24th August 2010 continued:

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Stipends	3	5	01/07/2010 14:44	W/K	23/08/2010 15:10	W
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Amount - adequacy	0	0	01/07/2010 14:53	W/K	24/08/2010 12:48	W
Non-payment or different to stated amount...	4	15	01/07/2010 14:58	W/K	23/08/2010 15:11	W
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Complete non-payment-	2	3	01/07/2010 14:58	W/K	23/08/2010 15:11	W
Delays in payment	1	1	01/07/2010 14:59	W/K	23/08/2010 15:11	W
Early cessation or no final payments-	1	2	01/07/2010 14:58	W/K	23/08/2010 15:11	W
Reduced stipend	1	1	01/07/2010 14:58	W/K	23/08/2010 15:11	W
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Non-VCs receiving benefits	1	1	01/07/2010 15:00	W/K	05/07/2010 11:15	W
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Training	5	23	01/07/2010 14:44	W/K	30/07/2010 09:09	W
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Duration	2	9	02/07/2010 09:18	W/K	12/07/2010 16:34	W
Paperwork or certificates	4	15	01/07/2010 14:56	W/K	08/07/2010 19:36	W/K
Problems	4	31	01/07/2010 14:54	W/K	12/07/2010 16:34	W
Toolkits	3	16	01/07/2010 14:56	W/K	12/07/2010 16:32	W
Tools or resources during training	3	4	01/07/2010 14:54	W/K	05/07/2010 14:39	W
Trainers	3	10	01/07/2010 14:54	W/K	12/07/2010 15:31	W
Training choice not available	2	2	20/08/2010 17:05	W	20/08/2010 17:05	W
Training NGOs	4	20	01/07/2010 14:54	W/K	12/07/2010 16:06	W
Usefulness or adequacy	3	14	01/07/2010 14:54	W/K	23/08/2010 14:55	W
Workshop (post training)	3	8	20/08/2010 17:05	W	20/08/2010 17:05	W
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Re-running Reintegration or DDR	5	28	01/07/2010 14:50	W/K	24/08/2010 12:50	W
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Advice for others taking part in DDR	0	0	01/07/2010 14:52	W/K	24/08/2010 12:50	W

24th August 2010 continued:

21 August 2010 continued.

DDR.nvp - NVivo

File Edit View Go Project Tools Window Help

New

Nodes

- Free Nodes
- Tree Nodes
- Cases
- Relationships
- Matrices
- Search Folders
- All Nodes

Sources

Nodes

Sets

Queries

Models

Links

Classifications

Folders

Free Nodes

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Benefits in general	4	20	21/07/2010 19:08	W	23/08/2010 16:11	W
Test - Participation Set sa	5	110	17/08/2010 16:57	W	17/08/2010 17:00	W
Women	4	6	05/07/2010 11:57	W	26/07/2010 10:01	W
Youth	1	1	05/07/2010 11:56	W	05/07/2010 11:57	W

Code At: ... In: ...

4 Items