Sourcing and Framing the 'War on Terror'.
A Study of Attribution in Elite Newspaper Coverage.

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

The 'war on terror', described as the most important framing case of our time, is analysed in this study of elite newspaper coverage primarily in terms of the 'attribution of responsibility' for specific terrorist attacks. This is justified by the role of attribution in terms of 'primary definition', the exertion of political power in the text, and the constitutive role of attribution in public opinion formation. In addition to an analysis of how the coverage 'framed' attribution, the study also attempts to speak to the validity or otherwise of the 'mythical metanarrative' interpretation of the 'war on terror'. The study proceeds to analyse the nature of news sources drawn upon in the coverage, most specifically again with respect to the construction of attribution. The latter necessitates the creation of a novel coding scheme to distinguish the specific nature of attributive 'contributions' by various news sources, and in this manner it is hoped to explicate the nature of the ‘discursive regime’ employed which specified who could speak, what they could speak about, and in what circumstances. The three case studies chosen for analysis are the Bali attacks of 2002, the London attacks of 2005 and the Mumbai attacks of 2006, as reported in the first seven days by The Sydney Morning Herald, The Times of London, The Times of India and The New York Times. The study concludes with the presentation of an explanatory framework that situates the most significant factors influencing newspaper coverage at the ideological, political and media routine levels, before constructing an evaluative framework that judges the coverage by three commonly accepted standards of normative journalistic performance. Finally, a new ‘contingent model’ of primary definition is proposed.
DEDICATION

To my parents.
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First, I would like to thank my two supervisors, Professor Farrel Corcorcan and Dr. Kevin Rafter. I could not have been more fortunate in either instance.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 The War on Terror.

On September 11 2001, almost three thousand people died in the spectacular terrorist attacks on the United States. Putting that total in perspective, during the entire twentieth century, no more than 14 terrorist attacks had occasioned more than 100 fatalities and prior to September 2001, no terrorist attack had ever killed more than five hundred people\(^1\) (Jenkins 2001). While responsibility for terrorist attacks had been attributed to Islamic fundamentalists prior to 9/11, the concept of a 'war on terror' did not emerge until the weeks after 9/11. Since that time, the 'war on terror' has become one of the most analysed phenomena in political communication during the first decade of this century. Indeed, this is perhaps unsurprising given its prominence and impact on domestic and international politics during that time. It has increasingly been regarded as 'the new ordering principle of international relations' (Archetti 2004) and initially seemed to validate Huntington’s thesis first expounded in the early 1990's which talked of a 'Clash of Civilisations' (1992). As a heuristic to illustrate the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on global politics during the first decade of the twentieth century, it has been recently shown elsewhere (Stack 2012) that the rhetorical device ‘war on terror’ was applied in three broad contexts of newspaper coverage between 2001 and 2008. First, as a co-option device to bring previously disparate issues under its rubric; second, as a strategic ideological justification for the prosecution of the Iraq war and the contestation of the 2004 US Presidential election; and third, as a rationale for significant departures from previous policy norms in the areas of law, privacy, torture and rendition.

\(^1\) The largest being the 440 fatalities when a fire was set by terrorists in a movie theatre in Iran in 1978.
While the majority of studies of the ‘war on terror’ have taken the legitimacy of the phenomenon for granted before proceeding to analyse some aspect of it, often in terms of the discourse involved or notions of the ‘other’; this study, in contrast, by analysing the coverage of three high profile terrorist attacks in four of the leading elite global newspapers, attempts, in the last instance, to speak to the legitimacy of the concept. Paul Krugman has noted how ‘wonderful’ the war on terror is from a neocon point of view as ‘nobody from the outside can actually say how it’s going.. It's all in the shadows, so we have no way of knowing’ (Borjesson 2005 184). However, when a terrorist attack occurs, we do have phenomena to analyse and, in this instance, newspaper coverage to benchmark against. As terrorism is the quintessential ‘mediated’ event (i.e. only a miniscule proportion of any population are ever likely to have first hand exposure or knowledge pertaining to it), the ‘need for orientation’ is typically extremely high and thus representations of the phenomenon in newspaper coverage are likely to be influential in terms of public opinion and public policy formation, most especially with respect to the agenda-setting newspapers selected for analysis in this study.

1.2 Journalism Research.

The study of journalism has been approached from many diverse philosophical, methodological and theoretical perspectives. For example, Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009), in their review of journalism history, identified four distinct but overlapping phases in the history of journalism research:

While the field came out of normative research by German scholars on the role of the press in society, it gained prominence with the empirical turn, particularly significant in the United States, was enriched by a subsequent sociological turn, particularly among Anglo-American scholars, and has now, with the global-comparative turn, expanded its scope to reflect the realities of a globalized world. (Wahl-Jorgensen, Hanitzsch 2009 p.4)

If the current study is situated within the global-comparative turn, it is so with more than a passing relevance to the ‘sociological turn’ of the 1970’s. It was in that era that the focus of journalism scholarship shifted to an engagement with occupational conventions and routines and how these in
turn manifest ideology - in addition to analysing aspects of news content itself such as framing, storytelling, narrative etc.

The move away from empiricism in this regard thus returned the study of journalism in many respects to earlier schools of journalism thought. For instance, whereas the Chicago school recognised that news was ‘more than just the items found in the newspaper’, and scholars like Weber and Park stressed the cultural and political implications of news, the Columbia school which came to dominate in the post war era had a considerably more functional approach to the study of journalism and typically utilised empirical or survey oriented research, particularly in the contexts of ‘news flow’ and electoral campaigns. However, by the 1970’s, the qualitative approach to the study of news in a political and cultural context reasserted itself with a slew of studies on news organisations as complex institutions, typically involving some methodological formulation of participation, observation and/or content analysis. As Tuchman has demonstrated, these studies were typically political in that ‘the authors sought to understand how news came to support official interpretations of controversial events’ in addition to raising the important epistemological question of how news organisations come to ‘know’ what they ‘know’ (Tuchman 1991 p.84). This is the antecedent research tradition into which this study aspires to be situated.

Apart from emphasising how the processes of making news resulted in embedded ideological meanings, the studies of the ‘sociological turn’ typically demonstrated how news organisations necessarily developed special ties to legitimated and centralised sources of information. Reflecting the titles of their work (e.g. ‘Making’, ‘Constructing’, ‘Manufacturing’), studies in this tradition adopted a broadly phenomenological approach to the study of news that stresses how news is socially constructed. Implicit in this view is the idea that we live in an ambiguous social world with no inherent meaning, and, as Davies has noted; ‘If meaning is not inherent, it must be created’ (Davis 1990 p.159). Berger & Luckmann (1976) popularised the notion of ‘the social construction of reality’ in their 1976 book of the same name, and stressed, like the authors of the ‘qualitative wave’, the impact of social institutions and social processes upon the generation and definition of social facts.
If the predominant concern of the study of media historically has been, in the final analysis, an analysis of whether and/or how the media influences, or ‘acts on’, individuals, groups or society as a whole i.e. has ‘effects’, then the current study should be seen as a preliminary step in the attainment of that goal. Cohen (1981) has suggested that there are four types of research which can be done on the media: 1) in terms of ownership and control, 2) with the processes of selection and manufacture of news, 3) with the content presented and finally 4) with the effects of that presentation. Ostensibly, this research project falls into the third of these domains, but ultimately the concern is with questions of the fourth. However, examining content is a precursor to studying effects because only on some preliminary hypothesis can an imputation or hypothesis of effects be advanced, speculatively or by inference. In this way, examining content facilitates two processes: it 1) gives an insight into the possible factors that influenced that content and 2) allows one to hypothesise forward possible effects. While sociological studies of the media have emphasised the many influences at play shaping the content of news media, they are not typically associated with the study of effects, the latter having largely consisted of studies of a psychological, or at best social psychological nature. In summation therefore, the current study seeks to illuminate the nature of the coverage in the first instance, and attempts to identify the main factors acting, in a sociological sense, to influence that coverage in the second.

1.3 News Framing & Sourcing.

News framing developed concurrently in the mid to late 1970s from the symbolic interactionist conception of Irving Goffman regarding how conceptual frames organize experience and guide action. However, from a metatheoretical perspective, the ‘framing’ concept has evolved to be regarded as something of a synonym for ‘presentation’ in the context of news. In fact, it is this ubiquitous quality than can be considered both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. A strength because one can apply ‘framing’ analysis in so many diverse ways – as a format (episodic), as a means of deconstructing issue opinion (pro-life), as a device to guide analysis of selection and salience (Entman...
1991), as a descriptor of election news coverage (horse race), or as means of defining meaning (Hall et al. 1978). However, such diverse application occasions a ‘scattered conceptualisation’ and as a result comparable framing analyses have become the exception rather than the rule. There is little doubt however but that the huge volume of framing studies since the early 1990’s is largely a result of the ubiquity of this ‘a la carte’ application. Nevertheless, when the objective of a frame is to influence in a certain direction, there is good evidence to suggest that it often succeeds. As Entman has noted with some understatement: ‘if the text frame emphasizes in a variety of mutually reinforcing ways that the glass is half full, the evidence of social science suggests that relatively few in the audience will conclude it is half empty’ (Entman 1993 p.56).

The ‘war on terror’ itself has been described as 'the most important framing case of our time' (Reese 2007 152) in addition to being a 'master frame' akin to the 'Cold War' which dominated political discourse in the latter half of the twentieth century (Hackett 2001, Kuypers, Cooper & Althouse 2008). Snow & Benford (1992) had originally used the term 'master frame' in their analysis of social movements 'to signify political and cultural shorthand, used to unify a broad movement and instil political agency', but Meyer (1995) later sought to expand its significance beyond social movement politics, using the term to describe a more comprehensive worldview where a 'master frame' will have resonance both within mainstream political discourse and movement politics.

Regardless, in the current study the conception of news framing is applied at the unit of analysis of the newspaper story or article rather than the political culture as a whole. Indeed, the application of framing in this study has a twofold manifestation: 1) as a preliminary methodological device it provides categories, or ‘frames’, by which the dataset can be dissected and partitioned for analysis and 2) as a tool of textual interrogation where the work of framing is evidenced by reference, for example, to notions of selection, emphasis, salience etc. At the former level of abstraction, four frames are identified that account for over 95% of the newspaper coverage under review; 1) the ‘attribution of responsibility’ frame, 2) the ‘economic consequences’ frame, 3) the ‘treatment recommendation’
frame and 4) the ‘human interest’ frame. However, the study proceeds to analyse only one of these in detail - the 'attribution of responsibility' frame.

Finally, Chapter 5 in the current study contains an analysis of the news sources drawn upon in the coverage. News sourcing studies were typically an appendage of organisational studies during the ‘sociological turn’ of the 1970’s and 1980’s but they have since somewhat fallen out of favour apart from a flurry of interest circa 2004 in the phenomenon of anonymous sourcing - which was itself largely the result of two minor sourcing scandals at The New York Times. In place of a focus on anonymous sourcing, this study seeks to deconstruct the nature of a qualitatively different type of attribution by distinguishing between official and unofficial sources in the first instance, and by the nature of the information product in the second. If the reliance on official sources in the context of national security issues is ‘one of the most consistently replicated findings in American journalism’ (Hallin, Manoff & Weddle 1993) the knowledge value arising from the current study will be in the extent to which that is so alongside some novel methodological inventions that serve to illustrate just how few sources of any kind can be classified in terms of ‘counter framing’.

1.4 Attribution & Cognition.

Cicero is reported to have once said that ‘the causes of events are ever more interesting than the events themselves’. However, the focus on attribution in this study is justified on grounds of journalistic inquiry. The first and most important of these relates to the role of ‘primary definition’ in terms of attribution. In this conceptualisation, attribution becomes the 'primary definition' which 'provides the criteria by which all subsequent contributions are labelled as 'relevant' or 'beside the point' (Hall et al. 1978 59). Related to this is the notion of framing as the exertion of political power, or as Entman (1993) has noted: ‘the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power, it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text’ (Entman 1993 55). This conception of power evokes Schattschneider’s argument that political conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance on a definition of the issues. In fact, ‘the definition of the
alternatives is the supreme instrument of power’ (Schattschneider 1960 p. xxvi). Third, the focus on attribution is justified by reference to concepts of meaning, as: ‘frames construct particular meanings concerning issues by their patterns of emphasis, interpretation and exclusion’ (Carragee, K. M., Roefs, W. 2004 p.215). Finally, attribution framing is said to influence public opinion by invoking ‘domain-specific’ contextual cues, and thus issues of attribution can be said to be broadly constituent of public opinion (Iyengar 1994 p.7).

The focus on attribution is also justified on the basis of some recent findings in the literature of social cognition, specifically on a number of interrelated models of information processing. For example, Iyengar & Kinder’s (1991) study of the effect of news framing on the attributions of responsibility for public issues asserted that the primary factor that determines opinions concerning political issues is the assignment of responsibility for the issues in question:

That is, individuals tend to simplify political issues by reducing them to questions of responsibility, and their opinions on issues flow from their answers to these questions (Iyengar 1994 p.8).

In addition to constructing opinion around dimensions of causal responsibility, Noelle-Neumann (1984) had famously established by the early 1970’s that 80-90 percent of the people in a representative cross sample of the population easily offered their assessments of the opinions held by the people around them, rather than respond ‘how should I know?’, when asked what other people thought - as she notes ‘might well have happened’ (Noelle-Neumann 1984 p.9). These findings, taken in tandem, indicate not only that individuals routinely construct opinion for themselves, but that they also routinely scan their social environments to gauge the opinions of others.

At the same time however, research by Fiske & Taylor (1991) has found that individuals are ‘cognitive misers’ and frequently rely on simple and time efficient strategies when evaluating information and making decisions. Rather than rationally and objectively evaluating novel information, the ‘cognitive miser’ assigns new information to categories that are easy to process
mentally, along lines suggested by criteria like ‘applicability’ or ‘availability’ (Scheufele 2000). These categories arise from prior information involving schemas, scripts and other knowledge structures that have been stored in memory. As a result: ‘the cognitive miser, thus, tends not to stray far from his or her established beliefs when considering new information’ (Fiske, Taylor 1991). Herbert Simon’s portmanteau of ‘satisficing’ was coined in a similar context but with respect to decision making. In order to bridge this seeming contradiction between the almost universal possession of opinion (personal and social) by ‘cognitive misers’ in the ‘blooming, buzzing’ confusion of the world (Lippmann 1922), we are said to rely on a set of cognitive heuristics to navigate the world such as frames, stereotypes etc., that do the work of simplification for us.

In this model of cognition, once definitions of the social world are acquired, we ‘take them for granted’ and they become a part of a set of ‘typifications’ (Schutz 1967) or a ‘stock of knowledge’ that we routinely use to ‘frame’ or interpret our everyday experience (Goffman 1974). Though we actively impose meaning on our world, we do so with little or no awareness of what we are doing. We are especially unaware of the extent to which the meanings we impose are grounded in situations controlled by distant groups or organisations (Davis 1990 p.160). Likewise, confronted with a novel and unfamiliar event, people do their best to understand it in terms of events they know well already, even when connecting the two requires a mental leap (Holyoak, Thagard 1997 p.2). Entman (2004) was referring to this process when he described the role of news framing in terms of ‘spreading activation’:

The theory of spreading activation underlines the importance of the order in which information is presented. Early stimuli arising from new events and issues generally have primacy, since activation spreads out from the initial idea. A dominant frame in the earliest news coverage of an event can activate and spread congruent thoughts and feelings in individuals’ knowledge networks, building a new event schema that guides responses to all future reports. First impressions may be difficult to dislodge. (Entman 2004 p.7)
The implications of these models of information processing suggest therefore that the typical individual will form opinion easily by reference to both contextual cues and social norms and that once formed, such opinion, shallow as it may be, may be difficult to dislodge. If so, such a process would appear to underscore the importance of attribution in news coverage, most especially early in an issue cycle when opinion is typically said to congeal.

In addition, it is claimed that this model of cognitive ‘typification’ applies also to journalists, who, consciously or unconsciously, select the type and format of news stories ‘in terms of their fit or consonance with pre-existing images’ (Boorstin 2012). Ericson et al. (1987) identified this phenomenon as a ‘vocabulary of precedents’ whereby previous exemplars guide journalistic behaviour in terms of how to recognise, produce, source and justify their stories (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1987 p.348). Such journalistic shorthands are said to be dictated to a large extent by the pressures and constraints of routine occupational and professional ideologies which ultimately determine the bounds of ‘responsible’ journalism. In this vein, Cohen has noted that once the subject of a story is fixed, ‘its subsequent shape is determined by certain recurrent processes of news manufacture’ (Cohen 1980 p.44) and Hall has similarly noted how ‘once the inferential structure is established it becomes more difficult to alter’ (Hall et al. 1978 p.58). Taken in toto, this research literature suggests that the ‘primary definition’, once established, will set the tone and content of much of the coverage to follow, in addition to ensuring that ‘relatively few in the audience will conclude that the glass is half empty’.

The study of attribution as a field has been largely carried out within the field of social psychology and three theories of attribution have come to dominate the field. The first, by Fritz Heider - generally recognised as the godfather of the field - sought to formulate the processes by which an untrained observer, or ‘naïve psychologist’, makes sense of the actions of others (Heider 1958). Having identified the factors influencing behaviour as either related to disposition (e.g., personality traits, motives, attitudes), or to situations (e.g., external pressures, social norms, peer pressure, etc.), Heider made the argument that people tend to overweigh internal, dispositional causes over situational
factors, at least partly because those factors are more visible to the observer. This finding later became known as the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Ross 1977) or ‘correspondence bias’ (Fiske, Taylor 1991). The two other major theories of attribution (Hewstone 1989), ‘correspondent inference theory’ and ‘the covariation principle’ were refinements of Heider’s work that sought respectively to demonstrate how a perceiver’s judgement of an actor’s behaviour is caused by, or corresponds to, a particular trait (Jones, Davis 1965) and how a certain behaviour is attributed to potential causes that appear at the same time (Kelley 1973). However, Hewstone (1989) has noted how the vast majority of research on attribution has taken place at the intra and inter-personal levels of analysis, to the exclusion of work at the intergroup or societal levels, which might serve as a more general ‘theory of social understanding’. Nevertheless, despite this, what little research has been conducted to date at these two levels has shown that attribution can be a function of the social group or category to which the perceiver and actor belong, whether such attribution is based on dislike for outgroup members (ethnocentrism), founded on cultural stereotypes, or having perceived societal functions e.g. scapegoating. Though not empirically examined in this study, such racial stereotypes as Hollywood’s ‘Islamic villain’ are clearly relevant in this regard.

Finally, the decision to focus on issues of attribution is also motivated by the fact that counter-narratives exist in respect of all three case studies under review, and indeed contra the ‘war on terror’ in general. This is epitomised by Said's criticism of Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations' thesis where Said proffered that there is an official culture and a counter-culture in every society:

The two cultures do battle over ideas, the understanding of reality, and the definition of their society. The official culture in power often dominates the society by constructing myths and fables that are useful for serving the interests and goals of a powerful few.
(Said 1998 p. 7)

Said’s reference to the ‘construction of myths’ evokes Lippmann’s notion of ‘Manufacturing Consent’ and Niebuhr’s notion of ‘Necessary Illusions’ (two terms that became book titles for Chomsky) in addition to the Straussian concept of the ‘noble lie’ and the Machiavellian concept of ‘myth making’.
Taken together, these models suggest the necessity of ‘experts’ to manage public opinion as, in the words of Lippmann: ‘the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class’ (Lippmann 1922 p. 195).

Related to this argument is Lyotard’s concept of the metanarrative which he defined as an abstract idea that is thought to be a comprehensive explanation of historical experience or knowledge (Lyotard 1984). Indeed, testifying in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2007, President Obama's foreign policy advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski identified the 'war on terror' as a 'mythical historical narrative' to justify the case for protracted and potentially expanding wars in the middle-east and Asia (Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2007) before warning of the dangers of another 'false-flag' attack. In *The Postmodern condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Lyotard characterised the postmodern condition as increasing scepticism toward the totalizing nature of metanarratives and their reliance on some form of transcendent and universal truth, a public phenomenon which has undoubtedly occurred in the context of the 'war on terror'. In conclusion therefore, by analysing the nature of attributions in the newspaper coverage it is also hoped that the findings will speak to the validity or otherwise of the 'metanarrative' interpretation of the 'war on terror'.

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2 According to Brzezinski: 'A plausible scenario for a military collision with Iran involves Iraqi failure to meet the benchmarks; followed by accusations of Iranian responsibility for the failure; then some provocation in Iraq or a terrorist act in the U.S. blamed on Iran and culminating in a 'defensive' U.S. military action against Iran.'
Chapter 2 - Literature Review.

2.1 The Sociology of News.

If sociological inquiry is that domain of research that ‘targets people and the interactions among them, the organisations and institutions in which they reside, and the structures by which their lives proceed’ (Zelizer 2004 p.47), then the sociology of news must concern us with the application of the above to the news media. However, as the concept of news is quintessentially social, both in terms of production and consumption, vast swathes of research concerning news can thus be considered sociological. While the label ‘sociology of news’ can be attached to some facet of almost every study in the field therefore, at the same time a plethora of studies in this domain make no mention of the theoretical domain in which they reside, to the extent that ‘the frame’s existence has largely become invisible’ (Zelizer 2004 p.45). A second curious aspect of labelling in this regard is the tendency to describe the sociology of news exclusively as the set of ‘patterned interactions’ amongst individuals, organisations and institutions that shape the production and content of news – how society acts on the news media. McNair (1998) is among a relatively small cadre in the literature that stresses that the sociology of news is about the relationship of news to the societies within which it is produced, which of course denotes that in addition to society acting on the news media, the news media also act on society. Perhaps the traditional de-emphasis of the latter goes to the fact that many of the so called ‘effects’ studies over the years (i.e. how the news media have acted on society) have been psychological in nature and typically concerned with discrete measures of attitude change or some such. However, as the current study is not directly investigating effects, the review of the literature thus proceeds by an analysis of how society ‘acts on’ the news media to influence the nature of content that is manifest in the news coverage.

In advance of a consideration of those specific matters however, it may be useful to outline some common and oft cited approaches to the study of the sociology of the media. Three approaches in
particular are germane and structure the following review. First, the ‘schools of thought’ that are considered to have dominated various eras in the development of the media sociology, specifically the Chicago School, Functionalism and Marxism. Second, theoretical approaches to the study of news - with an emphasis on Schudson’s classification of Political Economy, Culture and ‘mainstream’ sociology - along with some other theoretical examples to illustrate the diversity of doors that open onto this field. Finally, a brief consideration of what has been called the ‘levels of analysis’ approach to the identification of influences on media content (society acting on) that have been stipulated as occurring at the individual, media routine, organisational, political economy and ideological levels. These various ways of ‘looking at’ the sociology of news are obviously related and overlapping, most notably those at the level of theoretical approaches and ‘levels of analysis’, and the latter two have their intellectual roots in competing ‘schools of thought’. Nevertheless, it is instructive to isolate and map them independently to the extent possible, if only because, as Tumber (1999) has noted, there is no obvious and single point of departure into this research domain.

2.1.1 Schools of Thought.

A formative idea in the communications sciences - one hesitates to call it a school of thought - was the idea that media messages are close to being all powerful in their effects, especially in a mass society context where the increasingly urbanised population had been displaced from familial and community associations which might, in another context, have served to ameliorate the consequences of such message power. This idea took root around the time of World War I with the apparent success of propaganda efforts at that time. However, as Rogers has noted: ‘I have never known a serious scholar to endorse or make research use of the so-called ‘bullet theory’ of communication effects’ (Chaffee, Rogers 1997), as the idea was referred to, alongside that of a ‘hypodermic needle’. If indeed the conception was a popular rather than an academic one, such little research was being conducted on the topic until closer to World War II that no conclusive answers can be drawn about its legitimacy at that time, other than to state definitively that the conception of a ‘magic bullet’ is a gross simplification and is not sustainable in any universal sense. In any event, the concept was suggestive of
psychological rather than sociological effects, and it was not until the arrival of what became known as the ‘Chicago school’ that concerted attention was aimed in the latter direction.

2.1.1.1 The Chicago School.

In his 2009 reflections on ‘Why Sociology Abandoned Communication’, Katz has noted that ‘for the first half of the last century, the Chicago School dominated American sociology’ (Katz 2009). In terms of media and communications specifically, perhaps the most famous Chicago school study was that by Park (1923) on the immigrant press. The school, although known in the main for their emphasis on urban sociology, was concerned with the role of social institutions (including the media) in the maintenance of social and community values and the propagation of a progressive democratic public sphere. In doing so they typically rejected the behavioural approach that stressed stimulus-response approaches to social investigation and instead favoured a more holistic or cultural approach that sought to identify how individuals in a social structure use and produce media messages. However, before, during, and after World War II, media sociology in general and the Chicago school in particular fell from favour. Pooley & Katz (2008) have argued that the sociology of media was displaced by then recent emergence of the interdisciplinary field of public opinion research in the mid-1930s which took up the study of media related questions ‘often at the request of private and public clients’. In their own words:

But this was an accident of funding and world crisis and not the result of a conscious intellectual program or a received tradition of study. The field’s mass communication focus was a straightforward outgrowth, rather, of media and advertiser sponsored research, Rockefeller Foundation intervention and the federal government’s wartime propaganda mobilization. (Pooley, Katz 2008 p.3)

These were the years in which an academic coalition arose with roots in attitude psychology, market research and the refinement of sampling methods, all of which were underpinned by governmental, commercial and foundation support. Based largely around the towering figure of Paul Lazarsfeld at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, academic inquiry into the media was to take a new turn, stressing less the structural or cultural locus of communication in favour of a ‘new
empiricism’ that stressed how the public are less passive consumers of media messages than active interpreters. The so called ‘limited effects’ paradigm was born which was to constitute the academic orthodoxy for the next two decades. In contrast to earlier conceptualisations of grand theory such as ‘mass society’, here the focus was on ‘middle range’ theories and indeed a focus on methodology rather than theory per se. Labelled ‘administrative’ research by Lazarsfeld himself as early as 1941, the new focus on attitudes and behaviour, as exemplified by the twin focus on market research and electoral campaigns, demonstrated to the authors that, in the words of Bernard Berelson (1948):

Some kinds of communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects. (Berelson 1948 p.172)

The broad findings of this new ‘paradigm’ in the study of the effects of the media were then synthesised in 1960 by Klapper, then head of social research at CBS, in a touchstone work entitled ‘The Effects of Mass Communication’.

However, the paradigm of ‘limited effects’ was to fall from favour in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s in parallel with what became known as ‘the cognitive revolution’ – itself a reaction to the behavioural view that believed one cannot look inside the mind and therefore the only valid approach (e.g. Pavlov) was to study how communication affected behaviour. Perhaps the most damning critique of the ‘limited effects’ paradigm was by Gitlin (1978) who declared that, in effect, the authors were looking in all the wrong places for ‘effects’:

By its methodology, media sociology has highlighted the recalcitrance of audiences, their resistance to media generated messages, and not their dependency, their acquiescence, their gullibility. It has looked to ‘effects’ of broadcast programming in a specifically behaviourist fashion, defining ‘effects’ so narrowly, microscopically, and directly as to make it very likely that survey studies could show only slight effects at most. (Gitlin 1978 p.205)

Specifically, Gitlin (1978) attacked five assumptions of the ‘limited effects’ school as exemplified by the touchstone work Personal Influence. Firstly, the notion of the commensurability of modes of influences i.e. that the power of the media was held comparable to the power of individuals in face to face situations. Second, the assumption of power implied in the role of the ‘opinion leader’, ‘as if
power were a kind of free flowing marketplace commodity in a situation of equality’. Third, the assumption of the commensurability of buying and politics i.e. marketing, fashion, movie going and public affairs were assumed to be assimilable within a single theory. Fourthly, assumptions about attitude change as the dependant variable i.e. ‘If they had not changed their attitudes they were assumed not to be influenced’. Fifth and finally, the assumption that ‘opinion leaders’ possessed independent agency and were not, as the survey wording suggested, simply those individuals most attuned to the mass media. Perhaps most damning of all in Gitlin’s critique however was the finding that in terms of public affairs alone (and not all four categories of marketing, fashion, movie going and public affairs above taken together), respondents reported that 58% of the attitude changes in one period ‘were apparently made without involving any remembered personal contact, and were, very often, dependent on the mass media’ (1978 p.219).

Despite these devastating critiques, what became known as the ‘new look’ in mass communications research has proceeded on other less antagonistic grounds. For instance, some scholars have revisited the ‘limited effects’ studies and, looking at the small print, have found that many of those earlier scholars qualified their findings in many important respects, sometimes obscured by the passage of time, to allow that in a number of instances the media may indeed be persuasive e.g. when audience attention is casual, when information rather than attitude or opinion is involved, when the media source is prestigious etc. Curran et al. (1982) have noted importantly that many of the classical empiricist studies did not show that the mass media had very little influence, but rather, because the locus of attention was responding to the previous orthodoxy that had defined the omnipotent influence of the mass media precisely in terms of changing attitudes and beliefs, that their subsequent negative findings of the absence of media conversion consequently tended to be equated with the absence of influence. Indeed, the empiricists found that a central role for the mass media was functional and consisted of consolidating and fortifying the values and attitudes of audience members, a finding that is not dissimilar to later Marxist critiques that that the mass media play a strategic role in reinforcing dominant social norms and values that legitimise the social system.
2.1.1.2 Functionalism.

Paralleling the rise of the ‘limited effects’ paradigm was the sociological school of thought labelled functionalism or alternatively ‘structural functionalism’. Functional analyses of mass media largely centred on the role of the mass media in the maintenance of social order and social structure, and at one level sought to examine how well they perform in the execution of these tasks. It is based on a belief, no doubt influenced by the devastation of World War II, that all components of society including the media are organised and structured to maintain social stability. Many of the notable early contributors to functionalist thought were the leading figures in the Columbia school that gave rise to the concept of ‘limited effects’ such as Lasswell (1948), Lazarsfeld & Merton (1948) and Merton (1957). That such ‘administrative’ scholars should be prominent in the domain of functionalism was perhaps unsurprising given their largely uncritical stances towards the status quo and their close affiliation to what Gitlin called the ‘command posts of institutions that seek to improve or rationalise their control over social sectors in social functions’ (Gitlin 1978 p.225). As Reece & Ballinger (2001) have noted, the functional approach sees news as a problem to be solved. Here, the focus is on the normal, ‘routine’ functioning - not the crisis, the marginal, and the built in tensions between institutions and within society. Although their focus was largely uncritical, Lazarsfeld and Merton did acknowledge ‘dysfunctions’ of the media. They paid little attention however to the nature or desirability of the status quo per se. Indeed, they dismiss as ‘grossly speculative’ the possibility of serious empirical study of the social role of the mass media ‘by virtue of the fact that they exist’, presumably suggesting the fact that no ‘control’ world exists with which to compare and that historical comparisons would have been too crude. Functionalism was closely associated too with the tradition of Pluralism i.e. the view that power in western societies is dispersed among a variety of competing groups and interests. This is most formally expressed in the common tripartite of governance into the legislature, executive and judiciary, but more informally through the idea that there exists a plurality of voices. McNair has conceptualised the sociology of journalism as traditionally taking the form of a debate between two ways of looking at how the social world is
organised and the role of the news media in sustaining that organisation. According to McNair (1998 p.9), they are the ‘competitive paradigm’ and the ‘dominance paradigm’. Greer (2010) used an alternative terminology by referring to the ‘Liberal Pluralist’ versus ‘Control’ paradigms of news media research. The competitive paradigm is closely associated with pluralist views and holds, for example, that the media constitute a fourth estate that acts as a ‘watchdog’ on potential abuses by other branches of government. In contrast, adherents of the dominance paradigm have typically consisted of critical theorists who argue, in short, that the media are closer to ‘lapdogs’, that power is not distributed equally, and the focus is on class conflict, inequality and perceived injustice. These adherents typically couch their arguments in some version of Marxism.

2.1.1.3 Marxism.

Classical Marxism conceived of the media in terms of the metaphor of base and superstructure. The base of a society refers to its economic foundations, which determines the superstructure of the society i.e. it’s political, social and ideological institutions and their interactions. In this view, the power of the mass media is simply the power of the extant ruling class utilising the news media to pursue their specific class interests. This is encapsulated neatly by the oft cited passage from Marx & Engels (Marx, Engels 1970 p.64):

> The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.

Marxist approaches to the study of the news media became common in the 1960’s and 1970’s, particularly in Europe or by European scholars and partly as a reaction to the dominance of empirical, functionalist and pluralist schools of thought in the US. Under a Marxist analysis, the effects of the mass media were not seen as discrete and measurable in the sense of short term attitude changes for example, but rather in the dissemination of ideologies opposed to the working class and in the reproduction of ‘false consciousness’. In a Marxist view, the selection and production of news is
shaped by: elite interests and the demands of capitalist enterprise; constraints on media workers’ professional autonomy; the dominance of a narrow range of powerful sources and the normalisation of ruling class values throughout societies structured around a ‘manufactured consensus’. However, several variants of this view have been promulgated, most typically involving notions of Instrumental Marxism, Structural Marxism and Political Economy.

Instrumental Marxists argue that elites use their power to ensure that information flows reinforce their capitalist interests. ‘Instrumental’ here refers to agency and the media are typically seen as the agents of the ruling class. In this view, the media are seen to work more or less directly in their service and are commanded by them. Apart from questions of agency, this view presumes that the ruling class are to some extent coherent in their activity without necessarily being seen as simplistically ‘conspiring’.

According to Instrumental Marxists, media content is shaped internally through newsroom hierarchies and self-censorship and externally through pressures from advertisers etc. In contrast, Structural Marxists do not presume one unified and coherent elite. Rather, the mass media are viewed as the direct servant of the capitalist system rather than the ruling class per se. As a result, Structural Marxists are concerned with how processes of signification and representation collectively reproduce the dominant ideology. Apart from de-emphasising agency, structuralists point to the need for the ruling class to constantly renegotiate and re-establish ‘legitimacy’ through ideology and so, for example, a structuralist Marxist might see a rise in the minimum wage as serving capitalist interests by meeting the demands of workers only sufficiently to prevent an uprising that could threaten the system as a whole. Finally, Political Economy theorists reject the interventionist approach of Instrumental Marxists and the ideological approach of Structural Marxists. Instead, they argue for the location of media power in the economic process and structures of media production. In the words of Curran et al.: ‘Ideology becomes the route through which struggle is obliterated rather than the site of struggle’ (Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott 1982 p.26). As such, political economy theorists stress ownership of the culture producing industries and the increasing tendency towards concentration and monopolisation, in addition to the role of economic forces in, for example, marginalising unpopular viewpoints as being ‘bad for business’.
A propos the current study, Greer (2010) has conducted an interesting study of the manner in which these distinct but related traditions can be mapped onto the three academic institutional centres that pioneered the development of British news media research in the sixties and seventies: 1) the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at Birmingham University, 2) the Centre for Mass Communication Research (CMCR) at Leicester University and 3) the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG). Ultimately, all were concerned to understand the role of news media in the reproduction of ‘dominant ideology’ but important differences remained. Greer (2010) labelled the three approaches as ‘cultural and structural Marxism’ (Birmingham), ‘media studies and instrumental’ Marxism (Glasgow) and finally, ‘sociology of mass communications and political economy’ (Leicester).

Greer noted how *Policing the Crisis* (the seminal work of the ‘Birmingham school’ and one which introduced the concept of ‘primary definition’ so central to the current study) was a Structuralist work because it noted ‘how the relatively autonomous institutions of the state (police, judiciary and media) contributed to the mugging panic independently while simultaneously functioning collectively to reproduce the dominant ideology’ (Greer 2010 p.4). Accordingly, the ideology was continuously reproduced because the news media is structurally orientated in the name of journalistic ‘objectivity’. Journalists are thereby stripped of agency and have, in the first and last instance, to cite the accredited experts who represent and command institutional power. In contrast, Greer (2010) notes how the Glasgow Group conceived of a view of Instrumental Marxism whereby the journalists were not ‘secondary’ players or structurally subordinated in any way. Instead, their agency is stressed by examining the subtle but powerful ways in which bias was instituted e.g. a clear absence of alternative views or comment that challenged the dominant ideology. From this perspective journalists are empowered with an agency and intentionality they are denied in the work of the Birmingham school. The group’s follow-up study *More Bad News* (1980: 400) confirmed this view, finding that journalists ‘actively embrace’ the dominant ideological viewpoint ‘in a way that would be hard to justify as impartial’. Their activities include:
Not only the agenda-setting functions we have described, but also a systematic partiality in the reporting and interpretive use of government statistics. (Glasgow Media Group 1980 p.401)

Here, journalists are not secondary players, ‘structurally subordinated’ in a communication process shaped by the cultural and economic power of state institutions. They are the ‘primary definers’.

Whilst the Birmingham and Glasgow schools of Marxist variants were united in their rejection of economic determinism, the Leicester school placed economic forces at the heart of the media production process. For Murdock and Golding (Murdock, Golding 1977 p.37) these forces:

…work consistently to exclude those voices lacking economic power or resources… the underlying logic of cost operates systematically, consolidating the position of groups already established in the main mass-media markets and excluding those groups who lack the capital base required for successful entry. Thus the voices which survive will largely belong to those least likely to criticize the prevailing distribution of wealth and power. Conversely, those most likely to challenge these arrangements are unable to publicize their dissent or opposition because they cannot command resources needed for effective communication to a broad audience.

Although scholars at the Leicester school allowed for other influences on news content such as pressures exerted by the State and the constraints of professional ideologies and practices - these were always secondary to the ‘material and determining impact of economic forces’. According to this sociological interpretation of control through concentration of ownership, monopolisation and diversification, notable phenomena like culture and ideology were secondary.

2.1.2 Theoretical Approaches.

Studies of the news media have taken many diverse theoretical approaches. For example, a basic distinction exists in the literature between early pioneering studies on news ‘selection’ processes (exemplified by the gatekeeping tradition) and a focus on inherent ‘news values’ in the first instance, and a later focus on how news was ‘made’ (Tuchman 1978), ‘created’ (Altheide 1976) or ‘manufactured’ (Cohen, Young 1981, Fishman 1980). However, many other scholars have
operationalized their approach to the study of the news media in very different terms. Molotch & Lester (1974) for example classified news in terms of the way that it comes to the awareness of the news organisation. Davis (1990) has classified studies of the news media into categorical themes – social constructionism, news organisations, narrative theory etc. Tumber (1999) classified research on the sociology of the news by the point at which such research entered the newsmaking process i.e. production, economics, sourcing and ideology. However, perhaps the most prominent and prolific author on the sociology of news has been Michael Schudson, and therefore for reasons of conceptual clarity the following discussion of theoretical approaches to the sociology of news tracks his tripartite schema over the course of some twenty five years.

In an early paper, Schudson (1986) wrote that media sociology developed in three directions: 1) neo-Weberian, 2) neo-Marxist and 3) neo-Durkheimian – named after the three individuals who are commonly cited as the three ‘godfathers’ of sociology. According to Schudson, neo-Weberian’s had an emphasis on the concepts of organisations, professions and occupations, and were ultimately interested in the ‘producers of culture’. Neo-Marxists were, in contrast, primarily interested in issues of hegemony and ideology and in the symbolic content of culture. Finally, neo-Durkheimian’s focused on ritual and the public reception of culture. It is easy to see in this early categorisation themes which were to repeat in his later published work on the same theme, but which by the early 1990’s Schudson (1991) had re-labelled as 1) Political Economy, 2) Mainstream Sociological and 3) Cultural – divisions which have rather obvious intellectual antecedents in his 1986 model. However, this novel diagrammatic was to be a recurring theme of Schudson’s subsequent work, albeit with a few modifications discussed presently. For example, the labels are retained in variants of his later published work (1997, 2002). However, in a later paper, admittedly refocused towards the ‘political sociology’ of the news media, the author speaks of 1) Macro-institutional perspectives, 2) Micro-institutional perspectives and 3) Cultural traditions and symbolic systems (2005). As in the revision above, the intellectual antecedents and parallels are also obvious here. Macro-institutional approaches echo themes in what had previously been labelled Political Economy. Such approaches minimise the role of human agency and imply that structural conditions alone account for most of the features of
the news. In contrast, Micro-institutional approaches (which echo the themes of mainstream sociology) stress the power of routines, journalistic conventions and social pressures on journalists, while allowing that journalists can sometimes bend or challenge these constraints ‘without losing their jobs’. Finally, cultural approaches may either emphasise a role for human agency where reporters can select from a cultural repertoire, or alternatively one where agency may be constrained by cultural archetypes as in an instance when a journalist feels compelled to link a story to existing myths, stereotypes or narratives. However, in the brief review of these three traditions below, for simplicity, Schudson’s nomenclature of Political Economy, Sociological and Cultural is retained, albeit with the Political and Economic partitioned and analysed sequentially.

2.1.2 Economic.

The Political economy approach to news analysis has typically been concerned with the influence of ownership and control of media organisations in the first instance, and in the dictates of capitalistic pressures towards profit generation in the second. However, it has been a tradition criticised for concentrating on the economic to the determent of the political (Schudson 1991, Benson 2004). Schudson himself states in a later paper (2010) that he had left this categorisation out of a previous paper ‘because I had come to believe that its use in communication studies had developed from a Marxist presumption that economics is fundamental and political structures secondary’, before returning to it on a realisation that the way economic structures organise news organisations and sets their boundaries are now ‘more visible than ever’ (2010). However, as Murdock noted as far back as 1982, the link between political economy and day to day issues of journalism can be oblique. Take, for example, the fact that the television news on publicly owned stations in Europe does not differ in fundamental respects from commercially owned stations. Scholars in the political economy tradition have at various times held that corporate ownership compromises democracy by pointing out alternatively that there is an inherent contradiction between capitalism and democracy (Machesney 1997, Herman & Chomsky 1988) or that there is an inevitable tendency of unregulated markets
towards monopolistic status which serves only to reduce the perspectives offered to society in the
‘marketplace of ideas’.

Perhaps the most cited work in this tradition is ‘Manufacturing Consent’ by Herman & Chomsky (1988) which posited the existence of a propaganda model whereby five filters (ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak and anti-communism) combine to ‘fix the premises of discourse, interpretation and the definition of what is newsworthy (Herman, Chomsky 1988 p.2). Schudson maintains that the propaganda model is ‘a blunt instrument for examining a subtle system’ while Cottle has criticised it's tendencies toward generalisation, economic reductionism and ideological functionalism (Cottle 2006). However, it can be argued in response that any model of a system is by definition reductionist and Herman & Chomsky do not confine themselves to economic influences alone (see sourcing, ideological and cultural aspects of their analysis). In general, the political economy perspective seeks to examine the conservative, system maintaining character of news and it is true to say that there is normally little challenge in demonstrating that news coincides with and reinforces the definition of the political situation offered by the political elite. However, as per Schudson, the point remains well made that the political and legal determinants of news have been elided in the foregrounding of the economic, an emphasis that is reversed in the conclusions of this research project (documented in Chapter Six).

2.1.2 Political.

The domain of political influences on news content is largely under-conceptualised in the literature. However, the political factors at play in the current study are thought to dominate their economic brethren and this thus necessitates consideration of the nature of such influences. In short, it is found that political influences operate manifestly in either proactive or reactive senses. Thus, the discussion below proceeds with a consideration of first, proactive influences, and second, reactive influences.

Journalist Marvin Kalb argued that the Iranian hostage crisis was the moment when political decision makers were forced to take the ‘media’ dimension of political activity seriously – and coined for it the
term 'press politics' - reflecting 'the inseparability of foreign policy from its management in the news' (Bennett, Paletz 1994). Nevertheless, 'management' of the news has been a reality as far back as the first modern institution specifically designed for that purpose (the Creel Committee in 1916) and no doubt much further. However, the level of organisation, sophistication and professionalism of such efforts has increased significantly since the phrase 'news management' was apparently coined in 1955 by journalist James Reston (Wyatt 1995). Although 'news management' and related activities have been implicit in the US State Department’s 'public diplomacy' role (which existed as USIA until 1999) and the US Department of Defence's enormous public information apparatus during and since the Cold War, unlike the roles of both State and Defence departments, which are normatively overt, the role of intelligence agencies in these practices remains highly clandestine.

However, several inquiries into the role of the CIA in the news media during the 1970's for example (Loory, Schorr 1974, Rockefeller Commission 1975, Church Committee 1976, Bernstein 1977, Crewdson, Treaster 1977) have demonstrated that for some decades the CIA has effectively run the largest media organisation in the world with some 800 ‘assets’, more than 400 of whom were human (Crewdson, Treaster 1977). Carl Bernstein, in his famous Rolling Stone expose of the CIA involvement in the news media, quoted CIA officials at the time as saying that: 'the most valuable of these associations have been with The New York Times, CBS and Time Inc.', with the relationship with The New York Times (hereafter NYT): 'by far its most valuable among newspapers' (Bernstein 1977).

In a NYT investigation of the CIA's role in the news media published two months after Bernstein's piece in Rolling Stone, it quoted a CIA official as saying that:

We had at least one newspaper in every foreign capital at any given time.. and those that the agency did not own outright or subsidise heavily it infiltrated with paid agents or staff officers who could have stories printed that were useful to the agency and not print those it found detrimental. (Crewdson, Treaster 1977)

This network was known in the CIA as ‘The Mighty Wurlitzer’ which was the metaphor Frank Wisner (first head of political warfare for the agency) used to describe the C.I.A.’s ‘array of front organizations’ that were, he said: ‘capable of playing any propaganda tune he desired’. In the book of
that name Wilford documented the extensive links between the CIA and (again) specifically the NYT, CBS and Time Inc. Writing on the relationship specifically between Henry Luce's Time Inc. and the CIA, Wilford noted that the collaboration was so extraordinarily successful that: 'it was difficult to tell precisely where the Luce empire's overseas intelligence network ended and the CIA's began' (Wilford 2009).

In addition, the Congressional Pike and Church Committees reported between 1975 and 1977 that some of the CIA's most influential agents were placed in news agencies like UPI and the AP from where they could feed news stories to the entire world. As if to highlight the fact that the CIA was not the only agency to engage in such clandestine activities, individual CIA personnel told the various Congressional Committees that the CIA had no agents in Reuters as this was 'MI6 territory', although even this is disputed by the Loory investigation into the CIA's role in the news media published in the Columbia Journalism Review in 1974 (Loory, Schorr 1974). With regard to British intelligence manipulation of news, Nick Davies, writing in Flat Earth News, cites a recently retired intelligence officer as saying that MI6 has 'particularly close links' to The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph and The Financial Times (Davies 2009). The author also cites former MI6 officer Kim Philby as saying that MI6 had 'penetrated English mass media on a wide scale' as well as author and former MI6 agent John Le Carre who stated that 'MI6 controlled large parts of the press' (Davies 2009).

However, very little is known about current intelligence operations in the news media as there have been no investigations over the last three decades on the scale of those conducted in the 1970's. However, two factors suggest that such operations may have become an even more potent force since that time. The first is the vast consolidation of the news media that has taken place since the 1970's and which greatly facilitates such 'news management' practices. The second has been the relatively recent reformulation of emphasis - most notably by the US but also other nation states - on the related phenomena of 'information operations' and/or 'strategic communications', which have been elevated since the events of 9/11 to become a new 'core competency' in the US military (Davies 2009).
The phenomenon of ‘news management’ is surely therefore one of the true 'black boxes' in modern journalism. After all, how does one analyse a phenomenon that is specifically constructed in order to elude such analysis? One approach is to examine instances where such news management practices experience a ‘breakdown’ or become temporarily transparent. Indeed, there are a surprising number of such instances dotted across the landscape of the ‘war on terror’. A famous (or perhaps notorious) example was the 'after the fact' publication by The Washington Post on 10 April 2006 of an official US military plan ‘to create a legend’ of ‘senior Al Qaeda figure’ Abu Musab Al Zarqawi as the leader the insurgency in Iraq. The story demonstrated how a leak to a named NYT journalist was the commencement of a multiyear plan to invoke Al Zarqawi as a bogeyman in order to achieve a number of strategic goals including the discrediting of the opposition in that country and 'helping the Bush administration tie the war to the organization responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks' (Ricks 2006). As The Washington Post noted at the time: 'Leaks to reporters from U.S. officials in Iraq are common, but official evidence of a propaganda operation using an American reporter is rare' (Ricks 2006). It has also been claimed that alleged 9/11 'mastermind' Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's 'confession' in 2007 was an example of news management as the court transcript detailed how KSM had allegedly claimed a list of 30 atrocities that he had planned or put into action, including the Plaza bank skyscraper attack in Washington State. However, as critics noted at the time, the Plaza Bank was only founded in early 2006, at least three years after Mohammed was allegedly captured in Pakistan (Watson 2007).

In addition to proactive political influences on newspaper coverage, political influences can also be viewed in reactive terms. This phenomenon evokes one of Herman & Chomsky's five filters i.e. ‘flak operating as a control mechanism’. For instance, Indian magazine Tehelka, which features in Chapter Four in the context of their special report, 'The SIMI Fictions', originally became a household name in India for an expose it carried out on Indian defence procurement in 2001 that led to the resignation of two Indian Defence Ministers. Writing in the wake of the SIMI expose in 2008 however, Tehelka features editor Shoma Chaudhury described how the magazine became the subject of an official Indian government Commission of Inquiry for that original procurement expose:
Trapped in that Commission with the government as an adversary, fighting a mammoth propaganda battle that has taken almost a decade to abate, we were yanked out of our innocent cocoon and brought face to face with how malevolent power can really be. Kafkaesque is a tired word, but nothing else can explain the bewilderment. If the government’s affidavits were to be believed, we were one of the gravest threats to India’s security: we had shadowy godfathers, we were stock market manipulators, we were, God knows what. Look away from their trick mirror, and in truth, we were just a bunch of journalists. (Tehelka 2008c)

In her book on 'The Tehelka Affair', veteran Indian journalist Madhu Trehan documented how the Indian establishment retaliated against the magazine by attempting to destroy it and its investors. Suggestively, Trehan documented how in advance of the expose Tehelka had a staff of 120, but by 2003 it retained only one salaried employee. One investor in Tehelka was served with 200 summonses, suffered 25 searches and arrests and 17 revenue audits, had their business closed, their right to livelihood revoked and their right to travel suspended (Trehan 2009). It is to the credit of the magazine that they survived and proceeded to publish investigative work as profound as 'The SIMI Fictions', but whatever was achieved in journalistic terms was undoubtedly in the face of a relentless political and institutional headwind.

In addition, whereas the former focused on 'flak' against news organisations, such political reactions can also be directed against individual journalists. On this theme, ex-CBS producer Kristina Borjesson published a collection of essays in 2004 entitled 'Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free Press', which documented the experiences of many journalists when they sought to publish stories 'on topics that powerful interests did not wish to see in the public domain' (2004). All found their careers in tatters after experiencing 'the buzzsaw'. In Borjesson's words, the 'buzzsaw' was:

..what can rip through you when you try to investigate or expose anything this country's large institutions - be they corporate or government - want to keep under wraps. The system fights back with official lies, disinformation, and stonewalling.... Anyone who hasn't experienced it will call you crazy. Those who don't know the truth, or are covering it up, will call you a conspiracy nut. (2004)

Borjesson found herself surplus to requirements at CBS after repeated attempts to report on the overwhelming evidence that TWA Flight 800 had crashed as the result of an explosion or a missile.
Others in the volume had been tackling sensitive subjects like CIA’s role in drug smuggling (Webb)\(^3\) and ‘forgotten’ American POWs in Vietnam (Jensen-Stevenson).

### 2.1.2 Social Organisation.

Schudson’s second category, what he called ‘the social organisation of newswork’, was exemplified by the large scale participant observational studies of the late 1970’s by Gans, Tuchman and Fishman. In this intellectual tradition, the argument that a ‘real world’ exists ‘out there’ to be reported faithfully is dismissed - to be replaced by a view that news is ‘socially constructed’ by ‘a network of individuals engaged in patterned interaction in complex settings’ (Zelizer 2004). Whereas the political economy approach drew its intellectual tradition from the Marxist school of thought, the ‘mainstream sociology’ of Schudson had antecedents in the Chicago school. Here the emphasis is on the day to day, or ‘routine’ aspects of journalism that could serve to explain the apparent discrepancy between the fact of the largely autonomous professional journalist and the largely conservative or ‘typical atypical’ news content. In this vein, according to Tuchman for example:

> News is not a report of the factual world, news is a depletable consumer product that must be made fresh daily…. or a frame through which the social world was routinely constructed. (Tuchman 1978 p. 179)

In addition, Fishman (1980) highlighted how the news media were ‘bureaucratically’ organised in terms of news beats and structure, Molotch & Lester (1974) emphasised the synthetic nature of much news and Epstein (1974) drew on organisational theory to conclude that most of what we regard as news was derived from the organisational tensions involved in its production. While some scholars examined the political affiliations of newsworkers in order to impute some ‘bias’ to the news content they created, more often the new wave of research agreed with Schudson’s thesis:

> Who are the journalists in news organisations who cover beats, interview sources, rewrite press releases from government bureaus, and occasionally take the initiative in ferreting out hidden or complex stories? If organisational theorists are correct, it does not matter. Whoever

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\(^3\) Gary Webb was found dead in 2004 from multiple gunshot wounds to the dead.
they are, they will be socialised quickly into the values and routines of the daily rituals of journalism. (Schudson 1989 p.273)

Related to the notion of routines and professional norms, this theoretical approach to the sociology of news often returned to the importance of the journalist – source relationship. As Schudson noted:

One study after another comes up with essentially the same observation. The story of journalism, on a day to day basis, is the story of the interaction of reporters and officials. (Schudson 2002)

Waisbord (2000) emphasised the same point when he drew attention to the journalistic law of least effort – it being faster and easier to practice journalism based in the world of government than an emphasis on what is actually happening in society. Although estimations of the agency of individual journalists in this model vary, they typically allow for more than that of analyses in the political economy model, although scholars who stress the power of sources vis-à-vis journalists diminish agency to the extent that they do. Finally, the view being implied here, that news production begins in the newsroom – rather than the halls of power - has been criticised as being too ‘media centric’, a debate that will be returned to shortly in terms of the dispute between Hall and Schlesinger over the applicability of the concept of ‘primary definition’.

Although news routines can be seen as a complex amalgam of the interplay of news values, professional journalistic conventions such as objectivity, and the practical and daily constraints of deadline journalism, of especial interest in the context of the current study are the latter, most notably the notion of ‘inferential structures’. Lang & Lang (1955) had coined the phrase in their study of how television viewers had responded to differing coverage from three TV networks that were all covering ‘live’ the complex proceedings of the 1952 Democratic National Convention. According to the authors, the differing interpretations given by the three groups of viewers ‘reflect and were determined by’ an ‘unwitting bias’ of the TV networks ‘differential structuring’. In essence, their research was concerned with how and why media frames are transmitted and become manifest in certain circumstances. Lang & Lang (1955) suggested that the differing commentaries were indicative
of the networks differing conception of audience i.e. the background information deemed relevant depended on an inferred view of audience response. However, the authors used ‘inferential’ in the sense that ‘content elements can be built together into a number of configurations’, rather than ‘inferential’ in deducing or concluding one specific interpretation, as is more commonly associated with the idea of ‘inferential structures’ and news framing today.

Halloran et al. (1968) picked up on this terminology in their famous study of the 27 October 1968 demonstration/protest march against the Vietnam War in London. However, their usage of ‘inferential structure’ is quite distinct from that of Lang & Lang’s (1955) in that here the structure is not perceived in terms of audience guidance, but rather in terms of the ‘consonance’ news value. They explain:

The idea behind this factor is that events will be selected for news reporting in terms of their fit or consonance with pre-existing images – the news of the event will confirm earlier ideas. The more unclear the news item and the more uncertain or doubtful the newsman is in how to report it, the more likely it is to be reported within a general framework that has already been established. (Halloran, Elliott & Murdock 1970 p.26)

It is in this sense of a (typically unidirectional) ‘underlying frame of mind’ that Halloran et al. are interested in order to explain how and why the framing of the demonstration was decided in advance as being ‘about violence’, rather than Lang & Lang’s sense of alternative ‘differential structuring’. However, both studies stress that the development of an ‘inferential structure’ is not the development of a pro or con bias per se but rather ‘a process of simplification and interpretation which structures the meaning given to the story around its original news value’ (Cohen, Young 1981). The notion of ‘simplification’ is evocative of phenomena like stereotyping and sociological ‘typifications’ and was picked up in the same context by Chibnall when he said:

This oversimplification of reality, the elimination of the shades of grey that lie between black and white, the glossing over of subtle complexities of motivation and situation which makes human action intelligible at a level beyond the mundane one of ‘cliché’, ‘folk wisdom’ and taken for granted assumption. (Chibnall 1977 p. 29)
Furthermore, Halloran et al. have noted how these ‘inferential structures’ guide journalists construction of ‘events as news’ on the basis of values and definitions already legitimated in the public mind.

According to Chibnall, this ‘pruning down’ of reality and the moulding of its shape to fix pre-existing forms of news means that reality must be made accommodate news, rather than vice versa, and that social situations must be reduced, if at all possible, to binary oppositions. Chibnall locates this process of what he calls ’conventionalism’ in the dictates of professional objectivity where the innovative qualities of interpretation have been replaced by organisational commitment and conventionality of meaning.

Instead of aiding his audience to come to terms with old realities in new ways, the journalist now tends to help his audience come to terms with new realities in old ways… Fresh thought about new phenomena becomes unnecessary; they merely require locating within the existing frameworks of press ideology. (Chibnall 1977 p. 35)

As such, these structures of meaning become incorporated into journalism’s stock of knowledge and as conventional wisdoms. Hall (1974) makes the same point:

These maps of meaning give plausibility, order and coherence to discrete events.. Such ‘structures’ tend to define and limit the range of possible new meanings which can be constructed to explain new and unfamiliar events. Such normative definitions contain strong dispositions to ‘see’ events in certain ways; they tend to ‘rule in’ and ‘rule out’ certain kinds of additional inferences. (Hall 1993)

In this sense, such ‘inferential structures’ are ‘bits and pieces of a world view’ pressed into the service of occupational routines. By employing these interpretations the journalist can be sure that he is on tested ground, that he will not give offence, and that his reporting will be seen as ‘responsible’. In addition, they allow the journalist working under pressure to produce copy rapidly and with a minimum of thought and preparation. Furthermore, Lang & Lang (1955), Hall (1978) and Entman (2004) have stressed how such ‘inferential structures’, once established, are difficult to alter. Indeed, Lang & Lang (1955) go as far as to say that upon crystallising, the ‘frame of reference overshadows subsequent information to the point that even specific new information is ignored’ (Lang, Lang 1955
p.171). The notion of ‘inferential structures’ will be returned to in Chapter Six, but it is sufficient at this juncture to highlight to common theoretical ground employed by it and notions of news framing and ideology, both of which are discussed in forthcoming sections.

2.1.3 Cultural.

The third and final categorisation by Schudson was the cultural approach to the sociology of news. According to Schudson, most understandings of news merge a cultural view with the social-organisational view but that they are, in fact, distinct. As an example, Hallin (1980) in *The Uncensored War* combined an analysis of the professional convention of objectivity with a discussion of the role of hegemony, to name but two approaches from the respective domains executed in a single study. Whereas the organisational view finds determinants of news in the relations between people, the cultural view finds symbolic determinants of news in the relations between facts and symbols (Schudson 1991). The cultural approach is more commonly associated with a British intellectual tradition linking such centres as the Glasgow University Media Group and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. Thus, in Bad News (1976):

> News developed not as a reflection of ‘the events in the world out there’, but as the manifestation of the collective cultural codes of those employed to do this selective and judgemental work for society. (Glasgow University Media Group 1976 p.14)

Stuart Hall at Birmingham was perhaps the best known individual scholar within this theoretical domain, having found that reality itself can be seen not as a given set of facts but as a mode of definition. The ‘culturological’ approach to the study of news can be considered as an amalgam of what Schudson had previously labelled neo-Marxist and neo-Durkheimian. Whereas the former places a stress on notions like ‘false consciousness’ or ‘ideological state apparatuses’ acting on the individual in a critical sense, the latter is more apt to a functionalist view of issues like political socialisation, uses and gratifications and identity formation.
Definitional issues in turn are evocative of notions of ideology and hegemony and these concepts were to remain closely tied to this approach. Although ideology is a 'decidedly complicated term with different implications' (Croteau, Hoynes 2003 159), and has often come to be seen as a pejorative term to mean 'a system of wrong, false, distorted or otherwise misguided beliefs' (Van Dijk 1998 2), in this study it is interpreted in a neutral manner to denote 'a system of thought' that serves to 'govern the way we perceive our world and that controls what we see as natural or obvious' (Becker 1984 69). Hoggart (1976) made reference in this context to the 'cultural air we breathe' which in turn tells us how 'some things can be said and others had best not be said' (cited in Preston 2009 12). George Orwell makes reference to ideology in his original preface to Animal Farm written in 1943. Noting the potential significance of the prevailing ideology in the context of the difficulty he encountered in getting that book published (as a result of its perceived criticism of then British ally Stalin), Orwell stated:

> At any given moment there is orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that all right-thinking people will accept without question. It is not exactly forbidden to say this, that or the other but it is 'not done' to say it, just as in mid-Victorian times it was 'not done' to mention trousers in the presence of a lady. (Orwell 1972 2)

Related to the concept of 'ideology' is that of 'hegemony', which, according to Gramsci, is the name given to the ruling class's domination through ideology, typically through the shaping of popular consent. Gitlin (1980) expounds on Gramsci's 'core conception' of hegemony in the following way:

> Those who rule the dominant institutions secure their power in large measure by impressing their definitions of the situation upon those they rule and, if not usurping the whole ideological space, still significantly limiting what is thought throughout society. (Gitlin 1980 10)

### 2.1.3 Levels of Analysis.

Finally, writing in 1983, Herbert Gans noted a 'veritable flood' of studies on news production since 1970, following a 'relative famine' of such research in the previous decades (Gans 1983). This newfound emphasis on media content as the dependent variable asked questions regarding the various
factors at play that served to influence the nature of manifest media content. Although it would be another decade before Berger and Chafee (1987) explicitly noted that a valuable approach to ordering the study of communication would be to think of several 'levels of analysis', this was in effect what Gans (1979) had done when he listed four theories regarding how the selection of stories was routinized. Gitlin (1980) then adopted Gans model to explain the origins, appearance and development of news frames in his study of media coverage of the New Left. Later studies by Shoemaker & Reese (1996) and Preston (2009) adopted a typology perhaps more germane to media sociology specifically when they spoke of five levels: 1) Individual influences, 2) organisational influences, 3) media routines and norms, 4) political economic factors and 5) cultural and ideological factors. This ‘levels of analysis’ approach to the study of news content is utilised in the conclusions of the current study to illustrate the factors operating at various levels thought to exert the greatest influence on content.

2.2 News Framing.

2.2.1 Introduction.

The origins of the framing concept lie principally in the fields of cognitive psychology and anthropology (Van Gorp 2007). The frame as an individual or cognitive concept, alternatively referred to as a ‘schema’ in the psychological literature, dates back to Remembering: A Study in Experimental & Social Psychology by Sir Frederic Bartlett in 1932, and even he was reputed to have borrowed the term from the work of Sir Henry Head (Tannen 1993b). The concept of a ‘frame’ is often accredited to the sociologist Irving Goffman in lieu of his oft-cited 1974 book, Frame Analysis, but he in turn credits the well known anthropologist Gregory Bateson with originating the concept in his 1955 paper 'A Theory of Play and Fantasy;' later published as an essay in his book Steps to an Ecology of the Mind (1972). Bateson demonstrated that no communicative move could be understood without
Observing monkeys playing, he noted that it was only by reference to the metamessage ‘this is play’ that a monkey could understand a hostile move from another monkey as not intended to convey the hostilities that it obviously denotes. In other words, metamessages ‘framed’ the hostile moves as play. (Tannen 1993b p. 3)

Goffman (1974) later built on the concept by expanding it for face-to-face interaction. For Goffman, ‘frames’ define social situations by providing the answer to the question: ‘What is it that is going on here?’ According to Goffman, the world is far too complicated for any individual to deal with without drawing on prior experiences or cognitive frames. The term ‘frame’ is often used interchangeably with related concepts such as schemas, scripts or packages and thus Goffman (1974) refers to frames as ‘schemas of interpretation’ that enable individuals to 'locate, perceive, identify and label' events or information: ‘Frame analysis is a slogan for analyzing experience in terms of principles of organization which govern events... and our subjective involvement in them’ (Goffman 1974 p. 9). Although cognisant of Goffman’s work on the general relationship between interpersonal and mass-mediated talk and social interaction (Ytreberg 2002), Meyrowitz claims that Goffman focused on the study of face-to-face interaction and: ‘ignores the influence and effect of media on the variables he describes’ (Meyrowitz 1985 23). Similarly, Gamson, in his analysis of Goffman’s legacy to political sociology, points out that while Goffman was ‘an inveterate news clipper' and cited hundreds of examples from the mass media in his book, he was never overtly interested in framing when it involved the daily cycle of news (Gamson 1985).

The framing concept, however, does not belong exclusively to the fields of cognitive psychology, anthropology or indeed mediated communications, the domain of this research project. In fact, framing theory has been adopted by many disciplines, often with a slight variation in meaning or emphasis, including economics (Kahneman, Tversky 1979), linguistics (Tannen 1993a), social-movements research (Snow et al. 1986) and public relations research (Hallahan 1999), amongst others.
The first manifest applications of the concept of a ‘frame’ in communications (specifically the news production process) were those by Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980). For Tuchman (1978): ‘frames turn non-recognisable happenings or amorphous talk into a discernible event. Without the frame, they would be mere happenings of mere talk’ (1978 p. 192). On the other hand, Gitlin sees frames as ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual’ (1980 7). The emphasis on selection is a theme later picked up by such theorists as Entman (1993), D’Angelo (2002) and Reese (2001). According to Entman’s locus classicus:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation of the item described (1993 p. 52).

Likewise, both D’Angelo (2002) - in his response to Entman’s call for a clarification of the ‘fractured paradigm’ - and Reese (2001) stress the conscious nature of frame selection. However, as Koenig (2004) points out, this emphasis on conscious selection of frames is novel when compared to the model of framing that Goffman originally envisaged: ‘In a Goffmanian framework, such a question would have been nonsensical, since framing is an innate property of all social processes, not only those most consciously manufactured’ (Koenig 2004 2).

Although news frames are conceptualized in various ways, generally, framing is centred on meaning, as ‘frames construct particular meanings concerning issues by their patterns of emphasis, interpretation, and exclusion’ (Carragee, K. M., Roefs, W. 2004 p. 217). According to Gamson (1989), a news frame is: ‘a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue’ (Gamson, Modigliani 1989). Similarly, Tankard (2001) noted that it is a ‘central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration’ (Tankard 2001 p. 100). Gamson and Lasch (1983), in their analysis of the political culture of welfare policy, distinguish between framing devices that suggest how to think about an issue and framing devices that suggest what should be done about it. In
the former category they place metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and images while in
the latter they place roots, consequences and appeals to principles (Gamson, Lasch 1983). In this
manner, they mirror Entman's (1993) explication of causal and treatment attribution.

The word ‘frame’ can be used both as a noun (a frame) and as a verb (to frame). As a noun, a 'frame'
connotes the boundary within which an image is displayed and set apart from the background - it
plays a filtering role in perception, interpretation and understanding of specific situations. The verb 'to
frame', refers to the crafting of a frame, whether deliberately or not, during communication (Shmueli
2008). Framing theory and the concept of framing bias suggests that how something is presented i.e.
'the frame', influences the choices people make. This idea is important because it is contrary to a
central concept of rational choice theory, according to which people always strive to make the most
rational choices possible. Thus, rational decision makers should always make the same choice when
presented with equivalent data, regardless of framing.

2.2.2 Media & Individual Frames.

Frames may be considered as having two principal loci. Frames can refer to the content of
communication that serves to select or emphasise certain information (frames in communication) or
alternatively, they can refer to an individual’s (cognitive) understanding of a given situation (frames in
thought). Both are concerned with variations in emphasis or salience but they differ in that the former
focuses on what the communicator says while the latter focuses on what an individual is thinking
(Druckman 2001). This conception parallels Kinder & Sander's (1990) distinction between frames
that function as both 'devices embedded in political discourse' and frames that function as 'internal
structures of the mind' as well as Scheufele's (1999) distinction between 'media frames' and 'individual
frames'. For Kinder & Sanders (1996), frames exhibit a double life. They are interpretive structures
embedded in political discourse where they function as rhetorical weapons 'created and sharpened by
political elites to advance their interests and ideologies' (1996 p. 164) as well as more implicit and
unconscious journalistic habits that attempt to explicate rather than persuade. At the same time,
frames: 'live inside the mind; they are cognitive structures that help individual citizens make sense of the issues that animate political life' (p. 164).

Scheufele (1999) uses various definitions of frames to show how they invariably refer to one or other of these conceptualisations. For example, Entman is referring to media frames when he says that frames are 'attributes of the news itself' and he is referring to individual frames when he talks about 'information-processing schemata' of individuals or 'mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals processing of information' (Entman 1993). Similarly, both Gamson & Modigliani (1987) and Tuchman (1978) are referring to media frames when they respectively speak of 'a central organising idea or storyline' or that 'the news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality... it is an essential feature of news' (p. 193).

2.2.3 Frames as Independent or Dependent Variable.

In his attempt to systematise the fragmented approaches to framing in political communication and integrate them into a comprehensive model, Scheufele (1999) classified framing not alone along the media versus individual dimension outlined above, but also by the way frames are operationalized by researchers. By integrating both approaches to framing, Scheufele (1999) hoped that his typology would serve as a tool for theory building, thus contributing to what Entman (1993) called 'social theory in the largest sense' (Scheufele 1999 p. 104). He therefore identified frames as both dependent and independent variables. Studies of frames as dependent variables examine the role of various factors in contributing to the creation or modification of frames. This can be considered at both the media level where journalists framing of an issue may be influenced by organisational factors (Shoemaker, Reese 1991) or individual factors (Tuchman 1978) and at the audience level where frames as the dependent variable are examined mostly as direct outcomes of the way mass media frame an issue (Price, Tewksbury & Powers 1997). Studies of frames as independent variables are typically more interested in the effects of framing.
In the current study it can be argued that the focus on the 'attribution of responsibility' frame is operationalized as both independent and dependent variable. Thus, Chapter Four is largely concerned with establishing 'who' was implicated and 'how', paralleling studies examining frames as the independent variable and looking to 'effects', although the precise cognitive processes that individuals use to 'process' this information remains outside the scope of this study. By contrast, Chapter Six, it can be argued, operationalizes the frame study as a dependent variable because the primary concern here is to identify the most significant factors that are constitutive of this process of attribution.

The intersection of the two distinctions identified above give shape to four research questions. First, with respect to media frames as the dependent variable, the question becomes 'what factors influence the way journalists or other social groups frame certain issues?' Second, with respect to media frames as the independent variable, the question becomes 'what kinds of media frames influence the audience’s perception of certain issues?' Third, with respect to individual frames as the dependent variable the hypothesis is tested by asking 'what factors influence the establishment of individual frames?' Fourth, and finally, with respect to individual frames as independent variable, the question is typically posed as: 'how do individual frames influence individual perceptions of issues?' Based on the two dimensions, Scheufele (1999) constructed a four cell typology that thus allows for a classification of framing studies with respect to their main focus. In doing so, he cites three advantages to the model. First, it permits a direct comparison of findings within cells and between cells. Second, it provides insight into how well previous studies have answered questions pertinent to each cell. Third, 'the typology goes beyond hypothesis testing in relatively isolated or eclectic studies in different disciplines, to develop a common understanding of the concept of framing', as seemingly called for by Entman (1999 p. 108) among others.

Table 1 Scheufele's Four-Cell Typology of Framing Studies.
2.2.4 The Process Model of Framing.

One of the most intuitive approaches to the study of news frames is to explicate the phenomenon in terms of its lifecycle stages i.e. production, content and effects. A perennial problem for research in these areas has been to convincingly link news texts to both production and consumption processes (Pan, Kosicki 1993). Neuman (1989) for example has detailed how the field has historically diverged between media-centric scholars (those who are primarily interested in the structure of the communication industries and media content) and effects-centric scholars (who focus on audience effects and take the complexity of media content and structural organisation as a given), before going on to suggest a new theoretical perspective and measurement model to bridge the gap (Neuman 1989).

More recently, the point has been restated, with scholars again emphasising that for framing research to fulfil its potential: 'audience research needs to be tied carefully to the work of journalists in meaningful ways' (McLeod, Kosicki & McLeod 2002 p. 230). To study the process of framing in its entirety therefore, framing must be examined 1) in the newsrooms of media organisations, 2) as frames in the news, and 3) as individually and collectively expressed opinion (De Vreese 2003).

The process of news production, and specifically framing, is inevitably influenced by factors both internal and external to the news organisation. Internally, empirical work on news work has typically focused on either individual media workers and/or on organisational structures and routines. In the
latter category are ‘inferential structures’ which suggests that ‘events will be selected for news reporting in terms of their fit or consonance with pre-existing images’ (Boorstin 2012). Borrowing from agenda-setting research, this phase of the news framing process has been labelled frame building (Scheufele 1999, De Vreese 2005). In answering the question regarding the kind of organisational/structural factors of media organisations (or individual characteristics of individual media workers) that influence the framing of news content, Scheufele (1999) cites the work of Gans (1979) and Shoemaker & Reese (1996) to suggest at least three: 1) journalist centred influences (news values, ideology, attitudes etc.), 2) organisational routines and 3) external factors (ownership, politicians, elites, interest groups etc.).

For individual media workers, news values play a central role in the process of news selection and framing. Price & Tewksbury (1997), for example, identified conflict, shared narratives, human interest, proximity and timeliness as core news values, and consequently predicted that these values are likely to be adopted by news-workers in subsequent framings of news events along these lines. However, news values not only influence the selection of news but also its presentation (Gamson 1992). Framing a news story as conflict for example is a co-option of a news criterion to become ‘a central organising idea’ for the presentation of the news item itself (De Vreese 2003).

At the organisational level, both Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980) shared not only the conception that news is a socially constructed product but also a view of news-work that is rooted in the routines of media organisations. For Tuchman (1978): ‘news both draws upon and reproduces institutional structures.. through its arrangement of time and space.. the news organisation disperses a news net which is limited to legitimated institutions’ (1978p. 210). Also on this theme, Gitlin (1980), in answering his own question of how frames are ‘clamped’ onto reporting, stated:

For the most part, through journalist’s routines.. these routines are structured in the way that journalists are socialised, then trained recruited, assigned, edited, rewarded and promoted on the job; they decisively shape the ways that news is defined, events are considered newsworthy, and ‘objectivity’ is defined. (1980 p. 11)
The second stage of the lifecycle (or process) model of framing seeks to identify frames in the news. There is little agreement in the literature on how best this objective might be achieved. Two broad approaches have been identified and are discussed in more detail in Chapter Three of this study (De Vreese 2005). These are the inductive approach which refrains from analyzing news stories with predefined news frames in mind, allowing them to emerge in the course of analysis (Gamson 1992, Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992) and deductive which investigate frames that are defined prior to analysis (Semetko, Valkenburg 2000). In practice however, a mixed approach is more typical, as it is important to 'know' one's material before defining frames a priori. The latter is the approach adopted in this study.

A distinction should also be made between the two typical types of frames encountered in framing studies. Some frames are pertinent only to specific topics or events and may be labelled issue-specific frames. Other frames transcend issue limitations and can be identified in relation to many topics. These frames have been labelled generic frames (De Vreese 2005). Studies of issue-specific news frames have looked at the framing of Air Force misadventures (Entman 1991), nuclear power (Gamson, Modigliani 1989), the anti-nuclear movement (Entman, Rojecki 1993), the Intifada (Cohen, Wolfsfeld 1993), the women’s movement (Terkildsen, Schnell 1997), labour disputes (Simon, Xenos 2000), local TV framing of the Gulf War (Reese, Buckalew 1995) and public perceptions of US national budget deficits (Jasperson et al., 1998), amongst many other topics.

Generic frames, on the other hand, can be applied either to issues as diverse as above or more generic ones, but constitute a comparative functionality that greatly facilitates cross analysis and interpretation. Studies using generic frames have looked at the framing of European politics (Semetko, Valkenburg 2000), the launch of the Euro (De Vreese, Peter & Semetko 2001), strategic election coverage (Patterson 1993), political strategy & cynicism (Cappella, Jamieson 1997), abortion discourse (Pan, Kosicki 1993), meaning construction (Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992) and strategy in public policy (Lawrence 2000), amongst many others.
One of the most oft cited studies of generic news frames is Iyengar’s (1994) work offering a distinction between ‘episodic’ and ‘thematic’ frames. The episodic frame focuses on individual cases or discrete episodes, whereas the thematic frame ‘places political issues and events in some general context’ (Iyengar 1994). These frames are examples of a more generic conceptualization of news frame that have the capacity to transcend issue, time, and space limits (De Vreese, Peter & Semetko 2001). A more common conceptualisation of generic news frames however, as noted previously, typically draws from what could loosely be termed news values. Thus, Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) conducted an extensive literature review of generic frames for their study of European politics and confirmed that the following frames (in order of frequency used) largely account for the most frequently appearing generic frames in the news i.e. attribution of responsibility, conflict, economic consequences, human interest, and morality (Semetko, Valkenburg 2000). Similarly, in a study of frames used in different news outlets, Neuman et al. (1992) identified human impact, powerlessness, economic consequences, moral values and conflict as the most common generic frames used by both the media and the audience (Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992). In the current study, approximately 95% of the newspaper coverage under analysis was classified according to four generic frames: (1) attribution of responsibility, (2) economic consequences, (3) human interest and (4) treatment recommendation. In regard to the conceptualisation of generic versus issue-specific frames, generic frames hold a number of advantages. First, issue specific frames have no common reference point which makes it impossible to compare differences and similarities across studies. Second, for the purposes of theory building, issue specific frames do not allow generalisations to be made across situations and third, generic frames are linked theoretically and conceptually with the news production process as outlined above with regard to news values.

The third and final aspect of the lifecycle model of framing, or what De Vreese calls the ‘process’ model, addresses framing effects. It is possible to conceptualise framing effects in a number of ways. Druckman (2001) for example makes the basic distinction between equivalency framing effects and emphasis framing effects. Equivalency framing effects occur when the use of different (but logically equivalent) frames causes individuals to alter their preferences by casting the same information in
either a positive or negative light. The most cited example of an equivalent frame is the Asian disease problem where, faced with two equivalent scenarios framed differently, 50% of respondents changed their preferences (Kahneman, Tversky 1979). Another type of equivalency framing effect occurs when respondents change their preferences in response to variations in survey question wording, such as 90% employment vs. 10% unemployment. In contrast, emphasis framing effects show how 'by emphasising a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker can lead individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions' (Druckman 2001 p. 230). As an example, it has been shown that when government spending on the poor is framed as enhancing the chance that poor people can get ahead, respondents tend to support increased spending. However, when it is framed as resulting in higher taxes, respondents tend to oppose increased spending (Sniderman, Theriault 1999).

A primary focus of the current study is to examine how, 'by emphasising a subset of potentially relevant considerations', the newspaper coverage under review served to construct images of attribution which, it is assumed, led 'individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions' regarding the war on terror itself.

2.2.5 Framing Terrorism & The War on Terror.

As discussed previously in this review of the literature, framing or alternatively 'news framing' is a relatively new approach to the study of news discourse. The Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts demonstrates that the number of studies on ‘framing’ have grown exponentially over the past four decades. For the periods 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2010 for example, the following number of 'framing' studies were returned: 176, 511, 1,916 and 8,354. In contrast, the phenomenon of terrorism dates back at least to the French 'Reign of Terror' in 1793. In the model of Rapoport that distinguished between four waves of modern international terrorism i.e. (1) the Russian ‘Anarchist’ wave beginning around 1890, (2) the ‘Anticolonial’ wave beginning around 1920, (3) the ‘New Left’ wave beginning around 1970 and (4) the ‘Religious’ wave beginning around 1990 (Rapoport 2006b), we can observe that it is only the latter two that have been analysed in the context
of the mediating role of the mass media, and that only the final wave has been analysed in terms of the nascent approach of news framing.

The bulk of the literature in this first phase of analysis of the relationship between terrorism and the mass media has revolved around the question of whether the mass media are 'culpable' or 'vulnerable' (Barnhurst 1991) in regard to the role they play in the reporting of terrorism and terrorists. The competing positions on this question are explored more thoroughly elsewhere in this literature review as are considerations of the literature more generally on the 'war on terror'. However, apart from the question posed above regarding the effects of media coverage on the phenomenon of terrorism (whether pro or anti), the literature in this area has increasing looked to ‘framing’ as a more nuanced approach to the study of media coverage of terrorism. This is no doubt connected to the growing body of framing research more generally in the 1980’s and 1990’s but also because the events of 9/11 have given way to a new ‘master-frame’ of the ‘war on terror.’ The older Cold War frame, used for shorthand comprehension in international conflict during the post-war era, had been losing its intellectual coherence and narrative power steadily throughout the 1990's following the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. After the fall of the Berlin wall: 'the replacement of the older frame with the newer ‘war on terrorism’ frame offered a way for American politicians and journalists to construct a narrative to make sense of a range of diverse stories about international security, civil wars and global conflict' (Norris, Kern & Just 2003 p. 15).

In the wake of the events of 9/11, the media narrative quickly gelled within a kind of ‘master-frame’.

Writing in the weeks following the attack, Hackett noted that:

Frames are unavoidable in journalism, as in any form of effective story-telling. Comprising mostly implicit assumptions about values and reality, they help to construct coherent narratives out of a potential infinity of occurrences and information. The problem is that when they are accepted uncritically, frames can lead journalism to exclude information which, from another perspective, would be considered relevant. In America's alternative press, but rarely in the dominant media, other frames were in play - that violence begets violence, or that the double standards and hegemonism of the U.S. government's foreign policy were part of a broader pattern from which the evil acts of September 11 emerged. (Hackett 2001 p. 1)
Similarly, writing about the framing of the President’s speech to the UN two months after 9/11, Kuypers, Cooper & Althouse (2008) also considered the new label in terms constituent of being a ‘master frame’:

We believe the War on Terror frame can best be described as a master frame, one that is comprised of numerous themes. Some have defined master frames as similar to paradigms in science. (Kuypers, Cooper & Althouse 2008 p. 13)

Others have declared that master frames structure: ‘the way in which its adherents process information coming from the environment and the manner in which they disseminate information to others’ (Levin 2005 p. 84). Like Hackett (2001) and Kuypers, Cooper & Althouse (2008), Reese (2007) has also written on how ‘the war on terror’ frame (‘perhaps the most important framing case of our time’) has made it extremely difficult for political actors to advance a compelling counter-frame, such has been its hegemony in political discourse over the past decade:

The war on terror has been elevated to a macro-framework that comes closer to ideology. That is, political debate takes place largely within the boundaries set by the frame with general acceptance of the assumptions built into it. (Reese 2007 p. 152)

In a later study of the USA Today newspaper, Reese & Lewis (2009) analysed how the frame was internalised by the US press. The authors here regard the war on terror as ‘a macro level cultural structure that functions in its scope as an ideological expression... meaning in the service of power’ (2009 p. 778). Specifically, the authors distinguished between three types of engagement with the master-frame: (1) transmission i.e. shorthand reference to specific national policies, (2) as reification of that policy, dropping any sense of its constructed aspect, and (3) as a naturalised, uncritical way of seeing the world (Reese, Lewis 2009). They conclude that in addition to simply repeating the preferred terminology of the President, journalists reified the policy and naturalised it: ‘suggesting that they accepted its use as a way of describing a prevailing condition of modern life' (2009 p. 792).
According to Entman (2003), calling the post-9/11 policy a ‘war’ on terrorism was ‘a contestable but effective framing choice’ (2003 p. 416). He proposed what he called a ‘cascading activation model’ to supplant the well established findings and insights of research using the hegemony and indexing approaches in order to better explain how, and under what conditions, frame challenges can be successful. The model explains how interpretive frames activate and spread from the top level of a stratified system (the White House) to the network of non-administration elites and on to news organisations, their texts, and the public – and how interpretations feedback from lower to higher levels. Valenzano (2009), in his study of Canadian newspaper coverage of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, builds on Entman’s model and concludes that ‘in instances where there is disagreement with the White House frame, reporters enhance the elite criticism offered toward the White House’ (2009 p. 174).

Since the events of 9/11 a large body of literature has developed on the concept of framing in relation to various aspects of the ‘war on terrorism’. George (2003) for example has looked at the differences in news framing of terror in Malaysia between mainstream and alternative press, Li & Izard (2003) examined how newspapers and television networks differed in their framing of 9/11, Dimitrova & Stromback (2005) studied how framing of the Iraq war differed between the elite newspapers of the US and Sweden, Ryan (2004) examined the framing of the war on terrorism in the editorials of the ten largest US newspapers in the month after 9/11, Danis & Stohl (2008) examined media framing of the London bombings and the ‘transatlantic plot’ of 2008 and Spielvogel (2005) examined moral framing of the war on terrorism in the context of the 2004 Presidential campaign. There has, however, been no study of the ‘framing’ in terms of the construction of attribution with respect to the ‘war on terror’, a more fundamental question which speaks alone but directly to the legitimacy of the concept.

2.3 News Sourcing.
2.3.1 Introduction.

While news framing as a subset of political communication only gained widespread currency in the 1990's, news sourcing was the object of seminal studies much earlier. For example, Hall et al.'s notion of primary definition, which indicated for them 'a form of cultural power through which particular ideologies and preferred meanings are circulated throughout the wider society' by the news media, was published in 1978, echoing the 'hierarchy of credibility' that Becker had identified ten years previously (Hall et al. 1978, Becker 1967). The same year saw the emergence of Tuchman’s oft quoted newsroom ethnography, *Making News*, where the metaphor of a 'news net' was put forth by Tuchman as an image of a device to 'catch' news like fish from news sources (Tuchman 1978). Many studies have documented the prevalence of official sources in news discourse. These include the studies by Sigal (1973) and Brown (1987) on newspapers and by Herman & Chomsky (1988) and Solely (1992) on network evening newscasts. This era of news source investigation was bookended by *Negotiating Control* (1989) which, like Hall et al.'s work, looked at the role and influence of news sources in the criminal justice system, on this occasion in Canada (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1989).

The latter ultimately concluded by showing how sources and journalists join together physically, socially and culturally as interdependent participants in knowledge production and use. In place of studying media content as an independent variable (which was an approach often seen in numerous 'effects' studies of the early period), many of these scholars turned their attention to the 'processes' of media creation (such as news making) in order to understand how the media 'product' is produced. Studies in this tradition range from those at the individual level to those at the organisational and environmental 'levels of analysis' (Preston 2009, Berger, Chaffee 1987, Shoemaker, Reese 1996).

The first of these has as the focus of analysis the individual media worker and their preferences, background, experience and personal ideologies (Shoemaker, Reese 1991). Fiske & Taylor (1991) for example suggested that journalists have a prior stock of generalised knowledge about other people or situations that they use as guidelines of how to deal with news events in terms of sourcing, questioning etc. (Fiske, Taylor 1991). The second level focused on the organisational structures and
routines that influence media workers and the media content they generate. The trend in organisational studies of news work has emphasised the 'manufacturing processes of news' (Schudson 2003). In contrast to studies at the individual level, the organisational theorists argued that: 'it does not matter who (journalists) are or where they come from, they will socialise quickly into the values and routines of the daily literatures of journalism' (Schudson 1997 p. 27). However, a third focus of analysis is the interaction between media organisations and the wider social, cultural and political environment. The focus here is on forces external to the media organisations that shape its functioning and performance. Apart from the central role of news sources, Shoemaker & Reese (1991) identify four others: revenue sources, technology, the political and legal environment and perceptions of audience needs and wants (Shoemaker, Reese 1991). Despite the centrality of news sources to news selection or 'creation', Schlesinger (1990) argues that this has been an area 'under-conceptualised' largely due to the traditional focus on how news organisations have made use of sources of information, rather than any consideration of the power of news sources in their own right (Schlesinger 1990).

Both of these competing foci in relation to what might be called organisational and environmental influences on the role and power of news sources will be considered in this review of the literature of news sources. This will necessarily include consideration of whether news is selected or 'created' (Fishman 1980, Molotch, Lester 1974), whether official news sources enjoy dominance in a 'structured relationship' with news organisations (Hall et al. 1978, Becker 1967, Sigal 1973) and/or whether the power of such sources is overstated or at least more problematic (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1989, Schlesinger 1990). Consideration too will be given to some of the metaphors and models that have guided research in the area of news sources. These include for example Tunstall’s (1971) 'exchange model' (Tunstall 1971) whereby information is exchanged for publicity in a reciprocal relationship; Gans' (1979) metaphor of a 'tug of war' between news organisations and news sources in which both attempt to 'manage' the other for maximum advantage (Gans 1979); in addition to models of the 'news net' (Tuchman 1978) and of 'information subsidies' (Fishman 1980, Gandy 1982).
2.3.2 Organisational Influences.

Subsequent to the establishment of 'gatekeeping' and 'social control' as news making phenomenon, Galtung & Ruge (1965) addressed an area that had been unexplored to that point i.e. the criteria of news values (Galtung, Ruge 1965). They analysed international news stories to find out what factors they had in common and what factors placed them at the top of the news agenda. Arguing that the notion of 'newsworthiness' was in fact a complex set of twelve criteria, Galtung and Ruge (1965) stipulated that the more criteria an event satisfied, the more likely it would be reported. Golding & Elliott (1979) have stressed that news values are used in two ways: 1) as criteria of selection from material available to the newsroom and 2) as guidelines for the presentation of items, suggesting what to emphasise, omit etc. (Golding, Elliott 1979).

Little research had by this point been pursued into the organisational and occupational influences on the news making process but this was to change with the first comprehensive study of the practice of British journalism by Tunstall (1971). Indeed, Tunstall (1971) explicitly states in his introduction that 'the situation in 1965, at the beginning of this study, was that not a single social science study of any aspect of British journalism existed' (1971 p.25). The focus of his research was on the role of 'specialist correspondents' and two hundred such journalists (in nine specialist fields) employed by 23 British media organisations were surveyed. With regard specifically to the relation between news sources and specialist correspondents, Tunstall investigated the structure of this relationship with regard to the primacy of a particular source in a given field (e.g. crime), the attitude of the source organisation to publicity (promotional, negative or cautious), the role of payments to sources (none, a little, much), the role and type of sanctions open to news source organisations, the role of attitudes held by specialist correspondents and even the demeanour adopted by specialists in dealings with sources (deference, discretion or aggression). The role of governments and organisations as news sources is also given extensive treatment in the study by Tunstall. Indeed, the presence of a major government source organisation is specified as a key factor in the setting up of a new specialist field by newspaper editors who want to be sure that there is 'enough' news to keep a specialist busy,
thereby crystallising the often symbiotic relationship between news gatherers and news source organisations.

This was also the period of large scale newsroom ethnography studies, examples of which were the studies by Tuchman (1978), Gans (1979) and Fishman (1980). The theme that the act of making news is the act of constructing reality itself rather than 'a picture of reality' runs through the oft quoted study by Tuchman (1978). The data for her study Making News was gathered by participant observation and interviews over a period of ten years at one TV station and two newspapers, in addition to time spent at the New York City Hall Press Room. The metaphor of a 'news net' was created by Tuchman as an image of a device to 'catch' news like fish (McQuail 2010). This aids in an examination of how news organisations place reporters in order to find occurrences that can be transformed into news stories. The finer strands of the net are provided by 'stringers', while reporters and the wire services provide the larger mesh: 'The netlike formation of the dispersion of reporters is of theoretic importance, for it is a key to the constitution of news' (Tuchman 1978 p. 23). It is furthermore asserted that the news net incorporates three assumptions about reader's interests regarding: 1) occurrences at specific localities, 2) the activities of specific organisations and 3) specific topics of interest. 'Accordingly, the news net is flung through space, focuses upon specific organisations and highlights specific topics' (1978 p. 25). Tuchman (1978) also explores the relationship between finding facts and using news sources, particularly with regard to the question of whether journalistic practices in the casting of the news net increase the probability that some news sources or occurrences will be caught by the net while other news sources or occurrences will be allowed to slip through:

Reporters seek out centralized sources, politicians and bureaucrats... they contacted the powerful... not the dissident or dissatisfied... that people with power serve as sources bear consequences for the information news workers uncover. (Tuchman 1978 p. 24)

In a much later paper on the role of qualitative methods in the study of news, Tuchman (1991) sought to identify her participant-observation study cited above in the context of other such studies regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis (Gans 1979), the Vietnam war (Gitlin 1980), the war in Northern Ireland
(Schlesinger 1978) and views of deviance (Fishman 1980). These studies were deemed a significant departure from earlier work for three reasons: 1) their unit of analysis was not the individual reporter or editor but news organisations as complex institutions, 2) they were implicitly political with the authors seeking to understand how news came to support official interpretations and 3) they raised epistemological issues regarding how news organisations come to know what they know (Tuchman 1991).

While Fishman’s (1980) study of a Californian newspaper was more participant than observer (he actually worked as a reporter there for seven months), his study had much in common with that of Tuchman. Like Tuchman, Fishman distinguished between an approach to the study of news that focused on the creation of news rather than the traditional focus of media studies that emphasised the selectivity of news by news workers, exemplified by White’s (1950) classic study of gatekeeping. Underlining this new approach was a critical view of the traditional assumption that reality consists of facts and events 'out there' which exist independently of how news workers report them. McNair (1998) for example summarised three categories of the real world: 1) the world as is, 2) the world as perceived by human observers and 3) the world as reported, adding, that to go from category one to three requires a complex social process, which changes 'the real' as it goes (McNair 1998). This was an approach evoking work six years earlier by Molotch & Lester (1974):

> By suspending belief that an objective world exists to be reported, we develop a conception of news as constructed reality. Public events are held to exist because of the practical purposes they serve, rather than because of their inherent objective importance. The news content of mass media is seen as the result of practical, purposive and creative activities on the part of news promoters, news assemblers and news consumers... the result is a process of news creation. (Molotch, Lester 1974 p. 101)

In his primary focus on the creation of news, Fishman (1980) focuses on what he calls the most fundamental elements of news making; the work routines that journalists use to approach the world and the methods by which 'they transform that world into news stories'. The journalist’s relationship to the world, according to Fishman, is not a direct one but one mediated by practical concerns: publication deadlines, news space limitations etc. News then is a 'practical organisational
accomplishment' and the practicalities of news production tie news organisations to government agencies and corporate bureaucracies.

Fishman fleshes out this argument by reference to what he calls 'the three dynamics in the American news production system': the bureaucratic logic, the normative logic and the economic logic of news reporting (Fishman 1980). With regard to the first, it is pointed out that news organisations need reliable, predictable, scheduled quantities of raw materials because: 'it is set up to process these in reliable, predictable, scheduled ways in order to turn out a standard product' (1980 p. 143). Fishman refers to this as 'the principle of bureaucratic affinity' i.e. only other bureaucracies can satisfy the input needs of a news bureaucracy. The normative logic refers to the fact that reporters are held accountable to write about 'real happenings using factual information' and thus reporters operate with the attitude that officials 'ought to know what it is their job to know;' amounting thus to a 'moral division of labour: officials have and give the facts; reporters merely get them' (1980 p. 145). Finally, the economic logic dictates the 'minimisation of labour costs' inherent in the 'capitalist economies of news enterprises'. The minimum labour force required is much smaller than what it would be if journalists could not rely on bureaucracies to do much of the work for them in what amounts to an 'invisible bureaucratic subsidy of news', pre-empting later themes by Gandy (1982). All three logics serve to reinforce the symbiotic relationship between (usually official) news sources and news reporters.

Thus, Molotch & Lester (1974), Tuchman (1978) and Fishman (1980) would all agree that in the manner outlined above, routine journalism communicates an ideological view of the world. What journalists end up reporting is not what actually happens or what is experienced by journalists but an ideologically constructed version of reality with its roots in the practicalities of news work, the 'news perspective'(Altheide 1976), imposed by the existing structure of the news gathering industry.

2.3.3 Environmental Influences.
Similar structuralist and ideological themes are explored by Hall et al. (1978) in their consideration of the reaction in the UK to 'the importation' of the American phenomenon of mugging (Hall et al. 1978). According to Hall et al., the media play a central role in 'the social production of news' which is deemed by them to have three aspects. Along with the structuralist idea that the bureaucratic organisation of the media produces the news in specific types or categories, the structure of news values is deemed to order the selection and ranking of particular stories within these categories and finally the 'moment of construction' places the stories within a frame of meanings familiar to the audience. Hall et al.’s assertion that the media do not themselves autonomously create news items - rather that they are 'cued in' to specific new topics by regular and reliable institutional sources - will be familiar to students of Tuchman (1978) and Fishman (1980). Likewise, his rationale for this state of affairs - having to do with the internal pressures of news production and the fact that media reporting:

Underwritten by notions of objectivity, balance and impartiality are wherever possible, grounded in objective and authoritative statements from accredited sources.... These two aspects of news production... combine to produce a systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions. The media thus tend, faithfully and impartially, to reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in society’s institutional order. (Hall et al. 1978 p. 653)

Original in Hall et al.’s analysis however is his introduction of the idea of 'the primary definer' and his delineation of the types of accredited sources deemed granted access. Institutional representatives are deemed to be ‘accredited’ because of: 1) their institution power and position, 2) their representative status – either of people or organised interest groups and/or 3) their expert status. With the latter, the disinterested pursuit of knowledge naturally conveys on the expert the labels of 'objective' and 'authoritative.' Hall’s notion of the primary definer is analogous to what Becker (1967) had previously labelled the 'hierarchy of credibility’ – the likelihood that those in powerful or high status position will have their definitions of controversial matters accepted because such individuals are deemed to have access to more accurate and/or specialised information (Becker 1967). This is intended to apply across the board, and it arguably does to a greater or lesser extent (Schlesinger 1990). However, it is
especially pronounced in the area of crime reporting where Hall et al.’s study *Policing the Crisis* was situated. Here, the police, Home Office spokesmen and the Courts form a near monopoly of news sources as identified by Tunstall (1971) previously and Ericson, Baranek & Chan (1987) later. The situation is further exacerbated by the consideration that while in the normal course of events a statement by a company may be balanced by that of a union for example, a police statement is rarely if ever balanced by one from a criminal. Criminals are neither legitimate nor organised and by virtue of being criminals have 'forfeited the right to take part in the public negotiation', thereby further narrowing the potential sources of information in this manner (Hall et al. 1978). This is an especially noteworthy phenomenon in the context of the current study, addressing as it does the 'crime' of terrorism and the 'discursive regimes' that are constitutive of the discourses in this subject domain. In fact, as Chapter Four demonstrates, only one 'terrorist' gets to 'speak' across the three case studies in this research project.

Schlesinger (1990) agrees that there is a strong case for arguing that the way in which journalistic practice is organised generally promotes the interest of authoritative sources, especially those of government and state. However, Schlesinger argues that because Hall et al.’s approach to primary definition treats the question of source power on the basis of structuralist assumptions, it 'closes off any engagement with the dynamic processes of (source) contestation', whether official or non-official. Schlesinger proceeds to critique Hall et al.’s model of primary definition by noting that it does not take account of contention between official sources, that official sources also influence story construction by briefing 'off-the-record', and for being 'atemporal' i.e. for it tacitly assumes the permanent presence of certain forces in the power structure.

While the model expounded by Hall et al. (1978) - in which primary definition is seen as 'commanding the field' and producing a dominant ideological effect - has been seen as a critique of more pluralistic approaches, Schlesinger (1990) argues that a study of non-official sources, rather than running counter to a theory of dominance or determinism should be viewed instead from within a theory of dominance. For the structuralist approach is profoundly incurious about the process
whereby sources engage in ideological conflict prior to or contemporaneous with the appearance of definitions in the media’ (1990 p. 68). The question of alternative views arises as a matter of importance as does recognition of the fact that official status does not necessarily ensure credibility. Schlesinger (1990) quotes the study by Sigal in this regard:

The convention of authoritativeness may assure a hearing in the news for those in authority, but it is no guarantee of a good press... The press, in amplifying some voices and muting others, in distorting some messages and letting others come through loud and clear, affects the nature of opposition... (but)... The press does not do so on its own: groups differ in their ability to make their voices heard and to direct and shape their messages for the public. (Sigal 1994 p. 35)

Schlesinger’s (1990) objective is to offer a model of non-official sources in which competition for access to the media takes place, but in which material and symbolic advantages are unequally distributed. According to Schlesinger, the most advantaged do not secure a primary definition by virtue of their positions alone. Rather, it is because of a successful strategic action in an imperfectly competitive field. Putting it differently, primary definition becomes an achievement rather than a wholly structured predetermined outcome. In this sense, sources may be seen as ‘political entrepreneurs’ who use available resources to maximum effect’ (Schlesinger 1990 p. 74). This proposed model requires consideration of factors such as if: 1) the source has a well defined message capable of satisfying news values, 2) the optimal locations for placing that message and the target audiences have been identified, 3) the preconditions for success have been assured and 4) the opposition has been neutralised or anticipated.

In sociologist Herbert Gans' classic Deciding What’s News (1979), the author spent ten years (intermittently) at four major television and magazine newsrooms (CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time) observing and talking to the journalists who choose the national news stories ‘that inform America about itself’. The study described how America is reported by the popular national news media, why it is so reported, and proposes some other ways of reporting it. For the purposes of this literature review the ‘why’ is the most relevant and apart from a consideration of news sources, Gans' study dealt with the organisation of story selection, story suitability, objectivity and
ideology, profits and audiences and pressures and censorship. Although Gans fieldwork approach gives the emphasis to the inner workings of media organisations, he also provides an insight into the power of sources. Gans emphasises the relationships that play the key roles in the news making process, for example, the 'tug of war' between the source and audience interests, with reporters being more source orientated and editors being more conscious of what will have audience appeal (Reese 1994). However, in a point reiterated by others (Sigal 1973, Golding, Middleton 1982), Gans sees the media as passive on the whole and so leaving the strategic advantage with the more aggressive sources. Gans sees powerful sources, especially public officials, exerting their influence through their dominance of journalism:

Sources alone do not determine the news, but they go a long way in focusing the journalists attention on the social order described earlier. Neither do sources alone determine the values in the news, but their values are implicit in the information they provide. Journalists do not, by any means, parrot these values, but being objective and detached, they don't rebut them either. (Gans 1979 p. 145)

Gans identified four primary factors which he felt significantly shaped source-media relations. The first relates to the source desire to get information into the public domain. Second, the power of the source can in itself signifies newsworthiness. A third factor is the importance of economic resources to those that act as news sources. This boils down to the ability to provide information and can manifest also in terms of media skills. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, Gans points to the ways in which social and geographical proximity act as selector mechanisms, evoking Schlesinger (1990): 'lack of social contact screens out most would-be sources and geographical concentration of news gathering brings about regularisation of media search procedures' (Schlesinger 1990).

Some years after Gans' study, Herman & Chomsky’s (1988) Manufacturing Consent proffered a 'propaganda model' to focus on 'the inequity of wealth and power and its effects on mass media interests and choices.' As noted earlier in this study, the ingredients of the model are a set of five news filters (Herman, Chomsky 1988). In their treatment of news sourcing, the third filter, they reference earlier work by Tuchman (1978) and Fishman (1980) by noting how the mass media are drawn into a
symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest (Herman, Chomsky 1988). To consolidate their preeminent position as sources, government and other official sources are said to make life as easy as possible for media organisations by a number of means including: 1) the provision of facilities and advance copies of speeches, 2) scheduling press conferences geared to news deadlines and 3) writing press releases in usable language. Echoing Fishman (1980) & Gandy (1982), Herman & Chomsky also drew attention to the fact that 'the large bureaucracies of the powerful subsidise the mass media' (Herman, Chomsky 1988).

The authors further contend that the relation between power and sourcing extends 'beyond official and corporate provision of day to day news to shaping the supply of experts' (Herman, Chomsky 1988). By co-opting experts and putting them on the payroll as consultants, funding their research, and organising think tanks that will hire them directly and thus help disseminate their (official) messages, inherent bias may be structured. Subsequently, by giving these 'purveyors of the preferred view a great deal of exposure, the media confer status and make them the obvious candidates for opinion and analysis' (1988 p. 18). As an illustration of this in practice, Herman & Chomsky surveyed the 'experts' on terrorism and defence issues who appeared on the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour in the course of a year in the in the mid 1980's. Excluding journalists, a majority of the participants (54%) were present or former government officials, with the next highest category being individuals from conservative think-tanks (16%) and finally, academics (14%).

No review of the literature on news sources would be complete without reference to the comprehensive studies by Ericson, Baranek & Chan (1987, 1989, 1991). The authors, with a criminology background, are centrally concerned in their first work Visualising Deviance (1987) with the study and representation of deviance in society. They note how regular sources, politically involved in the deviance-defining elite, organise to benefit through the news media:

Grounded inside the newsroom, the research reported in this book has a dependency to depict news-media power as virtually boundless. Grounded in source organisations, the research reported in a forthcoming volume adjusts this picture. Journalists face the bounds of powerful sources that mobilise strategically to variously avoid and make news. While the news media institution is effectively closed to most citizens.. a limited range of sources can
Indeed, the title of their second volume in the series, *Negotiating Control*, denotes a more contested reality than even the authors allude to in its forerunner. In an approach that was also favoured by Schlesinger (1990), the authors emphasise their concern with the strategies and tactics used to control how the source organisations and their activities are visualised in the news media. Thus, just as sources face the problem of obtaining access to the news, so journalists have the problem of obtaining access to a source organisation. According to Ericson et al. (1989), negotiation for control of the news takes place on three terrains: the physical, the social and the cultural. The physical terrain is the actual physical arrangements available for journalists to do their work and include considerations of access, temporal and otherwise. The social relations map the network among journalists and sources and include consideration of the flow of personnel between the two, as journalists come to work as public relations consultants for example and vice versa. Finally, cultural terrain considerations pertain to questions such as whether news or other values are mutually shared (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1989).

Regarding the negotiation of control between sources and journalists, the authors conclude that it is not a straightforward matter to answer the question: 'who controls?' While much of the prior literature has argued that the news media are dependent on their sources (Hall et al. 1978, Fishman 1980), the research by Ericson et al. (1989) note that the news media are very often in possession of key resources that often give them the upper hand. For example, sources, when considering how to contribute within an established news frame or when limited to a twelve second clip sometimes feel that it is *they* who function as 'conduit pipes' and 'secondary definers' for the news media:

> There is considerable variation in who controls the process, depending on the context, the type of sources involved, the type of news organisations involved, and what is at issue. (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1989 p.378)

### 2.3.4 News Source Typologies.
Perhaps the most obvious distinction between source types is that between 'official' and 'non-official' sources. It is also one of the most frequently utilised distinctions in the literature. In his classic study of reporters and government officials, Sigal (1973) was one of the first researchers to specifically look for news media bias by studying the sources used by reporters. Sigal asserted that it is more objective to look at who the sources are instead of trying to interpret what the sources are saying. He surveyed almost three thousand sample page one articles spanning two decades (1949-1969) from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* and classified channels of information into three categories: routine, informal, and enterprise. After analyzing the stories which used only one source, stories which used multiple sources (divided into one primary channel and one or more secondary channels) and all stories together, he reported a significant dependence on official news sources. He found that, first, almost half of the stories relied on routine channels, and second, that almost three quarters of all sources for national and foreign policy issues were official - whether US or foreign.

Sigal argued that because reporters cannot witness many events directly, they 'must locate themselves in places where information is most likely to flow to them' (Sigal 1973 p. 119). Mirroring the findings of Tuchman (1978), Hall et al. (1978) & Fishman (1980), Sigal found that economic efficiency dictates newsgathering through 'routine channels'. The result is that the reporter looks to official channels to provide him with newsworthy material day after day. One broad implication made by Sigal was that the news media acts a mediator between the officialdom and the citizenry of the United States (Sigal 1973). He likened it to a pipeline connecting a reservoir to a city: 'A few drops might evaporate or get redirected, but the effects of the pipeline are insignificant in comparison to the source of the water, the reservoir' (Sigal 1973 p. 120).

Other studies of media before and after Sigal have confirmed in general his findings. Kern, Levering & Levering (1983) examined the front and inside foreign policy 'crisis' stories during the Kennedy administration in five major US newspapers. In the sample, of the 11,250 stories, 30% of the sources were Kennedy administration officials and 50% of the sources were foreign officials, again reaffirming repeated dependence on official sources (Kern, Levering & Levering 1984). In their book
Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in the News Media, Lee & Solomon (1991), who worked on the staff of the liberal media watchdog Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR), analysed 865 instalments of, and 2,498 guests on, the influential ABC current affairs show Nightline (Lee, Solomon 1991). The authors found that of the guests surveyed, 80% were government officials. Two further studies in 1987 and 1989 - involving six daily newspapers and television news respectively - also confirm the dominance of official news sources (Brown et al. 1987, Whitney et al. 1989). Communications scholar Michael Schudson has commented on this situation by noting:

This reality – that news gathering is normally a matter of the representatives of one bureaucracy picking up prefabricated news items from the representatives of another bureaucracy – is at odds with all of the romantic self-conceptions of American journalism. (Manoff, K., Schudson, M 1987)

A second type of news source commonly analysed is the 'expert'. This is typically an academic, member of a think-tank, or former political insider. In his succinctly titled paper 'Sound bite seeks expert', Steele (1990) notes how academics are particularly attractive to television news producers who have usually already decided what they want said before calling these sources to 'reinforce their own understanding of a story' and to invoke 'the illusion of objectivity' (Steele 1990). Elsewhere, Soley (1992) also confirmed the tendency of network news organisations to rely on a homogenous handful of the same experts to put events into context in an apparently natural and objective fashion (Soley 1992). Confirming both the ubiquity yet unwelcome nature of this development, Shaw (1989) recounts an anecdote that speaks volumes:

Albert R. Hunt, Washington Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal, says he grew so annoyed at seeing the same experts quoted in his paper all the time that he banned the use of several of them for a couple of months last year. ‘The ban ended when I did a column and had to quote a couple of them’, he says, sheepishly. (Shaw 1989 p. 3)

A third category of news source relates to the distinction between named and unnamed sources and the distinct but related issue of the relationship between unnamed sources and reader credibility. One of the most prolific authors in the area of unnamed sources is Culbertson who conducted a content analysis in 1975 of twelve newspapers ranging from local to national titles, finding that unnamed
news sources appeared in about one-third of all analysed news stories but substantially more often in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* (Culbertson 1975). Three years later he followed up with another study 'Veiled Attribution – An Element of Style?' where he found in a content analysis of *Time* and *Newsweek* that unnamed attributions occurred in 75% of the stories in *Time* and 70% of the stories in *Newsweek* (Culbertson 1978). In the intervening two years, Culbertson allied with Somerick to analyse the effect of unnamed sources on reader credibility but found no differences in perceived accuracy or truthfulness between news stories with and without named sources (Culbertson, Somerick 1977).

Other studies of unnamed sources have utilised longitudinal and comparative research designs. For example, St. Dizier (1985) looked at use of unnamed sources in Florida newspapers in 1978 and 1984 and concluded that the frequency of their use dropped in that time (Dizier 1985). In the same year, Wulfemeyer (1985) analysed anonymous attribution in *Time* and *Newsweek* and found the former quoted anonymous sources in 77% of all stories while *Newsweek* quoted anonymous sources in 80% of all stories (Wulfemeyer 1985). In both cases, anonymous sourcing increased in stories regarding foreign rather than domestic issues. Another study of anonymous sources was conducted by Denham (1997). Here the author focused on the coverage of the wars in Bosnia and Somalia by the AP and *The Washington Post* and found that the latter used more anonymous sources (Denham 1997). Finally, in a more recent study, Martin-Kratzer & Thorson (2007) studied use of anonymous sources in 16 newspapers and four major broadcast network shows, concluding that there had been a fall in the use of unnamed sources in the period reviewed i.e. between 2003 and 2004 (Martin-Kratzer, Thorson 2007).

### 2.3.5 Sourcing Terrorism & The War on Terror.

While sourcing practices in the context of media coverage of terrorism have been studied, such studies have been isolated and/or niche and do not attempt to answer the question of what the 'war on
‘terror’ coverage means for source-media relations. For example, Paletz et al. (1982) looked at news sources utilised by *The New York Times* in terrorism stories during the 1970’s on the IRA, the Red Brigades and the F.A.L.N. Finding that 69% of all stories included direct interviews, quotations, or reports of the official side while only 21% of stories included some form of adversarial perspective, the authors concluded that coverage of the three groups relied heavily on authority sources and hence ‘does not serve to legitimise their concerns’ (1982 p. 162). Some years later, Atwater & Green (1988) studied source use on the three major US networks and found that the ratio of unofficial sources to official sources to be approximately 70% versus 30%, although this may have been an aberration due to the distinct nature of that event i.e. the TWA hostage crisis.

In contrast, Wittebols (1995) compared terror sourcing practices between US and Canadian TV networks, also in the late 1980’s. Based on a nine week sample in which the stories selected reflected topics dealing with different kinds of terror, he concluded that official sources make up 60% of all sources for networks in both countries and are quoted for longer periods than non-official sources. Wittebols (1995) concluded that television news generally serves as a bully pulpit for dissemination of official, bureaucratic perspectives in U.S. television network news, although Canadian TV news presents a comparatively more nuanced, less institutional and less superpower-dependent tone to its coverage of terrorism (widely defined).

In addition, some other sourcing studies have looked at what ‘experts’ are utilised as terrorism commentators over time, such as Herman & O’Sullivan (1989), Reid & Chen (2007), Riegler (2010) and Miller & Mills (2009). In all cases, the studies found that terror ‘experts’ utilised are closely linked to security and intelligence establishments and that as a result, their analysis is politically and ideologically biased. However, apart from Archetti (2010a), who studied news sources drawn on by the elite international press to gauge ‘indexing’ among other concepts (Archetti 2010a), no study has sought to obtain a comprehensive overview of news sourcing practices in regards to newspaper coverage of the war on terror and less again to do so from the specific perspective of the attribution of responsibility for specific terrorist attacks.
2.4 Terrorism & The War on Terror.

2.4.1 Origins & Introduction.

Although terrorism in its various forms has been in existence for thousands of years, etymologists claim that the term did not enter the popular lexicon until after its French forerunner ‘terrorisme’ had been coined in France in the early 1790’s. Wilkinson (1974) outlines how the modern words terror and deterrent are derived from the Latin verbs terrere, to tremble, and deterre, to frighten from. Prior to the French ‘Reign of Terror’ however, multiple groups had utilised terror for political purposes e.g. the Sicarii, the Assassins, and the Thugs. However, it can be asserted that the modern period of terrorism was inaugurated by the Jacobin ‘Reign of Terror’ in 1793-1794. One of the earliest references to terror was made by Edmund Burke who famously wrote in 1795 of 'those hell-hounds called terrorists... let loose on the people' (Law 2009 p. 65). Unlike terrorism as it is commonly understood today i.e. to mean a revolutionary activity undertaken by non-state actors, in this period terrorism was distinctly state directed and the term had yet to take on the pejorative connotations of today. Indeed, before his demise in 1794, and with him that of the terror, Robespierre had proclaimed that ‘terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible’ (Palmer 1959). Thereafter ‘terrorism’ became a term associated with abuse of office and power. Hoffman (2006) has noted that one of the French Revolution’s enduring repercussions was:

..the impetus it gave to antimonarchical sentiment elsewhere in Europe... the advent of nationalism based on the common identity of a people rather than the lineage of a Royal family was resulting in the unification and creation of new states such as Germany and Italy... from this milieu a new era of terrorism emerged, in which the concept had gained many of the familiar revolutionary, anti-state connotations of today. (Hoffman 2006 p. 4)

One of the earliest exhibitors of this was the Italian Republican Pisacane, who is sometimes credited with the theory of 'propaganda by deed', although Wardlaw (1989) identifies the French anti-parliamentarian Paul Brousse as the originator of the concept. In any event, Pisacane wrote that 'ideas
result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are free' (Hoffman 2006 p. 6). Perhaps the first organisation to put into practice these theories was the Narodnaya Volya, or 'People’s Will', which operated in Russia between 1878 and 1881 and which sought to overthrow the Tsarist rulers. Wardlaw (1989) has written that the most important influences on the formation of terrorist policy in Russia at this time were anarchism and nihilism, and that what distinguished Narodnaya Volya’s terrorist campaign from anarchist activities taking place elsewhere in Europe was the fact that anarchist activity was characteristically an individual activity while the campaign in Russia was a directed campaign (Wardlaw 1989). In the end, the pressure brought to bear on the organisation after its assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881 led to its demise, although various successor organisations later took its place. At the same time, Irish terrorist groups were also engaging in directed ‘terrorist’ campaigns, although in this case the motivations were nationalist and separatist rather than anti-monarchical or anarchist in nature. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (founded 1858) and later Clan na Gael (1873), were both formed with the intent of directing terrorist activity against British interests in Ireland and with the aim of securing Irish independence. The groups met with little success for decades however until the Easter Rising of 1916 contributed to a swelling of nationalist sentiment that ultimately paved the way for the negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921, ultimately establishing an Irish Free State within the Commonwealth.

If the connotations of the term ‘terror’ had changed from state directed violence to anti-state in the period from 1795 to 1895, it was to change back by the 1930’s to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states such as Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. After World War II however, when those regimes were dismantled and defeated (although Stalin prevailed until 1953), the focus shifted back again to revolutionary connotations - especially in the context of the nationalist and anti-colonial struggles that were taking place at that time in Africa and the Middle East. Countries such as Israel, Kenya, Cyprus and Algeria owed their independence at least in part to nationalist movements that employed terrorism against colonial powers. It was also during this time, as Hoffman (2006) recounts, that:
...the politically correct appellation of 'freedom fighters' came into fashion as a result of the political legitimacy that the international community accorded to struggles for national liberation and self-determination. (Hoffman 2006)

Indeed, so important had legitimacy in the eyes of the international community become that other groups of nationalist or ethnic origin outside of the colonial context emerged that sought to 'ride the wave' of international sympathy during this period. Groups such as PLO, the FLQ (Quebecois separatists) and ETA (Freedom for a Basque Homeland) were later joined by other groups of a more ideological bent (typically left-wing) such as the Red Brigades and the Weather Underground.

Rapoport (2004, 2006) has outlined a useful shorthand distinction of modern terrorism by utilising the concept of waves rather than organisations. According to Rapoport, a wave is a cycle of activity in a given time period characterised by expansion and contraction phases:

A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships. As their names – 'Anarchist,' 'Anticolonial,' 'New Left,' and 'Religious' – suggest, a different energy drives each. (Rapoport 2004)

In this model the first three waves last approximately 40 years each while the fourth has lasted about 30 to date. Of the four waves outlined by Rapoport, the anti-colonial was by far the most successful, principally because both the victors and the vanquished in WWII either elected to or were forced to abandon their colonial empires. Thus, nations like Philippines, Libya, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Morocco became ostensibly independent states free from imperial control (Rapoport 2006b). The anti-colonial phase lasted until 1962 when the New Left wave began. Here, organisations like the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Weather Underground in the US and Action Directe in France adopted philosophies than commonly had a leftward orientation but were also very anti-imperialistic in outlook, looking first at the Viet Cong in Vietnam and later at the PLO as heroic models. Before the third phase finished in the 1980’s, the final phase of religious terrorism had begun in 1979, inspired by the events of the Iranian Revolution, the Camp David Accords and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan according to Rapoport (2006a). This wave’s signature tactic was the suicide
bomb, which was typically delivered without warning, thereby abandoning established tactics of the previous waves. The wave was characterised not so much by religion itself, as by fundamentalist Islam specifically. The main proponents of the violence in this phase were initially state actors like Iran and latterly non-state groups like Al Qaeda. The latter declared war on the US in 1996 before allegedly launching attacks on US embassies in Africa in 1998, the USS Cole in 2000 and the US itself on 9/11, leading to the instigation of the 'war on terror' in 2001.

2.4.2 Typologies of Terrorism.

The many varieties of terrorism have led to a plethora of attempts at classification. This is probably due to the fact that in resolving definitional difficulties, a theoretical analysis must be structured and classification is a necessary prerequisite to hypothesising (Friedlander et al. 1979). Indeed, the use of typology is regarded as essential by Schmid & Jongman (2005): 'in that scientific information requires the systematic ordering and classification of empirical data'. According to Chalmers Johnson (1976 p. 37), typologising is related to analysis in the chemical sense: 'the division of a substance into its constituent parts and the attempt to reveal the relationship that they have with each other'. In his study of terrorism, White (2006) has identified some advantages in utilising typologies and some disadvantages. First, according to White, terrorism is composed of a variety of activities, not a single defined action. A typology therefore captures the range of terrorist activities better than most definitions. Second, according to White, the scope of the problem allows the level of the problem to be introduced. Thus, a typology helps identify what kind of terrorism is to be explained. In terms of disadvantages, White (2006) outlined the fact that terrorism is in a constant state of change. Models, taxonomies and typologies are generalisations that describe extremely unstable environments. Thus, while typologies and other models may aid our comprehension of the subject, each terrorist incident 'must be understood in the context of its specific social, historical and political circumstances'. A second potential drawback to the use of typologies is the danger of scholars, having developed a model of terrorism: 'to try to fit particular forms of terrorism into it. They alter what they see so that it will blend with their typology' (White 2006 p. 14).
In advance of looking at specific examples of some of the more commonly cited typologies, it is instructive to outline a ‘typology of typologies’ as developed by Fleming, Stohl & Schmid (1988). According to the latter, there are numerous possible approaches to the analytical classification of terrorism but they concentrate their analysis on four distinct approaches: 1) classification of terrorist groups, often based on ideologies as a distinguishing feature, 2) classification of underlying motivations, often based on the objectives of the terrorists, 3) classification based on terrorism rather than terrorist groups, often based on the nature or degree of terrorist acts, and finally, 4) classification based on the etiology or origins of terrorism (Flemming, Stohl & Schmid 1988). Ultimately, according to the authors, the test of a good typology rests on the degree of functional utility. Although they conclude that none of these classification schemes have shown ‘broad multifunctionality’, they do serve to elucidate some of the more common approaches (Flemming, Stohl & Schmid 1988).

One of the most commonly cited typologies of terrorism is provided by Wilkinson who based it on the three typical aims or ‘motivations’ of terror (Wilkinson 1974). The first is repressive terrorism i.e. that which is ‘most commonly but not exclusively used by states to suppress, put down or constrain certain groups or individuals’. Sub-types of repressive terror include colonial terror, police terror, martial terror, prison-camp terror, counter-insurgency terror and ideological and thought terror. The ‘Reign of Terror’ that followed the French Revolution is the quintessential example of repressive terror. The second type of terrorism that Wilkinson identifies is revolutionary terror i.e. ‘that which has the long-term objective of bringing about political revolution’. The latter typically involves a fundamental change in the power structure and often a fundamental change in the socio-economic order. The terrorism in the current study can be situated in this category. Wilkinson’s final category in his oft cited typology of terrorism is the sub-revolutionary type. This is defined as ‘terrorism employed for political motives other than revolution or governmental repression’. Typical goals of sub-revolutionary terrorism include attempts to compel governments to introduce specific policies or legislation (e.g. eco-warriors or abortion activists), revenge or warning against specific officials, waging terror in a feud with rival factions, retaliation against invasion of land or against interference
with a way of life. Sub-types of revolutionary terrorism may include 1) vengeance, 2) assassination, 3) feuds and 4) partisan resistance (Wilkinson 1974).

If Wilkinson’s 1974 typology of terrorism is the most frequently cited in the literature, it is by no means the only one. Paralleling the distinction between the 'repressive' and 'revolutionary' terroristisms identified by Wilkinson, Thornton (1964), a State department analyst, mirrors these concepts but uses a different terminology in his 'motivational' typology. He identifies 'enforcement' terror as coercion applied by regimes in power while 'agitational' terror is the use of force by those seeking to gain power. Evoking Flemming et al.’s third category, 'modus operandi', Gross (1972) delineates what he calls terror-violence by means of the five strategies involved: mass terror, random terror, focused random terror, dynastic assassination and tactical terror. Another 'modus operandi' typology of terror is provided by the historian Bowyer Bell who identifies six categories, namely psychotic, criminal, endemic, authorised, vigilante and revolutionary (Bell 1977). Typologies are ultimately based upon observation of difference, and attempt to discover the underlying causes of the difference. In this vein, Johnson (1976) identifies what he refers to as four species of 'group' terrorism (Flemming et al.’s first category): ethnic, nationalistic, ideological and pathological.

Majid Tehranian (2002) of the Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research at the University of Hawaii provides one of the most current typologies of terrorism. According to Tehranian, the terrorism phenomenon can be divided into four distinct categories. The first of these, revolutionary terrorism, differs slightly from previous uses of the term by allowing not only organised acts of terrorism (as per Wilkinson) but individual or lone acts also. Thus, he cites in this category Palestinian terrorism against Israeli targets as well as Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the Federal building in Oklahoma. Tehranian’s second category is labelled 'global terrorism', which 'aims at shocking the world into recognition of certain worldwide grievances' and 'is a new phenomenon responding to the forces of globalisation'. He cites the 9/11 attacks as the quintessential example of this form which have 'dramatized' economic, technological and cultural changes in international relations. The third type is 'messianic' terrorism that seem to be motivated by religious beliefs e.g. Heaven’s gate
collective suicide in 1997. The final category of Tehranian is state terrorism which is exercised by regimes against their own populations e.g. Iraq’s chemical attack on the Kurds (2002 p. 6).

### 2.4.3 The Media & Terrorism.

Although the phenomenon of terrorism preceded the advent of the mass media in the early part of the twentieth century, its modern incarnation has come to be closely associated with the media, largely though not exclusively due to the tactics and strategies said to be employed by terrorist groups to ‘play’ the media in order to maximise objectives in terms of publicity and exposure. This process has accelerated in recent decades as the ubiquity of modern mass media has grown in tandem with the increase in media channels (TV, radio, internet etc.) and a similar (although less dramatic) increase in media consumption among audiences. At the same time, the amount of terrorist groups has also proliferated, especially since the late 1960’s in what Rapoport referred to as the 'third wave' of modern terrorism. Indeed, Schmid (1982) has noted that the term 'international terrorism' first entered The New York Times index as a separate category only in 1970. In Britain, its first appearance in The Times index was in 1973 – prior to this it was included under the more general heading 'guerrillas and terrorists' (Schmid, De Graaf 1982). Apart from the increase in terrorism (and terrorist groups), Alali & Eke (1991) outline two further reasons why the phenomenon gained increasing attention in the 1970’s & 1980’s from academics, governments and the mass media: (1) the proliferation of know-how on explosives manufacturing and (2) the advancements in telecommunications technology 'which have increased both the size and the speed with which news and information travel' (1991 p. 1).

This new focus on terrorism and the mass media has often centred on the question of whether or not media coverage of terrorism has a contagion effect, or alternatively phrased, whether media coverage is a help or a hindrance to the terrorist cause. Writing on this subject, Paletz and Boiney (1992) assert that 'there are two diametrically opposed camps: those that indict the media as proterrorist and those that indict the media as antiterrorist' (Paletz, Boiney 1992). Similarly, Barnhurst (1991) identifies two camps of scholars; one which sees the media as ‘culpable’, instrumental to terrorism; another one
arguing that the media are ‘vulnerable’ victims of the manipulation by terrorists. According to Norris et al. (2003 p. 3), the debate has centred around two questions: 1) whether media coverage errs on the side of terrorists, lending them legitimacy and credibility and leading to a contagion effect or 2) err instead on the side of governments, due to over reliance upon the framework of interpretation offered by officials. It is worthwhile exploring some of the opposing positions on either side of this divide, beginning first with those who propose the ‘contagion’ hypothesis.

A common theme among those scholars that propose that the media have a 'contagion effect' on terrorism is the idea of the perceived need by terrorists for publicity, and the perceived need of governmental authorities to ‘starve’ them of such publicity, as was memorably phrased in a famous speech by Margaret Thatcher in 1985. This view was neatly encapsulated by Laqueur of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, when he stated:

> Terrorists have learned that the media are of paramount importance in their campaigns. that the terrorist act by itself is next to nothing, whereas publicity is all. they are, in some respects, the super-entertainers of our time. (Laqueur 1987)

This view is also reflected in the words of Brian Jenkins, a Rand Corporation expert on terrorism, when he states that 'terrorists choreograph their violence. terrorism is theatre' (Jenkins 1980). Schmid & De Graaf (1982) point out that the terrorist news promoter and the professional journalistic news assembler have what have been called 'parallel event needs'. They both seek attention and a large audience and on that basis they collaborate instinctively. Schmid & De Graaf (1982) proceed to outline how media can promote terrorism in three ways: by reducing inhibitions to violence, by offering models and know-how, and by motivating potential terrorists. Another scholar who analysed coverage of terrorist violence carried out by the IRA in The Irish Times, The Times and The New York Times, found strong support for the contention of media support of terrorism: 'The mere quantity of newspaper coverage sufficiently predicts the subsequent volume as well as scale of terrorist violence. This relationship holds for both those newspapers that are especially critical of the violence and those especially apathetic about the violence' (Tan 1988). Likewise, another study by Weimann (1983) that
looked at changes in audience perception based on exposure to press coverage of terrorist events, found that students who were exposed to media coverage of a terrorist event tended to consider the event more important and noteworthy, and that exposure to press coverage did tend to enhance slightly the evaluations of the terrorists (Weimann 1983). While the study does not support the contagion hypothesis as such, it does point to subtle attitudinal effects that can be traced to media coverage of terrorism.

One of the most forceful advocates of the position that media do not constitute a 'contagion' of terrorism is Picard (1986), who wrote a paper specifically on the topic with the subtitle 'Dangerous Charges Backed by Dubious Science'. In the paper, Picard notes that there is 'no credible evidence that media are an important factor in inducing and diffusing terrorist acts' and that 'not a single study based on accepted social science research methods has established a cause-effect relationship'. Indeed, Picard notes, scholars have attempted to overcome this problem by 'borrowing' conclusions from the literature on the effects of televised violence and crime on viewers, a body of work that, according to Picard, is 'contradictory, inconclusive, and based on widely differing definitions, methods and assumptions'. The historian Johnpoll (1977) is another scholar who dismisses the 'media as contagion' argument. Echoing Picard, Johnpoll argues that 'little or no evidence indicates that publicity spawns terrorism... publicity and terrorist activities do not follow the chicken and egg syndrome. Publicity does not spawn terror in the same way that terror leads to publicity' (Johnpoll 1977). Similarly, Adams (1982) has noted that the accusation that excessive media coverage legitimizes terrorist interests warrants documentation before accepting such a charge as factual (Adams 1982). Likewise, Paletz, Ayanian & Fozzard (1982) studied network coverage of three terrorist groups and found that while networks reported the same events and portrayed them similarly, they concluded that the television news did not endow them with legitimacy and the justness of their cause was denied. In this sense they could not be accused of providing a contagion effect, especially as the underlying motivations were rarely explained and almost never justified (Paletz, Fozzard & Ayanian 1983). This latter point was also emphasised in the work of Kelly & Mitchell (1981) who analysed 158 incidents of transnational terrorism in The New York Times and The Times before concluding that while
terrorism does generate a considerable amount of press attention, the particular type of coverage it receives ‘would appear to undermine the effectiveness of terrorism as a communications strategy’ (Kelly, Mitchell 1981). In summary, Paletz & Boiney (1992) conclude that the research evidence tends to support the argument that media coverage does not help terrorist, but qualify this on two grounds: 1) that the evidence is confined to media content rather than attempting to trace actual effects of media coverage on public opinion for example and 2) that the studies rarely analyse media coverage of terrorism in terms of the specific arguments made by its critics (Paletz, Boiney 1992).

2.4.4 The War on Terror.

A ‘war on terror’ was launched by the then Reagan administration (and specifically by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) No. 138) in late March 1984, only days after Muslim extremists kidnapped the then Beirut CIA station chief William Buckley. However, the term did not enter the common lexicon at the time, in contrast to the post 9/11 experience when President Bush’s identical framing of the new conflict took hold almost immediately (Arquilla 2006). Since then, the ‘war on terror’ has surely been one of the most analysed phenomena in political communication during the first decade of the 21st century. This is perhaps unsurprising given its prominence and impact on domestic and international politics during this time. It has increasingly been regarded as the new ordering principle of international relations (Archetti 2004). The phenomenon has been identified as a ‘master frame’ akin to the ‘Cold War’ (Hackett 2001, Kuypers, Cooper & Althouse 2008) which dominated political discourse in the latter half of the 20th century. (A discussion of the ‘war on terror’ in terms specific to news framing is conducted elsewhere in this literature review). Scholars have looked at the phenomena of the ‘war on terror’ through a variety of lens over the past decade, including but not limited to the approaches of discourse, international relations, international communications, myth-making, legal questions etc. Some exemplars of this scholarly work are outlined and discussed here.
Perhaps one of the most common lens through which the ‘war on terror’ has been examined is that of discourse. The discourse analysis approach recognizes that terrorism is socially constructed and attempts to demonstrate how understanding this form of political violence relies on the use of words, symbols, and meanings (Dowling 1986, Tuman 2009). Like the Cold War therefore, the ‘war on terror’ can be seen in terms that approach ideology – ‘it conjures up a larger world of meaning, bringing with it a set of assumptions, symbols, and worldviews that gain and maintain organizing power as they are naturalized’ (Lewis, Reese 2009 p. 88). In his essay on discourse analysis and the war on terror, Drake (2007) noted that the past couple of decades have seen a growing awareness of the social effects of discourse and the way representations can have wide-ranging social implications. Drawing attention to the habit of ‘bracketing off’ words and phrases (as commonly done with the master frame of ‘the war on terror’) also indicates what Fairclough (1999) referred to as ‘critical language awareness’:

Signs such as quotation marks around conventionally accepted terms have become commonplace in print to indicate that the usage of a term is up for question, contentious, and we have even developed hand signs as a supplement to indicate this in speech.

(Drake 2007 p. 16)

Scholars have analysed the ‘war on terror’ discourse from many perspectives, but perhaps one of the most frequent and commented-upon aspects of the discourse was that of its binary nature i.e. ‘the placement of one thought or thing in terms of its binary opposite’ (Burke 1969). Kellner (2004) for example, argues that both Islamic Jihadists and the Bush administration deployed Manichean discourses of good and evil, positing a binary opposition between Us and Them, civilization and barbarism. Kellner (2004) labels these as ‘spectacles of terror’, specifically designed to promote their respective political agendas. He also draws parallels between Bush’s Manichean dualism and the friend/enemy opposition of Carl Schmidt upon which National Socialism was based. According to Hall (1997), binary constructions are dominant discursive patterns because they are the simplest way of making a difference (Hall 1997). Coe et al. (2004) also note this and identify how such binary constructions are ideally suited for a U.S. political culture dominated by mass media: ‘that is, binaries well fit the dominant norms of news construction, making it likely that a political leader’s use of them would be echoed in press coverage’ (Coe et al. 2004 p. 235).
Other analyses of the 'war on terror' from the perspective of discourse have varied in methodologies and angles of approach. For example, Graham et al. (2004) utilised what they call ‘a discourse-historical approach’ to illustrate the significance of the ‘war on terror’ when compared with other famous ‘call to arms’ speeches in history. Steuter & Wills (2009) outline what they call a 'discourse of dehumanisation' in the Canadian press where the enemy in the 'war on terror' is constructed 'as dehumanized, de-individualized, and ultimately expendable'. Archetti (2010), in contrast, looks at the strategic narrative of Al Qaeda as she argues that 'the concept of narrative is essential to understanding the process of radicalisation' (Archetti 2010c). In a later paper Archetti (2010) extends this analysis to consider strategic narrative as a brand (Archetti 2010d).

In addition, scholars have also examined the 'war on terror' from the perspective of international relations. Bellamy (2005) for example asks the question of whether the war on terror is just, and ponders the answer to his question in terms of three theories of international relations: Realism, Pacifism and the Just War tradition (Bellamy 2005). A topic related to international relations is the legal status of the 'war on terror'. Paust (2007), writing in 'Beyond the Law – The Bush Administration’s Unlawful Responses in the War on Terror', notes how, contrary to assertion, the US simply cannot be at war (in a literal rather than metaphorical sense) with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda as such:

The lowest level of warfare to which certain laws of war apply is an insurgency. For an insurgency to occur, the insurgent group would have to have the semblance of a government, an organised military force, control significant portions of territory as its own, and its own relatively stable population or base of support. (Paust 2007 p. 49)

In a similar vein, members of Al Qaeda cannot be 'combatants', much less 'enemy' or so-called 'unlawful combatants'.

Other scholars have approached the 'war on terror' from the perspective of international communications. For example, Archetti (2010) tested the validity of explanations of the news provided by three distinct approaches: 1) by measuring the extent to which coverage was shaped by
national political discourse (Political communication), 2) by measuring the extent to which coverage could be situated within international news flows rather than being localised or globally homogenised (International communication) or 3) was the unique output of each newspaper organisation (News Sociology). Specifically in regard to the second of these three factors, the author outlines concepts like 'media flows', 'globalisation', and 'localisation', terms that are often associated with phrases like 'cultural imperialism' and/or 'Americanisation'. Ultimately, Archetti’s (2010) findings are contrarian in that rather than finding evidence solely confirming these concepts (long established in the international communications literature since the NWICO debate of the early 1970’s) she argues that the reality is more nuanced and is related to questions of national interest, national journalistic culture and the editorial policy of each media organisation. In an earlier but related paper, Archetti (2004) had asked whether the media were globalising political discourse by reproducing the 'war on terror' consistent with the wishes of the Bush administration, but found again that local considerations are paramount in shaping the form that the discourse takes including factors like: 1) geography, 2) affiliation to international organisations, 3) national identity, 4) local culture, 5) existing political agenda, 6) role of the media and 7) information exchanges (Archetti 2004, Archetti 2010b).

Two other scholars that have looked at the 'war on terror' in the context of questions of international communications are Cottle and Thussu. Cottle (2006) looked at how the 'communicative architecture' of television journalism shaped the public representation of this 'globalized conflict'. According to Cottle: 'a powerful confluence of controls and constraints help explain the media tendency to succumb to cheerleading and consensual support of government in times of war' including 1) censorship, 2) routine news deference, 3) news values of drama, conflict, violence and human interest, 4) commercial logics of the media and 5) the cultural nature of war. Specifically, Cottle (2006) identifies 11 'communicative frames', and investigates how each serves to mediatise the 'war on terror' and in particular the possibilities they offer in the 'democratization of violence', a phrase borrowed from John Keane (2004) which refers to the potential of media to provide deepening public understanding of conflicts and their contexts, consequences and contending claims (Keane 2004). Cottle specifically identifies the possibilities offered by current affairs and documentary programming to offer different
perspectives and to widen television’s field of vision. Thussu (2006) also studied international television news coverage of the 'war on terror'. Noting how broadcasters across the world continue to depend for international news footage mainly on two Anglo-American television news agencies, Reuters Television and Associated Press Television News, Thussu (2006) outlines how 'myths' circulated by television news help consumers construct their worldview: 'this worldview in the long run can make the consumers accept as being ‘natural’ something which in fact is a manufactured reality'. The role of 'myth' was also picked up in other studies.

Nossek (2008) for example outlines a 'news-media-media events' model which purports to show how journalists change their ritual of news coverage when dealing with exceptional terrorist attacks. According to Nossek (2008), journalists abandon their usual normative professional frame when confronted with such an event and assume a national-patriotic coverage frame that seeks to re-establish normality and restore order. In seeking to identify the cultural myths embedded in specific news content the author utilises the concept of myth 'primarily as a metaphorical device for telling people about themselves'. In an earlier study Lule (2002) looked at editorials in The New York Times after 9/11 and considered the way in which they can be understood as myth. He found that over four weeks, The New York Times drew from four central myths to portray the events: the 'End of Innocence', the 'Victims', the 'Heroes', and 'the Foreboding Future'. More than editorial ‘themes’ or political ‘issues’, Lule (2002) found that these were myths ‘that invoked archetypal figures and forms at the heart of human storytelling’.

2.5 Press State Relations.

2.5.1 Introduction.

The relationship between 'the press' and 'the state' has been contested since the rise of printed pamphlets towards the end of the seventeenth century, most notably at that time in England and the then colonies of America. Indeed, the central role that the press was to adopt in society was conferred
unofficial status as early as 1787 when Burke spoke of ‘the Fourth Estate’. The central importance of
the press to democratic societies was also illustrated both by the remarks attributed to Thomas
Jefferson: ‘were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter’, and later by the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which stipulated that ‘Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’. Implicit in the idea of the press constituting
a 'Fourth Estate' is the notion that the press stood apart from government and thereby constituted
oversight over its power. In the words of Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart: 'the First Amendment
creates a fourth institution outside the government as an additional check on the three official
branches' (quoted in Hentoff 1980).

2.5.2 Philosophy of the Press.

However, despite this 'Fourth Estate' view of the press, differing conceptualisations of its role are
held. Two principal but contradictory ideals are the 'watchdog ideal' and the 'mirror ideal'. Writing in
The Uncensored War, Hallin (1986) identifies the 'watchdog' ideal as an older and more activist
conception of the 'Fourth Estate' whereby journalists see themselves as champions of truth and
openness:

The watchdog role has always been there. All you have to do is go back and read Thomas
Paine at the beginning of the Republic. This country had a press before we had a government.
(Hallin 1986 p. 5)

In pursuing the watchdog ideal however, journalists clash with a second interpretation of the Fourth
Estate, i.e. the mirror ideal. A mirror does not champion truth or accountability or indeed shine a light
on wrongdoing, unless of course wrongdoing happens to materialize before it (Mermin 1999).
According to Graber (1997), under the mirror ideal journalists aim 'to observe the world around them
and report what they see as accurately and as objectively as possible... they reflect what comes to their
attention; they do not shape it in any way' (Graber 1997). In reality, the mirror ideal cannot be
achieved in practice, as Epstein (1973) points out, because ‘what is reflected in the news depends,
unlike a mirror, on certain predecisions on where camera crews and correspondents will be assigned’ (Epstein 1974 p. 16). However, the mirror ideal does resonate with commonsense notions of accurate, objective reporting and reinforces the notion that the press operate at a level above the day-to-day political fray.

Both of the above ideals are born of philosophies of society that have come to be called classic liberalism in economics or libertarianism in theories of freedom of expression (Dennis, Snyder 1997). Classical liberalism and capitalism come together in the metaphor of 'the free marketplace of ideas'. The principal that underlies this metaphor is the idea that as good products drive out bad, so too over time good ideas will triumph over lesser ones, thus market forces guarantee optimum intellectual welfare. However, critics of classical liberalism’s conception of media performance argue that such a system does not in fact serve the public, and they cite two principal rationales for this view: 1) that classical liberalism’s model of media markets has a ‘fetish’ towards media concentration and thus potentially stifles the multiplicity of voices and that 2) such models inhibit ordinary citizens becoming producers as well as consumers of media content – it’s only a free press if you own one (Liebling 1960).

2.5.3 Normative Media Theory.

Shortly after WWII, a Commission was established in the US to discuss the state of American news media. In 1947, the Hutchins Commission concluded that the press was not meeting its responsibility to provide 'a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a meaningful context' (Blanchard 1977). The Commission suggested that the press should be providing a forum for the exchange of ideas and attempt to be more representative of society, and that this could best be achieved if the press was more responsible, its practitioners better trained, and if it effectively regulated itself. This led to what has become known as the Social Responsibility theory, which constituted a challenge to classical liberalism in the US and for the first time acknowledged a normative role for government in the formation and regulation of media systems.
Apart from introducing Social Responsibility Theory, the 1947 Commission on the Freedom of the Press also stimulated a sequence of attempts to describe the varieties of normative media theory, beginning with the work of Siebert et al. (1956) in *Four Theories of the Press*. Siebert et al. suggested that media systems around the world could be classified according to four main descriptors: the first two being authoritarianism and libertarianism and the second two being variations on these, the Soviet Communist and the aforementioned Social Responsibility. Some decades later, McQuail (1992) added two more categories to the four identified by Siebert et al. i.e. 'Development media' and 'Democratic-participant'. In 1974, Merill argued that there were really only two fundamental kinds of relationship, authoritarian and libertarian, although operating along a continuum (Merrill 1974). Ten years later, Altschull argued that there were three models: ‘market’, ‘Marxist’ and ‘advancing’, corresponding to the division into three worlds – first, second and third (Altschull 1995). However, such conceptions seem antiquated today, and even in their time they did not account for diversity within countries - for example, with regard to the mix of commercial and public sector media ownership common to most European countries. In addition, the theories were perhaps more accurately described as empirical, descriptive or historical rather than normative in a pure sense.

### 2.5.4 Hegemony.

Hegemony is a concept borrowed from Gramsci’s term for a ruling ideology and refers in this context to the means by which the culture of media maintains the status quo in society. It has been described as a world view in which:

> ..a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations. (Williams G.A. 1960, p. 587)

Rachlin (1988), in his study of *News as Hegemonic Reality* extends this line of thought when he stated that 'experiences within the institutions of socialisation will introduce us to manners of thinking, schools of thought, and general world views that are seen as natural – and therefore right' (Rachlin
In the introduction to his book length analysis of the treatment of the New Left by the Mass Media, Gitlin (1980) asks rhetorically why certain ideas are accepted or rejected in varying degrees at different times before identifying hegemonic processes as a principal reason:

One need not accept all of Gramsci’s analytic baggage to see the penetrating importance of the notion of hegemony – uniting persuasion from above and consent from below. (Gitlin 1980 p. 10)

Hegemonic values in the news are said to be effective not because they appear through coercion but because they are made to appear natural via the normal operation of media routines. For example, Hallin (1986) introduced a model of three spheres by which the news media maintain ideological boundaries: legitimate controversy, consensus and deviance. At the core of the model, the ‘sphere of consensus’, journalists do not feel compelled either to present opposing views or remain disinterested. In the ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ however, the journalistic norms of objectivity and balance are sought while outside of this, in the ‘sphere of deviance’, journalism casts off its neutrality and seeks to expose or condemn those who deviate from the political consensus (Hallin 1986 p. 116). As an example of the influence of such hegemonic ideology in the Vietnam War, Hallin (1986) cites the fact that when the (anti-war) student leaders of the New Left were caricatured in the press they were not balanced, but when treated seriously they were. In the normal course of events, media routines work to the advantage of the dominant ideology. As Hallin (1986) points out, in the early years of the Vietnam War, reporters shared the prevalent Cold War consensus, a consensus that was reinforced by media routines such as an over-reliance on official sources etc. In addition, while the conventional wisdom now typically holds that news coverage of the War was what ultimately led to public disenchantment and later US withdrawal, according to Hallin (1986), this can be overstated:

It (news coverage) probably also accounts for the fact that the Nixon administration was able to maintain majority support for its Vietnam policies through four years of war and for the fact that the public came to see the war as a ‘mistake’ or ‘tragedy’, rather than the crime the more radical opposition believed it to be. (1986 p. 11)
Another example of hegemonic or ideological influence over news coverage was examined in the study of local news coverage of the first Gulf War by Reese & Buckalew (1995). The authors found that local news produced an ideologically coherent body of reporting that was implicitly supportive of administration policy. Citing a need by local television to seek means of fostering community through common symbols and interests, the authors identify how frames like 'supporting the troops', and 'winning is what counts', allowed local television to restore a sense of community threatened by divisive opinion over policy (Reese, Buckalew 1995).

The hegemonic approach to the study of media and foreign policy can be thought of as falling into the critical tradition of media analysis that encompasses a broad spectrum of work from the Frankfurt school in the 1930's to the 'one-dimensionality' of capitalist culture and the media's reproduction of false needs to the media's functional role as an 'ideological state apparatus' and beyond (Marcuse 1972, Althusser 1971). This critical tradition also intersects with what has become known as the 'political economy' approach to the study of mass media:

..where researchers have sought to explain, for example, the media’s privileging of dominant views and values and the marginalisation of oppositional voices as the largely unintended outcome of market structures and economic determinants. (Cottle 2006 p. 14)

One of the most influential studies in this tradition is the work of Herman & Chomsky (1988) entitled *Manufacturing Consent*. Their book is based on their hegemonic belief that 'media serve to mobilise support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity, and that their choices, emphases and omissions can often be understood best by analysing them in such terms' (Herman, Chomsky 1988 p. 11). Specifically, their 'propaganda model' seeks to argue that through the operation of five filters, the media fix the premises of discourse and interpretation and the definition of what is newsworthy. The propaganda model has been criticised for permitting little sense of the contested interests that are often at play between the state and media, where there is said to be more contention and complexity at play that the model seems capable of predicting. However, in the words of Cottle (2006):
For all its tendencies towards generalization, economic reductionism and ideological functionalism, the manufacturing consent paradigm provides a necessary means for engaging with important levers of economic and political power and how media performance is often subservient to these (Cottle 2006 p. 20).

### 2.5.5 Indexing.

The second major school of thought concerning media and foreign policy relates to the phenomena that its author, Lance Bennett, labelled as ‘indexing’ (Bennett 1990). The concept of 'indexing' refers to the journalistic routine of relying upon political elites when defining and framing the news agenda. This phenomenon had been identified earlier by Hallin (1986) when he pointed out the fact that only when a portion of the Washington establishment had turned against the Vietnam War did the media reflect any opposition to that conflict. According to Bennett, it is well established that the mass media in the US rely substantially on government officials as the source of most of the news they report, especially in the foreign policy arena. Mermin (1999) explains this phenomenon in terms of a powerful set of incentives in US journalism; to conserve time, money and credibility. Bennett (1990) proffers three potential theories to describe what 'indexing' might mean in practice: 1) that granting public officials a virtual news monopoly restricts diversity in the 'marketplace of ideas' and thereby safeguards the business climate in which media conglomerates operate, 2) that reliance on official voices in the news is the result of ‘transactional’ or ‘symbiotic’ relations between journalists and officials and/or 3) that the press acts in a democratically responsible fashion by favouring the views of public officials as these are, after all, representatives of the people. Bennett (1990) proffers a theoretical framework in which to synthesise these diverse perspectives (boardroom, newsroom, individual reporter) into a general theory of the press and the state. In advance of doing so however he seeks to outline a normative ideal i.e. how the press ought to do its job, and proposes the following:

It is generally reasonable for journalists to grant government officials a privileged voice in the news, unless the range of official debate on a given topic excludes or 'marginalises' stable majority opinion in society, and unless official actions raise doubts about political propriety. (1990 p. 113)
Bennett (1990) goes on to assert how a hypothesis (‘based on impressionistic evidence’) about actual journalistic behaviour can be used to help determine the approximation to the ideal – the ‘indexing’ hypothesis:

Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to 'index' the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic. (1990 p. 106)

To test his hypothesis, Bennett sampled all news articles and editorials indexed under 'Nicaragua' in *The New York Times* between Jan 1st 1983 and Oct 15th 1986. The results showed that opinions voiced in news stories came overwhelmingly from government officials – of the 889 voiced opinions, 604 came from officials. Throughout the entire period, without exception, when the ratio of voices in Congress opposing administration policy went up, so did the ratio of opposing NYT op-ed page opinion, and vice versa. In fact, the correlation between opinions expressed in the op-ed page of *The New York Times* and congressional opinion was found to be .63 in one test and .76 in a related one, offering solid support for the indexing hypothesis.

Since Bennett’s (1990) original formulation of 'indexing', the theory has been tested in many contexts, though typically at times of foreign policy crises such as during the first Gulf war (Bennett, Manheim 1993, Entman, Page 1994, Althaus 2003), the Libya crisis (Althaus et al. 1996), Abu Ghraib (Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston 2006) and the Second Gulf war (Halttu 2008). In addition, scholars have looked at indexing in the context of multiple crises over many years (35 in the case of Zaller & Chiu (1996) and eight in the case of Mermin (1999)) as well as in the context of more general news (Livingston, Bennett 2003). In the majority of such studies support for the indexing hypothesis has been found, but while Archetti (2008) ‘does not deny the validity of the original formulation’, she does challenge its use as a paradigm to explain the media foreign policy nexus by raising a number of issues (Archetti 2008).

First, she argues that the correlation between political debate and media coverage can be the outcome of methodological choices rather than objective reality i.e. the level of detail in terms of closeness of
fit can alone determine the presence or otherwise of indexing. Second, she points out that most studies that followed Bennett’s original paper have operationalized the detection of indexing in differing ways, making generalisations difficult if not impossible. Finally, she argues that indexing cannot apply internationally because the concept of indexing is predicated on a specific role of the journalist in society and the specific nature of press-government relations, namely the 'North Atlantic' model in the typology proferred by Hallin & Mancini (Archetti 2008, Hallin, Mancini 2004).

This latter point by Archetti (2008)documents a skirmish that has broken out over the extent to which indexing as a theory of press-state relations is applicable outside the US, especially as 'other democracies organise press coverage on the basis of different normative understandings of power, citizen information and the role of the press' (Bennett 1990). In illustrating this point, Archetti (2008) argues that in her study of newspaper coverage of the 'war on terror' in four countries, levels of correlation are explained by what she calls 'previously neglected variables' rather than indexing per se; i.e. national interest, national journalistic culture and editorial policy of the media organisation in question. As an example, she cites how French journalists do not see their role as giving 'voice to the people' but rather as 'high literary creators' whose role is to express their own voice. A second argument against the 'exportability' of such 'American theories' of press-state relations comes from Halttu (2008) who argued convincingly that states and news organisations are part of hierarchical international systems and that the American influence on national media during international crisis is substantial due to the position of both the US government and US news organisations as sources of information (Halttu 2008, Nohrstedt, Ottosen & Nordicom 2005). In this view, national media organisations - who may have insufficient resources to cover international news items (especially in developing countries) - may rely on western news agencies that typically reproduce the perspectives of major western powers (Thussu 2002). According to Halttu (2008), this suggests that national media 'rather than manufacturing consent for the views of national foreign policy elites, reflect the viewpoints of major powers in the international system'.
One of the interpretations of indexing originally offered by Bennett (1990) was that 'the press acts in a democratically responsible fashion by favouring the views of public officials as these are, after all, representatives of the people'. Bennett (1990) continues: 'If for some reason the voices of government are unrepresentative or irresponsible, does the responsibility to correct the problem lie with journalists or with the people who elect governments in the first place?' (1990 p. 106) Scholars differ on this issue. For example, Zaller (1994) argues that the role of the media is 'to convey the policy recommendations of leading political figures and to indicate, after the dust has settled, whether the advice succeeded or failed' (Zaller 1994). Similarly, Paletz (1994) considers it unreasonable for the press to look beyond the spectrum of debate found among the elite political actors as the job of a journalist is 'to report the news, not to offer critical analysis of policy decisions' (1994 p. 280). In contrast, other scholars have argued just the opposite. Dorman & Livingstone (1994), in their study of newspaper coverage in advance of the first Gulf War, have lamented that the news media 'fell short of helping to create a robust culture of debate'. Entman & Page (1994) likewise have lamented (in their study of the same build-up to conflict) the absence of opposition voices: 'no matter what their institutional roles or power'. In many respects, this debate reflects the differing interpretations of the role of journalism identified earlier – whether journalists should strive to be 'watchdogs' or 'mirrors' of society. However, according to another scholar, journalism that indexes debate in the news to debate in Washington violates not just the watchdog ideal, but also the mirror ideal: 'for under the indexing rule the journalistic mirror is held up not to reality, but to official interpretations of reality' (Mermin 1999 p. 145).

A related interpretation of indexing would suggest, in the words of Hallin (1986), that when official sources are in consensus 'the media play a relatively passive role and generally reinforce official power to manage public opinion'. However, the latter does not fit well with the journalistic norm of providing 'conflicting possibilities', as identified by Tuchman (1972) in her discussion of the use of objectivity 'as strategic ritual’ - the appearance of objectivity being achieved by reporting 'both sides' to a conflict. However, what happens when there is only one side? In this case, Mermin (1999) argues, journalists find conflicting possibilities: 'not in the wisdom and justification of US policy itself, but in
the execution and outcome of US policy, and the possibility of political triumph or disaster for the President' (1999 p. 10). A startling case study of this phenomenon in recent years was the reporting of the ‘war on terror’ at the time of the 2004 election. Elites were in agreement that the US was in such a war, so reportage and debate instead focused on how the policy was being executed and what the ramifications were for the President and the election. In other words, according to Mermin (1999), when there is no policy debate in Washington, reporters offer critical analysis inside the terms of the Washington consensus.
Chapter 3 Methodology.

3.1 Introduction.

This chapter outlines the methodologies utilised in this research project and thus illustrates the basis of the approach to the analyses in Chapters Four and Five. It seeks to address issues related to the overall methodology employed as well as the specific methods or techniques utilised. It is necessary at this point to distinguish between what we refer to as research methodology and what we refer to as research methods.

Thus, when we talk of research methodology we not only talk of the research methods but also consider the logic behind the methods we use in the context of our research study and explain why we are using a particular method or technique and why we are not using others so that research results are capable of being evaluated either by the researcher himself or by others. (Kothari 2008 p. 8)

It can be said that while theory provides the conceptual framework for the conduct of research, methodology offers the modus operandi for the actual execution of the study. As such, in the following sections, once the dataset is identified, we begin our consideration of methodology by restating our research questions and outlining why two specific research methods are appropriate in seeking to answer those questions i.e. content analysis and framing theory. As the former is ostensibly a quantitative method and the latter ostensibly a qualitative method, it could be said that our research methodology proposes a mixed-methods approach. However, this is true only in so far as two methods are utilised. The respective methods are aimed exclusively at one or other of the research questions.

3.2 Selection of Dataset.

As it is not possible to survey all newspaper coverage of the ‘war on terror’, it is necessary to conduct a sample. Due to the unique scale and impact of the events of 9/11 and the related fact that it has no comparable peer in terms of terrorist attacks, it is proposed to exclude analysis of the coverage of that
event in this project. In addition, in order to ensure that the newspaper coverage in any single instance is not perfunctory, it is proposed to consider only terrorist attacks where the fatalities numbered more than 30 individuals. It is also important that the terrorist attacks selected were 'globally' reported in order that geographically dispersed elite newspaper coverage can be compared. For example, apart from the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2006 and in 2008, at least six terrorist attacks in India met the criterion of 30 fatalities used in this study, but were negligibly reported outside of that country. As an example, the largest of these attacks, the Jaipur bombing of 2008, returned one article in the following seven days in *The New York Times*.

Therefore, excluding the events of 9/11, attacks claiming less than 30 fatalities and those that were not globally reported, 11 terrorist attacks were identified between 1998 and 2008 that were attributed to Islamic terrorism. Whereas Al Qaeda was attributed responsibility in most instances, other organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (attributed responsibility for the Mumbai bombings) and Jemaah Islamiyah (attributed responsibility for the Bali bombings) are also implicated. As the ‘war on terror’ was not declared until after the events of 9/11, it is also proposed to exclude the attack that occurred before that date (i.e. 1998 US Embassy bombings) as they were occasioned in advance of the global focus on terrorism as a phenomena. With that exclusion, ten attacks remain with broadly comparable fatality rates, ranging from a low of 33 in the case of Algiers to a high of 209 in the case of the Mumbai attacks of 2006.

Figure 1 Qualifying terrorist attacks claiming over 30 fatalities since 2001.
However, as we are interested in comparative coverage of terrorist attacks by elite English language newspapers⁴, it is necessary to also exclude those cases where there is no substantial English language newspaper (Turkey, Spain and Algeria) or where such a newspaper exists but the archives are inaccessible (*The Philippine Daily Inquirer, Asharq Alawsat, Daily News Egypt* and *The Jordan Times*). As a result, four case studies remain: Bali, London, Mumbai 2006 & Mumbai 2008. In each of these cases the host country has a significant English language newspaper – *The Jakarta Post, The Times of London* and *The Times of India*. However, accessing relevant archives is still an issue in the case of *The Jakarta Post* and *The Times of India*. Regarding *The Jakarta Post*, it is not accessible via Lexus Nexus and its online archive is only available from 2008. However, the Bali bombings were unique amongst those surveyed in that the majority of victims were not from the host country, in this instance Indonesia. Instead, of the 202 fatalities, 88 were Australia and only 38 were Indonesian. Therefore, as *The Jakarta Post* archives are not accessible, it is proposed to utilise *The Sydney Morning Herald’s* which are. In addition, while *The Times of India* is only accessible via Lexus Nexus from January 2010, its e-paper version is accessible from 2004 and in this manner it is possible to overcome the lack of access via Lexus Nexus. Finally, it is proposed to exclude the 2008 Mumbai

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⁴ The choice to focus on elite newspapers reflects what other communication scholars have observed, that stories tend to spread vertically within the news industry, with editors at regional media outlets often deferring to elite newspapers and newswires to set the national news agenda (Gitlin 1980).
attacks as this event was qualitatively distinct from the other three and therefore not directly comparable, primarily due to its nature as a siege and the fact that it occurred over a multi-day period.

Therefore, in summary, in order to conduct the analysis, it is proposed to include coverage of three comparable terrorist attacks, situated squarely within the 'war on terror' phenomena: Bali (2002), London (2005) and Mumbai (2006). The newspapers chosen for analysis are the elite English language newspapers in each country (except in the case of Bali for reasons addressed above) as well as one additional newspaper chosen to act as a quasi control for the study i.e. *The New York Times*, chosen for its perceived status as the *primus inter pares* of elite newspapers (Talton 2009). Table 2 illustrates the dataset population of articles resulting from the search string 'insert city name and bombing or terror or terrorist'.

Table 2 Population of Relevant Newspaper Articles in the Seven Day Post Attack Period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bali 2002 Total</th>
<th>London 2005 Total</th>
<th>Mumbai 2006 Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to the four newspapers selected, all are part of larger media groups and are publicly listed companies, with the exception of *The Time of India* which is privately held by the Sahu Jain family. Regardless of public status, the parent companies of *The New York Times* and *The Times of London* are controlled by the Sulzberger and Murdoch families by virtue of control over specific voting class shares. *The Sydney Morning Herald*'s largest shareholder, Gina Rinehart, now controls 15% of the Fairfax group in the wake of her disposal of 86.5 million shares in 2012.
3.3 Research questions.

Two research questions are explored in this research project. The first seeks to examine news sourcing practices by the respective newspapers surveyed to construct their coverage of the three terrorist attacks in the first seven days. As outlined in Chapter One and discussed in Chapter Two, consideration of news sources has a long tradition within communication and journalism studies. However, while many studies in the 1970’s and 1980’s considered questions of news sourcing, little recent work has investigated the topic in spite of the many economic and structural changes that have occurred in the news industry since that time. Based on those early studies, the working hypothesis in this study is that the coverage in elite international newspapers will show a bias towards official sources, especially as the topic under consideration falls within the national security realm where police/security/intelligence and/or military actors are often presumed to be the only legitimate sources of ‘authorised’ knowledge. To answer these questions, a sample of newspaper coverage was selected from the first seven days in the wake of each terrorist attack as this period was presumed to coincide with the period of most concentrated coverage. The next step was the adoption of a research method for the analysis of news sources utilised in the newspaper coverage. Multiple research methods are appropriate for document analysis. For instance, discourse analysis typically examines how various social phenomena are represented; rhetorical analysis tends to focus on how messages such as speeches are delivered and narrative analysis studies self-revelation, for example in biographies.
However, in this instance, the requirement was for a research method to analyse the specific (and
discrete) phenomena of news sources in newspaper coverage. The obvious candidate for this task was
the method of content analysis, previously defined as 'a research technique for the objective,
systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communications' (Berelson 1952).
Indeed, the method of content analysis specifically arose out of studies of newspapers in schools of
journalism. In the words of Carney (1972):

Newspapers are so very countable. They come out in series. Their pages are set out in space
units. Their news is easily divisible into categories. They cover a vast range of issues, at
length. (Carney 1972 p. 33)

Although content analysis has traditionally been regarded as a quantitative rather than a qualitative
research method - and in this research project it is utilised to gain an insight into the quantity and type
of news sources stipulated in the pages of the respective newspapers - one of the most frequently cited
authors on content analysis, Krippendorf, has taken exception to this distinction when it comes to the
analysis of documents:

I question the validity and usefulness of the distinction between quantitative and qualitative
content analysis. Ultimately, all reading of texts is qualitative, even when certain
characteristics of a text are later converted into numbers. (2004 p. 16)

The latter is a point worth noting because although in the current project the intention is to count the
type and occurrence of news sources, ultimately this is performed in order to make qualitative
inferences about the meaning of this quantitative data. A more expanded discussion of content
analysis as a methodology is included in a forthcoming section.

The second research question addresses the issue of how the information sourced was subsequently
'framed' by the newspapers surveyed but specifically with respect to the construction of attribution. As
outlined in Chapter Two, a lot of attention has focused either on the 'master-frame' of the war on
terror as perhaps the major discursive phenomena of this century to date, or alternatively on more
micro studies of framing as identified in discrete (often linguistic) contexts or circumstances. In the
current study however, it is proposed to utilise a comparative study of framing practices between the four newspapers stipulated in order, first, to identify the types of news frames operating at the unit of analysis of the article and second, to explicate and evaluate specifically the 'attributions of responsibility' contained therein.

It is also proposed to address the attribution frames employed by the newspapers specifically in terms of meaning, or as stated in the words of Carragee & Roefs (2004): 'as frames construct particular meanings concerning issues by their patterns of emphasis, interpretation and exclusion' (2004 p. 215). While all significant considerations that affect meaning or interpretation will be included in the analysis, particular emphasis will be placed on specific attributions to individuals and groups and with respect to how these are justified. A fuller explication of framing theory as a research method is presented in a forthcoming section.

**3.4 Content Analysis.**

Content analysis is a traditional method for the systematic analysis of communications content. Krippendorff defines content analysis 'as the use of replicable and valid methods for making specific inferences from text to other states or properties of its source' (Krippendorff 2004 p. 103). The development of content analysis as a formal method of social science enquiry took place in the years between the two World Wars, as well as in the research programmes of Lasswell during the Second World War. Developments in the method were spurred by concerns about the contribution of mass media to social upheaval and international conflict, as well as the desire to make social inquiry 'scientific' in a manner comparable to the method of the natural scientists (Hansen et al. 1998). Since that time, content analysis has become a frequently used tool of the social scientist. For instance, Riffe & Freitaf (1997) note a nearly six-fold increase in the number of content analyses published in Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly over a 24 year period – from 6.3% of all articles in 1971 to 34.8% of all articles in 1995.
The content analysis pioneer Lasswell, who analysed leaflets dropped from balloons and airplanes as well as military recruitment posters for his 1927 PhD dissertation on WWI propaganda techniques, called the latter a 'content analysis' although scholars have noted that while empirical it was actually very qualitative and critical in nature (Neuendorf 2002). Later, the Second World War effort provided resources and funding for academic efforts that would surely not have been occasioned in its absence. As Rogers (1994) has noted:

The banks of the Potomac were an exciting place for social scientists during World War II. What academic compartmentalization had made difficult in the university was a matter of ease in wartime Washington. (Rogers 1994 p. 224)

As part of this effort, Lasswell worked at the Experimental Division for the Study of War-Time Communications in the U.S. Library of Congress (funded by the Rockefeller Foundation) and later at a division of the Hoover Institute. Under their auspices, Lasswell and others developed content analytic techniques for various purposes including uncovering enemy orientations during war and analysing Nazi propaganda films to identify mechanisms of persuasion. Later he used similar techniques during the Cold War to, for example, discern the Communist leanings of pamphlet authors. Scholars have noted how advances in content analysis during this time were reinforced after the war by unparalleled expansion of American higher education in the post-war period by such innovations as the G.I. Bill (Delia 1987). It was also Lasswell that formulated the core questions of content analysis: 'Who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect?' (Lasswell 1948)

Wimmer & Dominick (1994) have identified five main purposes of content analysis. First, they identify the role of content analysis in describing patterns or trends in media portrayals. Such studies may look at how media represent violence, sexual behaviour, gender-roles or any other niche relevant to an area of social science study. Second, content analysis may be used to test hypotheses about the policies or aims of media producers such as their motives or ideologies. Third, content analysis may be used to compare media content with the real world. A seminal study in the latter category was Gerbner’s (1976) cultural indicators programme which sought to articulate the media’s role in the
cultivation of public consciousness, most notably in this instance with a comparison of violence onscreen and off-screen, with the former found unsurprisingly to be considerably more common (Gerbner, Gross 1976). A fourth category of application was with regard to assessing the representation of particular groups in society such as men and women, ethnic minority groups, disabled groups or socioeconomically classified groups. Finally, a fifth use of content analysis is described by Wimmer & Dominick (1994) as drawing inferences about media effects. A key example here again is Gerbner’s study of cultivation effects, where the latter used content analysis together with analysis of audiences to examine media influence on public beliefs, attitudes, opinion and behaviour (Wimmer, Dominick 1994).

Communication scholars have broken down the steps involved in a content analysis in various ways, from as few as four to as many as twelve. Hansen et al (1998) constructed a six-step program to guide the student of content analysis through the process, and to identify some of the issues involved at each stage (Hansen et al. 1998). Hansen’s first step was 1) the definition of the research problem. In this study the research problem relates to the analysis of news sources contained within the sample periods of the newspapers coverage in question. The study is concerned with the identification, classification and quantification of news sources utilised in articles relating to the three terrorist attacks in the first seven days. Hansen’s second step relates to 2) the selection of media and sample. As outlined previously, the study seeks to analyse the coverage of terrorist attacks by leading English language newspapers, notably The New York Times, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Times and The Times of India.

Hansen’s third step was 3) to define analytical categories, a task he described as the most conceptually taxing aspect of the content analysis. In all, Hansen identified four typical categories of analytical categories. First, categorisation’s of actors and sources, or who is portrayed as saying what in the news which, according to Hansen, goes a long way toward showing how social power is expressed through and within the mass media. Such an analysis is germane to our current study. Second, a content analysis may seek to classify according to subjects, themes or issues. An example is the
seminal study by Erickson et al. (1991) that subcategorised deviant behaviour into five types: violence, economic, political, ideological/cultural and diversionary (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1991). Third, a content analysis can classify according to vocabulary or lexical choice. An example is the study by Picard & Adams (1991) which looked at characterisations of acts of political violence in US newspapers between 1980 and 1985 and categorised them according to nominal and descriptive characterisations. The former for instance included 'bombing', 'shooting' and 'attack' but the latter included 'brutal', 'criminal' and 'terrorism' (Picard 1991). Fourth and finally, Hansen identified a typology of classification labelled the value-dimensions or stance. Some examples of this type of categorisation are studies by Dickson (1994), Semetko (1989) and Einsiedel (1992). Dickson (1994) coded opinions expressed by sources in The New York Times according to whether they were positive, negative or neutral with regard to the invasion of Panama. Semetko (1989), in a study of TV news coverage of a British election, used a number of such ‘evaluative categories’ including whether TV reporters commentaries on politicians campaign activities were predominantly ‘reinforcing’ (positive), ‘deflating’ (negative), ‘straight’ (descriptive), or ‘mixed’. Finally, Einsiedel (1992), in her analysis of coverage of science and technology, coded the tone of stories in terms of whether they were predominantly ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘neutral’, or ‘mixed’. It is worth noting that the main problem with such ‘evaluative categories’ is the degree of interpretation required of the coder in order to maximise the ‘repeatability’ and ‘systematic-ness’ of the results. This requires that clear interpretational guidelines be laid down in advance of any such coding analysis.

Hansen’s fourth and fifth steps constituted 4) constructing a coding schedule and 5) piloting that schedule i.e. a series of rules by which the content analyst is to systematically conduct the content analysis. This can be seen as a second aspect of defining the analytical categories as the steps are so closely intertwined. As the coding schedule was central to the current content analysis, it is proposed to issue guidance on same in a following section. Finally, the last step in a content analysis according to Hansen is 6) the data analysis and preparation, which may require computer software depending on the complexity of the case.
During its long history, content analysis has been criticised for, inter alia, its quantitative nature, its fragmentation of textual wholes, its positivist notion of objectivity or for its lack of a theory of meaning (Kracauer 1952). However, content analysis is and should be enriched by the theoretical framework offered by other more qualitative approaches. The above criticisms are valid in so far as they go however. Indeed, later definitions of content analysis have omitted references to ‘objectivity’, requiring simply that content analysis be ‘systematic’ (Holsti 1969) or ‘replicable’ (Krippendorff 2004).

3.4.1 Coding Schedule.

In the current study the analytical categories were developed inductively after a pilot study which allowed the categories to emerge from a preliminary reading of the texts. Due to the traditional distinction between official and nonofficial sources, this demarcation was retained as a starting point.

3.4.1.1 Official Sources.

In total, from the pilot study, six categories of official sources were identified: Politicians, Military, Government, Police/Security, Intelligence and Opposition Politicians. In most instances, classifying an official source according to one of the six categories was a straightforward procedure. However, inevitably, as in any content analysis of this nature, there will be some grey areas that need clarification. It is hoped to explicate the most important of these here.

Most sources classified as Politicians in the officially demarcated category were individuals holding high office such as Prime Minister, Minister or leader of a political party holding office. However, it also included any other politician such as an ordinary Member of Parliament if he/she were an elected member of a political party constituting a government either fully or partly (i.e. in coalition). Two other categories of individual were also coded as Politicians although on the surface they did not merit such a classification. The first of these was the Attorney General, the leading legal expert of the government. This individual would ordinarily be classified as a Government official but due to the
fact that the Attorney General is (unlike most civil servants) directly appointed by the governing political party and due to the fact that again, unlike normal civil servants, his or her term of office ceases when the government falls, it was felt that this uniquely political office would be better classified as Political rather than Governmental. The second category of official that are coded as Political rather than Governmental are Ambassadors, largely for the same reasons. Ambassadors are political appointees, their term of office expires with a Government’s, and they are at all times expected to relay the political thinking of their political masters. Finally, any spokesperson for a politician is also coded as being a political source as it can be assumed again that they are relaying the views of their employers. The latter is a rule that applies across the categories of sources unless stated to the contrary.

The second category of official source identified was Military sources. These are typically easy to identify as the individuals named as military sources often have their names accompanied by a military rank such as Brigadier General, Admiral, Major etc. The third category of official source identified was intelligence sources. These can theoretically also be military sources as in the case of Military intelligence but where this occurs, the latter classification of intelligence is used. Intelligence sources, unlike military, are rarely cited by name, presumably because individuals working in intelligence rarely want to be identified as such. Instead, intelligence sources are typically cited generically (‘intelligence officials suggest’), by organisation (‘the CIA says’) or by nationality (‘Singaporean intelligence said’). When intelligence sources are cited via a media report, both are coded as sources i.e. both intelligence and media, as in: ’a Washington Post report quoting Indonesian security services’. By contrast, a generic intelligence source quoted twice or more in the same report is coded as one instance of this phenomenon.

The fourth category of official source are ‘Government’ sources and they comprise many diverse roles. Perhaps the most common attribution in this category is the attribution of information to government departments, perhaps provided by civil servants in the course of their information dissemination or public diplomacy duties. Thus, the likes of the UK Foreign Office or the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs are counted as official government sources. A second common classification in this category is with respect to information that is attributed to a country or an administration. In addition, if no individual is named then this is counted as an instance of a Governmental source e.g. 'The US claims that it passed on a warning' or 'the Bush administration denied'. A third classification in this category is the generic attributions to 'officials' or variations on this, e.g. 'authorities', 'diplomatic sources' or 'advisors'. Unlike the case of Ambassadors noted above, consular officials cited are included as Government sources as they are not political appointees. Also, any individuals identified as a 'former' official or otherwise known to have retired are excluded from this category and are classified simply as Individuals (non-official). Finally, any source that is identified only as a 'source' is placed into this category also. The fifth category of official source is the Police/Security category. Sources in this category are typically either named ('Police Chief Bachtiar') or unnamed ('Police said yesterday'). In the latter category many variations on the theme are cited in the newspapers; e.g. 'Investigators', 'security chiefs', 'security sources' etc.

Finally, the sixth category is Opposition Politicians. Politicians in this category are distinguished from Politicians in the official category due to their status in opposition to governing politicians. This invariably denotes that they do not hold any public office and their views are canvassed typically due to the fact that they will invariably, with some exceptions, oppose government policy on any given minor policy issue. The leaders of political parties are the most frequently cited political opposition sources, although such political parties will usually also nominate individual party members to act as spokespersons in particular policy arenas such as foreign affairs etc.

3.4.1.2 Non-Official Sources.

In the category of non-official sources the pilot study identified seven categories: 1) Experts, 2) Victims, 3) Terrorists, 4) Individuals, 5) Corporate, 6) Media & 7) NGO’s. The first category of nonofficial source identified was the Expert. The Expert is an individual or spokesperson for an organisation deemed to be expert (such as a think tank) in a given policy domain. Given the nature of
the material under study, it is unsurprising that terrorism experts constitute a large proportion of the experts cited, although experts were also utilised in other areas such as on the law, medical matters, effects on tourism and the economy etc. A second category of nonofficial source utilised were those included as Victims. This category included individuals that survived the terrorist attacks analysed but also their family members, those near the attack sites that were unharmed, associates and friends of victims etc.

A third category of nonofficial source was labelled Terrorist but not because individuals in this category met any objective definition of what might constitute a terrorist. Rather, they were depicted as such in media accounts (rightly or wrongly) and it was felt useful to capture their viewpoints as they were invariably in opposition to government, security or other official sources. In addition to individuals depicted as terrorists, spokesperson for them and advocates for them such as attorneys were also coded as sources falling into this category.

Individuals constituted the miscellaneous category constructed to contain any non-official source that could not be coded as falling into one of the other seven non-official categories. Thus, the 'man on the street' source would be the obvious staple of this category but it also included any former official, be they previously government, security, military, politician or any other role. The presumption here is that such individuals having retired are now speaking in a personal capacity, although this categorisation must be accompanied by the caveat that their worldview will have been informed by their prior roles or experiences. This category also included religious figures of various denominations that are typically consulted at times of tragedy or loss of life.

The fifth category of non-official source was Corporate. In this category, any individual speaking on behalf of a corporate entity or a trade association was included. Corporate sources were typically surveyed to gauge the effect of terrorist attacks on commercial life in the areas affected or to elicit consumer information such as the conditionality of insurance contracts or the cancellation of airline traffic. The sixth category of non-official source was Media and included all sources stipulated in the newspaper coverage in question that were derived from other media sources including radio, TV,
magazines or other newspapers. Finally, NGO’s (Non-Governmental Organisations) were included as a separate category. These organisations could be sporting, religious, charitable, political or otherwise. Coding these organisations separately allowed the analysis to document the extent to which civil society had a voice in the newspaper discourse.

It is instructive to compare the coding schedule utilised here with a seminal sourcing study conducted in 1973 by Sigal i.e. *Reporters and Officials* (Sigal 1973). Sigal posited nine categories in his study; 1) Government elected, 2) Government official, 3) NGO representative, 4) NGO affiliated, 5) Unaffiliated citizen, 6) Victim, 7) Observer/Unofficial Commentator, 8) Celebrity personality, 9) Central participant. The coding classification for this study, which was inductive in nature, demonstrated remarkable similarities to Sigal’s. For instance, 1) Government elected was equivalent to Politicians, 2) Government Official was equivalent to Government, 3) NGO representative & 4) NGO affiliated was equivalent to NGO, 5) Unaffiliated citizen was equivalent to Individual, 6) Victim and 9) Central Participant was equivalent to Victim and 7) Observer/Unofficial Commentator was equivalent to Expert. Using this mapping we can see that only Sigal’s category of Celebrity was not reproduced or echoed in the current study, no doubt as a result of the fact that terrorism coverage does not typically rely on celebrity commentators.

Finally, when determining when a citation in the newspaper text constituted a source the analysis was guided by the adjectives used to describe the action conducted by the source. Thus, an individual was a source, for example, when they said something, confirmed something, advised in regards to something, revealed something, expressed something or gave warning about something. However, an individual was not classed as a source if they are described in the third person as deciding something, monitoring something or seeking something etc.

**3.5 Framing Theory.**
Although 'framing' as a concept in political communication has enjoyed a remarkable rise in prominence since its earliest incarnation in the 1970’s, there remains great disparity in the literature as to how the concept is conceptualised and applied, leading Entman (1993) to famously attempt to clarify what he called a 'fractured paradigm' (Entman 1993). Indeed, the dispute starts with simple questions of definition. Entman (1993) remarks that 'framing is often defined casually, with much left to an assumed tacit understanding of reader and researcher’, before going on to propose his own definition involving selection and salience and comprising particular problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations, and/or treatment recommendations. Elsewhere, scholars preferred their own definitions, alternatively involving notions of 'central organising ideas' (Gamson, Modigliani 1989, Tankard 2001), 'interpretative packages' (Gamson, Modigliani 1989), 'organising principles' (Reese 2001a) or 'patterns of cognition, interpretation, presentation, selection, emphasis and exclusion' (Gitlin 1980).

Due to its use as a theoretical tool to understand bottom-up as well as top-down communication processes, the status of framing theory has indeed become somewhat unclear (Leurs 2007). Commenting on this 'fractured paradigm', Scheufele has remarked that frame analysis is neither a full-fledged theoretical paradigm nor a coherent methodological approach: 'Rather, frame analyses are a number of related, even sometimes partially incompatible methods for the analysis of discourses' (Scheufele 1999). However, Entman (1993) in his famous survey of the field concluded that:

> Whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text. Analysis of frames illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer of information from one location - such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel - to that consciousness. (Entman 1993 p. 51)

Apart from questions of definition, research in the area can be concerned with why journalists use certain frames in the construction of news stories, how these stories articulate frames, and how audience members process frames (Carragee, K. M., Roefs, W. 2004). As noted in Chapter Two, De Vreese (2005) refers to these loci as frame-building and frame-setting (De Vreese 2005). Reese (2009) has referred to them as the 'what' and the 'how' of framing:
The ‘what’ perspective is concerned with frame-building and involves the dissection of the content of the frame, specifically the network of concepts and the unique narrative and myths that make it work... The ‘how’ perspective concerns framing effects analysis. (Reese 2001a)

In Chapter Four of this study we are concerned with the ‘what’ of framing i.e. what frames can be identified in the content of the four newspapers under analysis in the first instance and the nature of their construction in the second.

3.5.1 Frame Identification.

Scholars have proffered many different approaches to the identification and extraction of frames in the news. Entman (1993) for example suggested that frames can be examined and identified by ‘the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments’ (Entman 1993). In a similar fashion, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) identify ‘framing devices’ that condense information and offer a ‘media package’ of an issue. They identify metaphors, exemplars, catch-phrases, depictions, and visual images as framing devices (Gamson, Modigliani 1989). A comprehensive taxonomy of approaches is offered by Tankard (2001) who suggests a list of eleven framing mechanism or focal points for identifying and measuring news frames including headlines, quotes used and conclusions attached (Tankard 2001). De Vreese (2005) has noted that frames are specific textual and visual elements or ‘framing devices’ that are essentially different from the remainder of the news story which may be considered as core news facts (De Vreese 2005). In this vein, Neuman et al. (1992) divided news articles into sections containing ‘frames’ and sections containing ‘facts’ (Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992). This distinction between news elements and frame elements has effectively been applied in many studies of framing effects (Iyengar 1994, Price, Tewksbury & Powers 1997, Cappella, Jamieson 1997).

3.5.2 Inductive.
Precisely because frames consist of tacit rather than overt conjectures, notorious difficulties to empirically identify frames arise (Maher 2001). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) assert that there are two possible ways of identifying frames in the news: inductive and deductive (Semetko, Valkenburg 2000). The inductive approach focuses on analyzing a news story without any concrete preconceptions of the frames that one might find. In this approach, frames are identified in a bottom-up process from the empirical data to more general constructs by using qualitative techniques of data analysis (Dahinden 2005). Frames thus emerge from the material during the course of analysis. The main advantage of this approach is the potential to identify new frames that the researchers have not thought of in a deductive frame approach to identification. However, qualitative analysis of this nature can only be applied to small data sets and can be difficult to replicate. Two examples of this approach are the work of Gamson (1992) and Neuman et al. (1992). Archetti (2006) argues that Ferree et al.’s comparative analysis of abortion discourse in the US and Germany also falls into this inductive frame study category.

Matthes & Kohnring (2008) identified four types of inductive approaches to frame identification: the hermeneutic approach stresses an interpretative account linking frames with broader cultural elements e.g. (Tucker 1998), the linguistic approach identifies frames by analyzing the selection, placement and structure of specific words and sentences in a text e.g. (Pan, Kosicki 1993), the manual holistic approach generates frames by a qualitative analysis of some news texts as a first step before coding as holistic variables in a manual content analysis e.g. (Meyer 1995) and finally, computer assisted approaches such as frame-mapping e.g. (Miller, Andsager & Riechert 1998). The modus operandi of the current study is closest to the manual holistic approach.

3.5.4 Deductive.

On the other hand, the deductive approach to frame identification consists of predefining certain frames and verifying the extent to which these frames occur. In this approach, frames are defined in a
top-down process from either theoretical reasoning to empirical categories or from general cultural patterns to specific media frames (Dahinden 2005). The deductive approach is typical for studies that use a quantitative methodology. Its main advantage is its transparency and applicability for large data sets. However, its main short coming is the inability to identify new frames that exist in the empirical data but are ignored because they were not considered by the researchers at the outset. The deductive approach thus requires a clear idea of the kinds of frames likely to be in the news, because the frames that are not defined can be overlooked. According to a 2007 study by Matthes (which was a content analysis of framing studies in the world’s leading communication journals between 1990 and 2005), 68% of framing studies rely on inductive extraction of frames while 32% rely on deductive extraction. (Matthes 2007)

In deductive approaches to frame identification, the distinction must first be drawn between issue-specific frames and generic news frames. While a deductive approach can theoretically apply frames in either category, this study did not predefine any issue-specific (i.e. terrorism related) frames and did not find any on sample reading of the text at the unit of analysis of the article, so the following will therefore concentrate on generic frames. Building on the work of Neuman et al. (1992) and Iyengar (1991), Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) conducted a wide review of the literature on news coverage in the US and Europe and found that five generic frames 'largely account for all the frames that have been found in the news' (Semetko, Valkenburg 2000). Of these five, four had been analogous to four of the five that Neuman et al. had identified (i.e. conflict, economic consequences, human impact and morality) and one was drawn from Iyengar (1991) who had measured how audience members had framed who was responsible for various social problems after they had been exposed to competing ‘episodic’ and ‘thematic’ frames, thereby coming up with the fifth frame, the 'attribution of responsibility'.

3.5.5 The Level of Analysis Problem.

In advance of addressing the question of whether an inductive or deductive approach to frame identification is preferable in the current study, consideration must be given to a skirmish in the
literature over when a frame is a frame or when in fact it is a topic, issue or attribute. Or, to put it in
the words of Reese (2009): 'where do topics and themes leave off and frames begin?' (Reese, Lewis
2009). At the most basic level, topics and frames are not the same. Again, in the words of Reese
(2001):

The tendency, for example, to classify issues into categories, such as 'the economy' and
'crime', obscures the important questions of how they are defined in the first place. As
Kosicki (1993) notes, the agenda-setting approach to issues, emphasizing the salience of
topics, misses a 'real focus on the nature of the disagreement between the parties and the
essence of the controversy'. In short, a great deal of valuable contextual information about
the issue would be lost. (Reese 2001a)

Frames organize and structure issues and thus are ways of thinking about topics. The reduction of
frames to story topics, attributes or issue positions can ignore the ways in which frames construct
particular meanings and how they advance specific ways of seeing issues (Carragee, K. M., Roefs, W.
2004). The approach of equating frames with topics or attributes is typical of the agenda-setting
approach to news analysis where the selection of attributes for thinking about objects (or second level
framing studies) are agenda-setting roles. Thus, in the words of Carragee & Roefs (2004):

Framing research informed by an agenda-setting perspective would identify nuclear power
as a frame or story topic and characterise pronuclear power and antinuclear power positions
as particular frames on this topic. This approach however, neglects how frames construct the
very meaning of nuclear power as an issue. (Carragee, K. M., Roefs, W. 2004)

In discussing generic news frames typically used in a deductive approach to frame identification, De
Vreese (2005) distinguishes between generic frames that are typically used in the coverage of politics
and generic frames that are structural and inherent to the conventions of journalism. In the former
category are the studies by Capella & Jamieson (1997) and Patterson (1993) that look at how
strategically framed political news affects voter cynicism or how electoral frames focus on contests as
games or 'horse races'. In the latter category of generic frames inherent to journalism are the five
identified by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000).

However, the question remains - are these generic frames or issue specific frames or story topics? For
example, De Vreese et al. (2001) would say that an economic frame is a generic frame but Shen &
Edwards (2005) would say that it is a specific issue frame for welfare reform and Carragee & Roefs (2004) criticised Miller, Andsager & Riechart (1998) for including the economy as one of 28 frames in their study of candidates in Presidential primaries on the basis that ‘these are story topics, not frames, because they categorise news stories by their subject.’ Who is correct? The answer surely depends on questions of definition and conceptualisation. If we define a frame as a way of thinking about an issue, then surely an economic frame is a generic frame, because it is a way or a ‘frame’ of thinking about an issue, whether that is a general issue or a specific issue. However, when the economy (noun) is the issue or topic it ceases to be the frame and other frames take over in describing aspects of the economy. Perhaps the distinguishing feature then is the level of specificity required of the frame, with an 'economic frame' residing on a higher level of abstraction and sub frames narrowing in on aspects of that topic. This problem of abstraction was addressed by Gamson (2001) in the foreword to *Framing Public Life* when he said:

> We all struggle with the same issues, particularly the vexing problem of the level of analysis. There are event frames, issue frames, master frames and worldviews – frames within frames within frames. Even within an agreed level of analysis (e.g. frames about abortion policy), two independent investigators will inevitably slice up the discourse in different ways. Is there any use for a concept that every investigator ends up applying in a different fashion. I have gradually come to the conclusion that this level of analysis problem has no solution but may be less of a problem that first appears. (Reese, Gandy & Grant 2001)

The other generic frames identified by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) are less likely to be accused of being, in fact, topics rather than frames i.e. conflict, attribution of responsibility, morality and human interest. Of these perhaps only the very last could ever be construed as being a topic rather than a frame. But the same conditions apply. It too is a generic frame at one level of abstraction.

### 3.5.6 Review of Survey Population.

It is appropriate, in advance of detailing the specifics of the framing and sourcing analysis, to recap the nature of the dataset under review. Although the dataset comprises some 1,140 articles for the seven day period using the search string 'insert city name and bombing or terror or terrorist,' a
proportion of these were deemed non applicable for a number of reasons. The reasons included: 1) the article was a duplicate of an existing article, 2) the article was concerned with an unrelated subject matter and just coincidentally contained the designated search string, 3) the article was comprised of only a single sentence, 4) the article was in fact a letter to the editor, 5) the article was concerned with non news coverage such as sport etc. When these articles were removed, the dataset consisted of 857 articles that were 'centrally concerned' with the subject matter at hand. Table 4 provides a breakdown of articles in the study.

Table 4 Total Dataset Population less 'Excluded.'

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<th>Mumbai</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>Centrally Concerned</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>Centrally Concerned</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
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<td>-14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKT</td>
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<td>-21</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>-107</td>
<td>177</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
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<td>-55</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>122</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td>309</td>
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<td>425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5.6 Attribution of Responsibility.

It was a straightforward matter to identify the generic frames operating at the unit of analysis of the article. Indeed, four generic frames accounted for over 95% of the articles in the dataset: 1) the attribution of responsibility frame, 2) the economic consequences frame, 3) the human interest frame and the 4) treatment recommendation frame. The breakdown of articles by case study in respect to generic frames is provided in the following table.
Table 5 Breakdown of Dataset by Generic Frame.\(^5\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Frame</th>
<th>Bali Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>London Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mumbai Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attribution of Responsibility</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Consequences</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Interest</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment Recommendation</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>305</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>404</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, it is proposed that one of these generic frames is of more interest than the others i.e. the ‘attribution of responsibility’ frame. As noted in Chapter One, this is asserted primarily by reference to issues of primary definition, power, meaning and opinion formation. Perhaps the common thread running through these ideas is that of meaning. Thus, while Entman’s definition of framing is perhaps most often used, emphasising selection and salience, Reese (2001) has outlined that other definitions ‘move beyond an emphasis on selection to capture a more active generation of meaning’ (Reese 2001a). Other definitions also stress this focus. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) refer to frames as ‘interpretative packages’ that give meaning to an issue. At the core of this package is ‘a central organizing idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue’ (Gamson, Modigliani 1989). Reese himself regards framing as:

> Similar to Hall’s idea of defining the situation, which if compellingly presented provides the criteria by which all subsequent contributions are labelled as relevant or irrelevant - beside the point. (Reese 2001a)

Thus, it can be argued that when we consider what frames are constitutive of the central meaning of the terrorist attacks under review, it is not economic consequences or human interest concerns that are paramount but rather questions of responsibility, or attribution. In this manner, when a terrorist attack

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\(^5\) The reader should note that the ‘total’ Table in Table 5 (847) differs from the ‘total’ Table in Table 4 (857) as some articles are coded as containing multiple frames and some articles are not coded as containing any frame. The discrepancy of ten is explained by the Bali and London coverage containing 25 frames less than the total number of valid articles but the Mumbai coverage containing 15 frames more than the total number of valid articles in their respective datasets.
occurs, the first question required to define the situation (ala Reese & Hall) is not what the bombing will cost the local economy or what the personal stories of the victims are, but rather – who conducted the attack – who is responsible? This emphasis on attribution brings us back to Entman’s second of four constituents of framing i.e. causal interpretation (Entman 1993). In addition, the 'attribution of responsibility' frame is also important with respect to considerations of what Entman (1993) called 'the exertion of political power' as 'the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power - it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text' (1993 p. 55). This point was reiterated by Carragee & Roefs (2004) when he said that a substantive approach to the origin, character and influence of media frames must confront how the distribution of power shapes the construction and interpretation of those frames (Carragee, K. M., Roefs, W. 2004).

Of the other generic frames that were identified in the preliminary analysis, both the 'human interest' frame (where articles recount the experiences of ordinary people called up in the blasts) and the 'treatment recommendation' (where articles discuss what should be done in response) are significantly represented. The question of 'what to do' closely mirrors what Entman (1993) called 'treatment recommendation', and this label is adopted to describe our fourth generic frame. This latter evokes the definition proffered by Entman (1993) when he said that that frames *prescribe* in addition to *diagnosing* and evaluating. Finally, the 'economic consequences' frame (that recounted the effects on the economy as well as sectoral industries like tourism and airline travel) accounted for, at most, 11% of the frames identified (in the case of London).

Of the remaining two generic frames utilised by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) i.e. conflict and moral values, one would have expected them to be abundant in stories regarding terrorism. However, a review of the dataset finds that not to be the case. Of the two, certainly conflict frames were evident in the sample but typically in terms of questions of attribution i.e. individuals and groups contesting agency. For this reason, it was decided to analyse this 'conflict' exclusively from within the 'attribution of responsibility' frame. In the case of the 'moral values' frame, again, it was expected that this would
feature prominently given the subject matter, but apart from some official sound bites by leading politicians this was not a prominent frame.

Finally, the question of the units of analysis needs to be addressed. In some studies the unit of analysis is the news item or article e.g. (Husselbee, Elliott 2002), in others it is the paragraph or proposition e.g. (Pan, Kosicki 1993). The literature indicates that the unit of analysis should be chosen so that it is consistent with the nature of the research question (Harris 2001). Although most researchers have investigated the media’s framing of events at a macro level (i.e., coding or considering entire articles as the unit of analysis), the concept of framing seems amenable to study at various levels, including micro level linguistic analysis (Lind, Salo 2002), depending on the degree to which the researcher wishes to ‘drill down’ into the text, the size of the data population at hand and the nature and diffuseness of the material under study. In his analysis of 131 framing studies, Matthes found that in 57% of all studies there is only one frame per article. In other words, the unit of analysis is the article and one frame ‘dominates’. However, 28% of all studies analyse more than one frame per article, and for the remaining 15% the unit of analysis could not be determined. Given the large data population and the relatively homogeneity of the individual articles in the population, it is proposed to utilise the news article or story as the unit of analysis in this study, but to code it for multiple frames if applicable.
Chapter 4 Framing Attribution.

4.1 Introduction.

This chapter deals specifically with an analysis of how the newspapers under review framed the news with respect to questions of culpability, or 'attributions of responsibility', in the wake of the three terrorist attacks that are the objects of the current study. Of the four frames that are identified as accounting for over 95% of the coverage (i.e. the attribution of responsibility frame, the economic consequences frame, the human interest frame and the treatment recommendation frame), the attribution of responsibility frame is both the most frequently occurring and the most significant. A number of reasons for this are noted here. First, as questions of definition are central to many if not most social and political issues, and indeed news framing is often viewed as a contest over definition, it stands to reason that frames that contribute to issue definition are more central to ultimate assessments of meaning or import. Indeed, the most commonly cited definition of framing for example cites four functions of frames, with the first two of these being: 'problem definition' and 'causal interpretation' (Entman 1993). Of the four frames identified in the dataset, only the 'attribution of responsibility' frame contributes to a definition of the issue under consideration. Secondly, as a result of the centrality of 'definition', which 'if compellingly presented provides the criteria by which all subsequent contributions are labelled as relevant or irrelevant' (quoted in Reese, Gandy & Grant 2001 p. 10, Hall 1982), framing contests are engendered where parties - often with unequal symbolic, cultural or financial resources - compete to promulgate their own preferred interpretations. Framing in this context plays a major role in the exertion of political power and here 'the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power - it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text’ (Entman 1993 p. 55). Finally, in the process of public opinion formation, Iyengar (1991) demonstrated that 'domain-specific' or contextual cues (such as news framing) serve an equally - if not more important - role in influencing public opinion than stable
dispositional characteristics or 'global' worldviews (Iyengar 1991). Thus, whether viewed through the lens of issue definition, meaning generation, power invocation or opinion formation, the attribution frame is the most important of the four under review. While it is possible to have a framing contest in terms of the economic consequences of, or human interest in, terrorist atrocities, the outcome of such a contest is irrevocably bound up in prior questions of definition, as are any treatment recommendations resulting there from.


In this first section, the application of the attribution of responsibility frame (hereafter referred to as the ‘attribution’ frame) is unpacked and analysed. As a percentage of all frames coded in the dataset, the attribution frame was the most frequently occurring frame in the coverage of the Bali bombing by the UK Times (hereafter UKT), the Times of India (hereafter TOI) and the New York Times (hereafter NYT) comprising 38%, 55%6 and 53% of the datasets respectively. In the case of the Sydney Morning Herald (hereafter SMH), the frequency of the attribution frame at 28% was exceeded only by the human interest frame which comprised 44% of the SMH dataset. This is most likely explained by the large amount of Australian fatalities sustained. The significant emphasis on the attribution frame is perhaps unsurprising given the subject material, although it remains an approach unique in the literature. In the analysis that follows, attributions were analysed under the headings of 'official' framing and 'counter' framing. The former refers to the attributions of responsibility emanating from the ‘primary definers’ in government, law enforcement, intelligence and the military. The latter refers to all responses and rebuttals to official framing by individuals and groups either implicated or otherwise. The coverage of the Bali bombings in the four newspapers under review was notable relative to the other two case studies in this research project for the significant presence of counter framing, a phenomenon that was largely absent from the coverage of the London and Mumbai attacks.

66 The figures for the Times of India should be treated with caution as they are based on a very small survey population of 11 articles.
From the first day of coverage in the four respective newspapers under analysis, it quickly became evident that the responsibility for the attack would be predominantly framed as being the work of Islamic extremists, whether expressed as a generic group or as being the responsibility of particular groups or individuals. In only a rare instance in the coverage of the four newspapers was it suggested that this could possibly be unrelated to religious fanaticism. However, in each of these cases, this possibility was summarily dismissed, despite the fact that no claim of responsibility was ever made for the bombing. For example:

There is, of course, the possibility that what occurred was a one-off incident which was simply the product of some sort of criminal dispute in Bali’s club land. No one, however, seems to seriously believe this. (Dr Barton 2002)

In the analysis it emerged that responsibility was variously attributed to four specific entities – three groups and one individual. These were: 1) Islamic extremists, 2) Jemaah Islamiyah, 3) Al Qaeda and 4) Abu Bakar Bashir. It should be noted that a large degree of overlap existed between these entities. For instance, Jemaah Islamiyah was frequently 'linked to' Al Qaeda and Abu Bashir was often described as 'the symbolic head of Jemaah Islamiyah'. All four however, fairly or unfairly, came under the rubric of 'Islamic extremists'. Nevertheless, it is instructive to analyse the coverage by isolating the attributions to these groups and individuals to the extent possible.

4.2.1 Official Framing.

4.2.1.1 Islamic Extremists.

The culpability of ‘Islamic extremists’ was enunciated from the very first article in each of the UKT, the SMH and the NYT. What was to be identified, it was implied, was only the nature of this nascent ‘Islamic’ threat in Indonesia:

The recent rise of radical Islam in Indonesia and the anti-Western sentiment that the US-led ‘war on terrorism’ has fanned has heightened official concerns... The question is whether external actors are manipulating nascent, radical Islam inside Indonesia, or whether
international events, in particular US war plans for Iraq are, themselves, creating a new breed of Indonesian terrorists. (SMH 2002a)

Although the adjectives used to describe the would-be Islamists varied, it was a recurring theme throughout the coverage. Whether it was a network of ‘Islamic extremists’ (Parry 2002a, NYT. 2002, TOI 2002a), ‘Indonesian militants’ (Parry 2002c, McGrory, Johnston 2002a) ‘radical Islam’ (SMH 2002a, Bumiller 2002), ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ (TOI 2002b, Mackay 2002), ‘Islamic militants’ (Bumiller 2002, Riley, Allard & Wilkinson 2002), ‘Islamic terrorism’ (Kremmer 2002b, Judt 2002) or ‘Islamic radicals’ (Kremmer 2002b, Perlez, Bonner 2002c), the import was the same in every instance. It should be noted that in the first seven days of the newspaper coverage of the Bali, no claims of responsibility or evidence surfaced that to legitimate these attributions. However, the Bali bombing occurred just over one year after the 9/11 attacks in the US, which were widely interpreted as being the work of Islamic fundamentalists, and within two years of the Christmas Eve bombings in Indonesia, which were attributed at that time to both Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda. However, within six weeks of the latter attacks, the respected Indonesian magazine TEMPO had published a sensational front page investigation documenting the extensive telephone contacts between the alleged culprits and leading figures in Indonesian military intelligence in the days leading up to those attacks (Tempo 2001). This then appeared to constitute a relatively recent precedent for official collusion in Indonesian terrorism and could have acted as the basis for a more nuanced attribution of responsibility in the wake of the Bali attack. However, apart from some coverage in the SMH to this effect detailed below, none of the other newspapers qualified their attributions in this regard.

4.2.1.2 Jemaah Islamiyah.

Within the broad category of ‘Islamic extremists’ however, two specific groups were targeted for attribution by the official framing: Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda. Official prognostications on attribution were predominantly directly towards Jemaah Islamiyah, especially by Australian and Indonesian officials. However, the only justification for this attribution (that was stipulated) was the
alleged confession by Omar Al Faruq. Faruq was reportedly captured by Indonesian police in June 2002 and handed over to the US military before being transferred to Bagram Air Force base in Afghanistan to be interrogated. According to US officials and as reported by TIME magazine in September 2002, Faruq eventually ‘broke’ in September 2002 after three months of interrogation, and allegedly confessed to be a leading figure in Al Qaeda amongst other confessions (Time 2002). The UKT reported on 14 October 2002 that his confession: ‘..also linked a controversial Indonesian cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir, to a South-East Asian extremist network called Jemaah Islamiyah and to Al-Qaeda’ (UK Times 2002c).

However, this alleged confession by Faruq had been questioned at the time by figures such as retired Indonesian intelligence chief, A.C. Manulang, who accused Al Faruq of being a CIA ‘mole’ some three weeks before the Bali bombing, with the role of: ‘infiltrating Islamic radical groups and recruiting local agents within these groups... with the aim of starting conflicts in Indonesia and creating the image that Indonesia is a land of terrorists’ (Tempo 2002). As for Faruq’s testimony that he had masterminded a plan to murder Indonesian President Megawati and a plan to conduct several bombings in Indonesia, Manulang considered this: ‘..as an attempt to make Islamic groups the scapegoats for all terrorism incidents... Anti-Islam intelligence agencies committed the bombings in Indonesia. They have been trained for this and they are very organized' (Tempo 2002).

Indeed, in later years, this allegation gained credence when the US refused to allow Al Faruq testify in the court cases of individuals later prosecuted for their alleged roles in the Bali bombing and also due to the fact that Al Faruq allegedly escaped from the high security Bagram prison in 2005 - with the US not publicly disclosing Faruq’s jailbreak for several months thereafter. However, although the alleged testimony of Al Faruq is cited repeatedly in the coverage, no question is ever raised about the authenticity of Al Faruq’s testimony in any of the four newspapers under study, despite the fact that Manulang made the allegations above less than three weeks before the Bali bombing and that they were published in the high profile Indonesian investigative magazine TEMPO. If we consider news framing at its most basic elemental level as construed by Entman (1993) as being about selection and
salience, then certainly the selection of Faruq’s testimony for dissemination and the prominent salience with which it was treated, as opposed to the silence that greeted Manulang’s assertion, is certainly a case study in dichotomous news framing (Entman 1993). As Table 6 demonstrates, Omar Al Faruq was cited 49 times across the four newspapers in the seven day period. By contrast, Manulang was never cited.

Table 6 Frequency of citation of ‘Omar Al Faruq’ in Bali coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UKT</th>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>SMH</th>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>TOI</th>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>NYT</th>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UKT1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMH12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TOI11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NYT24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMH83</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NYT40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMH40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NYT46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMH122</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NYT54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMH137</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SMH197</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SMH201</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the aforementioned testimony implicating Jemaah Islamiyah in the Bali bombings which was proffered as being ‘inside’ information, no other information was presented to implicate that group in the bombing apart from speculative attributions not grounded on any evidential basis. On analysis of the coverage of the four newspapers, a total of 40 speculative attributions to Jemaah Islamiyah were discovered: nine in the UKT, 21 in the SMH, two in the TOI and ten in the NYT. The language used to link Jemaah Islamiyah to the bombing varied but included ‘suspected’ (Johnston, McGrory 2002, McGrory, Johnston 2002c, Bhandari, Ananthnarayanan 2002b, Kremmer 2002a, Banham 2002, Frantz 2002); ‘suspect’ (UK Times 2002b, Watson, Webster & Beeston 2002, Maynard 2002); ‘chief suspect’ (Chew 2002a); ‘concerned about’ (Johnston, McGrory 2002); ‘little doubt’ (Parry 2002d, Riley 2002); ‘behind the bombings’ (Chew 2002b, Allard 2002d); ‘group most

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7 The author conducted a Skype interview on 03 July 2012 with Raymond Bonner, NYT correspondent in Indonesia in 2002. Responding to a question about Manulang’s allegations, Bonner replied that he ‘had never heard of him.’
commonly ascribed’ (Fealy 2002, Counsel 2002); ‘heads a shortlist of suspects’ (Riley 2002); ‘top of my list’ (Parkinson, Williams 2002); ‘the murders could come from’ (Henderson 2002); ‘only group capable’ (Gunaratna 2002) (SMH106); ‘most widely accused’ (Moore 2002a, Moore 2002b, Moore 2002e); ‘bombers are linked with’ (O’Malley, Miller 2002); ‘mounting evidence of’ (Bonner 2002c); ‘probably the work of’ (Bonner 2002c); PM ‘says he believes JI’ (Moore, Benns 2002) and ‘thought to be responsible’ (Moore 2002c, Ahmed 2002).

Apart from these speculative statements of attribution that directly assert or accuse Jemaah Islamiyah of having a role in the Bali bombing, the same group was also implicated in news stories where no direct attributions of responsibility were made. For example, on 16 October 2002, in a SMH article by Tom Allard under the headline ‘Australia to stamp outlaw brand on JI’, he wrote that: ‘Australia will call for Jemaah Islamiyah to be recognised as a terrorist organisation by the UN so any supporters or financial backers here can be pursued under new anti-terrorism laws' (Allard 2002a). Similarly, on the same day, the TOI noted how although JI was not known to have any British members or even links to organisations in the UK: ‘commentators said Jemaah Islamiyah.. could be banned like several Kashmiri organisations and two Sikh groups under Britain's Terrorism Act 2000' (Ahmed 2002).

Stipulating that an organisation is to be banned is a clear imputation of guilt when, as noted previously, no evidence (apart from Al Faruq’s alleged testimony) is proffered to assert that guilt. In addition, other stipulations in certain contexts also reinforce this notion of attribution without directly enunciating it. On 16 October a story in the UKT states how: ‘the hunt has been intensified for Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), a leading figure in the Jemaah Islamiyah group' (McGrory, Johnston 2002b), clearly implying that JI was responsible. Elsewhere in the same story a ‘terrorism expert’, Rohan Gunaratna, declared that Hambali was a member of the group's ruling council and that Jemaah Islamiyah was split into four groups, or mantiqis. In this latter case the notion of attribution is reinforced by describing the alleged constituent parts of Jemaah Islamiyah. There was a little introspection to be found on the alleged role of Jemaah Islamiyah. For instance, on 19 October in the
SMH, the Jakarta correspondent Matthew Moore noted how the bombing had given rise to much debate in Indonesia:

Much of it has centred on whether or not Jemaah Islamiyah, the Islamic group governments in the United States, Singapore and Australia suspect is responsible for the bombings, exists in Indonesia, whether it should be pursued, and whether US evidence of its activities is reliable. (Moore 2002c)

However, even when circumspection is stressed, it was invariably negated almost immediately. For instance, as Mark Baker writes in the SMH on 14 October:

Whether or not they were involved in the Bali bombings and no evidence has yet been produced that they were, there will be intensified pressure on President Megawati Soekarnoputri to crack down on the fundamentalist Muslim group Jemaah Islamiyah (Baker 2002b).

4.2.1.3 Al Qaeda.

Following JI, the next most frequently cited culprit in terms of attribution of responsibility is Al Qaeda. As with Jemaah Islamiyah, attributions of responsibility are made both directly and indirectly (or by inference). Fifteen direct statements of attribution to Al Qaeda were found in the dataset. For example, on 17 October, in a story entitled 'Bush vows to fight terror on all fronts', the US President 'last night blamed Al-Qaeda for the Bali nightclub bombing and a wave of other attacks' (McGrory et al. 2002). In the same story, the Indonesian Defence Minister also accused Osama bin Laden's network of causing the carnage in Bali: 'I am not afraid to say, though many have refused to say, that an Al-Qaeda network exists in Indonesia...I am convinced that there is a domestic link with al-Qaeda', Matori Abdul Jali said (McGrory et al. 2002). As in the case of the JI attributions discussed above, there was an infrequent sentiment asserting circumspection. On 19 October for example, the TOI reflected local sentiment that:

In the immediate wake of the bombing, a few Indonesians, like the defence minister, quickly jumped to the conclusion that the shadowy al-Qaeda was to blame. But that was mainly to please the outside world, in which all too many ‘experts’ and observers had jumped to the same conclusion well before the crime had been investigated and motives clearly established. (Bhandari, Ananthanarayanan 2002a)
All told, the fifteen direct assertions of Al Qaeda responsibility represented less than two fifths of those directed towards Jemaah Islamiyah. The texts did conflate the two however with attributions citing Jemaah Islamiyah ‘links to’ Al Qaeda. This relationship was asserted without naming the source on three occasions (McGrory, Johnston 2002a, Chew 2002a, Riley 2002) but elsewhere it was attributed to government officials (Johnston, McGrory 2002, Bonner 2002c, Reuters 2002, Perlez 2002), experts (Gunaratna 2002) or intelligence officials (Kitney 2002, Perlez, Bonner 2002a). The phrase ‘with links to’ or derivations of same was utilised 91 times in total over the coverage by the four newspapers to conjoin disparate individuals or groups. By far the most frequently ‘linked to’ however was Al Qaeda (65 times) and if Osama Bin Laden (5 times) is taken as a synonym for Al Qaeda in this context, that number rises to 70. In contrast, Jemaah Islamiyah was ‘linked to’ on only 22 occasions.\(^8\)

As with JI however, Al Qaeda was also implicated indirectly. For example, the fact that simultaneous bombs detonated at Bali was suggested as indicating the culpability of Al Qaeda as supposedly: 'evidence that three bombs were detonated virtually simultaneously in Bali points to terrorists trained by Osama bin Laden's network' (McGrory, Johnston 2002b). In addition, the fact that C4 explosives were found was cited in the same implicating manner. Squaring the circle of military grade explosives being used in terrorist attacks, ‘terror expert’ Rohan Gunaratna asserted that Islamic terrorists had bought the C4 explosive from rogue elements in the Indonesian military (McGrory, Johnston 2002a). As with a vast many other assertions in the coverage of the Bali bombing by Gunaratna and others, no substantiation was ever proffered for this statement.

\textbf{4.2.1.4 Abu Bakar Bashir.}

\footnotesize{\(^8\) Other entities ‘linked to’ in the coverage of the Bali Bombings included Abu Bakar Bashir (six times) and Lashkar Jihad (four times).}
Apart from Islamic militants in general, and Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda in particular, the next most frequently cited culprit was Abu Bakar Bashir. Bashir is cited approximately 30 times in the UKT coverage, approximately 50 times in the coverage of the SMH, approximately 70 times in the NYT coverage and once in the TOI. The most striking aspect to emerge from an analysis of these citations is the extent to which he is accredited with the role of leader of JI. Although the UKT asserts this ‘fact’ directly only twice (McGrory, Johnston 2002c, Chew 2002b), the NYT asserts it nine times (Bumiller 2002, Perlez, Bonner 2002c, Bonner 2002c, Perlez 2002, Bonner 2002a, Mydans 2002, Perlez, Bonner 2002b, Bonner 2002b) and the SMH asserts it 17 times, despite no evidence being proffered and despite Bashir’s consistent denials. Of the 32 total assertions of ABB’s leadership of Jemaah Islamiyah across the four newspapers, ten do prefix the assertion ‘said to be’ (Perlez, Bonner 2002b, Jones 2002) or ‘accused’ or ‘alleged’ (McGrory, Johnston 2002c, Moore 2002a, Moore 2002b, Moore 2002c, Allard 2002c, Moore, Goodsir & Rochfort 2002) but 22 assert it as uncontested. The language used varies but includes; ‘headed by’ (TOI 2002a, Perlez, Bonner 2002c, Bonner 2002c); ‘named as head’ (Fealy 2002); ‘run by’ (Riley 2002); ‘led by’ (SMH 2002b); ‘power behind’ (Wilkinson 2002a); ‘guru of’ (Carlton 2002) and ‘leader of’ (Bumiller 2002, Kremmer 2002a, Chew 2002b, Parkinson, Williams 2002, Gunaratna 2002, Baker 2002b, Letters. 2002, Wilkinson 2002b). In addition to these assertions, Bashir is credited as being alternatively ‘the intellectual inspiration’ (Perlez, Bonner 2002a) or ‘the spiritual leader of’ Jemaah Islamiyah five times over the coverage of the four newspapers (Chew 2002a, Allard 2002d, Perlez, Bonner 2002b, UK Times 2002a, Walker 2002). However, later prosecutions of Bashir by the authorities in Indonesian concluded with the verdict that there was no evidence to sustain the charge that Bashir was the head of Jemaah Islamiyah.

Apart from the unsubstantiated assertion of his alleged leadership of JI, the coverage on occasion also frames ABB’s personal attributes consistent with his alleged role as the head of a terrorist organisation. Thus, he is variously described as; ‘a militant cleric’ (McGrory et al. 2002); ‘an outspoken cleric’ (McGrory, Johnston 2002c); ‘a radical Muslim leader’ (Parry 2002b) or ‘radical cleric’ (Riley 2002) who is alleged to have ‘advocated a holy war to establish a separate Islamic state in South-East Asia’ (Riley 2002) and ‘has publicly expressed his admiration for bin Laden’ (Parry
2002a, Perlez, Bonner 2002b, Bonner 2002d) and for Al Qaeda (Baker 2002b). Even Bashir’s posture and demeanour were framed in a manner consistent with his alleged role as the leader of a terrorist organisation. At a press conference denying the allegations, correspondent Mike Carlton of the SMH spoke of Bashir’s: ‘chilling tone, the mesmeric cadence of his speech, the soft-spoken yet steely conviction of the righteous maniac’ (Carlton 2002). Similarly, Amy Chew in the UKT described how ‘throughout the interview with The Times, Mr Bashir remained composed, but ‘when asked about America, his back straightened and his voice crackled with anger’ (Chew 2002b).

Notably, shortly after the Bali bombing, Indonesia’s TEMPO’s Magazine published an opinion poll in which 75 per cent of Indonesian respondents disagreed with the proposition that Bashir was involved in an international terrorist network and nearly half of the respondents considered that Bashir was a convenient scapegoat for the US in its fight against terrorism (McDougall, Shearman 2006). In any event, in contrast to the other three entities most commonly attributed responsibility (Islamic extremists, Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda), Bashir alone was in a position to defend himself directly in the media. It is proposed to analyse his responses in the next section under the heading of counter framing.

Finally, as an adjunct to the official attributions of responsibility, it is necessary to include the short-lived but curious phenomenon of the ‘former Air Force official’. The first of eight articles in the dataset to mention this individual was a TOI article headlined 'Ex-Air Force officer built Bali bomb: Report’, on 16 October 2002. The article begins:

A dismissed Indonesian Air Force officer has confessed to assembling the deadly bomb that killed over 181 people in the island of Bali, media reported on Wednesday. The man, now held by authorities, said he regretted the huge loss of life in Saturday's attack but had not revealed who had asked him to build the ‘C-4’ military explosive, the Washington Post reported, quoting Indonesian security sources. The suspect had learned to handle explosives while serving in the Indonesian Air Force, which later dismissed him for misconduct. (TOI 2002a)

9 However, the same articles neglect to mention that Bashir did not consider Bin Laden or Al Qaeda as being responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and instead considered them as ‘false flag’ attacks by the US government.
However, subsequent coverage of this individual was wildly contradictory. On 17 October, both the TOI and the SMH carried denials by the Jakarta authorities that this individual was implicated in the bombing while the UKT reported that he had claimed to run to the Sari club to help in the rescue effort (McGrory, Johnston 2002a, Moore 2002b, Bhandari, Ananthanarayanan 2002c). However, on 18 October, the SMH reported that while Jakarta authorities were still denying that the individual was a suspect, the Bali police still considered him thus:

Contradicting earlier denials from Jakarta, Bali police said they were still questioning a former member of the Indonesian Air Force over the bombing. At a press briefing yesterday, the Bali police chief, Budi Setyawan, said the man was ‘believed to have helped design the bomb’. Another senior police officer, the commissioner in charge of information, Suyatmo, told the Herald the suspect had trained in bomb disposal but had not completed the course... But this version of events was contradicted within hours by Jakarta authorities, who said the man was not a suspect. (Mercer 2002a)

Three further articles in the SMH on 18 October and 19 October also cited this individual and the conflicting version of events emanating from the Balinese and Jakarta authorities (Allard 2002b, Mercer 2002c, Mercer 2002b) before the story disappeared, never to resurface. A further curious aspect of the case was that the retired Air Force officer was never named in any of the eight articles cited above, despite the fact that his name was on the public record at least as early as 18 October when the Christian Science Monitor reported it as Lt. Col. Dedy Masruchin (The CS Monitor 2002).

4.2.2 Counter Framing.

As noted above, Abu Bakar Bashir was stipulated from the outset as a prime suspect in the Bali bombings and was allegedly ‘linked to’ Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism in general. The only stipulated evidence for this conflation was the disputed testimony of Omar Al Faruq. However, unlike in the cases of Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda and militant Islam, who did not ‘speak’ in the pages of the respective newspapers, Bashir immediately sought an audience with journalists to condemn the bombings and to deny that he played any role. Direct denials by Bashir were carried in all newspapers in relation to the charge that he had an involvement in the bombings (McGrory,
that he had links with terrorism or that he was a part of Jemaah Islamiyah (Baker 2002b). Indeed,
Bashir denied that Jemaah Islamiyah even existed in Indonesia, saying that the organisation operated
in Malaysia and Singapore but not Indonesia (Perlez, Bonner 2002c, Chew 2002b). Furthermore,
asked whether Omar al-Faruq had given him $74,000 as alleged to carry out the Bali bombing, he
denied the allegation with the retort: 'That's such a big lie. This is all made up by America and Jews'
(Chew 2002b).

Indeed, Bashir went on to assert that not alone was the Faruq testimony fabricated, but that the
bombing itself was conducted by western, 'probably American', intelligence agencies. This assertion
by Bashir was reported eight times across the four newspapers (Bumiller 2002, Johnston, McGrory
2002d). He proffered two rationales for his assertion - one relating to capability and one related to
motive. In terms of capability, Bashir said that the bombing could not have been carried out by
domestic individuals considering the huge power of the explosives involved (Johnston, McGrory
2002, Parkinson, Williams 2002). In terms of motive, Bashir outlined why he thought that the US
would be motivated to conduct such an operation in parallel to stating why he would be motivated not
to do so. In the former category he stated that: 'America has long given the impression that Indonesia
is a nest of terrorists. The explosion may have been done to strengthen claims that Indonesia is a
nest of terrorists' (Chew 2002a). In the latter category he asked rhetorically: 'Why would I do this in
the midst of the US allegations against me? It would only confirm President Bush's allegation that we
are the biggest terrorists in the region' (Parkinson, Williams 2002).

In the majority of instances where Bashir attributed responsibility to alternatively ‘Americans’ or ‘the
Jews’ (Bonner 2002d), the contention is not remarked upon, even to dismiss it. It is conceivable that
the correspondent involved did not feel the need to do so as they considered the contention on its face
‘outside the bounds’. However, in another context, the idea of governments or intelligence agencies
staging terrorist attacks for political purposes is not alone considered as a possibility, but taken as fact.
For example, most notably in the pages of the SMH, the role of Indonesian politicians and the Indonesian military (TNI) in fomenting and staging terrorist atrocities to be attributed to Islamic militants is documented in considerable detail. On 14 October for example, correspondent Louise Williams wrote:

Indonesia's small bands of so-called ‘jihad’ warriors have been largely supported and manipulated by Jakarta's politicians to fuel religious and ethnic tensions in the tinderbox of multicultural, religiously diverse Indonesia. Such chaos has frequently been fomented for political gain; either to discredit the Government or strengthen the hand of the military in 'securing' the nation' (Williams 2002).

In later articles this thesis is expanded upon on numerous occasions in the SMH, with frequent reference to the Islamic groups Laskar Jihad and Komando Jihad, who, it was alleged, had been manipulated by hidden actors to various ends. The following two excerpts exemplify the suspicions that were being enunciated at the time in the SMH:

The Kuta bombings demand more analysis, not less, but sections of the right are deeply reluctant to countenance this for one big reason - the possible involvement of sections of the Indonesian military in the atrocity, and their links with Islamic fundamentalist paramilitary groups. We know that there are links between the TNI and Laskar Jihad, and there may be links with others. (Rundle 2002)

Although the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, has dismissed the line of suspicion as ‘silly’, some officials in his entourage must have wondered... There is a long history of political manipulators within the Indonesian armed forces, or TNI, playing with the fire of Islamic extremism and staging incidents of terrorism. (McDonald 2002)

Indeed, such assertions of TNI involvement in terrorist atrocities in the past were not just cited in the abstract. Direct accusations were made of TNI involvement in the Bali bombing also. Writing on 14 October in an article entitled: 'In the shadow of the generals - The long hand of the military may have left its prints on the Kuta bomb', political scientist Dr. Greg Barton quotes the respected political commentator and former spokesman for Indonesian President Wahid, Wimar Witoelar, as saying:

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10 A reformed member of Komando Jihad, Timsar Zubil, stated in a 2005 Australian SBS documentary that the name Komando Jihad was suggested by Indonesian intelligence agents who supported the formation of the group.
The plot is probably hatched by hard-line military rogues, as impatient as many are with Megawati, but coming from the right flank. This is certainly an excuse for a military takeover. (Dr Barton 2002)

Relevant to the credibility of the hypothesis that the Indonesian military or intelligence agencies could have played a role in the Bali bombing was a 2005 documentary broadcast on the Australian public access channel SBS. The Dateline production produced a litany of evidence for Indonesian instigation and infiltration of Muslim terrorist groups including official documents dating from 1990, 1995 and 2002 citing Fauzi Hasbi as an intelligence agent. Hasbi had close contact with alleged Jemaah Islamiyah operations chief Hambali and lived literally next door to Abu Bashir. He was also an instrumental figure in the formation of Jemaah Islamiyah in 1990 and in the Christmas Eve bombings of 2000. Hasbi was murdered in mysterious circumstances in early 2003 after his role as a mole was exposed (History Commons 2012). In addition, the documentary makers interviewed former militant Umar Abduh who later became a researcher and writer. Abduh told Dateline that Indonesian authorities had a hand in many terror groups:

There is not a single Islamic group either in the movement or the political groups that is not controlled by (Indonesian) intelligence. (The Australian 2005)

Therefore, when Abu Bakar Bashir asserted that American or other western intelligence agencies were responsible for the bombings, the assertion cannot be dismissed on the basis that such things never occur - rather, that Americans would not do such a thing - a less tenable proposition. It is a striking feature of the comparative coverage that, as noted, the SMH outlines frequently and in some considerable detail the precedents for official collusion in terrorist incidents, but the UKT and the NYT did not mention such precedents on a single occasion. In the case of the TOI, even though the dataset of their coverage was only 11 articles, the newspaper twice referenced the possible role of the TNI. For example, on 19 October, a TOI article outlined some culpability scenarios:

If some renegade Indonesian military personnel or faction were mainly responsible for the bombing, then an anti-Australian motive is a possibility - given military resentment of Australian assistance to East Timor's moves towards independence. The difficulty of finding
a satisfactory motive for the bombing helps explains why not a few Indonesians assume that the Americans must have done it. (Bhandari, Ananthanarayanan 2002a)

The last line above brings us back full circle to the assertion by Bashir that the US was complicit in the bombings. All newspapers under review, with the exception of the UKT, reported the sentiment either held in Indonesia or elsewhere, that ‘Americans’ were involved. Once in the NYT and twice in the SMH, references were made to this assertion. The following is the excerpt from the NYT penned by Sidney Jones on 16 October 2002, director of the International Crisis Group:

Extraordinary as this seems in the West, many Indonesians are convinced that the United States sponsored the Bali bombing in order to convince reluctant governments to join its war on terror and support an attack on Iraq. Hard-line Muslims like Abu Bakar Bashir are not the only ones making this claim. Some Indonesians seem to believe that the only organization with the capacity to carry out such a devastating attack is the American government. (Jones 2002)

The language and strategy used to dismiss the notion are noteworthy. In the NYT for example, the views of ‘many Indonesians’ regarding US complicity are labelled ‘extraordinary’. Given the well documented abuses perpetrated by the CIA during the Cold War years and after, that such an allegation would gain credence among the Indonesian populace given their direct experience of such collusion at home, is hardly ‘extraordinary’. In addition, the mention of Bashir in two out of the three contexts noted above brings to mind one of Pan & Kosicki’s (1993 p. 60) three ‘framing devices’, (cited within their discussion of ‘syntactical structures’), the last of which involved: ‘marginalizing certain points of view by relating a quote or point of view to a social deviant’.

4.2.4 Conclusions.

In Entman’s oft quoted study of the contrast in narratives of the KAL and Iran Air incidents by the US media, he made the point that ‘the essence of framing is sizing - magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient’ (Entman 1991). Building on that notion with regard to the question of responsibility for the Bali bombings, it is instructive to note the three causal
agents whose alleged roles were magnified in the coverage over that first seven days: 1) Jemaah Islamiyah (directly attributed responsibility in 40 instances), 2) Abu Bakar Bashir (cited 151 times and ascribed leadership of Jemaah Islamiyah in 32 instances) and to a lesser extent 3) Al Qaeda ('linked to' some 70 times). It can now be stated with conviction that none of these 'magnified' culprits were responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings or that at the very least no evidence has ever been proffered that they were. The crux of this argument relates to the three individuals who were later arrested for the bombing and who reportedly confessed immediately before they were eventually executed in 2008. However, although they were depicted throughout this period as being ‘the face’ of Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, they denied to the end having any relationship with that organisation.

In addition, although they were seldom depicted in the media as members of Al Qaeda, Ali Ghufon did claim in a CNN interview some months before he was executed that while not a member of Al Qaeda, he was acting as part of global jihad (CNN 2008). Thus, at first glance, it could be argued that the newspaper attributions were valid in only one of the first three categories of attribution identified i.e. 'Islamic extremists.'

Despite the confessions and convictions, many unanswered questions remain about the perpetration of the Bali bombings. The first and perhaps most obvious of these relates to the sheer size of the explosion. Then editor at the Jakarta Post, American native and former US Marine Robert Finnegan, (who was later fired at the behest of the US Ambassador to Indonesia for his ‘over aggressive’ investigation into the bombing) claimed that a potassium chlorate compound (as alleged) had a 

'velocity of detonation' in feet per second (FPS) of only 3,500 FPS and argued that the bomb at the Sari club exhibited a velocity of detonation closer to 1 million to 1.5 million FPS (Finnegan 2003). Indeed, so large was the explosion and resulting fireball at the Sari club that two separate witnesses interviewed by both the UKT and the NYT in the days following the attack described it alternatively as 'about 10 stories high in flames alone... It was a mushroom cloud of flames,' (Carlton 2002) and as ‘a huge – like insane – ball of fire, like a mushroom cloud’ (Mydans 2002). The massive nature of the explosion had, on 18 November, prompted the respected Indonesian Speaker of Parliament, Amien Rais, in Parliament, to question the validity of the police conclusion that Amrozi was the main
perpetrator. Rais was supported by Deputy House Speaker A.M. Fatwa, who stated, also on the floor of the Indonesian parliament: 'I don’t believe that Amrozi has the capability to make all kinds of the preparations for the bombings, like setting off a kind of micro nuclear bomb in Bali' (Vialls 2003). This allegation that a ‘micro nuclear’ device had been used in the attacks was also asserted later by Abu Bakar Bashir in both 2006 (ABC News Australia 2006) and 2008 (ABC News Australia 2008). Indeed, in an article in the Australian Newcastle Herald on 5 September 2006 that reviewed the former of these assertions, the correspondent noted that the micro nuclear device theory:

..is a theory that has some currency in Indonesia. The convicted bomber Amrozi himself speculated in court that the device he detonated couldn’t have caused the damage that occurred at the Sari club, specifically nominating a mini-nuke – remotely exploded by Americans or Israelis – as a possible alternative. (Ray 2006).

The damage done by the blast was described in various terms. A SMH article on 19 October had stated that 'a whole block at Kuta Beach, 27 buildings, had been destroyed’, (Cornford 2002) while six months later the NYT, on reporting the trial of Amrozi, declared that 'the huge explosions levelled the nightclubs and destroyed 422 other buildings, according to the indictment (Mydans 2003). Whatever the exact number of buildings destroyed, the blast was enormous in scale. Apropos of this and rather incredibly, when a UKT reporter, Michael Sheridan, travelled to an Indonesian prison to interview the three convicted men on death row some six months before they were executed in 2008, he reported the following exchange. Speaking to Imam Samudra, still apparently unrepentant for his role in the bombing, Sheridan wrote:

And then he said something extraordinary. He claimed the bombers had never meant to kill so many people. What happened at Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club was ‘unacceptable’, he said. Had he made the bomb? ‘No, no, no!’ he said, shaking his head. ‘I didn’t help to make it, and who made the bomb and when I don’t know.’ The second explosion was much bigger than they had expected, he said. The only explanation, he suggested, was that ‘the CIA or KGB or Mossad’ - those familiar bogeymen of the conspiracy theorist – had somehow tampered with the bomb. ‘It is very possible,’ he claimed. (Sheridan 2008)

Finally, in the last respect - the case of Abu Bashir - it has been established in Indonesian legal proceedings that no evidence exists to demonstrate his culpability with regard to the Bali attack or any
connection to Jemaah Islamiyah, despite the deployment of a range of dubious legal mechanisms against the defendant. While an argument can be constructed that in the aftermath of the bombings the respective newspapers under study simply engaged in a trawl of the usual suspects prompted by official sources within and without Indonesia, no argument can be constructed to plausibly maintain that attribution a decade later, yet this remains the case. For example, when Umar Patek was detained in 2011 for his alleged role in the Bali bombings, the NYT repeated the attribution of responsibility to Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Bashir as if nothing had happened in the previous ten years to negate the validity of that assertion:

His arrest, if confirmed, would be a major intelligence boon for Indonesia, which has successfully curbed much of the violent Jemaah Islamiyah network which was behind the Bali bombings and a string of other attacks.... The arrest comes as the co-founder of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir, is standing trial in Jakarta on charges of supporting a militant camp set up in the northern Sumatran province of Aceh last year. (Belford 2011)

In summation, we can make certain tentative assessments regarding the veracity of the attributions of responsibility contained in the newspapers under review in the first seven days after the Bali bombing. Regarding ‘Islamic extremists,’ it would appear that individuals fitting this description were at least partially responsible for the Bali blasts and thus attributions of same were correct, if unqualified. Regarding Jemaah Islamiyah, no evidence was ever produced certifying their role in the attack, despite their being the most cited culprit in media reports even a decade later. Similarly, no evidence was ever produced certifying a role by Al Qaeda, apart from that group apparently inspiring Ali Ghufon. Finally, despite repeated attempts by the Indonesian authorities to prosecute Abu Bakar Bashir for an alleged role in the attacks, nothing more incriminating than an alleged conversation with Amrozi was proffered as evidence, with the later retracted later on the grounds that it was obtained by torture.

The newspaper coverage of the London bombings differed in one important respect with the coverage of the Bali bombings in that within seven days of the attack, authorities in the UK claimed to have identified the four individuals who they believed were responsible for the four bombs that detonated in central London on 07 July 2005. This disclosure was reported in all four newspapers under review on Wednesday 13 July, changing fundamentally the frames of attribution that were employed in the coverage. Thus, when analysing the framing of attribution in this case, it is proposed to separate the attributions into ‘before’ and ‘after’ sections that reflect this cleavage. In the first five days of coverage, attributions of responsibility were multiple such was the multiplicity of groups and individuals that were speculatively ascribed a role in the attacks. Thus, in the first section, it is proposed to analyse the ‘before’ attributions in three categories analogous to those used in our corresponding Bali attribution analysis i.e. 1) Islamic extremists, 2) Al Qaeda and 3) Individuals.

Two other distinctions from the Bali analysis should also be noted at this point. First, unlike Bali, two claims of responsibility were reported after London. Due to the fact that the organisations claiming responsibility were framed as being subsets of Al Qaeda (rather than as distinct but related as in the case of Jemaah Islamiyah), it is proposed to subsume the analysis of both under the analysis of Al Qaeda attributions. Second, while only one individual was attributed responsibility in the case of Bali (Abu Bakar Bashir), several individuals were stipulated in the context of culpability for the London bombings. On completion of the ‘before’ analysis, the second major section below is concerned with attributions ‘after’ the authorities identified the four men they believed to be responsible.

As in the case of the Bali coverage, the attribution frame is the most commonly occurring frame in the coverage by the NYT (40%) and the TOI (56%). In addition, and also as in the pattern of Bali coverage, the frequency of the human interest frame in the most proximate newspaper (the UKT) is marginally more frequent than the attribution frame at 31% and 30% respectively, a phenomenon that is surely again explained by the fact that the majority of fatalities were sustained by citizens of the UK.
4.3.1 Attributions – Before 13 July 2005.

4.3.1.1 Islamic Extremists.

As in the case of Bali, Islamic fundamentalists were ascribed responsibility from the outset in the wake of the London attacks, either as individuals or as a group. In the case of the former for example, NYT correspondent Peter Bergen remarked, almost as an aside, that they: ‘seem to be the work of jihadist militants’ (Bergen 2005). On the same day, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair explained that those responsible: ‘would have believed they were acting in the name of Islam’ (UKT 2005b). Elsewhere, they were described as; ‘Islamic terrorists’ (Cowell 2005c); ‘Islamic extremists’ (NYT 2005, Cowell 2005e, Stephens, Gooodsir & Connolly 2002); ‘Islamic militants’ (Ahmed 2002) or ‘local militants’ (Reuters 2005b). Regarding Islamic group attributions, examples included; ‘MI5 has said it believes that a fundamentalist organisation was responsible’ (Johnston 2005); ‘the bombers, who no one doubts are part of an Islamist group’ (O'Neill, S., McGrory, D. 2005, Baldwin 2005) and that they were ‘likely to have been by a radical Islamic group’ (Letters 2002). It is interesting to review these statements in the light of the later identification of four ‘clean skin’ individuals by the authorities. According to the official narrative these four individuals were ‘inspired by’ radical Islam rather than being members of any specific extremist group. If this is the case, then MI5 were incorrect in their attribution to a group. This raises questions as to how a preeminent intelligence agency could be quoted as ‘believing’ something which turned out to be false only a matter of days later - and why it would have asserted this in the public domain at that time. It is also curious that the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and intelligence agencies were asserting a link to Islamic terrorists at the same time that the Police (in the form of the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Paddock) was asserting that this was not the case: ‘As far as I am concerned, Islam and terrorists are two words which do not go together’, he said (Hoyle 2005).

4.3.1.2 Al Qaeda.
Moving on from attributions to Islamic individuals and Islamic groups in general, attributions to Al Qaeda are also made frequently in all four newspapers, although in comparison to coverage of the Bali bombings it is notable that such attributions are often made in the sense of the culprits being ‘inspired by’ Al Qaeda rather than that organisation being directly responsible. Attributions are either stated declaratively or reasoned based on a study of the attacks themselves. In the former category are statements like; ‘The Times understands that the Government’s ‘working assumption’ is that Al-Qaeda is responsible’ (UKT 2005b); ‘there is little doubt, however, that they were carried out by terrorists linked to or inspired by Al-Qaeda’ (O’Neill, S., McGrory, D. 2005) and ‘intelligence services are operating on the assumption that a network with allegiance to Al Qaeda was responsible’ (Webster 2005). In the latter category are those statements that attribute responsibility to Al Qaeda for the bombings based on the character or ‘signatures’ of the attacks such as their: 1) simplicity, 2) co-ordination, 3) timing, 4) precision, 5) targeting of civilians, 6) lack of warning etc. For example; ‘the lack of advance warning of the attacks, as well as their timed co-ordination, contributes to the case that Al Qaeda - or a European splinter group - was responsible for them’ (Crabb 2005); ‘it bears Al-Qaida’s stamp in many ways, apart from claims of responsibility made by an organisation using its name. There is the precision of the attacks, the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, and the choice of a symbolic moment’ (TNN 2005a) or the general statement by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw declaring that, in general, the explosions bore: ‘all the hallmarks of an Al Qaeda-related attack’ (UKT 2005b, Webster 2005, Button, Crabb & Munro 2005, Crabb, Munro 2005a).

Reinforcing the notion of Al Qaeda culpability in the minds of the readers of the newspapers under review were the curious cases of the claims of responsibility reportedly by ‘The Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe’ (SOAE) and The Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades’ (AHAB) respectively. With regard to the former, the reported claim by the SOAE was posted anonymously to an Islamic website elqal3ah.com (which translates as ‘Castle’ in English) at 12.55pm (according to the House of Commons ‘narrative’ of the event) and was then reported by the Italian ANSA news agency and picked up by BBC Monitoring - all in the space of a few hours on 07 July 2005. However, in the 20 citations of the SOAE across the four newspapers, only twice was it reported how this purported claim
found its way into the respective newspapers (Reuters 2005a, Crabb, Magnay 2005). While it is outside the scope of the current study to specifically investigate why the Italian news agency ANSA felt that this ostensibly anonymous internet post was news, it is a curious situation as such news sourcing practices would normally be anathema to most media outlets, and most especially the four elite ‘newspapers of record’ in the current study. In any event, of the 20 citations, a full 50% reported the claim without any qualification whatsoever. Typical language used went something like the following: ‘A group calling itself the Secret Organisation Group of al-Qaeda of Jihad Organisation in Europe claimed the attacks on an Islamic website’ (UKT 2005b). A further six reported the claim as above but noted that it could not be verified or confirmed (Reuters 2005a, Crabb, Magnay 2005, Cowell 2005f, Van Natta Jr., Sciolino 2005, Wilkinson 2005, Taheri 2005). Finally, in articles comprising 25% of the citations, some qualification (apart from it being unverified) was stipulated but these often contradicted one another. For instance, while the NYT reported that ‘several experts doubted it was authentic’ (Van Natta Jr., Sciolino 2005), the UKT reported that ‘experts found it credible’ (O'Neill, S., McGrory, D. 2005). Elsewhere, the TOI noted that the claim: ‘did not appear on a website normally associated with Al Qaeda’ (Reuters 2005a) and the SMH noted that it contained errors in its references to the Koran as well as reporting that the website: ‘was a public one where anybody could post anonymously’ (Crabb 2005). Given the last three qualifications especially, it was remarkable that the claim entered the news discourse at all, but to have been cited without at least substantial qualification in 15 instances (75% of citations) would clearly have left an impression of Al Qaeda culpability in the minds of all save the most diligent reader.

The second claim of responsibility by an Al Qaeda ‘linked’ group arrived on 10 July, some three days after the bombing. The alleged group, the Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades (AHAB), was cited six times in the coverage across the four newspapers. According to the TOI, the group: ‘ordered attacks on Europe in a 29 May Internet message that the Spanish secret service forwarded to their British counterparts at the weekend’, the Spanish Daily El Mundo reported (AFP 2005b). Of the six citations, this was the only one that referenced the source of the claim, but even in this instance no indication was given as to why it was taken seriously, especially given that the ‘group’ had apparently claimed
responsibility for numerous incidents over the previous years, including the Istanbul bombing (2003) and the Madrid bombing (2004). Indeed, the ‘group’ had even outrageously claimed responsibility for the New York power outage in 2003 in an operation ‘they’ codenamed ‘Operation Quick Lightning in the Land of the Tyrant of This Generation’ (Foreign Policy 2010). Given that investigators in Istanbul and Spain found no evidence to support the group’s claims and the patently absurd claim regarding the power outage, how the claims were ever reported by a newspaper, let alone four national newspapers of record, is mystifying. Indeed, not only were the claims cited but their statement was quoted at length in four of the six instances (AFP 2005b, Cowell, Van Natta Jr. 2005, Crabb, Munro 2005b, UKT 2005d). Unlike the case of the first group analysed above where 50% of citations were qualified and approximately 25% were strongly qualified, only one of the six citations of the AHAB was qualified: ‘the group has taken responsibility for attacks in Turkey and Spain, but the police have tended to be sceptical about the authenticity of its claims’ (Cowell 2005a). Perhaps the most succinct explanation of the ‘group’ was provided at the time by Ben Venzke, CEO of IntelCenter, a private company that specialises in analysing terrorist messages for government agencies:

They started claiming responsibility for just about everything in the world. We've never been able to determine if it is just one person sitting at a computer having fun or if it really is a group. (Boston Globe 2004)

Regardless, the citations would have further reinforced the notion of Al Qaeda culpability in the days following the bombings and apart from the weak proviso cited above, none of the newspapers under review seriously questioned the legitimacy of the claims by either group.

Another notable feature of the coverage was the use of the rejoinder ‘linked to’ or ‘with links to’. It was noted in the corresponding Bali section how a derivation of this phrase was utilised in the coverage 91 times, with 70 of those instances used to conjoin something or somebody with Al Qaeda. In the coverage of the London attacks, a derivation of the phrase was used in 68 instances, although Al Qaeda was ‘linked to’ in only 31 of these. Of the remainder, four instances served to ‘link’ one of the two alleged Al Qaeda affiliates analysed above to Al Qaeda itself. Other citations were used to
‘link’ something or somebody to the alleged mastermind of the London bombings (four times), to ‘link’ the Madrid bombings (seven times), to ‘link’ Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (three times) and to ‘link’ Tariq Ramadan (twice). The case of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar is discussed in more detail below.

4.3.1.3 Individuals.

Over the course of the coverage across the four newspapers, eight individuals were named as being potentially relevant to the investigation into the attacks or indeed having a direct role in the attacks. The first of these individuals was an Egyptian national, Magdy El-Nashar, a biochemist who had just completed his PhD at the University of Leeds. El-Nashar was named six times in the coverage across the four newspapers. All reports declared that Scotland Yard were searching for El-Nashar who was said to have rented the apartment in Leeds where the bomb factory was found and who ‘was understood to have known some of the bombers’ (TNN 2006e, Cowell 2005d, UKT 2005e). Two of the reports put these two facts together to describe El-Nashar as ‘the possible bomb maker’ (Button 2005e, Button 2005c). El-Nashar was subsequently arrested in Egypt some days later. However, after being held for a number of weeks and questioned intensively by Egyptian security services, El-Nashar was subsequently released without charge and cleared of any involvement in the attacks. Interviewed later on the BBC Radio 4 Today Program, El-Nashar described how he had met Germaine Lindsay in November 2004 at a mosque in Leeds and how some six months later Lindsay had asked him for assistance in finding accommodation in Leeds which he subsequently did through his landlord, declaring in the same interview that Lindsay was ‘very kind and nice’. He also recounted how he feared for his safety in returning to the UK, declaring that: ‘the British media showed me like a bad person.. a terrorist or something.. and they made a big propaganda’ (ElNashar 2005).

The second individual named in the coverage was the British citizen Zeeshan Siddique who had been arrested in Pakistan in May 2005 after British officials had fed information to the Pakistani authorities about his alleged links to terrorism (CagePrisoners.com 2006). He was named four times across the coverage. All references stipulate how British officials planned to question Siddique, who was
described as a suspect and ‘is alleged to be among those schooled in bomb-making’ (Ford, Bennett 2005). However, after being held in Pakistan for almost eight months, Siddique was released in January 2006 without charge, apart from being fined approximately €10 for overstaying his visa. In a later interview, again with the BBC Radio 4 Today Program, Siddiqui described in detail how he was tortured by Pakistani ISI agents with the knowledge of British MI6 officers who also visited him and interrogated him in his cell (CagePrisoners.com 2006). This allegation was given credence when a Pakistani Judge presiding over his case ordered the local health department to pay for corneal grafting surgery in order to repair the damage that had been inflicted on him during his period in custody (CagePrisoners.com 2006). On his return to Britain, Siddique was served with a control order for unspecified reasons and sometime later was placed in a mental institution as a result of what the BBC described as: ‘hallucinations and flashbacks related to his torture’ (BBC News 2007). Siddique was then said to have escaped the mental institution in September 2006 and has not been seen or heard of since (BBC News 2007).

A third individual who was repeatedly stipulated in the coverage of the London attacks was the Moroccan born Mohammed El Guerbozi. He was cited twice in the UKT, once in the TOI, once in the NYT and four times in the SMH. In the coverage it was stated that: Moroccan authorities have accused Guerbozi of planning the 2003 Casablanca bombings (Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005); that Guerbozi was convicted in absentia for his role in those attacks (Crabb, Munro 2005b, Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005, Crabb, Munro 2005c); that Guerbozi was a key figure in the Madrid bombings (Crabb, Munro 2005b, Crabb, Munro 2005c, Button 2005a, Munro 2005); that Guerbozi was an extremist thought to be a senior member of Al Qaeda (Crabb, Munro 2005b, Munro 2005) and that Guerbozi was head of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005, Roshan 2005).

However, the attributions were quite untrue, or at least unsupported by any evidence. First, while the Moroccan authorities had indeed accused Guerbozi of being involved in the Casablanca attacks, the British authorities had refused to arrest him (let alone extradite him) because: ‘British officials say there is not enough evidence to arrest him’ (Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005). The same was true of Guerbozi’s alleged role in the Madrid bombings as well as his alleged membership of Al Qaeda and
his alleged leadership of the Moroccan Combatant Group. Second, while it is true to say that Guerbozi
‘was convicted in absentia by a Moroccan court and sentenced to 20 years in prison for his alleged
role in the Casablanca bombings in 2003 that killed 44 people’ (Crabb, Munro 2005b), a point that
was repeated almost verbatim in dozens of news stories worldwide at the time, in all except a very
few articles the fact was omitted that 700 other individuals were also convicted for their alleged roles
in the same attacks, which puts a very different complexion on the attribution, especially as all
‘convictions’ seem to have been obtained within weeks of the bombing (News 24 2004). In addition,
in three of the four articles in the SMH, it is stated unequivocally that ‘this is the man that British
authorities believe masterminded the attacks’ (Crabb, Munro 2005b, Crabb, Munro 2005c, Munro
2005), despite the British authorities having noted that Guerbozi was not in fact a suspect. In three of
their articles dealing with Guerbozi the headlines were; ‘this is the fanatic Scotland Yard is hunting’
(Crabb, Munro 2005b); ‘this is the man who Scotland Yard wants to question’ (Crabb, Munro 2005c)
and ‘Madrid suspects may have struck again’ (Munro 2005). However, a year later, a series of
apologies to Guerbozi were published by practically every major media organisation in Britain. The
UKT apology was published on 26 May 2006 and stated that Guerbozi: ‘was not involved in any way
with the London bombings and has never supported terrorism’ (UKT 2006). It appears that Guerbozi
sued various British media outlets, resulting in the apologies (Rhanem 2006).

The fourth individual cited in the coverage as being related to the investigation into the London
bombings was Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, a Syrian born man with Spanish citizenship due to his
marriage in the late 1980’s to a Spanish woman. Nasar was cited nine times in total across the four
newspapers – twice in the TOI, once in the NYT, three times in the SMH and twice in the UKT. The
police are described as ‘hunting’ Nasar (Crabb, Munro 2005b, Crabb, Munro 2005c, Munro 2005,
Roshan 2005) who is alternatively described as ‘having links to a Spanish Al Qaida cell’ (Roshan
2005); being ‘an Al Qaeda veteran believed to have links to the Madrid bombings’ (Crabb, Munro
2005b, Crabb, Munro 2005c, Button 2005a, Munro 2005) and ‘believed to have masterminded the
directly described as a likely suspect in the London bombings twice (Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005,
PTI 2005), although no direct evidence is produced to substantiate this. In fact, unlike the previous three individuals, Nasar does appear to have a long history of involvement in radical Islam, apparently fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the late 1980’s, working as an editor on the GIA (Algerian Armed Islamic Group) related Al-Ansar publication in London in the mid-1990’s and apparently publishing well received books on the Jihadi movement (Whitlock 2006). In addition, in September 2004, Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon indicted 35 individuals for their alleged role in the Madrid bombing, including Nasar, although it is unclear on what specifics this indictment is based. In the end, Nasar is reported to have been captured by Pakistani authorities in October 2005 and handed over to US authorities a month or so later. After this time, little or nothing has been reported about him, although in 2006 American intelligence sources will claim that he is now in the secret custody of another unnamed country (Whitlock 2006). Since that time, there have been numerous attempts to identify the location of Nasar by his family, NGO’s, and the Spanish magistrate (Garzon) that had previously indicted him, all to no avail. In June 2009, in response to an ACLU request for information about Nassar’s whereabouts, the CIA stated that it could: ‘neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to the request’ (ACLU 2009). As Nasar has never been prosecuted in a court of law, it follows that he has never been convicted for any alleged role in any terrorist related activity. Indeed, the suspicion remains that if such evidence existed, he would have been so convicted since his capture almost seven years ago.

Three other individuals are stipulated across the four newspapers with respect to the London bombings but are not named as being directly responsible for the attacks. Rather, they are identified as contributing to the fundamentalist milieu from which the bombers and other radicals sprang. The three are Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza Al Masri and Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed. In total, Qatada is cited three times (Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005, Button 2005b, Farrell, MacKinnon 2005), Al Masri is cited three times (Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005, NYT News Service 2005, Smith 2005) and Bakri Mohammed is cited six times (Baldwin 2005, Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005, Farrell, MacKinnon 2005, NYT News Service 2005, AFP 2005a, Hume 2005). Typical of this coverage are articles depicting how these men have: ‘played to ever-larger crowds, calling for holy war against Britain and
exhorting young Muslim men to join the insurgency in Iraq’ (Scioliono, Van Natta Jr. 2005). However, all three have been identified at various times as being either informants or agents for Britain’s MI5. For example, in an article in the UKT on 25 March 2004, some 16 months before the London bombings, Abu Qatada is identified as an MI5 double agent based on the just released report of a Special Immigration Appeals Commission. Indeed, numerous other media reports and books identify Qatada as working for MI5 since 1996, some eight years previous. Likewise, a few months before the London bombings, Bakri Mohammed had reportedly admitted to author Ron Suskind that he too was working for British intelligence, although Bakri’s role as an informant will not be made public until Suskind mentions it in a book published in August 2008 (Suskind 2008). Suskind does not make clear when Bakri’s collaboration with MI5 began or ended, or even if he was still collaborating when they spoke in early 2005. Asked why he helped the British, he replied: ‘Because I like it here. My family’s here. I like the health benefits’ (Suskind 2008). Finally, according to authors O’Neill and McGrory in their book ‘The Suicide Factory’ (O’Neill, McGrory 2010), the third of this trio, London-based imam Abu Hamza al-Masri, started working with two branches of the British security services, the police’s Special Branch and MI5, in 1997. According to that book, his code name was ‘damson berry’ for the Special Branch and ‘910’ for MI5. The relationship, according to the authors, continued for several years. Based on records of the meetings, they will describe the relationship as: ‘respectful, polite, and often cooperative’11. Indeed, Omar Nasiri, an agent of the British intelligence services and the French intelligence service DGSE, who penetrated radical Islamic circles in London, getting close to both imams Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza at the Four Feathers and Finsbury Park mosques respectively, will later say that the mosques were ‘crawling with spies’ (Nasiri 2006).

4.3.2 Attributions – After 13 July 2005.

11 Abu Hamza is eventually extradited from the UK to the US on 06 October 2012 for his alleged role in the settling up of a terrorist training camp in Oregon.
On Wednesday 13 July, the British police declared that they had identified the four individuals believed to be responsible for the four explosions in London on 07 July. In an article reporting this announcement in the UKT entitled ‘The suicide bomb squad from Leeds’ (Evans, McGrory & Tendler 2005), the reporters named three of the four individuals (Khan, Tanweer & Hussain) and noted that: ‘the mastermind behind the attacks and the bomb maker are both still thought to be at large’ (Evans, McGrory & Tendler 2005). In advance of analysing the attributions of responsibility to the four alleged bombers, it is proposed to document the attributions to the alleged mastermind as these were numerous across the four papers under review but were later to be curiously and inexplicably dismissed.

4.3.2.1 The Mastermind.

The UKT and NYT led the way in reporting that officials were searching for an individual they believed was the mastermind of the attacks. On 14 July the UKT reported that:

Police believe that they have identified the British-born man who masterminded the suicide bomb attacks on London. The leader of the terrorist cell is believed to be in his thirties and of Pakistani origin. He arrived at a British port last month and is understood to have left the country the day before four suicide bombers murdered at least 52 people. Security sources believe that he has been involved in previous terrorist operations and has links with al-Qaeda followers in the United States. (Alberge 2005).

The same article also goes on to report that:

..detectives were trying last night to track other possible members of the cell. The first was seen on CCTV cameras on the platform of Luton station near the four bombers as they set off on July 07. There are fears that the man, also believed to be of Pakistani origin, could be a fifth bomber, still at large in the London area. (Alberge 2005)

However, on the same day the NYT seem to have conflated the alleged ‘mastermind’ and the alleged ‘fifth person’ as one and the same person:
British investigators have mounted a worldwide manhunt for a man seen on a videotape with four suspected bombers last Thursday morning at the Luton train station, an American official said Wednesday. The four suspected bombers are seen leaving for a London-bound train, but the fifth man stays behind... The official added that British police investigators know the man's name but decided not to release it or his image. This fifth man is suspected of being the ringleader and possibly the bomb maker, the official said. (Cowell 2005b)

On the following day, 15 July, the UKT had more details on this alleged 'mastermind'. He was ‘believed to be connected to a senior figure who took part in an Al-Qaeda terror summit in Pakistan 16 months ago’, and ‘is thought to have been trained in an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan and has been linked to previous terror operations’ (McGrory, Evans 2005). On the same day, both the TOI and the SMH ran stories detailing the same specific biographical details on this individual (TNN 2006e, Button 2005e, Button 2005c).

Although this figure was not named in the period of coverage under review, it is now known that the individual in question was Haroon Rashid Aswat as he was named in the UKT on 21 July 2005. The latter UKT story reported how Aswat was apprehended in Pakistan with a number of guns, an explosive belt and carrying around £17,000 in cash. It was also reported that: ‘intelligence sources claim that there were up to twenty calls between Aswat and two of the bombers in the days leading up to the bombing of three Tube trains and a double-decker bus’ (UKT 2005g). Aswat was an associate of Abu Hamza at Finsbury park mosque and had been the focus of federal prosecutors in the US in 2002. The US authorities were then preparing charges against Aswat, Abu Hamza and two others for their role in allegedly attempting to setup a terrorist training camp in Oregon in 1999. However, the prosecution was later blocked by the US Justice Department for unspecified reasons (Bernton, Heath. D. 2005). Although one of the men was charged and convicted in 2002 and Hamza was later indicted in 2004, no charges were ever brought against Aswat. When a federal prosecutor was asked at the time why Aswat was not also charged, he reportedly said: ‘that’s a great question’ (Bernton, Heath. D. 2005). Also in 2004, Canadian and British authorities report that Aswat met with members of the fertiliser bomb plot in London, codenamed Operation Crevice by police, although when the police swoop on 30 March 2004 and arrest dozens of suspects, Aswat was again inexplicably not arrested.
It later emerged that Aswat was identified by US intelligence as living in South Africa in June 2005, but when the US requested permission to apprehend Aswat they were denied by the UK authorities and Aswat reportedly returned to the UK where the UKT notes he allegedly exchanged approximately 20 phone calls with two of the four identified bombers (Sherwell, Rayment 2005). However, seven days after the UKT reported that Aswat was arrested in Pakistan, the LA Times reported that Aswat was in fact arrested in Zambia, and that earlier reports of him being arrested in Pakistan were based on mistaken identity (Serrano, Rotella & Miller 2005). No explanation was provided for why the individual arrested in Pakistan - reportedly now a ceramics salesman - was identified as Aswat or why a ceramics salesman was would have had a number of guns and an explosive belt on his person (Sunday Herald 2005). The following day, a terrorism expert appeared on Fox News and declared that Aswat was an agent for Britain’s MI6, and that this is the reason why he has not been previously arrested or charged with any crime (Fox News 2005). Also on 29 July, the UKT reports the capture of Aswat in Zambia and reports of his arrest in Pakistan begin to fade (UKT 2005a). He was deported to London by the Zambian authorities on 07 August and was arrested on arrival.

However, on Aswat’s arrival in London, the position of the British authorities immediately alters. Instead of being the ‘mastermind’ of the London bombings as extensively reported in the days after the attacks, he was now reported as ‘a British Al Qaeda suspect’ but of no interest to the ‘7/7’ investigation:

But Scotland Yard sources have played down Mr Aswat’s significance to the London bombings inquiry. Instead the British authorities seem content to let the United States seek his extradition to face charges over an attempt to set up a jihad training camp on a remote Oregon ranch in 1999. (UKT 2005c)

No explanation was given for this volte face despite the fact that, according to the UKT, up to 20 phone calls were reportedly made between Aswat and the bombers in the days and hours leading up to the attack (Sherwell, Rayment 2005). Naturally, this invoked even more suspicion that Aswat was working for British intelligence. For instance, The Sunday Times reported on 31 July 2005 that when this specific charge was put to British officials they replied that: ‘senior Whitehall officials deny any
knowledge that he might be an agent for either MI5 or MI6, which is a less than unequivocal denial (Sunday Times 2005). As it turns out, the legal process of Aswat’s extradition to the US stalls for almost seven years. Eventually, on 16 April 2013, The European Court of Human Rights declared that Aswat’s extradition to the U. S. would violate his right for protection against inhumane treatment, given his mental state, as he was reported to be suffering from ‘paranoid schizophrenia’. No mention of Aswat was made in any of the government reports or investigations into the London bombings. Regarding the fifth man identified on CCTV at Luton, the Intelligence and Security Committee report declared later that: ‘there is no intelligence to indicate that there was a fifth or further bombers’ (ISC Report 2006) and the House of Commons report declared that:

There was at the time of the attacks, reports of a ‘5th bomber’. It was thought, because of witness statements and CCTV, that there was a ‘5th man’ with the group travelling down from Luton. Inquiries showed the individual was a regular commuter and he was eliminated from the inquiry. There is no intelligence to indicate that there was a fifth or further bombers. (House 2006)

The four men ultimately attributed responsibility for the London bombings were named in newspaper reports beginning on Wednesday 13 July 2005 in the UKT, NYT and SMH and on Thursday 14 July in the TOI. The stated evidence for the culpability of the four individuals varied according to the newspaper however. For instance, the UKT reported that the men were identified ‘after the discovery of driving licences and credit cards at the scenes of the explosions’ (Mackinnon, Farrell 2005) while the NYT reported that ‘the body of one of the men had been found in the wreckage of the London Underground and property belonging to the other three was found at the location of the other blasts’ (Cowell, Van Natta Jr. 2005). In contrast, the SMH simply reported police claims that ‘evidence of the men had been found at the four bomb sites’ (Riley, Allard 2002) and the TOI simply quotes anti-terrorism chief Peter Clarke as saying that ‘the investigation quite early led us to have concerns about the movements and activities of four men, three of whom came from the West Yorkshire area’ (Agencies 2005). It is a feature of the coverage of the four identified individuals in the first seven days that little or no information is provided that sought to explain how or why these individuals became so apparently radicalised or how they were supposed to have acquired the technological expertise and
explosives to manifest their destructive intentions. Instead, the coverage focused on testimony by
dividuals who knew them either as family members, friends, neighbours or colleagues. In almost
every instance this testimony is remarkable for the absence of characterisations consistent with their
alleged roles as suicide bombers.

4.3.2.2 Mohammed Sidique Khan.

The most senior member of the four, Mohammed Sidique Khan, was reported by all newspapers as a
husband, the father of a baby girl and having worked as a teaching aide at a local school in Beeston
Leeds, at times with disabled children and invariably children of immigrant parents (Button 2005e,
Mackinnon, Farrell 2005, Alvarez 2005a). Khan is alternatively described as responsible, well
adjusted, quiet, polite and private (Alvarez 2005b). Across the four newspapers, seven depictions by
individuals who knew Khan were reported:

1) According to unnamed parents and colleagues of Khan at the school: ‘he was invaluable, a
friendly and trusted person who loved children’ (Alvarez 2005b),

2) According to the named mother of a five year old boy who attended the school he was: ‘a nice
guy, he was very good to children. He would be smiling all the time with the children. I'm
surprised about all this. He was a good man' (Alvarez 2005b),

3) According to the named headmistress at the school: ‘Sidique was a real asset to the school
and showed 100 percent commitment’ (Alvarez 2005b),

4) According to Sanji Dutt (relationship to Khan unclear): ‘we used to respect him, we used to
come to him with problems. He gave me good advice, had a good head on his shoulders. He
was rational’ (Alvarez 2005b),

5) According to an unnamed source: ‘some of the young men looked up to Mr. Khan because he
took the time to listen to them and help guide them’ (Alvarez 2005b),
6) According to unnamed staff at the school, Khan was: ‘gently spoken, endlessly patient, and immensely popular with children who called him their buddy’ (McGrory, Evans & Kennedy 2005),

7) In fact, only one of the seven depictions described Khan in a manner consistent with what one would expect of a suicide bomber. On Friday 15 July, an article in the UKT reported that:

Mohammad Sidique Khan, the oldest of the four bombers, used a youth centre on the Beeston estate in Leeds to radicalise young Muslims in the area. The two youngest bombers... were among the youths who regularly played football with Khan as part of the youth project and came to see him as a father figure. One of Khan's friends told the BBC last night that the primary school teacher had used the mixed faith centre to recruit young men to his ‘fruitcake’ views. (Fresco, O'Neill & Tendler 2005)

If Khan had indeed sought to radicalise young Muslim men at the centre it is remarkable that this is the only mention of it across all four newspapers. In contrast, Khan’s religious views were described on four occasions and on no occasion were they described as consistent with Islamic fundamentalism. As an example, in the NYT on 14 July he was described by neighbours as: ‘not particularly devout, and few neighbours said they could remember seeing him at the mosque’ (Alvarez 2005a). In addition, and notably, the NYT reported that: ‘according to British news reports, the Patels, including Mr. Kahn's wife, were outspoken opponents of Islamic extremism and proponents of women's rights’ (Alvarez 2005b). The latter raises the question of how an individual accused of being an Islamic fundamentalist could be married to a woman who was an outspoken opponent of such ideology.

4.3.2.3 Shehzad Tanweer.

Shehzad Tanweer was typically referenced as ‘a devout cricket lover’ (Jenkins et al. 2005b). Apart from that depiction, he was described as: ‘a good-looking, sporty lad, with a lean physique and fashionably dyed hair’ (Jenkins et al. 2005b) who also excelled at soccer. Indeed, when a New York Times reporter asked rhetorically: ‘what kind of radical force threw these men together to commit such a heinous crime against their country, the one they rooted for in soccer matches?’ (Alvarez
2005a), it underscored a widespread disbelief that these seemingly normal and well-adjusted young
British men could have committed such an act. As with the framing of Mohammed Sidique Khan
noted previously, the framing of Tanweer in the pages of the four newspapers was of an individual
that least fit the profile of a suicide bomber.

As an example, there were five references across the newspapers to Tanweer’s disposition towards
politics. One of these references suggested he took a slight interest in the plight of Muslims across the
world but the other four suggested he had little interest and that what interest he had could not be
characterised as radical. In the former category were the remarks by an acquaintance Sanji Dutt that
when Tanweer and Hussain got together: ‘they mostly talked about cars and soccer, but once in a
while they discussed the plight of Palestinians and the war in Iraq and criticized President Bush’
(Alvarez 2005b). In contrast, ‘a friend who asked not to be named’, was quoted in the UKT as saying
that: ‘after 9/11, I can remember talking to Shehzad. He said that what had happened was wrong’
(Norfolk, Jenkins 2005). Similarly, a friend of Tanweer’s, Azi Mohammed, 21, told London’s The
Daily Telegraph: ‘He's the kind of guy who would condemn terrorism’ (Button 2005d). In addition,
journalists who sought the views of Tanweer’s family also reported alternatively that ‘Shehzad never
expressed an interest in politics’ (Jenkins et al. 2005b) or that ‘Tanweer's family say they cannot
remember him arguing about politics’ (McGrory, Hussain 2005).

There does appear to be unanimity that Tanweer was religious, but again not to any degree that would
be suggestive of a suicide bomber. In total there were eight references to Tanweer’s attitude towards
his religion, all of which were consistently described his piety but dismissed any notion of
radicalisation. An example was the description in the SMH of Tanweer being ‘a good Muslim who
attended mosques but no extremist’ (Button 2005d). Apart from characterisations of Tanweer by his
uncle (which are returned to below), there are approximately thirteen characterisations of Tanweer
contained across the coverage of the four newspapers, respectively by friends (five), neighbours (five)
or acquaintances (two). Remarkably, all thirteen are positive regarding Shezad Tanweer the man and
were often explicitly incredulous that he could have become a suicide bomber. In fact, such was the
incredulity in the neighbourhood amongst people who had known Tanweer, that reporters for both the NYT and the UKT recounted local sentiment that the men must have been somehow 'brainwashed'. In the NYT: ‘many in the neighbourhood theorize that the men must have been brainwashed’, as Adrian Healy, a neighbour, put it. ‘That may sound extreme’, he added. ‘But then so is blowing people up’ (Alvarez 2005a). Likewise in the UKT: ‘many talk of ‘brainwashing’, as if only by the powers of mental manipulation could a youth recalled as polite, decent and ordinary have become a suicidal killer’ (McGrory 2005). This was also a sentiment asserted by Tanweer’s uncle, Bashir Ahmad. Speaking outside the fish and chip shop run by Tanweer’s father Mumtaz, Bashir said the young man had done: ‘a terrible thing’ (Midgley 2005). But he did not blame his nephew for the bombing, saying instead that it was the fault of: ‘forces behind him’ (Midgley 2005). He said: ‘Shehzad had never been in trouble before. So what drove him to do it? It can't be him. It must be something else behind him’ (Midgley 2005). In the same paper on the same day Mr. Ahmad was also quoted as saying that: ‘He was such a calm, loving, normal boy. Extremists must have got their hands on him’ (McGrory, Hussain 2005).

4.3.2.4 Hasib Hussain.

Hasib Hussain was most commonly depicted as a ‘19-year-old former tearaway’ (TNN 2005b), a ‘troubled teenager’ (Jenkins et al. 2005a) or ‘the impressionable one who had been drifting into a reckless teenage life until religion set him straight’ (Alvarez 2005a). Indeed, apart from some brief descriptions about how Hussain’s mother had called the police late on the night of the London bombings to report him missing or how the police had asked for public assistance to trace his movements on the morning of the attack during 81 minutes when his movements were unaccounted for, nearly all references (approximately 20) to Hussain across the four newspapers were in reference to how he had been a troubled teenager until he suddenly became quite devout about 18 months prior to the bombings. These characterisations, where attributed, came from relatives, friends and neighbours, and appear to be consistent. The reader is given descriptions of how Hussain was ‘drifting into reckless teenage life until religion set him straight’ (Alvarez 2005a), or how ‘he had taken up
with a rough Pakistani crowd’ (Alvarez 2005a). The remarks of a cousin of Hussain were reported consistently across three of the four newspapers to the effect that Hasib:

..went off the rails and his parents were very worried. They wanted to instil some discipline in him; I don't know what happened, but 18 months to two years ago Hasib suddenly changed and became devoutly religious. (Riley, Allard 2002, Alvarez 2005a, Norfolk, Jenkins 2005)

The NYT reports that Husain’s family sent him to Pakistan after getting into trouble (Alvarez 2005b), a claim repeated in the UKT: ‘his family thought that sending him to Pakistan with relatives might curb his rebellious streak and stop him hanging around street corners. His parents thought the plan had worked’ (McGrory, Hussain 2005). Hussain also travelled on the Hajj to Saudi Arabia around this time, and according to a neighbour, he was ‘touched by the experience’ (Alvarez 2005b), ‘returning changed, less aggressive and more interested in religion’ (Alvarez 2005a). Such was the change in Hussain that the same (unnamed) cousin remarked: ‘I thought he had been brainwashed. I do not know by who’ (Button 2005e, Midgley 2005). Across all four newspapers, only two references to Hussain’s political views were documented. The first was the anecdote related previously about Hussain’s conversations with Tanweer about politics, the second a statement attributed to relatives that Hussain: ‘was never aggressive in his views about how British Muslims should behave’ (McGrory, Hussain 2005).

4.3.2.5 Germaine Lindsey.

The fourth bomber was identified in newspaper reports as ‘Jamaican born, Muslim convert’ Lindsey Germaine (Cowell 2005d, Button 2005e, Cowell 2005b, Fresco, O'Neill & Tendler 2005, O'Neill, Tendler 2005). However, the five articles referenced above are the only articles across the dataset that mention Germaine at all in the first seven days after the bombing. Of these, only two in the UKT contain more than a cursory reference to ‘the fourth bomber’. The first of these on 15 July noted that:
1) a house in Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, where Germaine lived with his wife and child was being searched, 2) that he is believed to have met one or more of his accomplices at an Islamic school in
Pakistan and that 3) intelligence leads suggested that the men were approached by the mastermind of the attacks, a British Pakistani Muslim, while they were abroad (O'Neill, Tendler 2005). The second UKT story on the same day entitled ‘Jamaican-born bomber from the suburbs of Middle England’, expanded on what little was known about this individual by referencing the ‘the mystery surrounding Germaine’ (Fresco, O'Neill & Tendler 2005). The reader is informed that he was married to a white woman, Samantha, who had converted to Islam and changed her name to Sherafiyah. The three reporters listed in the by-line to the story speculated that Germaine’s identification as the fourth bomber had explained why the three bombers from Leeds travelled south by car instead of taking a train directly to King’s Cross, supposedly due to the fact that Lindsay’s home in Aylesbury is 20 miles from Luton and ‘their controllers will have wanted the four to meet, to say a prayer, strengthen each other’s resolve and synchronise their watches before setting off to London’ (Fresco, O'Neill & Tendler 2005). However, the official version of the bombing states that the four men did not meet any other individuals at Luton, despite early reports of individuals seen on CCTV with them at the station. The remainder of the article on Lindsay reported that he was said to have been in Leeds with the other individuals and that investigators were examining whether they had met originally in Pakistan. Only one characterisation of Germaine is contained across the dataset, also in this story - that of a neighbour of Germaine in Aylesbury who remarked to a reporter that ‘it was a normal family home - he was nice to speak to’ (Fresco, O'Neill & Tendler 2005).

4.3.4 Conclusions.

As in the case of Bali, it can now be emphatically stated that none of the identified and 'magnified' culprits in newspaper coverage before 13 July 2005 played any role in the London bombings. These included attributions to Al Qaeda in the first instance (including the 20 citations of 'The Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe’ and the six of 'The Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades’) and the plethora of individuals in the second: El-Nashar (named six times), Zeeshan Siddique (named four times), Mohammed El Guerbozi (named twice), Mustafa Setmalian Nasar (cited nine times), Abu
Qatada (cited three times), Abu Hamza (cited three times) and/or Bakri Mohammed (cited six times). Given the specificity of those attributed responsibility in the case of London, Chapter Six in this study explores the extent to which these attributions were the result of 'news management'. However, it is also the case that the attributions occurring after 13 July 2005, principally to the four named individuals, remain highly contested for a host of reasons.

For example, in May 2006, the UK government issued an official report into the bombings by way of a House of Commons 'narrative' in addition to an 'Intelligence and Security Committee' report issued at the same time and which has subsequently been updated periodically. The House of Commons 'narrative' is striking in terms of the vagueness of its findings and conclusions. In fact, in the 10,000 word body of the report, it uses the phrase 'appears' an inordinate 45 times, as in: 'Expert examination continues but it appears the bombs were homemade' (House of Commons 2006). One wonders how it is possible that an 'official' report into a terrorist attack cannot even identify the explosives used in those attacks a year later.

In addition, the House of Commons Report states that 'the key evidence' indicating that these were co-ordinated suicide attacks by the named four men' was: 1) DNA evidence of the four at the four separate bombsites and linking them to the suspected bomb factory at 18 Alexandra Grove, 2) the four identified together by CCTV at various points before the bombings, carrying large and heavy rucksacks, consistent with bombs of the size and nature used in the attack and 3) a self-incriminating video statement by Khan, shown on the Al Jazeera television network on 01 September 2005 (House of Commons 2006). However, sceptics have contested each of these evidential claims and have asserted with some legitimacy that none of this evidence has been subject to independent verification, less still proven in any criminal justice sense.

For example, The New York Times reported on 17 August 2009 that DNA evidence can be easily fabricated, citing an academic paper by Dr. Dan Frumkin in the journal 'Forensic Science International' where he stated that 'any biology undergraduate could perform this' (Pollack 2009). In addition, the one CCTV image released showing the four men together at Luton station has been
widely perceived as fraudulent as it appears to show physical impossibilities like a railing running behind and in front of Mohammed Siddique Khan. Even the British TV station Channel 4 has conceded that: 'it apparently shows railings coming out of the men’s arms' (Soni 2007). Finally, the authenticity of the Al Jazeera video has also been questioned in terms of both its provenance and its authenticity. Regarding provenance, all that is known is that: 'last week's tape is understood to have been dropped off at Al-Jazeera’s multi-million pound studios in Doha, the capital of Qatar’ (Burke 2005). Regarding authenticity, a presentation at the BlackHat security conference in Las Vegas in 2007 by computer security consultant Dr. Neal Krawetz, raised questions regarding the authenticity of such alleged videos by demonstrating how a novel method of image analysis (error level analysis) could determine if and how an image or video had been manipulated (Krawetz 2007). As examples in his presentation, Krawetz analysed various Al Qaeda images and videos and showed how they had been digitally manipulated. His analysis of one 29 September 2006 video of Al-Zawahri demonstrated that the Al-Sahab logo (i.e. Al Qaeda's media arm) had been added to the video at the same time as the 'Intelcentre' logo of the 'terror analysis' company cited previously in this study (Wired 2007). Needless to say, this finding raised profound questions regarding the legitimacy of many of the videos of Al-Zawahri - including the one specified above featuring Mohammed Siddique Khan in September 2005. It is also far from self-evident that either the CCTV image or the Al Jazeera broadcast would have been permitted as evidence in any conventional legal proceeding.

Another remarkable series of events prompted by the London bombings and relevant to questions of attribution were the experiences of Anthony John Hill. Hill is an Englishman living for the past decade in Co. Meath, Ireland. He came to the conclusion that the London bombings had been perpetrated by the British security forces and in order to publicise his contentions he made a documentary entitled '7/7 Ripple Effect', which he released on the internet in November 2007. Some six months later, he noted how three men were being prosecuted for their role in allegedly assisting the four named plotters of the London bombings, so Hill explained how he sent copies of his documentary to the presiding Judge in what he insists was an amicus curiae attempt, or 'friend of the court', maintaining that if the four original men were not guilty then the later three could not be guilty
of assisting them. Subsequently however, in January 2009, the UK issued a European Arrest Warrant for Hill on the basis that sending his documentary to the court was an attempt to ‘pervert the course of justice’ in that trial. A month later the Irish Police arrested Hill at his home in addition to seizing computers and other material (Irish Times 2009). In April 2009, the Judge sitting on the extradition case declared that the extradition was valid and this was again confirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court in November 2010. Remarkably, neither the Irish District Court Judge, nor the three Supreme Court Judges, viewed the documentary that is alleged to have perverted the course of justice in preparation for their judgements. Over the next few months Hill spent 151 days incarcerated in Wandsworth prison until his trial began on Monday 09 May 2011. On Tuesday 10 May 2011, a 12 person jury was empanelled which heard two days of testimony regarding Mr. Hill's asserted evidence for official complicity in the events of 7/7. On Wednesday 11 May, the jury watched the documentary in open court. Finally, two days later, the jury returned a verdict that Mr. Hill was not guilty of perverting the course of justice. The experience of John Hill throws up multiple questions, but most relevant to the current study is the almost complete absence of media coverage of what ostensibly is a sensational and remarkable criminal proceeding/news story. However, while The Irish Times did run four stories on the case during the time that Mr. Hill was fighting extradition, and the Belfast Telegraph one, these are apparently the only five news stories on the extradition and trial ever published in the British Isles. Not a single British mainland newspaper reported on any aspect of the case and even The Irish Times did not report on the verdict. As an addendum, in late 2009 a senior lecturer at Sheffield Hallam University published a paper, Theorising Truth', which compared the '7/7 Ripple Effect' with a BBC episode of 'The Conspiracy Files' on the same topic. The author, Dr. Ridley-Duff, concluded that the '7/7 Ripple Effect' was more credible and that:

..the BBC theory has a lower level of correspondence with known ‘facts’ and 'is incoherent to the point of being implausible. (Ridley-Duff 2011)

More generally, the years since 2005 have seen a slew of books and documentary films that have taken as their task to debunk various aspects of the official narrative, such as the train times that the
alleged bombers caught at Luton that morning; the existence of a series of (admitted) terror training exercises that were taking place on the morning of the attack and that mirrored the actual attack exactly (three underground explosions and one surface level explosion); allegations that Mohammed Siddique Khan was an informant for the security services etc etc. Indeed, a thorough examination of all this material and more precluded for space considerations, is suggestive that, at the very least, the culpability of the four men identified is 'contested' and by no means proven in any conventional sense of that term.


The attribution of responsibility frame was again the most frequently employed frame in the coverage of the Mumbai bombings. This was the case by a large margin in the NYT (46%) and the UKT (47%). Even in the case of the TOI, where a reader might have expected the human interest frame to predominate, the latter is only the third most frequent frame behind attribution (46%) and treatment recommendation (33%). In the case of the SMH, the attribution frame was present exactly as frequently as the treatment recommendation frame at 38%. In this section it is proposed to delineate the analysis of the attribution frames employed in terms analogous to the categories employed in the previous two case studies. However, some caveats to this should be noted here. First, while the ‘Islamic extremist’ attribution category was employed in the previous two sections, this type of attribution was not found to be as frequent or as significant in the coverage of the Mumbai bombings. However, rather than rejecting this categorisation for this reason, it is proposed to briefly discuss the nature of these attributions in the case of Mumbai in order that the attributions in this category across the three terrorist incidents can be compared and contrasted transparently.

Second, and in contrast, while the previous two case studies contained a section on attributions to Al Qaeda, it is proposed to remove this section in the analysis of Mumbai coverage as, quite simply, Al Qaeda did not figure as a potential agent of culpability in the newspaper coverage of Mumbai. In fact,
Al Qaeda was only mentioned in five articles in the TOI, two articles in the UKT, three articles in the SMH and two articles in the NYT. Of these 12 articles; three related to a phone call purportedly made by a member of Al Qaeda to a journalist in Kashmir announcing that Al Qaeda had set up an organisation in the disputed province; seven were generic references to Al Qaeda made in the context of the war on terror; two expressly dismissed any connection between the group and the Mumbai bombings, while only one asserted a link: ‘suspicion has fallen on an Al Qaeda linked Lashkar-e-Toiba’ (Snow, Baker 2006).

However, although the analysis of Mumbai coverage below does not contain a section on Al Qaeda, the analysis will retain a discussion of the discursive device ‘with links to’ (or variations on same), analysed in previous sections in the case of Al Qaeda and to a lesser extent JI, but examined below in the context of attributions to Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). It should also be noted that the dataset of newspaper coverage is not equally distributed between the three terrorist attacks under review. Thus, of the 1,140 articles reviewed in total, 399 related to Bali and 615 to London, but only 126 related to Mumbai. This is important to bear in mind in terms of comparison of absolute figures across the three terrorist attacks. For example, in terms of number of occurrences of phenomenon, such as the use of the aforementioned rejoinder ‘with links to’, discussed in more detail below.

4.4.1 Islamic Extremists.

The attributions to ‘Islamic extremists’ in the coverage of Mumbai were qualitatively distinct to those in the coverage of the other two case studies, although a sub-cleavage is evident between the attributions in the coverage of the TOI and the SMH on the one hand, and the UKT and NYT on the other. In the former category, neither the TOI (which accounts for almost 75% of the dataset on Mumbai) nor the SMH mention ‘Islamic extremism’ once. Indeed, of the 19 mentions of the word ‘Islamic’ across the two newspapers, nearly all are in the context of the application of the designation in one of the two organisations attributed responsibility i.e. the Students’ Islamic Movement of India.
It is plausible that since SIMI and LeT are both regarded as Islamic organisations that neither the TOI nor the SMH felt the need to labour the point by using the label ‘Islamic extremists’. In contrast, the UKT and the NYT cite SIMI only three times between the coverage of the two newspapers. Instead, they appear to have substituted reference to SIMI by reference to Islamic extremists in a generic sense, possibly taking the view that the SIMI designation would not mean anything to many of their readers. Thus, the UKT variously noted that; ‘the most likely suspect is Islamic extremists opposed to Indian control of Kashmir’ (McDougall 2006); ‘Muslim militants fighting against Indian control in Kashmir were the prime suspects’ (Beeston 2006); ‘Police still suspect Islamic fundamentalists were behind..,’ (O’Connor 2006) and ‘blasts thought to have been caused by Islamic extremists’ (McDougall 2006). Likewise, the NYT notes that ‘the pattern of the bombings, however, has fuelled unsubstantiated speculation that Islamic militants fighting Indian rule in Kashmir could be behind the attacks’ (Rai, Sengupta 2006), and later that the bombings were ‘suspected though not proved to be the work of Kashmiri separatists’ (Shane 2006). It should be noted however that the small size of the dataset in terms of SMH, UKT and NYT coverage of Mumbai necessitates an asterisk on the representativeness of any findings in this regard.

4.4.2 Lashkar-e-Toiba.

Attributions of responsibility for the Mumbai bombings across the four newspapers were largely concentrated on two organisations – LeT and the SIMI. LeT is an Islamic group generally thought to have been formed in 1990 to challenge Indian rule in Junnu and Kashmir provinces, and to strive more generally for a larger Islamic state in South Asia. The SIMI was formed in 1977 with the stated mission of the ‘liberation of India’ from Western materialistic cultural influence and to propagate the Muslim way of life on the subcontinent. It is proposed in this analysis of attributions to examine the coverage of each group independently of each other, and thus the next section looks solely at the attributions to SIMI. However, on a number of occasions (nine in total) the two groups are jointly attributed responsibility, usually in the same sentence, and thus it is proposed to analyse these joint-
attributions in advance of a more focused look at the specific attributions to each individual group. As a means of classification, the analysis adopts three distinct categories to describe the nature of the attribution: 1) declarative, 2) suggestive and 3) circumstantial. While the first two are self-explanatory, the third is a type of attribution classification where the presentation of facts, speculation, rumour or other information is combined in such a way as to imply attribution of responsibility to either group.

In terms of joint-attributions, four of the nine found in the coverage were declarative and five suggestive. In the former category were statements like; ‘Security agencies have identified Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) as the perpetrators of the blasts’ (TNN 2006l) and ‘D. K. Shankaran, a senior figure in the Maharashtra state government stated that: ‘There was substantial involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba with local support', pointing the finger at the banned Students Islamic Movement of India for providing the manpower to carry the explosives on to seven trains’ (Premachandran, McGrory 2006). Although these statements were unaccompanied by any substantiation, they were at least attributed to government officials or government agencies. Other declarative examples were both unsubstantiated and unattributed, such as the following:

   Scripted by ISI, with Lashkar-e-Taiba as its spearhead, the terror to be unleashed against India is bankrolled by Saudi charities, has a distinct Dubai stamp and, most worryingly, involves locals. (TNN 2006b)

Such a statement stands out in its audacity of conclusion and would surely be criticised under the convention of journalistic objectivity for demonstrating an absence of balance and attribution, regardless of its actual veracity or otherwise.

Of the five ‘suggestive’ joint-attributions, a little more circumspection is evident: ‘There are strong indications that the terror attack on Mumbai trains on Tuesday was carried out by Pakistan-based jehadi gang Lashkar-e-Taiba, local SIMI activists, and members of the underworld’ (TNN 2006j), and ‘The authorities remained tight-lipped about which groups could have been responsible, except to say there was a possibility that a militant organization based in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Toiba, was involved.'
The police said the group could have been aided by a banned Indian organization that calls itself the Students Islamic Movement of India’ (Sengupta, Mazzetti 2006).

Apart from these nine joint-attributions, a further 23 attributions are made across the newspaper coverage to LeT alone, giving a total of 32 attributions in total. Of the former 23, only one, by a ‘TOI source’, is declarative: ‘LeT plots the terror strikes, funds them and then gets them executed by cadre of the disbanded SIMI or other operatives. This modus operandi is the highlight of all LeT’s modules recently busted in Maharashtra, Delhi and Gujarat’ (TNN 2006k). Of the remaining 22, 14 are suggestive in nature and eight are circumstantial. The language used in the suggestive attributions varies, but includes the following; ‘Intel sources seem pretty sure’ (TNN 2006j); ’sources suspect LeT’s hand’ (TNN 2006g); ‘Investigating agencies in Gujarat believe this to be a distinct possibility’ (TNN 2006k); ‘amid suggestions that’ (Dhillon 2006a); ‘details are emerging suggesting that’ (Dhillon 2006b); ‘probably the work of’ (Dhillon 2006b); ‘initial suspicion focuses on’ (SMH 2006); ‘suspicion has fallen on’ (Snow, Baker 2006); ‘LeT could be involved’ (O’Connor 2006); ‘LeT, the main suspects for masterminding the bombings’ (McGrory, Deol 2006); ‘suspicion it was the work of’ (Rai, Sengupta 2006); ‘impossible to rule out’ (Sengupta, Gentleman 2006) ‘government officials have suggested involvement by’ (Sengupta, S, Masood, S 2006) and ‘authorities have pointed fingers at’ (Sengupta 2006).

Of the remaining instances of attribution to LeT i.e. those that were neither declarative nor suggestive, the reader is led to imply responsibility to the group based on the evidence presented. Thus, the day after the bombing on 12 July, the TOI reported that an ‘LeT terrorist had been arrested with a large amount of RDX explosives and cash’ (TNN 2006n). The following day the same newspaper recounts how ‘intelligence reports’ state that LeT has recruited local youths by suggesting they take revenge on the Gujarati government for perceived ill treatment of Muslims (Gujaratis residents of Mumbai were targeted in the bomb blasts) and how a former SIMI member had reported that LeT had ‘brainwashed’ members of that group. Also on 13 July, the TOI reported the testimony of Mumbai Police commissioner AN Roy who declared that they have ‘made a huge haul of 50 kg RDX and other
explosives from LeT operatives’ (TNN 2006a). On 14 July the reader is told of ‘two captured LeT operatives’ who have told of plans for further attacks’ (Mukherjee 2006b) and on 15 July an intelligence officer tells of how the leadership of LeT has: ‘urged its cadres to step up its efforts to spread the arc of terrorism’ in India’ (TNN 2006i). Meanwhile, the SMH reported on how the LeT was: ‘the only organisation able to organise co-ordinated blasts on this scale’ (Dhillon 2006a).

Perhaps the only common theme running through all three types of attribution – declarative, suggestive and circumstantial – is the absence of any evidence that can be verified independently of ‘official authorities’. No specific or tangible evidence is proffered as to the responsibility of LeT in the case of the Mumbai bombings despite 32 attributions of responsibility being made to the group. This is not to say that there is conclusive evidence that they were not responsible, but rather to note how the attributions to the group are ‘framed’ in the absence of such evidence - using that term in the sense of its academic connotations. Perhaps the scenario was most succinctly stated by Ajai Sahni, a Delhi-based intelligence analyst who tracks terrorist groups in South Asia, and who is also responsible for the eighth circumstantial attribution, when he stated in the pages of the NYT that:

Suspicion fell on Lashkar-e-Taiba less on the basis of specific evidence than on the record of past attacks in which it has been implicated (Sengupta, Gentleman 2006).

It is a curious feature of the coverage that of the 16 attributions to LeT contained in the pages of the TOI, no denial of involvement ever accompanied the attribution, despite an LeT spokesperson asserting almost immediately that his organisation was not involved and indeed condemning the atrocity. In contrast, of the 16 attributions shared across the other three newspapers, the LeT denial is carried six times, and is carried as soon as the name LeT is mentioned in both the SMH and the UKT. Of these six instances; four consist of brief reportage of the fact that there was a denial (Sengupta, Mazzetti 2006, Dhillon 2006a, SMH 2006, Sengupta, S, Masood, S 2006); one carried a three word quote that described the bombings as ‘inhuman and barbaric’ (Dhillon 2006b) while just one carried the name of the spokesperson, Abdullah Ghaznavi, and a full sentence from his statement: ‘Our jihad
is only against the Indian troops in Kashmir. Islam does not allow the killing of innocent people’ (O’Connor 2006). The complete absence of the ‘denial’ in the pages of the TOI again raises questions about the extent to which the TOI coverage differs from western norms of journalistic objectivity and if that deviation can be attributed to factors like nationalistic bias given the longstanding enmity between India and Pakistan. Regardless, the other newspapers also have a case to answer in that despite 16 attributions to LeT, in only one instance was the LeT spokesperson named and even then he was only allowed one sentence by way of explanation of that group’s position.

In addition to the attributions to LeT, the TOI coverage contains two articles relating to a claim of responsibility emailed to an Indian TV channel by an individual claiming to represent an organisation called Lashkar-e-Qahhar, translated as ‘The Army of Terror’. In the first TOI story on 16 July entitled ‘LeQ claims responsibility’, it is reported that the blasts, according to the e-mail:

Were in retaliation to the ground situation in Gujarat and Kashmir and was part of a series of blasts that it had planned on targets that include Mumbai’s international airport, Gateway of India, Taj Mahal and Red Fort, among others. (TNN 2006h)

The story went on to report how intelligence agencies were trying to track the email while noting that ‘most officials claim that Lashkar-e-Qahhar could be a front for LeT’ (TNN 2006h), although it is unclear why LeT would wish to have a front organisation with almost exactly the same name. In the second article the following day entitled ‘Does Lashkar-e-Qahar exist?’ (Natu 2006a), the article recounts the testimony of an official at the Special Task Force (STF) who stated that:

Lashkar-e-Qahhar claims to be an offshoot of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). We suspect the motive was to distract investigating officers and throw off suspicion from the actual perpetrators. (Natu 2006a)

This is the last mention of Lashkar-e-Qahhar in the TOI dataset which only extends two days after 17 July. However, on 21 July, a story appeared in the TOI entitled ‘Terrorists trying to confuse cops’ (Natu 2006b). The story related how several phone calls and emails had caused confusion in the aftermath of the bombings by claiming responsibility and warning of further attacks, as well as noting
how even the mix of explosives reportedly used in the blast (reputedly RDX and ammonium nitrate) did likewise. Utilising this as context, the article quotes officers of the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) who asserted that these claims could be a part of an Al Qaeda strategy to ‘take up co-ordinated, cohesive and integrated measures to confuse the enemy’ (Natu 2006b). The story went on to note how:

Al Qaida training manuals carry detailed instructions on the use of deception and hoax calls. The investigators are made to look incompetent, with the result that the general public increasingly concludes that the terrorist threat is exaggerated, and it becomes that much easier for the terrorists to mount the next attack. (Natu 2006b)

The above excerpt is recounted in order to provide context to another story in the same newspaper seven days later, on 28 July, which reported how a 19 year old Shariq Ahmed Khan had been arrested for sending the emails in the name of Lashkar-e-Qahhar although ‘the police were yet to link him to the banned SIMI or any other terrorist outfits’ (The Times of India 2006). The tale of Lashkar-e-Qahhar seemingly ended on 08 November 2006 when the Bombay High Court, against the wishes of the prosecution, noted how the police had not produced any evidence against Shariq except that he had sent the email to the TV station, and therefore 'on the grounds that no charge sheet had been filed against him during the 95 days when he was in custody, he was eligible for bail by default' (WebIndia123.com 2006). It is almost redundant to note that in the context of the ATS statements quoted above regarding the alleged Al Qaeda 'disinformation strategy', the case of Lashkar-e-Qahhar does not enhance the credibility of Indian anti-terrorism officials in attributing responsibility for terrorist related activity.

4.4.3 Students’ Islamic Movement of India.

Apart from the nine joint attributions with LeT discussed above, the coverage contains 11 attributions to SIMI independently of LeT. In advance of an analysis of these however, it is necessary to provide a little background to the status of SIMI in the years before the Mumbai train bombings of 2006. SIMI
as an organisation was banned for two years by the Indian government on 27 September 2001, just
over two weeks after the events of 9/11, under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967.
SIMI challenged the ban by taking a case to the relevant tribunal but were unsuccessful. Meanwhile,
after the expiry of the two-year ban, the ‘Centre’ (colloquial name for the central Indian government)
renewed the ban for another two years on 26 September 2003. Again SIMI challenged the ban but
again the relevant tribunal adjudicated against it. When that ban expired on 25 September 2005, the
government took no action for five months, but on 08 February 2006, some five months before the
Mumbai train bombings, they renewed the ban for a third two year period. During all this time, SIMI
had been attempting to get the Supreme Court to hear a petition against the ban to little effect.
Coincidentally, only five days before the Mumbai train bombings, SIMI was in court again attempting
to do just that. SIMI’s president Shahid Badr argued through counsel that the government’s
notification of 08 February 2006 terming it an unlawful organisation ‘smacked of arbitrariness’ as
none of its activists have been found involved in any criminal act over the previous two decades.
Questioning the government’s approach towards SIMI, counsel quoted a report of the government
which stated that: ‘though no violent incident involving SIMI has been reported during 2004-05, there
is no indication that the outfit has given up the path of violence’, a seemingly odd evidential standard
that suggested that for the ban to be lifted, the organisation would have to prove it would not engage
in violence in the future, even though no evidence was proffered that it engaged in violence in the
past. The court refused to entertain the petition.

This legal status of SIMI and the debate around it provide the context for three of the attributions to
SIMI appearing in the week after the train blasts - all suggestive in nature. For example, on 14 July,
the TOI noted in an article entitled ‘Centre suspects SIMI hand but Mulayam gives it clean chit’,
(Ghildiyal 2006) how Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mulayam Yadav refused to clamp down on SIMI
as directed by the central government for ‘its suspected involvement in the Mumbai massacre’
(Ghildiyal 2006). Mulayam is quoted in the article as saying: ‘SIMI was not found involved in the two
main terrorist incidents in the state’ (i.e. the Aodhya and Shramjeevi bombings), while his brother,
Minister and ‘Virtual No. 2’ in the UP government, Shivpal Singh, was quoted as saying: ‘SIMI is not
a terrorist organisation’ (Ghildiyal 2006). The response to these assertions by the Times correspondent, Subodh Ghildiyal, is noteworthy. Quoting Ghildiyal:

The strong defence flies in the face of SIMI’s involvement in the Shramjeevi train blasts near Jaunpur which killed 10 persons. The case was investigated by the state police and SIMI’s link was unearthed. State home officials, too, have acknowledged the spread of SIMI network in the state under Mulayam Singh’s tenure. (Ghildiyal 2006)

The above rebuttal of Mulayam in the pages of the TOI is another example of a deviation from journalistic notions of objectivity in that newspaper. Ghiddiyal would, of course, have been entitled to assert any evidence that proved or otherwise suggested SIMI involvement in the Shramjeevi train bombing. However, simply stating that ‘the case was investigated by the police and SIMI’s link was unearthed’ - is both insufficient from an evidential standpoint - and incorrect. While there was speculation as to SIMI’s involvement at that time, no evidence was ever produced to assert a link and nobody from SIMI was ever charged with the crime. Indeed, as noted above, on 28 July 2006, when the Indian government was presenting information to the tribunal adjudicating on the legal status of SIMI, their background or briefing note to the judge clearly states that there was no violent incident in which SIMI was involved in the previous two to three years. In addition, some two years after the bombing of the Shramjeevi train, the Indian police arrested a figure known as ‘Jalaluddin’, who was reportedly the head of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) in India. According to a report in the TOI dated 24 June 2004, police claimed Jalaluddin confessed to his involvement in the Shramjeevi train blast in 2005. However, as will be discussed below, the phenomenon of forced confessions (and later rejections) was endemic in Indian prosecutions of terrorism related cases over the past decade and thus any such assertions cannot be accepted prima facie.

Apart from asserting the reasons why Mulayam and his brother were allegedly incorrect about the culpability of SIMI, Ghildiyal goes on theorise (or speculate) why the brothers were taking this stand, and concluded that it was for political considerations: 'The decision has been motivated by the attempt to poach his Muslim vote bank by a group of clerics who, inspired by the success of Jamait-e-Ulema-inspired Assam United Development Front in Assam, have launched a Muslim Front' (Ghildiyal
Another instance of SIMI attribution also echoed this hypothesis. On 15 July, an article bemoaned the political response to the Mumbai attacks by the Hindu nationalist Modi on the one hand and by Mulayam on the other. Regretting that the latter had stated defending ‘shadowy organisations’ like SIMI, the article (without by-line) repeated the previous charge that: ‘the SP leaders ‘clean chit’ to SIMI is aimed at securing the support of its cadre ahead of assembly elections in the state’ (TNN 2006o). Unlike the previously cited example, no attempt is made in the latter to enunciate a rationale for banning or otherwise accusing SIMI, other than to label it ‘shadowy’.

Of the remaining eight attributions to SIMI across the four newspapers, four are circumstantial and four suggestive. The attributions in the former category typically consist of providing information that suggests suspect or subversive activity before appending the name of SIMI in a manner inferring SIMI ownership of such activity. Thus, in the TOI, an alleged former member of SIMI is reported as having told police that since LeT is not able to find recruits in Gujarat, it has brainwashed former activists of SIMI and new recruits in Maharashtra: ‘Funds are available for the asking for the LeT not only from Pakistan, but also from Wahabi fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia and the UAE’, the ex-activist stated (Balakrishnan 2006). In addition, when the UKT reported how Indian police officers have travelled to a port town to question 11 men who were said to have been caught trying to cross back into Bangladesh, the article appends the statement that: ‘the men are believed to be militant members of the outlawed Student Islamic Movement of India, which police allege helped in the bomb plot’ (McGrory 2006). Nothing ever comes of the ‘lead’.

On 15 July the newspaper carried two articles that implicated SIMI in the train bombing by associating them with previous alleged nefarious activities. The first entitled ‘Did the cops ignore SIMI?’, noted that when the Godhra massacre occurred in 2002 ‘SIMI was the first suspect, found to be operating under the banner of Tehreek Tahaffuz Shariat-e-Islam’ (TTSI). In fact, as the respected Indian investigative journal Telekha reported in extensive detail in November 2007, the Godhra train incident was not a premeditated terrorist attack by SIMI or any other group, but rather a spontaneous mob riot that ended catastrophically and which provided a pretext for the massacre of up to 2,000
Muslims in its wake, the latter with the tacit support of the then Modi government (Tehelka 2007). The article goes on to note that when the politician Haren Pandya was killed in March 2003 the murder was attributed to SIMI: ‘since he, as minister of state for home, had advocated its ban’. Again, the attribution of murder to SIMI on this basis alone is highly dubious. The second article in the newspaper on 15 July continues this line of inference or attribution by association. Entitled ‘SIMI now operates under fresh names’, the article notes how SIMI has: ‘begun to ward off proscription by changing identities and assuming different names in different states’ (TNN 2006m). ‘Intelligence sources’ pointed out that ‘linkages’ of former SIMI activists have been found with organisations;

..like the National Democratic Front of Kerala, Tehrik-e-Ahiya and Nehjatul Ulma in Maharashtra, and that in the past SIMI has been allegedly linked with several international organisations, including Ittehad al-Tallab al-Muslimeen of Myanmar, Islami Chhatra Shibir of Bangladesh, Islamia Jamiat-e-Talaba of Pakistan, World Assembly of Muslim Youth based in Riyadh and Jammat-e-Islam of Pakistan and Bangladesh. (TNN 2006p)

The reader will note that SIMI has here been ‘linked’ with six or seven organisations in one paragraph alone, entirely, it appears, based on supposition.

In addition to circumstantial attributions, a further four suggestive attributions are also made to SIMI. For example, in the TOI, an article entitled ‘Hunt on for SIMI activists in Gujarat’, noted how a manhunt for SIMI members was being conducted as, according to a police source: There is a strong possibility that dormant SIMI activists in Gujarat have played a role in this sudden spurt of terrorist activities in western India’ (TNN 2006f). Elsewhere the SMH notes that ‘details are emerging suggesting the group may have acted with locals’ (i.e. SIMI) and that ‘Police believe a local group, the Students Islamic Movement of India, was involved’ (Dhillon 2006b). Likewise, the UKT headlines an article on 14 July with ‘Suspicion falls on Islamic students’ (Premachandran, McGrory 2006). No evidence of SIMI complicity is cited in any of these instances.

As noted previously, the discursive rejoinder ‘with links to’ or derivations of same was also present in the coverage of the Mumbai train bombings. In total, 24 instances of its use were identified, with SIMI the most frequently ‘linked to’ in six cases, followed by Al Qaeda in three cases and LeT in two.
In comparison with the other two case studies in this research project, the frequency of use of the rejoinder in the case of Mumbai almost exactly split the difference between the most frequently used (i.e. in the Bali coverage) and the least frequently used (i.e. in the London coverage). The frequency metric was calculated by dividing the total number of articles in each distinct dataset by the total number of instances where the rejoinder was used. As a result, the numbers produced are expressed in terms of instances (or usages) per number of articles. For example, the Bali case had 393 articles in the dataset and the rejoinder was used 91 times which represents one usage per 4.3 articles. The London numbers were 578 (dataset) and 68 (instances) producing a figure of one usage per 8.5 articles. Finally, the Mumbai numbers were 134 (dataset) and 24 (instances), producing a figure of one usage per 5.6 articles.

4.4.4 Individuals.

Although 15 individuals were cited in the coverage of the Mumbai train bombings in the context of attribution, nearly all were incidental to the investigation and not directly attributed responsibility. For example, the TOI alternatively reported that; ‘an LeT terrorist’, Aijaz Hussain, had been arrested with two kg of RDX (TNN 2006n); two individuals, Aftab Mohiuddin and Ghulam Hussain Cheema, were reportedly arrested in Nepal and questioned about the bombings (TNN 2006c); Mohammad Ali Chhipa and Feroz Ghaswala were arrested in advance of the bombings with four kg RDX etc. (TNN 2006k). In fact, just two individuals were specifically named as suspects in the attack with two others also speculated as having a role. The main suspect was named as Zabiuddin Syed but this name varied according to the media outlet and he was also known as ‘Jabiuddin Syed’, ‘Sayyad Zabiuddin’, ‘Zabiuddin Sayyad’, ‘Mohammed Zaibuddin’, ‘Zaibuddin Ansari’ in addition to ‘Jabi’ and ‘Zaby’. The individual’s real name was apparently Syed Zabiuddin Syed Zakiuddin according to school records (Rediff News 2010b). Zabiuddin was first named in the TOI on 13 July 2006. Correspondent Sourav Mukherjee reported how two other individuals, Amir Shaikh ‘and another LeT operative Akik Sayyed’, arrested in a haul of arms and explosives in Ahmedabad in May 2006, had confessed to
police that an Aurangabad terrorist module was responsible for an earlier bombing in Ahmedabad. Indian police had then speculated a role for the module in the Mumbai bombings also, noting that ‘if there was truth in this theory’, the police would rue the fact that it could not nab all the members of the module, especially Jabizzuddin Syed and Mohammed Faiyyaz (Mukherjee 2006a). In total, the reader is told that three names ‘emerged during interrogation’, the latter two and ‘Junaid, an LeT coordinator now in Bangladesh’ (Mukherjee 2006a).

The following day in the TOI an article also noted that the Mumbai ATS recently busted an LeT module in Aurangabad and that Mohammed Faiyyaz, Zabiuddin Sayyad and Mohammed Rahil were linked by it to the RDX blast at Ahmedabad railway station, before concluding that: ‘Cops believe that they have played a pivotal role in Mumbai serial blasts too’ (Mukherjee 2006b). The article also named the aforementioned Junaid as ‘planning and coordinating terror strikes in western India’ (Mukherjee 2006b). The UKT and the NYT also noted on the same day (14 July) that the ATS had released photographs of Sayyad Zabiuddin and Zulfeqar Fayyaz, as well as naming a third suspect, a man known as Rahil (Premachandran, McGrory 2006, Sengupta, Mazzetti 2006).

However, of these four main suspects - Zabiuddin, Fayyaz, Rahil and Junaid - only Junaid is captured and charged for his role in the attacks. Ultimately, less than two weeks after the Mumbai train bombings, Zabiuddin, Fayyaz and Rahil mysteriously disappear from media coverage of the bombings and are never heard of again until it is alleged in 2009 that Zabiuddin was one of the terrorist masterminds in the 2008 Mumbai attack and hotel siege. Zabiuddin was finally reported captured on 21 June 2012 when he arrived at Delhi airport having been deported from Saudi Arabia by the Saudi authorities. The Indian authorities claimed, rather incredibly, to have tracked Zabiuddin down when he opened a Facebook page in his own name 'to find new recruits' (NPR 2012). Almost immediately, Zabiuddin allegedly 'confesses' to being the infamous 'control room' commander for the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and that the ISI were involved (amongst other confessions), but no mention is made of any role in the Mumbai train bombings (Kay 2012). Instead, the investigation of ‘7/11’ was to go in a very different direction.
4.4.5 Conclusions.

Beginning on 20 July 2006, the day after the period of coverage under review ended, the Indian police arrested their first suspect in the case of the train bombings, Kamel Ahmed Ansari. Three further suspects were arrested over the following four weeks and eight more in the period between 28 September and 03 October 2006, including the aforementioned Junaid, giving a total of 13. However, the prosecution of these men has been plagued over the following years by judicial and prosecutorial wrangling, allegations of malpractice, physical abuse and murder - in addition to allegations by the Mumbai Crime branch that a different set of individuals led by Sadiq Sheikh were in fact responsible for the train bombings.

During the course of what has been an eight year prosecution to date, on 10 February 2010, counsel for several of the accused, Shazid Azmi, was shot dead by two assailants at his offices in Mumbai. Asmi had been the defence lawyer for approximately 120 suspects in terror related prosecutions across India and in Maharashtra (home state of Mumbai) and was defending 39 individuals accused for their alleged roles in connection with: 1) the 2006 Malegaon bomb blasts, 2) the ‘7/11’ train bombing case and 3) the Aurangabad arms haul case (Hafeez 2010). Azmi had long argued that the prosecutions of the 13 held in the case of the Mumbai train bombings were fraudulent and politically motivated. In a 2007 interview he stated emphatically: 'Here is one case where I am damn sure that the arrested people are innocent' (Rediff News 2010a). In the days following Azmi’s murder, both members of the legal establishment in Mumbai (Dixit 2010) and Azmi’s family (Ahmed Ali 2010) accused the police and the Indian establishment of complicity in his murder. Senior Supreme Court lawyer Prashant Bhushan alleged that the only people who could have had a motive in getting rid of Azmi were the police: 'Shahid is the only lawyer who had the maximum cases showing that the police were fabricating evidence', Bhushan said (Dixit 2010). In addition, Azmi’s brother told the TOI that:

My brother had told us once that he knew the consequences he would have to face because he was fighting against the system which had falsely implicated innocent persons in the blast cases. (Ahmed Ali 2010)
Regardless, the trial of the 13 accused resumed in July 2010, but over the next two years it was to be
dogged by accusations of malpractice. Four state witnesses ‘turned hostile’ and made allegations
against the investigating police for fabricating evidence, procuring evidence illegally and coercing
witness testimony by coaching and threatening individuals (PTI 2011b, PTI 2011b, HT Correspondent
2011, PTI 2011a, HT Correspondent 2010). In addition, since the accused were first arrested in late
summer and autumn 2006, they have consistently claimed torture by the prison authorities. In August
2008, the Indian investigative journal Telehka carried a story which claimed that on one day, 28 June
2008, 39 prisoners in the three cases that Azmi was defending were: ‘assaulted brutally for almost two
hours with batons, lathis, belts and stones’ by about 75 jail employees as well as other convicts. A
High Court Petition over the matter claimed that: ‘(Over) the last six months there was (an) escalation
of torture and humiliation of the accused by prison staff’ who, it was claimed, were: ‘pressuring them
to turn ‘approvers’ so that they can implicate the other accused’ (Tehelka 2008a). Indeed, a few days
after the assault, the police took two prisoners (Sayed Jafar and Sunil Walmiki) to a magistrate
claiming that they wanted to turn ‘approvers’. But as soon as the two appeared before the magistrate,
they told him that the Jail Superintendent was torturing them to force them to turn ‘approvers’
(Tehelka 2009). Responding to the Petition a year later on 21 July 2009, the Bombay High Court
found that;

> Force was used against the trial prisoners for no fault of theirs. Force was used excessively
> for extraneous reasons and [the] law was also flouted. We, therefore, direct the Chief
> Secretary, State of Maharashtra to initiate [a] disciplinary inquiry against all the Officers
> involved in the incident.. If need be, in addition to the departmental inquiry, criminal
> action be also initiated against the concerned Officers. (Tehelka 2009).

Given all the above, it seems clear that even if the 13 accused are found guilty of having perpetrated
the Mumbai train attacks of 7/11, little confidence can be placed in such a judgement. It is also
noteworthy that little or no mention has been made in the trial to date of LeT, SIMI, or any of the
individuals that were attributed responsibility for the bombings in the newspaper coverage over the
week following the attack, apart from ‘Junaid’ who was one of the 13 individuals in custody.
Parallel to these developments was the admission by an Indian Army Intelligence Chief, Lt. Col. Purohit, in the wake of a bombing in the city of Malegaon on 29 September 2008 which killed six people, that he was the mastermind of the Malegaon bombing and had supplied the RDX explosives used (Hafeez 2008). As the investigation proceeded, Purohit is said to have given sensational information that he also supplied explosives for numerous other ‘terrorist’ attacks over the previous years (Express India 2008). However, as these revelations were being disclosed in mid to late November 2008, the Mumbai terrorist attack and hotel siege occurred on 26 November. During this latter event, the Chief ATS investigating officer in the case of the Malegaon blasts, Hemant Karkare, was killed. S.M. Mushrif, a retired former senior police officer in Maharashtra, published a book in 2009 with the title *Who Killed Karkare? The Real Face of Terrorism in India* (Mushrif S.M. 2009). In the book, the author closely examines 12 incidents of alleged Islamic terrorism in India between 2006 and 2008 and in the process makes a circumstantial case that some (if not all) of the incidents were staged by the premier intelligence agency of India, the IB. Mushrif’s contention in the book is that Karkare was deliberately targeted during this event and that the terrorist attack was used as a pretext for achieving this, thereby removing Karkare from the potentially explosive Malegaon investigation.

Although the trial of those accused (by the ATS) resumed in April 2010, it has taken over two years for the authorities to collect 188 witness statements and the 13 accused have only submitted statements to the effect that they are innocent and have been ‘falsely implicated’ in July 2012 - the 11,000 page charge sheet having been filed on 30 November 2006. A TOI article on the case published 11 July 2012 carried the appropriate headline: ‘6 years later, no clarity on real culprits behind train blasts’ (Hafeez 2012).

In conclusion, and despite that fact that the prosecution in the Mumbai train bombings has not run its full course, it is possible to tentatively assess the newspaper attributions in this case. If the atrocity was committed by Islamic extremists who were members of alternatively LeT or SIMI, it is true to say that absolutely no evidence has come to light over the past six years to validate that assertion in
any sense. If the standard of assessment in terms of attributions is proof, then the attributions must be
dleared to be false. What one can conclude is that the attributions to three of the four individuals were
almost certainly ill founded, as they have never been mentioned again. Regarding LeT, hardly any
mention of that organisation was made in any subsequent prosecution, so either the attribution was
incorrect or the outstanding prosecution is. Regarding the prosecution, given the abuses that have
been perpetrated both in terms of due process and bodily harm to the 13 detainees, and based on the
exhaustive investigations of the Tehelka magazine series ‘The SIMI Fictions’, the objective reader has
to conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, the prosecutions are politically motivated and have
no basis in fact, as was emphatically claimed by the murdered defence counsel Shadid Azmi in 2007.

Regarding the attributed role of SIMI, again, hardly any mention of that organisation was made in
either prosecution, again suggesting that either the attribution was incorrect or the outstanding
prosecution is. Assessment of the attributions to SIMI would be incomplete however without
reference to an August 2008 special issue of the Indian investigative magazine Tehelka, entitled ‘The
SIMI Fictions’. In that edition, the magazine devoted the entire issue to an exhaustive analysis of
many aspects of the alleged SIMI threat (circa 20,000 words), including personal testimonies, legal
trials, the centre’s ban, media coverage of SIMI etc. What did the analysis prove? In the words of
Telekha Editor-in-Chief Tarun Tejpal:

A three-month long investigation by TEHELKA - carried out all over the country - reveals
that a large majority of these cases are redolent of a chilling and systematic witch-hunt against
innocent Muslims. Sadly, the expose shows it is not just the policing and intelligence agencies
that are to blame - even the judicial process is often complicit in the terrible miscarriage of
justice. (Tehelka 2008e)

Likewise, according to Tehelka Features Editor Chaudhury: ‘It has proved that scores of innocent
Muslims have been falsely accused and jailed to create a contagious sense of miasma’ (Tehelka
2008c). Perhaps most relevant to our analysis of attributions in the case of the Mumbai train bombs is
the following excerpt by Ajit Sahi, the lead reporter on the investigation, who wrote the following in
an article appropriately entitled ‘The Kafka Project’:
Typically, top ministers and police level allegations against SIMI, especially when there is a terrorist attack, and the news media play them up incessantly. Yet, no proof or evidence is ever offered from a public forum... During the course of the four bans, hundreds of criminal cases were slapped on alleged SIMI activists across the country. Hundreds of Muslim men were arrested. A majority has spent a year, sometimes two, in jail on the flimsiest of evidence... WHAT IS most amazing is that to date, police across India have failed to establish a single charge of sedition and terrorism against SIMI... (Tehelka 2008b).

Regarding the prosecutions of the individuals detained and charged with such terrorist activity Sahi notes:

Once the arrested person is in police custody, he is miraculously struck by remorse a few days later and volunteers ‘confessions’... That the confessions by the SIMI accused are fabricated is evident from the fact that in several cases, the police claimed that numerous accused are struck by remorse all at the same time and confess to their crimes on the same day and, most surprisingly, in near identical words. To be sure, the minute the accused are brought before a magistrate, they deny having made confessions or say that the police tortured them to sign on the dotted line. (Tehelka 2008b)

If all this is the case, it would suggest that all attributions relevant at least to SIMI - those made during the period of coverage under review, and those subsequent - were false, although it is not possible to state this definitively in the absence of other information. Perhaps the scenario is best summarised by ‘suppressio veri, suggestio falsi’, the suppression of truth is equivalent to the suggestion of what is false (Mushrif S.M. 2009).
Chapter 5 - Sourcing Attribution.

5.1 Introduction.

This chapter seeks to analyse aspects of the news sourcing practices manifest in the coverage of the four newspapers under review. Sourcing studies in general appear to have fallen out of favour over the past decade apart from a flurry of interest in the phenomenon of anonymous sources (Martin-Kratzer, Thorson 2007, Carlson 2007, Sheehy 2010, Duffy 2010). The increased interest in the phenomenon of unnamed sources occurred in the wake of the anonymous sourcing scandal at *The New York Times* in 2003 involving reporter Jason Blair (who had fabricated many stories he had penned for the newspaper and invented non-existent sources) in addition to the controversy over the use of official sources by Judith Miller in the build-up to the war in Iraq. These controversies resulted in the 2005 Siegel Committee report and recommendations on journalistic practice at *The New York Times*. In contrast, between the mid 1980's and the mid 1990's, a plethora of sourcing studies were published investigating source use by newspapers (Brown et al. 1987, Hackett 1985, Stempel III, Culbertson III 1984) and TV (Lee, Solomon 1991, Hoynes 1990), in addition to studies analysing the types of experts utilised as sources (Herman, Chomsky 1988, Soley 1992, Steele 1990, Hoynes 1990) and the forerunners to later studies on anonymous attribution (Dizier 1985, Wulfemeyer 1985). In the realm of national security matters into which this study falls were studies of news coverage (which included an element of sourcing analysis) by Kern et al. (1983), Brown et al. (1987), Soley (1989), and Landers (2004). However, only Hallin et al. looked specifically at the 'Sourcing patterns of National Security Reporters' (Hallin, Manoff & Weddle 1993). In addition, although some studies did look at questions of sourcing in coverage of terrorism, these were often incidental to more overarching themes of exploration (Paletz, Fozzard & Ayanian 1982), although some studies did concentrate specifically on news sources in terrorism coverage (Atwater, Green 1988, Wittebols 1995). With regard to the 'war on terror' specifically, no studies have addressed the question of sources specifically, with perhaps the
exception being those studies that have analysed terror experts utilised by the news media (Reid, Chen 2007, Miller, Mills 2009).

Although the cited studies are diverse in many respects, a common theme is the greater or lesser reliance on *official sources* for news. Hallin et al. (1993) described this as: 'one of the most consistently-replicated findings of research on American journalism' (Hallin, Manoff & Weddle 1993). Indeed, why this has been the case has been variously rationalised in the literature in terms of:

- source accessibility and authoritativeness (Hallin, Manoff & Weddle 1993),
- a defence mechanism against attack (Schlesinger 1990),
- regular flows of information without requirements for fact checking (Shoemaker, Reese 1996),
- the professional demands of impartiality and objectivity (Hall et al. 1978),
- news gathering routines and journalistic conventions (Sigal 1973),
- the outcome of transactional relations with journalists (Bennett 1990),
- source authority, credibility and availability (Van Ginneken 1998).

From the point of view of the analyst, the official / non-official source distinction is of interest because those descriptors typically act as shorthand to describe typologies of information, in addition to suggesting contrasting provenance of such information. Thus, once the initial stages of the sourcing analysis below are completed, the analysis proceeds to examine questions of information provenance specifically with regard to the non-official sources that speak in the coverage, utilising an approach that is novel if not unique in the literature. In toto, the analysis that follows proceeds in six stages. (1) First, a sourcing analysis of the entire dataset is performed in order to establish a baseline set of results. This is achieved by coding sources into thirteen categories of source type on either side of the official/non-official source distinction. (2) Second, a subset of the dataset relating to articles coded as employing an 'attribution of responsibility' frame is extracted in order that a sourcing analysis can be
performed that is broadly comparable with prior sourcing studies in the 'national security' domain. (3) Third, a coding scheme is devised and applied that identifies the nature of the contribution by sources within this 'attribution' subset in terms of eight distinct source contribution types. (4) Fourth, of the eight source contribution types identified, the three that play a direct role in terms of attribution are isolated and analysed and the distribution of sources responsible for these are compared with baseline results from steps one and two above. (5) Fifth, the nature of the non-official sources that are found to play a role in terms of these three specific 'attribution contribution' categories are analysed in terms of the actual provenance of the information they provide. In addition to analysing provenance, instances where contributions were unoriginal or otherwise deemed invalid for stated reasons are extracted in order to illustrate how few non official sources provide original contributions in attributing responsibility for acts of terrorism in elite newspaper coverage. (6) Finally, a brief overview is provided regarding the role of unnamed sources in the coverage.

5.3 Source Analysis by Type.

In order to achieve a baseline set of results for all sources in the dataset, the entire valid population of articles was coded along six official source types and seven non-official source types. These categories are for the most part self-explanatory. However, some brief explanatory guidelines are pertinent. The reader will note that two 'Politician' categories exist under official sources. As per Chapter Three, this reflects a distinction employed between politicians holding elected office or belonging to a ruling government (official) and politicians in opposition. The 'Government' category includes all officials that could not be coded into one of the other four official categories. Likewise, the 'Individual' category includes all sources that could not be coded into one of the other seven non-official categories. The overall breakdown by source type is illustrated in Table 7 which demonstrates that of the 3,002 sources under analysis, some 48% were classified as official and 52% as non-official.
Table 7 Total Valid Survey Population by Source Type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICIAN</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>GOV</th>
<th>POLICE/SEC</th>
<th>INTEL</th>
<th>POL-OPP</th>
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The proportion of non-official sources (52%) appears high given previous research findings in the literature. For instance, Sigal (1973) had found that 75% of sources used in newspaper coverage were official, Kern et al. (1984) had found that 80% of sources in foreign policy crisis were official and Hallin et al. (1993) also found a figure of over 80%. However, two factors largely explain this differential. The first relates to the divergent methodologies employed. For instance, Hallin et al. (1993) excluded over 400 sources for which affiliation could not be determined e.g. 'experts' and 'analysts'. These would both have been classified as expert (non-official) sources in the current study. Second, the non-official source figure in the current study is high because the dataset itself is not comparable with those used by Sigal (1973), Kern et al. (1993) or Hallin et al. (1993). In all three studies, the newspaper coverage focused on foreign policy or national security coverage. In contrast, while the current survey population includes consideration of such issues, it also includes human interest and economic consequence coverage for example, which would not have been a feature of the survey populations in the above cited sourcing studies. This will obviously have an effect on the distribution of sources as human interest coverage, for example, will contain a far larger proportion of non-official sources.

The following three tables illustrate the breakdown of official and non-official sources by each of the three case studies under analysis. They demonstrate that the coverage of Bali and London broadly mirror the overall findings but that the coverage of Mumbai contains a far higher proportion of
official sources at 55%. This differential is explained by the relative absence of human interest coverage in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. While the Bali atrocity was an enormous news story in Australia in 2002 and the London atrocity likewise in the UK in 2005, the Mumbai attacks were greeted in a much more muted manner in India in 2006, resulting in a far lower proportion of human interest coverage and a consequentially higher figure for official source usage. The muted reaction in the TOI is possibly explained by the fact that India suffered up to a dozen comparable terrorist attacks in the last decade alone.

Table 8 Total Valid Survey Population by Source Type - Bali Coverage.

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<th>Military</th>
<th>Gov</th>
<th>Police/Sec</th>
<th>Intel</th>
<th>Pol OPP</th>
<th>Total</th>
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Table 9 Total Valid Survey Population by Source Type - London Coverage.

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</table>

189
In order to produce a figure for official source use that is directly comparable to the findings of Sigal, Kern, Hallin etc., it is necessary to extract only the coverage in the current dataset that is directly comparable. Of the four types of article identified previously in the study, it is possible to exclude economic consequence and human interest coverage as these are qualitatively and structurally distinct from national security or policy coverage. Of the remaining two, from a close reading of the coverage, it is also possible to exclude articles coded as employing a 'treatment recommendation' frame, that is, articles concerning 'what to do' in response to the atrocities. Here the focus here was typically on what specific technologies or counter-terrorism strategies should be employed. However, articles employing an 'attribution of responsibility' frame should be broadly comparable to those earlier studies in that the focus is on macro national security concerns where officials are considered to have specialist knowledge not available to the general public, as in the case of Cold War foreign policy coverage for example. As Table 11 below illustrates, the ‘attribution of responsibility’ frame accounts for 34% of all frames coded in the Bali coverage, 36% of all frames coded in the London coverage and 46% of all frames in the Mumbai coverage.

5.4 Source Analysis by Type - Attribution Subset.

In order to produce a figure for official source use that is directly comparable to the findings of Sigal, Kern, Hallin etc., it is necessary to extract only the coverage in the current dataset that is directly comparable. Of the four types of article identified previously in the study, it is possible to exclude economic consequence and human interest coverage as these are qualitatively and structurally distinct from national security or policy coverage. Of the remaining two, from a close reading of the coverage, it is also possible to exclude articles coded as employing a 'treatment recommendation' frame, that is, articles concerning 'what to do' in response to the atrocities. Here the focus here was typically on what specific technologies or counter-terrorism strategies should be employed. However, articles employing an 'attribution of responsibility' frame should be broadly comparable to those earlier studies in that the focus is on macro national security concerns where officials are considered to have specialist knowledge not available to the general public, as in the case of Cold War foreign policy coverage for example. As Table 11 below illustrates, the ‘attribution of responsibility’ frame accounts for 34% of all frames coded in the Bali coverage, 36% of all frames coded in the London coverage and 46% of all frames in the Mumbai coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICIANS</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>GOV</th>
<th>POLICE/SEC</th>
<th>INTEL</th>
<th>POL OPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERTS</td>
<td>VICTIMS</td>
<td>TERRORIST</td>
<td>INDIV</td>
<td>CORP</td>
<td>MEDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 411 | 100% |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>POLICE/SECURITY</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
<th>POLITICAL OPPOSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERTS</th>
<th>VICTIMS</th>
<th>TERRORIST</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
<th>CORPORATE</th>
<th>MEDIA</th>
<th>NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 411 | 100% |

190
Table 11 Total Valid Dataset Population of Articles coded by Frame Type.\textsuperscript{12}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bali Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>London Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mumbai Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attribution of Responsibility</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Consequences</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Interest</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment Recommendation</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>305</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>404</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is notable that when only that subset of the dataset coded as ‘attribution of responsibility’ is considered, the results of the sourcing analysis are altered markedly. In place of a finding that 48% of sources emanated from ‘officials’ and 52% from ‘non-officials’, the ‘attribution’ subset reflects an official source usage of 63% with 37% non-official. See Table 12.

Table 12 Total Valid Population of Attribution Articles by Source Type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICIAN</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>GOV</th>
<th>POLICE/SEC</th>
<th>INTEL</th>
<th>POP OPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>248</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1002</strong></td>
<td><strong>63%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERTS</th>
<th>VICTIMS</th>
<th>TERRORIST</th>
<th>INDIV</th>
<th>CORP</th>
<th>MEDIA</th>
<th>NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>597</strong></td>
<td><strong>37%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1599</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{12} Table 11 is a duplicate of Table 5.
However, even this is an understatement of official source usage for the following reason. When the dataset was coded for the presence of frames, an article qualified as an attribution frame if only two sentences from the article related to attribution. This was in order that no attributions would be
excluded from the framing analysis. The result of this is that the stories coded as attribution are practically 100% inclusive of all attributions in the dataset, but as a result, the sourcing findings are slightly skewed in favour of non-official sources. For example, if an article was 98% human interest but contained two sentences relating to attribution, it was then coded as both. However, the distribution of sourcing in a human interest story - typically heavily reliant on non-official sources - would therefore skew by inclusion any sourcing analysis by lowering the reported levels of official source use. Thus, the 63% illustrated below for official source usage is an underreporting for this reason.

5.5 Source Analysis by Contribution.

In order to gain an insight into the nature of source contributions in the subset of attribution articles, a novel coding scheme was devised. This was constructed from an inductive reading of the dataset and comprised some eight categories: 1) Explicit, 2) Implicit, 3) Investigation, 4) Miscellaneous (N/A), 5) Assertion, 6) Comment, 7) Denial and 8) Causal. Table 16 below provides a detailed breakdown of the proportions of contributions within each category identified both in respect to each individual case study and on an overall basis. The breakdown of the source contributions by case study demonstrates a remarkably consistency across the three cases and is therefore suggestive of unspoken journalistic conventions deemed inherent in reporting this type of event.
Table 16 Breakdown of Attribution Articles by Source Contribution Type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explicit</th>
<th>Implicit</th>
<th>Invest*</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Assertion</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Denial's</th>
<th>Causal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There follows a brief analysis of each contribution category, including an explication of the coding rules utilised for each in addition to illustrative examples and a brief analysis of the findings.
5.5.1 Explicit: This category of source contribution pertains to an instance where a source is cited who 'explicitly' attributes responsibility for the terrorist attack to a particular individual or organisation even if the attribution is accompanied by qualifiers like 'all the hallmarks' etc.

Bali: 'Mr Downer said yesterday that it was conceivable that Jemaah Islamiyah could have carried out the attacks in Bali'. (Johnston, McGrory 2002)

London: 'The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, said the attack bore the hallmarks of al-Qaeda'. (Glendinning 2002)

Mumbai: 'Ajai Sahni, a Delhi-based intelligence analyst who tracks terrorist groups in South Asia, said suspicion fell on Lashkar-e-Taiba less on the basis of specific evidence than on the record of past attacks in which it has been implicated - 11 in all since 1997 in Mumbai alone'. (Cowell 2005f)

The 'Explicit' category of source contributions accounts for 14% of all contributions within the attribution subset and includes both attributions to people and organisations as well as self-attributions - otherwise referred to as 'claims of responsibility'. In addition, a distinction is made between conventional attributions and counter attributions. In the former category are attributions made to the 'usual suspects' such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda and/or Abu Bakar Bashir in the case of the Bali attacks. In the latter category are attributions made to entities outside of the range of 'usual suspects' and typically manifested in attributions to governments or intelligence agencies. Table 17 below provides a breakdown of explicit attributions by terrorist attack. In addition, the three columns on the right hand side of the table provide a breakdown of explicit source contribution by:

1. official and non-official sources,
2. conventional and counter attributions and
3. official and non-official sources excluding explicit counter attributions.
Table 17 Breakdown of Explicit Attributions by Case Study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 17 illustrates, 56% of explicit contributions emanated from official sources and 90% of all such contributions were conventional in nature. However, these figures hide two notable phenomena. First, the percentage of explicit contributions by official sources in the London coverage is surprisingly low at 44%. However, a close reading of these contributions demonstrates that of the 65 contributions coded in the London coverage as explicit and by non-official sources, 28 referred to claims of responsibility by the 'Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe' or the 'Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades' respectively and a further 20 were attributions by various media organisations where the latter were simply acting as conduits for information most likely provided to them by authorities. Thus, in reality, the actual provenance of 48 of these contributions were either of dubious validity or actually official in nature. Second, the percentage of explicit contributions that were unconventional or 'counter' in nature was much higher in the case of Bali (at 25%) than in either of the other two case studies. This is largely explained by the voice of Abu Bakar Bashir in the coverage as the latter was responsible for 55% of these counter explicit attributions. Indeed, the Bali coverage is exceptional in terms of the opportunity afforded to Bashir to speak in the coverage as such individuals - alternatively...
depicted as either terrorists or militants - are rarely publicly accessible to the news media in this manner. Of the 20 explicit counter contributions in the coverage of Bali, 13 directly suggested or accused the US government of complicity. In contrast, not one instance of counter attribution was found in the coverage of the London attacks across the four newspapers.

5.5.2 Implicit: Instances in this category of source contribution did not explicitly attribute responsibility for the attacks but clearly infer or imply culpability by citing an individual or an organisation in a context where the reader is likely to draw such an inference.

Bali: An Al Qaeda operative, Omar al-Faruq, who was seized here in June and has been in American custody, has said that Mr. Bashir was behind attacks in Indonesia, including the bombing of the biggest mosque in Jakarta in 1999 and other bombings in the city in December 2000. (Perlez 2002)

London: The series of bombings in London highlight US concerns about a ‘two-way pipeline’ moving Islamic militants between Europe and Al Qaida chief Abu Musab Al Zarqawi’s insurgent network in Iraq, a senior US counterterrorism official said on Friday. (Reuters 2005c)

Mumbai: Home department sources say that officials should have taken reports about LeT more seriously instead of getting bogged down into deploying operatives to gather intelligence about political rivals. (Balakrishnan 2006)

The implicit category of source contribution is the second most frequently occurring in the attribution subset, accounting for 16% of all source contribution types. Implicit attributions are arguably the most powerful type of contribution in terms of framing attribution as they can make questions of culpability appear self-evident when, in fact, as Chapter Four has demonstrated, this was rarely the case. The inference to culpability is operationalized in many diverse ways. Some examples provided here illustrate only a sample of these means. For instance, in the NYT coverage of Bali, an article on 15 October 2002 stated:

The defence minister, Matori Abdul Djalil, said in Jakarta, the capital. ‘I am not afraid to say, though many have refused to say, that an Al Qaeda network exists in Indonesia. (Bumiller 2002)
Although no explicit attribution of responsibility is contained in the above sentence, a clear impression would have been created in the mind of a reader regarding Al Qaeda culpability. As the discussion in Chapter Four showed, this was in fact an erroneous inference. Another example from the same newspaper is selected from the following day, 16 October 2002:

Mr. Bashir, 64, the principal of an Islamic boys' boarding school in central Java, was described by Mr. Faruq as providing money, explosives and operatives for several terrorist acts, including an plan to blow up the American embassies here and in Malaysia, the officials said. (Perlez, Bonner 2002a)

In this instance again there is no direct attribution of responsibility to Abu Bakar Bashir in relation to the Bali attacks. Nevertheless, the reader is likely to infer from the testimony of Al Faruq that if Bashir was responsible for 'several' previous terrorist acts then the likelihood is strong that he played a role in the Bali atrocity also. In order to furnish an indication of the types of Implicit source contributions found in the text, Table 18 shows the issue context in the NYT coverage of Bali by which Implicit attributions of responsibility were constructed. Of all the Implicit source contributions that appeared in the NYT coverage of Bali, two types occurred most frequently. The first was the description of the membership and/or leadership of Jemaah Islamiyah and the second was related to the last cited example above i.e. the linkage of Abu Bakar Bashir to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and 'a string of attacks' in South East Asia.

---

13 Bashir was later found not guilty in respect of the charge that he played a role in the Bali atrocity.
Table 18 Sample of Implicit Source Contributions Topics in the NYT coverage of Bali.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implicit Source Contribution Topic</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description of Source as Expert on II</td>
<td>Sydney Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Indo Gov decrying lack of evidence to arrest ABB</td>
<td>Indonesian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Indo Gov as being Under Pressure to Deal with ABB</td>
<td>Asian Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Al Qaeda Cells being in hiding in Indonesia</td>
<td>American &amp; Singapore officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Attack confirming warnings received</td>
<td>Western officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of JI as having Al Qaeda trained explosives experts</td>
<td>Singapore intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of apprehension about attack since attack on Aus Embassy</td>
<td>Downer, Foreign Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of JI 'financial and personal' links to Al Qaeda</td>
<td>Downer, Foreign Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Hambali as operational Head of JI</td>
<td>Singapore intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Hambali professing fealty to Bin Laden</td>
<td>Senior Singapore intel official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of how attacks will assist the anti ABB faction in Indo Gov</td>
<td>Western official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Indo Minister admitting Al Qaeda operating in Indonesia</td>
<td>Indonesian Defence Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of reactivated Al Qaeda as a threat</td>
<td>President Bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Link between Bali, War on Terror and looming Iraq war</td>
<td>Sec State Powell / Straw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of US providing warning about looming Al Qaeda attack</td>
<td>Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of looming attack based on testimony of Omar Faruq</td>
<td>Bush administration officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of likely attack site i.e. One involving Americans</td>
<td>Senior American Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Need to break up JI</td>
<td>American officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of JI 'developing links and pooling resources with Al Qaeda'</td>
<td>Western &amp; Asian intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of ABB support for several terrorist attacks</td>
<td>Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Calls to Crack Down on JI</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of US Support for Labelling JI a terrorist organisation</td>
<td>US Embassy Canberra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of JI as part of 'an international terrorist network'</td>
<td>Minister for State Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Hambali as Mastermind of several bombings in SE Asia</td>
<td>Singaporean intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Hambali bringing JI and Al Qaeda together in the 1990’s</td>
<td>Asian Intelligence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.3 Investigation: This category of source contribution does not explicitly or implicitly attribute responsibility to any individual or organisation but nonetheless provides information, background and/or context, typically regarding the investigation, but relevant to constructing a picture of likely culpability in the mind of the reader.

Bali: As part of this effort, the minister for state security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, announced today that his investigators had returned from interviewing an Indonesian-based Al Qaeda operative who is now in the custody of United States forces in Afghanistan. (Perlez, Bonner 2002c)

London: Dominic Armstrong, director of research and intelligence at Aegis Defence Services, said: 'The London bombers were an 'A team', clearly well trained and good at counter-surveillance.' (UKT 2005f)
Mumbai: Counter-terrorism expert Lt Gen DB Shekatkar (retd) has stressed that henceforth, intelligence agencies and the society at large will have to play a pivotal role in helping detect ‘sleeper cells’. (Vaidya 2006)

The Investigation category of source contribution is the third most frequently occurring type of source contribution coded in the subset of attribution articles and comprised 14% of the dataset. Given that the type of information relevant to the investigation of a terrorist attack is normally in the strict purview of investigating authorities, it is of little surprise that official sources comprise between 71% (Mumbai) and 82% (London) of the source contributions coded in this category. In order to illustrate the mechanics of source contributions in this category, a subset of the dataset, again comprising the NYT coverage of Bali (23 instances) is selected. The source contributions in this category are alternatively suggestive of culpability or indicative of the trajectory of the official investigation. In the former category is the following example:

1. Ten days ago, the American embassy in Jakarta took initial steps to evacuate certain nonessential personnel and dependents of embassy officials because of threats of attacks on Americans, an American diplomat said. The diplomat declined to discuss the nature of the threats but said they were specific in nature. (Bonner 2002a)

This contribution suggests that the culprits were being tracked either directly or indirectly by the authorities and thus were not 'cleanskins' but somehow connected to a known terrorist network. In the latter category is the next example:

2. A declared admirer of Osama bin Laden, Mr. Bashir said tonight that he was aware of reports that he was to be questioned. (Perlez, Bonner 2002c)

The contributions in this category were dominated by official sources. In fact, 79% of all such Investigation contributions across the three case studies originated with official sources.

5.5.4 Miscellaneous: This category includes source contributions where the contribution could not be categorised according to any of the other seven categories and thus contains a wide variety of contributions.
Bali: A hospital official in Bali said today that 75 percent of the dead were foreigners. (Bonner 2002a)

London: Dilowar Khan, director of the mosque, said: 'We're worried about the repercussions for our community. We don't want people to be frightened but they should be careful and keep an eye out. I'm concerned that the mosque will be attacked.' (Baldwin 2005)

Mumbai: Peter Chalk, an Australian analyst working with the Rand Corporation in the United States, said the design of many trains could 'amplify the destructive effects of explosive devices', and that 'station security remains questionable.' (Snow, Baker 2006)

The largest category of source contribution is the Miscellaneous category which accounts for almost two fifths of all contributions coded (39%). In all three case studies under analysis, the sources in this category were coded as official in between 68% and 70% of instances. In order to provide the reader with an insight into the nature of source contributions in this category, it is proposed to outline all such contributions occurring more than once in a subset of the dataset, again the NYT coverage of Bali. 77 source contributions in this subset were coded, with 65 of these (84%) coded as official sources and 12 (16%) coded as non-official. The higher official source use figure in this instance can at least partially be explained by the fact that the NYT had less human interest coverage of the geographically and culturally distant Bali attacks. Of the 77 source contributions, 15 ‘issue contexts’ are identified below that were evoked more than once, amounting to 58 in total.


**Non Applicable Source Contribution Topics**

| Description of What Happened     | 3 |
| Description of Consequences      | 2 |
| Description of Who was Affected  | 9 |
| Description of Event Definitions | 4 |
| Description of Response          | 2 |
| Description of Other Related Events/People | 9 |
| Description of What Indonesia Should Do | 5 |
| Description of Condemnations     | 5 |
| Descriptions of Open/Unsure Culpability | 2 |
| Description of What Bombing Means for the WoT | 2 |
| Description of What US Citizens in Indonesia Should Do | 3 |
| Description of Links Between Bin Laden and Hussain | 3 |
| Description of Importance of Peace | 2 |
| Descriptions of Failure to Secure the Crime Scene | 3 |
| Description of Health of Abu Bakar Bashir | 4 |
| **Total**                        | **58** |

### 5.5.5 Assertion

This category of source contribution only applies to the coverage of the London bombings as this was the only case where the individuals purportedly responsible were identified within the seven day period of the study. The 'Assertion' refers to the fact that this contribution asserts some 'fact', typically in relation to one of the identified culprits.

**London (1):** Britain's Independent newspaper described one of the bombers, Hasib Hussain, as having recently undergone a sudden conversion 'from a British Asian who dressed in Western clothes to a religious teenager who wore Islamic garb and only stopped to say salaam to fellow Muslims.' (Friedman 2005)

**London (2):** A senior European counterterrorism investigator, who is working closely with his counterparts in Britain, said Scotland Yard now believed that at least three of the bombers had died in the attacks. (Cowell, Van Natta Jr. 2005)

This category is exclusively comprised of assertions, ostensibly presented as fact, relating to one of the four individuals identified as culprits, either individually or as a subset of same. Comprised of 37 source contributions, this category accounts for 5% of all contributions coded in the London coverage. Given the fact that official sources are almost exclusively in possession of information in the early
stages of an investigation of this nature, it is unsurprising that 81% of the sources cited are categorised as official and of the 19% categorised as non-official, all seven in this category are media outlets who are presumed to be reporting (or asserting) facts passed to them from official sources, either directly or indirectly. Thus, it could be argued that in terms of provenance of information, all sources in this category are official in nature. Of the cited sources that comprise the 81%, these are: 1) 'the Police' (8 instances), 2) 'deputy commissioner Charles Clarke' (7 instances), 3) 'officials' (8 instances), 4) 'security sources' (2 instances), 5) 'investigators' (5 instances), 6) 'authorities' (1 instance), 7) intelligence agencies (1 instance) and 8) Sir. Ian Blair (1 instance). The source contributions in this category varied between:

- providing background and biographical information on the suspected bombers (e.g. 'In particular, the American officials said, the authorities are investigating a possible family relationship between one of the London bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, and Omar Khyam Khan, a suspect in the 2004 operation' (Cowell 2005d),
- description of their movements on the morning of 07 July (e.g. 'As investigators continue to piece together the bombers' story, London police's deputy assistant commissioner, Peter Clarke, said three of the men travelled to Luton from Leeds by train, where they met up with the fourth, who had driven by car' (Button 2005d),
- asserting the import of evidence found at the crime scene and elsewhere (e.g. 'Meanwhile, police investigating the bombings said they had evidence that one of the bombers had died in the explosions' (Agencies 2005) and
- asserting other activities had had been conducted in the course of the investigation (e.g. 'The police said they had taken possession of a second car linked to the investigation in Leighton Buzzard, about 50 miles north of London').
5.5.6 Comment: This category of source contribution refers to sources who were cited typically not because of an institutional affiliation or social status but rather due to the fact that they were somehow caught up in the bombing or were otherwise affected by it.

Bali: Len Notaras, the Royal Darwin Hospital medical superintendent, said: 'We're looking at full body burns, which are quite horrendous. In a sense it has been our own September 11; it's a tragedy'. (Maynard 2002)

London: 'They are fine, he got scratched and bruised. They are both home', said Mrs. Cancellara, who lives in England. (Button, Crabb & Munro 2005)

Mumbai: Karan Shah, who had been waiting on the platform since Tuesday night said, 'I stayed at the station thinking that train services would resume but the railway authorities just cancelled the trains and there was no information available'. (TNN 2006d)

The Comment category of source contribution accounted for 10% of all source contributions. However, the figure is artificially high in the context of the sub dataset under analysis (i.e. attribution articles) as a result of the inclusive nature of attribution article coding explained previously. In fact, of the source contributions classified under this heading, a large proportion are contained within articles that are also coded as human interest. The specific figures for this are 47% for the Bali coverage, 53% of the London coverage and 72% of the Mumbai coverage i.e. 47% of contributions coded as Comment in the Bali coverage originated in articles that were coded as human interest in addition to attribution. As a result, should the approach have been taken to code articles on what Strömbäck and van Aelst (2010) called the 'dominant frame' basis, whereby an article is coded only for the presence of one 'dominant' frame, then a proportion approaching the percentages above would be eliminated from the analysis. Regarding the nature of Comment source contributions themselves, these were typically cited to document the experiences of individuals during or after the blasts. For instance, relatives and friends were cited to comment on the status of victims and other individuals were cited on topics as diverse as insomnia and patriotism. Due to the nature of the individual source contributions coded as Comment, it is unsurprising to note that between 95% and 97% of sources were coded as non-official.
5.5.7 Denials: This category of source contribution is self-explanatory.

Bali: Mr. Bashir condemned the bombing and denied that his group was involved. 'All the allegations against me are groundless,' he said at a news conference. 'I challenge them to prove anything.' (Bumiller 2002)

London: Speculation persisted that a suicide bomber detonated the bus bomb, although London's Police Commissioner, Ian Blair, said there was no information so far to suggest that a suicide bomber was responsible for the attack. (Button, Crabb & Munro 2005)

Mumbai: The references to Lashkar-e-Taiba have worsened diplomatic tensions, with the Pakistani foreign minister, Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, lashing out late Wednesday at Indian suggestions of a Pakistani role. 'There should not be a knee-jerk reaction that everything happening in India starts in Pakistan,' he told CNN. (Sengupta, Mazzetti 2006)

The contribution category of Denials accounted for 3% of the cited sources (54 instances). The distribution of official versus non-official Denial contributions across the three case studies varies dramatically between those dominated by non-official sources in the case of Bali, those dominated by official sources in the case of London, and those equally distributed in the case of Mumbai. A close reading of the dataset illustrates the context of this variation. In the case of Bali, of the 23 denials in the coverage, 17 were by Abu Bakar Bashir denying that he had anything to do with that atrocity. In contrast, in the coverage of London, apart from four denials on behalf of Mohammed Guerbozi and Omar Bakri, all other source contributions of this nature were by officials or authorities who were denying everything from evidence of suicide bombers at the four blast sites to the presence of unexploded devices and military grade C4 explosives at same. Finally, in the case of Mumbai, the source contributions in this category were split almost equally between (official) denials by Pakistan that it had anything to do with the train bombings and (non-official) denials by Lashkar Jihad regarding same.

5.5.8 Causal: This category of source attribution can be differentiated from Explicit in that it does not identify any specific culprits but instead seeks to identify the root cause of the attacks which is often expressed in terms of the possible motivation for the terrorists.
Bali: Bruce Haig, a former Australian diplomat, said that the Prime Minister had been too vocal in his support of US threats to attack Iraq and was now paying the price. 'Our Prime Minister should adopt a much lower profile', he said. (Maynard 2002)

London: Mr Kennedy's remarks, which went close to breaking the cross-party display of unity since the attacks, came after those of the Respect MP George Galloway, who said that Mr Blair had 'paid the price' for the Iraq conflict. (Ford 2005)

Mumbai: No example in dataset.

The Causal category of source contribution accounted for only 2% of the contributions in articles coded as attribution. Although Causal source contributions do not speak to attribution of responsibility specifically, they can be seen as a precursor to attribution in that they seek to illuminate the motivations of those allegedly responsible by constructing a causal hypothesis for their behaviour. In the case of Bali, 12 causal contributions were cited by sources. The preponderance of these were contained within the pages of the SMH (nine) and sought to rationalise why Australians were attacked. Nearly all situated the cause of the attack within Australian foreign policy, whether expressed in terms of Australian support for aggressive American foreign policy ('America's puppet') or more personally with the traits of Prime Minister Howard ('sycophancy', 'arse licking', 'gung ho rhetoric' etc.). In the coverage of London, Causal source contributions were more numerous (18) but were again concentrated along the theme of Britain 'paying the price' for its support of US foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. The most commonly cited causal source was the Respect MP George Galloway who was cited six times across the coverage. Finally, in the coverage of the Mumbai bombings, no causal source was stipulated in the coverage.

5.6 Source Analysis - A Comparative Differentiation.

Of the eight source contribution categories identified, only the first three play a direct role in attributing responsibility for the attacks i.e. Explicit, Implicit and Investigation. While the other categories of source contribution play distinct roles within the text, they do not inform questions of attribution directly. Table 20 below demonstrates the effect on source distribution by narrowing the
dataset from a consideration of all valid articles (Column 1), to a consideration of only those articles coded as containing an attribution of responsibility frame (Column 2), and finally, to a consideration of only those sources stipulated in attribution articles as qualifying in terms of the three direct attribution categories listed above (Column 3). The progression shows a relative increase in the proportion of official sources stipulated from 45% to 61% as noted previously, but also a subsequent progression from 61% to 69% when only those sources directly constructing 'attribution' are considered. Thus, as Table 20 demonstrates, when the non-attributive contributions are removed (Column 3), it is found that the coverage contained only 218 'attribution contributions' by non-official sources. The next section examines these non-official source contributions more closely in terms of the identity of sources and the provenance of the information they provided, in order to establish the extent to which they are bona fide independent voices, amongst other considerations.

Table 20 Differential Source Analysis by Subset.
5.7 Source Analysis - Non-Official Source Contributions.

The longstanding interest in news sources utilised by media organisations has traditionally been expressed in terms of the official / non-official distinction for a number of reasons. First, along with the named / unnamed distinction, its binary nature is an obvious starting point for any sourcing analysis as it allows a direct cleavage into two distinct categories. Second, this cleavage reflects a widely held assumption that information obtained from official vis-a-vis non-official sources is likely to be qualitatively distinct for many reasons. The a priori assumption is that official sources speak on behalf of authorities and have a tendency to be conservative, rarely deviating from the conventional wisdom and being controversy averse. The converse assumption is that while non-official sources typically do not have the same access to information and knowledge, they are more likely to challenge the status quo as their independent status allows them more leeway when contributing to news discourse. However, while this distinction is valid in some respects, it obscures the many differences between the types of non-official sources contributing in the news media and ignores the actually provenance of information that is being provided by non-official sources when they are cited. The provenance of information is important because if an equal number of official and non-official sources are cited in a newspaper article it may give an impression of balanced coverage, but if the information presented by both types is the same or broadly similar, then it can be argued that such balance is illusory. Thus, in this section, it is proposed to take a closer look at the identity of non-official sources utilised in the coverage in addition to the actual provenance of the information provided.

Table 20 above illustrates that when only non-official source contributions coded in terms of the three attribution categories are considered, they amount to 218, or 31% of the relevant dataset. Of these 218 however, how many can be said to be truly independent in terms of status (being unaffiliated to official institutions) and/or are actually citing original information? (i.e. the provenance of
information is not second-hand). Table 21 below provides a breakdown of the 218 non official sources by case study and by category of non-official source.

Table 21 Total Non-Official Sources Stipulated. (3 Attribution Categories)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pol</th>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>Vic</th>
<th>Terr</th>
<th>Ind</th>
<th>Corp</th>
<th>Med</th>
<th>NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 21 illustrates, the most frequently occurring type of non-official source were media organisations, which comprised one third of all non-official sources. However, a close reading of the coverage illustrates that many of these source contributions consisted of media organisations simply acting as a conduit for information provided by official sources. For example:

The man, now held by authorities, said he regretted the huge loss of life in Saturday's attack but had not revealed who had asked him to build the 'C-4' military explosive, the Washington Post reported, quoting Indonesian security sources. (TOI 2002a)

The coding convention adopted in this study is to code both The Washington Post and 'Indonesian security sources' as sources in this instance. However, it is self-evident that that the information disclosed did not originate with the newspaper in question. Thus, as a first stage of analysis, it is proposed to remove all such non-official source contributions from the 218 instances cited above.
where it is obvious from the text that the non-official source stipulated was not the actual provenance of the information being cited. In total, 46 such instances were identified across the three case studies. All 46 consisted of media organisations reporting information that had obviously been obtained elsewhere, essentially second hand information. When these 46 'non-official' sources are removed, the total non-official source contributions in respect to attribution falls to 172. See Table 22.

Table 22 Total Non-Official Sources Stipulated less Non Original (3 Attribution Categories).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pol</th>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>Vic</th>
<th>Terr</th>
<th>Ind</th>
<th>Corp</th>
<th>Med</th>
<th>NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ball</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 172 'non-official' source contributions remaining, 71% are accounted for by three of the most frequently occurring categories: experts (23%), terrorists (34%) and media (14%). In the next three sections therefore, the sources coded under these category headings are analysed in detail to ascertain the extent to which sources in these categories are indeed 1) independent of institutional ties and/or 2) provide original contributions in terms of attribution in the newspaper coverage under review.

5.7.1 Expert Sources.
Of the 172 source contributions coded as non-official and qualifying under the three 'attribution' categories, 39 were designated as emanating from experts (23%). In their study of terrorism experts utilised by the news media over the course of the 'war on terror', Miller & Mills (2009) noted how such terror experts invariably comprised:

A network of knowledge and integration with other powerful institutions, including policing, the military, intelligence agencies, the arms and security industry, and last but not least, the media industries. (2009 p. 418)

In addition, Miller & Mills (2009) conceptualised such terror expertise as constituent of hegemonic processes ('contributing to the reproduction of the ‘common sense’ consensus on policy') and viewed the contribution that terror expertise made as: 'a matter of information management' (Miller, Mills 2009). In their study of the 100 most commonly cited terror experts in 'major world newspapers' between 2000 and 2007 for example, they found that 67 had been members of private think tanks or research institutions at some stage, 16 more had been affiliated with private security, military or intelligence agencies while only 17 (17%) had been 'independent' in the sense of being unaffiliated to either of the above. In addition, they identified the two leading international academic centres on terrorism (Georgetown's CSIS and St. Andrews's CSTPV) as being inextricably intertwined with 'a nexus of interlocking corporate and intelligence interests' since their foundation. The current study draws on the methodology of Miller & Mills (2009) by analysing the terrorism experts cited in the coverage in terms of their past or present institutional affiliations. Of the 39 expert source contributions cited, the specific names of the experts were not provided in 10 instances (e.g. 'some experts denied authenticity') and two related to Muslim rather than terror scholars. However, of the remaining 27 expert contributions by 19 individual ‘experts’, and using Miller's (2009) framework of analysis, only two experts, Abdullah Al Madani and Hasan Askari, comprising 10% of all experts cited (i.e. 2/19), did not obviously have past or present affiliations with military, intelligence, think tanks, foundations, or the two leading academic centres that Miller & Mills (2009) demonstrate were
either founded by intelligence agencies,\textsuperscript{14} funded by private industry, or both. Table 23 demonstrates the institutional affiliations of 17 of the 19 experts cited across the three newspapers. The implications of this finding are discussed in a forthcoming section.

Table 23 Expert Source Affiliations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Affiliations</th>
<th>Expert</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Affiliations</th>
<th>Expert</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Affiliations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Leiken</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td>Sidney Jones</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ford Found</td>
<td>Hasan Askari</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boaz Ganor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Israeli Intel</td>
<td>Magnus Ranstorp</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>St. Andrews</td>
<td>Radha Kumar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CFR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Clarke</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Rohan Gunaratna</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>St. Andrews</td>
<td>Aschek Mehta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Pape</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Carnegie Corp</td>
<td>Abdullah Al Madani</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Gareth Price</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RIJA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorge Descaillar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spanish intel</td>
<td>Clive Williams</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aust intel</td>
<td>Ajit Doval</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indian intel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom Armstrong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aegis Def Res</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paul Wilkinson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>St. Andrews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Lehr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>St. Andrews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Shekatkar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indian intel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total |     |                       | 9               |     |                       | 10              |     |                       |

| Total |     |                       | 8               |     |                       | 27              |     |                       |

5.7.2 Terrorist Sources.

Of the 172 source contributions coded as non-official and qualifying under the three 'attribution' categories, 59 were designated as emanating from terrorists (34\%). It should be noted again that the choice of label 'terrorist' does not actually imply that these individuals are in fact terrorists (although some may be) but rather that they are depicted as such in the newspaper coverage. Of the 59 ostensibly non-official source contributions in this category however, how many can truly be said to be bona fide independent actors? Removing one citation where the designation of terrorist was unspecified ('Islamic militants') brings the total number of contributions to 58, comprising the contributions of 11 individual 'terrorist' actors (See Table 24 below). However, if the sources are

\textsuperscript{14} The forerunner of the CSTPV, the Institute for the Study of Conflict, was shown to be an outgrowth of the CIA's Kern House Enterprises by Steve Weissman in 'The CIA Makes the News' (1978).
removed that are now known to be invalid or bogus (e.g. Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda Iraq, Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades, Lashkar Qahhar etc.) or to have had a relationship with intelligence agencies at some point (Omar Bakri, Mohammad Babar), then the figure for bona fide ‘terrorist’ source contributions falls to 27. The implications of this are discussed following consideration of the third of the trio, media, in the next section.

Table 24 Terrorist Source Contributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Name</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Invalid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Bakr Bashir</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Org of Al Qaeda</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkar Jihad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkar Qahhar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Bakri Mohammad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noureddine Nifa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Abdullah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Babar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osama Bin Laden</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.7.3 Media Sources.

Of the 172 source contributions coded as non-official and qualifying under the three ‘attribution’ categories, 24 were designated as emanating from media (14%) of various types.\(^{15}\) However, it is possible to distinguish within these sources that are providing what may be termed ‘first-hand’ information and sources that are providing ‘second-hand’ information. Contributions in the first category are often simply descriptive or commentary (e.g. Backpack butchers wrote ‘The Sun’) but the

\(^{15}\) Note that this Table already excludes those media source contributions where it was obvious that the media source was simply acting as a conduit for official sources.
media can also be sources of original information (e.g. a Guardian opinion poll found that 13% of British Muslims felt that further attacks were justified). However, contributions categorised as second-hand, while they are not obviously a conduit for any specific other source, cannot be simply the product of original reporting as the nature of the information reported is such that it could only have come from official sources (e.g. The Sun and Daily Mirror said he was Magdy el-Nashar, 33, a chemistry student'). Thus, using this distinction, Table 25 tabulates the proportion of first-hand and second-hand media source contributions and finds that the information in 12 instances (55%) did not originate with the media source in question.

Table 25 Media Source Attributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>First Hand</th>
<th>Second Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta Post</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Indo Daily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP TV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Website</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Website</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda Website</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current News Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It can be therefore demonstrated that of the three categories above that comprise 71% of all non-official source contributions, a large proportion are by sources that:

a) possess institutional affiliations to organisations that are official in nature or alternatively are known to share the worldview of official institutions (i.e. experts),

b) are known now to be invalid or bogus sources and/or are known to have had a relationship at some stage with intelligence agencies (i.e. terrorists) or

c) are known to have cited 'second-hand' information in their source contributions that can only have originated with official sources.

It can be argued that since the contributions of these ostensibly non-official sources are - for the reasons listed above - often indistinguishable from the contributions of official sources themselves, that they should therefore be coded as official sources. The counter view might argue that it would be inappropriate to code Sidney Jones as an official source for example, simply on the basis that she used to work for the Ford Foundation. As neither of the above coding methodologies are beyond reproach, it is proposed to simply extract the contentious source contributions and evaluate the effect of this extraction on the distribution of those sources remaining. The results of the analysis that follows cannot be said to be in any way the only legitimate approach to an analysis of sources in this context, but it can claim to be indicative of the quantity and nature of non-official source usage by such sources that are not obviously: a) compromised by institutional affiliations, b) bogus or invalid in nature and/or c) citing official information second-hand. Drawing on the prior analysis therefore, Table 26 below lists the non-official source contributions in each category whose exact nature was not specified or who extracted for the three stated rationales.
As a result, the figure for non-official source contribution in Table 27 below comprises the figures listed in Table 22 (p.210) above less the 81 extracted as illustrated in Table 26 (172-81=91).
Table 27 Non Official Source Use Post Extraction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pol</th>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>Vic</th>
<th>Terr</th>
<th>Ind</th>
<th>Corp</th>
<th>Med</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the overall effect on source composition and distribution by extracting contributions where the information was simply conduited from official sources in the first instance and was either compromised by a) an institutional affiliation, b) the invalid nature of source or c) provision of second hand information in the second, results in the progression demonstrated below in Table 28, which takes as its starting point the last column in Table 20 (p.207). The net result is a finding that post extraction, the figure for non-official source contributions in the attribution subset falls to 16%.

Table 28 Differential Source Analysis by Subset.
Of the remaining 91 non official source contributions in the coverage, a full 17 (19%) were by Abu Bakar Bashir whose contributions were often prefixed in a manner that served to dismiss the validity of anything he might say e.g. 'Mr. Bashir, who expresses admiration for Osama bin Laden and loathing for Jews and the West..' (Perlez, Bonner 2002b). In addition, of the six NGO's listed, four could conceivably be extracted as they were private think tanks and thus not independent actors as construed by Miller & Mills (2009). Finally, in the categories of victims and individuals, seven and 11 respectively were not identified by name and thus can never be held accountable for their attributions.

If the latter four types are also extracted from the rump of 91 non official (attribution) source contributions, then the number of non official source contributions falls to 52. If expressed as a percentage of 'attribution contributions' coded in attribution articles, the 52 non-official 'attribution contributions' would lower the proportion still further from 16% to 9%. If expressed as a percentage of all sources cited in attribution articles, the remaining non-official attribution contributions would
comprise just 5.6% (91/1599) if the higher figure of 91 is used or 3.2% (52/1599) if the lower figure of 52 is used.

5.8 Source Analysis - Unnamed Sources.

Finally, interest in the phenomenon of unnamed sources was spurred in 2003 and 2004 as a result of the anonymous sourcing scandals involving Jason Blair and Judith Miller at the NYT and Jack Kelley at USA Today, leading three prominent US newspapers (The New York Times, The Washington Post and USA Today) to introduce new sourcing policies at their respective newspapers. Studies of unnamed sourcing in the wake of these scandals found a decrease in unnamed sources from 2003 to 2004 (Martin-Kratzer, Thorson 2007) among other findings, but methodological inconsistencies provide a significant impediment in comparing the results of unnamed sourcing studies over the years for a number of reasons. First, sourcing practices of differing media such as TV and newspapers cannot be directly compared. Second, even within the same media, differing topics exhibit differential approaches to the usage of unnamed sources (e.g. national security vs. welfare reform). Third, studies differ in how unnamed sources are defined with some studies coding separately for the presence of 'partially identified sources'. Finally, even the headline results of such studies express the findings in conflicting terms. For instance, many studies operationalize the findings by citing the proportion of articles containing 'at least one anonymous' source. The disadvantage of this latter approach is that it serves to hide the proportion of unnamed sources as a percentage of all sources utilised, arguably a more indicative figure.

For this reason, the current study eschews the formulation expressing results in terms of proportions of articles containing unnamed sources. It also coded sources as simply named or unnamed, without any 'partially identified' category, on the grounds that partial identification does not enable the reader to challenge a source if the information provided turns out to be incorrect. It does, however, code for the presence of explanations of anonymity. The study has the advantage in that the temporal span of the case studies (from 2002 to 2006) involves acts of terrorism before and after the furore over
unnamed sources in 2003 - and thus is well equipped to detect the influence of new sourcing policies and procedures if they manifested in the newspaper coverage of, most notably, The New York Times. The Siegal Report in particular, drafted by The New York Times and published in July 2003, called for stricter standards in terms of sourcing practices and these were formally introduced at the newspaper on 01 March 2004. At that time, Executive Editor Bill Keller made the following pledge:

A year from now, I would like reporters to feel that the use of anonymous sources is not a routine, but an exception, and that if the justification is not clear in the story they will be challenged. (Keller 2005)

However, as Table 29 below indicates, while the proportion of unnamed sources in the NYT coverage of London (at 53%) did fall relative to coverage of Bali three years earlier (at 61%), the number of unnamed sources cited over a year after the new sourcing standards were introduced suggests that the change in journalistic practice was not profound. While the figures for Mumbai a year later were significantly improved, the dataset in this instance is too small (12 articles) to allow an inference to generalisation. In a similar vein, of the 209 sources utilised in the NYT coverage of Bali, 31% used the descriptor 'official' (64/209) although the figure in the case of the newspaper's London coverage had fallen to 23% (79/350). While these figures certainly suggest improvements on the part of the newspaper, they are a very long way from constituting unnamed sources as an 'exception' in the words of Keller. In fact, when 53% of sources (in London coverage) are unnamed, the phenomenon cannot be seen as anything other than 'routine'.

In addition, the current study coded for the presence of explanations of anonymity. In the coverage of Bali, no explanations were provided for anonymity in any newspaper. In the coverage of London however, nine explanations for anonymity were provided, eight in the NYT and one in the TOI. However, although again an improvement, even these eight explanations in the NYT coverage account for an explanation of anonymity in only 4% of instances where unnamed sources are cited (8/186).
With regard to the other newspapers, it can be said that in general they used more named sources when the attack in question was proximate to them. Thus, the UKT had the highest proportion of named sources (70%) in its coverage of London, the SMH had its highest proportion of named sources (68%) in its coverage of Bali and the TOI had its highest proportion of named sources (62%) in coverage of Mumbai. This is a variation of findings in the literature that suggests that sources will be more numerous and diverse when the event reported on is proximate to either the media organisation or the journalist respectively (Berkowitz, Beach 1993, Martin 1988). In addition, leaving aside some instances where the dataset is not large enough to validly allow for generalisation (i.e. all coverage of Mumbai apart from the TOI in addition the TOI coverage of Bali), it is also generally true to say that more named sources are used when the attack is culturally proximate to the newspaper in question. For instance, the TOI uses more named sources in its coverage of London than Bali. In conclusion however, it must be stated that a figure of 54% of all 'attribution subset' sources remaining unnamed is simply not simpatico with any normative ideals of news journalism, especially in the context of the elite 'newspapers of record' under review and in the issue context of a phenomenon with such far reaching implications.

Table 29 Unnamed Sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Named</th>
<th>Unnamed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOI</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Named</th>
<th>Unnamed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOI</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Named</th>
<th>Unnamed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOI</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Named</th>
<th>Unnamed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKT</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOI</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6 - Conclusions.

6.1 Introduction.

This chapter addresses the research findings from Chapters Four and Five in three stages. The first section develops an explanatory framework that attempts to identify and elucidate the most significant sociological factors and influences at play that are thought to account, to a large extent, for the newspaper coverage of the terrorist attacks under review. The second section constructs an evaluative framework that seeks to 'judge' the quality of the same coverage in the context of some vision of what elite newspaper coverage should have looked like, based on some specified criteria and in specified contexts (e.g. in a democratic society). This will necessitate a brief mapping of normative media theory. Section three concludes by a) assessing the implications for journalism and related fields (including suggested avenues for future research) and b) offering some thoughts on the implications of the findings for politics and wider society.

In advance of addressing these issues however, it is worthwhile restating here some of the overarching research findings before locating them within a web of primarily ideological, political and professional constraints.

Finding 1 - In all three cases studies under review, all newspapers, to a greater or lesser extent, attributed responsibility to Islamic fundamentalists in the absence of any stated empirical basis.

Finding 2 - In all three case studies under review, both proactive political influence (i.e. 'news management') and reactive political influence are evident.

Finding 3 - In all three case studies under review, the tenets of 'objective journalism' dictated that the ideology of the ‘war on terror’ determined the nature of the coverage, little context was provided and the focus was almost exclusively on immediate events.
Finding 4 - In all three case studies under review, coverage exhibited a reliance on official sources, with 63% of all sources in 'attribution' articles coded as official. In addition, the study found that 69% of sources actively constructing attributing were coded as official, a figure that has no comparable benchmark in the literature owing to the novelty of the metric. On removal of sources where non-official status is disputed or contested, the latter figure rises to 84% or 91% dependent on questions of source definition.

With respect to the above findings, it can be stated that this study has largely confirmed previous findings of critical studies of journalism - from the findings of Gitlin (1980) regarding the role of ideology and hegemony in newspaper coverage of national security issues (broadly defined), to the findings of Herman & Chomsky (1988) and Borjesson (1990) regarding the potential significance of political influences at 'critical moments' and finally the findings of Hallin (1986) and Tuchman (1978) amongst others in the realm of organisational or ‘media routine’ studies that focused on the significance of such professional conventions as news ‘objectivity’. In addition however, a forthcoming section develops some novel findings from the study for the concepts of ‘primary definition’ and ‘inferential structures’. The latter are thought to be predominant ‘drivers’ of attribution in the coverage by external (to the newspaper) and internal journalistic means. With respect to the news sourcing findings, again, they are broadly in line with the findings of prior sourcing studies in comparable contexts such as Sigal (1973), Kern et al. (1983) and Hallin et al. (1993), although the figures arrived at cannot be directly compared owing to differing methodological approaches. Finally, it should be noted that it is not being implied that non-official sources serve in every instance to challenge official framing. Indeed, the vast majority of them explicitly do not do so, which illustrates to an even greater degree how few sources are cited actively contrary to official framing.

6.2 Explanatory Framework.
The most significant factors influencing the newspaper coverage under review were identified and correspond broadly with Schudson’s sociological classification introduced in Chapter Two i.e. 1) Cultural, 2) Political Economy and 3) Social Organisation. However, for the purposes of this explanatory framework, the influences are situated at three of Shoemakers & Reese’s ‘levels of analysis’ i.e. 1) Ideology, 2) Media routines and 3) Political. Regardless of typological issues however, which are suggestive of an ontological debate not easily resolved, the categories, although ‘leaky’ and overlapping, serve as useful heuristics (in a Weberian ideal type sense) that facilitate consideration of the effects of various factors operating at differing ‘levels of analysis’ in influencing the nature of, in this context, elite newspaper coverage of terrorist attacks. After all, in the words of Whitney et al.:

It is clear that in some ‘grand narrative’ sense, complete explanations for why content looks as it does require attention to all levels in this hierarchy. (Whitney, Sumpter & McQuail 2004)

It should be stressed that this chapter does not seek to elucidate a comprehensive mapping of the various influence clusters to the research findings on newspaper coverage documented in Chapters Four and Five, but rather to highlight the three specific influences residing at various 'levels of analysis' that are thought to exert the greatest influence on the coverage.

6.2.1 Ideological.

Writing in 2003, Norris et al. noted how the rhetorical descriptor ‘war on terror’ constituted a masterframe that supplanted the older ‘Cold War’ masterframe while maintaining: ‘a way for American politicians and journalists to construct a narrative to make sense of a range of diverse stories about international security, civil wars and global conflict’ (Norris, Kern & Just 2003). As Lewis & Reese (2009) have noted however, the war on terror ‘conjured up a larger world of meaning’ and 'brought with it a set of assumptions' about the world, or what might alternatively be labelled ‘an ideology'.

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In addition, the prevailing ideology of the 'war on terror' implied a number of related and overlapping themes. First, that 9/11, the 'foundational event' (Norris, Kern & Just 2003) of the 'war on terror', constituted a terrorist attack on the United States by a fundamentalist Islamic organisation called Al Qaeda, headed by a Saudi militant named Osama Bin Laden. Second, and consequently, that Islamic fundamentalists, either members of this organisational or inspired by it, were responsible for various other acts of terrorism around the world and were determined to attack western interests for a potpourri of rationales including: a hatred for western freedoms, to enact retribution for perceived acts for western aggression in the middle east and/or to establish an Islamic caliphate across the Muslim world.

However, it needs to be restated that the US government's claims regarding the 'foundational event' of 9/11 have never been conclusively established, less still proven. For instance, speaking in the weeks after 9/11, then Secretary of State Colin Powell stated on NBC's Meet the Press that: 'in the near future, we will be able to put out a paper that will describe quite clearly the evidence that we have linking him (Bin Laden) to this attack' (Powell 2001). However, the following day, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer backtracked on that undertaking by saying that there were no plans to produce such a white paper, that Powell's remarks had been misinterpreted and that 'the evidence on bin Laden was classified, and releasing it would compromise US intelligence agencies' (Tarpley 2005). According to Seymour Hersh at the time, citing officials from both the CIA and the Department of Justice, the real reason for the reversal was 'a lack of solid information' (Hersh 2001). In addition, the later 9/11 Commission Report has been widely criticised for, inter alia: its: '115 omissions and distortions' (Griffin 2005), the fact that it was 'delayed, underfunded and set up to fail' (Kean, Hamilton 2007), its hearing of testimony from the President and Vice President 'in secret, off the record, not under oath and behind closed doors' (Corbett 2011), and the fact that the Commission's powerful Director, Philip Zelikow, has an academic background in the 'creation and dissemination of public myths’ (Fetzer 2011).
Nevertheless, the apparent absence of conclusive evidence regarding Al Qaeda culpability for 9/11 did not noticeably obstruct the US administration in the process of constructing the 'war on terror' narrative, with all its attendant ideological assumptions regarding the existence of, and threat posed by, Islamic fundamentalists. Nor did it appear to inhibit the widespread internalisation of those ideological assumptions by the preponderance of populations both within and without the US, with the possible exception of Middle Eastern populations who had pre-existing 'oppositional schema' (Entman 1991) regarding US foreign policy pronouncements.

These accompanying ideological assumptions occasioned significant and tangible effects on media coverage of terrorism over the following years. Perhaps the most immediate and obvious of these was the tendency to ascribe responsibility for terrorist acts to Islamic extremists almost as a fait accompli whenever and wherever such acts occurred. Chapter Four in the current study for example documents the immediate and largely unquestioning assumption of the four newspapers under review regarding the culpability of Islamic fundamentalists for the three terrorist attacks that are the objects of this study. This was in spite of the complete absence of any empirical evidence that would serve to legitimate such attributions, and where evidence was later proffered, it remained highly disputed. It is surely the manifestation of this ideology or 'worldview' for example, that led The UK Times reporters O'Neill and McGrory to assert the day after the London bombings that 'no one doubts (that the bombers) are part of an Islamic group' (O'Neill, S., McGrory, D. 2005). Such internalised assumptions (or inferential structures) were also responsible for the several dozen instances across the three attacks where reporters asserted that 'the most likely suspects are...,' or where phrases like 'thought to be responsible' were used, despite a dearth of evidence that pointed specifically in any particular direction, apart perhaps from the dubious claims of responsibility also examined in Chapter Four.

In addition, the ideological assumptions of the 'war on terror' manifested in others contexts too. For example, when Abu Bakar Bashir accused the US government of being complicit in the Bali atrocity, none of the four newspapers under review thought it pertinent to address that accusation, if only to refute it. The underlying assumption was surely that such accusations were primae facie beyond the
bounds of rational discussion or contemplation, or in what Hallin (1980) famously referred to as a 'sphere of deviance'. Likewise, when Sidney Jones mentioned this accusation in the pages of The New York Times, she was compelled to prefix it with the phrase 'extraordinary as this seems in the west', which unconsciously seemed to suggest a contending ideology in 'the east' which permitted the validity of such an idea and possibly even favoured it. Likewise, when it was put to Australian Foreign Minister Downer that the Bali attack may have involved the Indonesian military, he is reported to have dismissed the line of suspicion as ‘silly’, which is surely a manifestation of ideology in practice, regardless of whether he actually believed it to be the case.

In his study of media coverage of the Vietnam war, Hallin (1986) asserted that the President's power to control foreign affairs news in the early 1960's rested primarily on two factors. The first of these was the ideology of the Cold War:

> The 'responsible journalist' did not give credence to 'Communist propaganda'; neither did he quibble when the leader of the 'Free World' announced to the nation that 'aggression' had occurred (1986 25).

Such an exposition would retain its resonance in the current context with the direct substitution of 'terrorist' for 'communist' in the above excerpt. Thus, when faced with two diametrically opposed statements by President Bush and Abu Bakar Bashir, then, as now, the 'responsible journalist' did not give credence to what is taken to be Bashir’s self-interested propaganda. Hallin's second factor, the assumptions and routines of what is often known as 'objective journalism' is the topic of a following section.

Finally, by way of parallel, The New York Times Indonesian correspondent at the time of the Bali bombing, Raymond Bonner, has since criticised press coverage of the 'war on terror' by relating an anecdote that linked it to his experiences of Cold War coverage:

> I remember a reporter in Egypt once telling me that she knew how to see her stories get on the front-page - put a reference to communism in the first three paragraphs. (Bonner 2011)
Bonner is especially critical of the use of the dominant discursive device ‘with links to’ which was utilised on an enormous 183\(^{16}\) occasions in the coverage under review:

> After 9/11, Al Qaeda terrorists were ubiquitous, and 'linked to Al Qaeda' became a journalistic mantra, still in wide use today. What does 'linked to Al Qaeda' mean, anyway? (Bonner 2011)

In short, it didn’t mean anything. In practice, this device was constituent of hegemonic practices as it facilitated ‘definitions’ of situations in the absence of any empirical connection between entities, which of course were themselves unproven entities. The rhetorical device ‘with links to’ is also evocative of Foucault’s application of ‘discursive formations’ to the analysis of particular institutions (Foucault 1972) and their ways of establishing ‘orders of truth’, or what is accepted as ‘reality’ in a given society.

### 6.2.2 Political.

As both Whitney, Sumpter & McQuail (2004) and Preston (2009) have noted, there is considerable conceptual overlap between the ‘ideological’ level and the ‘political economic’ or ‘extramedia’ level as identified by Shoemaker & Reese (1996) among others. At this level, the concern is regarding influences originating outside of news organisation that possess the capability to shape news coverage (e.g. government, news sources, advertisers etc.). Within this level, it has been argued that the literature has traditionally given more attention to economic determinants of news rather than political ones (Benson 2004). However, the most significant influences operating at this level regarding the coverage under review are identified as political. As if to re-stress the overlapping nature of the five levels identified, this section could have been dominated by a discussion of the influence of news sources on content. However, this analysis is largely reserved for a following section on media routines which documents, amongst other phenomenon, the reliance on official sources. Instead, this

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\(^{16}\) The figure of 183 is an aggregation of 91 instances in the Bali coverage, 68 instances in the London coverage and 24 instances in the Mumbai coverage.
section proposes to critically evaluate the role of political influence on the newspaper content in both proactive (from a political perspective) and reactive terms. Proactive specifically refers to the phenomenon of 'news management'.

In the corpus of data under review there are many instances that might not have appeared curious to a casual reader at the time, but are, with hindsight, suggestive of news management practices. For instance, practically all the attributions in the wake of the Bali attack (to Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda and Abu Bashir) were based on the alleged confession of Omar Al Faruq on 09 September 2002. The main conduit for these 'revelations' in the news media at the time was *Time*, which, as a feature magazine, was a curious source for 'breaking news' of an impending terrorist attack as Faruq had allegedly warned of. Of course, *Time* was one of the media organisations that was cited by the CIA in the 1970's as being one of the agency's 'three most valuable relationships' (Johnson 1991). In any event, almost everything that is attributed to Faruq in that *Time* feature has been since shown to be untrue, or at the very least unsupported by any evidence, including the charges against Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda and Bashir. It should also be noted that there is no independent corroboration that Faruq has ever actually testified to these matters as he was being detained at Bagram prison at the time and even Indonesian authorities investigating the Bali attacks were refused access to him, as was the court that conducted prosecutions against those allegedly involved in the Bali attack. As noted previously, retired Indonesia intelligence chief AC Manulang had claimed in the week after Faruq's alleged confession that he was a CIA agent based on the pattern of Al Faruq’s behaviour (Tempo 2002). Although it is impossible to state declaratively that Faruq's testimony and subsequent news coverage was an example of 'news management', in practice, all the circumstantial evidence appears to point in that direction, including the choice of *Time* as the news media conduit of choice.

A related phenomenon that was evident in the newspaper coverage of the London attacks were the reported 'claims of responsibility' by 'The Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe' and 'The Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades'. Many of the exposes of the CIA in the 1970's documented the practice of the agency of using various foreign 'assets' to publish stories that it wished to appear in the public domain,
trusting that these would be picked up and subsequently reported by other media outlets. For example, Nick Davies in *Flat Earth News* documents the Cold War news management operation by the CIA in regards to the famous Khrushchev speech denouncing Stalin at the twentieth Communist Party Conference in 1956. When the agency were unable to obtain the full transcript of the speech, they 'concocted their own version of the 34 missing paragraphs and fed them into the media through the Italian news agency ANSA' (Davies 2009). The reader will recall that it was also the ANSA news agency which reported (within three hours of the London explosions) that a claim of responsibility had been posted on the internet by 'The SOAE', when any conventional mainstream news organisation would surely have demurred in reporting an anonymous internet posting as news. Was this an example of 'news management?' Did some agency wish to create the public impression of Al Qaeda culpability? There can be little doubt but that this was the net result.

Another notable feature of the coverage in this regard was the explicit or implicit attribution of responsibility by the newspapers under review to named individuals for their alleged roles in the London and Mumbai attacks especially. While attributions to various groups could potentially be 'explained away' by the 'cultural air' of the time, attributions to individuals cannot be dismissed in the same manner. Yet, in the case of London for example, nine individuals were identified in the days after the attacks as potentially culpable. However, apart from El-Nashar, who vaguely knew one of the four individuals later identified as responsible, none of these individuals was in any way involved in the London bombings, yet their names were reported worldwide in that context. Was it an example of 'news management' when Mohammed El Guerbozi was relentlessly described as having being convicted in abestia for his role in the Morocco attacks, but to omit the fact that 700 other people had also been so convicted? Likewise, in the aftermath of the Mumbai bombings four individuals were specifically highlighted in terms of attribution: Zabiuddin Syed, Mohammed Faiyyaz, Rahil and Junaid. Of these four, only Junaid was eventually charged and six years later little or no evidence has been proffered against him. The question then must be posed. Who fed these names to the news media and why? In any normal criminal investigation it would be anathema for investigating authorities to 'leak' names of potential suspects to the news media but this happened on multiple occasions in all
three case studies under review - see Abu Bashir in Bali coverage. As Bonner (2011) also noted in his posthoc criticism of press coverage of the war on terror:

A book could be written about the lives that have been ruined by allegations from intelligence officials that a man was a 'suspected' terrorist. We routinely reported on these arrests without flinching. (Bonner 2011)

Apart from suspicious coverage suggestive of ‘proactive’ news management practices, the three case studies under review also provide instances suggestive of ‘reactive’ political influences. For instance, the only journalist who appeared to challenge the emerging official narrative of one of the terrorist attacks, Robert Finnegan of *The Jakarta Tribune*, was removed from his editorial position at that newspaper within four weeks of publishing a sceptical investigative report on the Bali atrocity that questioned how homemade explosives could, in effect, take out an entire city block. Finnegan claims that this was as a result of pressure brought to bear on the newspaper by the American ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph Boyce, and cites as evidence in this regard the testimony of a friend of one of his then employees, Sari Setiogi, who, it is claimed, explicitly overheard Boyce state same at a meeting with the Post’s publisher, Sabam Siagian, a downtown Jakarta restaurant. Although it is difficult to corroborate all aspects of Finnegan's testimony, no one has ever disputed it in the public domain. According to Finnegan, even that investigative story was only rushed into print after Finnegan was informed about that conversation. If the story is true, it is an exceptional exemplar of reactive political influence on news content.

6.2.3 Media Routines and Norms.

In the last four decades 'objectivity' as a news convention has been criticised for being a 'strategic ritual' (Tuchman 1972), 'a defensive routine' (Altheide 1984), 'an instrument of domination' (Hall et al. 1978), 'a code for maintaining the status quo' (Altschull 1995) and 'a set of rhetorical devices' (Sigal 1973). Evidence for all of the above can be cited from this study. However, and perhaps most

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17 Personal correspondence with author 23 February 2012.
importantly, the convention of objectivity as applied in the coverage under review has served to
directly impede the search for truth, which has traditionally been the normative goal of journalism. In
this regard, McManus (2009) has observed how objectivity throws out the ‘useful biases’ with the
destructive ones, the former being the journalist's conception of the common good, the journalist's
conception of what is important, and journalist's storytelling capabilities. Indeed, McManus concluded
that: 'As a standard to separate news from nonsense, and a guide to ethical reporting, objectivity is
about as reliable as judging character by the firmness of a handshake' (2009 1). Indeed, the latter
metaphor is apt to illustrate the distinction between what was reported in terms of attribution, and the
wider empirical reality that is made manifest by a closer examination of the three case studies. Some
of the most problematic manifestations of objectivity as a journalistic convention were perhaps most
succinctly unpacked by Hallin (1986) when he elucidated three conventions that embody objectivity
in practice and that are pertinent to the current study: the use of official sources, an absence of
interpretation, and a focus on immediate events.

**6.2.3.1 Use of official Sources.**

Hallin notes how the convention to present 'just the facts' leaves the journalist in a difficult position as
'the facts are almost always to some degree in dispute' (Hallin 1986). One solution to this problem is
to simply take facts from official sources, which as Hallin et al. (1993) have noted: is 'one of the most
consistently replicated findings in American journalism' (Hallin, Manoff & Weddle 1993). Chapter
Five in the current study notes that of the sources actually attributing responsibility in the coverage,
69% were coded as official. In addition, if non-official sources were extracted that were deemed to be:
1) acting directly as a conduit for official sources, 2) had institutional affiliations with officialdom, 3)
were bogus or invalid and 4) were simply citing second hand information gleaned from official
sources, the figure for official sources attributing responsibility rises to 84% or 91% dependent on
questions of source definition. Even then, it is not ‘a given’ that the remaining 9% are contributing
attributions contrary to official sources, merely that they are not nominally official sources.
The many rationales for the use of official sources were cited in Chapter Five, but Hallin notes that it also fills another, 'a vacuum of authority' left by the rise of 'disinterested realism', by which he implies that somebody has to provide a narrative to a series of factual statements and that:

Journalists cannot, without stepping outside the role of disinterested observer, decide on their own authority to favour one version of the facts over another because it seems to them, for instance, closer to the truth. (Hallin 1986 71)

In the same manner therefore for *The New York Times* to have given prominent play to Hanoi's version of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in the 1960's would have been 'a significant and highly controversial political statement' (Hallin 1986 72), the same would have been true forty years later for *The New York Times* to give prominent play and credible treatment to Abu Bakar Bashir's allegations regarding US complicity in the Bali bombings. Whether they are true or not, the statements by US and other officials in the wake of the terrorist attacks under review are unquestionably 'newsworthy', and by citing such statements uncritically the reporter can say that he or she represents the 'disinterested observer' that is called for by the tenets of objective journalism.

### 6.2.3.2 Absence of Interpretation.

In his study of media coverage of the Vietnam war, Hallin also noted the inherent tension between the need for reporters to 'just give the facts' and the need to place those facts into some kind of framework that will make them meaningful. This, argues Hallin, is typically resolved by focusing on the only kind of fact which really does 'speak for itself' - facts about what people say. Indeed, such an approach is typical of much of the coverage under review. As an example, Raymond Bonner, then Indonesian correspondent for *The New York Times*, penned an article for that newspaper on 14 October 2002 entitled 'Bombing in Bali Seen as Opening New Front in Fight on Terror', which was constituted almost entirely by what 'people' said, and invariably 'official people'. Of the 22 sources coded in the article, eight were politicians, nine were government 'officials', three were intelligence officials and two were security experts. While all eight politicians were named, none of the other 14 were.
However, as Hallin noted, the source contributions were 'more than mere data being transmitted to the audience', they served to place the events within a context. The following is an excerpt from the article:

Although lacking any immediate evidence, American and Australian officials concluded that based on earlier intelligence gathering and the nature of the blast, the bombing was probably the work of Jemaah Islamiyah, a regional fundamentalist Islamic organization based in Indonesia and headed by Abu Bakar Bashir. Many of the group's members have trained at Al Qaeda camps in Indonesia, they said. 'As far as I'm concerned, this is Jemaah Islamiyah, in some form,' said the security analyst, who has worked in Indonesia for many years. 'A lot of planning went into this, into the preparations and execution,' he said. 'This is not the work of some weirdo radical group. This bomb was beyond the expertise of Indonesian terrorists working alone,' he said. The blast compared in magnitude to the attack on two American Embassies in Africa in 1998, he said. Singaporean intelligence officials said in a recent interview that there were not many explosives experts who knew how to make and detonate bombs capable of destroying large buildings, and that Jemaah Islamiyah had at least two experts who had been trained at Al Qaeda camps. Australia's foreign minister, Alexander Downer, said Australia had been worried about an attack on Australians in Indonesia since Jemaah Islamiyah plotted to blow up the Australian Embassy in Singapore in December. He added that Jemaah Islamiyah had financial as well as personnel links to Al Qaeda. (Bonner 2002c)\(^{18}\)

Indeed, this passage is typical of coverage across all three terrorist attacks and across all four newspapers, which in itself serves to stress the ubiquity of the objectivity norm and is suggestive of globally constituted professional norms, certainly in elite newspaper coverage. Reese (2001) noted this when he stated that 'more important than national differences may be the emergence of a transnational global professionalism' (Reese 2001b). However, the critical reader will note that the entire passage cited above is based on supposition with not a single fact or statement that can be verified independently by the reader. The effect of 'objectivity' as a convention here therefore, as Hallin notes, is not to free the news of official influence: 'but to open wide the channel through which official influence flowed' (Hallin 1986). It is also an irony that the outcome of the Indonesian legal process basically amounted to establishing the culpability of 'a weirdo radical group' who officials at

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\(^{18}\) In a personal correspondence (April 2013) Bonner said of the article that: "This article was a composite work, i.e., that it had input from other NYT reporters, and from the TV talk shows - it was back in the days before the paper put all the names of the contributing reporters at the bottom of the article. Looking at the article, and noticing that it doesn't have a dateline, I think it was written while I was in NY. I was in NY on home leave and having brunch with a friend when the first reports of the attack came in; as the reports continued and the toll mounted, I went into the paper's offices on 43rd St. I made some phone calls to Indonesia, and that's the 'security analyst'; I have no clue now who that was."
the time were asserting could not possibly have possessed the expertise to carry out such a sophisticated and powerful attack.

6.2.3.3 Focus on Immediate Events.

Hallin's third convention of objective news was the focus on immediate events, where news is normally defined in terms of discrete 'events' which unfold over the course of a day or less. The historical context of these events, unless it is made an issue of by the newsmakers themselves, is rarely to the forefront of coverage. This phenomenon was identified by Iyengar (1991) when he noted that network newscasts during the 1980's showed hundreds of reports of particular acts of terrorism but virtually no reports on the socioeconomic or political antecedents of that terrorism (Iyengar 1994). Perhaps the only exception to this tendency in the current study was the SMH coverage of the Bali attacks which noted some precedents for official or military collusion in terrorism over the decades prior to the Bali attacks. However, even this was superficial as no mention was made of the terrorist attacks in Indonesia that immediately preceded the Bali attack, both of whom were widely suspected to have been conducted by military or intelligence agencies. For example, the two individuals convicted for the Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing of 14 September 2000 were two members of Kompassus, the elite Indonesian Special Forces Group. Although it is claimed that they were 'rogue' agents, many analysts suspected at least a faction of the military was involved (BBC News 2000). Three months after the Jakarta bombing, a series of 38 bombings in 11 Indonesian cities on Christmas Eve 2000 killed 19 people. As with the Jakarta Stock Exchange bombings, Islamic militants were again attributed responsibility. However, and as noted previously, Tempo magazine will publish extensive proof of up to 50 telephone calls between the Christmas Eve bombers and the Indonesian military (Tempo 2001) although these are apparently never investigated by the authorities. Even six weeks before the Bali attack, two American teachers were killed in Indonesia and although the TNI again quickly blamed the killings on the Free Papua Movement (OPM), a separatist group in the province, a preliminary Indonesian police investigation found that 'there is a strong possibility' that the ambush was carried out by members of the Indonesian military' (History Commons 2002).
Washington Post will later note that an intelligence report to the same effect was provided to the US State Department about two weeks after the ambush and suspected that the American deaths were the consequence of a plot by the Indonesia military to target the Freeport mine and to discredit the Free Papua Movement. As The Washington Post story noted: 'If the separatists were listed as a terrorist group it would almost guarantee an increase in US counterterrorism aid to the Indonesian military' (Nakashima, Sipress 2002). The New York Times later reported in 2006 that the main suspect for the shootings, Anthonius Wamang, was arrested and confessed that he did shoot at the teachers 'but so did three men in Indonesian military uniforms' (Bonner 2006). This then is the context of Indonesian 'political' terrorism in the months prior to the Bali attacks, yet none of these three precedents for official collusion is ever mentioned in this context in the coverage of any of the four newspapers under review.

It could also be argued that the focus on immediate events in the wake of the Bali attacks also ignores precedents for official collusion in acts of terrorism in the wider world. For example, it is a matter of historical record that a faction of NATO, under a secret operation codenamed Gladio - the Latin word for 'double edged sword' - were responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks across Europe during the Cold War years with the intention of attributing responsibility to groups like the Red Brigades and thereby discrediting communists and the left in general. This existence of Gladio was confirmed by then Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti on 03 August 1990, was the subject of a (passed) resolution by the European Parliament on 22 November 22 1990 and is extensively documented in the book 'NATO's Secret Armies' by Swiss historian Daniel Ganser Operation (Ganser 2005). Former CIA director William Colby confirmed in his memoirs that setting up the secret armies in Western Europe had been 'a major program' for the CIA (Colby, Forbath 1978). In addition, almost every official and non official inquiry into collusion between paramilitary forces in Northern Ireland and the British State has found collusion - including the Stevens Report 1 (1990), Amnesty International (1994) and the Stevens Report 3 (2003). Of course, how a journalist would incorporate even some of this background into newspaper coverage without being seen as 'indulging in a quixotic interest and crusade' evokes Herman & Chomsky's comment that:

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The structure of the media virtually compels adherence to conventional thoughts; nothing else can be expressed.. in seven hundred words.. without the appearance of absurdity that is difficult to avoid when one is challenging familiar doctrine with no opportunity to develop facts or arguments. (Herman, Chomsky 1988 305)

While this explanatory framework identifies what are perceived to be the three most significant influences on the news coverage operating at three of the five distinct 'levels of analysis' (ideology, political and media routines and norms), it does not argue that there are no influential factors working at the individual or organisational levels. Indeed, if pushed to represent all five levels, the model would probably have expanded to focus on what Reese (2001) labelled 'journalistic anticipation of organisational boundaries, the power of which is manifested in self-censorship' (Reese 2001b). Keane memorably described self-censorship in 1991 when he stated that:

..censorship can take another form entirely. It can echo within us, take up residence within ourselves, spying on us, a private amanuensis who reminds us never to go too far. The internal censor warns us that too much is at stake - our reputation, our families, our career, our jobs, legal action against our company. It makes us zip our lips, tremble and think twice, with a smile... (Keane 1991 39)

Such an analysis would necessarily drawing on Breed's 'reward and punishments' model of how potentially intransigent staffers are 'stayed' from acts of deviance (Breed 1955) and would ideally include a repurposing of Noelle-Neumann’s findings in term of a ‘spiral of silence’ when the latter quoted Tocqueville to the effect that ‘people dread isolation more than error’. In addition, Noelle-Neumann noted that:

Today it can be proved that even when people see plainly that something is wrong, they will keep quiet if public opinion and hence, the consensus as to what constitutes good taste and the morally correct opinion, speaks against them. (Noelle-Neumann 1984 p. x)

However, any insights in this regard would be intuitive and not directly imputable from the corpus of this study.

6.3 Evaluative Framework.
6.3.1 Normative Media Theory.

Any evaluation of newspaper coverage necessitates a preliminary consideration of normative media or press theory. However, there is no single widely agreed on normative standard for press performance. In this vein Christians et al. (2009) have noted 'the multiplicity of levels at which normative theories have to be confronted'. Likewise, Benson (2004) has stressed how normative theories (plural) rather than any singular theory can help clarify the range of policy and ethical choices available to guide the practice of journalism (2004). As a result, this evaluation seeks to proceed in the first instance by outlining normative philosophies of the press and, facing difficulties grounding the evaluation in specifics there, goes on in the second instance to identify what various conceptualisations of democracy imply for media, before finally settling on three specific and commonly ascribed 'roles of the press' that ultimately guide the evaluation.

However, in the first instance, it needs to be restated that any normative models proffered are irrevocably bound up in normative conceptualisations of 'what the press should be and do'. Indeed, the latter is the subtitle of the most famous text in the field, *Four Theories of the Press*, by Siebert et al. (1956). However, it is a curious aspect of much of the research in this tradition that so called 'normative' models or theories are actually more accurately described as empirical, historical and/or descriptive theories. For instance, Nerone (1995) identified the authoritarian theory and soviet communist theory of Siebert et al. 'as essentially straw men and bogeymen'. This is as true of *Four Theories* as it is of later typologies by Lowenstein & Merrill (1979), Hachten (1987), McQuail (1987), Altschull (1995), Martin & Chowdary (1983) and Raymond Williams (1962). This tendency towards typology was identified by Nerone et al. in 1995 when they declared that *Four Theories*: 'advises us to see normative theory as ideologies not ideas, as historical specific cultural formations, not generalizable moral precepts', a point that can as easily be applied to the other listed typologies (Nerone 1995). This interpretation was also implied by Hallin & Mancini (2004) when they declared that the authors of *Four Theories*:
...looked neither at the functioning of media systems nor that of the social system, but only at the rationales or theories by which those systems legitimated themselves. (2004:9)

In the context of the current study, the objective is an evaluation of elite newspaper coverage in 'actual existing democracies', a phrase borrowed by Ferree et al. (2002) from Fraser (1997) and which was originally coined to distinguish between utopian and achievable ends. This objective therefore situates the evaluation in the context of the libertarian or social responsibility theories of the press, as these constitute the typical philosophical and occupational self-conceptualisations of the role of the press in the societies of the four newspapers under review, with perhaps only India nominally lying outside the 'the Liberal model' of media systems (Hallin, Mancini 2004).

6.3.2 Philosophy of the Press.

It is necessary first to outline a brief exploration of the issues thrown up by the concepts of liberalism and 'its nicer younger sibling' (Nerone 1995) social responsibility, for purposes of this evaluation. The philosophy of liberalism elevates freedom of expression to its highest point as seemingly codified in the First Amendment to the US constitution. However, as Nerone et al. note:

Four Theories celebrates the triumph of liberalism over authoritarianism at the same time as it confesses that we no longer have a clear idea of what Liberalism means for the press. (Nerone 1995:7)

One of the basic pivots in the debate over liberalism is 'a free press for who?' This concept owes its origins and tradition to a time when, in the words of Supreme Court Justice Sandra O’ Connor: 'the premise of the First Amendment is that 'government power is the main threat to free expression' (Baker 2002a). However, almost every recent contribution to this debate in the literature has identified corporate power as a threat that has matched if not exceeded that of the state, including Siebert et al. themselves (1956), Barron (1973), Altschull (1995), Keane (1991), Nerone (1995) and Baker (2002a, 2007). The case was succinctly put by Keane (1991) when he stated that 'the contemporary market liberal case for freedom of communication is spoiled by its fetish of 'market competition', which
always produces market censorship’ (Keane 1991). Indeed, it was such concern for the ‘negative results of unrestrained entrepreneurial freedom’ (Christians et al. 2009) that led to the codification of social responsibility theory in the first instance, although as scholars have noted, it had long been a mainstay of journalistic professional self-conceptualisation. However, social responsibility has alternatively been described as ‘a libertarian myth’ (Merrill 2002) or even ‘absurd’ (Altschull 1995). The latter description was coined in the context of Altschull stating that:

...the term social responsibility is devoid of meaning... the question remains: to whom are the press socially responsible to, and for what?’ (Altschull 1995 446)

The question is well posed. The net result however is that it is difficult to evaluative a corpus of newspaper coverage against either philosophy without grounding the evaluation in some specifics. A crucial factor in this regard is the distinction between what each says about liberty. Liberalism is taken to imply a conceptualisation of ‘negative’ liberty, ‘freedom from’, (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm 1956) which is interpreted as the ‘absence of arbitrary restraint’. Meanwhile, ‘positive’ liberty, ‘freedom for’, is the conceptual axis around which social responsibility revolves (Hocking 1947, Chafee 1947, Picard 1985, Berlin 1958). In the context of the current study therefore, liberalism does not have much ‘positive’ to say. As Hallin noted in The Uncensored War, the guidance of the ideological system of ‘objective journalism’ (comprising in his view independence, objectivity and balance) is solely negative:

They tell the journalist not to allow political pressures to interfere.. not to take sides in political controversy, not to let their personal opinions colour the news... they do not tell the journalist which stories to cover... which facts to include.. or how to present those facts.
(Hallin 1986 68)

6.3.3 Democracy and the Press.

In order to establish standards by which to evaluate the coverage under review therefore, it is necessary to operate at a differing or lower level of abstraction. One promising approach in this regard seeks to outline what specific conceptualisations of democracy suggest normatively for the press.
Three standout efforts in this regard are recent studies by Ferree (2002), Baker (2002) and Christians (2010). Each identified a typology of democratic theories which broadly correspond. First, a notion of elite democracy where the public are understood to lack the interest or capacity to address the complex problems of society and are, in the words of Schumpeter: 'limited to a role solely where they have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them' (Schumpeter, Bottomore 1987). Second, a notion of a Liberal Pluralist or Participatory democracy which stresses popular inclusion and empowerment (Ferree 2002) and/or interest groups and distributional issues (Baker 2002a). Third, a notion of democracy alternatively labelled Republican (Baker 2002a), Discursive (Ferree 2002) or Civic (Christians et al. 2009) and where the emphasis is on deliberativeness and notions of the common good, in contrast to sectional or elite interests. Of the three, it is immediately possible to discard notions of elite democracy, not because it has no value in empirical or normative terms (indeed, it may approximate reality most closely), but because few actors articulate that model in a public forum and it is not widely held in any 'existing democracy'. Thus, we are left with the Liberal and Republican notions of democratic theory to inspire our evaluation of the newspaper coverage. However, even at this level of abstraction, it is difficult to map what these theories say 'positively' about the coverage under review, apart from pointing out that their stress on notions like public participation, empowerment and discursiveness would surely inform their broader critiques.

6.3.4 Evaluation of Coverage.

As a result, in the last instance, it is proposed to evaluate the coverage on the lowest levels of abstraction possible, by reference to simple, but widely held, notions of the 'good' press. Evoking 'actual existing democracies', these notions are often self-evident to the majority of 'actual existing citizens', although there remains wide variation in the manner in which they are articulated. Perhaps the most obvious point of departure is the specific recommendations of the Hutchins & Royal Commissions which are commonly recognised as giving birth to the explicit notion of social responsibility theory.
(1) First, The Hutchins Commission suggested that the media should: 'provide a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning' (Hutchins Commission 1947). The Royal Commission likewise concluded that a democratic society: 'needs a clear and truthful account of events, of their background and causes' (Ross 1949).

(2) In addition, the Hutchins Commission declared that: 'the media should serve as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism' and the Royal Commission likewise called for 'a forum for discussion and informed criticism'. These two, reflecting what Christians et al. labelled the 'Monitorial' and 'Facilitative' roles of journalism, are often augmented by other requirements, most typically:

(3) the need for the press to critique power or act as a watchdog, a role which loosely corresponds to what Christians et al. labelled the 'Radical' role (Christians et al. 2009).

In the same vein, Curran (2005 120) has labelled these three 'primary democratic tasks of the media' as being: 'to inform, to debate and to scrutinise'. Given these three specific normative roles of the press therefore, what can we say about the performance of the four elite newspapers under review?

Q.1. Did the coverage provide a clear and truthful account of events, of their background and causes?19

A. The coverage achieved this aim only in the sense of providing a clear and truthful account of what official or authoritative sources said about the terrorist attacks, but surely, as Chapter Four has established, not a bona fide 'clear and truthful account' of the events, less still their background and causes.

Q.2. Did the coverage provide a forum for discussion and informed criticism?

A. The coverage achieved this aim only in the sense of providing a forum for discussion amongst elites and officially sponsored 'experts' closely identified with established centres of power. Of the 27

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19 This analysis, like that of Ettema, Whitney & Wackman (1987), does not deny 'the ancient philosophical problems surrounding truth', but assumes as a practical matter that there is truth to be known and told.
expert contributions, not a single one was from a critical scholar. In addition, the wider public played no role in 'informed criticism'.

Q.3. Did the coverage exhibit 'watchdog' characteristics or critique institutional or official conduct?

The coverage does not exhibit a single substantial critique of government or institutional conduct and did not act as a 'watchdog' in any significant manner.

As noted previously, the explanations proffered for this state of affairs are thought to be drawn largely from ideological, political and 'media routine' influences.

6.3.5 Contrast with Journalistic Exemplar.

In order to investigate the extent to which differing organisational, structural or environmental factors impede or facilitate journalistic attainment of the three stated normative roles for the press, an exemplary journalistic account in the same subject domain that scores well on all three criteria was identified for comparative purposes. The exemplar was the investigative series 'The SIMI Fictions' published in Tehelka magazine in August 2008.

Tehelka was originally conceived of as an 'in your face web based news portal' (Trehan 2011) and since its foundation in India in 2000 it has become well-known, perhaps notorious, for exposes, most famously on government corruption in weapons procurement. It has been described as 'creating a new paradigm in Indian Journalism' (Trehan 2009). The 23 August 2008 issue of the magazine was dominated by a 20,000 word series of 17 distinct articles on all aspects of the alleged 'SIMI threat' in India. The Tehelka series scores very highly in respect to 'a clear and truthful account of events, of their background and causes' regarding many of the most significant events and issues relating to alleged SIMI culpability for terrorism over the previous decade. The series also scores very highly in terms of provision of 'a forum for discussion and informed criticism' by detailing the stories of twelve Muslim individuals who have been caught up to varying degrees in 'the SIMI scare' and allowing them space, perhaps for the first and only time, to tell their stories. Finally, the series, almost by
implication, critiqued institutional and official conduct and acted as a 'watchdog' against abuse - indirectly so by providing a forum for those negatively affected but also explicitly so by addressing official misconduct directly in their conclusions (Tehelka 2008c).

The question then becomes: what are the factors that account for the differing coverage in respect to the same subject material? Although conclusive answers to this question are outside the scope of this study, the analysis would necessarily consider the extent to which the differing 'communicative spaces' of newspaper and magazine publication inform and construct the type of journalism they produce. For example, does the role of elite newspapers in terms of providing a 'first draft of history' necessarily constrain such journalism in the context of their dependence on official guidance in the daily news cycle, especially in terms of quintessential mediated events like acts of terrorism? But even if that was the case, how does that explain the absence of expose or investigative journalism by the elite newspapers in question months and years after the fact?

Is it a question of organisational role conceptualisations? For instance, the Tehelka founder Tarun Tejpal famously sought 'kick ass journalism' (Trehan 2009) while in contrast, the then New York Times owner Adolph Ochs once wrote to a disgruntled reader that: 'The New York Times is not a crusading newspaper' and his business manager defended the newspaper from criticism at the same time by saying that: 'The Times is not a detective bureau or prosecuting attorney' (Porwancher 2011 p. 192).

If the contrasting coverage can be explained by the employment of distinct 'discursive regimes' which specified who could speak and what they could speak about, then how are we to explain how these 'regimes' come to be constituted in distinct 'communicative spaces'? Likewise, if the Tehelka coverage can be seen as an exemplary application of 'the strategic ritual of emotionality' (the overwhelming use of anecdotal leads, personalized story-telling and expressions of affect) and we know that 'its correct display garners cultural capital in the field of journalism' (Wahl-Jorgensen 2012 p. 3), what then explains the non-engagement of elite newspaper journalists with such journalistic practices in this issue context?
6.4 Conclusions & Suggested Research.

The analysis in this final section seeks to address two principal objectives. The first of these is in respect to the implications of the study for the study of journalism and related fields. At the outset, it seeks to re-evaluate the concepts of ‘primary definition’ and ‘inferential structures’ in the context of the findings of the study, and to extend and defend their explanatory power as theoretical models. The relevance of ‘primary definition’ is rearticulated in clearly defined contexts and the potential role played by the largely unconscious processes of ‘inferential structures’ in the construction of attribution is highlighted. In addition, the potential implications of the study for future research in the domains of professional journalism, journalism studies, media studies and the sociology of news are drawn briefly. Finally, the concluding section outlines some brief implications of the study for politics and wider society.

6.4.1 Implications for Journalism.

6.4.1.1 A Contingent Model of Primary Definition.

As noted in the introduction to this study, the focus on attribution that characterised the analyses in Chapters Four and Five was justified partly on the grounds of ‘primary definition’. Since its development, the model of ‘primary definition’ has been subject to various critiques (Schlesinger 1990, Miller 1993, Anderson 1997, Schlesinger, Tumber 1994) and it is therefore germane to review these criticisms in the light of the findings of the current study, before advancing a contingent model of primary definition that suggests that the primary defining ‘effect’ will be ‘weak’, ‘strong’ or ‘mixed’ in specified contexts concerning ‘source capabilities’ and the nature of the issue terrain, specifically the extent to which it is deemed ideologically ‘open’ or ‘closed’.

The most comprehensive and direct critique of the model was that of Schlesinger (1990) who complained that, broadly speaking, the model did not take into account the dynamics of source contestation. This criticism is valid in that the model of primary definition cannot be said to apply
universally in all circumstances, a point which Hall et al. would normatively have stated more explicitly, but which is alluded to nonetheless by the authors when they cited exceptions e.g.

Primary definers would find it difficult to establish a complete closure around a definition of a controversial issue in, say, industrial relations, without having to deal with an alternative definition generated by spokespersons of the trade unions. (Hall et al. 1978 p.64)

However, by appearing to claim applicability in some universal sense, this ‘strawman’ has allowed the explanatory value of the model – in clearly specified circumstances – to be too easily dismissed. As for the authors, Critcher (personal correspondence) has argued in the foreword to the 35th anniversary edition of *Policing the Crisis* that no such universal applicability was proposed:

The original argument did allow for contested definitions, depending on the topic or issue and whether the process of definition happens under routine or extraordinary conditions. (Critcher 2013, personal correspondence)

Had, for example, the model of ‘primary definition’ been declared explicitly ‘a rule of thumb’ in a general issue context but only universally applicable to specific contexts (e.g. the context in which it was enunciated - news coverage of crime), then the criticisms of Schlesinger et al. are immediately deflated in potency, or even nullified. The rationale for this assertion relates to the special nature of coverage of both crime, and, in this context, terrorism. As Critcher (2013) noted:

*Policing the Crisis* argued that crime was a morally transparent and thus ideologically closed issue. Debate was allowed only on the terms of moral outrage dictated by elite and media opinion. The same is true of terrorism: then Irish republicanism, now Muslim fundamentalists. (personal correspondence)

In this regard, when ‘primary definitions’ of either crime or terrorism are stipulated, unlike possibly any other area of political or social activity, there are no organised pressure groups, accredited or otherwise, that are in a position to ‘strategically organise’ and challenge such ‘primary definitions’. Given that most criticisms of the model broadly coalesce around the idea that the model ‘fails to look at source media relations from the point of view of the sources themselves’, this criticism cannot remain valid when there are simply no sources contesting definitions. This reality was referenced by
Hall et al. when they noted that crime is ‘less open than most public issues to competing and alternative definitions because criminals, by virtue of being criminals, have forfeited the right to take part in the negotiation of consensus about crime’ (Hall et al. 1978 p.69). The same can be said for ‘terrorists’, although as we have seen in the case of Abu Bashir there can be exceptions.

Questions regarding the validity of the model of ‘primary definition’ therefore must be addressed in the context of the contingent conditions which, ceteris paribus, serve to enhance or limit the explanatory power of the model as being ‘strong’, ‘weak’ or ‘mixed’ in any given context. Such a model is presented below in Figure 3. The X axis of the model is a continuum representing the ideological nature of the issue terrain, utilising a binary distinction between issues that are ideologically ‘open’ or ‘closed’. This binary notion is intended to convey the nature of the dispute under analysis in terms, broadly speaking, of the legitimacy of the state and of prevailing ideologies. Hall et al. refer to this when they speak of ‘consensus’ in terms of ‘decisive ideological leadership’ and the notion is related to Hallin’s ‘sphere of consensus’. In this respect, while Miller (1993), in his critique of primary definition in the context of Northern Ireland was able to demonstrate how official sources diverged within organisations (competition between civil servants and press officers in the Northern Ireland office) and between organisations (MI5, MI6, RUC, Army etc. in disputes over spheres of influence), these disputes took place clearly within what Hallin (1980) has termed the ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ where such ‘turf disputes’ appear as run of the mill jurisdictional disputes over resources etc. There were however, no official (or unofficial) source disputes over the nature of the violence in Northern Ireland as called into question by allegations of collusion, and which no doubt would have been regarded as in the ‘sphere of deviance’ had they been enunciated at the time, and which were later partly justified by numerous investigations into collusion by official organs of the state and private NGO’s.

In contrast, the Y axis is a continuum of ‘source capabilities’ from low to high that encapsulates a broad range of media related strengths: material and symbolic resources, ‘representativeness’, legitimacy, ‘reasonableness’, specialist knowledge etc. Low source capabilities are suggestive of the
absence of the latter characteristics but also denote the absence of source challengers. In the contingent model therefore, the explanatory power of primary definition is deemed to be strong when the ‘issue terrain’ is ideologically closed and the ‘source capabilities’ are low. In contrast, the explanatory power of ‘primary definition’ is weak when the ‘issue terrain’ is ideologically open and ‘source capabilities’ are high. The other two quadrants in figure 3 (B & C) are said to produce ‘mixed’ results whereby neither primary definers nor challengers will necessarily prevail but where the location in the quadrant (closer or further away from A & D) nevertheless indicate the likely potential for success or failure of source challenges.

For example, Anderson (1997) has convincingly demonstrated how Greenpeace became a ‘primary definer’ in relation to an environmental controversy in 1988 over the cause of a seal virus in the North Sea. The contingent model of primary definition below indicates that this is an area in which primary definition is likely to be weak as the source capabilities (of Greenpeace) were undoubtedly strong and the ‘issue terrain’ was ideologically open– the latter determined in the context of ‘legitimation’ of state and ideological power. In contrast, the study by Daniel Hallin of media coverage of the Vietnam war indicates how source capabilities (most importantly within official circles) were strong, and thus the primary definition of the war did not prevail unchallenged, although as Hallin noted, the military endeavour came to be seen as ‘a mistake’ or a ‘tragedy’ ‘rather than the crime the more radical opposition believed it to be’ (Hallin 1986 p.11). Likewise, in the opposite quadrant (C), Miller & Williams (1993) were able to demonstrate the partial success that non-official sources without strong source capabilities were able to achieve in defining issues around AIDS and HIV. Finally, Hall et al. themselves have demonstrated how official sources were ‘largely successful’ in defining issues around the mugging panic in the 1970’s and, in addition, the current study has demonstrated how attributions, or primary definitions, in the context of Islamic culpability for terrorist atrocities, were almost entirely within the purview of officials (and hence quadrant D).

While there existed no organised source groups challenging attributions in the context of the ‘war on terror’, there had been, by 2005 at least, a broad (if fragmented) international social movement (‘The 9/11 Truth Movement’) that had as its raison d’etre, the contestation of attributions to Islamic fundamentalists in the...
The ‘contingent’ model of primary definition is potentially useful in that it incorporates the criticisms of Schlesinger regarding official source disunity and ‘off the record’ briefings (see Hallin above) and it is not ‘atemporal’ in that it can accommodate shifting boundaries and changes over time (e.g. unions in the 1970’s would have been in quadrant B but necessarily in 2013). Indeed, it can also incorporate contrasting findings in the same issue domain. As an example, Schlesinger & Tumber’s (1994) analysis of crime news reportage asserted the potential source capabilities of challengers in a much stronger fashion than Hall et al. (1978) and thus their study was classified within quadrant B rather than D.

Figure 2 The Contingent Model of Primary Definition.

Finally, Schlesinger (1990) noted in his rebuttal to Hall et al. that:

context of terrorist atrocities. However, ‘source capabilities’ as defined in the contingent model were practically non-existent and this phenomenon evidenced not a single mention in the coverage under review, less still a considered exposition of its position.
Taken at face value, its import (i.e. the model) is that the structure of access necessarily secures strategic advantages for primary definers, not just initially but as long as the debate or controversy lasts. (Schlesinger 1990 p.66).

In the context of news media coverage of crime and perhaps especially terrorism, one is tempted to answer that question with a curt: ‘well yes’. Indeed, it is difficult to argue with any aspect of that position as proffered by Policing the Crisis, notwithstanding that the rider ‘as long as the debate or controversy lasts’ grants something of a hostage to fortune. In summation therefore, this study argues for the retention of a model of primary definition contingent on the nature of the issue under review and the capability of potential challengers to challenge such definitions.

6.4.1.2 Inferential Structures.

Related to the concept of ‘primary definition’ is that of the ‘inferential structure’. As noted in Chapter Two, Lang & Lang (1955) had coined the term in their study of television coverage of the Democratic convention to refer to ‘the manner in which a given episode was linked to prior or outside events’. In their original model, the Lang’s stressed that the differences in television commentary, or framing, were seen as indicative of the telecasters' conception of the audience and as responsible for the emergent differences in interpretation, leading to what they termed an ‘unwitting bias’. However, the ‘inferential structure’ of the Lang’s was indeterministic in the sense that they stressed the television commentary was dependant on ‘inferred views of audience response’ and that ‘the same manifest content elements can be built together into a number of configurations’ (Lang, Lang 1955 p.170) In contrast, later conceptualisations of the notion of ‘inferential structure’ placed less (or no) stress on the perceived needs of the audience, and the notion was reformulated in the context of professional and occupational routines. For example, in their study of the Vietnam war protest march on 27 October 1968, Halloran et al. utilised the notion of ‘inferential structure’ to denote frameworks which guide journalists construction of ‘events as news’ on the basis of values and definitions already legitimated in the public mind. According to Halloran et al:
The development of an ‘inferential structure’ is not the development of a pro or con bias but is a process of simplification and interpretation which structures the meaning given to the story around its original news value. It gives an indication of the way in which ideas about current events are structured, simplified and fed into the general consciousness. (Halloran, Elliott & Murdock 1970 p.216)

In the context of the protest march, the ‘original news value’ was deemed to be ‘violence’ and so the coverage of the march was ‘predefined’ in advance as being ‘about violence’, regardless of the fact that on the day, less than 50 individuals out of 30,000 protesting were engaged in what could be called violent activity. It is this second, more active, conceptualisation of ‘inferential structure’ that is relevant to the study at hand. Although the factors that determined the ‘framing’ by journalists of the terrorist attacks under review cannot be established irrefutably by means of a content analysis, it seems very likely that even if official sources had not prompted attribution to Islamic fundamentalists at the issue outset, as they did in each case and usually in the absence of any stated evidence, that the newspaper coverage would have adopted the ‘inferential structure’ extant, which of course associated terrorist attacks with Muslims, certainly at least since 11 September 2001. As scholars like Chibnall have noted:

By employing these interpretations, the journalist can be sure that he is on tested ground, that he will not give offense and that his reporting is likely to be seen as responsible. (Chibnall 1977 p. 36)

Taken together then, the concepts of ‘primary definition’ and ‘inferential structure’ can be thought of as having combined in a centripetal ‘mutual reinforcement spiral’ whereby the explicit and proactive processes of official sources combined and ‘reinforced’ the implicit and reactive processes of news construction by journalists, in determining to a large extent the nature of the coverage under review.

In the following sections it is proposed to outline briefly the implications of the findings with respect to aspects of the journalistic and media fields. For purposes of brevity and conceptual clarity, the suggestions will be confined to one implication for each domain of professional journalism, journalism studies, media studies and the sociology of news.
6.4.1.3 Implication for Professional Journalism.

With respect to professional journalism, it can be said that while a reporter can ‘point at’ occupational conventions like objectivity by way of explanation of much of the reportage under review, such ‘legitimation’ cannot easily be squared with the common self-conception or traditional normative idealisation of the role of journalism in democratic societies. The most succinct exposition of this dichotomy was proffered by Fishman when he noted that:

> Every time a journalist treats bureaucratic accounts as plain fact, they help an agency make the reality it wants to make and needs to make in order to legitimate itself. Thus, not only does routine news provide ideological accounts of real people and real happenings, it ends up legitimating institutions of social control by disseminating to the public institutional rationales as facts of the world. Ultimately, routine news places limits on political consciousness. (Fishman 1980p 138)

The concept of shaping political consciousness is no doubt one that Weber would have consented to given his description of journalists as ‘professional politicians’. In the current study, practically the only occasion in which a reporter was explicitly or implicitly incredulous regarding a source was with respect to the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir. On no other occasion across the four newspapers, primae facie, was a pronouncement of an official, whether named or unnamed, met with any level of incredulity or scepticism in the subsequent reportage. It is principally in this specific sense that the metaphor of ‘stenographers for power’ (Barsamian 1992), (borrowed from a book title of the same name by Chomsky collaborator Barsamian), resonates with such explanatory force and the coverage, while objective in a conventional sense, did indeed ‘place limits on political consciousness’.

6.4.1.4 Implication for Journalism Studies.

With respect to the field of journalism studies, the significant implication of the findings relates to the need to study the ‘what’s not there’. That is to say, studying content is ‘all very well’, but as this study demonstrates, the significance of content can often only be illustrated by reference to what is not included. In this manner, unless the wider political and social context is studied in parallel to content
studies, any findings in the latter regard will remain partial at best. Related to this is the model constructed by Schudson in *The Sociology of News* (2003) where the author argued that news:

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..is not so much a 'cause' as a common locus for three distinct facets of a cultural message.. First, information itself.. Second, the force in news that is not in the information itself but in the fact that it is presented in a prestigious and public location. Third, the slant, frame or bias in which it is presented. (Schudson 2003 26)
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Schudson (2003) further notes that almost all discussion of the power of the press centres on this third point (including this study), which: 'under ordinary circumstances, may be the least important of the three'. Specifically, Schudson identifies the second facet, ‘public sanctification’ with; the conferral of public legitimacy on news; the stimulation of social interaction about subjects; the certification of importance; and finally; it announces to audiences that a topic deserves public attention. However, a little pondered question is with respect to whether the corollary is true? Does the non-reportage of news suggest public illegitimacy, preclude social discussion of topics, certify unimportance and suggest to an audience that a topic does not deserve public attention? In the context of the current study, the testimony of AC Manulang and Robert Finnegan in the case of Bali; the Kafkaesque experiences of Anthony John Hill in the case of London; and the many revelations of Tehelka in the case of Mumbai, would be excellent candidates for further exploration of these questions.

**6.4.1.5 Implication for Media Studies.**

With respect to the findings for the field of media studies, if there is one important implication of the current study it would most likely be with respect to studying any media content *prima facie* ‘as it appears’. Many fine studies have been conducted on the ‘war on terror’ for example, but almost every one known to the author has taken the legitimacy of the concept for granted by assuming that what is reported in the news media is basically factual. If this study has illustrated anything, it is surely that this cannot be assumed a priori. To illustrate in another context - in the wake of the recent school shootings in the United States, there are no doubt members of the academy currently engaged in
studies of how the media covered these incidents. One suspects however, that for a variety of rationales, none of these studies will address in the first instance whether the basic narrative of the authorities stands up to scrutiny before they proceed to analysis. It goes without saying that any analysis, even a very fine one, can be fatally undermined by the neglect of these aspects of ‘first principles’. Hall et al. (1978) referred to this problem when he flagged attention to so called ‘strategic areas of silence’.

The media thus help to reproduce and sustain the definitions of the situation which favour the powerful, not only by actively recruiting the powerful in the initial stages where topics are structured, but by favouring certain ways of setting up topics, and maintaining certain strategic areas of silence. Many of these structured forms of communication are so common, so natural, so taken for granted, so deeply embedded in the very communication forms which are employed, that they are hardly visible at all, as ideological constructs, unless we deliberately set out to ask; ‘What, other than what has been said about this topic, could be said?’, ‘What questions are omitted?’, ‘Why do the questions – which always presuppose answers of a particular kind – so often recur in this form?’, ‘Why do certain other questions never appear?’ (Hall et al. 1978 p.65)

6.4.1.6 Implication for the Sociology of News.

Finally, the principal implication of the study for the sociology of journalism is methodological and refers to the problem of illustrating effects. Lazarsfeld & Merton (1948) referred to this problem in a macro sense when they rhetorically asked: ‘What role can be assigned to the mass media by virtue of the fact that they exist?’ Answering their own question they noted:

These questions can of course be discussed only in grossly speculative terms, since no experimentation or rigorous comparative study is possible. Comparisons with other societies lacking the mass media would be too crude to yield decisive results and comparisons with an earlier day in American society would still involve gross assertions rather than precise demonstrations.(Lazarsfeld, Merton 1948 p. 232)

In a similar manner, such a question as: what role can be assigned to the mass media by virtue of their coverage of the ‘war on terror’?, while not limited to ‘grossly speculative’ theorising in the same manner, are yet so large in their theoretical and methodological implications that they present such
practical problems as to largely rule them out as a practical research endeavour for any individual scholar.

Lazarsfeld & Merton (1948), in answering their own question, proposed for instance that ‘however tentatively, we can compare their (i.e. mass media) social effects with, say, that of the automobile’. However productive that particular line of inquiry, the suggestion prompts us to conceptualise these effect questions anew. As an example, while there has been significant work on attitude and opinion change, little if any work has addressed ‘worldview’ change, which is surely a more significant metric given that it subsumes both attitude, opinion and more. Such a study however is so much more onerous on any individual scholar than a typical study of content.

In addition, if we are to understand effects in a more holistic fashion, the independent variable cannot simply be any single media or medium, for the simple reason that very few individuals construct their opinions, attitudes, emotions, worldviews etc. on the basis of any single media, to the extent that they base them on media at all. This suggestion evokes an answer by Professor Roderick Hart at an American Political Science Association roundtable session in 2005 made up of Edelman award winners on the ‘The Future of Political Communication Research’. When asked what they would do if a foundation were to give a $5 million grant and a timescale of five years for one project, he responded that he would:

Attach an electronically activated recorder to every nth person in the world, let it run for two months, transcribe it, create a large textual databank, make it available to researchers, and let them find out what they find out. (Althuas)

Had such a research program been in existence in the months after 9/11 it would surely have provided much more insightful data on media effects than any analysis of content in the same period, but regardless, like Lazarsfeld’s suggestion above, it forces us to conceptualise new approaches to these old problems. Finally, in terms of ‘effects’, what if the ‘effects’ of media coverage of the ‘war on terror’ are not to be construed in terms of notions like framing or other middle range theories, but rather in the fact that the preponderance of populations around the world actually came to believe that
there was such a Muslim political phenomenon. It has to be acknowledged that a close reading of the three case studies in this study suggests otherwise - which invokes a whole new conceptualisation of media, or ‘worldview’, effects.

6.4.2 Implications for Wider Society.

Apart from the issues thrown up by this study for journalism and political communication however, something should be said briefly about issues which emerge for politics itself or society in general. In toto, across the three case studies, this study identifies why legitimate doubts persist regarding the veracity of attributions to both individuals and groups in respect of all three terrorist attacks, albeit the doubt being of a distinct nature in respect of each individual case. That alone might be considered mildly troubling. However, these findings exist in a political and cultural context where the legitimacy of attributions in the case of the 'foundational event' of the 'war on terror,' 9/11, have not alone been disputed, but disputed to the extent that they have occasioned a globally constituted social movement ('The 9/11 Truth Movement'). Indeed, popular scepticism regarding attributions by the US government and others with respect to 9/11 has reached 'politically impressive' numbers, to borrow a phrase from Entman (Entman 2004 p. 49). For example, a Scripps Howard poll in the US in July 2006 found that 36% of US respondents thought it 'somewhat or very likely' that U.S. officials either participated in the 9/11 attacks or took no action to stop them' (Scripps Howard 2006). As Lev Grossman of *Time* magazine stated as long ago as 03 September 2006: 'Thirty-six percent adds up to a lot of people. This is not a fringe phenomenon. It is a mainstream political reality' (Time 2006). If Bennett's guideline for press-government relations suggested that it was generally reasonable for journalists to grant government officials a privileged voice in the news 'unless the range of official debate on a given topic excludes or 'marginalises' stable majority' (1990 p. 104), what is the normative position if the number is 'only' 36%? Furthermore, a world public opinion survey of four Muslim countries in 2007 (Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia and Morocco) found that, on average, less than one in four believes that Al Qaeda was responsible for the September 11 attacks. Pakistanis were the most
sceptical with only an astounding 3% in that country thinking that Al Qaeda 'did it' (WorldPublicOpinion.org. 2007).

In this context, the fact that the official narrative in all four cases is disputed, and disputed with legitimacy it should be emphasised, should surely occasion more than mild psychological discomfort. After all, the 'war on terror', which was inaugurated and sustained largely by the events of 9/11 and the three terrorist attacks that are the object of the current study, has led to profoundly negative global developments. Can it be satisfactory that such a cloud of doubt and suspicion surrounds questions of attribution in all four cases? Finally, the lack of curiosity on the part of elite newspapers (and indeed nation states) to solve these 'riddles of attribution,' act, in the words of Arundhati Roy: 'to set off a whole lot of thoughts' (Tehelka 2008d).
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