The basis of democracy and regime legitimacy in African States

The Case of Tanzania

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Humanities and Social Science
School of Law and Government
Dublin City University
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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January 2013
Declaration

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Acknowledgements

Studying, researching and writing this PhD thesis here at the Dublin City University-DCU has been a great experience. So many people have helped me in different ways along the path to completion.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my research supervisor and mentor, Dr. Eileen Connolly for her inspiring guidance throughout the various stages of producing this thesis. My sincere gratitude for unlocking my potential to do this research and write the thesis and for her constant support without which I would not have been able to finish this work. Her Socratic philosophy (if I may call that so) and style of guidance worked the well for me.

I would also like to thank Dr. Iain McMenamin for his guidance and support at the first phase of this research project.

Many members of staff of School of Law and Government in DCU have provided me with valuable assistance at various stages. Two former heads of School Dr. John Doyle and Professor Robert Elgie and the current head Prof. Garry Murphy. My internal reviewers Dr. Carl Death and Dr Shane Mac Giollabhuian and my internal examiner Dr.Eoin O’Malley, whose comments helped to improve this work. I would also like to thank, Dr. Jim Rogers. Thanks also to Ms. Tina Reddy and Paula Smith-Meaney- great School secretaries.

I extend my thanks to my fellow students, in DCU, Jean Sommers, Morina O’Neill, Aurelie Sicard, Des Delaney, James Fitzpatrick, Juan Portilo, Diane O’Dwyer, Christina Bucur, Victoria, Pablo Gonzalez, Gemma McNulty, Francoise Joly and all rest of the team and a particular thanks to Veronica Mkilanya, a fellow student from Tanzania, for her help and support. Thanks also to those who finished their PhD before me Walt Kirloy, David Doyle and Michael Seifu. Dr. Huizhong and Vittoria Flamini –my great housemates and company in VB 205, also Frida Besong and Dr. Sabine Moebs for their invaluable support. Thanks to my great friends George and Sheila and Garret Early and all my friends at the African Students association of Ireland (ASAI) and Africa Centre. Many thanks in particular to Dr. Azra Naseem for all her valuable help.

I am thankful to Dr Padraig Carmody, the external examiner of this work for his valuable review and for his high acclaim of this study.

To my friends and family I would like to say many thanks. I am grateful to you all and my family, Nyalukes, Ntullos, Ligates, Sangas and sister Idda Mlelwa (OSB), my sister Bahati Sanga, na wanao Catherine and Valentina, Kaka zangu Charles, Augustine, Kilian, Fedrick, Setty, Steven, Robert, Farida and Wadogo Zangu Wote, Edda, Betty, Veronica na Tuntemeke Sanga rafiki na mwalimu na Rafiki yangu Yolanda, Damian and Saskia, Roelien and Flora. To Lissa Roberts and Jack Spaapen thank you very much for your support. Thanks also to my former teachers in Mabatini primary school, Njombe, Matola and Mafinga seminary, Dar es Salaam Technical College, University of Dar es-Salaam, UVA, Amsterdam, Teramo, Italy and CEU Budapest Hungary.

Last but not least I am thankful to the Centre of International Studies at Dublin City University and the School of Law and Government here in Dublin City University, Ireland for offering me a Scholarship to undertake this research, without which it would have been much more difficult to reach completion.
To my grandmother and grandfather
Grace Ligate and Ngebeda Sanga Ntullo

‘My grandson a human heart (soul) is like a big clay pot with mouths that have lids, close them all tight and open one at a time’.

To my Mother

Lestituta Matilda Ntullo- A book and a film of your life can perhaps suffice to tell it’s long interesting tale

To my father

Adam H. Nyaluke
A great encourager

To Makete, Matola, Njombe town community and Matalawe village where I participated, learned and lived
Tanzanian life and politics as a young villager in primary and secondary school.

To my teachers and professors

To the human family for opening their heart and doors
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Abstract

David Nyaluke

African states have been seen to struggle with the implementation of democracy, both before and after they adopted multiparty electoral systems, from the 1990s onwards. Many states continued to be dominated by a single party and opposition parties have found it difficult to establish themselves as regime parties dominate the political competition. The neo-patrimonial literature, as the most widely used framework for analysing African politics, explains this in terms of a misuse of state power and corrupt electoral practices favouring the ruling parties. This thesis argues that African politics cannot be adequately understood using a neo-patrimonial framework, because this framework discounts the possibility of African political thought and the development of a political organisation in Africa as a basis for democracy and public good politics. In the case of Tanzania it is argued that the continued electoral success of CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) cannot be explained either by the misuse of state power or corrupt election practices, and that the explanation lies in the capacity of CCM to use a legitimacy narrative to build a political organisation and the continued mobilisation of the party and the electorate on the basis of ‘public good politics’ founded on the ideas of the independence movement. It analyses the way in which the regime built legitimacy and popular support between 1961 and 1985 and how the regime party used this legacy of legitimacy to control the transition to a multi party system. It demonstrates that the continued high levels of electoral support for the regime party CCM rested on a successful legitimacy narrative developed during the multi-party era and linked to the ideology of the independence movement rather than the factors indicated by the Neo-patrimonial literature. Contrary to the argument of neo-patrimonial approaches, which posits a pessimistic view of the capacity of African states to evolve into democracies, this thesis argues that the case of Tanzania indicates that a form of African public good politics and the building of a political community can be a foundation for the development of democratic government.
Abbreviations

ANC- African National Congress
ASP- Afro-Shirazi Party
AMNUT – All Muslim National Union of Tanzania
BAKWATA- *Baraza Kuu la Waislamu WA Tanzania*
CCM- Chama Cha Mapinduzi( Party of Revolutions)
COI – Colonial Office Information
CHADEMA- Chama Cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia
CHAUSITA- Chama Cha Usitawi wa Tanzania
CUF- Civic United Front
DP- Democratic Party
EMWA-East African Muslims Welfare Association
ESaurp- Eastern and Southern African University Research Program
ESRF- Economic and Social Research Foundation
FACEIT-Front Against Corruption Elements in Tanzania
TANU- Tanganyika African National Union
TAA- Tanganyika African Association
DMK- Demokrasia Makini
NCCR National Constitutional Convention and Reform
NLD - National Liberal Party
NRA- National Reconstruction Alliance
NUASO- National Autonomous Students Organization
IMF- International Monetary Fund
ILO-JSPA International Labour Organization Jobs and Skills Program for Africa
JKT - Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa (JKT)
JUWATA, Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi Tanzania
KNPA- Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association
PPT- Progressive Party of Tanzania
SA - Sauti ya Umma
TADEA- Tanzania Democratic Alliance
TTACSA - Tanganyika Territorial African Civil Servants Association
TEMCO- Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
TPDF-Tanzania People’s Defence Force
UDP- United Democratic Party
UPDP- United People’s Democratic Party
USSR- United Socialist Soviet Republic
UTP- United Tanganyika Party
URT- United Republic of Tanzania
UWT- Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania
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INTRODUCTION

In the past three decades, one of the major global political developments has been the adoption of multiparty liberal democracy by many states, in what became known as the third wave of democracy. Many dictatorial and monolithic regimes worldwide were either swept away, or saw their tenure of political power seriously challenged by a tide of strong opposition from civil society and political parties demanding democracy. As part of this process, the 1990s also saw African states forced to introduce multiparty elections following strong challenges to the existing regimes from opposition parties and civil society. This study stems from an interest in investigating the Tanzanian puzzle. Tanzania in this wave of democratization stands out as state where opposition to the regime was weak and the regime managed and controlled the transition without being forced to do so by the opposition. In almost all of Tanzania’s neighbouring states, the transition to multiparty democracy was tumultuous, with the outbreak of civil wars in Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo and with a serious challenge to the regime by opposition parties and civil society in Zambia, Malawi and Kenya. In contrast to this, in Tanzania the regime party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), comfortably controlled the transition to democracy between 1992 and 1995 but also continued to dominate political competition in the four subsequent multiparty elections between 1995 and 2010, holding on to the presidency and retaining a parliamentary majority. In Africa where in most states the transition to democratic competitive politics pitted the existing regime and against an emerging opposition Tanzania is an exception and it is among the few regimes worldwide that transited to multiparty liberal democracy political system in the third wave of democratization without being forced to do so by a strong opposition and a popular uprising. Therefore the case of Tanzania presents a puzzle.

However for the mainstream literature on this topic the Tanzanian case is not puzzling as in both a global and a specific African context, it has been categorized and explained as a typical hybrid regime—a pseudo democratic regime including features of liberal democracy but using neo-patrimonial practices to manipulate the system to ensure that the regime party remained in power (Bratton and Posner, 1999, Schedler 2002, Diamond, 2002 and Levitsky and Way, 2002). Neo-patrimonial theory has dominated the analysis of African political systems and has been used to explain the undemocratic
nature of African states since independence (Clapham, 1985, Bayart, 1993, Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997, Chabal and Diloz, 1999). However the theory has been criticised for containing an essentialist and overly negative interpretation of African politics and society and for being dominated by a narrow Western perspective incapable of appreciating alternative political ideas and structures. Since 2002, an emerging research project has begun to re-examine the political basis of the legitimacy of African regimes and the relationship between the general public and the regime party and its political leaders (Mustapha, 2002, Erdman and Engel, 2006, de Grassi, 2008, Pitcher, Moran, and Johnson, 2009). The new research has emerged along with a reassessment of African history and Africa’s place in the international system by society at large and amongst political elites as well as in academic literature.

This thesis is part of this process of reassessment and builds on existing critiques of the neo-patrimonial literature. It asks if the ability of Tanzania’s regime party to remain in power since 1961 can be explained by its capacity to retain legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate rather than by the negative explanations put forward by the neo patrimonial and hybrid regime schools of thought. The objective of this study is therefore twofold. The first is to elaborate on the critique of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime literature and to establish an alternative explanation for the continued legitimacy of the regime party in multiparty elections in Tanzania. As this study proposes another way of understanding African politics, a critique of neo-patrimonial theory is of seminal importance. This perspective has so far been the dominant framework used to study African politics and other socio-economic processes within Africa. The alternative explanation developed in this thesis rests on the idea of regime legitimacy derived from the political ideas and aspirations of the independence movement, and the capacity of that movement to build a political organisation encompassing the political leaders, the institution of the independence movement and the people. The second task is to analyse the development of Tanzanian regime legitimacy from the foundation of the independent state through the multi-party era using the alternative explanation put forward by this study.

The research uses a single qualitative case study of the Tanzanian mainland referred to here as Tanzania. The main advantage of following the single case study
model is that it allows the researcher to carry out holistic and in-depth research that can deal with the complexities of the case (Punch 1998). Tanzania, with a population of over 40 million, is one of the economically poorest countries in the world. According to UNDP classifications, it has a low level of economic development. It is a united republic that brings together the Tanzania mainland (formerly called Tanganyika) and the Zanzibar Islands’ state. Even though the two countries have existed in a union since 1964, Zanzibar has its own parliament and President in addition to representatives at the national parliament on the mainland. The two parts of the united republic have distinct and very different political histories and dynamics that make it difficult to treat them as a single case study for the purpose of this thesis. On the Tanzanian mainland, post-independence political dynamics produced a weak opposition when a multiparty electoral system was introduced in 1992. This was not the case in Zanzibar where the political opposition is very strong. In the Tanzania mainland ruling party candidates receive a high level of electoral support; more than 60% in 2010 and as high as 80% in the 2005 multiparty election. In Zanzibar, on the other hand, electoral contests are very close with the ruling party candidate winning by 0.5% of the vote in the 1995 presidential elections. The political culture in the two entities is significantly different, with social and religious differences between the individual islands that make up Zanzibar playing a significant role in politics in contrast to the Tanzanian mainland where such differences have been muted.

Tanzania provides a useful case study in the African context to investigate the basis of regime legitimacy and democracy because it has been a stable and peaceful country since independence in 1961. The state did not engage in excesses of repression during the one party political system and also managed a peaceful transition to multiparty democracy. It is the same party regime that has been in power from independence till the present. Since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992, CCM has won all four cycles of the multiparty elections conducted so far, in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. As such, this case study allows an examination of the dynamics of regime legitimacy and the development of democracy as part of a continuous process - from the foundation of the state through to the one-party era and the multiparty era. It allows an analysis of the changing nature of an African political organisation in this stable context and, because it
has been stable, it allows exploration of the influence of African political ideas emanating from the independence movement on both the development of the state and on its current political dynamics.

In this way the thesis engages with the core question of the nature of democracy in Africa, in particular it seeks to explain the basis of African regime legitimacy in those states, which appear to have stable and consensual government. The research focuses on an evaluation of the legitimacy of African governments in the eyes of their citizens, and the ideational basis of legitimacy in these contexts. It is therefore in contrast to much of the existing literature on African democracy, including the neo-patrimonial literature, as it takes a positive approach to the potential of African democracy and the capacity of Africa society to produce democratic political communities.

Neo-patrimonial theorists tend to apply, without nuance, Western European epistemology in judging and conceptualizing African regime legitimacy. This research in its evaluation of African regimes favours African ideas and viewpoints draw from Africans’ writing and political engagement, as the standard for judging African political developments. In doing this the research is also sensitive to the fact that democracy was asserted by Africans in a particular historical milieu in which some individuals had knowledge of Western ideas of democracy, but for them and for the mass of the population, it was the lived experience of democracy in their communities before and during colonialism, and in the independence movements, that primarily informed their thinking. In the post-independence era, African leaders had the opportunity to mix that lived experience with borrowed and learned ideas from other continents. On this basis this thesis offers an alternative interpretation of the outcomes observed in the political literature on Sub Saharan Africa as it argues that ideas of democracy and political community in Tanzania can be traced to the independence movements that crystallized these ideas drawing on both the colonial experience and an idealised vision of African society in the pre-colonial period. This is of critical significance as the independence movements occurred a little more than 50 years ago in many African countries and was a watershed moment when ideas of democratic governance, on the developmental state, and on building unity and cohesion, were put forward as part of the ‘promise of independence’. This thesis asks the important question what ideas, values, political
experience and political thinking underpins the political system and the collective understanding of governance, even if those ideas and values are not fulfilled through the actions of government in African states. This is an important assertion, that ideas and values about democracy exist in African society although in any given polity those ideas and values can be either incorporated into the legitimacy narrative of political parties or deviated from by the ruling elites.

In the scholarship on Africa Tanzania is often taken to be an exceptional case, and studies have investigated what intrinsic factors have allowed the country to be peaceful, relatively stable, and the way in which ethnicity has been depoliticized. However this research places Tanzania on a continuum with other African states which have to a lesser or greater extent engaged with the ideas of democratic governance, which are present across post-colonial Africa. Arguing that explaining the basis of regime legitimacy and the development of democracy in Tanzania is relevant for understanding political dynamics and police thought in other African contexts.

Structure of the thesis

Chapter One discusses the study’s theoretical framework. It reviews and critically discusses the neo-patrimonial and the related hybrid regime theory, and provides an alternative explanation based on the ideas that this thesis argues inform the legitimacy of African regimes, provide the basis of democracy and, in some cases, result in the dominance of regime parties under systems of political competition.

Chapter two explains the case study selection and the epistemological approach of the thesis.

Chapter Three discusses the impact of colonialism on the political ideas of the independence movement and the impact of those ideas on the movement’s formation. It contributes to the argument of this thesis by setting out the origins of the ideas that this thesis argues formed the basis of Tanzania’s political organisation and hence regime legitimacy in the post-colonial regime.
Chapters Four, Five and Six trace the development of the Tanzanian regime from 1961-1985. This is studied according to the alternative framework of the ideas of legitimacy and basis of democracy put forward in Chapter One. Based on this alternative framework, which has three components - democracy, development and building national unity - Chapter Three discusses how the regime endeavoured to be democratic according to the meaning of democracy as Tanzanian leaders and people then understood it. Chapter Four deals with evolution and management of the economy in line with ideas of the developmental state, welfare state and prosperity for all. Chapter Five evaluates the Tanzanian regime’s policies and efforts to build a cohesive and united nation.

Chapter Seven analyses the transition period in Tanzania’s economic and political systems from the African socialist (Ujamaa) economy and one-party polity to a liberal economic system and a multiparty liberal democracy between 1980 and 1992. The chapter analyses how the regime managed the transition, and the impact of their actions on the legitimacy of the party.

Chapter Eight examines evidence for the manipulation of elections by the regime as the basis for their apparent continued high level of support. As an alternative explanation for the electoral success of CCM it analyses the regime’s evolving legitimacy narrative and its platform of policy ideas expressed in its elections manifestos as a form of political engagement designed to maintain popular support.
CHAPTER 1. ANALYSING DEMOCRACY AND REGIME LEGITIMACY IN AFRICA

In order to understand how political regimes maintain legitimacy and dominate the polity in Africa with the attendant weaknesses of opposition parties, researchers have explored various causes that can be categorized as either sociological or institutional factors (Ware, 1996). In relation to sociological factors, previous explanations of regime legitimacy were dominated by the personal rule theory of Jackson and Rosberg (1982), and efforts of leaders to form and consolidate a ruling class (termed as ‘comprador’ class by Marxian researchers) that enjoys power and wealth of their states without regard to the development interest of the people and the overall nation-state (see for example, Shivji, 1976 and 1989, Diamond, 1982, 1983 and 1987, Campbell, 1987, Joseph, 1987). Other researches using sociological factors focused on hypotheses and theories of how ethnic diversity is a challenge in African politics and the way in which leaders and their regimes deal with ethnic groups (Nnoli, 1980, Rothchild and Olorunsola, 1983, Bates, 1983, and 2000, Osaghae, 1991, Wunsch and Olowu, 1990, Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1993, Wamba dia Wamba, 1996). The dominant current explanations of African politics that use sociological factors have been largely by influenced by Bratton and Van de Walle’s (1997) focus on the neo-patrimonial logic of African regimes. The argument of neo-patrimonial rule put forward by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 61-68) and applied to African regimes is formulated within an equation which brings together presidentialism (as the prevailing political system in Africa), the political importance of ethnic groups and the use of state resources to gain and maintain political legitimacy. This is, therefore, a socio-institutional model as it captures the interactions of sociological factors of the communities as well as its institutional structures.

In terms of the institutional factors in the study of the ‘third wave’ of democracy regimes, the key theory that has gained prominence is the ‘hybrid’ regime theory as proposed by Levitsky and Way, (2002), Schedler, (2002), Diamond, (2002). Hybrid regime theory explains the mode of survival in power of African leaders and their regimes after undergoing transition to liberal multiparty democracy as maintaining their political rule by violating the institutions and rules of liberal democracy, which they
adopted. The researchers point out that although such regimes mainly adhere to the conduct of multiparty elections, those elections are not free and fair.

It is notable also that hybrid regime and the neo-patrimonial theories have been explicitly linked (Diamond; 2008). These two theories (neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime theory) have gained traction as the main explanations for the failure to embed multiparty liberal democracy in many African states (Bayart, 1993, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Hyden, 2006). Neo-patrimonial theory also subsumes earlier work on the impact of personal rule and discussions of the challenge of ethnic diversity. The work of the neo-patrimonial and the related hybrid regime theory remains the most complete and influential explanation of the nature of the African state and African democracy.

The discussion in this chapter is organized into three main parts. The first section discusses the neo-patrimonial theory; the second deals with hybrid regime framework; and the final part analyses the limits and critiques of neo-patrimonial theory, setting up an alternative African-centred explanation of regime legitimacy, dominance and basis of democracy that is critical of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime positions.

The neo-patrimonial explanation

The neo-patrimonial approach to African politics has its origins in the earlier broader modernization research agenda. The modernization research paradigm sought to observe, analyse and investigate how newly independent countries in Africa and Asia could develop to modernity given the foundations of modern institutions (the parliament, courts, government system and bureaucracy) established by departing colonial powers. This form of enquiry drew from Max Weber who early on grouped types of authority across societies into three categories: patrimonial, as found in traditional societies; rational legal, as they have evolved in modern societies of Europe; and charismatic (Roth and Wittich, 1978). The newly independent states in Africa and Asia, it was assumed, would develop to modernity by acquiring more of the features that characterise Western States, and by consolidating institutions of rational legal authority as opposed to patrimonial authority features present at the time of independence. However, this did not turn out to be the case, as pointed out by Eisenstadt (1973:11-55). What he and others
came to call *neo-patrimonial* regimes developed many characteristics that differed greatly from the modern nation-state. In fact, they saw patrimonial characteristics being more visible and crystallizing in these states as there was a dissolution or breakdown of the initial institutional models of modernization (Eisenstadt, 1973:13; Clapham, 1985:44).

Like these earlier researchers who adopted neo-patrimonial explanations of African politics, contemporary proponents picture and capture Africa’s current political system as a ‘hybrid political system’ in which ‘customs of patrimonialism coexist with and suffuse the rational legal institutions’ (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 62). Bayart (1993: 35) argued that Africa was different from Asia and Arab countries and also from Latin America because the dynamic of hybridization of politics unfolds a particular way in Africa given the absence of ‘a great’ historical tradition of power. Chabal and Daloz, (1999) agree with Bayart, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) that the patrimonial and other cultural components of Africans straddle and suffuse the modern institutions, resulting in a hybridization that explains African politics. However, Chabal and Daloz differ with them in how much weight they give to culture. They argue that the real cause of this state of affairs in Africa is what they call political ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:4-16). By this they mean Africans have a vested interest, or some kind of economic rationale, in perpetuating the weak institutionalization of political practices. They argue that their standpoint can be supported by observing the state in Africa. They point out that the state is vacuous and ineffectual (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:14). It is vacuous in that it did not consolidate, as once expected, on the foundations of the colonial legacy. Instead, it rapidly disintegrated and fell prey to particularistic and factional struggles, rendering it an empty shell. It is ineffectual because it has never been in the interest of African political elites to work for proper institutionalization of the state apparatus. They argue that the usefulness of the state to the African elite is in fact greater when it is least institutionalized and incapable of action.

Apart from minor differences, researchers agree on the main pillars of neo-patrimonialism. The key components of the neo-patrimonial regimes, from which the explanation of the African regimes is derived, arise first of all from the notion of the patrimonial. This term, according to Chabal and Daloz (1999:9), encompasses the
‘cultural stuff’ from the traditional pre-colonial past that the elite and people appropriate and use in their lives. More importantly, as Therkildsen (2005:37) notes, the term patrimonial also connotes a patron: a person culturally anchored in the social and political order, bestowing gifts from his own resources to followers to obtain and strengthen their loyalty and support. The clients he patronises, in return, obtain material benefits and protection.

The client-patron relationship and its links to patrimonialism are of seminal importance and significance. Patrimonialism is a traditional form of authority, one type of which is a patron-client relationship between the masters or rulers and the subjects. This relationship is elaborated in numerous studies of the patron-client relationship in traditional communities and in modern day political systems, both in developing and developed countries. To an extent, the phenomenon is a common feature in all societies and has also been described as the basic pillar of neo-patrimonialism in Africa (Lemarchand, Gellner and Waterbury, 1977; Clapham, et al., 1982; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand et al, 1981; Clapham, et al., 1982; Bayart, 1993; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; and Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The patron-client relationship in the context of African regimes is viewed as a relationship between the ‘strongmen’ or ‘big men’—the African term for rulers—and their subjects. This hierarchy is duplicated at all levels of society. The strongmen use public resources and or their positions to buy off clients to enlist their support and loyalty or to simply to meet extended family and communal expectations (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:98-99)- what Hyden (2006:72-93) has termed as an ‘economy of affection’.

Moreover, this literature proposes that the patron–client relationship features African leaders and their subjects as a modern version of traditional ruler-subject relationship where an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power while ordinary people are treated as an extension of the big man’s household with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler. Authority is entirely personalised, shaped by the ruler’s preferences rather than codified in systems of laws. The ruler ensures political stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing a zone of security in an uncertain environment and by selectively distributing favours and
material benefits to loyal followers. These followers are less citizens of a polity than clients of the ruler (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:61-62).

The second tenet of the neo-patrimonial explanation is signified by the prefix neo. Chabal and Daloz (1999:9) point out that this emphasizes the political system is no longer entirely traditional. More importantly, as observed by Therkildsen, (2005: 37) neo signifies patrons who typically are office holders in rational-legal state institutions that use public funds to build their personal loyalty among clients in order to stay in power. Even though people who hold positions in the rational legal institutions and their actions are the most important factors for the working of this system, the shape of the political institutions also matter. Bayart (1993:74-82) points out that positions of power give access to monopolistic resources. In these institutions, personal interests can be promoted. As Chabal and Daloz (1999:9) points out, rational legal institutions are the ‘edifice to conform to the ‘Western template’ but their workings are derived from patrimonial dynamics.

It is observable that even though rational legal institutions are ‘straddled’, ‘suffused’ and ‘instrumentalised’, they are important contours and markers along which actors interact as ‘big men’ or their clients (Bayart, 1993: 60-86). As Clapham (1985) pointed out, officials who hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers that are formally defined actually exercise those powers as far as they can, and they do so as a form of private property, not of public service. Clapham further observes that the relationships fall into a patrimonial pattern of vassal and lord rather than that of superior and subordinate; and official positions are correspondingly devised to display a personal status, rather than to perform an official function (Clapham, 1985:48). Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:66-67) have also emphasized the use of state resources in this way as an important feature of neo-patrimonialism. In Africa in particular, the heterogeneity of ethnicities has been seen as one of the major components of patrimonial maintenance of power (Clapham, 1985:77-81). Salih (2003) has defined ethnic groups as ‘interest groups’ in African politics—a conduit through which resources are channelled and power is established.
Neo-patrimonialism and emerging multi-party democracy

Rather than see the tendency towards the dominance of regime parties in Africa’s multiparty political systems as the outcome of a normal process of electoral competition which results in a dominant party in spite of the potential of the system to facilitate the emergence of opposition parties (Bogaards, 2008:124-125), neo-patrimonial theory is primarily employed to explain the observed pattern of party dominance (Van de Walle, 2003). As Lindberg and Jones argue - where dominant parties continue to rule neo-patrimonialism is likely to still be in place (Lindberg and Jones, 2010: 8-7). In fact much of the literature on dominant parties globally assumes the impact of incumbency advantage and also the diversion of state resources to the advantage of the dominant party (Greene, 2009) in a way that is similar to the neo patrimonial theory applied to Africa. However, Borgaards (2008) and Lindberg and Jones (2010) in their studies of party systems have focused more on the classification of dominant party systems in Africa than attempt to analyse reasons for the emergence and persistence of dominant party system in Africa other than an acceptance of a background of neo-patrimonial practise.

To study the effect of neo-patrimonial practices in relations to the multiparty system and how regime parties become dominant in the polity, Van de Walle (2003), one the field’s leading theorists, used the key aspects developed with Bratton in their previous research (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). In the 1997 study they conceptualize African neo-patrimonialism as operating with three main features: presidentialism as the most common political system prevalent in Africa; clientalism; and flow of state resources to ethnic groups and individuals. Their essential conclusion was that neo-patrimonialism works because governments in Africa tend to be centralised; and, because power is so disproportionately concentrated in the president that degeneration into personal rule becomes easy as the President, facing weak accountability mechanisms, disproportionately controls state resources that can be used to appease and control ethnic groups (Bratton, and Van de Walle, 1997). From that conclusion Van de Walle (2003) elaborated that ruling parties become dominant because the system composed of presidentialism, clientalism and control of state resources conspires to make the
opposition weak and fragmented. This fragmentation of the opposition is made possible, according to Van de Walle, because of the self-interest of ethnic groups and politicians.

On one side, these features of neo-patrimonial create ‘disincentives’ for opposition politicians to form coalitions to defeat the ruling party (Van de Walle, 2003:313). On the other, they provide ‘incentives’ for politicians to seek to become powerful individuals in their own right by mobilizing small and highly personalized parties to join or have leverage in negotiating with the ruling party to access state resources. On the other side, are the ethnic communities seeking representatives in arenas where they believe ‘the national pie is divided’ (Van de Walle, 2003:315). This is arguably what made Salih (2003) describe ethnic communities here as ‘interest groups’. As opposition politicians seek narrow sectional votes, they mobilize their ethnic group to vote for them so that they can gain leverage in the winning coalition (Van de Walle 2003:314). The interests of politicians and ethnic groups therefore coincide, and politicians are then able to garner ethnic organisation support to engage in political competition. This results in the formation of ethnic parties, following on from this the system does not provide incentives for opposition parties or politicians to form coalitions to defeat the incumbent. Therefore, the opposition remains divided and fragmented because each opposition politician either wants to be president or join the winning party to avail of public resources under the president and their government.

Van de Walle (2003:314) also observed another fact he considered important in African multiparty political competition: ruling parties use the ‘divide and rule’ technique to deal with the opposition. Providing subsidies to parties is one such method. It creates incentives for the politician to form individual small parties to benefit directly from the funds. Also, he pointed out that the ruling party could form surrogate small parties to further fragment the opposition and also gain access to resources for sympathetic politicians. Furthermore, this logic implies that there is an incentive to vote for the most resourced party as the one likely to win, to benefit in terms of resource allocation when the party is elected or re-elected.

The centrality of the neo-patrimonial argument of Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and prevalence of the Van de Walle (2003) hypothesis in explaining the
emergence of party systems in Africa has been echoed in many recent studies on party system development following the ‘third wave’ of democratization in Africa. Tracing the evolution of the party system in Africa, Salih (2003) has pointed out that the difference between African political parties and Western parties is that the African ones are ‘by and large ethnically based’ (Salih 2003: 1-13). In Africa, he has pointed out further; ethnic interests are often treated as group interests. Like Bratton and Van de Walle, Salih observed that the client–patron relationship is an important feature in African politics. Following the assertions about the dominant party system and its relationship with ethnic groups, recent research (both small n and large n studies) has investigated the phenomenon. These enquiries have focused on the ethnic basis of support for successful parties, and the strategies that the ruling party employs to court winning coalitions from ethnic groups (Van Cranenburgh 2003, Brooks 2004, Bogaards, 2004, Petterson and Fadiga-Stewart, 2005). Discussion of the ‘hybrid regime’ theory will be followed by discussion of limits of the neo-patrimonial theory and alternative explanations.

Researchers have followed up by positing a direct link between the working of neo-patrimonialism systems and political competition in the current multiparty democracy context in African countries (Diamond, 2003, Van de Walle, 2003, Salih, 2003, Van Cranenburg 2003, Bogaards, 2004, and Peterson and Stewart, 2005). In general, they have maintained that neo-patrimonialism disadvantages the opposition while favouring the ruling party. It allows not only the use of state resources to command political loyalty, but also the use of bureaucracy to rig elections and even orchestrate violence.

**African multiparty democracies as hybrid regimes**

The literature on hybrid regimes is an attempt to provide a specific institutional explanation of African political systems that builds on neo-patrimonial explanations. It proposes that while African states have implemented multiparty democracy, the result has been a dominant party and a fragmented opposition. The concept is derived from the characteristic features of most regimes in Africa and also those in other parts of the world following their transition to multiparty democratic politics in the 1990s. The transition to liberal multiparty democracy was not considered complete in that these regimes became

It is argued that as hybrid regimes--semi-democracies or electoral authoritarian regimes--maintain dominance of their polities not by institutionalizing and consolidating the democratic norms they formally adopted but by proactively violating these norms. As Schedler points out the regimes hold elections and tolerate some pluralism and inter-party competition but, at the same time, violate minimal democratic norms severely and systematically (Schedler, 2002: 36). While these regimes have arenas of power contestation as in a democracy, (Levitisky and Way, 2002: 54-58), these arenas are neither sufficiently open nor free and fair so that a ruling party cannot be readily turned out of power even if it is no longer preferred by the majority of the electorate (Diamond, 2002:24). The latitude of hybrid regimes in following the ideals of liberal democracy or violating them, implicit in the theory of hybrid regimes, is arguably an important element constituting institutional mechanisms that enable hybrid regimes in Africa and elsewhere to evolve into dominant or hegemonic party systems. It is this leeway of action that saves the incumbents in political competition while putting the opposition at a disadvantage in the multiparty contests of the emerging democracies.

The classification and evaluation of the hybrid regime, semi-democracy and electoral authoritarians, begins and uses the key ideals of liberal democracy put forward by Robert Dahl (1973) as the yardstick of measuring democracy. Dahl’s definition is preferred because, in addition to procedural elements prescribing competitive elections for government leadership, elements of civil and political rights of citizens are also considered necessary for democracy to be realized (Diamond, 2002:21-22). It is notable that the substantive elements of Dahl (1973) are more focused on civil and political rights and therefore social, cultural and economic rights have been left out. This is problematic as, ‘where poverty is the issue, what democracy means and support for it cannot be divorced from the bread and butter issues’ (Harrison, 2002:83)

The use of liberal democratic ideals as a yardstick for evaluation of regimes has not come about incidentally or by fiat of researchers. Arguably, four factors contributed concurrently to this being the case. First is the fact that in the last two decades of the 20th
century, the one-party, monolithic, socialist and communist political systems became associated with the failed authoritarian political system of the former Soviet Union. The fall of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes in Eastern Europe and, therefore, its defeat in the Cold War led to the undesirability and indefensibility of monolithic socialist and communist political-economic systems. This left its rival Western liberal democracy as the main alternative system for emerging democracies (Clapham, 1992, Diamond, 2002).

Secondly, not only was the Western liberal democratic model the main one standing after the end of the Cold War, but Western democracies and the multilateral institutions they control remained the most economically resourced. Western countries, and the international institutions that they dominate, used their economic power to leverage political reforms in the direction of the liberal democratic model in emerging democracies (Otunnu, 1995, Abrahamsen, 2002).

Thirdly, Western ideas of liberal democracy were already significantly advanced even before the fall of the USSR; the ideals have a long history and feature prominently, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They enjoyed continuous support over this period and more recently has been more explicitly defined by institutions such as Freedom House, that have evolved indicators to try and measure liberal democracy development.

Fourthly, most Western intellectuals were not in disarray as they always worked for and supported the ideas and institutions of liberal democracy. In African countries and other emerging democracies, a sizable number of outspoken intellectuals had Marxist, socialist and communist orientations. Intellectually, there was dislocation in late 1980s and early 1990s as the researchers could not call for socialism or communism as an alternative system in an international atmosphere where these systems had proven to be failures, especially with the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Liberal democracy therefore triumphed in the intellectual arena also. Even among the array of ideas and definitions of democracy, liberal democracy as formulated by Dahl (1973) has proven to be effective in providing a framework of democracy that is influential in both
theory and practice, and provides a framework for the implementation of democracy (Diamond, 2002).

In relation to the power and legitimacy configuration between the regime and the opposition during the transition and democratization process from monolithic regimes to democracy, one of the main conclusions of the transition to democracy research project, a precursor to the hybrid regime research program, is the conceptualization of the modes of transitions to democracy (Linz 1990, Karl and Schmitter, 1991, Huntington, 1991, Linz and Stepan, 1996). The researchers here are in broad agreement in defining three modes of transition to (liberal) democracy the choice of which, in a given context, is determined by who controls the transition to democracy process---the existing regime or the emerging opposition. The relative strength of the prior regime and the emerging opposition in terms of legitimacy determines who controls the transition process to democracy and hence the mode of transition. Linz (1990) and Huntington (1991:114) argue that the transformation or reforma mode of transition occurs when the existing regime is stronger in legitimacy than the already present or the emerging opposition. Because it is stronger, the existing regime controls and leads the transition process carrying out most reforms at the pace and mode it deems fit for its advantage. If the opposition gains more legitimacy, it can instigate a revolution or other radical reforms. This context is described as the ruptura mode of transition. Here the opposition defeats and displaces the existing regime. When the legitimacy of the two forces is in equilibrium, the negotiated or packed mode of transition is likely to occur. Such a transition can happen with the two sides negotiating and agreeing on the future of political process.

This thesis provides a counter explanation to neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime theory of why a prior regime may become a dominant. Here it is argued that if the prior regime is strong and has a high level of legitimacy it can not only successfully control the transition but also maintain popular support in multiparty elections that follow the transition. Although in these circumstances it will set up the rules of the political system of the multi party state, it does not mean that it would necessarily engage in a menu of manipulation to stay in power. An analysis of regime legitimacy and dominance that seeks to explain the absence or weakness of a political opposition needs to consider the
historical genesis of regime legitimacy and its dominant political party, including its relationship to the independence movement. As the following analysis of limits of neo-patrimonial theory, its critiques and alternative explanations establish, such an analysis also needs to consider the ideas of the independence struggle and movement as well as aspirations of Africans as a political organisation, if it is to properly explain the capacity of a dominant regime and its party to retain legitimacy and popular support in a multi-party era.

**Limits of the neo-patrimonial explanation**

Even though the neo-patrimonial explanation of African politics has gained significant traction as the explanation of African socio-economic development resulting in significant amounts of research based on the model, the neo-patrimonial theory has also attracted criticisms that highlight its weakness and suggest alternatives to it. The critique of neo-patrimonial theory is firstly of a general nature, while the second is more specific. The latter points to the erroneous reading, interpretation and use of the concept---patrimonial---as originally conceptualized and used by Max Weber.

At the general level, deriving from earlier debates and discussions, scholars have pointed out the methodological and substantive flaws of the neo-patrimonial approach. De Grassi for instance, appreciates the neo-patrimonial approach as an important counterweight to studies that focus on purely technical prescriptions. He also praises the attention that neo-patrimonialism has brought to important issues of corruption and illegal activities. But he criticises the neo-patrimonial perspective in terms of its research methodology in that it focuses on relatively few countries, pays attention to few journals, and tends to present mostly anecdotal evidence, (De Grassi, 2008:108-109). De Grassi (2008) also asserts that limitations of the neo-patrimonial approach are observable in the ‘African essentialism’ it contains, which is also a result of its functionalist approach.

Prior to this critique, Mustapha (2002) suggested a number of limitations of the neo-patrimonial approach some of which go beyond what De Grassi suggested. Like De Grassi, Mustapha criticised the use of selective anecdotal evidence from individuals. He suggested what he expected of Bayart’s (1993) (one of the key contemporary proponents of the neo-patrimonial approach) invocation of people (referring to Bayart’s extensive
interviews with people deriving from them his anecdotal evidence) was an account of African politics that places emphasis on the lives and politics of ordinary people as a group. But the expectation remained unfulfilled. Mustapha also points out that ‘the so-called people are in reality an assortment of individuals’ (Mustapha, 2002:1). Mustapha calls this a problem of ‘methodological individualism’ and claims that, as an approach, it departs from the normal view of politics as a group process in which ‘both rulers and the ruled participate’ (2002: 1). In this process, both the ruler and the ruled exercise ‘a measure of autonomy and political expectation’. He is critical of the work of neo-patrimonial researchers, arguing that in such work the notion of people or the ruled are perceived as nothing more than a passive mass of victims. In summary, his primary criticism is that, to these researchers, Africa is ‘replete with individuals, but the people as collective social reality is missing’ (Mustapha, 2002:1).

The second main methodological problem, which the critics of neo-patrimonial research have pointed to, is what De Grassi (2008) has termed African essentialism, and what Mustapha (2002) has called cultural determinism. This is an issue that Erdmann and Engel (2006) as well as Pitcher, Moran and Johnson (2009) have also focused on in their critique of the neo-patrimonial approach.

De Grassi (2008:112-113) argues that it is essentialist and erroneous to assume neo-patrimonialism is the essence or common core of politics throughout Africa. He argues against Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:63) who suggest that neo-patrimonial personal relationships form ‘the foundation and superstructure of political institutions in Africa and that neo-patrimonial practice is the core feature of politics in Africa and in small number of other states’. He also disagrees with Chabal and Daloz (1999: xix) who concluded that ‘in the end what all African states share is a generalized system of patrimonialism and an acute degree of apparent disorder’. Mustapha’s (2002:2-3) notion of cultural determinism does not depart largely from De Grassi. Both share similar concerns that that neo-patrimonial approach errs in reifying the patrimonial in neo-patrimonial as a primordial African tradition. This places African politics in the ‘traditional realm as opposed to modern realm’ (De Grassi, 2008:112:115). Mustapha suggested that notions such as the criminalization of the state which Bayart, Ellis, Hibou (1999) attribute to the neo-patrimonial politics in African states—which they suggest
have roots in African culture—contributes, in large measure, to the notion of Africa ‘as a
theatre of the absurd’ (Mustapha, 2002:2). Mustapha argues that while it is true that
culture is an important element in the economic and political processes at work in Africa,
the reduction of this important variable to ‘absurd sensationalism and the so called spirit
of criminality’ (suggested by Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999) has only served to ‘demean
Africans without contributing in any meaningful way to improving our knowledge of the
complex linkages between cultural, economic and political processes’ (Mustapha,
2002:3).

In addition to the critique of essentialism and cultural determinism, the critics of
neo-patrimonial approach to African politics have pointed out the tendency towards
functionalist explanations despite their general weakness. De Grassi (2008:115) points
out that the existence of neo-patrimonialism is explained by its function in maintaining a
centralized political coalition of elites through the distribution of spoils. Patrimonialism is
often seen as fulfilling the ‘the need for mechanisms of social insurance’ in the risky and
uncertain environments of low-income societies. De Grassi argues that the weakness of
this explanation is that it ‘ignores history of manifested arrangements and cannot account
for competing arrangements— that is, it cannot explain why one potentially functional
arrangement would have been adopted rather than another equally functional option’ (De

Another strand of criticism proposes alternative ways of looking at African socio-
economic development. It stems from what can be described as a ‘back to Max Weber’
school of thought. The researchers in this group believe that the neo-patrimonial
approach, as proposed by contemporary researchers, is based on erroneous and biased
empirical observations and readings of Max Weber’s (1864-1920) analysis of patrimonial
and legal bureaucratic authorities. The first group of researchers within this strand is
Erdmann and Engel and those who followed on from their research project. As pioneers
of the project, Erdmann and Engel (2006:104) argue that since neo-patrimonialism is a
mixture of two co-existing partly interwoven types of domination—namely patrimonial
and legal-rational—the conceptualization of neo-patrimonialism must account for both
types of domination as proposed by Weber. They have pointed out that various authors
gave different weight to, but nevertheless almost all failed, in elaborating sufficiently the constituent elements of this form of hybrid structure.

Deriving from Weber, Erdmann and Engel (2006:105) have observed that under patrimonialism all power relations, political as well as administrative, between the ruler and the ruled, are personal relations. There is no distinction between the private and the public realm. However, under neo-patrimonialism, the distinction between the private and the public exists at least formally. It is accepted, and public reference can be made to it. Neo-patrimonial rule takes place within the framework of legal-rational bureaucracy or ‘modern’ stateness. Formal structures and rules do exist although, in practice, separation of the private and the public sphere is not always observed. These spheres are not isolated from each other. Erdmann and Engel (2006) have pointed out that, on the contrary, the two spheres permeate each other: the patrimonial penetrates the legal – rational system and twists its logic, functions and output, but does not take exclusive control over the legal-rational logic. That is, informal politics invades formal institutions. Informality and formality are intimately linked to each other in various ways and by varying degrees; and this mix becomes institutionalized. Clientalism therefore exists not only in the traditional periphery but also in the modern centre; ‘which itself is not modern, but very much tainted by and interwoven with the traditional elements’ (2006:99).

Erdmann and Engel (2006) accept the definitions of neo-patrimonialism given by Clapham (1985:48) and by Bratton and Van De Walle (1999) as well as the conceptualization of neopatrimonialism by Chabal and Daloz (1999). However, in these definitions Erdmann and Engel disagree with the bias towards and emphasis on patrimonialism because they neglect legal-rational elements. Bratton and Van De Walle agree that in neo-patrimonial regimes, customs and patterns of patrimonialism coexist with and suffuse rational – legal institutions (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:62). But Erdmann and Engel (2006) refute the operationalization of a definition where the formal institution of presidentialism is defined informally as a personal institution of the president occupying the position, and argue that at least some aspects of the role of the presidency are conducted by formal rules.
These counter arguments and analysis of African regimes based on both patrimonial and legal-rational elements put forward by Erdmann and Engel are being demonstrated by an emerging research project. Early on Ole Therkildsen (2005:35-52), referring to Erdmann and Engel’s (2006) forthcoming work, pointed out that civil service, independent courts, and functional taxation systems do exist in Africa, and is not wholly underpinned by the neo-patrimonial logic as posited by the neo-patrimonial approach. Therkildsen’s argument is based on empirical evidence from the World Development Report of 1997 focusing on governance, Rauch and Evans (1999) comparative study of bureaucracies in 35 developing countries from 1970-1990 and on Transparency International reports. Christian Von Soest (2006) pointed out from a case study of Zambia that there is no linear correlation between a neo-patrimonial system and the collection of taxes.

While Erdmann and Engel called for balanced observation and conceptualization of regimes along both patrimonial and legal-rational planes, Pitcher, Moran, and Johnson (2009) seek to actually rehabilitate what they observe as the misconceptualisation and misuse of the patrimonial element in the neo-patrimonial equation. They have argued that the misreading of Weber’s patrimonial form of legitimacy has turned African countries into examples of ‘an imagined common pathology’ and caused a mistaken identification of this pathology with a type of legitimacy or authority (2009:126). Arguing against most contemporary use of patrimonialism, the researchers deriving from Weber’s original conceptualization of patrimonial authority or legitimacy have pointed out that patrimonialism ‘was not a synonym for corruption, bad governance, violence, tribalism or weak state. It was instead a specific form of authority and source of legitimacy, with specific cultural underpinnings in which compliance to authority was constructed’ (Pitcher, Moran and Johnson, 2009:126). Contrary to common agreement among most contemporary research in which African leaders are portrayed as ‘big men’ with almost absolute powers, Pitcher et al. have insisted that true patrimonialism would have to include the reciprocities that Weber discussed, along with the personal dimensions of power, governance and compliance that feature in contemporary accounts (Pitcher, Moran and Johnson, 2009:126).
African culture is the motor, which drives neo-patrimonialism with all its negative effect on the African states as they conceptualized it. To Pitcher, Moran and Johnson (2009:128-129), the cultural element is also important. But they begin their argument by pointing out that, as Weber put forward in his conceptualization of patrimonial authority, there are traditions (rituals and other cultural elements) in African culture highlighted by anthropologists Jean Francois Vincent (1986) and Scharzberg (2001) that require the leadership to be accountable by reciprocities between the ruler and the ruled. They proceed to use the case of Botswana to show and refute the arguments that African cultural heritage is incompatible with democracy and economic growth. They have shown in Botswana how a succession of elites, ‘deeply rooted in the traditional life of village and countryside used personal power and a range of reciprocities to solidify their legitimacy as governing elites. In the process the elites built bridges across tribal (morafè) divisions and solidified their own financial stakes on sound institutions’ (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnson, 2009:145-150).

Pitcher, Moran and Johnson (2009:145) argue that building on the traditional reciprocity practices and networks, the political elites in Botswana have been able to deliver sustained economic growth and a successful open elite democracy. They ascertain that the Botswana elite did not abandon patrimonialism or overcome it; rather, they built a democratic state on the foundations of traditional and highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties. They concluded that the leadership has been sufficiently secure politically and economically to accommodate opposing parties and the rise of civil society that also brings traditional loyalties into the public arena.

Alternatives to Neo-patrimonialism beyond the existing critique

The critique by Erdmann and Engel (2006) and Pitcher, Moran and Johnson (2009) rebalances to some extent the relationship between what have been defined as traditional African culture and the modern institutions state. Here it is argued, however, that African regimes can have at their core political processes that are more than simply the combination and interaction of the legal-rational and patrimonial elements in the regime as discussed by Erdmann and Engel (2006) or the fact that there are cultural aspects supportive of accountable and responsive regimes as discussed by Pitcher,
Moran, and Johnson (2009). Mustapha (2002) arrived at this core when he questioned the neo-patrimonial approach for its reliance on methodological individualism. He essentially argued that what is missing in the neo-patrimonial research and analysis is the discussion of African regimes as a political organisation. He pointed out that the neo-patrimonial approach discusses African regimes as if they were ‘an assortment of individuals with only self interests’ and ‘people as collective social reality is missing’. He concluded that this biased and reductionist perspective on African politics robs non-elite groups of political agency (Mustapha, 2002:1 and 6-9).

Mustapha (2002:6) pointed out that methodological individualism orients researchers away from the view of politics as a group process in which both rulers and ruled participate, both exercising a measure of autonomy and political expectation. He argued that the monochromic fixation on elite politics reduces African politics to the struggles for spoils within the elite, while the visions and passions that have fuelled broad based African political life since the colonial period---nationalism, Islamic radicalism, African Christianity, communitarian self improvement and ethnic mobilization etc.---all disappear from the analytical view. It reduces the political organisation to a narrow elite with greed and predation as the only sentiments in evidence. He concluded that analyses of the political organisation effectively disappear to be replaced by grim realism with its gaze decidedly fixed on the behaviour of wayward and self-serving elites.

Starting from Mustapha (2002), it can be argued that the key element that the neo-patrimonial literature has failed to identify and deal with in African politics is the ideals and values guiding Africans as a political organisation. This is true even when the manifestations of politics can be interpreted as neo-patrimonial. A serious search for values and ideals underpinning developing countries, and therefore African politics, can be seen in the work of Clapham (1982 and 1985). His conclusion, however, was that lack of common ideals and values has made African elites adopt neo-patrimonialism as the only possible way to legitimize the state and avoid governing by force.

Explaining the absence of ideals and value politics in Africa and the third world in general, Clapham (1985:42-44) argues that ‘what did not take place in the third world countries partly because of colonial origins of the state is any merging of the state and
society as a common expression of a set of shared values’. He pointed out that the lack of organic unity and shared values between the state and society is ‘the single most basic reason for the fragility of the third world state’ and therefore ‘its problems of legitimacy’ (1985:44). It is this absence of legitimacy, Clapham pointed out, that fuels insecurity, as well as personal and political corruption. In the final analysis, Clapham argues that given how African states do not operate according to the classical model of modern state in which the constitutional structure is ultimately upheld by a sense of national identity, and in the absence of this national identity, regimes resort to practices which fall under the theme of neo-patrimonialism.

To show how a lack of common ideals and values is problematic and why third world states are in trouble without them, Clapham (1982) argued that the enormous powers of the modern state are invariably justified by its rulers, in terms of their ability to express the aspirations and achieve the welfare of its people. Their aspirations are initially expressed through a process of self-determination for them to own and belong to defined territory. This is followed by a process of participation, which enables them to choose their rulers and decide policies, to achieve welfare, and at the most basic level, guarantee their physical security. Increasingly, it also means seeking their economic and social wellbeing. These justifications carry with them the secondary and instrumental requirements of fairness and efficiency (Clapham 1982:1-2).

Contrary to the positions above, it is argued in this study that there is a basis of shared values and ideals that inform African politics even though it has not been taken seriously in the existing literature. In particular, these are the ideals and values that constituted African people as political communities against the colonial regimes, a notion Mustapha (2002) noted in his critique of the neo-patrimonial research. There is a case to be made that it is the persistence of these values and ideals as aspirations in the modern period that informed politicians, university students and lectures, writers, NGO activists—and people as a whole—and led them to denounce dictatorial post-colonial African regimes. It is these aspirations which made people stage massive protests and support opposition activists and parties to demand restoration of democracy at the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s to the surprise of most western researchers of African politics (Joseph, 1997) who had predicted the third wave of democratization will
not touch the shores of Africa. Yet people’s uprisings toppled regimes in Africa; and Africa is also one of the places where support for democracy was high from the onset of the third wave of democracy (Diamond, 2001).

It is the viewpoint of this thesis that the basis of these shared ideals and values, which constituted the idea of democracy and national political communities in African colonial states, stem from three things. First, and most important, is the struggle of Africans against colonial rule and the promise of what an independent state would be. The second source is shared cultural values of ideal African organisation leadership that Africans had before colonialism. Third is the experience of existing under dictatorial post-colonial regimes in opposition to which African people defined and continue to define themselves. The struggle against colonial rule can be conceptualized as having promised three things broadly or narrowly defined: democracy, development and national unity or integration. The speeches of African leaders, the poetry, the songs, and even armed struggle against the colonial regime amply demonstrate the ideas contained in the promise of independence. As Ake pointed out, the independence movement in Africa ‘denounced the violation of the dignity of the colonized, the denial of the basic rights, the political disenfranchisement of the colonized, racial discrimination, lack of equal opportunity and equal access, and the economic exploitation of the colonized’ (Ake 2000:45). So, even though many states have failed to embody the aspirations of the independence movements in a significant sense, it may be that they still indicate a basis for political organisation which was at the core of African political system before and is more so since the struggle for independence as discussed further below.

The legacy of independence movements and African regime legitimacy

Independence struggles in Africa developed in response to brutal and racist colonial regimes; in essence the struggle and the independence movement promised to deliver new African states that would reflect desirable political and social government characteristics that colonial rule had denied African communities. That is, the post-colonial independent African states would be politically democratic and just, economically developmental even welfarist, and would unite all the people within their territory socially. In the early years following independence, the regimes that came to
power had more leeway to interpret these rather general themes, put forward ideological and policy directions of their choice and even to prioritize their implementation (Anyang’aNyong’o 1997 and Burgess, 2004: 13-14). The legitimacy of the state and its leaders was premised on fulfilling the promise of independence, embodied in the ideas of the independence movements, and also to behave in accordance with what society expected of its leaders. It is with this authority that the African regimes argued for and adopted single-party systems and socialism to achieve democracy, development and national unity.

The main argument for adopting one-party political systems after independence was to cement unity in the nation-building processes within what were, for most states, arbitrary boundaries without historic roots. It was also argued that a form of democracy could exist in a one-party system, as the institutional set-up could be similar to the African tradition of democracy where all people in the organisation discussed matters until they reached an agreement, which was then broadly binding on the members of the organisation (Ake 2000: 38). In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere (1967), in advocating a single-party regime made a further argument that a non-class based African society, such as Tanganyika was at independence, did not need to have many parties to represent the different classes unlike in a European multiparty system. Therefore a one-party state was deemed appropriate for Africa, as it would also avoid the emergence of a political opposition, which did not serve the key aims of independence. As Ake (2000: 38) points out, the adoption of one-party political systems were premised on cementing inclusion, unity and solidarity of the people in political affairs within state boundaries.

The adoption of socialism followed a similar argument, which posited that socialism is the socio-economic system closest to the communalism which most African traditional societies practised. Land, the main means of production in the society, was communally owned and people cooperated to meet family and organisation needs. As an economic system, socialism was deemed desirable because it would place a cap on the differential acquisition of wealth and avoid attendant divisions and conflicts, which could follow growing inequality. Such socio-economic conflicts were not considered desirable and as such inconsistent with the unity and development that had been promised by independence. Arguing for socialism, Nyerere (1974) pointed out that the socialist option
was also a rational choice given the smallness of the capitalist class in African countries at independence. Also as a means to hasten developmental state intervention in the economic sphere, which socialism permitted, was considered desirable. In addition, and more importantly, socialism promised to do away with exploitation, which was understandably an issue in Africa because of the experience of exploitation under colonialism. Socialism promised equality of opportunity and of prosperity (Burgess 2004:30).

Political elites in Africa adopted these strategies (one-party political systems and socialism) as the policy solution most likely to meet the challenge of bringing about democracy, development and national unity as framed in the ideology of the independence movements. Arguably, in most cases, they easily won the argument to adopt the ideology and policy option of their choice with little or no opposition (Burgess 2004). Only in a few countries, such as Angola and Mozambique, did the adoption of socialism come to feature as a source of conflict between the ruling elite and the opposition. These conflicts fell prey to the Cold War divisions of global superpowers of the time turning them into a protracted civil war; the opposition got support from capitalist powers such as United States of America including the then Apartheid South Africa regime, while the incumbent ruling elite got support from the former USSR and Cuba.

What African leadership elites did in adopting one-party political systems was to establish the potential ideological and institutional means by which to achieve the promises of independence and legitimize their rule to the people. Whether or not in practice they achieved legitimacy through meeting the promise of independence needs to be analysed for each individual African state. So while the hybrid regime and neo-patrimonial theories can help an understanding of the situation in many African states, as they do ignore this core basis of African political organisation, they cannot provide a full analysis for any African state and in some cases may be a weak explanatory theory.

The neo-patrimonial theorists have argued that the political problems of Africa substantially reflect a triumph of African ideals and values of society over the state. Chabal, Daloz, Bayart and Hyden (2004) suggest that in neo-patrimonial society African
traditional values have been harmonized with the state. Thus Chabal and Daloz (1999: 8-30) have argued that ‘the problem of the state in Africa is that it has not emancipated or differentiated itself from society’ and what has happened is that the state has been ‘traditionalized’ with African culture (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: xxi). Hyden has elaborated this by suggesting the state in Africa is deeply embedded in social relations, it lacks autonomy which can make it an instrument of collective action, that is, the state is unable to act as an institution distinct from the organisation and the church (Hyden, 2004:62-69). Equally it could be argued that the instrumental and corrupt abuse of authority that neo-patrimonial theorists have elaborated is not essentially a part of traditional African culture. As pointed out by Pitcher, Moran and Johnson (2009) a Weberian view of patrimonial authority emphasized that authority cannot be overstepped without endangering the position of the ruler because the exercise of power is a balance between the goals of the leader and the rights of the ordinary people.

Here it is argued that, although it is reasonable to suggest that African politics is informed by African culture, values and ideals as many researchers have suggested, it does not seem reasonable to simply assume that as African peoples were looking forward to independence in countries like Tanganyika and Uganda, they would settle for being guided by the most negative aspects of their culture rather than the best. Africans had already been disappointed with the role played by some indigenous leaders under indirect rule in the colonial period. In this system indigenous leaders were incorporated into colonial structures and became collaborators in colonial rule (Mamdani, 1992). The independence movement was a space in which Africans formed and articulated visions, ideals, and hopes for the new independent nation-state that would be just, democratic and caring of people and development of their nation-state. The people expected these visions to be implemented and they informed their evaluation of the performance of the state and its leaders post independence.

Unlike in the first decade of independence in the 1960s, in the current wave of democratization from the late 1980s, African leaders did not articulate unique forms of democratic political systems for African countries, with perhaps the exception of Museveni of Uganda who, on coming into power in 1986, for a while defended a no-party system for his country and resisted external pressure to adopt a multi-party system.
In this he was supported by several referendums indicating that Ugandans backed his stance. Among African leaders Nyerere of Tanzania was one of the most notable proponents of the one party system in the 1960s, and he articulated the view that a one party system combined with African socialism was a suitable framework for African states. Although he implemented these systems in Tanzania during his tenure (1961-1985), he also advised the country to adopt a multi-party system in the early 1990s. Nyerere (1992) maintained the view that even if there is only a minority percentage of Tanzanians who now sincerely wanted a multiparty system, they were ‘substantial’ enough not only to warrant the establishment of such a system, but if a multi-party system was not implemented then, those who sought it in the future could disrupt the peace and unity of the country with demands for multiparty democracy. Nyerere and many proponents of the one party system struggled with how to reform and rehabilitate the one-party political system to make it more accountable and accommodating of the opposition, which developed due to discontent with governance under the one-party systems. This failure of the regimes and of their leaders to put forward an African blueprint of their own for democracy left multi-party liberal democracy as the only roadmap and therefore, to some, the sole yardstick for evaluating regime legitimacy and progress towards democracy in Africa.

While neo-patrimonial researchers have privileged internal factors in the adoption of multi-party democracy in Africa (Bratton and Van De Walle, and Joseph, 1997), Abrahamsen (2002), correctly points out that both internal and external forces played key roles in the decisions of African states to adopt multi-party liberal democracy. In fact it is arguable that external factors were critical in many of these decisions. For example in Tanzania, even though there was a level of discontent with the regime, the level of protest and opposition to it was still low and, in fact, quite manageable (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992). As Abrahamsen (2002) pointed out, Western donor communities put considerable pressure on single-party states and formed alliances with opposition groups and pockets of civil society within countries to press for the adoption of multi-party liberal political systems.

In the first decade of independence the leadership of new African states still had substantial reserves of legitimacy and the external environment of the Cold War allowed
at least three possible configurations for their political and economic systems - Western tending, Eastern tending or non-aligned. In those international circumstances African regimes could justify their own systems of choice (Clapham, 1992). In the wave of democratisation from the 1990s all these factors were absent. Regimes had lost legitimacy, both because of how they had handled the polity since independence and because of the economic failure of Africa, and Western liberalism had declared itself triumphant after fall of the Soviet Union (Clapham, 1992, Diamond, 2002). Multi-party electoral democracy was the internationally sanctioned model African leaders were pressed to adopt, and its adoption attracted material support from western democracies and international institutions.

This thesis argues that even though African states have adopted western liberal democracy political system there is a set of indigenous ideas on state and government that imposes on political leaders a responsiveness and accountability to the public in Africa. This set of ideas has its origins in the struggle for independence and also in governance systems of African traditional society. This is an element of democracy that can be seen as an organic social contract in African nation-states between the leadership and the African citizenry since the African experience of colonialism and the struggle against it. This social contract is now arguably in co-existence with liberal democratic ideas and both are necessary to give a full picture of how democracy is evolving in Africa and of how Africans are appropriating elements of democratic thought and using it to support or oppose their regimes. This appropriation is in response to their own political experience, including the violation of civil and human rights by independent African regimes. It is also influenced by a growing knowledge of liberal democracy, as states were forced to implement many of its key features in the third wave of democracy since mid 1980s.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the abuse of power which leaders of post independence African governments inflicted on their people resulted in insurrection and protests against many regimes. This resistance was motivated by a demand for change and for more accountable government and the scale of the protests took many scholars of African politics by surprise (Van de Walle, 1997; Joseph, 1997 and Abrahamsen, 2002). This surprise was because Africa was thought to be an ‘unfertile terrain’ for democracy (Joseph, 1997:363). However the resistance of people against oppressive, non-responsive,
African regimes has been a feature of political life throughout the post-independence period (Anyang’Nyong’o, 1987 and Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007). Resistance has included some members of African political elites, trade unions, academics, students, small farmers and peasants in villages. Many opposition elements, including politicians, writers and scholars have been exiled or suffered imprisonment or death in their own countries for denouncing the dictatorial tendencies of the regimes.

Therefore, the fall of Soviet Union in late 1980s under pressure from civil society demanding political reforms and supported by Western democracies was not the source but rather an avenue which gave an opportunity for opposition leaders and publics in Africa to resist not only abusive regimes but also those that had failed to provide leadership in the economic difficulties of 1980s. It is acknowledged that these protests resulted in the transition in Africa to multi-party political systems (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997 and Joseph, 1997). Therefore, contrary to the position taken by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), it can be argued that while protests against African regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s may have had their genesis in the bad economic conditions of that period, they were equally protesting against the undemocratic tendencies of the regimes taking into account the behaviour of regime leadership since the founding of post-colonial independent African states. Most of the behaviour of post-colonial African regimes was contrary to the promise of independence and fell short of the standard African people knew and expected of their leadership even from the pre-colonial period.

The tendency to ignore the history of African political thought, and to conceptualise African society as essentially non-democratic is well illustrated by the titles of two academic books from this period. Bayart’s ‘The State in Africa: the Politics of Belly’ (Bayart, 1993) and Chabal and Daloz’s ‘Africa; Disorder Works as Political Instrument’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) are both, in different ways, negative stereotypes of Africans as either people who are only concerned with immediate material welfare (Bayart, 1993) or political leaders and people who are masters of disorder (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). In neither case are Africans portrayed as having the potential to be political actors who may be motivated by ideals and a sense of the common good. Yet, Africans demanded an end to corruption, nepotism and the establishment of institutions
of justice, democracy and solidarity in the pro-democracy street protests of the late 1980s and 1990s.

Contrary to the materialist and instrumental perspectives of African politics put forward by proponents of the neo-patrimonial view and those of the hybrid-regime institutional theory, this thesis argues that the political ideas and ideals that constituted the struggle for and the independence movement in African states, form the basis and do matter for the legitimacy of African regimes and can explain the continued support for at least some dominant parties in Africa. These ideas and the degree of legitimacy of the regime can be traced from the promise of, and struggle for, independence through to the present day. These ideas, particularly during the struggle for independence, galvanized the political elite and people as a political organisation. The general thrust of the ideas that constituted the promise of independence was the enactment of a post-independence state that would be politically just and democratic, economically developmental and capable of socially uniting peoples within the borders of the state. This thesis argues that these ideas are still significant and act as reference points or goals to African people in evaluating the states political regime, even in circumstances where the ideals this vision contains are not met, and it puts them forward as an alternative framework of ideas for explaining African regime legitimacy and democracy.

Conclusion

It is observable that the neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime literature, as discussed in this chapter, describes African states as lacking legitimacy, the basis for democracy, and the idea of a political organisation. Where stability exists it is built on patron/client relationships or the corrupt manipulation of political institutions. This literature sees one party states and dominant regimes and parties in Africa as failures in terms of democracy, because a weak opposition is assumed to be a result of corrupt and repressive practices and a denial of freedoms. This literature implicitly does not recognize an African model of regime legitimacy and democracy and sees a western model of democracy as superior and the yardstick against which all other polities are measured. This thesis provides a counter-argument by using the case of Tanzania, to analyse the basis of ideas of regime legitimacy and democracy in an African context. It will examine how Tanzania
developed a one party state and how that state transformed into a multi party democracy - contrasting the regime party’s level of legitimacy with the level of repression and corrupt practices it used to remain in power.

The thesis examines the origins of the independence movement and how it put forward ideas used to inspire the population in the struggle against colonial rule. The following chapters investigate if the regime lived up to the promise of the independence movement, which encapsulated ideas of regime legitimacy during the period of the one party state up to 1985. To do this, it examines how the regime justified the policies it implemented in terms of their contribution to fulfilling the promise of independence reflecting the ideas of regime legitimacy of the independence struggle and movement. This is followed by a discussion of the transition to democracy and challenges to the legitimacy of the regime party presented by these new circumstances. The regime party in the multiparty election period has remained in power but has faced mixed fortunes; it is notable that it has not always been able to attract the highest level of public support. In these circumstances how has it tried to maintain its legitimacy and to hang onto power?
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research methodology of this study. It highlights the research question, explains why Tanzania was chosen as the case study, discusses the epistemology of the study, and elaborates the main information sources that provided the basis for the argument, discussion and narrative presented in the thesis.

Research question

The research question guiding this study is: what explains the legitimacy of the Tanzanian regime party and its dominance of the polity from the foundation of the independent state through to the multiparty era? Two alternative explanations are considered, one based on the neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime literature that gives a negative assessment of the reasons why regime parties stay in power based on corruption and repression; and the other, which this thesis will develop, that assumes a regime party can maintain power for positive reasons that are related to its capacity to retain legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate.

The period covered by this thesis stretches from the development of Tanzania’s independence movement to the present. The ideas and mode of organisation of the independence movement is investigated, as it is from this movement that the regime party was formed. The Tanzania political system was changed from the multiparty system of the independence elections in 1961 and 1962 to a one-party system in 1965. The one party period analysed is from 1965-1992 and the link between the policies followed by the one party state and the ideology of the independence movement is explored. In this way the thesis analyses the sources of the ideas of regime legitimacy and how those ideas were implemented in the one-party era. The one-party system remained in place until July 1992, when the law that allowed other political parties to operate came into effect. Four multiparty elections have been conducted since, in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The thesis analyses regime legitimacy in the multi party period through an analysis of the transition to democracy and the political dynamics of the multi-party elections. Throughout the analysis its aim is to assess firstly, the degree of legitimacy and popular support the regime enjoyed, and secondly, to assesses if the regime’s legitimacy (or loss of legitimacy) is based on its ability to establish a political organisation in Tanzania that
built on public good politics expected of the regime by the population or based on the negative practices of neo-patrimonialism.

**Case study selection**

The selection of Tanzania as the case study for this research was influenced by the fact that Tanzania posed a puzzle in terms of the democratization processes compared to that process in other Sub Saharan African states. As opposition groups sought political change in almost all Tanzania’s neighbouring states the transition to multiparty democracy was tumultuous, in some states resulting in the outbreak of civil wars, for example in Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo. In other states the transition was relatively peaceful but accompanied by a serious challenge to the regime by opposition forces, for example in Zambia, Malawi and Kenya. In contrast, in Tanzania the regime comfortably controlled the transition and went on to dominate political competition in the multiparty elections. In fact, Tanzania would be among the few regimes that transited to multiparty liberal democratic political system worldwide in the third wave of democratization without being forced to do so by a strong opposition and/or a popular uprising. Tanzania is often considered an atypical case in Africa because it has been a stable and peaceful county since the state gained its independence in 1961. Therefore it could be argued that a study of Tanzania would not be relevant to other African states. However, given the aim of this thesis is to investigate the basis of regime legitimacy and also its democratic (or non democratic) nature; the Tanzania case is ideal as it allows an investigation of the emergence and development of regime legitimacy in this stable context. Rather than pursue a comparative case study to answer the research question, this study chose to investigate Tanzania as a single heuristic case study given that to date there has been very little research on regime legitimacy from the perspective taken in this thesis - leaving the task of comparison to other follow up studies.

The focus on Tanzania as case study in terms of Gerring’s (2007) case study selection strategies, is based on Tanzania as a ‘deviant’ case or as an ‘outlier’ in the category of East African and indeed of most African states in relation to regime legitimacy, both during and after the transition to a multiparty political system. Gerring and Searight (2007:105) point out that the deviant case selection method that selects a
case(s) by reference to a general understanding of the topic (either specific theory or common sense), offers the potential for valuable insights. Tanzania is anomalous and presents a puzzle compared to other states in the same region that made the transition to multiparty democracy. It is also anomalous in the resilience of the regime party in multiparty political competitions and its capacity to retain popular legitimacy. Investigating Tanzania as single case study is justifiable given its ‘deviantness’ as it does not appear to be easily explained by the dominant literature on this topic. Also as pointed out by Flyvberg (2006: 231) single case studies are also important to generating scientific knowledge and for testing theories. Particularly relevant to the selection is the observation that if a case study is not explained by a theory then that theory can be ‘considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected’ (Flyvberg, 2006: 228). This rationale of case selections study fits in with the aim of this study to examine and analyse Tanzanian regime legitimacy in order to test the validity of the neo patrimonial and hybrid regime literature to explain this case and to develop alternative explanations of Tanzanian regime legitimacy and of its perceived uniqueness.

A single case study is also useful for a detailed empirical study over a relatively long period of time. The benefits to be gained from a comparative study would be at the cost of reducing the level of detail available on each case. The contemporary literature on African democratisation is weak on detailed case studies, which focus on a single case and analyse in depth the specific characteristics of the country within the context of the international literature. From the perspective of empirical depth, from the necessity to explore the regime’s legitimacy over time, from the perspective of Tanzania being a deviant or outlier case and in the context of building a heuristic model, a single case study strategy is appropriate and Tanzania is a good choice of country.

Research information sources

This study involves a reassessment of the narrative of the Tanzanian independence movement, the one party state and the transition to democracy. It uses historical research including for example that by Tanzanian historians such as Kimambo, Temu and Gwassa (1969); and international historians of Tanzanian history such as Maguire (1969) and Illife (1979). It uses academic sources that were written contemporaneously with the
events that are being discussed to capture the debates at that time and because they provide a record of actions and speeches that is no longer available from any other source.

It also uses a range of primary documents many of which had to be translated from Swahili. Developments during the colonial regime used historical records of the British Colonial Information Office and research information commissioned by that Office. It also used material from TAA and TANU, as well as the key speeches of independence leaders, but in particular Julius Nyerere, as the single most influential figure. The writing and speeches of politicians as well as printed political party material are used to construct the view of the political elite on what constituted regime legitimacy and democracy. It is an expression of African ideas on the nature of the state though the period under study here.

In discussing the period of the one party state primary sources from TANU (CCM) been complemented with a large body of secondary research information. This has mainly come from academic research conducted since the Tanzania regime endeavoured from 1967 onwards, to implement Ujamaa (a brand of African socialism). This move attracted widespread international research interest and Tanzania was the subject of strong debate between those who supported the aims of the Tanzania regime and those who opposed them. Both viewpoints are used in this study.

The analysis of how the regime in Tanzania maintained its legitimacy in the multiparty era relies significantly on the manifestos, speeches and reports put forward by the regime party, this material reflected the party’s positions on the policies pursued by the government and the party’s responses to the challenges if faced during this era that had the potential to impact on its legitimacy. CCM in the multiparty era produced an extensive election manifesto for each election that was then used as the basis of their campaign. Election manifestoes from the much smaller opposition parties are not readily or consistently available. To assess the freedom and fairness of the elections conducted during the multiparty period, this study has utilized reports of the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), an independent consortium of University of Dar es Salaam researchers and non-governmental organizations that monitored the elections.
from the beginning of the multiparty political system in 1992. The reports of this organisation are more in depth and accurate than those of the external monitors. Unlike other independent observers TEMCO observes the election from the registration of voters to campaigning, voting, counting and announcement of results and so were able to reflect on the whole election process. TEMCO despatches observers—mostly academic members of staff from the University of Dar es Salaam—to almost all electoral constituencies of urban and rural Tanzania. In contrast foreign observers tend to rely on TEMCO for background information and reports as they are usually in the country only a few days before voting day and have too few staff to cover the entire country.

For the multi party period in particular the research has been supplemented with newspaper reports that presented a critique of CCM. A number of interviews were also conducted focusing on the leaders of the emerging opposition parties as this was the only way to get information on their party positions and their critique of the regime party, as printed material on this topic was not available in the public domain in the same way as were the ideas of the regime party.

**Research epistemology**

Research methodology also concerns the ontological and epistemological issues of a study. Ontologically, this research does not differ from neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime research, in that the matter and object of the study are regimes and political elites. In particular, it examines how elites seek and gain power, how they develop legitimacy and achieve dominance of the polity. The difference between this study and the approach taken by neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime research projects, particularly the neo-patrimonial, is in epistemology. While neo-patrimonial theory emphasizes individual actions, leading Mustapha (2002) to point out that such research is led by methodological individualism, this thesis is guided by an epistemology which understands politics as a group process in which both the political elites and the public participate in shaping political expectations within a given state, as elaborated by Mustapha in his critique of the neo-patrimonial theory (Mustapha 2002:3).
In terms of how an idea becomes shared by a collectivity, this episteme is similar to that used for gaining knowledge and understanding of social realities such as nationalism and nations that researchers have come to see and conceptualize as cultural artefacts (Gellner, 1983) or imagined communities (Anderson, 1991). The fundamental features this study shares with Anderson’s and Gellner’s studies of nations and nationalism is the tracing of historical visions, ideas, socio-economic processes and activities that came to produce these communal social realities shared by a collectivity of people.

Following this methodological approach, this study traces not only the origins of the visions and ideas of the African republican nation-state (understood here as a nation adhering to the idea of democracy, a developmental state and unity of its citizens) that came to be shared by Africans (Tanzanians in this case study) as a political organisation, but also how these ideas were used by the regime party and underpinned the legitimacy of the state and regime parties’ dominance of the polity, both before and after the introduction of a multiparty political system.

The final point of departure in the epistemology employed by this study from neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime theory is that it favours African ideas and viewpoints from Africans’ worldview as the standard for judging African political developments. For example, if the political elites in Tanzania claimed they would institute a one-party democracy, the effectiveness of that democracy has been judged according to the standards by which they defined the nature of democracy and the policy innovations that they developed to make that system democratic, rather than a Western model of democracy. It also takes into account that while Africans asserted democracy in a particular historical milieu in which some individuals had knowledge of the Western idea of democracy through academic studies, it was the lived experience of democracy in their communities and in the independence movements that primarily informed their thinking. This lived experience also included an idealised vision of pre-colonial society and was shared by the mass of the people. In the post-independence era, African leaders had the opportunity to mix the ideas that were drawn from that lived experience with borrowed and learned ideas from other continents. This is in contrast to the way in which African democracy and the idea of public leadership in Africa is viewed in the neo-patrimonial
and hybrid research, which has been largely Western-European centric in its epistemology.
CHAPTER 3. THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
REGIME LEGITIMACY IDEAS IN THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

This chapter traces the development of ideas of regime legitimacy in the formation of the Tanzanian independence movement. As in many, if not most, postcolonial states the independence movement went on to form the first government of the new state. Neo-patrimonial theory has described the faults of African states as the inevitable result of the legacy of colonialism including the political practices learnt during the colonial period and later reinforced by African governance traditions. While the colonial experience inevitably left an imprint on the newly formed states that frequently went on to produce negative consequences, it was also responsible for the production of counter ideas or counter ideology in the independence movements that opposed colonialism. The chapter begins with a discussion of the main features of the colonial regime against which Africans reacted, and which galvanized and stimulated their thinking about the future post-colonial state. The second part of the chapter traces the development of the independence movement from the cultural organization TAA (Tanganyika African Association) to the political party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). This section also discusses other parties formed during the era and their relationship to the main independence movement, TANU, as well as the key ideas they advocated.

Colonial rule in Tanganyika

The socio-economic processes of establishing the economy and society of what has become the modern state in Tanganyika began with German rule at the time of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), when Germany declared herself the colonial power of Tanganyika. To the Germans, with a direct rule strategy, colonialism meant simply establishing their rule by force over the Tanganyika territory and its people who were hitherto in different autonomous traditional communities, chieftainships, and some in a few emerging kingdoms (Illife, 1979: 88-122). However, the form of colonial rule that would have a long-term impact began after the First World War in 1919 when the British took over from the Germans. The Germans, for the most part of their rule, had to overcome indigenous resistance to their presence (Raum, 1965:147). The British colonial
rule was more sophisticated, implementing the Dual Mandate, as the strategy of indirect rule of the indigenous was termed. The British endeavoured to identify local traditional institutions of governance and incorporated them into their colonial administration (Bates, 1962, and Mamdani, 1992). The colonial process under the British was not just a foreign imposition but also a foreign imposition that incorporated some features of local governance institutions. Coercing the native people into engagement in the project of building the colonial state and forcing them to serve its aims and objectives required the colonialists to establish various institutions and implement a number of policies. It is the rolling out of these policies in the political, economic and social spheres and people’s responses to them that eventually led to the emergence of forms of political organization and ideas on which the political outlook of the future independent state would be built.

The undemocratic nature of the colonial regime

Ending slavery, providing conditions for civilisation and spreading Christianity as well as opening up legitimate trade and commerce were the stated aims of colonialism in Africa - as declared by the Berlin Conference and professed by early humanitarians, missionaries and traders (Frint, 1963: 352-390). In reality it sought to replace forcefully, or modify, the traditional ways of life and governance of the African people, and interfered with their independence. Imposition of foreign rule by force largely attacked ‘African democracy’ firstly as the right of peoples for independence to govern their affairs as they deemed fit (Gwasa, 1969). Secondly, even when indirect rule was imposed, the effect was dislocation and destruction of the internal mechanism which made African traditional leaders accountable to their subjects (Aston, 1947, Mamdani, 1992). Thirdly, the replacement and modification of indigenous rule by colonialism did not help to cement democracy because most practices of the colonial regime itself were undemocratic and repressive (Ghai, 1972; Chazan et al, 1989). Colonialism perpetuated, an anti-democratic culture of governance that was violently enforced. The hallmarks of the German colonial administration were to use threats and force to impose the Wilhelmstal, a system of compulsory labour, on the natives (Raum, 1965, Bates, 1962 and Gwassa, 1969). The Wilhelmstal forced people to work on infrastructure projects
such as building roads and on German cash crop plantations (Raum, 1965:138 and Bates, 1962: 401).

In matters of justice, in place of the reasoned and measured judgement expected of a civilised and civilising western power, was arbitrariness. As noted by Bates (1962:402), German officers at the district level, known as the ‘bizksamtmanns’, had wide powers unchecked by the central government. In daily contact with the people at the local level, their arbitrary behaviour, Bates points out, made a ‘special impression’ on the Africans. This was particularly so in their administration of justice. According to Bates (1962), arbitrary judgements were reached with little knowledge of local law and customs and frequently included corporal punishment and penal labour. An often imposed sentence was to lash the offender with a rhinoceros-hide whip twenty-five times (Hamsa Ishirini in early Swahili). The punishment affected natives to such an extent that the term Hamsa Ishirini later became synonymous in local language with the arbitrary use of authority (Bates, 1962:402). It was this undemocratic mode of government that often resorted to the use of coercive instruments of the state that led to the violent armed resistances of 1905-1907.

The British takeover of Tanganyika after the First World War did not change the undemocratic nature of colonial government. The new administration replaced direct rule with indirect administration. With indirect rule, the British sought to govern Tanganyika via local traditional chiefs. In areas where such a chief did not exist, the British created chieftainships (Illife, 1979: 323-328). The aim was to allow the institutions to implement colonial government decisions and policies while they governed their people according to local traditions and customs. As pointed out by Sir Cameroon, one of the colonial governors of Tanganyika, governing through native authority is ‘to endeavour to administer the people through the instrument of their own indigenous institutions where they still exist and function with assent of the people’ (Cameroon, 1937:37). As also noted by a retired colonial officer from Tanganyika, the aim of indirect rule ‘was to train Africans to develop their capacity to administer themselves first in the tribal areas and finally over the whole of a particular territory’ (‘A retired official’, 1949:240)
Stated as such, these aims were by no means inherently undemocratic, nor were they incompatible with the British colonial administration to which the League of Nations, and later the United Nations, accorded the mandate to prepare Tanganyika for self rule. However, the economic focus of the regime as well as the division and use of state power by the central colonial government meant the native administration was weak and its powers were watered-down. The result was discontentment among Africans that later crystallized into demands for independence.

Had the colonial government, in designating the native authority, made them ultimately accountable to their people, the colonial government would have advanced the benign democratic features inherent in the theory of indirect rule and the British League and United Nation mandate rule of Tanganyika. What transpired instead was the evolution of a system of ‘decentralized despotism’ whereby the despotic nature of the colonial regime was cloaked in the native authority ruled by what were alleged to be traditional practice and customary law (Mamdani 1992:37-61).

‘Decentralized despotism’, as Mamdani (1992) has argued, hindered democracy in the colonial regime in two ways. Firstly, many Africans – and to some extent Asians – had far less rights as citizens than Europeans living in the colony. ‘The rights of free association, and free publicity and eventually political representation were rights of citizens under direct rule and not of subjects under the indirect rule, ruled by customarily organized tribal authority’ (Mamdani, 1992:19).

Those Africans who were not under the native authority, as those in cities and district towns where the colonial administration ruled directly were excluded from many rights enjoyed by Europeans within the colony. ‘As they were neither subject to the custom nor exalted to rights-bearing citizens, they were exempt from the lash of customary law but not from modern racially discriminatory civil legislation. Neither subjects to the custom nor exalted as rights-bearing citizens, they languished in a judicial limbo’ (Mamdani, 1992:19).

Mamdani elaborates further that Africans under the native, customary or traditional local administration were under despotism as they were now exposed to the untrammelled powers of the chief.
‘Not only did the chief have the right to pass rules (bylaws) governing persons under his domain, he also executed all laws and was the administrator in ‘his’ area, in which he settled all disputes. The authority of the chief thus fused in a single person all moments of power: judicial, legislative, executive, and administrative’ (Mamdani, 1992:23).

It has been noted that the colonial era traditional chief was authoritarian and despotic as the legitimacy of his authority no longer depended on the will of the people and the myriad of traditions and mechanisms that had, until then, held him accountable to the people (Aston, 1947, Mamdani, 1992) O’Toole, 2000, Burgess, 2004, Pitcher, Moran and Johnson, 2009). The chief was appointed and could be removed from his seat by the colonial government. It is the colonial state that made available to the chief its coercive apparatus so he could implement its orders and policies.

Re-constituted this way, the chieftainship lacked the democratic features that made it accountable and responsible to the people. With colonialism, ‘the institutional context in which this exercise of power took place changed in terms of context, its institutional framework was heavily skewed in favour of state appointed customary authorities’ (Mamdani, 1992:22). Similarly, Aston (1947:241), discussing the same subject in his study of indirect rule in Sotholand and Bechuanaland, observes that the colonial era indirect rule changed a rather strong participatory democracy within the two kingdoms in which authority was exercised according to the Sotho maxim: ‘the chief is a chief through the people’.

In his discussion of the democratic nature of East African pre-colonial societies including that of Tanganyika, Burgess (2004) concluded that:

‘in general, rulers wielded authority on behalf of the corporate entities such as clans or ethnic groups not on behalf of individuals or nations that transcend ethnic identity. The prevailing wisdom was that all members of a organisation shared the same interest, religious beliefs and code of conduct, since everybody was believed to be related according to ties of blood kinship. Personal relationships and principles of reciprocity
were more important than protection of pluralism or abstract notions of democracy, in which individual rights and responsibility are well defined' (Burgess 2004: 25).

This democracy and accountability of leadership gradually encountered despotism and authoritarianism as chiefs enforced a myriad of policies, and demands on the people emanating from both the colonial administration and the chiefs themselves. As noted by Mamdani (1992), much of what was to be done for the colonial regime comprised activities that had to be ‘enforced’ on the people, as they were alien to their way of life and against their interests.

The focus of the colonial regime was a functional extractive economy - to extract whatever revenue possible from the colonised state (DeLancey, 2007: 113). The economic focus of the colonial government impacted on how the administration organised its executive, legislative and judiciary functions. Arguably it was not necessary to divide and demarcate the functions of government. Compared to the government in the metropolis itself, which had to serve the citizens of the metropolitan state as well as seek and implement a popular mandate from its citizens, the function of the colonial government was mostly protective. It was charged with protecting the capital of British, and other Europeans, who had invested in the colony. Other issues were secondary and subservient to this main aim. As observed by Chazan et al, (1992) and Ghai (1972), the decision-making [legislative] and implementation [executive] functions were not distinguished in the colonial rule (Chazan et al.1992: 46). Even when such relevant institutions were established, power over the legislative and executive functions was still wielded by the colonial governors who had supremacy in both aspects, and only in few instances were they ‘constrained procedurally’ by the judiciary system (Ghai 1972:406).

Those most affected by this non-consultative style of governance were the Africans. In matters of administration of the natives, the British, as the Germans before them, wielded all legislative, executive and judiciary powers. While Europeans and Asians had representatives in the consultative legislative organ of the administration, Africans were not represented until a few years before independence (Illife, 1979:373-375). Europeans enjoyed the right to a trial in the courts where the right of counsel was allowed and imperial statutory law was adjudicated (Bates, 1962:466-477). Africans were confined to
native courts where imperial statutory law was not applicable and the right of counsel was non-existent. The high court appeal system catered only for Europeans and Asians (Bates, 1962: 477 and Court of Appeal of Tanzania, 2004:28-48)

This materialist and racist focus of the colonial regime and its system made it possible to have in place a government that did not consult the majority of the colony’s population and was not accountable to them because its primary aim was to make the colony economically viable and exploitable for the minority.

**Exploitation and under-development of indigenous people**

Exploitation and under-development of the African people is the other major negative experience that contributed to their increasing agitation for independence. The colonial regime enforced exploitation of Africans through forced and low-paid labour; taxation; curtailment of the freedom to engage in economic activities; and lastly, caused underdevelopment by not investing significantly in social services including, education and public health. The British, who had banned the slave trade and slavery, also used forced labour for public works. Furthermore, during and for a few years after the Second World War, they forced natives into labour on British owned sisal plantations (Illife, 1979:247 and 371)

While forced labour was a brutal and direct way of acquiring African labour, the imposition of a system of taxation on Africans, which had to be paid in money, was an indirect way of getting natives to work for Europeans. To make tax an effective instrument in forcing Africans to engage in paid work on European farms, tax collection was enforced ruthlessly. Africans who failed to pay taxes were hunted down or their property – mainly cattle – were confiscated till the tax was paid. Chiefs who failed to collect taxes were dethroned. Sometimes they were held hostage until their people paid the taxes (Illife: 1979:133-134). If people wanted to escape the brutality, they had to seek paid work in European farms (Stephens, 1968:46-47 and Illife1979: 305). The thinking in the colonial regime was that ‘Africans should be made to work either by direct compulsion, by levying a poll tax or by increasing the hut tax’ (Henderson, 1965: 149).
Arguably to the Africans, compulsory labour and taxation were symbolic of slavery, of which Africans were well aware (Raum, 1963:176).

Africans were exploited by low-pay and bad working conditions. Throughout the colonial establishment, from 1890 until the last decade of colonialism, the colonial governments and European (and to a lesser extent Asian) economic entrepreneurs ran an economic system that exploited African labour unchecked by any form of trade union. The first trade unions were founded in 1947, (Mpangala, 1992: 21-41 and Mukandala, 1999:5). It is not surprising then that in this system wages were kept low and workers were hired and fired easily. To the employers, as noted by Bienfield (1979:555), neither the government nor the employers took responsibility for workers through any form of welfare system, even to the extent of guaranteeing a minimum wage. Minimum wage legislation was introduced in Tanganyika in 1956 (Bienfield, 1979:596). For the most part legislation governing labour relations was the ‘servant and master’ ordinance, which, as Bienfield unhesitatingly points out, had ‘strong undertones of indentured labour’ (1979:565). When Africans working at the Dar es Salaam harbour successfully carried out a major strike in 1947, which spread to other sectors and to all parts of Tanganyika, the tribunal investigating workers claims found their previous working conditions to have been so bad it recommended a 40-50 % increase in the workers salaries (Illife, 1979:404).

As Africans were the main suppliers of manual labour in the colony in which the main economic activity was agriculture, however, the land interests of Africans and their engagement in agriculture was not an issue of significance for the government. In fact, land alienation was used both as a policy to secure land for Europeans and as a tool to force Africans to work for Europeans (Hatch, 1972: 86-89 and Illife: 1979:289). Since the German colonial era, land in Tanganyika was declared ‘crown land’ - legally it could not be used without permission of the colonial government or it could be taken by the colonial government (Illife, 1979:127). The British were relatively constrained in this respect due to stipulations in the League of Nations mandate that required them to hold the interests of the indigenous people in higher regard. This included some protection of their right to land they owned or had traditionally farmed.
Adding to the restrictions imposed on Africans with regards to the land, once European plantations were established, the colonial government advocated various policies that prohibited and constrained Africans from engaging in production of cash crops (Erlich, 1965, Hatch, 1972, Illife, 1979, Nabudere, 1982). When Africans persisted, or when the colonial government allowed them to produce cash crops, they faced two main problems. Firstly they were not given a licence to purchase and resell the produce to world markets (Maguire, 1969). Such licences were reserved for Asians who kept a watchful eye on whether or not they were granted to Africans (Illife, 1979: 374-375). Secondly, government officials through its local government heavily supervised the production of cash crop by Africans. This interference in the production of cash crops by Africans was carried out under the pretext of controlling crop diseases and ensuring production of high-quality produce to maintain a certain standard of products from Tanganyika. If Africans planted the forbidden crop - as was the case when some planted Arabica coffee only allowed for Europeans - their crops were uprooted by government order (Illife, 1979:290).

Apart from the direct exploitation of Africans by low wages, unfavourable working conditions and restrictions on cash crop production, other more subtle forms of exploitation began to rise more clearly to the surface as awareness among people increased. Such exploitation mainly took the form of inadequate and/or lack of government investment in the colony’s social services, especially where Africans were concerned. This inadequate funding in social services and its consequence is elaborated below in the education sector. Aware of the importance of education, Africans themselves began to put their own resources together to build and run schools and colleges. In Moshi the native cooperative union started and ran several schools and a business college (COI, 1961:31).

The colonial government failed to invest in education for Africans at all levels from primary school onwards. As observed by Ehlich (1965) universal elementary education was not achieved during the colonial era. The reason was insufficient funding for African education. While the colonial government budget for education was £333,000, a universal elementary education of up to standard III and a modest program of
higher education would have required a recurrent annual budget of £1,800,000 (Ehlich 1965:299)

Even in primary education where the colonial government placed emphasis (Cameroon and Dodd, 1979:59-76; Robertson, 1983: 55; Buchert 1994:58), enrolment figures were only 20 % of the population that was supposed to benefit from the education as shown in the table below.

**Table: 1 Number of children attending primary school**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated eligible children (000)*</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Receiving any education</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Eligibility calculated on 20 % of the total population being 20 per cent of the total population between ages of 8 and 14.

Source: Stephens (1968:49)
Moreover, the primary education most students received was insubstantial, general and basic. The emphasis of the colonial government was mostly on primary education for Africans. ‘It was an education designed to impart the rudiments of literacy, hygiene and agriculture, little effort was put into the post-primary and higher education’ (Stephens, (1968:50). As pointed out by Robertson (1983), the primary schools in Tanganyika ‘as the foundation of learning standard V and beyond, were effective enough, but for the majority it was a quantitative success and in many cases a qualitative failure’ (Robertson 1983: 50).

It is noteworthy that it is only in the last five-year plan of the colonial government before independence (1957-61) that the emphasis shifted to expansion beyond standard IV level of primary to middle schools and secondary schools. When independence was achieved in 1961, as observed by Robertson, the development of secondary education had been ‘long overdue and it clearly came too late’ (1983:50).

The impact of the colonial government policy of education and employment was the ‘continued limited access to the opportunities of modern sector economy’ to Africans (Buchert, 1994). As Buchert categorised, less than 0.5 million Africans within the 8.7 million African populations in 1957 were in waged employment. Among these, 199,000 Africans worked in the agricultural sector and earned 38 % of all wages paid to Africans. Meanwhile, between 1948 and 1957 more than 60 % of Asians, who numbered around 100,000, continued to monopolise wholesale and retail trade. Asians also established themselves as capitalist owners of plantations or were engaged in public and other services (Buchert, 1994:53). Buchert further observes that among the approximate 20,000 gainfully employed Europeans, about half were in public and other services primarily as administrators and technicians. Approximately 20 % were employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing; and a small number were owners or managers of agricultural estates or engaged in commerce and industry. At independence in 1961, Europeans and Asians together constituted 87 % (African 13 %) of the highest-level graduate professionals, senior administrators and senior managers in industry and commerce. They formed 70 % (Africans 30 %) of the next level of technicians; sub-professional grades; executive grades in the civil service; middle management in industry and commerce; and teachers in secondary education without a university degree (Buchert 1994:53).
As a consequence of the economic and social policies of the colonial government, Africans increasingly felt the exploitative and discriminatory nature of the colonial regime. The colonial government, it was felt, was focusing on economic exploitation of Tanganyika while investing little in the public health and education of Africans and development of Tanganyika as whole. While all European and Asian children had opportunities in primary and secondary school and colleges, African children did not. The two groups were the main beneficiaries of the economic activities within the colony. They operated under minimum constraints and were in representative bodies to advocate their interests. It is the negative sentiments produced by such political, economic and social policies that leaders of political independence movements could both tap into and then express them as political ideas. The articulation of African interests began with the formation Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in 1929 as a national body that sought to unite all Africans and work for them as whole. The movement began as a social cultural movement of Africans and was later transformed into a political party, which was initially Africans-only but later opened its membership to people of other races.

**Development of the independence movement**

The roots of the independence movement are found in the many self help associations formed by Africans in response to the colonial regime. To this end, Africans formed tribal, regional, territorial and even pan-African associations. One of the earliest associations of modern kind to be formed was the Tanganyika Territorial African Civil Servants Association formed in 1922 (Illife, 1979: 267) by the most educated section of the African population - Africans in the colonial civil service. The labour sector - from workers on plantations to labourers in ports - organized various forms of joint action, welfare associations, and trade unions. A number of African trade unions were formed after the 1947 Tanzania-wide strikes of workers (Mpangala, 1992: 21-41). Up to 1959 (two years prior to the independence) in Tanganyika, there were 27 national registered trade unions with about 384 branches countrywide (COI, 1959). The trade unions were mostly associations of Africans from those working in the civil service to those labouring in the plantations. These organisations cut across the ethnic divides among Africans, and united all African workers regardless of their ethnicity (Mukandala, 1999:15). With the
development of trade unions, the workers formed the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) as a national organisation (Mukandala 1999:15).

In the agricultural sector, which was the largest and one of the most important components of the colonial economy, workers were engaged in a conflict that pitted European settlers, Asians and African peasants against each other. Africans in Tanganyika resorted to formation of their own cooperative unions to defend their interests against Asians who the British colonial state promoted as ‘middle men’ to purchase agricultural produce (Moshi, 1992:66). The unions were also set up to cope with interference by the colonial regime in agricultural activities of Africans. The cooperatives started by Africans were essentially local and sometimes provincial. There was no nationwide association of cooperative societies as there was a federation of labour. One of the earliest and by far the strongest, cooperative movement was the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), established in the Kilimanjaro area in 1925. Like KNPA, most cooperative associations were formed from 1920s onwards. By the 1940s there were about 79 registered societies with 60,445 members. In 1960, a year before independence of Tanganyika, the number of cooperatives had increased to 691 societies with 326,211 members (COI, 1960). The figure represented 12-15% of the adult population engaged in agriculture. This made the cooperative movement in Tanganyika one the largest movements in tropical Africa (Illife, 1979:464).

The history of the formation of particularistic interest groups and the formation of national, even pan-African associations, in Tanzania was not sequential but intertwined. As pointed out earlier, important groundwork for this was laid by the colonial regime’s racially privileging policies that consolidated African solidarity as it did that of other races in the colony. Even though African people formed professional, tribal, regional and area specific associations, the same general treatment and predicament as a race made them unite and form African territorial/national solidarity associations in facing the colonial regime. The particularistic, professional and tribal associations were not in conflict with but, rather, complemented territorial/national racial associations (Kimambo and Temu 1969; Maguire 1969; Illife 1979).
In addition to the common predicament of Africans under colonial rule, a particular catalyst for territorial/national motivation for solidarity and African national politics was the fact that both the territory and its people were under the mandate of the League of Nations, and later the United Nations. Tanzanians became increasingly aware of this and often resorted to the mandate status argument to defend Tanganyikans’ territorial interests (Illife, 1979:430-431). Africans in Tanganyika brought the mandate argument to the fore in 1929, when European settlers in Tanzania and Kenya campaigned for the formation of one colonial government for the two colonies. The group in Tanganyika, which opposed this move on behalf of Africans, was mainly from the Tanganyika Territorial African Civil Servants Association (TTACSA). This engagement served as the immediate stimulus for them to seek to form an organization to represent Africans in Tanzania that incorporated leaders of all social groups and serve as the *chama cha umoja wa watu wa Afrika* (the association of unity of Africans). It would be the African counterpart to the European Association, which defended interests and rights of Europeans and the Asians Association, which represented all Asians (Illife, 1979:406). The desire to form an African representative body resulted in the formation of the Tanganyika African Association in 1929. TAA stressed African unity, and membership was open to any African regardless of tribe, religion and territorial origin. Its aim was to safeguard the interests of Africans not only in Tanganyika but also in the whole of Africa (Illife, 1979:406).

Two ideas were as central to the founding leaders of the TAA as they were to the founding leaders of the TTACSA. First was the idea of African unity. Illife pointed out that Martin Kayamba, the founding member of TTACSA, which spearheaded the formation of TAA, believed that ‘unity is strength and unless Africans sooner or later come to realize this their future is dark and gloomy’ (1979:267). TTACSA, itself an embodiment of unity of African civil servants, arguably sought to extend the same to all Africans in the colony. Civil servants as an elite were united by education and experiences that made them transcend tribal and other provincial focuses. Not only were they educated in trans-tribal and trans-religious melting pots of educational institutions; they were also colleagues as servants of the cross-territorial colonial administration (Illife, 1979:407-409). A less immediate reason for the emphasis on African unity, and
for TAA to embrace the idea of unity, arose from remembering that divisions among Africans were perceived to be responsible for Tanzanian communities falling under colonial rule in the first place (Illife, 1979:406-407).

The second main idea was that the educated had to take the lead and work for the betterment of all Africans in Tanganyika. It was the general belief of society that the educated had a leading role to play, as they possessed a European education and knowledge. This collective expectation in African thinking since their defeat to colonialism was summed up by the following quote: ‘if our children learn to read and write, they will find out what the Europeans know, then the Whitemen won’t be able to order us about any more. Then we will become our masters’ (Listowel 1965:181). African writers have explored this thinking in various novels; key among them is ‘No Longer at Ease’, by Chinua Achebe (1958) and ‘The River Between’ by Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1965).

Educated Tanzanians were of the view that ‘educated Africans must not keep away from the uneducated and the illiterate’ (Mwangosi quoted in Illife, 1979:422). The educated, both in and out of colleges, acknowledged and accepted that the wellbeing and betterment of Tanzania and Tanzanians depended on them (Listowel, 1965:184). The position noted here was summed up in a TAA resolution thus:

‘the educated as politically advanced shall endeavour to teach his people what he knows and thereby help the political awakening and advancement of the whole nation. A small group of educated persons who prefer to keep away from the elders and the masses cannot be truly strong and useful, nor can it be expected to represent the people in the true sense. Each African Association shall have the elders and the masses as its backbone’ (TAA resolution, 1945, quoted in Illife, 1969:424).

Since its inception, the TAA, spear-headed mostly by educated Africans had as its key goal the representation of all Africans in Tanzania (Maguire 1969:112-159; Illife 1979:405-435; Listowel 1965:209-217 and 221-227). It was particularly helpful for the cause of unity that the educated from all ethnic groups and religious affiliations subscribed, and wanted, to spread the use of TAA as a social and political forum for themselves and their people. The educated took the lead in working for and with the
organization to champion local causes of people. It was particularly helpful that the colonial administration had a territorial civil service system by which government employees could be posted to anywhere in Tanganyika. With work visits and work location transfers, the educated in the civil service were able to spread and disseminate TAA ideas and information to most parts of Tanganyika (Maguire, 1969, Illife, 1979, and Listowel, 1965).

TAA was not only expanded by the African elite in the civil service, African traders too contributed to its spread (Illife, 1979:428). In the provinces and rural areas, having a branch of TAA was found desirable not just due to the allure of solidarity with other members of TAA around the country, but also for the promise of support from the headquarters of the association in Dar es Salaam (Illife, 1979:412 and 427). In championing the cause of Africans in the colonial capital in Dar es Salaam and in the provinces, TAA took local causes and made them national and international. It successfully campaigned and raised funds, for example, from among Africans across Tanganyika to bring before the United Nations the land case of Meru African peasants and pastoralists against the colonial government in 1952 (Listowel, 1965: 209-217).

TAA became the most widespread African organization in Tanganyika, and also the one with the highest status and levels of support. Nyerere, who was to lead the independence movement, took the stance that ‘any political movement must take TAA as its basis or risk dividing the country’ (Illife, 1979:510). Evidently, since most political organizers were TAA members, starting a new organization outside the TAA structure would have caused divisions between the elite and people. The organization was not only known but was already spread across many parts of Tanganyika with thirty-nine branches totalling 1,780 members’ in 1948 (Listowel, 1965:223). Membership increased to 5000 in 1951 (Stephens, 1968: 66-67).

Even though it was recognised that TAA had done substantial work in uniting and articulating local and national issues of concern to Africans, it was also deemed necessary to articulate the demand for independence through a political movement established specifically for the purpose. This was the case because TAA was not sufficiently centrally organized and controlled. It was, in other words, a broad church that
accommodated and allowed leading individuals in provinces to champion whatever causes, in whatever manner they wanted, in the organisation’s name (Ilife, 1979:405). For a political organization demanding independence, a political party with as strong a central organisation was believed to be necessary. Secondly, TAA’s aims were not purely political. In Nyerere’s words, it was ‘a semi-social and semi-political movement’ (quoted in Temu 1969:202). Thirdly, it became necessary to transform the TAA into a full-fledged party to enable a new leadership that sought to give the population a new sense of ‘political awakening, direction and techniques’ (Temu, 1969:213).

Political conditions of the time favoured this development and provided the impetus needed for transformation of TAA into a political party. Post-Second World War austerity and British policies to increase economic exploitation of the colony increasingly antagonised African people and made the demand for independence more pointed. When land annexation and repatriation of the Africans in Meru (Northern Eastern part of Tanzania) occurred, the African people sent their representative to the United Nations to present their case against the colonial administration’s breach of its mandate obligations in Tanganyika. This was made a national issue by TAA, which raised funds for the representative and his interpreter to journey to the United Nations headquarters in New York. On return from the United Nations, the representative toured the major provinces of Tanganyika, on TAA request to inform people of the proceedings, and the injustice of colonialism (Temu, 1969:206). Equally, the use of force to enforce new practices by the colonial government in agriculture and livestock antagonized peasants, and made the central and the local governments unpopular. In Sukumaland this reached a high point with a more militant organization of TAA defying some orders of the central and local government (Maguire, 1969).

African soldiers who had fought in the Second World War also returned and some took leadership roles in the TAA. They had new visions. They had fought for freedom along soldiers of free nations, including countries where the struggle for independence was advanced such as India and Burma, and had made the commitment to bringing independence to Tanzania more urgently and realistically (Mohamed 1998). In addition, the United Nations renewed its commitment to the former League of Nations mandate territories, of which Tanganyika was one. The United Nations began to send UN missions
to Tanganyika to assess developments in accordance with the stated aim of the mandate – to prepare Tanganyika people for self-rule (Bates, 1969:172). This provided the opportunity for Tanganyikans to organize and express views of the colonial government policies.

Equally important were two reforms announced by the colonial government during this time. One was its intention to reform local governments to provide an opportunity to the three races in the colony to elect representatives instead of the previous method by which all representatives were appointed by chiefs. For elections, a political party was deemed important. The second was the introduction of the Civil Society Ordinance Act, 1954. This required all civil society organisations to register---and for existing societies to re-register---with the colonial government’s registrar of civil society organisations. One of the provisions of the new law was that a society had to be non-political to fall under the civil society category (Shivji 1982; Tindu 2000). Previously, TAA had the status of a civil society but was able to pursue political goals. With the new law it was no longer possible to do so. It was inevitable, therefore, that as demand for independence became increasingly clear and urgent, the question of what to do with TAA would become a pressing one.

Of critical importance was also the fact that leadership of the Association fell on the young generation of Africans in Tanganyika (Bates, 1969:168-169). They had the opportunity to contemplate the country’s independence while studying in East Africa, and while abroad in Britain and other parts of the world (Listowel, 1965:179-190). Julius Nyerere came to be relied upon by many to lead TAA and the movement for independence. A group among the younger generation later engineered Nyerere’s successful assumption of TAA leadership, and worked with him to transform TAA into TANU along the lines of Nkurumah’s independence party (Ghana Convention People’s Party) and the British Labour party as suggested by Nyerere. Nyerere had studied in Britain and maintained TAA leadership’s contacts with the Fabian Foundation which stood for gradual reforms to socialism, supported the British Labour Party, and was sympathetic to decolonization at the time (Illife, 1979:509-510)
The transformation of TAA into a political party happened in July 1954 at a TAA national conference in Dar es Salaam at which representatives of TAA from all major provinces of Tanzania were present. Having ironed out previous disagreements, delegates deliberated on the new amendments to the TAA constitution that would change it to a political party (Illife, 1979:511). Key among these were amendments that corrected the main weakness of TAA and provided the headquarters with a central command structure. However, it also shared power with the regions by deciding that while the executive body of the party would be at the headquarters, the supreme decision making power of the party would be held by the annual delegate conference. Two thirds of contributions and levies made to the party had to go to the headquarters and a third had to remain at the local level. It also now spelled the aim of TANU as ‘to prepare people of Tanganyika for self government and independence and fight relentlessly until Tanganyika is self-governing and independent’ (quoted in Illife 1979:512).

TANU inherited the members and branches of TAA and began to build on its foundation. As an independence movement, TANU continued to vigorously articulate the key ideas that arguably further galvanized Tanzanians as a political organisation. The three main themes that formed the basis of the desire for independence correspond to three discernable strands of the colonial regime as discussed earlier in this chapter. The colonial regime was unjust and undemocratic, exploitative, hindered development of Africans, and did not foster equitable and sustainable development of Tanzania. In addition, it propagated its policies along racial lines with Africans in the last stratum. The thinking and ideas which TANU put forward and articulated in the three strands and themes were the opposite of what the colonial regime was to the African people.

**Ideas on Democratic Government**

In contrast to the colonial regime, African nationalists envisioned the post-independence regime to be a democratic one. This democracy was firstly in terms of a government formed by majority rule. TANU not only specifically demanded that the government was to be essentially African - as Africans formed the majority - but also stated that Tanganyika belonged to Africans. Secondly, the rule was to be just, in contrast to the injustice, and arbitrary tendencies of the colonial regime.
Articulating the majority rule demand before the United Nations’ Trusteeship Council in 1955 and the Legislative Council in Tanganyika in 1958, the leader of TANU, Nyerere, argued that, ‘Tanganyika is going to be developed as a democratic state and that since 98 per cent of the population is African this means naturally that Tanganyika is to become primarily an African state’ (Listowel, 1965:249). The principle of racial parity where all races (Europeans, Asians and Africans) would have equal representation – as advocated by the colonial regime and the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) and supported by some traditional chiefs – was rejected by the majority of TANU (Listowel, 1965:273). TANU rejected the parity principle because it would still favour Europeans and Asians in Tanzania as each of these races of people would have equal representation as Africans even though they were a small minority in comparison (Listowel, 1965:242).

On the second aspect of democracy, or a just government, nationalists in Tanganyika were inspired by their struggles against the injustices and excesses of the colonial and local native authorities implementing most of the decisions and policies of colonial government. The leaders and members of TAA and TANU opposed the injustices of the two institutions (Maguire, 1969). The nationalist vision for post-independence was that democracy would not only be a way of government but also a way of life in Tanganyika (Nyerere, 1967:133).

To this end, the idea of a democratic government, which is also explicitly socialist, is summarised in the TANU constitution:

- Every individual has the right to dignity and respect
- Every citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an equal part in Government at local, regional and national level
- Every citizen has the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious beliefs and of association within the context of the law
- Every individual has the right to receive from society protection of his life and of property held according to law
- That every individual has the right to receive just return for his labour
- To ensure safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
To ensure the country shall be governed by the democratic socialist government of the people

To see that the government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption (Nyerere 1968:13-15).

On one level democracy was viewed as a quest for universal human rights for Tanzanians. To nationalists, the struggle was, as Nyerere put it, ‘… fighting for our rights as human beings’ (Nyerere1967: 70). But it is also evident that the form of democracy that TANU implemented would be within a socialist framework and not that of a liberal democracy.

Economic Development and a Developmental State

The second aspect of the colonial regime from which the promise of independence and ideology of the nationalist leaders emanated, is the specific effect of the discriminatory policies of the colonial regime as a hindrance to Africans and their economic prosperity. Under colonialism most of the income of the State was siphoned off to Europe while the majority of Tanganyikans were not guaranteed even the basic right of universal primary school education or simple health care facilities in their localities. After more than half a century of colonial rule in Tanganyika, by 1956 only 40% of African children had access to primary school education, compared to all European and Asian children (Nyerere, 1967: 41-42).

In contrast to the colonial regime's disengagement from development issues in Tanganyika, African nationalist leaders envisioned a post-colonial regime that would be developmental. As stated in the TANU constitution, they expected to form a government that would utilise state resources to eradicate poverty, diseases and ignorance. It would be a government that, wherever possible, participated in the economic development of the country (Nyerere, 1967:14). A liberal capitalist non-interventionist state like the colonial state, or one like the state in the metropolis, were not desirable models for post-independence government. As adopted in the TANU constitution, a democratic socialist government was envisaged, and is what the nationalists hoped to form after independence (Nyerere, 1968:14). This sat well with the nationalists and could be sold to the people of
Tanganyika who had seen a ‘laissez faire’ colonial state impoverish the native majority while enriching the foreign minority.

A socialist orientation was compatible and, in fact, easily tuned in to the traditional organisation socio-economic system that most African communities had in Tanganyika. As Nyerere pointed out, ‘we in Africa have no more need of being ‘converted’ to socialism than we have of being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in our past - in the traditional society which produced us’ (Nyerere, 1968:12).

In addition, the adoption of developmental socialist, state interventionist ideology came at a time when it was the main trend, particularly in Europe, after the Second World War where many social democratic and socialist parties came to power. For Tanzania, further connections to politics and the ideology of socialism came from the politics of the British Labour Party after the Second World War. Many Tanzanian nationalist leaders were undergoing their university studies in Britain at the time and became involved with the Labour Party as well as the Fabian Colonial Bureau, a foundation associated with the Labour Party that sympathized with the cause for independence in Tanganyika (Illife, 1979:508-511).

Unity and Social Cohesion as a Means and a Goal

The third issue that formed the ideology of independence is the racially discriminative policies affecting Africans in the colony. Even though colonial rule did not have racism as its official ideology, as was the case in the former apartheid regime in South Africa, inevitably the administration reinforced racial discrimination that particularly affected African people as whole. As discussed in this chapter, Africans were deliberately kept in the lowest stratum and enjoyed the least social, political and economic rights in Tanganyika.

This treatment galvanized the unity of Africans who gradually came to know that their fate was bound together, and that to free themselves from the colonial regime, they had to unite against it. The first task was to correct some of its excesses and, in the long term, to get rid of them completely. In this, therefore, a functional difference between Africans working in different sectors of the colonial economy was not important, neither
were the ethnic, religious and denominational differences. The major cleavage was that of race with the majority of Africans uniting against the British colonial state.

The desire for unity - a problematic issue in most African states because of the many ethnic groups - was articulated as a means to attain the goal of independence and came to be part of the ideological outlook of the nationalists. This position was arrived at organically in response to the inferior position that all Africans were held in. Not surprisingly, this desire for unity as expressed by founding members of TAA (Tanganyika African Association) resembled the aspirations of the Pan African movement.

Following the formation of TAA, Africans formed all African social welfare associations alongside ethnic organizations in the Tanganyika capital, Dar es Salaam, and in the provinces. The associations ranged from those providing mutual assistance among city dwellers from one ethnic group to socio-economic development focused associations that contested the power and role of the colonial and conservative local ethnic authorities. In this the associations were not in conflict with nationalists. In fact most members of progressive ethnic associations were also members of TAA (Illife, 1979:486-507). The trade unions formed were all African and, as discussed before, TAA was later transformed into the political party TANU.

African unity in Tanganyika was a central aim of TAA and as TANU it also embraced the theme of unity (Illife 1969:239-240), adopting "Uhuru na Umoja" (freedom and unity) as the slogan for the independence struggle. TANU operationalized the theme of unity both as a goal and means to achieve independence. Unity, therefore, as a means and goal of independence was a product of the common experience of Africans as a whole, and as such, it became part of the ideology of the nationalists in TANU. The importance of unity to the leaders of the independence movement and to Tanganyikans in general arose for a number of reasons. Firstly, in the traditions of different Tanganyikan ethnic groups, unity is highly valued and emphasized. Swahili sayings from different ethnic groups such as "Umoja ni nguvu" (Unity is strength) "Kidole kimoja hakivunji chawa" (One finger cannot pinch a lice) or "Fimbo ya mnyonge ni umoja" (the stick of the weak is unity), attests to this. The use of these expressions by nationalist leaders resonated
among the people across different ethnic groups. The common use of Swahili language throughout the territory of Tanganyika was instrumental in this aspect as it allowed sayings and expressions from different ethnic groups to be easily translated and understood.

Secondly, the memory of formidable but defeated individual ethnic group resistances to colonialism made the argument for unity to topple colonialism one that did not need much persuasion. People did not doubt the idea of strength in unity but doubted more that independence could be achieved without waging a war with the colonialists as they had attempted to do before. Thirdly, as already discussed, Africans working in civil service and other sectors of the colonial economy and society, missionary schools, the health sector and local governments, mostly spearheaded the formation and spread the movements as they had mobility and already worked in a multi-ethnic environment. Also the work of African trade unions that successfully united workers and effectively demanded their rights was important and there was close cooperation between TANU and trade unions. Trade unions were represented in the TANU national executive committee (Guruli, 1974:31-58). In the provinces, moreover, the success of African cooperative unions showed that when united, people could achieve their aims as cooperative unionism grew and helped African peasants perform the middleman role hitherto played by Asians. This was so inspiring that TANU itself promoted formation of cooperative movements, and believed that cooperative unions would be a pillar in building a socialist and self-reliant Tanganyika (Nyerere, 1968: 14 and Mpangala, 2000)

Furthermore, the promotion of native authorities by the colonial government to implement its policies, and the despotic and nepotistic tendencies of the native authorities themselves, made these ethnic institutions unpopular among many people at the local level. This unpopularity of local native authorities as organizations of disunity and instruments of the colonial regime’s divide and rule strategy enhanced the position of TANU. Growing on this fertile ground, the Tanganyika’s independence movement became perhaps the most united such movement in Africa (Illife, 1979:526). It went on to become the regime party of a one party state and to dominate politics in the multiparty system.
Opposition to TANU

It is also interesting to look at the opposition to TANU as the potential basis for the formation of alternative political parties both in the immediate post independence period and when the space was created for that development in the multiparty era. The first alternative party to emerge was the United Tanganyika Party (UTP). The formation of the party was instigated by the colonial regime and was formed by unofficial members of the Legislative Council appointed by the Governor (Illife, 1979:521-522). UTP adopted as its platform a policy of racial parity and multi-racialism favoured by the colonial administration (Taylor, 1963:137). The agenda of the party was that Europeans, Asians and Africans should have equal representation and share of leadership to begin with, and only gradually should Africans assume more power as they become more advanced and responsible (Taylor, 1963:140). TANU opposed the racial parity policy arguing for a majority rule, which would automatically give more power to Africans as the majority in Tanzania.

UTP received support among some Africans, particularly from most of the chiefs and appointed members in the Legislative Council. Europeans also supported the party. There was less support than expected from Asians, however, as tactically they found it safer to remain neutral or to support TANU as the party most likely take over from the colonial administration (Taylor, 1963:141).

A section of African Muslims formed a party called the All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT). This party sought to capitalize on the Muslim constituency. AMNUT’s main demand was that the independence of Tanzania should be delayed until such time as ‘Muslims in the country had attained greater educational progress’ (Temu, 1969:212) given that, even by African standards, Muslims had been disadvantaged in the colonial state. AMNUT failed to gain much support among its target group. Muslims had been engaged with TAA from the beginning and their allegiance was now with TANU. Muslims played a key role in the foundation of TAA and TANU and were in top leadership positions of the two associations. Not withstanding their comparative disadvantage as a group, they did not think that their position would be improved by delaying independence.
In 1958, a difference among TANU’s leaders and members over whether to participate or not in the first multi-racial election—where voters cast a tripartite vote for a European, Asian and an African candidate—threatened the unity of TANU. Even though the conflict was resolved, the assistant secretary of TANU who opposed TANU’s participation in the multi-racial elections left TANU and formed another party – African National Congress (ANC). ANC campaigned on a radical program of ‘Africa for Africans only’ (Illife, 1979: 572). This was in opposition to TANU, which had a moderate program seeking majority rule by Africans but was willing and ready to engage and protect the rights of non-Africans who had—and would have—citizenship of Tanzania (Taylor, 1963:133). ANC, like AMNUT, did not find much support. It won no seats in any election towards the independence of Tanzania.

At the elections prior to and at the time of independence, when there was a progressive extension of the franchise, the opposition parties did not obtain substantial popular backing and TANU took over the government of the new state without a significant political rival.

**Conclusion**

It is discernible from the discussion in this chapter that the common experience of African people under colonialism in Tanzania resulted in two complementary common fronts: first, the struggle against the colonial regime and its tributary local governments and, second, the development of commonly held ideas about the future independent state and its governance. The process of developing common ideas was assisted by actions of the early African political elite and later by leaders of the independence movement. The ideas had the effect of galvanizing African people and their leaders together into a political organisation based on a common ideology that envisaged a post-independence state that would be politically democratic, economically developmental and socially capable of uniting the people within the territory of Tanzania.

It has been argued that post-colonial African politics is simply a continuation of the colonial state and the learnt behaviour of non-democratic practices that includes the use of the ‘divide and rule’ politics of ethnic group manipulation and appeasement (Lemarchand, 1972; Diamond, 1987; Bayart, 1993; Otunnu, 1995; Onyang‘iNyong'o,
However, the neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime theories do not treat the support levels for national independence movement and their mobilising ideas as significant factors in the capacity of regime parties to maintain legitimacy and popular support. At the time of independence there was no significant opposition to TANU. It enjoyed widespread popularity and took power accompanied by a sense of public optimism about the capacity of the independent state. In the following chapters this thesis will discuss the way in which TANU (CCM from 1977), as the regime party in Tanzania, maintained its legitimacy in the eyes of the Tanzanian people and compare this with the extent to which, as a political party, they engaged in practices that could be considered neo-patrimonial or manipulative in order to hold on to power.
CHAPTER 4. THE TANZANIA REGIME AND DEMOCRACY

Tanzania was a one party state for well over 27 years. The country become a one party state by law in 1965, four years after independence and remained so until 1992 when the law was changed to allow for other parties to form. For much of the period (1965-1992) under discussion in this chapter, there was no universal global agreement on the minimum conditions for a polity to claim to be democratic (Clampham, 1992). In the post-independence period African leaders put forward the argument for one party state and socialist economic systems not only as viable for democratic governance as western models but also as more suited to the conditions of the newly independent African states (Burgess 2002). It is notable that the judgement of many observers of the one-party period in Tanzanian politics were informed mostly by Western liberal democratic norms or by socialist standards of a Western European variety or the Lenin-Marxist communist models of Eastern Europe. By Western liberal and social democratic standards, the Tanzanian state was seen to have fallen short of democratic qualities by not only adopting the one-party state but also by adopting other features such as nationalization of the economy, media, and the centralization of power away from the parliament and its consolidation to the party and the presidency (Oketh-Ogendo, 1991, Luoga, 1994, Shivji, 1994, Baregu, 1997, Kilimwiko and Moshiro 2001, Oketh-Ogotha, Mihyo 2003).

The idea of the one party state has produced strong criticism on the level of democracy it contained. Commenting on the situation in Africa in general, Oketh-Ogendo (1991:15-16) has pointed out that Tanzania during the one-party era provided a classic case of a state in Africa where constitutional provisions provided for the existence of one party state that shrunk participation in politics. Luoga also stated categorically that ‘the evil under single party rule has been the wrestling of control over government from the people of Tanzania (1994:41). Shivji highlighted the same problem, pointing out that ‘the party state presented a high level of fusion of power whose defining characteristics was suppression of civil organizations in civil society on the one hand, and concentration of power in the executive, marginalizing the legislature and the judiciary on the other’ (Shivji 1994:84).
To commentators from a socialist viewpoint, the Tanzanian state fell short of fully implementing measures to make it a truly socialist state where workers are dominant and leading (Guruli, 1974, Babu, 1982:11-12). Guruli (1974:54) pointed out that in Tanzania the leading role of the working class is neglected. Instead, either the leading role of peasants or intellectuals is overestimated or, as in most cases, the necessity for a close alliance between the working class and peasants is not even advocated.

Given the evaluation of the two schools of thought—western liberal democracy and socialist perspectives—the Tanzanian state fell short of democratic credentials. Although both sets of criticisms hold some truth and the Tanzanian state was not ideal, the state remained stable and the ruling party remained able to attract support because it was seen as having attempted to be democratic in line with the Tanzanian aspirations on the nature of the independent state. Here it is argued that the use of western democratic norms—both liberal and social democratic and the Lenin-Marxist socialist, communist type—are not good criteria for judging Tanzanian democratic credentials in its one-party period. The main reason for this perspective is that these theoretical constructions, though they capture some aspect of the reality, are not consonant with the essential ideals and experiential world of the Tanzanian people and their leaders that emanated from the pre-colonial time and the experience of the colonial rule and its rejection. Therefore, the application of these externally generated standards fails to capture and explain the legitimacy of the Tanzanian state in the eyes of the population immediately after independence, when many African states implemented one party political systems.

African conceptions of the democratic regime after independence was arguably restrictive in one aspect but open in most others. It was restrictive in that it did not want or tolerate any feature reminiscent of colonial policies and regime practices as negatively experienced by the majority of African people. In all other respects it was open, leaving room for the imagination and creativity of a young generation of African leaders to conceptualize and present to the people forms of governance for a prosperous and peaceful state.

Political leaders in Africa in the post-independence period were in the privileged position of being able to espouse the way forward for a political, economic and social
system to govern the life of the people in their countries (Cartright 1983, Mushi, 1992). People held the leaders who led them to independence in high regard and granted them a large reservoir of legitimacy. This meant any new system of government they proposed to their societies were likely to be accepted (Cartright, 1983:1-3). Their problem in introducing their vision for society was to get agreement from the educated elites in their countries who, like them, claimed knowledge of Western and Eastern political, economic and social systems. Initially, even these groups in society seemed to have accepted the party leaders’ ideas. Opposition elements were also willing to compromise and accommodate ideas from the main parties, as demonstrated by the post independence elite pacts and compromises in Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and a number of other African states.

African leaders in Tanzania and many other African countries put forward the argument for a one party state, (Hayward, et al.1989, Ake, 2000). Many commentators have seen this move as a selfish act of power accumulation and centralization lacking the aim to serve a common good or a higher ideal (Oketh-Ogendo 1991, Luoga 1994, Shivji 1994, Baregu, 1997, Mihyo 2003). There is, however, an alternative view. That is, the overriding argument for the one party system which pertains to three issues relevant to the circumstances of African nation-states newly emerging from colonialism. Firstly, defeating the colonial regime required and, indeed, enforced the unity of African people within the state boundaries. Divisions of the elites prior to independence were seen as an obstacle to the common goal of fighting for independence. In Tanzania, divisions were seen as undesirable and something to be avoided (Temu, 1969, Illife, 1979:411-412).

With independence achieved, one-party democracy was advocated as desirable for continuing and consolidating unity. As Nyerere (1961) put it:

The new nations of the African continent are emerging today as result of their struggle for independence. The same nationalist movement having united the people and led them to independence must inevitably form the first government of the new state, it could hardly be expected that a united country should halt in mid-stream and voluntarily divide itself into opposing political groups just for the sake of conforming to the ‘Anglo-Saxon form of democracy’ at the moment of independence (Nyerere, 1961, 106).
Secondly, an overriding concern in the African post-colonial context was the reality of evolving and having a stable, peaceful and functioning new nation state. This was a serious consideration given the arbitrary way in which the colonial borders had been drawn, and the impossibility of unpicking those borders at the time of independence. The immediate post independence nascent African state was without a shared political history other than colonialism or an institutionalised culture of political governance. African leaders argued for adoption of one party democracy as more suitable as this would limit conflictual centrifugal tendencies that could rip the new states apart. African leaders were wary of the last minute liberal democracy bequeathed to them by the colonial powers as, in the absence of institutionalization of a moderated culture of political competition, this presented the possibility of mobilization along potentially destructive cleavages. To African leaders, building consensus, fostering unity of the people and a sense of common purpose, was more important and could be achieved better in a one party democracy than in a liberal multiparty system (Kleruu, 1964, 10-14).

Larry Diamond (1990) describes this fear of African leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s in discussions of one of his three paradoxes of an evolving democracy. Diamond sees achieving a balance between conflict and consensus, or what Terry and Schmitter (1991) have termed competition and cooperation, as the most difficult challenge of developing a democracy. Diamond captures this dilemma as follows:

Democracy by its nature is a system of institutionalised competition for power. Without competition and conflict, there is no democracy. But any society that sanctions political conflict runs the risk of it becoming too intense, producing a society so conflict ridden that civil peace and political stability are jeopardized. Hence the paradox: Democracy requires conflict—but not too much; [...] To survive and function well, democracy must moderate conflict. But cultural mechanisms for doing so do not develop overnight. In the meantime how can conflicts be contained so that political cleavages and competition do not rip society apart? (Diamond 1990: 103-104)

In addition to the dangers of conflict in a multiparty system, there was also the issue of how political parties would emerge. Lipset-Rokkan (1967) demonstrated that emergence of parties in western democracies had all been a result of significant cleavages and conflict, some of it violent. In 1963, Nyerere pointed out that there were no fundamental
differences or cleavages that could form the basis of political parties in Tanzania. He argued the one party system was thus suitable for Africa. In European countries, multi-party political systems had emerged to represent fundamental socio-economic differences in societies. This, however, was not the case in newly emerging African states (Nyerere, 1963:198). This chapter uses the ideas of Nyerere and other leaders in Tanzania to examine how the one party state was designed to reflect aspirations and ideals of the independence movement, the pre-colonial traditional democratic leadership and organisation and African ideals to judge legitimacy of governance in their state.

This chapter assesses the Tanzanian one party state using two criteria. Firstly, did it meet the democratic governance aims of the independence movement and expectations of the masses? Secondly, could it be considered neo-patrimonial? This discussion is organized into three main parts. The first deals with the main features of the one-party state system including the ideas and rationale of the system. The second part evaluates the extent to which the Tanzanian one party regime could be considered democratic. The third part discusses the critiques of the Tanzanian regime and the specific contribution of the Arusha Declaration to democracy in Tanzania.

The features of one party democracy

Ideas and rationale

The Tanzanian leadership urged that a one-party system would be a form of democracy that suits Tanzania and also that it would build on African traditions. In this regard Nyerere (1963: 103) argued that ‘traditional African society, whether it had a chief or not … was a society of equals and it conducted its business through discussion. Discussion to run the affairs of an organisation was as African as the ‘tropical sun’. Elsewhere Nyerere pointed out that ‘we in Africa have no more need of being converted to socialism than we have of being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in our past – in traditional society which produced us’ (Nyerere, 1968: 12). The leadership also accepted that as Tanzania is a modern large nation, it should follow a path of representative democracy to enable people to exercise authority in the affairs of their nation. They also
agreed with the main plank of democracy – free elections. To the criticism of the impossibility of free elections within a one party state, the leadership responded that ‘as long as TANU Membership is open to every citizen, elections can be conducted in a way which is ‘genuinely free and democratic’ (Nyerere, 1968-2000).

These essential elements of democracy and its representative modern version also appeared in the principles under which Tanzania would adopt the one party state system. Tanganyika was to remain a Republic with an executive head of state and the independence of the judiciary was to be preserved. All citizens were to be equal and would enjoy maximum political freedoms within the context of a single national movement. These political freedoms were to take the form of maximum possible participation by the people in their own government, and their ultimate control over all organs of the state through universal suffrage with the liberty to choose their own representatives in all Representative and Legislative bodies within the context of the law (Nyerere, 1968:261).

The commission that recommended the details of the single party state was asked to get answers from Tanzanians on a series of questions that included:

1. What national and local representative institutions are necessary for the full expression of the people’s will in a one-party state?
2. Is it essential for the maintenance of freedom that membership of one political party should be open to all without regard to opinions on any issue, character, or any other matter except Tanganyika citizenship?
3. Should both the National Assembly and the National Executive of TANU continue in existence? If so, what should be the relationship, and division of power between them? Is it necessary to have a district Committee of TANU and a District Council? If so what should be their relationship, etc.?
4. What should be the organs of the party through which-
   (a) national policy is formulated
   (b) the people`s will constantly find expression
   (c) changes can be brought about through peaceful means
   (d) corruption or abuse of power be overcome?
5. Should qualifications be laid down for membership of the legislature, or any other policy-making body, if so, what qualifications, and who shall determine whether the candidates possess them?

6. How should candidates for the central legislative body (or any local government) be selected, given that people should be able to freely choose the person they wish to represent them out of all those qualified? In particular:

(i) should there be freedom for anyone who wishes to stand for election to do so?

(ii) If not, what machinery is necessary to select the person or limit the number of candidates, who submit themselves to people’s choice-bearing in mind the necessity to ensure that all effective viewpoints can be put before people for decision, and that the people’s choice should be unfettered as between qualified persons?

(iii) If so, what voting or electoral procedures should be adopted to ensure that no candidate is elected on a minority vote? (Nyerere, 1968: 264-265)

In addition to the above, two important ideas were put forward as central to the Tanzanian one party democracy. They pertain to the role of the ruling party and government in governance, and the position of the people.

The relationship between the party, the people and the government

The tendency of many post independence regime leaders was to abandon building the political party and party system and only focus on the work of the government and governing, as Barkan points out in the case of Kenya from 1966 to 1983 (1989:226). In Tanzania, on the contrary, emphasis on the role of the party was central from its formation as an independence movement. This was the case despite the fact that at one point in time the Tanzanian leadership did entertain the thinking that, with the adoption of a one party state, the difference between government and party would disappear. As Nyerere pointed out in his argument for the suitability of one party democracy:

There would be no need to hold one set of elections within the party and another set afterwards for the public. All elections would be equally open for everybody. In our case, for example the present distinction between TANU and TANU government, a distinction which, as a matter of fact, our people do not in the least understand, would vanish (Nyerere 1963: 202).
In a speech delivered in 1968 as TANU leader in which he emphasised the separate role of the party and government, Nyerere appears to have reversed this position:

Our people’s governments must be backed by strong political party, deeply rooted in the people and capable of providing a living link between people and the governments the people have elected to serve them…. The party has to help the people to understand what the government is doing and why[...] But the party has also to ensure that the government stays in close touch with the feelings, the difficulties and the aspirations of the people. It has to speak for the people (Nyerere, 1968: 31-33).

Elaborating on the ideal party, Nyerere also emphasised the relationship between the party and the people, and a two-way flow of information. In his words:

Only a party which is rooted in the hearts of the people, which has its devoted workers in the villages and the towns throughout the country – only such a party can tell the Government what people’s purposes, and whether these are being carried out effectively. Only the existence of such a Party can ensure the Government and people work together for people’s purposes (Nyerere, 1968: 33).

It was clear also that the government is the instrument of the party, given that party is defined as expressing the views of the people: ‘it is not the Party, which is the instrument – of the Government. It is the government, which is the instrument through which the party tries to implement the wishes of the people, and serves their interests (Nyerere, 1968 33).

Tanzania officially adopted the policy of socialism in 1967. Later, in 1977, the ruling party officially pronounced the principle of party supremacy. The adoption of socialism and party supremacy gave commentators of socialist and Marxist schools of thought two key points on which to evaluate Tanzania. One was whether the control of the party and political affairs will be more in favour of workers’ interests (Gululi, 1974) and the other—promoted by commentators of Marxist tradition—was the establishment of a vanguard party in Tanzania (Othman 2001:159). However, the position of Tanzania’s ruling party as put forward by its leadership remained grounded in the popular principles of mass participation. The ruling party was now the party of workers and peasants. The workers were not privileged and, in fact, they saw their interests being
weighed against the overall interest of the nation (Coulson, 1989). The balance was tilted in favour of people in villages who were the majority of the population. As the TANU 1967 Arusha Declaration stated, ‘let us pay heed to the peasant’ (TANU, 1967: 15-18).

The establishment of a vanguard party, on the other hand, was rejected although many party cadres and leaders wishing to lead the people and the nation to a socialist future would have favoured such a move. Nyerere argued that:

Giving leadership does not mean usurping the role of the people. The people must make the decisions about their own future through the democratic procedures. The leadership cannot replace democracy; it must be part of democracy. If decisions relates to national affairs, then the people make it through the National Executive Committee, and Parliament, and through the National Conference of TANU. If a decision about district affairs, the people make it through the District Committee and District Council. If it is the question of purely local interest - for example whether to undertake a particular self-help scheme - then the people directly concerned must make the decision following a free debate (Nyerere, 1968: 62).

**How democratic was Tanzania?**

How democratic the Tanzanian regime was then must be judged using the criteria and ideas that were widespread in society at the time. As the question is how the regime gained legitimacy, it is important to examine what institutions the regime put in place then to enable democracy. Given that the population at this stage was more open to follow the ideas of the leadership than oppose it with alternative ideas, how enabling these institutions were is more important than how restrictive they were (Cartright, 1983: 1-2).

Researchers critical of the Tanzanian record on democracy have seen the country moving linearly from being a thin democracy bequeathed to it by the departing colonial power to becoming increasingly authoritarian (Shivji 1994, Mwaikusa 1994, Baregu, 1997, Miho, 2003). This process, they have pointed out, culminated in the adoption of supremacy of the ruling party. This thesis contends that the regime in Tanzania
introduced responsive government and implemented democratic policies at the same time with control measures in order to meet its other equally important objective of building a national political organisation. Arguably, the regime gained legitimacy because it was consistently responsive, engaged with democratic policies and rose to the challenge of building a united political organisation. The regime’s measures to build a national political organisation became a key point of its contribution to Tanzanian politics in its first 24 years, and was a significant factor in its winning the first multiparty general elections in 1995 after almost three decades of one-party rule (Maliyamkono, 1995, Omari 1996, TEMCO, 1997).

That the regime in Tanzania was responsive to the public, albeit with control measures, can be shown across the two main policies it implemented. That is, the one-party policy which began effectively in 1965, and the 1967 Arusha Declaration which set Tanzania on the path of *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* (socialism and self reliance).

**One party policy**

When Tanzania attained independence in 1961 it had a nascent multi-party system in which the supremacy of the parliament was a key feature of the Westminster model left by the departing colonial power. In the elections of 1960, overseen by the colonial administration, TANU won all seats in parliament except for one, which was won by a former member of TANU on an independent ticket. The ruling party TANU passed a resolution in 1963 to make Tanzania a *de jure* one party state (Msekwa, 1977:20). This decision was not implemented until 1964 when, prompted by army mutiny and increasing workers strikes, the government formed a commission to investigate opinions of the people on modalities of running a democratic one party state (Coulson, 1989, Othman, 2001:160, Mihyo, 2003). Based on the recommendations, Tanzania was made a one party state by law in 1965. This law required all political activities to be carried out under the one party TANU.

The adoption of a one party state, though seen as the main authoritarian policy, did not produce an outcry from the population in Tanzania. A very small number of the elite had
problems with this measure. In fact, there are only two prominent individuals, Kasanga Tumbo and Abdalah Fundikira, are on record as having protested the move to one-party state. Both were members of the ruling party (Maguire, 1969: 357-358 and Illife, 1979). Others who protested included Zuberi Mtemvu who formerly ran the only prominent opposition party. Mtemvu’s party had limited support and never won a seat in parliament nor posed a serious challenge when Mtemvu competed with Nyerere in the presidential election in 1962. Mtemvu had joined TANU earlier, before the policy of one-party was introduced, dissolving his party. A number of politicians and individuals from the defunct United Tanganyika Party (UTP) also joined TANU under its ‘open door policy’ of welcoming opposition into the party immediately after independence (Maguire, 1969:350-356).

Arguably, the move to a one-party system in Tanzania was not prompted by the need to accumulate power and control the population by the leadership, as is often presumed by researchers in assessment of African regimes (Luoga, 1994, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, and Oketh-Ogendo 2001). Three factors negate this argument. First, Nyerere put forward his thinking about one-party state in the particular circumstances of Africa, comprehensively addressing in theory the relevance, the rationale and the modality of implementing a democratic one-party state system of politics in Tanzania in 1963, two years before the system was adopted in 1965. The reasons Tanzanian leaders advanced in support of one party democracy, and their worries about the multiparty system in an emerging democracy, are understandable in the context of paradoxes of evolving a democracy conceptualised by Diamond (1990).

Second, there is a specific context, which in Tanzania triggered the regime to move fast to implement the idea of a one-party system. The first steps for implementing the idea of a one party state came after an army mutiny and amid continued workers’ protest marches and strikes demanding better pay and an Africanization program. Many researchers have seen the fact that the regime began implementing the idea of one party political system in these circumstances as evidence that it acted with the aim of controlling the opposition (Shivji 1994, Mwaikusa 1994, M Luoga 1994 and Oketh-Ogendo 2001, Mihyo, 2003). Arguably, the fact that the regime acted to change the system after unrest following an armed mutiny increased the legitimacy of the regime to a
public desirous of peace and consensus politics. After all, majority of Tanzanians were members and supporters of TANU. This enabled the party to win all seats thus becoming the sole party in parliament in the first post-independence election of 1961. It is also notable that in the first two decades and a half following independence, neither the workers unions nor many politicians of the opposition, or the population at large, organized to oppose the shift to one party system in Tanzania (Othman, 2001:159-160). This lack of opposition from the population towards one-party rule away from a nascent multiparty system left by the colonialists was a common feature among many other African countries (Hayward, 1989). This is an indication that the thinking of Africans about democratic systems of governance did not define democracy in terms of multiparty liberal democracy system yet at this stage.

Third, even though it was the only party in Parliament after the first multiparty election, TANU did not act recklessly in implementing the idea of a one party political system. Notably, the government in Tanzania formed a Presidential commission, which solicited the opinion of the people on how to run a democratic one-party state. The commission consulted with the people for almost a year from 1964-1965 before compiling a report on its findings. It was the commission’s report that formed the basis of the shift to a one party-state in Tanzania.

Equally important is that, among leaders in Africa that shifted their countries to a one party state system, the Tanzanian leadership had put forward its thinking about one-party states in an African context much earlier. It comprehensively addressed in theory the relevance, the rationale and the modality of implementing a democratic one-party state system of politics in Tanzania (Nyerere, 1963, and Kleruu, 1964).

As the analysis below points out, the Tanzanian regime’s struggle with the problem of ensuring democracy within the one party system, it is plausible to argue that it was more concerned with the question of whether the new nation will withstand the vicissitudes produced by the paradox of the incompatibility between a competitive democracy and the need to contain those forces that could tear a new state apart and prevent the building of a collective identify (Diamond, 2000) as the state faced the twin challenges of political participation and economic development.
Operating the one party political system

The one-party system was adopted in 1965. General presidential and parliamentary elections were held the very same year. The new one-party system of elections of leaders was put to the test. The system largely passed the one-party democratic test as postulated. Through the primaries conducted by the Annual District Conference delegates of the party from villages and town centres, all candidates who put their names forward were listened to and were voted by the conference delegates, ranking them according to votes they received. This list was submitted to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party, which had to send back two names of candidates to vote for by the entire electorate. Here also the system passed the test to a large extent with the NEC returning to voters all except 16 out of 210 names that had won first and second place in the primary election of candidates in the District Annual Conference (Samoff, 1989, 158). According to an NEC report, rejections of candidates who topped the primary election voter preference were made where a candidate’s loyalty to TANU and to the country was in question (NEC, 1965:12). After the 1967 Arusha Declaration, adherence to the public leadership code and the policies of Ujamaa were the main criteria (Kjekshus, 1976: 373-374).

In a way, which was fair to all candidates and to the electorate, the candidates were not allowed to run their own privately sponsored campaigns activities (Hill, 1973:210-214, TEMCO, 1995). All the campaigns were organized by the electoral commission, were publicly funded, and were to be jointly conducted with candidates attending joint campaign meetings, and making speeches and answering questions from the electorate in the same meetings. Important for the building of a sense of national political organisation, candidates could not campaign on platforms of race, religion, and ethnicity (Mushi and Baregu 1994:94-96).

In the first one-party election in year 1965, people exercised their choice and among the democratic highlights of the election is the fact that people changed 15 incumbents, including four government ministers. The change of incumbents, including powerful politicians at the national level, holding ministerial posts, has been the norm in Tanzanian
elections conducted without failure every five years since the first general elections in 1965, as the table below indicates.

Table 2. Turn over of incumbents in elections

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%/number MPs not re-elected</td>
<td>(15 MPs)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers Loosing re-election bid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The general election in which all people participated every five years was one of a set of elections held in the country. The other elections, conducted every five years, two years after the general election, were party leadership elections. This involved more than two million adult Tanzanians who were members of the ruling the party (Nyalali 1991). The party elections, like the general elections, were conducted without fail every five years. The party elections arguably consolidated democracy within the ruling party.

By giving all members of the political elite equal opportunity to contest for leadership posts, first through the Annual District Conference for parliamentary seats and then for the party leadership, and by giving all people the opportunity to vote every five years without fail—even when such choices were limited by the requirement that the candidate be of the ruling party—the leadership in Tanzania arguably legitimized the political system as democratic to the people. After all, if people were dissatisfied with their
representation, they could unseat incumbents however high ranking within the party or government (Mwansansu, 1973:161, Ofcansky and Yeager 1997: 77-80). Elections, therefore, substantially tilted power towards the electorate.

It is observable that the one-party system in Tanzania involved a majority of political elites, and it was open to others who wanted to contest for leadership but were not in the party. Few who were outside and composed the minority opposition before and after independence joined later under the open door policy of the party after independence (Maguire, 1969). Also, any adult Tanzanian could join the party; membership was largely open and did not require stringent qualifications for joining (Mwansansu, 1979:190, Kweka, 1995, Othman, 2001). As such, for the political elites, the system was open. Anyone could be a member of the ruling party and be able to contest for leadership. As incumbents could be overturned, the system did not bar or discourage old and new contestants. For the people, the political system as observed above provided the opportunity for questioning candidates and electing new leaders every five years.

Samoff (1989:179) gives a favourable reflection and evaluation on Tanzanian elections over time when he points out that:

Perhaps the most striking feature of elections in Tanzania has been their regularity. Elections have been institutionalized as the primary mechanism for choosing leaders in nearly all spheres of Tanzanian political life. The procedures employed embody an innovative hybrid, blurring the distinction between party and government. Those procedures have been codified, modified periodically, and implemented reasonably reliably. Citizens in Tanzania have come to expect to vote periodically and not infrequently to challenge the authority and legitimacy of officials who have not been selected through elections’ (Samoff 1989:179).

By Western liberal democracy standards, Tanzania’s one party system—even with its elections—was not democratic (Read, 1995:130). However, in the context of Tanzania, the system provided a democratic opportunity in which the majority of the political elite, along with the people, participated in choosing the leadership. Party elections held in 1977 after transformation of TANU and ASP into CCM allowed even
change of leadership as older generation leaders stepped aside (Kung’atuka) and a new generation of younger leaders contested and took positions in party leadership. This, as Hyden, (1980:138) stated, was ‘achieved within the framework of the single party what would in multiparty systems be called a change of regime’. In Tanzania’s one-party elections the voter turn out was also at an all-time high, as the table below shows.

Table 3. Voter turnout in the one-party presidential elections in Tanzania 1965-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Eligible voters</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>% of registered to eligible</th>
<th>Voters who voted</th>
<th>% of voters who voted to eligible</th>
<th>% of voters who voted to registered voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5,084,783</td>
<td>3,187,215</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>2,636,040</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,579,787</td>
<td>4,860,456</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>3,407,083</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6,991,965</td>
<td>5,577,566</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>4,557,595</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8,212,241</td>
<td>6,969,803</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>5,986,942</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>9,615,927</td>
<td>6,910,555</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>5,181,999</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7,296,553</td>
<td>5,425,282</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Presidential elections are held at the same time as the parliamentary elections. Source: Othman, (1994) deriving from various sources including election Study Committee, 1974, and Tanzania national newspaper reports such as Daily News and Sunday News before and after elections.

At the same time, this system enabled Tanzania to create consensus by building the national ethos (no religion, and ethnicity in electoral politics). The insistence of the party that candidates could not use religion and ethnicity in mobilization; that they should campaign only jointly in public funded campaigns to explain how they would interpret and implement the national manifesto (Hill, 1973, 210-214); along with the social and economic policies the regime undertook, helped to arrest and freeze the use of these issues in campaigns. This consolidated national values and placed local issues in the context of national issues. This, among other factors, contributed to building the national ethic of Tanzania as a political organisation that counts among its values the rejection of
religion and ethnicity as lines of political mobilization. As the country was about to undergo the first multiparty general election in 1995, researchers of Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee—composed mainly of researchers from various disciplines of the University of Dar es Salaam—evaluated the success of the one party regime with regard to building the national political organisation. They concluded thus about Tanzania’s one–party political system’s legacy:

A basis for national unity and political tranquillity had been built under the one–party system controlling the rise of divisive forces in the society and polity. Thus religious, tribal, ethnic and racial sentiment had successfully been kept under control…despite the many misuse of the concept of national unity to hide sinister and selfish political interests; the national consensus achieved under one-party will provide a cushion for the transition to competitive politics (TEMCO, 1997:10).

To the majority of voters in Tanzania unfamiliar with western liberal democracy, this system arguably inculcated and cultivated democracy. The system was largely consistent, mostly fair to candidates, and presented a competitive choice of candidates to the people for leadership. Just as importantly, the system was open. Party membership, compulsory for a candidate running for a leadership position, was largely open to any Tanzanian (Mwansansu, 1979, Kwela, 1995, Othman, 2001).

Another important feature relevant to adoption and success of the one-party system in Tanzania is that the regime did not just push for adoption of such a system; it also took very seriously the business of building the Party. This helped consolidate democracy and the democratic credentials of the regime in Tanzania. In many African states, parties lost their importance after independence. In these states, the importance of politics after independence shifted to governing and government. As neo-patrimonial regime researchers have theorized and pointed out, governing happened mostly informally, without building institutions such as the party and formal government structures (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, and Chabal and Daloz, 1999). In such cases, party only became important, and was revived, during elections (Samoff, 1989:125, Barkan, 1989, 276). In Tanzania, to the contrary, the leadership concerned itself
constantly with the question of building and revitalizing the party so that it served the people of Tanzania along side the government (Mwansansu, 1979).

One point that researchers (see for example, Oketh-Ogendo, 1991, Shivji, 1994, Luoga, 1994, Mihyo, 2003) have emphasised in their discussion of the undemocratic nature of the one-party system in Tanzania is the ruling party’s claim of supremacy. Indeed, the party made sure this principle was enshrined in the Tanzanian constitution (Msekwa, 1977:70 and URT, 1977). What is neglected in the literature is that this supremacy was not intended to replace and diminish the government. More importantly, it was put in place as a countervailing force to the temptation of governing without the constraints of party and of engaging the population. Nyerere pointed out in 1975 that ‘there are people who think that if the party governs it would be strong but I say that is not true. Should the party and government merge into one, it is the party which gets transformed and becomes the government’, (quoted in Mwansansu, 1979:176)

At least in the thinking of the leadership as presented by Nyerere here, the party could never attain a defector supremacy over the government. In practice, as observed by Samoff (1989), the ruling party in Tanzania never attained supremacy. And,

although the party is formally supreme, there remains sufficient tension between the party and the government and between national and local political arenas, to provide to Tanzania citizens alternative channels for securing desired outcomes’ because the party ‘often functions as something of a counterweight to government, representing and incorporating those segments of the Tanzanian population less likely to seek government office and often less successful in influencing government policy directly (Samoff 1989: 174-177).

Important for democracy is also the fact that TANU leadership made a conscious effort to avoid being a vanguard party. Of the vanguard parties, Nyerere is on record as saying that the structure of a vanguard party is like that of Catholic Church with a pope, cardinals, bishops, etc. Nyerere maintained throughout that TANU was a mass party ‘open to every Tanzanian who believed in its objectives and principles’ (cited in Othman, 2001: 59).
What has enhanced democracy is that effort was made in Tanzania to build the ruling party to be different from the vanguard party and governing body unlike communist parties in former Soviet Union or communist Eastern Europe. The impetus in Tanzania was to build a party open to any Tanzanian (Othman, 2001, Kweka, 1995, Mwansansu, 1979). This was to be a party to co-govern the country with the government, while keeping itself separate from the government and being a counterbalance and force to advocate the interest of the people (Mwansansu, 1979:170-189, Samoff, 1989:172-177).

The party efforts to be open to all Tanzanians were assisted by the following factors, which were also created by party leadership in party or in government. Firstly, unlike in other African countries, the language of government and party was Swahili. Language was thus not a barrier to anyone wishing to participate in party politics or public debates. In other African states, the language of public affairs is often a foreign language such as French or English. This acts as a barrier for those with less education wishing to understand public debates and participate in politics (Mazrui, 1989:98).

To be closer to the people and to allow more grassroots participation, it is observable that the party decentralized its structure as observed by Mwansansu, (1979). For example, TANU reduced the number of people required to form a branch of the party, and also allowed villages to establish themselves as branches of the party. TANU also advocated the establishment of party branches in the work place (Mwansansu, 1979:180). In a further development, the party expanded its structure to create the Shina (stem) unit as the smallest and basic unit of the party. Previously, the tawi (branch) was the main and basic unit (CCM, 1995). This allowed for a more decentralized structure of the party reaching to the grassroots level.

Shina comprises the Nyumba Kumi – ten house structures where all members of a street, whether they were members of the party or not, chose a leader who was to serve as the recognized authority and liaise with the party and government on the street. While shina was meant to be more for the purposes of party activities, the structure became a street governance body in general that not only provided people on the street with information from party and government but also, equally and more importantly, it
became an authority often playing the role of a mediator and quasi-judges in various matters that arose in the locality (Mshangama, 1971:25-27).

Attainment of such a status for this institution was important for legitimacy of the regime in Tanzania. The first element, which defined authority since pre-colonial society, played an important role in deciding cases among people (Burgess, 2004). In major research on the Nyumba Kumi system it emerged that most people in Tanzanian localities preferred settlement of cases at the balozi/mjumbe than at unfamiliar and legalistic formal justice channels. Settlement at the Baloi/mjumbe was more informal and social, like familiar traditional structures, and provided more immediate and negotiable arbitration of conflicts among the residences of the street (Kobwebangira, 1972:47-48). The studies of Nyumba Kumi structures have concluded that in most cases the ten-cell structure became a respected local authority, not only as a case deciding authority, but also one as legitimate as the former pre-colonial system where small communities had the responsibility for general security of the people.

Shina and Nyumba Kumi was an important basic unit of democracy in Tanzania. For it was from here that leadership at all levels of party emanated from, as the leaders of mashina stems voted to elect the leadership of the next level of party- the branch. They also voted for two delegates to represent the branch in the District Delegate Meeting, an electoral institution that vote to rank candidates for constituent seats in parliament (Mshangama, 1971:21). Not only was it an electoral instrument but through the mashina ideas flowed from the people to higher levels of the party and from higher levels to the people. However, research critical of the Tanzanian regime has seen the setting up of these structures as serving only as a form of watertight militaristic control of society (Mihyo, 2003).

From the shina level the party had a structure at the branch level, district level, regional level and national level. These structures had their meetings, and representatives from each levels attended meetings at the level above to ensure a two-way flow of communication (CCM, 1995). Maintaining peoples meetings and elections from these grassroots level through to national level was an important mechanism to curb the dictatorial tendency of the regime. Elections and party meetings were largely maintained.
Where there were lapses, the party was sensitive to act, and initiated major programs to revive the party. This was the case in 1962 when Nyerere resigned the government post as prime minister, and for several months, engaged in a party consolidation program. In 1983, the party announced another major party revival program, and again in 2002, fifteen years after the multiparty system, the ruling party has had the third major party revival project (CCM, 2005). In addition to this, from 1969, all party posts at the district, regional and national levels were subject to elections and appointment (Mwansansu, 1979:184-185).

Meetings and elections gave members at various levels the opportunity to have their input in the party, exercising the right of discussion, approving or rejecting proposals put forward by the leadership, and even making proposals of their own as well as being able to vote or be voted for leadership (Mshangama, 1971: 22 and 26, Samoff 1989). Such a culture of meetings has provided a check on what would otherwise be arbitrary and informal decision making by leaders at various levels of party and government. This way, the Tanzania regime defined itself distinct from the neopatrimonial regime and its informal and non-institutionalised system of making decisions.

Most researchers have, for example, seen Nyerere as the most powerful leader in Tanzania. The fact is, however, that Nyerere exercised his power and influence carefully through party meetings, which could reject his proposal, or call them into question. As Hartman (2001: 167-168) points out,

A careful reading of Tanzanian political history indicates that he [Nyerere] has frequently been unable to prevail on issues he has deemed important. Nyerere’s only advantage in the institutionalised tripartite system of decision-making—Party, Government and Presidency—was that Nyerere was the coordinator of the three institutions. And that this ‘was not easy as the position subjected the president to contradictory pressures and demands, which were reflected in frequent changes of policy Hartman (2001: 167-168).

Because of respect for meetings and the conducting of them as required, the culture of meetings, and passing all major decisions through party meetings became institutionalised within the party and government. In some cases, decisions were also brought to direct consultative process to all the people through appointed commissions that received and listened to ideas and opinions in public meetings, including the 1965,

The manner in which the political institutions and practices were arranged has contributed to what Samoff (1979:179) described as a ‘relatively open, though not unconstrained, pluralistic political system within Tanzania’s one-party state’. This substantially asserts the fact that the one-party system in Tanzania, though it had weaknesses and adequacies, still played a democratic role and was one of the channels through which the regime gained legitimacy.

1965-1977 Arusha Declaration

The Arusha declaration’s *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* (Socialism and Self-reliance) policy is the second major policy which was put forward by the Tanzanian regime in 1967, two years after the adoption of a one party political system. The declaration affected every aspect of Tanzanian government policy and had major implications for democracy. This policy, once passed by the ruling party TANU, was announced in the northern city of Tanzania, Arusha, hence its name. It is acknowledged that the announcement of this policy excited the population in Tanzania and the subsequent policy implementation attracted as much foreign funding assistance as it did foreign research (Kahama, Maliyamkono, and Wells, 1989, Kaplan, 1992). Although in the eyes of the Tanzanian government these policies enhanced democracy, they have attracted substantial criticism in the literature.

The regime in Tanzania began by the nationalization of industries and major commercial enterprises. This was criticised for infringing on the rights of foreign owners (Nnoli, 1974). Furthermore, workers did not gain more say in management of industries even when the government at some point instructed this to happen (Coulson, 1985:5-6). The next major policy flowing from *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea*, indeed one of the cornerstone policies of the declaration, was a major drive by the regime to persuade people to join and resettle in the Ujamaa villages. Fifteen per cent of the rural population were persuaded to do so. The rest moved only after the government issued an order that made moving and resettling in the villages compulsory for every one in rural Tanzania (McHenry, 1979:116-133). The fact that some measure of force was used to resettle
almost all of the rural population in Ujamaa villages attracted a lot of criticism, even though use of force was not of the scale and extent perceived by external observers (Hyden, 1980: 151 and Cartright, 1983: 1-2). Any use of force is, indeed, undemocratic and, above all, it caused human suffering and dislocations in production for while.

A number of other policies, which were not democratic, or were implemented undemocratically, followed after the villagization program. One of these was abolition of local government (Nyalali, 1991, Moshi, 1992). This was followed by decentralization of government’s central power, particularly in development planning at regional and district levels. It could be argued this resulted only in the devolution of the central authority and not decentralization people empowerment at the local level (Ngware, 1993). The government also became increasingly involved in cooperative unions which resulted not only in stifling their independence but also, eventually, in the government taking full control of the cooperatives (Mpangala, 1991, Shivji, 1992:141).

Indeed many of these regime policies militated against the overall vision of building an Ujamaa state in Tanzania and the democratic spirit this carried. In the critique of these policies and their contradictions to Ujamaa however, what most researchers have left unconsidered is the balancing act the regime in Tanzania had to strike between the centripetal forces contained in the actions it considered desirable for creating a united political organisation and the centrifugal forces that Diamond (1990) identified as threatening the existence of all new states, which TANU believed the independent cooperatives, local government and trade unions represented. Arguably, both people and leaders wanted unity in the post-independence state continuing on from the unity of the struggle for independence. As consensus decision making and organisation unity is also a central value of traditional African societies, calls and actions to foster unity provided a vision for the new nation state organisation to which the population could respond.

Importantly, consideration of these factors brings up the dilemma facing a new democracy in building cooperation and consensus and yet allowing for the conflict and opposition that Diamond (1990) and Schmitter and Karl (1990) put forward as the balancing act that each new democracy must engage with in its own way.
It is observable that after a decade of building Tanzania on the foundations and values of Ujamaa and putting measure to establish national cohesion, the regime did not see much threat in local independent organization. Cooperative unions and local governments were restored and allowed to form and run independently once again by the Cooperative Unions and Local Governments Act enacted in 1982 (Nyalali, 1992: 29 and 101).

The explanation of a balancing act to create national cohesion is plausible given that the regime not only supported the flourishing of these societies toward independence and few years after but, also, the most knowledgeable and experienced cooperative unionists who spearheaded the movement before independence were in key posts as national leaders in the independence government. Paul Bomani and Sir George Kahama, the two most prominent cooperative unionists were, for most of the time, ministers in Tanzanian government. At the time Sir George Kahama was the minister for agriculture and cooperatives (Maguire, 1969:273 and 302, and Kahama, 2010:5-48).

The earlier government actions to control the cooperatives were aimed at curbing corruption, mismanagement, and embezzlement from the unions´ funds (Nyalali, 1992:28). But, as pointed out by Samoff (1989), this action was also to avoid the capture and use of the unions by strong local forces. Samoff (1989) also indicated that this was the main reason for the elimination of district councils, which would also apply to the control of cooperation unions, as it ‘was the national leadership’s recognition that in many areas they had been captured by local interests distinctly unsympathetic to the national policies’ (Samoff: 1989: 167). These represented, as did the local district councils, ‘a major obstacle to a coordinated (and centrally-directed) development strategy. National leaders saw many of the local interests unsupportive of, if not explicitly hostile to national policies’ (Samoff, 1989:167).

An important point notable here is that if the Tanzanian regime did not take steps to balance national policy action with interests of independent and local organizations, it would not have built Tanzania’s cohesive national political organisation or gained the party-state legitimacy it did throughout the country. In this regard Samoff (1989:168), as confirmed by many current researchers (Miguel 2002, Jerve and Ofstad, 2005, Putzel and
Lindermann, 2008), has pointed out that the push for a central focus on national priorities rather than leaving and encouraging local powers to grow and consolidate, helped Tanzania achieve national goals and programs that would otherwise have been frustrated and not implemented to reach and benefit many at the regional level had the local powers been the brokers between central government and their localities.

The critique of the Arusha Declaration implementation is well established and is in order despite counter-critique that can be put forward. However, it is the argument of this thesis that for the issue of democracy, the *Ujamaa na Kujigetemea* pronouncement and its articulation henceforth moved Tanzania further towards democracy and bequeathed the regime a sizeable measure of legitimacy. This argument rests on two key issues. Firstly, three points are identifiable that establish problems with the focus, episteme and historicity of the Ujamaa research project that produced the critique of Ujamaa and its policy implementation.

Secondly, it can be shown building on the party system that Tanzania adopted in 1965 two years before the Arusha Declaration, despite weaknesses and anti-democratic practices of many policies implemented in several areas, the Arusha pronouncement made a contribution to some fundamental and essential elements of building democracy, and to democratisation of the Tanzanian polity as discussed further after analysis of the problem of historicity. This arguably bequeathed the regime a measure of legitimacy with the Tanzanian population that militated against the development of opposition factions.

**Problems of perception and research focus**

Part of the main contribution of the research projects on Ujamaa is the creation and establishment of an inflated perception of the Tanzanian regime as a dictatorial one that nationalized and inefficiently controlled the economy. From this perspective, the policies were thus not only disastrous to democratization, but also crippled the country’s economy notwithstanding the integrity and good intentions of Nyerere.

This verdict on Tanzania has been maintained. In a recent re-evaluation of African regimes, the conclusion on Tanzania is still largely the same. On Nyerere and Ujamaa, Meredith (2005) concludes that under the one-party system,
the parliament remained impotent; the press was muzzled. Real power lay in state house in Dar es Salaam, in party committee and with the ruling class of bureaucrats; all of them intolerant of opposition […] Nyerere’s achievement was related not to the success of his strategy but ability to persuade foreign sponsors that his objectives were sincere (Meredith: 258-259).

Derived from this perception is the logical conclusion that the regime will not be legitimate in the eyes of its population. That the regime had, however, developed its dynamic of legitimacy and was largely legitimate is the paradox left without explanation in the literature.

Apart from the problems of episteme and historicity of researchers discussed in the next section, one of the reasons why the negative perception of Tanzania was created and became dominant is the fact that, while there is much research on individual policies and their negative impact on democracy, little existing research focused on the more positive aspects. Also, the gradual abandonment of Ujamaa policies and the discrediting of the one-party system became worldwide from the 1980s, amplified the perception of failure of Ujamaa and the one-party system in Tanzania.

It is observable even in earlier research on Tanzania with a positive view of the state—the link between the legitimacy of the regime and its policies is an indirect issue. The research agenda that has often come closest to explaining the legitimacy of the Tanzania regime is one that has dealt with issues of why Tanzania is a peaceful and stable country. But this question was not framed to ask why the regime is legitimate. The answer to the peace and stability question has been mostly attributed to natural factors of composition and size of ethnic groups in Tanzania, while the conscious policies of the regime to achieve this were not appreciated (Mpangala, 2002). In contrast to earlier research, more recent literature (see for example, Miguel, 2002, and Mpangala 2002) engaged in serious discussions of the Tanzanian regime’s deliberate policies towards building peace and stability in the country. For instance, Putzel and Lindermann (2007) have discussed in depth the regime’s active positive policies that contributed to stability in Tanzania. Most of the policies they discuss flowed from the implementation of the
Arusha Declaration not only in economic but also in social, political and cultural spheres. As these policies were positive actions by the regime, it is arguable that the policies brought not only stability but also legitimacy of the regime. Arguably, the regime became stable because a number of its policies contributed to securing peace and stability in the country, winning people’s support for the regime and thus legitimacy.

**Problem of episteme**

The second problem in the Ujamaa research project that contributed to the perception of the Tanzanian regime as a democratic and economic failure lies in the gap between the episteme of the inquirers and the episteme of African leaders and African people in Tanzania.

Of the goals and objectives of Ujamaa, Othman (2000:161) has, for example, put forward that Nyerere ‘was always at pains to disassociate the *Ujamaa* concept from the science of socialism, Nyerere maintained that *Ujamaa* has got its roots in African traditional society, which had no classes. He completely discouraged the notion of class struggle and believed strongly that it was possible to evolve into socialism without class struggle’.

Yet many African researchers studied Tanzanian *Ujamaa* and judged the outcome of its implementation from the Marxian point of view of socialism. The same can be said of most European scholars who approached *Ujamaa* with the European episteme of socialism, ranging from social democratic socialism, to the socialism propounded by Marx and Lenin.

A discussion of Ujamaa as a variant of African socialism would have required a different framework that established firstly the broader parameters that would come to include and explain narrower and country specific conceptualisations of African socialism. Thus, a broader framework of African socialism and other African cultural aspects would have informed a wider debate with the ability to influence the evaluation of implementation of *Ujamaa* in Tanzania. It would also have taken into account the colonial experience of African people in Tanzania as well as the ideology of the independence movement. An attempt to establish a broader conception and framework of
African Socialism is present, for example, in prominent Kenyan labour movement leader, Tom Mboya’s (1963)’ definition of the term:

when I talk of African socialism I refer to those proved codes of conduct in the African societies which have, over the ages, conferred dignity on our people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to universal charity, which characterized our societies, and I refer to the African’s thought processes and cosmological ideas, which regard man, not as a social means, but as end and entity in the society (Quoted in Friedland, and Rosberg, 1964: 81).

Onuoha, (1965) also attempted a broader framework that put forward key principles and elements of African socialism, and Kopytoff (1964: 51-65) discussed the issues and challenges of putting forward and applying such a framework. Yet these frameworks have not been used in the literature to study and evaluate Ujamaa in Tanzania. Instead it was the Western and Eastern European conceptions of socialism that were prominent. Even great works on Tanzania such as Goran Hyden’s 1980 Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and the Uncaptured Peasantry did not engage with the Ujamaa concept and framework beyond Nyerere’s conception and the failures and successes in its engagement with peasants and its capacity to transform the economy of affection in Tanzania –the subject of Hyden’s study.

The problem of historicity

According to this thesis, the Arusha Declaration’s key contribution to the legitimacy of the Tanzanian regime is based on the argument that the Declaration was historically relevant and significant to Tanzania. This is the case because it linked the ideas of leaders’ legitimacy held by Tanzanian people before colonial rule and those they carried in hope for the post-independence leadership during their struggle against colonial rule.

Existing literature does not recognise this important factor beyond the claim that the declaration asserted Tanzanian independence and defined a clear ideology for the leadership in Tanzania to conduct national and international policies for the country
(Temu, 1969:253-257, Galbourne, 1978, Mukandala, 1995:31-38). It can be argued, rather, that the Arusha Declaration was of critical historical importance after independence in establishing a clearly defined basis for building a democratic, developmental and cohesive national society and organisation that Africans believed they had lost to colonialism.

The success of the Tanzanian regime, and of Nyerere as the main architect of the Arusha Declaration, was not in inventing the *Ujamaa* ideology as stated by (Nellis, 1972:97-108), or by affecting an intellectual coup to declare the ideology as argued by Meredith (2005:250). Neither was it the mastery of communication techniques to communicate the new idea (Coulson, 1982) that led to its success. Rather, and more fundamentally, its success lay in putting forward and attempting seriously to implement a vision that responded consciously to the immediate problems that Tanzania faced in the aftermath of independence, and in remaining linked to the aims and ideas of the independence movement.

There was nothing inevitable about the success of the Tanzanian regime in building a peaceful and stable state. In neighbouring Kenya, under *Harambee* ideology and *Nyayo*, the leadership chose to emphasize individual and local organisation driven development under the one–party political system of KANU. Hayward (1989) points out that by 1966 the Kenyan electoral and party systems were in place. But as Kenya became a one party state, the KANU coalition ‘became increasingly faction-ridden and weak, elections ceased to be held, national meetings of KANU parliamentary committee group became less frequent and the party slowly ceased to be viable organization’ (Hayward 1987:226). As a result, Kenya did not hold elections again until 1983. In contrast, as a society Tanzanians engaged in elections for numerous political positions at all levels and were encouraged to attend political and organisation meetings.

**Arusha Declaration and democracy**

As Dahl (1998:41-43) pointed out, the primary focus of democratic ideas and practices has been the state and democratising the government of states. Arguably, in Africa this begins from the authoritarian state and government that post-colonial African leaders inherited from the colonial regime as many researchers have pointed out (Shivji,
1991, Oketh-Ogendo, 1991, Chazan et al, 1994, Mustapha, 2002). The Arusha Declaration introduced elements and dynamics in Tanzania that assisted in democratising the state and government significantly. This contribution also arguably enhanced the legitimacy of the regime as Africans expected and were promised a post-independence state and government that will be democratic.

Among the elements introduced by the Declaration significant to the democratisation of the Tanzanian post-independence state and government is, first, the provision of a clear vision of the political organisation in post-colonial Tanzania. Second, it advanced the principle of political equality, a central element of any democratic rule. Third, it introduced and insisted on moral and ethical accountability of the leadership to the Tanzanian people and organisation. The consistent advocacy of these elements introduced a dynamic that gave more weight to the weakest side in the relationships between leaders and people, government and party, peasants and workers, urban and rural sectors.

**Vision, social contract and political organisation**

The ‘vision thing’ as pointed to by Mustapha (2002:4-5) is an important factor in the constitutive reality of both colonial and post-colonial state in Africa. Indeed, as Mustapha further points out, more important than colonial heritage is the vision—or visions—implicit in African nationalism. Coming six years after independence, the bold manner of the announcement of the 1967 Declaration and its largely euphoric reception (see, Kagwema, 1985, Bennett, 1989:84) by the Tanzania public is recognised even by the most ardent critics of the regime (Coulson, 1982, Shivji, 1991, Mihyo, 2004). The Arusha Declaration seems to have provided a widely acceptable vision and, therefore, a social contract for the post-colonial Tanzanian state.

The Declaration was not a utopia that sprung from nowhere; nor was it a wholly wishful idea that never saw the light of day. The Declaration arose as a response to six years’ post-independence experience in which there was rapid polarisation in Tanzania society between leadership and people while the gap between the rich and the poor widened with the difference in welfare between the urban sector and the rural sector,

In terms of implementation, unlike in other African countries where post-colonial visions of society were promulgated, in Tanzania, dissemination and implementation happened because the leadership remained largely committed to the ideas for almost two decades--1967-1985 (Nancy-Bray, 1980, Mohiddin, 1981, Meredith, 2005). Also, unlike other African states, in Tanzania, the Declaration provided a vision consistent with African values expressed in Swahili vernacular which allowed people to understand its cultural associations, which spoke to their worldview (Mazrui, 1971: 93).

The creation of a new public sphere or a republic to which Africans would be loyal, whatever their ethno-religious loyalties, has been seen as the main problem and obstacle to creation of a democracy in Africa, as agreed to in the neo-patrimonial research. In fact, multi-ethnic composition of societies has been established as the main source of divisions, conflicts and even of the collapse of once thriving nation-states (Bates et al, 1987). The ethnic pull of loyalty, as pointed out by Ekeh in his seminal 1975 paper (Africa’s Two Publics), presents a deeper problem for the African person who has more affinity with the primordial private than civic public sphere.

In Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration provided republican values in politics, society and economy. The Tanzanian regime’s articulation of the Ujamaa vision for a post-colonial national political organisation, and the commitment of the regime to spreading and implementing it for almost two decades, arguably put in place a social contract that established a republican political organisation in Tanzania. Loyalty of the people in these circumstances were to the general national organisation and citizenship, largely recognizing one another as compatriots regardless of ethnic and religious affiliations (Okema, 1996, TEMCO 1995:10-11, Kiondo, 2001, Miguel, 2002). In this political organisation there was general agreement about what Tanzania’s key values were (Nyerere, 1977:2-4, Nyerere, 1995, Kagwema, 1985, Warioba, 2005, Wangwe, 2005, Bagenda, 2006, Butiku, 2005, Wakuhenga, 2007). That such consensus was achieved is arguably one of Arusha Declaration’s key contributions to the democratisation of Tanzania. This success was featured in defence of the regime’s record
in the first multi-party elections (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994). It has also been the subject of several newspaper articles, conferences and meetings on restoring the national consensus (mustakabali wa taifa) since 1990s.

**Entrenching and enhancing Political Equality**

The principle of political equality is at the core of any democratic governance system (Dahl, 1998). The Arusha Declaration’s first three opening statements address the equality of human beings. It states that TANU (1967:1) believes all human beings are equal, that every individual has the right to dignity and respect, and that every citizen is an integral part of the nation with the right to participate equally in Government at local, regional and national levels. Even though these statements were restated in the Arusha Declaration in 1967, they were the beliefs that were part of TANU since its foundation.

In practice, the leadership took many measures before the Arusha Declaration to entrench the principle of political equality in Tanzania. As pointed out in the previous section of this chapter, since its inception TANU was committed to open mass membership, expansion and consolidation of membership participation at grassroots level, and opened most party posts to electoral competition. It thwarted attempts to be a vanguard party, and remained committed to building the party and making it a viable vehicle of political participation. It chose not to yield to the temptation, as many post-independence leaders had done, of ruling through a government only (Catright, 1983:58, Barkan 1989:226). More importantly, the leadership’s commitment to electoral politics and the conduct of public affairs through party and governmental meetings remained strong during the post-independence period. Party and parliamentary elections were held every five years, giving people the opportunity to contest for leadership and vote for candidates.

The Declaration, with its socialist approach, asserted the principle that Tanzania is a country of peasants and workers, and established the condition that any individual leading the party, government or a public owned firm must be a worker or peasant (1967:25). This made the party and leadership open to the majority, comprised mostly of peasants and workers. Wealth was to play a very insignificant role in politics, especially
since election campaigns were party-state organized and funded (Kyerukus, 1970:213, TEMCO 1995).

The Declaration addressed some of the main underlying causes of political inequality—socio-economic differences. Chapter Four of this thesis discusses policies of the regime to reduce and curb socio-economic inequality. Socio-economic inequality is recognized as an obstacle to establishing a democracy and it makes maintaining an established democracy difficult (Lipset, 2006:56-57). With the Arusha Declaration, the regime began and consolidated programs seeking to lift the welfare of all and ensure everyone benefited equally from economic activities in Tanzania.

The push for socio-economic equality was advocated neither as an affirmative action nor as charity or a social justice issue. It was advocated as part of the national ethos that Tanzania sought to build in the political organisation. It was based on the belief that the dignity of all human beings and their place in society require no exploitation of one group by another, of a person by another, or of the ruled by the rulers. This was also the basis on which Tanzania spoke and organized for a fairer world economic system. The campaign against exploitation in Tanzania was widespread after the Arusha Declaration, as seen by analyses of speeches made by leaders in the 1967-1985 period in which the campaign against exploitation featured prominently (Brennan, 2006, Ngonyani, 2006). In the Arusha Declaration, absence of exploitation is proposed as the first feature that defines the socialist society Tanzania sought to build. A socialist state was defined as one in which all people are workers, and in which neither capitalism nor feudalism exists (TANU, 1967).

Lipset (2006:57) has identified literacy and education as key socio-economic elements that are important for democratisation. The Tanzanian regime embarked on a massive literacy and education for all project before—and more so after—the Declaration (Maliyamkono and Mseka, 1979 and Kahama, Maliyakono, and Wells, 1989). Concomitant with the national ethos that Tanzania sought to build, the education system was to be egalitarian, with opportunities open to all equally as opposed to the racial, religious and regional differentiation that the colonial system propagated. The regime took the first step to make provision of primary education universal, funded by the state.
The second step was to make higher levels of education available to all on a merit basis and mostly in national schools (Msekwa and Maliyamkono, 1969). The main challenge in higher education was to curb the elitism and differentiation which education could bring (TANU, 1967). Part of the regime’s effort to face this challenge was to insist on the new values that education was to serve (TANU, 1967). The new attitude propagated was that achieving higher education was in the service of Tanzania as whole. Introduction of national service for pre-and post-graduate students was to further inculcate that spirit (Coulson, 1982). Further measures were put in place to curb salaries and benefits for those with higher education and high salary posts (Green, 1974). To enforce these values further, a leadership code was also introduced to guide the conduct of educated individuals in such positions (Green, 1974).

The Arusha Declaration further resulted in the formation of Ujamaa villages, and concentrated the regime’s focus on rural development. This was an important contribution to political equality in Tanzania as rural areas, where most powerful interests do not reside, tend to be easily marginalized, making the consideration for development and participation of rural inhabitants in decision-making minimal (Catright, 1983:61). The Arusha Declaration’s call was, ‘let us heed the peasant’ (TANU, 1967:15). The focus on rural development brought balance and, more importantly, allowed villages to create self-governing structures integrated into the national administrative, government and party structures. Villages were thus an important and integral part of the administrative and political system, giving people influence and status in the overall government and political system. For political equality, this brought an important balance between urban and rural inhabitants of Tanzania.

**Accountability of leadership**

Accountability is another main pillar of a democratic system put forward by Dahl (1956: 3) that makes leaders accountable to citizens and gives the ordinary citizen control over leaders (Held, 2006:163). Others have also pointed to the Weberian idea that regime legitimacy or authority rests on mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability to their subjects, whatever the regime type (Erdmann and Engel, 2009, Pitcher, Moran and Johnson, 2009). In Africa, the issue of leaders’ accountability arises from the very
unfavourable underlying initial structure that the colonial government established as the foundation of the modern states. Colonial governors and administrators had large unconstrained power to administer the affairs of the state and government in Africa without any legitimacy of their rule except subjugation, threat and use of force (Gai, 1979, Naomi et al, 1986, Maamdani, 2000, and Mustapha 2002:5-6). African leaders promised to do away with this underlying structure and institute democratic governance. Cartright (1983: 3-4) has also rightly pointed out that the balance of power in the post-colonial state was very much tilted towards African leaders, given the charismatic role they played in the struggle for independence. The assessment of accountability of African leaders in the post-colonial era, therefore, begins from this almost absolute power derived from the structure they inherited that they could change or maintain.

It can be argued that the continuation of electoral accountability (Samoff, 1989) and working through consultation with people in organisation and party meetings to arrive at decisions which were established as a norm in both party and government in post-independence Tanzania made a significant contribution to making leaders accountable in addition to specific demands of the Arusha Declaration in this sector (Mwansansu, 1979, Coulson, 1989). The Arusha Declaration’s focus was not only on demanding that leaders be held accountable to the public but also on introducing structures of direct people participation in governing their communities. The regime created village structures driven by this impetus. Workers unions and workers councils, cooperative unions, women and youth organizations and other various institutions—including parastatals—created as micro units in which members participated directly in decision-making, contributed to the overall aim of building an Ujamaa state in Tanzania. According to the Declaration they had the duty and right to do so (TANU, 1967:9).

This emphasis arose from the regime’s perspective that the Arusha Declaration sought to inculcate: the country belonged to all Tanzanians, and everyone had to contribute and participate equally to build it. The regime’s consistency in guiding and spreading these ideas (Mihyo, 2003) helped to purge the view that the country belongs to the leaders; that benefits should go to those who are economically powerful; or that leaders and the economically powerful should be more privileged. The Declaration’s
provisions, and the actions taken to implement them, was reflected in the term used to mean a Tanzanian citizen, *Mwananchi* (child of the country), as opposed to prior government used term *Raia* which meant a citizen in a more formal sense, *Mwananchi* was a term that brought with it a sense of belonging and possession.

To enforce the idea that the country belongs to all the people, the Tanzanian leadership established a code through the Arusha Declaration, which made it difficult for the leadership to benefit wrongly, using their office to enrich themselves and accrue advantages using their positions. From 1967 onwards, when Tanzania began to seriously build a socialist state as pronounced in the Arusha Declaration, leaders were supposed to lead by example. As noted in the Declaration:

> the first duty of a TANU member, and especially of a TANU leader is to accept these socialist principles and to live his own life in accordance with them. In particular a genuine TANU leader will not live off the sweat of another man, nor commit any feudalistic or capitalistic actions (TANU, 1967:26).

The salaries and wages of leaders were capped and reduced persistently to minimize the disparity of income between higher earners and lower earners in the Tanzanian economy as a whole (Green, 1974, Ossoro, 2001). This affected many sections of the Tanzanian society, as a leader was not only in the party and government but also senior officers in parastatal organizations and corporations as well as civil servants in high and middle cadres (TANU, 1967:21). In effect, this condition did not affect only those in private sector, which was proportionally smaller compared to the public sector, as a large portion of Tanzania economy was within the public sector during the *Ujamaa* era (Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells, 1989 Mtatifikoro 2002).

What also reduced the distance between leaders and people with the onset of the declaration was that leaders were not to be called *Mheshimiwa* (Swahili for honourable) as before but were to be addressed as *Ndugu* (a term in Swahili applied to a blood or clan relative). These changes have been pointed to in research as being important for reducing
the perception of authoritarianism, thus inducing accountability and legitimacy of the leadership among people (Okema, 1996). Proving that this is not a minor point, in the post *Ujamaa* era, members of parliament demanded that they be addressed as *Mheshimiwa* and not *Ndugu* (Okema, 1996:43, Warioba, 2005 and Wakuhenga 2007). Moreover, the development equation put forward for Tanzania in the Arusha Declaration pointed out that, for development, the country needed people, good leaders, good policies and land (TANU, 1967:18-19). This further showed that people as well as leaders were important for development. In a minor but important modification, the salutation of leaders, which used to be ‘long live the ideas of the CCM chairperson’ (*Zidumu Fikra za Mwenyekiti wa CCM*) was changed to ‘long live the correct ideas of the CCM chairperson’ (*Zidumu Fikra Sahihi za Mwenyekiti wa CCM*) more in keeping with the principle of accountability and the importance of party compared to the individual office holder.

By insisting that every Tanzanian is an integral part of Tanzania and has the duty and right to participate in development of Tanzania; by curbing leaders’ benefits and imposing a stringent leadership code; by changing the ethos, value and purpose of education; by frowning upon exploitation; by striving to bring equal socio-economic benefits to all Tanzanians; and establishing institutions of participation particular to villages and fostering rural development, the Arusha declaration contributed significantly to advancing political equality and leadership accountability in Tanzania. It created the feeling among the people of being in a state where they have a position, value, rights and duties—an important step towards democratisation and democracy, as these points helped the regime in Tanzania define and maintain its legitimacy with the population.

**Conclusion**

The discussion in this chapter on the nature of democracy that the Tanzania regime established refutes to a large extent the neo-patrimonial explanations of African politics. The case of Tanzania, as discussed here, points to the fact that there can be a basis for democratic republican politics in Africa. The chapter has shown the ideology of the independence movement and idealised African pre-colonial forms of society and governance, from which the Tanzania’s *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* Arusha Declaration
derived, was a strong basis for building a national common good, as well as a public sphere for a democratic and just government system. With the declaration the Tanzania one party political system established a philosophical foundation on which the regime then endeavoured to build policy actions. This was done in ways that gave the regime legitimacy, which has not been recognised in the literature as it is outside of the framework used by critics of one party political system who dismiss such systems as anti-democratic. The Tanzanian regime established and built a party (chama) both as the organ that would develop and communicate its ideology and as a vehicle for political participation and mobilization that would create a platform vis a vis the government (serikali) and the people.

Even though implementation of many policies which flowed from Arusha Declaration’s Ujamaa na Kujitegemea did not, and were not intended to, foster liberal democracy of Western European type as many critics of Tanzania Ujamaa project pointed out, neither did it follow an Eastern European Communist type model. Judging from the reception of the pronouncement by the population in Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration provided a widely acceptable vision of a post-colonial society in Tanzania. Importantly, throughout the two decades, the regime in Tanzania consistently preached that policy, implemented it and insisted it should be judged by its performance in following the Declaration. In the commitment the government displayed to these policies and the fact they resulted in a unified, and relatively equal society, the regime party gained legitimacy and status for this. The next chapter discusses in more detail how the Tanzania regime used the Arusha Declaration and the ideas it contained as well as other initiatives to advance Tanzanian political organisation through social cohesion and national solidarity.
CHAPTER 5. SOCIAL COHESION, UNITY AND STATE BUILDING

Introduction

A key challenge facing African post-independence regimes was building unity in the context of the boundaries of the former colonial state that lacked any ethnic or historic resonance. Here it is argued that TANU/CCM had unity as a policy goal and that the party ideology, the conscious unity building policies they adopted and the party structure all played a role in building national community cohesion and solidarity in Tanzania. In building unity, TANU/CCM- the regime party was not only a vehicle for political participation of individual citizens but was also structured to promote national unity through a redefinition of the major interest divisions in Tanzanian society. The party was developed into an important arena where these interests within society were both articulated and reconciled. In this regard, the difference between Tanzania and other regimes in Africa was that while all regimes expressed their initial opposition to ethnic and religious divisions as the basis of political mobilization and interest articulation, in Tanzania, the leadership attempted to redefine what it was to be a Tanzanian citizen and to shift people away from their ethnic and religious identities towards nationally based group identities (TANU 1967).

The leadership structured the party in such a way that the main groupings by which people were defined economically and socially constituted the main organisations within the party. The function of these structures was to organize and represent their members within the party, articulate their interests, and spread party ideas to members. Worker and peasant organisations were the two main groups though which the regime sought to redefine people’s self-perception and worker unions and agricultural cooperative unions became part of the party. In addition, there were the women, youth and parents’ associations. The workers union was the most influential of such party organisations while the cooperative union was comparatively weak in spite of their significance to the regime after 1967. This chapter discusses the way in which the regime built social cohesion through these groups within the party and also through those aspects of its policies on education, media, national language and religion that aimed at reducing the significance of ethnic, religious and regional differences.
Workers unions

Studies of workers unionism in Tanzania have been critical of the Tanzanian regime’s gradual absorption and ultimate control of workers unions as a ruling party tool (Mukandala, 1998 and 2000). Using mostly liberal democratic theory, the research points out how the regime enacted legislation to inhibit the freedom and independence of trade unions. However, this research does not sufficiently take into account a narrative of unity, nation building and views of substantial sections of workers’ organization in Tanzania.

Consistent with the paradox of democracy, it would be difficult for a regime in a new or emerging democracy to sustain waves of strikes or independent political mobilization of workers, as was the case in the early years of the post-independence regime in Tanzania. It certainly contained the danger of ripping the state and the polity itself apart, just as strikes threatened and eventually undermined the colonial state (Jackson, 1979 and Mukandala, 1999). In critical moments it can be seen that even in mature long standing democracies, leaders are known to appeal to the civil society and the opposition to tighten their belts and forego some of their rights as the government attempts to bring the country through a critical situation. It is also not uncommon for civil society and opposition to offer such an understanding. It can thus be argued that for the sake of holding the state together and embarking on the journey of creating order in the new state, it was necessary for civil society to exercise restraint and for the regime to find ways of ensuring restrained articulation of interests. In the case of Tanzania, the regime attempted to do this by making organizations operate from within the ruling party.

It can also be seen that all worker leaders did not have the same position *vis-à-vis* the ruling party and government. Mpangala, a leader of the workers federation during the struggle for independence, pointed out in his memoirs that the majority of the leaders of this organisation were in favour of cooperating and working with TANU and voted in favour of the two organizations working as one entity (Mpangala, 1999). This significant portion of the workers’ leaders therefore did not defend the independence of the workers movement as the liberal theory of democracy proposes, and as advocated by the dominant view of Tanzanian labour movement research. This position arose from the fundamental issue discussed below.
In Tanzania, as in many colonial regimes, what became the independence movement began with the workers. TAA which was the predecessor of TANU, the party that led Tanzania to independence, was an idea that evolved from workers—mostly civil servants—in the colonial government (Iliffe, 1979). It was the workers who spread the association as they travelled, or were transferred, from one part of the country to another in territorial civil service postings. The workers were the leaders of the independence movement. They were forced to abandon these positions by order of the colonial regime, which intended to slow down the struggle for independence by depriving the movement of the most educated section of the population (Mukandala, 1999). Yet cooperation was maintained, and the two sides worked together secretly to advance the Tanzanian independence agenda. Colonial law made it impossible for a lot of Africans to be members and serve the party while still working. To combat this issue, TANU got workers’ wives to participate in politics on their own behalf and on behalf of their husbands (Iliffe, 1979).

With such a history, it is arguable that after achieving independence the natural progression would not have been necessarily to keep the party and unions separate. As Nyerere asserted in 1961, the aim of TANU and the workers union were one in the struggle for independence, and their common task was to build the new independent state. He said:

[...] if either one of my legs were to be persuaded that too close cooperation with the other would be an infringement of independence, neither one of them would arrive anywhere at all! Similarly either the trade unions and political organization are prongs or legs of the same nationalist movement or they are not. If they are then the question of whether they would or should not cooperate in getting the country from point A to point B does not arise. They must cooperate. (Nyerere, cited in Guruli, 1974).

In practice there was a substantial section of union leaders who wished the party and union to work together as joint entities (Mpangala, 1999).

The regime’s on going legitimacy and its success in co-opting the workers’ movement into the ruling party was based on the strong representation of workers as part of ruling party organizations. Workers were represented in all key decision-making and
executive organs of the party. As pointed out in the literature, however, workers were not
free to choose their leaders (Mukandala, 1999). Indeed, it was the chairperson of the
party and president of the Tanzanian state who appointed the national general secretary of
the workers organisation. Workers elected the chairperson from among candidates pre-
screened by the party. It can be seen, however, that the tenure of leadership positions in
the workers’ organisation was always held by personalities at the forefront of
championing workers’ interests and putting forward their agenda. Strong trade unionists
such as Mpangala, Kolimba and Rwegasira are among leaders approved by the party and
elected to head the trade union movement. Also, except for the general secretary, other
leaders were not appointed by the government or the party, people contested for positions
within the workers organisation. Given that the workers’ union was led by high profile
trade unionist, the screening by the party’s central committee seemed to have not
interfered with workers getting genuine representatives.

Given the profile of such leaders, it is observable that within the party, the
workers movement was neither an empty shell nor a conveyor belt for party interests. The
organisation of workers was active, it held meetings at all levels and continued its
educational activities for workers and defended workers rights and welfare through party
and government channels (JUWATA 1986). The secretaries and chairpersons of NUTA
and JUWATA at all levels were an important part of management at the workplace. New
branches of the workers organisation were encouraged and opened in all workplaces. One
of their functions was to represent workers in management; the other to defend workers
rights. Notably, the Tanzanian regime party was among few regimes in the world that
passed a declaration which tilted power strongly in favour of workers. In 1971 the regime
issued *Mwongozo* (guidelines) that freed workers from control of the management and
ensured workers place as co-participants in managing industry on behalf of the Tanzanian
nation. Tanzanian workers were supposed to be responsible self-agents working for the
benefit of industry, themselves and the nation as whole. In this new role they were
supposed to hold the management in check. Hyden (1983) observed that *Mwongozo*
advanced the political consciousness of Tanzania workers as they became aware of the
‘historical roots of their predicament in the way few other African workers had’ (Hyden,
1983: 167). Also important for workers rights and political influence in Tanzania were
the workers council and committees, which had a strong role in work place workers rights, and were paramount vis-à-vis the management. This was also an important step in increasing workers participation, which Chambua (2002: 20) points out is defensible as a ‘fundamental human right’ that ‘contributes to productivity’ and ‘promotes democracy’.

To strengthen its work, the organization of workers in Tanzania established cooperation with ILO (International Labour Organisation) and also with many individual trade unions in different countries including social democratic, socialist, communist and also liberal capitalist countries such as United States of America (JUWATA, 1986). As an organisation within the party, the workers unions were perhaps the most powerful, and its strength within the party was a distinctive feature of Tanzanian unionism. Furthermore, their continued organization and development within the one party, although not the sole cause, certainly helped Tanzanian workers gain most from the regime in terms of improved wage levels and employment rights (Bienfield, 1982). This contradicts a perception in the literature that unionism in Tanzania was weak during the one party regime (Coulson, 1982).

The other factor, which contributed to the consolidation of workers unions, was the government’s commitment to serving the two main categories of socio-economic groups in Tanzania (workers and peasants). These were the two categories by which the regime sought to redefine the identity of all Tanzanians, away from ethnic and religious groupings. To honour the commitment, the regime set up and gave special importance to two special annual party-state sponsored festivals: one especially to commemorate workers on 1 May, and the other dedicated to peasants/farmers.

The workers day in Tanzania contributed to regime legitimacy because, instead of celebrating past heroes, a workers revolution or the party, it celebrated workers. It was also a day of serious dialogue and reflection. It was an occasion on which workers heard government and party positions, and vice versa, discussing failures and successes on each side.

During celebrations at the national, regional and district levels, secretary of the workers’ organisation read a risala (a written speech) on behalf of the workers, each focusing on the rights and interests of workers at a different level. At the national level it
was the national Secretary General of workers’ organisation who delivered the *risala* on behalf of the workers, and it was usually the President who delivered the speech in answer to the workers’ *risala*. The president normally also treated this as a ‘state of the nation’ address on the economy. Wage increases, if any, were often announced on this day along with explanations for why such an increase was possible or not. All in all, these occasions were not merely celebrations or opportunities for party mobilisation—they also provided the opportunity for the expression of worker views and grievances through the *risala*.

The presence and continued mobilization of workers within the party through the organisation of workers helped build unity in Tanzania as workers organized and negotiated their deals from within. This was important for unity because workers had the power to destabilise any regime with demands, strikes and protests as they did during the colonial era. To save the young nation-state and build it based on the evolution of the workers movement, independence and the ruling party, the leadership argued for unity and cooperation between party and trade unions. In doing so it co-opted the unions into the party and in the process also removed any local divisions between union organisations based on religion and ethnicity. It also muted conflict between rural and urban communities.

**Cooperative unions of farmers and peasants**

Until 1990, about 90 % of Tanzanians lived in rural areas and engaged in agricultural activities. Agriculture production contributed 56 % of GDP and 85 % of Tanzania’s foreign exchange earnings (Nyalali Commission, 1992). This made agriculture and, therefore, farmers and peasants very important for Tanzania.

Prior to independence and for a few years afterwards, peasants in Tanzania organized themselves in independent cooperative unions. The cooperative movement in Tanzania prior to independence was the largest in tropical Africa (Illife, 1979). The cooperative unions formed an important base of the independence movement. A number of prominent leaders of the independence movement were cooperative unionists (Kaniki, 1974). After independence, the ruling party further encouraged the formation of cooperative unions, viewing them as important building blocks for its socialist policy. Some have argued that
the regime began to lose legitimacy when it started to introduce policies interfering with the independence of trade unions, especially when it ordered the closure of cooperative unions in 1976 (Shivji, 1999). It has been pointed out that this was not only a political problem curtailing democracy but also an economic problem. Productivity in agriculture dropped in response to the controlling measures (Moshi, 2000).

The regime’s counter narrative, consistent with its unity building measures, was that it interfered in the cooperative movement to stamp out the dominance of big farmers which prevented these organisations from benefiting all farmers (Nyalali Commission, 1992). The cooperative unions were seen as a source of independent power wherein powerful local interests entrenched within hindered the regime’s efforts to implement more egalitarian policies, especially after 1967 when *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* was adopted as the official socio-economic blueprint for Tanzania (Samoff, 1987).

It can also be argued that the need in Tanzania to create a socialist complementary economy serving the basic needs of all necessitated the government to control surplus in agriculture as it did in the state-run industry and service sectors to balance the distribution of resources in a complementary and equitable manner.

It has been argued that with the high level of interference in the affairs of the cooperatives following their abolition, the regime ran the danger of losing the support of rural Tanzania (McHenry, 1975, Shivji, 1999 and Fungi, 2000). However, it is put forward here that the parallel policies the regime implemented for rural Tanzania balanced its interference in the cooperative unions and also its appropriation of agricultural surpluses and saved it from a significant loss of support.

One of the most important policies, which counterbalanced the regime’s interference with cooperative unions, and the skimming of surplus is, arguably, its overall policy, which was designed to redefine key interest groups in Tanzania as workers and peasants. Since the Arusha Declaration, the regime was inclined more favourably towards peasants and the development of rural Tanzania than to workers and urban areas. Urban dwellers and workers were described as potentially, or actually, exploiting the farming population in rural areas (TANU, 1967). The highly contested policy of the development of *Ujamaa* villages as the central mechanism for implementing party ideology not only
saw resources reach rural Tanzania but also contributed to building unity as it integrated rural Tanzania into the party and government structure. Villages were linked to party structures, government administration and the electoral system. A village thus became the most basic and important government and party unit. At the height of *Ujamaa* village development, each elected leader in Tanzania was a part of an *Ujamaa* village and was required to explain themselves if they did not actively participate (Kjekshus, 1976).

Through the marketing board which replaced the abolished cooperative unions, the Tanzanian regime diverted money to central government through tactics such as delayed payment for farmers and peasants. On the other hand, the regime provided a substantial subsidy for farming implements. It also made available extension services to peasants and farmers through farming and veterinary officers. The government provided free dipping facilities for cattle as well as education and health services to farming families.

Also, as part of the regime’s focus on redefining Tanzania as a nation of either workers or peasants, a day of national festival was dedicated to peasants, farming and rural life. Marked on 7 July, the day not only allowed farmers and peasants to showcase agriculture products, but also made it possible for the leadership to address agricultural issues nationwide. On behalf of the peasants, representatives led speeches extolling agricultural successes and dissecting problems at the district, regional and national levels. In addition to putting forward its position on agriculture and food security, the leadership of the party also responded to queries about how it would help with agricultural problems specific to a particular district or region.

Most research critical of the Tanzanian regime’s treatment of peasants and their cooperative unions describe as dictatorial and disastrous for the economy not just the interference, control and eventual abolition of cooperative unions but also the forced resettlement of a majority of the rural population in *Ujamaa* and designated village areas (Mushi, Maghimbi, and Shivji, 1992). However, it can be argued that, with the counterbalancing and parallel policy commitments favouring peasants, agriculture and rural life, the regime not only succeeded in maintaining legitimacy in rural areas but also succeeded in raising the status of peasants; integrated the rural population into political
and governmental process. This facilitated building unity and solidarity in rural Tanzania and among peasants and the urban population of workers and national, regional and district leaders where such a population could otherwise have been easily marginalized.

**Women’s organisation**

The presence of a women’s organisation in the party has a long history dating back to TANU’s early efforts to seek Tanzania’s independence. The women’s wing of the party was formed shortly after the formation of TANU itself (Illife, 1979). It played an important role in the struggle for independence, not only by enlisting many women to join the independence struggle but also by facilitating the participation of civil servants barred from politics by the colonial government. In this case it was the wives of civil servants that were the official members of TANU and played an organising role. There were also cases where women encouraged men to take part in protests against the colonial regime at times when their courage faltered (Illife, 1979, Geiger, 1982).

Following independence, the ruling party maintained the women’s wing as an important organisation of the party. In 1969 UWT got its own constitution (Geiger, 1982). It is also notable that throughout the history of the struggle for Tanzanian independence, in addition to a leadership position in the party, a ministerial position also remained dedicated to women’s affairs. The presence of women in the party made sure they were represented in all key decision-making and executive organs of the party. The ministerial position guaranteed the presence of women in the government cabinet (Gieger, 1982, and Maina, 1999), and, a number of women were always present in the parliament.

UWT carried out many projects for women during its existence. It is also notable for providing a platform for, and nurturing, a number of women who came to be prominent in Tanzanian, African, and world politics. In recent years, Tanzania has had women as minister of finance and as minister of foreign affairs. The former, and also first, president and speaker of African union parliament was a Tanzanian woman, Gertrude Mongella who was also the chairperson of the 1995 Beijing United Nations Women conference. The first female deputy secretary of the United Nations Dr Asha–
Rose Migiro was also a Tanzanian woman. All these women were associated with and worked with UWT.

Tanzania has also been at the forefront of implementing various international resolutions to improve gender equality. Currently, Tanzania has in place a 30% quota reserved for women in elected decision-making bodies. There has also been an increase in the appointment of women to important state and semi-state bodies since president Mkapa’s government in the 1990s.

Research on women’s representation in Tanzania has been critical of the fact that women’s interests, particularly those geared towards transforming gender relations, were not represented despite the presence of women in party, parliament and government (Geiger, 1982:59-60). While this remains true for the political agenda of fostering unity, the regime in Tanzania arguably provided platforms for representation on which women could build, Women were seen to be present and represented, which bolstered the Tanzanian regime’s image as a political system that included all key groups of the society.

Apart from the role women played through the party, like the youth, there was a strong organization of women in churches and mosques. This also helped to consolidate the role and participation of women at the grassroots level. Even though the gendered nature of the relationship between men and women still existed, the regime set up and provided public spaces that both men and women shared contributed to, and participated in. Notwithstanding on-going issues of inequality that women face in Tanzania, the new nation-state embodied the idea of gender equality in its constitution and, by degrees, into the formal laws of the state.

Youth

In an attempt to consolidate unity in the corporate structure of society, the leadership in Tanzania also evolved structures and programs for youth and children’s participation in party and government activities. Youth, it can be seen, were an important part of TANU since its formation and early struggle for independence (Illife, 1979). The
youth wing of TANU was then called the Tanganyika Youth League. In the independence era their main role was mobilization, voluntary activities and acting as stewards at party meetings to keep order and assist in other ways (Maguire, 1979:311).

The youth league made a very important contribution to Tanzania during the independence era and, because of this, the leadership decided to recruit mostly youth league members to form the new Tanzania Peoples Defence Force (Coulson, 1982). This was a new army formed from scratch after the regime in Tanzania dismantled and dismissed the existing army which mutinied in 1964 demanding high salaries and a faster pace of Africanization so Africans could fill the ranks held by Europeans (Coulson, 1982). As the army had to follow party ideology, members of the youth league provided an already highly politicised section of population to set up this army. For an individual to qualify as a soldier in the new Tanzanian army, they had to be a member of the party. Recruiting from the youth league meant only a few new members of the army needed to be educated about the party ideology (Mmuya, 1994).

Youth were also mobilised into another type of army - *Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa* (The army of national building). The function of this army was to undertake various nation-building projects, and it played a part in building *Ujamaa* villages after the 1967 Arusha Declaration. It was also instrumental in running national service programs for colleges and secondary school graduates. The national service involved participants from different parts of Tanzania staying together in a JKT camp where they received military and political training, and contributed labour to nation-building projects for six months to a year.

In the party, the Tanganyika youth league was transformed into *Umoja wa vijana*, or *Jumuiya ya vijana* (Association or organisation of youth) after TANU joined ASP to form CCM in 1977. The youth wing maintained its position as representatives of youth in the party. As a wing of the party, the youth organization had representatives in all the main bodies of the ruling party from the national level to village level. In addition, a ministerial position responsible for youth affairs also existed in government in most years. The youth organization within the party also coordinated leaders of student organizations in universities and colleges. Students in colleges were organized under the
union of students of Tanzania (*Muungano wa wanafanzi Tanzania*). As an organization affiliated with the youth wing of the party, it was supposed to serve party interests and adhere to its policies. Such an obligation caused problems at the University of Dar es Salaam, where students strived to form an autonomous students’ organization. Students from other colleges also followed this trend. During the transition period to multiparty democracy, college and university students formed the National Union of Autonomous Students Organizations (NUASO), which was later followed by TAHISO and NUTAS as autonomous national bodies of students in higher education.

Students at secondary and primary schools had rather tenuous links to the party. However they were in an environment in which they were often incorporated into party structures. Firstly, political education classes, which were compulsory, played an important role in explaining and educating people about the party and its ideological message (Kyomo, 1982:98-107). In fact political education (*Siasa-Politics*) was a final national level secondary and primary education examination subject (Kassam, 1982, 119-126). Also, primary and secondary school pupils had to participate with their teachers in all main celebrations, festivals and visits of important leaders in the locality. Students participated in parades, choir and drama performances. Parades were a primary school speciality. Parade leaders formed an informal structure within the party that rose to the national level known as ‘Off-shoots’ (*Chipukizi*).

Led by teachers, these performances conveyed messages that at times cautioned and attacked the leadership, particularly when it failed to adhere to proclaimed policy and ideology. They sounded warnings against the rise of certain forms of behaviour in society seen as obstructing the country’s desired path along the party’s main policies and ideologies. These messages and forms of entertainment earned them the acclaim of leaders and the general public.

Although not related directly to the party, once in two to three years the Ministry of Education organized national sports competitions for primary and secondary schools from the district to national levels. Colleges, too, had their own competitions at the national level. Arguably, these activities increased a sense of worth, belonging and national integration among participants.
As a graduate of secondary school, individuals also closely encountered party ideas during national service. National service of some sort became compulsory for secondary school graduates before they attended colleges and universities. Military service was compulsory after college before taking up employment. Resistance from university students resulted in the revision of this practice, and military service before university became the norm. Primary school leavers, meanwhile, had the opportunity to train in local security organisations (*Mwanamgambo*).

It is notable that, in addition to youth organization within the party, there was also strong youth organizations within the churches. This organization complemented the organization of youth by the party and government. Within the church, youth had activities ranging from being members of church choirs and sports teams to running economic projects. There were also prominent faith-based organizations in secondary schools and colleges.

For the regime’s legitimacy and unity building agenda, the children, students and youth organizations within and outside the party helped to engage this segment of the population in Tanzanian national life. It inculcated in them a sense of importance, belonging, and participation in the nation-state. As for the unity and nation building agenda of the party, not only did the structures helped spread its ideas and values but the activities also returned to the modern Tanzanian society aspects of its traditional past where structures were in place for youth to be initiated into, participate and contribute to much greater roles in society as adults.

**Unity building in the education system**

The formal education system is one of key instruments which the regime in Tanzania gained control of early on, consciously transforming it, and effectively using it to further its agenda of unity and nation building. The regime in Tanzania had a proactive approach in making sure its ideology was translated into the national curriculum and educational ethos and practice. This was especially the case after *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* was adopted as a guiding ideology and philosophy of the country.

Few regimes, if any, in post–independence Africa ended the colonial system they had inherited and completely overhauled and transformed the education system to match
the philosophy and ethos adopted by the country. Following the 1967 proclamation on the Tanzanian mainland, the regime inaugurated *Education for Self-reliance* in line with this national policy (Cameroon and Dodd, 1970: 219-228). Not only did the regime require a national curriculum to be taught in all schools but also, in line with equality of opportunity of the *Ujamaa* ideology, nationalized most private schools and colleges (Cameroon and Dodd, 1970). Most of these schools happened to be missionary schools, the most common type of school in the country. With the monopoly of schools and colleges, the Tanzanian government could implement its view of education practically with no negotiation, as there were no other stakeholders in the sector to counter-balance it.

It is also notable that for the nation building agenda, nationalization of schools enabled the Tanzanian regime to effectively use primary, secondary schools and college level institutions for this purpose. It was a government policy that students from various regions of Tanzania should mingle. Secondary schools and colleges thus acted as melting pots for this purpose. Students did not study in their region but were posted to study in other regions where they encountered students from other areas of Tanzania.

In terms of imparting the ideology of the party and state in schools, a specific module was devoted to political education. The main subject matter taught in political education (*Siasa*, as it was called in Swahili), which replaced the *civics* classes taught since colonial times, was mostly the ruling party’s ideology, party and state structure, and functions of various party and state organs (Kyomo 1982:98-107). Initially there were no examinations but it soon became an examinable subject at all levels of education.

Recognizing the need for continued education, as many adults had not been educated under the colonial system or had only attended a few years of primary school, political education was also introduced into the adult education curriculum along with standard academic subjects (Kassam, 1982, 119-126). Elements of political education were also inserted in workers’ adult education programmes that were run as part of the continuing education for workers (Utukulu, 1982:127-135).

For the general public, radio programs were one of the most important sources of political education. Informal programs such as folk music, choir performances and other
cultural activities—particularly during governmental and party public celebrations—complemented the radio programmes (Mpangala 1982; 141). Print media were also effectively used, as most nationwide newspapers were state-party owned. In total, the regime employed all major means through which education could be imparted.

Apart from emphasizing political education in schools and colleges, there was a party college in Kivukoni, Dar-es-salaam to provide political education for leaders and cadres of the party. The courses ran for between two weeks up to three months for short courses and up to six months for longer courses. When the party initiated major policies, Kivukoni College was at the forefront of educating party and government officials on what the policies entailed. When the country moved towards a socialist policy, it was incumbent upon Kivukoni College to translate, elaborate and explain the new policy to leaders of party and government who in turn were responsible for imparting it to the general public (Mpangala, 1982:142).

Critics of political education during the one party era, including the 1991-1992 Nyalali Commission, decried lack of human and citizen rights content in such education. The Nyalali Commission, which addressed the question of whether the country should shift to multi-party democracy or not, recommended that the shift to multi-party democracy called for the establishment of a major education program to teach people about human rights issues to rectify the imbalance in the regime’s education policies. The Commission recommended human rights education as a priority to be met as the country moved towards multiparty democracy. Reflecting these recommendations, the shift to multi-party politics in Tanzania was accompanied by a change in the political education syllabus from politics (siasa) to civics (uraia-citizenship).

Criticism of the Tanzanian education system’s political education content and emphasis is not unreasonable, however, for the unity and nation building agenda, the education system during the one-party era arguably achieved its aims and objectives and served the purpose for which the regime employed it. The education system was not a passive element; although neither was it in contradiction with the national ideology and ethos the regime sought to build. It was a very active medium through which the national ideology and ethos were transmitted. Contrary to the view espoused by the critical
research on this education, including the Nyalali Commission (1992), the Tanzanian education system produced a competent Tanzania citizen who knew the country’s ideology, ethos, and his or her position and rights within society and state. The small volume of existing research examining competence of the Tanzanian citizen during the one-party era supports this claim (Samoff, 1987, Othman and Baregu, 1994).

This competence of the Tanzanian citizen is also attested to by the active and assertive participation of people at grassroots level meetings and development activities. Tanzanians at this level have confidently questioned political leaders and they have, not uncommonly, forced changes in political leaders at local and national levels (Kjekshus 1979). This confidence also manifests itself in Tanzania’s ability throughout the one-party era to maintain a responsive electoral system that kept in place elected leaders people saw as serving their interests (Samoff, 1987). During and in-between elections people had opportunities to attend meetings, question and petition their leaders through village and party structure meetings and to mobilize to organise meetings.

The other proof of competence of education system in Tanzania is that throughout its history the regime has been able to recruit competent men and women from village level to the national level to run party and governmental activities. The political competence of a Tanzanian during the one party era, when judged according to the national ethos and ideology the regime put forward as a vision of the society it seeks to build in Tanzania, attests to the fact that the education system it put in place largely accomplished the task of making a competent and confident Tanzania citizen.

**Information systems-mass media**

Researchers and agencies critical of the regime’s media and freedom of information practices during the one-party era have faulted the regime for gradually gaining ultimate control and monopoly of the media in Tanzania and in this way limiting freedom of information. Condon (1967), MISA (2000) and Kilimwiko and Moshiro, (2001) have noted the introduction of legislation through which the Tanzanian regime
curtailed freedom of information and came to monopolize the information and media space.

Tanzanian mainland at independence inherited three national newspapers. Commercial private interests operated the Standard, while Uhuru and the Nationalist were operated as ruling party papers. The national radio station was state owned but operated through an independent Tanzanian Broadcasting Corporation. Locally there were smaller newspapers, such as Kiongozi owned by the Tabora Catholic diocese, Mwenge owned by Songea diocese and Njoo Uone, operated by Lutheran diocese of Njombe.

Beginning with the press, the regime began to move to acquire control and monopolise the media. The independent, but state funded, corporation that managed Radio Tanzania was disbanded in 1965, and broadcasting services were rearranged and placed under the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism. Since colonial times, this service was government-funded but its broadcasters were outside the political arena. According to Kilimwiko and Moshiro (2001:136) the radio station was accessible to the party and government authority but was independent of its political direction. It is claimed that the move to control national radio broadcasting was prompted by the army mutiny of 1964 (Kilimwiko and Moshiro, 2001:136).

In 1970, the government nationalised the Standard and its Sunday News edition. It was argued by the party that this was done to enable the press in Tanzania to be responsive to the aspirations of the people and be at their service after the Arusha Declaration (Kilimwiko and Moshiro, 2001: 142). This move was followed by the banning of imported books, newspapers and films that contradicted the party policy of Ujamaa and, in addition to this, a number of acts were passed to minimize freedom of information and expression (Kilimwiko and Moshiro, 2001:142). According to Candon (1967), the two papers joined the other party newspapers in that it ‘preached and exorted’ the party line 90% of the time (Condon, 1967:352).

Two more pieces of legislation were passed in 1976, the Newspapers Act (no 3) and News Agency Act (no 14). The Newspapers Act gave discretionary powers to the registrar of newspapers. The registrar, an appointee of the minister responsible for
information, had powers to refuse registration of any paper that appeared to be used for any purpose prejudicial to, or incompatible with, the maintenance of peace, order and good government (MISA, 2000:8). The Tanzania News Agency Act followed and further limited freedom of information and expression, confirming the state and the party’s monopoly of information. The act prohibited anybody except the agency itself, or people authorized by it, to collect, process and disseminate news from within or outside Tanzania (MISA, 2000:9-10, and Kilimwiko and Moshiro, 2001:144). Important in these developments was also the creation of a special party subcommittee for mass media chaired by a member of the party’s Central Committee. Its function was to overview press activities in the country. Furthermore, from then onwards, all heads of mass media organisations became presidential appointees.

The state-party maintained its virtual media monopoly right until the beginning of transition to multi-party democracy, even after the introduction of the Bill of Rights in the constitution in 1984 (MISA, 2000). The Bill of Rights introduced a whole package of rights including the rights of opinion and free expression, receiving, imparting or disseminating information and ideas through any media regardless of national frontiers, as well as the right to freedom from interference with communications without prejudice to the laws of the land (Tanzania Constitution1977, Article 18(1)).

That the regime controlled freedom of information and the media is clear, yet, it can be demonstrated that this behaviour on the part of the regime did not affect its legitimacy or the effective propagation of its vision, ideas and values. This can be attributed to three factors:

First, the newly independent Tanzania had only a tiny private media sector. As noted by Kilimwiko and Moshiro (2001), there was only one privately owned national English language daily with a Sunday edition. The ruling party set up the other two national newspapers, the Nation (English) and Uhuru (Swahili), during the struggle for independence. The first national radio station was set up in the early years of independence, and it was state owned. Tanzania did not have a television station, private or state controlled, until 1993 when the first private TV station was launched. There were no private radio-stations until early 1980s.
As such the government did not have to close many news outlets to establish its control of the media. The only paper on record to have been closed is *Ulimwengu*, a small paper owned by younger brother of the exiled former secretary of the ruling party Oscar Kambona. Its closure did not cause public outrage because it published the views of Kambona who had become marginalised when he opposed the popular Arusha Declaration.

Second, beyond the prohibitive laws and legislation pointed out in this chapter, in actual practice, the Tanzanian media was not always limited to disseminating party doctrine. Radio Tanzania (Tanzania national radio broadcast), for instance, carried political programs but these did not overshadow other content such as entertainment (music, other artistic performances, sports) and educational programs on a variety of subjects from health to farming, agriculture and international affairs. There were also religious programs as well as educational programs for students and adults. What the regime attempted was all-round radio broadcasting that catered to the entire population instead of just an all-round propaganda machine for the regime. The broadcasters also attempted to engage with the population by visiting people in their communities and workplaces.

Third, where the print media was concerned, ‘Letters to the Editor’ columns provided space for the public to express and air their views. This was an important opportunity for people to communicate their grievances against the regime. The column also accepted poetry, a powerful means of communicating with the regime and other readers.

Fourth, people did not regard freedom of information and the regime’s media monopoly as issues worth protesting about. In this, as in other areas where state monopoly and control were absolute, Tanzanians did not protest, petition or organize against the regime. Its media monopoly and prohibitive laws against freedom of information were spoken and written about as cardinal sins only by critics of the regime. At the beginning, and for most of the period of the one-party system, there was no substantial constituency in Tanzania to demand and advocate for these rights. Until early 1984, the demand for media rights seems to have been a preserve of some university
professors, lawyers and other members of the legal organisation aware of the wider implications of state control of the media as well as information rights and freedoms. Their campaign was in part responsible for inserting a media clause into the 1984 Bill of Rights in the new Tanzania constitution, permitting many liberal democratic media rights and freedoms.

**Army reorganisation and mobilization**

The Tanzanian regime’s strategy of unity building and securing legitimacy that it used to co-opt workers, women and youth movement was also effectively deployed and used by the regime to co-opt and make the army part of the party and government structure from 1964. Before then, the Tanzanian army’s position *vis-a-vis* the state was similar to that of the United Kingdom, which created and established the Tanzanian army in the colonial era. Co-opting the army and making it part of party structure was a delicate issue the Tanzania regime did not affect until an opportune moment—the 1964 army mutiny, which was ended with British navy assistance. This event provided an opportunity for the regime to dismantle the army completely and establish a new one. The first step was to recruit youth wing members of the ruling party into the army (Coulson, 1982 and Mazrui, 1968:274-275).

Subsequent reforms implemented after Tanzania became a one party state de jure in 1965 made membership of the ruling party compulsory for joining the army (Mmuya, 1995:40). The next set of reforms made the army a site for government and political participation in party structure and activities. In addition, senior army officers joined the Defence and Security committee of the party at all levels from district to national (Mmuya 1995:40). This meant that in the Tanzanian army there was a military and party command structure working in conjunction with each other.

As participants in the party system, army officers benefited from political patronage just as any other party cadres and leaders. Army officers were appointed to a number of ministerial posts, and many more were appointed to regional and district commissioner posts just as other civilian party cadres and leaders were. They also got appointments in the party structures. In addition to its conventional defence role, the army carried out many important functions for the ruling party. The army contained well-
trained party cadres that were used to train civilian party members. During major events such as various anniversaries and state-party sanctioned public events, the army provided choirs and bands playing mobilising songs as they entertained the people.

In addition to the conventional army (Tanzania People’s Defence Force-TPDF), the regime also created the National Building Army (Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa-JKT) and Mgambo (a civilian army for local security purposes from village to district levels). JKT, which was instrumental in building villages under the Ujamaa policy, was adopted in 1967. It was also in charge of national service programs for secondary school, college, and university graduates. Apart from military training, the JKT camps also imparted party ideology to young people. In fact, most recruits were given party membership after being instructed in party doctrine during national service. When it began in 1966, national service lasted for one year. Amidst the economic problems of the 1980s it was reduced to six months and was completely abandoned in the early 1990s.

The co-option of the army into party and government structures helped the Tanzanian regime’s legitimacy in three important ways. Firstly, the army was made to be politically committed as opposed to its previous political neutrality (Mazrui, 1968:274). With its participation in party structure and activities it thus became part and parcel of the regime. For Tanzania this achieved valuable civilian military control, something that eluded many African countries, plunging them into instability with army revolts and military coup d’états. The Tanzania regime achieved a large measure of legitimacy for keeping the country stable and peaceful amid violent conflicts in the Great Lake states region and in Africa as a whole. Secondly, the regime achieved its agenda of unity building by making the army work together in cooperation with other important sections of society that were within the party. This was not only a demonstration of unity but also a means of achieving it.

**Promotion and use of a common of language - Swahili**

Historically Swahili spread in all East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) fostered by the colonial power, the United Kingdom, which encouraged its development and use. In all three countries the post-independence leaderships were aware of Swahili’s potential as a national language. However, it was Tanzania that took
committed steps to make Kiswahili the national language and maximised its use in most spheres of public life. In 1967, around the same time that the Arusha Declaration instigated *Ujamaa* and the self-reliance policy, Vice President Rashid Kawawa announced the adoption of Swahili as the official language of business, with this he ushered in Tanzania’s commitment to using Swahili (Mazrui, 1972:87-88).

Why did Tanzania adopt Swahili and promote it as the national language unlike other East African countries? The adoption of Kiswahili in Tanzania has been explained by a number of factors. All are equally relevant and several can be pointed to as being congruent with the view of this thesis. That is, the regime in Tanzania embarked on a committed and rigorous national building process, efficiently employing all means that made the process possible. Part of the uniqueness of the Tanzanian national building process was also its quest for equality that sought to make redundant not only class exploitation but also elitism. Explaining problems adopting Swahili as the national language in Kenya, Harries (1976) points out among other things that while in Tanzania Swahili was already spoken in the national capital, this was not the case in either Nairobi or Kampala. For Tanzania, the adoption of Swahili as the national language came in the context in which it was already accepted and used in the most important city, and therefore, among African elites.

Mazrui (1972) has asserted that the promotion of Swahili in post-independence Tanzania can be explained by the leadership’s quest to establish a unique national ideology calling for the use of an indigenous language. *Ujamaa* (African Socialism), which Tanzania adopted, was not equal to European socialism. Therefore, according to Mazrui, had *Ujamaa* been given an English or another European term, it could not possibly have captured and engaged Tanzanian African imagination the way it did.

Another explanation can be found in Mukuthuria’s (2006) argument on why Swahili was not adopted as the national language in Uganda. He points out that Swahili was not adopted in Uganda because some of the country’s important elites—the Bugandans—opposed it and sought to promote Luganda as the national language instead. Harries (1976) holds the same view about Kenya except that sections of the Kenyan elite opposed Swahili for a different reason. In Kenya, part of the ruling elite was attached to
English and its use as a differentiating status symbol. They objected to the adoption of Swahili as a national language, particularly its use in parliament. Part of the reason for their objections was that, according to them, Swahili was ‘the national language of ordinary folk and not the elite’ (Harries, 1976:159).

The explanation put forward in this thesis for Tanzania’s success in adoption and use of Swahili is that rather than being merely an act of nationalism—perhaps more importantly—it also hastened nation building and unity since Swahili was already understood in some areas, and had the potential to be understood in all areas. This view is congruent with an aspect of Harries’ (1969:60) explanation, which asserts that the Tanzanian elite adopted Swahili because of its potentially unifying function given that it was already understood in many parts of the country since the early years of the struggle for independence.

Tanzania reaped the benefits of adopting Swahili as the national language brought together more than 120 ethnic groups each with its own vernacular language. Furthermore, with time, Swahili also became a symbol of cultural identity marking Tanzanians among other nations in Africa and in the world.

**Unity building measures in religion**

Apart from divisions of ethnicity and class, religious heterogeneity was an area with the potential to create conflict and derail nation building and other political processes. In Tanzania, in terms of faith, people are divided into Christians of several denominations and Muslims of two main strands. There are also people who maintain African tribal and ancestral faiths that are not prominent in public and political process. Hence Christianity and Islam are the two religions staking claims and exerting influence on the Tanzanian public sphere. Inter-faith political conflicts of interest occurred in Tanzania during colonial times. As previously indicated, during the independence struggle, a section of Muslims in Tanzania formed the All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT), a political party with the key demand that Tanganyika’s
independence be delayed until Muslims had the same access to education as the Christians.

Given that the main independence movement which became the ruling party in Tanzania after independence involved a sizable number of Muslims as well as Christians within the African political elite and among the general population, it can be seen that the Tanzanian regime adopted certain stances from the beginning to avert conflicts, handle religion-state relations and establish unity among people of both religions. To achieve this, in addition to adopting a clear-cut stance in the relationship between state and religion, the regime maintained certain institutions of the past, adopted new policies, and took advantage of others to further and maintain unity among people of the two religions.

On the relationship between state and religion, the regime’s stance was that Tanzania was a secular state that recognized and respected religious freedom. This is not a statement appearing only in policy papers or the Constitution; rather, it is a fact that the Tanzanian leadership proactively spread in public speeches.

In practice, the regime is seen to have largely respected religious freedoms and freedom of worship despite its commitment to socialism, which religious institutions feared would result in communistic anti-religion stances. This the regime did not do (Westerlund, 1980). With the adoption of the *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* ideology, the regime continued to respect and engage with religious institutions, upheld the principles of human dignity, equality, communal life, ethical leadership, and propagated pro-poor policies which religious institutions themselves cherished.

While it spread the idea of a secular state, it can be seen that in order to establish unity, the regime did not adopt a policy of disengagement with religious institutions. Rather than stay away from them, the regime established and maintained cooperation with religious institutions and accorded much respect to religious leaders and institutions. Not only did Muslim and Christian leaders continue to be devoted members of their denominations, thus maintaining solidarity with their fellow members, but religious leaders could consult the government while government leaders participated in religious functions. In terms of policies, the main feature was that religious institutions were
exempt from taxes in running their activities and in the importation of goods for welfare and development projects.

For the general public, one thing must have stood out clearly in making the point that in Tanzania the government leadership and religion worked together amicably, each respecting the role of the other. For the first 24 years of independence, a Christian president joined Muslims in all major celebrations. Whether as a personal style or as respect and appreciation of Islamic culture, the president cherished and wore the Muslim hat (Barakshia) at such celebrations and also other public occasions if he so wished. Once a Muslim President succeeded the Christian one, he too carried on the tradition of accepting invitations to join and celebrate events organized by Christian churches.

Given the clearly secular nature of the state adopted by the regime, respect for freedom of worship and public relations gestures would not have brought about unity of people of the two religions in Tanzania if the regime had not adopted measures to rectify policies from the colonial era that put Muslims at a serious disadvantage in obtaining education and, therefore, in sharing in professional employment opportunities. It is also important that the regime maintained an informal policy of power sharing that took advantage of the historical engagement of Muslim and Christian elites in national and local politics. Also, the adoption of *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* policy in 1967—which stressed respect, welfare, and ethical, people-serving leadership with state ownership of the economy for the benefit of all Tanzanians—and actual commitment to this policy helped to moot further mobilization of particularistic grievances.

With the 1969 Education Act, the government of Tanzania honoured the main grievance of Tanzanian Muslims. It nationalized all schools run by Christian churches except those dedicated to producing religious personnel (Maliyamkono and Msekwa, 1972). The nationalised schools were brought directly under government and a national policy of education, along with a merit based system of admission for secondary schools, replaced past discriminatory policies where both parents and schools discouraged Muslim students from joining missionary schools. By adopting this policy, the Tanzanian leadership laid to rest one of the main demands of Muslims in Tanzania, arguably taking a further step in consolidating Tanzanian unity.
Information that confirms whether or not there was serious consultation with Christian churches in Tanzania prior to the nationalization of schools and colleges is not currently available in the public domain. However, the *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* ideology adopted in 1967, and the incremental changes to the education system brought by the leadership during the first eight years of independence before nationalization, clearly contributed significantly to facilitating a nationalization policy.

Nationalisation of schools would not have come as surprise to the churches as early on in the post independence the government made a radical departure from the colonial administration’s policy of dealing with the churches in the provision of education. The post–independence government introduced major changes that interfered heavily with not only schools run by religious agencies but by any other agencies in receipt of the aid grants that all church schools received. Education was to be provided under a *Single System of Education* territory-wide (Msekwa and Malyamkono, 1979-12-13). By 1963, autonomy in setting school fees and discrimination on racial, religious or any other grounds in admission was prohibited. In addition, a unified Teaching Service Terms was set by the government to guarantee equality of treatment throughout the teaching profession in the country (Cameroon and Dodd, 1970: 184-185). The latter measure was popular among religious schoolteachers who had felt they were under stringent control of religious authorities.

Religious institutions’ reaction to the 1967 Arusha Declaration, as Westerlund (1980) found, was a mixed one; but substantial numbers in the clergy supported the policy. One of its most firm believers was the Roman Catholic Bishop of Rulenge Diocese who relocated to an *Ujamaa* village and asked priests, nuns and monks as well as ordinary Christians in his dioceses to relocate to an *Ujamaa* villages as the declaration called for (Kilaini: 2005:179). Many others supported from the pulpit if not in practice. Churches found it difficult to oppose *Ujamaa* ideals because its ideals were close to that of early biblical Christian communities (Westerlund, 1980:35-40). For Roman Catholics these were also times of Vatican Two, which exalted organisation life versus individualism, as the Tanzanian leadership did not fail to remind the Bishops and all clergy. Furthermore, it was also a time when Latin American Christians were moving in the direction of adopting liberation theology (Westerlund 1980:35). Against this
backdrop, the Church agreed to the policy rather than struggle against it. The state’s implementation of *Ujamaa* left only two options for the Church, as Bishop Kilaini (2005) pointed out: support *Ujamaa* or remain silent. Therefore, fighting the nationalisation of schools became difficult for the churches after *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* as the Tanzanian public and most of the clergy overwhelmingly supported *Ujamaa*. Also, the atmosphere of nation building engendered by independence and the *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* made it difficult for religious figures to stand against the urgent need to provide education for all children.

The church system of schools had meant that not only were Muslims discriminated against but also that education and socialization in Tanzania followed two separate systems—one for Christians and another for Muslims. Such a situation was not favourable for early integration and unity. Having nationalized the schools, the leadership was able to implement its policy of using the system to forge unity among people.

Even though not written policy or strategy, the leadership’s practice of sharing top posts of government amongst the two main religions in Tanzania helped consolidate their unity. This feature can be seen throughout the history of emancipation and the struggle for independence, when Muslim and Christian elites worked together in TAA and TANU. In Tanzania for almost half a century following independence in 1961, the top three government positions have always been filled by a combination of leaders belonging to the two religions. Nyerere was a Christian; when the Tanzanian mainland united with Zanzibar, Kawawa (the former trade union leader), a Muslim, was made the Prime Minister, a post he held for eight years. In the 1980s reshuffle, Nyerere continued as the president with a Muslim as his Vice President and also the president of Zanzibar. The Prime Minister then was a Christian.

When in 1985 Tanzania got its first Muslim President, the Vice President was automatically from Zanzibar and hence a Muslim. To maintain the mixed balance, in his ten-year tenure the President appointed three prime ministers who were all Christians. Law governing the first general election after Tanzania established a multi-party system in 1992 required presidential candidates to have as their running mates an individual from the other side of the union (either Zanzibar or Tanzania mainland). This has produced
Christian and Muslim presidents who both had Muslim running mates from Zanzibar as Vice Presidents. To balance leadership, the Christian president Mr Mkapa (from 1995-2005) chose a Muslim Prime Minister for both his terms. The Muslim President, Mr Kikwete, who succeeded him in 2005, appointed two Prime Ministers in his tenure, who were both Christians.

**Conclusion**

One of the premises discernable from a neo-patrimonial perspective is that African leaders had no basis and incentive to undertake policies and programs to build and promote social cohesion and nation building as they thrive on a policy of dividing and ruling the populations of their states. Hence they are presumed to promote politics of ethnic competition (Van De Walle, 2003). From this perspective the importance of the promotion of unity has been seen ‘only as a means’ to secure independence from the colonial rule (Mpangala, 2000) and this was a ‘veen’ African leaders used to cloak their self-interests which they then unveiled in the post-independence era (Okaya and Dyk 2000). However, the case of Tanzania as discussed here disputes this general premise as the regime, through political and social programs, endeavoured to seriously build social cohesion by redefining key interests into non-ethnic interests and promoting social cohesion in this way through the groups it encouraged. The Tanzanian regime did not promote ethnic political competition by policy or by omission. Through the regime’s efforts in mobilizing society as discussed here it is seen that the regime did not take for granted that a Tanzanian nation-state organisation will evolve by itself. Consistent with the importance that African people have attached to unity since the onset of colonial rule when the colonial powers defeated disunited, separate ethnic groups, the regime party took seriously the issue of promoting and building nation unity.

So important was this issue that the party’s success in building a national organisation in Tanzania was promoted as one of the key achievement of its 34 years in government during its campaign in the first multiparty election in 1995. The next chapter discuss the contribution of economic policy to this national goal.
CHAPTER 6. REGIME LEGITIMACY AND ECONOMIC POLICY

The challenge for post-colonial African states to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their population as whole in economic development was, as summed by Cliffe (1969), ‘whether the efforts would be made to bring some general improvement in the life of the broad masses of the people or whether development would be something confined to a small section of the nation’ (1969: 243). Perhaps even more than embedding the political process of democracy and national unity, economic development was the most important agenda for African people and their leaders after independence as colonialism was regarded as a period of forced underdevelopment. It is also notable that post independence concerns about nepotism and lack of tangible economic development delegitimised many African regimes and led to the intensification of ethnic political competition and, in some cases, to cessionist movements in many African states.

It is undisputable that development was one of the most important issues in the post independence era. However, exactly how and by what means it would be affected, or what its goals and focus would be, were not predefined by the independence movement. In Tanzania it took the regime six years after independence to produce a statement of economic policy that set out a vision defining the focus, means and goals of development. This statement was contained in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The six years interregnum was significant because it gave the public concrete experience of economic self governance that would influence the choice of policy direction.

The importance of a popular common vision which inspires building of common institutions and pursuit of mutually beneficial nationwide policies for all cannot be over-emphasised in new and young nations. In established states an economic system that is politically acceptable to a majority of the population evolves over time. In new states, however, because of expectations raised by the struggle for independence, such a system has to be established quickly. If not, sectional interests and conflicts are likely to arise and threaten stability of the state as various individuals and groups compete to capture as large a share as possible of the national economy. The need for a common vision in developing countries is thus important not just for development (Mmuya and Quorro, 2003:215-217) but also as conflict resolution tool as it is a means to ensure the equitable
distribution of economic benefits to all, which in turn gives the regime legitimacy to the
majority of the population.

The 1967 Arusha Declaration with its socialist ideology provided that vision for
Tanzania. Arguably, critics of the Tanzanian regime have focused more on the
implementation of individual policies and how the regime failed to live up to the
Declaration and its policies. However, the very fact that Tanzania had a common vision
which was popular as a whole, and to which the leadership was committed and attempted
seriously to implement, was in itself important for the regime in building and maintain
legitimacy and a political community. It is not the aim of this chapter to discuss how
successful the economic policies pursued by the Tanzania government were. Rather, its
aim is to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the external assessment of the impact of
these policies on the economic development of Tanzania, these policies tended to build
regime legitimacy and national cohesion.

This chapter first discusses the decision to embark on a socialist economic path,
including the economic aspects of the leadership code and its centrality to curbing the
potential for corruption. It then analyses the implementation of the socialist economic
programme through the main planks of nationalisation, rural development, welfare and
social services. It ends with an assessment of the contribution of economic policy to the
building of national unity and how this gave the regime legitimacy.

The Socialist path

Given the immediate international circumstances in which post-independence
states operated, African leaders faced a situation in which they could choose a variety of
policies for their countries (Cartright, 1989: 1-2; Moshi, 1992:60). In terms of a socio-
economic strategy, this was largely a choice between a capitalist or socialist oriented
strategy. It has been argued that Tanzania’s choice of socialism as its official ideology
and policy was damaging for economic growth and development (Lewis, 1990; Meredith,
2005), and this debate has dominated the literature on Tanzanian development under
socialism. Most criticism of the Tanzanian economic policy, particularly from liberal
political economy leaning research, including the dominant IMF critique of (socialist)
statist economic policies, have failed to take into account—or simply ignored—the
political logic that made Tanzania, and perhaps other African countries, adopt a socialist economic strategy rather than laissez faire liberal economic policies (Biermann and Wagao, 1986:93-94). It could be argued that for a newly independent state in the 1960s, socialism was an internationally acceptable choice seen as a reasonable economic policy for a regime seeking to maintain popular support and the engagement of the entire population in the economic system in a way that reflected the struggle for independence.

This feature of socialism does not apply easily to capitalism when advanced as an economic strategy in these circumstances. As noted by Yeager (1989) and Moshi (1992), the capitalist policy that Tanzania practised for the first six of independence was not easy for the regime to use for mobilising the population as a whole. The policy, because of its dependency on capital and capitalists among the population, meant that economic policy incentives were given first to citizens who were already producers and to richer regions in the hope that the economic benefits of their activities will gradually trickle down to all citizens. In the case of agricultural development, this meant focusing on specific areas which were already endowed with favourable climatic conditions and as such could ensure higher yields of specific crops as noted by (Moshi 1992:62). Secondly, within these respective areas, efforts were to be concentrated on particular individuals (progressive farmers) thought of as receptive and ready to adapt new innovations in agriculture. As such, the policy called for the post-independence regime to mobilize the population within a highly ‘inegalitarian’ economic system (Yeager, 1989:31).

Thus a socialist economic strategy was not only consistent with the ideology of the independence movement but the introduction of this economic ideology also came as an alternative to the liberal capitalist economic policy Tanzania pursued for the first six years after independence (Bennett, 1969, Fimbo, 1974, Coulson, 1989, Yeager, 1989, Moshi, 1992). In that period, during which capitalist economic policy was implemented, researchers have reported that a majority of people in rural and urban areas became disillusioned with the prospect of economic improvement while sections of the elite and those with capital in the private sector became richer (Hugh, 1968: 152-155 and Cliffe, 1969: 242 and Coulson, 1982: 180-182).
In this liberal economic thinking, foreign direct investment was seen as central to economic development. However, even on this front, the Tanzania regime was disappointed as despite major efforts, foreign direct investment was not forthcoming (Nsekela, 1974:111, ILO- Job and Skills Programme for Africa- ILO-JSPA, 1982: 209, Mtatifikoro, 2002:226 and). At the same time, during the 1960s, Tanzania’s development aid expectations were not met (although this situation changed during the 1970s). Two of its main aid supporters, West Germany and United Kingdom, broke diplomatic relations with Tanzania (Coulson, 1982). Tanzania differed with United Kingdom over the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Zimbabwean settlers. With Germany the difference arose over the establishment of an East German consulate in Zanzibar.

In these first six years inequality in Tanzania increased. While those with capital and a position in government or private sectors were getting richer, the position of the majority of the population did not improve (Yeager, 1989). Although the government had followed liberal economic policies and prepared a favourable environment for investment, the economy did not grow as expected. For the majority, this was a situation of diminishing hope and enthusiasm after the successful struggle for independence. It is from this background that the Arusha Declaration was announced as a curative alternative to the ideological and practical problems that the Tanzanian economy and development process faced at the time.

As an economic and political announcement the Arusha Declaration was successful not only because it was communicated effectively to most of Tanzania (Coulson, 1982:180), but also because the regime put forward with zeal arguments that re-committed Tanzania to the socio-economic promises of independence. This excited the majority population who were, indeed, becoming disillusioned about their prosperity and welfare within independent Tanzania in the first six years (Yeager, 1989).

The Arusha Declaration reiterated the economic promises of TANU dating back to its foundation in 1954:

- To see that the government mobilizes all the country’s resources towards elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease;
• To see that the government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of cooperative organizations;
• To see that where possible the government participates directly in the economic development of the country;
• To see that every individual has the right to receive just returns for his labour;
• To see that the government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption;
• To see that the government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country.

That these objectives formed the preamble of the Arusha Declaration arguably linked the aims of the independence movement to the socialist policy of 1967. The Arusha Declaration included two things that were important to building and maintaining a political community and legitimacy of the state. Firstly it asserted a commitment to equality through a policy against economic exploitation with the aim of establishing a classless society. Secondly it put forward a leadership code that explicitly prohibited leaders from engaging in business and using their positions to enrich themselves.

Arguably the goals to achieve equality and the classless society without exploitation put forward in the Arusha declaration (TANU, 1967), and the commitment of the Tanzania leadership to implementing this, gave the regime a coherent common purpose (Nyerere, 1968, Msekwa, 1979). By putting forward and committing to a policy of equality, the regime limited and nipped in the bud illegitimacy and conflicts bound to escalate when economic benefits are seen to reach only, or mostly, certain sections or areas (Bennett, 1969, Miguel, 2002). With this policy the regime in Tanzania recreated the unity people cultivated in the struggle for independence.

The leadership code that was part of the Arusha Declaration is arguably one of the main instruments that contributed to the legitimacy of the regime in Tanzania and ensured a greater degree of equality. Economically, the leadership code was of import because it formally demarcated and separated the public sphere and the private sphere. In fact, it made clear that as servants of the public sphere, political leaders could not
continue to serve or have economic interests in the private sphere. Specifically it stipulated that:

- Every leader, of the party or government must be either a peasant or a worker and should be in no way associated with the practices of capitalism and or feudalism.
- No leader should hold shares in any company.
- No leader should hold directorship in any privately owned enterprises.
- No leader should receive two or more salaries.
- No leader should own houses, which he/she rents to others.

This clear stipulation by the Tanzanian leadership of a code of conduct for leaders is important because engagement of the leadership in the private economic sphere has often been the cause of conflicts of interest, corruption and neo-patrimonial practices. How these practices happen and how they feature in African politics have been elaborated thoroughly in neo-patrimonial literature (Lemarchand, 1972, Clapham, 1985, Bayart, 1993, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997. Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999, Chabal, and Daloz, 1999)

In Tanzania, implementation of the leadership code was complemented by the fact that most of the economy after the Arusha Declaration was state-controlled and run (Kahama, Mallyamkono, Wells, 1986). This meant not only that leaders were prohibited by the code from engaging in business but also that—given the smallness of the private sector—the leadership could not abuse their powers in its favour nor engage in it themselves. Because of the economic structure after the Arusha Declaration, there were few push factors for leaders to serve competing entrepreneurs from the private sector. Given the government’s commitment to expansion of the public sector and its promotion of public, collective and cooperative practices as best for society (TANU, 1967), there were very few private entrepreneurs. This explicit separation of the private sphere and the public sphere also served to prevent business owners from engaging in politics and seeking political office or political leadership positions (Kiondo, 1998:70,75; Ngowi, 2009:263). This way, the largely state-run and controlled economic system and the leadership code served to minimise abuse of leadership positions to implement neo-patrimonial practices that benefit leaders.
In order to increase the effectiveness of the leadership code as a deterrent, leaders were given a year to choose to continue in their positions—in which case they had to adhere to the new code—or resign (Bennett, 1969:84). It is also notable that in the nationalisation of the economy, a sizable number of leaders real estate properties were nationalised by the government through the 1971 *Acquisition of Building Act* aimed at discouraging such endeavours seen as exploitative and a cause of land speculation and scramble (Fimbo, 1974). Fimbo notes that nationalisation dealt a ‘crushing blow’ to commercial and petty bourgeoisie interests (1974:252). The leadership code continued to be important and played an important role in monitoring and deterring leaders from engaging in private economic activities until it was officially modified by the Zanzibar resolution of 1992 at the time of the introduction of the multiparty system. This resolution allowed leaders to rent their properties and engage in other economic activities for income generation (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992) and it was implemented at a time when both inequality and corruption were growing in Tanzania.

The following section discusses how the socialist economic programme was implemented within this political framework.

**Implementation of the socialist economic programme**

On the production side, key policies adopted were nationalization of major means of economy, starting new and expanding existing state owned commercial companies, and focusing on the development of agriculture (Kahama, Mallyamkono, Wells, 1986:171). On the distributive side, the regime extended a system for providing free social services for education and health, and water in cities and towns for a nominal charge (Maro, and Mlay, 1979, Sawers, 1989, and Ngowi, 2009). The regime also attempted to maintain a balance in supplying basic and economic production needs in the rural, urban and industrial sectors (Kahama, Mallyamkono and Wells, 1986, Sawers, 1989).
Nationalisation

Adoption of the public owned and controlled economic policies of the 1967 Arusha Declaration was consistent with the aims of TANU (1954), which had argued that ‘in order to ensure economic justice the state must have effective control over the principal means of production’ and that there should be ‘collective ownership of the resources of the country’. In a further elaboration of this policy, the Arusha Declaration also stated that ‘to build and maintain socialism it is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants and workers through the machinery of their government and cooperatives’ (TANU, 1967:2). This meant land; forests; minerals; water, oil and electricity; news media; communications; banks; insurance; import and export trade; wholesale trade; iron and steel industry; machine tools; arms, motorcar, cement, fertiliser, and textile industries; any big factory on which a large section of people depended for their living, or which provided essential components for other industries; and large plantations, especially those which provide raw materials essential to important industries (TANU.1967:4-5).

What was stated in Arusha was put into practice gradually by the government. All private banks and insurance companies were nationalised and placed under the state owned National Bank of Commerce and the National Insurance Corporation respectively (Nsekela, 1974:121). Import and export firms were taken by the State Trading Corporation while milling and food production interests were placed under the National Milling Corporation. The government also acquired 60 per cent shares in seven major companies: Kilimanjaro Breweries, Tanzania Breweries, British American Tobacco, Bata Shoe Company, Tanzania Metal Box Company, Tanganyika Extracts Company and Tanganyika Portland Cement Company (Kahama et al, 1986: 34-35). In 1970, it took over wholesale trade and, in 1971; it requisitioned rent-earning buildings valued at Tshs. 100,000 (Coulson, 1982:179).

In addition, large parastatal organisations were created (Nsekela, 1974:126-137) including: National Development Corporation (NDC), Tanzania Tourist Corporation (TTC), National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) and State Mining
Corporation (STAMICO). These were placed under the supervision of ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs and Development Planning.

Further development of the public sectors necessitated additional financing and investment in this sector. The National Bank of Commerce increasingly had to service these institutions and it did so in a manner that favoured the public sector more than the private sector (Nsekella, 1974). Restrictions were also placed on TANU and government leaders as well as on senior party officials, associations affiliated to the party, the parastatals, and on the government. Leaders were not allowed to have any shares in any company nor could they be directors in any privately owned company (TANU, 1967:25). As a result of the nationalisation with its main focus on developing public owned industrial and commercial firms, in a few years most of the economy was likely to be in the public sector with an estimate that by the end of 1970s that 80 per cent of large and medium scale activity would be in the public sector, accounting for 44 per cent of monetary GDP and 80 per cent of monetary capital formation, (ILO-JPSA, 1982, Kahama, Mallyamkono, and Wells, 1986).

As most industries nationalised were foreign-owned, the nationalisation programme had the support of the indigenous population. Nationalisation also enabled the regime—through its ownership of the industries—to attempt fulfilling other policy objectives such as providing more employment opportunities and accruing more revenue from the industries the state could now use to meet other needs of people and invest further in the Tanzanian economy (Nsekella, 1974, Kahama, Mallyamkono, Wells, 1989:74 and Limbu and Mashindano, 2002:48).

**Rural development and building a more equal society**

Rural and agriculture development was the key policy of the government expressed in the 1967 Arusha Declaration. As in other areas of economic policy, research has been critical of various aspects of how specific policy objectives were carried out, their effectiveness and results (Kahama, Mallyamkono, and Wells, 1986, Forster and Maghimbi, 1992). Yet, there is substantial room to argue that the regime’s general focus on rural and agriculture development, plus the tangible benefits of some specific policies contributed significantly to its legitimacy.
It can be argued that policies followed by the regime had tangible effects on the development of rural areas and agriculture, reversing the focus of development. Resource allocation, until then, mostly favoured urban areas and other sectors even though majority of the people lived in rural areas and engaged in agriculture (Maro and Mlay, 1979). Moreover, the regime’s focus on balancing development nationwide meant policies were designed to spread development to regions away from Dar es Salaam. This benefited rural areas as they could be serviced from those peripheral regional centres and towns (Sawers, 1979:843-846).

The focus on rural development not only resulted in a transfer of resources to such areas, but also allowed the regime to engage closely with the rural population (Msekwa 1979, Nyerere, 1968:131-132). Seen as dealing with their problems both in rhetoric and in action, the regime thus gained legitimacy in the rural areas. This was crucial for the government as the population of rural areas accounted for more than 85 per cent of the total population in Tanzania. The new policies reversed the perceived neglect of rural areas seen as regime policy in the first six years of independence (Nellis, 1972 and Yeager, 1989:29-37).

To spur rural development and ensure those with lower income catch up and benefit from the economy, the government rolled out four key policies: public ownership of land and establishment of village land allocation; subsidy for agricultural implements; extension and education services; equalization of prices for all agricultural produce and consumer goods; and a progressive tax and equitable wages. Moreover, the government also embarked on a programme for bringing social services to rural areas as is discussed after the following examination of the four key policy areas.

**Public ownership of land and establishment of village land allocation**

From the beginning of independence, the Tanzanian government was committed to public ownership of land. In fact, public ownership of land was one of the earliest pieces of legislation enacted in Tanzania. The 1962 Land Ordinance Act placed all Tanzanian land under custodianship of the president. From 1962, and more so after the
1967 Arusha Declaration, the regime enacted a multitude of laws to make land public property by limiting private land rights. The new legislation was also aimed at ending feudal and land accumulation practices and towards creating the possibility for every Tanzanian to have land for housing and farming.

Fimbo (1974) undertook a comprehensive study of land legislation adopted before and after 1962. It includes the 1962 Land Ordinance Act, which transferred custodianship of land to the president from the governor who had held it since the 1947 Colonial Land Ordinance. In 1963 the Tanzanian government enacted the Freehold Title Conversion Act, which converted all freehold titles to 99-year government leaseholds. This act also subjected leaseholds to seizure if they were not developed. This was to limit the practice of individuals buying and hoarding land for future use or for re-sale.

The freehold legislation was followed by the 1965 Nyarubanja Tenure Act, which gave ownership of land to tenants who were renting and had to pay tribute to landlords. The Nyarubanja system had developed significantly in the West Lake Region of Tanzania as a traditional feudal system even before colonialism. A more comprehensive act to limit feudal systems and extend rights of land ownership to tenants in all parts of Tanzania was enacted in 1968. This was the Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act 1968.

In 1965, at the same time as the Nyarubanja Tenure act, the government also enacted the Rural Farmlands Act, granting the government rights to acquire and give land to cultivators who had leased land or been given licence to cultivate someone else’s land without government permission.

The Land Acquisition Act was enacted in 1967, at the same time as the Arusha Declaration, entitling the president to acquire land if it was required for any public purpose. Fimbo (1974: 254) points out that this law was particularly useful for facilitating demarcation of land for Ujamaa villages. Among other things, the Act entitled the president to acquire and give land for use to any person or group of persons who, in the opinion of the president, deserved such land for agricultural development. Land acquisition for villages was consolidated with the Rural Lands (Planning and Utilization) Act 1973. Furthermore, following the Declaration, most foreign-owned estates, which comprised 21 per cent of cultivated land, were nationalized. Only a few estates—mostly
tea and sisal—were left with private individuals (Kahama, Mallyamkono and Wells, 1986:52).

The new land legislation also extended to renting and real estate businesses. The Rent Restriction Act 1962 which, as Fimbo (1974:251) pointed out, extended more rights to tenants was already in place. Landlords’ rights of re-entry were restricted even when there was a breach of contract. The tenant could not henceforth be evicted except by a court order issued on specified grounds and could no longer be removed from a property as, according to the Act, he or she was to remain the statutory tenant even after their tenancy came to an end.

In 1971, the government enacted the Acquisition of Buildings Act, empowering the president to acquire (i) any building if it was in public interest to do so; (ii) any building with a construction and rental value over one hundred thousand shillings and (iii) any building solely for the purpose of letting.

Thus, since 1962 the Tanzanian regime had in place laws that gave the President custodianship of all land. This meant land was public property only leased to people or allocated to them by the state for a particular purpose. What made a difference in villages was that when villages were established following the Arusha Declaration, the government encouraged every villager to own pieces of land for farming and gave villages the authority to allocate to any villager who needed it a plot for cultivation and/or for establishing a residence. All villagers had or could, therefore, possess land to live on and cultivate, independent of inheritance or their capacity to buy land.

Public ownership of land, nationalisation of plantation and housing estates by the government, its discouragement of leaders engaging in feudal and capitalistic activities, and the overall focus on empowering every able individual to work on their own plots or in communal farms, all contributed to discouraging land scrambles, speculation and accumulation. As a result of these policies, land in Tanzania was also less commoditised till the 1990s (Van Donge, 1992: 82 and 91). However, these policies also arguably contributed to land holdings among Tanzanian farmers being smaller. As pointed out by Kahama, Mallyamkono and Wells (1986:62), from the early 1970s, over 82 per cent of farmers possessed land less than 2 hectares in size. 31.5 % possessed land holdings less
than 0.5 hectares 26.7% had 0.5-1 hectares, 24.7 held 1-2 hectares, 8.9 had 2-3 hectares, 0.6% occupied 3-5 hectares, and 7.6% of farmers held more 5 hectares of land. This widespread small size land holdings corresponds with information about the percentage of produce and type of farm the produce was cultivated in. As pointed out in the table below, almost all of the produce in Tanzania at the time came from small holders’ farmers and state farms.

Table. 4. The percentage share of small holders in the production of selected food and cash crops (1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Small Holders</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Estate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paddy</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum/Millet</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Export</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew nuts</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyrethrum</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Moshi, 1992: 68.
The fact that there was no land scramble or speculation throughout the first three decades meant that peasants in Tanzania did not experience the vulnerability that arises when a majority of the rural population becomes landless. The availability of land meant every Tanzanian could have a space to cultivate and live in most rural areas. As pointed out by Jerve and Ofstad, (2005:25), state ownership and various forms of communal tenure systems provided a safety net for poor people. It ensured the right to land to all Tanzanians through the empowerment of village governments to reallocate land.

Arguably, minimising peasant vulnerability this way provided the government with a reservoir of legitimacy. It meant that the evolution of desperate groups of landless people in rural areas and large groups of urban rural migrants, whose problems and dissatisfaction can be easily organized against a ruling regime, did not materialise in Tanzania. The widespread land ownership and distribution has been acknowledged as contributing towards preventing low-income Tanzanians from falling into extreme poverty during bad economic times as was the case in other developing countries. As noted by the Jerve and Ofstad Report (2005), Tanzania:

has never been a country of massive human suffering. A very important factor is that most rural Tanzanians have access to land or land-based resources. Even during periods of severe drought, individuals, communities and government have been able to fend off famine-like conditions’ (2005:6).

**Subsidy on farm implements and extension services:**

Complementing the fact that anyone could have a piece of land to cultivate was the government policy of subsidized farm implements at affordable prices for the cultivating population introduced in 1970. Subsidies were reduced in 1984 for the first time (Biermann and Wagao, 1986:97) and the trend continued in the 1990s (Meertens, 2000). The availability of subsidized farm implements, which in some cases reached up to 50-75% of the cost, (Kahama, Mallyamkono and Wells, 1986:56) meant most peasants could afford to cultivate.

Subsidy for farm implements—tools, pesticides, fertilizers and improved seeds—was one form of support. Other forms of support the government provided for free, or at
lower fees, included provision of veterinary and dipping services livestock. A system of extension services from peri-urban areas to rural areas through veterinary and agricultural officers and village executive officers was also made available (Ngugi, et al, 2002:70-71). Furthermore, to ensure spread of agricultural knowledge and education, the government started a network of adult education classes, radio programs on farming, folk colleges, farming training centres, agricultural colleges and, eventually, a university specialising in agriculture in the Morogoro region (Ngugi et al, 2002: 66-70). Agriculture as a theoretical and practical subject was also included in the primary and secondary school curricula (Msekwa and Mallyamkono, 1979).

Research has pointed out that the educational programmes were not effective in delivering the expected agricultural revolution (Ngugi et al, 2002:64). However, in political terms, the regime gained points with the public for focusing on agriculture and rural development by establishing and running these tangible programmes.

**Price equalization for agricultural produce and consumer goods:**

Also favourable to the rural areas was the government policy of equalization of prices wherever agricultural produce was bought (Sawers, 1989). This pan-territorial price policy helped peasants in rural areas furthest from cities. Significant also for the rural population was the government subsidy for consumer goods under a system of uniform prices wherever they were bought (Green, 1974:24-25 and Sawers, 1989:847), shielding the rural population from higher costs for such goods.

The policy was not based on neo-patrimonial distribution of resources but on a principle of social justice, mindful of the importance of the rural population to the largely agricultural country that Tanzania was. Nyerere (1971) summed it up as follows:

This fact should always be borne in mind, for there are various forms of exploitation. We must not forget that people who live in towns can possibly become exploiters of those who live in rural areas. All our big hospitals are in towns and they benefit only a small section of people of Tanzania. Yet if we have built them with loans from outside Tanzania, it is the overseas sale of the peasants’ produce, which provides the foreign exchange for repayment. Those who do not get the benefit of the hospitals thus carry the major responsibility for paying for them. Tarmac roads too, are mostly found in towns and are
again of especial value to the motorcar owners. Yet if we have built those with
loans, it is again the farmer who pays for them…we should always bear this in
mind. Although when we talk of exploitation we usually think of capitalist, we
should not forget that there are many fish in the sea… if we are not careful we
shall get to the position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of town
dwellers exploiting the peasants’ (Nyerere quoted in Dalton, 1974:554).

While the rural population was favoured this way the urban population also enjoyed
subsidized food prices, controlled and kept low by the regime. The thrust of the regime
policy was to keep a balance of advantages in terms of cost of living for the rural and
urban populations and of those working in agriculture and those employed in other
sectors (Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells, 1986:49-64).

**Taxation and income policies:**

Taxation and wage equalization are among the instruments the Tanzanian regime
employed to promote income equity and equitable development favouring people in the
lower end of the income spectrum both in urban and rural areas. Osoro (2002) points out
that during the *Ujamaa* era attainment of equal distribution of the tax burden, both
horizontally and vertically, was one of the major objectives of the tax structure (Osoro
2002:258).

Green (1974) suggested that by 1974 Tanzania already had a highly progressive
tax regime. Taxes ran from 12.5% on rural (excluding the plantation sector) cash and
kind income. 17% was levied on minimum wage earners, 40% on the middle level cohort
and as high as 80% on the few citizens in the top income bracket (Green, 1974:21).

Earlier reforms in implementing a progressive tax system were introduced in the
1969 budget, which ushered in the first national development plans after the Arusha
Declaration. It was a budget that favoured the rural sector as no tax was imposed on
unprocessed foods and maize meal. 10% tax was to be levied on consumer goods, and
20% on luxuries. This, Green (1974:35) observed, shifted the tax burden from rural to
urban incomes of approximately 50-60 million Shillings a year.

On income tax, Tanzania was from 1969 onwards tied to the East African
community common income tax legislation also catering for Uganda and Kenya as
members of the community. As this arrangement did not allow the flexibility, which the Tanzanian regime needed to implement its egalitarian agenda after the 1967 Arusha Declaration, it sought to change this system and adopt a national one. The attainment of this progressive national income tax, which Osoro (2002) credited for helping Tanzania in the Ujamaa era achieve equity in distribution of tax burden and income, was difficult to attain as many elites were not in favour of changing community legislation to national legislation (Green, 1974). When the Tanzanian national income bill was tabled for the first time in parliament, it was defeated by a 60 per cent No vote. It was passed when re-introduced a second time after the party leadership threatened to dissolve the parliament and call an election if members of parliament persisted with their resistance (Green, 1974:52-53). This was a real threat as many incumbents lost their seats in the Tanzanian parliamentary elections (Nugent, 2004; 152) and the electorate would not look favourable on MPs who voted against this measure. The immediate impact of the Tanzanian National Income Tax Act was the abolition of family and marriage allowance paid to high income earners. Also, for the purpose of taxation, married women’s incomes were separated from their husbands’ income. The effect in principle was that the Act exempted minimum wage earners from tax. When the Act was first applied, it freed 75,000 workers and few thousand smallholders from tax obligations and reduced taxes to another 100,000; and increased upper income tax rate. With the legislation, the Tanzanian regime was in control of one more instrument it could use to further its agenda (Green, 1974:53).

Wage adjustment began earlier, with events that were a prelude to formulation and announcement of the Arusha Declaration. In 1966, in response to protests by university and college students regarding salaries of senior officials and terms of the newly introduced national service, the president announced a 20% cut in his salary (Coulson, 1982:181-182). This was followed by a range of salary cuts including a 5% cut in salaries of lower civil servants (Green, 1974: 19).

Following on from the presidential directive, all salary increases were predicated at maximum of 5 per cent per year henceforth. This was significant for the regime’s egalitarian agenda as previous minimum rates of salary increases were 12-15 % per year (Green, 1974:33). As pointed by Green, the reduction in annual rate of salary increases to
a 5% maximum helped bridge the gap somewhat with the annual rate of increase in rural income, which was only growing at 0.5% annually at that time.

It is also observable that, henceforth, salary increases tended to favour lower wage earners. In annual reviews for salary increases as pointed to by Green (1974:22), those on the lower end received wage increases between 5-7% and those on the upper scale got increases of 2-3%. There were minimum wage increases in 1969, 1972 and 1974. However, the 1969 and 1972 increases applied only to minimum wages. This reduced wage differences of all people in employment by 50%. The wage increase in 1974 also compensated for inflation arising from the economic crises of that year and the year before. The increases (in both 1972 and 1974) gave a 41% rise to people in lower income brackets, 15 and 12% to the middle and 3% to top earners in the public sector (Green 1974:47).

In evaluating the regime’s pricing and tax policies, Kahama, Mallyamkono and Wells (1986) arrived at the conclusion that it was somewhat successful in achieving balance. By calculating the amount of disposable income they found that

[…]on the whole the farmer had a relative advantage over the minimum wage earner, and has disadvantage to the average wage employer and that this disadvantage (of the average wage earner over the farmers) has decreased in the last decade…. and taken together, pricing policies can probably be said to have achieved a slightly greater degree of equality between urban and rural population’ (Kahama, Mallyamkono and Wells, 1986:61-62).

**Extension of public social services**

Another feature that supported rural development and people with lower incomes was the government’s extension of social services. This saw the building of primary schools, health centres and provision of clean water to rural and peri-urban areas. These services were provided free to all by the government. Schools provided books and notebooks to schoolchildren and to adult education classes. Health centres dispensed medical services and water was available freely except for peri-urban and urban centres where piped water was charged a small fee according to usage. These developments are discussed in the following section of this chapter.
Welfare and redistributive policies of the regime

The government built public, national and local institutions for equitable distribution of profits accrued by its economic activities, paying particular attention to making development beneficial to rural areas and other disadvantaged groups (Green, 1974:42-43). This welfare agenda, which the regime argued was what development was about, arguably gave the regime legitimacy because people experienced tangible development in their villages and availed of services provided freely by the state. Using surplus from the economy and aid, which increased in volume during the 1970s, the regime was able to expand provision of social services to the population (Msekwa and Maliyamkono, 1979: 39-42 and Kahama, Maliyamkono, Wells, 1986:158-159)

The regime’s ability to extend social services to the population meant Tanzania met the criteria of developmental state both as expected by people in the post-independence state and also in comparison to the neo-patrimonial regime model in which national resources are appropriated by ruling elite (Evans,1989). The achievement of the Tanzanian regime in providing education, health service and distribution of clean water is discussed below.

(i) Education sector development

In the education sector, three features distinguished the Tanzanian regime’s strategy enabling it to spread education benefits to most of the population. Firstly, rather than aiming at expanding higher levels of education after post primary level, the regime aimed at widespread provision of education at primary level. For post-primary level, the government developed a limited national system of secondary schools and colleges in which admission was restricted with quotas and was by merit only. Thirdly, from 1969, the government nationalized almost all schools and colleges in Tanzania (Msekwa and Maliyamkono, 1979:14). The nationalization of schools and expansion of public owned schools enabled the regime to make education available equally for all in primary and post-primary levels. As discussed previously in Chapter 4, previous policies had put Muslims at a disadvantage as Christian churches owned many schools that Muslim students were unable to attend (Dodd and Cameroon, 1970).
Rev. Christopher Mtikila, an opposition politician held the view that the regime’s focus on providing primary school education was aimed at keeping Tanzanians ignorant (Mtikila, 2006). However, it can be seen that the regime, constrained in resources, could not have achieved as much in the education sector had it focused on expanding the more costly secondary schools and colleges. Also, expanding primary school education to give all school-age children from towns and rural areas the opportunity was consistent with the regime’s professed aims of equality and no exploitation.

Indeed, aiming at the primary level can be seen as aiming too low. However, the Tanzanian regime’s aim was not merely to provide minimum primary school education; it also aimed at making this level of education substantial and a sustainable basis for primary school leavers to participate in village life and society at large (Msekwa and Mallyamkono, 1979:46). For this purpose, the regime increased the enrolment age for primary school, modified the syllabus, and introduced practical subjects such as agriculture, and other handwork skills and projects.

The regime was successful in establishing primary schools in all villages in Tanzania. Maro and Mlay (1985) have reported that by 1976 all villages had a primary school within its premises. This expansion in primary schools, and the decision of government in 1974 to provide education to all primary school children, saw 3.57 million children attend primary school by 1981. This was 96 % of all school-age children. The immediate post-independence situation was that only 0.47 million children, that is 25 % of school-age children, attended primary school (Kahama, Malyamkono and Wells, 1989:183-184).

These expansions were complemented by a similar expansion in adult education. Campaigns in this aspect made Tanzania increase enrolment of adults in education from 600,000 in 1969 to 5,190,000 in 1975 (Msekwa and Malyamkono, 1979: 56-58). By 1980 Tanzania had managed to reduce illiteracy in the country from 67.7% in 1970 to 10 % in 1980 (JASPA, 1982). These developments put Tanzania much further ahead of many developing countries. For example, Tanzania reached universal provision of primary school education for the first time in 1977 while Kenya, a country with many more
resources, only set the same goal when the opposition government of President Mwai Kibaki came to power in 2003.

The Tanzanian government also established a national system of secondary schools whereby students could apply to a secondary school anywhere in the country. Places were awarded on the basis of merit but there was also a quota system to ensure the poor areas of the country were not disadvantaged (Msekwa and Malyamkono, 1979:29). Those who completed secondary school joined a national system of colleges and universities. Here, too, meritocracy was combined with a quota system to ensure equality of access.

The introduction of a national school system was particularly important to the Muslim population, which had been disadvantaged under the colonial system as most schools were run by Christian missionaries. Colonial governments under pressure from Christian missionaries did not fund Muslim schools (Dodd and Cameroon, 1970). Under the new national school system there was no discrimination on religious grounds (Msekwa and Maliyamkono, 1979:14-15). Arguably, without TANU’s policy of nationalization and commitment to an equal and equitable national policy of education, the demands of Muslim could have consolidated around this issue. If the regime had not responded positively to the issue of Muslim education it ran the risk of alienating more than one third of the population.

(ii) Health services

Health service was another key component that the Tanzanian regime took into account in its people-centred development approach of the 1967 Arusha Declaration. From then on the regime focused on providing health services to all Tanzanians in urban and rural areas under a public system (Green, 1974). Particular attention was paid to rural areas where majority of the people lived and to reversing the imbalance in resource allocation and benefits (Green, 1974 and Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells, 1986). This emphasis of the regime on providing health services is reflected in increased budget allocation to the sector and in the various tangible programmes it rolled out in the health sector.
As pointed out by Kopoka (2002:196), budget allocations to health care increased from Tsh 31 million ($4.3 million) in the First Development Plan (1964-1969) to Tshs.91 (US$13 million) in the Second Development Plan (1969-1974). This increase in government spending effectively tripled health care expenditure. Compared to health sector allocations prior to the Arusha Declaration of only 2.2 per cent (Kilama, Nhonoli and Makene, 1974:199), the new allocations brought it up as high as 8.9 % of budget (Kahama, Maliyamkono, Wells, 1986:171).

In line with its commitments, the Tanzanian regime expanded construction of health care facilities and services, particularly in rural areas. As shown in the table below, there were more increases in rural healthcare centres and dispensaries than there were in the construction of hospitals. This helped to spread health services wider as Tanzania, being a poor country, could afford to build more healthcare centres and dispensaries than hospitals, which are more capital and labour intensive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensaries</td>
<td>1356</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>1594</td>
<td>2600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Health centres</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kilama, Nhonoli, and Makene, 1974: 196
The expansion in healthcare centres and dispensaries also saw an increase in training staff to run these health facilities. According to Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells (1986: 167), by 1980 there were seven medical assistant training centres, five schools for general health assistants, eleven schools for rural medical assistants and eighteen mother and child health assistant training centres. However, there was only one faculty for training medical doctors. The establishment of these centres enabled the country to increase trained personnel in the health sector as shown in the table below.

Table 6. Increase of number of medical personnel from 1961-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of personnel</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>44*</td>
<td></td>
<td>667*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Assistants</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Medical Assistants</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>2310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M C H Assistants</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This number excludes expatriates.

Source: Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells, (1986: 170) and Kilama, Nhonoli, and Makene, 1974:197

Hospitals, dispensaries and health care centres enabled the government to also provide curative services and other major health campaigns such as immunization programs, mother and child health programs (MCH) and health education programs to the population. With the MCH project, children’s health checks were readily available at clinics on a regular basis, and mothers could obtain advice on nutritional and other health needs for their infant children. According to Kahama, Wells, and Maliyamkono (1986:170), by 1979 all rural health centres and nearly half of all dispensaries had a weekly MCH service session. The government also launched programs for immunization.
against and information on other communicable diseases. The challenge was to protect the population from about 50 communicable diseases (Kilama, Nhonoli and Makene, 1974:201)

Outside the healthcare facilities, the government was also able to launch two major health programs involving a large percentage of the adult population. The first program was the *Mtu ni Afya* (A person is health), which was run using radio broadcasts followed by discussions led by trained personnel in groups that had pre-registered and attended the radio broadcast (Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells 1986:165). This program, which aimed for the participation of a million people, engaged 75,000 group leaders. Two million adult learners registered and 63 % attended the discussions. The program was a multi-sector initiative conducted as a twelve part series covering a range of subjects from the importance of boiling water to construction and use of latrines, and ways of preventing various communicable diseases from Bilharzias to Tuberculosis.

The second campaign launched in 1975 after the *Mtu ni Afya* program, *Chakula ni uhai* (Food is life), focused on educating the population about the importance of nutrition and a balanced diet for an individual’s health. The campaign was more ambitious than *Mtu ni Afya*, and aimed to reach two million people (Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells, 1986:165).

This effort by the government resulted in tangible outcomes in terms of improving heath care and health accessibility for all Tanzanians. With these people-oriented programs, the aim of the Tanzanian leadership was to provide a healthcare facility within five kilometres for people everywhere. By 1980, an estimated 72% of the population was living within five kilometres of healthcare facilities (Kopoka, 2002:198). This corresponds with UNICEF findings which established that by 1980, 76% of the population lived within one hour of a healthcare facility by public transport and that by 1991, 99% of urban population and 72% of rural population had such access to health care (Kapoka, 2002:198). The national health education campaigns have been evaluated as widespread and, indeed, as successful in spreading health awareness among the population (Kilama, Nhonoli, and Makene, 1974, Green, 1974, Kahama, Maliyamkono, and Wells, 1986, Kapoka, 2002).
(iii) Water supply

Among important services that the Tanzania regime embarked on in urban and rural areas is the provision of safe and clean water accessible to all. After the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, there was notable development in making clean and safe water available to urban and especially rural areas. According to a JPSA (1982) report, by 1980, 91% of the urban population in Tanzania had access to clean and safe water. This was an increase of 29% from 1970. Within this same period, the rural population’s access to water also increased from 9% to 42%, an increase of 33%.

The above information is corroborated by other selected area researches. Maro and Mlay (1979: 298) who studied nine randomly selected villages found that between 1970 and 1976 there was an increase of 50% in provision of water in six of the villages.

According to Green (1974), the major focus on supplying water in rural areas came after 1971 after TANU issued a Mwongozo (Guideline) to reaffirm the 1967 Arusha Declaration. This mwongozo was in response to pressure from the local level leadership in the party and from rural communities. It demonstrates the government’s capacity to be reactive to local priorities (Green, 1974:36).

Assessment of the Ujamaa policies

A number of policies in the 1967 Ujamaa package produced negative effects and negative reactions among some sections of the population and in the socio-economic development of Tanzania. These include the compulsory villageisation—sometimes by force; the nationalisation of cooperative unions; and the abolition local government. After a decade, the government reconsidered the later two policies and reversed them.

However, the thrust of the Ujamaa policies also produced a significant positive result. The outcome of the regime’s policy to spend on socio-economic development produced achievements that Tanzania is still striving to regain in many sectors (Osoro, 2002, Rakesh, 2004, Jerve and Ofsad, 2005). Although the goal of self-reliance was not attained, significant progress was achieved. The government succeeded in meeting the basic needs of its population and in reducing the ratio of income disparity from 27:1 at independence to 9:1 in one and half a decade (Cheru, 1989). This achievement is
remarkable when compared to neighbouring Kenya with its capitalist policies where income disparity remained as high as 49:1 after the same length of time (Cheru 1989:46-47).

Bagachwa and Maliyamkono (1990) have reported that during the Ujamaa era, Tanzania raised its adult literacy from 10% to 60% between 1961 and 1977; double that of any other low-income country. At independence, Tanzania was behind other low-income countries in percentage of its children entering school, with 25% enrolment compared to 37% for low-income countries on average. By 1977, Tanzania had reversed this situation, making primary education available to all, while other low-income countries averaged only 64% primary school attendance. Higher education also increased significantly. By 1984, for example, there were 1,800 indigenous engineers compared to only two at independence.

There were also impressive achievements in health, with life expectancy increasing from 43 years at independence to 52 years by 1977. By comparison, equivalent countries increased their life expectancy only from 40 to 48 years on average. During the same period, Tanzania’s infant mortality rate also fell from 152 to 103 per thousand births compared to an average decrease from 164 to 130 per thousand births in low-income countries, and its maternal mortality rate was cut from 33 to 19 per thousand births (Bagachwa and Maliyamkono 1990:5).

The Tanzanian regime’s policies are often seen to have been disastrous for the economic development of the country (Lewis, 2009). But the observation and analysis of regime policies in the Ujamaa era show a contrary pattern of an economy that was growing and sustaining itself well until it was brought down by events largely out of the Tanzanian regime’s control. As Nugent (2004) observes Tanzania and Kenya may have taken different economic policy paths but by the 1980s they had ended up in the same place. Kenya had in the first decade of independence experienced growth without development and with growing inequality, while Tanzania had not experienced the same level of growth but had created a more equal society.

Also, observation and analyses show that adopting and embarking on Ujamaa na Kujitegemea with its people-oriented focus as Tanzania did in 1967 did not result in
lower or negative economic growth. Furthermore, the economy extended social services to the population. The irrecoverable economic downturn happened between 1978 and 1980 when the country was engaged in war with Idi Amin’s troops. During the 1970s, Tanzania faced a number of external shocks and crises that had serious financial implications for the economy. As pointed out by Mtatifikoro, the two major oil shocks of the 1970s (1973/74 and 1978/79) cost the Tanzanian economy US$ 206 million, the equivalent of 56% of Tanzania’s total export earnings. The 1974 drought resulted in the regime spending US$80 million instead of the normal US$5 million on importing grain. Also in 1977, Tanzania had to bear another loss when the East African Community unraveled and had to develop the services it had until then received from the Community (Yeager, 1989: 133). In 1978, the economy was dealt another major blow with the outbreak of war with Uganda and Idi Amin’s forces. The war cost Tanzania up to US$ 1 billion (Yeager, 1989:138-139).

It can be seen from Tanzanian economic statistics that it is during and after the war that the economy incurred its greatest losses. GDP growth in 1980 was only 1.2%. National debt increased to US$1.3 billion, inflation reached 30%, and the Tanzanian shilling was devalued by 25% (Yeager, 1989, and Mtatifikoro, 2002). It is after this time that Tanzania sought support beyond its SDR (Structural Drawing Rights) in the IMF (Biermann and Wagao, 1986:92-93). The IMF would not give loans to Tanzania until the country reformed its socio-economic policies entirely. The Tanzanian regime refused, and mobilized the population to face difficult economic times while waging a campaign to protest the IMF stance. This remained largely the position of Tanzania until Nyerere the first president, and the chief architect of the Ujamaa na Kujitegemea policies and one of the main force behind their implementation, stepped down in 1985.

Given this story of Tanzanian economic development in the first decade of Ujamaa na Kujitegemea ideology and policies, it is arguable that the Tanzanian regime survived with its legitimacy intact because of three factors. First, for most of the early years of Ujamaa na Kujitegemea policies, the economic outcomes were positive and the country withstood all major external shocks to the economy without exposing the people to major economic misery. Second, with the economic surplus and aid, the regime built an extensive social services network with tangible benefits to the entire population. Third,
the economic crisis which caused irrecoverable damage to the country’s economy was brought on by war and the IMF’s refusal to provide aid without political conditions to the country. The first two factors favoured the legitimacy of the regime as they could be seen as positive developments that demonstrated its commitment to development with equality. The last factor also played well for the regime, as it absolved the regime from blame for the economic difficulties faced by the people from 1980. In fact, the regime used this effectively to mobilize the population to survive the difficult times ahead while it sought ways of resolving the crisis.

Conclusion

After the Arusha Declaration as discussed in this chapter, the Tanzanian economy was geared towards meeting the basic needs of the entire population and this was an integral part of the strategy for development that emphasised the needs of disadvantaged areas and groups. The regime refocused both its policy emphasis and its resources on where majority of the people lived and worked, that is, the villages and agriculture. It provided services to all based on principles of equality and equity with the aim of correcting the injustices of the past and through the eradication of exploitation. The oft-cited failure of the Tanzanian economy is exaggerated in some ways. To some extent the economy had withstood major floods and periods of drought as well as international economic disruptions such as the first rise in oil prices. The main issue which brought the Tanzanian economy to its lowest point was the war with Idi Amin, a fact rarely considered by commentators. However, it was this fact coupled with the second oil crisis that the Tanzanian leadership used to explain the crisis in the Tanzanian economy in the 1980s. The regime also highlighted its conflict with IMF over the organisation’s refusal to loan Tanzania funds unless the government agreed to policy conditionalities that would fundamentally change the nature and basic purpose of Tanzanian economic policy. In the eyes of Tanzanians, therefore, the socialist period—at least up to 1985—did not bear responsibility for the economic crisis.

Implementation of its economic policy, on the hindsight, was important for the legitimacy of the regime because these policies, pursued for almost two decades, prevented neo-patrimonial tendencies building up in the economy. Economic neo-
patrimonial programs where political leaders, their associates or regions or ethnic groups are the only ones who mainly benefit from the national economy were consciously discouraged in Tanzania both through the leadership code and also through the socialist policies and structure of the economy that the Tanzanian regime began to build since 1967.

The regime, as it demonstrated such a focus of its economic policy, gained legitimacy with majority of the people. With this level of credibility it was possible for the regime to lead people during the economic crisis of the early 1980s, at that time in the hope that a more permanent solution to the crisis would be found. While in other African states the failure of regimes to maintain the support of the population during the economic crisis led or compounded the political crisis of those regimes, in Tanzania this was not the case. The economic crisis in Tanzania did not lead to political crisis. This arguably contributed to the capacity of the Tanzanian regime in controlling the transition from a one party state to multiparty democracy in the face of rising, primarily external, political pressure to change the country’s one party political system as discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 7. TRANSITION TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY

Tanzania’s transition to democracy can be categorised as having followed a typical *third wave* transition path. As observed by democratisation researchers, the typical transition path begins with a liberalisation phase mostly in the economy followed by changes allowing for more political rights and eventually a full fledged democracy with competitive political institutions (Karl and Schmitter, 1991, Linz and Stepan, 1996, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). In Tanzania, changes in the economic policy regime happened between 1984 and 1990 and political changes were affected largely between 1990 and 1992. The first multiparty democratic election took place in 1995.

The transition period can be divided into two parts. The initial phase was the government’s response, led by Nyerere, to the economic crisis of the early 1980s. The government led by Mwinyi, the second president of Tanzania, handled the second part of the transition period. Mwinyi was in government from 1985 to 1995, when the first multiparty democratic elections were held. It is important to make this distinction because the two parts of transition not only had different policies, but also the government during the second phase had a different focus from the independence movement ideas and Ujamaa policies which were implemented by Nyerere’s government.

The theory of transition to liberal democracy, as discussed earlier, presumes the presence or emergence and consolidation of opposition parties and civil society to affect the transition to liberal democracy, as it is a political system rulers usually have to be forced to adopt (Diamond 1990:104). Based on this assumption, Linz and Stepan (1996) have defined the various monolithic regime types and their architecture, which allow or block the emergence of political opposition and civil society groups that are able to contest the legitimacy of the existing regime. One of the main conclusions of the transition to democracy research project is the conceptualization of the modes of transitions to democracy (Linz 1990, Karl and Schmitter, 1991, Huntington, 1991, Linz and Stepan, 1996). The researchers are in agreement in that there are broadly three modes of transition to (liberal) democracy determined by who controls the transition process between the existing regime and the emerging opposition. Linz (1990) and Huntington (1991:114) state that a transformation or *reforma* mode of transition occurs when the
existing regime is stronger in legitimacy than the opposition (either pre-existing or emerging). In this case, because it is stronger, the existing regime controls and leads the transition process carrying out most reforms at the pace and mode it deems fit. It is important to consider two questions that are fundamental to explaining the political system that emerges from transition. Firstly, do previously non-existent opposition groups emerge during the transition period or does a previously existing opposition consolidate during this time? Secondly, does the regime control the transition period, or is it the opposition that sets the pace of change (Linz and Stepan, 1996)?

The balance of power in the political transition between the prior regime and the opposition depends on the balance of legitimacy of the two. The effect of who controls the transition process means that realistically the new or reformed political institutions will reflect the interests and ideology of the dominant group, but this may not be necessarily to the detriment of the other political actors. The predictable tendency for the prior regimes will be to maintain as much as possible the institutions, which place them at advantage over the opposition. The opposition will seek to introduce new changes to level the field or even tilt it to the disadvantage of the regime party. But these issues are not out-played in a vacuum, they are conditioned by ‘the prevailing socio-economic and political structures’ (Karl and Schmitter, 1991:158 and Huntington, 1991:587).

This chapter discusses the initial phase of the transition to multi party democracy, which primarily deals with the state’s response to the economic crisis. It then explores how the Mwinyi government, coming after Nyerere’s, constructed its legitimacy narrative in these changed circumstances before describing the process of transition to a multiparty state.

**The initial phase of Transition – Economic Reform**

As discussed in the previous three chapters, the Tanzanian regime, with its ideology of *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* of 1967, managed to build a legitimacy narrative that bridged ideas of the independence movement and policies of post independence governance. As a result, the leadership evolved a political system that had a significant measure of democracy within the one party state structure (discussed in Chapter 3) and an economic system, which was sustainable until the international financial crisis of the
1970s and the war with Uganda; and there was an acknowledged attempt to provide economic development and social services for all Tanzanians (discussed in Chapter 5). Also, as previously discussed, the government made the goal of national unity central, delegitimising political organisation on any fractional basis despite competing religious and ethnic allegiances within the state (discussed in chapter 4). The regime arguably succeeded in its agenda as it achieved a stable and unified nation-state mostly through persuasion and the political and socio-economic mobilisation of the population.

The transition period began early in the 1980s in response to a major economic crisis. In Tanzania, the impact of the international financial crisis that followed the second oil shock was intensified by 1978-9 Uganda Idi Amin- Tanzania war. It was this economic crisis, compounded by war, which in the long term necessitated changes that began the Tanzanian transition to liberal economy and politics (Wagao and Bierman, 1986:92, Kessel, 2001:10, Mbele and Mashindano, 2002, Ossoro, 2002:269).

In response to the crisis, Tanzania sought assistance from friendly donor states and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF asked Tanzania to change its statist economic policy as a condition for loans, to which the Tanzanian government objected (Wagao and Bierman, 1986:92-93). At the same time, the international financial crisis also meant that donor countries themselves suffered economic hardships. Combined with the move towards free market models of economy in previously social democratic states, these changes meant that even states friendly to Tanzania asked the government to shift its economic policies away from the statist model. The Tanzanian government was disappointed when donors asked the regime to adopt the prescriptions of the IMF as a condition for further support (Wagao and Bierman, 1986:95-97 and Mtatifikolo, 2002: 232).

The implementation of IMF conditions would have entailed a U-turn in Tanzanian economic policies and, therefore, in the whole social and political ideology which underpinned those policies (Wagao and Bierman, 1986: 91 and Shivji, 1994:20-21). Such a move would have prompted a major crisis in legitimacy for the Tanzanian regime. At least initially the regime was not prepared for such radical a move.
Rather than change its economic policy, the regime responded by holding the IMF responsible for the Tanzania economic crisis because of its refusal to loan funds unconditionally (Wagao and Bierman, 1986:93, Othman, 1994:138) and tried to galvanise public support behind domestic responses to the crisis. The Tanzanian leadership launched a national campaign to educate the population and organised ‘emotional demonstrations’ against the IMF policy positions (Othman 1994:138). Tanzania also joined international campaigns against the IMF, and Nyerere became one of the most outspoken critics of the organisation in the developing world.

In addition to campaigning against the IMF, the government asked Tanzanians to tighten their belts to face up to the economic crisis while the regime implemented the NESP- the National Economic Survival Plan (Wagao and Bierman, 1986:93 and Mtatifikolo, 2002:2). It also launched a ‘war’ against people labelled ‘saboteurs of the economy’ within the country (Shivji, 1994:20). Subsequently this ‘war’ was extended to deal with corruption and corrupt leaders. The campaign, and all such efforts by the regime, were meant to demonstrate that, as Prime Minister Edward Sokoine put it, ‘the government was not on leave’ (quoted in Shivji 1994:87-88). The regime campaign and strategies were successful, as it managed to keep its legitimacy intact and retain support from the population throughout the acute economic crisis from 1980-1985 (Wagao and Bierman, 1986:133 and Kaiser, 2000).

These efforts saw the regime manage popular support in Tanzania for four years of economic crisis without changing its ideology and the major planks of its socio-economic policies. However, the situation did not improve. From July 1984 Tanzania underwent a form of economic liberalization, allowing private business to import basic consumer items into the country on a comparatively large scale (Wagao and Bierman, 1986: 97 and Kelsall: 2001:10-11). Private individuals were already allowed in the transport business, and also following the crisis, there began to emerge more cooperative and non-governmental initiatives to solve some socio-economic problems (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994:44-45). With difficulties arising in government-funded education, health and economic facilities, services provided by religious institutions became more important (Kiondo, 1995). It is also within this context that local governments were
reintroduced in 1982, followed by the reintroduction of the cooperative unions (Samoff, 1987).

These problems were compounded by the public perception that since economic problems had intensified during the 1980s, corruption had taken root within the political leadership of the party and in public service ranks, which undermined the regime’s legitimacy. The most earnest public effort to get rid of this corruption began with Edward Sokoine in 1983, and ended with his demise in 1984 (Shivji, 1994:20). As Prime Minister Sokoine changed the national discourse on the economic crisis from one that pointed only to external factors as its cause to one that also took internal issues—such as corruption—into account. Sokoine’s conceptualisation of the problem gained traction with the public. There was popular support for the view that corruption, economic sabotage and irresponsible leaders contributed to socio-economic problems of Tanzania. The interregnum of Sokoine’s premiership was thus crucial for the Tanzanian regime’s legitimacy: as a government leader he credibly identified and defined an issue of political concern, and appeared to be taking serious action on it, identifying CCM as standing against corruption.

In summary, the government, despite allowing some limited liberalization initiatives permitting more involvement of the private sector, refused IMF loans and conditions. Right up to the end of its tenure it remained committed to the ideals that evolved in the building of an Ujamaa state (Bierman and Wagao, 1986, Othman, 1994:138). Until the Nyerere government tenure ended in 1985, CCM’s hold on the state remained strong. However, further change appeared inevitable; Nyerere did not run for presidency in the 1985 elections. With the untimely death of Sokoine, Ali Hassan Mwinyi was put forward as the party’s candidate.

The legitimacy narrative of the Mwinyi government

In the period following the 1985 elections, the legitimacy of the regime in Tanzania faced four key challenges: (1) change in the top leadership from Nyerere to Mwinyi; (2) adoption of IMF policies Tanzania could no longer resist given the pressure from donor states; (3) international and regional pressure for one-party states to become
multiparty democracies; and (4) rise of nascent opposition and growth of corruption under lax political leadership during economic liberalisation.

**Change of leadership from Nyerere to Mwinyi**

President Mwinyi took over from Nyerere as President of Tanzania to lead the second phase government (*serikali ya awamu ya pili*) in October 1985. The change of leadership did not initially affect the legitimacy of the regime as it had taken all necessary steps to minimise such effects. Nyerere had managed to successfully lead the country through the tough economic times of 1980-84. He thus left a regime that still enjoyed public support.

Three factors were used to ensure this legitimacy continued with the change of leadership. One of them is the novel way in which Nyerere’s departure was presented to the public—as a decision motivated solely by the wish to allow fresh new leadership to takeover. Until Nyerere’s decision not to run in the 1985 elections, there was no word in the Swahili political vocabulary that described the act of someone willingly giving up leadership. Up to then, post independence leaders were only known to resign, either in failure or amidst a scandal. To avoid such negative inferences being made about his intention to step down, Nyerere chose not to use the words *anajuzuru au anastaafu* (resigning or retiring) to describe his departure. Instead, Nyerere introduced into Swahili the term *kung’atuka*. The word comes from Zanaki, Nyerere’s own tribe. Literally, it means to pull oneself out of something, and is used to describe a common Zanaki practice whereby older generation of leaders left their positions so a new, younger generation of leaders could take over. When describing his departure in English, Nyerere used the term ‘stepping aside.’ This description of Nyerere’s departure from leadership arguably helped to smooth the change in leadership, clearing up ambiguities and doubts about the reasons for it.

Secondly, while Nyerere was in leadership he wore two hats (*kofia mbili*). He was the chairperson of the party and the president of the Tanzanian government and state. The party was made the supreme decision making body in Tanzania in 1977. Not to affect a sharp change of leadership, in 1985 Nyerere stepped aside as President and Head of State, but continued to be Party Chairperson. This arrangement meant that he was still
technically in a leadership position, as the party continued to be the supreme decision-making body in Tanzania. This measure ensured there was no drastic and complete change in the top leadership, which helped stabilise and keep intact the regime’s legitimacy. This step was especially helpful given that Mwinyi was relatively new and unknown in the Tanzania mainland. Previously he had served briefly as a minister in the Nyerere government and as President of Zanzibar, a post that does not make one influential in the Tanzanian mainland.

Thirdly, the party had been holding general elections every five years since 1965. Although people could only vote for one party-elected candidate, these regular events established a tradition of elections—a factor that helped greatly with smoothening the transfer of power. The internal party electoral process of a primary party caucus to elect the presidential candidate ensured that the successor to Nyerere was not simply handpicked by Nyerere himself but involved the whole Electoral College. The party chairperson could still influence these procedures but, as participants in the process have attested, Nyerere did not exert any significant influence in the election of Mwinyi. In fact the kingmaker in Mwinyi’s election was an ordinary member of the party Central Committee who suggested that before proposing a candidate, members must first agree on what qualifications were required of Nyerere’s successor (interview with Gertrude Mongella, 2011). These agreed upon qualifications played a key role in determining the next candidate.

The fact that the election procedure did not end with the party’s Electoral College also played a key role in the change. The Electoral College’s job was to pick and propose a suitable candidate for the presidency. This was done in three steps. First, the party central committee considered and proposed names, which were then put to the party National Executive Committee (NEC). The candidate selected by the NEC was then put before the party National Congress to pass or reject. Once approved by the Congress, the party campaigned throughout Tanzania for a Yes vote for the chosen candidate (Othman, 1994:136). What helped make Mwinyi acceptable and known to Tanzanians was that once the party caucus elected Mwinyi as the presidential candidate, Nyerere and the entire party campaigned for Mwinyi in the 1985 one-party general election. This campaign helped introduce Mwinyi to the Tanzanian people. Mwinyi received 92.2%of
the popular vote, coming very close to matching Nyerere’s votes in the 1980 election (Othman, 1994:141). The regime campaign sold Mwinyi as a capable, able, wise and gentle leader (Maliyamkono, 1995:57).

Through these processes established since 1965, the regime in Tanzania affected a successful change in the top leadership through the one-party democratic process, where one leader stepped aside and another one took over. It can be argued that the change increased legitimacy of the regime and Nyerere personally, as many leaders of Nyerere’s generation in other African states—including those bordering Tanzania—clung to power and were only removed forcibly by violent protest and conflict that in some cases escalated into civil war. In the neighbouring countries, on Tanzania’s west, the Mobutu regime succumbed to serious attacks from the opposition and called a national constitutional assembly to work with the opposition and other sectors of the society to resolve the country’s political future (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). In the South West of Tanzania, the Zambian opposition was gaining the upper hand against the Kaunda regime, and to the north of Tanzania, in Kenya, there were similar developments with the Moi regime coming under intense attack from the fast rising and consolidating opposition as well as pressure from donor countries, particularly the United Kingdom, to adopt a multiparty system (Otonnu, 1992:15).

In contrast, the first president of Tanzania stepped aside of his own accord and allowed established party procedures with a one-party election process to peacefully confirm his successor.

**Acceptance of IMF conditions and change of economic policy**

Early in 1986, the Mwinyi government accepted IMF conditionality with party consent. With no alternative assistance to boost the economy forthcoming, it implemented fully the economic management plan prescribed by the Fund. This overturned the statist and protectionist pillar of the *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* regime’s economic policies. As Othman (1994) points out, the Mwinyi government’s agreement with the IMF was ‘something which Nyerere had resisted for more than six years and against which the party had held emotional demonstrations. Under the said agreement,
the IMF imposed harsh conditionality on the country’(Othman 1994:138). It was a move with the potential to create legitimacy problems for the government.

To avert the looming crisis as the regime oversaw implementation of economic policies diametrically opposed to its former stance, it was important for the regime to offer a narrative that would save its legitimacy. Thus in October 1987 it issued a new policy package entitled Programu ya Chama Cha Mapinduzi 1987-2002. This program’s main aim was to provide guidance for what the regime described as Kipindi cha Mpito Kuelekea Ujamaa (Transition Period Towards Socialism). What the Kipindi cha Mpito program and policy direction did was contextualize and justify the regime’s implementation of IMF policies. It convinced people that implementation of liberal economic policies were a temporary, and necessary, process for coping with the economic problems of the time (CCM, 1987: 4-11). As such, these steps constituted a transition period necessary for Tanzania to arrive at its goal of being an Ujamaa na Kujigemea country by 2002.

The document to justify the change of policy direction also stated that transition periods are normal interregnums for any country aspiring to be a socialist state (CCM 1987: 4-5). It further noted that the time was right for Tanzania to rectify socio-economic anomalies in order to become a socialist state. With this narrative package, the regime in Tanzania sought to rescue its legitimacy and establish a link between its firmly established Ujamaa ideology and the new IMF-prescribed policies it began implementing vigorously from 1986.

Two things are observable about the regime’s narrative of legitimacy under the Mwinyi presidency and Nyerere’s party chairpersonship in the Kipindi cha Mpito. Firstly, the Kipindi cha mpito program—from announcement and population mobilisation to implementation—lacked the organization and zeal behind the 1967 Arusha Declaration. While many Tanzanians still remember the Arusha Declaration four decades after it was pronounced and implemented, few people remember the much more recent Kipindi cha Mpito. Furthermore, compared with the seriousness and extent of the regime’s pursuit of economic saboteurs spearhead by Prime Minister Sokoine in 1983- 1984, the enforcement of Kipindi cha mpito program was a subdued affair. It can be said that the
regime had little enthusiasm for the new campaign. It had lost the past zeal with which it mobilized the population in support of its ideology and policies and which contributed to making its policies understood and well received by the population.

Secondly, there were problems with the implementation of the Kipindi cha Mpito program. Instead of bridging the gap between the declared aims of the program, which was the transition to Ujamaa by 2002 and the programme of conditionalities required by the IMF, it became clear the liberal economic policies favoured by the IMF were taking priority. This meant that Kipindi cha mpito was not a route to Ujamaa because it was not capable of modifying the new policies or their impact. It is observable that the economic liberalisation and privatisation agenda gained more prominence while the focus of the regime on developing policies to curtail the effect or embedding of IMF liberalism with counter Ujamaa policies gained less attention.

Increasing corruption engulfed government institutions themselves where services were obtained by corruption not only in the civil administration but also in the courts of justice; this was even identified and admitted by the ruling party (CCM 1990). The rapid privatisation of the economy, it can be said, went hand in hand with privatisation of the government in that civil service administrators and leaders used their offices for private gain. As described by Mmuya and Chaligha (1992), some of the acts amounted to ‘plundering and outright thievery’ of public funds and property (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992: 34).

Furthermore, the popular campaign against corruption in 1983-1984 was discontinued by the Mwinyi administration. In fact, erosion of the regime’s legitimacy through corruption increased in the intervening years (Mmuya, and Chaligha, 1994:96, Mushi and Baregu, 1997). To make Mwinyi know that his job on coming to power was to continue to keep an eye on stumping out corruption, in 1986, one year into his government, the people of Dar es Salaam organized a rally to congratulate president Mwinyi and gave him a symbolic gift of an iron broom, symbolically requesting and encouraging him and his government to sweep up the corruption (Uhuru, 1986). Social services previously provided equally and freely to all Tanzanians as one of basic tenets of Ujamaa na Kujitegemea deteriorated, leaving a majority of the people powerless and
unable to participate in and benefit from the economy. As noted by Shivji (1994), Mwinyi government’s wholehearted implementation of IMF policies (privatisation, liberalization of the economy, cutting government spending across all sectors including social services and subsidies to agricultural production) dealt a severe blow to socio-economic welfare, equality and social protection which were key pillars of the *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* policy (Shivji, 1994: 21-23).

Having brought the country to such a state, the Tanzanian regime was seen as uncaring. The general perception was that the people had been abandoned and made victims of private interests that were rapidly taking over economic opportunities gained by privatisation of the economy. Existing public social services deteriorated rapidly while services provided by private institutions charged prices higher than the majority of the population could afford.

The effects of economic liberalization and the increase in corruption in the administration and judicial circles posed major legitimacy issues for the regime. The government acknowledged this when highlighting its issues of concern during the October 1990 one–party general election in which President Mwinyi was to seek a second term (CCM Manifesto, 1990, Mushi and Baregu, 1994:99). At this stage, Nyerere was also to step aside from party leadership, leaving Mwinyi to don the double hats of power: the presidency and party leadership.

Since President Mwinyi was to run for re-election for a second term, from as early as 1989, he began to seriously and directly engage with Tanzanians in the attempts to remedy the worsening situation. He held rallies and *in camera* meetings directly with aggrieved citizens, and attempted to sort out their problems personally on-the-spot or soon afterwards through directives to relevant authorities (Mushi and Baregu, 1994:99). His intention was to change the perception of the government as uncaring.

The 1990 one-party election was therefore an important election, held amidst many grievances caused by liberalization and privatisation of the economy. People had been left in precarious financial situations, without sure and affordable medical services and unable to pay for the education of their children, and a government with a corrupt network of civil and justice administrators (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994, Shivji, 1994,
Mushi and Baregu, 1994). The regime had failed to take the steps necessary to put the country back in the direction of *Ujamaa* socialism as stated in the party’s working policy document, the *Kipindi cha Mpito* 1987-2002. Thus it failed to bridge the gap between IMF liberal policies it was then implementing and the socialist *Ujamaa* policies it had implemented between 1967 and 1985.

The party leadership in Tanzania sought to use the 1990 election to re-launch its legitimacy revival campaign by providing an election manifesto that acknowledged and dealt directly with issues that affected people. It also declared that *Kipindi cha Mpito* program was still to guide the party towards transitioning and building Tanzania as an *Ujamaa* state (CCM Election Manifesto 1990). The original intention of the party was to use the *Kipindi cha Mpito* document as the party’s election manifesto, but this idea was abandoned, and the party prepared a new manifesto for the 1990 election (Mkandala, 1994:58). The new manifesto mentioned the *Kipindi cha mpito* document and, like the *Kipindi cha mpito* program, it spelled out the party’s intention to put all its resources, along with that of the government, towards developing every sector in order to gain new momentum in implementing *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* Socialism and Self-reliance (CCM, 1990:1). The party manifesto produced a list of items under the heading *Kero za wananchi* (things that afflict or disturb the people), one of the regime’s responses for the immediate problems facing Tanzanians at the time. This list, and the focus on mobilizing the masses for self-reliance and economic activities, took up a third of the manifesto. Top of the list of things that afflicted *wananchi* were the problem of buying crops produced by some farmers in areas where transportation was the main problem; uncontrolled price hikes in consumer goods; difficulties in getting essential and scarcity of products; problems of transportation in rural areas and failures in social services—falling standards of education, lack of human medicines in hospitals, lack of clean water, and injustices including bribes, embezzlement and ill-treatment of people. The issue of bribery was expanded and had its own section on how the government would tackle bribes and corruption (CCM, 1990, 2-5 and 7).

Mwinyi was elected with more electoral votes than he got in the first election that brought him to power. In 1985 he received 92.1% of the vote; in 1990 95.8%. It can be argued that, although the people did not have the choice of an alternative president,
Mwinyi’s campaign had regained lost legitimacy by admitting problems and promising a caring leadership.

**Regime legitimacy 1991-1995**

The Mwinyi government did not follow through on the campaign promises of the 1990 election. The perception of the regime as corrupt or condoning corruption was exacerbated further with the Zanzibar Declaration, when the Mwinyi leadership relaxed laws that prevented the engagement of political leaders in business. The public were already convinced that political leaders and civil servants were using their offices for private gains and enrichment through bribes (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992, Shivji, 1994). In a move meant to address challenges facing Tanzanian politics and the ruling party leadership in the 1990s, when economic liberalization and privatisation dominated, Mwinyi government and party leadership took steps through the Zanzibar Declaration to reform Arusha Declaration’s radical socialist measures. However, in so doing the regime went too far, according to observers. Maliyamkono (1995:28), for example, noted that the Zanzibar Resolution almost reversed the Arusha Declaration.

The Arusha Declaration had aimed at establishing leadership accountability and socio-economic and equal protection. In comparison with not just the Arusha Declaration but even the *Kipindi cha Mpito* program, the Zanzibar Resolution did not become part of popular discourse. What people remembered most about it was that it relaxed the Arusha Declaration’s tough conditions that made it difficult for political leaders to engage in private business thus preventing conflict of interest and corruption.

With the onset of transition to multiparty political system CCM was forced to abandon the *Kipindi cha Mpito* program also. In such an environment the idea of transition period to *Ujamaa* was difficult to defend with communist and socialist regimes crumbling all over the world and the country becoming a multiparty state. The new CCM Party policy document, which declared the direction of CCM Policies in the 1990s, was issued in December 1992. It replaced the *Kipindi cha Mpito* program, abandoning the idea of a transition to *Ujamaa*. It is observed that since then the party lost clear
ideological and policy direction. As the former secretary of CCM Horace Kolimba (1997) pointed out, the ruling party ‘lost direction’ from 1992 onwards.

Between 1990 and 1993, the media exposed three scandals involving the government. These were high profile cases revealing that permission had been granted for importation and distribution of expired foodstuff in Tanzania; huge tax exemptions were given to businessmen; and a part of the national parks were to be sold to an Arabian Sultanate (Luanda, 1997:117-145). There were also other problems such as erosion of social and professional ethics as manifested in widespread corruption, drug abuse and disregard for public property among other things. There was also a decline in governance: a breakdown of public security and law and order, general inefficiency, lack of accountability, and an inability on the part of the government to collect taxes (Mushi 1997:10).

Corruption, which had surfaced in 1984 as one of the regime’s main problems, gained prominence in the Mwinyi government’s second term. Legitimacy problems caused by corruption were further compounded during this time by the public’s perception that neither Mwinyi nor the prime minister was leading a fight against corruption. This damaged the regime’s legitimacy in ways that did not happen during Nyerere and Sokoine’s era.

One member of the Mwinyi Government—Minister Augustine Mrema—was exempt from its general inaction against corruption. Mrema fought corruption wherever his mandate extended. Corruption—as the root cause of other policy failures—was what people were then most acutely concerned about. Mrema became so popular a leader in Tanzania that Mwinyi was forced to create a new post to accommodate his important status among the people. Mrema thus became Tanzania’s first Deputy Prime Minister. He was also its last; the post has not been re-created since Mrema left (Maliyamkono, 1995:34). Mrema’s anti-corruption efforts were not part of the overall government or party strategy. His individual popularity in Tanzania, therefore, did not extend to the regime as whole, similarly there were individual MPs who also became prominent by revealing various scandals and corruption cases and by taking the government to task over them.
The failure to tackle corruption more than anything else damaged the government’s legitimacy narrative and made it more vulnerable to political criticism that could potentially provide space for an opposition party to emerge.

The political opposition

In 1990 Tanzania had held a peaceful national election under the one party system as it had done since 1965. This was in the context of the beginning of the third wave of democratisation in Eastern Europe and Africa when states bordering Tanzania were beginning to experience the effects of these changes. However, up until 1990, Tanzania did not have to deal political protests, and resistance to the regime and political system (Mukandala and Othman, 1994). Even a number of prominent businessmen who had been previously barred from leadership positions by the party’s anti-capitalist and pro-socialist ideology contested for parliamentary seats in this election. They were made eligible by Mwinyi’s decision to welcome business community members to politics. Later some of these businessmen joined the opposition (Kiondo, 1994: 82-83). One of them Mmosa Cheyo formed his own party, the United Democratic Party (UDP).

However, from the end of the 1980s, civil society, members of religious organizations and elements of the emerging opposition became quite vocal against the regime. For the first time, the regime could be seen as gradually losing its dominant position as a moral force particularly due to its weak stance on corruption. In 1989 a number of individuals - Mabere Marando, Mashaka Nindi Chimoto, Dr. Ringo Tenga, Ndimara Tengambage and Prince Bagenda -formed a committee to demand a multiparty system and began enlisting others to work with them. They strategically enlisted former prominent politicians who had fallen out of favour with CCM. These included Chief Abdallah Fundikira who resigned his ministerial post in 1965 in protest over the establishment of a single-party system, and Kassanga Tumbo, Dunstan Lifa Chipaka, and James Mapalala, all of whom had also been victims of the Preventive Detention Act (1962). According to Mabere Marando (interview 2007), they formed a committee
because it did not require registration the way an organization was required to be registered under the 1954 Societies Ordinance.

Notable also are two evangelical church pastors, Rev. Christopher Mtikila and Rev. Kamara Kasupa, who from the pulpit and through their writings in the new private media, called for change to the political system. They highlighted corruption and the oppressive nature of the single party system. Other churches were also critical of the government and its lack of focus on improving social services as well as the rise of corruption. But they fell short of organising and advocating any specific alternative policy or mobilising their constituents to oppose the government, as did their sister churches in Kenya who were at the forefront of the demand for constitutional change, or in Zambia where they had united with the opposition.

In terms of civil society organisations, few existing ones agitated for change to the political system at this time. Most organisations acquiesced to the requirement of the 1954 Societies Ordinance, which required them to be non-political. The Tanganyika Law Society (TLS) is the only organisation apart from the University of Dar-es-Salaam that organised forums for discussion on political reform. For most part this did not pose a threat to the regime as the activities of these organisations were within academic and legal professional circles. In 1990, however, the TLS held a national seminar that included the general public and where calls were made for a multi-party system.

After the single party elections of October 1990, the political opposition became more open (Kiondo, 1994). In February 1991 the reform committee mentioned above issued a press release announcing the preparation of a national meeting open to all individuals and groups advocating the adoption of a multi-party system. This announcement came two days after the government announced the formation of a presidential commission to investigate public opinion on the current political system or the alternative of a multi-party democracy, indicating the extent to which the opposition were not making the running on this issue (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994). Even though the government made it illegal for anyone to carry public discussions on political reform outside the commission, this did stop members of the committee for multi party elections and other groups from meeting and discussing this agenda, indicating that there was a rise
of confidence among the opposition. One member of the now political opposition, Mabere Marando, was appointed to join the Presidential Commission but declined the invitation arguing essentially that a multiparty-system is a people’s right, a fact which did not need to be established by an expensive commission (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992:99).

**The shift to multiparty elections**

Given the international situation at this time, the question for Tanzania was when, not if, it would face an increased domestic demand for multiparty elections. This is why regime leaders explained the anticipated transformation to a multiparty system in the absence of a strong opposition as an act of ‘wisdom’. It arguably averted the potential chaos and strife that could have occurred had the regime waited for the opposition to grow stronger before, in due time, forcefully demanding the multiparty system (Nyerere and Mwinyi 1992). As a result, in March 1991, five months after the 1990 one-party general election, the Tanzania regime announced a Presidential Commission to conduct public meetings to establish all Tanzanians’ views on the question of whether the country should shift to a multiparty system or remain a one party. The Commission was set up in such a way as to allow the regime extensive control over the transition to a multiparty political system. The commission travelled through Tanzania and consulted people of all regions on whether the country should shift to a multiparty system or remain a one party. The Commission was set up in such a way as to allow the regime extensive control over the transition to a multiparty system. The commission travelled through Tanzania and consulted people of all regions on whether the country should remain a one-party state or adopt the multiparty system. It also sought their advice on how both possible systems should work (Nyalali Commission, 1992). This was announced as the legal public channel of discussion, making other channels for the discussion of the political system illegal.

The appointment of a high-profile commission to consult with *wananchi* (countrymen and women) was not a new method of dealing with major political change in Tanzania. The regime was employing a method it had successfully used in 1964-1965 to transform the political system from a multiparty system to a one party system. In 1964-1965 the *wananchi* were asked their views about how the single party should function in Tanzania after multiparty was abandoned (Msekwa, 1977:56). Not only that, between 1975 and 1977, the leadership conducted a major consultation process with party members of TANU in the Tanzanian mainland and ASP in Zanzibar Islands. Party members in all branches of TANU (6389) and Afro-Shiraz Party -ASP (257) were
consulted and given opportunity to vote on the question of merging the two parties so that only one party governed the united republic of Tanzania (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992: 94-95).

The first anticipatory step towards a multiparty system that the regime took was establishing the main platform for national discussion and opinion gathering on the question of whether Tanzania should remain with the one party system or change to a multiparty one. Mmuya and Chaligha (1992) whose early study closely traced political development in the Tanzanian transition period, have pointed out that the announcement of the commission came just one day before the emerging opposition was due to make their first major announcement that it was forming a steering committee to prepare a seminar on adopting a multiparty system (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992:131). Thus the regime in Tanzania pre-empted the opposition and set the agenda, and also the mode with which the Tanzanian public would handle the agenda. The opposition criticised the Commission, arguing that such a consultation process was unnecessary given that a multi-party system is a fundamental human right (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992:99). However because, the opposition was weak, the regime could easily ignore their objections.

The results of the Presidential Commission’s consultations meant the regime had also pre-emptively robbed the opposition of the agenda it could have used against the government. The results of the votes organised by the Commission on the question of whether the country should adopt a multiparty system showed that almost 80 per cent of Tanzanian mainlanders who attended the meetings preferred the one-party system. This result could have given the regime a strong reason to postpone demands for a multiparty system for another decade or so as Mseveni’s Uganda did with its referendum on shifting to the multiparty system (McHenry, 2004). But, following the advice of the Presidential Commission, Miwnyi accepted and took an anticipatory move to change the political system from a one-party to a multiparty system; and scheduled a six-month time-table in which the change was to be affected (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992:141-144). In July 1992 Tanzania officially became a multiparty state with elections scheduled for October 1995 when the sitting president was due to complete his two constitutionally permitted terms.
The small size of the opposition and its lack of support at this time meant the Tanzanian regime’s decision of 1991 to conduct such consultations with the people was not effectively challenged by opposition groups. It remained in place, and was the key medium by which Tanzania transited to a multiparty political system. People in towns and villages went before the commission and aired their views. A few cases where the opposition defied the practice caused small incidents of clashes with the police, but the country remained largely peaceful and orderly. The police did not crack down on all opposition meetings, and the opposition was too small to organize large-scale protests. Furthermore, the presidential commission quickly gained prominence and traction as the main channel for people to air their opinions. As pointed out by Mmuya and Chaligha (1992:99-100), the ‘professional thoroughness of the commission debate’ impressed even the opposition. Indeed, they became the first to demand that the Commission’s report be made public.

The Commission conducted 946 public debate meetings covering all 20 regions of the Tanzanian mainland and 32,279 people from these regions spoke before the Commission. Of these people, 79% favoured continuation of the one-party system, provided the ruling party under-went reforms to become more democratic (Nyalali Commission, 1992: 60 and 70).

The Tanzanian regime controlled the process of transition because the main ideas for dealing with political changes were channelled through the Presidential Commission, which did its work for one year. Furthermore, once the results were announced, the regime did not give the opposition any chance to lead the demands of political change from one-party to multiparty.

In another anticipatory move, the regime agreed with the reasoning of the Commission that, despite the result of the consultation process, Tanzania should shift to a multiparty system. Both Mwinyi and Nyerere said it was ‘wise’ for the country to shift to a multiparty system. Nyerere (1992) argued that the fact that 20 per cent of people said they would like a multiparty system was substantial, and if those people were not given the chance of participation through a multiparty system, their agitation for political
reform could be disruptive. There was also the possibility, he said, their numbers would increase in time.

The regime in Tanzania was able to control the transition process as the regime was able to enact a multiparty law that changed the political system in the one-party parliament already in existence. When the opposition demanded a role in determining the shape of the new system, the regime responded that the opposition could not participate in enacting multiparty reform as they were yet to receive an electoral mandate from the people (Marando, interview). Likewise, other arguments of the emerging opposition—such as the call for a national convention to draft the new constitution and a transitional government to oversee the interregnum between the one-party and new multiparty system elections—were rejected without provoking protests or demonstrations as the opposition was still too weak to organize support for counter-regime activities (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992: 139).

These anticipatory actions of the Tanzanian regime to change the political system of its own accord without much pressure from opposition groups and donors were an important factor in contributing to the legitimacy of the regime in Tanzania. Delay, reluctance and out-right resistance to changing from a one party to a multiparty system had pitted many regimes in the third wave of democracy against opposition and western donors. The result had been opposition gaining increased legitimacy for leading the demands for more democracy while incumbent regimes lost legitimacy because they were seen as resisting democracy. A successful and peaceful transition led by the Tanzanian regime helped it to consolidate the single most important credential it had acquired so far: that of maintaining peace and tranquillity (Amani na Utulivu) in Tanzania since the independence of the state while many violent conflicts raged across other African states, including the genocide in Rwanda bordering Tanzania on the north-west. The various narratives on why it should continue to lead Tanzania that the regime put forward in the lead up to the multiparty elections pointed to its record as the builder and maintainer of peace and tranquillity in Tanzania and to its championing of major changes including the transition from a one-party democracy to a multiparty one (CCM 1992, Mmuya and Chaligha 1992) which it initiated and led successfully and peacefully.
Consistent with the argument put forward about regime legitimacy in Tanzania, the regime succeeded in leading the Tanzanian transition because of the legitimacy it gained between 1967 and 1985 in the Ujamaa and Nyerere years. The regime built its case of for legitimacy with the narrative of its legitimacy between 1967 and 1985. It is arguably this legitimacy that also resulted in a low level of opposition up to 1990. The low level of opposition made it possible for the regime to lead the transition without having to contend with internal opposition and external donor pressure.

In 1990, the Tanzania regime had conducted its one party general election comfortably. An opposition party or opposition group as such did not exist in Tanzania then. Any notable opposition to the regime began with leaders of religious organizations being vocal and critical of Mwinyi government for corruption. It was the same issue that students and academics, particularly at the university of Dar es Salaam, criticized the regime for (Maliyamkono, 1995). A number of people, who went on to form political parties, were individual critics of the regime who aired their views mainly through new independent newspapers that began to grow from 1986 (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992: 133). No one had formed any political group or movement to begin opposing the regime at this time. As noted above, individuals who began to constitute the opposition movement issued their first major statement in 1991; but the ruling party was already a step ahead of them, announcing its transition period agenda and laying out a schedule for the transition. By 1992 there were a number of organizations comprising individuals who opposed the regime operating as pro-human rights, education and environmental organizations. As noted by Mmuya and Chaligha (1992:61 and 133-140), a seminar to launch a common opposition strategy was convened in June 1991 and the National Committee for Constitutional Reforms (NCCR) was formed from this. The NCCR brought together some academics and individuals keen to set up an opposition movement and party (Bagenda and Marando, 2006 interview with the author). To the detriment of the opposition’s legitimacy, some of the leaders who formed the opposition movement were leaders who had been discredited by the CCM party and had not recovered their credentials, having failed in their challenge to the party following their expulsion.

Emerging in this manner, the Tanzanian opposition constantly struggled to coalesce with individual leaders who in most cases attempted to each form their own
political party (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994). Opposition politicians tended to emerge as individual entrepreneur politicians who sought members to join their parties. In this respect the Tanzanian opposition was different from the opposition that arose in many other transitory states in *the third wave* of democracy. In most countries undergoing transition to democracy, because of the regime’s serious loss of legitimacy, opposition leaders and movements emerged that either opposed the regime openly or through various large-scale clandestine movements. In such cases, since the public were disenchanted with the regime, the opposition organized and established its roots within civil society and the population at large. Hence, towards transition there were strong opposition leaders within civil society, and mass support against the regime. In Tanzania, although individual opposition political actors emerged at the height of international demands for multiparty elections, they had no roots or strong support within civil society or among the general population (Bagenda, 2006 interview, Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992: 135).

**Rules of the Multi-party Election**

Given its dominant position the Tanzanian regime party had a wide degree of latitude in forming the Commission to gather people’s opinions on the political system. It also had the same wide latitude in choosing which recommendations to accept from the Commission for implementation and which it would reject. It adopted as a matter of urgency those recommendations that were essential to fulfilling the regime’s decision to adopt multi-party democracy. Other recommendations, particularly those that were inclined to favour the political opposition and therefore to increase political competition, it declined to implement. Recommendations formed on the basis of demands from the political opposition were also not implemented. The government rejected outright the recommendation to create a body to oversee transition, a major demand of the opposition, as it would have been a serious attempt to remove control of the transition process from CCM. For similar reasons it rejected the recommendation for the formation of a constitutional commission to draft a new constitution. The Nyalali Commission Report (1992:164) had described such a commission for the constitution as the body that would
conduct a national debate on the constitution and organise a constituent assembly to pass the new proposed constitution.

Instead the regime produced the changes that were necessary to reinstate a multi-party system (Nyalali Commission Report, 1992:164). It retained many of the features that had characterised elections in the one party state, readapting the Westminster style ‘first past the post’ constituency electoral system it had inherited. There was not much discussion on the actual form of the election system itself as Tanzanians were used to voting in elections since the foundation of the state and the single seat constituency system was what they were familiar with. There were some calls for the state to consider some form of proportional representation but this was not widely discussed (Mtei, 1996: 107).

It made changes to the relationship of CCM to the state and closed party branches in work places and in the armed forces. It restored the supremacy of the parliament, and reduced the number of *ex-officio* members of parliament to basically one (the Attorney General) and a small number of presidential appointees. The most significant step was the removal of the prohibition on the formation of political parties in the constitution and the enactment of a law on the formation and regulation of political parties. To allow new parties to form and operate, it instituted a two-stage registration process that had an initial six months period to allow the party to meet the legal requirements of full registration. Parties had to have a national character; the main measure of this was that they had to have at least 200 supporters who were registered voters in 10 regions in Tanzania including at least two from Zanzibar. Parties also could not be organised on an ethnic or religious basis, be anti-Tanzanian or have foreign sponsorship. The Act also set up the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, and determined that the registrar would be appointed by the President (Political Parties Act, 1992).

While on the one hand it can be argued that by insisting on the ‘national character’ of political parties, CCM was preserving the high degree of national unity and social cohesion that the state had built. On the other hand, the inability to use such social cleavages did reduce the capacity of political opposition to form. Furthermore, as the law did not allow independents, only political parties could stand for elections.
In addition to the problem of the selective use of the recommendations of the Nyalali Commission, the specific recommendations of the role of the National Electoral Commission, a body charged to manage the elections, was disputed by the opposition parties. This Commission had existed in the one party period but it was completely reformed as part of the transition process. It became mandatory for its members to be professionals, although their appointment by the president made the opposition question its independence (Chaligha, 1995, and TEMCO, 1995). The opposition brought this question of the Commission’s independence before the High Court (Mabere Nyauch Marando V. The Attorney General, 1993). The court decided in favour of maintaining the president’s authority to appoint the Commission, arguing that appointment of members does not amount apriori to the commission not being independent, fair and just in the execution of its duties (Chaligha, 1997: 30-31).

In other challenges where the opposition brought their case before the court concerning the powers of the commission, the court ruled in favour of the opposition. The opposition challenged the rules governing the commission which protected its decisions from being questioned by any court. The courts received and adjudicated complaints of malpractice and unjust decisions in the administration of elections by the Commission, for example, in Hon. Attorney General and two others V. Dr Aman Walid Kaborou, 1994. This case was filed on the constitutional principle which affirms that nobody is above the law and was successful (Kaborou, 2006 interview with the author). In addition to this, the practice of requiring parties to seek permission from district commissioners to conduct their meetings was also found unconstitutional by the courts (Mabere Nyauch Marando V. The Attorney General, 1993). In this case it was ruled that the political parties should simply inform the police of the details of their meetings (Marando, 2006 interview).

Following complaints from opposition parties, supported by pressure from donors and based on the by-elections conducted between 1992 and 1994 before the first multi-party general election, the Elections Commission took a vital decision in favour of the opposition. This decision meant that vote counting had to be carried out at the polling stations instead of transporting votes for counting at the district headquarters (NEC, 1995: 63 and 71). The transportation of votes, a common practice during the single party
era, was deemed to create opportunities for inserting additional votes into the boxes or even replacing boxes with a new box containing fake votes. As part of this, party agents were allowed in the voting stations to witness the whole voting process. Observation by party agents was also extended to other electoral related activities such as registration of voters (TEMCO, 1995:179).

Conclusion

Given that the ruling party’s main weakness after the 1990 election was that people were becoming disillusioned by the increasing levels of corruption it seemed that the regime’s popularity, and therefore the perception of its legitimacy, was threatened with the adoption of the multiparty system. By then donors had sanctioned the regime for corruption and failure to collect taxes (Mushi 1997:141 and Maliyamkono, 1995:22 and 29). This further compounded the government’s problems with meeting wage bills on time to pay civil servants, teachers, nurses, doctors and workers in other public sectors. Social services deteriorated within the country, where public hospitals lacked medication, public schools suffered from lack of books and teachers, and those present went without salaries. Describing the conditions, Professor Maliyamkono who visited most parts of Tanzania with the voter education program before the first multiparty general election of 1995 stated:

Across the country I observed the decay of many institutions that would require a fortune to rebuild. Education institutions, secondary schools (government or private), hospitals, health centres, roads, public places for privacy etc. We have lost even the little we had gained. Just imagine how many people in Dar es Salaam manage without almost no private places to go. I have seen abject poverty, depicted by virtually naked people, in spite of the so-called economic growth. I am talking about the quality of life (Maliyamkono, 1995: ix).

Not only this, but security in the country deteriorated once more along with religious tolerance and the social cohesion people enjoyed in the absence of much social economic differentiation (Kaiser, 1996). Members of parliament and media organisations continued to expose one major government scandal after another (Luanda, 1997). Mwinyi failed to halt any of these negative trends during his second term. This context provided ammunition for the opposition. Even though collectively weak, able opposition leaders
such as Rev. Mtikila provided a critique of the government that began to gain traction with the population. Mtikila’s concept of *Walala hoi* (*those who go to bed and sleep exhausted because of the difficult daily struggles of life*) and *Walala hai* (*those who sleep well because of the easy way they earn a living*) became accepted as the class division among Tanzanians. His negative characterization of rich Tanzanian Asians as *Magobacholi* (*thieves stealing from the Tanzanian economy*) also became more popular indicating a weakening of social cohesion at this time (Kaiser, 1996: 145). Similarly NCCR-Mageuzi, a new opposition party articulated the *sera ya uzawa* (*indigenisation policy*) which, although reactionary and reminiscent of the policy of the ANC of the pre-independence period, also gained traction as people felt the leadership was doing nothing to improve the lives of ordinary people while foreigners were benefiting from the Tanzanian economy.

The opposition was highly fragmented and lacked unity from the time the decision to adopt a multiparty system was announced in 1992 up to the first multiparty election in 1995. The opposition lacked a credible leader with popular support, which stopped it from becoming a major political force and made it unable to attack the obvious weaknesses of CCM. The regime’s control of the transition process and its anticipatory changing of the Tanzanian political system brought the regime much credit nationally and internationally. Elsewhere in Africa and the world at large, transition to democracy frequently involved a lot of confrontation, civil strife and even violent conflicts. The ruling party claimed the title the *bingwa wa mageuzi* (*champion of change*) in Tanzania. The success of the regime allowed rehabilitation and consolidation of its reputation as the architect, builder and maintainer of a peaceful and united Tanzania. It was these achievements that the regime used to taunt opposition in the campaign during the first multiparty elections of 1995.

In spite of the weakness of the opposition, CCM felt vulnerable going into the first multiparty election. The next chapter discusses the conduct of the four cycles of multiparty election up to 2010. It examines the way in which the rules of the multi-party elections were implemented in practice. It also analyses the legitimacy narrative developed by CCM in its battle with the emerging opposition and how this enabled the party to retain leadership of the Tanzanian government.
In line with the argument of this thesis it is observable that because of the legitimacy the regime gained by meeting expectations of Tanzanians in three main policy areas that made up the promise of independence (as discussed in chapter 3, 4 and 5) the emergence of a political opposition was restrained. It also meant that when opposition did emerge it was still weaker than the regime. It is notable also the regime in Tanzania before and during the transition had to dealt with the issue of how to maintain its legitimacy in the new circumstances both in terms of the policies it pursued and its reform of the political system. Despite this, the regime had leeway to make adjustments to its legitimacy narrative and comfortably controlled the transition politics toward a multiparty democracy.
CHAPTER 8. TANZANIAN REGIME LEGIMACY IN THE MULTIPARTY ERA 1995-2010

Although Tanzania is no longer a one party state CCM remained the dominant party, winning all elections from 1995 to 2010. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the existing literature classifies most new regimes that emerged during the third wave of democracy in Africa as hybrid regimes (Schedler, 2002, Levitsky, 2002 and Diamond, 2002). Such research points out that these new hybrid regimes, or pseudo-democracies, survive in power by using what has been termed the ‘menu of manipulation’ during elections (Schedler, 2002). This menu of manipulation has been described as complementing the neo-patrimonial practices by which African regimes maintain political power prior to the introduction of multiparty elections. Having observed what they considered to be ‘the fiasco’ of the first multiparty election held in 1995 in Tanzania, Bratton and Posner (1999) classified the Tanzanian regime as a hybrid one. Bratton and Posner (1999) pointed out that the opposition parties faced many hurdles and that the incumbent party manoeuvred to ensure its victory. They highlighted, for example, that opposition parties encountered limited access to government–controlled electronic media, most notably Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, the only radio station with national coverage. They also noted that the polling was so chaotic in the capital that it had to be rerun. They concluded that ‘although most ruling party candidates were re-elected, the country’s first multiparty contest since independence dismayed many Tanzanians’c(Bratton and Posner, 1999:383). Following on from the discussion of the way in which the regime managed the transition to multiparty democracy, this chapter seeks to establish whether the CCM retained its position as the dominant party through the use of a ‘menu of manipulation’ as the hybrid regime literature suggests, or whether it did so by political actions and the legitimacy it had built during the one-party era. Using reports by Tanzania Elections Monitoring Committee, TEMCO (a independent University of Dar es Salaam led civil society umbrella organisation that acts as independent and impartial election observers) it first analyses how ‘free and fair’ Tanzanian elections have been. It then discusses the political campaigns of CCM to analyse how the dominant party defended its legitimacy and popularity over four electoral cycles.
A ‘menu of manipulation’ and the conduct of Tanzanian elections

As the tables overleaf indicates, the degree of electoral success for CCM has varied over time, being at it lowest in the first multi-party presidential election, and dropping again in the 2010 election. The margin of victory was significantly higher in the second election and the third election. In parliamentary elections held since adopting the multiparty system, the ruling party has won more than 80 per cent of seats. However, the CCM’s percentage of the popular vote in parliamentary elections has followed the trend set by presidential elections. That is, the party won more seats in parliament when the president won more votes and less when the president’s votes decreased. Local elections have also largely been dominated by CCM with the widest margins of victory, a reflection of the party’s strength at the local level, where it has had an effective grassroots structure since the one-party era (Mtei, 1996 and Chaligha, 2002). In all elections this feature puts the CCM at a greater advantage relative to new opposition parties without a strong and widespread grassroots structure. The tables below also indicate that the opposition has remained weak and fragmented. Only CUF has maintained a significant opposition presence. However CUF derives its strength almost solely in Zanzibar particularly in Pemba where it gets majority of it parliamentary and presidential elections support.
Table 7: CCM and other parties’ presidential multiparty election results

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<th>MK</th>
<th>SAU</th>
<th>OTHERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
- **Vote in percentage**
- **Vote in numbers in millions**
- **Others** UDPD
Table 8. CCM and other parties’ number of parliamentary seats won in multiparty elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CCM</th>
<th>NCCR</th>
<th>CUF</th>
<th>UDP</th>
<th>TLP</th>
<th>CHAD</th>
<th>DP</th>
<th>NLD</th>
<th>PPT-M</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>SA</th>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: - Less than 1%

The last chapter discussed how CCM controlled the transition process and set up the electoral system. This section discusses how the elections, including the campaigns, were run. TEMCO, a local independent election observation consortium, has consistently observed the elections in Tanzania since the first multiparty election in 1995. The organisation certified the 1995 and 2000 elections as free but not fair. The 2005 election was certified as a ‘qualified free and fair election’ and the 2010 election was classified as both fair and free.

Analysis of TEMCO reports shows that even though there is no evidence of widespread and systematic manipulation, various actions were taken to skew elections in favour of CCM on a local and ad hoc basis. This occurred at all stages of the election processes from registration of voters, nomination of candidates by the electoral commission to campaigning, voting, counting and announcing of results.
Issues in the voter registration process

TEMCO found that manipulation during the voter registration stage was at its highest level in the 1995 elections. These included registration of prisoners to vote in the Kilosa district constituency, and the registration of under-age persons, mostly secondary school students, in the Bagamoyo constituency. Also, CCM representatives used the threat that services would be denied to those who register to vote for the opposition in Ruvuma constituency; non-citizens in border areas were registered as voters; and there was wide-spread intimidation by the CCM when conducting a voter-intentions survey in the Dar es Salaam and Songea Urban constituencies (TEMCO, 1995:48-49).

In the 2000 elections, the main problem noted in the registration process was the mixing of voter registration and tax collection information (TEMCO 2000:41-42). Although this was a problem, it is not possible to say if it favoured CCM only, as the TEMCO report does not specify whether or not it was done specifically to prevent suspected opposition supporters from appearing on the register. Apart from this problem there was only one notable case where election officials registered underage voters in Kiagata Ward in the Musoma Rural District constituency (TEMCO, 2000:44).

Both the 1995 and 2000 elections were conducted without first establishing a permanent voter register. Such a register was introduced for the 2005 elections. TEMCO reports that during the registration process in 2005, 85% of the objections raised related to allegations of registration of non-citizens, 10.9% were about registration of deceased individuals, and 4.8% related to voter age and mental health. The report notes that the National Election Commission (NEC) handled those complaints and objections fairly and impartially (TEMCO, 2005:24-25). The 2010 TEMCO report found no acts of manipulation or bad practice that would favour CCM in the voter registration process.

Manipulations in the presidential and constituent candidate nomination process

In 1995, election officials put obstacles in the way of the nomination of opposition candidates, generating a relatively high number of complaints about rejection of candidates nominated opposition party candidates by returning officers. Opposition party nominations were declined in at least twenty constituencies (TEMCO, 1995:78-79).
However, none of these rejections involved the nominations of the main opposition party, then NCCR-MAGEUZI. On no occasion was a CCM candidate objected to (TEMCO, 1995: 79). The 2000 election also occasioned a number of rejections by the Returning Officers of opposition party nominees. However, according to the TEMCO report, this time opposition parties complained that the CCM bribed their candidates into failing to meet all nomination conditions or to withdraw their nominations at the last minute. As a result there were 28 constituencies where CCM candidates ran unopposed (TEMCO, 2000: 61-66).

In the 2005 election nominations were manipulated much less. There was only one case of an unopposed CCM party candidate because the only opponent was declined on the valid ground that a private advocate instead of a magistrate signed his papers. According to the TEMCO report, this improvement was partly due to opposition political parties taking precautions during the nominations (TEMCO, 2005:46). However, the 2010 elections repeated the trend of the 2000 election where 20 parliamentary and 500 councillorship CCM candidates ran unopposed. Again, opposition candidates were bribed into not meeting the nomination conditions or into crossing over to CCM (TEMCO, 2010: 78-79). Given that CCM ended up with a majority of more than 100 seats in parliament, however, this level of manipulation did not affect the overall outcome, and also reflected badly on the standard of some opposition candidates.

**Manipulations in the campaign process**

Four features in the menu of manipulation used by the regime can be deduced from the TEMCO reports: manipulation of the campaign timetable; monopoly of state media; campaign financing; and support and mobilisation of state officials.

To avoid parties campaigning in one area at the same time, parties and election officials agreed on a timetable that allocated each area and time to a specific party to conduct its campaign rally. In the 1995 election, particularly in rural areas where village leaders and ward executives were in charge of letting people know which party was coming to address them, local leaders—mostly CCM party members or supporters of the regime—deceived people about times of opposition meetings. According to Limbu (1997), who contested the election in 1995, the fact that people were given the wrong
time to come to his meeting and came when he was not there, discredited him in many locations. Limbu recounted how CCM caused confusion:

The trick CCM did was that they would announce very loudly early in the morning before people had woken up regretting that the meeting to be addressed by the NCCR candidate, Dr. Limbu has been postponed from the morning to afternoon. They would do the same in the village where I was supposed to address in the afternoon that I would address them in the morning instead (Limbu 1997:116-117).

Another continuous practice interpreted as an act of unfairness by the regime was the interruption of opposition party campaigns by those of former CCM leaders. In the 1995 elections Nyerere, who campaigned for CCM, disrupted opposition campaigns as his arrival in a locality was accorded a state reception and protection arrangements, pulling attention and large crowds to his campaign (TEMCO, 1995:97-98). Up to 2010 Tanzania had two retired presidents and, in addition to the sitting President, all of them joined the campaign trail on behalf of CCM and its candidates in 2010. As a sitting president holds his position during the election, in some areas timetables of opposition parties addressing rallies were disrupted to allow the president to address the public instead of the opposition (TEMCO, 2000:86-87).

TEMCO has noted that the regime was highly favoured in campaign financing. In the first multiparty elections in 1995 all candidates were allocated public finance. While CCM candidates got their finance on time, finance for opposition party candidates was delayed (TEMCO, 1995:86 and 123). In the following election, finance for candidates was withdrawn altogether (TEMCO, 2000:78). In this case, the incumbency favoured CCM candidates, as at the dissolution of the parliament they were paid a gratuity of 20 million Tanzania shillings they could use to for re-election campaigns.

Another perennial advantage that CCM had in each election was the disproportionate coverage by the public media, radio and television. Since radio and television broadcasts of independent media was limited to certain regions and it was only public media that had national coverage, media bias in favour of the CCM campaign messages was important to its victory (TEMCO 1995: 120-122). Opposition parties lost out in not being able to get their messages out through the same medium. This was
especially the case in difficult to access rural areas where opposition candidates were largely unable to establish a presence. The regime not only had the advantage of widespread media coverage but also, as noted earlier, it already had grassroots structures, built during the one-party era, that reached all urban and rural areas of Tanzania equally.

Even though the electoral commission issued guidelines for equal coverage in the public media for all parties during the official campaign, they were ignored (TEMCO, 1995:120). As also noted in the TEMCO 2000 report:

during the 2000 elections we have seen government owned media behave as if they were owned by CCM. For example RTD covered all CCM conventions live but did not cover any of the opposition conventions. RTD and government journalists reporting for Sunday and Daily News travelled with the CCM candidate and covered their campaigns, but did not cover campaigns of the opposition parties’ candidates unless they were in Dar Salaam (TEMCO, 2000: 120).

According to the 2010 report of Commonwealth election observers mission, 59% of media coverage of the elections went to CCM while the remaining 41% percent was divided between the opposition parties. CHADEMA and CUF, for example, received 19% and 16% of the coverage respectively (Commonwealth Mission, 2010:19).

A thriving private media sector also existed in Tanzania at this stage. However, to the advantage of the dominant party, even in this sector CCM had more supporters. According to the 2010 TEMCO report, apart from a small media company owned by a small group of journalists, all media companies were owned by politician-cum businessmen, most of who were CCM members of parliament or CCM supporters. Out of 11 major private media corporations, nine were owned by sitting and former members of parliament (TEMCO 2010: 154).

Although the issue of campaign finance and media coverage favoured CCM, it is not clear that the issues raised in the TEMCO reports amount to ‘manipulation’ in a corrupt sense. To some extent they were the advantages of incumbency and electoral dominance.
Issues in voting, voting counting and the declaration process

In the first multiparty elections there was a lack of voting papers or a delay in delivering voting material to potential opposition areas. While such inefficiencies occurred in many parts of Tanzania in the first multiparty election, the voting system failed almost completely in Dar es Salaam constituencies even though it is the commercial capital and administrative headquarters of the National Elections Commission (NEC) of Tanzania. The Commission called what happened in Dar es Salaam sabotage and requested a police investigation. The investigation concluded that ‘there was’nt any evidence of deliberate sabotage but rather negligence of a high degree on the part of officials’ (NEC, 1995:56-57). As there was delay in opening the voting stations and lack of voting material and other necessary documents, the elections in Dar es Salaam had to be postponed and were held two weeks later. The opposition boycotted the elections in protest, giving CCM an easy victory in these constituencies.

According to TEMCO (2000, 2005, 2010) the voting process was organized smoothly in the 2000, 2005 and the 2010 elections. No CCM actions in the voting process during the three elections could be considered manipulation.

Vote counting and declaration of results are the final two stages of the election process where acts of manipulation can occur. To increase transparency and reduce suspicion, since the first multiparty elections, vote counting is done at the polling station first, in front of witnesses from all parties (TEMCO 1995). Although counting in polling stations did not cause any problems in the 1995 elections, the amalgamation of results from all stations did cause problems in eight constituencies. According to TEMCO, reported delays and lack of transparent procedures created suspicion of corrupt practices (TEMCO 1995).

In the 2000 election, vote amalgamation and the declaration of results produced fewer complaints. The 2005 TEMCO report noted:

it is evident and plausible for us to state with confidence, that vote addition was carried out acutely and in accordance with the methods and procedure prescribed by the Electoral Law as well as subsequent Election Regulations
In all constituencies the results were declared in accordance with the provisions of the electoral legislation (2005:98-99).

The 2010 election occasioned many requests for recounts, which election officers dealt with to the satisfaction of parties concerned (TEMCO, 2010:190). In this election, although there were delays in adding results from each polling station and declaring the winner, these were due to elections officers being unable to use new technology purchased by NEC for the task (TEMCO, 2010:191-192).

**Evaluation of the use of ‘menu of manipulation’ practices 1995-2010**

In the case of Tanzania, consistent with the main argument made in this thesis, the use of the menu of manipulation is not substantive and extensive enough to be regarded as the main way in which CCM retained its dominant position. The ‘menu of manipulation’ does not largely and fundamentally account for the electoral success of CCM given the level of their parliamentary majority. Use of practices from the menu are not as widespread and systematic nationally as it would be the case if the regime party was weak and its tenure of leadership is precarious and challenged seriously. Also, as the TEMCO reports indicated, the level of irregularities decreased over time with the 2005 election being declared both free and fair. The hybrid regime literature assumes that under multiparty politics the strength of the opposition parties will increase, since it is also assumed that sitting regimes would be seen as dictatorial, undemocratic and corrupt (Scheider, 1992, Bratton and Posner, 1999). In Tanzania the political opposition has not strengthened over time. Of the two main opposition parties CUF maintained a fairly consistent level of support, but mainly in Pemba and Zanzibar. CHADEMA surfaced on top to significantly increase their support only in the 2010 elections. Both parties, however, are still weak compared to CCM overall strength. NCCR-Mageuzi, which challenged CCM significantly in the first multiparty election, became one of the weakest parties after its leader, who defected from CCM moved to another political party-Tanzania Labour Party(TLP)--which itself never became as strong as NCCR-Mageuzi had him as leader. The level of ‘manipulation’ of the electoral process in the past does not seem sufficient to account for the comparative weaknesses of the opposition parties.
Given that CCM had the legacy of the independence movement and its 34 years history of leading Tanzania to draw on, the next section examines how CCM proactively campaigned and used its historical record and the politics of ideas to retain popular support. The discussion here seeks to demonstrate the argument and the hypotheses of this thesis, that the success of the regime in Tanzania is based on fulfilling the ideas and ideals of the political community in Tanzania. These the ideas and ideals of leadership and government which developed before and particularly during the struggle for independence which the Tanzanian leadership endeavoured to articulate and fulfil for Tanzanians since independence before and after instituting the one-party political system, that is throughout the leadership of Nyerere of Tanzanian nation-state.

**CCM and the first Multiparty Election 1995**

The first multiparty election presented a key challenge to CCM to defend its legitimacy as the government of Mwinyi was rife with corruption scandals and it was seen as incapable of not only tackling corruption but also of ensuring peace, security and unity for Tanzanians.

Mwinyi and his leadership team’s inability and unwillingness to be committed and follow the founding ideas, which legitimised the Tanzanian regime during the struggle of independence and during the leadership of Nyerere, resulted in many socio-economic problems that manifested in many ways. Arguably, the Tanzanian public’s main concern was corruption. It is also notable that to restore the credibility of his regime, the Mwinyi government, close to the re-election campaign in 1990, engaged directly in solving the problems, and listed fighting corruption as one of the key issues in its manifesto (CCM 1990, Mukandala and Othman, 1994:286-292).

It can be said that corruption became a code word for causes and the results of an ineffective government during the Mwinyi era: a government that failed to collect taxes (Mushi, 1997); was selling off Tanzania to foreign interests (Katabalo, 1991-1992, Mnyonge, 1995, Nyagawa, 1995, Nzowa, 1995 and Ludovic, 1995); and failed to pay its public sector workers on time (Mkumbwa, 1994). It was an administration where officials were corrupt and demanded small or large payments for services, possessed no integrity, and let the unity of Tanzanians disintegrate (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992, Nyerere, 1995,
Hellman and Kaiser, 2002). Above all it was a regime that did not care about the common man (mnyonge, and mtu wa kawaida) (Okema, 1996).

Corruption became the main characteristic of the regime as it was widely reported by the private media allowed to operate since 1986. Government owned media also took the lead in exposing and covering some of the corruption scandals involving big businesses colluding with government officials to evade taxes, purchase certain public natural resources, sell foodstuff unfit for human consumption and violations of the Constitution (Luanda, 1997).

Ultimately, the donor community withdrew aid to Tanzania subject to improvement of the administration’s governance record, particularly in collecting taxes (Maliyamkono, 1995, Mushi 1997). Towards the end of Mwinyi’s first term, his administration promised a caring government that would stamp out corruption, improve lives of all Tanzanians and commit to building Tanzania to its previous Ujamaa ideals (CCM, 1990). The government, however, completely failed to fulfil these promises after Mwinyi’s re-election (Mushi, 1997 and Luanda, 1997). Facing adverse public opinion and emerging opposition parties, it was important for the regime party to dissociate itself from Mwinyi and his team of leaders to rescue itself from the stigma of the corruption and ineffectiveness of the era.

Demonstrating the personal culpability of Mwinyi and his team came to be indispensable to the Tanzanian regime’s continued legitimacy. Fortunately for the regime, proving this did not require much persuasion or provision of evidence, as there was a clear demarcation between the two administrations. In Tanzania, having taken leadership from Nyerere who led the first government (serikali ya awamu ya kwanza), Mwinyi is known as leader of the second phase government (serikali ya awamu ya pili). Nyerere led a team that was mostly corruption free and effective in fighting corruption and appeared to be imbued with a strong national ethic and the ability to foster the common good (Wangwe, 2005). What further served the regime in dissociating itself from Mwinyi is the obvious fact that Mwinyi was not going to run for the presidency in the 1995 multi-party elections (Maliyamkono, 1995:21), which was of enormous advantage to the party as they could make a break with his period of government. This
situation came about because in 1984, during the one-party era, the regime, of its own accord, affected a change in the Tanzanian constitution whereby no president could serve more than two consecutive five-year terms (Nyerere, 1995:27, Maliymkono, 1995:21). This constitutional limitation was crucial to ensuring Mwinyi did not continue as President.

Since corruption was identified as the main issue of concern to Tanzanians in the Mwinyi era, CCM put forward the fight against corruption as the main CCM election issue. Those who sought change within the regime, including Nyerere, argued that Tanzania required an effective leadership, particularly a clean presidential candidate untainted by corruption (Omari, 1997:95-96) to lead the fight against corruption and cleanse Tanzania of it. Nyerere reminded Tanzanians of how his administration had been able to lead a corruption-free state respected in Tanzania and abroad (Nyerere, 1995: 15-22, Mwandishi wetu in Mfanyakazi and Busara 1995).

This determination was not simply rhetoric. In the CCM primaries to elect a presidential candidate, Nyerere, with the support of others within the regime, fought hard to ensure victory for the candidate they saw as corruption-free (Maliyamkono, 1995, Omari, 1997). Many well-known and influential politicians put their names forward, but many saw their candidacy bids fail either for being key leaders in the Mwinyi government, or for being implicated in corruption scandals (Maliyamkono, 1995, Bagenda, 2006). Three candidates remained in the final round. The candidate whom Nyerere campaigned for emerged the winner of the CCM candidacy Benjamin Mkapa (Kassam, 1995, NEC, 1997, Omari 1997).

Early in 1995, Nyerere had become increasingly vocal against the Mwinyi regime for running a corrupt government, which allowed divisions to emerge between Tanzanians. Nyerere did this on several occasions including at a major public rally celebrating Mayday in 1995 (Mwandishi Wetu, in Mfanyakazi 1995, Nhende, 1995). This intervention by Nyerere was of critical importance to the party’s capacity to stage a strong campaign against the main opposition party, NCCR-MAGEUZI. The latter had gained widespread support following the defection of Augustine Mrema, (a former government minister and deputy prime minister who had taken an anticorruption stance)
from CCM to become their presidential candidate. Mrema claimed he left the government and ruling party following a disagreement with the Mwinyi government over the handling of corruption issues (Mwandishi wetu in Mwananchi 1995 and Mtobwa, 1995). However, it has also been suggested that he left government upon realising that he was unlikely to be chosen as the party’s presidential candidate as CCM passed a rule requiring that presidential candidates must be a university graduate and Mrema did not have a university degree at that time. This was not a new idea in the party as having a university education was also a key criterion in 1985 when Mwinyi was elected the presidential candidate (Interview with Mongella, 2011).

Although leaders of religious, academic and non-governmental organisations as well as the emerging opposition indirectly and directly attacked the Mwinyi government’s performance, especially on corruption, Nyerere’s intervention in support of CCM was crucial. Nyerere was the lynchpin connecting the idealistic past of the regime to the present. He was also a living embodiment of the struggle for independence from 1950s. The Nyerere period was favourably compared to the situation in the country in 1995 (Shivji, 1994, Okema, 1996, Mtatifikoro, 2000). No corruption scandal involving Nyerere had ever been revealed, giving him a high moral stature. He himself pointed to the fact he led a government that was tough on corruption (Nyerere, 1995:15-22). The regard in which Nyerere was held and the high opinion people had of his personal ethics can be estimated from the fact that the Catholic Church in Tanzania has instituted a request to Rome to initiate a process to canonize Nyerere a saint (Mesaki and Malipula, 2011). Nyerere was respected as baba wa taifa, the ‘father of nation’ (Okema, 1996), ensuring his meetings were well attended by people wherever he made a public speech (Mwandishi wetu in Mfanyakazi 1995, Nzowa, 1995 Omari, 1997). Both private and the public media broadcast his speeches. The public media, in addition to broadcasting his current speeches, also aired Nyerere’s former speeches in a program called wosia wa baba wa Taifa (words of advice from the father of the nation) after the main evening news bulletin.

In addition to the strength CCM gained by having Nyerere campaign for them, their 1995 election manifesto, which also featured prominently in their campaign, drew strongly on the past record of legitimacy of the one party state regime. The manifesto
noted the that CCM was ‘the only party with the experience of leading Tanzania in this period of change’, (CCM, 1995: 87 quoting Nyerere) and stated that CCM was ‘a historical party which unlike other parties in Africa has succeeded in fulfilling its historical mission of building umoja wa kitaifa (national unity) and building an environment of unity and peace (amani na utulivu)’ (CCM, 1995:83). It was also pointed out in the manifesto that ‘the work of building national unity so that the citizens feel that they are people of one nation is done on the basis of policies’ (CCM: 1995:83). The party argued that ‘there are policies of political parties and government which lead to the building of national unity and there are policies that build misunderstanding, hatred and mistrust in a state’. The manifesto emphasises that ‘the policies of CCM (TANU and ASP before it) have been seeds, which have grown unity, love, solidarity and trust among countrymen and women of Tanzania”, (CCM, 1995:83).

The policies, which the party manifesto mentioned as being credited for its successful historical mission, include the policies of Ujamaa na Kujitegemea (Socialism and Self-reliance), policies against ethnicity and tribalism, religious intolerance, racism, sexism and regionalism. The party manifesto also emphasized other policies such as respect for the rule of law, policies which cater for the interests of the poor and powerless in society, national security policy involving men and women, good relationships with bordering states, as well as democracy and openness in running activities of the state and its institutions from village to national level (CCM, 1995:84).

It was emphasized in the manifesto that ‘African countries whose party and government failed to have these correct policies of CCM have failed until now to have national unity. The people in these countries still face conflicts based on ethnicity, religion, sexism, regionalism etc.’ (CCM: 1995:84).

It further stressed that ‘Tanzania still wants national unity to be consolidated and this work is permanent’ and stated that ‘among the political parties in the country it is only CCM alone that can ascertain to Tanzanians that if it wins the October General Election, the state of peace and tranquillity are items that will be consolidated and developed’ (CCM, 1995: 84-85). It attacked the opposition on this peace and tranquillity issue challenging that:
the statement of some of the leaders of the new parties in the country and the kind of leaders themselves have no idea of consolidating national unity nor to continue the environment of peace and tranquillity (Amani na Utulivu) in the country in their political agenda. Instead their statements indicate disunity in the nation, rupture and hatred in the country (CCM, 1995:85).

The manifesto also highlighted CCM’s capacity to handle major changes and times of uncertainty and crises. As an example it pointed out the regime’s handling of the 1974-75 famine caused by droughts. The manifesto claimed that the party and government ‘handled this crisis with courage and wisdom. The result was that no person died with hunger as predicted by experts in the country and abroad’ (CCM, 1995:85). The manifesto also recalled the war with Uganda as evidence of the party’s capacity for national leadership (1995, 85-86).

The manifesto also dealt with the party’s handling of the 1980s economic crisis, observing:

[T]he 1980s were very bad years for the economy of Tanzania, at this time the economies of many other African countries plummeted to the extent that growth was below one percent. Tanzania reached that stage. But, because of the capacity of the CCM and its government to face the crises [...] for the past four years economic growth has averaged four percent. It now exceeds the population growth of 2.8 percent and this means our country is on a development track (CCM, 1995:86-87).

Having stated these facts, the manifesto underscored the argument that CCM is the party capable and deserving of the country’s leadership during times of change. Highlighting the uncertainty of political change happening in the world and in the African region at the time, it further observed that CCM had a large reserve of leaders with vision and ability (CCM, 1995: 87-89).
It criticised the opposition for having and depending on one prominent individual leader only, arguing that

the issue of leadership is very important for the country because the country cannot be led by one person. … If you look at the political parties that are in Tanzania it is only CCM that has a team and that can field a team of leaders with the capacity and perception to lead the nation confidently. Leaders in the remaining parties have major problems in capacity, view and the experience of leading the country diligently and confidently. Because of that it is dangerous even to think about handing over the leadership of the country to them’ (CCM, 1995:87-88).

The important message of the regime’s intention to fight corruption, the main issue of the 1995 election, came under the title ‘Consolidation of the Party’. The manifesto pointed out that in order for CCM to have majority support, strong steps had to be taken to consolidate the party. It flagged as a priority the ‘integrity and honesty of the leaders’, an issue related to the main problem then facing CCM and its government, that is, the perception—and also the reality—that the regime and thus the country was mired in corruption. The manifesto admitted the fact of corruption, promising that if elected, in next five years, CCM will stand firm on the implementation of section 18 of the CCM constitution dealing with the regulation of leaders in order for the leadership of the party to be trusted more by the countrymen and women. Also CCM will support strongly the implementation of the laws on the ethics of state leaders that have been passed by the parliament this year (CCM, 1995:88).

The manifesto restated Section 18 of the CCM constitution dealing with qualifications required of leaders:

This section prohibits leaders from

(i) using leadership authority given to them in party or government for their own benefit or in a nepotistic way
(b) using the authority given to them to receive secret payments and to give, or receive bribes. (CCM, 1995:89)

It admitted that ‘there have been signs that some leaders have not respected these ethics and this condition is derailing the faith of CCM members and countrymen and women in their leaders’(CCM: 1995:88).

The issues, which the party highlighted in the election manifesto, were the key messages and arguments, which the CCM candidates highlighted in their campaign. Campaign speeches by CCM leaders and the presidential candidate emphasised their commitment to fighting corruption (Kassam, 1995). They also questioned the personal capacity of some opposition figures to work as a team, especially their major opponent in the presidential race Mrema. As the CCM national paper, Uhuru, pointed out, there was a major problem fomenting in NCCR-MAGEUZI (the opposition party Mrema defected to from the ruling party). It claimed Mrema was violating joint decisions made by the party and that he could not take advice (Mwandishi wetu in Uhuru, 1995). Another recurring argument put forward by CCM candidates was the claim that the opposition was incapable of maintaining national unity, peace and tranquillity. The opposition parties were also attacked for not having nationwide support and for only carving out niche support in certain regions and religions. CCM and its supporters also attacked them for being too dogmatic, which was seen not only as dangerous for peace but also as going against the collegiality, compromise and collective ways of resolving conflict which had brought peace, tranquillity and national unity to Tanzania (Magunisi, Kidulile, and Ngwalungwa, 1995, and CCM, 1995).

CCM’s main campaign message was that they had been popularly responsive in the past and built Tanzania on the right national foundation and, given a chance, would refocus and be responsive and accountable to the people of Tanzania in the future. They made tremendous efforts to distance itself from the Mwinyi government, which had brought the legitimacy of the Tanzania regime very low. Nyerere, with his unparalleled status as ‘father of the nation’, played a critical role in ensuring the electorate received this message. In its widely used election manifesto, and in the campaign, CCM
highlighted past successes and claimed support based on this record. Given that the main issue with the electorate was corruption, CCM made it a central plank of their campaign and produced a candidate free of any corruption scandals - Mr Benjamin Mkapa who won the 1995 first multiparty election for CCM.

2000 General election

As promised in the 1995 election manifesto and campaign, the regime government and the new president from CCM embarked on a fight against corruption. To demonstrate the importance given to corruption, President Mkapa appointed a Presidential Commission on Corruption (PCC) on 17th January 1996 tasked with investigating causes of corruption in Tanzania. Its duties included recommending review of statutes, rules, regulations and working procedures of the public and private sectors to close loopholes that allowed giving and receiving bribes and the growth of corruption as well as improving transparency in rendering the services (PCC, 1996: 1). Judge and former prime minister of Tanzania, Joseph Warioba, who was respected as a leader with integrity was appointed as Chairperson of the Commission, (Economic and Social Research Foundation-ESRF and Front Against Corruption Elements In Tanzania-FACEIT, 2002:7). The Warioba Commission was tasked to work for 11 months and was required to handover its preliminary findings to the president within three months of commencing the job. It did its work by listening to leaders and members of the public, and through research and investigation within the government and judiciary system (PCC, 1996: 1). It produced a comprehensive report, which in some sectors went as far as mentioning cases that it considered to be corruption. One such case mentioned saw the Minister of Public Works and some members of staff prosecuted for corruption in awarding road construction contracts (PCC, 1996: 269-270).

Other instruments to deal with corruption included giving more capacity to the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (Kisanga, 2005:303). Not only was PCB involved in identifying corruption but it also began preparing and spreading awareness campaigns against corruption through radio programs, leaflets and posters. Some of its education
programs reached up to secondary schools. Also in 1996, the government inaugurated the Secretariat of Ethics with the mandate to oversee public leaders to ensure they abided by the ethics law enacted in 1995 (Maina, 2005). In June of the same year, the government Gazette (number 108 of 2 June 1996) published procedures members of the public could follow to view records of wealth and debts of public leaders (Maina, 2005: 311-312). The Secretariat of Ethics also ran awareness programs through radio seminars for leaders and the public.

In 2000 the government took another major step, establishing the Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance. It replaced the Permanent Commission of Inquiry established in 1965 (Kisanga, 2005: 295-296) and was tasked with protecting the human rights of Tanzanians vis-à-vis public and private institutions. According to Judge Kisanga, its chairperson since inauguration, the commission dealt with 10,315 complaints, 2,237 of which were inherited from the Permanent Commission of Inquiry. 99% of the complaints concerned violations of the principle of good governance and 1% related to human rights violations (Kisanga, 2005:300). It is notable that to improve good governance, which was also the policy objective of international donors at the time, the Mkapa government established a new ministerial post to coordinate good governance activities.

These efforts to fight corruption, even though they did not eliminate corruption, provided a sense of movement towards dealing with the issue and a sense that CCM was now governing the country, filling the leadership vacuum that had existed at the heart of the Mwinyi government (Maliyamkono, 1996). Tanzanians in general, the donor community and, even to some extent, opposition leaders, appreciated that Mkapa provided leadership during this period (Maliyamkono, 1996:27-28, Mwandishi Wetu, 1996 in Kiongozi, Mnyonge, 1998, Majwala, 2007, Machumu, 2007).

The other main policy area the government dealt with was improving the economy in order to increase government funds to pay for social and economic services and repay the national debt. Up to the 1995 elections, donors had reduced support for Tanzania, accusing the government of failing to collect taxes allowing too many tax exemptions and evasions (Mkajanga, 1995). Linking the problem of low tax collection to
corruption, Nyerere described it as a symptom of a corrupt government (Nyerere, 1995:19). In response, the government put in place measures to improve tax collection and a number of reforms to ensure transformation of the country into a market economy. It also introduced new measures to reduce and eradicate poverty (CCM, 2000, Mkapa 2005).

In the first year of such efforts by the government, tax collection improved from Tshs. 28.9 billion a month in 1995 to Tshs 40 billion a month by June 1996 (CCM, 2000). The donor community began increasing aid to Tanzania shortly after (Hellman and Ndumbaro, 2003). Improvement in tax collection also meant the government had dealt with some corruption in the sector. In fact, in the second year of government, Mkapa’s Minister of Finance had to resign because he authorized a tax exemption for a cooking oil importer (Kelsall, 2003:65).

The government privatised formerly state owned parastatals and encouraged investments in the tourism sector and mineral sectors. In 1996, it reformed investment laws and in 1997 established a new Tanzanian investment authority, the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC). TIC helped to cut bureaucracy and served as a one-stop centre for investment. The effect was a reduction in the investment registration process from 100 to seven days (Sitta, 2005:139). Improvements in the tourism sector saw visitors to Tanzania nearly double from 295,312 in 1995 to 482,331 in 2000, increasing tourism revenues from US$ 205 million to US$ 590 million (CCM 2000: 22). In the mining sector, outside sales of minerals increased from US$ 14.95 million in 1995 to US$ 85.57 million in 1999 (CCM, 2000:23).

Even though it was difficult to carry out measures to improve the economy at the same time as satisfying donors by paying the Tanzanian debt, the government also instituted anti poverty policies. This was particularly important in countering the public perception formed during the Mwinyi years that the liberalised and privatised economy was in the hands of a few who were its only beneficiaries. Even though they may have shared the same aim of social equality as the government’s previous anti-poverty policies, after 1995 such policies were presented within the framework of the liberal economic thought that structured development policy in the 1990s. This framework
envisaged that governments would not engage directly in development and instead promoted ‘people-led development’ largely through NGOs and other civil society institutions including the private sector (Mushi, 2001:7-8). The complementing of improvements in the economy with the evolution of poverty reduction policies was significant for the legitimacy of the party and government. Anti-poverty policies followed by the state also tallied with the development thinking of donors and civil society organisations, most of which were already in partnership with external donors (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992 and Mushi, 2001).

The poverty issue was most obvious among women and youth. Youth unemployment became a critical issue and women’s poverty became more visible since, as the ultimate carers of families, they struggled with issues of the imposition of school fees and hospital costs, as well as the rising costs of feeding a family (Mmari, 1997). With the formation of opposition parties, women and youth were critical constituents in the 1995 election (Mmari, 1997). Prior to this, the CCM accused women’s NGOs, particularly BAWATA, the Tanzanian women’s council, of mobilizing women politically against the CCM (Milinga, 1995). BAWATA’s alleged involvement in politics resulted in it being banned after the 1995 elections under the law prohibiting NGOs from being political (Maina, 1999). Despite this, the government and party addressed youth and women’s poverty by advocating loans to women immediately after the government was formed. The President’s wife, Mama Mkapa, partly spearheaded this movement with the CCM women’s wing, UWT and some government ministries (Gauluhanga, 1999 and Mwandishi Wetu in Heko 1999). After the 1996 Beijing Women’s Conference, the third phase government identified four of the twelve areas of action it would deal with. One of them was related to the economic empowerment of women and eradication of poverty (Kassimoto, 2005:173). The government maintained the ministry dedicated to women and youth and established a National Youth Development Policy in 1999 under the Ministry of Employment and Youth.

In 1998, Tanzania published its own National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NESP), which described the role of government and other actors including women, youth, and the public and private sectors in eradicating poverty; and analysed challenges and opportunities related to the task. In this strategy, emphasis was placed on linkages
and cooperation between government, the private sector and civil society organisations in fighting and eradicating poverty (Likwelile, 2005:71). This was followed by the 1999 Tanzania Mid-range Development Plan (Vision 2025) to coordinate all development efforts by the government and the Tanzanian people. Its vision and aim was to create a poverty-free Tanzania by the year 2025.

The evolution of the 2025 vision was arguably part of the answer to the main challenge and question that had arisen since Tanzania abandoned *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* as the general ideology and vision for the country’s development. This question, even though pertinent, has not received a straightforward answer as CCM had not restated its overall vision and strategy for reaching the vision and goals since the adoption of a liberal economic policy framework that began with Mwinyi administration in 1986, with the acceptance of IMF conditions. The Mkapa government continued with the same economic perspective. This state of affairs is arguably what prompted the former secretary general of the CCM Horance Kolimba to point out that the party had lost direction (Maliyamkono, 1997:287). As of now, CCM does not have a clear stated vision of direction and purpose, as CCM’s predecessor TANU and CCM itself did throughout the one-party era (1965-1992), when the aim and the actual effort of the regime was to implement *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* vision and policies.

While these processes were on going, the Tanzanian government in 2000 also finalised the Tanzanian Aid Strategy (TAS) for Tanzania and donors to coordinate aid (Likwelile, 2005: 71). In the same year, Tanzania concluded the consultation process and produced its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which was the initial step towards qualifying for HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Country) debt relief. The HIPC is an IMF criteria which, after undergoing fiscal discipline measures, entitles a poor country to qualify for debt reduction by cancellation and restructuring, and for further assistance towards socio-economic development.

These poverty reduction and eradication initiatives were coupled with a number of other major reforms intended to improve government efficiency, decentralization and accountability as demanded by external donors. They included the Local Government Reform Program (LGRP) and the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP). These
measures were carried out between 1996 and 2000 (Rugumyamheto, 2006). Given the limited policy space and dependency on external funds, the government’s policy approach was arguably a robust response to the problems facing Tanzania.

The Mkapa administration managed to restore confidence in CCM and put it on a good footing for the 2000 elections. Demonstrating that the Mkapa government was aware of the need to fulfil the promises it made in 1995, CCM formed a party committee in 1997 to evaluate the implementation of the 1995 election promises and recommend areas of focus for the 2000 election (CCM, 1997). REDET public opinion polls conducted in December 1999 as the Mkapa government completed four years in office showed that approximately 73% of the population trusted the CCM and believed it had provided good political leadership. However, they were not satisfied with the economic performance of the government or its responsiveness to people’s needs (REDET 1999).

**The 2000 General Election - why CCM won**

The CCM 2000 election manifesto, unlike that of 1995, focused more on the economy and the fight against corruption. It still included the regime’s long-term achievement of maintaining a peaceful and united nation, but its focus was more on the current policies and challenges of government.

In the 2000 manifesto unlike that of 1995 the introduction dealt with the modernisation of the economy as the main challenge. The focus of the party and its government, as stated in the party’s 2000-2010 policy, was ‘to build the foundations of a modern economy’ as ‘the Tanzania economy currently is still backward and is dependent’ (CCM, 2000:1). Also different from the 1995 election manifesto, which highlighted success only in the CCM’s unquestionable achievement in building national unity and maintaining peace and tranquillity in the country, in the 2000 election manifesto the party was keen to highlight successes in all areas since coming to government in 1995. The manifesto clearly set out success achieved, and challenges remaining for each policy area and the government’s plan for dealing with each of them.

As previously discussed, the 2000 election manifesto detailed the government’s achievements against corruption. It claimed that the ‘fight against corruption is the
promise and policy of TANU, ASP and CCM. The third phase government has taken courageous steps to fight corruption inside CCM’ (CCM, 2000: 94). It then detailed what CCM would do in the next five year period which was to some extent a reiteration of existing policy, stating that ‘the government will continue to take legal, administrative and disciplinary measures against all who are discovered participating in corruption activities. In this period the government will make sure all this is implemented to reach the desired goal, that is, to wipe out corruption (CCM, 2000: 95-97’).

On the economy, perceived as the party’s most successful area since the 1995 election, and which it was determined to make the defining issue of the 2000 election, highlighted that:

‘under CCM leadership the government has made major changes in the policies of the economy and social welfare. Because of these changes the economy has grown on average by 4% annually. Parallel to the achievements in the growth of the economy, the rise of inflation has been reduced from the average of 30% per year in 1995-1996 to 5.9% by June, 2000. Also the government increased efficiency in generating income and reducing spending. The collection of taxes, customs and other incomes has increased from Tsh. 29 billion a month in 1995 to Tsh. 72 billion monthly by June 2000’ (CCM, 2000:9)

After this the manifesto mentioned successes and problems to be tackled next in each economic and social sector (CCM, 2000: 50-56). In particular, the manifesto mentions achievements and challenges in adult education, health, water services in towns and villages and development of housing. Also, given the importance of youth and women as strong constituents for gaining votes, the two groups had sections specifically devoted to addressing their problems (CCM, 2000: 101 –104).

As is normal for CCM election manifestos, the 2000 manifesto carried popular leadership quotes. ‘The seed capital of the poor is her or his strength’ reads a quote which Mkapa popularized having noted it from one villager’s shop cottage. Another was from Mkapa’s speeches on corruption. ‘Let us fear corruption as leprosy; corruption is infectious and it kills ethics and human dignity of the whole society’. The two statements
summarised the defining issues on which the regime focused in the election—its economic efforts and success and its fight against corruption. The seed capital idea resonated with another key message of the regime—building the economy so that Tanzania will be self-reliant, which is an important part of the development process (CCM, 2000: 1-5 and 7-8). This was a link with the past as Kujitegemea (self-reliance) was the second pillar of the Ujamaa policy the party still claimed to follow.

It is notable that CCM candidates and other party campaigners largely focused on the success of the regime as the key defining issue of the election. As noted by Mallya (2001:44-45), an election study group from the University of Dar es Salaam summarised campaign issues from the 2000 election campaign inaugural rally as controlling inflation and the government’s good record on managing the economy, including the successful privatisation of some public enterprises (Tanzania Breweries, the Tanzania Cigarette Company, and cement factories at Tanga, Mbeya, and Dar es Salaam). The second main plank was what CCM described as the intensification of the war against corruption. They also drew on their historic legitimacy gained from building relative peace in Tanzania compared to the rest of Africa. To this they now added the CCM government as the initiator of political reforms that led to the peaceful reintroduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania.

CCM faced the opposition, which attempted to prove less progress has been made in these areas than CCM claimed (Lipumba, 1999, Mallya, 2001: 45-47). Unlike in 1995 when the CCM was on the defensive to such an extent that even Nyerere had to make a major effort in the regime’s defence, in the 2000 election it was on the offensive with its own track record. As pointed to both in the manifesto and in the election campaign, the party was keen to put forward its success and define areas that needed more work in the next term for which it sought re-election.

In the period 1995 to 2000 the party gained confidence and the security of its mandate increased, as reflected in the increase of electoral support for the party and of regime legitimacy. In the 2000 election CCM got 71.7% of the presidential vote, and won 202 seats in parliament. These were significantly higher numbers than in the 1995 election when the party’s presidential candidate got 61.8% of the vote and the party won
168 out of the 232 constituency seats. The independent elections monitors concluded that the election was free but unfair. This time, however, the unfairness did not stem from any suspected acts of sabotage by the regime but arose mainly from incumbent advantages enabling CCM to use state resources. As the TEMCO report pointed out:

all considered, elections on the mainland (Tanzania mainland) were free but not fair. Unfairness comes from the big state bias in favour of the ruling party, the heavy handedness of the police in campaign rallies of the opposition parties, and the incomplete separation of state resources from those of the ruling party (TEMCO, 2000:198-1999).

2005 Election, CCM, and the desire for renewal

The 2005 general election marked the end of 10 years of the third phase government led by Mkapa. Unlike the first term of Mkapa’s presidency, in his second term the government kept up the momentum of reforms in the economy and other policy areas. At the very start of the second term of his presidency, Mkapa ‘promised war on corruption would be pursued with renewed vigour and called to arms all citizens and institutions including individuals, mass media, civil society, NGOs and the private sector’ (Kavishe, 2000). There were on-going prosecution of former Minister of Construction and communication ministry and earlier on in January 2001, the government initiated the process of reforming the anti-corruption law (Maro, 2001). However, in managing the spending of national revenues, public assets and natural resources, the government was implicated in an intractable web of corruption reminiscent of the Mwinyi government.

Government successes included, for example, Tanzania qualifying for debt forgiveness under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and World Bank support schemes in education. With more donor support it built more infrastructure, removed primary school fees, and increased support to improve education in general. The government also removed taxes, such as the development levy, that were a burden on ordinary rural communities (Ntullo, 2006, CCM 2005, Likwelile, 2006).

The web of corruption in which the Tanzanian regime became entangled despite its fight against corruption included the sale of government houses intended for use by
civil servants, to party leaders (Ndekirwa, 2006: 3). The availability of this housing had made it easy to transfer civil servants from one part of Tanzania to another, a long-term government policy which contributed to nation building. A major corruption scandal also occurred in the provision of power supply. To deal with shortage of electrical power, the government entered into a very high cost contract with Independent Power Transmission Limited (IPTL) to produce electricity to complement the supply from other sources (Kelsall, 2003: 70, Kamwaga, 2006). Dr. Mvungi a University of Dar es Salaam law lecturer, and presidential candidate for NCCR-Mageuzi, pointed out in a critique of the Mkapa administration that IPTL was costing Tanzania US$100, 000 each day (Mvungi, 2005). Another scandal surrounded the purchase of a radar from British Aerospace (BAE). The move was highly disputed not only because Tanzania bought the military radar for civilian use, but also because there was corruption involved with inflated prices and political representatives getting personal payments (Kelsall, 2003:71, Kubeana, 2006:6). While the Tanzanian government avoided dealing with the latter case, in the United Kingdom, investigations were conducted by an anti-corruption agency, which found BAE officials guilty of corruption and were ordered to pay compensation to Tanzania (Kubeana, 2006, British Broadcasting Corporation, 2010).

Also during this period, Tanzanians complained about a number of mining contracts, which gave Tanzania very little income from the sale of minerals. Tanzanians have always felt they were poor amidst the country’s rich mineral resources (Vizram, 2006, Muhigo, 2007, Kingsley, 2007, Mbonea, 2007). Furthermore, an audit company appropriated a large part of this profit (Kisaka, and Luumbo, 2006). Also, when the government was questioned on why it had purchased a presidential jet at high cost, the Minister responsible replied, ‘as he knows Tanzanians are ready to eat grass so that the president can buy a plane ’ (Bagenda 2004, Mtikila, 2006, Mairari, 2006). Dr. Slaa, Member of Parliament and presidential candidate for CHADEMA, pointed out the plane cost Tanzania Tsh. 6 million per hour (US$ 4000) when in use and has often required a technician from the United States to come and repair it (Mwandishi Wetu in Mtanzania, 2006).

At the same time, the government commissioned the building of new twin towers for the Bank of Tanzania the necessity and costs of which were questioned (Kelsall,

The Members of Parliament, media and civil society made the corruption allegations public. Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, as well as public and private broadcasters aired parliamentary proceedings making it possible for the public to hear them. The media, particularly newspapers, were at the forefront of revealing and discussing corruption issues. Since the introduction of private media from 1986 (Luanda, 1997), the civil society—especially NGOs activists—contributed to discussions on talk shows on television and radio, and to coverage in newspapers. Religious leaders and organizations in Tanzania also saw it as their duty to condemn corruption (Joel, 2000, Kavishe, 2000, Tanzania Episcopal Conference-TEC, 2004, Bagonza, 2005 Kilaini, 2005). Although Nyerere died in 1999, his speeches still played an important role in Tanzania’s fight against corruption (ESRF and FACEIT, 2002:148). Nyerere’s warnings against corruption are very influential on the Tanzanian psyche as they continue to be broadcast on public and independent media from time to time. On 14 October every year, marked in Tanzania as a day to commemorate Nyerere, writers and commentators appear in media and other public platforms to reflect on the Nyerere era, looking back at the period as a time when corruption was successfully controlled and the common good
was the central concern of party and government. It is often the yardstick against which the Mkapa government is measured (Idrissa, 2005, Msuya, 2006, Karugendo, 2006, Mjengwa, Halimoja, Mtanzania, 2006, Mkinga, 2006).

Despite pressure, the Mkapa government was reluctant to deal with the allegations of corruption that emerged in the second term, in contrast to the first term where one Minister resigned because of a corruption scandal and a former Minister was brought to court on corruption charges (Kelsall, 2003:70). No significant progress was achieved in investigating and prosecuting other corruption cases (ESRF and FACEIT, 2002). Kelsall (2003:70) points out that the Warioba Report named seventy corrupt officials and political leaders and, although Mkapa believed that there could be twenty prosecutions, none occurred during the second five years of his government.

There are some reports showing a drop in corruption during the Mkapa government. Transparency International reports show, for example, Tanzania improving from its perception of corruption from 1.9 in 1998 to 2.7 in 2002 while ESRF and FACEIT also pointed out that the level of corruption declined somewhat between 1996 and 2002 with some variations among sectors. In a 2005 at the Tanzania State of Politics conference convened by the REDET research centre at the University of Dar es Salaam to evaluate his ten years tenure, Mkapa himself called on critics to pay attention to the World Bank report which showed Tanzania to be among five countries in Africa which made significant progress in accountability and responsiveness of the government between 1996 and 2004. In spite of this, public perception that corruption had not been tackled significantly continued. Many individuals and organizations felt much more could have been done in the fight against corruption (ESRF and FACEIT, 2002, Mvungi, 2005, Warioba, 2005, Msangi, 2005, Rweyemamu, 2005). There was also dissatisfaction with the extent to which the improved macro-economic stability and growth had been translated into benefits for Tanzanians en masse (Kavishe, 2000, Kelsall, 2003, The Guardian 2003, Mkinga, 2003, Likwelile, 2005). Mkapa government’s failures in fighting corruption and extending economic benefits to a majority of Tanzanians set the tone for the 2005 election.
In the 2005 elections, declared free and fair by the main independent national election observer, TEMCO, CCM won by 80.28% of votes in the presidential race. This was 10% more than the 2000 election when CCM presidential candidate received 71.7% of the vote. In the general election, CCM increased its seats in parliament from 202 in the 2000 election to 206. This result was unexpected given the problems with Mkapa’s government discussed above. This major success of CCM, which came despite the government’s lack of legitimacy in the fight against corruption, is explained by one agreed-upon key factor: the party produced an extremely popular candidate (TEMCO, 2005, Bagenda, 2006).

In the 2005 CCM primaries, Jakaya Kikwete emerged as the presidential candidate. For the previous ten years Kikwete had been like a presidential candidate in waiting. In 1995 he was highly favoured as the presidential candidate of the ruling party, supported by the party’s youth wing seeking a generational change of leadership. Kikwete was the frontrunner in the 1995 CCM primary elections with Mkapa coming second. In the second round to get a candidate with more than 50 per cent of the total vote, Mkapa came in ahead of Kikwete. When Mkapa was elected president on the CCM ticket, he chose Kikwete as Tanzania’s Foreign Minister for both terms of his government. During this time Kikwete built a network that would facilitate his election campaign both in the party and outside CCM (Bagenda, 2006).

Kikwete’s acceptability to Tanzanian people as president stemmed from his good leadership record in posts he held in the later part of the Mwinyi government. He was first a junior minister in the Ministry of Energy and Minerals and later became Minister of Finance, in charge of cleansing the ministry of corrupt officials and bringing in financial management reforms demanded by donors as a condition for aid to Tanzania, tasks at which he was successful (Mwandishi wetu, 1995 in Nipashe, Bagenda, 2006). He was effective in the Foreign Ministry during the Mkapa era when Tanzania played a key role in conflict resolution and peace building in East Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Also, through efforts of his Ministry, Tanzania managed to regain the international reputation it had lost in the Mwinyi era (Machumu, 2007 and Majalwa, 2007). Moreover, being one of the candidates Nyerere had approved prior to the 1995 election, he was seen as coming from a new generation and a ‘clean’ candidate untainted by corruption,
(Nhende, 1995). These characteristics were desired by Tanzanians (Mwasi, 1995, Mwandishi wetu, 1995 in Heko). There was euphoric support for Kikwete when he announced his candidacy in 2005 (Shayo, 2005). Religious leaders also supported Kikwete, including some Christian churches. Bishop Kulola proclaimed, for example, that Kikwete, a Muslim, was ‘the choice of God’ (Kulola in Nyakati, 2006).

The CCM manifesto highlighted the key election message from Kikwete, stated in bold letters covering two pages:

Maisha bora kwa kila mtanzania
kwa nguvu mpya, ari mpya na kasi mpya
Tanzania yenye neema tele inawezekana (CCM, 2005)

This translates into English as:
A better life for every Tanzanian
with new zeal, new strength and new speed
a Tanzania of plenty is possible’ (CCM, 2005)

The second part of the manifesto highlighted the party’s promises in different policy sectors for the next five years. Its economic section began by highlighting the achievements of Mkapa years and laying foundations for the fight against corruption. Its economic message was very similar to the 2000 manifesto:

CCM would like to pronounce two fundamental tasks. The first task is to move Tanzania from the pool of backward and dependent economy and bring it up to the stream of modern and self-reliant national economy. The second task will be to involve all countrymen and women by enabling them to participate in building the economy and to eradicate poverty […] the poverty faced by our countrymen and women and millions of people in South countries is the result of the economy that is backward and dependent (CCM, 2005: 8-9)

As corruption was still an important unfinished agenda for the legitimacy of the CCM government, Kikwete promised—both in the manifesto and in his post-election inaugural address to the parliament—to consolidate a war against corruption. In the manifesto it was stated thus:
The third phase government brought many successes in the war against corruption; the results include the increase in government revenue because many loopholes allowing corruption have been sealed. Also many officers have been charged and several others have had their employment terminated. (2005:27)

Apart from implementing existing policies, the manifesto promised to follow up on accusations from ordinary people of suspected incidences of corruption and to deal with complaints of corruption more vigorously in state institutions such as the police, hospital, schools and courts (CCM, 2005: 8-9). In the parliament address Kikwete promised to ‘continue to increase openness in decisions of the government, especially in procurement and contracts’ (CCM, 2005: 38).

The two main policy areas in the campaign (the economy and the fight against corruption) and how the Kikwete campaign framed them were a direct response to the successes and failures of the Mkapa government. Saying that the focus of the Kikwete government would be to bring prosperity to all Tanzanians was an appropriate frame as the Mkapa government, despite doing well economically, had been criticised for failing to translate the economic success into reducing inequality. Tanzanians named this economic problem *Ukapa*, a word derived from Mkapa’s name (Kelsall, 2003:65). In the fight against corruption, the criticism was that reforms had dealt with petty corruption and left major corruption by those in leadership positions untouched (Kelsall, 2003). As pointed out by Vizram (2006:18), Kikwete’s platform of ‘anti-corruption, clean government and progress for all with new zeal, new speed and new vigour’ captured the Tanzanian imagination.

**Implementation of the 2005 manifesto and background to the 2010 election**

Even though there was an acute shortage of power in the first year and a drought in the second, the Kikwete government managed to achieve a high economic growth rate of 7.1% (Kikwete 2010:17). Inflation was reduced from 12.1% in 2009 to 4.2% in 2010. Of particular significance to rural constituencies, which were CCM strongholds, was the regime’s success in building roads (CCM, 2010).
On the question of corruption, which was important for Kikwete’s election, the government failed to make the expected progress. An evaluation of the government in its first year showed a failure to implement the promise to review all major government contracts Kikwete made in his inaugural address to the Tanzanian parliament in 2005. By the end of the first year of Kikwete’s government there were calls in the media and parliament for a review of contracts and more action on anti-corruption measures (Vizram, 2006, Ndekirwa, 2006 Mutekanga 2006, Kisaka and Luumbo 2006, ).

Not only did the Kikwete government fail to review big government contracts as promised, but also to great public dismay, the Kikwete government itself entered into corrupt contracts. One such contract was particularly damaging for Kikwete’s credibility in that it had a significant and direct impact on the public and on the economy of Tanzania. The contract in question involved an American company, Richmond Development Corporation (RDC), contracted to supply supplemental electrical power to Dar es Salaam. The company failed to supply the power after two extended deadlines since June 2006. Not until early 2007 did it start supplying power.

This shortage of electricity and the trouble it caused was captured in an article in the Dar es Salaam University Paper thus:

we don’t need experts from outside the country to assess the impact of power rationing on our own economy, we can do it ourselves and we can assess everyone who is affected with power blues. While the very people whom the government couldn’t employ had decided to employ themselves, they are now suffocating just because the same government, which failed to employ them, has again failed to supply power and they are making losses everyday. Who is to carry the burden of these poor fellows who couldn’t afford to buy generators? Before and after his election to house number one, CCM president Jakaya Kikwete was and remains Tanzanians favourite politician, but with the power blues some cast shadows of doubt as to whether he is going to deliver as he promised… the power blues have turned Tanzanians into helpless animals they are subjected to poverty by their own government - surely this not what President Kikwete and his party had promised the people, or at least his voters (Kishombo, 2006).

Even though members of parliament and opposition party leaders called for all implicated in the power supply scandal to be held accountable, the government prevented a full
parliamentary inquiry during 2007. It was not until early 2008 that a parliamentary inquiry was set up. The findings of this inquiry implicated the prime minister and two ministers in the corrupt practices that resulted in awarding the contract to Richmond Development Corporation (Mwakyembe, 2008). This implication forced the resignation of the prime minister and two ministers. Edward Lowassa was the first Prime Minister since the founding of the Tanzanian state to resign because of corruption.

The resignation of the prime minister, two ministers, governor of the central Bank of Tanzania (BOT) and the sacking of several government Ministers notwithstanding, media and opposition parties continued to pressure the government into dealing with all corruption scandals. Kikwete’s government did not respond with more significant measures, and was perceived to have failed in cleansing Tanzania of corruption or at least in running a clean government as people had expected of the Kikwete government (Kubeana, 2006, Vizram 2006 and 2008, Reverend Robert, 2007, Mayega, 2008, Mwandishi wetu in Rai, 2008). In addition, economic progress did not improve the living standards of the majority of Tanzanians nor did it reduce poverty even though inflation had fallen in the last year of Kikwete’s five-year term. The impact of these issues on the popularity of the government resulted in reduced support for CCM and Kikwete in the 2010 elections.

Had it not been for the problems of corruption it is probable that Kikwete and the CCM could have explained and defended the economic failures as arising from the drought conditions that affected the country, the increase in oil prices, and the global economic problems as Kikwete attempted to do in an address to the parliament (Kikwete, 2010). However, economic failure could not be separated from corruption which continued to resurface as the main problem for various reasons: the Prime Minister, two Ministers, and the Central Bank governor were all implicated in dirty deals and forced to resign; other cases and issues suspected of corruption were not dealt with; contracts of mineral mining were not reviewed; and the power supply contract with Richmond Development that led to the resignation of the Prime Minister Lowassa remained unfinished after it was awarded to Dowans, ultimately costing Tanzania Tshs. 94 billion (US$12 million) in fines awarded by a ruling of the International Commercial Court of Arbitration (ICCA (Orwa, 2009, Kimati, 2011).
The 2010 election

The 2010 election came with the prevailing situation that the regime party government failed to deal with corruption. Mbambwo, a journalist with Dar es Salaam based newspaper, *Raia Mwema* described the October 2010, election as ‘a grande finale between corruption and ethics’ (Mbwambo 2010). In the campaign, as they in Parliament, leaders from Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (CHADEMA) exposed corruption scandals involving government officials and leaders, and called on the government to be accountable (Mwandishi wetu, 2010 in *Raia Mwema/Tanzania Daima*, Commonwealth Observer Mission, 2010).

In response to this prevailing situation, the CCM 2010 election manifesto restated the regime’s commitment to fighting corruption, proclaiming:

> corruption is an obstacle to national development and giving of bribes in this country, if not keenly controlled, the evil that is done by those who give and receive bribes can spread in all sectors of society and cause a major erosion of accountability and ethics of leaders’ (CCM, 2010: 26).

The manifesto then outlines measures the party in government was to take in the 2010-2015 period. These included improving the system of investigation, educating citizens and public servants, and enhancing the capacity of state instruments for fighting corruption (CCM: 2010).

To garner support in the 2010 election, alongside the promise to fight corruption, CCM also promised to improve performance in all other sectors. It is notable, for example, that the infrastructure section of the 2010 election manifesto promised the construction of more roads than in the previous election manifesto. While six major road projects were promised in 2005, 32 such projects were promised in the 2010 period. As noted earlier, roads are important for rural constituencies, the CCM strongholds.

Two issues that dominated the election campaign were the economy and corruption. The CCM defended its economic performance arguing that it was very good despite bad economic conditions, particularly the drought which caused shortages of food as well as electricity from hydro power plants (Kikwete, 2010). On corruption, the regime noted that it had made progress and promised to do more. It pointed to the resignations,
convictions and the number of corruption cases filed by the government in the courts. Some of the cases resulted in more embarrassment for the government as it involved CCM politicians who were contesting for the 2010 general election while having corruption cases to answer in court at the same time. CCM argued that it did not bar them from contesting the election, as they had not yet been found guilty by law (Mbwanambo, 2010).

Opposition parties in and out of parliament argued that CCM was the party of *Mafisadi* (thieves of public property) who were protecting each other and had failed to fight corruption (*Mwanahalisi*, 2009). Given people’s concerns about corruption, the message of the opposition struck a cord with voters (Bagenda, 2006). As in the previous elections when corruption was a major issue, the failure to fight corruption largely contributed to the big drop in Kikwete’s electoral support. As presidential candidate, Kikwete polled 63.8% of the vote in 2010 in contrast to the 80.1% he won in the 2005 election. The party also got less seats in parliament, winning just 186—a significant drop from the 206 seats it won in the 2005 election. Opposition party CHADEMA, which championed anti-corruption in parliament and in the election, increased votes for its presidential candidate from 5.8% in 2005 to 27.05% in 2010. Its parliament seats also increased from five in 2005 to 23 in 2010 elections.

Having been affected by the weakness of his government in fighting corruption in his first term as president, at the start of his second one, Kikwete reiterated his government’s commitment to fighting corruption in his inaugural speech to the parliament:

‘in the past five years we took steps to build legal, systemic and institutional capacity to fight corruption in the country. We enacted new stronger laws, with a wider perspective to face the problem of corruption. Also we have enacted a law on election funds. We have created a new instrument to prevent and fight corruption, PCCB, with more legal powers and a bigger capacity resource-wise, to carry out its responsibilities. It is an open truth that in this period (2005-2010) many allegations have been put forward, investigated and brought to court. Many of the accused have been found guilty and convicted. Major corruption has been dealt with and many big shots have been held accountable. Despite that there is a need to do more because the problem of corruption is still significant. I have heard, we have heard, and they have
heard the cry of the countrymen and women of wanting us to do much better. We shall increase efforts in this fight. I ask countrymen and countrywomen to support us and to encourage especially the PCCB (Kikwete, 2010:38-39).

Conclusion

The ideological basis of regime legitimacy, which the Tanzanian regime had built from independence, was an important factor that helps explaining the capacity of CCM to remain the dominant party in a multiparty system. This ideological basis of the regime was that it unified the population; it was developmental, just and democratic, and that it distributed the benefits of economic growth across the population reducing poverty. Being against corruption from the early days of the state was also part of this. Through the four cycles of multiparty elections, not only has this ideological agenda remained a central part of the CCM’s platform, but also the perceived capacity of CCM to deliver on this platform influenced party fortunes from one election to the next with its success fluctuating according to the extent to which they fulfilled public expectations. The party’s capacity to build on its legacy as the founding and responsive regime and to use political ideas that are consistent with expectation and vision of Tanzanians and, on this basis, to persuade voters to support them is much more compelling than viewing regime party dominance of the multiparty competition as a result of neo-patrimonial policies and hybrid regime practices. The level of manipulative practices during elections, while undesirable, is not on a sufficient scale to explain the level of CCM support.

Nyerere’s intervention to rescue CCM in the first multiparty elections could be considered an example of personal rule similar to the neo-patrimonial big man rule rather than an ideological move. But this is debatable as Nyerere was successful in defending the regime party not only because he was a link with the ideologies of the independence movement but also because he was the embodiment of that idealised past when his regime was perceived to have served Tanzania responsively. Had Nyerere not been the embodiment of the values and ideals that Tanzanians wanted their political leaders to possess, he would not have had the influence he did. Neither he nor the regime party he led were discredited by the onset of the third wave of democracy as happened in many
regimes during the move to democratisation in Africa, Eastern and Central Europe as well as Asia and South America.
THESIS CONCLUSION

The main objective of this study is to explain why, and how, the Tanzania regime has dominated political competition in the state well into the multiparty liberal democracy era. The regime party has been in power from 1961 when Tanganyika got independence to 2010 when the last multiparty elections were held. To achieve its objective, the study dealt with the key theoretical assumptions with regard to the legitimacy of African states, particularly as that literature relates to the legitimacy ideas and practices of ruling parties in these new democracies aimed at maintaining themselves in power. This chapter presents the theoretical and empirical conclusions and discusses the significance of the contribution of the thesis to the understanding of African politics and the nature of African democracy.

On the theory of African regime legitimacy

This thesis rejects neo-patrimonial theory (the main theory used to explain African regime polity dominance) as an inadequate tool for understanding African regime legitimacy and argues that neo-patrimonialism does not provide an explanation of the legitimacy of the political regime in Tanzania and the dominance of the regime party in Tanzania. This study proposed an alternative framework which draws on Mustapha’s (2002) idea of political organisation to deduce the concepts that form the basis of political organisation: the common good, public good politics and democracy. Neo-patrimonial authors have argued that these political ideas are unlikely to develop in African states and that the behaviour of most African states runs counter to such ideals. Their argument, however, does not engage seriously with the political dynamic of African societies and in particular fails to give adequate attention to the strongly established political communities in a state such as Tanzania.

This study argues that the alternative framework of ideas that can underpin the legitimacy of African regimes emanate from the anti-colonial, nationalist movements and from the struggle for independence. These movements promised that the African postcolonial polities that were established from the 1960s would be just and democratic, developmental and would unify all Africans within their borders. It was these ideas that
formed the political and social organisation amongst Africans during the struggle for independence and formed a political contract between African leaders and peoples both during the independence struggle and then within the newly formed states. Given the relatively recent date of the independence movements in historical terms, this framework still forms the ideological basis of political organisation in Africa. If it is accepted, as this thesis argues, that this framework of ideas has the potential to underpin the legitimacy of African regimes that subscribe to its basic tenets, then this is a significant contradiction of the neo-patrimonial theorists’ argument that neo-patrimonialism is prevalent in African and other states in the developing world because of a ‘lack of unity and shared values between the state and the society’ (Clampham, 1982). The values and ideas of the independence struggle and movements have this capacity to provide a link between state and society and to be a source of that unity.

This alternative framework of ideas for the legitimacy of African regimes is a basis for accountable and republican politics in Africa that draws on the ideas articulated during the struggles for independence and the expectation that post-independence governance would seek to enforce those desirable goals. This thesis argues that it is possible to provide empirical evidence that this central understanding of the goal of political organisation form the basis of an ideal of democracy and good government which can be used as a standard for regime legitimacy in post-colonial African states. It provides a foundation for understanding the non-violent, usually suppressed struggle for accountable and responsive government in Africa that often goes unnoticed, until it erupts into large-scale protests. So even if a state is non-democratic as it is seen to be in most African regimes, it does not mean that there are no strands of democratic thought within groups and people in that state. Rather, it means that African democratic thought is based not on the blueprint of western liberal democracy but on the ideas and promises that drove the African struggle for independence.

As an approach and episteme for understanding African politics, the framework of the ideology of independence is important because it has links with the pre-colonial ideas of leadership, organisation, authority and legitimacy which developed in African communities from the start of settled social life. These ideas were integrated into the struggle for independence because that struggle fundamentally rejected the undemocratic
and exploitative colonial order and promised that this order would be replaced by a
democratic regime that was informed by traditional organisation and leadership values as
well as contemporary ideas of a just, fair and democratic government.

**Empirical application and its implication for understanding Tanzanian regime
legitimacy dynamics**

It has been observed in this study that the success of the Tanzanian regime in
enlisting legitimacy and dominating political competition into the multiparty era stemmed
from the Tanzanian government’s perceived attempt to implement the three key aspects
of the ideas and promises of the independence movement--- democracy, development and
unity (of the nation-state organisation)---during the one-party *Ujamaa* era of 1965-1985.
This thesis has shown that despite criticism of *Ujamaa* policies in Tanzania, the period
played a significant part in the formation of Tanzania as a nation-state with a strong
political organisation which is unified by shared ideas and values that hold it together
and give it the capacity to function as an organisation. There is a strong push for
accountable and responsive leadership in Tanzania today not just because it is a strong
element in international discourse but because such practices were codified and made a
part of government policy since independence and during the *Ujamaa* era. As such, they
have been long embedded in the political culture of the state and the population. In the
*Ujamaa* era the regime also endeavoured to build unity through economic policies that
fostered greater equality. This study proposed that what made the Tanzanian regime
successful in terms of democratic legitimacy are two elements that defined and refocused
the promise of independence in the democratic governance: the one-party state and the
African socialism programme (*Ujamaa*). Although both aspects of Tanzania’s policy
programme have been subject to widespread criticism from both the left and the right,
this thesis argues that these policies, in the context of Tanzania in the 1960s, were able to
meet the needs of the new state. Given that the majority of African states that gained
independence at the same time as Tanzania have unravelled with violent conflict,
frequently based on internal divisions, it is notable that Tanzania has remained peaceful
without major incidents of civil disorder or social protest. The thesis explored what
aspects of state policies facilitated the building of a political organisation that produced this result.

Based on public consultations, the regime adopted a one-party system in 1965 with the purpose of producing a just and democratic system of governance as promised by the independence struggle. The adoption of the one-party system was followed by a successful competitive general election within the one-party framework. The 1965 election under one-party gave power to the people to contest and elect leaders of their choice under the umbrella of TANU. Significantly for democracy, competitive elections were held at all levels of government and for party leadership positions at national and local levels, establishing a strong commitment to this type of competitive system. Elections have been a regular feature of Tanzania political participation, being held every five years. This is in contrast to the practice in many African regimes where elections have not been a normal and regular feature of political life after independence.

It is important also for political democratic governance that the Tanzanian regime invested a huge amount of time and resources to develop and build the party as a vibrant structure with competitive elections that engaged the polity. The party was also consciously built to act as a counterweight to the power of government on behalf of the public. In many ways, the party can be seen to have acted as a counterbalance in the dynamic of the relationship between the two. In many other regimes, the government or the party was the sole, unchecked, instrument of political power. In Tanzania the party provided a platform for political participation from the street and village level through to district, regional and national levels because of its dense and inclusive organisational network. Both the party and government framework and network were developed concurrently.

This vibrant party system was a continuation of its mobilisation function during the independence struggle. It is observable that in Tanzania the party was an open movement and maintained an important role in mobilising people and allowing them to participate in discussions on policies the government wanted to implement. Unlike it other one-party regimes, party meetings were a regular part of Tanzanian life at every level for both people and leaders. When the multiparty system was introduced in 1992,
this was an advantage to the regime as the regime party was not simply a neo-patrimonial structure but a well organised entity with functional structures at all levels of Tanzanian society that provided a system of participation for years.

In 1967, two years after instituting one-party democracy to implement the promise of independence, the Tanzanian government announced the Arusha Declaration, which made *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* the formal vision and ideology of Tanzania. The Arusha Declaration, based on the national ideology of *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* (African socialism and self-reliance) departed from the neo-patrimonial features of African regimes in that it put forward and espoused ideas, values and virtues designed to bind leaders and people together to build a national organisation of common interests. Even before the Arusha Declaration the regime in Tanzania, contrary to neo-patrimonialism theory, had attempted to build a social and political system in which leaders are accountable to, and are servants of, the public. It also instituted an economic system that catered for the interests and welfare of the masses rather than favour political leaders and individuals with powerful economic interests. The idea of leaders as servants of the common good was stipulated with more stringent conditions in the public leadership code.

The Arusha Declaration served as a new social contract between the leaders and people in Tanzania that built on the social contract implicit in the national independence struggle and movement. The contract placed conditions on political leaders and defined what it meant to be a leader in Tanzania, a citizen of Tanzania, and what the common purpose of Tanzania was. The Declaration provided a common national framework for the political, social and economic development of Tanzania and arguably translated and defined the promise of independence, which up to 1967 had served as the unwritten contract between political leaders and the people. The declaration addressed democracy, development, national unity and the nation-building concerns that had motivated the independence struggle and movement in Tanzania. The Arusha Declaration’s importance for building democracy in Tanzania cannot be overemphasized. It helped to establish all key elements and ingredients needed to build a democratic state in Tanzania: a political system in which people participate in decision making, respect for the dignity of the people, and the fact that welfare of all was central to the affairs of the government.
Equally important was its emphastic stance that leaders are servants of the public sphere who must work for the common good and not their personal interests.

**Economic development**

The adoption of the socialist programme helped to eliminate the development of many features of neo-patrimolinalism because the manner of its implementation reduced the opportunity for corruption. Also the *Ujamaa* policy rationalised and made possible an unprecedented shift of development emphasis from urban to rural areas. These policies did not make Tanzania very wealthy but they helped Tanzania address the issue of rural development and forge ahead with economic integration at this very early stage in national development, largely avoiding the significant danger that some sections of society would develop faster than others. Unequal socio-economic development makes national unity, social solidarity and sustainable development of a peaceful polity difficult, if not impossible. The economic policies of this period were repeatedly pointed to by CCM in the multi-party period as one of the pillars on which the success of state-building project rested.

**Unity and nation- state Organisation building**

It was arguably the regime party’s success at state building that gave the party its reservoir of legitimacy in the multi-party period. The Tanzanian regime did not build its political support on the primordial social division of ethnicity and religion; in fact, it did everything it could to minimise those divisions. It is observable that the regime emphasised political, economic and social mobilization programs, which aimed to build a Tanzanian national identity that overrode ethnic, religious and regional identity and attachment. The efforts are evident in party and government policies, the speeches of leaders, education policy and state practice. This was complemented by a policy that favoured geographical movement and the mixing of people from various regions for study and later for work placement and national service, and by the advocacy of Swahili as the national language.
Regime legitimacy in the multiparty political competition

The efforts of the Tanzania regime to put forward a framework of ideas for Tanzania’s common interest established a social and political contract between the leaders and the people that the regime endeavoured to implement for almost two decades and a half. It came to play a major part in the transition to multi-party electoral democracy during the third wave of democracy that followed the fall of the Soviet Union. As a result, the absence of strong organized opposition against the regime, prior to and during the transition to multiparty democracy, is evidence of regime legitimacy rather than an indication of a high level of repression. In these circumstances the Tanzania regime, therefore, comfortably initiated and led the transition to a multiparty political system.

The legitimacy of the regime party became more obvious under the multi-party political system, as it continued to win the elections on the Tanzanian mainland, although with varying degrees of support, based on political campaigning rather than on a menu of corrupt practices. As outlined in the chapters above, the governing party in Tanzania used its previous record to argue for a mandate to continue its leadership of the state. Unlike in many regimes that made the transition to multiparty democracy in the 1990s, the Tanzanian regime produced a credible case, based on its past record, to be voted back into power. That record helped the regime win the first multi-party election. While some practices typical of a hybrid regime were used in the first multi-party elections, such practices became more marginal in subsequent elections in 2000, 2005 and 2010. Even in 1995 these actions cannot be said to have formed the means by which the regime dominated political competition and retained power. In Tanzania, as this thesis showed in Chapter 8, fortunes in the political competition of the regime party are clearly linked to efforts by the regime to be responsive and accountable, and to the extent to which the Tanzanian people perceived the party as having fulfilled their expectations. As this thesis has shown, this was a result of the regime’s implementation of the ideas and visions of responsive state which, according to the neo-patrimonial theory has no basis, existence or viability in African post-colonial states.
Significance and contribution of the study

The contribution of this study to the understanding of African regime legitimacy and the dominance of some of the regimes over their polities is two fold. This study first synthesised various strands of emerging critiques of the neo-patrimonial theory (the main theory used to explain African politics) and, building from this synthesis, it put forward an alternative framework of ideas that can be used to capture the reality and understand the basis of African democracy, the struggles for democracy, and legitimacy dynamics of African regimes.

Neo-patrimonial theorists could not see any indigenous African ideas and values as possible bases of accountable and democratic polity and went as far as describing African culture as the motor of neo-patrimonial, corrupt and unaccountable regimes. This study, however, has established that indigenous African political thought and processes, informed by African culture, is more than capable of providing a basis for democratic governance in Africa.

The thesis has pointed out that the alternative framework of indigenous African political thought was constructed by the African people through concrete reality and experience of living under the often brutal, racist, divisive, exploitative, and undemocratic colonial regimes. The reaction of the Africans was to formulate ideas and vision for democratic rule with a caring government striving for the welfare and prosperity of all that, instead of the divide and rule strategies employed by the colonial regime, united the polity behind this vision of society. The main inspiration for formulation of this vision was the idealised culture of democratic governance and communal living that Africans had before colonialism combined with ideas from modern democratic governments mostly learned by Africans in western institutes of education or or from residing in Europe, America and some Eastern European countries.

The alternative framework put forward in this thesis challenges the neo-patrimonial theory, the deployment of un-nuanced western liberal democracy ideals, and the episteme used to evaluate African regime legitimacy, accountability and democracy without engaging with African political thought and its history of development. Such western-centric thinking and practice has produced paradoxes and puzzles about Africa
that point to a misreading of African political processes in much of the research intended to offer a better understanding of Africa. This is particularly true about research on the African struggle for democracy. For instance, such research predicted that the third wave of democracy which arose after the fall of the Soviet Union would not reach African shores. What happened, however, is that clandestine and small overt movements fighting corrupt and dictatorial African leaders rose to the occasion, riding the wave with popular support to challenge undemocratic regimes in many African countries. Decades later, researchers largely failed to see the coming of the ‘Arab Spring’, which first bloomed in the Arab countries situated in Africa. Such failures of the neo-patrimonial approach becomes even more puzzling when considered in light of the fact that Africa is a continent where the level of support for democracy has been high from the very beginning compared to many parts of world where liberal democracy spread only during the third wave (Diamond 2002).

There are two important benefits that can be derived from using the alternative framework proposed by this thesis over the neo-patrimonial theory. For one thing, it allows a more complete appreciation of the underlying causes and internal contradictory dynamics of African regime legitimacy. Neo-patrimonial theory conflates cause and outcome, and treats the manifestation or the façade of African politics as the internal logic, dynamics and workings of African politics, based on the argument that African culture is the motor of neo-patrimonialism in Africa. The alternative framework proposes and will lead one to understand that the manifestation or façade of African politics is different from the underlying mechanisms and has contradictory forces operating within it. Neo-patrimonial theory has erred in this regard, seeking to justify its selected features and choosing to focus on the manifestation and façade of African politics as if what is outwardly observable is its only feature and its very essence.

The alternative framework proposed in this thesis puts emphasis on African political thought so that its users will have to engage with idealistic African thought, making it possible for them to tell the difference between African ideals and their manifestation in politics at all levels. The issue it opens up to researchers, which the neo-patrimonial theory keeps in the dark, is the question of how and what Africans want their organisation and country to be. Building on Ake (2000) and Mustapha (2002), this
thesis has argued that, from the time of the struggle for independence, Africans espoused a comprehensive vision of their ideal nation-states based on the harsh realities of the lived experience of colonialism. Neo-patrimonial research has engaged with African politics without taking African political thought into consideration. The theory has not recognized or acknowledged African political thought and thus treated African politics as a purely instrumental process. Indeed, Africa has not had many philosophers who have written down their thoughts on regime legitimacy. The continent was not part of the industrial revolution that produced many of the ideas about politics and state in Europe and America. However, the continent has well established traditions and a culture of democratic rule that predates colonialism. Indeed, it is this pre-existing culture that gave impetus to the African struggle for independence as the experience of living under colonialism with its undemocratic, racist, divisive and exploitative colonial rule contradicted harshly with their long established democratic traditions. In their critique of, and opposition to, the harsh realities of colonialism Africans made known the ideal type of nation-state and governance that Africans aspired to. Such political thought, which not only informs but forms and shapes the workings of the African state, cannot be left out when explaining African regime legitimacy. This, however, is exactly what neo-patrimonial theory does.

Using the case of Tanzania, this study has engaged with the political thought of Africans, how that political thought developed and informed the workings of the Tanzanian regime, and its dynamics of legitimacy. This study has been able to point out how African political thought and the policies based on them --- often criticised by analyses based on a western-centric episteme---produced a political organisation in Tanzania. Tanzanian leaders, for most part, engaged with the ideal type thinking and demands and aspirations that African people have had since the struggle of independence. In this way, the Tanzanian regime produced a united, functional nation-state that shared the values of national organisation. This negates the view held by neo-patrimonial theorists and other western centric evaluations of the Tanzanian regime, and African politics in general.
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Mwandishi Wetu. 1986. Mwinyi kukabithiwa fagio la chuma *Uhuru*. Dar es Salaam, August 9th [‘Mwinyi to be handed the Iron Bloom’]


Mwandishi wetu. 1995. Nilikuwa mfungaji mzuri .. kila nilipotaka kufanga nilipewa kadi ya njano-Mrema. *Heko*. Dar es Salaam, 23-29 th, March, pp 1 and 4.[I was good goal scorer.. but whenever I was about to score I was given a yellow card-Mrema]


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Mtikila, Christopher (Reverend), founder and chairperson of Democratic Party (DP), Interview, October 7th, 2006, Dar es Salaam.

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