A Comparative Test of Inglehart’s Theory of Postmaterialism.

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own composition and has not been accepted in a previous application for a degree. The academic sources of all work other than my own have been specifically acknowledged.

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This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Maud and Dave.
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A Comparative Test of Inglehart’s Theory of Postmaterialism.

Abstract

Ronald Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism contends that since the late nineteen sixties, a new type of politics is progressively taking over from the ‘old politics’ system. Inglehart’s case is built on steady changes in the postmaterialist index (PMI), where changes in public values are regularly assessed. Whereas ‘old politics’ consisted of debates over the place and scale of redistribution and pitted class-based parties of left and right against each other, the new politics pivots on lifestyle issues, which do not fit clearly into the left and right camps. This thesis looks at the political implications of this detected value change, gathering new and existing criticisms of Inglehart’s model, and empirically tests his claims by means of a small-n case study with France and Ireland as comparators. We test four hypotheses derived from his works: (i) that class is less predictive of vote choice; (ii) that voter discontent has been increasing; (iii) that new parties have prospered in response to the new priorities, and (iv) that there has been a rise in unconventional political activity. We find that there is at best, only partial support for Inglehart’s model, and conclude by outlining what this test of posmaterialism tells us about the link between political values and political change.
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large and varied implications for the nature of politics (see, *inter alia*, his 1996 article, *Democracy and its Citizens: Patterns of Political Change*¹, and his 1999 chapter, *Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*). Inglehart has collaborated with Dalton and his early work, including his PhD, drew heavily on ideas prevalent in Deutsch's work. The work of Deutsch and Dalton may be viewed as variations on the postmaterialist theme, while other scholars, notably Crepaz (1990) and Castles (2000), offer testable hypotheses that draw on the concept of PM. In this thesis, however, we test hypotheses drawn solely from Inglehart's research, as his work embodies PM and forms the most continuous argument over a protracted period of time.

This thesis tests the claims made by PM by performing a comparative mid-level analysis of Inglehart's theory of new politics. In Blondel's view (1995), a mid-level approach is a nation-specific setting whereby one assesses the goodness of fit between a grand level theory and its manifestation in an actual nation-state or states. This thesis intends to evaluate the theory's claims that any and all affluent states should exhibit postmaterialist politics in applying Inglehart's model to two such states, Ireland and France. The timeframe is 1968 to 2002. The choice of starting point is simple - Inglehart's own ideas were heavily influenced by the May riots of 1968 in Paris and the general sense of upheaval across the western world at that time. If one closes the timeframe at 1997, then only one cohort has been born and fully socialised (taking cohort birth dates as 1950, 1960 and 1970) since the beginning of the period examined. The year 2002 provides a good end point, as there were first-order elections in both states.

¹ www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/dalton.htm
Inglehart has written extensively on how the existence of the welfare state, the rise in education levels across the population, and the altered nature of work combine to yield a new type of electorate. In cases where there has been a reasonably prolonged dealignment, there then arises a series of political movements aiming to capitalise on the disaffected. This leads to the diminishing importance of the economy in first-order electoral politics and its gradual replacement by: ‘environmentalism, the women's movement, unilateral disarmament, opposition to nuclear power’ (Inglehart, 1984: 28).

The rationale for testing PM in this way is twofold - it is novel and it offers a more authoritative evaluation of the theory than those studies that have been previously carried out. Quite simply, there is a lack of similar work in the field. The thesis offers a theoretical and empirical critique of Inglehart’s argument, which, to this author’s knowledge, has not been done on a small-n comparative basis beforehand. Previous studies that have been concerned with large-n, for example, Castles (op. cit.) and Crepaz (op. cit.), have taken one aspect of PM – the relative importance of economic versus non-economic issue voting in the former, and the impact of PM on turnout in the latter - and thus offer only a partial test. A recent study by Todosijevic and Enyedi (2003) advances on these by looking at how new politics manifest itself in a large-n sample: its drawback is that it juxtaposes one overarching concept (PM) with another (corporatism). This thesis focuses on PM by itself. Todosijevic and Enyedi’s article is a valuable one because in addition to the empirical testing of parts of Inglehart’s theory, they go on to describe it as a social-psychological theory (op. cit. 631), thus allowing one to gain a theoretical insight as well.
It would be of marginal interest to the political scientist if value change was all that was involved – what is of significance is the political consequences of such value and attitudinal shift. Inglehart uses survey data to build his case for political change; we test to see how good a fit actually obtains.

As for small-n studies, aspects of new politics have indeed been looked at on a comparative small-n basis, with Ireland and France as the cases. For example, Regan and Wilson (1986) looked at the phenomenon of interest groups and corporatism in both states, while Royall (2000) examined NSM-type protest politics in the case of the collective actions of groups representing the unemployed. These are useful, but they only address one aspect of Inglehart's work and were not expressly designed to test PM.

Direct tests of PM on a small-n basis are few in number. Charnock and Ellis (2004) apply Inglehart's four-item measure of PM to graph the value base of the manifesto of the One Nation Party in Australia. Apart from the fact that their study is evidently not comparative, their focus is on party values, which I feel is too distal from Inglehart's work. The same lack of a comparative basis is found in Curry and O'Connell (2000) attempt to test how the theory can be used to explain the value profile of a Northern Irish sample. They bring a substantial amount of psychological knowledge to bear on the profiles of voters as distinct from parties. This thesis incorporates a thorough assessment of how competently Inglehart's use of psychology is, but stays within the discipline of political science in looking at the political consequences of putative value change.
1.1: Thesis structure

The rest of this chapter is taken up with Historiography. This is essential, as Inglehart has written consistently and extensively on PM. Chapter Two covers Criticisms both established and new. We present the Methodology, including a justification of the sample size and additional points about how the approach chosen hopes to test the theory, in Chapter Three. As his theory subtly and inevitably undergoes slight modifications over the years, it is good practice to use the four hypotheses derived from Inglehart and Abramson (1994) list given in the Introduction. Each hypothesis is fully fleshed out by its thorough grounding in a ‘Main Claims’ section and this is done for all four of the empirical chapters (Four to Seven) and then alternative understandings of the phenomena are detailed to ascertain how well Inglehart’s broad approach factors in existing accounts of the phenomena he discusses and claims to explain. These chapters follow the process tracing (Przeworski, 1987) structure, whereby as full an account as possible of within-comparator description is provided to test if the theory is applicable in all areas, or only some.

Chapter Four examines if the there has been a progressive decline in class voting. Chapter Five discusses whether the indicators of system dissatisfaction amount to a dealignment as defined by Inglehart. In many of his writings, Inglehart points to falling turnout and survey data that point to a disaffection with parliamentary politics and a weakening of party loyalty, respectively. A more authoritative view on the merits of this is presented on the basis of the above plus supplementary evidence in the form of three observable implications: (i) trends in electoral volatility, (ii) spoiled ballots and (iii) party membership figures. Chapter Six tries to find if there is a correspondence between the perceived voter demands
and the system responses to these in the form of 'new politics' parties and their impact on politics in both states. In Chapter Seven, we test Inglehart's claim that there has been a secular increase in extraparliamentary activity as people drift away from the established political channels. The Conclusion aims to distil the findings and demonstrate that a mid-level approach is much more parsimonious than a grand theory (Blondel, 1995) such as Inglehart's, in accounting for how the above indicators may be tracked and understood.

1.2: Historiography

Ronald Inglehart's work on values and their effect on political cognition and behaviour has been ongoing for over 35 years. In the following synopsis of his major writings, no attempt is made to be all-inclusive: only the works deemed more relevant to this thesis are the subject of comment. As of 2003, Inglehart's own website\(^2\) details 140 articles and eleven books, of which six are co-authored works and two edited. Although Inglehart's corpus is not seamless, it is cogent and thus demands description. Core concepts and terminology recur throughout. Where Inglehart collates his own pre-existing ideas and data, the reader will be shown from where the insight arose. This is essential, as Inglehart's books often recapitulate an earlier exposition. The reader should therefore not be surprised if the books' summaries are not more extensive than that for journal articles or chapters. The books are an interesting case: there is nothing novel in them that has not already been presented beforehand; instead one has lengthened examples coupled with larger, more diverse data sets, but still a restatement of a hypothesis he has already aired in a journal.
This chapter thematically divides Inglehart's oeuvre into three parts. These are: (1) *The European Project and intergenerational value differences*, (2) *Postmaterialism and its political effects*, and (3) *Culture-specific political forms*. These three themes are accompanied by a corresponding chronological shift. Broadly speaking, Part One covers the first five years of his career (1967-71/2) and is concerned in the main with the derivations of his doctoral research on country-level surveys regarding the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). Part Two figures prominently from 1971/2 to the mid-1990s. Here, Inglehart introduces the postmaterialist index (PMI), his classic four-item instrument for classifying respondents' values. Much of his work here looks at how these values map on to the political preferences of citizens in Europe and America. Part Three goes up to the present day, with Inglehart's most recent work marking an explicit linking up of Parts Two and Three. This period is marked by Inglehart's attempt to delineate culture-specific value systems and their accompanying political perspectives. It continues with the survey method, but is added to by incorporating more questions than the PMI and includes a large number of non-European countries. There is inevitably some chronological overlap between the discrete strands of his work - this results from Inglehart's inclination to take up earlier developed themes. It is hoped that the reader will note the contiguity of ideas in much of Inglehart's research. Within each theme, the work is presented in order of year of publication.

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2 http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/ringlehart/
1.2.1: The European Project and intergenerational value differences

Inglehart’s academic career commenced with his unpublished PhD obtained from the University of Chicago in 1967. Entitled The Socialization of ‘Europeans’, it was the culmination of his investigation into factors promoting the support for European integration (1967b: 91, footnote 3). Drawing on ideas first proposed in Karl Deutsch’s The Nerves of Government (1963), Inglehart probed how the strength of the ability of individual citizens to process information allows one to infer the probability that they will form communities or could be brought together to form new ones. One could assess the minimum ‘cultural compatibility’ which would allow new federations to be formed (op. cit. 177).

The dissertation’s heart was an analysis of a four-nation (France, W. Germany, Holland and the UK) secondary schools’ sample and their attitudes towards specified measures on the road to a politically constituted Europe. Questions in his survey centred on (1) the abolition of tariffs, (2) the free movement of labour and business, (3) a common foreign policy and (4) subsidisation transfers. The material was collected in the period 1964-5 and a comparison made with an existing database of adults’ responses from 1962-3. Age-based variation was marked. In finding that the younger cohort presented as decidedly more ‘European’, Inglehart deduced that this non-nationalistic aspect was probably attributable to two factors:

(1) The absence of antagonistic war memories and

(2) The experience of living through a period where a common European project was underway (op. cit. 4).
These ingredients were responsible for a qualitatively different socialisation matrix for the school sample. The linkage between their embrace of the four policies and the sample's age was in contrast to the older groups' pronounced hesitancy regarding the means and the end of the EEC.

In moving to the University of Michigan and publishing a paper based on his thesis, Inglehart established a continuing pattern. He would consistently write on the interface between values, opinions and the political implications thereof; periodically gather his ideas and reprocess them in book form, then set off on a related but new strand.

His 1967 paper drew on the same school sample as that for his PhD and intended to give a negative answer to the eponymous question, *An End to European Integration?* It covers the same ground as his PhD, but is worth summarising for three reasons. Firstly, it includes an emphasis on the psychological mechanisms underlying the development of values and preferences. Inglehart refers to Donald Hebb (1967b: 95), a neuropsychologist, and his comments that large-scale conceptual reorganisation is theoretically more difficult as one ages. The enthusiasm of young Europeans, by Inglehart's extrapolation, is resistant to tempering. In much the same way, Europeans socialised in the Depression and the Second World War are much less 'flexible' in their outlook.

A second valuable addition found in this paper is that of the *period effect* - the first published reference to short-term opinion fluctuations in response to an event is to be found in the 1967 article. Firstly, phenomena that seem conducive to a burgeoning European sentiment include the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Suez Canal incident, both in 1956. In the case of the former, the threat of a monolithic Eastern enemy is very much palpable, whilst for the latter, the Egyptian operation
had both British and French involvement. In both, the idea of a single nation-state as a powerful actor loses viability in the eyes of the public. Joint European action gains in stature (notwithstanding the Suez dénouement). The negative period effect was the elite-level disagreement on further EEC membership enlargement (exemplified by de Gaulle’s veto of British entry in 1962; op. cit. 98) and the deepening of political powers delegated by the member states to Europe. Inglehart takes pains to illustrate that citizens interpret and store memories of such events which serve to modulate optimism or pessimism for a large political project; as may be seen in the earlier reference to Hebb, Inglehart’s interest in psychology is never far from the surface of his thinking. Another example of a tentative political psychology is to be found concerning the drop in the numbers ‘for Europe’ and the lack of a corresponding rise in the ‘against’ column. Respondents abstain and in doing so ‘[avoid] the psychic “pain” of acknowledging that they were for what appeared to be a losing cause’ (op. cit. 100). The de Gaulle decision had eroded support levels, but not boosted the profile of those against integration generally. Thirdly, Inglehart suggests that Deutsch’s conclusions are shaky precisely because he focuses on the elite’s attitudes, which are inevitably constrained by the socialisation history of this group, and not enough on the mass public’s thoughts. This predilection on Inglehart’s part for large-scale survey research remains the main component of his methodology for the duration of his career.

In 1970, we note three journal articles from Inglehart, with two being relevant to this thesis. *The New Europeans, Inward or Outward Looking?* continues his emphasis on intergenerational value differences. Again drawing on information gathered for his doctorate, Inglehart presents a picture of a young generation more in favour of the European endeavour and as a result, less nationalistic. Taking France,
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK as his sample of nations, he finds that age differences are at their lowest in the Dutch case. The socialisation argument is invoked, but this time it incorporates a longer view. According to Inglehart, the Netherlands has been more international in identity since the end of the Napoleonic Wars and this supranational factor was boosted by the location of the then World Court in The Hague. In not being involved in World War One, the Dutch further deviate from the pattern for the other states. In their case, Europeanisation increases as the population gets younger; this is true for Holland, but to a less marked extent.

In conjunction with this greater European sentiment, reduced nationalism is also an aid to cross-Atlantic co-operation. French, German and British youth were strongly in favour of the above, whilst a follow-on question relating to the desirability of world government produced weaker support but nothing approaching ringing rejection.

One tangential dimension to this paper is its interest in the concept of Authoritarianism. Older cohorts may be described as more authoritarian (and thus less likely to accept a departure from entrenched rules) but cross-national consistency was lacking. Internationalism tapped a libertarian factor, one assumed to be orthogonal to Authoritarianism. Inglehart sketches in an explanation. The more authoritarian citizen will have a heightened sense of physical threat and so is certain to rely on the nation-state to fulfil its long-established protective function. Conversely, the more libertarian (and necessarily younger) individual sees nothing intrinsically dangerous in a potential partial loss of sovereignty. In annotations, Inglehart addresses the question as to whether older citizens, generally having grown up poorer, are more authoritarian because of this lack of felt security, or whether it is simply a case of changing parental styles. This is something of huge significance to
the idea of the Authoritarian Personality as outlined by the Adorno/Berkeley School. Inglehart devotes some time to an account of this idea’s formation. The Adorno School picked out early-socialised authoritarianism (a function of rigid parenting) as a key variable in explaining the political psychology of the Nazi Youth. Also in 1970, the first *Eurobarometer* survey was undertaken. Its cross-sectional and cross-national range was to prove of immense utility to Inglehart’s concept formation. A more theoretical paper from this year, one less dependent on survey data, was *Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity* (1970b). This article is very much expository and sets out to link up increased education, consumer prosperity and the communications revolution in order to explain a new altered socialisation of political identity. Although we cannot cite Habermas’s concept of the public sphere (it post-dates Inglehart’s paper), the increases in urbanisation and amount of information serve to lessen the number of ‘parochials’ (op. cit. 45). The Europeans affected are more likely to have an opinion on non-local and even non-national events, and furthermore, would seem to be better disposed to pan-European integrating measures. Working from a large Reader’s Digest database from 1963, he extended the sample in 1968 to individual nation polling. Again, intergenerational variation explains the extent of cognitive mobilisation (for example - years of education) and its impact on political identity. Data include television and radio ownership figures and exposure to print media. A shift in the construction of political identity is underway and will have progressively greater influence on those socialised after the Second World War. An additive factor is stressed, in that future cohorts will be even more cognitively mobilised.
1.2.1: Summary of Inglehart's first period

This early period of Inglehart's work is marked by three things: the emphasis on comparativism; the use of the survey as the sole method; and its referral to a tentative explanation of political processes by means of a psychological perspective. He extends his doctoral work on attitudes towards European integration and attempts to link political attitudes with their underlying values. He delves into historical context when he deems it appropriate, including both the Second World War and the Napoleonic Wars as exerting an effect on contemporary European politics.

1.2.2: Postmaterialism and its political effects

The second period of Inglehart's work is distinctive in three ways. Firstly, Inglehart does some case study work in his books and articles, giving a greater degree of detail in particular on contemporary politics in France, the US and Germany. This approach differs from his first period, which relied on historical context in order to explain the survey results. Secondly, he builds on the PMI, turning it into an instrument synonymous with this work. Extrapolating from the survey findings, he affirms that the trends picked up on here are the reasons for the political changes he describes. The nature of political change is a prime subject for Inglehart in this second period. Whereas he had previously focused on what we can predict from surveys about the likelihood of the acceptance of European integration, in this second phase he devotes considerable resources to explaining the reasons behind what he terms the new politics of protest. Thirdly, he often recapitulates his work, turning his main books (1977 and 1990) of this period into extended summaries of his earlier findings. The extent of this reworking is such that many of the articles are
interchangeable in content if not in phraseology; this applies to his co-authored work and publications where he is the sole author.

In 1970, Inglehart published a joint article for the first time with Paul Abramson, marking the beginning of a durable collaboration. They had met at a conference on political socialisation held in the University of Michigan in 1967. Recognising that they shared similar points of view, they joined forces to produce a paper based on the first Eurobarometer surveys of 1970.3

In 1971, Inglehart published findings based in part on the French Election Study of 1968. The paper, written in French, was titled Révolutionnarisme Post-Bourgeois en France, en Allemagne et aux Etats-Unis. It was the French material that formed the thrust of the article. May 1968 had been the crystallisation of mounting campus tension across much of Western Europe and America. As a result, the corresponding French Election Study dealt extensively with the rebellion and strikes. Two hundred variables in total were used for the study, and included (among others) items assessing de Gaulle’s performance and political party preference.

Contained within the article is the assertion that the nature of political engagement had begun to change drastically: the potential for class conflict was diminishing and the impetus for political upheaval was now seemingly sourced in the well-educated youth born after World War Two. ‘Post-bourgeois’ implies that the demands of the ‘revolutionaries’ were not property-based, but instead were more amorphous quality of life issues. Discontentment with the economic health of the system was not fomenting unrest: the west had undergone massive and sustained rises in numbers at work and job opportunities for graduates were plentiful. Although the French workers went on strike, the initial acts were student-instigated

3 Abramson and Inglehart, 1995.

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and Inglehart uses the study results to show that heavy-handed policing roused the workers' ire. What was significant was the simultaneity of the protests across the western world and that those who had apparently benefited most from the Golden Age of capitalism (in terms of education, welfare and health provision, and employment prospects) were the agitators for change. Inglehart furnishes the reader with the rudiments of his later grande idée: that the motivations behind revolts and extraparliamentary action were less and less economic and more and more 'radical' or 'expressive'. The latter reasons were more likely to be cited by younger, better-educated citizens who had grown up in a middle-class environment. For the three states covered in the article, it was not labour that they had cause to fear, but the offspring of the respectable bourgeoisie. Logically, in the post-war period where material gains had been near universal, the drive for altering the status quo ante would not emanate from those who had seen their standard of living rise. The older cohorts had undergone varying degrees of privation (most severely in Germany, least so in America) and would be reasonably content with their lot. The new list of demands related to pacifism, nuclear disarmament, environmental protection and a greater say in daily decision-making, whether at work or in politics.

Inglehart's seminal article, The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies (1971) is in many ways a microcosm of his entire career, containing the essence of his major books and should be seen as emblematic of his arguments, methodology and conclusions. His first statement on the functional dependency of political priorities on economic security appeared here, and he continues in the same vein by referring back to 'postbourgeois' values (op. cit. 991). It is also an instructive paper in that we see the first

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4 His most widely known volume (1977) is named after this paper.
explicit reference to Abraham Maslow, the psychologist whose theory of personality
Inglehart generalises to a political sphere. Inglehart's examples of this model's
applications are simple: if a man is lost in a desert, he will first crave water; if a
water supply is available, he will soon be preoccupied with sating his hunger (ibid).
Those generations who have grown up with war and economic hardship would
accord a high priority to economic security and what Maslow terms the 'safety
needs'. A greater emphasis on post-bourgeois or 'non-acquisitive' values would have
its first societal manifestation in the upper middle classes.

As a political illustration of this, Inglehart makes a connection with his other
1971 article on post-bourgeois revolutionary ideation. Stressing that such a
phenomenon was largely the result of middle-class disaffection with disparate
policies, Inglehart tries to contextualise the May 1968 revolt in France as the
exemplar of this new impetus. Previously, political rumblings had emanated from
the lower classes. This would no longer be the norm. Inglehart then looks at how
post-bourgeois political preoccupations present themselves. Firstly, they could be
described as anything that the (comparatively) recently embourgeoisified working
class would endorse. In order to operationalise this test, Inglehart drew up a now
famous four-item measure (op. cit. 994). Respondents are required to pick their top
two most important priorities from this quartet. They may then be classified into
value pair types. Two of these are noteworthy: acquisitive and post-bourgeois.
Acquisitiveness is thus defined as an overriding interest in stable prices and a strong
criminal justice system. Although Inglehart's terminology changes in 1977 (to
materialist and postmaterialist), the phrasing and the content of the measurement
stayed the same and do so to the present day.
Inglehart's sample was that of the first Eurobarometer: Holland, Belgium, Italy, France, Germany and Britain. Recapitulating much of his earlier work, notably his other main 1971 piece (three years in preparation), Inglehart expects to see that cohorts socialised after World War Two are more likely to be classified as post-bourgeois. The differences in percentage terms in the oldest and youngest cohorts on post-bourgeois values are given as follows in Table 1.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1.1: Cohort differences and post-bourgeois value type classification. After Inglehart, 1971b: 1000.*

A second hypothesis is that one would find a greater proportion of people with post-bourgeois leanings in the mainland European countries. Inglehart's argument hinges on Britain's low ranking in numbers of postmaterialists. He writes that Britain's outlying position is partly due to its great wealth prior to the recession of the 1930s and World War Two, and its slower rate of economic growth after 1945:
To put it briefly, high absolute levels of wealth in a given nation at a given time would predict relatively high proportions of post-bourgeois respondents among the cohorts socialised under these conditions; high rates of growth for a given country would predict relatively large increases in the proportion of post-bourgeois respondents, across that nation's age-groups.

(ibid. 998-9)

Consequently, older British generations would not have as great a disparity in relative wealth terms than younger Britons. Germany would be a clear counterpoint - the older generations would have experienced the lacerating privations of Weimar Germany and then the devastation of 1944-5, while the younger cohort would have grown up in the affluence of the Wirtschaftswunder (ibid. 1006). The table above bears this hypothesis out, where it is shown that the gap is smallest in Britain.

An insightful remark on page 1000 highlights the primacy of early socialisation: 'Even among the 25-34 year old cohort, there is still a heavy plurality of acquisitive types over post-bourgeois types'. This is due to the fact that a large proportion of this group will have spent their first years in a wartime or (immediately afterwards) devastated nation. Inglehart points to the swift reversal for the youngest cohort, undeniably post-bourgeois in their value structure. This evidence allows Inglehart to attribute this to a generational cause rather than a life cycle one; people do become more acquisitive as they age, but not to the extent that such sizeable gaps between cohorts would exist. One pithy example of the contribution played by socio-economics to this 'new values' direction is where Inglehart writes: 'A working class Frenchman 20 years old corresponds to a Frenchman in his 50s' (ibid. 1002).
Throughout the article, Inglehart underlines the socio-economic aspect - citizens from wealthier backgrounds will be less acquisitive than those from poorer environments - and the generational element - younger people are invariably less acquisitive than their elders, if class is held constant (ibid. 1005). Interesting pen pictures of the political ramifications of value change pepper the article:

1. Time series data on Germans' priorities with respect to differing conceptions of freedom had been collected at five stages from 1949 to 1963. At the start, 'Freedom from Want' was cited as of greatest personal importance, outranking the others of Speech, Fear and Worship. Its margin over the second most valuable freedom was nine per cent. By 1963, the percentage opting for 'Freedom from Want' fell to fifteen per cent, whilst 'Freedom of Speech' rocketed to fifty-eight per cent and thus first choice.

The Wirtschaftwunder is deemed by Inglehart as a rare instance of such telescoped change, both in economic conditions and the values stemming from these.

2. Political partisanship. Much of the paper's worth is located here. If one had to summarise Inglehart, the above would be the closest possible approximation. In his view, the coming electoral struggle would see post-bourgeois voters moving en bloc to 'parties of movement' as against 'parties of order'. This is a point of departure in party family typology. The former is essentially the kind of party responsive to new values and what they may imply, and is less
interested in appealing to a law and order or redistributive constituency. This is a 'new left' idea, as change is typically an emanation of the left. Inglehart refers to the Dutch party, Demokraten 66, the Italian PSIUP and the French PSU. The impulse to conserve may well become stronger in the face of such considerable shifts; regionalism and ethnocentrism are reasonably certain of a boost, as the electorates attracted by these programmes feel disenfranchised by the supranational thrust of politics, a thrust that also effaces the class cleavage reference point. As this line of demarcation gradually becomes less defined and defining, Inglehart argues that separatism and tribalism gain in momentum. The Belgian data show that there is a four-to-one ratio of post-bourgeois types who support their own linguistic community's party, whether Flemish or Francophone. The new cleavage in Belgium would seem to have a prominent place for separatist representation (ibid. 1011). Inglehart does not delve into the complexities of Belgian affairs but instead contends that ethnocentrism is a predictable by-product of increased affluence. Separatists are motivated by an ethnic belongingness and this incentive: "According to Maslow...comes next on the individual-level hierarchy, after needs related to sustenance and safety have been fulfilled." Inglehart seemingly trusts psychology more than theories of coalition building.

Inglehart co-authored a vital article in 1972 with Avram Hochstein. It merits presentation for three reasons: (a) it is the sole paper that utilises the method of a
small-n comparative study and (b), it tests the survey findings by juxtaposing them with up-to-date political events in both cases. Their piece, entitled *Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States*, argued that the new values had collided with the old in the most recent national elections of the countries concerned and had resulted in a quantum leap in electoral cleavage dimensions. Picking up from the main suggested political consequences of the emergence of a new values trend (as per Inglehart's 1971 papers), the authors compare the French Assembly Election of 1968 with the American Presidential contest of 1972. In the French instance, the data come from the French National Election Study of 1968, carried out by Inglehart himself. The findings of this survey, in conjunction with the actual electoral lie of the land, were sufficient to support the idea that an alignment had occurred in French politics. Inglehart contends that until the Fifth republic of 1958, French parties had failed in their core functions as political machines that coordinate the ruled with the levers of power. Too many parties, incoherently organised, were competing for the electorate. Charles de Gaulle brought about a functional division - Gaullists and non-Gaullists. A united left was not to the fore and consequently, one axis did not explain maximal variance. The authors make significant derivations from the May 1968 disturbances and the subsequent elections. The core argument is that a polarisation occurred at the National election in the summer of that year (23 June). The left had split into two camps, one (led by the PSU) identified as being the *soixante-huitard's party*, whilst the Communists had come out strongly against the civil unrest of the insurrection. The PSU were punished at the polls in that their vote was only four per cent nationally. However, they received 29 per cent of the post-bourgeois vote. The other leftist parties obtained nine per cent more votes in this constituency as against their acquisitive
base. It is plain that Rocard's PSU is deemed by both Inglehart and Hochstein as the party for the post-bourgeois cohort, but not for the nation at large. The clear victory for De Gaulle may be explained as the result of a clash between new and old values. A heightened sense of threat repelled the majority of the electorate, acquisitive in value type, away from the left to the Gaullists. The authors sound a note of caution regarding the future of the PSU – it would not be in a position to be the majority left-wing party, let alone form a government, until a large number of post-bourgeois youth, socialised in a time of ever increasing plenty, attained the right to vote. This would have to be repeated successively until the effect was sufficiently cumulative to swing the pendulum in the New Left's direction.

The 1972 American Presidential contest between the Republican incumbent, Richard Nixon, and the Democrat George McGovern, was in point of fact, a no-contest. Referring to the classic survey data in *The American Voter*, Inglehart acknowledges the durability and clarity of the cleavages structuring American voting, but deem this election as the force that brings about a new cleavage. Inglehart and Hochstein claim that the post-bourgeois voter was more likely to plump for McGovern, but this group was too small to prevent a crushing Nixon victory. The Democrats were in danger of becoming a niche postmaterialist party.

In choosing France and America, Inglehart and Hochstein propose a testing ground of two industrialised nations *but* with significantly contradicting cleavages. The challenge to inveterately held values and political identities contained in the emergent issue agenda provokes alarm. To seek reassurance and straight answers to the political and civic puzzles, the electorate in each country rotates away from its existing lines of demarcation. Bearing in mind the muddled state of party orientations in early Fifth Republic France, there develops a cogency; de Gaulle
consolidates his position as fulcrum. Conversely, a solid socio-economic and racial cleavage in American life, dividing Democrat and Republican, substantially atrophies. In sum, Inglehart and Hochstein propose that an alignment occurs in France and a dealignment in the US.

Inglehart builds on to this scaffold in another 1972 article, co-authored with Lindberg. Entitled *Political Cleavages in Post-Industrial Society - The May Revolt*, they extend the French case study and add more detail, in the main on the structure of the left and the relative position of the Communists. He reaffirms the explanation that the Gaullists maximised their vote in June 1968 due to their underlining the importance of a strong law and order policy and their aim to strengthen centralised rule. The result of this for Inglehart is a splitting of the left. On the left, the PSU and its supporters would spin off to form the 'New Left'. Gaullism would assimilate many of the economic and criminal justice concerns of much of the SFIO's working class core vote, plus a significant part of the PCF's weakly identifying constituency.

The impact of value shift on parties is taken up again by Inglehart and Barnes (1974) in a paper titled *Affluence, Individual Values and Social Change*. They acknowledge that for much of the twentieth century, the most important cleavage in the affluent West was the class-based one. Political parties from the two major antagonistic factions, left and right, oversaw the expansion and eventual ubiquity of the welfare state. In this case, it can be shown that rightist parties felt themselves constrained to (at the least) maintain social provision and not knock down the edifice of the welfare state. In proposing that there will be a progressive effacement of the left/ right divide, Inglehart is developing a theme that will reach its fullest expression from 1977 on – that new politics is replacing the mid-century compromise (Crouch, 1999: *passim*) and so left/right materialist politics will gradually fade away.
Inglehart's most widely known work, *The Silent Revolution*, was published in 1977. It is a direct follow-on in content to his 1971 article of the same name. The socialisation and scarcity hypotheses are re-emphasised, but Inglehart does not add much that is conceptually new. It is reasonable to view the book as a collation of his extant ideas. The method of assessing one's value preferences is by means of the Postmaterialist Index (PMI). It is obtained by asking respondents to pick what they believe should be their country's top two aims from a list of four items; a twelve-item assessment has been harnessed by Inglehart (see pp. 22-23). For the purpose of clarity, the four-item breakdown is given here:

1. Maintaining order in the nation
2. Giving the people more say in important government decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom of speech

A combined score allows for the following classifications where a person picks the following combinations as their top two priorities:

(a) 1 & 3: Materialist.
(b) 2 & 4: Postmaterialist.
(c) Any of the other four possible combinations: Mixed.

By subtracting the percentage of people in category (b) from those in category (a), the PMI is obtained. Since the full socialisation of those born post-1945, Inglehart argues that the good economic conditions have served to boost the PMI. He draws up a partial regression model and then a 'tighter' multivariate beta analysis and finds that education and age are by far the most important variables in predicting postmaterialist values (from a US sample). The third-ranked factor,
political party, is decidedly ambiguous, according to Inglehart: does one's party choice mould one's values or *vice versa*? (ibid. 93-94). In any case, it accounts for just over 50 per cent of the variance due to either of the first two. After extensive examples of postmaterialist politics in action - Inglehart returns at length to France 1968 and the Nixon - McGovern presidential contest of 1972 (see the summary of his 1971 paper, this chapter). Inglehart's summary is a carbon copy of his 1971 article: the younger, more educated generations have entirely different political priorities when compared with their older fellow citizens and: ‘Western governments have only begun to learn how to cope with the types of demands which are most salient to the Post-Materialist types, and it is not clear that they will eventually master these problems’ (ibid. 71).

This era of a 'new politics' shopping basket is not without end; however, it will take big drops in population levels of education and income to regress the people's concerns to materialist ones. Deep and durable recessions which may occur would overlay the postmaterialist stratum of those fully socialised in the abundance of the post - World War II environment; the demands of any cohorts who grow up in periods of penury would clash with those of the postmaterialist generation:

Or we might witness a renaissance of prosperity that endured a few more decades and were *then* followed by economic collapse (the basic forecast of *The Limits to Growth*). In that case, we would eventually find the *opposite* relationship between age and value type from that which prevails today: the older cohorts would manifest vestiges of a

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5 This would have occurred by the mid- to late 1960s.
6 This excludes factors that contribute to each other.
bygone Post-materialist era, while the younger cohorts would begin to emerge as materialistic, money-grabbing barbarians.


An aspect of Inglehart's style of thinking that recurs again most notably in his current work is the link between a person's social background and life satisfaction. This is a *leitmotif* of his research and is something from which he rarely strays. Citing a study by Campbell, Converse and Rogers and their weakly established link between socio-economic status and satisfaction, Inglehart points to the importance of *stability* - the person's aspiration to leave behind their current position in life is attenuated as the life pattern is reinforced over time. People's subjective well-being may well oscillate wildly if their standard of living shuttles up and down, but a long-term placement serves to dampen dissatisfaction - the habituation effect. It is here that one sees the extent of Inglehart's ambition - to apply a psychological model of the individual to a psychosocial analysis of the state and what traits it is likely to imprint on its citizens. The wealthy European publics have one contradictory aspect; happy with their lives generally, but unhappy with the political side of things in their states. On an individual level, the professional worker in such states has the highest satisfaction scores *in toto* but the lowest satisfaction self-ratings of all job classifications for the political state of affairs in their country.

The utility of *The Silent Revolution* is its in-depth coverage: Inglehart more fully outlines the causes and effects of PM. It draws on diverse literature outside political science and comments on broader societal changes likely to flow from value shift. For example, one non-party political implication is a move away from the priority of maximising growth to instead pursue social equality. The communal
aspect of the worker's life is more emergent; this may be gauged by Inglehart's reference to 'workers' demands for reorganization of the assembly line into smaller, more autonomous groups in which each member has a voice in how the job is done.' (1977: 69). This is clearly a sociotechnical idea, and as such, is not directly political. Inglehart further connects the workplace to the political arena, citing the importance of theorists such as Bell, Lipset, Mannheim and Weber. Inglehart rows in with them and states that professional workers are more likely to be postmaterialist in their values than the other job classification members. The sociological bent to Inglehart's work is brought out by such wide-ranging inclusions. A diffuse societal push for greater democratisation in all domains is instanced again a few paragraphs later - more horizontal styles of decision-making are predicted to gain in popularity in schools, businesses and local government.

A 1981 article, *Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity*, tries to explain what happens to postmaterialist values in a defined period of economic retrenchment. Period effects, first mentioned in his 1967 paper are invoked. These press down on the levels of PM, but not to the extent that the general post-war upward trend is reversed. More valuably, Inglehart proposes further concrete political results of PM. Whereas in 1971 and 1977, he relies on two individual elections in France and the US as *in vivo* experimental settings, in this article he provides a list of political effects. He speculates that the membership of new protest movements will be disproportionately postmaterialist. The postmaterialists, having graduated from college, '...furnish the ideologues and core support for the environmental, zero-growth and antinuclear movements; and their opposition to those who give top

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7 The sociotechnics side of Inglehart's writing will be taken up in the 'Criticisms' chapter.
priority to reindustrialization and rearmament constitutes a distinctive and persisting
dimension of political cleavage.' (1981: 880).

It is arguable that Inglehart's fullest statement on how value transformation
affects politics may be found in his chapter, *The Changing Structure of Political
Cleavages in Western Society* (1984), part of the classic *Electoral Change in
Advanced Industrial Democracies*. The research flowed from Inglehart's involvement
in the Political Action Study group (1979), which had as its remit the assessment of
all conceivable acts of political participation. The value of this paper lies in how
Inglehart links the rise of new protest movements to the electoral fortunes of
established left-wing parties. In one of his rare inclusions of an institutionalist
perspective, he claims the new leftist parties in Holland, Scandinavia and Italy are
likely to remain 'fringe' because such groups cannot aspire to claiming the mass
working class support as a consequence of their advocacy of postmaterialist issues.
Instead, they draw on a middle class base. The overriding emphasis, though, is on the
main left parties in the US, Britain and Germany.

It was Inglehart's view that the incremental effects of postmaterialist
politicisation had already had a sizable effect on established left-wing parties. He lists
the defeat of McGovern in his presidential challenge to Nixon in 1972, and argues
that the divided British Labour Party of the early 1980s bears has more than a
superficial resemblance to the internecine combat within the US Democrats. In
describing the British left as consisting of a 'neo-Marxist and neutralist left wing'
(ibid) and a much more centrist Social Democratic Party. In Germany, he refers to
the postmaterialist 'Young Socialist' faction being at odds with the SPD leadership.
Further fragmentation in the 'old politics' monolith in Germany and also in France
came in the form of the emergence of the ecological parties.
Yet another ‘new politics’ phenomenon is the rise in extraparliamentary activity, which has shot up since the end of the 1960s:

...the most massive political demonstrations that have taken place in recent years have not been directed against unemployment or declining real income - on the contrary, the largest and most intense ones have been aimed at preventing the construction of nuclear power plants, highways, airports, military installations, hydroelectric dams, and other projects that might reduce unemployment. Now, as earlier, labor is concerned with unemployment, wages, and inflation, but political activism continues to reflect mainly postmaterialist concerns.

1984: 29.

Inglehart proposes that there is an Issue polarization and a Group polarization in action. The former concerns the diminishing importance of the economy in first-order electoral politics and what has filled the gap (postmaterialist topics), while the latter depicts which groups are still more materialist in their priorities and which are not. He also foresees a backlash against PM, one which would centre on the working class moving to the right to counter demands regarding the following: ‘environmentalism, the women’s movement, unilateral disarmament, opposition to nuclear power’ (1984: 28); note how these items resemble his earlier hypothesised bones of contention as per his 1981 paper.

Having discussed some distinctive features of contemporary politics in Britain, France and the US, he then tries to predict what will happen to the class

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*Inglehart interchanges this term and ‘PM’ throughout his writings.*
cleavage in these countries and by extension, in the advanced democracies. According to Inglehart, the left/right axis acted as a heuristic: 'a higher-level abstraction used to summarize one's stand on the important political issues of the day. It serves the function of organizing and simplifying...providing an overall orientation toward a potentially limitless number of issues, political parties, and social groups.' (ibid. 37). He argues that the postmaterialist left differs from the old left primarily in terms of how they view the state. The class-based left parties of old favoured using government to bring about far-reaching social and industrial changes, whereas Keynesianism and big government did not chime well with the new left. They instead view the state as oppressive and too unwieldy to be responsive to citizens' needs. The left/right definition is now one of supporting or opposing change that is egalitarian in intent. It is supplanting the class antagonism of the past and leads to a present and future where 'The specific kinds of change may vary, but the question of more or less equality is usually involved, whether it be between social classes, nationalities, races, or sexes.' (ibid). Where this becomes highly germane for 'new politics' lies in the fact that whereas the public can easily identify state ownership and industrial management, say, as falling within set ranges on a left/right spectrum, the 'new' issues do not fit so neatly into the mass-moulded receptacles. There may well be an elite conception of which items are logically left and right, but as Inglehart pithily points out, 'the mass public has not read the classic literature.' (ibid. 40). The public has a different interpretation of where a specific problem should be located. It is in this article that we read Inglehart at his most precise, dealing with the minutiae of an individual party's policies and how redistribution measures are differentially construed by materialist and postmaterialist alike. Divergence between elite and public conceptions of issue importance and how to resolve the difficulties involved is
most apparent for two 'new politics' items - nuclear power and terrorism. The sheer range of the piece is impressive, with tables on contrasting support bases for government regulation, environmental protection, internationalism and parochialism. He draws out the link between the economic wealth of a country and its voters' support for classic left-wing policies.

In 1987, Inglehart wrote a paper that was accompanied by a response from Flanagan. Entitled Value change in Industrial Societies, the article is once more a restatement of his application of Maslovian ideas to the political sphere. It deals with two concerns – (i) the interaction between wealth levels and political goals across nations and (ii) how new left parties fare in the affluent west.

The article begins with a curve illustrating the interaction between economic development and life expectancy. As wealth rises, so does life expectancy up until the level of $2,000 GNP per capita - it then flattens out, due, Inglehart claims, to the increasing importance of lifestyle and associated factors such as health behaviours and pollution. Another curve follows immediately after this (1987: 1291), this time tracing the connection between economic development and income equality; poorer countries were less equal than richer ones. Once more the curve levels off, but now at a higher level: $3,500 GNP per capita. Inglehart attributes this to the law of diminishing returns; the then Communist countries were already at a very equal spread of distribution. Western democracies, on the other hand, had differential pay structures to motivate their workforces. Due to the ubiquitous post-war construction of the welfarist safety net, 'the political base for further development of the welfare state is simply not there.' Any impetus for extending the equalising measures would not flow from arguments based on economic efficacy, but on 'nonmaterial' appeals to social solidarity and justice. The conclusion of this is simple, in Inglehart's view:
both "savage laissez-faire policies" and left "fundamentalists" (ibid. 1295) are anachronistic. Inglehart sets the stage for a new centrism. He does not deny that economics is likely to remain a prime political concern, but foresees that its continued presence as an electoral issue will be as a sociotropic feature (solidarity and justice), rather than as an effect of class antagonism.

In Inglehart's view, 'new politics' parties have taken two main forms - New Left and Green. The New Left forces have not capitalised on their late 1960s good electoral performances due to their inability to secure voter loyalty (see Inglehart, 1984 and pp. 28-29, this thesis). There has, however, been an overall rising trend for the 'progressive' groupings, with the Green parties amassing most of the electoral gains from the 1970s onwards. The short-term fluctuations in the upward postmaterialist trend are compensated for by the upswing following a downturn; for example, the inflationary spell of the early 1980s ends in 1985 and this is accompanied by a return to the PMI scores predicted by the model (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987). The remainder of the article is an extended critique of PM, written by Flanagan; as such, it will be discussed in the 'Criticisms' chapter.

Having considered entire national cultures\(^9\) as the unit of analysis in his assessment of the interface between values and politics, Inglehart tries to give more grounded instances in his paper co-authored with Michael Minkenberg, *Neoconservatism and Value Change in the USA: Tendencies in the Mass Public of a Postindustrial Society* (1989). Inglehart aims to contextualise the 1980s electoral victories of Thatcher, Kohl, Reagan and Chirac. All, as Inglehart sees it, were based on a willingness to be neoconservative and respond to populist opinion on the classic public debates - tax, welfare, jobs. Inglehart classes neoconservatism as diverging

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\(^9\) A focus which becomes the unifying aspect of his third period.
from the old form in its message, tools and support. It has subsumed those who feel threatened by the postmaterialist agenda and thus would incorporate parts of the 'old left' and traditionally conservative constituencies.

It is not just economic policy that unifies neoconservatives, but also commonly held values tapping the family, religion and the nation. Inglehart is keen to get down to fine detail and begins the analysis with the three-nation ‘Generation and Politics’ study of the US (1981), West Germany (1980) and Holland (1981). The authors construct both a neoconservatism and a conservatism index. Conservatism is defined by Minkenberg and Inglehart ‘not simply as an antimodem movement but as the dialectical counterpart to political modernization (democratization, emancipation, self-government, etc.) which becomes mobilized in processes of differentiation and accelerated change.’ (1989: 86). They are convinced by the evidence that neoconservatism is a feature of both the new elites and the masses in these countries.

What is most interesting is how again, Inglehart treats an entity as an instance of a larger class; in 1988, he classified the Reformation as a subset of economic modernism and here, conservatism is altered according to ‘historical conflict constellations’ (ibid. 87). In practice, this means that it (conservatism) defended the Church and oligarchy in the nineteenth century nationalist tumult; in the Industrial Revolution, it set the bourgeois against the worker. With the end of World War II, the wealthier class, historically conservative, was socialised in an environment of egalitarianism and social cohesiveness. The rebellious 1960s and 1970s tilted against this comparatively pacific political modus vivendi and in turn provoked a backlash: ‘Neoconservatism, then, is bourgeois modernism becoming conservative itself in the face of this radical attack’ (ibid. 88). Its composition is contradictory:

10 This is the negotiated outcome that Crouch (1999) terms the 'mid-century compromise'; it marked the end of the most severe clashes between labour and capital.
'...east coast intellectuals with a liberal or even radical biographical background...'

(ibid). What motivated them was an attempt to repulse the attacks on 'authority, family, community, religion and American political tradition' (ibid.). They distrust interventionist government and lament any further extension of the welfare state's coverage. In favour of a strong capitalist market, robust defence and inveterate anti-Communism, they are in the position of sharing such an outlook with the old left's working class core. The populist conservatism strand has similarly convergent views on family, state and schooling; strongly patriotic but also wary of what they see as excessive Washington interference. In these attitudes, the public and the elite are startlingly similar. Minkenberg and Inglehart acknowledge the difficulty of framing a public's ideology. And refer to work by theorists such as Campbell, Converse, and McClosky on issue constraint and ideological conceptualisation. Nevertheless, the authors cite an extensive list of issue positions and how they tap the 'old conflict' and 'new conflict' headings.

In terms of party politics, the authors use party identification and ideological orientation measures. For neoconservatist group membership, religiosity and value orientation explain more than twice the variance than party identification or social class; the structural variables are diminishing in strength. This is in contradistinction to the old politics orientation - social status has twice the impact on old conservatism than it has on party identification. If one only had a voter's social structural profile, it would be more difficult to predict their party preference than their values outlook (ibid. 101). They conclude that the US Republican party is sufficiently broad to house both the traditionally affluent old conservatives and the new, lower socio-economic,
populist neoconservatives.\textsuperscript{11} By comparison, the Democrat identity is decidedly amorphous.

Inglehart's second major book on PM, \textit{Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society} (1990a), is mainly a reaffirmation of his preoccupations.\textsuperscript{12} One plausible reason for why Inglehart adds nothing of new significance to his research is the timing of the book's writing and publication: he was co-ordinator of the World Values Survey of 1990-91.

The 1981-83 had assessed 22 societies, whereas this one covered 43 societies and represented more than 70 per cent of the world population.\textsuperscript{13} It is thus no real surprise that in this book, Inglehart takes stock and again disseminates his major lines of inquiry. The theory is that culture, economic development and political structure mutually interpenetrate, and that once a culture is established, it can go on to exert durable effects of its own in the moulding of values. Inglehart specifically contrasts cultural Weltanschauungen with political attitudes, acknowledging the comparative mutability of the latter (this is something that Inglehart does not address in his methodology throughout his work - see 'Criticisms').

The empirical part consists of reams of data that indicate covariance among happiness, trust, political discussion and endorsement of existing political institutions. A series of complicated analyses control for Gross National Product and percentage of service sector workforce, and still reveal a 'cultural' factor in the stability of democracy from 1900-86. Inglehart duly defers to Weber regarding the origins of his idea - culture is not as intangible as economists would have it. Growth

\textsuperscript{11} Inglehart neglects to mention protectionism, something both Pat Buchanan and the Poujadists would have in common.
\textsuperscript{12} A similar function is expedited by his co-authored 1994 paper - see this chapter, pp. 43-44.
\textsuperscript{13} Inglehart and Abramson, 1994: 346.
can slow down within a society due to the high levels of PM that mitigate the wealth generation imperative.

A substantial part of the book examines cognitive mobilisation;\textsuperscript{14} political acts necessitate a matrix of institutions, knowledge resources and social networks. The value system or ideology\textsuperscript{15} can only come into play once the cognitive mobilisation of the polity is a given. The materialist/postmaterialist distinction is, as Inglehart has it, the best explanatory factor for tracing ecological participation and anti-war protest activity. It outranks both left/right self-placement and income in its predictive worth. However, there is a possible pollutant to the theory in the form of the life-cycle variable, as Inglehart admits - older people may simply be less likely to participate in any non-traditional political measures and so the PM input is less valid in the first place. For Inglehart, the upward curve in value shift is not monotonic - slight blips do occur due to 'short-term forces' (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994: 337), such as rising unemployment or bouts of high inflation. Economic activity is dampened and the citizen's optimistic outlook is attenuated. There is a downward readjustment as the person retreats to a defensive mindset, a real-time response to a less auspicious environment. Significantly, such falls are neither durable nor drastic - for those born after 1945 who do suffer a recession or live through a time of high unemployment, the tail-off is not sufficient to move them down to the same background level of materialism as those who were socialised before the War (Inglehart, 1977). For a dramatic example of period effects, Inglehart refers to the survey results for the former USSR and Germany after reunification, where material issues are in the ascendant (Inglehart, 1998: 74).

\textsuperscript{14} See pp. 6-7, this chapter, for comment on Inglehart's first treatment of this concept.

\textsuperscript{15} Inglehart points to the public's interchangeable usage of these.
Inglehart has always had a keen interest in the related topics of party identification and spacing. His joint 1995 paper, *Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies*, is a continuation of the line of work dating from his analysis of the Swiss party system (1974) and more generic papers in the mid-1970s on policy space judgments. Inglehart and Huber begin with a brief but detailed sketch of the history of how left/right ideology content has drawn scholarly attention. This article's findings were culled from data collated for the World Values Surveys and follow-ups. The strong cross-cultural contrast is the meat of this paper; left/right conflict still taps the macroeconomy in the wealthy West, but whereas nationalisation and control of industry had been the foci of the debate, it has now moved on to privatisation and deregulation. For the bulk of the stable western democracies, 'new politics' was in the process of supplanting the 'industry' question. For non-democratic or recently democratising states, left/right was best understood as a polarisation of authoritarian and democratising forces, with national identity also loading heavily onto this factor.

In 1998, Inglehart co-authored a chapter with Terry Nichols Clark entitled *The New Political Culture: Changing Dynamics of Support for the Welfare State and Other Policies in Postindustrial Societies*. The Marxian tinge to some of Inglehart's theories is drawn out at the beginning of the piece: 'A specter is haunting Advanced Industrial Society - a specter of new political fault lines and a new political culture' (1998a: 9). Arguing that the axes in modern or advanced industrial states are harder to separate out from each other, Inglehart and Clark restate the seven aspects of postmaterialist politics as already given in Inglehart (1987) and Inglehart and Abramson (1995). The fourth, fifth and sixth elements evoke Inglehart's political topography of the New Right in America as described by him in 1989. This chapter is
the first to specify what the new political culture would be, both for left and right; whereas in 1989, although he underscores the American new right in some detail, there had not been a conjoined account of both new wings. These factions would result in a new political centrisn. Harking further back to his elite analysis of European parliament candidates and the question of more powers for said institution (1980), Inglehart and Clark draw extensively from a comparative study of the broad political mindsets of US and French mayors. Challenges from the American sample to a centralising authority are less feasible than for the French, simply because the étatiste and dirigiste forces in the American polity are in no way of the same magnitude as for France. They sum up the absence of any concerted push for further decentralisation epigrammatically as: ‘To Americanise Hegel: no antithesis for want of a thesis’ (ibid. 41).

Inglehart moves his propositions onto a more abstract level in his usage of the concepts of rationality, postmodernisation, and religion in his chapter, Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy (1999), which again draws from the relevant WVS data sets. Whereas modernisation effected a change from traditional-religious- to rational-bureaucratic authority (and thus expedites the advent of the state); postmodernisation instigates movement away from both traditional and state authority (1999: 240). Another interesting point is the proposition that authoritarian values vary as a function of economic development, with a 0.62 correlation between greater reverence towards authority and Gross Domestic Product. This picks up from Inglehart’s first expressed interest in the psychology of authority as per his 1967 doctoral thesis. Exceptions to this covariance exist, though, and Inglehart relies on a cultural variable to explain the dual characteristics of wealth and high authoritarianism i n say, Taiwan and South
Korea. Confucianism is common to both and it is this value system that bolsters deference towards authority, even after the sustained enrichment of both states.

Due to the successes of the welfare state and industrialisation, plus the comparative peace of the past fifty years, the need to rely on the state as protector against insecurity (either perceived or actual), has inexorably lessened. Inglehart cites how poverty induces a craving for strong leadership: the Great Depression in Europe yielded the fascist powers. Too rapid rates of change only serve to promote anxiety, so even in affluent states, postmodernisation may well entrain an 'Authoritarian Reflex that may bring fundamentalist or xenophobic reactions or adulation of strong leaders'\(^{16}\) (ibid. 242). Generally, though, wealthier and more educated publics are much more sceptical than their older counterparts of their existing governments' \textit{bona fides}. The doubts do not extend to democracy as a principle, but do serve to attenuate the publics' confidence in the church, police and military.\(^{17}\)

A political implication of the above is Inglehart's explanation for why George Bush did not win re-election to the US presidency in 1992. On the face of it, Bush's Gulf War victory and second-half stewardship of the economy (it had entered its second year of growth) should have swung the contest his way. The Cold war was over, and it had ended while Bush was in office. Precedence in the form of Eisenhower's 1952 victory placed the emphasis on, as Inglehart puts it 'a grateful nation' recognising the general's war effort. But as Clinton was to discover

\(^{16}\) A comment that seems most apposite for this thesis in light of Le Pen's qualification for the French presidential run-off, April 2002.

\(^{17}\) For the first psychological account of the similarities between the agents of state and canon authority, see Freud's \textit{The Church and the Army} (1921).
'Postmodern publics evaluate their leaders by different, and more demanding, standards than were those applied throughout most of the modern era'\(^{18}\) (ibid. 254).

Inglehart's 2000 paper, *Globalization and Postmodern Values*, is another repeat of his WVS project, subtly tweaking the same data. There are loud echoes of his very first writings. He gives a *verbatim* restatement of his scarcity and socialisation hypotheses; (2000: 219) and reaffirms his claim that a postmaterialist politics had damaged trust in government and turnout rates, but 'elite-challenging political actions were steadily rising' (2000: 224), such as in the US. This paper may be viewed as a brief summary and update of his comprehensive 1984 paper (see pp. 35-38, this chapter).

1.2.2.1: **Summary of Inglehart’s second period**

In this second period, we note Inglehart's usage of contemporary political detail and how he uses it as support for the trends detected by the PMI. We commented at the beginning of this section that prior to this timeframe, he had primarily been using the survey in conjunction with an historical overview in order to understand attitudes towards European integration. In the earlier years of this second period, up to 1989, he adopts a modified case study approach, usually referring to the US, France and Germany, and occasionally to Britain, Italy, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. Once he finishes with *Culture Shift* (1990), he moves on to make large-n analyses of the correlations between nations' wealth and their political goals. Throughout this period, he continues to draw on other social sciences as he did in the first phase. For psychology, he stops referring to specific work by people such as Hebb, utilising

\(^{18}\) See the 2002 BBC2 television documentary, *The Century of the Self*, for an excellent historical account of how such ideas attracted political campaign teams throughout the 1980s and on; the Stanford Research Institute collated reams of data on this new political appeal.
instead a more ‘common sense’ view based mainly on Abraham Maslow. Inglehart dips into sociology and is not content to graph the political effects of value shift, but rather also wants to predict a broader societal impact. A new feature is his collaborations, especially with Abramson, and his use of the ever-growing body of Eurobarometer data. From 1990 onwards, he has already begun to construct a cross-cultural view of political phenomena, including types of rule in societies as a function of their wealth and the political aims of citizens in such societies. The third period extends this line of enquiry.

1.2.3: Culture-specific political forms

In 1988, Inglehart paused the ‘value change’ stream of publications and switches focus to write on the hitherto neglected area of cultural differences and how they structure politics in an article titled The Renaissance of Political Culture.¹⁹ He recapitulates earlier work on life satisfaction and again illustrates the people of wealthier nations tend to be more satisfied with their lives than those from poorer ones. It is essential, Inglehart argues, to look at both overall life satisfaction and political satisfaction (a subset) of a nation's citizens in order to account for stable democracies. A regime that cannot sustain its people is unlikely to retain a committed support base; nor is a polity deemed unresponsive or corrupt similarly able to bank on the continued endorsement (or even acquiescence) of its citizens. Political satisfaction is weakly correlated ($r = 0.21$) with continuous years of established democracy, whereas life satisfaction has a much stronger link ($r = 0.85$) (1997: 79) with democratic stability. Inglehart proposes that the long-term survival of a democracy hinges more on ‘enduring cultural traits such as life satisfaction and
interpersonal trust' (ibid). It is the political satisfaction score which is more prone to being erratic.

This paper is valuable for its cogently delivered message on the links between interpersonal trust, economic development and democracy; it is an area that excites Inglehart to this day and is his first sustained foray into the topic. Low levels of interpersonal trust are recorded for Europeans' views on the Greeks, Italians and French (excluding self-assessment). Inglehart builds on the work of Almond and Verba (1965), which demonstrates that Italy and France score minimally on attitude clusters tapping the 'civic culture'. Another thread in the tapestry is Inglehart's assertion that both Italy and France possess strong 'antisystem' parties in the form of the Italian MSI, and for France, the Poujadists of the 1950s and Le Pen's Front National. Inglehart writes that cross-nationally and cross-temporally: 'Life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for the existing order tend to go together. They constitute a syndrome of positive attitudes toward the world one lives in. And this syndrome goes with enduring democratic institutions.' (ibid. 80-81).

The rest of the paper is very much derivative, entailing a retelling of the rise of the Protestant work ethic; this would be irrelevant were it not for Inglehart's claim that it is those countries in which the Reformation occurred that are more likely to be postmaterialist. Inglehart treats the Reformation as 'one case of a more general phenomenon: the breakdown of traditional cultural barriers to economic modernization' (ibid. 83). These states have had a head start in affluence (the most economically dynamic states at the start of the twentieth century were Protestant) and in innovation in wealth creation and are thus more likely to be in the vanguard of any

19 The edition cited for this paper is a 1997 reprint; it appears as a chapter in Zahariadis's Theory, Case and Method in Comparative Politics. All references in my chapter will refer to this reprint's pagination.
subsequent pervasive economic/cultural shift. The emphasis on achieving high economic growth levels has now been diffused globally and in regions where it has always been to the fore, an anti-growth movement has emerged. Societally, postmaterialists are more preoccupied with a definitively new political issue like the environment; individually, they espouse this view while earning less than their materialist peers. In Inglehart's opinion, the new 'high growth' culture is the resurgent Confucian tradition. The economic profile of Confucian and Buddhist nations such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan are exemplary of this.

Although Inglehart does not explicitly select states as subject matter on the basis of membership of the OECD or not, the durable bias towards a wealthy western sample is clear. In moving on to 1994, one sees the first comprehensive coverage by Inglehart of non-western states in his co-authored article, *Economic Security and Value Change*. It is his major paper of the 1990s and is the first of two important joint publications with Paul Abramson over two years. Inglehart repackages all his core arguments from the 1970s: a new politics axis, falling turnout, right-wing backlash parties, the rising prominence of ecological issues, and the scope of period effects. Interestingly, Inglehart departs from his habitual sample and extends the cases to include former COMECON and poorer states including Nigeria, India and the South-East Asian countries.

In the rapidly growing economies of China, South Korea and Taiwan, for example, Abramson and Inglehart argue it cannot be claimed that the young cohorts, even though socialised in times of comparative strong growth, are postmaterialist. What is strongly indicative of a move towards PM, is, however, the size of the gaps between young and old cohorts in South Korea versus, say, the US. The authors are

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20 Inglehart omits Greece due to its non-democratic rule for a sizable part of his research timeframe.
21 Controlling for education and family background.
eager to point out that the US has consistently been wealthy for all of the twentieth century (1994: 139) and consequently, relative disparities between young and old are not of great moment. In South Korea, by contrast, the economic drive has been quite recent and so one can make a comparative (temporal) test of how the differential socialisation of young and old South Koreans has affected their value structure. Younger citizens are markedly less materialist than their older compatriots, but as the baseline of PM is at a negative level, it follows that their value profile could not equate to that of a western sample. The authors provide clear mathematical support for the outlined link between postmaterialist values and comparatively high degrees of economic development: ‘...the regression coefficient indicates that every thousand-dollar increase in per capita gross national product contributes to a 1.7 point gain on the materialist / postmaterialist value index’ (ibid. 347). One can thus arrange countries according to GNP and assume a linear relationship between their wealth ranking and extent of PM. Notably, Inglehart and Abramson cite an interpolation of this model, in the form of Diez-Nicolas' study of Spanish regions and their varying levels of PM: the poorest regions have the lowest scores. There is one further point of significance in the paper, concerning how inflation and unemployment affect value scores, but as this was written in response to a long-standing criticism of Inglehart's theories, it is included in the 'Criticisms' chapter.

Inglehart then pauses in his theoretical work to compile an overview of values and their interactions with culture in his third major relevant book, *Value Change in Global Perspective*, written with Paul Abramson (1995). Inglehart had been the global co-ordinator for the 1990-93 World Values Survey (WVS) and this book covers the main findings of same in conjunction with the appropriate National

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22 Inglehart does not feel the need to distinguish between Shinto Buddhism (Japan) and other variants.
23 For the purposes of answering this research question.
Election Studies (NES). Chapter One re-summarises what 'political values' have been construed to be by Inglehart, referring to his overriding interest in the area since 1971. In Chapter Two, general upward trends in values and the rate of change would appear to bear out what Inglehart had predicted as far back as 1971; intergenerational replacement is slow but steady, entraining a one-point rise in the value index per year. The American data generate more robust conclusions, as the value survey had been carried out in every presidential contest since 1972; such comprehensiveness is not a given for each European state. There is a tight fit between each American WVS and the corresponding NES. Chapter Three is a microscopic examination of the magnitude of period effects; earlier criticisms, especially by Clarke and Dutt (1991), had questioned the validity of Inglehart's conclusions as the mid-1970s through to the mid-1980s had produced sharp negative spikes in the PM Index (PMI). Inglehart duly accepts that period effects actually outweighed the intergenerational effect from the years 1970-82 (1995: 2). However, multiple hypothetical models are constructed that allow for the separation of cohort and period effects they undoubtedly corroborate Inglehart's hypothesis of an overall upward shift.

Chapters One to Six deal solely with the affluent West. One aspect of this sample of wealthy states is the weakening of the intergenerational effect over time; lower birth rates and increased longevity were partially effacing the extent of replacement's changes. From 1970-82, Western Europe recorded a 19-point gain on the values index, 90 per cent of which Inglehart and Abramson attribute to replacement. With a wealthy Europe as constant, the authors hypothesise that the general European population will attain the postmaterialist score applicable to that of the 1966-75 cohort, and the mass publics are likely to stay at this level (ibid. 96). The

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24 Is also be termed the cohort effect.
continuous operation of a welfare state and the avoidance of prolonged deep recession/depression are sufficient to ensure that the difference between future cohorts and the current youngest ones will be less drastic than that between the 1936-45 and 1946-55 cohorts.25

Chapters Seven to Nine include non-western states, whether rich like Japan or poor like Nigeria. The authors are able to demonstrate that the same materialist/postmaterialist operates outside the West - the same five items top and tail the value priorities list. Recently developing societies with strong annual growth have the largest differences in scores for young and old (something commented on by the authors in 1994, even at low absolute levels of PM). This does not apply to more stagnant economies: 'In preindustrial societies, conversely, there are few Postmaterialists and there is little difference between the values of young and old: intergenerational value differences reflect a society's rate of economic growth.' (ibid. 136). The Conclusion illustrates the strength of PM as a cross-cultural force. Inglehart and Abramson contend that with increased globalisation, the non-western states will also produce gains on the PMI and such rises are likely be very steep due to the large proportion of the developing world's population below the age of 15. Sizeable numbers of citizens, socialised in a safer26 and affluent time when compared to their older compatriots, will serve to yield gains in the values index.

Inglehart's 1998 chapter, Political Values, further serves to disseminate his research on the WVS. After a technical opening concerning the international comprehensibility of survey questions, Inglehart delves into analyses of countries exhibiting steep rises in their values indices. One illustration of the need for a

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25 Even though the age difference is only ten years, the absence of wholesale war and the presence of a ubiquitous welfare state is enough to alter the Maslovian value matrix for the younger cohort.

26 The authors make no reference to the prevalence of internecine or other types of conflict, present or future.
political context to interpret the underlying meaning of values is the case of privatisation and socialist and ex-socialist states. In 28 non-socialist states surveyed, there is no link between one's stance on privatisation and a postmaterialist outlook. In the socialist and ex-socialist states, there is a robust connection: 70 per cent of postmaterialists are in favour of privatisation. The explanation lies in the history of the respondent's nation (1998b: 70). People in poorly performing planned or ex-socialist states reject government involvement in business due to the connotations of sluggishness and excessive control. For western respondents, government management can serve to dilute the worst excesses of pure market capitalism (ibid. 73). The difference in response type and outlook is national-political history. Inglehart (op. cit. 75) repeats the point made in 1994 and 1995 that

Even the oldest birth cohorts in these advanced industrial societies rank higher than the younger cohorts in most other countries. But an upward slope, reflecting a rising proportion of postmaterialists to materialists as one moves from old to young cohorts, is also found in Eastern Europe and East Asia.

Inglehart's biggest project of 1998 was his co-authorship of the massive *Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook* (Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno). This is a truly exhaustive undertaking, assessing 'people's values and goals concerning politics, economics, religion, sexual behavior, gender roles, family values, and ecological concerns' (1998c: 1). The authors are not shy to boast at what they try to do - assess everything meaningful by asking questions of people in nations 'covering the full spectrum of economic, political, and cultural variation' (ibid).
The book, although huge, is little more than a set of tables. Appended commentary is slight as to how such variables would direct the policy paths of a nation's government or an opposition party's platform within that nation and it does not provide cross-references to available NES information. All in all, it is a book of 'more than 100,000 cross-tabulations' (ibid. 3). Indeed, it is only within the laconic Introduction that Inglehart supplies anything extra to the PM thesis.

The book's premise is that norms differ across cultures and the core 'claim of modernization theory is largely correct: economic change, cultural change, and political change are closely linked' (ibid. 3). Inglehart goes on to sketch in some of the influences on his ideas: Lerner (1958) and Inkeles and Smith (1974), who believed that mass communication would gird the impact of formal education to mould a modern Weltanschauung. Bell's 'post-industrial society' is similarly recognised, with Inglehart's theory of economic security as a promoter of value change presented as a kind of by-product of these concepts. Value changes ratchet varying political priorities up or down in salience. Inglehart is keen to emphasise that economic development pushes societies along two different paths: modernisation and postmodernisation; only the already 'modern' states can be shifted to 'postmodernise'.

Further references to Calvinism and Weber's Protestant ethic are of a piece with Inglehart's ambitiously constructed grand design: economics and culture are mutually influencing. Inglehart explicitly refers to intrasocietal value systems' differentiation (ibid. 7) - a rarity, as most of his work is on international and/or cross-cultural differences. He restates his scarcity and socialisation hypotheses verbatim and outlines the increased worth of 'belonging, esteem, and intellectual and esthetic satisfaction' (ibid. 3). Postmaterialists are further described as being more tolerant of

27 This is not a criticism - many states featured do not have any electoral study at all.
not having a cohesive worldview and so can thus adapt to yet more changes more easily (ibid. 11). Within the space of three pages, Inglehart encapsulates his research project as one that tries to combine changes in religious, social and familial structures, culminating in a shift of political cleavages (as runs through his earlier work).

The two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation are *Traditional authority* vs. *Secular-Rational authority* and *Survival values* vs. *well-being values* (ibid. 14). The latter is definitively postmaterialist in nature. Cultural differences between polities are the fruits of a considerably prolonged gestation: the basic value 'gaps' between former East and West Germans are of the same order as those between Canadians and Americans, even though from 1945 to 1990, an attempt was made to remake the East German citizenry along socialist lines. What Inglehart takes as remarkable is the absence of meaningful differences in the value profiles of East and West Germans on the two central dimensions outlined earlier. Generally, 'socialist or ex-socialist societies fall in to the upper left-hand quadrant: these societies are characterised by (1) survival values, and (2) a strong emphasis on state authority, rather than traditional authority' (ibid. 18).

This Introduction also contains Inglehart's first examination of institutional determinism, albeit a brief one. He dismissed what he calls 'extreme' institutionalism, whereby a society's values are the unalloyed product of its institutions; the whole historical experience is the determining force. Holland and Germany's Protestants and Catholics are more or less located on the same space on the two-dimensional map, and Dutch Catholics are more similar to Northern European Protestants than their Southern European co-religionists. Poland and Ireland fall as outliers: Inglehart

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28 Inglehart also occasionally uses the term 'state capitalist', but not Stalinist.
categorises them as 'hyper catholic', and consequently Ireland does not fit the Northern European dimension. America's religious attitudes do not follow the classical modernist bureaucratic rationalist path; Inglehart asserts that the high US religiosity as reported in surveys is a hangover from the 'frontier mentality', or maybe it acts as a bulwark for the baby boomers who seek solace not available in their secular world (Washington Post, January 12, 1998). As may be gleaned from above, the history is essential to allow for a more comprehensive explanation than the institutional one. Another direct link-up with the 'whole history' argument is made in the repeated theme: 'Almost without exception, stable democracies rank high on subjective well being and interpersonal trust, and authoritarian societies rank low on them. These linkages persist when we control for economic level and social structure' (ibid. 23).

Inglehart published again in 1999 on the same WVS data in the chapter Trust, well-being and democracy. The chapter's thrust is once more a cultural argument (in three parts):

1. ‘Protestant and Confucian-influenced societies consistently show higher levels of interpersonal trust than do historically Catholic or Islamic societies’ (1999b: 92);
2. There is a link, albeit weaker than for the above, between viable democratic institutions and interpersonal trust, and
3. Economic development gives rise to cultural changes that help stabilise democracies.

Polities benefit when people feel good about their lives overall. In a strong reference to a psychology of cultural politics, Inglehart claims that contented people's ‘...political institutions gain legitimacy by association’ and additionally,
When people are dissatisfied with politics, they may change the parties in office. When the people of a given society become dissatisfied with their lives, they may reject the regime - or even the political community, as in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

1999b: 107

Overall, a series of correlations reveals that subjective well-being, interpersonal trust and postmaterialist values go together. This applies at the societal but not the individual level and Inglehart is persuaded that this yet again vindicates his choice of mass publics as his subject matter. There is again the notion of Diminishing Marginal Utility in Europe and the US:

...more than two decades of living under democratic institutions produced no clear trend toward rising life satisfaction among the publics of the European Union countries. In some countries it rose gradually, and in others it fell. Nor did the past four decades of democracy produce any rise in interpersonal trust in the US.


In 2002, Inglehart addressed the highly topical question of the distinctiveness of political values among Muslims in states where Islam is the major religion (Norris and Inglehart, 2002a). The authors test Huntington’s notion of a clash between two civilisations regarding the place of democracy by referring to the 1995-2001 waves of World and European Values Surveys. They find that a robust ‘value difference’ exists, but disagree with Huntington that it is based on the acceptance of democracy. Instead, they argue that the point of divergence is on views of the role of women in society; in their words, the ‘cultural gulf separating Islam from the West involves
Eros far more than Demos.’ (op. cit. 235). In another paper in the same issue of the journal *Comparative Sociology*, Inglehart, Norris and Welzel link support in poorer states for increased democratisation with support for an increased role for women in public life, with both driven by modernization. They look at the spread of institutions and compare this process with indicators of cultural change.

His most recent work harks back to the constant theme of value shift and what he deems to be its political correlates, as a quote from an Autumn 2003 paper illustrates:

Membership in mainline political parties and civic organisations has been dropping around the world...But people in most established democracies are more active than they have been in the last quarter century in forms of civic engagement that used to be considered unconventional but have now become more or less normal forms of political activity.

2003:1.29

Inglehart goes on to write that hitherto poorer states are beginning the shift towards a postmaterialist politics as their standard of living rises. One key outcome of this shift will be a rise in unconventional political behaviour across the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002c).

In a co-authored paper (Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003), Inglehart defines ‘human development’ as a syndrome composed of three things – socio-economic development; emancipative cultural change; and democratisation. It is a very broad concept, and again, Inglehart argues that the cause is changes in people’s

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views of freedom, which in turn forces elites to initiate appropriate policy-level responses. Based on the WVS results, Inglehart argues that such a process currently affects all states, irrespective of income or level of industrialisation. Inglehart argues for a greater extent of convergence due to modernisation and postmodernisation for poorer and wealthier states respectively. The end result of this convergence is the primacy of choice in how citizens live within their societies (op. cit. 341), with states having to be much more responsive to the new sets of demands made by their publics.

1.2.3.1: Summary of Inglehart's third period

In the 1990s and currently, Inglehart carries the postmaterialist theory onto a more expansive plain; cultural upheavals such as the Reformation are harnessed as illustrations of a broader construct - that laws of production will serve to effect cultural changes. In his view, publics living in such resulting cultural climes have qualitatively different demands than their forebears. A type of 'picopolitical science' is embarked upon by Inglehart, wherein people's levels of contentment may be taken as a reliable gauge of their society's democratic profiles, past, present and future. In going on to claim that a 'new axis of polarization' has developed, based on cultural and quality-of-life issues, Inglehart returns to the key theme of his work. He uses survey data to construct a model which he affirms is sufficiently robust to allow one to infer that the major political markers of the post-1960s affluent states are attributable to value change. He adopts a cross-cultural and historical perspective, allied to a psychological construct, to interpret the survey results. It may be seen from this historiography that Inglehart has developed this core argument and disseminated it repeatedly.
1.3: Summary and Conclusion

The aim of this chapter is to highlight the continuities and changes within Inglehart’s work and thus enable the reader to better understand the rationale for the testing process carried out in the rest of this thesis. We have seen that on certain crucial points, Inglehart has been remarkably consistent. He has stressed the primacy of the survey instrument throughout, and most of his work relies heavily on the PMI. As his work matures, he moved away from invoking historical context, instead adducing details from contemporary politics in specific states. Interestingly, it may be seen that his work has now moved back to drawing in historical pen-pictures of events such as the Reformation in order to explain political traits which he argues are culture-specific. He has continued to bring in psychology to account for the mechanisms underlying value shift and political change. Without explaining his reasoning, he uses the same Maslovian model to explain value change at a societal and individual level. His middle period sets out to chart how issue polarisation and group polarisation are necessarily intertwined and how both will have a progressively greater impact on politics.

It is Inglehart’s linkage of putative value shift with direct political effects that is problematic and which we set out to test in the remainder of the thesis. In the first period, Inglehart tabulates attitudinal surveys and makes tentative predictions based on such the findings. He moves on through the 1970s and 1980s to claim that the PMI is picking up a shift that has clear and unidirectional consequences on politics, whether it is in the form of new parties or the withering away of the class cleavage. In his third period, he invokes unfalsifiable claims on the continuing impact of entities such as Confucianism and the Reformation.
In this chapter, we stated the aim of our thesis and provided a historiography of Inglehart’s work. We traced three distinct periods in his work, and emphasised where the periods both diverged from each other and also converged in terms of collaborations, methods, content and implications. As Inglehart’s theory has been in constant circulation for such a long time, it is not surprising that Inglehart’s work has attracted a sizable volume of criticism. The next chapter details the most important criticisms and the responses Inglehart has made. It also contains new criticisms of my own which advance our understanding of Inglehart’s theory and how we should appraise it.
Chapter 2: Criticisms

Inglehart's theory of PM has inevitably attracted some criticism - for such a long-established concept, this is unsurprising. The contribution of this chapter, then, is to thoroughly cover existing criticisms and to add to the store of knowledge on Inglehart's theory. Its aim is twofold - to present established criticisms of Inglehart's ideas and methodology; and to outline a new set of criticisms. Through coverage of previously neglected areas such as Inglehart's borrowings from industrial sociology and psychology, this chapter accomplishes a novel and valuable aim.

There are two parts in this chapter: firstly, it gathers together several key criticisms of Inglehart's research, something never previously done in a major publication (Section One). Secondly, it introduces criticisms based on this author's study that have never been articulated before (Section Two). For Section One, the established criticisms are organised according to whether they are general or specific, with the general being considered first. We then go on to new criticisms I make. In this last section, we assess the theorising that informs the whole of Inglehart's conceptualisation of the new politics; a lot of his core ideas can be traced back to other social science research. In doing so, we endeavour to show that the transfer of knowledge from one domain to another is not as easily accomplished as Inglehart would have the reader believe.

2.1: Existing criticisms

This section is divided in two; the first part looks at the general level criticism made by Flanagan of Inglehart's theory of PM. There is a substantial body of work (cf.
Callaghan, 2000; Esman, 2002; Evans, 1993; Green, 1972; Sassoon, 1997: 670-674; Wilensky, 2002: 186-208; and Weil, 1994, among others) that critiques the notion of a ‘new politics’, but as this is a conglomerate term, the debate around it is necessarily short on direct references to Inglehart. We do not discuss the more tangential works listed above. All the points in both general and specific criticisms are drawn from authors who explicitly set out to respond to Inglehart’s body of work. With regard to *specific criticisms*, we find a set of investigators who purposefully take Inglehart to task on a range of points, usually methodological. These major criticisms question whether the *Eurobarometer* is internally and externally valid. The reader will note that there is an element of overlap; for example, Flanagan’s challenge to the construction of the PMI is taken up later by Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992), and Clarke (1999) respectively.

### 2.1.1 Flanagan’s general criticisms

The most wide-ranging critique is made by Scott Flanagan, who wrote the now classic second half of the journal article *Value Change in Industrial Societies*. Flanagan’s contention is that there are two related but different political changes occurring which Inglehart has mistakenly collapsed into one. Where Flanagan departs from Inglehart is in the application of the term ‘libertarian’. This is a broad concept, covering personal and political freedom, greater say in all types of hierarchical structures, be they governmental or work-based; in addition to a basket of issues such as equality, tolerance of minorities, openness to new ideas, environmental concerns, actualisation and self-indulgence.\(^{30}\) The list is irrefutably similar to Inglehart’s description of postmaterialist concerns (1977, 1984, 1990a and

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\(^{30}\) Flanagan does not deride the last two; he is impartial and is merely providing a list.
Flanagan returns to Inglehart's breakthrough *Silent Revolution* (1977) and is more rigorous in his definition of materialism. Essentially, he thinks that Inglehart is confused as to what constitutes materialism: strong defence and a prominent law and order agenda are not materialist, but instead form part of an authoritarian cluster. This would neatly explain the predilection of 'materialists' for hierarchical institutions and stronger religiosity. To Flanagan, materialism is nothing more than the economics of self and society and so manifests itself in concerns with maintaining low inflation and high growth on the one hand and holding down a well-paid job; living in good housing and leading a comfortable life on the other.

Flanagan also points out that Inglehart is quite neglectful of the 'New Right'; this is less true for Inglehart's later work, most notably his 1989 co-authored chapter with Minkenberg on the new monetarist realism of the regimes of Chirac and Kohl, in addition to the established supply-side emphasis in the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. Notwithstanding this, Inglehart does not give a comprehensive account of the political forms of the New Right, especially the far right.

Flanagan also dissects the 'new voter' more assiduously than Inglehart. Whereas PM as a theory does not specify how economic classes will change as a function of increased affluence, Flanagan argues that embourgeoisement is really only valid when it is tagged on to the wealthier sections of the working class.  

Put simply, Flanagan's axis is more detailed and takes account of more phenomena than Inglehart's; Axis I depicts economics and how importantly one views it. This is the New/Old Politics (NP/OP) split and New Left and New right are located here. The NP line has a libertarian/authoritarian split (Axis II). The result is

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31 He writes that the 'New Tory' voters are emblematic of this process; the implication being that the marginalised are as likely to vote Labour as they ever have. See the section on industrial sociology, this chapter.
cross-pressured voters, something which explains features such as working-class authoritarianism; backlash New Right parties capitalise on the responses to the magnitude of the New Left’s impact. \textit{Level of education} accounts for why the middle class is (more recently) leftist inclined and the working class, right-wing.

Entities as diverse as an anti-immigrant tendency; the debate over nuclear power; the deservingness of the unemployed; the idea of patriotic sacrifice and belief in God are deemed (wrongly, according to Flanagan) by Inglehart to be all instances of a materialist orientation. Flanagan also reinterprets the Diminishing Marginal Utility (DMU) argument more strictly than Inglehart: acquired affluence does entail a move away from materialism, but not necessarily all the way to PM. Instead, a halfway stage of non-materialism is arrived at, and as and when the economy declines, people’s orientations shift back towards materialism. Pure PM, a positive embrace of egalitarian and libertarian ideals, is a much rarer beast. As is evident, Flanagan’s model subsumes Inglehart’s concept of period effects.

In another attack on the foundations of the theory, Flanagan detects a fatal flaw in the construction of the PMI; instead of the four items being divided equally into two divisions of materialist and postmaterialist measures, Flanagan gives a new breakdown of each measure:

(a) ‘Free speech’ and ‘More say in government’ as libertarian measures.

(b) ‘Defence’ as an authoritarian concern and

(c) ‘Fight rising prices’ as a materialist issue.

There is a \textit{dilemma of constrained choice}, as Flanagan puts it (1987: 1311): non-materialist libertarians will pick the two items in (a); while materialist
libertarians will pick (c) and one from (a). As a result, inferring that there has been a drop in the number of materialists based on more people choosing (b) and (c) is a mistake. In Flanagan’s view, materialists are not that concerned with defence issues, and any rise in the numbers choosing (b) should instead be viewed as due to a rise in authoritarianism among the population.

2.1.1.1: Summary of Flanagan’s critique

To sum up, Flanagan's model has more components than Inglehart's and to its credit, attempts to tackle the knotty problem of extremist parties and their core voting base. It is fair-minded in that it acknowledges the useful insights that flow from the original 1977 schema and addresses, unlike the work of Clarke or Davis and Davenport, (see below) more than one category of problem in the formulation of the PMI and the theory itself.

2.1.2 Specific points

There are two areas where critics have given direct criticisms of Inglehart’s work. These are (i) that PM explains changes in voting patterns, and (ii) measurement issues relating to the PMI. There are other assorted criticisms, but they mention Inglehart only briefly and so are excluded. The coverage of voting patterns is restricted to only two studies, and the rest of this section looks solely at measurement issues.

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32 Flanagan partly defines these classifications by referring to a survey of young Japanese - a sizeable proportion being liberal in political outlook, but still very much concerned with accruing possessions and leading a comfortable life.
Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992) performed a 16-country study on how PM may be used to model changes in electoral volatility from the 1960s through to the 1980s. They found it made no contribution. The notion of volatility is an important one with regard to Inglehart (see Chapter Five), as its fluctuations may be indicative of a growing sense of disillusionment with established parties at election time, thus suggesting that new politics could find much support. The authors also could not find any evidence that PM explains either changes in the share of the leftist vote nor that of new parties. These three negative findings in this large-n study impair Inglehart’s case. Similarly, Jackman and Miller (1995) found that PM did not explain turnout changes in the industrial democracies from 1981-1990. Falling turnout would again support Inglehart’s claim that old parties are less reliably able to attract votes, while new parties entering elections would be accompanied by rising turnout. This twin effect was not found in the Jackman and Miller study.

Having described the literature that looks at PM and voting, the rest of this section is now devoted to measurement issues. The studies here address the validity and reliability of the PMI, and there is a considerable amount of research that we may use. Clarke’s work is more concerned with order effects in and psychometric properties of the PMI, while the other studies look at the expected political corollaries of given PMI scores in specific populations.

2.1.2.1: Clarke and the validity of the PMI

The most persistent critic of Inglehart is Harold Clarke. He has co-written five journal articles (one in 1991; two in 1997; and two in 1999) that question the validity of the Eurobarometer Values Index. The most recent paper serves as an
adequate summation of his case. Clarke contends that the four-item index is a poor measure of value change _per se_ and should instead be viewed as a series of cumulative gauges of immediate responses to prevailing politico-economic conditions. Homing in on the 'fight rising prices' component, he stresses that this is only one of two co-ordinates of a materialist orientation. The core problem that faced western governments for much of the fourth quarter of the twentieth century was unemployment. Therein lies the difficulty - if someone is motivated by a pressing (and undeniably materialist) concern about joblessness, they have no suitable endorsement option in the four-item index (note how this relates to Flanagan's argument of the dilemma of constrained choice). By dint of a lack of any genuine choice, the 'worried' respondent opts for 'fight rising prices', as this is at least one item that has fiscal and thus survival implications. How this affects the resultant classification breakdown is summed up by Clarke et al. as follows:

When inflation is not a salient economic problem, respondents eschew the rising prices item but are forced by the format to choose one of the remaining three, none of which deals with other economic concerns they have. Respondents who do not select the prices item have a zero probability of being classified as a materialist.

_**op. cit. 2.**_

In the 1991 and the first of the 1997 articles, Clarke, Dutt and Rapkin[^33] re-examined the _Eurobarometer_ data on eight Western European countries from 1976-

[^33]: The trio only combined on the second paper here - Clarke and Dutt co-authored the first one.
1982 and found a surprising correlation: the percentage of postmaterialists was positively associated with rising unemployment which itself was negatively associated with the percentage of materialists. If one accepts Inglehart's index as a valid measure of value change, then one must logically accept that '... these relationships suggest that joblessness and resulting economic insecurity helped fuel the value shift in Western countries in the 1980s and early 1990s.' (Clarke et al., 1999: 3). The correlations reinforce the challenge to the entire socialisation/scarcity foundation of PM by departing from Inglehart's approach in explicitly tracing the Eurobarometer trends against the backdrop of the actual politico-economic setting of the 1980s on. This is a valuable contribution to the appraisal of PM precisely because Inglehart more often than not neglects to directly cite how in vivo political circumstances can mould postmaterialist trends. Clarke et al. presume that as inflation tended towards a low and stable level for this period overall, citizens were quite correctly not according much importance to rising prices as a perceived political priority. This 'realistic' and 'appropriate' response to the economic background led to a fall in the number of people picking 'fight rising prices' as their top priority so that there was an artificial rise in postmaterialists and a similarly deceptive fall in materialists.

However, Clarke and his collaborators acknowledged the circumstantial aspect of the evidence and so decided to explicitly test how an altered index affects the percentage of recorded postmaterialists and materialists. Replacing the inflation measure with a joblessness one, they surveyed a Canadian sample in 1995. They kept the original measure in addition to their revised one and randomly distributed both sets of the questionnaire. The response rate was approximately equal. For the

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34 'create more jobs' in place of 'fight rising prices'.
35 709 for the original measure and 696 for the revised one.
half-sample that received the original measure, 15 per cent selected 'fight rising prices' as their most important priority, whereas 52 per cent picked 'create more jobs' as the crucial concern in the revised index. The difference was significant at the $p = 0.001$ level and was not eroded by a follow-up question as to the second most pressing concern. As an adjunct to the new index, the authors included a Likert-type question gauging the extent of concern with eleven issues: 0 (not at all concerned) to 100 (extremely concerned): 54 per cent of the sample were more worried about jobs, whereas only 12 per cent emphasised price control.

To pre-empt any criticism that they should have tested in a country where Eurobarometer had already been running, the investigators then repeated the procedure in Germany. Recognising that the responses of former East and West Germans were likely to be different, they break down the results accordingly. In 1996, 30 per cent of the western Germans responding to the standard battery were classified materialists, with 16 per cent postmaterialists. With the modified battery, however, the percentage of materialists rises to 42 and that for postmaterialists drops to 7. The PMI balance measure in the former is -14, but -35 in the second half-sample. A similar picture emerges from the eastern German survey in 1996 and for both politico-geographical groups in 1997. The modification to the methodology used in Canada was subtle yet illuminating: there were two sampling points (1996 and 1997). The 1996 test mirrored the Canadian procedure as already described, whilst the 1997 test entailed administering both the old and new batteries to the same respondents at different stages in the interview. Even more disturbingly for Inglehart, there appear to have been strong order effects. For western Germans taking the new battery first, 28 per cent opted for 'maintain order in the nation' as
their second ranked priority; this is a 16 per cent drop when compared with western Germans taking the old battery first. The corresponding figures for 'more say' and 'free speech' (the postmaterialist concerns) are 13 per cent versus 21 per cent and 7 per cent versus 14 per cent. This validity infirming factor is accompanied by a test-retest problem: for western Germans answering the new battery first, 53 per cent chose unemployment as their number one concern - yet when they took the old battery 15 minutes later, only 21 per cent picked rising prices as the top priority. With both items being materialist, there should not be this degree of discrepancy. The challenge is more graphically depicted in the following: for the western Germans asked the old before the new version, 69 per cent of those categorised as postmaterialist move to the mixed or materialist groups. The shift is even greater for the eastern Germans (79 per cent). The authors conclude that whenever an economy exhibits high unemployment and low inflation, the standard battery misinforms through making it appear that a postmaterialist trend is ongoing. The closing argument of Clarke et al. is that Eurobarometer responses are context-bound and thus do not reflect underlying value shift. At a stroke, the socialisation part of Inglehart's structure is cut away.

### 2.1.2.2: The construction and corollaries of the PMI

It is this context-bound or situational interpretation of the Eurobarometer archive that serves as the entry point for further challenges to the generalisability of Inglehart's findings. Curry and O'Connell (2000) found that Postmaterialist Values

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36 Reber (1995) writes that these can confound an experiment and must be accounted for by counterbalancing, whereby Sample 1 performs tests $X$ and $Y$ in that order, and a matched Sample 2 performs $Y$ and $X$ in that order. Inglehart completely omits to do this.

37 Another term for Reliability of a test.
(PMVs) rose in Northern Ireland Nationalists and Republicans, which would contradict Inglehart's assertions. The authors' opposition rests on the timeframe in which the Eurobarometer data were collated. Curry and O'Connell looked at the figures for 1982-1991 and found the rising PMVs in a time of high physical (terrorist-based) and economic (damaged economy due to bombings and a precarious environment for business investment) insecurity.

A problem of heightened resonance exists for Nationalists and Republicans with the 'free speech' measure; this could act as a proxy for the right to challenge authority, while 'greater say in government' may well tap the desire for a change in the status of UK dominion over the region and/or power sharing. Curry and O'Connell buttress their claim by referring to Smith and Gaskell (1990), who found that black British males were less likely than their white counterparts to emphasise 'maintain order'. Should one attribute this to greater levels of PM in blacks or instead to the reasonable assumption that they associate 'order' with a police force infected by racism? With these possible oversights - the Canadian data; the breakdown of the German results; the Northern Ireland nationalists' postmaterialist values, and those of young black Britons, there arises a real doubt as to the applicability of the traditional reading of the Eurobarometer when one has a context against which to check the assessment.

Davis and Davenport (1999) question the worth of Inglehart's Eurobarometer at a nuts- and-bolts level. Instead of looking at the PM balance figures, they set out to define how individual item responses measure up against the claim of a diffuse value transformation. They acknowledge from the beginning that the aggregate level (across states and periods) scenario does indeed corroborate Inglehart's generational

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38 As gauged by their vote choice of SDLP (Nationalist) or Sinn Féin (Republican).
replacement hypothesis, but do not discern a constraining logic at the individual level - there appears to be a randomness to their choices. In dissenting from Inglehart as to the validity of the Eurobarometer as an indicator of value change, the authors are motivated by a scepticism concerning both the four- and twelve-item batteries. Their analysis is laid out in three sections: (i) a restatement that PM, if it exists at all on a national or cultural plane, must have its homologue at the level of the individual; (ii) the statistical significance of response patterns to both four- and twelve-item batteries, and (iii) a broader look at the concomitant validity of PM as a predictor of sociopolitical values and attitudes as a whole. A large databank, collected from the 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1992 National Election Studies (NES) for the United States; the General Social Surveys (GSS) of 1993 and 1994, and the American part of the 1991 World Values Survey, is deployed. This is evidently a fairly based attempt to see if the batteries work well across different time and interview contexts for an American sample. All the surveys listed used the four-item measure, while the WVS also included the 12-item battery. We take each of their points in turn.

Firstly, they highlight the likelihood that individual responses may well suffer from cognitive factors such as ease of retrievability (the item being placed at the end of the list would be such a feature). They tested this by means of a 1997 survey of more than 1,000 adults in Michigan and found strong response order effects: 'Giving people more say' was chosen as most important by 50 per cent of people when it appeared last on the list, but by 48.2; 34.2 and 33.9 per cent when placed second, third or fourth respectively. This militates against Inglehart's proposal of an undergirding value consistency in choosing goals.
Secondly, basing their research question on classical probability theory, the authors highlight the appropriate statistical point - there is a 0.50 chance of selecting a postmaterialist or materialist value (two items from four) and there is by extension a 0.333 chance of selecting a matching value item (one from three remaining items). There are 12 possible response combinations. Randomness allows for eight of these (66.6 per cent) to be classified as mixed; two (16.6 per cent) as postmaterialist and two (16.6 per cent) as materialist. Taking these probability values as given, Davis and Davenport pose two questions - is the overall response pattern suggestive of randomness (are the ratios the same as probability theory could predict)? Secondly, is the conditional probability of picking a second item that matches the first in value type is greater than chance (one in three)? The challenge has been mooted before by Brooks and Manza (1994:547), who question whether postmaterialist and materialist values are mutually exclusive above the chance benchmark. For the entire databank (nine pooled data sets), in only three cases - the NESs of 1988 and 1992 and the WVS of 1991 - did selection of postmaterialist values exceed chance and only one of these (the last) fell within the range of sampling error. For the NES sets of 1972, 1976 and 1980, the figures are sizeably smaller than the randomness margin, whilst the remaining cases approximate chance values. Davis and Davenport detect a tendency for Americans to become less materialist but not necessarily more postmaterialist. In fact, the figures for the more recent data sets follow a random pattern. There is a small but steady fall-off in selection of the two materialist items and furthermore, the percentage of those who chose a second materialist item exceeded chance in six of the nine years. This statistically probable response set was at its highest level of significance in 1972, 1976 and 1980, years of high inflation. In times of low inflation (the late 1980s and early 1990s sampling points), there is no corollary of a PM trend -
only in 1991 is the figure greater than chance. The conclusion of Davis and Davenport is that the situational context may well mask the true picture, inflating any putative underlying generational shift. In this case, the particularity is inflation: Davis and Davenport note the volatility of inflation in the 1970s and its peak value of 13.5 per cent in 1980. It would appear logical for citizens to opt for this real-world concern as and when they were surveyed.

Inglehart addresses the criticisms of both Davis and Davenport and Clarke et al. in the one article (all three pieces were published in the one issue of the American Political Science Review). Taking up from where Davis and Davenport leave off, Inglehart affirms that he carried out validation procedures for each of the four index items and how they related to the larger item list. He reports that he was able on the basis of this to split the 12 concerns into two six-item clusters, expressing materialist and postmaterialist goals respectively. There then follows a very intricate defence against Davis and Davenport's accusation that there is no probability-based reason for accepting that people choose any two goals according to consistent ideological preference. Davis and Davenport cavil that a factor analysis of the items and choice consistency cannot be carried out as the items are ranked, and factor analysis is thus inappropriate. In his defence, Inglehart cites work by Rokeach, and Jackson and Alwin, where they demonstrate that factor analysis is applicable.

Inglehart then invokes the 1995 WVS, where the four goals are divided into the appropriate postmaterialist / materialist cluster in all 40 societies polled. This is, however, tantamount to changing the rules of the game. Inglehart seems to be asserting that in practice, people classify goals according to how he has conceived they would classify - but Davis and Davenport are motivated by an individual-level
analysis, and not by the cross-cultural view. To shield his work from criticism about internal validity, Inglehart draws on a second, unrelated case of in situ findings. He presents aggregated data to back up his case and perhaps his most persuasive piece of evidence is where Inglehart goes back to the Davis and Davenport samples and finds that responses fall together 'appropriately' or consistently in three out of four comparisons: all to a statistically significant degree. A percentage breakdown better illustrates the point:

...66% of those classified as materialist chose economic growth as the most important goal in the second four-item battery, while only 41% of the materialists selected that option; conversely, only 14% of the materialists chose giving people more say in their jobs as the most important goal, while 41% of the postmaterialists gave it top priority. In every case, persons in the mixed category occupy an intermediate position between materialists and postmaterialists. Contrary to Davis and Davenport's claims, these choices are far from random: They are significant at lower than the .001 level.


Inglehart's second response to Davis and Davenport's claims centres on the strength of correlation between the materialist and postmaterialist indices according to the three batteries (of four items each) that compose the extended test. Correlations

39 This refers to the ability of any one element of a test to adequately measure what it purports to measure (Kerlinger, 1986).
in each case do not reach 0.30, but Inglehart contends that these are still robust findings for individual items, as there is no booster effect, often found with response sets. As a result, Inglehart would have the reader believe that these are more than adequate correlations. He moves away from individual-level statistics and examines the broader setting. If we take this point as one related to that made in the Davis and Davenport paper, their case is made more compelling. Inglehart also tries to cast doubt on the merits of Clarke et al.'s criticisms; interestingly, the two protagonists had by this stage been involved in a debate on PM that had been ongoing since the mid-1980s. To reiterate: Clarke's point (1999) is that the index measures situationally-specific political responses, namely the comparative unimportance of inflation in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century. Inglehart rejects this, underlining the extended temporal length of the _Eurobarometer_ survey in contrast to Clarke et al.'s circumscribed samples. In order to do justice to the concept of PM, Inglehart proposes that one has to test over the whole course of the time series. He is eager to allude to his prediction of (roughly) a one point rise per year in the PMI balance - as this prediction was made as far back as 1970, he is apparently safe with this defence.

Clarke and other colleagues have elsewhere focused on unemployment as a substitute measure, but Inglehart is not content with this switch. He argues that the three separate batteries complement each other, allowing investigators to more accurately measure similar value objects. This, then, excuses the fact that Clarke et al. find different results precisely because they use different batteries (inflation replaced by unemployment). Inglehart is wary of including an unemployment measure in the values survey; he writes that he already ran a test with this in 1970, but found it to be 'less effective than most of the materialist factors tested' (1999: 13). The reason for this is because of its ambiguous location on the materialist / postmaterialist
dimension. Materialists, according to Inglehart, may well prioritise it because it actively threatens their financial security, while postmaterialists may endorse it out of a sense of solidarity with poorer citizens. He does not deny that unemployment can have a depressive effect on the PMI - it, like inflation, serves to act as the two period effects that counter the upward trend. What Inglehart nevertheless does think crucial is the overall rising trajectory due to intergenerational replacement. He also notes that the overall pattern of unemployment and inflation serves to cancel out the effect due to each; inflation has been generally low whilst unemployment has been high since the late 1970s. Skillfully deploying economic data, Inglehart is able to demonstrate that the 1990 weighted average inflation rate in the original six European states surveyed was the same as in 1970, thus controlling for inflation. The PMI went up in this period, from -29 to -6. This rate of change amounts to the 1.15 points per annum increase that Inglehart (Inglehart and Abramson, 1995) had stated would occur solely due to intergenerational replacement.

Inglehart uses the same nation-specific example as found in the second half of the Clarke et al. paper. As unemployment in the former East Germany was higher (twice as much, approximately) then in the old West, Inglehart continues on from Clarke et al's assertion that high unemployment is negatively correlated with materialism - the opposite would appear to hold. In the former East Germany, the materialists outweigh the West German equivalents (34 per cent versus 29 per cent), while the number of postmaterialists is considerably lower (9 per cent versus 16 per cent).
2.1.2.1: Summary of the specific criticisms

The large-n quantitative work by Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992) weakens Inglehart’s case that PM is a useful model for understanding vote change in three areas - volatility; turnout; and relative party share distributed between ‘new politics’ parties and the established left. The survey analyses variously carried out by Clarke; Dutt and Rapkin; Davis and Davenport; and O’Connell and Curry, amount to a strong attack on the validity and reliability of the PMI. Specifically, we learn that situational factors amount to a confounding variable, which Inglehart neither accepts nor refutes; that the PMI has low test-retest reliability, and that the materialist / postmaterialist ranking is prone to order effects.

2.2 New criticisms

This section presents this author’s own general and specific criticisms on Inglehart’s theory. It sets out to appraise Inglehart’s work in a new way. The bulk of the existing criticisms are invariably very specific, looking at the construction of the surveys and what we may reliably know from them. My aim was to critically evaluate his work in two different areas – his assumptions about the applicability of concepts from other fields of social-scientific inquiry, and his line of research in political culture. This section of the chapter serves as a new set of theoretical criticisms of his work in PM. The rest of the thesis does not aim to test these criticisms; instead it aims to empirically test a set of hypotheses we derive from Inglehart’s claims about PM.

This section is divided in four parts. In the first and second, Inglehart’s usage of industrial sociology and psychology is critically assessed; we bring in other psychology findings in order to better appreciate how prone to untested assumptions
much of his value shift argument is. Thirdly, his integration of the concept of postmodernism in to his work is discussed. Finally, existing concepts relating to the problems of researching culture are applied to criticise his third period of work.

Inglehart’s research is interdisciplinary, not in terms of its methods, but in his borrowing of concepts in order to explain value change and then to link it up with political outcomes. His grasp of the concepts he utilises from industrial sociology and psychology and his understanding of their implications has not been discussed in the political science literature.40 Industrial sociology merits discussion as Inglehart’s work relies implicitly on the concept of embourgeoisement, which was developed by industrial sociologists. The psychology part is particularly relevant and it is surprising that it has not been addressed before. As Todosijevic and Enyedi (2003:631) describe PM as a social-psychological theory, I devote some time to looking at how social psychology is inextricably linked up with any evaluation of Inglehart’s claims. I advance on Todosijevic and Enyedi’s discussion by also drawing in work from the field of developmental psychology in order to judge the soundness of Inglehart’s claims on political socialisation, and psychometrics so that his design of the PMI may be evaluated. Finally, we examine Inglehart’s recent practice of interchanging postmodernism and PM. In so doing, we have a further demonstration of Inglehart’s lack of rigour in explaining political phenomena through inappropriate referrals to other areas of social inquiry.

40 Although the reader is directed to Wilensky (2002: 186-208), where a critical account is given of how the social sciences qualify and depict socio-political change; there is also a good overview of Inglehart’s work and some of its flaws.
2.2.1: Inglehart and Industrial Sociology

There is much to contest in Inglehart’s understanding of the profile of the ‘new politics’ voter - he extrapolates from theories produced elsewhere in the social sciences, but does not rigorously specify how and where the transfer from one domain of knowledge to the other may be expedited. It is Inglehart’s usage of variegated theoretical inputs that causes a problem for the student; more often than not, he does not explicitly refer to a corroborating framework in the system of thought from which he borrows. The above accusation is certainly valid in Inglehart’s proclamation of a new society where ‘working-class’ is a notion that structures less and less voting and political values. All through his research, Inglehart underlines the changed priorities evinced by the non-manual worker; this term, as is explained here, derives from industrial sociology. What we find when we read Inglehart (especially 1970 and 1977) is that he gives a very selective view of the concept of how work changes may come to affect politics. His referencing is sparse, not drawing on the debates around all of the points he deems important, suggesting a desire to make the reader believe that his view is correct or that there is in fact no disagreement. This is apparent, for example, in his presentation of workplace change, from increased pay to job role variation, as having nothing to do with the activities of trade unions. His views of the political and societal by-products of a reduced scale of manual labour are simplistic, as evidenced by his lack of insight that automation results in deskilling and often higher unemployment. This in turn would affect both the standard of living and the negotiating power of trade unions.

41 Interestingly, Inglehart is much less keen to use empirical findings from other disciplines; he clearly favours grafting theories instead.
Scholarly work on the consequences of a diffuse raise in the standard of living abounded in America and Europe in the 1960s. Many view Friedmann's (1946) research as the foundation of this new area of industrial sociology; he speculated as to the dual effects of greater automation - rising frustration at deskill and more leisure time. In the early 1960s, Kornhauser noted in a paper the likely psychological results of industrialisation and increased affluence. This in turn followed on from Sayles' (1958) article, *The Behavior of Industrial Work Groups*. The theorists were all interested in the culture of work within the factory and the concomitant micropolitical activity: the propensity to strike or disobey management. It is stressed that with regard to the political consequences of automation, all of these authors were either silent or tentative.

In 1969, Goldthorpe et al. took the first steps in changing this by bringing the term 'embourgeoisement' into the arena of social science enquiry. This classic study took as its sample a 'Luton car worker', a skilled working-class male whose aspirations and attitudes marked him out as different from the inveterate working-class. Goldthorpe's idea was simple: that a wealthier class of worker, with more leisure time and middle-class aims, was emerging in certain sectors of British industry that were undergoing a boom. The hypothesis was part of a series of British, American and French studies that took 'embourgeoisement' as a new and critical sociological development. What is noteworthy, however, is that the profile was constructed by sociologists, and the prime concern in each study was not the resulting new political orientation of this type of worker. In fact, only Mallet (1965) provided a reasonably thorough political exegesis, in the analysis of how this altered section of the working-class population was not attracted by the platform of a

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42 See Rose (1988) for an authoritative introduction to this field.
classical class-based party (in this case, the French Communists). For the other key studies (cf. Blauner, 1964, and Gallie, 1978), the political implications of working-class affluence are expressed in the form of codas. It was not until 1974 that MacKenzie moved the concept on to a broader level of analysis by looking at the political profile of the newly-constituted, materially-satisfied working class. It is Inglehart who takes the concept of the affluent worker from one field (industrial sociology) and grafts it directly onto another (political behaviour). But where Inglehart errs is in his omission of bridging points - how easy it is to transfer the concept and where do the necessary changes need to be made and contexts adduced. This is most apparent in his most representative works, *The Silent Revolution* (1977) and *The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society* (1984). Inglehart does not even refer by name to the original research field that first proposed the notion of the affluent worker. In reading Inglehart, one would think that the link between the nature of work and political orientation has been an unbroken one. That is simply not that case. The methodology deployed by the industrial sociologists could not capture the range of implications that Inglehart would appear to think it has. Reading Rose (1988) strengthens the sense of confusion - the individual reader is left to decide how best to view the aggregated information on embourgeoisement.

2.2.1.1: Summary of Inglehart and Industrial Sociology

There has been much debate within industrial sociology on as to whether the concept of the affluent worker explains more about workplace, societal, or electoral change. Inglehart presents an argument based in part on industrial sociology that people in that field would be wary of making. He assumes that certain changes in
the nature of work are automatically accompanied by a weakening of the links between the working-class and old leftist politics. No such unambiguous claim is made within the specific literature. He also assumes that certain changes in the aspirations of workers in the service sector have pressing political implications. Again, this has not been shown to be the case by the competent authorities in the field.

2.2.2: Inglehart and Psychology

In the above, we saw how Inglehart’s usage of embourgeoisement does not square with its base domain of industrial sociology. We now move on to how he treats psychology, another building block of his theory. Inglehart’s utilisation of psychological concepts is marked by an incoherency that affects his theory based on a less than solid understanding of (i) the mental durability of pre-adult experience and how this may be measured; (ii) how education affects political thinking; (iii) the nature of identity and how changeable it is; and (iv) how values, attitudes, opinions and behaviours link up to each other. The material is arranged in the foregoing structure as it then follows the natural course of ipsative development — from childhood experience through identity acquisition and education, on to political behaviour in adulthood. Taking each of the four aspects in turn, it will be seen that he misapprehends much of the concepts he borrows from psychology and it is proposed that this seriously infirms his theorising. He does not give a balanced account of the literature cited, nor does he acknowledge debates within psychology as to the contestability of the psychological material he uses.
2.2.2.1: The mental durability of pre-adult experience and how this may be measured

One of the two conceptual pillars of PM is the socialisation hypothesis (Inglehart, 1977; 1999b) - that one's political values are in large part determined by one's pre-adult exposure to political phenomena. In his 1967 paper, Inglehart delves into the topic of when political orientations are acquired:

The central element...is something which we might call "structural inertia" in concept formation. Taking this view, we would regard the socialisation process as one in which perceptions become altered into increasingly complex conceptual structures. Only a few of the infant's earliest perceptions - those related to basic needs - will give rise to subjectively important symbols...Subsequent perceptions which are regularly associated with these symbols may take on a derivative importance; these will tend to become relatively permanent...


Inglehart presents late childhood as the stage of maximal sensitivity to political information that will have a durable effect (ibid. 96). Anything encountered before the late childhood period is likely to be most influential. The missing information here are studies that back up Inglehart's hypothesis and also a clear reference to what psychological literature he has consulted; Maslow is not sufficient here.
A sample-related problem is the factor of class mobility; can resocialisation occur if, say, a child from a working-class background goes on to university and a professional career? Abramson (1972), a long-term collaborator of Inglehart, tentatively concludes that young adults do adapt somewhat and move closer to towards ‘the political norms of their destination class’, as Sears (1983: 92) writes. How much of a modification takes place? Sears (1975) provides an overview of the relevant literature here and writes in a later paper ‘...the best current guess is that the lion’s share of mobility-instigated resocialization is accomplished in late adolescence and early adulthood.’ (1983: 92-3). This is an important point - a long-running debate in developmental psychology is the idea of when a pattern is set up from which deviations are unlikely to occur. Some psychologists propose that there are crucial periods, which means that there are given timeframes for when an organism is maximally responsive to the laying down of psychological faculties. Whether perfect in form, flawed, or indeed absent, the resulting state is immutable. Inglehart’s works are entirely neglectful of any of the evidently relevant research here. Additionally, he is seldom unequivocal as to the precise timeframe of the acquisition of political attitudes or values or identities.

With the above problem in mind, it is helpful to return to Inglehart’s core model of socialisation and scarcity, one which contains two elements - the impressionable years and Maslovian principles. Alwin (1994) tells us that there are six models of stability over the course of the lifespan. To begin with, the models can only be applied to phenomena that are reasonably robust; tastes in clothing or music are inappropriate. The 'stable' entity should be psychologically meaningful, measurable and reasonably durable. Political values are eminently suitable for study

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43 It is left to the reader to delimit 'late childhood'; the developmental psychologists Rutter and Rutter (1992) take adolescence as staring at eleven or twelve, so it (late childhood) is thus prior to this.
here (see Kuklinski, 2000). Differences in stability reflect the relative composition of the phenomenon in question. If it is a trait, it is quite resistant to change; if a state, then as state alters as, say, a function of maturation, then so will the phenomenon. Inglehart's schema is an instance of the Model D category, as is clear from Alwin's taxonomy:

This model converges with what I take to be the most prominent view of the relationship between individual development and macro social change, which, as stated at the outset, contains three distinct elements: (a) the impressionable years hypothesis, which states that youth or young adulthood are periods of greatest mutability, (b) the stability hypothesis, which states that after some early point in adult life most human characteristics become relatively stable, remaining so throughout the adult life span, and (c) the hypothesis that social change occurs via the turnover in cohorts, with each cohort potentially bearing different traits and/or world views, and thus, changing the aggregate nature of society through cohort succession and replacement.

*Alwin, 1994: 144*

Strikingly, Alwin's account of intergenerational change is more explicit and concise than anywhere in Inglehart's work. It is remiss of Inglehart not to be as unambiguous in presenting how his theory arose and where it fits in with extant knowledge. Psychologists are much more hesitant about giving a definite timeframe for the acquisition of durable values. In an authoritative review of the developmental
psychology research on continuity and change in psychological phenomena, Roberts and Del Vecchio (2000) conclude that one cannot say with any certainty that values are held 'intact' from pre-adult years. In a study specifically designed to test the impact of generational replacement on cultural change, van den Broek (1999) concluded it to be, at best, limited. Furthermore, he found that psychometric instruments could not be reliably used to differentiate between different generations.

We can infer the following from this – Inglehart’s PMI may well be able to produce an age-differentiated profile, but it is at odds with purpose-built psychometric models in being able to do so. It would seem to be the case that Inglehart’s PMI, as a four-item measure, simply does not meet the level of rigour and sophistication required in its construction in order to qualify as a valid psychological tool. This fault leads us to look at the sensitivity of the PMI and how well constructed it would need to be in order to fulfil Inglehart’s claims about it. We note two lacunae in the instrument. The first refers to repeated stimuli testing (where the sample changes but the test is purposely kept invariant as in the case of Eurobarometer) - the method cannot faithfully gauge pressure to change (Sears, 1983). Pressure on certain political issues may be heavy at one time and not another; Sears cites the waxing and waning in targets of xenophobia as exemplary. Due to a wartime situation, distrust of non-self nationalities usually rises (op. cit. 85) and is evidently most marked for the military opponents. The four items from Eurobarometer are constant throughout the length of Inglehart's research programme; a chronology of political events alongside the time-series data would allow the reader to (partially, at least) assess the impact of, say, a national strike or a political scandal on any one set of national responses. Such an adjunct is absent from the published work on PM. Of course, such an undertaking would add considerably to the burden of the country specialists.
Inglehart's methodology does, however, benefit from the combined cross-sectional and panel approaches to surveys; the result is a type of sample known as the synthetic cohort. Essentially, as the same cohort is not followed over time, any fluctuations in responses are attributed to cohort differences. Again, Alwin is a useful resource here:

the problem [of using a synthetic cohort approach] is one of specifying a model that allows both instability and unreliability to vary as a function of age and obtaining estimates of age-specific stability that are unconfounded with measurement error.

*op. cit. 154*

Here is another flaw in the PMI - the shaky assumption on Inglehart's part is that any changes in attitudes are due solely to cohort change and not, for instance, to the topicality of a certain political entity as reported in the media. We see how these problems combine to skew how we interpret Inglehart's reading of the survey data. Let us look again at the Clarke et al. criticisms of his work and Inglehart's lengthy defence. We see that his defence is itself flawed in two vital areas. The first is where Inglehart categorises postmaterialists as being concerned with unemployment because of its comparatively more damaging effect on the poor. A perusal of a basic economics text would inform the reader that inflation also disproportionately injures the poorer members of a society. They are more quickly exposed to rising prices of necessities and their lack of assets leaves them more reliant on devalued money than more affluent citizens. As this is evidently the case, why should a postmaterialist *not* be as concerned about inflation for purely altruistic reasons as they are for unemployment? Secondly, Inglehart is disingenuous when citing levels of PM and
materialism in the old East Germany with unemployment as the independent variable. He conveniently omits to incorporate the *early socialisation* aspect of his theory; indubitably, (East) Germans are likely to be materialist precisely because they were socialised in a state with a lower standard of living than (West) Germans. Without a regression model here, one which would allow for the separating out of early versus contemporary experience and how they differentially mould responses, Inglehart is not on steady ground.

### 2.2.2.2: How education affects political thinking

There are three obstacles to accepting Inglehart's view of how education relates to political change at the individual level. Firstly, the glaring omission here is the lack of supporting evidence from other scholars. It is hard to conceive of how one could leave out the work of Sullivan *et al.* (1979), Jackman and Muha (1984) and Bobo and Licari (1989), all of which cover the ground on the links between education, political thinking and acting. Inglehart does not take time to consider that although people improve their communicative skills through education, it is important to note that 'these skills, however, are of a purely technical nature. They concern a general ability to receive, process and discuss information. However, nothing can be said about the democratic substance of such skills’ (Roßteutscher, 2002: 521). Galston (2001) corroborates this; his comprehensive review of the link between levels of education and political knowledge supports a view diametrically opposed to Inglehart (1971 and *passim*) that more education leads to greater knowledge, which in turn facilitates critical thinking and, eventually, more extraparliamentary activity. Galston concludes that the current US college graduates know as much about politics as high school graduates did 50 years ago. There has been no increase in
'cognitive mobilisation'. Warwick (1998) sets out to adjudicate between the effects of education versus early socialisation security. He finds that Inglehart is statistically naïve, not taking care to construct a model that considers the indirect effects early socialisation and education have on each other.

2.2.2.3: The nature of identity and how changeable it is

There is a marked imprecision in Inglehart's usage of the concept of identity. Much of his basic work in this area has heavily influenced survey designers in political science; Abramson and Inglehart (1998) are cognisant of this in their review of the Beliefs in Government series. The aim of this series was ambitious: to present the attitudinal co-ordinates of mass publics and specify how these interacted with politics. In Volume Two, the question is the stance of the citizen towards international governance and especially the European Union. Niedermayer and Westler found the following, as summarised by Abramson and Inglehart: 'The data suggest an increase in European identity between 1982 and 1986, followed by a decline until 1990, a brief recovery in 1991, and a general decline in 1992' (op. cit. 186). As there is no criticism of the finding on the part of the reviewers, it can safely be assumed that the foregoing is not problematic for Abramson and Inglehart.

However, even a passing familiarity with the concept of identity would show that it is much less mutable than as described above; if it were not, identity would not be the anchor that it has to be in order to count as a firmly definable constellation of psychological attributes. Reber's Dictionary of Psychology (1995: 355) takes it to be ‘a person's essential, continuous self; the internal, subjective concept of oneself as an individual; Baumeister (1991) is similarly stringent in setting the bar at a high level - identity is not prone to this frequency of fluctuation. Rosenberg's definition,
as cited in Alwin (op. cit.) includes such identities as sexual and racial categorisations, which are evidently quite resistant if not nigh-impervious to change. Next on the list in terms of resilience are family and work identities, while identities based on a geographic area, political party, or voluntary organisation are most likely to shift. Political attitudes on the European Union would seemingly rank even further down the list than this last grouping. Similarly, Inglehart does not look at intraindividual cognitive and value shifts which affect identity and thus lifestyle choices in any of his papers, with the possible exception of his 1989 reply to a paper by Reimer on the psychology of values in adolescents. Reimer focused on the political content of alternative lifestyles and tastes and Inglehart acknowledges that such an approach may be a useful adjunct, without being specific. This lack of detail works its way into his methodology. Inglehart does not have a clear rationale for disregarding membership of some lifestyle groups and not others, for example, the political content of being a skinhead or a new age traveller, as distinct from someone who is a member of Greenpeace. Inglehart's meaning has little to do with the psychologists' meaning; although there is a range of stringency in defining the term, not one psychological definition extends so far as to encompass Inglehart's reading. It amounts to slack research on which his entire theory stands.

2.2.2.4: How values, attitudes, opinions and behaviours link up to each other

Finally, and perhaps most damagingly of all, is Inglehart’s fundamental misapprehension of the set of relations between values, attitudes, opinions and behaviours. There is a rigorous body of work in social psychology that was begun by Ajzen and Fishbein (1975, see Ajzen, 2001, for an update) which looks at the complexities underlying the consistencies between these four categories. Briefly,
their work proposes that what a person says they will do does not mean they will do it. By extension, it has been noted that people’s responses to surveys are often a weak indicator of consequent behaviours. This line of reasoning has featured in much political socialisation research, for example, some key works of Sears (1983), Billig (1982), Alwin (1994) and Rasinski (2001). As a result, Inglehart is hardly in a position to comment authoritatively on the nature of attitudinal-behavioural linkage as we have no indication he has consulted the canonical works. It is considered as good survey practice to recognise that great care must be taken when inferring likely behaviours from responses to general questions. Inglehart makes sweeping assumptions about respondent’s intentions and outlooks when the survey method just does not allow for this. When Inglehart assumes that he is tapping people’s values by means of a questionnaire, it is in fact quite likely that instead, he is accessing people’s attitudes, which are much more contextually-influenced and thus changeable.

2.2.2.5: Summary of Inglehart and Psychology

Inglehart has no real evidence on which to base his claims that political values are acquired in pre-adolescence. His sampling does not enable him to draw the conclusions he makes, nor does he incorporate any modern psychology theory or experiments on the relative permanence of early-acquired mental content. Inglehart’s work is lacking in any exploration of how education interacts with a person’s developing political cognitions. He does not distinguish between the technical skills that years of education provide, versus the content of thought that results from formal tuition. Nor does he differentiate between types of acquired education and how they may or may not affect social thinking. The same problem in reverse affects
this aspect of his theorising as affects his thinking on the durability of pre-adult experience – he assumes identity is highly malleable, whereas all the psychological literature posits that it is in fact quite resistant to change. The study of values is acknowledged as being a remarkably complex activity, largely because we do not have sufficiently sensitive instruments that can pick up these underlying facets. As a result, Inglehart’s work on political values should be realistically relabelled as the study of political attitudes. This weakens the solidity of any claims he makes on value shift.

2.2.3: Postmaterialism as Postmodernism

Inglehart’s third period is much marked by his interchanging of the terms postmaterialism and postmodernism. He first uses it in response to Reimer’s (1989) criticism of the postmaterialist and materialist labels. Reimer contends that the concepts described by the terms are too narrow and that the best way of explaining the weakened ties between social structural variables and voting is to invoke a postmodernist approach. Reimer looks at a Swedish sample of young people and notes their seemingly contradictory political choices. To clarify the admittedly blurred picture, Reimer deems the work of Pierre Bourdieu\(^44\) essential. Reimer believes that it is a misjudgment to argue that people are either postmaterialist or materialist (or an even mix of the two); people are confronted with by ever-increasing pluralism. As the hierarchical structures further loosen their grip on young people, then a confluence of lifestyle types emerges to form a patterned

\(^{44}\) Bourdieu’s work is both philosophical and sociological in nature; his major works in translation are a treatise on television values and 'lifestyle' demarcations - a person's tastes may be plotted on the axes of cultural and economic capital. The former involves the enjoyment of the high arts, whereas the latter indicates a pleasure due to partaking in, \textit{inter alia}, auctions and business meals (Bourdieu, 1984).
identity (identities is probably preferable). Reimer underlines the point that politics is also a lifestyle choice and is continuously changing as are people's conceptions of it; the binary model of old and new is insufficient and one has to adopt a postmodernist interpretation.

Inglehart considers Reimer's argument to have some merit: 'In his thought-provoking essay, Bo Reimer argues that the orientations of young people are too diverse to be contained inside a materialist/postmaterialist value conception. On this point he is clearly correct.' (Inglehart, 1989: 251). So forceful is Reimer's parry that Inglehart's 1997 book is named *Modernization and Postmodernization*. Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995), summarise the revised Inglehart thesis as found in his third period. They state that a postmodernist society is one where there is a reduced influence of hierarchical institutions and rigid social norms; this is accompanied by an increase in the range of individual choice. It represents a move away the definition of the intrasocietally defined postmaterialist voter, the one who backs George McGovern in the 1972 US Presidential election against Richard Nixon and protests over quality of life issues, to an attempt to geographically pin down types of citizenship according to cultural inheritance. The 1997 book serves as a useful primer of Inglehart's analysis of cultures and differential value outcomes (his ongoing work). Van Deth records that Inglehart takes PM as an instance of postmodernisation. To quote Inglehart himself:
The concept of postmodernism...is amorphous. Defined as 'a space where diverse social and intellectual tendencies converge and clash', almost anything, including postmaterialism, could fit into this diffuse concept. Indeed, postmaterialism fits particularly well because one of its characteristics is the fact that it has raised new issues and a new axis of conflict.

Inglehart, 1989: 251

The original article by Reimer and the response set off alarm bells for the wary empiricist. It is salutary that in the above passage Inglehart feels he can adequately summarise postmodernism in eleven words, as countless others have tried and failed to be so economical. It is a term found in architecture and literature; laboratory science critiques and late-night 'talking heads' television programmes. Sokal and Bricmont (1998) caustically treat it as:

...an intellectual current characterised by the more-or-less explicit rejection of the rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment, by theoretical discourses disconnected from any empirical test, and by a cognitive and cultural relativism that regards science as nothing more than a 'narration', a 'myth' or a social construction among many others.

Practically everything is *prima facie* traduceable to a postmodernist explanation. Once again, the student of political values is entitled to ask how the gap between the postmodernist vogue\(^{45}\) and the political scientist's theory is crossed.

### 2.2.3.1: Summary of Postmaterialism as Postmodernism

We may presume that postmodernism as an academic line of thinking is different from a postmodernist life or set of values, but Inglehart does not explain how the two are different. If he had written a paper where he patiently explained what parts of postmodernism were transferable to political science and operationalised the process; or if he had taken the time to explain the tangent in his thoughts that led him from the 1989 response (a mere aside in terms of word count) on to the genesis of the 1997 book, then the reader would be more certain about just what Inglehart means when he uses the term. In short, his usage of the concept only serves to confuse the reader.

### 2.2.4: Inglehart’s research into political culture

Inglehart’s work for most of the 1990s (and currently) has taken large cultural entities as the unit of analysis. This period is important because in his most recent paper cited here (Autumn 2003) he conjoins a political-cultural argument with a postmaterialist one in order to explain current political behaviours of Central and Eastern European citizens. In these later publications, he looks a range of phenomena from how the Protestant Reformation has affected levels of trust within a contemporary state; how Confucianism is related to subjective well-being in certain

\(^{45}\) Sokal and Bricmont furnish another apposite capsule judgment of postmodernism, calling it a ‘nebulous \textit{Zeitgeist}’ (1998: 4).
Asian countries; on to his use of survey data to test Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ argument (Inglehart and Norris, 2002). Let us look at examine the plausibility of some of these political-cultural findings. Expressed within Inglehart’s later work is the idea that in more educated and technologically advanced states, hierarchical institutions such as organised religion have less of a foothold in the outlook of people. Running counter to this, the 1997 WVS found that of the developed nations, the United States was the most religious. We have a conundrum - the most advanced society of all is marked by the highest levels of religiosity (in observance and beliefs) of all the wealthy states. Inglehart gives two explanations: the finding is attributable to a hangover from the frontier life in the American West, where faith in a higher order ‘gave pioneers the will to brave the challenges of the wilderness’ (Inglehart quoted in The Washington Post, January 12, 1998). A second, entirely different explanation is provided by Inglehart in the same article - religion serves as an anchor for baby-boomers seeking meaning in a secular world.

The first account’s premise presupposes the existence of a type of ‘cultural memory whereas the second invokes a real-time response to the sense of worthlessness in an atomised, money-fuelled society. As Baumeister reminds us (1991), religion has *always* served as a force that bestows a sense of meaning to people’s lives; this applies for animistic, polytheistic and monotheistic faiths. Crucially, one cannot really disconfirm what Inglehart proposes precisely because his explanation is *post hoc*. Additionally, Inglehart’s claim that ‘stable democracies rank high on subjective well-being and interpersonal trust, and authoritarian societies rank low on them...these linkages persist when we control for economic level and social structure.’ (*op. cit.* 23). This is confusing, as Inglehart wrote (1990) that culture was crucial in explaining economic development. This was first focused
on by Inglehart in his 1988 article, *The Renaissance of Political Culture*.\(^\text{46}\) Here, Inglehart follows on from Weber (1930) in claiming that the most economically innovative societies were Protestant (as exemplified in the places of origin of the Industrial Revolution). More recently, the work ethos and respect for authority of the Far Eastern states accounts for how these economies' performance has been so impressive (pp. 81-5). What Inglehart neglects to include is a methodological justification for how economic level can be controlled without self-selecting for cultural type; if economic expansion emanates from a cultural matrix, then logically any and all states that were either classifiable then as Protestant or now as Confucian should be the most innovative and entrepreneurial.

Inglehart's emphasis on the causal nature of political culture causes many problems for the scholar. The scale of difficulty has been commented on by many scholars, but Przeworski's work on the separability of culture and its effects is representative of the best scholarship in the field (Przeworski, 2000). Firstly, cultural explanations are unsound precisely because they are necessarily *post hoc*: the culture is in place first and so axiomatically, everything within a polity post-dates the culture from which it has emerged. Secondly, precisely because it is a *post hoc* explanation it is impossible to falsify (Kerlinger, 1986). If an outcome is at odds with the given cultural cause, then the only solution is to examine the cause in greater detail. The political culture theorist, in discerning Calvinism or Confucianism as the progenitor of any and all political aspects of a culturally-defined state, must guess at how that culture was formed — it is impossible to formulate or test an experimental model. Thirdly, the framework of political culture

\(^{46}\) As for the reference to this article in Chapter Three, the pagination refers to a 1997 reprint of the article.
can serve as an all-purpose excuse rather than a scientific model: as Huntington remarks (1987), if one finds something confounding within France, for example, then one can attribute this to the French being French (cited in Zahariadis, 1997: 15). Inglehart’s neglect of the key debates in this domain further infirms the set of arguments he makes in his third period.

2.2.5: Summary of the new criticisms

Inglehart is inclined not to adequately ground his supporting arguments; he rather disingenuously presents material from sociology and psychology to back up his points. As we have seen, there is a rich history of the socio-political correlates of increased affluence which Inglehart discounts as it leaves the reader with a more conflicting sense of how voting may be affected as a result of workplace change. His handling of psychology is remiss, omitting key counterarguments; on the issues of the nature of identity and how we measure durable psychological entities, as well as the durability of the experiences of early socialisation, he misleads the reader with an ill-founded air of certainty. Similarly, there is no evidence to back up his claim that education always has been and is positively correlated with sociotropic or postmaterialist views. He confuses the reader with enthusiastic but poorly explained reasons as to why we should attribute significance to a postmodernist turn, and he does not take the time to refer to the problem of endogeneity that affects cultural understandings of contemporary processes.
2.3: Conclusion

Flanagan apart, no scholars have tackled Inglehart's work on more than one front at any one time; for this reason, anyone reading the stand-alone critiques of Inglehart has no sense of how the theory bears up generally. It is to Inglehart's credit that he has consistently ploughed the same field for so long; however, as this chapter has demonstrated, he may well be compounding existing errors by not taking on board the diverse charges levelled against the theory of PM.

It may be seen from this chapter that Inglehart's account of a new politics axis is flawed on three points. Firstly, he does not have a proper grasp on the underlying factors behind cross-pressured groups and voters. Secondly, his view of the new right is blurred and confusing. Thirdly, he has a blind spot relating to survey methods - for the political scientist, his repeated usage of instruments that do not take account of confounding variables is an overarching problem, which likewise affects his political-cultural work.

In terms of my new criticisms, it is arguable that his work is vulnerable in his tendency to misrepresent how humans think and act politically, as well as how their outlooks are formed. His keen interest the social sciences is not accompanied by diligent study in either psychology or sociology. Too often, we are expected to take his unsupported word on the nature of how values transform into actions.

This chapter has gathered together a wide range of existing criticisms and proffered a series of new points to bear in mind when appraising Inglehart's model. Many of these individual criticisms and their surrounding debates are sufficient material for a thesis by themselves. This thesis, though, has a specific empirical task and so must leave these debates to one side. In the next chapter, we look at how one may carry out a fair test of Inglehart's model while accepting that his theorising is
contestable. As the reader has seen, Inglehart’s work and the related criticisms add up to a very considerable literature. Most of the literature covered in Chapter One (Historiography) and Chapter Two (Criticisms) is based on large-n quantitative work. Our task is to extract a set of clear hypotheses from all of this work, and test this series of derived hypotheses. We do this by means of a small-n comparative study, a testing process which has not previously been applied to Inglehart’s model of PM. In Chapter Three, we turn to how we accomplish this goal.
Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to provide an empirical test of Inglehart's PM theory by means of a comparative analysis of Ireland and France. We try to see if Inglehart is right when he states that PM has affected politics in western states. We focus on his second period which looks at the political consequences of the supposed value shift. We take his second period as the basis for our thesis as it amounts to his largest body of research and established his reputation. His first period is very much timebound in that it looks at attitudes towards the first efforts to bring about European integration. His third period deals with 'macro' concepts such as the Reformation and culture-specific outlooks that are not amenable to small-n testing. It his middle period which is most specific on contemporary politics and how its features have been affected by value shift. In this context, our first task is to identify the hypotheses that capture Inglehart's main claims. Our second task is to defend the method chosen by which we test our derived hypotheses. Let us begin by setting out our hypotheses.

3.1: Formulating our hypotheses

The article that sets out the effects of value shift on politics most succinctly is Inglehart and Abramson's *Economic Security and Value Change* (1994). They write (op. cit.: 336) that the changes in the electoral landscape are due to parties' unresponsiveness to the new type of voter and issue. They further comment that this lack of responsiveness has already resulted in the following and that these trends will progressively increase:
1. A drop in social class voting.
2. The rise of New Social Movements (NSMs).
3. The increased presence of the ecological movement and Green parties.
4. A fall-off in turnout.
5. A drop in party loyalty.

These symptoms of dealignment combine and eventually build up over time to yield a new political axis, that of the 'new left' and 'new right'. Unfortunately for the scholar, this straightforward list is not readily usable in formulating hypotheses to test. To start with, Inglehart does not state, either here or in other publications, which indicators come first and whether or not they manifest themselves incrementally and sequentially. Secondly, his later work is imprecise on whether green parties are the only new politics parties that have succeeded in establishing themselves electorally. Thirdly, he is not explicit enough on the causes of certain processes. In spite of this, the article still represents the best summary of Inglehart's work on PM, as it gathers in one place more linked symptoms of postmaterialist politics than in any other publication. We now detail how we may better operationalise the test of the theory by justifying each of the hypotheses below:

\[ H_1: \text{That there has been a progressive decline in social class voting.} \]

This is lifted directly from the article and has clear measures, so it does not need to be modified.
\( H_2 \): That drops in party loyalty and turnout are progressively increasing as voters become disaffected by what the established parties have to offer.

Symptoms 4 and 5 are conjoined and a cause hypothesized. The resulting single hypothesis is clearer than the two separate indicators as we work from an assumption that loyalty will weaken before turnout drops.

\( H_3 \): That the new issues and new voters have resulted in a greater prominence for 'new politics' parties.

Symptoms Two and Three overlap, as, presumably, the ecological movement will exist as a group before it contests elections. Additionally, Inglehart refers to the rise of other electoral movements and parties, but often includes discussions of these in his work on NSMs. For the sake of clarity, we look at the impact of new politics parties. In so doing, we also consider the electoral significance of the Green parties for part of this hypothesis.

\( H_4 \): That due to system disaffection, there has been a rise in extraparliamentary activity, most notably in the form of increases in the profile of New Social Movement (NSMs).

As is the case with our second hypothesis, we set out to produce a clearer proposition of Inglehart’s claims by nominating a cause for any rise in NSM activity. We also take into account the possibility that unconventional political activity and NSMs are not synonymous with each other and so look for trends in both.

Above, the five indicators are recast as four hypotheses and form the organising theme of the thesis. An attempt is made to arrange the hypotheses in
some type of hierarchy. While it is of course arguable that the resulting structure may be erroneous, at least we acknowledge the problem of knock-on effects and try to account for them by beginning with the first 'symptom' and moving through to the fourth. We devote a chapter to each of these hypotheses. Having established our hypotheses, we now move on to outline our methodology and its justification.

3.2: The Theory-Infirming Method and Comparative Political Science

Our primary goal is to test PM in a novel and fitting way. It is arguable that the previous criticisms and evaluations as collated in Chapter Two have only taken one or more parts of his theory in isolation from its broader empirical and theoretical context.

Using the PMI, Inglehart presents PM as a model applicable to the post-industrial world generally. He affirms that any country with a per capita Gross domestic product (GDP) figure of $6,000 is certain to fit into this pattern. For countries where the GDP is lower, it is assumed that the pressing needs in life are at the 'survival' level and so the opportunity to emphasise 'expressive' concerns is absent (Inglehart, 1998, passim). The tenor of many of Inglehart's examples of postmaterialist politics is often American; he rarely gives concrete political instances of a 'new politics' morphology outside the US, even though his main data set is a European one. This is further justification for a comparative test. Inglehart's work is of interest to the comparativist as his theory is open to the charge of false universalism or the ecological fallacy (Rose, 1997) - an author assumes a theory drawn from the particularities of one setting or country can be generalised
universally. To test a theory on the basis of the researcher's suspicions that the consequent predictions have not been firmly grounded is to adopt the *theory-infirming method* (Lijphart, 1971). It is worth noting that such a process cannot by itself disconfirm a theory; at best, it may challenge it (Collier, 1994). To question a model is a form of *hypothesis testing* (ibid.) - this thesis aims to see if PM is a useful theory for explaining the politics of two states that fit the Inglehart’s own eligibility criteria.

In this thesis, we attempt to test the predictions that flow from Inglehart’s model through the juxtaposition of another method, that of small-n comparative cases. We accept, *ceteris paribus*, the reliability of the survey data recorded by Inglehart, but question the political consequences he infers from them. Inglehart's design is exemplary of the *parallel demonstration* method (Skocpol and Somers, 1980). Parallel demonstration is where a theory is generated that is purported to apply to many individually different cases; as such, the model is often constructed without reference to any specific case. Rose could well have been referring specifically to the non-case nature of PM and the imperative to test when he wrote: ‘In order to connect empirical materials horizontally across national boundaries, they must also be connected vertically; that is, capable of being related to concepts that are sufficiently abstract to travel across national boundaries’ (1997: 26). Testing on the level of the nation-state is an instance of *middle-level analysis* (Blondel, 1995), a procedure that tells us more about the validity of the postmaterialist view of disaffection by more securely locating it within a nation’s borders. A ‘Blondel’ test of PM is valid because of its *landless* aspect (Rose, 1997: 28). If Inglehart’s inferences from the survey data hold, we will able to make certain predictions about

47 Inglehart began with *Eurobarometer* data in the early 1970s and then went on to include *European Values Survey* material: his later, more general cultural work, entailed *World Values Survey* analysis.
political features within a suitable case or cases. However, it would be wrong to see if PM explains the politics of one nation-state alone as this would not be a fair and valid method of testing for the effects of value change on contemporary politics. Previous tests of Inglehart’s model have not used a comparative cases methodology. As a result, the comparative approach is chosen. In opting for this approach, our next task is to select our cases. It would be foolhardy to present an overview of western politics and then try to see if PM is valid or not; in any case, several large-n studies have already interrogated key aspects of PM.\textsuperscript{48} The imperative in this thesis is to test using comparative cases and so obey Blondel’s stricture:

\begin{quote}
Comparative government...needs both a concern for a detailed knowledge of countries and of their institutions and an ability to deal with general models; it needs an interest in concrete situations and a desire to bring these situations within a common mould.

\textit{Blondel, 1995: 391.}
\end{quote}

\section*{3.3: The Small-n Aspect}

There are two points that must be argued to convince the reader that performing a small-n test of a large-n survey-based theory like Inglehart’s is an appropriate and feasible thing to do. Firstly, Inglehart and his defenders are entitled to claim that this test is not along the lines of Inglehart’s original work. Inglehart’s research is deductive in nature, extrapolating observations from one type of data, surveys, and

\textsuperscript{48} See Chapter Two.
basing predictions on behavioural consequences in politics on these. Inglehart’s defenders could argue that focusing on the nation-state level is self-evidently likely to throw up anomalous details that Inglehart’s methods simply could not detect. This does not disqualify a small-n test, though - Rose (1997) considers a small-n case study to be an adequate vehicle for research, largely because it allows for 'thick description' (Geertz, 1973). Additionally, Lieberson (1991) praises the contrastive powers of a narrow gauge comparative study, where again, extra detail is piled up to answer the research question - in avoiding large-n, one can give a fuller sketch of the polities to see how the dependent variable manifests itself. We assert that if PM is to have any real scientific worth, its predicted consequences must be observable at the level of the individual polity.

Secondly, the number of cases to be studied is an age-old question in comparative enquiry (Blondel, 1995). In performing a two-case analysis, it is a trivial truth to remind the reader that we lose out on the degree of detail we would have had we chosen only one case. The most immediate problem with using only two cases is the danger of self-selection; essentially one may well have rigged the sample to one's liking (Macaridis, 1955). Anyone carrying out small-n comparative research has to bear in mind Geddes’s (1990: 132) caveat that selecting on the dependent variable is to work within a discipline where ‘...the deficiencies of the conventions’ are inevitable, albeit accepted. One additional and recurring problem is that it is not possible to cover the exact same ground in both cases, as Stinchcombe’s method of ‘deep analogy’ (1978) sets out to accomplish, as congruent phenomena, data, and literature do not exist for the two cases. Thus the reader will see that for some hypotheses, there is varying amount and type of evidence used to test it. This is

49 See Blondel (1999: 154-5) for a succinct account of the differences between deductive and inductive research in political science.
true, for example, for the case of the new left in Ireland and France. France has had some strong contenders for the description of new left thinking and parties, whereas Ireland has not. It is likely that the reader will be able to produce other, possibly better examples of work or phenomena that are pertinent to this thesis. However, it must also be acknowledged that it is not necessary to carry out book-length expositions on each of the four hypotheses in order to test PM. As Collier (1993: 108) would argue, the objective is to use the method of comparative cases to cast light on the theory in question, not to see if Inglehart’s theory better explains contemporary politics in Ireland and France.

3.4: Maximising value from the choice of cases

The exercise of small-n comparative research contains well-documented problems. It is outside the remit of this section to delineate every possible flaw and whether or not it can be controlled (see Ragin, Berg-Schlosser and de Meur, 1996, for a concise chapter on the epistemic and methodological aspects of this question). In the following, we note the main justifications and safeguards for carrying out small-n comparative hypothesis-testing. They are (a) using most similar / least similar cases; (b) using deviant and crucial cases; and (c) longitudinal analysis of cases.

Firstly, one should maximise the data gains available in only having two cases by making them fulfil different functions. Precisely because Inglehart specifies that poor states will not exhibit markers of PM (1977: 150), the case selection is restricted to wealthy states, which poses a problem for ‘least similar’ analysis. Furthermore, in trying to perform a ‘most similar’ analysis, Inglehart does not specify if the postmaterialist country set means all OECD members or not. Standard most / least similar case selection does not appear appropriate. We get round this obstacle by
following a modified version of Collier and Collier's 'mixed method' of most- and least- similar (1991). They looked at the trade union movement in eight Latin American countries, with religion and language, among others, as the main similarities. Within this broad sample are markedly different states. We do the same to select two cases from the pool of wealthy democracies.

Secondly, a way of strengthening the case selection that complements the mixed most / least similar method is to apply the comparativist's concepts of (1) deviance (Lijphart, 1971) and (2) cruciality (Eckstein, 1975). According to Lijphart, deviant case analysis attempts to better construct a theory's premise. Selecting a deviant case entails selecting a case that does not exhibit all the characteristics we deem important to fitting a model. For example, within the universe of wealthy democracies, we note discrepancies in how long they have been both wealthy and democratic. We select two cases that differ from each other in terms of how they have traditionally been viewed as wealthy or advanced industrial democracies. On a second dimension, we turn to Inglehart's proposition that postmaterialist politics will replace the old politics of left and right; we select a state with a clear left right divide and one without. Eckstein depicts a crucial case as one that should follow the tested model's predictions; if it does not, then the model is ipso facto questioned. This is defined as a state that is frequently used as a first test of a model's predictions. Cases are defined in this way by how they measure on the dimensions of factors including size, history and political influence. Four habitual candidates for crucial cases are Germany, the US and Britain and France. In having only two cases, one can still derive maximum information as to the rigours of Inglehart's model by treating it according to these two separate manipulations.
Thirdly, the lack of comparison points due to small-n can be minimised by increasing the number of references within each case; this approach, called process tracing (Campbell, 1975), entails successive temporal comparisons for each state. By looking at both cases over an extended time period, the test gains extra comparisons. A fuller picture of the implications of a research question is possible if one spends more time looking closely at each case, rather than hurtling through them superficially. It also serve to reduce the likelihood of bias, as the researcher has to faithfully follow the unfolding of events within each case, rather than choosing one point in time as the in vivo test (Lieberson, 1991).

We take Ireland and France as our cases because they match all the relevant criteria given above. This case selection satisfies Collier's (1997) criteria regarding comparability and the most similar / least similar method and the modified mix of most / least similar cases. For this thesis, the main similarities of Ireland and France include EU and OECD membership, along with both states having been traditionally Catholic. The main dissimilarities are population size, scale of the economy and foreign policy power. On a different level of dissimilarity is the fact that Inglehart has written virtually nothing on Ireland whilst he has written extensively on France, especially in the ten years from 1967-77. Inglehart's early work incorporated much close-range analysis of France; his observations of the political upheavals there in the late 1960s and early 1970s were instrumental in his formulation of the Pm thesis, especially in the years 1967-1977. However, he has not undertaken a French case study since the early 1970s and has never committed even one full paragraph to Ireland in his major works on the idea.50

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50 Inglehart penned a couple of lines en passant in a 1987 paper on Ireland and again in 1997; the comments briefly referred to agriculture and Catholicism respectively. See Chapter Three.
With regard to deviance and cruciality, Ireland is suitable as a deviant case for two reasons. Firstly, it is not always viewed as an *established* advanced industrial democracy. This may explain how Marsh et al. (2001) found that PM does not seem to play a structuring aspect in Irish voting or political identities. This corroborates Inglehart's assertion that Ireland did not fit the postmaterialist classification (Inglehart, 1987) even though it seemed that it should be a candidate. Secondly, of the four countries traditionally at the poorer end of the list of wealthy democracies – Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece, only Ireland has a continuous democratic regime. Regarding the crucial case, of the sample of four viable crucial cases given earlier, France is chosen as Inglehart has written virtually nothing on Britain; the US is evidently not assessed by the long time-series available in *Eurobarometer*; and Germany as it is currently constituted is not a durably established state.

### 3.5: The Timeframe of the Thesis (1968-2002)

As Inglehart himself avers, PM is an ongoing, progressive phenomenon with a short history. The researcher is thus denied the opportunity to neatly parenthesise the subject in terms of chronology. However, Inglehart also recognises 1968 as the point of departure from 'old politics', so the beginning of the period may be agreed upon. In deciding when to end the study, some element of choice is involved. While 1998 would allow for a round 30 year timeframe, one would lose the 1980 cohort for comparative purposes as by the date of the last preceding legislative elections (1997 in both France and Ireland), the age of this cohort's members would be 17, and they thus would be ineligible to vote. In opting to extend the study to 2002, we
gain an extra temporal reference increment and we are also allowed to examine the priorities of fully four post-war cohorts.\textsuperscript{51}

In testing whether politics is marked by PM from the late 1960s onwards, we need to have some picture of how different this period is in contrast to the pre-1968 setting for both France and Ireland. Consequently, where possible and where it is useful to do so, we look at pre-1968 data for both cases to check if there has indeed been a shift in the indicators linked to our four hypotheses.

### 3.6: The case for aggregate data

It is imperative that we operationalise what we should study when testing PM. This thesis is based on the modest proposition that statistical analysis of attitudinal data sets is not necessarily the most valid way of studying the politics of post-industrial states. Consequently, the research aimed to give a more contextualised account of political affairs in the test cases. Through the examination of aggregate data we look at the validity of each of the four hypotheses. This was done in order to gauge whether political values shifts as measured by surveys were linked with salient political events. Election results plus opinion and exit poll findings were also studied. For France, the relevant National Election Studies were accessed – until the forthcoming study on the 2002 contest, Ireland did not have a systematic election study (Marsh et al., 2001). Inglehart omits an operationalised account of how parties mould their policies in response to perceived changes in the nature of political demands. These entirely political data facilitate a more coherent assessment of

political outcomes and value change. The extra sources above serve to strengthen the validity of conclusions drawn in the thesis and meet the criteria of contextual material that is a valuable accompaniment to raw survey data (Brady, 2000). Chronological comparison here reveals a clear shift towards PM, or more parsimoniously, there is an irrefutable rise in the PMI for most western states. This thesis looks at the political-behavioural ramifications of the political changes that Inglehart claims are picked up by the PMI.

In tracing the political consequences of PM, we face the question of striking a balance between breadth and depth. PM is a very broad construct, and it is this very capaciousness that possibly explains why no small-n test of PM has been previously performed. It would be impossible to fully survey all the literature that pertains to each of these hypotheses in both of the cases in this thesis; the academic corpus on class voting in France, for example, could fill several theses. Similarly, there is a reasonably established tradition of studying the trends in the number of spoilt ballots in France — this is not true for Ireland. Another example is that of NSMs — their activity has been much more visible in France than in Ireland. Selectivity has to apply, in terms of data, events, and sources presented. In recognising that selection is a problem, all we can do is to try to ensure that a fair and valid test is of PM is performed.

3.7: Summary

The aim of this thesis is to carry out a small-n comparative test of Inglehart’s PM theory. The theoretical aspect to testing PM has been dealt with in Chapter Two (Criticisms). In this chapter, we have looked at how we may go about performing the empirical part of the test, stressing that a small-n comparative method is a fair and
valid way of testing PM. We have stipulated the procedures that must be followed to 
minimise selection bias and maximise data value. We have laid out the case for 
choosing France and Ireland, and have argued why we need to go beyond survey 
data to look at aggregate data. We have noted that some insight into the pre-1968 
picture for both countries is necessary to judge whether ‘new politics’ is indeed 
applicable to both. We now carry out the empirical testing in the in the next four 
chapters, each of which deals with a separate hypothesis.
Chapter 4: Class Voting

Introduction

Inglehart's theory on class structure and voting is a recurrent theme in his PM research; Weakliem and Heath (1999) cite his 1990 work, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*, as one representative of a whole set of class voting theories. They detect three separate groups of propositions, one of which is described as 'General Class Voting', which is itself composed of four different hypotheses. Inglehart's research is classed as the 'AI' hypothesis; he argues that there is a long-term weakening of the class – vote link in all wealthy democracies. Weakliem and Heath view the book as an instantiation of a model of long-term secular decline in class voting, occurring cross-nationally. As this decline is clearly a foundation of the postmaterialist research design, it is valuable to examine how such a feature has played a part in the cases of Ireland and France.

There are two ways of assessing the strength of the link between class and vote. The first is to take the defined class or classes as the dependent variable and parties as the independent variables. The second, less reliable method, is to look at class as the independent variable and parties as the dependent variable. Inglehart does both, giving us some class breakdowns for the 1967 and 1968 elections, and then referring to the decline of the established left in numerous publications (1984, 1990, 1994). Our focus is on the first approach, with class behaviour as the dependent variable.

This chapter is organised as follows: in Part One, we detail Inglehart’s claims that are most relevant to class voting in Ireland and France. We then attempt to operationalise Inglehart’s claims by referring to other relevant work on class voting.
and its post-war trajectory in Part Two. In Parts Three and Four, the evidence is examined and presented separately for France and Ireland.

4.1: Inglehart’s main claims

As noted in the Introduction of this chapter, Inglehart’s hypothesis is that class has less of an organising effect on voting than it had in the past; the break is purported to be (in the French case, definitively so) in 1968. Prior to this year of unrest, Inglehart proposes that as in every other wealthy western state, the working class as a rule voted left and the middle and upper classes voted right. Contained within Inglehart’s general assertion are two different claims (a) that class is currently of reduced utility in predicting voting patterns compared to the pre-1968 period and (b) that classes from then on behave less as a unit when voting. We are in the fortunate position of being able to refer to Inglehart’s work on the broad level of the class - vote trajectory and what it now implies, as well as looking at more focused work on Ireland and France. Let us begin with the general claims.

Inglehart’s hypothesis that class would become less and less important as a structuring vote variable is found throughout his work from the late 1960s through to the 1990s (1968, 1971, 1977, 1984, 1987 (with Flanagan), 1990). The 1987 paper is the most succinct treatment of the topic. Referring to historical and contemporaneous data, Inglehart and Flanagan (1987) point to the drop in Alford index scores across Europe which was clearly discernible by the 1980s. The Alford Index is obtained by subtracting the number of middle-class voters who choose leftist parties from the number of working-class voters who do so. In 1948, the average Alford score for Scandinavia was 50; this had fallen to 31 by 1985. Even so, Sweden’s score was still the highest in the world at this time (Boore, 1984). Of a core group of four states
with post-war Alford figures of 30 to 45 (America, France, Britain and Germany),
there is a marked fall-off to the 8-18 per cent range for elections occurring within the
period 1983-86. According to the postmaterialist thesis, such a fall-off is due to
simultaneous trends:

(1) The more postmaterialist middle class is no longer voting for right-wing
parties to the same extent as previously, but is instead switching to new left and
ecological parties and

(2) The working-class voters can no longer be relied upon to automatically
vote left; some sizeable shift of this support to right-wing parties has transpired as a
backlash against what they see as inappropriate priorities on the 'liberal agenda'.

(3) That, in any case, the size of the traditional working class has shrunk with
the decline of manufacturing industries. Consequently, leftist parties can no longer
hope to gain office by solely appealing to a reduced constituency of voters.

As a demonstration of this, Inglehart and Flanagan (1987:1299) examined,
inter alia, voting choice and materialist / postmaterialist orientation for six European
states: France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Holland and Belgium. Using voting intention
data they themselves collated over the 1970-85 period, it was found that 61 per cent
of materialists would vote right wing, while only 40 per cent of Postmaterialists
would do so. By the 1982-85 election years, the ratio of Materialists to
Postmaterialists and right/centre-right wing voting had risen from 1.5:1 in 1970 to
2.3:1. In percentage terms, only 25 per cent of postmaterialists had voted for right-
wing parties in 1982-85. Moving on to left-wing parties, it is apparent that that the
postmaterialist migration is partly to their benefit. 48 per cent of postmaterialists
would vote Socialist or Communist in 1970; by 1982-85, there was a five per cent
upswing. The main beneficiary was the ‘New Party’ category, constituted mostly by Green parties: 13 per cent of postmaterialists would opt for these in 1970; by 1982-85, the figure was 22 per cent. These trends are ongoing (Inglehart, 1997) and will solidify through the process of intergenerational replacement. Consequently, Inglehart contends that the usefulness of the Alford Index progressively lessens. From these points, we derive our hypothesis:

\[ H_1: \text{That there is a secular decline in class voting in both Ireland and France.} \]

Having established our hypothesis, we now look in detail at Inglehart’s account of the class – vote link in both France and Ireland.

Inglehart’s fullest comment on voting patterns in France is to be found in Chapter Ten of *The Silent Revolution* (1977) and, interestingly, it focuses solely on the electoral landscape of 1967-8. He additionally looks in some detail at the performance of the PSU’s Michel Rocard in the 1969 presidential election, but we leave the examination of this to Chapter Six. Inglehart makes his first sustained examination of class voting in France in referring to the 1967 and 1968 legislative elections (1977). The big winner was the Gaullist coalition, moving from a position of precarious control of the Assemblée in 1967 to one of a comfortable majority one year later. Inglehart comments (op. cit. 270) that Goguel, among others, attributed the Gaullists’ success to the shift by apprehensive Centrist voters towards Charles de Gaulle in order to unite against the masses in upheaval. Inglehart instead attributes the result to an alteration in the voting of both the middle and the working classes. Inglehart refers to survey data to challenge Goguel’s view. His argument is that whereas the middle class had in the past voted consistently for parties in the centre or
on the right, in 1968, a significant proportion of them voted for a new left party, the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU). The July 1968 Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP) survey in fact shows that eleven per cent of Centrists deserted and voted left, with almost half of these voting for the PSU and only 12 per cent quit the Centrists to vote for the Gaullists. According to Inglehart, what was also notable was that ‘...the 1968 election was the first in which Gaullist candidates won a larger number of working-class votes than did Communist candidates’ (ibid. 273). Using more survey data, Inglehart demonstrates that the class profile of the PSU alters from a 50:50 working / middle class split to a 25:75 breakdown in these groups. To round off the picture, the Gaullists made gains across all socio-economic groups in the 1968 election. The heuristic of ‘working-class goes left and middle-class goes right’ was no longer appropriate in Inglehart's view. Inglehart reproduces 1970 EEC survey data which further demonstrate that class was of less than prime importance in voting. Using multivariate analysis, Inglehart shows that the Occupation of the head of the household (0.115) was ranked fourth behind Parents' Party (0.349), Value Priorities (0.265) and Church Attendance (0.133) in terms of predictive validity for party preference (ibid. 246).52 A quick switch in the bases of party choice had occurred, Inglehart asserts, which exemplified the underlying changes to France's social structures.

Regrettably, Inglehart does not expound on Ireland and class voting. He comments several times on Ireland in his later political - cultural research from the mid-1990s on, but there is nothing more than a desultory reference to Ireland in papers or chapters on PM per se. I deem his 1987 paper to be the most pertinent, and

52 The foregoing values are the beta figures, which are a better indication of how one factor alone explains the dependent variable; the eta values include the effects of other independent variables.
even then it is acknowledged that it is hard to adequately probe the implications of what Inglehart writes:

...everyone knows that Ireland is a largely rural nation, with a modest public sector and no significant Communist or Socialist movements. Clearly, Ireland must be a bastion of conservatism on the classic Left-Right issues. Instead...support for the classic economic policies of the Left tends to reflect a nation's level of economic development. As [the table] demonstrates, Greece is by far the poorest country among the 11 societies surveyed in 1979-83; and the Greek public has by far the highest level of support for nationalization of industry, more government management of the economy, and reducing income inequality. Ireland is the second poorest country and overall Ireland ranks second in support of these policies.

_Inglehart, 1987: 1294._

Inglehart believes that the stereotype of countries remaining strongly leftist where there has been significant left-wing government is no longer true: the rationale for redistribution is lessened. Presumably, as these countries have undergone periods of leftist administration, it is probable that they have experienced some or all of the policy measures as listed by Inglehart in the above article. In Ireland (and Greece), conversely, the stage of industrialisation was such that people felt that the government could intervene, as it had not done in any significant way prior to the sampling timeframe. Notwithstanding this, his general theory stands -
there is no exemption made by Inglehart here with respect to Ireland. As a result, one is obliged to look for general evidence of a secular decline outside of Inglehart's writings and see if this is true in the case of Ireland. Unfortunately, that means that the case is addressed obliquely.

4.2: Testing the derived hypothesis

Our hypothesis is that there has been a secular decline in the strength of the class-vote link and we are taking class as the explanandum or dependent variable, with the performance of parties as the independent variable. In terms of how class voting is measured, we note that the method and subject matter do not fit together convincingly. Inglehart uses one tool (the Alford Index) for one socio-economic voting group (the working class) in a Time 1-Time 2 study (the overall change from pre- to post-mid century). There are four problems with the resulting reading of the class voting context in the late 1960s and onwards: (i) his use of outdated methodology; (ii) his narrow definition of class voting (iii) his lack of baseline data; (iv) his over-reliance on Eurobarometer survey data in place of other sources, such as national election studies (NES). As a result, we are unlikely to gain any real insight unless we make appropriate changes in each of these problematic areas. Let us now explain why we have to improve on Inglehart's methods and outline how we do so.

Firstly, Inglehart relies on the now-superseded Alford Index for measuring class vote fluctuations. There are two significant problems with the Alford Index — that it is confounded by changes in the popularity of any one party and also by changes in the social structure of a nation-state (Evans, 1999: 13). It does not fit the
Irish case, where there has been no major left-wing party. To better test the research question, this chapter uses the more differentiated Erikson - Goldthorpe class schema tables and odds ratio values. The rationale for examining more than just the Alford data is reinforced when one considers that Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999) begin their authoritative investigation by acknowledging that the Alford Index is nowhere near as informative as log odds ratios / log linear modelling – something Inglehart does not incorporate into his research.

Secondly, Inglehart's overriding preoccupation is his attempt to understand fluctuations in the vote of the working class - he contributes very little of rigour on the extent to which any and all classes act uniformly at the ballot box. He does not pay any heed to the possibility that a class splitting away from one bloc or party is less pertinent for voting scholars than if a class moves en masse towards another party - a realignment can still be categorised as class voting if the whole group (or a significant proportion of it) moves as one. By extension, if a wealthy professional stratum of voters continually opts for one part, niche or otherwise, then this is also class voting (Evans, 1999). Our way of negotiating around this problem is to include classes other than the working class in our analysis.

Thirdly, Inglehart looks only at the post-1968 electoral record alone. As a result, it could reasonably be proposed that all of the claims made in The Silent Revolution merely demonstrate that the typical French class voting pattern was disrupted at the 1967 and 1968 legislative elections, and the 1969 presidential election. He does not demonstrate that there was an actual decline in the class -vote link as he does not delineate a pre-1968 baseline. Inglehart does not even look at the

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53 The reader is reminded that the Alford Index looks at differential support for the left-wing party and was designed with a two-party left / right system in mind.
trends in support for the next two elections (one presidential, one legislative) that occurred between 1969 and 1977, the year of publication of the book. Where the data are of sufficient quality to permit, we include longitudinal data with a pre-1968 baseline on the predictive value of class in voting for both cases.

Finally, Inglehart does not give multivariate analyses of the interaction between class and vote—what we have instead in his work is a snapshot of attitudinal data, not voting behaviour. The lack of a rigorous analysis of the voting record is a crucial omission. In this chapter, we add NES data and exit polls to get a better view of class voting.

Having described the inherent problems in Inglehart’s methods and argued for why four types of changes need to be made, we now move on to test the hypothesis by looking at the link between class and vote in both cases.

4.3: France

The analysis of the link between class and voting in France is a bigger task than for Ireland for the following reasons. Firstly, there is simply more scholarly work with France’s class voting profile as the subject matter. Secondly, the fact that France has two first-order elections, legislative and presidential, makes available another dataset. There is the additional factor of a longer time series of systematically collated data from surveys, broad and narrow, for France.

The ‘canon’ may be sourced as far back as André Siegfried’s Tableau des Partis en France (1913), which contains the first systematic treatment of class and its link to political behaviour. Unlike the Irish case, where the Whyte and Carty works dominated the field of inquiry until the mid-1980s, there are many general
models of voting in France that have waxed and waned over time. In the French case, the class or sociological model of voting has animated much academic discussion. As Elgie and Griggs (2000, Chapter Six), and Charlot (1994: 157-171) contain succinct accounts of the fluctuations within French academia on the nature of class and voting, the reader is directed to these works to follow this specific debate. In this chapter, we discount the historiography of the debate to look at two aspects of electoral sociology – Inglehart’s account’s reliance on the Alford Index to measure the link between the working-class and the left, and methodological advances on measuring class voting.

Our analysis is in two parts. Firstly, we examine Inglehart’s argument that the working-class is increasingly less leftist. Secondly, we trace the cohesiveness of vote patterns of all classes, using more methodologically advanced evidence than Inglehart. Within each part, we follow the trends over time.

4.3.1: The votes of the working class.

Inglehart’s broad case is supported by Bidou’s (1984) argument, which claims that increases in the middle-class population, allied to the fact that the offspring of the classic peasant and proletarian classes were increasingly more socially mobile, served to lessen the influence of typical voting anchors. Regarding social mobility, while the occupation and education of this new voter may be white-collar, their partisanship allegiance was towards the Gaullists or the PCF. The social semiotics of modern France offered little in the way of unequivocal voting cues - identity, candidates and platforms combined to constitute a ‘brouillage de référentiels’, as Bidou puts it. The old equilibrium was destabilised by party adaptations and
underlying shifts in social class composition. In summary, the left / right rule of thumb could no longer apply as felicitously as before in organising the class vote.

Cayrol's (1992) analysis of the 13 SOFRES surveys from 1980 to 1991 is illuminating: on self-placement scales at the end of the series, the ‘left’ total among workers was down ten per cent and ‘refusal to class’ in this sector rose by eleven per cent. The workers may well not have plainly changed allegiance to the right, but as Cayrol confirms, ‘...le socle s’est fait moins solide’.54 This is further support for Inglehart’s reliance on the Alford Index, as its focus, the working-class, are demonstrably less leftist when measured with a self-report instrument.

Over the course of political science inquiry, the most common mechanism for assessing the class-vote link is the Alford Index. The general trend of this datum for France is as per Inglehart’s hypothesis. Weakliem and Heath’s (1999) longitudinal study focuses on French legislative elections and systematic surveys where the appropriate NES was not carried out. Barring spikes in the late 1960s and late 1970s,55 the downward trend over the course of the post-war period is visible. Lane and Ersson (1994: 94) disagree, contending that class voting in France was higher in the 1970s and 1980s than it had been in the 1950s and 1960s, but as their study focuses on nine countries in total, the more focused work of Weakliem and Heath leads us to accept their analysis and thus H1 is supported on the basis of this point. We now trace in more detail the character of this apparent decline.

However, as Evans (1999) points out, the Alford Index misses out on two fundamental aspects of class and voting. Firstly, the working-class may not always have supported the left. He states that it is poor practice to only look at the vote share

54 "...the base has become less solid."
55 Interestingly, two peaks occur in the late 1960s - Inglehart's description of 1968 vs 1967 needs the context of previous elections in order to support the argument for a secular decline.
of the left among working-class voters. We take heed of this by checking how the working-class distributed their votes over time across all main parties from left to right. This will tell us if the drop in the Alford Index is paralleled by a genuine dispersal of working-class votes among different parties arranged on different cleavages. If, conversely, we find that the working-class switches from one bloc to another, then this is clearly class voting. Secondly, we need to have a view of how all classes behave at election time, which we simply cannot obtain by using the Alford Index. We deal with this problem by incorporating new mathematical methods which have replaced the Alford Index in political science research.

In Table 4.1, we assemble the electoral sociology for the different parties from 1965-2002, focusing solely on blue- and white-collar workers. Some of the cells are missing where the data are not systematically collected, or where there are strong doubts about their soundness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Far Left</th>
<th>Communist</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Gaul.</th>
<th>Mod. R.</th>
<th>Far R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965 (P)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 (P)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>73#</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 (P)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 (P)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63#</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (P)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41#</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (L)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (P)</td>
<td>32@</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: The destination of the white- and blue-collar votes, 1965-2002. After Knapp, (2004) and Goldey, (1998). # = a combined RPR / UDF vote; * = average of far right votes at both rounds; @ = combined score for Laguiller and Besancenot.

What is apparent is that there are three distinct periods. From the mid- to late 1960s, white- and blue-collar workers are more likely to vote for the right. From 1978 on to the early 1990s onwards, the Gaullists and Moderate Right are matched
by the fast-growing PS in the choices of the white-collar workers, but blue-collar workers are much more likely to vote for the leftist parties than for the right (Lancelot, 1994: 163). In 1981, the blue-collar workers still largely vote left, but the balance between their communist and socialist tendencies tilts in favour of the PS. By 1993, white-collar workers shift towards the right, dividing themselves nearly equally between the two poles. From 1995 onwards, a sizeable proportion of blue-collar votes go to the far right, with a lesser percentage going for far left parties and candidates. The blue-collar voters in particular desert the PS, but not to the same degree as they stop supporting the combined right. The movement of a sizeable bloc of disaffected manual workers towards the FN qualifies as a form of class voting as it follows Mair's (1999) prescription, but it is of a type that cannot be captured by the Alford Index.56

4.3.1.1: Summary of the working-class voter

The working-class is less leftist now than it was in the late 1970s, but more leftist than it was in the first decade of the Fifth Republic. There has been no secular decline in class – vote linkage among the working class. White-and blue-collar workers moved from supporting Gaullists through Socialists, which is still class voting according to Evans (1999), and hardly follows the trajectory that Inglehart predicted. It is only from 1995 onwards that we see a genuine dispersal of working-class votes. H₁ is not supported.

56 See Perrineau's *Le Symptome Le Pen* (1997) for details on the sociological base of the FN vote.
4.3.2: Advances in measuring the behaviour of all classes

To better test Inglehart’s argument, however, we need to make three improvements to the quality of information discussed in the foregoing. It is easy to get bogged down in focusing either on the working-class or on the middle-class, looking at party performance scores and inferring class cohesion from party performance. This line of thinking is apparent, for example, in concluding the working-class are less leftist because the PCF has not performed well over the past 20 years.

Our first improvement is in terms of the instrument used: it is better practice to look at mathematical differences in how classes behave. We do this by adding in odds-ratios, a method with distinct advantages over the Alford Index. Secondly, we can draw on the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema of socio-economic class. This is more differentiated than the models used by Inglehart – it typically covers six classes, although four- and five-member variants have been used. It is a more sensitive instrument than the binary system underlying Inglehart’s claims. Thirdly, it is useful to check if the longitudinal data support his assertion that the left / right traditional vote base has been weakening since the late 1960s. To do this, we need to go back before the supposed shift first appeared. As a result, the reader is not led to attaching too much importance to the outcome of any one election. Most of the relevant work incorporates both a longitudinal aspect with a pre-1968 baseline and goes beyond the Alford index.

Lewis-Beck’s (1998) reporting of the class - vote correlation is helpful. According to the Eurobarometer 10 data of 1978, the French Alford Index was 20-plus; the class - vote correlation is 0.23, not a very high figure. In a series of
correlations for five other legislative election surveys, the following figures are obtained and given in Table 4.2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey year</th>
<th>Class - vote R value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: The strength of the link between class and voting in France over five legislative elections. After Lewis-Beck, 1998: 44.

The mean over the five surveys is 0.20 and as may be seen, there is no trend of a rise or fall in the relationship. The secular decline hypothesis is not supported, partly because it seems that class and vote were not strongly correlated before the 1968 election in the two available surveys; 1967 would thus seem an 'aberrant' year, as is illustrated by the near-identical low correlations for the 1958 and 1973 surveys.57

Weakliem and Heath's (1999) comparative study of France, the US and Britain is a further indication of the lack of any solid foundation to Inglehart's argument. Their dataset covers all French Assemblée elections from November 1946 to 1993. They discount presidential elections precisely because the franchise record is shorter and also because they suggest that party affiliation of the présidentiables is blurred when compared to the legislative contests. This makes it harder to gauge whether a class has a party political tendency as distinct to one for personality. Their chapter includes a test of Inglehart's hypothesis of long-term decline and the

57 There is a considerable debate on the role of 'heavy variables' in survey design and analysis; see Ysmal (1994) and Lewis-Beck, (1996) for one such example.
resulting 'new politics' axis.\textsuperscript{58} Their Alford Index graph does show a fall-off, but not a monotonic one - interestingly, they speculate that social class compositional changes, which served to reduce the numbers of the more politically 'extreme', have taken place. Holding other variables constant, this 'one-dimensional' model of class voting accounts for the support base profile of the Communists, but leaves one to conclude that the Socialists are more heterogeneous. The graph of these figures shows no trend, with class voting actually \textit{higher} in the late 1970s than in the mid-1940s. Concerning Inglehart's 'new politics' or embourgeoisement thesis, where professionals and skilled workers are pitted on the new left against the old middle class and manual workers on the new right, the level of detail derived from the data is ultimately disconfirming. The trend of embourgeoisement is significant, that is, the new axis is apparently emergent, but it is not at all significant if one excludes the farmers. Weakliem and Heath's fine-grained analysis proffers an explanation - it seems that the markedly rightward shift of the farmers causes the relatively static other sectors to appear more leftist; a numerically small\textsuperscript{59} class has become more right-wing, but that is all - one cannot extrapolate from movements within this sector to other socioeconomic groupings in France.

For log-odds data, the simplest way of illustrating its effectiveness may be found in Cautrès (2004), where he runs paired comparisons of Erikson-Goldthorpe schema socio-economic classifications. The findings are as follows (Table 4.3):

\textsuperscript{58} Weakliem and Heath categories these theories as belonging to two separate divisions - A and C respectively.

\textsuperscript{59} Numerically small class has become more right-wing, but that is all - one cannot extrapolate from movements within this sector to other socioeconomic groupings in France.
Table 4.3: Class voting odds-ratios in France for the left/right split, first round of legislative (L) and presidential (P) elections, 1967-2002; after Cautrès, 2004: 81.

Where the odds-ratios are around 1.0, then there is no significant difference in how the paired classes are voting. Interestingly, the ‘class effect’ is much stronger in the 2002 legislative election than in the presidential election of that year. We can see that in the 2002 legislative elections, the biggest differences were between the unskilled working-class and petty bourgeois voters (3.94) and the lower salariat and petty-bourgeois (2.92). Interestingly, in the former pairing, the odds-ratios have always been the highest and have remained stable. Based on these data, class voting is as real in 2002 as it has been since 1967. There has been a substantial increase in the odds-ratios between the self-employed and the higher salariat over the time period, which has been consistently high since 1995, suggesting that a new category of class politics is entrenching itself. In the first round of the 2002 presidential election, the French Electoral Panel data show a ‘public – private’ split: 55 per cent

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59 Census data reveal that only 3.5 per cent of the population work in either the mining or agricultural sectors (Crouch, 1999: 107) In 1978, farmers alone made up 6 per cent of the electorate (Capdevielle et al., 1981.

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of public sector management and higher professionals voted left, while only 35 per cent of their peers in the private sector did so (Dargent, 2002: 55). Both of these trends run counter to Inglehart’s hypothesis of secular decline.

4.3.2.1: Summary of the class – vote link for all classes

The odds-ratios studies show that clear class differences still apply, particularly for the self-employed, but the unskilled working class are also highly distinctive in how they vote in comparison with most other classes, although they show some convergence with the votes of the lower salariat from the 1990s to the present day. $H_1$ is not supported.

4.3.3: Overall summary of the data for France

Using the Alford Index gives partial support to Inglehart’s claim of a weakened class vote, but extending the analysis over time gives a different picture. There is less cohesiveness in the working-class vote, but it is notable that the most marginalized voters have been becoming increasingly likely to vote FN, which may be construed as a burgeoning form of class voting. When we use tools which measure the behaviour of all classes, we see that class voting has in no real way weakened since 1967. We thus reject $H_1$, as class is quite strongly predictive of vote choice.

4.4: Ireland

Ireland poses problems for any class-voting comparativist. It is generally acknowledged that the left is markedly weak in comparison with any other European counterpart. So sound is this assertion that Sassoon (1997) omits Ireland from his
historical study of the West European left in the twentieth century, thus making Ireland one of four states to be excluded; the others being Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland (ibid. xxv). Sassoon's sole criterion is the presence of a major or dominant role for the left in either government or opposition. The lack of a history conducive to strong social factors in voting is pointed out sharply by Mair (1992), who writes of 'the striking electoral debility of class-based, left wing parties' (ibid., 385). Mair asserts that the only real match to the Irish scenario is America, where a left wing is 'effectively non-existent'. More specifically for this thesis, Inglehart does not mention class voting in Ireland.

There is an organisational difficulty in presenting the evidence for Ireland. The structure we used for assessing the trend in class voting in France – how the working class votes; and what new methods tell us about the link between class and vote – is unsuitable for Ireland. As the reader will see, none of the academic work on voting in Ireland is classifiable in these ways. Instead, we have a body of work claiming that there was no class voting in Ireland, followed by another set of studies that asserts there has been a weak form of class voting, which brings us up to the 1989 and possibly the 1992 elections. In terms of methods, there is not one work that focuses exclusively on using new methods to get a different picture of class voting; for example, the odds-ratios findings on Ireland given here are drawn from a large-n study by Weakliem and Heath (1999). For the third section, we look at the evidence from the 1990s to the present day. This period is much quieter in terms of the response of the academic community. The 2002 election is a good end-point for this subsection as it is the first election for which we have an NES, which allows us to introduce another form of data.
As a result of this ‘exceptionalism’, the material follows a chronological line, both in terms of elections and academic work based around these contests. This simple structure is facilitated by the much-reduced number of studies that pertain to class voting in Ireland in comparison to France.

4.4.1: Ireland as ‘sui generis’ on class voting

One must go back to Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) concept of crystalline cleavage formation to contextualise class voting in Ireland. On a Western European comparative level of analysis, Ireland's political cleavage structure is anomalous. It does not express a marked materialist or class-antagonist division, which is attributable in the main to two factors - Ireland was predominantly rural and was a colony. Sinnott (1978), Girvin (1997) and Farrell (1999) all deem Ireland to be best positioned on nationalist and clerical axes, with the political activity located at the upper range of nationalist and traditional Catholic thought. Sinnott goes on to aver that while cleavages in Europe were being built around class at the time of enfranchisement, Ireland was undergoing an ‘aligning electoral decade’ (ibid. 38) which stretched from 1918-27. These years were book ended by the first all-Ireland election and the acceptance by Fianna Fáil of a purely parliamentary modus operandi, which resulted in their taking up their seats in 1927. In the middle of this eventful decade was the Treaty and the resulting Civil War. Add in the War of Independence (1919-21) and the result is a continuous entrenching of nationalism as the crux of Irish politics. This was a blueprint most forcefully traced out by Whyte (1974) in a paper that became the sine qua non of any discussion on Irish class voting. Whyte picked up a distinct strand of thinking in the first broad-based survey
of Irish political attitudes carried out in 1969. Whyte concluded from the responses that electoral behaviour was 'exceptionally unstructured' (ibid. 64). Any structuration that existed was due to the operation of two 'outlooks': nationalism, which placed the bulk of the people on one side and few on the other (that is, there were few non-nationalists) and religion, which was even more unequal in its partitioning (in such a homogeneously Catholic state, no part based on any other religion or on none could have hoped to prosper). A cultural aspect did show up, albeit not very strongly. This was drawn out by the extent of respondents' support for the re-introduction of Irish as the main spoken language of the state.

At the party level as distinct from the voter, Garvin (1974) somewhat agrees with this lack of structure, alluding to the lack of orthogonally opposing parties within Ireland. In noting that the electoral profile for Labour and Sinn Féin / Fianna Fáil was broadly similar in its appeal to workers and agricultural labourers, Garvin claims it is logical to affirm that two parties from three rely on the same constituency. Counterintuitively, Garvin reports that Fine Gael / Cumann na nGaedhal were not the preserve of the middle and landed classes; instead, Garvin asserts that from 1923-44, there was no clear class basis one way or another to the Fine Gael vote.

This goes against the 'conventional wisdom' first voiced by Moss in 1933 that Fine Gael was the party of the prosperous businessmen, older priests and farmers with substantial holdings. Indeed, it seems probable that this received view, not corroborated in the early electoral record, is a misinterpretation of McCracken's early study of TDs' occupations, which found that the more affluent deputies were

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60 An earlier survey, commissioned by RTÉ in 1961, focused on attitudes of the Irish towards EEC membership - O'Leary, (1979)
61 Fianna Fáil was not founded until 1926.
likely to be in Fine Gael. From 1923-43, both Fianna Fáil and Labour score well among poorer voters, but Fianna Fáil's catchment also extends to the lower-middle classes and even as far as the reformist middle-class proper (O'Leary, 1979). It is only in 1943 that Fianna Fáil expands on all fronts to become a genuine catch-all party (Garvin, 1977) as per Kirchheimer's prescription. With Fine Gael fitting the same description as Fianna Fáil, but just being less successful at attracting enough votes at all class levels, the two dominant parties were voted in on a whole-electorate basis.

Survey analysis by Rose (1974) confirmed this broad-based tendency was alive 30 years later. The three structural variables of occupation, religion and region explained 26.7 per cent of the variance (on average) in West European voting; Ireland is the dramatic outlier, with a corresponding figure of 3.1 per cent. Whyte's case was not overstated, at least in terms of occupation and thus class.63 Knowing the socioeconomic status of an Irish voter was of little worth in predicting how they would cast their ballot. Even as recently as 1981, Carty felt justified in claiming that 'social characteristics do not structure voting in Ireland' (1981: 74). The new 'conventional wisdom' based on the work begun in the 1970s was that segmenting party appeal on the basis of class was a misguided venture. There are election-specific factors that cannot be discounted and militate against a purely class-shift argument in voting behaviour. Let us look at the 1977 elections, for which we have a reasonable amount of good-quality survey data. Sinnott (1978) notes that if one looks at the breakdown of their 1977 electoral performance, then one could summarise '...that Fine Gael is moving towards a more balanced social-class

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62 O'Leary (1979) performs a fine service in presenting the early scholarship here, some of which has been misrepresented over time.
63 Definitions of class incorporate one or more of education, income, job, and parents' income - see Crouch (1999) for differing conceptions and uses of the term.
support profile.' (ibid. 53). A closer look at the figures used by Sinnott is helpful. He draws on party identification surveys carried out in 1976 compared with the combined profile derived from three separate voting intention surveys taken from May-June 1977. Fianna Fáil goes from attracting 38 per cent of the large farmers’ votes to 48 per cent; while Fine Gael’s appeal to this constituency drops by four per cent (from 46 to 42 per cent). The Fine Gael attrition results in the more broadly based catchment described by Sinnott. Instead of looking at how Fine Gael ‘succeeds’ in broadening their appeal, one could invert the question and ask how they lost their lead among large farmers. If one considers that Fine Gael was embarked on a course of modernisation through ‘Europeanisation’, then one detects here one reason as to why conservative-minded farmers might fall away from the party. Additionally, the Fine Gael / Labour coalition of 1973-7 was notable for a type of politician less likely to appeal to rural constituents; the FG Foreign Affairs Minister, Garret FitzGerald, had written\(^6\) about how backward Ireland had been and how it must modernise; he clearly predicted and desired a whole raft of liberalising legislation that would confront the Catholic traditions of the state. Rural constituents, especially farmers, have long been looked on as traditionalist (O’Connell, 2001).

4.4.1.1: Summary of early work on class voting

Most of the early work reinforced the notion that Ireland did not fit into Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) left / right cleavage pattern. However, the studies in the main look at constituency-level performance and also how the parties put forward different programmes and how they fared over time. As we note in the Conclusion, making

\(^6\) *Towards a New Ireland*, 1972.
inferences on class voting on the basis of party performance is a weak substitute for survey analysis and other individualised types of data. It was not until the mid-1970s that reasonably rigorous work appeared with surveys as the base data. This work placed farmers and the self-employed apart from other classes, but aside from this, could do little more than restate that party politics was indeed notable for its lack of differentiated class appeal. H₁ is only partly supported, as Inglehart’s model is not backed up by a weakening of the class - vote link; it had always been weak.

4.4.2: A reassessment of Ireland’s position

More systematic work on a series of Irish elections appeared in the 1980s, when a flurry of papers and chapters written by academics based in Irish universities challenged this depiction of Irish voting as socially baseless. Marsh's (1985) chapter actually agrees with Whyte insofar as he detects no real class alignment pattern from 1969-82, but that the three elections in 18 months (1981-82) presages a shift towards some form of class voting that mimics the European trend, albeit in dilute form. On the basis of the political tumult of this year-and-a half, it does seem plausible now to propose that some process was emerging that was disturbing the electoral equilibrium. It is reasonable to argue that the parlous economy and politically volatile climate promoted a new type of voter, splitting along quasi-left and right lines. Marsh notes in particular the rise in the strength of the Workers' Party, mainly in Dublin; this finding stirs Marsh to hypothesis that ongoing urbanisation was serving to remould Irish voting (ibid. 180). A separate argument adduced by Marsh is that a generally higher level of education and social mobility was impeding the intergenerational voting transfer pattern.
Simultaneously, Gallagher (1985) refers to the notion of an altered electorate. Like Marsh, Gallagher was swayed by the eventful 1981-2 period. The research here was based on elections up to 1982; Gallagher's book concluded with a speculative prediction on how further voting change might manifest itself. The section itself amounted to a passing mention.\textsuperscript{66} However, a left-right division was ‘...on balance, unlikely’ and ‘Instead, the trend is likely to be...towards increasing volatility and unpredictability in voting behaviour.’ (1985: 155). The overall tenor is that class was becoming more of a feature in Irish voting, but that it was rising from a very low baseline.

Three papers published in 1986-7 by Michael Laver were concerned with the notion that a manual / non-manual class dichotomy was an insufficiently sensitive device for detecting class patterns in Irish voting. Interestingly enough, Whyte's data referred to earlier was presented along a six-category class breakdown, while Laver's work is a five-category modification of a four-category system as devised by Heath, Jowell and Curtice (1985).\textsuperscript{67} Laver's results may be seen below (Table 4.4) in the following table:

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Category & 1982 & 1983 & 1984 \\
\hline
Manual & 0.3 & 0.4 & 0.5 \\
Non-Manual & 0.7 & 0.6 & 0.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Class Voting Patterns in Irish Elections}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{65} The hunger strikes in Northern Ireland and the phone tapping scandal in the Republic were new departures for political life here.

\textsuperscript{66} This is not a criticism - Gallagher's book had a much wider remit than the examination of one solitary aspect of Irish politics.

\textsuperscript{67} Laver's papers do not include the original 1969 survey data analysed by Whyte as a baseline measure.
This PD profile is not surprising - as the PDs presented themselves to the electorate as a niche party, with strong neo-liberal economic credentials and an avowal to move beyond Civil War politics, it follows that on the last point, the voter characteristics should not be expected not logically match those of Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil. However, the profile is given on the basis of one constituency, Galway West, where the PD candidate, Bobby Molloy, had been a notable Fianna Fáil TD who went over to the PDS. As a result, we may have a profile of a Molloy loyalist vote rather than a typical PD supporter. An election-wide analysis by Laver, Marsh and Sinnott (1987: 109-11) noted that most PD voters at the 1987 election had been Fine Gael voters. Laver found a pattern following a similar trend, but not to the same extent, in his eponymous 1986 paper: *Ireland: Politics with some Social Bases*. Using a dataset of 67 polls, Laver found that non-manual workers were more likely to support Labour than another party; Fine Gael had the largest support base among farmers with large holdings (those with more than 50 acres) and the middle class; while their non-manual workers figure was typically 10-15 per cent higher than for manual workers. Fianna Fáil fitted a catch-all description.
In attempting to get a firmer grasp of the data, it is helpful to turn to Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999), who give us log odds ratio. Their chapter is a longitudinal study of twenty post-war societies, all wealthy democracies. Inglehart approvingly cites their point that there is a decline in the class—vote link but as Evans (1999) contends, this is a disingenuous reading of their findings. Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf begin their investigation by acknowledging that the Alford Index is nowhere near as informative as log odds ratios/log linear modelling—something Inglehart does not incorporate into his research. Instead, they use the log odds-ratios\textsuperscript{68} data in conjunction with the Erikson-Goldthorpe scheme. This system of class categorisation is much more sensitive to class structure and changes therein than the binary Alford Index.\textsuperscript{69} The authors rely on a combined dataset of published tables (\textit{aggregated country data}) and \textit{individual level data} from national representative surveys and consequently their study is more rigorous than one reliant on the Alford index alone. Unfortunately, they only report on one case in their French dataset (ibid. 38) so we can only refer to them for Ireland.

In terms of the Alford Index, the class pattern does indeed decline—from a base of 14.1 in 1961-70, to 8.7 in 1971-80 and 7.3 in 1981-90. This trend is backed up by scores of a similar magnitude for the Thomsen Index.\textsuperscript{70} There is a trend, but it is not pronounced and is \textit{not} statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Evans (1999) comments that most of the 'weight' for Ireland's decline is attributable to one election—the 1989 contest. Either this election embodied a sweeping change in the relationship of class and vote, or more likely, there is highly significant error and

\textsuperscript{68} The log odds method is preferable to the odds ratio as the former adjusts for floor effects, so this is better for avoiding a large skew due to a small change.

\textsuperscript{69} See Evans (2000) for a very concise account of the benefits of using their model.

\textsuperscript{70} This datum is similar to the Alford figure; its advantage is that it is less affected by changes in to popularity of parties.
instability in the data (ibid. 325-6). One other problem is the dispersal of cases - the
data cited here represent patterns over the course of 18 elections, but there is only
one case for the first period, 1961-70. If one has a result to start with that is in any
way deviant or atypical, then it can serve as a skewed baseline and thus distort the
resulting 'trend'. Transforming the data to take account of different respondent
numbers, Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf produce a table that exempts Ireland, as there
are only two cases - one cannot construe a trend from this. Consequently, further
investigation is needed. However, the authors also provide revealing log odds-ratios
(see Table 4.5):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Log Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manual (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agri. labourers</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine non-manual</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service class</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeois</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5: Mathematical differences in voting behaviour between the
unskilled manual class and the five other Erikson-Goldthorpe classes at five general

The logic is plain: there is a sizable difference in how the classes voted from
1981-1990, with the petty bourgeoisie and farmers diverging from the other four
classes. Their log-odds values are more than twice as large as the other comparison
classes. Admittedly, the difference between the service class and the unskilled
manual worker is not quite 1.0, the level of a marked distinction, but it is sufficiently
large to suggest a distinction all the same. Similarly, the service-class vote may be
seen to go elsewhere than the vote of the farmers and the petty bourgeoisie (0.94 vs. 2.30 and 2.24 respectively), with the log-odds ratios being more than doubled in each case. Unfortunately, Weakliem and Heath do not list the parties which attract these differentiated support profiles. On the basis of contemporaneous research, it is probable that the PDs and Fine Gael were more successful among the farmers and the petty bourgeoisie, although Fianna Fáil also does well amongst the latter.

4.4.2.1: Summary of non-Alford measures

The impression given by reading the work produced on the Irish elections of the 1980s is consistent with Laver’s assertion that class was a weak-to-moderate structuring force. However, the reader’s attention is drawn again to the mix of party performance and survey analysis. Marsh’s work (and with Sinnott) is similar to Gallagher’s in its emphases on party performance and geographical support, suggesting that working-class voters will opt for left-wing parties. On the other hand, Laver’s study adopts a variation of the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema, and, as with the Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf study, this individual-level analysis indicates that there are strong and enduring differences in how the self-employed vote. $H_1$ is not supported.

4.4.3: Still some social bases?

Unfortunately, the data for the 1992 election period onwards are much less systematic than what we have for 1981-1990. In fact, the academic coverage of the debate moves away from the mathematics of class and its impact on the vote, back to more theoretical work on the nature of class voting in Ireland. Peter Mair’s (1992) paper concerned itself with the issue of a class element to Irish politics, and so it was much broader than a mere voting behaviour question. As such, it does not present
Alford or Thomsen Index figures for each party over a series of elections. Mair instead tries to explain how class politics and the materialist clash in particular had not occurred in Irish politics. Contemporaneous events influenced Mair. For the first time ever, Fianna Fáil entered coalition (with the Progressive Democrats) in 1989. There had been no single party government since the end of Haughey's 1979-81 administration. Corroborating this was the altered electoral landscape of 1989 to 1992 (see Table 4.6):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>DL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The weakening of Fianna Fáil's position of dominant strength, allied to the rise in the left-wing vote, induced Mair (1992: 409) to forecast, much like Marsh (1985), an 'eventual realignment towards a modern version of class politics'. It is crucial to point out that Mair's paper conflates elements of the class voting debate with the arguments surrounding class politics. It is arguable that a party system alignment was in the process of taking place, pitting Labour and the then Workers' Party on one side and the big two of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael on the other. Based on their 1992 seat gains, Labour's status as a viable challenger to the Civil War parties was seemingly becoming attainable. This is in no way the same proposition as contending that one or more classes were behaving at the ballot box in a uniform way, as the following makes clear. In terms of Labour being the party capable of bringing about class voting, 1992 does not advance the party's proprietorial claim to the working-class vote. Labour had attracted new votes from all classes, but
particularly from the middle-class electorate. Exit polls for this election (Marsh and Sinnott 1999: 170) reveal that Labour got 22.6 per cent of the combined middle class (upper and lower middle) vote. Whilst this tally falls considerably short either Fianna Fáil's or Fine Gael's respective middle class shares, it is most interesting when compared with Labour's support from the working classes (skilled and unskilled). At 26.5 per cent of the votes cast by this group, it is evident that Labour's ability to recruit votes from this 'loyal' base is very much in doubt.

The 1997 election result further underlined the observation that Labour's large 1992 gains were not predominantly among working-class voters. Its sharp fall in seats can be taken as a vote of dissatisfaction from more Fine Gael-inclined floating voters who punished Labour for entering the 1992-4 coalition with Fianna Fáil. A close analysis of vote transfers in the previous election throws light on the roots of the floating voters' unease: where both Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil candidates were available to pick up Labour transfers, the latter were twice as successful at doing so (Mitchell, 2000: 133).

Regarding the 2002 general election, we have three forms of data – the Lansdowne exit poll; a close-grained analysis of constituency results, and preliminary findings of the 2002 National Election Study. The 2002 election represents a great opportunity to test the hypothesis as for the first time, we can cross-reference three different types of data against each other. Let us look at each in turn.

The Lansdowne exit poll shows up three clear results – that both Labour and the Greens are predominantly middle class in their support, while Sinn Féin is more successful among working-class voters. Labour performed better among the middle class than among the working class, picking up 14 per cent of the middle class vote
as against its overall tally of 1.2 per cent (The Labour Party, 2002: 16). Transfer analysis of Labour’s performance in the 2002 election shows that surpluses and eliminations benefited the Greens more than any other party, while the same applied in the opposite direction. As noted earlier, the typical Green voter is likely to be educated and middle class. The exit polls show that a Sinn Féin voter is two-and-a half times more likely to be working- than middle class. Interestingly, there is not much that is distinctive about the sociology of the support of the other parties. For more information, we turn to our second source, the constituency-level analysis. The performance at the polls offers an insight into the class basis of the main parties, with the exception of Fianna Fáil. At first glance, one detects a clear differentiation – in the capital, the Greens attract a more prosperous voter, while Sinn Féin targets the disenfranchised. Broadly speaking, the Greens' Dublin seats are based on votes of an affluent portion of the electorate; their seven per cent share of the middle-class vote when compared with their four per cent overall score is illustrative of this (The Labour Party, op. cit.). They did not gain seats in the poorer constituencies nor in the less prosperous wards of those constituencies in which they did manage to win seats. They picked up three seats out of their total of six, one each in the well-to-do constituencies of Dublin South, Dublin South-East and Dún Laoghaire. Sinn Féin scored two notable successes in Dublin South-Central and Dublin Mid-West; the former is classified by Kavanagh (2002) in his study of the social geography of the electorate in the south-west inner city as being disadvantaged. Dublin Mid-West, which includes the poor housing estates of Killinarden, Jobstown and Kilnamanagh, returned another Sinn Féin deputy. Towards the other end of the spectrum, there is a

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71 The document cited is a confidential internal memorandum and as such was expressly not made available to the public, to the media, or to libraries.

72 12 of the 14 Divisional electoral districts studied in the SW Inner City by Kavanagh fall into Dublin South-Central.
generally accepted view that the typical Progressive Democrat and Fine Gael voter is ‘urban, middle class, socially liberal and economically right-wing’ (Gallagher, 2003: 95). Gallagher supports this claim by pointing out that all four Progressive Democrat seat gains in the 2002 election were won from Fine Gael.

For the NES breakdown of the impact of class on the vote of each of the main parties, we look to Marsh (2003). Of the five dimensions included by the NES team (‘church’, ‘manual’, ‘rural’, ‘not union’ and ‘GAA’), only two are relevant to this chapter. Table 4.7 is a selection of some of his findings. Note that ‘Independents’ are given here as a bloc, which is a most unlikely reflection of the support of each of the assorted non-party candidates; however, it is the best one can obtain on the basis of an NES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FF</th>
<th>FG</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>PD</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>Ind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not union</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FF</th>
<th>FG</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>PD</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>Ind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: The effect on party support of class and trade union membership; after Marsh, 2003: 31.

Gallagher’s description of the typical class profile of a PD and FG voter presented earlier may be extended on the basis of this table to include Labour and the Greens. Strikingly, both the Greens and Labour have an identical pattern of support in terms of class and trade union membership - their voters are more likely to be middle-class and not in a union. We also note that the profile of the supporters of both Sinn Féin and Independent candidates are more likely to be working class. There is an undeniable class pattern in the 2002 election, albeit weak, and this
contradicts Inglehart's hypothesis when taken in conjunction with the profile we obtained for 1981-1990.

4.4.3.1: Summary of class voting for the last decade

For the 1992 election, there is a case to be made of a party-political realignment, as the left-wing vote share goes up. However, the analysis of exit polls and transfer patterns reveal that most of this leftist vote gain was due to switching by middle-class voters; this is supportive of Inglehart's claim. Extending the analysis on to the 1997 and 2002 elections demonstrates why it is poor practice to base too much on the outcome of any one election. Although we note that Inglehart's hypothesis of a leftist middle class is backed up by the data on the Labour vote, it is striking that the same class breakdown is reasonably applicable to the largest four of the main six parties. Conversely, the votes of the unskilled working-class are increasingly likely to go to Sinn Féin and the independent candidates. There is a muted form of class voting in Ireland, but as we have repeatedly noted, we cannot argue that this amounts to a decline since pre-1968 periods, as the longitudinal data are simply not there. H1 is not supported.

4.4.4: Overall summary of the data for Ireland

To begin with, the reader is reminded that there was no real pattern of class voting in Ireland since 1922. Alford Index data do show a longitudinal decline, but this is a most inappropriate instrument precisely because there has never been a strong or dominant left-wing party in the state. For Ireland, Gallagher's prediction (1985) of trendless fluctuation still retains some validity, while Laver's (1986) claim of a muted class base has garnered support. Tellingly, both of the above contradict Inglehart's claim. The new comparative research of Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf (1999) also
discounts a claim of a simple progressively downward trend, with consistent differences between the petty bourgeois and farmers on one side, and a less cohesive set of 'others'. It is disingenuous to argue that a greater likelihood of the middle-class support for the leftist party is sufficient to claim that PM has led to an alteration in the role of class in Irish politics. The 2002 NES indicates a reasonably clear dichotomy between working- and middle-class voters. As the latest elections are the ones where it is most likely that generational replacement will have its greatest impact, these findings are not in line with Inglehart's model. H₁ is rejected.

4.5: Conclusion

Inglehart's early work presaged a rise in what Dalton (1996) termed the 'new conventional wisdom' of comparative politics research - that there was indeed a secular decline in class voting across the industrialised states. Franklin et al. (1992) studied 14 Western democracies and found the drop to be near-omnipresent. Kriesi (1998) argued that the class cleavage as had been conceived was on the verge of extinction. According to Kriesi, a new value cleavage, the one painstakingly documented by Inglehart, emerged to fill the gap. We have not found equivalent outcomes in our study of France and Ireland. A similar lack of thoroughness is found in his lack of discussion on how class voting may have changed in form over time. In continually underlining the fact that the age of the manual worker has come and gone and so has the concomitant political cleavage, he neglects a vitally relevant contribution to the debate: what the relatively poor or relatively disenfranchised now do with their vote and whether they cluster together for one type of party. As Sassoon (1997: 651-7) comments, the label 'non-manual' is invariably attached to
those working in the tertiary sector. Crucially, Sassoon argues, this field of labour is so stratified by salary and skill levels as to be theoretically useless in predicting political behaviour.

One key problem for this chapter is the diversity of data; we have good quality odds ratios for the most recent election in France, but we only have the best data, log odds ratios, for the earlier series. In Ireland, we have a marked reliance on simple cross-tabulations and not enough analysable data, barring 1981-1990 large-n material from Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf (1999). This necessarily hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions. Nevertheless, we are confronted with a series of points which serve to disconfirm Inglehart's hypothesis. We conclude that class voting still exists, albeit in a modified form. The case for a secular decline in class voting is not corroborated by the body of Irish research on the phenomenon, nor by the quantitative work on France. The following points are addressed towards Inglehart's work on class voting, but all of them have some relevance for how we need to better operationalise the link between socio-economic status and voting.

Firstly, it would be rash to predict a change in the electoral allegiance of classes if one does not take into account the fact that the composition and relative size of classes also changes. As Dargent (2003: 50) points out, there was a decline of 12 per cent (from 37 to 25) in the workers' share of the economically-active population since the 1970s, while the educated liberal professionals have grown from 7 to 13 per cent, intermediate professionals have gone up from 16 to 23 per cent. In this sense, Inglehart's claim that the left is no longer the party of the manual labourer is an instance of his knocking down a straw man; no party could win power in the wealthy west if it had to rely on an ever-shrinking pool of citizens identifiable as old working class. French work in particular has tried to take account of the
changing nature of class, whilst acknowledging that relative socio-economic positions affect people’s votes. Work by Boy and Mayer on France (1997) in particular counters Inglehart’s rather facile point: one can see from their figures that the wealthier one is, the less likely one is to vote left. Job classifications may change but the re-ordering of wealth distribution still entrains poorer people voting left, although the rise of the FN among the poorest white French blurs this picture.

The above is part of a broader problem with Inglehart’s methodology on conceptualising the class-vote link. Firstly, in using the Alford Index on a Time 1 – Time 2 basis, Inglehart is less than thorough. As we have seen, the Alford Index only captures fluctuations in the votes of the working class, defined as such by a method that is outdated. Inglehart does not factor in the premise that the manifestation of class, with its corollaries of advantaged or disadvantaged positions, is not immutable. He also neglects to check if other classes behave uniformly or not.

Secondly, Inglehart’s lack of political context in The Silent Revolution is exposed in the French case. There is no account of whether or not parties were able to mobilise votes on a cross-class basis prior to 1968. Gaffney (1991: 23) spots some resemblance to de Gaulle’s catch-all appeal in Mitterrand’s breaking beyond the traditional core constituencies of the Socialists. As Bréchon (1995:82) describes, the pre-1968 Gaullists were most capable of commanding support from all socioeconomic divisions. The 1962 election was the first where IFOP ran pre-electoral polls and at this juncture, the party was well able to attract a very large proportion of working-class support.73 It is surprising that Inglehart is content for the reader to take his word that class was a stronger predictor of voting prior to 1968; he does not give systematic data to back up this claim. It is not as if such data could not

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73 The Gaullists attracted 29 per cent of workers, who made up 32 per cent of the voting-age population.
have been located in 1977. This compares unfavourably to Weakliem and Heath's (1999) comparative study of France, the USA and Britain, which includes data on class voting that go back as far as the 1930s. As for Ireland, Inglehart is silent on how his model may be applied to states where the influence of the 'heavy variables' of class, religion and urban/rural divide has historically been low. We cannot criticise him much here, though, as he has not written substantially on Ireland. It makes for an interesting digression, though, to note that in updating Rose (op. cit.), we see that the weight of these structural factors has in fact gone from 3.1 per cent to 16 per cent. This increase is likely to be related to methodological differences and arguably the decline of the church as a result of various scandals. We simply do not know enough about how class affected the vote in Ireland prior to the 2002 NES study. Class voting is unlikely to have been strong to begin with from the late 1960s but the most recent evidence indicates that it certainly exists.

Thirdly, there is a danger in attaching too much importance to the individual election results, particularly for with regard to the 1989 election for Ireland. Inglehart arguably does the same with the 1968 French legislative election.

Finally, we rely too much on party electoral performances and make insufficiently grounded inferences about the typical voter from these. It is difficult to avoid this type of error in the Irish case because we do not have enough systematic data on class voting over a longitudinal basis. For this reason, work should remain focused on the degree of behavioural cohesiveness among all classes as the explanandum.

In this chapter, we examined Inglehart's claims on class voting. We used more sophisticated methods than the Alford Index to check if there has been a

74 Year that The Silent Revolution was published.
secular decline in the predictive power of class for voting. As the data permitted us to do so only for France, we specifically tested Inglehart's claim that the working-class would be increasingly less leftist. We did not find this to be the case, other than from a trend from 1995. Using mathematical methods that allow us to assess the behaviour of all classes, we find that there has been no decline in the class-vote link in either state, and consequently, we rejected $H_1$. We now go on to test our second hypothesis, that there has been a secular rise in the levels of voter discontent.
Chapter 5: Indicators of disaffection

Introduction

In Chapter Four, we tested the implications of the first consequence of a shift to new politics – how it would first manifest itself in the shape of a fall in class voting. Chapter Five is concerned with the second hypothesis of the thesis; if Inglehart is right in proposing that the parties that depended on a class-based mobilisation will exert less of a hold over voters, then we expect to see rising levels of disaffection. Inglehart’s entire theory is built on the premise that there is a political realignment taking place that has already partially undermined the old politics system which divided parties, policies and voters along survivalist lines. In his view, the increasing number of people socialised in affluent periods lessens the primacy of old politics, as the new voters are instead compelled by lifestyle politics. The process is an incremental one, however. As there is no ‘overnight’ changeover in the preponderance of materialists and postmaterialists, the replacement is graduated. In the same vein, younger citizens will still have experienced the culturally pervasive reach of old politics, one that reasserts its hold via party identification and familial transfer of opinions and political stances. The postmaterialist model stipulates that the entire old politics structure is necessarily slower to respond to value shifts than the citizens who constitute one of its parts; logically, then, the newer voters will become increasingly disenchanted with the issues and relevance of ‘old politics’ actors and institutions.

This chapter is structured according to the following lay-out. To more fully judge the merits of this second hypothesis, we detail how we derive our hypothesis
from a reading of Inglehart’s work in the area of system support (Part One). There is one significant problem in testing how true it is that old politics is losing its hold—that is, how one adequately measures political disaffection. In Part Two, we look at how we may rigorously test Inglehart’s general hypothesis of rising disaffection and what specific processes we should expect to change. We do this by setting out a series of measures that are synonymous with political disaffection. Parts Three (France) and Four (Ireland) look at how of the hypothesis explains trends in these measures in the two cases. Finally, in the Conclusion (Part Five), we judge the validity of Inglehart’s claim of a secular rise in disaffection.

5.1 Inglehart’s main claims

In the book *Value Change in Global Perspective* (1995), Inglehart and Abramson cite work by Dalton, Flanagan and Beck (1984) and Inglehart himself (1990) which ‘...argue that weakening party loyalties and low rate of voter turnout partly reflect the established parties’ failure to offer meaningful choices about the New Politics issues’75 (1995: 2). Our hypothesis is as follows:

\[ H_2: \text{That drops in party loyalty and turnout are progressively increasing as voters become disaffected by what the established parties have to offer}. \]

We can now document how Inglehart’s dual argument is constructed by more closely examining the most relevant work, his 1999 chapter, *Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy*. In this chapter, Inglehart proffers a more theoretically coherent explanation of value change and the concomitant weakening of a set of political indicators:
Well-educated publics are turning their backs on established systems of organisation...the same publics that are increasingly critical of hierarchical authority...are more apt to play an active role in politics ... hierarchical political parties are losing control over their electorates, and elite-directed forms of participation such as voting are stagnant or declining...

Inglehart, 1999a: 236.

If this were so, then postmaterialists would be reasonably expected to abstain from voting more consistently than materialists, as new politics issues are not adequately aired at election time. Yet eight pages later, Inglehart's one-tailed hypothesis opens up to become a two-tailed one: ‘...Europeans who choose Postmaterialist values are more likely to be politically active in conventional politics as well as to approve of and engage in unconventional political protest’76 (ibid. 244). It would seem, then, that as a postmaterialist is generally more educated and presumably in possession of a more activist mindset, that they would try to remake party politics from within, through their votes. Where this fails, these postmaterialist citizens are more likely to cease to adhere to conventional political activity, gravitating instead to extraparliamentary politics.77

Lower turnouts are classified by Inglehart as a symptom of a syndrome of distrust: ‘Pointing to declining rates of voter turnout they [some observers] argue that the American public has become disenchanted with the entire system and

75 A verbatim repetition of Inglehart and Abramson’s summary journal article (1994: 336).
76 Another exact repetition of a point raised in Inglehart and Abramson (1992: 184).
77 This is sufficient justification for looking at New Social Movements and political protest in Chapter Seven.
withdrawn from politics completely. Though voter turnout has stagnated (largely because of weakening party loyalties...') (1999a: 242). Here Inglehart gives us a consequence and its antecedent: the researcher is now in a position to link party loyalty with turnout and see if any drop in the former entrains a drop in the latter.

According to Inglehart, party politics and its most defining feature, the general election, suffer attacks on their legitimacy precisely because

The rise of Postmodern values is bringing a move away from acceptance of both traditional authority and state authority. It reflects a declining emphasis on authority in general - regardless of whether it is legitimated by societal or state formulae. This leads to declining confidence in hierarchical institutions. For the past several years, political leaders throughout the industrialised world have been experiencing some of the lowest levels of support ever recorded. This is not simply because they are less competent than previous leaders. It reflects a systematic decline in deference to authority, and a shift of focus toward individual concerns...In virtually all advanced industrial societies, Postmaterialists are less likely to consider more respect for authority desirable, than are materialists in the same society.

Inglehart, 1999a: 242

Consequently, the indicators of democratic support become even more important; it is not just a particular election or election cycle that is marked by low turnout, but politics as it has been practiced. A crucial test of whether realignment is occurring is to analyse the trend pertaining to party loyalty: if people switch
allegiances *en masse*, then a realignment is in process. If, however, they merely stop supporting a party, then this constitutes dealignment. As Inglehart acknowledges, it takes time for disaffection to result in alterations in the figures for as ‘...major political parties represent great psychological and institutional investments; established voting patterns are not lightly discarded’ (Inglehart, 1984: 26). In this sense, Inglehart’s work on regime endorsement among western publics is critical for determining whether or not a postmaterialist realignment has occurred or is in the process of occurring.

Having outlined the claims made by Inglehart regarding PM and how it impacts on partisan attachment, turnout and party membership, we now detail how we may test Inglehart’s hypothesis. There is much scholarly work and consequently much discussion on system discontent; the challenge is to use the right set of indicators that allow us to examine trends in both the cases over the time period.

### 5.2 Testing the derived hypothesis

Inglehart’s explanation for falling turnout is radical in political science terms because it is a clean break with the canonical works. His tabulation is a psychopolitical account of how estrangement from electoral democracy first appears, then strengthens and eventually yields a non-voter. To understand how Inglehart’s values-based explanation is markedly different to that offered by the established works, we note that models of turnout have consistently stressed the place of socio-economic factors. Since Lipset’s *Political Man* (1960) onwards, most of the significant literature in the field starts from this assumption. Standard treatments of political disaffection invariably take survey measures of confidence and trust in parties, politicians and institutions, and then correlate these findings with the electoral record.
through checking turnout levels. Two representative examples of this strategy are Dalton's (1999) chapter *Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* and Bentley, Jupp and Stedman Jones' paper *Getting to grips with depoliticisation* (2000). The latter paper in particular departs from Inglehart's methodology, as it explicitly tries to link up attitudinal variations with actual political outcomes, namely turnout levels. Both works are broad-ranging, with the latter including party membership and participation rates in unconventional politics, thus illustrating if people are becoming depoliticised or are merely not voting. We have systematic data on turnout and party loyalty for both cases; however, the Demos paper suggests to us that there is more to measuring disaffection than merely tracking changes in two indicators. Moreover, according to Reiter (1989), any analysis of disaffection is incomplete if we rely on only two independent variables. We thus extend the number of measures to give a better test of the hypothesis. From the full list of twelve indicators given by Reiter, five are fully applicable to both cases in terms of having systematic data available. Let us now outline the full set of indicators by which we test the hypothesis.

*Closeeness to a party* acts as our first measure. The partisanship or party identification measure's merit lies not just in its ability to track any one party's fortunes, but also its capacity to act as a device calibrating the institution of party democracy itself (Weisberg and Grofman, 1981). As Inglehart proposes that voters are becoming more consumerist and less partisan, we look at *volatility scores* in both states as our second measure. Inglehart's shift would have the logical outcome that as politics then retrenches itself and does not succeed in subsuming the concerns of

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the voter, it becomes an ever more élite-driven pursuit. A sustained *drop in party membership* should have occurred over the course of the timeframe and is our third measure. Although Abramson and Inglehart (1994) do not specifically argue that this is a corollary of growing disaffection, it is a strong candidate for our third measure.

Our fourth indicator, turnout, is more complex than the rest. Inglehart and Abramson (1994) cite a paper by Crepaz (1990), which assesses how the presence or absence of a postmaterialist party affects turnout. Crepaz looks at turnout rates for 16 industrial democracies from 1945-87 and shows that turnout rises when there is a postmaterialist party contesting an election. Specifically, 'the presence of a postmaterialist party increases voter turnout by 13.45 per cent' (op. cit. 196). His reasoning is as follows:

> These 'new' parties offer many individuals new opportunities for self-expression and therefore go to the polls for a cause they thought worthwhile: before, these individuals who were dissatisfied and disillusioned with the established 'old' parties only had the option of abstaining.

*Crepaz, 1990: 185.*

One point worth underlining is that as both France and Ireland have proportional elections to a greater or lesser extent, one should expect higher turnouts than where simple plurality system elections are held. We refine the case made on the trends in our turnout by stipulating that turnout should actually have risen when new parties have contested the elections.
We also check for trends in the number of purposely spoilt ballots cast at each election; these should be seen to have increased over time as discontentment grows. If the ballot is knowingly defaced, then this indicates that the 'voter' is so disgruntled with the state of play that they are physically moved to attend the poll but opt for a plague on all the parties' houses (cf. Bréchon, 1995 and Reiter, 1989). Concerning spoilt ballots, one immediately visible (and possibly insuperable obstacle) in using this number as an indicator is that we have no reliable way of determining those that were purposefully versus accidentally spoilt. For the purpose of this test, let us assume that they are divided equally. If there is an increase in the number of spoiled ballots, then it follows that the number of deliberately defaced papers also rises. One is now in a position to check for any trend in this datum and it becomes our fifth indicator. We now look at how these indicators have fared over the course of the timeframe in Ireland and France.

5.3: France

5.3.1: Closeness to party

We have systematic data on closeness to party in France that come from the Eurobarometer (Table 5.1). France's party identification scores decline steadily from 1978 through to 1994; this trend occurred for both types of partisans ('closely attached' and 'all attached plus sympathisers'; using the Eurobarometer data, the following emerges:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>France - Closely attached</th>
<th>France - All.</th>
<th>EC 9 average - closely attached</th>
<th>EC 9 average - All.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is noteworthy that the level of attachment in France has always been below that of the (then) EC - 9 average. The table clearly shows that the low point of French partisanship is from 1980-7. In fact, only in 1988 and 1993 is the continuous decline arrested. The Bentley, Jupp, Stedman-Jones study cited earlier goes back and forward a little further (1975-96) than the *Eurobarometer;* 59 per cent identified with a party in 1975 but by 1996, only 45 per cent did so. Generally, then, the trend is as per Inglehart’s prediction. We draw on SOFRES data analysed by Knapp (Table 5.2) to bring us up to 2000. Excluding the widely-disliked *Front National,* more people generally thought all parties to be bad rather than good. The balance figures are as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Balance (bad over good)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2000</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: The negative view of French parties - time series data collated by SOFRES. After Knapp and Wright, 2002: 121.

Only the Socialists escape this judgement and then only intermittently, with a positive balance of public opinion from 1981-3 and again from 1986-91 (op. cit. 119).

5.3.1.1: Summary of the evidence on closeness to party
Evidently, parties are not popular in France - instead, they have provoked antipathy. The fall-off in closeness to party has accelerated from 1990 onwards – again, further support for Inglehart’s claim that party loyalty is in decline. \( H_2 \) is supported.

5.3.2: Volatility and fragmentation
In using the measure of volatility, we can better gauge if parties are indeed becoming less popular. This value allows us to see if total levels of partisanship within the system are low enough that all parties cannot rely on a core vote at successive elections. The main problems with assessing volatility in France are the two-ballot run-off system which, coupled with two first-order elections, certainly muddies the
waters in comparison with Ireland. Additionally, long time series data on volatility in
French elections are difficult to collect precisely because of the frequent eruptions on
and disappearances of parties from the political scene. The standard measure would
be to track changes in the Total Net Volatility (TNV) figure over time. Grunberg
(1985) cautions against this, arguing that the fluidity in French politics waters down
the conclusions one can make with this information. He itemises 15 reasons why the
TNV figure is thus not that instructive, this large number of reasons may be roughly
categorised into three main groups:

(a) The arrival and departure of individual parties. During the life of the
Fourth Republic, two movements appeared that challenged the legitimacy
of the regime itself. Further complications arise even recently, with the
splits suffered by all of the three main parties.

(b) The mere fact the one regime gave way to another poses a problem –
should one only include time series data from the lifespan of the Fifth
Republic?

(c) A decision to only measure volatility from the inception of the Fifth
Republic must be tempered by the fact that direct election to the
presidency became a feature from 1962 – one thus has two separable
datasets, referring to legislative and presidential elections respectively.
One way of negotiating this problem is to see if the extant TNV scores
are corroborated by the surface indicators of ‘novel’ election outcomes,
where observers agree that a shift has occurred.
Grunberg does not give any volatility figures at all; instead, he looks at vote swings across the right and the left\(^79\). To obtain the TNV values for both the legislative and presidential contests from 1958, we turn to Knapp (2002). Let us look at the legislative elections first in Table 5.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TNV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is a clear rising trend, as Inglehart's hypothesis predicts; mean volatility rises from 5.1 in the 1960s, to 7.05 in the 1970s; 10.1 in the 1980s, and 16.25 in the 1990s. The point of departure may be best located in 1981, where for the first time in the Fifth Republic, the Socialists controlled both the presidency and parliament. An additional problem is the lack of panel data, which means that there is no accurate way of following an individual voter's decisions across two or more separate elections. One way around this problem is provided by Subileau and Toinet (1984)\(^80\), who summarise the *listes d'émargement* (official checklists) of voters and abstainers over five ballots – the 1979 European elections and two rounds each of the 1981 Presidential and Legislative elections. Forty-six per cent of voters abstained at least once and only eleven per cent of the sample voted at all five ballots, so Grunberg seems on steady ground in assuming that voting records must have varied substantially, boosting TNV. The relevant figures for 1981 are indeed the largest from the 1958-81 period. The record adds strong additional evidence to Inglehart's hypothesis that parties are less able to retain loyalty.

\(^79\) This method is analogous to that used by Sinnott (1995: 110) in his referral to the block volatility measure to chart changes across the Civil War divide.
For presidential elections, the evidence is more mixed. 1974 is the high water mark and it declines quite steadily since then. In its relationship to Inglehart’s case, one is obliged to note that the run-off system in this election skews the contest in favour of the candidates of established parties; in a two-player competition, volatility is less insightful than it is in a legislative election, where more parties can have candidates. For this reason, we look in Table 5.4 at the first round of the presidential contests, where one has more than two candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TNV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We have no rising trend; in fact, we have the opposite. Inglehart’s hypothesis neatly fits in with the evidence of the legislative record, but not for the presidentials. However, it is reasonable to propose that TNV is a better measure in legislative elections due to the number of parties; therefore, the volatility indicator follows the trend predicted by Inglehart.

The figures for volatility suggest rising voter consumerism in that parties can rely less and less on large core votes. As Grunberg observes, fluctuations in vote share are due to increased fragmentation within the party system, affecting both first-order elections. With substantially more parties (itself a proxy indicator of volatility) competing for an electorate that is expanding at a slower rate, one consequence of

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80 Cited in Grunberg (op. cit).
this trend is that governments have been changed by smaller numbers of voters than in earlier decades. This is particularly valid for the period from 1993 to the present day in contrast to earlier. In 1993, the huge parliamentary majority of the Centre-Right was won with a smaller share of first ballot votes than that which those parties had held in 1981 when the Left massively defeated them. Furthermore, in 1995, the total vote share of centre-right candidates at the first ballot – Chirac’s winning coalition for the second ballot – was significantly less than that for similar candidates in 1981, when Mitterrand had won for the Left. Even slight variations in vote numbers can bring about significant change – Bell and Criddle’s comment on the 2002 presidential election is insightful: ‘Here was an earthquake without movement: a slight rise in the vote for the extreme right and a fall in the Socialist vote combining to push Le Pen rather than Jospin into the second ballot...’ (2002: 643). This trend could well serve as support for Inglehart’s hypothesis.

Increased party system fragmentation supports Inglehart’s hypothesis, and such a pattern seems to apply to the French legislative elections since 1993. In 2002, there was a 32 per cent increase in the number of small candidates (outside the established large parties) as against 1997 (Libération, July 19, 2002). Overall, the 2002 legislatives had 20 per cent more candidates than 1997 and 45 per cent more candidates than 1993. If this were so, however, it is hard to explain why the 2002 election produced such an effusion of candidates; why no secular increase from, say 1978 or 1981? However, being fair to Inglehart, he could argue that the increased fragmentation is now gathering pace. Inglehart could point to the range of choices available in the 2002 presidential election as an illustration of the impact of PM81 (Miguet, 2002: 211).

81 In the previous two elections, there were nine.
However, such a reading neglects the more parsimonious explanation for candidate profusion provided by Cole (2002: 336), who attributes this increase to changes in campaign finance legislation which guarantees state subvention to any party that fields 50 candidates in at least 30 départements. This helps to account for why Chevènement, who signally failed in the 2002 presidential first round, went on to head a team of 408 candidates at the subsequent legislative elections. We can also add in the changes in legislation which reduced the number of signatures needed in order to stand for the office of president from 1974 on. One consequence of this was the entry into the race of candidates such as Laguiller, who are not allied to major parties and are unlikely to win through to the second round. As French parties are less able to retain voter loyalty, we may now examine if their ability to attract members has been similarly lessened.

5.3.2.1: Summary of the evidence for volatility

Inglehart’s hypothesis is backed up by the TNV figures for the legislative contests, but not for the presidential elections. This mixed result is not damaging for Inglehart’s case, though, as TNV is more suited to multiparty elections than for presidential elections. H$_2$ is supported.

5.3.3: Party membership

French party membership figures have been assessed in many diverse ways (Billordo, 2003: 136) and are the source of much confusion, largely due to a practice of inflating membership rolls (op. cit., 140). In the past, they were typically

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82 Miguet (2002: 216) reports that the campaign reforms of 1988 resulted in a 1.68 Euro payment per vote from the state.
exaggerated to suggest two things – (i) that the party was indeed representative of French society and (ii) the larger numbers and resulting subscriptions served as an alternative and genuine source of otherwise illicit funds. Bearing in mind these caveats, let us try to ascertain a trend. In support of Inglehart’s model, there is a clearly accelerating fall-off, as Table 5.5 shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% in parties in 1990s</th>
<th>1960s to 1990s</th>
<th>1980s to 1990s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.5: Rate of decline of membership of French parties; after Bentley, Jupp and Stedman Jones (2000): 7.*

On party membership, most scholars, Inglehart including, rely on the *Members / Electorate ratio*, which allows one to see how successfully parties appealed to interested citizens over a long time period. There has been a considerable debate, though, about exactly how and when one should measure party membership; for the review on the figures for France, see Billordo (2003).

As we see in Table 5.6, the historical backdrop complicates things:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimated numbers</th>
<th>M/E ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late 1940s</td>
<td>1,675,000</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1950s</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1960s</td>
<td>498,500</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1960s</td>
<td>615,000</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1970s</td>
<td>724,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1970s</td>
<td>906,900</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1980s</td>
<td>792,500</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1980s</td>
<td>771,113</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1990s</td>
<td>578,500</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1990s</td>
<td>464,200</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.6: Estimated party membership in France since 1945 in numbers and as a percentage of the registered electorate; after Knapp, 2002: 121.*
The late 1940s figure is clearly the high point and supports Duverger’s (1951) claim that the ‘mass party’ would come to typify France as it would any wealthy western state. However, the figures for the rest of the time series indicate that far from setting precedent, the 1940s M / E value was the peak and a sudden collapse set in from which there has been no real recovery. Mitterrand’s professionalisation of the Socialists in the late 1970s apart, it is apparent that the French have never been party foot soldiers. The trend from the early 1980s is downward, but Inglehart’s case depends on a linear decline: as the table shows, there are two peaks and an ascending period from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. In itself, this time of growth is hardly such, as the rise in membership numbers starts from a very low base in the late 1950s. Knapp cites Cambadélis (op. cit. 122) who argues that the middle of the century was comprised of three great mobilising events for the French – the Resistance; the Algerian crisis, and May 1968. As there has been nothing of this rank since, it follows that membership could not be expected to be as high as it was for these three periods. This conjectured explanation nonetheless misses the mark – the M / E ratio and the raw numbers tell us that even these three ‘mobilising events’ did not yield any mass influx in party numbers. They may well have politicised the French electorate and younger voters especially, but this did not translate into thicker registries of party members in the respective parties’ headquarters.

5.3.3.1: Summary of the evidence for party membership
Although Inglehart’s hypothesis is not built on solid longitudinal data which would question the notion of a golden age for mass parties, the trend since the late 1970s is discernibly downwards, and so H₂ is supported.
The litmus test of turnout levels examines if the French are increasingly disenchanted with electoral contests and also determines if both the legislative and presidential elections are equally affected. Inglehart's argument rests on the claim that old parties are not attractive to new voters. We see if the presence of new parties at elections has boosted turnout as per Inglehart's model.

The Fifth Republic's turnout rates must of course be compared with those of the Third and Fourth Republics so that we may have some idea as to whether or not there has been a secular fall in participation. From 1885 right through to the end of the Fourth Republic, turnout rates never dipped below 71 per cent (Schain, 2003: 237). Falling turnout affects France much like most other industrialised states. An additional and possibly key factor in explaining why lower turnout may well be a congenital problem for Fifth Republic France is the run-off system. If at the first round of a presidential election, a voter's preferred candidate is eliminated, then only three possible alternatives present themselves to this 'thwarted voter' - loyalty to the basic orientation (typically left or right), abstention or defection. This notion of understanding the thwarted voter gains importance when one notes that at the 1995 presidential election, more than half of the tour décisifs voters had not voted for either of the combatants in the first round. From 1965-95, there is a mean of 40 per cent thwarted voters for the presidential elections. One could reasonably extrapolate that in 2002, this figure rose to 63 per cent, as Chirac (19.9 per cent) and Le Pen (16.9 per cent) polled a combined total of 36.8 per cent between them.

What is required is longitudinal data which will enable us to see what happens to turnout at each election. Type of election is also pivotal (see context

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83 This phrase and the theory originate from Pierce's article of the same name (in press).
effects above). Although France has two first-order elections, the presidential contest has traditionally been viewed by politicians, academics and voters as being more important. As Chiche and Dupoirier put it, 'Celui-ci pose comme première règle que le degré de mobilisation électorale dépend de l'importance attachée par les électeurs aux différents types de consultation.' (1998: 142). Turnout has invariably been higher for the presidential contest.

Subileau (2002) tabulates the rate of abstention for all legislative and presidential elections since the inception of the Fifth Republic; let us first look in Table 5.7 at the presidential record.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>First round</th>
<th>Second round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.7: Abstention rates for the first and second round of the French Presidential elections; after Subileau, 2002: 11.*

Given the considerable level of debate about the declining legitimacy of French elections, we note the existence of a dual institutional approach to understanding turnout variations in France which has nothing to do with PM – the model consists of (a) context and (b) conjuncture effects (Subileau, 2002: 10). These may be invoked to explain the low tallies of the second round of the 1969 and the first round of the 2002 presidential elections. The context model predicts that turnout drops when there is no run-off between a right and a left candidate. In 1969, there was no leftist candidate and the predicted winner, Georges Pompidou, was
challenged by another right-of-centre politician, Alain Poher. Not surprisingly, the Communists lamented this run-off and urged its voters not to choose between _bonnet blanc et blanc bonnet_. The only other presidential _tour décisif_ where there was no left / right contest was 2002, where Chirac faced the FN's Le Pen. Vote fragmentation, low turnout and weak appeal resulted in Chirac becoming President with the lowest number of first round preferences recorded (Miguet, 2002: 210). For the 2002 presidential election, a Louis Harris pre-election poll found that a remarkable 74 per cent of respondents thought the programmes of Chirac and Jospin to be similar (Cole, 2002: 320). A British variation of the context model is provided by Pattie and Johnston (2002), whose analysis of turnout in Britain found that if competitors present similar programmes, turnout will be lower.

Both the 1969 and 2002 elections are thus theoretically amenable to an analysis grounded in the context effect, but the higher turnout of the 2002 election is at odds with the model, due to the formation of an anti-Le Pen movement. Abstainers were in fact the largest group of the first round (at 28 per cent of registered voters). Abstention on the second round is much lower in this case, largely because the PS, other components of the _gauche plurielle_ and a majority of France’s civic society (including third sector spokespeople, sports stars, musicians, trade unionists and media figures) came out strongly against the idea of a far-right candidate gaining a chance to win the Élysée. In the face of this 'legitimacy crisis' for the political system, Chirac won by the largest margin of any Fifth Republic election. If conjuncture effects apply, then value change in no way relates to falling turnout. Instead, more parsimonious reasons such as electoral fatigue or the timing of an individual election are invoked. In the French case, the sequence of the

---

14 Colloquial expression, meaning "tweedledum and tweedledee".
presidential and parliamentary elections is deemed to be influential. If the presidential contest precedes the legislative one, then one sees from the depressed turnout in the latter that voters view the decisive election to have occurred. In this sense, the case put forward is that the legislative contest becomes something of a second-order election. (Cole, 2002: 320). These are competing claims to Inglehart's model, but again, all Inglehart's hypothesis needs is for the trends to go in his direction, which, as we have seen, is true in both the legislative and presidential series.

Table 5.8 demonstrates that the record for the legislative elections indicates a rise in apathy that, on one level, is supportive of Inglehart's hypothesis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8: Fifth Republic first round abstention rates for the Assemblée Nationale elections; after Subileau (op. cit.).

The 1980s seems to mark a new higher level of abstention (Schain, 2003: 237) and so serves to bolster the case for accepting the hypothesis. There is a strong 'second-half' trend, with this rising abstention a feature right through to 2002, where the elections saw the highest level of abstention since the inception of the Fifth Republic. The three previous elections all had abstention rates in excess of 30 per cent. The note of caution is that turnout has still fallen in spite of the presence of postmaterialist parties, such as the Greens. Crepaz (op. cit) found that where such parties contested elections, turnout rose. This pattern does not fit France, where the
advent of parties from outside of the main established blocs has not boosted turnout. So Inglehart's explanation that falling turnout is due to a lack of choice for new voters does not seem a well-grounded one. $H_2$ is not supported.

5.3.4.2: Summary of the evidence for turnout
The trends in both the legislative and presidential elections support Inglehart's hypothesis of increasing decline but contradict his accompanying argument that new politics parties can arrest drops in turnout. As for the demographic profile of those more likely to abstain, the hypothesis is confirmed by the data on age – young people are less likely to vote. Due to the lack of clarity on whether recent elections should be accompanied by higher or lower turnout, however, $H_2$ is not supported.

5.3.5: Spoilt ballots

Inglehart argues that voters turn away from electoral politics when they are confronted with what they view effectively as Hobson's choice. Let us assume that the ratio of accidentally to deliberately spoilt ballots is constant over time; if this is true, then any notable rise in the figures indicates a rise in the number of the latter category and thus is suggestive of rising disaffection. There is one large obstacle – the percentages of spoiled ballots are only ever a fraction of the total, and so it is wrong to expect very visible deviations. Instead, we should attend to fluctuations in the order of a half or less.

There is an established corpus of work on spoiled ballots in France. Bréchon (1995) invokes the well-worn explanation that they go hand-in-hand with abstention per se. Noting that the percentage ratio of spoiled votes is typically higher in rural départements, he states that social pressure to vote is higher in these less anonymous
communities. Faced with a lack of what they perceive to be an effective choice, these 'constrained' voters spoil their ballots: 'Selon les terroirs, on préférera manifester son incapacité à choisir ou son opposition politique de manière passive (en s'abstenant) ou par une attitude civique (par un vote blanc et nul).' (op, cit. 37).

In this, he is supported by Subileau (2002) '...d'autre part, le contrôle social sur les comportments électoraux y est moindre que celui qui existe dans les groupes d'inter-connaissance où le vote blanc et nul peut exprimer quelquefois une abstention contrainte.' (op. cit. 8).

In the 1995 presidential second ballot, spoiled votes reached a Fifth Republic record tally of six per cent. We again present separately the data for the legislative (Table 5.10) and presidential (Table 5.11) elections; Bréchon contends that it is impossible to calculate exactly what proportion of votes are deliberately spoiled, but that an average level of approximately two per cent pertains:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9: Spoiled ballots as a percentage of votes cast at the first round of legislative elections in the Fifth Republic; after Knapp, 2002: 112 and http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/resultats.asp85

The 1986 figure marks a new trend, with a tally of 3.4 per cent; this drops to 1.4 per cent two years later only to rise above the average in 1993 and in 1997. The presidential data are of the same order (Table 5.11):

Table 5.10: Spoiled ballots as a percentage of votes cast at the first round of presidential elections in the Fifth Republic; after Knapp, 2002: 113; and Bell and Criddle, 2002: 651

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the presidential contests, 1995 and 2002 have the highest percentage of spoiled ballots, with figures above two per cent. There is a continuous rising trend from 1974 onwards. Second-round spoiled ballots are an informative statistic in the case of the presidential elections also. We saw earlier that Subileau (2002) affirms that frustrated voters may well heed their party's message not to vote for either of the second round candidates. This interpretation certainly seems to hold for 1969, where the spoiled ballot figure grows from one per cent to four-and-a-half per cent (Cole and Campbell, 1989: 106) when voters were faced with two centre-right candidates. A similarly high percentage (4.3 per cent) spoiled their votes at the second round of the 2002 presidential election, a clear case of thwarted voters venting their frustration at having to choose between what many viewed as unpalatable choices.86 The impact of both Besancenot and Laguiller87 not advising their supporters to vote for Chirac at the second round is in all likelihood unknowable, as neither polled substantially in the first round, but still finished in the top half of the poll. The loyalty of their voters has not been ascertained.

5.3.5.1: Summary of the evidence for spoilt ballots

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86 Both Le Pen and Chirac came in for much personal criticism during the campaign, with newspapers reporting that many voters believed accusations that Chirac had misappropriated funds as leader of the Gaullists and as Mayor of Paris.
From the 1980s onwards, there is a higher level of spoilt ballots at both contests; this is supportive of Inglehart’s hypothesis. For the presidential elections, there has been an increase in the percentage of spoilt ballots at every election since 1974. For the legislatives, the increase is both sharper and more recent, beginning to rise markedly from 1993 onwards. $H_2$ is supported.

5.3.6: Overall summary of the data for France

On four of the five indicators — closeness to party, electoral volatility, party membership, and spoilt ballots — Inglehart’s hypothesis is supported. This amounts to an impressive sweep of support for his argument of a secular rise in electoral disaffection. There is large question mark against turnout, where Inglehart’s case is ambiguous. Firstly, Inglehart has argued that turnout will continue to fall where old parties are left to themselves and, by extension, that it will rise when new parties serve to increase the range of options to the new voter. Contemporary French elections show that this is not the case — turnout has continued to fall. Inglehart is not sufficiently specific on this basic issue, and so we do not accept that PM predicts turnout in France.

Precisely because four of the five indicators follow the direction predicted by Inglehart’s model, we accept $H_2$ for France.

87 Fringe left-wing candidates who polled a total of ten per cent between them.
5.4: Ireland

5.4.1: Closeness to party

To begin on a cautious note, Sinnott (1995: 149-50)\(^88\) comments on a lack of directly relevant data that are needed in order to assess where Ireland falls regarding de/realignment. This applies to partisanship as much as it does to the other measures of volatility, turnout, spoilt ballots and party membership. The comparative weakness of attachment in Ireland was noted in Inglehart and Klingemann's analysis of partisanship in the EC-9 in 1973; where Ireland came bottom of the table for levels of same. Schmitt (1988) comments on elections up to the 1987 and notes that if dealignment was to be found anywhere in the EC, it was in Ireland, with a 60 per cent level of identification in the mid-1970s dropping to 40 per cent by the mid- to late 1980s. Most interestingly for the purposes of this thesis, Mair and Marsh (1999) report that the decline in party attachment features in all age groups. One possible fly in the ointment is the inconsistency of question format - in its deployment in Ireland, four different types of question purporting to interrogate attachment have been used.

A study of 19 industrialised democracies places Ireland joint sixth from bottom in terms of party identification. In reference to the weakening of affections of strong identifiers, then Ireland is part of a near-ubiquitous trend\(^89\) (Dalton, 1999: 166). However, the drop in Ireland's values is the largest of all over the time period of the survey,\(^90\) from 61 per cent of respondents being classified as 'identifiers' in 1978, to 30 per cent in 1996.

The most recent data concur with the above. In Table 5.12, we reproduce the Eurobarometer figures, which cover the period from 1978 to 1994, and add the

---

\(^{88}\) Much of this section draws on Sinnott's comprehensive (1995) account of voting behaviour in Ireland.

\(^{89}\) Only Belgium is exempt.
update provided by Marsh (2003: 26), which includes the 1999 European Election Study and the 2002 Irish Election Study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% 'very close'</th>
<th>% 'fairly close'</th>
<th>% 'merely a sympathiser'</th>
<th>% 'Not close at all'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the absence of an Irish National Election Study series, one unfortunately only has systematic data up until 1994. The year-by-year breakdown shows that 1991 was a low-point, with some slight pick-up in the remaining three years. A European Elections study (1999) reveals a renewal of a sharp downturn. The trend for 'very strong' identifiers matches the overall magnitude of decline but starts off with a swift and sudden drop from 1978-9; the 1986 figure is the joint lowest, along with the 1999 European elections findings (Murphy and Farrell, 2002: 221). The strongest support for Inglehart’s hypothesis is on the column furthest to the right—

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90 One should take note that there are different starting points for some nations in this study.
there is a steady and uninterrupted growth in the percentage of people who classify themselves as ‘not very close at all’.

5.4.1.1: Summary of the evidence for closeness to party
Although there is no demographic profile suggesting that people who fit the postmaterialist description are more likely to feel alienated from parties, it is apparent that the distance between parties and the electorate has grown. H₂ is supported.

5.4.2: Volatility and fragmentation
Superficially, increased Irish electoral volatility would appear to be a probable correlate of PM, as it seems to dovetail with the timeframe of new politics. 2002 was the first election since 1969, ten ballots in all, that an outgoing administration was returned to power. Additionally, the vote share of the two main parties has decreased, indicating increased party competition and thus both opportunity and motive for vote switching. As recently as 1982, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil polled 84 per cent of the vote between them; 20 years later and they could only muster a fraction less than 64 per cent jointly (Nealon’s Guides, various election years). More scientific work is of course required.

Sinnott (1995: 110) recommends that one should also invoke the concept of block volatility when chronologically comparing Irish elections. This form of volatility involves vote switching across the bifurcation of an established cleavage and was coined by Bartolini and Mair (1990). However, for reasons of comparability, the Pedersen Index is used.

The longitudinal data do not back up Inglehart’s hypothesis. Marsh (1985: 178) tells us that there is a decline in net volatility in the final third of the last
century as picked up by the Pedersen Index: ‘At five of the six elections between 1948 and 1965 net volatility was higher than at any of the six subsequent elections’.

Acknowledging that the three elections of 1973, 1977 and 1981 exhibit an upswing that is not carried on by the two 1982 elections, it is apparent that turbulent elections are not a peculiarly contemporary aspect of Irish politics. Multiple time-point series data show a 70 per cent-plus level of voting consistency and the little vote switching that does take place has ‘...predominantly been between (sic) the three major parties’ (ibid: 179). So convinced was Marsh by this impression of muted volatility based on both the ballot and survey records that he writes that instead we should discuss the ‘considerable stability’ of Irish voting patterns up until the mid-1980s.

We now examine the pattern of electoral volatility in Ireland from the 1969 to 2002 elections. Table 5.13 contains the figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 1977 election is marked by a sharp upward swing; 1977 was the first election since 1932 that Fianna Fáil registered two consecutive gains in vote take (Chubb, 1977: 129). The 1981 election, where Fine Gael scored a notable success, is also accompanied by an upswing in volatility. There is a large rise in comparing the two elections of November 1982 and 1987, then an accentuated fall in 1989 followed by another large increase in 1992 only to be succeeded by yet another drop. This concertina-like unfolding of volatility makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions, but the recent pattern is as per Inglehart’s predictions, In Table 5.14, we
note that the averages for the decades show that volatility for each election has risen from the 1980s to the 1990s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.13: Mean electoral volatility for each decade from the 1960s-1990s; based on Murphy and Farrell, idem.*

Unfortunately, the 2002 figures for volatility were unavailable at the time of writing. One adjunct to the measure of volatility is the leakage figure; this sums up how effective a party is in keeping transfers within its ranks. In Table 5.15, we focus on the last two elections as this gives us some insight into how volatility has unfolded up to 2002. The more reliable data are for the big three parties, as the smaller parties do not run enough candidates for a transfer datum to make sense.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% to own party</th>
<th>+/- from 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>62.70</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>63.02</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lab.</td>
<td>49.43</td>
<td>+1.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.14: Leakage figures for the three largest Irish parties at the 2002 election. From Nealon’s Guide to the 29th Dáil.*

The numbers for 1997 and 2002 are near-identical for the big three (FF, FG and Labour). This suggests that volatility may well have settled at a plateau.
5.4.2.1: Summary of the evidence for volatility

H₂ is only partially supported, as the longitudinal record tells us that volatility has actually lessened in the final third of the last century. Additionally, the downward trend is only apparent when comparing the 1980s to the 1990s, and not for any earlier pairing.

5.4.3: Party membership

Kavanagh (2002: 53) includes a comment from an interview that parties are increasingly much less able to rely on members to engage in canvassing. This is linked by the interviewee to a lack of coverage of and visibility in a constituency and depresses turnout. Members of parties are also described as being much less willing to volunteer to put up posters and stuff envelopes, small but essential acts in winning voter attention.

Similar to France, party membership figures are notoriously unreliable (Murphy and Farrell, 2002). In the Irish case, the inveterate lack of a centralised register ensured that any head count was an estimate at best, while the ‘paper branches’ phenomenon resulted in wildly inflated numbers that only seemed to be important in intraparty decision-making processes. Changes in the party roll numbers in the Irish case are at times untraceable. Party HQ - dictated revisions to branch structures can reduce the incidence of paper and dormant branches, while any increases seem to correspond with an electorally-successful, newly combative party.

As in France, Irish parties will also massage figures to present an image of a party that adequately reflects the demographics of its society and to testify to their ability to energise people to band together to aid the cause.
Bentley, Jupp and Stedman-Jones’s overview (op. cit.) of democratic legitimacy shows across-the-board falls in the members / electorate (M / E) percentage ratios in 12 EU states and in the US. The M / E ratio is the more comparable measure over simple head count, as it at least parallels fluctuations in the size of the electoral register. Ireland’s M / E ratio value is mid-ranking, with an approximate attrition of 30 per cent during the time period. This decline in the 1980s-1990s is the explanandum, not the low absolute level of membership. As adduced above, systematic membership details are rare for Irish parties and even more so prior to the 1980s. We thus have corroboration for Inglehart’s prediction that parties will lose some of their prominence in contemporary politics.

Ireland’s figures lack the longitudinal aspect applicable to the other states – reliable data only obtain for the 1980s – 1990s. Going back earlier than the 1980s, we have a problem in both the availability and reliability of data. The information from centrally-maintained registers goes as far back as 1976 but not for all parties – note that ten years’ worth of figure for Fianna Fáil are unavailable, while presumably an eagerness to avoid the prospect of state surveillance induced the Workers Party to obviate keeping a central list. In Table 5.16, we have figures on party membership that span 13 years:

---

91 This usually has its effect in an influx of new members who are allowed to nominate delegates with voting powers. It is a practice used to wield influence on behalf of the party candidate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>M/E (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some individual party figures from which this table is drawn up require comment and elucidation. Fianna Fáil reports a gain of 9,000 members, or in excess of eleven per cent in one year alone, from 1986-7, the year of an election build-up and campaign proper. Were the PDs in error when they recorded 7,000 members in 1997 and then a near-halving to 4,000 just one year later? Fine Gael’s membership high of 1979-1981 is contemporaneous with their best electoral performance since 1922: a neat symbiosis between membership effort, canvassing and appeal of membership to interested voters. Regarding Democratic Left, there is no agreed figure on how many of the 1,400 members listed as of 1997 transferred to Labour in 1999: any increase in Labour numbers is thus attributable to merger rather than increased party appeal.

Overall, absolute party membership numbers drop for ten years out of thirteen (only 1991, 1992 and 1997 are exempt), matching the overall trend for the M/E ratios. Admittedly there are two increases in the latter here, but as they are
only 0.07 and 0.03 per cent respectively, they certainly cannot be construed as proof of bucking the trend. On this evidence, a decline is unequivocal.

5.4.3.1: Summary for party membership

Notwithstanding the lack of systematic sources needed for a longitudinal view, the trend is slightly downward for every year, and is thus supportive of $H_2$.

5.4.4: Turnout

In proportional systems, the classical reasoning is to expect higher turnout compared with majority systems as a voter's choice is more resonant - vote wastage in one-horse race constituencies is considerably less likely. Norris' (1997) comparative overview of average turnout as a function of electoral system is reproduced in Table 5.17; it registers this effect quite tangibly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Mean Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-proportional</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.16: Mean turnout levels as a function of different electoral systems; after Norris, 1997: 9.

Interestingly, unlike France, the academic work on Ireland gives figures on turnout rather than abstention – for the reader, the result is still the same.

Sinnott (1995: 84) covers all elections from 1922 to 1992. Putting some flesh on the bones, we see that the 1933 turnout figure of 81 per cent was the peak - in 1937, there was a five per cent drop and from then on, turnout never exceeded 77 per cent. The 1944 and 1948 elections had lower turnouts than for any contest from 1969
to 1989. The figures on turnout for the 12 elections from 1961-2002 are given in Table 5.18:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Percentage of those registered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>76.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>76.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>76.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1982</td>
<td>73.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1982</td>
<td>72.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>73.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>68.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>68.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>65.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>62.73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures from 1969 up to 1982 are broadly in line with the mean predicted by Norris (op. cit). Inglehart's postmaterialist trend is end-loaded. The usefulness of baseline turnout measures may be gauged from the following. Turnout from 1969-77 is higher than for 1961-5, and only from then on is the general trend slightly downwards. Notwithstanding, 1989 onwards would seem to herald a new period of substantially reduced turnout. From this election, Ireland's turnout record fares comparatively unfavourably: its fall of 10 per cent from 1989-2002 is twice that half times that of the European average (O'Malley, 2001: 215). Even allowing for inadequacies in the keeping of the electoral register (removing the deceased and emigrants, for example) there is still a loss. Both official turnout and estimated

---

92 Sinnott does comment that the wartime rationing of fuel and newsprint, and the fact of censorship depressed turnout; he could have added that the lack of any viable political alternatives in the face of the war and rationing surely detracted from the motivation to go to the polls.
turnout\textsuperscript{93} decline. This pattern again supports Inglehart's case on one level - there is a process of voter disaffection that manifests itself in the last third of the period studied, but one should note that this does not amount to a secular collapse in turnout over the whole time span under investigation. However, as with France, if Crepaz (1990) is correct, then as the number of parties increases, so should turnout. As Crepaz's work is a corollary to Inglehart's model, we are thus able to judge that Inglehart is wrong in proposing that as more new parties appear, turnout will rise. The emergence of the PDs, the Greens and Sinn Féin in the past 15 years of Irish elections are the new inputs, while the migration of the biggest part Workers' Party to become Democratic Left may act as both a new input and its eventual disappearance (after the merger of Democratic Left with Labour in 1999). The impact of the Greens is thus most relevant as they are clearly postmaterialist (Inglehart, 1984) and have contested all four elections from 1989-2002. Turnout has fallen, not risen – new politics parties have not succeeded in arresting turnout decline, let alone boost it.

A rival explanation which has some applicability to Ireland may be found in a reading of Pattie and Johnston (2001); their point, in turn, approximates Subileau's (2002) account of context-based turnout predictions. They argue that the specific set of circumstances accompanying each election serves to explain much variance in falling turnout. Pattie and Johnston propose that the closeness of electoral competition is a good indicator of how high abstention will be. The Irish general election of 2002 is a graphic illustration of this - Fine Gael as main opposition party was not in a position to offer an alternative administration to the Irish electorate and so voters were left with little prospect of a change in power. The result was the

\textsuperscript{93} Based on electoral register anomalies as above which mean that 107 per cent of the eligible population was on the register.
lowest turnout in the history of the state. Understanding why the third election in the 18-month period of February 1981-November 1982 also produced a markedly low turnout, one may reasonably propose electoral fatigue as the overriding explanation, not value change. The 1989 election set the new lower mark for turnout in Ireland and one may view this as the outcome of voters not being persuaded to vote by Haughey's peremptory (as it was viewed at the time) decision to call another general election, only two years into his term of office. This, then, is tangential to a secular 'generational replacement' explanation of turnout decline. On balance, as the recent trend of new parties has not boosted turnout, H₂ is not supported.

5.4.4.2: Summary of turnout

H₂ is not supported. New parties have not boosted turnout and, in contrast to Inglehart's notion of values-driven disaffection, it is the poor and less educated who are consistently less likely to vote.

5.4.5: Spoilt ballots

The figures for elections from 1969 to 2002 are given in Table 5.19. The numbers are indeed small, so the reader cannot detect changes of any large magnitude. However, we again should look for fluctuations in the range of a 50-200 per cent of the baseline figures:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1982</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1982</td>
<td>0.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.18: Percentage of spoiled ballots in eleven general elections; after various Nealon's Guides.*

It is apparent that there is no trend, apart from a four-election increase over the period 1982-1992, but this fades away in the last two elections. The two most recent elections have a lower spoiled ballot percentage than the two earliest ones. No definitive conclusions can be drawn, which impairs Inglehart's case that there should be swelling numbers of disaffected voters.

**5.4.5.1: Summary of spoilt ballots.**

This indicator does not follow Inglehart's prediction, and so $H_2$ is not supported.

**5.4.6: Overall summary of the evidence for Ireland**

On two of the five indicators, we find that Inglehart's hypothesis is supported, while it is partly supported on a third. Absolute figures on partisan attachment, irrespective of what question is asked, indicate that the claim of a drop in party loyalty holds. The volatility figures do not equate to a progressive decline; leakage figures suggest a steady state over the past two elections, indicating that the erosion of attachment may well have gone as far as it is likely to do. There is incontrovertible evidence of a fall-off in party members, one that has accelerated as time has gone on, leading us to
accept this indicator as supportive of Inglehart’s hypothesis. The hypothesis is not supported on turnout - there is a negative trend in from 1989 onwards, suggesting that new parties are not the missing ingredient in enticing voters to the polls. Spoiled ballots are not a critical indicator in deciding whether to accept $H_2$, as they have maintained a consistent level since they were systematically documented. On balance, then, $H_2$ is supported.

5.5: Conclusion

Inglehart’s model is impressively accurate on the general question of growing disaffection. Leaving to one side his inadequate operationalisation of how we can measure this, we have seen that the hypothesis is confirmed. Even on indicators that Inglehart does not detail, such as the number of spoiled ballots and the $M/E$ ratio, we have seen that Inglehart’s predicted trends are in the right direction. The sharp falls in partisan attachment make this the strongest evidence for his hypothesis. It is apparent that there is a growing bloc of floating voters who decide elections on a more short-term basis than party identification. Decline in party membership is in some ways a red herring - it has never been particularly high in either state, but it is clear that there has been a fall-off within the past 15 years.

The quibble remains as to his view of turnout. Firstly, his argument is lopsided - turnout is falling because new parties are not contesting elections, but he does not point to cases where new parties have merged and turnout has still dropped. We have found this latter pattern applies to France and Ireland. The context and conjuncture models do not explain a prolonged series of elections in France, but are still useful in understanding the 1969 presidential and both the 2002 presidential and legislative elections. Pattie and Johnston’s related account of British turnout patterns
is quite useful for explaining the four elections – the two in 1982; 1989, and 2002, and so cannot be immediately dismissed. Thirdly, there is his neglect of the longitudinal record; Time One-Time Two data for the period in question are insufficient grounds for making a case. This problem also hampers how his theory applies to class voting.

Inglehart's work in arguing his case is not carried out by him, though. All he supplies is the evidence from the *Eurobarometer* on levels of attachment. Missing from the equation is the behavioural correlate of the surveyed attitude, namely, vote-switching data. We have had to supply additional information in the shape of established indicators that surprisingly, Inglehart does not use. As a result, his own works on electoral disaffection are reliant on attitudinal measures.

Overall, the large parties in both states have proven increasingly less able to maintain their dominant positions; volatility has risen and vote fragmentation has fed and is fed by an increasing number of candidates. This is particularly true for recent French presidential elections. The survey work of Inglehart is used by many scholars, most notably Dalton (cf. 1999), to explain the growing levels of disaffection in wealthy democracies.

In this chapter, we have looked for specific evidence of the general claim that electoral discontentment is rising. We have looked at party, survey, and electoral data and found that $H_2$ is supported, but not on perhaps the key indicator, turnout. How established parties have responded to this disaffection and whether new parties have emerged to profit from it is now examined in Chapter Six.
Chapter 6: New Parties

Introduction

Whereas Chapters Four and Five have the voter as the dependent variable, this chapter takes parties as the dependent variable. It tracks new politics developments as they affect parties, examining their origins, policies and electoral performances.

Inglehart’s model is dependent on both structural and attitudinal change. It assumes that with the decline of the monolithic working class, materialist politics becomes less relevant; in Chapter Five, we looked at the evidence of a rise in the various indicators of disaffection. Inglehart argues that the positive evidence backs his claim that old politics is losing its position. In response to the new priorities of lifestyle politics, Inglehart proposes that new parties will emerge. He is not clear as to the exact sequence of these changes and how dependent they are on each other. We do not find in his writings, for example, any claim that the Alford Index must drop to such a level or turnout must fall below a threshold before new parties will gain in prominence. Instead, there is a general argument that lifestyle politics will gain a greater foothold in contemporary politics. If Inglehart is correct, we would expect to have witnessed the emergence of some new parties.

Nor does Inglehart write precisely on what types of new parties will emerge. In the works cited above, Inglehart traces the emergence of the Greens and a new left and new right. In this chapter, we are only concerned with the new left and the Greens – the new right is discounted for reasons given in 6.1 and 6.2.

This chapter aims to see if new parties have come to the fore that have articulated lifestyle issues and whether they amount to some form of a realignment. The chapter is structured in five parts. In Part One, we look at Inglehart’s main
claims. Part Two is concerned with how we may operationalise his arguments. The evidence for France and Ireland is presented in Parts Three and Four respectively, while in Part Five, we conclude that Inglehart’s hypothesis is not supported.

6.1: Inglehart’s main claims

Inglehart’s fullest accounts of how these parties appear are found in *The Silent Revolution* (1977); *The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society* (1984); and *Neo-Conservatism and Value Change in the USA* (with Minkenberg, 1989). His co-authored paper *Economic Security and Value Change* (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994) offers a very concise summary of the combined party system changes (ibid. 336). However, it is the 1984 paper that allows for the clearest testing of hypotheses that have a bearing on party systems; the rest are, in the main, preoccupied with tracking value change in the independent variable (the electorate). Additionally, we can discount the 1989 paper as it is concerned with the ‘new right’, a topic which we rule out of this chapter (see section 6.3, this chapter). Although Inglehart does comment on the form of the new right and the thinking behind it (Inglehart and Minkenberg, 1989), he is at times bafflingly unclear as to whether or not ‘new right’ refers to old established parties who reinvent themselves after a period in opposition (Inglehart and Minkenberg, 1989); new groupings which espouse a belief in neo-liberal economics (Inglehart, 1977, 1990); or extreme right parties (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994: 336). Three competing definitions are derivable from reading the above works.

According to Inglehart (1984), the new party forms arise as a response to changing voters and changing concerns of these voters – the Greens focused on the environment and more participatory forms of rule; while the new left emphasised
that class conflict could no longer be the sole structure of politics and shared with
the Greens the notion that democracy had to be reinvigorated.

Paying attention to France, Inglehart (1971) devoted a considerable amount
of detail to the PSU electorate, viewing it as the exemplar of the new voter.
Although it only polled four per cent nationally in the 1968 legislatives, 30 per cent
of its electorate was ‘post-bourgeois’. Inglehart measured this by administering the
four-item test to a sample of the French electorate and noted the size of the
imbalance. He has written more generally about the profile of a new parties’
supporter and how it corresponds with their keynote policies. Unfortunately, there is
not much of detail in his works on this linkage. Concerning demographics, the
typical profile is repeated – the supporter of new parties is likely to be young and
well educated (Inglehart, 2003: 1). As he has written before (1985, 1997 and
passim), postmaterialists are more likely to reside in cities than in rural areas.95

Based on the above, we derive our hypothesis:

\[ H_3: \text{That the new issues and the new voters have resulted in a}
\text{greater prominence for ‘new politics’ parties.} \]

In terms of specific policies that new parties are likely to focus on, we have
the list of concerns that Inglehart (1984: 26) provides us with, detailing how
feminism, environmentalism, pacifism, and movements such as the anti-nuclear
campaign, consumer advocacy and ‘limits to growth’ activists, are all expressing
themselves ‘at the centre stage of contemporary politics’ (idem). For us, one problem
is that this list is more indicative of what people will protest about rather than what
new parties will offer as their key policies. We are thus obliged to make inferences

94 His earlier term for postmaterialist.
95 See Sellers, 1998, for an interesting extrapolation of this.
about what new parties will offer at election time. Inglehart mounts a weak case in favour of viewing taxation as a postmaterialist issue. Postmaterialists are slightly more inclined towards tax policies being used with the aim of maximizing "redistribution for the sake of human solidarity" (Inglehart, 1984: 55-6). We can thus conclude that postmaterialist parties would logically commit themselves to a redistributionist strategy. As regards attitudes on moral authority, Inglehart (1997) asserts that postmaterialists are much less likely to believe in a higher power and consequently, are more amenable to question hierarchies as a whole. This attribute helps to explain why postmaterialists are more likely to seek a fuller expression of democracy and to press for greater accountability and representativeness in politics. The new politics parties should therefore be likely to attach importance to democratic and constitutional reform.

6.2: Testing the derived hypothesis

The above works make three substantive points. Collectively, they state that there will be new parties; that they are likely to be disproportionately supported by postmaterialists; and that they should have made an increasingly large impact over time.

Our first task is to select our cases. The idea of new parties encompasses both the new left and the new right, as well as a competing definition which would argue that new parties are neither right nor left in the typical senses of the words. There is much work on the new right that draws on Inglehart’s thinking, but significantly

96 And therefore, statistically not significantly.
97 The reader is directed to note how Inglehart weaves together an account of the linkages between rationality, postmodernisation, and religion in his chapter, Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy (1999); see Chapter One.
extends it. Supporting Inglehart, Gunther and Diamond (2003: 168) note that postmaterialist conflicts had begun to impact on party politics by the end of the 20th century. Interestingly, though, they attach more weight to the extreme right ‘backlash’ party, as described by Ignazi (1996), and not to ‘quality of life parties’. Gunther and Diamond describe this type as being a ‘movement party’ (op. cit. 188-9), but do not cite any one named party as being illustrative of this category. Kitschelt (1995) drew on Inglehart’s work to encompass the authoritarian-Right, but the taxonomy given is markedly different from Inglehart’s. We noted earlier that Inglehart’s writing on the new right is too vague to allow for a fair testing in this chapter. If we want to look at the new right on Inglehart’s terms, then, we are not in a position to use his definitions and sparse examples, nor are we able to rely on other works as they are either too distal (Kitschelt) or do not give enough cross-referenced examples of actual parties (Gunther and Diamond). Consequently, we do not examine the new right in this chapter.

Unfortunately, Inglehart’s imprecision in his usage of the new right category spreads to his understanding of the new left. Esman (2002: 378) outlines a basket of five policies by which the European new left defines itself. Taking the modified programmes of established parties such as Germany’s SPD and Britain’s Labour party, Esman outlines five markers:

1. A lauding of entrepreneurship.
2. The desire to lessen the interference of the state.
4. Cut taxes, especially on corporations.
5. Deregulation.
Items two and five could arguably fit into Inglehart's new politics category, but only after the individual has done the mental work; Inglehart does not expound on the specifics of how parties try to lessen state intervention and generally adapt it to modern society, nor on which sectors are good candidates for deregulation and which ones are not. The strength of Esman's analysis is its referral to the real world. In reading Inglehart and how the left may be said to have modified itself, one has a surfeit of survey data and a lack of information on actual parties and actual policies. Again, as we are testing Inglehart, we cannot use Esman's structure.

One other obstacle is the nature of how durable and successful must a group be in order for it to qualify as a new party. Janda's (1980) book on new political parties set a five per cent electoral threshold; if a party did not reach this, then Janda excluded it. His book contains only 14 parties in 16 democracies from 1950-78. Willey (1998) discounts the threshold qualifier, and consequently, lists 24 new\textsuperscript{98} parties in Ireland and 17 in France (op. cit. 658). Surprisingly, none of these is listed in the appendix.

To circumvent Inglehart's inexactitude whilst still ostensibly testing his hypothesis, we turn to Kitschelt's (1994) model of party system change. In this, three levels of change are specified. We now detail how this scheme allows us to select the parties to be assessed in this chapter.

\textit{Level One} change is where parties modify their message and structure in response to new voter expectations. At its simplest, the new left is operationalisable as those leftist parties who emerged in the 1960s and after; this gives a small, readily agreed number of parties. Additionally, a second category is provided by Inglehart (\textit{passim}) and is examined here, namely old leftist parties who recognised from the

\textsuperscript{98} That is, post-1945.
late 1960s onwards the electoral imperative of moving beyond a workerist agenda. This could incorporate the major leftist parties in Ireland (Labour) and France (the PS; the PCF and *Lutte Ouvrière*). Labour is not included here, for two reasons. The first is that Ireland is usually deemed to have never had a large old democratic socialist party in the first place (Sassoon, 1997: xxv). Secondly, nowhere in the literature is Labour regarded to have undergone a programmatic renewal involving an increased emphasis on quality of life issues. We also exclude the PCF and Lutte Ouvrière, as their ideology is not at all in the left-libertarian category that both Flanagan (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987) and Kitschelt (1997) use. Neither group’s core philosophy advances on the purely historical-materialist conception of society, and as Inglehart’s theory explicitly sets out to account for how quality of life issues are gradually eclipsing the old politics agenda over time, they do not qualify as parties who have remodelled themselves. The PS is included as it emerged in 1969 from the old Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), and thus neatly fits Inglehart’s chronology.

*Level Two* change entails the formation of new parties along existing ideological lines – this only meets Inglehart’s argument halfway, as he affirms that ‘new politics’ parties arise on a new axis or axes. The new left could also simply be those parties which were not present at the Second International in Paris in 1889 either in original name or later re-branded form – this would rule out the Irish Labour party which was not founded until 1913 and also the SFIO, forerunner to the PS, as the parent party originated in 1905. Two other criteria to account for such variation would be parties defined by expert judgment (The Comparative Manifestos Project is the strongest body of work here) to be left-wing, and as for new *parties* on the left, splinter groups from larger parent parties are good candidates for the title of
‘new left’ – the SDP in Britain is exemplary. These two definitions are not suitable for both Ireland and France. Our benchmark, as defined by Kitschelt, allows us to select from four new parties that emerge from the old axis: Democratic Left, the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU), and the French Trotskyist party, the *Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire* (LCR). The LCR is excluded for the same reasons we gave for omitting the PCF and *Lutte Ouvrière*. There are additional left-wing *groupuscules*, but these are also excluded as they have not passed a minimal electoral threshold and are more concerned with a Marxist view of society and politics quality of life issues than. This leaves us with the PSU and DL. Inglehart (1971, 1977) described the PSU as a ‘new politics party’, whether a new axis results is a separate question that this chapter tries to answer. DL explicitly cast itself as a new type of party, with an increased emphasis on bringing new ways of thinking to bear on a broad range of political problems.

In *Level Three* change, new parties appear which articulate new interests – the variegated green parties are the likely contenders for both Kitschelt and Inglehart’s templates. Consequently, we examine the Green Party in Ireland and the largest French environmentalist party, *Les Verts*.

Having selected the cases, the next step is to outline how we assess whether their existence is indeed indicative of a new prominence for lifestyle politics. We do this by examining them on three dimensions (a) the importance they attach to quality of life issues in their manifestos; (b) the extent to which their electorate may be described as postmaterialist; (c) and whether the parties have become increasingly successful in first-order elections. Let us look at how carry out each of these assessments.
Firstly, a policy audit is carried out. By means of expert judgments, manifesto analysis, and acts performed in office where applicable, we assess whether ‘new politics’ has indeed altered parties by looking at how prominently quality of life issues are cited in their electoral programmes. For parties who have not held office, one measure of policy influence would be the extent to which a party’s programme has affected the political debate in a country.

Secondly, to measure the cohesiveness and distinctiveness of the postmaterialist voter category, the demographics and attitudinal profile of each party’s supporters are presented. To do this, we use Bartolini and Mair’s (1990:215) framework for assessing the social structure of a party’s electorate. This specifies that in order for a group or category to have a valid meaning in psephology, it must satisfy three criteria: 1) it must have a distinctive social structure; 2) it must be composed of members who are aware of their membership and as a result, are not part of another electoral constituency and 3), the party must explicitly tailor its agenda with the aim of commanding the support of said group.

Finally, we judge whether the new parties are increasingly successful or not. The neatest qualification here would be the gaining and holding of seats in legislative elections; this would set an unfairly high barrier to the PSU, for example, as it may reasonably be said to have coloured French politics but still had a risible record of winning seats. A second measure, a threshold of five per cent of the national vote in more than one election in the period studied would rule out the Greens in Ireland, *inter alia*, so this is evidently unsatisfactory. To set a level playing field, therefore, the set of electoral performances in the first-order elections of each party’s country is presented here.
6.3: France

6.3.1: Level One change - The Parti Socialiste (PS)

There are four suggested reasons why the PS makes a good candidate for an Inglehart-type party. The first is their date of birth – their emergence in 1969 from the old SFIO. The second is the rhetorical presentation of their core philosophy. In 1974, Mitterrand’s presidential election challenge was based on the slogan “la seule idée de la droite est de garder le pouvoir, mon premier projet est de vous le rendre” (Duhamel, 1980: 305). This pledge is entirely in keeping with the tenor of the Inglehart item ‘giving more say to people in important government decisions’.

Thirdly, there is its success in changing its image is the self-description of its supporters. The capacity of a party to move beyond the parameters of its established class base is a key indicator of its becoming postmaterialist. In 1966, 50 per cent of the SFIO’s voters, declared themselves to be either ‘extreme left’ or ‘left’ (five per cent and 45 per cent respectively), with only 20 per cent on the centre-left. By 1977, a sea change had occurred, with 60 per cent of the new PS voters placing themselves on the centre-left, and only 12- and five per cent respectively on the left and extreme left. By 1978, the PS was distinguishable from the PCF by its near catch-all appeal; it was a better vote winner among the higher managerial class than either of the big two centre right parties, for example, and was more evenly spread in its catchments than ever before. The renovation of the party in the eyes of its supporters is support for this hypothesis of Inglehart. The fourth marker is the success of the PS in forging links with new political movements such as SOS Racisme and ecologists’ groups.

Under Rocard’s stewardship in the 1990s, the party held a series of meetings and policy workshops with diverse new social movements in order to see how new ideas could be introduced into mainstream French politics to benefit both these groups and
the PS. The PS was able to maintain its position as the biggest single party because the party proved able "through social and political "networking", to adapt to changing ideological and social conditions within the electorate and to adopt to new social movements" as Machin (1994: 51) puts it.

The section on the PS is slightly different than that for other parties in this chapter. Firstly, the policies discussed here are necessarily only a subset of all PS ‘quality of life’ legislation. There is simply not enough room to go into each and every aspect of the PS’s policies from 1969-2002, and attempting to do so would only submerge the reader and not facilitate a clear test of the hypothesis. Secondly, there is no section on the party’s electoral impact; as the PS held office for a considerable number of years within the timeframe of this thesis, it is acknowledged right from the outset that the party was successful. Let us begin with a policy audit of the PS.

6.3.1.1: The policies of the PS

For reasons of space, this chapter only deals with the legislative record of the PS whilst in power and only under one administration – that of Lionel Jospin, from 1997-2002. In looking at this administration, the reader is reminded that it was a PS-led coalition of five parties, and then four, with the departure of Chevènement’s MDC. Consequently, we must differentiate between the legislative initiatives carried out by the PS itself as distinct from those carried out by other members of the coalition that held office from 1997-2002.

Our reason for examining only the Jospin government is both practical and theoretical. It would be impossible to adequately cover all of the quality of life issues mentioned in manifestos or legislated for from 1968-2002. In terms of Inglehart’s
theory, the 1997-2002 government is a valid test case of the impact of postmaterialist values on parties, as the PS inherited a strong economy. By Spring 1997, just before the PS won power, inflation and interest rates were low, the franc was both competitive and stable, the budget deficit was dropping and there was a considerable trade surplus (Hainsworth, 1998: 72). It may be reasonably argued that if postmaterialist values cannot exert a real influence over party policy in this favourable climate, then they cannot be expected to have an impact at any other time.

Even in the context of restricting our case to the Jospin administration, there is the problem of scope – should every non-economic quality of life piece of legislation implemented by the Jospin cabinet be treated as pertinent? The scale of the thesis and this chapter do not permit for this. As a result, the central parts of the legislative record of the PS are assessed with regard to how they fit a new politics agenda, loosely defined. Of course, for reasons of space and focus, we cannot hope to provide a compendium of all the policy initiatives in each of these areas. Instead, we demonstrate that that the main foci of the PS were the economy and crime, classic ‘materialist’ measures, but also show that a reasonable amount of the legislation of the PS from 1997-2002 may be described as postmaterialist.

The record of the Jospin administration leads us to view them as a party with a ceaseless zeal for economic issues. On economic reform, the Jospin cabinet implemented privatizations that outstripped the total financial volume of the Chirac, Balladur and Juppé administrations put together (Knapp and Wright, 2001: 187). Jospin’s manifesto for the 2002 presidential election committed him to introduce tax cuts of more than €13 billion and to balance the budget within two years.
Its employment policies mark them out as more old than new left. Right from the beginning of the Jospin administration, the party was keen to stress its divergence from the Balladur and Juppé periods by its two policies of the 35-hour week and the youth employment programme (Elgie, 2002: 305). Employment was placed as his government's number one priority by Jospin in his investiture speech. The *Plan Aubry* aimed to create 700,000 jobs, equally apportioned between the private- and public sectors. Finance Minister, Laurent Fabius legislated to introduce a 'prime pour l'emploi' or job bonus, to anyone earning less than 140 per cent of the minimum wage, assessed and paid for by the tax authorities (The Economist, January 20, 2001). The appointment of Laurent Fabius in March 2000 as Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs is itself an indication of the paramount importance the PS attached to the economy. Fabius had long since established himself as a key PS figure, emphasizing that the left should focus on financial issues, such as maintaining middle-class support by not having high levels of personal taxation. His appointment to the cabinet in 2000 effectively made him second only to Jospin (Leruez, 2000: 311). Still on employment legislation, Law no 2002-73 aimed to address job insecurity, workplace conditions, and training needs; originally, the PS had aimed to restrict the use of dismissals for economic reasons, but this was vetoed by the *Conseil constitutionnel* (Le Blan-Delannoy and Douay, 2002, 23). The centrepiece policy of the PS was the introduction of the 35-hour week. The PS emphasised to businesses that expected reductions in levels of worker fatigue and absenteeism would help competitiveness. This was window-dressing, as the measure aimed specifically to reduce unemployment and to redistribute wealth.

(Clift, 2000: 491). It was intended as a response to the need to try and restrain the market without hurting fiscal health, company competitiveness or the balance of payments (Clift, 2002, 476-477).

The foregoing demonstrates that the PS does not neatly fit the description of a new politics party, as so much of its resources were devoted to the economy, jobs, and taxes. On another ‘survivalist’ concern, crime, the evidence is more ambiguous, for we note that the PS acted in both liberal and illiberal ways. Jospin’s investiture speech pledged his government to tackle crime as a top priority, guaranteeing the deployment 35,000 extra national police. This old politics slant was stressed again at the Villedepinte forum in October of that year, leading commentators to judge the discourse of the PS to be moving towards one of punishment: ‘A partir de 1998...la politique du gouvernement en matière de securité est influencée par des discours politiques d’une tonalité plus repressive que preventive’. Running counter to this assessment is the more liberal measures announced by the PS, such as in May 1998, when the then Justice Minister, Elisabeth Guigou, stated that the president was open to investigation by the tribunal in order to answer allegations of financial wrongdoing (Elgie, 2002: 307). In stressing the equality of all citizens before the law, the party demonstrated their zeal for reform of legal precedent in political affairs, but the political capital to be gained from implicating the president cannot be discounted as a motive. Another liberal act of the administration was their passing of the law reinforcing the presumption of innocence and victims’ rights two years later (Law number 2000-516). The intention was to increase the suspect’s protection by introducing audiovisual recordings of young interviewees, restate the right to


101 The PS government had originally wanted to introduce sound recordings in all interviews; much hostility forced it to back down.
silence and restrict the range of people who may be interviewed (witnesses could no longer be detained for interview), tighten up the regulations on the usage of remand, and remove the state’s right of appeal against acquittal. All in all, the package of measures amounted to the biggest reform of criminal procedural law since 1958 (Bédier, 2001: 3). Notwithstanding the comparatively repressive system of French pre-trial law, the attempts by the PS to legislate in the area are clearly driven by a desire to lessen the likelihood of injustice, and in this way, may be described as postmaterialist.

In three other policy domains, there is a reasonable case to be made that the PS implemented more quality of life legislation than they probably had to, and, in this way, demonstrated some new politics tendencies. We now look at some policies in the area of (a) democratisation; (b) immigration, and (c) civil rights to further test this case.

6.3.1.1. (a) Democratisation

One repeated theme of the PS manifestos when in opposition was the stress on how on assuming office they would empower people and make the state more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens. In this regard, two policy areas are relevant. The first concerns decentralisation, a process motivated by the recognition that too much of France was controlled by Paris and that there was a lack of vitality in the political life of the regions. The second policy area is autonomy, and specifically for this section, how the Jospin administration dealt with an upsurge in nationalist violence in Corsica.

More sceptical commentators have claimed that in granting greater powers to the sub-national level, the PS were only doing what favoured their own traditional
stronger base; at national elections, the PS underperformed. In the expectation that they were more likely to gain and retain power at the lower level, the party was hoping to initiate a process that would act as a counterbalance to the Right’s hegemony at first-order elections. Either way, the push for decentralisation necessarily results in a restricted manoeuvrability for national government and theoretically at least, should increase the contact of the government with the governed. The central aim of the PS reforms of local government was to make it more efficient and effective. Michel (1998: 165-6) argues that the move towards greater integration of the different layers of sub-national government was making it more systematic and reducing internal squabbling. The case is less clear when we come to the work of the Mauroy Commission, a body set up to look at how the states should reconfigure its system of sub-national government. Under Jospin’s leadership, there was a perceived dilution of decentralisation. The work of the commission was hampered by walk-outs from both government and opposition parliamentarians frustrated by what they saw as a creeping recentralisation. This was cited with special reference to the gradual rises in the size of the central government block grant at the expense of restrictions on the amount and number of taxes that could be levied by the local authority. Law 2002-276 concerned ‘démocratie de proximité’ had as its main aim the deepening of local democracy (Garroy, 2002: 15). Its 167 articles covered a vast range of regulations, from the conduct of the census to reform of public utility management and environmental measures. The PS were obviously restricted in what they could hope to implement as they lost power within a matter of months of formulating the law, but again, the intent was to increases subsidiarity.
The Jospin cabinet's handling of the Corsican problem is further evidence of a shift towards a new way of thinking about centralisation of decision-making. Low-level disturbances in the form of sporadic bombings and assaults on government officials, their homes and places of work, had been simmering for some time. Talks began under the Jospin government to square the demands in some quarters for total independence with the Republican imperative of territorial integrity. A protracted series of discussions culminated in sizeable parcels of autonomy being signed over by Paris. These included the setting up of a single legislative body for the island, the right for instruction in the Corsican language to be made available in schools and the right to modify (within certain parameters) national legislation. The ‘rotten borough’ argument was used by opponents of the outcome, most notably the MDC’s Interior Minister Chevènement, who depicted Corsica as an increasingly corrupt and lawless island (Levy, 2001: 113). He resigned, but his PS successor, Vaillant, took a different tack and suggested that the Corsican arrangement could serve in the future as a model of for subsidiarity in all French regions (Regards sur l'actualité, 2001, no. 271: 3). The willingness of the PS to update the state’s way of thinking where feasible is indicative of a flexible party that was keen to respond to the agenda of the citizens concerned.

6.3.1.1. (b) Immigration

The ebb and flow of French immigration policy must be set against the broader context of the republican state. Typically, the predilection in France has always been to favour assimilation rather than accommodation (Schnapper, 1991) so as to make immigrants French rather than leave them to their own national-cultural identity. In

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102 Chevènement was the leader of a coalition partner in the 1997 coalition government, the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC). He left the government over the handling of the Corsican problem.
this sense, the French approach is indicative of a residual colonial perspective on how to deal with immigration, as the majority of applicants come from France’s former African colonies, be they predominantly Islamic (Maghreb) or not (West Africa).

There was a swing back towards a more immigrant-tolerant stance during the Jospin years. The Pasqua laws\textsuperscript{103} had led to a curbing of the rights to stay based on marriage to a French citizen and also tightened up the regulations governing family reunions where the immigrant’s immediate family could join the person in France. A much more forensic vetting process applied to immigration generally. On assuming office, Jospin commissioned the Weil Report,\textsuperscript{104} which set out to accomplish the seemingly impossible task of reconciling the demands of the pro- and anti-immigration lobbies. The 1998 law granted legal status to many of the \textit{sans-papiers} (immigrants already residing in France but without full legal papers and protection) and lessened the intrusiveness of state interference in assessing the credibility of marriages between immigrants and French citizens (Weil, 2001: 219).

6.3.1.1. (c): Civil rights

In three areas, the Jospin administration may be said to have acted on a new politics agenda. These areas are gender equality; reform of the state’s view on marriage; and religious tolerance.

From the moment of assuming office in 1997, the PS acted to address gender and issues. In an acknowledgement of the imbalance at top-level politics, Jospin had

\textsuperscript{103} Named after the Gaullist Minister for the Interior, Charles Pasqua, who in the 1993-5 Balladur government, at first aimed for a quota of immigrants but then crept towards a policy of zero immigration.

\textsuperscript{104} According to Knapp (2004: 157-8) Jospin’s cabinet was divided on the sans-papiers issue and so they commissioned Weil to get them out of the fix.
backed a 30 per cent quota for women candidates at the 1997 election, with a third of his first Cabinet being women (three times their level of representation in the parliament (Hainsworth, 1998: 82). Also, his investiture speech stated that they would introduce a section in the constitution that affirmed the equal status of women.

On marriage and the place of the family, as recently as 1994, Jospin, as leader of the PS in opposition, dismissed a motion sponsored by 15 leftist figures in favour of a type of civil union. By 1997, he had changed tack, referring in campaign interviews to the need to act in favour of unmarried couples and included gay couples in his references. PACS\textsuperscript{105} (Pacte Civile de Solidarité) was a measure undertaken by the Jospin government that aimed to offer rights to unmarried couples in same- or different- sex households. Anomalies in the areas of tax, insurance and inheritance were addressed by this law, granting a greater degree of rights to both gay and unmarried heterosexual couples (ibid). In terms of its ability to adequately deal with the realities of cohabitation in all forms, the PACS specifically leaves out any reference to the imperative of fidelity (Regards sur l'actualité, 1999: 69). Once in power, the party did not commit anything like its full resources to getting the measure through parliament\textsuperscript{106} – instead, two PS deputies were tasked by an Assembly Law Committee to consider the arguments and return with a proposal. However, the eventual piece of legislation suggests that the PS was aware of how French society and morality had changed. PACS would appear to be a strong case of a party acting in a postmaterialist fashion to update the law with respect to new lifestyles. The law was criticised by some as not being sufficiently far-reaching: the wording and thus the remit were carefully designed so as to be silent on the family.

\textsuperscript{105} See Borrillo and Fassin (2002) L'aventure ambiguë du pacs.
law aspects of couples – there is nothing in the law referring to IVF, medically assisted conceptions generally, or adoption rights (Borillo and Fassin, 2002: 48). In this sense, the policy was a true compromise, as neither the traditionalists nor the libertarians were entirely happy with the outcome. In sum, the policy can only be described as an attempt to modernise legislation in response to altered lifestyles and is thus classifiable as an Inglehartian measure.

The fact that there are no state-funded Islamic schools in metropolitan France is illustrative of the avowedly secular slant to French republicanism. Such an absence would be unthinkable in say, Britain (Soper and Fetzer, 2003: 49). The heated exchanges between the secularists, pluralists and Islamists on religious expression in education were instigated by the foulard affair of 1989, when a Muslim schoolgirl was expelled from a school in the Paris suburbs for wearing her headscarf in class. The 1993-5 RPR / UDF government issued a circular which outlawed the wearing of ‘ostentatious’ signs of religious affiliation in schools. The Jospin government did not legislate to remove this, but instead relied on a Constitutional Court decree that deemed such ‘signs’ acceptable unless a teacher had reason to believe they were being worn ‘provocatively’. The PS acted in a less illiberal manner than the Balladur administration, but they could hardly be said to have been agitators for a new cultural-religious tolerance (Soper and Fetzer, 2003: 49). The PS behaved more like a postmaterialist party when they opened up a consultation in January 2000 to grant state acknowledgement of Islam and features such as its cemeteries and feast days. Although initiated by the MDC’s Chevènement, the new policy of accommodation was continued by Vaillant of the

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106 Reasons of space mean that the full account of how the PACS was first rejected by the Assembly and blocked by the Senate cannot be given – see Regards sur l’Actualité, 1999: 64.
PS when he became minister in August 2000. The intention was to move away from
the republican view towards a more liberal conception of how people should be
allowed to practise their own religion as they see fit.

6.3.1.1 (d): Summary of the policies of the PS

It would be too high a threshold of proof to demand that each and every PS policy in
the areas listed above fits a postmaterialist description. The process of government
necessarily entails a steady focus on issues such as the economy, unemployment,
health and education, none of which could reasonably be classified as postmaterialist
concerns. However, during the period of the Jospin administration, there is a
discernible increase in prominence for lifestyle politics. On crime, the party was
ambitious in one area (detainee’s rights), but adopted an old-fashioned rhetoric when
they talked about crime generally. The level of self-interest of the PS in pushing for
greater decentralisation has been oft-remarked on, and the impact of a new corpus of
legislation on the quality of decision-making is of course a separate topic;
notwithstanding these caveats, the party did devolve some powers away from the
direct purview of ministers in Paris. Interestingly, they expressly set out here to tidy
up an ever-more ramified area of administration. The reform of the laws on the
family in the shape of the PACS is perhaps the most postmaterialist of all the
measures enacted that are discussed here, while on the question of the place of Islam
in French life, the moderateness of what PS proposed must be weighed against the
strongly secular nature of France and its system of rule. On the basis of the policy
initiatives noted above, the PS may be described as acting like a new politics party in
many substantial ways from 1997-2002. Against this, the party was clearly focused
on the economy to a very large degree, and its ‘centrepiece’ (Cole, 2002: 319) was
the old politics measure of a reduction in the working week with no loss of pay. Clearly, both the PS and Jospin felt that the economy was always their overriding focus, and the quality of life issues were not of paramount importance to them. Unfortunately, Inglehart gives no adequate operationalisation of how one may rule a party in or out in terms of the relative importance it attaches to specific policy outcomes. The hypothesis is partially supported on the basis of the evidence for this section.

6.3.1.2: The profile of the PS electorate

In this section, we map the sociology of the PS electorate. The intention is threefold – to see if the PS vote was (a) less working-class; (b) disproportionately made up of a youth vote over the course of the timeframe and (c), held distinctive ‘new politics’ values. If these descriptions are valid, then its electorate may be said to have become increasingly more ‘new political’ as time has passed, thus supporting Inglehart’s claim.

Table 6.1 illustrates clearly just where the PS made gains as it sought to reinvent itself during the course of the 1970s. The party’s popularity rose sharply among white-collar workers, with significant gains among clerical workers and technicians. It was able to attract support from the traditional working class, too, as the PCF began to fall away as a major political party:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-occupational category</th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>Non-PCF left</th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>Non-PCF left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small shopkeepers</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeois (including senior management)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried middle class</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+17</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary and higher education teachers</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary teachers</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative staff</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office employees</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+19</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop workers and domestics</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Changes in the class base of the PS, 1967-78; after Capdevielle et al., 1981: 255.

From 1978 onwards, the party’s credentials as a genuinely cross-class party begin to establish themselves. Note that the party makes bigger strides among women voters than among men, which is oblique support for an Inglehart-type party that is able to maximise its appeal on the basis of women’s issues. Furthermore, its biggest increases were among the salaried middle class, which is specifically the catchment amongst which Inglehart predicted the new left would have most success.

Let us continue with a longer series of data, culled from the election studies and exit polls for the legislative and presidential elections from 1978 to 2002 (Table 6.2):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petit bourgeois</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher mgmt/prof.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate mgmt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The gains made among the higher managerial class are consolidated and advanced upon, and it is only in the 2002 presidential election that its strong showing fades away, only to recover at the legislative elections immediately afterwards. The party does particularly well among white-collar workers in the 1980s, and its support is stronger here than it was in 1978, even with the poor performance at the 2002 presidential election. It is a lot less successful among the petty bourgeois, and performs erratically among farmers. However, the relative size of these classes has shrunk in comparison with the salariat, so the party still makes gains beyond the working-class core vote. Instead of being reliant on the manual working classes, it may be seen from the table below that the party’s most faithful voting group is teachers. The anecdotal view of the PS as ‘the teacher’s party’ is corroborated by the national election studies of 1978, 1988 and 1995, where the PS obtained the votes of 67, 66 and 65 per cent respectively (Boy and Mayer, 1997:
This capacity to extend one’s appeal beyond the parameters of class voting is a hallmark of a postmaterialist party.

A central part of Inglehart’s hypothesis of a new voter bloc is the age profile: as societies became increasingly more affluent over time, a levelling-off of the imbalance between the number of materialist and postmaterialist cohorts would occur. Younger voters, socialised in times of affluence, would be more likely to choose parties that articulated their lifestyle concerns. Working backwards, the logic here, according to Inglehart, is that postmaterialist parties are those parties that disproportionately attract the youth vote. The new left was likely to be the greatest recipient of this vote migration. We detail the performance of the PS among young voters (18-24 and 25-34) in Table 6.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 +</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the 1980s, Mitterrand had been remarkably strong at attracting the youth vote (18-34 years). We note that the ‘Mitterrand effect’ is highlighted by examining the second round run-offs. Mitterrand had been able to easily outperform his rivals at the second round run-offs of 1981 and 1988, but Jospin failed to do so in the right amounts in 1995 (see Table 6.4). Jospin’s performance among the 18-34 age group at the first round of the 2002 presidential elections represented a loss of two-thirds of the party’s 1980s average among this category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981 (M vs. GE)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 (M vs. C)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (J vs. C)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PS had begun the 1980s as an increasingly postmaterialist party in terms of the age distribution of its voters, but by the mid-1990s, had begun to resemble the other mainstream parties in their demographic indistinctiveness.

The 1960s and 1970s had witnessed a dramatic migration of the youth vote towards the left and anti-system parties, but the situation of the left as the natural home of the youth vote no longer applies, according to Muxel:

Contrairement aux années 1960 et 1970, le vote des jeunes ne se démarque guère de celui de leurs aînés. Il n’est traversé ni par le désir de changer radicalement la société ni par des visées anticonformistes. Il porte la marque des effets de l’alternance et s’est peu à peu rallié, à quelques nuances près, aux choix de l’ensemble du corps électoral.


In fact, by 1993, the Front National was matching the PS’ appeal amongst 18-24 year olds and did so again in the 1995 presidential election; by the 2002 Elysée contest, it had overtaken the PS (Habert, Perrineau and Ysmal, 1993; Buffotot and Hanley, 1996; and Muxel, 2002).
Concerning the values of the PS voter, the most recent systematic work we have is on the attitudinal make-up of the PS. This survey formed part of an all-party post-electoral study, carried out by a team examining the responses of a representative sample of just under 3,000 citizens in May 1997 (Chiche et al., 2000). The 20 items tapped Ethnocentrism, Authoritarianism, Social issues, Politics generally, Economics and Supranational bodies. A four-point Likert scale was used to measure the attitudes’ intensity. The survey’s worth lies in its integration of ‘timeless’ items such as ‘The death penalty should be brought back’ to more topical issues such as the degree of solidarity one felt with the striking public sector workers of 1995. In this sense, it is an improvement on Inglehart’s unchanging value index.

The PS electorate was broadly similar to that of the mainstream right and the PCF in terms of how it viewed supranational bodies and the place of immigrants in society; intuitively, PS voters were mid-way between the mainstream right and the PCF on ‘old politics’ questions of strikes and economic liberalism. In fact, what was striking was how similar to the other main parties were the PS voters’ interpretations of political issues. Attitudinally, there was a greater likelihood of differentiation within a party’s electorate than when compared with another party’s support (intraparty variation was twice that of interparty variation – op. cit. 481). In short, as with the other major parties, there is little distinctive about the attitude base of the PS electorate. This disconfirms Inglehart’s hypothesis that a new politics party would act as the home of people who were like-minded on the salient issues, be they new or old.

108 The project’s full title is the SOFRES/Liberation/CEVIPOF/CIDSP-Grenoble/CRAPS-Lille postelectoral survey.
109 The authors specifically refer to the utility of the construct of postmaterialism in understanding the results of the survey – op. cit. 475.
6.3.1.2 (a): Summary of the vote profile for the PS

On the occupation measure, the PS behaves as an Inglehart-type party, able to stay to the left in terms of policies while attracting new votes, and largely keeping them, among the salaried classes. While in 1981 and to a lesser extent, 1988, Mitterrand had attracted a larger share of the youth vote, we note that there is no longer an overarching tendency for young people to vote PS. In terms of attitudes, we further note that there is little to distinguish the PS electorate from those of other parties. We can thus conclude that the PS electorate is not distinctively postmaterialist in terms of age or values/attitudes.

6.3.1.3: Summary of the PS

On the question of the place of PM within the PS, we have seen that the party was probably more postmaterialist than it had to be. However, it is apparent that old politics issues were its main concerns at all times. Apart from the question of immigration, none of their quality of life issues were signalled at Jospin’s investiture with anything like the emphasis attached to the jobs and crime. On the profile of their electorate, we have noted the party’s ability to attract a broad range of support across the socio-economic categories, but have not detected a consistent tendency for younger voters to support them. In short, the PS partially supports H₃.
6.3.2: Level Two change - The Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU) 110

The PSU arrived on the national stage at the same time as other new left parties in Europe such as the Socialist Peoples’ Parties in Norway (SPP) and Denmark (SFP) in the mid- to late 1960s. This type of party is distinctive in two ways by Sassoon (1997: 401-2) - their date of birth and their divergence from their nations’ larger socialist parties on the key issue of foreign policy, be it EEC or NATO membership (the SPP in Norway and the SFP in Denmark) or colonial policy (PSU). In this sense, the PSU could reasonably be said to have arisen as part of an internationalist, pacifist bloc of parties, a quintessential postmaterialist phenomenon. Even though, as Reif (1987) acknowledges, the party rarely won seats in the National Assembly, the PSU merits analysis in this thesis for two reasons. The stronger justification for studying the party is that in Inglehart’s view (1971, 1977), the PSU behaved as a simulacrum of postmaterialist politics. Its supporters were young and well educated, its programme had ambitious targets for including the agendas of single-issue groups in policy formation, and its analysis of society was one that moved beyond a class-antagonistic one alone. The party thus acts as a test case in itself: if PM is anything more than a sideline trend in French politics, then it follows that the PSU should be in a healthy state and / or have succeeded in implementing quality of life policies while in government or have shifted debate away from the materialistic purview. We look in considerable detail at the context in which the PSU formulated and propounded their loose strategy of autogestion, taken by most scholars as the ‘badge’ of the party (Touchard, 1977). It is an important identification, as it allows one to note how a theoretical value may be translated (or not) into a political idea.

110 This section draws extensively from the Archives Nationales. www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/chan/chan/ fonds/xml_inv/EtatsdesfondsAP/581AP.html and works by Touchard (1977) and Reif (1987)
and thence into a policy; this is crucial to giving us an insight as to how the *Weltanschauung* of PM was viewed by some scholars, notably Inglehart, as having percolated downwards into the political arena. As a smaller party, the literature is necessarily less abundant than that for the PS.

The PSU sprang from the fusion of three leftist splinter groupings in 1960. The years 1956-66 witnessed a profusion of new thinking and organizations on the left in France, as the country was forced to re-examine its position as a colonial power abroad and respond to demographic and societal changes at home. The earliest noteworthy grouping is the *Union de la Gauche Socialiste* (UGS), founded in 1957. Within the SFIO, France’s main left wing party, opposition had been mounting to Mollet’s decision to take commit France to the invasion and occupation of the Suez canal; furthermore, the administration’s handling of the Algerian problem was a cause of great discontent within some of the party’s key figures. A domestic issue that also roused the left-wingers’ ire was the SFIO’s inertia when faced with de Gaulle’s constitutional proposals to found the Fifth Republic. What began as a study group within the SFIO, the *Comité Socialiste d’étude et d’action pour la paix en Algérie*, led to a fully-fledged split, with the dissidents forming the *Parti Socialiste Autonome* in 1958. Mendès France’s departure from the Radicals to form the *Centre d’Action Démocratique* had not been much of a success and so he merged his party with the PSA in 1959. In 1960, the picture was complete when the PSA / CAD joined with the UGS to result in the PSU.

The PSU’s apogee was in 1968-9, when the party seemed more in tune than any other with the rebellious mood and in the 1969 presidential election, the party’s young leader, Michel Rocard, performed creditably on a shoestring budget (Bell, 2000: 194), leading many commentators to predict great things for Rocard. The
party's fortunes slumped irrevocably in 1975, when Rocard and a sizeable proportion of the party's most talented personnel and members left to join the PS. Despite its period as a junior partner in the PS-led government from 1981-4, with its leader, Huguette Bouchardeau, as Minister for the Environment, the PSU never recovered electorally and passed into history when it voted for its own dissolution at its conference in 1989. In terms of durability, the record of 30 years is sufficient to dismiss the argument that the party was a transient entity. Let us now look at their policies.

6.3.2.1: The policies of the PSU

The party's credentials to be 'new' (read 'radical') are indirectly supported by the attitude of the French intelligence community. The Renseignements Généraux, akin to a political police force was in 1973 divided in nine sections, with one section having two sub-units which compiled intelligence on (i) the PCF and the PSU and (ii) on revolutionary movements and activists in general (Hayward, 1983: 151). This is indicative either of paranoia or that the PSU was genuinely subversive. Although the early years of the party and its precursors were marked by an anti-colonial and pacifist outlook, the imperative for the PSU was to develop other keynote policies from 1963, when the Algerian question was settled in the eyes of the French. This posed a significant challenge, as the glue of their anti-colonialist perspective could no longer serve to hold the party's strands together. What emerged in its place was an emphasis on democratization, both in terms of government and in the organization of work. This motif of the PSU may be subsumed under the Inglehart item 'more say in government'.

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If there is one worldview that defined the PSU, then it is reasonable to propose that it was the imperative of societal reform. This train of thought was very prevalent among French intellectuals from the 1950s to the 1970s. André Philip wrote two tracts, *Le Socialisme Trahi* (1957) and *Les Socialistes* (1967) that propounded these views. He was expelled from the SFIO for not toeing the party line and founded the PSA in 1957-8 (Sassoon, 1997: 271). One corollary of this approach was the view that decisions at governmental level were best left not to politicians intent on short-term electoral gain; instead, dispassionate experts should use the finest statistical models to inform each government ministry’s remit to gauge and meet the country’s needs, a concept that became increasingly popular in politicians’ views on best practice in administration in both Britain and America in the 1960s. Hubert Prévôt, a PSU strategist and advisor to Rocard who served in the Finance Ministry’s Forecasting Division from 1961-74 (Hayward, 1983: 200), was a key thinker in looking at how the philosophy could be shown to operate in practice.

In terms of specific polices, it was on the subject of industrial relations that the PSU had most to say. *Autogestion* (self-management) was the PSU’s concept of devising novel ways of organizing work as a necessary and inevitable consequence of a re-ordering of society. People should not have to work in demeaning or boring jobs to pay bills; work should move away from the Taylorist straitjacket and allow a person’s potential to be fulfilled. Such an argument had a rich and tangled provenance in sociology and philosophy and thus had extensive ramifications. The very notion of hierarchy within society should be entirely reworked. Consequently,

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111 Which itself eventually merged with other small leftist groups to form the PSU.
112 See Jacoby (1995), for an account of how techno-bureacracy influenced Edward Heath’s economic and industrial policies in the 1970s, and also Shapley’s (1992) biography of Robert McNamara for how the idea of technocracy gained sway in the Pentagon.
the idea of an elected parliament implementing laws on the basis of an intermittent mandate, operating many leagues removed from the individual citizen’s life, was flawed. Democracy must pervade all aspects of life – in politics, work and education. Given the chance, people could construct more responsive, flatter structures in these domains (Mallet, 1965). It is because of its heritage that the concept of autogestion should be regarded as a PSU policy that came to be taken up by the PS, most clearly through the policy documents of the CERES faction led by Chevènement.\textsuperscript{113}

*Autogestion* was predicated on moving France to a climate of high value work, with skills, wages and productivity exceeding the European average. This would entail in some instances the replacement of conveyor-belt industry with small autonomous work groups. It also envisaged the abolition of the ‘them’ and ‘us’ distinction in labour by bringing both workers and management together to realise that they could achieve more in the long run by working together and not against each other. Antiquated working practices and industrial action that hindered productivity would be replaced in exchange for non-hygienic\textsuperscript{114} benefits such as family-friendly workplaces and on-the-job training. Many of the interpretations and implications of *autogestion* were taken up by the PS at their 1975 conference (*Quinze thèses sur l’autogestion*). It was no coincidence that 1975 was the year of entry of Rocard and his PSU dissidents into the PS. The PSU never obtained the power to carry out *autogestion*, but the concept influenced the PS’s handling of industrial relations policy in the early nineteen eighties in the formulation of the ill-fated Auroux laws.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113} *Projet socialiste*, p. 32. PS: Paris, 1980.
\textsuperscript{114} The term is used here as a loan from Herzberg’s theory of work motivation; non-hygienic factors are those not based on pay and basic conditions.
\textsuperscript{115} The account of these laws comes from Gallie, 1985. The reader’s attention is drawn to Gallie’s previous work (also cited in this theses – Chapter Three) on the embourgeoisement thesis and the sociotechnics view in politics.
From May 1968 when the PSU appeared as the only viable vehicle for the activists of the May events, the party sought to forge alliances with single issue- and new politics groups. In its environmentalism, the party was undoubtedly acting out a sense of zeal – it was heavily involved in the setting up and running of the Mouvement pour une alternative non violente (MAN) in 1974, which peacefully protested against the extension of France's nuclear energy policies. On April 26 1975, the PSU joined together with Amis de la Terre and the Mouvement Écologique to mount an anti-nuclear day of marching, the first one to have a national reach. (Bennahmias and Roche, 1992: 43). It was also a major component of the Réseau des Amis de la Terre, which ran a joint list in the 1978 legislative elections. The PSU banner, Front autogestionnaire, a structure set up by the PSU in collaboration with MAN, feminists and regionalists, was a truly postmaterialist movement, albeit an unsuccessful one (op. cit.). As noted earlier, a PSU representative was Minister for the Environment in the 1981-4 PS-led government. Even as late as 1989, when the PSU had ceased to exist, a remnant of the party tried to stay in politics and bring together a new left – it chose the name Alternative Rouge et Verte (ARéV). At the Dijon Congress of 1969 and the 17 Theses adopted summed up the PSU's value system: capitalism was in crisis and universal suffrage was poor imitation of participatory democracy; the Left's structures and ideology were bankrupt (Rocard, 1969), with the PCF in particular drawing the PSU's fire.

In terms of increasing the responsiveness of government to new forces within society, the PSU was distinctive to both the PS and the PCF. Anti-communism had always been a feature of the PSU, but it became a leitmotif under Rocard's leadership. He refused to sign the Programme Commun in 1972 because he thought

116 www.lgu.ac.uk/langstud/politics/psu.htm
its analysis of the problems and proposals to amend them were obsolete. He also did not want to be a party to any agreement that would revive the PCF's fortunes.\textsuperscript{117}

By the mid-1970s, the party had exhausted its appeal to voters, and consequently, there are no other policies to analyse. It continued its emphasis on remaking democracy in the state, helping fringe groups, and urged the adoption of measures to protect the environment.

6.3.2.1 (a): Summary of the policies of the PSU

We concur with Inglehart (1971, 1977) that the PSU offered a new politics platform. Its radicalism may be seen in its desire to change the terms of politics away from class-antagonism and to concentrate on improving the quality of life, most especially at work. The party's willingness to forge new alliances marked it out as a new politics vehicle, able to link up the wider arena of protest politics. \(H_3\) is supported.

6.3.2.2: The profile of the PSU electorate

We do not have any good quality data on the age profile of the PSU electorate, as its vote was so low that surveys and exit polls could not adequately discern it. Consequently, we only have 'snapshot' data of the PSU when it comes to depicting their electorate and even this holds for only two dimensions - (a) the occupational profile, and (b) their views on religion.

We use the 1978 legislative election study to graph the occupational profile of the PSU voter in Table 6.5:

\textsuperscript{117} Of course, it can now be seen that the \textit{Programme Commun} hampered the PCF at the polls by allowing Mitterrand's PS to secure everything to the left whilst targeting his message at centrist and disillusioned right-wing voters. The resurgent PS left the PCF in its wake in the 1981 elections.
It is apparent that the PSU vote was disproportionately drawn from the managerial and educated classes. No party scored higher than them in their percentage base in the middle managerial cluster and white-collar sectors, and only the Environmentalists exceeded their vote share of the students (Capdevielle et al, idem). The PSU was well placed to exploit the May 1968 events to its benefit among young voters as it was strongly represented in the main students' union, the Union Nationale des Etudiants Français or UNEF (Knapp, 2004: 121-2).

This is an exact match with Inglehart’s categorization of the postmaterialist electorate as one that is predominantly better educated and middle class (Inglehart, 1977, 1985, 1990 and passim).

In Table 6.6, we have the figures for the religious beliefs of party blocs taken at a 1977 survey:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catholic practice</th>
<th>PSU</th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>PS and allies</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregularly</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-practising</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-religious</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6: The secular nature of the PSU voter in 1977: after Hayward, 1983: 80.

The disproportionate number of PSU supporters who described themselves as of no religion tallies with Inglehart’s description that new voters are more likely to reject religion. (Inglehart, 2003: 2).

6.3.2.2 (a): Summary of the PSU voter profile

We have such little information here that it is difficult to come to any reliable judgment; however, what evidence there is indicates that the typical PSU voter was likely to be salaried and to hold secular views on religion. In short, this description supports H_3.

6.3.2.3: The party’s impact at the polls

As an avowedly pro-student party that had a strong anti-system bias, the PSU was the only force in the late 1960s on both sides in France that was not out of kilter with the newly-turbulent France. The poor performance of both the SFIO and the PCF at the 1969 presidential elections and Rocard’s creditable tally of 3.6 per cent induced commentators to predict great things for him and his party (Bell, 2000: 22). We note the party’s performance in Table 6.7:
The electoral record proves that these commentators were wrong. The PSU could not in any way be said to have been electorally successful – they never reached a five per cent threshold and only returned three and four deputies in the 1978 and 1981 legislative elections. The PSU won four seats in the 1967 parliamentary elections (Bell, 2000: 20) and despite being able to attract a disproportionate share of the rebel’s votes in the contest held in June 1968 due to the party’s pro-student stance, they could still only poll four per cent nationally (Inglehart, 1971) and did not win any seats (Sassoon, 1997: 402). The party hovered around this level at their next contest where Rocard polled 3.6 per cent in the first round of the 1969 presidential election. Rocard’s refusal to sign the *Programme Commun* in 1972 ensured that it came to be viewed as a fringe force on a uniting left, as the party polled very badly at the 1973 legislatives. These results were so bad that Rocard felt it behoved him to leave the party. Without its main personnel, the party could not hope to make the vital breakthrough by itself and tried a policy of alliances. At the 1978 legislative elections, the party ran a joint list with regionalists, feminists, and anti-nuclear protestors. With 201 candidates in the field, they polled only 1.15 per cent of the national vote. The results were at floor level and remained so for the rest of the party’s existence – in the first round of 1981 legislative elections, for example, the party ran 132 candidates but only obtained 0.75 per cent of the vote nationally and did not have a presence in any second-round run-off. It voted for its own dissolution at its 1989 conference. H3 is not supported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968 (L)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 (P)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (L)</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 (L)</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 (L)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6.7: The PSU’s percentage share of the vote at five elections, 1968-1981; after Inglehart, 1971 and Bell, 2000: 22.*
6.3.2.4: Summary of the PSU

The PSU is a crucial case for H3; Inglehart describes it as a party that defines new politics. We have seen that in its policies; demographics; and in one value (secularism) of its supporters, that this is valid. However, the fact that the party never made an electoral breakthrough suggests that new politics has not become increasingly popular. If anything, the opposite applies. From a creditable performance in the 1969 presidential, the party performed at floor level. It may be said to have effectively vanished with the departure of Michel Rocard, and from 1978 until 1989, it had ceased to be a party worth examining. In fact, it could be argued that the party's biggest impact is indirect, when its former leader, Rocard, served as the PS prime minister from 1988-1991. The tenet of Inglehart's argument is that the new politics parties will grow; if not, then there is no party-system indication of any values-based revolution. As we have seen, the PSU failed to secure its place in French politics. H3 is only partly supported by the PSU.

6.3.3: Level Three change – Les Verts

Richardson (1995: 14), in a survey of Green parties in Europe, repeats the oft-stated hypothesis that ecological concerns can only be elevated to become political ones in states with a high standard of living. Such states are post-industrial in their economic activity and likely to be postmaterialist in their value structure. This line of argument, proposed by, inter alia, Marien (1977) and Inglehart (1977, 1990) would result in all Green parties being deemed axiomatically postmaterialist. Kitschelt (1990) gives a related account but it diverges in concentrating on the political
opportunities framework and is thus less theoretically Inglehartian. What Kitschelt proposes is that as the established left underwent retrenchment and moved right in the 1970s, a space emerged on the left that the Greens filled. A second factor behind the Greens' development occurred within the same time frame, namely the nuclear power issue. As a result of these two 'opportunities', the Greens became a fully-fledged party in much of Western Europe. Richardson (ibid) is not convinced by this argument, writing that Kitschelt relies excessively on the West German and Belgian parties and not at all on southern Europe. A second lacuna is Kitschelt's unwillingness to adequately record just how divergent from the rhetoric of the modified New Left much of the ecology movement's pronouncements were.

In France, the formal recognition that the environment deserved its own political domain may be traced to 1972, when the first Minister for the Environment was appointed in Messmer's first government (Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 1993). One obstacle is that, unlike the Irish case, one does not have a single party to analyse, but two (with assorted splinter groups). One must bear in mind that there was no uniform manifesto or environmental programme commun for the Green parties: Lalonde's Génération Écologie (GE) was in favour of both a nuclear defence strategy and the maintenance of France's nuclear power industry (Richardson, 1995: 17). These are stark divergences from the thinking of les Verts and, in Richardson's view, disqualify GE as a Green party. The student should note that it is more profitable to think of the environmentalists' policies and ideas rather than the platform of any one party. This section focuses in the main on les Verts due to their comparative longevity and success in winning votes and gaining cabinet seats.

Variegated ecological movements in France supported the campaign of René Dumont in the 1974 presidential election, but as a party proper, the history of the
Greens\textsuperscript{118} is less amenable to track. Ecologie 78 was formed as the result of a meeting of the Rhône-Alpes ecological movement (MERA) with the intention of competing as an autonomous party in the 1978 legislative campaign. The next major mutation was in 1981, when at a joint convention which brought together Amis de la Terre, the Fédération écologiste and some members of the Mouvement d'Ecologie Politique (MEP), the Confédération écologiste (CE) was established; the party was officially founded at a meeting in Rennes in 1982 (Bennahmias and Roche, 1992: 66). Almost simultaneously, the reminder of the MEP launched a separate party, while the Communists sponsored a spin-off group, the Mouvement national de lutte pour l'environnement (MNLE). The Green parties fought on an internecine level as well as trying to establish themselves as creditable electoral machines and during the period from 1986-93, three reasonably discrete strands of Green thinking and politics result which try to gain the upper hand over each other, respectively headed by: the moderate reformist Waechter; an ‘alternative left’ group with Cochet and Anger at the helm, and Les Verts au pluriel faction with Dominque Voynet in command (Cole and Doherty, 1995: 52). Under Dominique Voynet, Les Verts formed part of the gauche plurielle coalition of 1997-2002 with the PS, the PCF and (initially) the MDC. We now turn to the policies of les Verts.

\textit{6.3.3.1: The policies of les Verts}

The key question is the extent to which the ‘Green parties’ offer a distinctively new policy package. Even in 1974, though, the range of Dumont’s policies was broad and evidently something of a repackaging of extant ideas – self-control for workers, students and teachers; tackling the degrading quality of life and changing overnight

\textsuperscript{118} Throughout this section, an upper case ‘G’ refers to the collective of environmentalist parties, voters and policies. The French term is used to describe the specific party and associated details.
France’s policies regarding the Third World (Dumont, 1974). The first idea was borrowed from the PSU’s ideal of *autogestion*, while the second had a heritage reaching back even further than the Second International. Only the ecology element was ‘new’. By the time of the 1981 presidential election, the ecologists’ manifesto had five themes that broadly resembled Dumont’s: make the economy more responsive to people’s needs, limit the activities of the state, lessen the sense of isolation in society, protect the environment and develop a feeling of world solidarity (Bennahmias and Roche, 1992: 62).

In the early 1990s, *les Verts* were decidedly split over the Maastricht Treaty, with Waechter campaigning for it and Voynet and other prominent figures such as Blandin opposing it at the hustings (Cole and Doherty, 1995: 56). By 1997, the party had increasingly made room for non-environmental concerns - their 1997 manifesto wanted to introduce a 32-hour week (Hainsworth, 1998: 77). Their 1997 national assembly manifesto specifically mentioned that mad cow disease was a pressing worry and should be acted on by the next government. Other salient policy commitments included the aim to cut the working week to 32 hours by the year 2000 and rebuilding the social security system to better aid the unemployed and the under-25s. They also stressed the need for a level of political control of the European Central Bank (ECB) (*Les Verts*, 1997) in addition to the repeated demands to halt further construction of nuclear power plants and to impose a carbon tax.

In government, the party commented loudly on the need to change laws in immigration, namely to liberalise immigration policies, to grant the vote at municipal and European elections to non-French residents, and to give residence permits to all *sans-papiers*\(^\text{19}\). The party has always favoured proportional

\(^{19}\) Drawn from Knapp, 2004: 196.
representation. As minister, Voynet introduced the ‘precautionary principle’, which banned the importation of British beef as the BSE crisis broke, deemed by Hayward (2002: 257) to be a good example of where the protection of consumers as citizens via the attempt to raise food production standards was championed by *les Verts*. It is not surprising that the party acted in true postmaterialist fashion on the question of nuclear power. They had come out strongly against the construction of the *Superphénix* installation, but diverged from the PS on their reasons. The PS terminated the project only when cost overruns threatened to burden the state with a massive bill, and when technical problems led advisors to question its viability. *Les Verts*, on the other hand, opposed it on first principles.120

Once in office, however, the party had to learn the tough lessons of compromise, most especially over nuclear power where it is improbable that France will abandon its investment in this area. The road hauliers’ protest over fuel taxes were defused by Jospin’s pledge to give some leeway to this lobby and in doing so, the policy of taking steps wherever possible to lessen ozone damage was inevitably compromised (op. cit.). The party supported the PS on bills to reform Corsica’s status; to establish the principle of gender parity; and backed reform of detainee’s rights (Knapp, 2004: 195). This shift towards political moderation may also be traced in their views on military action. GE supported the Gulf War while *les Verts* argued loudly against it. As a strong tradition of pacifism veins *les Verts*, Boy notes how striking it then was to see Voynet and her colleagues supporting the French armed forces’ deployment in Kosovo (Boy, 1999: 677). This marks a subtle shift in the overall pacifist strain within *les Verts* – they had opposed the first Gulf War, but by the late 1990s, had moved away from an absolutist ‘no war’ stance to one

120 See Jospin’s investiture speech for his reasons for abandoning the project.
predicated on a case-by-case basis. The principled aspect of the Greens manifesto had to give way to the pragmatism of holding office. It was against this backdrop of a clash between expediency and ideological purity that the party chose their candidate for the presidential elections of 2002. Their hitherto reformist platform altered with the nomination of Alain Lipietz as the party’s candidate in 2001. Lipietz is a very notable thinker in *les Verts*, a former Maoist who is trenchantly set against globalisation. As economic spokesman for the party, he was in favour of a reduction of the working week to 35 hours with no loss in pay (a policy taken up by Minister for Employment, Martine Aubry in the 1997-2002 administration) and controversially argued that France should increase its intake of immigrants to meet labour shortages and provide a tax base to adequately finance the pensions of those about to retire, a volatile proposition in France.\(^{121}\) His main publication, *Towards a New Economic Order: PostFordism, Ecology and Democracy* (1992), indicates the expansiveness of his policy concerns and shares the voguish language of Inglehart’s writings. He was forced to pull out before the campaign proper because he opposed outright the coalition’s handling of the Corsican issue. His replacement, Mamère, had a raft of measures in his manifesto that can only be described as postmaterialist.\(^{122}\) Four policy pledges stand out in particular – (i) the legalisation of cannabis; (ii) lowering the voting age to 17; (iii) emphasising that policing was not the answer to crime in the suburbs – he advocated recruiting 10,000 workers for the 700 ‘sensitive urban areas’.\(^{123}\), and (iv) reducing France’s reliance on nuclear power. This last policy pledge was perhaps the most postmaterialist, as there has always been a marked unwillingness among all established parties to reduce the proportion of France’s power needs that is generated by nuclear installations. Mamère’s pledge

\(^{121}\) [www.web.net/32hours/lipietz.htm](http://www.web.net/32hours/lipietz.htm)

\(^{122}\) Drawn from Knapp, *idem.*
was to scale nuclear energy’s input from 80 per cent to 60 per cent, in direct
contravention to the coalition government’s stance. The announcement was
controversially made outside a chemical plant in Toulouse where there had been a
major accident (Bell, 2003: 31).

6.3.3.1 (a): Summary of the policies of Les Verts

The policies of Les Verts have consistently been postmaterialist. Even in
government, when the hard realities of office would have forced them to
compromise, most notably on the fuel protests of 2000, where they had to row in
behind Jospin, the party tried more often than not to implement a raft of quality of
life measures. The evidence here supports Inglehart’s hypothesis.

6.3.3.2: The profile of the Green electorate

Unlike the situation with the PSU, we have sufficient data to enable us to give a pen
picture of the Greens’ electorate in terms of (a) their class (b) their age and (c) their
value profile. As before, in order for Inglehart’s hypothesis to be supported, the
electorate of this party must be more middle class, younger, and more liberal on a
range of issues – if these markers apply to the Green voter, then Inglehart’s
hypothesis is supported.

There is a reasonable amount of material on the characteristics of the Green
voter that are based on second-order elections. We look at that later in this section,
but begin in Table 6.8 by detailing the occupational profile of the Green voter at
first-order elections:

---

123 This is a euphemism for the disadvantaged banlieues.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1988 (P)</th>
<th>1995 (P)</th>
<th>1997 (L)</th>
<th>2002 (P)</th>
<th>2002 (L)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petit bourgeois</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mgmt and professions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: The occupational profile of the Green electorate at five legislative (L) and presidential (P) elections, 1988-2002; after Knapp, 2004: 186.

We note that the party performs best amongst the middle to higher salaried classes and worst amongst the farmers and petit bourgeois; this is as per Inglehart’s description of a new politics party relying disproportionately on the middle classes.

On age, we use the same source and the results are given in Table 6.9:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1988 (P)</th>
<th>1995 (P)</th>
<th>1997 (L)</th>
<th>2002 (P)</th>
<th>2002 (L)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 +</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The party does much better amongst the two young voter cohorts in the two elections of 2002 than before, but this is a divergence from earlier contests.
Manère's score amongst the 18-24 group was the best of all the candidates at the first round of the 2002 presidential contest, and second only to le Pen among the 25-34 year-old cohort (Muxel, 2003, p. 34). It is unwise to read too much in to the party's performances in 2002. In fact, the only sure thing that may be said about the age profile of the party's electorate from 1988-2002 is that it is old people are least likely to vote for it - oblique support for Inglehart's hypothesis.

There is further support for the view that the party does best among young voters in the shape of the European election surveys for 1989 and 1999. The SOFRES election-day survey for the 1999 Europeans reveals that the Greens had disproportionate support among the young – 19 per cent of 18-24 year olds said they would vote Green compared to the actual national vote share won by the Greens of ten per cent (Boy, 1999: 677).

One additional way of categorising the typical voter is by means of geography. A combined analysis of the 1992 regional and 1999 European elections brings together the profile of the GE electorate in 1992 and that of Cohn-Bendit's - led _Verts_ in 1999. It clearly demonstrates that the central _arrondissements_ of Paris were the most likely localities of Cohn-Bendit voters (Boy, op. cit. 683). Boy argues that the fashionable _arrondissements_ II-V, X and XI have a disproportionate number of inhabitants working in the cultural and knowledge sectors of the economy and that these people are classically more likely to be Green voters. Cohn-Bendit's list performed very creditably in the more outlying XVIII-XX _arrondissements_, which Boy explains by attributing the migration of creative professionals from the central areas of Paris due to rising property prices to these quarters. Rural voters are markedly unlikely to vote Green: the CPNT list headed by Saint Josse had a contradictory demographic profile (-0.60 correlation between the lists) at the 1999
European elections (op. cit.). In the 2002 presidential election, the attractiveness of
the Green candidate, Mamère, is evidenced by his showing among young voters. His
score of 14 per cent in the 18-24 group is a trebling of his overall vote share of five
per cent (Muxel, 2002: 55).

This line of thinking is extended by Sellers (1998), who pays great attention
to locale. Sellers claims that university towns are a strong source of Green votes and
a likely milieu for environmentally friendly policies at the local level. He examines
the voting record and subsequent incumbency record for local councils in Germany
and France from 1982-95. The university factor is, Sellers proposes, responsible for
the typical demographic of the Green voter: university towns ‘...occupy a position
analogous to that of factory towns in the emergence of the old workerist Left...’
(ibid. 191) in that young, Green, postmaterialist voters are far more likely to reside
in such towns than in very large cities or rural areas. This interpretation is borne out
by an assessment of the local election results which reveals that in France, the Green
parties did better when the size of the population involved in the university grew
disproportionately to the size of the town overall and where the absolute number of
students increased. Sellers is patently arguing that it is not just students, but those
who work in the creative and liberal setting of universities per se who are more
likely to vote Green. This amounts to an advance on Inglehart’s original
demographic analysis.

In terms of values and beliefs,124 the Green electorate is manifestly
postmaterialist – 76 per cent were either atheist or non-practising Catholic (20 and
56 per cent respectively) and were the least likely of all parties’ supporters to
condemn pre-marital cohabitation, marital infidelity and homosexuality. Only the far

124 Based on Bennahmias and Roche, 1992
left voters had a more modern view on the role of women, and in terms of cultural
tolerance, the Green voter was the most likely to disagree with the statements (a) that
they were proud to be French (b) that there were too many immigrants in France and
(c) that Jews have too much power. They were also the least desirous of seeing the
return of the death penalty (Bennahmias and Roche, 1992: 168-74). On one point
alone are they similar to the far right voter – both classes are more likely than not to
distrust the political classes, a similarity noted by Inglehart (1977). Bennahmias and
Roche (1992: 177) propose that four main motives for voting Green emerge from the
survey data:

1. A critical, even disgusted\textsuperscript{25} view of politics.
2. A sense that the PS has betrayed voters and the
   progressive cause.
3. An interest in the environment and quality of life.
4. A desire to promote a third way of managing society.

All of these correspond quite neatly to how Inglehart explains the emergence
of a new axis electorate (Inglehart, 1984): the old left is seen as unsatisfactory in
what it does and irrelevant to new pressing concerns.

The 2002 French electoral panel study brings out the distinctiveness of the
green electorate. Mamère's voters were not significantly different from the rest of
the electorate on economic questions such as the need to reduce the gap between rich
and poor, but as we see in Table 6.10, they are typically postmaterialist:
Table 6.10: The values and attitudes of Mamère’s supporters at the first round of the 2002 presidential election; after the preliminary results of the 2002 French electoral panel.126

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not very- or Somewhat important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect traditions and customs</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence / protect against enemies</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition / work hard to succeed</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the gap between rich and poor</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European or French identity</td>
<td><strong>Soledy French</strong> 17</td>
<td><strong>More French</strong> 32</td>
<td><strong>Equal</strong> 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Completely agree or agree somewhat</th>
<th>Completely disagree or somewhat disagree.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More freedom for business</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many immigrants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut number of civil servants</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspend transfers to families of delinquents</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bring back the death penalty</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The typical Green voter is the least likely to be nationalist, as measured by the items on immigration and sense of identity; the most liberal on law and order issues as tapped by the death penalty and social welfare/delinquency items, and the least traditional in terms of how they view the respect due to customs and established ways of living. All of the above is congruent with Inglehart’s description of a new voter.

6.3.3.2. (a): Summary of the Green voter profile
Most of the available data on the Green voter shows them to be young and centred in urban areas, with some (less strong) evidence that they are more educated as well.

125 The author’s own term, directly translated.
By the time of the 1989 European elections, the Green\textsuperscript{127} electorate was, along with that of the Centrists, the most educated (34 per cent had a university education) and also had a greater household income (40 per cent placed themselves in the top two monthly income categories). After 1989, however, both \textit{les Verts} and GE were able to move a little beyond these parameters and attract a cross-section of the electorate (\textit{Libération}, 23 March, 1992; cited ibid. 61). However, their strength still lies primarily in the younger and more educated sections of the electorate and thus tallies with Inglehart’s hypothesis. Based on the 2002 panel study, they are clearly postmaterialist in their values and attitudes. The evidence in this section supports Inglehart’s hypothesis.

6.3.3.3: The party’s impact at the polls

In Table 6.11, we present results for all ‘ecology’ parties at both legislative (L) and presidential (P) elections from 1974-2002

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Year & Percentage Share  \\
\hline
1974 (P) & 1.32  \\
1978 (L) & 2.18  \\
1981 (P) & 3.88  \\
1981 (L) & 1.07  \\
1986 (L) & 1.21  \\
1988 (P) & 3.78  \\
1988 (L) & 0.35  \\
1993 (L) & 11.1  \\
1995 (P) & 3.3  \\
1997 (L) & 6.9  \\
2002 (P) & 5.3  \\
2002 (L) & 4.5  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The percentage share of the ecology parties at twelve first-order elections, 1974-2002\textsuperscript{126}.}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{127} For all this section, the term ‘Green’ refers to the list headed by Waechter at the 1989 European elections.
The ecology movement increases its vote share, albeit from a very low base, in 1978 and 1981, and is then up and down until its very creditable showing in 1993, which came at the end of a sharp rise at the 1989 European and 1992 regional elections. One key reason for why the Greens perform so poorly in the 1981 and 1988 legislative elections is their lack of funds due to having fought expensive presidential campaigns immediately preceding. Consequently, they were not able to finance a large number of candidates (cf. Goldey, 1998, idem, and Knapp, 2004, p. 183). The party stayed above the five per cent threshold from 1997 through to the two contests of 2002, but ends up with only two seats in the legislative elections. This result is indicative of their inability to insert themselves into the running as a major political party. Once again, a clearly postmaterialist party is unable to make an electoral impact.

6.3.3.4: Summary of Les Verts

In terms of policies, we have seen that les Verts have been much more inclined towards quality of life issues than not. By definition, environmental concerns have been looked on by political scientists (cf. Richardson, 1995) as being indicative of a non-materialist outlook. In terms of party support, on both demographics and attitudes, the French Greens may be described as postmaterialists. The party’s failure to consolidate its electoral position having seen off rival ecology groups is a finding which goes against Inglehart’s prediction that new parties would be able to draw on the shift in preponderance of postmaterialists among the electorate. Taking into account their traditionally small number of seats, their longevity and their acts in office, H₃ is supported by the case of Les Verts.

128 See Goldey, 1998, p. 544, for a full listing of the numbers and type of each candidate running under the broad ecology/green label.
6.3.4: Summary of the evidence for France

Of the three parties surveyed in this section, not one fully supports H$_3$. The PS has undeniably been electorally successful, but nowhere does Inglehart’s case include evidence to suggest that people voted for them because of their stance on new politics issues. It is clear that from 1997-2002, they prioritised old issues. Inglehart’s exemplary ‘new politics’ party, the PSU, never achieved any real electoral gain, and did not succeed in substantially affecting France politics. It is not surprising that Inglehart did not update his readers on the fate of the PSU and what this tells us about PM and new parties. Les Verts is a different case; they are undeniably postmaterialist, but not very successful. If PM is correct, then there should be an ever-larger bloc of voter cohorts who would endorse their policies. Their electoral performances tell us otherwise.

On voter profiles, all three parties again combine to yield a mixed outcome for Inglehart’s hypothesis. The surest conclusion we have for Les Verts is that they are not attractive to old voters; the evidence for young voters is that there is a slight overrepresentation. On attitudes, the party is distinctively more liberal, and thus Inglehart would argue, more postmaterialist. We cannot even make these weak arguments for the PS, who resembles all the main parties in the indistinctiveness of their typical supporter. There is so little evidence for the PSU that all we can say is that their average supporter was more likely than not to be secular.

We may thus conclude that H$_3$ is partly supported, in spite of Inglehart’s lack of a case for the PS (he barely mentions them) and his model’s patchy performance on the PSU.
6.4: Ireland

6.4.1: Level Two change - Democratic Left (DL)

Like the PSU, DL also fit a first reading of Flanagan’s definition of left-libertarian parties (1987). DL’s vote share in the two elections it contested was below the threshold figure of five per cent mentioned as a competing criterion at the beginning of this chapter, but as it was a party of government it may be argued that the justification for assessing the party in this thesis is clear and reasonable. According to its first leader, Proinsias De Rossa, DL would focus right from the beginning on articulating policy preferences built around a new set of issues. Internally, the party would depart from the established top-down organization – ordinary members would be seen as more than mere party workers and would be encouraged to help influence the direction of the party (Holmes, 1994: 151). In short, DL attempted to increase participation in its own internal structure and to widen its base interest beyond a purely class-based one – two measures that any left-libertarian (Flanagan, 1987) party should endorse if they wish to be regarded as such.

Democratic Left (DL) was founded in 1992 as the result of a failed Workers’ Party (WP) EGM motion by the leader, De Rossa, to radically alter both the organisation and policy content of the WP. Of the seven WP TDs, six left (including De Rossa) to form DL, and the bulk of the membership went in the same direction. From the outset, the nascent party was keen to stress its novelty and how it was a new force for change in Irish politics – even its provisional (and aspirationally eponymous) name, New Agenda, explicitly aimed to convey this. The party was to remain in existence for only seven years; for nearly half its life, it was a
governmental party, holding one ministry and two ministries of state in the 1994-7 Rainbow coalition. In 1999, having continued to fare poorly in the opinion polls after their disappointing 1997 general election returns, the party voted to merge with Labour.

The section on DL is inevitably shorter than that of its French homologue for two reasons – it existed for a shorter period of time, so there is simply less to describe and juxtapose. Secondly, the PSU’s outlook was tinged by new philosophical trends that animated the French intelligentsia for much of the mid-century period; this does not apply to DL.

6.4.1.1: The policies of DL

Quite apart from the organisational reform that De Rossa and his supporters wanted to conduct, the split from the WP came about as the consequence of an ever-deepening division on policy emphasis in the party, with the old guard stressing that the party should remain a class-antagonistic one while the modernisers sought to appeal to voters interested in ‘women’s rights...the environment...[and] consumer’s rights’ (Farrell, 1999: 41-2), about as Inglehartian a formula as one could hope to get.

Laver’s (1994, 1998) expert policy judgment articles are the only systematic attempt to gauge the policy positions of DL. The exercises focused on the manifesto content of all the main parties for the 1992 and 1997 elections. Only the axes most relevant to Inglehart’s quality of life / new politics issues are referred to here. Starting with the 1992 manifesto, DL was deemed the most anti-clerical and was

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129 Marxist scholars would argue that a politburo system, properly run, maximized the involvement of the ordinary card-carrying member. The Trotskyist- influenced operation of the WP would thus be seen as internally democratic. See Jakubowski (1990).
judged to be the most permissive of all on abortion and homosexuality legislation, which tallies with Inglehart’s assertion that new left parties aimed to build a society comparatively free of moral intervention in people’s private lives. However, on another key new politics issue, the environment, DL broadly resembled every party bar the Greens in its position - that is, DL was not much concerned with environmental protection. Furthermore, on decentralization, DL was more against than in favour of this goal; Inglehart and Flanagan (1987) were both of the view that new left parties would do all in their power to promote greater and more diffuse political participation at the most localized level possible.

By the time the 1997 manifesto was analysed, Laver had included a separate ‘new politics’ category and although neither Inglehart nor PM is cited, it is evident that Inglehartian concerns are catered for by the axes of Decentralisation, Freedom of Information, and the Environment (Laver, 1998: 161). The credentials for DL in this area are not strong – like the other parties but excepting the Greens, they give nothing more than a cursory mention of them in their manifesto. On the three new politics items, DL hovers around ten and eleven on the 20-point scale – hardly a radical stance for a party with new left pretensions (ibid. 166-170). DL’s emphases mirror those of the established parties: Northern Ireland attracts their greatest interest (frequency of references amounting to a salience measure), while they were most distinguishable from other parties on Tax, in Inglehart’s eyes, as ‘old’ a political issue imaginable. On the topic of Europe, DL does indeed diverge from the established parties. Leaving Laver’s expert judgments to one side, we note that in 1992, DL was opposed to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on the grounds that it contained an incipient threat to Ireland’s neutrality and that the economic strictures necessary for monetary union were likely to damage the economy.
On the first point, it may be argued that neutrality is in general a new politics issue, as it runs counter to the idea of power blocs exercising a military control over individual states and equates to the support of an international peace movement, listed by Inglehart (1984) as a postmaterialist concern. Complicating things a little is the fact that a nominal policy of neutrality has been followed by every Irish party right from the state's inception. The balanced judgment would be, though, to credit this as a new politics issue that DL endorsed. It is not so simple to do the same, however, in the case of European integration, for reasons that stay well outside the parameters of this thesis.

Regarding the Social dimension, defined by Laver as a party's views on abortion and homosexuality, DL is again in 1997 more liberal than any other. A problem here is that Laver does not classify this 'sexual politics' composite as a new politics entity, but it is reasonable to add this as a fourth element to the list. As may be seen from the foregoing, on only one issue out of four is DL distinctively different from the other parties, either in terms of salience or position.

In terms of specific policies, DL's 1997 manifesto stressed the need to adopt the typical Keynesian\textsuperscript{130} measure of using the public sector to fight unemployment and increase the rate of welfare benefit to the poorest recipients (Democratic Left, 1997). Unemployment and poverty are in no way congruent to new politics issues. One other new politics issue is the notion of a basic income – the first governmental mention of this was made in the 2002 Green Paper on the topic. The literature review referred several times to the non-economic benefits such a move would bring, for example, facilitating volunteer work. The very notion of a basic income evidently has strong implications of an overall anti-poverty strategy, but it also has an

\textsuperscript{130} Such a term was not used in the manifesto.
additional quality of life aspect in that it is not a simple redistributionist measure. The party balked at pressing for a basic income and in doing so, resisted some internal party pressure (Dunphy, 1998: 61) to propose the policy in both the manifesto and any subsequent government negotiations. With this omission, the solidity of the party’s new leftist classification is again eroded. The leftist position of DL is further corroborated by Laver, Benoit and Garry’s (2002)\textsuperscript{131} computerised content analysis of Irish party manifestos which puts DL to the left of all the major parties.

The *Strategy 2000: a radical agenda for change* (Democratic Left, 1993) document is another confusing piece of evidence in that it expresses old leftist aspirations then proceeds to contradict itself: ‘Democratic Left recognises that capitalism does not have the answers to the world’s problems and that answer lies in the democratic transformation of society’, and urged the party to take on ‘vested interests and power structures’ by means of implementing ‘forms of public or social control of key means of production and distribution’ (quoted in Dunphy, 1998: 58), yet simultaneously stated that public ownership and planning were obsolete. The first three clauses are resoundingly socialist, almost anachronistically so, while the last retracts the ideological prescriptiveness of them all. In a new leftist vein, DL also acknowledged that a workerist party was ill-fated if it hoped to capture the institutions of the state as power was now ‘diffused with (sic) a number of competing sources of power: state institutions, capital, trade unions, media, public opinion, *social movements and single issue groups*, etc.’ (op. cit. my italics).

6.4.1.1 (a) Summary of New Politics and DL

Although the party was more liberal than the main Irish parties on sexual rights, the party was clearly and typically old left on its central policies. \( H_3 \) is not supported.

6.4.1.2: The profile of the DL electorate

We do not have much evidence to go on in describing the typical DL voter. In fact, we have nothing at all on the attitudes of its voters. There was no distinctive age or educational profile for DL voters (see Marsh and Mitchell, 1999: 170) – Inglehart has repeatedly averred that postmaterialists are more likely to be young and well educated. A further piece of evidence contradicts Inglehart’s modeling of the support base of a new left party - the WP had primarily been a Dublin party and this remained a feature of the DL electorate (Holmes, 1994: 152). DL’s best performances were among workers in the Dublin suburbs (Nealon’s Guides, 1992, 1997). This is shown in its 1997 election performance, where the party’s share of the vote in Dublin was twice that of its overall national percentage (five- versus two-and-a-half per cent).

We noted earlier in this chapter Sellers’ emphasis on the geography of new left support. He argued that the city is more likely to give rise to new parties than the more traditional rural setting. Interestingly, DL’s standing was consistently higher in Dublin than anywhere else. In two elections, a total of seven TDs were elected to the Dáil and only one, Liz McManus, was from a non-Dublin constituency (and even here, she was disproportionately stronger in the urban areas of Wicklow adjoining Dublin). In a by-election in the course of the 28th Dáil, one other non-Dublin TD was returned (Kathleen Lynch from Cork North-Central). Tellingly, no candidate from a rural constituency was successful in either of the two elections that DL contested.
6.4.1.2 (a): Summary of the DL voter profile

When confronted with such a lack of evidence, it is difficult to reach a definitive assessment. On what we know, the party’s electorate was probably not postmaterialist, as on two of the three core demographic criteria, the evidence runs counter to Inglehart’s template and even on the third, the geographic location, the findings are inconclusive. H₃ is not supported.

6.4.1.3: The party’s impact at the polls

The poor performance of the party in the 1997 election served as a precursor to the demise of DL. In 1999, the decision to join Labour was presented as a merger, when surely the appropriate term was takeover, as the name remained that of the larger party. Whilst it could have been (and indeed was) argued by the more optimistic of the party supporters that the 1992 vote share of 2.8 per cent was due to the infant status of DL, the same could not be said for their 1997 performance. Certainly, the 1992 election was a difficult start for the party – they had already spent a considerable amount of their scarce resources on their anti-Maastricht campaign and they were left in the wake of a resurgent Labour, even after having tried to match their policies with Labour’s in advance of the poll (Dunphy, 1998: 56) in an attempt to maximize the left-wing vote. Their planning did not help the party. The same defence could not be used in 1997, where having completed three reasonably well-received years in office, its tally fell to 2.5 per cent (Murphy, 1998).
6.4.1.3 (a): Summary of the performance of DL

$H_3$ is not supported, as the party only contested one election and then, when faced with a poor outcome, merged with Labour.

6.4.1.4: Summary of DL

The party does not fit model of a postmaterialist party. Its rhetoric was clearly left-wing and it did not make any significant statements on modernization. Against, this, on Northern Ireland DL set itself apart in its self-depiction as a party that wanted to leave the struggles of the past behind. Similarly, its stance on sexual morality (read ‘abortion and divorce’) marks it out as more liberal than either FF or FG. In its overriding emphasis on the economy, the party fits an old politics category. In terms of its support, we note that it was not disproportionately young or well educated, and we have no reliable information on its attitudinal base. Its inability to make any real headway at elections marks it out as another party that failed to attract support based on a platform that had a modicum of postmaterialist influence. $H_3$ is not supported.

6.4.2: Level 3 change - The Green Party / An Comhaontas Glas

The Irish Greens would prima facie qualify as a new party, as the issue they have been so closely identified with, the environment, was for long absent from the list of priorities of the Irish state. Indeed, the first Irish Minister for the Environment, Sylvester Barrett, was only appointed as recently as 1977 by the then Taoiseach, Jack Lynch. Another ex-Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, writes that the advent of the Greens in the 1980s was a specific tropism to the failure of the existing parties to...
take account of concerns other than the economy (2003: 61). On the basis of this assertion, then, the Greens in Ireland would corroborate Inglehart’s hypothesis of how a new politics axis would first appear and how a party would derive from this new division.

6.4.2.1: The policies of the Greens

Again, the most systematic work on party positioning in Ireland is that of Laver (1994, 1998) and his expert judgment studies. These indicate that the Greens have retained environment as their raison d'etre but have also gone on to secure a consistent position for themselves in Irish politics that is distinctively different. On the two fiscal measures from the original study (‘raising taxes’ and ‘public ownership’), the Greens were placed to the left; they were deemed ambivalent on Europe and in favour of decentralisation. The Greens were the party with the greatest emphasis on two of Laver’s ten policy dimensions (Laver, 1994) – those of environment and decentralisation (ibid. 164). Continuing the reforming of politics theme as highlighted in their emphasis on decentralisation in the 1992 manifesto, the party adopted the most open-minded and democratic stance of all the parties on the ‘freedom of information’ dimension (Laver, 1998: 170) and also gave it the greatest prominence. These distinctions also applied again to their stance on decentralisation in 1997. By the 1997 election, the experts judged the Greens to be an anti-establishment party in terms of their opposition to the consensus politics surrounding Europe and foreign affairs.133 Sinn Féin joined them on this anti-mainstream front. The fact that the Greens’ 1997 manifesto positions on these two issues placed them away from the established parties explains their involvement in the 2001-2 Nice

133 In the 1992 survey (published in 1994), ‘foreign affairs’ measured the extent to which a party supported close ties and political agreement with America.
referendums. The ‘foreign’ affairs dimension tapped by the 1997 expert survey refers to whether or not the party favours a close relationship with NATO and / or the Western European Union.¹³⁴

In the 2002 election, the party took pains to underline decentralisation and the twin concerns of political ethics and accountability. According to Bomberg (2002: 331), the latter two policy co-ordinates are the logical result of recognising that cross-European action is necessary to safeguard natural resources, but the imperative to grant greater subsidiarity in all aspects of decision-making runs against this grain. The anti-Maastricht campaigning of the Greens (they were a founder member of the National Platform for Employment, Democracy and Neutrality, an umbrella group for organising opposition to the main parties’ pro-acceptance push – Holmes, 1993: 107) was no once-off affair; in the two Nice referendums of 2001-2, the party was firmly anchored in the ‘no’ camp. Nice One and Two entailed considerable debate on how Ireland’s neutrality would be affected by the terms of the treaty; so much so that a coda, the Seville Protocol, was formulated which specifically ruled out Irish involvement in any military venture mounted by the EU without explicit provision for this by recourse to the Irish people in a referendum. The Greens (and specifically John Gormley) argued that this alteration did not in any way hinder any prospective Irish involvement in a NATO-led military project and so they urged a second ‘no’ vote.

In terms of the secular / moral factor, as Sinnott (1995) describes it, the Greens have moved from an unclear position (Whiteman, 1990) to a liberal one; their leader called for a ‘no’ vote in the abortion referendum of 2002, an amendment

¹³⁴ Laver does not explain why this does not amount to a ‘defence’ dimension.
of much debated complexity and in doing so, sided with the liberal, pro-choice, activist groupings.

Academic work on the 2002 manifesto is in abeyance at the time of writing, but in a pre-election newspaper interview (The Irish Times, March 30, 2002), Sargent reiterated his party’s commitment to setting a higher ethical standard for politicians. This is clearly a subject close to the Greens’ heart; Sargent himself was a prominent whistleblower on corruption of local politicians regarding the rezoning of land in Dublin in the early 1990s and his party remains untouched by allegations of impropriety. Their 2002 manifesto maintained the overriding environmental focus with, *inter alia*, proposals to restrict vehicular access to the cities at certain times, to spend less on roads and to increase petrol tax, and to levy a type of a carbon fuel tax. Their repeated bargaining position in the event of any coalition talks was the ‘non-negotiable’ control of the Department of Environment and less trenchantly, the desire to gain a ‘super junior’ position in Finance to influence infrastructural spending.

6.4.2.1 (a): Summary of new politics and the Greens

The Green Party is not as distinctively postmaterialist as its French counterpart, but its stance on decentralisation and an emphasis on ethics in power are of a piece with a new values party. These policy strands are presented in conjunction with a clear set of measures to enforce environmental protection and a willingness to give people

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135 This office and the term first appeared in the Rainbow coalition of 1994-7, where the smallest party, Democratic Left, obtained the concession that their Minister of State, Pat Rabbitte, could sit at the cabinet table for discussions even though he was constitutionally prohibited from casting a vote. Since then, the phrase has referred to the idea of any enhanced junior ministerial position with cabinet access privileges.
more say in how major political projects, such as European integration, affect them.
In short, the Greens' policies are those of a new politics party. H₃ is supported.

6.4.2.2: The profile of the Greens' electorate

There is little work of systematic rigour here. The 2002 National Election Study casts some new light on the Green voter. The relevant findings are presented in Table 6.12:

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<tr>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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We note that the Greens are much more successful outside the traditional working class and that their typical voter is less likely to be a trade union member. Furthermore, the Greens do better amongst those who verge towards secularism. On these three markers, the Green supporter fits Inglehart's definition of a new politics voter. Moreover, statistical analysis of the profile of all voters at election time and of Eurobarometer surveys has consistently found the Green supporter to be more likely to be younger and better educated (Whitman, 1990: 55; Marsh and Sinnott, 1997: 171). Green candidates do better in affluent urban constituencies than elsewhere — with five TDs from Dublin (three from the most affluent constituencies in the country) and one from another urban base in Cork, the Greens are predominantly reliant on city voters for their support. This runs against the NES finding that the party did better among voters located in rural areas, but geographical dispersal
probably militates against the Greens actually gaining enough votes to take a seat outside of the cities.

6.4.2.2 (a): Summary of the profile of the Green voter

Based on the scant evidence we have, the party fits the description of one that acts as a vehicle for the Inglehart’s new type of voters. H₃ is supported.

6.4.2.3: The party’s impact at the polls

The Greens’ emergence on the Irish political map may be traced to the 1989 General Election, when Roger Garland won their first Dáil seat in Dublin South. The Green Party / Comhaontas Glas was not formed until 1988, but it had previously existed in two guises – as the Ecology Party of Ireland (from 1981-3) and as the Green Alliance (from 1983-8). They first contested a general election in 1982. Table 6.13 depicts their electoral record:

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<tr>
<td>Constituencies contested</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of national vote</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
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Starting off from a tiny base, the Greens have shown steady if marginal improvement. On the three indices covered here, the party has incrementally grown in all of them. The curve took off sharply upwards in 2002 when they tripled their
Dáil representation. The two election successes for the Greens in 1997, Sargent and Gormley, topped the poll in 2002 in their respective Dublin constituencies, whereas in 1997, Gormley obtained the last seat by 27 votes. To attach too much weight to the results of the last election would be a mistake – judging from the full time series, the prospects for the Greens for the next ten to fifteen years are probably healthy if unspectacular. One hindrance is the size of the party and the reduced scale of its resources – it does not receive any large corporate donations and relies on its elected members to campaign and generally contribute on a continuous basis. It needs to be able to obtain the finance and the local network - the party is estimated to have only 600 members - on the ground to contest more seats.

6.4.2.3 (a) Summary of the Greens’ performance

H3 is partly supported, as the party has not made a lasting breakthrough at the polls. Their 2002 seat tally was by far their best, but with a lack of widespread support, may well represent a peak for the party.

6.4.2.4: Summary - the Greens

The party’s policies are identifiably postmaterialist, as we would expect those of any environmentalist party to be (cf. Toke, 2000). Its electorate is more likely to be affluent, better educated, young, and urban, all of which match the postmaterialist demographics. Interestingly, it is the only party studied in this chapter, the PS apart, which could be said to have steadily increased its vote share and to have consolidated its position in the electoral landscape. Nevertheless, it is sincerely doubtful that it can become a major party.

136 However, the success of the Progressive Democrats as a governmental party, in spite of their size, suggests how the Greens could exert influence at executive level.
6.4.3: Summary of the evidence for Ireland

Inglehart could claim that Ireland was always going to be a difficult case for H₃, as there has never been a large left-wing party. It is precisely for this reason that Ireland qualifies as a deviant case for a small-n comparative study. H₃ is not supported for the following reasons. Firstly, the Greens did well in the 2002 election, but this was the first time they have won more than two seats. Unlike in France, the party has not gained office, but that is something that in some respects is outside a party’s control. Future coalitions may well include the Greens. We do not have a strong body of evidence to conclude that the Greens are particularly attractive to younger voters, but what evidence we do have suggests that they are more ‘Inglehartian’ in their demographic than not. There is no evidence - opinion poll, exit poll, or NES - that voters are attaching more decisive significance at election time to environmental issues. In short, the Greens hold up their side of Inglehart’s case, but only just.

The same cannot be said for DL. Their truncated existence and lack of a distinctive and broad new politics stamp weakens Inglehart’s case. Their work in cabinet does not merit a new politics label, as the portfolios their minister and junior ministers held did not fit a quality of life agenda. The single biggest difficulty for Inglehart’s case is the voter profile – there is nothing to suggest that the party’s electorate fits the PM demographic. If there had been stronger support for H₃ across the board from the Greens, then the hypothesis would have been partly supported, but the patchiness of the evidence for the Greens allied to the complete absence of support from DL lead us to reject the hypothesis.
6.5: Conclusion

The hypothesis is not supported, and one’s overriding impression is that even the evidence that favours Inglehart’s case is quite weak. Individually, the new politics parties have not made a progressively greater impact in general elections. Two of the parties in the sample of five have faded into history, while the 2002 election seems to have effaced *les Verts* as an effective electoral party. Only the Irish Green Party finished the period stronger than it had ever been during the course of its history, and here with only six seats out of 166. The PS is undeniably different; a party of government for much of the 1980s and 1990s, there is at present little cause for doubting its future. On electoral performance, the PS is a stand-alone case. Their successes from 1981 indicate that a new type of left-wing politics found favour with the French; it is reasonable to propose that many of their policies were postmaterialist in emphasis.

If a new politics party is judged by how successfully it taps into the burgeoning support for new politics, then one is faced with two conclusions – neither DL nor the PSU were new politics parties or the new politics constituency is virtually non-existent in general elections. As Inglehart repeats, the PSU were an archetypal new politics party; interestingly, he never mentions them in any of his writings after the late 1970s. At least the Green parties looked at in this chapter in do fit the ‘common sense’ argument by Inglehart – they are electorally recent and they are likely to have a younger, more educated vote base.

In terms of the demographics and attitudinal base of the new parties, though, H3 performs better. The pattern fits for the Greens, both in France and Ireland, and for the PSU. It works less well for the PS and not at all for DL. According to Hug (2001) this is an intuitive outcome, as only the Green parties are categorically ‘new’,
both in terms of their age and issue base. Hug appends a caveat, though – even the high levels of affluence as pertain in the Netherlands are no guarantee of a quick growing, viable Green Party.\(^\text{137}\)

The reader is confronted by four flaws in Inglehart’s model. Firstly, there is the methodological fault that he is inclined to rely on one-shot case studies. His enthusiastic coverage of the PSU (Inglehart, 1971, 1977) links the party with the emergent anti-system attitudes of the 1970s. He omits to mention the party’s negligible ability to win seats, even at its so-called high tide of 1968-73. Democratic Left fought two elections and never really advanced on the territory they marked out as the Workers’ Party. There is no measured attempt to look at the seedbed for previous new parties and how they fared. Inglehart is seduced by the new without adequately documenting the lessons gleaned from the old. To assume that the PSU could benefit from the wave of discontentment and rejection of the established parties is to assume a reliable linkage exists between attitudes and voting behaviour. Inglehart nowhere proves this and even worse, does not document the available literature on attitudes and voting intention. Inglehart would probably invoke the defence that it takes time for disaffection to result in alterations in the figures for as party support as ‘...major political parties represent great psychological and institutional investments; established voting patterns are not lightly discarded.’ (Inglehart, 1984: 26). All well and good, but he should give the reader more specific figures as to what constitutes a breakthrough; how long does a party have to perform at this level not to be dismissed as an aberration, and when and where will such a party make this quantum leap.

\(^{137}\) In fact, the Harmel and Robertson study found no correlation between levels of postmaterialism and the emergence of a Green party.
Secondly, something not mentioned by Inglehart is that the large-n comparative work finds no strong correlation between the level of PM in a country as recorded in surveys and the presence of new politics parties. An analysis of post-war elections in 15 western democracies found the relationship between PM and the number of new parties to be ‘very weak’ (Hug, op. cit. 91). This finding is thus of a piece with an earlier study by Harmel and Robertson (1985: 516) which found no correlation at all. Todosijevic and Enyedi (2003) find that the link between the percentage of postmaterialists in a country and that country’s degree of support for new politics attitudes was also weak. PM only attained significance as a predictor for three out of 16 ‘new politics’ variables. Strikingly, though, one of these is the exact opposite of Inglehart’s hypothesis; the vote share of new left parties in the 1990s was inversely related to the percentage of postmaterialists. The PM variable performed better in predicting individual behaviours, specifically, belonging to the peace movement and voting green in the 1990s (see Table 6.1)

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<tr>
<td><strong>Green 80s</strong></td>
<td>0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Green 90s</strong></td>
<td>0.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New left 90s</strong></td>
<td>-0.77*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New parties 90s</strong></td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Member of Env. group</strong></td>
<td>0.51*</td>
</tr>
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Two-tailed hypotheses; *significant at 0.05.

*Table 6.14: How PM relates to new politics – structures, attitudes and behaviours. After Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2003: 638*
In a similar vein, postmaterialists are slightly\textsuperscript{138} more inclined towards tax policies being used with the aim of maximizing 'redistribution for the sake of human solidarity' (Inglehart, 1984: 55-6). The motives for tax redistribution are difficult to probe, but Inglehart is poor at explaining why old left supporters have different views on redistribution when compared with new left supporters. It appears that Inglehart’s work is applicable to some degree at the individual level, but not at the party system level. His best party ‘result’ is the success, durability and policy set of the PS, with the performance of the Greens coming in second place as they have not achieved consistently solid results in general elections. Even in the case of the PS, Inglehart does not attempt any such policy audit for any new politics party, other than at the most general level.

This brings us to our third criticism, that he leaves hanging the question as to how many new politics issues must a party take up in order for it to be gauged as postmaterialist. Although a raft of measures were enacted by the PS that could be reasonably said to be postmaterialist, this is an entirely different thing to saying that the \textit{fons et origo} of such policies is PM.

Fourthly, his work pays scant attention to institutional factors. How the Greens fit into the ‘new party’ system is not fully explained by Inglehart. Callaghan (2000) documents how the Greens related to the left as a whole in the 1970s in Britain, Sweden, Norway and Germany. His article alone contains a more patiently arrived at description of possible points of policy divergence and endeavours to juxtapose how a renovated left tried to cope with the electoral presence of the Greens. Callaghan thus provides a more nuanced account of how environmentalism interacted with the new left across Europe, whereas Inglehart is remiss with regard to

\textsuperscript{138} And therefore, statistically not significantly.
providing instances of specific new parties and how they related to each other. The above leads us on to questioning how Level One Change distinguishes itself from that occurring at Level Two. This chapter's case selection was restricted from looking at two instances of Level One party change as Ireland does not have any party that fits this bill. One obvious point not raised by Inglehart is that if there is a new political axis, then it follows that the constituent parties of the old axis must have either disappeared or be in the process of doing so. Let us take one fixed pole, the west European left. If Inglehart (1977; and Abramson, 1994) is correct, then these parties, originating in a class-antagonistic setting, will decline as new types of voter and issues emerge. Merkel (1992: 141), in his survey of European social democracy from 1945-90, records a remarkably consistent vote performance by socialist, social-democratic and labour parties. Taking the period from 1945-73, the left's combined vote share was 31.7 per cent. From 1974-90, it was 31.5 per cent. There is no decline in vote share from the late 1960s. Whether the socioeconomic composition of this percentage of the electorate changes is unknowable from this statistic, but Inglehart does not provide any evidence that it has, apart from the crude Alford Index.

This chapter set out to test whether new politics parties are becoming more prominent due to the presence of new voters and their associated new issues. We laid out three dimensions - presence of new politics issues in their manifesto; their ability to attract new voters, and their electoral success - along which we judged the performance of five parties, three French and two Irish. We found that Inglehart's case was partly supported by the evidence for France, and not by the evidence for Ireland. There are two lessons to be taken from this chapter. The first one is that Kitschelt is more likely to be correct than Inglehart in predicting the formation and
fate of new parties - he states that new parties can only succeed where 'the
unresponsiveness of existing political institutions coincides with favourable
opportunities to displace existing parties' (1994: 12). The mechanical rules of
elections affect political actors, both voters and parties. This argument is ignored by
Inglehart. The second lesson leads us on to our final chapter. Willey (1998: 656)
notes that when the likelihood of success in forming a new party appears to be small,
the potential instigators are most likely to turn to interest group-type activity. In
Chapter Seven, we examine Inglehart's argument that frustrated postmaterialist
citizens resort to unconventional political behaviour.
Chapter 7: Unconventional political behaviour and New Social Movements

Introduction

All of Inglehart’s key works on PM pivot on two things: citizen-level political disaffection and what the citizen does about it. In Chapter Six we looked at what happens when new politics voters interact with an unresponsive electoral system. Inglehart has consistently argued that new parties will emerge to meet their needs, but, as we saw in the coda provided by Willey (1998), the institutional backdrop is critical. In this chapter, we look at what the disaffected voter has done when the parliamentary avenue has proven to be a dead end; according to Inglehart, they will act unconventionally. Inglehart makes numerous claims on the nature and focus of unconventional political behaviour in *Values, Ideology and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements* (1990). Let us begin this chapter by recapitulating Inglehart’s central points on this topic. Inglehart distinguishes postmaterialists from materialists in terms of education and propensity for political action. Instead of pressing for political change through the ballot box, the postmaterialist generations are more likely to opt for direct action. Inglehart reiterates the claim that while old politics issues are the currency of general elections, there is a discernible lessening of importance of such elections and their issue base in the eyes of younger citizens. New concerns based on, *inter alia*, the environment and citizen’s rights are more likely to be articulated outside parliamentary politics. The unconventional style of
action which extraparliamentary politics implies has greater appeal to more educated and younger people.

This chapter's focus is on unconventional political behaviour. As most of the recent literature in the field treats this form of activity as a subset of New Social Movements (NSMs), it may be said that in studying one, the other is included. We ask three questions in this chapter – (i) are NSMs postmaterialist in their motives and do they use new tactics to achieve them? (ii) do their members have a distinctive values profile?, and (iii) have they had a progressively greater impact? In Part One, we look at Inglehart's main claims in detail and derive our hypothesis. We outline our case selection criteria in Part Two to enable us to fairly test the hypothesis. Parts Three and Four are taken up with delineating how the hypothesis fits the cases of France and Ireland respectively. In detailing the following NSMs and instances of unconventional political activity, no attempt is made to pass off this selection of evidence as a comprehensive one; rather, what follows are instances and data that undoubtedly have a bearing on how we should appraise the fourth and final hypothesis. Finally, in Part Five, we discuss how tenable Inglehart's claims are in the light of the evidence.

7.1: Inglehart's main claims

increase in intellectual skills predisposes these more recent cohorts to involvement in extraparliamentary activity. Due to the length and comparative specificity of the 1990 paper, this chapter is mainly concerned with the 1990 paper, but draws on his 1984 chapter as well, even though it is somewhat oblique on the question of NSMs.

The 1990 chapter appeared in Dalton and Kuechler’s *Challenging the Political Order*. The work serves as a concise summary of the thrust of his theory of postmaterialism. In it, he stresses the link between cognitive mobilisation and values, namely that the more educated one is, the more likely one is to hold postmaterialist values: ‘Effective political action requires the presence of certain skills among the relevant individuals; even severe problems or a superb organization would be unlikely to mobilize a population consisting of illiterate and apolitical people’\(^{139}\) (op. cit. 44). In alluding to previous research that Inglehart cites in support of the finding that the German Greens supporters are disproportionately postmaterialist, he extends the premise: ‘Postmaterialist values underlie many of the new social movements’ (1990:45) – namely, the anti-nuclear, peace, and ecology campaigns. In his 1984 paper, Inglehart refers to how these issue bases are involved in protests against military installations, hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants, among others (1984: 29). By adding the two papers together, one has a seemingly straightforward argument – postmaterialists are not likely to protest against ‘unemployment or declining real income’ (1984: 29) but instead take up cudgels against the problems of pollution and militarisation, for example. However, as the party system in the west is still, in the main, reflective of old politics issues, there arises a disjuncture. The parties campaign on issues that the new electoral cohorts find anachronistic (1990: 46, 63). The new cohorts have to resort to other means to articulate their

\(^{139}\) It would be fascinating to see how Inglehart would defend this assertion against the contradictory evidence presented in the form of, say, the Russian Revolution.
concerns. He writes that the western publics have become far more likely in the past two decades to engage in elite-challenging activities. (1997: 295-6). In Inglehart’s view, NSMs are a *soi-disant* indicator of changed political cleavage structure because of two distinctions – their issue base and the tactics employed by their supporters: ‘The new social movements are new not only in their goals, but also in their political style and in the factors that mobilize their activists’. (1990: 63). The above points lead to the formulation of our fourth and final hypothesis:

\[ H_4: \text{That due to system disaffection, there has been a rise in extraparliamentary activity, most notably in the form of increases in the profile of New Social Movement (NSMs).} \]

In Part Two, we look at how we lay out our case selection for this hypothesis.

### 7.2: Testing the derived hypothesis

Unlike the situation for political parties, there is no one unambiguous definition we may use in order to rule groups in or out of our analysis of NSMs. As Inglehart’s work avoids a scientific definition of a new politics movement (we only have his definition of lifestyle politics), we draw on Rucht and Neidhardt’s (2002) guidelines as detailed below. These distinguish between ‘political change movements’, which set out to affect policy, and ‘personal change movements’, which do not (op. cit. 8). This cuts down on the universe of NSMs one has to contend with initially. We ignore ‘personal change movements’, which is a term both too broad and vague, and look instead only at those movements which set out to explicitly affect legislation.

140 For example, it could include skinheads and new age travellers,
The question that then springs to mind is whether we can track similar numbers and types of NSMs in both states. Plainly, we cannot hope to document every group in both states that has had some element of a political agenda. All we can do is allow for a set of cases that reflect contemporary unconventional political behaviour within the specific context of each state’s political system. Ideally, this selection should allow us to juxtapose the tactics and results of a postmaterialist issue group (say, the women’s movement) with one that does not fit a new politics motivation (say, the rights and standard of living of the unemployed).

We assess the NSMs in three areas (a) whether they use new tactics to achieve postmaterialist goals; (b) whether their activists and supporters exhibit the classic postmaterialist profile, and (c) whether they are increasingly successful. The first part is difficult to operationalise. The first consideration is tactics – we should find a clear difference in NSMs versus previous forms of political organisation in types of activity. The Dalton and Kuechler (1990) view is that NSMs differ in terms of tactics (Appleton, 2000: 58). Tarrow’s (1999) list of collective actions is a good one - strikes, marches, occupations of public and private buildings, rallies, blocking of thoroughfares and sit-ins. In other words, previous extraparliamentary movements should be found to have deployed a different repertoire of tactics. If this is not the case, then Inglehart’s hypothesis is not supported. The second point concerns the relative novelty of extraparliamentary activity. If Inglehart is correct, we should expect to see that unconventional activity was much less common pre-1968 because the postmaterialist value shift had not occurred. We now detail the NSM setting for France.
7.3: France

Unlike Ireland, France has an established record of unconventional protest – as Keeler and Hall (2001: 64) note, ‘what might be seen as outrageous elsewhere is treated as more normal in France’. They stress that a key theme in the understanding of groups in France, especially political ones, is the intrusiveness of the state in their affairs. They go on to observe that it is difficult to conceive of many governments in Europe who would act as the French did when a group of employees dumped sulphuric acid in the Meuse river in protest at redundancy plans at their chemical factory in 2000 – the government stepped in with a deal on a better package (idem). France has not been uniformly revolutionary, though - there has never been much of a peace movement, for example (see Hazareesingh, 1994, for an account of why this has been the case). Let us now begin with the first of our three questions – whether NSMs are postmaterialist or not.

7.3.1: Issues and tactics of NSMs

Kriesi (1995) writes that NSMs normally have one of three goals (a) instrumental, (b) counter-cultural and (c) sub-cultural. The first is self-explanatory, while the second is about the identity of external society and the third deals with within-group identity. The literature treats NSM activity in France as being classifiable according to a first or second wave of protest (see Duyvendak, 1995: 109-49). Appleton proposes that there are two waves of NSMs in France – the first has its origin in May 1968 and lasts until 1974, not surging again until the 1980s, and was mainly based on anti-racism, AIDS, gay rights and social solidarity: ‘Rather than macro-societal concerns, these movements appear to be predominantly focused on sub-cultural
goals. They have tended to be less prescriptive in orientation than their first-wave counterparts and more defensively oriented.' (op. cit: 62). ‘Second wave’ movements are more likely to act in terms of the second and third of Kriesi’s classifications, that is, counter-culturally and sub-culturally (op. cit: 65). Duyvendak brackets the periods differently, claiming that NSM activity levels were consistent from 1968 to the end of the 1970s, then there is a marked drop in NSM activity in France from 1980-84. Despite the small chronological differences in their arguments, both of these authors support $H_4$ as they locate the qualitative shift to NSM activity post-1968.

The case of the women’s movement supports $H_4$. The radical feminists were the first new politics group to attain status after the 1968 events. They wanted the abolition of the family and marriage and also strove to abolish sex roles entirely, and have it so that one’s life outcomes are dictated by neither gender nor sexual identity. The first explicitly feminist movement was *Politique et Psychoanalyse*, formed in 1968 by a Lacanian psychoanalyst, Antoinette Fouque. Their activities mirrored those of the early PCF – they set up a newspaper, a bookshop and a publishing house. Kriesi (1988: 366) describes ‘movement milieus’, where bars, newspapers, and communes set up by a group, literally amount to another way of life. These, though, are old tactics, as adopted by the Spartacists, among others. The movement did move on to adopt new tactics in the early 1970s. In August 1970, a small group of women, including writers, placed a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier, and dedicated the wreath ‘to the unknown wife of the soldier’ (ibid: 215). This was the act which ‘baptised’ the movement. The media and nation were shocked, to use

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141 Duyvendak sees a second wave emerging from 1975-80, but Appleton thinks the data are not strong enough to support this.
142 Appleton does not enlarge on the relative solidaristic and welfare components of a public health concern like AIDS.
Hirsh’s (1981) term, and the women dubbed themselves the *Mouvement de Libération des Femmes*. In 1971, a much attention was paid to the ‘Manifesto of the 343’, a list of women who publicly declared they had had abortions as an attempt to lessen the stigma and change the law (Hirsh, op. cit. 218).

Appleton’s (2000: 73) view is that the women’s movement had a broad agenda for change at first, but in 1990s and onwards, it became more concerned with specifics such as violence, prostitution and sexual harassment. Their agenda is a mix of sustenance or materialist concerns (divorce law reform, protection against physical assault, equal opportunity and pay), to more ‘lifestyle’ issues such as access to birth control, abortion, and childcare. The movement qualifies as an NSM, with the tactics of the French groups being more diverse than those of the Irish ones. More specifically, their issue base and their date of origin are supportive of Inglehart’s claim.

Two movements appeared in the 1980s that also used a wide range of tactics. The blood transfusion crisis143 fuelled the AIDS movement, which lobbied for better medical care and enquiries into how the scandal happened. It is a trivial truth that AIDS is a new politics issue, as the disease was only documented in the 1980s. The *Comité d’Urgence Anti Répression Homosexuelle de Paris* (CUARH) movement lobbied Mitterrand in the run-up to the presidential election of 1981, offering to canvass support for him within the gay community if the PS acted positively towards gay rights on assuming office.144 Both groups used marches, petitions, concerts and media contacts to force politicians to attend to their concerns. The gay movement’s most significant joint stance was when it combined with SOS-Racisme and the LDH in protest at Chirac’s banning of the magazine *Gai pied* in

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143 This was due to a policy of not adequately testing or treating donated blood which was later used in transfusions.
In terms of tactics, there is a split between those groups who favoured lobbying and more traditional methods generally to get their message across, and Act-Up Paris, which was concerned both with gay rights and the government's handling of AIDS. Tactics used by Act-Up included 'zaps', where activists would confront a politician while s/he was being interviewed for television in a public space, and 'die-ins', where activists would lie on the ground in a public space. Banners placed alongside them would criticise government policy on AIDS (Waters, 2003: 132). One oversight on Inglehart's part is that it is trivially true that AIDS is a new politics issue, as the disease was not documented and acknowledged to be a public health problem until the 1980s.

There is a significant theoretical obstacle for Inglehart in that the PM model does not tell us how to classify a movement with materialist goals that uses new tactics. Such a movement could be classified as an 'old' NSM. Contemporary French politics may well be marked by this kind of movement rather than classical NSM activity. According to Desbos and Royall (2002: 116), two principal themes mark the course of social conflicts in France since the end of the 1980s – those based on jobs, in their fullest sense of maintaining job security, and those who stressed their right to socially participate, in terms of being acknowledged by society and government and gaining the concomitant resources. The advocates for these two broad clusters occasionally went so far as to directly question the social and political order. The cases of the AIDS and anti-globalisation movements embody these two motivations, with many constituent parts in the latter striving for job security, while the entirety of the former tried to remove the stigmata of the disease and increase the range of sufferers' entitlements. These are not typical Inglehartian NSMs, in that

\[144\] www.France.grd/org/texts/cuarh1980.html
they are contemporary, but they are concerned with the question of survival. This causes problems for the PM model of NSM, and the anti-globalisation movement is the most discrepant, as the Nice Summit protests were the biggest in France since the 1995 strikes. We continue our discussion of tactics in NSMs with the unemployed advocacy movement in France in the 1980s and 1990s.

The movement had four member groups. These were the Comités de chômeurs; the Mouvement national de chômeurs et précaires (MNCP); the Association pour l’emploi, l’information et la solidarité (APEIS); and Agir ensemble contre le chômage! (AC!). The groups were set up from the 1970s through to the 1993 (AC!). The tactics deployed by the unemployed advocacy groups drew attention in France between 1982-5, when they used petitions, demonstrations, media contacts, occupation of buildings both public and private, and hunger strikes. Interestingly, although less implicated in political structures than the others, the MNCP and the AC! sought to make greater use of political contacts. In the 1990s, the use of novel actions became more sporadic – there was a flurry of activity in 1997/8, targeting the attraction of high-profile media coverage. The events ranged from occupations of unemployment offices (1997), excursions to famous restaurants (1998) and sit-ins of landmark buildings such as the elite third-level institution, the Ecole Normale Supérieure (1998); the headquarters of the PS (1998) as well as supermarket trips in the same year, where they brought attention to the fact that they could not afford to maintain themselves and their families (ibid. 93). The mix of tactics is testament to the unemployed’s disaffection with standard channels of representation and thus tactically, marks these groups out as NSMs. Inglehart does
not explain whether or not a group primarily driven by an old politics concern but deploying new tactics is a postmaterialist phenomenon.\footnote{The inverse also applies.}

We may now test to see if there is a qualitative difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ periods in France. If Inglehart is correct, we should find that post-1968 France is more marked by unconventional activity than pre-1968 France. Lane and Ersson (2003) assess the relative stability of Fourth and Fifth Republic France and describe the protest levels in both periods. They rely on a study of 12 nations (eleven European and the USA), and report an above-average ranking in inclination to protest for post-war France as a whole. Specifically, the French rank fourth on the list of lawful demonstrations and second in readiness to occupy buildings. Their overall figures are given in Table 7.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>V:1</th>
<th>V:2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-government</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General strikes</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work days lost</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 7.1: Comparing the fractiousness of the Fourth and Fifth Republics; after Lane and Ersson, 2003: 124}\footnote{Definitions found in Lane and Ersson, 2003: 133. V1 refers to the period 1958-74.}

Chronologically, only on one of the four measures (anti-government demonstrations) does the Fifth Republic outstrip the Fourth in terms of protest. The new era of French politics is not as disrupted as the old. Cross-nationally, for a country that according to Waters and Touraine, has an entire class of movements particular to it (the second wave of NSMs), France is surprisingly quiescent. Therefore, Inglehart’s argument that contemporary politics is less conventional in
how it expresses itself is deficient in that there is no indication that there are progressively more incidents where unconventional tactics are used.

7.3.3.1: Summary of issues and tactics of NSMs

His model is inadequate in accounting for movements driven by materialist goals, such as some anti-globalisation groups and the unemployed advocacy movement. PM performs better on one aspect of the question of tactics, as the width of the tactical repertoire increased, but does not do well on its prediction that contemporary France should have more instances of unconventional political activity. Inglehart fails to point to any record that can prove that, numerically, France post-1968 is more ‘unconventional’ than France pre-1968. As a result, H₄ is only partly supported.

7.3.2: The profile of an NSM supporter/activist

There is simply not enough information for us to build a profile of the typical member of the any individual NSM. There are no systematic data on the demographics of NSM activists in France. For want of anything better, we focus on Inglehart’s own datasets which examine the entirety of NSM-type activity. The values aspect is key here – NSM activists in general should be postmaterialist as measured by surveys. In Table 7.2, we reproduce the original 1986 data collected by Inglehart:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Ecology movement</th>
<th>Anti-nuclear</th>
<th>Anti-war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialist</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: EC 12 sample in April 1986 of percentage membership or likelihood of a respondent becoming a member of any or all of the ecology, anti-nuclear power and anti-war movements. After Inglehart, 1990: 53.

The pattern supports Inglehart’s claims – postmaterialists are much more likely to either support or be a member of an NSM.

7.3.3: Has the relative impact of NSMs increased over time?

As with the preceding section on the values profile of NSM supporters/activists, we do not focus solely on the women’s movement and unemployed advocacy groups, but broaden our account to give an insight into how NSMs have affected French politics. We can operationalise this in two ways – their ability to affect change at the legislative level through applying pressure on the government and the number of activists the movements attracted and retained. In the latter, as we lack high quality data on membership, we are obliged to use more oblique indicators such as the durability of the movements and their capacity to mobilise large-scale events.

For the women’s movement, the political record is supportive of the claim that they became increasingly important in French legislation, but not electoral politics. From 1974-86 and 1988-93, ministries for women’s rights were in existence, a signal indicator of how effective the main women’s movements, MLF and Choisir, had been. Choisir also helped secure a change in the abortion law in 1974. After Chirac’s victory in 1986, feminist bodies that had been subsidised by the Ministry of Women’s Rights had their funding cut (Keeler and Hall, 2001: 60). The personalities
associated with the women’s movement in France may partly explain its inability to entrench itself in the political system there. Its protagonists were disproportionately composed of literary critics, academics and psychoanalysts (Hirsh, 1981: 219). These are hardly representative of women generally in France and so may well have come across as removed from the average French citizen, male or female.

The overall judgment given by Mazur (1995) is that the movement has not gained a proportionate say in national politics. She states that the women’s movement has not made significant advances on women’s conditions and quality of life in France for three main reasons – there was no clear programme after abortion reform; the groups could not present a united front; and it is argued that there cultural resistance to feminism, something which is hard to test. More recently, though, the global goal of having more women involved in politics was addressed by the PS, who rolled out the gender parity law.

For groups with limited, specific goals, the picture is one of eventual success, albeit in terms of legal modifications rather than sweeping changes to the status of the groups involved. The combined efforts of the unemployed representative groups contributed to the modification of financial assistance laws in 1998 and 1999 and also to the eventual shape of anti-social exclusion policy of 1998 (Royall, 2000: 97). In early 1998, unemployed organisations protested in 78 departments. A billion francs of additional aid was given (Keeler and Hall, 2001: 64). The movement of the unemployed succeeded on two fronts - getting limited material concessions from the state and some policy input. The gay rights movement which gained two notable successes – repeal of the criminal status of homosexual acts and in contributing to the eventual PACS legislation. The PACS legislation\textsuperscript{147} first proposed in 1998 was

\textsuperscript{147} See Chapter Six of this thesis.
partially moulded by lobbying from the movement. However, the gay rights movement was not successful on other fronts in the 1980s and up to the mid-1990s that hampered its efforts to exert influence. The PS did not offer state aid to CUARH, unlike say, the women’s movement, and so it found itself with meagre backing and dissolved (ibid: 69). The PS went on to found its own division, Homosexualité et Socialisme, in 1983, thus undermining the existing gay rights groups. The inability of the remaining ‘independent’ groups to effect change led to the setting up of more confrontational groups such as Act Up. This, though, had the concomitant problem of alienating support from moderates. Duyvendak’s view (op. cit: 193) is that the government was cool about consulting with the two main bodies and the satellite gay rights advocacy movement as the groups did not act in a unified way.

There was a more positive outcome for the sans-papiers movement, which succeeded in getting Jospin to set up the Weil commission to look at immigration and the regularisation of illegally residing foreigners in France (Wihtol de Wenden, 2002). Large numbers of them were granted legal residence, but the movement’s more enduring achievement was to set the parameters for a debate on French identity, citizenship, and the human effects of globalisation.

On legislation, we see that NSM activity has had some keynote successes. They have not been as successful, though, at promoting their issues to the status of having an impact at elections – the women’s movement is the best illustration. It was a different story, though, when the women’s movement tried to expand its sphere of influence in to elections. In the 1978 general election, Choisir, an offshoot of the ‘343’ group,148 jointly contested constituencies with the PSU, but performed at floor

148 Simone de Beauvoir was a signatory to the Manifesto of the 343, and was also head of both Choisir and the Ligue du droit des femmes.
level and won no seats. There are two reasons given for why NSMs were on the whole unable to translate their grassroots support into a greater number of tangible political outcomes; both are institutional. According to Hirsh (1981: 209), a political vacuum occurred with the collapse of the united left policy at the 1978 legislatives. The gap from 1978-1981, when the PS gained control of both parliament and the presidency, was there to be filled by any bloc that could mobilise significant left-wing support. This explains the timing of the emergence of the NSMs. From 1981 onwards, though, the PS was in a position to attempt to co-opt any major offshoot. Such a process is best illustrated by the case of SOS-Racisme, a group which came to be ‘allied’ to the PS. It was effectively co-opted into the PS as it was secretly funded and generally aided by Mitterrand’s office. The established left saw how they could use the cachet SOS-Racisme had with disaffected groups of young and black voters.

The second reason is based on a reading Waters’ (1998) outline of French NSM structures. She writes that many of the groups resembled ‘flash’ organisations, appearing and disappearing suddenly and without trace. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that such ephemeral organisations were unlikely to have a durable and significant impact at the polls or on legislation.

In terms of mobilising people, the picture is again a mixed one – the use of protest tactics increased for a substantial part of the period, but the causes were not postmaterialist. From 1975-89, more participants were involved in racist-based demos than any other (44 per cent), with the ecology movement being the next most significant (at 14 per cent) (Duyvendak, 1995: 103). Comparative analysis indicates that protest politics in France in the main were not due to NSM-type action. The most cited study is Kriesi et al.’s tabulation of per capita rates for unconventional
political activity in four European states (1995); they take the 15-year period in West Germany, Holland, France and Switzerland between 1975 and 1989. Numbers involved in unconventional protest are small by international standards (see Duyvendak, 1995: 103). France was the least affected by NSMs of the four: only 36.1 per cent of any protests in France had NSM influences, whereas the figures were 61 per cent in Switzerland, 65.4 per cent in Holland, and 73.2 in West Germany. Koopmans (1996) extended the number of cases, adding Britain and Spain. Here, Spain is the country with the lowest proportion of NSM protest, with Britain and France second- and third from bottom respectively. Duyvendak devotes a considerable amount of space to the further analysis of this database, and finds that France is first overall for protest on more traditional groups (my italics); it has the highest incidence of education-, racist-, trade union- and farmer- based disputes. In addition, the disputes were more likely to entail injury and serious unrest, with France finishing top of the list for ‘heavy violence’ in percentage terms (Duyvendak, 1995: 65, 101).

7.3.3.1: Summary of the impact of NSMs

In terms of legislative outcomes, NSMs have had a reasonable effect, but not at all when it comes to turning their goals into electorally-important ones. Although the numbers of people involved in protest pick up in the 1990s, it would be disingenuous to claim that they did so in support of postmaterialist causes. H₄ is partly supported.
7.3.4: Summary of the evidence for France

In terms of the scholarly literature, the late 1980s onwards appears as a period when new groups fought for legitimacy by means of high-profile actions. Overall, the number and range of the groups detailed that emerged in the 1980s give credence to Inglehart's argument that new politics organisations are more characteristic of the period post-1968. However, his case is weakened in that he does not present any data to show that pre-1968 France was indeed more conventional in terms of political activity. Political protest was actually more a feature here than for contemporary France. On balance, H₄ is supported.

7.4: Ireland

Unfortunately, we do not have anything like the wealth of data, comparative or single case, that we have for France when it comes to assessing unconventional political activity in Ireland. The one noteworthy exception is Regan and Wilson's (1986) comparative paper on pressure group activity in Ireland and France, but as Inglehart simply disregards a corporatist influence in the emergence of new politics movements, it is of little use here. We automatically disqualify any events linked to the Northern Ireland question on the grounds that the nation-state problem is neither materialist nor postmaterialist. This means that protests such as the burning of the British Embassy in 1972 are omitted. Prior to the foundation of the state, extraparliamentary activity was by definition the only avenue available to the Irish who protested against the British presence.
As with France, we look for indications that groups are using a distinctively new range of tactics, and that post-1968 Ireland is more marked by unconventional activity than prior to this baseline.

The sense that a ‘modernisation’ was taking place in Irish affairs was strengthened in December 1972, when the electorate voted for two constitutional changes by referendum – the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 and the removal of the special status of the Catholic Church as referred to in the constitution. The increase in the numbers of the educated population would also serve to fuel a new trend of youth political involvement. Between 1960-2000, the secondary school retention rate increased by 70 per cent (Smith, 2002: 130). The figures for third-level are given below in Table 7.3:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,800</td>
<td>19,900</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>62,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7.3: Number of fulltime students in Ireland aged 20-24. From the Central Statistics Office, 2000: 46.*

It would seem, then, that the basic ingredients for a new type and rate of political activity were at hand; a linear increase in the proportion of the population with the technical capacity to engage in political information processing to a greater extent and a student-led series of confrontations with the authorities.

Inglehart’s fundamental claim that a shift towards protest takes place in Western Europe from the late 1960s is applicable to some ‘flashpoint’ events in Ireland. In 1970, there were marches and sit-down protests outside US embassy as President Nixon toured Ireland, voicing the people’s (mainly students) disagreement with the USA’s continued involvement in Vietnam. Also in the same year, there
were attempted blockades and marches outside Lansdowne Road in Dublin in protest at the South African rugby team’s match against Ireland. In spite of this, the record of extraparliamentary protest in Ireland is scant, and more motivated by old politics concerns than new. The anti-nuclear power movement has only been prominent for a brief period in Ireland at the end of the 1970s, when the government was less than clear as to its future energy. The largest mobilisation in Ireland in the nineteen seventies was sparked by indubitably ‘old politics’ concerns. On March 20 1979, in what was at the time the largest mobilisation of protesters since the founding of the state, 200,000 people took to the streets in protest at the punitive levels of taxation and its unequal burden of distribution.\footnote{http://www.rte.ie/tv/reelingintheyears/1979.html} This seminal protest could hardly be classified as postmaterialist either in character. In Ireland, sympathetic strike level 1972-81 as proportion of days lost was 0.1, comparable to Britain (Walsh, 1983: 21). It was unlikely that the Irish worker was going to take part in any industrial unrest that was not directly related to their own pay and conditions.

Inglehart (1977, 1990 and \textit{passim}) views the women’s movement as the exemplary NSM – a new group adopting new tactics to effect legislative change. In terms of organisational structures and tactics, the late 1960s is a key period for the emergence of second wave feminist groups (Galligan, 1998: 49). In 1968, the \textit{Irish Housewives’ Association} and the \textit{Business and Professional Women’s Club} organised a meeting of all the active women’s groups in response to a UN call for investigations into the status of women. The resulting memorandum delivered to government was the impetus for the setting up of the Commission for the Status of Women in 1970 by the Fianna Fáil in order to investigate discrimination and make policy recommendations. The Council for the Status of Women (CSW) grew out of this function, forming in
1973 (Smyth, 1993: 247). The group renamed itself the National Women's Council of Ireland (NWCT) in 1995. From 1973, the group, was quite reformist in tactics, running seminars and conferences, information and referral service, and lobbying government. It collaborated with The Women's Political Association, co-founded in 1971 by the eventual Irish President, Mary Robinson, to set up a National Women's talent bank of women willing to serve on public bodies and thus directly affect the legislative process at the top end – an entirely entréeist way of functioning which does not fit into the postmaterialist rubric.

In 1971, a more militant organisation came to public attention. The Irish Women's Liberation Movement (IWLM) used contacts in the media to gain no small measure of notoriety for its tactics, most notably in the Case of the 'Contraceptive train', which brought contraceptives illegally through customs at the border with Northern Ireland (Connolly, 1997: 556). However, a tension emerged between the more conventional groups as embodied in the shape of the CSW, and the more radical IWLM and its ilk. The lack of anything approaching a broad membership of the more radical groups led to a pronounced decline in their ability to mobilise attention (Connolly, op. cit. 557-59).

Girvin's (1996) observation on the tactics of the women's groups in the 1995 divorce referendum leads one to conclude that the tried and trusted conventional means that won out in the mid-1970s were to endure. The repertoire of press releases, conferences, lobbying TDs, and granting interviews to the media is similar to that used by the early groups of professional women to bring about changes in pay and equality (Galligan, op. cit. 50) Looking at the recurrent range of activity of women's groups, it is striking to see exactly how 'conventional' their tactics have been.
Inglehart’s account of the timeframe and political context of women’s rights simply does not square with the unfolding of women’s politics in Ireland. The Irish Women’s Suffrage and Local Government Association (IWSLGA) existed from 1876 to 1948. It succeeded in having women participate in local government by 1898. This group was preoccupied with securing an outlet for women at the local level, and unsurprisingly, more militant bodies superseded it after the turn of the century. The group maintained a role as a monitor of legislation that affected women and children and later became the Irish Housewives’ Association. The Irish Women’s Franchise League was set up in 1908 and aimed to ensure women’s suffrage was included in any pending Home Rule Bill. It also sought independence from Britain. Some time after this (1915) the Irish Women’s International League came into being. This group was preoccupied with two Inglehartian goals – the pacifist opposition to the Great War and the securing of the right to vote for women. Clearly, the suffragettes, in both motive and tactics, could not be termed old politics if one uses a postmaterialist vocabulary, yet their chronology clearly locates them in the old politics era. Interestingly, Inglehart never refers to the international suffragette movement at all, so this is not simply an Irish exception. It is true that scholars make a working distinction between first and second wave feminism, with the former subsuming the suffragette movement (Connolly, op. cit. 552), but Inglehart does not. He does not explain why the campaign for equal pay, for example, that was waged by the Commission for the Status of Women qualifies as a postmaterialist issue, when pay is ostensibly a materialist concern.

150 The data are obtained from Connolly (1997) and Smyth (1993).
There is a possible case for including the unemployed movement in Ireland as an NSM According to Royall, organisations for the unemployed had existed in Ireland as far back as the early 1950s (Royall, 2000: 87)\(^{151}\) but the INOU did not emerge until 1987. The socio-economic context of both timeframes was consistent: high unemployment leading to mass emigration. In fact, the origins of the movement go back even further and are clearly ‘old political’ in motive, as the *Irish National Unemployed Workers’ Movement* existed from 1929-30. The INUWM took up where the previous Larkin and Connolly-led worker revolts of 1913 left off, in striving for revolution. Unlike the earlier movement, the INUWM was avidly communist in its thinking and agenda.

According to Royall, the INOU shirked the use of unconventional tactics. ‘In Ireland, direct action has not been used to the same extent as in France. This is more a result of cultural differences than of a lack of organisational know-how on the part of the INOU.’ (2000: 93). The new forms of protest amounted to a rally in front of the Central Bank in 1992. Allen concurs that the leadership specifically moved away from direct action and even went so far as to actively discourage it (1998: 278-88), largely because members doubted themselves and were afraid of the state’s reaction. From 1985-93, the INOU was more likely to use seminars and their own newspapers, summer schools, pamphlets in order to convey their messages and educate their membership (Royall, 2000: 93). The INOU’s output at this time was varied – it campaigned for cheaper power and transport and greater access to retraining; issued annual pre-budget statements and specific reactions to named government initiatives (Royall, 2000: 95)

\(^{151}\) Royall (2000) and Allen (1998) are the main sources for the information on the INOU; Royall misses out entirely on the 1930s movement for the unemployed – see this chapter.
In dealing with new political tactics, one has to move forward to the 1990s when Patricia McKenna, Green Party MEP came out against the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties of 1992 and 1998.\textsuperscript{152} Her involvement had centred on the unequal aspect of government funding for one side only in referendums. The action centred on a High Court case against the state, which she won, thereby ensuring that the government had to fund the opposing camp to the same extent as the state in any further referendum campaign (\textit{Irish Times}, May 15, 1998). In a similar vein, Anthony Coughlan took a High Court case against the state broadcaster, RTE, over perceived unfairness of airtime for the opposing camp in previous referendums.\textsuperscript{153} Although these legal actions may well constitute novel tactics (Inglehart does not provide a definitive list), they are both diminished in their standing as NSM markers precisely because they were mounted by individuals. Even though Anthony Coughlan has been long identified with the anti-EEC/EC/ factions in Ireland, it is worth noting that he took that action in his own name and not of any group. Likewise, Patricia McKenna’s court case was taken when she was a Green Party MEP – neither her party nor any one NSM group was discernible in the decision to go to court.

There has been a rise in activity in Ireland with a focus on international politics. The direction of US policy towards Iraq was cited as the reason for the setting up of a peace camp outside Shannon Airport and a small group damaged a US jet there in September 2002. One other feature of the anti-US protests in 2002 was its insight into the profile of the organisers. The main spokesman for Irish Anti-War movement was Richard Boyd Barrett, a leading figure in the tiny Socialist Workers’ Party. The Peace and Neutrality Alliance shared the platform, as did a

\textsuperscript{152} See Gilland, 1999: 430-8.
Green TD, John Gormley – both these groups were involved in running the campaign opposing Ireland’s ratification of the Nice Treaty of 2001. The fringe Palestine Solidarity campaign had speakers on the platforms of many marches. This is a good fit for the new politics category. We have a fluid organisational structure behind a movement that is disproportionately attractive to younger citizens, campaigning on a non-material issue.

As we have stressed throughout, there is a need to go back further than 1968 in order to test if Inglehart is correct in affirming that old politics was conventional in its tactics and materialist in its issues. Here we find evidence of groups who are arguably identifiable with lifestyle politics, but crucially for Inglehart’s case and the fourth hypothesis in particular, they predate the lifestyle politics era.

In terms of tactics, the key point would seem to be the willingness of groups to bypass the electoral process and appeal directly to people via marches and street protests. This is not a phenomenon peculiar to the late 1960s and onwards. As far back as the 1930s, political movements sought to gain influence and gather support by organising demonstrations. A key example is the Irish Christian Front (1936-9), set up by elements within Fine Gael and the National Guard in support of Franco’s coup in Spain. It organised mass rallies across the state.

One group that does fit into Inglehart’s schedule is the Irish Sovereignty Movement. It was founded in the early 1970s in opposition to Ireland’s entry to the EEC. The EEC was interpreted as a threat to Irish neutrality and so the movement may be seen to have articulated two lifestyle goals – more say in government and international peace. However, there is nothing distinctively of a new politics nature

\[154\] This is not to say that the anti-war movement found it difficult to recruit support from older cohorts.

\[155\] The data are again obtained from the Encyclopaedia of British and Irish Political Organizations (2000).
about the Irish pacifist movement as a whole; three precursors of contemporary pacifism disconfirm Inglehart’s claim that the late 1960s was the tipping point in the emergence of new politics. The Irish Pacifist Movement emerged in 1936 and lasted until 1969. Dominated initially by Quakers, it supported the arrival of Jewish refugees and opposed any alliance between Ireland and Britain in the war. The group campaigned against conscription and organised a peace march in 1939. It adapted its focus after the war in moving on to campaign against the hydrogen bomb. The Fellowship of Reconciliation in Ireland was formed in 1949 and still in existence. Its signal goals are an anti-nuclear Europe and for peace in Northern Ireland. It held joint conferences in North and South of the island between 1950-69 with the Irish Pacifist Council. The Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was set up in the 1950s and is still in existence. It has a charitable focus (it organises the Chernobyl Children’s project) and is active against the processing of nuclear waste at Sellafield. As time has gone on, it is not at all surprising that this group uses high-profile media events and celebrity appeals to publicise their message.

Indeed, the origins of lifestyle politics may reasonably be argues to lie in the late 1920s, when Blind Men’s Party existed. It was the electoral vehicle of the Irish National Association for the Blind and embodied the concept of a ‘parallel movement’. Rucht and Neidhardt (2002: 240 define this as a group that has a loose structure approximating that of a social movement, but one that is willing to compete in elections. This category of movement allows for greater insight into contemporary Irish politics than the typical NSM / party dichotomy. Interestingly, in the late 1990s and the present day, it is the Socialist Party, and not an NSM per se that is most associated with new forms of protest activity. The Socialists are not structurally

\[156\] It unsuccessfully fought two seats at the 1927 general election.
different\textsuperscript{157} from previous class-based parties; they depend on a \textit{kadar}\textsuperscript{158} for the initial stages of policy development and are formed in geographical branches. New members are expected to familiarise themselves with both classic and contemporary Marxist-Leninist readings, and members are only admitted into the party’s formal structure having completed a ‘training period’. In the early 1990s, it led a campaign in a Dublin suburb against the paying of water rates and it has consistently been to the fore in organising meetings and marches against referendums on European integration. The party urged people to vote no in the Amsterdam Treaty if they did not want an EU army, an EU arms industry and an EU nuclear threat (Gilland, 1999: 433). The party targets young recruits by means of meetings centred on the topics of racism, low pay and rights for women, sensing that all three resonate with young, disaffected voters (interview material). It has also organised extensively against the introduction water rates and bin collection charges and led the movement against the local authority’s attempts not to introduce the charges. Their next step in this campaign was to blockade bin lorries and thus stop them from collecting unless the crews agreed to collect the bins of everyone, irrespective of whether they paid the charge or not. In September 2003, its sole TD and one of its councillors were imprisoned for one month for refusing to obey a court injunction not to interfere with the collection of rubbish. The party thus embodies the NSM concerns of anti-militarism and unresponsiveness of the state to the citizen’s needs, coupled with its class-based complaint about regressive taxation, and expressed through an ‘old politics’ organisation which frequently resorts to ‘new’ tactics. This, then, hardly amounts to an Inglehartian NSM. The Socialist Party displays a willingness to

\textsuperscript{157} The information on the Socialist Party’s structure was obtained on the basis of access to its internal regulations in its Dublin headquarters. To my mind, there is no published work in this area.

\textsuperscript{158} Named after a former Hungarian Communist leader, a \textit{kadar} is charged with giving a Marxist analysis of phenomena that Marx did not comment on or could not have foreseen.
modify its tactics as it sees fit and in this sense slots into the category of parallel movement. Its tactics support $H_4$ but not its goals.

7.4.1.1: Summary of issues and tactics in NSMs

There is a clear history of political groups which have resorted to unconventional tactics and have had non-material motives at their base; whether Inglehart’s model can successfully categorise them as postmaterialist is moot point. There is an upward shift from the early 1990s in terms of tactics deployed, but the group most associated with these is a new ‘old politics’ party, the Socialists. The hypothesis is not supported.

7.4.2: The profile of an NSM supporter/activist

We have a comparable paucity of data on the profile of Irish NSM activists as for France. Inglehart provides us with aggregate data collated on an EC-12 basis. The relevant figures for Ireland are presented in Table 7.4. This is fortuitous for us as Inglehart rarely writes anything which lends itself to testing on Ireland; at least here, though, we have usable data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ecology</th>
<th>Anti-nuclear</th>
<th>Anti-war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialist</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: EC 12 sample in April 1986 of percentage membership or likelihood of a respondent becoming a member of any or all of the ecology, anti-nuclear power and anti-war movements. After Inglehart, 1990: 53.

The trend mirrors that for France – the more postmaterialist one is, the more likely one is to endorse the goals of a new politics movement. The tendency is
impressively unidirectional; as one goes from materialist through mixed and on to postmaterialist, the likelihood of becoming a member of the aforementioned NSMs increases. This supports the hypothesis, in that prospective members and activists of NSMs are more likely to have postmaterialist values. There is one conundrum, though. Taking the samples from the other ten countries into consideration, France is third from bottom on first measure and second from bottom on other two, with Ireland middle (6th) on the first measure, second on the second and third on the third. In short, the Irish report themselves to be more ‘active’ than the French. The reader is referred back to the historiography chapter of this thesis where we note that Inglehart (1987) claims that Ireland is unlikely to be ranked high on the list of postmaterialist indicators because traditionally, it has primarily been an agricultural country. How, then, does Ireland outrank France on such a crucial indicator of postmaterialist politics as membership of and affinity to NSMs? Inglehart does not give an answer. In itself, this is not much of an error, as it would be disingenuous to expect Inglehart to explain the relationship of one state with every other on any one marker of postmaterialism. Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain away using Inglehart’s model.

7.4.3: Has the relative impact of NSMs increased over time?

The legislative record for the later women’s groups in Irish life evidently impacts on the divorce and abortion debates that animated the country throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, in addition to the changes secured in pay and employment legislation.159 To detail every piece of legislation in these and linked areas (such as contraception) would amount to a digression from the chapter’s aim. What follows is a brief

159 See Galligan, 1998, chs. 3-4, for a concise account of the workplace changes.
account of some key changes. At the 1991 Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis, the party pledged to release a white paper on divorce. FF had trenchantly remained ‘neutral’ on the question for much of the 1980s. A white paper on marital breakdown was published in September 1992. Under the terms of the 1993-7 partnership agreement, in the section dealing with women’s rights, there was a pledge to introduce sweeping changes to family law with a specific commitment to a divorce referendum in 1994. The Rainbow government programme, *A Government of Renewal*, issued in December 1994, was more radical in its plans, stressing that it would have a whole raft of legislation on taxation, inheritance rights, family law courts, protection of spouse and children from the first marriage and mediation services (Girvin, 1996: 174).

The INOU stressed how it was affecting policy – it secured more money for Community Employment programmes in 1995 and 1999, the National Agreement review on unemployment (1996) (Royall, 2000: 96). They were also involved in increasing the range of social partners to be consulted for the partnership agreements of the late 1990s onwards. Economic improvements leading to sustained falls in joblessness have clearly lessened the need for and visibility of an INOU-type body. The INOU recognised that the policy arena had changed in the 1990s, and so it devoted resources to drawing up EU policy documents. In the policy papers on the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the group criticised what it saw as the unwillingness of the European Union to take on board the concerns of the unemployed, ranging from increased minimum cash transfers to the maintenance of low interest rates to aid manufacturing industry. This shift of emphasis is noteworthy, as it indicates that the remit of the national parliament is shrinking as
sovereignty is pooled in the EU. This has some implications for NSM activity in general, and where they are likely to target their future efforts.

The women's movement is a class apart from the other lifestyle groups that fought for political space throughout the 1970s and up to the present day. What is striking is the lack of impact these assorted others had on policy-making and their seeming inability to mobilise significant numbers of people. Groups such as the Peace Alliance have two decades of protest activity behind them, dating from their protests against Reagan's policy in El Salvador, but are still very small in organisational terms or active supporters. It is arguable that a minor blip in unconventional activity is discernible in the late 1970s-early 1980s, in the form of protests against the proposed siting of a nuclear power plant at Carnsore Point in Wexford, that could have induced commentators to predict a new type of political involvement in Ireland. This, though, did not lead to a surge in protest politics generally.

The Irish Social Forum (ISF) is another case in point. It was invigorated by the anti-war demonstrations of 2002, and sets out 'to offer alternatives to the implications of corporate-led globalisation or neo-liberalism.' Interestingly in that it has a broad organisational membership but few actual activists. It lists more than 36 constituent groups, ranging from the Debt and Development Coalition to Indymedia. Although the list is large and diverse, the actual number of people regularly involved in unconventional protest would appear to be low, judging by newspaper reports and general attendance of events. It would appear quite possible that one can have many new politics organisations without attaining the participation (and maybe even awareness) of a sizable mass of the public.
7.4.3.1: Summary of the impact of NSMs

The women's movement aside, new politics groups have not succeeded in altering the political landscape. It would seem to be the case that there are not many people who campaign outside the conventional political channels. One cannot have a definitive tally of who does get involved, but it would seem fair to argue that many if not most of these groups are tiny in terms of membership and thus are hampered in any attempts to exert leverage on government policy. They do not seem to strike a chord with the public. The lack of any reliable set of performance indicators on Inglehart's part means that one has to rely on the groups' ability to raise their concerns to the prominence of an electoral issue or how they have managed to influence government through mobilisation of the public. They have been short-lived or inconsequential, or both.

7.4.4: Summary of the evidence for Ireland

On the profile of supporters of NSM-type activity, we report than Inglehart's own survey data support his hypothesis, but Inglehart's analysis does not fit the Irish case. Tactics have been and are currently mainly conventional. There is no numerical difference between Ireland 1922-1968 and Ireland 1968-2002 in the number of groups who tried to raise 'minority' concerns (for example, the rights of blind people), nor is there any clear distinction between the age of formation of a group and whether it resorted to protest politics or not. While the INOU is noteworthy for its departure from the organisational-structural norms of Irish affairs, the Socialists are illustrative of a continuing emphasis, albeit electorally small, on improving the lot of the disadvantaged. It may well be more useful to think in terms of parallel

movements rather than NSMs when it comes to Irish political groupings. \( H_4 \) is rejected.

7.5: Conclusion

The hypothesis is only partly supported, as NSMs are neither increasingly effective nor peculiar to contemporary politics in either state. There is a clear history of groups who have tried to make a breakthrough into electoral politics. On the question of attitudinal or value profiling, the only aspect which strongly supports Inglehart's hypothesis, we are confronted with a dearth of data. Inglehart's own surveys are all that we can rely on for comparative analysis. As these surveys are based on a single sampling point, it is difficult to build them up to the extent needed to give strong support to his hypothesis. There are no direct measures of value or attitudinal profile of political protesters prior to the 1970s, so nothing can be said with respect to the likelihood of a values change being responsible for a shift to unconventional protest politics. It may well be that any political activist, whether driven by or a new or old concern, has a qualitatively different set of values to a typical voter or non-voter; it is moot point whether such a differentiation must necessarily be classified as postmaterialist/ materialist.

In terms of his conceptualisation of PM's influence on unconventional political behaviour, Inglehart's case is weak in four areas. Firstly, he does not detail how new movements can emerge that are explicable under a materialist account. Diani (2000: 388) stresses the material aspect of the new movements which focus on material redistribution and citizenship rights in post-Fordist society. In this sense, the
quintessentially 'new' debate on global capitalism is just a geographical extension of this (Smith, 2001: 16).\footnote{Interestingly, Inglehart has not written on the subject of globalisation. In its tactics, it may well be new, but how new is the struggle for basic economic rights?} The French strikes\footnote{162} of 1995 were notable both for their disruption and for the diversity of support they attracted. As the strikers' slogans were ‘defence’, ‘maintenance’, protection’, it is evident that the strikes were a reaction to perceived threats to their incomes and pensions. Waters (1998) claims that the current batch of NSMs are the result of a fundamental split between the haves and the have-nots in post-industrial France and are indicative that a new interaction between citizenship and political expression is being constructed. (op. cit. 61); Hérault and Lapeyronnie (1998: 199-209) make a similar argument. The case of the Socialist Party is a good illustration of an Irish equivalent, but in parallel movement form.

Secondly, his work is patchy on what earlier forms of protest looked like and which issues motivated them - he makes no reference to the international women's suffragette movement, for example, and when it emerged; or how women came to obtain the vote after World War II and whether the debates at the time were influenced by extraparliamentary events. Doing so would shed some light on whether unconventional tactics and quality of life issues are features more reliably indicative of post-1968 France, or rather they are phenomena that have been present in French affairs for longer than this, and thus the 'old - new' dichotomy has little classificatory power. Poujadism is a case in point. By 1955, the movement claimed it had more than 200,000 members. In its aim to fight the spread new management techniques and protect small firms from predators, the poujadistes would qualify as an anti-modernist and thus a lifestyle politics party. Inglehart does not adequately differentiate between an anti-modernist and an anti-postmodernist party as a lifestyle
politics party.\textsuperscript{163} By extension, Inglehart’s model does not allow us to distinguish between José Bové and his followers (anti-postmodernist?) from Poujadism (anti-modernist?). Protest is not typically new, nor are lifestyle movements, as we note again here.

This flaw is repeated in the case of the women’s movement in Ireland. As the following demonstrates, this misunderstanding of history is not just confined to the women’s movement:

The social movements of the 1970s and 1980s are not the same as those of the 1840s or of 1900. The emergence of postmaterialist values among a substantial segment of Western publics, together with the process of cognitive mobilization, give new scope and new impetus to movements that earlier history foreshadowed only faintly.

\textit{Inglehart, 1990b: 65.}

This is questionable logic on Inglehart’s part. Is he looking for a carbon copy of the past to serve as a model for contemporary events? What events is he referring to? Would ‘the hot year’ of 1848 and its revolutions be an appropriate precursor for unconventional political protest? The same line of argument may be pursued for each of the granting of suffrage, the right to organise in a trade union, or the right to access a welfare state. The precursors of such lifestyle concerns as anti-racism, drug usage and women’s rights can be traced in the US to the first half of the 19th century.

\textsuperscript{162} See Howard (1998).

\textsuperscript{163} See Chapter Two for instances of where Inglehart’s research is concerning itself with postmodern politics.
Abolitionism emanated from the Second Great Awakening, an evangelical movement that swept across the northeast of the US and lasted from 1800-40. In addition to the Mormons, it also gave rise to the temperance and women's rights movements. In its anti-institutionalism, 'Abolitionism was a party for people who did not believe in parties...' (Menand: 2001: 13). Here, then, we have a cultural politics that vitiated the US a full century prior to Inglehart's proposed starting point.

Thirdly, Inglehart does not specify which aspects of the study of NSMs are explicable and relevant to postmaterialism and which are not; as a result, his work often suffers from the same criticisms that have been levelled against NSMs. The strongest of these is that many of the defining features of NSM theory are not new at all.164 His postmaterialist model is built on the basis that cultural or lifestyle politics is superseding material politics. This is worth examining from its first principles. In a laconic summary, Martin proposes that both NSMs and the study of same have switched focus from large citizenship rights struggles on to the 'analysis of symbolic challenges, collective identity and cultural politics' (Martin, 2002: 74). This raises more questions than it answers on the general notion of NSMs, irrespective of the country concerned. Touraine (2002: 92) observes that during the 1980s, the typical NSMs were also quite Marxist or even Leninist in their influences; the moot question is how postmaterialist can these philosophies be? Similarly to Inglehart, Nash (2001: 89-90) argues that 'the conflicts in which social movements engage are always, at the most general level, conflicts over cultural meanings'. Whilst impressive in terms of rhetoric, such an analysis is weak; how 'general' is this level and is an economically-driven struggle not also one imbued with cultural meaning? The latter point bears on the case of the organisations of the unemployed. By

164 See Martin, 2002: 81.
definition, they can hardly be vehicles for the educated affluent to express their sense of disaffection with the quality of democracy in a state.

Fourthly, Inglehart's model is not very useful for explaining how existing institutions affect the development of movements. This becomes important when one notes that Inglehart does not invoke the degree of corporatism or division of powers in order to contextualise the emergence, growth and activity of NSMs. In reading Rucht and Neidhardt, we can see how damaging an oversight this is:

...we consider it improbable that the relations between these factors and their effects on social movements can be expressed as linear functions (the more x, the more y). Rather, we often find curvilinear relationships; for example, high responsiveness as well as high intransigence or repression by political elites make the emergence of protest movements unlikely, while mediate or mixed responses tend to promote movements, as demonstrated by Eisinger (1973), Koopmans (1993) and others.

_Rucht and Neidhardt, 2002: 13._

Rucht and Neidhardt acknowledge a growing prominence of NSMs but do not reckon that this presages a new type of politics in general. They doubt that new politics movements will usurp parties in office-holding or vote-winning functions (ibid: 21). Their reasoning is illuminating, not just because Inglehart does not mention any associated material in his arguments. In their view, parties have to absorb new and important issues without alienating voters while also keeping their hierarchical structure. This causes tension. For these two reasons, it is difficult for
movements to be absorbed into parties (ibid: 23) and for the movement's original goals to be kept. A high degree of co-opting, as was the policy of the PS with the gay rights and anti-racist movements, serves to take the wind out of the sails of much NSM activity. Rucht and Neidhardt also comment on the likely emergence of hybrid or parallel organisations – movement-parties, but are quite modest in their prediction of how effective NSMs will go on to become:

But it is impossible to predict whether such actors will actually appear and become effective. In light of these crucial dimensions of action, any efforts at prediction will remain mere speculation, except for the prediction that there will be social movements and protest.

_Ibid: 24._

Precisely because their prediction is much more modest and is backed up by a clear modelling of the state-level factors implicated in the emergence of NSMs, Rucht and Neidhart’s work is much more insightful and scientific than Inglehart’s.

Overall, then, it is creditable to take Inglehart’s model and note the diversity of issues that new, relatively loosely-structured organisations bring to politics. Inglehart may well be on solid ground when he claims that NSM activists are disproportionately postmaterialist, but the electoral and legislative implications of such a linkage must remain conjectural.

With the end of this chapter, we have completed our empirical testing of PM. In our concluding chapter, we recapitulate the findings and what they tell us about PM, and outline possible future lines of research.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis adopted a small-n comparative cases approach in order to test Inglehart’s model of PM. Previous studies had mainly tested PM only indirectly, and even then, only on a large-n basis. There was a complete absence of small-n comparative work. No We thematically documented his work, collated existing criticisms, and added new points that questioned the theoretical basis of his model. Four hypotheses were derived from his work and formed the basis of the empirical testing of PM. We then used a mixed most / least different cases methodology to result in our selection of France and Ireland as comparators. Both cases were assessed separately from 1968-2002 on each of the four hypotheses. If Inglehart’s PM is correct, we would have expected to see support for the following hypotheses – that there has been a weakening of the class – vote link; that voter disaffection has grown; that there are more postmaterialist parties that are electorally successful, and that there is an increased prominence of NSM-type activity that is driven by PM. If the evidence does not support PM, then we may reject the model for the cases in the thesis, but not disconfirm it in general.

This concluding chapter is laid out in four parts. In Part One, we return to our findings for each hypothesis and give a final assessment of how the evidence squares with PM. Part Two is concerned with how well PM explains key areas in contemporary politics, while Part Three looks at what Inglehart’s model tells us about attempts by political science to explain the notion of value shift. We highlight some possible areas for further research by other scholars in Part Four. Let us now begin by looking again at our findings.
8.1: What this thesis tells us about PM

We recapitulate the findings in Table 8.1; as may be seen from the table below, Inglehart’s model is only partly supported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>supported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_1$: Drop in class voting</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_2$: Growing disaffection</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_3$: Greater role for new parties</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_4$: Increase in NSM activity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1: Summary of how each hypothesis performed in the cases of Ireland and France.

Only one hypothesis, ‘growing disaffection’, is accepted in both cases. The first hypothesis is rejected outright in both cases, while the balance for the third and fourth hypotheses leads us to reject the third and accept the fourth with reservation. Let us now again briefly summarise our findings for each of the four hypotheses, offering judgments in each instance on Inglehart’s model.

On class voting, we can still use standard socio-economic classifications to predict who votes for the right in France; this works less well for the PS, but the public sector salariat seems to be solidly PS. Votes of the marginalized have been increasingly moving to the far right. The situation is considerably different for Ireland, as there have never been very high levels of class voting to begin with.
Again, though, there are tendencies, notably for the middle classes to support the right of centre parties. The very fact that Irish voting patterns have not been strongly structured by class does not mean that Inglehart’s model cannot be tested in this state; we have no indication that the situation is becoming even more fluid or classless, though, which is what Inglehart’s case would need. To assert that traditional industries have been in decline and so the traditional form of class voting has also declined is to leave out the question as to what we may know about the political preferences of the disadvantaged in contemporary societies. Moreover, the rise of the tertiary sector does not make the job of predicting how service workers will vote any easier, as Wilensky (2002:190) writes:

“Services” embrace a computer scientist and an urban dog walker; the full-time, stably employed office supervisor in the headquarters of a drugstore chain and a part-time temporary worker at the checkout counter in the supermarket whose wages place him or her among the working poor; a high-tech consultant in a firm selling software for financial managers and a no-tech salesperson in a local dress shop ... In practically every routine of life that is important to people ... these pairs are in different worlds.

It is probable that Inglehart has continuously overestimated the strength of the link between class and vote in the past, and he does not cite the requisite data to support his case. Another problem was his crude use of the Alford Index, when methods in political science have long since moved on from it.
Inglehart's model performs best on voter disaffection, but even here, there is a significant problem. On perhaps the single most important element, turnout, Inglehart's hypothesis is untenable: turnout has not risen where postmaterialist parties have contested elections. Important implications flow from this shortcoming. Interestingly, the most disadvantaged are the least likely to vote, which could be a variant of class voting. His model is very strong on another aspect of disaffection, party membership, and this leads us to conclude that the role of the party is in doubt as a structure that can draw on its supporters for continued behind-the-scenes activities. Party loyalty has followed Inglehart's downward prediction, but volatility figures have not served to indicate that one party or group of parties is benefiting at the expense of others. This suggests that there is a functional partisan attachment at election time; again, illustrating that the party is progressively less effective in bringing like-minded people together.

New politics is an empty concept without new parties; the most noteworthy aspect of the parties studied in Chapter six is their collective inability to entrench themselves in the choices of voters and in cabinet seats. The PS is evidently exempt from this assessment, but of the five parties presented, it is the most atypical 'new party'. It followed a hierarchical structure, formed alliances with the PCF where necessary, has periodically resorted to 'old' Keynesian policies, both in its manifestos and in office. Of course, elements of renewal must be detectable in all established parties, or else they fail. Where it has manoeuvred itself to take account of new political currents, it has often done so by means of co-opting leftist offshoots, most clearly in the cases of SOS-Racisme and Homosexualité et Socialisme. One point that cannot be resolved in this thesis is to judge how many new policies must a party have and in which areas in order for it to be classified as a new politics party.
For although the PS introduced a raft of quality of life measures from 1997-2002, we saw that its unceasing targets were the economy and law and order. The Greens are *ipso facto* 'new politics', but have not succeeded in pushing quality of life issues up to, say, the top three issues in deciding elections. Inglehart has remained silent since the late 1970s on the disappearance of his exemplary new politics party, the PSU; its Irish 'homologue' DL, lasted for an even shorter period, but at least held office. Strikingly, there have been very few new parties over time, postmaterialist or otherwise, in both Ireland and France. It is apparent that Inglehart’s model falls down in that he does not consider how the institutional matrix which can help or hinder new party formation and consolidation. For example, the demands people place on parties and the shape of their political wants are affected by what Duverger (1951) called the mechanical and psychological laws. Inglehart addresses the psychological side inadequately, and the mechanical side not at all. This latter oversight goes some way to explaining why he does not modify his model to take account of how the referendum device can serve as a pressure valve for non-materialist concerns, thus insulating parties against any fall-out at first-order elections. Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s illustrates this principle perfectly.

In the case of NSMs, Inglehart’s hypothesis is, on balance, supported by France, where there has been a widening in the range of groups who press for legislative change via unconventional tactics. What he fails to include, however, is that clear examples of NSM-type activity have long been a feature of French politics, even if academics had not by then invented this category of political actor. Perhaps surprisingly, Ireland has probably been a case where there was a richer tradition of unconventional activity than in the present; consequently, Inglehart’s hypothesis was rejected here. It is apparent that Irish NSMs have fared very badly in terms of
mobilising a reasonably durable support base. Regarding the profile of the NSMs activist, the scene is a mixed one for Inglehart. Using his own method and data, we find some support for the claim that NSMs activists are younger than the average and also more liberal. However, we simply do not know the value profile of protesters from the ‘old politics’ period, and what little we do know is usually in the more qualitative shape of diaries and biographies, not survey data. One confounding factor is that probably all politically-active people have been ‘different’ from the typical person; would Inglehart argue that these were always and everywhere precursors of postmaterialist citizens?

**8.2: What this thesis tells us about PM in Politics**

Inglehart’s work is of prime importance to us as a way of understanding political change. He makes grand claims about the political world – how it has changed and how it will change. Ultimately, his work has pressing implications for politics, both as an activity in its descriptive side, and as a science in its attempts to arrive at an overarching cause. It is for these reasons that we tested Inglehart in a comparative political science context, and not as a survey artefact. We may now draw some final points as to the implications of PM for (a) understanding contemporary politics and (b) understanding how political science tries to incorporate the factor of the individual citizen in explaining political contemporary politics. We deal with (a) here and (b) in the next section.

Overall, it appears that Inglehart’s work is applicable to some degree at the individual level, but not at the system level, when we try to understand contemporary politics. It is in his handling of parties and polities that Inglehart’s work is most flawed. Two general points are made here to illustrate the problematic
nature of Inglehart's rationale of PM. The first concerns the impact of a new politics realignment, while the second questions the assumptions inherent in Inglehart's writings about the nature of old politics.

Firstly, Inglehart claims that dealignment has occurred and that an incremental realignment is ongoing (1971, 1977, 1992, 1994, 1995). In The Silent Revolution, Inglehart is quite precise that McGovern's defeat in the 1972 US Presidential election was on a scale that suggested realignment had occurred in that country. Running counter to this, Niemi and Weisberg (1993) base their understanding of political realignment on historical US cases and conclude that there have been one plausible and three undoubted contenders for such upheavals. Realignments occurred (less certainly) in 1828, 1860, 1896 and 1932. This pattern 'suggests a striking periodicity of 32-36 years. Simple extrapolation led researchers to expect a realignment in the 1960s' (op. cit. 321). Similarly, Mayhew's work on political realignment in the US takes great pains to differentiate between democratic systems on numerous dimensions: key elections versus key election periods; sea-changes in policymaking; and the periodicity of realignments, among others things. In all, he documents eleven distinguishing features of realignments (Mayhew, 2000: 452-456), leaving the reader with an entirely different conception of realignment than Inglehart's. Mayhew concludes that the American body of realignment literature, the strongest in the field, 'do[es] not hold up well, and the genre's illuminative power has not proven to be great. At an analytic level, the genre has proven vulnerable to at least three counterposing ideas: contingency, strategy, and valence issues' (op. c it., 471). This negative conclusion is of prime relevance, as Inglehart (and Abramson, 1972; 1977, Chapter Ten and passim) builds his realignment case on the notion that the US was undergoing such a change in the
1960s and early 1970s. He relies on specific elections, most notably the 1972 US presidential contest, without admitting, as Mayhew does, that each election is accompanied by election-specific factors. The realignment concept that Inglehart refers to throughout has rarely been identified in Europe and is really an American idea.

In fact, it is arguable that Inglehart’s notion of a politics increasingly structured on a clash between orthogonal value systems is probably more tenable in the US than in Europe, and that he has been subtly influenced by trends in US affairs that have skewed his extrapolations from European survey data. Alan Ware has written of a battle that has been occurring within the Republican Party since the late 1970s that pits Moralists against Civicists. He goes on to comment that this is itself the recasting of clash between ‘pieticals’ and liturgicals’ in the 1890s (1998: 367), where literal religious values were the divisive issue. The diversity of politically-active groups within the two US parties leads me to conclude that Inglehart’s model may work better there than in Europe. An incomplete set of issues which divide Americans along values dimensions would include those groups on both sides of the following issues: abortion; gun law reform; affirmative action; the death penalty, and stem cell research. There are few similar debates of equivalent magnitude in Europe.

Secondly, Inglehart has an idiosyncratic view of the old left and materialist politics. Sassoon (1997: 670-4 and 730-778) proffers an entirely different view of how materialist politics have been articulated and their place in the world today. He contends that the assumption that there was a monolithic, class-antagonistic left, exclusively able to draw on the votes of the working class, is erroneous. The left would have been in power all over Europe in the 1930s, when poverty was at its height and class divisions were accepted as being stronger than now. In fact, the left
was out of power in many European states and Alford-style class voting was not a given. Worldwide, the left has always been interested in more than just ‘survivalist’ concerns, and has more consistently been in favour of universal suffrage; women’s liberation; equal pay; minority rights; ceding a degree of sovereignty to international organizations; and pacifism. Most of these issues are historically distant, yet Inglehart’s model has to deem them as ‘new’. The left-wing share of the vote has been stubbornly consistent since 1945. From the above, Sassoon argues it is a trivial truth to proposes that politics changes, for no-one could claim it has ever been impervious to time and events. Issue bases change and parties survive by co-opting them; the militarism of the pre-1914 social democratic left contrasts with the pacifism of the mid- to late-1930s social democratic left. Sassoon keenly underlines how parties must co-opt new important groups and issues; but one does not need a time-bound, culture-specific theory like PM in order to understand this imperative.

Moreover, Inglehart’s model does not tell us how dominant new politics can be and whether it can eventually overtake the old issues at first-order elections. There may well be more diverse issues that break through to public consciousness as time goes by, but that is not the same as arguing that they will have durable effects at either the legislative or the psephological level. As party theorists have invariably pointed out, the political party is necessarily a broad church – the idea of winning and retaining power on the back of a set of lifestyle issues seems misguided. The voters’ focus on material concerns is traced in a more contemporary setting by Chappell and Gonçalves-Veiga (2000). In their large database, based on national economic performance and 136 election outcomes in 13 Western Europe states from 1960-97, they sum up that inflation is the most important variable in
explaining the incumbent's vote share\textsuperscript{165}; interestingly, this is heightened when the voter compares their nation's fiscal management with the prevailing European average. It is apparent that political parties have always prospered or fallen in terms of their handling of the macroeconomy and not lifestyles; strikingly, this is an argument that Inglehart never addresses throughout his work. These political priorities (sound money and a reliable safety net) are not new - they are as old as the franchise. Lloyd George's 1909 budget is deemed epochal (Jenkins, 1998) precisely because it expressed a popular concern about the lack of state-backed provision and progressiveness in taxation. The rational response of political elites to this continuous public demand for a well-managed economy is to keep focusing on old politics. All of the EU polities have found it expedient to maintain fiscal prudence in conjunction with widespread protection against the social ills of unemployment and its corollaries\textsuperscript{166}. Politicians (quite rightly, affirms Castles) reckon that an electorate left exposed to hardship will desert them, as will an electorate tied to a worthless currency. Survivalism would appear to be alive and well, or as Pierson's assessment of the 1974-90 period puts it:

\textsuperscript{165} The incumbent is punished for being on watch when inflation rose higher than for comparable cases. The obverse - reward for being in charge when inflation has been perceived to be low - is dramatically less prevalent.

\textsuperscript{166} See Crouch (1999: 482-487) for data on the scale of increased social provision as a function of GDP from 1960-1995.
...economic, political, and social pressures have fostered an image of welfare states under siege...if one turns from abstract discussions of social transformation to an examination of actual policy, it becomes difficult to sustain the proposition that these strains have generated fundamental shifts.


Inglehart’s rhetoric of the end of the mid-century compromise does not square with the evidence. All things being equal, citizens are more likely to attend to quality of life concerns when the economic side of things is going well; this is probably most true for Inglehart at a cultural level of politics, where respondents from the world’s poorest states score lowest on the PMI. The body of work on sociotropic versus pocketbook voting suggests that a similar process operates for individuals, but not to the same extent. Unfortunately for Inglehart, there is a clear lifecycle effect, with sociotropic liberalism falling off as one ages and family welfare comes to the fore (cf. Renwick Monroe, Hankin and Bukovchik Van Vechten, 2000; and Roberts and delVecchio, 2000).

Where Inglehart may well be on track is in his tracing of what Bennett (1998) terms changing *civicism*; people’s views of what they expect their public sphere to contain may well have shifted from the views of people socialised in earlier times. This point is made by Lance Bennett (1998), who comments that people are still concerned about ‘public’ matters ranging from the content of their children’s education to pension benefits, and a more personalised view of how taxation and spending affects them. If party politics is less compelling (whatever this may mean) now than 45 years ago, it may well be that this waning is due to a diffusion of power.
Bennett refers to Pool (1983) and Putnam (1995), who both affirm that people view national legislatures as comparatively shrunken in their remit. In this way, Inglehart would appear to be accurately predicting a shift in the lessening importance of nation-state level issues among citizens. Rucht and Neidhardt (2002) refer to the globalization of the economy and culture, the latter more driven by the media, leading to a weakening of state autonomy and its symbols. The immigrant problem is an exemplary outcome. Identity formation requirements are rarely sated by the mishmash of a global identity and so the individual is obliged to think about constructing their own identity (Beck, 1983: 58). The postmaterialist badge may well be one of these identities, but we do not have any high-quality instruments to depict identities. Disappointingly, Inglehart is, as noted earlier, empirically silent on globalisation.

8.3 What this thesis tells us about PM as Political Science

At its heart, PM is an attempt by a political scientist to understand the links between values and political actions. Political science has long incorporated psychology, whether in the shape of rational voter or the prisoner's dilemma. It is curious, though, that political science rarely incorporates current, ecologically valid psychology research into its models (Kuklinski, 2001). Inglehart's willingness to bring in classic psychology theory is laudable, but his unwillingness to update PM as a result of more recent psychological findings is not. In reading the full range of works on PM, we are no nearer understanding how values are refracted through attitudes, and then link up with observable behaviour.
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It is interesting that the strongest criticism of Inglehart’s methods is to be found for his surveys. He relies on these excessively, and it is plainly wrong to stay within the confines of running, re-running and re-examining survey data. Inglehart has made sweeping claims about the political consequences of value change, but does not ground them with rigorous case studies. This may well be due to the level that Inglehart’s work is supposed to operate on. As a general theory of western politics, PM is always likely to be susceptible when it comes to detail over grand design. It is surprising that no consistent body of work has previously tried to trace the results of the ‘postmaterialist shift’.

On balance, this test of Inglehart’s model brings to mind Lewis-Beck and Eulau’s (unrelated) comment of ‘a good hypothesis facing resistant data’ (1985: 4). Inglehart’s model is both durable and widely invoked. It offers a simple bifactorial explanation - cognitive mobilisation and generational replacement - for a whole raft of political phenomena. Modelling value shift and its associated political developments is a harder task than straightforward survey research would have us believe. It is wrong to carry out recursive research, that is, where we assume that PM is gathering pace because the measure we use to assess PM tends slightly upwards. Instead, political science would be better served by looking at the mediating factors between values, attitudes and behaviours, and try to take account of the meaning people attach to specific political acts. For example, one reason why European voters may attach reduced significance to fiscal policy may be because parties recognize that a national parliament no longer has oversight of this area. This attitude may be implicitly picked up by voters, and it is therefore not surprising that inflation, for example, would drop down the list of priorities. This is not due to PM, but rather due to voters recognising where they can and cannot influence policy. On the basis of the
test carried out in this thesis, we may conclude that the political implications of value change need to be traced much more thoroughly than Inglehart has done. In the last section, we outline possible directions for further research.

**8.4: Suggested research directions**

Although Inglehart's list of publications is impressively long, it should not intimidate researchers from tacking its implications. As we stressed throughout Chapter Two, his work entails repetition of two basic concepts — the socialisation and scarcity hypotheses.

There are three main ways in which we can add to the knowledge of the link between political values and political change. The first is to strengthen the survey method by adopting a longitudinal design to support his cross-sectional one, and moving to regular updates of a PMI-type instrument would enable us to keep the stimuli topical and meaningful. This would allow us to see if people's expressed preferences are indeed affected by the stage of life they are at and their current political context. Such an approach would enable us to judge the relative merits of Inglehart's early socialisation hypothesis against that of the lifecycle effect. The latter has been extensively looked at in psychology, but not by political scientists.

The second suggested procedure is to run a quasi-experiment or a series of them. Political scientists have not been very willing to test their models in this way, but Inglehart's work on preferences could be tested by using a ranking assessment in a citizens' jury exercise, for example (cf. Kinder and Palfrey, 1993, for a set of chapters that justify and demonstrate experiments in political science).

167 See Brady (2000) for a strong case for these modifications for much survey work in political science.
The third suggestion is the most complicated. Although the model may perform better in predicting individual political attitudes, this is not the same as arguing that attitudinal change in the person necessarily results in a system-level change to new politics. It would be desirable to design a method that lends itself to regression modelling of how short-, medium- and long-term new politics goals interact with the political structure of the state in which the citizen lives. Ultimately, we need some figures that would allow us to estimate timeframes and likely prominence of new politics phenomena, and such an exercise can only be speculative without regression modelling.
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