Implementing Peace
Settlements

Multiple Motivations, Factionalism
And Implementation Design

Catherine Lynch
Ph.D
2002
Implementing Peace Settlements
Multiple Motivations, Factionalism and Implementation Design.

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For the degree of Ph.D.

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October 2002.
I hereby confirm that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of PhD is entirely my own work and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed

(Candidate)

ID No

Date

11th October 2002
For my Mum  my Dad and Eoin

Without their support this would have been a far inferior piece of work

I also thank my supervisor Dr John Doyle for his guidance and hard work for never doubting me and for always reading my drafts promptly and returning with good advice. I also thank Professor Eunan O Halpin for his guidance especially during the early days of my thesis and Dr Eileen Connolly for patiently working with me as I wrote up my final draft. Finally I thank DCUBS for supporting me financially for most of my period of research and Professor Robert Elgie, head of the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University.
Implementing Peace Settlements
Multiple Motivations, Factionalism and Implementation Design

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Abstract
This research seeks to explain the obstacles to the implementation of peace settlements and to the consolidation of more co-operative and stable political systems in the aftermath of civil conflicts. Peace processes are explored through comparative observation and the theoretical modelling of strategic interactions in the immediate post-settlement implementation process. The study develops the argument that in the factionalism that characterises parties to a civil conflict, and in the multiple motivations that drive individual and group members to support these factions, lie the explanations for successful, stalled or unravelled implementation processes. It further considers the proposal that the design of the implementation process, and the political economy at the regional and international level, will have a determining effect on the outcome of implementation to the extent that they impact on the intra-party struggle between factions. In developing this argument a new model of implementation - the 'intra-formation factionalism' or IFF model - is proposed. The plausibility of the 'intra-formation factionalism' model and its predictions on the design of the implementation process are empirically explored by the application of a number of hypotheses to a data-set of 25 post-settlement civil conflicts. This is supported by a further analysis of three in-depth case studies in which the institutional procedures that appear to facilitate the successful implementation of negotiated peace settlements are highlighted.
## OUTLINE OF ABBREVIATED TERMS AND PERSONALTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRA</td>
<td>Continuity Irish Republican Army (split from IRA in 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party (Northern Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>New Angolan Army formed in 1992. Subsequently the Angolan Government’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALA</td>
<td>UNITA’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPLA</td>
<td>The MPLA’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Frente Farabundo Marti Liberacion Nacionale (Made up of ERP, PCS, RN, FPL and PRTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDR</td>
<td>Frente Democratico Revolucionario (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOA</td>
<td>Government of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOES</td>
<td>Government of El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity (Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFF</td>
<td>Intra-formation factionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Assembly (Northern Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party (El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUP</td>
<td>Progressive Unionist Party (Loyalist Party in Northern Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rIRA</td>
<td>Real Irish Republican Army (split from IRA in 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Sinn Fein, Republican Party in Northern Ireland (and Republic of Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Labour Party (Northern Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDA</td>
<td>Ulster Democratic Association (Loyalist paramilitary organisation in N Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Ulster Democratic Party (Loyalist Party in Northern Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Unity for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN SG</td>
<td>United Nation’s Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations mission in Angola (United Nations Angolan Verification Mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party (Northern Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVF</td>
<td>Ulster Volunteer Force (Loyalist paramilitary organisation in Northern Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFF</td>
<td>Ulster Freedom Fighters (Loyalist paramilitary organisation in Northern Ireland. A cover name for the UDA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PERSONALITIES IN CASE STUDIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adams Gerry</td>
<td>President of Sinn Fein, Republican political party, Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anstee Margaret</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General, Chief representative in Angola, 1992-3, UNAVEM 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Ben General (Pena)</td>
<td>Senior Commander of the UNITA armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’Aubusson</td>
<td>Founder of ARENA, El Salvador Steppe down as leader in 1985 but continued as senior member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Soto Alvaro</td>
<td>UN Chief Secretary General, representative in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dos Santos</td>
<td>President and Head of Armed Forces of MPLA, Angola President of Angola, 1979-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ervine David</td>
<td>Leader of Progressive Unionist Party, Northern Ireland MLA, Good Friday Agreement negotiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goulding J</td>
<td>UN Under Secretary and key player in the Salvadorian implementation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hume John</td>
<td>Leader of the SDLP (until 2001) A key architect of the peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handal</td>
<td>Leader of the PCN, one of the five parties (and former guerrilla armies) that make up the FMLN One of the seven FMLN negotiators and signatories of the accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuvokola</td>
<td>Secretary General of UNITA until February 1995 and UNITA signatory of Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallon Seamus</td>
<td>Deputy Leader, SDLP, Deputy First Minister NI Assembly, (until 2001), Leading negotiator of Good Friday Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGuinness Martin</td>
<td>Senior Sinn Fein leader, MLA, Minister for Education in the NI Assembly, Leading negotiator for Good Friday Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLaughlin Mitchell</td>
<td>Senior Sinn Fein leader, MLA Negotiator for Good Friday Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasley Ian</td>
<td>Leader of Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Northern Ireland Walked out of multi-party talks in September 1997 MLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Ponce</td>
<td>Minister for Defence, El Salvador until his removal after the Truth Commission in 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samakuva</td>
<td>Senior UNITA leader, elected to parliament, chief representative on the post Lusaka implementation commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallentuim</td>
<td>Senior UNITA leader, UNITA Spokesman and Head of Information from the early 1990s until 1997 when he split to form UNITA R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savimbi Jonah (Leader)</td>
<td>President and Head of the Armed Forces of UNITA, 1966 – 2002, Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trimble David</td>
<td>Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Northern Ireland First Minister, NI Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villhabos</td>
<td>Leader of the ERN, one of the five FMLN parties and former guerrilla armies that make up the FMLN One of seven FMLN negotiators and signatories of the accords</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Civil conflict is currently the most pervasive and protracted form of violent conflict in the international system. But empirical data shows that despite their apparent 'intractability', civil conflicts do come to an end. And while the majority of civil conflicts have ended with the military victory of one party over the other (Licklider, 1998, 121), negotiated settlements have brought some conflicts to an end.

The process through which violent civil conflict may be de-escalated, or brought to a durable end through negotiations, is the subject of this study. More specifically, it seeks to increase understanding of the process through which negotiated settlements are implemented, and to uncover the factors that facilitate and present barriers to full implementation. It thereby seeks to explain why some negotiation processes are ultimately successful and why others fail or become stalled.

The study explores the argument that in the factionalism that characterises parties to a civil conflict, and in the multiple motivations that drive individual and group members to support these factions, may lie the explanations for successful, stalled or unravelled implementation processes. It further considers the proposal that the design of the implementation process and the political economy at the regional and international level will have a determining effect on the outcome of implementation to the extent that they impact on the intra-party struggle between factions.

In addressing the implementation of negotiated settlements, the study will contribute to the development of the conflict resolution literature on de-escalation. More specifically, it will contribute to the de-escalation literature that seeks to explain the process of bringing civil conflict to an end through a negotiation process. Efforts to reach negotiated settlements have increasingly characterised de-escalation processes in civil wars across the international political system (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997).

However, while the number of successfully negotiated settlements has increased since the end of the 1980s, this success does not appear to automatically imply that successful outcomes to implementation follow. In fact, in case after case, where former enemies to civil wars agree to compromise, to share power, to establish new political systems, to demobilise armies, and most importantly to stop fighting, the celebrated peace settlement is not fully implemented or it unravels, and there is a return to violence at a
future date  Even those agreements that are eventually implemented tend to face long, conflict-ridden implementation processes. For example, in May 1991 following sixteen years of civil war, the UNITA insurgency\(^1\) and the MPLA\(^2\) government of Angola promised to demobilise their armies, to establish a joint army and to replace military with political competition in a democratic system. Eighteen months later, after an implementation process characterised by persistent stalling by both parties, they were engulfed in renewed civil war with unprecedented intensity. The current violence between Israel and the Palestinians was not imagined in 1993, when Yitzik Rabin and Yassar Arafat shook hands, established an accord on the principles governing the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis, and vowed to bring peace to the Middle East. The parties to the Lebanese civil war have since 1990 existed in a society free from violence, but in which many of the commitments of the 1989 Taif Accords have been permanently stalled or frozen. In El Salvador, Nicaragua and Mali, it took at least five years, with violent interruptions, before parties to the settlements made sufficient moves to ensure their successful implementation. In Northern Ireland, the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement has been slow and tortuous, with stalling characterising the actions of almost all actors.

This prompts the question as to why the elite members of parties to the conflict sometimes refuse to implement the commitments to which they agreed, after what were generally long negotiation processes, which apparently facilitated consensus on how to deal with the core issues of a conflict. Conflict resolution literature to date is only beginning to address seriously this important question. Classic conflict resolution theory would suggest that civil wars are simply not suitable for peaceful settlement, given mutually exclusive goals and the indivisibility of spoils (Ilke, 1971–95), but this raises the question as to why groups enter the process in the first place, and why some processes are eventually successful. Some analysts address this question by exploring the conditions under which conflict actors might enter negotiations, negotiate and formally endorse a settlement (Zartman, 1993, 1995; Kreisburg, 1989; Stedman, 1991). However, this literature does not truly address the post-agreement implementation process.

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1 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
2 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
Conflict management analysts offer well-developed theories on the types of institutions that create incentives for cooperation (Lijphart, 1969, Horowitz, 1985), but they do not address the process through which a 'blueprint' for settlement is transformed into a situation where the parties actually implement the agreed institutions. Where implementation processes fail, some analysts have gone full circle to present 'intransigence, narrow-mindedness and obstinacy' on the part of the actors, as the key barrier to implementation (Knudsen, Mundt and Zartman, 2000). In doing so they are explaining the obstacles to implementation with intransigence and zero-sum goals that lead to the absence of political will without political will no settlement will be successfully implemented. Yet it is arguable that political will is better interpreted as a fluctuating concept. It is not a constant, rather the result of a 'complex process that can be inhibited by a number of factors' (Smith, 1995 251). Uncovering the factors that determine political will should help us to understand some of the factors that cause political elites to alter their attitudes to implementing settlements that they previously endorsed. This in turn should go some way towards explaining the barriers to the implementation of settlements in general.

This thesis seeks to address the gap in the literature by building a theory of implementation and the factors that facilitate and impede it. It analyses aspects of the design of the implementation process and aspects of the external environment in which implementation takes place to explain why actors might endorse a compromise settlement, yet apparently lose the political will to consolidate it during the implementation process. Analysts who address the implementation of settlements (Walter, 1997, 2002, Hartzell, 1999, 2001, Stedman et al, 2001) tend to emphasise a number of factors as fundamental determinants of outcome, but these factors are generally external to the immediate rules and procedures of the implementation process. This study adds a new dimension to the literature by placing more emphasis on the design of the implementation process as a determining factor. This balance between institutional and external factors is not unique to the study of civil conflict and reflects a fundamental debate across the disciplines of political science, as to the relative role of institutions versus power relations in determining the behaviour of actors (Young, 1995 37-8).
The thesis makes a second original contribution to the literature in its focus on the critical importance of the factions that make up political organisations in determining their attitude to the implementation process. Although the existing literature does acknowledge that political organisations are not unitary actors, the study of their decision-making processes tends to treat them as if they are, or at most simply focuses on elite-societal linkages. This study seeks to analyse the struggle between the rival factions that exist within the elite and sub-elite of conflict actors and the importance of this struggle to understanding their political behaviour in the post implementation period. It seeks to generate this analysis through the use of both formal modelling and case-study analysis.

Critical to this research is the idea that it is possible and useful to make general statements about the politics of implementing post civil conflict negotiated peace settlements, whether the conflict in question is referred to as an ethnic, a revolutionary or a factional civil conflict. Further, it is argued that such general statements provide valuable insights into the political process in question, and into the power-games which take place both between and within conflict actors. It can also contribute to a debate about the effect of implementation rules, procedures and mechanisms, and the impact of the external environment, on the ultimate outcome of the implementation process.

Chapter one develops a theoretical framework on which to build the analysis of the dissertation. The theoretical framework is based on the assumption that conflict actors are made up of factions. These factions are composed of elite, sub-elite and mass elements, who are driven by multiple motivations to support, be sceptical about or to oppose implementation. Chapter two discusses the methodological concerns of the thesis, explaining the decision to employ formal model building, the criteria on which data were selected, the process of defining the concepts of successful, partially successful or failed implementation processes and the method of selecting in-depth case studies for empirical analysis. In chapter three a formal model of the implementation process is developed using the factions that belong to conflict formations as the key.

* The terms conflict ‘formation’ and conflict ‘party’ and conflict ‘actor’ are used interchangeably throughout the thesis to refer to the same thing. The groupings or actors that take part/fight in conflict and that negotiate to reach a settlement. The term formation captures the idea that conflict actors, while unified to fight against one or more enemies, are composed of groupings with different focuses — military or political — and of different ranks — elite, sub-elite, rank-and-file and supporter/grass roots
unit of analysis From the formal model a number of hypotheses are developed on the impact of the design of the institutional framework of implementation, and on the impact of external variables, on the outcome of the implementation process Chapter four empirically explores the explanatory power of the hypotheses vis-a-vis explanatory variables derived from other theories It employs simple statistical techniques and a data-set of twenty-five post cold-war implementation processes, to assess the abilities of the hypotheses developed in chapter three, to explain the outcome of implementation. Chapters five to seven present in-depth case studies selected from the twenty-five-country data-set. Chapter five explores the capacity of the hypotheses to explain the failure to implement the Bicesse Accords (1991) and the Lusaka Protocol (1994) in Angola. Chapter six analyses the relatively successful, but yet incomplete, process of implementing the Good Friday Agreement (1998) in Northern Ireland, and chapter seven, the ultimately successful implementation of the Chapultepec Accords (1994) in El Salvador. The work is concluded in chapter eight and its contribution to the de-escalation literature assessed.
CHAPTER ONE
IMPLEMENTATION
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter develops a theoretical framework within which to examine the implementation of negotiated peace settlements. It argues that theoretical models of conflict resolution need to acknowledge that the strategies and actions of the parties to the conflict are in part a function of the intra-party struggle that takes place within them. In the dominant theories of the existing literature, authors who focus on the zero-sum nature of civil conflict (Ilke, 1971, Pillar, 1983, Holl, 1993) have tended to ignore intra-party factionalism, as their focus is the intractability of civil conflict. Non-zero sum approaches are more focused on conflict resolution, but still tend to treat the political organisations involved in conflict as unitary actors (Walter 1997, 2000, 2002, Zartman, 1993, 1995). While much of the literature implicitly recognises that conflict actors are internally divided, this is not included in the analysis of the success or failure of peace settlements. In other words, the competing motivations that drive elite and sub-elite actors who collectively make-up each party to the conflict, and the potential of this disunity to explain the intricacies of the post settlement implementation process, are not comprehensively analysed.

This thesis will address this gap in the literature by examining implementation using a framework that considers the key players to be the rival factions that make up conflict actors. The inclusion of factions as a key element in a theoretical framework requires an understanding of faction motivation. A mixed motivations approach is developed and is used to analyse the impact of organisational structure and elite-societal links on the actions of factions, and ultimately on the attitudes of the entire political organisation towards the implementation of the peace agreement.

The assessment of current literature begins with an analysis of zero-sum and non-zero sum approaches, and their potential to contribute to an understanding of the different outcomes to implementation.

ZERO AND NON-ZERO APPROACHES
The inability of the zero-sum approach to adequately explain the intricacies of the management of civil conflict through a successful negotiation and implementation.
process is perhaps a function of its success in explaining the intractability of civil conflict. Zero-sum approaches usefully portray conflict as fought over high stakes and indivisible spoils (Heraclides, 1997: 695). Civil conflict is interpreted as a game of deadlock—cooperation is impossible because competing groups will always have competing interests (Walter, 1997: 342) and compromise solutions that are preferable to a continued fight for victory are rarely available (Pillar, 1983: 24). Where the goal is, in fact, to wipe out the enemy, compromise solutions are impossible (Holl, 1993: 275). Classic conflict resolution theory explains the indivisible spoils as arising from the desire of both conflict actors to control the government of the entity in question as there cannot be two governments and the passions aroused and political cleavages opened render a sharing of power unworkable, civil conflicts resist compromise (Ilke, 1971: 95).

Thus central to the zero-sum model is the contention that settlements are only likely where compromise solutions are available. However, issue rigidity, indivisible spoils and high stakes mean that compromise solutions are rarely available to civil wars, hence their intractability (Pillar, 1983: 24). The model is less useful when applied to de-escalation and more specifically to de-escalation through the implementation of a settlement. It does not explain when, and more importantly why, compromise solutions are sometimes available and agreed. The increasing number of cases where conflict formations enter prolonged negotiation processes (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997), negotiate and endorse settlements, and make some attempt to begin an implementation process, implicitly questions the argument that stakes are indivisible, differences are zero sum and compromise is impossible, regardless of whether or not they culminate in peace agreements. Amongst Walter's data set of 1940–1990 civil wars, in only six percent was no cease-fire ever drafted and in seventeen out of the forty-one civil wars formal negotiations did take place (1997: 337). While the drafting of a cease-fire agreement provides no proof that compromise over issues was possible, that there were some moves to consider a compromise agreement surely indicates that, for at least a period of time, a perception that common ground existed may have prevailed. Where more formal negotiation processes took place over a period of time, only to break down before a settlement could be reached, it is unconvincing to argue that intractable root-

1 In separatist conflicts, one side generally seeks to partition or secede from a given state, but both parties to the conflict seek to control fully the part of the state in question.
cause issues were the key obstacles to settlement, given the movement to negotiate in the first place, and the considerable progress frequently made in the settlement of issues Many zero-sum interpretations highlight the issues, or what are referred to as the root causes, that polarise relations between conflict formations, as the key obstacles to compromise. In accordance with this interpretation, analysts of ethnic conflict have presented it as more intractable and therefore less susceptible to compromise solutions than any other form of civil conflict (Rothschild and Hartzell, 1997, 152). Issues of identity are presented as threatening to one’s very personal security or survival (Herachides, 1997, 695), and as less malleable to compromise than, for example, socio-economic issues. The zero-sum model helpfully explains that once escalated to violent civil conflict, zero-sum perceptions of root-cause issues make the conflict more intractable, raise the stakes, and make spoils further indivisible. This increases the utility of fighting over compromise (Kaufmann, 1997, 153, Herachides, 1997, 695). Kaufmann argues that hyper-nationalist rhetoric and the atrocities that accompany the escalation of ethnic conflicts make cross-ethnic appeals unlikely. This is because the rhetoric and the atrocities help to create a security dilemma that is likely to prevent de-escalation without the physical separation of the conflict formations (1996, 137).

However, the contention that the rigidity of issues central to ethnic civil conflict best explains its intractability has been questioned. It has been difficult to conclusively bear out the hypotheses that civil wars, concerning what are generally perceived to be more zero-sum identity issues, are more difficult to resolve than other civil wars. Licklider (1995) reveals less negotiated settlements to ethnic than other civil conflicts from 1945-1995, but neither Mason and Fett (1996) nor Herachides (1997), nor Licklider himself in a review of the literature’s findings (1998) find conclusive evidence to support this contention. Maill finds that conflicts (civil and international) defined as primarily ethnic, minority, ideological or a power struggle for government were equally difficult to resolve. Only territorial or resource conflicts are found to have a better resolution record (Maill, 1992, 114-5). He thus concludes that all civil wars, and not just ethnic civil wars, are difficult to resolve.

In sum, the zero-sum literature does not convincingly explain why actors might involve themselves in negotiated settlements, and the nature of root-cause issues does not
appear to be critical to explaining the obstacles to successful de-escalation. An alternative model of civil conflict explains intractability as stemming, not from indivisible spoils and issue rigidity, but from the fear, insecurity and distrust associated with the uncertainty of entering a bargaining process with the enemy conflict party (Galtung, 1996, Walter, 1997, Walter and Snyder, 2000, Zartman, 1995). Most proponents of this model take what can be referred to as a 'rational actor' approach, their interest in power is considered to be as important to, or perhaps more important than, their policy objectives on the root-cause issues of the conflict. The rational approach can be distinguished from an ideational school that perceives civil conflicts as uniquely emotional and value-laden and naturally shunning of compromise. Underlying the rational approach is the utility-focused concept that actors will agree to enter negotiations and, perhaps, to a compromise settlement if they no longer perceive the military option to be rewarding. This is the case regardless of root-cause issues. A perception by all sides that the rising costs of conflict pose a threat to substantial interests and power bases is considered to be necessary if a stable settlement is to emerge (Rothschild and Hartzell, 1997 153). Zartman (1995) refers to this condition as a 'mutually-hurting stalemate'.

But obstacles to the emergence of mutually-hurting stalemate lie in the fear and distrust emanating from the asymmetric power relations that characterise civil conflict (Zartman, 1995), the reciprocal problem of settlement enforcement and vulnerability (Wagner, 1993, Walter, 1997, 2000), and a security dilemma (Snyder, 2000). According to Zartman (1995 336), the dominant party (government) initially perceives the use of coercion to crush insurgent actions, as less risky than negotiations. Equipped with this knowledge, the weaker party, in fear and distrust of its more powerful rival, is unlikely to make any moves that might endanger its ability to use violence to attain its goals. Without recourse to violence, the power asymmetry is unbearable for insurgents. Zartman argues that, where successful negotiations have taken place, the insecurity of the insurgency was lessened by its retention of the potential to seriously disrupt the new political system, in the event of a reneging government (1995 339).

2 See King 25-6 for an overview of this school. The extent to which it is a zero or non-zero sum interpretation depends on how immovable the value-laden, deep issues of recognition and denied participation that underlay conflict are presented to be.
Echoing Zartman’s theory on the vulnerability of parties once recourse to violence is no longer an option, Walter argues that comprehensive settlements present overwhelming threats to the security of conflict actors as they require de-mobilisation. As soon as parties begin to implement the provisions of a settlement, they become vulnerable to the possibility that the other party has not and will not fulfil its part of the bargain, and will instead increase its power and gain the upper hand. Thus, while conflict actors may wish to comply with the terms of peace agreements, they are powerless to enforce the terms over which they bargained so hard (Walter, 1997: 338). They will avoid settlements rather than risk the uncertainty and insecurity that is created by their distrust of the intentions of other formations. Wagner (1993: 263) also emphasises the difficulties associated with enforcing a compromise, rather than the obstacles to its negotiation presented by rigid issues and indivisible spoils. He presents intractability as ultimately stemming from structural constraints and the absence of converging expectations about possible outcome on the battlefield.

For Snyder, rational calculations about the high cost of misplaced trust decrease incentives to negotiate a settlement. He presents this as a security dilemma that mirrors not a game of deadlock but a prisoner’s dilemma game: both parties prefer to defect from a settlement if sure that the other actor will co-operate, but prefer mutual co-operation to mutual defection (2000: 27-8). In other words, if party A is sure that party B will co-operate, party A will defect and receive benefits without having to concede any power. On the other hand, if party A knew that party B would co-operate in the event of party A committing to co-operate, it would agree to co-operate, thereby securing its second-best option and avoiding the scenario where they both refuse to implement, and thus gain nothing. But party A’s fear that party B will renege on its commitment to co-operate, while it co-operates itself and is thereby forced to concede too much power, prevents it from co-operating.

Empirical studies do support the thesis that negotiated settlements face enormous obstacles that stem from the fear and distrust between conflict actors. Richardson and Wang (1993, 185) find that failure to establish trust and to identify areas of interest

\(^3\) Snyder describes the dilemma as one resembling the prisoner’s dilemma without developing the game in game theoretic format. He does not explicitly say so but he appears to interpret the interaction between conflict actors as an iterated, rather than a one-off, version of the game (2000: 22).
accounted for the collapse of initiatives in many cases. Rothschild and Lake (1998, 203-4) highlight the centrality of fear and insecurity to ethnic conflict. They point out that, where ethnic groups possess effective safeguards, share specific expectations and feel secure in their relationship with the state and with each other, inter-group competition tends to be constructive. Fears and insecurities are at stake for ethnic groups in conflict, alongside core issues for negotiation such as self-determination and sovereignty, according to O’Leary. The obstacles posed by fear, insecurity and distrust of the other conflict actor do appear to loom large in all civil conflicts. But the question of why this fear, insecurity and distrust might prevail to prevent the implementation of a settlement after complex negotiations see actors building the trust required to reach a compromise settlement is left un-addressed by this model. If fears and insecurity loom so large, why are negotiation processes entered and implementation frequently, at least temporarily, pursued?

The impact of divisions within conflict formations on the ultimate strategy of the formation may provide an answer to this question. It may help to explain what frequently appears to be a reduction in elite political will to implement a settlement after its endorsement. Yet inherent in almost all endeavours to explain the obstacles to compromise amongst civil conflict parties, including those discussed above, is the tacit assumption that conflict formations are ‘unitary,’ rational actors. This is true even where an elite-masses dichotomy is recognised. It persists despite a sophisticated literature on the negative role played by extremist, ethnic outbidding in the escalation of conflict and an apparently clear recognition in the literature concerned with de-escalation that conflict formations are not, in fact, unitary. This is next explored.

UNITARY VERSUS NON-UNITARY ACTORS
The assumption that conflict formations are unitary actors simplifies a complex set of interactions. This is useful especially where the quest is to explain the intractability or sustainability of civil conflict. But there is need to consider intra-formation divisions. There is need to consider the role that factions play in determining conflict formation strategy where de-escalation and, in particular, the barriers to implementation are concerned.

4 Radio 4, 13 04 00 ‘Peace in Our Time’
5 This assumes that settlements are not completely imposed (see chapter two)
Many analysts include intra-party and intra-elite relations as a variable affecting the intractability of civil conflict, but there is little systematic investigation of the possible effect that this may have on impeding compromise, especially from the point of view of impeding the process of implementing agreements. For example, Walter (2000, 64) acknowledges that conflict formations are not unitary actors, but she does not proceed to discuss the possible implications of this fact. Richardson and Wang (1993, 185) conclude that in many failed peace agreements key influential actors, perhaps factions of larger actors, were left out of the negotiation or implementation stage. They recommend that would-be third parties attempting to conclude accords ensure the agreed terms have adequate support among adversaries. Implicit in this task is the acceptance that negotiating parties are not unitary actors and that an agreement to settle may not be an indication of complete support for this position in each party. But there is little further analysis of this fact. Inherent in Horowitz’s central recommendation, that institutions must create incentives for moderate political actors, is the assumption that ‘broad conflict formations’\(^6\) are not made up of unitary actors. Implicit in both Duffield’s (1999, 2000) and Keen’s (1996, 2000) analyses discussed below is a recognition of the existence of different factions within conflict parties, and of controlling, structural hierarchies that frequently dictate the relationships between elites and masses.

Stedman (1996, 349) assesses the implications of intra-party power struggles positively as long as there are intra-group differences, and as long as those who are willing to accept compromise solutions can influence the group decision-making, the preferences of a party or group are changeable. The corollary of this argument is, of course, that, as long as those unwilling to compromise can affect group decision-making, there exist strong barriers to the successful management of conflict. For Stedman (1991, 12-15), insurgent movements include individuals, frequently labelled as extremists, who put principles before interests, while at the same time they contain individuals who would accept far less than the settlement that may be negotiated. In other words, insurgent groups, like many political groups, are made up of diverse factional elements who,

\(^6\) Defined in chapter three
'although united, may have competing objectives’ and there may be ‘little consensus within a revolutionary organisation on overall goals’ (Stedman, 1991 12)

Zartman (1993 25, 1995 9-10) argues that rebel insurgent groups substitute two factors for their lack of military clout: commitment and grievances. In a powerful theory on the incentives for conflict actors to enter negotiations, he argues that a conflict is ripe for resolution through negotiations if the grievances that compelled the conflict actor to take up arms initially are stronger than the commitment to a power struggle against the government. Once commitment exceeds grievances, or in other words once the war becomes an end in itself, the obstacles to conflict management increase to make success extremely unlikely. Zartman separately discusses intra-party relations and the role of extremists (1993 27, 1995 340-1). He argues that polarisation of the conflict facilitates the agendas of extremists. He does not appear to consider that the causation may be the other way around—that the agendas of extremists polarise the conflict. Nor are the implications should ‘commitment’ be high amongst one faction of a conflict formation and ‘grievances’ high amongst another analysed. Yet important explanations for the dynamics of the post-settlement implementation process may lie in the constant struggle between those emphasising ‘grievances’ and those driven by ‘commitment’.

Licklider et al (1993 14), in an endeavour to establish a more systematic relationship between settlement and features of conflict formation leadership, conclude that a settlement is facilitated by power concentration on the winning side and leadership changes on the losing side in civil wars (Licklider, 1993 308). In other words, the outcomes of the internal power struggles over the nature of leadership determine, at least to some extent, how and whether or not civil wars are settled. Waterman (1993 295-6) argues that the way in which collectivities are structured and leaders empowered largely determines the possibility [or probability] of solutions. He argues that, if leaders lack autonomy, accommodation will not take place as competitive outbidding makes leaders incapable of giving consent to compromises. With this he implies that only conflict formations that have centralised leadership structures and power to make authoritative decisions will bring about a sustained settlement to civil conflict.

However, according to this logic, no leader will sign and endorse a peace settlement unless he or she believes himself to have sufficient control over a conflict formation to
implement it, and thus to remain in power. Either this, or leaders with enough autonomy but without total centralised control will negotiate and sign an agreement in the hope that the implementation process will deepen their hold on power and perhaps increase their autonomy. That settlements are signed yet implementation processes are replete with barriers suggests that the latter interpretation is more accurate, or at least that leaders' confidence in their ability to control the formation is over-estimated. This brings the argument back to a question raised in the introduction of why elites might sign an agreement that they never intended to implement, and suggests that it is quite unlikely that he or she will do this knowingly. Instead, it is argued that the intra-conflict formation power struggle that follows the signing of the agreement explains his or her ability to pursue the implementation of the settlement. If the implementation process is to be understood, the actors to this power struggle must be the central unit of analysis. But the question remains as to how intra-formation divisions are best defined and understood and what form this intra-formation power struggle will take. Divisions between the elite and masses parts of conflict actors are first considered.

ELITES AND MASSES
Conflict management literature presents the fact that conflict actors are composed of blocks of elites and masses as significant. Two conditions have been identified as essential for the successful application of conflict management solutions: elite willingness to implement and sufficient elite control over its constituency to pursue implementation (Nordlinger, 1972 468-470, Sisk, 1996 77-80, Galtung, 1996 88). But short of total imposition of the terms of a negotiated settlement by a third party, settlements are products of negotiations between conflict actors. They therefore command the support and reflect the positions of those elites who negotiated them. Are obstacles to implementation thus explained by the unwillingness of the masses (constituency) to support the implementation policy of the elites? It is difficult to accept at face value this proposition that elite inability to persuade followers to support negotiated settlements provides the key impediment to successful implementation. This is especially the case given the important role that many analysts assign (King, 1996 30-2) to elites in the mobilisation and escalation of civil conflict. Instead, the question of whether or not the elites or the masses present greater barriers to conflict management is complex. What is more, there is rarely consensus on the question of whether it is fears, insecurities or distrust on the part of elites or the masses
that pose the greater obstacle to demobilisation. This is true even for a specific conflict, and few analysts conclude that a conflict is either wholly elite or masses led. Amongst analysts who interpret conflict as non-zero sum, there appears to be disagreement over the relative contribution of structural\(^7\), actor, psychological/cultural and socio-economic factors to intractability. From these disagreements stem the incongruities in the literature as to the relative role of elite decision makers versus mass-level behaviour in sustaining the intractable structures of civil conflict.

Some analysts emphasise the hardened perceptions of elite members of conflict formations as the key obstacle to problem-solving approaches to conflict (Stedman 1996 347). Others, such as Smith, focus on the motivations of the masses and their attitude to members of the other conflict formation(s).\(^8\) Woodward focuses on the role that elites play in escalating the insecurities that sustain civil conflict. She implies that civil conflict is sustained by the rational and strategic decisions made by elites who seek to avoid their own insecurity (2000 84). Smith\(^9\) questions the rationale behind mass willingness to follow unscrupulous elites, plausibly arguing that without genuine grievance it seems unlikely that elite endeavours to escalate conflict would succeed. Posen explains that the near collapse of the state triggers the security fears of the masses and leads to the competitive mobilisation of self-help groups (Snyder and Walter 24). Self-help groups restrict the choices of the masses and make them likely to support even unscrupulous elites. This is echoed in Mayall’s description of the quest for security on the part of the masses that follows state breakdown.\(^10\)

These approaches to the role of the elite and the masses assume that the elites and the masses are coherent groupings. But the lack of consensus on the role of elites vis-a-vis the masses in sustaining conflict, and by extension impeding implementation, might be better explained by the proposition that neither the masses nor the elites are, in fact, cohesive groupings. An alternative understanding of the intractability caused by intraparty factionalism may help to explain the barriers to the implementation of elite-endorsed settlements. The multiple-motivations approach to conflict developed below.

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\(^7\) Meaning the development of underlying structure of relations and power distribution, outside of the immediate control of conflict actors, that constrains the choices / behaviours of conflict actors.

\(^8\) Radio 4, 13 04 00 ‘Peace in Our Time’

\(^9\) Radio 4, 13 04 00 ‘Peace in Our Time’

\(^10\) Radio 4, 13 04 00 ‘Peace in Our Time’
does not explain resistance to implementation as a product of the insecurities of the masses and their consequential refusal to support elite pursuit of implementation. Nor does it explain resistance to implementation as entirely the product of dishonest elites who seek to reduce their own vulnerability by continuing conflict against the wishes of the masses. It instead proposes that the different motivations that drive the disparate factions that collectively make up conflict actors explain the dynamics of the post-settlement implementation stage of conflict.

**MULTIPLE MOTIVATIONS: UNDERSTANDING INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLES**

The struggle between the factions that characterises the elite (and sub-elite) members of a conflict formation is crucial to understanding the behaviour of conflict formations during implementation. The motivations that drive these factions therefore require consideration. Conflict typologies are frequently used to categorise the motivations of civil conflict actors, and many make the popular distinction between conflicts on the basis of underlying issues. Maill et al (1999: 30-1) suggest three categories: Revolutionary/ideology; identity/secession and factional civil wars, the latter including coup d'états, brigandage, warlordism and criminality, where the aim is to seize or to retain state power to further particular interests. But the typologies do not reflect the different cycles that characterise long civil conflicts. The level of violence may intensify, the degree of domestic and international support for any civil war party may alter, and the leadership of the political elite may change. In accordance with these cycles, the relative importance of issues generally seen as causal may decrease as other issues, perhaps associated with the structures resulting from escalation, assume more prominence and present more obstacles to resolution.

For example, White (1990: 88) documents extensive research that reveals the policing and security forces issues to be the most divisive inter-community issues in the Northern Ireland conflict. This is despite widespread perceptions that the zero-sum nature of ethnic issues and the constitutional question present the biggest obstacle to compromise. In El Salvador, despite the Marxist 'revolutionary' aims of sections of the FMLN\textsuperscript{11} insurgency, reliable survey data suggests that political exclusion and the actions of the armed forces were most important in persuading the population to support the insurgency (McClintock: 267-71; 284-87). What is more, it is possible to find
elements of all three typologies in most civil conflicts. Take, as examples, the cases of Angola and Mozambique, while ethnicity provides/ed a powerful domestic mobilising force for each party to the conflict in both conflicts, the expression of ideological differences was essential for the mobilisation of international support, while there is at the same time clear evidence of warlordism in both conflicts. Savimbi’s UNITA once claimed to be ‘freedom fighters’ against Angola’s communist regime. In 2001, while remaining a relatively homogenous organisation in terms of ethnic make-up, UNITA appeared to seek to control diamond mines, over and above seeking to control the governing of the country or to overthrow a regime on ideological grounds (Conesa, 2001 10, Keen, 98 42). Similarly questioning the use of rigid typologies, conflict management practitioner, Rupesinghe, questions whether the Palestine-Israeli conflict is about religion, territory, power or identity, and whether the escalation of violence in Bosnia was really the resurgence of a long-standing ethnic feud. In support of the argument outlined above, Rupesinghe argues that, while it is possible to categorise according to rigid typologies based on root-cause issues, new lines of demarcation are drawn as conflict escalates. Original issues are frequently juxtaposed with other issues and external factors serve to make the conflict more complex (Rupesinghe 57).

In fact, protracted civil conflicts display institutional, structural, actor and issue characteristics in common that question the usefulness of rigid typologies. For example, following a comparative study of post-1945 ‘internal’ wars, Azar contends that regional instability, political fragmentation, and fragile state structures are the pre-dominant features of all such conflicts (Maill et al 71). This is regardless of the underlying issues. Maill et al (1999 74) point out that, regardless of typology, there is a near consensus amongst analysts that a perceived ‘deprivation of human needs’ and recognition of this deprivation by a significant proportion of the population is a pre-condition for mobilisation in all conflicts. The ‘deprivation of human needs’ may emerge from a number of sources. It may emerge as a result of frustrated and rising social and economic expectations, as a result of an increasingly widespread awareness of political discrimination on ethnic, racial or religious grounds, or awareness by a particular group.
of their complete exclusion from power and patronage. But common to all conflicts is that for escalation to occur the grievances require mobilisation.

It is here proposed that two factors determine whether or not mobilisation is undertaken on ethnic, tribal, revolutionary, religious or other grounds: the strategic actions of the elite who mobilise support on the back of discontent and the pre-existing divisions in society. The primary source of mass discontent may not necessarily be the prime mobilising factor. For example, mobilisation may occur along ethnic lines where key reasons for discontent have been socio-economic. The degree to which the elite actually represent the grievances of their constituency and use the promise to redress them as a mobilising and sustaining force, relative to the degree of patronage, racketeering and intimidation used to create structures sustaining support, will vary from conflict to conflict and from actor to actor. Important, however, is that in no conflict is mobilisation solely based on a single one of these factors. Even in situations where most neutral international opinion has recognised the legitimacy of a movement and its grievances, for example the FMLN in El Salvador, there were some reports of FMLN coercion to mobilise membership (Stanley, 1996:226).

In sum, conflict constitutes a struggle for power and this remains the case regardless of the mobilising issues and methods. This remains the case regardless of whether power is sought by elites for personal enrichment, fulfillment of personal ideological beliefs or to genuinely address their grievances and/or the grievances of the masses. More often than not the three would combine to form the goals of individual elites. Even where an individual leader may have only ‘genuine’ or benevolent goals, it is unlikely that the entire leadership will have, and the goals of the elite are a sum of all elite goals. Given the multiple motivations that drive individual elite members of conflict formations, the goals of the elite (including sub-elite) are not always cohesive.

Recent analyses of ethnic conflict structures in Bosnia lend some support to the multiple motivations interpretation of conflict outlined above. According to one analyst, following initial mobilisation, a hierarchical political economy has emerged, less by identity than by fear and racketeering along ethnic lines, reinforced by physical force.

12 Including elite and sub-elite levels of leadership.
violence. The upper echelons of that hierarchy fear that peace would mean a loss in political and economic power (Griffiths, 1999: 58-9). Griffiths’s findings suggest that, while identity served as and remains as a powerful mobilising force, the structures of the political economy and the power hierarchies that characterise elite and sub-elite organisation present the key obstacle to conflict management, regardless of underlying identity issues. Rather than interpreting intra-party conflict as a function of masses-elite disunity, obstacles to the resolution of ethnic conflict are portrayed as a complex interplay of ‘structures’ involving actors, agents, processes and dynamics.13

Bellamy’s impression of the Bosnian conflict was that very few people supported it, it was the legacy of the pre-1990, well-organised society and military structure that enabled the conflict party elite to exercise the control to instigate and prolong the conflict (1998: 6). While generally supporting Bellamy’s interpretations of the spiral of violence in Bosnia, Woodward is careful to point out that, while the actions of elites played a very significant role in sustaining the civil war, the US conviction that only the very top elite, in particular Milosovic, was responsible for the aggression that led to civil war was very misguided (2000: 84-7) and ignored the role of sub-elites who belonged to power-hierarchies. Indeed that Bellamy was able to form the impression that the conflict lacked mass societal support, despite the high level of ethnic cleansing which was carried out at both elite and societal level, is perhaps testimony to the mixed motivations of those involved in conflict. The lack of ‘opposition to ethnic cleansing’ at a societal level stemmed for many from the need to remain part of local power hierarchies. While this silence certainly did not imply support for ethnic cleansing (hence Bellamy’s findings), a degree of complicity from some actors at societal level existed, even if it was for some a reaction to coercive power hierarchies.

Like Woodward, Keen (2000: 20) stops short of placing all blame on power-seeking elites at the top of power hierarchies. Central to his analysis is a discussion of the economic incentives, which exist for certain groups, at both elite and societal level to

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13 This perhaps explains why despite the apparent strength of ethnic identity as a mobilising force and the cohesion that this mobilising force should give to the masses-elite goals, the negotiation and implementation of negotiated settlements to identity civil conflicts encounter enormous obstacles.
pursue a strategy that prolongs conflict. The barriers to implementation surely increase when, despite the settlement, continuation of conflict is perceived to be in the self-seeking, economic interests of some powerful factions. Griffiths (1999), Keen (1996) and Duffield (1998) present civil conflict as sustained by multiple, over-lapping structural and institutional factors that increase the incentives for some factions to pursue strategies that perpetuate it, and to present it as intractable. Using this model, which is broadly termed as a 'political economy' model of civil conflict, Duffield presents two central obstacles to its management. The first, the breakdown in the pre-civil war political and economic system, heralds an alternative system of profit and power, which depends on continued civil war for its survival. Secondly, with the development of this power and patronage system, the distinction between war, peace and crime are blurred (1998 71-2). According to this interpretation, the development of politico-economic hierarchies leaves many people totally dependent on their workplace, locality or bosses for needs as basic as food and housing (Duffield, 1998 77-9). This system of *personalism* and patronage serves to engender loyalty for the civil conflict actor that promises to protect these basic interests. If the survival of the power hierarchy depends on supporting a continued policy of civil war, elites, sub-elites and the masses in question will do so to protect their own rational interests. An interpretation of conflict formations as constituting an elite and a masses block ignores the important role that such power hierarchies play in sustaining civil conflict. Power hierarchies incorporate elite, sub-elite and sections of the masses.

Mark Duffield specifically uses this interpretation of conflict to understand post-cold war civil conflicts, which he defines as 'post modern'. This political-economy model of civil conflict is increasingly applied to conflicts throughout the African continent, where almost complete state breakdown and the absence of the provision of basic services and needs, such as food and physical protection, tends to accompany conflict. But Horowitz (1994 49) has pointed to hierarchies as a sustaining factor in previous civil wars when he discusses the sense of security and source of trust, certainty, reciprocal help and protection that ethnic affiliations provide in the face of the neglect of one's interest by strangers. The level of state-breakdown and governance varies radically from civil conflict to conflict, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka perhaps placed at one end, and

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14 For example, features of this self-help system are found in Northern Ireland (Cochrane, 2000 12) this questioning the need to create a different, 'post-modern' category.
Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Angola at the opposite end of a continuum. But in all civil conflict elements of the political-economy structures of power described above exist to preserve sections of conflict formations, both elites and masses, in favour of violence. On the prevalence or depth of these power hierarchies, the structures that keep elements of them in favour of continued civil war, and the ability to create incentives to weaken them, may ultimately depend the strength of barriers to implementation.

Thus the decision to implement a negotiated settlement is arguably dependent on the outcome of a power struggle between the factions within each conflict formation. Each faction is not necessarily made up of individuals who are driven by the same motivations. But in each faction individual members perceive the same outcome of implementation as crucial to their fundamental goal, be it increased security, redress of grievances, increased access to power or resources, or all three. Each faction incorporates actors at elite, sub-elite and societal level. And it might be argued that with the reaching of a certain threshold in the process of intra-formation out-bidding, whereby militant elements, who perceive continued conflict to be in their interest,

gain control of party strategy, the implementation of a settlement is no longer an option. This theoretical framework, developed through a multiple motivation typology of conflict, presents the factions that make up conflict formations as the key actors in the implementation process. It presents the outcome of implementation as dependent on the ability of those factions, who perceive compliance with implementation to be in their interest, to control party strategy.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWER STRUGGLE
If intra-conflict formation relations is a key determining variable for the outcome of implementation, the organisational or institutional structure of the conflict formation and its effect on power distribution within it may be significant. McKinley (1998) argues that the motivations and organisational structure behind warlord-led

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15 For example Bellamy (7) considers that disintegration and the collapse of society in Bosnia has not gone as far as some states in Western Africa as described by Michael Ignatieff
16 For Northern Ireland, see David McKittrick, *The Independent* 9 03 01 McDonald Henry, *The Observer* 27 08 00
organisations are significantly different to those of insurgent movements. However, given the argument that civil conflict actors are not unitary actors, they should not be defined as 'war lord' formations or 'insurgent' formations, as this draws too strong a defining line where in reality the line is blurred. All conflict formations constitute power-seeking factions with multiple goals, motivations and strategies, ranging from the personal, to the principled, to the ideological, to the self-interested. To the extent that the elite genuinely represents the grievances of the entire conflict formation and depends on its support for power, and the extent to which support of the masses is mobilised rather than forced, the group can be classified as closer to the conventional conception of an insurgency than to that of a conflict formation dominated by warlords. It is possible to interpret individual civil conflicts as falling somewhere along a continuum where motivations and structure of conflict formations are concerned. At one end, one hundred per cent of the motivation behind elite pursuit of the conflict is the use of grievances to sustain personal power, wealth and politico-economic structures, at the other, one hundred per cent of the motivation is inspired by a genuine commitment to political change and to the advancement of certain economic, social or anti-discrimination goals to reduce grievances. Conflict nearing the former end will tend to include actors that operate according to warlord-style organisational structures. Those at the latter end will tend to be dominated by the more traditional, insurgent-style organisation that depends on community support for some legitimacy. Most conflicts will lie somewhere in the middle, as neither the motivations of the masses nor of elite members of conflict formations are unified, and the strategy of the collective conflict formation depends on the outcome of the struggle between factions. Most actors will attempt to present themselves as lying nearer to the former end.

MASSES AND FACTIONS

Most political-economy models seek to explain the decisions made by individuals to comply with institutional procedures or rules. In doing so they tend to take into account the multiple motivations, preferences and behaviour at the individual level (Ostrom, 1982 23-4). In a similar way, the typology here helps to put some structure on an exploration of the motivations of an entire society of individuals, using intra-party

17 Rich (1999) introduces this concept and he calls for the development of a typology of warlords ranging from those that are effectively large-scale gangs to those that resemble insurgent and national liberation movements with claims towards being treated as legitimate actors.
factionalism. The multiple motivation typology of conflict removes exclusive emphasis from interactions between the elite and sub-elite members of conflict formation elites. It moves it to focus on the divisions that cut across the elite and sub-elite section of conflict formations and to interactions both within and between conflict formations. The factions that exist in conflict formations are built on power hierarchies. They are led by and composed of elites and sub-elites who are motivated to either comply with or defy the negotiated settlement. But the strategies adopted by faction elites and sub-elites are 'clearly affected by the perceived degree to which the proposed action would hurt the hierarchy of support' enjoyed by a faction (Geddes, 1999: 204).

If we are to generalise about the motivations of the individual and the effect that the individual's actions have on the choices made and actions taken by elite members, the different backgrounds against which individuals make decisions must be recognised. A gesture of support may either involve a genuine degree of political choice or be the result of either physical or socio-economic structural coercion. Lending support can be by means of election or by other voluntary means such as participation at grass-root level in the organisation of a conflict formation, or the contribution of resources to it. It can also mean compliance with local leaders for dependency reasons, because of threatening or coercive behaviour or forced participation in the campaign of violence. It is assumed that multiple motivations account for the behaviour, attitude and decisions made by individuals to lend support to political elite and sub-elite groupings and/or to actively support a paramilitary or insurgency organisation in the conflict-management process. Motivations may range from allegiance to a family member or traditional family support, to a genuine or ideological commitment to the defined political goals of the organisation, to a fundamental desire to be involved in violence, to personal economic enrichment, to fear or forced recruitment. Table 1 summarises the multitude of plausible motivations that influence individuals and grass-root groups to 'lend support' (whether because of choice or force) to a conflict formation or faction.

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18 Actors described as 'warlord' organisations tend to be highly decentralised, with limited command.
Table 11 Mixed motivations of mass support for conflict formations and their factions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOTIVATIONS</th>
<th>DEGREE OF POLITICAL CHOICE</th>
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<td>POLITICAL CHOICE OR PHYSICAL / STRUCTURAL COERCION</td>
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<td>Economic Opportunism/ Economic Necessity/ Economic resentment</td>
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<td>Physical Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of loss / Aim to maintain current degree / Aim to increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideological or Identity Motivations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of loss of self help support groups/ Genuine commitment or loyalty to identity/ Genuine ideological commitment or loyalty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal / Family / Traditional Loyalty</td>
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<td>Traditional family or personal loyalty to a certain group / person/ cause/ issue</td>
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Arguably, the extent to which the political choices of the masses directly influence the strategy of conflict factions (and the outcome of intra-formation power struggles) will be determined by the organisational structure of the conflict formation. The overall level of democracy in an entity may shape this. Yet in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, where the political choices of the masses or the constituency have arguably carried weight, barriers to implementation have remained high. In Angola, where coercion and hierarchical political-economy structures account for much of the support for both the government and UNITA and where the leadership of each appears to be centralised and coercive, implementation has failed outright on two occasions. On the other hand, in Mozambique, where hierarchical structures and coercion similar to those in Angola existed, the implementation process succeeded and formal civil violence has ended since 1992. There is little experience of democracy in Mali yet implementation was ultimately successful. In sum, whatever the elite-masses relationship (level of democracy), it would appear that implementation processes are faced with obstacles. In fact, it would appear that the extent to which the masses have a formal political choice rather than being primarily motivated by physical or economic coercion does not provide a convincing explanation for the differing outcomes of implementation processes.

19 Some may argue that this is a non-rational motivation. However, the decision can be interpreted as rational at the individual level, in that the individual perceives continued association with a traditional (family or personal) cause or organisation, as important to his or her overall goals or position in society.
Take, for example, a society where the key motivating factor for supporting a political group appears to be the fear of physical or socio-economic retribution for deviating from a leadership strategy. One might expect that in this situation the leadership would find implementation of a settlement to be straightforward. Similarly in a situation where political choice is a fundamental part of the political system, but where individuals appear to offer unquestioning support to parties or factions for reasons of personal, family or ideological/identity loyalty, one might expect that leaders could follow an implementation strategy without too many obstacles. But these clear-cut scenarios do not materialise. Elites and sub-elites making up conflict formations and their factions are driven by many different motivations, and individuals, whether acting primarily by choice or by coercion, are equally so driven by mixed motivations to support factions in the intra-formation power struggle.

The elite and sub-elite of factions, whatever the extent of their genuine commitment to the espoused cause, are motivated by the desire to either retain or gain power. They adopt a strategy that they hope will maximise support, in the context of the primarily choice or primarily coercive conditions for mobilisation in which they operate. Where the attitudes of the masses carry weight and can influence the overall balance of power within a conflict formation, their attitudes will tend to be directly reflected in the strategies of the conflict factions.20 Here the power struggle is a struggle to gain the initiative by maximising public support through a combination of representation, manipulation, patronage and at times intimidation. Where racketeering and structural coercion make political choice less meaningful, the conflict between factions remains reflective of the concerns of individuals. If successful, a faction will fulfil the immediate motivation of individuals supporting it − self protection, preservation and economic security. Yet no one faction depends solely on complete representation or coercion.

**FACTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION**

Given this interpretation of civil conflict and of the parties to it as non-unitary actors, peace agreements and the formal endorsement of settlements may merely set forth, as Hampson (1996: 25) suggests, the expectations, goals and compromises that the parties (and their factions) and mediators ‘held or accepted at a given point in time’. They

20 Tsebelis (1990: 173-4) uses similar reasoning when considering the elite/masses role in consociational politics.
might simply formalise a momentary balance of power that is changeable with time. Therefore, agreements are signed by formations for a mixture of reasons, for some honest expressions of support for new polities, for others dishonest attempts to buy time to re-arm and to re-build support bases. Yet underlying all actions by elites is the desire to retain their power base within their respective conflict formations. Within each party to any agreement there are individuals and factions who hold differing aspirations and expectations from the negotiation and endorsement of an agreement. Expectations and goals tend to change as they interact with other independent variables, be they the external or structural forces referred to by Galtung (1996 93), or the institutional variables associated with the implementation process. The expectations, goals and strategies of individual factions will thus change during the implementation process. The outcome of the implementation process depends on the sum of the factions' expectations. The sum of the expectations of factions is, in fact, the result of the intra-formation struggle between factions.

If this multiple motivations, political-economy model of civil conflict is accurate, conventional conflict-management solutions frequently agreed on during peace negotiations, such as the setting up of democratic procedures, the holding of elections, the introduction of constitutionally protected minority rights for ethnic groups, intricate power-sharing institutions, liberal economic agendas that aim to introduce more equality and demobilisation programmes are alone simply inappropriate as they fail to take into account the structural power-hierarchies that characterise conflict actors and shape the incentives for actors to implement. At the same time peace settlements are not just prescriptive blueprints that have no chance of being implemented. At the time of endorsement it is possible to argue that an equilibrium exists in favour of agreeing to and implementing a settlement. The implementation process should serve to maintain the equilibrium in favour of implementation. It should therefore make the reneging option as difficult or as unattractive as possible for the factions that make up conflict formations.

CONCLUSION
Many conflict analysts consider intra-party relations and the organisational structure of conflict formations as two of many variables that contribute to the intractability of civil conflict and the difficulty of successfully applying negotiated settlements. Yet most
proceed to analyse the intentions of conflict formations as the intentions of unitary actors. Within the conflict-de-escalation literature that is concerned with exposing factors that impede the application of negotiated settlements to civil conflict, a number of theories are directly applicable to the question of implementing settlements (Walter, 1997, Zartman, 1995, Hartzell, 1999). All however are based on unitary, rational-actor assumptions about the actors to civil conflict. By focusing its analysis on factionalism, this thesis seeks to advance an understanding of the implementation process, and to make more accurate predictions as to the likely determinants of success or failure.

Settlements are negotiated and endorsed by elite actors and, given that the masses are driven by multiple motivations to lend support to particular power hierarchies, the shifting alliances within the elite and sub-elite section of conflict formations are most critical to the analysis. The formal model of factionalism in chapter three presents implementation as depending on the strategic behaviour of the leaders of conflict formations (i.e., elites and sub-elites). This itself depends on the outcome of intra-formation factionalism. It is argued that the non-unitary actor approach on which it is based gives the best insight into why the leadership of conflict formations might negotiate and endorse settlements, while subsequently failing to implement them. While all individuals and factions in a conflict formation act as rational, self-interested actors, the collective outcome may be quasi-rational, and ultimately no factions may fulfil their goal and the implementation process may be permanently stalled.

The purpose of the model developed in chapter three is to advance understanding of intra-formation factionalism and its effect on efforts to implement negotiated settlements. Affecting intra-party power struggles are a wide range of other variables. Many of these are hypothesised to be essential for the comprehensive de-escalation of conflict in the literature discussed above. The variables can be categorised into external and internal (institutional) variables, the former referring to variables that exist outside of the formal institutions of the implementation process. The degree to which these variables determine the success or failure of implementing a settlement depends on their impact on the outcome of the intra-formation power struggle. Intra-party power struggles determine the attitude and strategies of conflict formations towards the implementation process. In other words, in order to understand how external and internal variables can explain different outcomes to the implementation process, an understanding of the effect that these variables have on the attitudes and choices made...
by the factions involved in the intra-formation power struggles is required (chapter three)
CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This chapter outlines the method employed to fulfil the fundamental goal of this research to increase understanding of the actors and structures that make up the post-negotiated settlement phase of civil conflict, and to develop a comprehensive theory with which to explain the varied outcomes to implementation processes. It focuses on a number of methodological concerns which include the usefulness of theory-building through formal modelling, the selection of a data set for empirical analysis on a macro-level, the appropriateness of measures used to define the dependent variable (the outcome of implementation processes), and the sources of data used in the selection and operation of in-depth case studies. While chapters three and four deal with further methodological concerns, which are particular to their content, this chapter outlines the rationale for the overall methodological approach to this thesis, beginning with a discussion of theory-building.

THEORY BUILDING
In the theory-building section, rational-choice and game-theoretic analysis are used to build a formal model of the implementation process. New institutionalism theory is subsequently used to analyse the institutional environment in which the actors who are party to the implementation process make their choices. This approach to theory-building has been taken for a number of reasons outlined below and further clarified in chapter three.

This thesis defines the process of implementing negotiated peace settlements as a clearly political process. The process of ending civil war has also been implicitly and explicitly recognised as a collective action problem. Many analysts, including Zartman (1995), Walter and Snyder (2000), have recognised the problem as one of collective action between rational, goal-seeking actors. Others, such as Collier (1998, 2000) and de Soysa (2000, 2001), recognise it as a fight between rational actors who aim to increase the economic benefits of violent conflict at the expense of other actors. Both Snyder (2000) and Dixon (2000) model civil conflict as an ongoing, iterated prisoner's dilemma game, a game-theoretic model, which "captures the core logic underlying the problem of collective action." (Goodin 14)
It follows that to understand the factors that sustain civil conflict and make it resistant to conflict-management solutions, including the implementation of a negotiated settlement, the incentives that shape actors' choices and the structures against which they make these choices must be explained. Game-theoretic and political-economy tools of analysis are accordingly employed in an attempt to explain outcome. In chapter one's mixed-motivations approach to civil conflict, internal power struggles between factions characterise the immediate aftermath of the signing of an agreement, and determine each formation's relative ability to cooperate with the other conflict formation/s. The analysis is thus shifted to the faction level in order to explain the factors shaping actors' choices, but the de-escalation process remains interpreted as a collective-action problem involving rational actors. This approach assumes that the individual members of the factions that together constitute each conflict formation are, in fact, rational actors who work consistently to achieve a given set of preferences and an outcome that will enable them to reach their rationally defined goal. The question remains as to whether or not this is a valid and useful assumption and whether or not it has implications for the result of the study.

Rational choice cannot explain every phenomenon and there is room for other explanations. Some analysts focus on the system as a whole and explain political or social phenomena with reference to the processes and structures that make up the system. Some argue that forerunning or previous processes and structures best explain the current ones, and that processes and structures are perceived to be far more important explanations for political phenomena than decisions that are made by actors (Tsebelis, 1990). These approaches are not entirely incompatible with a rational-choice approach, provided that the structures in which actors are making decisions are adequately considered by the observer.

Another criticism of the rational-choice approach is that actors may indeed be the most important unit of analysis, but that even if real people would like to conform to these prescriptions of expected utility, they do not and they are simply incapable of making all the required calculations. So actors may aspire to be but are not, in fact, rational. A more fundamental criticism is that actors do not act rationally, or even approach acting rationally, but instead they act irrationally. In both critiques the assumption of rationality is considered to be normative and unreflective of real life. In real life actors...
miscalculate and make mistakes, they may have little information about the structures of the interaction in which they find themselves. Such an approach might argue that implementation processes tend to fail because actors miscalculate and make mistakes, and, for example, might presume that they either have more or less power than they actually do have. Or in real life actors may not, in fact, always try to optimise goals, and may instead choose to pay a price for their beliefs. Goals may be egoistic or altruistic, idealistic or materialistic (Tsebelis, 1990: 20) and actors who make decisions on idealistic or altruistic motivations cannot be described as rational.

But in defence of the rational-choice approach, it simply assumes that actors try to do their best under given circumstances to achieve their overall objective. Provided that the rules and structures of the interaction and the actors themselves and their objectives can be clearly discerned, a rational-choice approach is a good approximation of reality (Tsebelis, 1990: 37-9). Given that the implementation process is a political phenomenon in which the actors' identity and their goals are established, and the rules of the interaction are relatively precise and known to the interacting agents, the adoption of a rational-choice approach is appropriate and has advantages. The implementation process consists of a series of rounds. Miscalculation provides actors with information about the intentions of other actors in subsequent rounds. Actors who are willing to pay a price for beliefs, such as ideologically motivated actors, will, in fact, act rationally, given this objective. Provided the observer is aware of this objective, the behaviour of the actor can be interpreted as rational behaviour given pursuit of this consistent objective. In sum, given the political phenomena under investigation, the advantages of the rational-choice approach are considered to outweigh the possible drawbacks associated with it, provided the possibility that miscalculation due to the lack of perfect information is recognised and built into the empirical analysis.

The rational-choice approach is helpful when one seeks to understand the fundamental puzzle presented in chapter one—why do elites and sub-elites in a conflict formation negotiate and endorse an agreed settlement and then take actions and make statements during the implementation process that appear to reduce the prospects of its full implementation? In the rational-choice model of the implementation process the critical actors are considered to be the factions that make up conflict actors, with the result that the collective decisions made by conflict formations may frequently appear to be sub-
optimal. But the apparently 'sub-optimal' actions are the outcome of rational choices made by factions in the intra-formation struggle between factions. Tsebelis (1990:11-12) explains this phenomenon with the concept of nested games. Actors (in this case conflict formations) do not choose what is for the observer, the apparently optimal alternative because they are involved in nested games. Nested games are interactions in which contextual or institutional factors have an over-riding importance and explain seemingly sub-optimal choices (Tsebelis, 1990:11). In the case of the implementation process the intra-formation power struggle provides the contextual factor that sometimes make actors' choices appear to be sub-optimal. But there are other contextual factors and institutional factors that shape the implementation process.

Factions are endowed with preferences and 'the possibility for conflict and cooperation, for collective or isolated actions are all part of a strategic agenda.' How the interaction is worked out 'depends on the structure of politics' (Shepsle, 1999:269). Structures originate in both external and institutional factors external/structural factors and the institutions (rules, procedures and mechanisms) of the implementation process. While the literature has devoted considerable attention to highlighting the external factors that might shape the structures in which conflict formations make choices (chapter four), the political science literature has devoted little attention to explaining the institutions at the heart of this explicitly political process and the possible impact that institutional innovation may have on the outcome of the implementation process. In seeking to address this gap, this research adopts an approach increasingly used in political science to understand the impact of institutions on the behaviour of individuals and actors - new institutionalism.

Central to the study of institutions in political science is a quest to explain the origins of political order (Levi et al, 1999:4-5). To explain the outcome of implementation is essentially to explain the extent to which political order prevails and results in full, partial or non-implementation of an agreement. The application of new institutionalism theory is thus highly appropriate. Uncertainty about other factions' intentions and the insecurity that this creates arguably prevail during the implementation process and threaten the continuity of political order introduced at the endorsing of the settlement. Institutions can reduce costs associated with uncertainty across time through a system of nested rules. In fact, political bargaining and exchange, of which negotiated settlements...
are a product, are possible only against the backdrop of stability provided by more deeply nested, institutionalised rules (Goodin 1996:23) External actors and structures may provide the background stability necessary for implementation but external actors who intend to provide stability do not operate in a vacuum and will encourage actors to adhere to a set of rules, mechanisms and procedures to further implementation. Thus it appears that the failure to focus considerable attention on the set of institutions that govern implementation, alongside the external variables that also contribute to the structures within which actors make decisions, is a significant omission in the effort to gain a greater understanding of the obstacles that exist to full implementation.

A formal, rational-choice model of the implementation process and its actors is preferred for a number of further reasons. Firstly, given the complexity of examining interactions between more than two actors, there are advantages to the use of a formal model, which requires rigour and clarity. Secondly, a formal model demands an explicit account of the assumptions about actors and the structures in which they act (Gates and Humes, 1997:6). Thirdly, formal models need clear, precise explanations of the payoffs or rewards for actors associated with making certain moves. Fourthly, as chapter three illustrates, the concept of equilibrium at the heart of game theoretic analysis is highly applicable to the concept of a negotiated settlement, and to an exploration of the factors that cause actors to sign and endorse one yet fail to implement it. The benefits of this methodological approach are more thoroughly illustrated in chapter three.

From the model of the implementation process a number of hypotheses are proposed on key independent variables concerned with the internal rules and procedures of the implementation process, and with the external environment. Their explanatory value is subsequently explored in the empirical section.

EMPIRICAL SECTION
There are two parts to the empirical section of the study: a macro-study and three micro-studies. The macro study uses a data set of 25 cases to explore the relative capacities of the Intra Formation Factionalism (IFF) model hypotheses and hypotheses derived from other popular theories to explain the outcome of implementation. The second explores the IFF hypotheses more specifically using three in-depth case studies selected from the data set.
Reflecting a methodological discussion in progress across the social science disciplines, a debate has ensued within disciplines concerned with civil-war termination over the relative advantages associated with the comparative and individual case-study approaches to the analysis of civil conflict. Those who argue that all conflicts are unique and thus should be examined individually and not comparatively ignore the fact that all phenomena and events that involve the actions of individuals are in some sense unique (King et al. 41). While individual case studies provide crucial data for the conduction of a comparative analysis, a comparative approach to the empirical section is implicitly favoured in the typology of conflict presented in chapter one. While unique root causes may feature in all civil conflicts, each civil conflict involves individual actors who themselves are motivated by multiple factors frequently distinct from the 'unique' root causes. Further it is worth recalling the assertion made in Chapter One that long civil conflicts enter cycles. In accordance with these cycles, the relative importance of the issues generally seen as causal and contributing to the uniqueness of the conflict may decrease as other issues, perhaps associated with the structures resulting from escalation, assume more prominence and present more obstacles to management.

Amongst those advocating a comparative method, a further debate can be identified between those favouring empirical studies which tend to treat each case study as a single empirical observation, and a case-study approach (Walter, 1997, Licklider, 1995). The latter seeks to highlight a number of observations within a single case study. In a pioneering study on methodology in social sciences, King et al. (1994 47-8) emphasise the importance of maximising the number of observable implications of the theory in question, which they refer to as the critical maxim. By combining a comparative analysis of a data set of twenty-five cases, followed by a more in-depth analysis of the IFF model hypotheses using three case studies, this work bridges the gap between advocates of the former and latter methodological approaches, and simultaneously increases the number of observations of the IFF theory. As well as increasing the number of observations, the cases examine the plausibility of both the assumptions and the predictions of the model developed in chapter three, and the implications of the results for the design of implementation processes.

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1 See Bloomfield, 1997 for overview of analysts who defend a single case study approach
Critical for the empirical application is the accurate and non-biased selection of cases for the data set and in-depth case-study selection. Equally crucial is an accurate definition of the dependent variable. The criteria used to develop the most appropriate data set of cases (observations) on which to explore the plausibility of the hypotheses are first outlined. Following this, the process of defining the dependent variable and of employing appropriate proxies with which to classify or code cases according to the dependent variable is described. The chapter concludes with a section on in-depth case study selection.

DATA SET SELECTION CRITERION

In an effort to avoid selection bias and to reduce the possibility that the criteria for case selection might effect the findings of this research, a highly inclusive data set of post-civil conflict implementation processes was developed. Furthermore, an effort was made to control for the impact of the international political system and great-power rivalry on the implementation of negotiated settlements, in particular given the involvement of cold-war patrons in such a large proportion of civil wars.

Civil conflicts are defined using criteria based on those used by Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1996, 1997). The more frequently employed Singer and Small correlates of war (COW) criteria are considered to be unnecessarily restrictive and too arbitrary, in their requirement that over 1,000 battle deaths per year must have been generated by the conflict for its inclusion in the data set of civil conflict. This results in the exclusion from the COW data set of relatively intense, apparently protracted civil conflicts that have been ongoing for decades. Allowing for lower intensity, Wallensteen and Sollenberg include a conflict if at least 25 battle-related deaths are recorded during a year, and define a conflict as minor armed conflict if the total number of battle related deaths is below 1,000, as intermediate armed conflict if the total number of battle related deaths exceeds 1,000 for the duration of the conflict (1998 621-2), and as major armed conflict if the battle related deaths every year exceed 1,000. By taking into account both duration and intensity, a more inclusive empirical examination than COW would allow is conducted, and the potential selection bias associated with the threshold problem is by and large eliminated.
Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s data set was used to initially identify intermediate and major civil conflicts ongoing (but not necessarily beginning) in 1989. A conflict is accordingly defined as a civil conflict if it constitutes a contested incompatibility between government and an opposition movement(s). The conflict concerns the type of political system, the replacement of central government or the change of its composition, or the status of a territory, secession or autonomy. In order to ensure inclusion and thus avoid selection bias, cases were updated and cross-checked against the Heidelberg University’s Kosimo database and Kosimo conflict barometer (1997, 1999 2001), Heraclide’s database of separatist conflicts (1997), the State Breakdown data set (1999), Monty G Marshall’s Major Episodes of Political Violence (1999), and a data set compiled by Caroline Hartzell (1999), which correlates heavily with data bases used by Walter (1997, 2002) and Licklider (1995). Where Wallensteen and Sollenberg code intensity as minor, but battle deaths are subsequently recorded by other sources as over 1,000 for the duration of the conflict, the cases are included for analysis. The civil conflicts in Niger, Mali and Djibouti (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 351-352, Marshall, 1999) fit into this category. Using the above sources, civil conflicts were next coded according to whether or not negotiations took place leading to the signing or formal endorsement of any kind of negotiated peace settlement, including those defined as comprehensive, peace process, partial or cease-fire agreements.

The data set is restricted to including post-cold war settlements, or more specifically to including settlements concluded since the later years of the 1980s, when warming relations between the US and the USSR created a structural international environment similar to that which emerged in the 1989 and post 1989 international system. Firstly, third-party mediated settlements to civil conflicts were a rare political development during the cold war (Licklider, 1995). In fact, many civil conflicts intensified and were significantly complicated by the strategic intervention of superpowers and their allies. While it is questionable, if not inaccurate, to interpret any of these civil wars as ‘proxy wars,’ this interpretation ignoring ferocious domestic power struggles, the nature of the international political system ensured that negotiated settlements were either an unlikely, or a potentially very temporary outcome. In other words, there exists an

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2 Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s data set begins with conflicts ongoing or beginning in 1989
3 The party controlling the capital of the state, either internationally recognised or in control of territory and its control not disputed by an internationally recognised government that previously controlled it.
overwhelming probability that negotiated settlements to cold-war civil conflicts from at least the 1950s until the mid 1980s were negotiated not in earnest, but to allow for a temporary pause in violent conflict, and that the fate of its implementation lay in the hands of rival super powers, interested in re-launching the conflict when the right opportunity arose. The current analysis restricts empirical data to negotiated settlements concluded after this period. This restriction helps to limit the probability that the failure of implementation is far better explained by the nature of the international system, than by the other external variables and the internal variables of concern to this study.

Secondly, restricting the analysis to settlements that were concluded in a non-bi-polar international system, in the first instance takes into account the effect that the thawing of super power relations, and the reduction in financial and military support for conflict actors that frequently followed, may have had on the collective goals and strategies of conflict formations. With the removal of the pretext of the communist or capitalist threat resulting in a decline in strategic intervention in civil wars, domestic actors lost long time sponsors, a factor that may have motivated some factions of conflict formations towards negotiations, and others towards finding alternative sources of material and political support. However, the changes that the thawing of superpower relations may have had on the motivations of conflict formations should be similar across most conflicts, and thus controlled for in so far as possible. In the second instance, the thawing of super power relations altered the strategic interests of powerful international actors, and a large proportion of post-1987 interventions by former superpowers or other powers has been to bring economic and political stability to the region in question. Therefore the 'peace process,' as currently known, is a relatively new phenomenon (Cox, 1997 671), increasing in number since the end of the cold war, and more often than not including powerful actors who publicly prioritise the implementation of the terms of the settlement. In sum, while the capability and best third-party strategy to oversee successful implementation remains unclear, and is a concern of this thesis, the intentions of the most powerful actors in the global political system are, for strategic interests, more disposed towards securing an implementation of peace agreements than was likely during the cold war.

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4 It could be argued that as no peace agreement could have been signed in the cold war period without the consent of the superpower, those that were must be included in the analysis. However many analysts make distinctions along pre and post cold war lines and other civil war data sets begin in 1945, a date also
Operational concerns relating to the availability of comparable data coincide with the decision to concentrate on post 1987 implementation processes. Table 2.1 lists all such civil conflict settlements between 1987 and 1999.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Process</th>
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<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>CHT (Banglads)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>N Ireland</td>
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<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Philip (MNLF)</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>S Leone2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Israel/ Palestine</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Western Sahara (Morocco)</td>
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Conflicts were next coded according to whether or not the settlement was reached via inclusive negotiations, and whether it constitutes a 'formally endorsed, negotiated settlement'. This is to ensure that the selection of cases reflects the concern of the thesis with explaining the obstacles to implementing comprehensive, negotiated settlements that document compromises, and a guide to a political process through which the conflict will be transformed. The coding criteria, and the proxies appropriate for the identification of formally endorsed negotiated settlements, are next discussed with an eye to avoiding selection bias.

Where possible, cases are excluded if there appears to be a high probability that parties negotiated and endorsed the agreement in order to dupe the other party(s), while fully intending to return to battle as soon as their military capacity had been strengthened. It is judged that in these cases actors did not truly endorse the settlement, and that this
demarcated by a shift in the international system. To conclusively deal with such criticisms, seven negotiated settlements from 1945 – 1987 could be added to the current set in another study.
non-endorsement is most likely to provide the best explanation for a failure to implement

But, given the mixed motivations and non-unitary actor interpretation of conflict outlined in chapter one, the elimination of cases on these criteria is a complex and potentially highly subjective process. In fact, it is virtually impossible to conclusively judge in which cases 'to dupe' is the primary motivation of all (or a critical mass of) factions in the conflict formation. While the presence of Zartman's concept of a mutually hurting stalemate (discussed in chapter one) could be useful in identifying cases unlikely to be a dupe, he in fact argues that mutually hurting stalemates are required to convince parties to enter a comprehensive negotiation process. By this argument, a mutually hurting stalemate characterised all conflicts for which negotiated settlements were negotiated (table 2.1)

Walter endeavours to control for duping by omitting from her group of successfully negotiated settlements those settlements where the terms were either never implemented or only partially implemented, with violent conflict following within the year (1997 344-345). In a similar endeavour, Hartzell (1999 14) only includes cases where 'some effort' was actually made by antagonists to implement the settlement. But the question must be asked as to whether or not the failure to move to implement a certain number of settlement terms is due to a prevailing motivation within all formations to dupe, or due to a more fundamental failure in the design of the implementation process, or to a structural variable such as the underlying political economy. Could it be that the failure to implement is due to the absence from implementation design of agreed rules and procedures that facilitate movement on implementation? Or might it be that the absence of a third party, security or economic credible commitment to the parties implementing the agreement contributes to its early failure? Or perhaps the reluctance of regional powers to endorse the agreement prevented parties from initiating a genuine implementation process. Further, if we assume that in all conflicts divisions exist within conflict formations, it is quite likely that it is these factors, and not the fact that conflict formations were only motivated towards 'duping,' that are key.

5 Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh
A selection criterion used by Walter helps to further illustrate this point. Walter (1997, 344) excludes from her data set of negotiated settlements negotiation processes that appear to have been undertaken in bad faith, where either 'duping' or spoiling the negotiations would appear to have been the real goal, or where delegates refused to talk to each other or set ridiculous pre-conditions. She argues that by excluding these cases that were 'unlikely' to succeed (despite their having endorsed an agreement) she is making the test for her credible commitment hypothesis, to explain the successful outcome of settlements, tougher. This argument is based on the premise that amongst the cases she does examine belligerents were favourably disposed to negotiations, and therefore it was more likely that they would succeed without outside factors. The strong correlation between settlements that are eventually successfully concluded and the presence of a credible commitment is interpreted to imply that even where belligerents are favourably disposed towards negotiations they will not succeed without the credible commitment. While this point is well illustrated, what is omitted from the analysis is the possibility that a credible commitment, or any of the other variables which are included for empirical testing, characterised the afore-mentioned, eliminated cases. With the inclusion of these cases, other variables may have explained equally well or even better the success or failure to negotiate and to consolidate settlements. In other words, an explanatory variable other than credible commitment, and other than an apparent 'dupe,' may have explained why the implementation process managed to overcome some obstacles or failed at the first hurdle.

A further danger with approximating duping with the re-emergence of civil war within the year is that of selecting cases more likely to be successful, while eliminating cases that look likely to fail during implementation. This not only introduces selection bias, but it reduces the variety on the dependent variable to a point where it may be difficult to discern anything from the results of an analysis that attempts to explain varied outcomes.

Yet, despite these methodological difficulties, where the task is, as outlined, to identify 'inclusive' and 'formally endorsed, comprehensive negotiated settlements,' it remains desirable to exclude cases in which no actors are interested in implementation. But, given the concerns outlined, this study does not attempt to read the intentions of conflict formations as unitary actors, nor does it use stalemate or outbreak of civil war within
the year as indicative of a dupe. Instead, it is argued that if a number of criteria that define a settlement as inclusive and comprehensive are satisfied by a settlement, it cannot be categorised as a dupe and must therefore be included.

Firstly, the settlement must be negotiated or at least be endorsed by the key conflict formations, with evidence of some support for the agreement on signing, and of documented compromise on issues deemed to be central to the conflict and its management. Where members of conflict formations played no part in negotiations, and where a settlement appears to have been completely imposed by outside parties, cases are excluded, as they do not fulfil either the first (inclusion) or second condition (endorsement of compromises) to make it an inclusive, comprehensive negotiated settlement. Excluding cases on this basis, a basis adapted from Hartzell, who excludes cases where an uneasy peace appears to be the result of an imposed settlement that depends on foreign troops (1999 12-13), is an apparently sensible way to deal with cases where it is unclear whether or not existing documented compromise is really endorsed by the conflict formations (or any part of). On this basis, the cease-fire agreements producing a type of imposed stalemate in Nagorno-Karabak, Georgia and Moldova are excluded from the examination. The cases of Haiti and Kosovo are excluded on the grounds that they are arguably inaccurately defined as post-civil conflict implementation processes, and more accurately defined as state-building processes in which the international community negotiated with one party to the conflict. In fact, Cousens and Kumar (1996 1) refer to the UN operation in Haiti as the ‘first time that UN peacekeepers were deployed in a situation characterized by neither interstate nor internal warfare’. The Portuguese-Indonesian settlement for East Timor is excluded on the double bases that East Timorese formations were not directly involved in negotiations, and the process of implementation is possibly more accurately defined as state building.

The settlements in Namibia and Sri Lanka are included. While in Namibia neither SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organisation) nor the South African installed government of Namibia were directly involved in the negotiations which involved UN mediators and the South African, Angolan and Cuban governments, negotiations were

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6 - ‘Conflict formation’ or ‘conflict actor’ refers to a single political organisation/party or to a broad alliance of organisations which together represent a community.
based on agreement reached in 1978 and 1982 and were believed to have the full endorsement of SWAPO, who were represented by mediators and had been internationally recognised as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia (Hampson, 1996: 78, 59). While the Accord between the Sri Lankan and Indian government primarily excluded Tamil groups from negotiations, several were supportive of the agreement and of India’s role as their representative, with the most strident opponent LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) agreeing to support it after its signing (Hancock, 1999: 91-2).

Concerning the second criteria, that a settlement be comprehensive, the level and depth of documented compromise differs from agreement to agreement. Provided that documented compromise exists on more than a retreat, or that settlements signify more than a cease-fire accompanied by a promise to have talks in the future, the agreement is included. In sum, agreements are excluded if the settlement appears to have been imposed, and/or if substantial agreement pertains only to a cease-fire and is followed by no further documented compromise, or by stalemated negotiations over the management of conflict issues.

Partial agreements, to which not all conflict formations involved in the conflict in the entity in question were party, are included provided that documented compromise exists and the door was open to the non-endorsing formation to take part in the negotiations for the settlement. For example, the peace accord signed by the Philippine government and the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) is partial in that the rival MILF (Moro Islamic National Liberation Front) insurgent organisation, which split from MNLF in the late 1970s, did not endorse it. But the door has been left open to the MILF to negotiate with the government, this recently leading to a cease-fire agreement in June 2001 (Manilla Herald: 8:8:01). The existence of a section of a conflict formation that continues to fight might in fact enable a clearer identification of factions, while this non-endorsing faction would itself incorporate factions with differing motivations.

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7 The theory could well be applied to such ‘purely cease-fire agreements,’ but for the purposes of comparing implementation processes further agreements must be signed for inclusion. Anyway, purely cease-fire agreements, in particular those that are frequently broken or that have moved to no further compromise, suggest that endorsement may have been motivated by the desire to ‘dupe.’
8 If certain formations or factions are invited, but refuse to participate or leave half way through negotiations, without being suddenly subjected to stringent pre-conditions for participation, the negotiation process conforms to the inclusion requirement.
towards negotiations. Similarly, in Djibouti, a faction of FRUD (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy) did not endorse the settlement signed by the government and a moderate FRUD wing in December 1994 (European Platform, 10 2000 Djibouti). But the door was not closed to the other FRUD faction, which continued to wage low-level violence against the government, and further negotiations between it and the government resulted in negotiated settlements in 2000 (Jane’s Sentinel North Africa, 7 01 118) and 2001. The significantly different dynamics behind the partial agreements in Chad in both 1994 and 1996, which saw a number of conflict formations outside of the process and government insistence on negotiating with some and not with others, along with the cease-fire nature of the agreements (European Platform, 2000), results in their exclusion from the data set.

For the practical purposes of examining an implementation process, the settlement must have been endorsed four years before the time of final analysis (July 2002), except where a settlement was so clearly a failure that it can be identified as such in a shorter time frame of three years. The 1999 settlement endorsed by parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone is the only such exception included in the data set. The full list of twenty-five cases appears in Table 2 2.

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*www AllAfrica com Peace Agreement Addresses Atar Discontent* 14 05 01 [27 8 01]  
*At least mutually*
Table 2.2, Final Data Set and the Dependent Variable (Outcome of Process)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola 1</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola2</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosna-Herz</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHT(Banglds)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palest</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1992(5)</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1991(4)</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Ireland</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philipp(Mnd)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Leone1</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Leone2</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikstan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Sah (Mor)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[S = \text{Successful}, \ P = \text{Partially successful and / or stalled, F = Failed}\]

The process of coding the dependent variable (outcome), which also appears in Table 2.2 above, is now addressed.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Dependent variables must be explicitly defined, and the proxies selected to approximate the dependent variable must be clearly distinguishable from those that approximate explanatory variables for each observation. In their endeavours to explain the causes of 'complex humanitarian emergencies,' Melkas (1996) and Auvinn and Nafziger (1997) devote much thought to the definition of the concept and the proxies most suitable for its measurement. While it may have immediately seemed appropriate to seek to define a complex humanitarian emergency using macro-economic aspects of the state in question, when the goal of the study is to use economic trends and phenomena to explain the occurrence of CHEs, this is clearly an inappropriate method. Thus Auvinn and Nafziger (15-17) employ proxies of the intensity of fighting, the volume of...
displaced people, malnutrition and infant mortality to confirm whether or not a CHE prevails in an entity.

The dependent variable in this thesis is the outcome of the implementation process and three possible outcomes exist: Successful, Partially Successful/Stalled and Failed. The measurement of outcome is problematic, given the complexities associated with both the short period of time since the endorsement of settlements, and differing interpretations in the literature of what truly constitutes the successful ending of a civil war or conflict and thus the outcome of an implementation process. Different theories of conflict resolution apply different criteria to judge the extent to which the management or resolution of conflict is successful. But these differing approaches are not entirely incompatible and can be taken together, within the constraints imposed by the short duration of the implementation processes, to assess degrees of successful implementation.

A principled-negotiation approach would perceive the ability of parties to reach a formal agreement through negotiations as successful conflict resolution. Human-needs theorists, on the other hand, require that a significant duration of time will have passed since the agreement was signed to assess the degree of success and require that the needs of the parties, such as identity or security, are met (Ross and Rothmann, 1999). Some analysts require that comprehensive reconciliation processes that frequently establish new institutions to deal with reconciliation are part of implementation if the roots of the conflict are to be truly addressed (Ma'iol et al, 1999). Those who focus on conflict transformation see a recasting of the relationship amongst parties as the key to judging success (Ross and Rothmann, 2000). Others blur the line between conflict and peace (Duffield, 2000), pointing to the very fine, defining line separating societies 'at war' and societies 'at peace', and highlighting a number of structural factors that serve to maintain coercive war-time power hierarchies in societies that are ostensibly 'at peace'.

But can an implementation process be rendered successful given, for example, the persistence of war-time coercive power hierarchies or deeply entrenched animosities yet to be addressed by truth or reconciliation processes? If the answer is no, as peace studies and some conflict resolution analysts might suggest (Groom, 1986), highly
subjective criteria must be applied to assess, for example, the extent to which socio-
economic power hierarchies have been broken down, or reconciliation has taken place,
in order to derive the dependent variable for each conflict. If the answer is yes, and thus
allows for the possibility that implementation may be successful without a formal
reconciliation process, or without a full transition to democratic governance, or without
the full breakdown of power hierarchies that originated in war time, the definition of
success should be indicated by other, arguably less subjective criterion. The latter
interpretation is tentatively adopted by this research for a number of reasons that are
explained below.

The proxies that are selected to reflect this will have an important impact on the result
of empirical analysis. The less subjective, the more accurate the analysis will be. The
dependent variable is defined as simply an estimate of the extent to which
implementation has proceeded along the lines envisioned in the agreement and
according to the stated overall objectives of the agreement. Principled negotiation
theorists' proxies would be insufficient to establish successful implementation, Human
needs theorists' proxies too restrictive, given the length of time that an implementation
process lasts.

A recent paper concerning lessons for policymakers involved in implementing peace
agreements reports the findings of one of the few empirical works to address
implementation from a broad, comparative perspective. In an apparent effort to avoid
both overly restrictive and subjective criteria for the identification of successful
implementation, an emphatic definitional distinction is made between the requirements
of peace building and of implementation. According to the project co-director 'good
things like reconciliation, justice, democracy and the rule of law cannot be attained in
the short run,' they argue (Stedman, 2001 7) 'Good things like economic growth,
equitable development and good governance' are also considered to form a 'useless
standard for evaluating implementation actions that take place in a short period of time'
(Stedman 2001 8). Thus only two proxies are used to indicate the outcome to
implementation: (i) Whether the specific war that the peace agreement is designed to
address is brought to an end while the implementers are present and (ii) whether the war
is terminated on a self-enforcing basis, so that the implementers can withdraw without fear of the war resuming.\footnote{They focus clearly on policy lessons for the external implementer and their analysis restricted to cases in which external actors are the implementers, this giving them a data set of 16 agreements}

While agreeing with the principle behind this approach – namely the limited progress that can be made inside a short time frame – this thesis takes a slightly broader one and attempts to take into account improvements or developments in the institutionalisation of mechanisms for managing conflict that appear to follow or accompany the implementation process. This refers to the somewhat intangible concept of the degree to which the documented compromises were indisputably implemented to the point whereby space for the operation of the new instruments of conflict management, and the breakdown of former power-hierarchies, has been created. It is argued that, rather than hailing settlements as ‘political solutions,’ where the outcome of implementation is concerned, it is more helpful to interpret peace agreements as serving to facilitate the political management of the conflict by creating an institutional set up through which structures to manage the conflict might be established. This concept is worth defining in the quest to seek the most accurate proxy for the dependent variable.

The approach taken by the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR, 1996 28-9) illustrates how it might be possible to operationalise the concept of ‘political space.’ Analysing the ‘important, if limited or modest,’ effect that the peace accords have had on changing Guatemalan politics and society, it notes that the accords have facilitated the subordination of military power to civilian authority, a new exercise in leadership and citizenship and a move from confrontation to negotiation. But first and foremost, it reports, the peace process allowed for a political solution to the armed conflict. It created the space for a political solution. Mirroring this approach, the success of implementation here is measured by the extent to which compromise solutions, documented in agreements, were implemented, opening up the way for the political and peaceful management of power struggles over conflicting issues.

How can the quality of this ‘space for a political solution’ be measured in a way that approaches objectivity, and, what is more, how can this measurement process avoid reference to important proxies subsequently employed as ‘explanatory variables?’ To
this end, a number of proxies have been selected that are together considered to give an overall assessment of progress in implementation and the relative development of the entity, from one where violent civil conflict defines relations between actors, to one where political institutions replace it.

Sources for all proxies are listed in appendix A and the bibliography. A measurement of the extent to which armed conflict persists, has decreased or has ended altogether is included as a key indicator of the extent to which the most fundamental objective of a 'peace agreement' is achieved: Violence is brought to an end. This proxy measures trends in violent conflict levels over the four years following the endorsement of the settlement, using a number of sources (appendix A). Clearly the withdrawal, in the context of completing its mandate, of third party actors involved in the implementation process will be important in defining the extent to which the terms of a settlement have been implemented, but it is not in itself the only aspect of this proxy to be evaluated, and, in conflicts where no external actor has played a key implementing role, it would be problematic. The apparent progress achieved by conflict formations in the implementation of the commitments they endorsed in the settlement serves as an equally direct measurement of the extent to which implementation is achieved. Using a range of sources (bibliography), conflicts are evaluated for evidence of movement on key commitments in the peace agreement, such as the setting up or dismantling of institutions, adherence to agreed procedures and contributions towards the setting up of implementation bodies.

The volume of displaced people tends to correlate highly with the incidence of violent civil conflict (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1997: 15) and estimates of the number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) seeking refuge both inside and outside of the entity are frequently employed to measure the extent of civil conflict. Where the measurement of implementation is concerned, the return of refugees and IDPs serves as an important proxy of the extent to which the general population believe that some movement towards the replacement of coercive and violence-centred institutions of governance with more peaceful, co-operative institutions has been made. In many cases, such as El Salvador, some people who fled as refugees during the civil war prefer, for socio-economic reasons, to remain abroad (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1997). Figures compiled by agencies such as the UNHCR and US Committee for Refugees make a
laborious effort to exclude former refugees, now nationals (or aspiring nationals) abroad, who fit this description and who therefore do not fall into the category of refugees. Given this effort, the figures do give a picture of the extent to which people who want to return, fear returning home, either from abroad or from internal displacement. Estimates of the extent to which the problem of unreturned refugees and internally displaced people persists are used alongside a measure of violence levels to assess the extent to which implementation is real.

Independent, comparative assessments of relative improvement or deterioration in the level of democratic institutionalisation, and the civil and human rights situation in the entity in question, complete the proxies that are used to measure the dependent variable. Regardless of the initial level of democracy, all peace agreements enshrine as a central goal the further institutionalisation or establishment of democratic institutions and sometimes the decentralisation of power as steps in the implementation process. An independent measure of the level of democracy and autocracy thus helps to assess not only whether or not the institutions were established, but whether or not they conform to the type of institutions outlined in the agreement. The Polity 98 and 2000 databases are used to assess changes in democracy and autocracy levels, both before and after the endorsement of agreements. Freedom House Scores of the extent of political and civil freedom both before and after the negotiated settlement are included alongside regular reports from Human Rights Watch to broaden the institution-centred definition used in Polity 98 and 2000.

Taken together, these indicators give a fairly clear assessment of the relative success or progress in the implementation process, even for conflicts that have only formally ended for four years. The time frame of implementation clearly restricts evaluating success using the more demanding criteria proposed by peace-building or ‘human needs’ theorists. However, simple trends in the level of institutionalisation and civil freedoms, frequently at their most restricted during civil war, can only enrich the evaluation of

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12 Where the civil conflict has taken place in an entity or part of a state, Freedom House Index and Polity scores were read in conjunction with country reports from Human Rights Watch and European Platform for Conflict Transformation and Management to ensure that the trend indicated for the state by the indices reflected human and civil rights and democratisation trends in the entity.
implementation and the accurate coding of outcome. A summary of the conditions and corresponding proxies appears in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Summary of Dependent Variable Proxies (See Appendix A for Elaboration and Case Data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxies</th>
<th>No Change/Deterioration</th>
<th>Some Improvement</th>
<th>Significant Improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative Level of Civil Violence</td>
<td>Remains the same or worse</td>
<td>Decreases but remains persistent at a lower level (&amp; is connected)</td>
<td>Almost disappears except some isolated incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Position of Refugees and IDPs</td>
<td>The number of refugees either increases overall or remains the same</td>
<td>Numbers decrease as a result of the agreement but remain at a significant level</td>
<td>The majority are returned home and some moves are put in place to deal with IDPs with some movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Implementing Key Provisions</td>
<td>Little or no movement on the implementation key provisions in the agreement or formally set up but not used</td>
<td>Some movement on implementation but the overall characteristic on most provisions = Stalling</td>
<td>Institutions and compromises of the agreement have by &amp; large been implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative level of institutionalised democracy &amp; civil rights/freedoms</td>
<td>Both remain the same or deteriorate overall</td>
<td>Some improvement but not consistently moving in an improving direction</td>
<td>Significant and incremental improvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By including all proxies, the situation where a case notable for a profound reduction in the level of civil violence, but also for permanent stalling on the implementation of agreed institutions and a consequential persistent real threat of renewed fighting, might be labelled as successful is avoided. Similarly, where agreed compromises and institutions are set up, but where conflict and fear remain relatively persistent and the level to which institutions have resulted in any perceived consolidation of democratic governance is highly questionable, both casting doubt on the verbal endorsement given by conflict formations to the principles of the agreement, the implementation process is unlikely to be classified as successful. Equally unlikely to be defined as successful is a process, for example Cambodia, in which further sustained outbreaks of violent civil conflict or war precedes the final consolidation of more peaceful governance, raising the possibility that the outcome of violence was the most likely catalyst for final consolidation. Details of the proxies used to determine the dependent variable are displayed in Appendix A. The independent variables and the proxies and sources used to code them for each hypothesis are described, along with the statistical techniques for the macro-empirical analysis, in chapter four.

13 Hartzell 1999 codes Cambodia as an agreement that secured stability, despite the increase in violence and re-outbreak of civil war before stability emerged.
IN-DEPTH CASE STUDIES

After chapter four the dissertation further explores the plausibility of the IFF model predictions using case studies selected from the data set (Chapters Five to Seven). Case studies were selected to represent different values on the dependent variable, a selection criteria critical if selection bias is to be avoided. They include two relatively successful outcomes: El Salvador and Northern Ireland and two failed outcomes: Angola (1991) and Angola (1994). What is more, within each case study there are observations of many outcomes, both successful and stalled. In both Angolan implementation processes, in particular the second, while there was ultimately more stalling, there was some implementation. In Northern Ireland, stalling has prevailed on many occasions and in El Salvador it frequently characterised the process. A successful outcome was by no means a given in either case. In fact, the process in Northern Ireland is not yet fully institutionalised and in El Salvador, while more or less institutionalised, the socio-economic provisions of the agreement require further incremental implementation if root causes of the civil war are to be fully addressed.

Given that the case studies serve as an effort to explore the accuracy of the IFF model predictions on the institutions of the implementation process, an effort was made to control, in so far as possible, for other potential explanatory variables which are considered in detail in chapter four. For example, two popular independent variables are the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate, and the presence of certain conditions in the international regional political and security environment. Despite the different outcomes on the dependent variable, in all three conflicts regional factors supported a settlement, and the mutually hurting stalemate predicted to encourage settlement appeared to characterise the conflicts and its actors. As chapter four will outline, a number of other independent variables concerning the presence of a credible commitment and power sharing were similar across all cases despite the different outcomes. The end of the cold war and of greater power interest in perpetuating civil conflicts contributed to the development of mutually hurting stalemates in favour of settlement, as did the end of regional conflict complexes in each of the case studies, in particular in El Salvador and Angola (Juhn, 1998; SWO, 1996). The regional circumstances that helped to sustain the conflict in Northern Ireland gradually eroded during the late 1980s and 1990s, with the development of a greater degree of common understanding between the British and Irish governments on what needed to be done if
the conflict was to be managed (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995 386, Darby and McGinty, 2000 85)

The methodology employed is consistent across all three cases. The closed and centralised nature of conflict formations and the coercive political structures that characterise many of them, regardless of the level of democracy in the entity, makes it difficult to clearly establish membership of factions, and therefore to highlight the impact of predicted mechanisms on the intra-formation struggle at each juncture in the implementation process. In an effort to overcome this empirical difficulty, conflict formations are examined at the outset for evidence of, and incentives for, the existence of factions with different attitudes towards implementation. Following the identification of factions, for each case study the rules, procedures and mechanisms of the process (central to an examination of the hypotheses developed in chapter three) are detected and an analytical narrative presented that focuses on using these rules and procedures and any changes to them to explain the behaviour of factions and formations in the implementation process and to ultimately explain the outcome of the process.

The texts of the Accords and any subsequent agreements on implementation were used to highlight the features of implementation design central to the hypotheses developed in chapter three. A range of reliable international news and news wire services, such as Agence France Presse International, Associated Press, Financial Times, the Guardian, the International Herald Tribune and the BBC news were used to create a highly detailed, day-to-day account of the actions, events and general progress in implementation for all cases. BBC World Wide Monitoring, which closely monitors and reproduces local broadcast and print media, was used extensively to access statements and actions of conflict formations and factions. Financial Times Profile, which permits access to a wide range of worldwide media sources, was also extensively used to assess progress on implementation. Further extensively used sources include Estudios Centro Americano (ECA), El Diario/La Prensa, Latin American Newsline, Angolan Peace Monitor (APM), Jane’s Intelligence Review and Jane’s Sentinel.

Special Representative to the UN SG, Margaret Antsee, provides an eyewitness, detailed account of the first Angolan implementation process from 1992 – 1993. An invaluable source that concentrates on detailing the day-to-day events and frustrations.
of the process, while arguably seeking to defend the UN role in the process, serves as an unbiased account of the conflict actors as it does not seek to place blame for the collapse entirely at the door of one conflict formation or the other. Tricia Juhn (1998), in her account of the negotiation process preceding the signing of a final agreement in El Salvador, draws on a range of primary sources and documents, including internal memos from the parties to the negotiations. As access to this documentation was not available in this case, the sources and her well-argued and highly-illustrative account of the process are drawn upon where relevant. While access to some documents and statements of conflict actors in El Salvador and Angola was possible, the contents of statements were more comprehensively available using the media sources above, which in fact covered day-to-day broadcasts from official broadcast media and broadcast media run by the FMLN and UNITA. Given the more recent agreement in Northern Ireland and the proximity to the case, it was possible to access first-hand the statements of actors and daily coverage of events in the process from Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and British media sources. The Independent (London) and the Irish Times, alongside chronologies provided by the Northern Irish Office (NIO) and CAIN for the earlier 1998 and 1999 periods, and the statements of actors, were primarily used to create the four-year chronology.

Media sources and personal accounts that do more than reproduce or report the statements made by formations invariably include some bias. By using a wide range of media sources, backed up by official UN accounts in the cases of Angola and El Salvador, and by focusing sharply on documenting concrete events, actions and statements, including those of third parties, an effort is made to avoid the problem presented by bias in the interpretation of events in certain media sources. Where media sources assign blame or quote those assigning blame to one or another formation for stalling, this may be noted, but the focus remains on documenting events and actions and discussing them in the context of the rules, procedures and mechanisms of implementation and their impact on shaping formation choices.

Using the combination of conflict actor statements, UN or mediator reports, media source recounts or direct reproduction of statements and events, it is estimated that every week in the implementation process was analysed, from May 1991 until October 1992 and November 1994 until at least mid 1997 for the Angolan process, from April
1998 until October 2001 in the Northern Ireland process and from December 1991 until the end of 1993 for the Salvadoran process. This was in addition to UN or other summary reports of the implementation process. Once compiled, the data was analysed to examine the extent to which multiple motivations and factionalism within the conflict formations were evident throughout the implementation process. It was next subjected to an analytical process, which sought to expose progress or setbacks in implementation, and the rules, procedures and mechanisms of the implementation process at the time in question. Events and statements in the day-to-day category were thus deemed important in so far as they represented a change in the rules, procedures and mechanisms of implementation, a significant step away from or towards implementation or exposed a serious internal dispute. An effort was made to explain the inter-formation disputes, which will inevitably characterise implementation processes, as a function of intra-formation factionalism and, where possible, to highlight the mechanisms that facilitated a simmering in intra-formation factionalism and progress in implementation.

Finally, while far more extensive empirical and analytical work was undertaken on the in-depth case studies, international news and news-wire sources outlined above were used, as well as the sources that establish the value of other independent variables outlined in chapter four, and a similar process of analysis was employed to research each case in the data set. Before the empirical work is set out in detail, the next chapter (three) presents the intra-formation faction (IFF) model of the implementation process.
CHAPTER THREE
A STRATEGIC MODEL OF INTRA-PARTY FACTIONALISM
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

A theory of implementation should explain the difference between 'giving orders' or agreeing on a common action and 'getting results' (Munger, 2000 28). But without identifying the actors central to the process and without a good theory of incentives and compliance, one cannot determine the factors that may facilitate or impede the implementation process. Using the power struggles that take place within conflict actors and the strategic interaction of the competing factions as the central unit of analysis, this chapter builds such a theory.

Few analysts apply formal, strategic interaction to the process of negotiating settlements, and fewer again to their implementation. Walter's depiction of the security dilemma inherent in all attempts to consolidate negotiated endings to civil conflict is a descriptive application of strategic interaction. A later study by Wagner (2000) applies strategic interaction to the process of pre-settlement bargaining. Dixon (2000 1-6) uses rational choice to develop a 'civil war termination game' with which he investigates the effect of third-party military intervention on the decisions made by conflict actors to either accept or reject compromise agreements. Interpreting civil conflicts as revolving around a struggle over the stream of resources available between government and insurgents, Dixon's theory includes a post-negotiation sub-game that mirrors the security dilemma presented by Walter (1997) and Snyder (2000). Each actor has an opportunity to defect from implementing the agreement and at least some incentive to do so. To favour co-operation, the actor must believe itself to be unlikely to have enough power to use force to better control the stream of resources. The incentive to cooperate therefore depends on the extent to which the actor believes that co-operation will further or at least maintain their control over the stream of resources.

The interaction between the two conflict formations, which is presented as a security dilemma, is depicted in game-theoretic format below. '4' is the highest possible payoff for each formation. It is argued that where a third-party security presence can physically increase the costs of continued conflict sufficiently to increase incentives for mutual co-operation, a settlement will be negotiated and implemented.
Table 3.1 Prisoner's Dilemma/Security Dilemma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Formation A</th>
<th>Conflict Formation B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-operate/Negotiate</td>
<td>Don't Co-operate/Defect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operate/Negotiate</td>
<td>(3,3) (4,1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inherent in the application of strategic theory to the settlement and post-settlement process is the assumption that actors are unitary, rational actors. There is no recognition of conflict formation actions as the product of an internal bargaining process of power struggle, and thus no consideration is given to the nested games in which actors are involved. Adopting the unitary actor approach discussed in chapter one, the model offers little explanation outside of a third-party security presence for why conflict formations might negotiate, endorse and begin to implement an agreement, only to later renge on its clauses.

The IFF model seeks to explain faltering implementation processes by modelling the dynamics of intra-party factionalism and its effect on the overall strategies of collective actions undertaken by conflict formations. The focus shifts to the unexplored, strategic actions between factions that shape the interactions between conflict parties. An 'intended' rational actor approach\(^1\) is assumed, all factions belonging to all formations act rationally in pursuit of their own interests, but the collective action of the conflict formation may not appear to be in the best interests of the entire formation. The multiple motivations that together determine the strategy of each conflict actor, the uncertainty or lack of information about the payoffs and the motivations of the other conflict formation and its factions are central to the model.

The model draws on a number of concepts developed within the political science discipline that help to measure incentives for compliance including transaction costs, agency costs and the logic of collective action. In the first section, the strategic model

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\(^1\) Heibert Simon defined this intended rational actor approach. See Ostrom 1982, 184-6
of incentives and compliance for conflict factions is developed. Given these incentives and strategies, the next section presents an incentive-altering political context that may increase the likelihood of implementation. A number of hypotheses are derived from this model and the third section discusses these hypotheses in the context of the two categories that define the political context of implementation: The institutional design of the implementation process and the external environment.

**IFF Model: Theory of Incentives and Compliance**

In his model of negotiations, Druckman (1978) highlights the dual role of the negotiator as *bargainer* and representative, as an inter-mediatior between his constituency and the opposition party. An adequate reflection of pre-agreement negotiations, this model sees negotiating teams which are generally reflective of the leadership of the party, bargaining with the opposition while involved in an ongoing process of persuading the majority of their own party to support their position (Figure 3.1)²

As negotiations inch nearer to agreement and reach a formula or a final settlement, the model of the interaction changes significantly. A signed agreement introduces a new element or reference point into the interaction, with which the leadership or ‘pro’ faction’ of both or all parties identify. An agreement establishes a norm (Gelpi, 1997, 355). A new focal point in the relationship between parties; this effectively establishes a new or public declaration on the positions of each party to the conflict.

*Figure 3.1 The Pre-Agreement Negotiation Process*

While intra-party differences clearly provide difficulties during the pre-agreement negotiation process, and this will be reflected in the leadership’s consistent consultation with all elements of its party and/or constituency, this consultation manages in a number

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² This resembles the process famously coined by Putnam as the ‘two level game’ (Putnam, 1988).
of ways to alleviate the obstacles presented by intra-party power struggles. By consulting elements within the party it gives them a sense of power and a sense of choice. As long as no final agreement has been reached, the leadership can continue to present itself as being answerable to only one base the party. During this time those with anti-settlement tendencies within the party may prefer to wait in the hope of yet seeing their perspective becoming dominant. As Tsebehs argues in his analysis of strategic behaviour (1990 103), as soon as political actors recognise an outcome as disadvantageous for them, 'they do not necessarily attempt to modify existing arrangements immediately', but hope that outside conditions will work in their favour and/or calculate that more time is needed to build political coalitions around then perspective. Therefore, even minorities within the party who are fundamentally opposed to the negotiation strategy can hope that if moves towards the finalising of a peace settlement collapse then the initiative within the party may shift to them.

Recalling Hampson (1996 25), the negotiated settlement reflects 'the expectations, goals and compromises that the parties accepted at a given point in time'. At the time of endorsement the decision by factions to accept the agreement or to mute objections - thereby ensuring that the endorsement of the settlement on behalf of the formation is not prevented - is the best strategy for the factions within each conflict formation. The factions' decisions to endorse the agreement is an 'equilibrium' point in the negotiation process. An equilibrium outcome is defined as one that is stable against the unilateral deviation of one party (or in this case faction) no faction has the incentive to deviate as a unilateral move cannot improve its payoff (Tsebehs, 1990 67). In other words, an agreement is the outcome of equilibrium strategies of conflict formations and, perhaps more critically, equilibrium strategies of the factions that make up formations. While the rationale or motivation behind the strategy of endorsement pursued by individual factions is likely to differ at this equilibrium point no faction with the ability to act in such a way as to bring the agreement down has the incentive to do so, or no faction with the incentive to do so has the ability. Thus, one would expect the agreement to stay in place unless a change in the external environment or the rules of the game transforms.
the incentives of some pivotal actor or the \textit{pivotality} of some actor who already holds incentives\textsuperscript{7}.

The signing of the agreement itself fundamentally alters the political context. The presentation of the conflict in 'zero-sum' terms by leading actors in the conflict formations is no longer an immediately feasible strategy as the process has resulted in documented common interest between parties. The above model changes to one where the leadership must bargain with factions within its own party and represent the negotiating parties that signed the agreement. Intra-party divisions may not be immediately obvious on the signing of the agreement, with suspicious and anti-peace elements sometimes unwilling to appear completely disinterested in 'peace and development'. However, once the implementation process dawns, Figure 3.2 is a more adequate reflection of the interactions taking place,\textsuperscript{6} with factions motivated by different goals emerging. The formations are broken into pro, sceptic and spoiler factions\textsuperscript{7}.

\textbf{Figure 3.2 Actors in the Immediate Post-Agreement Implementation Process}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure32.png}
\end{figure}

The degree to which the pro faction represents, controls or has the capacity to lead the rest of the party can be presented as the key variable effecting implementation (Figure 3.2). The sceptical faction has genuine fears and insecurities as to the real benefits, politico-economic, personal or ideological of newly-agreed structures and the

\textsuperscript{6} Definition is adapted from Laver and Shepsle, 1996 61-2

\textsuperscript{7} This is perhaps an accurate depiction of relations just before a settlement but it is more formalised or pronounced following formal endorsement

\textsuperscript{7} The term 'spoiler' is not an original term. It is borrowed from Stedman 1997. Only the term is borrowed and the context in which it is used here and the attributes of the faction are original work
feasibility of trusting the other conflict formation to implement them. While sceptical factions may be motivated by multiple and differing factors, the key defining characteristic of these factions is that they are not fundamentally in favour of the pre-settlement status quo, but fearful that implementation will not bring the security, and perhaps the power, promised. Spoiler factions, on the other hand, are fundamentally opposed to co-operation, and are in favour of the pre-settlement status quo. They oppose co-operation for personal or ideological reasons, perceive it as threatening their political and, perhaps, economic security, and fear any threat to their position in the political and socio-economic hierarchy. Some of those leading and supporting the spoiler faction tend to believe that the personal benefits, material and power they will accrue from a continuing state of war out-weigh what they expect to gain from the peace. Others believe the agreement to be a strategic mistake, which will weaken the movement’s capacity to achieve its political goals. Personal motivation is not exclusively reserved for spoiler factions. The factions in favour of and sceptical of implementation are also primarily motivated by expected economic and political benefits. The point is that, while ‘pro’ factions see implementation as a way towards fulfilling this motivation, spoiler factions see blocking implementation as fulfilling this motivation.

Before describing the incentives and transaction costs of compliance for each faction, the assumptions of the model are addressed. Firstly, it is assumed that at the point of endorsement and at the outset of implementation, a significantly powerful faction in each formation has made a calculated decision that it is in its interest to co-operate and to make moves to implement the agreement. Secondly, consistent with chapter one, the illustration of divisions in parties as three broad factions does not indicate that these factions include fixed membership. In fact, a power struggle is underway and elite and sub-elites shift allegiances amongst factions. In other words, faction membership is fluid as the spoiler faction becomes more numerous and hence more powerful, and if the sceptical faction adopts a strategy that aligns with spoilers, the prospects for implementation are significantly reduced. The point is that it is difficult for outsiders to differentiate formations that are genuine in their search for peace from those who adopt tactical peace-seeking strategies, because conflict formation strategy is a function of the

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8 Power here refers to the relative ability of each faction to dictate the actions of the conflict formation.
fluid internal struggle. It is similarly difficult to identify beyond doubt members of spoiler, sceptic and pro factions—a factor which presents barriers to implementation.

Thirdly, in keeping with an assumption frequently made by political scientists, the interests of politicians or political actors are assumed to centre on access to office or where not feasible, on access to power through the domination of structural hierarchies. In other words, all individuals who make up factions are assumed to be power-seeking actors. Some individuals seek power for ideological or policy-driven motivations, others for personal enrichment. However, their reason for seeking power does not change the fact that they seek it and access to power is required for the pursuit of goals, whatever their driving force and regardless of the extent to which they are driven by ideological forces, policy beliefs, economic goals or all three.

Fourthly, ‘conflict formation’ refers to a single political organisation or to a broad alliance of organisations perhaps representing a community or a cause. For example, the Unionist and Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland, the Singhalese and Tamil communities in Sri Lanka or the Muslim, Serb and Croatian communities in Bosnia, and the political and military actors that represent them are defined as conflict formations. Furthermore, the model is limited to two formations, whereas in many conflict situations, for example in Cambodia, there are more formations. It is argued that, where three and four formations exist, the intra-formation struggles that ensue will have identical implications for the design of implementation processes.

ACTORS AND INCENTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE

The fate of the agreement lies on the outcome of the intra-formation power struggle and on the degree to which opposing ‘pro’ factions can remain united in their consensus on the agreement and its implementation. The incentives for pro, sceptic and spoiler factions to comply are thus highly significant and are next considered.

PRO’ Factions

pro’ factions have staked their immediate political future on the implementation of the agreement. Therefore mutual co-operation or mutual implementation is then preferred.

1 For one account see Geddes, 1999, 201-2
outcome. A pro faction's aims are not limited to this, however, and their interest in remaining as the most powerful faction in the formation (or community) is generally of equal interest to them. Whether power or full implementation is of more or less interest to a pro faction depends on the individual in question, but it is assumed that both are of equal importance to the overall strategy of the faction. But pro factions are generally made up of elites who are publicly committed to the implementation process above all else, and, if they wish to legitimately present their interest in remaining in power, they tend to do so by proclaiming successful implementation to be contingent on their retaining power. In order to fulfil its desire to retain power and control over the formation, the pro faction is reluctant to move forward without the support of its sceptical faction. Implementation without the sceptical faction's support increases transaction costs for the pro faction by placing at risk its power and control over the formation.

Using supply and demand and cost transaction concepts of the political economy literature, pro factions' demand function for implementation depends on the extent to which their power is, and becomes dependent on, full implementation. Then supply function for implementation depends on the political and economic costs to them of achieving compliance (and this depends on their ability to convince sceptical and spoiler factions to comply). Given the information available to them, if the incentives for reward (dictated by the demand function) exceed the costs required in achieving agreement (the supply function), pro factions will pursue with implementation. If not, they are likely to choose to create legitimate reasons to stall and to eventually abandon implementation, in order to remain securely in control of the conflict formation.  

It is clear that the pro faction would initially prefer to implement, but its ability to do so depends entirely on there being a strong probability that the other pro faction will do likewise. As such the strategic interaction between pro factions constitutes a form of what is called co-operative game theory. Given imperfect information on the dynamics of intra-party factionalism and the size and relative strength of the sceptic and spoiler factions in the opposite conflict formation (see below), neither can be sure of the others factions' payoffs and incentives and therefore of the probability that they will.

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10 See Levi 1997 31-3 for a similar approach to the implementation of conscription.
choose to implement. Arguably this is the case despite the trust engendered and the increased communication and compromises made during the negotiation process, and even despite the effect of credible commitment and/or confidence-building measures. In other words, while pro-faction A might entirely trust the intentions of pro-faction B towards the agreement, it is unsure about pro-faction B’s ability to persuade other factions and is keen to avoid its worst payoff, which results if it cooperates and pro-faction B reneges. This weakens its position vis-a-vis the spoiler faction within its own formation.

The preferences of pro-faction A in an inter-party interaction with pro-faction B can be summarised with the assistance of game-theoretic concepts (table 3.2). Labels used by Tsebelis (1990, 61) are employed alongside payoff numbers. R stands for reward and refers to the individual payoff for mutual co-operation, P stands for penalty and refers to the individual payoff for mutual intransigence/refusal to implement, T stands for temptation and refers to the payoff for reneging while the other actor implements and S stands for the sucker punishment for unilateral co-operation, i.e., co-operating while the other actor reneges. So the possible outcomes are (R,R), (P,P), (T,S) and (S,T).

Table 3.2 ‘pro’ faction Preferences in Interaction with other ‘pro’ faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘pro’ faction A</th>
<th>‘pro’ faction B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implement</td>
<td>Don’t implement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement</td>
<td>(4,4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘pro’ faction A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Implement</td>
<td>(2,1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mutual co-operation > Mutual intransigence > Unilateral intransigence > Unilateral co-operation
pro-faction A: (Ra, Rb) > (Pa, Pb) > (Ta, Sb) > (Sa, Tb)
(4,4) > (3,3) > (2,1) > (1,2)

As outlined above, an equilibrium strategy refers to an outcome in which neither actor could increase its payoff by changing its move unilaterally. Actors therefore have no incentive to deviate from these outcomes. In the one-off interaction depicted above there are two equilibrium strategies at mutual co-operation (R,R) and mutual defection.
It is thus equally likely that the interaction will result in mutual co-operation or mutual defection, the latter precipitates the breakdown of the process.

Given that the implementation of peace settlements by formations clearly involves a series of interactions, Figure 3.3 presents the interaction between ‘pro’ factions during implementation as one round in a repeat play, finite set of interactions or in other words as a series of the interactions depicted in Table 3.2.

Many game-theoretic analysts would use the logic of ‘backward induction’ to argue that the likelihood of mutual co-operation \((R_a, R_b)\) ultimately emerging from the finite interaction depicted Figure 3.3 is no better than in the one-off interaction displayed in Table 3.2. Backward induction refers to the process whereby actors partaking in a finite set of interactions look ahead to the clearly identifiable (because it is finite) last ‘round’ and base their strategy on their best move in that round, given their knowledge about the other player’s payoffs. The last round will resemble Table 3.2. Therefore each actor’s calculation of the probability of the other party co-operating with or reneging on
implementation in Table 3.2 remains the key variable affecting their decision. Taking this to be the case, the extensive game is a series of one-shot interactions. It does not alter the original equilibrium outcomes and lends nothing to the endeavour to predict which of the two equilibrium strategies will result. Then what factor does help to predict which equilibrium strategy results?

**PROBABILITY, RISK PERCEPTION AND TRANSACTION COSTS**

In the context of either the extensive set of interactions or the single-shot interaction there are two possible outcomes to PFa ('pro' faction A) or PFb's decision to cooperate they risk receiving their worst pay-off ('I' or S) while opening up the opportunity to receive their best (4 or R) Therefore 'implementation' gives them a R+5 (4+1) payoff = 5. On the other hand, by choosing to defect or not to implement, 'pro' factions risk a mutual defection outcome (3 or P) or a penalty (2 or T) Their combined payoff from this move also amounts to 5 (P(3) + T(2))

Given a 50/50 perceived probability that the other 'pro' faction will choose to implement, is it as likely that 'pro' factions will stall on implementation as it is that they will move towards their mutually desired outcome of implementation? This scenario leads to two equilibria in a once-off or a repeat-play, finite game (4,4) and (3,3). The second equilibrium, if repeated in an extended series of interactions, would lead to deadlock, whereby little or none of the agreement is implemented and the prospect of its unraveling is real.

Where K signifies PFb's perception of the probability that PFa will implement and (1-K) signifies its perceived probability that PFa will not implement, PFb's dominant strategy will be to implement if

$$K (R+S) > (1-K) (P+T) \text{ \textit{Equation 3.1}}$$

PFb's dominant strategy will shift to defection if

$$K(R+S) < (1-K)(P+T) \text{ \textit{Equation 3.2}}$$

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The concept which was developed by Stelton, has been challenged. Tsebelis argues using the folk theorem that given incomplete information and a significant number of repeat interactions, the logic of backward induction is less likely to preclude mutual co-operation. Tsebelis, 1990, 73-6 This idea is taken up later.
Thus if either pro faction were to perceive the probability that its counter-part will implement as below 50/50 the dominant strategy shifts from a toss up between implementation and detection to defection. For example, given a perceived 40/60 probability that PFA is in the position to implement, PFb will calculate that it will obtain a payoff of (0.4)(4+1) for co-operating and (0.6)(3+2) for defecting, making defection marginally preferable.

Linking the above interaction to the struggle between factions that affects pro faction strategy, the worst outcome for a pro faction is if it implements without the support of its own sceptical factions, while the other pro faction does not implement. This puts at dual risk its overall objectives. Leadership of the conflict formation and implementation of the agreement. If payoffs were re-structured to reflect the devastating and potential dual blow that the sucker punishment presents to pro factions (this threatens its position in the formation and the future of the agreement), defection becomes the dominant strategy for both parties, even given a 50/50 calculation that the other party will implement. For example, if the payoff in Table 3 or Figure 3 for R remains 4, for T remains 3, for P remains 2 but for S is altered to ‘minus 1’, K, or the perceived probability for each pro faction of its counterpart implementing, would have to increase to at least 62.5% in order to secure implementation as a dominant strategy.

In sum, the crucial determinants of the pro faction’s ability to proceed to implement, while pursuing its overall objectives, is determined by its perception of the probability that other pro factions can implement and that it has the support of its own sceptical faction. The actual payoffs associated with the ranking or labelling of preferences is key to determining the dominant strategies in this pro faction interaction which itself will determine probability. But what factors determine the probability that PFA and PFb will choose to implement? Or, equally significant, what determines PFA’s perception of the probability that PFb will implement?

The short answer to these questions is that pro faction A’s strategy depends on the outcome of its own intra-formation struggle and of the intra-formation struggle ongoing in formation B. These interactions cannot be illustrated in the table or figure above. The strategies and preferences of sceptical and spoiler factions are crucial to determining probability, and illustrate the complexity of interactions and inter-dependent strategies.
that makes up the implementation process and its outcome. More specifically, two factors determine firstly the probability that PFa will implement and secondly PFb's perception of the probability that the PFa will implement (K).

(i) PFa's capacity to persuade their own sceptical faction A to support them in implementation,

(ii) PFa's belief that PFb has the capacity to persuade sceptical faction B to support implementation and thus its perception of the probability that PFb can implement.

This depends on other factions.

SCEPTICAL FACTIONS
The concept of a sceptical faction captures well the fluidity of intra-formation factionalism. At the immediate point of signing, sceptical factions are representative of those who actually do perceive the implementation of peace and stability to be desirable and to be ultimately in their interest. However, they do not perceive their political future and security to depend on its successful implementation, and, if in time they are convinced that a return to civil war is more likely to facilitate their goals, they will support this. Sceptical factions, above all, fear the implementation process. They fear that the change in the status quo brought by the process could, on balance, result in more physical insecurity, political insecurity, a loss of patronage and/or of economic security which is frequently associated with their position in the power hierarchy that makes up the conflict formation, and society in general. Ideologically-driven members of the sceptical faction perceive the survival of their ideology to depend on their retention of influence within the power hierarchy or conflict formation. Thus the fundamental motivations amongst elite and sub-elite sceptical elements are similar to those driving 'pro' factions, in that they seek to retain security and power.

Critically, however, sceptic fears are focused on the need to be associated with either outcome. Sceptical factions

(i) Fear full implementation of an agreement to which they did not clearly lend support, lest they lose important security derived from their position in the power hierarchy.
Feaithowmg then support clearly behind implementation, lest it subsequently fail to materialise in a successful outcome and then security is reduced vis-a-vis triumphant spoiler factions who identity them as a rival faction.

These incentives create what are frequently over-riding incentives for the sceptical faction to adopt a strategy that aims to free-ride on the back of its own pro or spoiler faction strategy. But if sceptical factions free ride, the collective action of each conflict formation will be to stall (fig 3.5 below) continued stalling by conflict formations results in reneging and in the eventual unravelling of the implementation process.

Given its original disposition towards implementation, the sceptical faction’s preferred outcome in an interaction between its choice and the combined move of the other conflict formation is implementation (R,R). The second best outcome is one in which it holds-off giving its support to the ‘pro’ faction, which in turn holds off on implementation, while the other conflict formation simultaneously implements (T,S). In this scenario, the other formation’s move keeps the hope of implementation alive, yet the sceptical faction did not have to take a risk of openly supporting its ‘pro’ faction and can do so in the next round of interactions. Its third best or second worst outcome is if both formations stall (renege) the prospects for full implementation fade but it has, at least, not risked security in the process (P,P). Its worst outcome emerges if it clearly supports its own ‘pro’ faction by implementing while the other conflict formation does not implement (S,T). This reduces the ultimate prospect of implementation and places at risk its security vis-a-vis the spoiler faction. The spoiler faction is in turn encouraged by the damage done to its pro and sceptical factions by the other formation’s detection, and the reduction in the security of the entire conflict formation vis-a-vis the other formation.

In terms of transaction costs for the sceptical faction, demand depends on the extent to which it believes that the new arrangements, if fully implemented, would be significantly more likely to provide it with security than the status quo. The supply function depends on the extent to which the sceptical faction sees compliance as a risk.

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12 This does however depend on how far the agreement proceeds. Spoiler factions may have some interest in keeping sceptical factions on side so as to maintain the size of the formation that they would then lead
to its own security and the extent to which it believes it can get away with incurring low transaction costs, while still enjoying the benefits of peace if implementation succeeds i.e. the extent to which it perceives free riding to be an option. This in turn depends on two factors: the effectiveness of the spoiler faction in its effort to challenge the ‘pro’ faction and the sceptical faction’s beliefs about the preferences of the opposite sceptical and spoiler factions. Demand exceeds supply, reducing transaction costs when the perceived benefits from supporting implementation are higher than the risk factor associated with supporting implementation. Its preferred outcome is security and it consequently depends on the actions of the other factions in both formations.

Table 3.3 illustrates sceptical faction A’s strategy in a once-off or finite repeat-play interaction with the collective strategy of Conflict Formation B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutual Co-operation</th>
<th>Unilateral Intransigence (by Sceptical factions)</th>
<th>Mutual intransigence</th>
<th>Unilateral Co-operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(R,R)</td>
<td>(T,S)</td>
<td>(P,P)</td>
<td>(S,T)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 Sceptic A’s Preferences as dependent on Party B’s Moves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support Implementation</th>
<th>Don’t Implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support Implementation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Support Implementation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sceptical factions A

Don’t Support Implementation | 2

Given that a similar process is underway in conflict formation B, whereby the probability that the ‘pro’ faction will make a move on implementation is dependent, in part, on the actions of sceptical factions, the preferences of both sceptical factions can be presented as dependent on one another. Figure 3.4 displays one round of an extensive form interaction between sceptical faction A and sceptical faction B.

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1 This gives payoffs for the sceptical faction depending on the move finally taken (after the intra-party struggle) by the other party.
While pro and sceptical factions are differently motivated, there are two equilibria in every round of the sceptical faction interaction in figure 3.4 (R,R) and (P,P). But given uncertainty about the relative strength and perceptions of the other sceptical faction, and its willingness to support implementation, it is likely that sceptical factions will not move forward to support implementation. In fact, if all else is equal, unless a sceptical faction calculates with an over 50/50 probability that the opposite pro faction will implement and thus has the support of its sceptical faction, it is likely to defect.

Sceptical faction A’s preferences, and the relative degree to which the potential reward

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14 The key difference between sceptical and pro factions is that sceptical faction interest in implementation is purely a security one. This is reflected in the payoffs. Sceptical factions prefer to cooperate while the other formation defects, to the mutual defection outcome. The greater trust in the pro faction interaction is illustrated by their preference for mutual defection over their own unilateral defection.
from co-operating (demand) exceeds the perceived costs of getting there (supply) depends on a number of different inter-formation and intra-formation interactions. Unsure of the true intentions and motivations of individuals, sceptical faction B may not be explicitly aware of who represents each faction. However, it can be sure that a spoiler and a sceptical faction exist in formation A. It can also be sure that the probability that conflict formation A will collectively choose to either co-operate or to renounce depends on

(i) Their belief that ‘pro’ faction B can persuade, or has the capacity to persuade, sceptical faction B to support a move to implement,
(ii) Their belief that spoiler faction B has not convinced sceptical faction B otherwise,
(iii) Susceptibility of sceptical faction A to its own spoiler faction’s persuasive arguments against supporting ‘pro’ factions in implementation.

For a full picture of the implementation process, and an assessment of the probability that the stalling equilibrium will emerge, an analysis of the preferences and strategies of spoiler factions is required.

**SPOILER FACTIONS**

Spoiler factions are fundamentally anti-implementation for what are power-calculating and sometimes, ideological reasons. Believing the personal, political and economic benefits that they accrue from a continuing state of conflict to outweigh what they expect to gain from peace and implementation, spoiler faction leaders tend to be supported unconditionally by those in society who feel similarly, or those who depend on them in power hierarchies that make up the formation.

The preferences of a spoiler faction are twofold. One, to increase its power vis-a-vis the leadership or the group centred on the leadership and, two, to ensure the non-implementation of the peace agreement. It achieves its preferred outcome (Figure 3.5) if no moves on implementation are made in the extended process of implementation and

---

15 Some members of spoiler factions use ideological concerns to justify opposition to implementation covering what are primarily power seeking motivations. Others are genuinely motivated against the agreement on primarily ideological grounds.
that it can simultaneously isolate the 'pro' faction in their party to take over its leadership. This is a difficult task, as the 'pro' faction (above) generally perceives power and leadership of the party as equally important to implementation, and is unlikely to make a move that will jeopardise its position. However, as figure 3.5 will show there are fewer obstacles to the spoiler faction goal of bringing about a permanently stalled implementation process and this is eventually likely to result in an unavailing of the process, and a return to the status quo before settlement. It thus serves as an alternative route to the ultimate goals of spoiler factions.

The worst outcome for the spoiler faction emerges if its sceptical faction supports the 'pro' faction and facilitates mutual implementation, while the spoiler faction itself simultaneously miscalculates and exposes its fundamentally anti-implementation stance. It is thus isolated from a party and, perhaps, from a dominant hierarchical position and from any immediate chance of increasing its power. Its demand function depends on the extent to which it collectively perceives new arrangements to be detrimental to its power struggle. Its supply function depends on the extent to which open defiance puts at risk its maintenance of power and its chances of increasing it, economic well being or dominance, and thus depends in part on the protest avenues available to it. The transaction costs of moving to 'spoil' the implementation process increase where open defiance is perceived to be more damaging to their prospects for increasing or maintaining power to pursue goals than is allowing implementation to proceed.

Figure 3.5 illustrates spoiler Faction A's preferences in an extensive interaction with PFa and Sceptic Fa, a strategic interaction that falls into the category of non-cooperative game theory.
Figure 3.5 Spoiler Faction A Payoffs in an Interaction with 'pro' Faction and Sceptical Faction

Spoiler Faction Intransigence (provided sceptical factions are intransigent) > Intransigence of all three (deadlock) > Co-operation (when the sceptical faction defects/free rides) > Mutual co-operation (of all three factions) > Unilateral (spoiler) intransigence

Both spoiler factions have two first preferences, the ranking of which depends on the 'pro' faction's move. One preferred outcome, the alternative route referred to above (deadlock) emerges if the 'pro' faction stalls at the first node, believing that the sceptical faction will not support it and/or that the opposing faction will also stall. This increases the prospect of permanent stalling. The preferences in the upper part of the figure relate only to the instances in which the 'pro' faction implements, i.e., does not stall. Spoiler faction's first preference in this interaction - to renege along with sceptical factions when the 'pro' faction moves to implement - is a difficult outcome to sustain on a repeat-play basis. Their second preference, co-operation alongside the free-riding of intransigence of the sceptical faction, reflects their desire to initially avoid open defiance while simultaneously wishing to reduce the probability that pro factions will
implement in the next round. Then preference in each round for the co-operation of all three factions over the co-operation of the pro and sceptical faction along with their own detection reflects their fear of isolation and their hope that circumstances will enable them to practice spoiler tactics to undo the settlement in subsequent rounds or in the future. This ranking is based on the assumption that the spoiler faction wishes to appear reasonable, an assumption that is discussed in more depth below (page 77-8).

In sum, it is assumed that pro’ factions rank the retention of power and the implementation of the agreement as equally important. Some will be primarily motivated by the desire to increase or to retain power. Others are motivated by the collective good of political development and peaceful conflict management that they hope the implemented agreement will bring, but they perceive successful implementation as only possible if they retain power. Spoiler factions are assumed to rank equally the retention of position and/or increase in relative power within the formation to non-implementation of the settlement. For sceptical factions, security is the priority, and during the implementation process its incentives to implement are likely to sway, depending on ‘pro’ faction or spoiler faction actions and on the actions of factions in the opposite formation.

Two equilibria exist in the inter-faction interactions in Figure 3 5 (R,R,R), which if continued in a number of rounds results in full implementation and (S,T,T), which if repeated ultimately unravels the process. If implementation is to succeed, the conditions under which it takes place must create incentive structures that result in the first equilibrium outcome (R,R,R). The factors that determine the choices made by the spoiler faction help to explain the probability that this implementation-guaranteeing equilibrium will prevail and they are next explored.

The spoiler faction’s best outcome depends on a series of events that they hope might precipitate the breakdown of the process and their own ascendancy to a powerful position in their formation. To set about achieving their preferred outcome, spoilers try to influence the actions of a number of factions within both formations over a number of rounds to precipitate a series of events in the following order:

(i) Stall the implementation process (deadlock, Fig 3 5),
(ii) Win the support of sceptical factions in their party,
Breakdown the consensus between the two 'pro' factions and thereby ultimately precipitate the fall of the agreement and of the 'pro' faction too, achieving the (S,T,T) outcome on an ongoing basis.

The degree to which opportunities are available to spoiler factions to precipitate this sequence of events is critical to the outcome of the implementation process.

**WHAT DETERMINES THE SPOILER FACTION'S INCENTIVES TO SPOIL?**

The first step of the spoiler faction's three-pronged strategy (stall the process) is not too difficult to achieve, given other faction aims and strategies (figure 3.5). In fact deadlock is a highly likely outcome to the early rounds of the interaction, and it becomes even more probable the more incomplete the information and the more uncertainty that prevails.

The spoiler faction's ability to precipitate the second step - to rally the support of the sceptical faction - depends on a number of factors, including the extent to which sceptical factions consider the issue in question to be important. Despite the compromises inherent in the agreement, different interpretations by each party of the obligations arising from it can leave many 'controversial' issues for the implementation process. Genuine fears and insecurities do exist and differing interpretations of the requirements of the agreement reflect these. The strategy of the spoiler is designed not to lessen these fears, but instead to use them to bring down the peace agreement during implementation. For this reason spoiler faction A aims to focus on issues that are conducive to heightening the fears and insecurities of conflict formation A's sceptical faction. It hopes that this strategy will simultaneously have a knock-on effect on sceptical faction B and will reduce its confidence in party A's ability to move on implementation. Spoilers aim to transform 'difficult' and inconclusive issues (issues that are perhaps less conducive to neat, conflict resolution formula) into 'intractable,' zero-sum' issues, by focusing their efforts primarily on the two sceptical factions. If sceptical faction A grows increasingly suspicious and distrustful of Party B's ability to deliver, and thus fearful of the outcome of implementation, they are likely to either support spoilers' efforts to break down the process, or at least to stall on implementation, which eventually has the same effect. Once this happens, that these factions oppose implementation for quite different reasons no longer matters. In fact
(i) How might the spoiler faction transaction costs associated with spoiling or open defiance be increased?

(ii) How might the ‘pro’ faction’s transaction costs associated with compliance be reduced?

(iii) Would a reduction in the transaction costs of compliance for ‘pro’ factions and an increase in the transaction costs of open defiance for spoilers be sufficient to encourage ‘pro’ factions to implement? There is a tendency for a lack of information or a miscalculation about the preferences of others to result, in some rounds, in non-implementation by sceptical factions, who instead opt for their second best payoff – \((T, S)\) – in the intra-formation game. How might the damaging effects of one miscalculation and thus the adoption of an intransigent position by one formation (collectively) at the expense of the other, be reduced to avoid it preventing further co-operation?

Taking the first two questions together, the ability of the ‘pro’ faction to increase the spoiler faction’s transaction costs lies in its ability to exploit the weaknesses of its strategy and the other spoiler faction’s strategy. The weakness of the spoiler faction’s strategy lies in two inter-connected aspects. Firstly, in the spoiler faction’s stake in appearing to be reasonable, (outlined below) and thus on using what are defined as ‘tricks’. Secondly, if it is to achieve its ultimate goal the spoiler faction depends on its ability to precipitate a number of events to bring down the process that are ultimately dependent on the attitudes and strategies of other factions. The spoiler’s stake in appearing to be reasonable is first considered.

Given the assumption that the third parties involved in peace processes are at least publicly committed to overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement, the spoiler faction must simultaneously endeavour to influence a number of audiences in order to pursue their preferred strategy. These audiences do not only include those directly involved in the implementation process, but include the international community, regional financial donors upon which the success of their faction may
depend\textsuperscript{17} and the spoiler's own constituency or the general public. Depending on the level of accountability in the political system, they will seek to influence their community either through coercive or persuasive methods, but generally through a mixture of the two. Because of the multiple audiences which they are simultaneously trying to influence, and given the differing motivations and incentives for individual action alongside the spoiler faction's ultimate fear of being isolated (from power) the success of its strategy lies in its ability to hide its true preferences and to instead present ideological, legitimate or fundamental objections to implementation, based on concerns other than its ambition for power or objections to the entire peace process \textsuperscript{18} Spoiler factions are unwilling to openly declare themselves to be anti-peace, anti-negotiation or anti-compromise, or to expose their true preference as directly related to the continuing insecurity which would boost their own power or immovable, ideological position. Instead they prefer to pose apparently reasonable opposition to key aspects of the implementation process with a view to ultimately unravelling it. For this reason they employ a strategy, which has been referred to as 'tricks '(Ury, 1991 73)

A 'trick' sees spoiler factions present either publicly or privately to 'pro' factions, a fait accompli (fixed intransigent position) on a particular issue, but one couched in cooperative language and reasonableness for the purposes of deception. Tough to detect and more importantly tough to expose, the apparent reasonableness of tricks makes it difficult to challenge them directly. The point is, however, that the strategy of the spoiler faction is staked upon appearing to be reasonable and it is in this lies its weakness.

The best response to 'tricks' in any set of negotiations has been presented as one that restrains from directly accusing the faction of hiding true motivations, rephrases the issue in terms of interest instead of position, and asks for clarification on these interests in the form of reasonable requests (Ury, 1991 74-5). Refusing to undertake a reasonable request will expose an unreasonable position and, if occurring early in the

\textsuperscript{17} Many analysts point to the importance attached by all formations to the opinion and strategy of powerful members of the international community. See Collier 2000 92

\textsuperscript{18} Even where it seems clear that a faction is against a settlement it is extremely rare for any organization or faction to justify this opposition to their domestic or international audience in terms of power-maximising motivations. As the model explains, the signing of the agreement places spoiler factions in a weaker position. They have little to gain from publicly attacking a position on which they have been shown to be in a minority and they seek legitimate pretexts.
implementation process may limit the appeal of spoilers to sceptical factions and thus undermine the spoiler faction's strategy. Sceptical factions in both conflict actors are primarily concerned with security. If the obstacles that spoiler factions present to implementation are exposed as disingenuous, exaggerated and deliberately designed to heighten the insecurity of the rest of the formation, sceptical factions will realise the trick at the heart of the rhetoric and their insecurities will reduce.

The implementation process is made up of a series of rounds involving several different issues, sub-issues and moves. It is proposed that sceptical factions have different preferences for each round in the process. The more that the move required in each round is initially perceived to put their security at risk, the more susceptible sceptical factions are to the tactics of spoiler factions and the less costly it becomes for the spoiler faction to use tricks to increase the sceptical faction's risk perception. In a round of implementation where a sceptical faction perceives high transaction costs, it is more likely to collectively perceive its best strategy to be a non-committed one that free rides on the back of a 'pro' faction-led strategy of implementation. This leaves open the option to free-ride on a spoiler-led return to the pre-agreement status quo. Thus while the sceptical faction's highest payoff remains (R,R) for which it receives 4, the risks associated with sceptical cooperation in the event of non-implementation by the other formation (S,T) dramatically increase, the sucker payoff giving them –3. Table 3.4 ranks a sceptical faction's payoffs in an interaction that requires it to inevitably move to implement a step that it perceives as incurring high transaction costs.19

Table 3.4 Sceptic's preferences on implementation rounds with 'high transaction cost' as dependent on the ultimate outcome of the implementation process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Agreement Implemented</th>
<th>Process Breaks Down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate with Implementation</td>
<td>4 (R,R)</td>
<td>-3 (S,P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sceptical factions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Cooperate</td>
<td>3 (P,S)</td>
<td>2 (T,T)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 In this case it is assumed that if the agreement were fully implemented (i.e. by party B) the security risk could be inverted.
Two equilibria exist at (R,R) and (P,P). But the transaction costs associated with seeking their first preference have significantly increased for the sceptical faction compared to the payoffs in the round of implementation illustrated by Table 3.3. The probability that the (R,R) equilibrium would prevail in the above outcome depends on the sceptical faction A's perception of the probability that the result of intraFORMATION B struggles will be a move to implement (R). Recalling Equation 3.1 for the implementation equilibrium to result from this interaction, sceptical factions believe there to be an 84 per cent probability that the opposite conflict formation will implement.

\[ K(R+S) > (K-1)(P+T) \]
\[ K(4+(-3)) > (K-1)(3+2) \]
\[ K > 5(K-1) \]

Given the high probability required for sceptical factions to choose to implement, then dominant strategy in any round that resembles Table 3.4 will be to stall. In this scenario, it is highly likely that spoiler factions will see non-implementation becoming dominant.

If, on the other hand, the round is perceived to pose less risk to the security of the sceptical faction, its preference will reflect these reduced transaction costs (Table 3.5). Here the costs associated with co-operating in the absence of the co-operation of the other conflict formation reduce from -3 to 0 (sucker), with payoffs for the temptation of reneging while the other formation implements and thus dis-improving relations with the faction (2), marginally preferable to mutual stalling (1). As a result of the changed payoffs in this scenario, sceptical factions are more likely to risk receiving the sucker payoff (0). The transaction costs associated with receiving S are lower and to encourage them to take the risk they require a lower perceived probability that the other conflict formation will implement than they do in the preference structuring in Table 3.4.

\[ K = 0.84 \] in the equation \[ K > 5(K-1) \] (\[ 84 > 5(84-1) \])
Table 3.5 Sceptic Preferences on moving to implement on rounds with 'lower transaction costs' is dependent on the ultimate outcome of the implementation process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Agreement Implemented</th>
<th>Not Implemented/Process Breaks down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-operate</td>
<td>4 (R, R)</td>
<td>0 (S, P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sceptical factions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Co-operate</td>
<td>2 (P, S)</td>
<td>1 (T, T)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There remain two equilibria for sceptical factions at (Rsf, R) and (Tsf, T) in Table 3.5. But using equation 3.1 \[K(4) > (1-K)(3)\], the sceptical faction's dominant strategy will be to implement if it believes there to be a 42% probability that conflict formation B will implement. If Table 3.5 resembled the preferences of sceptical faction A in a round of the implementation process, they are likely to risk openly supporting implementation. Therefore, the incentives in Table 3.5 alter the sceptical faction's attitude to the implementation process in two important ways. Firstly, co-operation becomes a sceptical faction's dominant strategy. Secondly, the probability that a 'miscalculated' or noise-induced (Axelrod, 1984 31) move by one formation will preclude any future co-operation amongst 'pro' factions is reduced. Given that the transactions costs associated with co-operation by sceptical factions are lower than in Table 3.4, a defective move by one conflict formation is unlikely to increase the transaction costs of co-operation in the next round sufficiently to make it no longer the dominant strategy.

If it were possible to permanently alter the sceptical faction's transaction costs to reflect the preference and outcomes in Table 3.5, its dominant strategy in each round would be to co-operate. Given knowledge of the sceptical faction's payoffs and risk perception, the spoiler faction's opportunity to use tricks without high risks would be reduced, this reinforcing a dominant strategy to co-operate for the sceptical faction. The less scope there is for spoiler tricks, the higher the chance that the sceptical factions' payoff structures would remain unaffected by spoiler faction attempts to increase their perception of costs. Given 'pro' faction A's knowledge of this incentive structure for sceptical faction A and sceptical faction B, it would be more confident to move to implement, in the expectation that the sceptical faction would support it and that sceptical faction B would support pro faction B. The incentive structure would be
quite likely to guarantee implementation (see Figure 3 5(R,R,R)) The deadlock outcome in Figure 3 5 might thus be avoided if rounds in the implementation process were structured to resemble the above table. The perceived and real value of K in equation 3 1 would be altered to result in a dominant strategy that would replace the two equilibria in Figure 3 4 with one equilibrium (R,R,R). It would also replace the two equilibria in the ‘pro’ faction interaction in Table 3 2 with only one equilibrium Mutual co-operation (R,R). To structure the sceptical faction’s decision-making process to avoid the dominance of the Table 3 4 scenario while encouraging that of Table 3 5 two factors are key:

(i) The ability of ‘pro’ factions to limit the capacity of both spoiler factions to successfully use ‘tricks’. This reduces their ability to engage sceptics in a blocking coalition which creates the incentives illustrated in Table 3 4.

(ii) The simultaneous and inter-dependent ability of both ‘pro’ factions to incite sceptical factions to undertake the costs necessary to implement, rather than simply free riding on the risks taken by the two ‘pro’ factions.

If ‘pro’ factions were together to seek to expose the unreasonable stance at the heart of the trick, to reveal the illegitimacy of the ‘trickster’s’ difficulties with the negotiation issue, spoiler strategy may fail. But as Figure 3 3 illustrates, at the heart of the problem is ‘pro’ faction uncertainty about each other’s abilities to pursue pro implementation strategies and this spreads to uncertainty about their ability to pursue this counter-trick strategy. The next section addresses the possibility of engineering this incentive structure, and the question of what contextual factors associated with the implementation process might facilitate the equilibrium that delivers implementation.

DESIGNING AN INCENTIVE STRUCTURE FOR IMPLEMENTATION

A political settlement and its subsequent implementation are not set in a vacuum but in a context defined by factors that fall into two broad categories: the design of the implementation process and the external, structural environment against which implementation takes place. The following section develops a number of hypotheses concerning the rules, procedures and mechanisms of the implementation process (design of the implementation process) and their ultimate impact on the outcome of implementation. It considers how they may be structured to increase the likelihood that
an incentive structure facilitating implementation emerges. Following this, the obstacles created or imposed by the external environment to its emergence are briefly considered.

**INTERNAL FACTORS: RULES, PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS OF THE PROCESS**

New institutional theory, used in political science, political economy and international relations, seeks to explain the variance in outcomes to inter-dependent decision-making or collective-action processes, like those involved in an implementation process. It proposes that the rules and procedures, which are frequently determined by the political structure in which interactions take place, alter the strategies of actors. The theory assumes that the effect of social and political institutions that operate in the absence of centralised government, rather than or in addition to, material considerations, can explain the variance in the outcomes to collective action problems (Young, Keohane, and Ostrom, 1995: 33).

The implementation process described above is a post-conflict, collective-action problem. The outcome can be seen as in part determined by the effect of the institutions, rules, and procedures of the process on the choices made by the actors that ultimately shape the outcome. Realists and neo-realists in the international relations discipline would consider the determining effect of implementation design on the outcome of implementation to be secondary to power relations in the regional and international context (Young, 1995: 37-8). In fact, the neo-realist approach to aspects of international politics has argued that institutions merely reflect the existing power relations in the entity for which they are designed. Others are less critical of the approach, but point out the limitations of a purely institutional one. Like any set of rules, institutions depend upon the players accepting to play the game, and if powerful actors decide that the rules are not valuable, they may cancel the emergent game (Moestrup, 1999: 174).

These concerns are addressed as follows. Firstly, in contrast to the evolutionary origin of the rules and procedures of the institutions frequently associated with common-pool resource problem in small entities, and sometimes with governing the international community, the rules, practices, and institutions of the implementation process originate in both the terms of the negotiated settlement and frequently with the influence of third-party mediators or arbiters. It is assumed, in line with the empirical data of civil conflict negotiation processes, that 'pro' factions and an intervening (non-military) third
party have significant scope over the wording and design of the final settlement and thus over the mechanisms for implementation. As many analysts point out, stalemate characterises relations between formations at the end of civil conflicts (Zartman 1993, 1995, Rothschild and Hartzell, 1997, Hampson 1996). The implementation mechanisms and the post-conflict governing institutions agreed tend to reflect this balance of power, thus opening up the possibility that institutional design and not just the relative balance of military power, will affect actor’s incentive structures in the post-settlement stage.

Secondly, as Ostrom (1992 1992) points out, actors frequently perceive obeying rules and acting in their own interest to be the same thing. Only total enforcement which is generally too expensive will ensure obedience without this incentive. Where the process of implementing peace settlements is concerned, there is almost never a third party available willing to take on the expense of implementing a settlement entirely through force, and thus an examination of the mechanisms and rules of the implementation process is important, if the action of conflict factions is to be understood.

In sum, it is assumed that there is some scope for an impartial arbitrator and indeed for pro’ factions, who are instrumental in the negotiation of the agreement, to insist on the use of certain mechanisms for implementing the agreement. Given this, an investigation of the institutional set-up more likely to deliver an optimal outcome to the collective action problem is vital to an inclusive theory of implementation. This section proceeds with this exploration, initially focusing sharply on the possibility that a particular institutional design might serve to alter the equilibrium outcome from short-term deadlock and long-term return to conflict to one of mutual implementation. While all other potential explanatory factors are initially held constant, the final section briefly builds further independent variables into a more comprehensive framework. This addresses any remaining concerns with the concentration on institutional above external.

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21 If the institutions implemented during the implementation process are in effect devices created by the privileged in tandem with a third party to perpetuate asymmetrical distribution of power and wealth between formations and providing for little equity, inclusion or long-term efficiency the probability of a future return to violent conflict is high unless repression is high. This is not caused by mechanisms of the implementation process but the terms and compromises set out in the original agreement which resembles more closely a military victory than a negotiated settlement.
Institutional analyses of public policy processes are based on the premise that rules can create opportunities for particular individuals or groups, impose constraints on others, and thus affect who wins and who loses the competition to influence policy outcomes (Huber, 1996 1). In explaining the outcome of public policy, institutional theory considers the effect of various rules and procedures that define how representatives are chosen, how policies are formulated and adopted, how policies are enforced, and how the rules for choosing policy are themselves established. It follows that an institutional analysis of the implementation process and the opportunities that it creates for certain actors (factions) should consider the rules and procedures determining how and when provisions in the agreement are to be acted on, the mechanisms for monitoring or overseeing this action and how the rules and procedures for implementation are established or interpreted. The theory of implementation should explain how these rules, procedures and mechanisms, which outline how to get from A (the paper agreement) to B (the post-implementation political system), determine the existence of differing incentives for factions to co-operate.
Therefore, implementation design refers to the rules, procedures, and mechanisms that determine how the issues on which the compromises have been reached will be implemented. Issues on which compromise agreements have been reached generally fall into a number of categories such as military, public security, political, socio-economic equality/human rights, and reconciliation issues. If each issue is to be fully implemented, conflict actors (formations) are generally required to take a series of moves, which are of varied size and importance. In other words, each issue is made up of an end goal and a series of steps that suggests or outlines how actors will achieve that end goal. An end goal is frequently concerned with the full consolidation of a new institution. For example, on policing issues, the end goal is frequently the institutionalization of a new police force, on military issues it is perhaps the completion of a comprehensive demilitarization process. Agreements frequently require parties to implement concrete steps which together consolidate new procedures and institutions. They also frequently require the parties to implement what are termed as confidence-building measures (CBMs) ‘incremental, transparent actions that demonstrate compliance with the promises made in a treaty’ (Rothschild and Stedman, 1996: 29). But beyond this, the design of implementation processes can differ enormously from Accord to Accord. The aspects of a settlement that account for this critical variety in implementation design, and the impact of different aspects of design on the ultimate outcome of implementation processes, are next considered. They are separated into two categories:

SEQUENCE, TIMING AND CONTENT OF EACH INTERACTION

Firstly, the sequence, timing, and content of each interaction or round in the implementation process is considered. Analysts of political development, for example Nordlinger (1978), have frequently applied the notion of sequence and timing to variables affecting processes and outcomes of political development. Furthermore, the deliberate sequencing of issues so that they are interlinked has been identified as an important mechanism in the successful negotiation of compromise or regulatory agreements between rival organizations (Martin, 1995). The sequence and timing rules that govern when and how the moves that together make up the process of implementing each issue in the agreement clearly shape each round or inter-action in the implementation process. These rules have an impact on the incentive and payoff structures for each faction in each formation. The final order and sequence of events and
moves in the implementation process is referred to as the output of implementation
design.

Settlements vary in the degree to which they endorse specific and detailed timetables,
but all settlements include timetables of sorts. Some agreements include detailed
commitments on the steps that are required for the full implementation of issues. In
others the documentation of the commitment on each issue is itself vague, and the
parties’ endorsement to work together to outline a road to full implementation is instead
included. In other words, some give a clear road map of how to get from A to B; others
only include guidelines.

Secondly, the mechanisms and procedures that control the output are derived from three
broad aspects of design. In the first instance the output is controlled by terms in the
agreement that specifically or deliberately outline sequencing and timing requirements.
In the second instance, rules that sequence and time implementation moves can be
influenced or changed through dispute-resolution mechanisms that are empowered by
the agreement to deal with the implementation of all or specific issues. In the final
instance, the rules and procedures governing the sequence and timing of implementation
can be discerned by a body that is empowered to interpret the agreement and to
determine what it requires of each/all conflict actor/s.

Settlements also differ in the degree of power that is allocated to outside, established or
newly-created, independent actors to interpret the rules that govern implementation and
to oversee the implementation process. They further differ on the extent to which
dispute-resolution procedures are provided for and on the nature of these dispute
resolution procedures.

But can implementation design have a determining effect on the likelihood that the
intra-formation struggle will ultimately result in full implementation of the settlement?
Recalling the determinants of faction strategy, pro agreement factions have differential
capacities to move forward with implementation. Payoffs in each implementation round
are set by their intra-formation arrangements: the costs to spoiler factions of adopting
spoiler tactics, and the interlinked ability of ‘pro’ factions to present each
implementation round as low in transaction costs to sceptical factions. If the spoiler
faction’s costs are high, the constraints on ‘pro’ factions decrease and payoffs for their miscalculation on the intentions of sceptical factions towards each move reduce. This enables ‘pro’ factions to move forward on implementation with bearable costs. If transaction costs for sceptical factions can be presented as low (Table 3.5), this itself a function of high spoiler faction transaction costs associated with spoiling, ‘pro’ faction constraints are further reduced. But if the spoiler faction’s costs associated with spoiling are low, they will have the effect of increasing the sceptical faction’s transaction costs associated with implementation and increasing the constraints on ‘pro’ factions who face potentially crippling punishment for implementing. These obstacles will result in a stalled process that is likely to eventually unravel. The below hypotheses propose that rules, procedures and mechanisms might sequence and time the moves required of actors in the implementation process in such a say that facilitates the emergence of the mutually co-operative equilibrium in place of the mutually stalling equilibrium (Figure 3.5).

HYPOTHESES ON IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN AND OUTCOME
The presence of rules and procedures that encourage the following sequencing and timing of issues is hypothesised to facilitate the equilibrium that makes full implementation a likely outcome.

1. STEP-BY-STEP IMPLEMENTATION: ISSUE BREAKDOWN
The implementation of an agreement generally requires moves by actors on a number of clearly identifiable issues: constitutional, military, public-security, socio-economic, prisoner, human-rights/reconciliation. Issue breakdown is a central part of design if the compromises and commitments made on each issue are broken down into a series of clear steps which together will incrementally result in the full implementation of each issue. Take for example the implementation of demobilisation. The design of its implementation is informed by issue breakdown if actors are required to demobilise armies in a number of steps, for example, the assembly of 20 per cent at a time followed by their disbandment, before the assembly of the next 20 per cent.

This feature of design will simultaneously contribute to a reduction in the transaction costs associated with each move to implement for both ‘pro’ factions and an increase in the transaction costs associated with adopting spoiler tactics for spoiler factions. This
decreases the likelihood that sceptical factions will be susceptible to spoiler faction tactics. This is because a spoiler faction hopes to exploit issues in order to form a blocking coalition with its own sceptical faction and to encourage a blocking coalition in the other formation. Its ability to do this is enhanced when the step in question is a large step which appears to be highly sensitive to the security of sceptical factions. The opportunities for spoiler factions to exploit issues so as to force the deadlock equilibrium and the subsequent unravelling of the agreement are reduced when pro-'facts present them with a reasonable request. It is argued that issue breakdown can present a series of reasonable requests to spoiler factions, thereby limiting their ability to form a blocking coalition without exposing their unreasonable position.

Issue breakdown should also reduce the damaging effect that backward induction can have on the prospects for co-operation in finite, repeat-play interactions. Recalling the two possibilities for combating backward induction, Axelrod (1981:75) argues that an unknown or infinite number of rounds reduces the logic of backward induction and instead increases the chances of co-operation that is based on the adoption of a tit-for-tat strategy. While arguing that all political processes are inherently finite given the short term aims of political actors, Tsebelis uses Fudenberg and Masking's folk theorem to defend his argument that a significantly numerous, though not infinite, number of rounds in conjunction with incomplete information is sufficient to encourage cooperation and to overcome the logic of backward induction in non-cooperative game theory (1990:74-5). Whether an implementation process is closer to Tsebelis's finite set of interactions, a perception preferred by this analysis, or to Axelrod's infinite set of interactions, the principle of issue breakdown, which maximises the number of interactions that make up the process of implementing each issue, should limit the barriers to co-operation presented by backward induction and facilitate the engineering of interactions that resemble Table 3.5.

However, issue breakdown does not in itself create enough incentives and there remain obstacles to full implementation. While issue breakdown may reduce the vulnerability
of pro and sceptical factions and reduce the opportunity for spoiler factions to use spoiler tactics to stall the implementation of each issue in the process, issue breakdown is not enough to overcome the obstacles to implementation that may arise from rules and procedures that govern the ordering of implementation. Furthermore, the incomplete information about the content of each round that Tsebelis (1990, 74-5) requires if a significant number of rounds is to overcome the obstacles presented by backward induction is not necessarily present in an implementation process which is quite clear on the compromises and commitments required of each actor. In fact, the steps that are required of factions during implementation are still open to exploitation by spoiler factions, regardless of issue breakdown and the ordering and sequencing of the steps that make up full issues is crucial.

2 PARALLEL SEQUENCING

Without rules and procedures that provide for a parallel, sequenced implementation of issues, the positive effect that issue breakdown has on facilitating full implementation is reduced and, perhaps, eliminated. The parallel sequencing of implementation requires conflict actors to incrementally and simultaneously work towards achieving the full implementation of all issues, such as military, policing, constitutional, human rights, socio-economic or reconciliation issues. A number of timing and sequencing procedures can prevent parallel sequencing from governing the implementation process. Parallel sequencing of implementation can be achieved if all forms of issue hierarchy are avoided, unilateral demands and issue holdover are avoided, and if reciprocity and/or reversibility characterizes each step in the implementation process.

**Issue hierarchy**

Issue hierarchy is a rule or mechanism that makes the implementation of one agreed issue in its entirety contingent on the full implementation of another issue. This ordering is frequently assumed to encourage implementation on the basis that the trust built up from earlier co-operation will induce parties to continue to co-operate. For example, procedures that require the military commitments of both/all formations to be implemented in full before they begin to implement the provisions that make up other issues demand issue hierarchy. This form of issue hierarchy increases the opportunity for spoiler factions to point to process-related features associated with this ordering of implementation as unfair and perhaps security threatening. This is because it is
inevitable that one 'issue' (for example, demobilisation) will be seen as more security sensitive to one formation than another and the issue hierarchy thus serves to create a unilateral demand that one actor implements fully its security sensitive issue prior to the implementation of the rest of the terms of the agreement.

Unilateral demands facilitate spoiler factions' quests to adopt intransigent positions that are couched in co-operative language. It enables them to declare their support for a solution to the conflict, but to make the seemingly fair demand that the issue hierarchy be altered before their consent to implementation is given. They can do this in the knowledge that the other conflict formation will not be in the position to alter the ordering which was agreed in the rules and procedures of implementation, given the tactics of its own spoiler faction. It will use a call for strict adherence to the ordering outlined in the agreement as a tactic with which to stall the process. Moreover, spoiler factions will attempt to create issue hierarchy demands where they do not explicitly exist in order to create difficulties for the opposite 'pro' faction in its quest to gain its sceptical faction's support for the implementation process.

Barbara Walter has argued that, given the obstacles to implementation that stem from the enormous distrust between the parties, conflict actors must implement the military/security issues last, after confidence and trust has been built during the implementation of other issues (Walter, 1997). But this sequencing does not appear to consider the intra-formation struggle that actually determines the ability and the will of actors to implement the agreement. Nor does it take into account the obstacles created by the power asymmetry that generally characterise relations between conflict actors. These two fears make the demand that one issue be implemented in its entirety before implementation commences on another a highly exploitable one for spoiler factions in both formations. In this context, the IFF model predicts that parallel sequencing, which ensures the absence of this form of issue hierarchy, will facilitate full implementation.

Zartman (1993, 1995) presents the problem of an asymmetry of power between what is usually the government of an entity and a challenging insurgency or warlord-led organisation as the biggest obstacle to the resolution of civil conflict as the weaker formation is too insecure to commit to a process of demobilisation.
can eliminate the opportunities that the design of the implementation process can create for spoiler factions in both/all formations.

Issue Hierarchy 2: Unilateral Demands

Timetables are characterised by either unilateral deadlines, reciprocal arrangements or a combination of the two. ‘Unilateral and irreversible’ requirements of any conflict formation are a form of issue hierarchy and create disincentives for implementation. Instead, reciprocity should prevail where steps in the process of implementing provisions are not reversible. For example, those who initially demanded that the FMLN be fully demobilised before further negotiations were held on reforms to the Salvadoran political system wanted to include a unilateral demand or deadline. This form of issue hierarchy is hypothesised to result in breakdown for the following reasons. Inflexible, unilateral demands or deadlines written into a settlement are exploitable by spoilers who will present them as imposed, arbitrary and threatening. On this basis, they will attempt to undermine the equilibrium at the heart of the compromise in question. Unilateral deadlines are frequently interpreted as a threat, especially as the deadline approaches (Ury, 1991: 118). Spoiler factions aim to increase the threat, to remove focus from the compromise, and to use the unilateral deadline to ensure that reasonable requests cannot be made of them. Thus, deadlines per se are not an obstacle to a successful outcome but inflexible or unilateral timetables, which give pretexts for spoiler factions to call into question the legitimacy of the substantive issue or compromise in the agreement, present obstacles to implementation.

This ability to exploit unilateral demands is further enhanced by the fact that they make no allowances for the concept of ‘noise’ (Axelrod, 1997: 31). In this way they put pressure on the unity-of-purpose that exists between ‘pro’ factions. An outcome results from noise when one actor misinterprets the actions, or at least the strategic intentions, behind the actions of another actor and defects where the other actor co-operates. But the detection in this case is the result of miscalculation rather than being indicative of the detecting actor’s lack of interest in co-operation (1997: 31). Noise can result in a miscalculation by ‘pro’ faction A on the intentions of its own sceptical faction A. More commonly, noise can result in a misinterpretation by sceptical faction A of the intentions of the sceptical faction that it knows to exist in conflict actor B and to have considerable influence on the ‘pro’ faction. This miscalculation can lead to a detection
by conflict actor A (pro and sceptical factions) and co-operation by conflict actor B. With recourse to the initiation of a reciprocal mechanism that has the effect of making its move reversible the co-operating ‘pro’ faction B may be more successful in persuading its sceptical faction to co-operate in the following round of the process despite the recent detection by conflict actor A. Further, this mechanism should help to reduce the opportunities for the spoiler faction in actor B to point to the defection of conflict formation A as a legitimate reason to resist any further co-operation with formation A. Without reciprocity or reversibility it is unlikely that co-operation could be repeated by conflict actor B.

Empirical research on inter-party competition (Axelrod 1997: 31) supports the argument that ‘noise calls for forgiveness, but not too much forgiveness, as this calls for exploitation’ (Gelpi 1997: 335), who is concerned with co-operation between unwieldy organisations, finds that future co-operation is best facilitated by a firm but flexible response to the breaches of newly-established norms. Both findings support the interpretation that too much flexibility can lead to appeasement and to further breaches. In the intra-formation context, too much flexibility in response to breaches of the terms of implementation will encourage ‘pro’ factions to take less risks to implement, given that they will expect to be appeased in the event of not taking them. This will increase the chances that ‘pro’ factions will stall, and will little-by-little decrease the transaction costs associated with the use of ‘tricks’ for spoiler factions. Therefore, deadlines may actually facilitate the ‘pro’ factions in the pursuit of implementation, as complete flexibility may provide spoiler factions with opportunities to use process design to justify relentless stalling. But unilateral deadlines will not facilitate implementation.

In sum, the absence of unilateral demands, or in other words the presence of reciprocity or reversibility is predicted to both reduce the opportunity for spoiler factions to use tricks and to facilitate the persistence of ‘pro’ faction co-operation. This is the case despite mixed signals that may emerge during the process as to the other faction’s ability to implement the terms of the agreement.

**Issue Hierarchy 3: Issue Holdover**

Negotiation processes tend to follow either a ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ principle or one that requires the implementation of provisions agreed on certain
issues before negotiations on other issues begin. The second principle endorses issue holdover and it is predicted that where issues are held over in their entirety for future negotiations the implementation of agreed conflict-management procedures will be impeded. The hold-over issue simply resembles Table 3.4 and results in stalling regardless of the possibly successful implementation of parts of earlier issues. What is more that the hold-over issue awaits the end of the process is clear, and backward induction reduces the incentive for factions to fully implement prior issues, despite what might otherwise be a well-designed implementation process.

While having a similar effect to the first concept of issue hierarchy, issue holdover differs in that it concerns the promise to hold future negotiations over an issue, such as the constitutional status of an entity, in the aftermath of the implementation process. Unless hold-over issues are eventually agreed and sequenced with the rest of the implementation process, it is predicted that implementation will ultimately stall and unravel.

**Issue Hierarchy 4 Early Inter-Party Electoral Contests**

While not creating a unilateral deadline, the setting of a tight deadline for an early, winner-takes-all election creates disincentives for ‘pro’ factions to implement other aspects of the agreement. In fact, regardless of the sequencing and timing that govern all other aspects of implementation, ‘pro’ factions are aware that winner-takes-all elections are likely to change the equilibrium that resulted in the agreement and to possibly make its terms irrelevant. Should one party decisively win early elections, its ‘pro’ faction may be under pressure from its spoiler faction to ignore the agreement, which was negotiated when the power of the conflict formations was less certain. On the other hand, the sceptical faction within the losing party, feeling its position threatened by the loss in the elections and by the rhetoric of the opposite spoiler faction may be unresponsive to calls to continue to implement other aspects of the agreement. This unwillingness is likely to be contounded by the spoiler faction’s efforts to undermine the sceptical faction’s trust of the other conflict actor. This can eventually unravel the process despite the existence in both formations of relatively strong factions who remain interested in implementing the settlement. Thus it is predicted that winner-
takes-all elections, if not sequenced to take place at the end of a process, will create issue hierarchy, and will result in the unravelling of the process.24

3. INSULATED MECHANISMS AND DISPUTE-RESOLUTION PROCEDURES CONTROL DESIGN

The implementation of a settlement is generally steered by a single institution or by a number of institutions/commissions which each deal with a specific issue(s) in the process. These institutions drive and interpret the rules and procedures for implementation and for dispute resolution which together control implementation design. Oversight institutions can be either insulated or not: insulated implies that the institution or mechanism charged with implementation has no outside interest other than that of furthering implementation. It is predicted that if institutions are insulated and thus shielded from the intricacies of intra-formation factionalism, they have a greater capacity to bring about a sequence and timing output hypothesised to facilitate implementation. Furthermore, it is important that institutions are not left open to the accusation of partisan behaviour even if the accusation is untrue. This charge presents spoiler factions with pretexts on which to stall. In other words, they use arguments associated with process to hide their true objections to the implementation of a settlement.

But insulated institutions will only guarantee successful outcomes where they can ensure that design is informed by the sequence and timing optimal for implementation. In sum, it is predicted that if the implementation of issues in the process is governed by issue breakdown and parallel sequencing, the latter which requires the absence of issue hierarchy, prospects for successful implementation are high. Where parallel sequencing and issue breakdown are not clearly outlined, insulated mechanisms should facilitate the agreement on such a sequence and increase the prospect of a successful outcome. On the other hand, where issue hierarchy is central to the design of the implementation process, insulated institutions are unlikely to be able to bring about the successful implementation of the settlement.

24 This does not contradict the parallel sequencing hypothesis. Holding the elections is generally the last of a series of steps to reform an existing electoral system or establish a new electoral and political system. This hypothesis predicts that if the system is a 'winner takes all' system, this last step must take place at the very end of the entire implementation process.
EXTERNAL MECHANISMS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
The determining effect of variables that are external to the institutional design of the implementation process was held constant to facilitate the development of the hypotheses on the internal mechanisms and institutions. But an accurate empirical application of the model requires that consideration be given to external variables and their effect on the intra-formation power struggles. The role of actors in the international system of third-party international and regional former sponsors of the civil war, and of structural factors associated with the working of the political economy are identified by many as crucial to the successful negotiation of a settlement. It follows that external factors that shaped the environment that facilitated the agreement between parties are critical to maintaining that equilibrium during the implementation process.

Understood from within the context of the IFF model, external variables are significant in that they can affect and even alter the preferences and strategies of the factions central to the implementation process. They are crucial if they serve to alter the external equilibrium-maintaining factors that facilitated the settlement sufficiently to alter the incentives to comply or defy implementation for a number of factions. As such, external variables can undermine an implementation process even where the mechanisms, procedures and rules of the process create incentives for all factions to abide by the agreement. It is therefore concluded that the presence of certain external variables, which will be discussed in chapter four, are necessary but insufficient conditions for a successful outcome to implementation. External variables that facilitated the endorsement of an agreement must remain constant if they are to maintain the equilibrium in favour of implementation.

The formal, intra-formation faction model of implementation has facilitated the development of hypotheses on the expected impact that implementation design will have on the outcome of implementation. Chapter four empirically examines the plausibility of the hypotheses on implementation design, and on the equilibrium-maintaining impact of external variables, using the data set of 25 implementation processes developed in chapter two. It also considers the plausibility of alternative hypotheses developed from established theories of the implementation process and
mostly concerned with external variables. It concludes by empirically assessing the strengths of the hypotheses generated from the intra-formation factionalism model.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE OUTCOME OF IMPLEMENTATION A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

This chapter explores the capacity of the IFF model’s hypotheses to explain successful, partially successful and failed outcomes to implementation processes. A number of alternative conflict management theories are first introduced and their contribution to the quest to explain the dynamics of the implementation process are outlined. These theories are formulated as hypotheses and their predictions are discussed in the context of the IFF model and its predictions. The explanatory power of all hypotheses is empirically explored using the data set developed in chapter two. The criteria used to select and code proxies for the independent variables derived from the hypotheses is described, and the process of gathering data to establish proxies for the twenty-five cases is outlined, before an analysis of the data through the application of statistical techniques is undertaken in an endeavour to establish the variables that appear to best explain outcome. The final results indicate strong support for the IFF model’s predictions on the variables that determine the outcome of implementation processes.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FROM THE LITERATURE

There is near consensus in the literature that external variables, both security and politico-economic, have a strong determining effect on whether civil wars persist or can be managed with negotiated settlements. These external variables are also deemed to determine whether or not conflict actors can be persuaded to negotiate and to implement peace settlements. The explanatory variables presented below, most of which can be defined as ‘external’ variables, are used to explain the barriers to consolidating negotiated settlements by a number of conflict analysts discussed in chapter one.

Walter (1997, 335) empirically defends her hypothesis that a credible third-party security commitment to the settlement is the single most important determinant of a stable, negotiated settlement. Equally significant is her finding that agreement on power-sharing structures has a significant positive relationship with a stable outcome. This is reinforced by Caroline Hartzell’s findings (1999, 2001). Using comparative analysis of a data set of peace settlements, she finds that stable settlements

1 Hartzell’s power sharing proxy (1999, 2001) is possibly more appropriately defined as internal to the implementation process but as it does not specifically address procedures for implementation it is treated as external in this analysis.
are determined by the extent to which 'security-providing guarantees' are included in the terms of the settlement. Security guarantees are defined as 'political, territorial, economic and military power-sharing arrangements' (Hartzell, 2001) which are written into the text of the peace agreement (Hartzell, 1999).

Both Walter and Hartzell's analyses are based on an assumption, discussed in chapter one, that distrust between conflict actors is the single greatest obstacle to the implementation of a stable settlement. According to Walter (1997, 338), it is almost impossible for conflict actors themselves to give credible commitments to implement the terms of the settlement because vulnerability, stemming from distrust of the other party's intentions, reduces the incentives to implement. Consequently, efforts to implement almost inevitably suffer from the dual and mutually-reinforcing problems of enforcement and vulnerability. According to Walter's analysis, distrust and vulnerability are most effectively reduced by a credible commitment to the implementation of the settlement by a third party. Distrust and vulnerability are reduced, according to Hartzell, by the inclusion of power-sharing guarantees in an agreement. In sum, while Hartzell's analysis is more concerned with the content of the agreement and Walter's with external mechanisms, both perceive distrust between conflict formations, and the insecurity that distrust creates, as the critical barriers to implementation. In fact, in a recent empirical study, Walter (2002, 107) argues that in most cases a third-party credible security commitment and a power-sharing pact are required for a successful outcome.

The determining effect of the military balance of power is also used to explain the outcome of conflict management initiatives. Zartman contends that the factor best determining the prospect of successful negotiations is the existence of a mutually-hurting stalemate for parties to the conflict only then is a conflict 'ripe for resolution' (Zartman, 1993, 1995). Applied to implementation, the critical obstacle to implementing agreements is the persistence of the perception on the part of conflict formations that there is more to be gained on the battlefield than from a consolidated negotiated settlement. The concept is somewhat difficult to apply to implementation.

2 Where the process concerned is the mechanisms and rules of implementation, the military balance and question about the existence of a mutually-hurting stalemate before and during negotiations is clearly an external / structural variable.
given that an agreement has at this point been endorsed. This endorsement, according to Zartman's theory, required the presence of a mutually-hurting stalemate. Perhaps its most appropriate application to the implementation process is the implicit contention that negotiated settlements that fail during implementation were in fact negotiated and endorsed by conflict formations who did not truly experience a mutually-hurting stalemate. At the heart of such a contention is the idea that, once negotiated and endorsed, peace agreements are either guaranteed to succeed or doomed to failure, as parties (unitary actors) are either suffering a mutually-hurting stalemate or not. Settlements that fail, according to this interpretation, were never intended as more than a temporary lull in the power struggle between parties. They were endorsed when the conflict was not truly 'ripe for resolution' as conflict formations were not committed to a non-military strategy.

An alternative interpretation of the 'ripe for resolution' approach might posit that the hurting stalemate prevailed and was in fact necessary for the successful completion of negotiations in a settlement. But a hurting stalemate might be temporary and implementation might fail as changing structural factors erode it. For example, it might be eroded by strategic actions in support of one or another formation in the implementation process by an external actor, such as the diversion of significant amounts of financial support by diaspora organisations or of financial and military support by regional actors with intransigent agendas not necessarily compatible with the implementation. This interpretation raises another important external factor.

The persistence of civil conflicts has been explicitly linked by a number of analysts to the prevailing state of regional inter-state relations (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998). Furthermore, changing politico-security dynamics in the immediate regional environment have been cited as the catalyst for the successful conclusion of a number of negotiation processes in stable settlements (Hampson, 1996 19, Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998 625). Applied to implementation, the proposition is that incentives to implement vary with the favourable or unfavourable regional context against which implementation takes place. Where a 'regional conflict complex' either exists or develops over the course of implementation it presents barriers to implementation.
Highly linked to the regional security environment, regional and internal politico-economic dynamics may also be important variables. Political-economy analysts of conflict, such as Collier (2000), Duffield (1998), Keen (1996) and de Soysa (2001), all imply that, where the political economy accommodates the economic agendas of rebels, increasing the likelihood that civil conflict will persist, conflict management, and thus the implementation of peace agreements, will face enormous obstacles. The greed model of conflict makes the assumption that, while actors publicly articulate their agendas as 'grievance agendas,' conflict actors' self-fulfilling economic agendas dominate (Collier, 2000: 93-4). Civil war is interpreted as a battle to control the resources of an entity both the rebel and government's conflict formation rationally calculate the size of the potential resource base in the event of victory, and the sum of the total costs incurred by continuing to fight to control these resources, or by continuing to operate in a state of quasi-conflict in which at least some control of resources is guaranteed (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998: 564-6). It follows that if rebel or government conflict formations perceive the expected material benefits from victory or a continued state of civil war to outweigh the costs incurred by fighting, no genuine conflict management initiatives will be fruitful. If by remaining at war they can more successfully pursue selfish economic agendas dominated by the desire to control the state's resources civil war will persist.

According to this interpretation, civil wars are far more likely to prevail in political economies where few politico-economic opportunities outside of the civil war's conflict structures exist for the elite and sub-elite (Collier, 2000: 93-4). For Collier (2000) and de Soysa (2000, 2001), where the availability of 'lootable' resources is high, so are incentives to persist with civil wars. Duffield (2000: 73-4) and Keen (1998) argue that civil conflicts will be sustained where conflict actors are heavily involved in economic networks that are engaged in the extra-legal or informal political economy. These activities tend to be an integral part of the power structures associated with the civil war and they satisfy rebel organisations and governments' quests for financial sustainability. Civil conflict is thus protracted. Applying the logic of the greed hypotheses to the implementation process, where political economies display these features, efforts to implement negotiated settlements will face greater structural resistance.
Grievance models emphasise the justice-seeking issues that motivate conflict actors, such as the desire to eradicate a government that discriminates against certain sections of the population, to seek autonomy, or to seek socio-economic changes to reduce inequality (de Soysa, 2001 4-5). Inequality has been empirically linked to the incidence of political instability and violence by a number of analysts (Alesina and Perotti, 1996 1225-8, Auvinen and Nafziger, 1997 68, Melkas, 1996 22, Gissinger and Gleditsch, 1999 14). Its significance is explained by its propensity to lead to violent civil conflict between the regime and those who seek to challenge the regime that is perceived to perpetuate this inequality. Others argue that inequality does not have a relationship with the incidence of civil war, and point to the many states where structural inequality exists without perpetrating violent civil conflict.

While the results of many empirical analyses suggest that economic inequality alone does not appear to have a causal relationship with the outbreak of violent civil conflict (Collier 2000 97, Gissinger and Gleditsch 14), it would be wrong to thus conclude that inequality has no impact on the persistence of civil conflict, once escalated. Once escalated, inequality and the lack of access for significant proportions of the population to opportunities to earn a decent living, to access education, let alone to increase income (all predicted to be significant by Collier's greed motivated model) may serve to perpetuate conflict by either forcing people to support or to join corrupt, rebel or government-dominated networks in order to live, or as has been suggested, by making people susceptible to supporting extremist rhetoric and demands (Melkas, 1996).

A number of hypotheses can be derived from these popular theories on the obstacles to conflict management. A summary of these hypotheses appears in table 4.1 below.

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3 Gissinger and Gleditsch find that inequality is related to political instability but not to civil war.
TABLE 4.1 Summary of Hypotheses From Dominant Theories in the Literature

1. The failure to secure a third party’s credible commitment to the settlement and to the parties during the implementation process best explains why settlements either fail or are only partially successful.

2. Failed and partially successful processes can be explained by the absence of power sharing guarantees in the terms of the agreement. The more institutional guarantees in a settlement, the more successful an outcome will be.

3. The absence of a mutually-hurting stalemate before, during and after the negotiation stage of the process, explains stalled and failed outcomes to implementation processes.

4. A shift in regional dynamics that either creates, significantly alters, or reinforces an already present regional conflict complex, best explains the variety of outcome to implementation processes.

5. Structural conditions associated with the political economy, namely the dominance of primary commodity products and low human capital, combine to create barriers to implementation associated with conflict actor’s decision that the status quo better serves its purposes.

6. Persistent inequality present obstacles to the implementation of peace settlements as the grievances underlying the conflict persist and create incentives for people to support extremist agendas.

Before the IFF model’s predictions on the accuracy of these hypotheses is addressed, the concept of a credible economic commitment is briefly considered. Not unlike the credible security commitment recommended by Walter, this is emerging as a recommendation, particularly in the peace-building literature, that focuses on the policies and actions of donor governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Two interpretations of a credible economic commitment can be found in the literature, the first of which is presented here, the second in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

The first interpretation is that large sums of money and resources are required if implementation of settlements and peace-building initiatives are to succeed. Those involved in efforts to implement agreements frequently cite the lack of resources and funding available to pursue important objectives as creating enormous barriers to implementation (Anstee, 1996, Lode, 1997). Loans from international financial institutions (IFIs) aside, for ‘peace-building activities’ most implementation processes rely on resources pledged by international donors, be they governments, intergovernmental organisations or NGOs. The argument appears to be that the credible commitment envisaged by Walter must extend to the economic field to ensure that large
amounts of financial assistance serve, alongside the credible commitment of a third party to implementation, to decrease distrust to a point where implementation is possible. Thus implementation will succeed if the amount of donor aid and IFI assistance to the country is high. Linked to this proposition is the idea that the stronger an economy in terms of growth, the more capable the entity will be to consolidate peaceful relations (de Soysa, 2000: 17) or to fully implement a peace settlement.

**PREDICTIONS OF THE IFF MODEL ON EXTERNAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

Recalling the IFF model's hypotheses, the determining impact of the external environment on implementation is explained in two ways. Firstly, while the international and regional security environment and the political economy may serve as equilibrium-maintaining forces, they cannot alone guarantee implementation. Secondly, changes in the external variables that prevailed when an agreement was signed may effect a shift in the strategies of pro, sceptical and spoiler factions that makes implementation highly unlikely.

More specifically, the model predicts that, while credible commitments and institutionalisation of power sharing may be instrumental in persuading conflict formations to end negotiation processes with the endorsement of a peace settlement, neither will guarantee its implementation. Some settlements will falter during implementation despite both credible commitments and guarantees. Therefore, while institutional guarantees and credible commitments are influential in increasing trust between conflict formations, they will not reduce the damaging effect of intra-party power struggles on the process. The texts of peace settlements are frequently necessarily vague and interpreted, or at least presented, as having drastically diverging implications by different parties or factions who are in pursuit of their own immediate objectives (Cousins, 2001: 114). The very nature of negotiated settlements requires, more often than not, that a peace agreement mean different things to different people. Thus, written guarantees are open to interpretation or misinterpretation and, while possibly necessary to induce signing, are not sufficient to secure its implementation. In sum, institutionalisation of power sharing may coincide with a successful or partially successful implementation process, but a more immediately significant explanation for this relationship will be the mechanisms and procedures for implementing guarantees. Credible commitments and the guarantee that this provides for formations will have a
significant relationship with all successfully negotiated settlements, but its relationship with the outcome of implementation will be unclear.

Fundamental to theories that focus on 'ripeness' is the argument that the presence of a 'mutually-hurting stalemate' for parties to the conflict best explains their entry into negotiations and the successful negotiation of a settlement. Given the stalemate necessary for the settlement outcome, one would expect implementation to be a relatively straight-forward process once the agreement was negotiated and signed. That this is not the case and that even successfully implemented settlements undergo implementation processes replete with obstacles suggests that the stalemate was not sufficient to ensure implementation, and that other barriers threaten the full implementation of the agreement. In other words, the usefulness of the ripeness concept to efforts to explain the implementation process is questionable.

But the IFF model introduces an alternative interpretation of the ripeness concept. What is a 'hurting stalemate' for some factions in the post-settlement period may be seen by another faction in the same formation as an opportunity to re-launch violent conflict with a view to satisfying its dual goals: to catch the other formation off guard, and thereby improve the overall military position of its party vis-a-vis the other formation, and to simultaneously promote its own faction power vis-a-vis other factions in its own party. If this is the case, no strong relationship should exist between the proxies used to measure the presence or absence of a 'mutually-hurting stalemate' and the outcome of the implementation process. While this may be in part due to the difficulties inherent in measuring such a concept, the prediction is also based on the proposed non-unitary nature of conflict formations, and the fluidity that characterises post-agreement intra-party relations and strategies.

According to the IFF model, dramatic shifts in the strategy and actions of relatively powerful regional and international actors during implementation will erect enormous obstacles to implementation. These shifts can alter the preferences of factions, decreasing transaction costs for spoiler factions to follow their preferred strategy, and increasing pro factions' transaction costs for implementation. But the emphasis on shifts in regional policy is important; formations are unlikely to collectively endorse a settlement while a 'regional conflict complex' continues to exist and thus, unless shifts
in regional policy occur, it is contended that regional conflict complexes will not present the key obstacles to implementation of agreements. It is contended that regional co-operation is necessary to encourage formations to negotiate and to endorse an agreement, but it is not, in itself, sufficient to ensure that peace agreements will be implemented. In other words, shifts in regional dynamics threaten to alter equilibrium strategies and may encourage stalling and thereby present barriers to implementation. But implementation processes may still falter despite a favourable regional environment.

Structural conditions embedded in the international political economy may serve to make implementation more difficult by increasing the incentives for spoiler factions to spoil, and reducing the confidence of sceptical factions in their post-implementation security, and in a strategy that advocates implementation. However, given their structural nature, these factors existed at the time of signing and they should not make implementation impossible, given the right implementation process. If not addressed in the agreement and in the long run, they are likely to result in the outbreak of renewed civil conflict. However, a strong relationship is not anticipated between the factors that proxy the greed and grievance political economy models and the outcome of implementation in the short term.

What about the proposition that inadequate and insufficient funding creates insurmountable obstacles to implementation and ultimately causes its failure? Importance has been attached to the positive effect of financial resources and their effective management in Mali (Lode, 1997). Some empirical evidence suggests that a donor policy informed by ‘peace conditionality’ contributed to the relative success of implementation in Guatemala (Auvmen and Wayne, 1997: 26). At the same time, the Guatemalan government’s foot-dragging over the implementation of important socio-economic commitments (Cousens and Kumar, 1996) highlights the degree to which the pressure to spend little on peace-building came from internal, political forces. The IFF model argues that using insufficient resources or weak economic commitment to a process to explain unsuccessful outcomes suffers from the same weaknesses as the credible security commitment argument. This is because sufficient resources will not guarantee the successful implementation of peace agreements. Resources that do not take into account the barriers to implementation created by intra-formation factionalism.
will not destroy the incentive to stall. Resources, both national and international, are clearly essential if an implementation process is to result in a successful outcome that contributes positively to development and peace-building. But the relative volume of donor aid will have no significant effect on the prospect of implementation. In other words, unless accompanied by the implementation process outlined by the IFF model, resources cannot in themselves guarantee success.

The predictions of the IFF model on the internal mechanisms of the implementation process developed in chapter three are now recalled in Table 4.2 below.

### Table 4.2 IFF Hypotheses on the Implementation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The prospects of a successful outcome should increase with:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Absence of issue hierarchy (issue hierarchy 1, unilateral demands, issue holdover and ‘early election’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Presence of issue breakdown (with reciprocity and reversibility which is connected to 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Presence of parallel sequencing of all issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The presence of insulated institutions should increase the probability that the sequence and timing hypothesised to facilitate implementation develops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The IFF model's hypotheses on the external variables employed by many analysts to explain the outcome of conflict management initiatives are summarised in Table 4.3 below.

### Table 4.3 IFF Hypotheses on External Variables from other theories

| The institutionalisation of different forms of power sharing may coincide with a successful or partially successful implementation process, but a more immediately significant explanation for this relationship will be the mechanisms and procedures for implementing guarantees |
| Credible commitments and the guarantee that this provides for formations will have a significant relationship with all successfully negotiated settlements, but its relationship with the outcome of implementation will be unclear |
| There will be no strong relationship between the proxies used to measure the presence or absence of a ‘mutually-hurting stalemate’ and the outcome of the implementation process |
| Regional co-operation is necessary to encourage actors to negotiate and to endorse an agreement, but it is not, in itself, sufficient to ensure that peace agreements will be implemented |
| Given their structural nature, the conditions associated with protracted conflict by the greed model of civil conflict should not make implementation impossible, given the right implementation process |
| Given their structural nature, the proxies associated with coding the grievance model of civil conflict existed at the time of signing. The conditions associated with prolonged conflict by the grievance model of conflict should not make implementation impossible |
| Unless accompanied by the implementation process predicted by the IFF model to facilitate success, resources cannot in themselves guarantee a successful outcome |

In the next section the coding of proxies for the independent variables derived from all the hypotheses is discussed and, following this, their empirical application to the outcome of implementation is described. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the results of statistical analysis, and an assessment of the strength of the IFF model.
CODING PROXIES FOR EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESES
The tables in appendix B provide supporting data for the generation of the proxies discussed below. The existence of a credible commitment was measured for all 25 cases using the criteria employed by Walter. For each case, a commitment was considered to exist where there is a formal or official ‘implicit or explicit promise by an outside power to protect adversaries during the treaty implementation period’ (1997, 345-6). A formal promise offered publicly by the head of state (or his or her direct emissary) to intervene should an agreement break down was coded as a weak guarantee, a moderate guarantee sees the promise accompanied by the deployment of at least five hundred soldiers prior to the implementation period, and a strong guarantee exists when the number of troops exceeded three thousand. While the strength of the guarantee is less important to the testing of the power of the credible commitment theory to explain the outcome of implementation, it was included so as to check for a relationship between the strength of the commitment and outcome.

After relatively extensive empirical analysis of a data set of 23 cases, Hartzell proposes that extensively institutionalised settlements are the most likely to prove stable, even with the inclusion of a number of control explanatory variables (Hartzell, 99, 17). The clarity of her findings is somewhat reduced by the evasive concept of ‘guarantees,’ which are arguably written into all peace agreements in some form or another. Guarantees, or institutionalisation, refer to rules written into agreements regarding the distribution of political power, coercive force and economic or distributive policy. The independent variable was coded on a scale from zero-to-four according to the extent to which guarantees are institutionalised (Hartzell, 2001). Distinctions were made between military, political, economic, and territorial guarantees. This independent variable - institutional guarantees – was measured for each case using the coding criteria explicitly set out in her empirical work (2001) and a breakdown into type of power sharing for each case appears in appendix B.

A number of proxies were employed to test the capacity of a mutually-hurting stalemate to explain the outcome of implementation. The measures are based on those used by...

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1 Few cases overlap with Walter’s dataset of settlements from 1940-1990
2 Walter, 1997 requires it to exceed 10,000. In 2002 she breaks down the categories further.
Walter to proxy the existence of a mutually-hurting stalemate, and the extent to which the costs to conflict formations of continuing to adopt belligerent strategies likely outweigh the benefits is estimated (Walter, 1997 347) For each case, the duration, the magnitude, and the intensity of the war, measured by battle-related deaths per 1,000 people, were established as proxies for the extent to which a mutually-hurting stalemate might have prevailed 6 Marshall (1999) has created an index of magnitude which uses a number of factors to estimate the destructive impact of the conflict on the directly affected society, including state capabilities, interactive intensity, area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement and the duration of violent conflict Marshall’s index includes all cases in the data set It codes magnitude on a scale of 1 to 10 and these codes are used to assess the magnitude of the civil war According to Walter’s interpretation of the ‘mutually-hurting stalemate’ concept, a high magnitude, high intensity and long duration increases the probability that a mutually-hurting stalemate will exist The hypothesis is therefore examined, with an assessment of the extent to which these proxies for a mutually-hurting stalemate coincide with successful implementation Cases are analysed for the presence or absence of a ‘regional conflict complex ’ The central question is whether or not either the persistence of or the development of a ‘regional conflict complex’ explains prolonged stalling or failed outcomes A ‘regional conflict complex’ has been defined as existing where conflict, whether civil or inter-state, persists or erupts in neighbouring states and has clear links to the civil conflict in the state in question The links may be ‘so substantial, that changes in conflict dynamics or the resolution of one conflict will have an effect on a neighbouring country ’ (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998 623) These links may be related to the existence of an ethnic group straddling a border, such as the large group of Palestinians living in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan They may also relate to the active support of a conflict formation by a regional actor in a neighbouring civil war by direct military, political or financial assistance, such as the direct intervention of the Angolan

6 Walter uses number of deaths per month to measure intensity, but battle deaths per 1,000 is favoured by this analysis She adds a further indicator to proxy the apparent ability of combatants to make noteworthy advances on the battlefield, and codes each conflict from historical sources (347) Given that she found a relationship to exist between magnitude, duration the incidence of successfully negotiated settlements, as well as with this personally coded indicator, it was decided that the first three proxies should be sufficient to capture the concept of a mutually-hurting stalemate
government in the conflict in the Congo, or the direct intervention of Israel and Syria in the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s and beyond

The concept of a 'regional conflict complex' is here extended to include situations where regional actors, who are not involved in other civil wars, do pursue an official policy of obstruction to the peace process, thereby having an effect similar to a conflict complex and creating an unfavourable regional environment for implementation. Proxies for the persistence of this extended concept of 'regional conflict complex' are sought by the application of the following to each implementation process. A 'regional conflict complex' does not exist or has not emerged in the following scenarios: if the final agreement was formally endorsed by regional actors, in particular those actors who were previously sponsors of the different conflict formations, if these actors remain committed to the agreement during implementation, if no neighbouring civil or inter-state war has erupted that is significantly linked to the conflict to which the negotiated settlement is being applied

A major break with the peace process by a regional actor, judged to have the potential to influence the direction taken by conflict formations, indicates the existence of a poor regional environment or a regional conflict complex. An important distinction is made between the official rejection of a peace process by a regional actor, and covert/unofficial breaching of official policy in support of a peace process by elements of regional actors. For example, while neighbouring governments, some former sponsors of actors in the Cambodian civil war, remained officially committed to the implementation of the Paris Peace Agreements, there is ample evidence of continued Thai assistance to Khmer Rouge elements, and in particular of the Thai military's involvement in cross-border trade worth millions of dollars to the Khmer Rouge (Berdal and Keen, 1997, 802-4). This breach of official policy by elements of a neighbouring state is qualitatively different to a break-down or fundamental shift in regional power relations between states, or to the outbreak of violent conflict in a neighbouring state, in that it pertains to the inability (or unwillingness) of a regional actor in the implementation process (most likely a previous sponsor) to control elements supposedly under its control. This is defined as intra-conflict formation factionalism as it constitutes factionalism within a party that is officially in support of the peace process, in this case the Thai government. More significantly for this thesis, it highlights factionalism within
the former Thai-Khmer Rouge coalition between factions in favour of and against cooperation with the Cambodian peace process. On the other hand, if this covert support is the result of a nearby civil or inter-state conflict, such as the support for conflict formations in Sierra Leone by actual and subsequently former parties to the Liberian civil war, it is interpreted as stemming from a regional conflict complex.

Charles Taylor (NPFL)\textsuperscript{7} was a long-time supporter of the challenging conflict formation (RUF)\textsuperscript{8} in Sierra Leone's civil war. His continued support for a militant RUF despite the peace agreement in Sierra Leone (1996) and the peace agreement in Liberia (1996), were the result of a continuation of the civil war in Liberia at a low level, as resulting from a 'regional conflict complex.' The official end to the civil war in Liberia coincided with the 1996 agreement in Sierra Leone. With the onset of the implementation process in Liberia, travelling Liberian militias introduced a dramatic shift in the regional environment, which presented obstacles to implementation in Sierra Leone. Former rival Liberian conflict formations are involved in Sierra Leone, in support of both the government and the RUF, and factions belonging to Liberian formations presumably use Sierra Leone as a base for their officially disbanded (but in reality only reduced in size) militias. Thus the actions of the Liberian actors, though frequently officially denied by the President of Liberia, and in this sense 'covert,' must be interpreted as part of the 'regional conflict complex' still in existence. The instability in Sierra Leone creates a 'regional conflict complex' for Liberia, in that the government protects Liberian militias who continue to fight the NPFL Liberian government. In Cambodia, on the other hand, the former inter-state war in which Thailand was allied with Khmer Rouge essentially came to an end with the cold war. There is no longer violent inter-state conflict that could be linked to the peace process in 1992 and 1993.

Conflict in Namibia, South Africa and Angola during the 1980s would have been part of a regional conflict complex. But after 1989 the Namibian conflict was no longer ongoing and cannot be seen as negatively impacting on the Angolan implementation process. While elements of the South African Defence Forces appeared to have continued to support UNITA (Africa Confidential, Feb 93), the government was no longer officially and militarily involved and, more significantly, any breaches of official

\textsuperscript{7} National Patriotic Front of Liberia
\textsuperscript{8} Revolutionary United Front
policy were not sudden or new in the post-May 1991 implementation process. On the other hand, if the Democratic Republic of Congo were included in this sample, it would be coded as existing within a regional conflict complex, given that outside interference and support for conflict formations is so great that it makes it akin to an inter-state conflict played out on Congo soil.

Moving on to political-economy theories centred on the greed and grievance models, analysts tend to focus on the politico-economic factors that contribute to the escalation or to the persistence of civil conflict. While most offer recommendations on the factors necessary if cycles of protracted conflict are to be broken, the accuracy of many of these recommendations is difficult to empirically assess given their untried and untested nature. For example, Duffield (2000: 81) interprets patterns of conflict and trade to be inseparable and perceives the commercial complicity that characterises many parts of international business culture (Duffield, 2000: 85) as perpetuating the trans-border trade central to elite politico-economic strategies in civil wars. These strategies are consequently presented as vulnerable to a concerted application of appropriate compliance and regulatory measures for international and trans-border trade (Duffield, 2000: 86). The UN-led effort to regularise the international diamond trade, aimed at cutting off access to badly needed capital for rebels with economic agendas, in particular UNITA in Angola and the RUF in Sierra Leone, is the best example of efforts to implement this recommendation. Opinions widely diverge on the relative success of this measure, in terms of both of its actual success in limiting the trade in illegal diamonds and in curbing the economic options open to conflict formations that pursue violent strategies. It is, perhaps, too early to undertake a comprehensive comparative study of this independent variable.

But a number of factors predicted to be important by political-economy theorists, both those who fall into the 'greed' or 'grievance models of conflict (de Soysa, 2000: 4-5), are appropriate for empirical testing on a data set 'Lootable goods' that characterise conflict-prone economies, according to the greed model, are approximated using the degree to which the economy is dominated by primary commodities the generic quality of most primary commodity goods makes it more difficult to trace their origin, thus making them more susceptible to lucrative black-market trading. Also, the way in which they are extracted and the export routes on which they depend makes them far more
susceptible to predatory taxation than other manufactured goods (Collier, 2000 93)
The incremental stabilisation of government and governance that a successful implementation process should bring may threaten this lucrative black market and its trade roots, and facilitate an economy that immediately offers far less opportunity to those who control power hierarchies and resources

Collier uses the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP to measure this proxy. It is also measured as the proportion of primary commodities to overall exports (de Soysa, 2001 4) or as the extent to which exports of manufactured goods exceed export of food (primary) commodities (Gissinger and Gleditsch 14). Sachs and Warner (1997 15) argue that the former – primary commodity exports as a percentage of GDP - is the best proxy of the importance of primary commodities to an economy as it gives the best estimate of the wealth effect caused by primary commodities. It is thus judged to be the best estimate of the value that conflict formations would place on controlling them. The lower their value, the less incentive there is to incur the costs of rebellion to control them.

De Soysa (2000, 2001) differentiates between different types of primary commodity goods, arguing that where a country has vast amounts of mineral resources it is more conflict-prone. The potential quick-profit earning from trans-border trade in mineral resources is, he explains, so high that it presents rebels with strong economic incentives to continue conflict (de Soysa, 2000 115). The extraction of subsoil assets requires little in the way of bargained outcomes between elites and the masses of society (de Soysa 126). It therefore creates little incentive for the development of good governance. Frequently referred to as ‘Dutch Disease’ (Sachs and Warner, 1997), this concept has been used to explain the weaknesses in governance in the Congo as stemming from its vast mineral resources (Gissinger and Gleditsch, 1999 16). De Soysa uses the natural resource stock per capita,9 splits it into renewable and non-renewable resource stock, and finds a very strong relationship between the incidence of conflict and high quantities of non-renewable resource stock.

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9 This is a new indicator developed by the World Bank. De Soysa obtains the information from World Bank, 1997, Expanding the Measure of Wealth - Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. See Table 4.6 below.
The greed model also suggests that the utility of conflict is reduced, and the costs incurred by persisting with conflict are heightened, if many other income-earning options exist for members of conflict formations, or, in other words, if the strength of human capital is high. Where the level of education amongst young men is low, yet the proportion of young men in the population is high, the political economy offers fewer options to members of conflict formations (Collier, 2000 94). Collier finds that, along with lootable goods, educational levels amongst men relates inversely to the incidence of civil conflict. De Soysa (2000 131) uses pre-civil war per capita income to capture this variable, describing it as a stronger proxy of earning potential in the formal economy, as it takes into account a host of political and social factors such as the provision of health services, infrastructure and other public goods (2001 16-17).

In an earlier article, Collier (1999) argues that the extraction of primary products, such as minerals or agriculture, are civil-war invulnerable activities and are thus more likely to dominate war economies. Economies tend to see a shrinking of the manufacturing and other more diversified sectors as civil conflict ensures. This seems to result in a circular argument once wars begin, the dynamics resulting from the war economy present obstacles to conflict management. Thus, it may be that the longer the civil war ensues, the more entrenched the war-sustaining political economy becomes, and the higher the obstacles presented by the political economy to conflict management. But Collier finds that duration actually has a determining impact on the likelihood that an economic dividend will ensue in the early years after a settlement (implementation). Peace dividends, i.e., the rapid growth of war vulnerable activities and of the economy in general in the immediate post-war period, are found to be larger for long, intractable civil conflicts (Collier, 1999 179-81). Thus, the prediction goes in the same direction as the prediction of Zartman's theory concerning the mutually-hurting stalemate. The longer the civil war the more successful will be the implementation process. This assumes that a transition to a peace-time economy occurs during the implementation process.

The overall proposition derived from the greed model of conflict is that implementation processes will face enormous and potentially insurmountable obstacles where structural politico-economic variables accommodate the selfish agendas and the financial sustainability of conflict-formation elites. These variables serve to make the material benefits from continued civil war a more attractive and useful option for elites and
sub-elite members of conflict formations. One would thus expect the outcome of implementation to be closer to failure the greater the economy's reliance on primary commodity exports, the higher the natural resource stock per capita and the lower the human capital, whether measured by education or per capita income (GDP per capita).

For each case, these proxies are used to assess the extent to which a conflict-prone political economy exists in the period immediately prior to the negotiation of a settlement. To examine whether or not a post-settlement political economy creates obstacles to implementation, it is arguably desirable to detect changes in the degree to which the variables associated with conflict prevail in the political economy over the course of implementation, and thus alter the politico-economic incentives for conflict. There are two problems with this approach. Firstly, there is the potentially endogenous nature of this variable: a worsening political economy (i.e., changes that are hypothesised to create or perpetuate incentives for conflict) could be interpreted as the result of a failure to implement settlements and to prevent the continuation of civil war. Equally so, an improving political economy may be the result of the stability brought by a relatively successful implementation process. Secondly, the up-to-date data that such an analysis would require are unavailable for many cases, especially for the most recently-agreed settlements. Therefore, the relative presence of conflict-prone elements is compared across 10 cases. Values are taken for years as near as possible to the year of signing, and, where feasible, average values over a few years immediately preceding the implementation process are taken.

Despite the lower availability of the data, a measure of inequality is added, where available, to investigate the possibility that high levels of inequality impact negatively on efforts to implement peace agreements. A measure of structural inequality is taken, using the method employed by Gissmger and Gledistch, and supplemented by a dataset compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996).

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10 Collier (2000) and de Soysa (2000, 2001) compare across cases in their empirical analyses of political economies prior to escalation.

11 The concentration of income in the top 20% of the population is taken and it is assumed that it is measured before taxes – this cited as a weakness. Some countries use the gini index of inequality and others the share of income in top the 20 percent.
The comprehensive application of the credible economic commitment theory to implementation is discussed further in the concluding chapter. The current empirical examination of the economic commitment on the outcome to implementation is limited to including a measure of the average level of growth in the economy both before and after the implementation process begins. While the limitations of this measure are clear, it should give some indication of the 'extent of opportunities available for advancement' (de Soysa 17), or the extent to which lack of finance and a weak economy can impede, or be used as a pretext to stall, the implementation of a settlement.

Lastly the coding of the IFF hypotheses on sequence, timing and procedures for implementation is addressed. Each case was examined to detect the rules, procedures and institutions that were outlined in the settlement, and those that were eventually adopted to govern the sequence and timing of implementation. Cases were examined for the presence of any of the four features of issue hierarchy, for phased parallel sequencing and for issue breakdown. For each case a chronology of implementation was generated, and any renegotiation of the institutions to which power to implement is allocated, or adjustments to the rules and procedures governing output, was detected. The texts of peace agreements and a range of newswire and print media sources, UN documents and reports, regular country reports (see bibliography for details), Jane's Intelligence review and Jane's Sentinel accounts, Keesing's record of world events, journal articles and book chapters, were used to code the hypotheses for each case.

Issue breakdown underpins design if provisions outline clear, incremental steps that together constitute the full implementation of an issue. For example, issue breakdown on the issue of elections to governing bodies might include a number of steps through which a formation is transformed into, and is legally recognised, as a political movement, whereby the system for elections is altered to prepare for a more level playing field, and transitional bodies to manage disputes over the organisation of elections and to monitor elections are established. Further issue breakdown would include initial elections to transitional or permanent power-sharing institutions, or a phased decentralisation of political power in the run-up to elections. Issue breakdown of a military issue, such as demobilisation, might provide for the incremental assembly of...
militias or armies in groups of ten or twenty per cent, followed by a similarly broken-down movement towards full demobilisation, disarmament or re-integration. On issues of reconciliation or justice, issue breakdown might entail the establishment of a body through which the grievances and complaints of victims of violence are registered and addressed before a body dealing with punishment or justice is established. For issue breakdown to be effective, the steps must be reversible or reciprocal and thus not undermined by issue hierarchy demands.

In order to ensure the most accurate reflection of the hypotheses on issue breakdown, evidence of issue breakdown in every key issue of the settlement (either set down in the agreement or agreed subsequently in the implementation process) is sought before coding the principle of issue breakdown as an instrumental part of process design. Some implementation processes include issue breakdown on many issues, while at the same time leaving important issues uninfluenced by it. For example, in the case of Cambodia, issue breakdown appeared to underpin the provisions that called for the establishment of neutrality across political bodies with the power to influence the elections, from the army, to the police, to the civil service, and for the establishment of viable political parties, before the election process was underway. By requiring that the elected body function firstly to draft and approve a new constitution for Cambodia, before it was converted into a legislative assembly, a breakdown of political issues was envisaged. The parties had to agree the basis for the new, multi-party, democratic political system before the new assembly was formally established. The demobilisation process was also marked by some issue breakdown and it was to take place in stages. On the other hand, issue breakdown did not characterise the implementation of agreements on the important issue of public security, the functioning of the judiciary or the full integration of former combatants into the Cambodian Army. In other words, issue breakdown was present but it did not underpin implementation design across all issues.

Issue hierarchy is created by the design of the implementation process if actors agree to abide by the following ordering and sequencing. Firstly, if the provisions agreed for the implementation of one full issue or sub-issue (for example on all military issues or the demobilisation of armies) must be fully implemented before the implementation of

13 Paris Peace Agreements, Cambodia UN, Blue Helmets, 1996
other full issues commences. Secondly, if one conflict formation is required to fully implement all of its commitments on one issue (or sub-issue) before the other conflict formation(s) commences implementation of its commitments, this sequence places a unilateral demand at the centre of design and is frequently accompanied by a specific, unilateral timetable. This form of issue hierarchy prevails if the moves for each actor (on each issue) are not reciprocal and/or reversible. Thirdly, if the concept of issue holdover, as defined in chapter three, is explicitly or implicitly required by the design of implementation. Fourthly, if a tight and specific deadline for the holding of 'winner-takes-all' elections is included and means that these elections will take place early in the implementation process.

Some of the difficulties encountered during the coding process are briefly outlined. A clear definition of the rules and procedures that lead to issue hierarchy helps to make the empirical analysis as accurate as possible. For this reason, the presence or absence of the four features of design that create issue hierarchy are separately established before it is concluded that 'issue hierarchy' is, or is not, a feature of a process. However, during the coding process, it became clear that it was difficult to separate the issue hierarchies caused by the first type of issue hierarchy - ordering of entire issues for implementation before others commence - and by the existence of 'unilateral deadlines' for one party or the other. Each case was therefore coded as either 'including or not including' these either of these forms of issue hierarchy (combined issue hierarchy). Cases were also coded as to whether or not they included dated unilateral deadlines (unilateral TT). During the course of the coding process, it also became clear that in no case where either issue holdover or early elections were features of design was the issue hierarchy created by 'issue hierarchy 1' or 'unilateral deadlines' not also present. Therefore, it was difficult to assess the individual effect of issue holdover or early elections on outcome.

Furthermore, while the hypotheses would suggest that the complete absence of issue hierarchy means that parallel sequencing must govern the implementation process, the two are coded separately to make for a more thorough and accurate coding process. For example, some agreements do not endorse issue hierarchy but neither do they provide for parallel sequencing. Also, it is possible to imagine a situation where issue hierarchy is eventually adopted in a process in which neither issue hierarchy nor parallel sequencing were a part of design, but where the implementing institutions were not
Further, parallel sequencing as clearly defined in chapter three, may be explicitly provided for in the settlement, or it may be facilitated by the absence of rules and procedures that encourage issue hierarchy and eventually adopted. Therefore, there are two indicators for parallel sequencing: it is either an explicit part of implementation design (parseq2) or it is eventually adopted as the guiding principle of implementation design (parseq). Appendix B4 displays each indicator for all 25 cases\(^{14}\) and appendix B5 provides a brief explanation for the coding of each case.

Cases were next coded for the presence or absence of insulated institutions. For each case, the bodies with overall responsibility for driving implementation, interpreting the agreement and resolving disputes regarding its implementation were identified. Appointments to insulated institutions are not controlled by conflict formations, or, if so controlled, are permanent appointments. Where a number of independent commissions played a role in resolving difficulties with the implementation of a single issue or group of issues, alongside an independent body with the capacity and power to oversee the process by co-ordinating all institutions responsible for implementation, insulation of the process would be strongest. However, for the purposes of this comparative analysis, implementation bodies are coded as either 'insulated' or 'not insulated' for each case.

Concerning the predictions of the hypotheses, while the eventual procedures adopted for sequencing and timing are the critical ones, the hypotheses predict that if any form of issue hierarchy - issue hierarchy 1, unilateral timetables, issue holdover and/or early elections - is clearly endorsed in the terms of the settlement, the barriers to adjusting the timetable are high and the sequence and timing is unlikely to change sufficiently to alter outcome. If the agreement is unclear on implementation procedures and mechanisms, not explicitly providing for issue breakdown and parallel sequencing, yet neither specifically providing for any form of issue hierarchy, the eventual adoption of a sequence and timing conducive to a successful outcome might be possible, and damaging issue hierarchy might be avoided. In this case if insulated institutions control implementation design, the chances of success are increased.

\(^{14}\) For both Djibouti and Niger the information available was not sufficient to make a judgement on the rules and procedures outlined in the agreements or developed during the course of its implementation.
The empirical analysis through which the accuracy of the IFF model and its hypotheses is established is next outlined. It begins with a description of the statistical techniques employed. The findings of this analysis are then presented, and conclusions are drawn on the overall capacity of the IFF model's hypotheses to explain the dynamics of the implementation process.

**STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE**

Advanced statistical methods, such as logistic regression and ordered logistic regression, are frequently used in social scientific research where the data is categorical, i.e., has a small number of values. These methods are best suited for the type of data that research on the outcome of civil wars throws up, and given the small number of dependent variable values—successful, partially successful, and failed—unfortunately some analysts, such as Hartzell (1999) and Walter (2002), use these methods despite the fact that the number of observations available is less than would be desired by statisticians in order for the results to be reliable. Long (1997, 54), whose work concentrates specifically on categorical or limited dependent variables, says that it is risky to use regression models for categorical variables with samples smaller than 100, while samples over 500 seem adequate. First, if there are many parameters, more observations are needed. A rule of at least ten observations per parameter seems reasonable. This does not imply that a minimum of 100 is not needed.

Given that the current empirical study involves 25 observations, and the parameters include all the proxies developed for the independent variables discussed above and displayed in appendix B, the exploration of the hypotheses does not rely on these statistical methods. Instead, cross tabulation, a statistical method more suitable for a small number of observations, is used to explore the statistical significance of independent variables. Within cross tabulation there are a number of relevant tests of significance, of which the chi-squared is the best known and most commonly used. It, however, overestimates significance when the expected cell count is small (<5). As this will often be the case in this analysis, the more reliable Fisher's exact test is used in conjunction with chi-squared to estimate the significance of independent variables. The cross-tabular test is, in effect, a test of independence between two variables. A low
probability or a low Fisher's exact value (0.05) indicates that there is a very low probability that the two variables under examination are independent of each other (i.e., a high probability that there is a relationship). A chi-squared is a relatively high figure where a relationship exists, but the chi-squared must be read with the probability or with the Fisher's exact test to assess the impact of a variable.

For non-categorical data, such as the contribution of primary commodity exports to GDP, or the 1-10 scale estimate of hurting stalemate, the proxy data was collapsed into categorical data suitable for a cross-tabular test, using Stata's kmeans cluster analysis to generate the three, most homogeneous categories. For example, the value of primary commodity goods exports to GDP that appear in appendix B (table 4.1) was divided into categories of low, medium, and high contribution to GDP, and the ability of these categories to explain outcome was explored. Similarly, duration, battle deaths, and intensity were categorised into three groupings of low, medium, and high intensity. The categories suggested by the statistical package were, by and large, judged to accurately reflect the theories under analysis, but the variables were re-categorised manually in other groupings to ensure that the explanatory power was not lost in the categorisation process.

Finally, given the number of observations, it is not methodologically sound, even in the context of the cross-tabular tests, to analyse the effect of two independent variables together with a view to estimating the extent to which one may correlate with the other. The statistical tests simply cannot give a reliable estimate for this. Each independent variable is thus examined separately for its effect on the dependent variable outcome.

**FINDINGS**

The empirical findings on the explanatory value of both the implementation design and external variables are next presented. A reflection on the significance of the empirical results to the generation of an overall theory on the dynamics of the implementation process concludes the chapter. The results of cross-tabular analysis for all independent variables are reported in table 4.4, which gives the chi-square test, probability and the Fisher's exact for each variable.
Table 4.4 Results of Cross-tabulations of Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Pearson's chi square</th>
<th>DF*</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Fisher's exact</th>
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<td>0.064</td>
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<td>Issue Breakdown</td>
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<td>0.022</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Sq 2</td>
<td>3.9828</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined Is. Hierarchy</td>
<td>17.1868</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral TT</td>
<td>3.9828</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue HoldOver</td>
<td>7.9307</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td><strong>0.022</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cred Commnt</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.405</td>
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<td>0.632</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>0.027</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.952</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lootable3 (Commodity dominance)</td>
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<td>Years Education</td>
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<td>Income Group (GDP pcapita)</td>
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<td>0.474</td>
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</table>

*DF = Degrees of Freedom.

The results provide much support for the IFF model hypotheses on the design of the implementation process. The chi squared test and the Fisher's exact, more rigorous test of independence\(^{17}\) indicate that all features of issue hierarchy - unilateral deadline, issue hierarchy 1 and issue holdover features of 'issue hierarchy' - are strongly related to the

\(^{15}\)Non-categorical data was also run using logit. A relationship with logit may have suggested (despite its above reported questionable reliability) that the categorisation process had distorted the data. Also, by using logit the methods used by others to establish relationships were replicated. See below.

\(^{16}\)This should not be interpreted without reading the text on page 118. It highlights the fact that the nine cases that included either the 'issue holdover' or 'early election' indicator also included other forms of issue hierarchy. This made it difficult to determine the separate effect of these particular forms of issue hierarchy and it supports the conclusion that any form will inhibit implementation.

\(^{17}\)The Fisher's Exact should be generally below 0.05 if a relationship exists. At this there is only a one in twenty chance that the two variables are independent of each other.
outcome of implementation.\textsuperscript{18} This indicates that the presence of issue hierarchy is significantly, and negatively related to the outcome of the implementation process. While there is no apparent relationship between the presence of dated unilateral timetables and failed outcomes, unilateral timetables were coded as 'present' only if an actual specific unilateral date is included in the text of the agreement. The finding thus supports the contention that it is the unilateral demand (coded in combined issue hierarchy), as opposed to the inclusion of a date per se, that creates the barriers to implementation.

Therefore, the presence of ‘combined issue hierarchy’ is very strongly related to outcome, meaning that the inclusion in the agreement or a subsequent timetable agreement of a basis on which to justify a demand for issue hierarchy presents steep barriers to successful implementation outcomes and tends to result in stalled or failed outcomes. For example, the Dayton peace agreement endorsed issue hierarchy, by including strict deadlines for the implementation by all parties of the military cease-fire and the holding of election issues, while omitting any provisions or guidelines for the sequence and timing of all other issues, on which detailed compromises had been documented. These included critical issues such as demobilisation and re-integration of combatants, the creation of a new civilian police force, the institutionalisation of human rights, the re-settlement of citizens and other political provisions of the Accord\textsuperscript{19} This issue hierarchy has presented enormous obstacles to the implementation of these latter issues. Both the 1996 and the 1997 treaties between Russia and Chechnya, by leaving the question of independence open and, more specifically, deferring it for five years, allowed hardliners (spoiler factions) in both camps to continue to concentrate on one issue - the constitutional status of Chechnya - at the expense of all others. By omitting agreement on the establishment of an institution through which its status might even be worked on, the five-year deadline before which the status of Chechnya would be decided endorsed issue holdover and ensured, as the hypotheses outline, that any other provisions of the agreement were unlikely to be implemented in any serious way. Issue hierarchy, in particular unilateral demands, were central to the implementation design of the failed 1987 Sri Lankan accords. The government agreed to release Tamil prisoners,\

\textsuperscript{18} Issue hierarchy and unilateral demands were together coded as combined issue hierarchy. This is because they both ultimately lead to a unilateral demand.\

\textsuperscript{19} For more detail see the Dayton Accords and see Cousens and Kumar, 2001, especially page 129.
but this was dependent on their prior implementation of demobilisation and disarmament programmes (Hancock, 1999: 95). Formal devolution of powers to the Northern and Eastern regions was also dependent on the demobilisation of the insurgencies, and demobilisation was itself to take place over a number of days, and in the absence of provision for the parallel reintegration of insurgents into society (Hancock, 1999: 97).

Furthermore, as predicted by the IFF model, the instance of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing are both strongly related to outcome, the latter displaying a 0.000 Fisher’s exact value, meaning that there is little or no chance that the outcome of implementation and parallel sequencing are independent of each other. This supports the hypotheses that the presence of issue breakdown, and the eventual presence of parallel sequencing in the rules and procedures for implementation increase significantly the prospect of a successful outcome. Their absence is related to partially implemented or failed processes. For example, in Mozambique, the gradual introduction of rules and procedures that guaranteed issue breakdown and parallel sequencing of issues coincided with an ultimately successful outcome. Demobilisation was initially closely phased with reintegration of combatants and with political issues, and, for example, a voluntary trust was established to assist the insurgency, RENAMO, to establish itself as a political party before demobilisation began. However, deadlock prevailed until an agreement was struck which introduced issue breakdown to the extension of central administration, by allowing RENAMO to retain a considerable and institutionalised presence in the areas formally under its control as a part of the process. The introduction of this procedure paved the way towards a final breakthrough in the implementation process in October 1993, when parties agreed on procedures for the parallel implementation of all issues in a type of package agreement: On the procedures for the assembly and demobilisation of RENAMO and government troops, the simultaneous disarmament of all paramilitary forces, irregular and militia troops, on the quick establishment of local police commissions and sub-committees (UN monitored) to monitor police behaviour in parallel to all other issues, and agreement on the composition of the National Elections Commission, and the system and timetable for finalising the electoral law.
There does not, at first glance, appear to be a relationship between the presence or absence of insulation and outcome. On the other hand, there does appear to be a relationship between the presence of insulation and outcome when the coding of the dependent variable is altered slightly and is coded as a dummy variable when conflicts were coded as either 'successful' or 'not successful,' with the latter including all settlements that were partially implemented or failed, insulation is related to outcome (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5 Cross Tab, Insulation with dummy outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Insulation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi2(1) = 4.7902, Pr = 0.029, Fisher's exact = 0.074, 1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.038

* Where 0 = failed or partially implemented and 1 = successfully implemented and 0 for insulation means its absence and 1 signals its presence.

While the relationship would be stronger if both Fisher's exact figures were below 0.05 (rather than only the one-sided result given in two by two cross-tabulations being below 0.05), the result supports the contention that stalled and failed processes are more common where no provision is made for insulated institutions, while success is not guaranteed by their inclusion. This suggests that insulation alone will not guarantee full implementation, but that its absence appears to facilitate stalled and failed outcomes. This is useful for the discussion of a further prediction.

It was predicted that if an implementation process does not explicitly provide for parallel sequencing and issue breakdown, the presence of insulation will encourage its development. It was not possible to examine this prediction statistically, given the low number of cases, but an examination of the data provides some support for this contention. As appendix B shows, parallel sequencing is explicitly provided for (parseq2) in few peace settlement texts, and it is present in far more settlements as a result of dispute resolution during the implementation process. But not all settlements with insulated institutions managed to bring about rules and procedures that facilitated...

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parallel sequencing, and the six settlements with insulated institutions that failed to do so were either partially implemented or unravelled. Significantly, out of the six, all were characterised by issue hierarchy. This suggests that the presence of insulation will facilitate success if issue hierarchy is not inherent in the settlement. Thus, it appears that while insulated institutions have the capacity to guide implementation towards issue breakdown and parallel sequencing, they are unlikely to do so if issue hierarchy is entrenched in the rules and procedures for the process. In other words, insulation will not alone guarantee a successful outcome, and insulated institutions will face obstacles to the incorporation of procedures for issue breakdown and parallel sequence, if issue hierarchy is clearly endorsed by the rules and procedures of the implementation process. It therefore appears that the absence of issue hierarchy is the key requirement if the possibility for the adoption of parallel sequencing is to be kept open. In fact, it appears that the two are mutually exclusive.

In sum, the evidence suggests that the strongest predictors of a successful implementation process are the presence in implementation design of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing and the absence from process design of any form of issue hierarchy. Furthermore, the absence of insulated institutions is quite likely to result in failed or partial outcomes.

Concerning other explanatory variables, on the one hand, the ‘regional conflict complex’ variable appears to be related to outcome. If a ‘regional conflict complex’ is present at the time of signing or emerges during the course of the implementation process, the outcome of implementation appears to be negatively affected. This supports the equilibrium-maintaining or equilibrium-breaking proposition at the heart of the IFF model. Any shift or dramatic change in regional relations that creates a ‘regional conflict complex’ or worsens an existing one may open or close up military options that make pro factions’ strategies more difficult to pursue, and provide ‘legitimate’ pretexts on which to stall for the opposite spoiler faction. A ‘regional conflict complex’ that emerged in Angola in 1997 may be understood as contributing to the unravelling of the stalling process. The ‘regional conflict complex’ in Central Asia associated with the

21 Angola 2, Cambodia, Sierra Leone 1, Sierra Leone 2, Liberia, Western Sahara
civil war that ensued in Afghanistan can be understood as contributing to preventing the partially successful outcome in Tajikistan from being fully successful.

On the other hand, there appears to be no relationship between the outcome of implementation and the presence of a credible commitment or of power-sharing guarantees. While a credible commitment might be necessary for the successful negotiation of a settlement, its presence in 21 out of the 25 cases supporting this proposition, the data suggest that its presence will not ensure successful implementation without the appropriate design of the implementation process. The power-sharing proxies which test the strength of Hartzell's theory when applied to implementation, whether tested individually or combined (on a scale of 1-4 and 1-3), appear to have no apparent relationship with outcome. Nor do the proxies used to estimate the extent to which a mutually-hurting stalemate exists appear to explain the outcome of implementation.

Non-categorical, independent variables were run using the cross-tabular and the ordered logistical regression programmes, despite the question mark over the reliability of the latter signalled above. Firstly, this allowed the use of political economy and stalemate hypotheses data as seen in the appendices, before it was transformed into categorical data to make it suitable for analysis using the cross-tabular method. Secondly, it was considered important to report a significant result using this method, given that other analysts have used it. However, neither the proxies for politico-economy and economic commitment variables nor any of the proxies used to measure a mutually-hurting stalemate appeared to be significant when ordered logistical regression was used.

Neither a high availability of 'lootable' goods, nor low human capital are related to the outcome of implementation, regardless of the proxy or the statistical technique used, the cross-tabular or logit regression. This supports the IFF model, which predicts that given their presence at the time of signing, structural politico-economic conditions are unlikely to present the key barrier to implementation in the short-term. Neither did high levels of inequality appear to coincide with unsuccessful processes or low levels of inequality.

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22 Neither did the logit test reveal a relationship with either of the proxies.
23 Only non-categorical variables were run. The ologit method in Stata was used.
inequality with successful ones. What is more, empirical evidence presented by Gissinger and Gleditsch (1999) illustrates that a high percentage of primary agricultural exports, a measure similar to Collier’s primary commodity export proxy, lead to lower economic welfare, high inequality and political unrest, this suggesting that the proxies for greed and grievance motivated conflict may in fact correlate, and that formations are simultaneously motivated by greed and grievance. That none of the proxies appear to explain the outcome of implementation supports the IFF model predictions that in the immediate implementation process external factors will significantly impact on implementation only if they dramatically shift to alter the equilibrium at signing.

The possible impact of De Soysa’s ‘sharper measure’ of lootable goods (2000 125-6), the total per capita stock of non-renewable, natural resources, was considered. He uses this proposition to test the theory that it is not the poverty that tends to exist in countries with a high density of primary commodity exports (grievance) that causes the conflict, but the greed associated with the high density of non-renewable primary commodity resources. According to his findings, the higher the per capita stock of non-renewable resources, the higher the incidence of civil conflict. Data on per capita availability of natural resources are available for only 13 out of the 25 conflicts and are over-representative of the successful value of the dependent variable (Table 4.6). The data does not cover a sufficient number of cases to use statistical methods to estimate the ability of de Soysa’s proxy to explain outcome. However, despite the low number of cases, and the drawbacks with using data that represent an entire country as opposed to the entity in which conflict has been concentrated, a quick examination of the data suggests that the relationship is at best questionable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dep Var</th>
<th>Natcap</th>
<th>Total Subsoil Assets per capita $</th>
<th>Total Renewable R per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>3110</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>4840</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>5320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>7180</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>3690</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>12340</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>2730</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>F (96) F (99)</td>
<td>3040</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>2860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>3480</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3480</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The estimates give the net worth of the stock of renewable and non-renewable natural resources in per capita terms for a given country (de Soysa, 2001 19) While the two failed processes in Sierra Leone coincide with relatively high levels of subsoil assets per capita, they do not nearly approach the levels in two successful processes, Namibia and South Africa. While the absence of known quantities of subsoil assets in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique or Mali may indicate that this variable in some way explains success, in Guatemala the process has been relatively successful despite comparatively high levels of subsoil assets per capita. While the stalling process in the Philippines and Bangladesh may be explained by the presence (albeit low) of subsoil assets, especially in the latter case given that a considerable extent of these resources are concentrated in the CHT area, the stalling process in Niger cannot be, nor can the failed outcome in Sri Lanka.

Finally, only one proxy was included in the analysis to measure the extent to which the macro-economy might be able to support implementation, and no relationship was

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24 Source de Soysa, 2001 Data was forwarded to the author by the de Soysa (See footnote 9)
found between this – GDP growth levels in the years immediately preceding the settlement – and the outcome of the implementation process. Further, the IFF model prediction on the impact of a high availability of resources on the process is supported by empirical data from six case studies in Foreman and Patrick’s volume (2000: 27-31). They conclude, after detailed investigations of the resources pledged and made available to six implementation processes, that ample resources will not sufficiently alleviate distributive and other cleavages in conflict-prone societies to guarantee lasting peace, and in the end ‘the critical determinants of successful peace-building and sustainable recovery are likely to be internal (2000: 31).’ They proceed to recommend that resources injected into implementation processes must be informed by peace-building priorities. They recommend a strategy of peace conditionality for donors, an important concept which is revisited in chapter eight.

CONCLUSION
What can the findings contribute to a general theory on the implementation process? What factors appear to facilitate successful or failed outcomes? At the very least it is possible to assert that there is a relationship between the design of the implementation process - the rules and procedures that govern sequence and timing - and the outcome of process, a relationship predicted by the intra-formation faction model. It also appears that, while explanatory variables such as the presence of a credible commitment, of power-sharing institutions, of a mutually-hurting stalemate appear to play a significant role in the successful negotiation of a peace settlement, they do not best explain the barriers to consolidation or the outcome of the implementation stage. What is more, though structural, political-economic conditions associated with the incidence of conflict might raise the barriers to successful implementation for pro factions, their presence or absence does not appear to explain the outcome of implementation. It is argued that this is because conflict actors agreed to endorse a settlement in the context of these structural variables, and the results conform to the hypothesis that only in the context of a dramatic change in the political economy of an entity, would outcome be effected. The empirical findings on the importance of the emergence or worsening of a ‘regional conflict complex’ to outcome appear to support the idea that external variables are significant to outcome, in that, where they change, they can have an equilibrium-maintaining or breaking effect on the process. This supports the IFF model predictions and suggests that dramatic changes in other variables, such as a credible commitment, a
mutually-hurting stalemate or the political economy of an entity, might have an impact on outcome.

However, in none of the 25 cases studied, regardless of outcome, was there any such dramatic change in the political economy of the entity, or to the presence of a credible commitment, this suggesting that variety in outcome is not well explained by a dramatic change to the political economy of an entity, or in a shift in the level of credible commitment to the process The absence of these conditions ensured the maintenance of the status quo on the political economy and credible commitment variables, thus allowing the analysis to focus on elements that do appear to impact on the implementation process.

The predictions on the significance of process design, and the relative significance of external variables to outcome, are derived directly from the intra-formation faction model, itself based on the premise that sub-elite and elite members of conflict formations are driven by 'multiple motivations' to support, be sceptical of, or to oppose implementation. The findings lend support to the interpretation that independent variables are significant to outcome, to the extent that they influence the struggle between spoiler, sceptic and pro factions that make up individual conflict actors.

Given the small number of observations, the results must be treated with care, but the avoidance of selection bias in the development of an inclusive data set increases confidence in the findings. The in-depth case studies that follow are designed to explore the findings in greater detail, to strengthen the reliability of the analysis As indicated in chapter two, in the selection of the in-depth case studies an attempt was made to control for different values of alternative explanatory variables, with a view to focusing the case studies on the IFF model predictions on design, and its impact on the implementation process. The empirical findings in this chapter give increased methodological legitimacy to using the case studies to concentrate on further examining the impact of design on the ultimate outcome of implementation. Cases are specifically designed to assess the capacity of issue hierarchy, issue breakdown, parallel sequencing and insulation to explain the events and the ultimate outcome of implementation. They are presented in chapters five, six and seven.
CHAPTER FIVE

ANGOLA, BICESSE, LUSAKA AND BREAKDOWN

In May 1991 the parties to the Angolan civil war – the MPLA and UNITA – concluded peace negotiations with the endorsement of the Bicesse Accords. Promising to bring almost 16 years of civil war to a close, the Accords provided for a cease-fire, the demobilisation of the MPLA and UNITA’s armies, the formation of a unified, national army equally representative of both parties and the neutralisation of the police force. The parties also made a number of commitments that would ensure the establishment of newly-democratic laws and institutions to replace the coercive, one-party system that had been abolished on paper in March 1991 (Tvedten, 1997 53). In so far as the designers considered the implementation of the settlement, they clearly hoped that the MPLA-UNITA power struggle could be channelled into the new, democratic institutions. Political reforms were to pave the way for free and fair elections to a multi-party system. The ultimate goal during implementation seems to have been to gradually replace civil war with the institutionalisation of political competition and reconciliation.

But the ‘road map’ that guided the parties to this destination was seriously flawed. Eighteen months later, and in the immediate wake of Angola’s first ever popular elections, the compromises of the stalling process unravelled and Angola was once again engulfed in civil war. After two more years of intense fighting the parties once again reached a settlement in November 1994. The result of several rounds of negotiations which were led by the special representative of the UN Secretary General (SG), the Lusaka Protocol offered a new hope for peace to the war-weary population of Angola. But the Protocol was followed by stalling, the cosmetic implementation of commitments, cease-fire violations and continued re-arming by both parties. Lusaka’s compromise gradually unravelled and Angola returned to full-scale civil war in December 1998.

Analysts have highlighted a number of aspects specific to the Bicesse Accords as undermining the inter-party trust required for their successful implementation: the lack

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1 Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
of political and financial support from the international community (Janes Intelligence Review (JIR), 06 93), the weak UN mandate to manage the implementation of Bicesse (SWO, 1996 8, Anstee, 1996 77-8), the strict election timetable (SWO, 1996 9) and the unsuitability of elections that pitted former warring-parties against one another in a win-lose contest to a country with no democratic tradition (Wesley, 1997 101, Anstee 534, Tvedten, 1997 60) But while these explanations do in part explain the failed outcome, they do not explain why a greater UN presence and mandate, more committed international support, a flexible election deadline, and the introduction of power sharing did not prevent the Lusaka process from unravelling

Others blame the failure of Bicesse on mutual intransigence on the part of the MPLA and UNITA For example, Alex Vines (1994 5) argues that both processes failed to end civil war because intransigence ultimately characterised the actions of both the MPLA and UNITA For Barbara Walter, Savimbi’s intransigence is largely responsible for the failed outcome (2002 85) One US observer presents intransigence as a constant, arguing that the political will to implement never existed UNITA and MPLA have never trusted each other, hence all accords, no matter how lofty, have been cosmetic (Knudsen et al, 2000 16) But these explanations overlook the fact that intransigence characterises all actors to civil wars at some point in time, hence civil wars are sustained Factors that facilitated the re-emergence of intransigence within both formations, despite their endorsement of the settlements, should be directly considered and are the subject of this chapter

The chapter analyses the implementation processes and explores the ability of the IFF model and its hypotheses on the design of the implementation process to explain the failed outcomes It considers the possibility that the rules, procedures and mechanisms that governed the implementation of the core commitments of both Bicesse and Lusaka enabled spoiler factions to dominate the strategies of both the MPLA and of UNITA In doing so it argues that the rules and procedures that create incentives for a cross-party alliance between pro factions during implementation were starkly absent from both processes This facilitated the domination of the spoiler faction in each party Moreover, the failure of rules and procedures to reduce the risk that sceptical factions associated with supporting the pro factions made it easier for spoiler factions to stall and to
dominate the implementation process. This made it unlikely that either agreement would bring peace to Angola.

In sum, it is proposed that the incentive structure created by the design of the settlements made failure the most likely outcome, regardless of the enormous obstacles to implementation presented by logistical and economic conditions, which added to the devastation of the breakdown. However, while the rules and procedures that governed the implementation of the Bicesse Accords placed a form of issue hierarchy at the heart of the implementation process, the obstacles that this issue hierarchy presented were hugely reinforced by the winner-takes-all political system that the settlement endorsed. On the other hand, the failure to implement the Lusaka Protocol can be best explained by the incentive structure that arose directly from the inadequately designed implementation process. This chapter explains how the centrality of issue hierarchy to the rules and procedures of the Protocol’s implementation, and the failure to adequately sequence the implementation of issues concerning the political economy, undermined the positive effect that the power-sharing aspects of the settlement and the insulation of oversight institutions could have had on the outcome.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Following a 14-year war of independence in Angola and a successful coup in Lisbon, the new Portuguese government withdrew from Angola in 1975. The withdrawal gave way to a three-way power struggle between the rival, regionally and ethnically mobilised, Angolan independence movements: the MPLA, UNITA and FPLA. Following a weakly institutionalised and poorly-monitored attempt by the Portuguese to set up a transitional, three-way, power-sharing government, two of the movements - UNITA and FPLA - together withdrew their ministers, formed a military alliance and heralded civil war in July 1975. On the eve of the ‘formal’ handover of power to the Angolan movements, the MPLA had soundly defeated the FPLA in Angola’s capital.

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2 See Chapter Four, 115-116 for discussion of the impact of the detail of constitutional settlements on incentive structure during the implementation process.
3 National Front for the Liberation of Angola.
4 UNITA was sponsored by South Africa. The US and Zaire sponsored the FPLA and later sponsored UNITA.
5 Cuba and the USSR backed the MPLA. Most sources point to November 1975 as their arrival date.
This enabled it to convincingly establish itself as the government of Angola on 11 November 1975. But the undefeated UNITA continued the civil war with the MPLA government from its bases in the south and central, Omdivimbu-dominated, rural heartlands of Angola, and was able to create basic insecurity in 80 per cent of the country.

Central to the conflict was a struggle to control the state and the resources and patronage associated with it. The extent to which existing ethnic, social and regional divisions were, in themselves, sufficient to contribute to an escalation to full-scale civil war is largely unexplored or at least inconclusive in the literature. It can be assumed that ethnic and rural-urban divisions, which certainly existed in the social fabric of Angolan society, were encouraged, harnessed and intensified by political elites in their efforts to build the anti-colonial (subsequently civil war) conflict formations. External and regional powers, encouraged by the wealth that the mineral and diamond-rich Angola had to offer, added not only a devastating intensity to the conflict, but also obstacles to a political solution.

UNITA based its internal ideology on the resurgence of black hegemony and the wealth and power of the Ovimbundu people, who make up the largest ethnic block in Angola. It presented the MPLA government as urban, northern-dominated, anti-Ovimbundu, Portuguese-educated and mestizo (mixed race) (Vines, 1994). Its ethnically focused, internal rhetoric on black hegemony sat uneasily with its alliance with the South African apartheid regime and against the ANC, the contradiction revealing the extent to which its leadership has been motivated first and foremost by the quest for political power and resources. Furthermore, despite its origin in 1966 as a Maoist-influenced communist movement (Tvedten, 30), UNITA quickly denounced all forms of communism and presented itself as a powerful, pro-western, pro-Ovimbundu force.

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6 UNITA had most complete control over the south-east and central provinces of Moxico and Cuando Cubango. Moving eastwards it established some control in Lunda Sul and westwards towards Benguela and Cuanza Sul. It pushed northwards and established some control in Cuanza North, Malange, Bengo, Uige and Zaire. Tvedten, 1997 38
7 See Tvedten, 1997 for background
8 In an overview of literature concerning Angola and its political history, Niemann cites this as a general weakness in many accounts of the civil war. Niemann, 1999
10 Savimbi broke away from Holden Roberto’s FNLA in 1966. He protested against the over-representation of the Bakongo ethnon-linguistic group in leadership positions. Tvedten, 1997 29-30
anti-communist force. Using its control over information and sources of patronage (Vines, 1999: 197, Tvedten, 1997: 35-6), it mobilised the support of large sections of the Ovimbundu people in the rural, south-eastern and central plains of Angola (Maier, 1996: 81). While UNITA had some ties to the civilian population which were based on health and educational provision, it used political persuasion and primarily coercive means to mobilise support (Tvedten, 1997: 50-1). In fact, according to Alex Vines, in 1995 UNITA remained 'a strict, military machine with a political face,' and its leader, Jonah Savimbi,\(^{11}\) was believed, after thirty years, to still rule with an 'iron fist' (Vines, 1999: 197).

The first Angolan independence movement, the MPLA, was established in 1956. Its communist ideology is judged to have had some conviction but to have been mostly a reaction to the international environment (Tvedten, 1997: 45). Popular support for the MPLA government was motivated in part by ethnic and regionally-based loyalties associated with distrust of the more numerous Ombivindu people who were considered by many of the Mbundu and assimilados peoples to be backward and rural (SWO, 1996: 3). Popular-based support was reinforced by the MPLA’s comprehensive takeover of the institutions of the state in 1975. Under president Dos Santos\(^{12}\), the MPLA introduced an extraordinary degree of centralism to the political system (Tvedten: 46-7, Vines, 1999: 181). This concentration of power was facilitated by its control of Luanda and the relatively widespread international recognition of its legitimacy and the constant civil war with UNITA provided the pretext. The centralisation of government was also driven by the MPLA’s quest to eliminate relentless internal power struggles (Tvedten, 1997: 44). The network of patronage on which the MPLA was based was reinforced by the civil war and meant that people of Ovimbundu origin were underrepresented at all levels of the party, especially the central institutions of the state. This in turn played into the hands of Savimbi and increased his ability to mobilise on ethnic grounds.

In the late 1980s, two developments opened a window of opportunity to resolve the internal Angolan conflict through negotiations. The warming of US-USSR relations and the settling of regional power struggles with an agreement on Namibian independence in 1988. The Angolan civil war was highly linked to the cold war, with the US and

\(^{11}\) Leader of UNITA since its foundation in 1966 until his death in the civil war in 2002

\(^{12}\) President of the MPLA and of Angola since 1979
South Africa heavily backing UNITA in its fight against the Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLA government. It was also highly linked to the Namibian conflict between SWAPO and South Africa. For 25 years, SWAPO had been fighting the South African Defence Forces for independence in Namibia. With UNITA heavily backed by South Africa, the Angolan MPLA government and its Cuban sponsor supported SWAPO in its war of independence against South Africa. It allowed SWAPO to set up bases in Angola and thereby gave the South African government the pretext on which to directly intervene in Southern Angola on behalf of UNITA, in 1981-3 and in 1988. International pressure against the South African apartheid regime facilitated the settlement of Namibian independence, which included a commitment by the Angolan government to allow and to ensure the withdrawal of Cuban troops from both Namibia and Angola. The settlement of the Namibian civil war therefore removed regional obstacles to negotiations between the Angolan parties by facilitating the formal withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops (and of SWAPO bases) from Angola.

A number of failed pan-African attempts to facilitate agreement amongst the Angolan parties followed in 1989 until in 1990 and 1991, with their interests no longer requiring civil war in Angola, the USSR and the US together with Portugal (the troika), facilitated six rounds of intricate negotiations between UNITA and MPLA delegations. These negotiations led to the signing of the Bicesse Accords in May 1991.

UNITA, THE MPLA AND FACTIONALLISM
Both UNITA and the MPLA’s command structures are a product of the civil war. In this sense, ‘the maintenance of authority’ was largely ‘dependent, on the continuation of underlying insecurity’ (SWO, 1996: 20). Given this, there were big incentives for elite members in UNITA and the MPLA to adopt intransigent positions associated with spoiler factions. UNITA members who were either against or sceptical of the settlement would have perceived the risks that peace, stability and a more accountable political system presented to their centralised, coercive hold over the UNITA organisation as too high. Similarly, those in the MPLA who were sceptical about the merits of the settlement or resolutely against the settlement, would have thought that it placed the government’s carefully-balanced, coercive hierarchy of control at risk. Rather than stemming from a simple absence of trust between the UNITA and MPLA leaderships,

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13 South West African People’s Organisation
this fear of a final settlement stemmed predominantly from intra-formation power struggles and the unknown impact that implementation might have on the shape and composition of the leadership.

The incentive to prevent the implementation of the settlement did not only exist for leaders and those in their immediate inner-circles. All elites and sub-elites who were benefiting from the coercive and patronage-based power hierarchies that characterised both the MPLA and UNITA had incentives to oppose the settlement. But incentives also existed for the development of pro factions in both parties. The pro factions would have foreseen the future development of the conflict formation and their own position within it as dependent on the implementation of a political settlement and of a more transparent political system. These pro factions included a significant number of UNITA and government officials who were closely involved in and identified with negotiations, and whose political careers were secure if the negotiated agreement were implemented.

Sources and events suggest that these different tendencies existed in UNITA and disunity frequently resulted in the adoption of contradictory strategies by the different UNITA factions. While even those heavily involved in the implementation processes remain unsure of Savimbi's initial intentions towards the peace agreements, evidence suggests that he did away with any real challenges to his leadership, surrounding himself with loyal, political and military leaders. It appears that whatever his position at the signing of the settlement, Savimbi felt threatened by a strong, pro faction during its implementation. This faction saw UNITA's future purely in political terms, regardless of the election results. It what appears to have been a reaction to this threat, in March 1992 Savimbi ordered the torture and death of high-ranking UNITA officials and their families for dissenting behaviour and questioning of his leadership strategy (Vines, 1994:11). Among the victims was 'Chingungi,' a well-respected senior UNITA leader who was the organisation's lobbyist in Washington. Reflecting on these events, Savimbi's former biographer believed that Savimbi had prepared his own downfall by eliminating Chingungi and other gifted rebel leaders whom he perceived as potential rivals. He killed the politically-minded people that he needed for the democratic phase.

14 By 1997 it had become common to point to Savimbi's intransigence as the key stumbling block, but both Anstee and Hare's accounts of the first and second implementation processes respectively, reflect the uncertainty of those in highest diplomatic circles about his true intentions.
Highlighting another incentive for the development of a strong spoiler faction, Bridgeland maintained that Savimbi would ‘have to defend himself against further accusations’ if he were to enter the political process (AP, 31-10-92).

A number of senior UNITA officials, arguably belonging to this pro faction, deserted Savimbi after the details of the murders emerged in early 1992 (FT, 15-1-93). Disunity was increasingly characterising the UNITA elite in the run up to the September elections, following the defection of two leading members. Some analysts predicted that in the event of renewed civil war the movement would split along regional lines reflecting these defections (JIR, 06 93 285). In the post-election battle of Luanda in October 1992, many UNITA casualties were leaders judged to have been part of a ‘pro faction’ who were ‘willing and able to continue with the implementation process’ (JIR, 06 93 284). They included Chitunda, UNITA’s Vice President and a chief negotiator of the Bicesse Accords. Savimbi was reported to be unable to effectively control his troops without Chitunda, who had ‘brought about the Bicesse Accords’ (Anstee, 1996 290-91). UNITA’s (later discussed) initially confused strategy in the immediate aftermath of the September 29-30 election would appear to support the contention that the leadership was severely weakened by the loss of its politically-minded elite and severely divided on strategy.

Within the historically factional MPLA, divisions over the post-agreement strategy can also be clearly discerned. Following the death of its founder (Neto) in 1979, Dos Santos was widely believed to have been the only person in the position to unite opposing interests (Tvedten, 1997 50). He achieved unity by increasingly centralising power in a hierarchical system, based on coercion and patronage, and facilitated by civil war. Maier’s account of the multiple intelligence systems put in place by the MPLA leadership to ‘spy’ on its own members (Maier, 1996 21), while a standard feature of Marxist-Leninist regimes, are an indication of the persistent distrust that existed between the rival MPLA factions.

12 In March 1992 factionalism was evidenced by a breakaway group calling itself Democratic Unita
16 Tony da Costa Fernandes and Miguel Wizau Puna were both senior members of the Unita leadership.
The impact of the 1990-1991 negotiations on the MPLA appears to have created more division in an already-divided organisation. Many factions opposed the leadership's strategy which was itself a reaction to severe pressure from the international community to democratise and to sign an agreement (Vine, 1996 7, Wesley, 1997 102). The movement is described as having been 'disunited' and in 'considerable political disarray' in 1991 (Messant, 2001 303). In fact, many observers expected it to split and collapse in the post-Accord interval between the cease-fire and the elections. That officials in the MPLA anticipated electoral defeat (Vines, 1996) would have only served to increase their sense of insecurity about the merits of the Accords.

There was certainly a faction within the MPLA and the armed forces who perceived full implementation to be the best strategy (Maeir, 1996 51-2, 83). This faction was primarily made up of personnel who were closely associated with the negotiations. Margaret Anstee (1996 316) was of the opinion that some MPLA factions were committed to implementation, but that significantly large sections were only conditionally so committed, committed in the event of an electoral victory. It was unclear the extent to which the MPLA (collectively) was committed to implementing the terms of the agreement in the event of an electoral defeat. The current power holders, the MPLA, had much to lose collectively, including access to resources used by Dos Santos to maintain his position at the top of a centralised power hierarchy. Wesley, who is generally sympathetic to the MPLA's position and presents it as 'more genuine in its commitment to the peace process' (1997 105), argues that neither the government nor UNITA appeared totally committed to abandoning the war for democratic peace, and that it is unclear how comfortable the MPLA would have been with a Savimbi government (1997 102). Others argue that the MPLA had 'no intention of opening access to the structures of power' in 1992 (Messiant, 2001 290), and that the electoral win provided them with the legitimate pretext on which to refuse to do so.

The uncertainty amongst analysts over the level of commitment to full implementation within either the MPLA or UNITA can best be understood as a product of the factionalism that characterised them. Factions who could see a way to preserve power in opposition were more likely to push other factions to implement the full terms of Bicesse, those unable to were more likely to seek to adopt spoiler tactics to bring the process down. Members of this faction evoked 'legitimate' reasons for refusing to
proceed with implementation. For example, it appears that some MPLA members planned to reject the result of the elections in the event of a UNITA victory, on the basis that the UN had behaved partially and had given more assistance to UNITA (Vines, 1994: 11). This faction refused to allow the UN to implement provisions that would have addressed their concerns; this was because they aimed to reserve the concerns as a pretext on which to reject the entire process at a future date.

In sum, evidence suggests that factionalism characterised the elite and sub-elite circles of both UNITA and the MPLA prior to and during the implementation of Bicesse. The impact of the design of the Bicesse and Lusaka implementation processes on this factionalism and on the ultimate strategy of each formation is next considered.

THE BICESSE ACCORDS

The Bicesse Accords (Appendix C) committed UNITA to recognising the Angolan state, the presidency, and the presidency's responsibility for running the state during the transition period (Vines, 1999: 15). In return, from the moment that the cease-fire went into place, UNITA was entitled to all the rights of a legitimate political party in the newly-created, multi-party system. The MPLA government agreed to hold all-party discussions concerning the constitutional amendments necessary for the holding of 'free and fair,' internationally-supervised, multi-party elections\(^\text{17}\) and the consolidation of a democratic political system. Both the MPLA and UNITA would simultaneously implement a ceasefire and both committed to cooperate with a prisoner release programme that would be supervised by the International Red Cross. The neutralisation of the police, mutual cantonment and demobilisation of existing armies, and the completion of a process that would form a neutral, national army (FAA),\(^\text{18}\) would be followed by the formal extension of central administration to the whole country. All of this would be implemented by the parties before the holding of elections, which would take place 18 months after implementation had commenced, between 1\(^{st}\) September and 30\(^{th}\) November 1992. UNITA and the MPLA, with the support of the United Nations, were to guarantee the neutrality of the newly-formed army during the election campaign (Fundamental Principles 6). A triple-zero clause forbade either formation from re-arming and committed the former sponsors - the 'trioka' (US, USSR, Portugal) - to

\(^{17}\) UN technical assistance to organise the elections was agreed in December 1991

\(^{18}\) Armed Forces of Angola
refrain from supplying either formation with military equipment during the implementation period (Vines, 1994 10)

RULES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS

The entire implementation process was to be driven, overseen and interpreted by a series of commissions each made up of an equal number of UNITA and GOA representatives. A Joint Political and Military Commission (CCPM) was to ‘guarantee strict compliance with all political and military understandings’ and to make ‘decisions on possible violations’ (Protocol of Estorial II). Its supervision of the implementation of the cease-fire and the assembling of troops was within the framework of the subordinate Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVP). Both Commissions made decisions by consensus and included troika representatives as permanent observers19. CCPM also oversaw a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA) and a Joint Political Commission.

The CCPM – the commission charged with ensuring that implementation would follow the agreement - was not insulated from intra-formation factionalism. Given this, it would find it difficult to introduce adjustments that would sequence and time issues so as to facilitate a more successful outcome. In fact, the Joint Commission structure, chaired as it was by the representatives of the Angolan formations, made Bicesse a ‘self-implementing’ peace agreement. UNAVEM II, established on 31st May20, was to ‘verify this verification process’, in particular where the cease-fire, the neutrality of the police and the preparations for elections were concerned. A UN representative was not entitled to be part of the CCPM structures and, when invited, only had observer status. While UNAVEM would find itself attempting to play the role of a mediator, to instigate procedures for dispute resolution and to alter sequence and timing to facilitate implementation, in particular prior to and in the aftermath of the September 1992 elections, there was no support for such a UN role in the Accords. The formations were not obliged to co-operate with these dispute-resolution efforts and could point to the Joint Commissions which, regardless of their inability to function effectively and

19 UN, Blue Helmets 238
20 Appointed in February 1992, SG special representative, Margaret Anstee co-ordinated all aspects of the UN role in verifying the verification process. The cease-fire, police and election divisions (UN on Angola 2)
independently of intra-formation conflict, were the point of authority on interpreting and implementing the Accords.

**SEQUENCING TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF THE ACCORD**

The parties agreed to establish a unicameral, presidential democracy. A strong and powerful President would be elected by the people using a majority system with recourse to a second round (Tvedten, 1997: 53). The president would appoint his own executive and a national Assembly (legislature) would be elected by the people through a system of proportional representation at the national level. The heads of the 18 provincial governments and of local governments would still be appointed by the president and would therefore remain unaccountable to the provinces’ populations. New rights including the freedom to assemble, freedom of speech, freedom to set up and to join a political party, and universal respect for human rights agreements were enshrined in the constitution. But an active civil society and a free media were very new concepts in Angola and the reforms, even had they been fully implemented, in reality could have done little to prevent the persistence of a highly centralised, relatively unaccountable political system with a very powerful, relatively unaccountable president.

In fact, the full implementation of the peace Accords was obstructed first and foremost by the nature of the post-conflict political institutions that the parties had agreed on. In this way, the procedures through which the parties had agreed to implement the new, democratic political system, as well as features of the political system itself, created insurmountable obstacles to the full implementation of the settlement. The winner-takes-all nature of the new political institutions and the centralisation of power within them created high incentives for all elite and sub-elite members of UNITA and MPLA, regardless of the faction to which they belonged, to initially comply with the military aspects of the agreement. This compliance ensured their entry to an electoral process that could see them winning ‘legitimate’ control over the most powerful office in Angola. This prize was made even more attractive by the failure of the Accords to outline any steps towards the decentralisation of political power, despite a rhetorical commitment to democratisation. This explains why, despite much foot-dragging, the

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21 See Bicesse Accords, Protocol of Estoril, I: Elections
Bicesse Accords did hold until the election had taken place. The terms of the Accords and the implementation process had clearly created incentives for all factions in UNITA and in the MPLA to abide, at least tactically, by the agreement. Even spoiler factions saw the advantages of a cessation of violence and some implementation of the military terms of the agreement. In the period prior to the elections there is little evidence that either spoiler faction perceived open opposition to the agreement to be in their interest.

The question remains as to whether or not an alternative settlement, which outlined different procedures for the implementation of a democratic political system, could have made the continued observance of the cease-fire and the full implementation of military provisions an attractive option for each conflict formation. In other words, it is possible that a settlement with different procedures for implementation and with an alternative route to democratisation could have closed off the opportunities to dominate that the Bicesse process so clearly presented to spoiler factions. This argument is examined in more detail below along with further analysis of implementation design.

SEQUENCING AND TIMING

The sequence and timing outlined in Bicesse includes few of the conditions associated with a successful outcome according to the IFF model. On the one hand, neither parallel sequencing nor sufficient issue-breakdown was central to the sequence and timing outlined in Bicesse. On the other hand, issue hierarchy was written into the agreement. Issues essentially fell into political, military and policing issues, with agreement on legal and human rights unspecified, aspiring or absent, this absence reinforcing obstacles to parallel sequencing. On the implementation of military issues, the rules did call for some reciprocal moves by the parties. Beginning on the same date (May 31st), the two were to begin a reciprocal process of quartering for UNITA and confinement to barracks for MPLA. This was to be completed by August 1st and to be followed by the simultaneous demobilisation and disarmament of the assembled troops. Arms were to be left in the hands of UN observers. This procedure could have insulated the implementation of disarmament from spoiler factions' tactics. After demobilisation, socio-economic programmes for the reintegration of combatants into civilian life were to run alongside the process of incorporating troops into the new national army. Troops were to have been selected from both formations by a joint Commission on the FAA established by the CCPM. These provisions introduced some step-by-step, reciprocal
implementation to military issues. It also made some provision for the parallel implementation of military and socio-economic issues, a sequence that is predicted to facilitate implementation.

But the rules and procedures did not facilitate the full breakdown of military issues to provide for their step-by-step implementation. No specific steps towards demobilisation and disarmament were outlined, such as the quartering, demobilisation and reintegration of troops in small groups of 10 or 20 per cent. Instead the agreement required that all troops would be fully quartered before demobilisation and reintegration began. According to the hypotheses, this makes the pro-faction vulnerable to the tactics of the spoiler faction which uses the enormity and complexity of the requirement that all troops be cantoned before any movement on demobilisation takes place, to delay any movement on demobilisation and to thereby stall the implementation process. And this feature of design was by no means the only barrier to implementation.

Full parallel sequencing of implementation was not a feature of implementation design. No procedures required the parallel implementation of military issues and the above-mentioned socio-economic issues with other aspects in the process, such as the closely related police reform. In fact, the provisions guiding police reform presented wide-open opportunities for spoiler factions to adopt 'legitimate' stalling tactics on all issues. The provisions were vague and unspecific and there were two basic problems: while committing the parties to set up an impartial police force into which UNITA members would be incorporated, they provided little guidance on the steps that would be required to do this, let alone on the sequencing and the timing of their implementation. Secondly, its implementation was not clearly linked to the other provisions of the process. A twelve-month delay in establishing police monitoring units meant that the process of incorporating UNITA combatants into the police force did not begin. But this had no further consequences for other aspects of the process as its implementation was not sequenced to it. Yet it provided legitimate pretexts on which both UNITA and MPLA spoiler factions could justify their refusal to comprehensively implement the military provisions of the Accords.

Given the vague nature of the provisions on policing, it might have been possible for the body driving implementation to design an implementation sequence. But according to
the terms of Bicesse, the parties had to set up joint, mobile monitoring groups in the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire. Only after these groups were set up would UNAVEM's police component have a role to play in its implementation (Bicesse). As the setting up of these monitoring bodies was in the hands of the non-insulated CCPM and was not tied to the implementation of any other provisions, there was little institutional or process-related support for factions who were in favour of fully implementing the compromise reached on policing. As a result, when pro factions managed to achieve agreement to set up the police bodies almost a year late in June 1992, the date for the election was known (29/30 September). Spoiler factions had plenty of legitimate obstacles, including logistical ones associated with the short time scale, to prevent furthering the process of setting up an impartial police force before the elections.

In sum, because the implementation of the military issues was not governed by issue breakdown, actors were faced with an initial high-risk, one-step move to quarter their troops. This would be followed by a second move—full demobilisation. Equally so, issue breakdown did not feature in the provisions that guided the implementation of policing provisions and the failure to link the implementation of policing and military issues reinforced obstacles to a pro faction strategy. Spoiler factions in both parties could with relative ease create legitimate, politico-logistical pretexts on which to avoid the implementation of steps to reform the police, while still apparently pursuing a policy of implementation. Given that the rules and procedures of design allowed this to happen, pro factions could do little to persuade sceptical factions to oppose it and to prevent spoiler factions from leading it. For example, the MPLA was able to legitimately, or at least technically within the terms of the agreement, create a new, powerful, anti-riot, paramilitary police force (Anti-Riot Police), into which it allegedly transferred 30,000 of its best FAPLA (MPLA army) troops. The government's anti-riot police in turn provided UNITA spoiler factions with legitimate pretexts on which to persuade sceptical factions of the absolute necessity for UNITA to retain a 'hidden army,' which existed in violation of the reciprocal military provisions of the Accords (Anstee, 1996: 51-2). It in turn fuelled the perceived need for a further strengthening of the anti-riot police. This mutual lack of compliance with the letter and spirit of the police and military provisions

22 UN, Blue Helmets 242-3 Anstee (150) writes that 'there were reasons to believe that the anti-riot police contained the government's best troops, but there was no way of proving it'
later provided justifications for those in UNITA who refused to recognise the election result (Anstee: 73-4). Had it lost the election, the same justifications would have been available to the spoiler faction in the MPLA.

A number of efforts to overcome stalling and investigate the alleged breaches that characterised the implementation of military and policing aspects of the Accords highlight the space to dominate that existed for the spoiler factions. In a letter to Margaret Anstee, UNITA’s representative on CCPM, Elias.S.Pena, highlighted the potential danger that the anti-riot police posed to free and fair elections. When Antsee suggested ways in which the commissions could monitor and thus eliminate this danger, UNITA leaders were reluctant to co-operate (Anstee, 1996: 73-77). The MPLA suggested to the UN mission that obstacles to fair elections existed in UNITA’s alleged hidden army and in UNITA’s grip on its Jamba heartland (Anstee: 51-2). But when a practical solution involving a degree of issue break down was suggested, what appeared to have been deliberate inactivity prevailed (Anstee: 137). Both reactions suggest disinterest on the part of both parties in investigations that might have increased the sceptical faction’s confidence in the process. The rules and procedures of implementation, in particular the failure to sequence military and policing issues in parallel, and the absence of powerful, insulated institutions, provided no institutional backing for factions willing to employ these mechanisms.

Turning to the sequence, timing and detail of the provisions that governed political competition and national reconciliation, issue breakdown and parallel sequencing with military and policing issues are also starkly absent. The MPLA government was to alter the constitution to allow for elections in the recently legalised multi-party system. UNITA was to transform itself into a political party to take part in these elections. While the government was obliged to ‘invite’ other political parties to discuss constitutional changes, and UNITA had representatives on the government body planning the elections, no provisions that might have broken down the issue of allocating political power existed. In this way, the allocation of political power was governed by a zero-sum election to a centralised political system. A democratic political system that inherently institutionalises a constructive role for the opposition, de-

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23 A senior Unita official, a chief negotiator of Bicesse and Savimbi’s nephew.
centralisation of the state and its disentangling from avenues of social mobility was implicitly but not explicitly part of the agreement. As a US official, George Moose, subsequently remarked:

‘the assurance, that win or lose a meaningful voice in governing the country’ would exist for an opposition was clearly missing from the provisions (Knudsen et al, 2001: 6).

The opportunities that the rules and mechanisms governing the implementation of the new political system provided for spoiler factions are more clearly evident in the aftermath of the elections of October 1992. Following his relatively narrow electoral defeat (Table 5.1) 24 Savimbi cried fraud and as one analyst comments:

‘The passions that Savimbi can now exploit could have been defused by a constitution offering proportional representation in the country’s executive, a decentralised government which gives provincial administrations real power and a revenue allocation formula that ensures that all regions receive an equitable share of Angola’s oil wealth’ (FT, 5.11.92).

As the above quote suggests, the lack of issue breakdown in the implementation of political provisions not only reduced incentives to implement a more de-centralised political system but it also resulted in a failure to address the need to incrementally breakdown the almost complete control that the MPLA had over the political economy. Instead, during the implementation period, the leadership of the MPLA was able to use its monopoly of the state, its institutions and resources, to ‘neutralise its internal-opponents’ or factions (Messiant, 2001: 294) and to:

‘intensify predation of oil revenue, reorganise its appropriation of public wealth through legal privatisations, and to extend the scale of redistribution through its clientelist system’ (Messiant, 2001: 290).

By permitting both parties to implement the policing and military provisions in a cosmetic way and including no mechanism to breakdown political issues or to postpone the elections if provisions were not genuinely implemented, the MPLA’s

24 Dos Santos won 49% of the vote, Savimbi 41.1%.
ability to institutionalise its grip on the Angolan political economy was ignored. This in turn provided more pretexts for the UNITA spoiler faction it refused to implement the provisions that would transfer areas under its control to central authority in advance of the elections. Regardless, the design of provisions governing the transfer of central authority was unlikely to facilitate either pro faction to follow its preferred strategy. Parties had committed to study the practicalities of extending central authority in joint MPLA-UNITA teams. But the extension of central authority effectively amounted to the implementation of an MPLA security presence in all administrative areas. As well as constituting a single step, it was, in effect, a unilateral demand on UNITA. Without a commitment in the accord to decentralisation, there was no basis for any kind of provisional or local power sharing with UNITA, which was accustomed to controlling these areas. With the police force remaining an MPLA one, the FAA only cosmetically established in a rush to remove all potential obstacles from the elections in August 1992, and no provision that would alter the mechanisms for allocating political power and implementing decentralisation, efforts to fully extend the central government’s control over Angola proved fruitless. UNITA’s spoiler faction had by this stage ample opportunity to secure its sceptical faction’s support for resisting anything but a cosmetic implementation of all terms of the Accords. In the event of an electoral defeat, the MPLA spoiler faction had ample opportunity to point to UNITA’s failure to fully implement the Accords as making elections illegitimate.

Yet there were even further deficiencies to implementation design. On top of the stark absence of issue breakdown from political provisions, there were no mechanisms to guarantee the parallel, sequenced implementation of political, military, policing and socio-economic provisions. This was because the election date was set in stone, a rule that served to make it implicitly unconditional on the fulfilment of other provisions. In fact, Savimbi repeatedly remarked to Anstee that if the elections were not held within the right time-frame, ‘UNITA was under no obligation to implement the agreement’ (Anstee, 1996: 88). His threats revealed what little sway was held by the aspiring, but not institutionally underpinned, provision in the Accords that called for the full

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25 Compare this with the design of the Salvadoran process where the extension of central administration was facilitated by UN brokered local power-sharing arrangements between returning mayors and FMLN and local bodies, which had filled their vacuum. It was also clearly sequenced with military and policing aspects of the Accords and its implementation began 18 months before elections.
implementation of the military, police and political provisions, alongside the preparations for and before the actual holding of the elections. Without provisions explicitly providing for issue breakdown and parallel sequencing, and with the rigid election deadline, these pre-conditions were simply not implemented. The rigid election deadline created institutional support for what was in effect a form of issue hierarchy.

This design meant that the elections would be held first and the military conflict subsequently sorted out. But holding the election was, in fact, the key to reinforcing the military conflict in Angola. Anstee (1996 78) maintains that military provisions were implemented to the point where the ceasefire held, because neither conflict formation wanted to imperil the elections, which were regarded as the best route (Anstee 150) in their bid for total power. But rather than explaining this over-riding aim to gain power at the expense of the other as evidence of the persistent 'zero-sum' nature of the conflict, it is essential to recognise that the rules, procedures and mechanisms in place to transform the words of Bicesse into action shaped the choices available to conflict formations, and promoted the domination of this strategy. The firm deadline for elections and the failure to include mechanisms to precipitate a step-by-step, sequenced implementation of other provisions ensured that the pro factions could not dominate. The process instead allowed the spoiler factions to remain outwardly united to their respective pro and sceptical factions, while they simultaneously practiced spoiler tactics and ensured that stalling dominated all aspects of the process. The process supported the spoiler faction's strategy to go along with the implementation process until the elections, to accept the process if their formation won the elections and to reject it, using process based justifications that they had the opportunity to create, and the military forces that the rules and procedures had allowed them to retain, if they lost.

The lack of incentive for inter-party trust created by winner takes all elections is correctly highlighted by analysts (Wesley, 1997 101, Anstee, 1996 534) as partly responsible for the collapse of the Bicesse process. But the timing of these elections and the failure of design to ensure the prior, step-by-step implementation of the democratic political system aspired to in the Accords and the parallel implementation of military and policing provisions, allowed the spoiler factions in both formations to dominate. This worsened further the effect of 'winner-takes-all' elections. Without recourse to re-negotiate elements of the agreement to make the holding of the election conditional on
the broken-down, phased implementation of the military and policing commitments, 'pro factions' had no institutional backup to pursue their strategy. Without a process that committed formations to the step-by-step implementation of a de-centralised political system with a role for an opposition, pro factions would get little support from their sceptical factions in their endeavour to genuinely implement military and policing commitments. In fact, the failure to effectively sequence political and security issues and to break them down into broken small, reciprocal steps, left the pro faction with little or no leverage to implement the military commitments along with their preparations for the elections. This ensured that the winner-takes-all elections were held before other aspects of the process were implemented. To accept defeat in a contest over who controls a centralised political system, in a state where few alternative routes to accessing power existed, let alone an institutionalised role for opposition, was a step too large for any pro faction to take in the face of powerful spoiler factions with ample justification to resist it.

In sum, the issue hierarchy caused by the election deadline and the absence of adequate issue breakdown or parallel sequencing allowed stalling to characterise every aspect of implementation. The process of confining UNITA and the MPLA's troops to Assembly Areas and barracks was slow and incomplete and the UN supervised collection of arms (SWO, 1996 7) was hugely incomplete and 'less than effective'. Yet UNITA and the MPLA insisted that they were complying with the agreement. On 26 August 1992, UNITA and MPLA Generals together formed the General Command of the new FAA. Its formal establishment, along with the constitutional revisions to legally underpin the elections, occurred less than a month before the elections (AP, 27 08 92) when the demobilisation of huge numbers of surplus troops had not taken place (SWO, 1996 7).

UNITA soldiers should have been undergoing a process of demobilisation or of incorporation into the FAA. Many had left the assembly areas and they were able to cite process-related pretexts for doing so, such as the long waiting times and the inadequate facilities for incorporation into civilian life (Vines, 1994 15). The demobilisation of

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26 UN and the Situation in Angola, UN Ref paper, 1995 5
27 Through some reports suggested 8,000, there appear to have been about 2,000 troops in the FAA on the eve of election and its institutional establishment was very far from complete (JIR 06 93)
28 It appears that only 41% at best of all UNITA and government troops were demobilised.
government troops appears to have been more complete (SWO 19) However, the spontaneous demobilisation of significant numbers of MPLA troops (SWO 19) was partly responsible for this and further highlights the disunity that characterised the MPLA. These informally demobilised soldiers, with few opportunities and little assistance with re-incorporation into civilian life, would provide fodder for the civilian militias later mobilised by the MPLA to fight UNITA in the post-election period.

Long waiting times for ex-combatants stemmed from a form of issue hierarchy in the disarmament and demobilisation process which called for demobilisation after all soldiers were quartered. Accentuating the difficulties caused by this sequencing was the lack of an adequate and parallel socio-economic programme for demobilisation. While the agreement had provided for this type of programme, the failure to closely sequence quartering and demobilisation (not to mention poor resources) meant that it came too late to be effective. This effectively left cosmetically demobilised armies mobilised. In UNITA’s case, demobilised soldiers appeared to remain under officers’ orders (Vines, 1996 9) This helps to illustrate the drawbacks of a process in which little focus was placed a well-co-ordinated reintegration process sequenced in parallel with demobilisation. The stalling that this process allowed ultimately resulted in the ‘legitimate breaches’ that allowed UNITA to retain an apparently ‘hidden army,’ and the government to build up a new, well-equipped, anti-riot police force. The role of the anti-riot police in the subsequent phase of civil war, gives credence to the allegation that the MPLA had incorporated 30,000 of its best forces into it 29.

This was the picture on the eve of the September 1992 elections. Efforts to implement an inadequate settlement that was characterised by issue hierarchy, insufficient issue break-down, no parallel sequencing or insulated mechanisms to introduce it, were stalled. And in the immediate aftermath of the elections as the stalled process unravelled into civil war, the deep factionalism within both parties became even more apparent.

UNRAVELLING LEADS TO CIVIL WAR
Despite the stalling implementation process, the elections (Tables 5 1 and 5 2) passed

29 UN, Blue Helmets 242
off peacefully and recorded a turnout of over 90 per cent. However, unofficial sources emanating from the NEC\textsuperscript{30} in the immediate aftermath of the elections suggested that the MPLA would win a majority in the legislature, and would, perhaps, win the presidency on the first count.

Table 5.1 Parliamentary Elections (September 1992)\textsuperscript{31}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Members of Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Renovacao Social, PRS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Liberal Democratico, PLD</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola Democratico, AD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Democratico Angolano, FDA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido de Alianca Juventude Operarios e Camponeses de Angola, PAJOCA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Democratico para o Progresso de Alianca Nacional de Angola, PDP-ANA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Renovador Democratico, PRD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Social Democratico, PSD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (220)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The UNITA leadership's reaction revealed the disunity and confusion that prevailed amongst its strategists. Some members, including Savimbi, cried electoral fraud. Pena and Chivukuvuku (CCPM), the UNITA leaders who appeared to be most associated with its pro faction, requested that UNITA's charges of electoral fraud be jointly investigated before any formal announcement of the election results was made (AP, 5 10 92). The pro faction arguably presented the adoption of this strategy as a reasonable request to its more bellicose, spoiler faction who favoured dismissing the results outright on the basis of fraud, and threatened to return to war (AP, 3 10 92).

The leadership's priority was to ensure that it would retain enough power to lead a unified and powerful organisation. Two factors associated with electoral defeat threatened to prevent Savimbi from achieving this objective and raised questions about his power at the centre of UNITA. Full demobilisation, the acceptance of electoral defeat and of UNITA's status as only a political party threatened his authority in UNITA, which, without control over the levers and resources of the state, depended on a state of insecurity. Secondly, the result of the elections raised questions about

\textsuperscript{30} National Electoral Council. Government institution, including UNITA representatives. Organised elections with UN assistance.

\textsuperscript{31} There are 18 provinces in Angola.
Savimbi’s greatness amongst mid-elite and lower-ranking members of UNITA and contributed to Savimbi’s ‘acute paranoia’ (Antsee, 1996: 211) Maeir witnessed an incredulous reaction to Savimbi’s defeat in many UNITA-controlled areas. This helped to create a crisis of legitimacy (Maeir, 1996: 81) and it undermined the logic of Savimbi’s hitherto accepted rhetoric on UNITA’s right to rule Angola. The option of leading UNITA into opposition in 1992 risked allowing another leader to step into the ‘strongman’ role to lead a guerrilla struggle and thereby control the coercive structures that still kept the organisation together. This was especially true given that the implementation of the police and military provisions of the Accords was stalled and the extension of central government even more so. In other words, given that implementation had progressed so little, without the rule of the iron fist Savimbi could not control these factions.

Table 5.2 Presidential Election Results (September 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jose Eduardo dos Santos</td>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>49.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonas Savimbi</td>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>40.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Neto</td>
<td>Partido Democratico Angolano</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holden Roberto</td>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorato Lando</td>
<td>Partido Democratico Liberal de Angola</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis dos Passos</td>
<td>Partido Renovador Democratico</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengue Pedro Joao</td>
<td>Frente para a Democracia</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samao Cacete</td>
<td>Partido Social Democratico</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Chipenda</td>
<td>Partido Liberal Democratico de Angola</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaia Pereira</td>
<td>Partido Liberal Democratico</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rui Pereira</td>
<td>Partido Reformador Angolano</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Given this knowledge, UNITA’s pro faction appears to have initiated a strategy that used brinkmanship to save the agreement. A senior UNITA leader, Valentim,32 played down Savimbi’s war-like comments as no more than a ‘bid to boost the moral of UNITA supporters’ (AP, 4 10 92) Valentim’s comments were followed by the withdrawal of UNITA’s Generals from the FAA. The generals demanded that consideration be given to the intimidating tactics of the anti-riot police during elections, and that a review or a cancellation of the electoral process be undertaken (FT, 7 10 92) UNITA called on the MPLA government to postpone the official announcement of the election results until an investigation and a deal was made. This response supports the

32 Senior Unita leader, Chief information officer 1992-8 onwards, Leading negotiator for Lusaka
idea that a damage limitation exercise was underway. So too does UNITA’s agreement to take part in a UN-led fraud investigation involving joint commissions and to accept UN arbitration of the dispute over the election (FT, 8 10 92). Its strategy appeared to be based on the premise that the investigations would prove fraud, and thereby provide support for a re-negotiation of the agreement (Anstee, 1996 212), and facilitate their need to provide their leader with ‘a dignified solution’ (Anstee 213). The actions of Pik Botha, South Africa’s foreign minister, also lend support to this interpretation.

Long-time ally of UNITA, Botha was perhaps in the best position to understand Savimbi’s needs in October 1992. He outlined a compromise that involved genuine power sharing and some form of new administration in the provinces where UNITA had registered strong support. When an improvement in Savimbi’s poll in mid-October made a second round of the presidential election probable, Botha still advised against holding them and instead proposed a transitional government of national unity (GNU), with real power sharing and full UN presence for the next round of elections (Anstee, 1996 233-4). His proposal supports the view that UNITA needed issue breakdown, a transitional government and some sharing of power at national and local level, if the implementation of the rest of Bicesse was to be possible.

Recommending that the official announcement of the results be delayed, Botha called for a comprehensive investigation of the elections and the provision of ‘a face-saving device for Savimbi’ (Anstee 224-5). Botha’s efforts, like those of UNITA’s pro faction, appeared to be based on the assumption that investigations would reveal sufficient fraud to create space for a deal (FT, 14 10 92). In this sense, his strategy failed to adequately consider for the obstacles to a deal presented by the MPLA’s spoiler faction.

The MPLA had just defeated UNITA in elections, which, following investigations by the UN and the joint commission, were approved as ‘free and fair’. The legitimacy that this gave to the MPLA, and in particular to factions that were against further accommodation with UNITA, cannot be underestimated. The MPLA’s actions must be understood from within this context. Reports indicate that the MPLA was divided into hard-liners and soft-liners (Anstee, 1996 215). Its pro faction, who may have favoured the implementation of an institutionalised form of power sharing in recognition that

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13 Bie, Humbo and Benguela and Cuando Cubango were mentioned.
only this would avoid further civil war, had no process mechanisms to back a strategy that agreed to re-negotiate parts of the agreement. Dos Santos issued conciliatory statements, promising to immediately set up a GNU, but only in the event of UNITA’s demobilisation and its acceptance of the results (FT, 9 10 92). The MPLA spoiler faction had a process design on which to base this issue hierarchy. Following the announcement of the results, the MPLA could claim legitimacy when it continued to make this demand. UNITA ‘must demobilise its soldiers and allow the extension of state administration to all parts of Angola, before a GNU is negotiated, and before preparations for the second round are put into place (AP, 19 10 92). UNITA’s pro faction could not recommend this to the formation, given the issue hierarchy at the heart of the sequence which its spoiler faction was clearly in the position to exploit. At this point and with these demands the return to civil war seemed unavoidable. It began on October 31, when a pre-emptive strike by the new government of Angola (GOA) on UNITA resulted in the death of thousands of elite and supporting members of UNITA in Luanda (Vines, 1996 3).

Some argue, including many in the MPLA, that troop movements by UNITA prior to October 31 had indicated its intention to re-take large sections of Angola before staging a coup d’etat in Luanda (FT, 8 10 92). However, most neutral analysts argue that UNITA was engaged in a policy of brinkmanship, one that reflects a last attempt by the pro faction to dominate the formation. The diaries of high-ranking UNITA elite who were captured in Luanda in October 1992 support this interpretation (Vines, 1994 19). Analysts also point out that large sections of UNITA’s political elite were unprotected in Luanda on the day on which hostilities broke out (October 31), and point to the contribution of the government’s anti-riot police to the incremental outbreak of hostilities (Vines, 1994 19), as evidence in support of the argument that UNITA was not planning to stage a coup d’etat in Luanda (Vines, 1994 19). Instead, it would appear that with the prospect of a deal fading, UNITA’s pro faction aimed to threaten the MPLA government, with what Savimbi referred to as ‘controllable pressure’ (Anstee, 1996 216). With this pressure it hoped to force enough concessions to enable UNITA to remain part of the process. Most probable, of course, is that some factions of UNITA were involved in a policy of brinkmanship with a view to securing a negotiated solution, while other factions were engaged in one which sought a justification to return to civil war.
As Angola slipped back into civil war, Savimbi and other surviving UNITA leaders referred constantly to the deep divisions within the organisation. The extent to which the cries of disunity were genuine or part of a brinkmanship that aimed to force concessions is impossible to discern. However, that UNITA was not under clear, central control is evident. Pressure for a return to hostilities from military commanders in the field appeared to climax in the aftermath of the battle of Luanda. Several commanders reportedly started military engagements on their own initiatives, while civilians took up arms in the names of both UNITA and the MPLA to settle old grievances (Vines, 1994 19). Anstee (1996 283) believes that the leadership of UNITA had seriously ‘overreached itself’. She points to men ‘akin to warlords,’ who were conducting attacks around the county and who ‘might not easily respond to ceasefire commands’.

Furthermore, Savimbi left Luanda for UNITA’s base in Huambo immediately after the elections. The purpose of his departure was, according to a high-ranking UNITA official (Jardo Meukalia), 34 to calm generals and their supporters who threatened a violent reaction to the election result (FT, 6 10 92, AP, 8 10 92). Days before he was killed in October 1992, E S Pena told Anstee that ‘for once Savimbi was in a minority, by taking a more moderate position than many of his immediate collaborators’ (Anstee 231). Yet it is inaccurate to depict Savimbi as simply at the mercy of the ‘hard core,’ hawkish factions of UNITA. Savimbi and his closest associates were making calculated decisions as to which strategy would be most effective in the pursuit of their key goal to maintain control over the leadership of a strong and united UNITA. Whether they would adopt the strategy favoured by the bellicose generals, or that advocated by the pro-faction and the international community, would depend on this calculation.

Despite efforts to negotiate a cease-fire, and despite the formal negotiations that took place in Nimibe in November 1992, the spoiler factions appear to have gained the initiative in both formations. The mutual game of blame and counter-blame for the escalation of violence that followed highlights the efforts of the spoiler factions to legitimise their actions (see AP, 4 12 92). When the Prime Minister offered UNITA one ministerial post in a government of national unity which was established in December, he added that UNITA should be banned (AP, 3 12 92). Even if the MPLA government

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34 Senior Unita official (Financial Times 6 10 92)
had responded to a beleaguered call by Valentim for an increase in UNITA’s role to match its electoral support, it was at that stage unlikely to have stemmed the re-escalation of the war that followed.

FROM CIVIL WAR TO LUSAKA

Heavy fighting ensued from late 1992 and UNITA made important strategic advances in 1993. However, efforts to reach a new settlement continued despite the heavy fighting and a draft protocol was produced in mid-1993. It reflected the situation on the battlefield, and envisaged that political concessions would be made by the government in exchange for military concessions by UNITA (Vines, 1996 5). But intra-formation divisions within the government (Anstee, 1996 469-70) and UNITA (Anstee 481-6) were highly evident towards the close of negotiations and talks ended when Savimbi refused to agree to withdraw from the areas illegally occupied by UNITA since October 1992, without the simultaneous presence of a UN security force. This presence could not be guaranteed, much to the frustration of Anstee, who argues that the conditions surrounding the 1993 Protocol were more favourable for a successful outcome than any conditions that existed, before or afterwards (Anstee, 1996b 73). While Antsee’s argument is quite convincing, UNITA’s final communique suggests that the successful implementation of the draft protocol may have faced at least some barriers similar to those eventually faced by Lusaka. In it, UNITA insisted that its withdrawal and its demobilisation would only have been agreed in the context of a simultaneous demobilisation of the government’s troops (Anstee, 1996 494).

Diplomatic efforts continued into 1994 under the leadership of the new UN SG’s representative (Beye) and in 1994 these negotiations resulted in the Lusaka Protocol. The Protocol was signed in the context of a militarily and politically weak UNITA vis-à-vis the MPLA, which had successfully eroded UNITA’s military advantage throughout 1994 (Vines, 1996 6).

THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL

Although it included some improvement in design, especially by avoiding rigid deadlines, improving insulated dispute-resolution procedures, and including a far stronger UN military presence, at heart of the process there were enormous obstacles.
These largely stemmed from the zero-sum elections of 1992, and they served to make issue hierarchy, issue holdover and inadequate issue breakdown almost unavoidable

IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
The Lusaka Protocol outlined a clear and strong role for a neutral mechanism to oversee, supervise and verify implementation. This body was relatively insulated from the obstacles to implementation presented by intra-formation factionalism. The agreement gave the UN SG’s representative the power to chair and to set the agenda in the joint commission for implementation, which replaced the CCPM. Dispute-resolution mechanisms were centred in this body, which would investigate allegations of non-compliance with each element of the implementation process. This gave it the power to ensure that the sequence and timing outlined in the agreement was upheld, and implicitly gave it some power to influence parties to agree to alter sequencing and timing as part of an effort to improve the prospects of implementation. But barriers to the adoption of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing were inherent in the unilateral demands and other issue hierarchy central to the implementation process.

SEQUENCE AND TIMING
Despite evidence that there had been some recognition of the need for reciprocity, on close examination the terms governing military and policing issues do not facilitate the breakdown of issues into a series of ‘reciprocal or reversible’ steps. Nor do they endorse parallel implementation. Largely due to the political context which had conferred legitimacy on the MPLA and the outcome of the discredited Bicesse process, the terms of Lusaka more or less demanded of UNITA that it implement a series of unilateral, non-broken down military moves which would together dismantle its military capacity. Meanwhile the government’s FAA was to be confined to barracks and to implement some demobilisation, the anti-riot police to initially remain mobilised.

The deployment of additional UN observers and the armed peacekeeping force was conditional on the completion of the first phase of the ceasefire. This involved the establishment of a ceasefire in situ and the completion of a UN-supervised separation of forces where they were in contact. It also required generals from UNITA and the FAA to begin negotiations on the procedures for the FAA’s transformation, including agreement on the number of UNITA forces that would be incorporated into it. These
negotiations would take place through a newly-established commission chaired by the United Nations.\footnote{After UNITA generals withdrew forces from the FAA, the newly established FAA remained the army of the government.}

The second phase would begin after the UN Peace-Keeping force had begun deployment (Annex 3 Timetable, Phase 2) This phase involved the following actions: the UN would verify the withdrawal, quartering and demobilisation (and disarming) of UNITA troops and would simultaneously verify the FAA’s return to barracks, or to agreed verification locations. A UN operation to collect and store all UNITA’s lethal war material in locations separate from the quartering areas would form part of the demobilisation process. This would be immediately followed by the return of UNITA’s generals to the high command of the FAA, and a subsequent start to the selection of quartered and disarmed UNITA troops for the FAA, and of UNITA and FAA elements for return to civilian life.

While logistical preparations for other provisions were to be simultaneously laid, their implementation would not begin in practice until the first major stage of the military process – the quartering of all of UNITA’s troops and the full stationing in barracks of FAA – was complete. While the UN’s police monitors were to be in place, the quartering of the controversial anti-riot police and its transformation, which included the implementation of changes to its armament and equipment and its role in public security, were to begin after the ‘public order situation’ was considered to have improved sufficiently.

The unilateral demands were reinforced in April 1995, when the parties agreed to adopt a procedure known as ‘global incorporation’ to incorporate UNITA soldiers into the FAA before implementing a gradual reduction of FAA, which it was agreed in August 1995 would number 90,000 (SWO, 1996:25). The global incorporation mechanism as designed in Angola increased opportunities for parties to insist on issue hierarchy. The selection of the 26,300 UNITA elements for incorporation into the FAA remained conditional on UNITA’s prior compliance with the quartering and disarmament clauses of the agreement, including the requirement that it handover all lethal material to the UN. In other words, all 50-62,000 UNITA troops were to withdraw from the areas.
under UNITA control, hand in their weapons, and await demobilisation. Meanwhile, the
at least 110-120,000 strong FAA (SWO 25), while confined to barracks, remained
armed and the anti-riot police were fully mobilised. In fact, the anti-riot police would
only begin the process of confinement to barracks once UNITA was fully quartered and
demobilised. The process of disarming civilians, this mainly referring to the MPLA-
created armed civilian militias that had emerged in October 1992, was to begin during
the final stage of UNITA's quartering and demobilisation (Annex 3, Timetable, Phase 2).

Implementation design provided no clear opportunities for UNITA's pro faction to
make reasonable requests of its spoiler faction. The pro faction had little opportunity to
expose the spoiler faction's intransigence and to thereby limit the appeal of its spoiler
faction to its sceptical faction. Instead unilateral, irreversible moves were required and
demanded a sequence that was based on issue hierarchy. This provided clear pretexts on
which spoiler factions could win support for a strategy that was dominated by stalling
and characterised by a refusal to fully quarter, let alone to disarm troops. For example,
UNITA spoiler factions would have wasted no time in pointing out the danger of
quartering troops while the anti-riot police, who UNITA held responsible for the
massacre in Luanda in 1992, remained in strategic positions.

At the same time the MPLA's spoiler faction could use the terms of the agreement to
resist any adjustment to sequence that might have facilitated the efforts of UNITA's pro
faction to implement the agreement. As detailed below, relatively successful efforts
were made by UNAVEM II and the Joint Commission to remove the obstacles that the
unilateral demands presented to UNITA's efforts to quarter its troops. But the
government's spoiler faction could support its objection to new timing arrangements
with an insistence that parties stick to the timetable outlined in the agreement. On this
basis it could 'legitimately' refuse to move the anti-riot police to barracks before
UNITA was fully quartered.

Further issue hierarchy, an absence of sufficient breakdown in political provisions, and
the failure to sequence political, politico-economic and other issues in parallel
reinforced the obstacles created by this unilateral demand, and are described below.
POLITICAL ISSUES
The run-off between President Dos Santos and Savimbi was still pending since the disputed elections in September 1992. This election to the most powerful executive position in the country was to take place when all other provisions of the Accords, including the extension of central government authority to the country, were judged by the UN SG’s representative to have been implemented. The omission of a fixed date removed the focus from the winner-takes-all presidential elections and could have created space for the step-by-step implementation of other political provisions. But, as detailed below, other provisions created ample obstacles to implementation.

The provisions under the national reconciliation section of the agreement committed all parties to uphold the elections of 1992 as legitimate. UNITA was therefore to return its 70 elected MPs to the National Assembly. But this could only happen provided UNITA had implemented its military commitments sufficiently for the GOA to legalize the movement (Annex 1 and 2). Unless sufficient issue breakdown could be introduced, this made the implementation of political provisions conditional on the prior implementation of military provisions (SWO, 1996 39). This was the first threat of issue hierarchy.

In an effort to breakdown the implementation of issues concerning political power, administration was to be decentralized and local government office holders, previously directly appointed by the president (SWO 21), were to be elected. These elections would be supported by legislation to be passed under the existing constitutional provisions for decentralization (Annex 6 II 5). In addition to this, the agreement outlined a special, constitutional status for UNITA’s president as leader of the largest opposition party (Annex 6 II 6). Details of this position and of security arrangements for the UNITA elite, while agreed in principle, were to be subsequently negotiated between Dos Santos and Savimbi. Agreement on the latter was critical given Savimbi’s persistent refusal to go to Luanda on security grounds. Specific party facilities and offices reflecting its electoral strength were also to be given to UNITA (Annex 6, II 16).

Further issue breakdown is evidenced (Annex 6 Modalities 8, Specific Principles 10) in the government’s commitment to appoint UNITA members to positions in...
government and state administration, and to promote professionally-qualified UNITA people to carry out some functions in the public administration. But the concrete modalities of UNITA’s participation in the government, state administration and diplomatic missions abroad were to be specified in a letter to be written by the Angolan authorities to the leader of UNITA (Annex 6 III 1) This underlines the fact that not only was the power-sharing aspect of the agreement less than institutional, but that the degree of power offered to UNITA was the government’s prerogative to choose. Furthermore, rather than being presented as a bargain, the allocation of some degree of political power to UNITA was dependent on UNITA’s implementation of its military provisions.

In sum, the political agreements concerning the location of power were broken down in theory, in that the agreement provided for administrative decentralisation and local elections. But the commencement of this step-by-step implementation not only depended on the full implementation of military terms, but the extension of central administration (i.e., government control) to all of Angola was a prerequisite to its implementation. Even then it was not subject to any firm timetable. Consequently, UNITA, which actually governed the areas it controlled with its own political and policing structures, power hierarchies, and even with its own currency (JIR, 08 98), was to ‘surrender’ all of this land and control before it was included in a non-institutionalised power-sharing government (albeit with an institutional position for Savimbi), before positions were allocated to it in the police and the administration, and before local elections and other initiatives were undertaken to decentralise power.

POLITICO-ECONOMIC ISSUES

In the words of UNITA’s General Ben Ben, ‘diamonds were UNITA’s life and blood’ after the return to civil war in 1992. In fact, UNITA controlled up to 90 per cent of Angola’s diamond areas between 1992 and 1994, and while this declined during 1996 and 1997, UNITA still controlled about two thirds of Angola’s diamond output in late 1996 (Vines, 1999 132-3). Given UNITA’s heavy financial reliance on the diamond output, agreement over the access to diamonds had to be a central part of the Lusaka

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36 Provisions did not reflect electoral strength. UNITA was to nominate a provincial governor in only one of the four provinces where it emerged as the largest party in 1992, while it is to nominate the governors in two other provinces where MPLA was the largest party (SWO, 1996 40)
peace process. As diplomats argued, if the MPLA’s administration was to extend to the diamond areas, UNITA would require resources to finance a political party.

However, the protocol failed to comprehensively address the diamond issue (Vines, 1999 133) and provisions were either stated in vague terms, or were left 'completely un-addressed' (Knudsen, 2000 9). It appears that the UN and the pro factions expected that the diamond issue would be settled during the implementation process, especially given its close connection to the extension of central administration to Angola. But while there were intermittent, secret negotiations on the issue, it was not settled and it was, in effect, held over for settlement until other issues, such as full demobilisation, were implemented. By failing to sequence the settlement of this issue to the implementation of the central administration one, the Lusaka Protocol gave institutional back-up to those willing to stall on the negotiations concerning diamonds while still insisting that UNITA allow the extension of central administration.

FACTIONALISM AND STALLING CHARACTERISES IMPLEMENTATION

Samakuva37 was UNITA’s representative on the joint implementation commission and is perceived to have been part of UNITA’s pro faction throughout the implementation of Lusaka. He argued in 1994 that if implementation were to succeed ‘a space for UNITA’ was needed (JIR, 05 00). But the sequence and timing described above provided ample opportunity for UNITA’s spoiler faction to question whether or not political space would ever open up. Equally so, it gave the MPLA’s spoiler faction ample opportunity to close that political space. In fact, a process can be discerned whereby the strategies of the spoiler factions gradually gained ground in both conflict actors.

There were factions in the MPLA who were clearly unhappy with the terms of the Lusaka Protocol. In fact, significantly powerful sections of its military believed that if a Peace Agreement were to be implemented, UNITA would have to be comprehensively defeated (SWO, 1996 13). In 1996 Tvedten (1997 64) identified people in the MPLA who for personal and generally politico-economic motivations did not want peace or stability even given the MPLA’s dominant position in the political system.

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37 Senior Unita member, elected to parliament and chief representative on the post Lusaka implementation commission (CCPM)
UNITA was also very divided. While General 'Ben Ben' and de Matos (MPLA) made early progress on the implementation of military issues early (AP, 11 01 95), and the joint MPLA-UNITA commission made progress in preparations for demobilisation in early 1995, Savimbi signalled disunity and warned that his army was not ready to demobilise (FT, 24 01 95). According to Savimbi, in the immediate aftermath of the agreement disunity in the organisation meant that UNITA was suffering the 'biggest crisis since its foundation' (AP, 21 12 94). At a party conference in Bailundu in February 1995, Savimbi was reported to be fighting for control of the movement, which was 'split over the accords, with hard-line military brass pressing Savimbi to fight on, instead of accepting the power-sharing deal' (FT, 13 3 95). Savimbi is believed to have re-stamped his control over a divided movement at Bailundu (Vines, 1999 96 7). He used the event to dress down Samakuvu in front of the assembled delegates, to remove Manuvoakola, UNITA's Secretary General and signatory of the Protocol, from his post, and to win approval for a strategy that appeared to neither reject or endorse Lusaka (Hare, 1998 76-7).

But despite Hare's interpretation, the re-shuffle at Bailundu appears to have been against those most associated with Lusaka. This can be read in one of two ways. Firstly, it can be interpreted as a gesture towards the spoiler faction, designed to give Savimbi some breathing space to continue a policy of engagement with the process. On the strength of this engagement he would aim to alter sequence and timing procedures and to thereby secure a larger role in the political system for UNITA. This would allow further engagement, including the summit meeting with Dos Santos in May 1995.

Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a decisive move by the previously-sceptical Savimbi towards the adoption of the spoiler faction's agenda. This would have been in response to a leadership challenge from a UNITA spoiler faction which was strengthened in the context of the Lusaka Protocol's demands. Many accounts subsequently suggested the latter interpretation, citing the moves at Bailundu as evidence of Savimbi's increasingly intransient stance. One dissident UNITA commander's account of Bailundu supports the interpretation that the conference marked Savimbi's movement off the fence to the strategy of continued civil war (AP)

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38 General Arhndo Chenda Pena – Chief of Staff of Unita armed forces (FALA) and Joint Chief of staff (temporarily) of the FAA (before the Unita pullout)
39 General de Matos, MPLA Chief of Staff (FAA)
However, others suggest that he reserved his decision for later and remained firmly in the sceptical faction (see below). Regardless of interpretation, most analysts believe that Savimbi and his immediate associates re-asserted authority on the factional UNITA movement at Bailundu (Vines, 1999, Hare, 1998, Tvedten, 1996) and that, if not at Bailundu, by 1997 Savimbi had progressively moved away from the faction that can be identified as a pro faction. The degree to which this incremental triumph of the spoiler faction can be explained by the design of the implementation process is assessed below.

Savimbi officially endorsed the Lusaka Protocol in May 1995, three months after the Bailundu conference and he made an unprecedented pledge to demobilise his army (AP 8 5 95) in accordance with the terms of the agreement. In the absence of further significant moves by either party to implement their commitments, some momentum was maintained by the UN which guided the agreement on new modalities for the FAA and facilitated some understanding on political issues. An important summit meeting between Dos Santos and Savimbi took place in May 1995 and both leaders reiterated their commitment to the peace process. But despite this, for most of 1995 stalling dominated both UNITA and the MPLA’s implementation of troop disengagement, prisoner releases and the repatriation of mercenaries. Genuine logistical obstacles existed, especially when the 7,640 strong UN force was not yet in place (AP 26 9 95). This, along with the unilateral demands outlined above, created uncertainty and facilitated the stalling that plays directly into the hand of the spoiler factions.

Progress resumed and a start to the quartering process was announced by UNITA in November 1995 (AP 16 11 95). However, in the immediate aftermath of this announcement, officers of the FAA illustrated their ability to quickly move from ‘disengaged’ positions, when they took control of several locations in the oil-producing region of Soyo. Whether or not they were acting on orders from central command and/or with a view to provoking UNITA’s spoiler faction, the risks exposed by this troop movement provided the UNITA spoiler faction with a pretext (and with its sceptical faction’s support) on which to stall the quartering process. UNITA responded...
with a suspension of its quartering process, a move that effectively deadlocked the process once again.

The deployment of more UN troops improved the security situation in late 1995 and removed some pretexts for stalling. Talks that were monitored by the UN subsequently resulted in an agreement by both parties to re-design the implementation process with a view to overcoming deadlock. The MPLA agreed to introduce reciprocity to some aspects of the process, agreeing to quarter the anti-riot police in return for UNITA’s commitment to resume its quartering and demobilisation process (AP, 23 01 96). Following this, the MPLA released some UNITA prisoners, declared an end to a contract with a South African mercenary company, announced that it would station the anti-riot police in barracks and withdrew forces from the areas where UNITA was supposed to be quartered. At this point, the government appeared to be ‘meticulously fulfilling’ its commitments and this removed some of the pretexts on which UNITA’s spoiler faction could justify continued stalling. Savimbi’s immediate response to the MPLA’s moves was to suggest that the mercenaries had simply changed their corporate name (instead of leaving Angola), and to question whether or not the anti-riot police had really been withdrawn to barracks. He also argued that the absence of an amnesty law prevented UNITA from further fulfilment of its implementation promises. The last pretext for inaction was promptly addressed when the government passed an amnesty law, and Savimbi’s other ‘pretexts’ were generally considered by the UN to have run out (Hare, 1998 98-9). Coupled with this heightened international pressure, this reciprocity eventually resulted in some commitment by UNITA to the process. It quartered and demobilised 7,000 troops, and pledged to the US to demobilise 16,500 troops by 16 February 1996. The government simultaneously confined 2,000 anti-riot police to barracks (AFPI, 7 2 96). But, despite some reciprocal progress, the pretexts still existed on which the UNITA spoiler faction could persuade its sceptical factions to continue to stall.

40 UN, Blue Helmets 261
41 The full force was not deployed until late 1996 (Vines, 1999 2) March 1996 336 military observers, 6,376 troops and support personnel and 226 civilian police officers (Blue Helmets 365)
42 AP 25 1 96
4 International Herald Tribune, 15-01-96
In fact, the ability of UNITA’s spoiler faction to present its military obligations under the agreement as unilateral moves remained evident, in spite of the adjustments to sequence and timing. The Secretary General himself reiterated the unilateral demands after the timetable adjustment he publicly pointed to a disturbing lack of progress in UNITA cantonment, called for the implementation of all military issues first and prioritised the disarmament of UNITA as the most important part of the peace process (AFPI, 2 2 96). The message in the international media reinforced the issue hierarchy, and argued that Savimbi must

‘quarter all his forces, not just some of them. This unlocks the door to government recognition of his political party, to his participation in a temporary unity government and to discussion on amnesty for his men’ (International Herald Tribune 17 2 96)

It was during this short period of movement that Savimbi began to seek the breakdown of ‘political and national reconciliation issues’ and their parallel implementation with military issues. Interpreting the legal expiration of the 1992 legislature’s term as an opportunity to alter the provisions of Lusaka, Savimbi declared himself to be against the government’s proposal to extend to the parliament’s mandate. Instead, he recommended that a ‘transitional government’ prepare conditions for reliable and transparent elections which would seal off the peace agreement (AFPI, 18 02 96). He proposed too that sequencing be altered to make UNITA’s implementation of its military provisions dependent on the government’s implementation of these new provisions concerning national reconciliation

“UNITA makes military compromise through the disarmament and quartering of troops and the government makes political compromise by integrating UNITA civil servants into the administration and the government” (Savimbi, AFPI, 18 02 96)

Perhaps in response to this proposal, the parties agreed to alter sequencing in a way that arguably softened the issue hierarchy demand in March 1996. The changes were agreed at a summit meeting between Dos Santos and Savimbi in Gabon which was organised by the United Nations. The quartering and disarming of UNITA troops and the selection of its troops for incorporation into the FAA would take place simultaneously, and not consecutively, before June 1996. The incorporation process would immediately follow and would take place between June 1 and July 31 (SWO, 1996 15). It was agreed, on
UNITA's request (Hare, 1998:123), that the establishment of a GNU would take place immediately after the June deadline had been met. It would also coincide with the final step in the formation of the FAA, and would happen before the extension of central administration. This constituted a significant change to the procedures for sequencing and timing, given that the extension of central authority to Angola had originally been sequenced to take place immediately after the quartering process was complete and before the implementation of political provisions began.

These changes suggest that the pro factions may have been gaining the initiative. But while subsequent events indicate some evidence of the pro factions' influence, the adjustments to sequencing and timing did not facilitate pro factions in their quest to fully control the strategy of their respective formations. This is explained below as the result of obstacles created by the issue hierarchy that was still upheld in the provisions governing the extension of central administration, the politico-economic issues, and to a lesser extent in the military and policing clauses. These barriers limited the success of efforts to introduce parallel sequencing and issue breakdown to all issues: military, policing and political—and are discussed below.

In May 1996, UNITA had reportedly encamped and demobilised 54,040 soldiers (AP, 17/7/96), this going some way towards meeting the newly-agreed timetable for demobilisation. It stalled on full demobilisation by declaring its intention to maintain some forces as a presidential guard, and giving no indication as to when it would hand over lethal military material. Perhaps more significantly, it stalled on the concurrent process of selecting its troops for the FAA, and this delayed progress towards the subsequent deadline for the full transformation of the FAA. While it would subsequently emerge that a significant number of demobilised UNITA soldiers had been bogus (AP, 11/10/96), at this point the concern was with its failure to select troops for the FAA and reports. By August 1996, it appeared that only 3,500 UNITA troops had been incorporated into the FAA (AFPI, 30/8/96). This concern was all the more pressing given that in the absence of a parallel, comprehensive, socio-economic programme for demobilisation, some 10,000 'encamped' UNITA troops had deserted UN demobilisation camps in July/August (AFPI, 30/8/96). Less emphasis appears to have

44 Meaning that not all were UNITA soldiers but forced recruits, often farmers.
been placed on the government’s failure to implement its commitments, a factor that reinforced the perception of unilateral demand. However, a number of international commentators noted in late 1996, that the government had failed to simultaneously confine the anti-not police to barracks and to complete the FAA’s confinement to barracks (AFPI, 14 10 96).

As in the first implementation process, desertions by UNITA’s soldiers were frequently under the orders of former UNITA commanders. This again highlights the obstacles to implementation created by the failure to demobilise and reintegrate combatants in close sequence and in small groups. The logistical problems associated with keeping soldiers occupied in quartering camps while the implementation process was stalling left them open to exploitation by the spoiler faction. New arrangements did not alter the fact that full quartering and demilitarisation remained a precondition for the implementation of the internationally-supported programme to demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants into society. Notwithstanding the financial requirements and logistical difficulties with implementing an effective reintegration programme (SWO, 1996 27-8), a well-funded and well-timed programme may have lessoned the coercive hold that many UNITA army officers had over soldiers, even after demobilisation.

While demobilisation stopped and started, Savimbi publicly rejected the government’s offer of a newly-created position of joint vice president. Modelled on the South African position, Savimbi refused to accept it on the grounds that the UNITA party had voted against it. It has been suggested that Savimbi and his closest allies had considered the allocation of this position to another UNITA member. This would have left Savimbi free to negotiate a transitional government, in which UNITA would have a bigger share of power (AFPI, 30 8 96). This proposal was quickly ruled out by the MPLA. In fact, it is quite likely that Savimbi wanted to avoid associating himself institutionally with the Protocol at this point in the implementation process. Such an association may have placed him at the mercy of the spoiler faction, over which he appeared to have maintained control up to this point. Savimbi’s obsession with not leaving UNITA headquarters (despite pledges of huge security protection from the government), while perhaps indicative of his lack of trust of the MPLA, also suggests that he perceived as

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45 The offer had been the product of direct Savimbi-Dos Santos negotiations in 1995 and 1996.
more dangerous the rogue UNITA factions that sought a return to war than the UNITA members which he would agree to send to Luanda in 1997

After he rejected the Vice Presidency, Savimbi persisted with his quest to negotiate institutionalised power sharing for Angola. He proposed the creation of a special post for himself as leader of the opposition, and the revamping of the National parliament into a multi-party constitutional assembly (AP, 11 10 06). In late 1996, Savimbi appeared to seek Nelson Mandela's endorsement of a more powerful role for UNITA in the structures of Angola's government. But the government was quick to refuse a role for South Africa (AFPI, 9 01 97), and important and increasingly vocal MPLA actors argued that there was no basis in the political system for post-Lusaka concessions to UNITA (Tvedten, 1997 63). Some of these actors were likely to have been motivated by their distrust of UNITA. But the MPLA faction who awaited an opportunity to return to war with UNITA would also have voiced these objections. It would have cited the protocol to present reasonable and legitimate justifications to reject UNITA's requests, which, if granted, may have undermined UNITA spoiler faction's opportunity to use tricks, and facilitated a pro-faction strategy.

Many point to Savimbi's delaying strategy in 1996 as evidence that he personally had no intention whatsoever of implementing any major Lusaka commitment, or no intention of making peace without becoming President of Angola. However, there is evidence to suggest that the implementation of the power sharing on offer in Lusaka would have been unlikely to enable Savimbi and his inner elite circle to retain control over a strong and unified UNITA. The power-sharing on offer was, according to Messiant, 'hugely insufficient to come near to breaking the MPLA's hold over the Angolan political-economy' (2001 289-91). And in late 1996, media sources suggested that UNITA believed that strict adherence to Lusaka would 'destroy its military might and bring a slow, political death' (AP, 11 10 96). Most of UNITA's deserters suggest that UNITA began to re-arm in earnest in mid 1996, and not in 1995 (JIR, 08 98, APM 02 99). This supports the contention that, until some time in 1996, the faction influencing UNITA's leadership perceived minimum implementation, alongside efforts to alter sequence, timing and the interpretation of some terms, as compatible with retaining the leadership and maintaining the strength and unity of the organisation.
1996 Tvedten (1997 63) identified a UNITA faction ‘that wants increased political transparency and faster implementation of the 1994 Accords’

UNITA’s factions appeared to be at odds with each other over the wisdom of accepting the power-sharing outlined in the Protocol and subsequently agreed with the government. The moderate or ‘pro faction’ Samakuva announced in January 1997 that UNITA ‘still has some problems to resolve’ (AFPI, 9 01 97). Reflecting these problems, the establishment of the GNU was postponed four times in 1997 and UNITA, according to a government minister, did not appear willing to implement until Savimbi’s special status was agreed (AP, 31 1 97). Indeed, the agreement of (and the parliament’s ratification of) Savimbi’s special status, along with enormous international pressure, including the threat of immediate sanctions on UNITA, finally resulted in the establishment of the GNU in April 1997 (AP, 9 04 97). Following this, UNITA’s 70 MPs gradually took up their seats in parliament.

But the spoiler faction within UNITA could still convincingly argue that the unacceptable issue hierarchy associated with its unilateral demobilisation, inadequate power sharing which was implemented in a manner which ignored the demand for issue breakdown (decentralisation), and the holdover of agreement on politico-economic issues, justified its continued stalling on military and policing issues. This helps to explain why, despite the establishment of GNU, UNITA continued to drag its feet on military provisions (Le Monde Diplomatique, 07 1999), and failed to select its allocated number of personnel for incorporation into the FAA or the police force (Hare, 1998 122-3). This was despite the fact that the government had announced the completion of the quartering and demobilisation process in December 1996 (AP, 17 12 96). On the other hand, the MLPA’s spoiler faction could protest at the establishment of the GNU before the letter of the agreement had been upheld. On this basis, it could justifiably create obstacles to the fulfilment of its military commitments, and to the introduction of any further mechanisms for issue breakdown to the political and politico-economic issues. Meanwhile, UNITA combatants awaiting demobilisation continued to desert camps (FT, 12 04 97), and in May 1997 the war in neighbouring Zaire introduced further instability into an already unstable process.
The imminent fall of President Mobutu, a long-time ally of UNITA, threatened UNITA’s political economy and its hold over the diamond areas in Angola. In this context, the MPLA, which it later appeared had directly supported Kabila’s military effort to overthrow Mobutu (APM, 05.97), launched attacks in the increasingly insecure UNITA diamond areas along the Northern border with Zaire in May and June 1996. These attacks, which closely followed the establishment of the GNU, exacerbated the insecurity that UNITA associated with Mobutu’s fall, and resulted in UNITA’s threat to pull out of the Lusaka process (APM, 05.97):

“We still want to go forward, but obviously if this offensive continues we will call a halt to it. If the army insists on taking these areas militarily, then there will be no more peace process for UNITA”.

(Samakuva, APM, 05.97).

The process had been characterised by sporadic breaches of the ceasefire, but this episode was the most blatant breach yet. Most report it as a FAA offensive which the government justified as an effort to protect the border area from Zairean refugees (AP, 24.06.97). But the timing of the attacks indicated that at least some faction of the MPLA saw it as an opportunity not only to win important diamond areas from UNITA against the terms of the Protocol, but to provide pretexts for UNITA’s spoiler faction to further establish itself as the driving force behind UNITA’s policy. If this was the strategy of the majority of those behind the MPLA’s breaches, it arguably had the desired effect.

Kasanja, a deserter from the higher ranks of UNITA, claims that it was UNITA’s decision to counter attack these advances on diamond areas that precipitated his decision to desert (AFPI, 24.06.97). This counter-attack threatened to derail the last part of the implementation process - the extension of central authority. While he testified that prior to the incident UNITA had been undergoing a process of re-organisation and strengthening in the north and centre of Angola, his testimony

46 Clearly deserters have their own agendas, and seek to clear their names to avoid arrest, and some perhaps seek to keep both formations onside, in the case of a change in fortunes. But if Kasanja was motivated to lie by a fear that the MPLA would not accept that he had deserted, he would surely have given a far more damning account of UNITA, its goals, and the coercion that had prevented him from earlier desertion. This would have been quite credible, for example, when Manuvoaokola escaped to Lusaka in 1997, he had reportedly been held by UNITA under duress for a number of months (Vines, 1999: 19). If, on the other hand, Kasanja was motivated to protect UNITA, he was unlikely to reveal that the decision to attack in 1997 had been taken on central orders.
supports the IFF model’s interpretation of the implementation process: whether or not Savimbi had settled on a return to civil war before May 1997, he had not done so openly and was likely still in the process of playing factions off against each other, and still ‘justifying’ actions as legitimate in the context of agreed implementation procedure.

The incident also serves to highlight the obstacles that were presented by the unresolved nature of the diamonds issue, which designers had failed to sequence with other issues and in particular with the linked and pending task of extending central administration to all of Angola. As long as the rules and procedures of implementation demanded that the extension of central administration take place in the absence of real decentralisation, of the establishment of local government structures, and the settlement of the diamond issue, the unilateral demands that created issue hierarchy remained central to implementation design.47

The diamond issue is first considered. Efforts had been made to design mechanisms to implement a compromise on the diamond issue. The ministry of mines was offered to UNITA in 1996, but the ministry was regarded to have little power if UNITA had to relinquish vital territory (SWO, 1996: 38). A memorandum of understanding reached in November 1996 envisaged granting UNITA the right to control or to participate in the exploitation of specified diamond areas through a legal holding company (Hare, 1998: 125). It confirmed vague commitments made in Lusaka, but did not result in a comprehensive agreement. It appears that the government planned to divide the diamond regions into concessions, which would be offered to mining companies who would pay tax and market diamonds through the state-owned diamond company, Endiama. Sources suggest that UNITA-controlled companies would have been part of the arrangement (SWO: 38-9). The attacks by the MPLA on UNITA’s diamond areas in May 1997 reportedly stalled the talks, this outcome highlighting another possible motivation for the attacks (Vines, 1999: 134). In October 1997, it was reported that a

47 The Protocol stipulated that it take place alongside the distribution of 150 state administrative positions and the incorporation of UNITA workers into administrative structures. But as the chapter argues these provisions for decentralisation and the allocation of political power were insufficient and did not reflect the broad commitment to decentralisation agreed in the Protocol.
delicate negotiation process was working towards a settlement, whereby the handover of many UNITA-controlled areas would coincide with the legitimisation of its control over some diamond areas (APM, October 1997) The IFF model predicts that an agreement that promised a parallel, sequenced implementation of the diamond issue and the extension of central administration would have reduced the obstacles to implementation A package deal certainly appears to have been the aim of the negotiating parties until, and even in the aftermath of, June 1996. But a number of the other process-related obstacles continued to present obstacles to the reaching of a package deal. Political issues remained uninforming by issue breakdown and parallel sequencing of different aspects of military and police issue implementation remained elusive.

1997 AND 1998 OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION PERSIST
By 1997, the implementation process had resulted in the incorporation of a significant number of politically-minded UNITA officials and members of the assembly into the government and the structures of the Angolan state (GNU), the incorporation of approximately 8,000 out of 18,500 selected (and 26,000 agreed) UNITA combatants into the army (APM, April 91), and an even smaller proportion of allocated numbers into the police (Hare 100-01) A rapid demobilisation and reintegration programme was launched after the GNU was formed in April 1997, this far too late to introduce real issue breakdown to the implementation of military provisions and parallel sequencing of military and politico-economic issues. It was implemented over two years after quartering had begun. It had little success in the task of demobilising at least 100,000 FAA and UNITA forces (APM, Vol 3 7), many of whom had left the demobilisation camps. Thus, at least partly as a result of these shortfalls in design, UNITA was widely believed to have an army of at least 30,000 (Le Monde Diplomatique 07 99) in 1997. A vital agreement was pending over the sharing of the diamond resources on which UNITA had become increasingly reliant, while a nominally joint FAA (which was in reality controlled by the government) was to lead the process of extending central administration to all of Angola. To make matters even worse, at this time when armed UN personnel were arguably most needed, UNAVEM III was in the process of demobilising and the smaller MONUA observer mission was taking over...
The IFF model’s hypotheses help explain why the process of extending central power, which was led by the FAA whose formation process was declared to be complete, could do little more than stop and start throughout late 1997 and 1998. While in October 1997 a deal on diamonds appeared close, and in early 1998 Savimbi handed over much of the diamond areas as part of the process of expanding central administration (Vines, 1999 134), UNITA had alternatives at this point. The incomplete process of demobilisation and the resources already drawn from diamond mining meant that UNITA’s army was well rebuilt. A series of deadlines for UNITA’s full demobilisation were made and missed and UNITA’s stalling was twice met with the imposition of UN sanctions in October 1997 and in August 1998 (diamond trade). In October 1997, Samakuva, a moderate UNITA representative, warned that the sanctions were “nothing but a new obstacle in the peace process” (AP, 30 10 97), and indicated that they only fuelled the agendas of those who wished to renew the civil war. As if marking the words of Samakuva, in 1998 the intra-formation factionalism evident in UNITA’s persistent stalling broke under the contradictory pressures of the implementation process. This break up was closely followed by renewed civil war.

THE UNITA SPLIT
While still united, UNITA had protested vehemently against the fresh sanctions introduced by the UN in July 1998 and it withdrew from the Joint implementation Commission in protest. On its united return to the commission at the end of August, it faced an ultimatum by the government that it implement all outstanding provisions concerning the extension of state authority to all regions before August 31 1998, or face suspension from the GNU on the grounds of non-compliance with the agreement (Vines,1999 26). This, in effect, demanded that UNITA transfer its administrative headquarters to its Luanda base, which had opened in June 1998, and hand over all sensitive zones to the government, including the headquarters of Savimbi and the military core of UNITA. It was in this context of this threat that the UNITA split occurred.

Denouncing the rest of UNITA, the Renovation Committee of UNITA was established by sections of UNITA’s ‘pro faction’ who were very associated with the negotiation and

\[48\] The towns of Andulo, Bailondo, Mungo and Nharea JIR, August 1998 37
implementation of Lusaka Valentim and Manuvoakola were its most significant leaders. Its establishment appears to have been sponsored by the MPLA government (Vines, 1999: 26-7) in a move that seems to have been designed to provoke a return to civil war with UNITA, or with its more militant factions. Immediately after the establishment of UNITA Renovada (R), the MPLA government announced that it would only negotiate with it, and other factions, which included members of the National Assembly, were subjected to attacks and harassment by the government security forces, who referred to them as ‘criminals’ (Vines: 26-7). This forced a second split in UNITA led by Chivukuvuku.

Chivukuvuku was a high-ranking member of UNITA’s inner circle who was very associated with the negotiation of the Bicesse Accord. With the support of the majority of UNITA’s National Assembly deputies, he declared that his faction had severed all contact with Savimbi in September 1998, while it did not intend to join UNITA R (Vines, 1999: 27). Despite the bribes and threats from the government’s security forces, this larger bulk of UNITA was not prepared to follow Unita R, which it perceived to be a government-instigated party (APM Vol 5: 2).

The split between Chivukuvuku’s faction and Savimbi’s faction was formalised on October 27, 1998, when the National Assembly, with its MPLA majority, abrogated a law that granted a special status to Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition party. This decision was attributed to Savimbi’s failure to fulfil his party’s obligations under Lusaka (Vines, 1999: 27). In December 1998, Dos Santos made the ‘total isolation of Savimbi’ the official policy of the MPLA government and he called for the termination of MONUA’s mission. This hardened stance notably enabled him to strengthen his position at the centre of the MPLA conflict formation, this indicative of the powerful position that spoiler factions occupied in the conflict formation. Just prior to the opening of the MPLA congress at which this strategy was announced, government forces launched a military attack on the well-prepared UNITA troops in central Angola. The parties had finally returned to full-scale civil war, and, on January 27, 1999, the National Assembly declared Savimbi a war criminal and an international terrorist. In

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49 He simultaneously implemented a cabinet reshuffle. The changes reflect a strengthening of the position of Dos Santos and the new Secretary General – Lourenco – who is tipped to be his successor. Angolan Peace Monitor Vol 5 4 1998.
July the Angolan authorities issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of rebellion sabotage, murder and torture, of kidnapping, robbery, the use of explosives and the planting of landmines (Vines, 1999 29)

The renewal of civil war rewarded both spoiler factions, whose journeys to dominance in both organisations were facilitated by the design of the implementation process. As one analyst subsequently noted, the government could not risk any move that would bring the civil war to a definitive end as this would have entailed resolving the deep social crisis that existed in Angola. This risked undermining the entire social logic of the MPLA regime and the power hierarchies on which it rested (and rests) (Messiant, 2001 302-3). Analysts point to the Chivukuvuku-led faction of UNITA, which was publicly launched in November 1998, as a thorn in the government’s side (Messiant, 2001 303, APM, Vol 5 3). By presenting themselves as a ‘clean hands’ opposition (APM, Vol 5 3), perhaps more appealing to the masses, it serves as an example of an alternative to the persistent civil war. It is a faction of UNITA that is willing to be critical of yet willing to negotiate with the MPLA. The civil war ensures that the MPLA retains its coercive hold on Angolan society, and the current MPLA leadership its hold of the MPLA. But with its rejection of the Savimbi-led faction of UNITA, the Chivukuvuku-led group has perhaps reduced the strength of MPLA spoiler factions, who continue to seek total defeat of UNITA on the battlefield. For example, in September 1998 it forced the government to swiftly lift its unilateral suspension from the GNU. The president did so but at the same time highlighted the weakness of the Lusaka Protocol’s power-sharing provisions by dismissing one UNITA minister and one vice minister. Fifty-three UNITA deputies signed a declaration that sought clarification of the dismissals.

Heavy civil war ensued from December 1998 until Savimbi’s death at the hands of government forces in February 2002. This incident has offered Angola an exit from the circle of power relations that has sustained civil war and its first real chance for peace since 1991. With UNITA severely weakened by over three years of fighting, and its soldiers emerging weak and starving, the current de-escalation process is more definable as one that follows a military victory than as a post-settlement implementation process. But arguably some of the lessons from 1992 and 1994 apply without a broken-down and phased implementation process where reintegration programmes accompany
quartering and demobilisation, and de-centralised socio-economic programmes in the territories that were formally held by UNITA accompany demobilisation, and an eventual opening up of the political economy to allow for political and economic competition, Angola will remain a society 'at peace but at war,' and UNITA factions will re-group and return to insurgency and warlordism

CONCLUSION

The IFF model's hypotheses on implementation design predict that where issue hierarchy is entrenched in the rules and procedures for implementation, the obstacles to the implementation of peace settlements are insurmountable. Where issue hierarchy is entrenched, the prospects of introducing real issue breakdown and parallel sequencing are minimal, even given the presence of insulated institutions for implementation. The Lusaka Protocol, like the Bicesse Accord before it and despite some progress in implementation, was arguably doomed to failure from the start by its implementation design.

The strength of the UNITA pro faction and its ability to ensure the unity of the conflict formation largely depended on its convincing the highly sceptical Savimbi that his personal interests—power and continued unity of his formation—would be served by implementing the Lusaka Protocol. But the process through which the terms of Lusaka were to be implemented, in particular the barriers to the true introduction of issue breakdown to all aspects of the agreement and to the replacement of unilateral demands and issue hierarchy with reciprocity and parallel sequencing of implementation issues, severely undermined the capacity of UNITA's pro faction to pursue the strategy necessary to deliver implementation. The procedures for the implementation of power sharing actually placed the degree of political power available for MPLA pro factions to offer to UNITA at the discretion of the MPLA formation, thereby limiting the amount of issue breakdown that could be introduced to facilitate implementation. Reinforcing these obstacles was the failure to sequence the implementation of political decentralisation with power sharing and the military issues. This made the implementation of military issues by UNITA extremely unlikely. The absence of institutionalised power sharing, itself rooted in the accepted legitimacy of the zero-sum elections of the Bicesse Accords, along with the issue hierarchy that required the full implementation of military before political provisions, contributed to the obstacles to
the implementation of the military provisions of the Accords. That the monumental task of extending central government control was eventually undertaken in the absence of both agreement over the highly controversial diamond issue and the decentralisation of political power made it impossible for a pro faction UNITA to convince its sceptical faction of the benefits of Lusaka, or that a realistic opportunity for Savimbi to win a further presidential election existed.

Despite the efforts of the UN to use the insulated implementation mechanisms to alter the rules of sequence and timing during Lusaka, unilateral demands, issue hierarchy and the resistance of some issues to issue breakdown gave legitimacy to the MPLA's spoiler faction. It refused to accept adjustments that would have helped UNITA's pro faction. Therefore, the MPLA's pro faction was consistently under pressure from its spoiler faction, who cited legitimate rules and procedures of process inherent in the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements to support a position that conceded very little to UNITA's pro faction. The MPLA's spoiler faction played on the fears and insecurities of its sceptical faction that a real role for UNITA would involve a reduction in the government's power and in the patronage and resources available to it. It would therefore present a threat to its own position in this hierarchical system. Furthermore, after the 1992-4 period, the general command of the armed forces had collectively become a relatively autonomous power player in the government conflict formation (Messiant 2001 303). Continued conflict with UNITA allowed its influence, or the influence of powerful elements within it, over government policy and the political economy to continue.

In 1999, Kofi Annan criticised the MPLA government for 'a lack of mutual tolerance and an unwillingness to engage in mutual accommodation' (Le Monde Diplomatique 07 99). But Bicesse and Lusaka had given legitimacy to and opportunity for the MPLA's spoiler faction to use the process to justify this unwillingness, and to secure the retention of politico-economic resources for the MPLA, returning the country to civil war if necessary in the process of doing so. It is difficult to envisage any political settlement that could have maintained a pro-implementation equilibrium which did not include a commitment to implement a step-by-step de-centralisation of the political system alongside institutionalised power sharing at least at the local level, parallel steps to reform the police system, to reciprocal demobilisation of armed formations in small stages, to simultaneous reintegration of former combatants, and to the formation of a
neutral joint army. The extension of state authority, which is arguably the final step of both political and security issues, required simultaneous agreement on the critical issue of access to diamonds.

Central to the political system that Bicesse and Lusaka upheld was the possibility for only one organisation to hold power. There was not enough power to spread around significant sections of both conflict formations to ensure peace unless implementation design had provided for small and parallel steps, which could serve to break down the power structures at the heart of the system. The 'profound lack of institutional capacity' (Knudsen et al., 2000:11) resulting from over twenty years of civil war added structural barriers to the prospects of developing a step-by-step, phased implementation process.

Furthermore, the relegation to the sub-text of a commitment to human rights standards, which included no implementation mechanisms (Vines, 1999:2), arguably strengthened the hands of those who perceived the persistence of coercive power hierarchies and systems of control to be in their political interest. Further structural obstacles are found in the coercive networks that dominate the political economy in Angola. It is argued however, that given the availability of implementation-supporting resources and the right sequence and timing, these obstacles are surmountable and the equilibrium that existed at endorsement maintainable.

Those who perceive the MPLA and UNITA to be unified formations, and attribute failure to their intransigence, might argue that neither party would have endorsed an agreement that included the conditions hypothesised by the IFF to guarantee success. Indeed, even those who do recognise that factions might exist within the organisations argue that spoiler factions would have blocked such an agreement and that the need to include the features that guarantee a successful implementation process would thus have precluded a settlement. But these arguments fail to take into account the reality that 1990-91 provided the best window of opportunity for the negotiation of a successful peace agreement in Angola. Pro factions had more room to manoeuvre in both formations in this pre-agreement stage, this in part due to the pressure on parties to reach a settlement from the international community and from former sponsors of the civil war and in part due to the structural difference between inter-party bargaining in the pre and post-settlement phase. Indeed, that Dos Santos emphatically ruled out a
multi-party system in 1989 twelve months before he unilaterally changed the constitution to provide for one (Wesley, 1997 102) helps to illustrate the power that international pressure can play in creating space for a settlement

The Angolan case reveals that negotiations that prioritise the reaching of an agreement over the reaching of an agreement that includes provisions to facilitate its implementation, not only put at risk the prospect of a successful outcome to implementation, but risk creating structural conditions beyond the relevant Accord and its implementation, which can close the window of opportunity for settlement, obstruct further negotiations and result in a long-term reversion to civil war. Recognising the potential for the design outlined in settlements to present hostile obstacles in the implementation period, Margaret Anstee (1996 535-6) implicitly warns against the temptation to prioritise agreement when she says

"In any negotiations, the desire and need for compromise plays a large role, not seldom inimical to effective implementation later."

CHAPTER SIX
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT

This chapter will use the IFF model's hypotheses to explain why stalling has overwhelmingly characterised the process of implementing the Good Friday Agreement and has on a number of occasions placed in danger the institutions central to the management of the conflict. Sequence and timing of implementation was not clearly outlined in the agreement. This has provided opportunities for the spoiler factions within both unionism and nationalism to repeatedly use the agreement to make unilateral demands. These unilateral demands create the issue hierarchy that has fuelled continual stalling. However, institutions that are relatively insulated were given the power to oversee the implementation process, this partly a consequence of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland and the important role played by the British and Irish governments in the pre-agreement negotiation process. This facilitated the gradual introduction of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing to the procedures determining the sequencing and timing of implementation. This eventually helped to undermine the issue hierarchy demand at the heart of the spoiler factions' strategies and enabled pro factions to move forward on implementation in late 2001 and early 2002. The efforts to introduce parallel sequencing and issue breakdown were helped by the absence of clear, unequivocal, issue hierarchy in the actual terms of the agreement. The chapter concludes that unless issue breakdown and parallel sequencing continue to inform sequence and timing, the relatively successful outcome to implementation is in real danger of reversal.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
At its most basic level, the Northern Irish conflict is about the unionist preference to maintain the union of Northern Ireland with Britain, and the nationalist preference for an end to partition and for a united Ireland. But these majority unionist and minority nationalist communities lived together in relative peace for almost fifty years (1920-1968), despite the disputed partition of the island and the Irish government’s constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. In fact, Irish Republican Army (IRA) activists point out that there was little support during the 1940s and 1950s from the nationalist, primarily Catholic community, for their ongoing efforts to use armed struggle to unite the island (Taylor, 1998 21-2). The roots of escalation instead lie in the extent to which
the entity and its institutions, the parliament, electoral system, administration, local
government, security forces, legal system and the economy in general were subject to
the hegemonic control of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which formed the
government for almost fifty years.1 While there is some disagreement amongst analysts
as to the extent of discrimination resulting from this concentration of power, few deny
that it existed and many perceive a persistent, 'irrefutable pattern of deliberate
discrimination' (Darby and McGinty, 2000: 78). Thus Catholic or nationalist grievances
tended to concern discrimination in public housing, gerrymandering of electoral
districts, a heavy-handed security force (the B Specials), and a Special Powers Act,
while protestant or unionists' concerns focused on a growing and increasingly organised
minority population, and the threat that this posed to their power (White, 1990: 195).

Two external events exposed the system as untenable (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993:
155-9). The first, the improving relationship between the Irish and British governments
appeared to reduce the immediate threat to the union from the Republic of Ireland. This
weakened the Unionist party's justification for such a high concentration of unionist
power. The second, the introduction of the welfare state to Northern Ireland created a
new and educated, nationalist middle class, from which emerged the civil rights
movement of the 1960s.2 While aspiring to a united Ireland, the civil rights movement
rejected the hither to accepted nationalist policy of abstaining from political institutions.
Instead it advocated active engagement with the system in order to achieve the reforms
vital for the reduction of discrimination. Under pressure from the civil rights movement
to reform, the conservative UUP split into those who perceived reforms as necessary if
the union and the political system were to survive, and those who resisted them at all
costs, claiming that the civil rights movement was a cover for the IRA and its
republican (united Ireland) agenda. While some sections of unionism and loyalism
feared reforms, others used this fear to mobilise support. The political forces resistant to
reform later converged around the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and militant forces
immediately converged around the re-strengthened and re-emerging loyalist
paramilitary groups.

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1 For detailed accounts see O'Leary and McGarry, 1993: 110-141; White, 1990: 164-69.
2 From which the SDLP (Social Democratic Labour Party) emerged in 1970.
Loyalist paramilitaries, in collusion with the B-Specials and elements of the regular security forces (RUC), reacted violently to the civil rights marches. This response confirmed for many nationalists the discrimination that they had long contended lay at the heart of the system. For other nationalists, it justified the vigilante groups that emerged in response to the violence. Amidst the widespread inter-community violence that followed, and the clear evidence of security force collusion with heavy handed targeting of Catholic communities, the republican movement (Sinn Fein and the IRA) saw an opportunity for the reinvigoration of the IRA (Taylor, 1998 39). The movement infiltrated and took control of the vigilante groups.

The escalating inter-community violence of the late 1960s and the inability of those in the UUP who wanted to introduce reforms and to control the security forces to do so gave way to a wave of violence across Northern Ireland in the summer of 1969, which prompted the Northern Irish Prime Minister to request the dispatching of British troops (O'Leary and McGarry 173). By the time reforms were forced on the UUP by the British government in the early 1970s, what may have satisfied many nationalists in 1965-8 was no longer enough. Coupled with the introduction of coercive security measures by a struggling, deeply divided UUP government, the attempt to reform played into the hands of the more radical elements in both communities. Violence involving nationalist paramilitaries (primarily IRA), loyalist paramilitaries (UVF, UDA), the Northern Irish security forces and the British army spiralled from 1969 and the Westminster government responded by closing down the Northern Ireland parliament and introducing direct rule in 1972. This afforded Northern Ireland a degree of stability rarely available to entities on the verge of civil war, but it did not ameliorate the security situation, instead freezing it and prompting a vicious, low-level civil conflict that has ensued for almost three decades.

The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was the direct product of multi-party negotiations, which took place in 1997-1998, but were built on many years of bi-party and tri-party talks, paramilitary ceasefires (1994) and British-Irish negotiations. The late 1980s saw

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3 Sinn Fein is the political wing of the republican movement and during the 1980s it is judged to have incrementally become more influential in the overall republican movement.
the incremental emergence of a British-Irish axis,\textsuperscript{4} through which the Downing Street Declaration (1993) and the Framework Document (1995) which together provided the vision on which the GFA would be negotiated were agreed. The later negotiations were unprecedented in that they brought together for the first time the elite and sub-elite of all Northern Irish political parties,\textsuperscript{5} including those linked to paramilitary groups (Sinn Fein, PUP, UDP). The Agreement was signed in April 1998.

**THE AGREEMENT**

The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) set out to re-define three sets of relations central to the thirty-year conflict: relations between the Northern Irish parties (GFA, Strand 1), North-South relations (GFA, Strand 2) and East-West or British-Irish relations (GFA, Strand 3). Fundamental to the Agreement is a compromise on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland which is guided by the 'principle of consent'. This confirmed Northern Ireland's position in the UK unless the majority of its population decide otherwise in a constitutionally-provided-for referendum and it guarantees this change if so voted for. Alongside this, the agreement provided constitutional guarantees for dual nationality, for agreed, power-sharing institutions\textsuperscript{6} in Northern Ireland now and in the future, and for over-arching and interdependent British-Irish and North-South institutions (GFA, 21). Critical to the viability of the GFA was agreement on other issues that were central to the conflict. These issues concerned the management of civil rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity, the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons and effective demobilisation of paramilitary organisations, security and demilitarisation, policing and justice, and prisoner issues, which are together frequently referred to as 'confidence-building measures'.

The agreement provided for the replacement of direct rule from Westminster with an elected (PR STV), power-sharing Assembly, with potentially extensive devolved, executive powers (O'Leary 1998 4). A First and Deputy First (DF) Minister would be elected from the Assembly to serve as joint, interdependent 'presidents' of the

\textsuperscript{4} The Anglo Irish Agreement (1985) gave the Irish government an institutional, consultative role in the governing of Northern Ireland. It was fiercely resisted by all shades of unionism except for the Alliance Party.

\textsuperscript{5} Although the DUP and UK Unionist Party walked out of talks in 1997.

\textsuperscript{6} Including proportionality across the civil and public service.
Executive. Difficult to remove during the lifetime of an Assembly, the agreement almost ensures that a unionist and a nationalist will share these top two posts (O’Leary 1998 3) Ministers would be allocated\(^7\) to the executive of between six and ten members on the basis of their strength in the Assembly (GFA Ch 3) All key executive decisions in the governing of Northern Ireland would be subject to rules, checks and balances that uphold the principle of power sharing at the heart of the agreed consociation.\(^8\)

The parties agreed to establish a North-South Ministerial Council through which ministers from the Irish government and Assembly Executive would meet to cooperate, consult and develop policy on areas of mutual interest (GFA, 4 1) Crucially for nationalists, the Council would have institutional, executive powers. Crucially for unionists, the Council would not have full executive powers in that it cannot make decisions without the approval of the power-sharing Assembly (and the Irish parliament) The Council would be a fundamental part of the institutional set up in that neither the Assembly nor the Council can function alone (GFA, 4 1-6) The parties also agreed to establish a consultative and consensus-building British-Irish Council for representatives of the devolved governments of the UK, the British government and the Irish government. Of critical importance to unionist negotiators was the agreement to replace the despised British-Irish architecture, which had in 1985 (Anglo-Irish Agreement) given the Irish government an institutional, consultative role in policymaking for Northern Ireland, with a new Standing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (GFA, Ch 5 1-9) This was more acceptable to unionists because it would exist alongside power sharing and as the governments would not have the power to override the democratic arrangements established by the GFA (GFA Ch 5 9)\(^9\)

Having outlined the key features of the agreement, the incentives for the development of spoiler, sceptical and pro factions in both conflict formations are next considered.

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\(^7\) The d’Hondt procedure

\(^8\) Key decisions must be agreed by a parallel majority procedure or by a weighted majority procedure that requires 40% of nationalist and unionist Assembly members and 60% of the Assembly. Key decisions include budget, election of chair, of first and deputy first ministers, standing orders.

\(^9\) If agreement could not be reached on the establishment of the institutions the conference would contribute to a review of the agreement. The British government introduced a new power to ‘suspend’ the institutions in early 2000 on the basis that it came from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Given the unilateral power that it bestows on the British government, it has been argued that this breaches the agreement and the rules and procedures it established for implementation. See O’Leary B, 2001 66
FACTIONALISM

The membership of factions is fluid and therefore it is subject to changes under the pressures of the implementation process. For this reason the IFF model suggests that those designing the process of implementation should not be obsessed with identifying particular individuals as either pro or anti-implementation. But for the purposes of this analysis, it is helpful to point to some individuals as most likely fitting into the pro, sceptical or spoiler factions of unionism or nationalism in Northern Ireland.

The endorsement of the GFA by the SDLP and Sinn Féin, the two main nationalist parties, and by 94 per cent of the Catholic population in a referendum, suggests that the nationalist formation comprises a more than sizeable pro faction. But this does not mean that sceptical or spoiler factions were, or are, absent. Given that the agreement gave nationalists an unprecedented say in the governing of Northern Ireland, without precluding the future pursuit of a united Ireland, their support for it can be seen as a 'good each way bet' (O'Leary: 1998, 15). There was arguably little scope at the outset for members of nationalism who were fundamentally opposed to implementation (spoiler faction) to couch their rejection to the agreement in acceptable, sceptical terms, when regardless of its merits it improved the status quo.

Some members of the pro faction within nationalism can be identified. The SDLP had since its inception prioritised the attainment of genuine power sharing and of reforms that would guarantee parity of esteem for the nationalist community. On this basis it is accurate to assume that the elite and sub-elite sections of the SDLP by and large belonged to the pro faction.10 The picture was more complex within Republicanism which comprises Sinn Féin, the IRA and other armed republican groups11. Since the mid-1980s, the combined leadership of the Republican movement appears to have been slowly preparing republicans for a settlement that would be short of a united Ireland (McAuley, 1997: 39-40). The incremental pace of this change in strategy was designed to preserve the unity of the movement (Tonge, Gilligan, 1997: 10-12) which was threatened by a more militant wing that wished to continue the armed struggle. A breach of the 1994 IRA ceasefire in February 1996 is frequently interpreted as the outcome of a

10 For SDLP's peace process policy see McGovern Mark, in Gilligan and Tonge, 1997.
11 David McKittrick suggests in this article that the credibility of Gerry Adam's leadership of the republican movement would have been lost if it had chosen in mid-1996 to re-enter negotiations that subsequently turned out to be a 'charade.'
temporary shift in power towards the more militant wing (Independent 14 05 96) On Sinn Fein 's return to negotiations in September 1997, an openly anti-agreement republican faction formally split from it (Dixon, 2001 268) Publicly defending themselves on primarily ideological, nationalistic grounds, anti-agreement republican groups argued that the agreement was 'partitionist' and contrary to the goal of a united Ireland. They comprise the '32-County Sovereignty Group' and two separate armed groups associated with its viewpoint (Hennessy, 2000 197) the Real IRA (rIRA) which split from the IRA in 1997, and the Continuity IRA which split from the IRA in 1986 The INLA (Irish National Liberation Army) served as another dissident, militant group, although it did subsequently sign up to the GFA

The breakaway groups are small, but they provide a potential alternative for disillusioned elite, sub-elite and grass-root elements And it certainly appears that there are disillusioned sceptical and, perhaps, spoiler factions within mainstream republicanism who have taken a 'wait-and-see' approach Demonstrating the different attitudes within the movement towards the GFA is a poll commissioned by the Sunday Tribune in April 1998 at a Sinn Fein Special Conference attended by 138 delegates, 44 per cent were in favour, 28 per cent against and 28 per cent were 'don't knows' (Dixon, 2001 271) In fact, it was only after much internal debate during which the pro faction tried to persuade the sceptical faction of the merits of the agreement that Sinn Fein finally endorsed the Agreement (Darby and McGinty, 2000 80)

Aside from objecting to its failure to deliver a United Ireland, republicans who were against the agreement pointed to process-related issues For example, the adequacy of the commissions on equality, human rights and policing were questioned on the basis

12 David McKittrick suggests in this article that the credibility of Gerry Adam's leadership of the republican movement would have been lost if it had chosen in mid-1996 to re-enter negotiations that subsequently turned out to be a 'charade'
13 Radio Free Eireann, January 3 1998 interview with Bernadette Sands
14 See Taylor, 1998 355-62 about the multiple motivations that drive these republican factions
15 Linked to Republican Sinn Fein, which still regards the Irish state as illegal and disagrees with Sinn Fein taking positions in its institutions CIRA and rIRA are believed to co-operate on the ground
16 See Independent, 4 6 00 for an overview of the rIRA
17 According to Taylor (1998, 355-8), the former IRA Quarter Master General, who led the split was outmanoeuvred by the rest of the leadership which managed to secure nine out of the twelve votes on the Provisional Army Executive (IRA governing body) in favour of its cease-fire and talks strategy, instead of the seven to five vote it had originally feared
18 This conclusion was drawn after the authors interviewed a senior member of Sinn Fein on 27 April 1998
that they would be appointed by the British government i.e. could not act impartially (Dixon, 2001 271). It is likely that a significant proportion of those raising these concerns were sceptical factions, distrustful of the British government and fearful of the consequences of implementation for their faction and their community. However, spoiler factions tend to focus on the process-related difficulties with implementing the agreement. They do so with a view to couching in reasonable terms what are their more fundamental objections to the agreement and the break-away factions also raised these concerns. It is accurate to assume that a proportion of these internal objectors belonged to a spoiler faction within mainstream republicanism. Indeed as O'Leary points out in his analysis of the agreement, some hardliners within republicanism may have calculated in April 1998 that they should ‘insist on the full letter of the agreement’ during implementation in the knowledge that ‘non implementation might provide them with the pretext of a return to civil conflict’ (O’Leary, 1998 17).

Some analysts, such as Schulze and MLR Smith, dismiss the extent to which the struggle between the pro faction and the intransigent spoiler faction explains the stalling which later characterised the strategy of the republican movement. They instead argue that stalling is an age-old brinkmanship tactic (Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR), 09 99 19). But it is impossible, and perhaps futile, to try to prove that dissident republicans who present themselves as anti-agreement are simply part of an elaborate Republican strategy to use the threat of renewed violence as a means to squeeze more concessions, rather than illustrative of genuine divisions and power struggles within the movement. In fact, most evidence would appear to be to the contrary. Moreover, even if it were the case, and thus the entire republican movement were ‘spoilers’ who aimed not to implement the agreement but to trick unionists into implementing it, it is an essential contention of the IFF theory that such a strategy will work for spoilers unless the spoiler faction is prevented from adopting this strategy by the design of the implementation process. In fact, it is likely that both of these motivations – those associated with sceptical and spoiler factions - exist within republicanism. However, many neutral observers believe that most of the current Sinn Fein leadership, and in particular Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, have calculated that implementation of the agreement is in their interest.
A majority of unionists endorsed the GFA (Hennessy, 2000: 195). But it was a bare majority and the size of the anti-agreement unionist block following the June Assembly elections has allowed it to ‘constantly challenge whether the Agreement and its implementation has the support of a majority of Unionists’ (O’Leary and Evans, 2000). Thirty of the fifty-eight Unionist MLAs were members of parties that had endorsed the agreement: UUP (28) and Progressive Unionist Party (2). Twenty-eight of the elected MLAs were anti-agreement, despite having contested elections to an institution created by it: dissident UUP (3), DUP (20), UKUP (United Kingdom Unionist Party) (5). While another party - the Alliance Party - chose to define itself as neither ‘nationalist’ nor ‘unionist’ but ‘other’, it is traditionally associated with unionism and its 6 seats can be added to the 30 pro-agreement representatives of unionism.

Most members of the loyalist political parties – the PUP and the UDP\(^\text{19}\) - and the paramilitary organisations to which they are respectively linked – the UVF and UDA - can be identified as initially part of the pro faction of unionism. Both were prepared to back a power-sharing solution in return for important gains. In its pre-negotiation document (Six Principles) the PUP and its leader, David Ervine, had prioritised the attainment of a genuine power-sharing government within the context of a re-strengthened union. The UDP had similarly outlined its support for power sharing as part of an overall settlement in its pre-negotiations document entitled ‘Common Sense’ (McAuley, 1997: 39-40). The early prisoner-release programmes, and the opportunity for loyalists, both leaders and grass-root supporters, to re-build their lives in a Northern Ireland which would be free from IRA violence, were considered to be important gains for pro faction loyalists in the paramilitary organisations. Equally important was the security of the loyalist identity and security of the union between Northern Ireland and Britain that the agreement seemed to offer. But the factionalism within the parties and the fluidity of dividing lines between the pro, sceptical and spoiler faction groups within loyalism are most clearly evidenced by the disunity and the eventual dissolution of the smaller UDP in 2001 and the mounting violence by dissident loyalist paramilitary elements to which it is connected, mostly in the UDA (Ulster

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\(^{19}\) Progressive Unionist Party: Political party linked to the UVF loyalist paramilitary group. Ulster Democratic Party: Political party linked to other loyalist paramilitary group, the UDA.
Despite formally approving the GFA in 1998, the very divided UDA formally revoked this approval in 2001.

Constitutional unionism has been similarly fragmented. Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, most moderate unionists from the largest party (UUP) had accepted power sharing as the only way in which it might regain some of the power it had lost through the imposition of direct rule. Power sharing was also seen as a bargaining chip with which to secure the union (Darby and McGinty, 2000). It was on this basis that Ken Maginnis (UUP Westminster MP) expressed support for the agreement. He argued that it fulfilled the goal of unionism by guaranteeing a united Northern Ireland within a pluralist United Kingdom (Maginnis, Cox et al., 2000). According to the UUP leader, David Trimble, the GFA had achieved the unionist goal of 'placing Northern Ireland’s future within a wider British-Irish context than the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985'. The agreement was, he argued, a 'partitionist resolution based on the principle of consent' (Cox et al., 67). In fact, David Trimble, along with the rest of his pro-faction amongst the elite and sub-elite of the UUP, have more or less staked their political future on the implementation of the GFA. The failure to implement the GFA would likely expose Trimble's pro-agreement strategy and his willingness to work with republicans as a failed initiative. This would serve to increase both the threat to his leadership from sceptical and spoiler factions within his own party and the threat from the rival DUP to the UUP's brand of unionism. The latter threat would itself reinforce the former threat.

However, despite some dissent, a sizeable UUP pro-faction existed that was willing to support the leadership's strategy at the outset. 53 out of 79 UUP Executive Officers and 540 as against 210 in the UUP ruling council (UUC Ulster Unionist Council) voted in favour of the settlement (Dixon, 2001). This show of support was despite the fact that six out of the UUP's 10 Westminster MPs had declared themselves to be against the agreement, a stance that was quickly adopted by the Orange Order (Dixon, 2001). However, the UUP's constitution makes the executive council highly accountable to the ruling body (UUC). This body is itself constituted by a pre-allocated bloc voting.

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20 Sometimes their cover name is used Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
21 A large, mass based unionist club with lodges all over Ulster dating since 1795 and named in honour of King William of Orange
system which is no longer considered to be representative of the party, but overrepresentative of its most intransigent elements, such as the Orange Order and the Young Ulster Unionists. Despite this or, perhaps, because of this, Trimble has consistently sought the approval of the UUC for his strategy. The different outcomes to the votes taken by the UUC over the implementation period highlight the existence of sizeable sceptical and spoiler factions in the party. They also illustrate the fluidity with which some members move from pro to sceptical and from sceptical to spoiler faction.

It can be concluded that a sizeable minority of the UUP elite is not only sceptical of the GFA, but could be classed as ‘spoiler’ factions, who by definition bide their time before openly challenging the process. Anti-agreement unionists argue that the agreement promotes ‘a Northern Ireland in transition to a united Ireland and’ those in favour of the agreement are accused of collaborating with British disengagement (Cox et al. 70). The Republican movement’s support for the agreement is portrayed as a tactical strategy to advance the course to a united Ireland (Cox et al. 71). Process-related objections, such as the objection to having ‘terrorists’ in government and prisoners released before decommissioning has taken place, are constant themes (Dixon 271).

The difficulty in distinguishing the sceptic from the spoiler lies in the fact that both are motivated to highlight process-related issues as concerns. The deputy leader of the UUP, John Taylor, articulated a sceptical position when he argued that his insistence on the completion of decommissioning by the IRA before the establishment of power-sharing institutions was ‘not based on a desire to exclude any grouping,’ but was an attempt to decrease insecurity amongst unionists about the real intentions of the IRA (John Taylor, Hennessy 198). But a spoiler faction making the same decommissioning demand was demanding what it believed the IRA would not, or could not, deliver. This faction hopes to expose the unionist pro faction’s strategy as a failed one and to create for itself the opportunity to take over unionism. Distinguishing between the sceptical and the spoiler factions can be extremely complex and, in many cases, impossible. However, for a number of reasons outlined below, the UKUP and the majority of the DUP party can by and large be assumed to belong to the spoiler faction within unionism.

22 Irish Times, 9 03 02
The DUP’s MLAs tend to be far more willing to share power with the parties linked to the loyalist paramilitaries than with Sinn Féin, despite the fact that they publicly defend their opposition to power sharing with Sinn Féin as resulting from their unwillingness to share power with ‘terrorists’. This suggests that many hold a fundamentally anti-power-sharing position, rather than an aversion to being in government with groups that remain linked to armed, paramilitary organisations. In fact, two aspects of the DUP’s strategy suggest that a significant proportion fall into the spoiler faction. Firstly, this desire to couch in legitimate terms what appears to be a fundamental objection to power sharing with nationalists, or at least with republicans (Independent 01 06 00), secondly, a practical tendency within the DUP which makes it willing to accept the institutions of the agreement, and perhaps to even accept the agreement in order to guarantee its position within unionism, i.e. ensuring inclusion while awaiting a justified pretext on which to unravel the GFA. The significant percentage of DUP grass-roots who declared that they voted for the agreement in the referendum would fall into this category, while a proportion would fall into the sceptical faction and do appear to like certain aspects of the agreement.

Intra-formation competition not just involving the DUP and the UUP, but also the DUP and the smaller paramilitary-linked parties, has clearly driven the DUP’s strategy and has, in fact, ensured that the DUP partakes in aspects of the process that it has been unable to obstruct. A number of activists appear to be warming to aspects of the agreement (Independent 28 05 00) and the general argument of the rest of this chapter points to process design as largely responsible for this behaviour.

**RULES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS**

Power and responsibility for implementing the GFA was quite clearly allocated to a series of what can be described as insulated mechanisms. The British-Irish Conference, and the British government’s retention of the right to legislate for Northern Ireland in areas that have not been devolved, gave the two governments the power to review and to settle implementation disputes (including a subsequently introduced power to

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23 Ulster Marketing Survey, 1998
24 While the threat from the UDP decreased, during the negotiation years a number of DUP councillors defected to the UDP. The UDP and the PUP see Paisley as favouring a sectarian brand of unionism. Gilligan and Tonge 13, 40
25 Clause 43 of British Government’s Northern Ireland Act, 1998
suspend the institutions) But the British government had 'no power to override the democratic arrangements set up under the agreement' (GFA, 5 18)\(^{26}\) Evidently anticipating process-related barriers, in particular the probability that actors would present different interpretations of their obligations under the agreement, the architects of the process provided dispute-resolution rules and procedures that give the joint-government driving force considerable agenda-setting and chairing power, while at the same time it included provision for a formal, independent, review process (GFA, 11) The latter provision deprived spoiler factions of one justifiable pretext on which to base a refusal to accept or to recognise the outcome of a review - on the process-related basis that it is 'partial' Therefore, aspects of the agreement could be reviewed at British government or joint government-chaired meetings of parties to which the issue in question was relevant Alternatively representatives of the two governments and all relevant parties could meet under independent chairmanship to review implementation of the agreement as a whole (GFA, Ch 11 4)

Outside of the power vested in the two governments to oversee implementation, a number of independent commissions were created to oversee the implementation of individual issues Together with the governments, they have ensured that relatively insulated mechanisms have responsibility for driving, overseeing and designing the implementation process The Commissions are most appropriately dealt with in the sequence and timing section below

SEQUENCING, TIMING AND MECHANISMS
Following the endorsement of the GFA by conflict actors a six-month transitional period was to begin and would end with the full implementation of constitutional changes It was envisaged that the implementation of other provisions would commence, but would not necessarily be completed, during this period But endorsement of the agreement required not only that the majority of political parties declare their support for it Approval was sought from the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum (May 1998)\(^{27}\) and the implementation process could not begin in practice

\(^{26}\) Westminster's assumption in 2000 of the power to suspend the institutions can be interpreted as a breach of this commitment (see footnote 9) Suspension is discussed in more detail below

\(^{27}\) The agreement included a commitment by the Irish government to amend articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution and this commitment was also subject to a referendum, which took place on the same day as the referendum on the agreement in Northern Ireland
until this approved had been won. The referendum was to be followed on 25 June by elections to the newly-approved Assembly. But did the referendum requirement, by demanding that one issue—the referendum—be complete before the implementation of other issues commenced, place issue hierarchy at the heart of the implementation process?

The form of issue hierarchy that could be in question is the deliberate sequencing of the implementation of an entire issue, like for example demobilisation, disarmament, constitutional changes, new institutions or policing reform, before the implementation of another has commenced. But on examination, the requirement to hold a referendum on the agreement before the commencement of the implementation process did not introduce this form or any form of issue hierarchy. First of all, the referendum was not, in itself, an entire ‘issue’ in the implementation process. It did not require parties to take steps to fully implement a core compromise of the process. Instead, the approval of the agreement by a referendum provided the mandate for the Assembly elections (O’Leary and Evans, 2000: 87). The parties’ reciprocal co-operation with the referendum might therefore be interpreted as part of the procedure through which the new institutions would be established.

Secondly and alternatively, the referendum can be interpreted as actually preceding the implementation process and therefore as part of the endorsement process. It was a device with which the designers of the settlement hoped to legitimise the agreement in both communities, and perhaps, to deprive those factions who were against its implementation from claiming that it did not have popular support. Had the result of the referendum been negative instead of 71 per cent in favour of the agreement, the implementation process would not have commenced. However, it is correct to argue that without the support of the majority of both nationalist and unionist (bare majority) communities, the result would have increased the obstacles to implementation. Had the bare majority of unionists in support of the agreement been instead a bare minority, the vulnerability of sceptical unionist factions to their spoiler faction partners would have dramatically increased. In that sense the mechanism employed for endorsement may have been risky. But this obstacle would not have been created by issue hierarchy, instead by insufficient grass-root support for the endorsement of the settlement. As it was, the designers calculated (with the help of opinion polls) that the best time to seek
to legitimise the agreement with the approval of the electorate was prior to the commencement of the implementation process. Either way, the positive result triggered the beginning of the implementation process.

The agreement sought to sequence the implementation of constitutional issues by all parties reciprocally. The formal establishment of the Assembly, North-South and East-West institutions, and the formal entering into force of the British-Irish Agreement (effectively enacting the constitutional changes underpinning the principle of consent and the new institutions) was to coincide exactly with the Assembly's assumption of legislative and executive powers. But the holding of the elections did not automatically lead to the establishment of the Assembly and its executive. Until the formations, through their newly-elected Assembly representatives (MLAs), agreed to formally establish the executive using the Assembly's cross-community consent procedures, the governments' moves to implement the constitutional compromise inherent in the agreement had no legal force. Parallel sequencing thus linked the implementation of provisions underpinning the new constitutional status to the implementation of those to establish the power-sharing and linked institutions.

An attempt was made to introduce issue breakdown to the process of establishing the executive. The Assembly would meet in shadow format and undertake a number of steps towards implementation. These included the election of shadow First and DF Ministers, the creation of a shadow cabinet (Strand 1 35) and agreement on the number of ministers. The shadow cabinet would then put in place procedures, including agreement on standing orders and working practices of the Assembly and preparations for the eventual functioning of the Assembly and that of the British-Irish Council, the North-South Council and its implementation bodies.

Parallel sequencing ensured that none of the constitutional and institutional provisions for which the two governments were responsible would be legally implemented without the formal establishment of the executive. A start to the implementation of the other issues of the agreement, which 'are plainly inter-linked, but are not explicitly tied' (O'Leary, 1998 13) to the construction of the new political institutions, would simultaneously take place. But obstacles to the formation of a 'stable executive' existed. In fact, a stable executive would not be formed without the implementation of measures...
to ensure that progress was made on the implementation of the other issues. The procedures that sequenced and timed the implementation of these controversial issues were not explicit and were open to exploitation by the spoiler faction in each formation.

DECOMMISSIONING
While referred to as the most ‘ambiguous area of the Agreement’ (Hennessy, 2000 184-5), the GFA was clear on the fact that no formal surrender was demanded of any paramilitary organisation (O’Leary 1998 13). Yet the agreement aimed ‘to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons within two years following an endorsement of the GFA in referendums, North and South,’ and ‘in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement’ (GFA, 7 1-3). This apparent clarity on the need for parallel, but not prior, implementation of decommissioning was blurred by a provision that called for the exclusion from executive office of those who use means other than ‘democratic, non-violent means’ (GFA, 3 25) and a clause that required shadow ministers ‘to affirm their commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means,’ and their opposition to any use of or threat of force by others for any political purpose (GFA, 3 35). Unionist parties would use these provisions to support the demand that IRA decommissioning precede the establishment of the executive. They also used a connected promise made by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair on the eve of the settlement that it was his view that decommissioning should start straight away (O’Leary Brendan, 2002 80).

The agreement endeavoured to depoliticise the issue of decommissioning by giving responsibility for its design to an apolitical, technical body, which is subject to agreed rules and procedures. It formally empowered an already established Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) to develop workable bases for achieving decommissioning, and to monitor, review and verify progress on the decommissioning of illegal arms, while reporting regularly to both governments (GFA, 7 2 and 4). The agreement required that all signatories work constructively with the body, and ‘use any influence that they may have’ to achieve decommissioning (GFA, 7 4).

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28 Negotiations on the confidence building measures were reportedly even more tortuous than those on the new institutions and constitutional status. SDLP negotiator, DCU, April 2000, Darby & McGinty 99
29 The British and Irish governments are responsible for providing and updating where necessary legislative back up to its role.
POLICE REFORM AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The GFA recognised that an opportunity for 'a new beginning to policing' existed and it aspired to 'a police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole' (GFA, Ch 9 1) But clear procedures for the implementation of this reformed police force are not included. Instead, in an attempt to insulate a potentially divisive issue, an independent Commission with clearly outlined and relatively extensive terms of reference was to be established. It would address and make recommendations on the procedures and reforms necessary to transform the existing police force into the police force agreed to by the parties to the agreement (GFA, Ch 9 3) The Commission was required to report by the summer of 1999, a year before the two-year deadline for the completion of the decommissioning of weapons was up. This sequence is assumed to have been deliberate, and indicates that agreement on procedures for the introduction of police reform was viewed as important if decommissioning were to be achieved. This would later provide opportunities for the introduction of parallel sequencing to these issues in an endeavour to unblock the process.

DEMILITARISATION AND NORMALISATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

The GFA committed the British government to 'begin a series of phased developments to de-militarise Northern Ireland' (O'Leary, 1998 14). This included the removal of security installations, the reduction of armed forces to levels compatible with a peaceful society, and the removal of emergency powers (GFA, 8 1-2). The power to implement demilitarisation clearly lay in the hands of the British government and, more specifically, in those of the Secretary of State and his advisors. Timing depended on a reduction in the security threat, which was itself linked to decommissioning, policing and the establishment of workable, power-sharing institutions.

PRISONERS

Consistent with the 'no-surrender' principle inherent in the decommissioning clauses, both governments committed to introduce mechanisms for rollout, early-release programmes for prisoners who were affiliated to the organisations judged to be on

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30 O'Leary, 1998 13 says that it was plainly intended to be available as a confidence building measure.

1 The agreement commits the Secretary to consult with the Irish government and the Northern Irish parties. The Irish government undertakes to simultaneously review the Offences Against the State Act (GFA, Security, 4 and 5).
The implementation of provisions under the ‘rights, safeguards, and equality of opportunity’ chapter of the agreement was to a large extent insulated from post-agreement conflict. The provisions were inherently broken down and in parallel sequence with the rest of the implementation process. With the automatic, government-initiated incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern Irish law (GFA, 6.2), further implementation of the agreement’s equality provisions was phased and controlled by independent commissions. These Commissions—the new Statutory Equality Commission and a new Human Rights Commission—would constantly monitor the new Northern Ireland institutions. The functioning of the Equality Commission as envisaged in the GFA ultimately depends on the establishment of the new institutions, but the commissions could be and, in fact, were set up in the absence of their establishment.

In an endeavour to deal with the republican’s allegations that inequality and corruption were inherent in the criminal justice system, rather than agreeing the concrete provisions for its reform, the agreement included the terms of reference for an independent commission. The commission would be appointed early in the implementation process and would review the criminal justice system and make recommendations for its reform. This mechanism enabled the governments to diffuse

\(^{32}\) GFA, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity Chapter
the issue and to maintain control over the sequencing and timing of its
recommendations, which it could consider in tandem with the implementation of other
issues. By appointing a commission to work in parallel with other implementation
efforts, the nationalist spoiler faction was deprived of a justification to stall on the
implementation of all other issues on the basis that the omission of the criminal justice
issue was issue holdover. However, by omitting detail of the exact reforms, and instead
outlining principles and terms of reference, a ‘reasonable request’ was made of the
unionist spoiler faction. It was, at least temporarily, prevented from presenting reforms
as large, unacceptable steps to re-organise a criminal justice system which its members
perceived to be fair, and in which many have a stake.

In sum, while parallel sequencing and issue breakdown were not explicitly provided for
on all issues, neither did the GFA clearly and unequivocally endorse any form of issue
hierarchy. This is the case, despite ambiguities that created opportunities for spoiler
factions to convince the sceptical factions in both formations to insist on it. During over
four years of implementation, a relentless endeavour by pro factions, the governments
and the bodies responsible for implementation to agree on an implementation design
based on issue breakdown and parallel sequencing is evident. The series of endeavours
that have attempted to circumvent the stalling that has plagued the process include the
Hillsborough Declaration, the Way Forward and Failsafe initiatives, the Mitchell
Review, the introduction of weapons inspectors, the introduction by the UUP of step-
by-step sanctions, and the Weston Park talks. Where it remained possible to promote
any form of issue hierarchy, initiative after initiative failed until October 2001, when a
formula informed by adequate issue breakdown and parallel sequencing appeared to
improve the prospect of a successful outcome to implementation. The initiatives are
explored in detail below and are explained using the IFF hypotheses on sequence and
timing.

ISSUE HIERARCHY, MISSED DEADLINES, BREAKTHROUGH AND SUSPENSION
Intra-formation factionalism was highly visible during the election campaign that
followed the agreement in June 1998. The disunity within his party forced David
Trimble to make a significant public announcement concerning the sequence and timing
of implementation that the UUP’s support for the agreement was based on the premise
that it would not form a power-sharing executive that included Sinn Fein unless the
IRA had decommissioned weapons (Hennessy, 2000: 197). Trimble’s declared interpretation of the implementation process was facilitated by the lack of clarity on the sequencing and timing of decommissioning and by Prime Minster Tony Blair’s assurances to unionism. This unilateral demand for ‘guns before government’ introduced issue hierarchy to implementation design. This issue hierarchy, on which the spoiler faction in nationalism insisted in reverse – ‘government before guns’ – was to create the single biggest obstacle to implementation.

Despite the looming issue hierarchy crisis over the sequence and timing of executive formation and decommissioning, when the 31 October deadline for devolution approached, issue breakdown and the insulation of some issues from post-agreement bargaining had facilitated the implementation of some reciprocal or reversible issues and the parallel commencement of implementation on others. For example, Westminster and Dublin passed constitutional legislation underpinning the principle of consent which would automatically take effect with the establishment of the executive. The Assembly met in shadow format on 1 July, elected the transitional First and DF ministers (Trimble, UUP and Mallon, SDLP). Meanwhile the governments began a phased, parallel implementation of the agreement’s provisions on equality, prisoner releases, police reform and constitutional change. With the passing of the NI Police Act, the Police (Patten) Commission, which had been appointed prior to the elections (NIO), was empowered to set about its investigation of policing issues. The Northern Ireland Sentences Bill (July 98) automatically triggered the implementation of provisions on prisoner releases by laying down constitutional requirements for the release programme. Although highly contentious during negotiations, the prisoner-release scheme initiated the first wave of releases in September 1998 and the last in 2001 and created less stalling than was anticipated by many analysts. This was arguably facilitated by the manner in which it was implemented: provided paramilitary organisations remained on unequivocal ceasefire, prisoner releases were automatic, insulated from post-agreement bargaining and implemented in steps, which were, in

33 The Northern Ireland Bill received royal consent on 19th November 1998.
34 All elected MLAs took their seats, including those from parties against the agreement.
35 In November 1998 it is noted that releases had been proceeding with less disruption than might have been expected. O’Leary, 1998: 14.
36 Responsibility for judging the nature of the cease-fire falls to the Secretary of State.
fact, reversible. The British government simultaneously appointed the independent commission to review the criminal justice system, and moved to start the implementation of demilitarisation in September 1998, announcing the demolition of a number of installations and checkpoints (CAIN, 2001).

But despite some progress on these issues, the issue hierarchy at the heart of the opposing 'guns before government /government before guns' demands, ensured that parties stalled and missed the October 31 GFA deadline for the formal establishment of the executive. The unionist pro faction was unwilling even to agree the technicalities of the new institutions with the SDLP in the absence of an agreed decommissioning timetable (Hennessy, 2000 197). Without movement on these issues, it is possible to argue that progress on other issues would ultimately stall.

The first in a series of intense, joint-government initiatives to circumvent the issue hierarchy took place from November 1998 to April 1999. The initiative focused on encouraging actors to take steps to deepen the roots of the institutions in shadow format. The logic behind the formula appears to have been that if the new power-sharing and North-South bodies could function in shadow format, nationalist pro factions could demonstrate the advantages, stability and irreversibility of the institutions to its significantly large sceptical faction. Based on this logic, when the institutions were fully established in shadow format and on the point of legal establishment, the nationalist pro faction would be in the position to persuade its sceptical faction to commit to a specific decommissioning process. This would remove the 'government/guns' issue hierarchy and open up the way for parallel sequencing of the two.

Some progress followed and by February 1999, the pro factions agreed on the structures of the Assembly and of the North-South implementation bodies and guaranteed the endorsement of this by the Assembly and the British and Irish legislation to underpin it (Hennessy 198). This arguably increased the stability of the power-sharing structures and helped to advance the two governments' formula for breakthrough. According to the hypotheses, movement was possible for a number of reasons associated with design.

Prisoners could be re-arrested if the security forces had consistent evidence of continued paramilitary activity. The re-arrest of loyalist prisoner Johnny Adair in August 2000 gave credibility to this reversibility.
the step-by-step moves to establish the details of power-sharing and North-South institutions could be presented as reversible to the sceptical faction of unionism in that they could ultimately refuse to establish the executive should no move be made on decommissioning. The issue breakdown inherent in the executive’s shadow format prevented the unionist spoiler faction from convincingly claiming that they were taking a unilateral step on the establishment of the executive. However, the shortcomings in design out-weighed the positive features and they allowed spoiler factions to continue to demand issue hierarchy. The ultimate failure of the initiative, which culminated in the ‘Hillsborough Statement’ of April 1999, is explained as follows:

The Hillsborough Declaration focused on the decommissioning and the executive-formation issues. It proposed breaking them down into a number of steps that would be undertaken by both formations. To begin with, the relevant parties were to nominate ministers to the executive. This was a reversible move and was to be followed by ‘a collective act of reconciliation’ which would involve the ‘putting beyond use’ of weapons. Within a month of the nominations, the IICD would issue a report that verified the decommissioning move. This verification would coincide with the entering into force of the British-Irish agreement which legalised devolution and formalised the executive’s formation. Without the decommissioning move, the Assembly would not confirm the ministerial nominations (Hillsborough Statement).

The Hillsborough Declaration describes decommissioning not as a pre-condition, but as an ‘obligation’ derived from the GFA, which will happen ‘where implementation is actively moving forward’ (Hillsborough Statement). Central to the formula was the need to assure those moving to establish the executive that their step would be revocable if decommissioning did not follow. While the initiative introduced issue breakdown and reversibility to the establishment of the executive, this was less so the case where decommissioning was concerned. Despite attempts to disguise it, the sequence effectively upheld the ‘guns before government’ issue hierarchy. The formula seemed to require a commitment from republicans to make a verifiable start to decommissioning and to agree to complete it by May 2000 before the executive and the power-sharing institutions were established.

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38 UUP, SDLP, DUP and Sinn Fein as the largest parties in the Assembly.
However, the design of the implementation process allowed the spoiler faction within nationalism to argue reasonably that, while it was not opposed to decommissioning in the context of an overall settlement, the Hillsborough formula required that it respond to a unilateral demand with an irreversible move. That other key issues, such as policing and demilitarisation, were not yet part of the equation was equally problematic and reinforced the issue hierarchy at the heart of the sequence and timing of implementation. Despite the introduction of some issue breakdown, the government/guns issue hierarchy, and the lack of parallel sequencing ensured that stalling prevailed. Illustrating this, Gerry Adams39 denounced the formula saying that while the proposals may ‘have merit’ they amount to ‘an ultimatum to armed groups’ McGuinness40 said that ‘the IRA would not accept decommissioning as a precondition to Sinn Fein’s entry into power-sharing’ (CAIN, Chronology), and Sinn Fein formally rejected the initiative on April 13 on the ‘reasonable’ basis that it ‘moved away from the GFA’.41 Given the republican movement’s rejection of the formula, the UUP was not forced to accept or to reject it. However, despite some objections from the UUP (CAIN, Chronology), the government interpreted as a given its commitment in April 1999 to nominate and form the executive in parallel with a start to decommissioning.

The next formula - the ‘Way Forward Document’ and the Failsafe Initiative (2 July 99) - reflected a shift in focus. The formula called for the immediate implementation (by July 15 1999) of the de Hondt procedure to nominate ministers, followed by the laying of the Devolution Order before Westminster to take effect on July 18 and the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons to be carried out in ‘a manner determined by the IICD’ by May 2000 (The Way Forward). The IICD outlined a decommissioning formula which, beginning with urgent discussions with points of contacts appointed by all paramilitary groups, would be followed by two progress reports in September and December 1999 before a final report in May 2000.

The Way Forward quite clearly envisages devolution before decommissioning, a position that the Irish Taoiseach had, controversially, publicly endorsed in June (CAIN). But to guarantee the establishment of an executive and thereby to secure devolved,

39 Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein and an MLA, and believed to have been a member of the IRA
40 Martin MacGuinnes, Sinn Fein, MLA and Minister for Education. He was the commander of the Derry unit of the IRA in the 1970s
power-sharing government, the IRA was required to give 'an absolute commitment to decommissioning' (Blair, 23 06 99, CAIN) and to engage fully with the IICD A Failsafe Clause was proposed and it was in draft legislative form. It would have ensured that if commitments in relation to either decommissioning or devolution were not met the governments would 'automatically and with immediate effect' suspend the operation of the GFA institutions. Therefore, if the institutions of the agreement were not working as a result of the UUP's unwillingness to establish or work in an executive with republicans, the May 2000 decommissioning deadline would not hold. Equally so, 'if the IRA failed to deliver on decommissioning the executive would be suspended and a review of the process would take place' (Irish Taoiseach, CAIN, 10 July 1999) In this way, the Way Forward and Failsafe initiatives introduced reversible steps with a reciprocal effect, while retaining the aspects of issue break down inherent in the Hillsborough declaration. The question thus remains as to why both Sinn Fein and the UUP simultaneously rejected it on 14 July?

By July 1999, the UUP's pro faction leadership appeared to have gained the sceptical faction's support for the parallel implementation of the 'guns and government' issues (CAIN, 2001) By undermining its spoiler faction's ability to reject what was, in effect, a 'reasonable request,' the pro faction increased the sceptical faction's confidence in the process. But if the pro faction were to endorse the formula that the 'Way Forward' document outlined, it was moving one step further than parallel implementation without actually securing any decommissioning. While the Failsafe legislation essentially made the establishment of an executive that included Sinn Fein a reciprocal or reversible move, it was only reversible according to the interpretation of the governments. This provided the unionist spoiler faction with an opportunity to persuade its sceptical faction that the failsafe would not be 'safe enough,' and that the British and Irish governments would never be persuaded to undo the establishment of the institutions once established, whether or not the decommissioning commitment were carried through. The vague and secret steps in the decommissioning process enabled spoiler factions to further increase the doubts of sceptical factions. The UUP was able to reject

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41 Mitchell McLaughlin Statement, 13 04 99
42 The initiative ultimately failed and the draft legislation discussed by the two governments for the Failsafe initiative was never passed. But the suspension powers at the heart of the Failsafe proposal were controversially passed in legislation by the British government in the Special NI Act, 2000
the formula reasonably they declared that no resistance existed to a fully inclusive executive, provided that decommissioning took place 43

For the nationalist sceptical faction, the Failsafe legislation was, perhaps, more problematic. It left the pro faction vulnerable to the accusation that the institutions were simply 'British rule' under a different guise. The spoiler faction could point out that suspension was not part of the GFA and that it effectively constituted a unilateral deadline for decommissioning, imposed not by the IICD but by a British government vulnerable to unionist pressure. Some factions within nationalism had ideological difficulties with accepting devolved power sharing instead of a united Ireland. This formula appeared to dilute even devolved power sharing by making it dependent on 'the stroke of a Westminster pen.' Whether or not the pro faction genuinely believed that the Failsafe was any more than a formula to guarantee implementation was irrelevant as long as the spoiler faction could credibly persuade the sceptical faction that the devolved power-sharing on offer was unstable, and decommissioning governed by a unilateral demand.

For the reasons outlined, both the nationalist and the unionist formation rejected the initiative. In response to the rejection, the governments evoked the formal review procedure. A ten-week review chaired by the US Senator, George Mitchell, commenced and focused exclusively on two issues: decommissioning in the context of the IICD and the establishment of an executive (IT, 15 11 99). This was the focus of the review, despite the recent publication of the Patten recommendations on police reform in September 1999. The review proposed a new formula which called for the formal establishment of the executive alongside the break down of the decommissioning issue into small steps. Sinn Fein was to publicly condemn all forms of violence as a form of political behaviour, the IRA and all other paramilitary groups were to appoint interlocutors to enter into ongoing discussions with the IICD about the modalities of decommissioning, and the IICD was to issue a progress report within ten days of the executive appointments 44

43 UUP Implementing the Agreement, October 1999
44 Report of IICD to the GFA Review 15 11 99

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The UUP party appeared to be generally opposed to this formula (McDonald, Independent, 19-09-00; Daily Telegraph, 20-11-99). Like the Way Forward formula, it required the immediate formation of the executive while it did not guarantee decommissioning. It could be, in effect, interpreted as issue hierarchy. However, the UUP pro faction was persuaded to take a number of conciliatory steps, which were presumably designed to decrease the uncertainty of the nationalist sceptical faction, and which could be presented to the unionist spoiler faction as reasonable requests. These steps included a number of UUP statements which recognised the aspirations of nationalists as legitimate, embraced the principles of *inclusivity*, equality and mutual respect, and more or less reaffirmed the position of the UUP as not opposed to sharing power with the republican movement in principle (IT, 16.11.99). A ‘reciprocal’ IRA statement (17.11.99) committed the IRA to peace, to the GFA, to the leadership of Sinn Féin in the negotiations, and agreed to nominate a representative to enter discussions with the IICD. Following these steps, the Mitchell review appeared to facilitate a historical breakthrough. The UUP agreed to establish the power-sharing executive that included Sinn Féin. This triggered the replacement of direct rule with devolution and formalised in law the changes to their respective constitutions which had been prepared by the British and Irish governments. Following the meeting of the executive on the 2 December, the IRA delivered on its commitment and announced the appointment of its representative to the IICD (IRA, 2.12.99).

While the formula recommended by the Mitchell review had differed in one important way from earlier initiatives and had succeeded in advancing the implementation process, on closer scrutiny the dynamics that promoted issue hierarchy remained. In fact, the UUP’s agreement to establish the executive had been facilitated less by the formula and more by its own introduction of two procedures to implementation design: issue breakdown and reversibility to its own step and a unilateral deadline to the decommissioning step. To secure the backing of the UUC, Trimble had submitted a post-dated letter to the chair of the UUC that tendered his resignation as First Minister if the IRA had not de-commissioned by February 2000. With this move he hoped to

45 The DUP initially refused to attend this meeting.
46 If either the First of Deputy First Minister resigns the other also ceases to hold office. This inter­dependence agreed to in the GFA is also legislated for in Article 14.6 of the Westminster Nl Act 1998. Trimble’s resignation meant that the assembly would be without executive leaders and the election of new leaders required approval by parallel consent by the Assembly.
make a stable executive directly dependent on decommissioning by the IRA and with this self-introduced, 'time-lined' entry into government, the UUC endorsed the Mitchell review by 480 to 349 votes (27 11 99, CAIN) Given the close result, it seems unlikely that the unionist pro faction would have secured the support of its sceptical faction without this move.

The difference between the suspension clause in the draft Failsafe legislation (July 1999) and Trimble's post-dated letter of resignation was that the latter made the stability of the institutions automatically dependent on IRA decommissioning by February 2000, the former on the government's reading of the extent to which IRA decommissioning had progressed. This difference sheltered the unionist pro faction from the tactics of its spoiler faction and enabled it to establish the executive. In the immediate aftermath of the move Trimble challenged republicans with the refrain - 'we've jumped', now it's your turn' (BBC News, 27 11 99). But this challenge obscured the fact that while the UUP had clearly made its move reversible, and in doing so highlighted the powers of the First Ministry to threaten the feasibility of the institutions, it called on republicans to take a large, irreversible step in response to a unilateral and specific deadline. This formula was clearly vulnerable to breakdown. And in February 2000, with the deadline for Trimble's resignation approaching and no moves on decommissioning by the IRA or by any other armed group, it did breakdown (IICD Report, 11 02 00).

Responding to the crisis, Westminster evoked the special NI Suspension Act (2000) to suspend the devolved institutions just before Trimble resigned. The controversial Act had been hastily passed in early 2000. It embodied the suspension powers which had been part of the draft Failsafe legislation (which was, itself, never passed). The move to suspend the institutions momentarily 'froze' the implementation process which was on the verge of collapse, and it arguably bought space for more dispute resolution. However, its impact on the stability of the institutions was controversial and it served to transform the issue of executive formation into the more complex issue of institutional stability.

47 Which Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, confirmed as an option in November though it was only in draft form (IT 22 11 99)
The central role that factionalism played in the crisis is confirmed in Anthony McIntyre's explanation for the stalling and the breakdown. A declared pacifist, yet anti-GFA insider of the republican movement, Anthony McIntyre explained that

Trimble has made the leap but crucially has held his party together. Adams has not made the leap, presumably because he feels he could not hold republicans intact. If it were a question of choice, Adams would accept decommissioning (though not necessarily hand over to British Government), while Trimble would not demand it.48

Adams responded to the UUP's challenge by re-stating Sinn Fein's commitment to decommissioning (Newry, 27 01 00). The IRA stated that the peace process was 'under no threat' (IRA, 5-2-00). But the unionist pro faction accused the Republican movement of failing to take 'a single step forward,' and being 'openly in defiance of the democratic will of the whole of Ireland' (Magennis IT, 7-2-00). Magennis's reference to a 'single step' may indicate that a small move within the February deadline would have been sufficient to reduce the unionist pro faction's vulnerability to its spoiler faction. However, as it was, Sinn Fein and the IRA's failure to move created to a good opportunity for the unionist spoiler faction (both within and without of the UUP) to threaten the credibility of the pro faction's strategy. The last-hour, IRA promise that it would 'consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use in the context of the GFA and of the removal of the causes of the conflict' (IICD, 11 02 00) was, regardless of timing, not enough to enable the unionist pro faction to remain in the executive. The step did not prevent the spoiler faction in Unionism from presenting the continuity of the executive as the capitulation of the unionist formation to issue hierarchy.

FEBRUARY – MAY 2000 BREAKTHROUGH?

During the suspension period, which lasted from February to May 2000, disunity within the nationalist conflict formation was marked. David Trimble's threat to resign and the suspension of the institutions presented its spoiler faction with an opportunity to credibly highlight the instability of the institutions and the continued power of the British government to overrule nationalists (Adams, IT 12 2 00). The spoiler faction could present decommissioning as a unilateral demand which would not guarantee

48 McIntyre Document, 2000
stable institutions in return. On this basis, it could persuade sceptical factions to be cautious in its strategy towards the agreement and its implementation. Reflecting the pressure on the pro faction in nationalism were inflammatory statements by Sinn Fein in February 2000 which painted the process as near to collapse and questioned its own participation in any post-suspension review (IT, 14 2 00). The IRA in turn announced that it would no longer cooperate with the IICD (IRA, 15 2 00). Gerry Adams subsequently called on Sinn Fein’s followers to return to the streets, and to demand democracy in the face of suspension and the ruling over their heads by the Secretary of State’s (IT, 26 2 00).

Critically to the dynamics of intra-formation conflict, nationalism’s unequivocal pro faction - the SDLP - was also critical of the UUP’s February deadline for decommissioning, and considered it to be ‘fictional’. Even more critically, while wary of the inflammatory speeches, the SDLP perceived the republican movement’s refusal to move on decommissioning in February 2000 as a function of disagreements in Sinn Fein’s ranks and within the IRA’s leadership, and not of Sinn Fein’s fundamental rejection of decommissioning, or adoption of a spoiler faction’s position. The factionalism within both unionism and nationalism was accentuated by the persistent ability of their respective spoiler factions to use the implementation process to force a collective strategy of stalling. And despite Trimble’s standing up to the IRA in February 2000, his strategy was increasingly under pressure from the spoiler faction within his conflict formation who consistently portrayed his move as capitulation to issue hierarchy. Illustrating the depth of the crisis was Trimble’s victory by only 56.8 per cent to 43.2 per cent of the ruling council in an anti-agreement leadership challenge in March 2000 (IT, 25 3 00).

Despite the controversy, one event in particular helped to soften the contradictory demands for issue hierarchy that caused the suspension crisis. While the institutions were suspended, Trimble managed to secure a commitment from his sceptical faction (i.e., won UUC approval) to return to the assembly ‘without prior decommissioning, provided that the issue was dealt with’ (IT, 17 3 00). On the strength of this window of opportunity, low-key, multi-party talks chaired by the governments in the two-month

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49 April 21 2000 Talk by leading SDLP MLA and GFA negotiator
suspension period, produced a new formula (Independent, 8 05 00). At the heart of the formula was a promise by the UUP to return to the executive and to secure the institutions of the GFA in return for a start to step-by-step, concrete movement on decommissioning by the IRA. Beginning this process, the IRA issued a promise to immediately 'initiate a process that would completely and verifiably put their arms beyond use' (06 05 00). This would begin with the admission of two independent, international weapons inspectors to inspect the security of IRA weapon stocks (BBC News, 6 5 00).

The May 2000-formula led to, what was perhaps, the biggest breakthrough on the executive formation and decommissioning issues to date. On 15 May 2000, international weapons inspectors working through the IICD held meetings with the Northern Irish parties. Following this, the parties and the governments agreed to formally restore the institutions on 22 May (BBC News, 16 5 00). The IFF hypotheses can help to explain the partial success of the formula.

The clear break down of decommissioning into verifiable steps prevented the spoiler faction within unionism from presenting the move to re-establish the executive as a unilateral one to which the IRA would never respond with decommissioning. The 'reasonable request' inherent in the concrete and verifiable decommissioning steps and the omission of an explicitly clear May 2000 deadline, which was removed through the review, undermined the ability of the nationalist spoiler faction to resist its endorsement. The decommissioning request was reasonable, reversible and reciprocal. Inherent in the design of the formula was the idea that if the decommissioning issue were left to progress in steps under the insulated IICD and the executive were secure, the emerging and divisive issue of police reform could be worked out between the pro-agreement parties and the governments.

But while the IFF model helps to explain the temporary success of this formula, it also suggests, that without parallel sequencing all implementation issues are vulnerable to stalling. The process for implementing the agreement's policing and demilitarisation provisions remained unclear and unlinked to the rest of the implementation process. Further, despite the introduction of the weapons-inspectors, the May formula did not entirely circumvent the 'government before guns' or the 'guns before government'.
controversy over issue hierarchy. Nor, as the below account outlines, did it entirely end Trimble’s problems which were caused by insufficient issue breakdown. In fact, according to the IFF theory, it was unlikely that the May 2000 formula would produce the ultimate breakthrough required.

It appears that the republican pro faction was seeking during the negotiations of May 2000 to decouple the guns and government hierarchy with, what appeared to be, a move to introduce parallel sequencing. The Republicans presented the IRA’s initiation of the decommissioning process as part of an all-encompassing agreement on the sequence and timing of implementation. They argued that decommissioning depended on British government-initiated demilitarisation, the delivery of the report on the reform of the criminal justice system, and agreement on and the initiation of police reform. In this context, the British government made a number of promises in May 2000 to begin implementing the demilitarisation provisions of the agreement in parallel with the moves on decommissioning. While this, alongside the re-establishment of the executive, was to facilitate the capacity of the nationalist pro faction to take concrete steps towards decommissioning (inspections took place in June 2000 and October 2000; IIDC, 26-10-00), it was to simultaneously undermine the ability of the unionist pro faction to guarantee the stability of the executive. Full reciprocity and reversibility was absent from the UUP’s step of re-entering the executive, this contributing to its spoiler faction’s efforts to present the move as one adhering to issue hierarchy. Furthermore, as the above suggests, the move was not sequenced with other issues, in particular with policing.

From day one these difficulties left the formula, and the return to the executive, vulnerable to fierce, unrelenting spoiler tactics. In fact, the UUP’s decision to re-enter the executive was only backed by a very narrow majority in the Ruling Council. An alternative proposal by Jeffrey Donaldson, who belonged to either the sceptical or to the spoiler faction, seriously challenged the May 2000 proposal to re-enter the executive (459–403, Independent, 25 5 00). Donaldson insisted that decommissioning take place prior to the formation of the executive, and proposed that the UUP re-enter the executive in shadow format until the IRA delivered. Unionism’s spoiler faction appeared to be gaining the support of its sceptical faction. In fact, the ascendancy of sceptical and spoiler factions was not confined to the UUP and the DUP sections of
unionism, but was also apparent within the loyalist paramilitary groups. This became very evident throughout the summer of 2000, which marked the prelude to a deadly feud within loyalism, and to increasingly violent behaviour by dissident republicans.

**MAY – OCTOBER 2000 BREAKDOWN OF FORMULA**

The DUP rejoined the executive in May 2000, while at the same time declaring its intention to use the Assembly to ‘defeat the Republican’s agenda and the GFA’ (Robinson, Independent, 16 00). This decision to re-enter the executive suggests that its leadership recognised that the policy of insisting on decommissioning before the formation of an executive had lost a small part of its reasonableness given the IRA’s move in May 2000. It signalled a recognition that, despite its rhetorical stance against the GFA, ‘now’ was not the right time to move to spoil the agreement’s institutions from without. Instead, it announced its plan to ‘periodically disrupt business’ and to gather enough UUP votes to oust David Trimble as First Minister (Ind 16 00). From within the Assembly, the DUP relentlessly demanded issue hierarchy by calling for the expulsion of Sinn Fein on the grounds that the IRA had not yet decommissioned. At the same time it sat in government with Sinn Fein. Attempting to highlight the spoiler tactics at the heart of the DUP’s strategy which aimed to bring the agreement down while avoiding any risk of self-isolation in doing so, the UPP’s Reg McGimpsey responded with the challenge: nothing can disguise the fact that the DUP are in government with Sinn Fein (McGimpsey, 50 Independent 27 6 00).

Outside of the Assembly, the marching season and the annual protest at the blocking of an Orange Order march at Drumcree became a rallying point for ‘uncompromising loyalism’. Threatening the implementation process from without, the Orange Order called for a peaceful, anti-agreement protest to bring Northern Ireland to a halt (Independent 9 6 00). Facilitated by the failure of the IRA to decommission, the public display of defiance by increasingly militant anti-agreement factions worked to heighten the fears of those sceptical of the agreement’s benefits for unionism. This served to increase the potential benefits that the unionist spoiler faction could gain from openly adopting spoiling tactics.

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50 UUP MLA and Minister (Industry) in the Assembly. Perceived to be one of Trimble’s key supporters in the senior assembly party.
The intra-loyalist feuds which emerged in the second half of 2000, and the subsequent violence between loyalist groups and Catholic citizens and loyalist groups and republican dissidents, can be interpreted in one of two ways. The first interprets the events as the result of the loyalist spoiler faction’s efforts to provoke the IRA back to violence, or to at least prevent it from decommissioning. If the IRA refused to take any more decommissioning steps, the successful implementation of the GFA would become far less certain. This would facilitate the spoiler faction’s goals by making the successful implementation of the GFA less likely. This interpretation perceives the violence as more-or-less driven by the politics of implementation. The loyalist pro-faction feuded with its anti-agreement faction who were mostly in the UDA and who were attempting to prevent the pro-agreement loyalist and republican factions from cooperating with the agreement. This is closest to the PUP leader, David Ervine’s, interpretation of the violence.

The second interpretation dismisses the loyalist feud as a turf war between ‘gangsters’ (Sunday Tribune, 27 08 00). But while there are certainly gangster elements within loyalist organisations, in particular within the UDA, it would be inaccurate to argue that the feud was apolitical. Even if the key motivation of loyalist paramilitaries is to control their own turf, most are likely to see the implementation of the GFA as either facilitating or impeding this aim.

Regardless of which way the loyalist violence is explained, as events both within and without the Assembly were to prove, the May 2000 formula had lost the support of nearly all elements of unionism early on, despite confirmation that arms dumps had been inspected and were secure. The IFF theory explains this as follows. Without a further, more substantial step towards putting arms beyond use, the pro-faction within the UUP, the PUP and the UDP were still at the mercy of the spoiler and sceptical unionist factions, for taking a large, non-reciprocal step to re-establish an executive that included Sinn Fein. It was also increasingly apparent that the perceived concessions to nationalism in the Patten Report on police reform (IT, 6 6 00), despite its dilution by Peter Mandelson, were placing the unionist pro-faction under further pressure to denounce the agreement (Trimble, IT, 26 6 00). The escalating violence was in part a reflection of this.

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21 David Ervine, RTE 2FM 10 10 00 Radio Interview
Factionalism within the UUP climaxed in the run up to a critical UUC meeting held on 28 October. At the meeting, the UUP’s pro faction sought to expose the trick at the heart of the spoiler’s tactics with a proposal to introduce more issue break down, reversibility and reciprocity to the ‘security of the institutions’ issue. This would make it difficult for the spoiler faction to continue to stall without revealing its ultimate objection to a settlement. It proposed the imposition of a six-point sanction plan against Sinn Féin, which would only be removed when the IRA engaged substantially with the IICD (BBC News, 28 10 00). The UUC agreed to the initiative if the first sanction were imposed with immediate effect. Trimble would use his powers as First Minister to ensure that Sinn Féin ministers would not be nominated to attend North-South Ministerial Council meetings.

The sanctions facilitated the unionist pro faction’s goal to remain in the executive. Sanctions made its continued participation in the executive reversible and subject to an internal review in January 2001 (BBC News, 28 10 00). This meant that only a subtle difference remained between the demands of the ‘no’ unionist camp and those loyal to David Trimble. The former, which is assumed to driven by spoiler and sceptical factions’ motivations, was still demanding a specific decommissioning deadline. The latter - the pro faction - demanded that a decommissioning process begin in consultation with the IICD, an institution which it urged to take a more proactive stance.

The sanctions clearly placed the nationalist pro faction under pressure from spoiler and sceptical factions. They once again threatened the security of the power-sharing and all-island institutions, on whose implementation the nationalist pro faction had staked its strategy. The republican movement’s reaction was swift. Blaming the British government’s failure to deliver on its commitment to step up the removal of troops and border watchtowers, and to replace the RUC with a police service acceptable to Catholics, the IRA reversed its decision to co-operate with the IICD. The SDLP criticised Trimble’s abuse of the First Minister position and Sinn Féin mounted a legal challenge that aimed to legally prevent the First Minister from using sanctions to undermine the stability of the institutions (Independent 29 10 00).

In the wake of the events of 28 October, the alliance between the nationalist and unionist pro faction that is predicted to be critical to the implementation process was at
its weakest The perpetual stalling appeared to be in danger of worsening and of leading to an unravelling of the process The obstacles to implementation can be summed up as revolving around four interconnected issues the stability of the institutions, decommissioning, police reform and demilitarisation Some issue break down, which included reciprocal or reversible steps, characterised both the decommissioning and the stability of the institutions issues, although the mutually exclusive issue hierarchy demands over the order of 'guns and government' was not entirely resolved and was to worsen These issues are considered in more detail below

Concerning the decommissioning issue, the unionist spoiler and sceptical factions seized upon a new deadline An ambiguous clause in the 1999 legislation underpinning the IICD appeared to give the Commission a mandate until May 2001 While the IICD did not consider itself to be working to a timetable, the clause was alternatively interpreted as a deadline, the interpretation depending on the goals of the faction in question If the IICD's mandate collapsed, the agreement would most likely collapse (Sunday Tribune, 11 3 01) Those who interpreted the mandate as subject to a June 2001 deadline argued that if the IRA failed to deliver by June 2001 Sinn Fein would be expelled from the GFA process Most neutral sources suggested that the IICD's mandate would run out unless something substantial was happening on the decommissioning front

Concerning the policing issue, Westminster's legislative response to the Patten report (Police Bill NI) was passed on 21 November 2000 It was much criticised by all shades of nationalist opinion, including the Irish government, the SDLP, the Catholic church and Sinn Fein Amidst the criticism, the focus shifted to the publication of an implementation plan by the Secretary of State It would bring the legislative reforms into effect and would outline the content, sequence and timing of reform, and the nature of the body that was to replace the existing police authority (BBC News, 22 11 00) To guarantee implementation the proposals in the plan had to be acceptable to a sufficiently large proportion of each conflict formation This was a tall order given the diversion of

52 The legislation following the April 1999 Hillsborough Statement STribune, 11-3-01
53 It believed that it was to recommend its own disbandment if no concrete progress on decommissioning were made (IT, 20 4 01)
the policing bill from Patten's recommendations and the reaction by nationalists to this
diversion (Independent 6 06 00)

The implementation of demilitarisation was sequenced to take place in parallel steps
with decommissioning. By this stage in the implementation process, it had become clear
that for any demilitarisation to happen the stability of the institutions was also required.
But the extent to which demilitarisation could take place in parallel with other initiatives
depended on the extent to which violence by dissidents prevented it from happening.
Spoiler factions from either conflict formation who were willing to use violence had the
potential to pose enormous obstacles to any demilitarisation and, therefore, to the entire
implementation process. The intra-loyalist feud and a sharp increase in dissident loyalist
attacks on Catholics beginning in late 2000\(^4\) provided a perfect pretext on which the
nationalist spoiler faction could base its resistance to further movement on
decommissioning. The increasingly active rIRA\(^5\) was likely motivated by a calculation
that its continued campaign provided pretexts for a continued loyalist campaign, could
worsen the loyalist feud, and perhaps make sceptical republicans even more weary of
decommissioning. Those members of the unionist and nationalist spoiler factions who
were unwilling to use violence were not unwilling to use the climate of violence and
uncertainty to incite fear and insecurity amongst the general population. This would
ensure that the climate of violence persisted and would make further, even step-by-step
implementation, very difficult for all pro factions.

Thus in late 2000, the implementation process was in deep crisis. The IRA was not
engaged with the IICD, the UUP was operating a programme of sanctions against Sinn
Fein and subject to meet in January 2001 to up the pace of sanctions. The SDLP was
still deeply concerned about the shortcomings of the proposed police reform and the
enormous step that its implementation presented, and violence in the province escalated
close to pre-ceasefire levels. This impending crisis, and the intense intra-formation
competition that was anticipated in the immediate run up to the Westminster elections

\(^{4}\) A long campaign of loyalist paramilitary pipe bomb attacks on catholic homes began in January 2001
(Guardian, 3-4-01). Inter-community violence, especially in Belfast, was like pre-ceasefire times.

\(^{5}\) The rIRA was believed to be responsible for bombs in June 2000 (Hammersmith Bridge), July 2000
(Ealing railway line), September 2000 (M16), February 2001 (Shepherd's Bush)
of June 2001, prompted the governments to prioritise January – March 2001 as a period of concentrated negotiations.\(^5\)

**THE SEARCH FOR A PACKAGE SETTLEMENT**

The Hillsborough Round Table talks took place in early March 2000. With these talks, the governments aimed to produce a formula that would 'break the deadlock over the issues of policing, disarmament and demilitarisation' (BBC News 8 3 01). However, the governments and the pro factions failed to secure agreement on sequencing procedures that would facilitate any real movement. Instead, they only managed to freeze the process, to shield it from collapse and from a 'formal review' (UTV, 8 3 01). The freeze of the stalled implementation process was facilitated by a one-step movement by the IRA back to its pre-October 2000 position. It committed to 're-engage with the decommissioning body on the basis of the statement it had made in May 2000.' This basis held the British government accountable for moving forward with the human rights, equality, justice, demilitarisation and policing aspects of the GFA (BBC News 8 3 01).

Some analysts interpreted the republican's move as a miscalculation on the basis that no moves had been made in return to increase the security of the institutions (Sunday Tribune, 11 03 01). But the IFF model can explain the republican's move to re-engage with the IICD as logical. The move remained a reasonable request to nationalism's spoiler faction. Engagement with the IICD was a move that had already been reversed once and therefore the republican's spoiler faction could not question its reversibility. Furthermore, that it was not a response to a unilateral deadline served to reinforce it as a 'reasonable request.' On the other hand, the step served to benefit the republican pro faction on three counts. Firstly, it served it in its quest to ensure that the British government re-made its promises to link the implementation of police reforms and demilitarisation to the IRA's decommissioning process. This link, which provided for some parallel sequencing, was critical if the sceptical faction was to be kept on board.

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\(^5\) Reid replaced Mandelson as Secretary for State in January 2001. Mandelson's removal was the result of a political scandal in Britain and not out of matters relating to Northern Ireland. But the move was arguably helpful for implementation as many nationalist actors objected personally to Mandelson, some considering him to be a 'securocrate' (Gerry Kelly Dublin City University Nov 2000). These objections, some of which appear to have been justified, presented barriers to implementation and gave republican spoiler factions opportunities with which to attract sceptical factions.
and the spoiler faction to be weakened. Secondly, it helped Sinn Féin’s leadership in its electoral quest to ensure that it appealed to the large pro-agreement section of the electorate. Electoral success would further reduce the spoiler faction’s ability to question the strategy of the pro faction leadership. Thirdly, it shielded the GFA from collapse by effectively ‘freezing’ the stalling.

The failure to break the stalling that blocked implementation in March can be attributed to similar dynamics as before: the absence of procedures for parallel sequencing and the persistence of issue hierarchy demands. If the pro factions were to reduce the appeal of the spoiler factions in March 2001, a package settlement, in which all issues for implementation were agreed and implementation sequenced in parallel, was required. But the procedures for governing the sequencing and timing of implementation did not change as no package proposal was reached. Given the impending election and the pressures that the campaign would have on intra-formation factionalism, it was unlikely to be reached until after June.

The battle between the DUP and the UUP was at the heart of the electoral campaign and at the outset the UUP’s pro faction was highly vulnerable. Internal UUP sources indicated that high amongst the concerns of its pro faction was the increasingly likely prospect that in place of the GFA would emerge a political order in which the power of ‘mafia-style’ paramilitary groups was dramatically increased, along with the power of extremist and intransigent elements within both conflict formations. In such a scenario, the political relevance of the UUP, and especially of its pro faction, would sharply reduce. If the UUP’s pro faction was to retain the power to implement the GFA, it needed the IRA to take a step towards full decommissioning before June. This caused commentators to say that a move on decommissioning before June was necessary if the GFA agreement was to be saved from collapse (IT, 20.4.01) and the UUP’s pro faction saved from the above-described fate. However, it appeared unlikely that such a move would be forthcoming.

57 According to one report teenagers were flocking to loyalist paramilitary groups, even though they were on cease-fire and the organisations were signing members by the 100s, The Guardian, 3.4.01. Alleged death threats from a republican terror group (Utv, 20.04.01) heightened tensions.

Re-acting to this threat and in a quest to defuse the decommissioning issue hierarchy demanded by its spoiler and sceptical factions, the UUP leadership introduced further break down and reciprocity to the executive issue in May 2001. David Trimble submitted a pre-dated letter of resignation to the speaker of the Assembly, making credible his threat to resign on July 1 in the absence of a substantial IRA move to decommission (IT, 9.05.01). In the event of his resignation on July 1, the Assembly rules allowed six weeks before the GFA would automatically go into review, to new assembly elections (BT, 10.05.01) or to a further suspension under the Suspension Act. With the decommissioning issue temporarily shelved, Trimble had silenced his spoiler faction’s call for decommissioning before June, and had enabled the UUP to fight a more unified electoral campaign than would otherwise have been possible. However in spite of Trimble’s threat, the spoiler faction and those sceptical who were increasingly dubious about the benefits of the agreement, made significant gains in the Westminster elections. An increase in the DUP’s representation at Westminster (Table 6.1), which was mirrored in local elections (IT, 13.06.01), raised questions about the ability of UUP’s pro faction to continue with its policy of implementation.

But equally significant to the increase in support for the DUP was the tone of the DUP’s election campaign. The campaign was unprecedented in that it almost amounted to an acceptance of the GFA. Speculation as to whether or not this was a tactical shift in policy (IT, 30.05.01) missed the point. It failed to highlight the significance of the shift which appears to have been a practical response to a growing realisation that full implementation could proceed without its support, and that in this scenario the DUP risked exposing itself as a spoiler faction. The sequencing and timing of implementation had limited its opportunity to ‘spoil’ from without and, arguably by June 2001 it had begun to limit its capacity to spoil the agreement from within: it may have been that to eclipse the UUP it would have to work the institutions of the agreement.

59 The DUP’s principles included support for devolution; support for the police; for ‘genuine equality’ and an accountable relationship with the Republic of Ireland. Interestingly, the DUP did not campaign on a return to the pre GFA ‘RUC,’ but on one to ‘restore the morale and effectiveness of the police force, and while opposed to power-sharing with Sinn Fein without de-commissioning this can be read as willing to share power in the presence of de-commissioning. DUP, Seven Principles Document.
Table 6.1 Westminster Election Results, 2001 and 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Unionist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 (Total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>33 (9) (by-election, 2000)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>14 (3) (by-election, 2000)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Unionist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 (Total)

Source: Northern Ireland Election Results since 1973 [http://www.aik.ac.uk/elections/gallsum.htm](http://www.aik.ac.uk/elections/gallsum.htm)

Also highly significant in the Westminster elections was the increase in Sinn Fein's representation in both Westminster and on local councils (Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). The result marked its surpassing of the SDLP to become the largest nationalist party. This arguably increased the power of the pro-faction leadership in Sinn Fein vis-à-vis its sceptical and spoiler factions, but, as will be clear below, it also introduced tension to the pro-faction alliance within nationalism.

Table 6.2, Local (district council) elections, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
<th>Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>181336</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>169477</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>163269</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>153424</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>40443</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUP</td>
<td>12261</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKUP</td>
<td>4763</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Coalition</td>
<td>3301</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUAP</td>
<td>2648</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>51997</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>34 clrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total valid vote</td>
<td>790,457</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Uses a first past the post electoral system with one candidate elected from each of the 18 constituencies.

In a South Antrim by-election held on 21 September 2000 as a result of the death of the UUP's Clifford Foyle, the Rev William McCrea (DUP) defeated the UUP candidate, David Burnside, with 37.95% of the vote to 35.25%. Thus the DUP had one seat more and the UUP one less going into the 2001 election.
### Table 6.3, Local (district council) elections, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
<th>Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seats</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>175,036</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>130,387</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>106,934</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>99,651</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>41,952</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUP</td>
<td>12,051</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>6,244</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women's Coalition</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKUP</td>
<td>2,945</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2,774</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>2,634</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind Nationalists</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind Nationalist Community</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newtownabbey Ratepayers</td>
<td>1,424</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dem Left</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Unionists</td>
<td>10,376</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>23,695</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Total valid vote</strong></td>
<td>632,197</td>
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**POST ELECTIONS WESTON TALKS SEARCH FOR A PACKAGE SETTLEMENT**

Immediately after the election, the pro factions and the governments were faced with Trimble’s July 1 resignation deadline. Despite the issue breakdown introduced to the issues concerning the stability of the institutions and decommissioning, demands for issue hierarchy by both the UUP, the DUP and Sinn Fein (and to a lesser extent now the SDLP) persisted in providing the single biggest obstacle to implementation. Republicans argued that they had honoured the May 2000 deadline to be in discussions with the IICD\(^{62}\) and were still awaiting a unionist reciprocal move to secure the institutions. Unionists insisted that the IRA had honoured neither its May 2000 nor June 2001 deadlines, and its pro faction called for a substantial move by the IRA to put its weapons beyond use\(^{63}\) before the institutions were re-secured (Independent 8 5 01).

According to the IFF hypotheses the parallel sequencing still absent from design was necessary to further implementation. Lending some support to this hypothesis, the negotiations running up to the resignation deadline (August 10/11) were unprecedented in that they specifically pressed for a breakthrough on all issues as part of the one

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\(^{62}\) IRA – IICD contacts continued throughout the March – July period (IICD Report, 3-7-01)

\(^{63}\) Spoiler and some sceptic factions still insisted on full de-commissioning.
package stability of the institutions, decommissioning, police reform and
demilitarisation, as well as outstanding issues on human rights, criminal justice and
equality (Independent 2701, IT 13701) The initiative climaxed with the high-
intensity, secret, proximity talks at Weston Park in England (9-14 July) These talks
were held against the backdrop of the 'marching season' and mounting inter-community
violence that resulted in the worst rioting in nationalist areas in many years. The
motivations behind this violence were undoubtedly political, and clear incentives
existed for the spoiler factions to orchestrate it. And reacting to pressures from the
spoiler and sceptical factions that were part of his movement, in a provocative, public
speech made during the course of the secret talks Adams declared that 'the issue of arms
would not be resolved within the artificial deadline imposed by Trimble' (IT 12701)
Meanwhile, pressure on the unionist pro faction intensified with an Orange Order call
for the UUP to withdraw from talks (Independent 130701)

The Weston Park initiative ended in stalemate, but this time the governments used their
power as drivers of the implementation process to impose a deadline within two weeks
they would present a 'take-it-or-leave-it' package to the parties outlining the sequence
and timing that would govern the implementation of all issues in the process. If the IFF
theory is accurate, the package proposal would dramatically close-off the opportunities
for spoiler factions to demand issue hierarchy, and would thus secure significant
progress towards implementation, if it included reciprocal and/or reversible issue
breakdown and parallel sequencing of implementation

AUGUST - SEPTEMBER THE PACKAGE SETTLEMENT
The 'rescue package' (August 1) was divided into four sections: decommissioning,
policing, demilitarisation and the stability of the institutions (Independent1 - 2801) It
centred on encouraging the unionist pro faction to take three clear steps towards the
establishment of secure institutions: the re-establishment of a working executive (by
Trimble), of inclusive North-South institutions, and the agreement to sign a statement
preventing a First Minister from using his/her position to repeat actions like the refusal

64 Loyalists groups threw petrol bombs at police and nationalist estates in Portadown (IT 120701),
loyalist paramilitaries were firing on Shankhill Road (120701), tense nationalist riots in response to a
parade on the Ardoyne in Belfast resulted in the police shooting of 40 plastic bullets (IT, 13-7-01)
Meanwhile a several-week blockade of a Catholic school on the Ardoyne in Belfast began (Independent,
30-7-01)
to nominate Sinn Fein to the North-South bodies. But the package did not request that Trimble and his party take these moves first, and they were, in fact, subtly reciprocal with a more firm commitment from republicans to decommission. Procedures for decommissioning were left to the IICD whose work on disarmament to date was defined by issue breakdown, but the package implied that a decommissioning step should precede the step to restore the stability of the institutions (Independent, 28 01). No deadline for the end of the decommissioning process was given and no rule or procedure presented the unionist spoiler faction with a clear deadline on which to seize (although clearly factions could use missed deadlines as a justification for the creation of new ones).

In keeping with the prior-handling of the issue, demilitarisation was presented as a series of steps, a ‘progressive rolling programme’ to reduce troop levels and military installations, moving to close army bases, end army presence at police stations and destroy surveillance towers. These steps were more or less reciprocal and they depended on movement from republicans on decommissioning. But demilitarisation, in turn, depended on a decrease in the threat of violence in the province (itself clearly connected to decommissioning). The logic was that a move to de-commission by the IRA would enable the loyalist pro faction to decrease the insecurity that was evident amongst its grass roots and actively encouraged by the elite and sub-elite members of its spoiler faction. Further, as later events indicate (October, November 2001), the British government had given Sinn Fein a commitment to immediately implement a number of these concrete steps in a response to a significant move on decommissioning.

The governments, in consultation with the parties, had sought during the Weston Park talks to narrow the ground between Mandelson’s police legislation, which had aimed to win back unionist support for police reform, and the Patten report, which nationalists favoured. The package aimed to include enough, and as little, of the Patten Report’s outstanding recommendations to protect both the nationalist and the unionist pro factions from their sceptical and spoiler factions. This would enable both to make the

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65 Trimble’s refusal to allow Sinn Fein MLAs to sit on the North-South Ministerial Council was, in fact, successfully challenged by Sinn Fein who had lodged judicial review proceedings in November 2000.
66 In fact, the British government was instigating a de facto return to try to implement the reforms outlined in the Patten Report. This was arguably only possible as part of the implementation package.
critical move to endorse the newly-proposed Police Board by making nominations to it. The logic of the implementation plan appears to have been that with the endorsement and establishment of the new inclusive, representative and accountable institution, all other aspects of police reform would be incrementally implemented. Without its endorsement, the implementation of police reform, and consequently the whole implementation plan, would be stalled (IT, 19 09 01).

The governments' approach to the policing issue appears to have been aimed at strengthening the hand of both pro factions. They first sought the parties' acceptance of 'principles' on which the governments would base the final police reform implementation plan. With this approval secured, they would publish a revised implementation plan which would include details on the composition and powers of the police board. Therefore, any reasonable objections to the principles on which the plan would be based could be dealt with before the official plan was published and the pro factions could then present the 'principles' as a reasonable request to their respective spoiler factions. Also part of the package were commitments to introduce draft legislation for an overhaul of criminal justice system, to appoint a judge of international standing to investigate alleged cases of loyalist paramilitary-RUC collusion, and to review the parades commission. The latter was designed to meet unionists' concerns, the former to meet those of nationalists.

There were potential difficulties with the rescue package. The first difficulty was the broken-down nature of the decommissioning issue and the reciprocal yet less broken-down nature of the steps that were required to secure the institutions. This may have given the spoiler faction within unionism grounds for articulating reasonable objections to the deal. Why take such a large step in response to IRA moves that were still short of full decommissioning? However, in a similar manner to the UUP's move to form the executive in May 2000, the move was reversible in the event of the IRA's reversal of its parallel process of step by step decommissioning. Its reversal would automatically impair the stability of the institutions once again, even if the UUP signed the mooted statement. This reversibility, which might have assisted the pro faction within unionism,

67 The new Police Board was to incorporate ten elected representatives to be nominated by parties on the basis of their strength in the Assembly and using the de Hondt system. It would also include 9 independent members. This gave elected members a majority. See Irish Times, 18-09-01.
in turn highlights the potential difficulties that the package presented for nationalism's pro faction. The spoiler faction within republicanism could argue that if the unionist move to re-establish the institutions could be reversed in the event of no IRA decommissioning, it could be reversed in the event of IRA decommissioning. The British government's evident power to suspend the institutions (though on some occasions it was used in consultation with the Irish government) provided further fuel to this argument. If the spoiler faction could convince the sceptical faction that the institutions would never be secure unless full decommissioning (surrender) had taken place and that, even after full decommissioning the security of the institutions remained in doubt, the pro faction within the republican movement and nationalism in general would face insurmountable obstacles to implementation. This would possibly precipitate an end to the cohesion between the SDLP and Sinn Féin.

Reinforcing this difficulty for the republican pro faction, the consensus was that a move on decommissioning was essential first. A number of questions thus abound: did this provide the spoiler faction in the republican camp with a reasonable basis on which to refuse to implement? Could the spoiler faction present this move as one that continued to demand an unchanged, unreasonable, unilateral move, to which the terms of the agreement did not bind them? If this were the case, would the pro faction within nationalism be forced to take this line to maintain the unity of the movement?

Two factors central to the design of the implementation process worked against this scenario. On the one hand, the formula did not call for the full decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, but only for a significant move to begin the phased process to which republicans had already agreed in principle. The issue was broken into a stepped process and, while not 'reversible' in the technical sense, the size of the move was not specified but secret. It could possibly be presented as a reasonable request to the spoiler faction especially given Trimble's agreement to reciprocate with three steps towards securing the institutions. This breakdown decreased, but did not entirely remove, the spoiler faction's opportunity to reject the package on the basis, that in its call for a decommissioning move to secure the institution, it demanded issue hierarchy. But on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the move was not just presented as a prerequisite if Trimble was to secure the institutions. It was to take place in conjunction with the implementation of other issues: police reform and demilitarisation. If police
reforms were reasonable and their implementation sufficiently broken down, and if the promise to begin demilitarisation were real, it would prove difficult for the spoiler faction to present a reasonable objection to a move to begin decommissioning.

AUGUST – OCTOBER 2001 RESPONSE AND BREAKTHROUGH

In response to the package and to the August 11 deadline (which the governments appeared likely to meet with a one-day 'suspension'), the IICD announced that the IRA had agreed on a method for putting its armoury completely and verifiably beyond use (IT 7-8-01). With this unprecedented move (Independent, 7 8 01) the IRA had met two of the three demands made by the pro, sceptical and spoiler factions of unionism commitment to put arms beyond use (May 2000) and commitment to a specific method of putting them beyond use. Yet the move failed to give any timetable or any indication as to when the IRA might begin the actual decommissioning process. Therefore, it was predictably too little for unionist pro faction who, after much consultation with the UUC ruling body, publicly announced that unless the blueprint for implementation delivered an actual decommissioning of (some) weapons, the Ulster Unionists could not support it (IT, 8 7 01). The IRA responded by withdrawing its offer on August 14 (IRA Statement) and blamed its decision on both the British government and the UUP's rejection of police reforms recommended by Patten (IRA Statement 14 8 01). This suggested that as long as the police reform implementation plan was pending there remained an opportunity for breakthrough.

Some perceived the first IRA statement in August as part of a 'genuine attempt' (Hume, IT, 15 8 01) by those in favour of implementing the agreement to meet the needs of the unionist pro faction, by making a move to progress the process of decommissioning, while maintaining the unity of its organisation. David McKitterick suggests that the republican movement's pro faction perceived the UUP's rejection of the move as an upping of the stakes (Independent, 12 08 01). Given the climate of violence, it would appear that this faction of Sinn Fein aimed to ensure the security of the institutions with one decommissioning step and to use the next decommissioning step to induce amendments to the police reform which should silence its spoiler faction. Some members likely hoped that they could at once silence their spoiler factions and take

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68 This mechanism gave another six weeks before the agreement would go into review or elections.
credit at the expense of the SDLP for further changes to police reform. In fact, it is quite likely that both motivations were behind the move. However, agreement on the rules and procedures for the implementation of police reform was critical for any breakthrough.

The extent to which the policing-implementation body met recommendations of the Patten report would be highly significant. If the plan for the implementation of police reform enabled the SDLP and the pro faction Sinn Fein leadership to make reasonable requests of the nationalist spoiler faction, it would offer an opportunity for breakthrough on all issues, including decommissioning. The position adopted by the SDLP towards the rest part of the package was critical in this context. It gave an important signal to the government immediately after the package was published when it indicated that if the implementation of police reform did not live up to its expectations one hundred percent it would not reject it out of hand (IT 9 8 01). Subsequently, in response to the revised implementation plan (August 17), the SDLP took a historic step in endorsing the new policing authority (Independent 22 08 01) on 21st August.

The implementation plan provided for a powerfully accountable, over-arching, representative police board, which had the power to make the Chief Constable explain operational decisions and to sack him/her with majority support. It also provided for representative District Policing Partnership Boards at local level, in addition to an Ombudsman office (implemented in October 2000) with a staff of 70. In a gesture to unionists, the RUC was not to be disbanded but to be renamed and to adopt a new badge and symbols that are free from any association with either the British or the Irish states (IT, 18 8 01). Substantial compensation was provided for police victims and their families. Most analysts, including some members of the original Patten Commission, agreed that the accountability structures flowing from the police implementation plan were close to being compatible with Patten’s recommendations (IT 18 08 01).

As analysts explain, nationalists had never been prepared to concede legitimacy to a reformed RUC in the absence of an overall settlement to the constitutional issue, as without this, nationalism continued to reject the state that the RUC represented (O’Leary and McGarry, 2000 35). The SDLP’s decision to endorse the police reform implementation plan, suggests not only that reforms were deemed sufficient to truly transform the institution, but that they perceived the step as furthering the consolidation of the overall political settlement, which they required to ensure the legitimacy of the new police.
Independent, 21 08 01) Many groups ordinarily sympathetic to republican concerns about policing, including the Irish bishops, the Irish government and members of the Patten Commission on policing (IT, 27 08 01, IT 22 08 01, IT 30 08 01), claimed that the implementation plan included provisions to deal with these concerns. But in the first signs of real division in the pan-nationalist front, Adams called the SDLP’s endorsement ‘pre-mature and short-sighted’ (IT, 30 08 01). Significantly, however, he did not rule out the prospect of ever joining the police board.

Sinn Fein’s refusal to endorse the police board might be read as the action of a monolithic, spoiler faction, attempting to use process concerns on the issue of police reform to defeat the SDLP (pro faction) in the battle within nationalism. Alternatively, it can be read as the move of a pro faction, unwilling to take an irreversible move until the avenues that would allow its spoiler faction to increase its sceptical faction’s unhappiness with the process were closed off. If this were the case, they could be expected to move in the context of the overall package. Furthermore, another consequence of Sinn Fein’s decision not to immediately join the board was that the DUP did join. This certainly served to make the policing board more stable and reduced some of the pressure on the pro faction within the UUP and, perhaps, saved the board from the fate of the executive.

FROM PACKAGE TO BREAKTHROUGH

The package proposal and the publication of the implementation plan for police reform increased the pressure that was mounting on the Republican movement. Pressure climaxed when the SDLP, along with the UUP and the DUP, formally nominated representatives to sit on the board (Independent 21 09 01). The police reform issue, while far from resolved, was institutionally resolved and the three parties implicitly indicated their support for the reform, the implementation of which would be overseen by the board. But room remained for spoiler factions to present obstacles to its implementation and the reciprocity inherent in its implementation is clear from an RUC Chief Constable security warning that followed the nominations without serious moves towards decommissioning by the IRA, followed by loyalist and other republican groups.

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71 A seven member Oversight Commission on policing had been set up to ensure that the recommendations in the Patten Report were implemented. This work was ongoing.
it will be difficult for the new police service to implement important policing changes (IT, 22 09 01)

Immediately before the approaching six-week deadline (23 September)⁷², and almost simultaneously to the nominations to the police board by the SDLP, the UUP and the DUP, the IRA announced that it had intensified its dialogue with the IICD. This reversed its decision of August 14 to cut off communication with the IICD (20 9 01 IRA Statement) But it was unlikely to secure a breakthrough and almost all parties immediately declared it as ‘welcome but not sufficient’ ⁷³ In fact, the move offered less than what the IRA had agreed with the IICD before the 6th August, and it did not give any indication as to when decommissioning would take place. Therefore, the republican pro faction was most likely aware that the move would not enable the UUP to re-establish the security of the institutions. Instead, the intention behind the move may have been to enable the unionist pro faction to persuade its sceptical faction to save the institutions by tolerating a further one-day suspension. The unionist pro faction had been presenting this one-day suspension as difficult to accept unless there was a realistic prospect that decommissioning was going to happen’ (IT, 18-9-01) Its spoiler faction, which clearly had the support of some of its sceptical faction, demanded that there be no more one-day suspensions if the IRA failed to disarm before the end of the six-week deadline 21 September (Donaldson, IT, 20-9-01)

However, the Secretary of State allowed what he referred to as the last one-day suspension on 21st September and this extended the life of the process by six weeks. Trimble’s move in the immediate aftermath of the suspension was a clear and direct response to the pressure from his spoiler faction. Once again placing the stability of the institutions at the centre of a reciprocal bargain, he tabled an assembly motion to exclude Sinn Fein from the executive on the grounds that it had not lived up to its promises of May 2000 and May 2001. If, as anticipated, the exclusion motion were to fail to win cross-community consent, the UUP ministers vowed to resign one-by-one from the executive. This would precipitate the fall of the Assembly unless the Assembly

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⁷² A ‘one-day’ suspension of the institutions on 11th August had given the parties another 6 weeks to agree on a formula that would re-establish the institutions.

⁷³ They argued that it did not give a full response to the Weston Park proposals (IT, 21-09-01)
was once again suspended.\textsuperscript{74} Therefore, when the Secretary of State confirmed that further one-day suspensions were no longer tenable in the absence of progress (IT, 4.10.01), the implementation process faced its most defining moment: were no progress made that enabled the Assembly to re-elect (or elect) First and DF Ministers before the next six-week deadline, a formal review and direct rule or new elections would follow (IT, 10.10.01).

According to the IFF hypotheses, the UUP’s pro faction hoped to use the sanction to keep its sceptical faction onside and its spoiler faction at bay. At the same time it hoped to persuade the republican leadership to take the comprehensive step on the issue of decommissioning that the UUP’s pro faction believed it was in the position to take. The spoiler faction, especially those members of it who were outside of the UUP, would have welcomed the elections at this point. A second best to elections for the spoiler faction would have been a harder ultimatum to the IRA which would have surely ensured that the IRA did not deliver decommissioning. Then if the institutions collapsed, the spoiler faction within the UUP would cite the failure of the IRA to decommission as justifying its refusal to re-establish the Assembly. It would present this as a vindication of its strategy and would, perhaps, perceive the moment as an opportune one to challenge the pro-faction-leadership of the UUP. But Trimble’s proposal to introduce sanctions was a reasonable request to his own spoilers. His decision to drag out the deadline by moving slowly towards ministerial disengagement (IT, 10.10.01) was most likely taken in the context of reports that internal debate over a comprehensive move ensued in republicanism (Independent, 10.10.01). The republican pro faction and the UUP’s pro faction needed each others’ moves for the survival of their own strategies.

In the absence of any progress, the UUP’s motion to exclude Sinn Féin was triggered. As anticipated, it failed to win cross-community support and this precipitated the incremental resignation of UUP ministers. The DUP ministers also resigned having

\textsuperscript{74} As Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam introduced a standing order which required the executive to have a proportionality of nationalists and unionists to be operative (July 1999). This had lapsed and so legally the resignation of the ministers did not make the executive inoperative. But politically the British government (arguably with the agreement of the Irish government) was unlikely to allow this to happen.
declared that they would do so to ensure the integrity of the UUP’s resignations. In reality, the DUP ministers had to resign or be left in a very difficult position of being in government with Sinn Féin when the UUP was not. By 19 October all the unionist ministers had resigned from the executive. If the parties could not find a way to continue sharing power in the executive by 25th October, the Secretary of State would choose to review the agreement, to hold fresh elections or to impose direct rule and an indefinite suspension of all institutions.

The pro faction of republicanism would have reacted to the crisis by considering its options: would a review of the agreement and the possibility of more elections, or the retention of the current assembly and a step in the decommissioning process, better serve its goal to maintain control over its organisation, to maintain the ground that it had made within the nationalist conflict formation on the SDLP and to implement the GFA? The pro faction within republicanism most likely calculated, that without decommissioning at this point, and in a subsequent election campaign in which its refusal to decommission could appear unreasonable, it could lose ground to the SDLP and thus increase the power of the sceptical faction in its own party. If a review without elections were to follow, it appeared unlikely that the restoration of the institutions would occur without this decommissioning step. In fact, it also appeared that in view of the settlement of other issues, the SDLP would insist on decommissioning in the event of a review.

A movement to de-commission could now open the way for movement that would secure the institutions and the sequenced implementation of both police reform and of demilitarisation. This narrowed options for the spoiler faction in republicanism and reduced the likelihood that it could use spoiler tactics to prevent the implementation of the agreement. The spoiler faction would have tried to argue that the actions of unionists exposed the instability of the institutions and that they should not respond to ultimatums that amounted to ‘surrender.’ However, there was a weakness in this argument which might have helped the pro faction to win the sceptical faction’s support.

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75 The result of legislation underpinning the agreement and assembly, seven days after the executive no longer functions the Secretary of State must indicate which action he will take: Review alongside indefinite suspension of all institutions or dissolution of the assembly and new elections. Irish Times 10.10.01.
for implementation The decommissioning move was part of a secret, step-by-step process which would be overseen by an independent commission and the security of the institutions could be perceived as actually dependent on the initiation of this process. The police issue could be seen as more or less institutionally settled with the implementation of agreed reforms set to begin, demilitarisation had begun and a report of the criminal justice review was complete. This surely weakened the spoiler faction’s case and protected the pro faction from the worst spoiler tactics. Parallel sequencing and issue breakdown, at least temporarily, governed the entire implementation process.

The presence of issue breakdown, the introduction of parallel sequencing by the package proposal and its near circumvention of the issue hierarchy demand should have given the unionist and nationalist pro factions the power to initiate a move while maintaining the unity of their movements. But it was critical that the unionist’s response to a republican move would increase the nationalist sceptical faction’s confidence in the stability of the institutions. Sinn Féin’s pro faction had to be assured that if it delivered the UUP was in the position to take the reciprocal step to re-instate the institutions and to leave the decommissioning issue to the IICD. Re-instate Sinn Féin’s ministers on the North-South bodies (IT, 20 10 01). Sinn Féin appeared to receive these assurances from David Trimble and on 22 October Sinn Féin publicly called on the paramilitaries to make a move on the arms issue (IT, 23 10 01). On 23 October, in the biggest breakthrough of the implementation process, the IRA announced, and the IICD confirmed, that the process of putting its weapons completely and verifiably beyond use had begun (IRA Statement, 23 10 01). Trimble immediately moved to re-instate the executive and the full working of the North-South institutions (IT, 23 10 01)

**CONCLUSION**
Given the at least temporary vindication of the pro faction’s strategy, the unionist spoiler faction was prevented from undermining the agreement with the refrain that the IRA would never decommission. And with Trimble at least temporarily in the driving seat, the pro faction sought to institutionalise the security of the institutions. Before seeking re-election as First Minister in the Assembly, he called an emergency meeting of the UUP ruling council to win approval for a return to full participation in the Executive and the North-South Ministerial Council, and for an instruction to all
Assembly members by the UUC to support this approval (24 10 01) Once again this lends support to the IFF model's prediction that step-by-step moves remove many of the conditions that allow spoiler factions to undermine the implementation process without the approval of the UUC, Trimble would have been consistently vulnerable to the accusation that pro factions had over-estimated the significance of the decommissioning move. With the approval, pro faction strategy prevailed, and the sequence and timing at least temporarily limited the spoiler faction's opportunities.76

There has been much speculation on the extent to which two external events were the catalysts to the IRA decision to formally begin the decommissioning process: the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, and the August 2001 arrest of three men, formerly and possibly still linked to the republican movement for alleged collaboration with Columbian guerrilla insurgency, FARC. But it is difficult to support the argument that pressure from the US administration following these events was the catalyst. The American government's priority in the immediate aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Centre was to secure the support of the British government in a 'war against terrorism.' It would thus appear unlikely that the US administration wanted to interfere in Northern Ireland in any way that was incompatible with the British government's strategy. Thus, to the extent that the British government wanted to use the incident to put pressure on the IRA, it was important. In fact, to the extent that pro factions within the nationalist formation wanted to use it to highlight to nationalist sceptical and spoiler factions the futility of any other course of action, it was perhaps most significant.

One analysis considers the events of 11th September 2001 to have had 'dramatic reverberations in Northern Ireland' and, combined with the events in Columbia, 'to have changed the terms of trade' and ended the 'proverbial logjam' in the process.77 The Irish Times published a letter which articulated a view that with the events of September 11th 'the shadow world between paramilitary and legitimate politics in which...'

76 Despite this UUC's ruling, two of the 28 UUP assembly members voted against the motion to re-elect Trimble as First Minister in November. A feature of the consociational settlement helped to avoid the crisis in executive formation that this nearly created. Assembly parties had to adopt either a 'unionist,' 'nationalist' or 'other' label, but this label was amendable. Following the action of the dissenting UUP MLAs, the Alliance Party - a traditionally unionist party but with middle ground support - changed its label from 'other' to 'unionist.' Trimble needed the Alliance party votes to pass the motion by the cross-community consent procedures.
Sinn Fein operates, ended' (IT, 10-10-01) But suggesting that it ended on September 11th is, at best over-simplistic and, at worst highly inaccurate. The most important consequence of the US support for Sinn Fein is the licence that this gives it to fundraise there and to substantially enrich the party each year. The majority of its US support groups had backed its peace process strategy, had been hugely instrumental in the promotion of Sinn Fein with the US administration, and had invested energy and enormous resources in promoting Sinn Fein's commitment to democratic politics and the GFA (Darby and McGinty, 2000 90-1). That they would have continued to support a Sinn Fein that was evidently refusing to let go of its bullet and ballot box strategy, where it was no longer perceived to be a legitimate one, is unlikely. There is a strong argument to suggest that Sinn Fein's ability to indefinitely operate in this shadow world while maintaining the capacity to raise the funds so important to its strength in the US had ended in 1994 or, if not then, in 1998, provided that the agreement was perceived as being implemented by other parties to the conflict. And in September 2001 this did indeed appear to be the case implementation had progressed to the point where a package that appeared to guarantee implementation was dependent on the Republican movement taking one step to initiate a decommissioning process. This was the crucial catalyst.

An approach that interprets the October 2001 IRA move on decommissioning as a direct result of US pressure is based on one that perceives the republican movement as a monolith. This approach tends to interpret the implementation strategy of the movement as one that seeks to use brinkmanship to squeeze concessions from the unionist formation and the governments (JIR 09 99 19), presumably with a view to getting closer to its united-Ireland ideal. But given this interpretation, it is difficult to explain why previous, tentative steps had been taken towards decommissioning the appointment of an IICD interlocutor, the agreement to allow weapons inspections, agreement with an independent body on a firm way of putting arms beyond use. Nor can it explain the willingness of the republicans to negotiate about decommissioning as part of a package concerning demilitarisation, decommissioning, police reform and the security of the institutions. The IFF model explains these events as resulting from a

77 Democratic Dialogue, November 2001
78 Off the record official Irish government sources have indicated that the leadership of Sinn Fein had given very positive re-assurances about the intentions to de-commission before 11th September
process whereby republican spoiler faction’s avenues were effectively curtailed by issue breakdown and parallel sequencing.

The IFF model proposes that pro factions will be able to persuade sceptical factions to support initiatives that further implementation and to curtail the ability of spoiler factions to exploit issues to prevent their implementation, if the sequence of issues accords to reciprocal and reversible issue breakdown, parallel implementation and the absence of any form of issue hierarchy. Through sequence and timing procedures that approximated the above hypotheses, the most serious movement towards the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement was prompted in October 2001. The move on decommissioning was immediately followed by a serious start to the roll-out programme for demilitarisation in Northern Ireland (Irish Independent, 25 10 01). As the institutions functioned once again, and the police board was established as a working institution, a second move on decommissioning under the auspices of the IICD followed in April 2002 (IT 09/04/02). UUP spokesman, Stephen King, interpreted the IRA’s ‘authenticated moves on decommissioning’ in April as a severe blow to the opponents of the agreement, and as ‘proving anti-agreement unionists wrong twice’ (IT 09 04 02). Almost completing the sequence and the implementation of all issues, Sinn Féin nearly endorsed the police authority on a number of occasions during the summer of 2002 and gave its strongest indication that it would eventually join in September (RTE News, 19 09 02).

While the process continues to move in parallel sequence and small steps, it is safe from spoiler factions. From October 2001 until April 2002, the implementation of the issues concerning the security of the institutions, decommissioning, equality and human rights, police reform, prisoners and criminal justice, were subject to issue breakdown, implicit reciprocity, and parallel sequencing. The IFF model predicts that given the issue breakdown and parallel implementation at the heart of implementation design and the insulated institutions of the implementation process there should be further progress. Given near agreement to the parallel implementation of all other issues, the full implementation of the agreement is likely to require one further agreement on the simultaneous implementation of decommissioning and of measures that will fully secure the institutions. On this basis it is argued that full implementation would be facilitated by the parallel sequencing of full decommissioning with a British
government (in consultation with the Irish government) rejection (in legislation) of its powers to suspend the Northern Irish institutions. The latter move would remove from republican spoiler factions a pretext on which to refuse to de-commission on the grounds that the British government could at any time undermine the democratic institutions of Northern Ireland. This argument continues to provide a pretext for those who wish to encourage further scepticism in the sceptical faction of republicanism. The former move (real decommissioning) would remove the pretext from the unionist spoiler faction that refuses to continue power-sharing with Sinn Fein on the basis of its failure to disarm.

But there is evidence of further difficulty in the sizeable groups who remain opposed to the consolidation of the GFA and willing to use and to incite violence to this end. These groups are in the position to threaten the phased implementation of decommissioning, full police reform or demilitarisation, and to ensure that the institutions remain permanently unstable. In September 2002, the biggest threat to the consolidation of implementation was perhaps the pretext that growing violence gives to those who continue to present 'legitimate obstacles' to implementation with a view to furthering spoiler agendas. Cracks in the ceasefires open up once again the opportunity for both sides to demand issue hierarchy, beginning with a refusal to continue to implement until the 'violence' stops and until the IRA arms are fully de-commissioned. A direct consequence of this uncertainty, in a clear illustration of the pro faction's reduced ability to keep its spoiler faction at bay, the UUP's ruling council passed another motion. This re-introduced a decommissioning deadline and committed the UUP to pull out of the executive by January 2003 if the IRA does not disband. But the escalating violence, perpetuated by spoiler factions, provides republican spoiler factions with the pretext on which to refuse to de-commission. This fuels the agenda of spoiler factions within unionism.

The uncertainty over the sincerity of the ceasefires spreads to uncertainty over the rights to continue prisoner releases, which in turn weakens further the support of some paramilitary groups for the process. The more the paramilitaries' support for the agreement weakens, the more pressure there will be on ceasefires and on the entire implementation process, including the stability of the institutions. The British government's attempts throughout 2002 to re-unite the divided loyalists paramilitaries...
under a combined leadership or loose organisation illustrates the degree to which this disunity is perceived to threaten the agreement. Further, in an endeavour to insulate the issue of whether or not the IRA or loyalist paramilitaries are breaking their cease-fires, the Secretary of State announced the appointment of an independent adviser in September 2002. The independent advisor will judge, in an agreed way, the degree to which violence is orchestrated, and thus the extent to which ceasefires are being breached (RTE NEWS, 19 09 02). With this, the governments hope to ensure that parallel sequencing of implementation continues and to prevent credible allegations that might justify the re-introduction of issue hierarchy demands. The power to introduce the independent advisor stemmed from the relative insulation of the institution with oversight powers in the Northern Irish peace process. Whether he proves to be sufficiently insulated may have an important bearing on the eventual outcome of the process.

In sum, the model predicted that the closer the institutions that shape and set agendas in the implementation process proximate institutions insulated from post-agreement political wrangling, the more likely that the sequencing and timing that facilitates unity between the pro and sceptical factions will be put in place. Facilitated by the power of the two governments and the existence of a number of independent commissions, many of the agenda setters in the implementation of the Northern Ireland agreement are insulated and have prioritised implementation above all else. This has ensured considerable progress in implementation, despite continued efforts by spoiler factions to insist on issue hierarchy. The ultimate outcome depends on the pro faction’s continued ability to resist the issue hierarchy demands that spoiler factions insist on and to replace them with parallel sequencing and reciprocal or reversible breakdown.
In January 1992 the government of El Salvador and the FMLN insurgency\(^1\) signed the Chapultepec Peace Accords. The Accords committed both parties to implement a series of substantive agreements which had been negotiated since July 1990 according to the timetable set out in the final agreement. Chapultepec encompasses all of the agreements, at the heart of which was a basic compromise: the FMLN would bring its insurgency to an end, would disarm, demobilise and accept and compete constitutionally in the political system, in return for a series of institutional reforms that would alter the civil-military power structure that had characterised the Salvadorian political system for over seventy years.

A number of substantive agreements were reached in 1990 and 1991 but spoiler factions were able to persistently undermine these compromises by disrupting efforts to agree on the procedures for their implementation. The barriers which they presented were finally overcome in late 1991 when a General Agreement was reached on the procedures, sequence and timing that would govern the implementation of all issues. This chapter will firstly use the IFF model to explain how the design of the process between September and December 1991 helped to facilitate pro factions in reaching this agreement. It then proceeds to explain how the design of the implementation process contributed to the ultimately successful implementation of the Accords. Ambiguities in the timetable initially presented opportunities for spoiler factions to demand issue hierarchy and to refuse to sequence the implementation of all issues together. This presented barriers to implementation and served to make it a tortuous and conflict-ridden process. These barriers, and the stalling that they encouraged, were eventually overcome by the careful introduction of parallel sequencing, issue breakdown and reciprocity, a task facilitated by the relatively insulated implementation mechanisms and the absence of clear issue hierarchy in the terms of the settlement.

**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**
The roots of the Salvadorian conflict lie in the depth of the political and socio-economic crisis which emerged from widespread poverty, the concentration of wealth in the hands

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\(^1\) Frente Farabundo Martí Liberacion Nacionale.
of a small landowning class, and the strength of its over fifty-year long alliance with the military (CIIR, 1994: 3; Juhn, 1998: 7). The persistent refusal by the oligarchy and the military to introduce any reforms, even in response to political, non-violent pressure for change, radicalised the resistance movements and social and political unrest escalated to violent conflict in the 1970s. Mirroring the decoupling of traditionally strong conservative alliances that preceded the escalation of conflict in Northern Ireland, a reformist-led coup in 1979 heralded the escalation of conflict to civil war. For many of its instigators, the reformist coup aimed to reduce the appeal of the extreme left, by breaking the domination of the narrow oligarchic-military alliance to incorporate moderate, democratic politicians (Christian Democratic Party – PDC) and forward-looking capitalists into a reformed political system (Byrne, 1996: 53). But conflict of interest between the differently-motivated members of the junta over the degree of reform that would be introduced and the degree to which positions of power would be opened up to moderate ‘leftist elements’ resulted in disunity. This disunity helped to ensure that the repression of peaceful protest continued as it had under the previous government. Ultimately the reformist junta was replaced with a new government which was based on a pact between centrist elements of the PDC and the conservative victors of the military power struggle (Juhn, 1998: 34).

Given the failure of the coup to introduce even moderate reform and the subsequent PDC pact with the military, the support for both moderate and radical-leftist opposition increased. The mass organisations and parties that had left the junta were unified into Zamora’s FDR\(^2\) behind a platform for democratic, revolutionary government (Byrne, 1996: 61). Five left-wing, guerrilla organisations founded during the 1960s and 1970s united into a well-organised, coalition movement with a combined military command and with considerable grass-root support: FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front). Ultra-right civilian and military squads with institutional connections to the divided armed forces were incensed and fearful of the threat that even minor reforms would bring. They were to further fuel the conflict and in the aftermath of the reformist coup they launched a brutal campaign of violence against both leftist guerrillas and the PDC elements of the government.

\(^2\) Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR)
In 1980 the repression of the civilian population by the army and the deaths squads was unprecedented in its intensity (Stanley, 1996: 2). The military government’s actions were in part motivated by the threat posed to its power by the successful leftist revolution in Nicaragua. Its actions can also be explained by the dramatic increase in financial support from the US that followed this revolution. In response to the increasingly violent actions of the government, in 1981 the FMLN launched a country-wide insurgency which rocked the foundation of the state. The threat posed by the insurgency dramatically confirmed the balance of power within the PDC-military government in favour of the military and its repressive, counter-insurgency policy. While the strong US support enabled the armed forces to achieve a stalemate in the war from 1983 until the settlement (Stanley, 1996: 3), the cycle of violence continued for almost a decade and resulted in over 75,000 deaths from 1981 to 1992.

While there were certainly many amongst the FMLN leadership and some amongst the rank and file who were ideologically driven to set up a socialist state, it would appear that other motivations were on balance more significant. The six-point platform agreed by its five leaders in December 1980 was pragmatic and moderate (McClintock, 1998: 56-7). During the civil war, the most frequently mentioned rationale for pursuing the armed struggle by the elite, sub-elite and rank and file was the impossibility of instigating change through elections, the repression of dissent by the military and economic grievances (McClintock, 48-63; 250-271). Many were also motivated by a sense of fear and by the need for protection from the military and the ultra-right death squads, who threatened those with even a tenuous connection to the left movement (Stanley, 1996: 223). When the counter insurgency adopted a new policy which opened up the political system slightly in the 1980s, some middle-class support for the violent struggle was lost. These political developments would arguably have strengthened the moderate factions of the FMLN who, rather than seeking to overthrow the political system, were prepared to use the war to force the government to negotiate and to change the political system (ECA, 03.89: 177).

There were hugely conflicting aims within the military-centrist-oligarchy coalition. It was most united in its desire to defeat the ‘communist’ insurgency. However, the

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3 Supported by both the USSR and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
military was most concerned with its survival as a powerful, autonomous, political institution, and financial and military support from the US and the continuation of civil war were perceived as central to this goal by many of its members. The PDC elite hoped that they could reduce the appeal of the left and rebuild its own popular support base which was destroyed after the failure of the 1979 coup. In pursuit of this goal they coalesced with the military to facilitate the implementation of its US-backed moderate and limited democratic reforms. Funded by wealthy landowners, right-wing opponents of the moderate reforms driven by the centre colluded with, and sometimes operated directly out of, official military agencies such as the National Police and the National Guard (Nacla, Vol., 23.2: 16). They formed a third faction in the counter-insurgency formation. They perceived the FMLN as threatening the very viability of the landowning classes, and death squads sought to violently wipe out FMLN social bases (Byrne, 1996: 76). In 1982, Roberto D'Aubuisson\(^4\) formally established this shady third force as a political party (ARENA).\(^5\) The extent to which intra-formation divisions determined the strategy of the counter-insurgency movement is seen in D'Aubuisson's attitude to the Christian Democratic party: the opposition were 'all communists' but the Christian Democrats were the worst as 'they lent legitimacy to the communist project' (Stanley, 1996: 189). Policy disputes and power struggles both within and between each member of the counter-insurgency coalition ensured that no adequate political response to the insurgency arose other than repression on the verge of anarchy, which served to concentrate power in the hands of the military.

In 1985 the unity of the increasingly powerful ARENA party was threatened when factions announced their intention to establish a separate party, dissociated with D'Aubuisson, the death squads, and the anarchy. A negotiated takeover of the leadership by a faction led by Crisianti, a coffee baron who was more moderate and 'acceptable' than some of those associated with D'Aubuisson, managed to preserve the unity of the party. Critically they managed to keep the influential D'Aubuisson faction firmly within the ARENA organisation (Zamora, 1998: 56). Crisianti promised to promote a narrow democracy by 'respecting the legal and electoral process' (Nacla, 23.2: 16-18). Members of the Crisianti faction of ARENA had clear interest in a

\(^4\) D'Aubuisson had formally been a high ranking member of the armed forces and maintained institutional links with sections of it. (Juhn, 1998: 36-8; Stanley, 1996: 190-2).
\(^5\) Alianza Republicana Nacionalista.
controlled, limited democratic transition, but they faced major opposition from the more radical faction of the party and its ally - the death squads. This Cristiani-led faction of ARENA also had a clear interest in limiting the power of the armed forces, which it perceived as encroaching on the power of the oligarchy and the business classes. This interest intensified when it won the elections and formed a government in 1989; if ARENA was to avoid the fate of the severely-weakened Christian Democratic Party, it needed to reduce the power of the army. The army's power would only be reduced in the context of peace. This meant that the insurgency would have to be brought to an end (Juhn: 1998).

Thus after 1989 some elite members of the FMLN insurgency and of the ARENA government had incentives to negotiate. What is more, improved regional relations between the Central American presidents (Esquipusal 11, 1987), the end of the Reagan administration in the US, and warming US-USSR relations provided a favourable, structural framework for negotiations. Although another three years of civil war were to ensue, with a dramatic and relatively successful offensive by the FMLN in November 1989, UN-sponsored negotiations, which began in earnest in December 1989, culminated in the final accord in January 1992.

THE ACCORDS
Chapultepec committed the ARENA government to dramatic institutional reforms that would place the institutional protection of human rights at the heart of the political system, to implement a reformed and impartial judicial system, a civilian-led government and an electoral system that would ensure free and fair elections (Appendix C). These changes were dramatic, given the exclusive, military-oligarchic political system that had long prevailed in El Salvador. The political system had never known inclusion or free and fair elections. Between 1931 and 1979 military elites used repression and electoral fraud to exclude the political 'left' (including the Christian Democratic centre) from power and between 1979 and 1982 exclusion and human rights violations afflicted an even greater variety of social groups (McClintock, 1998: 93). Repression by the state and political exclusion continued throughout the 1980s despite a

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slight opening up of the political system by the counter insurgency in 1982 with the creation of an elected, constituent assembly and of an elected presidency. Members of the 84-seat, legislative assembly are elected to serve three-year terms by direct popular vote using a list PR system. The first elections took place in 1982 and they were followed by presidential elections in 1984 when, for the first time in El Salvador’s history, the head of the executive was directly elected. As indicated the impact of these reforms was relatively cosmetic. However, the parties agreed in the Accords to maintain these institutions and, following a series of reforms to change the civilian-military balance of power, to hold presidential, legislative and local government (mayorite) election in March 1994. The government also committed to implement a number of mechanisms that would underpin socio-economic reform and specific provisions for land reform which was, perhaps, the most controversial issue of the conflict.

If the Accords were to create space for the real introduction of these reforms, the implementation of provisions concerning the role of the army and public security forces were critical. ARENA promised to radically reduce the legal powers and to increase the accountability of the military, to purge the military of violent and corrupt officers, to dismantle the existing military-controlled internal security forces, to exclude the army from responsibility for maintaining internal order, to create a completely new civilian police force designed to safeguard the rights and safety of citizens, and to incorporate the erstwhile guerrillas into the political life of the country as a legal party. The FMLN was to implement a definitive ceasefire, to separate and concentrate forces, to undertake a phased disarmament under the supervision of the UN (ONUSAL) and a phased demobilisation programme, which was referred to as the ‘reintegration’ of combatants into civilian life. Part of the government’s commitment to socio-economic reform, socio-economic, development programmes and land reform were to facilitate this reintegration and would be implemented simultaneously to demobilisation. The parties also agreed that former FMLN combatants could make up 20 per cent of the new national civilian police force.

The incentives for the development of spoiler, sceptical and pro tendencies in both conflict formations are considered before the potential of the IFF model hypotheses on implementation design to explain outcome is explored.
FACTIONALISM

Most analyses support the interpretation that while the FMLN was quite united over the policy of cautiously entering negotiations, especially after the 1989 final offensive (Stanley, 1996: 241), many of the FMLN were highly sceptical about the wisdom of the policy during the negotiation process (Juhn, 1998: 95; Standley, 1996: 242). In a series of proposals issued by its joint command in 1989, the FMLN identified the reforms that it required for the transformation of the political system. In return for its willingness to consider a ceasefire and demobilisation, it demanded fundamental changes to the political system that would institutionalise a framework for a democratic system through which it could pursue its socio-economic goals (ECA, Jan-Feb 89: 57). The leaders of the FMLN are reported to have had much trouble convincing its own sub-elite and rank-and-file of the value of electoral politics (Stahler-Sholk, 1994:32), especially given past experience and government foot-dragging during and after the negotiations. According to its chief negotiator - Samayoa⁷ - the debate within the FMLN was far more difficult than any negotiation with government (Byrne, 1996: 190-1).

At the heart of the internal political debate was the price it would (and could) demand for its demobilisation and reintegration into political life. Two of the five component groups, ERP-RN⁸, tended to see the Accords in themselves as a general fulfilment of their goal. On the other hand, the FPL, PCS and PRTC⁹ interpreted the Accords as a development that would enable the FMLN to use non-violent means to continue its struggle to implement the socio-economic reforms that would resolve the inequality that underpinned the conflict (Byrne, 1996: 214). Popular movements, whose activity had formerly been subordinated to the FMLN, emerged to make divergent demands on the FMLN. This increased pressure on unity across the elite and sub-elite sections of the organisation (CIIR, 1994: 20-1).

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⁷ Salvador Samayoa, FMLN leader and chief negotiator. 1995 interview cited on a number of occasions in Byrne, 1996.
⁸ ERP: Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo, founded in 1972 by leaders who tended to be more middle-class. Led by Villalobos since 1978 and during the negotiation of the accords. RN – Resistencia Nacional withdrew from ERP in 1978 over the execution of a Marxist poet by the ERP leadership.
⁹ FPL – Fuerzas Populares de Liberación. Worked from its founding (1970) to incorporate large numbers of peasants and workers and aspired to achieve a true Marxist-Leninist party. PCS – Communist Party in El Salvador, founded by Farabundo Marti in 1930 and led by Handal. PRTC – Partido Revolucionario de
At the outset, the majority of elite and sub-elite members of both strains in the FMLN appear to have belonged to the pro faction. They believed that the implementation of the Accords would further their political goals and they more or less staked their political future on full implementation. During negotiations, the FMLN’s joint command had placed more emphasis on institutional reforms than on socio-economic restructuring. While this strategy may seem to be odds with the FMLN’s historical ideology (Standley, 1996: 6), it most likely reflected the common ground on which the FMLN’s individual parties could agree: accords could provide the space to introduce the irreversible, structural changes to the political system that they sought.

But if events during the course of implementation were to change the more sceptical faction’s perception that the Accords could, in fact, enable them to further their objectives politically (Zamora, 1998: 250-1), the danger of power passing to more extreme and militant elements within the movement existed (Villalobos, 1998: 107). Evidence suggests that some members of the formation did retain more radical agendas and a number of these members certainly awaited the opportunity to pursue them to stall the implementation process. Reports point to several ‘Marxist-Leninist’ guerrilla organisations, six of which had publicly launched themselves as alternatives to the new political system, but note disunity as weakening their strategy (Arm the Spirit Report: 08.95). A post-1995 assessment predicts that provided that major FMLN players continued to observe the Accords, intransigent, insurgent elements seemed to be reduced to ‘criminal bands’ without political significance. This suggests that a ‘spoiler’ faction was marginalized during the implementation process.

The disunity that characterised the FMLN during the implementation process was illustrated in 1994 by an open split. The split occurred in after the 1994 elections and the immediate context of the political split was a decision by ERN and sections of RN los Trabajadores (Worker’s Party) was the smallest member and latest to be found. It emphasised regional revolution. (McClintock, 1998: 48-53)

Standley says that many sympathetic observers of FMLN were puzzled that the strongest guerrilla movement in the Western hemisphere would lay down their guns at the peak of their military power in exchange for institutional reforms. But he points out that the implementation of the institutional reforms were in fact just what the country needed to break the ‘protection-racket’: The over seventy year reliance by elite classes on the coercion of the military to control El Salvador. Standley: 6-7.

The leadership promoted the logic that ‘the stroke of a pen could not guarantee the radical transformation of a society in which authoritarianism was so deeply rooted’ (Canas and Dada, 1999: 74).

ERN Leader.

Jane’s Information Group, Jane’s Sentinel: Dec 00-May 2001:8-9.
to support an ARENA-led directive to redistribute the allocation of agenda-setting power in the assembly (Zamora, 1998: 251-3). But the dispute must be understood as the product of years of bitter internal party debate about the organisational structure of the new party, and its positioning on the left or centre-left of the political spectrum. According to Zamora\textsuperscript{14} (1998: 251) it was only a matter of time before the long-running dispute publicly erupted. The split suggests that some elite and sub-elite members of the FMLN would not go as far as other members to secure the ‘pro-faction GOES-FMLN alliance’ and thereby ensure sufficient implementation. After the split the FPL, PCS and PRTC presented the FMLN as a unified, revolutionary party, and made it quite clear that it would not include those willing to accept the neo-liberal agenda of ARENA (Zamora: 254). Critically for the success of the implementation process, these divisions emerged as a formal split in the context of the new political structure established by the Accords and not as a challenge to it.

The FMLN’s organisational structure was highly de-centralised and constant internal deliberation, negotiation and debate was needed before strategies could receive the sanction of the five commanders (McClintock, 1998: 91). Zamora (1998: 221) points to its organisational structure as necessary for its peace strategy and for its smooth incorporation into the system of political parties. It also helped to ensure that its strategy in the implementation process had the approval of all significant factions and this arguably facilitated the pro faction in its quest to keep the sceptical faction on board. But that an equilibrium in favour of signing the agreement existed for the five factions in January 1992 does not necessarily imply that it would hold during implementation. This is especially true given the strategy of the spoiler and sceptical factions within the government camp.

ARENA’s roots did not make it naturally disposed towards peace with the FMLN. The pro faction feared most of all that its spoiler faction would instigate a successful coup d’état or that civil war would once again break out (Juhn, 1998:116-7) and place them at the mercy of the armed forces. The only way it could deal with this threat was to implement the provisions of the Accord in the most minimalist way possible so as to keep the FMLN on side, while not decreasing its own power vis-à-vis its internal

\textsuperscript{14} Founder and leader of FDR (Frente Democratico Revolucionario), the civilian leftist opposition to El Salvador’s regime. Banned from competing politically throughout the civil war.
challengers. The minimalist interpretation of its obligations under the settlement would, it hoped, ensure that it would be sufficiently accredited with implementation and reconciliation to retain the support of significant sections of the bourgeois classes and urban poor classes. In a more open and competitive political system, the support of these groups might be less certain. ARENA perceived it to be vulnerable to the policies of the Christian Democrats and, at some point in the future, to the FMLN’s policies.

Given the conflicting strategies of the counter-insurgency coalition during the civil war, it is hardly surprising that it was rife with division during the negotiations and the implementation process. The pro faction needed to triumph in the intra-formation power struggle and to this end it aimed to end the FMLN’s insurrection in order to re-draw the balance of power in the state away from the armed forces and in favour of ARENA. Some members of the pro faction were motivated by a desire to end the wartime command economy which it perceived as damaging to business. They hoped to use the Accords to consolidate a neo-liberal, capitalist state (Juhn, 1998: 126). If this required allowing the FMLN to take part in narrowly-defined electoral democracy, it was a price worth paying and thus the Accords would have to be implemented. President Cristiani appears to have belonged to this pro faction and his unyielding resistance to the full implementation of the Accords (below) is perceived here to be a product of his ‘divided coalition’ (Juhn, 1998: 95). For ARENA’s pro faction, implementation made sense but only if they could keep the powerful ARENA coalition of interests together (ECA, 06.89: 424-8). And salient rationales existed for the existence of sceptical and spoiler factions within the counter-insurgency formation.

First of all, the pro faction’s strategy was in fact exclusive and based on the presumption that ‘liberalism would disarm the left and depoliticise,’ and, in other words, weaken ‘the military’ (Juhn: 127). Given that any settlement would include an agreement to reduce the power of the military, it was inevitable that large sections of the armed forces were not only sceptical of the merits of the Accords, but were openly prepared to adopt spoiler tactics to block them. Some members of the Army High Command, the Officer core and the rank and file who would not benefit from Cristiani’s patronage had little incentive to favour the Accords. In fact, Cristiani’s strategy rested on dividing the armed forces into pro and sceptical factions and this is illustrated by his choice of army representative at the negotiations: General Vargas. While a graduate of
the notoriously repressive and powerful Tandona military academy,\footnote{This class of graduates from the 1960s were in high-ranking, powerful positions in the military and were known for highly repressive military strategy.} Vargas was one of the less intransigent and was known to have connections with the Christian Democrats (Juhn: 82). By appointing him, Cristiani was arguably attempting to sideline powerful, hard-line military elements, while keeping an important body of sceptical elements onside.

Not only did the peace accords threaten the power of the army but large elements of the civilian elite and a considerable percentage of the population also perceived the Accords as threatening. For example, populist right-wing organisations mobilised over 50,000 people in a week-long, violent protest (LAM, October 91) against the substantive agreements reached in New York in September 1991. Powerful groups of individuals who were associated with the death squads and with the complicit public-security institutions (Stanley, 1996: 228) allied with a powerful civilian elite to form a large spoiler faction. The spoiler faction was prepared to use violence to provoke the left and to incite fear of the Accords amongst those on the centre-right of the political spectrum. It subsequently appears that these spoiler factions had some active support in the pre and post-1994 ARENA governments (Guardian 23.5.94). Without securing D'Aubuisson's support and the support of other elite and sub elite figures who had most control over the popular base of the ARENA party and the ultra-right, popular organisations, it was unlikely that Cristiani would be able to pursue a pro faction strategy.

After a highly comprehensive analysis of the negotiation process, Juhn (1998) concludes that intra-formation factionalism presented the critical obstacle to reaching final agreement on implementation design in December 1991: the axis was, she writes, not FMLN versus the GOES, or even FMLN versus the Armed Forces (AFES), but those who were pushing for a final agreement and those who pushed for anything less (Juhn: 116). In a private memo to FMLN negotiators on the eve of the final talks, US mediator, General Hamilton said that the final push was designed to encourage those in favour of implementation ‘to rally around the talks, and to isolate extremists through confidence-building measures’ (Juhn: 118). Furthermore, a number of FMLN sources admitted privately during December 1991 that their concessions in the field were
'designed to shore up Cristiani’s resolve to finish negotiations, against a growing chorus of dissent from the far right of his own party’ (Miami Herald: 3-12-91).

In sum, both conflict actors were factionalised and included a pro faction, a sceptical faction and a spoiler faction, the latter more clearly powerful in ARENA than in the FMLN. The chapter now proceeds to give an account of the mechanisms, rules and procedures governing implementation and to examine their impact on the ability of pro factions to pursue the implementation of the settlement. The degree to which the design of the process facilitated or impeded pro factions in their efforts to retain control over their formation while implementing the agreement is the focus of the analytical narrative that follows.

RULES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS
The Accords delegated extra-legal power to the UN mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which incorporated three divisions (Chapultepec: 7). The parties also agreed to establish COPAZ, a multi-party Salvadorian institution, which included the FMLN. It was made officially responsible for ensuring the implementation of the political agreements (New York Agreement, 1991). According to Cristiani, ONUSAL and COPAZ were together ‘the mechanisms’ empowered to ‘control and verify the implementation of the agreements’ (BBCWWM: 3.1.91).

ONUSAL operated a relatively wide interpretation of its powers in the implementation process. Led by the Secretary General and his representatives (de Soto, Goulding) and the leaders of the three ONUSAL divisions, it acted as chief mediator and agenda setter in the initiation of dispute-resolution procedures, particularly as the process progressed. According to one analysis, it served as a ‘channel of communication, and an authoritative interpreter of the Accords, ‘proposing solutions when crises developed, requesting concessions and commitment from both sides, and verifying compliance (Stahler-Sholk 1994: 41).

ONUSAL’s divisions were also mandated to oversee and verify specific aspects of the process, and this had the effect of insulating these issues in some way from conflicting interpretations. These related in particular to the establishment of the new police force.
(PNC), the monitoring of human rights and the implementation of institutional human rights provisions, the oversight of the cease-fire, the phased demobilisation and disarmament of the FMLN, the demobilisation of sections of the army and the overall reduction of the armed forces according to the agreed timetable. Some of the most controversial issues of the implementation process related to military reform and the demilitarisation of the political system. These issues were in the hands of the UN-appointed Independent Commission on the Truth (Mexico City Agreement, 1991) and the agreed, government-appointed Ad hoc Commission (New York Agreement, 1991), whose recommendations would be binding. While this would not preclude factions from disagreeing fundamentally with the recommendations of both Commissions, the independence of the commissions served to make it difficult for the spoiler faction to use process-related, reasonable arguments to resist the implementation of the recommendations.

Some provisions, including many of the commitments given by the government concerning the reform of the political and judicial system and many of the Truth Commission and the Ad Hoc Commission’s impending recommendations, would require the approval of the legislative assembly for their implementation. For this approval the unity not only of ARENA, but also of elements of its main competitor in the counter-insurgency coalition, the Christian Democrats (PDC), would be required. This fact, and the absence of the FMLN from any institutions of the state, was the key rationale behind the creation of COPAZ. COPAZ’s existence signalled a permanent, institutional commitment to the implementation of the Accords. It would facilitate the consensus required on the procedures for implementation, not only between the FMLN and the government, but also between ARENA and the rest of the National Assembly. Accordingly, COPAZ was to establish a number of working commissions which would facilitate agreement on certain disputed issues in the Accords, in particular on the composition of the new civilian police force (PNC), on furthering the implementation of land reform and of the socio-economic provisions of the Accords (New York Agreement, 1991). But while COPAZ was envisaged to be a chief mechanism for dispute resolution, the UN was also assigned this role. The UN was generally more

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16 UN, Blue Helmets: 425.
17 UN, Blue Helmets: 429-431; UN and ES: Chapters III & IV.
successful in practicing it, in particular in resolving disputes that were driven by political conflict (Guardian: 23.05.94).

SEQUENCING AND TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION
From September 1991 to January 1992 the mediators and the parties to the Salvadorean conflict struggled through intense rounds of negotiations to reach agreement on implementation design. In fact, agreement on implementation design preceded the final signing of Chapultepec, and disagreement over the sequence, timing and content of each move in the implementation process threatened to unravel all that had been previously agreed. The factors that facilitated agreement and enabled negotiators to endorse the final agreement in January 1992 are therefore highly significant to the exploration of the IFF model hypotheses. They are next explored.

EARLY PARALLEL SEQUENCING: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
Two events facilitated the early introduction of phased, broken-down, parallel sequencing of issues in the Salvadorean process. Firstly, following a proposal by the Secretary General, the parties agreed to establish mechanisms through which the implementation of the San José agreement (July 1990) on human-rights standards could begin. This meant that the monitoring of human right’s standards would begin well before a cease-fire and a final settlement were agreed. The neutral international body charged with managing this transition process – ONUSAL’s Division for Human Rights - began work in May 1991.\(^\text{18}\) Given the small-step nature of this move – i.e. to allow an international body to oversee the monitoring of human-right’s standards, it did not present the spoiler faction within the government with easy pretexts on which to reject the recommendation. Yet with the agreement came the initiation of a long, incremental process to improve El Salvador’s institutional capacity to monitor and protect citizens and groups from human rights abuses.

Secondly, in Mexico City in April 1991 the parties agreed on the concrete steps that would underpin the transition that would make genuine political central to the political system. The changes agreed included:

\(^{18}\) Its mandate was to verify compliance with human rights conventions and to investigate citizen or group complaints of human rights abuses.
(i) Security reforms that prepared a new military doctrine for the armed forces, which would exclude them from public security duties;

(ii) Judicial reforms including Supreme Court reform, the creation of the National Council for the Defence of Human Rights, and a Commission of the Truth;

(iii) Electoral reforms providing for the creation of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal, with the mandate to impartially organise elections.

These substantive agreements were critical if a final settlement was to be reached in El Salvador. However, it was necessary to agree on the procedures through which these difficult changes could be implemented. In fact, the procedures would determine the government's ability to implement the changes. And that the design of the process facilitated the immediate initiation of a phased, broken-down, process of implementing most substantial issues facilitated pro factions in their quest to reach a final settlement. The question of how these procedures were agreed is next addressed.

For their implementation the reforms required the amendment of the constitution. The Salvadorian constitution required the approval of two successive national legislative assemblies, with two-thirds of the votes in the second one, for amendments to the constitution. As legislative elections were to take place at the end of April 1991, the pre-election Assembly would have to approve the constitutional amendments before its dissolution. If it did not, the prospect of legally implementing substantial aspects of the accords would have been delayed until a further Assembly sat after March 1994. This would very arguably have prevented the reaching of a final agreement and the civil war is likely to have continued well into the 1990s.

To avoid that scenario, Cristiani had to rush the amendments through the ARENA-dominated, pre-election, assembly. But he faced enormous resistance from spoiler factions to this move. Factions in ARENA had frequently employed spoiler tactics in the past and had initially used the unconstitutional nature of some of the reforms demanded by the FMLN, as a pretext on which to base their refusal to negotiate an agreement (Juhn, 1998: 39; 82). But the rules (described above) governing the process of amending of the constitution introduced a natural two-step mechanism to the process.

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19 UN, Blue Helmets: 426.
of implementing these substantial reforms and this reduced the scope for spoiler factions to form a blocking coalition. As the amendments had to be approved by two successive assemblies before the reforms were fully implemented, spoiler factions were unable to present a move to approve the amendments in April 1991 as a huge, unilateral move that capitulated to issue hierarchy. Its two-step nature reduced the susceptibility of sceptical factions to any effort by the spoiler faction to present the move as irrevocable and dangerous to ARENA and their own interests. At the same time, by taking the first step to approve the amendments in April 1991, ARENA reduced the fears of those in the FMLN who were sceptical about the sincerity of ARENA’s commitments to a peace process (Stanley, 1996: 252). This most likely enabled the pro faction of the FMLN to partially recognise the Salvadorian political system for the first time in April 1991 by ‘urging its supporters to vote in the April 1991 elections’ (Juhn: 82). This in turn made it more difficult for ARENA’s spoiler faction to undermine the peace process on the basis that ARENA could not negotiate with an insurgency that had long indicated that it did not accept the legitimacy of the Salvadorian political system. Therefore, the prospect of consolidating the constitutionality of the agreed reforms, including the subordination of the military to the civilian government, was kept alive after April 1991 but still needed the approval of the newly-elected assembly for full implementation. The second approval could be presented to ARENA deputies as more of a choice and as depending on progress in other areas. In fact, the second stage of the approval of constitutional reforms to change the position of the armed forces was delayed until all issues were agreed (Cordova: 85-6; BBCWWM: 31-1-92).20

This simultaneous and early beginning to the implementation of human rights, constitutional and political issues did not signal an issue hierarchy demand. The step-by-step nature of procedures ensured that conflict formations were not required to implement all provisions agreed on one issue before the provisions for the implementation of another issue were agreed. It instead facilitated the commencement of a framework through which the political and judicial compromises inherent in the agreements would little by little be implemented. This framework proved crucial to further agreement on the precise provisions and implementation mechanisms for the issues that were still characterised by deadlock: land reform, the full content,

20 Those concerning human rights and the judiciary were held till October 31".
mechanisms and timing of military reform, the ceasefire and the de-escalation process through which the FMLN would be dismantled.

PHASE ONE: NEGOTIATIONG THE TIMETABLE
The most serious threat to final agreement on implementation (UN and ES, 1995: 20) was the insistence by the government and the FMLN on mutually-exclusive issue hierarchy, which would be mutually unacceptable and unworkable if a final Accord was to be negotiated. Referred to as the cease-fire/demilitarisation ‘gordian knot’ (UN and ES, 1995: 15-6), the FMLN insisted that the situation was one of ‘two governments at a stalemate’; it demanded that agreement be reached on the procedures for the simultaneous disarmament and demobilisation of both the Armed forces (ESAF) and the FMLN military before a definitive cease-fire was negotiated, let alone put into place. As well as simultaneous demobilisation, it suggested that the FMLN’s combatants be integrated into the new, restructured armed forces (Byrne, 1996: 183). What served to make this issue hierarchy was the FMLN’s insistence that it be allowed to participate politically once it implemented a cease-fire, but before it disarmed, a prospect that Cristiani said was out of the question (Juhn, 1998: 96).

The government-led formation, on the other hand, insisted that the FMLN implement a monitored and definitive (irreversible) cease-fire before final negotiations about the reduction or demilitarisation of the military forces and the re-incorporation of the FMLN’s forces into Salvadorian society. It was, they argued, a situation of ‘the State confronting irregulars (Juhn: 96) and in December 1991 Cristiani still maintained that ‘the armed forces cannot be restructured as long as the violence persists’ (Latin American Newsline: March 92). It followed that the FMLN’s capacity to create violence must be demobilised, not only before the military was restructured, but before full agreement on restructuring was reached.

The Caracas Agenda (1990), which proposed that negotiations take place in two phases, gave some endorsement to the issue hierarchy that the government was proposing. It called for the discussion of the cease-fire in phase one of talks. In phase two, parties would negotiate about the conditions and guarantees associated with the reintegration into society of the FMLN’s combatants, an issue that was inextricably linked to military reform. But this agenda did not facilitate agreement and in an attempt to circumvent this
order and to move forward simultaneously but separately on both sets of issues, the UN mediators set up two concurrent working groups in May 1991. The first concerned the nature and the procedures for the implementation of a cease-fire, the second the reforms to the military, including the issues of impunity, the purging of the Military High Command and the location of power in the new public security forces (Juhn, 1998: 95-96).

Despite the agreement on some details concerning the ceasefire, the unilateral demand that the government presented to the FMLN still prevented the parties from reaching full agreement. According to the ARENA government, the FMLN could not participate in the political system until it demobilised and it would have to implement a cease-fire before a final agreement on the reform of the military forces was made. The FMLN’s pro faction was not in the position to meet these unilateral demands. The demands presented its spoiler faction with much opportunity to persuade those sceptical in the FMLN to lose faith in the process. The FMLN’s leadership responded with a highly public campaign that served to highlight the unreasonable demand that the government was making: ‘if you want our guns’ said the campaign, ‘win the war’ (Juhn, 1998: 98).

The issue-hierarchy knot was partly untangled during unprecedented talks that were led by the Secretary General in September 1991. The UN mediators adopted a compressed agenda. According to this ‘agenda comprimida’, which was originally the FMLN’s proposal, all outstanding issues would be negotiated in a single stage which would end with an agreement to ceasefire. In other words, nothing was agreed (i.e. agreements were reversible) until everything was agreed. The parties agreed that the implementation of the ceasefire would last until all other agreements were implemented and the implementation of all agreements would be governed by a pre-negotiated timetable (Juhn, 1998: 102). While its own unilateral demobilisation remained unacceptable to, and impossible for, the FMLN, in August it indicated its willingness to consider its own demobilisation in return for a profound reform, as opposed to the abolition, of the

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21 It would be transitional, not benefit either side, would separate forces, be verifiable, promote reconciliation and not amount to any administrative division of the country or to any isolation of FMLN into small areas.

22 FMLN leader Villalobus explains this unwillingness in September 1991: We are not going to strategically weaken ourselves for a juncture that could be going nowhere: The militant sector of the FMLN is no longer an ideological factor, it is impossible to disarm it... It might be a bloody peace if one side is armed. FMLN internal notes, September 1991, Juhn: 107.

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armed forces. But this would only be considered in the context of the agenda comprimida (UN and ES: 20-21).

Through the compressed agenda the parties managed to overcome a series obstacles concerning sequencing and timing that helped to untie the ‘Gordian knot.’ The agenda facilitated agreement on a reciprocal, step-by-step and parallel sequencing that would govern the implementation of the ceasefire, the demobilisation of the FMLN and the profound reform of the military (Juhn, 1998: 107). This enabled the FMLN’s pro faction to drop the demand for the full disbandment of the armed forces without being at the mercy of its spoiler faction’s tactics.

The agreement on timing and sequencing also helped the ARENA pro faction to deliver. ARENA could never have committed to the demobilisation of the army as part of a deal involving the simultaneous demobilisation of the FMLN. But despite dramatic consternation within the ARENA formation, in the context of the agenda comprimida, ARENA had agreed to negotiate and commence the ‘profound reform’ of the military in September 1991. Further, having secured an FMLN promise to demobilise in return for this profound reform, Cristiani was able to agree to the immediate, legal establishment of the PNC (civilian police force), on its training curriculum and on the FMLN’s right to be a part of it. He also moved to get assembly approval for new laws on public security that excluded a role for the armed forces. Along with the promise to significantly reduce the size of the armed forces and to implement a separate ‘purge’ of the army high command, the above agreement met many of the needs of the pro faction in the FMLN on the profound reform of the military. In fact, one Christian Democratic party source believed that in agreeing to these profound reforms the oligarchy had ‘negotiated away the army’ (Juhn: 112). Whether or not the pro faction in ARENA would be able to implement this reform was another question.

Through the agenda comprimida issue break down and parallel sequencing had been introduced to implementation design. It appears to have helped pro factions to re-focus the issue from the unquestionably large step that full demobilisation of the armed forces demanded onto a phased, step-by-step profound reform of the military forces. This, and ARENA’s beginning of early steps in the process of police reform, in part enabled the FMLN to drop its demand for the full demobilisation of the armed forces in return for
its demobilisation. At the same time, the agreement to establish COPAZ, the new institution that would monitor implementation (New York Agreements), went some way to meeting the FMLN’s need to be included in the political system before the implementation of a ceasefire. Some progress was made on the establishment of procedures through which the land reform would be implemented (see table 7.1). This met the FMLN leadership’s aim that all issues, including socio-economic issues, would be included in the final agenda, even issues that ARENA had previously denounced as unrelated to the peace accords. However, despite the progress a number of obstacles remained because following the New York Agreement (September 1991) a number of opportunities remained for spoiler factions to demand that issue hierarchy govern the implementation process.

The parties had to agree on the design of the implementation process. The negotiations concerned the sequence and timing through which the full ‘profound reform’ of the military would be implemented, the degree to which demobilisation would extend to the military and public security forces and the mechanisms for its implementation, the modalities, timing and operation of the cease-fire, the procedures through which the FMLN would be separated, demobilised and re-integrated, and the mechanisms, timing and sequencing that would govern land reform and socio-economic issues.

In an effort to overcome the anticipated deadlock in these negotiations, the New York Agreements committed parties to continue to use the ‘agenda comprimida’ (UN and ES: 21) to negotiate all outstanding issues. Thus the mediators demanded that all these issues be agreed before the signing of a definitive cease-fire agreement. According to the UN Secretary General’s representative, Alvaro de Soto, this agenda helped to eliminate uncertainties and to avoid the impression that parties were ‘jumping into an empty pool,’ an impression that widens spoiler faction’s room for manoeuvre. In the words of de Soto on Salvadorian radio:

‘All the agreements we have been reaching are on ice, but ready to be used. The New York Agreement (September 91) called for an overall agreement without partial agreements in the process. In other words, we either reach an agreement on everything or nothing will be signed’ (BBC WWM: 3.01.92).
During these final negotiations that followed Cristiani was clearly under pressure from high-level spoiler factions in ARENA, who mobilised ultra-right rallies against the September Accords, and launched a campaign of intimidation against the international press and ONUSAL (UN and ES: 21). One government negotiator, Escobar Galindo, believed that at this point in ARENA, '0.2 per cent supported the process and 99.8 per cent opposed it for various reasons' (Byrne, 1996: 190). This challenge to ARENA’s 'pro faction' leadership seriously restricted its ability to drop the unilateral demand that the FMLN implement the ceasefire and demobilise before the implementation of armed forces reform. Spoiler factions, who hailed from both the Army Command and the right wings of the Arena party, demanded what they believed the FMLN could not deliver. As a result Cristiani’s stance became increasingly aggressive, and he threatened in November to walk out of talks 'if the FMLN did not suspend its military operations' immediately and before final agreement (Juhn: 114).

But the FMLN attributed Cristiani’s stance to pressure from the powerful minority in the army and the agrarian oligarchy, who were looking 'for a way to get them to reject the New York Agreements, and to walk away from the table,' (Juhn, 1998: 114, CPD memo, 14-11-91). Its assessment of Cristiani’s position persuaded its pro faction to save the negotiations with the introduction of a unilateral ceasefire in November 1991 (Byrne, 1996: 191). Despite the issue hierarchy at the heart of Cristiani’s unilateral ceasefire demand, the FMLN’s unilateral cessation of violence did not, in fact, weaken its military structure. It was thus reversible and a reasonable request to make of its spoiler faction, provided that negotiations on all issues continued and nothing was agreed until everything was agreed. Furthermore, it served to remove more of the pretexts on which ARENA’s spoiler faction could base its calls to withdraw from negotiations. This was especially true for the Army High Command, which had refused to negotiate with the FMLN prior to their establishment of a cease-fire. In fact, the move heralded a final round of intensive negotiations in New York in December 1991.

The parties finally agreed to a package agreement that covered all outstanding issues on 31 December 1991. The New York Accord was presented to the parties by the mediators following the negotiations and the FMLN, ARENA and the United Nations.

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23 UN, US, USSR and the four friends - Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia, Spain.
endorsed the formula for implementation (AP, 1.1.92). As part of this agreement, both parties committed to finalising the timetable for implementation before the official signing ceremony on 16 January 1992. If they failed to agree on a timetable, they would implement according to one designed by the United Nations.

In a powerful endorsement of the significance that the IFF model assigns to pro faction unity, the US mediator at the Salvadorian negotiations, Hamilton, believed that ‘the success of implementation would depend in a large part upon the trust between those individuals who favoured negotiations and the end of war’ (FMLN Record, Juhn: 118). If a successful implementation process was to follow, this alliance between the pro faction in ARENA and the FMLN would need to be supported by implementation mechanisms that could maintain the equilibrium that existed in the intra-formation power struggles in January 1992.

PHASE TWO: IMPLEMENTING THE TIMETABLE

Despite agreeing (January 1992) to implement according to an intricate timetable (table 7.1) designed to carefully balance and synchronise each side’s commitments (UN and ES: 23), the implementation process was ‘conflict-ridden’ (Stahler-Sholk, 1995: 9) and encountered barriers at several crisis points which threatened the very survival of the process. A series of adjustments to sequencing and timing were agreed through dispute-resolution mechanisms before the Accords could be successfully implemented.24 They are next addressed.

While not explicitly declaring the principle of reciprocity, the timetable was clearly designed to dismantle civil-military relations through a phased, broken-down, implementation of military and public-security reform and a parallel construction of the new police force and the demobilisation of FMLN forces. As the IFF model predicts, this sequence and the parallel implementation of the short-term socio-economic provisions that ensured the existence of reintegration programmes, food and provisions, training and eventually land to demobilising combatants would prove essential if the

24 The process is considered to be successful but it is argued that the lack of attention to the economic transformation was an oversight which if properly dealt with would have prevented the government from using the pretext (the true justification of which depended on the issue) of lack of funds for implementing socio-economic reforms, the absence of which did threaten the overall stability of the implementation process. See Spenser: 42-60; Boyce, 1998 and Wider, 1997.
FMLN was to move on demobilisation (Spencer, 1997: 45). The implementation of the land-reform provisions was also designed to be reciprocal: according to the timetable, the first land transfers would begin on the day that the FMLN implemented its first in five phases of demobilisation. Land reform that would directly benefit ex-combatants would be tackled first, a procedure that was clearly informed by the need to maintain unity within the FMLN and the armed forces on the benefits of continuing to cooperate with the process.

It is useful to view the implementation process as having six phases after the pre-ceasefire phase, each phase marked by and generally beginning with a step towards full demobilisation by the FMLN, along with a series of simultaneous, phased steps by the government conflict formation on military or public security, political/institutional and/or socio-economic commitments (Table 7.1). The six phases were to bring the process to the formal end of military conflict on 31 October 1992.

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Table 7.1: Timetable And Sequencing For Implementation

PRE-CEASE-FIRE
January 27th: First phase of the legalisation of the FMLN (Legislation to be introduced to Assembly).
Military Reform: Issuance of the agreement on the legal form and formalisation of the Ad Hoc Commission, charged with the armed force purge (29 January).
Security: Ratification of the constitutional reforms to underpin the changed role of the armed forces.

PHASE 1 - CEASE FIRE & SEPARATION OF ARMIES PHASE
FEBRUARY 1: D DAY
The ceasefire was to officially begin along with phase one of separation of both armies.

Security: The end of the practice of AFES conscription;
Political: The full installation of COPAZ (National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace).

FEBRUARY 5 – MARCH 1
Phase 2 of separation of two armies begins.
FMLN weapons to be concentrated under the supervision of ONUSAL throughout February.

Institutional: The agreed new Supreme Election Tribunal would be selected;
Socio-Economic: The government would present its plan for national reconstruction to FMLN for input
Security: The draft law for the National Civilian Police would be submitted (20th Feb).

MARCH 2 – MAY 1
ONUSAL to assume control of FMLN arms;
Security: Treasury Police and National Guard Disbanded; New State Intelligence Agency created;
Director General of new PNC to be appointed; Political prisoners released.
Institutional: Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office created.
Socio-Economic: Reconstruction Fund Created by government (April 1).

PHASE 2, DEMOBILISATION (MAY 1992)
20% of FMLN forces, already gathered in their 15 concentrated areas, will be ‘reincorporated’ into civilian life (demobilised and reincorporated using socio-economic measures in Accords);
Security: National Police Academy for PNC to begin operations and admit recruits;
Socio-E: Land Transfers to ex-combatants to begin;
Political: Second step in legalisation of FMLN: Legality of FMLN to become law.
Security: Ad Hoc Commission (legalised in January) to be installed and to begin evaluation (May 16).

PHASE 3, DEMOBILISATION (JUNE & JULY 1992)
Another 20% of FMLN concentrated forces to be reincorporated into civilian life (31 May);
Security: Civil Defence (?) Dis-armed on 31 May and eliminated on 30 June;
Security: National Intelligence Directorate (DNI) dissolved;
Security: The first of the five elite counter-insurgency battalions to be eliminated (July 17).

PHASE 4, DEMOBILISATION (AUGUST & SEPT 1992)
Another 20% of FMLN concentrated forces (30 July) to be reincorporated (=60%)
Socio-E: Process of legalising land tenancy in the zones of conflict to be completed (July 30)
Security: Ad hoc Commission evaluation to be completed;
Security: Second of the five elite counter-insurgency battalions to be eliminated (Aug 17)
Security: Third of the five elite counter-insurgency battalions to be eliminated (Sept 17)

PHASE 5, DEMOBILISATION (SEPT 28 – OCT 28)
Another 20% of FMLN reincorporated (28 Sept) (=80%)
Security: Fourth elite counter-insurgency battalion eliminated;

PHASE 6, DEMOBILISATION (OCT 28 – NOV 20)
Security: Phase deployment of the PNC to begin on 28 October;
Final 20% of FMLN to be reincorporated (=100% demobilisation);
Security: Last elite counter-insurgency army group to eliminated (Nov 20).

Process of ongoing reduction of Military Forces: According to an agreed UN monitored timetable

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26 Capítulo 9, Calendario de Ejecucion, Acuerdos de Chapultepec. Also UN and ES: Chapter IV.
27 The government presented to the Secretary General a calendar for the implementation of the reduction of the armed forces (Chapter 4, Chapultepec Accords) and the UN mission is to verify the completion of this calendar. The process was to be complete before March 1994.
While the implementation of most issues was governed by the timetable (Table 7.1), issues that fell outside it were governed by parallel sequencing. ONUSAL’s human-rights division continued to permanently monitor compliance with human-rights standards and to supervise the implementation of institutional reforms concerning human rights. ONUSAL’s police division worked to ensure that the steps taken to establish the civilian police force were consistent with the professional, civilian ethos agreed for the force. For the FMLN COPAZ would play a critical role in ensuring the government’s ongoing compliance with the socio-economic provisions of the agreement. Where provisions were vague, institutional commitment to the letter and spirit of the provisions was seen as critical if implementation was to continue into the post-1992 period (Villalobus, BBCWWM: 3-2-92). ONUSAL monitored the reduction in the armed forces which, while time-tabled to end in 1994, was to begin before October 31, and to take place according to a timetable already agreed by ONUSAL and the government in the Chapultepec Accords (Ch. 4). The presidential, legislative28 and mayoral elections in March 1994 would complete the formal implementation process.

The original timetable comes close to meeting the conditions that will facilitate a successful outcome to the process according to the IFF model’s hypotheses. Issue hierarchy is nowhere explicitly endorsed in the timetable and design is informed by efforts to institutionalise both parallel sequencing and reciprocal, issue breakdown. However, a number of weaknesses existed and served to illustrate that the process had not prevented some factions in the FMLN and ARENA from endorsing the agreement, while articulating mutually-exclusive interpretations of their obligations under the timetable.

For example, Cristiani made a number of early public announcements, which explicitly denied the existence of a link between the FMLN’s demobilisation and the restructuring of the armed forces: ‘there can be, he declared, ‘no symmetry between FMLN disarmament and the decrease in the armed forces’ (BBCWWM, 4.01.92). According to Cristiani’s defence minister, General Ponce,29 there could be no symmetry between a clandestine terrorist group and a professional and institutional arms corps (BBCWWM, 16.1.92). Ponce’s position highlights the pressure that was coming from factions within

28 Using a proportional representation electoral system.
29 Minister for Defence. Forced to step down on the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission.
the armed forces that still insisted on using issue hierarchy to ensure that the FMLN could not comply with the settlement. This interpretation of the timetable was persistently articulated by ARENA’s pro faction which was under pressure from its spoiler and sceptical factions. It was used to support a call for the full demobilisation and disarmament of the FMLN by the October 31 deadline that was set by the timetable, despite the failure of the ARENA-led formation to implement its own commitments.

Those in the FMLN who wanted to implement the settlement appeared to recognise the barriers that the internal division in ARENA presented to the implementation process. Through its radio station the FMLN indicated that while it understood the difficulties presented to Cristiani by the ARENA elements that feared and resisted change, it warned against distorting the meaning of the agreements to prevent chaos within ARENA (BBCWWM, 6.1.92). But the UN Secretary General, who was the key authority on the Accords, initially supported the interpretation of the timetable articulated by these more sceptical ARENA factions and, consequently by Cristiani himself (CIIR, 1994: 11). The Secretary General repeatedly told the FMLN that ‘a breach with one aspect of the agreement could not be used to justify a breach with another’ (UN and ES, 1995: 27). But this suggested that if ARENA was not fully implementing its promises concerning the land reforms, political reforms, reform of the military and of public security, the FMLN had to meet the requirements of the timetable regardless. This endorsed issue hierarchy and the Secretary General’s interpretation gave credence to the spoiler faction’s position. As the hypotheses of the IFF model predict, these conditions present spoiler factions with the opportunity to stall the process. In fact, the successful implementation of the settlement was not guaranteed until the Secretary General gradually re-interpreted the timetable to be governed by issue linkage and the reciprocal or reversible step-by-step implementation of issues, an interpretation which he formally endorsed it in late 1992 (CIIR:11-12).

A second, connected weakness in design was the unrealistic time frame in which the full demobilisation of the FMLN was expected. While this was sequenced with the implementation of many of the government’s commitments, a number of commitments, such as the report and implementation of the truth commission recommendations and the full UN-monitored reduction in the size of the armed forces, were not expected to take place within the timetable. Unless institutional reform was sufficiently deep to
guarantee the implementation of the critical changes that lay outside the timetable, it might prove difficult to persuade the FMLN to implement its commitments by 31 October. This weakness created incentives for the sceptical faction in the FMLN to insist on stalling and ultimately, the solution depended on the government and its ability to fulfil its commitment to lift all legal, political and security barriers to the full, legal participation of the FMLN as a political party before October 31: for the FMLN, this required that ARENA fully adhere to the implementation timetable.

These two features of design created opportunities for the government’s spoiler faction to adopt the following spoiler tactic. It used bureaucratic, logistical and financial obstacles, even those stemming from international financial agreements (Boyce, 1997), to ensure that ARENA could not fulfil its commitments in accordance with the timetable. However, justifying ARENA’s failure to implement with legitimate difficulties associated with governance, ARENA’s spoiler faction used the rules and procedures of process to demand that the FMLN unilaterally fulfil its requirements under the timetable and to declare the FMLN to be in breach of the agreement if it did not proceed. The IFF theory argues that the government’s spoiler factions aimed to use this strategy to cause the FMLN to stall. This stalling would signal an apparent unwillingness on the part of the FMLN to implement its commitments and would strengthen the argument which ARENA’s spoiler faction would put to its sceptical faction that the FMLN’s commitment to the settlement was shallow. This would help to precipitate more stalling by ARENA. This stalling might further convince those sceptical of the government’s commitments in the FMLN to question its intentions to implement the settlement and to accordingly refuse to implement their own commitments. This chain of events would eventually unravel the process.

The stalling on the land issue exacerbated the obstacles outlined above. In fact, in the details of the land issue lay the third major weakness in design. It was different interpretations of the meaning of the provisions on land reform that presented the first major crisis in the implementation process. Further disagreements later led to delays in the entire process of demobilisation and reintegration (Spenser, 1997: 37). Negotiations over the procedures through which land reform would be implemented had been tortuous. Mediators had to bridge a major gap between the positions of the pro faction in both the FMLN and ARENA. On the one hand the relatively moderate, pro faction in
ARENA was resistant to anything but very limited reform to the socio-economic system. On the other hand the FMLN’s pro faction was under pressure from those sceptical of and unwilling to accept the argument that institutional reform would enable the FMLN to pursue the socio-economic reforms necessary to create economic bases independent from the oligarchy and its new business class ally. The FMLN eventually accepted land reform and short-term socio-economic provisions that satisfied its minimal requirements and which it hoped to use to ensure sufficient socio-economic reform to satisfy its sceptical faction, through the mechanisms provided by COPAZ and through its own subsequent participation in the political system. But in order to bridge the gap and to facilitate a final settlement the provisions on land reform were left necessarily, but dangerously vague. As the below illustrates, vague terms facilitate spoiler factions in their quests to undo the settlement.

Land reform provided for the revival of the government’s land-tenure system. According to this system, those occupying land in conflict zones would be allowed to remain there and to receive assistance to increase production until a final plan for land in these zones was found. The final solution would be legal: a transaction would take place between the original landowners and the occupiers. (Spenser, 1997: 37). If the landowner was unwilling to sell, the government undertook, through the land bank and COPAZ, to re-settle occupiers on similar land elsewhere (UN and ES, 1995: 27). Lands in excess of 245 hectares (constitutional limit) would be used to meet the needs of small farmers in a programme of land distribution. Ex-combatants were to be prioritised in this distribution of land (Chapultepec, Chapter 5). Legal or re-settling problems that preceded the actual transfer were to be settled by May 1992. May 1992 was also the date for the beginning of the phased demobilisation of the FMLN and the public security forces and for the beginning of the land-transfer programmes.

It was the identification of those occupying land in conflict zones and thus entitled to be part of the programme that first created controversy. Within days of signing, the government indicated that only those occupying ‘productive land’ were allowed to remain or were entitled to re-settlement (BBCWWM, 14.2.92). According to the

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30 ARENA was more sensitive to the needs of the oligarchy than to the army, a trend strengthened since ARENA’s time in government. Elements in favour of implementation of the peace agreement remained resistant to anything but a very minimalist interpretation of land-reform and socio-economic clauses.
FMLN, the agreements respected the land-occupying situation that existed when the conflict ended. A prominent FMLN leader, Villilobus, argued that as productive land in conflict areas was scarce, the FMLN would never have agreed to the government’s definition: It would have reduced land reform to ‘a few charity handouts’ (Villilobus, Interview BBCWWM, 14.2.92). The ARENA government also queried the date interpreted by the FMLN as the ‘end of conflict,’ suggesting that the land-occupier situation at a date before FMLN’s deadline of 16 January 1992 was more appropriate (BBCWWM: 16.3.92).

The contentious land reform issue escalated to a crisis in the early months of 1992. The National Cooperative Association, a group associated with the FMLN, interpreted the Accords as permitting landless peasants to settle on unused land without risk of eviction. It encouraged landless peasants to do this in January 1992, just after the final agreement and just before the ceasefire was fully implemented (LAM: 04.92). The move by the National Cooperative Association was arguably opportunistic and outside of the letter of the agreement but it presented opportunities for ARENA’s spoiler faction to undermine the entire settlement on land reform. This spoiler faction used the uncertainty over the legitimacy of these landless peasants’ claims to question the right of far more people to receive land than just those who had opportunistically seized land. In fact, they threatened those FMLN supporters who had genuinely occupied land for many years. To make matters worse, the National Guard, the notorious public security force that was to be soon abolished, forcibly removed the occupiers on the basis that this was against the terms of the peace agreement (LAM: 04.92) and the conflict over interpretation was heightened when more land seizures by peasant groups led to further forced evictions (LAM, 04.92). While some members of the government accused the FMLN of organising the ‘illegal land seizures’ against the Accords, the FMLN accused the government of sanctioning overly repressive policies to deal with the issue. Creating further barriers, the actions of the National Guard would have fuelled the suspicions of the FMLN’s sceptical faction that the government and military did not intend to change.

The crisis was to worsen further. As the National Guard forcibly evicted peasants, Cristiani began to promote a different understanding of provisions that governed its

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31 ‘Acuerdo Complementario’, 22 December 1992
abolition, and that of the Treasury Police. He suggested that instead of their disbandment, a change in their responsibility away from public security was required. About 6-7000 of their members would, he said, join the military, and some members would be incorporated into the new police force (BBCWWM, 4.3.92). The FMLN fiercely rejected this interpretation, in particular the decision to incorporate some agents into the new National Civilian Police (BBC WWM, 6-3-92). This policy was seriously damaging to the argument of the FMLN’s pro faction. A civilian and non-repressive police force was critical if the pro and sceptical factions in the FMLN were to stay with the process.

After much delay which the FMLN had blamed on foot-dragging by the government, COPAZ reacted to the crisis by setting up a (i) Land Commission and a (ii) Special sub-commission. The latter was to ‘study reports of the government’s failure to disband security organisations by the 1 March deadline and their incorporation into the army of public security bodies in what the FMLN referred to as a ‘flagrant violation’ of the Accords (BBC WWM, 14.3.92). But despite these efforts, the land-reform crisis continued to endanger the implementation of all sections of the Accords in March 1992. The Land Commission was failing to overcome the land-reform disputes by consensus, as the agreement had envisaged. While suitable for working out technical details of agreed commitments, the COPAZ committee encountered frequently insurmountable obstacles to dispute resolution, arguably stemming from the absence of a neutral mediator or agenda setter. In the absence of break-through and with the spread of the stalling to other issues in the implementation process, UN special envoy Mark Goulding was dispatched to initiate dispute resolution procedures for non-compliance claims (BBCWWM: 16.3.92).

Central to Goulding’s initiative appears to have been an aim to negotiate a separate agreement for a phased implementation of the land-reform issue. He most likely hoped that if this could be achieved the land reform issue would be insulated from the rest of the process and it would not cause the FMLN to refuse to undertake its first demobilisation step in May 1992. Goulding persuaded the parties to reach a temporary agreement: while the implementation of the non-controversial aspects of land reform would proceed, land seizures and evictions would be suspended to facilitate the processing of cases for legal entitlement and re-settling under the conflict-resolution
mechanisms envisaged under the Peace Accords: the Land Bank and Land-reform Commission. To deal with the disputes over the groups who were entitled to benefit from the scheme, COPAZ was to form a special commission to settle land disputes by reviewing an inventory of occupied land, which the FMLN would present to it by September 1992 (UN and ES, 1995: 27-8).

But while the intervention managed temporarily to insulate the land issue, it did not break down issues sufficiently to enable the FMLN to complete its concentration of forces (by the end of phase 1) or to move to demobilise its first 20 per cent on May 1st (LAM: 05.92). Delays in the process of setting up the PNC, which parts of the FMLN interpreted as indicating the government’s reluctance to ever disband the former public-security bodies, meant that the National Police Academy would not as agreed begin operations and admit recruits on the 1 May. Anticipating that the FMLN would respond by stalling on its first key deadline, Goulding restated the UN position: under no circumstances should fulfilment of one agreement be linked to the fulfilment of another one. (BBCWWM: 16.3.92). But the FMLN stalled, attributing its stalling primarily to the government’s failure to dissolve the National Guard and Treasury Police (LAM, 06.92), while criticising its failure to implement steps to set up PNC, to redistribute land (AP, 30.4.92) and to fully implement aspects of the national reconstruction plan to meet the needs of reintegration. In keeping with the implementation timetable, the FMLN declared itself a political party on May 1, while ARENA did not implement the back-up legislation. Cristiani responded to the FMLN’s stalling with a reiteration of the UN-backed issue hierarchy demand: non-compliance with one agreement cannot be linked to non-compliance with another (BBCWWM6.5.92).

As the IFF model predicts, issue hierarchy in the form of unilateral demands, in place of the parallel implementation of reciprocal or reversible, broken-down issues, results in deadlock. Without altering sequence and timing, deadlock would remain. But without adequate dispute-resolution mechanisms, how could the pro factions agree to alter the sequence and timing agreement?

The answer to this question lies with ONUSAL. The UN used the power that the Accords gave it to precipitate a re-negotiation of dispute-resolution procedures that would open up the opportunity to break the deadlock. An agreement on new
mechanisms to expedite the implementation of the agreement was made, whereby the FMLN and ARENA would oversee implementation through the direct mediation of the UN, which would be in constant contact with working groups from both formations (BBCWWM, 9.5.92). These mechanisms could bypass COPAZ, which, according to many sources, had proved less effective than hoped (Guardian, 23.5.94).

But before the deadlock could be broken and the first major steps in implementation were taken, another serious incident threatened the process. A prominent activist from the FMLN’s 1989 offensive was shot and seriously wounded. This served to threaten the security of the FMLN for the second time since January and cast doubt on ARENA’s promise to guarantee the security of the FMLN. The incident was most likely the work of the ARENA spoiler faction who knew that the security of FMLN personnel was essential if any demobilisation was to occur (LAM, 06.92). An FMLN leader Shafik Handal interpreted the incident (May) as another sign of the far right’s rejection of the Peace Accords (BBCWWM, 2.3.92). As anticipated, the attacks prevented the FMLN from beginning its demobilisation process and the FMLN pulled out of COPAZ, declared all agreements frozen and demanded that the government make a reasonable request of its spoiler factions by launching a serious investigation into the threats to FMLN security (BBCWWM, 23.5.92). Despite much resistance within the ARENA government, after direct talks between Handal and Cristiani, the defence minister, General Ponce, agreed to launch the serious investigation requested, thus diffusing the issue and facilitating an FMLN return to COPAZ. But while concrete moves to implement the profound reform of the military pended, opportunities would remain for both spoiler factions to engineer insecurity and division within the FMLN.

That the threat was not the first serious threat to the FMLN’s security would have served to further heighten the fears of sceptical factions. In March 1992 Bolivian and Honduran surveillance aircraft had appeared over the FMLN’s demobilisation fields. These areas were strictly off-limits to the government as demobilisation was to be a secret process overseen only by ONUSAL.\(^{32}\) The FMLN immediately suspected that the government, or at least some factions of ARENA, were gathering intelligence on their weaponry and it threatened a violent response to this serious challenge to its

\(^{32}\) UN, Blue Helmets: 430-1.
security. ARENA moved to diffuse the situation by denying involvement and officially complaining to the Honduran government in an effort to highlight its innocence. But many reports suggest that that elements of the Salvadorian and Honduran militaries were attempting to maintain a war-threatening environment so as to prevent the demobilisation of the FMLN and to use this as a justification for refusing to implement the military reforms and the reduction in its size outlined in the Accords (LAM: 05.92).

The threats to the FMLN’s security, not to mention the government’s foot-dragging on other issues, made it very unlikely that it would make any moves to implement in May 1992. In the wake of this incident and immediately prior to the next deadline for the FMLN’s demobilisation, Cristiani agreed through the new ONUSAL mechanisms to take a first step towards the fulfilment of ARENA’s military and public-security force commitments: to complete the concentration of the armed forces, including the concentration of the infamous National Guard and Treasury Police. In Cristiani’s own words, the failure of the government to comply with these commitments could no longer be used by the FMLN ‘as an argument for not complying with the agreements’ (BBCWWM: 27.5.92). And while the FMLN still reneged on its next deadline (31 May), ARENA’s move provided the space for the two formations to alter the sequence and timing of crucial commitments through UN dispute-resolution mechanisms. These changes allowed the implementation of the timetable to begin.

The adjustments implicitly breached the government’s interpretation of its obligations: that compliance with one agreement was independent of compliance with others. Instead it re-scheduled implementation to endorse the inter-dependence of issues, a procedure which was actually inherent in the timetable. The parties agreed that all forces would be fully concentrated on 25 June and on 30 June the first FMLN contingent (20%) would begin demobilisation. On the same day, the government would present a bill to the legislature for the definitive abolition of the Treasury Police and the National Guard, establish a special brigade for military security with no responsibility for civilian affairs, propose an electoral code to facilitate the legalisation of the FMLN, and take steps to implement the agreed procedures on land reform. On 15 July the first recruits (according to original quotas) would begin training in the police academy.

33 UN, Blue Helmets: 431-2
before July 31 when the second group of FMLN troops would begin demobilisation. Despite the re-scheduling of other commitments, the October 31 deadline for final demobilisation was, on Cristiani’s insistence, retained (LAM: 06.92). This would soon create barriers to implementation.

As the IFF theory predicts, the agreement to implement issues in parallel and in reciprocal or reversible steps did help to bring about some progress in the implementation process. The FMLN implemented the first step of its demobilisation in July (BBCWWM, 2.7.92), and the government began to implement its commitments. It promoted the FMLN’s status as a legal party, concentrated the public-security force bodies and made legal preparations for their disbandment. On 18 July, the Salvadorian army began the demobilisation of the first of its five elite battalions and ONUSAL, along with a special commission of the armed forces, verified the battalion’s inventory until the unit was fully dissolved (BBCWWM, 21.7.92).

But the obstacles to implementation had not all been removed and failure to advance the phased implementation of adequate socio-economic programmes for combatants in sequence with demobilisation prompted the FMLN to stall on the demobilisation of the second twenty per cent on 31st July (LAM, 09.92). The FMLN insisted that they would continue to stall if the government persistently failed to ensure that these programmes were simultaneously implemented. It also insisted that the government simultaneously provide legalised land to ex-combatants as the land-reform provisions had promised and that the new police force be immediately legalised (BBCWWM, 31.7.92).

Despite some breakthrough, these issues which breached the rule of parallel sequencing, and a further controversy that had long threatened to emerge, presented further barriers to implementation. The controversy concerned the FMLN’s security commissions. In the absence of the disbandment of the public security bodies and the establishment of the new police force, in the early months of the implementation process the FMLN had re-established security commissions in parts of El Salvador. According to the FMLN, the commissions existed to protect citizens and were ‘necessary only until the new police force was established’ (BBCWWM, 21.8.92). However they were fiercely
rejected by the government and the government’s spoiler faction were not slow to present them as evidence of the FMLN’s intentions to continue the war.

In the midst of the crises over this and the other deadlocked issues, Goulding was once against dispatched in August 1992. He aimed to mediate efforts to overcome the deadlock created by the government’s refusal to comply with parallel sequencing and the consequential stalling by the FMLN on its commitments. He did so by encouraging both parties to take a number of small, reciprocal steps on all issues. The government pledged to continue to comply with the demobilisation of the military and the military forces declared themselves to be ‘politically prepared to comply with the accords’ (AP, 15.8.92). The FMLN simultaneously agreed to place the remainder of the weapons in its inventory and submit all of it to ONUSAL. The government promised to remove an immediate obstacle to demobilisation by implementing the programmes that would reintegrate former combatants into society (BBCWWM, 17.8.92). In the context of the August adjustments to the timetable and the concurrent beginning to FMLN-government negotiations on power-sharing mechanisms through which civilian authority (exiled, mostly ARENA mayors) would be returned to areas in conflict zones, the FMLN pro factions were able to dismantle these commissions, which had been a self-introduced breakdown of the military and public security issue. In other words, the FMLN would take the large step of trusting the government to play a role in the governing and the provision of public security in these areas, as long as power-sharing mechanisms existed. Given these agreements, both formations promised to get up to date on all their commitments within one month in an effort to meet the deadline of 31 October.

While not explicitly saying so, the newly-agreed rules and procedures further eroded the ‘issue hierarchy’ previously demanded by the government. In fact, following the rescheduling of commitments a clear pattern emerged, whereby stalling on all commitments by the government was met with FMLN stalling and with FMLN proposals that ARENA make reasonable requests of its spoiler factions i.e. that the formation abide by the step-by-step implementation process agreed to in the Accords. As long as this pattern continued there would be progress.
Demobilisation of the five counter-insurgency battalions continued and the FMLN demobilised its second twenty per cent when the government increased its efforts to reincorporate ex-combatants (UN and ES, 1995: Ch.4). The August readjustments also facilitated the establishment of the police academy and a beginning to training programmes. But resistance by the military to the full deployment of the national police, which was due to be in place in January 1993, was clearly evident (LAM, 11.92). Furthermore, if the implementation process was to be ultimately successful, two other issues required sequencing with the implementation timetable.

PURGING THE MILITARY AND INSULATING LAND-REFORM

The Ad Hoc Commission reported to the government and the UN on 22 September 1992. Moves to implement its recommendations on a purge of the army high command would be essential if the FMLN was to fully demobilise by October 31. But Cristiani refused to indicate how he would implement the purge of the high command. Even more controversially from the FMLN’s point of view he moved many on the purge list from the counter-insurgency battalions to other sections of the army in an effort to protect high-ranking personnel whose removal would seriously divide the ARENA party. The government justified its stalling by once again using its spoiler faction’s interpretation of the FMLN’s commitment to fully demobilise by 31 October as absolute and unrelated to the government’s commitments. The government not only resisted the steps to implement the highly sensitive provisions to purge the high command, but bureaucratic, legalistic and financial obstacles were complicated in a way that seriously delayed the procedures for implementing land reform that had been agreed in March. This stalling ensured that the FMLN would not meet the unilateral demand made by the government to demobilise the remaining sixty per cent of its troops. In turn ARENA’s spoiler faction, who continued to insist on the October deadline, was presented with pretexts on which to refuse to implement all commitments.

Insisting on issue linkage if it was to continue implementing the Accords (LAM, 10.92), the FMLN suspended stage three of its demobilisation in September, ‘to maintain the link in the original timetable.’ It refused to demobilise until 1,890 plots of land were immediately distributed, and new dates were set for the fulfilment of other aspects of the agreement. The UN responded to the deadlock with a proposal to settle the
implementation of the land-reform provisions separately, institutionally and for once and for all. The logic behind the initiative appears to have been to address the reasonable objections to the implementation of land reform such as logistical and bureaucratic barriers. By dealing with reasonable objections they could prevent ARENA’s spoiler faction from using these objections to hide their fundamental objections to land reform and to the settlement. After extensive discussions with both parties over issues such as the size of plots and the number of potential beneficiaries, the Secretary General presented a formula which he described as an ‘equitable compromise’ (Document 45/6: UN and ES, 1995: 257). This set the number of beneficiaries,\(^\text{35}\) guaranteed no more forced evictions and agreed that a COPAZ committee would determine the operational aspects of the proposal, including the amount of land available. According to Latin American Monitor (01.93), the initiative resolved the political debate at the heart of the land-reform issue. By setting in train its incremental implementation, according to an agreed set of rules and with dispute-resolution mechanisms, it was hoped that by sequencing a broken down implementation of land reform along with human rights and political issues, it could no longer be used to present obstacles to the remaining implementation of the security and policing issues. And although obstacles remained in the wake of the October initiative, some stemming from genuine financial and bureaucratic barriers, some from their deliberate complication by the government’s spoiler faction, by 1996 the land-reform programme agreed to in October 1992 had advanced significantly (Alvarez: 1998).

Furthermore and crucially for the prospects of successfully implementing the Accords, the agreement on a process of phased land reform and its insulation, at least temporarily, from other aspects of the process created space for a difficult re-negotiation of the sequence and timing of the rest of implementation.

MILITARY, PUBLIC SECURITY AND DEMOBILISATION

Despite some progress on the introduction of parallel sequencing, the implementation of military and public security issues remained in deeply stalled in October 1992. In response to the FMLN’s refusal to implement the commitments that it gave in August,

\(^{34}\) UN, Blue Helmets: 432.

\(^{35}\) The number would not exceed 47,500: 15,000 ex-army combatants, 7,500 ex-FMLN combatants and 25,000 land holders in the former zones of conflict.
the government froze the dissolution of the notoriously repressive Attacalt Battalion and pulled out of negotiations on October 21 (CIIR, 1994: 12). It then formally conditioned its continued demobilisation and its reduction in the size of the armed forces on the FMLN’s submission of all weapons in its inventory to ONUSAL and the official destruction of those weapons. But the FMLN linked the implementation of the Ad Hoc Commission’s purge with the demobilisation of the remaining 60 per cent of its forces (UN and ES: 30) and the destruction of its weapons.

In the efforts to overcome the persistent deadlock, the formula that guided implementation was finally formally altered and an announcement by the Secretary General confirmed this: ‘for the first time compliance with certain points on the calendar by one side was actually formally made contingent upon the compliance with specific undertakings by the other’ (Secretary General, UN and ES: 30). Taking into account the unrealistic, final deadline and the need for issue linkage, the UN facilitated an agreement that would extend the process until December 15 1992 and would almost overcome the barriers to implementation. The land reform would proceed as agreed. Cristiani would implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission which involved the purging of at least 103 officers, and the government would complete the process of fully legalising the FMLN, a move which some of its members had been increasingly resisting. The FMLN would begin the process of full disarmament and weapons destruction and the FMLN and the government would continue with phased demobilisation, which for the government required the demobilisation of the anti-insurgency battalions and for the FMLN the demobilisation of sixty per cent on October 31, eighty per cent by November 20 and one hundred per cent by 15 December.

Goulding and de Soto (UN) were dispatched to El Salvador in November to deal with government resistance to some aspects of the package and Cristiani agreed to inform the Secretary General of his administrative decisions concerning the purge of the armed forces by 29 November, following which FMLN would provide ONUSAL with its final inventory, conclude weapons concentration and begin destruction on 1 December (LAM, 01.93: UN and ES, 1995: 31).

The detail in the adjustments to sequence and timing highlight the importance of the order and content of each implementation move to pro factions in each conflict formation. Through dispute-resolution procedures that were driven by the UN, pro
factions had agreed to break down issues and to implement them in parallel sequence. This agreement on design coincided with the most significant progress to date in the implementation process in late 1992: the FMLN was fully legalised and fully demobilised, Cristiani informed the UN of the administrative changes that he would make to fulfil the requirements of the Ad Hoc Commission, the PNC was further institutionalised with the first deployments taking place in February 1993 and the FMLN handed over its inventory and began the destruction of weapons on 6 December (UN and ES: 34). In a parallel initiative, which was essential for the holding of elections and important in convincing FMLN to finally demobilise, after months of negotiations, the UN facilitated the return of ARENA mayors to conflict areas after months of negotiations. Their return was made possible by power-sharing arrangements which were negotiated with the de facto authorities that had ruled the conflict zones throughout the civil war (LAM, 01.93). This helped to implement the full restoration of public administration in former zones of conflict, but it was implemented in small steps and avoided making a unilateral demand of the FMLN to simply hand over power. With these agreements and with progress being made towards the establishment of the new police force, the FMLN’s sceptical faction had less need to establish security controls to ‘protect civilians’ in its former strongholds. This reduced the pretexts on which the spoiler faction could stall the process.

TOWARDS CRISIS AND FINAL DEMOBILISATION
Despite considerable progress, there were some serious threats to implementation in 1993. In January it emerged that Cristiani had reneged on his November promise to make public the list of personnel who would be purged according to the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations. It also emerged that, contrary to the assurances of the FMLN, the arms-destruction process was not complete.

The intra-formation conflict behind the barriers to full implementation is clear. On the one hand, ARENA’s pro faction had been able to dramatically speed up the process of reducing the size of the armed forces and to complete the reduction ahead of schedule on 31 March 1993. This was arguably because this process did not unduly threaten the most powerful elements in Salvadorian society and in the Salvadorian military. On the other hand, the implementation of the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations, and the implementation of the forthcoming recommendations of the Truth Commission,
threatened those at the centre of power in both ARENA and the Armed Force’s High Command. This placed at risk its unity and presented the critical barriers to full implementation in 1993, which began with this failure by Cristiani to live up to his promise.

Equally threatening to the unity of the government were the recommendations of the Truth Commission. The report held the Armed Forces responsible for 85 per cent of human-rights violations and massacres during the civil war, the death squads responsible for ten per cent and the guerrillas for five. It recommended the resignation of a number of powerful members of the Army High Command and the resignation of the entire supreme court which it judged to be ‘incapable of fairly assessing and carrying out punishment’. In March 1993 The High Command of the Armed Forces, the President of the Supreme Court, and highly-ranked government officials (Spenser, 1996:48) greeted the report with outcry.

Searching for a pretext on which to justify stalling and ultimately to avoid implementing any of the recommendations, the spoiler faction of the ARENA party and the Army High Command initially focused their criticisms on the rules and procedures of process. They accused the Commission of grossly exceeding its mandate and they put Cristiani under pressure to refuse to recognise its recommendations on this basis. To temporarily defuse the issue, the UN Secretary General undertook to analyse the recommendations, to identify those compatible with its mandate, and to identify moves that both parties would take to fulfil their pledges to implement recommendations (UN and ES, 1995: 38). ARENA meanwhile announced its intention to implement only those aspects of the report ‘that fell strictly within its competence and were consistent with the constitution, the peace accords and national reconciliation.’ But Cristiani simultaneously moved to protect a series of powerful individuals from the implications of the legal recommendations by introducing a general amnesty to the legislative assembly. While the amnesty was deplored by human rights groups, the catholic church, and other civil society organisations (CIIR, 1994: 20-21), the degree to which ARENA’s pro faction could implement all of the Truth Commission’s recommendations, while retaining control over its conflict formation, is highly questionable.

37 Recommendations were political, administrative and legal. CIIR: 7.
All sections of the counter-insurgency coalition greeted the report with outcry and this outcry took place in the context of escalating violence against the pro factions, especially those on the left (below). Full implementation of the Truth Commission recommendations in the absence of an amnesty would almost certainly have increased the power of ARENA’s spoiler faction which was willing to sanction such violence. In fact, Cristiani suggested that if the names of those who had testified had been made public, he would not have been able to guarantee their safety (Hampson, 1996: 156-7). In fact, it appears that the amnesty was intended to simultaneously enable ARENA’s pro faction to retain power at the expense of its spoiler faction who hoped to use the Truth Commission’s recommendations to bring down the Accords. In this sense, it served to keep the implementation process alive. And the alliance between pro factions was tenuously held together when Cristiani promised to implement some of the commission’s recommendations.

Adding fuel to the crisis in the implementation process, in May 1993 it emerged that the FMLN had not given accurate accounts of its weapons inventory to ONUSAL. It had retained up to 30 per cent of its arsenal in secret caches in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador (UN and ES: 41). Its refusal to comply with all steps of the demobilisation and disarmament process is a clear example of self-introduced issue breakdown. If sceptical elements of the FMLN had perceived full demobilisation to be too risky and too unreasonable a step in October 1992, the move would be broken down into smaller steps to ensure that sceptical elements remained supportive of the implementation process. It is not clear whether the move to conceal weapons was sanctioned by all five commanders or if was the separate work of a sceptical faction within the FPL but the revelations led to serious disunity within the FMLN ranks.

The revelations also clearly provided pretexts on which ARENA’s spoiler faction could base its refusal to implement any of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc or Truth Commission. And in response, some members of Cristiani’s party encouraged him to reverse the legalisation that legalised the FMLN (UN and ES: FT). Given that the elections were less than a year away, and given the formidable challenges faced by the FMLN to organise as a unified political movement and to find resources and media outlets through which to communicate its political campaign (CIIR, 1994: 22-3), a legal
challenge would almost certainly have thrown into question for the FMLN’s sceptical faction the viability of elections as an alternative to violence.

Once again the presence of the insulated institutions helped to save the implementation process from breakdown. In May the UN commenced a three-month process of intensive negotiations with the FMLN through which the mediators hoped to reach an agreement on some mechanisms through which the full caches of weapons would be revealed and destroyed. Two factors may have helped the FMLN’s pro faction in its effort to persuade its sceptical faction to cooperate so as to save the implementation process: that the reduction in the size of the armed forces was complete and that the PNC was partly deployed. Furthermore, in a simultaneous development, the result of ongoing bi-party talks between the UN and ARENA, Cristiani complied with more of (though not all) the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations, and with the recommendation of the Truth Commission to remove four senior military officers and replace them with moderates. Amongst these was the powerful defence minister and chief of staff (LAM, 08.93; 10.93). This move immediately preceded a final breakthrough in the UN-FMLN talks and in August 1993 the UN certified that FMLN no longer had a military capability (LAM, 10.93).

THE LAST SPOILER-INSTIGATED CRISIS?
In the immediate aftermath of the August 1993 breakthrough and before any elections had taken place, the UN, the FMLN and ARENA together agreed to institutionalise high-level tri-partite meetings. This was with a view to monitoring the implementation process closely and to clearing the board before the March 1994 elections and in September 1993 the parties agreed on a new timetable for the implementation of outstanding issues (UN and ES: 45-6). These were primarily concerned with steps to complete the implementation of issues: the phasing out of the National Police once PNC was fully operative, the speeding up of the land-reform process and the implementation of the remaining Truth Commission provisions, primarily those relating to the Supreme Court’s powers. The extension of ONUSAL’s mandate until May 31 1994 ensured that the police and human rights divisions would continue to ensure that the phased implementation of outstanding government obligations would continue until after the elections.
In an initiative that was negotiated through these mechanisms, six of the seven presidential candidates signed a solemn pact which committed them to implement outstanding Peace Accord commitments beyond the election (March 1994). With these measures the FMLN, the pro faction of ARENA and the UN aimed to institutionalise the commitments. This was critical given the FMLN’s fears about ARENA’s presidential candidate, Calderon Sol, who received most of his support from a faction of ARENA that was less devoted than Cristiani’s faction to the implementation of the Accords (Guardian; 23.5.94; Spence et al, 1995: 18). Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of the second round of the presidential elections and before Calderon Sol’s inauguration as President, the FMLN, ARENA and the UN endorsed a further timetable, in which they agreed to handle outstanding issues of the process with fortnightly tri-partite meetings, joint working groups, the continued existence of COPAZ and its sub-commissions, and the election (using new procedures) in the Assembly of a new Supreme Court.

As the UN and the pro factions appeared to be carefully and successfully overcoming barriers to implementation with parallel sequencing, issue breakdown and the institutionalisation of mechanisms to deal with outstanding commitments, ultra-right groups, perhaps increasingly deprived of legitimate process-related opportunities to practice spoiler tactics, escalated their campaign of violence. Beginning just after the August 1993 breakthrough in the implementation process, between October 1993 and February 1994 fifteen FMLN personnel, including leaders, former commanders and ex-combatants, were murdered in death-squad style attacks, which ‘raised fears of renewed civil war and ‘put the peace accords in serious jeopardy’ (LAM, 12.93).

38 UN, Blue Helmets: 440.
39 The presidential elections went to a second round after Sol won 49.03% of the vote in the first round. In the second round ARENA’s Sol won 68.35% to Zamora’s 31.65%. See table 7.2. Given that most accounts point to the stakes as racked against the left and centre-left FMLN and MNR parties, the result was respectable and gave FMLN a political base with sufficient power through which to pursue its goals. See Wantchekon, 1999.
40 Despite the slow pace of implementation of judicial reform the post 1994 election of the new Supreme Court, through the new Council of the Supreme court and the new requirement for a 2/3 majority in the Assembly for approval, is considered to have resulted in a more professional, independent Supreme Court. Spence et al, Chapultepec 5 Years On: 16.
But amidst the FMLN’s fears, ONUSAL’s Human Rights division promptly investigated and reported that, unlike the 1980s when death squads were associated with the army and the state, the violence was perpetrated by fringe elements and was targeted against the new democratic system worked out by FMLN and ARENA (UN and ES, 1995: 46-7). Four right-wing members of the ARENA party were murdered (El diario/La Prensa: 17.10.93) and later murders by the death squads were directed against an ARENA mayor and a number of industrialists (LAM: 02.95). This appears to support the argument that the attacks were driven by a faction within ARENA that was against both ARENA’s and the FMLN’s pro factions.

The violence appears, therefore, to have been the result of intra-formation conflict. But there remained a serious ‘danger that the violence would be couched as violent conflict between the left and the right,’ (Villalobos, El Diario/La Prensa 13.11.93) and could thus prompt the process to unravel. The question remains as to what elements of process might explain the inability of ARENA’s spoiler faction to precipitate the unravelling of the process that they clearly desired?

A number of elements associated with process design protected implementation from being reversed by these renewed threats. Firstly, the above described, carefully-sequenced timetable and the adjustments to it during implementation which saw the endorsement of reciprocal, broken-down moves and parallel sequencing had limited the spoiler faction’s opportunity to demand issue hierarchy. This had resulted in progress on all issues in the implementation process. That progress was on all issues had helped both pro factions to make reasonable requests of their spoiler factions: this reduced the legitimacy of spoiler faction’s campaigns and thereby helped pro factions to retain the support of their respective sceptical factions and to maintain the alliance between pro factions in favour of implementation. Secondly, the two-year presence of the ONUSAL Human Rights Division gave it both the ability and the credibility to promptly carry out a report on the escalating violence. This, and the timely dispatching of Goulding to manage talks to initiate an institutional response to the crisis in November 1993, further facilitated the pro faction alliance in the midst of the potential crisis. It was agreed that
an institutional, insulated mechanism would handle the crisis: a UN Commission that would investigate political murders by 'illegal armed groups.'

The FMLN insisted that the UN lead the investigative commission, stating as its rationale the need to avoid an attempt to present what appeared to be an organised political campaign of murders as ordinary crime (El Diario, La Prensa, 17.10.93). The request that the UN lead the investigations was presentable as a reasonable request to ARENA’s spoiler faction that was unwilling to reveal its true intentions. When combined with increased security provision for the vulnerable elite and sub-elite of the FMLN, the agreement to allow a UN-led investigation dealt with the crisis reduced the incentive for its sceptical faction to seek a break with the process. The space that was created allowed other aspects of the implementation process to proceed without major cracks in the FMLN formation and without serious cracks in the ARENA formation. As the Commission investigated the ONUSAL-supervised elections took place.

Table 7.2 Presidential Election, First Round: 20th Marzo 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate/Party</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armando Calderon Sol (Arena)</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruben Zamora (FMLN &amp; CD)</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidel Chavez Mena (PDC)</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10.49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presidential Election, Second Round: 24th April 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate/Party</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armando Calderon Sol (Arena)</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruben Zamora (FMLN, CD)</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3. El Salvador, Legislative Assembly Elections, 1994 and 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Assembly Elections, March 199443</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN Partido de Coalición Nacional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD Convergencia Democrática</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unión Democrática (UD)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84 (Total)

41 The Commission members included the Procurator of Human Rights and Director of ONUSAL Human Rights division. El Diario, La Prensa, 17.12.93.
42 FMLN and CD (Democratic Convergence) jointly proposed Zamora as presidential candidate. CD included the left wing constitutional party which had been banned from participating in the system prior to the 1989 elections - Zamora's FDR.
ELECTION AND CONCLUSION

Judgement of the frequently-faulted 1994 presidential, legislative and municipal elections, which signalled the formal end of the implementation process, depends on one’s start point and expectations. The questionable impartiality of the supreme electoral tribunal, the near monopoly of both capital and print and broadcast media enjoyed by ARENA and clear irregularities in voter registration (Stahler-Sholk, 1994: 24-5; Wantchekon, 1999), are correctly highlighted as reducing the democratic nature of the elections. But a measure of the success of the elections must be that the FMLN managed to win 21 seats out of 84 (Table 7.3) in a previously closed political system, where the odds, in particular the financial odds, were seriously stacked against it (Wantchekon, 1999: 815). Further, it was able, despite its disunity, to embark on the task of becoming a loyal opposition. A more serious question concerns the possibility that in the event of losing the presidency or winning considerably fewer of the 39 legislative seats, significant sections of the ARENA party would not have accepted the results of electoral democracy and would have chosen violence instead (Spence et al, 1995:8-9; Wantchekon: 827).

The IFF model can explain this: handing over power would have been too large a step if the ARENA pro faction was to be protected from its spoiler and sceptical factions in 1994. But a progressive erosion of ARENA’s monopoly appears to have commenced, the slow nature of which made continued implementation possible. In the 1997 elections (Table 7.4), the FMLN battled ARENA to a near tie in legislative seats (29-27) and to a mere 10,000-vote difference. While a third ARENA president was elected in 1999, in 2001 the FMLN won more seats in the legislature than ARENA and won the mayoral election in San Salvador. This increases the prospect that there will be an FMLN president after the next election (Spence, 01: 2).

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44 Conversation with an observer of the 1994 Salvadorian elections, Peader Kirby, in Dublin City University, September 1999.
45 At this point FMLN included FPL, PCS and PRTC. ERP and RN left FMLN in 1994 following their decision to support an ARENA directive in the assembly which heralded a new way of assigning power in the Assembly, perceived as an abuse of ARENA power by most of FMLN component groups. Zamora, 1998: 250.
Table 7.4 Legislative Assembly Elections, March 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of the vote</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MU</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(independent).

84 (Total)

Elections in the absence of power-sharing structures or decentralisation will not guarantee that the process of transferring some power will be phased and broken-down as it has been in El Salvador. The holding of elections relatively late in the process arguably helped the sceptical faction in the FMLN to believe that it could access power through the new political system; therefore, institutionalised power sharing, frequently inappropriate or simply not up for negotiation, was not necessary to facilitate the power allocation issue. The breakdown into small steps and the parallel implementation of political issues, such as constitutional changes, changes to the electoral system, the temporary element of power sharing in local government and efforts to institutionalise human rights in the political system decreased incentives to perceive the elections as a reason to stall on all other issues. Furthermore, the election was not, in fact, a 'zero-sum' election, in that other, significantly large parties existed in the political system, and because securing seats (through a proportional representation electoral system) in the legislature actually opened up space to incrementally win power. But without the parallel sequencing and issue breakdown that had led to the implementation of the immediate commitments in the Accords, including some reform of electoral system, the FMLN’s pro faction was unlikely to have been in the position to pursue this policy. That the differences that emerged to divide the FMLN do not appear to have been along a military/political line, a factor in part explicable by its organisational structure, may also have facilitated the pro faction’s policy.

Factionalism within both ARENA and the FMLN was evident throughout the implementation process. But features of implementation design, either explicit to design, or implicit and eventually established during the implementation process,
facilitated the implementation of the ambitious accords. According to the IFF model, the features - reciprocal or reversible issue breakdown, parallel sequencing and the absence of issue hierarchy – served to preserve the unity of pro and sceptical factions in each party and to marginalize the spoiler factions.

While Villilobos (ERN) reportedly sounded more and more like a European socialist as the implementation process progressed, his co-leader Handal (FPL) declared himself to remain a Marxist communist (BBCWWM, 14.2.92). The maintenance of unity between these two factions of the FMLN was crucial if implementation was to succeed. If the coalition had broken up before the 1994 elections, Handel’s faction may have extended its appeal to include extremist factions in a bid to remain the most powerful faction of the organisation. A power struggle like this would have made compromise with ARENA, particularly on divisive socio-economic issues such as the land issue, almost impossible.

ARENA is believed to be broadly split into three factions and its moderate faction, which is led by Cristiani, is persistently threatened by the old guard, a dangerous third force with connections to ARENA’s shadowy past. This third force was strengthened in the wake of the 1994 elections (Spence et al, 1995: 18-19). In fact, sources close to the UN Commission investigating the death squads did not rule out the possibility that members of government still actively support it (Guardian, 23.5.94; Report of the Grupo Conjunto). The newly-elected President Sol (1994) was believed to belong to a faction that straddles the moderate and far-right factions (Spence et al, 1995: 18-19). That the implementation process did not lead to a dramatic increase in the power of these factions on the far right, which together with Sol’s elements arguably make up a more numerous faction of the party, is a considerable achievement.

According to the IFF model, the ability of the pro faction to prevail in both the ARENA government and FMLN can be explained in a large part by the procedures and mechanisms of the implementation process. Time and time again when issue hierarchy

46 *The Report of the Grupo Conjunto*, August 17th 1994. The commission concluded that there was no evidence of an institutionalised government policy to support the organisations but says ‘indications are that active-duty members of the Armed Forces and the National Police, or public functionaries make up these clandestine structures...some of these activities are directed, supported, covered-up or tolerated by the military, police, judiciary or members of local government’.
prevailed and issue breakdown was insufficient - on issues from military, to public security, to political, to socio-economic, to the demobilisation of the FMLN - stalling, perpetuated by the need for intra-formation harmony, dominated. Stalling by the FMLN on its commitment to demobilise the first twenty per cent of its military was in response to issue hierarchy. The issue hierarchy was created by ARENA’s delay in the establishment of the new national police and its unwillingness to disband the public security forces. ARENA refused to disband public security forces and used them against land seizures, when it argued that the FMLN’s interpretation of the land-reform agreements was inaccurate and demanded too large a step for the government formation. Further stalling by the FMLN was prompted by the government’s failure to establish adequate socio-economic and re-integration programmes. Demobilisation was too big a step for the FMLN pro factions, without the parallel sequencing of all implementation issues and, while the government continued to demand issue hierarchy, no movement was facilitated.

Time and time again when the insulated dispute-resolution mechanisms facilitated an agreement that altered sequence and timing, and served to reduce the number of pretexts on which to make unilateral demands, implementation progressed. Where issue breakdown and parallel sequencing of issues was not explicitly provided for, the FMLN appeared to introduce it itself. Steps to handover its arms inventory to the UN were not only delayed, but, in what appears to have been a move motivated by those sceptical of the process (possibly with spoiler intent), sections of the FMLN concealed their retention of at least 30 per cent of its military capability until ARENA completed number of its commitments; reduced the size of the military forces, demobilised public security bodies and made significant moves towards the implementation of the Ad Hoc and Truth Commission’s recommendations. By late-1992, the rules and procedures for implementation called for a reciprocal, phased, broken-down implementation of issues, and implementation progressed.

Observers of the process have argued that in the wake of the 1994 elections:

‘although much remained to be done to implement the letter and the spirit of the accords, the transition entered a new phase, one in which
democratic norms, institutions and practices were to take root and to prevail' (Canas and Dada, 2000: 70).

However, following the end of formal armed conflict in August 1993, the insulated dispute-resolution mechanisms remained in place. The institutions of the implementation process ensured that conflict management would remain an integral part of the political system and that the outstanding commitments would be largely implemented. Some serious socio-economic issues remain, but this arguably reinforces the argument underlying the IFF model: that slow, incremental change poses less risk to the implementation process than implementation processes that request large steps of those with vested interests in, and opportunities to, induce stalling. Further, the extent to which the root cause of socio-economic problems in El Salvador lie outside of, as well as inside of, the Salvadorian political economy should be considered. This theme is briefly considered in the concluding chapter.
The analysis in this thesis suggests that while external factors, such as the presence of a credible security commitment, of power-sharing agreements and the absence of a ‘conflict-generating’ political economy, may be important variables in the implementation process, they do not offer strong explanations for the varying outcomes. For example, in a number of implementation processes, credible commitments were given and power-sharing arrangements agreed, yet the implementation processes unravelled. In fact, some of the strongest third-party credible security commitments were given to processes that subsequently unravelled and dramatically failed, such as the 1999 process in Sierra Leone, the Lusaka process in Angola, or the Indo-Sri Lanka accord in Sri Lanka. The agreed power-sharing arrangements in the Lusaka Protocol were not sufficient to ensure implementation, nor were the power-sharing arrangements in Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Israel-Palestine or Tajikistan, enough to guarantee success. Neither has the power-sharing arrangement agreed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts agreement in Bangladesh been sufficient to avoid serious stalling during the implementation process. The only external variable that seemed to contribute to explaining the outcome at the implementation stage was the worsening or re-emergence of a regional-conflict complex, this relationship supporting the hypotheses that external variables are significant to implementation, to the extent that they act as equilibrium-maintaining or equilibrium-altering factors.

On the other hand, the analysis in this thesis highlights some factors that are highly relevant to the management of implementation processes. Support was found in both the comparative study and the in-depth case studies for the hypothesis that internal features of the implementation process associated with its design have a strong bearing on the ultimate outcome. The absence of issue hierarchy in the rules and procedures for implementation and the presence of procedures that encourage parallel sequencing and issue breakdown, or at least the opportunity to agree on parallel sequencing and issue breakdown, were all strongly related to successful outcomes. In fact, no process was ultimately successful without the presence of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing and the exclusion of bases on which to make issue hierarchy demands.
In cases from El Salvador, to Mali, to Nicaragua, to Guatemala, parallel sequencing and issue breakdown helped to overcome deadlock and to facilitate ultimately successful processes. For example, in Mali, elements of the military and the insurgency grew increasingly hostile to the implementation of the National Pact in 1994 and the intensity of the civil conflict (Lode, 1997: 64-5), and of intra-formation struggles within the insurgency and within military-government circles, dramatically worsened (Lode, 1997: 71-2). It was only after a re-negotiation of the implementation plan that the prospect of successful implementation improved. The new implementation plan introduced issue breakdown to every move, and issue breakdown was accompanied by parallel sequencing of all issues, from the political process of decentralisation to the incremental withdrawal from the North of the most offensive elements of the Malian military, to a simultaneous and consultative process of insurgency demobilisation. These steps were accompanied by UNDP and NGO-managed socio-economic programmes, which were themselves developed alongside grass-root based, decentralisation initiatives and the civil society structures were formally converted into a level of local government in 1995. Thus, when the phased demobilisation process was being implemented, a degree of decentralisation had been simultaneously introduced. Perhaps more importantly, institutions were in place through which the implementation of decentralisation would continue.¹

In contrast, partially successful and failed outcomes tended to include some form of issue hierarchy, these presenting obstacles to the adoption of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing and creating incentives and opportunities for spoiler factions to induce a stalled implementation process. For example, the stalled Taif Accords in Lebanon endorsed issue hierarchy, which prevented the emergence of the procedures for sequence and timing that encourage full implementation. While including a phased timetable for other issues, the Accords ‘provide no timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian troops,’² which are associated with the parties that make up the Muslim ‘conflict formation’ in Lebanon (AP, 13.11.89). All issues were to be implemented before the negotiations on Syrian withdrawal were to take place and no mechanism, institution or rule was agreed to govern when and how it should withdraw troops (Malia, 1992: 87).

² Syria’s presence was tacitly linked to the presence of Israel in South Lebanon. But even a timetable for withdrawal that recognised this link was not included.
This issue hierarchy provided Christian leader, General Aoun (who arguably led a spoiler faction), with a pretext on which to reject the Taif Accords. This, in turn resulted in stalling by other members of the Maronite (Christian) formation, who because of their fear of splitting the Christian elite refused to become part of a new unity cabinet, despite their support for the principles of the Taif Accords. Pro factions feared a loss of power from within their own community, especially given the possibility of successful action by Aoun (FT, 7.12.89). In fact, until Aoun was physically removed from Beruit in a further civil war, the implementation of Taif could not begin.

The implementation design provided for in the 1993 and 1995 Israeli-Palestinian agreements explicitly endorses issue holdover in its delay on the settlement of issues such as the final status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian Authority’s status, borders and relationship with Israel and valuable water resources, until further negotiations. Implementation design further endorses clear issue hierarchy in its failure to sequence and time an end to the Israeli building of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas to a simultaneous implementation of other aspects of the process (Le Monde Diplomatique, 11.2000). The April 2001 Mitchell Report on the Al-Aqsa Intifadeh appears to recognise the barriers to implementation presented by issue hierarchy and it recommends that, if implementation is to be facilitated, Israelis must freeze all settlement activity, including the natural growth of settlements in order to prepare for a parallel process of agreement and implementation. The analysis in this thesis suggests that the formula for the Middle East peace process, which calls for the incremental implementation of agreements while negotiations over some substantial issues continue, is fundamentally flawed in its explicit endorsement of issue hierarchy. Intra-formation factionalism clearly presented the key barriers to progress during the implementation process (JIR, 05.96) and that implementation design created more incentives for spoiler factions to disrupt the process, than for pro factions to pursue with implementation, helps to explain the dynamics behind the dramatic breakdown in the process in 2000.

Issue hierarchy characterises almost every unsuccessful or partially successful implementation process in the data set. For only two of the unsuccessfully or partially implemented processes is it not possible to explain the outcome by the formal endorsement of issue hierarchy in implementation design. And, both of these processes - the Philippines and Tajikistan - are partially successful processes. In the Philippines
the partially successful outcome might be explained by the fact that neither issue
dependency nor parallel sequencing have been fully endorsed by the designers of the
implementation process. Furthermore, in both the Philippines and Tajikistan the
partially-successful outcomes may be partly explained by the additional obstacles
presented by anti-agreement spoiler or sceptical factions who operate formally outside
the implementation process.

Concerning the institutions of the implementation process, the empirical results suggest
that the absence of insulated institutions with the power to oversee and to design the
implementation process is closely related to failed and partially-implemented
settlements, while the presence of insulated institutions was not alone sufficient for
successful outcomes. The presence of issue dependency appears to explain this finding.
Insulated institutions for implementation cannot generally overcome the barriers to
implementation presented by issue dependency, but they can facilitate the breakdown and
parallel sequencing of issues in its absence. This helps to explain why, despite the
presence of provisions for insulated implementation institutions, the processes in
Liberia and Cambodia were only partially successful, the Lusaka Protocol process in
Angola and both processes in Sierra Leone unravelled, and the Western Sahara
settlement has remained stalled to the point of failure. In all six cases a form of issue
dependency was central to implementation design. On the other hand, the presence of
insulated institutions, for example in Mozambique, Northern Ireland, El Salvador and
Guatemala, facilitated the adoption of rules and procedures that introduced issue
dependency and parallel sequencing to overcome some of the most stringent barriers to
implementation.

The findings of the study help to contribute to the development of a general theory that
explains the outcome of implementation processes. Where a credible commitment is
given or a power-sharing arrangement agreed, it may be the catalyst that enables
formations to endorse a peace settlement, but in the absence of sequence and timing
mechanisms that ensure issue dependency and parallel sequencing and a degree of
insulation for implementation mechanisms it will not guarantee a successful outcome as
it does not prevent spoiler factions from using the process to engender breakdown.
While the emergence or presence of a regional-conflict complex will present barriers to
implementation, its absence will not guarantee implementation. Nor will
implementation be guaranteed by the absence of the conditions in the political economy that appear to foster violence. In sum, the key to understanding the determining effect of any single issue on the prospects for the successful implementation of a peace agreement is to estimate the effect that it will have on the ability of spoiler factions to use spoiler tactics to undermine the ability of pro factions to pursue the full implementation of the settlement. This, the struggle between factions that characterises all conflict formations is the cornerstone of the intra-formation faction theory on implementation, hypothesised in chapter three and proposed by this thesis as the best explanation for the outcome of implementation processes.

The depiction of a conflict formation as involving a constant power struggle between individuals and groups that are driven by multiple motivations to belong to factions, or power hierarchies, helps to answer the question as to why elites might endorse a settlement and subsequently stall or refuse to implement it. The empirical study in both the case studies and the statistical analysis of 25 post-cold war implementation processes supports the hypotheses on the design of implementation process and the impact of external factors suggested by the IFF model. This provides a good deal of support for the IFF model focus on the importance of factions and the assumption that the individuals that make up factions are driven by multiple motivations that complicate the implementation process. When elites negotiate and endorse a settlement, implementation or at least a start to the implementation process is perceived to be in their immediate interest. But the degree of fluidity in factions and the possibility that for very different reasons individuals may together support a strategy that aims to prevent implementation offers very plausible explanations as to why implementation encounters so many obstacles.

This idea, that all formations are characterised by factions composed of groups and individuals motivated by multiple factors to support a strategy that is in favour of, sceptical of, or opposed to implementation, is consistent with the conclusions drawn by Donald and Hayes (1998) in their work on obstructionist leaders. They argue that regardless of organisational structure, the incentives for factionalism exist and whether ‘a dictator, a militia commander or a warlord:’

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often a faction leader’s control over his followers is at best tentative, and followers may challenge that control when ordered to demobilise, since they may, as a result lose their own ability to dominate their region (Donald and Hayes, 1998: 79).

The intra-formation factionalism theory helps to illustrate the inadequacies of seeking to explain elite and sub-elite behaviour during the implementation process with a focus on personalities, or on an intransigence that is assumed to characterise the entire conflict formation. Analysts have suggested that mediators must work to judge the true intentions of conflict actors (Sisk, 1996: 114) and it has been proposed that a concerted effort by mediators to understand the personalities of leaders may facilitate a stable settlement (George, 1993: 125-9). It is perhaps as a consequence of this approach that analyses of the Angolan process have been obsessed with second-guessing the strategy of Jonah Savimbi. Yet those who worked with him on countless occasions, even former sponsors such as South Africa’s Pik Botha and members of the US administration, were unable to truly discern his peace-process strategy. On the other hand, the most useful assessment of Savimbi is a general one, which proposes that ‘Savimbi’s goal is the only easy question to answer: he wants to be president’ (JIR, 08.98: 37). Arguably, at some point Savimbi perceived implementation rather than a return to civil war as a better route to this goal. But by 1997, at the very least, Savimbi appears to have chosen to pursue a spoiler strategy. By 1998 he perceived that his best route to power was not through another presidential election, in which he may not have secured the support of UNITA pro factions anyway, but a fight to retain whatever quasi-governmental powers he had by effectively partitioning the country.

Instead of a reliance on a need to second-guess the intentions of leaders, the intra-formation factionalism model focuses on the set of rules, procedures and institutions governing implementation design that may serve to facilitate the exposure of true strategies. Implementation design should facilitate a pro faction strategy in its quest to gain sceptic support and should simultaneously serve to expose spoiler tactics and increase their risk perception. This does not necessitate the categorisation of specific individuals into pro, sceptic and spoiler factions. It is argued that, where the implementation design includes issue breakdown, parallel sequencing and excludes issue hierarchy, unilateral deadlines and issue holdover, the process is more likely to
allow pro factions to move forward and to make it more difficult for spoiler factions to disrupt the process. At the very least, if process design works to highlight the true intentions of 'spoiler factions' who pose as pro or sceptical factions, those concerned with furthering implementation can choose appropriate responses to stalling on the basis of accurate information, instead of trying to second guess human nature.

An application of the IFF theory may help to increase understanding of the impact of explanatory variables additional to the external variables and the variables on implementation design on which this study has concentrated. For example, it has been argued that a peace process should seek to identify ways in which the international community can contribute constructively to the consolidation of peace through the coordination of technical and material resources and effective support for the implementation of agreements (Amson, 2000: 49). But without a general theory on implementation, it is nearly impossible to begin to understand the various ways in which the external factors and resources injected into peace building actually impact upon the outcome of the process. Where one factor - the injection of donor financial aid and resources into a process – is concerned, Forman and Patrick (2000: 379) seem to recommend that aid should be conditional on an agreed timetable for implementation, or on the taking by recipients of certain actions that secure peace-building objectives. The intra-formation factionalism theory developed in this study, suggests that, if such a timetable were to include mechanisms that reduce spoiler capacity to stall and to eventually unravel the process, the implementation and peace-building process would have a greater probability of succeeding. If resource injections were coordinated to make delivery conditional on an implementation process that excludes any feature of issue hierarchy, any barrier to issue breakdown or to the parallel sequencing of issues, this study suggests that spoiler capacity to unravel the process would be dramatically decreased.

The intra-formation factionalism theory can also help to explain the obstacles to implementation posed by powerful international financial institutions (IFIs) in their prioritisation of sound fiscal policy above all else. A concern of the peace-building discipline briefly raised in chapter four, Boyce and Pastor (1997; 1998) argue that in seeking to avoid high inflation by focusing exclusively on macro-economic stability and the reduction of budget deficits, IFIs create obstacles to peace building. Obstacles stem
from the failure of IFI policy to recognise that high inflation and social unrest are equally likely to flow from extremely low public spending in an economy that is recovering from civil war and in the process of peace building. UN mediator Alvaro de Soto (de Soto and del Castillo, 1994: 71) highlighted this dilemma when he asked:

Should El Salvador sacrifice economic stabilisation to proceed with implementing the accords or...carry out its structural adjustment programme, perhaps endangering the peace process?

The IFF model explains that, firstly insistence on structural adjustment programmes for trade liberalisation and privatisation can undermine the livelihood of peasant producers (Boyce, 2000: 376) and thereby increase their vulnerability to spoiler faction coercion and rhetoric. Secondly, IFI insistence on low public spending can provide spoiler factions in government conflict formations with pretexts on which to avoid the implementation of socio-economic provisions to which they committed, but to which they are, in fact, fundamentally opposed. The theory and analysis in this thesis suggest that a resource and loan-allocation policy that prioritises both peace-building and macro-economic stability would financially support processes in which issue breakdown, parallel sequencing of commitments, the exclusion of issue hierarchy and the inclusion of insulated dispute-resolution institutions are central to design. This design would extend to the rules and procedures for the implementation of the socio-economic commitments that are frequently vaguely documented in agreement texts.

Mediators to violent civil conflict tend to prioritise above all the reaching of a mutually acceptable settlement. The serious impediments that this priority can present to the agreement on good institutions for the post-conflict political system have been recognised by analysts (Sisk and Horowitz in Sisk, 1996: 94). The analysis in this study suggests that, even if mediators do prioritise good post conflict-management institutions during pre-settlement negotiations, even more immediate barriers to conflict resolution are presented by the temptation for the mediator to prioritise any settlement over a settlement that is implementable. The findings of this thesis suggest that the prospects of concluding an ultimately implementable settlement will increase if the rules and procedures for implementation are informed by the intra-formation struggle between factions and if the process is designed to limit the opportunities for those factions most opposed to the consolidation of a settlement.
Raising the issue that prompted this study, Galtung contends that the assumption that a conflict is resolved:

'once elite members of the parties to the conflict, have accepted the solution, as indicated by their signature on some documents, is the most naïve view of a conflict.' (Galtung, 1996: 88).

But the evidence suggests that the barriers to implementation in the wake of these settlements are not best explained by the intransigence of parties to civil wars, and the argument that their intransigence ensures that elites never intended to implement the settlement in the first place. Neither can high levels of insecurity and distrust between the conflict formations fully explain the barriers at the implementation stage. Instead, barriers can be explained by intra-formation factionalism. Elites and sub-elites that make up each party to a conflict are driven by multiple motivations, which are ultimately security and power seeking, to support, be sceptical of, or to oppose the implementation of a settlement. The outcome of the implementation process depends on the ensuing power struggle between factions and on the extent to which those in favour of implementation can prevent the emergence of a blocking coalition between those sceptical of and against the implementation of the agreement. The findings of this study suggest that the rules, procedures and institutions of the implementation process are fundamentally important to outcome, in that they shape the choices and opportunities available to the factions during the implementation process. Design informed by reciprocal or reversible issue breakdown, parallel sequencing, insulated institutions and excluding all forms of issue hierarchy can overcome the damaging barriers to implementation that the intra-formation struggle presents.
APPENDIX A

DEPENDENT VARIABLE PROXIES

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<th>Democ Level</th>
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</table>
0 = No Change / Deterioration
1 = Some Improvement
2 = Significant Improvement

(Democracy and Autocracy Levels together have the same weight as the other proxies).

**PROXIES**

**SOURCES**

**Violence Levels**
Chapter Two Text.

**Democracy and Autocracy**

**Freedom**

**Implementation Record**
Secondary Source materials (See Bibliography, Sections III, V and Additional Sources).

**Trend in level of internal displacement and refugees**
## APPENDIX B.1
Credible Commitment, Regional Conflict Complex And Guarantees/Institutionalisation Proxies

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DATA AND SOURCES
The text in chapter four describes each independent variable in detail.

**StrengthCC**: Strength of credible commitment
This is on a scale of 0-3, from absent to weak to medium to strong. Data is outlined below in the Credible Commitment Table.

**RegConfCompx**: Regional Conflict Complex
Data on the presence or absence of a regional conflict complex is sourced from a reading of secondary sources; any major interruptions in regional relations (as outlined in the text, chapter four) are coded as a regional conflict complex. It is argued that this might be equilibrium altering.

**GuarantComb; Polpwersharing; TerrPwrsharing; EconPwrsharing; MilitPwrsharing; Guar Comb2**: Guarantees
The criteria used by Hartzell (1999, 2001) are used to code the extent to which all types of power sharing are part of the settlement, with the sum of power sharing giving the combined guarantees or institutionalisation variable. A second combined power sharing is added in which political and territorial power sharing are coded together as one aspect of power sharing, along with economic and military to give the overall level out of 3,2 or 1. The final GuarComb combines territorial and political power sharing into one proxy and thus adds political/territorial, economic and military power sharing for the combined institutionalisation between 0-3.
### APPENDIX B.2
Mutually Hurting Stalemate Proxies

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2. The population of the West Bank, Gaza and Israel (including all of Jerusalem) is approximately 8.2 million in 2000. Klieman: 73. It is here estimated at 8 million during the implementation period. Estimates of casualties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are complex and difficult to separate from the general Middle East conflict and the Israeli involvement in the Lebanon civil war and its conflict with Syria and Jordan. The intensity of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict since 1987 (the year in which the first intifada began) is first considered: Between 1987 and the signing of Oslo in 1993, 1,500 were killed and 1,000s were wounded. (Le Monde Diplomatique: 6.11.2000). This does not include the 1982 approximately 1,700 Palestinians (Independentnet, 24.01.02) killed in refugee camps in Lebanon. These casualties are considered in addition to the casualties of the first intifada. The numbers of people killed during the low level conflict involving the PLO campaign against Israel’s occupation and the Israeli counter insurgency campaign should be added to this figure. With this Marshall would have arrived at his 2 level of magnitude.
S. Leone 1 3 1.7 6
S. Leone 2 3 6 9
South Africa 3 4.9 18
Sri Lanka 2 4 15
Tajikistan 3 4.3 6
Western Sahara 3 33 16

DATA AND SOURCES

Magnitude
This is the most important proxy here. It combines the other proxies and gives the best indication of the extent to which a mutually hurting stalemate (as defined by intensity, duration and magnitude) prevails in a civil war. See chapter four, p.108 for description.

Intensity: Deaths per 1000 (intensity)
The estimated number of casualties inflicted by civil war is difficult to confirm and tends to vary widely from source to source. The line of distinction between battle related deaths, commonly referred to as a measure of intensity in the literature, has become increasingly blurred, as civilians are more and more becoming key targets of groups involved in violent civil conflict and civilians are more and more involving themselves in both military and civilian lives. Marshall (1999) discusses this problem and endeavours to estimate battle-related casualties for each conflict. Where the conflict takes place in an entity or a part of a state and the civil war is relatively concentrated there despite some conflict in the entire state, such as Mindanao in the Philippines, Northern Ireland in the UK, the North and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, Chechnya, the CHT in Bangladesh and Western Sahara under Moroccan jurisdiction/control, the population of the entity is taken in so far as possible. Population figures (over time) were taken from a number of sources including World Development Reports, 1991 – 2001, Human Development Reports 1989-2001; UNCTAD, Handbook of International Statistics and European Platform for Conflict Transformation and Management, (Reports for all countries). www.euconflict.org
APPENDIX B.3
Greed And Grievance Hypotheses Proxies (Table Below)

Proxies
Lootable 1 = Value of primary commodity exports as a % of GDP
Lootable 2 = Primary Commodity Exports as a % of GDP
Lootable 3 = Dominant Export category. This is a second way of measuring lootable 2. A category is dominant if it accounts for over 50% of export products. If no one category accounts for 50% the export economy is diversified. This variable was then coded as a dummy variable with economies coded as either dominated by primary products (including fuel) or diversified, services or manufacturing based.

GDP Per Capita = (US $ 1995)
Income Group = Measure in GDP per capita.
GNP Change = Average % GNP per capita change over five and ten yearly stages. The data for years immediately preceding settlement are used.
Years Ed = Years Education (see below) Inequality =
Gini Co-eff. = Higher the figure the more inequality (higher concentration of wealth).

DATA AND SOURCES
For civil conflict concentrated in entities rather than entire countries, where figures for the entity are available or information from which figures can be deduced is available, it is included and the source and method of deduction included in the appendix endnotes. Where separate information is not available the figure for the entire country is taken. In order to control for possible inaccuracies in these figures, the tests are run both including and not including these cases.

Lootable Goods
In so far as the available information allows, the proxies for both the availability of 'lootable goods' and opportunity in the political economy are taken from the year in which the settlement is agreed and/or in the years that immediately precede settlement. These years best reflect the extent to which the political economy might present structural obstacles to implementation, by decreasing incentives for conflict formations to implement agreed conflict management solutions. Data from later years are in danger of reflecting more accurately the dependent variable: Whether or not civil war continues, ends or the entity continues in a state of quasi-peace and quasi-war will clearly affect the political economy. Unless otherwise stated the data is taken from UNCTAD Commodity Report, 1995. Table 1.22 pp.84-6; Table 1.23 pp. 87-89; Table 1.19 pp. 74-9. Social Indicators of Development, 1991-2; 1995 and 1996 are used for lootable 3.

While the deduction of an overall figure for the extent to which the political economy displays 'conflict- sustaining structures' might be desirable, the task of deduction would reduce the accuracy of each proxy.
Opportunity And Strength Of Human Capital

Per capita income is used to proxy the existence of more opportunity in an economy (de Soysa, Collier): A level of per capita income, measured in the same currency and where possible in US95$ and from the same source, is taken for each entity in the closest year available in comparative form immediately preceding (or year of) the peace settlement. Unless stated the data comes from Human Development Report, 2000: Tables 7 and 8. A closely related proxy, which classifies states by per capita income, is also taken: The income group of each entity in 1990/1995/96 (Social Indicators of Development). Given the qualitatively different societies represented in the data set, a comparison of GDP per capita across cases may be unreflective of political economy factors individual to particular entities. Thus subsequently a measure of the % increase in GNP per capita over at least five years before, and up to and including, the year of settlement is taken. The availability of this data is less comprehensive for comparative purposes. World Development Reports, 1990-2001.

Educational opportunity is measured using the average number of years of education received by the male population (as Collier chose) in 1990. 1990 offers the best comparative figure for which information is available on all cases. The Human Development Report Education Index from 1995-2001, which is based on the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment rate and the adult literacy rate (HDR, 2000:278), is used to ensure that no dramatic changes occurred (although it is measured using different proxies it is intended to reflect the same thing). This information is not added as no entity appeared to undergo trends would suggest significant changes in education attainment patterns.
APPENDIX B.3
Greed And Grievance Hypotheses Proxies

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APPENDIX B.3
Greed And Grievance Hypotheses Proxies (Endnotes)

* The first figure is the average annual growth rate over the 1985-95 period. GNP per capita experienced a 12% growth rate in the 1996-7 period. In order to account for some of this growth in the early years of implementation a figure from 1985-1997 is calculated for the second process: -3.3.

II Figures are not available for Bosnia. In 1990 in the former Yugoslavia primary commodity exports were 3.2% of GDP and from 1989 to 1991 primary commodity exports were 23% of total exports. While these figures are reflective of the Federation as a whole, the Bosnian economy was fairly diversified in 1990, with manufacturing/industrial activity (metallurgy, chemical, manufacturing, sugar and tobacco) accounting for 65% of GDP. Value of exports in GDP are not given. Woodland and forestry were also important sectors. The Economic Situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Forum August 1999. www.europeanforum.bot-consult.se.

III World Development Report, 2000/01, Table 1a

From 1989-91 primary commodity exports make up 99% of total exports but in 1993 make up only 42.1% according to UNCTAD 1995 Commodity Yearbook. As the 1993 data is over a year into the implementation process the 1989-91 figure is used as the best indicator of the political economic structure at the onset of implementation.

V From 1989-91 exports from the USSR were 56% primary commodities, with 40% fuel exports and 16% other primary commodities. Chechnya is a mostly agricultural based economy with 70% of the population based on the land in 1989, but it remains an important centre of petroleum production and refining and crucial oil and gas pipelines are located there providing further income-generating activity in 1992. ASF Chechnya Brief – Andrei Sakharov Foundation: www.wdn.com/asf/cgi/ASF dbs [August 2001].

V Former Soviet Union had a GDP per capita of 3668 in 1990 and 2138 in 1998. Chechnya was one of the poorest parts of the former USSR and is assumed to have had a GDP per capita of at least ⅓ that of the USSR average.

VII The economy of Bangladesh appears to have made the transition to a more diversified economy, with the % of primary commodity exports reducing from nearly 29% of total exports in 1980/81 to 17.8% in 1990 and to 8.2% in 1999/00. UN Conference on Least Developed Countries, 2001: Bangladesh. United Nations Conference of Least Developed Countries, 2001: Bangladesh: 3. While no breakdown in economic data on regions is given Bangladesh is a ‘primarily agricultural’ based economy with 75% of the population residing in rural areas and a significant proportion of the population living below the poverty line (26). CHT is part of a large, heavily forested mountain range stretching from western Burma to an area where it merges with the Himalayas in China. The ‘tribals’ and Bengali settlers who live there depend on the forests (from which they have been refused access for many years by military) and agriculture. It is considered by the Bengali government to have huge potential for development (Levene: 345), with forest and mineral resources perceived as vital if the government is to turn around Bengali economic fortunes (Levene: 348). Given the large dam constructed there in the area displaced large proportions of the population. Sources indicate that the CHT region supplies Bangladesh with water (from the dam) and forest resources and it is believed that mineral resources are more widespread than currently exploited. Exports (internal to Bangladesh) are almost certainly primary commodity, though figures were not available to confirm this.

Palestinian Central Bureau Statistics are used for data on Palestinian territories alongside usual source for Israeli data. Primary products constituting food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, crude materials, mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes, together were worth $117,140 in 1998 (PCBS). As a % of GDP (1996 value) this is 3897$million (both at current prices) small: 3%. The total value of exports is $394,846, with
manufactured good, machinery and transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured goods together accounting for $276,626, primary 117,140. Thus manufacturing goods appear to account for 70% of total exports, with primary commodity exports contributing 29%. The commodity balance does not therefore differ much from Israel’s economy in which primary commodity exports were 2% of GDP in 1992. Primary commodity exports are significantly less as a % of all exports in Israel, accounting for 9.1%.

This is the figure for the West Bank and Gaza in 1994. In 1995 and 1996 the figure is 1496 and 1537$ respectively and the WDR 1000/01 estimates it at 1,610 in 1998/9. Israel’s GDP per capita in 1998 was 15,978 US $. This does not include the occupied territories.

This is the figure for Israel’s economy from 1980-1993. Figures for the Palestinian territories are arguably lower considering that from 1998-9 (during more peaceful times) the average GNP per capita growth rate was 1.3%. However the figure is included as a more accurate time (1993) and to proxy Israel’s economic situation too.

This is the figure for both male and female and it only refers to Israel, not including the number of years of education in the occupied territories, which is considerably lower.

Excluding fuel this becomes 45-6%. It is still a very high figure considering the fact that Djibouti is not coded as having a primarily primary commodity based economy. As a % of total exports neither primary commodity non-fuel nor primary commodity fuel account for over 50% of exports.

Despite this apparent drop from 20.9% in 1990 to 8.5 and 11.1% in 1991 and 1992, a recent report on Liberia confirms the huge significance of primary commodity exports to GDP (well above 11%). The UN Third Conference on Least Developed Countries, May 2001, reports that the contribution of exports in logs and timber to GDP was less than 10% in the late 1980s and was almost 20% in 1999 (43). Yet logs and timber are only secondary in economic importance to the export of rubber. A statistic for the contribution of rubber exports to GDP is not given, but the % of total exports accounted for by rubber increased from 24% to 77% (1987 and 1997). In terms of value in 1999, rubber contributes 61.7 Million US $ to GDP; Forestry 60.7 (of which logs and timber 19.3 MUS$). (73) At a conservative estimate, the value of primary commodity exports to GDP must exceed 60% (given the significantly larger monetary contribution of rubber to GDP yet the fact that export logs and timber constitute 20% of GDP.

This is the 1991 figure for the UK as a whole and pending a figure for Northern Ireland in the 1995-8 period is a good estimate. Lootable 2 is calculated using the UK 1993 figure (17%) as a base and using NIERC DETI National Statistics, 1998-9: 5 for information on the value of manufacturing exports as a % of GDP (National Statistics 1989-1999 values for GDP). Manufacturing exports are worth 20% of GDP and manufacturing exports is the biggest exporting sector. The value for primary commodity exports thus cannot exceed this and the UK 1993 figure is used. More up to date NI figures were sought.

NI GDP per capita as a % of the UK as a whole was 72.3% in 1990, 77% in 1993 and to 79% in 1995. It fell again and in 1998 was 75.8% of UK GDP per capita (NI Statistics, NI Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2000: 97). In order to keep the value in US$ 1995, this estimate is 75.8% of the UK figure for 1998.

Average between the 1985 and 1990 GDP per capita.

Calculated using figures on Mindanao trade and development. www.mindanao.com: Mindanao Economy in Perspective, Table 5. Lootable 3 is thus changed from diversified (which reflects the entire economy) to primary, which reflects the Mindanao economy.

GDP per capita in Mindanao is estimated to be 1/3 of that in the NCR (North) (www.mindanao.com). This figure is the combined figure for all of the Philippines and thus that of Mindanao (population of 17.2 out of 68 million) would be more than 1/3 of this figure but considerably less. The figure should thus be reduced by at least 1/2.
While the Philippines is categorised as lower-medium with 1064 $ GDP per capita, bearing in mind the above statistic it is estimated that Mindinao could be low income. It is tested as both.

1997-8 the average growth was –2.9% and from 1998-9 it was –9.8%. This figure is the 1997-9 average % growth.

Calculated from annual statistics for Tajikistan available at www.sesrtcic.org/

UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2000. Table 4.3:186. Cotton, Aluminium and fruit (all SITC primary commodity goods) dominate exports accounting for 40.6, 17.4 and 9.4% respectively.

1985 to 1994 average growth was –11.4%. From 1996-7, the years immediately, preceding the agreement average annual growth was 0.7%. This figure is from 1985-97.

Human Development Report, HD Index, 1994: 130. This refers to years of education for male and females. Male would be a little higher.

This reflects the Western Sahara economy only, CIA World Book of Facts, 2001. In the Moroccan economy as a whole primary commodity exports make up a far smaller % of overall exports. The 7.0% (lootable 1) is the % of primary commodity exports in GDP for all of Morocco as no breakdown figure for the Western Saharan GDP is available.
### APPENDIX B.4
Implementation Design: Sequencing and Timing Mechanisms

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DATA AND SOURCES
The independent variables are clearly defined in chapters three and four. There are six basic independent variables and one of them is coded twice, this making for the 7 overall measures that appear in the above table for each of the 25 cases.

1. Issue holdover,
2. Unilateral timetable (with date),
3. Issue Hierarchy Combined
4. Parallel sequencing 1
5. Parallel Sequencing 2
6. Issue breakdown
7. Insulation.

Issue Holdover and Elections; Unilateral Timetable and Issue Hierarchy Combined.
The absence of the first three variables is expected to predict success.

Combined Issue Hierarchy indicates that unilateral demands (with or without date), issue hierarchy or both are present.

Unilateral timetables in this case refer to unilateral demands with fixed deadlines (dates). The relationship of combined issue hierarchy proxy is expected to have the strongest relationship with outcome.

Parallel Sequencing 1 and 2
Parallel sequencing is initially coded as either absent (0) or present (1) (present, meaning that it is either explicitly provided for or eventually adopted) and a strong relationship is expected between the presence of this condition and successful outcomes. It is then recoded as either specifically provided for in the text of the settlement or not (absent). The specific provision for parallel sequencing in the text of the settlement is expected to relate to success, but its relationship will not be as strong as that with its simple presence (parallel Seq 1). It is expected that where parallel sequencing is not fully provided for in the terms of the settlement but where it eventually emerges (2), insulation is a feature of the observation in question and combined IH is not.

Issue Breakdown
Presence of issue breakdown is expected to coincide with success.

Insulation
Presence is expected to coincide with success.
APPENDIX B.5
BRIEF EXPLANATION FOR CODING THE IFF HYPOTHESIS
ON IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN

B5.1 ANGOLA 1
Chapter Five

B5.2 ANGOLA 2
Chapter Five

B5.3 BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
In the implementation process that followed the Dayton Agreement there are no clear signs of either issue breakdown or parallel sequencing. There is evidence of 'issue holdover' and of inadequate institutional provisions to deal with the 'issue holdover' concerning the eventual status of Bosnia, its two entities and three ethnic groups. While unilateral timetables (or demands) were not a feature of design, another form of issue hierarchy was endorsed by the inclusion of strict timetables to govern two issues only: the holding of national elections and the implementation of the military ceasefire in clear, reciprocal steps. There was no timetable for any other issue; this ensured that the implementation of other agreements, aspired to, but not part of the sequence and timing of implementation, did not commence. In the absence of insulated institutions with the power to facilitate the introduction of parallel sequencing, issue hierarchy would remain the dominant rule for the sequencing and timing of implementation.

With the exception of a strict ceasefire timetable and a strict deadline by which national elections, (both within each entity and to the three-person presidency and 'national institutions') were to take place within six to nine months, the Dayton Agreement gives little guidance for the sequencing and timing of all other military, civilian, political or human rights issues. Despite an enormous international presence there was no insulated institution with a clear mandate to oversee the implementation of all issues, with the exception of its military provisions. The large number of poorly co-ordinated international actors that oversaw implementation resulted in little or no setting of priorities on these issues (Cousins, 2001: 129). Thus demobilization, police reform, elections, constitutional reform, human rights guarantees, refugee returns, while dealt with as broad aspirations and commitments, were not subject to an implementation sequence, order or breakdown. As neither the agreement, nor a subsequent implementation plan, put any order or sequence on implementation, factions in favour of the most minimalist interpretation of all provisions (including the unprecedented agreement on the return of displaced people) could simply implement the ceasefire requirements, take part in the elections, and, while in line with the agreement, find legitimate pretexts with which to justify stalling on the implementation of other critical issues. This sequence, which emphasised elections above all else, legitimised hard-line nationalist factions in all three formations. The lack of sequence ensures that the task of, for example, the international police force in creating a new and civilian police force is made far more difficult with the demobilisation of militia and armed civilian gangs incomplete.

In the words of one analyst, no effort was made to present elections as a means through which a transitional regime would be established (Woodward, 1996: 4); a transitional regime that would facilitate the implementation of Dayton along with the institutions which Dayton establishes, such as the all Bosnian HR Commission and the Commission to work on the compensation or return of land. The transition regime could have been presented as a step in the implementation process and those driving implementation could have ensured that this transition included commissions involving civil groups, such as a commission for economic assistance, a commission for local redevelopment.

Opportunities existed to encourage a sequence and timing that creates incentives to implement more than the minimal. But there was no effective mechanism to deal with continued conflict over the clearly unresolved issue of national rights. Joint institutions provided for in the new constitution that Dayton presented appear to be the only mechanism; in them no inherent mechanism encourages co-operation and the development of a consensus, even on how to institutionally manage this issue. Maintenance of the uncertainty on national rights played into the hands of spoiler factions who could use it as an excuse to drag their feet on all provisions that might gradually facilitate the development of the entity to the Stated goal of Dayton: to draw the entities into one truly integrated state' (JIR, 09.97: 396).

B5.4 CAMBODIA
UNCTAD was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the agreement: it was a relatively insulated institution with wide powers to oversee the implementation of the process. However, the agreement provided for deadline-bound, winner-takes-all elections and this placed a form of issue hierarchy at the centre of the Cambodian implementation process. According to the terms of the agreement, these elections were scheduled
to take place after 70 per cent of demobilisation (and disarmament) was complete; demobilisation itself was to begin once the UN-monitored cease-fire was put in place. But the timetable for demobilisation was effectively ignored by UNCTAD once it became clear that it was not achievable before the time of the elections. Throughout the implementation process, the provision that made the holding of elections possible by the date agreed in the Accord was prioritised for implementation and all other issues were effectively stalled or left until after the elections. Therefore, the demobilisation and disarmament processes were highly incomplete when the elections took place, and the Khmer Rouge had not even started the disarmament process.

There was some issue breakdown in the sequence and timing of the security issues, for example, in the cantonnement, demobilisation and disarmament processes: these were to take place in stages and were reciprocal in that no faction was asked to disarm and demobilise before the other. But demobilisation was not linked with any other issue (bar the election and this was ignored). Important issues that were not properly implemented included the political issue of converting conflict formations into stable political parties before the elections, and the security issue which ultimately aimed to breakdown the military structure of each formation. These and other issues were reduced to sub-texts by the sequencing and timing of implementation. Therefore, the non-regular, coercive powers possessed by the conflict formations, especially by the CPP who controlled the bulk of the army, the lower-level bureaucracy (and the patronage associated with it), the judiciary and the police (Doyle, 1997: 91), were ignored during the implementation process. This was despite UNTAC’s promise in the agreement to ensure that these coercive powers would not be used. Thus the agreement’s promise to implement political provisions to make a neutral environment for elections was unfulfilled: this contributed to the issue hierarchy (elections above all other provisions) and to unilateral demands on the other formations to demobilise and disarm while the CPP was not required to implement provisions that would neutralise its political power. This was because the demobilisation process was not accompanied by provisions for phased, sequenced implementation of all issues: no administrative reforms were required of the CPP and the police force remained fully under its control (despite its agreement to allow UNTAC to provide a neutral environment for elections). Furthermore, provisions for the full integration of former combatants into a new army were lacking, despite aspirations to do this alongside demobilisation (JIR, October 1994: 470).

That these provisions, which were not broken down and were not sequenced in parallel with the preparations for elections, were never implemented is supported by the fact that, despite FUNCINPEC’s victory in the elections, the CPP effectively controlled the coalition regime that followed (JIR, October 1994: 468). A coup d’état in 1997 finally threw out the peace agreement: it was launched by the CPP; it was apparently in anticipation of an impending coup by its closest rival, FUNCINPEC, which included remaining factions of the Khmer Rouge (JIR, April 1998: 38-9).

In sum, the perception of issue holdover created by the emphasis on elections above all else encouraged spoiler factions and limited the opportunity for pro factions’ to control the agenda. The lack of issue breakdown left the state power possessed by the CPP intact, this creating a perception of unilateral timetables for other formations: some formations were required to dismantle military formations before elections while others, arguably, retained an almost unchanged monopoly of power.

B5.5 CHECHNYA

The August 1996 Agreement and the subsequent May 1997 Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic are considered to be part of the same overall peace process. The August 1996 Peace Agreement committed both sides in the Chechen war to defend human rights and freedoms of citizens and to acknowledge that the use of armed force, or, the threat of armed force to settle disputes is unacceptable. The Agreements worked out 'the principals for the determination of the basis of relations between Russia and Chechnya.' They were:

- Before December 2001 relations between the Russian Federation and Chechnya will be agreed in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law;
- Before 1st October 1996 a Joint Commission with representatives from Russia and the Chechen Republic will be formed to perform the following tasks:
  - To prepare and supervise the pull out of Russian troops from Chechnya;
  - To prepare for agreed-upon measures to combat crime, terrorism and manifestations of national and religious conflict and control of their implementation;
  - To prepare proposals for monetary and budgetary relations between Chechnya and the Russian Federation;
  - To prepare and create (by the govt of Russia) a programme of rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure of the Chechen republic;
  - To control the activities of organs of state power and other organisations in the supply of food and medicine;
o To allow for elections in Chechnya in January 1997, which would be monitored by the UNPO.
o In October 1996, the Russian PM and the Chechen leader agreed to set up a joint body to rebuild Chechnya's economy and organise local elections.

The May 1997 treaty once again shelved and left open the question of secession. It confirmed that Russia would abide by the norms of international law and would not use force to settle disputes. The Chechen delegation agreed to keep the Russian rouble and the treaty cleared the way for Russia's use of Chechen oil pipelines. This agreement was negotiated to clear the way for economic and social cooperation in the reconstruction of Chechnya.

By leaving the question of independence open, and, more specifically, deferring it for five years, both the 1996 and 1997 Russia-Chechnya treaties allowed hardliners in both camps to continue to concentrate on one issue and one issue only: the status of Chechnya. By failing to establish an institution through which the status might be debated, worked on or institutionalised, the five-year deadline in which the status would be decided constitutes issue holdover. Regardless of the other drawbacks in this agreement, this issue holdover ensured, as the hypotheses outlines, that any other provisions of the agreement are unlikely to be implemented in any serious way. As reports confirm, the Chechen moderate, who was elected by a strong majority of the Chechen people and received Moscow's recognition in January 1997, faced almost insurmountable opposition to the implementation of the agreement from hardliners in his own organisation. Before his negotiations with Moscow in May 1997, he met Radytev, warlord and former member of his formation. According to Reports, Radytev had a few hours earlier held a rally at which he promised to fight until Russia granted full independence. In sum, the failure to agree on any clear implementation timetable ensured that no space existed for those like the president of Chechnya, who appeared willing to implement a political compromise. The strong endorsement for issue hierarchy in the Chechen-Russian Agreements may reflect the strength during negotiations of those factions who were dis-interested in implementing any agreement, this especially so in the case of the Russian government. However, it confirms the argument that an agreement that places any form of issue hierarchy at the heart of the implementation process is unlikely to give any space to pro factions to fulfil their goal of full implementation.

B5.6 CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (CRT)

The peace agreement between the Bangali government and the PCJSS insurgency provided for the autonomous administration and government of the Hill Tribe area by a Regional Hill Council and district hill local governments; the amnestied return of guerrilla fighters from just over the Indian border; amnesty for other guerrilla fighters; the withdrawal of Bengali troops and their cantonment in barracks; the return of over 50,000 Jumna refugees; social and economic development of the region and provisions on land settlement and disputes. The new institutions provide for some non-tribal representation (as non-tribal people who have been relocated in the CHT area consistently since the 1960s now make-up a significant percentage of the population there); and a ministry of CHT affairs was to be set up in central government with a tribal member as minister.

However, issue hierarchy is evident firstly, in a unilateral timetable and secondly in the prioritising of military over other issues. Firstly, within 45 days a full list of the armed members, arms and weaponry of the PCJSS (insurgency) was to be submitted to the government, and a day for the PCJSS's depositing of arms would then be jointly agreed. The government could take legal action against those who refused to deposit arms within the stipulated time, and, while an amnesty and rehabilitation in the form of a cash payment was simultaneously provided for PCJSS members, no parallel commencement of the agreement to reduce the huge Bengali security presence in the area was provided for in the implementation process; nor are provisions to ensure the sequenced implementation of other issues included. Reinforcing the unilateral nature of the move on military issues, a withdrawal or (even) cantonment to barracks of Bengali forces was to take place with 'the coming of PCJSS to normal life,' and no deadline for this withdrawal was fixed.

Other issues were over-shadowed by this unilateral timetable and this served to create issue hierarchy. The absence of issue breakdown and of parallel sequencing is evident when the land issue is considered. Disputes over landownership, one of the most problematic issues of the conflict which stem from a Bengali government policy of re-settling Bengalis on tribal-owned hill tract land, was to be dealt with by a Land Commission. It would be chaired by a retired judge, an appointment which both parties would agree on. But little guidance was included on how to deal with the complexity of land disputes and no deadline that ties the settlement of land disputes to other aspects of the implementation process is included. Providing even more issue hierarchy, those measures that were agreed to settle existing disputes were not accompanied by a
government agreement to stop settlements. This created the potential for issue holdover, giving the government the unquestioned right to continue settlements without consultation. Further issue hierarchy can be seen in the provision that made the establishment of the Land Commission dependent on the formation of an interim regional council appointed by the Bengali government. Disagreement within the Bengali government, which was under pressure from the opposition, meant that this provision delayed action on almost all issues bar the above-discussed security issues: this sharpened the issue hierarchy demand and made the chances of introducing parallel sequencing even more remote.

While the possibility of its adoption is not precluded, issue breakdown is not explicitly evident for all issues. On the land issue, the Land Commission (once established) was to institutionally deal with the long-term issue of land disputes: the government committed to start a land survey in an attempt to ascertain the legal owners of, and provisions to, allocate small amounts of land to returning landless tribals: this provided some semblance of issue breakdown, in that the complex issue was broken down into a number of steps. On socio-economic issues, the government’s commitments were broken down into steps that included the allocation of additional finance to projects to develop the CHT; to encourage the development of tourism there, to consider the environmental aspect of the region, to continue a quota system in quota system in government jobs and educational scholarships for tribals (agreed in the late 1980s), and to take measures, and provide finance, for measures to preserve the distinctiveness of the culture and heritage. While broken down in that promises were detailed and clearly definable, they were not subject to any timetable for implementation.

Finally, the task of monitoring the implementation process was clearly assigned to an implementation committee, the governor of which was to be appointed by the government and the other two members of which were the chairman of the implementation task force and the president of a key tribal family. The body is a highly political one which is very subject to the pressures of spoiler factions, both within the political establishment and the PCJSS movement.

B5. 7 DJIBOUTI
Data on the implementation process is incomplete and the peace agreement text was unavailable to the author up to October 2002.

B5.8 EL SALVADOR
Chapter Seven

B5.9 GUATEMALA
The negotiation process in Guatemala took place over a seven or eight year period and concluded with a final agreement in December 1996. The URNG and the government agreed in 1990 to acknowledge the Esquipulas II (agreement between five Central American Presidents on paving the way toward peace in Central America) and to request UN observation of the process. But any real progress on its implementation, and on further negotiations, was blocked by the Guatemalan Army’s insistence on issue hierarchy in the peace process: URNG had to demobilise and disarm before any agreement could be reached (Spenser Denise, 1997:12). Agreement on a schedule for the implementation and verification of agreements in 1991 was still blocked by this issue hierarchy demand and the civil war continued.

Negotiations took place on a nothing is agreed until everything is basis from 1993 to 1996 and, in spite of continuing violence, agreements were made on a number of political changes that would be necessary if URNG was to negotiate for a final agreement with the government. These included some agreement on substantive issues such as human rights, the rights of indigenous people, social, economic and agrarian issues; on a commission to document war crimes; on a new, civilian role for the army and demobilisation and reintegration of URNG. In March 1996, a unilateral ‘temporary ceasefire’ implemented by URNG (the result of a reasonable request by its pro faction) created space for the final agreement, enabling the government to respond with an order to the army to stop all counter-insurgency operations. It also provided space for the government’s pro faction to call for the firing, arrest or purging of certain groups of individuals in the officer corps and city forces (spoiler faction). The size of this step was reduced with the introduction (and passing) in December 1996 of a general amnesty law to congress exempting soldiers and guerrillas from prosecution for killings and violent acts. Human rights and religious groups have been critical (Spenser, 1997: 13) but the amnesty is perceived here as an example of where issue breakdown enabled the government, in particular, to implement the political and military aspects of the Accords.

Unilateral deadlines were not a feature of the carefully-negotiated implementation timetable in the Final Agreement1. The timetable for URNG demobilisation and sequenced reintegration was quite tight but this

1 Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, Guatemala, 29 December 1996; Agreements on the
commenced after the official disbanding of the Voluntary Civil Defence Committees (December 1996), one of the most offensive militias of the war and after the beginning of reforms to the armed forces began (Amson: 114-5). It also coincided with the government's introduction into congress of specific agreements on institutional reforms and the first ninety days prioritised the firm establishment of the implementation commissions provided or in the agreement.

Other forms of issue hierarchy were not a feature. Actions required of the URNG were to be implemented alongside an institutionalised and sequenced implementation of government commitments, much of which had already begun prior to the signing of the final agreement. The final agreement sets out to provide a guide for the phased implementation of those commitments set down in the agreements, whose fulfilment could not be scheduled reliably in December 1996. The follow up commission, on which the URNG is well represented, is to determine the subsequent timetable for the implementation of commitments that are not susceptible to immediate monitoring. These commitments are listed specifically. (Agreement on Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace agreement. Guatemala City, December 1996)

Issue holdover is not a feature in that all substantive issues were part of a detailed agreement and very specific commitments were made on all substantive issues. Mechanisms for implementation were widespread and relatively institutionalised. Commissions on which members of civil society such as the church and unions, contributed significantly to the final agreements and commissions and these alongside URNG's representation in congress, a Civilian Secretariat of Strategic Analysis, a Department of Civilian Intelligence and Analysis of Information, and an Academy of National Civilian Police, exist to reduce the risks for the government's pro faction's efforts to continue to implement reforms which many in its conflict formation, especially in the Armed Forces, oppose (Schimicr: 8-9). While there have been some obstacles to the implementation of important constitutional changes on the status of indigenous people (low turnout and lack of information leading to the rejection of the referendums) as the political system normalises space may develop for the running of fairer referendums. This depends very much on the full implementation of socio-economic development measures.

Nonetheless the hypotheses on successful or stable implementation are satisfied. In terms of institutions for implementation, the UN (MINUGA) mission was an insulated mechanism for the process of documenting human rights abuses, of demobilising URNG and corresponding security and policing institutions of the state.

B5.10 ISRAEL-PALESTINE

A form of issue hierarchy was central to the Oslo Accords and to the series of agreements that followed on from the implementation of the Accord and on final status negotiations. The final status of Jerusalem and of the Palestinian Authority's relationship with Israel was held over and this reduced incentives to implement other aspects of the peace agreement in any comprehensive way. Clear issue hierarchy also exists the failure of the Accords, and the agreements on substantial issues that followed them, to comprehensively address several issues, the most significant of which were water rights and of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Once again this created enormous obstacles to the full implementation of other aspects of the accords: there was no parallel sequencing of implementation and parties had to implement full issues before agreements on how to implement these other issues were made. Given that there was no full agreement on important issues, there was no issue breakdown on how to implement them. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, no insulated institutions existed to ensure that the implementation process could be designed to facilitate the introduction of issue break down and parallel sequencing.

While the case bears out the IFF hypotheses, this case is also indicative of the limits of the IFF hypotheses as a prescriptive theory for conflict management. The question as to whether or not Israeli and Palestinian negotiators could (when the equilibrium in favour of reaching a settlement existed) have prioritised reaching a 'package' settlement (as opposed to one that endorsed issue hierarchy) is important and highlights the importance of the other variables considered by this thesis: the regional context and the degree to which a third party was willing to give a credible security commitment to the process. In this case, all three factors were missing, and this mitigated against the chance of reaching an implementable agreement.

B5.11 LEBANON

The TAIF Accords (1989) which aimed to bring 13 years of civil war in Lebanon to a close with a phased, reciprocal demobilisation of paramilitaries/militias, the formation of a new, unified Lebanese Army, and a renegotiation of the congressional political system to reflect new balances of powers between the main Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements, Guatemala, 29 December 1996.
communities: the Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, the Maronites and the Druze. It was agreed that while the military and other security and political issues were being implemented, a transitional unity cabinet (elected by a small group of the last-elected Lebanese MPs) would preside until the first elections in twenty years took place towards the end of the first phase of implementation in 1992.

However, while the Accords included a timetable and parallel sequencing for other issues, the Taif Accords ‘provided no timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian troops in Lebanon’ (AP, 13.11.89). According to one analyst, the issue of Syrian withdrawal was a unilateral commitment by Syria (which was associated with the Muslim conflict formations). It lacked ‘any mechanisms that guaranteed Syria to respect it’ (Malin, 1992: 87). Therefore, all other issues were, in effect, to be implemented before negotiations on Syria’s withdrawal were to commence; even then there was no mechanism to guarantee that it would happen. This placed issue hierarchy at the heart of the implementation process and provided the Christian Lebanese leader, General Aoun, with a pretext on which to reject the Accords, which he otherwise deemed acceptable. Given the need to maintain unity amongst the Maronite elite (and fearful of losing out to the spoiler faction), other Maronite leaders refused to become part of the new unity cabinet, despite their support for the principles of TAIF. They feared a loss of power from within their own community especially given the possibility of successful action by Aoun (FT, 7.12.89). Without the Maronites, the cabinet was doomed to represent only those sections of Lebanon under the control of Syria.

Syria eventually responded to the stalling that resulted from this issue hierarchy by intervening with military force, prompting renewed civil war and ousting General Aoun. With his threat to the power of the other Christian factions gone, they were free to engage with the implementation of the TAIF Accords, or at least the part of the TAIF Accords that were not obstructed by the continuing issue hierarchy.

Following the brief civil war of 1990, the implementation of Phase II of the peace agreement was in part facilitated. The reciprocal process of militia demobilisation, in which no unilateral deadlines were included, alongside the phased formation of a unified strong Lebanese Army was successful. This demobilisation began alongside the election (by former MPs) of the transitional, unified, power-sharing cabinet and its subsequent preparations for elections. While this parallel sequencing enabled the first democratic elections in twenty years to take place in 1992 and effectively ended the existence of multiple militias and laid the foundations for a centralised, unified army at the same time, the remaining provisions in the agreement have been stalled by the continuing issue hierarchy created by Syria’s presence. Members of the elite in both factions continue to support Syria’s presence (40,000 troops) in the knowledge that they will retain their power. These factions are spoiler factions in that they stall on the implementation of commitments to decentralisation and democratisation in the agreement and justify this by Syria’s continuing presence: when Syria withdraws, the rest of the agreement is to be implemented. Further, Hizbollah’s refusal to cooperate with demobilisation caused it to become a powerful political movement with both an armed and a political wing. Its refusal to demobilise was based on Israel’s presence in Southern Lebanon, this highlighting the ability of regional dynamics to obstruct the sequence and timing that is likely to facilitate full implementation.

In sum, issue hierarchy and the inability to introduce issue breakdown and parallel sequencing to the issues of Syria’s withdrawal and further democratisation and decentralisation, prevented the sequence that might have encouraged full implementation of the political system that TAIF envisaged. The implementation process appears to be permanently stalled at this stage (2001).

B5. 12 LIBERIA
The Abuja Accord II was signed by the rival Liberian factions in 1996 (NPFL, ULIMO-K, LPC, ULIMO-J). The agreement committed the warring parties to demobilise, disarm, transform themselves into political parties and take part in democratic, zero-sum elections to a Presidency and a national parliament. The difficulties of the implementation process are described at length in Aning (1999) and Adibe (1997). The implementation process was insulated in that ECOWAS (and its military force – ECOMOG) and UNIMIL

1 Division of power had been altered to reflect the new realities of demographics, decreasing the power of the Maronite president, increasing that of the Sunni Prime minister and the Shia Speaker of the parliament.
2 Hundreds of 1,000s of Syrian forces had been in Lebanon since they entered as an Arab League Peacekeeping Force in 1976; its power over Lebanon was extensive in 1990 and it had become embroiled in the civil war fighting against the Christian militias. Therefore, most of the Christian elite saw a reduction in Syria’s power as fundamentally important to any agreement. The rival Muslim factions (that together make up a formation) relied to various degrees on Syrian patronage. To back calls for Syrian withdrawal with a view to the development of the implementation process (pro faction) would have risked losing this patronage to other rival pro-Syrian groups (sceptical or spoiler factions). Only a significant majority of Muslim groups willing and able to challenge Syrian hegemony could have overcome this barrier to issue breakdown by together moving (and the Arab League and possibly France) to convince Syria to agree to a type of phased withdrawal.
3 According to the agreement the confessional power-sharing is a step on the way to full democratisation and decentralisation of power is central to its implementation.
4 The newly-negotiated, confessionally-based power sharing system was to be transitional.

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were given control to oversee and run the implementation process.

The sequence and timing in the agreement almost mirrored that of the Bicesse Accords in Angola except that the timeframe for elections was even shorter. A strict, rigid deadline for elections, in which only one party could truly gain power, placed one form of issue hierarchy at the centre of the implementation process. While demobilisation and disarmament were to have taken place before the elections, and were, according to the agreement, a requirement if a faction was to be transformed into a political party, the time frame for this was way too short for such a complex task (Aning, 1999: 345-347). The rigid deadline for elections, and the obstacle that this presented to parallel sequencing of security and political issues, meant that few (less than 1/3 of combatants) parties were truly demobilised or disarmed when the elections took place. The inadequacies of making the election issue more important than any other were seen when the newly-elected President, Charles Taylor, refused to implement a key commitment in the agreement to allow ECOMOG to control the reorganisation of the Liberian Army and security forces. By sequencing this re-organisation to take place after the elections, the agreement created little incentive for anyone in Taylor’s party to involve the former combatants from other factions, and little incentive for the other factions to join what effectively became Taylor’s army. In sum, the implementation process included no procedures for phased, broken-down implementation of demobilisation and de-militarisation, alongside a socio-economic programme that would have helped to encourage combatants that there was security in another way of life. Neither was the issue of political power broken down: a transitional power-sharing government to last until a unified army was formed would have helped to sequence issues in a way that created more incentives for compliance.

B. 13 MALI

The National Peace Pact was signed by the Malian transitional government, and MFUA (an umbrella organisation co-ordinating four insurgent groups fighting a rebellion against the government in Northern Mali). The agreement committed the government and the insurgents to the integration of rebels into the Armed Forces, the exchange of prisoners, to promote and support the safe return of refugees, to develop the under-developed and neglected Northern region of Mali, to decrease the heavy presence of the Malian military there, to allow policing of the peace to be carried out/implemented by local people and to set up a Commission for Northern Mali in the Central government’s Office (Lode, 1997: 64-65). While some attempts to implement the military provisions of the agreement were made, and a Commission of the North was set up, initial attempts to implement the NPP met with failure and the intensity of the rebellion increased with the military and rebel movements becoming increasingly hostile to its implementation. The difficulties were overcome in 1995 with the negotiation of a new implementation plan. The President of Mali’s ability to gradually win control over significantly powerful sections of the military who had been reluctant to implement the settlement in the pre-1995 implementation process was seen as critical to the success of the second implementation plan (Lode, 1997: 85).

In the second implementation plan, all moves were carefully broken down and breakdown was accompanied by parallels sequencing of every issue, from a political process of step-by-step decentralisation, to the process of withdrawing the most offensive elements of the Malian military from the North (as a step towards demilitarisation of the North), to the reconsideration given to new methods of demobilisation of insurgent troops. Once there was agreement through these new mechanisms on a strategy for demobilisation, a parallel socio-economic process, which was developed by grass-roots initiatives with the support of the UNDP and a number of foreign NGOs, was implemented to reintegrate combatants into society (Lode, 1997: 85). In a very important step towards decentralisation, civil society structures, which were strong in Northern Mali, were formally converted into a level of local government in 1995. This meant that by the time the phased demobilisation had been completed in 1996 a degree of decentralisation was well in place and a process whereby the most damaging socio-economic consequences of demobilisation was institutionalised in the Commission for demobilisation.

Low level international mediation by the UN, UNDP and NGOs had, according to most accounts of the process, played a hugely constructive role in both the socio-economic and civil society movement that eventually led to the re-negotiated implementation process (Lode, 1997: 123). The implementation process was insulated to the extent that these actors played a large role in designing and overseeing the post-1995 implementation process, in settling disputes, in the running of the demobilisation commission and the socio-economic reconstruction of the North (see Lode, 1997 and Poulton, 1996).

B. 14 MOZAMBIQUE

The agreement was signed in 1992 by the Mozambique government and RENAMO. The institutions responsible for directing the implementation of the agreement were insulated; implementation was overseen by a Monitoring Commission (CSC), which was chaired by the UN, and composed of an equal number of government and RENAMO members. Representatives from Italy, France, Portugal, the UK, the US, the
Organisation of African Unity and Germany were also observers on the commission. The CSC assumed responsibility for interpreting the Accords, for settling disputes, for guiding and coordinating the activities of the sub-commissions and appointed the main subsidiary commissions (Ceasefire, Formation of the Armed Forces and Reintegration Commissions). Facilitating phased implementation, UNOMOZ’s mandate included a political, military, electoral and humanitarian component and its mandate was based strongly on an inter-relationship between the four (UN, 1996: 323)

Critical to avoiding a form of issue hierarchy common to many implementation processes, the elections, which were to be planned by UNOMOZ, would only go ahead when the security situation was judged to be under control; no rigid deadline was included which would have elevated the importance of the issue above all others. In this way, procedures to enable the holding of elections were incrementally put into place in parallel with the implementation of other issues.

**Issue breakdown and parallel sequencing** were to eventually characterise all issues in the implementation process and their introduction was necessary to break the deadlock that initially prevailed. This was facilitated by the absence of clear issue hierarchy from implementation design. In fact, issue breakdown and parallel sequencing characterised every implementation issue following the negotiation of ‘package deals’ in September and October 1993. Concerning political issues, RENAMO and the government through the UN-led electoral commission agreed preparations for the elections. Through the package deals, the issue of political power was broken down by the negotiation of a type of power sharing which allowed RENAMO to maintain control of administration in the areas under its control. At the same time the agreement on policing was negotiated into the package: the UN would monitor all police activities in the country, monitor the rights and liberties of people and provide support to the joint police commission. These agreements preceded the October 1993 breakthrough, which included an agreement on the assembly and demobilisation of RENAMO and government troops, the simultaneous disarmament of paramilitary forces, irregular and militia troops, and the embellishment of local police commissions and sub-commissions to monitor police behaviour. Cantonment was broken down and phased with socio-economic reintegration programmes and with the formation of the new armed forces. There were no unilateral demands and all forces, including paramilitary and militia forces, were part of the demobilisation process. This was accompanied by an agreement on the composition of the National Elections Commission and the system and timetable for finalising the electoral law. Finally, while the political system did not include a measure of political power sharing, the elections took place after both formations had co-operated in the step-by-step implementation of the military, policing, political, socio-economic and other issues in the process: without this co-operation the elections would not take place (according to the agreement).

**B.15 NAMIBIA**

The December 1988 Peace Agreement provided for a democratic and independent Namibia incorporating both SWAPO – the independence movement which had fought for over twenty-five years – and the former South African-controlled administration which organised politically to take part in the new political system (Turnhalle Alliance). The institutions overseeing the implementation process were **insulated**. UNTAG, which was a militarily-robust United Nations Mission, and a Joint Commission incorporating members of both conflict formations, a strong mediator, and former sponsors of the civil war, were to oversee the implementation of the Agreement. According to the agreement, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General had to be personally satisfied with every step of the implementation process before it could move forward (Hampson, 1996: 72). This gave him an effective veto over the entire implementation process. It gave him the power and autonomy to design a workable implementation process in consensus with the sponsor states and the mediators in the Joint Commission.

The Agreement committed both parties to implement a number of political, military and security issues, which would together bring about a transition from a South-African controlled, one party political system to an independent, democratic, multi-party system. The transition period would end with elections to newly agreed institutions.

**Issue hierarchy was not endorsed** in any of its forms by the agreement. However, the Accord’s provisions were vague and presented many opportunities to spoiler factions from both parties to undermine the implementation process with persistent stalling. Concerning security issues, SWAPO was to withdraw its forces to camps outside of Namibia and the SADF (South African Defence Forces) to withdraw to barracks. But while the agreement clearly required SWAFF, a South-African controlled indigenous armed force, to simultaneously disarm and to integrate with the future of Koevoet, the infamous, elite counter-insurgency unit, was unclear from its terms. This lack of clarity meant that Koevoet was almost completely incorporated into SWAPOL, the South African police force. The parties had agreed that SWAPO would continue as the police force during the transition period, but with the whole scale incorporation of the elite counter-insurgency force (Koevoet), this was clearly unacceptable to SWAPO. This sequence effectively made a unilateral demand of SWAPO.
and, as a consequence, stalling ensued until the issue of the Koevoet force was resolved in October 1989. This resolution was only possible in the context of a parallel implementation of the political issues.

In fact, while mediators and pro factions endeavoured to bring about this resolution on military and policing issues, attempts were made to breakdown the political issues which were also stalled. The difficulty was that both parties perceived the upcoming elections as a continuation of war through politics. These perceptions provided opportunities for the spoiler factions, in particular the spoiler faction within the government party, to create further insecurities amongst sceptical factions. This fed into the existing insecurity over military and policing issues and led to antagonistic behaviour by SWAPOL and Koeveat (Hampson, 1996: 75). An agreement to breakdown political issues into smaller steps (which would eventually be implemented in sequence with military issues) was critical to the ultimate success of the implementation process. The agreement took the following form: the newly-elected constituent assembly was, according to the agreement, to draft the new constitution. This clause could, in theory, have undermined the implementation of a democratic system as it was anticipated that SWAPO would dominate this constituent assembly. This led to stalling by the government party until the mediators facilitated an agreement between the parties on a number of democratic principles which would be central to the political system outlined in the constitution. This included an agreement that the constitution would have to win the approval of a 2/3 majority in the constituent Assembly. This broke down the political issue from a zero sum contest to one in which parties were forced to co-operate on the drafting of the constitution. It thereby facilitated co-operation between the pro factions.

In sum, the insecurities that the move to accept the new political system created for the pro faction in the Turnhalle Alliance were lessened by two factors: the above-mentioned agreement on the constitution and agreement to use a PR electoral system. But these breakthroughs only happened alongside a resolution of the military and policing issues as follows: for SWAPO, the disbanding of Koeveat, the SWAFT and other militias, along with the confinement of SADF to barracks, and the neutral monitoring of the police force, ensured that the elections could take place without the threat of violence. These moves facilitated its pro faction's efforts to ensure that all of SWAPO's troops remained encamped during the election process (though there were some violent incidents).

Finally, the introduction of issue breakdown and parallel sequencing had been facilitated by the approach to dispute-resolution taken by UNTAG officials: when large disputes, both local and national emerged, they brought representatives of all parties, the church and ethnic and community leaders together in formal reconciliation meetings, They also set agendas at bimonthly meetings at the national and regional level (Hampson, 1996: 85).

B5. 16 NICARAGUA

Nicaragua is an unusual case in that the process was not strictly speaking a peace process but a series of agreements for an agreed transition and an end to violence. The civil war was fought primarily between the communist Sandinista government (FSLN) and the US and right-wing supported contra insurgency which attempted to over-throw it. An initial agreement was negotiated in 1989 between the Sandinista (FSLN) government and the contras with the endorsement of the Central American presidents (Teal Agreement). In this the contras promised to demobilise in return for early, free and fair elections. When the FSLN lost the elections to a centre-right coalition (UMT) led by Chimera, (which included many supporters of the contras), it demanded the full demobilisation and disarmament of the contras, as agreed in the Teal Agreement, before it handed over power. It also demanded their demobilisation before it introduced reforms to increase civilian control over the Armed Forces over which the FSLN still commanded control. A number of tripartite agreements followed which aimed to reform the army, to demobilise the contras and allowed the FSLN to occupy the position of Army Commander. Many obstacles, including the failure of the Chimera government to fulfill its socio-economic promises and a large spoiler faction amongst the contras, which re-mobilised in 1992, thwarted the long-term success of these initiatives. A further settlement was not reached until 1994 and this agreement is the focus of this analysis.

The agreements on demobilisation and reintegration of the contras were unsuccessful until they were implemented alongside the phased implementation of socio-economic programmes that were negotiated between the Chamorro government and the contras. Likewise, the complete hand over of power by the FSLN, and the implementation of reforms to the army, were not possible without phased demobilisation of the contras, an informal power-sharing arrangement which allowed Ortega (brother of former president) to

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1 SWAPO was a popular, umbrella independence movement which represented a large proportion of the indigenous population of Namibia: it was therefore anticipated that SWAPO would win the elections with a significant majority.
remain as head of the Armed Forces and allowed the Sandinista elite to remain considerable power and economic wealth. The breakdown in the implementation of issues facilitated a type of informal Chamorro-FSLN coalition in that the president relied on the FSLN to support her implementation process. In fact, powerful elements of Chamorro’s centre-right coalition were against her reforms and political reforms were introduced slowly with the support of both ‘pro factions’ and in conjunction with demobilisation and reintegration programmes, and reform of the Armed Forces. Unilateral deadlines were not a feature of implementation design: contra demobilisation was presented as voluntary. No other form of Issue hierarchy featured in implementation design which was slow and bargained.

Institutions were insulated for the implementation of the security aspects of the 1991-2 process. However, for the 1994 process, while there was a UN presence, it was the informal power sharing that developed which appeared to facilitate pro faction unity. Insulation was not a feature of this process.

B5.17 NIGER
Data on the implementation process is incomplete and the peace agreement text was unavailable to the author.

B5.18 NORTHERN IRELAND
Chapter Six.

B5.19 PHILIPPINES
The agreement in the Philippines was signed in 1996 between the government and the MNLF insurgency which had been fighting for an independent Muslim state in the Southern Philippines for over twenty years. An Joint Monitoring Committee with members from the government and the MNLF, and with the help of the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) was to meet continually to review the implementation process, to identify the aspects that could be immediately implemented, and to monitor implementation of the agreement during Phase I of its implementation. This institution was not, however, insulated and the OIC was not given a powerful role in the oversight of the implementation process.

The parties agreed to the demobilisation of the MNLF and the integration of most of its combatants into the police force and army of the Southern Philippines. They also agreed to the establishment of a consultative assembly involving members of both the Muslim and Christian communities, of a peace and security zone in part of Mindanao and a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development which would through a variety of steps work to establish a peaceful and secure area, with investment and economic recovery. The idea behind the agreement appears to have been that a semblance of peace and economic recovery in the existing Autonomous region (already implemented in 1989) was a necessary confidence-building step. This would be followed by the ultimate step which would see the powers of the Autonomous Region expanding both territorially and politically (subject to a plebiscite).

There is some evidence of reciprocal, step-by-step implementation on security issues: a phased demobilisation of MNLF fighters was to take place alongside a phased, socio-economic programme, and a programme (which included a system for dispute resolution) which integrated combatants into the police services and army of the Southern Philippines. This included some senior positions for the MNLF. However, while issue hierarchy is not a central part of the agreement, neither are clear guidelines for a parallel, broken down sequencing of all issues. The absence of an insulated mechanism to encourage this gave spoiler factions, especially those in the government and in the MILF (see below), ample opportunity to stall. While the military and policing provisions concerning the demobilisation and reintegration of the MNLF are quite clearly laid out in the agreement, the steps that the government would take to facilitate and finance the economic recovery in the Autonomous region, that was necessary if the next phase of the agreement was to be implemented, are very unclear. This gave opportunities to the sizeable spoiler faction in the government to stall on their implementation.

The spoiler faction within the government was provided with more pretexts for stalling by an external spoiler faction on the insurgency side. While the MILF, (which broke from the MNLF in 1976 and calls for full independence), has some stake in appearing to be reasonable and therefore continues to negotiate with the government, it does not have to appear to agree with the Peace Agreement in question and it presents a legitimate argument in favour of outright independence. While its actions stir up the security situation (throughout the endeavours to implement the agreement), it gave the government’s spoiler faction a further pretext on which to stall support for economic development, placing in danger the government’s economic commitments in the Peace Agreement. In fact, it appears that the fate of the peace agreement depends on whether or not the economic deliverance of the zone of peace can be actualised by the MNLF and the government. Yet the sequencing and timing of implementation, by failing to include a clear breakdown of issues and parallel sequencing, facilitates those who aim to thwart this process.
B5.20 SIERRA LEONE
The Abidjan Agreement was signed by the government of Sierra Leone and an alliance between the RUF (the civil war between the government and the RUF had been ongoing since 1990). The implementation process following the Abidjan Peace Agreement was almost immediately a stalled process. The provisions of the agreement provided for little issue breakdown, included no procedures for parallel sequencing and no mechanism likely to encourage it. Further, while unilateral timetables or demands were not an explicit feature of the implementation process, the lack of an explicit timetable on key political issues, and the inclusion of one on the issue of demobilisation, served to create issue hierarchy.

The issue hierarchy was created by a combination of the weakly-stated, but ultimately unilateral deadline for the RUF/SL to demobilise. This resulted from the agreement’s failure to sequence the RUF’s demobilisation to that of the government’s Kamajor militias and to a more stringent monitoring the SL army. It also resulted from the further failure to sequence steps to implement the political and human rights provisions along with the military provisions. This sequence and timing would have made it almost impossible for strong pro faction to prevail in the RUF. Further, the government committed to restructure and re-orientate the SL armed forces and to open up the opportunity to former RUF combatants to join it (article 9). But this was to be discussed by a commission, which was to be established by the government. There were no guidelines to ensure that this commission was established so that its work would take place in sequence with the RUF’s demobilisation.

There were further weaknesses in design. The political provisions committed the government to a number of steps but the commitment to begin a process of consultation with other parties with a view to appointing a new and independent Electoral Commission was the only one subject to a deadline (within 3 months of the agreement). Other commitments made by the government were not phased with the demobilisation process. They included provisions to set up an independent National Commission on Human Rights with the power to investigate violations in cooperation with local civil society groups; to strengthen the police force by vetting the current force and investigating a Police Council nominated by civilian sectors of society; promises on socio-economic policy including the establishment of a Socio-Economic forum on which the RUC would sit.

In terms of providing insulated institutions to guide implementation, the agreement is also weak. A national body - the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace - was to be established within two weeks. It was to be the verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring implementation of, and compliance with, all provisions. It was to be made up of representatives from the RUF and the government and was to appoint all other commissions that would oversee the implementation of the Accords. While it was to be assisted by a neutral grouping from the international community (article 11), which was to be responsible for monitoring alleged breaches of the agreement, the Neutral Monitoring Group had no powers to drive implementation or to set the agenda (i.e. to encourage parties to negotiate on sequencing and timing). Therefore, implementation was entirely in the hands of the CCP.

As the implementation process unfolded, stalling characterised every single issue, the only progress being the appointment of the CCP and the two formation’s request for UN observers. The degree to which a parallel socio-economic programme to assist with the demobilisation of the RUF was needed can be seen by the manner in which a disorientated RUF, primarily in search of food, prevailed on towns and civilians. This led to violence between the Kamajors (which were still legal) and the RUF (which was supposed to demobilise). As the process continued, intra-formation clashes between the kamajor militias and the armed forces of SL escalated into violent conflict over resources. It was these clashes, and the stalling implementation process, that eventually led to a coup in May 1997 and the end of the peace process.

B5.21 SIERRA LEONE B
While parts of the Lome Agreement have subsequently been successfully implemented, this analysis covers only the implementation process during the period from July 1999 until its collapse into violence in May 2000. The Lome Agreement suffered from many of the same drawbacks as those central to the Abidjan process. The Agreement, like Abidjan, provided for the legalisation of the RUF and for the setting up of a trust fund to facilitate its transition. It also provided for a type of power sharing which would see the RUF with 4 out of 18 cabinet posts, a number of diplomatic and state positions and the chair of an implementation commission that concerned resources and development. Sankoh (RUF leader) was also offered the position of Vice President. While the Lome Agreement provided was a far superior basis for a settlement to the Abidjan Accord, there were a number of series difficulties with the implementation process which was vague and which facilitated issue hierarchy.

Like in the Abidjan process, the encampment, disarmament and demobilisation terms were very specific, were focused on the RUF and its AFRC and SLA allies (who had split from the government in 1997). Due to the
The timetable stipulated that from day 1 to 31 the obstacles (legal) to the RUF-AFRC's establishment as a political movement were to be removed. However, the timetable it does not mention the setting up of the trust fund. During the same period the institutions for implementation were to be set up and the entire process of encampment, disarmament and demobilisation, which was to be overseen by UNOMSIL, was to begin and to end 90 days into the process. Simultaneously, soldiers from the Army were to be restricted to barracks and their arms and ammunition to be under constant surveillance by the neutral peace-keeping force. While the latter provision did introduce a measure of reciprocity to the demobilisation process, the moves expected of the Army were considerably less than those expected of the RUF which suggested a unilateral deadline. Furthermore, the failure to implement political provisions in any meaningful way (see below) meant that meeting effectively prioritised the implementation of military issues above all else. This created two possible issue hierarchies which would stall the implementation process.

The implementation of political provisions was to take place early in the process: the two parties were to meet within 3 weeks to agree on the personnel for the RUF appointments. But while the cabinet appointments were made, vague terms and the failure to sequence the further appointments with other parts of the implementation process, facilitated spoiler factions in both camps in their quest to undermine further implementation. For example, on several occasions between July 1999 and May 2000 Sankoh complained that the government had failed to honour its commitment to offer the RUF the political, diplomatic and para-state jobs provided for in the settlement. The government pointed to financial constraints as justifying its failure to do so but it subsequently set up diplomatic missions for its own members in 2000. This opened up opportunities for the RUF's spoiler factions to refuse further implementation. Furthermore, the government conceded cabinet ministries which were considered to be less senior that those suggested in the agreement. This opened up further opportunities for the RUF spoiler factions to refuse to co-operate. In addition to this, the power sharing in the agreement was not institutionalised and was watered down during the implementation process. For example, Sankoh was to chair the Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and Development. But this was a new institution, and, while supposedly autonomous and only answerable to the president, its powers were confused with the already-established Ministry of the Mines. The work of Sankoh's Commission was not co-ordinated with existing institutions, and, for Sankoh it was easier to continue funding the RUF through extra-legal mining activities (especially given the failure to establish a trust fund). If the RUF's spoiler factions needed a pretext for continuing this extra-legal activity it only needed to point to the government's Ministry of the Mines which obstructed the work of the new commission.

In further evidence of issue hierarchy, the Human Rights Commission was not to be set up until after the demobilisation process on day 90 of implementation. The Commission, if given power to carry out its mandate, would arguably have provided support to the process of deterring action by the many groups that were still armed with incentives to seek revenge.

While the principle of insulation is central to the implementation mechanisms envisaged in the Lome Accord (with the UN the key institution for oversight), the problems created by dual mandate and by the gradual process of changing the ECOMOG mandate, arguably reduced the positive effect that this insulation should have added. While issue breakdown did appear to be a feature of the process. The weakly-insulated institutions, along with the failure to sequence political and military issues and the unilateral steps called for in the military provisions, provided much opportunity for spoiler factions to control the implementation process.

**B5.22 SRI LANKA**

**Issue hierarchy** featured strongly in the Sri Lanka-India Accord. The Sri Lankan government's agreement to release Tamil prisoners was dependent on the Tamil insurgencies implementing the demobilisation and disarmament programme (Hancock, 1999: 95). Formal devolution was also dependent on their demobilisation. Demobilisation was itself to take place over a number of days and there were no provisions for the parallel reintegration of insurgents into civilian life (or into another, neutral force) (Hancock, 1999: 97). The provisions, in effect, stipulated that the insurgents meet a unilateral deadline after which the rest of the Accord would be implemented.

Although an Indian peace-keeping force was to be present to provide security in Tamil areas during the post-demobilisation implementation process, no details were provided on how this process would work. Issue breakdown was starkly absent. While the demobilisation process was taking place the government was to

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1 A request for parties to change ECOMOG's mandate to peace-keeping was also to be formally made and a phased withdrawal of ECOMOG in its current form to begin (by introducing soldiers from two new countries).
announce the setting up of an interim administration in the North and East provinces (a combined council) until elections could be held in the newly-devolved local councils (Hancock, 1997: 92). But no details concerning the Sinhalese population in the North and East provinces were included, no issue breakdown outlined how the implementation of a consultative institution, of a limited form of power sharing which would encourage other groups to support the process, were included. Instead, legislation was to be passed that would provide for a referendum in the East province concerning its inclusion in the autonomous area. This amounted to a form of ‘issue holdover’ and was the cause of much violence during the implementation period, with the LTTE insurgency attacking local Sinhalese settlers with a view to moving them before the referendum was to take place.

Therefore, issue breakdown and parallel sequencing were absent from design and issue hierarchy was present and created by a unilateral demand on insurgents to disarm and demobilise and by prioritising this issue above all others. A form of issue holdover was also central to the settlement. Institutions that oversaw implementation did not include representatives of the insurgents. In fact, implementation appeared to depend on the ability of the Indian Peace-keeping Force to coerce the insurgents into implementing the settlement and on the Sri Lankan government’s ability to fulfil its promises. The government was itself subject to immense pressure from Sinhalese chauvinists who led a rejuvenated JVP and which waged a bloody guerrilla campaign in the south of the country (Hancock, 1999: 99-100).

B5.23 SOUTH AFRICA
The ruling National Party of South Africa entered negotiations with the ANC to safeguard its economic privileges and to avoid destruction and revolution; the ANC entered negotiations for power, but for limited power, with economic power still concentrated (CIIR, 1996: 2). The negotiation process was not unlike the Salvadorian and Guatemalan negotiation processes in that it was made up of a series of agreements over a number of years which cantered on the 1991 National Peace Accord. The process of implementing some of these agreements, such as agreements on human rights issues and on some political issues, began (but was not complete) before a final agreement was reached.

The National Peace Accord between the ANC, the National Party and the IFP (an ethnically-based rival independence movement) provided a code of conduct for political parties and the security forces, measures for the development of communities, the setting up of local and regional peace committees to mediate in areas of conflict, a National Peace Commission to monitor implementation and a standing Committee of Inquiry into political violence (Goldstone Commission) which was widespread between and within communities (Guelke, 1999:97). It also paved the way for the multi-party talks through CODESA, which was established in December 1991, and through which negotiations on substantive issues were to take place. A nothing is agreed until everything is agreed formula was adopted during these negotiations (UN, 1994) but this was alongside the incremental implementation of political and human rights agreements that began the dismantling of apartheid, including one that lifted the ban on the liberation movements. The Goldstone Commission on political violence was an important mechanism and during the implementation process it exposed a co-operative relationship between the spoiler factions in the National Party and the IFP who were co-operating to ensure that their respective sceptical factions withdrew support from the process (United Nations, 1994: 103). This tactical spoiler faction alliance had effectively ended by 1993, and the ANC/National Party alliance was strengthened with the Record of Understanding signed in September 1992. The alliance between pro factions was to be the driving force behind the rest of the implementation process.

Issue breakdown was accompanied by a clear phased implementation of commitments, both before and after the National Peace Accord (1991) and before and after the multi-party elections that were held in 1994. Agreements on military, policing and paramilitary issues were reciprocal and were phased with other issues. Agreements on political issues concerned an incremental, legislative breakdown of the apartheid system and this was implemented in parallel with human rights issues which included legislative changes and the establishment of a Human Rights Monitoring Commission in 1991. Negotiations on further political issues - for new power-sharing institutions (including a two person vice presidency) and for a new constitution - also took place through CODESA alongside the implementation of all political and military issues. The power sharing that was agreed was a transitional arrangement and it led to the establishment of a government of national unity until 1999. The constitution was negotiated and approved by this government and it required 70% approval in the new national assembly, this allowing pro factions in both parties to have enough influence over the constitution’s drafting to keep spoiler factions at bay. According to one analysis, the ANC’s tactical concessions made it very difficult for the government to continue to stall over the key issue of the interim government (CIIR, 1996: 19).

While the South African army and the ANC’s troops had been on a reciprocal cease-fire and reciprocal cantonment prior to the elections in 1994, the reciprocal demobilisation of all forces was implemented alongside the government of national unity’s inauguration and its negotiation of the constitution. All forces were initially incorporated into the National Defence Forces and a phased process of demobilisation
subsequently took place (Malan, 1996:2). While there has been some criticism of the failure to implement adequate socio-economic support for the demobilisation process a phased and broken-down implementation of all issues characterised the implementation process and there was little endorsement for any form of issue hierarchy.

Finally, the creation of complex institutions which were to oversee the implementation process, such as the Goldstone Commission, the National Peace Commission and the local and regional peace commissions lent a measure of insulation to the process, despite the absence of a third party country or organisation on the ground.

**B5. 24 TAJIKISTAN**

An insulated institution did not oversee the implementation process in Tajikistan. The Commission for National Reconciliation (CNR) was charged with implementing the Agreement which was signed between the government of Tajikistan and UTO representatives in 1997. The CNR was the central implementation mechanism and was mandated to create an atmosphere of trust and mutual forgiveness and to institute dialogue amongst various political forces and to promote national reconciliation. It included an equal number of government and UTO representatives and was to be chaired by a UTO representative with a government representative as deputy. The Commission was organised into four sub-commissions that would concentrate on the following issues: return of refugees, political change, disarmament and economic regeneration. The agreement has been criticised, however, for failing to identify clear directions and guidelines for the CNR in its work on constitutional reform and for the consequential structural bias in favour of a centralised political system which dominated the implementation of constitutional reform. It has also been criticised as 'ill defined' and 'lacking procedural safeguards to ensure its independent functioning' (Accord Series 10, Zoir and Newton: 3). UNMOT was to guarantee the implementation of the General Agreement, to monitor implementation, provide expert advice, consultations and good offices. However, its did not control the implementation process; it did not control the agenda of the CNR which was effectively a bi-lateral, political institution.

UNMOT, a small UN peace-keeping force, provided some insulation to the implementation of security issues. A joint commission made up of members of the government and UTO was to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and the return of refugee issues and CIS peace-keeping forces were to assist with the ceasefire and the implementation of the military protocol.

From a reading of the agreement and of early accounts of its implementation (Accord Series, 10), the implementation process appeared to have been characterised by parallel sequencing and some issue breakdown. Reciprocal and broken-down steps characterised military and security issues which were to be implemented alongside other issues. Further, the terms of the agreement and its implementation do not appear to have created the basis for issue hierarchy. This does not mean that spoiler factions have not attempted to create issue hierarchy demands and the lack of an effective implementation mechanism, and the above-mentioned difficulties over constitutional issues, has facilitated them in this task.

**B5. 25 WESTERN SAHARA**

The peace settlement in the Western Sahara was agreed in 1991 by the Moroccan government and the Polisario, an internationally-recognised insurgency movement which had been fighting for decades for independence from Morocco. However, a form of issue hierarchy was at the heart of this agreement: the parties agreed that a referendum on the question of sovereignty would be held in Western Sahara. This would follow a transitional period during which each party would implement a number of commitments. However, the incentives to comply with any other aspects of the implementation process has been reduced by the issue hierarchy created by the zero-sum referendum, and intra formation rivalry, especially within the Moroccan government, has resulted in stalemate. The sequence and timing of the agreement, and its vague provisions on when and how the referendum should be run in relation to other commitments, has allowed spoiler faction to control each conflict formation. In particular, the Moroccan government uses logistical, historical and ethnic pretexts (which were not dealt with in the agreement) to justify permanent stalling.

Implementation began in September 1991 when ceasefires were implemented by both the Moroccan forces and the Polisario. A transitional phase that was to follow the ceasefires and to precede the referendum was to be driven by the UN peace-keeping force - MINURSO. It would begin registering Saharan for the referendum while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was to simultaneously run a programme to repatriate eligible voters. However, disagreements over who was eligible to vote, which for many were proof of the Moroccan government’s intention to stall until it stacked-up the prospects of winning the referendum (Gurr, Minorities at Risk Dataset, Western Sahara), meant that stalling prevailed. Following much diplomatic work by MINURSO to break the deadlock, a start to the voter-identification process began. In 1994 and 1995 some agreement was reached about who was eligible to vote. But further disagreements led to the suspension of this process for 18 months (until 1996). A series of face-to-face meetings between the Polisario,
representatives of the government, the UN Special Representative and his Assistant, culminated in a new agreement in 1997. The Houston Agreement, which was hailed as a breakthrough, included agreements to reduce troop levels (Moroccan), to release prisoners of war, to allow the voluntary repatriation of Saharans eligible to vote. It also included a compromise which was to lead to the resumption of the voter-identification process. However, while this did facilitate the end of the voter-identification process, the issue of three disputed tribes was left unresolved. A package agreement, which was proposed by the Secretary General in 1998, was accepted by the Polisario and accepted, in principle, by the government, but stalling has ensued.

In sum, stalling has ensued because the winner-takes-all solution, which is envisaged at the end of the transition phase, makes it difficult to create incentives for parties to fulfil any commitments on other issues. In other words, this issue hierarchy prevents the pro faction, in either the Polisario or the Moroccan government, from moving the process forwards. The commitments to deploy Polisario and Moroccan forces away from residential areas, the virtual withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the area, the exchange of prisoners of war, the release of political prisoners and an agreement to implement a code of conduct to enable the running of the referendum, all remain stalled.

Continual stalling by the Moroccan government prompted the Polisario’s Foreign Minister to say: there is a fear that the entire process, and the Moroccan government’s professed co-operation with it, is part of a plan to trap the Saharans by using the process to distort or deadlock the referendum process so as to destroy the Frente Polisario (BBC WWM, 24.11.97). This is most likely the goal of the spoiler faction which appears to control the government’s strategy. But the design of the agreement, which includes no mechanisms to breakdown the enormity of the zero-sum referendum, means that spoiler factions will continue to dominate both factions. With the current agreement, issue break down and parallel sequencing cannot be effectively introduced to expose the Moroccan government’s intransigence, and internal divisions which are emerging in the Polisario are likely to become more damaging (Gurr, Minorities at Risk). Its refusal to contemplate some breakdown of the political issue, such as extensive autonomy for Western Sahara suggested in May 1997, is justified by the text of the 1991 and 1997 agreements. Therefore, while the partial breakdown of some conflicting issues and the principle of reciprocity in security issues had helped to mitigate against serious outbreaks of violence, the agreement is unlikely to be implemented without a serious re-negotiation of the political issues and the procedures through which they are to be implemented.
APPENDIX C
PEACE ACCORD OUTLINES

ANGOLA
I  Cease-fire Agreement
II  Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola
III  Concepts for resolving the issues still pending
IV  Protocol of Estoril

Lusaka Protocol, 15\textsuperscript{th} November 1994
Annex 1  Agenda of the Peace Talks between the Government of Angola and UNITA
Annex 2  Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the government and UNITA of the relevant legal instruments
Annex 3  Military Issues I
Annex 4  Military Issues II
Annex 5  The Police
Annex 6  National Reconciliation
Annex 7  Completion of the Electoral Process
Annex 8  The UN Mandate, Role of the Observers of the Peace Accords and the Joint Commission
Annex 9  Other Pending Issues
Annex 10  Other Matters

NORTHERN IRELAND
Good Friday Agreement, 10\textsuperscript{th} April 1998.

GFA, Ch 1, Declaration of Support
GFA, Ch 2, Constitutional Issues
GFA, Ch 3, Strand One
GFA, Ch 4, Strand Two
GFA, Ch 5, Strand Three
GFA, Ch 6, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity
GFA, Ch 7, Decommissioning
GFA, Ch 8, Security
GFA, Ch 9, Police and Justice
GFA, Ch 10, Prisoners
GFA, Ch 11, Validation, Implementation and Review.
EL SALVADOR

AGREEMENTS OF THE CHAPULTEPEC ACCORDS

1990

April: Geneva Protocol: Agreed on Goals of the Negotiations

May: Caracas Agenda: UN Secretary General mapped out detailed timetable / Agenda for issues to be discussed

July: San Jose Agreement: Agreement to respect Human Rights. First substantive agreement in the process

Oct: Parties and UN, at a meeting in Mexico City, agreed to make adjustments in mechanics of the negotiations, which included more direct involvement of UNSG Special Rep, de Soto and more confidentiality.

Dec: Pact signed unifying on paper the parties’ commitment to a settlement.

1991

April: SG informed SC that he had accepted the recommendations of a preliminary mission that the ‘human rights component of ONUSAL be established immediately and in advance of a cease-fire.’

April: Mexico City Agreement: Agreement to speed up agreement on constitutional issues to overcome a potential crisis created by constitutional law: The content of a number of constitutional reforms necessary to transform the political system was agreed and it was agreed that they would be presented as a ‘package’ to the Legislative Assembly before its term expired in April 1991. Proposed constitutional amendments were to underpin:

1. Security reforms: Included the constitutional subordination of the armed forces to civilian government; provision to create a National Civil Police Force, independent of the armed forces and a National Public Security Academy to train civilian police.

2. Reform of the judicial system: A provision that would underpin new procedures for the selection of Supreme Court Judges and underpin the creation of a position of National Council for the Defence of Human Rights; Legal underpinning for the establishment of and mandate of a Commission on the Truth.

3. Electoral system: An amendment to provide for the creation of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal

The composition and mandate of the Three-Member-Truth Commission was also agreed: Members were to be appointed by UN Special Rep in consultation with the parties and the TC was to investigate serious acts of violence since 1980. Its final report to the parties and the SG was to be include conclusions and recommendations and would be made public by SG who would take appropriate action. The parties undertook to implement the T. Commission’s recommendations.

May 1991: SC 693 established ONUSAL as an integrated peace-keeping operation to monitor all agreements, initially carrying a mandate to verify compliance with San Jose. Began operating in July 1991 and investigating human rights violations in October.

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1 This was to overcome a potentially huge obstacle presented by the Salvadorian constitution which requires that a constitutional amendment, in order to be passed, requires the backing of two successive Legislative Assemblies, with 2/3 backing in the second (BH, 426; Juhn: etc.).

2 This involved actively monitoring the human rights situation, investigating specific cases of alleged violations, promoting human rights in the country, making recommendations for the elimination of violations, reporting on these matters to the SG and through him to the UN Gen Assembly and SC. BH:427.
September: New York Agreement.

(1) To establish COPAZ mandated to oversee the implementation of all political agreements;
(2) To ‘purify’ the armed forces and to reduce their size;
(3) To redefine the doctrine of the armed forces re. its function;
(4) To begin immediately to organise the new National Civilian Police (PNC).
(5) To use lands in excess of 245 hectares (constitutional limit) to meet needs of small farmers.
   Respect current landowning situation until a definite one is reached.

December: Act of New York
Combined with the previous four agreements, this completed all negotiations on substantive issues of
the peace process. It covered the details on the implementation of agreements on the reform of
military-civil relations based on the principles of the NY Agreement, of the FMLN cease-fire and
separation of forces. Before the agreements were formalised SG requested from SC a dramatic
increase in strength of ONUSAL to enable it to supervise cease-fire, separation of forces and monitor
the maintenance of public order while PNC was being set up. It set out the detail and parameters of
the reform of police force, judiciary and electoral system. In January 1992 a general agreement
including all agreements and the timetable agreement were formally endorsed.

Sources: Acuerdos de Chapultepec, www.cepaz.org; UN, 1995. UN and El Salvador, Chapter III. UN,
Blue Helmets, 425-28.

Ad Hoc Commission: Examining the record of up to 3,000 military officers with a view to making
recommendations to purge the high command of officers unsuitable for the military’s new role in El
Salvador. Subordinate to the civilian government and upholders of new human rights standards.
### APPENDIX B: CREDIBLE COMMITMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION BODIES CHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>3rd Party Involvement (Negotiations)</th>
<th>Main Body Responsible for Implementation</th>
<th>3rd Party Guarantee for implementation</th>
<th>Strength of Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM; UN SG; Portugal mediated, with US and USSR participating – Known as the Troika.</td>
<td>CCPM (Joint Military &amp; Political Committee): Composed of members of UNITA &amp; the MPLA government. Membership selected after signing of PA. CMVP was responsible for cease-fire monitoring. MAY 1991 – FEBRUARY 1995.</td>
<td>Yes. UNAVEM II staff &amp; Troika staff involved as observers of CCPM &amp; CMVP activity. Helped verify cease-fire and with negotiations. UNAVEM II’s duration was weak/moderate.</td>
<td>Weak/Moderate1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola 2</td>
<td>SG rep in Angola and troika and a number of African countries including Cote d’Ivoire; Ethiopia; were involved in negotiations.</td>
<td>A joint commission of government &amp; UNITA reps presided over by the UN, &amp; troika. observers. Size &amp; mandate of UN increased.</td>
<td>Yes, and stronger than during the 1992-4 period. MODERATE 2</td>
<td>MODERATE 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Yes: Strong third party involvement in Negotiations – US, UN, NATO, OSCE &amp; EU states. Dayton negotiated and signed in the US. NATO air strikes played a role in the of negotiations.</td>
<td>Institutions of the two entities created by Dayton with the international community. International community responsible for developing strategies to deal with obstruction.</td>
<td>IFOR (&amp; then SFOR)’s primary responsibility was to ensure that the parties met their military and extra-military obligations. Strong role for other international bodies too.</td>
<td>STRONG3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The military presence of UNAVEM II was 350 military observers, 126 police monitors, some 80 international civilian staff and 155 local staff. (Up to 400 electoral observers). [www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/](http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/).


3 With Dayton, the international community was involved in implementation on all fronts. IFOR, a 60,000 strong multi-national force, followed in Dec. 96 by SFOR (31,000) was responsible for military provisions, with UNMIB (UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and IPTF (International Police Task Force) responsible for other aspects of implementation, and the OSCE and UNHCR also heavily involved. Cousins and Kumar, 2001:127. Jane’s Sentinel (Balkans), 2001: 111.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>3rd Party Involvement (Negotiations)</th>
<th>Main Body Responsible for Implementation</th>
<th>3rd Party Guarantee for implementation</th>
<th>Strength of Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Contact group of 5 included all 5 Security Council members.</td>
<td>UNTAC. PA saw parties agreeing to a UN transitional administration in consultation with A committee comprising all 4 parties. UNTAC responsible for governing &amp; implementing terms of agreement.</td>
<td>Yes – UNTAC in charge of implementation. DURATION: March 92-Sept 1993</td>
<td>STRONG(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Russian and Chechen governments. There were moves in 1997 to set up an Inter-governmental Commission to work on drafting more agreements to implement peace in 1997 but responsibility for implementation was largely the governments.</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong Hill Tracts</td>
<td>Not in the negotiations. But improved relations between Bangladesh &amp; India facilitated negotiations, encouraging Shanti Bahini rebels to take part.</td>
<td>An implementation Committee comprising a Prime Minister nominee, Chairman of task force formed under the purview of the PA &amp; President of National committee of Hill tribes. No 3rd party supervision or verification. UNDP has had some involvement, but only facilitating(^6).</td>
<td>No. The only 3rd party involvement is NGO or members of the donor community willing to support the implementation process.</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) Cousens and Kumar, 2000: 124-5.
\(^5\) All accounts would consider the commitment to be strong, and to have had possibly the strongest international support of any peace keeping mission. Hampson, 1996 and Wesley, 1999 both stress the strength of the mandate and presence. According to UN public information sources, there were 22,000 military & civilian personnel; IISS, 93/4 estimate 19,450 military and civilian police personnel. The preceding mission (UNAMIC) from November 1991 – March 1992, immediately followed the signing of the peace agreement and comprised 1,504 military & civilian personnel.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Party Involvement (Negotiations)</th>
<th>Main Body Responsible for Implementation</th>
<th>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Party Guarantee for implementation</th>
<th>Strength of Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>France was periodically involved In negotiations – helping to negotiate Cease-fire in 92 and promised a peace-Keeping force. Assisted the govt militarily when conflict continued.</td>
<td>Government and FRUD -</td>
<td>There is a permanent French 3,200 strong military presence in Djibouti. It is not a peace keeping force but has acted before to contain fighting. France, EU and African Development Bank provided funding for demobilisation &amp; social reintegration of some soldiers.</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Yes – United Nations SG rep in El Salvador = interlocutor in Negotiations.</td>
<td>COPAZ (body representing FMLN &amp; Govt) but overseen by ONUSAL. ONUSAL verified cease-fire &amp; demobilized forces. Mandate expanded to verifying &amp; monitoring. UNOSAL effectively drove the implementation process.</td>
<td>Yes, by virtue of the duration of its presence, its role in overseeing &amp; monitoring implementation of key provisions. Remained in place until April 95 &amp; was succeeded by MINUSAL, a small mission to monitor outstanding issues.</td>
<td>MODERATE&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>6</sup> See the text of the agreement signed by the National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts (Govt) & The Parbatty Chattagram Janasanghati Samity. See also Daily Star (Bangladesh), 24.06.98.


<sup>8</sup> ONUSAL had 380 military observers; 8 medical officers; and 631 police observers. Provision for 140 civilian international staff & 180 local staff. Notably, it began in July 1991 - prior to the final PA, indicating a considerable commitment. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/

<sup>9</sup> MINUGA were present in Guatemala since 1994 with over 250 monitors facilitating the implementation of agreements leading up to the 1996 General Agreement. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/

<sup>10</sup> In addition to MINUGA’s 250 observers, the peace-keeping force established (within MINUGA) by the 1996 agreement numbered 188 uniformed personnel, 145 military observers and 43 civilian police. The maximum military strength was 155 military personnel. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/.
| Location        | Context                                                                 | Strong                                                                 | Weak                                                                 |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|Adamant                                                                 | Agreement established as part of MINUGUA a military observer mission. |
| Israel/Palestine| US heavily involved & Russia Also witnessing Oslo Accord. Norway the key mediator in Oslo Process. Also other ME states at Madrid Process. | Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee to deal with issues in agreement requiring co-ordination/issues of common interest/disputes. Arbitration Commission established also. | Yes. Eg. International monitoring of elections Palestinian authority); Numerous Statements from US & UNSC supporting & process & guaranteeing their role as Neutral parties/mediators in the process. |
| Liberia         | ECOMOG monitoring group – Ecowas & Liberian Transitional Government with UN playing a supportive role. | Ecowas – Its strong role in implementation & provision of security guarantees was increased to enable it to guarantee the disarmament components of Abuja II. In terms of mandate numerical strength plus UN backup, a considerably strong guarantee for implementation. | Tripartite Arab Commission, but it legitimized Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Syria guarantees the Implementation with 40,000 troops present and it has stalled on withdrawal. |
| Lebanon         | Yes, negotiations were instigated by 3rd parties and depended on 3rd party co-operation. | Lebanese government of unity & de facto Syrian co-operation. | |

11 Established by Articles X and XV of the Oslo Agreement, 1993, respectively. Sees the implementation process in the hands of joint commissions, and negotiation within the commissions as the main method of conflict management.

12 ECOMOG’s strength was increased from 3,500 to 7,000 in September 1990. Adibe, 1997: 476 and it acted as a regional peace enforcement force for a series of failed agreements between 1991 and 1996. Its strength was increased to 12,000 to enable it to fulfill its mandate to implement the provisions of Abuja II. See Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 1999: 339. UNOMIL was to monitor and verify compliance with Abuja ceasefire and embargo on arms, cantonment and disarmament of combatants in conjunction with ECOMOG was intended as a neutralizing presence. Its maximum strength was 303 military officers, with a medical unit of 20 and 25 civilian stag.

www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/
Mali

Algerian mediators involved in early (1991) negotiations for the Natl. Pact (92). Meetings to break deadlock in 1994 also held in Algeria. OIC

Transitional Government & newly created Commisariat for the North shared responsibility with a Steering Committee coordinated by NCA and the UNDP. UNDP and NCA playing a significant third party role. UN appointed a resident coordinator and UN support for demobilization was considerable.

Mozambique

Yes. Agreement was negotiated with the help of a number of mediators and observers including UN representatives. NSF (Supervisory & Monitoring Committee) to guarantee implementation. Comprised govt. & RENAMO reps set up with guidance of Interim UN Sec Gen rep. UN chaired CSC.

ONUMOZ set up by SC to monitor & verify c-fire and demobilisation; provide security; Also Humanitarian mandate for demobilisation;

DURATION:92 - 94

Namibia

UN, Western Contact Group and The US were involved in negotiations. Over at least a decade.

UNSR (Special Representative), UNTAG, Joint Commission for Implementation and The Administrator General (Governor).

Yes. UNTAC was responsible for monitoring S.African Defense Force withdrawing and Those remaining in Namibia; Monitoring restriction of SWAPO forces to bases; Disarming and de-mobilising forces; Monitoring police force during Transition; organizing and monitoring elections;

13 Following the 1994/5 re-negotiation and new agreement on the implementation process, the Commissioner du Nord retained responsibility for implementation but chose to negotiate with and give responsibility for part of the process to UNDP and NCA (Norwegian Church Aid).

14 The UN support for demobilization has been described as crucial at a time when no donor organizations or governments were ready to provide it. The UN paid almost half of the cost of cantonment (US $ 2 million) through the creation of a trust fund. European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation: Mali: 3-4.

15 ONUMOZ’s mandate involved a military, humanitarian and political (electoral) role in the implementation of the agreement. UN personnel were there as monitors and verifiers and coordinators of the overall implementation process (chair of CSC), along with its relatively strong military presence ensured that a strong credible commitment to implementation was given. (ONUMOZ constituted 6,625 troops and military support personnel, 354 military observers; 1,144 civilian police. It also involved some 355 international electoral staff and 506 local, with 900 electoral observers deployed also during polling. UNOMOZ had an authorized strength of between 7 and 8,000 military and civilian personnel. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Implementation Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Arias Peace plan (Esquipulas II)</td>
<td>Sapo Agreement (March 88) implementation - impetus provided by Central American states (89). Onwards ~ To monitor cease-fire &amp; separation of forces agreed to by Nicaraguan parties. Onwards - To monitor cease-fire &amp; separation of forces agreed to by Nicaraguan parties. ONUCA involved from Tela Agreement MODERATE17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paved the way for peace negotiations. Driven by Central American heads of State.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>France and Algeria - official mediators.</td>
<td>Special Peace Committee: to oversee implementation. Composed of members of the three mediating countries, the govt. and Toureg groups18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In '92. French withdrew from negotiations for a time in 1993. The 1995 Accord was reached with Algeria, Burkino Faso and France as mediators.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>US Executive and individuals facilitated negotiations eg. By holding separately exploratory meetings during the years preceding and following the agreement.</td>
<td>The British and Irish Governments along with the NI parties to the agreement through the governing institutions set up in the PA. A number of independent commissions responsible for setting agendas on security and justice system reform issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To the extent that the British and Irish Govts. are still perceived as part of the conflict, they do not offer a 'security guarantee'. Very strong US diplomatic and economic commitment &amp; independent commissions offer commitments of a sort. EU financial commitment also significant.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

16 UNTAC comprised military, civilian police and electoral units. Authorized upper limit was 7,500 personnel. Actual size was 4,650 personnel. Hampson: 70.
17 Moderate as the opposition (UNO - government by 1990) was aware that if the FSLN refused to deliver on commitments, the US would continue to support (as it did during 1989) the contras, thus enabling them to continue the military campaign. The UN was an acceptable guarantor or verifier, but one could argue that a guarantee from the US for the non-Sandinista parties, existed. For Sandinistas, compliance with agreements meant that the contras should no longer be perceived as legitimate or supported militarily. In terms of size, ONUCA included 260 military observers, and an infantry battalion of approx. 800; crews and support personnel for air wing and naval unit and international and locally recruited civilian staff. See Walter, 1997: 350.
18 Camel Express, 22 April 1995.
Philippinnes
Organisation for the Islamic Conference, Indonesia and Lybia played important roles in the negotiations.

Joint monitoring committee with Philippine Govt & MNLF reps, with OIC help, monitor implementation. Actual responsibility for implementation - Govt and MNLF (as part of governing body of the Zone of Peace & Security.

A role for OIC was provided for: To lend support during the transition period, by overseeing implementation and supporting the Zone of Peace & Security. In July 2000 an OIC Monitoring team was asked to report on implementation.20

Sierra Leone
Yes. Numerous African states involved in negotiations: Most significantly Ivory Coast, OAU & UN representatives.

Commission for Consolidation of Peace Created by the PA & monitored by a neutral group from the international community. Sub Commission to monitor security clauses.

Before signing, US announced commitment to fund OAU to monitor disarmament and the UK announced funding to resettle RUF fighters. ECOMOG was present - and perceived as guarantor by govt. RUF leader Refused to allow UN peacekeepers & monitors; but the offer of a guarantee was there22.

Sierre Leone
Yes. Numerous states incl. Tongo Lybia, OAU, UN rep (Okelo), ECOWAS, UK & Commonwealth representatives.

Joint Implementation Commission, chaired by ECOWAS in charge of reviewing implementation. Commission for Consolidation in charge of monitoring all implementation

Both sides requested strong role for UNOMSIL granted in October 1999 & ECOMOG phased out. Strong mandate to monitor compliance with cease-fire, to assist govt. with disarmament, demobilisation

20 Information from Keesings Record of World Events, the Minority Project, Accord publications. Also Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1.07.2000.
21 Despite there being a considerable ECOMOG presence in 1996 ECOMOG was not given a mandate to implement the peace agreement. In fact the agreement actually called for the withdrawal of all regional forces within 3 months (although full withdrawal did not take place). Accord: 'The First Stages on the Road to Peace': 8-10. While ECOMOG continued to play a significant (if partisan) role in keeping order in the country, it was only in October 1997 that ECOWAS authorized ECOMOG to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement as well to ensure the re-installing of the President who had been ousted by the Junta/RUF’s May 1997 coup. Additional ECOMOG troops were moved in to fulfill this task. JIR, 04.2000: 40. UN Secretary General had recommended that the Security Council agree to send a peace keeping force to monitor implementation, but this recommendation was not acted on, partly the result of RUF objections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Involvement</th>
<th>Peace Agreement Details</th>
<th>Implementation Efforts</th>
<th>International Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Involved ANC and South African Govt. With strong diplomatic &amp; economic pressure from the International community, support for elections.</td>
<td>National Peace Accord established a number of representative bodies to monitor implementation: Natl. Peace Committee, National Peace Secretariat; Dispute Resolution Committees (nationwide); Police Board; CODESA coordinated further negotiations.</td>
<td>Weak guarantees in the form of diplomatic support from the UNSC, the US, Europe and Russia/USSR. No security presence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Negotiations involved India and the Sri Lankan governments.</td>
<td>Sri Lankan Govt. in co-operation with an Indian Peace Keeping force.</td>
<td>The Indian Peace-keeping force was to maintain a cease-fire between Sri Lankan Forces and all Tamil insurgent groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>UNMOT (estbd Dec 94),</td>
<td>CNR – Commission for National Recon-</td>
<td>UNMOT, OSCE and the Contact Group have</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 While RUF leader Sankoh has since been involved in fighting with the UN force & disputed its mandate & right to be there, thus repudiating its guarantee, he initially accepted it as neutral & the offer of a strong guarantee on implementation did exist.  
24 UNAMSIL replace UNOMSIL’s military observer mission, put in place in June 1998 following the Feb reinstatement of the civilian government; It has a significant authorized military presence of 13,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers & 60 civilian police; it is at 12,477 on 31 August 2000.  
25 While the role of the international community was highly significant in pressurizing the South African government and the white South African community to compromise (see Guelke, 1999: 135-158) no credible commitment similar to that outlined by Walter was present during the implementation process.  
27 The Convention for a Democratic South Africa involved the government/ANC/ IFP and 16 other political groupings. It was set up to drive the implementation of the National Peace Accord of 1991, which outlined very broad principles for a settlement. Guelke, 1999: 99. A Record of Understanding between the government and the ANC was signed in September 1992 and another body – the Transitional Executive Authority – was set up in September 1993.  
28 IPKF (Indian Peace-Keepping Force), originally 3,000 strong in August 1987, had ballooned to over 100,000 by 1990 (withdrawal). Hancock L.E., 1999: 98. That the IPKF peace keeping force became a party to the conflict and was involved in an intense war with LTTE between 1987 and 1990 is important, but it does not take away from the initial offer of a credible commitment. On its arrival IPKF was welcomed as ‘a liberator’ by most Tamil people (Hancock, 97) and initially perceived to be a force capable of providing guarantees.  
29 The UNMOT peace-keeping force had an authorized number of 120 military observers with varying numbers of civilian and local staff and a civilian staff for the Secretary General’s permanent representative for Tajikistan. The security guarantee would be considered weak but for the presence of a 25,000 strong CIS (largely Russian) peace-keeping force (by 1999 all but Russian troops had left this force) which helped to implement the peace agreement. Transitions On Line, 1998: Tajikistan.
Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan and Krygstan formed contact group to drive negotiations. 

Mediation: Membership split evenly between government and UTO. With support from international community.

UNMOT peacekeeping force helped to monitor and implement security clauses, along with a large CIS peacekeeping force.

Morocco/West Sahara

UN Sponsored Peace Plan.

Significant Algerian co-operation

A necessary component of process.

UN Special Rep with help of MINURSO has sole & exclusive responsibility for implementing key provisions & all matters relating to the Referendum. MINURSO also verifies ceasefire and continued cessation of hostilities.

Transitional phases whereby UN exercises MOD.

The power to implement referendum remains on hold because of non-co-operation by parties (esp. the Moroccan govt.) in preparation for this process. Role has been that of monitoring cease-fire and attempting to generate a voting register satisfactory to all parties.

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30 Because of its duration and its extensive mandate to implement this peace plan, this commitment could be coded as strong. In terms of resources and military presence, and the appointment of James Baker to the position of SG’s special rep in the mid 1990s certainly indicates commitment and resolve. In terms of presence, MINURSO was authorized to have up to 2,800 military and civilian personnel (Independent, 8.08.91). The mission has, as of 31 July 2000, 204 military observers, 27 troops, 34 civilian police, supported by 275 international civilian personnel and 112 local staff. In terms of authorized size of implementation force the commitment is moderate-strong.
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Caribbean and Central American Report, Latin American Regional Reports.
El Diario/La Prensa (Spanish language newspaper published in New York)
ECA: Estudios Centro Americano (San Salvador)
FT: The Financial Times
The Guardian
IHTribune: The International Herald Tribune
IT: The Irish Times
Ir. Ind: Irish Independent
Ind: Independent (London)
JIR: Jane’s Intelligence Review
Latin American Newsline
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Miami Herald
Radio Telifis Eireann, RTÉ, 2FM
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ST: Sunday Tribune

(IV) Socio-Economic Data Sources (Appendix B)


(V) Data Bases / Regular Reports/ Area and Country Reports (Appendices A and B)
Accord Series (An International Review of Peace Initiatives) www.c-r.org/accord


Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project


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