TARGETED KILLINGS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES

By

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This thesis is submitted to Dublin City University as the fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Supervisors: Dr. Maura Conway & Dr. John Doyle

Centre for International Studies
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STUDENT DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of PhD is entirely my own work, that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law or copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed____________________(Rory Finegan)  ID No.: 57116580  Date 21 January 2014
In Memoriam

To All Those Who Died in What History Now Calls The ‘Troubles.’

Human beings suffer,
They torture one another,
They get hurt and get hard.
No poem or play or song
Can fully right a wrong
Inflicted and endured.

The innocent in gaols
Beat on their bars together.
A hunger-strikers father
Stands in the graveyard dumb
The police widow in veils
Faints at the funeral home.

History says, don’t hope
In this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
The longed for tidal wave
Of justice can rise up,
And hope and history rhyme.

So hope for a great sea-change
On the far side of revenge.
Believe that further shore
Is reachable from here.
Believe in miracles
And cures and healing wells.

Seamus Heaney 1939-2013
Selected Quotes
1995 Nobel Laureate for Literature
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to warmly thank my two supervisors, Dr. John Doyle, Director, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction and Executive Dean, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences and Dr. Maura Conway, Senior Lecturer, School of Law and Government, both of Dublin City University for their guidance, support and encouragement throughout my thesis experience.

Firstly, Dr. John Doyle, who challenged, persisted and encouraged at every opportunity. His experience, enthusiasm and energy provided a direction and focus for which I am very grateful.

A special thank you to my second supervisor Dr. Maura Conway. Her relaxed and calming influence instilled great confidence and belief in my project. She encouraged the work throughout, reassured when doubt arose and instilled great belief in the journey that I was undertaking. She valiantly mounted rescue operations on several occasions when I was lost in earth orbit.

Thanks also to Professor John Horgan of University of Massachusetts Lowell, who suggested the genesis of what became this thesis, also Professor Ray Murphy of NUIG for the key to a sealed door at a critical juncture. Many thanks to Margaret Devlin of the Military College, Command and Staff School for unstinting and patient help in formatting the work.

Deep appreciation also to my stalwart friends and compatriots Dr. Owen Foley (Capt. Retd) GMIT and Dr. Conor Galvin (Capt. RDF) UCD who on the marathon that is a PhD were always there when I hit the metaphorical ‘wall’ with both encouragement and suggestions.

I am particularly indebted to the interviewees who willingly participated in this research project, whom I found to be both thought provoking and interesting individuals, who challenged my preconceived concepts. The common factor they shared was the great courtesy they extended towards me.

Ní neart go cur le chéile.

Finally, and most importantly, I wish to dedicate this vignette of research to my wife Helen and also my children Cormac and Ellen and their loving ‘nana’ Angela.

“But this dedication is for others to read:
These are private words addressed to you in public.”
(T.S. Elliot, A Dedication, 1930)
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ABSTRACT

TARGETED KILLINGS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
An analysis of their effectiveness and implications for 
Counter-Terrorism Policies
RORY FINEGAN

What effect if any, do Targeted Killings (TKs) have on cycles of violence? This study explores and offers a perspective on the claimed successes of counter-terrorist policies, the issues that underpin them with a focus on pre-emptive actions aimed at disrupting or removing the terrorist threat. The study examines counter-terrorism activities in Northern Ireland in order to encompass a detailed analysis of the implications of the policy of selective TKs. For heuristic purposes the literature review will be primarily based on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The core case study is the use of TKs against republican paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, in particular the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in East Tyrone and is the principal case on which the primary research has been conducted. In a detailed analysis of both the immediate and broader implications of such activities in attempting to respond to terrorism, the strength of the arguments related to ‘lessons learned’ will be reinforced via such analysis. Equally this study is part of a current debate that hopefully will have an intellectual significance, especially given the number of TKs being conducted since 9/11 despite the virtual absence of a sustained public and scholarly debate on the means and the ends of TKs.

Assessing the impact of TKs on insurgencies is as difficult as it is important. Theoretically, there is little agreement regarding the logical consequences of repressive measures in general on the strategies and tactical repertoire of insurgent groups. Hafez and Hatfield (2006), identified four pillars of the Repression/ Rebellion Puzzle which tests the widest range of hypothesis, specifically, that terrorist targeting: (1) deter militant organisations; (2) produce a backlash effect; (3) cause a disruption effect and (4) a diminishing capacity when combined with other security enablers. By assessing common themes and experiences, preliminary conclusions will be presented in light of the expected and subsequent successes or failures of pre-emptive actions. This will facilitate a critical analysis of the Northern Ireland case study and implications for the current and future use of TKs in other operational theatres. The focus of this work is not whether any sort of TKs policy can be legally, morally and politically justified, rather what effect does such a policy have on levels of violence.

This study has found that TKs over a prolonged period predicated on accurate intelligence had no discernible deterrent effect on PIRA; the desire for backlash was always inherent but negated by security forces measures; with regard to disruption, TKs as implemented in East Tyrone had a cumulative effect on the operational capability of PIRA; and finally in relation to diminishing capacity while PIRA initiated substitution equally under this pillar TKs caused a gradual but incremental decline in operational efficiency and effectiveness.

My findings from the Northern Ireland case study focused on East Tyrone PIRA suggest that TKs however, should not be presented as an absolute proven solution in themselves to patterns of political violence. But when combined with other factors if utilised surgically and in a discrete manner they are a factor and therefore as a counterinsurgency tactic, their utility cannot be dismissed.
INTRODUCTION

“Nine years, seven months, and twenty days after September 11th, an American was a trigger pull from ending bin Laden’s life. The first round...struck bin Laden in the chest. As he fell backward, the SEAL fired a second round into his head, just above his left eye. On his radio, he reported, “For God and country-Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo.” After a pause, he added, “Geronimo E.K.I.A.” – “enemy killed in action.” Hearing this at the White House, Obama pursed his lips, and said solemnly, to no one in particular, “We got him,”...unwittingly repeating the words George W. Bush used to announce the capture of Saddam Hussein.”

New Yorker Magazine, 8th August 2011.

The killing of Osama bin Laden by American Special Forces in May 2011 was heralded as an event of massive symbolic importance. Within the US, news of the killing led to impromptu street celebrations and “pushed approval ratings for President Obama up six points” (Silke, 2012: 173). Some argued that the death of bin Laden did not mean the end of the threat from al-Qaeda, but bin Laden’s death did, however, reignite the debate over whether the Targeted Killing (TK) of suspected terrorists is an effective strategy to follow.

What effect if any, do TKs have on cycles of violence? Are TKs effective in combating insurgents and terrorists? This study examines and puts into context one of the tools that has been used in the “Global War on Terror,” (GWOT) namely that of TKs or pre-emptive action. A variety of terms are used to describe this tactic: preventive killings, active self-defence, extrajudicial killings, targeted assassinations and interceptions. The term TKs has achieved the broadest acceptance and is preferred in this thesis because it does not presume approval or disapproval of the tactic (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Duyvesteyn, 2008; Plaw, 2008).

The Repression Rebellion Puzzle

Do TKs lessen rates of violence, or intensify anger and increase motivations to attack with more deadly force? This is sometimes refereed to as the Repression/Rebellion Puzzle (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006:362). The answer to this question is of critical importance as it is necessary to know whether such a policy of pre-emptive
action/lethal force is pragmatically justified, and to place this method within a broader conceptual framework.

**Aim**

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect TKs have on the capability and motivation of violent, non-state, terrorist organisations. Doing so is important for two principal reasons. First, the increasing prevalence of TKs in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency suggests that a tactical evaluation is long overdue (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Duyvesteyn, 2008; Plaw, 2008). To date, few studies have gone beyond addressing the theory, and/or legality or morality of TKs in order to rigorously and systematically explore their tactical significance. Those that have evaluated TKs focus almost exclusively on the Israeli case study (David, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Brophy-Baermann & Coneybare, 1994; Luft, 2003; Stein, 2003). The primary case study of this thesis will be the use of a TK policy in Northern Ireland. The emphasis of this study will be on the level of targets and the consistency with regard to the use of the tactic and the dialect between the two, repression versus rebellion; and to examine also what was occurring contextually at the same time. I will also examine Israeli writings as a heuristic model on how they perceive the issue alongside the core case study of Northern Ireland. TKs represent a cost to planning and participation in terrorism, a cost that should, theoretically speaking, influence behaviour. Did TKs diminish the motivation and influence the behaviour of violent, non-state organisations? Such an analysis offers one way to investigate how the logic of “deterrence by punishment” (Wilner, 2010: 309) might be applied to terrorism, or how deterrence might be applied to counterterrorism. In effect to examine if TKs lessen rates of violence, or intensify anger, and increase the motivation to attack with more deadly force. This work seeks to bridge the gap between these two literatures of description and evaluation by attempting to answer the following questions: (1) Did the TK policy significantly affect the PIRA insurgency? (2) If so, then how? The answer to these questions will help clarify the validity of the tactic or counter arguments against its usage.
Counterterrorism Policy and Strategy

Terrorism is usually calibrated; it is intended to elicit certain public reactions, to include shock, horror, submissiveness, a change of opinion, or action on a particular issue, from release of prisoners, to creation of a new national homeland. “So too must counter-terrorism policy and strategy, be calibrated and integrated” (Harmon, 2000: 235). Duyvesteyn (2008) believes that “the use of the military instrument complies with the logic of terrorism; provoke the opponent into overreacting” (p. 343). Those who favour stronger action against terrorism sometimes argue that terrorism is war (Harmon, 2000). The application of military force after a significant terrorist attack is understandable in light of the acute threat to security. There is according to Sir Michael Howard a clear and ‘thunderous political imperative: something must be done” (Howard, 2002:90). This would indicate that “terrorism can be effective in its operational aim of provocation” (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 343).

Gauging Success

Policymakers therefore are often confounded by the problem of how to gauge whether or not they are winning their war against terrorism. “The concept of victory is difficult to conceive of because the nature of the terrorist threat is so fundamentally different from that of a hostile army,” (Morag, 2005: 310). Howard (2000) has stated, “we cannot be at war with an abstract noun” (p.7). In spite of the popularity of the declaration of war, to declare war on what is, after all a tactic “does not appear to make a great deal of sense…the problem with a declaration of war is that warfare conjures notions of victory and defeat,” (Richardson, 2006: 216). Stemming from this, a key issue therefore is how to analyse the utility of TKs as an effective implement within the tool box of counterterrorism measures.

Why is this question important?

The GWOT has become a leit motif in International Relations Theory since 9/11 and its various tools including TKs a watermark within the literature (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Duyvesteyn, 2008; Plaw, 2008; Williams, 2010). To date, few studies have gone beyond addressing the theory and/or legality or morality of TKs in order to rigorously and systematically explore their tactical significance (David, 2003; Stein, 2001; Luft, 2003). If such a policy is fundamentally flawed, however better to
understand that now; especially when voices demanding that terrorists be hunted down and killed have grown so loud. In essence what part does the use of lethal force against specific individuals by State security forces play in the pattern of events within a terrorist campaign? Equally this study is part of a current debate that hopefully will have an intellectual significance, especially given the increasing number of politically motivated assassinations being conducted despite the virtual absence of a sustained public and scholarly debate on the means and ends of TKs. The significance of this study is both manifold and multilayered. Professionally I believe it is imperative that the issue is addressed in a non judgemental manner, as current and future overseas deployments of the Irish Defence Forces are in theatres where this issue and its use by other actors may come to the fore.1 The targeting of terrorists is and remains a contentious issue. If the policy is legitimate and successful, then it warrants wider acceptance and perhaps even applications in similar cases, particularly as many countries around the world continue to confront transnational terrorist attacks. If it is illegitimate and counter-productive, then it should not merely be condemned, but aggressively confronted and halted before it can do irreparable harm to the credibility of international law and institutions, and to the prospect of effectively bringing contemporary terrorism to an end. The problem with the decision to carry out these operations is part and parcel of the “democratic dilemma” regarding counterterrorism (Stahl, 2010: 114). There is therefore good reason to approach any examination of the legitimacy or suitability of a policy of TK, and specifically of terrorist targeting with healthy scepticism.

Why research Northern Ireland?
The study of TKs in Northern Ireland is the central tenet of this research. While this case study is exploratory in nature it also involves description in order to contextualise the campaign and place it in a broader perspective. The Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ is a key epoch in the study of modern terrorism and one of the more recent examples of the use of TKs. Northern Ireland is also of note because the campaign whether officially or unofficially sanctioned took place within the context of a liberal democracy. Additionally, Northern Ireland as such has gone through the spectrum of violent conflict and conflict resolution to a relatively successful peace

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1 There are currently seven members of the Irish Defence Forces serving at ISAF HQ in Kabul, Afghanistan, on rotational six month tours of duty.
conclusion predicated on the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (1998), albeit with the notable qualification of the ongoing threat from dissident republican terrorist groupings. Conversely the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains essentially unresolved, with the Middle East Peace Process in a hiatus, and where the conflict still simmers with often unpredictable escalations. Indeed following my departure from the Golan Heights in July 2005, the early part of 2006 was marked by a slow re-escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which was marked by the Israeli government “slowly intensifying its policy of targeting terrorists [TKs] in the occupied territories as the level of diplomatic conflict between Israel and the Hamas government continued to escalate” (Plaw, 2008: 82). This tension dramatically escalated with Israeli military incursion into Gaza on 28 June 2006. The Israelis still continue to actively employ a policy of TKs within the occupied territories, but it is notable that both conflicts are similar, in that they were/are confined to relatively small geographical areas and both were/are based on ethno-religious divides.

I have chosen Northern Ireland as the central case study and Israel for heuristic purposes. While research on the effectiveness of military force as a response to terrorism is relatively limited in relation to Northern Ireland (Urban, 1992; Moloney, 2002; English, 2003; Kingston, 2007; Dingley, 2009), additionally these studies with the notable exception of Urban (1992); a journal article by Kingston (2007); a quantitative analysis by Lafree, G., Dugan, L. & Korte, R. (2009) comparing deterrence and backlash models in Northern Ireland and a Masters dissertation by Hearty (2011) only examine the issue of TKs as a segment of their overall work. Whereas in the Israeli case a great deal of valuable and comprehensive research has been undertaken that specifically examines the issue of TKs (David, 2003; Stein, 2003; Luft, 2003; Hafez and Hatfield, 2006). But equally I am mindful that as Lafree et al., (2009) have noted; that as with these and several other studies that focus is on Israel (Eppright, 1997; Grenner-Barcham, 2002), “it is unknown to what extent we can generalise results from terrorist attacks in Israel to other countries and regions” (p. 24). Bearing this qualification in mind, my work will be a point of departure in that it will specifically examine Northern Ireland in relation to the effects of TKs based on

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2 The spark for the incursion was when on 25 June 2006, Palestinian militants having dug a tunnel from the Gaza strip under the Israeli border, in a subsequent attack two Israeli soldiers were killed and Corporal Gilad Shalit was captured and spirited back across the border. He was subsequently released in 2010 in a prisoner exchange.
deterrence and backlash, and that additionally focuses on one specific geographic area, namely East Tyrone as a microcosm of the effects of TKs.

Structure of the Thesis

A conceptual framework founded on the Repression/Rebellion Puzzle\(^3\) will be the lens through which this subject will be viewed, specifically a qualitative adaptation of the quantitative work of Hafez and Hatfield (2006), incorporating its four constituent pillars. The conceptual framework is in effect the ‘road map’ through which an exploration and examination of this topic will be undertaken. Accordingly, utilising the Repression/Rebellion Puzzle as a fulcrum, I will examine the relationship and linkages between targeting and cycles of violence, other themes will include linking targeting to violence escalation/de-escalation. The focus of this work is not whether any sort of TK policy can be legally, morally and politically justified, rather what effect does such a policy have on levels of violence.

*How are TKs generally studied?*

Assessing the impact of TKs on insurgencies and terrorist campaigns is as difficult as it is important. There are several academic schools of thought, and theoretically there is little agreement regarding the logical consequences of repressive measures in general on the strategies and tactical methods employed by terrorist groups. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) in their seminal work conduct a detailed overview of the academic literature in this area. They note that some observers contend that repression increases the cost of collective action so as to make it unlikely (Hibbs, 1973; Oberschall, 1973; Oliver, 1980). Others conversely maintain that repression generates additional grievances that motivate further mobilisation to punish an ‘unjust’ adversary (Gamson *et al.*, 1982; Goldstein, 1983; Olivier, 1990). These two perspectives have been largely challenged on empirical grounds;\(^4\) that there are instances where repression both quells and provokes insurgency (Zimmermann, 1980, 1983; Hoover and Kowalewski, 1992; Lee *et al.*, 2000; Davenport *et al.*, 2005).

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\(^3\) Also referred to as the Repression/Protest Nexus (Araj, 2008: 287).

\(^4\) Empirical analytic/Natural Scientific, (largely quantitative, some qualitative), this framework is concerned with validity (i.e. Measuring what it intends to measure); reliability (i.e. Consistency of findings when study is repeated in the same circumstances); objectivity (i.e. Observer neutrality is assumed). Its methods are that of structured experiment allied to systematic survey, using subjective reasoning.
Attempts to solve the repression-rebellion puzzle have led some scholars to investigate non-linear relationships between repression and rebellion, arguing that various levels of repression – high, medium, or low – are likely to induce mass dissent or conversely hinder it (Gurr, 1968; 1970; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1972; Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Lichbach and Gurr, 1981; Muller, 1985; Muller and Seligson, 1987; Muller and Weede, 1990; cited by Hafez and Hatfield, 2006: 360). Others look to the timing of the repression in the protest cycle, its targets and the political and institutional context under which it is applied (Snyder, 1976; Tarrow, 1989). The consistency of its application in relation to accommodation strategies (Lichbach, 1987; Rasler, 1996; Moore, 1998, 2000; cited by Hafez and Hatfield, 2006: 360), and the ability of dissidents to adapt to it and unleash backlash mobilisation, or a combination of these variables (Della Porta, 1995). It is noteworthy that with few exceptions (Gurr, 1986; Della Porta, 1995; Koopmans, 1997; cited by Hafez and Hatfield, 2006: 360) much of the literature speaks of repression without specifying its different types.5

The Social Movement Theory (SMT) Literature: The Repression/Protest Nexus

Does repression by regimes either escalate or deescalate dissent by opposition groups? The social movement literature6 examines the relationship between protest and repression (Araj, 2008: 287; Opp & Roehl, 1990: 521-547). Gunning (2009) notes that “organisations that SMT terrorism scholars study are not only typically part of a broader social movement but are affected by similar opportunities and constraints, and profoundly shaped by their interactions with these broader movements and their detractors” (p. 156). Some studies have found that repression decreases protest whereas others have found a positive effect of repression on protest. Davenport (2005) concluded that when confronted by harsh state repression, “dissidents have been found to run away, or fight harder according to political-economic context” (Davenport, 2005; cited by Araj, 2008: 287). Zimmermann (1980) noted that “there are theoretical arguments for all conceivable basic relationships

5 Mass arrests versus massacres, or exile versus TKs.

6 Social Movement Theory (SMT) has been developed to study social movements, defined here as a collection of (1) informal networks, based (2) on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise about (3) conflictual issues, through (4) the frequent use of various forms of power (della Porta and Diani, 1999: 16).
between government coercion and group protest and rebellion, except for no relationship” (p. 191). Araj (2008) contends that “most students of social movements who study protests in countries under foreign control or occupation have found that harsh state repression typically has a strong positive effect on protest” (p. 288). In a study focusing on the cognitive processes that occur as a people move from supporting peaceful to violent protest, White (1989) found “that harsh state repression was the major determinant of IRA violence and that it introduces new grievances” (p. 1277-1302). Gunning (2009) has argued that “SMT has so far only made modest inroads into the field of terrorism studies” (p. 156).

Chapter Outline
In the following a brief outline will now be set forth of the structure of the following thesis and its associated chapters.

Introduction has introduced the topic and framed the research question, while also examining how this question has been previously addressed in the academic literature. Why is this question important? Why research Northern Ireland? The rest of the thesis will be presented as follows.

Chapter 1 ‘Setting the Scène,’ this chapter will define TKs, the language it is couched in and how it is changing, secondly, the evolution of its operational use and how the use of the tactic is evolving and changing since 9/11. It will also examine historical usage of the policy with three micro case studies based on its use in South Africa, Spain and by the United States since 9/11. Following this as a heuristic device, an expanded examination of its historical usage by Israel in the occupied territories will be presented.

Chapter 2 ‘Towards a Conceptual Framework’, Will set in context and fix the conceptual framework on which this work will be grounded, an adaptation of the seminal work of Hafez and Hatfield. As part of this the literature review encompassed within will examine the literature in relation to the Israeli use of TKs using a thematic approach grounded around the four Hafez and Hafez pillars. Israel while not being the primary case study will be utilised as a heuristic device to study
the use of TKs. Thus, a conceptual framework founded on the repression/rebellion puzzle will be the lens through which this subject will be viewed.

**Chapter 3** 'The Road Map' will be an explanation and justification of the methodology used to explore this work. The primary research will be conducted within an interpretive research framework which is a sub-category of qualitative research. Observations from the Israeli-Palestinian case will be analysed, following this a detailed justification as to why Northern Ireland remains the core case study of the work.

**Chapter 4** ‘Northern Ireland in Context’. This chapter will give the reader both a context and history of Northern Ireland prior to the outbreak of the Troubles in 1969, while also introducing the opposing sides in the conflict. As part of this the origins, evolution and development of an operational TK policy within an overall arching security forces strategy will be examined. This chapter will also describe the rise of PIRA and the corresponding state security apparatus as it evolved and developed. Following this, a justification will be provided of how the exemplary case studies were selected and how these will be interrogated using the Hafez & Hatfield (2006) framework but through a qualitative lens.

**Chapter 5** Cluster I~ 'Police Supremacy and the Stalker Affair', The Shoot to Kill period of Nov/Dec 1982 based on police supremacy and an examination of two TK incidents contained therein.

**Chapter 6** Cluster II~ 'Containment: East Tyrone and Gibraltar.' The SAS back in the ascendancy. How East Tyrone became the focus of TKs. The three incorporated incidents of Loughgall, Gibraltar and Drumnakilly.

**Chapter 7** Cluster III~ 'Stalemate and Endgame' The final cluster of Coagh and Clonoe where TKs were utilised against the post-Loughgall generation of PIRA in East Tyrone.

**Conclusion**: Overall analysis and lessons learned. The conclusion will summarise what has gone before, while linking the literature reviewed. This will facilitate an
analysis and discussion of the findings and how they relate to the primary case study of Northern Ireland, and arising from this the implications and applicable lessons that can be extrapolated, thereby defining central conclusions which will lead to specific recommendations and consequently highlight areas for future study or development.

Having signposted the reader as to how the thesis is both structured and will evolve, we will now commence Chapter I which as outlined will define TKs, map its operational usage encompassed within a number of micro case studies.
CHAPTER I

SETTING THE SCENE

Introduction

When we are discussing TKs we are faced with a moral dilemma. Indeed the heated debate both in the policy community and in academia about the morality of the issue has obscured the debate about the tool’s overall tactical effectiveness and usage. This work while not ignoring the moral or normative aspect is not putting this issue at the core of this thesis. What it considers and focuses on is the tactical utility or efficacy of the tool.

In order to explore the complexities of the issue, three clearly defined strands need to be explored to divorce ourselves from this moral repulsion that may come to the fore and hence focus the necessary analysis. Firstly, the definition of TKs, the language it is couched in and how it is changing. Secondly, the evolution of its operational use and correspondingly, what is seen as a TK. The issue here, arguably is that the use of the tactic is changing and being developed more quickly since 9/11, than in the previous fifty years. 9/11 is a lynchpin and a crossroads within the debate. Yet there is a previous history to this issue largely unknown to the general public, but which is useful to explore in this setting. Finally to try and set in context and fix both the presentation and explanation of the complex literature and fieldwork that will follow.

Defining TKs

Melzer (2008) suggests five definitional elements:

“TKs involve the use of lethal force; are designed to target specifically identifiable individuals (as opposed to collective random punishment); are carried out with the deliberate attempt to kill the individual in question; are used against individuals not in the physical custody of the targeting actor (distinguishing it from judicial or extrajudicial execution); and are carried out by states” (p. 3-6).

As Melzer (2008) has noted, the common element in all these contexts is that lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a degree of pre-meditation, against an individual or individuals specifically identified in advance by the perpetrator. Two
of Melzer’s comments are particularly helpful at this early stage of our discussion. The use of lethal force and its use in turn against specified individuals. Why is this important for the outside reader? The answer is the premeditated nature and use of the tool; it is not random, a very important feature is that the ‘subject’ of TKs is systematically analysed and selected.

**Definitions of TK**
The term TK came into common usage in 2000, after Israel made public a policy of ‘targeted killings’ of alleged terrorists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The term has also been used in other situations such as the April 2002 killing, allegedly by Russian armed forces, of ‘rebel warlord’ Omar al Khattab in Chechnya\(^7\) (BBC World Service, 25 April 2002), also the November 2002 killing of alleged al Qaeda leader Ali Qaed Senyan and five other men in Yemen, reportedly by a CIA-operated Predator Drone (Mayer, 26 October 2009; Miller, 13 Feb 2009); and the January 2010 killing, in an operation allegedly carried out by eighteen Israeli Mossad intelligence agents, of Mahmoud al-Mahbouh, a Hamas leader, at a Dubai hotel (Prusher, 23 February 2010).

Alston (28 May 2010) in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, defines a TK as “the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States\(^8\) or their agents, acting under colour of law, or by an organised armed group in conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator” (p. 3). David (2007) provides a useful discussion point in his definition that “TK is the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit government approval,” (p.114). Plaw (2008) sees the most immediately striking feature of David’s definition “is that killing is authorised simply by the expedient of government approval” (p. 3). The term TK incorporates two distinct ideas. While individuals and groups can be targeted by the state for intelligence gathering purposes, in this instance, ‘targeting,’ refers to a type

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\(^7\) In March 2005, Russian forces killed Aslan Maskhadov, formerly the democratically elected leader of Chechnya and arguably the only Chechen rebel leader with whom Russian president Vladimir Putin might conceivably have held talks. Shamil Basayev, the notorious radical Islamist responsible for the 2002 Dubrovka theatre siege and the Beslan school attack in 2004, was killed on 10 July 2006.

\(^8\) This thesis focuses only on killings by States and their agents because, as yet, no non-state actors have sought to justify specific ‘targeted killings.’
of government policy in which the state through its military or intelligence apparatus employs lethal force against individuals or groups that it perceives as a threat to its security. The second ‘killings’ invariably refers to the killing of individuals, which the state has labelled as ‘terrorists’ (Plaw, 2008). Selective targeting, otherwise known as “targeted killing” is a pre-emptive mode of operation characterising counterterrorism measures that a state uses as self-defence against an assumed or imminent danger from a threatening enemy (Gordon, 2008: 493).

TKs can thus take place in a variety of contexts and may be committed by governments and their agents in times of peace as well as armed conflict or by organised groups in armed conflict. The means and methods of killing vary “and include sniper fire, shooting at close range, missiles from helicopters, drones, the use of car bombs, and poison” (Alston, 28 May 2010: 4).

Plaw (2008) while noting that Police, for example are permitted to employ lethal force in some situations, and that equally soldiers are permitted to use lethal force in combat, notes however their use of force is crucially constrained. Police are only allowed use force against persons who pose an immediate and significant danger to themselves and others.9 In war, soldiers are only permitted to employ lethal force against enemy combatants.10 TK is significantly different, it separates the use of lethal force from the exigencies of emergency and combat situations, and permits those authorised by the state to kill designated targets wherever doing so would not pose an undue danger to others (Plaw, 2008). Another key differentiation that pertains to TKs “from these other, more familiar, uses of lethal force in a second way: the target is designated in advance” (p. 4). This is what Gross (2003) has referred to as ‘named killings’ (p. 362-3). Here the government authorises only the killing of specific, named persons.

9 The Irish Defence Forces is governed when on Aid to the Civil Power (ATCP) operations by CO/D6 (Current Operations Directive 6), which explicitly states that force may only be used in self-defence or in defence of others, including members of the Garda Síochána, Prison Officers or innocent bystanders/members of the public.

10 In International Law soldiers are governed by the law of conflict management, or jus ad bellum, and during combat with the law on the conduct of war, jus in bello (Cullen, 2008:23).
Legality of TKs

Despite the frequency with which it is invoked, TKs is not a term defined under international law (Alston, 28 May 2010: 4). Nor does it fit into any particular legal framework. A broad divergence of opinion exists in the literature on the legality of TK of terrorists (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Plaw, 2008; Duyvesteyn, 2008; Williams, 2010). “TKs are often confused with assassination – the killing of an individual for political reasons” (Casale and Patterson, 2005: 639). Casale and Patterson (2005) contend that “politically motivated assassinations can and should be distinguished from the legitimate use of force directed against specific enemy combatants,” and that “TKs are the latter: force directed against enemy combatants in hostile overseas environments” (p. 639). Alston (2010) while contending that “in most cases TKs violate the right to life, in the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict, they may be legal” (p. 5) and that this “is in contrast to other terms with which TKs has sometimes been interchangeably used, such as ‘extrajudicial execution,’ ‘summary execution,’ and ‘assassination,’ all of which are, by definition, illegal” (p. 5).

On one side, it is argued that TKs constitute extrajudicial killings or assassinations, which are prohibited under international law and is especially conducive to the abuse of state power. “Proponents argue that terrorists are civilians, not combatants, and should be dealt with using conventional law enforcement methods: rather than the more permissive law of war” (Cullen, 2008: 23). Alston (28 May 2010) believes “in the legitimate struggle against terrorism, too many criminal acts have been re-characterised so as to justify addressing them within the framework of the law of armed conflict” (p. 3). Conversely, it is argued that terrorists are direct participants in an armed conflict, so they may be lawfully targeted. That the topic of TKs can generate such divergent opinions from informed commentators reveals that the issue “is arguably a new paradigm with which international law has yet to come to terms” (Cullen, 2008: 23). “Public international law, accustomed to regulating actions by states, is in uncharted territory when dealing with non-state actors, and their involvement in the changing face of war” (p. 23).

Morality of Targeting Terrorists

Martin van Creveld (15 August 1989) has starkly stated that, “when you fight terrorism, you become a terrorist” (p. 19). This thesis per se does not deal with
normative issues of whether a TK policy is morally right or wrong, though it has been argued that “states using assassination [TKs] as an instrument enter a moral slippery slope that plays into the hands of their opponents” (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 338). Another recurring theme in those that oppose the policy of TKs is the ethical dimension of collateral damage in assassination policies, “if terrorism is condemned because it kills the innocent, how can one justify counter terrorism tactics that kills them too” (Byman, 2005: 101). In Israel, the government and the security forces refer to the killings as TKs. The suggestion is that they are pinpointed operations in which only the person who is targeted is killed. For every two persons targeted, another one is killed because he or she happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time (Crowley, 2007: 57).11 “Actions resulting in the deaths of numerous civilians highlight the grim reality of collateral damage, that adds greatly to the controversy surrounding TK operations” (Cullen, 2008: 22). Another aspect of the ethical dimension is “that states using such a policy run the risk of relinquishing the moral high ground, and associated with this is international justification” (Livingston, 1990; cited by Sederberg, 1990: 270-1). Williams (2010) in relation to the use of drones in Pakistan and its tribal borderlands with Afghanistan, quotes a blogger12 that “to sit at a console 7,000 miles away with life and death control over people whose land you’ve never walked on is too much power for any human being. It makes killing virtual and is a virtual licence to kill” (p. 881)

Plaw (2008) has noted “the rising incidence of terrorist targeting since 2000, both by Israel and the United States, has inspired a growing body of work, from scholarly publications to contributions that have taken the form of polemics, presenting only one form of the issue in exaggerated terms” (p. 199). Many of the debates within Israel over TKs revolve around four key arguments: legality and legitimacy of assassinations [TKs], consequences of TKs on innocent bystanders; alternative means

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11 A rocket fired from an Apache helicopter is the usual method of assassination. Sometimes it’s a GPS guided bomb dropped from a fighter plane. According to the Israeli human-rights organisation B’tselem, between the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2007, the Israeli security forces assassinated 210 Palestinians it said were militants. In the course of these operations, they also killed 128 innocent bystanders (Crowley, 2007: 57). In July 2002, the Israelis used a one-ton bomb to kill Hamas leader Salah Shehade in Gaza, but they also killed fourteen other people, most of them women and children (p. 59). See also www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/casualties.asp
to fighting terror; and effectiveness of these measures in actually reducing terrorism (David, 2003; Stein, 2003; Luft, 2003). Hafez and Hatfield (2006) acknowledge “that many of the claims proffered by proponents of targeted assassinations and their detractors are normative ones” (p. 362). They argue that “the debate on the effectiveness of targeted assassinations is an empirical one that can be evaluated through the use of statistical methods” (p. 363). Plaw (2008) however notes that even on this controversial issue, not all is disagreement, and that there exists some important moral reference points concerning targeting agreed by both proponents and detractors of the policy, namely that “among even some of the strongest defenders of targeting, that preventive arrest is, where possible, preferable to targeting” (p. 199). The next section will now examine the evolution of the operational use of this tactic within an historical context.

**Historical Usage of the Policy**

This section offers a brief history, not just a chronology, but a background and selected history of the development of TKs. It looks at two recent historical examples of the use of the tactic in countries prior to 9/11 which provides a useful referencing of the use of TKs. These two well known cases were in South Africa and Spain, which will both be briefly examined as important historical case studies in the evolution and development of this tactic. Additionally this will be done in order to foreground a number of common features, the language used and the justifications offered. This will in turn offer a broad understanding of the similarities and dissimilarities that characterise TKs in these settings. This section closes with a consideration of how this history has radically changed since 9/11 and a very particular ‘versioning’ of TKs that has been utilised since then by the United States.

**Evolution of TKs Operational Use; South Africa (1)**

In 1974, the National Government of South Africa under Balthazar Vorster initiated a policy of hunting and killing members of the African National Congress (ANC) who were opponents of the regime and living abroad (Plaw, 2008: 4). The same illegal

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13 Hafez & Hatfield (2006) in their seminal work consistently use the term Targeted Assassination, but I will continue to use Targeted Killing (TK) as the descriptor of this tactic throughout this work.

strategies being employed by the government had been tested during the election run-up in South West Africa. When Pretoria was faced with the inevitability of democratic elections, officials clandestinely set about fomenting communal violence, in the hope of disrupting the elections, and “preventing a landslide victory for the former guerrilla movement, SWAPO” (Marinovich and Silva, 2001: 116). Having failed in Namibia, the same regime and their covert units nonetheless redirected their energies “to weakening the ANC power-base, especially within the urban areas where the liberation movement had the vast majority of support” (p. 116-117). Initially this TK policy was restricted to opponents based abroad, but as resistance to the regime continued and even escalated in the early 1980s, the government of P.W. Botha covertly extended the targeting program to opponents of the regime at home. It was then allowed in effect to become the basis of a “total counter-revolutionary strategy” against all opponents of the regime (Plaw, 2008: 5). Marinovich and Silva (2001) who as journalists reported on the internecine warfare in the township of Soweto could not comprehend the seemingly indiscriminate acts of violence, and that the common and easily accepted answer provided by the white government was that the ANC was locked in a battle for power with the Zulu dominated Inkatha. “But many years later all the half-clues and evidence would finally be put together,” and show that the euphoria of Mandela’s release had been accompanied by a “sustained campaign of brutal killing and terror, covertly planned, funded and executed by government security units and police” (p. 14). Marinovich and Silva (2001) argue that this clandestine Dirty War was all pervasive and that within the white security forces there were government ministers, officers and foot soldiers who played an active role in helping to spark the dangerously flammable tinder that lay between the opposing sides by supplying weapons and training to Inkatha. The program was only brought to a halt in 1990 following “exposure in the press and a crackdown by the new government” (O’Brien, 2001: 128-37).

O’Brien (2001) maps out how South Africa’s ‘securocracy’ evolved insulated from public opinion. He stresses in particular, “the increasing brutality it demonstrated in the face of growing anti-apartheid protests” (O’Brien, 2001; cited by Plaw, 2008: 5). Estimates of the total number of those directly targeted by the state for elimination

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15 As neighbouring Namibia was called while it was a South African protectorate-in effect, a colony.
16 Inkatha, name given to the Zulu movement that became the Inkatha Freedom Party, abbreviated as IFP.
range from above fifty to over seventy-five, O’Brien ultimately concludes that the final number was probably fewer than 100 (O’Brien, 2001: 134-8).

Plaw (2008) contends that for all its successes in terrorizing the enemies of the South African State, “ultimately the strategy must be accounted a costly failure” (p. 5), as not only did it fail to protect the apartheid regime from revolutionary change, “but it did great damage to the image of South Africa and contributed significantly to its international isolation” (p. 5).

_Evolution of TKs Operational Use; Spain~Eta and the GAL (2)_

In the mid-1980s the Spanish government organised a secret elite security force – the _Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion_ (GAL). The GAL was intended to combat Basque separatist terrorist, by pursuing perpetrators back to their home bases in Basque areas of France and disrupting their activities. The GAL operations rapidly degenerated into a “dirty war” against Basque terrorists (Plaw, 2008:5), and during this period over 40 individuals were killed. Woodworth (2002) argues that if one of the aims of GAL was to force ETA to consider its own dissolution, it was a “total failure” (p. 412) and that far from being forced to surrender, ETA emerged from the GAL period stronger as a terrorist force and probably much stronger politically, than before. He also argues that crucially the dirty war proved for a generation of Basque radicals that, “Spanish democracy was a cosmetic façade which covered up a murderous fascist machine” (p. 412). He contends that a hard core of activists has always been able to maintain enough popular support to continue their ‘armed struggle’ but that the ‘pistol’ has lost much of its power in 21st century Basque country (Woodworth, 8 May 2010).

Perkoski (2010) analysed ETA violence over two periods: the first running from 1983 to 1987, the second from 1988 to 1992. He found that killing ETA members had no impact on ETA violence in the initial period; the killings neither increased nor decreased the overall level of violence in the conflict. He did find a difference however, in the second period. The killing of ETA members in this period did produce a short-term decrease in ETA attacks. This lasted no more than one month. This would suggest that TKs may work, but Perkoski then found there was a _rebound_
effect: in the second month after the killing, ETA attacks increased significantly. In
contrast Perkoski found that arresting ETA members as opposed to shooting them
dead was correlated with a significant reduction in violence. Allied to this an early
release package based on renouncing violence also led to “significant reductions in

Both the rise of Islamic terror and the dissolution of PIRA have made the organisation
(ETA) seem like an anachronism to many of its former supporters. Interestingly,
coupled to this, Woodworth (Irish Times, 8 May 2010) posits that many of the Basque
communiqués “still speak in a kind of code, laced with a jaded 1960s rhetoric”
additionally the organisation in the period 2008-2010 was critically weakened by
vigorous police operations, sometimes losing three leaders in as many months. ETA
has not killed on Spanish soil since 2009 and announced a ‘definitive end’ to its
campaign of violence in October 2011, a recent report by Basque premier Iñigo
Urkullu claims to be the first of its kind to document human rights abuses by all sides
in the northern Spanish region’s territorial dispute. This report noted that while ETA
during the course of the campaign had killed 837 people, it said the state had carried
out ninety four killings, while attributing another seventy three deaths to extreme
right-wing groups (Hedgecoe, Irish Times: 15 June 2013). While there remains some
550 ETA members still in jail, and as Hedgecoe (Irish Times, 18 June 2013) has noted
that “any formal peace process seems to be conspicuous by its absence” that
nonetheless long term observers of the Basque country feel there is little chance of a
return to full blown conflict. Tellingly Gesto por la Paz, an independent group
campaigning for peace in the Basque country, “announced its disbandment after 28
years because it no longer believed ETA posed a threat” (Irish Times, 18 June 2013).
Woodworth (Irish Times, 18 June 2013), a long term observer and writer on the
conflict believes that “the Basque war may not be entirely over, but hardly anyone
mentions it anymore. Like the bad weather, but rather more happily, that is an
unprecedented change”
Evolution of TKs Operational Use; Use of TKs since 9/11 by the US (3)

The tactic of TKs is currently most closely associated with Israel’s campaign against the second Palestinian Intifada, and the United States response to the attacks of 9/11. The Israeli case will be discussed in detail subsequently, but Plaw (2008) has stated that “Israel and the United States have correctly argued that they have been and continue to be major targets for international terrorist organisations. They maintain that they have little choice but to act in self-defence to protect their citizens. Therefore they have both declared war on terrorism” (p. 7). Since 9/11, the United States has consistently conducted TK operations against terrorist personnel. Indeed Plaw (2008) believes that the historical development of the United States policy of targeting terrorists has been very different from that of Israel, while “Israel has been involved throughout its history in targeting operations, the United States only began a systematic and sustained terrorist targeting program in 2001” (p. 91). Alston (28 May 2010) has noted that such policies [TKs] “have been justified both as a legitimate response to ‘terrorist’ threats and as a necessary response to the challenges of ‘asymmetric warfare’” (p. 3). The US has “reportedly adopted a secret policy of TKs soon after the attacks of 9/11, pursuant to which the government has credibly been alleged to have engaged in TKs in the territory of other states” (Alston, 28 May 2010: 7). The measures that President Bush authorised in a top secret presidential finding, shortly after the attacks of 9/11 created the largest covert action programme by the CIA since the height of the Cold War that has permitted the CIA to create paramilitary teams to hunt and kill designated individuals anywhere in the world (Plaw, 2008). “Pre-emption has been stressed by the Bush administration in its National Security Strategy published in 2002. Jeffrey Ross and Robert Ted Gurr identify pre-emption as conducive for ending terrorism. The other issue they stress is deterrence” (Sederberg, 1990; cited by Duyvesteyn, 2008: 335).

Etzioni (2010) points out, that as far as international law is concerned, “the US draws justification from Article 51 of the UN Charter: the US has contended that 9/11

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17 According to *B’Tselem*, an Israeli human rights organisation, between September 29, 2000, and January 31, 2007, Israeli security forces targeted and killed 210 Palestinians. An additional 128 civilian bystanders were also killed during these operations. [www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp](http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp)

18 Article 51: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’
constituted an armed attack, and that hence the US is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces” (p. 13). Cullen (2008) notes that based on “publicly available information, if the capture of designated terrorists is not deemed feasible, the US is prepared to use CIA or US military assets to target them in lethal operations” (p. 22).

The US has used drones and air strikes for TKs in the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the US has not explicitly acknowledged pursuing a policy of TK, in addition to operations in Somalia, TKs attributed to the US since 2001 have included attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) and Yemen (Cullen, 2008: 22). These actions resulted in the deaths of numerous civilians, highlighting the grim reality of collateral damage that adds greatly to the controversy surrounding TK operations. The next section will now focus on the US implementation of TKs in this region, in particular the operational tool of drones used increasingly to execute the policy.

**Afpak—The Great Game Revisited**

A new term – *Afpak* – had crept into the lexicon of policymakers and analysts concerned with the troublesome lands around the Durand Line, the colonial era boundary that today marks where Afghanistan ends and Pakistan begins. The US has two strategic imperatives in the region. One is to contain and ultimately debilitate al-Qaeda, which with the support of a resurgent Taliban on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has reconstituted its operational base and safe havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The other is to limit the radicalisation in Pakistan, staving off the country’s political disintegration and ensuring that a reasonably friendly Pakistan government remains in control and that the country’s nuclear arsenal stays

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20 This was the setting of *Kim* in which Rudyard Kipling described “The Great Game” of espionage played out against the dramatic backdrop of the mountains of the Hindu Kush between Imperial Britain and Czarist Russia at the turn of the 19th century.

21 In March 2008, Richard Holbrooke (1941-2010), then US special envoy stated: “We often call the problem *Afpak*...This is not just an effort to save eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theatre of war, straddling an ill-defined border.”
out of the hands of *jihadists*. Despite denials\(^{22}\) it has become common belief that the US has struck a tacit bargain with the new incumbent Pakistani President Zardari and his Army Chief of Staff, whereby the Pakistanis would covertly support the attacks\(^{23}\) with targeting information while continuing to publicly criticise them (Synnott, 2009).

Predator drones have been used extensively by the CIA to assassinate al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas of Northwest Pakistan. The secret TK program is “reportedly conducted by the CIA using ‘Predator’ or ‘Reaper’ drones, although there have been reports of involvement by Special Operations Forces (SOF), and the assistance of civilian contractors with the implementation of the program” (Perlez, *New York Times*: 21 August 2009). The first credible CIA drone killing took place on 3 November 2002,\(^{24}\) “since then there have reportedly been over 120 drone strikes, although it is not possible to verify this number” (Alston, 28 May 2010: 7).

Playstation War

In think-tanks, on University campuses and in the higher echelons of government – the reliance on unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) or drones to search out and kill perceived enemies has prompted ‘heated debate’ (Marlowe, 29 May 2010). Critics of US reliance on drones portray it as a cowardly weapon, since operators can kill without any risk to themselves.\(^{25}\) “On March 24th 2010, the State Department’s legal advisor, Harold Koh, made the clearest statement yet of the Obama administration’s policy on drone strikes. Koh said the strikes were legal under the 2001 Congressional Authorisation for Use of Military Force, and under the principle of self-defence. “He called them ‘TKs – the Israeli term – not assassinations” (Marlowe, *Irish Times*: 29 May 2010). Marlowe contrasts how it remains the case that the method of using drone strikes “in the US…are presented as efficient, precise and costless,” while conversely “in the Middle East and Pakistan they are perceived as

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\(^{23}\) The US angered by attacks on its troops emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, as early as 2002 began to take independent action against Pakistan militants particularly through the modus of strikes using unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). There were 36 such attacks in Pakistan sovereign territory in 2008 alone (Synnott, 2009).

\(^{24}\) A Predator Drone fired a missile at a car in Yemen, killing Qaed Senyan al-harithi, an alleged leader allegedly responsible for the *USS Cole* bombing.

\(^{25}\) An executive order handed down by President Gerald Ford in 1976 banned US intelligence from carrying out assassinations. Before 9/11, US officials criticised Israel for assassinating Hamas leaders. That changed after the atrocity of 9/11, when George W. Bush authorised the CIA to kill members of al-Qaeda and their allies anywhere in the world and Congress approved the measure.
cruel and cowardly.” Faizal Shahzad, the Pakistani-born US citizen who tried to detonate a home-made car bomb on Times Square, told a friend he was angered by the drone strikes in Pakistan (Marlowe, 29 May 2010).

A report by the UN warned that the use of ‘targeted executions’ (TKs) by the intelligence agencies of particularly Israel, Russia and the US were “problematic” and blurred the boundaries of international law. Regarding the use of drones, employed increasingly by the CIA to target suspected terrorists in Pakistan, including a senior al-Qaeda leader recently, the report said that there “is a risk of developing a ‘PlayStation’ mentality to killing” (Alston, 28 May 2010).

The Collateral Damage Debate

“Critics question whether the political ‘blowback’ from drone strikes outweighs the strategic advantage” (Marlowe, Irish Times: 29 May 2010). This issue of civilian collateral damage is widely debated with the figures been quoted often at huge variance between opponents and detractors of the drone TK strikes. Williams (2010) notes that, “not all the victims have, however, been terrorists. Hundreds of Pakistani civilians have been killed as ‘collateral damage’ in the aerial strikes and this has led to a backlash of anti-Americanism in Pakistan” (p. 872). Alston (28 May 2010) has noted that reports of civilian casualties in Pakistan “range from approximately twenty (according to anonymous US Government officials quoted in the media) to many hundreds” (p. 7). Etzioni (2010) believes that “critics pay little attention to the fact that the use of drones is subject to close oversight” (p. 11), and that figures that portray high civilian collateral damage “are based not on research, which of course is very difficult to carry out under the circumstances, but on reports in the media.” Additionally “the media is using the media to confirm what the media reports.” In contrast, US Intelligence officials estimate that between Obama entering office and March 2010, drones killed between 400 and 500 militants and about twenty civilians, putting the civilian death rate at 5% or lower” (p. 14). Williams (2010) posits that

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26 The killing of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, along with eleven family members and bodyguards by a Predator drone in August 2009, was considered a triumph for US intelligence. But as Jayne Mayer reported in the New Yorker, it took sixteen missiles strikes over more than a year for the CIA to kill Mehsud. Between 207 and 321 people were killed in these strikes, depending on which news reports one tallies (Mayer, 2009; cited by Marlowe, 2010).

27 The Matrix used by the US when a strike is authorised has the following elements. Intelligence from various sources is combined. A scoring system is used that allocates low scores to high value targets. The higher the score the matrix generates, the higher the rank of those who must approve the strike.
“on average the drones killed approximately nine people per strike in 2008 and twelve per strike in 2009 (p. 877). Wilner (2010) suggests that TKs in Afghanistan have “degraded Taliban professionalism, diminished the group’s success rate, influenced their selection of targets, and weakened morale (p. 307). He also argues that his findings “speak to the efficacy of TKs in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and to their value as both counter-capability and counter-motivation operations” (p. 307). Wilner assessed four TKs and compares the two to three week period before each killing with a similar period afterwards. Wilner argues that there is evidence that the quality of the attacks degraded in the aftermath, though the figures presented do show that the number of attacks overall increased after the killings; rising from 332 before to 352 afterwards. Silke (2012) has noted that as Wilner does not present data on the causalities caused by these attacks before or after, “it is difficult to judge to what extent the quality was affected” (p. 179).

There can be no doubt that the killings, “especially of innocent Pakistani women and children, have caused tremendous outrage among average Pakistanis who already are pre-disposed to anti-Americanism” (Williams, 2010: 880). Fears that the collateral damage will radicalize Pakistanis have been repeatedly expressed by observers. “Every one of these dead non-combatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased” (Kilcullen, 2009).

Zero Dark Thirty

Peter Bergen, author of *Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden – From 9/11 to Abbotabad*, reported in April 2012 that “at least 1,400 lives have been lost in 250 drone strikes in Pakistan since 2009. Bush launched a drone strike every forty three days; Obama, one every four days” (Bergen, 2012; cited by Marlowe, *Irish Times*: 9 June 2012). Extrapolating this Byman (2013) notes that “Bush oversaw fewer than fifty drone strikes during his tenure; Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last few years” (p. 32). Marlowe also notes that “linguistically, Obama reduced

Etzioni (2010) suggests that the higher the total score, the less likely the target will be approved. Reviews are conducted after the fact to check the validity of the information of which the matrix draws. The approval of the nation in which the strike takes place is “often sought” (p. 13). Klaidman (*Time Magazine*, 24 December 2012) suggests that Obama’s terrorism adviser John Brennan, the son of Irish immigrants is working on a project called ‘the playbook,’ a highly classified initiative to codify and institutionalise the standards and procedures for TKs.
George W. Bush’s global ‘war on terror’ to a more focused ‘war on al-Qaeda’” (*Irish Times*, 9 June 2012). In fact the official redesignation was from GWOT to “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)” (*The Guardian*, 25 March 2009).

These issues of when and how this war will finally draw to a close were one of the defining *motifs* of Kathryn Bigelow’s film *Zero Dark Thirty* (Colombia Pictures, 2012). Interestingly this debate is most keenly focused on those spearheading the US TK programme. Klaidman (*Time Magazine*: 24 December 2012) notes that “the military is increasingly acknowledging the limits of lethal operations in the war on terror,” and increasingly the emphasis is on “nonlethal approaches to achieving the military’s strategic goals.” A Special Operations commander is quoted “that ultimately we’re not going to be able to kill or capture our way out of this fight.” Klaidman argues what he calls the ‘mestasasizing’ nature of the threat which provides the most rational argument for tempering TKs and their associated drone strikes. Or as one military planner noted “how long can we continue to chase offshoots of offshoots around the world” (24 December 2012). The debate within academia has not abated on this controversial issue. Byman (2013) arguing that “the drones have done their job remarkably well [and] have devastated al-Qaeda and associated anti-American military groups” (p. 32), whereas Cronin (2013) counter argues that the problem for Washington is that its “drone program has taken on a life of its own, to the point where tactics are driving strategy rather than the other way around” (p. 44).

**Signature Strikes**

Yet within this debate an interesting sub issue has arisen which is that support for the drone strikes is possible where it is seen to be conducted by the Pakistanis themselves and not directly by America (*The News*, 5 March 2009). An anthropologist involved in a study in the tribal areas claimed of the local Pashtuns, “they feel powerless towards the militants and they see the drones as liberators” (*New York Times*, 3 December 2009). Williams (2010) has argued “that clearly, the simplistic paradigm that predator drones drive Pakistanis into the arms of the militants and infuriate and undermine the Pakistani government needs to be re-evaluated” (p. 886). Additionally, the Pakistani government and military “clearly feel that it might be more palatable for the Pakistani public to have the Taliban killed by Pakistani military drones instead of
those of a foreign power” (p. 886). This point was recently reiterated by Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan who contended that “the drone attacks are seen across the spectrum as impinging our sovereignty, we keep saying to the Americans give us the drones, but they won’t” (DCU, 19 January 2011).

It is abundantly clear that drone strikes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda have seriously disrupted “their ability to operate with impunity in their sanctuary in the FATA region of Pakistan. Dozens of top Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders have been killed” (Williams, 2010: 887). This may have disrupted future terrorist plots against the US mainland. This must be weighed against the fact that the drone strikes have led to a backlash against America in Pakistan. Many average Pakistanis see the drones “as a humiliating insult to their sovereignty and worry about innocent civilians dying as ‘collateral damage’” (p. 887). Williams has concluded “that for all their ‘lightening rods for anti-Americanism among non-Pashtun Pakistanis, the drone strikes are the best ‘worst option’ for dealing with a hard to reach enemy” (p. 887).

But Klaidman (Time Magazine, 24 December 2012) notes that both the US military and CIA utilise different methodologies in selecting targets. In the latter case the CIA engages in a controversial tactic known as ‘signature strikes’ targeting groups of military-age males whose identities are not known but who bear certain characteristics or ‘signatures’ associated with terrorism.

Having taken a historical overview of the use of TKs in both South Africa and Spain and the current use and evolution of the tactic by the US in its self declared Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the use of the tactic by the Israelis will now be examined as a lynchpin heuristic device. The Israeli case is of particular note, as the state of Israel has certainly been employing the tactic since the 1950s and arguably earlier, if the period pre the formation of the state of Israel is to be considered. Additionally, they continue to use TKs in the Occupied Territories on an ongoing basis, the tempo of its use the only discernible variation.

\[28\] Pakistan has not been entrusted with Predator Drones of its own by the United States for fear that prol-Taliban elements in the army may leak details of their flight patterns and weaknesses to the enemy. Most interestingly the Pakistanis have been manufacturing drones of their own and have been concurrently working with a Turkish company Rokestan to arm their drones with laser-guided anti-tank missiles (New York Times, 29 July 2009. See also Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 May 2009).

\[29\] See Footnote 27.
Evolution and History of Israeli TKs in the Palestinian Occupied Territories

At the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are competing claims to the same land. Following the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, Palestinians found themselves ranged on a battlefront along which armed forces from six Arab states confronted defenders of the new Jewish state. The Israeli government declined to permit most of the Palestinians refugees to return to their homes, setting up the Palestinian refugee problem that remains unresolved today.\(^{30}\) The use of the tactic of TKs is not unique to *Al-Aqsa Intifada*,\(^ {31}\) indeed its roots can be traced back to the period of the *Yishuv* (Jewish Community in Palestine pre-1948).\(^ {32}\) Interestingly, the nascent *Hagannah* was assisted during this period by the British Army Officer Orde Wingate in the establishment of Special Night Squads (SNS), to act as a nascent TK unit. Indeed “Irish republicans accuse Wingate of originating ‘the assassination policy’ applied allegedly by the British in Ulster in the 1970s” (Anglim, 2005: 3-4). In the 1950s Egyptian intelligence officers in charge of and coordinating *fedayeen*\(^ {33}\) cross-border raids were killed by mail bombs. German scientists were targeted in the 1960s for assisting Egypt with rocket research. Ariel Sharon commanded an anti-terror detachment that killed militants in the Gaza strip in the 1970s.

*Wrath of God*

The Israeli response to the Munich massacre of 1972 saw the establishment of the ‘X’ Committee, which systematically killed the Palestinian militants associated with the Black September group responsible.

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\(^{30}\) Future Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1956, 1967 and 1973 only exacerbated the issue. It would finally be the unresolved Palestinian refugee situation, and the violence that resulted from it, that would instigate initiation of Israel’s policy of TKs.

\(^{31}\) The second *Intifada*, also known as the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* was the second Palestinian uprising, a period of intensified Palestinian-Israeli violence which began in late Sept 2000. “Al-Aqsa” is the name of a prominent Muslim Mosque, considered third holiest in Islam. *Intifada* is an Arabic word literally translating as “shaking-off,” in effect a rebellion or uprising.

\(^{32}\) During the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, Yitzhak Sadeh, the commander of the *Palmach*, (the military wing of the *Haganah*), formed the *ManoDEDER*, a “mobile strike unit.” It was also during this time that British Major Charles Orde Wingate assisted in forming Jewish “Special Night Squads” (SNS) to conduct, among other things, counterterrorism ‘hits’ against Arabs (Stahl, 2010: 113).

\(^{33}\) Armed militias known as *Fedayeen*, grew from militant elements within the Palestinian refugee population. Members of these groups were largely based within the refugee community living in Egyptian controlled Gaza and Jordanian controlled West Bank. From the early 1950s the word entered international usage as a synonym for Arab militancy.
Operation ‘Wrath of God’ was a deliberate and systematic campaign of TKs focused against the terrorist group Black September. Wrath of God was not about capturing or imprisoning those responsible. It was purely and simply about killing those the Israelis could find and terrorising those they could not (Hunter, 2001). Stahl (2010) takes up this point and sees Wrath of God as a “crucial point in the history of Israel’s institutionalisation of assassinations” (p. 114) and “moreover, these killings represent clear examples of punitive or revenge killings, which are precisely the opposite effect of what is intended by carrying out a TK” (p. 114). There was widespread belief within the Israeli security forces that the TKs were “not simply justifiable but were and still are a necessity” (Silke, 2003: 221). Interviewed in the 1990s the originator of Wrath of God, General Aharon Yariv, defended the TK campaign, “I approach these problems not from a moral point of view, but, hard as it may sound, from a cost benefit point of view,” (Taylor, 1993: 27). Interestingly he also directly alluded to the political imperative that might drive such operations when he rhetorically posited, “Is it morally acceptable? One can debate that question. Is it politically vital? It was” (p. 27). Senior Israelis later admitted that under the “rubric of retaliating for Munich they used Wrath of God as an opportunity to eliminate leading Palestinians regardless of whether they were involved in the Olympic atrocity” (Taylor, 1993; cited by Silke, 2003: 221).

Alston (28 May 2010) states that it has been alleged that recently “Israeli forces have conducted TKs in violation of the (Israeli) Supreme Court Requirements” (p. 7). The reports denied by Israeli officials, based on classified documents taken by an IDF soldier during her military service; the soldier has been charged with espionage (Edelman, Ha’aretz: 9 April 2010). Alston (28 May 2010) notes that Israel has not disclosed the basis for its legal conclusions, and has not disclosed in detail guidelines it uses to make it TK decisions, “the evidence or other intelligence requirements that would justify any killing, or the results of any after-action review of the conformity of

34 In order to accomplish this task, a special assassination unit, known as Kidon (Gideon) was established comprising just under forty highly trained members.
35 In November 2008, Ha’aretz journalist Uri Blau published an article entitled ‘Licence to Kill,’ in which he reported that Israeli forces, with the backing of senior military commanders, ignored a 2006 Supreme Court ruling and shot dead Palestinian fugitives in circumstances where it might have been possible to detain them. The article was based in part on documents he had received from Anat Kam who copied more than 2,000 army documents during her service in the Israel Defence Forces Central Command between 2005-07 (Weiss, 2010).
the operation with legal requirements” (p. 7). Stahl (2010) in noting the history of the retaliatory nature of Israeli operations posits, that current TKs, “save for the revenge element…seek to achieve in relation to Palestinian Islamist terror organisations: the destruction of their mandate” (p. 114). Harking back to the decision to target members of Black September, that became Operation Wrath of God, was essentially designed to “put the fear of God into the Palestinians” (Reeve, 2006: 160-161). Additionally that while the missions were not published “everyone knew that revenge was the case” (Fighel, 2008; cited by Stahl, 2010: 114). Indeed the decision to carry out Operation Wrath of God is a crucial point in the history of Israel’s “institutionalisation of assassinations,” in that these killings represent a clear example of “punitive or revenge killings” (p. 114).

Cost Benefit Analysis
Silke (2003) believes that General Yariv’s highlighting of the “cost-benefit point of view” is significant; as such a statement creates an impression that there were clear and objective benefits to the Israeli policy.36 Stahl (2010) argues that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) seizure of, inter alia the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in June 1967 led to a “multitude of transformations in Israeli counterterrorism stratagems and tactics” (p. 111). The 1980s saw repeated attempts to kill Palestinian leaders that have morphed into the present policy. This most contested of all evolving Israeli strategies to counter the threat of militant Islamist terrorism, whether employed in the Disputed Territories (DT) or internationally, is Sikul Meh’mu’kad (SIKUM), literally focused foiling or thwarting. Stahl (2010) states that it is crucial to understand that from an Israeli perspective “SIKUM is not an ‘assassination’ and it is improperly translated into English as ‘preventative assassinations,’ or ‘preventative killings,’ and ‘targeted killings’” (p. 112). He contends “it is an overt military action carried out with extreme prejudice and precision” (p. 113). Gross (2002) has refereed to the act as ‘preventative action.’

36 As Wrath of God unfolded, attacks ‘claimed’ by Black September did decline, but Black September was never a stand alone terrorist group, but a small branch of the Fatah family. The record of overall attacks by Palestinian groupings did not demonstrate such a decline (Silke, 2003: 221).
Israel’s Long Term Security
A key debate in the Israeli case has been not only if current terrorist attacks can be prevented or deterred, but also of what the policies implications are for Israel’s “long term security” (Plaw, 2008: 165). The recurring theme is whether it will encourage more terrorism over the long term, or reduce it. Indeed many commentators see this as the most important issue in assessing the policy. “The most trenchant criticism of Israeli policy of TKs… rests neither on morality or international law, but on prudence: that it has made Israeli citizens less rather than more secure.” (Thomas, 2005: 38). Stahl (2010) acknowledges that during the 1980s and 1990s, “the notion that low-intensity conflict would become part and parcel of Israel’s future was clear” and that “as such, the Israelis would have no choice but to search for new efficacious counterterrorism operational responses” (p. 115). Yet this is tempered by the reality “that Israeli security had been unable to extinguish the raging fire of terrorism and the likelihood that it would be able to completely stamp it out seemed slim” (p. 115). Much of the writings addressing the consequences of terrorist targeting has thus focused on the short term impact of the policy, and particularly in the Israeli case the charge that targeting terrorists tends to aggravate the cycle of violence between terrorists and the states that target them. Assessing the impact of targeting terrorists is therefore a complex issue.

The Institutionalist versus Rational Choice Theory Debate
Brym and Maoz-Shai (2009) compare and contrast the use of ‘Institutionalist’ versus Rational Choice theory in attempting to explain and understand the severity of Israel’s response in the form of TKs against Palestinian militant groups. They argue that both the ‘New Institutionalist’ School and the ‘Rational Choice Theory’ School both have validity; but they apply to different levels of threat to Israeli society and the Israeli state.

- The ‘New Institutionalist School’ contend that both domestic and international norms can ‘constrain’ state violence against dissenting minorities (Row, 2000, 2003). Rational Choice Theory asserts that state violence is always a self-interested calculated response to a threat (Mitchell, 2004: 58-95).
The ‘New Institutionalists’ believe that norms surrounding the use of state violence crystallise and become institutionalised due to the existence of domestic political traditions and because the international community imposes such norms on states, whereas Rational Choice Theorists see the greater the threat, the higher the level of state violence.

Brym & Maoz-Shai (2009) found that Institutional effects are evident at low threat levels, as ‘New Institutionalists’ would predict, but effects are overwhelmed at high threat levels as Rational Theorists assert. State violence is a function of threat.

But perversely case studies have demonstrated that contrary to such general findings, low threat levels can result in massive, violent retaliation, whereas high threat levels can lead to a muted response contrary to the claims of Rational Choice Theorists.

Brym & Maoz-Shai (2009) believe that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this apparent contradiction is explained by what they term as “Frontiers versus Ghettos.” A region of the occupied territories viewed as a frontier elicited a harsh Israeli response to any perceived threat level, whereas a region perceived as a ghetto did not elicit such a harsh response to perceived threats. They compared and analysed the writings of Ron (New Institutionalist) versus Mitchell (Rational Choice Theory). Their findings were that;

- Ron is correct, there is an Institutional effect, but only where threat level was relatively low.

- Where threat level was high, so was Israeli state violence, regardless of institutional context.

- Beginning in 2000, Gaza became more of a frontier than did the West Bank. Therefore, Israeli state violence high in Gaza, irrespective of variations there in the threat level.


- West Bank was perceived as a ghetto, Israeli state violence in West Bank rose and fell with the threat level emanating from that region, as Mitchell (Rational Choice Theorist) would predict.

Social, Cultural, Psychological Influences
Honig (2007) argues that Israel’s indiscriminate use of strategic TKs have considerably diminished its overall contribution to Israel’s national security. He identifies five dimensions of systematic misuse: timing, political views of the targets, organisational affiliation and domestic political consequences for the adversary, and the visibility of Israel’s responsibility. He finds three clusters of causes for these patterns of misuse: “a flawed decision making culture, the prevalence of false causal stories, and the pernicious effects of norms” (p. 563). A direct link between domestic political pressures to any systematic pattern of misuse was not found. However the policy of TKs must be used more discriminately to enhance its effectiveness. Its diplomatic and political aspects need more consideration. Delegating the final authoritative voice to the operational agencies has proven a hindrance to a better decision making process in this regard.

Honig (2007) argues that from a realist perspective, killing the adversary’s leaders is counterproductive when it results in the elimination of a future negotiating partner. He also quotes Khaled Hroube, a Cambridge based academic who argues that TKs have only increased the popularity of Hamas, and “that a social movement cannot be eradicated only through military means” (p. 568). Honig (2007) also feels that there are three ‘pathologies’ that characterise the Israeli decision making in this process: a military dominant organisational culture, a lack of deep historical awareness, and what the author calls the “Hi-technology cult” (p. 569). The Israeli transparent responsibility for the attacks is contradictory to the way most Western nations conduct TKs.

Art and Richardson (2007) posit that the “military was too blunt an instrument to be successfully deployed against terrorism (p. 341). Trager and Zagorcheva (2006) state simply that military force “fails to achieve political objectives” (p. 121).
Duyvesteyn (2008) believes that concerning the effectiveness of the use of force; there are few indications that it contributes to lessening terrorism. “Rather the opposite is the case; the use of force makes things worse, in that it ‘complies’ with the aim of terrorist organisations to provoke the state into overreacting” (p. 328).

Silke (2005) has argued: “Ultimately harsh, aggressive policies in response to terrorism fail so often in their stated aims, because they so badly misunderstand and ignore the basic psychology of the enemy and observers. Strength and power alone are not enough to defeat terrorism” (p. 253).

Public Morale and Perceptions
Hafez and Hatfield (2006) suggest that while the utility of TKs as an instrument for reducing terrorist violence is open to question, it may still be “useful as a political tool to signal a state’s determination to punish terrorists and placate an angry public, but there remains little evidence that they actually impact on the course of the insurgency” (p. 359). TK is therefore, among other things, a way for the government to combat the social and psychological effects of terrorism, giving the population a sense of “efficacy in the face of a relentless threat” (Plaw, 2008: 182). In the Israeli case Byman (2006) argues that “by bolstering public morale, the TKs have helped to counter one of the terrorists primary objectives: to reduce the faith of Israelis in their own government” (Byman, 2006; cited by Plaw 2008: 182). David (2007) suggests that the need to sustain morale in the face of terror helps to account for the popularity of targeting in Israel and “withstanding repeated attacks without responding can lead to a sense of impotence and malaise that ultimately weakens a society’s ability to protect itself” (p. 17)

Muller (2005) believes that terrorist attacks create a “false sense of insecurity” or an “insecurity dilemma” (p. 487). In a sense that anti-terrorist measures are almost a self-fulfilling prophesy which start leading a life of their own and are difficult if not impossible to halt.

This chapter addressed three issues. It sought to give the reader a definition of TKs and how since the events of 9/11 have subtly but definitively changed the nuances of the language usage around which this subject is examines. Secondly it gave the
reader an understanding and insight that this tactic has fundamentally evolved and developed at a rapid pace since 9/11 than at any time in its historical. Therefore 9/11 is a key junction at the academic crossroads in this debate. This allowed the reader to be both navigated and signposted through the rich yet complex literature that has evolved and developed around this subject to the extent that terrorism studies and the analysis of TKs contained therein “once seen to lie in the margins between political science and military studies…is now a stand-alone subject entering a golden age of research (Shepherd, The Guardian: 3 July 2007).

In the following I now seek to explain and justify, how building on this initial analysis, the conceptual model as advocated by Hafez and Hatfield (2006) presented an academic platform to expand upon and allow a more rigorous academic interrogation of this issue. This will ‘fix’ the conceptual framework and concurrently launch the literature review encompassed within. The literature review will examine the literature in relation to the Israeli use of TKs as a heuristic device utilising a thematic approach around the four pillars of Hafez and Hatfields (2006) Repression-Rebellion puzzle.
CHAPTER II
TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Having set the scene in the previous chapter, TKs as they have been historically utilised in a number of theatres was analysed. This chapter focuses on the literature review but underpinned by an analysis of the Israeli case as a heuristic device. That in turn will bring into focus the conceptual framework. A conceptual framework is described as a set of broad principles taken from relevant fields of enquiry and used to structure a subsequent presentation (Reichel and Ramey, 1987). When clearly articulated, a conceptual framework has potential usefulness as a tool to scaffold research and therefore, to assist a researcher to make meaning of subsequent findings. Such a framework should be intended as a starting point for reflection about the research and its context. The framework is a research tool intended to assist a researcher to develop awareness and understanding of the situation under scrutiny and to communicate this. As with all investigations in the social world, the framework itself provides part of the agenda for negotiation to be scrutinised and tested, reviewed and reformed as a result of investigation (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). In a sentence my understanding of the conceptual framework is the overall approach to the research.

The Repression-Rebellion Puzzle

I originally came to this area through a Masters study, but I realised at the time that TKs were a much more complex and nuanced subject than treatment at this level would allow but as such it might be reasonable to assume that it would offer a fairly substantive point of departure for a doctoral work. This was true only to a point. For instance the literature review associated with the work threw up some interesting points. Amongst these points were how the substitution/displacement of terrorist actions as a counter to TKs comes into effect, and additionally the vast majority of the studies that were available fell within a short-term time and space analysis of the effects of TKs. While this was more than adequate for the Masters level, it was not robust enough to give me a platform adequate to properly comprehend the full reach of the area. A considerable amount of the time went into exploring/reading for this
much more comprehensive and sustainable and indeed defensible understanding of these issues.

With regards to sustainability I found that closer reading led me to an understanding that there were potentially considerable benefits to be gained from exploring the Repression Rebellion Puzzle. On the other hand no matter how widely I cast the net it proved impossible to find studies that looked at this issue over an extended period of time.

**Cumulative Research Programme**

A large corpus of the nascent literature on deterring terrorism is descriptive rather than evaluative, this suggests that the next step in constructing a cumulative research programme is to test and refine a conceptual framework founded on the Repression/Rebellion Puzzle. The literature on repression and rebellion suggest four plausible hypotheses about the effects of TKs (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006). These are:

- TKs act as selective disincentives that raise the cost of militancy and deter militant organisations from planning more attacks. A *Deterrent* effect.

- TKs enrage militants and produce a backlash effect, increasing levels of violence and sustaining the campaign. A *Backlash* effect.

- TKs deprive militant organisations of valued key commanders and force remaining members to concentrate on personal security and less on recruiting/organizing. A *Disruption* effect.

- TKs by themselves are insufficient predictors of increasing or decreasing terrorist activity, but when combined with other factors and instruments, they jointly produce an incapacitation effect. A *Diminishing* effect.

**The Israeli Policy of TK within a Repression-Rebellion Framework**

The Repression-Rebellion framework will be used to explore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as it is a similar conflict to the core Northern Ireland case study. Both are set
within relatively limited geographical confines and both are ethno-religious conflicts. Over the past fifteen years the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has produced one of the highest numbers of suicide bombers in comparison with other conflicts around the world. This and the Israeli response, particularly TKs, have served as the subject of many articles and research studies by journalists and academic scholars in Israel and abroad. The broad and diverse literature from the Israeli Palestinian case will help serve as a heuristic device to allow the development of analysis to similar issues that are pertinent to Northern Ireland.

**TKs produce a Deterrent Effect**

Several scholars have argued that deterrence against terrorists cannot work and therefore this tactic/posture is a heavily debated aspect in the counter terrorism literature. The main argument is that terrorists do not have a centre of gravity that can be attacked; “an adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005: 187). Even if deterrence is arguably successful, it can promote a substitution/displacement effect and often ‘displaces’ the attack to other venues or countries where targets are relatively softer. There exists strong empirical evidence for this substitution effect of terrorism (Enders & Sandler, 2004). Duyvesteyn (2008) also believes that the use of the military instrument leads to substitution. “The seemingly successful actions of counter-terrorism today create problems for the future. Additionally, substitution occurs not only locally, as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but between regions, types of attacks and sometimes even between groups” (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 343).

Conversely a number of authors posit that repression by authorities increases the revolutionary activists cost of collective action and serves as a deterrent and disincentive to engage in high risk militant activity (Oberschall, 1973; Hardin, 1982). It is contended that in such situations rational actors will calculate on a cost benefit

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37 In Israel a number of texts such as the *Seventh War, Boomerang*, and *Eyeless in Gaza* have been written about the Al Aqsa Intifida covering not only the phenomenon of the cult of the suicide bomber but of the reaction in the form of TKs to the tactic. (Harel & Isacharoff, 2006; Druker & Shelah, 2005: Eldar, 2005: all cited by Schweitzer, 2007: 667).

38 Eg. From skyjacking to kidnapping. Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990) found that the success of metal detectors in airports led to significant displacement into other terrorist activities, such as kidnapping. In the Israeli Palestinian case, the thwarting of suicide attacks has led to the substitution of mortar and rocket attacks by Palestinian militants.
analysis the different course of action available to them and consequently choose means that will avoid harsh state repression. “To the extent repression decreases the likelihood of group success or diminishes the ability of individuals to truly make a difference, it will deter others from participating in high-risk activism” (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006: 363). Lichbach (1987) expands on this rationalist perspective by maintaining that if violent strategies are applied consistently by state authorities, while accommodating non-violent strategies, militant groups will ultimately substitute violent for non-violent tactics to avoid prohibitive strikes against their organisations. Selective, focused repression against core militants signals to potential recruits that only key activists will be targeted, and that therefore those that do not become actively involved will not in turn become the victims of repression (Mason and Krane, 1989).

Wilner (2010) argues that “the very threat of coercion forces leaders to worry about their safety, hinders their freedom of movement, and requires that they spend time and resources in avoiding their own death rather than planning the death of others” (p. 312). Honig (2007) however contends otherwise, suggesting that targeted individuals may have political aspirations that might help foster future negotiations (p. 564-565). Duyvesteyn (2008) also contends that it “increases terrorist legitimacy by showing what the terrorists want, by highlighting that the state itself breaches its own laws, is disrespectful to the right of life and is repressive. Additionally, it complicates the negotiation process by eliminating leaders and compromising trust” (p. 338). Hafez and Hatfield (2006) believe that in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, that the available literature would suggest that TKs implemented against known militant commanders may force them to abandon the struggle, and at a minimum substitute tactics. Also by expanding the policy to the political leadership of Hamas, that this represents a strong message that the Israelis will not cave-in to the threat of terrorism or enter negotiations with radical groups. Allied to this because such targeting is both selective and focused, this the Israelis believe mitigates against drawing the broader Palestinian public directly into the fray and dissuades potential recruits.

**Pre-emption as an Adjunct of Deterrence**

“Pre-emption is the quintessential proactive policy; in which terrorists and their assets are attacked to curb subsequent terrorist campaigns” (Arce & Sandler, 2005: 184).
Pre-emption itself can possess a deterrent effect (Sederberg, 1990: 270). Luft (2003) argues that TK works well as a mechanism of pre-emption, “hundreds if not thousands go about their lives…this silent multitude is testament to the [TK] policy’s success (p. 1). But Duyvesteyn (2008) argues that there is a fundamental problem with measuring and proving that pre-emption can work as an effective instrument to counter terrorism (p. 335), because proving it works relies on counterfactuals, to “prove something that did not happen” (p. 335). There is therefore a fundamental problem with measuring and proving that pre-emption can work as an effective instrument to counter terrorism, which in turn morphs into a deterrent effect.

David (2007) argues that the sharp decline in Israeli deaths did not come about because of a decline of attacks by militant groups, “the reason for the dramatic decline had much to do with the success of TKs in eliminating, discouraging, and disrupting terrorist operations” (Byman, 2006; cited by David, 2007:118). TK he accepts has its drawbacks but as part of a larger array of policies, it is seen to be a successful response. Stahl (2010) while noting what he terms the ‘boomerang’ or backlash effect of TKs nonetheless does not purport that TKs are wholly ineffective. He concurs and notes that “as Byman and Frisch have concluded in their own studies on the efficacy of TKs, frequent TKs are responsible for a multitude of deterrent factors” (p. 128). These factors include “the decline in organisational morale, forcing leaders to spend more time protecting themselves and less time involved in planning terrorist activity” (Byman, 2006; cited by Stahl, 2010: 128). David (2002) suggests four improvements, “be open and unapologetic about the policy…that the policy does not degenerate into lawlessness and savagery. Israel should refrain from killing political leaders. Fourthly, they need to announce publicly, that the policy is a temporary expedient” (David, 2007: 124). Interestingly, “instead of abiding to international norms, Israelis may want to portray their own set of norms,” (Honig, 2007: 571). From a different perspective “the former head of Israel’s Mossad, Shavit, holds that ‘prevention’ infers ‘deterrence,’ which “means ideologically and normatively, to prevent or to deter your enemy from perpetrating future attacks in order to kill your people” (Stahl, 2010: 122). Therefore, even to Israeli security, the utilisation of ‘prevention’ continues to be up for interpretation. Finally Stahl (2010) posits that “the prostitution of TKs” has led to a decline in deterrence, as Hamas as well as other Palestinian terrorist
organisations, have succeeded in creating countermeasures to the now frequent employment of TKs (Stahl, 2010: 128).

Indeed Heymann (2001) believes that TKs may create martyrs and actually stimulate imitation with a greater effect on total commitment than the actual deterrence resulting from the assassination [TK] (p. 29).

**TKs cause a Backlash thereby increasing violence**

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the backlash hypothesis predicts that TKs will produce an escalation in violence. Israeli writings state that TKs causes a backlash effect. Francisco (2005) argues that acts of severe repression can serve as focal points for backlash mobilisation and that “organisations facing extreme coercion will fight back with greater levels of violence” (Francisco, 2005; cited by Hafez and Hatfield, 2006:364). The idea that targeting terrorists perpetuates and even intensifies a cycle of violence is certainly a popular refrain amongst its critics – particularly in relation to the Israeli case (Amnesty International, 2001:1). Duyvesteyn (2008) concerning the effectiveness of the use of force; “there are few indications that it contributes to lessening terrorism. Rather the opposite is the case; the use of force makes things worse, in that it ‘complies’ with the aim of terrorist organisations to provoke the state into overreacting” (p. 328). That in effect the use of the military instrument, including TKs complies with terrorist logic and is effective in its operational aim of provocation (p.343) Luft (2003) contends that TK is “operationally senseless because assassinating Palestinian militants only brings harsh retaliatory action, resulting in even more Israeli casualties” (p.3). One Israeli official aptly summarised: “for every Palestinian gunman killed there are five new volunteers for suicide missions,” (Plaw, 2008:171). Critics of retaliatory attacks argue that such backlash attacks against Israelis also lead to further TKs which in turn instigate further retaliation and can therefore lead to an escalating cycle of violence (Stein, 2003; cited by Plaw, 2008: 168). Silke (2003) sees that retaliatory strikes by the Israelis often provoke a backlash effect that can include acts of terror more destructive and more costly than those that originally goaded the government into action (p. 225). “Some hold that the ‘boomerang effect,’ is a presupposed element in the TK equation, as Palestinian militants will respond to an Israeli TK” (Stahl, 2010: 128). Indeed Stahl notes that the boomerang effect has occurred after most high-profile TKs and that “scores of Israeli
citizens were killed in buses, cafés, and nightclubs as a direct result of each TK” (p. 128). Hafez and Hatfield (2006) in their analysis contend that militants will view TKs as treacherous, and that within their mindset, this will enable them to mobilise through backlash retaliatory attacks. These groups will always seek to maintain their internal bonding and cohesion and will specifically display defiance to maintain this group identity. Consequently, TKs will produce both a surge in violence and create an atmosphere conducive to further recruitment to their cadres.

**Terror Stock**

A joint study by Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal and Samban (2005) offers a statistical examination of suicide bombings versus two types of counter terrorism measures – “TKs,” and “preventive arrest.” The authors propose a terror-stock model.39 This model suggests that the TK of terror suspects sparks estimated recruitment to the terror stock that increases rather than decreases the rate of suicide bombings. In fact, as far as terrorist targeting are concerned, the “analysis suggests that such hits are counterproductive.” They appear to spark “recruitment to the terror stock” (Kaplan et al. 2005:232). Only the deaths of suspected terrorists and not Palestinian civilians are associated with such estimated recruitment. Although Israeli actions have reduced the rate of suicide bombings over time, it is preventive arrests rather than TKs that have been more responsible for this outcome. Another related study by Brym and Araj (2006) concurs broadly with the findings of Kaplan et al. (2005). They found that fully 82% of identifiable participants were reactive to Israeli actions, and the single most cited provocation was “assassination of organisational leaders” (Brym and Araj, 2006:1978). Schweitzer (2007) argues that suicide bombings created an ‘action-reprisal dynamic’ between Israel and Hamas. “TKs by Israel led to acts of vengeance by the two Palestinian terror organisations, and the whole cycle was repeated” (p.672). Stahl (2010) notes the case of the Israeli killing of Abbas al-Musawi in February 1992.40 Stahl questions the net benefit of the operation, as “al-Musawi was

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39 The term “Terror Stock” is a model that treats the suicide bombing attack rate as a function of the number of terrorists available to plan and execute suicide bombings. The ‘intent’ of Israeli tactics such as targeted killings and pre-emptive arrests is to reduce the “Terrorism Stock.” This includes diminishing the current strength of volunteers and consequent ability to generate increased recruitment and therefore the capacity of terrorist organisations to launch attacks.

40 Abbas al-Musawi, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, was killed in Lebanon on 16 Feb 1992. Two Israeli Air Force (IAF) Apache helicopters fired half a dozen rockets at his convoy, killing also his wife and son. “Moreover in what can be understood as a ‘message,’ the Apaches fired their machine guns at those who escaped the rocket attack” (Stahl, 2010: 115).
replaced with Nasrallah, a fierce and more militant leader”, and “it is believed that Hezbollah responded to the targeting of al-Musawi with devastating attacks on Jewish community centres in Argentina” (p. 115).

Brophy-Baermann and Conybear (1994) looked at the case of Israeli retaliation after Palestinian attacks. They have found that retaliation does not possess a significant escalatory effect, but neither does the use of military force for retaliation act as a long term deterrent in the Israeli-Palestinian case. The authors concluded that there is “only a very temporary effect of retaliation under the condition that the forceful action exceeds the expectations of the terrorists” (Brophy-Baermann and Conybear, 1994; cited by Duyvesteyn, 2008: 337). Others have observed that retaliation can lead to the strengthening of group cohesion thereby making the counter-terrorism task more difficult (Kegley, 1990: 190).

As previously enunciated, there is much common agreement amongst many Israeli authors that TKs should remain as an effective tactical tool in the counter terrorism tool box (Byman, 2006; Gross, 2003; Luft, 2003). Yet a key point is that while amongst these authors there is a consensus that TKs are an effective policy, equally they acknowledge that after such TKs there is always an upsurge in terrorist or other violent activity (Byman, 2006; Gross, 2003; Luft, 2003). In other words they acknowledge that there is a cycle of violence and counter-violence.

The literature would therefore seem to suggest that in the Israeli-Palestinian case, that TKs produce a definable backlash effect, which is even accepted by those authors who believe in the utility of the policy. But Hafez and Hatfield (2006) notably do not concur with this. Again they reiterate that “Targeted Assassinations’ [TKs] do not decrease rates of Palestinian violence, nor do they increase them, whether in the short or long run” (p. 359).

**TKs produce a Disruption effect and diminishes violence over time**

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the disruption effect implied that as militant groups suffer the loss of experienced cadres and commanders, they are obliged to allocate scare resources in securing the remaining leadership. Bomb-making, recruiting and
intelligence gathering skills are not acquired overnight; “liquidating persons central to the preparation and planning of operations is a real loss for terror groups and they take a long tome to recover” (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006:365). The argument suggests that “terrorism is a ‘production line’ of activity—from scouting targets to preparing bombers—if coordinated acts of violence are to take place” (Wilner, 2010: 312). By removing particular individuals “that fill critical positions within organisations and forcing others to seek refuge, a group’s ability to coordinate acts of violence is considerably disrupted” (p. 312). In essence, defenders of targeting argue that in confronting terrorism, the best form of defence is offence in that they pursue terrorist organisations back to their bases of operations and seek to disrupt, damage and even destroy such organisations. As David (2007) contends, if these people are eliminated, the ability to mount attacks is degraded, the reason for the decline in Israeli deaths from suicide bombers “have much to do with the success of TKs in eliminating, discouraging and disrupting terrorist operations” (p.118). Another clear benefit of TKs is keeping would-be bombers on the run. The ‘taking out’ of the leadership of terrorist organisations is also a military measure that is suggested as effective by several experts (Harmon, 2008; Art & Richardson, 2007; Cronin, 2008; Hanle, 1989). Indeed Hanle (1989) argues that the terrorist leadership present the “centre of gravity” in the counterterrorism struggle (p. 216). Both Harmon (2008) and Cronin (2008) also point out the examples of the arrest of the leadership of Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Stahl (2010) notes two cases that he believes represent successful decapitation of terrorist organisations. But he also notes that “unfortunately, for Israeli counterterrorism decision makers, it is rare that current targeted operations have such a damaging effect on terrorist organisations,” because “today, mainly due to compartmentalisation, most terrorist groups can afford to lose the head of the snake (leader) without destroying the body (organisation)” (p. 115).

41 He cites two successful examples of taking out the leadership that led to the stifling of terrorism: the ambush of the Black Panther leaders in Chicago in Dec 1969 and the attack on the Symbionese Liberation Army headquarters in Los Angeles in May 1974. In both cases the ‘revolution’ was terminated by a single lethal act.
42 The 1995 Mossad targeting of Fathi Shikaki, founder of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), in that it severely compromised organisational infrastructure rendering the PIJ ineffective for nearly ten years. Also the killing of Zuhayr Muhsin, the head of al-Sa’iqa (lightening bolt), a Fatah operated terrorist organisation, killed in July 1979, which Stahl (2010) contends resulted “in the total collapse of al-Sa’iqa (p. 115). Silke (2003) would counter argue that in the latter case an organisation such as al-Sa’iqa was a sub-cell or affiliate of the larger Fatah branch of Palestinian resistance.
Byman (2006) believes that TKs have shattered Palestinian terror groups and made it difficult for them to conduct effective operations but qualifies that “to achieve such an effect on a terrorist group requires a rapid pace of attacks against it” (Byman, 2006; cited by Plaw, 2008: 175). In consequence, they were either unable to retaliate or botched operations in a rush to retaliate, resulting in the increased failure rate and falling lethality observed. The cumulative effect over time is to reduce levels of violence or, a minimum, lower the quality and success rate of violent operations against Israeli targets (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006). Silke (2003) criticises the argument that TKs specifically disrupt terrorist groups. He believes that the common defence forwarded by advocates of TKs is flawed, whereby they argue that regardless of the wider, long term impact, in the short-term such attacks will certainly disrupt the terrorist network and undermine the ability of the group to carry out further attacks. “This line of argument by advocates follows the cold logic that if members of the terrorist cells are killed, then the group is deprived of their effort, experience, skills and abilities. The more senior and skilled the person is, the more pronounced the loss” (p. 223). Silke (2003) contends that advocates of these tactics are blind to the collateral damage associated with such strikes and its wider impacts and that the “true irony of retaliation and military force as a tool of counter-terrorism is that it is a child of, and a father to, the cycle of vengeance and the common human desire for revenge and retribution” (p. 228). Ultimately, he believes that military retribution fails as it so often ignores the basic psychology of the enemy and observers. This theme that terrorism draws in not only a group and a state but also an audience is taken up by Cronin (2008), who views terrorism as a “tripartite Process” involving the very triad of actors that include the state, the group and the audience (p. 25). Terrorist groups can endure TKs not because the people lost were not important, “but because the violence works to increase the motivation of more members than it decreases, and works to attract more sympathy and support to the group than it frightens away” (Silke, 2003: 230). Hafez and Hatfield (2006) believe that a cumulative effect over time will develop, whereby because of the constant threat of TKs, key militant leaders will be diverted from their primary task of planning and implementing attacks too concerns about their own personal safety and avoiding detection. Equally the consistent systematic removal of key experienced commanders will ultimately
degrade the cognitive or ‘corporate memory’ of the group, causing a snowball effect over time that will degrade the quality and implementation of terrorist actions.

**TKs over time have a Diminishing Capacity**

This diminishing capacity is sometimes referred to as incapacitation. It is contended that reduction in one violent tactic does not necessarily mean that the overall rate of violence has diminished. Additionally, governments that “increase the costs of terrorism through repression, but fail to decrease the flow of resources available to terrorists, will ultimately not succeed in fighting terrorism because of the substitution effect” (Enders and Sadler, 2004; cited by Hafez and Hatfield 2006:365). Hafez and Hatfield (2006) assess the impact of Israel’s TK policy on rates of Palestinian violence from September 2000 to June 2004. They differentiated with the works of Kaplan et al. (2005) and Brym and Araj (2006). They concluded that TKs have no significant impact on Palestinian violence, they differed in that nor do they increase them, whether in the short or the long term. Targeting terrorists “do not quell violence, but they do not decrease violence either” (Hafez and Hatfield 2006:359).

They suggest that the sharp decline in the success rate of Palestinian attacks was primarily accounted for by “defensive measures,” including the building of the wall/separation barrier and a robust Israeli security presence. Morag (2005) demonstrates that the reduction in Israeli casualties has increased the sense of personal security in Israel, with attendant repercussions in areas such as confidence in the government and increased economic activity. It has also created a greater sense among the public that the ‘war’ on terrorism in being won. In fact, warnings of planned terror attacks provided by the Israeli intelligence community has remained largely constant during different phases of the conflict (Morag, 2005). In other words, the “motivation and intention to carry out attacks has not substantially changed, what has changed is the capacity of terrorist organisations to carry out significant attacks” (p.311). Therefore, despite the ongoing planning within terrorist groups, the public perception of the threat is substantially altered as it is more focused on the bottom line, the presence or absence of terrorist violence *per se*.

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43 Utilising differenced and lagged time-series analysis this article utilised multiple and logistic regression to evaluate the effects of TKs on Palestinian violence. Regression is a technique of bringing data towards its known mean value. Time lagging is a technique for assessing whether changes to the current mean value are as a result of past events.
As already enunciated the killing of the opposing leadership has been a policy in particular implemented by Israel, while dealing with Palestinian terrorism. Indeed both the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah has been a repeated focus of TKs of the Israeli government. Luft (2003) posits that “there is a profound cumulative effect of TK on terrorist organisations. Constant elimination of their leaders leaves terrorist organisations in a state of confusion and disarray” (Luft, 2003; cited by Duyvesteyn, 2008: 338). In effect these authors argue that the cumulative effect is favourable for suppressing terrorist activity. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) emphasise that a reduction in one violent tactic does not necessarily translate into an overall reduction in the rate of violence. In conclusion they contend that because of the substitution effect the killing of key commanders can be mitigated by militants through the use of adaptation, unless TKs are combined with other strategies such as arrests, capture and interdiction of material. Therefore the combined effect of this multiple strategy deprives terror cells of the ability to reconstitute and hence diminish their future effectiveness due to diminishing capacity.

The Relevance and Suitability of Hafez and Hatfield’s Model as a Conceptual Framework to Study Northern Ireland
In relation to the three empirical studies of Kaplan et al., (2005), Brym and Araj (2006) and Hafez and Hatfield (2006) the following arose. It is interesting to note that the first two, Kaplan et al., (2005) and Brym and Araj (2006) are primarily focused on explaining the rationale and driving factors behind the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign. They reflect only indirectly and to a lesser degree on the effectiveness of terrorist targeting, and in particular on its influence on overall levels of violence. The Hafez and Hatfield (2006) study is grounded in a more conservative methodology focusing precisely on testing the actual relationship of terrorist targeting and terrorist attacks generally. It begins from the established instances of targeting (distinguishing them according to the seniority of the target and whether they are coordinated with larger military operations.). It examines the changing level of Palestinian violence in the period that followed, in one, two, three and four-week increments (distinguishing “suicide bombings, non suicide bombings, sporadic shootings, organised armed infiltrations, rocket attacks, and other forms of lethal violence) (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006: 366). This methodology has clear advantages. It focuses on the direct correlation of variables in the recorded data without relying on latent variables or the
problematic claims of terrorist groupings. On the other hand it has some limitations. As both Bryam and Araj (2006) study suggests, the lag between an action and retaliation may be more than four weeks, in which case it will not show up in Hafez and Hatfields results. The study may then underestimate the degree of retaliatory violence. Conversely, the methodology could equally under represent the suppressive effect of terrorist targeting. Hafez and Hatfield fully recognise the limitations of their own work, acknowledging that it is premature to generalise the findings of TKs without further analysis of the factors that contributed to the decline in the success of Palestinian attacks.

Conversely the study by Hafez and Hatfield (2006) is primarily focused on precisely testing the actual relationship between terrorist targeting and terrorist attacks, the core issue at the heart of the “Repression-Rebellion” dialect. It is also the broadest of the three studies in scope, encompassing the impact of terrorist targeting not only on suicide bombings, but on the full range of terrorist attacks, differentiated by type, and including, as far as possible foiled attacks. Plaw (2008) additionally holds the view that the research of Hafez and Hatfield is based on the most carefully constructed and verified database, and tests the widest range of hypothesis, specifically, the four pillars of deterrence, backlash, disruption and the diminishing effect, which are the central tenets and bedrock of the Repression/Rebellion debate.

Taking clear and established instances of targeting and distinguishing them by both the seniority of the specific targets within the militant organisation and whether the killings took place as part of a concurrent larger military operation/incursion: they then examined the changing levels of Palestinian violence that ensued. This methodology focused on the direct correlation between repression and rebellion, and this work is therefore very significant in relation to my proposed study of Northern Ireland. Indeed Plaw (2008: 172) implicitly states that their study goes some distance to show that there is at the moment no hard evidence of a strong effect, either provocative or suppressive, from individual targeting over the following four weeks in the period of the second Intifada under study.
Plaw (2008) also believes that the work of Hafez and Hatfield is strengthened and independently validated by another study that is worthy of academic note. This is a statistical analysis conducted by the Israeli Human Rights group *B’Tselem*. Both found no consistent relationship between targeting attacks and levels of violence. Crucially the two analyses each provide an important time dimension missing in the other. Analysis conducted by *B’Tselem* was predicated on data organised on a month by month basis, therefore focused on evaluating the impact of terrorist operations on violence in the three months following the targeting attacks. It found no statistically significant increase or decrease over the following months. But Plaw (2008) has noted equally, it could not however rule out a retaliatory effect in the immediate period following targeting operations (p. 172). Critically the Hafez and Hatfield study counteracts this lacuna by showing that the four weeks immediately following targeting operations also exhibit no statistically significant relationship. The second manner in which the two studies compliment each other is the way they measure impacts. Where Hafez and Hatfield examined numbers of terrorist attacks (differentiated by type); the *B’Tselem* study focused on Palestinian and Israeli causalities.

The fact that the two studies came to similar results employing different methods (Triangulation) reinforces both sets of results. Together the two sets of results make a significant case that TKs tended neither to escalate nor diminish overall levels of violence in either the immediate or short run during at least the years of the second *Intifada* that were examined.

Secondly, the empirical findings to date are preliminary. Again, the most authoritative study to date, Hafez and Hatfield (2006), suggests there is no hard evidence that targeting has a strong practical effect on increasing or decreasing levels of violence, they argue that the debate on the tactics effectiveness is an empirical one that can be evaluated through the use of statistical methods. Arising from this defenders and critics may point to some evidence to support their views.
Lacunae in the Work of Hafez and Hatfield

A key area that Hafez and Hatfield do not address is the political dimensions of TKs, especially their potential to signal one’s determination to fight back, to demonstrate strength to placate an angry public, or as a means of restorative justice. Indeed they acknowledge that it may well be that the “political utility of targeted assassinations [TKs] is more effective than its military use” (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006: 361).

Hafez and Hatfield note that in Israel the debate in relation to the use of the tactic, revolves around four key issues. The legality and legitimacy of TKs, secondly, the consequences of TKs on innocent bystanders, thirdly, alternative means to fight terror and finally, the effectiveness of these measures in actually reducing violence (David, 2003; Stein, 2003; Luft, 2003). This latter issue is a key area that has never been fully analysed in relation to the Northern Ireland conflict and is at the heart of my research.

This central theme and vignette of research directly related to this thesis is taken up by Duyvesteyn (2008) who like Hafez and Hatfield has directly identified;

“…that more research is warranted into the specific conditions under which force is used. Arguably, it remains possible that in very specific circumstances, military force can make a difference. But based on current available insights from non-structured case study analysis, but also on theoretical discussions and statistical analysis indications, it suggests that there are serious problems with the military approach” (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 343).

Hafez and Hatfield suggest that looking at purely defensive measures such as intelligence collection, barrier building, and increased security measures may shed more light on the decrease in the attack success rate (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006: 374).

Based on this, Hafez and Hatfield (2006) suggest in their conclusion that instead of a focus on offensive repressive strategies (TKs), purely defensive strategies such as target hardening, humint, the building of security barriers, growing public precautions against attack, suggest a diminishing opportunity effect. This analysis is complimented by Morag (2006), who contends that motivation and intention of the terrorist versus capability are a central issue in the debate, allied to this that “public perception is focused on the bottom line, the presence or absence thereof of terrorist violence” (p. 311). Morag (2006) also quotes Barry Davies that “overturning the
events of a terrorist threat, rather than necessary killing large number of terrorists” (p. 310) may be the real focus in unlocking a terrorist campaign.

Motivation and Intention
Arguably looking at the number of attempted terrorist attacks is not necessarily a useful indicator in terms of the effectiveness of anti-terror measures either, as perhaps the key issue is looking at effectiveness rather than motivation. Morag (2005) argues that there are two main issues concerned in degrading a terrorist campaign. These are mutually supporting and interlocking security measures, and secondly the utility/tactic of TKs. Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of Morag’s analysis of degrading a terrorist campaign which demonstrates how Hafez and Hatfield (2006) Repression Rebellion Framework with its four constituent pillars may be ‘nested’ within Morag’s analysis. The flowchart represented in Figure 1 also demonstrates as Morag (2005) has stated that overarching this is that motivation and intention to carry out attacks may not have waned, what may change is the capability of terrorist organisations to carry out such attacks, therefore despite the ongoing planning within terrorist groups; the public perception is focused on the bottom line, the presence or absence of terrorist violence.
Flowchart 1
Diagrammatic incorporation of Morag (2005) and Hafez & Hatfield (2006)

Aspiration of Terrorist
Does Motivation exist?
YES

Violent Intent
Does Capability exist?
YES

Violent Manifestation
- Arrests
- Arms Finds & Interdiction of Supply Chain
- Covert / Overt Surveillance
- Target Hardening
- Swamping /Patrolling

Presence of Violence

Degradation of Capability

Mutually Reinforcing Security Measures
Targeted Killings

Absence of Violence

Public Aspiration
No

- Deterrence
- Disruption
- Backlash
- Diminishing Capability

Hafez & Hatfield (2006)

Figure 1.
Additionally Morag (2005) contends that no combination of antiterrorist policies can therefore be deemed successful, including a successful policy of TKs, if growing numbers of citizens and security forces continue to be killed or maimed in terrorist attacks. The natural corollary of this is that TKs cannot be taken in isolation and as demonstrated in Figure 1 other issues *inter alia* have to be considered such as arrests, covert/overt surveillance allied to role of informers, arms interdictions, swamping, patrolling etc. are all subsidiary factors.

Duyvesteyn (2008) in her work also reiterates these key emerging themes. She believes there is little agreement among experts about the importance of the use of armed force in past counter-terrorist campaigns, and indeed, based on limited empirical investigations, it is indicated that police and judiciary measures have been much more frequently used than military.

She concurs with Hafez and Hatfield (2006) that on the effectiveness of TKs there are few indications that it leads to the lessening of terrorism. Conversely she digresses with their work and posits that rather, the opposite is the case; the use of force makes things worse. It remains possible that in very specific circumstances, military force in the form of TKs can make a difference, but equally, as reiterated by Hafez and Hatfield (2006) she warrants that more research is warranted into the specific conditions under which such force is utilised and that arguably, it remains possible that in very specific circumstances, TKs can make a difference. The evidence is still inconclusive as to whether retaliation can lead to escalation and/or can act as a deterrent, what should perhaps be investigated is under what conditions retaliation may escalate terrorist violence (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 337).

Duyvesteyn (2008) also identifies as do Hafez and Hatfield (2006) that it may be political imperatives that often drive counterterrorism policies. Byman (2005) also alludes to this: “The painful answer might be that ‘doing something’ is needed to reassure people after a massive attack…because a perception that the government was passive could contribute to a massive overreaction, reacting may be necessary to prevent overreacting” (p. 512).
The case remains that many of the claims of successful counterterrorism are based on often prescriptive and normative arguments, with a rather limited or non-existent empirical base. Allied to this much of the literature is essayist or polemical and heavily influenced by the case of Israel.

For researchers, therefore the challenge today is to find out what works and importantly what works under which conditions.

**Debate about past approaches**

The adoption of measures does not follow a logical selection process. Rather, the ‘ad hoc’ adoption of counterterrorism policies has been very common, especially when terrorism is viewed as war, counterterrorism favours repressive measures. Counterterrorism has a strong tendency for reactive rather than proactive measures, the ‘something must be done.’ In existing literature the police option has been consistently downplayed. It might be the case that the conditions under which force is used are important, SAS type units must be used in a controlled and precise manner. Chalk (1995) has argued that “it must be apparent that anti-terrorist commando teams have been created for a readily identifiable and necessary purpose. Second, it must be clear that any force these units subsequently employ will be used in a controlled and precise manner and only after all other possibilities have been exhausted. Military force can be useful in dealing with particular expressions of terrorist violence, but the employment of military force needs to be carefully controlled, for it can easily play into the hands of the terrorist and become counterproductive” (Chalk, 1995: 26). Therefore in Northern Ireland what was the degree of control and calibration?

In much of the literature pre-emption is portrayed as the quintessential proactive policy, allied to deterrence. The view that pre-emption itself can possess a deterrent effect. But proving it works relies on counterfactuals, to “prove something that did not happen” (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 335). There is a fundamental problem with measuring and proving that pre-emption can work as an effective instrument to counter terrorism.

Duyvesteyn (2008) also notes that if deterrence is successful, it can promote a substitution effect. She notes that there is strong empirical evidence for this
substitution effect in terrorism. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) fully concur with this view.

But in much of the existing literature while pre-emption, and retaliation are all expected to deter future terrorist activity, data to illustrate this is actually the case is scarce. There are few reasons, neither from the perspective of substitution, nor from the limited effects on state sponsors, to currently justify deterrence as an entirely successful approach to counterterrorism.

Duyvesteyn (2008) notes that even among Israeli authors whom support TKs, that nonetheless they recognise that there is always an upsurge in terrorist violence. There is a cycle of violence and counter-violence. Schweitzer (2007) as noted previously has referred to this as the ‘action/reprisal’ dynamic. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) in their seminal work diverge and specifically do not yet concur with this. They feel more research is warranted on this theme, and that such a conclusive statement that a cycle of violence is initiated by a TK cannot at this point in time be conclusively stated.

Duyvesteyn (2008) notes that military measures against terrorist activities have been indicated to possess a high risk of escalation, but she also crucially notes that these observations, however, are often too anecdotally substantiated, theoretically flimsy, and/or incompletely argued through or qualified. We simply know too little whether force works against terrorists, apart from these indications that there are drawbacks and problems, in this she concurs with Hafez and Hatfield (2006). Therefore it seems most productive that research efforts should concentrate on the conditions under which military force might be useful and effective, that “context becomes more important in determining appropriate response” (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 340).

Another issue is the order in which soft versus hard instruments are employed, “when you approach your opponent in a forceful manner, the effectiveness of subsequent soft measures can be questioned. It could be argued that the order of the hard followed by the soft approach reduces the effectiveness of the latter” (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 340).
In summary, the use of the military instrument in the form of TKs can fulfil the terrorist operational aim of provocation. The use of force may lead to a counterterrorist spiral, though not definitively. Equally use of force leads to substitution/displacement of terrorist attacks. Most analysts acknowledge the substitution/displacement effect. It remains the case that for researchers, the challenges today are what works and importantly what works under which conditions.

**Long Term Versus Short Term Oppressive Effect**

Cronin (2008) believes that there is considerable evidence to indicate that capturing leaders has been more effective than killing them in ending a group (p. 29). Capturing a group’s leader may be effective. The leader is often the source of inspiration for a group and thus its intellectual engine. Cronin reiterates that even in the short term, state targeting of a leader has sometimes backfired, especially in non-hierarchical groups where a ready successor is found or where the leader is killed and becomes a martyr. Determining whether or not a group will be ended by decapitation means thinking through the second and third order effects of removing the leader. Killing or capturing leaders often results in a struggle for succession. This may reduce the group’s short-term operational effectiveness, but it may also push it to adapt into a more effective, flatter, less hierarchical organised organisation that is harder to destroy. And as a new leader tries to demonstrate his credentials to other members of the group, levels of violence may actually increase (p. 31). Stahl (2010) has noted that “the strong ideology [of militants]…assists in their ability not to break [under interrogation] (p. 122). But he has also noted that irrespective of this “that militant Islamist extremist organisations, such as Hamas, are highly compartmentalised and as such, the apprehended terrorist may simply not know anything outside his mandate” (p. 122). Therefore arising from this while ostensibly a TK is permitted only when no viable arrest option exists, “one former high-ranking IDF officer has stated there have been times when the Israeli security agencies preferred to simply ‘get rid of a terrorist without attempting arrest, because even if a certain terrorist was apprehended, he or she may not break” (p. 122)

Hence, much of the writings addressing the consequences of TKs have thus focused on the short term impact of the policy, and particularly in the Israeli case. The study
by both Hafez and Hatfield (2006) and B’tselem both focus on relatively short time frames (Plaw, 2008). In Northern Ireland, there is a strong case to be made that a focused study be brought to bear on the utility or otherwise of TKs that encompass a wider time frame, in a specific geographic area such as East Tyrone.

Allied to this some analysts have suggested that the very effectiveness of counterterrorism is dependent on the type of terrorist activity. “If we consider terrorism to be a particular form of coercive tactic selected by a variety of groups pursuing different purposes, then context becomes more important in determining appropriate response” (Sederberg, 1990; cited by Duyvesteyn, 2008: 340). In the Northern Ireland case this context is to the very fore as why were TKs apparently employed on more than a number of occasions in specifically East Tyrone, whereas in the other republican heartland of South Armagh, the tactic is more noticeable for its absence? It has been argued that in East Tyrone the intelligence picture was better compared to the ‘uniquely impenetrable’ South Armagh.

For Duyvesteyn (2008) this is a key point in the debate and for future research. Additionally she contends that future research should concentrate on the conditions under which military force might be useful and effective (p. 340). Her overarching argument is that based on limited empirical evidence, it is police and judiciary measures that have been used more frequently than the military in dealing with terrorism.

**Defenders and Critics of Targeting; Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models**

Defenders of TKs like David, Byman and Luft do not deny that terrorist organisations often attempt and sometimes succeed in conducting retaliatory attacks following TKs, and that such a pattern was perceptible particularly during the first years of the second Intifada (Plaw, 2008). David (2002) indeed acknowledges that in the early stages of the Intifada that “a much stronger case can be made that TKs actually increases the number of Israelis killed, by provoking retaliation, than it saves by eliminating terrorists” (David, 2002; cited by Plaw 2008: 173). However the advocates of TKs counter this by outlining what they see as the practicality of targeting on two basic tenets. Firstly they contend that the relationship between targeting operations and the
suppression of terrorist violence is more plausible than critics suggest and secondly that the relationship is growing stronger over time, and is becoming more evident. A key point in this argument by advocates of TKs, is that studies that have been conducted to date, such as those by Hafez and Hatfield (2006) have been relatively narrow in scope, focused on a short period of comparatively intense violence. Byman (2006) in particular suggests that such studies ignore the changing shape of Palestinian violence, and that such groups now no longer have a ‘reserve’ capacity to carry out retaliatory strikes because of Israeli targeting of their operatives (Byman, 2006; cited by Plaw 2008: 175). However, while Byman’s account of the gradual suppressive effect of TKs does help to explain the declining number and the lethality of Palestinian terrorist attacks, it is important to stress that it is not the only possible explanation for this pattern. For example both the Kaplan et al. (2005) and Hafez and Hatfield studies (2006) suggested that the principal explanation for the decline in attacks were improved defensive measures. Yet a long term suppressive effect from targeting cannot be ruled out either on the basis of the evidence that the literature provides. Hence proponents maintain that at a minimum level TKs results in a negative impact on a terrorist group, disrupting its activities and reducing its effectiveness.

Recruiting Sergeant
Critics conversely maintain that there remains significant danger to non-combatants and that the use of the tactic is a “Recruiting Sergeant,” for terrorist groups that does not deter but escalates violence. While the use of TKs has many strong supporters within Israel, evidence regarding its impact in terms of diminishing or deterring Palestinian terrorism has not been compelling. Evaluations of large scale military retaliations in response to terrorism have not found a significant impact in terms of reducing future terrorist attacks. Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) found that major retaliations either led to a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks against Israel, or had no impact whatsoever (in other words, the number of terrorist attacks neither increased or decreased in the aftermath). In cases where an increase occurred, this dissipated within nine months and then returned to pre-retaliation levels. Silke (2012) in analysing the work of Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare sees the explanation for the lack of impact in most cases was that the terrorists expected the retaliations and planned for them accordingly. In other words they were built in as a given into how
they operated and had no discernible long term effect. Equally Jordan (2009) also adds a cautionary note, in that her findings in examining 298 cases of leadership decapitation were that older terrorist groups, and those motivated by nationalist or religious agendas, were effectively immune from the effects of leadership decapitation. Furthermore, such groups who lost their leaders through TKs were perversely “more robust and endured for longer than groups who never suffered decapitation” (Jordan, 2009; cited by Silke, 2012: 174). Kaplan et al. (2005) contend that they [TKs] appear to spark “recruitment to the terror stock” (p. 233-4).

**Observations from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

The Israeli case was analysed through means of a literature review that allowed the arguments of both sides of the TK debate to be teased out, using the conceptual framework of Hafez and Hatfield’s (2006) four constituent pillars. While tentative observations can be drawn at this remove for the use of TKs in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is not the purpose of this thesis to resolve the debates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather to use that well developed debate to clarify a methodology and framework to conduct primary research on Northern Ireland and the potential for future comparison with other conflicts where TKs are utilised.

This qualification notwithstanding there appears to be an almost universal consensus among Israel’s defence establishment that it is an effective way to prevent and deter terrorist groups, yet critically has never succeeded in fully suppressing the terrorist threat and indeed overall the level of threat may well have steadily mounted. Arguments have been advanced both for and against TKs. Both critics and defenders may point to some evidence to support their views. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict advocates are insistent that in moments of “clear and present danger,” states have a right to act in defence of their citizens. Critics maintain that there remains significant danger to non-combatants and that the use of the tactic is a “Recruiting Sergeant” for terrorist groups that does not deter but escalates violence, and that in the absence of a very clear, tangible, and substantial reduction in violence, critics may then forcefully argue that no reasonable and responsible government should embrace such a policy. Defenders of TKs like David (2003), Byman (2005), and Luft (2003) respond that there remain compelling strategic reasons for continuing to employ it, despite the fact that there is no hard evidence regarding the effect of TKs on overall levels of
violence. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) allude to some of these considerations as possible means of justifying a targeting policy (p. 361).  

Overview

This review has examined the literature that is pertinent to the “Repression-Rebellion,” puzzle that is at the heart of the debate in relation to the use of TKs as a counter terrorism tool. The Israeli case was examined to facilitate a comparison with Israel’s use of TKs that acted as a benchmark for heuristic purposes, and shows a contrast, with Israel’s approach to dealing with its own conflict with the Palestinians and the Northern Ireland case study. In Israel a policy of TKs has been a consistent policy over the past fifty years, which has varied in intensity, and indeed has now developed as a core element of its anti-terrorist arsenal. There is almost universal consensus among Israel’s defence establishment that TKs are an effective way to prevent and deter terrorist groups, yet critically has never succeeded in fully suppressing the terrorist threat and indeed overall the level of threat may well have steadily mounted. Powerful arguments have been advanced both for and against terrorist targeting. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict advocates are insistent that in moments of “clear and present danger,” states have a right to act in defence of their citizens.

Thus, having adopted a conceptual framework in this chapter, in the succeeding chapter a detailed justification will be provided for the methodology that will be utilised to anchor this work. Using the data and findings from the Israeli case, an examination of the TKs in Northern Ireland will be examined. By bridging the gap between these two literatures in attempting to answer the following questions: (1) did a TK policy significantly affect the outcome of the PIRA campaign in Northern Ireland? (2) If so, how? As will be shown, the answers to these questions will help clarify the validity of the tactic of TKs in the first place.

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44 In Israel, support for retaliatory measures in response to terrorism has traditionally been high. Friedland and Merari (1985) found that 92 per cent of Israelis surveyed supported the TK of terrorist leaders.
CHAPTER III
THE ROAD MAP

Introduction
This chapter sets out the philosophy that influenced the selection of research techniques. It outlines the methodology that I have utilised and provides an academic ‘road map’ to contextualise the issues. This involves a clear outline of the research philosophy that underpins this work and related research decisions. A justification of why this work will be examined through a qualitative lens will be set forth and how I carried out the primary research based on semi-structured interviews and stemming from this how the resultant data was analysed. The rationale for undertaking the study is first outlined. The research design is then described, explaining why a case-study approach was selected. This section also raises the challenges associated with carrying out research in this particular field of terrorism studies and addresses the ‘positionality’ of the researcher. The third section describes the framework used for analysis. A timeline of the study is also provided. Finally, certain limitations of the research are considered.

My research methods were arrived at by a combination of factors. I undertook as much extensive pre-reading as possible to examine common threads and shortcomings that existed in relation to the analysis of TKs. Therefore having established and contextualised some of the problems associated with both defining the issue and researching it, the literature review then enabled me to develop other avenues of inquiry thereby opening other doors to further analysis. Certain themes worthy of additional exploration were identified through the literature review. This chapter is therefore concerned with describing the development and shaping of the overall research methodology compatible with these themes applicable to the overarching research question and in line with my epistemology.

The Importance of Northern Ireland
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effect TKs have on the capability and motivation of violent, non-state, terrorist organisations. What effect if any, do
TKs have on cycles of violence? This study explores and offers a perspective on the claimed successes of counter-terrorist policies and the issues that underpin them with a focus on pre-emptive actions aimed at disrupting or removing the terrorist threat.

This study examines counter-terrorism activities in Northern Ireland, in order to encompass a detailed analysis of the implications of the policy of selective TKs. Israel for the purposes of this work is largely the focus of the literature review because the use of TKs in Israel remains the focus of the majority of academic writings in relation to the utility of TKs as a tactic. But the major case for the purpose of this research remains Northern Ireland and is the principal case on which the primary research for this work has been conducted. It remains the case that the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ are a key academic portal in the study of modern terrorism and one of the more recent examples of the use of TKs. It has also been noted previously that Northern Ireland is also of note because the campaign of TKs utilised there whether officially or unofficially sanctioned took place within the context of a liberal democracy. Edwards (2011) while noting that “Northern Ireland was by no means unique in witnessing a clash between protestors and security forces in the late 1960s” (p. 73), also highlights the kernel that is at the heart of this study in that additionally what made the Troubles in Northern Ireland unique was the way in which at the time the violence was portrayed “as indelibly ethnic or tribal” and somewhat out of sync with the wider Cold War political confrontations between West and East. Indeed this analysis of Northern Ireland as been “a place apart” has being challenged particularly as ethnic-identity disputes erupted after the end of the Cold War in 1991. Equally in a post 9/11 universe TKs have become one of the primary modes of operation and the relevance of examining historical models of TK implementation as utilised in Northern Ireland is correspondingly both highly topical and relevant to inform the way we think about the contemporary use of TKs. Therefore while Northern Ireland may not portray definitive or absolute answers as to the utility of TKs in the modern era, there is nonetheless a strong argument that as a core case study it provides valuable lessons that can be rigorously analysed and interpreted that will both contribute to and enhance the academic jigsaw on this topic.
The Setting
The Northern Ireland case was chosen on the basis of the philosophy advanced by Mason (1996) that “qualitative researchers should not be satisfied with producing explanations which are idiosyncratic to the limited empirical parameters of their study, qualitative research should therefore produce explanations which can be generalised in some way, or which have a wider resonance” (p.6). Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun (2001) argue that a case study is a strategy that provides insight into how something works in life, over time. They extrapolate further that a case study can spot patterns and aid “in understanding the difference between the ideal and the real” (p. 117). Additionally, research into a particular study can provide detailed insight that is both unique and simultaneously general (Yin, 2008). Arising from this, by utilising analysis concerning TKs in one geographical area (Israel), I could interpret the phenomena as it applied there, and also using this as a heuristic device develop an understanding of events as they unfolded in Northern Ireland that has in turn a general application and utility as a linkage in the chain of academic studies in this field.

Interpretative Research
Qualitative research is best used for “research problems in which you do not know the problems and need to explore” (Creswell, 2005: 45) and quantitative research is best used for answering “specific, narrow questions to obtain measurable and observable data on variables” (p. 47). Frankel and Devers (2000) provide further reasons for qualitative methods. These authors explain that qualitative research methods are best suited when the research questions pose puzzles that cannot be fully solved using quantitative research methodologies. The examination of TKs in Northern Ireland is an excellent example of this.

I have chosen qualitative research and its variation of interpretive research rather than quantitative research for this endeavour as I feel this method best suits the Northern Ireland case study, because as Patton (2002) suggests “qualitative methods are often used in evaluations because they tell the program’s story by capturing and communicating the participants stories” (p. 10). Qualitative research places a value on ‘participants perspectives on their worlds: and tries to interpret “culturally significant phenomena” (Ryan, 2006: 21). Whereas quantitative methods which
conversely “may neglect the socials and cultural construction of the variables which qualitative research seeks to correlate” (Silverman, 2000: 5). Additionally the importance of data collection techniques allied to the broad and extensive face to face interviewing that I have conducted lends itself naturally to this method. I therefore came to the conclusion that I needed qualitative as opposed to a quantitative approach in order to extract fertile information. The qualitative researcher investigates the why and the how of the decision making in lieu of the what, where and when.

Because the issue of TKs is constantly evolving, its study necessitates a flexible or predominantly qualitative strategy (Robson, 2002), which as Bryman (2008) has noted allows a researcher “to see through the eyes of the people being studied” (p. 385). It has been acknowledged that much diversification has taken place in the field of qualitative research in recent years and “that a number of quite distinctive research traditions have emerged as a result of this” (Locke et al., 2004:148). Interpretive Research has emerged as an important subset of qualitative research. Interpretive approaches permit reading “through and beyond the data in some way” (Mason, 2002:149). Interviewing and the examination of literature and documents are some of the commonly used techniques within this subset.

**Research Strategy and Design**

There is a rich tradition in writing through the challenges of social inquiry and research in the social and political sciences (Schutt, 2011; Mertens, 1998; Hesse-Biber, 2010). Within this considerable attention is given to the strengths and drawbacks to specific ways to frame or theorise the research problem. Survey, interviews, personal histories are all in a sense ways of gathering data that are then tested through the critical lens of a research theoretical framework. The framework itself is important for at least two reasons: firstly, it is generated out of the best that we know about the specific problem, which requires a close and critical reading of prior work in the field and usually the identification from this work of at least the outline of a defensible frame for the proposed work: secondly, it has an ‘essentialising’ effect which must be guarded against constantly in order to ensure that the frame facilitates rather then determines the research reading.
The Concept of Lens: Research Framework

A research framework is a frame that comes from the reading and is adapted to make it more particular and suitable to the research question. It helps to analyse and interpret the data that is gathered and is an analytical frame usually bound in a series of questions. The research framework sets in context and fixes both the presentation and explanation of a conceptual/analytical framework to guide us through a complex literature and fieldwork that will follow. A conceptual framework acts as a tool to scaffold research and, therefore, to assist a researcher to make meaning of subsequent findings. In simple terms it is the overall approach to the research (Yin, 2008).

A conceptual research framework founded on the Repression/Rebellion Puzzle is the lens through which the topic of TKs will be viewed, specifically a qualitative adaptation of the quantitative work of Hafez and Hatfield (2006), incorporating its four constituent pillars. The conceptual framework is in effect the “road map” through which an exploration and examination of this topic will be undertaken. Accordingly, utilising the Repression/Rebellion Puzzle as a fulcrum, this thesis examines the relationship and linkages between targeting and cycles of violence, including linking targeting to violence escalation/de-escalation.

What does this model in its current form put forward and what does it actually do? There are two key important characteristics of the framework. Firstly it is based on a time series, a chronological sequence of observations on a particular variable. Secondly, it also looks at difference analysis, a quasi-experimental technique used in econometrics that measures the effect of a treatment at a given period in time. Both of these are strong positivist approaches, they are open to an interpretative reading in the final analysis but they structure a reading of the context that is both data driven and data dependant and does not ‘need’ the level of colour and characteristics that can be garnered through interviews. So it does not give the full richness or tapestry of the story, it looks at only a four month period, it is highly specific in that it looks at only one particular encounter group, the Israeli army versus Palestinian militants. What are the main affordances of this model? It allows the researcher to undertake these regressive analyses and a corresponding statistical analysis of a particular data set. This is eminently worthwhile, the major shortfall conversely is that it does not explain the deep nature of the incidents it is reflecting, and it is essentially a predictive model,
whereby over a specific period of time expected statistical outcomes are predicted. This does not deal with the actual physical outcomes on the ground, the often visceral reality of the aftermath of a TK, the reality for the people caught up in the cycle on both sides, the doctrinal decisions made by the policy makers on either side. It will just provide a linear, unyielding model of what is likely to happen. It is not absolutely dependable as a method of prognosis because the real world does not function according to multivariate models. It can be accurate so long as all other variables remain stable and do not change or are subject to an unpredicted external shock. The Hafez and Hatfield (2006) model in its quantitative form depends too much on a linear depersonalised reading of incidents and events, it does not provide the level of intelligence and understanding needed to really make decisions as to whether TKs are effective or not.

Hafez and Hatfield (2006): The Affordances of the Model

Arising from this I see five key points to justify why I should interrogate the use of TKs and their effectiveness using the Hafez and Hatfield (2006) model as a conceptual framework but through a qualitative lens. The first argument I wish to use in terms of moving beyond the original quantitative nature of the Hafez and Hatfield framework is that effectively we are looking at a solution that cannot be fully resolved using the current framework. This for me is the most important reason for extending it into a qualitative analysis. This draws from the work of Frankel and Devers (2000) where they allude to the power of qualitative work, and its ability to actually take the researcher beyond those insoluble problems that can perhaps not be fully explored quantitatively.

The second rationale comes from Creswell (2005) and again it is cited by Bufkin (2006) and it is a very powerful argument in that it reiterates and reinforces the contention that the characteristics of good qualitative work is that it allows us to work in a field where we do not fully understand the variables that are at play. The Hafez and Hatfield framework is very tightly restricted in terms of the number of key variables. What we are seeking are explanations which may in fact more than likely fall at least in part outside of the variables that Hafez and Hatfield actually put forward and what I am therefore seeking is a wider net, a wider way of actually
catching that. So I am taking the starting point and assuming that I do not fully know
the variables at play here and therefore I need to go beyond the purely quantitative
approach. That is the fundamental reason why I have chosen a qualitative lens
through which to interrogate this work.

A third point of justification following on from this, is that the open ended nature of
qualitative work when I embark upon it, allows the informant to tell its own story in a
much richer and detailed way. And again people like Ohman (2005) have actually
used that as a starting point in terms of their arguments. So therefore the problem
cannot be fully resolved by a quantitative analysis. By superimposing the Hafez and
Hatfield framework onto a qualitative platform I feel it will enable me to seek a richer
explanation and that this more open-ended type of approach will allow me to actually
hear the voice of the informant in a way that is not possible in a much more tightly
constrained quantitative frame.

The fourth kernel is inextricably linked with the kind of notion which I believe centres
on what we might call authenticity. I fully accept that authenticity is a problematic
area when one is engaged in this kind of research at many levels. But I would argue
augmented by the work of Schultz (2008) that basically the best way to understand the
world is to study it by focusing firstly and foremostly on the notion of a ‘fair’
reflection. So what we are looking for is an explanation that offers a fair reflection of
the various kinds of perspectives and the various story lines that are feeding into the
situation that has actually developed. While the framework by Hafez & Hatfield
(2006) as it currently exists does not achieve in its current qualitative hue and will
perhaps almost by definition ‘shoehorn’ people into certain explanations. Alternatively what I am seeking to achieve, is to find a mechanism that allows me by
all means, while taking as the starting point of the Hafez & Hatfield (2006)
framework and then to explore for a more authentic and full explanation by going
beyond the purely time limited constraint, which I feel is the biggest single problem
with the actual framework as it currently pertains. Once again, I am looking at a way
of giving a fairer kind of voice to all that are actually associated with the issue at the
heart of my research question and that it remains the case that a quantitative analysis
is not an adequate enough explanation giving the complexity of what I am
academically exploring.
Finally, I wish to follow a path of trying to identify multiple successive events that have led to a particular outcome. So while a quantitative study, with its associated statistics and data, will point to the outcomes it won’t help me get a ‘handle’ on the ever-twisting sort of story line, the event that led to another event that led to another incident over a period of time and that is again for me, the strongest argument to portray allied to my earlier arguments, in particular with relation to why it is necessary to extend the frame into a more longitudinal study.

These are both compelling and logical reasons for doing this, and consequently this remains the bed rock of the argument to justify the Hafez & Hatfield (2006) framework but through a qualitative lens, which are correspondingly defensible reasons for extending the frame in its current format to the model that will fulfil the research aims. I believe that in tandem these arguments are a rationale justification for moving beyond the initial assumption that we cannot explain TKs by just looking at the pillars in a limited timeframe and again by implication at limited associated variables. The issue of TKs is not so much more complicated as more nuanced than that. That is not to take away from the power of the original model crafted by Hafez & Hatfield (2006) which remains an academically thorough and critiqued model. Rather the original model gives very solid bedrock to actually start with. But I intend to take this solid bedrock of the original model, and in turn make it a ‘platform’ to seek out the nodes of the web or these vectors that for me encapsulates this notion of the multiple successive events that we cannot accommodate in a quantitative frame.

The idea of this sense of authenticity of what you are hearing is a ‘fair’ and rounded and more complete articulation of this view is a more complete telling of the story. A qualitative research frame allows a wider examination of the appropriate variables and Bufkin (2006) has referred to this kind of research as open ended and researchable questioning. This is a powerful kind of expression and gives the traction, the academic foot-hold to move the argument from where it currently resides to where I intend it to be in terms of the richer approach – the much more complex data set derived from that potentially rich seam. In essence it is the alternative that sometimes we need a more complex unpacking of the story over the time frame that is actually involved. That is the power of the qualitative voice as opposed to the quantitative in examining the issue of TKs.
Representation
In research like this there is always an issue around representation and confidence, but these are addressed and counter-balanced by having multiple observations, by having these multiple conversations. I may actually get closer to the truth, because the more people that are ‘feeding’ into the picture the more comprehensive the picture is going to be and the easier it will be then, hopefully, to read the larger jigsaw. That is the kind of metaphor I would be inclined to use – the frame would take you to a certain point, it will give you the large positions, it will give you the trajectory in some places even but that you need more and the best way to enhance this ‘more’ is to seek out these multiple ‘tellings.’ These complex stories running over space and time and in terms of different voices running across time; that may change from event to event and the way one event actually in some cases triggers another, or is impacted by another in some shape or form. You cannot identify those connections as readily using a more limited frame through a quantitative lens. Based on these assumptions and this rationale, the following section establishes more precisely the modus that will be adopted to undertake the necessary field work associated with my primary research question.
LOGIC MODEL FOR A TK CONTROL EFFECT

**PURPOSE or MISSION:** To determine what effect TKs have on cycles of violence

**INPUTS / RESOURCES**
- Mil & Police Intel
- Special Forces (SAS) / the Kinetic Options/TKs
- Use of Informers HUMINT (FRU)
- Electronic Surveillance (14th Int Coy)

**CONSTRAINTS**
- Political, not a stated policy
- Collateral Damage death of innocent bystanders

**ACTIVITIES**
- Detailed int base for Kinetic Targeting
- Kinetic / Non Kinetic Targeting
- Press & Media control of info – PR

**OUTPUTS**
- Arrests
- Insurgent Operations Abandoned
- TK of Insurgents

**EFFECTS** (sequenced over time)
- Hafez & Hatfield (2006)
  - Disruption
  - Deterrence
  - Backlash
  - Incapacitation

**EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT:** Things beyond control of programme that will influence results and outcomes: Media scrutiny, domestic and international; European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); Community mistrust of government.

Figure 2. Logic Model
Deriving a Logic Model from Hafez and Hatfield (2006)

My interpretative variant of the Hafez and Hatfield (2006) model is illustrated and explained in the Logic Model at Figure 2. The purpose of the research remains what effect if any do TKs have on cycles of violence. The box in relation to ‘inputs /resources’ looks at all the available means through which TKs, the ‘Kinetic Option’\(^{45}\) can be carried out with the associated necessary intelligence resources and the constraints that militate against the policy, which in the main are political. The box on ‘activities’ is concerned with examining the formulation of the detailed and comprehensive driven information base that is required to undertake TKs effectively that are operationally driven but intelligence lead. The box in relation to ‘outputs’ is the fact that insurgents are either killed or not in TK operations. The key output in terms of this model is therefore whether the insurgent is subjected to a TK. The final box looks at ‘effects’ and relates to what is the outcome on the removal of an active ASU through a TK both on the insurgent organisation and the community in which they derive. The Logic Model takes all the concerns of the doctrinal approach and the concerns of the Hafez and Hatfield (2006) model itself and has been built into this cyclical model that also includes the effect of external factors. The same Logic Model can therefore be applied to each of the three clusters incorporated within the study and what differences can be discerned of the effects of TKs. This consistency will be able to account for changes in resources, account for changes in relation to the stated mission and also for changes in relation to outputs, such as the number of insurgents killed in a particular TK and the effect across the four pillars of Hafez and Hatfield. This will therefore allow the opportunity for comprehensive comparative work.

Interview and Voice

One of my primary data is the interview, which is a universal technique of interpretive research. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were utilised as a keystone means of collecting primary data, indeed Mason (2002) perceives that this method “can be relatively informal and may take place face to face” (p.62). It is also an adaptable

\(^{45}\) A phrase that has become part of the lexicon in modern Counter-Terrorism Studies that implies the deadly use of force in dealing with a terrorist threat.
method (Bell, 1999), in which the content and order of the interview questions can be modified as necessary during the course of the interview. This method allowed exploration within the interview itself thereby teasing out the subject’s knowledge, opinion and experience. Providing a historical context to the Northern Ireland conflict by collecting data from key players who have lived or in some cases fought through the conflict, and whose experiences provide a source for the better comprehension of the utility of TKs is considered essential to describing and analysing a particular research issue (Ozga, 2000: 128). Ryan has argued that the semi-structured characteristics of such interviews, aligns the participants with “the shared understanding model of collecting data” (Antonesa et al., 2006:76), and not just a means of data collection. I have found that the flexible method inherent in this style of interviewing allowed me to focus on interesting lines of inquiry which were “developed and clarified” (Bell, 1999: 135). However I am conscious that interviewing key players means that these individuals are often highly skilled in ‘self-presentation’ and in managing the situation (Ozga, 2000). To mitigate this I have carried out an extensive survey of contemporaneous media reports reflecting the full spectrum of opinion, both Northern and Southern Ireland and mainland UK that relate to the seven incidents of the clusters that incorporate the primary case study, in order to validate and contextualise the ‘voice’ at the time and to get as accurate a picture as possible that will enhance the rigour of the research, additionally this will act as an important checking mechanism that places the TK incidents in context. This will allow a comparison of the ‘voice’ as articulated at the time and negate the effect that ‘elite’ respondents speaking today from a position of knowledge or expertise in discussing the issue within their particular personalised frame of reference (Dexter, 2006). With this caution to the fore I have interviewed a wide and diverse range of subjects from all sides of the Northern Ireland conflict, in addition to academics and journalists, which I believe lends balance, depth and credibility to the research. The journalists in particular are individuals who have covered the conflict at length and in detail and correspondingly developed deep and meaningful insights into the nuances of the Troubles and who critically were seen by all protagonists as balanced and fair in their coverage.
I am also aware that there remain divergent viewpoints within academia as to how interviews should be conducted. Platt (2001) notes that historically in the interview process, respondents were viewed as key informants and that in effect interviewees were perceived as experts in their respective fields, few questions were often asked so that informants could articulate their stories in their own way. As the 20th century developed controversies emerged pitting open versus closed questions, or whether standardised or quantitative interviews were superior to unstructured or qualitative interviews with associated implications for how respondents and interviewers were perceived. Gubrium and Holstein (2001) envisage interviews as a narrative process whereby both the respondent and interviewer take an active part in the process. Indeed they argue that interviewees should be perceived as ‘vessels of answers’ (p. 32) in response to questions seeking information without bias to the specific inquiry.

This concept that both parties are active subjects in the interview process reflecting both the social forces and the cultural framework that correspondingly inform the narrative discourse is reflected by both Dexter (2006) and Platt (2001), that such interviews are akin to a conversation amongst equals. Equally voice is subject to critique in such qualitative enquiry and remains one source of data and St. Pierre (2009) specifically warns that “a research methodology that privileges voice as the truest, most authentic data and/or evidence has to be problematic” (p. 221) and that the researcher must be mindful of how voice is interpreted. Dexter (2006) takes up this theme advocating ‘the third ear’ which allows a more nuanced interpretation and analysis of the meaning of what comes forth in interview. This view is supported by Yin (2008) that good case study relies not only on good questions but the inherent need to be a good listener, the ability to be adaptive and flexible allied to a clear understanding of the issues and threat of preconceived notions (p. 56).

Access to interviewees in the examination of such a controversial area as TKs presented a particular challenge. In this study, no interviewees were known to the researcher prior to the work, but having a professional knowledge of the issue of TKs and the cultural context in which they were practiced was a distinct advantage in gaining access. Having
gained access to some key players through initial communications, utilising ‘snowballing’ whereby they in turn facilitated access to other interviewees played a key role in the interview process. Hockey (1993) has noted how developing such rapport with respondents can in turn lead to fruitful contacts with other interviewees.

Respondents
The need to identify as broad a range of different perspectives from a multitude of respondents was identified at an early stage in this study. The identification of the range of respondents was designed in getting ‘buy-in’ from them for the scope of the study and getting the balance correct between the different groupings thereby ensuring an element of a multiple of sources while at the same time putting a realistic limit on the number of interviews to be conducted. A key strength of the interviewees selected is that they were targeted from a multitude of sources that were directly focused on the case study. Indeed Stake (1995) has acknowledged that the interview is the main road to multiple realities (p. 64), while Platt (2001) contends that “the interview remains an area of richly diverse practice about which few convincing generalisations can be made” (p. 24).

While these groups do not represent a technical representation because they have not been chosen statistically nonetheless the cross-spectrum represented in the sample can give me answers that others cannot. Getting the balance right between each group of interviewees be they security forces, former PIRA activists or academics and journalists and correspondingly getting the strengths from each group and how it represents not only an overall opportunity to harvest rich research data but also is a sample that can give answers that others cannot. Effectively it is what is termed an elite sample, these are people who can give very specific answers and who are practitioners in the field. All interviewees invited to participate, willingly agreed to participate.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Former Paramilitaries/Affiliated Political Organisations</th>
<th>British Army</th>
<th>Journalists &amp; Authors</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>RUC</th>
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<tr>
<td>Danny Morrison (Sinn Féin)</td>
<td>Brig. Gen Robin Brims (Retd)</td>
<td>Peter Miller, Foreign Editor Irish Times</td>
<td>Prof. Richard English St. Andrews University, author of ‘Armed Struggle.’</td>
<td>Officer A (Retd) Special Branch Officer in Southern Region.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Séanna Walsh (PIRA), Coiste na nlarchimí, West Belfast.</td>
<td>David McKittrick Freelance Journalist, editor of Lost Lives.</td>
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<td>Billy Hutchinson (Former UVF, MLA for PUP)</td>
<td>Mark Urban Diplomatic Editor of Newsnight, author of ‘Big Boys Rules.’</td>
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<td>Tommy McKearney (PIRA), former East Tyrone Brigade Commander. Writer and commentator. Author of ‘The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament.’</td>
<td>Ed Moloney Freelance Journalist, author of ‘A Secret History of the IRA.’</td>
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<td>Mr. A–Survivor of Clonoe TK.</td>
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Table 1: List of Interviewees. See Appendix J.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{46}\) The interviewees are listed in Appendix J which also includes a biography of each interviewee. This Appendix should be read in advance of Chapters V, VI and VII which examine the three clusters that encompass the primary case study.
Reflexivity as Defence against Bias, Subjectivity and ‘Positionality’

Reflexivity itself is a much discussed and often contested concept, but in general reflexivity is an explicit self consciousness about the researcher’s social, political and value positions, in relation to how these might have influenced the design, execution and interpretation of the theory, data and conclusions (Griffiths, 1998: Greenbank, 2003). The point is we all need to maintain reflective practices about how our own positionality inserts itself in what we do. Sultanna (2007) points to a need to maintain reflexivity and practice it consciously and consistently as the research progresses, I consciously therefore practiced reflexivity as it kept positionality in check throughout the interview process, the latter being everything I as a person brought to the academic study and therefore reflexivity allowed a higher reading of the answers that were obtained in interview. I am also aware that researchers not only take political and ethical stances, but they also inhabit them. Like all human beings they inhabit specific social roles and specific historical, geographical locations. This brings into focus the bias of the researcher. Griffiths (1998) believes that “bias comes from having ethical and political positions, this is inevitable, but not acknowledging them.” She also posits that “not only does such acknowledgement help to unmask any bias that is implicit in those views, but it helps to provide a way of responding critically and sensitively to the research” (p. 133). I have sought as far as possible to eliminate bias from this work.

My research focused on what effects TKs have on cycles of violence and it was critical to pay attention to positionality, reflexivity and the power relationships that are inherent in research processes in order to undertake ethical research. In the words of Sultana (2007) “reflecting on my own positionality vis-à-vis the way others constructed my identity helped in more fully engaging in reflexivity, that enabled engagement with the research process in a more meaningful way” (p. 382) and therefore this allowed me analyse answers that fitted the requirements of the respondents rather than the interviewer.
Epistemology

Epistemology is an aspect of the philosophy of knowledge dealing with the nature, sources and limits of knowledge. It asks what is knowledge, how do we go about getting it and how do we know what we know (Patton, 1990). My epistemology is shaped by my upbringing and life experiences. My epistemological approach therefore results from my socialisation, my career choice and my educational background. As a Southern Irish nationalist with a European liberal outlook on life I was acutely aware of the controversy surrounding the ‘Shoot to Kill’ period in Northern Ireland. My military training instilled in me a respect for order. The impression of military organisations is one that is mechanical in nature, rigid, formal and routine (Morgan, 2006). This indeed reflects the design and structure of the Irish Defence Forces.

I have been the beneficiary of a broad general education process both internal to the Defence Forces and through the USAC scheme. Foot (2002) contends that modern militaries provide “education opportunities that are institutionally challenging, intellectually exciting, and potentially carry great risk” (p. 100) thus developing professional reflection and an ability to see behind issues. In effect, military culture demands officers who are flexible, adaptable and who think outside the box. These factors I believe are inherent within the Defence Forces. Therefore I have military understanding and military education to a high level. When asking questions about military and strategic decisions I have a professional level of understanding of these issues.

In 2005 as a Military Observer on the Golan Heights I was stationed in Israel during a period of renewed application of the Israeli TK policy, this experience in the field where it was possible to see both the application and the impacts without fully understanding in many ways the underlying effects of this tactic afforded me an awareness of the accuracy of Mason’s (2002) admonishment that “a researcher cannot be neutral, or objective, or

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47 The USAC scheme allows commissioned officers to attend University or Third Level institutions. The overall objective of the scheme is to broaden the horizons of officers. It stresses the importance of the military as a component of Irish society and encourages officers to engage in all aspects of university life.
detached, from the knowledge and evidence that they are generating” (p.6). Northern Ireland’s situation has been so pervasive, so polarising in its effect that very few people, Irish or outsider seem able to take a dispassionate view of what has occurred. In this respect I consider myself to be no different than anyone else with my own ingrained sympathies and prejudices, nevertheless I have attempted in what follows to be objective even if a deep and predictable prejudice against all forms of terrorism will be quite obvious in my analysis. I will endeavour despite my ingrained epistemology to be “sufficiently rigorous and appropriate to the research question” (Rudestam and Newton, 2001:26).

While therefore acknowledging that my own life and career experience has shaped my epistemology and the lens through which I see the world, I strove to be as objective as possible and allow my epistemology to frame my research but to avoid any distortion. My aim was to be a reflexive researcher by thinking critically about the purpose and nature of my research, confronting where necessary, challenging and often reviewing my own initial assumptions as well as recognising the extent to which my thoughts, actions and decisions shaped my research (Mason, 2002).

Awareness of my epistemology leads me to an acknowledgement that my philosophical outlook is embedded in the positivist tradition. A positivist approach assumes the full understanding can only be discovered using scientific experiment and observation (Antonesa, et al., 2006). Hence my professional and academic background is steeped in this conventional approach. Military training cultivates a clinical approach to problem solving. Such martial schooling examines problems in black and white terms with a view to researching logical conclusions by way of calculated evaluation of data. It is a mechanical research method which can yields effective results.

However in acknowledging my own epistemology, the difficulty I faced centred on designing a methodology and associated research framework influenced by my natural inclination towards a positivist tradition. The type of work encapsulated in Hafez and Hatfield (2006) framework in its current quantitative form was nested within this
positivist outlook. Taking account therefore of my research philosophy, and conscious of the need to avoid my own predilection for reductionism, I chose a qualitative approach to my research because as Mason (2002) highlights qualitative research provides a wider basis from which to produce “well founded cross-contextual generalities” (p. 1).

I realised that I needed to move from that framework in its current quantitative form to a much less evident, less obvious but richer and deeper interpretative type reading, because this case study suggests the need for a fluid, malleable research process that “can move easily around a ‘constellation’ of potential informants and data types” (Visser, 2000: 16). I was conscious that knowledge created in this way is co-owned by the researcher and those who are subjects in the research and as Brookfield (1987) has noted “that a critically reflective stance towards our practice is healthily ironic” (p. 5). This requirement to adopt an interpretative position will be justified in the following section.

‘Positionality’
A key concern for a research is the identification of the core issues that are pertinent to a comprehensive and in-depth study of the particular topic that the work addresses. In effect this ‘sensitising’ is identifying the ‘knowns’ and the unknowns of a situation. As part of the sensitising process I have identified my own ‘positionality’ as a possible problem. The unknowns include how the researcher gets talking to key people as part of the interview process and identifying the sample for same. At all times the researcher approached these issues with an open mind.

When conducting research the positionality of the researcher vis-à-vis the researched can significantly influence access to informants and information (Herod, 1993; Cochrane, 1998; McDowell, 1998; cited by Visser, 2000: 7) and understanding positionality is crucial to understanding the subjectivity of researchers (Barton and St. Louis, 2002). Positionality refers to the social and political landscape inhabited by a researcher, which are determined by a multitude of factors including gender, nationality, race, religion, sexuality, social class and social status (Griffiths, 1998) How is my understanding of TKs impacting on the interviewees that are hearing my questions? It does not matter
whether they are insurgents or security forces, they still responded in a military way to a question from a military professional regardless of being in uniform or not. Therefore in the words of Barton and St. Louis (2002) “in reflecting on my own positionality, I find that I position myself and am positioned in various contexts (p. 2). I therefore got a better response to questions because of my positionality than others might. This stemmed from the need to recognise reflexivity and practice it consciously and consistently across the research.

Research positionality is central to the access that was garnered in interview, this leads to what is termed the ‘insider-outsider’ position which is the contention that the interviewer may be perceived as an insider or outsider when conducting the research (Visser, 2000). The argument therefore is that I get much deeper and richer responses from someone who sees me as an insider if asking the right sort of questions then someone who perceives me as an outsider who does not really understand the milieu from which they emanate. I feel that my role and experience as a member of the Defence Forces, both at home and abroad lends me a passport to cross cultural lines that are normally so rigid, thereby allowing me unique access to many of the interviewees who contributed to this work across the spectrum of the Northern Ireland conflict. I can therefore legitimately argue that I have an insider credibility and status with both groups of respondents, insurgents and security forces as someone who has a military background and training and demonstrating professional military respect to their military experience. This impacted on the strength of the answers that came forth in interview and as Visser (2000) relates “not only was researcher positionality central to my access to informants and information but was the intersection of politics, time and research project’s focus” (p. 13). From the perspective of this study, the politics relates directly to the Northern Ireland conflict, time in this case concerns the retrospective examination of TKs over a specific period of time during which TKs were utilised in a very intensive manner and the research project’s focus in this study is getting an understanding of whether TKs work or not using the four pillars of Hafez and Hatfield (2006).
In coining the research questions, a key area examined was if in fact the interviewees recognised instances of the four pillars of deterrence, disruption, backlash and diminishing capability, and also to what degree if in recognising it, how did they react. Equally if they did not recognise it, how did they react? I was conscious that the conclusion may revolve around the action designed to deliver an effect being actually recognised as such by the Target Audience (TA). The data point collection net, that I then subsequently developed (Appendix H), with its associated ‘nodes,’ is related to and stems from the Hafez & Hatfield (2006) paradigm, but analysed through a qualitative lens; this acted as a reference point to assist in the investigative interrogation of the four pillars that are encompassed within the Hafez & Hatfield paradigm. It is important to emphasise that this data collection net was used merely as a reference point; in effect as a guide and was not envisaged as an absolute rigid template. It was merely a fulcrum, a sign-post that assisted me in developing pertinent and focused research questions. Hence, the questions for the field research of the semi-structured variety were based on not only the Hafez & Hatfield paradigm and its four associated pillars, but also guided by this data collection net. But equally having conducted an extensive literature review prior to the interview process other key themes emerged that were intimately linked to TKs which in turn were ‘fed’ into my field research questions; include inter alia, the ever evolving and changing political situation and how it impacted on the course of the PIRA campaign particularly the rise of Sinn Féin post the Hunger Strikes of 1981.

Data Collection/Field Work
The principle source of data collection was based on semi-structured interviewees who on balance presented the key method for extracting the type of information required for this field research. Conscious that this method suited the subject matter, the sources and indeed myself as the researcher, I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews as my research method in order to “gain understanding of how the interviewee experiences aspects” of the tactic of TKs and gain a “shared understanding” (Ryan, 2006: 77) of the process and issues. The interviews were centred on a series of core questions but these were exploratory in nature and gave leeway to the respondents to engage freely in the interview process. Guidance was taken from Patton (2002) who suggests a combination
of the ‘general interview guide’ approach and the ‘standardised open-ended interview. The questions were based around the key tenets of the Hafez and Hatfield (2006) framework, namely deterrence, backlash, disruption and incapacitation and these four constituent pillars were utilised to evolve and develop questions that allowed me to focus on interesting lines of enquiry which were “developed and clarified” (Bell, 1999: 135) and thus provided a greater understanding of nuances and context so vital to the topic at hand. Examples of a cross-section of the type of questions posed include; what was your experience of the conflict? Did TKs trigger a ‘backlash’ effect within republicanism, in other words the desire to strike back with more deadly force? What effect did penetration of PIRA by both informers and/or agents have on militant republicanism? A list of the generic interview question can be found at Appendix I.

In total twenty four interviewees were interviewed. The sample selection used was “purposeful sampling” (Kane and O'Reilly-de Brún, 2001: 100). Primarily the interviews were conducted with a number of retired members of the security forces who had experience of the conflict in Northern Ireland in addition to former PIRA volunteers. Some had directly experienced violence during the course of the Troubles and consequently their shared experiences represented a variety of circumstances, regions and experience of the conflict. In addition journalists and academics were sought out who had a particular unique insight into the events as they unfolded and who have written critically acknowledged work on the conflict and in particular the topic of TKs from either a journalistic or academic perspective. It was critically important to shape the selection of the sample in order to interview a diverse group who represent, not only the diverse nature of the Northern Ireland conflict, but also the different epochs as they evolved and developed in the tactic of TKs as it was both utilised and experienced.

Most length of interviews varied somewhat and lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. All respondents were given the opportunity for anonymity but only three choose to seek this and they were given absolute assurances in this regard. The majority of the interviews were conducted in Northern Ireland, primarily in Belfast, but also in County Monaghan and Tyrone. Two with former members of the British army were conducted
in London. Two of the interviews with Irish Times journalists were conducted in Dublin, and for logistical reasons and unavailability to meet personally four interviews were conducted via e-mail. In total the interview process involved the recording of some thirty hours of voice data which was transcribed and encoded. In only one instance was it found necessary to conduct a follow-up interview which was done via means of a series of clarifying questions sent via e-mail to one respondent. It was realised at an advanced stage of research that there existed a lacuna in the interview process in that only one interviewee was from East Tyrone PIRA which had become the main focus of the research. This was mitigated when after much assistance from an academic intermediary; a key interview with another former East Tyrone PIRA volunteer was obtained who had uniquely survived a TK. This was a key interview to obtain of great significance for the work. Unfortunately it was not possible to specifically interview former members of the FRU, 14th Intelligence Coy (Det), or indeed another member of the SAS actually involved in a TK.

The following table illustrates an outline of the time frame of this thesis, including the period when the majority of the interview process took place.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Progression</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Time Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify &amp; Define Research Topic</td>
<td>Initial readings in area of TKs.</td>
<td>(2007-2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>Scoping papers and initial literature review.</td>
<td>(2008-2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodolopy/Decision/Interim Findings</td>
<td>Updated scoping paper</td>
<td>(2010-2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Field Research</td>
<td>Interview respondents</td>
<td>(2011-2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write-up &amp; present Final Draft,</td>
<td>Refine literature review,</td>
<td>(2012-2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contextualise findings, Editing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Research Timeframe.*

The corresponding associated field work was a two stage process, firstly consisting of a thematic review against the main areas of concern where interests were identified in the literature which in turn helped determine the question frame and the answers that were
obtained in interview, this then allowed patterning and clustering of same based on the Yin (2008) model, which will be extrapolated upon below and as illustrated in Figure 2. This process was the entry point to the second part of the field work which allowed a forensic analysis of the data with reference to the research framework through a critical lens.

**Coding and Analysis**

In analysing data the approach advanced by Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun (2001) has been adapted. They advocate, to initially reduce data, structure and organise in accordance with the broad topics identified during the literature review. I then streamlined the material thereby allowing me to recognise patterns and identify any newly emerging themes. Data coding and analysis of qualitative research provides the researcher with particular challenges. Where possible, clusters of information were identified, in addition to possible relationships between themes. Following this, a more detailed analysis was conducted to look for any premises inherent in the data concerning particular themes. Cross referencing with literature was initiated as required, once satisfied that my initial findings were valid, some initial conclusions were drawn. The data to be used must be systematically organised, interpreted and coded to “produce a meaningful and trustworthy conclusion (Bassey, 1999: 84). The information collected through interviews was then consolidated and re-examined in order to get a feel for the whole as Creswell (2005) recommends. As advocated by Yin (2008), a variant of the dashed-line feedback loop as illustrated in Figure 3 was utilised which provided a simple yet solid architecture for data collection and analysis.
Cluster Study Model adapted from Yin (2008)

Define and Design
- Develop Theory
- Select clusters
  - Design data collection protocol

Prepare, Collate & Analyse
- Conduct 1st Cluster
  - Write Individual Cluster Report
- Conduct 2nd Cluster
  - Write individual cluster Report
- Conduct 3rd Cluster
  - Write Individual Cluster Report

Analyze & Conclude
- Draw cross cluster conclusion
  - Modify Theory
  - Develop policy implications
  - Write cross cluster report

Figure 3. Cluster Study Model adapted from Yin (2008)
Ethics

All researchers must be cognisant of the paramount importance of maintaining the highest standards consistently from an ethical perspective. Indeed Sultana (2007) has noted that “in order to undertake ethical research, it is critical to pay attention to positionality, reflexivity, the production of knowledge and the power relations inherent in research processes (p. 382). In practical terms I have adopted the ethical practice laid down pursuant to the guidelines issued by the Research Ethics Committee at DCU. Respondents were initially contacted informally where they were given an opportunity to examine a general outline of the research proposal, prior to being formally requested to participate in the research process through the medium of semi-structured interviews.

Additionally an undertaken was given to all interviewees that a full transcript of the thesis relating to them would be forwarded to them for comment, additionally any respondents who had a difficulty with the inclusion of any particular comments had the inherent right to insist that such comments would be removed or adjusted. Where interviewees sought anonymity they were given a formal written undertaking that this would be respected and that their identity under any circumstances would not be revealed. At all times the researcher was guided by the wise counsel of Bassey (1999) that even though this was a laborious and time consuming process it nonetheless contributed to the trustworthiness of the research.

Limitations of this Study

The main limitation of this research was that a single data collection method, namely semi-structured interviews was utilised and correspondingly this did not allow for methodological triangulation to be conducted whereby more than one technique is used to collect similar information. While aware of Hamersley and Atkinson (1983) warning that “one should not adapt a naively optimistic view that the aggregation of data from different sources will ‘unproblematically’ add up to a more complete picture” (p. 199), this was countered by the use of “data triangulation” (Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun, 2001: 110), through the variety of the chosen sample and their very diverse experiences. Hence this allowed a portrayal of what Clifford and Valentine
(2003) have termed using “different sources of information to try and maximise an understanding of the research question” (p. 8).

Chapter Summary
This research related to a unique historical event in the study of TKs. This inclined the study towards a qualitative methodological design with its interpretative research variant. As a researcher steeped in military culture and traditions, this approach necessitated an in-depth self epistemological examination. Following this personal appraisal, a case study model approach was deemed the most suitable vehicle for extracting information on the utility of TKs as practiced in East Tyrone for the period under review. The next chapter is designed to give the reader a detailed historical background to the Northern Ireland conflict. Encompassed within this there will also be a discussion on the evolution and development of a TK policy nested within an overarching security policy, and related to this the evolution of PIRA into the most formidable insurgency in Western Europe since WW II.
CHAPTER IV

NORTHERN IRELAND IN CONTEXT

Historical Background

The prolonged and often bloody conflict witnessed in Northern Ireland (Figure 4) between 1969 and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (1998) has often been euphemistically referred to as the ‘Troubles’ and witnessed a large scale terrorism campaign initiated by PIRA that was unequalled in its intensity and ferocity in the history of Western Europe since the Second World War. The ‘Troubles’ claimed the lives of some 3,700 people (McKittrick et al., 1999). The often visceral sectarian nature of the conflict that pitted Protestant unionist and Catholic nationalist has its roots in the settler-native confrontations of the 17th century plantations. But as Edwards (2011) has noted this most recent phase of conflict can be traced to the partition of Ireland and the formation of a separate Northern Ireland statelet in the 1920s, which witnessed following the Irish War of Independence (1919-21), a Treaty that established the twenty six county Irish Free State but maintained the status of the six Northern counties (Ulster) as an intrinsic part of the UK with a regional assembly at Stormont, Belfast. Northern Ireland was thus born in violent conflict. It is a society rooted in an ethnic/religious divide. The 19th century was noted for the sectarian conflagrations that recurred regularly, especially in Belfast. During the period of the Second World War,

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48 Generally, Catholic nationalists are those who while espousing a united Ireland hold to the credo that this should be solely through democratic and non-violent means, Catholic republicans conversely argue that a united Ireland can legitimately be achieved through violent/militant means. Conversely in the Protestant community, Unionists are those who adhere to democratic principles to maintain the Union with Great Britain while Protestant loyalists believe that armed force where necessary can be used to defend the Union and prevent a united Ireland.

49 Protestant unionists/loyalists who wish to maintain the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland use the term ‘Northern Ireland’ and ‘the province.’ Irish nationalists/republicans who aspire to a United Ireland use the terms ‘the North’ and ‘the six counties.’ After the Irish Republican Army (IRA) split in 1969-70, those who remained with the old leadership became known as the Official IRA; those who left formed the Provisional IRA (PIRA); (Edwards, 2011).
Southern Ireland or Éire\textsuperscript{50} remained neutral while Northern Ireland played a significant role in the British war effort as a manufacturing hub and saw several thousand US troops stationed there throughout the duration of the war.

But half a century of Stormont government, while it had been successful in manipulating the ethnic divide, had done little to mitigate it. In 1969, the Catholic minority suffered considerable discrimination at the hands of the Protestant majority. Catholics were generally excluded from the Civil Service, the judiciary and managerial positions in Ulster’s industries.

During the late 1960s the Civil Rights movement\textsuperscript{51} took up many of the main Catholic grievances, but belated efforts were unable to contain growing Catholic street action

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\textsuperscript{50} In 1948 Irish Taoiseach John A. Costello declared his intent to lead the Free State (Éire) out of the Commonwealth and declared a Republic, in turn the British government reaffirmed the status of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the UK in the Government of Ireland Act, 1949.

\textsuperscript{51} In the late 1960s a conglomerate of Catholics, nationalists, republicans and agnostic socialists, along with a handful of Protestants opposed to unionist dominance founded the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
or keep Protestant militants in check who counter-demonstrated often forcibly against the Civil Rights movement. The situation was exacerbated by militant loyalists and small elements of the local Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the auxiliary Ulster Special Constabulary, the latter referred to as the ‘B’ Specials but also conversely some emerging militant elements within the Civil Rights movement. Thus both communities were propelled into direct confrontation with each other. In the heightened atmosphere of the 1969 summer marching season, Catholic nationalist protesters were in open conflict with their Protestant neighbours and the police, the latter drawn predominantly from the Protestant community. Widespread sectarian rioting led to the formation of vigilante groups as respective communities openly clashed. The Police were increasingly unable to contain the increasing violence and into this heated vacuum, British army troops were called out ‘in aid to the civil power’ in August 1969 to contain the growing agitation.

The conflict escalated in 1970 when the PIRA began a campaign of terrorist warfare against the security forces. In the next section we will examine the evolution of this revolutionary organisation.

The Rise of the Phoenix

The Provisional IRA (PIRA) whose origin can be traced directly to the violence in Belfast on 15 August 1969, was indeed the main beneficiary of rising Catholic alienation (O’Brien, 2005: 25). The IRA in its various manifestations is arguably the oldest continuous revolutionary movement in Europe whose lineage members argue can be traced back to a series of Irish revolutionary movements since the 1790s. It is a defining motif within this revolutionary milieu that the old guard has passed the metaphorical republican flame to each succeeding generation and that its spirit has re-

 Association (NICRA) in order to pursue what they saw as an end to partisan Stormont rule and associated discrimination in housing and allocation of jobs (Edwards, 2011).

52 For many generations the summer period traditionally witnesses a series of marches throughout Northern Ireland. These marches in particular are often led by the Orange Order. The largest of the ‘Loyal Orders’, it was founded in County Armagh in 1795 and by the time of the Home Rule controversies in the late nineteenth century, has expanded into an important politico-religious grouping which united all forms of unionism in opposition to Irish nationalism and British government efforts at constitutional change. Throughout its existence its tradition of marching, sometimes through nationalist districts, has caused controversy. Its extensive programme of marches culminates annually on July 12 in a commemoration of the victory of King William III at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. It should be noted that there are also nationalist marches during the summer season but not on the same scale as those organised by the Orange Order.
emerged Phoenix like from the ashes of a succession of failed insurrection attempts throughout this period.\textsuperscript{53} The pattern of modern Irish republican military activity has been very diverse. Since the Irish War of Independence (1919-21) there have been several mutations of the IRA from a mass movement of armed fighters in the Anglo-Irish War of Independence. Over the decades the movement has embraced an assortment of low intensity war techniques, ranging from anti-colonial guerrilla warfare in the early twentieth century, terrorist bombings of Britain in the late 1930s, rural insurgent warfare in the 1956-62 Border Campaign, through to a social revolutionary strategy of the 1960s and the largely urban guerrilla campaign in the early 1970s, ending up in the late 1980s with a dual military/electoral strategy (Smith, 1995).

1969: The Troubles Erupt

The spiralling events of 1969/70 caught the IRA as unprepared as the British government, “in 1968, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was a moribund organisation” (Silke, 2005: 242); where in 1969 there had only been a handful of members across Belfast, “with poor structure and associated command and control, by the end of the year the IRA had split into two organisations and mushroomed in size to almost 1,000 members” (Edwards, 2011: 23). PIRA thus emerged as a splinter from what is now known as the Official IRA (OIRA) in 1969-70. This split had been preceded by an internal political debate that had been ongoing within the organisation that reflected the \textit{zeitgeist} of the 1960s. This reassessment came about because by the mid 1960s the IRA “had become little more than a folk memory among ordinary Catholics in Northern Ireland” (Neumann, 2009: 37). Its last major effort to eject the British from Northern Ireland, the so-called Border Campaign had ended in an embarrassing defeat.\textsuperscript{54} In 1969 the then IRA pre-split “was under southern command [Dublin] and heavily influenced by Marxists” (Dingley, 2009: 55), who argued that

\textsuperscript{53} This revolutionary heritage stems back to the establishment of the United Irishmen in 1791 by the founding father of revolutionary republicanism Theobold Wolfe Tone and subsequently defeated in the great rebellion of 1798. This was followed by an abortive Dublin putsch led by Robert Emmet in 1803 followed by the Young Ireland Movement of the 1840s, through to the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) also known as the Fenians who led a botched rising in 1867. This in turn spawned the IRB/Volunteer movement of the Easter rising of 1916, which in turn morphed into the IRA in 1920.

\textsuperscript{54} Differences within the IRA were exacerbated by the failure of ‘Operation Harvest,’ the IRAs Border Campaign fought from 1956 to 1962. From the military point of view, the campaign was a fiasco. Attacks were launched on border crossings, police barracks, military installations and the occasional BBC transmitter. Eighteen men died, six of them members of the IRA, twelve of them members of the security forces (Taylor, 1993: 114).
military activity should be limited, and envisaged a “scenario of a working class revolution across the island of Ireland in which armed resistance to British rule only played a subordinate role” (Neumann, 2009: 37). But it was the perceived inability of the IRA to defend Catholic communities in 1969 that hastened events. At a Sinn Féin/IRA Ard Fheis (main meeting) in January 1970 the republican movement formally split into Official IRA (OIRA) and Provisional IRA (PIRA), and it was the latter that were increasingly to be the vanguard in the newly launched republican military offensive.

The situation was exacerbated by the military techniques initially used by the British which completely backfired; internment without trial and the Falls Curfew turned out to be major propaganda victories for PIRA and had the effect of turning passive observers into PIRA recruits (Clarke, 2009).

Silke (2005) contends that “from being a parochial joke, the IRA [PIRA] became a fiercely supported organisation…which in time became the largest, best equipped, best funded terrorist organisation in the Western world” (p. 243). Beggan (2009) argues that the escalation of political violence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1999 resulted from the state’s reliance on repression and this had conflicting effects contributing to the rise in violence. Perhaps the most important finding of this particular research was that a state’s reliance on repression is positively associated with more insurgent violence (p. 705). Two distinct forms of repression used in Northern Ireland, formal and informal were identified in research by White and Falkenberg-White (1995) which contributed to the escalation of violence in Northern Ireland. They assert that formal repression took the form of policies legitimately authorised by the state (internment) and, whereas informal repression (Bloody Sunday) usually took the form of unsanctioned repression undertaken by state agents such as military personnel or the police. The severity of this informal activity dramatically reduced the legitimacy of the state and ignited Lichbach’s (1987) substitution effect. On PIRAs side, it was considered that the denial of Irish national

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55 On 29 May 1972, OIRA announced a ceasefire, though it reserved the right to act in self defence and undertake defensive operations.
56 The Falls Curfew, which was implemented between July 3 and 5, 1970, was a thirty six-hour military curfew and search operation designed to locate IRA members and weapons stockpiles. The military killed four people and severely damaged several homes during the intervention (Lafree et al., 2009: 27).
rights was compounded by a day-to-day unfairness within the British state in Ireland and this overlapped with an emotional rage and a desire to hit back.

White (1989, 1993) in an examination of why people engaged in political violence interviewed members of PIRA and he was able to demonstrate that the decision to engage in political violence was influenced by two main factors (1) the use of repression by the state and (2) the interacting effect they encountered with other people experiencing state repression (e.g. internees being locked up together). White (1989) concluded that the repressive acts applied by the state had the end result of a “guarantee of support for the IRA” (p. 1298). Brighton bomber Patrick Magee had an IRA grandfather, but he has also stressed that his own arrest and beating at the hands of British soldiers played its part in leading him to join the IRA (English, 2009: 64). McCann (Irish Times: 12 June 2010) argues that “the events of “Bloody Sunday”57 catapulted working class Catholic communities across the North outside all notions of constitutionality, removing from the Stormount Parliament whatever legitimacy it had retained among Catholics. While one PIRA member argued that “the British security forces are the best recruiting’ officer we have” (Geraghty, 2006; cited by Dugan et al., 2009: 31). The Parliament at Stormont which had governed the North since partition was abolished eight weeks after Bloody Sunday. Moriarty (Irish Times: 16 June 2010) contends that “it should not be forgotten too how the events of Bloody Sunday inflamed the conflict, contributing to countless republican, loyalist and state killings and horrors.” Lord Saville in his report on the events of Bloody Sunday noted “what happened on Bloody Sunday strengthened PIRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed” (Moriarty, Irish Times: 16 June 2010). Similarly, while it is true that PIRA became a powerful force, with more recruits than it required, partly as a response to state aggression, it is also true that the state aggression was itself a response to prior insurrectionary provocation from amongst others, PIRA.

57 On 30 January 1972, during a Civil Rights demonstration in the Bogside area of Derry, British Paratroopers opened fire on the demonstrators killing thirteen civilians. A fourteenth died later in hospital. The Widgery Tribunal, was held in the immediate aftermath of the event. The Saville Inquiry, established in 1998, re-examined the events and was published on 15th June 2010.
Targeting Terrorists

What effect, if any did the targeting of terrorists have in bringing PIRA along the road to the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement 1998? A distinction exists between the killings carried out by the security forces as part of a counter-terrorist strategy, distinct from the counter-insurgency methods deployed in other situations\textsuperscript{58} (Kingston, 2007: 128). Drawing upon their wealth of experience in battling insurgencies, the British seemed well prepared to quell an uprising in Ulster, certainly familiar territory. Less than four days after the military was first deployed on the streets of Belfast in 1969, the General Officer Commanding of the army in Northern Ireland took over the entire security apparatus. O’Brien (2005) believes that this decision, “taken through necessity rather than volition, represented a subversion of the relationship in a democratic society between the army and the police” (p. 28). However, only after suffering serious setbacks did the British learn that their counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine could not simply be transplanted from one conflict to another (Charters, 1977: 25). Following the imposition of direct rule in 1972 there was a noticeable shift in British COIN policy in Northern Ireland. The army was ordered to become less visible and less intrusive while still battling insurgents. According to Charters (1977) because “Northern Ireland is constitutionally part of the United Kingdom, the problem is a domestic one, and politicians in London are more inclined to intervene directly in the actual conduct of security policy and operations” (p. 26).

Did a TK Policy Exist?

A number of factors combine to exclude mere coincidence and indicate that a TK policy operated during particular periods. The number of incidents and the circumstances in which they occurred, points towards a deliberate planning of operations, in which opportunities for the use of lethal force would arise. There were relatively few cases where lethal force was used by the security forces, and it was not the ‘norm’ for security forces to shoot to kill (Kingston, 2007: 135). In a limited set of circumstances a small group of specialist soldiers/police were given the

\textsuperscript{58} Much has been made of the writings of Brigadier Frank Kitson (born 1926) and his books, in particular Gangs and Counter-gangs (London, 1960, his Kenya experience), Low Intensity Operations (Oxford, 1970) and Bunch of Five (1977). British colonial policy and principles of counter insurgency predate this, but he researched its workings, updated and commented intelligently upon it.
opportunity to engage terrorists aggressively. Secondly in the vast majority of cases the people shot were activists of terrorist organisations. Thirdly, there was a judicial process post these events which the state facilitated. This is a key differentiation between Israel and Northern Ireland, where Israeli transparency for their responsibility in carrying out TKs is in marked contrast to Northern Ireland where the existence of such a policy was always denied. In practice, this was a somewhat more nuanced form of TKs, as the security forces only tried to kill militants who had either carried out an attack or were in the process of doing so.

Silke (07/04/09) in interview took up this theme. “The shoot to kill operations were carefully staged, allowing the IRA to strike first, the British approach was more nuanced [than the Israelis], because this muted any criticism of the policy in the UK.” This is a key difference between the Israelis and the Northern Ireland case study.

Whereas Israel certainly stands out as an example of a state that has embraced military force as a solution to terrorism. In Northern Ireland usages of TKs against insurgent groups have not been favoured; at least not openly. Unofficially the story has sometimes been very different. “UK governments for example certainly appeared to tolerate an undisclosed ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy in dealing with the IRA in the 1980s” (Silke, 2003: 215). In a number of high profile cases, PIRA/INLA members were shot dead by the security forces (usually elite SAS teams). In most cases, the security forces had detailed intelligence in advance of the terrorist attack and knew when and where the terrorists were planning to attack, what methods the terrorists were planning to use, where their staging areas were and even the identities of most or all of the terrorists involved, in circumstances where their non-violent arrest seemed readily achievable. “The ambushes were normally carried out after the IRA members had carried out an attack rather then before [the Gibraltar killings were an exception to this general rule]” (Silke, 2012: 177). The point that many of the victims were suspected republican activists and their killers were members of specialist units’ points in the direction that these operations were TKs (Jennings, 1990). Murray

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59 In his book, *Big Boys Rules* (1992), Mark Urban makes much of expressions such as ‘covert patrol’ and ‘Observation Post/Reactive’ used as euphemisms for ambushes staged against PIRA units. This ‘fudge factor’ principle was elaborated to describe the granting of some discretionary latitude to Special Forces soldiers who believed that they had caught PIRA volunteers ‘red-handed.’

60 It is worth noting that even in the case of the 1982 “Shoot to Kill” cases no evidence of a general policy was found by the European Court of Human Rights (Kingston, 2007: 137).
(1990) contends that “assassinations as administrative policy are not new in Northern Ireland…the shoot to kill policy became more ruthless after the Brighton Grand Hotel bombing of October 1984, when the IRA attempted to kill the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher” (p. 31). Clarke (2008) likewise asserts that as the ‘supergrass’ trials collapsed and came to be viewed as a waste of operational intelligence, that a ‘shoot to kill’ policy was implemented and unofficially sanctioned by the highest reaches of the British government. “Indeed, for several years immediately following the end of the ‘supergrass’ trials, a large number of PIRA members were shot by the security forces” (p. 12). Taylor describes the shoot to kill policy as ‘selective assassination’ (Taylor, 1997: 268). “By the mid-eighties the intelligence…was very precise, with sophisticated electronic surveillance supplementing the information supplied by agents; and informers within the IRA’s ranks,” (English, 2003: 253). In particular, “the increased monitoring and penetration of PIRA led to a rise in the number of counter-ambushes mounted by the security forces, most notably by the Special Air Service (SAS)” (Smith, 1995: 188). Similarly Bamford and Bradley (2005), argues that “it appeared that in certain situations the security forces had abandoned the route to prosecution that was the desired outcome under the policy of ‘police primacy’ in favour of a more militaristic response” (p. 596). Geraghty (1998) posits that “there were cases where minimum force, legal and illegal lethal force were so close as to be indistinguishable” (p. 123). Geraghty (1998) makes the additional point that because many of those killed by the SAS had already been through the criminal courts at least once and had chosen to live as outlaws rather than making their political point without violence “the SAS campaign, from now on, was a conflict in which orthodox soldiers had little or no part” (p. 23).

Southern (2009) in his analysis of the RUC during the conflict noted that RUC respondents to his research consistently argued against a shoot-to-kill policy “It was acknowledged that killing terrorists was not the best of options, because it helped nourish the ideological grounds for political violence” (p.195). Additionally such killings generated a ‘tit-for-tat’ cycle of revenge killings and were therefore

61 The ‘supergrass’ trials lasted from 1982-1985. A supergrass is a police informer, usually paid. These trials were based on the testimony of captured terrorists who sought a more lenient sentence and the promise of admission into the witness protection programme. Ultimately, the ‘supergrass’ trials were an abysmal failure. Many witnesses recanted their testimony, or in subsequent appeals their testimony was found to be unsafe.
ultimately, from a cost benefit analysis unproductive, in effect a zero sum game “within the communities from which the terrorist came the killing of terrorists is likely to psychologically condition those communities to an acceptance of the killings of members of the security forces” (p. 195). Holland and Phoenix (1996) argue that “police officers interviewed both publicly and privately that there was no such policy, and contend that the rarity of incidents such as those that led to the Stalker inquiry would suggest that they are right” (p. 130). But the shootings that will be examined in Cluster I and the subsequent trials exposed the RUC as never before and helped influence policy makers towards a decision to “strengthen the SASs role in counter-terrorism operations” (p. 130). Security force sources interviewed by me are all insistent that a TK policy did not exist. They view as naïve criticism that heavily armed, disciplined and motivated ASUs could have been apprehended and captured without minimum force (which may have been lethal) under the Rules of Engagement (ROEs, See Glossary). Additionally that their own intelligence picture was not all encompassing as sometimes portrayed in the media and academia, in that they might know of the prospect of a potential attack but not all the exact details, such as the precise identity of the PIRA volunteer’s within the ASUs.

The Rise of the Paramilitaries and the State Response

Following on from this, I wish to provide a brief overview of the historic development as well as the key institutional dynamics of the main state military and paramilitary groupings that were active throughout the current Northern Ireland conflict. This is to set in context not only the main actors but to provide sufficient context in which the utility of TKs can be discussed and analysed.

The wide scale eruption of violence in Northern Ireland in August 1969 took both the IRA and British government by surprise. The manner in which each responded to this violence, and their respective actions as circumstances developed during the ensuing years, played a major part in influencing the duration and outcome of the conflict. Part of this was the use of the tactic of TKs by the security forces. For reasons of operational intelligence gathering or masking of anti-terror methods, information of a certain percentage of thwarted terrorist attacks remains classified and may not be available. But in the case of Northern Ireland there is much data and statistics that has
been collated from the events of the Troubles (McKeown, 2001; revised 2009; McKittrick, 1999).

The Troubles

As Figure 5 demonstrates, most of the violence perpetrated during the Troubles has been the responsibility of Irish republican groups. A number of republican paramilitary organisations were active in Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles, but it was PIRA and its associated capabilities that posed the most potent threat. PIRA was generally conceived as a sophisticated, intelligence-led insurgent group because of its capability and operational precision (Smith, 1995: 145; Irwin & Mahony, 2009: 205).

The statistics for terrorist attacks and for the death toll in Northern Ireland show a dramatic rise in all types of terrorist activities from 1970 onwards. In July 1972, the climax of the PIRA strategy of ‘one big push’ there were 200 explosions and 2,800 shootings resulting in the deaths of seventy four civilians and twenty one members of the security forces (Figures 6 and 7; Appendix A and B). Almost all of this violence was generated by PIRA. From the beginning the PIRA posed a significant challenge to the security forces, which as time passed became even more lethal as PIRA

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The ‘one big bush’ strategy initiated by PIRA at the outset of the Troubles envisaged an overwhelming military onslaught that would force a British withdrawal. This was subsequently replaced in the mid 1970s by a new reappraised strategy of the Long War, which acknowledged that the British could not be overwhelmed at any given point in time, “but that victory could be achieved through a ‘long war’ of attrition” (Neumann, 2009: 39).
displayed growing sophistication and ability to adapt (Figure 6; Appendix A). As Brigadier James Glover\(^63\) observed, this was an organisation that was “constantly learning from mistakes and developing its expertise” (Moloney, 2002: 174). Parallel to this PIRA continued to broaden its technical ability and hone its TTPs through both procurement and constant innovation and adaptability. This technical proficiency, and the growing confidence that it generated, allowed PIRA to broaden the scope of its targeting.

![Figure 6. Deaths Due to Security Situation in Northern Ireland 1969-1998 (Irwin and Mahoney, 2009)](image1)

![Figure 7. Security Related Incidents in Northern Ireland 1969-1998.](image2)

**Dynamics of Violence**

The dynamics of violence in the years 1968-2001 demonstrates that there were significant fluctuations within the basic framework imposed by the republicans’ ideological and strategic posture. Irwin and Mahoney (2009) have noted that following the introduction of the Armalite rifle as illustrated in Appendix A, the number of recorded shooting incidents rose from 213 in 1970 to 1,756 in 1971 to 10,631 in 1972, with the British army casualty rate rising correspondingly (Figure 6; Appendix B). In 1971, when the Armalite rifle was first introduced, forty three soldiers were killed, forty two from gunshot wounds, by 1972 this had risen to 105 killed, sixty four of whom are were killed by gunshots (Figure 6; Appendix B). Equally the introduction of other weapons systems such as the RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher, heavy calibre sniper weapons and Road-Side-Bombs (RSBs)/Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) took a toll. The efficiency of the kill ratio also improved, one military assessment was that PIRA had to launch 191 attacks to kill a single member of the security forces; by 1984 the figure had fallen to one death for every eighteen attacks (Irwin and Mahoney, 2009: 211). But as the ‘Troubles’ evolved the security forces responded with an increasing array of interlocking and mutually supporting security measures which included the construction of bomb and mortar proof bases, intensive local protection patrols, and intelligence led search and interdiction operations. PIRAs killing rate of security forces, which can be used as a general indicator of paramilitary activity, dropped from 148 people in 1972 to seventy nine in 1973 (Figure 6; Appendix B). In the following years the PIRA campaign declined further, a 1975 ceasefire seriously weakened the organisation. In 1978, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason had claimed, “we are squeezing the terrorists like rolling up a toothpaste tube,” but in the words of the historian Jonathan Bardon PIRA consistently demonstrated “that there was still plenty of paste in the tube” (Bardon, Dec 31 2009: 12). Additionally in 1979 an internal British army analysis of PIRA *Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends*, prepared by Brig Gen James (later Sir James) Glover, the senior British army officer involved in Intelligence work in Northern Ireland, who had become Commander of Land Forces, Northern Ireland and known thereafter as ‘The Glover Report’ fell into

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64 Roy Mason (born 18 April 1924), British Labour Politician, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1976-1979.
the hands of PIRA (De Bréadún. & Bew, Dec 31 2009: 12). The leakage of the report was a source of embarrassment to the British government because of “the document’s contention that PIRA had the capacity and support to continue its activities for the foreseeable future” (p. 12).

**Play for a Tie**

While this was the case, the acknowledged growing technical sophistication of PIRA was matched by security forces innovation, as Appendix A demonstrates. This was correspondingly reflected in one out of every three IEDs being neutralised (Figure 7; Appendix C). The British army response across a wide spectrum was to both deprive and frustrate the PIRA of targeting opportunities, if an ambush by PIRA was anticipated the locale was put out of bounds to the security forces thus causing PIRA to wait for a target that simply did not appear. Jackson (2007) has referred to this as ‘playing for a tie’ (p. 83).

Every technical innovation of PIRA was matched and ultimately trumped by an opposing countermeasure, the detail of much of which remains secret. The focus was constantly evolving and shifting, as there was no single military response to counter PIRAs strategic adaptability. Allison (2009) has noted that in countering PIRAs increasing technical innovation “one discipline, working in isolation, will not defeat the bomber; it has to be a combined effort if it is to be successful” (p. 123-124). Correspondingly as PIRA extended its campaign both within Northern Ireland and beyond its borders, so the security forces pooling and sharing intelligence resources both internally and with other international agencies, met such surges either defensively or more actively in the form of TKs.

**PIRA Reorganisation~ ‘One Big Push’ to ‘Long War’**

The late 1970s were not only a time of flux for the security forces; PIRA was also experiencing profound changes. The organisation was trying to regain the initiative after the collapse of the 1975 ceasefire, after which many PIRA members drifted away. Consequently, for PIRA the ‘Big Push’ strategy became more difficult to
sustain. Adams and McGuinness introduced a new doctrine, which postulated that it was not possible to overwhelm the enemy at any given point in time, the so called “one big push,” but that victory could be achieved through a ‘long war’ of attrition. Smith (1995) has argued that the long war approach adopted in the late 1970s is a perfect self-justifying strategic framework. It allows the movement [PIRA], to proceed in “tandem with an intellectual rationale which excuses present failure with the promise of future success” (p. 225). Thus he contends that “Tiocfaidh ár lá – our day will come – “is more than a meaningless republican slogan” (p. 225).

PIRAs Strategic Adaptability- The ASUs

It was plain that PIRA continued to regard physical force in the period 1983 to 1990 as the key component in their campaign to obtain a British withdrawal. Smith (1995) believes that “given the extent of infiltration by the security forces in the 1970s, it was quite obvious that PIRA could not have carried on with the battalion structure without jeopardising the survival of the movement (p. 188). To prepare the organisation for such a ‘long war’ they restructured the PIRA along cellular lines and imposed stricter discipline (Appendix E).67

The most important rationale was that far too many people knew ‘who was who’ in their local PIRA infrastructure, exposing the organisation to informers. Additionally maintaining the administrative structure of companies and battalions required the recruitment of too many unreliable people, most of whom were involved in administration and not operations (Urban, 1992). Under the reorganisation the people

65 Gerry Adams (born 6 October 1948) is an Irish republican politician and President of Sinn Féin since 1983. He was interned twice during the Troubles and was instrumental in the emergence of Sinn Féin as a major political force, especially post the hunger strike of 1981. Currently TD for Louth in the ROI.

66 Martin McGuinness (born 23 May 1950), Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland since 2007. In 1972 he was second in command of PIRA in Derry, served two sentences for PIRA related activities in ROI, alleged subsequently to have been officer commanding PIRA Northern Command. He was Sinn Féin Chief Negotiator in the lead up to the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (1998).

67 In 1977 PIRAs GHQ staff commissioned a report to examine both the structure and long term military plans of the organisation. The Staff Report recommended a ‘reorganisation and remotivation’ of PIRA, to that end tougher anti-interrogation training was recommended along with the dissolution of the old Battalions and Companies to be replaced by Cells or Active Service Units (ASUs), which would operate independently from each other and receive information through an anonymous hierarchy. This would limit the scope of infiltration and restrict the damage that could be done by informers or interrogations (Smith, 1995: 145).
who actually carried out acts of violence were regrouped into cells, drawing on the experience of urban guerrilla movements in Latin American countries. PIRA called its new cells Active Service Units (ASUs). Only the ASU commander theoretically would have contact with the next level of authority. The cells were also instructed to operate outside their own areas as often as possible, to both confuse British intelligence and expand the area of military operations (Taylor, 1997). With the adaptation of the new cell structure based on the ASUs, PIRA had consistently demonstrated to be a complex adaptive enemy with a new organisational structure consisting of in effect a ‘system of systems’ and the flexibility to rapidly adjust to changes in their environment. In conjunction with the advent of the ASUs was the establishment of a new Northern Command that created in effect an autonomous tier between the Army Council, responsible for strategic direction and policy and GHQ (Appendix E) who planned and coordinated military operations (Bishop and Mallie, 1987). All this reinforced PIRA as an exceptionally ruthless and proficient terrorist organisation, indeed Soldier A (07/11/12) noted that as a British army officer PIRA were;

“taken very seriously. I absolutely accept that PIRA was the most proficient of the Western European terrorist organisations, it was a learning organisation, very sharp people, I regarded them as a very serious enemy to be taken very seriously, it was not a game….I absolutely banned the use of the word player [in describing PIRA volunteers], because players indicated it was a game and this wasn’t a game, it was a deadly struggle.”

This view is reinforced in the literature including Lafree et al. (2009) who noted that, “Republican strikes made Northern Ireland the most politically violent region in the European Community” (p. 35).

ASU Weaknesses
Transition from ‘one more push’ to ‘long war,’ and from companies to cells, together with the stepping-up of convictions based on confessions, meant that PIRA membership shrank. Smith (1995) paradoxically argues that a lot of the advantages and disadvantages of dropping the old structure and shifting to the cell system, based on ASUs, largely cancelled each other out, “by reorganising into such a small force

68 An Active Service Unit (ASU) was a Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) cell of five to eight members, tasked with carrying out armed attacks. Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie (1987), in their authoritative book, The Provisional IRA, estimate the number of active members to have gone down from 1000 in the early 1970s to around 250 ten years later.
PIRA has been unable to sustain concerted efforts of the kind which did so much to destabilise Northern Ireland in the early 1970s” (p. 188). Taylor (1997) noted that the cell was not, and could not be, totally isolated from the main body of the local Brigade structure. Brigades were retained for both practical and administrative reasons in that it allowed as many people as possible to be involved in PIRA and as a credible alternative to those who could not be inducted into the elite ASUs. It was a legacy issue, in other words there was a logic in doing something that was counter-intuitive from an intelligence point of view. This meant that despite tight security, potentially one person from one cell might have contact with possibly some senior members of the Brigade Staff. So while “the new cellular structure was an improvement…it did have limitations” (Taylor, 1997: 211). Brims (06/11/12) spoke of how in 1984 “you start looking at what you see there then, you were very aware there is talk of ASU, but an ASU is not an absolute, it’s a much more fluid thing, and although they have to get their operations authorised…they’re not all authorised.”:

and that in effect the ASUs adapted a policy of ‘mission command.’ Additionally “the reduction in the number of PIRA activists made it far easier for the security forces to concentrate their resources against known operatives, which left the movement just as vulnerable to losses in personnel as it had been under the old system” (Smith, 1995: 188).

Republican Heartlands

Neumann (2009) has identified, that like any terrorist organisation, the PIRA was faced with a whole host of organisational and institutional dynamics that made it difficult to enforce military order across all units all of the time (p. 42). This was reflected within Northern Ireland in the distinct geographical districts and heartlands that encompassed various republican redoubts. Many interviewees agreed that there were distinctive differences within various PIRA Brigade areas, particularly rural versus urban (Brims, Sheridan, Soldier A, Mallie)

It is South Armagh and East Tyrone that will now briefly be examined, because each is noteworthy for contrasting reasons. East Tyrone became a focal point for the use of

69 Mission Command is the concept of a fluid and devolved system of Command & Control (C2) whereby units are briefed on the mission objective and not how to achieve same which is left to their own tactical initiative, once the focus is maintained on the ultimate operational objective nested within the overarching strategic goal.
TKs against its ASU members whereas South Armagh was noted for the complete absence of the use of the tactic. The tactic is also noted for its almost complete absence in the main urban areas of Derry and Belfast; why was this?

**Saor Uladh–Tyrone**

Tyrone, the largest of the six counties, is a heterogeneous area; it stretches from Strabane, on the Republic’s border in the west, across desolate moors to undulating farm land where the county touches the Republic again at Monaghan. Unlike South Armagh, some villages are exclusively Protestant, others Catholic, and towns such as Cookstown and Dungannon contain roughly equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants. Moloney (*Sunday Tribune: 4 September 1988*) argues that the British viewed Tyrone as a key republican heartland. “Tyrone is one of the strongest republican redoubts in Northern Ireland with a history stretching back decades… in the early 1950’s *Saor Uladh*, led by Liam Kelly and seen widely as a sign of frustration with IRA inactivity was founded in Pomeroy…a record of intense support for PIRA and *Sinn Féin.*” The region had produced many PIRA activists since the late 1970s. These activists were drawn from a wide and diffuse social stratum including the prosperous end of working class and those from substantial farming stock on the margins of middle class affluence.

Urban (1992) believes that while the PIRA cells in East Tyrone did not match South Armagh in terms of the number of security forces killed, they were able to carry out more operations than ASUs in Derry or Belfast. Crucially however they “appeared unable to stop widespread informing within the Tyrone republican community – something which allowed the security forces to stage many more covert operations in this area [Tyrone], than in South Armagh” (p. 220).

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70 *Saor Uladh*, translated as ‘Free Ulster’ (See Glossary).

71 By the mid-1980s, PIRAs Army Council recognised that its campaign was effectively being contained by the British. PIRA military strategy to counter this was a massive escalation in violence supported by huge arms importations from Libya. The plan was designed to shock the ‘occupying’ force and, more importantly its political class, into thinking the war was unsustainable. Phase one of the plan was nullified by the Loughgall ambush of East Tyrone Brigade in 1987. Phase two was contained in subsequent operations against the post Loughgall generation of PIRA volunteers in 1991/92.
Taylor (1997) noted that in the second half of the eighties and early nineties, the SAS “devastated the Provisional IRA in Tyrone in a manner unlike anywhere else in the province” (p. 268). He believes that such operations [TKs], were on the whole much more difficult to carry out in urban areas like Belfast and Derry, because of the risk to civilians. McIntyre (02/03/2009) in interview put forward the theory that TKs weren’t utilised in urban Belfast because “we find a situation in Belfast where the police and the IRA seemed to have an understanding that if the police raided a house…the IRA fell on their knees and volunteered to put their hands behind their heads.” An analysis of East Tyrone as a PIRA Area of Operations (AO) will be examined in detail later in Chapter VI; that will focus in particular on the geography of the ‘battlespace’ and how this was reflected in the operational tactics utilised by Tyrone PIRA.

Bandit Country – South Armagh

The counter-intelligence capability of PIRA in South Armagh versus East Tyrone appears to have been much more formidable. Southern (2009) notes that “infiltration was not easy and in certain Brigade areas of the IRA, like the close knit rural communities of South Armagh, which had a long history of republican sympathy and active involvement, made penetration difficult” (O’Brien, 1999; cited by Southern, 2009: 193). Harnden (1999) has noted that anyone trying to enforce the law in South Armagh is treated with intense suspicion and that additionally “only a handful of people live to tell the tale of an interrogation at the hands of the South Armagh Brigade” (p. 206). Unlike East Tyrone, South Armagh with its proximity to the border, absence of a Protestant community, except in small isolated pockets and undulating terrain all combined to make it the ideal operating ground for PIRA. Additionally as demonstrated in Figure 8 South Armagh PIRA displayed their ruthless lethality and tactical proficiency in that they were responsible for the greatest number of security forces deaths during the course of the Troubles, some 238. Soldier A (07/11/12) speaking of South Armagh PIRA noted “they were a highly proficient organisation and if we weren’t equally professional they would do a job on us, and to be fair to them with the benefit of a quarter of a century of hindsight, they regularly

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72 Retired Brigadier Ian Liles, at the Smithwick Tribunal, who spent 14 years in senior intelligence positions in Northern Ireland noted that security among the IRA in South Armagh was ‘water tight’ (O’Brien, Irish Times: 10 Feb 2012).
did a job on us.” Chapter VI will also elaborate on the difference between South Armagh PIRA and their counterparts in East Tyrone PIRA.

Additionally within PIRA the “South Armagh Brigade always enjoyed a degree of autonomy” (Harnden, 1999: 15) but crucially was noted for the fact as one volunteer noted “we don’t really let outsiders in” (p. 266) and was “resilient to penetration” (McIntyre, 02/03/2009). Hence the TK response when it came was to be in the rolling countryside of Tyrone, which suggests that the intelligence picture there was better than in South Armagh. Kingston (2007) in noting that while there was ‘minimum penetration’ of the republican stronghold of South Armagh, argues paradoxically that “there, the greatest success in the fight against PIRA came between the ceasefires of 1994 and 1998, that is, after the aggressive tactics of the late 1980s” (p. 134).

Evolution of British Counterinsurgency (COIN) Structures

The British experience in Northern Ireland, particularly the fight against PIRA is an often cited case study in the COIN spectrum. While a number of other paramilitary organisations were active in Northern Ireland at the time PIRAs' capabilities remained the most serious threat. The growing professionalism of PIRA and the security chiefs desire to intensify information gathering activities were to spawn several ‘undercover’ units who took the lead in combating PIRA (Urban, 1992). It is to the evolution of this security apparatus and in more particular the honing and analysis of the intelligence provided by these units that we will now examine (Appendix G). Despite their huge COIN experience the initial British response to PIRA was characterised by poor coordination and often competition between agencies (Ryder, 2005)

It is the totality of the British intelligence experience in Northern Ireland, with its successes and challenges that makes it such a valuable example from which to draw insight to shape contemporary COIN intelligence operations, and as an adjunct of this the use of TKs. Multiple organisations were involved in the intelligence war against PIRA which by the late 1970s had morphed from a nascent and inexperienced group into a formidable terrorist group. At the beginning the RUC, which might have been expected to spearhead such intelligence collection was not in a position to do so. This prompted the British army to intervene in Northern Ireland and forced it and other intelligence organisations to take the lead in this sphere. As the conflict both prolonged and intensified a multitude of intelligence units from military, law enforcement and intelligence agencies became involved. Responsibility for intelligence gathering and combating PIRA was shared between a number of organisations: this organisational landscape is described in Urban’s (1992) chart listing some 20 units that were formed or evolved between 1969 and 1983 (Appendix F). These evolved to deal specifically with the growing professionalism of PIRA and

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73 British security forces were quite successful in decimating a number of other terrorist organisations that unlike PIRA used more centralised structures...and this made possible the identification of entire geographic units...in the case of the INLA or the Red Hand Commando, one defection led to the identification of the entire leadership of the organisation and perhaps its entire membership (Jackson, 2007: 77).

74 See Appendix G for an executive summary of these individual units, their evolution, role and function.
the desire of the security establishment to intensify information gathering activities which spawned these various agencies.

War within a War: The Intelligence Battle

O’Brien (2005) argues that “the policy of providing primacy within the police (already a quasi-military force) to Special Branch, while simultaneously downgrading legal safeguards, had a corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the state itself” (p. 6). Significant upgrading of the RUCs intelligence prowess had begun with the appointment of Kenneth Newman as Chief Constable in 1976 (Appendix G). As the capability of the Special Branch grew, the force established Divisional Mobile Support Units, Headquarters Mobile Support Units and Special Support Units, “all provided with military training in surveillance and ‘ambush’ techniques” (p. 43). “Yet there remained a deference to the Army’s military capacity vis-à-vis a terrorist attack, which also reflected the ambiguity of the dual roles expected of RUC officers in a counter-terrorism context” (Southern, 2009: 189). “A more sophisticated intelligence-handling regime was instituted within Special Branch, modelled on the army’s 14th Intelligence Unit” (O’Brien, 2005: 43; Appendix G). One of the results of the strategy of ‘Ulsterisation’, building on the failure of a military-led approach, “provided RUC’s Special Branch with the opportunity and resources for developing a modern, professional, and intelligence led counter-terrorist operation” (Southern, 2009: 190).

The factors that led to the supremacy of the Special Branch were codified in a confidential document known as the Walker Report, the existence of which was first publicised by Insight, a current affairs documentary series in 2001 (O’Brien, 2005: 6). The Walker Report was a set of internal guidelines designed to ensure the centralisation of all intelligence-gathering. O’Brien (2005) argues the Walker Report provided the basis for a policing culture that gave a lower value to the detection of crime and its prosecution than to the accumulation of intelligence (p. 6).

The Right Capabilities for Analysis: The TCGs

But parallel intelligence efforts in separate organisations also generated inefficiency, in the early years there were few joint operations, and command arrangements were complex. Jackson (2007) posits that as PIRA transitioned away from the perspective
of ‘one more push’, to an approach focused on maintaining its survivability over the long-term and “integrating its violent action with a more explicit political strategy” (p. 83); similarly Taylor (1997) also noted that if the Provisionals were fighting a ‘long war,’ British intelligence was gearing up to fight it too. Although they took years to develop and implement, the setting up of three new integrated intelligence centres called a Tasking and Co-ordination Group, usually referred to as the TCG, (Appendix G) was probably the most important step in developing enhanced information gathering that brought together the tactical activities of various organisations involved in the intelligence fight. According to Urban (1992), “the TCGs attained a critical role in what security chiefs called ‘executive action’ – locking together intelligence from informers with the surveillance and ambushing activities of undercover units” (p. 95). Critically data was collated across the collection spectrum. Law enforcement organisations for instance, fed their intelligence into a unified criminal intelligence system based on Regional Crime and Intelligence Units (Clarke, 2009; Jackson, 2007; Urban, 1992, Appendix G). When it deployed in 1969, the British army had not expected to be involved in a conflict for decades. Both sides came to realise that strategies based on winning quickly, and primarily through military means, produced results that were unsatisfactory at best and frequently damaging to their interests. Jackson (2007) has correspondingly argued that for state security organisations, truly adopting a ‘long war’ approach entailed a shift from “decisive to patient operations” (p. 84). Soldier A (07/11/12) supported this analysis of the evolution of British security strategy and how precisely it was based on a ‘patient’ approach that took a long term analysis.

He outlined how in the security strand of overall British strategy there were three elements; reassurance, deterrence and attrition. So the campaign strategy was based on these three pillars, reassuring the law abiding population and those you could influence in terms of the non-combatants that the rule of law would eventually win “reassure people who wanted to be on your side and those that were wavering that they were better off with the political strand,” so reassurance is directed at non-combatants. Deterrence was designed to deter and disrupt PIRA operations, done through a variety of different activities, essentially not about deterring people from joining per se, but in terms of deterring the operations themselves. Also ‘hard
targeting” by creating a network of towers which therefore make it more difficult for PIRA to manoeuvre, so you deter operations by things which you do, and the third strand is attrition; attrition of the terrorist capability.” The attrition could take place through a number of different means, “it could take direct action in terms of their capability, in terms of their leadership; decapitation strategy.” It could take place through attrition of their resources, through the finding and recovery of arms caches and “crucially and I think this was the determining factor, attrition of financial resource.” Soldier A argues that “the attrition was not just around are we going to kill people, because actually in Big Boys Rules, people accept that, so people just step in to take their place.”

**Strategic Momentum versus the Brick Wall**

In the following I wish to demonstrate that while paramilitary groups have presented a considerable challenge to the law enforcement authorities, after 1972 none of these groups ever came close to defeating the security forces, or even to forcing a major change of policy upon the British government. Their effectiveness in terms of achieving political objectives, however, does not mean that they were of no consequence. While PIRA may have ended its traditional campaign, dissident republican groups continue to plan major military operations, albeit with little success. Likewise, on the loyalist side, the major paramilitary groups remain in existence. Conversely, the security response *ab initio* in itself has been reasonably clearly focused. Both the army and police clearly recognised they confronted a terrorist threat, primarily from the PIRA.

It has previously been seen how PIRA in adapting a new cell structure to counter British intelligence infiltration also redefined its strategic pathway from ‘one big push’ to that of ‘long war.’ Volunteers were told to conceptualise the British government like a ‘brick wall,’ the analogy been that if it is hit often enough it will collapse (Neumann, 2009). The Provisionals had in effect pinned their hopes on violence having a cumulatively unbearable quality. English (2009) has argued that it

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75 In South Armagh in particular form the late 1980s the British army constructed an intricate series of inter-linked and mutually supporting network or *cordon sanitaire* of fortified OP Towers, each with deep bunkers for protection against PIRA mortar/rocket attack. They were designed specifically to impede PIRA freedom of movement and were equipped with an array of sophisticated listening and surveillance devices (Harnden, 1999).
is probably nearer the mark that the longer PIRA violence continued without yielding a result, the more bearable it seemed to a state that had managed to endure it “unyieldingly for decades” (p. 79). The situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s was being reversed with PIRA inflicting an average of forty one killings per year in the 1980s (Neumann, 2009: 40; Figures 5 and 6; Appendix B); PIRA in effect was not maintaining the strategic momentum necessary to inflict unsustainable casualties on the security forces and that the organisation increasingly focused on spectaculars (Figure 7). On the contrary by the mid 1980s the British government had successfully contained the conflict both politically and militarily (Neumann, 2009: 40).

_The Red Hand ~ Loyalist Counter Violence_

While this thesis core function is to examine the use and consequent impact of TKs as implemented by state agencies on the motivation of republican paramilitaries, as Figure 5 illustrates it should not be forgotten that much violence was perpetrated during the period by loyalist paramilitaries operating under various banners, flags of convenience and _nom de guerre_. The trajectory of the loyalist campaign was based on a strategic posture that sought to influence two target audiences. From an Influence Activity (IA) perspective, a key audience was the British government itself, which they saw as weak in its determination to uphold the constitutional link between Northern Ireland and the mainland. Within that analysis, a key defining rationale of the loyalist paramilitaries was that they acted as a vanguard to prevent any perceived ‘sell-out’ of Ulster’s role within the British constitution. This is what Bruce (1992) has referred to as ‘Pro-State Terrorism.’ The second target audience was not only militant republicans, but also the wider nationalist community; here the aim was to maintain a ‘balance of terror.’ (p. 45). Figure 5 clearly demonstrates that the dynamics of loyalist violence during the period 1969 to 2001 was intimately related to the perception of constitutional insecurity (Neumann, 2009: 46), such as the Sunningdale Agreement of 1972 (See Glossary).

The evolution and dynamics of loyalist violence is very well portrayed in Steve Bruce’s _The Red Hand_ (1992), but a detailed analysis of TKs carried out by loyalists is not being examined as part of a substantive study incorporated within this work. I have made a conscious decision to differentiate between TKs enacted by the state and its official organs against republican paramilitary groups, versus killings perpetrated
by loyalist paramilitaries against their republican counterparts. In other words the raison d’être of this thesis is to specifically examine TKs as perpetrated by the state against a terrorist/revolutionary organisation. This qualification been made we will see in Chapter VII that loyalist paramilitary squads took an increasing toll against the republican community in East Tyrone that often very effectively targeted known republicans, we will also briefly examine the subsidiary effect of this.

We have seen how none of the force protection measures that the security forces implemented to reduce their profile and thwart PIRA actions acted or operated in isolation, there was no single military response to counter PIRAs strategic adaptability, challenges were met defensively or sometimes more actively in the form of TKs in response to different phases of the republican threat and in particular by PIRAs switches in strategic emphasis.

It is the latter that will now be examined, by looking at the genesis of this policy and how certain incidents contained within clusters of events, that may be identified as part of an orchestrated and coordinated campaign of TKs or ‘counter-ambushes,’ that took place during key periods of the Troubles.

The Governments Response
Arguably, the government’s response was most effective whenever it crossed the boundaries of the criminal justice model. The ‘supergrass system’ whereby people were convicted on the word of an accomplice, managed to break-up the Ulster Volunteer command structure and virtually eliminated PIRA in North Belfast. However, it also produced a number of unsafe verdicts, and needed to end as a result. The systematic penetration of paramilitary organisations with informers (the ‘dirty

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76 Equally it is not within the scope/ambit of this work to examine the issue as to whether loyalist paramilitaries were either manipulated or supplied with targeting intelligence on known militant republicans by organs of the state whether sanctioned officially or not. This issue of so-called ‘collusion’ was examined by Sir John Stevens, former Metropolitan Police Commissioner in a series of three reports that collectively became known as the Stevens Inquiry. He found that rogue elements within the RUC and Military Intelligence had colluded with the largest loyalist paramilitary organisation, the UDA to murder nationalists.

77 The ‘supergrass’ trials lasted from 1982-1985. A supergrass is a police informer, usually paid. These trials were based on the testimony of captured terrorists who sought a more lenient sentence and the promise of admission into the witness protection programme. Ultimately, the ‘supergrass’ trials were an abysmal failure. Many witnesses recanted their testimony, or in subsequent appeals their testimony was found to be unsafe (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1499).
war’) helped save many lives, yet it also implicated the security forces in the crimes of their agents. The entrapment and killing of terrorist operatives by British Special Forces in TKs (the so called ‘counter-ambush’) eradicated entire PIRA units, yet it is hard to see how this sort of tactic conformed to the domestic imperative of ‘minimum force.’ In that sense, then, the military containment of the conflict was achieved not only through adherence to the criminal justice model, but also by the occasional – yet carefully calculated – breach of it.

_Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Dirty War_

Even as the technology used to counter the PIRA grew more sophisticated, “the war itself grew dirtier, as increasingly nefarious means were used to combat the group” (Clarke, 2008: 2). The contribution of the SAS and other Special Forces was of great significance; however it evolved in a wider security and political context than is usually considered. Kingston (2007) argues that the fear generated within IRA ranks was often more important than the actual damage/casualties caused. He adds the caveat that it would be a mistake to claim that what its critics describe as the “dirty war,” was solely responsible for the current peace, but that it did contribute to reducing the PIRAs military options.

As the PIRA morphed from a nascent and inexperienced group into a more formidable opponent, the British realised they would need to counter the group by using more sophisticated techniques. This included increased and sophisticated surveillance.78 Alongside this, in Northern Ireland, a network of informers, the scale of which is only now coming to light was also developed, giving the security forces pre-emptive insight into PIRA operational plans. Indeed English (2009) posits that the latter years PIRAs war was characterised by their ranks being “riddled with agents and informers”79 and this did help limit their capacity” (p. 79).

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78 Beginning in the late 1970s, the British began to exploit the enhanced techniques and technology at their disposal, including listening devices, phone taps. The technology of ‘jarking,’ (placing tracing devices on terrorist weapons); and bugging, which improved steadily during the thirty years of the Troubles (See 14 Intelligence Company, Appendix G).

Evolution and Genesis of TK Policy

By the mid 1980s due to increased coordination facilitated by the TCGs allied to robust analytical capabilities predicated on a systematic gathering of framework data to make sense of the information (Jackson, 2007), “the intelligence…was very precise, with sophisticated electronic surveillance supplementing the information supplied by agents; and informers within the IRAs ranks,” (English, 2003: 253). In particular, the increased monitoring and penetration of PIRA led to a rise in the number of TKs mounted by the security forces, most notably by the Special Air Service (SAS) (Smith, 1995). “Between its first deployment in 1976 and November 1978, the SAS was responsible for the deaths of seven IRA members” (Kingston, 2007:130). From late 1978, the SAS seemed to change tactics and did not use lethal force again until 1983. Smith (1995) notes that “between 1978 and 1988, some thirty PIRA members were killed in SAS operations. The period “between 1983 and 1984, and between 1987 and 1988, were particularly severe as the Provisionals lost around fifteen and twenty members respectively to accidents and shoot-outs” (p. 188). This again points to the episodic use of the tactic of TKs. Holland and Phoenix (1996) contend that “internal conflict arose within the security forces in relation to the deployment of the SAS. While, “the SAS had been used in the Province from the late 1970s, but with the increasing role of the police, under the so-called ‘Ulsterisation’ programme, their operations had been reduced” (p. 30). Bambridge and Morgan (Sunday Times, 27 November 1988) highlight turf wars within the security forces, as to how to deal with the PIRA threat. “SASs official (sic) arrival in Ulster exacerbated rivalries and enmities between different branches of the security services…the men of the RUC had often lamented, only to suffer the indignity of first, the British army invading their territory and now the presence of the SAS” (27 November 1988).

Equally there were tensions within the military, “the army itself considered the presence of the SAS as a condemnation of their own efforts to stem the tide of violence” (27 November 1988). Keegan (Daily Telegraph, 1 October 1988) contends that the extraordinary but immensely powerful ideology of the PIRA represented ‘itself to itself’ as both the legitimate government and the legitimate army of the ‘Irish Republic.’ Furthermore “it derives the greatest satisfaction, therefore, from being opposed by soldiers rather than policemen.” That as Keegan saw it, was one of the “excellent reasons for the government’s establishment of the principle of ‘police
‘primacy’ in Ulster, and the use of the Army only in support of the RUC.” Yet Keegan believed that “the single derogation of this principle concerns the use of the SAS.”

**SAS: The Cutting Edge**

Evans (*Daily Express*, 10 December 1984) noted that “everyone in the security forces in Northern Ireland is engaged in counter-terrorism. But the SAS is the rapier amongst them.” Geraghty (1998) believes that as the conflict developed the role of the SAS also evolved, as after 1976- as intelligence groups of various kinds came of age and evolved separately from the SAS – the regiment’s role increasingly was to “ambush IRA terrorists known to be on their way to a target and unlikely to surrender without a fight” (p. 123). Urban (*The Independent*, 6 September 1988) believes that the role of the SAS in these unfolding events developed along a particular pattern, whereby the SAS was committed when a successful ambush based on ‘hard int’ was deemed possible. Urban acknowledges that there have been frequent accusations that the SAS was used as a force of state executioners, violating principles of minimum force. He argues that there are contradictions in the response to such allegations and that Special Forces personnel brush aside as naïve claims made by non-military people that terrorists in certain situations [for example in Gibraltar], could have been arrested. Yet he also points out that the SAS were happy to be called ‘the cutting edge’ of covert operations in Ulster and to describe “the business of soldiers as killing people” (6 September 1988). Kelly (*Sunday Press*, 4 September 1988), states that the SAS had their own special terminology, euphemistically describing a TK not as an ambush but as a ‘negotiation.’

In 1983 the SAS returned to more aggressive tactics, in subsequent incidents in 1984, 1985 and 1986, SAS and ‘14 Int’ operatives killed seven PIRA members. These operations were episodic in nature and it is hard to argue that they significantly affected PIRA strategy in this period. Indeed, during these years, PIRA was not prevented from perfecting new technologies, such as mortar capabilities. This manifested itself from 1987, when a sustained intelligence-led campaign by the SAS effectively nullified two major military ‘pushes’ planned by PIRA (Cluster II and III). This approach, the very careful intelligence led targeting of terrorist suspects, took time to develop. Coordination between the different branches of the security forces
was increasingly seen as a key to success. Ryder (The Daily Telegraph, 1 September 1988) highlights and reinforces the importance of how;

“each Brigade area there is a Tactical Coordination Group (TCG), chaired by the Police, which controls all the undercover intelligence work of the Police and Army and which plans and supervises undercover ambushes...more senior RUC officers have been involved in the supervision of this work and more senior officers take command during operations on the ground...the coordination between the police and army and the analysis of intelligence to provide them with material is regarded as being very efficient after years of confusion and often turmoil reflecting professional jealousy between the two organisations” (1 September 1988).

Tyrone: The Perfect Killing Ground

Moloney (The Sunday Tribune, 4 September 1988) argues that the British viewed East Tyrone PIRA as a key republican heartland. Post 1985, with the influx of Libyan arms, the East Tyrone PIRA Brigade Commander stepped up attacks on isolated rural Police stations. Holland and Phoenix (1996) believe that it was the killing of building contractors employed by the state in refurbishing bases, being specifically eliminated by East Tyrone PIRA that became a key factor in focusing the security forces effort in this locale. It is significant that as reflected and illustrated in Figure 9 and associated table (Appendix D), that geographically the vast majority of TKs took place west of the river Bann, in particular in the municipal boroughs that relate to County Fermanagh, and even more pronounced County Tyrone and East Tyrone in particular. Indeed Taylor (1997) notes that “throughout the second half of the eighthies and early nineties, the SAS devastated the Provisional IRA... and that the rural areas like Tyrone offered a ‘perfect killing ground’ (p. 268). An expanded examination of why East Tyrone became such a key battleground will be expanded upon in Chapter VI.

Urban (1992) notes that from 1976 to 1992 the RUC and army only ever killed republican activists with their undercover units. Between November 1982 and February 1992, I have identified forty-five\(^80\) (McKeown, 2001; revised 2009;

\(^80\) Moloney (2002) states that “up to April 2000, the IRA in Tyrone had lost 53 members...but over half, 28, were killed in the five years between May 1987 and February 1992” and that “IRA deaths increased fivefold after the Loughgall ambush” (p. 319). However, it should be noted that this figure of 28 as calculated by Moloney in a Secret History of the IRA (Moloney, 2002 :319; cited by Kingston; 2007: 132) appear not to be corroborated and at variance by my analysis of the statistics available, such as a cross referencing of McKittrick et al., Lost Lives and data from the CAIN website (McKeown, 2001; revised 2009; McKittrick et al., 1999) as tabulated in Appendix D and superimposed onto Figure 9.
McKitrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, 1999) militant republicans killed in undercover/covert/surveillance operations that may be classified as TKs. Six of these by the RUC, the remaining thirty-nine by SAS/14 Int; as tabulated in Appendix D.

Targeted Killings (TKs) by Location 1976-1992

These forty-five identified TKs took place in the following Boroughs, and as illustrated in Figures 10 and 11 and based on Appendix D.

**Targeted Killings by Location 1976 - 1992**

![Map of targeted killings by location 1976-1992]

*Figure 9*

1-5 Upper Bann
6 Foyle
7-8 Mid-Ulster
9 West Tyrone
10 North Antrim
11 Mid-Ulster
12-13 Fermanagh/S. Tyrone
14 Foyle
15-17 West Tyrone
18 East Londonderry
19 Fermanagh/S. Tyrone
20-27 Newry & Armagh
28-30 Gibraltar
31-33 West Tyrone
34-36 Newry & Armagh
37 West Tyrone
38 South Down
39-41 Mid-Ulster
42-45 Fermanagh/S. Tyrone
Figure 10

Figure 10 illustrates the deaths of republican paramilitaries inflicted by the security forces during the course of the Troubles. For the purpose of this study I have identified seven incidents incorporated within three clusters as illustrated in Figure 11, which are in turn detailed in Table 3.

Figure 11
### Cluster 1 – November and December 1982

1. (Appendix D-Ser; 01-03). Three PIRA members killed by the HMSU of the RUC on 11 November 1982.

2. (Appendix D-Ser; 04-05). Subsequently two INLA members are killed also by RUC HMSU on 12 December 1982, in incidents that collectively became known as the ‘Shoot to Kill’ period and subsequently investigated by Stalker Inquiry. These are generally regarded as revenge killings by many commentators but were nonetheless TKs.  

### Cluster 2 – May 1987, March and August 1988


5. (Appendix D-Ser; 31-33) Drumnakilly, 30 August 1988. Three members of an ASU killed in a carefully staged counter-ambush involving the use of a *ruse de guerre*, where an SAS Trooper posed as a UDR Reservist. Using the ruse of a broken down delivery lorry, succeeded in luring the PIRA ASU into a carefully prepared killing zone.

### Cluster 3 – June 1991 and February 1992


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**Table 3. The Three Clusters and Associated Seven Incidents**

81 John Stalker was removed from the inquiry into this episode before he published his final report. The report of Colin Sampson, who took over from him, was not made public (McKittrick *et al.*, 1999: 926). Stalker published his version of events in a subsequent autobiography, John Stalker, *Stalker*, London (1988).
Rationale for Cluster Selection

Looking at the totality of TKs as they evolved, it would be impossible to provide detailed treatment of each of the forty-five known TKs that took place across the time span of this work, as Ní Aoláin (2000) has noted the “use of force is not static in a conflict situation. It is responsive to changes in the progression of conflict and the state’s perception of its own vulnerability” (p. 18). Therefore more is to be gained from framing the period in terms of three Clusters of killings incorporating a total of seven separate Incidents. There are a number of reasons why this is so: first, these TKs firstly took place at clearly graduated periods within the time-span that encompasses this work, at key points across the life of the study, thereby allowing both a broad overview and a longitudinal scope. Second, each Cluster represents a key shift in regard to security policy and its implementation in the guise of TKs, giving contextualisation in the framework of the wider strategies employed by the state to confront low-intensity armed conflict over the period under review. Equally there is a commonality shared by them, yet each represents the phenomena of TKs in a particular context, thereby representing a key actualisation of changes in regard to the security policy. While these Incidents are not predictable, they are all good examples of the change and new reality emerging at key junctures in time. While they definitively do not explain everything, they nonetheless act as a fulcrum around which key issues in this policy revolved and coalesced. Incidents incorporated within the Clusters are emblematic of the different type of contexts against which the various Clusters are set. Each Cluster has a unique and separate context, yet conversely there are common themes within each Cluster and also across the spectrum encompassed by the Clusters.

Thirdly, each Cluster provides an entry point into a better understanding of what happened subsequently. Finally these Clusters and the Incidents contained within are not selected on a purely scientific basis but are exemplars. While other Incidents could have been selected these examples were chosen because they were sufficiently emblematic; they contain common characteristics that display a consistency of practice of a policy of TK sufficient to be utilised as representative of the utility of TKs within a particular context of time and space. They are also indicative of a particular operationalisation of TKs as a sub-set of evolving security forces policy at
key junctions during the conflict, where it is discernible that such a tactical policy of TKs is subtly evolving and developing as part of an ultimate operational objective nested within an overarching strategic goal.

Cluster I occurs in a period in which the SAS role was relatively muted, yet some of the most controversial killings of the Troubles occurred. Special Support Units (SSU) of HMSU; Uniformed Special Branch (Appendix F), killed five republicans in late 1982, as well as one innocent civilian,⁸² in a series of incidents that provoked the Stalker inquiry and led to allegations of a deliberate ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy being pursued by the RUC. Unlike most incidents incorporated within Cluster II and III, all those killed were unarmed at the time of their deaths (The PIRA unit killed at Gibraltar was also unarmed). The shootings and the subsequent trials exposed the RUC as never before and helped influence policy makers towards a decision to “strengthen the SASs role in counter-terrorism operations” (Holland & Phoenix, 1996: 130).

Cluster II and III represent a major shift in the policy of TKs been utilised in a more focused precise manner that was moulded by an influence activity perspective. By mid-1980s, PIRAs Army Council recognised that its campaign was effectively being contained by the British. PIRA military strategy to counter this was a massive escalation in violence supported by huge arms importations from Libya. Phase one of the plan was nullified by the Loughgall ambush of East Tyrone Brigade in 1987, the Drumnakilly counter-ambush of 1988, both part of Cluster II in addition to the Gibraltar killings of 1988, nested between these two. The latter killing of PIRA members at Gibraltar, it is argued was to ‘tell’ the IRA in unmistakable terms that extending the conflict was not acceptable (Sunday Press, 13 March 1988).

Phase two was contained in subsequent operations against the post Loughgall generation of PIRA volunteers in 1991/92, in two Incidents contained within Cluster III. Cluster II and III were a clear and unambiguous message to PIRA that surges in activity on their part would be met by counterforce and nullified. It was in effect a nuanced and calculated policy, with a clear rationale underpinning its implementation.

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⁸² Michael Tighe, killed by the RUC HMSU on 24 November 1982, in the second of what became known as the ‘shoot-to-kill’ incidents, he has NOT been included as part of the statistical graphs.
The map below at Figure 12 giving the geographical outline of the Clusters graphically demonstrates that the TKs were implemented exclusively west of the river Bann, specifically in East Tyrone.

In summary: Cluster I contains Incidents of TKs that many analysts would contend were ‘revenge’ killings and not specifically part of a long-term operational plan. Cluster II and III were different – both in character and intent. What they had in common was a clear intention to send an unambiguous message to PIRA that surges in activity on their part would be met by counterforce and nullified.

Targeted Killings by Identified Cluster

Targeted Killings by Identified Cluster

The Ascendancy of the SAS

It was discussed above how between November 1978 and December 1983 the SAS was not responsible for any deaths of republicans in Northern Ireland (Figure 11). In
1983, the SAS returned to more aggressive tactics. In subsequent incidents in 1984, 1985 and 1986, SAS and '14 Int' operatives killed eleven PIRA members (Appendix D-Ser, 09-19). These operations were episodic in nature and it is hard to argue that they significantly affected PIRA strategy in this period (Figures 11 and 12). In relation to Cluster II and III of Figure 11, all PIRA fatalities with exception of Gibraltar casualties were members of East Tyrone PIRA. This again reinforces the view that security forces had surveillance and intelligence access there that was of a better quality than that other major rural republican redoubt of South Armagh, which again has been described as being 'uniquely impenetrable.' Each spike in PIRA activity whereby the PIRA heightened its profile, brought much the same response (TKs) in 1982, 1987 and 1988 (Figure 11) and arguably proof that PIRA could only increase its killing rate, at the height of exposing its members to being killed in counter-cyclical TKs. Furthermore, the ability of the security forces to engage in long-term surveillance outside the Northern Ireland arena was underscored by the Gibraltar operation (O’Brien, 2005: 54).

In relation to Figure 14, security forces killing of republicans ceases in 1992, loyalist targeting of republicans continues until 1994 (Figures 13 and 14).83

![Republican Paramilitary Fatalities by Loyalist Paramilitaries 1974 - 1994](image)

**Figure 13**

83 I have previously noted how there remains a debate outside of the remit of this thesis as to whether intelligence for such targeting was provided by the security forces using loyalists paramilitaries as proxies or counter-gangs.

Year

Security Forces TK cease 1992

Figure 14


Year

Figure 15
In relation to Figure 15, it is discernible that killing of informers/alleged informers by PIRA and other militant republican entities is invariably associated with TKs of republicans by security forces. This may suggest that a subsidiary effect of TKs was to sow a degree of mistrust within militant republican ranks as to how their operations were being potentially compromised by security forces infiltration and/or surveillance.

This initial examination of the Clusters provides a useful and illustrative entry point which opens out not only the targets but the varieties across the spectrum which characterise this tactic.
CHAPTER V  
Police Supremacy and the Stalker Affair  
Cluster I  

Introduction  
In the preceding, Chapter IV, a justification for and framework via which the three Clusters and their associated seven Incidents incorporated within the central Northern Ireland case was examined based on Hafez and Hatfield’s (2006) framework, but through a qualitative lens as opposed to their quantitative approach. The following three chapters therefore individually interrogate the seven exemplary Incidents contained within these Clusters.  

The present chapter examines the events of Cluster I that occurred in November and December 1982. Prior to this, a brief overview of key Northern Ireland political events as they evolved and developed in 1981 and 1982 will provide the historical context in which the first Cluster of TKs occurred. It will also supply background as to how this Cluster was predicated within security forces strategy as it evolved and developed during this period, particularly the concept of ‘Normalisation’ that was nested within the overall policy of ‘Ulsterisation,’ which sought in one sense to remove the British army from the front-line of the conflict, relegating them to a supporting role and whereby local forces in the form of the RUC and UDR would take the lead in the counter-insurgency battle against PIRA. This will be followed by a brief background description of each of the two Incidents composing this Cluster, which will then allow an analysis of Cluster I based on the four principal pillars of the Hafez and Hatfield (2006) framework.  

Northern Ireland in 1982  
What made the mood of this period particularly intense was that military operations were conducted against the backdrop of the republican H-Block Hunger Strike in the Maze/Long Kesh prison over a dispute with the authorities (Edwards, 2011). The historian Jonathan Bardon has argued that the early months of 1982 proved to be
bleak ones for Jim Prior,\(^{84}\) “the hapless Northern Ireland Secretary of State in Margaret Thatcher’s government” (Irish Times: 29 Dec 2009). The previous year, 1981, is regarded “as a troubles watershed” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 846). The republican prison dispute once more became a Hunger Strike with ten protestors dying and many more killed on the streets. Consequently, the “Hunger Strike is a watershed in the history of the republican movement” (Taylor, 1997: 252). In the wake of the 1981 H-Block Hunger Strikes, Prior’s main concern was the evident large scale alienation of the Catholic minority “as the prison struggle gained support from many moderate nationalists” (Edwards, 2011: 55). Unionism was also inflamed by the sometimes huge funerals that visibly united Irish nationalists.

Most analysts agree that the Hunger Strikes of 1981 were a boon for PIRA recruitment in much the same way as the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972 had translated into increased recruitment into the ranks of PIRA (Smith, 1995; Taylor, 1997; Dingley, 2009; English, 2000). This analysis of both increased PIRA recruitment and increased tempo of operations was confirmed by interviewees. McKittrick (13/11/12) believes “it was a spur, a tremendous growth period for the IRA; the Sinn Féin vote went up considerably. Adams was elected in Westminster, I think and it was the creation of the IRA political machine in a way that it hadn’t been before.” This view was reinforced by Dingley (14/09/12);

“…on a deeper level, not all a particularly social or cultural level, republicanism has always played very heavily on a cultural dimension wherein martyrdom is an important feature, particularly the Gaelic revival of the 1890s, where people start supposedly rediscovering all these Gaelic traditions wherein the Hunger Strike was an important feature. You kill yourself to embarrass your opponent; it was done publicly so there was a sort of martyrlogy in their thinking, and the idea therefore of new martyrs being created by the British was another disaster for counterterrorism.”

Colbert (21/05/13), a former PIRA activist, stated that “the recruitment to the IRA post Hunger Strike was just through the roof.” Hutchinson (25/07/12) as a former loyalist paramilitary believed that it “hardened peoples attitudes towards the Brits…it galvanised the IRA.”

\(^{84}\) James Prior (born 11 October 1927), a British politician and member of the Conservative Party, he was a member of Parliament form 1983 to 1987. In September 1981, Prior became Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (See Glossary) and was in this office until September 1984.
Ironically, Mallie (13/11/12), contends that “in 1981, when the Hunger Strikes were over the IRA were bust, it hadn’t the capacity to mount a war, it took them five years to recover” because they had put so much energy and associated resources into the Hunger Strikes, so the military machine got ‘bogged down’ in terms of organising inside the jail. Smith (1995) agrees that amongst other factors the “Maze [H-Block] protests had sapped most of the movements’ energy” (p. 161). But Mallie (13/11/12) saw the corollary of this was that when the Hunger Strike was over, “they had become more political, and the evolution of the Sinn Féin political machine in a way that it hadn’t been before.” Taylor (1997) confirms this: “Sinn Féin’s electoral successes through the next two decades are the Hunger Strike’s political legacy” (p. 252).

But Mallie (13/11/12) who worked extensively as a journalist reporting the unfolding events of the troubles, and who had deep insight into both PIRA and security force thinking brings into focus an issue that, even in 1981, was viewed likely to become a major factor as the conflict developed: the role of informers. Mallie contended “the British had several informers in the H-Block Committee; so they had inserted so many informers and if you look at 1981 the IRA killed…five or six guys [Informers] in that particular year.” Additionally Mallie believed that this penetration was very deep: “the H-Block Committee was riddled with informers…so the security services choose to penetrate in any and every way and to use technology more, surveillance, covert.”

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Evolution of TKs in 1982

Colbert (21/05/13) as a former republican activist said that the evolution of TKs was as a direct result of this increased recruitment into PIRA ranks post Hunger Strikes:

“from my reading psychologically, if I saw a whole wave of young people moving into the IRA because of this [the Hunger Strikes]…I’d know they wouldn’t be in it for the long term…I reckon I’d give them a ‘quare’ scare, I would have a go at giving them a good scare. That’s just what I’d do; I think that’s what the British did.”

So Colbert suggested that the TKs of November/December 1982 were direct responses to increased PIRA recruitment post the 1981 Hunger Strikes. Cusack, then security correspondent of the Irish Times, suggested that the Cluster I killings were

85 This is substantiated by an analysis of Lost Lives, which indeed records that in 1981 alone PIRA executed five individuals as alleged informers (McKittrick et al., 1999: 848, 868, 869, 876, 879).
“understood to have resulted from a major rethinking of security policy following the success of Sinn Féin in the Assembly elections” (Irish Times 22 Dec 1982) and that the response of the RUC in Cluster I “was mobilised to meet the increase in republican paramilitary violence in Co. Armagh following the Assembly elections.” McKittrick (13/11/12) leans towards this viewpoint too: “intelligence would have said these guys are getting a lot more recruits, so I would imagine that in response to that they would have sat down and said ‘what are we going to do?’ and one of the responses was the shootings. Another was the supergrass tactic, which was just around then.” Nó Aoláin (10/01/13), in interview, noted that post-Hunger Strikes the radicalisation that occurred of a certain segment of the nationalist community and consequent mobilisation was really important in explaining what happened during this Cluster “because the state responds to that mobilisation through the use of certain kinds of tactics and methods of operation.” The substantive modification that Nó Aoláin makes now, having reflected on her work The Politics of Force (2000), is that “these set-piece killings were defined by the use of informer information…the evidence would be that there was much greater infiltration of the non-state actor groups by the state…I think that may affect the nuance of the case I made, but not take away from the fundamental staging.”

**Resurgent PIRA**

Additionally the failure of the supergrass trials in the early 1980s militated against a reduction in paramilitary violence. Urban (1992) noted that significantly while in operation “the supergrass system was also backed by those who felt that ambushing the IRA was counter-productive and that convicting a large number of its members might break the organisation” (p. 134). Nó Aoláin (2000) posits that “the supergrass operations amounted to a more sophisticated form of internment, as those charged with offences on the strength of supergrass evidence were held on remand for up to two years before trial” (p. 61). Urban (1992) agreed, “In effect, it was a more discriminating form of internment” (p. 134). Nó Aoláin (2000) further contends that the development of TKs was directly linked “to the failure of the supergrass trials in the early 1980s” added to persistent levels of paramilitary violence and that this was correspondingly a “strategic element in the upsurge of counter-insurgency type operations as a key component of the state’s emergency arsenal (p. 28). Urban noted too that the collapse of the supergrass system represented “a depressing setback for
those who believed that the courtroom was the best arena for cutting back the IRA, rather than the shoot-out” (1992: 165). However in this period paramilitary activity and associated success rate increased dramatically. English has argued that “at the start of the 1980s the Provisionals were emerging as a movement combining a campaign of attritional violence with a more committedly political profile” (2003: 227). Having recently taken the ballot box in one hand, PIRA continued to deploy the Armalite with the other; they were responsible for 53 of the 112 people who died violently in 1982, while a further fifteen people died at the hands of loyalist paramilitaries. The RUC and British army killed fourteen people in the same period, some in engagements that one interviewee said had “all the appearance of being in the category of ‘shoot-to-kill’” (Bardon, 29 December 2012). Indeed the period from 1980 to the Incidents described later in this chapter witnessed a decline in the number of PIRA casualties, which Ellison and Smyth (2000) have ascribed a number of reasons, including volunteers being better trained allied to more selective and carefully mounted operations, but also the suspension of undercover SAS operations involving ambushes.

The Incidents of this Cluster are also of significance because controversially all those killed were unarmed at the time and not specifically on operations which makes Cluster I unique compared to the other two Clusters.

The Active Counter-Insurgency Phase

Figure 16 incorporates how different authors have all identified similar epochs or developments in the evolution of the security forces strategy in combating PIRA and the corresponding security response as it evolved and developed. Nested within this

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86 Between September and December 1982, PIRA killed six RUC officers, one former policeman, one former UDR soldier, one civilian, and Lenny Murphy, the leader of the notorious ‘Shankill Butchers.’ But in the same period the INLA ‘out-killed’ its PIRA rival by accounting for the deaths of thirteen soldiers, two RUC officers and ten civilians. The INLAs greater death toll was primarily the result of one Incident on 7 December 1982 when eleven soldiers, mostly from the Cheshire Regiment were killed in a bomb attack on the Droppin Well Bar in Ballykelly, County Derry (Taylor, 2000: 243).

87 The ‘Armalite and Ballot Box’ strategy first enunciated by Danny Morrison at the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis in 1981 “articulated the interlocking political and military sides of PIRAs campaign into a mutually supporting symbiosis” (Smith, 1995: 155). In essence this was “a referral to the republican movement’s intent to fight the war on both a military and political footing” (Cochrane, 2013: 88).

88 In Cluster II and III the PIRA members were all armed and on active service or about to initiate an operation/attack; with the notable exception of the three PIRA members killed at Gibraltar, the second Incident of Cluster II; who while on an active reconnaissance for an operation were also unarmed.
is also a comparator that shows how the PIRA evolved and morphed its campaign in a similar trajectory; neither was directly linked, but parallel each other. Ní Aoláin (2000) has characterised the period 1981-94 as the ‘active counter insurgency phase,’ (p. 28), marked by the end of the republican Hunger Strikes. It is within this phase that the Incidents comprising the three Clusters analysed in this text occurred.
**Figure 16. Comparison of Evolution of PIRA & British Army Strategy, 1968 – 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Disaggregation of PIRA Campaign into Five Phases*</th>
<th>Evolution of Phases in Security Response to PIRA Campaign (British Security Policy)**</th>
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<tr>
<td>1969-1976</td>
<td>PIRA structured like an army, each unit responsible for specific geographic area</td>
<td>Suppressing Dissent: The colonial war model / militarization</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977-1980</td>
<td>Large-scale reorganisation; leading to a cell structure. A shift away from quantity to security and discipline resulting in fewer convictions and a change in leadership</td>
<td>Normalization: The policies of ‘Ulsterisation’ of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1989***</td>
<td>Growing politicization, post Hunger Strikes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-1994***</td>
<td>Negotiations and pathways towards ceasefires, (secret) organisational elites</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>Negotiations made public</td>
<td>Negotiations made public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Adapted from Gill and Horgan (2013)
** Adapted from Ellison & Smyth (2000); Ní Aoláin (2000); Clarke (2009)
*** Period of Targeted Killings
The Shoot-to-Kill Controversy

Between November 11 and December 12 1982, six individuals were fatally injured by members of HMSU/E4B, the RUCs nascent anti-terrorist unit (Appendix G). Five of the dead were members of paramilitary organisations, and in the following section a detailed examination of the two Incidents in which these five were killed that comprise Cluster I will now be examined. The sixth individual killed was a civilian, when at Ballyneery Road North, again near Lurgan on Nov 24 1982, Michael Tighe was shot dead in a hayshed where some old rifles were found without ammunition. His death took place between these two Incidents; Tighe a seventeen year old youth was not involved in PIRA, and this ‘hayshed’ shooting though not a specific Incident under examination nonetheless became the most controversial of this grouping of killings and its repercussions echoed through the decade. The killing of Tighe therefore is not treated as an Incident per se but will be referred to for contextual and a background purpose as it is nonetheless related to the two Incidents that comprise the Cluster under examination.

All six deaths occurred in controversial circumstances (Ní Aoláin, 2000). These deaths were subsequently investigated by John Stalker. The then main flagship of current affairs programmes for the Southern Irish national broadcaster RTE was the Today Tonight programme; they carried out a major investigation into these events in a programme aired on 30 October 1986. The programme emphasised that the background to the Stalker inquiry lay in a vicious shooting spree by republican gunmen in the latter half of 1982, the intense pressure on the RUC to get results were “nowhere felt so strongly than in the historic county of Armagh. The Chief Constable and his colleagues found themselves in late 1982 attending funeral after funeral of members of the security forces” (Heaney and MacCoille, Today Tonight: 30 October 1986).
Figure 17. Shoot to Kill Incidents of Nov/Dec 1982. (Urban, 1992; Schweitzer, 2007)
It has been suggested by many authors (Urban, 1992; Taylor, 1997; Ellison and Smyth, 2000) that these killings were part of a counter cyclical series of actions initiated by the RUC in response to republican killings. This correlates with the views of interviewees and my determination is that there is a strong indication that this reflects Schweitzer’s Action-Reprisal Dynamic (2007) or Araj’s Repression/Protest Nexus (2008) as represented in Figure 17.

These incidents were subsequently investigated by the Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, John Stalker, and gave rise to what became widely known as the ‘Stalker Affair’ or ‘Shoot-to-Kill Inquiry’ (Taylor, 1997: 268). The then SDLP leader John Hume89 expressed concern that “recent police tactics of shooting terrorists had brought the security forces down to the level of the terrorists. They had replaced law and order with war” (Phoenix, The Irish Times: 29 Dec 2012).

In the following the two Incidents that comprise Cluster I will be examined and this in turn will be followed by an analysis of the overall Cluster based on the four Hafez and Hatfield (2006) pillars.

**Incident I: Advent of Shoot-to-Kill**

Before examining the first Incident of Cluster I in detail, it is worth briefly revisiting why the examination of the two Incidents contained in Cluster I are both important and central to this study. First, in 1982 the police were dabbling directly and ineptly in overt counter-insurgency and “these shootings sharpened the RUCs response to the Provisionals’ campaign” (Taylor, 1997: 268). Second, this Cluster is also firmly nested within the period that sees the projection of the ‘Ulsterisation’ of the conflict (Figure 16), whereby the lead in the anti-terrorism campaign was taken away from the British army and the RUC became the ‘tip of the spear.’ The purpose of ‘Ulsterisation’ was to restore an atmosphere of normality to Northern Ireland. Ní Aoláin (2000) believes that the policy of ‘Normalisation’ or ‘Ulsterisation’ specifically sought to place management of the conflict in local hands: “the symbolic re-establishment of the RUC as the primary and visible law-enforcers had an

89 John Hume (born 18 January 1937), Derry nationalist politician who consistently advocated non-violence. Leader of the SDLP (see Glossary), from 1979 to 2001; co-recipient of the 1998 Nobel peace Prize.
immeasurable public relations value” (p. 52). She believes that it changed the very terms of the external and internal reference of the conflict.

**Ulsterisation**

Smith (1995) believes that Ulsterisation bestowed a number of benefits on the British position in that “the policy aimed to contain the conflict in Northern Ireland and minimise its impact on the wider British body politic” (p. 143). Cusack (Irish Times: 22 Dec 1982) interestingly noted that previous RUC tactics had been dictated largely by the view that tough measures were essentially counter-productive. Indeed “this was inherent in the Ulsterisation policy introduced in 1976, after which the RUC gradually took over from the British army in many important security fields.” But the change in police policy arose from the Provisional Sinn Féin vote in the assembly elections, and the support given to the Provisionals was seen as a “peak of Northern Catholic alienation, the Police view was that strong methods would not therefore significantly worsen Catholic alienation.” Duyvesteyn (2008) has noted how it may be political imperatives that often drive counter-terrorism policies. Ní Aoláin (2000) would argue that a similar situation would later pertain in Tyrone during the events of the second and third Cluster and “that the tactical use of counter-insurgency measures in particular geographical areas is intimately linked to state perception of the political ‘costs’ of operations in these districts (p. 93).

The first Incident of this Cluster occurred on 11 November 1982 when three Lurgan PIRA members, Eugene Toman (21), Sean Burns (21) and Gervaise McKerr (31), none of whom were armed were killed at Tullygally Road East outside Lurgan on November 11 1982 (Appendix ‘D’-Ser; 01-03; McKittrick et al., 1999: 920-921) by a special RUC unit, “in the first of a series of shootings which number among the most controversial of the troubles” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 920). Two weeks prior to the first deaths, those of McKerr, Burns and Toman, three RUC officers were killed in their vehicle by a road-side-bomb at Kinnego, Lurgan, County Armagh (McKittrick et al., 1999: 918-919; Figure 17). Linking these two Incidents is problematical; nonetheless as we have seen commentators have suggested that the three deceased PIRA members were linked to the ASU that instigated the Kinnego Embankment attack (Ní Aoláin, 2000). Today Tonight argued that the deaths of the three PIRA
members were indeed directly linked to the Kinnego Embankment attack of 27 October 1982 where “three policemen were blown to bits” (30 October 1986).

We have seen how Duyvesteyn (2008) has suggested that “the use of force ‘complies’ with the aim of terrorist organisations to provoke the state into overreacting” (p. 328). Moloney (23/02/09) believes that the killings in this Incident and the death of Michael Tighe killed in the hayshed Incident “followed the killing of three RUC men in a landmine explosion [at Kinnego Embankment] caused by explosives that had been stored in the shed.” In other words it is suggested that the explosives used in the killing of the three RUC officers was removed by PIRA from the shed prior to the subsequent killing of Michael Tighe in the very same hayshed, despite the hayshed being under electronic surveillance by the security forces. Taylor (The Guardian: 23 May 2000) states that “MI5s listening device had failed and the IRA had removed them (the explosives) under the noses of British intelligence…had there been human surveillance on the hayshed, three policemen would not have died.” A fortnight after the killing of McKerr, Burns and Toman there were sounds of movement in the hayshed, “this time, MI5s bug was working. The anti-terrorist unit moved in and shot seventeen year old Michael Tighe, who had no IRA connections, and seriously wounded his friend, nineteen year old Martin McCauley” (Taylor, The Guardian: 23 May 2000).

The Tullyglass East Shooting
The fatal confrontation with McKerr, Burns and Toman “was pre-planned on the basis of informer information, and indeed the three men had been under surveillance for a considerable time before their death” (Ní Aoláin, 2000: 60). The three deceased, who were unarmed, “were killed outright in a hail of 109 bullets” (p. 60). Sean Burns was the back-seat passenger in a car driven by Gervaise McKerr. Police claimed it crashed through a roadblock and that they fired as they gave chase. Both Burns and McKerr were hit several times. “The front-seat passenger Eugene Toman was shot through the heart evidently after he had left or was leaving the stationary car” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 920). Three policemen were subsequently charged with and acquitted of the murder of Eugene Toman. Lord Chief Justice Gibson in acquitting the three police officers commended them “for their courage and determination in bringing the three deceased men to justice, in this case the final court
of justice” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 920). One of the policemen acquitted in relation to the Tullyglass East shooting later took his own life (p. 920). Moriarty (13/09/12) related interviewing a woman whose brother was an RUC officer who took his own life, “she was telling me her brother had been part of the shoot-to-kill and it had destroyed his mind.” Mallie (21/05/13) on the killings of the three was told by an RUC source, “that was a ‘wipe-out’…which was the phrase used by the RUC at the time. An undercover operation; and that Toman, Burns and McKerr had been wiped out.” Before examining the events that comprise the second Incident, it is worth taking the opportunity to examine how with the advent of police supremacy, a key pillar of the Ulsterisation or Normalisation policy, this period witnesses an incremental development of an intelligence apparatus that is to evolve and develop into a highly sophisticated method of containing PIRA as the conflict evolves and develops.

Police Supremacy

From the beginning of 1980 (See Appendix ‘G’) the RUC had specially trained surveillance and operational units in situ, and the new Chief Constable, Sir John Hermon saw these “as a means of curtailing the operations of British Army special units and pushing the RUC to the forefront in this area of counter-insurgency” (Ellison and Smyth, 2000: 116). Moloney (23/02/09) states “it is also worth bearing in mind that the relatively new leadership of John Hermon, had just started to deploy new Mobile Support Units of all sorts and they were eager to try them out.” Moriarty (13/09/12) believes that the policy of TKs at this juncture was in fact driven by the then Chief Constable: “Hermon was an unusual sort of cop, bluff. Fairly practical minded guy, tough; he would have had a lot of cops underneath him who would be fairly gung-ho.” Urban (1992) quotes one RUC officer who noted that “I believe that Sir John (Hermon) would demand the ultimate without thinking it through” (p.158). McKittrick (13/11/12), believes that these police units were the equivalent of the Police SAS “…the famous phrase speed, firepower and aggression….maybe it was an idea of the ‘Thatcherite’ times was that you go in and get them.” A BBC Panorama current affairs programme quoted RUC Chief Constable Michael McAtamney “that the men of the HMSU were trained to operate and fire in any conceivable situation they find themselves in” and that additionally “they were trained to fire not at
people’s legs but at their bodies to put them ‘permanently out of action’” (Panorama, 12 November 1984; cited by Irish Times: 13 November 1984).

**Special Branch**

This new hierarchy of police counter-terrorism units was spearheaded by the RUC Special Branch. Southern (2009) has noted throughout the UK counter-terrorism has always been the specialist area of policing known as ‘Special Branch.’ Thus when the “troubles broke out in Northern Ireland the local Special Branch inevitably took on a primary role, which increasingly evolved around intelligence on the terrorist groups” (p. 189). Officer A (21/02/13) outlined the evolution and development of this intelligence architecture. The Special Branch had a stand-alone system, which Officer A noted “is often criticised ‘as a force within a force,’” but as a Special Branch officer himself outlined how this system in particular became increasingly coordinated and sophisticated. In effect, there was a Special Branch officer in every station who was primarily responsible for gathering intelligence on both republicans and loyalists in their given area of operations; this in turn was fed into a Regional HQ where the intelligence was analysed. Officer A (21/02/13) notes that the foundations for this had been laid by Kenneth Newman, who as Chief Constable created “Crime Squads and they had a better intelligence system from the ground, so that officers on the ground could create information that could be collated…brought into the Crime Squads and made available to Detectives interrogating suspects.” This is substantiated by Taylor noting how Newman created four new Regional Crime Squads “whose specific task was to target the IRAs ASUs” (1997 p.203), which in turn were subdivided into four units of five detectives with one Special Branch officer assigned to each unit. Officer A (21/02/13) noted how;

> “we had at our disposal all the traditional techniques for gathering information, which is intercept, listening devices, covert agents and surveillance and we are managing all that, so the Region controls that and what controls that [the Regions] is the Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG) who have access to all the agencies, which are Police surveillance, Army surveillance, 14th Int, and the COP platoons.”

He noted finally that this system is “now being exported around the world; Iraq, Afghanistan, New Zealand uses it, Canada and the Guards [The Southern Irish Police, An Garda Síochana].” Taylor (1997) remarks that ironically this new RUC counter-
intelligence structure “came to resemble the Provisionals’ ASUs they were designed to smash” (p. 203).

**Incident II: INLA TK**

In addition to PIRA, the INLA was also very active in County Armagh in the early 1980s. “Two policemen were shot dead at Markethill,⁹⁰ and then in December (1982) at Droppin Well (See Footnote 86), it was a shocking attack that inflamed passions across the North, again the Police were ready to respond” (Heaney and MacCoille, *Today Tonight*: 30 October 1986). This again suggests that the events of Incident II where at Mullacreevie Park in Armagh city, two members of the INLA,⁹¹ Seamus Grew (31) and Roddie Carroll (22) were shot dead on 12 December 1982, (Appendix D-Ser; 04-05; McKittrick *et al.*, 1999: 929-930) were a direct response to the INLA bombing at Droppin Well and the killing of the two Police officers at Markethill. Again neither Carroll nor Grew was armed. This brings into focus the argument “that the use of the military instrument [TKs] complies with the logic of terrorism: provoke the opponent into overreacting” (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 343), and that therefore this would indicate “that terrorism can be effective in its operational aim of provocation” (p. 343).

Seamus Grew and Roderick Carroll, two members of the INLA were shot on 12 December 1982 at the Killylea Road outside Armagh in the third of a series of so-called ‘shoot-to-kill’ Incidents involving the RUCs Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU), also referred to as E4B (See Appendix G). “Carroll was recently released from jail along with Mr. Grew’s younger brother…after another Armagh man had retracted evidence against them” (Pollak, *Irish Times*: 13 December 1982). Grew and Carroll “were suspected of having shot two RUC men in the Armagh village of Markethill, almost a month previously” (Cusack, *Irish Times*: 23 February 1988). It later emerged that an RUC Inspector from E4Bs sister unit, the covert surveillance

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⁹⁰ Two RUC Reserve Officers (RUCR) were shot dead by the INLA on 16 Nov 1982 in the village of Markethill as they stood at security gates (McKittrick *et al.*, 1999: 924).

⁹¹ Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). An extreme republican paramilitary group, it was established in 1974 as a breakaway from the Official IRA, which PIRA itself had split from in 1969. INLA members engaged in a number of republican internal feuds and three of its members died in the 1981 Hunger Strike. An offshoot of the INLA, the Irish People’s Liberation Organisation (IPLO) morphed during a feud in 1986, it ceased to exist after attacks from PIRA in the 1990s.
unit E4A, had followed them while they were in the company of INLA leader Dominic McGlinchey who gained great notoriety during the course of the troubles (McKittrick et al., 1999: 929). McGlinchey “had been responsible for an upsurge of INLA activity in the border area, particularly in Armagh” (Urban, 1992: 155). Stalker’s team were surprised to learn that within the RUC there were “no regulations barring cross-border incursions” (Today Tonight: 30 October 1986; Irish Times: 13 Nov 1984). Ellison and Smyth (2000) contend “that the Incident was a carefully planned if eventually botched HMSU operation to ambush Dominic McGlinchey, who was then leader of the republican splinter group, the INLA” (p. 121), and “the RUC had expected Dominic McGlinchey to travel with the two men that night and that McGrew and Carroll visited McGlinchey that night in Castleblaney,” a town across the border in Southern Ireland (Heaney and MacCoille, Today Tonight: 30 October 1986). An Phoblacht stated that this Incident “in a planned RUC ambush…bringing to six in the last month those summarily executed by the brutal [RUC] force” (An Phoblacht/Republican News: 16 December 1982).

Constable John Robinson was charged with and acquitted of the murder of Seamus Grew. According to Urban (1992), Constable Robinson shot Carroll as he sat in the car’s passenger seat (p. 152). Some 15 shots were eventually fired into the passenger side of the Allegro car driven by Grew (McKittrick et al., 1999: 929). Constable Robinson, reloading his gun, went around the car and shot the driver, Grew (Urban, 1992: 152). It is suggested that a former member of Sinn Féin working for the RUC passed on the information about the two INLA men to the RUC, both of whom would later have brothers killed (McKittrick et al., 1999: 929; Cusack, Irish Times: 23 Feb 1988).

Analysis of Cluster I Using Hafez and Hatfield’s Framework

Having examined the exact circumstances in which the two Incidents of the first Cluster took place in addition to the security strategy of the security forces as it pertained in 1982, in the following these Incidents will be interpreted and analysed utilising Hafez and Hatfield’s (2006) four pillars: deterrence, backlash, disruption, and diminishing capacity.
Deterrence

These killings were unusual for a number of reasons. They were the first killings by undercover units since the SAS shot James Taylor in September 1978. A stark component in the ensuing post-1982 controversy was the discrepancy between the initial RUC version of events and the facts as they later emerged. Again, to emphasise, the three Incidents contained within this Cluster are also unique in that none of the individuals shot were armed at the time. Moloney (23/02/09) was of the view that if a pattern of TKs is to be observed it is not necessarily discernible during this period and that this study should be more firmly embedded in the “years 1984 to 1994 and there you can discern patterns which support the view that such assassinations can do, or did, persuade an organisation to more readily embrace a non-violent approach.” Additionally he “would be inclined to see these Incidents as part of the usual story of those days, with the RUC responding with like to an upsurge in violence.” Correspondingly, Sheridan (15/01/13) as a former RUC officer while emphatically rejecting the suggestion that a shoot-to-kill policy existed, noted that the RUC unlike any police force in the Western world were subjected to a sustained, deliberate targeting and attrition of their officers and a consequent experiencing of that sort of terrorism over a prolonged period of time. Sheridan now believes that there was a lacuna in a range of legislation: “Unfortunately looking back on it now…you didn’t have Human Rights legislation, you didn’t have covert and policy of interceptions,” and arising from this, “you had Police officers who in the ordinary course of events; you would expect police officers doing ordinary things, moved into this world and having to respond,” but doing so without legislation. Therefore, “I don’t think they [the RUC], set out to say we’re going to kill X, I think what they said ‘we have intelligence that says X and his friend are going to do Y shooting, we will plan an operation around that, they may end up being shot in that or arrested,’ they didn’t say we’re going to shoot them.”

Smith (2 July 1988) noted that Stalker “appreciated that some beleaguered RUC officers saw themselves as soldiers in an undeclared war with the IRA. He admired many,” but he was also convinced that “heavily armed and psyched-up RUC officers

92 James Taylor, a Protestant civil servant with no paramilitary connections was shot by the SAS while duck hunting on 30th September 1978 (McKittrick et al., 1999: 768).
felt justified in shooting suspected terrorist suspects on sight rather than taking prisoners.” Moriarty (13/09/12) believed that police involvement in these Incidents was inherently at odds with a policing ethos and culture, “on an individual level for police officers to be involved like this, for all the complaints about the RUC…it was certainly against the grain for some of them.” This is why ultimately Moriarty believes that the army subsequently regained the ascendancy as “the army SAS would have been much more clinical and detached.” Silke (07/04/09) viewed TKs as “one of those policies that is popular within the military, the security services. It goes down well with the ordinary rank and file.” David (2007) and Byman (2006) have also alluded to this imperative in the Israeli case.

John Stalker’s inquiry was seriously obstructed by the RUC and in June 1986 he was replaced as head of the inquiry, amid allegations that he had associated with criminals – allegations later shown to be false (Taylor, 1997). “Stalker himself felt that the RUC had indeed shot unarmed men and then lied in the circumstances; though he also concluded that there existed no formal policy of killing suspects in preference to arresting them” (p. 238). Seamus Mallon, then Deputy Leader of the nationalist SDLP and MP for the area noted;

“One cannot escape the conclusion that either orders have been given to a special SAS type unit within the RUC to summarily execute people on suspicion and nothing more then suspicion; or indeed there are rogue RUC men who are taking the law into their own hands, disregarding their own instructions from their own Chief Constable and embarking on a war of attrition that can only lead to the war of the jungle” (Today Tonight: 30 October 1986).

McKearney (23/11/12) believed that these deaths were a boon to PIRA recruitment and had no deterrent effect. In relation to the deterrent effect Murtagh (25/05/09) said that “bearing in mind such experience that I have, it would be along the line that it would harden resolve.” Interestingly he believed that on the periphery, what Murtagh refers to as “around the edges,” it may have had an effect. “It might put some people off. If you were a thirty-something or forty-something volunteer in the IRA and this trigger thing [TKs] started happening, I suspect that most of their reactions would be this is the fight I’m in.” Murtagh asserts it would merely reaffirm their status as an activist. But Murtagh feels that on the periphery—amongst those considering becoming volunteers—there was a possible effect. “Now, around the
edges, if I was an eighteen year old and thinking of getting involved… it might have an effect on me.”

Brims (06/11/12), who served in the British army throughout the Troubles in increasingly senior appointments, specifically differentiated between those on the periphery and those already committed: “…correct, that’s exactly right, the people on the periphery or neutral, they will say ‘not for me; I’ll carry on doing a 9-to-5 job,’” but equally “for somebody who has already gotten involved, then they see killing…I see it probably has the effect of making that person even more committed to their cause.” Morrison (03/03/09), originator of the ‘Armalite and Ballot Box’ strategy believes that TKs in one sense had a deterrent effect, but that in another it fuelled the conflict, “it depends on the person, it depends on the circumstances. You could foresee a situation in another conflict situation where an organisation is so battered it will suspend its actions.”

Colbert (21/05/13), a republican activist before and during this period, spoke of the death of Brendan O’Callaghan, a fellow volunteer shot dead by a British military ‘stake-out’ at the Hunting Lodge Bar in Lenadoon, West Belfast.93 “I would have been a very good friend of Brendan’s…I have to say speaking at a personal level; it was awful…so he was shot dead, it was just awful…he got out of jail, shot dead at the Hunting Lodge Bar…after he was buried, lets go again…next operation…it didn’t honestly [deter].” Hutchinson (25/07/12) believed that both republican and loyalist paramilitaries shared a parallel motivation, “It doesn’t deter you if you’re politically motivated…because if you believe in something strongly enough, it’ll not deter ya.”

Brims (06/11/12) absolutely refuted the suggestion that a TK policy existed per se, Brims believes that from a deterrence perspective “amongst the people that were going to join anyway, it [the death of volunteers] enhanced the recruitment. Amongst those people who were hard-line nationalists, but not actually members of the terrorist organisation…..I think they would probably think this is not for me. But amongst the

93 Killed on 23 April 1977, he was a member of the Belfast PIRAs 1st Battalion (Bn). He was described by the IRA as part of a three-man patrol “designed to protect republican areas after recent bombings and shootings carried out by British and loyalist elements.” Two men who were with him escaped in a car (McKittrick et al., 1999: 719).
sort of people who come from the background, I think certainly in the early years, the shoot-to-kill years (1982), the febrile atmosphere made it conducive to IRA recruiting. By 1990 it’s not quite the same thing.” English (14/12/12) additionally contended that from a deterrence perspective that “it made the harshness of the conflict clear, but I doubt that it deterred many serious recruits.”

The response in Northern Ireland to the Cluster I Incidents was as varied as it was predictable. Contemporaneous newspaper articles from the period reveal that immediately after the events there was deep disquiet within the nationalist community. In the immediate aftermath, for example, one local councillor stated “that on the face of it, the RUC used maximum force in stopping the car” in which the three PIRA members were killed. Pollak (Irish Times: 15 November 1982), reporting immediately after the funerals of the three PIRA Volunteers killed in Incident I, noted how the effect on the local community of the three killings was shown by the broad based attendance at the funeral mass from a cross spectrum of both nationalist and republican political representatives and how “the disquiet about these deaths goes beyond party political lines.” Pollak (Irish Times: 13 December 1982) noted that in relation to Incident II how the Dungannon priest Fr. Dennis Faul noted that “the RUC’s new policy was a disastrous one since the law should be based on the sacredness of human life.” Moriarty (13/09/12), who reported on the period, was very conscious of this prevailing deep disquiet amongst even moderate nationalists; “it seemed like a major cover-up; certainly anyone in the Catholic nationalist community would have said this is shoot-to-kill: it is premeditated.” Middleclass Catholics would think “they are playing the IRA game with IRA tactics and that isn’t the way it should be.”

After another separate Incident where two PIRA members94 were killed in Derry one leading unionist said he felt as if “Santa Claus had come home early this year.” A nationalist councillor caused a furious row when he alluded to the Union flag as the ‘butcher’s apron’ (Johnson, The Guardian: 10 December 1984). Johnson further noted that “the episode has caused concern and anger amongst politicians and churchmen among the minority community who condemn violence and will have no

94 Appendix D-Ser; 13-14; McKittrick et al., 1999: 1002 /1003).
truck with the paramilitaries” (*The Guardian*: 10 December 1984). While Morrison (03/03/09) noted, that there is an “old leftist slogan, that repression breeds resistance and that is true.”

We have seen previously in the academic literature how Duyvesteyn (2008) and Livingston (1990) have both discussed how the use of TKs as an instrument by state forces may play into the hands of their opponents and relinquishes the moral high ground.

**Backlash**

Murtagh (25/05/09), who investigated the period in detail, believes that TKs “existed as a fact on the ground.” “I think there were elements within the Special Branch, probably elements within MI5, internal Military Intelligence of the UK who were very active in Northern Ireland, elements within both those organisations who worked together and in effect had what we call a shoot-to-kill policy” (Murtagh 25/05/09). Mallie (13/11/12) states “we had instruments here, they weren’t called TKs…they were in the republican parlance ‘shoot-to-kill,’ but they were the same thing.” English (14/12/12), author of *IRA, Armed Struggle* (2003), did not think a policy of TK is what occurred, in the usual use of the phrase, at least. English believes that “it is important to recognise how limited any such state killings were. The figures on responsibility for deaths in the conflict are utterly clear here.” English contends that the events of this Cluster “were a muscular response to IRA/INLA violence.” Ní Aoláin (10/01/13) believes that the state “we’re looking at here is not one that had shoot-to-kill orders written down,” but Ní Aoláin also believes that what did exist was “a culture of permissibility, where certain things became possible because the state communicates both obliquely and not so obliquely to its actors and institutions that certain courses of action will be tolerated, and it is that toleration that is *de facto* policy.”

What effect did these Incidents have on the PIRA insurgency from a backlash perspective? Dingley (14/09/12) stated simply that “it was a boon to republicans.”

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95 Murtagh, now Foreign Editor of the *Irish Times*, wrote a series of articles at the time on the ‘Shoot-to-Kill’ period for the *Guardian* newspaper for which he subsequently received the UK’s Annual Reporter of the Year award in 1996.
While not fully accepting that a TK policy existed per se, “it was a total failure...as a tactic of the security forces if it did have any acknowledgement it was an abysmal failure.” Dingley felt it played directly into the hands of the IRA, and that the IRA were driven strongly by social and cultural factors and a certain reading of history, which always cast the British as the oppressive enemy, “who simply go out killing republicans because they are republicans...but as a shoot-to-kill policy it was a disaster from the state’s point of view; it was a gift to republicans.” Pollak (Irish Times: 15 Nov 1982) noted how one bystander at the funeral of the Incident I PIRA members noted “if there weren’t any Provos in Lurgan up to now there sure will be after this.” An Phoblacht stated “the fact remains that in flagrant contravention of their own supposed procedures [the RUC]...cold-bloodedly fired into a halted car” (An Phoblachten/Republican News: 18 November 1982). Pollak (Irish Times: 13 December) also noted that the circumstances of the deaths had a radicalising effect in that it was perceived that if there had been some kind of shoot-out with the RUC things might have been regarded differently, but the “the fact that the three men were apparently unarmed had particularly shocked the people.” The RUC released a detailed and lengthy statement in the aftermath of the killing of Grew and Carroll, “some 230 words in length” (Pollak, Irish Times: 13 December 1982). It is notable that subsequent press releases post TKs are short and terse, unlike this period. After the Loughgall ambush of May 1987, for example, the initial press release was described as “terse and carefully worded” (Ellison and Smyth, 2000: 122). The RUC press office refused to elaborate further as to whether the security forces had prior knowledge of the attack. Similarly, after the Drumnakilly ambush of 30 August 1988 where the Harte brothers and Mullen were killed, the then RUC press release simply stated that the Incident occurred when “soldiers encountered armed men in a vehicle and opened fire” (Vallely, The Times: 31 August 1988). It is also striking that there was relatively little coverage in the mainland UK press of the Cluster I Incidents. This may be simply because there was so much killing taking place at this juncture of the troubles, of which these particular TKs were just a part. Even a cursory examination of McKittrick et al., Lost Lives (1999) suggests that this is at least part of the explanation. Moriarty (13/09/12) also alluded to this;
“It [TKs] didn’t work, it did some damage but in the grand scheme of things it was just another couple of Incidents…at the time we just thought it was going to go on forever, because there were absolute militarists running the IRA, they would exploit politics but politics to support the military.”

Fall-out from the ‘Stalker Affair’

It was only later due to the controversy surrounding the dismissal of John Stalker that the mainland UK press began to look in-depth at these two Cluster I Incidents, which is why, as Moriarty (13/09/12) argued, “if anyone came muddied out of it, it was certainly the RUC, British authorities, British government up to the very top.” Another factor that the Incidents of this Cluster shares with subsequent Clusters is the considerable and lengthy delays of inquests into the killings (Cusack, *Irish Times*: 26 January 1988; Pallister, *The Guardian*: 1 September 1988). Ní Aoláin (2000) notes that “inquests have been subject to protracted domestic and international criticism…such inquests are subject to interminable delays” (p. 150). Officer A (21/02/12) believed it had a negative impact in that “the republicans used this in their reaction to this activity, they used it as propaganda against the state, and they used it to force inquest activity.” Officer A also pointed out that the “republicans are very adept at using their dead volunteers to create a reaction and create more volunteers and that’s one of the themes that comes through in every killing…and use that as a backlash.” Silke (07/04/09) posited the question in relation to backlash that it has to be seen from both sides of the conflict. In that “it’s a kind of case in that [if] the IRA kills a group of soldiers or policemen, what does that do in terms of motivation of the other. Does it increase their desire to defeat the IRA or does it make them want to give in?” Silke suggested that in fact it generally increases motivation, “there’s a desire to get back, a desire to strike back and it’s the same with the IRA; if you kill an IRA guy the others want revenge.”

Pollak (*Irish Times*: 13 December 1982) quoted the then Sinn Féin Assembly member for Armagh, Jim McAllister, who even immediately after the second Incident noted “the shooting of Seamus Grew and Roderic Carroll is an extension of the RUC policy of summary execution of nationalists, which they have been practicing in Armagh.” Closely following the two Incidents of this Cluster, a Co. Fermanagh man was wounded in the chest by British soldiers after it was alleged he was discovered near bomb equipment and detonator wire, led Seamus Mallon Deputy deputy-leader of the
SDLP to comment “that the further this goes, the more likely it will be that there would be massive retaliatory action” (Irish Times: 30 December 1982). Sheridan (15/01/13) as a former RUC officer stated;

“my perception is, and again I’d be surprised at human nature that there wasn’t a revenge with some people’s mindsets, you see that sort of tit-for-tat across the Troubles here and in other conflicts, where one group does something and the other responds with even greater force and so it goes on. So I imagine with some people it became an emotional response and how do we make it even worse the next time around.”

**Action/Reprisal Dynamic**

Equally on backlash, Brims (06/11/12) believed it was quite discernible and there was a serious security consequence that flowed in the ensuing couple of weeks: “you could expect a backlash and you would get it in the few days following the event…you would see more sticks and stones type violence [rioting] on the street and you would then see the odd gunman taking the opportunity of it.” The funerals of volunteers killed became a major focus for activist republicans too: “and then there would be funerals with great emotion and great publicity, so if you took all of those things; that is a backlash” (Brims 06/11/12). Silke (07/04/09) posited that an issue that arises with backlash from the insurgents perspective is that the planning time for an operation is quite long and that many PIRA operations took months to meticulously plan, “so if a killing occurs for a really good response to happen might take a long time.” Silke believed that insurgent groups such as PIRA “[what they] sometimes do is rush operations; they might have something in the pipeline, but if you rush it you increase the chances it’s going to fail.”

Duyvesteyn (2008) has noted that even amongst analysts (Byman, 2005; Gross, 2003; Luft, 2003) who support TKs in the Israeli case, there is recognition that there is always an upsurge in terrorist violence, the so-called ‘action/reprisal dynamic,’ following a TK Incident (Duyvesteyn, 2008: 338). Hafez and Hatfield (2006) do not specifically concur with this however; as they argue it cannot be conclusively stated. McKearney (23/11/12) in interview took up this theme. He said “the response wasn’t instantaneous; the IRA didn’t have the capacity to deliver. By the 1980’s it didn’t have the ability to randomly, just at will, to go back to strike.” The desire and intent for backlash was always there, but the circumstances had changed;
“From ’71 to ’74 the IRA was capable of striking almost at will, after the ceasefire in ’75 the same momentum never returned and operations were more selective, they were more calculated, and they were much more opportunistic then; when they apparently rose, they would strike. Whereas in the first couple of years it was a huge scattergun effect, but by the middle ’80s the IRA would not have had the capacity to simply say ‘well, tomorrow we’ll go out and do something’” (McKearney, 23/11/12).

Another potential element, identified by Murtagh (25/05/09), would be some politician somewhere standing up and saying something like ‘the IRA are beaten, we have them defeated,’ “and as sure as the sun will rise tomorrow, not long after those sort of comments were made you would have some Incident with the IRA saying, ‘oh by the way, I think you were wrong.’” Moriarty (13/09/12) believed that “Stalker served the IRA’s propaganda battle pretty well…Sinn Féin and the IRA has always been highly conscious of PR, media, propaganda and they have been top class with it all through the conflict.” This is similar to Urban’s (1992) contention that the controversy engendered was a “running sore which over a space of years allowed republican propagandists to exploit the Catholic community’s darkest fears about the police” (p. 152). These findings support the view of Hafez and Hatfield (2006) that while there is a desire for backlash it is not immediately evident post a TK Incident.

**Disruption**

Adams (03/03/09) in interview posited “I’m not so certain that there was a shoot-to-kill policy…I don’t think it was as organised as some of us would believe. Some of it involved police officers I think who almost were working off their own bat.” Urban (30/03/09) felt that the “RUC shootings investigated by John Stalker had more of an air of revenge about them.” Cusack (Irish Times: 23 Feb 1988) states that Stalker in his autobiography believed that the killings of Incident I stemmed from the Special Branch investigation into the deaths of the three RUC officers in the Kinnego landmine and that the “Stalker book states that a motive of revenge in these Incidents should have been investigated.” This view is supported by the academic literature, where Hafez and Hatfield (2006) have noted that TKs may still be “useful as a political tool to signal a states determination to punish terrorist and placate an angry public, but there remains little evidence that they actually impact on the course of the insurgency” (p. 359). We have seen how Plaw (2008) has previously noted that TKs are a way for the government to combat the social and psychological effects of terrorism, giving the population a sense of “efficacy in the face of a relentless threat”
Murtagh (25/02/2009) supported this view “…so within the RUC if you like for some elements it had a firming or supporting effect.”

Moriarty (13/09/12) stated quite simply that “in terms of deterrence, disruption, backlash I don’t think it would have done them [PIRA] any great damage. It would have given them pause for thought: ‘OK, we’ve got informers here who have set up this thing,’” but he then quoted a republican militant that he interviewed who said “there is always going to be informers, so long as the Brits are here we will do this regardless of the threat of informers.” McKearney (23/11/12), a former East Tyrone PIRA Brigade Commander argued that “I think in terms of these shootings that we are looking at something more complex than simply revenge; or on the other hand a very calculated, calibrated attack.” McKearney speaking of this period alludes to a theme that he takes up further in interview in relation to the subsequent Clusters. This is that TKs must be seen not only in context but in space and time. Indeed this is an issue that is recurring not only in the academic literature, but was raised too by many of the respondents in interview. McKearney (23/11/12) stated that even in 1982 “really we would have to look at the context of the situation” McKearney also believes that the dynamics of the violence organisation itself are a factor. That while the events of November and December 1982 were “maybe possibly counter-productive from the point of view of those who are carrying it out,” because it had little or no effect on PIRA, really the targets were more the INLA and their two members who were killed. McKearney pointed out that the INLA was a much smaller organisation without the same political support or communal base as PIRA. Additionally being weaker and in the throes of a devastating internecine feud the effect on the INLA of the deaths of Grew and Carroll “was then arguably effective in terms of, if you like, the knockout punch or a serious blow.” “I would suggest,” he went on to say “that something similar was to happen later to the PIRA.” Critically, however, he holds the view that “it comes at a time when these organisations are experiencing difficulties; that the mileage is running out.” English (14/12/12) articulated the viewpoint that the effect of such killings as there were was mixed: “it put undoubted pressure on certain IRA resources, but it also left a legacy of anger and understandable outcries about the harshness of such state actions.” Edwards (2011) argues that if anything PIRA

“increased its operations against the army” during this period (p. 56). Smith (1995) concurs, noting that during the period 1977 to 1983 “PIRA injected a wide diversity into its targeting policy ranging from, for example, businessmen and prison wardens, to off-duty members of the security forces” (p. 156). One of the main features of the Long War strategy, he posits, was to avoid disruption of long term PIRA operations “whereby it enabled the military instrument to be governed by calculations of its efficacy rather than ideological tradition” (p. 157).

**Diminishing Capacity**

Silke (07/04/09) noted that over the course of his academic career he had interviewed many individuals in the security services who contended that the shoot-to-kill [TK] strategy worked and that it increased the price for PIRA to operate, Silke does not believe that it is clear from current academic evidence that this is really the case however. Urban (1992) also noted that “many Police officers and soldiers who support the ambushing of terrorists, on the other hand, say they find it hard to accept that the number of people returning to terrorism [after release from prison] is so low” (p. 134).

It is worth noting that no evidence of a general policy of shoot-to-kill [TKs] was found by the European Court of Human Rights. Officer A (21/02/13) who served as a Special Branch officer in Southern Region, recalled how he himself interviewed a former senior RUC officer, since deceased, who was present in the RUC Chief Constable’s Office when these first killings took place. Officer A related how this senior officer “walked into ‘the morning prayers’ and there was a lot of back-slapping and they thought that this was a fantastic result, you know very active terrorist had been killed.” But this officer stopped them in their tracks when he said, “Chief Constable Hermon, I just have to say I want to disagree with the action that has taken place here, we are no better than the terrorists, in fact we are worse, and I want to put a marker down that this should stop.” He was told he was entitled to his opinion, but that was all. So Officer A (21/02/13) believed there was a difference in RUC senior command viewpoints as to how police should operate. One such former senior officer was Assistant Chief Constable Charles Rodgers who “when he left the police was

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disillusioned and disenchanted with the force...he had a very difficult relationship
with Jack Hermon over the shoot-kill-policy” (McKinney, *The Irish News*: 26 May
2012). Moriarty (13/09/12) believed “it was a tactic for the period under a particular
Chief Constable, but what they hadn’t bargained for was the huge PR damage that
was going to come down the line.” McKittrick (13/11/12), co-author of the seminal
Lost Lives (1999), took up this point in interview: “so looking back [to the period
1982/1983], you have to balance this with that there was a much bigger IRA and a
more dangerous IRA coming along and these things [TKs] didn’t stop it…I don’t
think that there was any sense that it [the PIRA campaign] was slowing down at all.”

Colbert (24/07/13) made little differentiation between PIRA volunteers being either
killed or captured, indeed seasoned committed volunteers became almost inured and
their focus was on the next operation: “it was a similar situation to your comrades
getting captured, it was ‘that’s life; that’s tough,’ because once they’re buried, its
awful cold, you just get on with it, what you’re doing…the nose to the grindstone.”
Colbert saw no diminution in PIRA capacity. Smith (1995) has noted that PIRA was
conscious of avoiding a diminishing capacity effect on their operations by avoiding
attacks on supposed symbolic targets thereby preventing the security forces predicting
a set pattern where “the security forces could take counter-measures and PIRA could
suffer increased losses as a result” (p. 160). Already a definitive pattern was also
emerging during this period of the funerals becoming a major focal point for renewed
republican fervour. Colbert (24/07/13), when specifically asked was this the case,
replied “yes, I am in agreement with that.” Walsh (24/07/13) equally believed there
was little or no diminished capacity within PIRA during this period “but to come back
to the killing of IRA volunteers, it would have an impact on morale. It would have an
impact on possibly your capacity within a particular area for a limited period of time,
but the thing about that is you always find someone to step up to the mark and it has
never been a problem.”

Pollak (*Irish Times*: 15 Nov 1982) again reporting on the funerals of the three PIRA
members killed in Incident I, stated that while the paramilitary display at the funeral
lacked the military efficiency of the Hunger Striker funerals this was perhaps because,
as one bystander put it, “Lurgan was so unused to burying its republican dead during
the latest round of the Northern conflict.” Indeed, Colbert (21/05/13) asserted that
during this period because of the shortage of munitions, arms were a higher priority
then personnel: “I mean it got to the stage where people were getting captured, the
first question asked was what was lost? ‘Cause weaponry was very low, they were the
questions being asked…the person was missed to a degree…but you always had a lot
of personnel, you didn’t have a lot of weaponry in ’76, ’77.”

*Hearts and Minds*

Ní Aoláin (10/01/13) contended that on one view these killings were successful if the
strategy of the state was to identify high profile dangerous active service members of
a paramilitary organisation, which was continuing apace to target the state, and “to
take these ‘actors’ out of commission within a legally defensible framework; then you
could say in a short term instantaneous measure they [TKs] were successful.” The
second measure Ní Aoláin believed was what the ‘ripple’ effects of the deaths were.
At one level it is displaying ‘hard-end’ militarised tactics by the police that might
have been a successful strategy “with particular audiences or elite groups or political
groups within the state and outside in the UK as well”. But overall Ní Aoláin felt
that this message was ultimately not successful, because the killings garnered
everseous publicity and raised serious issues in the public mind as to their legality.
Another issue was the perception that “the police have screwed up, basically that
these deaths were not as clean as they should have been, that there was evidence of no
attempt at arrest.” This Ní Aoláin argued is a more problematic dynamic for a police
force engaged in counter terrorism than it is for a military. Within the hard-line
nationalist community the TKs fed “an ideological or PR language that such groups
can consistently use that is that the state behaves excessively, that the state is not a
rule of law state, that the state is corrupt and that the state doesn’t hold its own to
account.” Ní Aoláin believed that in those communities “it’s very clear that these
deaths had an ongoing mobilisation effect…there’s a repression-nexus there, that’s
very clear.” Moriarty (13/09/12) concurred and added that it also had a wholly
negative effect within mainstream nationalism “because they [the authorities] had
antagonised constitutional nationalism in that the alleged good guys were playing that
sort of game.”
Conclusion

An analysis therefore of authors from this period allied to interviewees supports the view that the events of this period had little or no deterrent effect on PIRA. There was no diminution in recruitment and PIRA could afford to be highly selective in inducting new recruits such were the numbers willing to join both post the Hunger Strikes of 1981 and during the period of this Cluster. Additionally it created a backlash effect whereby PIRA distinctly sought to retaliate against the security forces reinforcing Schweitzer’s (2007) Action Reprisal Dynamic theory.

Duyvesteyn’s (2008) assertion that, even amongst Israeli authors whom support TKs, there is a recognition that there is always an upsurge in terrorist violence post-TKs, was previously noted herein. There is a cycle of violence and counter-violence. Schweitzer (2007), as noted previously too, has referred to this as the ‘action/reprisal’ dynamic. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) diverge somewhat from this viewpoint, arguing that more research is warranted on this theme and that conclusive statements as to cycles of violence invariably being initiated by TKs cannot at this point in time be conclusively stated. My determination in this regard is that there is consistent evidence emanating from the interviewees who were questioned in relation to this Cluster that correlates with Duyvesteyn (2008) and Schweitzer (2007); there is a distinct cycle of violence and counter-violence evident in this Cluster.

Backlash, however, was delayed and not immediate because PIRA unlike the 1970s no longer had the ability to initiate backlash at will; what McKearney (23/11/12) has referred to as “the scatter-gun effect.” From a disruption perspective the TKs had little or no effect on PIRA, because PIRA was a large and evolving organisation at this juncture, with huge recruitment assisted by the febrile atmosphere that still existed in Northern Ireland in the aftermath of the 1981 Hunger Strikes. Indeed, the controversy engendered by the Stalker inquiry was a veritable boon to PIRA recruitment and from a propaganda perspective was akin to disaster for the security forces. Finally, in relation to a diminishing capacity effect there was little impact on the insurgency and its momentum as a result of these Cluster I TKs. PIRA tactics were evolving and changing, but this was a result of their adaptation of the Long War strategy not a direct result of TKs.
**Ripple Effects**

What was the ripple effect(s) of these events? Ni Aoláin (2000) has argued that the police foray into military confrontation backfired, confirming the army’s evaluation that the police were inherently unsuitable to the task of counter-insurgency. The attempts of the RUC to take the lead role at the sharp end of counter-insurgency, surveillance, and covert operations were thwarted after the killings in County Armagh. Questions were raised as to the ability of the RUC to replace the SAS in the undercover war against PIRA and a “decision was made to rein in the extensive and dangerous autonomy which the RUC Special Branch had acquired under Hermon” (Ellison and Smyth, 2000: 128). The experience in Armagh in 1982 “did not lead the security hierarchy to the conclusion that such operations were counter-productive but that the RUC was not competent to carry them out” (p. 129). Pallister (*The Guardian*: 1 September 1988) noted that “since the furore over the RUC shootings in 1982, a government policy decision was taken, with advice from MI5, that any future aggressive action against the IRA should be undertaken by the SAS.” Edwards (2011) observes that “in a bid to reduce the IRAs capacity for mounting attacks on security forces personnel, the cutting edge of the army’s Special Forces units increasingly came to the forefront in the 1980s” (p. 57). McKittrick (13/11/12) took up this theme in interview: “on a longer term basis the RUC had to have a degree of acceptability in the general community, especially in the nationalist community… First of all they weren’t like normal police at all…these were SAS tactics they used; and second, they were controversial; and third, they were gung-ho.” Thus the events of the so called ‘shoot-to-kill’ period again witnessed a discernible shift for the lead in such operations. Ni Aoláin (2000) has described these as ‘Set-Piece’ killings--to be taken up again by the army, and this was to remain the case until 1994 and the remaining two Clusters incorporated within this work.

The RUC was to be relegated to the role of gathering intelligence and agent handling. Officer A (21/02/13) continued that “the HMSU as they were called were not stood down, but they were changed to be more [a] support than offensive unit; so the HMSU remained the cutting edge of the Special Branch, but they were more or less coming in to take charge of crime scenes and the aftermath of activity by the SAS in a handover to investigators.” It is also illustrative that Holland & Phoenix (1996) have observed that as Ulstermen the RUC for the most part lived in the community, thereby
running an additional risk “of being targeted by paramilitaries thirsting for revenge” (p. 131), whereas the SAS were in Northern Ireland for a fixed period of time, “they could return for court appearances, but they did not have to make their lives there” (p. 131). Urban (1992) agrees, noting that the shootings exposed the fact “that the police, unlike the army, lacked the skills to protect their officers from difficult questions” (p. 159). Urban also contends that RUC officers viewed the whole affair with bitterness and that one RUC officer involved in the affair said: “Soldiers will be taken away to some other part of the world. You can’t do that with us, we live here” (p. 160). Allied to this Ni Aoláin (2000) believes that a deliberate political calculation was made post-1982 that a counter-insurgency campaign by a theoretically civilian police force would be subject to much greater scrutiny than any similar action by an elite military unit.

This led directly, as will be seen in the next chapter, to the lead in TKs being definitely removed from the RUC, who until the closure of this period had taken the lead security role as part of the policy of police primacy that was enunciated within the Ulsterisation concept. The direct effect of the ensuing controversy was that the army would now definitively take primacy, with the ‘tip of the spear’ being the SAS. It would also witness an acceleration and metamorphosis of the state security architecture (as outlined in Appendix G) that would in effect see the role of specialist RUC units confined to that of surveillance and back-up to the military, and the evolution and refinement of what I term the ‘triad’ of SAS, 14th Int (The Det), and the FRU coordinated and honed by the Tasking and Co-ordination Groups (TCGs) into a highly sophisticated intelligence gathering apparatus with an embedded kinetic option.
CHAPTER VI

Containment: East Tyrone and Gibraltar

Cluster II

Introduction

The previous Chapter examined the two Incidents of Cluster one, which collectively became known as the ‘shoot-to-kill Incidents’ or ‘the Stalker Affair.’ This Chapter examines a second Cluster of TKs made up of a further three Incidents that took place between May 1987 and August 1988, two of which concern TKs initiated against PIRA in East Tyrone (Loughgall and Drumnakilly) and a third that took place in Gibraltar. The Gibraltar Incident is the only TK initiated against PIRA on mainland Europe. However, it is included here because—as we shall see—it is directly linked to the two TK Incidents described in East Tyrone and comparable in its operationalisation to both.

Northern Ireland 1987-1988

The key political development that had taken place prior to the Incidents that will be described and analysed in this Chapter was the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, which for the first time gave the Republic of Ireland (ROI) a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The UK and Irish governments signed the agreement on 15 November 1985, “systemising co-operation with permanent inter-governmental conference machinery and giving the Irish government a consultative role in Northern Ireland affairs with a joint secretariat at Maryfield outside Belfast” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1006). The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the near universal unionist rage against it were 1985s most striking features.

A critical implied aim of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was to wean support away from Sinn Féin and back to the moderate SDLP amongst the nationalist community. A natural corollary of this was to seek to make the RUC more acceptable to the nationalist community. This in turn reinforced the trend to distance and eventually remove the RUC from active counter-insurgency. McKittrick (13/11/12) took up this theme;
“with the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 Dublin said we have to make the RUC more acceptable, and there were things like when the army went out on patrol they should always have RUC accompaniment with them…I think there would have been a thing here saying the RUC would be the best show in town, so if we could stop having them kill people that would help in terms of acceptability…the guns were shifted from the police to the army, so that was a key moment really.”

The British government as a quid pro quo in turn expected increased security cooperation from the Southern government.

In the years after the Agreement the conflict only worsened however. The death toll, which had been at its lowest level since the outbreak of ‘the Troubles,’ rose dramatically. PIRA and loyalist paramilitaries were rearmed and more sophisticated; “…but Margaret Thatcher’s government was also more ready to use lethal force” (Birney and Curry, Below the Radar TV: 02 July 2013). In time then British PM Thatcher was to express disappointment at the lack of what the British side perceived as a failure of the Southern government to enhance security cooperation. Patterson (2013) has noted “Thatcher’s own angry comments on what she has saw as the Republic’s failure to deliver on security cooperation in return for the enhanced role accorded it in the government of Northern Ireland” (p. 187).

Despite this contemporaneous media reports from the period reflected the argument of enhanced security cooperation and argued “the build-up in the ‘secret war’ against the IRA was ordered…as part of London’s bid to sell the 1985 Anglo Irish Agreement to the rebel unionists” (News Letter, 30 April 1986). It was posited “that a series of major security coups, especially in border areas, could be pulled off to prove to loyalists that the accord had tangible advantages in improving security cooperation with the Gardaí” (30 April 1986). Dr. Martin Mansergh, former special advisor to the Irish government on Northern Ireland from 1988-1992 noted that,

“once the British and Irish governments have concluded an agreement which obviously is sold in America as an initiative of major importance…and that they are in tandem together working on the problem then that leaves Britain much less exposed to criticism in terms of what it does and therefore if you like gives a somewhat freer hand to its security forces” (Birney and Curry, Below the Radar TV: 02 July 2013).

Brady and Cochrane (Sunday Telegraph: 27 April 1986) take up this theme on the shooting dead of IRA fugitive Seamus McElwaine on 26th April 1986 (Appendix ‘D’
They argue that “the operation-one of the most brilliant successes by the British army in the ‘bad lands’ of the border region – was immediately seen in Belfast, London and Dublin as the first fruit of the Anglo-Irish agreement” and they associated such actions with “informal discussions (that) have already begun between the British government and the Ulster unionists…Ministers are confident…in a renewed opening of talks between Mrs Thatcher and Northern Ireland political leaders” (Brady and Cochrane, *Sunday Telegraph*: 27 April 1986). Moving into 1986 nationalist support for the Anglo-Irish agreement encouraged Sinn Féin to drop its traditional policy of not taking seats in the southern Irish Parliament (Dáil), “producing a split in the republican movement which left Gerry Adams and his northern associates in unchallenged leadership of the republican movement” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1028). 1987 witnessed a continuation of a decline in the Sinn Féin vote. On Remembrance Day (8 November) 1987, a PIRA bomb planted at a war memorial in Enniskillen killed eleven Protestant civilians. This attack attracted worldwide attention, was viewed as hugely counterproductive to the republican cause, and was pointed to by some as “a significant turning point” in ‘the Troubles’ (McKittrick et al. 1999, p. 1094).

Having given the political and general security background to this Cluster in the following a brief background will be provided on East Tyrone PIRA and its disposition and organisation in County Tyrone, the geography of the landscape that shaped the area of operations in which they operated, and the constraints that this imposed on the tactics utilised. This is crucial for an understanding of why East Tyrone became a key battleground between PIRA and the security forces and hence why TKs were so focused here as the remainder of this study will demonstrate.

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98 A Maze escapee, he was shot in disputed circumstances by the SAS during a surveillance operation close to the Fermanagh border while planting an 800 lb landmine. His fellow PIRA Volunteer was wounded and subsequently captured and was later sentenced to twenty-five years in prison (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1036).

99 This attack was perpetrated by Fermanagh PIRA NOT East Tyrone. The Enniskillen bombing along with a number of incidents was the reason given by PIRA for subsequently disbanding this unit in 1989 (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1157).
East Tyrone PIRA

Two of the three TKs incorporated within Cluster two were focused against PIRA in Tyrone; the exception was Gibraltar. It was commented upon in Chapter three how many authors noted that Tyrone in the 1980s became a major fault line in the clash between PIRA and the British army (English, 2003; Moloney, 2002; Taylor, 2001; Urban, 1992; Hearty, 2011).
Security Forces and PIRA Configuration

Figure 18. (Urban 1992; www.sinnfein.org)
**Tyrone ASU Constellations**

This section examines the PIRA infrastructure in Tyrone (Figure 18) and the associated configuration of ASUs grouped in particular parts of the county.

East Tyrone PIRA was also known as the Tyrone/Monaghan Brigade (O’Brien, 1999: 158). Around Dungannon, in villages like Cappagh, Pomeroy, and Coalisland there were several ASUs with close connections across the border in Monaghan and north Armagh. There was also a Cluster of them in the central part of the county in villages such as Carrickmore, Gortin, Greencastle, and Eakra. Finally, around Strabane there were groups with close connections with PIRA in Derry and Donegal (Urban, 1992: 220). These ‘constellations’ of ASUs sometimes referred to themselves respectively as ‘East Tyrone,’ ‘Mid Tyrone,’ or ‘West Tyrone Brigade.’

To counter and mitigate British surveillance of individual ASUs, making communications and coordination between them more difficult, the Tyrone leadership began bringing together groups of ASUs to mount more complex attacks (Urban, 1992: 221). It is also significant that in the mid-1980s PIRA arsenals witnessed a significant increase in not only the quantity, but in the quality of their weaponry.

**Tyrone’s Geography**

At this juncture it is equally important to have a picture in one’s mind of the terrain in Tyrone. Co. Tyrone is the largest of the six counties in Northern Ireland, but more important is why it became such a major battle ground between PIRA and the British army in the guise of its covert units. Tyrone cannot be examined in isolation however; the key to understanding why it became such critical terrain lies in its subtle differences with that other bastion of PIRA activity, south Armagh. This in turn affected the strategy that each PIRA Brigade could employ in their respective area of operations (AO), which in the case of Tyrone was in fact militated against by the very terrain itself. Mallie (13/11/12) noted that “in South Armagh, it’s just a fact of life, if

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100 The total number of active PIRA activists across the county was perhaps fifty, with another one hundred highly motivated supporters.
101 PIRA received a huge influx of munitions including RPG-7 rocket launchers, SAM-7 missiles and semtex in four shipments/importations from Libya in 1985/86. The semtex, a powerful Czechoslovak made military explosive was a particularly significant boost to their arsenal and indeed became synonymous with the campaign. A fifth, even larger, consignment on board a ship called the *Eskund* was intercepted off the coast of France. This loss notwithstanding, PIRA had a formidable arsenal with which to mount a fresh campaign (Kingston, 2007: 131).
you’re an informer you’re dead,” reinforcing just how difficult it was to penetrate the area from an intelligence point of view. While South Armagh was perhaps the most crucial area of operations for the British army, “they didn’t crack South Armagh, south Armagh was essentially the most critical one for them to target…Fr. Faul used the wonderful phrase that the hills of south Armagh keep their secrets.” This is widely supported in the literature, Urban (1992) noting that for the SAS “South Armagh…was to prove the least suitable for operations by the regiment because the republican community there has always been more successful than other communities in preventing informing” (p. 239). Patterson (2013) quotes a former senior RUC officer who noted that “the Provisionals [particularly South Armagh] made excellent use of the fact that there was a border to separate off their support system from their active service system north of the border” (p. 188). Indeed Patterson (2013) has noted that the importance and controversial issue of cross-border security co-operation against PIRA is woefully under-represented in the literature on ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. Mallie (13/11/12) also noted that there was “no indigenous intelligence available in south Armagh for the security forces, the number of Protestants was tiny, and it was a predominantly rural community”, whereas Tyrone was mixed with some quite large urban centres. McKittrick (13/11/12) also states that “the security forces failed to penetrate south Armagh for decades and I seem to remember prisoners in the jail, didn’t get many…from Armagh.”

Sheridan (15/01/13), a former RUC officer agreed that South Armagh was quite impenetrable, but also geographically because of its proximity to the border it was difficult for the British army to effectively operate in. But Officer A (21/02/13) made an interesting point in that because Tyrone PIRA did not have the advantage of the proximity of the border, “East Tyrone had a self-sufficient ethos whereby they thought they were the best…they took on the SAS.” Equally, he believed that because of this they were “harder, more dedicated and because they are that, they are better republicans” than other PIRA Brigade areas including South Armagh.

McKearney (23/11/12) as a former East Tyrone Brigade Commander knew the area intimately and gave an insightful analysis of the operational constraints that applied to PIRA in Tyrone as opposed to south Armagh. He emphasised that location and geography dictated what could be done: “if we operated in East Tyrone we had to
operate in depth…for different reasons south Armagh was a more comfortable zone.” He noted that on the eastern shore of Lough Neagh, “you are thirty miles from the Border.” Additionally the map at Figure 18 demonstrates just how heavily policed and militarised this area was in the 1980s and 1990s, with numerous security force bases that mutually supported each other and were backed-up by Quick Reaction Force (QRF) reserve mobile airborne units, which again militated against PIRA freedom of movement.

PIRA Doctrine and Tactics in East Tyrone

Compounding this McKearney (23/11/12) also emphasised that in the failed 1956 Border campaign the then IRA had failed to realise how effective the locally recruited security forces had been in nullifying the IRA offensive; “because [in 1956], we were living loftily above the locals to battle with the British army and we allowed the others to overrun us, the B Specials and the RUC.” Dingley (14/09/12) supported this view, “PIRAs justification for murdering off-duty UDR was because they were never off-duty.” Dingley believed the UDR played a key role in gathering intelligence on PIRA because they were local and knew the area intimately, “they were very important, that’s why PIRA targeted them.” An Phoblacht argued that these and other attacks “serve to explode the British government’s myth of ‘normalisation’ in the occupied six counties” (An Phoblacht/Republican News: 23 April 1987).

The corollary of this was that the killing of UDR and RUC Reservists (RUCR) was seen within the Protestant community as purely sectarian and this fed into the ‘tit-for-tat’ violence that parts of Tyrone witnessed, whereby the area between the towns of Dungannon and Portadown with Armagh as its epicentre was often refereed too as the ‘Murder Triangle’ (Cadwallader, 2013: 111). Officer A (21/02/13) noted how “‘Ulsterisation’ replaced the British army with the UDR and RUC and you see a very distinct change in the statistics of deaths and there’s less British soldiers killed, more UDR killed.” De Breádún (25/02/09) suggested that the “British had successfully implemented the ‘Ulsterisation’ of the conflict, similar to the ‘Vietnamisation’ of the conflict in South Vietnam.” De Breádún believed that “the visibility and the ubiquity of the British army was significantly reduced and they were replaced by the RUC, and the killings of RUC wouldn’t have the same impact on the British government.” This Officer A (21/02/13) believed played directly into heightening sectarian tensions in
East Tyrone as “nine out of ten times the part-time UDR man is also a local Protestant, living in the area, who’s maybe a land owner and maybe the senior son…and that’s where you get the ethnic cleansing coming in.” This led indirectly to the renewed loyalist campaign in the area in the 1990s led by the UVF, which itself carried out TKs of known or suspected republicans. As examined later in this text, this opened up a second front against PIRA in Tyrone. McKearney (23/11/12) concurred with this hypothesis: “I would argue that the calibre and importance of those killed, I think there was a dual policy directed against Tyrone; the British engaged the IRA while the loyalists and I do subscribe to the theory of collusion, were there to undermine the soft underbelly.”

This issue of the role of loyalists paramilitaries as proxies, whether officially sanctioned or not, increasingly comes into focus in this period. While not directly linked to the Clusters examined in this text, it arguably played a considerable subsidiary role in PIRA thinking. Again Mallie (13/11/12) noted;

“the alternative war, which the British brought to the IRA in later years, was the usage of Johnny Adair102 and the boys, they used loyalists…they had ceased the ‘scatter-gun’ approach, and were going after specific PIRA/Sinn Féin personnel. That was a switch that came into the loyalist campaign and Nelson103 was a manifestation of this.”

Incidents I: Loughgall, PIRA A Team

Kingston (2007) has argued that in the mid 1980s, PIRAs Army Council believing that their military campaign was being effectively contained by the British, ordered a massive escalation that was to be logistically sustained by new shipments of advanced weaponry. He suggests that the plan was modelled on the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968 and was designed to “shock the ‘occupying’ force and, more importantly, its political class, into thinking the war was unsustainable” (p. 131). English (2003) also

102 Johnny Adair, also known as ‘Mad Dog’ Adair, was a former leader of ‘C’ Company, 2nd Battalion Shankill Road, West Belfast Brigade of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), a nom de guerre for the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). In September 1995 he was convicted of directing terrorism and was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment. He was subsequently expelled from the UDA and now lives in Scotland.

103 Brian Nelson, a former British soldier, was a senior UDA intelligence officer who, when eventually arrested, revealed his role as a double-agent working for the FRU (Ellison & Smyth, 2000: 143). It is alleged that he was provided with detailed targeting information on known Republicans by the Security Forces, which he in turn passed onto the UDA. The de Silva inquiry into alleged collusion highlighted failings in a number of state agencies in relation to Nelson and raised “no doubt that the UDA were heavily reliant on RUC and UDR leaks to carry out its targeting and attacks during the period” (Moriarty et al., 13 Dec 2012).
argues that Lynagh had “become a keen admirer of Mao Tse-tung” (p. 254). Most interviewees did not, however, accept this theory of a PIRA-style Tet offensive, which also directly contradicts much of the literature. McKearney (23/11/12) dismissed this notion that PIRA strategy was based on replicating a Tet style offensive based on Maoist guerrilla warfare theory, as he believed the British army could easily have reinforced Tyrone in a surge-like manner, if necessary. “They were certainly looking for a different strategy, but not a Tet offensive in the sense that they thought they could ‘hold’ Tyrone; I think the Tet offensive [analogy] is pushing it too far…certainly to make the place less governable.” Indeed McKearney believed that the ASUs themselves “would have known it as untenable…the British knew it was untenable.” Officer A (21/02/13) supported this view: “I don’t think the IRA ever sat down and said we’re going to launch a Tet offensive.” Clarke (Belfast Telegraph, 2 December 2011) believed that Lynagh as “head of cross border operations…was attempting to create a ‘liberated zone’” and therefore it seemed incorrect to label the series of operations launched by Tyrone PIRA as akin to a Tet offensive. A more correct analogy was that they appeared instead to be trying to replicate in Tyrone a strip of territory similar to South Armagh where the security forces could not operate freely and which would effectively split the county, a sort of ‘no-mans-land’ but dominated and controlled by PIRA. Nonetheless An Phoblacht noted at the time that the “IRA was on the offensive” and that attacks carried out in March 1987 not only in Northern Ireland, but also in Germany, “clearly demonstrated the IRAs flexibility and determination to strike relentlessly at crown forces targets” (An Phoblacht/Republican News: 26 March 1987). In the words of Kelly, “it [Tyrone] is ideal ambush country, a killing ground for both sides now locked in mortal combat” (Sunday Press: 4 September 1988). The new PIRA strategy aimed at comprehensively destroying RUC stations thus making Tyrone a no-go area for the police and unfolded in spectacular fashion at Loughgall.

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104 Jim Lynagh (1956-1987), PIRA ASU commander and activist killed at Loughgall, was responsible for a series of attacks in the border region including the planning and coordination of several attacks against isolated rural RUC stations.
**Tyrone PIRA Leadership**

In late 1985, with the first batch of Libyan arms and explosives flowing into PIRA hides, East Tyrone PIRA came under the command of Paddy Kelly, who was the architect and instigator of these increasingly large joint ASU operations. Kelly came from a family steeped in the militant republican tradition; his father “was officer commanding the IRAs northern brigade during the treaty period and his brother Liam was a republican MP for mid-Tyrone during the 1950s” (See Glossary, Saor Uladh; McKitterick *et al.*, 1999: 1078-1079). Many of these large scale ‘spectaculars’ were delegated to and coordinated by Jim Lynagh who while often decribed as being the IRA Commander in the Border region, it seems more probable that he led groups on specific missions. An army intelligence officer stated that “Lynagh saw himself as the leader of a guerrilla band, not a member of a terrorist cell” (Urban, 1992: 223). Lynagh was badly injured in 1973 when the bomb he was carrying exploded prematurely and he was captured and subsequently imprisoned. *An Phoblacht* noted that so strong was his commitment that on his release in 1978 “he immediately reported back to his unit – even before he went home” (*An Phoblacht/Republican News*: 14 May 1987). The article also noted that “he had no illusions that he was invincible and working on the law of averages he reckoned that his luck would run out sooner rather than later” (14 May 1987).

He held sway over a group of volunteers in Monaghan, North Armagh, and East Tyrone. He was tried and acquitted in Dublin in 1980 for the murder of former UDR soldier Henry Livingstone and Special Branch detectives in Northern Ireland suspected him of involvement in several PIRA operations in Co. Tyrone during 1987 (McKittrick *et al.*, 1999: 1079). Taylor (1997) states that Lynagh was known as ‘The Executioner’ (p. 272).

**New PIRA Strategy**

Francie Molloy, a republican activist argued that “what PIRA were trying to do in a pretty targeted way was to remove what the British and unionists would see as the second line of defence, like the second border” (Taylor, 1997: 269), hence RUC stations became the target. The new PIRA strategy was heralded by a devastating mortar attack on Newry police station in County Down on 28 February 1985, in which nine RUC officers were killed. Ten months later, on 7 December 1985, the
East Tyrone ASU blew up Ballygawley RUC station and killed two policemen inside. This last attack was “audacious and involved IRA volunteers raking the police station with gunfire and then blowing it up” (Edwards, 2011: 58). This was succeeded by mortar attacks on bases in Castlederg and Carrickmore. The following summer, on 11 August 1986, the police station in ‘The Birches’ near Portadown, County Armagh, which was unmanned at the time, was attacked. In this instance, the PIRA unit employed a new tactic where the bomb was carried to the target in the excavating bucket of a mechanical digger. Urban (1992) describes these attacks as ‘spectaculars’ (p. 224).

The Loughgall attack was an exact repeat of this new modus operandi. It was not just the attacks on police stations that caused increasing concern for the authorities however, “but a deliberate PIRA campaign to target contractors tasked with repairing the stations” (Holland & Phoenix, 1996: 140). Holland and Phoenix quote an RUC Special Branch officer who was of the view that it was the execution style killing of one such contractor, Harold Henry, on 21 April 1987 that was a turning point for the authorities: “we were under pressure from the government to get results” and thus knew that “strong counter-measures would have to be taken” (1996, p. 141). Four days after Henry’s death, PIRA struck again carrying out “one of its most spectacular operations since the assassination of Lord Mountbatten” (Taylor, 1997: 271) when they killed Sir Maurice Gibson, a Lord Justice of Appeal in Northern Ireland, who was killed along with his wife Cecily by a remote controlled road-side-bomb initiated by PIRA on 25 April 1987 (Harnden, 1999; Mckittrick et al., 1999: 1075-1076). Taylor (1997: 271) notes how the British tabloid press demanded tough action thereafter.

105 On 21 April 1987, Harold Henry, who helped run a building contractor firm that had carried out work for the security forces, was taken into the backyard of his home, put up against a wall, and shot. (Mckittrick et al., 1999: 1073). “He was the first of more then twenty such ‘collaborators’ to be ‘executed’ for ‘assisting the British war machine’”(Toolis, 1995; cited by Taylor, 1997: 271).

106 Sir Maurice Gibson had been the trial judge who in 1984 acquitted three RUC officers in the killing of three PIRA volunteers in 1982 (Incident I, Cluster I).
Figure 19. The Loughgall Incidents [1] (Edwards, 2011: 58)
Ambush at Loughgall

In an ambush at Loughgall in May 1987, eight members of an IRA ASU (Appendix ‘D’- Ser; 20-27; McKittrick et al., 1999: 1077-1080) including Paddy Kelly and Jim Lynagh were shot dead by the SAS during an attempted assault on Loughgall RUC station. This was described “in terms of lives lost, [as] the organisation’s worst single setback during its modern history” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1077); An Phoblacht concurred noting this was the “single biggest loss the IRA has suffered since the Tan War” (An Phoblacht/Republican News: 14 May 1988). Urban (1992) noted that “Lynagh’s group had hidden their explosives in a farmyard some kilometres to the north of Loughgall …this cache was under close surveillance for days or even weeks before the attack” (p. 228). Downey (Irish Times: 9 May 1987) further noted that “well informed sources here [London], hinted that it [Loughgall] came about as a result of the information supplied to the security forces by an informer within the IRA.”

“A 24-strong SAS team had been assembled…they split into a ‘killer group’ and three ‘cut-off groups’ each taking up position” (Edwards, 2011: 59; Figure 19). The PIRA unit had earlier hijacked a mechanical digger, loading a 200lb bomb into its bucket, three of the PIRA volunteers travelled in its cab and five others in a blue

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107 This was the biggest single loss to the IRA since the War of Independence, when on Sunday 2 February 1921 at Clonmult, County Cork, twelve IRA volunteers were killed and eight captured at a Training Camp by member of the 2nd Battalion the Hampshire Regiment. Those captured were subsequently court-martialed and two of these were in turn executed. Condt. T. O’Neill (RDF, Retd.) author of The Battle of Clonmult (Nonesuch Publishers, Dublin 2006), in conversation with the author, believed that this dealt a devastating blow to 4th Battalion 1st Cork Brigade IRA from which they never recovered.

108 The number of theories suggesting that an informer betrayed the unit has multiplied with the years. English (2003) states that forewarning of the PIRA attack came from a listening device planted in a premises used by a republican. He also states that one of the ASU killed, Tony Gormley (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1079), was a long-time Special Branch source nicknamed the ‘Banker’ owing to the large sums of monies received by him (English, 2003: 254). Taylor (2001) states “‘Eyes-on’ and technical surveillance with a listening device had been going on for weeks…critically, there was also intelligence from the Special Branch agent who was part of the ASU” (p. 274). Urban (1992) notes that on 21 May 1992, an Ardboe woman Colette O’Neill was rescued from an alleged PIRA kidnapping, and there was speculation that she was ‘The Loughgall informer’ (p. 237). Moloney (2002), in noting the allegations against O’Neill, also quotes a British source who claimed that electronic surveillance of two other Tyrone PIRA members tasked to hijack the mechanical digger, Gerard and Martin Harte, compromised the operation. “The same eavesdropping operation directed against their home led subsequently to their death a year later,” this same source told Moloney (p. 316).
Toyota Hiace van (p. 59). As the mechanical digger “smashed through the gates of the station, with the bomb’s fuse lit, the SAS opened fire from several different directions” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1077; Figure 20) “Over 1,500 rounds were fired by the SAS and the elite policemen who were accompanying them” (Edwards, 2011: 59).

Downey (Irish Times: 9 May 1987) viewed Loughgall as interpreted in London “as an indication that the British security forces in Northern Ireland are taking the offensive against the PIRA” and that it was believed “that since the murder of Lord Justice Gibson and Lady Gibson, the Secretary of State – after discussions with the Chief Constable of the RUC and the British army GOC in Northern Ireland – has put into operation a set of measures to improve intelligence gathering by covert methods” (Downey, 9 May 1987). He noted the phraseology being used “whereby ‘covert intelligence gathering’ and ‘offensive covert operations’ by the regular army and the SAS, as opposed to merely ‘defensive operations’ by the RUC.” Additionally, he clarified that ‘covert operations’ are “understood to mean largely intelligence – gathered by electronic means.”
The next section examines the second TK of this Cluster when three members of a PIRA GHQ unit were killed at Gibraltar.

**Incidents II: Gibraltar**

In perhaps one of the most controversial episodes of the troubles, three PIRA volunteers were killed by the SAS in Gibraltar on 6 March 1988. Although they were unarmed at the time they were shot, “intelligence suggested that the IRA suspects were preparing a car bomb aimed at British military personnel taking part in a parade” (Edwards, 2011: 71). The ‘Gibraltar Three’ as they were later known, “became martyrs for the republican cause, and their deaths led to an outpouring of sympathy for the IRA not only from within republican communities in Northern Ireland, but in Irish diaspora communities abroad” (p. 71).
Figure 21: PIRA GHQ Gibraltar ASU Unit (Oxley, C. and Manyon, J., *This Week*: 28 April 1988)
Following PIRA losses at Loughgall in “the Autumn of 1987, the Army Council of the IRA, seeking revenge for the massacre at Loughgall of eight IRA men...decided to assemble a special active service unit, an elite group of hardened terrorists” (Adams, Bambridge & Morgan, *Sunday Times*: 4 December 1988), under the direct operational control of PIRA GHQ (Figure 21). “In order to avenge its fallen and to justify its own logic, the IRA required a clean kill against the British army” (O’Brien, 2005: 54). Mairead Farrell, Danny McCann and Seán Savage (Appendix ‘D’-Ser; 28-30; McKittrick *et al.*, 1999: 1112-1116) had planned to massacre the bandsmen of the Royal Anglian Regiment with a car bomb at the changing of the guard outside the Governor’s House in the British dependency; instead they died in a hail of SAS gunfire while carrying out a PIRA reconnaissance. Oxley and Manyon (*This Week*: 28 April 1988) noted how Mairead McCann on release from Armagh women’s prison where she had been involved in a ‘dirty protest’ nonetheless “re-entered the IRAs military structure in a special unit attached to the GHQ” which was specially established to carry out the Gibraltar operation (Figure 4). McKittrick *et al.*, (1999) noted “on the republican roll of honour, she and the two men killed with her were described as members of the IRAs GHQ staff” (p. 1115). Farrell in a recorded interview before her death in describing her previous arrest for bombing a hotel that led to her subsequent imprisonment noted that “nowadays they don’t take prisoners. You know, I was lucky” (Oxley and Manyon, *This Week*: 28 April 1988). *An Phoblacht* noted that “her ten and a half years in prison had, as she said herself, strengthened her resolve” (*An Phoblacht/Republican News*: 10 March 1988). In the same team were “Sean Savage, a committed terrorist known for his bomb making skills and Danny McCann who choose to shoot his victims at point blank range” (Oxley and Manyon, *This Week*: 28 April 1988). O’Brien (2005) contends that “the ability of the security forces to engage in long-term surveillance outside the Northern Ireland arena was underscored by the operation” (p. 54). A fourth member of the PIRA team, a woman using a passport in the name of Mary Parkin, is believed to have escaped. Spanish and British security forces had known about the operation for some

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109 Before Gibraltar, PIRA had injured thirty people in Rheindahlen, in Germany, when a 130 kg car bomb exploded, and it had killed three RAF personnel in attacks on Roermond and Nieuw Bergen in the Netherlands (*Hennessy, Irish Times*: 23 March 2013)
months. The operation against the PIRA cell was codenamed ‘Operation Flavius’ (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1113). It is suggested that a Renault car not containing any explosives was parked by the team in a car space to secure a location for a subsequent car bomb where members of the Royal Anglian Regimental band would assemble prior to the ceremonial changing of the guard two days later (Oxley and Manyon, This Week: 28 April 1988). The three PIRA members were shot dead as they walked out of Gibraltar (Figure 22). Subsequently a car was found across the border in Spain containing “140 lb of semtex explosive and 200 rounds of Kalashnikov ammunition in a car rented by Mairead Farrell in the alias of Catherine Smith” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1112)
Shoot-to-Kill Debate Reignited

The killings fuelled allegations, reignited after the Loughgall ambush, that the security forces were again committed to a conscious shoot-to-kill policy. Magee
(Sunday Times: 16 April 1989) quotes a Captain ‘X’ who stated “I don’t think the decision to kill them was taken at a higher level. It was individuals on the ground who took the decision. A live terrorist is much more useful than a dead one.” But an article in the Sunday Press, claiming to rely on London sources close to the intelligence community claims “the decision to kill the Gibraltar Three was political and taken at high level in London…the two SAS men who carried out the killings took no decisions themselves. They were acting on clear orders” (Sunday Press: 13 March 1988). It further quoted that “confidential sources in London suggest that the reason why the three were killed was to tell the IRA in unmistakable terms that extending the conflict was not acceptable.” But Gibraltar and the ensuing controversy was to have another effect that would come to bear in the conflict as it developed, and this was the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In September 1993, the ECHR announced that it was prepared to investigate the Gibraltar shootings and in 1995 ruled that “the killings were unnecessary, that the IRA members could have been arrested and that international conventions had been breached by the excessive use of force” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1114; Ní Aoláin, 2000: 198).

Death on the Rock
The events in Gibraltar generated a heated debate within the media particularly on the UK mainland. Controversy ensued when a Panorama documentary on the role of the SAS was withdrawn by Mr. Michael Checkland, the BBC Director General, only 48 hours before it was due to be broadcast on October 17 1988 (McIlroy, Daily Telegraph: 6 October 1988). One of the most contentious parts of the programme was criticism from Mr. Enoch Powell, the former MP for South Down, of government handling of SAS activities. In the film he stated: “My view is that what happened in Gibraltar was a catastrophe. There was at no time a car bomb in Gibraltar, but nevertheless three human beings have been shot to death by soldiers without being in possession of arms or a method of detonating a car bomb, had there been one.” The programme also contained an interview with Lord Prior, who said “there was little day to day control of the SAS when he was Northern Ireland Secretary” (McIlroy, Daily Telegraph: 6 October 1988).

On 28 April 1988 ITV broadcast a Thames television documentary ‘Death on the Rock’ reflecting concerns about the shooting, which led to criticism of the British
government (Oxley and Manyon, *This Week*: 28 April 1988). British tabloids attacked the character and credibility of some of the witnesses, which eventually led to successful libel actions by Ms. Carmen Proetta\(^{110}\) against several newspapers, including *The Sun* and *The Sunday Times*. Keegan (*Daily Telegraph*: 1 October 1988) believed that the events at Gibraltar “raised the question of whether the SAS, as presently constituted, is an appropriate instrument with which to prosecute anti-terrorist operations in a European context.” Ogden (*Time Magazine*: 19 September 1988) noted that at the heart of the investigation were allegations that Britain had been conducting a shoot-to-kill policy against the IRA. The British PM Margaret Thatcher insisted that the security forces “operates within the law and follows the same rules of engagement that prevailed during the Falklands war,” and stated that “you obviously set certain criteria and let the people operate within them” (Ogden, *Time Magazine*: 19 September 1988). English (2003) argues some of the most devastating blows against PIRA in these days were self inflicted, such as the ‘good neighbours bomb’ when Sean Dalton (55) and Sheila Lewis (60), a widow, were blown up when they went to check on the apartment of a Derry friend (p. 259). This fits with Ogden’s contemporary analysis: “psychologically, however, problems are mounting for the IRA. The tragically accidental deaths of Sean Dalton and Sheila Lewis…were a worse blow to the IRA than the loss of gunmen.” Martin McGuinness acknowledged at the time that “these accidents were very damaging to the armed struggle” and “if they continued they would cut into our support” (*Time Magazine*: 19 September 1988). These comments reinforce the views of interviewees such as Brims, Dingley, McKittrick and Urban who noted previously how the events at both Enniskillen and Warrington were very damaging to PIRA and its support base.

A week after the shooting dead of the PIRA members in Gibraltar, the majority of British newspapers supported the action of the British Government and the SAS, bolstered by a poll conducted for the *Sunday Express*, which found that 76.9% of those questioned agreed with the action taken (Coulter, *Irish Times*: 14 March 1988). *An Phoblacht* acknowledging the three killed as PIRA members and that “like all volunteers they were prepared to take the risks involved in active service against a ruthless enemy” (*An Phoblacht/Republican News*, 10 March 1988).

\(^{110}\) Ms. Carmen Proetta, a Gibraltar resident, witnessed the killings from her apartment window.
Writing in the *Sunday Telegraph*, Sir Philip Goodhart, a Conservative MP, said: “Those who are planning mass murder should not expect to be given the benefit of any doubt.” The *Sunday Express* carried the results of a poll carried out by *Telephone Surveys Ltd* and which had asked the question: “Do you think the SAS were right to kill the terrorists although they were subsequently found to be unarmed?” After taking account of the “Don’t Know,” the number of which were not given, the result was 76.9% in favour, and 23.1% against (Coulter, *Irish Times*: 14 March 1988). *An Phoblacht* stated that “the only rules that the British have ever operated against our nation – shoot-to-kill” and that PIRA were “the peoples army undeterred” (*An Phoblacht/Republican News*: 10 March 1988).

**Incidents III: Drumnakilly, Fateful Ruse**

On August 20 1988, mid-Tyrone Brigade of PIRA blew up a bus killing eight British soldiers at Ballygawley. Just ten days later, three PIRA members, Gerald Harte (mid-Tyrone PIRA Brigade Commander), his brother Martin Harte, and Brian Mullin were killed in an SAS ambush on the Long Bog Road at Drumnakilly (Appendix ‘D’-Ser; 31-33; Magee, *Sunday Times*: 16 April 1989). Gerard Harte “was described as commander of mid-Tyrone IRA and was a veteran of the organisation he had joined fourteen years earlier…a number of newspapers referred to the killings as direct revenge for the Ballygawley bus bombing” (McKittrick *et al.*, 1999: 1143). *An Phoblacht* described Gerard Harte within his ASU as a “disciplinarian, strict but fair” (*An Phoblacht/Republican News*: 8 September 1988). O’Dwyer-Russell (*Sunday Telegraph*: 4 September 1988) believed that the PIRA attack on the bus at Ballygawley, which preceded the Drumnakilly ambush, translated into a “mood of political resolve to beat the IRA militarily as well as through political means, the army’s somewhat more hard-nosed approach to the IRA is firmly in the ascendancy.” Additionally, he painted the “carefully planned SAS ambush” as an event that “has boosted army morale in Northern Ireland after the recent attacks on off-duty

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111 The 20 August 1988 Ballygawley RSB attack in which eight soldiers from the Light Infantry were killed was an aberration in declining security forces casualties during this period. It accounts for the spike in security forces casualties in Figure 26 for 1988. The bus had diverted from its normal route and it was alleged that PIRA had placed diversionary road signs to direct the bus along a route not normally considered safe. Some days after the explosion the RUC arrested eight men, one of whom was Gerard Harte who was killed in the next TK Incident at Drumnakilly, the RUC regarded him as a chief suspect in the Ballygawley bombing (McKittrick *et al.*, 1999: 1141-1142).
servicemen in Britain, mainland Europe and Ulster” and that “just like the SAS ambush at Loughgall last May in which eight known terrorist were killed, last week’s ambush was efficiently carried out” (Sunday Telegraph: 4 September 1988).

The Hartes and Brian Mullin were killed in a carefully orchestrated ambush. A white covered lorry, with a distinctive blue streak, had been parked as a decoy at Cloughfin, Drumnakilly. An SAS Trooper posed as an off-duty UDR reservist who worked as a coalman. The soldier was pretending to fix a tyre (Figure 23).

Officer A (21/0213) argued “there was no plan to kill Mullin and the Hartes, but there was a plan to exploit intelligence to prevent attacks by them.” Taylor (1997) states that the ASU “had been under surveillance for some time, including it is thought, electronic surveillance carried out by 14 Intelligence Company.” Officer A (21/02/13) said that “people who say those people were under surveillance for weeks; its absolute nonsense, its impossible to put someone under surveillance for weeks, its not sustainable.” The ASU first hijacked one car from a local family they kept hostage to carry out a reconnaissance of their potential victim, they then switched cars “into a white Ford Sierra hijacked from a local debt collector and drove to their fatal rendezvous only minutes later” (Kelly, Sunday Press: 4 September 1988; Figure 24).
Officer A (21/02/13) states that the RUC learned “there had been a ‘friendly’ house takeover; ‘friendly’ means nobody reports it.” Ken Maginnis, a then unionist MP, recounted how following the Ballygawley bus attack in which the eight soldiers died he was invited to speak to Margaret Thatcher who was seeking information on those behind the attack;

“…she said ‘thank you very much for coming to see me; now tell me who did this?’ So I told her because I couldn’t tell her 100%, but I was able to name names, and she said ‘right, she said, thank you very much.’ Subsequently, believe it or not, there was an SAS operation when the same team tried to kill a coalman and they were ambushed and that was the end of that particular team” (Birney and Curry, *Below the Radar TV*: 2 July 2013).

**Intelligence Insight**

Officer A (21/02/13) stated that when “all the Incidents two years before Drumnakilly were analysed it became very obvious who was doing the killing.” Moloney (*The Sunday Tribune*: 4 September 1988), writing on the deaths of the Harte’s and Brian Mullin, posits that as a PIRA ASU basic security precautions were ignored, “the three men, not only worked together but operated together in the IRA, making them perfect targets for surveillance.” In fact, Martin Harte was a brother-in-law to Brian Mullin (*An Phoblacht/Republican News*: 8 September 1988). Additionally “the local consensus now is that the three dead men were under constant surveillance following the Ballygawley blast, and that their car, perhaps even their houses, could have been

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**Figure 24. The Drumnakilly Incidents [2] (Murray, 1990: 447)**

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bugged” (Kelly, *Sunday Press*: 4 September 1988). Moloney (*Sunday Tribune*: 4 September 1988) also believes that these deaths were part of an almost self-fulfilling prophesy in that “the last time the IRA heightened its profile, brought much the same response in 1982, in 1987 and now proof again that the IRA can only increase its killing rate, at the risk of exposing its members to retribution.” He further argued that to see the deaths of the Harte’s and Mullin as a ‘new development’ was a mistake. “The truth is that covert ambushes have continued at regular intervals in the North since 1982 ‘shoot-to-kill’ Incidents – the major difference been that invariably it has been the British army rather than the RUC, now restricted by post-Stalker regulations” (Moloney, *Sunday Tribune*: 4 September 1988). Kelly (*Sunday Press*: 4 September 1988) noted that one of the sisters of the ASU stated unequivocally that “my brother was shot down in revenge” and mourners at the subsequent funerals “agreed that it was an SAS ‘hit squad’ intent on the deadly game of ‘reprisals.’” Taylor (1997) notes that the mainland tabloid press were jubilant, the *Sun* proclaimed “SAS rub out IRA rats” while the *Star* was more specific: “Revenge! SAS kill three bus bombers” (p. 309). In republican eyes they were “three young men in the front line of the struggle for a free and peaceful Ireland” (*An Phoblacht/Republican News*: 20 August 1998). Ryder (*The Daily Telegraph*: 1 September 1988) noted that “to the unionists, there is not enough of this sort of aggressive response to the IRA terrorist. Only last week Mr. Peter Robinson, MP for East Belfast, said the Prime Minister ‘has not got the gravel in her guts to take them on.’” At the funeral oration of Brian Mullin a statement from PIRA declared that “with volunteers like Brian Mullin, the IRA can never be defeated, the struggle can never be suppressed” (*An Phoblacht/Republican News*: 8 September 1988). It has been noted by many analysts that in the case of the Incidents of this Cluster covert surveillance came to play an increasing role by the security forces in intercepting and foiling planned PIRA operations whether through TKs or intercepts.

**Analysis of Cluster II Using Hafez and Hatfield’s Framework**

Having examined the exact circumstances in which the three Incidents of Cluster II took place in addition to a detailed analysis of East Tyrone and why it became such a key focus for TKs, in the following these Incidents will be interpreted and analysed utilising the four pillars of Hafez and Hatfield (2006): deterrence, backlash, disruption, and diminishing capacity.
Deterrence

O’Brien (1999) has noted that the 1980s heralded “an extraordinary hardening on the part of the British in East Tyrone” (O’Brien, 2005; cited by Hearty, 2011: 15). Geraghty (2000) conveys the belief that the SAS “were licensed to take the war to the enemy,” with the intention to kill rather than arrest leading to “attrition on a damaging scale” (Geraghty, 2000; cited by Hearty, 2011: 15). Urban (1992) noted that “during the 1980s Tyrone was one of the key arenas in the battle between the Provisionals and undercover forces” (p. 220); Moloney (2002) similarly points out that in targeting East Tyrone the SAS were attacking the IRA in “the most important and active operational area outside of south Armagh (p. 314). What, if any, then was the deterrent effect of these TKs on east Tyrone PIRA?

As Ní Aoláin (2000) has noted the tactical use of TKs, or what she terms “set piece killings,” in particular geographical locations is governed by what the state views as the political costs to conducting such operations in these various districts. Here she specifically alludes to the fact that, as will be examined, “Tyrone in particular has a high concentration of Incidents involving specialist military units, frequently assisted by informer information, and a targeting of suspects with paramilitary affiliations” (p. 93). Hearty (2011) adds that “the proliferation of assassinations [TKs] in East Tyrone from 1983-1992 is supportive of the belief that the set piece tactic was used as a method of security force containment” (p. 37).

In any of the literature from this period that even vaguely touches on the issue of TKs, Loughgall is portrayed as emblematic. It was seared into the contemporary collective consciousness precisely because so many PIRA members were killed in one dramatic blow. While some interviewees may have had initial difficulty in recollecting exact details in relation to other TK Incidents examined in this work, the events of Loughgall remained to the fore. As McKittrick (13/11/12) noted, “Loughgall was like that, it sticks in the memory, and it sticks in the memory where the security forces had super intelligence.” So therefore the events of Loughgall and its aftermath remain of critical value when seeking an appraisal of the overall effects of TKs in Northern Ireland. What therefore do events at Loughgall, but also Gibraltar and Drumnakilly reveal about selective disincentives, and their ability to deter militants?
McKittrick (13/11/12) believed that, on the one hand, Loughgall must have deterred some: “you can’t [but] look at eight IRA coffins and think this is a bad thing to get into.” On the other hand, he posits, there is an element of irrationality;

“The Dissidents, they are not deterred by the lack of a sense that they could ever win. It is about playing your part in the struggle that might go on for another hundred years or so but to my mind it is irrational….and even after all this they are still at it so deterrence is a very hard thing to bear on committed republicans.”

Again Hutchinson (25/07/12) noted that PIRA volunteers were “totally determined, were dedicated and prepared to kill. Now there might have been some [PIRA] people who weren’t prepared to do that, but they had other tasks to do and were given those tasks…making sure the operation went right, planning them.” Walsh (24/07/12) stated “there were dozens and dozens of young lads who joined the IRA as a result of Loughgall…it very clearly did not deter.” One such was Mr. A, who was not deterred by these events or the prospect of being killed in a TK and who was subsequently severely wounded but survived a TK. “You always knew it could happen but a lot of people getting killed, I don’t think had a really big effect on what I was doing” (31/07/13). Equally when asked whether he thought TKs had deterred his contemporaries, Mr. A answered ‘no.’

McIntyre (02/03/09) when asked if TKs had broken the capacity of the East Tyrone Brigade to wage war responded, “I think it had on that particular area ….the loyalist attack had a deterrent affect on the East Tyrone Brigade and I think it was also losing key figures, like Sean O’Hagan who was arrested on a bombing operation in 1989 in Antrim. When they were losing people like that Tyrone was under serious pressure”

Similarly, Fairweather (30/03/09), a former SAS Troop Commander, believed that “we’d [SAS] like to think so, but probably not, in the longer term” and that “there will always be punters at a lower level willing to yield a gun in most situations, chasing after them is relatively pointless in the overall scheme of things.” McIntyre (02/03/09) also did not believe that the killings of PIRA volunteers deterred existing members: “the volunteers kept coming forward [after Loughgall], but the British hoped that through a campaign of attrition, they would take out our most experienced and serious activists.” The deaths of volunteers, he felt, “only had a short term effect
on morale; people felt down that volunteers were killed, but were very easily rallied by the funerals.” Silke (07/04/09) stated, “if anything Loughgall increased recruitment for the IRA.” Taylor (1997) on this issue of republican funerals noted regarding the Loughgall funerals that “the leadership of the IRA and Sinn Féin turned out in force for the eight funerals, delivering some of the most bitter graveside orations of the Troubles” (p.275). Addressing 5,000 mourners in Monaghan at the funeral of Jim Lynagh, Gerry Adams declared that Loughgall would become “a tombstone for British policy in Ireland and a bloody milestone in the struggle for freedom” (p. 276). An Phoblacht declared “The Loughgall martyrs did not live to see the Ireland they fought for. Let us ensure that we in this generation fight on ever harder” (An Phoblacht/Republican News: 14 May 1987). The funerals acting as a rallying point to renew republican fervour is a recurring theme in the literature and in the interviews that I conducted. Morrison (02/03/09) argued;

“the IRA as an organisation had immense potential to absorb punishment… it almost became philosophical. It can be summed up by Terence Mac Sweeney,112 ‘it’s not those who can inflict the most, but those who can endure the most’…if it [PIRA] has no options that would be another factor, but that wasn’t so.”

Morrison also believed that part of this ability of PIRA to weather the storm of casualties lay within the psyche of the PIRA volunteer. “Anyone coming into the IRA were ‘green booked’113 and were told you are either going to get killed and if you’re going to jail you’re doing your full sentence, do you still want to come in?”

Hutchinson (25/07/12) almost verbatim repeated the same analysis: “one of these things is going to happen to me, going to prison, being killed or maimed, but it’s not something you think about before an operation, you go out but it is something you should have thought about before you joined the organisation…you are prepared to die.” Morrison (03/03/09) stated that volunteers were carefully selected and profiled for their psychological suitability. “We were trying to attract a much more considered volunteer who wasn’t…being swept along emotionally.” A probation period was utilised, “there would be a gap from the time you applied to join and when you would be accepted, we were trying to create a different sort of volunteer…a higher standard

112 Terence Mac Sweeney, Lord Mayor of Cork, died on Hunger Strike in November 1920.
113 The Green Book is both the training manual and disciplinary regulations for PIRA. It sets out the rules and regulations which an individual is obliged to follow as a fully sworn member.
being produced.” Again Hutchinson (25/07/12) uncannily reiterated this, “no, it would have made them more determined, but again its down to the individual…you either collapse in a heap with mental health problems or you learn to put that ‘barrier’ up around you…you have to have a particular mindset, and if ya don’t have it ya don’t create it.”

McIntyre (02/03/09) felt that the deaths of activists merely reinforced the determination of IRA volunteers: “When their comrades were killed, they became more determined.” McIntyre argued that as the conflict evolved, volunteers became almost contemptuous of death, and that such a psychology is “well observed…if you watched the type of things that happened in Stalingrad and the Nazi soldiers’ contempt for death…it’s so mundane; you know it happens to so many, it could happen to me.”

Mairead Farrell, killed at Gibraltar, adopted this almost fatalistic philosophy in an interview with An Phoblacht “you have to be realistic, you realise ultimately you’re either going to be dead or end up in jail. It’s either one or the other. You’re not going to run forever” (An Phoblacht/Republican News: 10 March 1988).

These findings are in contrast to Lichbach (1987) and David (2007) in the Israeli-Palestinian case, who view a consistent policy of targeted assassinations as a deterrent. Conversely Hafez and Hatfield (2006) in respect to deterrence reject its utility as a counter-terrorism tool in their findings. In the Northern Ireland case this study strongly supports the findings of Hafez and Hatfield (2006), because as Urban (30/03/09) posits, unlike the Israelis, the security forces in Northern Ireland were wary “that escalating such operations would create its own negative effects.” Morrison (03/03/09) also posited that “repression works, that’s why governments use it, but in our situation and many others, it has to be overwhelming and it has to be ruthless to work.” Morrison also referred to societal context: “Within the constraints of a quasi social democratic society, under the full glare of the media, so the Brits couldn’t get away with it.” Interestingly, he also felt that PIRA were culturally and
societally inhibited; “the conditions under which we lived, circumscribed a certain level of violence and behaviour and accountability on all sides.”

Soldier A (07/11/12), who served as a British army officer throughout ‘the Troubles’ in increasingly senior appointments, compared the effect such casualties as PIRA suffered at Loughgall would have had on the British army and believes any effect there was on PIRA in terms of deterrence was simply a by-product;

“…had no difference on our campaign, because that’s just Big Boys Rules, you just get on with it, you reconstitute, you reorganise, you learn different ways of doing things, so even if there was and I don’t think there was a TK policy, I don’t think it would have had that effect, if one looks at the period of the late 1980s where I think actually 89, East Tyrone, I think that had in the context of the campaign a temporary, but marginal effect. We took out a whole ASU in Loughgall…by the early 1990s what difference had that made in East Tyrone? Not very much; did it fundamentally alter the course of the campaign? No.”

In relation to the three activists who were killed at Drumnakilly, McKearney (23/11/12) noted that these men specifically hadn’t been deterred by Loughgall: “I think when you look at what was happening [post-Loughgall] the existing ASUs didn’t change because we had seniors taken out at Loughgall, the shooting removed that group of men.” In fact, McKearney stated that the Harte brothers and Mullin were intimately involved in the logistics of the Loughgall operation, including the acquiring of the mechanical digger that was used to transport the bomb. He acknowledged that he was not there at the time, as he was in prison, but his sources are reliable. “Some of those that died at Drumnakilly had been in the wider operation that night in Loughgall…but certainly they had heard the gunfire, they were that close to it. So they weren’t deterred.” McIntyre (02/03/09) added, “I worked with people in the IRA who had come away just when their comrades were killed, they became more determined.” An Phoblacht argued, at the time, that the PIRA volunteers killed at Loughgall were fully cognizant of the risks and that “in this, as in every operation carried out by the IRA, those involved ran the risk of…injury or death” and that they did so because they were “politicized and highly motivated republicans committed to the armed struggle” (An Phoblacht/Republican News: 14 May 1987). Finally, as an article in the Irish Republican News noted, the milieu from which these volunteers were drawn was;

114 The British were anxious to abide by international norms, whereas Honig (2007) argues that Israel may be seeking to develop and entrench its own set of norms.
“a closed world, with an unchangeable, unambivalent internal code of its own, of people shaped since childhood by the same common experiences and struggle, who maintained a system of mutual support and assiduous sense of ideological and personal commitment to each other” (2 May 2007).

Finally it is worth elaborating on the work of Lafree et al., (2009) who conducted a more detailed investigation of the effectiveness of six highly publicized counter-terrorist strategies or policies in Northern Ireland: internment, Criminalization/Ulsterization, the Gibraltar Incidents, Operation Motorman, the Falls Curfew, and the Loughgall Incidents as portrayed in Figure 25. Their analysis is interesting for two reasons. Interestingly, it can be quite easily superimposed onto Figure 16, which shows the evolution and development of security forces policy during ‘the Troubles.’ Secondly, and more importantly, their analysis is of particular relevance to this Cluster because it includes the Loughgall and Gibraltar Incidents, which we have just examined. Lafree et al., analysis suggests that most of these strategies failed to deter terrorists.

Terrorist Attacks by Loyalists and Republicans 1969-1992

Figure 25. Lafree et al., (2009)
Backslash

Continuing the analysis of Lafree et al., as it pertained to backlash they argue in fact that implementation of several of these policies was followed by upswings in extremist acts suggesting possible backlash effects (Figure 25), causing Lafree et al., to state that “the far more limited but in some ways severe methods used in the Loughgall and Gibraltar operations produced more evidence of backlash than deterrence” (p. 37). Hearty (2011), on the other hand, believes that Lafree et al., analysis is “minimally applicable in East Tyrone” (p. 51). Hearty’s (2011) graph at Figure 26 suggests that in fact there was a steady decline in PIRA success as “the set-piece tactic becomes more entrenched and confirms the belief of Tuck that British counter-insurgency in East Tyrone “remained containment rather than victory” (p. 51). Walsh (24/07/12) a Belfast based PIRA activist, questioned on the attrition rate, added “no they add up in localised areas in terms of Tyrone – the British attrition rate of the Tyrone Brigade was very stark, you didn’t have the same Tyrone killing practice here in Belfast. We had Pearse Jordan was assassinated by the cops. They shot him – it was a shoot to kill operation – he was unarmed and all the rest of it, but that would be notable by being the only sort of Incidents.”

My analysis of such interviews confirms Hearty’s (2011) viewpoint, specifically with regard to Cluster II in East Tyrone, where security force casualties declined as PIRA casualties increased. My interviewees further countered Lafree et al., (2009) with their insistence that while there may have been a desire there was no noticeable
increase in backlash due to operations being restricted pending a review of internal security within Tyrone PIRA. Additionally, while hardcore activists were not deterred, as in the TK Incidents at Drumnakilly, what we are beginning to witness is the effect on the periphery. What Soule (1989) has described as the “ritualistic dance of death” (Soule, 1989; cited by Lafree et al., 2009: 22), in which Tyrone PIRA and the British army were involved, was beginning to have an increasingly detrimental effect on the wider republican family allied to the escalating onslaught of attacks that republicans were beginning to experience at the hands of loyalist paramilitaries, which was also becoming more focused and honed.

Cunningham (The Irish Independent: 11 May 1987) noted that the ambush at Loughgall “could bring a respite in the current terror campaign or an escalation of outrages in revenge.” He contended that the Provisional leadership “stunned by the deaths at Loughgall may be forced to temporarily halt bombing operations in parts of the North until they trace the moles [possible informers]. But the desire for swift revenge may bring new outrages.” Indeed, Ogden (Time Magazine: 19 September 1988) quoted a senior RUC source who noted “the RUC was bracing itself for retaliation…‘I imagine they are desperate to do something fairly quickly, and this is when they are at their most dangerous.” Thus commentators at the time clearly expected a backlash from PIRA. And indeed Ogden (19 September 1988) believes that after Loughgall PIRA “bounced back in deadly fashion. Last November [1987] a war memorial service at Enniskillen was bombed, killing eleven and wounding sixty-four, most of them women and children.” He also notes that “this marked the start of a lethal phase of tit-for-tat assaults” (19 September 1988). Ogden states that Martin McGuinness argued “the IRA has shown it can take casualties. After Loughgall, Britain argued it had broken the IRA. Now 18 months later, the IRA is stronger than ever.” Interestingly, Ogden notes that British security officials “agree that it [PIRA] is strong, albeit not numerically” (Ogden, Time Magazine: 19 September 1988). Holland and Phoenix (1996) believed that “while Loughgall had delivered a stunning blow to East Tyrone PIRA, but it did not put it out of business” (p. 163) and that Phoenix\(^\text{115}\) knew that no single blow could do that, and that they were involved in a

\(^{115}\) Ian Phoenix was a senior RUC Special Branch officer who was one of twenty five intelligence personnel drawn from MI5, RUC, and the British army killed in the Mull of Kintyre Chinook
war of attrition during which PIRA would constantly adapt to meet whatever new security measures they had to face.

Dingley (14/09/12) said that even though there was willingness and a desire within PIRA to strike back after Loughgall, they simply were not in a position to initiate backlash as part of the action-reprisal dynamic: "Loughgall didn’t [see backlash post the event], you come down to the size and the circumstance.” Equally, PIRA were deeply concerned as to whether the operation at Loughgall had been as a result of informers, particularly against the background “that PIRA knew they were deeply penetrated with a lot of operations going wrong.”

Oxley and Manyon (This Week: 28 April 1988) noted that the ‘Gibraltar Three’ “were tracked and died in what seemed like a stunning military success for British forces, but in the way of Northern Ireland that success is already turning sour, soured by the violence of the following days.” The Gibraltar killings opened what English (2003) has termed a “crescendo of retaliatory violence” (p. 257).116 Lafree et al., (2009) believe that the loss of life suffered by the IRA in Gibraltar “was easily construed by activists as brutal overreaction. The event made it relatively simple for the republicans to portray those murdered as martyrs” (p. 36). They note that the Gibraltar Incidents was still associated with ‘positive’ increases in terrorist attacks 36 months after it occurred. By contrast, the results of their research failed to show any long term change in the risk of new terrorist attacks after the Loughgall Incidents (p. 36). This suggests, as evidenced by my interviewees, that post-Loughgall PIRA initiated a major security review for possible informers that might have compromised the Loughgall operation and as part of this few, if any, further operations were planned pending the outcome of that review. Officer A (21/02/13) said that while “yes, there was a backlash and it was measured and tempered,” but post-Loughgall “there wasn’t one Incident in East Tyrone in the following nine months, nothing. Then it started again.” The desire for backlash was always there, but was discernibly

116 At the Milltown funeral of the Gibraltar ASU, a loyalist gunman, Michael Stone carried out a grenade and gun attack on mourners, before being arrested by the RUC. At the subsequent funeral of those killed at Milltown, two soldiers whose unmarked car erred into the cortège were abducted and killed by an angry mob.
restricted by the fear of infiltration and/or covert surveillance. “So what the IRA do is have a security inquiry as to what went wrong, that is a very methodical process…and they take whatever action they deem necessary, and then they’ll start again.” But despite this rigorous analysis and After Action Review (AAR) conducted by PIRA, Officer A argued that “what they don’t plan for is the SAS taking them head on and that had a cumulative effect especially in County Tyrone.” Here, like other interviewees, he alluded to the effect on the periphery “where I know the community said ‘enough is enough,’ our boys are being slaughtered by the SAS, ‘stop this now.’” Mr. A (31/07/13) concurred that the desire to initiate backlash was always present: “It would have been there, yeah, of course, to get back at them as quickly as possible or help as much as you could for someone else to get back at them.”

Delayed Backlash
McKearney (23/11/12) also posited that from a backlash perspective the response was not instantaneous; PIRA did not have the capacity to deliver as instantaneous a response as heretofore. “By the 1980s it didn’t have the ability to randomly, just at will, to go back to strike.” He contrasted this with Israel whereby “if there is a bomb fired in Gaza or the West Bank, the Israelis can retaliate within twenty minutes.” He suggested that new time and space factors existed for PIRA that had not in the 1970s. “From ’71 to ’74 the IRA was capable of striking almost at will, after the ceasefire in ’75 the same momentum never returned and operations were more selective, they were more calculated, and they were much more opportunistic.” McKearney believed that the situation for PIRA had fundamentally changed after Loughgall “but by the middle ’80s the IRA would not have had the capacity to simply say ‘well, tomorrow we’ll go out and do something.’ They wouldn’t have had the capacity even without an ASU being taken out.” Smith (1995) reinforces this view that overall the advent of smaller cells meant that the same tempo of operations from the 1970s could not be sustained in the 1980s and 1990s. McKearney (23/11/12) stated similarly that by that time PIRA “had to bide their time and as time was going by they were putting much more effort…productivity was going down as well all the time.” Mr. A (31/07/13) concurred: “It wasn’t like years ago in ’21 [War of Independence], they had a helicopter up in the air in a minute, you would have been tracked down like a dog.”
Do TKs enrage militants and produce a backlash effect? Did the killing of PIRA activists produce an escalation in the level of violence? Fairweather (30/03/09) in general believed that this “sometimes could be the case depending on the circumstances of any deaths.” Mcintyre (02/03/09) felt that “it increased the desire, I’m not sure it increased the lethality. I think the IRA were operating under diminishing returns as the years went past…fewer and fewer British soldiers were killed.” Urban (30/03/09) contended that there was a degree of backlash as a negative consequence of the attrition strategy. “In the first place it bolstered the Provisionals self image as ‘soldiers’ fighting a war. These phrases appear in many of the orations to republicans shot by the SAS, I believe this was helpful to mobilisation, both of new recruits and for political action.” The issue of increased recruitment supports the “Terror Stock” model put forward by Kaplan et al. (2005). This theme of the funerals of volunteers acting as focal points to renew militant republican ideals and determination is recurring as evidenced by Mcintyre (02/03/09), Morrison (03/03/09) and Taylor (1997) and also within republican media (An Phoblacht/Republican News, 14 May 1987; An Phoblacht/Republican News, 8 September 1988). Fairweather (30/03/09) while he noted that the events of “Loughgall probably shook some players to the core, for a while slowed them down, on the other hand ‘the filthy SAS slaughtering our brave boys’ probably worked considerably against the Special Forces.” These findings concur with the research and analyses of Luft (2003), Francisco (2005) and Plaw ((2008). Urban (30/03/09) said however that “the ability to generate more violence in response to these deaths was limited, but I believe the Provos often tried to maintain a level of violence in a particular area after an SAS ambush.” He argued that the method of doing this involved bringing in outsiders, who were considered immune from penetration. But the desire for revenge was tempered by the fear of security forces intelligence penetration of PIRA;

“ASUs hit by these operations were torn between their desire to revenge their comrades and the sense that the security forces had been acting on inside information. The sense of widespread penetration, for example in Derry PIRA, was debilitating to their operations in my view. So the desire to hit back always had to be tempered by the sense that an unplugged leak might remain.” (Urban, 30/03/09)

117 Organisations like 4th Battalion of the Belfast Brigade and GHQ Units were brought in this way, after Loughgall (Urban, 30/03/09).
McIntyre (02/03/09) contended that while the desire to kill British soldiers was “given an impetus by volunteers being killed…but I didn’t see any collective rush of blood to the head.” Additionally these findings bear out the research of Mintz et al. (2005) and Hafez and Hatfield (2006) that while there may be a desire for backlash such backlash can be curtailed by mutually supporting and interlocking security measures.

**Disruption**

Urban (30/03/09) believed that if any discernible pattern existed in the use of lethal force during this period by the security forces it was that “the key to the pattern was maintaining the appearance of a just use of force.” Urban “is not sure that the term ‘targeted killing’ is appropriate to the operations conducted in Northern Ireland. People involved talk about an attrition strategy and I think that is very subtly different.” Additionally, he maintained that the attrition strategy “as practiced in Northern Ireland involved engaging or ambushing the Provisional IRA where circumstances could broadly be defined as lawful.” The covert operators “aimed to take on and kill PIRA men under these circumstances in order to reduce their strength, sow confusion or distrust in republican ranks, send a deterrent signal and boost friendly force morale.”

Mallie (13/11/12) noted that PIRA “in response to the Anglo-Irish Agreement put a second and third line [of] leadership in place in the border areas fearful that the leadership in those areas would be wiped out…so they were reading Thatcher’s mind very well,” and again Mallie (13/11/12) noted “but that for which they [the British] hadn’t budgeted was that Garret Fitzgerald118 and the guys were not going down the road of wipeouts.” It has been seen previously that the British government were disappointed with the Southern Irish authorities and what they perceived as a lack of enhancement of security policy to jointly defeat PIRA.

In the aftermath of Loughgall English (2003) notes whatever succour might have been given to republicans by the UK government’s embarrassment over shoot to kill allegations, “the fact remained that they had lost experienced volunteers to the SAS”

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118 Dr. Garret Fitzgerald (1926-2011), leader of the Fine Gael party in the Republic of Ireland was then in a coalition government with the Irish Labour party and as Taoiseach (Prime Minister) was the co-signatory of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.
and “many of their operations were not coming to fruition, owing variously to the role of informers, bad luck, loss of nerve, incompetence and security force activity” (p. 260). Smith (1995) believed that the damage to the IRA “was felt not just in numerical terms but also in the loss of experience and seniority” (p. 188). Moloney (2002) argues that the Loughgall ambush was a devastating blow to the IRA. “Morale was rocked; they lost a number of key activists, skilled and determined operators” (Moloney 2002: 305). For Moloney, the suspicion within the IRA that the unit was compromised from within was even more destabilising than the loss of experienced operatives (p. 305). Moloney argues that the leader of the unit, Jim Lynagh, represented a visceral form of republicanism, hostile to any attempts to dilute the republican message, and speculates on his likely opposition to the current peace process (p. 311). While the evidence of a leak from the headquarters staff is inconclusive, Moloney argues that the putative plan for a split by East Tyrone PIRA from mainstream PIRA in 1987 left the unit exposed within the organisation and that the ‘vertical IRA structure introduced by Gerry Adams…combined with the greater political control exercised over operational matters, made it easier, not harder, for British intelligence to penetrate the IRAs nerve centres” (p. 317).

Smith (1995) concurs that “the move to the cell system thus made even modest losses hard to bear” (p. 188). Mr. A (31/07/13) too believed that TKs “disrupted the IRAs capabilities or activities.” O’Brien (2005) believes that the IRA entered 1988 a depleted and demoralised force, “the killing at Loughgall had wiped out a major component of its military capacity on domestic soil” (O’Brien 2005: 54). Walsh (24/07/12) argued that TKs “may well have blunted the spear in a certain area for a limited period of time, but it didn’t incapacitate areas…areas regrouped and reorganised.”

Despite this Officer A (21/02/13) acknowledged that “East Tyrone were very adept in their operations, I have an operational respect for them because they had good intelligence, they had good operators, good training, good Quartermaster system and they were good on the ground.” As a serving Special Branch officer he was very conscious that “we had to be better than them in our intelligence gathering to make sure we were stopping them with whatever means was at our disposal.” This statement is of note in that as an RUC Special Branch officer, Officer A can still
acknowledge the cold professionalism that PIRA had developed, despite their ongoing attempts to systematically target Officer A and fellow officers.

Fr. Denis Faul, a noted critic of the IRA campaign believed that “militarily, the IRA has not been hurt by the recent [Gibraltar and Drumnakilly] setbacks” and Ogden (Time Magazine: 19 September 1988) noted that Faul had “exceptional knowledge of the IRA,” and stated “replacements for dead volunteers have been easily found in County Tyrone, where the IRA has been recruiting with the pitch, ‘join us – we’re winning.’”

Effect on Tyrone ASUs

For an organisation that due to its restructuring into a smaller cell system had reduced the number of overall activists, what were the effects? It was previously examined in Chapter II how many analysts (Smith, 1995; Taylor, 1997), viewed the move to the cell structure as having inherent weaknesses that would subsequently come to the fore. This is supported by interviewees such as Soldier A (07/11/12) who argued that in East Tyrone PIRA bringing together two ASUs at Loughgall to maintain the momentum of their campaign; meant greater opportunity and ease of surveillance for the security forces. Soldier A believed that these amalgamated ASUs translated as “more people, more opportunity for penetration, more opportunity for observation, more opportunity for electronic surveillance, which then makes them more vulnerable.”

Hutchinson (25/07/12) reiterated this theme, “the ASUs can operate independently up to a certain point, because there’ll be some stage where they need somebody else to give them something to operate…that somebody else has to be the QMs [Quartermasters]...The difficulty was once you had someone in it who had infiltrated, the whole thing went to pot.” This view is supported by Smith (1995): “the reduction in the number of PIRA activists made it easier for the security forces to concentrate their resources against known operatives, which left the movement just as vulnerable to losses in personnel as it had been under the old system” (p. 188).

It therefore seems clear that PIRA made a tactical mistake in merging two ASUs as they did at Loughgall. This is a key finding that will be analysed later in greater
Additionally, as Taylor (1997) has noted, the Loughgall volunteers were known as “the ‘A’ Team” (p. 272), so within PIRA they were considered an elite unit, the loss of which must have been quite shocking. Moriarty (Irish Times: 3 Dec 2011) noted that the eight men killed were “viewed as part of the ‘cutting edge’ of the organisation.” McKittrick (13/11/12) observed that Gerry Adams had described the killings as murder, and he asked a republican what he thought of this remark, “I said to one of the republicans that Gerry Adams said ‘murder’…and the guy smiled and said, I wouldn’t have said that, but it’s the way it’s sort of being looked at.” McKittrick believed this was quite revealing, “so that was a portrayal to me of a sort of shock within republicanism that you had one of the top teams all wiped out, because there was no propaganda value left in it, there was none of this, ‘they were unarmed.’” An Phoblacht noted that in Tyrone “a stunned silence hung over the estates, and the faces of republicans, young and old, bore the heavy strain of shock and disbelief” (An Phoblacht/Republican News: 14 May 1987). English (2003) pointed out that four of the younger PIRA members killed at Loughgall “Gormley, Donnelly and Kelly had been close friends and they had died young…friends, locality, loss, revenge, youth” (p. 254). Officer A (21/02/13) noted that he was astonished by what he termed “the psyche of republicanism and how strong a tradition it is.” He fully recognised the strong history of emotion and sacrifice that came forth at republican funerals and how it is “embedded in families, it’s embedded in history, it’s embedded in communities…the lineage of a grandfather that was around in the 1920s.” McKearney (23/11/12) noted how his grandfather had been active in a Flying Column in Roscommon during the period of the War of Independence, confirming this whole notion of family and lineage impelling individuals as militant republicans. Mairead Farrell too “came from a republican family, and her grandfather fought in the Tan War and was interned in 1920” (An Phoblacht/Republican News, 10 March 1988).

Officer A believed that “East Tyrone were hit more than any other area and the secret of that is that East Tyrone RUC Special Branch were better at gathering intelligence in that area and there you have the distinct difference and comparison between South Armagh.” Officer A argues that in effect “South Armagh was given up by the police to the republicans, nobody ever gave up in East Tyrone.” Officer A argued in fact that if Loughgall, Drumnakilly, and later Coagh had not occurred “East Tyrone would
have been like South Armagh.” McKearney (23/11/12) described the use of TKs in Tyrone as a ‘blocking tackle’ against a potentially truculent group in mid-Ulster who had not only the military ability to spoil a settlement “but also the political clout to interfere.” He made the point too that Tyrone had always been more politically active then their counterparts in South Armagh.

**Diminishing Capacity**

It is interesting to note as Ní Aoláin (2000) has pointed out that the Incidents of the second and third Cluster are predominantly confined to specific geographic areas, namely East Tyrone. She posited that at one reading the use of TKs in areas that are considered so republican merely reinforces local opinion “on the partisan nature of the security forces” (p. 69). Coogan (2002) contends that these killings were not of new PIRA recruits, but that they were designed to remove “prominent IRA activists” (p. 293). Murray (1990) states “in the 1990s there was almost a frenzied effort on the part of the British army to wipe out the IRA in County Tyrone” (p. 31). Hearty (2011) suggests that in East Tyrone TKs were initiated against those who were “largely responsible for intensifying the IRA campaign in that area” (p. 48) and that by eliminating the nucleus of activists at the ‘epicentre’ of PIRA activity in East Tyrone, what Hearty (2011), like Ní Aoláin, also refers too as the ‘set-piece tactic,’ appears to have “been refined almost to paralyse the PIRA in the area” (p. 48). This also brings into focus East Tyrone not only being a specific geographic area, but also reinforces just how small a ‘manoeuvre’ area within an area of operations it was for both sides. Soldier A (07/11/12) noted that when talking about ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland “we’re talking about really, really small places…right in the centre of Tyrone, small group area there, East Tyrone in particular…tiny geographical areas. If you weren’t actually in those areas and playing by those ‘Big Boys Rules,’ it’s quite hard to understand.”

It is argued that repression will not ultimately succeed in fighting terrorism because of the substitution effect, unless counterterrorism policies address the resources of terrorist groups. Fairweather (30/03/09) contended that “long term arrest operations,

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119 With the obvious exception of Gibraltar and even the Loughgall ambush while it took place in Co. Armagh, it was still East Tyrone PIRA operating just outside their area of operations.
especially those aimed at individuals higher up the chain were the only effective way of dealing with the situation we faced in Northern Ireland.” For Fairweather “arrests are what matter in the end…especially of higher level players, difficult though this is to achieve, as these individuals are careful to appear to bide by the law of the land – and indeed positively shelter behind them.” Mr. A when asked did TKs contain PIRA was of the view “big time, yeah, the policy was working for the Brits.”

*Irish Republican News* interestingly noted that Loughgall “was a devastating setback for the IRA, practically decimating the East Tyrone Brigade.” Significantly, this republican paper noted at a remove from events in 2007 that “given the movements new ‘lean’ look and its reliance on a small number of ASUs, [that Loughgall represented]…an *incapacitating* dilution of its manpower and seasoned leadership” (O’Malley, 1990; cited by *Irish Republican News*: 4 May 2007). This suggests that within republicanism there was an acknowledgement that because of the move to the smaller cell system losses such as those sustained at Loughgall did have a degree of diminishing capacity. A leading IRA activist Brendan Hughes (d. February 2008) argued that the IRA operation proceeded without proper intelligence, organisation, or training. “I remember arguing against operations like this going ahead…GHQ staff were planning this major upsurge in the campaign…what was lacking was the training, but there was this sort of bullish attitude from people like McGuinness to push ahead with these operations. I argued against them”120 (Moloney, 28 March 2010: 2).

In relation to Gibraltar, Adams et al., (*Sunday Times*: 4 September 1988) argue that one of the personnel selected for the PIRA mission to Gibraltar was selected because of a diminishing pool of PIRA volunteers due to security force TKs: “Danny McCann…was once expelled from PIRA for his hawkish beliefs…had won reinstatement because the active service list, depleted by the recent successes of the security forces and a shortage of young recruits, was in need of reinforcement” (*Sunday Times*: 4 December 1988).

120 Moloney (2010) in *Voices from the Grave*, argues that when Hughes saw how the peace process was unfolding that he began to suspect that operations like Loughgall might have been sabotage – set-ups by peacemakers in the republican movement to remove militant hardliners who might be obstacles to the compromises that lay ahead. *Voices from the Grave* is the first publication from Boston College’s IRA/UVF project, an oral history archive based on interviews with veterans of those paramilitary organisations.
The examination of these Incidents now gives us an opportunity as part of the diminishing capacity pillar to introduce its core subset of substitution and displacement and how this may have been initiated by the events of these and other TKs analysed herein. It has been argued that TKs are insufficient predicators in themselves because of the substitution effect, but when combined with other factors, they jointly produce a diminishing capacity. This diminishing capacity is sometimes referred to as incapacitation. Brims (06/11/12) believed there was discernible displacement, “yes, you were very conscious of it [displacement], they were going for the soft targets, and therefore what you have to do is look at where your vulnerabilities were.” Brims continued, “I think the IRA, as [did] we the British army, became better at preventing, making ourselves an even more harder, difficult target, they said we’ll go for the softer target”. Sheridan (15/01/13) conversely disagreed;

“There may have been some element of displacement, but when you think about most of the types of attacks that the IRA carried out were largely in republican areas, yeah there were some in loyalist areas, but not to that extent. Displacement doesn’t seem as valid as substitution...maybe because Northern Ireland is such a small place...they had attacks on rural police stations, but again they weren’t as often in areas that weren’t part of their heartland.”

Sheridan accepted however that there was a definitive substitution effect whereby PIRA changed the modus of their attacks and the associated weapons systems that they utilised: “you certainly would have seen the substitution where they adapted, because we use ECM that intercepted radio waves and so prevented them detonating remote control devices, so they would have went back to anti-handling devices or command wire devices or other opportunities were closed off, it didn’t prevent them...you could see their thinking had changed to adapt to whatever the change was.” Morrison (03/03/09) used the analogy of putting your hand on a bubble, “you press down and it reappears somewhere else.” This again demonstrates that PIRA remained a learning organisation constantly adapting and innovating.

Equally, attacks such as Gibraltar or on mainland Britain were not understood as displacement, as all of the interviewees concurred that PIRA since the 1930s England bombing campaign had always sought to bring their campaign to the British mainland and Gibraltar was a continuum of this. McKittrick (13/11/12) viewed the PIRA...
campaigns in the UK and Europe “in terms of the IRA theatres of operations.” Hutchinson (25/07/12) noted “we also had them attacking the city of London; they get further attacking the city of London, ‘the financial city’ than they ever did killing British soldiers. That’s what brought the British government to talking, all of these other killings didn’t.”

Walsh (24/07/12) noted that “at times some of the people that the British took out would have had a military capacity that would not have been matched by the people coming in behind then and all of that mattered.” Walsh believed that TKs impacted on morale and on PIRAs capability “within a particular area for a limited period of time but you always find someone to step up to the mark, it’s never a problem.”

Urban (30/03/09) identified as “other significant factors [in ending the PIRA campaign] were ‘own goals’ such as Enniskillen or Warrington and the general sense of growing security force penetration of PIRA.” In terms of self-inflicted harms, Brims (06/11/12) pointed out “the biggest event of 1987 unquestionably was the blowing up of the war memorial in Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday, that was the biggest PIRA own goal that had a far more detrimental effect than Loughgall.” De Breádun (25/02/09) also believed that the “Enniskillen Day massacre would have caused the republican leadership to think about whether the war should be continued or not,” equally that it had the appearance “of a sectarian act and it certainly would be contrary to the leadership ideology.”

Urban (30/03/09) suggested that it was the widespread penetration by informers that resulted in an increase in the “power gained by the IRA Security Department [ISU] during these years, where they killed more republicans than the IRA killing members of the security forces.” Urban contended that PIRA’s ability to maintain the same tempo of operations “presumably required a great deal more effort due to jittery volunteers and security precautions…it all for PIRA contributed to the sense that it was harder to achieve spectacular results.” This relates to the theme that the cumulative effect over time is to reduce levels of violence or, at a minimum, lower the quality and success rate of violence (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006). The following section will therefore briefly examine how the use of this increasingly sophisticated
resource came to be utilised by the security forces and its role in both thwarting PIRA operations and acting as the intelligence platform for initiating TKs.

**Covert Surveillance**

We have seen previously how it had become demonstrably apparent that by this period the security forces were operating with highly accurate intelligence as a result of the increasingly integrated intelligence system developed under the aegis of the Tactical and Coordination Groups (TCGs) with its associated ‘triad’ of the ‘Det,’ FRU, and the SAS, in turn assisted by the work of the COPs (Appendix G). According to Urban, “the TCGs attained a critical role in what security chiefs called ‘executive action’ – locking together intelligence from informers with the surveillance and ambushing activities of undercover units” (Urban, 1992: 95). Moloney (23/02/2009) contended that by the 1980s British security efforts and operations were co-ordinated between RUC Special Branch, MI5, and British Military Intelligence, in that “they co-ordinated and planned every single operation together, with the lead being given by whichever had provided the core intelligence, this meant that it was possible to place operations within the framework of overall strategy or policy aims.” This is an important point, in that it reinforces that TKs as a tactic were nested within an overarching operational security policy and were not carried out in an *ad hoc* fashion.

Sheridan (15/01/13) believed that “there is no doubt that both intelligence, that the use of covert intelligence, whether that was people or technological intelligence…the whole range of intelligence availability was used and the security services were very good at that. I have no doubt it played a huge part in that frustration of the campaign.” It is also within this Cluster that the effect of informers comes increasingly to the fore, and again in the following the use of such informer collected intelligence allied to electronic surveillance became increasingly utilised by the security forces, to the extent that unlike the period of Cluster I where the security forces intelligence picture of PIRA was not very well developed, by this stage of ‘the Troubles’ marked by Cluster two the security forces had increasingly accurate insight into PIRA operations. Interestingly Mr. A (31/07/13) felt;
“a lot of IRA would have blamed touts but I would have blamed more technology...I think surveillance and all the devices they had, touts to a lesser extent. There were some operations that happened there was nobody else that knew about it and people were still getting caught, so that rules out touts. Some IRA ones would have went just on a quick thing [an operation initiated at very short notice to militate against possible informers] maybe thinking there was a tout, they would have went and done something and still get caught. So that was all down to pure surveillance and pure use of equipment by the security forces.”

Having briefly therefore analysed the effect of electronic surveillance, the following will examine how this was twinned with the exploitation of informant-based intelligence. A brief analysis of both these means of intelligence gathering by the security forces is justified as they played a pivotal role within the overall security architecture in garnering the intelligence that was then utilised operationally against PIRA in the form of TKs. Indeed, the TKs of this Cluster and the final Cluster were specifically predicated on such intelligence, whether informer or electronic surveillance led. Again, this is pertinent because information gathered through the use of informers was translated into intelligence that in turn was operationalised into TKs.

Fishers of Men: The FRU and Informer Recruitment

It has been alleged that the Loughgall operation was compromised by an informer and also covert electronic intercepts and that these intercepts were also used subsequently to monitor the PIRA ASU killed at Drumnakilly. Cochrane (2013) has noted that in particular with the formation of the Force Research Unit (FRU), the British military intelligence agent handling department (Appendix G), “much effort and ingenuity was put into the targeting of individuals deemed worthy of recruitment” (p. 87). It seems that the movement had been infiltrated at every level and across a wide geographical area, and according to one estimate, “one in six volunteers in Derry were said to have worked for FRU” (p. 88). Urban (1992) has even suggested that as many as “one in thirty to forty frontline membership were informants at one time” (p. 244). Belfast was said to have been infiltrated to such a degree that “eight out of ten planned operations by the IRA’s Belfast brigade were being thwarted by the RUC” (Holland & Phoenix, 1996: cited by Cochrane, 2013: 89). Dingley (14/09/12) suggested that this had an increasingly decisive effect;

“In the 1980s the security forces were clearly winning and they were starting to work out why they were winning. Number one, good information, good intelligence. PIRA was riddled with informers; my friends in Special Branch could ring me up and say there is an Army
Council meeting this weekend…it was riddled at that level, they had turned so many people and that in itself had a major destabilising effect within PIRA.”

When it was suggested to Walsh (24/07/12) that many republicans were reluctant to admit the effect of informers on the organisation, he replied, “I don’t have a problem with that. Informers created havoc. It has to be said that you try your best to try and counter it and they try their best to try and counter it and they try their best in intelligence war and technology war and everything else.” McKearney (23/11/12) also endorsed this position: “agents and informers had a detrimental impact on PIRAs ability and capacity to deliver.”

Belfast and Derry Nullified
The heavy degree of infiltration of both Derry and Belfast by Informers and the consequent ability of the security forces to thwart planned operations almost at will meant that Tyrone and south Armagh would remain the key focus for TKs. Hearty (2011) believes that “it is clear that in targeting East Tyrone in such a manner [through TKs], the security forces could remove those posing the greatest threat…the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the tactic was enacted to intentionally achieve this” (p. 50).

A sub-set of this was that over the course of ‘the Troubles’ PIRA killed seventy-one alleged informers (Cochrane, 2013: 90), and indeed Urban (1992) has noted that “young volunteers joining the IRA in the 1980s were almost as likely to die at the hands of their own comrades through accusations of informing as they were to be killed by the SAS” and that “doubtless the IRA has committed miscarriages of justice” (p. 244) as a result of the paranoia that was induced by the informer problem. McKittrick (13/11/12) supported this view, noting how Sinn Féin addressed this issue in latter years: “they [Sinn Féin] apologise like within the last three or four years and a couple of other cases and they said either publicly or quietly to the families that he was wrongly shot.” Dingley (14/09/12) noted that “all my conversations with British intelligence and Special Branch were all very clear [i.e. perceived paranoia in PIRA due to threat or perceived threat of informers], it created massive paranoia.”
It became increasingly clear that informants were recruited at the very heart of the republican movement in often key and highly sensitive positions, as evidenced by the role of Freddie Scappaticci.\textsuperscript{121} Cochrane (2013) has noted that it would be difficult to envisage a more damaging scenario whereby “intelligence coverage of the IRA enabled them [the security forces] not only to receive details of all potential recruits seeking to join…but also to have oversight of those under suspicion and who were suspected of informing” (p. 87). McIntyre (02/03/09) in relation to Scappaticci noted that “yes, which meant that everybody that came into the IRA was known because he vetted them and he would have known them,” he believed that in hindsight when you look back, “the volunteer didn’t stand a chance; and you wouldn’t notice it at the time because the ‘operational people’ were always frustrated and looking out for Touts.” This McIntyre believed put a strain on PIRA because “they would have been the people who would have been forced to consider the implications of anything that went wrong.” McIntyre added that the search for informers allied to the frustration of operations being consistently compromised had a cumulative effect.

“They’re sitting there all the time wondering what went wrong, they’re doing inquests, they’re going out to the pub after a twelve hour day, the IRA getting drunk, they can’t get it out of their heads what went wrong. I’d say can you not pull back or withdraw or hold up on that operation. They’d say we have to draw out the touts; we’re not going anywhere till we draw them out. So the informers were demoralising, yeah.”

English (14/12/12) believed that overall “informers and intelligence had a much more damaging effect than did those few killings of IRA people which the state carried out.” Officer A (21/02/13) noted that if the PIRA Internal Security Unit (ISU) known as the ‘Nutting Squad’ “arrived in town, a brigade panicked, if the Nutting Squad were called in people were lifted and interrogated by their own, there was no process of your innocent until proven guilty.” Indeed this often suited the security forces “unless they were focusing on someone who was [actually] a tout, you had that game to play as well.” Effectively such an investigation by the Nutting Squad had the effect

\textsuperscript{121} PIRA was rocked when it was revealed that Scappaticci, who at one time was the second-in-command of PIRAs Internal Security Unit (ISU), known as the ‘Nutting Squad’ for the Northern Command was alleged to be Steakknife working for British intelligence. The ISU was tasked with counter-intelligence and the investigation of leaks within PIRA along with the exposure of moles/informers (also known as ‘touts’). Via the ISU, Scappaticci was said to have played a key role in investigating suspected informers, conducting inquiries into operations suspected of being compromised, debriefing PIRA volunteers released from Police and British army questioning, and vetting potential PIRA recruits.
whereby “if an ASU or brigade became suspected they would go to ground until you’re given the all clear, so we played mind games with them to that extent.” Cochrane (2013) has noted that “an interesting proposition… [is that the] move away from the battalion to the cell structure in the mid 1970s…that instead of preventing infiltration by informants the move actually facilitated it” (p. 90).

**Conclusion**

This Chapter examined a Cluster of TKs made up of three Incidents that took place between May 1987 and August 1988 – two of which concern TKs initiated against PIRA in East Tyrone (Loughgall and Drumnakilly) and a third that took place in Gibraltar.

There was a series of subtle but highly significant differences within Cluster II that is noticeably at variance with Cluster I of this study. An examination of this second Cluster utilising the four pillars of the Hafez and Hatfield (2006) framework resulted in the following conclusions:

In relation to deterrence, this Cluster of TKs generated no discernible effect; neither existing volunteers nor potential recruits were deterred. In this respect then, TKs clearly failed.

As to backlash, there remained a strong desire within PIRA to initiate retaliation, but this was effectively mitigated by interlocking and mutually supporting measures put in place by the security force. Consequently, and similar to the period examined in the first Cluster, during the timeframe of this second Cluster, PIRA demonstrably could not initiate backlash immediately or at will. Furthermore, the desire for backlash was tempered by a fear of either real or imagined security force penetration utilising informer-based intelligence and/or covert electronic surveillance. From this reading, TKs demonstrated important successes. But of course it was more complex than just TKs alone here. Enhanced force protection practices by the security forces also contributed in some degree to it becoming increasingly difficult for PIRA to score notable successes against them, in addition to ongoing arrests and convictions. Silke (07/04/09) viewed this as a key issue: “The IRA was losing the intelligence war, and
that’s crucial as their success rate was going down…days of wiping out, ten or twelve soldiers in an ambush were gone.”

To what degree had disruption become a factor during this period? The analysis of data from this Cluster suggests that while PIRA in East Tyrone remained both a highly competent and effective fighting unit there was nevertheless a marked rise in the degree of disruption occurring to its operations. The cause of this may seem counterintuitive, but emerges as an important finding from this study: the move to an active unit / cell system based on ASUs while initially improving PIRA security perversely became an Achilles Heel over the Cluster timeframe. TKs were arguably a major factor in the disruption experienced by PIRA during the timeframe involved.

As to diminishing capacity, it is with regard to this pillar in particular that the effect of TKs became most discernible. Because of the smaller number of cells with an accompanying number of reduced activists, intelligence penetration where successful was being translated into TKs that were increasingly operationally driven, but intelligence led, to the extent that PIRA’s strategic reserve of active, experienced, and battle hardened volunteers was seriously dissipated. Parallel to this PIRA also suffered ongoing ‘attrition’ due to continuing arrests and subsequent imprisonment of volunteers.

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that PIRA operations in East Tyrone were not only contained, but aggressively challenged when initiated. During the timeframe of this Cluster, the security forces were in a position effectively to nullify any operational pushes that PIRA made. In simple terms, this led to a steadily increased attrition rate, which meant that PIRA lost their most highly trained and skilled personnel. This diminution of the pool of skilled veterans was extremely problematic for the base of active volunteers – already restructured into ASUs. This earlier decision had already created a de facto distributed pool of hardcore experienced activists: PIRA in East Tyrone, accordingly, did not have the strategic depth in manpower to replace these losses with volunteers of similar experience and caliber. While there was no shortage of young volunteers willing to take their place these – as will be shown in the description and analysis of Cluster III – did not have the same tactical acumen or experience of their predecessors. Additionally, the fear, either real
or imagined, of future operations being compromised due to the role of informers and/or covert surveillance stymied many PIRA operations pending prolonged internal security reviews in the wake of TK Incidents. This represented a significant success in policy terms for the British security forces and must to some degree be attributed to the TK practices of the time.

Equally, while PIRA was experiencing a significant and ongoing attrition rate, correspondingly British army casualties were falling. In the words of McIntyre (02/03/09) PIRA were operating in an environment of ‘diminishing returns’. Allied to this, as noted by McKearney (23/11/12), over the timeframe of the second Cluster, the British army in particular were an increasing ‘fleeting’ target, whose ever-evolving Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (See Glossary; TTPs) were greatly enhancing their force protection against PIRA attacks. Officer A (21/02/13) was in no doubt as to the seriousness of the consequence of these TKs to PIRA and posited that “the IRA were treading water; they were treading a pool of death and the loyalists had started to take the upper hand.”

Essentially, with the ramping-up of a focused UVF campaign against known republicans in Tyrone allied to the TKs being carried out by the SAS, East Tyrone PIRA were effectively caught in a pincer movement. This issue of loyalist killings will be briefly examined in the next Chapter. This undoubtedly resulted in the beginning of the ground-swell within the larger republican community led, as already mentioned, by the families on the ‘periphery’ who desired an end to the ‘war.’ An element of war-weariness emerged and had an undoubted negative psychological effect on a community that felt increasingly both besieged and terrorised. As Mulvagh (22 May 2013) has noted, just as in the period 1912-1923 “the impact of Ireland’s revolution cannot be measured in purely statistical terms. The deepest impact was psychological and the killing of civilians and police was one of the central differentiations between regular and irregular warfare.”

Stalemate
As English (2003) has noted the period towards the end of Cluster II especially offered problems for PIRA across a wide spectrum of arenas. They lost members; twenty-six died violently during 1987-1988 of whom fourteen were killed in the
combined three Incidents of this Cluster. Additionally, PIRA also unintentionally killed civilians, twenty-seven during 1987-1988 (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1059-1155) and this translated negatively from both a public relations and propaganda perspective, including translation into morale issues for the PIRA support base: “unfortunately, through a combination of tragic circumstances, many civilians died in operations which dented the confidence of some of our supporters” (An Phoblacht/Republican News, 26 Jan 1989).

Most importantly, perhaps, many PIRA operations failed to come to fruition for a variety of reasons, including the role of informers allied to covert surveillance. This was compounded by more subtle security forces tactics that involved either swamping an area where an attack was perceived imminent or simply removing any security forces from the area so that PIRA was not offered a target. The principal result of this was that as many as 80% of PIRA operations were abandoned after lengthy and detailed planning. English (2003) has also noted that PIRA “and their sympathizers were party marginalized from the media by a broadcasting ban which had been introduced by the British authorities in October 1988” (p. 260).

In summary, while the effects and side-effects of TK Incidents in Cluster II are complex and difficult to disentangle, it can be asserted with reasonable confidence that in terms of PIRAs ability to exploit backlash, the effect of disruption to their operations, and diminishing their capacity to mount successful operations, TKs were a significant contributor to the deterioration of PIRAs ability to wage war, even within the East Tyrone heartland. Where TKs were least successful was in regards to deterrence, as neither existing volunteers nor potential recruits were found to have been overly deterred by the practice, despite the attrition level involved. In this respect TKs clearly failed.

However, when deterrence is set against significantly damaged capacity and the resulting inability to wage successful operations, most especially in terms of PR and the morale necessary of these to help sustain the war, it is clear that in this Cluster timeframe the efficacy of TKs was significantly higher than in the first Cluster considered.
Examination of a third and final Cluster will determine whether this was anomalous or a sustained trend.
CHAPTER VII
Stalemate and Endgame: Coagh and Clonoe
Cluster III

Introduction
This chapter examines the third and final cluster of TKs that took place between June 1991 and February 1992. In the following, the two incidents composing Cluster III are described and analysed. The early part of this decade was pivotal in a number of ways in relation to the use of TKs. Prior to this, a brief overview of the key political developments taking place within Northern Ireland before and after this Cluster will be presented to provide the historical context in which this last cluster of TKs occurred.

Nineteen ninety one witnessed PIRA launching a mortar bomb attack on Downing Street, which came alarmingly close to killing the British Cabinet including PM John Major. This year was also of note because for the first time it witnessed loyalist killings outstripping those carried out by republicans (McKittrick et al., 1999). Peter Brook,122 the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, told Westminster that political talks in Northern Ireland would have three strands including internal Northern Ireland relations, a North-South relationship, and the East West-dimension. Brooke in an interview with journalists on 1 November 1989 “broke all the unwritten rules and said that he genuinely believed…it is difficult to envisage a military defeat [of PIRA]” (Taylor, 1997: 316). The ‘Brookes talks’ continued into 1992, but with little progress; as 1993 dawned moves to evolve and develop a Peace Process began to take shape however. Edwards (2011) has noted “there was a much longer gestation to the IRA ceasefire than is generally acknowledged” (p. 77). A lot more information is now entering into the public domain as regards the background to these talks and how, even at this juncture, tentative, but key, conversations between the protagonists that was unknown to the main body politic at the time were taking place. While this is not

122 Peter Brooke (born 3 March 1934) was a Conservative politician and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from 1989 to 1992.
immediately germane to the consideration here of TKs it is nonetheless an underlying factor occurring contextually throughout the period under discussion. 1994 saw tentative moves towards a ceasefire, with American involvement under the direct tutelage of President Bill Clinton being increasingly to the fore. Continuing high levels of loyalist violence was becoming increasingly more focused and targeted against members of both PIRA and Sinn Féin, predominantly centred in Tyrone. Finally in August a PIRA ceasefire was announced. A month later the main loyalist groups declared a ceasefire conditional on PIRA maintaining its ceasefire (McKittrick et al., 1999).

It is against this background that the final cluster of TKs took place; it incorporated two incidents at Coagh, County Tyrone in summer 1991 and Clonoe, also in County Tyrone, in early 1992 incorporated within them. They are the final TKs of the Northern Ireland Troubles initiated by the state against PIRA that have been identified in this study. They are again of note in that they were specifically targeted against the so-called post-Loughgall generation of Tyrone PIRA (Kingston, 2007). In the following a detailed overview will be provided of the events of the two incidents of Cluster III.

**Incident I: Death in Hanover Square**

The Coagh Ambush was a controversial incident that took place on 3 June 1991 when three members of PIRAs East Tyrone Brigade, Lawrence McNally (38), Peter Ryan (37), and Tony Doris (21) were ambushed by the SAS in the village of Coagh, County Tyrone (Appendix D-Ser; 39-41). Coagh is “a largely Protestant enclave in a predominantly nationalist area” (McKittrick, *The Independent*: 4 June 1991). McNally and Ryan, both Monaghan-based operators, had “been lured to the village by a sighting of a UDR soldier, who because of his alleged connections to loyalists had long been an IRA target” (Moloney, 2002: 318). Once again the SAS used the tactic of an SAS decoy who, like the driver of the broken-down lorry at Drumnakilly in 1988, bore a passing resemblance to the UDR member the IRA were intending to kill (Figure 27).

Peter Ryan had been on the run from the security forces since escaping from Crumlin Road jail in Belfast in 1981. Ryan came from Ardboe, several miles away. His
cousin was shot dead by loyalist paramilitaries two years earlier (Bowcott, *The Guardian*: 4 June 1991). McKittrick (4 June 1991) noted that Ryan and McNally were “two of the organisation’s key gunmen in the area, according to security sources.” Laurence McNally’s brother, Phelim, had been shot dead by the UVF in 1988 apparently mistaken for his other brother, Francis, who was a Sinn Féin councillor. The youngest of the three dead men, Tony Doris, also had a cousin who was a Sinn Féin councillor in Dungannon, Doris was to be the driver of the car for the forthcoming PIRA operation.
Figure 27. Coagh Ambush (An Phoblacht, 6 Jun 91)
Operational Use of Intelligence

Taylor (2001) states that the PIRA ASU had been the subject of an intense surveillance operation, carried out by Tasking and Coordination Group South (TCG-South), on intelligence that the ASUs target was to be killed in the Protestant village of Coagh. At least half a dozen agencies were tasked by TCG (South) to carry out the operation. The ASU had hijacked a car the previous evening in nearby Moneymore. The car was tracked both “on the ground and from the air on its journey to Coagh” (Taylor, 2001: 305). The PIRA operation was either “betrayed by an informer inside PIRA” (Toolis, 1995: 73) or “by technical surveillance” (Taylor, 2001: 305). McKittrick (Newspaper, 4 June 1991) noted that “in this instance the security forces clearly had precise intelligence that an IRA attack was planned and laid an ambush in which maximum firepower was used.” Tyrone republican activist Mr. A (31/07/13) when questioned regarding security forces surveillance and its disruptive effect in its own right stated, “it would surely, big time.” He believed that in effect the security forces surveillance and ability to quickly react to PIRA operations became pervasive. “Guerrilla warfare in the later years – it wasn’t like way back in the ’20s [where] you had a fair ‘dig’ [chance] at getting away. The way it got in the late ’80s, early ’90s, they had too much things [resources and technology].”

Coagh with its predominant Protestant community was surrounded by strongly republican towns and countryside. “At the village’s heart lies Hanover Square, constructed in the 1720s by Protestant settlers loyal to the then King George I” (Bowcott, The Guardian: 04 June 1991). At approximately 7.30 am the three PIRA volunteers drove from Moneymore (County Derry) in the hijacked car crossing the bridge between counties Derry and Tyrone (Figure 27). PIRA said the trio were on an operation to kill a part-time UDR soldier, who was also a contractor to the security forces (Toolis, 1995: 73). All three members of the ASU were killed in a hail of gunfire as their vehicle entered Hanover square. A parked lorry was utilised to conceal some of the SAS team. The intensity of the firepower directed at the Vauxhall cavalier car “in which the volunteers were travelling was such that the vehicle careered out of control into a Volkswagen Golf parked in Hanover Square, where it burst into flames” (An Phoblacht/Republican News, 6 June 1991).

An unnamed relative later described them as “dedicated soldiers of the IRA” (Bowcott, The Guardian: 4 June 1991). An Phoblacht stated that “IRA operations over the past seven days,
which have continued to place the crown forces under severe pressure, were overshadowed with the death on active service of volunteers Tony Doris, Peter Ryan and Lawrence McNally” (An Phoblacht/Republican News, 6 June 1991). An Phoblacht further claimed that “no pretence was maintained by the RUC that an attempt to arrest the three men was even contemplated.”

Just three days before this incident three members of the UDR were killed in Glenanne, Markethill, Co. Armagh when a truck packed with 2,500 lb of explosives was rolled down a hill through a perimeter fence into the base causing utter devastation, which An Phoblacht described “as a severe blow to the British army” (An Phoblacht/Republican News, 6 June 1991). Bowcott (The Guardian, 4 June 1991) suggests that this PIRA attack was part of a “campaign which appears designed to destabilise the Brook talks.” PIRA later accused the security forces of killing its three members “in revenge for the Glenanne bombing” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1238).

Tit-for-Tat Killings
Kevin Toolis (1995) argued that the Coagh ambush needs to be examined in the context of a series of ‘tit-for-tat’ killings taking place at the same time and in the same space as this TK in East Tyrone, whereby PIRA had specifically targeted off-duty UDR soldiers, who tended to be Protestants, thereby fostering the perception among the Protestant community that PIRA was waging a sectarian war against them (p. 60). McKittrick (4 June 1991) noted that “one landmark came two years ago [March 1989] when the IRA killed three local Protestants [Leslie Dallas, Austin Nelson, and Ernest Rankin] in a Coagh garage: one was alleged to be a loyalist extremist, but the other two were indisputably harmless elderly men.” Patterson (2013) noted that the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was imported from the ongoing Balkan wars to refer to the experience of Protestant communities in border areas of Northern Ireland in the early 1990s. He argues that however sensationalist the term “it had an emotional truth for border Protestants as the continuing attacks and killings struck at their community’s morale and sense of security” (p. 194).

Following the TK of the PIRA ASU it was found that one of the rifles recovered from the burnt out car had been used to kill Leslie Dallas, Austin Nelson and Ernest Rankin on 7 March 1989 in a Coagh garage 200 yards from the scene of this incident (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1239). In fact Gorman (The Times, 4 June 1991) in also noting that “the shootings
[took place], yards from the spot where the IRA shot three Protestants in March 1989, came after an exceptionally violent weekend as the IRA increased its activity in an attempt to destabilise the faltering Brook initiative.” As part of this cyclical violence the UVF on 3 March 1991, killed four men, three of whom were PIRA activists in the republican stronghold of Cappagh, County Tyrone (Appendix D-Ser; 37-38; McKittrick et al., 1999: 1227-1229).

Referring to the PIRA volunteers, Kevin McNamara, the British Labour Party spokesman for Northern Ireland said “I would much rather people were behind bars than under the ground. Under the ground they tend to become martyrs” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1239). The republican newspaper An Phoblacht, articulating the PIRA viewpoint, complained that;

“Church leaders bitterly condemn the IRA when it ambushes and kills British soldiers, SDLP and Dublin politicians do likewise. There is a chorus of condemnation from the media. But when the British army obliterates the bodies of three volunteers, there is a different kind of sound from these sources – the shuffling of feet” (An Phoblacht/Republican News, 6 June 1991).

**Incident II: Fin-de-siècle**

The year 1992 opened with an attack by East Tyrone PIRA on 17 January at Teebane Crossroads on the main Omagh to Cookstown road that killed eight workmen, all Protestants. These men worked for a building firm that had been carrying out repairs at an army base (McKittirck et al., 1999: 1268). While this attack caused shock and condemnation across the political spectrum, this is not to suggest here that it can be causally linked to the next and final TK incident. It is apparent at this remove that the planning and preparation for this TK was based on ongoing and detailed intelligence analysis on the part of the security services that was already in train prior to the Teebane attack as part of an overall TK strategy.

The final use of lethal force by the SAS during the course of the Northern Ireland conflict took place on 16 February 1992, when “undercover soldiers cut a swath into the next IRA generation” (Moloney, 2002: 318) when an ASU attacked Coalisland Police station with a Russian made Degtyarev heavy-machine-gun mounted on the back of a hijacked lorry. They had intended to rendezvous with a getaway car in the church car park having carried out their attack, but the SAS mounted an ambush. Four members of the ASU were killed: Kevin O’Donnell (21), Sean O’Farrell (23), Peter Clancy (19), and Daniel Vincent (20) (Appendix D-Ser; 42-45;; McKittrick et al., 1999: 1280-1281), in a set-piece ambush in the parking lot of the Catholic Church in Clonoe, between Coalisland and Ardboe (Figure 28). Two others
wounded at the scene, including Mr. A. were captured and three others escaped. “Flares lit
up the scene, bouncing on the roof of St. Patrick’s [Church] and setting it alight… In the first
fifteen seconds 580 rounds were fired” (Clarke and Prescott, The Sunday Times: 23 Feb
2012). Three of the ASU volunteers were killed in the vicinity of the truck (Figure 29) while
trying to dismantle the heavy-machine-gun.

A statement from Sinn Féin claimed that the latest “SAS shoot-to-kill operation” was a direct
consequence of meetings between the British PM, SDLP, and unionist leaders in London the
Minister, Dr. Brian Mawhinney, stated that the fact that the British Army was confronted
with a heavily armed gang “dictated the degree of force used by the security forces in the gun
battle in which the four IRA men were killed” (Moriarty, 25 February 1992).
Figure 28. Clonoe Church Ambush [1] (Irish Human Rights Commission, 1 October 2013)
O’Donnell had previously been acquitted at the Old Bailey in London, after two AK-47 rifles were found in the boot of his car.\textsuperscript{123} “When he returned to Tyrone, he would immediately have become a target for surveillance, as he returned to his old haunts and picked up again with his old comrades” (Taylor, 2001: 306). There was speculation that they had been making a propaganda style video of the attack (McKittrick \textit{et al.}, 1999: 1280), but Mc Kearney (23/11/12) refuted this as nonsense, while acknowledging that they were all young men who “hadn’t been deterred.” He believed that the \textit{modus} of the attack was from “my point of view a criminal waste of ammunition...there are things they did which you have to say were inexperienced, but there were added bits to it about flying flags, cheering etc., which I am reasonably sure is wrong.” He argued such stories were blown out of proportion: “inexperience we can accept...the other aspect is that it turned around to saying that this is the madness of Tyrone.” He contended “there can be a fine line between \textit{esprit de corps} and madness or indiscipline.”

Clarke and Prescott (\textit{The Sunday Times}: 23 Feb 1992) suggested that “at best the IRA operation that led to the ambush appears to have been a foolhardy risk,” but also said that the IRA had actually planned a large bomb attack that was scaled down after a diversionary operation failed. They argue that the eventual failed attack was only a segment of the original operation that was planned. The night of the incident, PIRA telephoned a Chinese take-away in nearby Cookstown and kidnapped the driver who brought them the meal. They told him a bomb had been placed in his van, which he was ordered to park at Cookstown RUC station. The driver panicked at an army checkpoint and the threat was found to be a hoax. Security sources believed that this was a diversion to enable a bomb to be exploded at Coalisland, exposing the survivors to devastating fire from the Degtyarev heavy-machine-gun mounted on the rear of the stolen flatbed truck (Figure 29).

\textsuperscript{123} He had also previously been acquitted of having a rocket launcher near a social club in Coalisland (McKittrick \textit{et al.}, 1999: 1280-1281).
Figure 29. Clonoe Ambush [2]: Enlargement of Area around Lorry (Irish Human Rights Commission: 1 October 2013)
Nonetheless the intelligence was precise, Taylor (2002) describing it as ‘pin-point’ (p. 306) and Moloney (2002) noting that in this and other ambushes “intelligence had been excellent” (p. 319). McKittrick et al., (1999) note that the deaths “prompted a revival of speculation that the security forces had penetrated the IRA locally with an informer,” but equally since some of the unit, especially Kevin Barry O’Donnell were well known to security forces, “it is possible that the SAS tactics were determined by information gathered through surveillance of suspects”(p. 1280).

In the next section an analysis of Incidents I and II of Cluster III will now be undertaken utilising the four pillars of the Hafez and Hatfield (2006) framework.

**Deterrence**

The events at Clonoe were to be the *Fin-de-siècle* of TKs witnessed during the course of the conflict. It is clearly evident that there was no deterrence effect upon the post-Loughgall generation of volunteers despite being aggressively targeted. This is manifested in interview by all sides in the conflict. Commenting on the young age profile of the volunteers killed, McKearney (23/11/12) stated that nonetheless “they hadn’t been deterred” and Taylor (1997) noted that O’Donnell “had joined the IRA the year after Loughgall” (p. 310). Officer A (21/02/13) on O’Donnell noted that despite “being caught red handed with weapons in London, sent home, [he] reorganised East Tyrone, he became OC East Tyrone, and he’s taken out.”

Officer A (21/02/13) noted that despite the high attrition rate experienced by PIRA in East Tyrone, even after Clonoe, “it increased recruitment…after the funerals the IRA set up a table in the parochial hall and there was a queue of people to join the IRA.” Indeed, if anything it “puts the IRA in a difficult position because they have to be seen to be responsive to those individuals.” They then go through a detailed vetting process and “cherry-pick one of those individuals they believe could be nurtured into a good volunteer, so not just anybody is allowed to join the IRA.” Again, as previously identified PIRA “certainly utilized death, funerals, to generate new recruits.” So crucially, according to Officer A (21/02/13), “never did any SAS killing prevent recruitment.” He went on to say that oftentimes PIRA viewed the deaths of volunteers as an opportunity. “First of all you had the grieving and it quite public grieving and then you have the difficulty with the burials and the shooting over the coffins.” This led to protracted stand-offs with the RUC: “conflict again; bodies unable to be
put into the ground until the police had an assurance from the family and the IRA that there were going to be no shots fired over the coffin.” This he believed was manipulated and used by PIRA for propaganda purposes. Mr. A (31/07/13) who survived the Clonoe incident, when specifically asked if previous TKs acted for him as a deterrent replied, “not really, no, there was certain things I wouldn’t be able to do, but I’d have went as far as the stage of things I was willing to do.” Asked whether he felt TKs might have had a deterrent effect on the four PIRA volunteers killed at Clonoe he replied simply, ‘no.’ On the wider issue as to whether TKs in general had a deterrent effect on other ASU cells, he stated:

“I don’t honestly think so, they [ASUs] kept going. I know the fellow Tony Doris that was shot in Coagh, all the fellows killed at Clonoe were his best friends…any of the lads I knew were hard, not hard like, but plenty of guts like…even the lads that got out of the lorry,\(^\text{124}\) they were lucky, they made good work to get away” (Mr. A, 31/07/13).

Therefore from this and previous discussions from the two other clusters it is clearly discernible that deterrence is a very hard factor to initiate against committed and dedicated insurgents. There was no deterrence effect on PIRA volunteers who clearly knew the risks when engaging on active service as part of ASUs, despite being well aware of the fate that befell previous ASUs in TK incidents.

**Backlash**

McKittrick (13/11/12) felt that in relation to backlash “one of their instincts [of PIRA] in the wake of a disaster like that is to show they have the capacity to strike back, but they didn’t manage that after Clonoe.” Walsh (24/07/12) agreed that;

“yes, it was a lot harder to hit them…it was obviously [different] trying to go out on an operation against the British army in 1990s – it was totally different from IRA operations against the British army in 1971 or ’72 whereby you had one or two guys gone out and taken on four, six, eight British soldiers…you wouldn’t have been able to do that to get away in later years.”

Allied to this, the evolving technical sophistication of surveillance tools available to the British Army continued to make backlash difficult for PIRA. McIntyre (02/03/09) noted;

“yes, the infiltration, the technological sophistication which the British operated, it was getting very, very difficulty for the IRA active service units to kill British soldiers, so you had fewer and fewer killings; and in my experience of the IRA they always wanted to kill British soldiers.”

\(^{124}\) Three individuals escaped unscathed from the Clonoe ambush.
Mr. A when asked his opinion of the surveillance capabilities of the security forces replied “excellent.”

Fleeting Targets

Another issue related to backlash that comes to the fore during this period is the increased difficulty for PIRA in achieving a high kill ratio against the security forces. Through a series of specific measures, such as the ‘target hardening’ of British army bases against PIRA mortar and rocket attacks, much improved personal body armour for individuals that provided a high degree of ballistic protection, in addition to the development of a range of Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) that was underpinned by mutually supporting and interlocking security measures, the security forces simply presented an increasingly ‘fleeting’ target for PIRA. English (14/12/12) noted that “the IRA/INLA found it increasingly hard to attack state forces lethally as the conflict wore on. The desire for revenge was there, but only limited actual capacity [to do so].”

McKearney (23/11/12) also noted that as the conflict developed it became increasingly difficult for PIRA to actively engage the security forces, particularly the British army. He recognised that as Soldier A (07/11/12) observed the British army had “become a much more nuanced and effective organisation” that was adaptable and a learning organisation in much the same way as PIRA. In a similar fashion, McKearney (23/11/12) emphasised how British army tactics transformed subtly during the course of the conflict. “You have to take on board that the British professional military machine will adjust very quickly and will come up to speed.” He believed that by the 1980s the British army had radically transformed its profile, “…what they [the British army] started to say was that this wasn’t a conventional war, we don’t need to fight a conventional war with PIRA where we are going toe-to-toe.” He said that the British army realised that they did not necessarily have to dominate terrain, but control it, “The British army objective is to hold territory so that they [PIRA] don’t run it and control it and after that avoid casualties.” McKearney (23/11/12) also stated, “They simply didn’t move out, or they would come across in choppers, but they didn’t put their feet on the ground. They didn’t expose their men.” Additionally, “you didn’t get routine patrols, you didn’t even get constant patrols!” Along the east shore of Lough Neagh in particular, he said, the British army “were there fleetingly, so we could sit for three weeks on a mine, we sat for months on mines, we never seen them.”
Preventative Strategy

Brims (06/11/12) discussed not only the tactic of ‘swamping’ an area with police or military, but also ‘clearing the table’ so that there were no security force targets in an identified zone where PIRA intended to launch an attack. “You just know something is going to happen, somewhere on ‘this table’, clear the table or fill the table so they can’t get into play.” He also referred to the combination of both tactics (i.e. ‘spooking’ and ‘swamping’): “a combination of the two, aborting, why do you abort? Because you’re frightened of getting caught, all the way through you created the atmosphere in which the terrorist is concentrating on creating the escape after the act, as you’re making that more difficult.” He believed that this created a scenario of what he termed “a virtuous circle for the security forces and a vicious cycle for the terrorist…you would certainly try and frustrate them…it was a tactical policy to prevent a loss of life.” Officer A (21/02/13) noted that, in his view, the coordination between the overt and covert activity in East Tyrone;

“…was absolutely excellent. We had codes whereby if we knew terrorists were on the ground we could put a code out to every single uniformed officer or army – get them to present their grid, say all members present and accounted for, and then we would give them routes back or tell them not to move or go to ground. We had other ones where if they found a weapon or a bomb, they simply left it there, walked away, and came to me, and then I would take it down for exploitation purposes.”

Southern (2009) has noted that this preventative strategy was not as a result of insufficient intelligence, but one often used to frustrate PIRA volunteers. “Such ‘frustrations’ had been found to be more internally disruptive and demoralising to the terrorists then openly confronting them or having major ‘shoot outs’ with them, which could provide the terrorists with excellent propaganda and long running inquests” (p. 191).

The corollary of this is that there must have been many instances where TK operations were in situ and PIRA simply failed to materialise. In my own professional training it was always emphasised that most deliberate ambushes that are established fail to be initiated. Officer A (21/02/13) related how with impending intelligence of a PIRA attack at a permanent vehicle checkpoint in Cookstown the normal troops stationed there were replaced by the SAS. The Pomeroy ASU was tasked to do a ‘dry run’ reconnaissance and report back. Even though nothing suspicious per se was noted the ASU Commander called it off. Officer A noted, “But if they had come down the road with guns they were either arrested or dead. There were many, many occasions like that whereby they would look about putting operations in place
and then cancel them at the last minute.” Officer A described this in terms of a “war of attrition.”

At this juncture it can be reasonably deduced that many TK operations were put in situ during the period encompassed by this study, but for various reasons failed to come to fruition. This is a significant finding in that it indicates the high level of not only resources, but ongoing intelligence gathering and analysis involved that was being in turn translated into the mounting of numerous operations only a small proportion of which were kinetically initiated in the form of TKs. Additionally, these were focused over a prolonged period of time in the very small geographic area represented by East Tyrone. To extrapolate this TK effort onto a bigger geographical area of operations such as currently witnessed in Afghanistan would represent a staggering commitment of manpower and resources, the long term sustainability of which would be exorbitantly costly over a similar time scale.

Substitution and Displacement

In 1990, at the advent of Cluster III, we see a clear example of substitution and displacement by PIRA to counter this when they adopt and utilize a tactic that became known as the ‘human bomb’ or ‘proxy bomb attack’ (Edwards, 2011: 60). Kingston (2007) argues that in response to the use of TKs “the IRA resorted to techniques which even its own ‘base’ disliked, the proxy bomb campaign being perhaps the most notorious” (p. 136). So the tactic is a clear example of substitution. The first usage of this proxy bomb tactic was on 24 October 1990 in an attack on the Victor Two Permanent Vehicle Checkpoint (PVCP) outside Derry and near the border with Co. Donegal. This killed five soldiers from the King’s Regiment and a civilian named Patsy Gillespie. Gillespie had worked in the canteen of another local army base (Kingston, 2007: 61) and his family was held at gunpoint by PIRA while he was forced to drive a van bomb onto the base. There was widespread criticism of this PIRA tactic. There were several other attempts to use the technique, which was widely condemned as a particularly savage and merciless tactic. The Catholic bishop of Derry, Dr. Edward Daly, accused PIRA of “crossing a new threshold of evil” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1215). Taylor (1997) posits that the revulsion caused by this use of a ‘human bomb’ increased a “groundswell for peace that the IRA could not ignore” (p. 317). On foot of the attack, the British army instituted new measures to protect their bases that effectively mitigated the threat posed. Edwards (2011) argues that the political and military pressure being exerted on PIRA at this point in time “forced the organization to switch its attention to
more high-profile targets on the British mainland” (p. 61). Whether this can be assessed as displacement remains contested as it has been shown that most interviewees held the view that PIRA had always strategically sought to strike at the British mainland, particularly London. Yet in February 1991 PIRA launched an audacious mortar attack on No. 10 Downing Street, followed by a series of coordinated attacks on the London Stock Exchange. Robert McCartney a leading unionist politician remarked that “a bomb in London is worth 100 in Belfast” (p. 62). These specific mainland attacks were orchestrated by South Armagh PIRA, which was still relatively immune to security forces intelligence penetration. McKearney (23/11/12) agreed that “yes, you are right about the publicity that you get for a bomb in Britain,” but equally posited that “bombing Britain was a little bit harkening of desperation, in the sense when we found it difficult to operate in the six counties.” Moving into 1994, in March that year PIRA targeted Heathrow airport on three separate occasions using mortars buried around the perimeter with time delayed switches (Edwards, 2011: 62). Colbert (24/07/12), on the PIRA campaign in mainland UK in the 1990s, asserted that this tactic was nested as part of “a much more strategic view of what tactics to employ to impress the enemy. I think that’s why Manchester, London, I think that’s why these [were utilized]… I don’t want to use the word ‘spectaculars’… there is nothing in isolation, Sinn Féin was [correspondingly] massively growing.”

**Disruption**

Taylor (2000) notes that despite the views of two female member of the ‘Det,’ “that the ‘Group’ had decimated the IRAs East Tyrone Brigade, killing eight of its members at Loughgall, three at Drumnakilly, two at the mushroom shed, and now three at Coagh,” nonetheless “there was no shortage of recruits to take their places” (p. 306). Clearly, there was little deterrence and PIRA recruiting in Tyrone continued unabated despite the ambush. But as we shall see these new recruits did not have the same experience as former PIRA activists who despite their tactical acumen had been killed in previous TKs. It is equally noteworthy, particularly in relation to the final TK incident at Clonoe in 1992, that the four volunteers who were killed were all young men in their very early twenties or late teens.

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125 Taylor (2000) contends that by “the mid-1980s, the SAS and the 14th Int Coy (‘Det’), had become known as the ‘Group.’ Its undercover soldiers not only worked together, but lived together when operations were underway” (p. 254); see Appendix G.

126 On 9 October 1990, in a mushroom shed at a farm outside Loughgall, two PIRA volunteers, Desmond Grew and Martin McCaughey, were killed by the SAS while collecting weapons from an arms cache in the shed (Appendix D-Ser; 35-36; McKittrick et al., 1999: 1210-1211).
PIRA had in effect through a ‘war of attrition’ lost its battle-hardened veterans in previous TKs.

Many analysts (Moloney, 2002; Taylor, 1997; Urban, 1992) have argued that when one compares the Clonoe ASU members to other ASU members killed in TKs that there was a discernible difference in the ability and military professionalism of those killed at Clonoe vis-à-vis what were perceived as the much more hardened, battle-experienced ‘professionals’ killed at Loughgall and Drumnakilly. McIntyre (02/03/09) on the events at Clonoe stated “I think there’s a younger generation coming through, certainly brave and gung-ho, that wasn’t tempered by experience, but then Tyrone didn’t manage a great deal after that, but having said that the last days of the peace process was kicking in.” Officer A (21/02/13) argued that the PIRA operation that night was a fiasco, “he [O’Donnell] made a complete mess of it, and he ran the operation in Clonoe simply to video it for Americans, madness.” Officer A (21/02/13) contended that ultimately PIRA in East Tyrone “never learned from their defeats so it had a devastating effect when top operators were taken out and in the end East Tyrone was on its knees.”

While Urban (1992) contends that “successive ambushes in Tyrone during the 1980s appear to have had no noticeable effect on the level of terrorist violence there (p. 242), he nonetheless believes that the removal of people with key skills is a feature of TKs as practiced by the Israelis. In the Northern Ireland context there were undoubtedly some effects on local organisations too. Urban (30/03/09) said that “The removal of Jim Lynagh [Incident I, Cluster II] forced a change to less spectacular or large scale operations.” But he does not believe that the security forces achieved the necessary critical mass in disruption terms, “the impression I formed though is that the security forces only eliminated a small proportion of the people they would have needed to kill in order to turn the PIRA into an incompetent organisation robbed of good leaders or bomb makers.” This was because they simply “didn’t achieve the tempo required to do that within their self imposed limits of what might be seen as a ‘legitimate’ ambush and an overall consensus amongst the military and RUC, that escalating operations would create its own negative effects.” Urban (30/03/09) believed this transferred into the lexicon and use of phraseology, hence “phrases like ‘acceptable limits,’ being used in connection with security force violence as well as that of paramilitaries.”
McIntyre (02/03/09) believed that the removal of Lynagh and other key PIRA personnel did not “have an effect on the ability of the IRA”. He believed that the IRA could absorb such disruption, “the IRA always reproduced itself as an organisation”. The loss of individuals with key skills was not absolutely debilitating as “the experience gained was handed down…lessons learned from people who had survived bombs, what went wrong, all that was passed on” and that such skills and technical expertise were evident “when technical people were arrested, we can still watch the IRA ability to bomb at the very heart of London at the very latest stage of the campaign.” Morrison (03/03/09) took up this theme too: “I know people who have left the IRA for ten years and then come. They suddenly re-emerge: people opt in and out,” suggesting that this made it very hard for the security forces to monitor PIRA activists. He argued that the greatest strength of the organisation in the face of TKs was that “there is no weapon or strategy that can be brought to bear against an organisation that is so diffuse. OK, so we lose an explosive expert, but there is always someone else who can pass on the skills.”

Fairweather (30/03/09) identified the bomb makers and technical experts within PIRA as key activists: “the people who are important are the handful of bomb makers, those with real knowledge of high speed detonation.” Disruption effects were limited, “from time to time such an effect [disruption] came about, but not for long in most cases. In particular, significant inroads on bomb makers were few and far between, a major failing.” McKearney (23/11/12) supported this view: “the engineering department was always separate anyway, and was always deep in the South…some of them were in prison for a considerable number of years in the Republic and it still didn’t undermine the IRAs ability to train people in the use of weapons and explosives.” Officer A (21/02/13) agreed “that the real ‘super duper’ engineers were kept South.” Patterson (2013) noted that the advances in the PIRA engineering department also de facto allowed for a degree of substitution and quoted a former RUC Special Branch Officer who noted “a big investment was made by the IRA so as not to have a shooting war…you could avoid confrontations with the British army if you used remotely-controlled bombs, land mines, and sophisticated booby-trap devices” (p. 188). It is demonstrated by this study however that Tyrone PIRA still predominantly maintained a doctrine based on ‘a shooting war.’ Had they concentrated more on using remotely controlled and initiated improvised-explosive-devices (IEDs) as they had at the Ballygawley bus bombing in 1988 they would arguably not have exposed their ASUs to the high level of TK attrition described herein.
But an area where a disruption effect was discernible was on PIRA arms dumps which was witnessed on 9 October 1990 when two PIRA members were killed in an incident that is not one of the specific seven Incidents of the three Clusters under review. Both were shot while retrieving weapons from an arms cache in a mushroom shed near Loughgall that was under SAS surveillance (Appendix D-Ser; 35-36). One of the men, Martin McCaughey, was a former Sinn Féin councillor who “had several gunshot wounds from a shoot-out with undercover soldiers in Cappagh, County Tyrone, earlier in the year” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1211). While McCaughey had definitely not been deterred despite being previously seriously wounded, the circumstances of their deaths whereby they were killed while retrieving weapons had a resonance with Mr. A. He noted when asked whether TKs or surveillance was more effective against PIRA;

“It’s a mixture, probably side with the surveillance one or touts. It just got impossible. If you had an arms dump somewhere you know, there was arms dumps left, people never went back to them because they had been caught like – watched like…if ya went near them the SAS would a shot ya. You couldn’t go near it…you wouldn’t have known for sure” [if the arms hide was under surveillance and/or electronically bugged].

Therefore at this stage of the conflict ASU members could not be certain that many of their arms dumps had not been compromised. TKs were therefore having a disruption effect in the sense that these ASUs did not always feel that they had freedom of access to their weaponry due to perceived fear that these arms dumps were not secure from security force surveillance. Brims (06/11/12) noted how arrests played into this. “If a person [who was arrested and imprisoned] knew for example where certain arms dumps were, they would be very cautious; QMs were key people.”

On volunteers lost in TKs, McKearney (23/11/12) said “their leadership ability was possibly of greater value to the IRA than their technical ability…its relatively easy to train men in the use of weapons…leadership ability was a different thing altogether and that’s a lot harder to replace.” He made the point that PIRA being a revolutionary movement did not have the luxury of established training schools and colleges associated with a regular army “to produce middle management and senior management.” Emerging leaders in PIRA were predicated “on local knowledge and the emergence of people with the ability to lead…but also the fact that local commanders are very often respected within the local community.” Because of this, he posited, aspiring PIRA commanders “had to gain and maintain respect
and that’s not easily replaced.” Officer A (21/02/13) believed that the death of key personnel was “devastating, in my view; that’s what helped bring the ceasefire closer. The key to our success was taking out their best operatives. People like Jim Lynagh, Peter Ryan, Laurence McNally.” Officer A argued that such operatives were ‘killing machines;’ they “were 24/7 IRA men ready to kill” and “the fact that they were stopped and taken out removed the killing machine.”

McKearney (23/11/12) identified, as previously noted by Mallie (13/11/12), that PIRA had developed tiered layers of leadership, precisely to allow individuals to fill a vacuum “a tradition of someone else stepping up to fill the gap, layers of organisation and there is the expectation that you will step up to fill the breach… [But] if nothing else it took longer for him to be embedded into the community.” Officer A (21/02/13) said that the ongoing attrition wore down some potential PIRA leaders who might have stepped into the breech to replace fallen comrades, “it was comical in some cases whereby a certain Brigade [North Armagh] were looking to replace their O/C and he says ‘why the f….k would I do that; everybody that’s gone before me is dead or in jail, why would I do that job.’” In the latter stages of the conflict, he posited, “they did have a difficulty in securing successful operations. They made mistakes, we made mistakes, it’s just how you deal with your mistakes and how to capitalise on them.” Therefore the evidence suggests that, on balance, TKs did have a degree of disruption effect, a finding that is reinforced by the research of David (2007) and Byman (2006).

**Diminishing Capacity**

McKittrick (13/11/12) posited that “the one [TK] that did have an effect, as I see it was Clonoe. Again, maybe with the ceasefires coming up, it didn’t come back after that; you can check *Lost Lives* [1999]. It didn’t get back after the Clonoe one. The Clonoe one, it didn’t look like the A team, like the Loughgall one did. They were generally younger.” Mr. A (31/07/13) acknowledged “there wasn’t much happening in the area after that. That was the British policy, take them out and hit them where it hurts.” So too Brims (06/11/12):

“I think by then most of the real hard core, hard nuts, their time has gone, they’re dead or a lot of them get killed by their own people…you get to the stage where by 1991 people were getting pissed off with this…they’re also getting increasingly paranoid about their security. There are still some hardened experienced ones, but they are still trying to find clean skins, who are inevitably very inexperienced because there is nothing on them. Therefore he [the average volunteer] is by definition very inexperienced; therefore it is a consequence of all those things happening at the same time. And the
number of incidents has dropped off dramatically... less people are going to get hurt, that’s what happening.”

Mr. A believed that again the role of surveillance and its translation into TKs was having an erosive effect on Tyrone PIRAs capacity. “If they knew who the main players were it was going to lead them to the rest of them anyway... If you watch one it will take you to the rest... If you watch the main operator it will lead you to the rest of the pack” (31/07/13). Officer A (21/02/13) supported this view: “they have their level of professionalism, what they lost was their effectiveness to operate efficiently, because if you cannot operate securely, you’re not efficient.” Those killed at Clonoe displayed no tactical acumen in the manner in which they carried out the attack. It is suggested that this reflects the fact that TKs were having a cumulative effect in removing experienced militants and commanders whose replacements were lacking in the same tactical nous. This brings into focus the issue as to whether TKs as they evolved and developed deprived militants of valued key commanders?

**Removal of Valued Key Commanders**

Morrison (03/03/09) argued that the effect of TKs were sometimes counter to what was initially intended. “In some cases where they removed a leader, the leader that has inherited the mantle has been far superior to the one that went before. It can be a double-edged sword”. He viewed the disruption effect as limited in time and space, “all it did was slow the organisation down for a while, because the issues at the heart of the conflict is [sic] political and until they are addressed, you were still going to get recruits.” Cochrane (2013) argues that it was good fortune for the republican leadership that the British “opted for a strategy of infiltration and management rather than destroying it or the Belfast Agreement of 1998 is unlikely to have occurred” (p. 90). Equally, Edwards (2011) argues that a key lesson for governments and security forces is “don’t kill anybody unless you really have to, especially do not kill the leaders of the militant group” (p. 85). This lends support to the view that in Northern Ireland TKs were used in a nuanced and carefully calibrated fashion and also suggests that TK should not be implemented against those who in the long term may be amenable to entering into political dialogue. It, further, validates the argument of Hearty (2011) that in the case of East Tyrone TKs were used against those who were perceived as being irredentist republican militants.
On the specific question of whether the volunteers killed at Clonoe were lacking in the same degree of tactical acumen and expertise as their predecessors, Mr. A felt that this was not only due to TKs, but ongoing arrest and subsequent convictions of PIRA activists.

“I would agree with you, ‘cos the other ones had been shot dead [in TKs] and other ones had been arrested in ’89; there were four or five ones [PIRA volunteers] had been arrested by the police and they would have been controlling this area and then they were in jail” (31/07/13).

An example of such ongoing arrests and detentions their effects were the life sentences handed down to four members of East Tyrone PIRA for the killing of a UDR reservist on 14 March 1989, one of whom was described as “the officer commanding the IRA in the Dungannon area” (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1166).

**Spooking and Swamping**
A subsidiary effect of both the role of informers and the fear of covert surveillance now begins to impact on PIRA operations, leading to the abandonment of many planned operations due to real or imagined penetration by informers and/or the fear of being under specific surveillance that would thwart the operation and compromise ASU activists. This abandonment of operations due to fear of compromise I have termed ‘spooking’ and have identified as being a key tactic utilised by the security forces that comes increasingly to the fore. Brendan Hughes, a PIRA member, noted the British army intelligence effort in this field had “effectively [brought] the IRA to a standstill where it could move very little” (Taylor, 2001: 302). According to some estimates, “around 85% of IRA operations in the late 1980s were aborted for fear of detection” (Neumann, 2009: 146) due to perceived ‘spooking,’ real or imagined. Increasingly, Jackson (2007) has noted, the security forces to avoid revealing sources or *modus operandi* ‘shaped’ the battlefield so that PIRA operations were frustrated and ultimately aborted. Such ‘frustration’ took many forms; Urban (1992) noted how a fake car accident along a particular route unnerved an ASU caught in the traffic jam that was created “thinking the police were about to arrive” (p. 213). This story when related to Sheridan (15/01/13) had major resonance: “…umpteen examples of that, of how they would have been intercepted, or the operator would have been intercepted, and they wouldn’t know whether it was legit, not legit; nevertheless, it was enough to spook them and thwart the operation.”
Officer A (21/02/13) gave what he considered the perfect example of a ‘spook.’ He related how a fatal road traffic accident had taken place and that PIRA would know that police would attend the scene of the accident. And through intelligence, the type of which he did not describe, that the local PIRA commander gave permission for a spontaneous operation to be implemented against the RUC;

“We heard about this, we had no time to react and all we did was put two choppers in the air going up and down the A4 [road] in south Tyrone. As soon as he heard the choppers he [PIRA Commander] calls everybody ‘return to base, cancelled,’ that’s spooking.”

Dingley (14/09/12) also noted that PIRA oftentimes inputted months of preparation to the targeting for individual operations, “but they suddenly turn up…and the place to be swarming with security forces…then they’re off…then they start a witch-hunt internally and the number of ‘innocent’ members of PIRA who get topped as a result.” Sheridan (15/01/13) too supported this view;

“I think that’s probably accurate and I think it’s more real than imagined, that disruption on them. So I have no doubt it played into their thinking, so if every time you go out the door something is happening that puts you off, it had to be. Because it’s one thing about them, they were meticulous in their planning, so they went through all this meticulous planning and the thing had to be aborted at the last minute; it had to be deeply frustrating…I’d be surprised, people would be disingenuous if they would say that it didn’t impact on them; it would be wishful thinking on their part.”

Mr. A (31/07/13), when asked if the threat of surveillance, real or imagined, created a degree of paranoia within PIRA ranks, responded “It would surely, aye, in the back of your head all of the time…resources, money was needed [for surveillance], money was never a question [for the security forces].”

Before drawing overall conclusions from this chapter based on an analysis of the four pillars of Hafez and Hatfield (2006), two additional issues that in time and space both affect and are related to the use of TKs will be briefly examined. Firstly, the role of external oversight through the guise of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and, secondly, the ramped-up loyalist campaign of killings concurrently taking place within Tyrone in addition to the TKs initiated by the SAS. This is justified for two reasons. I have emphasised before that TKs must be viewed in time and space and equally cannot be examined in a vacuum. The increasing oversight of the ECHR was now beginning to have an impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland. Had TKs continued after the period under review this role would have lead to increased scrutiny from Europe of the tactic outside of the ambit of British domestic
Secondly, as emphasised previously the role of loyalist killings of known republicans in Tyrone must also be seen in context and will be justified later.

**The Role of the ECHR**

It was noted in relation to the Gibraltar incident how the ECHR made an adverse finding against the UK, with Ní Aoláin (2000) observing that although the court recognized the need for states to respond to paramilitary activity “this did not lessen the strict requirements of protection of all citizens” (p. 205). The International Association for Democratic Lawyers (IDAL) had expressed “[how] disquiet had already emerged over a decision of a member state of the EEC to ‘execute suspects’ “rather than hand them over to justice’” (IDAL, September 1988; cited by Hearty, 2011: 54). The findings of the Court in relation to Gibraltar was the genesis for a series of rulings that resulted in requirements for the security forces to put in place measures that ensured that TKs were only a counter-terrorism option and not the option in the Northern Ireland conflict. The UK government were thus obliged to put in place a whole series of measures to ensure that every possible means was taken to ensure that, where possible, terrorists should be arrested. The extent and development of such case law means that the era of TKs witnessed in Tyrone in the 1980s and early 1990s would be highly unlikely to be repeated given the ECHR decisions.

Sheridan (15/01/13) noted that during the incidents of Cluster I the police were effectively operating in a vacuum whereby procedures were only being developed incrementally to deal with terrorism. Officer A (21/02/13) vehemently contested the very notion that a TK policy existed, stating “the only thing I would take great exception to is the term TKs.” He argued that it was exceptionally naïve to believe that in most instances heavily armed and committed PIRA activists could have been apprehended without very serious risk to members of the security forces. “There was never euphoria over deaths, no one sets out and says ‘tonight we’re going to kill A, B, C or D.’” But he, like Sheridan, noted a change and this was human rights law being incorporated into UK law and “that changed everything.” Gibraltar was the first time that an action by the SAS was subject to enquiry by the ECHR and, while the Court “backed the use of the SAS…what they didn’t like was that there was no pre-options around the actual operation…in other words why did it have to end up in Gibraltar.” Both Sheridan (15/01/13) and Officer A (21/02/13) agreed that this began to have an effect on the way such surveillance operations were carried out and that as Officer A (21/02/13) noted it created “a framework of accountability”
The Role of Loyalist Death Squads

This section briefly analyses the role of loyalist paramilitary killings in East Tyrone during this period. While this is not the direct subject of the current research, it is nevertheless an issue that is useful to consider here. This is for two reasons: firstly, this period witnesses the beginnings of a more honed and focused strategy of loyalist initiated killings against known republicans that, secondly, had never emerged previously. There are still a large number of unknowns in relation to loyalist information sources, which allowed them to accurately identify and target known republicans, including potential collusion with state forces, remaining. Because this thesis is on TKs as practiced by state forces it was not possible or practical to pursue this issue in any great detail in the context of this study. This is certainly an area that requires much further research at some future time, but for now I am simply abstracting one or two highlights that are relevant to my considerations here, as these loyalist killings were taking place in the same time and space as the TKs initiated by the security forces.

In Chapter VI it was observed that the loyalist campaign of killing known republicans in Tyrone was becoming a discernible factor during the period under review and that these attacks were based on solid intelligence. Dingley (14/09/12) supported this analysis: “loyalists started to get very accurate information on people in the republican community and started to murder them, in so called ‘Proxies’…The loyalists upped the game, and they became more [ideologically] pure.” He noted that in the early 1990s, “a Special Branch source said they were losing track on who the loyalists were” and the corresponding intelligence picture on them. This ironically was a result of successful security force penetration of loyalists as a result of the Stephens Inquiry that witnessed the decapitation of the older leadership of the UDA, who had been heavily involved in racketeering. Cochrane (2013) has noted that a new, younger, more ruthless, and militant leadership came to the fore who were much more security conscious. He quotes the then second-in-command of the UDA in West Belfast to the effect that “John Stephens did us a favour. He got rid of the touts and the gangsters and we replaced them. We should have put up a mural on the Shankill in John Stephen’s honour”(p. 81). Dingley (14/09/12) also believed that these attacks by loyalists were having a cumulative effect on the Catholic community, what has been termed elsewhere herein as the ‘periphery’: “in the early 1990s, you get the purely sectarian killings…Catholic communities were saying you’re bringing them on us and secondly a lot of the Loyalist targeting became much more accurate.” Hutchinson (25/07/12) contended that it
was because PIRA in Tyrone was considered so effective compared to other centres of PIRA activity that it was specifically targeted by loyalists. “When the UVF took a decision at Brigade level to attack the IRA in East Tyrone, because they felt that they were the people who still did have some people who were skilled and they went out to get them.” Dingley (14/09/12) also noted that not alone were PIRA members being targeted, but “also members of Sinn Féin were being targeted. It was targeted retaliation, sending a very specific message.” Hutchinson (25/07/12), in interview, echoed this view: “At the beginning they [UVF] couldn’t get them [PIRA volunteers], but they attacked their family members, which the IRA must have said…’Jesus, they’re getting closer and closer, they got my brother or my mother,’ it was that sort of stuff, it was this whole notion of terrorising, they started terrorising those people in Tyrone.” Taylor (1997) states that not only did the loyalists hone their tactics and in doing so launched attacks all over the Province, critically he endorses the belief that “Tyrone suffered disproportionally” (p. 311).127

Walsh (24/07/2012), on the other hand, maintained that “the killings by loyalists were [a] massive distraction,” but endorsed the position that the security services and loyalists were colluding in respect of these;

“totally over exaggerated… because if you look at the number of IRA personnel that were killed by loyalists, it is minimal. They killed a handful of IRA volunteers and they caused fear and a whole sense of being under siege within these communities. But they didn’t act as a deterrent to the IRA. In terms of their involvement and control by the British army I think – I have absolutely no doubt about.”

Hutchinson (25/07/12) countered that “there was political thought and military strategy coming from loyalists.” McKearney (23/11/12) also noted how the republican community was in effect being subjected to a two pronged onslaught, “the big thing in Tyrone that I know is however bad the settlement, the war was worse. We had the UVF slaughtering us in our beds, the British armed forces taking out our men.” Taylor (1997) concurred with this view that PIRA in East Tyrone “were being attacked from another front too…the loyalists refined their tactics and began targeting and killing known republicans” (p. 311). Taylor believes that “these lethal attacks on both wings of the republican movement by the SAS and

127 On 29 November 1989, an American PIRA volunteer, Liam Ryan (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1186), was shot dead by loyalists in his pub, the Battery Bar, in Ardboe, East Tyrone, by the shore of Lough Neagh. It is thought that the gunmen made their approach and getaway by boat. On 3 March 1991, in an attack at Boyle’s Bar, Cappagh, three PIRA members (McKittrick et al., 1999: 1227-1229) were killed in the pub car park. “The loyalists paramilitaries kept up their offensive and in the next eighteen months shot dead five members of Sinn Féin” (Taylor, 1997: 311).
loyalist paramilitaries,” as well as what he termed ‘conventional attrition’ by the police and army through the courts, were in his view “an important contributory factor in the IRAs decision to call its ceasefire in 1994” (p. 311).

Edwards (2011) notes that at the end of this period, in 1994, PIRA “undertook a coordinated assassination campaign in which a number of high-profile loyalists were shot dead” (p. 62), this cannot be viewed otherwise than a distraction for PIRA ASUs away from their main effort in targeting members of the security forces. Officer A (21/02/13) believed that to a degree the myth of PIRA invincibility had been “diminished by successful attacks by both SAS and UVF” and that, equally, “you had the families, and this is most important, families of IRA men, sometimes mothers didn’t know their sons were in the IRA, saying ‘this has to stop’” thereby reiterating the view of McKearney (23/11/12) that “if people are going out and they are liable to be killed and the UVF are coming to our homelands and killing us ‘this has to stop.’”

Conclusion
This chapter examined a cluster of two TK incidents that took place between June 1991 and February 1992 initiated against PIRA in East Tyrone at Coagh and Clonoe respectively. An examination of Cluster III utilising the four pillars of Hafez and Hatfield’s (2006) framework resulted in the following conclusions:

First, in relation to deterrence, it remains the case that this cluster like Clusters I and II demonstrated that TKs generated no discernible effect; neither existing volunteers nor potential recruits were deterred. In this, once again, TKs clearly failed.

Second, as to backlash, there remained a strong desire within PIRA to initiate retaliation. Once again this continued to be effectively mitigated by interlocking and mutually supporting measures put in place by the security forces. Consequently, unlike the period examined in Cluster I, during the timeframe of Cluster II and again in Cluster III, PIRA could not initiate backlash immediately or at will. If anything, the desire for backlash seemed even more tempered at this stage by a fear of either real or imagined security force penetration utilising informer-based intelligence and/or covert electronic surveillance. Indeed, the security forces had by this time developed their surveillance technologies to a highly sophisticated level. Allied to this, informers continued to have a detrimental effect within the ranks of the
republican movement. Both of these developments combined to give the security forces deep and accurate insight into many, though not all, pending PIRA operations.

The contemporary scene contained more complexities than TKs alone, of course, so the role of TKs cannot be considered in isolation. Nevertheless, this analysis demonstrates that TKs had some important successes. Ongoing force protection and enhanced and ever evolving Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) reinforced the difficulty for PIRA in recording notable successes against the security forces.

Thirdly, disruption was probably the factor identified by Hafez and Hatfield (2006) that was most influential during this period of time. The analysis of data from this cluster suggests that while PIRA in East Tyrone remained highly motivated and committed to the armed struggle, their competency and skill set as an effective fighting unit was beginning to display a marked decline, which in the case of East Tyrone PIRA as an already comparatively small fighting unit was compounded by suffering more casualties then it was inflicting on the security forces as the period progressed. TKs were a significant factor in the disruption experienced by PIRA during the timeframe involved. Again, TKs cannot be considered in isolation. Loyalist paramilitaries led by the UVF also brought a de facto TK campaign into the republican heartland, utilising accurate intelligence to target both PIRA and Sinn Féin members. Additionally, East Tyrone PIRA continued to suffer ongoing attrition of experienced volunteers through arrests and subsequent court convictions. This, allied to TKs, translated into the corporate memory of their Command and Control (C2) being disrupted, again degrading their effectiveness as a fighting unit.

Finally, as to diminishing capacity, it is under this pillar in particular that the effect of TKs became most discernible. It is demonstrable at Coagh, in particular, the final TK of this study that this ASU was comprised of very young volunteers who simply did not have the tactical acumen or experience that previous ASUs displayed, bearing in mind that these ASUs too were subjected to TKs. Because TKs were being implemented in a discrete and surgical manner, this post-Loughgall generation of volunteers that comprised the ASUs were being aggressively targeted to the extent that they could not gain the requisite experience that might have given them the edge in combat. Parallel to this, an experienced Command and Control hierarchy also suffered ongoing ‘attrition’ due to ongoing arrests and subsequent imprisonment of volunteers. This diminution of the pool of skilled veterans and their
associated leadership ability was extremely problematic for the base of young active
volunteers. Had an experienced leadership been *in situ* it is unlikely that the operation
conducted at Clonoe would have been sanctioned in the form it did.

The analysis contained in this chapter thus builds upon the trend identified in Cluster II and, in fact, is further reinforced by the evidence that East Tyrone PIRA, despite their zealous commitment, was being proactively and aggressively challenged based on highly accurate intelligence, based on both informer and covert intelligence.

While it has been emphasised that TKs cannot be considered in isolation and need to be examined in their specific time and space contexts, it is particularly worth re-emphasising that events under examination were taking place in a very small geographical area as represented by East Tyrone where the security forces were able to dedicate lavishly resourced surveillance assets. These resources were tasked by a finely-honed intelligence gathering system with a deep ‘corporate memory.’ During the timeframe of Cluster III therefore, the security forces were again in a position to nullify any operational pushes that PIRA made. An adjunct of this is that PIRA were aborting some 80% of planned operations, which themselves had involved prolonged and detailed planning and preparation. Increasingly, there was great uncertainly as to the degree of penetration achieved by the security forces that translated into a fear, either real or imagined, that PIRA munitions caches were potentially compromised.

Taking what emerges from this cluster in relation to disruption and diminishing capacity in particular this represented a significant success in policy terms for the security forces and must to a significant degree be attributed to the TK practices of the time.

The ongoing loyalist campaign, spear-headed by the UVF, that first manifested itself in Cluster II also brought a new dimension to the conflict in that loyalists were now striking with accurate intelligence in the republican heartland itself. This affected the ‘periphery’ of the republican *milieu*, the families of the volunteers, and again was a factor in PIRA ending their campaign. PIRA in East Tyrone had not been defeated, but at this juncture they had been aggressively and systematically checkmated. Once again in the words of Silke (07/04/09), it had become a ‘hurting stalemate’ for all sides. Price (2012), writing about the War of Independence and following Civil War in County Mayo in the period 1919-1924,
quotes then TD for South Mayo, William Sears, who noted after years of sustained and bitter conflict that “it is all very well to speak of the flame but the candle must be kept going too.” In Tyrone, arguably the candle could no longer support the flame.

In the next and final chapter of this work, the conclusion, key and salient lessons learned and findings will be presented based on the evidence that has emerged during the study of the three clusters. This will be done utilizing my development and variation of the Hafez and Hatfield framework (2006).
CONCLUSION

Introduction
This thesis has examined the literature pertinent to the “Repression-Rebellion Puzzle,” at the heart of the debate in relation to the use of TKs in counter-terrorism. The literature review of the Israeli case acted as a heuristic device to explore the tactical efficacy of TKs in Northern Ireland, the primary case study contained herein. In Israel both defenders and advocates of targeting concur that it is a divisive policy. There is agreement too amongst analysts of the Israeli case that a TK policy is unlikely to resolve terrorist threats on its own. The same general conclusion was reached by the present author with respect to the use of TKs by the British security forces in Northern Ireland.

Modifying Hafez and Hatfield (2006)
The academic framework developed by Hafez & Hatfield (2006) was adapted for the purposes of this project. While the original analysis had a significant quantitative component, the analysis conducted herein was qualitative, but drawing on Hafez and Hatfield’s ‘pillars’ and with the same research question at the core: Do TKs lessen rates of terrorist violence or intensify anger and increase motivation to attack with more deadly force? Or, put another way, the purpose of this study was to examine the effect TKs had on the capability and motivation of a violent, non-state, terrorist organisation, namely the PIRA, using a qualitative approach with a particular focus on the collection and analysis of interview data from individuals with relevant knowledge from all sides of the conflict. Three Clusters of TKs on PIRA were identified for analysis, incorporated within which were seven clearly identifiable TK Incidents in total. These three Clusters were specifically chosen because they allowed for a study of TKs as pursued by the Northern Ireland security forces over a ten year period thereby allowing for a longitudinal analysis, which has been missing from this research area to-date. While there were commonalities amongst the Clusters, each Cluster also represented a significant shift in security force policy as articulated through the use of TKs.

Chapters V, VI and VII described and analysed the Incidents composing each of the three Clusters, utilising the adapted Hafez & Hatfield (2006) model, while also addressing other issues identified as pertinent in the literature review or by interviewees. While the use of TKs in Northern Ireland remained the core focus of this research, it became apparent as the
project evolved that County Tyrone was the key battleground in which TKs had been utilised. This allowed for an even more focused analysis of the utility of the tactic in a relatively small geographical area as utilised against East Tyrone PIRA. The following ties together the various strands of the analysis, with particular attention paid to the specificities of the Northern Ireland case.

**Overview**

The findings from the interviews in relation to Northern Ireland, where security forces were involved in eliminating known terrorists, raised several issues when analysed in the context of the literature review, which was largely concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian case, as this is the conflict that the vast majority of the research into TKs as a counter-terrorism strategy have been concerned with to-date. While the use of TKs by Britain’s Special Forces in Northern Ireland was significant in producing a military equilibrium, it took place within the context of a wider political and security context. This research illustrates that there was a discernible shift in the empirical patterns of state confrontation with paramilitary actors in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in East Tyrone. These involved real and meaningful changes in the scale of a particular type of confrontation (i.e. TKs) with anti-state actors, which invariably involved the use of lethal force, resulting in the deaths of paramilitaries. These TKs were carried out by various specialist units of the British military, trained to kill, not to wound or incapacitate.

This study has clearly demonstrated that a policy of TKs was specifically implemented in particular against East Tyrone PIRA who were viewed by the security services as hard-line irredentist militant republicans. The policy was designed to negate a series of military pushes by East Tyrone PIRA. TKs were not utilised in other PIRA Brigade areas to the same extent because, in the case of the two urban centres of Derry and Belfast, security force infiltration, especially through the use of informers, was so pervasive as to effectively stymie any PIRA operations in either city without resort to TKs. Additionally, TKs were not, for a variety of reasons, conducive to being utilised in these urban environments, but were more operationally suited for use in rural areas, such as East Tyrone. East Tyrone PIRA, in stark contrast to their colleagues in Derry and Belfast, was growing in strength by the 1980s. A deliberate policy decision appears thus to have been taken “to contain the PIRA insurgency in East Tyrone” (Hearty, 2011: 52).
In the also rural South Armagh Brigade area intelligence insight was limited and therefore TKs, which were always intelligence-led, could not be effectively implemented. Ironically, real security force penetration into South Armagh PIRA only came about in the period between the respective ceasefires of 1994 and 1997. Then the tactics utilised in the arrest and detention of the South Armagh sniper team\textsuperscript{128} was noticeably different to the aggressive tactics of the 1980s and early 1990s in East Tyrone. Moreover, the tactical decision utilised by the SAS in arresting the PIRA sniper team in South Armagh instead of the kinetic option (i.e. TKs) has been attributed to the changed ‘political climate’ of 1996-97 (Kingston, 1999: 414). While South Armagh was ‘remarkably resilient’ (McIntyre, 02/03/09) to penetration, this study has shown that East Tyrone PIRA proved to be remarkably resilient to TKs over a prolonged period. This finding is quite striking; Tyrone PIRA, despite successive waves of TK operations initiated against them, managed to repeatedly reconstitute and regroup as a Brigade. This highlights just how difficult it is to degrade a committed insurgency.

The security forces cumulative attempt to wear down East Tyrone PIRAs military capability was prolonged and lavishly resourced, including establishment and continued support for a sophisticated intelligence-gathering apparatus as an adjunct to exceptionally heavy militarisation of the County with a huge attendant security force footprint. Nevertheless Tyrone PIRA staggered on, even after a series of seemingly knock-out punches. This is even more remarkable given the very small geographical area that County Tyrone encompasses within Northern Ireland, which itself is only the size of the US state of Connecticut. Most observers accept that there were never, in a post-reorganised PIRA (i.e. after 1977), more than fifty active volunteers in the East Tyrone Brigade. This qualification having been made, the security forces as the campaign progressed were also becoming an increasingly ‘fleeting’ target and PIRA was increasingly at the wrong end in what had become a war of attrition. As the conflict moved into the late 1980s East Tyrone PIRA were sustaining more casualties than they were inflicting, which was clearly unsustainable in the long term. As a carefully orchestrated security force policy TKs contributed to the eventual containment of PIRA activity in what was once a hotbed of armed conflict (Hearty, 2011). Tyrone PIRA was, in effect, operating within the constraints of the law of diminishing returns. Indeed the late 1980s in general saw a period of atrophy for PIRA and Sinn Féin. The tactic of TKs demonstrated the ability of the security forces to wipe out whole PIRA ASUs. While the

\textsuperscript{128} The South Armagh Sniper is the generic name given to members of South Armagh PIRA operating as two separate teams who conducted a sniping campaign against the security forces from 1990 to 1997.
supergrass’ trials had collapsed they nonetheless demonstrated the ability of the security forces to totally infiltrate republicanism (Dingley, 2009: 67).

The following sums-up this text’s findings as regards the impact of TKs on PIRA generally, and East Tyrone PIRA in particular, utilising the four pillars of Hafez and Hatfield’s (2006) framework.

**Findings**

*Deterrence*

There is an expectation within counterterrorism that deterrence might be the outcome of TKs; this expectation was not met by this research. Just as in the Israeli case, where a consistent TK policy has been adopted, the analysis contained herein of the more intermittent policy in Northern Ireland showed that escalating costs of repression did not serve as selective disincentives for individual militants. There is little evidence that deaths of PIRA volunteers on active service deterred new and willing recruits. This was consistently borne out in interviews in which PIRA activists were of one voice in stating that TKs had no deterrent effect on them or their comrades. Crucially, security forces interviewees universally concurred with this viewpoint that TKs had little or no discernible effect on PIRA volunteers. Additionally, the funerals of slain volunteers acted as focal points that regenerated militant republican fervour and commitment. It is also clear that this fervent commitment to militant republicanism was imbued in many cases by a family lineage in the armed struggle through previous generations. Bishop and Mallie (1987) note “…it is in the blood. About 80% of the current membership [in 1987] has fathers, uncles and brothers in the movement; Republicanism is a hereditary tradition” (p. 13-14). In effect, there was a tradition of armed struggle within families that motivated recruits to volunteer for active service with PIRA. TKs manifestly failed as an effective deterrent in the face of this commitment.

*Disruption*

With regard to disruption however, this study demonstrates that TKs as implemented in East Tyrone had a gradual cumulative effect on the operational capability and effectiveness of East Tyrone PIRA. While there was never a shortage of new recruits to fill the gaps in the ranks whittled down through attrition by TKs, the new cohort of PIRA volunteers post-Loughgall lacked the combat experience that previous generations of volunteers accrued and demonstrated. So, although not deterred, there was a discernible disruption effect as
demonstrated by the steadily eroding operational effectiveness of East Tyrone PIRA, despite their volunteer’s adapting an almost zealot-like attitude in the face of the severe losses meted out to them.

Effect on the Periphery

While PIRA activists were not deterred and there was a steady stream of recruits, there was however deterrence at another level that I have previously referred to as the ‘periphery.’ In addition to the TKs contained in the three Clusters that were the subject of this research, PIRA and the extended republican family in East Tyrone were from the late 1980s subjected to an increasingly effective and focused onslaught by loyalist paramilitaries acting on very accurate intelligence, whether obtained through collusion or not. In effect, PIRA in Tyrone were fighting a war on two fronts and thus found themselves in an ever tightening pincer movement. This alternative war that the UVF brought to Tyrone was much more than a distraction for PIRA and had an increasingly detrimental effect on the wider republican community. The UVF assassinations together with the security force TKs caused republican families to begin calling for an end to hostilities, as the ‘hurting stalemate’ became too acute for them. Not only were ASUs being aggressively checkmated by the SAS, but the war in the guise of the UVF was now being brought to the very door steps of the republican community. This was an important factor in making a continuation of the PIRA campaign effectively untenable. As Taylor (1997) has noted “After twenty years of ‘war’, it was becoming increasingly clear that a considerable section of the community on which the Provisional’s relied for their support, and whom they had originally come into existence to defend, had had enough” (p. 317). This tipping point of the ‘hurting stalemate’ (Silke, 07/04/09) was reached in the republican communities of Tyrone in the early 1990s, a psychological effect almost akin to war exhaustion.

Impact of Informers

The network of informers and associated security force penetration of PIRA, the scale of which is only now coming to light, was a key related factor in shaping PIRAs decision to abandon violence. It was this penetration through the modus of informers that seems to have had a particularly detrimental effect on militant republicanism, giving the security forces preemptive insight into PIRA operational plans. This allied to the tactic of ‘spooking,’ either real or imagined, and/or ‘swamping’ an area with security forces personnel to deter impending PIRA operations led directly, in the latter stages of the Troubles to PIRA being
forced to abandon as many as eight out of ten planned operations (Neumann, 2009: 146). This was amplified by the fact that, as all those interviewed acknowledged, PIRA dedicated huge amounts of effort to the planning and preparation of operations and the consequent frustration factor that was initiated when such operations were forced to be aborted.

The number of senior republicans who became informers demonstrated that penetration was successful up to and including the highest echelons of PIRA. Such intelligence penetration must have played a crucial role in influencing the direction taken by both PIRA and its political wing Sinn Féin that resulted in the abandonment of violence and a commitment to more peaceful means. This study has also highlighted that despite the almost Orwellian technical surveillance capacity employed by the security forces, their most valuable resource throughout the conflict remained human intelligence, provided from within PIRAs own ranks. Indeed, the logical corollary of this is that the British opted for a strategy of infiltration rather than systematically eliminating PIRA personnel through TKs; in other words, the tactic was used only intermittently and with some precision. Ironically, there is a strong argument that had the tactic been utilised in a more comprehensive and higher tempo manner the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement is unlikely to have occurred. This reinforces the point that TKs were used in a selectively focused and precise manner and not in a ‘blanket’ or ‘scatter-gun’ way. It also demonstrates that, as in the Israeli case, TKs cannot substitute for a political solution. While TKs may, as has been shown herein, contain an insurgent campaign, they cannot address those underlying grievances that originally fomented an insurgency. Indeed TKs cause huge anger within those communities at which they are quite literally targeted and the desire for backlash is therefore inherent within them.

Backlash

There is persuasive anecdotal evidence that TKs can precipitate what appear to be retaliatory actions (i.e. backlash), but that such actions can in turn be frustrated by effective mutually supporting security and defence measures. The ‘backlash’ scenario, whereby it is argued that repression in the form of TKs will result in swift and rapid retaliatory action, was not evidenced in the Israeli case (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006). Equally, in Northern Ireland the desire of PIRA to carry out retaliatory or backlash attacks was always there, but was frustrated by security forces defensive measures. In the cases of both Northern Ireland and
the Israeli-Occupied Territories, it was the multitude of interlocking security measures which consistently frustrated terrorist reprisal attacks.129

Another key influence, a side-effect of this, was identified during the literature review and reinforced by a number of interviewees. This is what one might term a ‘frustration’ effect whereby the members of the PIRA insurgency despite huge planning and preparation were often unable to carry out backlash. Why? Because in the early stages of their campaign PIRA had been able to initiate backlash with relative ease, but as the conflict evolved and developed PIRA was simply unable to maintain the same high tempo of operations. The 1970s witnessed a sustained wave of violence in an increasingly well-orchestrated offensive that caused huge infrastructural damage and large numbers of casualties that no other revolutionary movement in Europe could even hope to match. But as the PIRA campaign morphed and developed, two parallel but related factors come into play that increasingly frustrated this. Firstly, the restructuring to the cell-based ASU system while initially improving internal security could not sustain the same tempo of operations in the long term. This was for the simple reason of less frontline personnel being deployed under the aegis of the ASUs and thus ASUs no longer having the operational ability to initiate immediate backlash. Secondly, British intelligence collection and associated surveillance became allied to increasingly sophisticated and highly coordinated covert operations under the umbrella of the Tasking and Co-ordination Groups (TCGs), which allowed the security forces to engage in increasingly effective counterinsurgency operations against PIRA. A ripple effect of this was that the smaller numbers of activists incorporated within the ASUs ultimately, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, facilitated greater surveillance and hence penetration into PIRA.

**Explanations for Decline in Terrorist Violence: Patience and Decisiveness**

Perhaps instead of focusing on the effects of an offensive based TK policy, an alternative explanation might be predicated on purely defensive measures. In the Northern Ireland case, study of the Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) that were developed by the security forces over the course of the conflict suggest a diminishing opportunity effect, whereby

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129 The ‘target hardening’ of bases against mortar attack, enhanced ballistic protection for both vehicles and personnel. Continuous threat assessment based on a tiered system of linked intelligence and surveillance platforms allied to lavishly resourced air assets. Multiple, mutually supporting patrols. Use of Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) to negate against remotely detonated bombs. See Glossary on Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).
terrorists were frustrated and effectively checkmated by security force counter measures. That the PIRA desire to carry out attacks did not diminish, but the effectiveness of these attacks did was a recurring theme. The British army was constantly honing their TTPs to frustrate PIRA activity. PIRA were not gaining the same ‘kill’ ratio that they had once achieved.

An adjunct of this was that the security forces also came to the realisation that they could dominate the ‘battle-space’ absent constant exposure of their troops. So for PIRA the security forces became a ‘fleeting target.’ The security forces realised that it was to be a ‘Long War’ for them also. This in itself is a key lesson of the troubles in Northern Ireland that has also fallen out of this study: counter-insurgency is not necessarily predicated on ‘decisive’ victories, but on ‘patient’ on-going operations. Effective counter-measures can take years to develop, and while lessons from previous conflicts may be important, it is vital to apply the right lessons, which means that lessons from one conflict may not be transferred wholesale to another.

With regard to implementing lessons learned in respect of a terrorist threat, as a military officer I am well aware that it takes time not only to develop and implement lessons and associated doctrine based on a particularly strategy, but to develop the requisite experience to do so. Much like the long distance runner, unless a military organisation is actively engaged over a prolonged period in such operations, ‘skills-fade’ can set in remarkably quickly. This is why continuity in personnel who have the requisite institutional knowledge is so vitally important. The security forces personnel interviewed for this project, both RUC and British army, constantly alluded to this. They were involved in the Troubles for the long haul, particularly the RUC officers. Even the British army interviewees had served throughout the Troubles in a multitude of appointments at increasingly senior levels; their reservoir of experience was therefore vast. They all had a deep understanding of the problems of being a junior leader and what best doctrine could be applied to particular situations. Equally, like PIRA, they fully realised that the British military had to embrace the concept of being a learning organisation that did not remain static.

The Role of the European Court of Human Rights
Many authors and interviewees alluded to the fact that TKs must be examined within the context of the space and time in which they occur. A key factor that only appeared on the
‘academic radar’ as I journeyed through this project was the incremental but increasing influence that the European Court of Human Rights began to have on the conduct of the Northern Ireland conflict, particularly with respect to TKs. The findings of the McCann case in relation to Gibraltar was the genesis for a series of rulings that resulted in the security forces putting in place measures that ensured that TKs were one counter-terrorism option and not the counter-terrorism option in Ireland; instead the British government was required by the Court to put in place a whole series of checks and balances to ensure that where possible paramilitaries should be arrested. Therefore another finding of this study is that the contemporary extent of such case law, in addition to the controversy surrounding inquests, means that a TK policy as described herein would at this juncture be untenable in a UK context and that in the words of Hearty (2011) “the set-piece killing tactic [TKs] has been consigned to the annals of British counter-insurgency in Ireland” (p. 56).

Diminishing Capacity

What of the expectation of ‘diminishing capacity’ or ‘incapacitation’? Hafez and Hatfield (2006) felt that in the Israeli-Palestinian case a reduction in one violent tactic did not necessarily mean that the overall rate of violence diminished. Additionally, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a substitution effect was initiated whereby terror groups adapted from one tactic to another. For example, when the separation barrier/wall was erected it frustrated the use of suicide bombers, so the Palestinians substituted this method with launching rocket and mortar attacks. This finding of Hafez and Hatfield (2006) was replicated in Northern Ireland where PIRA continually adapted their tactics and weapons technology in a game of wits with the security forces. PIRA was demonstrably a learning organisation, their Engineering Department—largely based in the Irish Republic—was constantly developing new weapons with an R&D capacity that almost resembled a small military contractor for both innovation and production quality. Additionally, within PIRA great care was taken to ensure that skills such as bomb making were well distributed throughout the organisation; attempted inroads by the security forces against this capability was an area where they had little success. In this regard PIRA certainly demonstrated a substitution effect. But equally within East Tyrone PIRA over the period of the three Clusters identified in this thesis with their associated imbedded seven Incidents there was a cumulative effect caused by TKs that witnessed a gradual but incremental decline in the operational efficiency of the Tyrone Brigade despite their absolute commitment never being in doubt.
A displacement effect was not as evident however; an argument that PIRAs UK and European campaigns were evidence of displacement cannot be justified based on the collective views of the interviewees for this study. England had always been a key arena of operations for PIRA, based on the republican belief that a bomb in London was worth a hundred in Belfast; indeed Edwards (2011) has noted “that bombs in England became the powerful signature piece of each new incarnation of militant Irish republicanism over the next [20th] century” (p. 70). Similarly, the PIRA campaign on continental Europe was an extension of the mainland UK theatre of operations and was seen as having a greater impact from a publicity and propaganda perspective.

**Winners and Losers?**

“It is preposterous as the late Joe Cahill claimed to assert that the IRA won the war” (Morgan, 2009: 161); they did not precisely lose it either however. This leads to the paradox that even if the insurgency was arguably losing, this did not mean that the British government was necessarily winning. In other words, containment does not necessarily equate to victory. It was not just the case that operations in mainland UK were PIRA displaying the sting of a dying wasp. On two occasions in 1984 and again in 1991 they came within an ace of killing not only the incumbent Prime Ministers, but almost the entire British cabinet. Indeed, the early 1990s witnessed a cyclical dynamic whereby PIRA, although weakened by informers and often contained, could still launch overseas attacks that often had a strategic influence. The Baltic Exchange bomb in London detonated on 10 April 1992 “caused damage amounting to a staggering £800 million. The British government was worried and by the beginning of 1993 “had embarked upon its own top secret dialogue with the IRA” (Taylor, 1997: 327). This was also the case in respect of, for example, the Canary Wharf bombing of 9 February 1996 that heralded, in the most dramatic fashion, the end of PIRAs first ceasefire. The operation was carried out by a cell of the South Armagh Brigade, whom even at that late stage remained relatively impervious to penetration, thereby making the British mainland still vulnerable to attack. While weakening, therefore, PIRA still had the means to trigger a political crisis and it was therefore only logical that the British government would not only respond to and actively facilitate PIRAs own internal strategic re-evaluation.
A Changed Landscape

Outside influences were a factor post 9/11. A continuation of the campaign was no longer tenable, with both the Clinton Administration and a large part of the Irish American diaspora by that time exceptionally proactively engaged in seeking a peace settlement. The Sinn Féin policy so long based on the twin-track ‘Armalite and Ballot Box’ strategy witnessed a discernible shift from militarism to mainstream politics. PIRA came to the conclusion that the British military apparatus could not be defeated and as Brendan Hughes a senior republican activist noted “there had to be negotiations…[the] only alternative was to carry on a futile war” (Taylor, 2002: 208).

It was clear from the comments of all the interviewees, in respect of the last Cluster in particular, that there was a feeling amongst the protagonists on all sides that an end game in the conflict was being approached from the mid-1980s. This is not fully explored in this thesis, but is clearly important. In the words of Soldier A (07/11/12), “everybody was concerned with the political end game, anybody with any sense at all could see this would end up in a political settlement…you were going to have to talk to people…so I think these were the unwritten rules of the game.” Equally Colbert (24/07/12) observed, “I think there is certain inevitability when you look at any structured guerrilla conflict, the guerrilla movement is there to try and effect political change…it was inevitable that cessation would be getting discussed, it had to come into the agenda.” This brings into focus the key difference between PIRA and the post 9-11 terrorism represented by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Two security force interviewees noted that while PIRA wanted to bomb their way to the table, Jihadists want to blow up the table. Similarly, PIRA activists interviewed consistently made the point that they always wanted to ‘get’ to the negotiation table. The road to that table had many different junctions and signposts, which seem to have been implicitly understood by both sides in the waning years of the conflict.

9/11 and the Sands of Time

The geopolitical reality of the 1990s was very different from that which had pertained in the 1970s or 1980s. The events of 9/11 created a groundswell of opposition to terrorism, even in traditional heartlands of republican support and was yet another contributor to the cessation of PIRAs armed campaign. Neumann (2009) believes that absent the talk’s process, 9/11 would have caused PIRA to follow the same trajectory as ETA, which without any peace
process at all, virtually ceased to exist after 2001. “Even some of the IRAs former ‘hard men’ now admit that, following the 9/11 attacks, for anyone within the republican movement ‘to even advocate armed struggle’ would be inconceivable” (p. 153).

Related to this was that Northern Ireland itself in the 1990s was a markedly different place to what it had been when as a society it spiralled out of control in 1969 with the consequent tragic consequences. Then a key pillar justifying the PIRA campaign was the fact that nationalists as a significant minority felt alienated and prejudiced against within Northern Ireland society. But much of the Civil Rights inequities that had existed had been robustly addressed. Northern Ireland was still torn by a sectarian divide that could still flash with often ugly consequences, but was nonetheless a genuinely more just and equitable society after years of systematic reform implemented across a wide spectrum of local government, human rights and employment legislation. Therefore one of the key underlying rationales that PIRA put forward as a raison d’être for the continuation of the campaign was simply no longer tenable. As McKittrick (13/11/12) noted, “things had changed. You [Northern Ireland] had become a more just society here. Discrimination had practically gone, so the sense of injustice and lack of respect and so on had lessened considerably in the nationalist community.” It was not as enclosed a society as it had once been. Globalisation and its effects could not be checked, as Mallie (13/11/12) noted:

“remember kids were travelling more and more now, the outside world was now becoming the inside world in West Belfast...more and more kids were being educated now, more and more kids were getting out of the ghetto and weren’t coming back into the ghetto to join the IRA, because of the new social awareness and mobility.”

Summing-Up

TKs were not a **decisive** factor in bringing PIRA irrevocably along the road to exclusively peaceful means that saw a new horizon in Northern Ireland with the signing of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (1998); but they were a **factor** and this is indisputable. As utilised in East Tyrone, it seems fair to suggest that TKs significantly eroded East Tyrone PIRA’s operations and ushered-in a series of military onslaughts that ultimately contained East Tyrone PIRA. TKs allied to a parallel onslaught by the UVF had a detrimental effect on the wider republican community in Tyrone to the extent that it was from within the community itself that pressure was brought to bear upon PIRA for an ultimate cessation of hostilities. So while TKs should not be presented as in themselves a proven solution to patterns of political violence, when combined with other factors and if utilised surgically and
in a discrete manner they can be a useful device and therefore as a counterinsurgency tactic, their utility cannot be dismissed. It was a number of developments that allowed the social and political stars to be aligned that made it possible for PIRA to engage in dialogue that would lead to a negotiated political settlement of ‘the Troubles.’

**Wider Relevance of This Study**

The Northern Ireland conflict is now being used as a template for Conflict Resolution elsewhere. That conflict involved TKs which this study has found to be effective in specific contained circumstances. It would be erroneous to claim that what its critics describe as “the dirty war” was solely responsible for achieving the level of peace that now exists, but it did reduce PIRAs military options. Interestingly, Kingston (2007) noted that “one member of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs volunteered…that this [TK] campaign had been critical in bringing the IRA to the negotiating table” (p. 134). In the end, the military stalemate created helped the Adams-McGuinness leadership to sell a political approach to the republican movement. While not having lost the ‘War,’ the republican movement has set out to win the peace; whether it succeeds will fall to political pundits not military analysts to determine. What events in Northern Ireland suggest however is that a renewed focus on resolving the political issues that underline any given insurgent campaign are a better means through which to bring about conflict resolution than TKs.

**Strengths and Weaknesses of this Work**

A source of strength for this research was the relatively long timeframe which was addressed. This correspondingly has allowed for a focused analysis of the specific issue at the heart of this debate. The manner, in which Israeli writings on the use of TKs in the Occupied Territories were used as a heuristic device with the key Northern Ireland case study is another core strength of the work and represented a solid framework for analysis. Stemming from this, the adaptation of Hafez & Hatfield’s (2006) framework and its four incorporated pillars based on a quantitative framework, remodelled to examine this issue through a qualitative lens, has created an alternative academic framework through which other conflicts in which TKs have been or may be implemented can also be examined. Indeed in terms of recommendations for future research, a quantitative study focused on Northern Ireland along the lines of Hafez and Hatfields (2006) original model or an expanded Lafree et al., (2009) would seem to have potential for even deeper comparison and analysis allied with the adapted qualitative lens that this work has focused on Northern Ireland. Equally such a hybrid focus
incorporating both a qualitative and quantitative lens utilising Hafez and Hatfields (2006) four constituent pillars of the Repression/Rebellion puzzle that could then be used to examine an additional case study such as the Basque region in northern Spain; in turn offers a further vein of academic investigation. The range of interviewees from all sides of the conflict, in addition to academics and journalists, lends balance, depth, and credibility to the research. While there were overall some twenty-four interviews this remains a relatively modest number of interviews overall allied to their individual relatively short length in duration. Had time permitted it would have been of benefit to re-interview as many of the subjects as possible with even more focused and honed follow-up questions. It would have been of additional benefit if I had been able to interview not only additional members of the SAS, but particularly members of the ‘Det’ and FRU, but I was unable to secure such access. The men and women who were at the forefront of the covert war remain mostly in the shadows. Conversely, an interview with a PIRA member who, though wounded, survived a TK Incident offered unique insight from an ASU member, the elite Commando units of PIRA, who had also been a young Tyrone republican volunteer who had mustered for PIRA despite being well aware of events at Loughgall, Drumnakilly, and Coagh.

It is interesting that all the security forces interviewees claimed no TK policy existed (either officially or unofficially), all were consistent on this point yet all other interviewees believed otherwise. On the balance of probabilities the indicators are that a TK policy did exist, this however cannot be confirmed in any absolute way, equally it should be noted that this must be seen in light of the fact that in policy terms TKs were consistently disavowed and this is what has made the Northern Ireland case at once unique with and yet different to Israel where a TK policy is openly avowed. Indeed because of this an inherent strength of this work remains the fact that given the nature of the cross-spectrum of the interviewees that most agreed to be interviewed; given even at this remove, barely a generation since the signing of the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement; the sensitivity of the subject, the ongoing polarisation of the population which still leaves often bitter and abiding psychological wounds.

The on-going conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians does not permit for the exploration of all the available data on the cycle of violence in that region. In time, different methods of analysis may well alter the findings of this study. Additionally, it is premature to generalise the findings of TKs without further analysis of the factors that contributed to the
decline in the success rate of Palestinian attacks. It would equally be premature to offer policy recommendations to countries currently fighting insurgencies or a war on terrorism with only one case study of TKs. Also, it has been consistently noted herein how Northern Ireland is a very small geographical area and within it Tyrone is almost a microcosm in comparison with the vast and diverse theatre of operations represented by Afpak.

Looking Forward
This study has highlighted several areas worthy of further research and consideration. I have identified several key themes for future academic research. Firstly, is killing the adversary’s leaders counterproductive, when it results in the elimination of a future negotiating partner who might have advanced the political dialogue within the terrorist group that will ultimately lead to a peace process? From a realist perspective, any decision to kill an enemy’s leader must fully consider their political views and his/her future potential influence. A mastermind behind terrorist attacks may also be a pragmatist capable of making peaceful compromises. Secondly, does targeting terrorists impose unacceptable costs on the ‘targeters’? The claim that targeting terrorists (TKs) does psychological and moral harm to those tasked with carrying it out sets up an interesting and relatively original argument for not employing TKs. In effect, the impact of the Northern Ireland conflict or any conflict cannot be measured in purely statistical terms. Perhaps the deepest impact was indeed psychological and the killing of civilians, members of PIRA and security force members, which is at once both the central differentiation between regular and irregular warfare and became the defining often shocking daily reality of the period, warrants further investigation as to why responses to terrorist attacks often perpetuate cycles of violence. Therefore can an understanding of the psychology of these cycles help to break them and interrupt these cycles?

Another area for further analysis is what motivated people to become active members of PIRA. It is interesting in talking to PIRA members during the course of this work that many of them had a family history and distinct lineage in militant republicanism. A study of the sociological and cultural reasons for successive generations who become involved in insurgencies might offer insight as to how such a chain of involvement might be broken. A final theme worthy of further exploration is whether terrorist targeting is permissible under International Humanitarian Law; allied to this, can terrorist targeting be potentially categorised as a war crime or assassination? Ultimately, which, if any, model of targeting will be acceptable within customary international law will likely not only be an issue of legal
argument, but also one of state practice, and therefore a question of politics and perhaps morality.

**Policy Implications**

In conclusion both of the conflicts discussed within this study are of a sustained ethnic/religious sort that has military dimensions with a civilian casualty component. Additionally, both conflicts were/are played/playing out in a small geographical space. The use of TKs in Northern Ireland and the Occupied Territories cannot therefore be directly compared to Iraq or Afghanistan, which are different types of conflict. But while this work with its central focus on the use of TKs in Northern Ireland is *sui generis* in its own right in that it is a piece of research set in a very specific context, there are some salient policy implications that can be extrapolated that may be applicable not only to the continuing use of TKs in Afghanistan-Pakistan, but more crucially to the ‘War on Terror’ globally, both now and into the future. As it approaches its second decade, the ‘War on Terror’ has produced outcomes that are fundamentally different from those expected. Rapid regime change in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been followed by protracted wars involving heavy military and civilian casualties in which TKs are both a significant and ongoing component. This high tempo use of TKs against insurgent groups has substantial implications for the future. One of the lessons from this research is that TKs initiated against a committed, resolute, dispersed, and ideologically driven insurgency may contain it, but not eradicate or defeat it. TKs allow a degree of time and space that may be used to bring a multitude of other security enablers to bear, allied to a comprehensive approach that addresses the underlying socio-political and economic causes of the conflict. This has to be balanced by the legacy that TKs create in any society, the bitterness it engenders, and the difficulty in re-establishing relationships between conflicting parties as part of any eventual peace process. Equally, as Northern Ireland has shown, this is a protracted process. There can be no quick fixes; an ‘exit strategy’ is just that, it does not mean that the conflict has been resolved.

Meanwhile the use of drones by the US to carry out TKs against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Pakistan border region (i.e. so-called ‘Afpak’) continues unabated amid intense scrutiny of the CIAs covert drone programme. Amnesty International, in conjunction with Human Rights Watch, has demanded that American officials be held responsible for “illegal killings carried out by drones and call for greater transparency over its [US] secret
programme” (Crilly, *The Independent*: 23 October 2013). Amnesty rejected a “global war doctrine” that allows the US to attack al-Qaeda anywhere in the world (Boone, *The Guardian*: 22 October 2013). Bowden notes that while drone strikes are a far cry from the atomic vaporising of entire cities, “the horror of war does not diminish when it is reduced in scale” (*The Atlantic*, September 2013). More recently, in a major policy speech, President Obama defended the use of drone strikes as a ‘just war’ against militants but “waged proportionally, in last resort and in self-defence.” Yet critically he acknowledged that the US was at “a cross-roads” in its fight against militants and that “a perpetual war” involving drone strikes and Special Forces would prove “self-defeating and alter our country in troubling ways” (Carswell, *Irish Times*: 24 May 2013). Drone warfare appears to be here to stay, and it is “likely to expand in the years to come as other countries’ capabilities catch up with those of the US” (Byman, 2013: 32).

The implementation of a policy of TKs whether carried out by Special Forces operatives on the ground or via drones from the air, should not be undertaken lightly in any conflict. What this research highlights however is that it may be a particularly redundant undertaking absent the imposition of a wide range of other measures, particularly if attempted in a conflict that spans a large geographical area. Northern Ireland covers an area of 13,843 km$^2$; East Tyrone composes approximately 1,500 km$^2$ of that area. The eventual containment of East Tyrone PIRA nonetheless took years to achieve, with vast and prolonged expenditure in military resources and associated intelligence assets. This study strongly suggests that in a wider geographic area such as represented by the Afghanistan theatre of operations, a reliance on TKs is unlikely to be successful. Even with NATO’s resources, the same intensity and focus of TKs can never be brought to bear in an area of some 652,230 km$^2$, but the resultant backlash would nevertheless be considerable. Many American officials have always accepted that this ‘war’ is different and must combine a variety of instruments from the military stick to economic aid. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the US was correct in rethinking its entire military strategy. In the past US military posture was based on the Clausewitzian tenet that war was conducted between organised states and recognisable governments. The fact that the US remains arguably the world’s only superpower is irrelevant in the world of al-Qaeda and the new asymmetric warfare that has come to the fore, where TKs have become a key tactical instrument in the arsenal that is now employed against these insurgent groups. Equally for policy makers it is self-defeating to talk of the terrorists in terms as if they were vermin. What they commit is anathema to us, but equally when viewed in a cold abstract light; they
are intelligent, well organised and dedicated. For policymakers to set as an ambition the forcible defeat and eradication of a politically and religiously motivated terrorism is to condemn us to continuing frustration and disappointment, in a constantly evolving and mutating war against an enemy that is dispersed, hidden and driven by an ideology that transcends borders. This has implications on the need to have more solid evidence to base counter-terrorism policies and accordingly how to calibrate long term targeting policies, equally how effective are other instruments linked to a reduction in terrorism and the combination and/or sequence in which such instruments are employed. It therefore remains the case for both researchers and policymakers that the challenge remains unchanged, which is to find out what works and more importantly under which conditions. Hopefully, this work will be a link in that very chain of academic knowledge.

**End State**

Finally then, as a military officer, proud of my own heritage and traditions, I am well aware that in the study of battlegrounds there is no better alternative then ‘walking the ground.’ This summer in the rolling verdant countryside of East Tyrone this is exactly what I did. I paused for thought at Loughgall, Drumnakilly, Coagh, and Clonoe to get a feeling for how the events of this study took place. I was struck not only by the history and heritage of the landscape, but again at how small a geographical space within which the Incidents of the three Clusters took place. It is a land of outstanding natural beauty still haunted by the memory of the many people, be they civilians, PIRA or security forces who died there during the course of the Troubles.
## SECURITY RELATED INCIDENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-1998

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Sources: Complied from [www.cain.ulst.ac.uk](http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk) and UK Defence Statistics 2003.
# DEATHS DUE TO THE SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-1998

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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>452</strong></td>
<td><strong>203</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,329</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,289</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TOTAL EXPLOSIVES PLANTED: 1971-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Explosives planted (lbs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>13,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>67,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>79,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>73,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>24,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix D (Related to Figure 12 and Table 3)

TKs OF PARAMILITARIES BY THE SECURITY FORCES 1982-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fatality</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Sub Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Burns, Sean (PIRA)</td>
<td>Nov 11-1982, One of three Lurgan PIRA men shot by a Special RUC Unit, in alleged Shoot to Kill Incident, which led to what was called the Stalker affair.</td>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>HMSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) McKerr, Gervaase (PIRA)</td>
<td>11 Nov-1982, Ditto</td>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>HMSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Toman, Eugene (PIRA)</td>
<td>11 Nov 1982, Ditto</td>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>HMSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Grew, Seamus (INLA)</td>
<td>12 Dec-1982, killed in the third of a series of so called ‘shoot to kill’ incidents</td>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>HMSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Carroll, Rodney (INLA)</td>
<td>12 Dec-1982, Ditto</td>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>HMSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) McMonagle, Neil (INLA)</td>
<td>02 Feb-1983, shot by an undercover soldier</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>14th Int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) McGirr, Colm (PIRA)</td>
<td>04 Dec-1983, killed after a stake-out of an arms cache</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Campbell, Brian (PIRA)</td>
<td>04 Dec-1983, Ditto</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Martin, Declan (PIRA)</td>
<td>21 Feb-1984, killed in Gun Battle. Member of 14 Int also killed.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>14th Int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Hogan, Henry (PIRA)</td>
<td>21 Feb-1984, Ditto</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>14th Int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Price, William (IRA)</td>
<td>13 July-1984, ambushed after a stake-out of a factory</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) MacGiolla Bhrighde, Antoine (PIRA)</td>
<td>02 Dec-1984, killed while attempting to plant a RSB. One member of SAS killed. Another PIRA member drowned while attempting to escape.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) Fleming, William (PIRA)</td>
<td>06 Dec-1984, killed in grounds of Gransha psychiatric hospital, Derry.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Doherty, Daniel (PIRA)</td>
<td>06 Dec-1984, Ditto</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) Devine, Michael (PIRA)</td>
<td>23 Feb-1985, one of three PIRA members killed by SAS in a counter-ambush at Strabane</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16) Devine, David (PIRA)</td>
<td>23 Feb-1985, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17) Breslin, Charles (PIRA)</td>
<td>23 Feb-1985, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18) Bradley, Francis (Membership of PIRA Disputed). PIRA said he was NOT a member and does NOT appear on Republican Roll of Honor.</td>
<td>18 Feb-1986, killed by a five strong troop of SAS while moving guns for the PIRA.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19) McElwaine, Seamus (PIRA)</td>
<td>26 April-1986, killed while planting landmine, another PIRA member</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatality</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Sub Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20) Arthurs, Declan (PIRA)</td>
<td>08 May-1987, killed at Loughgall.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21) Donnelly, Seamus (PIRA)</td>
<td>08 May-1987, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22) Gormley, Michael (PIRA)</td>
<td>08 May-1987, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23) Kelly, Eugene (PIRA)</td>
<td>08 May-1987, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24) Kelly, Patrick (PIRA)</td>
<td>08 May-1987, killed at Loughgall, IRAs E. Tyrone Bde Comdr.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(25) Lynagh, James (PIRA)</td>
<td>08 May-1987, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26) McKearney, Patrick (PIRA)</td>
<td>08 May-1987, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27) O'Callaghan, Gerard (PIRA)</td>
<td>08 May-1987, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(28) Farrell, Mairead (PIRA)</td>
<td>06 March-1988, killed at Gibraltar.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31) Harte, Gerard (PIRA)</td>
<td>30 Aug-1988, Comdr of Mid-Tyrone PIRA. Killed in a counter-ambush at Drumnakilly.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33) Mullin, Brian (PIRA)</td>
<td>30 Aug-1988. Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(34) Corrigan, Martin (IPLO)</td>
<td>18 April-1990. Only member of IPLO to have been killed while attacking Scty Fces. Reports referred to army patrol, others referred to undercover soldiers.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>NOT Definitive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35) Grew, Desmond (PIRA)</td>
<td>09 Oct-1990, killed near Loughgall.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(36) McCaughey, Martin (PIRA)</td>
<td>09 Oct-1990, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37) Patterson, Alexander (INLA)</td>
<td>12 Nov-1990, alleged to have been a RUC Informer and shot by mistake.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quinn, John (PIRA)</td>
<td>03 March-1991.</td>
<td>UVF</td>
<td>UVF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Donnell, Dwayne (PIRA)</td>
<td>03 March-1991.</td>
<td>UVF</td>
<td>UVF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nugent, Malcolm (PIRA)</td>
<td>03 March-1991.</td>
<td>UVF</td>
<td>UVF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(38) Marks, Colm (PIRA)</td>
<td>10 April-1991, killed in Newry while setting up a mortar attack.</td>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>RUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(39) Ryan, Peter (PIRA)</td>
<td>03 June-1991, ambushed in their car in Coagh, Co. Tyrone</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40) McNally, Lawrence (PIRA)</td>
<td>03 June-1991, Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(41) Doris, Anthony (PIRA)</td>
<td>03 June-1991.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42) O'Donnell, Kevin (PIRA)</td>
<td>16 Feb-1992, Killed at Clonoe, Coalisland, Co. Tyrone in a carefully planned SAS ambush.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(45) Vincent, Daniel (PIRA)</td>
<td>16 Feb-1992. Ditto.</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>SAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PIRA STRUCTURE FROM MOLONEY

General Army Convention (GAC)

IRA Executive

Army Council

Chief of Staff

General Headquarters

Operations QMG Engineering Intelligence Finance Training Security

England Europe Publicity Political

Southern Command Northern Command

Belfast Derry Tyrone / Monaghan North Armagh South Armagh Donegal – Fermanagh Down

Brigade Active Service Units (ASUs)

1st Batt 2nd Batt

ASUs ASUs ASUs ASUs ASUs ASUs ASUs
Trained intelligence officers in each of the Army Battalions serving in Ulster. Some specialised intelligence units were also involved in early agent-running activities. 2 The elite Army surveillance unit was not known as 14 Intelligence Company when it was formed, but this name has become almost universal in the Army. It has also been called the Reconnaissance Force, NITAT (NI) and Int and Sy Group. 3 Research Offices were agent-running units in each of the Army’s three brigade HQs in Northern Ireland. 4 Intelligence and Security Group had also been used as a cover name for the elite surveillance unit alone. From 1982 onwards the difference was that the SAS troop and 14 Company’s three surveillance detachments were under the overall command of a single officer.
DEVELOPMENT, ROLE AND FUNCTION OF STATE COVERT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Military Intelligence
synonyms: Army Intelligence
Military Intelligence is a section within the British Army responsible for gathering analysing, and acting upon information about paramilitary organisations. Military Intelligence was one of a number of agencies operating in Northern Ireland that had an Intelligence remit – others included the Special Branch of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and Security Service (M15). Military Intelligence has been active in Northern Ireland at least since the deployment of British troops on 14 August 1969. However, Military Intelligence would have stepped up its operations following the imposition of ‘Direct Rule’ on 30 March 1972.

The Special Powers Act and more recent Emergency Legislation was used by ordinary soldiers and intelligence officers to screen large numbers of people. This screening process began in the early 1970s and was used as a means of recording basic information including: name, date of birth, address, family members, place of work, distinguishing physical characteristics, photographs, etc. Information was also gathered at static and mobile checkpoints, and through observation at particular locations by soldiers in watchtowers. Military Intelligence also used informers who were active in paramilitary organisations as sources of information. Within Military Intelligence there was a special unit known as Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) (also called Force Research Unit: FRU) which conducted covert operations involving undercover soldiers during the early 1970s. Another role of the MRF (FRU) was to recruit republican and loyalist paramilitary members to work as double-agents for Military Intelligence.

Reading:
Taylor, Peter. (2001) Brits: The War Against the IRA.

Force Research Unit (FRU)
synonyms: Forward Reconnaissance Unit (FRU)
Force Research Unit (FRU) was a special unit of Military (Army) Intelligence that was established in 1980 by Major General Charles Glover at HQNI, Lisburn. The FRU joined 14 Intelligence Company and the SAS in forming the trinity of army undercover operation units in Northern Ireland. FRU was a highly secret unit which sought to identify and recruit members of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups who could be persuaded to work as double agents on behalf of Military Intelligence. In particular it sought to recruit PIRA Quartermasters, so that weapons caches could be bugged through the technology of ‘jarking’ (placing hidden transmitters in weapons). The FRU remained more closely affiliated to the Intelligence Corps of the army then did 14 Int Coy or the SAS. The existence of FRU only became public when Brian Nelson, then a British army agent and an Ulster Defence Association (UDA) intelligence officer, pleaded guilty on 22 January 1992 to conspiracy to murder. This plea prevented any cross-examination of Nelson. Nelson was believed to have been involved in at least fifteen killings, fifteen attempted killings, and sixty-two conspiracies
to kill, during the two years that he was handled by FRU (Taylor, 2001; 294). Republicans claimed that FRU was one of the agencies that had been involved in collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. Their motto was “Fishers of Men” based on their unit logo which displayed St. Peter casting a net.

Reading:
Taylor, P. (2001) Brits: The War Against the IRA.

Mobile Reaction Force (MRF)
synonyms: Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF); Military Reaction Force (MRF)
The Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) was a special unit within Military (Army) Intelligence based at Palace Barracks, Hollywood, County Down. The unit was probably set up during the summer of 1971. The unit mainly conducted undercover (plain clothes) operations. It is believed that soldiers from elite regiments, including the Special Air Service (SAS), were members of the MRF. The unit was involved in a number of controversial incidents where Catholic civilians were killed. During 1972 undercover soldiers were operating in west Belfast using techniques that appeared to have based on ‘counter gangs’ (Kitson, 1960). A former member of MRF described the role of the unit as both ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ (Taylor, 2001; p129). The ‘defensive’ operations were intended to try to prevent PIRA from carrying out attacks. The ‘offensive’ operations appeared to be wide ranging. For example, on 12 May 1972 an MRF unit approached a checkpoint being operated by the Catholic Ex-Servicemen’s Association (CESA) which was checking cars entering the Andersonstown area. The MRF car stopped and then reversed a short distance. One of the soldiers opened fire from the car with a Thompson sub-machine gun [at the time this was a weapon usually associated with the IRA] and killed Patrick McVeigh (44), a Catholic civilian, and wounded four other Catholic men. None of the men who were shot were armed and none of the soldiers were ever prosecuted. In another MRF operation on 22 June 1972 an MRF unit opened fire with a Thompson sub-machine gun on a group of Catholic men standing at a bus terminal in the Glen Road in Andersonstown, west Belfast. Four Catholic civilians were injured. Some of the operations of MRF were unusual. During the early 1970s the unit set up the Four Square Laundry in Belfast which offered a cheap cleaning service but was intended to collect information about PIRA activities in west Belfast. Clothes sent for cleaning were routinely checked for traces of explosives or lead residues from bullets. PIRA subsequently found out about the MRF operation and on 2 October 1972 attacked a laundry van being used to collect and deliver clothes. An undercover British army soldier was shot dead in the attack. The MRF was disbanded in 1973. Within a year the new surveillance unit had emerged, later known as the 14 Intelligence Company.

Reading:
Taylor, P. (2001) Brits: The War Against the IRA.

A key understanding to the evolution and development of British army undercover units operation in Northern Ireland is that they have consciously gone under a bewildering number of names to cause deliberate confusion and disguise the destination of soldiers transferred to such units. However, the three-tier system of military undercover units put in place in 1977 remained the operational model for the next twenty years. A specialised surveillance force, known as 14 Intelligence Company, was set up for the purpose of covert observation from fixed positions and unmarked cars, in addition to specialising in Methods of Entry (MOE) to plant electronic listening and surveillance devices. In addition Close Observation Platoons
(COPs) were recruited from resident Army Battalions in the North to collect basic intelligence information. Finally, the SAS had the function of setting up operations, particularly ambushes, designed to disrupt the activities of PIRA active-service units (Ellison & Smith, 2000: 106). This triad of units is now discussed in brief, followed by a short explanation of another agency, the Intelligence & Security Group formed in 1980/81, to coordinate the activities of the SAS and the ‘Det.’

14 Intelligence Company (The ‘Det.’)
This surveillance unit has used a variety of cover names. Each name was chosen to sound akin to another army unit which carried out more mundane work, but is best known as the title adopted in the early 1980s, namely 14 Intelligence and Security Company (14 ISC); 14 Coy or simply 14 Int and the ‘Det.’

14 Intelligence Company was a special unit of the British army. The unit was formed in 1973 and its role was to provide surveillance in parts of Northern Ireland where regular British army and police units had difficulty operating. Its members were known as ‘operators’ who were drawn from a number of intelligence agencies and the Special Air Service (SAS). 14 Intelligence Company operations were based on ‘Detachments’ (Det) to each of the British army’s three Brigades in Northern Ireland. Hence its most common acronym was the ‘Det.’

The unit played a huge part in the war of attrition against PIRA, including the bugging or ‘jarking’ of terrorist weapons and specialising in breaking into premises undetected to plant technical devices or ‘bugs’ for the Security Service, MI5. In response to an ever increasing number of well planned PIRA operations, soldiers volunteering for duty with the unit received training from the SAS in order to prepare them for operations in extreme hostile territory in Northern Ireland such as South Armagh. To some extent the personnel were interchangeable, SAS ‘Troopers’ joined 14 Intelligence Company and ‘Det’ Operators joined the SAS. Taylor also believes that the introduction of women had transformed it, giving its operators greater flexibility and cover thereby making the ‘Det’ “a highly experienced, highly trained and effective counter-terrorist force” (p. 254). Allison (2009) notes how many operations were mounted in areas thought to contain ‘hides’ or against known bomb makers. The technology utilised became increasingly sophisticated and advanced. Wireless covert camera ‘fits’ eliminating the need for an operator to remain in situ were developed. Maximum use was made of existing objects around a target, e.g. where a rock or piece of wood in the vicinity of a target would be secretly filmed and precisely measured, so that an exact mock up replacement could be created with a hidden camera. In other cases unattended ground sensors (UGS) would be hidden in the vicinity of a firing point to provide early warning of movement (p. 115-116). See also Scty & Intelligence Group.

Reading:
Taylor, Peter. (2001), Brits: The War Against the IRA.

Close Observation Platoon (COP)
Maj. Gen. Dick Trant, appointed Commander Land Forces in 1977, was the driving force behind a large expansion of army surveillance resources. He introduced Close Observation Platoons, units of thirty in each Infantry Battalion. The COPs as they became known would take the best soldiers from each Battalion and were given expert training in covert observation techniques. COPs were to become important in establishing the regular patterns of activity among ASUs and movements of key republicans. Although 14 Intelligence Company or SAS operators were brought in when there was ‘hard intelligence’ of a
forthcoming PIRA operation, the COPs often provided the basic date about an area and PIRA activities therein. Many COP trained soldiers subsequently joined the SAS. The COP’s unlike the ‘Det’ or the FRU were covert observation units, not undercover units per se like the latter. In effect they were the reconstituted Reconnaissance Platoons of the Battalions that had always existed in the conventional military role, but remodelled to the counterinsurgency specific to Northern Ireland.

Reading:
(Urban, 1992: 45; Harnden, 1999: 123)

Special Air Service (SAS)
The SAS are the elite Special Operations unit of the BA, originally formed by Captain David Sterling in the North African Campaign of WWII. Their primary role in conventional military operations is to operate deep behind enemy lines in both a reconnaissance and “hit-and-run” mode. It was in Northern Ireland that they developed in particular their subsidiary role as an anti-terrorist unit. They were initially posted there in 1969 and again in 1974, but in 1976 after a republican attack at Bessbrook, in which five civilians were killed they were specifically deployed thereafter to augment and reinforce the Regular army. Their home base is in Hereford, UK. Organisationally the SAS is divided into three Regiment, one Regular and two Territorial (Reserve) Army, and each Regiment in turn is subdivided into Squadrons, - A, B, D and G (Guards). SAS soldiers are referred to as Troopers. Initially heavily involved in surveillance work in Northern Ireland, from the 1980s this role had declined as other specialist surveillance and firearms units in the army and RUC were developed for this role (Annex ‘F’).

The Intelligence and Security Group (Northern Ireland)
Synonyms: The ‘Group.’

The early 1980s saw a reassessment of the footprint of the SAS based on operational needs globally and rotation of personnel in Northern Ireland. As a result of this a new structure was created to act as the executive arm of Army intelligence in Northern Ireland. The new operations group took the deliberately confusing name of The Intelligence & Security Group, which had already been used by 14 Intelligence Company. With the formation of the ‘Group’ the number of SAS personnel was reduced, and the remaining SAS reinforced troop of some twenty personnel now did an extended tour of one year thereby allowing greater continuity in Northern Ireland, and the SAS and 14 Intelligence Company were effectively merged under a single commanding officer. This allowed increased flexibility whereby the three surveillance ‘De’s of 14 Int and the SAS detachment could be tasked together or separately depending on the operational requirement. The ‘Group’ as it now became known and other RUC special units were to be integrated by the Special Branch’s three Tasking and Co-ordination Groups (TCG) headquarters for any planned operations. Hence as Taylor (2001) states the SAS were no longer permanently co-located in the three ‘Det’ areas but based at Aldergrove as a resource that the TCGs could draw on and ‘task-org’ as and when necessary, in other words the TCGs had the delegated authority to both task and deploy units as seen fit. “The SAS was not only centralised but its soldiers were stationed in the Province for twelve-month tours instead of six” (p. 254). Their role thereafter was invariably as the kinetic force to act on detailed and specific intelligence of forthcoming PIRA operations, and as a specific foil to the PIRA ASUs.
Special Branch (E4) and Affiliated Units

synonyms: Headquarters Mobile Support Units (HMSU)

The Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU) was a uniformed elite within the RUC part of RUC Special Branch. The police gateway to active counter insurgency found its inception in the centralisation of intelligence in the RUC Special Branch from 1977 onwards. Under the tutelage of Chief Constable Newman, who was determined to professionalize the RUC, a key element of which was symbolised by two related elements in the intelligence field; first the expansion of the RUCs Special Branch to deal with intelligence gathering and surveillance, and second, the formation of the Bessbrook Support Unit (BSU), the forerunner of the HMSU, an undercover unit numbering twenty-eight SAS trained RUC officers who were deployed along the South Armagh border to interdict PIRA ASUs, and were part of a scaling up of the RUCs resources and capabilities under Newman’s tutelage to ‘Ulsterise’ as far as possible the maintenance of security.

The BSU were replaced in 1979 by the Special Patrol Group (SPG), the nascent RUC mobile anti-terrorist unit. Nested within the SPG was the Bronze Section, a firearms and observation unit, selected for special training in undercover operations, combining observation and disruption activities. The unit seems to have been modelled on the MRF introduced by Brigadier Kitson, and enjoyed a similar lack of success.

Incrementally the policy of specialisation was pursued within the RUC, subsequently, the RUC followed the lead of the British army and in recognising that SPG/Bronze Section had performed to wide a function senior RUC Officers decided to further separate and delineate separate intelligence gathering and operational units. Increased RUC control over intelligence sources led to the development of further specialised units within the police apparatus

In early 1981, parallel to the disbandment of the SPG/Bronze Section, the new Chief Constable Jack Hermon established a new hierarchy of Mobile Support Units (MSUs). This was largely a presentational change carried out to overcome the negative public perception of the SPG. These MSUs were differentiated as follows. Divisional Mobile Support Units (DMSUs) were established under the control of each of the respective 12 Divisional Command areas of the RUC, the DMSUs were conceived as Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or reserve mobile designed to act in a fire brigade role for handling incidents such as widespread public disorder and were intended to provide flash-point support when the ‘ordinary’ police were unable to cope.

The SPG itself was concurrently replaced in 1981 by the Special Support Unit (SSU) and was subsequently renamed The Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU) and conversely came under the direct command of RUC Special Branch. They were put under the control of E Department as the revamped Special Branch (SB) was now known which was itself subdivided into five sections.130 The Operations section was E4, which comprised four sub-units, but the two key sub-units were E4A and E4B. E4A carried out surveillance in plain clothes, similar to the army’s 14th Intelligence Company (The ‘Det’), and were to specialise in technical surveillance and consequently this SB surveillance unit developed close contacts

130 ‘E’ Department was divided into five sections; RUC E1 – administration; RUC E2 – legal affairs; RUC E3 – intelligence; RUC E4 – operations; RUC E5 – military liaison (Ellison & Smith, 2000: 194; Urban, 1992: 94).
with MI5, but pre-mediated confrontations with terrorists were not part of E4As brief. E4B was the operational unit involved in ambushes and executive action, in addition to acting on information relating to suspected paramilitary activity, and worked closely and in collaboration with its sister unit E4A, the plain-clothes covert intelligence gathering unit. HMSU and E4B are therefore in effect one and the same. Urban (1992) states that E4B was involved in technical surveillance, installing bugging and tracking equipment (p. 94), but my research suggests that in 1982 it was the executive arm. E4C and E4D are believed to have been involved in specialist photographic surveillance. Many journalists and authors have stated incorrectly that E4A was the executive arm, this was not the case, again like the ‘Det’ their primary function was covert surveillance. Consequently, in the 1982 incidents of the Stalker Affair many analysts incorrectly state that E4A was responsible for the shootings. Overall HMSU/E4B set higher standards in training then its predecessor the SPG/Bronze Section. They were SAS trained, with an emphasis on firearms training and reactive responses to situations of threat. Whereas DMSU members were giving training by the Regular army, only E4B/HMSU sent men in any numbers to be trained by the SAS, in effect making E4B/HMSU an elite ‘reserve’ for the RUC Special Branch. Many of those who had been in Bronze Section were apparently drafted into E4B. So in summary SPG/Bronze Section became the SSU, who in turn became the HMSU/E4B, a uniformed QRF that could back-up the plain clothes E4A.

Following the 1982 shootings, the role of the HMSU was reined back. Subsequently the RUC would play a supporting role in such operations, but the active role in intelligence led covert ambushes was returned to the British army, in particular the SAS and similarly trained army units, though under police operational control. After 1982 the HMSU continued to take part in ‘rapid reaction duties’, including raids on suspected terrorist properties and spearheading riot control and remained throughout the 1980s and 1990s as an operational Special Branch department of E4. In this time the unit traced and arrested several PIRA members in Northern Ireland.

Hence Special Branch had the inherent ability to mount its own operations or do everything ‘in-house’ and this led to the criticism that it was a ‘force within a force’ but it also meant that intelligence was kept compartmentalised thereby avoiding leaks and potentially compromising planned operations.

**Reading:**

**The Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG)**
Urban (1992) states that the setting up of the TCGs was probably the most important of all the steps taken during the late 1970s towards enhanced intelligence gathering. The Tasking & Co-ordination Group (TCG) was a permanent Special Branch (SB) command and formed part of the Special Branch regional structure. The focus of the TCG was the exploitation of intelligence to frustrate terrorist groups. They brought together the RUC Special Branch intelligence and operational resources from the RUC and army to mount counter-terrorism operations. This included, for example, exploiting intelligence by means of covert surveillance or the use of overt army or police units.

The TCG received information from all three organisations involved in intelligence gathering in Northern Ireland and from a variety of technical sources. They made decisions on the
prioritisation of covert sources to exploit intelligence and the manner in which such resources would be deployed. Unlike the other relevant bodies, which kept minutes of meetings and deliberations, statements to the Stephens Investigation by officers working in the TCG suggested that their records were generally destroyed after a short time. The first TCG was created in 1978 at Castlederg to serve Belfast Region. It was followed in 1979 by one at Gough Barracks (Mahon Road, Armagh) to serve South Region, and later by another at Derry (Ballykelly) for North Region. These centres at Castlederg, Gough and Ballykelly were normally known as TCG Belfast, TCG South and TCG North respectively. You had all the different Special Branch Officers feeding intelligence into their respective region. Associated with the region is the TCG, which had at its disposal E4A, HMSU (E4B), the resident SAS Troop, regular army COP Platoons and the ‘Det.’ The TCG had full control in relation to tasking and delegation. The TCG controlled any planned operations and allocated resources as seen fit.

Reading:
Urban (1992: 95)
HAFEZ AND HATFIELD (2006)

THE FOUR PILLARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Extrapolation / Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Node 1</td>
<td><em>The importance of the utility being maximised</em></td>
<td>Rational actors subject to a set of constraints will calculate costs and benefits of different course of action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 2</td>
<td><em>The probability of group success</em></td>
<td>If repression decreases the likelihood of group success it will deter others from participating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 3</td>
<td><em>The extent that the repression decreases the likelihood of group success.</em></td>
<td>Violence may diminish as groups adapt to a more fruitful strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 4</td>
<td><em>Diminishes the ability of individuals to truly make a difference.</em></td>
<td>Adaptation, may not be immediate due to a learning curve, but violence should decrease in due course.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DETERRENCE: What ‘nodes’ increases the contenders cost of collective action and serves a selective disincentive to engage in high risk activism. What are the cost benefit analysis from an insurgent / terrorist perspective will be predicated upon.

Deterrence models generally assume that human beings are rational, self interested actors who seek to minimise personal cost while maximising personal gain. An important implication of such perspectives is that individual behaviour can be altered by the threat and imposition of punishment. Deterrence models seem to be especially appropriate for understanding terrorist violence, given that many terrorists attacks are carefully planned and seem to include at least some consideration for risks and rewards. Indeed, deterrence based thinking has dominated counterterrorist policies in most countries since the origins of modern terrorism in the late 1960s. The deterrence perspective suggests that individuals commit a given act when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Therefore in the case of TKs or threat of same what are possible Deterrence nodes and corresponding indications of same? Do the targeting authorities target only leaders and core activists, or were supporters, sympathisers also targeted. Therefore did selective repression against only core leaders and militants deter potential recruits? How consistent was the implementation of TK as a deterrence policy seen, did the militant groups correspondingly substitute violence for non violent tactics to avoid the threat of further TKs (substitution and displacement). Other examples of a deterrent activity and its extrapolations and indicators are shown in the table below.
Node 5 | The probability of success will be negligible. | Selective repression against core militants signals to potential recruits that only ‘troublemakers’ will be punished.

Node 6 | Are only leaders and core activists targeted within the dissident movement. | Correspondingly, are supporters, sympathisers or anyone even suspected of involvement within the militant group.

**PILLAR 1 - DETERRENCE, SUMMARY.**

Under these circumstances, supporters and sympathizers may be inclined towards greater risk to mitigate their losses, seek security in militant groups, or inflict revenge.

**BACKLASH: Pre-existing and mobilised organisations facing extreme coercion will fight back with greater levels of violence.**

In the Northern Ireland case, the backlash hypothesis predicts that TKs will produce an escalation in violence. Researchers (Altran, 2003; Crenshaw, 2002; Higson-Smith, 2002) have long argued that terrorists frequently rely on the response of the government to mobilise the sympathy of would-be supporters. Sharp (1973) refers to this phenomena as ‘*jujitsu politic*.’ Were key leaders and militants able to institute greater personal precautions to minimise the risk of future TKs. Were pre-existing and mobilised terrorist elements able to frame the effect of TKs as treacherous and illegitimate that demanded a commensurate response. In particular were the funerals of killed militants used as a ‘war drum’ to heighten popular passion for the movement and increase the desire for revenge. Did a tight-knit group such as PIRA in the face of TKs seek to maintain the internal cohesion of their militant organisation by satisfying their cadres’ need to exhibit ongoing defiance in the face of perceived oppression? For the republican *milieu* perceived to be threatened by the use or threat of TKs did this translate into a determination to increase internal cohesion. Did TKs in fact embolden those already participating in an active campaign and encourage others to join. Other possible examples and indicators of a backlash activity and its extrapolations are shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Extrapolation / Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Node 1</td>
<td>Massive, swift and expanding mobilisation.</td>
<td>Publicity transmits info on repressive measures to a wider public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 2</td>
<td>Repression acts as focal points of resistance</td>
<td>There is continuity in leadership or new leadership emerges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 3</td>
<td>Dissidents can offer adaptive strategies that reduce the risk similar repression in the future.</td>
<td>Take more personal precautions. Frame TKs as treacherous / illegitimate that demands a commensurate response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 4</td>
<td>Tight-knit groups will seek to maintain internal cohesion.</td>
<td>Must satisfy the needs &amp; expectations of the group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**PILLAR 2 – BACKLASH, SUMMARY.**

TKs may produce a surge in violence and foster conditions that permit for the future recruitment of terrorists.

**DISRUPTION: Grievances alone are insufficient to produce & maintain rebellious collective action, group’s requirement of material resources and the organisation capabilities to organise and mobilise aggrieved people.**

Disruption suggest that due to both the effect of TKs and the ongoing threat of same, that militants particularly key commanders, rather then spend their dedicated time recruiting, planning and implementation of operations, they instead spend their resources on constantly shifting and rearranging their own personal security arrangements and cannot fully focus on their primary role. Removal of veterans with their operational experience and institutional memory will ultimately cause a gradual decline in both the quality and frequency of operations that are mounted. The cumulative effect over time is to reduce violence, again lowering the quality and success rate for same. Hence in the case of PIRA after incidents of TKs where key experienced militants were eliminated, even if a new cadre were not deterred from filling the ranks, did their lack of operational experience lead to a diminishing in the quality and success ratio of attacks. Again in the Northern Ireland case were PIRA operations abandoned due to specific feared threat of TKs and/or a pervasive belief of being under constant surveillance, perhaps accentuated by indefinable fear of compromise by unidentified informers within their ranks. Other possible indicators of deterrence are shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Node 1</td>
<td><em>Disrupt ability to mobilise collective action.</em></td>
<td>Disrupt coordination and comms networks, thus making it more difficult for militants to mobilise followings an incident of TK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 2</td>
<td><em>Militant groups suffer the loss of experience cadres and Comdrs.</em></td>
<td>Allocate precious resources to secure the remaining leadership from TKs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 3</td>
<td><em>Fear of surveillance leads to msns aborted</em></td>
<td>Securing safe houses. Alternating vehicles. Developing comms methods to avoid detection and surveillance. Restructuring &amp; reconstituting cells that have been disrupted by TKs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 4</td>
<td><em>Removal of ‘key’ Comdrs who have the ‘cognitive load’ for organising Ops.</em></td>
<td>Removal of experienced veterans being replaced by less experienced operatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PILLAR 3 – DISRUPTION, SUMMARY**

Is the cumulative effect over time to reduce levels of violence or, at a minimum, lower the quality and success rate of violent operations against targets designated by the insurgents / terrorists.
**DIMINISHING CAPACITY:** TKs by themselves do not diminish violence because of substitution / displacement / adaptation.

As long as counterterrorism policies do not address the resource endowments of terror groups, terrorists will adapt to repression policies such as TKs by substitution tactics to relatively less costly methods. In the case of Northern Ireland did the use of TKs lead the PIRA to adaptation and substitution, whereby their tactics were altered to carry out more attacks in the long term using different delivery means and technology. Equally did TKs against ASUs deprive them of such an ability to reconstitute effectively and diminish their capacity and effectiveness of same to attack in the future. Did the abandonment of operations due to fear of compromise and surveillance cause friction/frustration within the cadre’s of PIRA. These and other possible factors are shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Node 1</td>
<td><em>Were resource endowments of terrorists gps addressed?</em></td>
<td>Interdiction of arms supplies and arms caches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 2</td>
<td><em>The ability to organise collective violence by depriving them of prerequisite resources and org structure for violence.</em></td>
<td>Infiltration of cells by agents or being compromised by informers within.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 3</td>
<td><em>Substitution Effect</em></td>
<td>TK when not combined with reducing resource endowment will result in adaptation e.g. from suicide bombs to RSBs and/or rocket attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 4</td>
<td><em>Deprivation of ability to reconstitute</em></td>
<td>Arresting suspected militants. ‘Supergrass’ trials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node 5</td>
<td><em>Diminish capacity to attack in the future</em></td>
<td>Elimination of smuggling routes. Frustration of attacks leading them to be aborted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PILLAR 4 – DIMINISHING CAPACITY, SUMMARY.**

Can TKs combined with other mutually reinforcing and interlocking security measures possibly deprive terror cells of their ability to reconstitute and diminish capacity to attack in the future.
Appendix I

QUESTIONS FOR-semi-structured interview

Q.1 What was your experience of the conflict.

Q.2 The PIRA campaign was prolonged and active. One of the defining moments of the campaign was the so called “shoot to kill” policy in 1982, which was subsequently investigated by John Stalker. What effect in general terms did this policy (TKs) have on militant republicanism on the struggle from their perceived viewpoint.

Q.3 Were the killings of the Shoot-to-kill period part of a TK policy or were they reactive to IRA/INLA operations. In other words, revenge attacks on the part of the Security Forces.

Q.4 Did the period 1984 to 1994 offer examples of discernible patterns where it appeared that republican activists were being deliberately and systematically targeted according to a pattern.

Q.5 Did these killings/TKs in your view deter existing members of ASUs (Active Service Units) from continuing campaign or did it have a negative effect on recruitment.

Q.6 Did these killings trigger a ‘backlash’ effect within republicanism, in other words the desire to strike back with more deadly force.

Q.7 Did it lead to an increasing tempo and effort by PIRA to carry out ‘revenge’ attacks against members of the security forces.

Q.8 Did the loss of experienced members, who had specific skills as member of ASUs be it assassination or bomb making, also their leadership abilities to motivate and encourage other members. What effect did the loss of such arguably key personnel have on the organisation.

Q.9 Was the loss of experienced personnel being killed on active service by members of the security forces a key factor in determining the political leadership of PIRA (Sinn Féin) to engage in political negotiations that ultimately led to the 1998 Belfast Agreement.

Q.10 Were the loss of ASU members just one of a number of factors that led to this engagement in the political process by militant republicans. Were there other possible factors.

Q.11 What effect did penetration of PIRA by both informers and or agents have on militant republicanism. Did a widespread concern develop that operations were being monitored by the security forces or open to compromise from agents/informers.
Q.12 The Loughgall Ambush of 1987 and subsequent ambushes by the security forces of ASUs, particularly in East Tyrone. Did this effectively break the Brigade’s capacity to wake war.

Q.13 To what degree in your opinion were loyalist paramilitary groups infiltrated by the security forces and were they used as ‘proxy’ assassination teams against militant republicans.

Q.14 If they were manipulated by the security forces was this manipulation to a pattern that paralleled a political imperative. In other words, were republicans who were seen to anti-peace process specifically targeted, while those perceived as amenable to following a political path were not targeted.

Q.15 After 1992 there were no more killings of PIRA personnel by the SAS. In the 1990s the SAS were deployed in the arrest rather then ambush of PIRA operatives. For example the arrest of the IRA Crossmaglen sniper team in 1997. Did this reflect a change in then political environment and behind the scene negotiations?

Q.16 What effect, if any did this perception that the security forces were now placing more emphasis on the ‘arrest’ rather then the kinetic (use of force) option.

Q.17 Did PIRA experience a significant “loss of manoeuvre” as a result of the use or threat of TKs. It is fair to suggest that it contributed to significantly reducing the PIRAs military options. By loss of manoeuvre I mean the ability of the ASUs to carry out operations as effectively as they might have done herefore. Did the threat of targeted killings in other words reduce their operational effectiveness?

Q18 If so, did PIRAs loss of freedom of manoeuvre indirectly help the Adams/McGuiness leadership to sell a political approach to the republican movement.
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

David Adams:
A native of Lisburn, Adams was a member of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) although he was much more involved with the political side of loyalism rather than the paramilitary side. He represented the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) at the political negotiations that led to the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998 which had links to the UDA. No longer involved in party politics he now works full time for an international aid agency (GOAL), is a freelance journalist, and a columnist for the Irish Times.

Deaglán De Bréadún:

Lt. Gen. Robin Brims CB, CBE, DSO:
Is a retired British army officer who was commissioned into the Light Infantry in 1970. After various military appointments including a number of postings to Northern Ireland he was commanding officer of 24 Airmobile Brigade in December 1994 deploying to Bosnia as part of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps the following year. He went on to be Chief of Staff at Headquarters Northern Ireland in November 1996. He was subsequently deployed to Iraq for which he was given the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). He retired from active service in January 2008 having completed his career as Commander of the Field Army at Land Command from 2005 to 2007.

Michael Culbert:
Though both his grandfathers served in the British army Michael Culbert became involved as a republican activist after the events of Bloody Sunday. He is a former PIRA life sentence prisoner and Director of Coiste na nIarchumi, which represents former PIRA prisoners.

James Dingley:
Is a sociologist, with a PhD in Political Sociology from London University and previously lectured on Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of Ulster. He is now a freelance international lecturer and writer on all aspects of terrorism and conflict. He is editor of Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland (Routledge: Oxon, 2009) and Nationalism, Social Theory and Durkheim (Palgrave: London, 2008). He is chairman of the Northern Ireland think tank Northern Light Review and has his own consultancy, Cybernos Associates.

Prof. Richard English:
Was born in Belfast in 1963. He was professor of Politics at Queen’s University Belfast and currently teaches at St. Andrews University in Scotland where he is Director of the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV). His previous books include Ernie O’Malley: IRA Intellectual (1998); Radicals and the Republic: Socialist
Republicanism in the Irish Free State (1994); Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA (2003), and Irish freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland (2006). He has written widely on Irish politics and history, including work on Newsweek, The Times Literary Supplement, the Times Higher Educational Supplement and in Irish magazines including Fortnight and the Dublin Review. He has worked extensively as a media commentator on Irish politics, including work for the New York Times, the BBC and the Guardian.

Colonel Clive Fairweather OBE, CBE:
Was a former SAS Troop Commander who deployed to Northern Ireland in the early autumn of 1969. During the course of his career he rose from private soldier to full Colonel in the course of a 34-year Army career that saw three separate global tours with the SAS. As part of this in 1974 he was a Squadron Commander and helped train men and later women for surveillance work in Northern Ireland. Subsequently, in 1977/78 he was a Staff Officer in Lisburn responsible for coordinating intelligence province wide and with responsibility for Special Forces. He was injured in a booby trap bombing in Belfast in 1972, and investigated the capture and killing of Captain Robert Nairac by PIRA. Though not a direct member of the SAS over this period, he attended the ‘over the Border trial’ in Dublin and later was in the Special Criminal Court for the Nairac prosecution. He commanded one of the SAS teams which ended the Iranian embassy siege of 1980. On leaving the army he became Scotland’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for eight years and instituted several reforms, especially for women inmates, after which he became chief-fundraiser for the charity Combat Stress. He died in Edinburgh on 12 October 2012.

Billy Hutchinson:
Is the leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). He was elected to Belfast City Council in 1997 and to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1998. He lost his assembly seat in 2003 and council seat in 2005. Before this he had been a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the founder of their youth wing the Young Citizen Volunteers (YCV). He served a prolonged prison sentence for paramilitary offences, while in prison he took a degree in social sciences. He was released after serving sixteen years and was subsequently nominated by the UVF as their point of contact with John de Chastelain and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning. With his contemporary and close friend David Ervine (d. 2007) he was instrumental in helping to convince UVF commanders to endorse the Combined Loyalist Military Command ceasefire in 1994.

Eamonn Mallie:
Was born in County Armagh in 1951 and educated at Trinity College, Dublin. He has worked throughout his career as a political journalist in Ireland and extensively covered the period encapsulated by the Troubles. He is a regular contributor to nationally networked programmes on Independent Radio and LBC and was political correspondent with Downtown Radio in Belfast. In 1989, he formed his own company Eamonn Mallie News Services. With Patrick Bishop he is author of The Provisional IRA (Corgi Books, 1987), and The Fight for Peace (with David McKittrick, 1994). He has embraced the adoption of new media, being a prolific Twitter user and Blogger and has become equally well known as a critic of 20th century art. He has recently concluded a landmark series of interviews with Dr. Ian Paisley which has been televised as a two-part documentary, Paisley: Genesis to Revelation for the BBC.
Gerry Moriarty:
He first became a journalist in 1977 when he joined the Donegal Democrat during which he reported on the assassination of Lord Mountbatten at Mullaghmore, County Sligo in 1979. In 1982 he joined the Dublin based Irish Press where he specialised on covering the Troubles as they unfolded in Northern Ireland including many landmark events such as Loughgall, events post Gibraltar and the Enniskillen bombing. In 1991 he joined the Irish Times and is their Belfast based correspondent and has reported extensively on the conflict in Northern Ireland and events there post the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement 1998, in his own words “the transition from war to peace.”

Danny Morrison:
Is an Irish republican and writer who lives in West Belfast. He was editor of AP/RN from 1979-82. In the 1980s he was the national director of publicity for Sinn Fein, served time as a PIRA prisoner, and until 2006 was better known as a regular political commentator in newspapers, on television and radio. He then decided to concentrate on writing and arts reviewing, although he remains the secretary of the Bobby Sands Trust and has for several years been chairperson of Féile an Phobail, the festival founded in West Belfast in 1988 which is now the largest arts festival in Ireland. His play The Wrong Man, opened in London in 2005, it is based on his 1997 book of the same name. Other works include West Belfast and On the Back of the Swallows. His fourth book is Then the Walls came Down: A Prison Journal (1999). His latest original work is Rebel Columns published in 2004 followed by Hunger Strike, which features poems and stories from Christy Moore and Ulick O’Connor. At the 1981 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis he made a notable speech from which the term ‘Armalite and Ballot Box Strategy’ was derived describing the two-pronged approach of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin as it sought to advance the republican cause.

Mr. A:
Was a Tyrone republican activist who was wounded and arrested during an SAS ambush at Clonoe, County Tyrone in February 1992 in which four members of a PIRA ASU were killed.

Peter Murtagh:
Is Foreign Editor of the Irish Times, which he joined in 1979. Previously he had been Opinion Editor and News and News Features Editor for the Saturday edition of the paper. He was the paper’s Security Correspondent in the early 1980s before moving to the Sunday Times where he was editor of Insight, the investigative reporting team. In 1985 he moved to the Guardian where he was a reporter, deputy foreign editor and finally News Editor. He returned to Ireland in 1994 to edit the Sunday Tribune and rejoined the Irish Times in 1996. He received the award for Outstanding Work in Journalism in Ireland in 1983 and was Reporter of the Year in the UK in 1996. He extensively covered the events of the Stalker Affair. He is co-author (with Joe Joyce) of the Boss: Charles J. Haughey in Government (Poolbeg Press, Dublin; 1983) and Blind Justice: the Sallins mail train robbery (Poolbeg, Dublin; 1984); author of The Rape of Greece – the Kings, the Colonels and the Resistance (Simon & Schuster, London; 1994). He has also edited twelve editions of the Irish Times Book of the year.

Andy McIntyre:
Is a former member of PIRA in which he was a volunteer for twenty-five years. He served eighteen years in prison; one charge related to killing a loyalist, a paramilitary member of the UVF, the other two charges were PIRA membership. This included four years on the blanket
and no-wash/no work protests which led to the hunger strikes of the 1980s. Since his release from prison he has completed a PhD on the history of the Provisional IRA, 1969-1973 at Queens University Belfast and has written about the organisation and political events. He is co-founder of The Blanket, an online magazine that critically analyses the Irish peace process.

**Tommy McKearney:**
Comes from a family with a long republican tradition, both his grandfathers had fought in the Irish War of Independence. He lost three brothers during the course of the Troubles, one of whom was killed at Loughgall by the SAS. He joined the Tyrone Brigade of PIRA in the early 1970s and became Officer Commanding (OC) of East Tyrone Brigade in the mid 1970s. He served a life sentence for murder on the basis of a statement which he disputed as he never signed it. He was involved in both the blanket and dirty protests in the H-Blocks and took part in the 1980 hunger strike, along with other PIRA members. He spent fifty three days on hunger strike and according to a doctor had only a few hours to live before the strike was called off. He served sixteen years in prison before his release in 1993. He now works as an independent journalist and is an organiser for the Independent Workers Union of Ireland. He is author of The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament (Connolly Books, 2011).

**David McKittrick:**
Is a Belfast born journalist who has reported on the Troubles since 1971. He joined the Irish Times as a reporter in Belfast becoming Northern editor in 1975 and London editor in 1981. He worked briefly for BBC Northern Ireland between 1985 and 1986, before joining the Independent. He has since worked as the paper’s Irish correspondent. His published works include Endgame in Ireland (1994), The Fight for Peace (with Eamonn Mallie, 1994): Lost Lives (with Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney and Chris Thornton, 1999). He is the recipient of the Christopher Ewart-Biggs Memorial Prize for the promotion of peace and understanding in Northern Ireland, 1989 and 2001; Correspondent of the Year, 1999; and the 2000 Orwell Prize for journalism.

**Professor Fionnuala Ní Aolaín:**
A former Fulbright Scholar at Harvard Law School was awarded a PhD by Queen’s University Belfast in 1997. Formerly Assistant Professor of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, she is currently Professor of Law at the University of Ulster, where she teaches international law and international human rights law, and is the founder and Director of the Transitional Justice Institute – and the Dorsey and Whitney Professor of law at the University of Minnesota Law School. She is author of numerous works including The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland (Blackstaff Press, 2000); Women, War and the Post Conflict Process (Oxford University Press, 2011); Exceptional Courts and Military Commissions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press with Gross, 2013).

**Officer A:**
Joined the RUC in the early 1980s and served initially as a uniformed officer in the Ardoyne before being recruited into the RUC Special Branch. There he served in a number of postings but spent the bulk of his career in East Tyrone which organisationally was part of RUC Southern Region.
**Assistant Chief Constable Peter Sheridan:**
From a Catholic nationalist background he joined the then RUC Police Cadets aged 16 in 1978. Served a total of 30 years in both the RUC and PSNI as a uniformed officer rising to the rank of Assistant Chief Constable Crime Operations for Rural Regions. He graduated from the FBI academy in 1999. He spent most of his career based in Derry/Londonderry. He assumed responsibility for Crime Operations Department in 2006. He is an acknowledged expert on tobacco smuggling and has testified to the House of Commons on this issue. In June 2007 he received the Order of the British Empire. Having left the police in 2008 he is now chief executive of Co-operation Ireland, a peace building charity.

** Soldier A:**
Served throughout his career in various appointments with correspondingly more senior ranks as an infantryman in Northern Ireland to the extent that his thirty year career was ‘book ended’ by the course of the Troubles. He was present at Bloody Sunday though not a member of the Parachute Regiment. He also took part in Operation Motorman. In the latter stages of his career he was involved in the Northern Ireland pre-deployment training for the British army. He also played a role in the evolution and development of the Close Observation Platoons (COPs) that were utilised as covert observation units, not undercover units *per se* that assisted in gathering intelligence on PIRA ASUs.

**Mark Urban:**
Is Newsnight’s Diplomatic Editor, a role he has held since 1995. He came to the programme after being Middle East Correspondent for BBC News, a general reporter for Newsnight and Defence Correspondent of The Independent newspaper from 1986 to 1990 covering the end of the Cold War and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Before that he also worked behind the camera as an assistant producer on various programmes. He is the author of several books including *Big Boys’ Rules: The Secret Struggle against the IRA* (1992) and *UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence* (1996). He has also published military history titles: *The Man Who Broke Napoleon’s Codes: The story of George Scovell* (2001); *Rifles: Six Years with Wellington’s Legendary Sharpshooters* (2003); *Generals: Ten British Commanders Who Shaped the World* (2005); *Fusiliers: Eight Years with the Redcoats in America* (2007). In 2009 Urban received a Peace Through Media Award from the International Council for Press and Broadcasting. He wrote *Task Force Black: The Explosive Story of the SAS and the Secret War in Iraq*, which was published in February 2010 by Little Brown. As a former officer in the Royal Tank Regiment he recently narrated a two episode documentary *Tankies: Tank Heroes of World War II* which followed the 5th Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) from the Western Desert through to the Italian campaign to the battlefields of Europe after D-Day. The research for this documentary will be published as a book of the same title in 2013.

**Ed Moloney:**
Is a freelance journalist who currently lives in New York. He worked for the Hibernia magazine and Magill before going on to serve as Northern Editor for the Irish Times and subsequently for the Sunday Tribune. In 1999, he was voted Irish journalist of the year. His first book *Paisley*, was a biography of unionist leader Ian Paisley, co-authored by Andy Pollak and published in 1986. He is author of *A Secret History of the IRA,* first published in 2002 and again in 2007. This was followed, in 2008, by a new edition of *Paisley: From Demagogue to Democrat?* Of which Moloney is the single author. In March 2002 the book *Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland* which features interviews with former paramilitaries was published. In October 2010, the Irish state broadcaster RTE aired a

Prof. Andrew Silke:
Professor Andrew Silke (BSc Hons, AFBPsS, PhD) holds a Chair in Criminology at the University of East London where he is the Field Leader for Criminology and the Programme Director for Terrorism Studies. He has a background in forensic psychology and criminology and has worked both in academia and for government. Professor Silke has published extensively on issues to do with terrorism, crime and policing in journals, books and the popular press. His previous books include Terrorists, Victims & Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences (Wiley, 2003) and Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (Frank Cass, 2004); Terrorism Informatics (Springer, 2008). He serves by invitation on both the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, and the United Nations Roster of Terrorist Experts. He is an Honorary Senior Research Associate at the University of St. Andrews and is a Fellow of the University of Leicester. He also lectures by invitation to the Senior Command and Staff Course at the Irish Defence Forces, Military College.

Seanna Walsh:
Is the Legacy Officer with Coiste na nlarchimí, the republican ex-prisoners association in Belfast. He was born in the Short Strand area of East Belfast. He became a republican activist in 1972 post Bloody Sunday and was first arrested aged sixteen in 1973 in the aftermath of a bank robbery. He spent a total of twenty one years in prison during three separate terms of imprisonment related to PIRA activity. He was a friend and contemporary of Bobby Sands who later died on hunger strike. During this period in the immediate aftermath of the Hunger Strikes he was Officer Commanding (O/C) of PIRA prisoners in the H-Blocks (Maze) prison. He was finally released under the terms of the Good Friday (Belfast) agreement in 1998. In July 2005 he appeared in a DVD reading out a statement from the PIRA Army Council announcing an end to its armed campaign. In doing so, Walsh became the first PIRA member since 1972 to represent the organisation without wearing a mask or releasing a statement using the pseudonym of P. O’Neill.
CHRONOLOGY

1920  Government of Ireland Act passed, partitioning Ireland into North and South.

1922  Formation of the RUC

1939-1940  IRA bombing campaign in England

1941  April-May  Belfast ‘Blitz’ by the German Luftwaffe

1956  December  IRA launches its border campaign, Operation Harvest

1957  Internment temporarily introduced on both sides of the border

1962  February  IRA calls a halt to Operation Harvest and dumps arms

1964  The Revd Ian Paisley leads protest march into Divis Street in the Falls road area, sparking off three nights of intense rioting

1965  Ulster volunteer Force (UVF) formed; former soldier ‘Gusty’ Spence appointed as its first commander

1966  50th anniversary of the Easter Rising heightens tensions; UVF murders several people across Belfast

1967  Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) formed

1968  5 October  NICRA march turns violent in Duke Street, Derry/Londonderry

1969  4 January  People’s Democracy march from Belfast to Derry/Londonderry attacked by Loyalists and Ulster Special Constabulary members (‘B’ Specials) at Burntollet.

28 April  Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, resigns from office

10 August  Rioting in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry

14 August  British troops deploy onto Northern Ireland’s streets

December  IRA splits into Official and Provisional wings

1970  April  ‘B’ Specials disbanded; Ulster Defence Regiment formed

3-5 July  Falls Road Curfew

1971  6 February  First British Army soldier, Gunner Robert Curtis, killed by the IRA

9 August  Internment reintroduced

1972  30 January  Soldiers from 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, open fire on civil rights marchers; 27 people are wounded, 14 fatally. It later becomes known as ‘Bloody Sunday’

July  IRA detonates 22 bombs across Belfast, killing nine people and injuring hundreds on ‘Bloody Friday’; Operation Motorman is launched to retake ‘no-go’ areas

1974  4 February  PIRA kills 11 (including two young children) when it blows up a coach carrying off-duty soldiers and their families

May  Loyalist strike brings down power-sharing experiment

5 October  PIRA carries out the bombings of two Guildford pubs, killing four people

21 November  PIRA bombs two Birmingham pubs, killing 19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td><strong>5 January</strong> IRA gunmen execute ten Protestant civilians in Kingsmill, South Armagh; another is wounded.</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td><strong>November</strong> PIRA reorganises along cellular lines.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Overt military lead in security policy is scaled back in favour of ‘police primacy.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td><strong>30 March</strong> Airey Neave MP, former Colditz prison escapee and close confidant of Margaret Thatcher, is assassinated by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) when a bomb explodes under his car at the House of Commons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td><strong>27 August</strong> Lord Mountbatten, the Queen’s cousin and former Chief of the Defence Staff, is blown up by the IRA; 18 British Army soldiers are killed in a bomb attack near Warrenpoint.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td><strong>5 May</strong> Bobby Sands becomes the first IRA hunger striker to die, after 66 days’ fasting. Nine other PIRA and INLA prisoners follow suit.</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td><strong>11 November</strong> three members of PIRA killed by RUC HMSU.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td><strong>7 December</strong> INLA bombs the Droppin’ Well pub in Ballykelly, killing 17 people, including 11 off-duty soldiers based in the town.</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td><strong>12 December</strong> two members of INLA killed by RUC HMSU.</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>‘Supergrass’ trials publicly identify leading terrorists.</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>Gerry Adams begins secret dialogue with the British government.</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td><strong>15 November</strong> The Anglo-Irish Agreement is signed between the British and Irish governments; start of ‘Ulster Says No’ campaign.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td><strong>8 May</strong> Elite SAS soldiers kill eight PIRA members in Loughgall.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td><strong>8 November</strong> The IRA detonates a no-warning bomb next to the war memorial in Enniskillen, killing 11 people and injuring 63.</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td><strong>6 March</strong> SAS team kills three PIRA GHQ ASU cell in Gibraltar.</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td><strong>16 March</strong> Michael Stone, of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), attacks the funerals of the ‘Gibralter Three’.</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td><strong>19 March</strong> Two off-duty soldiers are abducted and shot dead by the IRA after mistakenly driving into a Republican funeral cortège.</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td><strong>20 August</strong> Tyrone PIRA blew up a bus killing eight British soldiers at Ballygawley, Co Tyrone.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td><strong>30 August</strong> three PIRA members killed by SAS at Drumnakilly, Co Tyrone.</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td><strong>24 October</strong> PIRA uses human bomb tactic, killing several soldiers.</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td><strong>7 February</strong> PIRA mortars 10 Downing Street.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td><strong>3 June</strong> three PIRA members killed at Coagh, Co Tyrone by SAS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td><strong>16 February</strong> four PIRA members killed by SAS at Clonoe, Co Tyrone.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td><strong>1 July</strong> The Ulster Defence Regiment is amalgamated with The</td>
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Royal Irish Rangers to form The Royal Irish Regiment

10 August The Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the largest Loyalist paramilitary group, is banned by the British government

1993 23 October Shankill Road bombing by the IRA kills nine civilians

1994 9, 11 & 13 March PIRA mortars Heathrow Airport

31 August PIRA ends its military hostilities

13 October Loyalist paramilitaries announced a ceasefire

1995 Talks between British and Irish government and paramilitary representatives

1996 9 February PIRA detonates a massive bomb in Canary Wharf, London, heralding an end to its ceasefire

30 May Forum Election

15 June PIRA bombs Manchester city centre

July Orange Order parade at Drumcree, County Armagh, leads to widespread civil disturbances in Northern Ireland

7 October PIRA attacks British Army HQ in Lisburn, with two 500 lb (227kg) bombs, killing one soldier and injuring 20 other people

1997 12 February Lance Bombardier Stephen Restorick is killed by a sniper he is the last soldier to die in Operation Banner

20 July PIRA reinstates its ceasefire

1998 10 April The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is signed

15 August The Real IRA, an ultra-Republican splinter group, explodes a no-warning car bomb in Omagh, County Tyrone, killing 29 people and two unborn children

1999 29 November Power-sharing executive appointed

2 December Direct rule ends; power devolved to Stormont

2000 Loyalist feud between the UDA/UFF and the UVF/RHC (Red Hand Commando, a small paramilitary group with close ties to the UVF)

2001 The ‘Holy Cross dispute’ in Ardoyne, North Belfast, sees British troops once again deployed in a major operation to keep the peace

2002 PIRA spy ring uncovered at Stormont, prompting the collapse of the power-sharing executive and suspension of devolution

2005 28 July PIRA calls an end to its armed campaign

September Annual Whiterock Orange Order parade in West Belfast ends in the worst rioting in three decades; the IRA decommissions the last of its weapons and explosives

2006 October Multi-party talks lead to the St Andrews Agreement

2007 8 May Devolution returns to Northern Ireland, as Ian Paisley
and Gerry Adams agree to enter a power-sharing executive

**31 July** Operation *Banner* ends
An Phoblacht/Republican News (AP/RN). Often known as ‘AP/RN’, the weekly newspaper is the official organ of the Provisional republican movement. An Phoblacht (AP) was the Provisional republicans Dublin based newspaper during 1970-9; Republican News (RN) was their Belfast-produced paper during the same period. In the autumn of 1978 it was decided that the southern An Phoblacht and the northern Republican News would amalgamate as An Phoblacht/Republican News. In January 1979 the new paper appeared, Republican News having effectively absorbed An Phoblacht. The early editors of AP/RN were Danny Morrison (1979-82), Mick Timothy (1982-5) and Rita O’Hare (1985-90). One of its best known contributors was Gerry Adams (President of Sinn Féin) writing under the pseudonym of ‘Brownie’ who consistently called for increased political activity, especially at local level.

Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985). The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, which for the first time gave the Republic of Ireland (ROI) a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The two governments signed the agreement on 15 November 1985, systemising co-operation with permanent inter-governmental conference machinery and giving the Irish government a consultative role in Northern Ireland affairs with a joint secretariat at Maryfield outside Belfast. The Agreement was rejected by all shades of unionism which saw the deal as a sell-out of their Britishness. Unionists were hostile to the accord because it was brokered between London and Dublin without their consent. Massive unionist/loyalist street protests ensued which were ultimately unsuccessful in reversing the agreement. It was also rejected by militant republicanism that saw it as a means to undermine their growing support post the 1981 hunger strike. Conversely the Irish government envisaged the agreement as a plank to shore up the moderate nationalist SDLP while the British government believed enhanced cross-border security cooperation with the southern Irish government would stem from the agreement and in time were to express their frustration that in the British view this did not materialise significantly.

Ard Chomhairle. The Irish term for central committee, usually used in a political context, most often in reference to Sinn Féin.

Ard Fheis. The Irish term for an annual political party conference or convention.

Armalite. An American rifle favoured by PIRA, especially in the 1970s, because of its light weight and rapid rate of fire. Its high-velocity bullets were capable of piercing armoured military and police vehicles.

Armalite and Ballot Box Strategy first enunciated by Danny Morrison at the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis in 1981 articulated the interlocking political and military sides of PIRAs campaign into a mutually supporting symbiosis. In essence this was a referral to the republican movement’s intent to fight the war on both a military and political footing.

Army Council The seven-member ruling body of PIRA which determines the organisation’s military strategy.

ASU or Active Service Unit was a PIRA cell of five to eight members, tasked with carrying out armed attacks. The term was first used during the War of Independence (Anglo-Irish
War), whereby every Brigade had an Active Service Unit, these were often called Flying Columns. The term was again employed after a PIRA reorganisation in 1977. It is estimated that PIRA had roughly 300 front-line members in ASUs at the height of the troubles.

**B Specials.** See Ulster Special Constabulary.

**Bloody Sunday.** On 30 January 1972, during a Civil Rights demonstration in the Bogside area of Derry, British paratroopers opened fire on the demonstrators killing thirteen civilians. A fourteenth died later in hospital. This proved to be a pivotal event in the troubles and its aftermath witnessed greatly increased support for PIRA. The Widgery Tribunal was held in the immediate aftermath of the event. The Saville Inquiry, established in 1998, re-examined the events and was published on 15 June 2010.

**Combined Loyalist Military Command.** An umbrella group established in 1991 comprising the UDA/UVF, UVF/ RHC. The CLMC declared the loyalist ceasefire in October 1994. The veteran UVF commander, ‘Gusty’ Spence read out the ceasefire statement, in which he expressed ‘abject and true remorse’ on behalf of loyalist paramilitaries.

**Cuman na mBan.** Meaning ‘Club of the Women’, this was the title of the women’s IRA. It was originally formed in Dublin on 2 April 1914 as an auxiliary of the Irish Volunteers. Illegal in both parts of Ireland during the Troubles, its members played a significant role in PIRA activities at all levels, with at least one woman believed to have been a member of the Army Council (see above). With the adoption of a cell-based structure it was subsumed into the main PIRA organisation in the 1970s.

**Dáil.** The lower house of the Irish Parliament.

**Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).** Founded in 1971 and formerly known as the Protestant Unionist Party, under the leadership of Dr. Ian Paisley it has consistently opposed any move seen as weakening the position of Northern Ireland within the Union. The DUP attracts a strong working-class Protestant vote. It has now become the dominant Unionist party in the Northern Ireland Assembly and consequently fills the post of First Minister in the Assembly, currently held by Peter Robinson.

**Dissident republicanism.** As a broad phenomenon, includes some who are still committed to the path of violence – but also some who are not. The term ‘dissident’ is in that sense used as a catch-all, to encompass those of an Irish republican persuasion who have broken with the ‘mainstream’ movement of Sinn Féin and the Provisionals. It is by their opposition to the peace process and/or the political status quo in Northern Ireland that they have come to be labelled ‘dissidents,’ though they dispute that very term.

**E4A.** The RUCs covert surveillance unit.

**Fenian.** The Fenian Brotherhood, founded in 1858, formed part of the history of militant republicanism but the term ‘Fenian’ in the modern context is an abusive description for a Catholic.
Fianna Eireann. In Irish meaning ‘Soldier of Ireland’, it was the junior wing of the IRA. Recruits usually graduated to membership of the parent organisation at the age of 16, though officially the age was 18.

Fianna Fail. Translated as ‘Soldiers of Destiny’, once the largest of the Irish Republic’s two main political parties. Perceived as being the more republican party, for much of the troubles it was led by Charles Haughey, a highly controversial figure. His successors Albert Reynolds and Bertie Ahern played key roles in the peace process of the 1990s.

Fine Gael. Literally meaning ‘Tribe of the Gael’, it is currently the largest political party in the Irish Republic. In 1985 its leader and then Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement with Margaret Thatcher.

Flying Column. A flying column is a small independent ad hoc guerrilla military land unit capable of rapid mobility, most notably during the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-21.

Force Protection (FP). Is preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions in specific areas or against a specific population, usually military personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information.

Force Research Unit (FRU). Military intelligence unit established by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence in the Intelligence Corps of the British army tasked with recruiting informers from within the ranks of PIRA and loyalist paramilitary organisations.

14th Intelligence. A military intelligence unit mainly deployed in a surveillance role but involved in several controversial incidents, often refereed to as the ‘Det.’

Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Founded in 1884 as a cultural nationalist organisation which promoted and revived Gaelic games such as hurling and Gaelic football, it is the largest sporting and cultural organisation in Ireland, its games in Northern Ireland are played almost exclusively by Catholics.

Gaelic League. Set up in 1893, an organisation pursuing the revival of the Irish language.

Garda Síochána. Normally known as the Garda, it is the police force of the Irish Republic. Most of its uniformed officers routinely carry out their duties unarmed.

Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (1998). Saw the main unionist and nationalist traditions reach a political accommodation in the wake of the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires. US Senator George Mitchell initially chairman of the international body on arms decommissioning was subsequently asked to chair the all party talks that had evolved out of the bilateral negotiations between the political parties and both governments. Although PIRA was not formally part of the negotiations that led to the Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998, it was represented by Sinn Féin.

H-Blocks. Compounds in the Maze prison, so named because of their shape, each had approximately 200 cells. They were the focus of major republican protest campaigns surrounding political status which culminated in the hunger strike of 1981, in which ten men died. See Long Kesh and Hunger Strike.
**Hide.** A generic name given to locations where paramilitary groups hid their arms and munitions. As the conflict developed PIRA constructed a series of increasingly sophisticated underground bunkers to secret their weapons and explosives, keeping them in secure, environmentally protected conditions. PIRA well aware that the security forces mustered excellent aerial photography and infra-red assets took great care when selecting their hide locations. In Northern Ireland ‘Beaters’ would check the hedges in areas of hides for British army undercover personnel before arms were retrieved. These munitions dumps were also sometimes referred to as ‘arms bunkers’ or ‘dug-outs’ and were often very elaborately constructed. It was to the Republic that four boatloads of Libyan arms and explosives amounting to over 120 tons arrived in 1985-86 to be secreted in bunkers throughout the country. The last consignment in the *Eskund* was intercepted by the French authorities in late 1987. Many of these hides/arms dumps were held in the ROI as part of PIRA Southern Command based on a Quartermaster system essentially operating a ‘just-in-time’ supply network thereby avoiding the risk of losing large quantities. PIRA made excellent use of the fact that there was a border to separate off their support systems from their ASUs north of the border. Consequently the recruitment of PIRA Quartermasters was always a key priority for British intelligence, thereby allowing them to place electronic surveillance devices in munitions dumps and the associated bugging of weapons known as ‘jarking.’

**Hunger Strike.** The 1981 hunger strike in which ten republican prisoners died was not the first of its type. In fact, republican prisoners had attempted previous hunger strikes although they had agreed to end them. Other protests included the ‘dirty’ protest, in which prisoners smeared their excrement on the cell walls and refused to shower, and the ‘blanket’ protest in which prisoners refused to wear prison issues uniforms of ordinary prisoners and instead wrapped their naked bodies in blankets.

**Improvised Explosive Device (IED).** PIRA as the conflict developed became increasingly expert in developing explosive devices or improvised landmines which they widely used particularly in the rural environment. Their own Engineering Department based in Southern Ireland was at the forefront in R&D of these devices. Often these devices were planted as Road-Side-Bombs (RSBs), detonated by a variety of means, initially command-wire and subsequently by electronic remote control. These RSBs were sometimes placed in drainage ‘culverts’ under roads to ambush passing security forces vehicular patrols, and were accordingly sometimes referred to as ‘culvert bombs.’ Even armoured vehicles offered little ballistic protection as these bombs became increasingly more powerful. PIRA in South Armagh in particular developed their operational expertise to such an extent using this modus of attack that from the mid-1970s the security forces had to effectively abandon vehicular mounted patrols and resort to movement almost exclusively by helicopter, including supply and/or reinforcement of bases.

**Internal Security Unit (ISU).** This was a PIRA counterintelligence unit for the Northern Command who was responsible for not only vetting of new recruits and entrants but also tasked with counter-intelligence and the investigation of leaks within PIRA along with the exposure of moles/informers (also known as ‘touts’). In addition to playing a key role in investigating suspected informers, the ISU also conducted inquiries into operations suspected of being compromised, debriefing PIRA volunteers released from Police and British army questioning. The ISU was sometimes nicknamed ‘The Nutting Squad’ (nut is Irish slang for head) and consequently the fate meted out to an alleged informer who in turn would be executed by being shot through the head.
Internment is the imprisonment or confinement of people, commonly in large groups, without trial.

Irish Civil War (28 June 1922-24 May 1923) followed the Irish War of Independence and the establishment of the Irish Free State, an independent entity from the United Kingdom but within the Commonwealth of the British Empire. The conflict was waged between two opposing groups of nationalists over the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The forces of the ‘Provisional Government’ (which became the Free State in December 1922) supported the Treaty, while the republican opposition saw it as a betrayal of the Irish Republic.

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). The INLA was an extreme republican paramilitary group, it was established in 1974 as a breakaway from the Official IRA. INLA members engaged in a number of internecine feuds and three of its numbers died in the 1981 hunger strike.

Irish People’s Liberation Organisation (IPLO). A small paramilitary group formed as an offshoot of the INLA during a feud in 1986, it ceased to exist after attacks from PIRA in the 1990s.

Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). A revolutionary, conspiratorial secret society which emerged out of the Fenian movement in the late nineteenth century and which – through violence – pursued Irish independence from Britain.

Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). The political wing of the INLA, the IRSP has attracted only a small member of votes in elections.

Irish Volunteers. An Irish nationalist militia established in 1913. It was ostensibly formed in response to the formation of the Ulster Volunteers in 1912. The start of the Great War witnessed a split in the organisation. A minority retained the name Irish Volunteers, while the majority some 90% became the National Volunteers who supported Home Rule and enlisted in the 10th and 16th (Irish) Divisions of the British army, leaving the Irish Volunteers with a rump estimated at some 10,000 to 14,000 members. This split, proved advantageous to the IRB, which was now in a position to control this organisation for insurrectionary purposes.

Irish War of Independence or Anglo-Irish War was a guerrilla war fought by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against the British Government and its forces in Ireland during the period 1919-21. The British government bolstered the then Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) with auxiliary forces who were nicknamed the Black and Tans, many of whom were notorious for ill-discipline and reprisal attacks on civilians. The war as a result is often referred to as the ‘Black and Tan War’ or simply the ‘Tan War.’

Jarking. The technology of secreting miniature electronic transmitters/bugging devices on weapons in PIRA arms caches or hides, thereby allowing the security forces to clandestinely monitor the movement of the weapons.

Kalashnikov AK-47. This Russian designed assault rifle has become synonymous with revolutionary movements across the globe since the 1960s. It became in effect the standard issue for PIRA ASUs from the early 1980s. The Rumanian licence made version of this weapon constituted a major part of the arsenal that was smuggled to PIRA with the assistance
of the Libyan Ghadaffi government in the 1980s in four large shipments before a fifth importation was seized en route by the French authorities. Large quantities of Czech manufactured Semtex plastic explosives were also part of these consignments, which further enhanced the lethality of PIRA bombs and IEDs.

**Kinetic Option.** A phrase that has become part of the lexicon in modern Terrorism Studies that implies the deadly use of force in dealing with a terrorist threat.

**Long Kesh.** The forerunner to the Maze prison, it was commonly described thus pre-1976 when paramilitary prisoners had special category status and were housed in compounds. Republicans still generally use the term ‘Long Kesh’ to describe the Maze. See H-Blocks.

**Loyalist Defence Volunteers (LDV).** A paramilitary group based mainly in Fermanagh, the LDV was established in 1974 and claimed some killings in Fermanagh and Tyrone.

**Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF).** A dissident faction of the UVF formed in the late 1990s, it was mainly made up of former mid-Ulster UVF members opposed to the organisation’s ceasefire in the late 1990s. It also attracted supporters in north and west Belfast and carried out a number of sectarian killings following the death of its leader, Billy Wright.

**M-60.** The standard US army belt-fed general-purpose machine-gun, several of which were acquired by PIRA in the 1980s and used in a number of attacks.

**Military Reaction Force (MRF).** Sometimes referred to as the Military Reconnaissance Force, it was an undercover unit of the British army deployed in the 1970s. MRF units were involved in a number of controversial incidents.

**Mission Command.** A fluid and devolved system of Command & Control (C2) whereby units are briefed on the mission objective and not how to achieve same which is left to their own tactical initiative, once the focus is maintained on the ultimate operational objective nested within the overarching strategic goal.

**Mortars.** PIRA from 1972 became adept at developing various variants of improvised, indirect fire, stand-off weapon systems that allowed them to defeat upgraded perimeter security measures from a safe distance. These weapons additionally had a major psychological effect, boosting PIRA morale and correspondingly engendering a degree of vulnerability in both police and troops. Indeed in time PIRA bomb makers became masters of these home-made mortars of the ‘Spigot’ or ‘flying bomb’ variety. One such mortar on 28 February 1985 killed nine RUC officers at Newry RUC station. Another variant was used in an attack against Downing Street on 07 Feb 1991 that came within an ace of killing the British Cabinet then in session. Security force bases were increasingly ‘hardened’ at huge cost to increase security from such ‘barrack buster’ attacks including sophisticated ventilated bunkers, which in time mitigated the threat posed quite effectively, allied to ‘base-plate’ patrols to disrupt possible firing-points. Significantly East Tyrone PIRA was the first to use the Mark-15 ‘Barrack Buster Mortar’ in an attack on 5 December 1992 against an RUC station in Ballygawley.

**New Ulster Political Research Group.** A UDA policy group established in 1978, it was led by Glen Barr and published *Beyond the Religious Divide*. It was the forerunner of the organisation’s political wing, the Ulster Democratic Party.
**NORAID.** An acronym of North American Aid, it was a US-based organisation formed to raise funds for families of republican prisoners. Some of its members openly declared support for PIRA. It was led for many years by lawyer Martin Galvin.

**Northern Ireland Office.** The department of the British government established in 1972 to administer Northern Ireland under direct rule from Westminster, through a secretary of state who has a seat in the British cabinet.

**Official IRA.** (OIRA) A republican paramilitary group, it has remained largely dormant since declaring a ceasefire in 1972 following a feud with the larger Provisional wing.

**Official Unionist Party.** The name adopted by the section of the Ulster Unionist Party which opposed the leader, Brian Faulkner, and the concept of power-sharing in 1974. Ultimately OUP members became the majority of the party which took over the original name of Ulster Unionist Party.

**Operation Banner.** The British army deployment during the troubles which began in 1969 and formally ended in 2007. It was the longest running single operation in British military history.

**Operation Demetrius** was a British army operation in Northern Ireland on 9-10 August 1971, during the Troubles. It involved the mass arrest and internment (without trial) of 342 people suspected of being involved with Irish republican paramilitaries.

**Operation Harvest.** Between 1956 and 1962 the IRA prosecuted a violet campaign – Operation Harvest – against the Northern State, attacking infrastructure targets such as bridges and the sole BBC transmitter in the province. The campaign sometimes referred to as the Border campaign failed for a number of reasons including minimal support from the then Catholic nationalist community and repressive cross-border measures including internment without trial instituted by both states on the island.

**Operation Motorman.** Was a British army operation launched on 31 July 1972 with the express purpose of militarily reoccupying so called ‘no-go’ areas in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry which had effectively become PIRA controlled neighbourhoods. Only token resistance was met by the army during Operation Motorman. Although Operation Motorman inflicted a short-term defeat on PIRA in both cities, it had little effect elsewhere on PIRA capability.

**Orange Order.** The largest of the ‘Loyal Orders’, it was founded in County Armagh in 1795 and by the time of the Home Rule controversies in the late nineteenth century, has expanded into an important politico-religious grouping which united all forms of unionism in opposition to Irish nationalism and British government efforts at constitutional change. Throughout its existence its tradition of marching, sometimes through nationalist districts, has caused controversy. Its extensive programme of marches culminates annually on July 12 in a commemoration of the victory of King William III at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.

**P. O’Neill.** The IRA traditionally used a well-known signature in its public statements, which are all issued under the pseudonym of ‘P. O’Neill’ of the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin. According to the late Ruairí O Brádaigh, it was Seán Mac Stiofáin, as chief
of staff of the IRA, who invented the name. However, under his usage, the name was written and pronounced according to Irish orthography and pronounced as ‘P. O Néil.’ According to Danny Morrison, the pseudonym S. O’Neill was used during the 1940s.

**Permanent Vehicle Check Point (PVCP).** PVCPs gave troops the flexibility to mount a permanent presence around their patrol bases and observation posts dotted along the border. Many of the army’s border bases were ‘supersangars’, 65ft-high watchtowers erected as surveillance and listening posts. They were located to mutually support each other and acted as a *cordon sanitaire* that was quite effective in limiting PIRA mobility of operations.

**Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).** The PSNI is the successor to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) which in turn was the successor to the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in Northern Ireland. As part of the negotiations for the Good Friday (Belfast Agreement) 1998, the RUC were renamed the PSNI as part of the Patten Report which recommended a number of changes to policing in Northern Ireland including this change in nomenclature which came into effect in November 2001. All major political parties in Northern Ireland now support the PSNI. At first Sinn Féin refused to endorse the PSNI until the Patten Commission’s recommendations were implemented in full. However, as part of the St. Andrews Agreement, Sinn Féin announced its full acceptance of the PSNI in January 2007. Due to the continuing threat from Dissident republican splinter groups the PSNI remains an armed police force.

**Progressive Unionist Party (PUP).** The political wing of the UVF, it is a small political party based mostly in west, north and east Belfast since the early 1970s and receives limited electoral support outside those areas. Its most prominent representatives were David Ervine (deceased) and Billy Hutchinson.

**Protestant Action Force.** A cover name used by some UVF units.

**Protestant Action Group.** A similar UVF cover name.

**Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).** Generally known simply as the IRA and by the security forces as PIRA, it was the largest of the republican paramilitary groups. Following the split with the Official IRA in 1969, its military campaign proceeded virtually unbroken for more than two decades. Known in Irish by republicans as Óglaigh na h-Éireann, in August 1994 it declared a ceasefire which was later broken and then later restored.

**Red Hand Commando (RHC).** A small, violent loyalist group mainly confined to Belfast, it was established in 1972 and has always remained close to the UVF and in effect was a *nom de guerre* for same.

**Red Hand Defenders (RHD).** A violent loyalist splinter group which emerged in 1998 in opposition to the Good Friday Agreement. Composed of dissident members of the main loyalist groups, it has engaged in sectarian gun and bomb attacks on Catholics and the homes of Catholics. It has been suggested that the membership of the Red Hand Defenders group and the Orange Volunteers (see above) overlap.

**Royal Irish Regiment (RIR).** A regiment of the British army established in 1992 when the UDR and Royal Irish Rangers were merged. The RIR is made up of the Home Service
Battalion of full-time and part-time soldiers, which is effectively the former UDR, and the regular General Service Battalions which mainly comprise members of the former Royal Irish Rangers.

**Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).** The police force for Northern Ireland established in 1921 until its name was changed to the PSNI in 2001.

**Royal Ulster Constabulary Reserve (RUCR).** Made up of both full-time and part-time members, it had an identical uniform to the RUC and patrolled alongside regular officers.

**RPG-7.** An anti-tank weapon, the rocket-propelled grenade is a shoulder-fired weapon which was used by PIRA and occasionally loyalist groups.

**Rules of Engagement (ROE).** ROEs are the authorisation for, or limits on, the use of force during military operations. ROEs are directives to military forces that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. In Northern Ireland these guidelines carried by troops were known as the Yellow Card.

**Saor Éire** (Free Ireland) was a radical republican organisation of Trotskyites and former IRA members established in 1967. It took its name from a similar organisation in the 1930s, some of its early leader’s emanated from the Young Socialists (originally, the Youth Wing of the Irish labour Party). The organisation carried out a number of bank robberies in the ROI in the 1970s and was involved in sporadic feuding with the Official IRA (OIRA). On 30 April 1970 during the course of one such robbery in Dublin, a Garda (Police) officer was killed. He was the first member of the Irish security forces to die in the Troubles. Saor Éire was officially disbanded in 1975.

**Saor Uladh,** (Free Ulster), was a short-lived paramilitary organisation in Northern Ireland in the 1950s and was viewed as a splinter group of the IRA. It was formed in County Tyrone by Liam Kelly and Phil O'Donnell in 1953. The group carried out armed robberies and burned a number of custom posts and in 1952, a political party Fianna Uladh, was formed. Saor Uladh had its main presence in County Tyrone, and in that area the IRA was forced to tolerate it because of the popularity of Kelly who was subsequently a republican MP for Mid-Tyrone. At the beginning of the Border Campaign (Operation Harvest) the group was subsumed back into the IRA. Liam Kelly’s brother, Paddy Kelly was O/C of the eight men Loughgall ASU that were killed in May 1987.

**SDLP.** The Social Democratic and Labour Party, was founded in August 1970, during the course of the troubles the SDLP was the most popular Irish Nationalist party in Northern Ireland. Its basic platform advocates Irish reunification. But since the PIRA ceasefire in 1994 it has lost ground to the republican party Sinn Féin, which in 2001 became the more popular of the two parties for the first time. A significant difference between the two parties was the SDLPs rejection of violence, in contrast to Sinn Féin’s support for PIRA. Its best known leader during the course of the troubles was John Hume, a position he held from 1979 until 2001, and who was a co-recipient of the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize, with David Trimble.

**Seanad.** Literally translated as Senate, it is the upper house of the Irish Parliament.
**Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.** Informally the Northern Ireland Secretary is the principal secretary of state in the government of the United Kingdom with responsibilities for Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State is a Minister of the Crown, who is accountable to the Parliament of the United Kingdom and is the Chief Minister in the Northern Ireland Office. Formerly holding a large portfolio over home affairs in Northern Ireland, the current devolution settlement has lessened the Secretary of State’s role, granting many of the former powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive.

**Self-Loading Rifle.** The standard issue NATO rifle used by British infantry in the 1970s and 1980s, the SLR was carried by the vast majority of British soldiers in Northern Ireland until it was replaced with the lighter SA80.

**Sinn Féin.** Often incorrectly translated as ‘Ourselves Alone’ but strict translation is ‘Ourselves.’ Regarded as the political wing of PIRA, it claims descent from the party established in 1904 by Arthur Griffith. It is an all-Ireland political organisation unique in that it has representation in the Dáil and the House of Commons as well as in the Northern Ireland Assembly, although its MPs do not take their seats at Westminster.

**Special Air Service.** A Special Forces unit of the British army officially known as 22 SAS Regiment, it was formally deployed in Northern Ireland in 1976. During the 1980/90s, it was involved in a number of controversial shootings of PIRA personnel and civilians.

**‘Stickie/ Stick’**. A derisory term for Official republicans and members of the Workers Party, coined in Belfast in 1970 because the Official republican movement decided to wear adhesive badges depicting the Easter lily, the symbol of the 1916 Rising, instead of pinning the badge to their clothing in traditional fashion.

**Stormont.** The building completed in 1929 which housed the Northern Ireland parliament, until it was prorogued in 1972. It became the seat of the Assembly established after the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement. The term Stormont is also used to refer to the unionist government of the period 1921-72.

**Sunningdale Agreement** in 1973 resulted in a brief, power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive, from 01 January 1974, which was ended by the loyalist Ulster Workers’ Council Strike on 28 May 1974. The strikers opposed the power-sharing and all-Ireland aspects of the new administration. The agreement was originally reached at the Civil Service College in Sunningdale Park, located in Sunningdale, Berkshire, on 9 December 1973. Seamus Mallon, Deputy Leader of the nationalist SDLP famously asserted that the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement 1998 was “Sunningdale for slow learners.”

**Supergrass.** A person who ‘turns Queen’s evidence’ and whose information leads to the prosecution of a large number of former associates and who gives evidence at their trial. Originally East London slang, the term first came into use in England in the 1970s, but was widely used in the media in Northern Ireland in the early 1980s to refer to former republicans and loyalists whose evidence led to a large number of prosecutions.

**Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).** A phrase used to describe a set of military skill-sets that have evolved and developed over time and with experience and which are enhanced through a lesson learned process which is then translated into pre-deployment training; all of which combine to mitigate threats that were in the case of Northern Ireland
posed by PIRA and other militant republican groups. Allied with advances in technology and ballistic protection this then combined to increase Force Protection (FP) for members of the security forces. This was further enhanced and validated by the implementation of a rigorous pre-deployment training package delivered by the Northern Ireland Training Team (NITAT) to all units in the British army and served further to hone the army’s tactical skills and drills incorporated within TTPs.

**Taig.** A derogatory term for a Catholic.

**Tánaiste.** Irish Deputy prime minister.

**Taoiseach.** Literally meaning ‘chief’, the term for the Irish prime minister.

**TD.** A member of the Dáil, the Irish Parliament (in full, Teachta Dála).

**The Troubles.** For more than a generation Northern Ireland was the site of one of Europe’s most bloody and protracted recent conflicts. The term the ‘Troubles’ became part of the lexicon of the language to describe the conflict between 1969 and 2007.

**The 1916 Rising.** Often referred to as the Easter Rising, the 1916 Rising was an insurrectionary putsch planned by the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and the Irish nationalist militia, the Irish Volunteers; the rebel ranks also contained the labour movement’s Irish Citizen Army (ICA), whose able leader James Connolly had been admitted to the revolutionary conspiracy in January 1916. In the event, the Rising which began on Easter Monday was essentially a Dublin affair due to confusion of various mobilisation orders and subsequent countermanding of same. The General Post Office (GPO) and other buildings in the Irish capital were occupied by some one thousand rebels, who were then militarily crushed within a week. Sixteen of the rebel leaders were executed including the seven signatories of the Proclamation, (amongst the latter being Patrick Pearse, putative Head of the Provisional Government and James Connolly, military commander in Dublin), on foot of field court martial and attained cult status within republican mythology. Most were shot by firing squad in Kilmainham jail except Sir Roger Casement who was hung for treason in London and Thomas Kent shot in Cork. Casement had help organise a failed importation of munitions from Imperial Germany that was intercepted *en route* by the Royal Navy.

**Tout.** A derisory nickname for an informer used by both loyalist and republican paramilitaries.

**Ulster** is one of the four historical provinces of Ireland, although it is used as a synonym to refer to Northern Ireland, one of the constituent countries of the United Kingdom. Three of Ulster’s nine counties are located in the Republic of Ireland, while the remaining six (Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry/Derry and Tyrone) are located in Northern Ireland.

**Ulster Defence Association (UDA).** The largest loyalist paramilitary organisation, the UDA was established in Belfast in 1971 and proscribed in 1992.

**Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).** A regiment of the British army made up of full-time and part-time members recruited exclusively in Northern Ireland, it was raised in 1970 after the disbandment of the B Specials (Ulster Special Constabulary). In 1992 the UDR was amalgamated with the Royal Irish Rangers to form the Royal Irish Regiment.
Ulster Democratic Party (UDP). The political wing of the UDA, it made sufficient electoral impact to secure its representatives, Gary McMichael and Davy Adams, seats at the talks leading to the Belfast Agreement. A poor performance in the subsequent Assembly elections saw it without a voice in the new chamber at Stormont.

Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). A cover name or nom de guerre first used by members of the UDA in 1973.

Ulster Loyalist Central Co-ordinating Committee. A loyalist paramilitary umbrella group, originally devised in the early 1970s, it briefly re-emerged in 1991 to oversee the loyalist paramilitary response to Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Brooke’s proposals for political talks.

Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party (ULDP). The precursor to the UDP as the UDAs political wing, it developed in 1981. The ULDP’s leader, John McMichael, published its policy document, Common Sense.

Ulster Special Constabulary. Established in 1920 by the new Stormont government to defend Northern Ireland against the IRA, it originally comprised three elements but only one, known as the B Specials, remained in existence over the years. An exclusively Protestant part-time force which attracted much nationalist criticism, it was abolished in 1969 and replaced by the UDR in April 1970.

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The main unionist party in Northern Ireland, it ran the state from 1920 until 1972, securing an overall majority in every election. From 1974 until the early 1990s it was called the Official Unionist Party to distinguish it from the DUP and other splinter groups which emerged in the early 1970s. In 1996 David Trimble MP became its leader.

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Originally a unionist militia, known as the Ulster Volunteers, formed in 1912 to block self-government (or Home Rule), for Ireland which was then part of the United Kingdom. In 1913 the militias were formed into the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). A loyalist paramilitary group claiming descent from Sir Edward Carson’s UVF of 1912 but established in modern times in the mid-1960s by Shankill Road loyalists, when it carried out the first killings of the current troubles. Banned in June 1966, it was legalised briefly in April 1974 before again being declared illegal in October 1975.

Ulster Workers Council. It emerged out of the Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW) to organise the loyalist strike which brought down the power-sharing executive (Sunningdale Agreement) in May 1974.

Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party. A political party established in 1973 by William Craig, the former minister of home affairs in the Stormont government.

Workers Party. Emerging from the split within republicanism in 1970, it was originally called Official Sinn Féin and later became known as Sinn Féin the Workers Party in the 1970s. It eventually dropped Sinn Féin from the title and has some success in elections in the Irish Republic, at one time winning seven seats in the Dáil. After a further split when the leadership formed a new Dublin-based party in 1993 called Democratic Left, the Workers
Party received less than 1% of the vote in the Forum election in 1996. Democratic left in turn became part of the mainstream Labour Party.

**Young Citizens’ Volunteers.** Originally a loyalist paramilitary unit in 1912 which merged into Carson’s UVF, the name was revived by the UVF for its junior wing, a copy of the IRA’s Fianna.

**Young Militants.** The UDA’s equivalent of the YCV. The name was used to claim some UDA killings committed in the mid-1970s.
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