

# **DO DEPUTY-LEADERS MATTER?**

## **A COMPARATIVE STUDY.**

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Dissertation submitted for the degree of Ph.D

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## DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of a Doctorate of Philosophy (PhD) is entirely my own work and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'P. H. Jones', is written over a horizontal line.

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## **ABSTRACT**

Little has been written on deputy-leaders and the received wisdom, such as it is, is that deputy-leaders have little power and hence do not matter. A global survey of deputy-leaders found that 68 per cent of states had a deputy-leader. So, however powerful they may be, they are certainly a fairly common political phenomenon. To test whether or not deputy-leaders are politically powerful and thus matter, seven hypotheses were identified with nine observable implications. A comparative approach was adopted, examining the careers of 64 deputy-leaders in five states. The overall results of the tests were somewhat at odds with the perceived wisdom that deputy-leaders do not matter. Furthermore, the outcomes of the tests at the level of the individual states in this study found strong proof that deputy-leaders in the US can influence policy outcomes and there was some proof that British and Swedish deputy-leaders could do so as well.

# 1 DEPUTY-LEADERS – A GLOBAL OVERVIEW

## 1.1 Introduction

### 1.1.1 Introduction and chapter outline

There is a perception among journalists and political commentators that the current US Vice-President, Dick Cheney is a very powerful politician. In a profile for the Sunday Times, respected biographer William Shawcross, describes Cheney as ‘the heart and soul and brains of the show ... he’s the man with the map, quietly giving directions to the driver.’<sup>1</sup> He goes on to call him ‘The most influential man in America ... perhaps the most powerful vice-president there has ever been.’<sup>2</sup> He backs up these assertions by attributing changes in taxation, education and energy policy to Cheney. Shawcross is not alone in this view. A profile in the Washington Post describes him as ‘powerful’<sup>3</sup> with former Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, being quoted as describing Cheney as ‘the center of power and influence in this White House.’<sup>4</sup> Dan Coen<sup>5</sup> argues that President Bush has given Cheney ‘the authority to make decisions.’ There seems to be no shortage of commentators who view Vice-President Cheney as having significant influence on US government policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Sunday Times Magazine, June 6 2003, p 44.

<sup>2</sup> Sunday Times Magazine, June 6 2003, p 44.

<sup>3</sup> Washington Post, January 18 2004, p D01.

<sup>4</sup> Washington Post, January 18 2004, p D01.

<sup>5</sup> Available from: [http://www.vicepresidents.com/new\\_page\\_15.htm](http://www.vicepresidents.com/new_page_15.htm) [accessed 14 March 2002].

What is the source of Cheney's power? He has no major position within his party either as a politician with his own power-base or as spokesperson for a particular group or section within his party. He has no additional cabinet positions other than that of Vice-President. Indeed, he was no longer involved in active politics when he was chosen to be George W. Bush's running mate and thus became US Vice-President. It would appear that it is his position as Vice-President through which he influences government policy.

Such a situation is very much at odds with the findings outlined in chapter two of this research. A review of the literature finds that little has been written on deputy-leaders and the received wisdom, such as it is, is that deputy-leaders (whether they be Vice-Presidents or Deputy-Prime Ministers) have little power and hence do not matter. How is this reconciled with the perception that Vice President Cheney is a very powerful politician? This apparent contradiction between the literature (insofar as it exists) and the policy impact of Cheney indicates that the role of deputy-leaders requires further research.

Moreover, this question raises more general issues about leadership and the functioning of government in general. If the perception that deputy-leaders do not matter (as they cannot influence policy) needs to be re-evaluated, then this may have significant implications for a number of areas of comparative politics where the perception that deputy-leaders do not matter has led to them being ignored. If deputy-leaders do matter (even if only in some cases), then existing research in areas such as that of coalitions, government and cabinets may need to be re-examined.

Over the course of the following eight chapters this work will examine deputy-leaders with a view to determining whether or not they matter insofar as they can affect policy. In the first chapter the position of deputy-leader is defined. It also contains a global survey of deputy-leaders which provides the basis for an analysis of their role and functions, as well as the circumstances in which they are found. The second chapter focuses on the perception of deputy-leaders and as has been outlined above finds that they are perceived not to matter. The second half of this chapter will provide a framework for the testing of this perception. To test whether or not deputy-leaders are politically powerful and thus matter, seven hypotheses were identified with nine observable implications. The third chapter provides a background to deputy-leaders across five states who will provide the basis for testing these observable implications. The results of these tests are given in chapters four to seven. Chapter eight brings these results together in order to answer the question do deputy-leaders matter. The overall results of the tests were inconclusive, which is at odds with the perceived wisdom. It was also found that deputy-leaders in the US can influence policy outcomes and there were indications that British and Swedish deputy-leaders could do so as well.

### **1.1.2 This chapter**

This chapter will provide a survey of deputy-leaders. At its core is a global database of deputy-leaders covering 192 states (the database itself is included as Appendix 1). The data gathered include: states with deputy leaders; their constitutional title; whether they



have a constitutionally-defined role and, if so, what it is; whether they are elected or appointed; whether they hold ministerial positions and the nature of government in those states (are they democratic? do they have single or multi-party government? and what are their leadership structures?) as well as the size of each state. The data will then be analysed and a number of conclusions regarding deputy-leaders reached.

## **1.2 Assumptions**

The only assumption that is made in the gathering of the data is that it was related to the situation at a specific point in time. In other words, the data on deputy-leaders gathered for this global overview relate to the state of affairs that existed during November 2001. Some of the items of data gathered will be more prone to change than others over time. As governments change, the ministerial responsibilities of deputy-leaders will change, as will the single- or multi-party composition of government and possibly even the number of deputy-leaders. Constitutional changes occur less frequently, so the constitutional role and the nature of the appointment of deputy-leaders will remain relatively constant. In states where there is no constitutional requirement for a deputy-leader, some governments may have such a position and others may not. Thus, the point-in-time nature of the data gathered must be borne in mind when conclusions are reached on the basis of them.

This approach was adopted so as to render the gathering of the data manageable. To gather data on deputy-leaders on a longitudinal basis (that is over time) would generate a large amount of data, much of which would not be comparable given that many states did not exist until recently. While longitudinal data would allow for some additional analysis,

particularly regarding the changing role of deputy-leaders over time, it would not identify the reasons for such change. A more detailed analysis of the changing role of deputy-leaders will be carried out in chapters three to seven.

## **1.3 Definitions**

### **1.3.1 Introduction**

Before any data can be gathered, a number of key concepts must be defined so as to guide the data search. Specifically, what, for the purposes of this research, is a state and what is a deputy-leader? As data are gathered on the nature of deputy-leaders, further concepts will need to be defined. What is meant by the statement that a deputy-leader in a specific country is elected rather than appointed? When a state is described as democratic or non-democratic, what is meant?

### **1.3.2 What is a state?**

What sort of deputy-leaders will this research relate to? The simple answer is deputy-leaders of states. The definition of 'state' that is used will determine how broad an overview of deputy-leaders is provided. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention<sup>6</sup> defines a state as having: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. The term 'state' as it is used here should be distinguished from the political subdivision of such states which also carry the title 'state' in countries such as the United States, India and Australia.

For the purposes of this research, the list of states that will be used will be based on those listed in the CIA Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments as at November 2001. This generates a list of 192 countries when we add the United States to it and remove the Cook Islands and the Netherlands Antilles which are overseas territories. Overseas territories are excluded from this database on the basis that they are off-shoots of states rather than states in themselves.

### **1.3.3 What is a micro-state?**

Data will also be gathered on the size of states included in the database. Specifically, small states will be categorised as 'micro-states'. There is 'no clear-cut definition of what constitutes a small state',<sup>7</sup> as there are numerous proxy measures for smallness such as land area, population size and national income. None of these measures is perfect in the sense that they all fail to capture adequately the nature of what it is to be a 'small' state. These measures can also give conflicting results. For example, a country with a relatively small population could have a large land area, for example Australia, while a country with a large population could have a relatively small land area, for example Bangladesh. A state such as Liechtenstein may have a high per capita income, but it has a small land area and population.

In the current context, population size appears to be the most appropriate variable on which to base a definition of small states, given that the population feeds into both the

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<sup>6</sup> Available from: <http://newtaiwan.virtualave.net/montevideo01.htm> [accessed 18 April 2002].

size of the electorate and the pool of possible political candidates. A cut-off point on which to base a definition of smallness must also be chosen. This is not a precise science. The higher one sets the cut-off point, the more micro-states will result. For example in 1998, there were 87 countries with a population under five million, 58 countries had a population under two and a half million and 35 had a population less than five hundred thousand.<sup>8</sup> For the purposes of this research, the cut-off point shall be taken as a population of one million or less. The rationale for choosing this point is that the population of states is generally measured in units of millions (with the exception of China which has a population over a billion). Thus, the first step on that measurement ladder would be an appropriate cut-off point with those states whose population falls below it being considered 'micro-states'. On this basis, 40 states (21 per cent of the states included in this study) are 'micro-states'.

#### **1.3.4 Democratic and non-democratic states**

All the states examined are categorised as either democratic or non-democratic. In this overview, states have been categorised according to Freedom House's<sup>9</sup> assessment of the extent of democratic practice in each state. Freedom House make use of the following seven categories for their assessment:

1. Democracies: where political leaders are elected in 'competitive multi-party and multi-candidate processes in which opposition parties have a legitimate chance of attaining power or participating in power' (Freedom House, 2000, p.1). An example of such a democracy is the United States.

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<sup>7</sup> Available from (<http://ase.tufts.edu/irconf/qa.htm>) [accessed 24<sup>th</sup> May 2002].

<sup>8</sup> Available from: <http://ase.tufts.edu/irconf/OA.htm> [accessed 24<sup>th</sup> May 2002].

<sup>9</sup> Available from: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org) [accessed 9 January 2002].

2. Restricted Democratic Practices: where one party has sufficient control so as to preclude a meaningful electoral challenge to its position. Zimbabwe would be an example of such a state.
3. Monarchies: three types of monarchy are outlined, the first is constitutional monarchy where a constitution sets out the role of the monarch and some power is devolved to an elected assembly and traditional and absolute monarchies where the power of the monarch is absolute. All three types of monarchy are non-democratic, so, for example, Great Britain would not be considered a monarchy under this definition. Saudi Arabia is an example of a monarchy using this definition.
4. Authoritarian regimes: either one party states or military dictatorships where there are significant abuses of human rights. Pakistan is an example of such a regime.
5. Totalitarian regimes: one party states where control extends beyond the public sphere into the private lives of citizens. The Soviet Union was an example of a totalitarian regime.
6. Colonial and imperial dependencies: territories under the control of one of the imperial states. Most African states up to independence would have been defined as dependencies.
7. Protectorates: states that are either under the jurisdiction of the international community or of another state. Namibia after World War I was an example of a protectorate.

For the purposes of this study, these categories will be simplified. States falling into the first category will be considered to be 'democratic' (of which there are 121), while states falling into categories two to five will be considered 'non-democratic' (of which there are

71). This is on the basis that citizens of category two states do not have a real choice when voting, while citizens of states in categories three, four and five do not have a vote at all. States falling into the final two categories will be excluded from this study as they are not considered to be independent states.

### **1.3.5 Single and multi-party governments**

A further series of distinctions will be made on the basis of the number of parties that make up the government of each state in the database. A state where one party makes up the government will be considered to have a 'single-party' government. Where one party is in power and has the support of a number of independents, this shall also be considered a 'single-party' government. A state where more than one party makes up the government will be considered as a 'multi-party' government. States where either no parties exist or where parties are banned will be considered to have a 'non-party' government. There are 81 single-party governments, 87 multi-party governments and 24 non-party governments included in this study<sup>10</sup>.

### **1.3.6 What is a deputy-leader?**

For the purposes of this project deputy-leaders are defined as follows:

1. They must be members of the cabinet.
2. They are the second ranking member of cabinet in that they deputise for the head of cabinet.

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<sup>10</sup> Available from: <http://www.electionworld.org/election/> [accessed 11 January 2002].

3. They must hold an office or title which explicitly recognises their deputising role or ranking.

The first criterion, specifying that deputy-leaders must be in the cabinet, narrows down the field of possible subjects. It was chosen to exclude heads of state where they are separate from the head of government. Where there is a President, but no Prime Minister, in other words where the head of state and head of government are one and the same, then the Vice-President will be the focus of this study. Where there is a President or King and a Prime Minister, and when the King or President are not members of the cabinet, it is the Deputy-Prime Minister that will be the focus of this study, rather than, for example, the second in line to the throne. An anomaly arises in cases where both the Prime Minister and King are members of cabinet (for example in Sweden the King can preside over special cabinet meetings and in Norway the King also attends cabinet meetings), where it would appear that under the second criterion, the second-ranking member of cabinet would be the Prime Minister. In this instance, the Deputy-Prime Minister shall be chosen for study on the basis that their secondary status is explicitly acknowledged which is the third criterion. Similarly, in cases where both the President and Prime Minister are members of cabinet, rather than choosing the Prime Minister as the second-ranking member of cabinet, the Deputy-Prime Minister will be chosen, again on their explicit secondary status.

The second criterion, that they must be the second ranking member in that they deputise for the head of the cabinet, was chosen so as to define what is meant by the 'deputy' in

‘deputy-leader’. It also distinguishes between deputy-leaders of parties and deputy-leaders of states where both are in the cabinet. Where a party deputy-leader is in cabinet, they are only considered a deputy-leader for the purposes of this study if they are also the second-ranking member of cabinet. This generally only occurs in single-party governments.

The third criterion, which requires that the above ranking be explicitly recognised, was also necessary to ensure clarity, as it may be open to dispute as to who the second most powerful person in cabinet is. In order to avoid such pitfalls, the ranking of second member of cabinet based on an explicit role of deputy for the head of cabinet must be explicitly recognised either constitutionally, or if not mentioned in the constitution, then by title alone or on the basis of a protocol list which specifies the ranking of cabinet members. Thus, in countries where there is more than one Deputy-Prime Minister, it is the Deputy-Prime Minister with the title of ‘First-Deputy Prime Minister’ who will be studied. Where there are multiple Deputy-Prime Ministers but no clearly predominant one, all will be included in this study.

These three criteria make it possible to clarify who the relevant deputy-leader is for the purposes of this study. There may, however, be situations where a judgement call will have to be made as to which political office-holder will be included in this study. Such instances will be clearly identified and are sufficiently few in number so not to affect significantly the analysis.



### **1.3.7 Elected and appointed deputy-leaders**

Once the area of study has been defined, the role of deputy-leaders can then be examined. The first question to be clarified is whether each deputy-leader is elected or appointed. While a distinction between these two concepts may initially seem clear-cut, this is not necessarily the case. Is the Deputy-Prime Minister who is chosen by the Prime Minister and ratified by parliament appointed (by the Prime Minister) or elected (by the parliament)? What about the case of the Vice-President selected by the Presidential candidate who is elected on the same ticket as the President in one ballot rather than two separate ones?

To provide clarity on this matter, a deputy-leader who is chosen by a direct ballot of the people will be defined as 'elected separately'. Whereas a deputy-leader chosen on the basis of being jointly on a ballot paper with the head of government (in all such cases the head of government is a 'President') will be defined as 'elected with the President'. In the case of the United States where the votes of the people decide the make-up of an electoral college which selects the President, the Vice-President will be deemed to be 'elected with the President' on the basis that voters make an explicit choice of whom they want for President and Vice-President when voting. In all other scenarios, whether chosen by the head of government or by parliament, the deputy-leader will be deemed to be 'appointed' on the basis that voters do not get an explicit say in the decision.

### **1.3.8 Ministers**

When examining whether or not a deputy-leader had a ministerial position or not, the list of cabinet members in the November 2001 ‘Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments’<sup>11</sup> was used. For the purposes of counting the number of states where deputy-leaders were ministers in cases of multiple deputy-leaders where one had a ministerial position while another did not, such states were considered to have deputy-leaders with ministerial responsibilities. At the point in time of gathering the data, there were six states where the deputy-leader position was vacant, these were excluded from the totals for calculations relating to ministers.

## **1.4 Sources of Data**

Data for this study was gathered from a number of sources. Whether or not a state had a deputy-leader and the title, number and ministerial responsibilities of deputy-leaders were gathered from the ‘Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments’ directory prepared by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).<sup>12</sup> Data on whether deputy-leaders were elected or appointed were gathered from Electionworld.org<sup>13</sup> and The Political Reference Almanac.<sup>14</sup> Whether or not deputy-leaders had a constitutional basis and, if so, what role the constitution outlined for them was gathered from the online database of the Political Studies Association of the UK.<sup>15</sup> Whether each state had a single or multi-party government and its leadership structures

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<sup>11</sup> Available from [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html) [accessed 1 November 2001].

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Available from: <http://www.electionworld.org/election/> [accessed 11 January 2002].

<sup>14</sup> Available from: <http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations.htm> [accessed 11 January 2002].

<sup>15</sup> Available from: <http://www.psa.ac.uk/www/constitutions.htm> [accessed 11 January 2002].

was ascertained from Electionworld.org. Data on population size, used to define states as micro-states, were taken from the CIA World Factbook.<sup>16</sup>

## 1.5 Analysis

### 1.5.1 Introduction

The deputy-leader database (see appendix 1) allows for a basic analysis of the office/position of deputy-leader. Some initial conclusions can be drawn about deputy leaders and some answers sought to such basic questions as what sort of government and what sort of state is more likely to have a deputy leader?

**Table 1-1**Number of states with deputy-leaders

	<b>Global</b>
<b>States</b>	192
<b>States with deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	130 (68%)

(Source: Global Database)

Some observations can be made from the data gathered in Table 1.1. 130 states out of the 192 (68 per cent) have deputy leaders. In terms of their title, 72 states have Deputy-Prime-Ministers, while 46 have Vice-Presidents as their deputy-leader. The remaining 12 states with deputy-leaders have variations on the title of Deputy-Prime Minister such as Vice-Chancellor (Austria and Germany) or on the title of Vice-President such as Deputy Minister to the President (Cyprus).

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<sup>16</sup> Available from: [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fbhome.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fbhome.html) [accessed 1 November 2001].

There are significantly more deputy-leaders than states with deputy-leaders as some states have more than one – there are in total 191 deputy-leaders (excluding Second-Deputy-Prime Ministers and Second Vice-Presidents) in 130 states.

**Table 1-2 Number of democratic and non-democratic states with deputy-leaders**

	<b>Democratic</b>	<b>Non-democratic</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>States</b>	121	71	192
<b>States with deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	82 (68%)	48 (68%)	130 (68%)

(Source: Global Database)

Whether or not a state is democratic makes no difference to the likelihood of having a deputy-leader. From Table 1.2, it can be seen that in both democratic and non-democratic states there is a 68 per cent likelihood of having a deputy-leader.

**Table 1-3 Number of micro and non-micro states with deputy-leaders**

	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Non-micro</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>States</b>	40	152	192
<b>States with deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	23 (57%)	107 (70%)	130 (68%)

(Source: Global Database)

The size of a state, however, makes a difference. From Table 1.3 it can be seen that 70 per cent of non-micro-states have deputy-leaders compared to 57 per cent of micro-states, so the larger the state, the more likely there is to be a deputy-leader.

**Table 1-4 Party-composition of Government and deputy-leaders**

	<b>Multi-party</b>	<b>Single-party</b>	<b>Non-party</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>States</b>	87	81	24	192
<b>States with deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	53 (61%)	63 (78%)	14 (58%)	130 (68%)

(Source: Global Database)

The party composition of a government also has an impact on whether or not a state has a deputy-leader. The data in Table 1.4 shows that there is a significantly higher likelihood of having a deputy-leader in single-party governments at 78 per cent compared to both multi-party and non-party governments. This conclusion is in many respects counter-intuitive, for one would expect that multi-party governments would be more likely to have a deputy-leader so as to give the leaders of each of the parties in government a formal leadership role.

Regarding the party composition of governments and their likelihood of having a deputy-leader, a related question is whether multi-party governments are more likely to produce multiple deputy-leaders? There are 28 governments with more than one deputy-leader, excluding those that have a second Deputy-Prime Minister or second Vice-President. Of these, 17 (or 61 per cent) are multi-party governments, so while the majority of multi-party governments do not have multiple deputy-leaders, governments with more than one deputy-leader are more likely to be multi-party in composition.

**Table 1-5 Number of deputy-leaders who are appointed and elected**

	<b>Global</b>
<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	130
<b>States with appointed deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	108 (83%)
<b>States with deputy-leaders elected with President (percentage of total)</b>	20 (15%)
<b>States with deputy-leaders elected separately (percentage of total)</b>	2 (2%)

(Source: Global Database)

In terms of how they attained their office, taking the total number of 191 deputy-leaders, 20 (10 per cent) were elected to their office on a single ballot with the President. Two (one per cent) were elected separately. The remaining 169 deputy-leaders (88 per cent) were appointed. When examined on a state-by-state basis, Table 1.5 shows that 108 states (83 per cent of those with a deputy leader) appoint them while 20 (15 per cent) elect them with their President and two (two per cent) elect them separately.<sup>17</sup> Deputy-leaders are thus far more likely to be appointed rather than elected.

**Table 1-6 Number of deputy-leaders who are Ministers**

	<b>Global</b>
<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	130
<b>States with deputy-leaders who are ministers (percentage of total)</b>	73 (56%)
<b>States with deputy-leaders who are not ministers (percentage of total)</b>	57 (44%)

(Source: Global Database)

As for whether or not they hold ministerial positions, leaving aside the six vacant deputy-leader positions, 102 (55 per cent) hold ministerial office, while 83 (45 per cent) have no ministerial responsibilities. Deputy-leaders are thus more likely to have a ministerial responsibility in addition to their deputy-leader role as not. Looking at it on a state-by-state basis, Table 1.6 shows that 56 per cent of states that have a deputy-leader give them ministerial responsibilities with 44 per cent not giving their deputy-leaders additional ministerial responsibilities. So an examination on a state-by-state basis rather than on a deputy-leader basis makes no difference as to the likelihood of a deputy-leader having ministerial responsibilities.

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<sup>17</sup> Columbia and Palau.

In some states deputy-leaders have more than one ministerial position: in Luxembourg, the Vice-Prime Minister is Minister of Civil Service and Administrative Reform and also Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Commerce; in Liechtenstein, the Deputy Head of Government has ministerial responsibility for the Education, Justice and Transport and Communication portfolios; and in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Deputy-Prime Minister is Minister for Commerce and Trade and also Foreign Affairs. All three of these states are 'micro-states' which would seem to indicate that deputy-leaders in micro-states are more likely to have multiple ministerial responsibilities. An analysis of the 22 micro-states with deputy-leaders shows that seven (32 per cent) hold more than one ministerial office. No deputy-leaders from non-micro-states have responsibility for more than one ministerial department. It can thus be clearly stated that deputy-leaders in micro-states are much more likely to hold more than one ministerial position.

There are also a number of states where some deputy-leaders have ministerial responsibilities and others do not. In Russia, three out of the five Deputy-Premiers have ministries while in the Czech Republic three out of four Deputy-Prime Ministers have a ministry.

As for what sort of ministry a deputy-leader is likely to hold, an examination shows that of the 102 with ministerial positions 19 per cent hold the position of Minister of Finance. This is almost twice as many as hold the next most popular ministerial portfolio which is Foreign Affairs (held by ten per cent of deputy-leaders). This is closely followed by

Defence at eight per cent. Agriculture, Energy and Foreign Trade are each held by seven per cent of deputy-leaders. While we cannot say why deputy-leaders hold the position that they hold in cabinet given the nature of this global overview, it appears that when deputy-leaders have a ministerial role that it is a significant one.

**Table 1-7 Most common ministerial positions of deputy-leaders**

<b>Position</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who hold position</b>	<b>Percentage of total</b>
<b>Finance</b>	19	19
<b>Foreign Affairs</b>	10	10
<b>Defence</b>	8	8
<b>Agriculture</b>	7	7
<b>Energy</b>	7	7
<b>Foreign Trade</b>	7	7
<b>Justice</b>	6	6
<b>Regional Development</b>	5	5
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>69</b>

(Source: Global Database)

The roles that deputy-leaders play in government are generally outlined in each state's constitution. Of the 130 states with deputy-leaders, one had its constitution suspended (Burma), five have no constitution (Israel, New Zealand, Qatar, Swaziland and the United Kingdom), the constitution could not be found for three (Equatorial Guinea, Palau and Papua New Guinea), 15 states mention the deputy-leader but do not assign them a role in their constitution and 31 states have deputy-leaders with no constitutional basis. This leaves 75 states where the roles of their deputy-leaders are detailed in their constitutions.



**Table 1-8 Constitutional roles of deputy-leaders**

<b>Roles</b>	<b>No of States where deputy-leaders have that role</b>	<b>Percentage of total No. of States with constitutional role for deputy-leaders.</b>
<b>Replace leader</b>	59	79%
<b>Functions delegated by leader</b>	17	23%
<b>Assist leader</b>	15	20%
<b>Chair cabinet if leader absent</b>	14	19%
<b>Parliamentary role</b>	12	16%
<b>Given 'special missions' by leader</b>	5	7%

(Source: Global Database)

An examination of these 75 constitutions provides some detail on the roles and duties of their deputy-leaders. From Table 1.8, it can be seen that the most common role of deputy-leaders is to take over as leader in the event of either a temporary or permanent vacancy arising. Seventy-nine per cent of states where deputy-leaders had a constitutional role had such a function. Temporary vacancies arise if the leader leaves the country, is ill or temporarily incapacitated or under investigation. In these scenarios, the deputy-leader relinquishes the role of leader when the leader returns. Permanent vacancies arise if the leader dies, resigns, is disqualified, removed, incapable or performing their duties. In such cases, the deputy-leader may see out the term of the former-leader, may start a full term as leader, or may serve as leader for a predefined period until a new leader is selected.

The next most common constitutional role of deputy-leaders is the performance of functions delegated by the leader (23 per cent of deputy-leaders with constitutional roles have such a function). A variation on this role is the giving of 'special missions' to the

deputy-leader (seven per cent of deputy-leaders with constitutional roles have such a function). Further roles allocated by their constitution to deputy-leaders include assisting the leader (20 per cent) and chairing cabinet meetings in the absence of the leader (19 per cent). Some also have a parliamentary role (16 per cent), with four (five per cent) chairing parliament (three of whom have a casting vote in the event of a tie) and five (seven per cent) having a liaison role between parliament and the executive.

While an examination of the constitutional roles and duties of deputy-leader gives an insight into their activity, it is not a complete picture by any means. Additional tasks not covered (and not precluded) by the constitution may be allocated to deputy-leaders. It will only be when the role of specific deputy-leaders are examined via case-studies in the following chapters that such roles can be clarified.

### 1.5.2 The likelihood of having a deputy-leader

Taking the analysis a level deeper and looking at combinations of factors such as state size, party composition of government and whether or not a state is democratic, which combinations have the greatest influence on the likelihood of a state having a deputy-leader?

**Table 1-9 Impact of democracy and state size on having deputy-leaders**

	Democratic Micro-states	Democratic Non-Micro-states	Non- Democratic Micro-states	Non-Democratic Non-Micro-states	Global
Total no of states	31	90	9	62	192
States with deputy-leaders (percentage of total)	20 (65%)	62 (69%)	3 (33%)	45 (73%)	130 (68%)

(Source: Global Database)

In Table 1.9, the impact of democracy and state size on whether or not a state has a deputy-leader can be seen. The only significant divergence from the global figures occurs in the case of non-democratic micro-states where the likelihood of having a deputy-leader is 33 per cent compared to 68 per cent globally. However, it must be noted that there are only nine countries in this category, so it is too small a base to draw any conclusions from.

**Table 1-10 Impact of democracy and party-composition of government on deputy-leaders**

	<b>Democratic Multi-party</b>	<b>Non- Democratic Multi-party</b>	<b>Democratic Single-party</b>	<b>Non- Democratic Single-party</b>	<b>Democratic Non-party</b>	<b>Non- Democratic Non-party</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Total no of states</b>	64	23	51	30	6	18	192
<b>States with deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	40 (62%)	13 (57%)	38 (75%)	25 (83%)	4 (67%)	10 (56% <sup>^</sup> )	130 (68%)

(Source: Global Database)

Looking at the impact of democracy and the party composition of government on whether or not states have deputy-leaders as outlined in Table 1.10, we find that it is the democratic and non-democratic single-party combinations which produce the greatest likelihood of having a deputy-leader, all the other combinations are in line with the global figures. This is in line with the earlier finding in Table 1.4, that single-party governments are most likely to have deputy-leaders.

**Table 1-11 Impact of state-size and party-composition of government on whether or not states have deputy-leaders**

	Micro-Multi-party	Non-micro Multi-party	Micro - Single-party	Non-micro Single-party	Micro Non-party	Non-micro Non-party	Global
Total no of states	9	78	19	62	12	12	192
States with deputy-leaders (percentage of total)	5 (62%)	48 (61%)	13 (68%)	50 (81%)	5 (42%)	9 (75%)	130 (68%)

(Source: Global Database)

Similarly, when assessing the combined impact of state size and the party composition of governments on the likelihood of a state having a deputy-leader, it is a single-party scenario that has the highest likelihood of having a deputy-leader. It can also be noted that as Table 1.3 highlighted, the non-micro-state scenarios have a significantly higher likelihood of having deputy-leaders than the micro-state scenarios except in the case of the multi-party scenarios, where the micro and non-micro state scenarios have an almost equal likelihood.

**Table 1-12 The impact of state-size, party-composition of government and democracy on whether or not states have deputy-leaders**

	Total no of states	States with deputy-leaders (percentage of total)
<b>Democratic Micro-Multi-party</b>	8	4 (50%)
<b>Democratic Micro-Single-party</b>	18	13 (72%)
<b>Democratic Micro-Non-party</b>	5	3 (60%)
<b>Democratic Non-micro-Multi-party</b>	56	36 (64%)
<b>Democratic Non-micro - Single-party</b>	33	25 (76%)

<b>Democratic Non-micro - Non-party</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1 (100%)</b>
<b>Non-Democratic Micro Multi-party</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1 (100%)</b>
<b>Non-Democratic Micro- Single-party</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0 (0%)</b>
<b>Non-Democratic Micro- Non-party</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2 (29%)</b>
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Multi-party</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>12 (55%)</b>
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Single-party</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>25 (86%)</b>
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Non-party</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8 (73%)</b>
<b>Global</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>130 (68%)</b>

(Source: Global Database)

When the impact of all three variables (state size, party-composition of government and democracy) in their various combinations as outlined in Table 1.12 is examined, a number of the categories have very small bases. Excluding these, there is only one significant divergence from the global figure for the likelihood of having a deputy-leader. This is in the case of non-democratic, single party governments in non-micro states where there is an 86 per cent likelihood of having a deputy-leader. This is in line with earlier findings on the likelihood of deputy-leader being found in non-micro states and single-party governments.

### **1.5.3 Further analysis of deputy-leaders**

Looking beyond the likelihood of whether or not a state has a deputy-leader and the factors that influence that likelihood, a number of further analyses can be conducted on the basis of the data in the global database.

**Table 1-13 Democratic and non-democratic states and whether deputy-leaders are appointed or elected**

	<b>Democratic</b>	<b>Non-democratic</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	82	48	130
<b>States with appointed deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	61 (74%)	47 (98%)	108 (83%)
<b>States with elected deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	21 (26%)	1 (2%)	22 (17%)

(Source: Global Database)

As there are only two states where deputy-leaders are elected separately from the leader and this is such a small base, the categories 'elected with President' and 'elected separately' have been combined to form a category 'states with elected deputy-leaders'. Table 1.13 shows, that as one would expect, deputy-leaders are more likely to be appointed and less likely to be elected in non-democracies than in democracies.

**Table 1-14 Democratic and non-democratic states and whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers**

	<b>Democratic</b>	<b>Non-democratic</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	82	48	130
<b>States with deputy-leaders who are ministers (percentage of total)</b>	44 (54%)	29 (60%)	73 (56%)
<b>States with deputy-leaders who are not ministers (percentage of total)</b>	38 (46%)	19 (40%)	57 (44%)

(Source: Global Database)

Table 1.14 shows that deputy-leaders in non-democratic states are slightly more likely to have a ministerial portfolio than deputy-leaders in democratic states.

**Table 1-15 State size and whether deputy-leaders are appointed or elected**

	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Non-micro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	23	107	130
<b>States with appointed deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	21 (91%)	87 (81%)	108 (83%)
<b>States with elected deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	2 (9%)	20 (19%)	22 (17%)

(Source: Global Database)

Table 1.15 shows that compared to the global figures, micro-states are more likely to have appointed deputy-leaders and less likely to have deputy-leaders who are elected. The non-micro-state figures are in line with the global figures.

**Table 1-16 State size and whether deputy-leaders are ministers**

	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Non-micro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	23	107	130
<b>States with deputy-leaders who are ministers (percentage of total)</b>	15 (65%)	58 (54%)	73 (56%)
<b>States with deputy-leaders who are not ministers (percentage of total)</b>	8 (35%)	49 (46%)	57 (44%)

(Source: Global Database)

As for the impact of state size on whether or not deputy-leaders have ministerial roles, Table 1.16 shows that there is a similar situation in that micro-states diverge from the global ones while the non-micro percentages are in line with the global ones. Deputy-leaders in micro-states are more likely to have a ministerial position than deputy-leaders in either non-micro-states or globally.

**Table 1-17 Impact of party-composition of Government on whether or not deputy-leaders are appointed or elected with President**

	<b>Multi-party</b>	<b>Single-party</b>	<b>Non-party</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	53	63	14	130
<b>States with appointed deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	42 (79%)	53 (84%)	13 (93%)	108 (83%)
<b>States with elected deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	11 (21%)	10 (16%)	1 (7%)	22 (17%)

(Source: Global Database)

Table 1.17 examines the impact of the party composition of government on how deputy-leaders attain their position. The only divergence from the global figures is in non-party governments, where there is a higher likelihood of deputy-leaders being appointed and a lower likelihood of them being elected. The probabilities for both multi- and single- party governments are in line with the global probabilities. This is in contrast to the earlier analysis where it was found that it was single-party governments that diverged from the global figures on whether or not states had a deputy-leader.

**Table 1-18 Impact of party-composition of Government on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers**

	<b>Multi-party</b>	<b>Single-party</b>	<b>Non-party</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	53	63	14	130
<b>States with deputy-leaders who are ministers (percentage of total)</b>	34 (64%)	32 (51%)	7 (50%)	73 (56%)
<b>States with deputy-leaders who are not ministers (percentage of total)</b>	19 (36%)	31 (49%)	7 (50%)	57 (44%)

(Source: Global Database)



As for whether or not the party composition of government affects whether or not deputy-leaders have a ministerial role, Table 1.18 shows that both the non-party and multi-party percentages diverge from the global ones. In the case of the non-party governments, deputy-leaders are as likely to hold as not hold a separate ministerial position.

**Table 1-19 Impact of democracy and state size on whether or not deputy-leaders are appointed or elected**

	Democratic Micro-states	Democratic Non-Micro-states	Non- Democratic Micro-states	Non-Democratic Non-Micro-states	Global
States with deputy-leaders	20	62	3	45	130
States with appointed deputy-leaders (percentage of total)	18 (90%)	43 (69%)	3 (100%)	44 (98%)	108 (83%)
States with elected deputy-leaders (percentage of total)	2 (10%)	19 (21%)	0 (0%)	1 (2%)	22 (17%)

(Source: Global Database)

Looking at the combined impact of state size and whether or not states are democratic on how deputy-leaders get their role as outlined in Table 1.19, the only significant divergences from the global figures occur in the non-democratic scenarios. As one would expect, deputy-leaders are significantly less likely to be elected and more likely to be appointed than in either the global or democratic scenarios.

**Table 1-20 Impact of democracy and state size on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers**

	Democratic Micro-states	Democratic Non-Micro-states	Non- Democratic Micro-states	Non-Democratic Non-Micro-states	Global
States with deputy-leaders	20	62	3	45	130
States with deputy-leaders who are ministers (percentage of total)	12 (60%)	32 (52%)	3 (100%)	26 (58%)	73 (56%)
States with deputy-leaders who are not ministers (percentage of total)	8 (40%)	30 (48%)	0 (0%)	19 (42%)	57 (44%)

(Source: Global Database)

Table 1.20 shows the combined impact of state size and whether or not states are democratic on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers. The only divergence from the global figures occurs in non-democratic micro-states, however the base is so small (only 3 states) as to render the result insignificant.

**Table 1-21 Impact of democracy and party-composition of government on whether or not deputy-leaders are appointed or elected**

	Democratic Multi-party	Non- Democratic Multi-party	Democratic Single-party	Non- Democratic Single-party	Democratic Non-party	Non- Democratic Non-party	Global
States with deputy-leaders	40	13	38	25	4	10	130
States with appointed deputy-leaders (percentage of total)	30 (75%)	12 (92%)	28 (74%)	25 (100%)	3 (75%)	10 (100%)	108 (83%)
States with elected deputy- leaders (percentage of total)	10 (25%)	1 (8%)	10 (26%)	0 (0%)	1 (25%)	0 (0%)	22 (17%)

(Source: Global Database)

Table 1.21 shows the combined impact of the party-composition of government and whether or not a state is democratic on whether deputy-leaders are elected or appointed. As one would assume, deputy-leaders are more likely to be elected in democratic governments.

**Table 1-22 Impact of democracy and party-composition of government on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers**

	Democratic Multi-party	Non- Democratic Multi-party	Democratic Single-party	Non- Democratic Single-party	Democratic Non-party	Non- Democratic Non-party	Global
States with deputy-leaders	40	13	38	25	4	10	130
States with deputy-leaders who are ministers (percentage of total)	23 (57%)	11 (85%)	19 (50%)	13 (52%)	2 (50%)	5 (50%)	73 (56%)
States with deputy-leaders who are not ministers (percentage of total)	17 (43%)	2 (15%)	19 (50%)	12 (48%)	2 (50%)	5 (50%)	57 (44%)

(Source: Global Database)

In Table 1.22, the combined impact of the party-composition of government and whether or not a state is democratic on how deputy-leaders attain office is shown. The probabilities in all the scenarios are in line with the global figures except in the case of multi-party governments in non-democracies where there is an 85 per cent likelihood of deputy-leaders also having ministerial responsibilities. This is in line with Table 1.18, in which deputy-leaders of multi-party governments were show to have the highest likelihood of having a ministerial portfolio.

**Table 1-23 Impact of state-size and party-composition of government on whether or not deputy-leaders are appointed or elected**

	Micro- Multi-party	Non-micro Multi-party	Micro - Single-party	Non-micro Single-party	Micro Non-party	Non-micro Non-party	Global
States with deputy-leaders	5	48	13	50	5	9	130
States with appointed deputy-leaders (percentage of total)	4 (80%)	38 (79%)	13 (100%)	40 (80%)	4 (80%)	9 (100%)	108 (83%)
States with elected deputy- leaders (percentage of total)	1 (20%)	10 (21%)	0 (0%)	10 (20%)	1 (20%)	0 (0%)	22 (17%)

(Source: Global Database)

Table 1.23 outlines how the size of states combined with the party composition of governments affects whether deputy-leaders are elected or appointed. The only divergence from the global probabilities occur in categories where the base is too small to render the result significant.

**Table 1-24 Impact of state-size and party-composition of government on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers**

	Micro-Multi-party	Non-micro Multi-party	Micro - Single-party	Non-micro Single-party	Micro Non-party	Non-micro Non-party	Global
States with deputy-leaders	5	48	13	50	5	9	130
States with deputy-leaders who are ministers (percentage of total)	4 (80%)	30 (62%)	8 (62%)	24 (48%)	3 (60%)	4 (44%)	73 (56%)
States with deputy-leaders who are not ministers (percentage of total)	1 (20%)	18 (38%)	5 (38%)	26 (52%)	2 (40%)	5 (56%)	57 (44%)

(Source: Global Database)

In the case of how state-size and party-composition of government impact on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers, it can be seen from table 1.24 that there are no categories where there is a divergence from the global probabilities and where the base of states falling in the category is large enough to be significant.

**Table 1-25 The impact of state-size, party-composition of government and democracy on whether or not deputy-leaders are appointed or elected**

	<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	<b>States with appointed deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>	<b>States with elected deputy-leaders (percentage of total)</b>
<b>Democratic Micro-Multi-party</b>	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)
<b>Democratic Micro-Single-party</b>	13	13 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Democratic Micro-Non-party</b>	3	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
<b>Democratic Non-micro-Multi-party</b>	36	27 (75%)	9 (25%)
<b>Democratic Non-micro - Single-party</b>	25	15 (60%)	10 (40%)
<b>Democratic Non-micro - Non-party</b>	1	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Micro Multi-party</b>	1	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Micro- Single-party</b>	0	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Micro- Non-party</b>	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Multi-party</b>	12	11 (92%)	1 (8%)
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Single-party</b>	25	25 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Non-party</b>	8	8 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Global</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>108 (83%)</b>	<b>22(17%)</b>

(Source: Global Database)

When assessing the combined impact of state-size, party-composition of government and democracy on whether or not deputy-leaders are appointed or elected, there are only three categories where the base is large enough to generate significant results. Of these, as one would expect where democracy is lacking, the non-democratic, non-micro-state, single-party government category had no deputy-leaders elected. The democratic non-micro-state with multi-party governments category was broadly in line with the global figures in that three-quarters of their deputy-leaders were appointed rather than elected. The remaining significant category was democratic non-micro-state with single-party governments, where 40 per cent of the deputy-leaders were elected rather than appointed.

**Table 1-26 The impact of state-size, party-composition of government and democracy on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers**

	<b>States with deputy-leaders</b>	<b>States with deputy-leaders who are ministers (percentage of total)</b>	<b>States with deputy-leaders who are not ministers (percentage of total)</b>
<b>Democratic Micro-Multi-party</b>	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)
<b>Democratic Micro-Single-party</b>	13	8 (62%)	5 (38%)
<b>Democratic Micro-Non-party</b>	3	1 (33%)	2 (67%)
<b>Democratic Non-micro-Multi-party</b>	36	20 (56%)	16 (44%)
<b>Democratic Non-micro - Single-party</b>	25	11 (44%)	14 (56%)
<b>Democratic Non-micro - Non-party</b>	1	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Micro Multi-party</b>	1	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Micro- Single-party</b>	0	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Micro- Non-party</b>	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Multi-party</b>	12	10 (83%)	2 (17%)
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Single-party</b>	25	13(52%)	12 (48%)
<b>Non-Democratic Non-micro Non-party</b>	8	3 (38%)	5 (62%)
<b>Global</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>73 (56%)</b>	<b>57 (44%)</b>

(Source: Global Database)

In the case of the combined impact of state-size, party-composition of government and democracy on whether or not deputy-leaders are ministers, two of the three significant categories are in line with the global figures – non-democratic, non-micro states with single-party governments and democratic non-micro states with multi-party governments. In the other significant category, democratic non-micro states with single-party governments, the likelihood of a deputy-leader decreases to 44 per cent. In democratic non-micro states, it appears that whether a government is single or multi-party impacts on whether or not a deputy-leader has a ministerial responsibility. In the multi-party

category, 56 per cent of deputy-leaders have ministerial responsibilities while in the single-party category, only 44 per cent of deputy-leaders are ministers. This is in line with the findings from the multi-party and single-party categories in Table 1.18

## **1.6 Conclusion**

The completion of the global database on deputy-leaders allows for a cursory analysis of their role. The majority of states (68 per cent) were found to have deputy-leaders. Of the 191 deputy-leaders in the database, most were appointed (168) rather than elected and 55 per cent have ministerial responsibilities (102). Indeed some hold more than one ministerial position. Such ministerial positions are generally significant (19 per cent hold the Minister of Finance position for example). Whether a state is democratic or not has no impact on the likelihood of having a deputy-leader (both have a 68 per cent likelihood). Deputy-leaders are more likely to be found in single-party governments (78% have a deputy-leader) and in non-micro states (70% have a deputy-leader). Indeed, when categories of states with a small base are excluded, the greatest likelihood of finding a deputy-leader is among non-democratic non-micro-states with single party governments (86 per cent have a deputy-leader). On a state by state basis, the vast majority of deputy-leaders (83 per cent) are appointed rather than elected.

In terms of their role, an examination of the constitutional functions of deputy-leaders shows that the most common tasks allocated to deputy-leaders are to replace the leader in the event of temporary or permanent vacancies arising (80 per cent of states where deputy-leaders have a constitutional role have such a role); to perform functions

delegated by the leader (23 per cent); to assist the leader (20 per cent) and to chair the cabinet if the leader is absent (19 per cent).

Given that so many states have deputy-leaders and that many also hold significant ministerial positions, one might think that deputy-leaders are important political figures. However, the aim of this study is not to explain why so many states have deputy-leaders. Nor is it to explain why some states have deputy-leaders and others do not. The aim is to determine whether or not deputy-leaders matter insofar as they can influence policy outcomes. In order to achieve this aim, the following chapters will take a more in-depth look at five specific states. Before that examination can take place, however, a structure and rationale for that examination must be outlined. That is the task of the next chapter.



## **2 THE PERCEPTION OF DEPUTY-LEADERS**

### **2.1 Introduction**

When one thinks of important or powerful political positions, Deputy-Prime Ministers or Vice Presidents rarely come to mind. Indeed, it is explicitly a second-ranking position. Nonetheless there appears to be a significant number of countries which possess deputy-leaders (the research in the previous chapter shows that 130 states have deputy-leaders), whether they be Vice-Presidents or Deputy-Prime Ministers. The significant number of deputy-leaders has not however led to any questioning of the perception that deputy-leaders do not matter (the case that this is the perception of deputy-leaders will be outlined later in this chapter). It is the objective of this research project to determine if this perception that deputy-leaders do not matter is correct. In order to do so, we must first clarify what is meant when we say that a particular position ‘matters’?

#### **2.1.1 What does it mean to ‘matter’?**

When it is said that a particular office ‘matters’, it is generally understood that it is an important position. Its importance derives from the power exercised by the holder of the office. Despite being ‘the most important single idea in political theory’ (Elster, 1976, p. 249), power is a difficult concept to define. As Barnes (1993) observes, power is:

one of the most problematic and controversial of all the key concepts of social and political theory. Many social theorists offer wonderful insights into the nature

and basis of power: Weber, Dahl, Arendt, Parsons, Lukes, Foucault and many others are indispensable reading on the subject. Yet all these writers are in radical disagreement with each other, about what power is, where it is, how we can tell what and where it is, what follows from its being what and where it is. (Barnes, 1993, pp 197-198).

In the current context, power will be understood as the ability to influence policy; in other words that policy outcomes will substantively accord with the initial position of the office holder in question on the policy issue at hand. That includes scenarios where there is no change in policy, if the relevant deputy-leader is seeking the maintenance of the status quo, or where there has been a partial change in policy. As Light (1984) points out: 'Partial influence is still influence' (Light, 1984, p. 620). It also must be noted that when we talk of 'policy outcomes', that policy can be influenced at any of a number of stages in the policy development process such as agenda setting, prioritising, funding and implementation. A deputy-leader may have little impact at one stage and significant impact at another.

It must also be clarified that ministerial power is not the focus of this research; insofar as to say a deputy-leader has power, the ability to affect policy must relate to policy beyond any ministerial brief they hold. A deputy-leader may influence health policy but if that person is Minister for Health then such influence is not indicative of any influence they have as deputy-leader. To matter, deputy-leaders must be able to influence policy outside of areas covered by their ministerial responsibilities. The one possible exception to this

rule would be in the case of controversial policy measures which the deputy-leader is able to force through their own department against the wishes of either their department or fellow cabinet ministers. However, as it would be extremely difficult to determine whether success in forcing through such policies was due to the minister's clout as deputy-leader or due to their being a strong minister. After all, many ministers who were not deputy-leaders have succeeded in pushing unpopular policies through their departments and cabinet.

A further refinement is required as we need to be able to distinguish policy outcomes favoured by the deputy-leader from outcomes favoured by the leader or other significant political actors. The initial position of both may accord in which case one will not be able to distinguish the policy influence of the deputy-leader. To do this, use will be made of Light's (1984) definition of influence as being 'the ability to change outcomes from what they would have been' (Light, 1984, p. 620). In other words, we must be able to show that without the intervention of the deputy-leader a different policy outcome would have resulted. If it is found that the deputy-leaders in this study have influenced policy in areas beyond any additional cabinet responsibilities that they may have had, then the conclusion will not be that every deputy-leader matters but rather that deputy-leaders can matter.

## **2.2 The perception of deputy-leaders**

### **2.2.1 Introduction**

In order to assess the perception of deputy-leaders, a literature review was conducted not only to see what political scientists have to say regarding whether or not deputy-leaders matter, but also to see what the office holders themselves and their biographers have to say.

### **2.2.2 A limited literature**

At present there appears to be no specific book or article about the policy-making impact of deputy-leaders. Furthermore, there is neither a comparative literature on Vice-Presidents nor a comparative literature on Deputy-Prime Ministers. There also appears to be no literature on deputy-leaders in particular country areas such as the Commonwealth or Eastern Europe for example. It is only at the level of individual countries that a body of literature is to be found, particularly in the case of the United States Vice-President.

A number of books examine the role of US Vice-President. In fact, no fewer than 113 books were identified on the subject of the US Vice-President. Of these, Turner (1982), Light (1984), Dorman (1968), Alotta (1981), Feinberg (1996), Goldstein (1982), Williams (1984), Kengor (2000) Relyea (2001) and Natoli (1985) examine the office. Nonetheless, Kengor (2000) describes the Vice President as a 'neglected area of research within the fields of public policy and political science' (Kengor, 2000, p. 5). Sixty-three

biographies of US Vice-Presidents were also located,<sup>18</sup> none of which are comparative in nature and all of which focus on the person rather than the role.

There are only a handful of journal articles on the US Vice-President. The most recent ones, by Romero (2001) Dudley and Rapaport (1989) and Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1997), examine the role of Vice-Presidential candidates in the Presidential election. Bilmes (2001) looks at the Vice-Presidential debates. Cohen (2001a and 2001b) examines the poll ratings of Vice-Presidents. Pomper (1966) has written on the nomination of Hubert Humphrey for Vice-President. A second subject of articles on the Vice-President is the succession as typified by articles by Schlesinger Jr. (1974), Brown and Silva (1949), Kallenbach (1947) and Brown (1928).

It is only Kengor (2000) and Light (1984) who examine the impact of the Vice-President on policy matters. Kengor (2000) examines how the interplay between Vice-President and Secretary of State impacts on foreign policy. Light (1984) looks specifically at the influence of Vice-Presidents Rockefeller and Mondale. He argues that they served as 'senior White House advisors' (Light, 1984, p. 617) but only Mondale had influence and goes on to explore why Mondale had such influence. He argues though, that by the end of his term as Vice-President, his ability to influence policy was limited to defensive measures such as attempting to modify existing proposals rather than initiate policy.

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<sup>18</sup> Based on a search of: Amazon.com (available from [www.amazon.com](http://www.amazon.com) [accessed 11 August 2002]); Bowker's Global Books in Print (available from [www.globalbooksinprint.com](http://www.globalbooksinprint.com) [accessed 11 August 2002]) and The Library of Congress Online (available from <http://catalog.loc.gov/> [accessed 11 August 2002]).

There appears to be no literature in terms of either books or articles on the role of Deputy-Prime Ministers. There is however a significant biographical literature on a number of politicians who were deputy-leaders at some stage in their careers. Eight biographies of UK Deputy-Prime Ministers were found. Eight biographies on Australian Deputy-Prime Ministers were also located (six of these were on Paul Keating who went on to be Prime Minister), this compares with 42 on Australian Prime Ministers. In an Irish context twelve biographies of deputy-leaders were identified, seven of which were on Sean Lemass who went on to be Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister). Four were found on Swedish Deputy-Prime Ministers (two of which were on Ingvar Carlsson who went on to be Prime Minister), this compares with 54 on Swedish Prime Ministers. Again, it should be stressed that this literature covers the entire political life of these Deputy-Prime Ministers and, as highlighted above, in many cases deals with the role of Deputy-Prime Minister in passing as most of the subjects went on to higher office. Again, none of these biographical treatments of Deputy-Prime Ministers are comparative in nature.

An examination of academic literature on areas where the Deputy-Prime Ministers would be expected to feature also reveals next to no focus on the role. Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001) do not mention deputy-leaders in their book on European government. Laver and Schofield (1990) give a brief mention of Deputy-Prime Ministers in their examination of coalitions in Europe but no examination of their role. McLeay's (1995) study of the role of the New Zealand cabinet describes the position of Deputy-Prime Minister as 'a high post' (McLeay, 1995, p. 68), however he does not examine the role. Mulgan's (1997) book on New Zealand politics provides a brief outline of the role of the

Deputy-Prime Minister's office in coalition cabinet formation. Blondel and Muller-Rommel's (1993) examination of Western European cabinets ignores the role of Deputy-Prime Ministers. Their 1997 examination of the same topic includes brief mentions of the Dutch, Belgian, Italian, Austrian and German Deputy-Prime Ministers and their role in ironing out differences within their governing coalitions. Only in the case of the Spanish Deputy-Prime Minister is there a brief discussion of their policy role. Blondel's (1995) book on comparative government makes no mention of the role of deputy-leaders.

In conclusion, the limited literature that exists on deputy-leaders is not comparative in nature. It is confined to a number of books and articles on the US Vice-President and biographies of various politicians who were at one time or another deputy-leaders. Neither is there any significant exploration of the role of deputy-leaders in the academic examinations of topics such as government, coalition or cabinets, where one might expect to find some.

### **2.2.3 The received wisdom on deputy-leaders**

Despite the fact that very little is written on deputy-leaders, the received wisdom, such as it is, is that deputy-leaders have little power. Indeed most of the literature that has been written on deputy-leaders is dismissive of the position. Looking at the position of the Vice-President of the United States, a number of holders of the office have disparaged its stature both in their comments and in their actions. The very first Vice-President, John Adams, wrote 'I am Vice-President. In this I am nothing, but I may be everything' (Dallek, 1998, p. 7). Thomas R Marshall (Woodrow Wilson's Vice-President) described

the Vice-Presidency as being 'like a man in a cataleptic state. He cannot speak. He cannot move. He suffers no pain. And yet he is conscious of all that goes on around him.' (Dallek, 1998, p. 7). He also told a humorous story of a woman who had two sons. One ran off to sea while the other became Vice-President. Neither were heard from again.<sup>19</sup> In 1872, Vice-President Henry Wilson occupied himself with writing a three-volume history of the United States, two volumes of which were published before he died after two years in office.<sup>20</sup> Lyndon Johnson described his time as Vice-President as 'filled with trips around the world, chauffeurs, men saluting, people clapping, chairmanships of councils, but in the end it is nothing. I detested every minute of it.' (Dallek, 1998, p. 44). Nelson Rockefeller described the office as 'standby equipment'.<sup>21</sup> Lyndon Johnson's biographer, Robert Dallek, observed that up to 1960 'There had been no notable achievements by a Vice-President' (Dallek, 1998, p. 7). After three years as Vice-President, Dallek described Vice-President Johnson as 'largely a forgotten man in the country' (Dallek, 1998, p. 44). More recently, Spiro Agnew has said that the office has 'no real power to do anything.' (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 315). George Bush has said of the office that 'it doesn't lend itself to high profile and decision making' (Duffy and Goodgame, 1992, p. 40).

Their superiors – the Presidents - thought similarly. Abraham Lincoln managed the Civil War without involving or consulting his Vice-President, Hannibal Hamlin, who spent

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<sup>19</sup> Felzenberg, Alvin, 2001. 'The Vice Presidency Grows Up.' Available from: [http://www.policyreview.org/feb01/felzenberg\\_print.html](http://www.policyreview.org/feb01/felzenberg_print.html) [accessed 14 March 2002].

<sup>20</sup> Coen, Dan, 2001. 'The evolving role of the Vice Presidency.' Available from: [http://www.vicepresidents.com/new\\_page\\_15.htm](http://www.vicepresidents.com/new_page_15.htm) [accessed 14 March 2002].

<sup>21</sup> Felzenberg, Alvin, 2001. 'The Vice Presidency Grows Up.' Available from: [http://www.policyreview.org/feb01/felzenberg\\_print.html](http://www.policyreview.org/feb01/felzenberg_print.html) [accessed 14 March 2002].



most of his term of office in his home state of Maine.<sup>22</sup> Franklin D Roosevelt managed the Depression and World War Two with minimal involvement from his three Vice-Presidents (although he did use the services of his first Vice-President – John Nance Garner, a former speaker of the House - to help get his legislation passed). Truman, his final Vice-President, was not even briefed on the Manhattan Project.<sup>23</sup>

In terms of journal articles that provide an overview of the role of the Vice-President, they all date from the 1960s and earlier: David (1967), Wilmerding (1953), Rossiter (1948), Paullin (1924) and Learned (1912). David (1967) observes that ‘The office of Vice-President of the United States is presumably the most important “second man” position in the world, but it is still a “second man position,” with characteristics of ambiguity, personal self denial, and psychological insecurity that are inherent in some degree in all such positions’ (David, 1967, p. 722). Rossiter (1948) describes the Vice-Presidency as ‘a hollow shell of an office, an impotent and uncomfortable heir apparenacy sought by no one we would like to see as President’ (Rossiter, 1948, p. 383). Wilmerding (1953) takes such arguments regarding the uselessness of the office to its logical conclusion and recommends its abolition. Indeed Learned (1912) quotes Charles Francis Adams who observed ‘No high position in the government of the Unites States could now be so easily lopped off without missing it as that of the Vice-President’ (Learned, 1912, p. 162).

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<sup>22</sup> Coen, Dan, 2001. ‘The evolving role of the Vice Presidency.’ Available from: [http://www.vicepresidents.com/new\\_page\\_15.htm](http://www.vicepresidents.com/new_page_15.htm) [accessed 14 March 2002].

<sup>23</sup> Coen, Dan, 2001. ‘The evolving role of the Vice Presidency.’ Available from: [http://www.vicepresidents.com/new\\_page\\_15.htm](http://www.vicepresidents.com/new_page_15.htm) [accessed 14 March 2002].

This apparent view of deputy-leaders in the United States as unimportant is also seemingly the view elsewhere. In terms of Deputy-Prime Ministers in the UK, Rawnsley (2000) described the position as being 'a grand title, but it did not come with commensurate power' (Rawnsley, 2000, p. 296). While Michael Heseltine - a former Deputy-Prime Minister - describes the position as 'at the heart of the government, in the number two position in the cabinet' (Heseltine, 2000, p. 483), he goes on to observe that 'to make the job work, I had to act with his [the Prime Minister's] authority' (Heseltine, 2000, p. 485). He also makes the point that 'modern technology may have greatly diminished the traditional role of a deputy prime minister ... Prime Ministers today may be out of the country but they are never out of touch ... although the deputy is nominally in charge while the Prime Minister is away, it is very rare that the substance of this transfer of responsibility ever mattered in the conduct of policy.' (Heseltine, 2000, p. 498). Kavanagh (1990) in looking at the experience of the various holders of the position, describes its as 'a non-job... a dead end... a consolation prize'.<sup>24</sup>

In Ireland the role of the deputy-leader (Tánaiste) is 'a limited one' (Connolly & O'Halpin, 1999, p. 260). Hussey (1993), herself a former minister, observes the addition of a small number of staff by Dick Spring in 1993 made the position 'for the first time in Ireland... more than just a title' (Hussey, 1993, p. 31). Most of the biographies of holders of the office while mentioning the office, give it little if any attention such as Collins' (1993) biography of Spring, while O'Sullivan (1994) describes Lemass' move to Tanaiste as 'another step up the political ladder' (O'Sullivan, 1994, p. 106), this is in the context

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<sup>24</sup> The Guardian, November 3, 1990.

of the move making him next in line to lead Fianna Fáil rather than any significance in the position itself. A similar reading can be made of Horgan's (1997) description of the position of Tánaiste as 'an important vacancy to fill' (Horgan, 1997, p.125) when talking of Lemass' move.

The Canadian Parliament's website describes the position of Deputy-Prime Minister of Canada as 'an honorary title ... It has no standing in law, and does not carry any formal duties or tasks.'<sup>25</sup> Willy Brandt in his autobiography writes of becoming the first post-war German Social Democratic Deputy-Chancellor, however it was his ministry which was the focus of attention: 'in the inner circle of the party leadership there was strong feeling that the Party Chairman (Brandt) should hold the "second most important" post in the Government, the most classic of all classic ministries, the Foreign Ministry.' (Brandt, 1992, p. 246). De Winter (1991) has a paragraph on the role of Deputy Prime Ministers in coalition governments: 'In coalition governments, deputy prime ministers are often party "watchdogs"; they are the main spokesmen for their party with respect to general cabinet policy' (De Winter, 1991, p. 62). This is hardly a description of an office that matters.

## **2.2.4 Conclusion**

So, political scientists have written little on the office and even biographers of the office holders pass over it in near silence. What little that has been written is far from positive,

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<sup>25</sup> Library of Parliament, 2002. 'Deputy Prime Minister of Canada – 1977 to Date.' Available from: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/people/key/DepPrimeMin.asp?Language=E&Hist=N> [accessed 6 August 2002].

even when it is written by former deputy-leaders themselves. These reactions indicate that the office is perceived as being sufficiently unimportant as to not matter.

### **2.3 Deputy-leaders and Political Science**

While the office of deputy-leader may be perceived as not to matter, this view is based on very little research. Further study of deputy-leaders may support this perception, but it may also add to the knowledge base of political science in a number of areas. The primary area where it may add to understanding is that of political leadership. While there is no agreed working definition of political leadership (Elgie, 1995), this has not prevented a significant amount of research from being conducted into various aspects of political leadership. For example, much has been written on the role of Presidents and Prime-Ministers on a stand-alone and comparative basis with Jones (1991), Rose (1990) and Weller (1985) focusing on Prime-Ministers and Elgie (1999a), Hayward (1993), Neustadt (1980), Rose (1984) and Rossiter (1960) looking at Presidents. The study of deputy-leaders will not only open up a new aspect to leadership in that to date little has been written on Vice-Presidents or Deputy-Prime Ministers, it will also add an additional layer on to existing studies of leadership. For example how do Deputy-Prime Ministers interact with Prime-Ministers and what impact has each office on the ability of the other to provide political leadership? While the impact of deputy-leaders on leaders' ability to lead is likely to be greater if deputy-leaders can influence policy, even if deputy-leaders are found not to be able to influence policy that is not to say that deputy-leaders have no impact on leaders. Given that 130 states were found to have deputy-leaders and that they

were found in diverse circumstances, there is a rich field of potential research that remains untapped within the study of political leadership.

Other areas of political science which could benefit from a greater understanding of the role of deputy-leaders include the areas highlighted in the previous section where an analysis of the role of deputy-leaders could be expected but currently does not exist. Such areas include coalition government, cabinets (how they are formed and how they function) and the functioning of government in general. If it is found that deputy-leaders do have policy influence then their roles in these areas may also be significant and will warrant further research. If the role of significant political players has been ignored, then the findings of current research in these areas are undermined.

In short, the study of deputy-leaders is linked to a number of broader issues within political research. Any re-evaluation of the role and importance of deputy-leaders may have significant implications for a number of areas of comparative politics where the uncontested (and untested) perception that deputy-leaders do not matter has led to them being ignored. The identification of a new factor that must be taken into account means that existing research in the areas of coalitions, government and cabinets may need to be re-examined. This will only arise if deputy-leaders are found to matter. In that sense, this research may have significant implications for political science research beyond the narrow remit of deputy-leaders.

## **2.4 Methodology**

### **2.4.1 Introduction**

The objective of this project is to determine if the perception that deputy-leaders do not matter is correct. In this section, the means by which this objective will be achieved will be outlined and justified. In the previous section, the case was made that the academic perception is that deputy-leaders do not matter. A simple description of the role and activities of deputy-leaders in itself is unlikely to successfully challenge this perception. How is it to be known that the description is correct? 'Description is far from mechanical or unproblematic since it involves selection from the infinite number of facts that could be recorded.' (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 34).

In order to challenge the current perception, there is a need to go beyond description and use inference. Inference is 'the process of using the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know' (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 46). There are two types of inference – descriptive inference and causal inference. The former is defined as 'the process of understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations.' (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 55), while the latter seeks to explain a phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations. It is the difference between inferring the 'what' of a phenomenon and the 'why'. In this case descriptive inference will be used to determine if deputy-leaders matter rather than why they matter. Given that deputy-leaders are perceived not to matter, the first task must be to show that they do in fact

matter. If this can be proven, then one can legitimately ask the question why do they matter. The current research is focussed on the first task.

The specific tools that will be used to go from observed phenomena to unobserved phenomena are hypotheses and observable implications. It is not known if deputy-leaders matter. What can be done is develop a number of hypotheses assuming that it is true that deputy-leaders matter. From these a number of implications can be derived which it should be possible to observe. A search for these observable implications can then be carried out. If they cannot be found, then the hypotheses must be called into question. On the other hand if it is found that the observable implications do actually occur, the likelihood of the hypotheses being correct increases and, by inference, the likelihood of our original unobserved phenomena existing increases. What this approach seeks to do is to 'bring as much information to bear on our hypothesis as possible ... [so that we can] increase the confidence that the theory is correct' (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, pp 48-49). The more observable implications actually found occurring, the greater the likelihood of the hypotheses being correct and the underlying theory being correct. The validity of the hypotheses and underlying theory are being inferred from the fact that the observable implications do exist.

#### **2.4.2 Why case studies?**

The observable implications derived from the hypotheses in a later section of this chapter will be tested by means of case studies. A case study involves 'the collection and presentation of detailed information about a particular participant or small group,

frequently including the accounts of subjects themselves. A form of qualitative descriptive research, the case study looks intensely at an individual or small participant pool, drawing conclusions only about that participant or group and only in that specific context ... emphasis is placed on exploration and description.<sup>26</sup> Why choose to adopt such a method in this instance? This project is descriptive in nature and as King, Keohane, and Verba point out 'Case studies are essential for description' (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 44).

### **2.4.3 Structure of case studies – by theme or state?**

The case studies will be comparative in nature insofar as they compare the policy role of deputy-leaders in a small number of states. As for how the case studies are structured, there are two possibilities: by theme or by state. In this instance they will be structured by theme.

The reason for adopting this structure is that it allows the greatest degree of comparison between the states being studied. Adopting a state-by-state testing of the observable implications would minimise the comparative aspect of the study. While a state-by-state approach may generate a more in-depth knowledge of the policy role of deputy-leaders in individual states, it is in the comparison between states, each with their own individual circumstances, that an understanding of whether deputy-leaders truly matter can be gained. This is, after all, a comparative study of deputy-leaders rather than a study of a specific deputy-leader in a specific state. Given that the number of hypotheses,

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<sup>26</sup> Colorado State University, 2002. 'Case Studies.' Available from:



observable implications and states in this study are fixed, whether the case-studies are organised by theme or on a state by state basis is in many respects a matter of presentation. Having said that, if each hypothesis is tested against all the states in the study together rather than separately, then such a presentation of results is more comparative and facilitates the drawing of conclusions regarding the deputy-leader across the states studied.

The case studies will be based upon primary documentation where available and secondary sources such as biographies and histories. In terms of testing the observable implications, both qualitative and quantitative methods will be used. Obviously, there will be practical limits in some instances; for example, there are no parliamentary questions in the US system of government, so it will not be possible to use them as a means of assessing US deputy-leaders policy related activity in parliament.

#### **2.4.4 Which states and what time frame?**

Given the constraints of this research, it is not possible to conduct an in-depth study of every state that has a position of deputy-leader. A narrower focus is required. The first step is to decide on which states shall be the subjects of the case studies. In order to obtain a good spread of different but comparable states a 'most similar' and then 'most different' basis will be used for state selection. This approach has been adopted from Collier and Collier (1991). This approach ensures that like is being compared with like, that 'the contexts of analysis are analytically equivalent, at least to a significant degree'

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<http://writing.colostate.edu/references/research/casestudy/> [accessed 27 August 2002].

(Collier, 1997, p. 40), while at the same time the ‘most different’ criteria ‘places parallel processes of change in sharp relief because they are operating in settings that are very different in many respects.’ (Collier, 1997, p. 40). In other words, the diverse circumstances should enable the researcher to more easily identify the appropriate explanatory factors.

The criteria for ‘most similar’ are that:

1. They must be democracies, so as to ensure that like is being compared with like.
2. They must be also long-standing democracies so as to generate a long enough track record to provide a proper understanding of the role of their deputy leaders and the greatest possible testing of the observable implications.

Using these two criteria, the list of potential subject states is narrowed down from an initial 192 states to 36.<sup>27</sup> This was based on Lijphart’s (1999) list of long-standing democracies. He based his list on those states which had been democratic for at least 19 years. He has ‘somewhat arbitrarily’ (Lijphart, 1999, p. 53) picked twenty years as his minimum cut-off point, but relaxed it by one year to include India, Papua New Guinea and Spain.

Lijphart’s (1999) categories of majoritarian and consensual democracies will be used as the ‘most different’ basis. He defines ‘majoritarian’ democracy as government by simple

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<sup>27</sup> The 36 are: Australia Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.

majority, while 'consensual' democracy seeks to maximise the decision-making majority: 'its rules and institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement on the policies that government should pursue.' (Lijphart, 1999, p. 2). The contrast between the two types of democracy goes further: 'the majoritarian model of democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterised by inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise' (Lijphart, 1999, p. 2).


He then identifies ten differences between majoritarian and consensual democracies with regard to institutions and rules:

1. In majoritarian democracies executive power is concentrated in single-party majority cabinets while in consensual democracies there is executive power sharing in multi-party coalitions.
2. The executive is dominant in its relations with the legislature in majoritarian democracies while there is a balance of power between the two in consensual democracies.
3. Two-party systems in majoritarian democracies contrast with multi-party systems in consensual democracies.
4. Majoritarian democracies have disproportional electoral systems while consensual democracies have proportional representation.
5. Free-for-all competition among interest groups in majoritarian democracies contrasts with 'corporatist' interest group systems in consensual democracies.
6. Governments in majoritarian democracies are unitary and centralised while federal and decentralised government is the norm in consensual democracies.

7. Legislative power is concentrated in a unicameral legislature in majoritarian democracies while it is divided between two equally strong houses of parliament in consensual democracies.
8. Flexible constitutions that are amended by simple majorities are the norm in majoritarian democracies while rigid constitutions that require extraordinary majorities are generally found in consensual democracies.
9. The legislature has final say on the constitutionality of legislation in majoritarian democracies in contrast to consensual democracies where legislation is subject to constitutional review either by a supreme court or a constitutional court.
10. Central banks are responsible to the executive in majoritarian democracies but independent in consensual democracies.

It should also be pointed out that no state neatly falls on one side or the other of the divide created by these ten differences. Lijphart divides these ten differences into two groups. The first five are grouped under a heading of 'executives-parties', while the second five are grouped under a heading of 'federal-unitary'. He then plots the position of each of his 36 states using these two sets of five variables giving a two dimensional representation of their positioning between majoritarian and consensual democracy. The average of each state's 'executives-parties' values is plotted on the horizontal axis and average of their 'federal-unitary' values is on the vertical axis. Each unit on the graph measures one standard deviation. The states are positioned as follows:

**Graph 2-1 Lijphart's two dimensional conceptual map of democracy**



(Source: Lijphart, 1999, p. 248)


Given that high values indicate majoritarianism and low values indicate consensus, a state's positioning within the four quadrants indicates whether it is:

- majoritarian 'executives-parties' and consensual 'federal-unitary' (bottom right);
- majoritarian 'executives-parties' and majoritarian 'federal-unitary' (top right);
- consensual 'executives-parties' and consensual 'federal-unitary' (bottom left);
- consensual 'executives-parties' and majoritarian 'federal-unitary' (top left).

He then develops a dynamic version of this table showing how each state's positioning has changed between the period 1945 to 1970 and 1971 to the middle of 1996. This could

only be done for 26 states<sup>28</sup> as some were not democracies during the initial period. The shifts are plotted in Graph 2.2 below.

**Graph 2-2 Lijphart's two dimensional conceptual map of shifts in democratic styles of 26 states**



(Source: Lijphart, 1999, p. 255)

From this table we can identify five state types: the four state-types where states stayed in their respective quadrant and a fifth state type where a state crossed quadrants between the two periods measured. While these measures contain an element of randomness insofar as the selecting of different periods or a grouping of different variables may have produced different shifts, they constitute a useful categorisation on which to base our selection of 'most different' states.

<sup>28</sup> The ten states lost in this process are: Bahamas; Botswana; Barbados; Greece; India; Malta; Mauritius; Papua New Guinea; Portugal and Spain.

Excluding the six states among the 26 that do not have deputy-leaders (Finland, France, Iceland, Japan, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago), 20 states are now left. These state groupings can now be examined with a view to selecting one per category for the case studies.

In the top-left quadrant, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, Luxembourg and Israel remain. Given that Finland and Norway were also in this quadrant (but have no deputy-leader), a Scandinavian state would seem most representative. On that basis Sweden will be selected as a case study subject as the archetypal Scandinavian state.

The states in the top-right quadrant are those which are nearest being majoritarian democracies. The states remaining in this segment are New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Columbia, Costa Rica and Jamaica. Given that three of these states are in the Commonwealth and modeled on the 'Westminister system' of government, one of these states would be most representative of this grouping. For that reason, the United Kingdom, as the original 'majoritarian democracy' will be selected as a case study subject from this quadrant.

In the bottom left quadrant, the states with the greatest degree of consensual democracy are to be found: the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and Austria. Given the peculiar political arrangements in Switzerland where the leader and deputy-leader positions are rotated annually, Switzerland will be excluded as a potential case study subject. The Netherlands has consistently had multi-party coalition governments, while Germany and

Austria have had either grand-coalition governments, coalitions involving a large and small party or single party governments. On that basis, the Netherlands will be selected so as to include in the study a state where there has consistently been multi-party governments.

The bottom right quadrant contains the United States, Canada and Australia. The United States will be chosen from this group as we already have a number of states with Deputy-Prime Ministers included as case study subjects and none with a Vice-President.

The fifth group contains those states which cross quadrants over the time periods in question. There are three such states: Ireland, Venezuela and Belgium. Venezuela will be excluded on the basis that a state with a Presidential system of government has already been included. Given that a number of the states already selected have monarchs and that a Benelux state has already been included in the study (the Netherlands), Ireland will be chosen over Belgium from this group.

Having selected five states, four with Deputy-Prime Ministers and one with a Vice-President, we must explain why more states with the former type of deputy-leader were selected. The simple answer is that this reflects the global situation where 72 states have Deputy-Prime-Ministers, while 46 have Vice-Presidents as their deputy-leader. In terms of the 20 states from which the five were selected, 15 have Deputy-Prime Ministers and five have Vice-Presidents. While selecting only one Vice-President for the five case studies under-represents Vice-Presidents according to this measure, increasing the



number to two out of five would significantly over-represent them. In the end, it was decided to select only one Vice-President. Given that five of the original 36 democracies are Presidential democracies, selecting one for inclusion in the study appears to be a fair representation of the type. So, on balance selecting one Vice-President adequately represents them by most measures and to select more than one would over-represent them according to all the measures.

As one would expect given their different positioning on Lijphart's two dimensional graph of democracy, the five states selected - the Netherlands, Sweden the United States, Ireland and the United Kingdom - provide a good cross section of states under a number of headings. Government in the Netherlands is multi-party based, in the US and UK it is one-party based, while in Ireland and Sweden it has alternated between being multi-party and one-party based (although Ireland has since 1989 moved to having solely multi-party governments). The Netherlands, Sweden and UK have Monarchs while Ireland and the US both have Presidents. In terms of the interest group system in each state, using Lijphart's categorisation, Sweden and the Netherlands score at the corporatist end of the scale while the US and UK are at the opposite end where there is more of an interest-group free-for-all. Ireland is positioned midway between these extremes (although given its status as a state that crosses quadrants in Graph 1.2, it should come as no surprise that Ireland has since the late 1980s become more corporatist with the instigation of national pay agreements).

Now that the subjects of the case studies have been selected, the remaining issue is to decide on the timeframe of the case studies. Two guiding principles were applied in determining the timeframe. Firstly, the timeframe should be as long as possible so as to allow the greatest opportunity to examine the role of deputy-leaders in each state under examination. Secondly, to ensure that like is being compared with like, the timeframe must be the same across all five states. Given these criteria, it is possible to go as far back as when the last of the five states became democratic or when the most recent disruption of democratic rule in these states came to an end (whichever event was most recent of these two). In this case democracy was most recently disrupted in the Netherlands during World War II. The first postwar elections took place in the Netherlands in 1946. Democracy has prevailed uninterrupted in the other four states since before this period. So as to ensure a comparable situation across each of the five states, the case studies shall examine the role of deputy-leaders in each state from 1946 to January 2002.

#### **2.4.5 Hypotheses and observable implications**

Having identified the states that will be focused on in this study, the hypotheses can now be established with which to determine whether or not deputy-leaders matter. It should be remembered that ‘mattering’ in this context has been defined in terms of the ability of deputy-leaders to influence policy outside their specific departmental responsibilities. Knowing the states that will be studied in advance of determining the hypotheses and observable implications ensures that the observable implications can actually be tested. For example, having both presidential and parliamentary systems of government represented among the five states selected means that the observable implications must be

as flexible as possible so as to cover both such systems. In some cases that will not be possible. However, as long as most cases allow comparison across all five states, then the observable implications are workable.

The hypotheses and resulting observable implications will be grouped into three sets, each one corresponding to a stage in the political life-cycle of a deputy-leader: the attainment of office; the term of office and the stepping down from office. At each stage if deputy-leaders can influence policy then the hypotheses and implications should stand up to the facts.

There are two elements to the hypotheses. Some are more concerned with the motivation of deputy-leaders. These hypotheses do not say that deputy-leaders can influence policy, but, rather, that they are people who want to influence policy. If the deputy-leader wants to influence policy, then it is reasonable to assume that in office they will at least try to do so. Hypotheses one, two, three and seven fall into this category. The remaining three hypotheses deal more directly with the capacity of deputy-leaders to influence policy.

#### **2.4.5.1 Stage 1: Attaining office**

The first series of hypotheses relate to the circumstances surrounding the attainment of the position of deputy-leader.

**Hypothesis 1: If deputy-leaders matter, then individuals appointed to the position will have held a significant policy-related post beforehand.**

If the position of deputy-leader is one where the deputy-leader can affect policy outcomes beyond their specific ministerial responsibilities, then it is unlikely to be filled by a political newcomer. In other words, an important position is unlikely to be given to a political novice. Equally, a ceremonial position is unlikely to be given to a political heavyweight, except perhaps at the end of a career. A position with policy-influencing powers would not be handed over lightly to one who has little or no previous experience of policy formulation and implementation. Such experience can only be gained from having previously held high political office such as a cabinet position. It is possible that in some cases a party has been excluded from power for a long period and so will lack politicians with previous cabinet experience. In such circumstances, one would expect that the party involved would select a member who has experience in a policy-related post at a national level such as a senior opposition spokesperson covering a major cabinet position or someone who served on a major legislative committee, or had previous policy experience at a sub-national state level.

In terms of the observable implications, we can examine the previous positions held by those who went on to be deputy-leaders and determine if such positions were significant. The positions that will be considered 'significant' include: a cabinet post; being primary opposition spokesperson or membership of a policy-influencing legislative committee, or prominent elected office (by this is meant an office with a national profile as distinct from being elected on to a local residents committee for example). This information should be relatively easy to obtain and straightforward to analyse.

It may be argued that the holding of one such position in itself does not indicate an interest in policy, and that in the case of some positions (eg legislative committees) all members of parliament may hold them. Nonetheless, the holding of a number of these

positions over a political career would indicate that the holder is likely to have an interest in policy. It should also be noted that in terms of assessing the motivation of deputy-leaders the accumulated results from the testing of a number of observable implications will be taken into account. An interest in policy will not be identified on the basis of the results from the testing of one observable implication but rather from the results of the testing of observable implications drawn from four hypotheses that examine proxy measures for policy interest over the course of deputy-leaders' political career.

**Hypothesis 2: If deputy-leaders matter, then those in the office will have had a strong policy focus prior to coming to office.**

If deputy-leaders can influence policy, then people with an interest in policy will seek the office. That is not to say that deputy-leaders will influence policy when in office, but merely that those who seek the position will be motivated by policy concerns.

How do we measure a strong policy focus? We can take it that a person who has a strong interest in policy will produce policy documents, give speeches on policy proposals, contribute to policy debates in the media and in a legislative context, propose legislation. All of these actions are in the public domain and therefore easily identified. While it may be argued that any senior politician is likely to give policy-related speeches, significant examples of such activity will be sought from both inside and outside parliament. In other words, an example of a policy document produced will be taken before an example of a policy-related speech. While there are difficulties in measuring motivation, it must also be pointed out that it is in the accumulation of evidence over the course of testing a number of hypotheses related to policy interest that will determine whether or not those who were deputy-leaders displayed a genuine interest in policy over the course of their political careers.

While the first two hypotheses appear quite similar, they are different in that the first one examines positions held prior to becoming deputy-leader, while the second focuses on the actions of those who went on to become deputy-leader.

#### **2.4.5.2 Stage 2: The term in office**

The second series of hypotheses relates to the actions of deputy-leaders during their term as deputy-leader.

##### **Hypothesis 3: If deputy-leaders matter, then they will focus on policy while in the office.**

If deputy-leaders influence policy, then those who hold the office will show an interest in policy. This hypothesis allows for the scenario where someone who has no interest in policy attains the office. If the office has policy implementation possibilities then one would expect holders of the office to show at least some interest in policy while they are in the office. That is not to say that deputy-leaders will focus exclusively on policy while in the office, merely that there should be examples of interest in policy.

An interest in policy will be measured by the following proxies: the generation of a number of policy documents, giving lengthy policy speeches and proposing legislation. Such proxies will be sought from outside any additional cabinet portfolios held by the deputy-leader so as to be able to distinguish between any policy influence arising from their having additional cabinet responsibilities and any policy influence due to their being deputy-leader.

**Hypothesis 4: If deputy-leaders matter, then they will have policy development and implementation resources available to them.**

The hypotheses to date have tested the motivation of deputy-leaders. This hypothesis looks at the capacity of the office holders to influence policy. It must be borne in mind that while a deputy-leader may have the motivation to influence policy, they cannot implement it by themselves. They will require staff to set policy priorities (within their department and across departments), to draft legislation, to follow it through the legislative process and to ensure its implementation and possibly to monitor its effectiveness. If the office is purely ceremonial in nature, then we would expect it to be backed up by a small secretariat. On the other hand, if it has policy influence, then it should have attached to it a number of civil service staff and political appointees whose role will be policy orientated. Their policy focus would reach beyond any ministerial brief held by the deputy-leader. Both the size of the staff available to the deputy-leader and their role will be examined. The departmental budget can be compared to other policy-making departments and to that of the leader's office and other non-ministerial officers. Additionally, on a qualitative level, it can be determined whether or not support staff have a policy role. If they do, then this would indicate that the office that they are supporting is policy orientated.

**Hypothesis 5: If deputy-leaders matter, then they will influence policies that they believe to be important while in the office.**

Generally, policies are implemented on the basis of an agreement of the parties to a coalition and/or the cabinet in a single-party government. However, each minister will have their own specific policy priorities which may not always form part of such

agreements. In the case of the deputy-leader, we would expect that they would seek to implement some policies that they consider important. This influence may range from the broad strokes of the general direction of government policy to more specific 'pet projects' such as a project in their constituency. In terms of negative influence, while deputy-leaders may not be able to undermine every proposal they disagree with, if they have influence over policy outcomes we should expect to see some instances where proposals that they disagree with are changed, deprioritised, delayed or abandoned. If, on the other hand, they do not have influence over policy, they will be unable to stop policies they disagree with.

What observable implications arise from this hypothesis? In the case of 'pet projects' we are seeking to identify policy proposals that find favour with the deputy-leader, but which are not a priority of the government as a whole or indeed of any of the parties that make up the government. We are looking for policy proposals that the deputy-leader in question has spoken in favour of but which were not among the government's policy priorities at that point in time. Such projects will not relate to matters covered by any ministerial brief held by the deputy-leader, except where it can be shown that it was due to their being deputy-leader that such policies were implemented, as in the case of controversial policies for example. Generally, each deputy-leader will have a small number of such 'pet projects'. Again, it is not expected that all such projects will be implemented, but if deputy-leaders have influence over policy outcomes we should expect to see some instances where their 'pet projects' are implemented. If they have no influence over policy outcomes then we would expect that none of their 'pet projects' are implemented.

In the case of a broader policy influence, we can seek to identify the policy committees that the deputy-leader chairs. Such committees should examine policy issues beyond the



deputy leader's narrow departmental responsibilities. The more policy committees that they chair, the greater their likely influence on policy.

The ability of deputy-leaders to undermine policies that they disagree with can be verified by identifying proposals that deputy-leaders have disagreed with in public statements and then tracking the progress of those proposals. Even if they are halted, we need to verify that it was as a result of the deputy-leader's actions. It must be borne in mind however that in some cases the deputy-leader may claim undeserved credit for the derailment of the policy. Alternatively, those involved in the policy process but not aligned with the deputy-leader may seek to underplay the influence of the deputy-leader. Observations of the outcomes of disputes over policy between the deputy-leader and the leader and fellow ministers will also be made so as to determine whether the deputy-leader was able to undermine policies that they disagreed with. In many such instances we can expect such disagreements and their outcomes to be highlighted in the media.

#### **2.4.5.3 Stage 3: Leaving office**

The third series of hypotheses relate to the circumstances under which deputy-leaders end their term as deputy-leader.

**Hypothesis 6: If deputy-leaders matter then, where they are involved in significant policy disagreement outside the area of any additional cabinet portfolio that they hold, their removal from office will be sought.**

If deputy leaders matter, then if there are major policy conflicts or disagreements one would expect the removal the deputy-leader from that position of influence to be sought

on occasion. On the other hand, if they had no policy influence, a disagreement on policy would not be expected to undermine their position.

How do we verify this hypothesis? Firstly, it needs to be noted that a component of this hypothesis strictly cannot be tested in the United States because the deputy-leader there, the Vice-President, cannot be removed by his party. In fact, they can only be removed from Office 'on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors' (US Constitution, Article II, Section 4).<sup>29</sup> However, it can be tested insofar as a Vice-President who is out of line with their party or the public on a major policy issue may have difficulties in being re-nominated to contest the following election for Vice-President or they may resign. In order to verify this hypothesis in all five states it will be a matter of isolating those cases where deputy-leaders were forced from office (i.e. either resigned, were sacked or moved to a different office) and identifying the reason for their removal from the office of deputy-leader. Resignation letters, media reports and analyses and academic research into the issue will provide a basis for assessing what was the reason for the removal from office. This scenario is not one that we can expect to occur very often, but if we do find instances where it occurs then we will have found support for the hypothesis. Again, policy disagreements or conflicts beyond any ministerial brief of a deputy-leader removed from office will be sought so as to ensure that the removal is due to their being deputy-leader rather than having any additional cabinet responsibilities.

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<sup>29</sup> Available from: <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html/> [accessed 10 October 2001].

While the absolute number of deputy-leaders removed from office may be small that is not to say it is insignificant. Such a measure will not include failed attempts to remove deputy-leaders from office which are more difficult to identify. Furthermore, deputy-leaders may not be involved in major policy differences during their term as deputy-leader. It will be sufficient for current purposes to compare the number of deputy-leaders who left office early due to policy differences with the total number of deputy-leaders who left office early. If a high proportion of those who left office early did so due to policy differences, then it can be taken as offering strong support for the hypothesis in question.

**Hypothesis 7: If deputy-leaders matter, then after their term of office as deputy-leader they will go on to hold another significant political office.**

The rationale for this hypothesis is that if deputy-leaders can influence policy, then the position is not a retirement home for politicians. If that were the case, then once they step down from the position of deputy-leader, it would be to leave politics altogether or move to another minor or ceremonial political position. On the other hand, if it is a position that matters and where policy is affected, then those who have held the position will have done so at the height of their political careers or they will use it as a stepping stone to higher political office. On that basis, it is reasonable to assume that any subsequent office they hold will also be significant. Of course, there will be cases where a deputy-leader fully retires from political life immediately after stepping down as deputy-leader or semi-retires by subsequently taking up a ceremonial role. There is also the possibility that the deputy-leader will be demoted in the event that they have not done a good job as deputy-

leader. Such instances are easily identifiable. However in most cases, if it is a significant political office, then they will go on to hold other significant positions. While Prime-Ministers generally do not go on to hold further significant policy-influencing offices, the office of Prime Minister is clearly recognized as the height of a politician's career and so it is reasonable to expect them to retire from politics after holding such a position. In the case of deputy-leaders, it may be the height of some politicians' careers. However, it is not being argued here that it is the most important office a politician could hold. Therefore, one would generally expect holders of it to continue to be active in politics after they have left the position of deputy-leader. The opposite example of the holder of an insignificant office then going on to hold a significant office also occurs and could be seen to question the validity of this hypothesis. This does not undermine the rationale of the current hypothesis as the positions that will be sought are sufficiently high level that one would not reasonably assume that anyone could attain them having immediately previously held an insignificant position. In the current context where we have defined 'mattering' in terms of policy influence, then we can say that if deputy-leaders matter, then they will generally go on to other high level political positions where they can influence policy such as ministers, chairs of parliamentary committees and directors of international governmental bodies. It must also be borne in mind that what is being sought here is an accumulation of evidence over a number of hypotheses that might indicate an interest in policy over a political lifetime, before, during and after a politician's time as deputy-leader.

#### 2.4.5.4 Summary

Seven hypotheses were derived from the assumption that deputy-leaders can influence policy outcomes. Two of the hypotheses relate to gaining office, three of them are to do with their actions in office and two relate to leaving office. Table 2.1 below summarises the hypotheses and their observable implications:

**Table 2-1 Hypotheses and observable implications**

	<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Observable implications</b>
<b>1.</b>	If deputy-leaders matter, then individuals appointed to the position will have held a significant policy-related post beforehand.	Deputy-leaders will previously have been a cabinet member; a primary opposition spokesperson; member of a policy-influencing legislative committee or a holder of a prominent elected office.
<b>2.</b>	If deputy-leaders matter, then those in the office will have had a strong policy focus prior to coming to office.	Deputy-leaders will have previously produced policy documents, given speeches on policy proposals, contributed to policy debates in the media or in a legislative context, proposed legislation.
<b>3.</b>	If deputy-leaders matter, then they will focus on policy while in the office.	Deputy-leaders while in office will produce a number of policy documents, give lengthy speeches and propose legislation outside the area of any additional cabinet responsibilities that they hold.

4.	If deputy-leaders matter, then they will have policy development and implementation resources available to them.	The deputy-leader's office will have a total budget in line with other policy-developing departments and areas.
		The responsibility of a number of staff of the deputy-leader will be policy orientated.
5.	If deputy-leaders matter, then they will influence policies that they believe to be important while in the office.	'Pet projects' outside the area of any ministerial portfolio that deputy-leaders hold and that have the strong support of the deputy-leader will be promoted by them or policies which deputy-leaders have publicly disagreed with will be changed, deprioritised, delayed or abandoned
		The deputy-leader will chair a number of committees with policy roles beyond their departmental responsibilities.
6.	If deputy-leaders matter then, where they are involved in significant policy disagreement outside the area of any additional cabinet portfolio that they hold, their removal from office will	Policy disputes outside the area of any ministerial portfolio that deputy-leaders hold will be a major reason for the removal from office of deputy-leaders.

	be sought.	
7.	If deputy-leaders matter, then after their term of office as deputy-leader they will go on to hold another significant political office.	Deputy-leaders will generally go on to other political positions where they can influence policy.

Having outlined the hypotheses and their observable implications, they will put to the test in the following chapters, but first a methodological issue that arises in relation to testing the hypotheses must be addressed.

#### **2.4.6 Testing the hypotheses**

A difficulty that arises in relation to the testing of the hypotheses is how to disentangle the role and influence of deputy-leader from party-leader and from holder of a cabinet portfolio. For example if a Deputy-Prime Minister who was leader of their party in a multi-party government and also Minister for Health was able to achieve a particular policy outcome in the health area, how can we say that this was the result of the person being Deputy-Prime Minister, Minister for Health or party-leader? There is no general answer to this dilemma, each instance may have a different answer. All that can be done is to try to isolate the independent effect of each variable on the deputy-leader's influence.

Deputy-leaders who are party-leaders can be separated out from those who are not. Of the 64 deputy-leaders in this study; nine of the 14 Irish deputy-leaders were not party-leaders at the time; ten of the 24 Dutch deputy-leaders were not party-leaders at the time; four of the seven Swedish deputy-leaders were not party leaders at the time; none of the US deputy-leaders were party-leaders at the time; and none of the seven UK deputy-leaders were party leaders at the time. In total 42 out of the 64 deputy-leaders (65 per cent) in this study were not party-leaders at the same time and a majority of the deputy-leaders in four of the five states were not party-leaders at the same time (in the case of the fifth state – the Netherlands, 42 per cent of the deputy-leaders were not simultaneously party-leaders). In other words the number of deputy-leaders who were not simultaneously party-leaders is sufficiently large so as to enable meaningful breakdown of the findings of the observable implications between those deputy-leaders who were party-leaders and those deputy-leaders who were not. This will enable the role of deputy-leaders to be isolated from that of party-leaders.

Furthermore, it will not be necessary to make this separation of party-leader role from deputy-leader role in the case of all the hypotheses. Hypotheses one, two, three and seven look at the motivation of the individuals involved and so the distinction between party-leaders and deputy-leaders is not relevant to them. In the case of the fourth hypothesis looking at the resources of the deputy-leader, the distinction may be useful in assessing if party-leadership has an impact on the policy-related resources made available to deputy-leaders. Similarly with the fifth hypothesis relating to the influence of deputy-leaders on policy, a breakdown of the results in terms of deputy-leaders who are also party leaders



and deputy-leaders who are not party-leaders will help clarify the influence of deputy-leaders. In the case of the sixth hypothesis, the results of the testing of the observable implication associated with it also need to be given in terms of whether or not the deputy-leaders are also party-leaders. So, for five out of the nine observable implications being tested, the results will need to be broken down in terms of deputy-leaders who are also party leaders and deputy-leaders who are not party-leaders. With the results of these breakdowns it should be possible to separate out the influence of deputy-leaders from that of party-leaders.

Similarly, deputy-leaders who have an additional cabinet portfolio can be separated out from those who do not. However, all of the Irish, Dutch, Swedish or UK deputy-leaders held a cabinet portfolio at the same time as being deputy-leader. It is only in the case of US deputy-leaders that one finds that they did not simultaneously hold additional cabinet portfolios (in all 12 cases). A difficulty thus arises in that only a small number of deputy-leaders in this study did not also hold an additional cabinet portfolio at the same time. Furthermore all instances of this occur in the US, making it difficult to draw any conclusions regarding deputy-leaders who do not have additional cabinet responsibilities that can be extrapolated to the other four states in this study. However, the difficulty in disentangling the effects of deputy-leadership from cabinet membership does not apply to all the hypotheses. The issue does not arise with the first two hypotheses, which deal with policy focus prior to holding office. In the case of the third hypothesis, there is an issue of disentangling the effects of deputy-leadership from cabinet membership. It must however be borne in mind that what is being tested for is an interest in policy and so it

does not matter whether a focus on policy expresses itself through a cabinet position or the deputy-leader position as it is sufficient to be able to show that the holder of the office of deputy-leader expresses an interest in policy irrespective of the means by which that interest is expressed. With the fourth hypothesis relating to policy resources, it is possible to distinguish between policy resources allocated to deputy-leaders in their role as deputy-leader and resources allocated to them for their cabinet responsibilities as the separate budgets are generally specified. As for the fifth hypothesis, while it may not be possible to separate out the role of deputy-leader from cabinet member in terms of advancing or halting projects, it will be possible to do so for the second observable implication relating to committee membership beyond their departmental responsibilities. However projects beyond the ministerial portfolio of deputy-leaders that they halted or promoted can be sought. With the sixth hypothesis, the base of deputy-leaders who were removed from office is likely to be so small as to render any breakout in terms of cabinet membership statistically meaningless. In the case of the final hypothesis which relates to the career of deputy-leaders after they have stepped down as deputy-leader, it may also be difficult to state categorically that they went on to other political positions where they could influence policy because they held the post of deputy-leader rather than because they held a cabinet position. However in this instance, the hypotheses relates to the motivation of the individual involved and so it does not matter whether they were employed because they had been deputy-leader or because they were a member of cabinet. What matters is that they displayed an interest in policy. So, while it may not be possible to separate out the influence arising from an individual being deputy-leader from an individual being a cabinet member in the case of those who are both deputy-leaders

and cabinet members, this difficulty affects only two of the nine observable implications. In those instances it will be clearly stated that such a difficulty arises. However, in the case of the remaining seven observable implications, it will be possible to associate an outcome solely with an individual's status as deputy-leader.

Even though it is possible to devise a research strategy that maximizes the capacity to distinguish between the independent effect of the deputy-leader, the party leader and the minister, the problem goes deeper in many respects than just disentangling the influence of deputy-leaders. It applies to the entire study of the concept of leadership in political science and beyond. As MacGregor Burns (1977) observes in relation to the study of leadership, 'the state of the art is primitive ... Political leadership is one of the most widely noted and reported and least understood phenomena in modern politics' (MacGregor Burns, 1977, p. 266). This is a view shared by most political scientists who have explored the subject, including Elgie (1995), who describes leadership as 'the unidentifiable in pursuit of the indefinable ... it is a concept whose meaning is socially constructed. Individuals have their own preferred definition of leadership. At best there may be common agreement that one definition of leadership is better than all the others. Whatever the case, "leadership" is an essentially contested concept.' (Elgie, 1995, p. 2). There appear to be as many definitions of political leadership as there have been studies of it (see Elgie, 1995, p.3). No single definition of political leadership captures the different types of leadership and the different contexts in which it is exercised and the fact that a leader may change from one type to another and from one context to another. Nonetheless, some generalization is possible. It is possible to identify and describe

particular styles of leadership and how they are suited to particular contexts. It is also possible to identify how particular contexts affect the ability to lead in terms of the constraints placed on political actors and resources available to them. While the nature of leadership appears to inhibit broad and in-depth understanding of the concept, productive research is possible but its limitations must be borne in mind.

As befits a concept with numerous definitions, the study of political leadership has taken many approaches. A number of broad approaches can be identified. An institutional approach examines leadership from the perspective of the political office rather than the office-holder, leadership is exercised through political institutions and the constraints and resources made available through those institutions. An alternative approach is behavioural in that it focuses on aspects of the behaviour of leaders, such as the relationship between leaders and followers. It is argued that often those who lead may not be in a formal leadership position or institution and that an institutional approach may miss this aspect of leadership. Between these two extremes, a more integrated and complex approach has been adopted. As described by Sheffer: 'Most people still believe that leadership qualities are connected to personal attributes, and hence that leadership is a very individualistic phenomenon. But most scholars in this area agree that in addition to personal attributes, leadership is intimately related to the fabric of the leader's relevant societies, to social and political organizations, to established institutions, and to leaders' relations with smaller and larger groups of followers' (Sheffer, 1993, p. vii). This more rounded approach to the study of political leadership captures 'the personal and systemic aspects of the leadership process. It implies that political leaders operate within an

environment which will both structure their behaviour and constrain their freedom of action. At the same time, it also implies that political leaders do have the opportunity to shape the environment in which they operate' (Elgie, 1995, p. 8).

While this approach overcomes many of the objections to the single perspectives of behaviourist and institutional approaches, approaches to the study of political leadership must still grapple with the difficulty of determining the precise role of individual factors in contributing to the effectiveness of individual leaders and indeed individual acts of leadership. The study of leadership must 'be part of a more general theory of social and historical causation' (MacGregor Burns, 1977, p. 266). How can a particular outcome be attributed to specific characteristics of specific political actors given the potentially infinite number of variables involved? In attempting to address this issue, a number of wider debates within political science are touched upon, such as the role of the individual versus the institution and the nature of power. These are significant debates within themselves, none of which have come to any definitive conclusion.

It must also be borne in mind that in reality there are numerous factors that determine the level of influence of a politician on policy, such as their reputation, their experience, their standing in their party, how important their support is, their popularity and so on and that it is not possible to account for every factor in every instance. That is not to conclude that nothing can be done to move this research forward, particularly given that the purpose of this study is not to determine what those factors are or the relative importance of various factors, but rather to determine whether or not deputy-leaders can influence policy

outcomes and thus be said to ‘matter’. By testing seven hypotheses on 64 deputy-leaders drawn from five states over 56 years, there should be a broad enough range of factors captured so as to ensure that any problem with individual cases are cancelled out. In other words, the study includes deputy-leaders with experience and those without experience, deputy-leaders with significant reputations and those without, deputy-leaders with strong standing in their parties and deputy-leaders who do not have such standing and so on. If there is a difficulty in terms of an instance where influence or the lack of it cannot be disentangled from deputy-leadership and some other factor(s), this will be clearly stated.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Having reviewed the current literature on deputy-leaders, there now is a basis in fact for arguing that they are perceived not to matter. It has also been outlined how to set about challenging this perception. Before embarking upon the case studies of the selected states, the following chapter will briefly examine the role of deputy-leaders in the specific states which will form the basis for this study.

## **3 A SURVEY OF DEPUTY LEADERS IN THE FIVE STATES UNDER INVESTIGATION**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Before setting out to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide a survey of deputy-leaders in the five states under examination. At its core is a database of deputy-leaders in those five states. Unlike the database in Chapter One, this survey will include data on deputy-leaders in the five states over time rather than at a specific point in time. The data gathered follow the format of Chapter One. For the period 1946 to 2002, it includes: who the deputy leaders have been; their term of office; their title; whether they have a constitutionally-defined role and, if so, what it is; whether they were elected or appointed; whether they held ministerial positions; their party affiliation; and the nature of government in those states (do they have single or multi-party government? and what are their leadership structures?). The data will then be analysed and a number of conclusions will be reached regarding deputy-leaders in the five states.

This analysis will provide a proper context for the investigations that will be conducted in the following four chapters (each chapter focusing on the hypotheses and observable implications from one of the three stages in the life-cycle of a deputy-leader) and will thus facilitate our understanding of the role of deputy-leaders.

## 3.2 The Irish Tánaiste

### 3.2.1 Introduction

In the Republic of Ireland, the Tánaiste is the equivalent of a Deputy-Prime Minister. They are a member of cabinet and the Irish constitution states that they act ‘for all purposes in the place of the Taoiseach if the Taoiseach should die, or become permanently incapacitated’<sup>30</sup> Thus, the Tánaiste meets the first two criteria for deputy-leaders. Tánaiste is an old Irish language word which means ‘second in rank’<sup>31</sup> and, thus, would be considered to be a deputy-leader on the basis of the third criterion outlined earlier regarding a title that recognises their second-ranking and deputising role. Indeed, some of the original proposals for what would become the 1937 Constitution used the English language term ‘Deputy-Prime Minister’ to describe the position and the original translation of this into Irish was as ‘Leas-Phríomh Aire’.<sup>32</sup>

The Irish Constitution specifically states that there can only be one holder of the office at any one point in time. Article 28, Section Six states that ‘The Taoiseach shall nominate a member of the Government to be the Tánaiste.’<sup>33</sup> In the time period under examination there have been 14 people who have held the position of Tánaiste (see Table 3.3).

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<sup>30</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10 October 2001].

<sup>31</sup> Smith, 1995, p. 182.

<sup>32</sup> Smith, 1995, p. 179.

<sup>33</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10 October 2001]



The maximum length of a single term of office for a Tánaiste is not specifically addressed in either the Irish Constitution or legislation. However, a maximum term length of approximately seven years is implied on the basis of the maximum time set down between General Elections. Article 16, Section Five of the Irish Constitution states that 'The same Dáil Éireann shall not continue for a longer period than seven years from the date of its first meeting: a shorter period may be fixed by law.'<sup>34</sup> This maximum length for a single term of office has been shortened by legislation. Section Ten of the Electoral Act 1963 states that 'The same Dáil shall not continue for a longer period than five years from the date of its first meeting.'<sup>35</sup> This can be extended to up to seven years (the constitutional limit) by amending the legislation. It should also be noted that a Tánaiste may serve for a slightly longer term than the maximum duration in the event that a Dáil runs for five years and an election then takes place (within 30 days of the dissolution of the Dáil according to Article 16.3 of the Constitution)<sup>36</sup> followed by negotiations to form a new government. In this instance, the Tánaiste continues in a caretaker capacity until a new government is formed (Article 28.11) and, on the basis of the present legislation, can actually serve a term slightly longer than five years. No term limit in the American sense of the phrase applies to the office in the sense that there is no maximum number of terms of office that a Tánaiste can serve.

Of the 14 Tánaiste in question, only one (Seán MacEntee) served a continuous term that ran in excess of five years. In terms of total time in the office, the longest-serving

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<sup>34</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10 October 2001]

<sup>35</sup> Available from [www.gov.ie](http://www.gov.ie) [accessed 11 November 2002].

Tánaiste during the period under examination was Dick Spring who served in the position for eight years and six months. He is followed by Seán Lemass who spent seven years and 4 months in the office and William Norton (six years and one month). The shortest serving Tánaiste was Peter Barry who only held the position for two months in a minority Fine Gael government in 1987. The average length of a single term for a Tánaiste over the period in question has been just over three years and one month. None of the holders of the office died while in office.

As for how Tánaiste attain the office, Article 28.6.1 of the Irish Constitution states that 'The Taoiseach shall nominate a member of the Government to be Tánaiste.'<sup>37</sup> The only condition imposed on who can be nominated is in Article 28.7.1 which requires that the Tánaiste be a member of the Dáil.<sup>38</sup> Once nominated, the cabinet is approved by a vote of the Dáil (there is no individual vote). While there is no clear constitutional direction on what happens if the office falls vacant within the term of the office holder, in practice it is filled on the basis of a new nomination by the Taoiseach and vote of the Dáil. Seán T. Ó Ceallaigh resigned to become President in June 1945 and was replaced by Seán Lemass; Seán MacEntee gave way to Frank Aiken who in turn gave way to Erskine Childers. When Labour resigned from government in 1987, Peter Barry replaced Dick Spring, while Brian Lenihan was sacked by the Taoiseach in 1990 and replaced by John Wilson.

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<sup>36</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10 October 2001].

<sup>37</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10 October 2001].

<sup>38</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10 October 2001].

Over the course of the period under investigation, there have been Tánaiste from all the major parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour and the Progressive Democrats). Fianna Fáil held the office on 10 occasions, Labour on six occasions and Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats on one occasion each. In terms of length of time in the office, Table 3.2 shows that Fianna Fáil have held it for 31 years and eight months (57 per cent of the time); Labour have held it for 19 years and eight months (35 per cent of the time); Fine Gael held it for two months (0.3 per cent of the time) and the Progressive Democrats for four years and six months (eight per cent of the time). When looking at this data, it must be borne in mind that the percentage of time the parties were in office exceeds 100 per cent as a number of parties were in coalition governments together at the same time. When this data is compared with the length of time each party has been in Government over the time period in question, a major anomaly appears in the case of Fine Gael. They only held the office of Tánaiste for two months despite being in government for 17 years and 11 months during the period in question. This is accounted for by the fact that in all Fine Gael coalition governments they gave up the position of Tánaiste to their minor partner – the Labour Party. Indeed, Fine Gael only gained the position when Labour walked out of government leaving Fine Gael in a minority government for two months in 1987. The discrepancy between the Progressive Democrats length of time in government and length of time that they held the position of Tánaiste is accounted for by the fact that they were in coalition with Fianna Fáil between July 1989 and January 1993 but did not hold the position of Tánaiste. The office has not been vacant for any considerable length of time during the period in question.

**Table 3-1 Length of Time in Office of Irish Tánaiste 1946-2002**

	<b>Length of time party in government (% of time period)</b>	<b>Length of time party held position of Tánaiste (% of time period)</b>
<b>Fianna Fáil</b>	38 years & 1 months (68%)	31 years & 8 months (57%)
<b>Fine Gael</b>	17 years & 11 months (32%)	2 months (0.3%)
<b>Labour</b>	19 years & 8 months (35%)	19 years & 8 months (35%)
<b>Progressive Democrats</b>	7 Years & 1 month (13%)	4 years & 6 months (8%)

In the case of single-party governments, the position has been filled by the deputy-leader of the party. In the case of coalition governments, it has been filled by the leader of the second largest party - the one exception to this latter rule was the Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coalition of 1989 to 1992, when the position was held by the deputy-leader of Fianna Fáil rather than the leader of the Progressive Democrats.

All 14 Tánaiste have had additional cabinet responsibilities (the position of Tánaiste was held by William Norton and Dick Spring twice and Seán Lemass three times). Six have held the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Lemass held it during his three separate terms as Tánaiste); three have held the Foreign Affairs portfolio; three have held Energy; two have held Health, two have held Social Welfare; two have held Finance and one each has held the Defence, Marine, Transport, Public Services and the Environment portfolios. The excess of ministerial portfolios over Tánaiste is accounted for by the fact that some Tánaiste changed ministerial portfolios during their terms (George Colley and Brian Lenihan) and that some had more than one portfolio (Brendan Corish, for example, had

both Health and Social Welfare). This latter finding conflicts with the analysis of current deputy-leaders in Chapter One which showed that deputy-leaders with multiple portfolios are currently only to be found in micro-states. However, given that the population of Ireland is approximately four million, the finding that deputy-leaders with multiple ministerial portfolios are found in small states remains intact. It should also be noted that the title of some portfolios changed over the course of the period in question (Industry and Commerce became Enterprise, and External Affairs became Foreign Affairs).

It is also worth noting here that the Tánaiste generally has not had a supporting ministry in that holders of the title have relied on the resources associated with their additional cabinet portfolio. There has been no Department or Office of the Tánaiste except for the 1993-1997 period. The role of the office was set out by the Taoiseach in answer to a Dáil question in 1993:

The role and functions of the Office will encompass briefing and advising the Tánaiste generally on all Government policy matters; representing the Government on the new National Economic and Social Forum and thereby ensuring direct liaison through the Tánaiste between the forum and the Government; joint responsibility, together with the Minister of State and Chief Whip attached to my Department, for the implementation of the provisions under the heading "Broadening our Democracy" which are contained in our Programme for a Partnership Government, 1993-97; representing the Tánaiste on a committee of programme managers to monitor the implementation of the programme for

Government; representing the Tánaiste on the Central Review Committee under the Programme for Economic and Social Progress, any successor to that committee under any further such programme and representing the Tánaiste on the Interdepartmental Committee on the Co-ordination of EC Affairs. (Dail Debates, Volume 426, 17 February, 1993).

This separate office was abolished by the incoming government in 1997.

As for which ministries deputy-leaders tend to hold, Table 1.7 showed that at a global level, the Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Agriculture, Energy and Foreign Trade were the most popular portfolios amongst deputy-leaders. The ministerial responsibilities of the Tánaiste are to a limited extent in line with these findings, with Finance, Defence, Energy and Foreign Affairs also being popular portfolios among Tánaiste. The most popular portfolio among Tánaiste is Industry and Commerce. This portfolio does not feature among the most popular with deputy-leaders globally. This divergence is partially explained by the fact that on three out of the six occasions it was held by a Tánaiste, it was the same person who held it (Lemass). The Health and Social Welfare portfolios are two that have been held by Tánaiste that do not figure highly in the global figures. It needs to be borne in mind that we are not comparing like with like here insofar as the global figures are from a specific point in time and cross-sectional in nature while the Irish data looks at deputy-leaders over time.

**Table 3-2 Irish Tánaiste 1946-2002**

	<b>Title of Deputy-Leader</b>	<b>No. of Deputy-Leaders</b>	<b>Deputy-Leader</b>	<b>Term of Office<sup>39</sup></b>	<b>Duration of Term (to nearest month)</b>	<b>Elected or appointed</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Additional Cabinet Positions<sup>40</sup></b>	<b>Notes<sup>41</sup></b>
1.	Tánaiste	1	Seán Lemass	1945-1948	2 years & 1 month	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Industry & Commerce	Assumed position 14 June 1945.
2.	Tánaiste	1	William Norton	1948-1951	3 years & 4 months	Appointed	Labour	Social Welfare	
3.	Tánaiste	1	Seán Lemass	1951-1954	3 years	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Industry & Commerce	
4.	Tánaiste	1	William Norton	1954-1957	2 years & 9 months	Appointed	Labour	Industry & Commerce	
5.	Tánaiste	1	Seán Lemass	1957-1959	2 years & 3 months	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Industry & Commerce	
6.	Tánaiste	1	Seán MacEntee	1959-1965	5 years & 10 months	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Health	Lemass became Taoiseach on 23 June 1959.
7.	Tánaiste	1	Frank Aiken	1965-1969	4 years & 3 months	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	External Affairs	Assumed position on 21 April 1965.
8.	Tánaiste	1	Erskine Childers	1969-1973	3 years & 8 months	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Transport & Power	Assumed position on 2 July 1969.
9.	Tánaiste	1	Brendan Corish	1973-1977	4 years & 4 months	Appointed	Labour	Health & Social Welfare	
10.	Tánaiste	1	George Colley	1977-1981	3 years & 11 months	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Finance & Public Services/ Energy	
11.	Tánaiste	1	Michael O'Leary	1981-1982	9 months	Appointed	Labour	Industry & Energy	
12.	Tánaiste	1	Ray MacSharry	1982	9 months	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Finance	
13.	Tánaiste	1	Dick Spring	1982-1987	4 years & 1 month	Appointed	Labour	Environment Energy.	
14.	Tánaiste	1	Peter Barry	1987	2 months	Appointed	Fine Gael	Foreign Affairs	Assumed position 20 Jan 1987 as FG left in minority Govt.
15.	Tánaiste	1	Brian Lenihan	1987-1990	3 years & 8 months	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Foreign Affairs/ Defence	
16.	Tánaiste	1	John Wilson	1990-1993	2 years & 2 months	Appointed	Fianna Fáil	Marine	
17.	Tánaiste	1	Dick Spring	1993-1997	4 years & 5 months	Appointed	Labour	Min for Foreign Affairs	
18.	Tánaiste	1	Mary Harney	1997-2002	4 years & 6 months	Appointed	Progressive Democrat	Min. for Enterprise	

<sup>39</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.

<sup>40</sup> Horgan, 1997; Collins, 2000 and Jones, 2001.

<sup>41</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.

### 3.2.2 The formal role and powers of the Tánaiste

The role of the Tánaiste is elaborated on in the Irish Constitution. Article 28.6 states that the Tánaiste: must be nominated by the Taoiseach (the Irish Prime-Minister); 'shall act for all purposes in the place of the Taoiseach if the Taoiseach should die, or become permanently incapacitated, until a new Taoiseach shall have been appointed',<sup>42</sup> replaces the Taoiseach in their temporary absence; must be a member of the Dáil and can be asked to resign by the Taoiseach. Article 31 also grants the Tánaiste ex-officio membership of the 'Council of State'<sup>43</sup> which is a body that advises the President on the exercise of his/her role.

A number of observations can be made on these powers. Firstly the Tánaiste does not see out the term of the Taoiseach if they fill a vacancy in the position. They only serve as Taoiseach until a new one is appointed. This is in contrast with the United States, for example, where the Vice-President sees out the remainder of the term of the President he/she replaces in the event of a vacancy arising. Further contrasts arise in that the Tánaiste must be a member of the Dáil and can be sacked by the Taoiseach. Neither of these conditions applies in the case of the US. There is a constitutional means of circumventing the requirement that cabinet members must be elected to parliament in that up to two members of the cabinet can be from the Senate (Article 28.2) and the Taoiseach nominates 11 members of the Senate (Article 18.1 and 18.3). However Article 28.7 of the Constitution specifically requires that the Tánaiste (and the Taoiseach and Minister for

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<sup>42</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10 October 2001].

<sup>43</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10 October 2001].



Finance) must be members of Dáil Éireann, all the members of which must be directly elected (Article 16.5), with the possible exception of the Speaker of the House.<sup>44</sup>

The only occasion during the period in question when the Tánaiste had to replace the Taoiseach for any length of time was when Eamon de Valera had to travel to the Netherlands for treatment for his failing eyesight and was absent from office for four and a half months.<sup>45</sup> The then Tánaiste, Seán Lemass, took on the duties of the Taoiseach until de Valera's return. During this period Lemass continued to fulfill his ministerial responsibilities.

None of this constitutional detail says very much about the day-to-day activities and role of the Tánaiste. They stand in for the Taoiseach at the discussion of the Order of Business in the Dáil and at question time and also travel abroad representing the State. However, in practice, most of their time is spent attending to their ministerial responsibilities. In short, the Tánaiste is rarely called upon to fulfill the specific tasks assigned to them in the constitution.

### **3.3 The Deputy-Prime Minister of the Netherlands**

#### **3.3.1 Introduction**

In the case of the Netherlands, the Deputy-Prime Minister appears to meet the criteria for deputy-leaders outlined in Chapter One. He/she is a member of the cabinet and so meets

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<sup>44</sup> Available from: [www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm](http://www.gov.ie/taoiseach/publication/constitution/english/government.htm) [accessed 10

the first criterion. In terms of meeting the second and third criteria, a difficulty arises in that the position of Deputy-Prime Minister has no basis in the Dutch constitution. Andeweg (1997) explains that informal arrangements for dealing with the illness or absence of the Prime Minister gained a degree of formality when 'a status-conscious substitute chairperson had stationery printed calling himself "Vice Minister President". The title stuck and eventually found its way into the Standing Orders.' (Andeweg, 1997, p. 57).<sup>46</sup> Insofar as they are the de facto substitute chairperson and their title recognises this, then the "Vice Minister President" of the Netherlands can be considered a deputy-leader for the purposes of this study.

Over the course of the period under study, there have been seven occasions on which the Netherlands has had more than one Deputy-Prime Minister. On each of these occasions there were two Deputy-Prime Ministers. During the period from 1946 to 2002, there have been 24 Deputy-Prime Ministers. The longest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was Wim Kok, who held the office for four years and nine months. The shortest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was Wilhelm de Gaay Fortman, who held the office for three months in 1977. The average length of time that an individual has held the office is two years and three months. None of the holders died while in office.

The office is attained not on the basis of appointment by the Prime Minister, but, rather, formal appointments are made by the Monarch following negotiations between the parties in government. Article 43 of the Dutch Constitution states that 'The Prime

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October 2001].

<sup>45</sup> Collins, 2000, p. 150.

Minister and the other Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree.’<sup>47</sup> Thus, the Prime Minister can neither appoint nor remove a minister. However, ‘Royal Decrees appointing or dismissing Ministers and State Secretaries shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister’ (Article 48).<sup>48</sup> Thus the Prime Minister has a say in appointments and dismissals, even if formally they cannot carry them out unilaterally without the consent of the Monarch.

The Deputy-Prime Ministers have been drawn from four parties: KVP (Catholic Party); VVD (Conservative Liberals); ARP (Protestant Party); PvdA (Social Democrats) and D66 (Progressive Liberals). Of the 24 Deputy-Prime Ministers, seven have been drawn from the KVP (29 per cent of the total), eight from VVD (33 per cent of the total), three from PvdA (13 per cent of the total), three from D66 (13 per cent of the total) and three from ARP (13 per cent of the total).

In terms of the length of time each party has occupied the office, the KVP have held it for 20 years and four months (36 per cent), the VVD have held it for 30 years and five months (54 per cent), the ARP for eight years & 3 months (15 per cent), PvdA have held it for seven years (13 per cent) and D66 held it for eight years and seven months (15 per cent). The position was vacant for two years and seven months (five per cent of the time) between 1946 and 1948. The percentage figures total more than 100 as the office was held by more than one person on seven occasions.

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<sup>46</sup> The Prime Minister’s title is ‘Minister President’.

<sup>47</sup> Government of the Netherlands, 2003. ‘Netherlands Constitution.’ Available from: [http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/nl00000\\_.html](http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/nl00000_.html) [assessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

The length of time each party was in the office can now be compared to the length of time each party was in government over the period in question. Table 3.8 reveals that the VVD were in government for 35 years and three months, the KVP for 33 years and 11 months, PvdA for 29 years and nine months, ARP for 27 years and three months and the D66 for 13 years and two months. What is striking from these figures is the significant amount of time most parties have spent in government, especially considering the ARP and KVP ceased to exist as separate parties in 1980. The party with the least amount of time in government (D66) was only formed in 1966, twenty years into the period under examination. The reason why most parties have spent significant time in government is that Dutch governments are often multi-party coalitions and have tended to include more parties than are strictly required for a majority, particularly in the period between 1946 and 1967.<sup>49</sup> Looking at how long parties were allocated the position of Deputy-Prime Minister compared to how long they were in government reveals that there was a VVD Deputy-Prime Minister for 86 per cent of the time that the party was in government; there was a KVP Deputy-Prime Minister for 60 per cent of the time the party was in government; there was a D66 Deputy-Prime Minister for 65 per cent of the time the party was in government; there was a ARP Deputy-Prime Minister for 31 per cent of the time the party was in government and a PvdA Deputy-Prime Minister for 23 per cent of the time the party was in government. Generally, the smaller parties in a coalition will hold the office of Deputy-Prime Minister, while the large party holds the post of Prime Minister. Thus, 21 out of the 24 Prime Ministers over the period under study have been drawn from the PvdA and KVP (and its successor party the CDA). The most clear-cut

cases where a second Deputy-Prime Minister position was created were where there were only three parties in the coalition (the 1965-1966, 1981, 1981-1982, 1994-1998 and 1998-2002 governments). The other cases arose were in a two-party coalition where the bigger party took Prime Minister and one of two Deputy-Prime Minister posts (1966-1967) and in coalitions of four and five parties. In two instances of four/five member coalitions, the largest party took the Prime Minister slot and one of the two Deputy-Prime Minister positions (1971-1972 and 1972-1973) and in one the second and third largest parties each held the post of Deputy-Prime Minister (1967-1971).<sup>50</sup>

**Table 3-3 Length of Time in Office of Dutch Deputy-Prime Minister 1946-2002**

	<b>Length of time party in government (% of time period)</b>	<b>Length of time party held position of Deputy-Prime Minister (% of time period)</b>
<b>VVD</b>	35 years & 3 months (63%)	30 years & 5 months (54%)
<b>KVP</b>	33 years & 11 months (60%)	20 years & 4 months (36%)
<b>D66</b>	13 years & 2 months (23%)	8 years & 7 months (15%)
<b>ARP</b>	27 years & 3 months (48%)	8 years & 3 months (15%)
<b>PvdA</b>	29 years & 9 months (53%)	7 years (12%)

The 24 Dutch Deputy-Prime Ministers have all had additional cabinet responsibilities. Seven have been Minister for the Interior; five have been Minister for Public Works; Four were Minister for Economic Affairs; four have been Minister for Finance and three

<sup>49</sup> Andeweg 1997, p. 66.

<sup>50</sup> Woldendorp, Keman & Budge, 1993, pp 87-89.

were Minister for Justice. The Labour and Social Affairs, Agriculture, Welfare, Health and Sport, and Foreign Affairs portfolios have each been held once by a Deputy-Prime Minister. The excess of portfolios over Deputy-Prime Ministers is accounted for by the fact that some held more than one ministerial portfolio at a particular point in time and some changed portfolio during their term as Deputy-Prime Minister.

These ministries are to a limited extent in line with global figures in that Finance, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture are common to both Dutch Deputy-Prime Ministers and Deputy-Prime Ministers globally. The Defence, Energy and Foreign Trade portfolios are popular at a global level, but have not been taken up by Dutch Deputy-Prime Ministers. While the Interior, Public Works, Economic Affairs and Justice portfolios are popular among Dutch deputy-leaders but not among global ones.

**Table 3-4 Dutch Deputy-Prime Ministers 1946-2002**

	<b>Title of Deputy-Leader</b>	<b>No. of Deputy-Leaders</b>	<b>Deputy-Leader<sup>51</sup></b>	<b>Term of Office</b>	<b>Duration of Term (to nearest month)</b>	<b>Elected or appointed</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Additional Cabinet Positions</b>	<b>Notes</b>
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1946-1948	2 years & 7 months	N/A	N/A	N/A	
1.	Vice Minister President	1	J. Schaik	1948-1951	2 years & 7 months	Appointed	KVP	Public Works (1948) & Interior (1948-1951).	
2.	Vice Minister President	1	F. Teulings	1951-1952	1 year & 6 months.	Appointed	KVP	Interior	
3.	Vice Minister President	1	L. Beel	1952-1956	4 years & 1 month.	Appointed	KVP	Interior	
4.	Vice Minister President	1	A. Struycken	1956-1959	3 years & 7 months.	Appointed	KVP	Interior (1956-58) & Justice (1958-59)	
5.	Vice	1	H. Korthals	1959-	4 years &	Appointed	VVD	Public	

<sup>51</sup> Woldendorp, Keman & Budge, 1993, pp 87-89 and 'Historische ontwikkeling Kabinetten.' Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

	Minister President			1963	2 months			Works	
6.	Vice Minister President	1 (1963-65) 2 (1965-67)	B. Biesheuvel	1963-1967	3 years & 9 months.	Appointed	ARP	Agriculture	
7.	Vice Minister President	2	A. Vondeling	1965-1966	1 year & 7 months	Appointed	PvdA	Finance	
8.	Vice Minister President	2	J. de Quay	1966-1967	5 months	Appointed	KVP	Public Works	
9.	Vice Minister President	2	H. Witteveen	1967-1971	4 years & 3 months	Appointed	VVD	Finance	
10.	Vice Minister President	2	J. Bakker	1967-1971	4 years & 3 months	Appointed	ARP	Public Works	
11.	Vice Minister President	2	R. Nelissen	1971-1973	2 years & 10 months	Appointed	KVP	Finance	
12.	Vice Minister President	2	W. Geertsema	1971-1973	2 years & 10 months	Appointed	VVD	Interior	
13.	Vice Minister President	1	A. van Agt	1973-1977	4 years & 4 months	Appointed	KVP	Justice	
14.	Vice Minister President	1	W. De Gaay Fortman	1977	3 months	Appointed	ARP	Justice	
15.	Vice Minister President	1	H. Wiegel	1977-1981	3 years & 9 months	Appointed	VVD	Interior	
16.	Vice Minister President	2	J. den Uyl	1981-1982	8 months	Appointed	PvdA	Labour & Social Affairs	
17.	Vice Minister President	2	J. Terlouw	1981-1982	14 months	Appointed	D66	Economic Affairs	
18.	Vice Minister President	1	G. van Aardenne	1982-1986	3 years & 8 months	Appointed	VVD	Economic Affairs	
19.	Vice Minister President	1	R de Korte	1986-1989	3 years & 4 months	Appointed	VVD	Economic Affairs	
20.	Vice Minister President	1	W. Kok	1989-1994 <sup>52</sup>	4 years & 9 months	Appointed	PvdA	Finance	
21.	Vice Minister President	2	H. Van Mierlo	1994-1998 <sup>53</sup>	4 years	Appointed	D66	Foreign Affairs	
22.	Vice Minister President	2	H. Dijkstal	1994-1998 <sup>54</sup>	4 years	Appointed	VVD	Interior	
23.	Vice Minister President	2	A. Jorritsma-Lebbink	1998 – 2002	3 years & 5 months.	Appointed	VVD	Economic Affairs	
24.	Vice Minister President	2	E. Borst-Eilers	1998 – 2002	3 years & 5 months.	Appointed	D66	Welfare, Health & Sport.	

<sup>52</sup> Available from: <http://asem.inter.net.th/asem-info/netherlands/leader.html> [accessed 24 March 2003]

<sup>53</sup> Available from: [http://www.minaz.nl/ministerraad/ministers\\_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html](http://www.minaz.nl/ministerraad/ministers_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html) [assessed 26 March 2003].

### 3.3.2 The formal role and powers of the Dutch Deputy-Prime Minister

As discussed earlier, the post of Dutch Deputy-Prime Minister has no constitutional basis. That is not however to say that there is nothing of relevance to the post in the Dutch constitution. Article 57 states that Ministers cannot be members of parliament. They must give up their seat in parliament unless they have offered to tender their resignation as Minister.<sup>55</sup> Article 69 gives Ministers the right to attend sittings of parliament and to participate in parliamentary 'deliberations' even though they are not members of it.<sup>56</sup> Article 68 states that 'Ministers and State Secretaries shall provide orally or in writing the Chambers either separately or in joint session, with any information requested by one or more members, provided that the provision of such information does not conflict with the interests of the State.'<sup>57</sup>

Beyond the constitution, the Deputy-Prime Minister attends the 'turret meeting', a weekly lunch attended by the Prime Minister, Deputy-Prime Minister(s) and the parliamentary party leaders of the parties in government to ensure that government business flows smoothly (Andeweg, 1997).

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<sup>54</sup> Available from: [http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers\\_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html](http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html) [assessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>55</sup> Government of the Netherlands, 2003. 'Netherlands Constitution.' Available from: [http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/nl00000\\_.html](http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/nl00000_.html) [assessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.



### 3.4 The Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister

#### 3.4.1 Introduction

The Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister meets the criteria for deputy-leaders outlined in Chapter One. He/she is a member of the Swedish Cabinet. They are the second-ranking member of the cabinet insofar as they carry out activities carried out by the Prime-Minister in their absence such as chairing cabinet meetings. The Swedish Constitution explicitly recognises this when it states in Chapter Seven, Article Eight that 'The Prime Minister may nominate one of the other Ministers to deputize for him in the event that he is unavoidably prevented from carrying out his duties himself.'<sup>58</sup>

The position was first filled after the election of September 1976 (Woldendrop, Keman & Budge, 1993) following the adoption of a new 'Instrument of Government' which had constitutional status on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1975. This document replaced one dating back to 1809 (Swedish Institute, 2002, p. 1).

This constitution specifically limits the number of Deputy-Prime Ministers to one at any one point in time. Chapter Seven, Article Eight states that: 'The Prime Minister may nominate one of the other Ministers to deputize for him in the event that he is unavoidably prevented from carrying out his duties himself.'<sup>59</sup> If the Prime-Minister resigns or dies, the Government is discharged.

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<sup>58</sup> Government of Sweden, 2001. 'The Constitution of Sweden.' Available at: [http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000\\_.html](http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000_.html) [accessed December 15 2002].

During the period from 1946 to 2002, Sweden has had only seven Deputy-Prime Ministers, however the position has only existed since 1976. The maximum length of a single term of office on the basis of the maximum time between General Elections set down in Chapter Three, Article Three of the Swedish Constitution is four years.<sup>60</sup> Prior to 1994, it was three years. The longest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was Ingvar Carlsson, who held the office for three years and four months. He was in his second term of office as Deputy-Prime Minister, when he was nominated as Prime Minister following the assassination of Olof Palme in February 1986. The shortest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was Mona Sahlin who held the office for one year. Her term was cut short as she resigned following a scandal involving inappropriate use of a Parliamentary credit card. The average length of time that an individual has held the office for is two years and five months. None of the holders died while in office. However, as mentioned earlier, Mona Sahlin resigned from the office in 1995.

In terms of how the office is attained, the holder is appointed by the Prime Minister. According to Chapter Six, Article Two of the Swedish constitution, the parliament (Riksdag) votes on a proposal of the Speaker regarding who should be Prime-Minister. Once a Prime Minister has not been rejected by a simple-majority vote, he/she is deemed elected and then informs the parliament of whom s/he appoints to the cabinet (Chapter Six, Article Four).<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Available at: <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000.html> [accessed December 15 2002].

<sup>60</sup> Available at: <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000.html> [accessed December 15 2002].

<sup>61</sup> Available at: <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000.html> [accessed December 15 2002].

All the Deputy-Prime Ministers during the period under investigation have come from the Social Democratic Party and the Liberals (People's Party). Three Deputy-Prime Ministers have been from the Liberals (43 per cent) and four from the Social Democrats (57 per cent). Since the office was first filled in September 1976, the Liberals have held it for eight years (32 per cent of the time), the Social Democrats have held it for 9 years and 3 months (37 per cent of the time) and the office has been vacant for eight years (31 per cent of the time). Since it was created the position has been vacant for almost as long as it has been held by either of the parties that held it. Vacancies have arisen on three occasions: during the minority Liberal government of 1978-1979; when Ingvar Carlsson was nominated as Prime Minister following the assassination of Olof Palme in February 1986, the position was not filled until the cabinet changes in 1990; and, when Mona Sahlin resigned in 1995, the position was not filled until after the 1998 General Election. The vacancies arose because the constitution only stipulates that the Prime Minister 'may' (Chapter Seven, Article Eight) nominate a Deputy-Prime Minister, thus the Prime Minister is under no obligation to do so.

Since 1976, when the length of time each party held the office of Deputy-Prime Minister is compared to how long they spent in government, Table 3.6 shows that the Social Democrats were in office for 16 years and two months (67 per cent of the time period) compared to nine years (37 per cent of the time period) for the Liberals. Thus, there was a Social Democratic Deputy-Prime Minister for 57 per cent of the time that the Social Democrats were in office while there was a Liberal Deputy-Prime Minister for 89 per cent of the time they were in office. This difference appears to be related to the fact that

the Social Democrats formed single-party governments, while the Liberals only gained the position of Deputy-Prime Minister when they entered multi-party governments. In other words, the position of Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister is more likely to be filled in multi-party governments. This is borne out by the fact that the only time the Liberals were in government during the period in question and did not hold the position of Deputy-Prime Minister was when they formed a minority single-party government in 1978 and 1979. Similarly, the Social Democrats were in single-party governments on the two occasions on which they did not hold the office of Deputy-Prime Minister.

**Table 3-5 Length of Time in Office of Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister 1976-2002**

	<b>Length of time party in government (% of time period position in existence)</b>	<b>Length of time party held position of Deputy-Prime Minister (% of time period position in existence)</b>
<b>Social Democrats</b>	16 years & 2 months (67%)	9 years & 3 months (38%)
<b>Liberals</b>	9 years (37%)	8 years (33%)

The seven Swedish Deputy-Prime Ministers have all had additional cabinet responsibilities. Three have held full ministries of significance – Foreign Affairs, Health and Social Affairs and Labour, while three have effectively been deputy-ministers with specific responsibilities for Justice, Equality, the Environment and Research (Ingvar Carlsson swapped portfolios during his term as Deputy-Prime Minister). Only Odd Erik Engström did not hold an additional ministry during his term as Deputy-Prime Minister.

Compared to the global trend in terms of the portfolios held by Deputy-Leaders, there are again similarities and differences. The Foreign Affairs and Justice ministries are both popular portfolios for Deputy-Leaders in Sweden and globally. However, Equality, the Environment and Research are portfolios that do not feature amongst Deputy-Leaders at a global level, yet do in Sweden.

**Table 3-6 Swedish Deputy-Prime Ministers 1946-2002**

	Title of Deputy-Leader	No. of Deputy-Leaders	Deputy-Leader <sup>62</sup>	Term of Office	Duration of Term (to nearest month)	Elected or appointed	Party	Additional Cabinet Positions <sup>63</sup>	Notes
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1946-1976	30 years & 8 months	N/A	N/A	N/A	
1.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Per Ahlmark	1976-1978	2 years	Appointed	Liberals	Labour	
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1978-1979	1 year	N/A	N/A	N/A	
2.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Ola Ullsten	1979-1982	3 years	Appointed	Liberals	Foreign Affairs	
3.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Ingvar Carlsson	1982-1986	3 years & 4 months	Appointed	Social Democrats	Minister without Portfolio – Research (82-85) Environment (85-86)	Assumed the position of Prime-Minister after death of Olof Palme. In Feb 1986
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1986-1990		N/A	N/A	N/A	Feb. 86 – Feb. 90
4.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Odd Erik Engström	1990-1991	1 year & 8 months	Appointed	Social Democrats	Minister without Portfolio	
5.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Bengt Carl Westerberg	1991-1994	3 years	Appointed	Liberals	Health & Social Affairs	
6.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Mona Ingeborg Sahlin	1994-1995	1 year	Appointed	Social Democrats	Minister without Portfolio – Equality	Resigned
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1995-1998	3 years	N/A	N/A	N/A	
7.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Lena Hjelm-Wallén	1998-2002	3 years & 3 months	Appointed	Social Democrats	Minister without Portfolio – Justice	

<sup>62</sup> Woldendorp, Keman & Budge, 1993, pp 98-100.

### 3.4.2 The formal role and powers of the Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister

The Swedish Constitution adopted on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1975 was where the role of Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister was first outlined. Chapter Seven, Article Eight states that ‘The Prime Minister may nominate one of the other Ministers to deputize for him in the event that he is unavoidably prevented from carrying out his duties himself.’<sup>64</sup> While the phrase ‘unavoidably prevented’ is somewhat ambiguous, Chapter Six, Article Seven states that if the Prime Minister resigns or dies, the government is discharged.<sup>65</sup> The Speaker of Parliament will then consult with the parties to propose a new Prime-Minister, or in the event of failure to select a new Prime-Minister after four attempts new elections will result. Thus the effect of Chapter Seven, Article Eight is that the Deputy-Prime Minister steps in for the Prime-Minister in his temporary absence. However, it is not entirely clear what happens if the Prime Minister becomes permanently incapacitated. It would appear that Chapter Seven, Article Eight relating to the Prime Minister being unavoidably prevented from carrying out their duties applies and so the Deputy-Prime Minister deputises. In practice the Deputy-Prime Minister chairs cabinet meetings in the absence of the Prime Minister.<sup>66</sup> However the Prime Minister is free to nominate a minister other than the Deputy-Prime Minister to deputise for him. In 2002, the Prime Minister Goran Persson, appointed three substitutes to chair cabinet meetings for a set period each while he was on his summer holidays.<sup>67</sup> While the Deputy-Prime Minister was one of the substitutes, the other two were not Deputy-Prime Ministers. Further mention of the

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<sup>63</sup> Available from: <http://www.asiawide.or.jp/iac/biography/carlsson.htm> [accessed 15 December 2002] and [http://www.alexnet.nu/eng/government/statsrad\\_a-o.shtml](http://www.alexnet.nu/eng/government/statsrad_a-o.shtml) [accessed 15 December 2002].

<sup>64</sup> Government of Sweden, 2001. ‘The Constitution of Sweden.’ Available at: <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000.html> [accessed December 15 2002].

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Larsson, 1997. P. 241.

<sup>67</sup> The Financial Times, July 18, 2002, p. 11.

deputizing role of the Deputy-Prime Minister is given in the 2001 Swedish Government Yearbook. It states that 'the Deputy Prime Minister relieves the Prime Minister of certain tasks and is responsible for constitutional issues relating to the Instrument of Government' (Swedish Government, 2001, p. 19), no further details of what these tasks or constitutional issues are given. So even the deputizing role of the Swedish Deputy-Prime Minister is in practice not reserved solely for the Deputy-Prime Minister.

The only other direct mention of the Deputy-Prime Minister in the constitution states that in the event of the Deputy-Prime Minister being unable to take up the reins as Prime Minister, then 'these duties shall be assumed by that Minister among those in office who has been a member of the Government longest' (Chapter Seven, Article Eight). As discussed already, this Article also makes clear that the Prime-Minister is under no obligation to select a Deputy-Prime Minister as it only states he 'may' nominate a Deputy-Prime Minister and goes on to deal with the situation where 'a deputy has not been nominated by the Prime Minister'.<sup>68</sup>

There are a number of other clauses of the Constitution that are applicable to the Deputy-Prime Minister. That the Deputy-Prime Minister must be a minister before they are nominated at Deputy-Prime Minister means that the criteria of Chapter Six, Article Nine relating to the eligibility requirements to be a minister apply: '(1) Only a person who has been a Swedish citizen for not less than ten years may be a Minister. (2) A Minister may not undertake any public or private employment, nor may he undertake any commission

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<sup>68</sup> Government of Sweden, 2001. 'The Constitution of Sweden.' Available at: [http://www.ocfre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000 .html](http://www.ocfre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000.html) [accessed December 15 2002].

or perform any function which is liable to impair public confidence in him.’<sup>69</sup> There is no requirement that ministers be drawn from the Riksdag (parliament) and indeed a number of ministers have been appointed who were not members of parliament. However, when a member of parliament becomes a Minister, ‘a substitute takes over the duties of an MP when he or she is appointed a government minister and continues to occupy that position for as long as the regular member remains in the Government. In other words, Government Ministers have to abstain from the right to vote in the Riksdag.’ (Swedish Institute, 2002, p. 2). They can, however, participate in parliamentary debates. Chapter Four Article Nine of the Swedish Constitution states that, ‘While a member of the Parliament is acting as Speaker of the Parliament or is a member of the Government, his mandate as a member of the Parliament shall be exercised by an alternate member.’<sup>70</sup> Chapter Six, Article Six gives the Prime Minister the power to discharge any Minister (including the Deputy-Prime Minister).<sup>71</sup>

While the Deputy-Prime Minister is a minister and member of cabinet, they work within the office of the Prime Minister. The Swedish Government Yearbook 2001 describes Lena Hjelm-Wallén’s ministerial position as ‘Minister, Prime Minister’s Office and Deputy Prime Minister since 1998’ (Swedish Government, 2001, p. 64).

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<sup>69</sup> Government of Sweden, 2001. ‘The Constitution of Sweden.’ Available at: [http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000\\_.html](http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000_.html) [accessed December 15 2002].

<sup>70</sup> Ibid

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.



## **3.5 The Deputy-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom**

### **3.5.1 Introduction**

In the case of the United Kingdom, the Deputy-Prime Minister is the most likely candidate to meet the criteria outlined in Chapter One to define deputy-leaders. The Deputy-Prime Minister is a member of cabinet. Thus, they meet the first criterion. However, there is ambiguity as to whether or not they are the second-ranking member of cabinet. The lack of a codified constitution in the United Kingdom makes issues of definition more difficult. For example, according to the House of Parliament website, 'The position of Prime Minister does not constitutionally exist – the Prime Minister's actual title is First Lord of the Treasury'<sup>72</sup> and it was only with the Ministers of the Crown Act 1937 that the position of Prime Minister gained official recognition. There is a position of 'Second Lord of the Treasury'. However, this is not the Deputy-Prime Minister, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Does this make him/her the second ranking minister and thus Deputy-Prime Minister? Definitely not, because while a denominated position of Deputy-Prime Minister has existed only sporadically and that of Chancellor of the Exchequer has existed on a continuous basis during the period in question, when the positions existed contemporaneously they were held by different people. Thus there is a distinction between the post of Deputy-Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer. Secondly given the British tendency to give Ministers their full title (including those titles that are not in common usage), one would expect that if the Chancellor of the Exchequer was Deputy-Prime Minister that they would be given that title in the 'List of Ministerial Responsibilities'. They are not and we can, thus,

conclude with some certainty that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not the de jure Deputy-Prime Minister. However, the possibility remains that the Chancellor of the Exchequer may be de facto Deputy-Prime Minister. When both positions exist and are held separately, this cannot be the case. What of the case where there is no explicitly titled Deputy-Prime Minister? In practice, it is difficult to tell without a concrete example of when the second-ranking member of cabinet was required to act as such. However, the third criterion used to define deputy-leaders requires that the second-ranking member within the cabinet be explicitly recognised as such. This precludes the Chancellor of the Exchequer from being considered as Deputy-Prime Minister for the purpose of this study. The only situations where the ranking of second member of cabinet is explicitly recognised either constitutionally, by title or on the basis of a protocol list which specifies the ranking of cabinet members all relate to the Deputy-Prime Minister. Thus we can conclude that the Deputy-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is consistent with the post of deputy-leader as defined for the purposes of this study.

The position was first created during the cross-party cabinet that held office during World War II for the leader of the Labour Party – Clement Atlee. In practice there has not been more than one Deputy-Prime Minister at any one point in time. During the period from 1946 to 2002, there have been only seven Deputy-Prime Ministers. The longest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was William Whitelaw, who held the office for eight years and eight months. The shortest serving Deputy-Prime Minister was ‘Rab’ Butler who held the office for one year and three months. The average length of time that an individual has held the office for is three years and nine months. None of the holders died while in

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<sup>72</sup> Available from: <http://www.explore.parliament.uk/search/data.asp?r=216> [accessed 12 December 2002].

office. However, Geoffrey Howe resigned from the office in 1990 over the then Prime-Minister's attitude to Europe. In terms of how the office is attained, the holder is appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by a vote of the House of Commons.

All the Deputy-Prime Ministers during the period under investigation have come from the Conservative and Labour parties. This reflects the fact that they are the only two parties that have been in power during this time and that they formed single-party governments. The Conservatives have held the office on five occasions and Labour on two. In terms of the length of time each party has held the office, the Conservatives have held it for 16 years and seven months (30 per cent of the time), while the Labour party held the office for nine years and eight months (17 per cent of the time). For the remaining 29 years and nine months (53 per cent of the time), the office has been vacant. In other words the office has been vacant more often than it has been filled during the period in question.

When the length of time each party held the office of Deputy-Prime Minister is compared to how long they spent in office, Table 3.4 shows that the Conservatives were in office for over 34 years (62 per cent of the time period) compared to 21 (38 per cent of the time period) for Labour. Thus the Conservatives appointed someone to the position for 48 per cent of their time in office while Labour appointed someone to the position for 45 per cent of their time in office. For the remainder of their time in office, the position was vacant. So, both parties left the position vacant for the majority of their time in office over the period in question. Furthermore, the position was almost equally likely to be

taken up by both the Conservatives and Labour when in office. In other words the position of Deputy-Prime Minister is not favoured by one particular party.

**Table 3-7 Length of Time in Office of UK Deputy-Prime Minister 1946-2002**

	<b>Length of time party in government (% of time period)</b>	<b>Length of time party held position of Deputy-Prime Minister (% of time period)</b>
<b>Conservatives</b>	34 years & 10 months (62%)	16 years & 7 months (30%)
<b>Labour</b>	21 years & 2 months (38%)	9 years & 8 months (17%)

All the Deputy-Prime Ministers have had additional cabinet responsibilities, although the level of that responsibility has varied significantly. Two were Leaders of the House of Commons; two were First Secretary of State; one was Leader of the House of Lords; one was Foreign Secretary; one was Home Secretary; one was Minister in charge of the Central African Office; one was Minister in charge of the Cabinet Office and one had responsibility for the Ministries of Environment, Transport and the Regions. Again, an excess number of ministerial portfolios over Deputy-Prime Ministers is accounted for by the fact that some Deputy-Prime Ministers held more than one portfolio and some also changed portfolio during their term as Deputy-Prime Minister.

In comparison with the global database, there are a number of portfolios which do not figure among those of UK Deputy-Prime Ministers. Specifically, the Finance, Defence, Agriculture, Energy and Foreign Trade ministries were not held by any UK Deputy-

Prime Minister during the period in question. This can in many respects be accounted for by the fact that the office was vacant for so much of the time. From a global perspective, while some deputy-leaders have an ex-officio parliamentary role (such as holding the casting vote in the event of a tie), the UK appears unique in that three deputy-leaders over the period in question were given the additional responsibility of leadership of the first or second House of Parliament.

**Table 3-8 UK Deputy-Prime Ministers 1946-2002**

	<b>Title of Deputy-Leader</b>	<b>No. of Deputy-Leaders</b>	<b>Deputy-Leader</b>	<b>Term of Office<sup>73</sup></b>	<b>Duration of Term (to nearest month)</b>	<b>Elected or appointed</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Additional Cabinet Positions<sup>74</sup></b>	<b>Notes<sup>75</sup></b>
1.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Herbert Morrison	1946-1951	5 years & 1 month.	Appointed	Labour	Leader House of Commons.	Assumed position on 26 July 1945.
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1951-1951	8 months	N/A	N/A	N/A	
2.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Anthony Eden	1951-1955	3 years & 6 months.	Appointed	Conservative	Foreign Secretary.	
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1955-1962	7 years & 3 months	N/A	N/A	N/A	
3.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Richard (Rab) Butler	1962-1963	1 year & 3 months.	Appointed	Conservative	First Secretary of State/Central African Office.	
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1963-1979	15 years & 7 months.	N/A	N/A	N/A	
4.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	William Whitelaw	1979-1988	8 years & 8 months.	Appointed	Conservative	Home Secretary/Leader House of Lords.	Created a Viscount 11 June 1983
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1988-1989	1 year & 6 months.	N/A	N/A	N/A	
5.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Geoffrey Howe	1989-1990	1 year & 4 months.	Appointed	Conservative	Leader House of Commons.	Resigned 1 Nov 1990.
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1990-1995	4 years & 8 months.	N/A	N/A	N/A	
6.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	Michael Heseltine	1995-1997	1 year & 10 months.	Appointed	Conservative	Cabinet Office (office of Public Service)	
7.	Deputy-Prime Minister	1	John Prescott	1997-2002	4 years & 7 Months	Appointed	Labour	Environment, Transport & The Regions/First Secretary of State.	

<sup>73</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994.

<sup>74</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994; Heseltine, 2000 and Rawnsley, 2001.

<sup>75</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994.

### **3.5.2 The formal role and powers of the Deputy-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom**

Unlike the states that have been examined already, there is no formal written constitution in the United Kingdom and so details of the role of the Deputy-Prime Minister must be sought elsewhere. However, there is no one central repository of guidelines that forms an alternative to a constitution. This creates a number of difficulties. As Mackintosh (1981) states regarding the UK's alternative to a constitution:

‘a great number of these rules are written and embodied in Acts of Parliament ... Other aspects of the system which are not laws but are established practices (such as the convention that the Queen asks the leader of the majority party after an election to form a government) are written down in many books on British politics ... Again, there is another category of practices, examples being the way the Cabinet is organised ... which are neither law nor established conventions but are simply convenient methods of procedure ... The difficulty in producing an accurate and comprehensive account of these laws, conventions and practices is partly that they are scattered over the history of the country ... In part, the difficulty is that situations which call for the application of certain conventions may be few and far between.’ (Mackintosh, 1982, p11).

Looking at the ‘List of Ministerial Responsibilities’ issued by the Cabinet Office,<sup>76</sup> as recently as 1997 the Deputy-Prime Minister was listed, but only his/her ministerial responsibilities are detailed. It is only since the 2001 edition that the Deputy-Prime

Ministers responsibilities have been given. There is, however, still some ambiguity regarding the Deputy-Prime Minister as the document states that in his capacity 'As First Secretary of State [he] deputises for the Prime Minister as required.' (Cabinet Office, 2001, p. 8). This implies that the position of First Secretary of State and Deputy-Prime Minister are either one and the same or equivalent in some way. However, only two Deputy-Prime Ministers have been First Secretary of State and Deputy-Prime Minister at the same time ('Rab' Butler and John Prescott). There have also been a number of holders of one office who did not simultaneously hold the other office (for example William Whitelaw and Geoffrey Howe were both Deputy-Prime Minister but neither was First Secretary of State).

In May 2002, the Prime Minister separated the office of Deputy-Prime Minister from the Cabinet Office (which focuses on supporting the cabinet and public service reform) and made it a department in its own right.<sup>77</sup> The role of the Deputy-Prime Minister as outlined included the following responsibilities: deputising for the Prime Minister 'across the range of his responsibilities at home and abroad'; dealing with issues as requested by the Prime-Minister; representing the Prime-Minister at home and abroad; acting as the Prime-Minister's emissary on certain areas of policy; chairing certain cabinet committees as well as responsibility for specific cross-departmental policy areas such as social exclusion and regional policy.<sup>78</sup> This clarified matters to a great extent in terms of the role and responsibilities of the Deputy-Prime Minister.

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<sup>76</sup> Cabinet Office, 1997.

<sup>77</sup> [www.odpm.gov.uk/news/0205/0001.htm](http://www.odpm.gov.uk/news/0205/0001.htm) [accessed 29 November 2002].

## 3.6 The United States' Vice-President

### 3.6.1 Introduction

In the United States, the Vice-President would be considered to be the deputy-leader on the basis that the office meets the definition given in Chapter One. In terms of the first criterion – that they must be a member of cabinet – there has been some debate as to whether or not the Vice-President is a member of cabinet. The Vice-President is the President of the Senate. Thus it is reasonable to assume that they are part of the legislative branch of Government. However, they are also mentioned in Article Two of the US Constitution which deals with the executive branch of government. According to Cronin and Genovese (1998), Vice-President Mondale viewed the position as a 'hybrid, half-legislative and half executive. He adopted the view that the vice president is the only office of national government that breaches the separation of powers' (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 331). In fact, Article Two states that 'The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.'<sup>79</sup> In short, the executive comprises the President only. The Vice-President only becomes a member of the executive if they assume the Presidency, in which case they cannot continue as President of the Senate, thereby resolving any apparent overlap of executive and legislative powers. This interpretation places the Vice-President firmly in the legislative branch of government. Indeed Cronin and Genovese (1998) observe that 'Until about 1940 most presidents and most Americans viewed the Vice-Presidency almost exclusively as a legislative job' (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 319). Given the separation of executive, legal and

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<sup>78</sup> Available from: [www.odpm.gov.uk/news/0205/0001.htm](http://www.odpm.gov.uk/news/0205/0001.htm) [accessed 29 November 2002].

<sup>79</sup> Available from: <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html> [accessed 10 October 2001].



judicial powers, an issue arises as to whether or not the Vice-President can be considered a member of cabinet? Prior to President Harding inviting Vice-President Coolidge to regularly attend cabinet meetings in 1921, the only occasions when Vice-Presidents attended cabinet meetings were when they were asked by the President to do so in his absence.<sup>80</sup> This only occurred on a handful of occasions. Vice-President Jefferson actually refused to attend cabinet meetings: 'I consider my office as constitutionally confined to legislative functions, and that I could not take any part whatever in executive consultations, even were it proposed' (Paullin, 1924, p. 497). Cronin and Genovese (1998) point out that it was only 'since 1943 [that] Vice-Presidents have, however, been invited to cabinet meetings and related policy councils with some regularity' (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 323). Since then, Vice-President Nixon presided over cabinet meetings during Eisenhower's illnesses and the concept of the Vice-President as a member of cabinet is now generally accepted.<sup>81</sup> Today, the White House website lists Vice-President Cheney as a 'cabinet-rank member' of cabinet.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, if the executive comprises only the office of the President, then there is no contradiction between the Vice-President being a member of the legislature and a member of cabinet. Thus, even though there is some ambiguity, it is reasonable to conclude that the Vice-President meets the first criterion for a deputy-leader.

As for the second criterion – that they are the second-ranking member of cabinet in that they deputise for the head of cabinet – the US Vice-President also meets this criterion. Their constitutional role includes replacing the President on a temporary and permanent

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<sup>80</sup> See Paullin, 1924, pp496-500 for a discussion of this subject.

<sup>81</sup> Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p 323.

basis as the powers of the President 'devolve on the Vice President'<sup>83</sup> in the event of the President's removal, death or resignation. Thus the US Vice-President can be considered the second ranking member of the cabinet and their title recognises their deputising role, thus meeting the third criterion.

Unlike some of the other states that will be examined in this study, the US Constitution specifically limits the number of office holders to one at any given time, Article Two, Section One speaks of 'the' Vice-President.<sup>84</sup> In other words there cannot be more than one US Vice-President at any one time. In the time period 1946 to 2002, there have been 12 US Vice-Presidents (see Table 3.1).

The term of office for a Vice-President is four years, beginning on the 20<sup>th</sup> January of the year following their election and ending on the 20<sup>th</sup> January four years afterwards. It is worthy of note that, while no term-limit applies to the Vice-Presidency, none of those who held the office during the period in question has served longer than two terms. Indeed, of the 12 Vice-Presidents in question, only three have served two full terms and five have served one full term. In other words, only two thirds of Vice-Presidents have seen out a full term during the period in question. The average length of time that an individual Vice-President held the office over the period in question has been three years and eight months. Of the four Vice-Presidents who have not served out a full term, two assumed the Presidency (Johnson and Ford) and one was appointed a quarter way

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<sup>82</sup> Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/cabinet.html> [accessed 21 October 2002].

<sup>83</sup> Available from: <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html> [accessed 10 October 2001].

<sup>84</sup> Available from: <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html> [accessed 10 October 2001].

through the full term (Rockefeller) and the current holder (Cheney) is seeing out his first term of office. There is also the case of Spiro Agnew who served one term of office, but resigned after only nine months of his second term to face charges on non-declaration of income to the revenue authorities. On a more optimistic note, none have died in office.

As for how Vice-Presidents attain the office, each candidate for the office of US Vice-President runs on a ticket with a Presidential candidate and so is elected with the President. However, if the office falls vacant within the term of the office holder, it is filled on the basis of a Presidential nomination which must be approved by a simple majority of both Houses of Congress (Section Two of the 25<sup>th</sup> Amendment<sup>85</sup>). Over the course of the time period under study, 10 of the Vice-Presidents were elected to the office with the President, while two came to the office as a result of a Presidential nomination and approval by the Houses of Congress.

In terms of their party allegiances, all the Vice-Presidents during the period in question have either been Democrats or Republicans. This should come as no surprise given the two-party nature of American politics. Five have been Democrats (42 per cent) and seven Republicans (58 per cent). However, out of the 56 years being examined, Democrats were only in the office for 22 years and 10 months (41 per cent of the time), while Republicans were in office for 28 years and 6 months (51 per cent of the time). During the remaining four years and eight months (eight per cent of the time) there was no Vice-President. This situation arose on four separate occasions during the period in question:

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<sup>85</sup> Available from: <http://caselaw.lp.fndlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html> [accessed 10 October 2001].

when Truman assumed the Presidency on the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 until January 1949; when Johnson assumed the Presidency on the death of President Kennedy in November 1963 until January 1965; when Spiro Agnew resigned in October 1973; and when Ford assumed the Presidency on the resignation of President Nixon in August 1974 until January 1977. As there was no automatic replacement for the Vice-President, there was a time-lag between the Vice-President leaving the position and a replacement being nominated and confirmed. In total, since the position of Vice-President was created, it has been vacant for a total of approximately 37 years.<sup>86</sup>

In contrast to deputy-leaders in many other states, none of the US Vice-Presidents have held additional cabinet positions. However, as we shall see in Chapter Five, they have chaired a number of ad hoc committees set up to address pressing issues of the day.

**Table 3-9US Vice-Presidents 1946-2002**

	Title of Deputy-Leader	No. of Deputy-Leaders	Deputy-Leader	Term of Office <sup>87</sup>	Duration of Term (to nearest month)	Elected or appointed	Party	Additional Cabinet Positions	Notes <sup>88</sup>
	Vacancy	0	Vacancy	1946-1949	3 years	N/A	N/A	N/A	Vice-President Truman assumed Presidency on death of Roosevelt on 12 April 1945.
1.	Vice-President	1	Alben W Barkley	1949-1953	4 years	Elected with President.	Democrat	None.	
2.	Vice-President	1	Richard M. Nixon	1953-1961	8 years	Elected with President.	Republican	None.	
3.	Vice-President	1	Lyndon Johnson	1961-1963	2 years & 10 months	Elected with President.	Democrat	None.	Assumed Presidency on death of Kennedy 22 Nov

<sup>86</sup> <http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vp/vpusa.html> [accessed 29 October 2002].

<sup>87</sup> Source: [www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/usa.htm](http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/usa.htm) [accessed 14 October 2002].

<sup>88</sup> Source: <http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vp/vprock.html> [accessed 29 October 2002].

	Vacany	0	Vacancy	N/A	1 year & 2 months	N/A	N/A	N/A	1963
4.	Vice-President	1	Hubert H. Humphrey	1965-1969	4 years	Elected with President.	Democrat	None.	
5.	Vice-President	1	Spiro T. Agnew	1969-1973	4 years & 9 months	Elected with President.	Republican	None.	Resigned 10 Oct 1973
	Vacany	0	Vacancy	N/A	2 months	N/A	N/A	N/A	
6.	Vice-President	1	Gerald Ford	1973-1974	8 months	Nominated by President & appointed by Congress	Republican	None.	Assumed Vice-Presidency on 6 Dec 1973. Assumed Presidency on resignation of Nixon on 9 Aug 1974.
	Vacany	0	Vacancy	N/A	4 months	N/A	N/A	N/A	
7.	Vice-President	1	Nelson Rockefeller	1974-1977	2 years & 1 month	Nominated by President & appointed by Congress	Republican	None.	Nominated in Aug 74. Assumed Vice-Presidency on 19 Dec 1974.
8.	Vice-President	1	Walter F. Mondale	1977-1981	4 years	Elected with President.	Democrat	None.	
9.	Vice-President	1	George H. Bush	1981-1989	8 years	Elected with President.	Republican	None.	
10.	Vice-President	1	J. Danforth Quayle	1989-1993	4 years	Elected with President.	Republican	None.	
11.	Vice-President	1	Albert A. Gore	1993-2001	8 years	Elected with President.	Democrat	None.	
12.	Vice-President	1	Richard B. Cheney	2001-2002	1 year	Elected with President.	Republican	None.	

### 3.6.2 The formal role and powers of the United States' Vice-President

The point of first call in terms of understanding the role and powers of the US Vice-President is the US Constitution. Article One states that the Vice-President shall be the president of the Senate with the casting vote. Article Two gives their term of office as four years and outlines how they are elected. Originally, this section stated that the Vice-President chaired a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives, where the results of ballots in each state among 'electors' will be counted and the candidate with the

highest total and a majority of the votes shall be deemed elected President. If none had a majority, the matter was to be decided by the members of the House of Representatives with each state having one vote. The candidate with the second highest number of votes was elected Vice-President. This Article also outlined how the Vice-President could assume the Presidency:

‘In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.’<sup>89</sup>

Section Four of this article goes on to state that the Vice-President may be removed from office ‘on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.’<sup>90</sup> So, all the constitution had to say was how they were elected and removed from office, the length of their term in office, that they were President of the Senate with casting vote and that they replaced the President on a temporary or permanent basis under certain circumstances.

Over time, a number of amendments were made to the constitution which affected the Vice-President. The 12<sup>th</sup> Amendment of 1804 introduced a separate ballot of the electors

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<sup>89</sup> Available from: <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html> [accessed 10 October 2001].

for Vice-President. If a President could not be elected after a tie and vote of the House of Representatives by March 4<sup>th</sup> of that year, then the Vice-President acted as President. If no one had a majority of the electors votes cast in the election for Vice-President, then the Senate would elect the Vice-President from among the two candidates with the highest votes. This Amendment also stated that anyone ineligible to be President could not seek the Vice-Presidency. The 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment specified that a citizen who committed insurrection or rebellion or who gave comfort to the enemies of the state could neither be an elector nor hold any civil office of the United States. The 20<sup>th</sup> Amendment of 1933 stated that the terms of office of both the President and Vice-President end at noon on the 20<sup>th</sup> of January in the year in which their term ends. More importantly, this Amendment also stated that if the President-elect died before taking up office, then the Vice-President-elect would become President for their term. It also stated that if a President had not been chosen by the date set for the start of their term or if they failed to 'qualify' for the office, then the Vice-President elect would act as President until the matter was resolved. If neither the President-elect nor Vice-President-elect qualified for office, then Congress was to resolve the situation via legislation. The 23<sup>rd</sup> Amendment of 1961 gave the District of Columbia electors for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections on the same basis as if it were a state. The last Amendment of relevance to the Vice-Presidency was the 25<sup>th</sup> which was passed in 1967 and dealt with Presidential succession. It addressed the issue of replacing the Vice-President when the existing Vice-President assumed the Presidency. The new President would nominate a replacement Vice-President who would take office when ratified by both Houses of Congress. It also

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<sup>90</sup> Available from: <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html> [accessed 10 October 2001].

clarified what happened if the President was temporarily unable to discharge his duties as President:

‘Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting-President.

Section 4. Whenever the Vice-President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting-President.’<sup>91</sup>

All of these Amendments deal with the matters of election and succession. The Constitution and Amendments to it give little insight into the day-to-day role of the Vice-President. Over and above the role outlined in the US Constitution, the Vice-Presidency has over time taken on a number of additional non-constitutional responsibilities. In terms of national policy committee membership, the first significant move to grant the Vice-President statutory membership of such a committee was the 1949 amendment to the National Security Act which gave the Vice-President a statutory membership of the



National Security Council. Since then, as we shall see in Chapter Five, individual Vice-Presidents have also been given the task of chairing short-term national policy committees that addressed pressing issues of the day.<sup>92</sup> For example, Vice-President Cheney chaired the National Energy Policy Development Group.<sup>93</sup>

The Vice-President has also taken on a diplomatic role as a touring representative of the American government. This started with President Roosevelt who sent his Vice-Presidents to foreign events as his representative.<sup>94</sup> This practice has continued to the present day with George Bush traveling over a million miles during his two terms as Vice-President.<sup>95</sup>

In conclusion, the role of the US Vice-President involves: acting as President of the US Senate with casting vote; taking over as President if the President is permanently or temporarily unable to discharge their duties; membership of cabinet; representing the President abroad and sitting on a number of policy committees. While the constitutional role of the Vice-President is limited, the position has over time been allocated additional responsibilities purely on the basis that they have become the traditional activities of a Vice-President.

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<sup>91</sup> Available from: <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/articles.html> [accessed 10 October 2001].

<sup>92</sup> David, 1967.

<sup>93</sup> Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/> [accessed 8 November 2002].

<sup>94</sup> Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 323.

<sup>95</sup> Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 323.

### 3.7 Conclusion

Having conducted a brief analysis of deputy-leaders in the five states under examination, the diversity of the role and powers of deputy-leaders becomes clear. Over a 56-year time period, the Netherlands has had 24 deputy-leaders, Ireland has had 18 (but only 14 different people), the United States has had 12 and the United Kingdom has had only seven. Sweden has also had seven even though the post was only created in 1976. The US, Ireland and Sweden can only have one deputy-leader at a time, while no such limitation applies in the case of the Netherlands. The situation is unclear in the United Kingdom where there is no constitution. However, in practice there has never been more than one Deputy-Prime Minister at a time in the UK. The US deputy-leader is not given additional cabinet responsibilities, while deputy-leaders in the other four states have tended to have additional cabinet positions. The Swedish and Dutch deputy-leaders have a similar average length of time in office at two years and five months and two years and three months respectively. The US, UK and Irish deputy-leaders average term of office are all similar at three years and eight months, three years and nine months and three years and one month respectively.

In terms of the basis for the powers of deputy-leaders, the US, Swedish and Irish deputy-leaders have a constitutional basis while the Dutch and British ones do not. The states take different approaches to the relationship between the deputy-leader and the parliament. In the case of Ireland, the deputy-leader must be a member of parliament, while in Sweden and the Netherlands, deputy-leaders must give up their seat in parliament upon becoming members of the cabinet. They do however retain the right to

speak to parliament. In contrast, in the US the Vice-President gains a place in the legislature in that they are President of the Senate and have the casting vote in the event of a tie. Again, the UK situation is unclear due to the lack of a written constitution, however in practice all the Deputy-Prime Ministers have sat in parliament.

While the deputy-leaders in the five states all have deputizing roles, there are different approaches to the issue of deputising for the leader. In the US, the Vice-President would see out the term of the President in the event that they were unable to, whereas in Sweden the Government would fall if the Prime Minister was unable to complete their term. In Ireland the Tánaiste replaces the Taoiseach until a new one is appointed. In the UK and the Netherlands the deputy-leader only replaces the leader in their temporary absence. In some respects it would be more accurate to describe these positions as deputizing-leaders rather than deputy-leaders, insofar as a deputy-leader is second in command.

In conclusion, this examination has highlighted the fact that even in a cross-section of Western democracies, there are divergences in the role and powers of deputy-leaders. Whether or not the deputy-leaders can influence policy outcomes given these divergences will be the subject of the following four chapters.

## **4 HYPOTHESES AND QUANTITATIVE OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS RELATING TO DEPUTY-LEADERS ATTAINING OFFICE**

### **4.1 Introduction**

In the previous chapter 64 deputy-leaders were identified in the five states under consideration in the period 1946-2002. In Chapter Two seven hypotheses and nine observable implications were identified. Given that all nine observable implications can be applied to all 64 deputy-leaders, this means that in theory there are 576 tests of the observable implications. It is not feasible to conduct such a large number of tests within the confines of this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, there are simply too many tests to be conducted to allow for a detailed examination of all 576 of them given the space constraints of this research. This difficulty is exacerbated by the nature of the data required for many of the tests, for example a detailed analysis of the speeches of deputy-leaders across five states and 56 years would constitute a significant research project in itself. Secondly, all the data on deputy-leaders necessary to test the observable implications is unlikely to be available. For example exact copies of all the speeches delivered (including extemporaneous additions) or policy documents from the late 1940s from various deputy-leaders may not be available, even in archives. Bearing these practical limitations in mind, sufficient information should still be available for it to be possible to provide a reasonable test of the observable implications. Where data cannot be

found this will be clearly stated. However, this study will not be exhaustive in that there are practical limits to the extent to which the 576 observable implications can be tested.

A second issue that arises in relation to the testing of the hypotheses is the uneven distribution of deputy-leaders across the five states under examination. While a common time-period is used, out of the 64 deputy-leaders in the study, 24 are Dutch (37 per cent of the total), 14 are Irish (22 per cent of the total), 12 are American (19 per cent of the total), seven are Swedish and seven are British (11 per cent each). Given that an even distribution of deputy-leaders over time and across the five states would have resulted in just under 13 deputy-leaders per state, it can be seen that Dutch deputy-leaders are over-represented in the study, while Swedish and British deputy-leaders are under-represented. To offset any imbalance that may occur as a result of this uneven distribution of deputy-leaders across the five states, the average of the averages will be calculated in each instance.

The first two hypotheses relate to the attaining of the office of deputy-leader. They focus on the motivation of those who seek the office. To be more specific, they seek to determine if those who seek the office of deputy-leader want to influence policy. Each hypothesis has one observable implication. The background of the deputy-leaders in each of the five states will be examined so as to see if they demonstrated a desire to influence policy before they attained the office of deputy-leader.

## **4.2 Hypothesis one**

### **4.2.1 Introduction**

The first hypothesis states that:

**If deputy-leaders matter, then individuals appointed to the position will have held a significant policy-related post beforehand.**

The observable implication that allows this hypothesis to be tested indicates that deputy-leaders will previously have: held a prominent elected office; been a member of a policy-influencing legislative committee; been a primary opposition spokesperson or held cabinet office. This observable implication will be tested comparatively. The background of deputy-leaders prior to their becoming deputy-leader will be examined to clarify if they held any of these significant policy-related posts beforehand. Each element of the observable implication will be tested in turn starting with any prominent elected office the deputy-leaders may have held and moving on to the more senior positions they may have held.

### **4.2.2 Deputy-leaders and previously held prominent elected office**

In this section the careers of the 64 deputy-leaders under examination will be studied so as to identify if they held any prominent elected office prior to becoming deputy-leader. In this instance 'prominent elected office' will be taken as membership of a national parliament, Mayor of a large city or Governor of a US state.

It should also be noted that in many respects like is not being compared with like. For example a member of the US Senate would have far more influence than a member of the Irish Senate or a member of the House of Lords or the Dutch Senate. However the key point is that those who held prominent elected office can be said to have displayed a desire to influence policy. The extent of such a desire and indeed whether or not they availed of the opportunity to exercise it is not relevant, for the purposes of this study it is sufficient that such a desire can be shown to have existed.

**Table 4-1 Number of deputy-leaders who previously held prominent elected office**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who previously held prominent elected office (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	14 (100%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	23 (96%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	7 (100%)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	7 (100%)
<b>United States</b>	12	12 (100%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	64	63 (98%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		99.2%

Table 4.1 provides a summary of the examination of the careers of the deputy-leaders included in this study. Full details of the prominent elected offices held by the deputy-leaders prior to becoming deputy-leaders are given in Appendix 2. From Table 4.1 it can be seen that all of the deputy-leaders bar one held prominent elected office prior to becoming deputy-leaders. In the case of the one deputy-leader who did not previously hold prominent elected office (Anton Struycken) – he had been Governor of the

Netherlands Antilles prior to becoming a deputy-leader and so held a policy-related post prior to becoming deputy-leader albeit an unelected one.

#### **4.2.3 Deputy-leaders and previous membership of policy-influencing legislative committees**

The second aspect of the observable implication is that deputy-leaders would previously have been members of policy-influencing legislative committees. Again, like is not being compared with like in that each of the states under examination has a different committee system. In the United States all Senators and Congressmen are members of committees which determine which bills are progressed. Many of these committees date back to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>96</sup> In Ireland, parliamentary committees are a relatively recent phenomenon, mostly dating back to the 1980s, not all members of parliament are members of them and they generally lack power (they cannot block progress of bills for example).<sup>97</sup> In the United Kingdom, committees are relatively weak in terms of amending legislation (they cannot accept amendments if the relevant Minister rejects them) and not all British MPs are on committees.<sup>98</sup> In the Netherlands, committees scrutinize proposed legislation and can make amendments but not all parliamentarians are on committees.<sup>99</sup> Swedish parliamentary committees on the other hand can initiate legislation and rewrite bills they are examining.<sup>100</sup> In summary parliamentary committees vary in their power across the five states. However, the key point from the perspective of this study is that they all have

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<sup>96</sup> [www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/committeehistories.pdf](http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/committeehistories.pdf) [accessed 5 June 2003].

<sup>97</sup> Gallagher, 1999.

<sup>98</sup> Mattson and Strom, 1995.

<sup>99</sup> Mattson and Strom, 1995.

<sup>100</sup> Mattson and Strom, 1995.



a legislative role and thus membership of such committees indicates an interest in policy. The hypothesis is not a test of committee strength or actual influence of deputy-leaders prior to taking office. It is a test of their motivation.

**Table 4-2 Number of deputy-leaders who previously membership of policy-influencing legislative committees**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who previously held membership of policy-influencing legislative committees (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	13 (93%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	16 (67%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	6 (86%)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	7 (100%)
<b>United States</b>	12	10 (83%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	64	52 (83%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		85.8%

Table 4.2 summarises the number of deputy-leaders who were on policy-influencing legislative committees prior to becoming deputy-leaders. Full details are given in Appendix 2. From this table it can be seen that the vast majority of deputy-leaders in this study were previously members of policy-influencing legislative committees. In the case of Ireland, the one deputy-leader who was not, Brendan Corish, was a member of a legislative committee (Procedures and Privileges). The lowest level of committee involvement by deputy-leaders was in the Netherlands but, even in this instance, almost 70 per cent of the deputy-leaders had been on such committees prior to becoming deputy-leader. All the UK Deputy-leaders were on committees, while only one Swedish deputy-leader was not. In the case of the two United States Vice-Presidents who were not on legislative committees, it was because neither was a member of a legislative body.

However, one of the two (Nelson Rockefeller) chaired a presidential advisory committee on government organisation, which resulted in the establishment of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.<sup>101</sup> Thus, the approach that has been taken in some respects underestimates the involvement of future deputy-leaders in policy developing committees. Nonetheless, the level of participation in legislative committees by those who went on to become deputy-leaders is very high at 83 per cent. Using the average of the averages, the level of participation of the deputy-leaders in this study in legislative committees rises to just under 86 per cent.

#### **4.2.4 Deputy-leaders and previous opposition spokespersonships**

Another significant policy-related post that deputy-leaders may have held prior to becoming deputy-leader is an opposition spokespersonship. The holder of such a position is their party's main spokesperson on a particular policy area and generally has de-facto responsibility for developing party policy in that area. Leaders and deputy-leaders of the party groupings in the legislature have also been considered opposition spokespersons for the purposes of this study as they are the primary spokesperson for their party. In the case of the United States, opposition spokespersonships do not exist so the nearest equivalent positions – those of Minority and Majority Leaders and Whips and their assistants have been included. In general, the main parties would have no more than twenty spokespersons each. The figure may be lower if the party has fewer members of parliament. In the case of the US, the two main parties would have five positions each (a leader and whip/assistant each in the Senate and a leader, assistant and whip in the House

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<sup>101</sup> <http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vpconts.html> [accessed 14 October 2002].

of Representatives). While the positions in the US are less comparable to the other four states, the positions are the only ones that can be compared with spokespersonships in the other four states. For consistency, the position of whip will also be included with spokespersonships for all five states.

**Table 4-3 Number of deputy-leaders with previous opposition spokespersonships**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who previously held opposition spokespersonships(percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	14 (100%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	20 (83%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	7 (100%)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	6 (86%)
<b>United States</b>	12	5 (42%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	64	52 (81%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		82.2%

Just over four out of every five deputy-leaders in this study held an opposition spokespersonship prior to becoming deputy-leader. However, the percentage of deputy-leaders with previous opposition spokespersonship experience differs from state to state. From Table 4.3 it can be seen that 100 per cent of Irish and Swedish deputy-leaders previously held opposition spokespersonships and that 83 per cent of Dutch deputy-leaders held a spokespersonship before they became deputy-leaders. Furthermore, three out of the four Dutch deputy-leaders who did not hold a spokespersonship position, Beel, Struycken and Bakker, did so because they became Ministers either on or before they became members of the legislature. Six out of the seven UK Deputy-Prime Ministers held a shadow cabinet post. However only five out of the 12 US Vice-Presidents held a

parliamentary leadership position. Using the average of the averages calculation, 82 per cent of deputy-leaders in this study were previously spokespersons.

#### **4.2.5 Deputy-leaders and previous cabinet experience**

Probably the most significant policy-related post that deputy-leaders may have held prior to becoming deputy-leader is a cabinet position. Junior ministers will be excluded from this study as they are not members of cabinet in most states. While some cabinet positions may have more policy influence than others and the power of cabinet members may differ across states, it remains the case that a member of cabinet has relatively more influence over policy than most other political positions. Therefore, it is a good test of the policy-related motivation of deputy-leaders. For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to assume that cabinet membership involves some policy influence.

**Table 4-4 Number of deputy-leaders with previous cabinet experience**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders with previous cabinet experience (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	11 (79%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	17 (71%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	6 (86%)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	6 (86%)
<b>United States</b>	12	1 (8%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	64	41 (64%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		66%

From Table 4.4 it can be seen that the majority of deputy-leaders (64 per cent) in this study previously held cabinet office. However there is significant variation across the five

states. In the case of Ireland, all the Tánaiste except Norton, Spring and Harney had previous ministerial experience before they became Tánaiste. It should be noted that Norton's party had not been in government prior to him becoming Tánaiste so it was impossible for him to have had ministerial experience. Furthermore, both Spring and Harney had been junior ministers prior to becoming Tánaiste. Again the narrow definition of ministerial experience is giving a lower result than an alternative and wider definition might give. In both Sweden and the UK, six out of seven deputy-leaders had previous cabinet experience. While in the Netherlands, seven Vice Minister Presidents had no previous cabinet experience, but it is still the case that 71 per cent of Vice Minister Presidents did. It is in the United States that the greatest divergence from this trend occurs in that only one out of the 12 Vice-Presidents (eight per cent) had previous cabinet experience (although another one, Rockefeller was an under-secretary). This may be accounted for by the fact that the cabinet is less influential in the US system of government. Nonetheless, even with the low level of previous cabinet experience among US deputy-leaders, it is still the case that most deputy-leaders in this study had previous cabinet experience. Using the average of the averages calculation increases the level of deputy-leaders with previous cabinet experience to 66 per cent.

#### **4.2.6 Conclusion**

Having examined the background of those who went on to become deputy-leaders, it can be concluded that the majority of them held a number of policy-related posts. Prior to being deputy-leaders, it was found that of those deputy-leaders in this study: 98 per cent held prominent elected office; 83 per cent were members of legislative committees; 81

per cent were opposition spokespersons and 64 per cent held cabinet positions. While US deputy-leaders diverged from these figures in both the case of opposition spokespersonships (42 per cent) and cabinet positions (17 per cent), they were in line with the global figures on the remaining two measures. Using the average of the averages calculation to address the issue of an imbalance in the distribution of deputy-leaders across the five states under investigation shows that: 99 per cent held prominent elected office; 86 per cent were members of legislative committees; 82 per cent were opposition spokespersons and 66 per cent held cabinet positions. Thus it can be concluded from these findings that the majority of deputy-leaders across all five states under examination displayed an interest in policy in terms of the positions they held prior to becoming deputy-leaders.

## **4.3 Hypothesis two**

### **4.3.1 Introduction**

The second hypothesis states that:

**If deputy-leaders matter, then those in the office will have had a strong policy focus prior to coming to office.**

While still concerned with the motivation of those who become deputy-leaders, this hypothesis contrasts with the first hypothesis in that it focuses on policy-related actions, while the former focuses on policy-related positions. In order to test this hypothesis, the

actions of future deputy-leaders will be divided into those taken inside and outside parliament. Actions outside of parliament to be identified include: policy documents that were produced by the future deputy-leaders; speeches that they made on policy proposals and contributions they made to policy debates in the media. In terms of actions taken in parliament, these will include: legislation that was proposed by those who went on to become deputy-leaders and speeches that they made on legislation. Again these two elements of this observable implication will be tested in turn on a comparative basis. It should also be noted that the significance of the speeches, policy proposals, contributions or legislation is not being tested as it is sufficient for the purposes of this study to show that the future deputy-leaders made speeches, prepared policy proposals, made contributions to debates, or proposed legislation. The taking of such actions in itself indicates an interest in policy, which is what is being tested for. Furthermore, the successful implementation of policy, proposals or legislation is also irrelevant insofar as the mere proposing of such measures is sufficient to display an interest in policy.

#### **4.3.2 Policy-related actions of future deputy-leaders outside parliament**

In terms of policy-related actions taken outside of parliament prior to becoming deputy-leader, policy-documents, speeches on policy or contributions to policy debates in the media were sought.

**Table 4-5 Number of deputy-leaders who took policy-related actions outside parliament prior to becoming deputy-leader**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who took policy-related actions outside parliament prior to becoming deputy-leader (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	14 (100%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	14	14(100%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	7 (100%)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	7 (100%)
<b>United States</b>	12	12 (100%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	54	54(100%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		100%

Table 4.5 provides a summary of the number of deputy-leaders who were found to have been involved in policy development or articulation prior to taking up office as deputy-leader. Full details are given in Appendix 3. It was not possible to determine whether or not ten of the Dutch deputy-leaders took policy-related actions outside of parliament prior to becoming deputy-leader due to a lack of data sources. For this reason they have been excluded from this table. From Table 4.5 it can be seen that all the deputy-leaders whose careers prior to becoming deputy-leaders were examined were found to have engaged with policy issues in one form or another outside of parliament.

### **4.3.3 Policy-related actions of future deputy-leaders inside parliament**

In order to assess if the deputy-leaders in this study engaged in policy-related actions in parliament prior to becoming deputy-leader, legislation and speeches on legislation and policy motions were sought.



**Table 4-6 Number of deputy-leaders who took policy-related actions in parliament prior to becoming deputy-leader**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who took policy-related actions in parliament prior to becoming deputy-leader (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	14 (100%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	23	23 (100%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	7 (100%)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	7 (100%)
<b>United States</b>	12	10 (83%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	63	61 (97%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		97%

Tables 4.6 shows the results of the search to find policy-related parliamentary actions taken by future deputy-leaders. It was not possible to determine whether or not one of the Dutch deputy-leaders took policy-related actions in parliament prior to becoming deputy-leader due to a lack of data sources. For this reason he was excluded from this table. The majority of deputy-leaders in this study were found to have taken some such action. In the cases of the Irish, Dutch, Swedish and British deputy-leaders for whom data was available, it was found that they all engaged in policy-related activity within parliament. In the case of the United States where 10 out of 12 deputy-leaders (83 per cent) engaged in policy-related parliamentary activity, it should be noted that the two future deputy-leaders who did not do so (Agnew and Rockefeller), were not in parliament and thus never had the opportunity to do so.

#### **4.3.4 Conclusion**

Having examined the activities both inside and outside of parliament of those who went on to become deputy-leaders, it can be concluded that the vast majority of them engaged in policy-related activity prior to becoming deputy-leaders.

Prior to being deputy-leaders, it was found that of those deputy-leaders in this study 100 per cent engaged in policy-related activity outside of parliament and 97 per cent engaged in such activity in parliament. When the average of the averages is calculated, 100 per cent engaged in policy-related activity outside of parliament and 97 per cent were active in the policy area while in parliament.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

The observable implications arising from the first two hypotheses have now been tested. These hypotheses seek to determine if deputy-leaders are likely to want to influence policy. Having examined the background of the deputy-leaders in each of the five states, it was demonstrated that the future deputy-leaders would appear to display a desire to influence policy insofar as the vast majority of them held policy-related posts and took policy-related actions both inside and outside of parliament. The average of the average figures show that 99 per cent held prominent elected office, 86 per cent were members of legislative committees, 82 per cent were opposition spokespersons, 66 per cent held cabinet positions, 100 per cent engaged in policy-related activity outside of parliament, and 97 per cent were active in the policy area while in parliament prior to being deputy-leaders. This strongly indicates that those who went on to become deputy-leaders

displayed an interest in policy matters in terms of both the positions they held and the actions they took.

## **5 HYPOTHESES AND QUANTATITIVE OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS RELATING TO DEPUTY-LEADERS IN OFFICE**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter will focus on the activities of deputy-leaders during their term(s) in office. It will involve the testing of hypotheses three to five via four quantitative observable implications. A qualitative observable implication relating to hypothesis five will be examined in a separate chapter. Hypothesis three is concerned with the motivation of the deputy-leaders while hypotheses four and five deal with the capacity of deputy-leaders to influence policy.

### **5.2 Hypothesis three**

#### **5.2.1 Introduction**

The third hypothesis states that:

**If deputy-leaders matter, then they will focus on policy while in the office.**

If the office of deputy-leader has policy implementation possibilities, one would expect those who attain the office to show some interest in policy once in the position. This will be tested by seeking policy documents, policy speeches or legislation that the deputy-leaders proposed while in office. These policy-related actions must relate to areas beyond

any ministerial role that the deputy-leader held so as to ensure that the policy focus is due to their being deputy-leader rather than any additional cabinet responsibilities that they had. Once again, the significance and success of the policy, speeches or legislation will not be examined as the delivery of speeches, policy proposals and/or legislation is sufficient to indicate an interest in policy, which is what is being tested for. Similarly when it is stated that the deputy-leaders in question will focus on policy, it is not meant that policy will be their sole focus.

### 5.2.2 Policy-related actions of deputy-leaders in office

In order to determine if deputy-leaders had an interest in policy while holding the office of deputy-leader, policy proposals, legislation or speeches on legislation that they were involved with while in the office beyond any ministerial role that the deputy-leader held were sought. Sources used in this search include: biographies, newspapers of record (for example *Irish Times*, the *Times*, *The Washington Post*) and news magazines such as the *Economist*, as well as the records of parliamentary debates and questions (Online databases are available in the Irish and Swedish cases while copies of the UK parliamentary records were also consulted).

**Table 5-1 Number of deputy-leaders who issued policy documents, speeches or legislation beyond their ministerial role while deputy-leaders.**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who issued policy documents, speeches or legislation while deputy-leaders (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	12 (86%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	19 (79%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	7 (100%)

<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	6 (86%)
<b>United States</b>	12	11 (92%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	64	55 (86%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		89%

Tables 5.1 shows the results of the search to find policy-related actions taken by deputy-leaders. Full details are given in Appendix 4. All but nine of the deputy-leaders in this study were found to have taken some such action. In the case of the Irish, twelve out of fourteen had taken policy-related actions. While nineteen out of twenty-four Dutch deputy-leaders engaged in policy-related activity beyond their ministerial role. All the Swedish deputy-leaders did so while six out of seven British deputy-leaders engaged in policy-related activity within parliament. In the case of the United States, eleven out of twelve deputy-leaders engaged in policy-related activity beyond their ministerial brief while they were in office. In this case it is only one Vice-President (Gerald Ford) who appears not to have had a policy role during his Vice-presidency as a search of biographies revealed no activities in the area. However, it must be borne in mind that he only held the office for eight months before he went on to assume the Presidency and that during those eight months the issue that dominated his agenda was the possible removal from office of President Nixon and how he as Vice-President would deal with that issue.

### **5.2.3 Conclusion**

Having examined the activities of the 64 deputy-leaders in this study while they were in office, it has been found that 55 of them had engaged in some form of policy-related activity while they were in office. While this indicates a focus on policy while they were

in office, it does not indicate that they were solely focused on policy while they were deputy-leaders. Nonetheless, such a strong result indicates that almost all of the deputy-leaders in this study had an interest in policy.

## **5.3 Hypothesis four**

### **5.3.1 Introduction**

The fourth hypothesis states that:

**If deputy-leaders matter, then they will have policy development and implementation resources available to them.**

In order to influence policy, deputy-leaders will require staff to research policy options, to draft legislation and see it through to implementation. If the office of deputy-leader is purely ceremonial in nature, then it is likely to be backed up by a small secretariat and would not have significant staff resources available to it. If however it has a policy role, then the office would employ a number of civil service staff and political appointees with policy-related job specifications. Both the size of the staff available to the deputy-leader and their role will be examined.

This will be tested via two observable implications. Firstly, if the deputy-leader's office has a policy-related role, then it will have a total budget in line with other policy-developing departments and areas. Secondly, a number of staff of the deputy-leader will have policy-orientated job specifications or roles. In this instance it is not the number of staff with such a role that matters, but merely that there are staff with

policy responsibilities in the office of the deputy-leader as distinct from being staff in an office dealing with any additional cabinet responsibilities of the deputy-leader.

### **5.3.2 Policy-related resources of deputy-leaders**

Given the difficulty of accessing historical data on departmental budgets, only most recently available budget allocations will be examined, which will be the 2002/2003 figures. All budgets will be for 2002, except in the case of the UK where the office of Deputy Prime Minister was only established in its own right in May 2002. The currencies are all converted to euros based on the exchange rate as it stood on December 12 2003.

A further issue that arises in relation to this observable implication is with whom the budget of the deputy-leaders office should be compared? Most government departments would have broad areas of responsibility and are thus likely to have a large staff of civil servants and thus a large budget. The most appropriate department would appear to be that of the Prime Minister/President, which would be the most similar department to that of the Deputy-Leader.

A third issue is the possible overlap of ministerial responsibilities and deputy-leader responsibilities and the resulting difficulty of disentangling the separate budgets for each role. In this instance, only the budget allocations for the deputy-leader will be included in this study. So where a deputy-leader has additional ministerial responsibilities, only the budget for their deputy-leader activities will be included, while the budget for their other cabinet portfolio will be excluded. The situation with regard to the budget of the Office of



Deputy Prime Minister in the UK requires clarification in this context. In May 2002, the Office of Deputy Prime Minister was established in its own right (prior to this it was part of the Cabinet Office) and has responsibility for a number of areas such as housing, regional policy and the fire service that would normally fall within the remit of a ministry such as Housing or the Environment. This gives the Office of Deputy Prime Minister a very large budget which is included in its entirety in this study because the office-holder is not simultaneously a Minister. Therefore the whole of the budget accrues to the deputy-leader per se.

**Table 5-2 Policy-related resources of deputy-leaders.**

	<b>Budget of deputy-leader's office</b>	<b>Budget of leader's office</b>	<b>Staff with policy-related role (Y/N)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	None <sup>102</sup>	N/A	No
<b>Netherlands</b>	None <sup>103</sup>	N/A	No
<b>Sweden</b>	N/A	€6.1m <sup>104</sup>	Yes
<b>United Kingdom</b>	€8.9 billion <sup>105</sup>	€204m <sup>106</sup>	Yes
<b>United States</b>	€4.1m <sup>107</sup>	€277m <sup>108</sup>	Yes

Table 5.2 summarises the policy-related resources of deputy-leaders in the five states under examination in 2002/2003. Irish, Dutch, Swedish and US data is for 2002, while the UK data is for fiscal year 2002/2003 (as the office was only created in 2002).

<sup>102</sup> Available from: <http://www.entemp.ie/depart.htm> [accessed 22 October 2003].

<sup>103</sup> Information supplied by Royal Netherlands Embassy, Dublin.

<sup>104</sup> Swedish Government Yearbook 2002, p. 70. Data is for 2002. Figure in Swedish Krone is 55,853,000 SEK.

<sup>105</sup> Data on UK Deputy-Prime Minister available from: [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pre\\_budget\\_report/prebud\\_pbr02/report/prebud\\_pbr02\\_repannxb2.cfm](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pre_budget_report/prebud_pbr02/report/prebud_pbr02_repannxb2.cfm) [accessed 20 November 2002]. UK figures are for budget year 2002/2003. Figure in Sterling is £6.2 billion.

<sup>106</sup> Available from: <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/68ED8/41.pdf> [accessed 15 November 2003]. Figure is for Cabinet Office budget 2001. Figure in Sterling is £142m.

<sup>107</sup> Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/appendix/EOP.pdf> [accessed 11 November 2003]. US figures are for budget year 2002. Figure in US dollars is \$5m.

From Table 5.2, it is clear that there is significant variation in the budget of deputy-leaders across the states under investigation. In the case of Ireland, the Tánaiste has no department separate and distinct from their ministerial office, thus strictly speaking the Tánaiste has no budget. The Dutch Vice-Minister President (or Deputy Prime Minister) is in a similar situation in that while the post exists there is no department to support it and the holder of the post is basically a Minister in charge of a department with the additional title and responsibilities of deputy-leader and so has no separate budget as deputy-leader. The US Vice-President has a budget of €4.1 million. However, when the resources available to the US President and Vice-President are compared, there is a significant discrepancy. From Table 5.2 it can be seen that the budget of the Executive Office of the President is just over 67 times that of the Vice-President. However, the Vice-President has significant resources available to him compared to the Irish and Dutch deputy-leaders. Nonetheless, all these figures are dwarfed by the budget of the UK Deputy-Prime Minister which stands at €8.9 billion. This budget far exceeds that of the UK Prime Minister and all other deputy-leaders in this study. The UK Office of Deputy Prime Minister has policy responsibility for housing, homelessness, planning, the fire service, devolution and local and regional government, hence the large budget.<sup>109</sup>

If we widen out this line of inquiry, it appears that there is also significant variation over time in the budgets of deputy-leaders in the states in this study. In the case of Ireland,

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<sup>108</sup> This figure is derived from a total budget of €342 minus Vice-President's budget of €5m. Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/agencies.html> [accessed 10 November 2003]. Figure in US dollars is \$337m.

while there was no office for the Tánaiste in 2002, a separate office of the Tánaiste had been created in 1993 and was retained following the change of government in 1994.

However while the post of Tánaiste continued to exist, the office of the Tánaiste was abolished when the rainbow government lost office in 1997.<sup>110</sup> In 1993, when it was set up, the budget for this office was set at €1 million.<sup>111</sup> This budget disappeared with the abolition of the office in 1997. Similarly in the UK and Sweden, the office has not existed for long periods, therefore there was no budget associated with it. In the case of the UK, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister was only created as an office in its own right in May 2002.<sup>112</sup> In 2002/2003, the budget for the office of Deputy-Prime Minister stood at €8.9 billion which was a significant increase on the already high figure for the previous year which was €6.6 billion,<sup>113</sup> and this figure for 2001/2002 includes not only the Deputy Prime Minister's budget but also the budget of his additional cabinet responsibilities. In the Netherlands there has been a degree of consistency insofar as there has been no separate budget for the deputy-leader. The US Vice-President's budget has steadily increased over time.<sup>114</sup> During the 1990s, it stayed within the three to €3.2

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<sup>109</sup> Available from:

[http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm\\_about/documents/page/odpm\\_about\\_025336.pdf](http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_about/documents/page/odpm_about_025336.pdf) [accessed 7 November 2003].

<sup>110</sup> Irish Times, June 21<sup>st</sup>, 1997, p. 6.

<sup>111</sup> Irish punt equivalent is £800,000 (based on euro conversion rate of 1 euro equals 0.787564 punt). Data from: Dail Eireann Vol 426, 23 February, 1993. Available from <http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/> [accessed 16 June 2002].

<sup>112</sup> Available from:

[http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm\\_about/documents/page/odpm\\_about\\_025336.pdf](http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_about/documents/page/odpm_about_025336.pdf) [accessed 7 November 2003].

<sup>113</sup> Available from [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pre\\_budget\\_report/prebud\\_pbr02/report/prebud\\_pbr02\\_repannxb2.cfm](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pre_budget_report/prebud_pbr02/report/prebud_pbr02_repannxb2.cfm) [accessed 20 November 2002]. Figures in sterling are £6.2 billion and £4.6 billion respectively.

<sup>114</sup> Information taken from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/sheets/outlays.xls> [accessed 24 November 2003]. All figures are based on 1996 prices.

million [\$4m] range, however between 1988 and 1995 it grew from €1.4 million to €2.6million.<sup>115</sup>

From Table 5.2 it can be seen that the policy-staffing situation of deputy-leaders also differs across the five states under study. In Ireland and the Netherlands, the deputy-leader has no staff specifically assigned to them in their role as deputy-leader. Once again, this is a consequence of the position of deputy-leader being a title without a supporting office. On the other hand, Swedish, UK and US deputy-leaders have staff with policy responsibilities to assist them in their deputy-leader role.

Furthermore, the situation in relation to staff with policy responsibilities who are assigned to the deputy-leaders office varies over time in most of the states under study. While the Irish Tánaiste has no staff in 2002, there was a staff between 1993 and 1997. In answer to a Dáil question in February 1993, the then Tánaiste, Dick Spring, stated that the newly formed office of the Tánaiste would have ‘a small number of additional staff ... for research and policy advice purposes’.<sup>116</sup> When the Tánaiste’s office was abolished with the change of government in 1997, staff were no longer assigned to assist the Tánaiste in the policy area. In the case of Sweden, there is also much variation in the role and resources of the Deputy-Prime Minister from government to government. ‘There is no set structure for a deputy PM. It is ... up to the PM to decide whether there should be a deputy [Prime Minister] or not. It is also up to the PM to decide whether the deputy should have a portfolio or not, and a staff working with issues in that portfolio.’

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<sup>115</sup> In US dollars this is a rise from \$1.7 million to \$3.1 million.

(Response to query from Jan Larrson – Head of Press Department, Prime Minister's Office 12 November 2003).

Variation in the staffing levels in the Office of the UK Deputy Prime Minister are more extreme, reaching a peak level of 6,500 staff in 2002,<sup>117</sup> however this is a result of the significant responsibilities of the office as it was then configured. While the staffing figures associated with previous holders of the office were not found, Geoffrey Howe who held the position between 1989 and 1990 as well as being Leader of the House of Commons had a budget of one and a half million pounds<sup>118</sup> which suggests that he had significantly less staff than Prescott (who had a budget of 6.2 billion pounds) whose responsibilities as Deputy-Prime Minister included housing, the regions and the fire service across the UK. Given that some of Howe's budget would be for staff to deal with his responsibilities as Leader of the House of Commons, the staff required to assist with his Deputy-Prime Minister role are likely to have been even less than the figure of one and a half million pounds suggests. Moreover, it is impossible to separate out the deputy-leader's proportion of the budget. In short, in the UK, the responsibilities of the deputy-leader have varied from holder to holder and thus so have the staffing requirements.

It is only in the US and the Netherlands that there has been some degree of consistency regarding the numbers of staff with policy responsibilities allotted to the office of the deputy-leader. In the case of the Netherlands, the position of Vice-Minister President is

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<sup>116</sup> Dail Eireann Vol 426, 16 February, 1993. Available from <http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/> [accessed 16 June 2002].

similar to that of Tánaiste insofar as it is a title without an accompanying office to support it. Dutch deputy-leaders rely on the staff in whatever additional cabinet portfolio they have been given for support. On the other hand the US Vice-President has staff with a policy role and this has been consistently the case. While policy responsibilities may vary from Vice-President to Vice-President, they have all had staff with policy responsibilities. However the number of staff has increased significantly over time: 'From fewer than 20 staff members at the end of Nixon's vice-presidency, the number increased to 60 during the 1970s, with the addition of not only political and support staff but advisors on domestic policy and national security.'<sup>119</sup> Vice-President Quayle's staff was larger than those of Bush or Mondale.<sup>120</sup> According to Hatfield (1997), Mondale had a Vice-Presidential staff that 'ranged from fifty-five to sixty members'<sup>121</sup> So, while the US Vice-President has consistently had policy focused staff attached to the office, their number have varied from Vice-President to Vice-President but are trending upwards over time.

In terms of whether party-leadership or additional cabinet responsibilities have a greater impact on the allocation of policy-resources than deputy-leadership, the limited nature of the data gathered severely curtails the possibility of a detailed examination. In particular in the case of Sweden, there is insufficient information available on the budget of the

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<sup>117</sup> Available from:

[http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm\\_about/documents/page/odpm\\_about\\_025336.pdf](http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_about/documents/page/odpm_about_025336.pdf) [accessed 7 November 2003].

<sup>118</sup> The Independent, March 4 1990, p. 21.

<sup>119</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>120</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

deputy-leader for any conclusions to be drawn. That is not to say that nothing can be said on the matter in the case of the other four states. In Ireland and the Netherlands, there have been deputy-leaders who have been party-leaders and deputy-leaders who were not party-leaders, yet the staffing and budgetary situations have remained the same (i.e. no specific staff or budget) with one exception in the Irish case. In the UK, none of the deputy-leaders in this study were party-leaders and they all had additional cabinet responsibilities, yet the policy-resources available to the deputy-leader fluctuated significantly over the time-period covered by this study. It is only in the case of the US, that a steady increase in the policy resources of the deputy-leader is found. None of the US deputy-leaders were party leaders and none of them had additional cabinet responsibilities. Overall, it is difficult to attribute the fluctuation in policy resources available to deputy-leaders to their status as deputy-leader or party-leader or their additional cabinet responsibilities.

### **5.3.3 Conclusion**

Having examined the policy-related resources of deputy-leaders in terms of their budgets and their staff, it can be concluded that there is significant variation in terms of resources available to the deputy-leaders in this study, not just across states but also over time within states. It is only in the case of the US Vice-President that staff with policy responsibilities and budgetary resources have consistently been available to the office-holder. However, even in this instance, the budgetary resources have varied over time. The Dutch Vice-Minister President is in the opposite situation in that they have

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<sup>121</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm)

consistently lacked staff with policy responsibilities and an office budget to accompany their deputy-leader title. In the case of the Swedish and UK deputy-leaders the situation has varied significantly depending on what role the deputy-leader has been given. In Ireland, with the exception of the years 1993-1997, the Tánaiste has not had either staff or a budget available to them in their capacity as deputy-leader. In other words, it would appear that deputy-leaders in three of the five states under investigation have only on some occasions had policy-related resources made available to them. In the case of the fourth state (the Netherlands), they have not had the resources made available to them at all and it is only in the case of the United States that such resources have been consistently available.

## 5.4 Hypothesis five

### 5.4.1 Introduction

The fifth hypothesis states that:

**If deputy-leaders matter, then they will influence policies that they believe to be important while in the office.**

This gives rise to two observable implications. The first observable implication is that if deputy-leaders can shape policy, then one would expect that they will push for the implementation of policies that they strongly believe in and that they will also seek to undermine policies which they strongly disagree with. These policies will ideally be outside the area of any additional cabinet responsibilities that they have so as to ensure

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[accessed 3 June 2003].



that any influence is due to their being deputy-leaders as distinct from ministers. The only exception to this will be in the case where they are able to push through or thwart a policy within the area of their cabinet responsibility which they were unable to do so prior to becoming deputy-leader. This will be tested in the following chapter which deals with the qualitative analysis of the hypotheses.

A second observable implication arising from this hypothesis is that deputy-leaders will chair a number of committees with policy roles beyond their departmental responsibilities as this is one of the key ways of influencing policy while in office. Furthermore, while it may be difficult to determine whether or not a deputy-leader did influence policy as those involved may have different perspectives on the issue, whether or not a deputy-leader chaired a policy committee while in office is clear-cut and a matter of public record. Mere membership of such committees will not be checked as it is a weaker measure of policy influence than chairing such committees.

#### **5.4.2 Deputy-leader's chairing of policy-related committees while in office**

If deputy-leaders seek to influence policy then they can be expected to chair policy committees while in office. Committees chaired by a deputy-leader will be sought as chairmanship indicates greater policy influence. Such committees should examine policy issues beyond the deputy-leader's narrow departmental responsibilities. As was pointed out in section 4.2.3, the power and role of legislative committees varies across the five states under examination. An added difference arises in the case of ministers. Constitutionally, ministers must give up their seats in parliament in the Netherlands and

Sweden. While in the US, the Vice-President chairs meetings of the Senate but is not drawn from among its elected members. In Ireland and the UK, ministers must be drawn from amongst the members of parliament and remain so after their appointment as ministers. To ensure comparison of like with like, given these differences, deputy-leaders' membership of legislative committees will not be included in this study.

Looking at cabinet committees, there are also some differences to be borne in mind. In the case of the Netherlands, all the permanent cabinet committees are presided over by the Prime Minister who 'chairs all meetings of the cabinet and its committees' (Andeweg & Irwin, 2002, p. 113). In other words the Dutch deputy-leaders do not chair cabinet committees. In the case of the United Kingdom, there has been a 'long-standing practice of refusing to disclose any details of the Cabinet committee system' (Dunleavy, 1994, p. 359). It is only since May 1992 that a full list of the names of members of cabinet committees and sub-committees has been made public. Details of cabinet committees prior to this date have emerged as once secret files are made public. In the case of British cabinet committees, their chairing is spread across the cabinet and deputy-leaders have chaired a number of such committees as is shown in the figures given below. In the United States, the Vice-President has historically been given a role in chairing policy committees. While many of these committees may not strictly speaking be cabinet-committees, they are close approximations in that they input into government policy. In the case of Ireland, it 'lacks an institutionalised system of cabinet committees comparable to European practice' (Connolly & O'Halpin, 1999, p. 257). While Irish cabinet committees exist, they tend to be informal, ad-hoc and shortlived (with some notable

exceptions). Furthermore, the resources that they draw on are provided by the ministers that serve on them rather than having resources of their own. So cabinet committee chairing is not a useful measure in an Irish context. Sweden does not make use of cabinet committees as 'Swedish ministers have limited powers to make independent decisions. All government decisions are taken collectively by the Government as a whole.'<sup>122</sup> Cabinet committees are 'an unknown concept' (Larsson, 1997, p.237) in the Swedish context.

So, while cabinet committees do not exist in all the states in this study, where they do exist the role of deputy-leaders in cabinet committees can still be examined. In the case of Ireland and Sweden, where there are few or no such committees, there is one less means of assessing the influence of deputy-leaders on policy while in office.

**Table 5-3 Number of deputy-leaders who chaired policy-related committees while in office.**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who chaired policy-related committees while in office. (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	N/A
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	0 (0%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	N/A
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	5 (72%)
<b>United States</b> <sup>123</sup>	11	11 (100%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	63	16 (25%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		57% <sup>124</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Available from: [http://www.sweden.gov.se/systemofgov/system\\_govandriks.htm](http://www.sweden.gov.se/systemofgov/system_govandriks.htm) [accessed March 13 2003].

<sup>123</sup> Alban Barkley has been excluded from this table reducing the number of US Vice-Presidents to 11 as data on his policy committee memberships could not be found.

Tables 5.3 shows the results of the search to find policy-related committees that were chaired by deputy-leaders. Full details are given in Appendix 5. The total percentage of deputy-leaders in this study who chaired policy committees while in office is low at 25 per cent. However, taking into account that none of the Dutch deputy-leaders served as cabinet committees chairs and the large number of Dutch deputy-leaders in the study, the average of the averages total rises to 57 per cent. This is due to the fact that all the US and 72 per cent of the UK deputy-leaders in this study for whom data was available were found to have chaired some policy-related committees in contrast with the Netherlands where none did. In the case of Ireland and Sweden, neither state has cabinet committees.

Examining the results to determine the influence of party-leadership or possession of a ministerial position as distinct from the influence of deputy-leadership is not very useful in this instance. This is because none of the US Vice-Presidents were party leaders or held additional cabinet positions at the same time as they were deputy-leader and similarly none of the UK Deputy-Prime Ministers were party leaders at the same time as they were deputy-leader, however they all held additional cabinet positions at the same time as they were deputy-leader.

### **5.4.3 Conclusion**

Having examined the quantitative observable implication relating to the hypothesis that if deputy-leaders matter, then they will seek to influence policies that they believe to be important while in the office, it can be concluded that in most of the states under

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<sup>124</sup> The average of the average in this instance relates only to the data from the Netherlands, the UK and the

investigation where cabinet committees exist the majority of deputy-leaders chair such committees indicating a capability to influence policy. It is only in the case of the Netherlands that cabinet committees were found to exist, but were not chaired by deputy-leaders.

## **5.5 Conclusion**

In this chapter, the quantitative observable implications arising from three hypotheses relating to the policy-related motivation and capabilities of deputy-leaders while in office were examined. In the case of hypothesis three, it was found that over four-fifths of the deputy-leaders in the five states under investigation had a policy focus while in office insofar as they produced policy proposals, legislation or speeches on legislation beyond their ministerial roles. The fourth hypothesis examined the policy-related resources of deputy-leaders in terms of their budgets and their staff. It found that while there is significant variation in terms of resources available to the deputy-leaders in this study, not just across states but also over time within states, deputy-leaders in three out of the five states had staff with policy roles attached to their office and half of the deputy-leaders for whom data was available had significant budgets for their office. The fifth hypothesis stated that deputy-leaders would seek to influence policies that they believe to be important while in the office. The quantitative data relating to this hypothesis examined whether or not deputy-leaders chaired policy committees while in office. It was found that in two out of the three states where cabinet committees exist and where data was available that the majority of deputy-leaders chaired such committees.

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US as data was not available from Sweden and Ireland.

The findings arising from the testing of the quantitative observable implications resulting from the three hypotheses indicate that, while in office, deputy-leaders have both the motivation and interest (as shown in the testing of hypothesis three) and in some states the capability (as shown in the testing of hypothesis four and five) to influence policy. While these are strong results, they are not conclusive in terms of showing that deputy-leaders can influence policy. This will require an examination of the findings relating to the testing of all the hypotheses.

## 6 HYPOTHESES AND QUALITATIVE OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS RELATING TO DEPUTY-LEADERS IN OFFICE

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on the activities of deputy-leaders while in office from a qualitative perspective. It will involve the testing of an observable implication arising from hypothesis five. Hypothesis five deals with the capacity of deputy-leaders to influence policy rather than their motivation or interest in policy.

The fifth hypothesis states that:

**If deputy-leaders matter, then they will influence policies that they believe to be important while in the office.**

The quantitative observable implication arising from this hypothesis was dealt with in the previous chapter. The qualitative observable implication is that if deputy-leaders can shape policy, then one would expect that they will push for the implementation of policies that they strongly believe in and that they will also seek to undermine policies with which they strongly disagree. It is unlikely that they will be capable of implementing all the policies that would like to and of halting all policies with which they disagree. However, what can be said is that if they have no influence then they will be unable to implement any of the policies they agree with and unable to halt the

implementation of any of the policies with which they disagree. In order to show that they have policy influence, all that is required is evidence to show that they were able to implement some policy with which they agreed with or halted some policy with which they disagreed. These policies should be in an area outside any additional cabinet responsibilities of the deputy-leaders so as to ensure that any influence identified can be attributed to their being deputy-leader rather than a member of cabinet. The one exception to this is the scenario where it can be shown that a minister was able to push through or stifle a policy within the area of their additional cabinet responsibilities when they were deputy-leader that they were unable to before they were deputy-leader.

## **6.2 Deputy-leaders' ability to influence policy while in office**

### **6.2.1 Introduction**

A number of practical issues arise in seeking to identify instances where deputy-leaders were able to either implement policies that they favoured or stifle policies that they opposed. Firstly, given the time and space limits of this research, it will not be possible to conduct an in-depth study examining in detail a number of policy outcomes for each of the 64 deputy-leaders under investigation. In order to progress the research, it is proposed that case-studies be conducted on a detailed examination of the policy influence of one deputy-leader per state in relation to particular policy measures. Strictly speaking, in order to show that deputy-leaders can matter, it is only necessary to identify one instance where they did have an influence over policy.



Secondly, as Light (1984) points out, in terms of policy influence 'it is almost impossible to give exact measures of success' (Light, 1984, p. 620). While it may be possible to state that a policy was implemented or halted, who can claim credit for that outcome is difficult to determine. Many will claim responsibility for policy successes, while few will claim ownership of policy failures. For this reason, the subjects of the case-studies will be deputy-leaders on whom there exists an extensive literature on their time as deputy-leaders. The more perspectives that are available on a deputy-leader's time in office, the more likely it is that an objective assessment can be made as to their ability to influence policy outcomes while in office.

Thirdly, in selecting the subjects for the case studies, there is a need to avoid 'cherry picking'; in other words, avoiding the selection of case-study subjects that bias the outcomes of the case studies. It may be argued that selecting subjects for the case studies on the basis of a pre-existing extensive literature biases the studies in favour of influential deputy-leaders in that it is likely that such a literature would only exist in the cases of influential deputy-leaders. However, it should be pointed out that there may be many reasons for there being an extensive literature on a political figure. Such an extensive literature on a political figure may exist not because they were an influential deputy-leader, but may be based on the impact of their entire political careers or their impact in a role other than deputy-leader. For example, much of the literature on Séan Lemass focuses on his time as Taoiseach rather than on his three terms as Tánaiste. Indeed, the view that what literature exists on deputy-leaders is due to their policy-influence is at odds with the earlier finding that the received wisdom on deputy-leaders is that they do

not matter, in that they are perceived not to have policy influence. Additionally, to rely on a less than extensive literature for the case studies increases the likelihood of a bias being imported from a literature with a limited perspective on a deputy-leader. Nonetheless, there is a trade-off being made in terms of the basis for the selection of the case-studies in that greater objectivity of the assessment of the policy-effectiveness of the selected deputy-leaders is being chosen with an acceptance that this may entail the introduction of an alternative bias, namely the risk that the selection of case-study subjects may favour deputy-leaders who were successful policy implementers. It must also be borne in mind that the case-studies are not being used in isolation to determine whether or not deputy-leaders matter. The findings of the case studies will be taken in conjunction with the findings regarding the eight other observable implications to arrive at a conclusion regarding whether or not it is correct to say that deputy-leaders do not matter. As has already been pointed out, to disprove the generally held view that deputy-leaders do not matter it is only necessary to show once that in certain circumstances they did matter, and this will be based on the findings of this entire research project rather than an individual aspect of it.

Fourthly, as mentioned in Chapter Two, to identify policy-implementing deputy-leaders is one thing, to be able to attribute that policy implementation to their being deputy-leader is another. Where a deputy-leader influences policy, how can that influence be attributed solely to their being deputy-leader rather than party-leader or holder of a cabinet portfolio? This is not an issue with US Vice-Presidents as they are not party-leaders nor do they hold additional cabinet portfolios. In the case of deputy-leaders in the

other four states under investigation, two of the four deputy-leaders selected to be the subject of case studies were not party leaders when they were deputy-leaders. In the case of the remaining two, examples of policy influence which was not due to their leadership of their party will be sought, in other words, cases where the deputy-leaders sought the implementation of a policy which did not have the support of their party. In such cases, if the deputy-leader influences policy outcomes, then it cannot be attributed to their party role as they did not have the support of their party. As for their cabinet responsibilities, all four deputy-leaders had additional cabinet responsibilities. Again, cases where their influence (if they had influence) was not due to their additional cabinet responsibilities will be sought. For example, where they had influence on policies in areas beyond their cabinet briefs.

Fifthly, it must also be stated that an exception fallacy is not being committed with these case-studies. The exception fallacy is defined as 'when you reach a group conclusion on the basis of exceptional cases'.<sup>125</sup> So, for example, in the case of this chapter general conclusions about the role of the Tánaiste are not being made on the basis of the study of an individual Tánaiste - Dick Spring. What this study is seeking to determine is if the individual deputy-leaders examined in the case-studies had policy influence as deputy-leaders and thus all that can be concluded if it is found that these individual deputy-leaders did have such policy influence is that deputy-leaders can matter.

Having addressed these practical issues, the case-study subjects can be selected. On the basis of selecting one deputy-leader per state where an extensive literature on that

deputy-leader exists, in the case of the Irish deputy-leaders, the most likely case-study subject is Seán Lemass who is the subject of seven biographies. However none of these biographies deal in great detail on his time as Tánaiste. This is in contrast to the case of Dick Spring. While there are only two biographies of him, they provide significant detail on his time as Tánaiste. Further detail on his time as Tánaiste is provided by Finlay (1998), Desmond (2000) and Kavanagh (2001) with Hussey (1990) and FitzGerald (1991) and (2004) giving some perspective on his time as Tánaiste from the view of his coalition partners. Therefore, given the extent of the available literature, Dick Spring will be the Irish case-study subject. In the case of US Vice-Presidents, Light (1984) has written on the influence of Mondale drawing on interviews with aides of both Mondale and Carter (who was President at the time) and there is a comprehensive biography by Lewis (1984). Hatfield (1997), Cronin and Genovese (1998) and Felzenberg (2001) also spend time on Mondale's Vice-Presidency as part of their wider studies of the position. Therefore, Walter Mondale will be the American case-study subject. As for UK Deputy-Prime Ministers, Eden is the most widely written about with seven biographies covering his political career and articles by Wight (1960), Young (1985), Adamthwaite (1988) and Ruane (1994) on policy aspects of this period of his political career. In the case of Dutch and Swedish Deputy-Prime Ministers, very little biographical material is available in English. As a result, the deputy-leaders selected from these two states will be more recent holders of the office who have been the subjects of extensive media coverage. On this basis, the Dutch deputy-leader selected for a case study will be Else Borst-Eilers and in the case of Sweden it will be Bengt Carl Westerberg.

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<sup>125</sup> Available from: <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/fallacy.htm> [accessed 28 February 2005].

## 6.2.2 The Netherlands – Else Borst-Eilers

Else Borst-Eilers was Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports between 1994 and 1998. She became Dutch Deputy-Leader (Vice-Minister President) in 1998, a post she held until 2002. During this term she remained Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports. Prior to this term of office she was also leader of the D66 party from February to May 1998 and leader of the D66 parliamentary party in the Tweede Kamer during May 1998.<sup>126</sup> This creates an issue insofar as it will be difficult to separate out whether her influence on policy derived from her role as deputy-leader, her role as Minister or her strong position within her party (D66). As Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports for eight years, she introduced a significant number of policy changes in areas as diverse as health insurance, drugs policy, alcohol policy and medical research. For the purposes of this research the focus will be on her second term as Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports when she was also deputy-leader. During this term she reformed the Dutch health insurance system with her 'Renewal of the Health Service' policy of 2001.<sup>127</sup> Her 2002 Tobacco Act restricted the sale of tobacco products to those over 18 years of age and placed controls on tobacco advertising, while her Alcohol Policy of 2000 also increased the age at which alcohol could be bought to 18.<sup>128</sup> In 2000, together with the Minister for Justice, she introduced legislation that effectively legalized euthanasia – the 'Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act'.<sup>129</sup> She also introduced changes to the regulations applying to the use of foetal tissue and embryos, as well as introducing measures to deal with hospital waiting lists. In 1999, she found herself at the centre of a

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<sup>126</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>127</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>128</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>129</sup> Available from: [www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm](http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm) [accessed 1 November 2004].

controversy over her handling of the crashing of an El Al Boeing aircraft into apartments in the suburb of Bijlmermeer in 1992. A parliamentary investigative committee criticized her handling of the crisis for not taking the health concerns of the affected residents seriously and not fully briefing parliament on the matter. Arising from the report of the committee a motion of no confidence in her was rejected in June 1999 after an 18-hour debate, even though it was supported by some dissident members of her own party.<sup>130</sup> All of these matters were within her brief as Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports and as such their implementation cannot be attributed to any influence she had as Dutch deputy-leader.

That is not to say that policies implemented during her second term as Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports cannot be attributed to her role as deputy-leader. It could be argued that the implementation of policies within her brief as Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports during her second term in that post required the additional influence derived from her role as deputy-leader to be implemented (otherwise they would have been introduced in her first term when she was Minister only). Even if this were the case, a further complication arises in that it may not be possible to determine if she was able to introduce policies as a result of her influence arising from being a major figure in her party or from being Dutch deputy-leader. If, for example, these policies were in her party's manifesto for the 1998 general election then their introduction can be attributed to her influence within her party. However their absence from the manifesto does not imply that they cannot be attributed to her position of influence within D66. For example, Borst

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<sup>130</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003] and Lucardie and Voerman, 2000, p. 467.

Eilers' D66 party had been at the center of the cabinet crisis over the issue of amending the constitution to allow national referenda. Having passed an initial vote in the Lower House in 1997 (when Borst-Eilers was not deputy-leader) and the Upper House in 1998, but requiring a second vote with a two-thirds majority, the proposal did not get the required vote in the Upper House in 1999. As a result the D66 ministers tendered their resignations from the cabinet and the rest of the cabinet followed suit. However, agreement on the matter was reached between the governing parties and the resignation of the cabinet was withdrawn.<sup>131</sup> This was a key policy objective for the D66 party and as such cannot be taken as a measure of the policy influence of Borst-Eilers as deputy-leader the issue was not only driven by her party but had been raised (and partially implemented) before she became deputy-leader.

The background to the introduction of the most controversial policy implemented during her second term as Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports will now be examined to assess if it is possible to determine whether her influence as deputy-leader had a role in its introduction. In 2001, Minister Borst-Eilers in co-operation with the Minister for Justice, introduced the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act that when passed, effectively legalized euthanasia by outlining conditions, which, if followed, would give doctors immunity from prosecution for mercy killing and assisted suicides. Two previous attempts had been made by her party to introduce such legislation in 1984 and during the early 1990s.<sup>132</sup> Government support for such a bill was made a condition of entry into coalition by the D66 party in 1998. Borst

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<sup>131</sup> Lucardie and Voerman, 2000, p. 468.

<sup>132</sup> Available from: [www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm](http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm) [accessed 1 November 2004].

Eilers herself stated in an newspaper interview that the policy was introduced 'thanks to the efforts of the D66 political party'.<sup>133</sup> So, it would appear that this policy was a pet project not of Borst-Eilers, but rather of her party. However, during her tenure as Vice-Chairperson of the Health Council (an advisory body to the government and parliament in the field of public health), she was a member of the Remmelink Commission in 1991 which examined the issue of euthanasia in the Netherlands. It found that many incidents of euthanasia were not being reported and that the government needed to address the issue. Prior to that, she was a member of the Netherlands Association for Voluntary Euthanasia.<sup>134</sup> She had also dealt with the issue as a medical practitioner as far back as 1983.<sup>135</sup> So while her party had historically taken the political lead in pushing for euthanasia to be legalized, this was an issue that Borst-Eilers had also championed. It could thus be argued that the legislation was not implemented until Borst-Eilers pushed for it. Even so, it is difficult to separate whether the influence she was able to bring to bear on getting the measure implemented was due to her influence within her party or arising from being Vice-Minister President. In terms of her party influence, it can be argued that it was in decline insofar as she had been replaced as party-leader. While she had been designated as party-leader by her predecessor, Hans Van Mierlo, Thom De Graf, who had earlier won a ballot of party members on the issue, succeeded her in 1998.<sup>136</sup> Furthermore, it could be argued that as she was seen as a future party-leader during her first term as Minister for Health, that if her party influence and Ministerial position were sufficiently strong, then the legislation on euthanasia could have been

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<sup>133</sup> Available from: [www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm](http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm) [accessed 1 November 2004].

<sup>134</sup> Available from: [www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm](http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm) [accessed 1 November 2004].

<sup>135</sup> Available from: [www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm](http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/holbors.htm) [accessed 1 November 2004].

<sup>136</sup> Available from: <http://users.skynet.be/herman.beun/page9.html> [accessed 22 August 2003].



implemented during her first term as Minister for Health. Certainly, she was no longer party-leader when she implemented the euthanasia legislation and her remaining major position of influence was as Vice-Minister President. So, there are arguments to discount her party role and her additional cabinet responsibilities as having a major influence on her ability to implement the euthanasia legislation, leaving her position as Vice-Minister President as the most influential factor. However, it is not possible to say that this legislation was only introduced due to Borst-Eilers being Vice-Minister President.

### **6.2.3 Republic of Ireland – Dick Spring**

Dick Spring held the position of Tánaiste on two occasions. During his first term (1982 to 1987) he was also Minister for the Environment and then Minister for Energy, while he was Minister for Foreign Affairs during his second term (1993 to 1997) as Tánaiste. FitzGerald (1991), Ryan (1993), Collins (1993) and Desmond (2000) cover Spring's first term as Tánaiste, while Finlay (1998) and Kavanagh (2001) cover his second term in detail. Spring became Tánaiste soon after being elected leader of his party and was faced with a party that was split on the issue of whether or not to be in government. At a meeting of the party's ruling Administrative Council earlier in 1982, the casting vote of the chair, Michael D. Higgins, had to be used to decide that the Labour Party should not join a coalition government. As Spring himself describes it – 'The internecine strife and the bitterness in Labour was terrible ... It was so divided; the Parliamentary Party and the AC were just nightmare stuff during the previous Government and it was still that way' (Collins, 1993, pp. 91-92). This siege mentality within the party did, however, foster a

bond between the Labour ministers, as described by Finlay (1999): 'the continuing strong strain of anti-coalition sentiment within the party, often had the paradoxical of forcing Labour Ministers to find their greatest solidarity in the cabinet room' (Finlay, 1998, p. 26). Paradoxically, it may also have strengthened Spring's hand when dealing with his coalition partners in that a demanding internal opposition had to be satisfied if Spring was to keep his own party in government. For example, Ryan (1993) points out that in 1986, 'threats by Labour Party dissidents not to support the Government saw climb downs on a number of issues including a directive on equality legislation' (Ryan, 1993, p. 81).

In office as deputy-leader, Spring also faced a coalition partner, Fine Gael, with whom his party were frequently at odds on the issue of how to tackle the financial crisis that faced the country with high unemployment and a large and growing national debt. As described by FitzGerald (2004), 'No previous Irish government since the outbreak of the Civil War had ever faced a financial crisis of this magnitude ... this issue necessarily imposed great strains on Cabinet decision making in that coalition, and required almost endless negotiations, in order to avoid a breakdown' (FitzGerald, 2004, p. 69). The coalition parties were divided as to how to address this crisis in that Fine Gael favoured significant cuts in public spending to reduce the public borrowing requirement, while Labour wanted to protect its constituency (the less well-off) from the worst of those cuts and favoured increased taxes on Fine Gael's constituency (the better-off). Furthermore, at Cabinet, Spring frequently found himself at odds with two strong Fine Gael personalities – Alan Dukes and John Bruton. Ryan (1993) observes that the tension between Fine Gael and Labour 'was almost always between Dick Spring and either Alan Dukes or John

Bruton' (Ryan, 1993, p. 65). As a consequence, during his first term as Tánaiste, 'Spring had never had the time to develop a platform of change. And his first experience of government was one where he was entirely on the defensive, where everyday generated a fresh crisis' (Finlay, 1998, p. 14).

During his first term within his own department, Spring found himself having to deal with the consequences of the financial crisis, having to rush through legislation to introduce local service charges. He also introduced the Local Government (Planning and Development) Bill, 1983, which amended the existing law in relation to planning appeal procedures. As Minister for Energy, he introduced legislation dealing with the powers of the Electricity Supply Board, dealt with the restoration of the Whiddy Island oil terminal and nationalization of Dublin Gas. Beyond his narrow cabinet responsibilities, as a party-leader in coalition Spring had to deal with controversial policies such as a referendum to ban abortion, a referendum to introduce divorce and legislation to liberalise the availability of contraception. He also inputted into work on the New Ireland Forum to discuss the future of Northern Ireland (at which Spring led the Labour Party delegation) and the signing of the Anglo Irish Agreement on Northern Ireland. While these contentious issues created difficulties within the coalition parties as individual TDs and senators objected to aspects of the policies (for example nine Labour TDs voted against the Fine Gael wording for a referendum on abortion)<sup>138</sup>, there was broad agreement between the coalition parties as to how to address them.

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<sup>138</sup> Ryan, 1993, p. 64.

Against this background, it is possible to find instances during his first term in office as Tánaiste when, in responding to the crises, Spring was able to exert influence beyond his cabinet brief. A few months into office, in the middle of a budgetary crisis, Spring stated that cuts in the budget would be on the basis of government agreement rather than on the basis of what the Minister for Finance decided.<sup>139</sup> As described by Collins (1993), the incident arose as a result of a Spring's economic advisor warning him that he 'must take an instant stand against unilateral pronouncements by Ministers in advance of Government decisions' (Collins, 1993, p. 106). Spring did so immediately after the Minister for Finance issued a press statement on the budget deficit necessitating greater cuts in public spending and after the Minister for Transport made comments about the need for salary cuts in CIE (the public transport company). According to the Irish Times, 'a strong protest about the solo line being taken by some Fine Gael ministers was made to the Taoiseach' by the Tánaiste.<sup>140</sup> The Taoiseach sided with the Tánaiste on this issue and a statement was subsequently issued by Cabinet to the effect that decisions on budgetary matters had yet to be made by the cabinet.<sup>141</sup> The Minister for Transport subsequently retracted his earlier statement on salary cuts. While this example shows that Spring exercised influence outside his ministerial portfolio, it is unclear if this influence can be attributed solely to Spring being Tánaiste or his position of being leader of a party in coalition. It appears that there was no consultation within the formal structures of the Labour Party on Spring's reaction as he responded straight away to the statements from the Ministers, it is hard to imagine his party reacting differently. Indeed, media reports describe the statements as causing 'alarm among the Labour Party and its supporters' and

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<sup>139</sup> Finlay, 1998, p. 12.

<sup>140</sup> Irish Times, January 11<sup>th</sup>, 1983, p. 1.

that Labour Ministers were 'displeased' with the behaviour of the two Fine Gael Ministers.<sup>142</sup> So, even though Spring acted without consulting his party, his influence may have been derived from the perception that his party would take a similar position. Finlay (1998) makes the point that if Spring had not objected to the statement from the Minister for Finance, 'he would never had the authority in his own ranks to keep that government alive' (Finlay, 1998, p.13).

Furthermore, the issue can be seen as one of the Tánaiste and Taoiseach both facing down the Minister for Finance, rather than just the Tánaiste doing so. FitzGerald, who was Taoiseach at the time, makes clear in his autobiography that he was unhappy with the unilateral action of the Minister for Finance and had the Minister's figures independently verified and supported the Tánaiste on the issue. Indeed, according to Collins (1993), 'the Taoiseach sided with the Tánaiste against his own Minister for Finance, so the ultimate responsibility for the budgetary strategy of 1983 rested with FitzGerald' (Collins, 1993, p. 106). While, on the one hand, this indicates that it was the Taoiseach who made the critical intervention on this issue, it is also possible to read the event as a case where the Tánaiste acted in a Taoiseach-like manner insofar as Spring was enforcing collective cabinet responsibility and reigning in ministers from making policy solo runs. Even so, whether or not this influence was due to his being Tánaiste or the leader of a party in a coalition government, or indeed due to the support of the Taoiseach is open to dispute with no clear and definitive answer. So, while Spring achieved his goal, his influence on

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<sup>141</sup> FitzGerald, 1991, p. 435.

<sup>142</sup> Irish Times, January 11<sup>th</sup>, 1983, p. 1.

the matter cannot solely be attributed to his role as Tánaiste, nor can the outcome solely be attributed to Spring.

Also during his first term as Tánaiste, Spring found himself on occasions in dispute with the Taoiseach. There was a dispute over the appointment of a new Attorney General in 1984. As Collins (1993) describes it, 'Dick Spring wanted his friend and advisor, John Rogers, for the job. Garret [FitzGerald] fought tooth and nail against this' (Collins, 1993, p. 132). It had previously been agreed between the two coalition parties that Fine Gael would fill the vacant European Commissioner position, while a Labour nominee would become Attorney General. While another party member, Mary Robinson, wanted the position of Attorney General, Spring rejected her for the post in favour of Rogers. There were mixed feelings within the Labour Party on the matter – 'while Spring's colleagues were at one with him in rejecting the candidature of Robinson, they were taken aback at the proposal of his best friend, John Rogers' (Collins, 1993, p. 133). Spring insisted and 'his [Labour] colleagues didn't oppose his choice' (Collins, 1993, p. 133). However, the Taoiseach was a different matter, and he tried to persuade Spring to change his mind – 'Garrett [FitzGerald] balked, and did everything he could to try to prevent John's appointment' (Finlay, 1998, p. 30). Spring threatened not to support the Fine Gael nominee for the position of European Commissioner if FitzGerald did not support Rogers for the position of Attorney General. While Spring got his way, whether this was a result of his being Tánaiste or his being leader of a party in government is difficult to determine. Certainly, Rogers was nominated as he was an ally of Spring and there were

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<sup>143</sup> Financial Times, August 24<sup>th</sup>, 1985, p. 3.

<sup>144</sup> Finlay, 1998, p. 22.

opponents of the move within the Labour Party whom Spring over-ruled. However, the critical act in ensuring Rogers nomination - the threat not to support the Fine Gael nominee for European Commissioner – could only be credible if Spring was speaking on behalf of his party and if his party's TDs were not willing to support the Fine Gael nominee for European Commissioner in the event that Spring's nominee for Attorney General was not supported by Fine Gael.. So, it would appear that it was Spring's position as Party Leader that ensured that he got his way on the appointment of the Attorney General.

There were further disagreements within the coalition involving the Tánaiste over the future of the state-owned Irish Steel company. The Minister for Industry and Commerce (John Bruton) had decided to close down the Irish Steel company as it was losing money and trade unions had rejected a rescue package involving restructuring. Bruton issued a public statement stating that unless the proposals were accepted the government would shut the plant.<sup>145</sup> Spring was opposed to the closure. The Taoiseach had left it to Spring and Bruton to resolve the issue.<sup>146</sup> After intense argument, the two Ministers agreed to save the company and it received government support in exchange for a rationalization programme. So, on an issue outside his cabinet brief, Spring was able to reverse a decision of another Minister. Again, whether this influence was due his being Tánaiste or Labour Party leader or other more personal factors such as his being willing to face down John Bruton on the matter is virtually impossible to clarify with certainty. That there had already been a number of significant job losses in the area where the plant was located

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<sup>145</sup> Financial Times, August 24<sup>th</sup>, 1985, p. 3.

<sup>146</sup> Finlay, 1998, p. 22.

was also probably a factor in determining the outcome of the discussion between the two Ministers on the plant's future.<sup>147</sup>

While Spring was involved in further disputes during the lifetime of the government (the future of the Dublin Gas company in 1983, the dispute over the cut in food subsidies in the 1984 budget, the Radio Bill of 1985, the National Development Corporation in 1985 and the cabinet reshuffle in 1986), these were disputes between the coalition parties and any positive outcome could not be attributed to Spring's role as Tánaiste as distinct from Party Leader. As discussed by Finlay (1998) and Ryan (1993), there were clear Labour Party positions at stake on these issues and Spring was battling for these positions on behalf of his party rather than as Tánaiste. While these disputes were resolved, eventually, failure to resolve differences over the budget for 1987 led to the coalition breaking up with the Labour Ministers resigning from government and Fine Gael continuing in a caretaker capacity.

Spring faced a different situation by the time he entered government as Tánaiste again in 1993 in coalition with Fianna Fáil. His party had healed its divisions and, having been given the credit for his party's electoral success in the preceding general election and the Presidential election of 1990, Spring's standing within his own party was at a high. While this would not last, as new internal disputes arose during the course of the government (such as over the selection of the party's Dublin European election candidate), these disputes were not of the same intensity as the disputes during the 1980s. Furthermore, the

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<sup>147</sup> Financial Times, August 24<sup>th</sup>, 1985, p. 3.



new government was not under the strain of having to deal with a financial crisis (apart from having to deal with the issue of devaluing the punt immediately after taking office) and, at least initially, there were none of the personality clashes that plagued Spring's first term as Tánaiste.

As Foreign Minister, Spring found himself caught up in the developing Northern Ireland peace process and with EU matters, such as ensuring the Structural Fund allocation that Ireland had been promised, all of which involved significantly more travel outside the country than during his previous term as Tánaiste. While there were some disputes between the Taoiseach and Tánaiste at various stages in the development of the peace process, these could be considered to fall within the area of responsibility of Spring's brief as Minister for Foreign Affairs and cannot be considered to indicate influence on the part of the Tánaiste. There was also legislation to decriminalize homosexuality, reform of the legal system and the Oireachtas as well as ethics in government legislation, all introduced as part of the agreed Programme for Government. For the first time, an office of Tánaiste with a small staff was set up, the primary focus of which was to monitor implementation of the Programme for Government (see Chapter Three).<sup>148</sup>

That is not to say that Spring's second term as Tánaiste was all smooth sailing. A major policy dispute arose at the start of Spring's second term as Tánaiste in 1993 when a proposal came before Cabinet for a tax amnesty. It was proposed that tax evaders who

came clean to the Revenue Commissioners could, in exchange for paying a proportion of their back-taxes and penalties, be exempted from prosecution. It would raise tax revenue at a time when the budgetary situation was still fairly tight. The proposal was opposed by the Department of Finance and the Minister for Finance. Within Labour, there was some ambiguity about the measure, for while ‘most of the Ministers and their closest advisors were uneasy about the amnesty’ (Finlay, 1993, p. 170), they ‘were very anxious to get their hands on the money to spend on things like social services’ (Kavanagh, 2001, p. 136). The Labour Party Chairman, Jim Kemmy, was in favour of such a amnesty as a means of raising funds and spoke in favour of it at the Party Conference in April.<sup>149</sup> Nonetheless, according to media reports, the majority of the Labour Ministers were opposed to the proposal.<sup>150</sup> Crucially, the Taoiseach was a strong supporter of the proposed amnesty. This created an opportunity for Spring to exert influence on the issue. ‘The Taoiseach and his Minister for Finance, both members of the same party, were on opposite sides of the argument. If Dick [Spring] took sides with one of them, that would end the argument - whoever he sided with would win.’ (Finlay, 1993, p. 171). However, Spring decided not to take sides. To confront the Taoiseach would create tensions in the new government which could be avoided as the measure appeared to be unpopular within the cabinet and was unlikely to be accepted. In the event, opposition was not raised at the cabinet meeting and the bill was pushed through by the Taoiseach. It could be argued that this example indicates that the Tánaiste has little influence insofar as if the Taoiseach were in a similar position, they would have to make a decision, while the Tánaiste could not afford to make a decision in this instance. On the other hand the Irish Steel example

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<sup>148</sup> Ryan, 1993, p. 183 and p. 186.

<sup>149</sup> Irish Times, April 5<sup>th</sup>, 1993, p. 16.

discussed earlier highlights the opposite case where the Taoiseach did not make a decision and left the matter up to the Tánaiste and relevant Minister to resolve. What can be said is that this was in theory at least an occasion when the Tánaiste could have exerted influence over policy beyond his Cabinet brief, but he choose not to. Nonetheless, the ability of the Tánaiste to influence policy beyond his cabinet brief was not tested.

Further issues arose in relation to taxation policy in 1994 when the Taoiseach proposed amendments to the Finance Bill that would have eased the restrictions on wealthy Irish expatriates claiming non-residency for tax purposes and put an upper limit on payments of capital acquisitions tax. Spring revealed details of the proposed changes to capital acquisitions tax in the Dáil in 1997<sup>151</sup> while Finlay (1998) details the background to the proposal on non-residency. The effect of these two proposals would have been to reduce the tax liability of wealthy individuals. The Tánaiste opposed the proposals and ‘made it clear right from the beginning that these changes were unnecessary and unacceptable. In letters to the Taoiseach and Minister for Finance, he set out his opposition unequivocally’ (Finlay, 1993, p. 215). However, the Taoiseach did not accept these objections. Following weeks of tense discussions, the Taoiseach eventually backed down and the matter did not make it onto the agenda of the relevant Cabinet meeting. As for whether this was a stand-off between the parties in the coalition, rather than the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste, Finlay (1993) indicates that there were discussions between Spring and his close advisers, but not within the parliamentary party or broader party. While subsequent

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<sup>150</sup> Irish Times, May 26<sup>th</sup>, 1993, p. 1.

<sup>151</sup> Irish Times, June 28<sup>th</sup>, 1997, p. 6.

media reports indicated that ‘Spring threatened to resign from government if the Taoiseach proceeded with such an amendment’,<sup>152</sup> Finlay (1998) states that Spring ‘had come to the conclusion that the government would be over’ (Finlay 1998, p. 215) if the measure was passed at cabinet. In other words, not only would Spring resign from the government, but the Labour Party would withdraw from government. According to Finlay, the Minister for Finance also disagreed with the proposals but had been unable to persuade the Taoiseach to change his mind. So, from the evidence, it would appear that the opposition to the measure from the Tánaiste was the main reason for the abandonment of the proposal. However, it is unlikely that if Spring had resigned as Tánaiste over the proposal that the Labour Party would have remained in government. The threat of pulling his party out of government (whether implicit or explicit) was a key factor in persuading the Taoiseach to abandon the proposal. So, once again it is difficult to attribute influence by the Tánaiste on policy areas outside his cabinet responsibilities solely to his being Tánaiste as distinct from his being Party-Leader in a coalition government. A position in which the threat of withdrawal of his party from government would give him considerable influence over the government’s policy agenda.

The coalition ultimately fell as a result of a further face-off between the Tánaiste and the Taoiseach, this time over the appointment of the President of the High Court. The Taoiseach wanted to appoint the Attorney General (Harry Whelehan) to the position. However, the Tánaiste did not and the matter was taken off the cabinet agenda while discussions took place. When the Tánaiste was out of the country, stories that the

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<sup>152</sup> Irish Times, June 28<sup>th</sup>, 1997, p. 6.

Taoiseach's preferred appointee was about to fill the post appeared in the media and the matter was re-instated on the cabinet agenda (a meeting the Tánaiste would miss as he was still out of the country). After further discussions prior to the cabinet meeting the issue was again deferred. Matters dragged on for a number of weeks while Labour Ministers and backbenchers became exasperated at the possible fall of the government over the matter – 'eight Labour TDs went on RTE to say that in their view, the appointment of Harry Whelehan should not be cause for breaking up the government' (Finlay, 1998, p. 251). So, Spring was pushing this issue without significant support from his own party. Matters took a turn when it emerged that the Attorney General's office had been tardy in dealing with an extradition warrant for a paedophile priest. While this issue was still being examined, the Taoiseach pushed to appoint the Attorney General as the President of the High Court. Following a cabinet meeting at which the Fianna Fáil ministers approved the appointment, the Labour Ministers walked out. While Spring now had the support of his party on the issue, at a subsequent parliamentary party meeting he stated that the decision as to whether Labour remained in Government was ultimately his.<sup>153</sup> As Kavanagh (2001) comments 'it was decided not to have a special PLP meeting to evaluate Albert Reynolds response; this was left up to Dick Spring ... leaving the fate of the government in his hands and taking all responsibility away from elected parliamentarians' (Kavanagh, 2001, p. 161). Following confusion regarding when the Taoiseach was made aware of another controversial case involving the Attorney General's office, the Labour Ministers resigned from the government, which ultimately fell. Whelehan subsequently resigned as President of the High Court. So, while Spring was initially unable to influence policy on this occasion, his persistence combined with

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<sup>153</sup> Finlay, 1998, p. 256.

fortuitous circumstances to see the newly appointed President of the High Court and the Taoiseach resign but at the expense of the fall of the government.

While the coalition fell, this did not end Spring's term as Tánaiste. A new government was formed with Labour in coalition with Fine Gael and Democratic Left. While one might have expected a repeat of the tension that existed between Spring and Bruton during their previous time in government especially as Bruton was now leader of Fine Gael and Taoiseach, this was not the case. As Finlay (1998) observed 'All of us who had worked for the 1983-1987 government had strong memories of someone who could best be described as an intellectual bully... I was wrong - or else he had changed quite a bit ...I found John Bruton open, honest and always willing to listen' (Finlay, 1998, p. 277). A media profile described how Bruton's change in attitude contributed to smooth relations between the three government parties: 'Prominent people within the three Government parties agree that things are going well and that Mr. Bruton has contributed significantly to good relations. From the position where he was the Labour Party's bete noire in the 1982-1987 coalition government, the Taoiseach is a man transformed, facilitating and encouraging Labour and Democratic Left in what he intends to be a true partnership government.'<sup>154</sup>

As the new programme for government was implemented, Spring as party leader was involved in the passing of a number of potentially divisive legislative measures that led to

a referendum to allow divorce, introduced a freedom of information bill, that legalised abortion information, abolished third-level fees and introduced a series of public ethics measures including new mechanisms on state funding of political parties. These were passed with little division between the coalition partners. As Foreign Minister, Spring was involved in a detailed review of foreign policy that culminated in a White Paper on Foreign Policy in 1996 and also hosted the EU Presidency in 1996. He also had a more hands-on involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process where his role changed as he became the liaison with the Northern nationalists (a role performed by Fianna Fáil Ministers in the previous government) as distinct from the member of the government who liaised with Unionists during the previous government. As Finlay (1998) describes it: 'Over the previous two years, he [Spring] had frequently found himself in the position of urging caution on Albert Reynolds, and of putting forward a Unionist perspective in government discussions. Now in the interests of identical policy objectives, he was the one who frequently urged the harder line' (Finlay, 1998, p. 278).

Despite the heavy ministerial workload and smooth relations between the new government partners, that is not to say that there were not disagreements within the government. However, they did not create crises in the government in the way disagreements in the previous coalition had. An argument over when the state-owned telecoms company would be opened up to competition between the Fine Gael Minister with responsibility for the area and the Tánaiste led to discussion of the matter being

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<sup>154</sup> Irish Times, March 25<sup>th</sup>, 1995, p. 7.

deferred by the cabinet with a compromise subsequently being worked out.<sup>155</sup> While the Tánaiste had an influence on the policy outcome, this could be taken as the Tánaiste pushing Labour policy rather than a personal preference and therefore the outcome can be seen as the result of pressure from the Labour Party rather than Tánaiste.

As in the early days of the 1982-1987 coalition, the Tánaiste also found himself having to publicly rebuff a Fine Gael minister over public announcements on policy initiatives prior to the matter being discussed by the cabinet. The Minister for Justice announced her intention to introduce measures to tackle drug smuggling prior to them being discussed by the cabinet. While there was unease at the actions of the Minister, it was at her leaking of the proposals rather than at the content of the proposals and as a result the measures were agreed by the cabinet.

Overall, during his tenure as Tanaiste, while there were instances when Spring was unable to change government policy (the tax amnesty), in this instance he was opposed by the Taoiseach. Nonetheless, it is still possible to identify an instance when he was able to influence policy beyond his Ministerial brief despite opposition from the Taoiseach (the shelving of changes to capital gains tax and non-residency status for tax purposes). There are also a number of instances during both his terms as Tánaiste where he influenced government policy beyond his Ministerial brief (the budget crisis of 1983, the appointment of the Attorney General in 1984 and saving Irish Steel in 1985), however

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<sup>155</sup> Irish Times, August 4<sup>th</sup>, 1995, p.12.



it is difficult to take this influence as arising from Spring's position as Tánaiste rather than as leader of a party in a coalition government where the threat of withdrawal from government could be used to gain leverage over policy decisions. So while Spring the politician influenced policy beyond the policy remit of his cabinet portfolios, it cannot be definitively stated that this was due to him holding the position of Tánaiste.

#### **6.2.4 Sweden – Bengt Carl Westerberg**

Bengt Carl Westerberg held the position of Deputy-Prime Minister on one occasion.<sup>156</sup> During his term, he was also Minister for Health and Social Affairs. He was Deputy-Prime Minister in a four-party coalition and leader of the Liberal Party and was described as 'a crucial figure in the new coalition as the joint author of its economic strategy – New Start for Sweden, drawn up with Mr Bildt's Moderate party'.<sup>157</sup> The new government planned to remove restrictions on foreign ownership of Swedish companies, privatize a number of state-owned companies, cut taxes and cut government spending.<sup>158</sup> During its term of office, the government found itself facing a deep recession, rising budget deficit, high levels of unemployment, a currency crisis sparked by speculation of a Krona devaluation as well as a crisis in the banking sector. An added difficulty was that, despite having four parties in government, the coalition did not command a majority in parliament. As a result, it had to rely on the support of the newly formed populist New Democracy party whom Westerberg walked out of a TV discussion with on election night

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<sup>156</sup> 1991 to 1994.

<sup>157</sup> Financial Times, October 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1991, p. 2.

<sup>158</sup> Financial Times, November 13<sup>th</sup>, 1991, p. 2.

due to its right wing policies on immigration and proposals to cut foreign aid.<sup>159</sup> Despite these difficulties, the coalition managed to govern for three years. As Minister for Health and Social Affairs, Westerberg introduced measures to encourage fathers to take parental leave, legislation on disability and pension reform.<sup>160</sup> He was also a vocal supporter of the moves towards Swedish membership of the European Union (his party held a congress in late 1993 adopting a pro-EU stance). While this issue did cause splits in Swedish politics, the various party elites were united in being pro-EU, with very little dissent within the government on the matter. Indeed the government declared that full EU membership was one of its primary objectives.<sup>161</sup>

Westerberg found himself in dispute with his government partners on a number of issues. In early 1992, he diverged from his coalition partners on the issue of tax cuts, arguing in a television interview that he had changed his mind on the need to reduce taxes and that he did not think cuts in government spending were possible or necessary.<sup>162</sup> Cuts in tax levels funded by cuts in government spending were a central component of the government's agenda. While planned tax cuts were cancelled, this had more to do with the decline in Swedish economic fortunes rather than pressure from Westerberg.<sup>163</sup> The recession had worsened during the course of the government's term in office with unemployment climbing to 10 per cent by 1993 and in the three years of the coalition the national debt doubled. This decline in the economic situation required dramatic action by

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<sup>159</sup> The Economist, September 21<sup>st</sup>, 1991, p. 60.

<sup>160</sup> The Guardian, November 13<sup>th</sup>, 1993, p. 39 and [http://www.folpartiet.se/templates/SimplePage\\_7186.aspx](http://www.folpartiet.se/templates/SimplePage_7186.aspx) [accessed March 2nd 2005].

<sup>161</sup> Miles & Widfeldt, 1995, pp. 1514-1515.

<sup>162</sup> The Financial Times, January 21<sup>st</sup>, 1992, p. 3.

<sup>163</sup> Hadenius, 1997, p. 153.

the government and rendered many of its planned initiatives unfeasible.<sup>164</sup> Furthermore to get a policy response to the economic crisis through parliament, the minority government required the support of one of the opposition parties. A number of crisis agreements were reached with the opposition Social Democrats in an attempt to tackle the economic crisis and the cancellation of tax cuts were part of these agreements.<sup>165</sup> So while this issue was potentially a situation where the ability of the deputy-leader to influence government policy could be tested, it would appear that the economic situation and minority status of the government were the key factors in bringing the government into line with the thinking of the deputy-leader.

As Minister for Health and Social Affairs, Westerberg found himself at odds with his cabinet colleagues on family policy, specifically on the issue of a proposed care allowance that would enable a parent to stay at home beyond the duration of the existing parental leave.<sup>166</sup> It was a means of returning childcare to the home and giving parents choice over the care of their children. The Centre, Moderate and Christian Democratic parties all supported this proposal, while Westerberg's Liberal Party ultimately went along with the proposal in exchange for other changes in childcare law. The proposal was passed by parliament and came into effect in July 1994. The Liberal Party had up to this point supported childcare institutions and an equal sharing of care responsibilities between parents (the care allowance would it was argued result in more women staying at home to look after their children). Westerberg, in particular, did not believe that the care allowance should be a substitute for a generous system of publicly funded childcare

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<sup>164</sup> Hadenius, 1997, p. 152.

<sup>165</sup> Hadenius, 1997, p. 153.

facilities and he also believed in both parents having a role in caring for children. So on the one hand, the result of the Liberal Party deal on the care allowance was that they agreed to support a policy which they (and Westerberg in particular) disagreed with. On the other hand, they gained agreement to implement a number of childcare policies that they favoured including the so-called 'Daddy month' whereby a month of paid parental leave is reserved for fathers and a law giving working parents the right to public childcare. Although these measures were implemented, it was as a result of a deal with the Liberal Party rather than due to the influence of the deputy-leader that they gained support within the coalition government. So, Westerberg only had influence over these policies insofar as he was party-leader of the Liberals.

A policy area where Westerberg was prominent was his opposition to the New Democracy party. During the 1991 elections he criticised the party for its anti-immigrant policies. He refused to enter government with them despite the four-party coalition of which he was part not having a majority in parliament. The currency crisis of 1992 put pressure on the government parties to gain the support of the opposition parties for austerity packages to restore confidence in the Swedish economy. While the Prime Minister was willing to contemplate seeking the support of New Democracy if agreement could not be reached with the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, these suggestions were 'firmly resisted by Westerberg and any thoughts of involving New Democracy were soon abandoned' (Widfeldt, 2001, p. 13). As the 1994 General Election approached the Social Democrats were less inclined to do deals with the government and so the government was forced to come to an agreement on an ad-hoc basis with New

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<sup>166</sup> Information on this issue taken from Bergqvist (2003).

Democracy at the level of parliamentary committees. While the government had options in terms of who it could seek the support of from amongst the opposition parties, it did not choose New Democracy; however the government had no alternative but to attempt to negotiate with New Democracy once the Social Democrats reverted to a policy of opposition. Westerberg was the most vocal and visible opponent of doing a deal with New Democracy, but can the initial decision of the government to avoid such a deal be attributed to Westerberg's position as deputy-leader rather than party-leader? Prior to the formation of the government, when Westerberg stated that he would not serve in a government that required the support of New Democracy, 'other influential liberals'<sup>167</sup> did not agree with him, so his party was not united on the issue. That is not to say that his party opposed his position on the matter. Indeed, his stance only had credibility if his party were to withdraw from government in the event of New Democracy joining the coalition. If he were to resign on his own then it would not undermine the government. The chairman of the Centre Party and Minister for the Environment resigned in June 1994 over the building of a bridge over the Oresund straits between Denmark and Sweden, yet the Centre Party remained in government and relations between the governing parties were unaffected.<sup>168</sup> Furthermore, it must also be remembered that Westerberg remained in the government when it was supported by New Democracy, albeit support that was not underpinned by a formal deal between New Democracy and the governing parties. So, when the coalition government initially refused to deal with New Democracy as a result of Westerberg's stance, it is unclear if this was due to his

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<sup>167</sup> The Economist, September 21, 1991, p. 60.

<sup>168</sup> Hadenius, 1997, p. 154.

party position or his position as deputy-leader. Ultimately circumstances forced the government and Westerberg to deal with New Democracy.

Overall, while Westerberg found himself on a number of occasions taking positions on policy issues that were at odds with his coalition partners, his record in terms of bringing the government into line with his views is mixed. He did not succeed in halting the implementation of the care allowance. However, proposed tax cuts were shelved in line with his change of mind on the issue and his attitude towards New Democracy led to them initially being kept at arms length by the governing coalition until circumstances left the governing parties with no option but to deal with them. Even in those cases where the government changed its position in line with his policy objections, Westerberg does not appear to have had an influence on government policy that can be directly attributed to his role as deputy-leader rather than his being party leader or Minister or indeed due to external circumstances.

#### **6.2.5 United Kingdom - Anthony Eden**

Anthony Eden was UK Deputy-Prime Minister for one term from 1951 to 1955. During this term he was also Foreign Secretary. He took over as Foreign Secretary in 1951 with a very full in-tray. Adamthwaite describes the position as ‘the most demanding job in the cabinet’ and lists the issues confronting Eden in this posting: ‘The cold war was at its height... Germany and Austria were dismembered and occupied with no sign of peace treaties. In Iran Prime Minister Mossadeq had nationalized the oil industry and thrown out the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Egyptian government had denounced the 1936

treaty with Britain which allowed the stationing of British forces in the Suez Canal zone until 1956. Early in 1952 the whole of the strategic reserve was sent to Egypt to deal with terrorism in the Canal zone. In Korea, a full-scale war raged between North and South... In Indochina France fought Viet Minh nationalists aided by communist China. Britain had its own colonial wars – from 1950 the emergency in Malaya, and in 1952 the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. Nearer home Italy and Yugoslavia clashed over their claims to the city of Trieste' (Adamthwaite, 1988, pp. 242-243).<sup>169</sup> This was all in addition to trying to maintain Britain's role as a world power while recovering from World War Two. There were more countries and international organizations to deal with and paperwork had increased exponentially since the pre-war years.<sup>170</sup> This workload was borne by a Foreign Office which was reduced in staff by economy drives and had its morale shaken by the defection of two senior diplomats (Burgess and Maclean) to the Soviet Union in May 1951. Furthermore, foreign policy was no longer the preserve of the Foreign Office with many matters involving the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Defence amongst others.<sup>171</sup> This situation was not helped by the Eden's ill-health which dogged him until well into 1953.<sup>172</sup>

In addition to the workload as Foreign Secretary, Eden as Deputy-Prime Minister faced a further significant constraint on his ability to influence policy. His relationship with Prime Minister Churchill has been described as 'uneasy' and 'acrimonious'

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<sup>169</sup> Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 253.

<sup>170</sup> Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 254.

<sup>171</sup> Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 256.

<sup>172</sup> Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 250.

(Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 241) and 'an increasingly difficult partnership' (Dutton, 1997, p. 239). The main reason for this was that policy-making suffered from 'two men acting as Foreign Secretary at the same time' (Shuckburgh, 1986, p. 126). This was a result of Churchill's determination to 'concentrate on his principle interests, defence and foreign policy ... whenever Eden was away – even for his honeymoon in 1952 – Churchill assumed control of the Foreign Office and launched policy initiatives' (Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 251). Rothwell (1992) agrees, describing how 'Eden's power was restricted by Churchill... [due to the]... many intrusions which Churchill attempted to make in foreign policy' (Rothwell, 1992, pp. 105-106). The difficulties that Churchill's interest in Eden's portfolio created were exacerbated by the fact that Churchill disagreed with Eden on a number of policy issues such as withdrawal from Sudan and Egypt and a proposed summit with the Soviet Foreign Minister (Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 251). As Eden hoped to succeed Churchill, he could ill afford to cross him and was thus forced 'to swallow policies which he disliked' (Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 251). Given this situation, it would appear that there was little scope for Eden to either implement policies that he favoured or stifle policies that he opposed.

This view is in many ways supported by Young (1985) who challenges the perception that Eden ruled out British involvement in the development of European supranational institutions in late November 1951 at a press conference in Rome despite the supposedly pro-European position of Churchill and the cabinet. Young argues that 'Churchill's commitment to European unity was limited' (Young, 1985, p. 924) and, thus, contrary to some perceptions, Eden had the support of the Prime Minister when he rejected moves



towards supranational European institutions and that the cabinet also supported him on this issue. Dutton (1997) agrees, arguing that 'The problem was that too much attention had been paid to the grand flourishes of Churchill's earlier pronouncements and too little to the small print ... the question of European unity did not figure high on the new Prime Minister's list of priorities' (Dutton , 1997, p. 292). That is not to say that Eden and Churchill were totally at one on European policy, as Young (1985) points out that Eden later found himself having to confront proposals which Churchill put to the cabinet dealing with the development of a European Defence Community (EDC). Churchill argued that the moves to create a supranational European army be watered down so that the separate identities of each national army could be maintained within the EDC. Eden countered that such a proposal might be seen as an attempt by Britain to sabotage the existing supranational proposals, which were vital to address French concerns over German re-armament, and, as a result, the cabinet did not adopt Churchill's proposals. So, it would appear that on European policy Eden was able to halt some proposals where he found himself in disagreement with Churchill but that the disagreement was not as great as was widely perceived.

A further area where the perception of influence on the part of Eden fails to hold up is the dispute with Churchill on the holding an Anglo-Soviet summit following the death of Stalin. Rothwell (1992) points out that 'Eden played only a limited part in the immense struggle in the Cabinet' over the issue, so the outcome cannot be attributed to Eden.

An area where there was open dispute between Churchill and Eden was Sudan and Egypt. Eden's policies advocating withdrawal from Egypt and Sudan were undermined at every step by Churchill – 'Each time Eden seemed to have won his point, Churchill – ever ready to take advantage of the Foreign Secretary's absence through illness or diplomatic business – was inclined to step in to undo what had been achieved.' (Dutton, 1997, p. 358). Furthermore 'few in the cabinet offered Eden much support' (Dutton, 1997, p. 358). This view is challenged by Rhodes James (1987) who contends that 'Eden had virtually the complete support of the Cabinet' (Rhodes James, 1987, p. 379) on the matter. It is clear however that Eden and Churchill were at odds on the issue – 'In February 1952 Eden stood up vigorously to Churchill in Cabinet when the latter indicated that he thought that the Foreign Secretary was ready to be overhasty about handing over Suez' (Rothwell, 1992, p.122). There was also considerable backbench opposition to Eden's proposals. The issue was only resolved when Churchill changed his mind as a result of the realization that the development of the hydrogen bomb, Greece and Turkey's entry into NATO and a lessening of attacks on British bases in the region lessened the strategic value of Egypt and Sudan to Britain. 'Churchill having changed his mind, now put his formidable influence into supporting Eden' (Rhodes James, 1987, p. 383) against a backbench revolt.

Adamthwaite (1988) highlights a more positive policy influence by Eden albeit a minor one. This relates to Eden's efforts to expand the overseas information services despite efforts by the Chancellor to halt any increase on expenditure in the area. A Ministerial Review Committee recommended that there be no immediate increase in expenditure and

this view appeared to have the support of the Prime-Minister. After over a year of stalemate, Eden was able to gain a more gradual expansion in the funding of the service.

It was not all a battle with Churchill over foreign policy. Eden also achieved a number of foreign policy successes during this period: the Korean armistice of 1953, the agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste, the oil agreement with Iran and the 1954 Geneva Conference which ended the war between the French and the Viet-Minh in Vietnam as well as ending the diplomatic isolation of the People's Republic of China. The later achievement being viewed as a major triumph by Eden – 'Eden and British diplomacy have been justly feted for their performance at Geneva in 1954 in ending the fighting (albeit temporarily) in Viet-Nam and in defusing a major international crisis' (Ruane, 1994, p. 171).

So far, all of this policy influence can be attributed to Eden's position as Foreign Secretary rather than Deputy-Prime Minister. In order to clarify the extent of Eden's policy influence as Deputy-Prime Minister his influence beyond foreign policy must be examined. Rothwell (1992), Thorpe (2003), Carlton (1981) and Dutton (1997) all highlight the intervention from Eden that led to the halting of proposals to float the pound in 1952 (known as Operation Robot). However, again commentators on the matter disagree as to the closeness of the debate within cabinet. Dutton (1997) states that 'the majority of the cabinet had more or less accepted that Robot was necessary' (Dutton, 1997, p. 267). Thorpe agrees, stating that without Eden's intervention the proposal would have been 'noddled through' (Thorpe, 2003, p.373) the cabinet. On the other hand, while

Shuckburgh states that 'the plan was strongly favoured by the Prime Minister' (quoted in Carlton, 1981, p. 296) he goes on to state that 'the position in the cabinet, we were told, turned entirely on what A.E. would do' (quoted in Carlton, 1981, p. 297). Rothwell (1992) takes a similar view, contending that 'the Cabinet was deadlocked over Robot and they asked Eden to exercise a sort of casting vote' (Rothwell, 1992, p. 107). This has led to confusion as to the exact role of Eden in the decision not to proceed with the plan. Was his the casting vote or did the decision come about as a result of the more difficult effort of Eden having to reverse what was an almost *fait accompli*? While views diverge on the precise role of Eden in halting a proposal he disagreed with, there is agreement however that Eden's intervention on the matter was 'decisive', indeed this is the word used by Thorpe (2003, p. 373), Burnham (2002, p. 85), Dutton (1997, p. 267) and Carlton (1981, p. 296) to describe Eden's intervention.

This influential intervention can it appears be attributed to Eden's position as deputy-leader rather than his position as Foreign Secretary as it related to an issue outside his policy brief. Although some of his arguments at cabinet against the proposal related to its potential impact on foreign affairs, he also 'attacked the plan vehemently on social grounds, particularly in view of the serious impact it would have on unemployment' (Dutton, 1997, p. 267). Thorpe (2003) sees it as an intervention 'into the field of economic policy' (Thorpe, 2003, p. 373), while Carlton (1981) describes it as an intervention in 'domestic affairs' (Carlton, 1981, p. 296) as does Rothwell (1992). Neither can his success in halting this policy proposal be attributed to his standing in the Conservative Party at the time as the confrontation over the issue brought him into

conflict with Rab Butler, the Chancellor, who would have had equal standing in the party. Shuckburgh, for example, writes of the press viewing Butler as 'a serious rival [of Eden's] for the succession to Winston [Churchill]' (quoted in Carlton, 1981, p. 296). The defeat of the proposed Operation Robot provides a clear example of Eden having the ability to undermine policies he disagreed with and also indicates that some of this influence extended beyond his remit as Foreign Secretary. Can it thus be concluded that this was due to his being deputy-leader rather than due to his being Foreign Secretary or his standing in the Conservative Party? Such a conclusion does not rule out other factors as contributing to Eden's influential role in this decision (factors such as Eden's reputation, experience or the strength of his arguments). However, the elimination of Eden's additional cabinet responsibilities and standing in the party as contributory factors to his influence on this issue leaves his position as deputy-leader as a major contributing factor. While it is not possible to account for every factor, and indeed different factors may have played a role in influencing different members of the cabinet in reaching their decision, what can be said is that there is good evidence to suggest that Eden's position as deputy-leader, was a contributory factor in the cabinet rejecting Operation Robot.

So, in conclusion, while Eden faced considerable opposition from his Prime Minister, and his influence on certain policies areas has been exaggerated (such as on Europe), it is still possible to identify policies which he favoured that he was able to push through cabinet despite opposition (Egypt, Sudan and the expansion of the budget for the overseas information services) and policy proposals beyond his area of direct responsibility that he

disagreed with which he was able to stifle (the Robot plan). It is however difficult to state clearly that this influence was due solely to his being deputy-leader.

#### **6.2.6 United States – Walter Mondale**

Walter Mondale was Vice-President of the United States from 1977 to 1981. In contrast with Anthony Eden, Walter Mondale enjoyed a good working relationship with his immediate superior – President Carter. Cronin and Genovese (1998) point out that ‘Most students of the vice presidency agree that Mondale enjoyed a closer relationship with his boss, President Jimmy Carter, than any previous vice president ... he tried in earnest to make the vice president as close as one can get to a full working partner.’ (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 329). Hatfield (1997) in his study of Vice-Presidents echoes this view, as he describes Carter and Mondale as forming ‘a remarkably close team’ and that Carter was ‘determined to make Mondale more of a partner’.<sup>173</sup> Mondale had an open invitation to attend all the president’s meetings and to bring his staff along as well as access to reports and weekly lunch meetings with the President. He was given an office close to the President’s and the Vice-President’s staff were treated as part of the President’s staff. These factors combined to give Mondale influence within the White House, as Hatfield notes: ‘The vice president’s free access to the Oval Office gave him considerable leverage over the administration’s agenda’.<sup>174</sup> That he did not have cabinet responsibilities beyond being Vice-President or a formal position within his party is not to say that there were not plenty of possibilities for the Vice-President to fill his time

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<sup>173</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

with, and indeed distract him from substantive policy influence. Mondale avoided many such possibilities, which actually increased his influence, because he was thus able to avoid becoming bogged down with specific tasks. 'Some 75 percent of the two staffs [Presidential and Vice-Presidential] suggested that Mondale's avoidance of line assignments increased his influence. In refusing such assignments, Mondale avoided bureaucratic infighting, while saving considerable time and energy for substantive policy interests' (Light, 1984, p. 628). Having studied the track records of previous Vice-Presidents, Mondale realized that many of his predecessors took on minor or ceremonial functions 'in order to appear that their role was significant'<sup>175</sup> yet ended up too busy to have a real impact on policy. Indeed, this was one of the key pieces of advice he gave his successor as Vice President, 'if such an assignment is important, it will then cut across the responsibilities of one or two cabinet officers or others and embroil you in a bureaucratic fight that would be disastrous. If it is meaningless or trivial, it will undermine your reputation and squander your time.' (quoted in Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 332). He rejected acting as Chief of Staff for similar reasons – 'it would have consumed vast amounts of my time with staff work and distracted me from important work' (quoted in Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 330). As a result, 'Vice-President Mondale is credited with being perhaps the first in that job who regularly exercised substantive policy influence rather than merely an occasional input of ideas.' (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 330). This view is shared by Felzenberg (2001) who holds that Mondale 'was the first vice president to command major influence within and without the

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<sup>174</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>175</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

administration in which he served'<sup>176</sup> and by Lewis (1984) who talks of Mondale's 'success at overcoming the job's historic limitations' (Lewis, 1984, p. 208). The US Vice-President, while a member of cabinet, does not have additional cabinet responsibilities in the way that deputy-leaders in the other states in this study do. Furthermore, in the specific case of Mondale, he did not have any formal party-leadership role. So, his policy influence (if any) during his term as Vice-President would seem to flow from his being Vice-President.

Light (1984) has conducted a major study of the nature and extent of Mondale's influence, interviewing eighteen top Mondale aides and twenty-six Carter aides. He found that Mondale was involved in a considerable number of decisions made by Carter such as the establishment of the Department of Education, the Camp David Summit, welfare reform, enactment of the Panama Canal treaties, the SALT II treaties, urban assistance programs and electoral reform, however he acknowledges that 'whether Mondale was the swing vote on all decisions is doubtful' (Light, 1984, p. 621). Nonetheless, Mondale was able to exert influence as he was in charge of the agenda-setting process for Carter's legislative program, he was thus able to 'win support for electoral reform and the establishment of the Department of Education as administration priorities' (Light, 1984, p. 638). From his survey of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential staff, Light (1984) found that '100 percent of the Mondale staff and over 80 percent of the Carter staff said that Mondale influenced Carter's agenda. Though there was predictable overstating of the importance among the vice-president's staff, ... if staff perceptions are accepted as an indicator of influence, Mondale emerges as a key player in

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<sup>176</sup> Available from: [http://www.policyreview.org/feb01/felzenberg\\_print.html](http://www.policyreview.org/feb01/felzenberg_print.html) [accessed 14 March 2002].



the White House policy process' (Light, 1984, 621). Cronin and Genovese's (1998) view of Mondale as a limited initiator of policy is not inconsistent with this, insofar as Mondale was able to prioritise those policies initiated by others which he was in favour of. That is not to say that Mondale always got what he wanted. As Lewis points out, 'By the end of the first year in office, it had become clear that there were limits to Mondale's ability to influence Carter's policies... He fought to salvage the fifty-dollar tax rebate as the centerpiece of Carter's economic-stimulus package – and lost. He fought for a higher minimum wage – and lost. He fought for higher farm prices – and lost.' (Lewis, 1984, pp. 202-203). Having said that, Lewis (1984) also points to a number of areas where Mondale did have real influence, such as persuading the President to order the Navy to rescue boat people in the South China Sea over the objections of the State Department, the Department of Justice and the Navy. So, Mondale, while not always successful at influencing policy, did have a number of successes to his name.

However, towards the end of his Vice-Presidency, as the election loomed, Mondale was 'forced into a rather unbecoming "cheerleader-in-chief" role' (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 318) as on the one hand he battled liberal Democrats during the renomination process and conservative Republicans during the Presidential election. During the later half of his term as Vice-President, as the public's support for the Carter administration fell as a result of inflation, recession, the energy crisis and a number of foreign policy crises such as the Iran hostages and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Mondale's influence was perceived to wane somewhat. As Light acknowledges Mondale had 'his share of internal defeats' (Light, 1984, p. 618), citing for example that Mondale advised

against the cabinet firings of 1979 which Carter went ahead with. That is not to say that Mondale went from having considerable influence at the start of his term as Vice-President to having none towards the end of the term. Light (1984) indicates that Mondale adapted his strategy to address the changed circumstances in which he found himself, moving to a more defensive approach which he summarises as:

‘First he tried to stop competing programs completely. If he could not win, perhaps he could stalemate the opposition. Second, after failing to stop the competition, Mondale tried to modify competing programs. By amending and adjusting opposition programs, Mondale could still gain a measure of influence ... Third, after failing to stop or modify, Mondale tried to delay competing programs. As Mondale had learned in the Senate, delays of weeks or months could mean the difference between legislative success or failure.’ (Light, 1984, p. 638).

Thus Mondale was still able to exert influence over Middle East policy by toning it down rather than removing it from the agenda. Light (1984) quotes a Mondale aide with another example of this approach – ‘We didn’t have the edge on the budget after 1978 ... the only choice was to work to keep the cuts from going too deep. We couldn’t stop the cuts from happening ... the best way to go was to keep some of the amounts down’ (Light, 1984, p. 638). Cronin and Genovese (1998) also agree that Mondale ‘succeeded in blocking some bad initiatives’ (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 330), while pointing out that ‘he also failed on a number of occasions’ (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 330). However, for the purposes of the current research, it is sufficient to show that Mondale

succeeded in influencing policy outcomes (even if in a negative sense of undermining policies that he disagreed with) on some occasions.

So, the ability of Mondale to determine policy outcomes varied over the course of his term as Vice-President. Early in his term it is possible to identify policies with which he agreed that he was able to push through (electoral reform and the establishment of the Department of Education). While his policy influence was reduced as he 'had trouble getting good things on [the agenda] later in the term' (Light, 1984, p. 638). He adapted to this situation by focusing on stifling policies proposals that he disagreed with (the budget and the Middle East for example). Mondale exerted influence over policy outcomes during his entire term as Vice-President to such an extent that Lewis (1984) argues that 'Mondale was a contributing member of the Carter administration, no question. The Carter record, to a significant degree is Mondale's.' (Lewis, 1984, p. 217). This was a not inconsiderable level of policy influence.

As Mondale did not hold any cabinet position other than Vice-President, his influence on policy can it appears be directly attributed to his being Vice-President. However, while not holding a formal position of leadership within his party, his position as a leading liberal within the Democratic Party may have given him some influence with the President, particularly later in his term when Carter faced a liberal challenge for his party's nomination from Senator Edward Kennedy. Light's survey of Presidential and Vice-Presidential staff found that Mondale's ties to the liberal wing of the Democratic Party were a factor in his influence with over half of Mondale and Carter's staffs

highlighting this as a factor in Mondale's influence,<sup>177</sup> with Mondale's liberal connections being 'of some worth to Carter in rebuilding his electoral coalition to defeat Kennedy for the 1980 Democratic nomination' (Light, 1984, p. 628). While not having a formal role in the party, Hatfield (1997) observes that 'As a senator, vice president and presidential candidate, Mondale played a transitional role in the Democratic party, seeking to bridge the generational and ideological divisions that racked the party during and after the 1960s.'<sup>178</sup> While Mondale's liberal connections helped Carter's bid to be renominated at the end of his term, his party connections were also useful at the start of his term as Vice-President. With a long political track record and extensive network of contacts in Congress, Mondale's 'longstanding friendships on Capital Hill, formed during a dozen years as a senator, remained intact and were of great help at moments of high controversy, such as ratification of the Panama Canal treaties' (Lewis, 1984, p. 217). Mondale also had strong ties to the Trade Unions, which he was able to use, for example, to help get support for the White House plan to bail out Chrysler.<sup>179</sup> Indeed, Cronin and Genovese (1998) highlight the view that 'Mondale's influence stemmed from Carter's dependence on him to explain how Congress worked and to maintain close ties with the labor movement' (Cronin and Genovese, 1998, p. 332). Such a dependence was exacerbated, it is argued, by the fact that Carter was a Washington outsider, whose political experience as a Governor left him ill-equipped to deal with Congress. A task for which Mondale was well suited given his political experience. Light agrees with this assessment: 'In the Carter White House, Mondale held some advantage simply from the

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<sup>177</sup> Light, 1984, p. 628.

<sup>178</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>179</sup> Lewis, 1984, p. 216.

lack of Washington experience among members of the president's staff' (Light, 1984, p. 630). A Mondale aide described what happened: 'Knowledge was power in the Carter administration, especially in the first year. There were so many areas where Carter and his staff had little background that we had a number of vacuums. No one knew too much about electoral reform, so Mondale's chief counsel Michael Berman got involved. No one knew too much about handling Congress, so Mondale's chief of staff Richard Moe got involved' (Light, 1984, pp. 635-636). So informally, Mondale had a party role and his party experience was an invaluable asset to the White House. To what extent were these factors responsible for his influence over policy while he was Vice-President? While it is impossible to quantify the precise role that individual factors had in determining Mondale's influence, a number of observations can be made with respect to the role of his party connections in determining his influence on policy in the White House. While on certain issues, Mondale's party connections may have been useful, they were not always utilised by Carter. As Hatfield (1997) points out, 'Mondale cringed at Carter's inept handling of Congress and tried unsuccessfully to stop actions that might alienate the administration from its erstwhile supporters on Capitol Hill.'<sup>180</sup> Furthermore, as Carter and his team gained experience in the ways of Washington, what reliance there was on Mondale lessened. Secondly, being in the White House weakened Mondale's party connections as he pursued a separate agenda from his party in Congress. In the words of Lewis (1984) - 'many liberals... questioned whether Mondale stood up for their values or was just a weak reed bending in a strong conservative wind' (Lewis, 1984, p. 217). Mondale's party connections may also have caused difficulties for him with the Carter

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<sup>180</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

White House in that Carter's political background and those of his inner circle would have been more conservative than Mondale's. According to Light (1984), Mondale faced 'ideological opposition' (Light, 1984, p. 628) within the White House, particularly later in the term when 'Mondale and his liberal allies were frequently in the minority' (Light, 1984, p. 638) as Carter faced a conservative Republican challenge for re-election. So while Mondale may have had a party-related role during his term as Vice-President and this may account for some of his influence, it does not account for it all.

Lewis (1984) talks of Mondale's 'unprecedented influence as vice president' (Lewis, 1984, p. 278). While there may be other factors that contributed to Mondale being able to exert policy influence, being Vice-President was key. For example, Light (1984) makes the point that 'among recent presidents, Carter was the most persuadable across the widest range of issues', however, no matter how persuadable Carter was, Mondale would not have been able to persuade him if he didn't have the access provided by being Vice-President. Similarly, while much has been made of the rapport that developed between Carter and Mondale, it would not have occurred if Mondale had not been chosen by Carter to be his Vice-President. However, as Light points out that 'much of Mondale's influence [over policy] came from the fact that he was appointed to operate the White House agenda-setting process, by canvassing ideas and setting priorities for the Carter legislative program' (Light, 1984, pp 634-635), can it be said that his influence over policy derived from his being Vice-President rather than his being granted charge of the policy agenda-setting process by the President? What can be said is that if Mondale had not been Vice-President he would not have been given such a role. So, there is a strong

case to show that Mondale influenced policy while he was Vice-President and that his being Vice-President was the main contributing factor to the level of influence that he was able to exert over policy.

### **6.3 Conclusion**

Having examined the qualitative observable implication relating to the hypothesis that if deputy-leaders matter, then they will seek to influence policies that they believe to be important while in the office, it was found that results varied for the deputy-leaders who were the subject of case-studies. Only in the case of the United States was strong and clear evidence found that the deputy leader could influence policy outcomes and that this was not due to factors such as their status within their party or their cabinet responsibilities. While in the case of the UK, evidence was found that the deputy-leader was able to influence policy outcomes beyond their ministerial brief, however it could not be clearly concluded that this was solely due to his being deputy-leader. In the case of Irish deputy-leader, Dick Spring, there exists plenty of evidence of policy influence beyond his cabinet brief during both his terms in office as Deputy-Leader. However, during the first term, this influence may have been attributable to his role as party-leader rather than Deputy-Leader. In his second term, evidence was found of a case where he could have exerted influence but did not. Nonetheless, a further case was found where his opposition to changes in the tax legislation led to abandonment of the proposal and it appears that this was due to his opposition rather than that of his party. Thus there is a plausible case to be made that during Spring's tenure as Tánaiste the office mattered insofar as he could influence policy outcomes beyond his ministerial brief, but it is

impossible to prove that this influence was due to his being deputy-leader rather than being due to his being leader of a party in a multi-party coalition government. In the case of the Dutch deputy-leader, Borst-Eilers, she was able to push through a controversial policy within her own department when she had the additional position of deputy-leader. However, again it is not possible to state with certainty that this success in policy implementation was solely due to her being a deputy-leader rather than her party role. Similarly, in the case of Swedish deputy-leader, Bengt Westerberg, the government changed direction on a number of policy fronts in line with his views. The difficulty that arises is that these changes cannot clearly be attributed to Westerberg's influence as deputy-leader and are more likely to be the result of changing circumstances and pressure from Westerberg's party. So, while it is possible to show that those who were deputy-leaders have influenced policy, and in many cases policy beyond the remit of any additional ministerial responsibilities that they may have had, there is a difficulty in most cases in attributing that policy influence solely to the fact that they were deputy-leaders (as distinct from party-leaders or members of cabinet). In the case-studies of the deputy-leaders examined in this chapter, it can be said that the US deputy-leader was able to use his position as deputy-leader to influence policy, while the UK and Irish deputy-leaders may have used their positions as deputy-leaders to influence policy. In the Swedish and Dutch cases, the evidence is less clearcut as it is unclear whether or not their influence on policy was due to their being deputy-leaders or party-leaders.



## **7 HYPOTHESES AND QUANTITATIVE OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS RELATING TO DEPUTY-LEADERS LEAVING OFFICE**

### **7.1 Introduction**

This chapter will focus on the activities of deputy-leaders as they leave office and afterwards. It will involve the testing of hypotheses six and seven via two observable implications. Hypothesis six is concerned with the capacity of deputy-leaders to influence policy while hypotheses seven deals with the motivation of deputy-leaders.

### **7.2 Hypothesis six**

#### **7.2.1 Introduction**

The sixth hypothesis states that:

**If deputy-leaders matter then, where they are involved in significant policy disagreement outside the area of any additional cabinet portfolio that they hold, their removal from office will be sought.**

In order to test this hypothesis the exact circumstances in which each of the deputy-leaders in this study left office will be examined in order to determine if a policy disagreement was the main reason for their departure from office. The number of deputy-leaders in the five states in this study who left office early due to policy disagreements

will be compared to the total number of deputy-leaders who left office early to determine if it is a significant reason for leaving office early.

The deputy-leaders' reason for leaving office will be categorised in six ways: the government was not re-elected; they resigned; they were sacked; they were not re-appointed; they had to take the place of the leader or they died in office. For the purposes of testing this hypothesis, focus will be placed on those leaders who left office through either resigning, being sacked or not being re-appointed. Each such case will be examined to determine if policy differences played a role in the deputy-leader leaving office.

One issue needs to be addressed before this can be done. There is a practical issue of how to identify the reason for a deputy-leader leaving office. Often the reason given may not be the real reason. Someone resigning for 'personal reasons' or 'wishing to spend more time with their family' may in fact be resigning out of frustration with a policy impasse. In order to address this difficulty, focus will be placed not only on the public statements relating to the departure of the deputy-leaders in question, but also on media analysis of the departure as these will tend to identify any additional issues that led to the resignation.

### **7.2.2 Policy-related reasons for deputy-leaders leaving office**

Full details of the circumstances under which the deputy-leaders in this study left office are given in Appendix 6 and are summarised in Table 7.1. Three deputy-leaders in this

study are still in office and a number of deputy-leaders held the office more than once and left it under different circumstances so in some cases the totals under the separate headings are less than the total number of deputy-leaders for that state and in others they exceed the number of deputy-leaders for that state. From Table 7.1, it can be seen that the majority (65 per cent) of deputy-leaders left the office when their government left office after either losing an election or resigning. A further 17 per cent left the position by retiring or resigning. Four (six per cent) were not reappointed. Only one deputy-leader was sacked and none died in office.

**Table 7-1 Reasons for deputy-leaders leaving office.**

	<b>No. of deputy- leaders (1946- 2002)</b>	<b>Govt left office</b>	<b>Retired/ Resigned</b>	<b>Not Re- appointed</b>	<b>Sacked</b>	<b>Became leader</b>	<b>Died</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	10	2	1	1	1	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	20	4	0	0	0	0
<b>Sweden</b>	7	3	2	1	0	1	0
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	2	2	1	0	1	0
<b>United States</b>	12	7	1	1	0	2	0
<b>TOTAL (% of total)</b>	64	42 (65%)	11 (17%)	4 (6%)	1 (2%)	5 (7%)	0 (0%)

In terms of testing the hypothesis via the observable implication, the reason why deputy-leaders were removed from office will need to be examined. The deputy-leaders who resigned, retired, were sacked or not reappointed will be focussed on. The total figures for deputy-leaders in these categories across all five states are summarised in Table 7.2. From this it can be seen that four Irish, four Dutch, three Swedish, three British and two US deputy-leaders either resigned, retired, were sacked or were not reappointed. In other words just a quarter (or under a third on the basis of the average of the averages) of the

deputy-leaders in this study left office prematurely. Each of these individual cases will now be briefly examined to determine what role policy differences played in these deputy-leaders leaving office.

**Table 7-2 Number of deputy-leaders who left office early.**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who left office early (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	14	4 (29%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	4 (17%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	3 (43%)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	7	3 (43%)
<b>United States</b>	12	2 (17%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	64	16 (25%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		30%

In the case of the Irish deputy-leaders, both Sean MacEntee and Frank Aiken were at the end of long political careers when they ceased being deputy-leaders.<sup>181</sup> Both retired as members of parliament at the general election following their stepping down from ministerial office. Their stepping down as deputy-leader was not the result of policy disagreements but the conclusion of long political careers. The first of the Irish deputy-leaders to resign from office was Dick Spring in 1987. He, along with his Labour Party colleagues, left government due to 'rows over the budget figures for 1987' (Ryan, 1993, p. 80). While this clearly was a policy-related reason, the Labour Party members of government resigned as a whole rather than the deputy-leader specifically. The resignation was due to Spring's status as a minister from the Labour Party rather than his being deputy-leader. The policy difference that led to the resignation was between his

<sup>181</sup> Coakley and Gallagher, 1999, pp. 379-382.

party and their coalition partners rather than between the deputy-leader and his fellow ministers. Thus he cannot be considered to be a deputy-leader who resigned in the sense in which this observable implication applies. In the case the Irish deputy-leader sacked from office - Brian Lenihan – ‘he was a casualty of an incident during the 1990 presidential election campaign in which he appeared to be giving contradictory versions of an event in 1982 involving an alleged attempt to bring undue pressure to bear on the President... it brought about his dismissal as Tánaiste.’ (Coakley and Gallagher, 1999, p. 382). This is not policy related. So none of the Irish deputy-leaders can be said to have resigned due to policy differences.

As for the Dutch deputy-leaders, Louis Beel resigned so as to serve on the commission of enquiry into the so-called ‘Greet Hofmans Affair’<sup>182</sup> and thus his reason for leaving office was not policy-related.<sup>183</sup> Hendrik Korthals withdrew his nomination as a candidate for parliament for the VVD in 1963 and so did not contest the following election. The reason for this was personal.<sup>184</sup> Andreas Van Agt’s KVP party left government in 1977 due to a disagreement over legislation dealing with land speculation.<sup>185</sup> Similarly, Johannes den Uyl’s PvdA party left the government in June 1982 ‘in protest over cuts in public spending’ (Ellis, 1982, p. 2). So, two out of the four Dutch deputy-leaders to leave office prematurely did so as a result of policy issues. However, as with the case of Spring, in both these instances it was the party of the

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<sup>182</sup> Greet Hofmans was a friend and advisor of the Queen who was viewed as having excessive influence over the Queen. The Beel Commission was set up to investigate the matter. While its report remains secret to this day, contact between Hofmans and the Royal court ended. Information taken from: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greet\\_Hofmans](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greet_Hofmans) [accessed 13 April 2004].

<sup>183</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>184</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

deputy-leader rather than the deputy-leader specifically which had the policy disagreement, therefore none of the Dutch deputy-leaders can be considered to have resigned due to personal policy disagreements.

As for the Swedish deputy-leaders, while Per Ahlmark resigned for 'strictly personal reasons',<sup>186</sup> his resignation was preceded by a number of disputes over policy issues with his coalition partners. He 'found it hard to muffle his distaste for some of his ... [coalition partners]... favourite policies'<sup>187</sup>. A month before his resignation he had his 'biggest dispute'<sup>188</sup> with the Centre Party over nuclear energy policy (he was deputy-leader and Minister for Labour at the time). So, while his publicly stated reason for resigning was personal, it must be seen against a background of policy disputes with his coalition partners. The case of Mona Sahlin is more clear cut in that she resigned following 'allegations of financial impropriety'<sup>189</sup> arising from her misuse of a government credit card. Lena Hjelm-Wallén was not reappointed as deputy-leader following the general election of 2002 which returned the Social Democrats to power. However, she is described as having 'retired without controversy...having served in Social Democratic governments for many years' (Widfeldt, 2003, p.1098). So in the case of Swedish deputy-leaders who resigned from office or were not re-appointed, policy disagreements were a factor in only one of the three cases. In this case it was disagreement over a broad range of policies, so it can clearly be stated that one Swedish

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<sup>185</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>186</sup> The Economist, February 4, 1978, p. 51

<sup>187</sup> The Economist, February 4, 1978, p. 51

<sup>188</sup> The Economist, February 4, 1978, p. 51

<sup>189</sup> The Guardian, November 11, 1995, p. 16.

deputy-leader involved in significant policy disagreement outside the area of any additional cabinet portfolio that they held, resigned from office.

In the case of the UK, there were three deputy-leaders who either resigned or were not reappointed. 'Rab' Butler went from being deputy-leader to being Foreign Secretary in 1963 following the change in party leader (and Prime Minister) from Macmillan to Douglas-Home. This was in many respects a promotion as his previous cabinet responsibility had been for the Central African Office. Furthermore, it was his 'wish' (Butler, 1971, p.251) to be Foreign Secretary. William Whitelaw retired as deputy-leader in 1988 as 'he suffered a stroke in 1987 which led to him cutting back on his political activity',<sup>190</sup>. The case of Geoffrey Howe is a clear-cut case of policy differences resulting in the resignation of a deputy-leader. In his letter of resignation to the Prime-Minister he stated: 'Our conduct of policy on the crucial monetary issue in Europe - first on ERM and now on EMU - has given me increasing grounds for concern... The need to find and maintain common ground on the European issue within our own party will be crucial to our electoral success, and the future of the nation. In all honesty I now find myself unable to share your view of the right approach to this question. On that basis, I do not believe that I can any longer serve with honour as a member of your Government.'<sup>191</sup> So only one UK deputy-leader resigned over policy differences. As his only additional cabinet responsibility at the time was Leader of the House of Commons, he clearly was involved in a significant policy disagreement outside the area of his additional cabinet portfolio.

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<sup>190</sup> Available from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/382770.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/382770.stm) [accessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>191</sup> Letter quoted in *The Independent*, November 2, 1990, p. 2.

Two US deputy-leaders left office in circumstances where policy disagreements may have been involved. In the case of Spiro Agnew, however, it was a straight-forward case of a financial scandal involving 'illegal campaign contributions and kickbacks'<sup>192</sup> from his time as Governor of Maryland. As for Nelson Rockefeller, he was on the verge of being dropped by President Ford as his Vice-Presidential nominee for the 1976 presidential elections when he announced that he would not be a candidate for the Vice-Presidency. President Ford himself provided an explanation as to why Rockefeller faced being dropped from the ticket; an opinion poll had shown that '25 per cent of Republicans polled said they wouldn't vote for me if Rockefeller remained on the ticket' (quoted in Light, 1984, p. 627). So Rockefeller was to be dropped for electoral reasons. This begs the question – why was Rockefeller an electoral liability? Ford's campaign manager described Rockefeller as 'too old, and too liberal, and too much of a detriment to the ticket.'<sup>193</sup> Ford himself stated that Rockefeller's unpopularity 'derived from things he'd said and stands he'd taken earlier in his political career... he'd established a reputation as a liberal, and he had outraged many ultra-conservative Republicans' (quoted in Light, 1984, p. 627). While Rockefeller's lack of political popularity among Republicans may have resulted in his failure to gain the nomination, his age and policy positions were significant factors in determining his lack of popularity. From this evidence it is safe to say that Rockefeller's policy positions played a role in his being viewed as an electoral liability and not being re-nominated for the position of Vice-President, however they were not the sole reason. While these policy positions were

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<sup>192</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>193</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].



taken by Rockefeller before he became Vice-President, they only became an issue when he became Vice-President and so it can be argued that policy disagreements had some role in his not being re-appointed. As he held no additional cabinet portfolios, failure to re-nominate him can in part be attributed to significant policy disagreement outside the area of any additional cabinet portfolio that he held. However, if we are to take a conservative approach to classifying the reason for his not being re-nominated, it is difficult to see this as a clear case of policy considerations impacting on Rockefeller re-nomination. It could be argued that his lack of electoral appeal was the major factor in his not being re-nominated.

While only two deputy-leaders (three per cent) left office due to policy differences relating to issues beyond any additional cabinet responsibilities, these absolute figures do show that in some cases, the hypothesis was found to be true. In order to show that deputy-leaders can matter, rather than always matter, this is sufficient. Furthermore, when the figure of two deputy-leaders leaving office due to policy differences is seen in the context of a total of 16 deputy-leaders leaving office early, it can be seen as a significant reason for why deputy-leaders leave office early.

How are these results affected by breaking them out in terms of deputy-leaders who were party-leaders and those who were not and deputy-leaders who had additional cabinet responsibilities and those who did not? Only four of the 16 deputy-leaders were party-leaders at the time of their removal from office (Spring, den Uyl, van Agt and Ahlmark), all of whom resigned from office. Only two of the 16 did not have additional cabinet

responsibilities (the two US Vice-Presidents). These numbers are too small for any definitive conclusions to be drawn.

### **7.2.3 Conclusion**

Having examined the reasons why deputy-leaders were forced from office (ie resigned, were sacked or were not reappointed), it was found that of the 64 deputy-leaders, only two (three per cent) left office due to policy differences relating to issues beyond any additional cabinet responsibilities that they had at the time. Another four retired as they were at the end of their political careers, while three were forced from office by scandals unrelated to policy matters. So while policy differences do not offer a comprehensive explanation for why deputy-leaders left office early, they are a major reason for deputy-leaders leaving office early in that of the two of the 16 deputy-leaders (13 per cent) who left office early did so as a result of policy differences outside their cabinet responsibilities.

## **7.3 Hypothesis seven**

### **7.3.1 Introduction**

The seventh hypothesis states that:

**If deputy-leaders matter, then after their term of office as deputy-leader they will go on to hold another significant political office.**

This gives rise to one observable implication, namely that if deputy-leaders can influence policy (and thus matter), they will generally go on to other political positions where they can influence policy.

If the position is nothing more than a retirement home for politicians, then one would expect that, after leaving the position of deputy-leader, the former holder would leave politics altogether or move to another minor or ceremonial political position. Alternatively if the position of deputy-leader matters, then one would expect holders of the office to be significant political actors who would go on to hold other significant political positions (i.e. positions which can influence policy such as ministers, chairs of parliamentary committees and directors of international governmental bodies). For present purposes, membership of parliament will not be considered a 'significant' political position as in itself such a position rarely provides policy influence. Of course, there will be cases where deputy-leaders retire from political life or are demoted. However, in most cases, if it is a significant political office, then one would expect that holders of the office will go on to hold other significant positions.

### **7.3.2 Policy-related positions held after deputy-leaders left office**

Table 7.3 shows the results of the search to identify what careers were pursued by deputy-leaders after they left the position of deputy-leader. Full details are given in Appendix 7. It includes the total figures for the number of deputy-leaders in each of the five states in this study who went on to hold further policy-related positions, as well as those who took up a career in business and those who went on to pursue other activities

(such as writing or lecturing). It should be noted that these are not mutually exclusive categories as some deputy-leaders not only pursued further political careers but then found employment in the business world. There were also a number of deputy-leaders who simply retired and so did not pursue further careers either inside or outside of politics.

**Table 7-3 Career direction of deputy-leaders after being deputy-leader.**

	<b>Number of deputy-leaders (1946-2002)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who held policy-related positions after being deputy-leader. (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who held positions in business after being deputy-leader. (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>	<b>Number of deputy-leaders who held other positions after being deputy-leader. (percentage of total number of deputy-leaders)</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	13	3 (23%)	3 (23%)	3 (23%)
<b>Netherlands</b>	24	12 (50%)	13 (54%)	4 (17%)
<b>Sweden</b>	7	5 (71%)	2 (29%)	2 (29%)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	6	3 (50%)	2 (33%)	1 (17%)
<b>United States</b>	11	6 (55%)	3 (27%)	4 (36%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	61 <sup>194</sup>	29 (48%)	23 (38%)	14 (23%)
<b>Average of the Averages</b>		50%	33%	24%

Excluding the deputy-leaders still in office reduces the Irish, UK and US deputy-leaders by one each. While just fewer than half of the deputy-leaders in this study went on to hold further policy-influencing positions after their terms as deputy-leaders, there is a wide variation in the results across the five states. In the case of Ireland only 23 per cent of deputy-leaders subsequently held policy-influencing positions; however in this instance it must be borne in mind that in four cases (31 per cent of the total) the deputy-

leader was leader of a small party in coalition government (in this instance the Labour Party). For these deputy-leaders the deputy-leadership was the highest office they could aspire to and, after their last term as deputy-leader, they subsequently stepped down as party-leader and took a back seat in politics if not actually resigned from politics altogether. In other words, for a third of the Irish deputy-leaders their career options (in terms of policy-influence) were severely limited after their terms as deputy-leaders. In the cases of Dutch, and British deputy-leaders, exactly half of the deputy-leaders went on to hold further policy-influencing positions. In contrast, in the case of US deputy-leaders a clear majority of them went on to hold such positions and in Sweden 71 per cent of deputy-leaders went on to hold further policy-influencing positions. The holding of policy-influencing office is the most common career move for former deputy-leaders, using the average of the average measure, exactly half of the deputy-leaders in this study took this route, compared to exactly a third who went on to take up careers in business and almost a quarter who took up some other career (such as lecturing or judgeships).

As for breaking out the results so as to determine if party-leadership or additional ministerial responsibilities had any effect on whether deputy-leaders went on to hold further policy-influencing positions, given that this hypothesis looks at the motivation of the individuals involved, the distinction between party-leaders and deputy-leaders is not relevant to them.

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<sup>194</sup> Excluding 3 deputy-leaders still in office

### **7.3.3 Conclusion**

So do the findings regarding this observable implication support or undermine the hypothesis? The finding that using the average of the averages measure, 50 per cent of deputy-leaders in the states in this study went on to hold other policy-influencing positions neither conclusively proves nor disproves the hypothesis. However, the fact that in some instances deputy-leaders do go on to hold such positions indicates that in some cases they have an interest in policy and that it is not just those at the end of their political careers who become deputy-leaders. This conclusion provides some evidence suggesting that it is not correct to state that deputy-leaders do not matter.

## **7.4 Conclusion**

Having examined hypotheses six and seven which both relate to when deputy-leaders leave office, it was found that of the 64 deputy-leaders only two (three per cent) left office due to significant policy disagreements outside the areas of any additional cabinet portfolio that they held. So, policy differences were the reason for their departure in only a small minority of cases. In other words policy differences were not one of the major factors behind the departure of deputy-leaders from office, however there were some cases where deputy-leaders left office due to policy disagreements and these figures are broadly in line with those for leaders leaving office for similar reasons.

As for the career of deputy-leaders after their term of office as deputy-leader, a significant minority of deputy-leaders (50 per cent of the deputy-leaders in the states in this study) went on to hold other policy-influencing positions. This indicates that some

deputy-leaders have an interest in policy and that it is not just those at the end of their political careers who become deputy-leaders.

The findings that in some cases (albeit a small minority) deputy-leaders leave office due to policy disagreements outside the area of any additional cabinet portfolio that they hold, and that in some cases they go on to hold other policy-influencing positions suggests that some deputy-leaders may matter (insofar as they may have influence over policy). The fact that such deputy-leaders were found in all five states (for hypotheses seven) suggests that deputy-leaders mattering may not be not confined to one or two states. In order to properly assess this, the results of all seven hypotheses will have to be examined. This will take place in the next chapter.

## 8 CONCLUSION

### 8.1 Introduction

In chapter two, it was found that the literature on deputy-leaders is extremely limited and what literature exists is dismissive of the position of deputy-leader. The aims of this PhD are therefore to expand on the limited literature on deputy-leaders and to see whether they matter. In order to meet the former aim, a global database on deputy-leaders was compiled. To the latter end, seven hypotheses were derived in order to test whether or not deputy-leaders mattered. Over the course of the last four chapters, nine resulting observable implications were tested against the experiences of 64 deputy-leaders in five states over the period 1946-2002. If the observable implications can be found to occur, then they support the hypotheses. The more observable implications found to actually occur, the greater the likelihood that deputy-leaders matter.

Now that the hypotheses have been tested, it is the purpose of this chapter to bring together the findings with a view to determining whether or not it is correct to say that deputy-leaders do not matter. First, the findings from the global database will be summarised. While the database does not determine whether or not deputy-leaders matter, it meets the first aim of this research which is to provide further information on the position of deputy-leader than is provided by the current literature. Once this is completed the results of the testing of the observable implications will be categorized in terms of how strongly they confirm or reject the hypotheses. These categorisations will



then be used to determine whether the deputy-leaders studied had an interest in policy and whether or not they could influence policy. It should then be possible to determine whether or not deputy-leaders matter.

## **8.2 The global database**

The completion of the global database on deputy-leaders allowed for a cursory analysis of their role. This database looked at the 192 states that existed in November 2001 to clarify the role of deputy-leaders and the circumstances in which they are found. The majority of states (68 per cent) were found to have deputy-leaders with many having more than one, in total 191 deputy-leaders were identified. In terms of absolute numbers, most were appointed (168) rather than elected. On a state by state basis, again the vast majority of deputy-leaders (83 per cent) were appointed rather than elected. The majority (55 per cent) have additional ministerial positions. These ministerial positions are generally significant (19 per cent hold the Minister of Finance position for example).

Deputy-leaders are equally likely to be found in democratic and non-democratic states (both have a 68 per cent likelihood). Deputy-leaders are more likely to be found in single-party governments (78% have a deputy-leader) and in non-micro states (70% have a deputy-leader). Indeed, when categories of states with a small base are excluded, the greatest likelihood of finding a deputy-leader is among non-democratic non-micro-states with single party governments (86 per cent of such states have a deputy-leader).

The most common constitutional functions of deputy-leaders are to replace the leader in the event of temporary or permanent vacancies arising (80 per cent of states with constitutionally-based deputy-leaders give them such a role); perform functions delegated by the leader (23 per cent); assist the leader (20 per cent) and chair the cabinet if the leader is absent (19 per cent).

The findings that so many states have deputy-leaders gives some indication that deputy-leaders may be significant political actors. The findings from the testing of the observable implications will clarify this.

### **8.3 Summary of findings**

In order to facilitate an understanding of how well the results of the testing of the observable implications fit with the underlying hypotheses, the results will be categorised in terms of how strongly they confirm or reject the hypotheses. Four categories will be used:

- High: The vast majority of the results gathered support the hypothesis.
- Medium: The results are sufficient to support the hypothesis although there is some evidence to contradict the hypothesis.
- Inconclusive: The results are mixed and it is not possible to conclude in favour or against the hypothesis
- Low: There is little or no evidence to support the hypothesis.

Table 8-1 Categorisation of results of testing of observable implications arising from hypotheses.

	High	Medium	Inconclusive	Low
H1: Held policy posts beforehand	Yes			
H2: Had policy focus beforehand	Yes			
H3: Policy focus in office	Yes			
H4 – Ob Imp 1: Have budget in line with other departments			Yes	
H4 – Ob Imp 2: Have policy staff			Yes	
H5 – Ob Imp 1: Promote pet projects			Yes	
H5 – Ob Imp 2: Chair policy committees in office		Yes		
H6: Policy disagreement led to removal				Yes
H7: Held policy related office after term		Yes		

## 8.4 Rational for categorisation of findings

### 8.4.1 Introduction

The rationale for categorization of the results of testing the observable implications will be given in this section. The categorization was conservative and erred on the side of caution in that the results of each test were placed in the lowest credible category. The results of the categorization are summarized in Table 8.1 above.

### 8.4.2 Hypothesis one

This hypothesis stated that deputy-leaders would have had a background of involvement in policy-related posts if the position of deputy-leader mattered. If the position matters, then the office of deputy-leader would not be given to political novices and if it is a policy influencing position, then it would attract those with an interest in policy. The results from the testing of the observable implication were categorized as having a high fit with the underlying hypothesis.

All of the deputy-leaders bar one held prominent elected office prior to becoming deputy-leaders. Using the average of the averages, 86 per cent of the deputy-leaders in this study sat on legislative committees prior to becoming deputy-leaders, with the figures high across all five states. Just over 82 per cent held an opposition spokespersonship prior to becoming deputy-leader. Only in the case of the US was there a divergence from this high level, the US figure was 42 per cent. There was also a low level of previous cabinet experience among US deputy-leaders (eight per cent). Nonetheless, 66 per cent of the deputy-leaders in this study had previous cabinet experience. On all measures of previous policy positions, a significant majority of those who went on to be deputy-leaders held such positions. Thus, the results indicate a high level of support for the hypothesis. Looking at the individual states, it is only in the case of the US that there is a divergence from this result, with the US results indicating a medium level of support for the hypothesis.

### **8.4.3 Hypothesis two**

The second hypothesis stated that deputy-leaders would have had a background of involvement in policy-related activity if the position of deputy-leader mattered. All the deputy-leaders, bar ten of the Dutch deputy-leaders for whom data was not available, were found to have engaged with policy issues in one form or another outside of parliament (policy-documents, speeches on policy or contributions to policy debates in the media). Excluding one Dutch deputy-leader for whom data was not available, 97 per cent of deputy-leaders were found to have engaged with policy issues in one form or

another in parliament (proposing legislation and speeches on legislation and policy motions). So, using all the measures of previous policy activity shows that the vast majority of deputy-leaders in this study engaged in policy activity prior to becoming deputy-leader. This indicates a high fit with the hypothesis. There is also a high fit at the level of each of the individual states in this study.

#### **8.4.4 Hypothesis three**

This hypothesis stated that deputy-leaders would have a policy focus while in office as deputy-leader. It was found that 89 per cent of deputy-leaders issued policy documents, made policy-related speeches or proposed legislation while deputy-leaders. This high level strongly supports the hypothesis and is consistent among the deputy-leaders across all five states.

#### **8.4.5 Hypothesis four**

The fourth hypothesis states that if deputy-leaders can influence policy, then they will have policy development and implementation resources available to them. This hypothesis gave rise to two observable implications. The first is that deputy-leaders would have a total budget in line with other policy-making departments, while the second is that deputy-leaders would have a number of staff with policy responsibilities. In terms of the first hypothesis, it was found that there is significant variation in terms of the deputy-leaders' budgets, not just across states but also over time within states. It is only in the case of the US Vice-President that budgetary resources have consistently been

available to the office-holder. In the case of the Swedish and UK deputy-leaders the situation has varied significantly depending on what role the deputy-leader has been given. In Ireland, with the exception of the years 1993-1997, the Tánaiste has not had a budget available to them, while the Dutch deputy-leader has consistently not had a budget. For this reason the global evidence is inconclusive with regards to the results of testing the hypothesis. While at the level of the individual states, the US evidence gives strong support to the hypothesis, in the UK and Sweden the evidence is inconclusive, while in Ireland and the Netherlands the results do not support the hypothesis.

A similar situation arises in relation to staff with a policy-related role in that there is significant variation across states and over time within states. In Ireland (again with the exception of the years 1993-1997) and the Netherlands, the deputy-leader has no staff specifically assigned to them in their role as deputy-leader, while the Swedish, UK and US deputy-leaders have staff with policy responsibilities to assist them in their deputy-leader role but the number vary significantly over time. So, again the evidence is inconclusive with regards to the results of testing the hypothesis. The individual state results give levels of support for this observable implication similar to the last one.

#### **8.4.6 Hypothesis five**

This hypothesis states that if deputy-leaders matter, that they will influence policies which they believe to be important while they are deputy-leader. There are two observable implications associated with this hypothesis. The first one states that deputy-leaders will push for the implementation of policies in which they strongly believe and

that they will also seek to undermine policies with which they strongly disagree. Such policies should be in an area outside any additional cabinet responsibilities of the deputy-leaders and also not result from any party role that the deputy-leaders might have so as to ensure that any influence identified can be attributed solely to their being deputy-leader. This observable implication was tested qualitatively via case studies of one deputy-leader per state due to constraints of space and time. The second observable implication is that the deputy-leader will chair a number of policy committees with roles beyond their departmental responsibilities. This was tested quantitatively.

The test of the first observable implication found that that only in the case of the US was there clear evidence of a deputy-leader able to use his position as deputy-leader to influence policy. While the UK deputy-leader influenced policy in areas beyond their cabinet responsibilities, there was some evidence that this was due to their being deputy-leader but it was not absolutely clear that this was the case. In the Dutch case there was evidence of being able to push controversial policies through in the Minister's own portfolio area. However, it was less clear that being deputy-leader helped achieve this result. Similarly, there were policy changes initiated by the Irish deputy-leader, but it was not possible to attribute these solely to their being deputy-leader. In the Swedish case it was even less clear as to whether or not their influence on policy was due to their being deputy-leader or party-leader. So there was a high level of proof in the case of the US deputy-leader examined, a medium level in the case of the British deputy-leader, an inconclusive level in the case of the Irish and Dutch deputy-leaders and a low level in the

case of the Swedish deputy-leaders. Overall there would appear to be an inconclusive level of evidence with regard to this observable implication.

As for the test of the second observable implication, it was found that 57 per cent of deputy-leaders chaired policy committees while in office. This is due to the fact that all the US and 72 per cent of the UK deputy-leaders in this study for whom data was available were found to have chaired some policy-related committees in contrast with the Netherlands where none did, while neither Ireland nor Sweden has cabinet committees.

On the basis of these findings, there would appear to be a medium fit of the findings with the hypothesis insofar as the findings in two of the three states where the hypothesis can be tested strongly support the hypothesis and using an average of the average measure across all five states shows that 57 per cent support for the hypothesis.

#### **8.4.7 Hypothesis six**

The sixth hypothesis states that if deputy-leaders can influence policy, then their removal from office will be sought where they are involved in significant policy disagreement outside the area of any cabinet portfolio that they might hold. This hypothesis was tested by examining the circumstances in which the deputy-leaders in this study left office and comparing the results with the figures for leaders who left office due to policy differences. Out of the 64 deputy-leaders, only two (three per cent) left office due to policy differences relating to issues beyond any additional cabinet responsibilities that they had at the time. However, policy differences are a major reason for deputy-leaders



being forced from office as 16 deputy-leaders were forced from office and the two who left as a result of policy differences outside their cabinet responsibilities constitute 13 per cent of these. Adopting a conservative approach in terms of categorising to what extent this result supports the hypothesis, it must be concluded that the results of the test give a low level of support for the hypothesis in question. The results give a similar level of low support for the hypothesis across all five states.

#### **8.4.8 Hypothesis seven**

The final hypothesis states that if deputy-leaders matter, then they would go on to hold other significant political positions after they completed their term(s) as deputy-leader. In other words they would go on to hold other political positions where they could influence policy outcomes. Using the average of the averages measure, it was found that exactly 50 per cent of deputy-leaders in the states in this study who have left the office went on to hold other policy-influencing positions. The holding of policy-influencing office is the most common career move for former deputy-leaders; half took this option compared to exactly a third who went on to take up careers in business and almost a quarter who took up some other career (such as lecturing or judgeships). It should be noted that there is a wide variation in the results across the five states. Only 23 per cent of Irish deputy-leaders went on to hold policy-influencing positions. Exactly half the Dutch, and British deputy-leaders hold policy-influencing positions after their terms as deputy-leaders. In the US 55 per cent of Vice-Presidents went on to hold such positions, while 71 per cent of Swedish deputy-leaders did so. On a global level, these results would indicate a medium level of support for the hypothesis. In the case of Ireland, the results indicate a

low level of support for the hypothesis; in the UK and Netherlands they indicate a medium level of support; and in the cases of the US and Sweden, they indicate a high level of support.

## **8.5 Conclusions arising from findings**

### **8.5.1 Introduction**

Taking the categorization of the findings arising from the testing of the nine observable implications together what conclusions can be reached regarding deputy-leaders? As was outlined in chapter two, hypotheses one, two, three and seven are more concerned with the motivation of deputy-leaders. These hypotheses contend that deputy-leaders want to influence policy. If the deputy-leader wants to influence policy, then it is reasonable to assume that in office they will at least try to do so and will seek offices that allow them to do so. The remaining three hypotheses (four, five and six) deal more directly with the ability of deputy-leaders to influence policy.

### **8.5.2 Deputy-leaders' interest in policy**

What does the categorization of the results of the testing of the observable implications arising from the first, second, third and seventh hypotheses say about the level of interest of deputy-leaders in policy? From Table 8.1 it can be seen that the results from the testing of the observable implications from the first, second and third hypotheses each show a high level of support for the hypothesis in question. In the case of the seventh hypotheses, the results of the test show a medium level of support for the hypothesis. These results

indicate a high level of proof that deputy-leaders have an interest in policy as they tend to have held policy-related posts and had a policy focus before they became deputy-leaders. They also had a policy focus while deputy-leaders and tended to hold policy-related office afterwards.

These findings indicate that those who became deputy-leaders were significant political actors prior to coming to office and most continued to be so after leaving office as deputy-leader. This can be concluded from the findings that they held policy-related posts before they became deputy-leaders. From hypothesis one it can be seen that they held positions on legislative committees, were opposition spokespersons and had previous cabinet experience prior to becoming deputy-leader. Many also went on to hold political positions where they could influence policy after they left office as deputy-leader as can be seen from hypothesis seven. This is not to say that deputy-leaders are able to exercise a significant influence over the policy-making process, but that the people who held the position of deputy-leader in the states under study were significant political actors on the basis of their political activity before and after they were deputy-leaders. This in itself should at least provoke some interest in further research into the position of deputy-leader insofar as it can be reasonably asked why do so many significant political actors hold the position of deputy-leader at some stage in their political careers? Given that those who were deputy-leaders went on to hold significant political positions after they were deputy-leaders, it cannot be argued that the position of deputy-leader was a dead-end position at the end of the holders' careers.

**Table 8-2** Categorisation of results of testing of observable implications relating to policy interest of deputy-leaders on a state by state basis.

	<b>Ireland</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>US</b>	<b>Sweden</b>
<b>H1: Held policy posts beforehand</b>	High	High	High	Medium	High
<b>H2: Had policy focus beforehand</b>	High	High	High	High	High
<b>H3: Policy focus in office</b>	High	High	High	High	High
<b>H7: Held policy office after term</b>	Low	Medium	Medium	High	High
<b>Overall</b>	Medium	High	High	High	High

When the findings from these four hypotheses are examined on a state-by-state basis, are there any divergences from the global position? From Table 8.2 it can be seen that the results of the tests of the first three observable implications in each of the states all show a high level of support for the hypotheses, with the one exception being the testing of the observable implication arising from the first hypothesis in the US where a medium level of support arises for the hypothesis. In the case of the seventh hypothesis, the results at the individual state level are more varied, with a low level of support for the hypothesis among Irish deputy-leaders, a medium level of support among British and Dutch deputy-leaders and a high level of support among American and Swedish deputy-leaders. Only in Sweden is there a consistently high level of support for all the hypotheses relating to the policy interest of deputy-leaders. There are high levels of support for three out of the four hypotheses with a medium level in the remaining hypothesis in the cases of the US, British and Dutch deputy-leaders. On this basis, all four states would be considered to show a high overall level of support for observable implications based on the hypotheses relating to deputy-leaders having an interest in policy. In the case of the remaining state, Ireland, where there were high levels of support for three out of the four hypothesis with

a low level in the remaining hypothesis, this would indicate an overall medium level of support for the hypotheses relating to deputy-leaders having an interest in policy.

### **8.5.3 Deputy-leaders' ability to influence policy**

Do the results of the testing of the observable implications arising from the fourth, fifth and sixth hypotheses indicate that deputy-leaders can influence policy? From Table 8.1 it can be seen that the results show one medium level of support for the hypotheses in question, three inconclusive tests and one low level of support for the hypotheses. On balance, controlling for ministerial portfolios and party positions, these results would appear to provide an inconclusive level of proof for the view that deputy-leaders can influence policy.

This inconclusive level of proof indicates that there is not a sufficient level of proof to support or undermine the view that deputy-leaders can influence policy. In other words the results are not clear-cut. While this is not the most satisfactory conclusion imaginable, it is somewhat at odds with the current perceived wisdom which clearly holds that deputy-leaders do not matter. That there is no clear-cut conclusion to the tests suggests that there are insufficient grounds for stating that deputy-leaders matter but equally that those who state that deputy-leaders do not matter do not have strong evidence for making such claims.

**Table 8-3 Categorisation of results of testing of observable implications relating to policy influence of deputy-leaders on a state by state basis.**

	<b>Ireland</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>US</b>	<b>Sweden</b>
<b>H4 – Ob Imp 1: Budget in line with other depts</b>	Low	Low	Inc	High	Inc.
<b>H4 – Ob Imp 2: Have policy staff</b>	Low	Low	Inc	High	Inc.
<b>H5 – Ob Imp 1: Promote pet projects</b>	Inc	Inc	Medium	High	Low
<b>H5 – Ob Imp 2: Chair policy committees</b>	N/A	Low	High	High	N/A
<b>H6: Policy disagreement led to removal</b>	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
<b>Overall</b>	Low	Low	Inc	High	Inc

Is there any variation in the results from the testing of the five observable implications when they are looked at on a state by state basis? The results are given in Table 8.3. Testing of the first of the two observable implications associated with the fourth hypothesis at the individual state level shows that there is high support for the hypothesis in the case of the US, inconclusive results for the UK and Sweden and low levels of support for the hypothesis in the case of Ireland and the Netherlands. The results are similar in the case of the second observable implication.

The fifth hypothesis also had two observable implications. The test of the first observable implication found high support for the hypothesis in the case of US deputy-leaders but the results for the other four states were more varied, with medium levels of support in the UK, inconclusive findings in Ireland and the Netherlands and a low level of support in Sweden. There was high levels of support for the second observable implication among the US and UK deputy-leaders and a low level of support in the case of Dutch deputy-leaders. Neither Ireland nor Sweden has cabinet committees and so this

observable implication could not be tested in these states. In the case of the sixth hypothesis, there was a low level of support for the hypothesis across all five states

In contrast with the global result of the test, the evidence from the state by state analysis is more varied as can be seen from Table 8.3. The evidence from the US offers a high level of support for the hypothesis (four highs and a low). Results are at the low level of support in the Irish and Dutch cases and inconclusive in the Swedish and British cases. So, it would appear that US deputy-leaders can influence policy, while the evidence is divided on Swedish and UK deputy-leaders. In the Dutch and Irish cases it appears, on the basis of the evidence, that their deputy-leaders have little if any policy influence. This is to some extent reflected in the literature in that what literature there is on deputy-leaders focuses on the role of the US Vice-President. However, it is at odds with this literature insofar as most of the literature regards the US Vice-President as not having influence and thus not mattering. While requiring further research, the difference in the level of policy influence may be due to the differing roles of Vice Presidents and Deputy-Prime Ministers.

## **8.6 Do deputy-leaders matter?**

Given that there is an overall high level of proof that deputy-leaders have an interest in policy and the inconclusive level of support for the hypotheses relating to whether or not deputy-leaders have an ability to influence policy, what can be said about deputy-leaders mattering?

Looking at Table 8.1 again, five of the nine results from testing the observable implications fall into the high or medium categories of proof, while three fall into the inconclusive category and one into the low category. So, while the evidence supports the view that deputy-leaders can influence policy, there is also some evidence to the contrary. This reflects the differing levels of support for the view across the five states where it was put to the test and also the fact that there is stronger evidence for the hypotheses relating to deputy-leaders interest in policy and an inconclusive results in terms of the hypotheses relating to deputy-leaders' ability to influence policy.

Taking the overall results of the testing of the nine observable implications in each of the states in this study gives a different picture. For the Irish deputy-leaders tested there were three high levels of proof, one inconclusive and four low levels with one test was not applicable, giving an overall inconclusive result. The testing of the Dutch deputy-leaders gave three high levels of proof, one medium, four low levels of proof and one inconclusive test result which gives an overall inconclusive result. As for the Swedish deputy-leaders, it was found that four tests gave high levels of proof, two tests gave inconclusive results and two gave a low level of proof. One test was not applicable in the Swedish case. The aggregate Swedish result gave a medium level of support for the view that deputy-leaders matter. In the UK, four of the tests generated high levels of proof, two tests gave a medium level of proof, one test was inconclusive and one gave a low level of proof. In this case there was a medium overall level of proof. In the case of the US, seven of the tests resulted in high levels of proof, one resulted in a medium level of proof and



one in a low level of proof which indicate an overall high level of proof for the view that deputy-leaders can influence policy.

While the overall global results of the tests are inconclusive on whether or not deputy-leaders matter, the results are more varied across the five states in this study. In the case of US deputy-leaders there was an high overall level of proof. A medium level of proof was found in the cases Swedish and British deputy-leaders, while the results were inconclusive for Irish and Dutch deputy-leaders.

In terms of answering the question of whether or not deputy-leaders matter in so far as they can affect policy outcomes, the overall results are inconclusive, but the ability of deputy-leaders to influence policy outcomes varies across states with a high level of influence in the US and a medium level of influence in Sweden and the UK. So the perceived wisdom regarding deputy-leaders appears to be wrong in certain states and the tendency of political science to ignore deputy-leaders in all states needs to be re-visited.

## **8.7 Areas for further research**

In terms of suggesting areas for further research arising from this study, the first area would have to be deputy-leaders themselves. As was outlined in Chapter Two, there is very little written on the subject of deputy-leaders, due in no small part to the perception that they do not matter. The results of this research indicate that for certain states that view is mistaken and thus the subject of deputy-leaders is one that political science must revisit. Furthermore, in the case of those states where the results of the tests were

inconclusive on whether or not deputy-leaders matter (ie Ireland and the Netherlands), more information should help provide a conclusion one way or the other.

This research looked at deputy-leaders from the point of view of determining whether or not they mattered insofar as they could influence policy. Having found that they can in some instances influence policy, the next logical step would appear to be to identify (where possible) those factors that determine the level of policy influence of deputy-leaders. Do deputy-leaders in single or multi-party governments have more say? Given that two out of the three states where deputy-leaders were found to have some degree of influence have single-party governments, it would appear that deputy-leaders in this context have more influence. Such a finding is almost counter-intuitive insofar as one might expect deputy-leaders in multi-party governments to have more influence arising from the need for inclusive consensual decision-making to ensure the stability of the government. Given that there are very few political offices which can be held by more than one person at any one time, does having more than one deputy-leader at any one time lessen their individual influence?

What effect do different systems of government have on the power of deputy-leaders? Given that Lijphart's (1999) categories of majoritarian and consensual democracies were used to select the states for this study, to what extent do deputy-leaders have influence in majoritarian and consensual democracies? While this study found that deputy-leaders in the United States (a majoritarian democracy) had a high level of influence, it also found that deputy-leaders in Sweden (a consensual democracy) had a medium level of

influence. Furthermore the states where the least evidence of deputy-leaders having policy influence (Ireland and the Netherlands) would both tend to be on the consensual end of the spectrum. While these limited findings and intuition would suggest that one is more likely to find deputy-leaders with policy influence in states where politicians are less constrained in making decisions, further research is required to clarify this. A related area of exploration, given the different levels of policy influence identified by this research would be comparing the roles of the US Vice-President and Deputy-Prime Ministers. Does the apparent greater policy influence of the US Vice-President result from specific aspects of the office itself or is it a function of broader factors in the US political system?

In short, the conclusion that deputy-leaders in some states can have some influence on policy and thus matter implies that the subject of deputy-leaders is an area worthy of research by political scientists. This study has identified a number of potentially fruitful avenues along which such research might progress.

## **8.8 Conclusion**

Having summarised and categorised the findings from the testing of the nine observable implications derived from the hypothesis that deputy-leaders matter where ‘mattering’ was taken to mean having influence over policy outcomes, it was found that the overall results of the tests showed that deputy-leaders in some states can influence policy and thus matter. This conclusion is at odds with the perceived wisdom that deputy-leaders in general do not matter.

# APPENDIX 1 – GLOBAL DATABASE OF DEPUTY-LEADERS

Country	Deputy Leader (Y/N)	Title of Deputy Leader	No. of Deputy Leaders	Elected/ Appointed	Constitutional Basis (Y/N)	Constitutional Role	Ministerial Position(s)	Micro-State (Y/N)	Democratic/ Non-democratic	Single/ Multi party Govt	Leadership Structure	Comments
Afghanistan	Y	Vice Chair	5	Appointed	N	-	Each also has Ministry (Defence, Finance, Planning, Water & Electricity and Women's Affairs)	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	Chair	Grand Council (loya jirga) of tribes to determine govt.
Albania	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	None	Minister for Labour	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Algeria	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (President elected & appoints PM)	
Andorra	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Head of Govt & 2 Heads of State (including French Pres)	
Angola	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Antigua and Barbuda	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Non-democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Argentina	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Casting vote in Senate; See out term of Pres if dies/resigns/impeached; Act as Pres when Pres absent from the capital	Position vacant at present	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Armenia	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Australia	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister for Transport & Regional Services	N	Democratic	Multi-party	Governor General & PM	
Austria	Y	Vice Chancellor	1	Appointed	Y	Entitled to deputise for the Chancellor in his entire sphere of competence (Article 69)	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & Chancellor	
Azerbaijan	Y	Dep PM	1+4	Appointed	Y	None	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM (also First Deputy PM and 4 Dep PMs)	
Bahamas, The	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Bahrain	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Non-democratic	Non-party	Amir & PM	No parties allowed
Bangladesh	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (President elected by parliament)	Currently has caretaker govt
Barbados	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister for Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Belarus	Y	Dep PM	1+7	Appointed	Y	None	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	President & PM (also First Deputy PM and 6 Dep PMs)	

Belgium	Y	Dep PM	4	Appointed	N	-	Each also has Ministry (Budget, Employment, Foreign Affairs and Transport)	N	Democratic	Multi-party	King & PM	
Belize	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	PM may deputise functions to him; acts as PM when PM absent/ill.	Minister for Natural Resources and Environment & Industry.	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Benin	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Bhutan	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	King	Only non-partisan candidates are allowed contest elections
Bolivia	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	President of Senate; See out term of Pres if dies/resigns/impeached and acts as Pres when Pres absent.	Position vacant at present	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	Tripartite presidency (1 Muslim, 1 Croat & 1 Serb)	Muslim & Croat Federation and Republika Srpska both have VPs & Dep PMs
Botswana	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	See out term of Pres if dies/resigns and acts as Pres when Pres absent	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Brazil	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Replaces the Pres 'in the event of impediment' and succeeds him in the event of vacancy (article 79). Can be given 'special missions' by the Pres. Member of Council of Republic & Council of National Defense	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Brunei	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Non-democratic	Non-party	Sultan and PM (same person)	No parties allowed
Bulgaria	Y	Dep PM	3 Dep PM	Appointed	Y	None	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Economy, Labour & Social Policy and Regional Development & Public Works)	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Burkina Faso	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	Head of State & PM	
Burma	Y	Dep PM	2	Appointed	Constitution Suspended	-	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Livestock Breeding & Fisheries and Dep Min for Energy).	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	PM & Chair State Peace and Development Council	Military Junta

Burundi	Y	VP	1+1	Appointed	Y	Countersigns legislation with Pres. Pres names cabinet after consulting VPs. Pres can delegate power to VPs. See out term of Pres if dies/resigns/impeached and acts as Pres when Pres absent or in event of temporary impediment (article 81). 1st VP coordinates admin & political affairs & 2nd VP economic & social affairs. Can chair Council of Ministers if Pres permits.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President	Current president assumed power following a coup on 25 July 1996
Cambodia	Y	Dep PM	2	Appointed	Y	Assist PM at Council of Mins. PM can delegate his power to Dep PM.	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Economy & Finance and Co-Minister of the Interior)	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	King, President National Assembly & PM	
Cameroon	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Canada	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Cape Verde	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Central African Republic	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Chad	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Chile	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
China	Y	VP	4	Appointed	Y	Assist Pres. Pres can delegate his power to VP. See out term of Pres if office falls vacant.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & Premier, State Council (Also VP and Vice Premier, State Council x 4)	One-party state
Colombia	Y	VP	1	Elected separately	Y	Replaces Pres in event of temporary vacancy & see out term of Pres if office falls vacant. Can be given 'missions or special duties' by the Pres. Cannot be elected VP or Pres for the immediately subsequent term.	Minister of National Defence	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Comoros	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Non-democratic	Non-party	Head of State & PM	Head of State is Army Chief of Staff following coup in 1999. Parliament has been dissolved
Congo, Democratic Republic of	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	President	President succeeded father who seized power in civil war. The parliament and all other parties have been dissolved

Congo, Republic of the	Y	Min of the Presidency	2	Appointed	N	-	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (National Defence and Presidential Cabinet & State Control).	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	President	President came to power by Rebellion
Costa Rica	Y	VP	1+1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Replaces Pres in event of temporary or permanent vacancy. Cannot be elected VP or Pres if VP was Pres for most of term or was VP for 12 months prior to election.	Each VP also has a Ministry (Culture, Youth & Sports and Environment & Energy)	N	Democratic	Single-party	President (Also First VP and Second VP)	
Cote D'Ivoire	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Croatia	Y	Dep PM	3	Appointed	Y	None	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Cuba	Y	VP of the Council of State	1+5	Appointed	Y	Pres can delegate receiving of credentials of ambassadors to VP. First VP replaces Pres if absent, ill or dies	First VP is also Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces while one VP is also Sec of Council of Ministers	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President of Council of State and Council of Ministers, (also First VP and 5 VPs of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers)	
Cyprus	Y	Dep Min to the Pres	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Appoints 3 Turkish Ministers; shares exec Power with Pres; right to veto or return to parliament any law.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	Y	Democratic	Multi-party	President	Post of vice president is currently vacant; under the 1960 constitution, the post is reserved for a Turkish Cypriot
Czech Republic	Y	Dep Premier	4	Appointed	Y	Represents Premier.	3 out of 4 have Ministries (Foreign Affairs, Industry & Trade and Labour & Social Relations)	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Denmark	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister of Economic Affairs and Nordic Cooperation	N	Democratic	Multi-party	Head of State (Monarch) & PM	
Djibouti	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Dominica	N	-	-	-	-	-	Position vacant at present	Y	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Dominican republic	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Acts as Pres when Pres absent/ill & see out term of Pres if office falls vacant.	Minister for Education, Fine Arts and Public Worship	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Ecuador	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Acts as Pres when Pres absent/ill & see out term of Pres if office falls vacant	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Egypt	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Member of government	Minister for Agriculture & Land Reclamation	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
El Salvador	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Acts as Pres when Pres absent/ill & see out term of Pres if office falls vacant.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Equatorial Guinea	Y	Dep PM	1+1	Appointed	Y	Unable to find constitution	First Dep PM has no other Ministerial responsibilities while Dep PM is also Minister for State for the Interior & Local Corporations	Y	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (also First Dep PM and Dep PM)	Although nominally a constitutional democracy since 1991, the 1996 presidential and 1999 legislative elections were widely seen as being flawed (CIA World Factbook 2001)

Eritrea	Y	VP	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister of Local Government	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President	One-party state
Estonia	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Ethiopia	Y	Dep PM	2	Appointed	Y	Act as PM when PM absent	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Infrastructure and Rural Development)	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Fiji	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Act as PM when PM absent/unable	Minister for Fijian Affairs	Y	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	Interim Government following attempted coup
Finland	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
France	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Gabon	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	Duties assigned by Pres.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Gambia, The	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	Leads Govt business in Parliament.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President	
Georgia	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Germany	Y	Vice Chancellor	1	Appointed	Y	Chancellor appoints Min as his deputy.	Minister for Foreign Affairs	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & Chancellor	
Ghana	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	Duties assigned by Pres; See out term of Pres if dies/resigns/impeached; Act as Pres when Pres absent and Member National Security Council.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Greece	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Grenada	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Guatemala	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	See out term of Pres if dies/resigns/impeached; Act as Pres when Pres absent (both can't leave country at same time); represent country abroad and coordinate the work on the ministers.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Guinea	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Guinea-Bissau	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Guyana	Y	VP	1+1	Appointed	Y	Assist Pres; PM is first VP; PM takes over if office vacant.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	Y	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM (also First VP & Second VP)	
Haiti	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Holy See (Vatican)	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Non-democratic	Non-party	Head (The Pope)	No parties exist
Honduras	Y	VP	1+2	Appointed	Y	Replace Pres in temporary absence; See out term of Pres if permanent vacancy.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Single-party	President (Also First VP, Second VP & Third VP)	
Hungary	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Iceland	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	



India	Y	VP	I	Appointed	Y	Receives resignation of Pres & pass onto Speaker of House; Acts as Pres until new one elected; Act as Pres when Pres absent/ill; Chair Council of States	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Indonesia	Y	VP	I	Appointed	Y	Assist Pres in exercising his duty; See out term of Pres if dies/resigns or unable to perform his duties	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Iran	Y	VP	1+5	Appointed	Y	1st VP administers affairs of Council of Mins & coordinates functions of other VPs. Replaces Pres if dies/dismissed/ resigns/absent/ ill for more than 2 months or if term over & new Pres not elected (new Pres to be elected within 50 days)	No other Ministerial responsibilities for First VP but others have (Atomic Energy, Environmental Protection, Legal & Parliamentary Affairs, Physical Training and Management & Planning)	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	Supreme Leader & President	
Iraq	Y	VP	2 VPs	Appointed	Y	Member Revolutionary Command Council; Replace Pres in official absence or in case of the impossibility of Pres exercising his constitutional competencies or any legitimate reason can call meeting of & preside over Revolutionary Command Council; Can attend National Council & participate in debates.	Two Dep PMs have Ministerial Responsibilities (Finance and Military Industrialisation)	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM (also 2 VPs and 4 Dep PMs)	One-party state
Ireland	Y	Dep PM (Tánaiste)	I	Appointed	Y	Replace PM if dies or becomes permanently incapacitated & during temporary absences; member Council of State.	Minister for Enterprise & Employment	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Israel	Y	Dep PM	2	Appointed	No Constitution	-	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Finance and Interior)	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (also 2 VPs)	
Italy	Y	Dep PM	I	Appointed	N	-	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Jamaica	Y	Dep PM	I	Appointed	N	-	Minister for Land & the Environment	N	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Japan	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	Emperor & PM	
Jordan	Y	Dep PM	3	Appointed	N	-	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Justice, Interior and Min for State for Economic Affairs)	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	King & PM (also 3 Dep PMs)	
Kazakhstan	Y	Dep PM	1+3	Appointed	N	-	One Dep PM is Minister of Energy & Natural Resources	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM (also first Dep PM and 3 Dep PMs)	

Kenya	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	Replaces Pres if dies/designs/not validly elected to National Assembly (new Pres to be elected within 90 days); Act as Pres when Pres absent/ill or 'any other cause' that Pres may appoint him for, Principal assistant of the President in the discharge of his functions; Needs Pres assent to leave country; cannot be speaker of National Assembly	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President	
Kiribati	Y	VP (Kauoman-ni-Beretitenti)	1	Appointed	Y	If Pres vacant other than when Pres resign/loses confidence vote/loses seat or incapable VP sees out term; Act as Pres when Pres absent/ill; must be member of parliament	Minister for Home Affairs and Minister of Rural Development	Y	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Korea, North	Y	Vice Premier	2	Appointed	Y	Member of Cabinet	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	Chairman National Defence Commission, President Supreme People's Assembly Presidium & Premier	
Korea, South	Y	Dep PM	2	Appointed	N	-	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Finance & Economy and Education)	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (also 2 Dep PMs)	
Kuwait	Y	Dep PM	1+3	Appointed	N	-	Three have Ministerial responsibilities (Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior and Min of State for Cabinet Affairs)	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	Amir & PM (also First Dep PM and 3 Dep PMs)	Amir, PM and Dep PMs all from Al Sabah Royal Family. Only non-partisans allowed contest elections
Kyrgyzstan	Y	Dep PM	1+1	Appointed	N	-	Dep PM is Minister of Foreign Trade & Industry	N	Democratic	Non-party	President & PM (also First Dep PM & Dep PM)	
Laos	Y	Dep PM	2	Appointed	Y	Assistants of the PM. PM may assign a particular Dep PM to carry out work on his behalf in case he is engaged.	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Foreign Affairs and Chairman of State Planning Committee).	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM (also VP and 2 Dep PMs).	
Latvia	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Lebanon	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Lesotho	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Acts as PM when PM absent/ill	Minister of Human Rights, Law & Constitutional Affairs	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	King & PM	

Liberia	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Assist Pres; Chair of Senate with casting vote; Pres can delegate functions to VP; Replaces Pres if dies or 'is otherwise incapacitated' (article 63) and sees out term but if pres dies before inauguration, this is a new term.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Libya	Y	Dep Sec for the General Peoples Committee	1	Appointed	Y	None	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	Leader & Sec of the General People's Committee	No parties allowed
Liechtenstein	Y	Deputy Head of Govt	1	Appointed	Y	Acts as Head of Govt if Head is prevented from attending to his duties' (Article 88).	Holds three Ministries (Education, Justice and Transport & Communication).	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Head of State (Royalty) & Head of Govt	
Lithuania	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Luxembourg	Y	Vice PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Holds two Ministries (Foreign Affairs & External Commerce and Civil Service & Administrative Reform).	Y	Democratic	Multi-party	Grand Duke & PM	
Macedonia	Y	Dep PM	4	Appointed	Y	None	One Dep PM is Minister Without Portfolio.	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (also 4 Dep PMs)	
Madagascar	Y	Vice PM	1	Appointed	N	-	In Charge of Budget and Development of Autonomous Provinces	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Malawi	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Assist Pres; 2 consecutive terms limit. Act as Pres 'whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Pres' (article 83) for rest of term. If Pres incapacitated takes over temporarily; Preside over cabinet meetings if Pres absent.	Minister for Privatisation	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Malaysia	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister of Home Affairs	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	Paramount Ruler & PM (also Dep Paramount Ruler & Dep PM)	
Maldives	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Non-democratic	Non-party	President & Speaker of People's Majlis	No parties exist
Mali	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Malta	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister for Social Justice	Y	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Marshall Islands	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Non-party	President	No parties exist
Mauritania	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Mauritius	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister of Finance	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (also VP and Dep PM)	
Mexico	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President	

Micronesia, Federated States of	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	Act as Pres if vacancy or Pres unable to perform his duties.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	Y	Democratic	Non-party	President	No parties exist
Moldova	Y	Dep PM	1+4	Appointed	Y	None	First Dep PM and one Dep PM hold Ministries (Economy & Reform and Agriculture & Food Industry).	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Monaco	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Chief of State (Royalty) & Min of State	
Mongolia	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Morocco	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	King & PM	
Mozambique	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Namibia	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Performs functions assigned by Pres; can deputise for Pres in absence; next in line after PM if Pres vacant	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Nauru	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Non-party	President	No parties exist
Nepal	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Member Council of Ministers; King designates as replacement PM if vacancy until new PM appointed	Minister of Local Development	N	Democratic	Single-party	King & PM	
Netherlands	Y	Dep PM	2	Appointed	N	-	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Economic Affairs and Welfare, Health & Sports).	N	Democratic	Multi-party	Queen & PM	
New Zealand	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	No Constitution	-	Minister of Economic Development	N	Democratic	Multi-party	Governor General & PM	
Nicaragua	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Pres can delegate functions to VP; Acts as Pres if temporary or permanent vacancy & sees out term; if Pres leaves country for more than 15 days VP acts as Pres.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Niger	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Nigeria	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Act as Pres if Pres dies pre-maturation/dies/resigns/impached/permanently incapable or removed from office for any other reason; Acts as Pres if Pres on vacation or otherwise unable to discharge the functions of his office' (article 145); meets with Pres to determine general direction of policy, coordinate activities & advise Pres	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Norway	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	King & PM	
Oman	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Chair Council of Mins if PM absent, supervise the affairs of their ministry & organisations	Minister for Cabinet Affairs	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	Sultan & PM	Sultan, PM & Dep PM all from Al Said Royal Family. No parties allowed

Pakistan	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	President	Military coup in Oct 1999
Palau	Y	VP	I	Elected separately	Y	Unable to find constitution	Minister of Health	Y	Democratic	Non-party	President	No parties exist
Panama	Y	VP	1+1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Act as Pres if temporary or permanent vacancy (see out term), attends but has no vote at cabinet; performs special missions for Pres & represent Pres in public acts, if Pres leaves country for more than 10 days 1st VP takes over temporarily.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President (also First VP and Second VP)	
Papua New Guinea	Y	Dep PM	I	Appointed		Unable to find constitution	Minister of Forestry	N	Democratic	Multi-party	Governor General & PM	
Paraguay	Y	VP	I	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Acts as Pres if Pres disabled/temporarily absent or permanent vacancy. Cannot leave country if Pres already out of country; to represent Pres domestically and internationally; coordinate relations between the executive and legislative branches.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Peru	Y	VP	1+1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	1st VP sees out term if Pres dies/mentally or physically incapacitated/resigns/removed/leaves country without Congress's approval; 1st VP acts as Pres if Pres on final/temporarily incapacitated.	First VP is Minister of Industry, Tourism, Integration & International Trade Negotiations	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (also First and Second VP)	
Philippines	Y	VP	I	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Can only serve 2 consecutive terms; If Pres not have correct qualifications then VP take over; if Pres-elect dies/permanently disabled VP-elect sees out term as Pres; If Pres dies/removed/resigns/permanently disabled VP see out term as Pres; If Pres unable to perform his duties VP act as Pres until Pres able.	Secretary of Foreign Affairs	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Poland	Y	Dep PM	3	Appointed	Y	Member Council of Ministers;	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Agriculture, Finance and Infrastructure)	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Portugal	N	-	-	-	-	-		N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Qatar	Y	Dep PM	I	Appointed	No Constitution	-	Minister of State	Y	Non-democratic	Non-party	Amir & PM	Amir, PM and Dep PM all from Al Thani Royal Family. No parties allowed. Constitution currently being drafted
Romania	Y	Dep PM	4	Appointed	N	-	Positions vacant at present	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	

Russia	Y	Dep Premier	5	Appointed	Y	None	Three have Ministerial responsibilities (Agriculture, Finance and Industry, Science & Technology).	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM (also 5 Dep PMs)	
Rwanda	N	-	-	-	-	-	Position vacant at present	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	None	Minister of International Trade, Labor, Social Security, Telecommunications & Technology, & Caricom Affairs	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Saint Lucia	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister of Education, Human Resource Development, Youth & Sports	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commerce & Trade	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	
Samoa	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Head of State (Royalty) & PM	
San Marino	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Multi-party	Two Capitani Reggenti (Ruling Captains) are elected every half year	
Sao Tome and Principe	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	There is a Dep Sec of State to the PM
Saudi Arabia	Y	Dep PM	1+1	Appointed	Y	Responsible, by expressing solidarity before the King, for implementing the Islamic Shari'ah & the state's general policy' (article 57).	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	King & PM (also First Dep PM & Second Dep PM)	King, PM and Dep PMs all from Al Saud Royal Family. No parties allowed
Senegal	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Seychelles	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	Sees out term if Pres dies/resigns/removed. Presides over cabinet meetings in Pres absence; exercises functions conferred by Pres	No other Ministerial responsibilities	Y	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Sierra Leone	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Principal assistant to the Pres' (article 51). Assumes Presidency for rest of term if Pres dies, removed or resigns. Acts as Pres when Pres absent/unable.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Singapore	Y	Dep PM	2	Appointed	N	-	Each Dep PM also has a Ministry (Defence and Chair - The Monetary Authority of Singapore)	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Slovakia	Y	Dep PM	4	Appointed	Y	None	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Slovenia	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	

Solomon Islands	Y	Dep PM	I	Appointed	Y	Acts as PM when PM absent/ill.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	Y	Democratic	Single-party	Governor General & PM	There is also an Assistant PM
Somalia	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Multiparty	President & PM	Interim Govt
South Africa	Y	Executive Deputy Pres	I	Appointed	Y	Attend & speak out not vote in National Assembly; Acts as Pres if Pres absent/otherwise unable to fulfill the duties of Pres (section 90); Pres assigns VP power & functions, assists Pres in the execution of Govt functions	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Spain	Y	VP	I+I	Appointed	Y	None	Both have Ministerial responsibilities (Economy and Interior)	N	Democratic	Single-party	Chief of State (Royalty) & President (also First VP and Second VP)	If Pres dies/resigns, Govt falls
Sri Lanka	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Sudan	Y	VP	I+I	Appointed	Y	If Pres absent or vacancy, VP acts as Pres until return or elections held within 60 days.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President and Chair Bureau of Federal Rule	
Suriname	Y	VP	I	Appointed	Y	VP acts as Pres if Pres unfit to hold office/temporarily gave up his powers/being prosecuted/absent; if there is no Pres, responsible to Pres for day to day management of Council of Ministers & presides over its meetings; deputy-chair of National Security Council	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	Y	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Swaziland	Y	Dep PM	I	Appointed	No Constitution	-	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	King & PM	No parties allowed
Sweden	Y	Dep PM	I	Appointed	Y	PM may nominate a Minister to deputize for him if he is unavoidably prevented from carrying out his duties himself (Chapter 7, Article 8)	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Democratic	Single-party	King & PM	
Switzerland	Y	VP	I	Appointed	Y	One year term; cannot hold office following year;	Chief Federal Department of Finance	N	Democratic	Multiparty	The president & VPs are elected for a year term by the parliament out of the ministers	
Syria	Y	Dep PM	3 Dep PM	Appointed	Y	Responsible to Pres.	All three Dep PMs have Ministries (Economic Affairs, Services Affairs and Defence)	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Taiwan	Y	Vice President Executive Yuan	I	Appointed	Y	If Pres resigns or office vacant when legislature not in session VP takes over; member Executive Yuan Council;	Chairman, Consumer Protection	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	

Tajikistan	Y	Dep PM	1+5	Appointed	Y	None	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM (also First Dep PM & 5 Dep PMs)	
Tanzania	Y	VP	1	Elected with Pres	Y	Assist Pres & perform duties assigned by Pres. VP acts as Pres if Pres absent or unable to discharge the functions of his office. Sees out term if Pres dies/resigns/loss of qualification/fails to discharge his duties/under inquiry. Member of Cabinet & presides over meetings if Pres absent.	No other Ministerial responsibilities.	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	Has no Dep PM so VP chosen as Dep Leader (VP is a member of cabinet).
Thailand	Y	Dep PM	5	Appointed	N	-	Three hold Ministries (Defence, Finance and Labour & Social welfare)	N	Democratic	Multi-party	King & PM	
Togo	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Tonga	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	N	-	Minister for Health and Attorney General	Y	Non-democratic	Non-party	King & PM	
Trinidad and Tobago	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Tunisia	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Turkey	Y	Dep PM	3	Appointed	N	-	Two hold Ministries (Both Ministers of State)	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Turkmenistan	Y	Dep Chair - Cabinet of Ministers	8	Appointed	Y	Pres can delegate management of meeting of Cabinet of Ministers to them (article 77).	All hold Ministries (Agriculture & Business Development, Banking, Communications & Transport, Construction, Economics & Finance, Energy, Healthcare and Textiles & Foreign Trade)	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President	
Tuvalu	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Acts as PM if PM absent/unable to perform his functions. Sees out term if PM dies/ceases to be member of parliament/resigns. Presides at cabinet if PM absent.	Position vacant at present	Y	Democratic	Non-party	Governor General & PM	No parties exist
Uganda	Y	Dep PM	1+2	Appointed	N	-	All hold Ministries (Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and Disaster Preparedness & Refugees).	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	First, Second and Third Dep PMs. Election campaigning by party not allowed
Ukraine	Y	Dep PM	1+3	Appointed	Y	Member of Cabinet of Ministers.	All three Dep PMs hold Ministries (Agroindustrial Complex, Economic Policy and Humanitarian Affairs)	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	1 First Dep PM & 3 Dep PMs.



United Arab Emirates	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Member of Council of Ministers	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Non-party	President & PM	No parties allowed.
United Kingdom	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	No Constitution	-	-	N	Democratic	Single-party	Queen & PM	
United States of America	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Sees out term if Pres dies/resigns/removed/unable to discharge powers of office; VP is Pres of Senate with casting vote.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Single-party	President	
Uruguay	Y	VP	1	Elected (with Pres)	Y	Pres of Senate & General Assembly; See out term of Pres if permanent vacancy & act as Pres if temporary vacancy	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Uzbekistan	Y	Dep PM	1+8	Appointed	Y	None	Two Dep PMs hold Ministries (Agriculture & Water Resources and Energy & Fuel)	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	1 First Dep PM & 8 Dep PMs
Vanuatu	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	Acts as PM if PM dies until new one elected.	Minister of Trade Development	Y	Democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	
Venezuela	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	Presides over Federal Council of Government; See out term as Pres is Pres dies/resigns/renounces office/removed/incapable; Act as Pres in temporary absence of Pres; collaborate with Pres in setting direction of Govt; preside over Council of Ministers if authorised by Pres; coordinates relations with National Assembly; exercise functions given by Pres	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Democratic	Multi-party	President	
Vietnam	Y	Dep PM	1+3	Appointed	Y	Assist PM; direct work of govt if PM absent	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	Chairman National Assembly, President & PM	1 First Dep PM & 3 Dep PMs
Yemen	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	None	Minister of Finance	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President & PM	
Yugoslavia	Y	Dep PM	1	Appointed	Y	None	Minister of Foreign Trade	N	Non-democratic	Multi-party	President & PM	Includes Republics of Serbia and Montenegro
Zambia	Y	VP	1	Appointed	Y	Act as Pres if Pres incapable/dies/resign until election within 6 months. Act as Pres if Pres absent/ill; Perform functions assigned by Pres. Preside at cabinet if Pres absent; Relates messages from Pres to National Assembly.	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President	

Zimbabwe	Y	VP	2	Appointed	Y	Assist Pres, perform functions allocated by Pres. Act as Pres if absent/ position vacant/unable, read messages from Pres in parliament, can sit & speak in parliament but only vote if member	No other Ministerial responsibilities	N	Non-democratic	Single-party	President	2 VPs
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## APPENDIX 2 – DATA RELATING TO HYPOTHESIS ONE

Deputy-leaders and previously-held prominent elected office, previous membership of a policy-influencing legislative committee, opposition spokespersonship or cabinet office

	Deputy-Leader	Term of Office <sup>195</sup>	Previously-held Prominent Elected Office <sup>196</sup>	Previous membership of a policy-influencing legislative committee	Previous Opposition Spokespersonships	Previously held cabinet office
1.	Seán Lemass	1945-1948/ 1951-1954/ 1957-1959	TD (1923-1969)	Worker's Compensation Bill <sup>197</sup>	Party Whip <sup>198</sup>	Industry & Commerce (1932-1946) Supplies (1943-1944)
2.	William Norton	1948-1951/ 1954-1957	TD (1926-1927 & 1932-1963)	Public Accounts	Party Leader	None
3.	Seán MacEntee	1959-1965	TD (1919-1969)	Public Accounts Game Preservation	Party Deputy-leader	Finance (1932-1937) Local Govt (1943-1948) Finance (1951-1954) Health (1957-1959) Social Welfare (1957-1959)
4.	Frank Aiken	1965-1969	TD (1923-1973)	Public Accounts	Party Whip <sup>199</sup>	Defence (1932-1937) Coordination of Defence (1943-1944) Finance (1945-1948) External Affairs (1951-1954/ 1961-1965) Agriculture (1957)
5.	Erskine Childers	1969-1973	TD (1938-1973)	Factories Bill Public Accounts	Party Deputy-Leader	Parl Sec for Local Govt (1944-1947) Posts & telegraphs (1951-1954) Lands (1957-1959) Transport & Power (1965-1969)
6.	Brendan Corish	1973-1977	TD (1945-1982)	None	Party Leader	Parl Sec for Local Govt & Defence (1948-1951) Social Welfare (1954-1957)
7.	George Colley	1977-1981	TD (1961-1983)	Corporation Tax Bill 1975 VAT Bill 1971	Finance <sup>200</sup>	Industry & Commerce (1966-1970) Gaeltacht (1969-1970) Finance (1970-1973)
8.	Michael O'Leary	1981-1982	TD (1965-1987)	VAT (Amendment) Bill 1977	Party Leader	Labour (1973-1977)
9.	Ray MacSharry	1982	TD (1969-1989)	Public Accounts Health Services Public Accounts	Office of Public Works, Agriculture <sup>201</sup>	Min of State Public Service (1978-1979) Agriculture (1979-1981)

<sup>195</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.

<sup>196</sup> Data from: Coakley & Gallagher (1999); [www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003]; Butler & Butler, 1994; <http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vp/vprock.html> [accessed 29 October 2002];

<sup>197</sup> Irish Data on committee membership from: [www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie](http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie) [accessed 16 June 2002].

<sup>198</sup> Horgan, 1997, p. 46.

<sup>199</sup> Horgan, 1997, p. 46.

<sup>200</sup> Collins, 2001, p. 108.

10.	Dick Spring	1982-1987/1993-1997	TD (1981-2002)	Secondary Legislation of the EC	Party Leader	None
11.	Peter Barry	1987	TD (1969-1997)	VAT (Amendment) Bill 1977 VAT Bill 1971	Economic Affairs	Transport & power (1973-1976) Education (1976-1977) Environment (1981-1982) Foreign Affairs (1982-1987)
12.	Brian Lenihan	1987-1990	TD (1961-73 & 1977-1995) Senator (1973-1977)	Health Services	Party Leader in Senate <sup>202</sup>	Justice (1964-1969) Transport & Power (1969-1973) External Affairs (1973) Fisheries (1977-1979) Foreign Affairs (1979-1981)
13.	John Wilson	1990-1993	TD (1973-1992)	National Board for Science & Technology Bill 1976	Communications Education & Arts	Education (1977-1979) Transport & Post & telegraphs (1982) Communications (1987) Tourism & Transport (1987-1989)
14.	Mary Harney	1997-2002	Senator (1977-1981), TD (1981-present)	Legislation & Security Judicial Separation & Family Reform Bill 1987 Crime, Lawlessness & Vandalism Public Accounts	Party Leader, Justice & Education	None
15.	J. van Schaik	1948-1951	Member Lower House (1917-1933, 1937-1948) <sup>201</sup>	Internal Affairs Committee <sup>204</sup>	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	Justice
16.	F. Teulings	1951-1952	Member Lower House (1929-1946) Member Upper House (1948-1949 & 1952-1957)	Taxation Committee	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	Interior.
17.	L. Beel	1952-1956	Member Lower House (1946 & 1948)	None	None	Interior, Prime Minister, General Affairs
18.	A. Struycken	1956-1959	None.	Justice Committee	None	Justice.
19.	H. Korthals	1959-1963	Member Lower House (1945-1959)	Foreign Affairs Committee	Spokesperson on EEC.	None.
20.	B. Biesheuvel	1963-1967	Member Lower House (1956-1963, 1967-1971 & 1972-1973)	Committee on Agriculture & Fisheries	Agriculture Spokesperson in House of Representatives	None.
21.	A. Vondeling	1965-1966	Member Lower House (1946-1958, 1959-1965 & 1965-1979)	Committee on Public Spending	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	Agriculture.
22.	J. de Quay	1966-	Member Upper	None	None	War.

<sup>201</sup> Trench, 1987, p. 160.

<sup>202</sup> Trench, 1987, p. 103.

<sup>203</sup> In the case of Dutch members of Parliament, they must give up their seat in parliament when they become Ministers, hence the gaps in their parliamentary career. A number of Dutch Vice-ministers President were members of the European Parliament in the 1960s, this position has not been included as it was filled by appointment rather than election prior to 1979.

<sup>204</sup> Data from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

		1967	House (1963-1966 & 1967-1969)			Prime Minister, Defence.
23.	H. Witteveen	1967-1971	Member Upper House (1958-1963 & 1971-1973), Member Lower House (1963 & 1965-1967)	Finance Committee	Finance Spokesperson in House of Representatives	Finance.
24.	J. Bakker	1967-1971	Member Lower House (1971-1972)	None	None	Economic Affairs.
25.	R. Nelissen	1971-1973	Member Lower House (1959-1971 & 1973), Member Upper House (1983-1987)	Enterprise Committee	Finance Spokesperson in House of Representatives	Economic Affairs.
26.	W. Geertsema	1971-1973	Member Lower House (1963-1970, 1971 & 1972-1973)	Justice Committee	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	None.
27.	A. van Agt	1973-1977	Member Lower House (1973, 1977, 1981, & 1982-1983)	None	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	Justice.
28.	W. De Gaay Fortman	1977	Member Upper House (1960-1973 & 1977-1981)	General Affairs Committee	Leader of Party in Senate	Interior.
29.	H. Wiegel	1977-1981	Member Lower House (1967-1977 & 1981-1982) Member Upper House (1995-2000)	General Affairs Committee	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	None.
30.	J. den Uyl	1981-1982	Member Lower House (1956-1963, 1967-1973, 1978-1981 & 1982-1987)	Security Services Committee	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	Economic Affairs, Prime Minister.
31.	J. Terlouw	1981-1982	Member Lower House (1971-1981) Member Upper House (1999)	Committee on Nuclear energy	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	None.
32.	G. van Aardenne	1982-1986	Member Lower House (1971-1977 & 1981-1982) Member Upper House (1995)	Committee for Social Affairs	Finance Spokesperson in House of Representatives	Economic Affairs.
33.	R. de Korte	1986-1989	Member Lower House (1977-1986 & 1989-1995)	None	Finance Spokesperson in House of Representatives	Interior.
34.	W. Kok	1989-1994 <sup>205</sup>	Member Lower House (1986-1989, 1994 & 1998)	None	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	None.
35.	H. Van Mierlo	1994-1998 <sup>206</sup>	Member Lower House (1967-1977, 1986-1994 & 1998) Member Upper House (1983-1986)	None	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	Defence.
36.	H. Dijkstal	1994-	Member Lower	Committee for	Leader of Party in	None

<sup>205</sup> Available from: <http://asem.inter.net.th/asem-info/netherlands/leader.html> [accessed 24 March 2003]

<sup>206</sup> Available from: [http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers\\_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html](http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html) [assessed 26 March 2003].

		1998 <sup>207</sup>	House (1982-1994 & 1998-2002)	Minorities Justice Committee	House of Representatives	
37.	A. Jorritsma-Lebbink	1998 – 2002	Member Lower House (1982-1994 & 1998)	Committee on Alcohol	Spokesperson for Roads & Waterways in House of Representatives	Roads & Waterways
38.	E. Borst-Eilers	1998 – 2002	Member Lower House (1998)	None	Leader of Party in House of Representatives	Health, Welfare & Sports
39.	Per Ahlmark <sup>208</sup>	1976-1978	MP (1970-1979)	Tax Committee Constitution Committee	Leader of Party	None
40.	Ola Ullsten <sup>209</sup>	1979-1982	MP (1970-1985)	Legal Committee Banking Committee Government Committee International Committee	Leader of Party	Foreign Affairs
41.	Ingvar Carlsson <sup>210</sup>	1982-1986	MP (1964-1996)	Manufacturing Committee International Committee Industry Committee	Party Deputy-Leader	Education & Cultural Affairs, Housing.
42.	Odd Erik Engström <sup>211</sup>	1990-1991	MP (1991-1993)	None	Party Deputy-Leader	Finance
43.	Bengt Carl Westerberg <sup>212</sup>	1991-1994	MP (1984-1994)	Foreign Affairs Advisory Council	Leader of Party	Industry
44.	Mona Ingeborg Sahlin <sup>213</sup>	1994-1995	MP (1982-present)	Justice Committee Culture Committee Labour Committee	Party Deputy-Leader	Labour
45.	Lena Hjelm-Wallén <sup>214</sup>	1998-2002	MP (1968-2002)	Culture Committee Labour Committee International Committee Education Committee	Party Deputy-Leader	Education & Cultural Affairs, International Development.
46.	Herbert Morrison	1946-1951	MP (1923-1924, 1929-1931 & 1935-1959)	Standing Committee on the Rent Restriction Bill <sup>215</sup>	None	Transport, Supply, Home Sec.
47.	Anthony Eden	1951-1955	MP (1923-1957)	All-Party Committee on Disarmament <sup>216</sup>	Deputy Leader Conservative Party	War, Foreign Sec.
48.	Richard (Rab) Butler	1962-1963	MP (1929-1965)	Franchise Committee <sup>217</sup>	Member Shadow Cabinet	Education, Labour, Chancellor of the Exchequer.
49.	William Whitelaw	1979-1988	MP (1955-1983)	Standing Committee on the Industrial Training Bill	Shadow Home Secretary	Northern Ireland,
50.	Geoffrey Howe	1989-1990	MP (1964-1966 & 1970-1992)	Standing Committee on the Fair Trading Bill	Social Services, Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer	Trade & Consumer Affairs, Chancellor of the

<sup>207</sup> Available from: [http://www.minaz.nl/ministerraad/ministers\\_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html](http://www.minaz.nl/ministerraad/ministers_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html) [assessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>208</sup> Available from: [www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>209</sup> Available from: [www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>210</sup> Available from: [www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>211</sup> Available from: [www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>212</sup> Available from: [www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>213</sup> Available from: [www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>214</sup> Available from: [www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>215</sup> Donoghue, 1973.

<sup>216</sup> Aster, 1976.

<sup>217</sup> Butler, 1971.

						Exchequer, Foreign Sec.
51.	Michael Heseltine	1995-1997	MP (1966-2001)	Standing Committee on the Transport Act <sup>218</sup>	Environment, Industry	Environment, Defence.
52.	John Prescott	1997-2002	MP (1970-present)	Select Committee on Nationalised Industries <sup>219</sup>	Employment, Transport	None
53.	Alben W Barkley	1949-1953	Congressman (1913-1927), Senator (1927-1949)	Committee on Finance <sup>220</sup>	Senate Minority Leader Senate Majority leader	None
54.	Richard M. Nixon	1953-1961	Congressman (1947-1950), Senator (1951-1953)	House Committee on Education & Labor House Un-American Activities Committee	None	None
55.	Lyndon Johnson	1961-1963	Congressman (1937-1949), Senator (1949-1961)	Naval Affairs Committee Senate Armed Services Committee Special Committee on Astronautics and Space Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee on Finance	Senate Majority Leader	None
56.	Hubert H. Humphrey	1965-1969	Mayor of Minneapolis (1945-1948), Senator (1949-1964)	Select Committee on Disarmament Appropriations Committee	Assistant Senate Majority Leader	None
57.	Spiro T. Agnew	1969-1973	Governor of Maryland (1966-1968)	None	None	None
58.	Gerald Ford	1973-1974	Congressman (1949-1973)	Defence Appropriations Subcommittee House Appropriations Committee	House Minority Leader	None
59.	Nelson Rockefeller	1974-1977	Governor of New York (1958-1973)	None	None	None
60.	Walter F. Mondale	1977-1981	Minnesota Attorney General (1960-1964), Senator (1964-1976)	Select Committee on Equal education Opportunity Committee on Finance	None	None
61.	George H. Bush	1981-1989	Congressman (1967-1971)	Ways and Means Committee	None	None
62.	J. Danforth Quayle	1989-1993	Congressman (1977-1981), Senator (1981-1989)	Armed Services Committee	None	None
63.	Albert A. Gore	1993-2001	Congressman (1977-1985), Senator (1985-1993)	House Intelligence Committee	None	None

<sup>218</sup> Heseltine, 2000.

<sup>219</sup> Vacher Dod, 1979.

<sup>220</sup> Data on US Vice-Presidents from:

[http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003];

<http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vpconts.html> [accessed 14 October 2002];

[www.ford.utexas.edu/grf/fordbiop.htm](http://www.ford.utexas.edu/grf/fordbiop.htm) [accessed 4 June 2003]; <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/> [accessed 4 June 2003] and [www.defencelink.mil/specials/secdef\\_histories/bios/chenev.htm](http://www.defencelink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/chenev.htm) [accessed 4 June 2003].

64.	Richard B. Cheney	2001-2002	Congressman (1979-1989)	House Intelligence Committee House Intelligence Budget Subcommittee	House Minority Whip	Sec. of Defence (1989-1993)
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Note 1: This table is not comprehensive in that it does not include all the committees, spokespersonships or ministries on which the deputy-leaders served. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to show whether or not each deputy-leader served on at least one policy-influencing legislative committee or held at least one opposition spokespersonship or at least one ministry.

Note 2: In the case of spokespersonships, the positions do not exist as such in the United States system of government. The nearest equivalent - the Minority and Majority Leaders and Whips have been included. While Committee Chairs could have been included this overlaps with committee membership which has already been examined.



## APPENDIX 3 – DATA RELATING TO HYPOTHESIS TWO

Policy documents, commentaries on policy proposals, contributions to policy debates in the media and legislation that was proposed by those who went on to be deputy-leaders.

	Deputy-Leader	Term of Office <sup>221</sup>	Outside parliament: Policy Documents/ speeches on policy/ Contributions to policy debates in the media	Inside Parliament: Legislation proposed/ speeches on legislation
1.	Seán Lemass	1945-1948/ 1951-1954/ 1957-1959	Address on full employment, 1956. <sup>222</sup>	Conditions of Employment Act, 1936. <sup>223</sup>
2.	William Norton	1948-1951/ 1954-1957	Speech calling for unified Ireland (1947) <sup>224</sup>	Speech on Bill on role of King in foreign Affairs(1936). <sup>225</sup>
3.	Seán MacEntee	1959-1965	Memo to Taoiseach on Senate reform. <sup>226</sup>	Trade Union Act, 1941. <sup>227</sup>
4.	Frank Aiken	1965-1969	Memo on wartime censorship (1940). <sup>228</sup>	Defences Forces (Temporary Provisions Act) 1933. <sup>229</sup>
5.	Erskine Childers	1969-1973	Speech on foreign policy, Trinity College, November 1938. <sup>230</sup>	Telegraph Act, 1953. <sup>231</sup>
6.	Brendan Corish	1973-1977	The New Republic <sup>232</sup>	Control of Importation, Sale and Manufacture of Contraceptives Bill 1974. <sup>233</sup>
7.	George Colley	1977-1981	1977 Fianna Fail Manifesto. <sup>234</sup>	Export Promotion (amendment) Act 1967. <sup>235</sup>
8.	Michael O'Leary	1981-1982	Speech on worker's democracy policy documents (1969). <sup>236</sup>	Worker Participation Act 1977. <sup>237</sup>
9.	Ray MacSharry	1982	On committee that drafted 'The Way Forward' <sup>238</sup>	Agriculture (amendment) Act, 1980. <sup>239</sup>
10.	Dick Spring	1982-1987/ 1993-1997	Interview in Irish Times 1981 on Law Reform Commission proposals. <sup>240</sup>	Speech on Motion on Crime Prevention 18 Nov 1981 <sup>241</sup>

<sup>221</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.

<sup>222</sup> Lenihan, 1991, p. 215.

<sup>223</sup> Horgan, 1997, p. 84.

<sup>224</sup> Gallagher, 1982, p. 126.

<sup>225</sup> Gallagher, 1982, p. 126.

<sup>226</sup> Keogh, 1994, p. 103.

<sup>227</sup> Horgan, 1997, p. 121.

<sup>228</sup> Keogh, 1994, p. 124.

<sup>229</sup> Available from: [www.irishstatutebook.ie](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie) [accessed 9 July 2003].

<sup>230</sup> Young, 1985, p. 90.

<sup>231</sup> Available from: [www.irishstatutebook.ie](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie) [accessed 9 July 2003].

<sup>232</sup> Gallagher, 1982, p. 309.

<sup>233</sup> Gallagher, 1982, p. 202.

<sup>234</sup> Downey, 1998, p. 105.

<sup>235</sup> Available from: [www.irishstatutebook.ie](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie) [accessed 9 July 2003].

<sup>236</sup> Gallagher, 1982, p. 80.

<sup>237</sup> Gallagher, 1982, p. 201.

<sup>238</sup> Joyce & Murtagh, 1983, p. 177.

<sup>239</sup> Available from: [www.irishstatutebook.ie](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie) [accessed 9 July 2003].

<sup>240</sup> Ryan, 1993, p. 48.

<sup>241</sup> Available from: [www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie](http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie) [accessed 18 July 2003].

11.	Peter Barry	1987	Ireland - our future together	Electricity (Supply) (Amendment) Act, 1974. <sup>242</sup>
12.	Brian Lenihan	1987-1990	Article in Sunday Press on Administrative Reform. <sup>243</sup>	Censorship of Publications Act, 1967. <sup>244</sup>
13.	John Wilson	1990-1993	On committee that drafted 'The Way Forward'. <sup>245</sup>	Air Navigation And Transport Act, 1988. <sup>246</sup>
14.	Mary Harney	1997-2002	Justice for all: Progressive Democrats' policy on law reform and the administration of justice (1987)	Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1992. <sup>247</sup>
15.	J. van Schaik	1948-1951	N/A	Policy on State Police (1935) <sup>248</sup>
16.	F. Teulings	1951-1952	N/A	Housing legislation (1950) <sup>249</sup>
17.	L. Beel	1952-1956	N/A	N/A
18.	A. Struycken	1956-1959	N/A	Official Secrets Act (1951) <sup>250</sup>
19.	H. Korthals	1959-1963	N/A	Contribution to debate on European policy (1957) <sup>251</sup>
20.	B. Biesheuvel	1963-1967	N/A	Supported Lottery Act (1960). <sup>252</sup>
21.	A. Vondeling	1965-1966	N/A	Questions on NATO use of nuclear weapons (1963) <sup>253</sup>
22.	J. de Quay	1966-1967	Speech to journalists on internationalization of New Guinea (1960). <sup>254</sup>	Changes to Pay Policy (1960) <sup>255</sup>
23.	H. Witteveen	1967-1971	N/A	Act on Damage Insurance (1964) <sup>256</sup>
24.	J. Bakker	1967-1971	N/A	Introduced legislation on serving of alcohol in hotels, restaurants and cafes (1964) <sup>257</sup>
25.	R. Nelissen	1971-1973	N/A	Census Act (1970) <sup>258</sup>
26.	W. Geertsema	1971-1973	Comments on Homosexual rights (1970). <sup>259</sup>	Contribution to debate on legalisation of Homosexuality (1970). <sup>260</sup>
27.	A. van Agt	1973-1977	Comments to press on release of Breda Three (1971). <sup>261</sup>	Changes to Act on Judicial Organisation (1972) <sup>262</sup>
28.	W. De Gaay Fortman	1977	Justification of response to South Moluccan terrorism (1977). <sup>263</sup>	Change in Ballot Act (1976) <sup>264</sup>

<sup>242</sup> Available from: [www.irishstatutebook.ie](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie) [accessed 9 July 2003].

<sup>243</sup> Downey, 1998, p. 236.

<sup>244</sup> Downey, 1998, p. 57.

<sup>245</sup> Joyce & Murtagh, 1983, p. 177.

<sup>246</sup> Available from: [www.irishstatutebook.ie](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie) [accessed 9 July 2003].

<sup>247</sup> Available from: [www.irishstatutebook.ie](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie) [accessed 9 July 2003].

<sup>248</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>249</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>250</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>251</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>252</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>253</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>254</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>255</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>256</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>257</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>258</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>259</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>260</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>261</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>262</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>263</sup> The Associated Press, September 10<sup>th</sup> 1977.

29.	H. Wiegel	1977-1981	Comments on Lockheed Affair (1976). <sup>265</sup>	Speech on Prices policy (1974). <sup>266</sup>
30.	J. den Uyl	1981-1982	Opposition to rejection of 'Nuclear tasks' at PvdA Congress (1981). <sup>267</sup>	Policies dealing with oil crisis of 1973. <sup>268</sup>
31.	J. Terlouw	1981-1982	Opposition to Nuclear Power (1981). <sup>269</sup>	Comments on Central Bureau of Statistics (1973). <sup>270</sup>
32.	G. van Aardenne	1982-1986	Set up Broad Society Discussion on nuclear energy (1981). <sup>271</sup>	Act on Investments Account (1978). <sup>272</sup>
33.	R de Korte	1986-1989	Comments on economic policy (1983). <sup>273</sup>	Participation in debate on the Report of the RSV Investigative Committee (1985). <sup>274</sup>
34.	W. Kok	1989-1994 <sup>275</sup>	Proposals on job-sharing (1982). <sup>276</sup>	Speech in response to Government legislative programme. <sup>277</sup>
35.	H. Van Mierlo	1994-1998 <sup>278</sup>	'A Reason to Be' (1985)	Proposals on NATO Nuclear policy (1981). <sup>279</sup>
36.	H. Dijkstal	1994-1998 <sup>280</sup>	Asylum reform proposals (1994). <sup>281</sup>	Comments on deportation of immigrants. <sup>282</sup>
37.	A. Jorritsma-Lebbink	1998 – 2002	Speech on Global information Networks (1997). <sup>283</sup>	Speech to Lower House on private participation in high speed rail network (1997). <sup>284</sup>
38.	E. Borst-Eilers	1998 – 2002	Speech on the use of IT in Medicine (1995). <sup>285</sup>	Heroin Maintenance Trial (1997). <sup>286</sup>
39.	Per Ahlmark	1976-1978	Opposition to proposed Wage-Earner Funds (1976). <sup>287</sup>	Energy Policy motion (1975). <sup>288</sup>
40.	Ola Ullsten	1979-1982	Speech on Norwegian purchase of 40% of Volvo (1978). <sup>289</sup>	Motion on Department of Foreign Affairs (1975). <sup>290</sup>
41.	Ingvar Carlsson	1982-1986	Talks on international issues with CPSU Central Committee (1980). <sup>291</sup>	Transport Policy motion (1978). <sup>292</sup>

<sup>264</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>265</sup> World News Digest, September 4<sup>th</sup> 1976, p. 642.

<sup>266</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>267</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>268</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>269</sup> The Economist, May 30<sup>th</sup> 1981, p. 55.

<sup>270</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>271</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>272</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>273</sup> The Financial Times, September 13<sup>th</sup> 1983. Section IV, p. 1.

<sup>274</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>275</sup> Available from: <http://asem.inter.net.th/asem-info/netherlands/leader.html> [accessed 24 March 2003]

<sup>276</sup> The Economist, March 20<sup>th</sup> 1982, p. 73.

<sup>277</sup> The Financial Times, July 31<sup>st</sup> 1986, p. 2.

<sup>278</sup> Available from: [http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers\\_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html](http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html) [assessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>279</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>280</sup> Available from: [http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers\\_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html](http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html) [accessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>281</sup> The Toronto Star, May 25<sup>th</sup> 1994, p. A17.

<sup>282</sup> The Financial Times, January 11<sup>th</sup> 1989, Section 1, p. 2.

<sup>283</sup> Available from: [http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/bonn/Speeches/i\\_jorritsma.html](http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/bonn/Speeches/i_jorritsma.html) [accessed 22 August 2003].

<sup>284</sup> Available from: <http://www.minvenw.nl/cend/dvo/international/english/summaries/eng0298.html> [accessed 22 August 2003].

<sup>285</sup> Available from <http://www.kb.nl/infolev/bmi/biomedities/bm34/amice.html> [accessed 21 August 2003].

<sup>286</sup> Available from: <http://www.drcnet.org/rapid/1997/8-22-1.html> [accessed 21 August 2003].

<sup>287</sup> US News & World Report, October 4<sup>th</sup> 1976, p. 40.

<sup>288</sup> Available from: <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp> [accessed 26 August 2003].

<sup>289</sup> The Washington Post, December 9<sup>th</sup> 1978.

<sup>290</sup> Available from: <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp> [accessed 26 August 2003].

42.	Odd Erik Engström	1990-1991	Statement on term as Finance Minister (1990). <sup>293</sup>	Privatisation motion (1990). <sup>294</sup>
43.	Bengt Carl Westerberg	1991-1994	'New Start for Sweden' (1990). <sup>295</sup>	Motion on Labour Market Policy (1981). <sup>296</sup>
44.	Mona Ingeborg Sahlin	1994-1995	Speech in favour of abolition of 'care day' benefits for off-work parents (1994). <sup>297</sup>	Motion On Property Tax (1985). <sup>298</sup>
45.	Lena Hjelm-Wallén	1998-2002	Speech in favour of EU enlargement (1997). <sup>299</sup>	Motion on regional Policy (1978). <sup>300</sup>
46.	Herbert Morrison	1946-1951	'The London Traffic Fraud' (1928) 'The Citizens Charter' (1921). <sup>301</sup>	Road Traffic Act 1920. <sup>302</sup>
47.	Anthony Eden	1951-1955	Speech on Western European Integration, Rome November 1951. <sup>303</sup>	Commons speech on NATO, February 1952. <sup>304</sup>
48.	Richard (Rab) Butler	1962-1963	Speech on 'Guidelines on future policy' to Conservative Conference on Political Education 1946. <sup>305</sup>	Education Act 1944. <sup>306</sup>
49.	William Whitelaw	1979-1988	Criminal Justice System proposals (1977). <sup>307</sup>	Criminal Justice Act 1982. <sup>308</sup>
50.	Geoffrey Howe	1989-1990	'In place of Beveridge' (1965). <sup>309</sup> 'The Right approach to the economy' (1977). <sup>310</sup>	Chancellor's 1980 Autumn statement to House of Commons. <sup>311</sup>
51.	Michael Heseltine	1995-1997	The Challenge of Europe (1989). <sup>312</sup>	Opposed Ports Bill (1969). <sup>313</sup>
52.	John Prescott	1997-2002	Alternative Regional Strategy. Planning for Full Employment. <sup>314</sup>	Opposition to privatisation of British Airways. <sup>315</sup>
53.	Alben W Barklev	1949-1953	Keynote Speech 1932 Democratic Convention. <sup>316</sup>	Speech opposing presidential veto of Revenue Bill (1944)
54.	Richard M. Nixon	1953-1961	Speaking tour of 1951.	Mundt-Nixon Bill 1947. <sup>317</sup>

<sup>291</sup> BBC World Broadcasts, October 6<sup>th</sup> 1980.

<sup>292</sup> Available from: <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp> [accessed 26 August 2003].

<sup>293</sup> The Financial Times, February 17<sup>th</sup> 1990.

<sup>294</sup> Available from: <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/index.asp> [accessed 26 August 2003].

<sup>295</sup> The Economist, September 21<sup>st</sup> 1991, p. 60.

<sup>296</sup> Available from: <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp> [accessed 26 August 2003].

<sup>297</sup> The Sunday Times, September 18<sup>th</sup> 1994.

<sup>298</sup> Available from: <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg8287.asp> [accessed 26 August 2003].

<sup>299</sup> Deutsch Presse-Agentur, October 25<sup>th</sup> 1997.

<sup>300</sup> Available from: <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/sakreg/sakreg7582.asp> [accessed 26 August 2003].

<sup>301</sup> Donoghue & Jones, 1973, p. 122 & p. 108.

<sup>302</sup> Donoghue & Jones, 1973, p. 137.

<sup>303</sup> Rothwell, 1992, p. 108.

<sup>304</sup> Rothwell, 1992, p. 108.

<sup>305</sup> Butler, 1971, p. 133.

<sup>306</sup> Butler, 1971, p. 95.

<sup>307</sup> Whitelaw, 1990, p. 197.

<sup>308</sup> Whitelaw, 1990, p. 227.

<sup>309</sup> Howe, 1994, p. 39.

<sup>310</sup> Howe, 1994, p. 104.

<sup>311</sup> Howe, 1994, p. 192.

<sup>312</sup> Heseltine, 2000, p. 343.

<sup>313</sup> Heseltine, 2000, p. 119.

<sup>314</sup> Anderson & Mann, 1997, pp. 153-154.

<sup>315</sup> Anderson & Mann, 1997, p. 154.

<sup>316</sup> Data on US Vice-Presidents from:

[http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003];

<http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/vpconts.html> [accessed 14 October 2002];

55.	Lyndon Johnson	1961-1963	'Our National Security' – speech to American Association of School Administrators (1950). <sup>318</sup>	Civil Rights Bill 1957.
56.	Hubert H. Humphrey	1965-1969	Speech on Civil Rights to 1948 Democratic Convention	Communist Control Bill (1954) <sup>319</sup>
57.	Spiro T. Agnew	1969-1973	Graduated Income Tax in Maryland (1967). <sup>320</sup>	None
58.	Gerald Ford	1973-1974	State of Union proposals speech (1967). <sup>321</sup>	'Why we are pulling our best punches in Vietnam' speech (1967). <sup>322</sup>
59.	Nelson Rockefeller	1974-1977	Proposed setting up of Department of Health, Education and Welfare.	None
60.	Walter F. Mondale	1977-1981	Proposed right to free counsel for the poor charged with major crimes (1963).	Fair Warning Act 1966
61.	George H. Bush	1981-1989	Campaign speech in favour of Fair Housing Act, 1968. <sup>323</sup>	Equal Rights Amendment Act <sup>324</sup>
62.	J. Danforth Quayle	1989-1993	Proposed term limit Bill (1977)	Job Training Partnership Act (1982)
63.	Albert A. Gore	1993-2001	Earth in the Balance (1992)	Computer Abuse Amendments Act 1990 High Performance Computing Act 1991 <sup>325</sup>
64.	Richard B. Cheney	2001-2002	Defence Planning Guide. <sup>326</sup>	Minority Report of House Intelligence Committee on 'Iran-Contragate'(1986). <sup>327</sup>

<sup>317</sup> Aitken, 1993, p. 240.

<sup>318</sup> Steinberg, 1968, p. 300.

<sup>319</sup> Steinberg, 1968, p. 389.

<sup>320</sup> Available from: <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAAgnew.htm> [accessed 1 September 2003].

<sup>321</sup> terHorst, 1975, p. 102.

<sup>322</sup> terHorst, 1975, p. 105.

<sup>323</sup> Evans, 1998, p. 651.

<sup>324</sup> Drummey, 1991, p. 17.

<sup>325</sup> Data from: [www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5\\_10/wiggins/](http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_10/wiggins/) [accessed 2 July 2003].

<sup>326</sup> Data from: [www.defencelink.mil/specials/secdef\\_histories/bios/chenev.htm](http://www.defencelink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/chenev.htm) [accessed 4 June 2003].

<sup>327</sup> Sunday Times Magazine, July 6<sup>th</sup> 2002, p. 47.

## APPENDIX 4 – DATA RELATING TO HYPOTHESIS

### THREE

Policy documents, speeches or legislation outside their area of cabinet responsibility proposed by deputy-leaders.

	Deputy-Leader	Term of Office	Policy documents, speeches or legislation outside their area of cabinet responsibility proposed by deputy-leaders.
1.	Seán Lemass	1945-1948/ 1951-1954/ 1957-1959	Radio address on Amendment to Constitution to change electoral system. <sup>328</sup>
2.	William Norton	1948-1951/ 1954-1957	Comments on budget (1956). <sup>329</sup>
3.	Seán MacEntee	1959-1965	Answer on parliamentary question on Irish Language (1964). <sup>330</sup>
4.	Frank Aiken	1965-1969	Answer on parliamentary question on Foot and Mouth Disease (1969). <sup>331</sup>
5.	Erskine Childers	1969-1973	Answer on parliamentary question on Budget (1971). <sup>332</sup>
6.	Brendan Corish	1973-1977	Taskforce on Childcare services (1974). <sup>333</sup>
7.	George Colley	1977-1981	Answer on parliamentary question on National Wage Agreement (1979). <sup>334</sup>
8.	Michael O'Leary	1981-1982	Comments on Hunger Strike (1981). <sup>335</sup>
9.	Ray MacSharry	1982	None
10.	Dick Spring	1982-1987/ 1993-1997	Opposition to changes in residency aspects of tax law (1994). <sup>336</sup>
11.	Peter Barry	1987	None.
12.	Brian Lenihan	1987-1990	Answer to parliamentary question on Gallery of Modern Art (1988). <sup>337</sup>
13.	John Wilson	1990-1993	Speech to parliament on 11 <sup>th</sup> amendment to Constitution. (1992). <sup>338</sup>
14.	Mary Harney	1997-2002	Article on economic policy (1999). <sup>339</sup>
15.	J. van Schaik	1948-1951	Acts on Surinam and the Dutch Antilles (1949). <sup>340</sup>
16.	F. Teulings	1951-1952	None. <sup>341</sup>
17.	L. Beel	1952-1956	Greet Hofmans Affair. <sup>342</sup>

<sup>328</sup> Horgan, 1997, p. 181.

<sup>329</sup> Available from: <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/> [accessed 18 July 2003].

<sup>330</sup> Available from: <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/> [accessed 18 July 2003].

<sup>331</sup> Available from: <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/> [accessed 18 July 2003].

<sup>332</sup> Available from: <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/> [accessed 18 July 2003].

<sup>333</sup> Desmond, 2000, p. 275.

<sup>334</sup> Available from: <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/> [accessed 18 July 2003].

<sup>335</sup> New York Times, August 30, 1981, p. 4.

<sup>336</sup> Finlay, 1998, p. 215.

<sup>337</sup> Available from: <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/> [accessed 18 July 2003].

<sup>338</sup> Available from: <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/> [accessed 18 July 2003].

<sup>339</sup> Irish Times, July, 28<sup>th</sup> 1999.

<sup>340</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>341</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

18.	A. Struycken	1956-1959	None. <sup>343</sup>
19.	H. Korthals	1959-1963	Motor Tax Act. <sup>344</sup>
20.	B. Biesheuvel	1963-1967	Issues relating to marriage of Princess Irene (1964) <sup>345</sup>
21.	A. Vondeling	1965- 1966	Re-organisation of State Mining companies. <sup>346</sup>
22.	J. de Quay	1966-1967	None
23.	H. Witteveen	1967-1971	None.
24.	J. Bakker	1967-1971	South Africa (1970) <sup>347</sup>
25.	R. Nelissen	1971- 1973	Act on Demesne of Crown (1972) <sup>348</sup>
26.	W. Geertsema	1971- 1973	Financial status of Royal Family (1972). <sup>349</sup>
27.	A. van Agt	1973- 1977	1976 Changes to Act on Opium. <sup>350</sup>
28.	W. De Gaay Fortman	1977	Act introducing Summer Time. <sup>351</sup>
29.	H. Wiegel	1977- 1981	1980 Act setting up position of National Ombudsperson. <sup>352</sup>
30.	J. den Uyl	1981- 1982	Nuclear Policy (1981) <sup>353</sup>
31.	J. Terlouw	1981- 1982	Nuclear energy policy (1982) <sup>354</sup>
32.	G. van Aardenne	1982- 1986	Death Penalty (1982). <sup>355</sup>
33.	R de Korte	1986- 1989	1986 Act authorizing participation in Central Organisation on Radioactive Disposal (COVRA). <sup>356</sup>
34.	W. Kok	1989- 1994	Legislation on money laundering (1993) <sup>357</sup>
35.	H. Van Mierlo	1994-1998	Amsterdam Treaty. <sup>358</sup>
36.	H. Dijkstal	1994-1998	Revision of Constitution (1995). <sup>359</sup>
37.	A. Jorritsma-Lebbink	1998 –2002	Decision to purchase of Joint Strike Fighter (2001) <sup>360</sup>
38.	E. Borst-Eilers	1998 –2002	None.
39.	Per Ahlmark	1976-1978	Speech in favour of nuclear energy policy (1978) <sup>361</sup>
40.	Ola Ullsten	1979-1982	Tax Reform Proposals (1981). <sup>362</sup>

<sup>342</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>343</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>344</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>345</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>346</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>347</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>348</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>349</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>350</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>351</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>352</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>353</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>354</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>355</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>356</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>357</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>358</sup> Economist, May 2<sup>nd</sup> 1998, p. 36.

<sup>359</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>360</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>361</sup> Economist, February 4<sup>th</sup> 1978, p. 51.

<sup>362</sup> New York Times, May 9<sup>th</sup>, 1981, p. 2.

41.	Ingvar Carlsson	1982-1986	Proposal on verification of disarmament agreements (1985). <sup>363</sup>
42.	Odd Erik Engström	1990-1991	Talks on EC and EFTA cooperation. <sup>364</sup>
43.	Bengt Carl Westerberg	1991-1994	Electoral strategy (1994). <sup>365</sup>
44.	Mona Ingeborg Sahlin	1994-1995	Opposition to proposed changes to legislation on prostitution. <sup>366</sup>
45.	Lena Hjelm-Wallén	1998-2002	Speech on foreign policy at the Institute for International Relations in Kiev (May 2001). <sup>367</sup>
46.	Herbert Morrison	1946-1951	Policy on Nationalisation of steel industry (1947). <sup>368</sup>
47.	Anthony Eden	1951-1955	Intervention on Plan Robot (1952). <sup>369</sup>
48.	Richard (Rab) Butler	1962-1963	None.
49.	William Whitelaw	1979-1988	Opposition to sending taskforce to Falklands. <sup>370</sup>
50.	Geoffrey Howe	1989-1990	European policy (1990). <sup>371</sup>
51.	Michael Heseltine	1995-1997	Speech to Party Conference (1996). <sup>372</sup>
52.	John Prescott	1997-2002	Statement on Kosovo (1999). <sup>373</sup>
53.	Alben W Barkley	1949-1953	Speech to Democratic Convention (1952). <sup>374</sup>
54.	Richard M. Nixon	1953-1961	Proposal on Higher Education Subsidy. <sup>375</sup>
55.	Lyndon Johnson	1961-1963	Proposal to end discriminatory practices by government contractors. <sup>376</sup>
56.	Hubert H. Humphrey	1965-1969	Head Start Program. <sup>377</sup>
57.	Spiro T. Agnew	1969-1973	Proposal for Space shot to Mars. <sup>378</sup>
58.	Gerald Ford	1973-1974	None.

<sup>363</sup> New York Times, March 3rd, 1986, p. 15.

<sup>364</sup> Xinhua News Agency, October 10<sup>th</sup>, 1990.

<sup>365</sup> Hadenius, 1997, p. 158.

<sup>366</sup> Agence France Presse, March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1995.

<sup>367</sup> Available from: [http://www.regeringen.se/galactica/service=irnews/action=obj\\_show?c\\_obj\\_id=39789](http://www.regeringen.se/galactica/service=irnews/action=obj_show?c_obj_id=39789) [accessed 12 September 2003].

<sup>368</sup> Donoughue and Jones, 1973, p. 402.

<sup>369</sup> Thorpe, 2003, p.373.

<sup>370</sup> The Independent, July 2, 1999, p. 6.

<sup>371</sup> The Independent, November 2, 1990, p. 2.

<sup>372</sup> The Times, December 7<sup>th</sup>, 1996.

<sup>373</sup> Available from: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/302976.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/302976.stm) [accessed 12 January 2005].

<sup>374</sup> Available from: [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>375</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>376</sup> Steinberg, 1968, p. 561.

<sup>377</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>378</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].



59.	Nelson Rockefeller	1974-1977	Energy Independence Authority. <sup>379</sup>
60.	Walter F. Mondale	1977-1981	Establishment of Department of Education. <sup>380</sup>
61.	George H. Bush	1981-1989	Recommendation of Taskforce on Federal Deregulation. <sup>381</sup>
62.	J. Danforth Quayle	1989-1993	Civil Litigation reform proposals. <sup>382</sup>
63.	Albert A. Gore	1993-2001	Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. <sup>383</sup>
64.	Richard B. Cheney	2001-2002	National Energy Policy. <sup>384</sup>

<sup>379</sup> Light, 1983, p. 620.

<sup>380</sup> Light, 1983, p. 638.

<sup>381</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>382</sup> Available from: <http://www.ombwatch.org/regs/archives/quayle.html> [accessed 3 September 2003].

<sup>383</sup> Available from: [http://www.a-ten.com/biographies/al\\_gore.html](http://www.a-ten.com/biographies/al_gore.html) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>384</sup> Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/Forward.pdf> [accessed 3 September 2003].

## APPENDIX 5 – DATA RELATING TO HYPOTHESIS FIVE

### Policy committees chaired by deputy-leaders.

	Deputy-Leader	Term of Office	Policy Committees chaired by deputy-leaders
1.	Seán Lemass	1945-1948/ 1951-1954/ 1957-1959	None.
2.	William Norton	1948-1951/ 1954-1957	None.
3.	Seán MacEntee	1959-1965	None.
4.	Frank Aiken	1965-1969	None.
5.	Erskine Childers	1969-1973	None.
6.	Brendan Corish	1973-1977	None.
7.	George Colley	1977-1981	None.
8.	Michael O'Leary	1981-1982	None.
9.	Ray MacSharry	1982	None.
10.	Dick Spring	1982-1987/ 1993-1997	None.
11.	Peter Barry	1987	None.
12.	Brian Lenihan	1987-1990	None.
13.	John Wilson	1990-1993	None.
14.	Mary Harney	1997-2002	None.
15.	J. van Schaik	1948-1951	None.
16.	F. Teulings	1951-1952	None.
17.	L. Beel	1952-1956	None.
18.	A. Struycken	1956-1959	None.
19.	H. Korthals	1959-1963	None.
20.	B. Biesheuvel	1963-1967	None.
21.	A. Vondeling	1965- 1966	None.
22.	J. de Quay	1966-1967	None.
23.	H. Witteveen	1967-1971	None.
24.	J. Bakker	1967-1971	None.
25.	R. Nelissen	1971- 1973	None.
26.	W. Geertsema	1971- 1973	None.
27.	A. van Agt	1973- 1977	None.
28.	W. De Gaay Fortman	1977	None.
29.	H. Wiegel	1977- 1981	None.
30.	J. den Uyl	1981- 1982	None.
31.	J. Terlouw	1981- 1982	None.
32.	G. van	1982- 1986	None.

	Aardenne		
33.	R de Korte	1986- 1989	None.
34.	W. Kok	1989- 1994	None.
35.	H. Van Mierlo	1994-1998	None.
36.	H. Dijkstal	1994-1998	None.
37.	A. Jorritsma-Lebbink	1998 –2002	None.
38.	E. Borst-Eilers	1998 –2002	None.
39.	Per Ahlmark	1976-1978	None.
40.	Ola Ullsten	1979-1982	None.
41.	Ingvar Carlsson	1982-1986	None.
42.	Odd Erik Engström	1990-1991	None.
43.	Bengt Carl Westerberg	1991-1994	None.
44.	Mona Ingeborg Sahlin	1994-1995	None.
45.	Lena Hjelm-Wallén	1998-2002	None.
46.	Herbert Morrison	1946-1951	Fuel supplies for Industry for the Winter. <sup>385</sup>
47.	Anthony Eden	1951-1955	None <sup>386</sup>
48.	Richard (Rab) Butler	1962-1963	None <sup>387</sup>
49.	William Whitelaw	1979-1988	Misc 62 Committee. <sup>388</sup>
50.	Geoffrey Howe	1989-1990	Home Affairs Committee <sup>389</sup>
51.	Michael Heseltine	1995-1997	Cabinet committee on competitiveness. <sup>390</sup>
52.	John Prescott	1997-2002	Ministerial Committee on Domestic Affairs <sup>391</sup>
53.	Alben W Barkley	1949-1953	N/A
54.	Richard M. Nixon	1953-1961	Cabinet Committee on Price Stability. <sup>392</sup>
55.	Lyndon Johnson	1961-1963	Space Council. <sup>393</sup>
56.	Hubert H.	1965-1969	Council on Native Americans <sup>394</sup>

<sup>385</sup> Catterall, P. 1997.

<sup>386</sup> Catterall, P. 1997.

<sup>387</sup> Howard, 1988 and Butler, 1971.

<sup>388</sup> Financial Times, October 4<sup>th</sup> 1985, p. 8.

<sup>389</sup> The Times, July 30<sup>th</sup> 1989.

<sup>390</sup> Financial Times, July 19<sup>th</sup> 1995, p. 16.

<sup>391</sup> Available from: <http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/cabsec/index/index.htm> [accessed 15 March 2004].

<sup>392</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>393</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

	Humphrey		
57.	Spiro T. Agnew	1969-1973	National Aeronautics and Space Council. <sup>395</sup>
58.	Gerald Ford	1973-1974	Domestic Council. <sup>396</sup>
59.	Nelson Rockefeller	1974-1977	Domestic Council. <sup>397</sup>
60.	Walter F. Mondale	1977-1981	White House Agenda Setting Committee. <sup>398</sup>
61.	George H. Bush	1981-1989	Task Force on Federal Deregulation. <sup>399</sup>
62.	J. Danforth Quayle	1989-1993	Council on Competitiveness. <sup>400</sup>
63.	Albert A. Gore	1993-2001	National Partnership on Reinventing Government. <sup>401</sup>
64.	Richard B. Cheney	2001-2002	National Energy Policy Development Group. <sup>402</sup>

<sup>394</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>395</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>396</sup> Time Magazine, December 17<sup>th</sup> 1973, P. 27.

<sup>397</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>398</sup> Light, 1984, P. 634.

<sup>399</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>400</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>401</sup> Available from: [http://www.a-ten.com/biographies/al\\_gore.html](http://www.a-ten.com/biographies/al_gore.html) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>402</sup> Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/> [accessed 12 March 2004].

## APPENDIX 6 – DATA RELATING TO HYPOTHESIS SIX

### Reason for deputy-leaders leaving office

	Deputy-Leader	Term of Office <sup>403</sup>	Government left office	Retired/Resigned	Not Re-appointed	Sacked	Became leader	Died
1.	Seán Lemass	1945-1948/ 1951-1954/ 1957-1959	Government left office (1951) <sup>404</sup>				Became Taoiseach (1959) <sup>405</sup>	
2.	William Norton	1948-1951/ 1954-1957	Government left office <sup>406</sup>					
3.	Seán MacEntee	1959-1965			Not reappointed. <sup>407</sup>			
4.	Frank Aiken	1965-1969		Retired <sup>408</sup>				
5.	Erskine Childers	1969-1973	Government left office <sup>409</sup>					
6.	Brendan Corish	1973-1977	Government left office <sup>410</sup>					
7.	George Colley	1977-1981	Government left office <sup>411</sup>					
8.	Michael O'Leary	1981-1982	Government left office <sup>412</sup>					
9.	Ray MacSharry	1982	Government left office <sup>413</sup>					
10.	Dick Spring	1982-1987/ 1993-1997	Government left office (1982) <sup>414</sup>	Party resigned from government (1987) <sup>415</sup>				
11.	Peter Barry	1987	Government left office <sup>416</sup>					
12.	Brian Lenihan	1987-1990				Sacked over scandal. <sup>417</sup>		
13.	John Wilson	1990-1993	Government left office <sup>418</sup>					
14.	Mary	1997-	Still in					

<sup>403</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999.

<sup>404</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>405</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>406</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>407</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>408</sup> New York Times, May 19, 1983, p. 26.

<sup>409</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>410</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>411</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>412</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>413</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>414</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>415</sup> Ryan, 1993, p. 82.

<sup>416</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

<sup>417</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 382.

<sup>418</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 375.

	Harney	2002	office <sup>419</sup>					
15.	J. van Schaik	1948-1951	Government left office <sup>420</sup>					
16.	F. Teulings	1951-1952	Government left office <sup>421</sup>					
17.	L. Beel	1952-1956		Resigned <sup>422</sup>				
18.	A. Struycken	1956-1959	Government left office <sup>423</sup>					
19.	H. Korthals	1959-1963		Retired from parliament. <sup>424</sup>				
20.	B. Biesheuvel	1963-1967	Government left office <sup>425</sup>					
21.	A. Vondeling	1965-1966	Government left office <sup>426</sup>					
22.	J. de Quay	1966-1967	Government left office <sup>427</sup>					
23.	H. Witteveen	1967-1971	Government left office <sup>428</sup>					
24.	J. Bakker	1967-1971	Government left office <sup>429</sup>					
25.	R. Nelissen	1971-1973	Government left office <sup>430</sup>					
26.	W. Geertsema	1971-1973	Government left office <sup>431</sup>					
27.	A. van Agt	1973-1977		Party resigned from government <sup>432</sup>				
28.	W. De Gaay Fortman	1977	Government left office <sup>433</sup>					
29.	H. Wiegel	1977-1981	Government left office <sup>434</sup>					
30.	J. den Uyl	1981-1982		Party resigned from government <sup>435</sup>				
31.	J. Terlouw	1981-1982	Government left office <sup>436</sup>					
32.	G. van Aardenne	1982-1986	Government left office <sup>437</sup>					
33.	R de Korte	1986-1989	Government left office <sup>438</sup>					

<sup>419</sup> The Irish Times, June 21, 1997.

<sup>420</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>421</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>422</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>423</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>424</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>425</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>426</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>427</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>428</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>429</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>430</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>431</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>432</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>433</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>434</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>435</sup> The Financial Times, June 24 1982, p. 2.

<sup>436</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>437</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

34.	W. Kok	1989-1994 <sup>439</sup>	Government left office <sup>440</sup>					
35.	H. Van Mierlo	1994-1998 <sup>441</sup>	Government left office <sup>442</sup>					
36.	H. Dijkstal	1994-1998 <sup>443</sup>	Government left office <sup>444</sup>					
37.	A. Jorritsma-Lebbink	1998 – 2002	Government left office <sup>445</sup>					
38.	E. Borst-Eilers	1998 – 2002	Government left office <sup>446</sup>					
39.	Per Ahlmark	1976-1978		Resigned from politics. <sup>447</sup>				
40.	Ola Ullsten	1979-1982	Government left office <sup>448</sup>					
41.	Ingvar Carlsson	1982-1986					Became Prime Minister <sup>449</sup>	
42.	Odd Erik Engström	1990-1991	Government left office <sup>450</sup>					
43.	Bengt Carl Westerberg	1991-1994	Government left office <sup>451</sup>					
44.	Mona Ingeborg Sahlin	1994-1995		Resigned over expences scandal <sup>452</sup>				
45.	Lena Hjelm-Wallén	1998-2002			Not Re-appointed <sup>453</sup>			
46.	Herbert Morrison	1946-1951	Government left office <sup>454</sup>					
47.	Anthony Eden	1951-1955					Became Prime Minister <sup>455</sup>	
48.	Richard (Rab) Butler	1962-1963			Not Re-appointed <sup>456</sup>			

<sup>438</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>439</sup> Available from: <http://asem.inter.net.th/asem-info/netherlands/leader.html> [accessed 24 March 2003]

<sup>440</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

<sup>441</sup> Available from: [http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers\\_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html](http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html) [assessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>442</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>443</sup> Available from: [http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers\\_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html](http://www.minaz.nl/ministeraad/ministers_staat/html/cvs/mierlo.html) [assessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>444</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>445</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>446</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 87.

<sup>447</sup> The Economist, February 4 1978, p. 51.

<sup>448</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 98.

<sup>449</sup> The Guardian, March 3<sup>rd</sup> 1986.

<sup>450</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 98.

<sup>451</sup> Woldendrop, Jaap, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, 1993, p. 98.

<sup>452</sup> The Guardian, November 11<sup>th</sup> 1995, p. 16.

<sup>453</sup> Government of Sweden, 2003, p. 58.

<sup>454</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 52.

<sup>455</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 52.

<sup>456</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 52.

49.	William Whitelaw	1979-1988		Retired for health reasons. <sup>457</sup>				
50.	Geoffrey Howe	1989-1990		Resigned over European policy <sup>458</sup>				
51.	Michael Heseltine	1995-1997	Government left office <sup>459</sup>					
52.	John Prescott	1997-2002	Still in office <sup>460</sup>					
53.	Alben W Barkley	1949-1953	Government left office <sup>461</sup>					
54.	Richard M. Nixon	1953-1961	Government left office <sup>462</sup>					
55.	Lyndon Johnson	1961-1963					Became President <sup>463</sup>	
56.	Hubert H. Humphrey	1965-1969	Government left office <sup>464</sup>					
57.	Spiro T. Agnew	1969-1973		Resigned over tax scandal <sup>465</sup>				
58.	Gerald Ford	1973-1974					Became President <sup>466</sup>	
59.	Nelson Rockefeller	1974-1977			Did not seek to be re-nominated <sup>467</sup>			
60.	Walter F. Mondale	1977-1981	Government left office <sup>468</sup>					
61.	George H. Bush	1981-1989	Government left office <sup>469</sup>					
62.	J. Danforth Quayle	1989-1993	Government left office <sup>470</sup>					
63.	Albert A. Gore	1993-2001	Government left office <sup>471</sup>					

<sup>457</sup> Available from: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/382770.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/382770.stm) [accessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>458</sup> The Guardian, November 3<sup>rd</sup> 1990.

<sup>459</sup> Available from: <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1376.asp> [accessed 12 November 2003].

<sup>460</sup> Available from: [http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm\\_about/documents/page/odpm\\_about\\_025336.pdf](http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_about/documents/page/odpm_about_025336.pdf) [accessed 7 November 2003].

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<sup>465</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>466</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>467</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>468</sup> Available at [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice\\_President.htm](http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm) [accessed 3 June 2003].

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64.	Richard B. Cheney	2001-2002	Still in office <sup>472</sup>					
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<sup>471</sup> Available from: [http://www.a-ten.com/biographies/al\\_gore.html](http://www.a-ten.com/biographies/al_gore.html) [accessed 3 June 2003].

<sup>472</sup> Sunday Times Magazine, June 6 2003, pp 42-49.

## APPENDIX 7 – DATA RELATING TO HYPOTHESIS

### SEVEN

#### Activities of deputy-leaders after their term as deputy-leaders.

	Deputy-Leader	Term of Office	Full-time policy-influencing positions held by deputy-leaders after their term as deputy-leaders	Full-time business positions held by deputy-leaders after their term as deputy-leaders	Other
1.	Seán Lemass	1945-1948/ 1951-1954/ 1957-1959	Taoiseach. <sup>473</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>474</sup>	
2.	William Norton	1948-1951/ 1954-1957	None. <sup>475</sup>		
3.	Seán MacEntee	1959-1965	None. <sup>476</sup>		
4.	Frank Aiken	1965-1969	None. <sup>477</sup>		
5.	Erskine Childers	1969-1973	President. <sup>478</sup>		
6.	Brendan Corish	1973-1977	None. <sup>479</sup>		
7.	George Colley	1977-1981	None. <sup>480</sup>		
8.	Michael O'Leary	1981-1982	None. <sup>481</sup>		Judge.
9.	Ray MacSharry	1982	Minister for Finance and European Commissioner for Agriculture. <sup>482</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>483</sup>	
10.	Dick Spring	1982-1987/ 1993-1997	None. <sup>484</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>485</sup>	
11.	Peter Barry	1987	None. <sup>486</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>487</sup>	
12.	Brian Lenihan	1987-1990	None. <sup>488</sup>		Unsuccessful Presidential candidate. <sup>489</sup>
13.	John Wilson	1990-1993	None. <sup>490</sup>		Chair, Independent Commission for the location of Victims. <sup>491</sup>

<sup>473</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 382.

<sup>474</sup> Farrell, 1983, p. 124.

<sup>475</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 383.

<sup>476</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 382.

<sup>477</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 379.

<sup>478</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 379.

<sup>479</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 380.

<sup>480</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 380.

<sup>481</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 383.

<sup>482</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 383.

<sup>483</sup> Available from <http://www.rte.ie/culture/millennia/people/macsharryray.html> [accessed 2 February 2003].

<sup>484</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 384.

<sup>485</sup> Irish Times, May 4, 2004, p. 57.

<sup>486</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 379.

<sup>487</sup> Irish Times, December 24, 2003, p. 16.

<sup>488</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 382.

<sup>489</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 382.

14.	Mary Harnev	1997-2002	Still in office. <sup>492</sup>		
15.	J. van Schaik	1948-1951	Minister for State. <sup>493</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>494</sup>	
16.	F. Teulings	1951-1952	None. <sup>495</sup>		
17.	L. Beel	1952-1956	Prime Minister. <sup>496</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>497</sup>	
18.	A. Struycken	1956-1959	Minister for Justice. <sup>498</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>499</sup>	
19.	H. Korthals	1959-1963	None. <sup>500</sup>		Director of Oxfam Netherlands <sup>501</sup>
20.	B. Biesheuvel	1963-1967	Prime Minister. <sup>502</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>503</sup>	
21.	A. Vondeling	1965- 1966	Chair, Parliamentary committees. <sup>504</sup>		Member of European Parliament <sup>505</sup>
22.	J. de Quay	1966-1967	None. <sup>506</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>507</sup>	
23.	H. Witteveen	1967-1971	Director – IMF. <sup>508</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>509</sup>	
24.	J. Bakker	1967-1971	None. <sup>510</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>511</sup>	
25.	R. Nelissen	1971- 1973	None. <sup>512</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>513</sup>	
26.	W. Geertsema	1971- 1973	None. <sup>514</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>515</sup>	
27.	A. van Agt	1973- 1977	Prime Minister. <sup>516</sup>		EU ambassador to Japan and US <sup>517</sup>
28.	W. De Gaay	1977	Chair Justice Parliamentary Committee. <sup>518</sup>		

<sup>490</sup> Coakley & Gallagher, 1999, p. 384.

<sup>491</sup> Irish Times, August 29, 2003, p. 8.

<sup>492</sup> The Irish Times, June 21, 1997.

<sup>493</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

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<sup>513</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

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<sup>517</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

	Fortman				
29.	H. Wiegel	1977- 1981	None. <sup>519</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>520</sup>	
30.	J. den Uyl	1981- 1982	None. <sup>521</sup>		Chair, jury for AKO literature prize 1988 <sup>522</sup>
31.	J. Terlouw	1981- 1982	None. <sup>523</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>524</sup>	Chair government Commission on GM Foods <sup>525</sup>
32.	G. van Aardenne	1982- 1986	None. <sup>526</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>527</sup>	
33.	R de Korte	1986- 1989	Vice-President - European Investment Bank. <sup>528</sup>		
34.	W. Kok	1989- 1994	Prime Minister. <sup>529</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>530</sup>	
35.	H. Van Mierlo	1994-1998	Government representative to the European Convention. <sup>531</sup>		
36.	H. Dijkstal	1994-1998	None. <sup>532</sup>		Board member, Netherlands Film Fund <sup>533</sup>
37.	A. Jorritsma-Lebbink	1998 –2002	Chair Parliamentary Defence Committee. <sup>534</sup>		
38.	E. Borst-Eilers	1998 –2002	None. <sup>535</sup>		Member of the National 4th and 5 <sup>th</sup> May Committee (WW2 commemoration). <sup>536</sup>
39.	Per Ahlmark	1976-1978	None. <sup>537</sup>		Author <sup>538</sup>
40.	Ola Ullsten	1979-1982	None. <sup>539</sup>		Ambassador to Canada, Bahamas, Italy and Albania. <sup>540</sup>
41.	Ingvar Carlsson	1982-1986	Prime Minister. <sup>541</sup>		
42.	Odd Erik Engström	1990-1991	Chair, Bank Support Authority <sup>542</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>543</sup>	

<sup>518</sup> Available from [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com) [accessed 8 April 2003].

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<sup>525</sup> Het Financieele Dagblad, January 10th 2002.

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<sup>540</sup> Available from: [www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksdagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>541</sup> The Guardian, March 3<sup>rd</sup> 1986.

<sup>542</sup> Financial Times, December 11 1993, p. 13.

43.	Bengt Carl Westerberg	1991-1994	Vice-Chair Central Bank. <sup>544</sup>	Chairman, Telia. <sup>545</sup>	
44.	Mona Ingeborg Sahlin	1994-1995	Minister for Industry, employment and Communications. <sup>546</sup>		
45.	Lena Hjelm-Wallén	1998-2002	Swedish Government Representative in the European Convention. <sup>547</sup>		
46.	Herbert Morrison	1946-1951	Foreign secretary. <sup>548</sup>		
47.	Anthony Eden	1951-1955	Prime Minister. <sup>549</sup>		
48.	Richard (Rab) Butler	1962-1963	Foreign Secretary. <sup>550</sup>		Master of Trinity College Cambridge <sup>551</sup>
49.	William Whitelaw	1979-1988	None. <sup>552</sup>		
50.	Geoffrey Howe	1989-1990	None. <sup>553</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>554</sup>	
51.	Michael Heseltine	1995-1997	None. <sup>555</sup>	Owner of Publishing company. <sup>556</sup>	
52.	John Prescott	1997-2002	Still in office. <sup>557</sup>		
53.	Alben W Barkley	1949-1953	Senator. <sup>558</sup>		
54.	Richard M. Nixon	1953-1961	President. <sup>559</sup>		
55.	Lyndon Johnson	1961-1963	President. <sup>560</sup>		
56.	Hubert H. Humphrey	1965-1969	Senator. <sup>561</sup>		Lecturer <sup>562</sup>
57.	Spiro T.	1969-1973	None. <sup>563</sup>	Business Consultant <sup>564</sup>	

<sup>543</sup> Financial Times, June 13 1995, p. 14.

<sup>544</sup> Available from: [www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/](http://www.riksgagen.se/folkvald/ledamotr/) [accessed 23 May 2003].

<sup>545</sup> AFX News, May 14, 1998.

<sup>546</sup> Government of Sweden, 2003, p. 61.

<sup>547</sup> Financial Times, April 9 2003, p. 20.

<sup>548</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994, pp. 52-53.

<sup>549</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 73.

<sup>550</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 72.

<sup>551</sup> Available from: <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/EDbutler.htm> [accessed 4 May 2004].

<sup>552</sup> Available from: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/382770.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/382770.stm) [accessed 26 March 2003].

<sup>553</sup> Butler & Butler, 1994, p. 74.

<sup>554</sup> Available from: <http://www.academy-experts.org/people/HOWE.HTM> [accessed 3 May 2004].

<sup>555</sup> The Guardian, March 20 2001.

<sup>556</sup> The Guardian, March 20 2001.

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	Agnew				
58.	Gerald Ford	1973-1974	President. <sup>565</sup>		Lecturer <sup>566</sup>
59.	Nelson Rockefeller	1974-1977	None. <sup>567</sup>		
60.	Walter F. Mondale	1977-1981	None. <sup>568</sup>		Ambassador to Japan <sup>569</sup>
61.	George H. Bush	1981-1989	President. <sup>570</sup>	Business Consultant <sup>571</sup>	
62.	J. Danforth Quayle	1989-1993	None. <sup>572</sup>	Board member of Business <sup>573</sup>	
63.	Albert A. Gore	1993-2001	None. <sup>574</sup>		Lecturer <sup>575</sup>
64.	Richard B. Cheney	2001-2002	Still in office. <sup>576</sup>		

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  - (i) Internet
- b) Secondary sources
  - (i) Books
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