Transnationalism, Power and Change: Three Decades of Debt Campaigning

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Date: ________________
**Acknowledgements**

I would first like to warmly thank all those debt activists from across the globe who agreed to be interviewed by me and who mined their memories for the insights I sought.

I am also very grateful to all the organisations which gave me access to their archival material – thank you all for keeping this material over the years.

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the nature of the power of transnational civil society and how it is exercised. It does this through a case study of transnational civil society (TNCS) responses to developing countries’ debt crisis from the first protests in Peru in 1976 to the mass mobilisations at the 2005 G8 Summit. It asks what is the nature of the power of transnational civil society, and how was this power exercised in order to change international debt policy? While the focus of the thesis is on the agency of transnational civil society, the concept of the internationalising state is used to provide the structural framework that describes the changing world order against which this agency was exercised. The debt campaign is examined in terms of three periods of activity: 1976-1990; 1991-1996; and 1997-2005. The power of TNCS is examined in terms of how they used knowledge, leveraged the national/international interface, and their modes of engagement with the decision makers of the internationalising state. The nature of power relations within TNCS is explored through an analysis of the internal fault lines along the south/north interface of those campaigns. The thesis is based on an analysis of debt campaign documents, interviews with key informants, media sources and secondary sources. It finds that debt campaigning challenged international debt policy largely through national political processes, regardless of how campaigns were positioned within world order – whether in G7 countries, other creditor countries or in debtor countries - and irrespective of the particular phase of world order. On the other hand, modes of engagement with decision makers did change with the changing world order, and how debt was framed was a key element in this process. South/north relations are conceptualised as a continual cycle of solidarity and conflict, as debt movements sought both to escape the impact of the hierarchical structuring of the internationalising state, but also to leverage their particular power within that hierarchy.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRODAD</td>
<td>African Forum and Network on Debt and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>Annual General Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>AITEC</td>
<td>Association Internationale de Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRODEV</td>
<td>Association of World Council of Churches Related Development</td>
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<td>AGM</td>
<td>Bataan Nuclear Power Plant</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADTM</td>
<td>Comité por l’Annulation de la Dette du Tiers Monde</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFOD</td>
<td>Catholic Agency for Overseas Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCD</td>
<td>Comité Coopération Développement</td>
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<td>CCFD</td>
<td>Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDETIM</td>
<td>Centre d'études et d'initiatives de solidarité internationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPAL</td>
<td>La Comisión Económica para América Latina</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDSE</td>
<td>Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAIE</td>
<td>Confederação de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRBM</td>
<td>Campagne per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRID</td>
<td>Centre de Recherche Informatique et Droit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTT</td>
<td>Currency Transaction Tax</td>
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<td>DCN</td>
<td>Debt Crisis Network</td>
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<td>DDCI</td>
<td>Debt and Development Coalition Ireland</td>
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<td>DEDE</td>
<td>Deuda Externa Deuda Eterna</td>
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<td>DTM</td>
<td>Debt Treaty Movement</td>
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<td>ESAF</td>
<td>Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility</td>
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<td>Eurodad</td>
<td>European Network on Debt and Development</td>
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<td>Eurostep</td>
<td>Network of autonomous European non-governmental development organisations</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EZLN</td>
<td>Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional</td>
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<td>FDC</td>
<td>Freedom from Debt Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONDAD</td>
<td>Forum on Debt and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
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<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of 7 major industrial countries</td>
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<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of 7 plus Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of 20, consists of 19 countries and the EU and focuses on international economic issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>G24</td>
<td>Group of 24 developing countries focusing on international financial issues</td>
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<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77 developing countries within the United Nations</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS</td>
<td>Global Civil Society</td>
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<td>HCCI</td>
<td>Haut Comité à la Coopération Internationale</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
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<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
<td>Irish Mozambique Solidarity</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Inter-Press Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latindadd</td>
<td>Red Latinoamericana sobre Deuda, Desarrollo y Derechos</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDRI</td>
<td>Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPH</td>
<td>Make Poverty History</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEF</td>
<td>New Economics Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO WB</td>
<td>NGO World Bank Working Group</td>
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<td>WG</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPV</td>
<td>Net Present Value</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OI</td>
<td>Oxfam International</td>
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<td>PAF</td>
<td>Poverty Action Fund</td>
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<td>PAID</td>
<td>People Against Immoral Debt</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIGS</td>
<td>Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Partido Popular</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty reduction strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCADE</td>
<td>Red Ciudadana por la Abolición de la Deuda Externa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAN</td>
<td>Transnational Advocacy Network</td>
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<td>TASOET</td>
<td>Tanzania Social and Economic Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNCS</td>
<td>Transnational Civil Society</td>
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<td>TNSM</td>
<td>Transnational Social Movement</td>
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<td>TOES</td>
<td>The Other Economic Summit</td>
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<td>TRIMS</td>
<td>Trade-Related Investment Measures</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRIPS</td>
<td>Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights</td>
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<td>TU</td>
<td>Trade Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWN</td>
<td>Third World Network</td>
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<td>UDN</td>
<td>Uganda Debt Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Union pour un Mouvement Populaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB NGO</td>
<td>World Bank NGO Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>World Development Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDM</td>
<td>World Economy, Ecology and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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<td>WFTU</td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WISE</td>
<td>World Information Service on Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSF</td>
<td>World Social Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Introduction

Globalisation stands for organised irresponsibility. Keeping a look out for someone you can contact, someone to whom you can make a complaint, someone you can demonstrate against is a lost cause. There is no institution, no telephone numbers, no email address. (Beck 2006, p.55)

While it is true there is no world government or central authority overseeing globalisation, active citizens have targeted a range of international bodies that they see as responsible for policies which have negative social, environmental, economic and political impacts. These range from the anti-IMF and World Bank protests during the 1980s to the Battle of Seattle against the WTO in 1999 and the huge civil society mobilisations at the G7 Gleneagles Summit in 2005. Parallel to these high profile and often contentious demonstrations against IGOs, transnational civil society groups have run campaigns against specific international policies. While transnational campaigning has a long history preceding the current phase of globalisation (Keck and Sikkink 1998), the transnationalisation of campaigning grew rapidly over the course of the second half of the twentieth century paralleling the globalisation of the world economy.

The developing country debt crisis of the last quarter of the 20th century gave rise to one of the most sustained and long-running of these transnational campaigns, involving people from across the six continents. The earliest records of transnational solidarity on this topic refer to the US/Peru solidarity group of the late 1970s in response to Peru’s debt crisis (Donnelly 2002). Over the following thirty years transnational debt campaigns expanded and at their peak had groups in over sixty countries, including churches, NGOs, trade unions, solidarity groups, environment groups, and indigenous movements. In addition to its long history and broad geographic spread, debt campaigning achieved high international recognition through the Jubilee 2000 campaign, which leveraged the symbolism of the upcoming millennium, and mobilised massive public support for debt cancellation.

This study examines these movements as they waxed and waned over three decades (from 1976 to 2005) from contentious action against banks, international financial institution summits, and government austerity programmes in the 1980s to the mass mobilisation of the Jubilee 2000 campaign from the late 1990s. The thesis arose from my experience coordinating Ireland’s campaign for cancellation of developing country debt (Debt and Development Coalition Ireland) from 1993-2005. The questions examined in the thesis are those which arose for me during those years: why did we as loose-
ly linked campaign groups from across the world, think we could make a difference; what did we bring into play that might make the whole array of actors – G7, IMF, the World Bank, and governments – change course? My practitioner questions translated into the research questions ‘what is the power of transnational civil society, what is its source and how does civil society leverage this power?’

Debt campaigning took place against the background of a dramatically changing economic and political world order. It developed as the neoliberal counter-revolution was gaining in strength in the 1980s (Toye 1993), but at this time competing world systems still existed. Following the fall of communism in 1989, neoliberal claims that there were no alternatives to the free market model appeared to be confirmed, leading to the closure of space for counter-discourses. These changes were accompanied by the development of a hegemonic discourse of good governance, part of which was a global participation norm (Gaynor 2010), which opened doors to civil society groups in some international institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF. Although the consensus on neoliberalism remained in place, it began to gradually fracture over the course of the 1990s due to internal strains arising from the continual cycle of financial crises (Mexico 1994, East Asia 1997; Russia, Brazil, Ecuador 1998/9, Argentina 2001) and from external challenges by social movements and civil society groups on issues like debt, trade, investment and the lack of legitimacy of global governance more generally.

While transnational debt campaigning in this thesis is set in interaction with this changing world order, the main focus of the research is on the agency of civil society. Structure is ever present as a constraint and shaper of what ‘is’, while agency operates in hope and optimism1 of what ‘could be’ (Holloway 2005). As a result, structure can operate as a fatal attraction, drawing us into its domain and so shrinking the space for hope and optimism. Holloway (2005, p.7) expresses this as the tension between the indicative (what is) against the subjunctive (what might be), and these two are in continual tension: “[w]e are but we exist in an arc of tension towards that which we are not, or are not yet”. So while acknowledging the presence and significance of structure, this study is centred on the more elusive concept of agency.

**Introducing the main actor - transnational civil society**

The central actor in this study, transnational civil society, is an aggregate of civil society groups from across countries and regions. Civil society is a contested concept, and the

1 Thanks to Diana O’Dwyer for this insight – based on her paper “The optimism of Agency and the constraints of structure”, Dublin City University 2008.
conflicting understandings can be set in the context of the particular historic moment in which the concept was reintroduced into public discourse. From the 1980s, ‘civil society’ was used to describe those challenging the communist governments of Eastern Europe and the military regimes of Latin America (Cox 1999; Kaldor 2003; Germain and Kenny 2005). The emergence of these movements coincided with the development of ideas on global governance as the way in which the globalising world was to be governed in the absence of any centralised authority. While the movements in Eastern Europe and Latin America were decidedly political, in contrast global governance involved a depoliticisation process, integral to which was a problem solving approach that accepted current power relations as given. The move to involve civil society in policy discussions, and also an increased role for civil society in providing services that had hitherto fallen under the remit of the state, gave rise to a debate on the nature of civil society agency. One view sees civil society as an autonomous space independent of the state and market with the potential to play an emancipatory role – as did the movements in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Kaldor 2003a). An opposing view posits civil society as integrated into - albeit not absorbed by - the process of global governance (Senzing and Neumann 2006). A third view argues that civil society is not a unitary body, but contains elements which contribute to the creation and maintenance of the consensus which global governance seeks to promote, while other elements seek to change it fundamentally (Katz 2006). A key aim of this study is to develop an understanding of civil society drawing on these theories and based on an analysis of how civil society debt campaigns engaged with national and international decision makers.

Different terms are applied to civil society operating across a number of countries - transnational, international or global civil society. The term transnational is used in this study, defined as the involvement of groups from two or more countries in joint action to challenge international public policy. Global civil society, used by a range of thinkers, contains stronger claims than does the term ‘transnational’. It suggests the emergence of a new global societal force in a post-sovereign world which can help to bridge the democratic deficit within globalisation and is a more contested term than transnational civil society (Amoore and Langley 2004; Munck 2004). The term ‘global civil society’ is used in this study when referring to thinkers who use this term and the term ‘international’ is used to refer to the formal inter-governamental realms e.g. IMF and World Bank, but is not applied to civil society.

The making of transnational debt campaigns involved new relationships between groups across the globe with the south/north relationship of central importance, given
that this division corresponded to the division between debtor and creditor countries. The south/north civil society relationship has evolved over time from a welfare approach, with NGOs providing aid from the 1940s (de Senillosa 1998), to the solidarity groups that emerged from the 1960s in support of southern struggles/revolutionary governments, and the subsequent shift to advocacy from the 1990s that focussed on specific problems that affected people across a range of countries (Eade and Ligteringen 2001). The activities of transnational civil society groups from the 1970s onwards, for example, the first NGO forum to parallel a UN conference at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment; the campaign to Boycott Nestle’s infant formula; and the early years of the campaigns for debt cancellation, give the impression of transnational civil society as a site of solidarity, promoting ideas of justice, equality and the public good. Global inequalities, however, are reflected back into transnational civil society itself, with the south/north interface as a strong fault-line. One of the stories told in this study is of the south/north relationship within transnational debt campaigning as it developed over time driven by solidarity and conflict and how this led to a reconfiguration of power within debt campaigns.

**Transnational civil society operating in a globalising world**

An important starting point for civil society campaigning is to identify where to attribute responsibility for an identified problem. Transnational civil society faces the particular challenge in identifying responsibility for global problems in the absence of any form of world government. A problem is to pinpoint internationally where dominant power lies in a given policy area and the power relationship that exists between states, intergovernmental organisations, and transnational corporations. The relationship between the state and capital, between the state and the international arena, the extent to which sovereignty has been conceded by states were issues with which debt campaigners grappled during the 1980s and continue to be subject of academic debate within international political economy. The concept used in this study to express the infrastructure of dominance in the world order is Cox’s (1987) ‘internationalising state’, which argues that the state is being internationalised into official and unofficial transnational networks of states, corporate representatives, IGOs, and intellectuals with the aim to reach a consensus in support of an open world economy, but that this does not result in a centralised governing structure. According to Cox (1987) the concept is based on the evolution of the state/capital relationship over time driven by a changing world econo-
my resulting in the restructuring of the state towards the international arena in line with the globalisation of capital. This shifts the balance of state accountability away from domestic societies and more outward towards the consensus emerging within the internationalising state. Under these conditions, how can transnational civil society contest policy and power structures in the context of the internationalising state? There are different schools of thought on this question. One argument is that states should be rearticulated towards resistance to neoliberalism (Gills 2000). Others suggest the state has either been so weakened by economic globalisation or complicit in promoting this process that the state should be bypassed and the focus should be on strengthening global democracy and accountability (Evans 2008). The strategic choices made by transnational debt campaigns in relation to these options are discussed in this thesis.

**Thesis question**

As stated above, the question being examined is ‘what is the power of transnational civil society, what is its source, and how does civil society leverage this power?’ The basic definition of power used to analyse these questions is power as the potential to make, receive or resist a change (Lukes 2005, p.69). This form of power as potential is leveraged by civil society making common cause transnationally on the nature of the problem, possible solutions, and how to work together to press for these solutions. In terms of how transnational civil society seek to exercise power, a range of theoretical approaches were explored. A largely consensual approach theorises the power of transnational civil society as persuasion through promoting norms and values (Yanacopulos 2004; Dryzek 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Other explanations focus on the adversarial nature of transnational civil society – engaging in contentious politics, or anti-systemic movements with the two approaches differing in terms of the degree of change sought and the level of challenge posed to the dominant understandings. Neo-Gramscians, for example, focussing on anti-systemic challenges, posit a struggle to change current ‘common sense’ understandings to a new ‘good sense’ enabling structural change, while contentious politics theorists focus on framing issues to resonate with current cultural understandings and therefore less fundamental change. Given the “organised irresponsibility” (Beck 2006) at global level, more conventionally expressed as the absence of democratic structures, the power of global civil society is seen by other theorists as arising from its potential to bridge this democratic deficit, but this potential is qualified by inequalities within global civil society and its own democratic defi-
As this is an exploratory study, primarily concerned with questions of agency, an analytical framework is developed (in chapters 2 and 3) that enables a bottom-up approach to analysing and interpreting the data collected. Within this framework the case study material is analysed through the lenses of ‘sources of power’ and ‘exercising power’ as follows:

**Source of power:** power as potential is described as being actualised by civil society groups coming together transnationally to make common cause, on their analysis of the debt crisis, their proposed solutions and how they will work together for a resolution of the problem.

**Exercising Power:** in this framework the exercising of power by civil society has three key dimensions

- Knowledge: the (counter) discourses on debt mobilised by debt campaigns
- Geography: how debt campaigns operated across the national/international interface
- Modes of engagement with decision makers – the degree to which these were adversarial or consensual.

Underlying this framework is a broader question: what was the level of challenge posed by transnational debt campaigns to the world order? As these research questions were those with which I grappled as a practitioner, they are likely to be of interest to others involved in transnational activism in terms of developing and implementing strategies. The study can also help activists and practitioners to place their efforts within a broader framework including understandings of civil society and of the national/international interface. The questions also have significant theoretical implications. This can be demonstrated by asking the questions: why a study of the power of transnational civil society; and why debt movements as a case study of transnational civil society?

In terms of why study the power of transnational civil society, this is relevant because the effects of globalisation continue to be strongly contested between those who argue that globalisation is decreasing poverty and inequality (World Bank 2002) and those who argue that globalisation is deepening the structural inequalities between core and periphery countries (Wade 2004). There are a range of bodies deeply enmeshed in this power struggle over the ‘common sense’ of globalisation—academics
think tanks, IGOs, business and finance representative bodies and civil society groups such as debt campaigns. Analysis of the power of different actors is of central importance for this debate, but the issue of power has tended to be somewhat neglected in the literature on global governance (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Gills 2000). Further, some theorists bypass civil society groups, and the role of transnational civil society has been neglected by much of IPE, which tends to focus on elite actors (Broome 2009, p.59). Even Neo-Gramscians who are centrally interested in the possibility of the transformation of world order pay far more attention to dominant forces than to civil society/social movements (Drainville 2005a). In this context studies of the power of transnational civil society can contribute significantly to more nuanced understandings of power in world order.

Why choose debt campaigns as the subject of this study? The long history, broad geographic span and significant southern involvement make the debt campaigns a very interesting case. It enables a study of change in the campaign over time and differences in the campaign between different countries and regions. There is a growing body of literature on debt movements (reviewed in Chapter 1), but this is dominated by the high profile Jubilee Campaign. This study adds to this literature by providing a more detailed examination of debt campaigns’ long history without privileging any particular phase; a wider geographic span covering campaigns in debtor countries, G7 and non-G7 creditor countries and has a stronger focus on southern involvement than has been provided in studies to date. This enables an examination of:

- how common cause was made and sustained over such a long period, the tensions that emerged, in particular along the south/north interface, and the outcomes of these tensions
- the diverse approaches to, and understandings of, the debt crisis by debt campaigns, enabling a multi-layered understanding of transnational civil society rather than positing it largely as a unitary actor
- the mechanisms through which debt campaigns engaged with decision makers and the implications of this for understandings of civil society relations with states and IGOs
- how debt campaigns operated across the national /international interface and whether this varied between countries differently positioned within world order or over time
- how campaigning interacted with, and impacted on, the changing world order
Asking these questions has the potential to provide a broader understanding of the power of transnational civil society as manifested in debt campaigns.

**How the study was carried out**

This exploratory study uses qualitative methods, providing a rich analysis of three time periods. While it was not possible to cover all the individual country campaigns or regional networks, material from a selection of debtor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America and from a range of European countries and the European Network on Debt and Development was gathered. The thesis uses interviews with key informants, secondary sources, archival material and media coverage. The three time periods relate to different forms of campaigning and to different phases of the changing world order.

Case Study Period 1: 1976-1990: in this period civil society groups from different parts of the world were developing transnational links, with adversarial action taking place in opposition to debtor government austerity programmes, creditor country banks and at international summits. The campaign took place against the background of a world order in which alternative political systems were still possible;

Case Study Period 2: 1991-1996: after the fall of the Berlin Wall the campaign involved close engagement with decision makers in a uni-polar economic world;

Case Study Period 3: 1996-2005: the Jubilee 2000 campaign which leveraged the upcoming millennium as a new symbolic opportunity to mobilise public support for debt cancellation emerged at a time when the neoliberal world order has begun to fracture.

**Thesis structure**

Chapter 1: This chapter, entitled ‘Debt Crisis and its Contestation’, provides an overview of the debt crisis and how it was contested by debt campaigns. It places debt campaigning in the context of a changing world order and concludes with a review of the literature on debt campaigning, highlighting areas where knowledge of the power of transnational debt campaigning needs further development.
Chapter 2: ‘Power and Transnational Civil Society’ reviews the main theoretical approaches to transnational civil society power and concludes with a rationale for the analytical framework used in this study.

Chapter 3: ‘Understanding World Order’ identifies Cox’s internationalising state as the structural framework for the thesis. Following a short review of alternative explanations, the development and operation of the internationalising state together with the weaknesses of the concept are set out. The internationalising state is then operationalised in relation to debt, and the implications for civil society campaigning are identified. The chapter concludes with an outline of how the internationalising state is to be operationalised in the case study chapters.

Chapter 4: ‘Researching Debt Movements’ provides an overview of how the study was carried out, a rationale for the qualitative case study methods used, and a reflection on my role as an ‘insider’ researcher. It describes the research process from data collection through analysis and interpretation.

The three case study chapters 5, 6 and 7 cover the three time periods and all have a similar structure based on the analytical framework. Chapter 5: ‘The Making of Transnational Debt Movements 1976-1990’ covers the first time period, focussing on how debt campaigns made common cause over the 1980s and action taken to contest the debt. Chapter 6, entitled ‘Campaigning for debt cancellation in a Uni-polar economic world order’, examines the first coordinated transnational debt campaign, which contributed to the adoption in 1996 of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. Chapter 6: ‘Jubilee Campaign’ covers the period of debt campaigning that achieved the highest and broadest levels of mobilisation, but also the one in which the south/north tensions became most acute.
Chapter One: The Debt Crisis and Its Contestation

Introduction

Civil society campaigning for debt cancellation is one of the longest running transnational campaigns. It was not a static activity, but rather a process which changed significantly over the thirty year period covered in this research, during which time the context in which campaigning has taken place also changed. Among these changes was a shift in the role of NGOs and in the way in which the role of civil society more generally was conceptualised. At the same time there were major advances in information and communication technologies and in transport and dramatic changes in world order. Transnational campaigning waxed and waned, targeted different decision makers, adopted different repertoires of action and used different discourses on debt over the decades. In the literature debt campaigning is highlighted as an example of a successful transnational campaign, especially the Jubilee 2000 campaign set up in 1996 (Friesen 2010; Broome 2009; Mayo 2005; Grenier 2003). This campaign influenced both national and international decision makers and achieved some debt cancellation and was also notable for the high levels of transnational mobilisation and the strength of the south/north linkages within the campaign. In spite of this assessment of the importance of the debt campaign and of Jubilee 2000 in particular, there is relatively little analytical literature on debt campaigns and this literature will be discussed in section 1.6 below.

This chapter firstly discusses the debt crisis and the response of campaigners; it then outlines the changes in world order which are relevant for this study. Following this, given that the concept of civil society is contested, different understandings of the term are considered in order to discuss the basis for a working definition of civil society. Finally, the literature on debt campaigning, produced by both academics and debt campaign activists and practitioners, is discussed, and the understandings of the power of civil society organisations that make up the debt campaign contained in that literature are analysed.

The emergence of two debt crises

The debt crisis in developing countries that exploded during the last quarter of the twentieth century enveloped Latin America and Africa, with the Philippines as the main
country affected in Asia. As with any major historical event, pinpointing the start of the debt crisis depends on which crisis is being considered – a crisis threatening people’s lives and livelihoods or one threatening the financial system. Some analysts and activists situate the Latin American debt crisis within the centuries of exploitation of its environment and people after the arrival of the conquistadores at the end of the fifteenth century. The resulting massive social, economic and ecological debts owing to the peoples of Latin America dwarf the amounts owed by the continent at the end of the 20th century (Mujica 1988; Osorio 1987). The colonial period also left its debt legacy in Africa. Many African states inherited huge foreign debts contracted by colonial administrations and never managed to emerge from their indebtedness (Adeleji 1985).

A shorter historical perspective situates the debt crises in the context of the development of the internationalising state with the shifting relationship between state and finance capital (see Chapter 3) and more specifically the emergence in the 1960s of the virtually unregulated Eurodollar Market that facilitated the lending which led to the crisis. The cost of operating in this market was lower due to lack of regulation. For example, US banks were required to hold a certain percentage of their assets in reserve, but this did not apply to their off-shore branches (Lipson 1981). The Eurodollar market was fed by substantial dollar surpluses held by private banks and central banks outside the US as a result of the chronic US balance of payments deficit (Teunissen 1987) due to stronger competition from Japan and Europe and also the costs of the Vietnam War (Walton 1989). The development of this market was also propelled by the huge amount of petrodollars that resulted from the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC in 1973 and which were deposited in international banks. Banks were obviously keen to lend their surpluses, and they found new markets in developing countries with 40% of Euromarket loans going to developing countries by 1979 (Lipson 1981). As a result, public debt as a percentage of GNP in Latin America increased nearly four times between 1970 and 1983 (Walton 1989, p.304), and African debt increased eight fold between 1971 and 1982, with interest payments rising from $277 million in 1971 to over $5 billion in 1982 (Adeleji 1985, p.56).

There were external and internal reasons why countries borrowed on such a scale. External factors included the fact that money was cheap – real interest rates were virtually zero during the 1970s (Green 1995), and governments were encouraged to borrow by the IMF and the OECD (Broome 2009). Banks lent far beyond prudent levels, and when borrowing countries could not maintain repayments, a crisis threatened the entire financial system. The lending bonanza was also fuelled by cold war politics, as
east and west competed for allies among developing countries. Internally, states had to finance the enormous oil price increases in addition to needing to finance their development programmes. According to Walton (1989, p.305), governments “bought some of the fruits of development on credit”, providing social mobility for the middle classes and profit to those linked to the international economy, while also enhancing the social wage by increasing subsidies on basic goods. The loans also fuelled corruption, leading to questions about the legitimacy of the lending, particularly in the case of Latin America during the 1970s, as many of the borrowing countries were run by military regimes. In Africa future problems were inevitable as the loans were used for the financing of basic infrastructure (education, health, water, transport), which was almost entirely reliant on external financing (Adedeji 1990).

The immediate cause of the crisis was a huge rise in interest rates and a second oil shock in 1979 and the collapse in commodity prices as a result of the accompanying recession. For example, Africa’s export earnings decreased by 25% between 1979 and 1982 (Adedeji 1985, p.61). US policy aimed at halting the fall in the value of the dollar drastically increased interest rates, exacerbating the crisis, and it was the hike in interest rates that accounted for a large proportion of the increased debt burden in the 1980s rather than any increase in borrowing. In the case of Africa, these high interest rates are estimated to account for one-third of its debt (Adedeji 1990), an example of the major transfers of resources from indebted southern governments to northern creditors.

While resolutions on developing country debt were passed at UNCTAD as early as 1978 (UNCTAD 1978), internationally the high level of debt was only perceived as a crisis for international finance in August 1982, when Mexico, a major debtor, caused panic by announcing that it could not continue to service its debt. Not all the debt was owed to commercial banks. There were two other significant sets of creditors: rich country governments and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the regional development banks. While Latin American countries owed significant amounts to commercial banks, Sub-Saharan African countries were more indebted to rich country governments and multilateral institutions. This meant that Latin American and African countries took different approaches to their creditors, and different initiatives were taken by creditors to deal with the different forms of debt, as will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6.

The other debt crisis, the crisis for the people of indebted countries, dates from when governments began to experience difficulty in servicing their debt, as they could not generate the resources to cover the higher interest payments and increased import
costs and turned to the IMF for loans. A condition for receipt of new loans or debt rescheduling was that governments should introduce IMF austerity programmes, which included devaluation, leading to higher prices for imported goods and a reduction in public spending, including slashing subsidies on essential goods, such as food, and wage reductions. The impact of wage cuts and price rises on individual household budgets mirrored the impact of commodity price falls and increases in interest rates on government budgets. Among the earliest countries affected were Peru and Jamaica, which were both in virtual default from 1976 (Walton 1989). Popular debt protests took place in Peru from 1976 (Walton 1989) and sparked off transnational solidarity (Donnelly 2002). As Peru and Jamaica were not systemically important countries, their debt crises did not pose a threat to international banks and so did nor evoke the same response from the international system as did Mexico’s crisis. It was the threat to the financial system that preoccupied creditor organisations, and therefore their focus was on the need to ensure that debtor countries continued to service their debts. It was, however, the devastating effects of the crisis on people’s lives which sparked off debt campaigning.

**Debt campaigning**

The earliest evidence of transnational action on debt dates to solidarity with Peru from returned US missionaries in the late 1970s (Donnelly 2002). From the 1980s, national and transnational action on debt began to develop, starting in Latin America and the Philippines and then spreading to Europe and North America. Action took the form of national protests against the austerity programmes which were a condition for debt relief, contentious mobilisations at IGO summits, and the emergence of national campaigns. A significant feature was the development of transnational links covering much of the globe between civil society groups concerned about debt. It is significant that this took place in the absence of the developments in information technology and cheaper travels which underpinned later transnational civil society networking. While initially the focus of campaigning was largely on Latin American debt owed to commercial banks, towards the end of the 1980s campaigning moved to Sub-Saharan African debt, 75% of which was owed to rich country governments and multilateral institutions (Adedeji 1990).

In spite of the severe social and economic effects of the crisis and protests from both debtor governments and civil society groups, creditors held strongly to the princi-
ple of the sanctity of contracts, and therefore that debts must be repaid. Their main response was to provide new loans to enable countries to continue to service their debts, leading to a further accumulation of debt. Two debt deals adopted by the G7 in 1988 and 1989, respectively, started the process of a series of inadequate creditor initiatives that contributed to the fact that the crisis dragged on for decades. In 1988 the Toronto Terms were adopted by the G7, with the aim of providing limited relief on the debt of low-income countries (Evans 1999; Adedeji 1990). The following year a further initiative, the Brady Bonds, was introduced to deal with commercial debt, involving swapping existing loans for low-interest bonds backed by the US Treasury Miles 1999 (Miles 1999; Vásquez 1996).

The second phase of debt campaigning from 1990 focussed on official debt, in particular of Sub-Saharan African countries. This phase of campaigning took place in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the subsequent narrowing of space for anti-systemic approaches. There was a shift from contentious mobilisation and protests to lobbying national and international decision makers. This involved adopting a discourse which was closer to that of national and international decision makers, involving in particular a more technical analysis of the debt issue (Momani 2010a; Callaghy 2002; Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998).

While the focus of campaigners was now on official debt, multilateral debt was far more onerous than debt owed to rich country governments (bilateral creditors). Although only 30% of the long-term debt of heavily indebted low-income countries was owed to multilaterals, half of their debt servicing went to multilateral creditors (Bokkerink and van Hees 1998). This was because multilateral debt was the priority for repayment, because a failure to repay carried the threat that the defaulting countries could become financial pariahs, being refused loans or grants from any source. A further problem was that aid was being recycled to repay debt to multilateral institutions rather than being spent on human development: “Repayments to multilateral creditors, mainly the IMF and the World Bank, now account for more than half of the $12bn in debt service payments made by African governments, forcing massive diversion of overseas aid provided by donors” (Bryer 1995). Particularly controversial was the fact that the inability to reschedule or reduce multilateral debt led to a reverse flow of resources from Africa to the IMF (Adedeji 1990, p.2).

Cancelling multilateral debt was particularly contentious, with the IMF and the World Bank strongly opposed, arguing that bilateral debt was the real problem facing low-income countries, that only a few countries had a multilateral debt problem, and in
any case multilateral debt could not be reduced due to the fact that the World Bank would lose its AAA credit rating, leading to an increase in the cost of its borrowing, and the IMF role as lender of last resort would be undermined. A further reason for resistance both by the IMF, the World Bank and other creditors was that by cancelling this debt, they would lose leverage over the economic policies of southern countries (Lawrence 1995). Pressure for multilateral debt reduction came from a range of sources: civil society debt campaigns, some rich country governments, UN organisations and parts of the World Bank. This resulted in the adoption of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative in 1996, which, with modifications introduced in 1999, offered the framework for dealing with low-income countries’ debt over the course of the next decade. This initiative provided some debt reduction to up to 41 designated highly indebted low-income countries, but they first had to complete six years of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes. Debt campaigners were divided in their response to the initiative. The division was between those who saw the initiative as copper fastening south/north inequalities giving further leverage to northern interests over southern countries through adjustment conditionalities, and those who saw it as a stepping stone towards a more just solution, providing opportunities for further lobbying (Bokkerink and van Hees 1998).

At the same time as the HIPC initiative was adopted, the Jubilee 2000 campaign, the most high-profile debt campaign, was launched in Britain in 1996. The campaign was based on linking the biblical concept of a periodic jubilee whereby ‘right relations’ are restored, that is, debts are cancelled, land redistributed and slaves freed, with the upcoming millennium as a new Jubilee moment. The central campaign call was for the cancellation of unpayable debt of the poorest countries by the year 2000, giving a debt-free start for a billion people (Buxton 2002). The campaign used a range of methods – an international petition, major mobilisations at G7 Summits, lobbying national decision makers and a wide range of actions at national level. This resulted in a new debt initiative – the Cologne debt deal, known also as the Enhanced HIPC - which increased debt reduction under HIPC, releasing resources into debtor government budgets (Greenhill and Blackmore 2002). A further element of the Cologne debt deal was that savings in government budgets as a result of debt reduction had to be directed towards the implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies (Stewart and Wang 2003; Seshamani 2005). As happened following adoption of HIPC 1, Jubilee 2000 campaigners were divided in their responses to the Cologne deal, with some northern campaigns giving it a qualified welcome, but others, in particular southern campaigns, rejected the deal, seeing it as
continuing oppressive relations between north and south and that it failed to recognise the illegitimacy of much of the debt owed by the south. This led to serious tensions between southern and northern groups. An autonomous Jubilee South network of southern groups was launched in November 1999 with a radical analysis of debt as illegitimate, questioning who owed what to whom, declaring that southern countries were the creditors and calling for repudiation of debt.

While Jubilee 2000 was set up as a time-limited campaign that would disband at the end of the year 2000, given the huge mobilisations it generated and the high international profile it gained, campaigns continued beyond 2000, albeit at a more modest level. In 2004/2005 a new transnational civil society initiative was launched -Make Poverty History (MPH)/Global Call for Action against Poverty (GCAP). This campaign had a wider focus, seeking improvements on debt, aid and trade. Within this Jubilee campaigns played a central role in relation to the debt issue, which was the focus of huge mobilisations in 2005 in relation to the G7 Summit in Gleneagles. The G7 announced the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MLDRI), which promised 100% cancellation of debt owed to the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank for countries which had completed the HIPC initiative. While this was a significant step compared to the early 1990s, when multilateral debt cancellation was taboo, neoliberal conditionality for countries seeking debt cancellation remained in place (Nash 2008), and only a limited number of countries benefited, as the initiative was limited to countries which had completed HIPC.

**Debt campaigning in a changing world order**

The changes in world order that occurred concurrently with three decades of debt campaigning consisted of a range of elements. Particularly relevant for this research are the shift in the power relations between southern and northern countries and the end of the east/west polarisation following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. With regard to south/north relations, following decolonisation in Asia and Africa after World War 11, southern countries formed significant groupings within the UN, the most important ones being the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G77. Operating through these groupings, countries of the global south challenged their unequal position within the world economy. A major proposal promoted by southern countries was for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), consisting of a range of measures to restructure international economic relations with the aim of enabling net inflows of resources to developing
countries through trade and aid. The UN General Assembly adopted the proposal in 1974, and a process of dialogue between southern and northern governments to resolve the issues covered by this proposal was initiated. While there was significant conflict within this relationship, there was also some recognition of common interests between south and north in the context of an increasingly interdependent world, for example, in the Brandt Report (Mittelman and Pasha 1997, Adams 1993).

The 1980s saw dramatic ideological shifts and changes in world order. The decade was marked by the launch of the neoliberal counter-revolution (Toye 1993), the election of neoliberal governments in the UK, US and Germany, and the explosion of the debt crisis – all of which became entwined in strengthening neoliberalism. Central to the counter-revolution was a depoliticisation of the structural inequalities within the international economy. These inequalities and the continued underdevelopment of some regions was increasingly attributed to failures by southern governments (Mawdsley and Rigg 2003). This was accompanied by the assertion that the same free market policies were appropriate for all countries, regardless of how they were integrating into the world economy (Martinussen 1999; Toye 1993). The debt crisis provided a lever whereby debtor states could be restructured in line with these policies through policy conditions attached to the receipt of debt relief, aid and loans. The parallel development of global governance as a “broad ordering strategy for the world economy that attempts to construct a perfectly apolitical civic space” (Drainville 2005a, p.106) further contributed to the depoliticisation process. This process was strengthened by the growing crisis in the Soviet Union over the 1980s, which resulted in the weakening of the idea of an alternative to capitalism. Further, the growing hegemony of neoliberal ideas led to the sidelining of the NIEO and the north/south dialogue. Some civil society groups, however, resisted the changes in world order, and in the 1980s debt movements sought to exercise power by challenging the changes arising from the strengthening of neoliberalism. These groups held on to counter-discourses of the NIEO, liberation theology and maintained solidarity with revolutionary struggles and the governments emerging from those struggles such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, one of the defining radical causes of the 1980s.

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a peak moment in the process of the depoliticisation of global inequalities. The pattern of cold war lending, whereby east and west sought to support their respective southern allies, came to an end, and the concept of ‘governance’ became central to international discourse as the framework to enable further development of the world economy. As part of the process of creating a new con-
sensus around the ‘governance’ discourse, the idea of the participation of civil society in policy processes became a global norm (Gaynor 2010). This development was a key factor that drew debt campaigns into close engagement with international organisations dealing with debt. They were pushed towards this form of engagement by the fatal weakening of the practical possibility of alternative ideologies in the short to medium term and attracted to it by the opening up of participation spaces in IGOs that they believed could be used to press for short-term changes in debt policy. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, to leverage these ‘invited spaces’ debt campaigns aligned their analysis with the framework of the dominant understandings that informed these IGOs and attempted to align their proposed solutions with the most progressive parts of the IGOs dealing with debt.

As a result of internal strains and external pressure, hegemonic neoliberalism began to fracture during the 1990s. While the 1989 Brady Bonds restored investor confidence in middle-income countries, international debt problems were exacerbated, because new investment came significantly in the form of short-term speculative capital (Soto 2013). This factor, together with the liberalisation of finance, contributed to a continual cycle of financial crises starting as early as 1994 with the Mexican crisis, followed shortly by the Asian Tigers in 1997. In 1998 Russia defaulted on its debt, while Brazil tottered on the brink of crisis, and Ecuador suffered a severe financial crisis during which the government was brought down as a result of the mobilisation led by the indigenous people’s movement, CONAIE (Lucero 2001). Following this there was the high-profile Argentinean default in 2001 which was also accompanied by massive domestic protests (Benclowicz 2011; Silva 2009). The unremitting cycle of financial crises dented the credibility of neoliberal policies and led to the emergence of critics from the heart of the internationalising state and of the key international financial institutions, such as the economist Joseph Stiglitz.² These internal strains were paralleled by external challenges from social movements and civil society networks. In 1994 the Zapatistas emerged in Mexico in opposition to the signing of NAFTA and to the neoliberal policies followed by the Mexican government. The Zapatistas played a central role in reactivating the tradition of solidarity with revolutionary movements from civil society organisations in northern states and also in promoting transnational resistance to neoliberalism. They organised an Intercontinental Encounter For Humanity against Neoliberal-

ism in Chiapas in 1996, which was a major counter-systemic international event (Morton 2002). In 1995 sustained strikes in France were framed as opposition to ‘global markets’ leading to the emergence of ATTAC (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l’Aide aux Citoyens) in 1998. This organisation called for a tax on financial transactions and became a new transnational social movement that played a central role in the establishment of the World Social Forum in 2001 (Ancelovici 2002). The first major Jubilee 2000 mobilisation at the G8 Summit in Birmingham and the defeat of the OECD’s proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment by “network guerrillas, a loose coalition of NGOs” (Jonquiere 1998), also took place in 1998. In 1999, a major mobilisation, the ‘Battle of Seattle’ took place at the WTO’s Ministerial Meeting which can be seen as the start of a new phase of the anti-globalisation movement. The 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle also marked the strongest southern government opposition within an inter-governmental organisation to the international economic structures since the NIEO debates of the 1970s, and marked the beginning of the unravelling of the consensus in favour of multilateral trade rules. This form of active mobilisation continued into the new millennium with further contentious mobilisations against the IMF and the World Bank and with significant protests at G7 Summits in 2001 and 2005.

The later phase of debt campaigning did not, however, emerge as a response to these strains in the world order, but Jubilee 2000 created a different opportunity to mobilise public support for debt cancellation through leveraging the symbolism of the millennium and achieving a high international profile. As a diverse and broadly based organisation, it also operated as a complex mix of campaigning, public mobilisation and institutional engagement in national and international arenas.

**Positioning civil society in relation to the national and international arenas**

As can be seen from the previous section, transnational civil society campaigns emerged as a central actor in relation to the debt crisis from the 1980s onwards. The emergence of transnational civil society was paralleled by the development of the idea of ‘global governance’ describing the decentralised, depoliticised process through which globalisation would be overseen in the absence of any form of world government (Roseneau 2002). Linkages between global governance and transnational civil society were promoted through the new global norm encouraging the participation of civil society in policy discussion referred to above. Given this linkage, transnational civil society is a particularly contested concept, giving rise to a debate in the literature as to the nature of the agency

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of transnational civil society. It is debated whether or not transnational civil society can be described as an independent space, which has the potential to challenge the policies and legitimacy of global governance, or is it best described as being integrated into a depoliticised problem solving process of global governance (Drainville 2005a; Chandhoke 2002). Even the name given to this form of social organisation has political overtones. The term ‘civil society’ was reintroduced into public discourse in the 1980s to describe those groups that were challenging the communist governments of Eastern Europe and the military governments of Latin America (Germain and Kenny 2005; Cox 1999; Kaldor 2003). The term also impacted on civil society replacing an activist discourse based on concepts such as ‘the grass roots’, ‘popular movements’, ‘the community’ and more broadly ‘the people’, and it is significant that the use of the more depoliticised term ‘civil society’ coincides with the rise of global governance and its associated norm of civil society participation.

In the literature there is a division between those who describe civil society as independent of state and market and those that position civil society historically as part of the development of the modern nation-state. The first approach – the liberal view – represents broadly speaking the common-sense understanding of civil society today (Cox 1999, p.10). This view is reinforced by civil society’s own strong narrative of itself as an autonomous, normative space (Cohen and Arato 1992) representing the public interest, in contrast to the narrow self-interest of states and corporations. The broader public perception of civil society reflects this understanding (Broome 2009, Chandhoke 2002, Risse 2000). Rather than see civil society as an independent space, however, Gramscian and Foucauldian perspectives both posit different forms of intermeshing of civil society and the state. From a Gramscian perspective civil society is a dialectical process within which the consensus underpinning a hegemonic order is created and maintained, but in which it is also contested (Katz 2006; Munck 2004; Gramsci 1971). From a Foucauldian perspective civil society is an element in a particular method of government in which civil society is engaged as a subject of as well as an object of government. In this case it is the very features of civil society that mark its independence – its ability to self-organise and to mobilise public opinion - which are harnessed by government (Sending and Neumann 2006; Lemke 2001; Burchill et al 1991). Unravelling this complex set of relationships is a key aim of this thesis.
Debt movements and power

To examine this nexus of relationships and the role of civil society this study asks two questions: what is the nature of the power of transnational civil society, and how is that power exercised? While the literature on debt campaigning is limited and overly focussed on the Jubilee 2000 campaign, it poses different questions using a number of theoretical approaches and takes different methodological approaches including single, comparative and longitudinal case studies. Among country campaigns studied are the Philippines (Ariate et al 2009; Gersham 1997; Grageda 1994); Spain (Vivas 2008), Ecuador (Molina Vera 2008) and South Africa (Rustomjee 2004). A number of studies compare different national campaigns, for example, Jubilee Japan and Jubilee UK (Holmes 2006) and British, French and German Jubilee campaigns (Josselin 2007). Friesen (2012) focuses on both popular campaigning and on elite ‘civil society’ (the World Economic Forum) support for debt cancellation, while Shawki compares Jubilee 2000 with the campaign for a currency transaction tax (CTT). A longitudinal approach is taken by Donnelly (2002) and Friesen (2012) who cover the period from the 1980s up to 2000 and 2005 respectively. However, while some studies focus on national campaigns, others focus on the transnational dimension of campaigning, but none integrate an analysis of both dimensions, and therefore cannot address the questions raised in this thesis holistically.

There are a range of studies which relate to the first question on the nature of power. A number of studies look at how debt movements generate power by making common cause and developing organisational structures in order to contest the debt issue. These studies also highlight the fault-lines within debt movements along which fractures developed weakening common cause (Reitan 2007; Tagle and Patomaki 2007; Mayo 2005b; Grenier 2003; Donnelly 2002). These studies primarily use social movement theory to examine the nature of power, which is seen as embodied in the way that debt movements construct themselves as social movements. Another range of studies focuses on the exercise of power: that is, how the debt issue was contested (Friesen 2012, Momani 2010a, Shawki 2010, Broome 2009, Josselin 2007, Yanacopulos 2004, Callaghy 2002. Evans 1999). In these studies constructivist understandings of power as persuasion are mainly used to examine the exercise of power in the transnational arena, while political opportunity structure is applied to studies of national debt campaigning. Finally, there are a limited number of studies which ask what shaped the debt policy of
G7 countries and use the impact of debt campaigning as one of a number of explanatory variables (Busby 2007; Helleiner and Cameron 2006; Dixon and Williams 2001).

In addition to the academic literature referred to above, there are a range of articles produced by debt campaign practitioners that provide historic detail. Most of this work again relates to Jubilee 2000, with the notable exception of an article by Bokkerink and Van Hees (1998) which outlines the role of the European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad) in the campaign for multilateral debt cancellation and provides useful insights into the lobbying process. Articles by Pettifor (2002, 2006) and Buxton (2002, 2004), both of whom worked for Jubilee 2000 UK, give accounts of how the campaign developed, perceived strengths and successes and tensions which arose, particularly between the south and north. Abildsnes (2007) provides an account of the Norwegian campaign against Norway’s illegitimate debt. Collins, Gariyo and Burden (2001) who worked for Jubilee USA, Uganda Debt Network and Oxfam UK, respectively, give an overview of the operation of the campaign globally. Southern perspectives are provided by Bendaña (2006), Keet (2000) and Gariyo (1999), with the latter two focussing on the south/north tensions which arose within the movement. Insightful as both the academic and practitioner literature on debt campaigns are, the literature does not currently provide an integrated account of the national and international dimensions of the debt campaign over time. Also, there is a need for studies which explore the diversity of the debt campaign and the different levels and geographic spaces in which it operated as a means of understanding the power and agency of civil society.

1.6.1 Exploring the nature of the power of debt campaigns

Civil society power in this study is seen as arising from the ability of individuals and groups to come together and make common cause about a particular issue. This encompasses a common understanding of the issue, including who is responsible, how issues can be resolved and the role of civil society groups in pressing decision makers towards the desired solution. Silva (2009, p.33) refers to this common cause forged by civil society as “collective power”, defined as the ability to “form horizontal linkages, to coordinate action and to establish coalitions and alliances”. There are a range of studies which examine how this collective power was generated and sustained by debt campaigns. In terms of studies which examine a broader span of debt campaigning than Jubilee 2000, Donnelly (2002) tracks the ebb and flow in the generation and maintenance of ‘common cause’ and the cleavages which emerged between debt groups from the late
1970s up to 2000 covering the US, Europe and to a lesser extent southern countries. Her study highlights the importance of individual activists and their inter-linkages for maintaining common cause over time. She also gives one of the clearest outlines of the radical/reform cleavages that resulted from different attitudes to structural adjustment and towards debt deals which offered partial rather than total debt cancellation. This study builds on this work. Another major contribution from Tagle and Patomaki (2007) is to chart the multiplicity of frames used by debt movements: including social, economic, ecological, human rights, and radical southern frames which declared that people of the south were the creditors because of the impact of colonialism and the ongoing unequal south/north relations. This demonstrates the breadth and sophistication of the understandings of debt which underpinned debt campaigns, in contrast to the primarily moral arguments which can be overstated in some of the literature on debt campaigning (Broome 2009; Yanacopulos 2004). Tagle and Patomaki (2007) also highlight similar areas of disagreement between debt campaign groups to Donnelly (2002), which while most acute between south and north did not represent a simple south/north split. For example, while there were debt campaigns in both the north and south calling for total cancellation without conditions, there were also campaigns in some debtor countries calling for some conditions to ensure that resources freed up by debt cancellation would be used for the benefit of the population.

Using social movement theory Reitan (2007) outlines how debt campaigning was developed: through brokerage that linked previously unconnected sites through NGOs and churches; using a range of already established contacts including the media and internet to diffuse the message; and through framings of the debt problem. Reitan (2007) sees churches with their extensive transnational networks as central to all three processes. While Jubilee 2000 was successful in building a global movement and achieving some debt reduction, Reitan (2007) describes this victory as ‘pyrrhic’, because adjustment conditions continued to be imposed, and internal tensions caused the campaign to fracture. Her application of Bennett’s (2005) theory of different generations of civil society networks to analyse the tensions within Jubilee 2000 throws more light on the south/north interface within civil society than do other studies. Bennett distinguishes between single issue, policy advocacy, NGO-led networks and the broader, more radical multiple-issue social justice activism. While there are major differences between these different forms of transnational activism, giving rise to significant tensions, they are connected through loosely related networks. Reitan (2007) highlights that Jubilee 2000 contained elements of both first-generation NGO advocacy network,
engaging in altruistic northern NGO policy reform advocacy, and second-generation direct social justice activism as represented by Jubilee South. It has been argued that NGO advocacy networks tend to break down when ‘intended beneficiaries’ become centrally involved (Sikkink 1998), and this was the case with Jubilee 2000 when southern activists set up the autonomous second-generation network, Jubilee South, in 1999. As the south/north relationship is central to the creation and maintenance of common cause and therefore to the power of transnational civil society, Reitan (2007) and Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) analyses provide useful insights for a more layered understanding of this relationship, taking us beyond the simple fact of northern dominance of Jubilee 2000 as the basis for the south/north tensions.

In the existing literature on the nature of power of debt campaigns, a number of points emerge: that transnational civil society power develops over time, growing from existing links between groups and individuals (Reitan 2007; Donnelly 2002); that it can operate with a multitude of frames (Tagle and Patomaki 2007); and that while fractures may occur, campaigns do not have to be wholly consensual, but in practise can operate with a level of tension and even conflict (Grenier 2003). What is currently not dealt with in the literature is an understanding of how civil society agency responded to a changing world, and there is also a lack of focus on the nature of southern agency within transnational debt campaigning. While there are studies of southern campaigns (Rustomjee 2004; Molina Vera 2008; Ariate and Molmisa 2009), because these studies focus mainly on national-level action they do not specifically address the south/north relationship within transnational campaigning, which is a subject of this thesis. Nor has this dimension been adequately integrated into studies examining debt campaigning at a transnational level (Mayo 2005; Grenier 2003), which tend to approach the issue from a northern perspective. A further limitation reflects a general difficulty in studying transnational movements. Faced with the diversity of any such movement - its geographic spread and its national and regional cultural and political diversity - there is a tendency to provide a view mainly through the lens of a dominant country, frequently the US or UK, for example, as in the studies by Grenier (2003), Mayo (2005), and Reitan (2007). Transnational campaigns are usually made up of a number of constituent parts, and these separate parts continually aggregate up into a transnational campaign and simultaneously disaggregate back into its constituent parts. In the case of debt campaigning, the constituent parts largely consisted of national and regional networks. This is a difficult process to capture, and in particular to capture in one study. Hence the understandable tendency to either focus on country cases (Ariate and Molmisa 2009; Molina Vera
or to present debt campaigning as a fairly unitary transnational actor, albeit one which fractured at times (Friesen 2012; Yanacopulos 2004).

### 1.6.2 Debt campaigns exercising power

A range of studies have examined how debt campaigns exercised power at both national level (Molina Vera 2008; Josselin 2007; Rustomjee 2004) and transnational level (Friesen 2012; Shawki 2010; Ariate et al. 2009; Broome 2009; Yanacopulos 2004; Callaghy 2002). The mechanisms identified through which power is exercised include persuasion, leveraging political opportunities, and different types of civil society relations with decision makers. The mechanisms identified and the theoretical approaches used differ depending on whether the focus is on national or transnational action. Those focussing on the transnational arena have highlighted norm cycles, moral authority, the power of ideas and alliances between transnational civil society and international institutions dealing with debt, situating their analyses broadly within concepts of power as persuasion. Yanacopulos (2004), for example, situates the Jubilee 2000 campaign within a norm cycle which reached its tipping point when G7 countries began to make new proposals on debt in early 1999 with norm internalisation following with the Cologne debt deal adopted at the G7 Summit in June 1999. Comparing Jubilee 2000 with the campaign for a currency transaction tax (CTT), Shawki (2010) argues that the Jubilee campaign was more successful because it used an effective justice frame, while the CTT had difficulty developing a frame linking a currency tax to values with wide popular resonance. Callaghy (2002), posits a ‘triple helix’, a fairly consensual alliance between the international institutions dealing with debt, transnational civil society debt networks, and the broad epistemic community as the framework within which changes in debt policy took place. Rather than present the ‘helix’ as a simple alliance between the three groups identified, Callaghy highlights the key bridging role played by the epistemic community, enabling a shift in ideas about debt. While ideas and norm change are central to understandings of the power of transnational civil society within the literature on debt campaigning, there is little application of anti-systemic analyses to debt campaigning. For example, the development of ideas and norms are not considered in relation to broader anti-globalisation/global justice movements of which debt campaign also are a part. Friesen (2012) takes a step in this direction, presenting debt campaigning as part of an international Polanyian counter-movement to the Washington Consensus consisting of both popular debt campaigning and action by the World Economic Forum, an elite
civil society forum. This counter-movement is described as operating through the persuasive power of ideas. It is arguable, however, whether World Economic Forum can be seen as part of a Polanyian counter-movement or whether it should be more accurately described as supporting on debt cancellation in order to avoid a backlash against globalising capital.

Political opportunity structure is used to examine national-level debt campaigning. Josselin (2007) applies the concept in her study of the reasons for the different levels of mobilisation by Jubilee 2000, comparing the very large-scale mobilisation in Britain to the smaller, but still significant mobilisation in Germany and the limited mobilisation in France. In her study the level of mobilisation is linked to the degree of institutional access enjoyed by the campaign, with the highest levels of institutional access in Britain and the most limited in France. Other individual country studies of debtor country campaigns (Ariate and Molmisa 2009; Molina Vera 2008; Rustomjee 2004) even when they apply the concept of political opportunity (Ariate and Molmisa 2009; Molina Vera 2008) also highlight a more complex relationship between civil society campaigns and governments, pointing to the need to go beyond the rather formulaic concept of political opportunity. In the cases of South Africa (Rustomjee 2004) and the Philippines (Ariate and Molmisa 2009) debt campaigning arose in the immediate aftermath of the fall of oppressive regimes (the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Marcos government in the Philippines), with close links between debt groups and the activists who would become the members of the new governments, as they had worked together in the struggles for liberation. The two spheres of civil society and state quickly diverged after new post-liberation governments were in place, however, with negative results from the perspective of debt campaigners, as President Aquino who led the first post-Marcos government promised to honour all of the Philippines debt (Grageda 1994) and the ANC government opposed Jubilee South Africa’s campaign for cancellation of apartheid debt. Further links between the church members of Jubilee South Africa and the ANC government gave rise to opposition from within the Jubilee campaign to the adoption of more radical positions where these conflicted with the wishes of the government. Molina Vera (2008) in her study of Jubilee Guayaquil in Ecuador highlights the linkages between the debt campaign and the government of President Correa. Some members of the Correa government had close links with the Jubilee campaign and the president himself had prior links with the campaign and shared some of their understandings of the debt issue (Molina Vera 2008, p.90). While Molina Vera (2008) and Ariate and Molmisa (2009) use the concept of political opportunity structure, these national studies
highlight the limitation of this theory to explain the power of social movements. Rather, the interactive nature of the civil society/state relationship is an important factor, including a framework that can capture how this relationship changes over time.

The literature on why particular G7 states supported debt cancellation broadly reflects the emphasis on domestic embeddedness (Josselin 2007) and norms (Friesen 2012; Shawki 2010; Broome 2009; Yanacopulos 2004; Callaghy 2002) already discussed. For example, when asking why the Bush administration became a leading supporter of 100% multilateral debt cancellation in 2004, Helleiner and Cameron (2006) identify similar factors at play to those which operated in other policy areas for the Bush administration. One of those factors, the dominance of the religious right within the Republican Party, enabled Jubilee USA to influence this sector because the biblical framing of debt cancellation resonated with the values of this section of the Republican Party. Likewise, Busby (2007), asking whether states and decision makers ever act for moral reasons, highlights the contribution that framings of the debt issue designed to resonate with major social values played in G7 countries decisions to cancel debts owed to themselves. However, Busby (2007) illustrates that it is unlikely that a single frame can be used across the globe, as the biblical framing of Jubilee 2000 did not resonate in Japan. The case for debt cancellation had to be reframed, therefore, in relation to a central Japanese value, that of being a responsible member of the international community.

An examination of the literature on the exercise of power by debt campaigns reveals that a differentiation between the mechanisms used by debt campaigning at national (domestic political opportunities) and at transnational level (leveraging norms) points to the need to examine how transnational civil society operates across the national/transnational interface in addition to examining their operation separately in these different arenas. Further, as outlined above, the concept of political opportunity has limitations, as it suggests that external political opportunities are key to the civil society/state relationship emanating from the state or political society, rather than defining the nature of the relationship as interactive. Regarding the power of ideas, positing ideas as central to the exercise of power is valid, but the use of framing which links new ideas closely to current cultural understandings constrains the degree of change that can be conceptualised. It is important, therefore, to extend the application of the power of ideas to include theoretical approaches that examine challenges to fundamental beliefs, for example, those contained in Gramscian approaches. Finally, studies of debt campaigning at transnational level tend to focus on a small number of major organisations such as Oxfam International, Eurodad, or Jubilee 2000 as a unitary actor (Broome 2009; Yana-
copolus 2004; Callaghy 2002), providing an overly northern perspective and calling for a stronger focus on the southern dimension of transnational campaigning.

Conclusion

At an empirical level a fuller picture of the history and geography of debt campaigning is needed in order to provide a more complete narrative over time and space. In terms of history, it is necessary to examine how debt campaigning changed over time and put this in the context of the changing world order during the three decades of debt campaigning, rather than see earlier phases of campaigning just as precursors to the Jubilee 2000 campaign. In terms of geography, a wider span than provided in studies carried out to date is needed, one that focuses on a range of countries which are situated differently within world order and including campaigns from debtor countries, creditor non-G7 countries and creditor G7 countries. This will enable a more robust comparison between campaigning in different country contexts and also a more nuanced approach to civil society power, identifying how it may vary in relation to the inequalities between countries within world order.

At a theoretical level a multi-layered concept of power that looks at how civil society power is exercised through a range of mechanisms would provide more complex understandings of the power of the transnational debt campaign. The range of mechanisms would include discourse/knowledge/frames, leveraging the national/international interface, and different relations with the state and international decision makers. Within such a framework, a broader approach to the discourses used by the debt campaign and to the civil society/state relationship is needed, going beyond framing and political opportunity structures which currently dominate the literature on this topic.

The next chapter therefore examines theoretical perspectives on the power of transnational civil society in order to set the framework which will be used to analyse the empirical data from an agency perspective in the case study chapters.
Chapter Two: Power and Transnational Civil Society

2.1 Introduction

Following the brief review of the literature on debt campaigning which concluded the previous chapter, this chapter provides a more in-depth examination of the major theoretical approaches to the power of transnational civil society. The purpose is to provide the theoretical background to the understandings of power and how it is exercised which inform the analytical framework used to examine the two research questions: on the nature of the power of transnational civil society, and on how this is exercised. The chapter is structured as follows. First the understanding of the nature of civil society power is set out. This is followed by a review of four theoretical approaches to the power of transnational civil society: power as persuasion, power as political opportunity, anti-systemic power, and the power of GCS within global governance. Finally, the conclusion sets out the framework within which the case study material is analysed.

2.2 Understanding power: an agency approach

As power is the focus of this study it faces the difficulty that power is a contested concept (Lukes 2005). How we imagine power depends on our motives for analysing power in the first place (Said 1986), and this means that locating power empirically is not a neutral undertaking (Davis 1988). The implication for empirical studies of power such as this research is that the theories chosen will depend on both the values and political assumptions of the researcher and on the demands of the research (Davis 1988). This raises a number of issues for this study. As the focus of the study is the agency of transnational civil society, an understanding of power from that perspective is needed. A further issue is that there is disagreement as to whether the first question, on the nature of power, should even be addressed. Foucault (1980) argues that, as power has no essence, asking about the nature of power reifies it and therefore the focus should be on the mechanisms through which power is exercised, as this centres attention on power relations. However, Lukes (2005) counter-argues that Foucault’s approach reduces power to sequences of observable events and equates power with the vehicle of power such as wealth and weapons. While accepting the validity of Foucault’s warning about the danger of reifying the concept of power, Lukes’ position that asking about the nature of power is valid was more useful to this research. Foucault’s central question was to re-
veal the history “of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault 1982, p.208). His central question, therefore, did not demand a definition of power, but rather a focus on the mechanism through which power is exercised. Foucault’s theory of the exercise of power which is relevant for this study – governmentality – is therefore reviewed in the following section which focuses on theories of the exercise of power.

Lukes’ (2005) definition of social power as the potential to “make or to receive any change, or to resist it” (2005, p.69) is the fundamental understanding of power that informs this thesis. This potential was leveraged in relation to the debt crisis by groups and individuals making common cause in relation to the nature of the problem and how this was to be contested. Lukes (2005) is best known for his third dimension of power, which operates by influencing and shaping people’s desires and preferences and achieving their compliance even against their objective interests. This is a form of structural ‘power over’ which can be relatively invisible. Lukes in fact argues that the less visible the exercise of power, the more effective it is. This concept of power may not fit well with transnational civil society, which is not positioned to exercise this kind of structural power and generally operates more effectively in the public arena (Risse 2000). As the focus of this study is on the agency of transnational civil society, following Davis, the definition of power to be used is the one which fits best with the questions being asked.

2.3 Theories explaining the exercise of power of transnational civil society

Theories which examine the exercise of power by transnational civil society can be distinguished along a number of dimensions. One factor is the degree to which theories focus on transnational civil society as largely consensual or conflictual. Theories can also be distinguished by the degree of change sought by the groups on which they focus. This varies between those who focus on transnational civil society groups seeking specific, incremental changes and those who focus on groups challenging the basic premises of neoliberalism. Other theorists analyse the function of global civil society (GCS) within global governance (Sending and Neumann 2006; Lipschutz 2005; Amoore and Langley 2004). Campaigns such as those for debt cancellation can be situated within any of these approaches – or insights can be drawn from a number of theories.

In the next sections four major conceptions of transnational civil society power are examined:
(a) **power as persuasion** which relates to consensual methods seeking limited change on specific issues;

(b) **power as political opportunity** which includes contentious methods and which share a number of concepts with theories of power as persuasion e.g. framing;

(c) **anti-systemic power** which analyses the anti-globalisation elements within transnational civil society as a challenge to the overall system;

(d) **power of GCS within global governance**: this includes two approaches, one which sees GCS as helping reform global governance and another which posits GCS as an operational part of global governance.

### 2.3.1 Power as persuasion

As highlighted in the previous chapter, power as persuasion is used to examine the transnational dimension of debt campaigning. Persuasion is linked to transnational civil society’s ability to contribute to changing international public policy by getting issues on agendas, promoting particular solutions, monitoring implementation, highlighting shortcomings/failures in implementation and sometimes setting off new cycles of agenda setting towards further new norms. These approaches cohere around the concepts of communicative power, soft power, moral authority and norm change/cycle, which are used somewhat interchangeably. Habermas’ (1984) theory of communicative action flows through these theoretical approaches – albeit mainly implicitly. Of particular relevance is his distinction between communicative action (through which actors engage in argument in order to reach common understanding) and strategic action (through which actors seek to achieve their own goals). Central to this distinction is the absence of power from communicative action where all have equal access to the discussion, and the only power which prevails is the power of the better argument. While not claiming that this ‘ideal speech situation’ exists widely empirically, Habermas (1984, p.19) argues that “No one would enter into a moral argument if he didn’t start from the strong presumption that a grounded consensus could in principle be achieved among those involved”.

A challenge for those arguing for power as persuasion is the relationship between knowledge and power. This is unpicked to differing degrees by, Dryzek (1999), Risse (2000), and Sikkink (2002). Testing the applicability of the theory of communicative action to world politics, Risse (2000) tries to reconcile Habermas’ theory that power should not enter the process with Foucault’s theory that power resides within dis-
courses themselves. He acknowledges that it is unlikely that power will ever be absent from international politics and seeks to solve the Habermas/Foucault impasse by accepting that there is no ideal type behaviour, that in practice people act both strategically and discursively (Risse 2000, p.18). He identifies different points in the political process when discursive rather than strategic action takes places – at the agenda-setting stage and when there is uncertainty of interests and/or lack of knowledge in relation to an issue. It is at these points that transnational civil society groups have a role according to Risse. Transnational civil society power, according to Risse, is the ‘power of the better argument’, as these organisations lack substantial material resources. As Risse’s focus is on world politics in general rather than the particular contribution of transnational civil society, he does not explore the process whereby transnational civil society groups pit their ‘better arguments’ against the material resources of states, international organisations and corporations. However, he does highlight that argumentation in the public sphere advantages transnational civil society as it is almost impossible to argue publicly from a totally self-interested position. Some form of common good or shared values must be invoked. INGOs/transnational civil society who can claim authoritative knowledge or moral authority are better able to convince public audiences than actors suspected of promoting private interests. The more an issue is subject to public scrutiny, therefore, the more likely it is that civil society groups have access to the discourse and that their arguments are endorsed by the public.

Dryzek (1999) also situates transnational civil society power within communicative action, but for him the power of transnational civil society is enabled by structural aspects of the international system rather than situational factors as in the case of Risse. Since formal institutional rules are relatively underdeveloped in the international system, this gives greater significance to discourses than at domestic level, where rules and institutions are stronger. Transnational civil society can, therefore, change “the terms of discourse and alter the balance between competing discourses” (Dryzek 1999, p. 46). Sikkink (2002) takes the question of the relationship of power and ideas further using Ruggie’s (1982) concept of world order, where power structures are linked with structures of social purpose which provide the content for that order. For Ruggie power and norms/social purpose can operate independently of each other, allowing for two sources of change in the international system – a power shift through a decrease in the power of dominant actors or a norm shift. For Sikkink the latter facilitates a role for transnational civil society in changing international norms. But the separation of norms and power is not equal across all issue areas. Sikkink distinguishes between issues where power and
norms are almost fused (e.g. in relation to economic liberalisation and free trade where the interests of the most powerful states are at stake) and other situations where there is more room for norm contestation, such as on debt reduction.

Among the processes through which persuasion operates are soft power and norm cycles. Soft power is ‘the ‘ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want’ – as distinct from hard power, which is the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise have done in the absence of threats or rewards (Keohane and Nye 1998, p.86). While Nye (1990) originally applied the concept of soft power to the changing nature of US power, soft power is not the sole preserve of powerful states. The ability to disseminate free information as a result of the information technology revolution has increased the potential for persuasion in world politics, thus increasing the soft power of transnational civil society (Nye 2004, p.90). Another mechanism through which persuasion works is norm cycle which captures the process of norm change – consisting of norm emergence, reaching a tipping point resulting in a norm cascade and ending with norm internalisation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Yanacopulos 2004). Norm cycle gives a privileged role to powerful states, with one criterion for reaching the tipping point being when the support of key states has been achieved. Jubilee 2000 keyed off this hypothesis, focussing their campaign on the G7. Moving through the norm cycle, alliances between civil society and state and international institutions are a key mechanism in creating a ‘norm cascade’ leading to norm internalisation. Transnational civil society groups work in alliance with states which have already accepted the new norm to press other states to do likewise. This has been conceptualised as a transnational advocacy network (TAN) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). TANs are cross-sectoral transnational networks of those working on an issue who are bound together by common values and discourses. They include civil society groups such as NGOs, social movements, churches, trade unions and from states/international institutions, parts of governments and of regional and intergovernmental organisations.

But is change really achieved through the power of norms and ideas? Focussing on changes in G7 countries’ debt policy Busby (2007) asks whether states ever act for moral reasons. He agrees with Risse (2000) that ‘true’ persuasion based on Habermasian communicative action, free of power, is rare in political life. Rather, a mixture of coercive and consensual approaches operates from successful framing, fundamental belief change and more coercive action. Busby, however, does not apply this distinction to Jubilee USA’s role in influencing US debt policy. Whether persuasive communication is really the way in which normative change is achieved has also been questioned.
by Payne (2001), who points to the degree to which the use of shaming, threats, promoting sanctions have been identified in case studies that apply power as persuasion. This suggests that persuasion does not exist as a stand-alone mechanism for the exercise of power, but is intermingled with more coercive methods, but how these methods interact to bring about change is not addressed by theorists providing these explanations.

*Power as persuasion – analysing consensual transnational civil society*

Power as persuasion provides a number of useful understandings in relation to consensual approaches of transnational civil society.

a) Power of ideas: central to these theories is the power of ideas, which operates mainly through norm change with proposed new norms framed to resonate with existing cultural values. Sikkink (2002) makes a useful contribution by highlighting limitations to the persuasive power of ideas because of the uneven linkage between power and discourse in world order.

b) In terms of transnational civil society operating across the national/international interface, Dryzek (1999) provides a useful analytical insight in his argument that the different degrees of institutionalisation at national and transnational level provide different opportunities to transnational civil society. The lack of strong formal rules and institutions at international level provides greater opportunities for transnational civil society to exercise communicative power, because discourse and norms play a more important role transnationally.

c) Alliances between civil society and states/international institutions: the concept of TANs provides a framework to analyse civil/political society consensual relationships. Using the concept of a network, however, suggests an overly consensual, horizontal relationship and does not distinguish between the power and roles of different participants. Callaghy’s (2002) concept of a triple helix between the international debt regime, transnational debt networks with elements of the epistemic community providing a bridge between them may be a more usefully way of looking at consensual civil society relations with states and IGOs.

### 2.3.2. Power as political opportunity
This approach, based on the significance of political opportunity structures, sits within theories of social movements and differs radically from the concept of persuasion outlined above in that the power to disrupt is seen as key to how social movements operate (della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Central to power as political opportunity is the argument that contention is more closely related to opportunities for and constraints on collective action than to the underlying grievance. Political opportunities emerge as institutions open up, divisions appear within elites, or influential allies become available (Tarrow 2005, p.23). Political opportunity structure has been criticised for its weak theory of agency based as it is on a ‘rational’ actor who weighs the costs and benefits of action. While emotions, identity and culture have been introduced over time, this has been as an add-on rather than leading to a rethink of the basic approach (Crossley 2002).

In terms of use of knowledge, persuasion and political opportunity theorists both use the concept of framing, but apply it differently. While for the former, frames which resonate with broadly held cultural understandings are part of the process of persuading decision makers, for social movement theory framing is part of how movements are built in order to take part in contentious collective action for change (Silva 2009; Benford and Snow 2000; Tarrow 1998). This involves defining the problem, attributing blame and posing alternatives with a view to motivating people to act to achieve these (della Porta and Diani 2006). Critics, however, point to the fact that framing does not tackle the relationship between meanings and power (Crossley 2002). Tarrow, however, has recognised the contradiction arising from framing messages to resonate with cultural understandings when those understandings defend existing inequalities (Tarrow 2005, p.61) which movements are challenging. But this has not led to a critical review of the concept. Since political opportunity theory is overly reliant on a business-type model, stressing the role of ‘political entrepreneurs’ who recognise a niche in the social movement market and provide ‘framing’ services to these niche markets, the public can appear as a passive consumer, constrained by cultural understandings in terms of the scope of the challenge to which they can respond.

While political opportunity structure has focussed mainly on national-level activities, it has also examined how groups campaign across the national/international interface (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Sikkink 2002). Sikkink uses institutional access to examine how activists leverage the national/transnational interface. A key factor is the relative openness of domestic and international opportunity structures vis-à-vis each other. This distinction enables Sikkink to define when the boomerang pattern or insid-
er/outsider coalitions are likely to happen. When both domestic and international systems are open this leads to insider/outsider coalitions (similar to TANs). Where the international system is open but the domestic system is closed, the boomerang effect operates. This refers to situations where civil society groups unable to achieve redress from national government leverage outside pressure through transnational NGOs. These allies mobilise forces from the international arena and pressure then boomerangs back on the national government in question (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Friesen (2012) develops the concept of ‘boomerang politics’ further, highlighting the different alliances which operated between Jubilee 2000, governments and IGOs who shared overlapping proposals in order to pressure unresponsive governments or IGOs to support debt reduction. Grenier (2003), however, argues that the boomerang effect is not relevant for Jubilee 2000, as the issue was not domestic blockage but the lack of openings for southern groups to challenge creditors. Grenier is right to restrict the use of the ‘boomerang effect’ to the situation for which it was developed. Otherwise the difference between the concept of the boomerang effect and that of insider/outsider alliances may become blurred, reducing the efficacy of both concepts.

Constraints in operating across the national/international interfaces have also been identified in relation to framing. Tarrow (2005) points to the discontinuity which may exist between the resonance of global frames and their ability to generate the action needed to progress a particular cause. While the ‘global justice’ frame has managed to mobilise diverse social groups (e.g. at the ‘Battle of Seattle’), it hasn’t managed to weld these into a more cohesive force. This is because activists work within differing domestic cultural and political systems. This is illustrated by the fact that the Jubilee 2000 biblical framing was replaced in Japan by the importance of being seen responsible members of the international community (Busby 2007; Holms 2006).

In terms of modes of engagement Tarrow (2001) usefully disaggregates transnational civil society into transnational social movements (TNSMs); international nongovernmental organisations (INGO) and transnational advocacy networks (TANs). The key distinction is between what organisations do and what they say - engage in contentious politics (transnational social movements) or in ‘routine transactions’ i.e. lobbying and collaborating with international elites’ (TAN and INGO) (Tarrow 2001, p.11). Underlying the different modes of engagement are different relationships between civil and political society – adversarial in the case of TNSMs, shared principles in terms of TANs. That these clear distinctions, however, may not exist empirically is acknowledged by Tarrow (2005, p.29).
Applying political opportunity

As noted in the previous chapter, a number of studies apply political opportunity structure to the debt movements. Josselin (2007) used domestic institutional access as a key variable to examine the different levels of mobilisation by Jubilee 2000 in Britain (major), Germany (less major but significant) and France (limited). There appears to be a good fit with greatest access in Britain and very limited in France. But there were other relevant factors, such as the influence of past campaigning on current opportunities. This raises a key question – to what extent are political opportunities external to social movements, and to what extent do social movements create political opportunities through their ongoing engagement with states and international institutions. For example, to what extent was UK Chancellor Gordon Brown’s strong support for debt cancellation an independent political opportunity arising from the election of the Labour Party in 1997, as argued by a number of academics (Broome 2009; Mayo 2005 a+b) and to what extent was Labour’s debt policy shaped by the strength of British debt campaigning from the 1980s (see chapter 5). One of the UK interviewees in this study recalled a conversation with Gordon Brown just before the 1997 election in which he indicated that he was aware of the political salience of the debt issue and of the strong action taken by his Conservative predecessors. This suggests that past campaigning was a significant factor in Brown’s support for debt cancellation while he was Chancellor (Interviewee UK, No. 5).

The importance of interaction between activism and political opportunity is reinforced by the Ariate et al’s (2009) study of the Philippine Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC). Whereas they also attribute FDC’s success to political opportunities, including allies in parliament, they point out that FDC may also have provided opportunities to these allies in the form of an issue and a constituency which might have helped in their re-election (Ariate and Molmisa 2009, p.53). This points to the need to put the concept of political opportunity structure in the wider framework of the dynamic of civil society relations with states and international institutions.

Implications of power as political opportunity for this research

The emphasis on the domestic embeddedness of transnational campaigning and the difficulties this may raise for successful global frames which can resonate across diverse national political and cultural contexts, are useful insights in examining how transnational civil society operates across the national/international interface. Further, distin-
2.3.3 Anti-systemic power

While political opportunity applies to contentious politics, its focus is on how movements are built and what they do rather than on the level of challenge posed to the dominant system. Writers starting from a critical perspective on neoliberal globalisation ask how systemic inequalities can be contested. They focus on the global justice movements made up of a multitude of causes (including debt campaigns) loosely held together by a very broad critique of neoliberalism. The problem facing these theorists is the lack of some form of central agency which holds together these diverse groups or an overarching transformatory project which drives them. One approach is to revisit European 20th century thinkers, Gramsci and Polanyi. The other is a 21st century radical, postmodern approach to power which emerged in particular from struggles in Latin America.

*Diffuse counter-movements*

Polanyi provides the starting point for many academics examining global social justice movements (Silva 2009; Evans 2008; Munck 2006b; Birchfield 1999 and 2005; Robinson 1999; Bernard 1997). The attraction of Polanyi arises from his powerful exposé of the myth of the self-regulating market—a myth revived by late 20th century neoliberalism—and his concept of the double movement through which this ideology was opposed. The double movement consisted of a movement by the trading classes promoting the self-regulating market resulting in the disembedding of the economy from society. This was countered by a movement for social protection involving diverse social forces (working class and landed classes) resulting in a rebalancing of the economy and society. A powerful symmetry is, therefore, perceived between today’s global justice movements and Polanyi’s ‘counter-movement’, both challenging market supremacy and consisting of diverse autonomous groups (Munck 2006b; Birchfield 2005 and 1999; Bernard 1997).

But Polanyi’s project was very different from that of today’s theorists of resistance to neoliberalism. He was not primarily interested in explaining agency, but wished to counter arguments from contemporary liberals that the downfall of the self-regulating market was due to a collectivist conspiracy. He, therefore, deliberately plays
down the role of social movements presenting his ‘counter-movement’ as spontaneous and diffuse. “At innumerable disconnected points it set in without any traceable links between the interests directly affected or any ideological conformity between them (2001, p.156). Polanyi’s counter-movement was therefore held together by conjunctural objective coincidences of interest between different social forces rather than any conscious organisational or ideological links.

Other thinkers grappling with the amorphous nature of today’s global social justice movements have introduced a stronger sense of agency. Falk’s concept of globalisation-from-above being contested by globalisation-from-below has resonances of Polanyi’s double movement, but he takes the concept further, distinguishing between the two movements not just in terms of their aims and social base, but also in terms of homogeneity versus heterogeneity:

Just as globalization-from-above tends towards homogeneity and unity, so globalisation-from-below tends towards heterogeneity and diversity, even tension and contradiction. This contrast highlights the fundamental difference between top-down hierarchical politics and bottom-up participatory politics. (Falk 1997, p.24)

Starting from the perspective that ‘revolutionary certainties no longer stand’, Holloway (2010, p.9) uses the ‘method of the crack’ to explain how capitalism can be contested. The cracks are the crises of the system and provide the basis for overcoming that system (2010, p.84). The aim should be to expand the cracks and promote their confluence.

Silva (2009) and Friesen (2012) provide more specific applications of Polanyi’s double movement: in the case of Silva to anti-neoliberal movements in Latin America, while Friesen presents the campaign for debt cancellation as part of a double movement at transnational level against the Washington Consensus. They highlight very different processes through which the double movement took place: contentious action involving road blocks, strikes and town uprisings in the first; the consensual application of persuasion in the second. Silva uses the concepts of brokerage and framing to provide Polanyi’s missing agency. Through these mechanisms broad coalitions were built to force neoliberal governments from power. Framing linked specific grievances into broader critiques of neoliberalism, and brokerage linked formerly unconnected movements together. Cannon and Murphy 2013 highlight how Silva’s combination of Polanyi’s expose of the self-regulating with concepts from social movement theory can be usefully applied to countries beyond Latin America, for example, to Ireland. Friesen’s application of Polanyi situates change largely within the power of ideas exercised through re-framing the debt issue in moral terms within a double movement including widely di-
verse social forces. In addition to popular debt campaigns the World Economic Forum (WEF) supported debt cancellation in 2005 in order to prevent a backlash against global capitalism and also because it was ‘the right thing to do’. Friesen places the double movement in the context of the capacity of capitalism to adapt to opposition to market supremacy, and this enhances the stability of the system. In the next Chapter the WEF is presented as a key element in the internationalising state consensus-making process rather than as a civil society body, albeit an elite one, contesting dominant policy. This highlights the need for more specific definitions of the double movement – in particular there is a need to distinguish between the social forces threatened by the effects of the self-regulating market and those which create the new consensus in response to the double movement. In this study, the WEF is placed in the second category.

The renewed interest in Polanyi demonstrates the mobilising power of ideas with Polanyi’s analysis bridging the divide between 19th century liberalism and late 20th century neoliberalism. His double movement, while capturing many of the features of today’s global social justice movements, calls for new concepts to grasp the transnational modes of engagement. Falk and Holloway contribute to this process by introducing a sense of agency, but they differ from each other in terms of their approaches to the power being contested and the nature of the engagement involved. For Falk (1997), globalisation-from-above is homogeneous and united; for Holloway the capitalist system is cut across by a multitude of cracks and crises. Falk presents a dichotomised struggle between globalisation-from-below and globalisation-from-above, while for Holloway those resisting are not outside capitalism, but are themselves the contradictions of capitalism as crises arise from a misfit between the needs of capital and the failure or refusal of people to adapt to those requirements (2010, p.9). In the context of his empirical studies, Silva found limited evidence for transnational influence on domestic movements nor of transnational movements playing a role in linking domestic anti-neoliberal mobilisations through developing overarching anti neo liberal strategies (2009, p277). This means that his study does not bring an international dimension to Polanyi, as it does not throw light on how civil society/social movements operate across the national/international interface.

Counter-hegemony

Unlike Polanyi, Gramsci engages explicitly with the nature of resistance – covering the social forces involved (working class and other subordinated social groups) and their interconnection (through political, moral and intellectual leadership), their modes of en-
gagement with dominant power (war of movement, war of position) and the terrains across which these struggles happen (civil and political society) (Gramsci 1971). Gramsci’s concept of power as a double-edged mixture of consent and coercion provides the mortar which holds all this together. Hegemony exists where power is predominantly based on consent, as is the case in bourgeois democracies, where the dominant class has managed to gain the consent of other classes to its world view. In explaining how consensus is maintained in deeply divided societies, Gramsci highlights the centrality of civil society to the stability of the state:

… in the west there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks… (Gramsci 1971, p. 238)

Through a combination of cultural, spiritual and intellectual means, the institutions of civil society (e.g. media, churches, education and trade unions) create and maintain the consent underpinning the state. Civil society is also where hegemony is contested – largely through a struggle to win the argument within civil society rather than through an onslaught on the state. This contestation of ideas is carried out through a counter-hegemonic project integrating the interests of a range of diverse social forces into a new commonsense – distinguished by Gramsci from a strategic alliance within which groups coalesce in relation to a particular coincidence of interest but keep their own specific identities. Ideas, culture and the transformation of consciousness play a central role, as the ability to shape people’s minds is the main terrain of struggle to move people from bourgeois ‘commonsense’ to ‘good sense’. Gramsci (1971, pp.326-327) points to the difference between thought and action enabling different understandings of the world to coexist. Chin and Mittelman (1997) interpret this as the existence of seeds of dissonance within apparently acquiescing subordinate groups providing space for the emergence of resistance. This enables an escape from the limitations of framing discussed above.

In spite of the richness of Gramsci’s ideas, efforts to apply the concept of counter-hegemony to the changed landscape of contemporary antagonisms, particularly at a global level, have not been entirely successful. Gill (2000) and Morton (2002) apply a Gramscian analysis respectively to two key moments/movements within globalised resistance: the ‘Battle of Seattle’ against the 1999 WTO summit and the Zapatista uprising in Mexico. Gill describes the Seattle protesters as a new form of emerging political agency struggling for an alternative to neoliberal globalisation. Keying off Gramsci’s
‘modern prince’ (the communist party), he dubs this the ‘postmodern prince’, a new postmodern international political party without leadership, but further development is needed on how this new agency will operate over time and across the national/international interface. Morton’s application of a Gramscian analysis to Zapatista resistance to neoliberalism in Mexico is more successful than is his consideration of their transnational role (2002). Examining the transnational aspect of the Zapatista struggle, he concludes that the terrain of state-civil society relations remains the arena for political struggle (Morton 2002, p.53) tagging on the coda “resistance to globalisation cannot be successful unless it is also prosecuted beyond national boundaries” (Morton 2002, p.114). This suggests that counter-hegemony, developed to apply to national settings, may not be easily transferred to transnational struggles.

Laclau and Mouffe (2001) tackle another challenge facing those applying Gramsci to today’s social struggles: the poor fit between his concept of counter-hegemony and the different configuration of class, left-wing party and social movements operating at the end of the 20th century. Their aim is to provide the basis for a new left-wing counter-hegemonic project linking workers’ struggles with those of other social movements.

Rejecting the idea that there is one central antagonism (class), they identify three broad foci of contention which motivate the myriad of social movements emerging since the 1960s: commodification (capital), bureaucratisation (state) and homogenisation of social life (the media). The very nature of these dominances leads to the autonomous nature of the ‘new’ social movements, giving rise to a contradiction between autonomy and hegemony. This contradiction is at the heart of tensions within the global social justice movements today, where there is strong resistance to any political party leading a counter-hegemonic project. The principles of the World Social Forum (WSF) for example, state that no-one is authorised to speak on behalf of the WSF, or to put forward positions which they claim to be those of all its participants.3 Laclau and Mouffe struggle to articulate a relationship between autonomous social movements and a universal hegemony. A new ‘common sense’ is needed that changes the identity of the different participating groups in such a way that the demands of each group are articulated equivalently with those of others: e.g. workers’ rights are not defended at the expense of women’s rights (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, pp.183-184).

While Laclau and Mouffe’s reconfiguration of the aspects of Gramsci’s thinking which do not fit a fractured post ‘universal’ world – a central political subject and a uni-

fied transformatory project – is useful, their analysis fails to explicate the core ‘how’ question: how can these diverse groups merge together beyond a limited alliance but still leave room for the ‘logic of autonomy’? Is ideational convergence sufficient or is organisational convergence also called for?

**Concluding on anti-systemic power**

Knowledge is central to anti-systemic struggles. Polanyi’s (2001) exposé of the self-regulating market has strong resonances, and Silva (2009) shows how framing and brokerage enabled successful counter-movements to neoliberalism. Gramsci’s (1971) approach to the role of ideas and culture in the transformation of bourgeois common sense into good sense posits a deeper transformation than does the concept of framing, but constructing the relationship through which this would be pursued - a counter-hegemonic project - is more problematic. In terms of anti-systemic modes of engagement, Gramsci’s linkage of the state and civil society in terms of conflict and consent provides a useful framework within which transnational civil society can be analysed. This counterbalances some of the theories in the next section, which focus largely on civil society’s functionality to global governance. Holloway’s (2010) ‘method of the crack’ suggests that in the short term the myriad of resistances are fracturing neoliberalism rather than constructing an alternative collective project, but over time the cracks may join up. This approach avoids the need to jump to premature judgement as to whether the anti-globalisation/global social justice movements are a counter-movement or a counter-hegemonic project or a new political formation. Anti-systemic theories, however, throw little light on how civil society operates across the national/international interface, but as will be seen in the next chapter neo-Gramscians have provided substantial structural analysis of this interface.

**2.3.4. Power of global civil society within global governance**

This section covers approaches which position civil society - including campaigns such as those on debt – in relation to global governance. Two major approaches can be identified:

(a) theories which argue that GCS has the potential to contribute to the democratisation (Scholte 1999, 2002b, 2004, 2007; Kaldor 2003a) or transformation (Evans 2008) of global governance. As stated in the Introduction, theorists taking this approach use the
term global civil society (GCS) whereas transnational civil society is the preferred term for my study.

b) theories which position GCS as a central part of global governmentality which calls into being civil society actors with the appropriate identities and necessary expertise to participate in this form of governance (Sending and Neumann 2006; Drainville 2005; Lipschutz 2005; Amoore and Langley 2004).

The following sections examine these two approaches.

2.3.4.1 Global civil society power: bridging the democratic deficit

Within this approach GCS is situated in the context of a shift from state-centred governance to global governance which has accompanied the growth of globalisation. According to Kaldor (2003a, p.583) global governance involving a range of international agreements, treaties and rules, has led to a ‘conditioned sovereignty’. Increasingly these agreements are based not just on states, but also on public support generated via GCS. For Scholte (1999, p.18-23), the expansion of GCS has played a significant part in the shift to ‘post-sovereign governance’. The lack of democratic processes at global level results in very limited explicit consent to global governance (Scholte 2002b, p.289). While recognising that GCS suffers its own internal democratic deficit, it is seen as having the potential to help bridge those at global level (Kaldor 2003a; Scholte 2002b; Florini 2000) by increasing public participation, giving a voice to those excluded, raising public awareness about how global governance operates, promoting debate about governance arrangements, and mobilising people to demand transparency and public accountability from traditionally closed institutions such as the IMF (Scholte 2002a). Cumulatively this action could result in greater legitimacy for global governance, with people acknowledging that global institutions have the right to govern.

Theorists of GCS recognise that it is not a homogenous, unitary body, but rather it reflects the hierarchically structured world order with the south/north interface posed as a particular fault line. GCS, dominated by northern civil society, is seen as having strengthened the centrality of northern values and ideas within the globalisation project rather than contributing towards the creation of a global society (Omelicheva 2009 p123). Scholte goes further and points to a ‘westernisation’ of parts of southern civil society with activism on global issues dominated by “western-styled, western-funded
NGOs led by Westernised elites” (2002b, p.296). Rather than being the proponents of global democracy, therefore, GCS promotes the central values of its dominant members from North America and Europe (Pasha and Blaney 1998). At an operational level, given the disadvantaged position of southern states, northern-dominated GCS may cause damage by contributing to shifting the balance of decision making from the national to the transnational arena (Edwards 2001; Tussie and Tuozzo 2001; Nelson 2000; Scholte 1999) and undermine a country’s ability to pursue progressive goals (Edwards 2001). Through over-reliance on international solutions, INGOs may undermine local participation and weaken governmental accountability to their citizens in favour of accountability to donors (Nelson 2000). In this context, GCS may be contributing to the globalisation process which is weakening third world states, fragmenting their societies with elites being integrated into the global project while the mass of people are increasingly marginalised (Pasha et al 1998).

As regards GCS modes of engagement with global governance, contrasting views are provided by Scholte (2002b) and Edwards (2001). Scholte is critical of excessive behind closed door lobbying by GCS and in particular highlights the dangers of ‘critical cooperation’. This mode of engagement exists where high levels of conflict and consensus coexist between GCS and global institutions because of the simultaneous existence of significant convergence and divergence of interests (Covey 1998). This criticism raises the question as to what are the alternative levers of power open to GCS, an important question given the lack of formal democratic processes at global level and the logistical difficulties of sustained global mobilisations. In contrast, Edwards (2001, pp.9-10) argues that as globalisation generates complexity and uncertainty, civil society should switch from ‘conversion’ to ‘engagement’ strategies, supporting a process of dialogue rather than simply lobbying for a fixed set of policies. This approach resonates with the argument made by Risse (2000) that Habermas’ ideal speech situation is most likely to prevail where there are uncertainties. Suggesting that uncertainty exists within global policy in general implies that power is largely absent from the global arena, which is clearly not so, given the fusion of knowledge and power in relation to key neoliberal beliefs.

The main issues raised for this research relate to the geography of power. One issue is whether, rather than operating across the national/ transnational interface, transnational civil society has crossed into the global arena and become GCS or whether the finding of domestic embeddedness of transnational campaigning (Josselin 2007) captures reality better. Further, rather than the question of leveraging the national and
transnational interface being one of strategy alone, these theories highlight challenging ethical and political issues, as south/north inequalities are being exacerbated by globalisation.

2.3.4.2. Power within governmentality: Global Civil Society

Foucault’s concept of governmentality provides an alternative framework for understanding GCS to the sovereignty/post sovereignty debate. Governmentality is defined as [t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy… (Foucault, 1991, p.102).

Given the nature of governmentality as a decentred form of governance, it transfers fairly smoothly to the global arena, where there is no central authority but a range of separate but differently interrelated governance regimes. Civil society also stands out more clearly in this arena empty of political parties and institutional democratic processes. In line with Foucault’s general analysis of power, governmentality is exercised through a nexus of technologies of power and political rationality/discourses which together constitute the subjects of this form of power – the populations being governed. Foucault distinguishes between sovereignty, the form of rule which operated in Europe up to the 17th century, involving rule over territory through law and prohibition and governmentality on which the modern state is based. Neoliberal governmentality involves a particular meshing of government and self-government. In this context governmentality is as much about how we conduct ourselves as it is about formal political processes such as elections (Danaher 2000, p.83). This element of ‘self-governing’ links the emergence of neoliberal governmentality with the growth of civil society in the 1980s (Sending and Neumann 2006, Drainville 2004). The view of civil society as the site of autonomous economic actors who can limit the power of the state is no longer relevant according to a Foucauldian analysis. Civil society is neither separate from nor in opposition to the state, but “the correlate of a political technology of government” (Foucault 2008, p296). As the emergence of governmentality depended centrally on its ability to harness civil society, according to Sending and Neumann (2006, p.656) “we would therefore expect that new practices of government emerge whereby civil society organisations on the global level are harnessed to the tasks of governing”.

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Applying Foucauldian thinking to GCS

Thinkers applying governmentality provide different explanations of the relationship between governmentality, resistance and GCS. One approach presents GCS as seamlessly interwoven into the web of governmentality - but not absorbed by it (Sending and Neumann 2006). Others present a more ambiguous view with some autonomous space for GCS (Lipschutz 2005; Amoore and Langley 2004). A final approach posits two modes of relating to the world economy – as part of governmentality and as part of concrete struggles (Drainville 2005a).

Rejecting claims that there has been a transfer of power from states to civil society actors, Sending and Neumann (2006) explain the evolution of state/civil society relations through changing ‘governmental rationality’. The new identities and action orientation called for from civil society resulting from these changes is illustrated through a study of the role of Norwegian NGOs in shaping government policy on banning landmines. While Norwegian NGOs operated in opposition to and in collaboration with the Norwegian government, Sending and Neumann (2006) argue that this was not a case of independent civil society groups persuading the government to change its policy. Neither was it a case of co-option of NGOs, but rather it represented a particular form of governmental rationality which included NGO expertise and ability to mobilise public opinion as key to effective government. Within this understanding, civil society groups are subjects of government as well as objects – as subjects their capacity to criticise and mobilise are used in the process of government. Questions of resistance or counter-power do not arise but rather

[government takes the freedom and agency of those that are governed as both an end and a means for governing. New practices of government emerge whereby civil society organisations at global level are harnessed to the tasks of governing. (Sending and Neumann 2006, p.656).

Lipschutz (2005, p.237) also presents GCS as a central element of the expanding global neoliberal regime of governmentality helping to legitimise that system. The shift in the role of the state from modifying the effects of capital on people’s welfare to one of providing the most attractive conditions for global capital has led to responsibility being transferred to civil society to pressure for regulation of the “sharper edges of the market” (2005, p.234) and their activities “serve to stabilise and normalise conditions that are seen as threats or disturbances to those conditions of normality” (2005, p.238). Much of what constitutes resistance may therefore be alternative tactics integral to governmentality. Ruptures and discontinuities within the web of governmentality, however,
provide micro spaces within which resistance can occur. While this echoes Holloway’s (2010) method of the crack, Lipschutz is less optimistic than Holloway as to the possibility that resistance can eventually overcome neoliberal governmentality. While also seeing GCS as “a means to making the global political economy governable” (2004, p.90), Amoore and Langley place GCS in a more ambiguous light than Lipschutz. They acknowledge that civil society may be an emancipatory force - pointing to the ambiguous role played historically by civil society with churches, trade unions, for example, playing emancipatory roles at times while acting as part of systems of control at others.

Abandoning efforts to provide a unitary understanding of GCS, Drainville (2005a) divides GCS on the basis of its practices and autonomy positing two modes of relation to the world economy. One mode relates closely to the ‘governmentality mode’ used by the above thinkers, which involves abstract subjects gathered by global governance into problem-solving humanity (‘cosmopolitan ghosts’). Governance’s GCS comes together at UN conferences, in dialogue with the IMF and World Bank and at a myriad of other transnational and regional fora. The second mode of relation involves campaign-based movements who enter the world economy with situated, concrete struggles. Examples are strikes which become transnationalised. While the first mode is a depoliticised and largely consensual process, the second mode involves forces which contest neoliberal globalisation via ‘placed struggles’. While the two modes of relation appear as a Manichean dichotomy within GCS between victims/villains and heroes, Drainville acknowledges that global governance itself is a site of struggle.

As can be seen from the above, the more Foucauldian thinkers (Amoore and Langley and Drainville) try to identify space for resistance, the closer they move to Gramsci’s concept of civil society as a site for both the maintenance and contestation of the established order albeit the mechanisms through which consent is maintained and contested vary.

In terms of geography, while Foucault did not focus on the transnational arena, his thinking about where power should be analysed has relevance for the question of how GCS operates across the national/ transnational interface. Foucault argued for “ascending analysis of power, starting from its infinitesimal mechanisms” (Foucault 1980, p.99). Following on from this, Lipschutz (2005, p.246) argues against viewing GCS as an aggregate of transnational organisations, but that GCS can be found within “the local politics of groups focussed on specific places but informed by a globalised epistemology”. Amoore and Langley also point to the local as to where the concrete manifestations of the global can best be understood.
It is in the everyday realms of family, cultural, religious life that GCS in its concrete, multiple forms form can be found with its many tensions and contradictions. (Amoore and Langley 2004, pp.109-110)

Keying off his second mode of engagement Drainville (2005b) goes further, positing a dialectical relationship between transnational movements and struggles within national boundaries, presenting this as the key defining feature of anti-capitalist movements. Seeking theoretical underpinnings for his analysis, Drainville uses Gramsci’s distinction between a war of position (operating at national level) and a war of movement (operating at transnational level), arguing that as social hegemony has been established at national but not at international level different forms of action are possible. Drainville’s formulation parallels Dryzek’s distinction between the national level (where there are formal institutional rules) and the transnational (where formal institutions are underdeveloped giving greater significances to discourse). While Drainville’s concept of a dialectical relationship between national and transnational level activism is the most interesting approach to this dimension of activism in the literature, this concept needs further development to increase its explanatory value.

*Concluding on Foucauldian approaches to GCS*

An emerging framework for civil society engagement can be identified from Foucauldian theorists: as an integral part of governmentality; seeking to exploit existing fractures in governmentality; or through concrete, placed campaigns challenging power relations in the world economy. Underpinning each of these modes is a different perception of the degree to which power and knowledge are fused and therefore the spaces which exist for counter-movements. In terms of geography both the second and third approaches emphasise concrete, ‘placed’ struggles as ways of avoiding being drawn into governmentality. This echoes Holloway’s method of the ‘crack’, fracturing capitalism through a myriad of concrete struggles – with the various local resistances linked by global framings of the issues (Lipschutz 2005). Drainville’s presentation of the national/transnational activist interface as a dialectical relationship takes us beyond the limited concept of the boomerang effect linking the national and international arenas. But the factors driving this dialectical relationship need further elucidation. Foucault’s thinking appears to converge with Gramsci in terms of understanding civil society as a site of consent and contestation once the possibility of taking a counter position to governmentality is accepted.
2.5 Power of transnational civil society: analytic framework

A number of key issues relevant to transnational civil society and the exercise of power have emerged in the course of this chapter. These relate to the interaction of knowledge and power; the relationship between campaigning at national and international level; and understanding modes of engagement with power. The main relevant issues are set out below.

Knowledge and power: the use of ideas is a key factor in all theories of transnational civil society, but there are different understandings: framing to leverage current cultural values, knowledge used as part of a long struggle to change current commonsense to good sense and Foucauldian understandings of power and knowledge as almost fused. Knowledge can be mobilised to present two different levels of challenge - challenges within the system and challenges to the system. Structural features which facilitate the first are the fact that knowledge and power are differentially fused, depending on how strategically important an issue is for dominant neoliberalism allowing for contestation on issues like debt but less so on market liberalisation (Sikkink 2002).

While there is a huge literature on ‘framing’, there has been far less examination of how groups move beyond the current dominant commonsense. For Gramsci there are always seeds of dissonance within social groupings from which fundamental challenges can be mounted.

Geography of Power: How transnational civil society operates across the national/transnational interface is still relatively under-theorised. Among the useful concepts distilled from the literature reviewed were

a) The domestic embeddedness of transnational activism was highlighted by political opportunity theory, whereas Foucauldians highlighted the need to pose challenges at the most local and micro levels of power. These approaches, however, are informed by different understandings of power. Power as political opportunity highlights the opportunities provided in formal domestic political contexts as key to the success of social movements (Tarrow 1998, 2005). Foucault’s argument is for a bottom-up approach to power, avoiding targeting dominant power or seeking ‘global’ solutions (Hoy 1986) and therefore not overly focussing on institutional opportunities. We can assume that Foucault was not using ‘global’ in its current meaning but was referring to the search for overarching solutions to problems from central authorities.
b) Differences between the national and international arenas and the resulting different opportunities available to transnational civil society were identified. Dryzek (1999) highlighted the lack of strong institutionalisation at the international compared to the national level providing greater opportunities for transnational civil society’s discursive engagement at the international level. Drainville (2005b) expresses the difference between the national and international levels in terms of the presence of hegemony at national level and its absence at international level, and this allows for different forms of struggle – long struggles to win the argument in civil society at national level and more adventurist forays at international level. While Dryzek and Drainville provide more dynamic explanations of the different national and international terrains facing transnational civil society their analyses remain underdeveloped. The relative advantage to transnational civil society of the discursive opportunities available at transnational level vis-à-vis the more formal political procedures at national level has not been addressed by Dryzek. Nor has Drainville sufficiently developed his concept of a war of manoeuvre at international level or how this operates dialectically with a national-level war of position.

*Modes of engagement with power*

Tarrow (2001) provides a useful framework distinguishing between INGO, TAN and TNSM on the basis of what they do rather than what they say – the degree to which they engage in contentious politics vis-à-vis routine transactions such as lobbying. These formations may involve temporary alliances between states and international institutions, depending on the issue. This differentiation raises questions about our understanding of civil society. Three broad understandings of civil society can be drawn from the above literature. Theories of power as persuasion (Sikkink 2002) are based on a view of civil society as independent of states and international institutions makers with the moral authority to call decision makers to account. Gramsci and Foucault both posit different forms of intermeshing of civil society and the state. For Gramsci, civil society is where the consensus underpinning a hegemonic order is created, maintained and also contested (Gramsci 1971). From a Foucauldian perspective civil society is an element in a particular method of government in which civil society is engaged as a subject of as well as an object of government. The understanding used within this thesis takes elements of these different approaches on board. While accepting that civil society is not
an autonomous sphere in any absolute sense, it has some autonomy from the state. Civil society’s own self-identity as independent of the state albeit exaggerated is a strong part of what underpins how it operates and as pointed out by Foucauldians, it is because of this autonomy that civil society can be useful to the state. A Gramscian perspective of civil society as consisting of consensual and adversarial elements adds to this understanding. Elements of these three theoretical approaches to civil society will be used in the study, namely, civil society’s own self-identity as autonomous together with the consensual or conflictual modes of engagement with decision makers.

Based on the above discussion and the earlier discussion of Lukes’ definition of power as potential, the following is a summary of the analytical framework to be used to examine the research questions on the nature of transnational civil society power and how this is exercised.

**Source of power: realising power as potential**
Leveraging power as potential, transnational civil society makes common cause on the causes of and solutions to the debt crisis and how to work together to tackle the problem. The empirical chapters will examine how transnational civil society debt campaigns made common cause transnationally, and the impact of the fractures and tensions which emerged.

**Exercising power**

**Knowledge and power**
The questions to be examined in the case studies under this heading are: to what extent was the debt issue explained within the confines of current common sense and to what extent was it explained as part of a broader challenge to the inequalities of the global system. This will be examined in the context of understandings provided by theories of power as persuasion and anti-systemic power.

**Geography and power**
The questions to be examined in the case studies under this heading are: to what extent did debt campaigns focus on national level or international level decision making processes and what was the relationship between action taken at these two levels. This will be examined in relation to the concepts provided by Drainville (2005b) and Dryzek (1999) and in relation to the concept of domestic embeddedness (Josselin 2007).
Modes of Engagement

The questions to be examined in the case studies under this heading are: to what extent were the methods of debt campaigns consensual or adversarial; what was the nature of the relationship with the state/international institutions which ensued; and what was the level of challenge posed by debt movements to the system. These will be considered in the light of the understanding of civil society drawn from liberal, Gramscian and Foucauldian understandings set out above.

The next chapter examines theories of world order and sets out the theory which will be used in this thesis to provide the structural context to complement the above framework, which focusses on the agency of transnational civil society.
Chapter Three: Understanding World Order

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter concluded with a framework to analyse the agency of transnational civil society. Although the focus of this thesis is on agency, it is recognised that this agency operates in relation to a structural context. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine different understandings of power within the international system in order to set the structural context for transnational civil society debt campaigning – recognising that transnational civil society interacts with and impacts upon this context rather than being simply constrained by it. For campaigning groups seeking to change international policy, the starting point is to identify who is responsible for the problem and how can these be challenged. This raises the question of the locus/loci of power in relation to the contested issue. A central issue is the extent to which, in a globalising world, states still have power – and which states have power – an issue still hotly debated within IPE/IR literature.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief review of two approaches to world order: firstly as an interstate system and secondly as a multilateral system, identifying the implications of these different perspectives for civil society. The following section examines the internationalising state, which bases world order within a changing state/capital relationship and explains why this theory has been selected for use in this study. The next section operationalises the internationalising state, explaining the institutions and processes through which it works and the implications of this for transnational civil society power. The final section examines the different possibilities for transnational civil society engagement - with the institutions of world order and the state, respectively. The conclusion identifies the key dimensions of the internationalising state relevant for this research and links these with the framework identified at the end of the previous chapter to provide a framework which engages with both agency and structural dimensions.

3.2 A state or a multilateral system of world order

Notwithstanding the onward march of globalisation, it is strongly argued by a range of theorists that world order is still mainly an interstate system with powerful states producing and maintaining that order (Waltz 2008; Gilpin 2002). While the relevance of
ideas and norms in international politics are not discounted, there is scepticism about the relevance of universal moral principles, as in the context of struggles between states ethical questions concede to ‘reasons of state’ (Donnelly 2009). In the absence of a central authority in the international system, power politics rather than persuasion is what propels international affairs (Gilpin 2002). This is because world order is driven by competition between states seeking their own self-interest, and there is no supra-state central authority which can mediate this competition.

Those holding this position are also sceptical about ‘globalisation’, that greater interconnectivity due to technological, communications and transport development is leading to a significantly more interdependent world. The state is not being superseded by power from above or below and “internationalist ideas are the continuation of statism by other means” (Dunne and Schmidt 2001, p.159). Theorists also question whether global markets are more integrated today than at other historical periods, pointing out that capital flows in the nineteenth century, as a percentage of global economic production was far greater than today (Hirst, Thompson and Bromley 2009). While they may agree that there are growing links between national economies, they disagree that these linkages are creating a single world economy with the relevance of national borders dissolving (Burchill 2009).

This raises the question of whether the existence of a range of intergovernmental organisations involve some concession of sovereignty by states? According to theorists (Waltz 2008; Gilpin 1987, 2002), emphasising the state as the key actor, these institutions are still state-dominated, with states making the rules by which such institutions operate. Further, while states may come to joint agreements within international organisations where their interests coincide, in the absence of any legitimate supra-state body, implementation of such agreements is dependent on states. In the context of state-dominated world order, international institutions are created by the more powerful states and survive in their original form for as long as they serve the interests of those states. An example given is the US unilateral decision in 1971 to take the dollar off the gold standard, ending the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (Waltz 2008). International institutions are therefore seen as having little if any autonomy from states (Gilpin 2002).

In this context, civil society groups/social movements/NGOs are seen as peripheral to world order, as it is mainly through states (particularly major states) that they influence global decision making (Omeliicheva 2009, Peterson 1992). Broome (2009) examining the role of NGOs in bringing about change in international debt policy, ar-
gues that while NGOs exercised moral authority, it was through influencing major states that they achieved change. While debt policy was implemented through the IMF and World Bank, these are essentially state-driven. Broome (2009, p.78) is sceptical that a global civil society is emerging “that can help to generate transnational democracy without accessing formal decision-making structures”. Further, the lack of priority given to ethical principles suggests a limited role for transnational civil society within a state-focussed system as one way that transnational civil society exercises power is by framing issues to resonate with strong moral and human values, as outlined in the previous chapter.

Countering the above analysis are arguments that globalisation is transforming the world, with states no longer able to control the flow of ideas, money, arms or drugs, and facing acute problems which cannot be resolved within state borders such as climate, change and financial contagion. In this context, the emergence of a ‘multilateral’ state (Kaldor 2003b) in the form of an emerging rule-based global governance system is posited within which hard power politics can be superseded (McGrew 2002). Governance operates through a variety of institutions, some interstate, (e.g. UN, WTO, IMF and World Bank) and some private sector bodies (e.g. credit rating agencies). Global governance institutions are both formal (based on constitutions) and informal (created through repeated practices). Ultimately their authority is based on their ability to achieve compliance from those to whom they direct their activities (Rosenau 2002). Within this perspective international institutions are central to global governance and contain mechanisms to prevent their capture by the most powerful states (McGrew 2002). By creating the conditions within which states can cooperate for mutual benefit, they reduce the costs of making agreements and reduce uncertainty giving powerful states an interest most of the time in following the agreed rules (Keohane 1988). Rather than being the agents of states, international institutions have some autonomy and authority of their own, which they derive from their knowledge and technical expertise and from their self-presentation as impartial in serving a common social purpose in contrast to self-serving states (Barnett and Finnemore 2005, pp.173-175). This perspective presents global governance and international organisations as a progressive force, with some seeing this as an opportunity to create an ethical cosmopolitan world order based on universal morality, with a world community formed of individuals with rights in addition to states (Held 2002).

The democratic and legitimacy deficits due to the dispersed nature of global governance among public and private bodies are acknowledged (Keohane 1998). Given
that international institutions are run by elites – managed by technocrats and supervised by senior government officials – governance activity takes place largely outside the public realm (Keohane 1998). There is some albeit limited, formal indirect representative democracy in intergovernmental organisations in so far as member states are accountable back to their citizens. This very limited national accountability is supplemented by ‘transparency politics’, with international policy scrutinised by transnational networks, including civil society networks (Keohane 1998). A further opening for transnational civil society within this perspective highlighted in the previous chapter arises from the fact that there is significant space for persuasion within world politics, giving civil society a role in changing international norms (Sikkink 2002). As discussed briefly in the previous chapter thinkers who posit a post-sovereign world in particular highlight the potential for global civil society to bridge the democratic deficit in global governance (Scholte 1999, 2002b, 2004, Kaldor 2003a). Unlike state-centric approaches, which situate civil society action on international issues mainly in relation to major states, ‘post-sovereign’ thinkers position civil society in the international arena and in direct relation to IGOs. This is facilitated by the fact that most of the major global governance bodies have established offices to liaise with NGOs (Scholte 2001b, p.26).

While state-centric views see civil society as working mainly through major states, those positing the emergence of a multilateral state recognise a role for transnational civil society in relation to the global governance institutions which provide the infrastructure to that multilateral state. Both these views provide an inadequate theoretical perspective for this research on a number of fronts. The actual state/transnational interface, a key dimension, is insufficiently elucidated, and neither theory therefore provides an adequate explanation of how civil society leverages this interface. The implication of the hierarchical positioning of states within world order on different national civil society groups is a further area which is underexplored. The focus of state-centric approaches is largely limited to the most powerful states, while the overly consensual multilateral views tend to treat civil society as a fairly homogenous actor within global governance. As can be seen from the previous chapter, there is evidence that the hierarchies within world order are reflected back into civil society, in particular along south/north lines (Omelicheva 2009; Scholte 2002b; Pasha 1998).

The next section examines a third approach to world order which is based on an analysis of the changing relationship between state and capital over time within a hierarchically structured world order.
3.3 State/capital relationship: the internationalising state

A third approach to world order situates the state in the context of the growing internationalisation of the economy (Cox 1987, 1992, 2002; Sklair 2001; Falk 1999; Gill 1998). A number of processes and mechanisms are identified through which the changing relationship between the state and capital resulting from this is portrayed – the transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001), the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill 1998) and the internationalising state (Cox 1987, 1993, 2002).

For Sklair the emergence of a transnational capitalist class – an alliance of the corporate sector, globalising professionals, globalising politicians and bureaucrats - sets the parameters for the state-capital relationship. Members of this class see their interest as promoting the practices of global capitalism, and they lobby on behalf of transnational corporations in the international arena e.g. the GATT/WTO (2001, pp. 298-299). Gill also sees a shift in authority from state to capital through the ‘new constitutionalism’ which locks in neoliberal policies at national level, putting quasi-legal restrictions on the policy space available to states. Gill (1998) dates the new constitutionalism from the 1980s, linked to the rise of transnational corporations. The aim of the new constitutionalism is to reconfigure the state so that governments are facilitators of and operate within the context of market values and discipline. To do this, areas of economic policy such as fiscal, monetary and trade policy are isolated from political influence through e.g. independent central banks and the rule of technocrats. These changes are then further locked in through WTO trade related intellectual property and investment measures (TRIPs and TRIMS), IMF World Bank structural adjustment programmes imposed on developing countries and regional agreements such as the Maastricht Treaty and NAFTA. A central aim is to secure the property rights of capital including its right of access and exit and to insulate dominant economic forces from democratic processes and popular accountability, co-opting opposition with a view to preventing a Polanyian ‘double movement’ (Gill 1989, 1998, 2003).

Cox’s concept of the internationalising state provides a more in-depth historical examination of the stages and processes through which the state/capital relationship has been reconfigured in parallel with the internationalisation of production (1987, 1992, 2002). He distinguishes between how this process took place in industrialised countries and developing countries. In terms of industrialised countries, during the 1930s the nationalist/protectionist state in the industrialised world operated as a buffer between domestic societies and the demands of the international economy which at that time large-
ly consisted of trade between countries. Government agencies with a national focus such as ministries of industry and labour held dominant positions. The post-1945 order of ‘embedded liberalism’ on which the original Bretton Woods system was based, balanced trade liberalisation with space for state intervention in the interest of domestic stability (Ruggie 1982). While states became accountable to the IMF and GATT in relation to trade and exchange rate policies, they were given time to adjust to the world economy enabling the state to mediate between the world economy and the needs of domestic society.

Further changes took place in the state-capital relationship from the 1970s following a number of developments which led to the disembedding of liberalism. From the 1960s financial markets were increasingly liberalised, and in 1971 the original Bretton Woods agreement ended when the US government removed an anchor of the system by breaking the link between the dollar and the gold standard. The 1970s economic crisis led to an increasing internationalisation of production driven by the information revolution (Castells 2000). The emergence of transnational corporations with weak national affiliations and developing global strategies was a key element in the move towards a world economy (Sklair 2001). As a result, production was increasingly operating through international production networks rather than largely nationally based (Cox 1987). The combination of liberalisation of capital and recession in the west resulted in an exponential increase in commercial lending to developing countries. This followed on from the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973, which resulted in huge deposits of ‘petro’ dollars in European banks. Recycling these deposits through loans to developing countries was promoted by the IMF and the G7 in order to avoid deeper recession in the west and led to the debt crisis which was set off in 1982 when systemically important countries like Mexico, Brazil and Argentina were unable to continue servicing their debts.

With the increasing financialisation of the world economy as governments and corporations moved from financing through taxation/equity to debt financing, finance capital gained power in relation to governments (and also in relation to industry). Faced with threats of investment strikes and capital flight, states were forced to prioritise creating business-friendly environments and became more accountable to bond markets, notably to credit rating agencies (Cox 1992). In this context, financial markets were able to exert strong influence on British government policies following financial market liberalisation in 1971 (Baker 1999, p.83). The French socialist government elected in 1981 experienced ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ when it tried to continue domestically oriented interventions e.g. reducing working time, increasing wages. The backlash from currency
markets forced the government to devalue the franc (Castells 2000, p.139). As liberalism became ‘disembedded’, the state became a ‘transmission belt’ – an unfortunate choice of term by Cox suggesting that the state is passive in the process – from the global to the national economy, adjusting national policies and practices and subordinating domestic economies and social priorities to the perceived demands of the world economy (Cox 1987, 1992).

A key element of the process through which the state is internationalised is the changing social base of the state as internal structures are adjusted to enable the transfer of the global consensus into national policy and practice. State agencies most connected to the global economy—ministries for finance and central banks—now take precedence over domestically oriented agencies, such as those dealing with industry, labour and welfare. On the business side, with the internationalisation of production, the sectors oriented to the world economy take precedence over those domestically oriented (Cox 1987). While Cox’s description gives the impression of a smooth transition within the state, Sklair (2001, pp.83-84) poses the impact of globalisation on the state and national capital as a struggle between outward oriented coalitions of corporate executives, state agencies and political parties versus inward oriented capital – and non-capital – localisers.

Further consolidation of the primacy of globally orientated actors takes place through the appointment of technocrats close to global markets to key positions in government bodies. The Spanish Socialist Party, faced with a severe economic crisis on taking power in 1982, appointed a new class of neoliberal technocrats throughout the government, some recruited from ‘IMF circles’ (Castells 2000, p.145). President Cardoso of Brazil – formerly an academic exponent of dependency theory – facing a monetary crisis in 1999 appointed an ex-manager of Soros’ hedge fund as president of the central bank (Castells 2000, p.145). A new nexus of influence emerged, with the dominant globalising forces within government and business coming together in international policy networks with key central agencies of government and big business (Cox 1987, p.263).

As regards southern countries, the period of ‘embedded liberalism’ between 1945 and the late 1960s was when countries across Africa and Asia achieved their independence. Populist regimes were in place across Latin America and developmental states emerged in Asia and Africa (Meyns and Musamba 2010; Mkandwire 2001). Developmental states gained some control over their national economies with a view to bringing about structural change and growth and breaking out of dependant develop-
ment. This included control over access to the economy by foreign capital and the terms and conditions of their operation once in the domestic economy (Cox 1987, 1992). The emphasis was on import substitution behind protective barriers rather than a major orientation towards the world economy. An inability to continue to provide benefits to the social groups on which the populist state was most dependent led to takeover by military bureaucratic regimes. In Latin America the majority of countries were run by military regimes starting from the 1960s up to the 1980s. The legitimacy of the military regimes was based on maintaining order and promising greater security to foreign investors. The neoliberal counter-revolution of the 1980s (Toye 1993), back-to-back with the explosion of the debt crisis, provoked the restructuring of southern states in line with the requirements of international production (Cox 1987, p.265). In return for access to international resources, they were required to open up their economies to world markets and transnational capital. At first this involved ‘rolling back the state’ through privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation, but subsequently the focus shifted to embedding ‘good’ policies and institutions in the state to enable the required business-friendly environment, with legal protection for property and contracts an important element. A further requirement was that priority should be given to repaying international lenders over the social and economic rights of citizens. There was a move to multi-party democracy in line with the neoliberal consensus of open markets and democracy – from single-party rule in some African countries (e.g. in Tanzania and Zambia) and in Latin America the end to the military regimes.

In addition to the processes internationalising the state, geopolitical considerations also impacted on southern states and contributed to the debt crisis. Some of the lending was driven by cold war imperatives – to support allies on either side of the divide resulting in keeping many military and oppressive regimes in place such as Mobutu in the former Zaire. The neoliberal counter-revolution coincided with the weakening of the power of the Soviet Union and therefore a lessening of cold war imperatives. Once the Berlin Wall fell, issues of good governance, human rights and democracy took over from cold war considerations in terms of aid and lending.

While both industrial and developing countries experienced a shift in the balance of power between the state and capital, the process through which this took place differed. For the public in industrialised countries the internationalisation process appeared to arise from impersonal forces and could be separated from domestic political debates (Cox 1987). In the case of developing countries the external pressure on states to restructure in the context of the debt crisis exercised through the IMF was very visible.
This elicited strong resistance from governments and people in southern countries. ‘IMF riots’ took place across Africa and Latin America in opposition to structural adjustment in the 1980s, and resistance continued through the 1990s. For post-colonial African governments IMF/ World Bank conditions curtailed their ability to ‘develop in freedom’, instead of which they had to hand over the management of their economies to the IMF and World Bank (Nyerere 1991). Nyerere resigned as President of Tanzania in 1985 rather than sign an IMF agreement, leaving the door open to a new leader who was prepared to take this step. President Kaunda suspended Zambia’s programme with the IMF in 1987, and relations were not fully reinstated until 1992 (Situmbeko and Zulu Jones 2004). President Sankara of Burkina Faso also sought to resist IMF conditions, and called for an African front to repudiate the debt at an OAU meeting in 1986 (Millet and Toussaint 2004, p.19). Following Sankara’s assassination in 1987, Burkina Faso came into line with IMF conditions. In Latin America, Alan Garcia, elected President of Peru in 1985, took the strongest debtor country line against debt and IMF conditions, unilaterally capping debt repayments at 10% of export earnings. By 1989, however, Peru had been forced back into an IMF programme.

3.3.1 Internationalising state in action

Cox does not suggest that state authority has moved to market actors such as transnational corporations, but that

There is a transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of the global economy. This process generates consensual guidelines, underpinned by an ideology of globalisation, that are transmitted into the policymaking channels of national governments and big corporations (Cox 1992, p.30).

Through these processes the state is being internationalised into official and unofficial transnational networks of states, corporate representatives and intellectuals - IMF and World Bank, UN, G7, WTO, Bank for International Settlements, Trilateral Commission, WEF, Bilderberg conferences. It is noteworthy that many of the informal fora were set up in the first half of the 1970s: the WEF was set up in 1973, the Trilateral Commission in 1973 and the G7 in 1975. The resulting ‘nébuleuse’ is a commitment to reaching consensus in the interests of promoting an open world economy facilitated by the dominant neoliberal ideology; but this is not a centralised force (Cox 1987, 1992, 2002). The consensus-forming processes shape the discourses within which policies are defined.
(Cox 1992), with policy harmonisation as the operationalisation of the consensus (Panitch 1994). Networking for policy consensus at global level is also highlighted by Sklair (2001) and Gill (1998) – between the different fractions of the transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001) and between transnational elites of business, state officials, members of international organisations enabling common perspectives on the role of international business (Gill 1989). These processes are served by a range of media publications such as the *Financial Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* (Gill 1989). This focus on networking to achieve common understandings reflects Dryzek’s (1999) understanding of discourse as a source of power internationally, as the absence of formal rules at international level increases the importance of discourse (1999).

Participation in the internationalising state is hierarchically structured. States contribute differentially to the consensus-making process and are subject to different pressures to implement the ensuing agreements as outlined above. Part of the process of restructuring southern states involved sideling the south/north dialogue which developed in relation to the NIEO during the 1970s. There was also a shift in the hierarchies of power between international organisations, with the UN marginalised on major political and economic issues, operating as a subordinate body to the IMF, World Bank and later the WTO, which was created in 1995 (Olsen 2005, Cox 2002). Southern governments had a strong base within UNCTAD and UNDP, but both these organisations lost some of their power. The centre of gravity in relation to trade and intellectual property rights shifted from UNCTAD and the World Intellectual Property Organisation to the northern government-dominated WTO. UNDP lost influence on development to the World Bank and even the IMF with the introduction in 1999 of the requirement for debtor governments to adopt Poverty Reduction Strategies which had to be endorsed by the IMF and World Bank before debt reduction or further financing was made available. Parts of southern civil society groups/social movements began to lose faith in UN institutions, perceiving them as having been captured by neoliberalism (Bond 2006, Jubilee South 2002b).

The operation of the G7, central to policy consensus formation on global financial issues – and a key target of debt campaigners – illustrates the consensus formation process in action. Set up in 1975 after the fall of the Bretton Woods system and the increasing mobility of capital, the G7 sits at the apex of a diffused system of global financial governance involving private and public bodies within which no one actor dominates. The G7 started as the G5, with Italy and Canada joining at a later stage. Following the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the role of the G7 changed with the
emergence of the G20. It is underpinned by a transnational state/society alliance involving departments of finance, central banks and financial interests in G7 countries (Baker 2006). Most officials involved in the G7 process see their national financial sectors (e.g. Wall Street and the City of London) as their main constituency, with the national interest seen as coinciding with the interests of this sector (Baker 2006). The G7 process largely functions through a network of ‘deputies’ i.e. senior officials from international divisions of finance ministries and the deputy governors of central banks. The shared understandings on financial issues held by these officials – an international financial system based on the principles of sound money and open markets - enables them to come to consensus positions (Baker 2006, p.231).

While interstate negotiation and bargaining takes place, the G7 operates mainly as a transgovernmental coalition in that there is a degree of autonomy from politicians and heads of government. The main focus is technical, with expertise as the key resource leading to a perceived depoliticisation of the process. The G7 process is informal – there are no recorded minutes of deputies or ministerial meetings (Baker 2006) – and the close ongoing contact between the individuals involved strengthens the network. The aim of the G7 is to maximise its collective influence towards the wider decision makers on global finance. It has no direct power over the private sector and communicates largely to financial markets through ‘strategic signalling’ i.e. statements with a view to persuading these bodies to take the action envisaged in G7 communications. The G7 is the most powerful set of countries within the IMF and World Bank, holding 41% of the vote at the IMF (IMF undated) and 41.5% at the World Bank (World Bank 2013). The G7, therefore, directly intervenes in policy making in these bodies. G7 finance ministers meet before the Spring and Annual IMF/World Bank meetings with a view to promoting their consensus at these meetings.

3.3.2 Criticism of the internationalising state

The internationalising state has rightly been criticised for presenting the national / transnational relationship as largely one-way, with influences from the international arena impacting on a passive nation state, neglecting the fact that there was active state input into the process of globalisation. This is a significant weakness for this thesis, as the role of the state in relation to the transnational arena is a crucial question in terms of situating transnational civil society within world order. Cox’s reduction of the state to that of a transmission belt for the smooth transfer of transnational policy consensus into
national policies and practices has been particularly criticised (Hobson and Ramesh 2002; Shaw 2000; Baker 1999; Panitch 1994). Rather than becoming an agent of transnational capital, the critics argue that the state is being re-organised involving a shift in power relations within the state – states in fact have played a strong role in promoting globalisation (Panitch 1994, Baker 1999, Hobson and Ramesh 2002). For Shaw (2000) the internationalisation of western states was a precondition for globalisation. This view of the state as actively involved in facilitating globalisation is supported by the wider literature on the subject of the state (Amoore, et al 1997; Obi 1997; Stevens and Boswell 1997). For Panitch the state is being reorganised, not bypassed, and is working with the capitalist class to secure the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism’ (Panitch 1994, p.64) e.g. through GATT and NAFTA. In terms of NAFTA, he argues:

this is not something imposed on the Canadian and Mexican states by American capital and state as external to the latter; rather it reflects the role adopted by the Mexican and Canadian states in representing the interests of their bourgeoisies and bureaucracies as these are already penetrated by American capital and administration. (Panitch 1994, p.75)

The relationship is two-way: not just that international institutions erode national sovereignty, but also that states bind themselves to international agreements as a way of resisting domestic demands and to push through measures against opposition from strong domestic forces (Hobson and Ramesh 2002). Further, rather than operating as a transmission belt for transnational agreements to the domestic arena, states are still a site of struggle over these power relations e.g. between those representing national and international capital. It is to the City of London rather than to international finance that the British government is accountable when drawing up its budget (Panitch 1994). Substantial lobbying has been carried out on behalf of corporate interests in GATT and WTO by these globalising bureaucrats and politicians (Sklair 1999).

Baker (1999) provides the most substantial critique of Cox’s internationalising state, based on an empirical study of the internationalisation of the British state. He argues that the internationalisation process was due to a shift in the social basis of the state and a domestic climate of ideas, rather than the impact of external forces of the nébuleuse. There was, in fact, a two-way relationship between the globalisation discourse and the state (Baker 1999, p.97). He illustrates his argument through examining the roles of the Bank of England and the British Treasury in the internationalisation of the state. The shift from heavy industry to more mobile factors of production resulted in
the financial sector and multinational corporations (both British MNCs operating abroad and foreign MNCs operating in Britain), dominating the new social base of the state. Baker confirms the process outlined by Cox, which resulted in precedence being given to state bodies geared towards the world economy. National discourse fora involving trade unions and industry were abolished; sections dealing with overseas issues in the Treasury took precedence over those dealing with domestic issues, and the climate of ideas changed with the appointment of advisers holding monetarist views. This represented a restructuring at the heart of the state with interests of international mobile capital prioritised over those of domestic capital and labour. Key for Baker is that as well as existing as external actors, global economic actors also exist within the state - the British state now has a transnationalised social base as market criteria are increasingly used to determine public policy (Baker 1999, p.96). Further, the relationship between the state and international discourse is mutually reinforcing rather than operating in one direction from the international to the national.

In the face of the above criticism, Cox withdrew his unfortunate metaphor of the state as a ‘transmission belt’ between the national and transnational arena (2002), clarifying his Gramscian understanding of the state as a political authority structure together with the balance of social forces sustaining or challenging its rule. He also accepted that there is complex, and multi directional interaction between various forces of the ‘nébuleuse’ – the pro globalisation social forces within the state, the evolving neoliberal ideology within universities and wider intellectual circles and intergovernmental organisations develop the guidelines to be translated into domestic policy and practice by governments’ (Cox 2002, p.33). This clarification rescues the internationalising state from a one-directional relationship between the state and the transnational arena and makes it a useful concept to analyse the dynamics of the state/international interface. Setting the balance of social forces at the heart of the internationalising state opens up the possibility for struggles over the internationalisation process and makes the concept consistent with Baker’s empirical findings in relation to the restructuring of the British state.

Findings in relation to southern states differ from Baker’s findings in relation to the British state. Examining the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), a major development project involving Mozambique and South Africa, Soderbaum and Taylor (2001) found that the state did act as a ‘transmission belt’ for transnational capital with its role reduced to that of an investment promotion agency rather than that of a developmental state. This meant that the state was unable to mediate between popular groups and private capital to tackle the negative social effects of the project:
An outspoken 'market paradigm' rules investment decisions in the MDC project, with the mediating influence of the state being absent at most levels. The project represents 'part of a deal between political elite and international capital supported by IFIs [international financial institutions] and international donors to precipitate liberalisation by the state. (Soderbaum and Taylor 2001, p.687)

In the Philippines, critical economic policy agencies (the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance) are transnationalised and are therefore more accountable to external bodies (i.e. World Bank, IMF and bilateral official aid agencies) than to Philippine citizens. The purpose of this transnationalisation, started under the Marcos regime, was to ensure access to foreign capital (Gershman 1997, p.88).

The difference between Baker’s analysis and that of Soderbaum and Taylor and Gershman further confirms the hierarchical structuring within the internationalising state. Clearly Britain, sitting at the heart of global financial governance as a member of the G7, will play a greater part in the creation, maintenance and imposition of the transnational consensus than countries subject to stronger external restructuring forces. It is important, however, not to overstate the role of external forces in relation to debtor countries nor to present the southern state as powerless within the internationalising state. Nor is it the case that all debtor countries are in the same power relationship to their creditors. In a study of the Argentinean government’s negotiations with its creditors 2001-2003, Cooper and Momani (2005) highlight the important role played by domestic political factors. Rather than being passive in the hands of its creditors, the government took a proactive role in its negotiations, separating the IMF off from its private creditors and managing to secure a better deal with both. The government also presented the social unrest generated by the debt crisis which took the form of regular road blockages, factory occupations and popular assemblies as a threat to the stability and survival of the state and so managed to shift the balance between the demands of international capital and domestic society back towards the latter (Cooper and Momani 2005).

A further criticism of the internationalising state particularly relevant for this research is the lack of serious consideration given to resistance to the restructuring of the state in the interest of global capital and opportunities to pose alternatives. A common problem with theories offering an overly structural explanation, as does Cox, is that they invariably come close to determinism. Within such explanations, dominant power inevitably dominates while resistance or counter-power becomes ‘other’ and sometimes is almost absent. According to Drainville (2005a, p.29), Cox poses the world economy as a place of absolute unilateral power, and he is bemused at their “unexplainable confi-
dence” that hegemony will of itself beget counter-hegemony (2005a, p.29). The cursory approach to counter-hegemony by Neo-Gramscian thinkers is demonstrated by Gill (2003) who dedicates most of his book *Power and Resistance in the New World Order* to analysing dominant power. While a short postscript ‘The Post Modern Prince’ focuses on the emergence of the anti-globalisation/global social justice movements following the Battle of Seattle, he provides limited understanding of these counter-movements. Holloway (2005) is also critical of the Neo Gramscian over-focus on hegemony – arguing that focussing on the reproduction of dominant power through concepts like hegemony, makes that reproduction seem inevitable. What is needed is a theory of the vulnerability of domination rather than a theory of domination. Scott (1990) goes even further, arguing that rather than signalling consent to dominant power, subordinated groups’ apparent acquiescence is veiling continual, covert acts of resistance.

Cox (2002), however, clarifies that he does not see the internationalisation of the state as irreversible, acknowledging that a ‘counter-nébuleuse’ is emerging in opposition to the dominance of global capital with the pressure for change coming from ‘globalisation from below’. He posits resistance as two-pronged: firstly, using existing intergovernmental organisations to press grievances with the UN as the most hospitable to oppositional voices – albeit the UN has been marginalised in relation to major economic issues, as referred to above – and secondly, building national civil society movements which are “transnational in orientation” (Cox 2002, p.40). Social forces within domestic societies are increasingly coordinating their resistance to globalisation and elaborating alternative visions for the future (Cox 2002, p.33). As a ‘counter-nébuleuse’ was introduced as an add-on in response to criticism, this is a very underdeveloped concept. Cox admits he is a better critic than advocate. His concept resonates somewhat with Polanyi’s – equally undeveloped - concept of a diffuse counter-movement against the supremacy of the self-regulating market (Polanyi 2001).

### 3.3.3 Why the internationalising state as the framework for this research

While civil society is deemed largely irrelevant for the interstate system in realise theory and a sought-after ally by proponents of the liberal order, counter-systemic thinkers see a potentially emancipatory role for civil society but fail to adequately theorise it, because they are overly preoccupied with explaining dominant power. The concept of the internationalising state, however, provides a useful framework for the structural con-
text within which transnational civil society operates – using the more nuanced concept provided by Cox following the criticism received.

Firstly, the genesis of the debt crisis sits centrally within the processes which gave rise to the internationalising state and is also the event which set off the restructuring of southern debtor states.

Secondly, the internationalising state provides an historically based explanation of the changing role of the state in relation to capital (internal and external). From this, key elements of the internationalisation process which faced transnational civil society during the period covered by this research (1976-2005) can be identified. The depoliticised, neoliberal-based international consensus which developed over this period presented as ‘common sense’ based on sound technical expertise provide the context within which transnational civil society sought to introduce counter-understandings on debt and to bring back ‘political will’ to solve the debt crisis.

Thirdly, the hierarchical structuring of the internationalising state highlights the need to look at the implications for civil society of the different power positions of their states within world order. There are a number of different relevant dimensions to the hierarchical structuring of states. The south/north interface within civil society becomes particularly relevant for debt campaigning because the debt crisis starkly reflects the creditor/debtor divide. There are, however, also other differences e.g. between northern G7 and non-G7 countries.

Fourthly, the interactive nature of the state/international interface enables a dynamic examination of the geography of power, how transnational civil society operates across the national and international interface rather than confining civil society mainly to state-level action as in a state-centric view or presenting civil society as part of global governance from a liberal view. The limitation of a cosmopolitan perspective for this research is that its focus has been on the political domain, on limiting abuses of political power with little attention to regulation of economic power or market mechanisms (Held 2002, p.317).

While providing an overly structural explanation of the state/international arena with little explicit attention to counter-power, Cox (2002) makes clear that the internationalising state is not a done deal, allowing room for struggle against the forces of neoliberal globalisation. This provides an opening to consider how transnational civil society groups interact with and impact upon the structural context of world order, rather than being simply shaped or constrained by this.
Having established the rationale for selecting the internationalising state as the world order framework for this study, the next sections operationalises this concept in relation to debt, and highlights the implications for transnational civil society.

3.4 Operationalising the ‘debt nébuleuse’

International policy on debt is developed through the ‘nébuleuse’ consensus making processes as outlined above. This section identifies those parts of the nébuleuse which are relevant for the making and implementation of debt policy – the term ‘debt nébuleuse’ will be used to describe this ensemble of institutions. It then highlights the hierarchical relations within and between these institutions and considers the implications for transnational civil society power. Finally, there is a brief examination of the processes through which transnational civil society can engage with the debt nébuleuse – whether through direct interaction with the relevant international institutions or through engaging with states. The overall purpose is to set the structural backdrop for the application of the analytical framework set out at the end of Chapter 2.

Hierarchically structured institutions of the debt nébuleuse

In terms of debt, there are four main bodies which make up the debt nébuleuse, the international fora within which decisions on debt are taken. These are the G7 central to global financial governance, the Paris Club of bilateral creditors and the IMF and World Bank both inter-governmental bodies with membership covering virtually all nation states. The London Club of commercial creditors figured less centrally particularly when the focus shifted from commercial to official debt from the start of the 1990s. A striking feature of the institutions of the ‘debt nébuleuse’ is that while two are formally constituted organisations (IMF and World Bank), the other two (G7 and Paris Club) are informal fora with no real, formal organisational existence. According to Baker (2008, p.103) referring to the G7:

[B]y no conventional measure or definition is the G7 process’ an institution. It has no official legal status, no permanent home base and no secretariat.

Examining the Paris Club, Callaghy (2002, p. 14) makes a parallel point:
The Paris Club has been one of the most powerful international organisations operating over the last several decades, directly affecting the lives of millions of people, although technically it does not exist.

The creditor/debtor country divide operates differently across these four institutions. Creditors and debtors are all members of both the IMF and World Bank but a state’s power within these institutions varies in relation to the size of its economy. Membership of the Paris Club is open only to creditor governments; and the G7 is limited to the most powerful states (with Russia included from 1998 it becomes the G8). While dealing with different types of debt, bilateral (Paris Club) and multilateral (IMF and World Bank), the four institutions are interlinked. Firstly, as intergovernmental organisations they have overlapping membership with G7 countries belonging to all four fora. Secondly as they all participate in the transnational consensus formation process on debt, they reinforce each other in ensuring its implementation. To receive bilateral debt rescheduling from the Paris Club, for example, a debtor government must have a programme agreed first with the IMF.

The next section sets out how these different bodies operate and the implications for civil society groups.

The G7 has played a major part in determining international debt policy over three decades, influencing policies adopted by the IMF and World Bank and also the Paris Club. As outlined above it is an informal discourse, not an implementation forum – it sets the parameters for financial and economic policies and initiatives and then seeks to influence other bodies to integrate these into their practice. As the dominant body within the debt nébuleuse it exercises direct power at the IMF and World Bank, where it holds the power of veto over proposals to which G7 members are collectively opposed (Baker 2008). All the major debt deals in relation to bilateral debt, while initiated by different states, emanated from the G7 and were subsequently adopted by the Paris Club. These deals were: the Toronto Terms 1988, London Terms 1991, Naples Terms 1994, and Lyon Terms 1996. The broader agreements covering multilateral and bilateral debt were also initiated at the G7: the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) in 1996, Enhanced HIPC1999 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative in 2005 with the IMF and World Bank taking the lead on implementation. The IMF and G7 are particularly entwined, with the IMF Managing Director attending G7 meetings and a significant number of senior G7 deputies having previously worked as national Executive Directors at the IMF (Baker 2006, pp.111-112). The links between the G7, IMF and World Bank are drawn tighter by the fact that the Executive Directors for the G7 gov-
ernments which serve on the IMF and World Bank boards are directly answerable to their national G7 deputies (Baker 2008, p.105).

The G7 represents a virtual fusion of the national and international. As an informal body there are no formal processes for most civil society groups to engage with the G7 – other than weakly through G7 embassies in their countries (Baker 2006). Civil society groups from G7 countries, however, have privileged access. By operating nationally, civil society in G7 countries also operates as transnational civil society as the national and international are virtually fused for them. Engagement with the G7 has therefore been led by civil society from G7 countries, starting with the counter-summits organised to parallel G7 summits from the 1980s (see Chapter 5). Nor has the G7 shown much interest over the years in opening up to civil society - the first G7 mention of NGOs was in their 1995 Communiqué, a limited technical reference to improving coordination between donors, international organisations, bilateral donors and NGOs. The first official dialogue between civil society and the G7 was at the 1998 Birmingham summit, when a special document was produced on the debt issue as 70,000 debt campaigners congregated in the centre of Birmingham (Hajnal 2007).

The Paris Club, founded in 1956 with a secretariat based in the French Treasury, is the least well-known of the bodies of the debt nébuleuse. It is an informal group of creditor countries which has no permanent members, no formal rules or statutes, and agreed minutes of meetings that are neither published nor legally binding (Brown and Bulman 2002). It functions under the principles of consensus and burden sharing and has links to the other bodies within the debt nébuleuse. In addition to representatives of the debtor country and its creditors, participants at Paris Club meetings include the IMF, which has an advisory but no decision making role. Other intergovernmental organisations attend as observers – OECD, World Bank, regional development banks and UNCTAD, which provides assistance to debtor countries at the Paris Club (UNCTAD no date). Power relations are very stark. Negotiations which take place at the offices of the French Treasury take the form of ‘proximity talks’, with the collective creditors and single debtor operating from separate spaces and the French Treasury representative acting as a mediator between them (Vilanova and Martin 2001). The creditors act as judge in their own case, with a minimal role for debtor countries, who can only either accept or decline the offer from the creditors (Eurodad et al no date). Finally, as pointed out above, the framework for the deals implemented by the Paris Club are set out at G7 meetings.
As an informal group based in the French Treasury, from an organisational point of view, the Paris Club is virtually part of the French state. This has given France a sense of ownership of this institution. According to Callaghy (2002, p.13), the French fought hard to protect the Paris Club in the battles over HIPC which resulted in a shift in the centre of gravity of the international debt regime from Paris to Washington, with the IMF and World Bank taking leadership. As a very secretive body with no formal procedures, there are no discursive entry points to the Paris Club for civil society groups. As a creditor country forum, only civil society groups from these countries have a possible entry point through their national delegates. Given the key role of the French Treasury, however, French NGOs became an intermediary between the secretariat of the Paris Club and civil society groups from other countries in the early 2000s.

In contrast to the G7 and Paris Club, the IMF and World Bank are the only formal institutions within the core organisations of the debt nébuleuse. There are a number of multilateral regional banks in addition to the World Bank, which also lend to southern governments, e.g. the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. For the purposes of this research, however, the focus is on the World Bank, as the highest profile and dominant development bank. The IMF and World Bank operate through similar governance structures, and therefore the focus here is on the IMF to illustrate the situation in relation to both institutions. The IMF Board of Governors is made up of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of all member countries. Voting is based on the size of a country’s economy so that power in the organisation is distributed according to ‘shareholdings’. An argument given for this is to ensure that powerful states are strongly represented and play a key role so that the IMF is effective in world affairs (Woods 2000, p.828). Voting, in fact, rarely happens, as the IMF operates through consensus decision making, but a running tally of votes is kept on decisions under discussion to enable the chair to assess the ‘sense of meeting’ (Woods 2000). Day-to-day running of the organisations is carried out by 24 Executive Directors (IMF 2013). Eight states have their own Executive Director at the IMF – the US, Germany, France, Japan, UK, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia (IMF 2013) - with the other 16 seats divided between the remaining 179 members, organised in constituencies, with Executive Directors elected by those constituencies biannually. The G7 together hold over 40% of the vote whereas Sub-Saharan African countries, which make up a quarter of IMF membership, collectively hold just over 4% of the vote (Woods 2008, p.1). Countries are represented at Executive Board level by nominees from their departments of finance and central banks.
The different power positions of countries within the IMF have strong implications for civil society groups. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is virtually disenfranchised given that their collective vote is so low. The Canadian-led constituency which includes Ireland and ten Caribbean countries illustrates another facet of the complexity of the national/international linkages within this system of governance. As Canada holds over 60% of the constituency’s votes, it holds the Executive Director position permanently. Canadian Executive Directors have not usually consulted with countries from the Caribbean and Ireland in formulating their statements to the Executive Boards (Momani 2010b). There are therefore very different levels of access to these institutions through states for civil society, with some groups virtually disenfranchised, although formally being represented, while civil society in countries which have their own executive directors or where the country holds a strong position within a constituency have greater access. The IMF and World Bank are the only bodies within the debt nébuleuse which engage significantly with civil society – highlighting the differential access to formal and informal bodies within the consensus formation process.

Based on this outline of the hierarchical structuring of the debt nébuleuse, civil society can be divided into four groupings in relation to their degree of access to the institutions of the debt nébuleuse. There are civil society groups in G7 countries and groups in non-G7 creditor countries but with significant intermediary power in that they have access to the Paris Club through their country representative and their country holds the Executive Director position at the IMF and World Bank. There are also groups in creditor countries more weakly positioned within the internationalising state which do not have their own Executive Director at the IMF and World Bank. Finally, there are groups in debtor countries which have no direct access to the G7 or Paris Club and where their country has a very limited or virtually no voice at the IMF and World Bank.

In the next section opportunities for direct engagement with the IMF and World Bank is explored.

*Engagement with/challenging the debt nébuleuse*

Having set out the institutions of the debt nébuleuse, the power relations within and between them and how this segments civil society, this section examines the channels of engagement available to civil society within the debt nébuleuse. Given the interactive nature of the relationship between states and the transnational arena, where within this process does civil society seek to engage – to what extent with international institutions,
to what extent through states – and do different sections of transnational civil society operate differently in relation to this question. The following section first sets out the opportunities to engage internationally with the debt nébuleuse and then looks at understandings of the state and civil society engagement.

**Transnational engagement in the debt nébuleuse**

Turning first to consensus formation within the internationalising state, there are a number of threads to the relationship of civil society to this process. International bodies have been keen to promote certain kinds of civil society involvement. In addition to increasing their support to NGOs significantly during the 1980s particularly to support project implementation, the UN, World Bank and bilateral donors have pressed southern governments to engage with NGOs as ‘development partners’ from the early 1990s (Brautigam and Segarra 2007, Reimann 2006). This reflects the significant leverage donors have because of the support they provide. Involvement of civil society became institutionalised at national level in 1999 through Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country conditionality. The interest of international and bilateral bodies within these initiatives has been to promote engagement between civil society and national governments.

As regards opportunities to engage at international level, links between civil society and the World Bank go back to the 1970s, when some limited operational collaboration took place (Covey 1998). This became more formalised with the establishment of the NGO World Bank – NGO Working Group in 1981 to enable dialogue and collaboration between the World Bank and NGOs. Originally the committee involved NGO members from Europe, North America and Japan, but subsequently representatives from Africa, Asia and Latin America were included, and over time the remit extended to include policy discussions. Collaboration was made more formal with the adoption of a World Bank directive in 1989 instructing staff to involve NGOs in projects (Covey 1998). As regards the IMF, there was little engagement with civil society up to the 1980s, when the explosion of the debt crisis and the introduction of structural adjustment programmes led to ‘IMF riots’ across Latin America and Africa (see Chapter 5). The IMF was under severe international pressure during the mobilisations against the IMF/World Bank AGM in Berlin in 1988, and the following year the IMF set up a public affairs department with a remit to engage with civil society (Scholte 2002a, p.37).

The most institutionalised engagement between the IMF, World Bank and transnational civil society takes place at the institutions’ Spring and Annual meetings when
the IMF and World Bank jointly organise a Civil Society Forum covering a range of issues with some events jointly organised with civil society groups. Contact between civil society groups and the IMF and World Bank do not take place totally independently of governments, however. As these bodies are inter-governmental organisations, formally their main relationships are with governments. The World Bank points out that, while it has extensive contact with civil society organisations, its “member governments remain the institution’s owners, clients and decision makers, and its ultimate accountability is to these shareholders” (World Bank 2005, p.ix). Similarly for the IMF, contacts with civil society organisations must not go so far “that they interfere with the IMF’s primary relationship with the national government” (IMF 2003, p.6). The IMF advises its employees engaging with civil society:

If a government raises objections to IMF-civil society relations, explain the rationale in terms of the aims identified above. If government resistance persists, refrain from the contacts and refer the matter to headquarters for possible follow-up. (IMF 2003, p.3)

As regards attendance at IMF/World Bank fora, civil society participants must get accreditation from the IMF and World Bank and all requests for accreditation are first cleared with the relevant Executive Director’s office (World Bank 2012).

IMF/World Bank motivations to engage with civil society are a mixture of seeking to convince civil society of the validity of the dominant consensus they are promoting, improving their projects (in the case of the World Bank) and defending themselves against criticism and threats to their funding. Given its major project portfolio in addition to its role in policy, the World Bank engages NGOs in order to improve its performance in addition to defensive reasons (Kelly 2005; Nelson 2000a). The World Bank’s own rationale for engagement is that:

Civic engagement is now an integral piece of the Bank’s strategy to strengthen the investment climate and promote empowerment in developing countries, and is part of the Bank’s business model. (World Bank 2005, p ix)

The IMF whose role is solely a policy one, engages with civil society in order to try to build consensus for its neoliberal restructuring policies and to improve the chances of implementation (Thirkell-White 2004; O’Brien et al. 2000). But the fault-line in the IMF approach is that the organisation is a central plank in the transnational ‘technical’ consensus based on sound money and open markets. If this consensus is not open to political challenge, with debate limited to technical issues, this leaves little room for
civil society to contribute to reshaping the dominant consensus (Thirkell-White 2004). The limitation of the IMF approach is illustrated by the difficulty that IMF resident representatives have in envisaging that farmers or women’s organisations could provide relevant input for their macroeconomic policies (Scholte 2012, p.194).

Given the major legitimacy deficit of both organisations, they are vulnerable to national and transnational civil society pressure. Particularly worrying for the IMF and World Bank is the possibility that transnational civil society might lobby their governments to withhold funding (Kelly 2005, Scholte 2002a, O’Brien et al 2000). US NGOs in particular have lobbied the US Congress to either not provide funding or to attach conditions to funding. In 1992 US NGOs opposed the proposed US $18 billion contribution to the tenth replenishment of IDA, the concessional lending wing of the World Bank which lends to low-income countries. It is funded by donor countries and is replenished every three years. Civil society opposition to IDA was motivated by World Bank involvement in funding the controversial Sardar Sarovar dams in India with their huge displacement of peoples and heavy environmental impacts (Udall 1998). Pressure from US NGOs and the US Congress pushed the World Bank to create an independent Inspection Panel (Woods 2000). There were, however, concerns at this campaign from some southern NGOs and INGOs because of the importance of IDA funding for Sub-Saharan African countries (Covey 1998; Udall 1998). In 1980, 1983, 1989, 1991-92, 1994 and 1997-98 US NGOs lobbied “with considerable effect to delay and/or qualify congressional support for increased US funding to the IMF” (Scholte 2002a, p.38). On a smaller scale, a civil society coalition in Ireland with parliamentary support successfully pressed the Irish government to withhold its contribution to the IMF’s programme in low-income countries (ESAF) from 1995 to 1999 (Irish Mozambique Solidarity et al 1997).

IMF and World Bank motivation for engaging is likely to influence which parts of transnational civil society they target. To defend against possible threats to their funding, their focus is likely to be on northern civil society, while if the priority is to improve their organisations’ policies/performance, the focus will have a stronger southern civil society involvement. Overall evidence is that northern groups dominate the IMF/World Bank interactions with civil society. Participants in the major formal IMF/World Bank forum with civil society at the spring and autumn meetings are mainly from the north (Scholte 2012, Kelly 2003). A bias towards engaging with northern civil society groups operating in or with members in southern countries has also been noted. Seeking discussions with civil society on structural adjustment in Honduras the World
Bank approached a number of INGOs, and the meetings were often held in English. Later local civil society groups were included in discussions (Interviewee INGO Central America). A detailed study of IMF/ civil society relations in six African countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria and Uganda, found that most of IMF resident representatives’ limited contact with civil society groups was with local branches of northern-based organisations rather than with indigenous associations. Given its role in global financial governance which is closely allied to private financial sector interests as outlined above, it is not surprising that the IMF’s closest links were with associations linked to the financial sector, such as the Congolese Association of Banks, the Bankers Association of Malawi, and the Financial Markets Dealers Association in Nigeria. Overall the study concluded that relationships reflected the same broad hierarchies of access and influence which can be found across world politics generally – north/south, rural/urban, class, gender and cultural divides (Scholte 2012). As with interaction within the debt nébuleuse, interaction between the IMF and World Bank and civil society is hierarchically structured.

Engaging with the state

Engagement within states in order to win power, seize power or pressure states to change their approaches has been central to civil society activity since the emergence of the nation-state (Tarrow 1998). In the context of the changing relationship between the state and the international arena on which the internationalising state is based, the question arises, to what extent is the state still a useful site for struggle. To what extent can civil society groups’ impact on international debt policies by engaging directly with relevant officials and ministers including the country representatives to debt nébuleuse bodies, or by lobbying parliaments. Or given the role played by institutions of the debt nébuleuse in creating and promoting international policy consensus, can transnational civil society engage more effectively at international rather than state level. It is, of course, not necessarily an either/or option but it is important to identify how, when and for what reasons do transnational civil society groups engage at either level.

Within the complexity of the relationship between states and the international arena, a number of different approaches to the significance of the state in terms of challenging international policy in a globalising world can be identified. There are those which argue that the state is still a significant player and therefore a worthy site for struggle (Bond 2006; Bendaña 2005; Bello 2002). Others take this further and argue
that the state can be rearticulated as an ally to rebalance the relationship between global capital and states (Gills 2000). An opposing position is that the state should be bypassed, either because the space for action at national level has become so limited or because the state’s role supporting capitalist forces weakens its ability to respond to domestic demands to counter the transnational consensus (Evans 2008; Cox 2006; Holloway 2005).

As was set out above, that the state is a significant player in world order is key to both a state-centric view of world order and to the concept of the internationalising state. Gills (2000) argues for a new coalition of social forces working together and where possible through governments pressing for social change. An aim of this coalition is to rearticulate the state towards resistance to neoliberal globalisation. For Falk (1998), while globalisation is a done deal and cannot be reversed, the state remains the critical focus of the struggle for the democratisation of globalisation. The aim of globalisation-from-below (those resisting the adverse effects of globalisation) is to reorient the state in terms of how it mediates between the logic of capital and the priorities of its peoples. At global level, coalitions may develop between states and social movements e.g. in relation to human rights, the environment with different potential coalitions involving different governments depending on the issue area.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) highlight that sovereignty and structural inequality are closely linked for southern civil society groups and as a result, defence of sovereignty is an important part of resistance. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of southern thinkers emphasise the importance of the state. Bello (2002) calls for ‘deglobalisation’, to re-empower the local and national within a pluralist global economic governance. Bond argues against civil society involvement in promoting global targets like the MDGs highlighting the importance instead of struggles which make demands on the state to “lock down capitalism” (2006, p.352). For Bendaña (2005), it is difficult to conceive of a viable alternative to the current development path without a recapture of the state (participative rather than vanguardist) and the defence of “key state development instruments that globalisers wish to negotiate away” (2005, p.68).

There are a wide range of thinkers who claim that the space for contestation at national level has shrunk with the shift of power away from the state, and the struggle therefore moves to the international arena (Evans 2008; Cox 2006; Drainville 2005a; Robinson 1999). Rather than seek to restore the nationalist developmental state, Evans (2008) argues for the construction of a counter-hegemonic globalisation which would prioritise democratic political control, equitable human and environmental stewardship.
Cox also sees an activist focus on the state as ineffective, since the ability of the state to maintain popular consent has declined as a result of the closing of national policy space by neoliberalism. This has resulted in a “declining credibility of political strategies which aim to work within ‘the system’ or to capture that system intact” (Cox 2006, p.221). He sees the involvement of particular groups (e.g. community activists) with the state as a major difficulty in creating broader alliances with the anti-globalisation/global justice movement. Holloway is also a strong proponent that resistance should bypass the state arguing that as the state is situated within a set of social relations based within the capitalist mode of production, engagement with the state pushes activists towards reconciliation with capital. For Holloway, the alternative is the drive to self-determination (communism) – and the struggle for self-determination and the struggle within the state cannot coexist: “engagement of the state is never innocent of consequences” (Holloway 2005, p.235). Recognising, however, that current movements combine those who seek state power with those who reject the state as a form of organisation, he concludes that “movements for radical change will be and should be, a dissonant mixture of positions and forms of organisation” (Holloway 2005, p236).

3.5 Conclusion

Following an examination of the internationalising state – including its weaknesses – the chapter shifted to an operationalisation of the concept in relation to debt. The institutions of the debt nébuleuse were identified and the power relations within and between them were highlighted. Four different sets of states were identified defined by these power differences: G7 countries; non-G7 creditor countries with significant power in the debt nébuleuse; non-G7 creditor countries weakly positioned within the debt nébuleuse; and debtor countries. Transnational civil society is also hierarchically structured by these power differences and these categories provide the basis for distinguishing between campaign groups in different countries. Finally, consideration was given to what factors might pull groups towards engagement at the international and those which might privilege national level engagement to set the scene for the case study chapters.

To apply the concept of the internationalising state in the case study chapters three questions are relevant: (i) what are the key relevant dimensions of the internationalising state; (ii) how did the internationalising state change over the case study period; (iii) how will the framework identified in the previous chapter to analyse the power of
transnational civil society interact with the understandings of the internationalising state provided in this chapter?

First, the following are the key relevant dimensions of the internationalising state:

a) the changing social basis of the state, so that influence moves from domestically oriented to externally oriented forces;
b) the non-transparent, consensus-making fora in which international policy is developed vis-à-vis representative democratic processes at national level;
c) the dominance of technical knowledge over political or normative ideas; the dominance of technocrats over democratically accountable agents within the process in which mainstream understandings are maintained;
d) the hierarchical structuring of the internationalising state.

Second, the following is a summary of the relevant changes in world order over the three case study periods. The debt crisis emerged towards the end of the 1970s as liberalism became disembedded, with the increasing internationalisation of production and the liberalisation of financial markets. The move towards the end of the dual world economy was also underway. The period from 1991 to 1996 coincided with the triumph of neoliberalism and the move to a unipolar world economy with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and a sharp reduction of the space for consideration of alternative economic and social frameworks. From the mid-1990s, a multiplicity of cracks appeared in dominant neoliberalism from within the system (financial crises) and from outside the system (challenges from social movements and civil society groups).

Third, while the two theory chapters separated agency and structure in order to achieve maximum clarity on both dimension, in the next chapter on methodology, the framework which was drawn up at the end of Chapter 2 is brought together with the outcome of this chapter.
Chapter Four: Researching Debt Movements

This chapter describes how the research was carried out, including the design, the rationale behind this and how this was implemented. The research was designed as a qualitative study of the nature of transnational civil society power when they seek to change international policy and how this power is exercised using transnational debt movements as a case study. In applying the concept of power to the relationship between transnational civil society and dominant power within world order, the research draws on three sets of literature – that on power, social movements and international political economy. The concept of power used is taken from Lukes (2005), who defines power as a potential to make a change in the world or to maintain the status quo. An analytic framework was developed from the social movement and IPE literatures and provides the operational basis for the study to answer a) how power as potential was leveraged by transnational civil society by making common cause on debt cancellation; b) how the power of this common cause was leveraged through knowledge, geography (operating across the national/transnational interface) and different modes of engagement with the state/internationalising state which may be consensual or conflictual. The study focuses on three periods of debt campaigning, with each period marked by different approaches by transnational civil society against a background of changing world order (1976 – 1990; 1991 – 1996; 1997 – 2005). The geographic scope is wide, as campaigning took place across the world over the course of its history – although the actual geographic spread varied at different periods. The research was designed to provide a broad spread of campaigning between northern and southern campaigns. Data was collected through documentary research – primary and secondary – media searches and interviews with key informants. Given the nature of the study, with the questions being asked about power, a relatively long historical period covered and wide geographic span, qualitative methods were used. Data were collected through a number of methods and analysed within the parameter of the analytic framework developed for the study. Interpretation was based on themes which were drawn from the data during analysis.

The chapter is structured as follows: after a brief overview of the research, the theoretical background is set out. The scope of the study in terms of the historical and geographic spans is then defined. This is followed by reflection on the research design and finally an outline of how the data was collected, analysed and interpreted. As this
was an exploratory study the data collection and analysis processes are set out in some detail.

4.1 Theoretical framework of the study

This research is a study of the debt movements from the start of the debt crisis towards the end of the 1970s to 2005. It examines the question: what is the basis of the power of transnational civil society, and how do they exercise this power when seeking to change international policy on debt issues?

Based on the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, the following framework to analyse the power of debt movements was developed. This thesis adopts a basic concept of power as potential: “power is being able to make or to receive any change, or to resist it” (Lukes 2005, p.69). Considering how power relations operate between transnational civil society and dominant power, IPE with its engagement across the political and the economic spheres provided insights into the structural backdrop of transnational civil society activism. From this literature the concept of the internationalising state (Cox 1987) was drawn as a framework to examine the national/international interface—referred to as the geography of power in this study. IPE, however, with its emphasis on dominant power is weak in relation to civil society actors. As pointed out by Broome (2009, p.60), IPE scholars “have failed to move beyond conventional understandings of who is able to act in the global political economy and, more importantly, whose actions matter and how.” Even the Neo-Gramscian school, within which the concept of the internationalising state was developed, privileges dominant power in spite of their emphasis on the need for transformation (Drainville 2005a). Social movement theory and constructivism provide insights into how social movements operate (e.g. through ‘persuasion’, framing, leveraging political opportunities and allies), and there have been limited attempts to provide anti-systemic explanations through the application of Polanyi’s double movement and Gramsci’s counter-hegemony to the anti-globalisation/global social justice movements. From these literatures the following analytical framework was devised bringing together insights from Chapters 2 and 3.

Firstly, power is the potential to make a change in the world or to maintain the status quo. (Lukes 2005). Secondly, this potential was operationalised by debt movements making common cause among a range of social groupings nationally and transnationally. Thirdly, debt movements sought to exercise this power through three dimensions: knowledge; geography; and particular modes of engagement.
Actualising power as potential: how did transnational civil society make common cause on the causes, solutions to the debt crisis and on how they would work together to tackle the crisis? To what extent did the inequalities within the internationalising state affect the development and maintenance of common cause by transnational civil society, in particular in terms of the south/north relationship?

Exercising power

Knowledge: to what extent was the debt issue situated within the limits of current ‘commonsense’ and to what extent was it situated as part of a broader challenge to the inequalities of the global system? To what extent were debt campaigners drawn into the technical approach of the debt nébuleuse?

Geography: to what extent did debt campaigns focus on national- or international-level decision making processes, and what was the relationship between action at these two levels; and is this decision by civil society groups affected by the power position of their country within the internationalising state?

Modes of Engagement: to what extent did debt campaigns use consensual or adversarial methods; what was the nature of the relationship with the state/internationalising state which ensued; and what was the level of challenge posed by debt movements to the system? How did debt campaigns engage with the consensus-making internationalising state fora?

Changing World Order

How did debt campaigning change over the three case study periods and, to what extent can this be attributed to a changing world order?

Dominance Dominates

An issue for studies of civil society power is the disproportionate focus in the literature on dominant power – even among theorists who wish to see people emancipated from that dominance, such as Lukes (2005), Foucault (1980, 2009), Gill (1989,1998, 2003) and Cox (1987, 1992, 2002). Since dominance dominates, dominant power sits centre stage, with resistance or counter-power treated as “other”. Without deliberate efforts to rebalance these imbalances within theories of power, there is a danger of a magnetic pull towards explanations from the perspective of dominant power, e.g. that transnational civil society is part of global governance, is being created by the new technolo-
gies of power of governmentality (Sending and Neumann 2006; Burchell et al 1991). Given the imbalance in terms of historical material available on NGOs/civil society groups vis-à-vis dominant bodies such as the World Bank or the G7, there is inevitably a bias in terms of whose perspective provides the dominant explanation of the interaction between transnational civil society and dominant power bodies. Scott (1990), whose analysis is based on a close study of ‘the weapons of the weak’, contests the concept of hegemony, that is, that subordinate groups comply because their consent has been won by the leading class. He argues that their compliance should be understood as a tactical/strategic response rather than as consent. But dominant power understandings prevail because of what Scott calls ‘infra politics’ consisting of public and hidden transcripts. Public transcripts contain the views of the dominant actors from which history is written, while hidden transcripts consist of what subordinate actors express outside the realm of the public transcript. While transnational civil society cannot be equated with subordinate groups as described by Scott, and they carry out their contestation in the public arena, because this contestation is often of the moment and adequate records are not kept, history is likely to be written predominantly from public transcripts of dominant bodies.

While explanations of transnational civil society coming from the perspective of dominant power are not invalid, it is important that some researchers try to stand outside of dominant power so that understanding can be built through a process of engaging perspectives from outside and inside dominant power. The approach I take in this study is to try to maximise the difference between dominant power and its resistances, not because I think power is a system of binary opposites, but as a device to throw greater light on resistance to dominant power which is the focus of this research.

4.2 History and geography of debt movements

This is a case study of one transnational campaign, but one which contains a significant amount of variation. Transnational civil society action on debt can be traced back to the late 1970s (Donnelly 2002). Over three decades (1976 – 2005) debt campaigning ebbed and flowed against a backdrop of changing world order. This made it possible to identify different periods of campaigning with different approaches by debt campaigners which can be set within the context of this changing world order. The following three periods provide the historical framework for the study.
Period 1: from 1976 to 1990: when transnational civil society was trying to create itself as a transnational debt movement and struggled to understand the complexity of the debt issue while embedded liberalism was going through its death throes and neoliberalism was on the rise. The year 1976 was chosen as a start date as this marked the first protests in Peru in response to their debt crisis, and 1990 was chosen as the end of the first period, as it marked the end of the bipolar world with the fall of communism, but also because the Brady Bond initiative to tackle Latin American debt was introduced in 1989, and this contributed to a lull in debt campaigning, followed by a shift of emphasis from Latin American debt to Sub-Saharan African and other low-income country debt from the early 1990s.

Period 2: 1991 – 1996: this covered the first period of concerted, coordinated civil society campaigning on debt against the backdrop of the triumphant neoliberal counter-revolution, with its central belief that there was no alternative world order. In this context there was a shift in civil society campaigning to greater coordination and greater engagement with the state/internationalising state. This period ends with the introduction of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative.

Period 3: 1997 – 2005: this period covered the Jubilee 2000 campaign. While Jubilee 2000 was planned to end in 2000 by the British group which initiated the campaign, campaigning continued beyond the millennium and flowed over into the Make Poverty History/Global Call to Action against Poverty (2004/5). By the time Jubilee 2000 emerged, cracks and fissures had appeared in the neoliberal uni-polar economic vision as described in Chapter 1. Against this backdrop Jubilee 2000 operated more as a transnational social movement than was the case for debt campaigning in the previous period, which resembled a transnational advocacy network.

As a set of (at a moment in time) or a series of (across time) national and regional and transnational groupings, questions of the geography of debt campaigning were central to the research design. The campaign geography varied over time, for example, during the first case study period the focus was largely, although not exclusively, on Latin America and the Philippines. In the second period 1990-1996 Sub-Saharan Africa became the dominant focus and this affected which debtor country civil society groups were involved in campaigning. With the broad framing of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, the geographic spread extended across the globe. While transnational civil society is often treated in the literature as a unitary agent, it has, in fact, a complex geography generally consisting of a range of groupings – national coalitions, regional networks and INGOs - which continually and simultaneously aggregate into transnational formations.
and disaggregate back into their national and regional level operation. This study is based on the second view of transnational civil society and seeks to centre debt campaigning within its complex geography, and the challenge was to capture a sample of that geographic spread within the resource constraints which obviously applied. Within this ‘centring’ approach the transnational dimension of campaigning becomes problematised, enabling an exploration of what is the particular transnational dimension of transnational campaigning beyond an aggregate of national level actions. The aim is to throw light on how transnational civil society groups operate across the national/transnational interface.

4.3 Reflections on study design

The study was designed as a single case study of debt movements using qualitative methods. This raises a number of issues which need to be clarified. These relate to single case studies and qualitative methods more generally and also to the fact that I was an insider researcher. The aim of this section is to clarify my position on these issues and how this influenced the research design.

Recognising that single case studies are criticised for failing to provide a basis for comparison, I first considered studying three examples of transnational civil society campaigns. For a number of reasons, I decided to focus on the debt movements rather than to do a comparative study. Firstly, it was difficult to identify appropriate comparable campaigns to the debt campaign; i.e. ones which dealt with economic justice issues. While transnational debt movements can be traced back to the late 1970s (Donnelly 2002), transnational campaigns on other parallel issues are relatively new. For instance, ATTAC was set up in 1998; the tax justice movement was set up in 2003 (Tax Justice Network, no date); the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ran between 1996 and 1998 (Global Non-Violent Action Database no date); and the Boycott World Bank Bonds campaign was set up in 2000 (Jubilee USA, no date). While there has been civil society action on trade, aid and environmental issues for many decades, it proved difficult to identify a transnational activity which could parallel the debt campaign. On trade there were strong campaigns against NAFTA and FTAA, but these were regional campaigns of the Americas. The International Trade Union Confederation campaign for the integration of labour standards into WTO agreements started after the establishment of that organisation in 1995. Gerring (2004), however, points out that a case study never represents only one case, as there is always variation over time or
space – or both - within what may appear to be a single case, and this provides the basis for comparison. In this context I decided that given the history and geography of the debt movements as set out above, this provided enough variation for comparative purposes. Variation existed between different time periods (e.g. pre and post the end of a uni-polar economic world order) and also across different geographic spaces as debt campaigns operated from Sweden to South Africa. Further variation could be identified between campaigns in countries with different power positions within the internationalising state: e.g. those in debtor and creditor countries; those in G7 countries; and those in non-G7 countries. The value of a single case study over time was that this would enable an in-depth exploration of what is a relatively new format – transnational civil society campaigning on international financial issues. As the study was particularly focussed on ‘how’ questions i.e. aiming to identify the mechanisms through which civil society sought to change international policy on debt, the case study method was particularly appropriate (Gerring 2004; Yin 2003).

While the case study method is widely used, there are significant reservations about this method, particularly in political science, where some hold it in ‘low regard’ (Gerring 2004). Reservations relate to anticipated problems about validity (how well the findings fit the evidence), reliability (whether the results can be replicated using the same method) and representativeness (whether the findings can be generalised across other cases). Others, however, defend case studies, as these are essential for description “it is pointless to seek to explain what we have not described with a reason able degree of precision” (King et al 1994, p.44). I would argue strongly that there is a need for more detailed and varied individual case studies on transnational civil society campaigns. As was seen in Chapter 1, even though debt campaigning can be traced back to the late 1970s, there are very few studies covering the period before the Jubilee 2000 campaign, and research on the latter is still limited. There is substantial room for more studies, including more individual country studies, comparative studies of debtor country campaigns, detailed studies of the south/north relationship within Jubilee 2000, and the relationship of debt campaigning in general and Jubilee 2000 in particular with the development of the global justice/anti-globalisation movements.

While the power struggle between those advocating quantitative and qualitative methods has now abated and “paradigm peace” has broken out (Bryman 2006), the standards set for research - validity, replicability and representativeness - tend to be those developed for quantitative research, but these have been modified to fit the reality of qualitative research (Merriam 2009; Flyvbjerg 2006; Burawoy 1998; Wainwright
1997; Wolcott 1994). In this context firstly a regards validity, I aimed at providing findings that were ‘credible’ in relation to the material gathered rather than claiming they represented some form of objective reality. (Lincoln and Gubba quoted in Merriam 2009, p.213). Credibility can be based on the rigour with which the research was carried out and this can be increased in a number of ways including by using multiple sources of information and seeking feedback. I used a number of sources of information – interviews and primary and secondary documents. I could not use observation as the study covered past events, but I sought feedback from a number of the people interviewed. An example of using multiple sources of information was in relation to the question of the contribution of Oxfam UK’s 1986 debt campaign to the introduction of the Toronto Terms debt 1988. I visited Oxfam UK’s archives to get details of their 1986 campaign and interviewed the organiser of that campaign. As both the British and French governments played a part in the introduction of the Toronto Terms I referred to then Chancellor Lawson’s memoirs (1992) and at a memoir of President Mitterrand by a close adviser (Attali 2005), both of whom provided partisan accounts and also at a document by the IMF (1999) which gave a more measured account of the role of both governments and finally interviewed another British campaigner to check further. The outcome was that there was not a simple relationship between the Oxfam UK campaign and the Toronto Terms. Other issues which affected the introduction of the new initiative were competition between France and Britain in relation to which led at international level on African issues and the fact that debt was an easier issue for Britain to move on than, for example, aid which was had been cut. Further, setting out in some detail in this chapter how I carried out the research is another element in seeking to establish the credibility of the study.

As regards generalisability, I would endorse Flyvberg’s (2006, p.236) argument that, as there are no universals in human affairs, formal generalisations are overvalued and case studies undervalued in terms of the development of scientific knowledge’. Following on from this and taking the point made by King et al (1994, p.45) that “good description is better than bad explanation”, my approach was to accept that there is a trade-off between the rich descriptive understanding which can be provided by an in-depth case study and the “thin explanations” which may emerge from quantitative comparisons (Gerring 2004, p.348). Using the words ‘rich’ and ‘thin’ may give the impression of a bias in favour of the former, but I recognise that rich descriptions will not deliver the parsimony and elegance much valued by political scientists and may in fact result in an overly cluttered picture. In terms of this research, I started with a single case
study and an exploratory question. While accepting that an aim of research may be at least some degree of generalisation, my first aim was to provide concrete contextualised knowledge, inducting explanations as far as reasonable from the information collected, avoiding jumping prematurely to interpretations or theoretical linkages.

A further issue for this research is that I was an insider researcher, as I had coordinated the Debt and Development Coalition Ireland (DDCI) from November 1993 until December 2005. I was therefore deeply involved in debt campaigning at national and transnational level for part of the second case study period and all of the third period. It was this substantial experience as a practitioner which motivated me to undertake this study. The research questions were those which arose for me while working on the debt campaign: why did we think we could make a difference; what did we, as civil society groups, bring into play that could get the G7 and IMF to change course. For the purposes of the study, this translated into: what is the power of transnational civil society and how does civil society leverage this power? The other question was where should DDCI as a campaign in a small peripheral northern country put its energy – seeking to change Irish government policy, for which we as Irish civil society had some responsibility; or should we concentrate on creating strong transnational networks and action aimed at the transnational arena? For this study, this question translated into: how does transnational civil society operate across the national/transnational interface? The dilemma of the insider researcher can first be put in the general context of qualitative research which - regardless of the background of the researcher - calls for continuous reflexivity and self-scrutiny. The qualitative researcher is advised to continually ask the question “How might my knowledge, position, and experience be shaping my analysis?” (Pyett 2003, p.1171). The advice is to counter researcher bias by making one’s “assumptions, interests, and objectives concerning the research and social practice as explicit as possible and to acknowledge, where relevant, one’s own philosophical and political perspectives” (Pyett 2003, p.1171). The call for transparency and self-reflection increases for those, like me, who have had substantial and direct involvement in the area being studied.

Most of the discussion of ‘insider researcher’ in the literature relates to participation observation. As my experience was of being a past participant in the case study, rather than participation being the central method used, not all of the issues identified in the literature apply. One which is relevant is that an insider researcher may be “over-familiar with the community” being studied (Delyser 2001). This was certainly an issue for me, as I had at least some direct acquaintance with 25 of the 37 people I interviewed.
– and substantial acquaintance with some - and the other interviewees were aware of my long engagement with the debt issue. I had taken part in some of the transnational meetings examined. I attended Eurodad meetings as the DDCI representative, was on the executive for a number of years (and chaired it for my last year) wrote some of the material reviewed, and was involved in organising some of the activities.

Looking for the biases I may have brought to the research e.g. finding what I wanted to find, this was mediated somewhat by the study design i.e. an exploratory approach and therefore, I was open to being – and hoping to be - surprised. One potential bias has been highlighted by Tarrow, who points to the fact that many scholars of social movements come to the research process with strong commitment to the goals of such movements:

Such scholars often saw states as unremittingly hostile to transnational actors, when empirical data show conclusively that states— particularly western states—are deeply implicated in their funding and promotion. (Tarrow 2001, p.10)

Tarrow correctly identifies the issue of the independence of civil society from the state (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) as a sensitive issue for civil society campaigners. As the relationship between civil society/state-internationalising state emerged as a central theme for this study, this called for a degree of self-reflection on my part as a researcher. When analysing the speech by the head of the IMF at a seminar in Dublin 1994 which I had been involved in organising, for example, I was a bit taken aback at his statement:

It isn’t so frequent for me to attend a meeting organised hand in hand by NGOs and a Minister of Finance showing that dialogue in your country on important issues is going on. (Camdessus 1994).

This motivated me to cast a dispassionate eye on what had been the respective roles of DDCI, the Irish Department of Finance and the IMF in the organisation of that event. The outcome of this was a recognition that the degree of DDCI autonomy was limited by the fact that the event was initiated by the IMF with the Department of Finance playing an intermediary role. It appeared that this event was an example of the new global norm of participation in action.

In addition to reducing bias by trying to be continually aware of the effect that my insider status might have on the research, the very process of carrying out the study
over time – 6 years - enabled a degree of distance from the material. Immersion in theory during the early period of the research also helped in drawing me gradually away from my direct experience. In the case of insider researcher, the aim of replicability is even less realistic and in fact the existence of a mixture of researchers in the social movement field coming from both activist and academic backgrounds, as noted by Tarrow (2001), strengthens the case for an approach which builds knowledge through creating engagement between studies carried out by insider researchers and outsider researchers.

4.4 Collecting, analysing and interpreting case study material

Turning to the practical aspects of the study, there were a number of significant challenges in gathering material which covered the history and geography of the three case study periods. The dearth of archival material on transnational civil society campaigns both in terms of span (geographic reach) and depth (historic coverage) was particularly problematic for the first period and to a lesser extent for the second period. Since a major focus of the study was to reveal the mechanisms involved in debt campaigning, considerable primary sources were needed.

Data were collected through a number of methods – documents (primary and secondary), media searches and interviews with key informants. Primary documents were gathered by visiting archives (Newcastle University Jubilee 2000 archives contain documents, news cuttings, cassette tapes and videos, mostly from the UK, but also from other countries and periods other than Jubilee 2000). I also visited a number of NGOs to access their archives (Oxfam UK, Christian Aid UK, NEF UK, Novib Netherlands, Erlassjahr Germany and Eurodad Belgium) and used internet searches. Two major problems arose. One was in relation to language – while I can read English, French and Spanish, in terms of European campaigns I could not read material from Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, German-speaking countries or Italy, all of which were very active in the debt movements. This also applied to media searches: for example, for the 1988 IMF and World Bank AGM in Berlin, when there were massive protests, it would have been useful to have had been able to check coverage in the German newspapers. In terms of countries beyond Europe, all the documents I found were in English, Spanish or French.
My main aim was to access material which related as closely as possible to an organisation’s decision-making processes such as annual reports, newsletters, strategic plans, evaluations, press releases, funding applications, minutes of relevant meetings, relevant correspondence, and reports on events, policy analysis and educational materials. Very little of this is available on the internet, particularly for the first and second historic periods. As some of this is internal to the organisation, it will never be made available on the internet, and therefore to assemble enough material for a transnational case study some travel is involved: but this had to be limited due to resources – both time and money. Even regarding material which civil society organisations do make available on the internet, there is generally a shallowness to the amount of historical material posted on the internet. Annual reports for Eurodad, for example, a key organisation for the second case study period, are only available on their web site from 1998 onwards. I had to visit three countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Germany) in order to assemble enough documents on Eurodad to carry out the study of the second case study period. In contrast, it took a couple of hours to download all G8 communiqués on debt from 1982-2005 from the University of Toronto G8 Information Centre. Civil society organisations appear to pay little or insufficient attention to their histories for a number of reasons. One is the constant imperative to live in the now so that websites focus on current events and issues: how the site visitor can help right then by donating or taking part in a campaign action. The other issue is limited material resources: e.g. to employ a librarian/archivist or even space to keep past hard copy material. I was sometimes one step behind NGOs closing down their libraries and getting rid of much of their ‘grey material, which cannot be found easily through conventional channels such as publishers which is particularly difficult to get hold of: e.g. reports on events and newsletters from campaigns around the world. Fortunately I was also just one step ahead of other organisations about to make their archival and library staff redundant and therefore in time to access their material. A further limitation on data collection related to media archival material. The database used, NexisUK, did not cover the relevant southern newspapers for the period in question. Coverage of, for example, The Manila Times starts in 2006, The Monitor (Kampala) from 2010, El Comercio (Peru) from 2005, resulting in a northern bias in material from this source. These points illustrate some of the practical difficulties in producing a comprehensive study of a transnational social movement or civil society campaign.

As the first case study period, in particular, was marked by a lack of access to a significant volume and coherent sequences of documents, this posed particular chal-
lenges in completing the study. Accepting that “an important topic is worth studying even if very little information is available on it” (King, et al 1994, p.6), my approach was to continue to delve until sufficient material had been amassed to provide a coherent, if not totally full, narrative of the origins of debt campaigning. While primary and secondary sources for the 1976-1989 period were limited, a number of very good primary sources were found. These included reports of transnational civil society conferences, regional trade union conferences in Latin America and Africa, some NGO educational material and a range of Declarations made at various civil society events – Arusha (1990), CEDETIM (2005), AITEC (1986, 1989). Oxfam archives provided material on debt campaigning in the UK in the 1980s, and Christian Aid material covered the emergence of the Philippine Freedom from Debt Coalition in the late 1980s and their operation up to 2000. It has to be acknowledged that finding some of this material was by chance – i.e. this was the material that somehow survived out of the mass of material which must have been produced during the 1980s when Latin America in particular was convulsed by the debt crisis which provoked such robust grassroots responses. References were found to transnational civil society gatherings, for which no further material could be found. No doubt other declarations were made which have not survived. Some rich material on protests and the development of debt campaigning were available from secondary sources, in particular Donnelly’s in-depth actor-oriented account of the development of debt activism from 1976 (2002) and Walton’s mapping of Latin American debt protests in the 1980s (1989). Media archives were useful in putting together a picture of contestation between debtor governments and their creditors during the period 1976-1989. There was, however, limited media coverage of civil society/social movement action during this period, other than for the protests at the IMF/World AGM in Berlin 1988. A major limitation of the media archival material, as pointed out above, was that the newspapers included were all from creditor countries. Given the centrality of the Latin American debt crisis to this period, some access to coverage from that continent would have enriched the study.

In the context of the above, I would describe the method of collecting material for the first case study period as ‘archaeological’. I am not using ‘archaeological’ in the Foucauldian sense here, but more impressionistically from studying archaeological at an earlier period of my life: as in assembling the chance findings of pottery shards and tools, the remains at prehistoric sites, icons or paintings available from a particular historic period and place from which inferences can be drawn about the life lived by those peoples. It is because of the incompleteness and somewhat arbitrariness of the evidence
which has survived that I refer to the method used to reconstruct debt movements in the 1980s as archaeological, painstakingly mining all possible sources of information, collating the limited results and putting this together as coherently as possible. Fewer inferences are therefore made in Chapter 5 than in the other two case study periods.

Documentary evidence for Eurodad, a major focus of the second case study period 1990-1996, were more substantial, and sequences of documents were found: annual reports, funding proposals, evaluations, minutes of network meetings, newsletters, some correspondence. In addition to covering Eurodad activity as a secretariat, annual reports contained summaries of action carried out by members of the network, enabling an overview of action taken by European debt groups over the period of the case study. This material was supplemented by considerable material sourced from media archives. As most of this came through press services, in particular IPS inter-press services and to a lesser extent Africa News, much of it was probably never published or broadcast in the mainstream media. For the researcher, however, these news services operate as an archive of press releases and reports issued by civil society groups/NGOs. As the documents on which the media reports were based were written for publication, they can therefore be seen as providing an insight into the public face of Eurodad supplementing the internal face which was gleaned from the documents studied. Media archives also covered the protests at the 1994 IMF/World Bank AGM in Madrid and the development of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative. Christian Aid archives provided a southern perspective with substantial material on a number of their partners in debt campaigning, FDC and Tanzania Social and Economic Trust (TASOET). Documents included annual reports, funding proposals, evaluations and correspondence. Significant amounts of information on the UK Debt Crisis Network for this period was sourced from the NEF archives. Limited primary sources on other groups active at the time were also found in the various archives e.g. on the US 50 Years is Enough and UK students’ group ‘Third World First’, World Development Movement, Uganda Debt Network, and Oxfam International network.

Substantial material on Jubilee 2000, particularly but not exclusively in the UK, was found in the Jubilee 2000 archives at Newcastle University. Particularly useful was a chronologically complete set of newsletters. There was much more material available on the internet for this period - on the French, Spanish, Uganda, Zambian, South African, Philippine, Peruvian and Honduran Jubilee 2000 campaigns and Jubilee South. This was supplemented by documents picked up at transnational debt meetings and by material from the various archives mentioned above. Because of the volume of material
gathered, less recourse was made to NexisUK in relation to Jubilee 2000, except for key moments such as the G8 summits in Birmingham 1998 and Cologne 1999.

Documentary evidence was supplemented by interviews. Efforts to source interviews through Irish media archives provided an interview with the President of the Philippine Freedom from Debt Coalition and one with ex-President Nyerere of Tanzania both carried out in 1991. Thirty-seven key informant interviews were carried out directly. All were with people who had been centrally involved in debt campaigning with some interviewees spanning the whole period of the research, others spanning the last two periods while for some their involvement related to one period. Thirty-five interviews were carried out by phone or face-to-face; two were carried out by email. The 37 interviews break down geographically as follows: Latin America: 2 (Peru and an INGO based in Central America); Africa: 3 (South Africa, Uganda, Zambia); Europe: Austria, Belgium (2), France (2), Germany (3); Ireland (6); Italy (1); Netherlands (4); Spain (1), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1); UK (7); Asia (1) (Philippines). These include interviews with three people who had also acted as coordinators of regional groups (Latindadd and Eurodad) and one person who had coordinated an international network on debt. From the point of view of history of debt campaigning, 19 of the interviewees had been involved for at least part of the first period, and 10 spanned the 3 periods. Given that these were key informants, the long historic span of their involvement is probably less striking than if they represented a more random sample of debt activists. Three of the interviewees had worked for the World Bank or a government department as well as for NGOs campaigning on debt, and one had operated as an advisor to both civil society debt campaigns and debtor and creditor governments. One had started out as a direct action environmentalist and had been involved in exposing the negative impact of World Bank projects and then moved on to coordinate first a national and then a regional network which covered IMF/World Bank and debt issues.

Interviewees were selected broadly on the following criteria:

a) knowledge of particular events or organisations e.g. a German interviewee who had knowledge of the events at the 1988 Berlin IMF/World Bank AGM; a British interviewee who had knowledge of the early years of Eurodad from a member organisation point of view, and two of the Irish interviewees had been involved in transnational networks dealing with debt as well as in national-level debt campaigning.
b) Geographic span from a debtor and creditor point of view. For debtor countries, the aim was to gain: coverage of campaigns in Africa and Latin America as the most indebted continents and the Philippines as the heavily indebted country of Asia. Coverage of creditor country campaigns focused on Europe, because the variety of countries and political cultures involved and their differential positioning within world order provided substantial variation i.e. G7 (4 members in Europe), non-G7 creditor countries with intermediate power (e.g. Spain, Netherlands, Belgium) and those more weakly positioned in world order (e.g. Ireland). Focussing on Europe also helped to avoid capture by the hegemonic English-speaking world. It must be noted that more interviews were carried out with British and Irish informants. This was partly because of the strong British involvement in debt campaigning over the three periods of the case study and also partly because of ease of access. In relation to Ireland, some interviewees had played a dual role as members of the DDCI and of transnational networks on debt.

c) In terms of selecting debtor countries, the criteria were ability to contact a key informant, together with having access to some documentary/media evidence for that country.

d) For the European countries, the aim was to cover the span of campaigning across Europe, and with the exception of Scandinavian countries, at least one interview was carried out for each of the countries which had participated significantly in debt campaigning. One interview was carried out with a Swedish key informant, and while some issues to do with Scandinavia were covered, this mainly covered campaigning in Sweden.

No reply was received to four approaches for an interview with prospective key informants in Brazil, France, Argentina and Tanzania. It was not possible to check whether the approaches had reached the person in question or whether they had decided not to participate.

Interviews were semi-structured, following the themes of the analytic framework set out above, but leaving room to follow up on particular themes raised and for respondents to introduce further issues. An outline of the interview themes was sent to the interviewees in advance to give them a chance to reflect, given the time that had elapsed since the events being discussed – in particular in relation to the earlier case study period. This prompted a number of interviewees to check organisational documents from
the period being covered in the interview. This was important, as clearly one issue was that for some they were recalling events from over 30 years ago, and sometimes they struggled to remember particular details. In spite of the significant time lapse from when the events had happened, interviews were essential to supplement the shortage of primary sources for the early period and also to provide more reflective information than can usually be found in organisational documents such as newsletters and annual reports. What was lost in historical recall was compensated for in the ability of the interviewees to take a long view and contextualise events within a changing world order over the 1980s and 1990s, which was one of the themes of the study.

4.5 Analysing the case study material

The aim was to follow the sequence of description, analysis and interpretation (Woolcott 1994). One objective of the thesis was to provide a fuller description of debt campaigning over time and across geography than has been provided hitherto. For that reason a fair amount of descriptive material is contained in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. A coding frame consisting of the categories set out in the analytic framework was formed, and the material was coded as it was collected within this framework. As coding progressed, the broad categories of knowledge, geography and mode of engagement were broken down into sub-categories responding to the material collected. The coding was refined a number of times, resulting in deep engagement with the material and further clarification of the analytic sub-categories and in particular the distinctions between them. As the starting categories of common cause, knowledge, geography and mode of engagement were very broad - and intentionally so, as this was an exploratory study - there are no absolute a priori distinctions between them. As regards ‘knowledge’ and ‘mode of engagement’, for example, how knowledge is used by campaigners can be part of the mode of engagement: i.e. frames may be aligned with dominant power understandings to gain access to decision makers. However, through continual engagement with the material working distinctions were made: i.e. knowledge related to content, mode of engagement related to activity. Similar issues arose with mode of engagement and geography. Some material fitted with both categories e.g. engagement with national decision makers was an indication of prioritising the national rather than the international arena but was also an indicator of the type of relationships operating between civil society and the state/internationalising state in that particular situation. Here the solution was that mode of engagement related to the nature of the relationship in terms of conflict/consensus.
whereas the scale of targeting of decision makers defined the geographic dimension. Clearly, however, there will always be some blurring of these categories in practice.

Proceeding to analysis, themes were identified from the coded data. A key issue which emerged within the category common cause was the national/international and south/north interfaces within civil society rather than ideological differences. These themes are covered in detail in Chapter 6 (relating to the national/international interface) and Chapter 7 (relating to the south/north interface). A further central theme became the degree to which civil society’s discourses were shaped in opposition to or shaped by the exigencies of the state-internationalising state, for example, by the need to gain access to decision makers (Chapter 6). The nature of the relationship became an overarching theme in both Chapters 6 and 7. This was not a static category but involved the shifting relationship between civil society and the state/internationalising state, including reciprocal interactions on some issues, conflicts on other and the ebb and flow of the relationship over time. On the geography of power, the privileging of national action came across so strongly that the question became to identify what transnational campaigning consisted of beyond an aggregation of national-level action.

Examining mechanisms and discourses through which civil society sought to leverage power involved breaking down categories like ‘moral authority’ and ‘lobbying’ which are often used in the transnational civil society literature as irreducible categories. The aim was to try and get behind these concepts. Given the overwhelming focus on moral discourse in the literature on debt campaigning, it was important to identify what this is and how does it relate to or differ from other discourses. This is explored in Chapter 7. A similar process was carried out in relation to ‘lobbying’, and in Chapter 6 the lobbying process is broken into a number of elements. Lobbying is presented in both Chapters 6 and 7 as an interactive process between civil society and states/internationalising state rather than one way from civil society to decision makers.

Once the analysis was done, a number of key themes provided the focus from which broader interpretations were drawn. These are listed below:

a) How to explain the relationships between civil society and the state/internationalising state which emerged from the study.

b) In the context of the strong national embeddedness (Josselin 2007) of debt campaigning, particularly in the Jubilee 2000 period, what then is the nature of the
transnational dimension of debt campaigning and how does this relate to the national element?

c) The changing nature of the south/north relationship within transnational civil society over the case study period.

d) The nature of the relationship between the overlapping structural and moral discourses of civil society on debt over the case study period.

Analysis involved an iterative process between theory and the data. Firstly explanations were inducted as far as possible from the material. Then a number of competing theoretical explanations were applied. In the case of the first question, for example, liberal, Gramscian and Foucauldian theories of civil society were tried against the data. I also brought my personal experience of working within national and transnational civil society into play to find an explanation which had both theoretical and practitioner resonance. In terms of the second theme, in addition to the internationalising state, I had recourse to Dryzeck (1999) and Drainville (2005b), both of whom try to define the different opportunities arising for transnational civil society as a result of the different levels of institutionalisation at national and transnational levels.

Conclusions were drawn in relation to the analytical framework in the three case study periods in Chapters, 5, 6, and 7. This was done by inducting as far as possible from the data and then engaging with the theory. In the final conclusion there is an effort to move from analysis to interpretation in line with Wolcott’s definition as making a leap beyond the data in relation to two questions: one in relation to the source of transnational civil society power; and one in relation to the exercise of power. The first question relates to the south/north relationship within transnational civil society campaigning as a key element in making common cause. The second question relates to the level of challenge posed by debt campaigns.
Chapter Five: The Making of Transnational Debt Movements 1976-1990

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a narrative of the first case study period of debt campaigning from 1976, when the first anti-austerity protests took place in Peru (Walton 1989) up to 1990. This period covers the emergence of debt campaigning and also the period in which transnational civil society focus on global issues was beginning to gain impetus. Early activists faced the challenge of making common cause transnationally on a complex technical issue involving multiple governments, international financial institutions and the private sector. A further challenge was to develop the organisational and networking structures needed to facilitate common or parallel action across the vast territory over which the debt issue was contested. This was before the tools facilitating globalisation – information and communication technology and changes in transport—were widely available to civil society activists (Evans 2008). Debt campaigns illustrate the dynamic of south/north civil society relations involving both solidarity and conflict and how these relations were negotiated over time. This chapter tracks the start of this relationship. Debt activism took place against the background of enormous changes in world order with two major features. One was the escalation of the internationalisation of the state, with the debt crisis as both a product of and a further driver of this process. The other was the move from a bipolar towards a unipolar economic world order dominated by neoliberal ideology. While this change took effect with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the weakening of the Soviet Union over the 1980s prefigured the coming change. Two interacting struggles underpin this narrative – the struggle to contest debt policy and the struggle to create the transnational civil society that debt movements needed to contest that policy.

The chapter covers an overview of how the two debt crises outlined in Chapter 1 were managed and contested during the 1980s. Following an outline of how the bodies of the debt nébuleuse dealt with the crisis, a brief outline of resistance from debtor governments is given. The main body of the chapter details the creation of transnational debt groups as a vehicle to contest international policy and the start of this contestation at national and international levels. It concludes with an assessment of how debt campaigns sought to create common cause in order to exercise power in relation to the debt
crisis. As stated in the previous chapter, because less material was available for this period, the conclusion contains fewer inferences than the other two case study chapters.

5.2 Managing and contesting the debt crisis: an overview

Debt policy was made and remade in the context of engagement between the global financial governance bodies and groups challenging them – debtor governments and civil society groups. The main institutions of the ‘debt nébuleuse’ which formulate international debt policy, as described in Chapter 3, are the IMF, World Bank; the regional development banks (Inter-American, African, and Asian); the Paris Club of OECD creditor government; and the G7 which dominates these fora. During the 1980s the main focus was on commercial bank debt and therefore the London Club, an informal forum which brings together commercial creditors, was also relevant.

How was the debt crisis managed in the 1980s within this ‘diffuse system of global financial governance’ (Baker 2006)? World Bank treasurer, Eugene Rothbergh, speaking in 1986, stated:

> The hard point is that no-one is in control anymore, not us, not the industrial governments, certainly not OPEC and not the debtor countries …. No-one has the power or the authority. (Reuter 1986)

An analysis of G7 communiqués 1983-1990\(^4\) indicates the G7’s signalling role to commercial creditors over the 1980s in an effort to influence their decisions. Soft verbs such as ‘call upon’ are used (G7 1984) in relation to commercial creditors whereas it took a more directive role towards the bodies where it had direct power. In addressing the Paris Club, IMF/World Bank, for example it urges them to take the action identified by the G7 (G7 1988). Baker (2006) and Bayne (2000) both argue that the G7 did not play a central role on debt in the 1980s. According to Bayne, the G7 showed little leadership in spite of the fact that many commercial banks were very exposed and default could have led to a systemic crisis. Bayne’s explanation is that as US Banks were the most exposed to Latin American countries, the US took the lead in pressing solutions. Both plans to deal with commercial debts in the 1980s came from US Treasury Secretaries (Baker and Brady plans, 1985 and 1989). Baker (2006) claims that because of the acrimonious nature of discussions on developing country debt the issue was side-lined during - US interest rates were a source of tension because of their effect in increasing the burden of

\(^4\) Available at: http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/
southern country debt and the threat posed to western countries’ recovery from recession.

In spite of this lack of leadership there was remarkable consistency in the creditor model which determined how the debt was dealt with during the 1980s involving a case by case approach whereby debtors individually faced a ‘creditor cartel’, consisting of all their creditors with high levels of conditionality imposed through the IMF. This was the key process through which debtor countries were disciplined into restructuring in line with the needs of the world economy. This can be contrasted with the more consensual approach proposed in the UNCTAD 1978 and 1980 resolutions, where debt would be dealt with treat debtors and creditors equitably in the context of international economic cooperation (UNCTAD 1978, 1980). The consistency in policy prescriptions in the absence of a central authority can be seen as a manifestation of the consensus forming mechanisms of the debt nébuleuse through which the internationalisation of the states operates. An important thread in the weaving of the debt movements is how concrete targets were drawn from this ‘nébuleuse’ and the understandings of global powers underpinning these decisions.

Resistance to the debt crisis in the 1980s involved debtor governments as well as the emerging transnational debt campaigns, and they mutually influenced each other. This took place against the backdrop of major ideological shifts, and changes in the relationship between the national and international arenas as the internationalisation of the state continued. Over the course of the 1980s, neoliberalism became increasingly embedded as the new orthodoxy. Statements that no-one was in charge helped neoliberalism’s self-promotion as a natural force with no alternative. This led to significant shifts in the north/south balance of power over the decade. Southern proposals for a new international economic order (NIEO) adopted by the UN in 1974 and the Brandt Commission proposals based on south/north mutual interests, were sidelined (Mittelman and Pasha 1997; Adams 1993).

Debtor Government Resistance

A range of governments in Latin America and the Caribbean - Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Dominican Republic - suspended payments and or suspended relations with the IMF at different times. In Argentina, under the brutal military regime which terrorised the country from 1976-1983, debt increased from $7bn to a massive $43bn (Keane 2007). The first democratically elected president after the fall of the mili-
tary, Raúl Alfonsin made an election promise not to repay debts which were found to be illegitimate. Argentina therefore suspended interest payments in March 1984 in order to assess the legitimacy of the debts (Keane 2007), but after standoffs between Argentina and the IMF led to the fear that an Argentine default might affect their own creditworthiness, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico made a loan to Argentina to pay off its arrears (Tussie 1988). A US banker speaking after a meeting with Argentine debt negotiators made it clear, however, that in creditors’ view economics and politics were totally separate spheres:

We expected to get facts and figures, a detailed picture of the country’s medium to long term economic plans. All we got were some platitudes about Argentina’s new democracy. (Burns 1984)

The most high profile action was taken in 1985 by newly elected President García of Peru who limited debt servicing to 10% of export earnings. García’s call for a united Latin American debtor front was rejected. Peru was declared ineligible for new loans and declared a ‘high risk country’, and by 1989 was forced to reopen negotiations with the IMF (Pastor and Wise 1992). There were two attempts to unite Latin American debtors. The first was through the Cartagena Group, which consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic (Potter 1988). As Brazil, Argentina and Mexico each posed a serious threat to the US banking system (Lawson 1992; Whitehead 1989), the group raised fears among bankers and hopes among civil society groups that it constituted a debtor cartel. But the Cartagena Group sought to reassure their creditors that they were not a debtor cartel and failed to support Argentina and Peru’s actions. Tussie’s (1988) assessment is that for debtors the Cartagena group was a bargaining chip to be traded for concession at the negotiating table on a case by case basis but did not alter the overall balance of power. The second initiative was the Havana Debt conferences 1985, which was convened by President Castro with a view to creating a radical Latin America response and involved trade unions, churches, business, military, women’s groups, students, academics lawyers, rural groups, guerrilla leaders, political parties and government representatives. The difficulty of getting consensus for a radical solution such as debt repudiation was highlighted by the Argentinean government representative who had been instructed:
...not to subscribe to any moratorium ... because this type of measure will only cause an increase in interest rates and create an inadequate climate for negotiations with creditors. (Associated Press 1985)

In contrast a young guerrilla fighter from the Colombian M-19 reflected the hope that revolutionary change was on the horizon:

We say to imperialism: Prepare yourselves, because it is us with whom in the 21st century you are going to have to discuss the future of this continent. (Gedda 1985)

Some participants supported repudiation and others the capping of debt payments but no formal agreement was reached. While no concrete progress was made on Latin American unity, the conference resonated beyond the event – part of the intangibles which make up the memories and motivations of activists and help create continuity across time and geography. A debt conference took place in Havana in 2005, with the cooperation of the Cuban government marking the 20th anniversary of the earlier conference bringing together debt activists from south and north.

Unlike Latin America, Africa’s debt while a huge burden on the people of the continent, did not pose a threat to the international financial system as it was largely owed to individual government and multilateral institutions. Among resistance from individual governments was President Kaunda’s break with the IMF following food riots in Zambia in 1986 (Situmbeko and Zulu Jones 2004) At a collective level African governments dealt with the crisis through the OAU seeking a solution within the framework of south/north cooperation for development, stressing the need for constructive dialogue and shared responsibility. They proposed an international conference in 1988 of African debtor countries and creditors referring to UN General Assembly and UNCTAD resolutions to legitimise their position (OAU 1987). President Kaunda, chairperson of the OAU, was mandated to bring the OAU position to the international community, calling for an international conference on Africa’s external debt (OAU 1987). The OAU lobbied the World Bank, EU and the G7, but creditors were not receptive, maintaining their position on a case by case approach.

The OAU was seeking to mobilise discourses (south/north mutual interests) and institutions (UN system) which were being increasingly sidelined during the 1980s. Broome (2009, p.77) refers to the “strategic use of frames’ by actors who do not have more coercive forms of influence”. He is referring to NGOs, but this can also apply to less powerful state actors. At a rhetorical level, Tanzania President Nyerere’ question
when addressing the OAU in 1985 “do we have to starve our people to pay debt?” reverberated through the subsequent decades of debt campaigning contributing to the creation of a ‘collective memory’ on debt activism.

Civil society resistance

Two key questions for civil society during this period were the discourses within which to situate explanations of the debt crisis and how to operate across the national/international interface. In terms of discourse, the ability to shape public debate whether through framing to resonate with current values (Tarrow 2005) or by introducing counter-discourses to shift the public to a new ‘good sense’ (Gramsci 1971) is fundamental to the power of civil society. The struggle over how to define the debt problem was central to the development of transnational civil society. Resisting dominant ideologies, like neoliberalism, involves introducing new discourses and/or maintaining existing ones which are being undermined. Civil society counter-discourses fell largely into the second category with the emphasis on the NIEO as a framework to critique unequal south/north relations underpinning the debt problem, anti-imperialism and liberation theology. NIEO provided an alternative framework against which debt could be situated as a symptom of the unjust economic order particularly for southern groups (AITEC 1986, 1989, African TU conference 1987, Osorio 1987, Mujica 1988, CAFOD no date). For some European groups, however, the NIEO was not a major influence. A German debt activist did not remember much focus on NIEO. For him, it was a matter of looking for practical solutions (Interviewee Germany No. 1). A Dutch interviewee, however, recalls that many European NGOs held positions close to those of the G77 on the international economic order (Interviewee Belgium No.1). It would appear that the NIEO provided the broader framework against which those seeking change need to place their case rather than as a concrete framework for how debt was contested and that this framework also had greater resonance for southern groups.

Liberation theology, with its call to confront ‘sinful structures’ (Donnelly 2002) that contribute to poverty, was a key influence in Latin America from the 1960s. One of the earliest references to north/south solidarity on the debt issue relates to US missionaries returning from Latin America influenced by liberation theology in the late 1970s, and setting up Peru Solidarity (Donnelly 2002). According to Osorio (1987, p.126), Christ was mentioned more often than Marx at the Havana debt conference 1985. The Biblical Jubilee message that every 50 years right relations should be restored including
debt cancellation provided a specific religious/justice frame and was referred to frequently during the 1980s – at the 1985 Havana conference, the Africa TU conference 1987, the international civil society conference in Lima 1988. In response to concern expressed within the church, the Pope raised the debt issue in two of his encyclicals Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 1987 and Centesimum Annus 1991 (Donnelly 2002). In 1990 the All African Council of Churches called for a Jubilee year on Africa’s debt. The Jubilee message can be seen as a new discourse based in the Old Testament rather than on the liberation theology mix of New Testament and Marxism. The Jubilee message proved to be a unifying frame which was taken up across Christian churches, including the religious right in the US, as will be seen in chapter 6. It differed from liberation theology which brought the struggle for justice and equality to the heart of Christian churches.

The prevalence of unifying religious counter-discourses was reflected in the emergence of Christian churches as one of the central social movements within debt activism. In the face of the growing dominance of neoliberalism civil society’s counter-discourses weakened towards the end of the 1980s, with many activists losing hope in the prospect of major change in existing power relations. “We had our dreams that the world could be different...but we were… more pragmatic, incremental in our approach” (Interviewee Germany No. 1).

Traditionally civil society had engaged mainly with national governments. The debt crisis, however, with its roots in both national and transnational policies and actions called for an engagement across the national/international interface both in terms of the scope of civil society networking and the levels of decision making to be addressed. While civil society struggled to emerge as transnational civil society by developing a transnational practice, there were also factors which kept hopes centred on the national level as the key zone from which change might result. Solidarity with revolutionary governments and movements continued to be a major framework for south/north civil society links. Hope in the possibility of revolutionary change was fed by successful revolutions in, for example, Nicaragua and Mozambique, and the struggles in El Salvador and South Africa. In the case of Nicaragua, Oxfam and Fondad provided advice to the Sandinista government on how to deal with debt (Interviewee UK No. 2; Interviewee Netherlands, No. 2). These bilateral solidarity relations represented the view that revolutionary transformation of governments was the central path to achieving fundamental change. More specifically as a result of debtor government resistance, particularly in Latin America, debt movements looked to those governments as potential major actors in forcing a solution to the crisis. Peru’s partial default became a cause celebre
among civil society debt campaigns internationally. Looked at retrospectively, debtor government resistance might seem to provide little to raise civil society hopes. Lived time, however, is different from historical time and hopes which today may seem unfounded, can and do fuel the wheels of activism at particular times. Throughout the 1980s, the possibility of unilateral action by debtors appears in the analysis and solutions put forward by civil society (Potter 1988; UN-NGO 1987; Clark 1986). By the 1990s, the focus had shifted, with demands being made on creditors for action to resolve the crisis.

5.3 The making of transnational civil society: debt activism

According to Keck and Sikkink (1998, p.27), in order to campaign effectively, groups must establish who bears responsibility and “the causal chain needs to be sufficiently short and clear to make the case convincing”. Part of the challenge to the emerging debt movements was to find such a clear target and short causal chain within the multiple and interconnected bodies which managed– and contributed to the creation of - the debt crisis. Reviewing the limited civil society material available for the 1980s, the overall impression is that civil society groups were struggling to understand the crisis and how best to contest it. There were multiple challenges: gaining a technical understanding of the crisis and solutions being proposed by creditors and developing alternatives; mapping the social impact; generating and coordinating action at the multi levels needed to tackle the debt crisis; and the struggle to define different but equitable south/north civil society roles. As the decade advanced, a web of national and transnational level groups which provided the framework for debt campaigning for the following two decades began to emerge. As a detailed history of debt campaigning has not yet been written, the following sections map the different methods used in order to capture how transnational civil society created itself but do not provide complete coverage of actions nor of the range of countries involved. Among the activities through which transnational civil society created itself as national and transnational actors were: analysis and information exchange nationally and transnationally; national popular mobilisations against austerity programmes; mobilisations in relation to international financial institutions events; di-

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5 Examples of this material are: Clark 1986; Ekins 1986; Africa Trade Unions Conference on External Debt 1987; Osorio 1987; UN-NGO Workshop on Debt, Adjustment 1987; Conferencia de las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 1988; Mujica 1988; Arruda1993 and 2000; CAFOD no date; Cleary (1996); Donnelly 2002; and archival material consulted in the New Economics Foundation (London); Christian Aid UK, Oxfam UK; Jubilee 2000 Archives held in Newcastle University.
rect engagement with the international financial institutions (IFI); and the beginning of national campaigning. Donnelly (2002) who provides the most detailed narrative of civil society action on debt from the 1980s focussing mainly on the US charts how a range of actors formed networks on debt, which subsequently dissolved - partly because major actors move on to new issues but also because of ideological disagreements with new networks emerging later with an overlap of actors. Donnelly's paper highlights both the central role of core activists in building movements and also how common cause can wax and wane.

*Popular Protest*

Protests, often referred to as ‘IMF riots’ (Tarrow 2005, pp. 64-5) against austerity measures took the form of demonstrations which sometimes turned violent (Chile, Turkey, Sudan, Venezuela), food riots (Haiti, Brazil, Morocco and Zambia) and strikes (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador) (Nkinyangi 1991; Walton and Ragin 1990). Between 1976 and 1986 more than half the major countries in Latin America and the Caribbean registered 57 separate protest events mainly precipitated by IMF policies (Walton 1989). 146 riots took place in 39 of 80 debtor countries between 1976 and 1992 (McMichael 1996). Although referred to as ‘riots’, the protests in Latin America were organised responses by those hardest hit by IMF programmes, the urban poor who were organised in neighbourhoods, churches, political associations and TUs (Walton and Ragin 1990). Students were identified as significant actors in protest in Africa (Situmbeko and Jones 2004; Nkinyangi 1991). Protests were directed at governments and indirectly at the IMF, and led to governments withdrawing or modifying these programmes – albeit sometimes temporally - or introducing compensatory programmes (Walton 1989). Some governments took more confrontational positions in relation to the IMF for example in the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Zambia. In some cases, popular unrest contributed to the fall of governments (Peru 1980 and 1984, Argentina 1983, Brazil 1984) (Walton 1989, p.321). The most serious protests were in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. Following the doubling of the price of basic foodstuff and a 200% rise in the price of medicine in the Dominican Republic in 1984, riots resulted in 112 dead and 500 wounded. Riots in Venezuela broke out in February 1989 following increases in the price of oil and food, and hundreds died, with estimates varying from 300 to 1,500. As will be seen later in this chapter, these riots contributed to the introduction of a debt initiative in 1989, the Brady Bonds. The impact of the protests can be detected in G7
communiqué albeit in a very veiled manner. In its 1987 communiqué, G7 recognises that the crisis is of economic and political concern as a:

….threat to political stability in countries with democratic regimes’ and they ‘salute the courageous efforts of many of these countries to achieve economic growth and stability (G7 1987).

As will be seen later, the Brady Bonds 1989 deal was partly motivated by the unrest in Venezuela. By 1990, banks are being told by the G7 that they should take realistic and constructive approaches given the ‘courageous reforms’ being adopted by debtors (G7 1990).

Are the seeds of subsequent anti-globalisation protests to be found in these ‘IMF riots’? Tarrow (2005) argues that the debt protests of the 1980s did not represent the transnationalisation of protest as there was no cross border coordination between the episodes in different countries. Walton and Ragin (1990, p.87), however, point to the continuities in how the protests were framed from Latin America to Africa: “out with the IMF”; “we won’t pay the debt – Let the ones who stole the money pay”. The protests in aggregate had an impact on global awareness as seen in the coining of the term ‘IMF riots’ and fed the mobilisation against meetings of the IMF, World Bank and G7 in northern countries in the 1980s (see below).

Understanding the Debt Crisis

Analysing a problem and how to contest it is a cornerstone of the making, maintenance and renegotiation of the common cause which holds activists together both at national and transnational level. Analysis of the debt crisis was carried out by a range of academics in the south and north, by civil society think tanks, and by NGOs. Work started in Latin America involving Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Nicaragua and Mexico and Argentina (Arruda 2000). Peruvian economist Oscar Ugarteche was studying Peru’s debt from the mid 1970s (Tagle and Patomaki 2007). Early debt activists in the Philippines, based in universities, used debt “as a potent tool in exposing the corruption and profligacy of the Marcos regime” (Ariate and Molmisa 2009, p.29). A number of northern think tanks and NGOs were also analysing the debt including AITEC, a research group set up in Paris in 1983 and the North South Institute in Canada. In terms of NGOs, Fondad, Novib, Christian Aid, the Swiss Coalition for Development and Oxfam UK were active on debt. Support organisations for churches in the Netherlands and Sweden
were also providing information to the churches in order to promote church action on the debt crisis (Interviewee Netherlands No. 2; Interviewee Sweden). These fed into transnational civil society events informing the analysis and information exchange which was a major focus of activity.

*Campaigns at national level*

Campaigning was mainly targeted at national level – at governments and, in the north, at the very accessible high street banks. One of the earliest national campaigns – and now the longest running debt campaign in the world - the Philippines Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) was set up to campaign for freedom from the illegitimate debt accrued by the Marcos regime. The roots of action on debt in the Philippines can be found during the Marcos regime when academics, opposition politicians and civil society groups campaigned against dependency on foreign loans because of the loss of independence involved and the huge corruption these loans involved (Pineda-Ofreneo 1991, p.77). As the Philippine debt crisis deepened in the early 1980s, academics organised workshops and disseminated publications on the crisis (Ariate and Molmisa 2009). With the fall of Marcos in 1986, FDC emerged as a coalition of progressive groups which had opposed the dictatorship including political blocs, people’s organisations and academics. (Grageda 1994, p.59-60)

FDC is in many ways a coalition of coalitions; it is a coalition of all the cause-oriented coalitions ranging from the liberal religious to the progressive, radically oriented groups. (Leonor Briones interview 1990)

The battle lines in relation to debt were set early in the post Marcos regime. While initially President Aquino committed to renegotiate the country’s debt and to prioritise domestic needs over those of foreign creditors (Grageda 1994, p.156), addressing the US Congress soon after her election, she stated that while the debts were unjust “We fought for honour, if only for honour, we shall pay” (Grageda 1994, p.158). In addition to assuming responsibility for the massive debt run up by the Marcos regime, a further mobilising factor for FDC was the institutionalisation of a decree from the Marcos regime mandating the automatic appropriation of debt payments from the budget giving absolute priority to debt servicing.

The FDC was formally launched in 1988 and adopted three ‘minimum unities’ at its founding congress: a moratorium on debt service payments until better terms were negotiated; disengagement from loans that did not benefit the people, particularly those
tainted with fraud; a cap on foreign debt service at 10% of export earnings. The adoption of selective rather than total repudiation of debt was to enable the broadest possible coalition (Grageda 1994). FDC had strong links with parliamentarians from the start, a number of whom attended its founding congress and many of whom signed the FDC Congress Declaration (Grageda 1994, p.160). There was also some support within Aquino’s cabinet for the FDC position, with the government’s chief planner supporting selective debt repudiation (Arias and Molmisa 2009, p.36).

While FDC was a strong member of the developing transnational debt movements, the focus of their campaigning was on national debt policy. They supported bills introduced into the Philippine Congress proposing a cap on debt servicing, including organising marches to parliament (Pineda-Ofreneo 1991). Although a bill capping debt was approved by Congress in 1991, it was vetoed by President Aquino (Gersham 1997, p.96). FDC also campaigned against the IMF programme signed by the government in 1989, taking a different approach to the anti IMF protests which had been mounted in other debtor countries. FDC set up the People’s Forum against the Letter of Intent, which is the letter sent by governments to the IMF setting out the reforms they intend to introduce in return for an IMF loan. The content of the Letter of Intent reflects the conditions demanded by the IMF in return for a loan. FDC ran an awareness campaign, targeted the media, picketed government offices, and organised rallies, setting off considerable debate in the Philippine Congress (FDC 1989). FDC opposed the government’s Letter of Intent, as the proposed policies would conflict with the government’s goals of poverty reduction and employment creation, massive debt service payments would continue and it would result in a rise in the price of rice (Pineda-Ofreneo 1991).

FDC became well known nationally and internationally for their campaigning against payment of the fraudulent loans taken on by the Marcos regime. Research carried out on six such loans received extensive media coverage and led to an investigation by the Department of Justice to see if there were grounds for repudiation. FDC attended Congressional hearings and fraudulent loans were back on the legislative agenda (FDC 1990a). The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant loan became the centre of campaigning against fraudulent loans and was used widely internationally as an illustration of illegitimate and fraudulent loan. There were allegations that bribes of $80 million were given by US Company Westinghouse to an associate of Marcos to win the contract. The Plant was deemed unsafe and not put into operation, but the government continued to service the loans taken on to build the plant. In 1988, the Philippine government sued Westing-
house for bribery in a Jersey court. By 1992 the government was ready to agree a settlement favourable to Westinghouse, but this was rejected by both Houses of Congress. The government continued to pursue the case (Beaver 1994), and it was finally settled in an out of court agreement in 1995 (WISE 1998). When a deal to securitise Philippine debt was underway, FDC joined with other groups in the No to BNPP (Bataan Nuclear Power Plant) campaign and opposed the inclusion of Bataan debt in the Brady Bonds scheme as this would legitimise the debt (Ariate and Molmisa 2009). The FDC programme 1990-1992 was named PAID – meaning both that the debt has been paid but also it stood for People against Immoral Debt (FDC 1990a, b).

Among FDC’s strengths was their strong expertise due to the significant involvement of academics. This gave them credibility, which resulted in extensive media coverage e.g. for their case on fraudulent loans (FDC 1990a). An issue for FDC in its early days was their relationship with the Aquino government – should they work with or bypass the government (Mendoza 1988). They also had credibility with politicians – the Senate President addressed FDC’s 1990 annual Congress - and with some government officials including some from the key Finance and Budget departments (FDC 1989, 1990a). FDC were invited to Congressional hearings on debt and helped members of Congress to develop their legislative agenda on debt (FDC no date a). While FDC’s was strongly oriented towards national government policy, they were also actively involved in the emerging transnational debt movements. Their orientation towards the international arena was partly to publicise the Philippines’ huge debt, much of it corrupt, and to gain transnational allies which could pressure the Philippine government to change its debt policy e.g. on the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant loans, in addition to putting pressure on international creditors. They worked with the Swiss NGO, Berne Declaration, on the role of Swiss banks in fraudulent loans and presented a study together with concerned shareholders to the annual meeting of the Union Bank of Switzerland outlining the bank’s role as a creditor and as a repository of flight capital from the Philippines (FDC 1990a). They also aimed to take part in broad transnational actions seeking solutions to the debt crisis, for example, FDC took part in setting up the Debt Treaty Movement 1992 (see Chapter 6). A further aim was to support campaigns in other third world countries struggling against unjust debt and unequal economic structures. FDC became an anchor of the international debt movement taking part in Fondad, sending speakers to a wide range of events from the 1988 debt conference in Lima, the counter-events in Berlin during the IMF and World Bank AGMs, Eurodad meetings and various events in the US.
Campaigning in other countries was also mainly targeted at national level. Campaigns to pressure commercial banks were run in a number of countries - Belgium, Britain, Holland and Germany. These were a mixture of NGO led campaigns using routine methods like letter writing, lobbying and more popular contentious campaigning. An example of the first is War on Want’s campaign launched in 1986 against the role of British banks in the debt crisis stating that “if they continue, will implicate Britain in human suffering on a vast scale” (Rodgers 1986). In contrast to NGO led campaigns, the Lloyds and Midland Boycott campaign was led by students and focussed on direct action. Students bought shares in the banks and disrupted shareholder meetings and were physically removed. They also occupied banks – “once we went to Leicester and closed down all the banks in a day” (Interviewee UK No. 1). A powerful weapon was to get students unions to ban the banks from fresher days. Radical actions against commercial banks were also carried out by students in Belgium (Interviewee Belgium No. 1). The Dutch debt campaign also targeted shareholders’ meetings using less adversarial methods. They bought shares in ABN-Amro Bank, brought debt activists from Brazil to input on environment and debt at shareholders’ meetings. Similar action took place in Germany in relation to Deutsche Bank, with debt campaigners addressing shareholder meetings and shareholders getting ‘het up’ and putting pressure on the bank to explain its involvement in the crisis (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1).

In the UK, the WDM started campaigning on debt in the early 1980s focussing on Latin America’s bank debt crisis, under the slogan ‘Can’t pay, won’t pay’. The strategy was to raise public awareness and mounted pressure on the banks (Interviewee UK No. 5). Oxfam UK ran its first debt campaign in 1986, which prefigured subsequent northern debt campaigns: framing the issue in stark terms; putting pressure on decision makers through direct mobilisation of public opinion via petitions; letter writing, which resulted in scores of parliamentary questions; the involvement of celebrities to gain media interest. The central storyline of the campaign was ‘the scandal of the money Africa gives us’: for every £1 given in famine aid, £2 came back in repaying debt (Clark 1986, 2001). A booklet ‘For richer, for Poorer’ was published to back the campaign. The section on ‘the fight back’ focuses on action by debtor governments – Brazil, Peru, Nigeria, Philippines and Mexico - and among the proposed solutions is “being sympathetic to developing countries who decide to set a ceiling on their debt payments” (Clark 1986, p. 88). This reflects the hopes placed by civil society groups on debtor government resistance. A postscript to the campaign is the comment of a treasury official - that the campaign was well placed but shameful, simplifying the issues (Clark 2001, p.22).
Public pressure of this kind was clearly in its infancy. A decade or so later the UK treasury was receiving 300,000 communications a year on the debt issue - a quarter of its entire correspondence was on debt (Mayo 2005a, p.181).

A campaign in 1989 by a coalition of Swiss development NGOs and church groups can be seen as prefiguring the Jubilee 2000 campaign of the late 1990s. The Swiss group leveraged the symbolism of Switzerland’s upcoming 700th anniversary in 1991 by calling on the government to mark the occasion by cancelling debt. The public was mobilised through a petition which collected 280,000 signatures (4% of the population). The petition also called for more equitable economic and financial relations with the south. In response, the Swiss government set up a debt reduction programme in 1991 involving Swiss NGOs. A condition of debt reduction was that civil society in the debtor country should be involved in the process (Arruda 2000).

The role of the German Green Party in the 1980s illustrates the organic links which can exist between political and civil society – with political parties growing out of civil society groups and then pursuing issues from that alliance through parliamentary procedures when elected. The Green Party grew out of a number of social movements including third world solidarity groups, and first won parliamentary seats in 1983. The link between structural adjustment and environmental degradation was a key concern for the Greens in relation to debt (Donnelly 2002). In fact the German Green Party was one of the first environmental groups to focus on the debt crisis (Potter 1988). They worked with well-known left-wing academics in order to initiate a number of ‘major enquiries’ (whereby questions could be put to government, the answers to which had to be passed by cabinet) on the role of the IMF and World Bank. The subsequent parliamentary debates generated considerable media interest and this work laid the ground for the Green Party role in mobilising in relation to the BWI AGM in Berlin 1988 (Interviewee Germany No. 1).

A number of national debt networks were set up bringing together NGOs, churches and others. The US Debt Crisis Network was set up in 1985, consisting of church groups, students, community organisations and other groups (UN-NGO 1987). This network dissolved in 1990, partly because of key people moving on and partly because of differences as to whether to call for modifications of structural adjustment or denounce it as an imperialist intervention (Donnelly 2002). The UK Debt Crisis Network was set up in 1986 with an active core of 12 to 14 organisations to enable groups to exchange information and this developed into active collaboration (Denham no date).
The network reconsolidated in the 1990s and was one of the major groupings from which Jubilee 2000 emerged.

All of these campaigns directed themselves at national governments—and only indirectly through national government at international bodies—but these national campaigns were simultaneously aggregating up into transnational civil society by engaging in a range of transnational civil society discourse events and transnational actions, as outlined below.

*Mobilisation to transnational events – IMF/World Bank and G7*

The 1980s saw the start of civil society focus on IMF, World Bank and G7 events with the debt issue as one of the major concerns. Action included both alternative summits (The Other Economic Summit – TOES) and a number of mass demonstrations. The first TOES took place in London in 1984, parallel to the G7 Summit also taking place there. These were transnational events with alternative thinkers from across the world taking part. The 1985 TOES was co-sponsored by the WHO and the European Parliament. “People in both organisations are evidently sufficiently disillusioned with official economics to try the opposition” (Swartz 1985).

While public demonstrations and other events (e.g. prayer vigils) accompanied all IMF/World Bank AGMs in Washington from 1986 (Scholte 2001a), the first major mobilisations took place during the 1988 AGM in Berlin. Preparations for the counter IMF and World Bank events took place over a two year period involving radical ‘autonomist’ groups who aimed to disrupt the conference and a large coalition aiming to protest peacefully made up of peace activists, left-wing unions, Third world solidarity groups, faith-based groups, NGOs and the Green Party which provided major finance for the coalition (Interviewee Germany No. 1). The Berlin events were highlighted in advance as a key moment for debt activists by AITEC 1988, Conferencia de las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales in Lima 1988 and the UK Debt Crisis Network.

Three major activities took place: a counter-congress, decentralised protest activities and a mass demonstration (Interviewee Germany No. 1; Days of Dissent no date). Among the organisers of the ‘counter-congress’ in which 4,000 people participated were a number of political parties—the youth wing of the Social Democrats, the Greens, West Berlin’s Communist Party. Discussions included whether the IMF and World Bank could be reformed or should be abolished (Colitt 1988a). The German mobilisation also provided a space for groups from outside Germany to organise events.
An International Citizens’ Conference on the World Bank, Environment and Indigenous People with five hundred participants from around the world blamed the debt crisis for creating pressure to exploit Amazonia to generate export earnings (Bank Information Centre no date). A Permanent Tribunal of the Peoples was convened with a jury which included two Nobel prize winners and an ex-IMF economist acting unofficially as the defence. The IMF and World Bank were accused of "grave violations" of their original goals and the principles of international law (Colitt 1988b). The Tribunal took the position that the institutions should be abolished (Budhoo 1994). 80,000 people demonstrated against the impoverishment of the developing world by IMF policies in what was one of the biggest mobilisations in post war Berlin. (Days of Dissent no date) Smaller radical and grass roots groups kept up a barrage of direct action throughout the meetings, including a demonstration at Tegel airport as a ‘welcoming ceremony’ for bankers and officials arriving for the meetings (Financial Times 1988). The IMF and World Bank were on the defensive with IMF managing director, Michel Camdessus, pleading to journalists not to make the IMF a scapegoat in the Third World's economic crisis. World Bank president Barber Conable, borrowing temporarily from the protesters’ discourse, told a West German newspaper that “his agency is no agent of colonialism trying to keep the Third World in bondage to the rich” (Crane 1988). The level of mobilisation in Germany went far beyond the expectations of the broad coalition which organised the events and was seen as “a new type of critical civil society response to the debt crisis and Bretton Woods Institutions” (Interview Germany No.1).

The 1989 G7 summit in Paris was timed to coincide with the bicentenary of the French revolution with both the French government and civil society groups leveraging the symbolism of the anniversary. On the official front, Mitterand invited the leaders of twenty developing nations to celebrate the bicentenary of the revolution in addition to his G7 colleagues (Phillips 1989a). The Other Economic Summit attracted 1000 participants (TOES USA 2004) and was organised by a broad coalition, including Tribunal Permanent des Peuples, CEDETIM, Agir Ici, CIMAIDE, Terre des Hommes, Justice et Paix (La Otra Bolsa de Valores 1990).

In contrast to the G7 summit of the richest countries, the alternative summit dubbed itself the P7, the summit of 7 of the world’s poorest countries – Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Haiti, Amazonian Indians, Mozambique, Philippines and Zaire, chosen for their levels of poverty and to provide a geographic spread. Le Monde captured the symbolism in an article titled ‘Two International Encounters in Paris, the Summit and the Abyss’ (Lebaube 1989). Echoing the OAU and the Berlin People’s Tribunal on interna-
tional debt, the final declaration called on the UN to convene a special international conference of debtors and creditors to find a political solution to the debt (CEDETIM 1989). In addition fifteen thousand people demonstrated against ‘debt, apartheid and colonialism’ under the slogan ‘Ça suffit’, and a hundred thousand took part in a concert in the Place Bastille. Celebrities involved were the writer Gilles Perrault, and singer Renaud (Le Monde 1989, Phillips 1989b). While some of the French organisers had participated in the 1988 counter-events in Berlin, the 1989 events were mainly French. Some delegations came from other countries but this was limited (Interviewee France No. 1). The 1989 events had transnational impact as they inspired the setting up of CADTM, which was started in Belgium in 1990 by people who had participated in the French events (Interviewee Belgium No. 2).

Engaging with Multilateral Organisations

While global governance with its norm promoting civil society participation was not embedded during the 1980s, policy engagement with the World Bank began through the World Bank NGO Working Group (WB NGO WG) which was set up in 1981. The aim was to develop collaboration between NGOs and World Bank at project level, composed of 26 NGOs from different regions and Bank officials (Arruda 1993). Under pressure from more radical organisations, in 1984 NGO members decided to organise separately from the World Bank and to take part in dialogue within the Bank from this position of autonomy (Cleary 1996). Three major policy issues were highlighted by the NGO committee - structural adjustment, popular participation and disclosure of information (Covey 1998; Arruda 1993). A fundamental question raised by the committee was whether it was possible for NGOs to collaborate with the World Bank while maintaining a critical position, and whether it was possible for the Bank to take criticism from NGOs with which it collaborated (Arruda 1993). Covey (1998) defines the NGO Working Group on the World Bank as an example of critical cooperation, relationships within which there are high degrees of both conflict and cooperation, an approach which is appropriate to pursue incremental but not structural change. Criticism of the WB NGO WG continued with a view among some organisations that NGOs on the working group “…were serving the Bank as a fig leaf of respectability by providing public relations cover through which the Bank would be able to dissipate criticism” (Cleary 1996, p.72).
5.4 Making common cause transnationally

In addition to the transnational mobilisations paralleling international financial summits outlined above, which provided opportunities for networking between debt groups, a number of autonomous civil society regional and transnational events were organised. These were key events creating the trust and understandings which held transnational activism together.

*Latin American regional events*

Trade Unions (TUs) played a key role in regional networking on debt in addition to involvement in popular protest against IMF policies at national level. Eight continental TU conferences on debt took place between 1984 and 1988. These took place in Cuernavaca, Mexico in August 1984, Madrid in June 1985, Havana in July 1985, Bogota in August 1985, Buenos Aires in November 1986, Lima in March 1987, Campinas, Sao Paolo in May 1987, and Lima in September 1987 (Mujica 1988). In addition to the south/north divide, TUs were bisected by cold war divisions and conferences were organised by TUs affiliated to both the western allied ICFTU and the eastern linked WFTU and by those which were unaligned. A common theme, however, was the need for the broadest consensus within a united Front going beyond ideological alignments. The various proposals from the conferences reflected the strong emphasis in Latin America during the 1980s of a solution initiated by debtor governments including ‘no pago’ (‘don’t pay’). Mujica (1988) sums up the proposed solutions emerging from the conferences as threefold: (a) solving the debt crisis involving a number of solutions - identify and repudiate illegitimate debt; put a cap on payment of the remaining debt; (b) reform the international economic order; (c) radical change to the national economic order to first pay the social debt owed to impoverished people. His assessment was that the most significant progress had been made in analysing the debt problem but that there had been little progress in terms of joint action although days and weeks of action were decided on with 1988 declared an ‘International Year of Struggle against Payment of the Foreign Debt’ (Potter 1988 p164). In particular, Mujica highlights the lack of action to get the support of northern trade unions in industrialised countries.
Regional Africa

The first African TU meeting on debt took place in 1987 in Ethiopia, organised by the WFTU and the Organisation of African TU Unity (African TU Conference 1987). TU leaders from twenty eight countries participated together with two regional TU organisations and representatives of the OAU, ILO and African Development Bank. It was linked to the OAU heads of state meeting on debt mentioned above (OAU 1987), which took place a week earlier. The TU conference took note of the outcome of that summit, showing that civil society and states were interacting, rather than staying as parallel worlds. Blame was laid on transnational corporations, rich governments and their agencies the IMF and World Bank and on African governments because of their unsustainable policies, economic mismanagement and corruption. The illegitimacy of much of the debt was highlighted – some loans were not properly documented, some were fraudulent, money was stolen with the collusion of the lenders. Among the solutions were that debt should be cancelled by creditors, or else collectively repudiated. The right of the people carrying the debt burden to participate in the solution was stressed. The Cartagena Group was interpreted as a Latin American debtor cartel and the OAU was urged to form an African debtor cartel linked with Latin America debtors and face the creditor cartel with a debtor cartel. If debts were to be repudiated, education and mass mobilisation would be needed, so that the ‘broad masses’ could protect governments that took progressive nationalist positions on debt from attacks from imperialists.

As in the case of the Latin American TUs, the need to build broad unity was identified. They envisaged popular alliances at local and national level, coming together on a continental basis and both south/south and south/north. This was a mammoth job and in the 1980s there seemed to be limited mechanisms to pursue such an ambitious programme. Latin America and Africa TUs tried to define different roles for governments and for TUs, nationally, regionally and transnationally but it was difficult to identify what the next steps beyond the conferences would be. The making of transnational civil society was a struggle in itself, apart from the struggle over the debt crisis.

Regional Europe

Fondad in the Netherlands was the first European organisation to start international networking on debt with Latin America and the Philippines. In 1989 Fondad organised the first European conference on debt, with the participation of Jan Timberged author of the original NIEO report. Fondad’s aim was to strengthen European work on debt and
share the costs of networking with other NGOs. From this, Eurodad emerged involving INGOs, NGOs and national debt networks. As will be seen in the next chapter, Eurodad became a major transnational actor on debt during the 1990s.

South/north civil society events
A number of south/north civil society events led by NGOs took place during the 1980s and two of these on which reports were available, are outlined below.

A workshop on debt and adjustment took place in Oxford in 1987 co-organised by Oxfam UK, Queen Elizabeth House, and the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGO 1987). There were fifty eight participants from southern and northern NGOs, six representatives of the UN system (including the World Bank) and CIDA. An aim of the conference was to explore how south and north NGOs could work together on public education and campaigning. Notable was the emphasis on the need for adjustment in northern countries involving a reduction in northern consumption rather than focussing exclusively on the need to tackle the impact of adjustment on southern countries which subsequently became the focus of civil society campaigning. The proposals for action were very broad and reflected the complex situation activists/NGOs were facing – debt to banks, individual governments and international financial institutions. The conclusion laid out a multi-layered strategy aimed at each of these bodies. To enable this to happen, south/north coordinated action, from information sharing to developing a common agenda for simultaneous international lobbying, was needed. Efforts were made to clarify complementary roles for southern and northern groups respectively. The conclusions recognised debtor governments’ resistance with NGOs urged to support debtors who put a ceiling on debt servicing, as Peru had the previous year, and to campaign for a mandate for the International Court of Justice to judge responsibility in the case of ‘repudiated’ loans.

In 1988 a coalition of Peruvian NGOs and the network of EU NGOs organised a transnational meeting in Lima with two hundred and forty nine delegates from thirty-three countries (Latin America, the Caribbean, USA, Europe and Asia). There were representatives from thirty Latin American TUs and rural organisations; representatives of four governments (Peru, Sweden, Cuba and Nicaragua); of five international organisations, including UNICEF, UNDP CIAT and CEPAL); and of 21 south/north NGO networks. This conference was originally proposed by a Peruvian NGO to support to the Peruvian government which was under pressure following the 10% cap it had placed on debt servicing. As the organisation of the conference developed, it became independent
of the Peruvian government. The conference, however, was addressed by the Peruvian Minister of Economics and Finance (Conferencia 1988).

At the level of discourse this conference made a clear option for the ‘no pago’ (‘don’t pay’) position based on delegitimising the debt and creating a popular movement ‘debtor cartel’ and stressed that any solution to the debt problem must be a step towards an NIEO. The focus was on how to achieve common action – horizontally across popular movements and also south/north. In relation to south/north engagement, it was recognised that they had different needs of each other and that they operated within different domestic contexts presenting different constraints. Priorities were to strengthen Latin American NGO networks and information sharing south/north with northern NGOs supplying the necessary resources. As in the case of the Oxford conference, how to coordinate transnational action remained a challenge, including the development of appropriate south/north relations.

South/north

More structured European/Latin American engagement was started in 1987 through Fondad, supported by the major Dutch NGOs and economists such as Robert Triffin and Jan Tinbergen. Fondad had a secretariat in The Hague, and membership in Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru and Chile. The purpose of the network was to promote debate on debt policies, working together to influence international decision makers and to engage with Ministries of Finance and other decision makers at national level. Debt was seen as a signal of a malfunctioning system, not as an issue in itself. Illegitimate debt was a strong concern in Latin America, but it was difficult to make progress on the issue. When the Sandinistas came to power, they chose the legitimate route of negotiating and getting better terms of payment, rather than confront the creditors and refuse to pay. An aim of the work by Latin American groups was to raise public awareness and put pressure on politicians to take a stronger role with creditors and not to accept adjustment programmes (Interviewee Netherlands No. 2). Tensions arose within the network over the respective roles of Latin American and European Fondad, including differences over policy, and also ownership. Issues included Latin American groups seeking a greater role in decision making (Donnelly 2002) and whether priority should be given to strengthening the work of individual organisations or developing joint work. As always in south/ north relations the fact that the northern (Dutch) partner in the network was also the funder impacted on relationships (Interviewee Netherlands No. 2). Fondad’s
work was also affected by the adoption of the Brady Bonds in 1989 which created the perception that the Latin American debt problem had diminished. (Donnelly 2002). Finally, at a meeting between the Dutch organisations and Fondad Latin America, the situation was resolved with an agreement that the European and Latin American organisations would operate independently of each other (Interviewee Coordinator Eurodad No.1).

*Fault lines within common cause*

Common cause arrived at by campaign groups are always fragile and subject to tensions, negotiations, splits or the dissolution of groups. The main cleavages in the debt movement were based on conditionality and south/north imbalances of power which were reflected in transnational civil society.

Discussion took place in south/north fora and in southern fora about the kind of south/north joint working needed to deal with issues like debt which went beyond country to country solidarity. There were calls from gatherings of southern NGOs for northern NGOs to focus on changing their governments’ and multilateral organisations’ policies which negatively impacted on southern countries and to support southern NGOs to carry out development work at country level:

Non-African NGOs should strengthen their advocacy work internationally and in their home countries and with regard to bilateral donors and the multilateral system, closely monitoring their response to the African crisis and holding donor governments and agencies accountable for their policies and actions. (Arusha Declaration 1990)

Discussion took place also at south/north events on debt as to how this division of labour would work. Speaking at the Oxford 1987 debt conference, a member of the Third World Network suggested a complementary relationship with mobilisation in the south, where the impacts are felt, with the results then transferred to the north which are in a better position to lobby as this is where power lies (UN-NGO 1987). An underlying question was who was to decide on priority issues and on the solutions to press for. While the principled position may be that southern groups should lead, there was recognition that northern groups had their own challenges to face. One southern contributor at the 1987 conference suggested that the south should provide a set of issues to the north, based on evidence from the grassroots. Reading their own publics, northern groups should decide which issue they could best promote domestically. Issues which
might be crucial to Peru or Ghana might not lead to effective mobilisation in the north. A speaker from the Netherlands at the 1988 conference in Lima stated:

In 1968 we acted on behalf of the south; in 1988 we must act with southern NGOs responding to their demands. (Conferencia 1988, p.152)

But she went on to outline the difficulties in responding to southern calls for greater action in the north. The massive European campaign against cruise missiles in 1983 had diverted attention from poorer countries and according to her, the European solidarity movements had not yet recovered (Conferencia 1988). While southern and northern groups were groping towards a modus operandi, issues of leadership, of autonomy of action and the direction of accountability remained grey areas as was manifested in tensions within the first on going south/north network, Fondad.

As debt was a lever which opened the door to the imposition of neoliberal policies of liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation on debtor countries, conditionality was a major source of tension. Should conditions be attached to loans or debt deals and if so, who should set them? Was this a breach of sovereignty which should be opposed or was it an opportunity to ensure better use of resource in southern countries to tackle poverty given the misuse of much of the borrowed money? War on Want’s 1986 campaign supported conditionality to rein in southern elites:

War on Want makes the irrefutable case that conditions attached to World Bank and other loans should discourage the atmosphere in which Latin America's wealthy enrich themselves on borrowed money. Instead the conditions should encourage social and development programmes, and link lending to the redistribution of wealth. (Rodgers 1986)

The Oxford 1987 conference called for “an alternative adjustment policy that responds to the needs of the poor and promotes development” (UN-NGO 1987, p. 4). Conditionality was a major source of contention for Latin America and Philippines activists. While everyone wanted to see increased resources going to, for example, health, the southern groups' position was “we’ll make those decisions, not you” (Interviewee Ireland No. 1). The TU Conference in Bogota 1985 denounced the imperialist policies which damaged sovereignty and self-determination (Mujica 1988). Divisions on conditionality were not confined to the south/north interface but arose also from different ideological positions. One of the reasons for the dissolution of the US Debt Crisis Network was disagreement over whether they should call for a revision of SAP similar to
the one which emerged from the Oxford conference or condemn it as an imperialist intervention (Donnelly 2002). Parallel to analyses critiquing the substance of adjustment – whether from a reformist or radical perspective – activists pinpointed the Achille’s heel of global governance: the lack of an accountability mechanism to those who were affected by adjustment programmes. Numerous calls were made for the participation of poor people themselves in the decision making process on adjustment but there were no proposals as to a process whereby this could take place.

5.5 Creditor action

Two international debt deals were adopted towards the end of the 1980s, The Toronto Terms 1988 and the Brady Bonds 1999. The 1988 Toronto Terms were introduced by Britain, and a parallel proposal was brought forward by the French government, with the final Toronto Terms a compromise between the two proposals (Attali 2005; IMF 1999; Lawson 1992). The deal provided limited relief on the debt owed by low-income countries to bilateral creditors, but represented a shift in creditors’ perception of low-income country debt as one of temporary liquidity to recognition that some debt reduction was necessary. The inadequacy of the Toronto Terms, however, became quickly clear with Adedeji (1990) estimating that the Toronto Terms would deliver a mere $500 million over a ten year period. In a report to World Bank Development Committee 1990, World Bank president highlighted that by the end of the century only an estimated 11 per cent of the countries' long-term debt would be relieved by the Toronto Terms (Fidler 1990). The terms were continually ‘enhanced’ throughout the 1990s. Seeking to establish the strength of the relationship between civil society action and creditor responses is difficult. While he describes the process through which the Toronto Terms were pursued in his memoirs, Lawson (2002) does not explain his motivation other than recognition that poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa could not repay their debts and a wish to steal a march on the French. Nor does Evans (1999), who at the time worked in the international finance side of the British Treasury, give any clear account of what prompted the initiative. One possible motivation was that the UK was not going to take a progressive position on aid or trade at that time, and action on debt would not be very costly for the UK, but Britain could be seen as taking action on a high profile issue (Interviewee UK No. 5). What is difficult to assess is the influence of the calls from the OAU for action on Africa’s debt or the domestic support mobilised by the Oxfam and other campaign. Overall, there is little recognition of the role of civil society campaign-
ing in the 1980s in the literature. Some suggest that no significant NGO pressure was involved in the emergence of the Toronto Terms (Scholte 2002 fn56). Yanacopulos (2004, p.723), however, refers to how NGO campaigning on debt in 1980s influenced the British government and how this translated into pressure on the World Bank Board of Directors.

Brady Bonds introduced in 1989 on the initiative of the US aimed at easing commercial debt, particularly in Latin America and are named after the architect of the scheme, then US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady. The scheme represented some recognition that debt reduction was needed and IMF and World Bank resources were used to encourage banks in this direction. The scheme involved swapping existing loans for low interest bonds backed by the US Treasury. There were a number of reasons for the change in US policy. When Bush was inaugurated as president in January 1989 he made a commitment to reviewing the debt strategy. According to International Banking:

The prospect that debt problems could contribute to the end of the democratic process in a number of Latin American countries, or trigger regional economic instability with severe consequences for the whole of the western hemisphere, appears to be the reason for the swiftness of the action. In other words, in US eyes, the crisis has moved more definitely from the financial and economic sphere, to the political. (International Banking Report 1989)

The serious rioting in Venezuela in March 1989 against the austerity programme introduced, which left hundreds dead, is recognised as increasing the pressure for action (Boughton 2001; Miles 1999; Kilborn 1989; Main 1989). Further, it was clear that the continuous rescheduling over the 1980s were not resolving the debt crisis, with massive net transfers from debtors to creditors continuing. A net transfer of resources from debtor governments to creditors in 1988 of over $40 billion seriously reduced living standards. Average incomes in Latin America were a tenth below those of the previous decade (Huhne 1989). There was also ‘debt fatigue’, with banks reluctant to lend new money as part of restructuring deals (Edelman and Hart 2003). But as the health of commercial banks had improved, they were able to substantially write down debt. Geopolitical factors may also have come into play as Japan had introduced a debt reduction plan at the 1988 G7 in a bid to get a larger role for itself in the world financial system (Greenhouse 1988). The Brady plan introduced by the US in 1989 was very similar to the Japanese plan. The scheme did not result in significant debt reduction, but contributed to restoring investor confidence in Latin America, and therefore there was a perception at the end of the 1980s that the systemic debt crisis was over. However, while private fi-
nance returned to Latin America, this was disproportionately speculative finance laying the basis for future financial crises starting with the Mexican crisis in 1994. The Brady Deal, therefore, can be seen as the result of a number of factors - the interaction of the interests of banks suffering debt fatigue, the people of Venezuela resisting an attack on their livelihoods and how these impacted on US interests – financial because of the exposure of US banks and security because of the US’ perception of radical action in its near neighbour as a threat.

Both the Toronto and Brady deals were conditional on countries following IMF/World Bank programmes which copper-fastening neoliberal policies. This meant a further contraction of the space at national level for debtor country civil society groups to influence their government’s policies – providing further impetus towards transnational civil society action focussing on the IMF and World Bank and G7. While both deals emanated from IGOs – G7/IMF-World Bank – the immediate catalyst in terms of civil society involvement was national level action which had an impact because of the positioning of both countries in question. Venezuela’s geographic positioning meant that any social instability was perceived as a threat to the US. In the case of the campaign on Africa’s debt, the impact arose from the fact that situated in a G7 country, Oxfam was able to impact on the G7 through influencing the British government. Reflecting on this, the then Oxfam campaign manager commented:

“Nowadays it is so much easier for civil society to campaign internationally, to network internationally; in those days..., it was much more difficult...It took a long time to send a letter to an NGO in another country and get a response.. it was ironically easier to press the British government to do something and the British govt made it an international issue. (Interviewee UK No. 2)

5.6 Conclusion

Debt campaigning developed in the 1980s against the backdrop of the ‘neoliberal counter-revolution’. The impact was particularly acute in southern countries, where the debt issue was used as an opportunity to restructure the southern state through programmes which adjusted government priorities away from domestic welfare and economic needs to the requirements of the world economy. Civil society, however, did not adopt unpromptedly to the changing world order, but rather held on to the alternative discourses – of the NIEO, liberation theology – and maintained faith that the emergence of revolutionary governments such as in Nicaragua would help rebalance unequal power relations in world order.
Developing transnational civil society power

An emphasis during the 1980s was on reaching the shared understandings of the debt issue and how to contest it, which would enable transnational debt campaigning, and this was the aim of the discourse events organised regionally and transnationally. Two major areas of knowledge were involved: understanding the dominant powers governing debt; and developing a technical understanding of the issue. As regards dominant power relations, dispersing the fog of Cox’s nébuleuse in order to identify the responsible agents was complicated due to the intermeshing of both the national and the transnational arenas, and the governmental and market sectors within the debt issue. Rather than a clear target and short causal chain (Keck and Sikkink 1998), a wide range of disparate targets were identified: market actors (international banks and MNCs), national governments (creditor and debtor governments) and international organisations (IMF). Sometimes these bodies were linked as principal/agent, for example, the African OAU TU conference saw rich governments and the IMF and World Bank as agents of MNCs. This resulted in very broad analyses which didn’t lead easily to action, as highlighted by Mujica (1988) or in very complex proposed programmes, as at the Oxford and Lima Conferences (Conferencia 1988; UN-NGO 1987).

In terms of the national/international interface the focus in the 1980s was more on the creation of the transnational linkages between debt groups rather than on active campaigning across the national/international divide. Rather than set up a centralised international campaign, looser forms were developed whereby activism from national and regional fora could aggregate up into a transnational practice within decentred coordination. New structures which emerged towards the end of the 1980s were either regional such as Eurodad, or national groupings FDC, UK Debt Crisis Network, but there was no overarching transnational formation.

As regards the south/north relationship, this research conceptualises it as a dynamic one driven by solidarity and conflict. The roots of this relationship can be seen at the various transnational debt discourse events where efforts were made to define appropriate south/north relationship within a solidarity framework, playing to each other’s strengths. The seeds of the conflict can found in the 1980s, when the first organised effort at south/north solidarity on debt through Fondad foundered due to tensions over decision making and agenda setting. This reflects the breakdown in advocacy networks because of tension between those advocating on behalf of those who are affected and direct involvement of those directly affected (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Reitan 2007).
There were also conflicts over adjustment conditions applied by creditors. Sovereignty was a very strong theme for southern groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998), with debt and adjustment programmes seen as undermining both sovereignty and the fragile democracies which had recently replaced military regimes or dictatorships in many debtor countries. Some northern groups, however, were prepared to bypass that sovereignty, seeking improvements for impoverished people through conditions imposed on debtor governments by northern powers. While the cleavage over conditionality did not fit a simple south/north divide, the importance of sovereignty meant that conditionality became a particularly sensitive issue across the south/north interface.

*Exercising Power*

Leveraging knowledge to challenge debt policies had two levels. As described above the NIEO, anti-imperialism and liberation theology provided a broad backdrop against which to position debt. The other level was the more detailed technical knowledge, and many groups struggled at the technical level throughout the 1980s, unsure how to interpret developments such as the G7 Toronto Terms. Challenging the unequal relations which had generated the debt crisis and seeking alternatives - the NIEO or ‘economics as if people mattered’ (Ekins 1986) - was a strong aim of many groups including TOES, FDC and southern TUs. Structurally based discourse appears to have been particularly linked to the major mobilising events such as in Berlin 1988 with more focussed leveraging of public understandings by national campaigns. Oxfam framed African debt to generate public shock at resources flowing from Africa to rich countries when many of these were suffering famine and drought. FDC leveraged public opposition to repaying the illegitimate debt from Marcos regime. The Swiss campaign used the symbolism of the Swiss 700th anniversary to mobilise public support for debt cancellation. Overall there was a strong structural element to challenges to the debt in the 1980s, as alternatives still appeared possible – from revolutionary governments or because socialist alternatives had not yet been written off with the fall of the Berlin Wall. With the growing entrenchment of neoliberalism, however, there was a shift, although not universal, towards seeking reformist solutions to the crisis rather than focussing on major change in power relations.

In terms of operating across the national/international interface, protests and campaigning were mainly aimed at the national level – at banks and governments. When concrete opportunities presented themselves, however, in the form of major
summits these were leveraged, as in the IMF/World Bank AGM 1988, discourse events at G7 summits, and the more significant mobilisations at the Paris G7 in 1989. While national campaigning prevailed, the fact that civil society groups do not have the same leverage within a hierarchically structured internationalising state is reflected in the different ways national campaigns targeted their governments. From a debtor country, FDC pressured their government to stand up to its creditors, especially in the case of fraudulent loans. In a non-G7 country, the Swiss campaign focussed on cancellation of debt owed to Switzerland while Oxfam’s campaign targeted the British state both as national government and as a member of the G7 in order to achieve action from all official creditors.

While there was a strong adversarial dimension in how debt groups engaged with national and international bodies, targeted campaigning geared towards long term struggle, as illustrated by the Philippines Freedom from Debt Campaign, was also being developed. This involved concerted and sustained struggles with national governments and banks. The nature of the relationship between civil society and the state-internationalising state was largely implicit, with civil society groups keying off positions taken by states, e.g. capping of debt service by debtor governments and the OAU call for an international conference on Africa’s debt. There is evidence of more explicit alliances operating within particular contexts: for example, the linkage between the African TU debt conference and the OAU Summit on debt. Also the Philippine Freedom from Debt Coalition maintained close relations with parliamentarians from its earliest days with some support also within the government arising from links made during the struggle against Marcos.

Against this background two separate approaches began to emerge. The Lima conference proposed a ‘popular movement debtors’ cartel’ involving awareness raising, strengthening Latin American NGO networks and south/north information exchanges. The Oxford conference focussed on putting pressure on commercial banks and northern governments. Both supported debtors’ right to cap debt payments. The underlying dichotomy between building social movements as the basis for a fundamental challenge to power and campaigning for shorter-term reforms is a tension which ran through many movements. The significance for the debt movements was that this difference corresponded broadly to the south/north divide.

Neither of the 1980s debt deals (Toronto Terms 1988, Brady Bonds 1989) brought about significant change. But the process of campaigning is a dialectical one – winning solutions which throw up new contradictions which are then pursued by further
bouts of campaigning. Campaigners can win the argument and get issues on the agenda, but they seldom win their preferred solutions (Leipold 2002). 1980s debt campaigning can be seen as unfinished business, laying the foundation for the common cause from which more coordinated campaigning took off in the 1990s. The next chapter takes the story on to the next phase, when campaigning became more coordinated transnationally and took place in the context of a different world order following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Chapter Six: Campaigning for debt cancellation in a uni-polar economic world order

6.1 Introduction

This chapter moves the story of debt campaigning on to the changed landscape of the post-communist world. The two broad campaigning approaches to the debt issue which emerged over the course of the 1980s – building social movements to pose systemic challenges and pressing creditors for debt reduction in the shorter term – rolled over into the 1990s. While radical social movement approaches continued, however, coordinated campaigning with a more technical focus became the dominant approach of in the first half of the 1990s. This involved moving away from more radical analyses and demands such as the NIEO, which had been supported by civil society groups in the 1980s, towards technical analysis, more direct engagement with power brokers including the G7, IMF and World Bank, and the emergence of debt campaigners as visible transnational actors. This shift in debt campaigning coincided with the triumph of neoliberalism and the move to a uni-polar world economy with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reduction of space for alternative economic and social frameworks. A further change for 1990s campaigning was the move from commercial debt to official debt (owed to the IMF and World Bank and to creditor governments). This change followed adoption of the Brady Bonds in 1989, which dealt with commercial debt and represented a shift from Latin American to African debt. As a result the hopes of 1980s campaigners that debtor government resistance would be a significant factor in resolving the debt crisis disappeared, as African governments did not have the same leverage as Latin American governments, given that African debt posed a human but not a systemic threat.

While this chapter covers the two approaches taken by civil society groups outlined above, it focusses in particular on the more technical campaign for debt cancellation. This is because this approach became dominant in the 1990s, and it is from within groups using this approach that the Jubilee 2000 campaign emerged in the second half of the 1990s. The focus is also particularly on European campaigning as a new actor, Eurodad, emerged in 1990 and quickly became a leading group within transnational civil society debt campaigning. As action on debt had decreased in Latin America and the
US at the end of the 1980s, partly due to the adoption of the Brady Bonds, debt groups were in the process of emerging in Africa at that time.

The aim of this chapter is to identify how civil society debt groups sought to exercise power to achieve cancellation of official debt – in particular multilateral debt - in this new context. The chapter first sets the scene by providing an overview of the emergence of the new debt initiative of the 1990s, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC). It then examines how transnational civil society – mainly European debt groups – made common cause. An analysis is then provided of how this common cause was used to leverage the geography of power and an examination of the modes of engagement used by debt groups with national and international decision makers. The conclusion sets out the findings of this case study in relation to these dimensions.

6.2 Emergence of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative: an overview

This section provides an overview of the struggle for cancellation of official debt, in particular debt owed to the IMF and World Bank which was the focus of debt campaigning during the first half of the 1990s. Cancellation of multilateral debt was strongly resisted by the IMF and World Bank and action for reduction of multilateral debt was pushed by both transnational debt groups and elements within the debt nébuleuse. From the end of 1993, encouraged and supported by a number of key members of the ‘epistemic community’, multilateral debt became a major focus for Eurodad. In spring 1994, Eurodad and two of its members, the Berne Declaration (Switzerland) and WEED (Germany), drafted a position on multilateral debt which was signed by 200 NGOs worldwide. But some NGOs wanted more a more nuanced position on the IMF/World Bank creditor position. The issue was resolved by a proposal that the IMF and World Bank should be preferred but not exempt creditors (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 1). This would give the two institutions priority as creditors but their debt would not be exempt from any cancellation. The adoption of this nuanced position on the IMF/World Bank creditor position demonstrates the technical level at which some European NGOs were already operating. The Eurodad campaign for multilateral debt cancellation was launched in October 1994 at the IMF and World Bank AGM (Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998).

In addition to pressure mounted by debt networks such as Eurodad and its members, a range of European social democratic countries, UN bodies, southern government
bodies (NAM, G77, G24) and G7 members, notably the UK, were also pressing for action on multilateral debt. The issue was put on the agenda of the 1994 IMF and World Bank AGM in Madrid and the 1995 G7 Summit called on the two institutions to develop a comprehensive approach to the problem (G7 1995). A shift occurred within the World Bank in favour of some multilateral debt cancellation, following the appointment of Jim Wolfensohn as President in June 1995 (Broome 2009). In September a World Bank draft proposal for a Multilateral Debt Facility was leaked to the Financial Times and received very hostile responses from the IMF, making public the divisions between the two organisations (Holman 1995). The case for multilateral debt reduction was contested over the following year at various transnational fora, - IMF and World Bank meetings, Paris Club and G7. The HIPC initiative was finally adopted by the September 1996 IMF and World Bank AGM. It purported to be a comprehensive approach to the debt of 42 heavily indebted low income countries giving them an ‘exit’ from the debt crisis by bringing their debt to a ‘sustainable level’, defined by the IMF and World Bank as a level which could be serviced without the country falling into arrears, needing rescheduling or compromising growth. The initiative involved countries carrying out six years of structural adjustment before receiving debt reduction. The division between campaigners on the initiative – whether it was a first step or further copperfastened SAP—corresponded to a division between those who saw debt in terms of its impact on finance for development and those who saw it as a tool to maintain unequal south/north relations through SAP. HIPC remained the framework for dealing with low-income country debt into the new millennium and became the focus of further challenge from the Jubilee 2000 campaign.

6.3 Making common cause transnationally

This section examines how common cause was made across the national, regional (Europe), transnational and south/north interfaces. Common cause at European level and wider was woven through loose regional coordination leaving autonomy for national networks6 reflecting the emerging organisational mode for NGOs. Eurodad emerged

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6 Networks/coalitions on debt and development issues existed in a range of European countries although not all of these survived: in Austria; Belgium (with 20 NGOs); Denmark (coordinated by Danchurchaid); Germany (set up in 1992 with 25 NGOs), Ireland (50 NGOs, churches, solidarity groups and TUs); Netherlands (with 27 development and environmental organisations); Norway (SLUG a student’s network was set up in early 1994 with the support of 20 aid, church, youth and left wing organisations); Sweden (coordinated by Development Forum of Swedish Churches); UK (with 42 members). (Eurodad 1990-1991, 1994b).
from the Fondad network which linked Latin American and Europe debt groups during the 1980s. Following the appeal from southern participants at the 1988 debt conference in Lima (Eurodad 1993-1995a), Dutch NGOs involved in Fondad organised a conference for European NGOs in 1989 to encourage greater cooperation and sharing of financing of debt work. Eurodad emerged from this conference and from 1991 received EC funding. In its early years Eurodad had representatives from thirteen countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), and a number of networks had observer status (CIDSE, Aprodev, Eurostep, World Council of Churches and International Workers Aid). The strength of the involvement fluctuated with the European south/north divide emerging as a particular fault line. While there was strong participation from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, there was limited exchange with Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg (Eurodad 1994b). In terms of debt power relations, three of the four European members of the G7 were involved. There was tension within Eurodad, however, on the appropriate division of labour between national groups and the Eurodad secretariat. The question was: should Eurodad provide a service to national members in terms of information and opportunities for transnational exchanges with other debt activists, or should members concede some autonomy to Eurodad to enable it to directly target governments and international financial institutions? For national members, Eurodad’s main role was as a service provider, rather than as a new transnational actor, as members did not concede any sovereignty by participating in Eurodad. The German debt network considered itself an autonomous national campaign and did not see Eurodad as providing guidelines for action (Interviewee Germany No. 2). This point was reinforced by a member of the UK DCN: “Eurodad should promote common policies by member but it is not a policy making body itself” (Eurodad 1993-1995b, p.16).

There were a number of underlying reasons for this. Firstly there were logistical problems in running European wide campaigns aimed at public opinion using common symbols and activities, as was initially envisaged. An early campaign ‘Time is Running Out’ called on governments to support the Trinidad Terms (proposed by John Major, the then British Chancellor, to increase debt reduction for low-income countries), using an egg timer as the campaign symbol. Seven of the eleven country groups reporting on national action between 1990 and 1991 had taken part in this campaign (Eurodad 1990-1991).
We produced a giant egg timer to go all over Europe but it turned out to be too difficult to transport. It was used in Britain… Some cartoons we produced and a number of recommendations we used at European level. And that was the…last attempt at a European campaign. (Interviewee Belgium No. 1)

Organisational exigencies made European-wide campaigning unattractive to large NGOs who:

were not interested in one European-wide campaign… all had some experience of running campaigns with other stakeholders and couldn’t come easily into a common campaign. Big organisations planned campaigns over a long period… they knew what works with their constituencies with their media targets and didn’t necessarily want one coordination based outside the country to design the campaign (Interviewee UK No. 3)

Cultural and historical differences were also a factor in privileging national campaigning.

In France it was always tricky as French NGOs had a more philosophical radical approach; in Britain, Netherlands, Scandinavia, Switzerland Germany we had more pragmatic approach (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 1)

Historical factors defined national symbols or events which could be leveraged as was demonstrated by the huge response to an advert in the German press marking the 40th anniversary of German’s 1953 debt deal when all of Germany’s creditors came together in London and agreed significant debt reduction. German debt campaigners contrasted the generous terms of that deal with the denial of debt reduction to poor countries. Public response was such that the German campaign was able to employ a coordinator (Interviewee Germany No. 2). In the context of the variety of cultural and political contexts across Europe, producing campaign material at European level, was considered of little value - echoing the point made by Tarrow (2005) that global slogans do not necessarily adapt well to national political contexts (2005). Eurodad’s campaigning role was subsequently expressed as a “common denomination” of national interests” which could be adapted to national level contexts (Eurodad 1993a). In relation to influencing decision makers, the emphasis was also on Eurodad’s role in strengthening national campaigns by providing research, information and policy advice, recognising that in most countries NGOs had frequent contact with decision makers on debt and had direct access to international institutions and international conferences (Eurodad 1996-1998a). Although a transnational campaigning role for Eurodad was dropped at an early stage, Eurodad’s role in lobbying decision makers remained a
major issue (Eurodad 1993-1995b). While some wanted a stronger role for Eurodad in lobbying the IMF/World or the Paris Club:

People wanted to make their own contacts with decision makers as we were learning a lot which we could feed back to partners. We were representing our own partners’ point of view. (Interviewee UK No. 3)

There was also wider motivation because “the impact of 10 different national platforms lobbying individually was more effective than subsuming us under one network” (Interviewee UK No. 3).

The emerging division of labour with Eurodad providing advice and support to action taking place at national level worked well in relation to the production of the World Credit Tables, produced by Eurodad in 1995 and in 1996, mirroring the World Bank’s annual Debt Tables (Eurodad 1994b; 1996). Creditor country profiles were provided by national civil society groups. The project was coordinated and launched by Eurodad at IMF/World Bank meetings and launched by national groups to their national media gaining coverage in UK, Germany, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands (Eurodad 1996).

As time went on members were more supportive of direct involvement in lobbying and Eurodad emerged as a transnational actor (Broome 2009; Callaghy 2002). There were two main reasons for this: because the secretariat spoke for a large network and this added weight to its standing with the IMF/World Bank; and its mastery of technical issues enabled it to engage officials in serious debate. Eurodad lobbying, however, was still seen by its members as complementing and strengthening national lobbying by members (Eurodad 1996-1998b).

While Eurodad was a regional network, its target was not the EU, but international financial institutions, and therefore the need to organise to the scale of global decision making (Evans 2008), was recognised from early on (Eurodad 1990-1991, 1994b). “In the early 1990s Eurodad had a lead internationally as there was no strong debt body in the US, Fondad was less active and Afrodad was just emerging” (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1)

Involving civil society from G7 countries was a priority, and Eurodad sought greater involvement from French NGOs (Eurodad 1994a) and supported the emergence of German debt network (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1). Establishing relations with Japanese NGOs proved difficult, as debt was not a priority for the Japanese (Eurodad 1993-1995b). Eurodad/US networking was loose and informal, with some
strong alliances emerging between Eurodad and the Washington-based Centre of Concern and later with Oxfam International (OI) which was set up in 1995 (Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998).

Overall, global networking and action on debt tended to be ad hoc and conjunctural in relation to specific issues and events, often taking the form of joint press releases during G7 Summits, IMF/World Bank meetings or joint letters to decision makers (Inter-Church Coalition 1993). A parallel initiative to Eurodad, the Debt Treaty Movement (DTM), illustrates the difficulty of generating a global network on debt. The DTM was set up by a loose network of NGOs at the UNCED conference in Rio 1992. Those signing the treaty made a series of pledges including to work for massive debt reduction starting with the repudiation of illegal debts, and ending structural adjustment. The aim was to set up a coordinating committee and, in contrast to Eurodad, it was envisaged that joint positions on debt issues and joint campaigns would be undertaken (Debt Treaty 1992). The level of global coordination aimed at was probably too ambitious, and the movement had faded out by 1994. In terms of more formal networking, regional and national civil society organisations have proved more long lasting. Eurodad and Afrodad, both of which emerged in the first half of the 1990s, and the FDC, set up in 1988, all still exist.

South/north

Following on from the dissolution of the Fondad network which linked Dutch and Latin American groups working on debt, south/north relations during the early 1990s were loose and related to particular issues and events. Eurodad campaigning in the early 1990s may be seen as representing an example of the south/north division of labour emerging at the end of the 1980s, within which the role of northern NGOs was to challenge the policies of northern governments and financial institutions which impacted negatively on southern countries. It is difficult, however, to define an equitable division of labour between groups placed unequally within the hierarchical internationalising state – any division labour is likely to reflect those inequalities. As pointed out by Grenier (2003) the problem for southern debt groups was the lack of channels through which they could access powerful northern decision makers. The division of labour set out above, while made in good faith appeared to lock in these inequalities, with northern

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7 Examples are: a statement issued by CBRM, 50 Years Is Enough, Eurodad, Halifax Initiative at the 1994 Lyon G7 Summit (Nutting 1996); a statement issued during the G7 Summit in Halifax 1995 by TWN, 50 Years Is Enough, Eurodad, Halifax Initiative, Mexican Action Network (Umoren 1995).
groups being the access point to creditors. While major south/north tensions did not emerge during this period, the contradictions thrown up by northern groups taking this role came to a head later in the Jubilee 2000 campaign.

The Debt Treaty Movement presupposed that there is a north in the south and a south in the north and did not distinguish between the roles of southern and northern organisations. In the more operational relationships which developed within debt campaigning in the 1990s, southern groups played particular roles in transnational campaigning. Creditor country debt groups needed links with groups from their countries’ debtors (e.g. Germany with Nicaragua, Belgium with the Congo and Rwanda). Southern groups provided expert information and legitimacy through their contribution to northern conferences and public events. Eurodad invited southern debt experts to the TOES at the London 1991 G7 Summit including Leonor Briones, from the FDC, Dr. Alvaro Diaz from Chile, Dr. Allast Mwanza from Zimbabwe and Reinaldo Goncalves from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, all of whom were closely involved in grass-roots organisations (Nduru 1991b). Groups from Africa, Central and Southern America and Asia participated in a major conference on multilateral debt in 1994. Eurodad organised consultations with southern groups as part of its annual conference but these were limited – in 1993 the aim was to invite two participants from each of Africa, Asia and Latin America (Eurodad 1993f). Southern groups also introduced their priorities into transnational debt campaigning with the issue of illegitimate debt highlighted by FDC and budget monitoring, responsible lending and borrowing raised by UDN (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1).

Although some southern groups did not agree with Eurodad’s moderate positions, the radical/reform spectrum did not correspond to a simple south/north divide as there were radical groups within Europe (CADTM) and in the US (50 Years Is Enough), as well as in the south. A different potential source of tension was that northern NGOs might develop autonomous relationships with southern governments, bypassing southern civil society. Although as a matter of principle northern NGOs did not engage directly with southern governments, but worked through southern NGOs (Eurodad 1993d), when Eurodad published its World Credit Tables this resulted in good working relations with some governments – Bolivia and Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania. This was a potential source of tension, as Eurodad had direct relations with southern government which southern NGO sometimes did not have (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1).

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8 Those attending came from: Dette et Investissements Senegal, Afrodad, Recursos Externos Nicaragua, FDC, representatives of the Asian Coalition on Debt and Adjustment, the Coordinator of the NGO WB WG, and a representative of Fondad Latin America (International NGO conference Report 1994).
In terms of the common cause developed, the mechanism of the global campaign was mainly discursive. Eurodad (1994b) gives eight examples of action involving European and global network, seven of which were discourse events for transnational debt groups. Activities involved sharing information/research and identifying joint action to be carried out by national groups or by short term conjunctural alliances. There is no sense that European NGOs felt the need for a strong centralised campaign within which they would pool some of their autonomy. “Overall, while Eurodad was very important to its members, for most of them national priorities are seen as more important” (Eurodad 1993-1995b). But much is masked by the simple definition of national level used in NGO documents. NGOs, the backbone of debt activism, while based in particular national territories, operate within a complicated geography – as part of national civil society, engaged in transnational alliances through networks like Eurodad and working through their funding/solidarity partnerships with southern groups which includes a commitment to represent the views of those partners within transnational advocacy.

In terms of south/north relations, debt campaigning in the first half of the 1990s comes between the tensions between Latin America and Dutch groups within Fondad during the 1980s and the south/north contradictions which arose during the Jubilee 2000 campaign. The difference was that there were no formal south/north structures during the early 1990s. As pointed out by Keck and Sikkink (1998) networks tend to break down when they include those acting on behalf of and those directly affected by the problem being tackled.

6.4 Debt nébuleuse in action

Debt campaigners faced a debt nébuleuse consisting of a web of actors involving alliances and conflicts between governments, within governments and within and between the IMF and World Bank. The G7 were lobbied by UN organisations, by the G77 and NAM and by non-G7 creditor countries:

[A]…loosely knit and floating group of countries’ working together on debt issues - including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland – lobbied the major creditors for more generous debt reduction” (Callaghy 2002, p.24).

New approaches to debt emerged from these coalitions of like-minded governments facilitated by the fact that countries are not totally internally unified and may follow different policies in different transnational fora. At the Paris Club creditor countries were
represented by their Export Credit Agencies for whom debt collection was the major concern while countries are represented by their aid agencies at Consultative Group meetings which bring together a country’s donors and the World Bank. Operating within different discourses, the government development cooperation sections often have different interests and agendas from their country’s Export Credit Agencies (Callaghy 2002, p.24). Early movement on multilateral debt emerged from an initiative taken by Uganda’s Consultative Group, rather than from the central organisations of the debt nébuleuse (Callaghy 2002).

France had a particular national interest in maintaining the status of the Paris Club, which was threatened by the shift of the centre of gravity of the debt nébuleuse from Paris to Washington, with the emergence of the HIPC initiative. France insisted that the debt problem could be dealt with via existing mechanisms, the Paris Club (Callaghy 2002, p.29), and strongly opposed a significant role for the World Bank (op cit p.32). As regards a possible role for the EC in the debt issue, the limited initiatives proposed were blocked by Britain (usually a proponent of debt reduction), Germany and France, who argued that there were other fora to deal with debt and that writing off the debt would undermine the overall debt strategy (Leen 1995, Eurodad 1993 c). As members of the G7, these three countries were dominant actors in those other fora.

As regards the World Bank and IMF there were differences between member states on the boards of these institutions, conflicts between staff within the World Bank and also conflicts between the two institutions. While some World Bank board members supported debt reduction (UK, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland), others had concerns (U.S., Canada, Australia, China Japan and Indonesia) with others opposed (France, Japan, Italy, and Germany) (Callaghy 2002, p.28). There were also major divisions within World Bank management and staff with strong proponents of debt reduction receiving support from the new president from 1995, Jim Wolfensohn. Wolfensohn’s support for debt cancellation is presented by some analysts as a new external variable, a new political opportunity for debt campaigners (Busby 2007, Broome 2009). Wolfensohn, however, was influenced by those already pressing for multilateral debt cancellation. As a new comer to the World Bank he was “casting around” for an issue on which to make his name (Interviewee UK No. 4), and there was a “war for his ear” within the World Bank (Interviewee UK No. 5). He was influenced by a range of pro multilateral debt cancellation actors including NGOs and the Dutch and Uganda governments (Interviewee UK No. 4). The IMF board was also divided between supporters and opponents of multilateral debt reduction (similar to those at the World Bank board, as both
boards have the same membership), and IMF staff were strongly opposed. (Momani 2010). As the World Bank shifted to supporting multilateral debt reduction, partly influenced by civil society arguments (Callaghy 2002, Fogarty 2003, Momani 2010), divisions opened up between the IMF and World Bank as illustrated by this quote from a World Bank insider at the time:

Wolfensohn had just arrived at the World Bank and he was determined to do something about low income country debt and he had asked for the International Finance Dept to come up with some workable strategy …. [Debt team leader] came up with this paper which was essentially rapid debt reduction.. she argued for sweeping debt reduction.... the proposal was shared with Larry Summers whether because he was the US treasury secretary or had been the Bank chief economist– it had also been shared informally with the IMF and the IMF had gone ballistic about it saying this is an intolerable proposal. Larry Summers sent it to Jim Wolfensohn saying we can’t have you institutions squabbling. We need you to come up with a united Bank /Fund proposal. (Interviewee UK No. 2)

The leaking to the Financial Times of the draft World Bank proposal brought divisions with the IMF into the open. “The Fund would not get involved (in such a plan),” one IMF official said yesterday. “Writing off debt is not our business”. He described the World Bank document as “ideologically unsound” (Holman 1995).

UN organisations formed a ‘soft’ part of the debt nébuleuse and had a stronger debtor country voice than existed at the harder end. A range of UN bodies, UNCTAD, UNDP and UNICEF, all pressed for action on debt. Encouraged by the significant reduction of Polish and Egyptian debt in the early 1990s, the UN General Assembly called upon creditor countries to write off the official bilateral debt owed by the least developed countries (Salih 1994). Southern government networks NAM and G77 were also actively pressing the G7 for action on debt. Indonesia, which held the presidency of NAM, organised conferences on debt to prepare NAM lobby position, and sought a hearing at the G7 Meeting in Tokyo 1993 (Eurodad 1993b).

Against the backdrop of adversarial relations within the debt nébuleuse, in September, a year after the draft proposal was leaked, the HIPC initiative was adopted at the IMF and World Bank AGM.

6.5 Debt campaigners’ understanding of the debt nébuleuse

As the campaign target was cancellation of official debt, the G7, as the body which dominated the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club, were the key decision makers. Given this, promoting debt campaigning in European G7 countries and linking with debt cam-
Campaigns in G7 countries beyond Europe were priorities for Eurodad. As national campaigning was the bedrock of action, could it then be argued that campaigns in G7 countries might have been able to do most of the heavy lifting to achieve debt cancellation? Not so, according to the Eurodad coordinator at the time, as dominant power structures such as the G7 were paralleled by other sources of power for less significant countries. There was the power of initiation – the Swedish, Dutch and Swiss governments took early initiatives on multilateral debt, organising a conference for creditors and debtors in June 1994 and therefore they became important interlocutors for transnational civil society at that point. Another source of leverage for less powerful government was their demonstrated commitment to international action, as in the case of the Netherlands which had a huge development budget in relation to the size of its economy and which was a major funder of the World Bank in the 1990s. This made the Netherlands a significant player alongside the G7. The Scandinavians, who operated as a constituency within the World Bank and the IMF (again, as significant funders of these institutions) also had a key voice. Less powerful countries held important positions within the IMF and World Bank from time to time, and this increased their significance for transnational civil society, for example the Belgian Minister for Finance was the chair of the IMF key committee, the International Monetary and Financial Committee, and a fairly low profile country like Finland became significant when the Finns held the chair of the Scandinavian constituency at the World Bank. Given the shifting terrain within the nêbuleuse, even countries which may not have held significant power, could operate as brokers and were important in shifting the balance of power (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1).

In relation to the international financial institutions in the early 1990s, the World Bank was more accessible to civil society as it already had a civil society liaison officer (in the 1990s the position was held by an ex-debt campaigner from Britain) and the World Bank NGO Working Group had been in existence from the early 1980s, albeit not always a harmonious arena. The deep divisions within the World Bank on debt (Interviewees UK No. 2 and No. 5) created fertile ground for ‘outsider/insider’ coalitions between World Bank supporters of debt cancellation and transnational civil society debt groups. For Eurodad the World Bank was “partially an ally … there were many World Banks” (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1). The IMF, however, continued as a closed institution into the 1990s and only opened up somewhat towards the mid-1990s. This led to a reluctance on the part of debt groups to focus on the IMF as highlighted when the UK DCN encouraged German groups to challenge the Bundesbank on IMF
gold sales to fund debt cancellation. German campaigners argued that they were concentrating on the World Bank and that getting involved with the IMF would raise organisational capacity issues (Eurodad 1994c).

6.6 Transnational debt groups in action

6.6.1 Operating across the national/international interface

As can be seen from the section on common cause, the national arena was central to action for debt cancellation. This meant identifying major national angles which linked a country to the debt crisis and also leveraging international opportunities available to national governments. National angles divide broadly into: a) tackling the bilateral debt owed to creditor countries; b) opposing national financial contributions to the debt management programmes of international financial institutions; and c) seeking to influence national policy pursued at the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club.

Pressing for cancellation of bilateral debt was a major focus of campaigning in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. Influenced by the earlier Swiss campaign, a major church and NGO led campaign was launched in Austria in 1996 calling for cancellation of debt owed to Austria. A petition was used, 67,000 signatures were gathered and the campaigns was given a further boost by a visit from ex-President Kaunda of Zambia, who raised the profile of the campaign by meeting the Austrian president, the chancellor and MPs. Following this action ODA debt owed to Austria was cancelled in 1997, partly because these were old credits as Austria had moved from making to loans to providing grants. The debt campaign “gave them the final kick” to cancel this debt (Interviewee Austria). In Ireland, which held very little low-income country debt, as aid had been given as grants rather than loans, the debt campaign successfully opposed a government contribution to the IMF’s programme for low income indebted countries, ESAF, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, later renamed the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (Irish Mozambique Solidarity et al 1997). This involved Ireland breaking the international consensus on debt of which the IMF’s ESAF was a key part. In both the Austrian and Irish cases, parliamentarians were key supporters (Austria, Irish Mozambique Solidarity et al, 1997). As regards influencing the policy pursued by national governments in the IMF and World Bank and the Paris Club, this was not generally subject to legislation so there were limited opportunities to insert the debt issue into adversarial political processes. MPs were therefore called upon
more often to use their voice rather than their vote in supporting more progressive national policies on international debt.

In addition to focussing on how individual countries were embroiled in the debt crisis, national campaigns and NGOs also leveraged international opportunities which presented themselves nationally, for example when a country held the EU presidency or chair of the G7. In the case of the EU presidency, efforts were made to get governments to take an initiative on the debt crisis while they held the presidency, for example, groups in Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland (Eurodad 1990-1991, 1993b, 1996). For campaigns in G7 countries where the national and transnational can be seen as fused, influencing national government policy within the G7 was of central importance (Interviewee UK No. 3). G7 summits taking place in the country holding the chair of the G7 gave national groups a significant opportunity to have an impact, through the media, lobbying or mobilisation. While in the UK lobbying was an important approach, for French groups the G7 was a key moment to influence the media (for example at the 1996 G7 summit in Lyons) with little if any government lobbying happening before the emergence of Jubilee 2000 at the end of the 1990s (Interviewee France No. 2). While groups from the different G7 countries took part in the counter-summit events, TOES, (Houston 1990; London 1991, Munich 1992), these groups did not form a ‘G7 NGO sub group’. “We weren’t prepared to give legitimacy to G7 by having a group of NGOs from G7 countries. It was ideological” (Interviewee France No. 2).

While the focus on national action outlined above may appear to refute Dryzek’s (1999) argument that the dominance of discourse in making transnational policy provide greater opportunities for civil society to engage transnationally, there were some direct engagements at international fora which took three main forms:
a) Counter-nébuleuse gatherings at G7 summits and IMF/World Bank annual meetings bringing together groups from different countries active on debt and providing opportunities to network, strategise and for mutual education.
b) Demonstrations involving wider publics against G7/ IMF/World Bank policies such as at the IMF/World Bank AGM Madrid 1994.
c) Fora for direct engagement between civil society groups and IMF and World Bank which took place at those organisations’ spring and autumn meetings. These fora covered a wide range of issues with debt an important agenda item throughout the 1990s. These events were attended mainly by those involved in technical discussions and provided an opportunity to get information on IMF/World Bank thinking and to seek to influence the staff who were working on debt initiatives. Such established fora did not
exist for the G7 or the Paris Club, because of the unevenness of the linkages between civil society and different institutions of the internationalising state, leaving demonstrations and counter-summits as the main civil society action in relation to these events. This resonates somewhat with Drainville’s (2005b) formulation that while a war of position is carried out at national level, in the absence of social hegemony at international level, a war of manoeuvre is pursued.

The understanding of the national/international interface and how this could best be leveraged from different national arenas strongly emphasised the national as the prime area for action. Different national contexts – historical, political, and cultural – meant that a single campaign focus would not resonate equally in different countries. Different positioning within the internationalising state also influenced the opportunities open to different national debt groups. For civil society groups in G7 countries where the national and transnational were fused, influencing their governments also meant influencing the G7. For other civil society groups their governments were seen as the gateway to international policy. An option for civil society groups from countries weakly positioned within the internationalising state was to press their governments to break the international consensus on debt as in the case of Irish campaign against a contribution to the IMF’s ESAF. Overall at a European level, while Eurodad emerged as a significant transnational actor (Eurodad 1996-1998b, Callaghan 2002, Broome 2009), national autonomous action was still the central focus of European civil society action on debt – but this action was based on understandings arising from discussions within the Eurodad network. It would appear that while elements within the debt nébuleuse may have found it convenient to engage with Eurodad as a transnational network, its member groups saw national groups operating through their national governments as the main channel for action. European debt groups did not, therefore, move with the contours of the internationalising state towards the international arena but by focussing on national governments they worked counter to this process, seeking to draw states back towards domestic societies.

6.6.2 Engaging with the debt nébuleuse: institutional advocacy

Debt campaigning during this period is an early example of the NGO shift to institutional advocacy which started towards the end of the 1980s (Eade and Ligteringen 2001). Institutional advocacy takes place within "internal structures and relationships between third sector organisations, governments and institutions” (Onyx et al 2010,
A central question is the nature of the space within which civil society engages in institutional advocacy - to what extent is this part of the government's/international organisation’s “machinery of participation” (Onyx et al 2010), invited spaces (Gaynor 2010) or ‘won spaces’ through contentious struggle (Bendaña 2005). Keet (2002, p.472) analyses the processes through which engagement could lead to a weakening of the civil society position. Campaigners get drawn towards the positions of decision makers, resulting in their shifting their arguments so they can operate within the dominant framework and language, and this draws campaigners into their adversaries’ logic rather than challenging it. Partial concessions made by decision makers are then exaggerated by these to the public with a view to demobilising those supporting the debt campaign.

A conflict which broke out between the World Bank and Oxfam UK at the IMF/World Bank AGM in 1994 gives an insight into the understandings of institutional advocacy held respectively by those organisations. The Bank, claiming that a study by Oxfam UK on structural adjustment was biased, warned that if Oxfam wanted:

… to sit at the table and be our partners" then it had to show "similar …responsibility in the use of facts" that it demanded from the Bank. (Inter Press Service 1994)

Responding via the Guardian letter pages, Oxfam stressed the joint problem solving approach which should underpin their relationship and called for a return to dialogue:

The cause of poverty reduction in Latin America...is one which should unite non-government organisations and the World Bank, rather than divide us. None of us has all the answers. But we share a joint responsibility to engage in constructive dialogue aimed at finding workable solutions to difficult problems. (Bryer 1994)

For the Bank, transnational civil society is clearly occupying an ‘invited space’ access to which is conditional. Oxfam, renegotiating its access to this ‘invited space’, offers engagement in a consensual problem-solving approach.

Institutional advocacy is usually backed by other more challenging activities by civil society in the public sphere via media and public mobilisations, with the different approaches sometimes taken by different sections of transnational civil society. Even while engaging closely with the state (national or internationalising), however, civil society usually wishes to clearly delineate itself as an independent sector. The advantages of public contestation for civil society groups are two fold. One is that argumentation in the public arena has to be framed in terms of a common good and this increases the
power of transnational civil society. This is because of public perception that civil society groups are not pursuing their own self-interest unlike powerful decision makers and therefore it is more likely that civil society arguments will receive public support (Risse 2000). Following on from this, contestation in the public sphere can lead to civil society groups ‘winning’ spaces of negotiations as “the fruits of the people’s struggle” (Bendaña 2005, p.83) rather than relying on invited spaces (Gaynor 2010).

To gain access to ‘invited’ spaces, debt groups needed credibility with the debt nébuleuse, and this was gained through bringing knowledge and expertise and a willingness to work within the limits of what was perceived as possible at that time. The campaign for multilateral debt cancellation represented “a qualitative leap forward, in terms of the quality of lobbying work” for European groups based on developing technical expertise.

From the beginning of the 1990s, maybe end of the 1980s, we started to be sophisticated, in terms of analysis, e.g. Mathew Martin’s booklet for Eurodad on bilateral debt was one of the turning point in having serious documents you could lay on the table...of your ministry … this was useful in creating credibility. (Interviewee Belgium No. 1)

Technical expertise was available to debt groups from ‘think tank’ NGOs (Weed, Sudwind and Oxfam) and through the relations Eurodad maintained with experts, academics, and staff of the World Bank, UNCTAD, UNDP, NAM/South Centre, government officials’ and the ACP (African Caribbean Pacific countries) secretariat and committee of ambassadors (Eurodad 1996-1998a). This reflects the bridging role played by the epistemic community between the debt nébuleuse and NGO debt networks in bringing about HIPC:

When conjunctural conditions permit, they [epistemic community members inside the debt nébuleuse who are sympathetic with parts of the NGO discourses on debt] form important network connections with “outsiders” of the epistemic community and with the more sophisticated NGOs that have helped to move things along. In part they help to do this by legitimating new ideas, knowledge, and approaches in their own institutions and delegitimating existing one. (Calllaghy 2002, p.22)

As a result of these insider/outsider contacts, information was shared with NGOs sometimes before even government representatives had received it: “I went to my minister of
finance here and sometimes I had documents which he didn’t have at that time” (Interviewee Belgium No. 1).

This technical expertise was leveraged by Eurodad in favour of multilateral debt cancellation as they matched IMF and World Bank arguments with technical counter-arguments at every stage in the process of the development of HIPC. Eurodad made eight responses to the IMF/World Bank and G7 between March 1995 and September 1996 (Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998). This discourse contestation demonstrates the depth of the technical engagement involved. The HIPC proposal aimed at achieving a sustainable debt defined mainly in terms of the net present value (NPV) of a country’s debt to its exports with a ratio above 250% was considered unsustainable. Eurodad criticised the threshold as arbitrary and questioned the use of NPV as investors work from nominal value and, moreover, the discount rate for NPV was too high (Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998, p.328). It might appear that this demonstrates the depth of the capture of debt campaigners by the dominant discourse, but in technically challenging IMF and World Bank analysis, NGOs were challenging their authority (Broome 2009) which is based on the respect in which governments hold their expertise (Momani 2010a; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Evans 1999).

Gaining credibility as a technically competent interlocutor meant not just having technical expertise but also aligning analysis and solutions with debt nébuleuse perspectives. According to the IMF, if NGOs want to be listened to they have to provide the expert analysis of problems the IMF was trying to solve’ (Yanacopulos 2005, pp.103-4). This led to debt groups sometimes throwing their weight behind what they saw as the most progressive proposals from within the debt nébuleuse such as the ‘Time is running out’ campaign in the early 1990s which promoted the Trinidad Terms, a British debt proposal. National campaign groups and NGOs also pressed their governments for improvements to the proposed HIPC (Belgium, Sweden, Norway, and Ireland) (Eurodad 1996). The call for specific levels of debt cancellation was dropped in favour of a case by case approach. Previously, the call was for 90% cancellation for Severely-Indebted Low-income Countries, and 50% for Middle-Income Severely-Indebted Countries (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 1). Further, debt groups accepted the preferred creditor status of the IMF and World Bank (Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998). These shifts meant they were taken more seriously by the debt nébuleuse but some groups, e.g. CADTM, (Comité por l’Annulation de la Dette du Tiers Monde), a radical Belgian debt group, saw this shift in position as a move closer to the IMF and World Bank, as a shift to a reformist position (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1).
The broad range of arguments for debt cancellation can be divided into two categories: human development and rights; and anti-systemic arguments based on the nature of the power relations within which debts arose and were dealt with (Tagle and Patomaki 2007). The dominant frame in the early 1990s was human development rather than the more adversarial power analyses. This is reflected in Eurodad’s first project proposal to the EC 1991-1992, which was titled ‘Debt and Resources for Development’ and subsequent proposals took the same approach (Eurodad c, f). Framing involves ensuring an issue resonates with current cultural meanings (Tarrow 2005 p.61; Keck and Sikkink 1998 p.2), giving campaigners the opening to expose the failure of decision makers to implement policies which fit with these meanings. The human development, finance for development approach fitted closely with contemporary development discourses. UNICEF’s report Adjustment with a Human Face (Cornia et al 1987) brought human development into the neoliberal frame, as did the human development index pioneered by UNDP in the early 1990s. The World Bank while promoting neoliberal adjustment programmes maintained a discourse on ‘poverty alleviation’. Campaigners leveraged the human development approach, by exposing the contradictions between the creditor and donor roles of countries and international institutions:

…of every $10 in bilateral aid provided to Zambia last year, $7 went out of the country to repay the IMF and other multilateral creditors, said Ted Van Hees of Eurodad…. In some cases, aid money is simply travelling from one office in Washington to another down the hall - never getting to the people in need. ..Van Hees said. (Canadian Press Newswire 1995)

More stark approaches were crafted for popular audiences highlighting the immorality of creditors prioritising debt payments over human development. “every day's delay in action is one more day of increased poverty of people malnourished” (Nduru 1991a). A human development solution would mean giving precedence to the right to food, shelter, work and health over debt payments (Northover 2008). Detailed proposals as to how such a human development approach could be implemented were developed in the second half of the 1990s by CAFOD, Oxfam, Eurodad and Afrodad (UNDP 1999). The political interests underlying decisions on debt cancellation were exposed contrasting the more favourable treatment of the debt of countries that were of strategic interest to creditors at a particular time. Examples used were the debt relief given to the Russian Federation (Aslam 1996) and the generous debt offered to Poland in 1991 to “ensure free market reforms do not fail” (Nduru 1991c). Highlighting the close alignment be-
tween national creditor interests and loans further challenged the right of creditors to demand repayment:

Christian Aid said that because many loans to poor countries were conditional on the purchase of British goods, Britain gained doubly. "We benefit from the increased exports, and then again from the interest on the loans given to buy these exports. (Thomas 1996)

While there was less emphasis on the wider power imbalances underpinning the debt problem, there were exceptions as illustrated by the following quote from the Eurodad coordinator:

…the Western countries are not prepared to cancel the debts of the African countries because they do not want to lose control over Africa. (Mantiri 1993)

Debt groups which used counter-discourses framing debt as illegitimate (France) or odious (Belgium) found that their governments refused to acknowledge the concept of illegitimate or odious debt (Interviewee Belgium No. 2; Interviewee France No. 1).

Tensions in relation to the linking of debt reduction to structural adjustment rolled over from the 1980s. There was a growing body of evidence of the negative social impact of SAP, including UNICEF’s *Adjustment with a Human Face* and studies by NGOs. One solution was to press for the link between debt reduction and SAP to be broken but this clashed with the need to stay in the credibility zone as SAP was central to the neoliberal consensus of promoting an open world economy. Another approach was to seek to reform conditionality and to introduce ‘positive conditionality’:

Conditionality was a major question, we had this debate about positive conditionality or conditionality connected to accountability/transparency… we became more sophisticated. This brought us to a position that particularly the World Bank began to take us seriously. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1)

The issue of positive conditionality – whether structural adjustment and democracy were compatible- was discussed at Eurodad consultations with Southern groups (Eurodad 1993e). While there was some support for ‘positive conditionality’, the question could not be satisfactorily resolved, given the tension between an acknowledgement of the unequal world order and the conjunctural priority to maintain credibility with dominant decision makers.
The arenas in which this knowledge contestation took place varied between formalised or semi formalised arrangements to implicit understandings of how access would be afforded. The Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations (Swiss Coalition) appeared to have the strongest formalised institutional position with representation on a government consultation committee on development cooperation set up following pressure from civil society for inclusion in decision making. This group consisted of representatives of political parties, industry, banking and agriculture, churches, TUs and the Swiss Coalition (Interviewee Switzerland). When Switzerland joined the IMF in 1992 sub committees were set up dealing with debt and the IMF and World Bank which provided a forum for the Swiss Coalition to raise issues.\(^9\) Again, the Swiss Coalition was the only group to report participation in their country’s Article IV Review, which the IMF carries out annually on all its members’ economic situation, but this forum proved unfruitful. as very little of the Swiss Coalition’s critique of Swiss policy appeared in the published IMF Review (Interviewee Switzerland).

Less formalised institutional access was afforded in other European countries. In Belgium the Ministry of Finance hosted two meetings per annum between NGOs and Belgian representative at the IMF and World Bank (Eurodad 1993e), following on from a public debate between the Minister for Finance and a representative of CADTM in 1995 (Interviewee Belgium No. 2). An event in 1994 in Sweden brought together NGOs and officials from Nordic Ministries of Finance and of Foreign Affairs with the aim of agreeing how to share information and to allow NGOs to take part in formulating Nordic/Baltic position in the IMF and World Bank. As a result the Swedish NGOs were asked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take part in preparing the Swedish position on IDA replenishment (Eurodad 1994b). In other countries there is a sense of implicit understandings that periodic access would be afforded. Regular meetings between officials and debt campaigners were reported from Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the UK (Eurodad 1994b, 1996). Engagement with parliaments was central to debt campaigning, involving submissions, contributing to parliamentary hearings/inquiries/debates, popular letter writing to MPs and petitions, parliamentary questions to get information and engaging MPs as one national actor among others at broad discourse events. Lobbying parliaments was cited by 9 of the 11 countries providing reports of national activities to Eurodad between 1993 and 1996 (Eurodad 1993e, 1994b, 1996). This process involved mutual exchange - parliaments relied on the expertise of NGOs to enable them to en-

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\(^9\) In 1994 Swiss Coalition tabled comments on 30 items due to be discussed at IMF/World Bank boards (Eurodad 1994 b). In 1996 the issues included HIP, poverty reduction, IDA 11 , the Inspection Panel and ESAF (Eurodad 1996).
gage with north south issues (Eurodad 1997) and this engagement with the democratic process established debt campaigners as a “legitimate interest in society” Interviewee Italy).

These processes were not confined to technical engagement between NGO experts and government officials. Meetings also took place with government ministers - and the nature of the government in power had an impact on these engagements. In Belgium which generally had a coalition government, socialist ministers were usually supportive but argued that because of their coalition with the liberals, they couldn’t act as they might wish (Interviewee Belgium No. 2). In Switzerland left, centre-left and green parties adopted many of the Swiss Coalition’s positions (Interviewee Switzerland). In France it was unusual for the administration to meet with NGOs on policies at this point. It was seen as a contradiction for a powerful state, like France where NGOs were considered illegitimate bodies with no democratic representation (Interviewee France No. 2). There were also reservations on the civil society side:

We had discussion among NGOs, should we go into technicalities or is it a trap with discussion on % to be cancelled we would accept, or should we remain at the ideological and philosophical level; we ask for cancellation, it is up to experts and politicians to find solutions. (Interviewee France No. 2)

In addition to the institutional access outlined above, a repertoire of action which became very prevalent during this period was cross-sectoral discourse events, sometimes organised by civil society groups, others co-organised by civil society and national/international institutions. These events brought together a range of relevant actors – NGOs south and north, officials from Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, IMF/World Bank executive directors, other IMF/World Bank officials and representatives of other international bodies (UN bodies, Commonwealth). An event in Dublin in 1994, at which the IMF managing director (Michel Camdessus) participated, illustrates the web of cross civil society/internationalising state interactions which underlay such an event. Department of Finance officials informed DDCI that an invitation to the IMF managing director would be favourably received. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the IMF would not engage with civil society groups in a member country without government agreement (IMF 2003). DDCI decided to issue the invitation to Mr Camdessus to address a seminar in Dublin on the debt crisis because of the public profile it would provide enabling them to mobilise their supporters. DDCI organised the seminar, sending out invitations and issuing press releases putting forward their critique of the role of the IMF in the debt crisis. Contact with Mr. Camdessus was handled by
the Department of Finance. Mr. Camdessus’ opening statement at the event, “It isn’t so frequent for me to attend a meeting organised hand in hand by NGOs and a Minister of Finance showing that dialogue in your country on important issues is going on” (Camdessus 1994), demonstrated his perception of the joint civil society/state nature of the event. In addition to Mr. Camdessus, the event was addressed by the Irish Minister for Finance and three representatives of DDCI. Mr. Camdessus had a two-pronged message: one for the civil society participants challenging their perceptions of the role of the IMF in the debt crisis; and the other was for the Irish Minister of Finance to support proposals Mr. Camdessus was promoting internationally. In his turn the Minister of Finance called for new initiatives from the IMF (Dáil Éireann 1994). Two things are striking about this example. One is the arms-length way the three sectors – national civil society, national government and an IGO - collaborated on this event maintaining the formal independence of civil society from the state and IGO. The other is the multidirectional nature of the lobbying – with all three sets of actors seeking to influence each of the others. It was not a simple engagement between civil society (DDCI) and Mr. Camdessus but Mr. Camdessus and the Irish Minister for Finance were also seeking to influence each other and DDCI was seeking to influence the Minister for Finance.

Particularly significant among these cross-sectoral events which sought to influence policy on debt was one hosted by British Cardinal Hume as part of an African leaders (including Zambian ex-president Kenneth Kaunda) tour to Britain organised by DCN in 1996. This closed session on multilateral debt, was attended by the IMF managing director, representatives from the World Bank, UK treasury officials, and MPs and “church leaders from three continents” academics, and journalists (Donnelly 2007, p.125). The IMF managing director, an active Catholic, was faced with the strong criticism from church leaders of IMF policy.

Parallel to this national level institutional access, significant behind the scenes discussion on the development of what emerged finally as HIPC took place between Eurodad and World Bank officials at different stages of the process – unmediated by national government:

The first time was in 1994 in Madrid at the IMF/World Bank AGM, we [Eurodad core group] had a meeting with a vice president, as we had done some calculations of the problems on multilateral debt. We said you will have at least 26 countries who will have problems. The Vice President said this is just a problem of 4/5 unmanageable countries like Congo, Zaire…If we get into repayment problems we will find – he didn’t say naive but almost - donors, Scandinavians, Dutch to pay for it. “You NGOs are good at drilling wells and raising capital but not economics”. (Interviewee Belgium No. 1)
Following the shift at the World Bank to a more positive position on debt cancellation, Eurodad developed a close relationship with the World Bank official leading the debt team.

I remember a very long meeting… about 3 hours, sitting with [World Bank official leading debt team] going through the politics and technicalities, of the solution they were working on. It sounded very promising, she wanted to know from our end where we were and she gave us a 'glance in her kitchen'. It was technical and political.. as well as the technical exchange we had, she was aware of what we could mobilise in capitals and finance and development ministries. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1)

A further feature which demonstrate the enmeshed nature of the civil society/debt nèbuleuse relationship at this time was that it is not a one way process with civil society as ‘invitees’ but they were also as objects of ‘reverse lobbying’ (Donnelly 2002). There can be two objectives to this reverse lobbying – one is to change civil society organisations’ policies and perceptions; the other to engage civil society in a chain of lobbying in order to draw oppositional governments into an emerging policy consensus. An example of the former was a request from IMF Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer for an opportunity to explain the IMF position to DCCI members when that organisation was campaigning against an Irish contribution to the IMF’s programme in low income countries. In terms of the second process mentioned above, European NGOs were the object of reverse lobbying:

Individuals inside World Bank and British government use NGOs in Eurodad to put pressure on other governments or decision makers inside the institutions’ (Eurodad 1993-1995b p14)

The UK government, in particular, used the strategy of engaging UK civil society in lobbying other national civil society groups in order to influence oppositional governments. The UK government encouraged NGOs like Oxfam and Christian Aid to put their arguments in Germany and Japan whose governments were hostile to debt reduction (Evans 1999). When the HIPC was finally adopted, Kenneth Clark, Chancellor of the UK Exchequer wrote to the director of the DCN:

You will by now have heard the very good news that the HIPC was launched successfully at the IMF/World Bank AGM this week…it only remains for me to
thank DCN for your encouragement and support over the last 2 years. I am grateful for your help in getting the initiative off the ground. (Clarke 1996)

The UDN had a parallel experience – as a result of its participation in transnational debt campaigning, the government sought their support in pressing for accelerated debt reduction. Government officials shared a letter from the government to the IMF and World Bank which UDN in turn shared with local media, increasing pressure on the World Bank to speed up Uganda’s debt reduction. (Collins et al 2001).

Civil society campaigning on debt at this time consisted of a move to deep technical engagement, reconfiguring campaign demands and discourses to fit better with decision maker preferences. The extent of institutional advocacy together with the reverse lobbying, led to the enmeshing of civil society with the internationalising state making it difficult to separate their different contributions to the change in international policy on multilateral debt.

6.6.3 Adversarial / conflictual/popular action

The shift to institutional advocacy in the 1990s did not completely replace more contentious approaches. Adversarial activism and advocacy can be seen as different points on a spectrum:

If you see advocacy as a spectrum, you start where no one is listening, to where you are sitting around table writing policy with your target. The method of campaigning depends on where you are in the continuum. (Interviewee UK No. 3)

or competing strategies difficult to combine. Belgium, for example reported a...

...relatively high level of technical lobbying and ‘riots in the streets’ making ‘difficult’ [the] combination of radical analysis, mobilising public action and their pragmatic lobbying. (International NGO conference Report 1994, p.50)

The ‘riots in the streets’ manifested as throwing stones and blood at banks embroiled in the debt crisis, however, led to a place at the negotiating table for Belgian NGOs with commercial banks, the national Export Credit Agency and government which came to an agreement on debt reduction for 14 low-income countries. The NGO negotiators were able to put pressure on the banks to come to an agreement because of the threat of further demonstrations against the banks (Interviewee Belgium No. 1). Popular actions reported by national NGOs networks, however, were generally fairly muted and includ-
ed petitions, letter writing to national and international decision makers, symbolic events, street events and use of the media.

There were two other sources of adversarial action, one from more radical debt groups and the other from direct action by environmentalist against World Bank funded projects. Parallel to the establishment of Eurodad, the more radical group, CADTM, was set up in Belgium in 1990 inspired by the counter-summit events and “the Bastille appeal” launched at the 1989 Paris G7 to “All popular forces throughout the world to unite for the immediate and unconditional cancellation of the so called “developing” countries debt” (CADTM 2009). Those involved in CADTM continued in the tradition of solidarity with left-wing governments and movements: They had links with Brazil’s then left opposition, workers party, with the Lavalas movement in Haiti and later with the Zapatistas in Mexico. While CADTM had these solidarity links, in the early 1990s they were primarily a Belgian debt campaign demanding full and immediate cancellation of debt owed to Belgium. They focussed in particular on ex-Belgian colonies DRC and Rwanda, and organised a major campaign on Rwanda debt which they declared was odious. They got huge public support but the issue was “too hot” and the government refused to engage or accept any responsibility (Interviewee Belgium No. 2). They also promoted wider left-wing discourse on debt putting it in the context of neoliberal exploitation at events which drew up to 1,000 attendees (Eurodad 1994b).

Nor did Eurodad and more radical groups like CADTM operate in completely parallel worlds or in total conflict with each other. In spite of having different perspectives CADTM collaborated with Eurodad, organising public events in the Netherlands on debt when CADTM invited Lula da Silva of the Brazilian Workers Party to Europe around 1992. They also took part in meetings with the Belgian delegate to the IMF and World Bank on HIPC although CADTM was opposed to the initiative while Eurodad was more supportive and trying to influence it (Interviewee Belgium No. 2). French organisation CRID (Centre de Recherche Informatique et Droit) active on debt from the early 1980s were initially part of Eurodad. While they found Eurodad’s work useful, they felt it was too technical. While they were not against negotiations or discussion with decision makers, they had a different answer to the question of what was the “equilibrium between demonstrations and negotiations” and “The French tradition is to be more confrontational and more principled positions, inclusion in lobbying, this came late” (Interviewee France No. 1).

The other relevant major site of contention was direct action by environmental groups against controversial World Bank projects, such as the Narmada dams, which
rolled over from the 1980s (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A UK activist who later became coordinator of British and European networks described his early involvement:

I cut my campaign teeth on Narmada not the same as the multilateral debt campaign but one of the main demands was to kick World Bank out of the project which was going to be destructive for 1 million people, building a reservoir 120 miles long. You could categorise this as an illegitimate debt case; there was incredible mobilisation going on, people threatening to drown themselves if they were moved out their land … We organised a fax block of ODA as it was called at that time in the UK [now DYFID]; we chained ourselves to the front door of ODA and built a fake dam and occupied the World Bank London office…..people were not saying we’re in the debt movement but it did link up. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.2)

The focus on the World Bank by both debt and environmental activists coupled with the fact that loans for environmentally damaging projects could accumulate as unpayable and illegitimate debt provided a link between the two groups but there is little evidence of joint action during the early 1990s. Debt and environmental groups intersected, however, at the IMF/World Bank AGM in Madrid 1994, the first time this event was held in Europe since Berlin 1988 when there were major counter-mobilisations. Debt and environmental movements were involved in organising what had become an established transnational civil society repertoire from the 1980s, an alternative Summit The Other Voices of the Planet involving 2,000 people from across the world (Vivas 2008). This provided a joint discourse space for those involved in institutional advocacy, and those taking more radical approaches and members of both groups participated in the march of 10,000 in opposition to IMF/World Bank policies (Vivas 2008, p.42). Conflict arose in relation to the different tactics used. While some NGOs took an insider approach, meeting with IMF and World Bank and government officials within the area of the official conference, other movements came inside the meetings in order to take direct action. The most dramatic action was when Greenpeace members climbed on to the rafters in the conference hall, unveiled a banner as King Juan Carlos of Spain was making his opening speech to the AGM, and scattered fake dollars with the inscription "No dollars for ozone destruction" over the audience (Gooch 1994). A divide opened up between those using direct action and those who worried they could lose their access to the World Bank (Gooch 1994). The cultural and political differences between some insiders and those taking direct action were expressed by a direct action activist (referred to above) who had attended the events:
I remember being a bit horrified at Madrid, the first international meeting of that type I’d been to… we’d gone there a whole bunch of us, taken the ferry from Plymouth to Santander, and gone in a battered transit from Santander to Madrid, staying in squats, feeling very gritty about our activism and then we’d come across organisational, credit card wielding NGO professionals and I remember being very surprised at that whole world as I hadn’t seen activism of that kind before. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.2)

This highlights the heterogeneity of civil society and suggests that at times there can appear to be closer affinity between members of large NGOs and decision makers within the internationalising state than between these NGOs and other civil society groups, such as direct action activists. While radical and more mainstream groups could participate together in counter-summits and demonstrations, action which threatened access to ‘invited spaces’ won by the latter was the serious dividing line.

6.7 Conclusion

Campaigning for debt cancellation in the first half of the 1990s took place in the context of a shift from commercial to official debt after the adoption of the Brady Bonds in 1989. This represented a move of the main campaign target from high street banks to less accessible creditor government institutions such as their export credit agencies and remote international institutions like the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club. In this context – and the wider changes in world order with the move to a uni-polar economic world order – there was a significant shift in campaign action towards institutional advocacy directed at governments and the other key organisations of the debt nébuleuse. The main change in international debt policy during this period was the adoption of the HIPC initiative which promised modest debt reduction for up to 42 countries once stringent structural adjustment conditions were fulfilled. While winning the argument that multilateral debt could and should be cancelled can be seen as a victory, the strong conditions were a poisonous sting in the tail. This double-edged outcome reflects once again that, while civil society may win the argument (or contribute to winning the argument as in this case), they don’t necessarily win the solution, as the new policy consensus is usually less radical than their original campaigning position (Leipold 2000).

In this period the power of transnational civil society can best be understood in terms of how campaign groups situated themselves in relation to the debt nébuleuse at that particular historical moment, rather than in specific repertoires of action such as public mobilisations, or particular framings of the debt issue. This led to an intermeshing of civil society with the internationalising state, making it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to fully disentangle or to quantify their respective contributions to the resulting policy change. A range of processes contributed to this intermeshing. Transnational civil society aligned its analysis and framing of the debt crisis with dominant debt nèbuleuse understandings and aligned its proposed solutions with the most progressive parts of the debt nèbuleuse, and so worked within the limits of what appeared possible at that point. The new repertoire of action – cross-sectoral events involving a range of civil society and debt nèbuleuse actors – was an expression of this intermeshing. These intersectoral linkages were then leveraged by parts of the debt nèbuleuse (notably the UK government and parts of the World Bank) through the process of reverse lobbying, in order to draw civil society groups into their efforts to create a new policy consensus on multilateral debt cancellation.

This finding raises central questions about the nature of the relationship between civil society and the state/internationalising state. The consensual relationship which prevailed during this case study period can be set in the context of the post-1989 moment with strong pull/push factors bringing parts of civil society debt groups together with the debt nèbuleuse. The pull factors include the emerging global norm of participation and consultation which provided ‘invited spaces’ to civil society (Gaynor 2010) and the push factors include the collapse of the ideological alternative which had created distance between the two sectors before 1989. The counter-forces which had created distance between civil society and states/internationalising state in the 1980s were provided by revolutionary states and the possibility of new revolutionary states emerging, socialism as an alternative ideology and the NIEO. There were, however, a number of rebalancing tensions within transnational civil society during the early 1990s. Those groups engaging closely with the state/internationalising state were linked back to public constituencies for whom a discourse which established distance between civil society and the state was needed (Holzscheiter 2005) and which positioned civil society as an autonomous force. Further, there were debt groups which did not get drawn deeply into the internationalising state. For example, in France and Belgium, where campaigners used mobilisation rather than institutional advocacy, counter-systemic framing of debt as illegitimate, radical demands for total debt cancellation and placed the debt crisis in the wider context of neoliberalism rather than human development. The different approaches taken by debt groups did not represent totally separate worlds. There was periodic collaboration, and both sets of groups participated in organising wider discourse events which can be seen as rebalancing spaces such as *The Other Voices of the Planet* 1994 in Madrid, where groups deeply involved in institutional advocacy re-centred
themselves within a broader spectrum of civil society. This finding fits with the understanding of civil society (set out in Chapter 2) as a continuous dynamic process between civil society’s own self-identity as autonomous, and its different modes of engaging with the state/internationalising state, ranging from consensual to conflictual. While parts of the sector may get drawn into close cooperation with the state, there are a number of rebalancing forces within civil society. There is civil society’s own self-identify as autonomous, which operates as a rebalancing force when the boundaries between themselves and the state/internationalising state become blurred. Another rebalancing force is that there are usually groups within civil society that take a more adversarial approach – as there was in this case – and rather than these consensual and adversarial civil society groups being simply in conflict with each other, they also cooperate and this operates as another rebalancing force.

In relation to the geography of power, while transnational civil society engaged with a range of bodies across the nébuleuse, the key focus was on national governments as the best avenue to influence international policy. The mechanisms through which civil society groups sought to leverage their governments differed, however, depending on the power position of their country within the internationalising state. For G7 groups, where the national and transnational arenas are virtually fused, the focus was on pressing their governments towards a more progressive consensus on debt policy within the G7 which would then shape operational policy at the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club. While less powerful than G7 countries, other governments such as the Nordics and the Netherlands, could promote more progressive positions because of their leverage within the debt nébuleuse due to the level of funding they provided. Civil society groups in these countries pressed these states to leverage this power to achieve debt cancellation. A system depending on consensus is vulnerable to weak members exercising leverage beyond the weight of their nominal voting power by simply breaking the consensus, and this mechanism was used by Irish debt campaigners based in a country weakly positioned within the internationalising state, which never holds an executive directorship position at the IMF or World Bank nor is a major financial contributor. They successfully pressed the Irish government, however, to break the policy consensus on the IMF’s programme in low-income countries, and this decision had an impact beyond the significance of the amount of money involved or the voting power of Ireland at the IMF.

In the context of the shift of state accountability through the internationalisation of the state from domestic societies to the international arena, or to those domestic forces orientated towards the international arena, some theorists argue that the most effective
strategy is to overcome national constraints by organising at global level (Robinson 1999, Evans 2008). It is significant, however, that European debt groups at this period were reluctant for Eurodad to emerge as a strong transnational actor, preferring it to play the role of strengthening national-level activism. This can be seen as part of the struggle over the state and its relation to the transnational arena, with states pressured to be more accountable to their domestic societies for their actions at international level rather than civil society following the contours of the internationalising state towards the international arena. Overall, while debt groups reshaped their discourse to enable within-the-system challenges in the context of the shrinking of ideological space after 1989, discourse opportunities at transnational level did not provide the opportunities suggested by Dryzek (1999). The focus in terms of seeking change was on national representative democratic mechanisms where there was a shorter chain of accountability from government to citizen than those which operate indirectly from the international arena back to citizens.

Debt campaigning in the early 1990s represented a shift from the more adversarial approaches of the 1980s towards participative engagement with the state/internationalising state, involving greater focus on technical rather than counter-systemic discourse. The Jubilee 2000 campaign, subject of the next chapter, represented a different moment with debt groups leveraging the symbolism of the millennium to craft popular understandings of the debt on the basis of which mobilisation played a bigger part in how the debt crisis was contested.
Chapter Seven: Jubilee Campaign

This chapter examines how, catalysed by the UK Jubilee campaign, debt coalitions/alliances emerged at national and regional level across the world to call for debt cancellation. The first section provides an overview of the campaign. The following sections examine, respectively, how common cause was made transnationally, and the tensions which arose between southern and northern groups; how the campaign leveraged the national/transnational interface, the different ways the debt was framed and clashed with the debt nébuleuse; and finally the nature of the relationship between civil society and the state/internationalising state underpinning the campaign. The conclusion distils what the Jubilee 2000 campaign reveals about how civil society sought to exercise power at that particular moment.

7.1 Overview of the Jubilee campaign

The Jubilee 2000 campaign, first launched in Britain in April 1996, and relaunched as a broader British coalition in November 1997, rapidly achieved a very high international profile. The campaign was based on linking the biblical concept of a periodic Jubilee, whereby right relations are restored – debt cancelled, land redistributed and slaves freed - with the upcoming millennium as a new jubilee moment. The central campaign call was for the cancellation of unpayable debt of the poorest countries by the year 2000, to ‘give a billion people a fresh start’. While linking debt cancellation to the biblical concept of Jubilee had been part of debt discourse among southern debt groups from the 1980s, Jubilee 2000 operationalised it as a campaign. The main tool was a petition to be handed in to the G7 Cologne Summit 1999 and human chains around G8 summits, most notably the 1998 Summit in Birmingham and the 1999 summit in Cologne. The biblical linking gave Jubilee 2000 a very strong base within Christian churches, and their mobilising structures and global reach enabled the campaign to spread rapidly. Another factor in the high profile achieved was the number of international celebrities who supported the campaign. The final petition count was 24,100,000 signatures coming from 166 countries (Barrett 2000). At its peak, there were Jubilee groups in 69 countries (Barrett 2000), although these were not all equally strong (Cox 2011). There were 16 campaigns in Latin America, 22 in Africa, 8 in Asia, and 23 in the global north (Barrett 2000). Regional networks developed with 15 African Jubilee groups launching Jubilee Afrika,
and a Latin American and Caribbean network was set up with the participation of 16 campaigns. There was no transnational structure, campaigns were to be designed and owned at national level. The UK group operated informally as a transnational hub and catalyst.

The campaign gathered momentum after the 1998 G7 Birmingham Summit, when 70,000 debt campaigners formed a human chain around the city centre. There was massive media coverage and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, requested a meeting with Jubilee 2000 leaders that evening. The impact of the campaign could be seen in early 1999 when a ‘norm cascade’ (Yanacopulos 2004) started with G7 countries competing in proposing new approaches to debt. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, host-to-be of the G7 summit in Cologne 1999, led the field with a new proposal in January 1999. This was particularly significant as Germany was traditionally a strong opponent of debt cancellation. While all the proposals fell far short of the Jubilee 2000 call for cancellation of unpayable debt, the small shifts in policy by all G7 members showed they were feeling the heat of the campaign. This was significant, as the HIPC initiative adopted in September 1996 closed the debt issue for international decision makers. In the event, the G7 came up with a new debt initiative – the Cologne debt deal in June 1999 which became known as HIPC 11 or the Enhanced HIPC, and this increased the level of debt reduction. The deeper cancellation under HIPC 11 released resources into government budgets. A further element of the Cologne debt deal was that in order to get debt cancellation countries were required to produce a poverty reduction strategy (PRS) in consultation with their civil societies, which had to be endorsed by the IMF and World Bank. Debt savings were to be directed towards implementation of these strategies. This was meant to replace the process whereby structural adjustment conditions were imposed by the IMF and World Bank. A major issue, in particular for southern debt groups, was that money released through debt reduction should be used for the benefit of people at community level, and evidence was gathered by debt campaigns that social sector spending increased following debt reduction (Buxton 2004; Greenhill and Blackmore 2002).

As happened following adoption of HIPC 1, Jubilee 2000 campaigners were divided in their responses to the Cologne deal, with British and German campaigns giving it a qualified welcome as a first step. Others, in particular southern campaigns, rejected the deal seeing it as a continuation of the oppressive relations between north and south, and failing to recognise the illegitimacy of much of the debt. This led to serious tensions between southern and northern groups. An autonomous Jubilee South network of
southern groups was launched in November 1999 with a radical analysis of debt as illegitimate, questioning who owed what to whom, declaring that southern countries were the creditors, and calling for repudiation of debt. Two south/north dialogues were subsequently convened by Jubilee South – at Dakar 2000 (Jubilee South no date) and Havana 2005 (Jubilee South 2005) and there were south/north engagements organised by Jubilee South at World Social Forums and the Social Forums which took place at global governance summits, for example, the Genoa Social Forum 2001. This led to northern campaigns focussing more on illegitimate debt. As a result, the Norwegian government cancelled some debt on the grounds of its illegitimacy in 2006, and Ecuador repudiated part of its debt in 2008.

Jubilee 2000 was planned by the UK as a time limited campaign, which would disband at the end of the year 2000. Given the huge mobilisations generated and the high international profile gained, there was widespread opposition to ending the campaign, particularly from southern groups, who argued that issues do not get resolved with the “flip of a calendar” (Jubilee Zambia 2003). In the event, Jubilee UK separated into three organisations. The transnational role was temporarily placed within a new organisation, ‘Drop the Debt’ which continued until the Genoa G8 Summit 2001, after which it closed. Jubilee Debt Campaign was set up as a national British campaign and Jubilee Plus provided research and information to transnational debt groups. While the high profile Jubilee 2000 UK campaign closed, as did a number of others, many campaigns continued, and were able to respond to the new opportunity for debt cancellation which presented itself in 2004/2005 through the Make Poverty History/the Global Call for Action against Poverty campaigns. At their summit in Gleneagles 2005, the G7 announced the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, which promised 100% cancellation of debt owed to the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank for countries which had completed the HIPC initiative. While this was a significant step from the early 1990s when multilateral debt cancellation was taboo, neoliberal conditionality stayed in place, and a limited number of countries benefited.

7.2 Making common cause transnationally

While Jubilee 2000 was a new and very dynamic moment in debt campaigning, it had roots within debt groups which had emerged during the 1980s and 1990s. The campaign was initially framed within biblical understandings linked to human development, and kept to a simple call for cancellation of unpayable debt by the millennium linked to the
biblical concept of Jubilee (Cox 2011; Pettifor 2006; Mayo 2005a+b). Given this framing, the backbone of the campaign was provided by the Christian churches (Cox 2011, Buxton 2004). Churches had both strong parish networks at national level, and dense transnational links, which operated as mobilising structures to promote the campaign. Jubilee Peru, for example, gathered 1,850,000 signatures through national Catholic Church structures (Donnelly 2002), and 10% of the signatures collected by Jubilee Bolivia came from transnational links with two German dioceses (Jubilee 2000. 1999).

When it came to mobilising across the church/secular interface, there was some resistance to the religious basis of the message. Even in Britain which initiated the campaign, the idea of Jubilee was thought of as ‘too religious and corny’ when it was first being promoted (Pettifor 2006). In the Netherlands there were some concerns that there might be a perception of ‘missionary zeal’, so they played down the biblical link for secular audiences (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1). The dilemma was:

The church is moved by Christianity and faith… How do you express your faith when you work with secular organisations. There are people in the church who say, what has this to do with the bible and Jesus, but secular organisations won’t join with that kind of motivation. How Christian can you be before people say, this is not for me. (Interviewee Sweden)

As maximising collective power depends on uniting as many sectors as possible (Silva 2009), Jubilee 2000 sought broad alliances, which in practice went beyond churches, increasingly involving secular community and solidarity groups, TUs, NGOs, youth and students, human rights, environmental and women’s groups. Indigenous and campesino groups participated in Ecuador (Molina Vera 2008) and the British Medical Association, black and ethnic minority groups and comic relief in the UK.

Although members of national Jubilee groups were overwhelmingly from civil society, there was no total discontinuity with political parties and governments. In Germany political parties were allowed to affiliate at local but not national level (Interviewee Germany No. 3). In the UK the Green Party joined Jubilee 2000 and Plaid Cymru became a member of Jubilee 2000 Wales (Jubilee 2000, 1998). MPs joined the Ugandan Debt Network, which organised Jubilee Uganda, as individuals (UDN 1998), and numerous government officials were members of Jubilee Guayquil in Ecuador (Molina Vera 2008). In the Philippines, the main political blocs had always been the backbone of the FDC (Ariate and Molmisa 2009; Grageda 1994).

Common cause was deepened and strengthened by transnational actions, such as the mobilisations at the G7 Summits in Birmingham 1998 and Cologne 1999, which
situated Jubilee 2000 as a high profile transnational campaign. These actions both engaged new groups because “Jubilee had such momentum, and was such a famous thing that everybody wanted to be there” (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1), and maintained the commitment of those already involved. A particularly positive aspect was the strength of transnational exchange through Jubilee 2000:

For me it was also the first time… to really have an international network and to get information from all parts and also from the south” (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1)

While Jubilee 2000 achieved a broad coalition, both in terms of the social sectors involved and its geographic reach, there were tensions. In Ecuador, the Jubilee campaign started in 1999 while Ecuador was experiencing serious economic, political and environmental crises. There were significant differences between groups working on debt with some continuing to hold to the radical positions of the 1980s, rejecting debt payments, and any conditions, while others took a more pragmatic approach. In this context, the campaign emerged as Jubilee Guayaquil rather than Jubilee Ecuador (Molina Vera 2008). In the UK campaign, which involved a range of major NGOs, there was a fear that the campaign would overshadow its members, and negatively impact on their public profile and fund raising abilities (Cox 2011, Pettifor 2006, Mayo 2005b).

Leadership and Organisational structures: a transnational fault line

In terms of organisation and leadership, there were no formal international structures, with Jubilee 2000 operating through sets of interweaving networks. National campaigns, together with a number of regional networks, loosely aggregated up into the transnational campaign. Many members of these national networks were also engaged in their own transnational networks, leading to dense relationships within Jubilee 2000. Members of the French Platforme Dette and Developpement, for example, were also members of CIDSE, CADTM, Faith and Justice, Caritas and Eurodad (Merkaert 2005). An NGO could work on debt within its bilateral relationships with its southern partnership, at the same time be a member of the national debt coalition of the country in which it was based, and also be a member of regional networks e.g. Afrodad, CIDSE, Eurodad, Latindadd. European Catholic NGOs for example were often members of both CIDSE and Eurodad.
The UK group which initiated the campaign, operated informally as a transnational hub and catalyst, with the petition to the G7 acting as a uniting mechanism. The obligations on groups who were members of Jubilee 2000 were light – to agree with the principles and aim. Beyond that, groups had autonomy, in terms of how they campaigned (Cox 2011, Pettifor 2006). Jubilee groups transnationally were only convened once in the run up to the year 2000 – at Rome in November 1998. There were, however, a range of regional discourse events in Africa and Latin America, from which agreed positions emerged in the form of declarations. These included declarations from meetings at: Accra 19 April 1998, Tegucigalpa 27 January 1999, Gauteng 21 March 1999 and Lusaka 19-21 May 1999. Eurodad continued as a forum for discussion on debt by European debt groups, with its annual conference involving a range of southern groups also. While not having an international framework gave flexibility, it left the door open to the ‘tyranny of structurelessness’, the informal leadership of the best resourced campaigns, which took strategic decisions without proper consultation (Buxton 2004). Part of the reason for this, was the fact that no-one could have foreseen that the campaign would reach such heights (Interviewee Austria). Jubilee 2000 UK was opposed to an international steering committee, believing that to try to build a “democratic, accountable global, borderless body, outside framework of the state was delusional and utopian” (Pettifor 2006, p.312). What was needed was to coordinate activities internationally on the basis of agreement by national coalitions. Jubilee UK’s board saw itself accountable only for UK campaign, and “kept ambiguous its relations with other national Jubilee 2000 Campaigns” (Pettifor 2006, p.301).

While recognising the issues raised by the informality of the international coordination, and the dominant role played by the British campaign, there was little enthusiasm in retrospect for a formally constituted steering committee:

....because the British were much more dynamic, they already had the infrastructure, they had tons of people mobilised, they had so many more people working full time on these issues, so you always had the risk of being run over... Still had we set up an international whatever, I think it would probably have killed the motivation of many people, because this type of process is just a nightmare. (Interviewee Germany No. 3)

Preferred solutions were based on dialogue:

..if you tell the British that they are running us over, it won’t go unheard, they are not a corporation who think, oh fine we are running you over ..where we can do something concrete together, go for it, and don’t use your scarce resources in these processes. (ibid.)
What enabled the transnational dimension of the campaign was the network structure:

We felt the network form was very good. You can do individual things, but you are calling for the same thing. And the Jubilee name... We all wanted debt cancellation... we had common principles, common objectives... There are always tensions... you need patience for this kind of work. (Interviewee Peru)

South/north interface

Jubilee 2000 marked a new stage in the dynamic relationship between southern and northern groups within debt campaigning. While tensions arose between south and north groups during the 1980s, contradictions became particularly acute within Jubilee 2000, leading to the establishment of an autonomous Jubilee South, made up of the more radical groups from Africa, Asia and South America. This was seen by some northern campaigns as a split (Interviewee Belgium No. 1; Interviewee Britain No. 6; Interviewee Germany No. 3), but it can be argued that the setting up of Jubilee South represented a reconfiguration of south/north relations within the debt movements. The dynamic of the south/north relationship was driven by the interaction of solidarity and conflict. Solidarity between south/north debt groups was the bedrock of Jubilee 2000. The shift from a charity to a justice approach, involving NGOs in advocacy, called for more equitable relationships, as once NGOs claimed to reflect the views of their ‘southern partners’, their legitimacy depended to some extent on those partners. While Jubilee 2000 was a transnational campaign, in practice the south/north relationship took the form mainly of bilateral relationships between particular southern and northern organisations. Groups largely chose to work with those with whom they had a fair amount of common ground. Radical groups like AITEC and CEDET in France linked into parallel groups in the south, while Spain’s Jubilee group worked with faith-based groups in Latin America, rather than with the emerging radical voices (Interviewee France No. 1; Interviewee Germany No. 2; Interviewee Ireland No. 4; Interviewee Spain).

Exchanges of information, resources and support between south and north were mutually beneficial. While funding is often considered a key nexus between north and south, from early on for FDC “the partnerships we forge are not mainly to get assistance. FDC is a major player in the global campaign” (FDC 1992). Funding, however, was also a major factor in many south/north relationships, for example, UDN had 33 northern NGO funders in 1999, some funding specific projects, others providing core
funding (UDN 1999). Information exchanges are central to transnational campaigning, and a major way in which common cause is built, and maintained over time. INGOs provided briefs from IMF/World Bank meetings and information on how to engage with these institutions (Interviewee INGO Central America). Southern groups provided key analysis and information on the impact of debt to northern campaigns, for example, the role of FDC in relation to illegitimate debt\textsuperscript{10}. Providing a platform in northern countries to southern groups was mutually helpful. It raised the profile of the debt problem of individual countries by giving southern campaigners access to decision makers, the media and the public within creditor countries. Southern visitors helped northern groups to mobilise their publics, giving the northern groups greater legitimacy with national decision makers, and helping them strengthen their constituencies, key to their fund raising\textsuperscript{11}. But in spite of the strong solidarity, conflicts arose because of different priorities between south and north, as each is positioned differently within the internationalising state and specifically in relation to the debt crisis. These differences can be factored in, to some extent, within bilateral relationships, but not so easily at a wider transnational level. Loose transnational networking structures are based on an implied assumption of relatively equally positioned members, and lack a mechanism to rebalance inequalities of power (Surman and Reilly 2003), especially those which reflect wider power structures. A major problem arose in relation to northern leadership of Jubilee 2000 at transnational level (in particular the British campaign). Northern leadership resulted in the campaign structure and framing being better aligned with northern contexts than southern ones. A particular fault line was that INGOs need “short term deliverables for funding reasons and this generates tension with those primarily coming from social movements” (Interviewee Italy). A southern view highlighted issues thrown up by this:

I worked in two campaigns – Jubilee and Make Poverty History. Many of us were invited when the strategy and method and form were already decided, including the names, slogan, symbols, but we saw them as good opportunities and could make adaptations in both cases. (Presentation to Eurodad Conference 2005)

But concerns were that:

\textsuperscript{10} The importance of FDC’s role can be seen in the responses from e.g. Centre for Concern and Development Gap in the US, the Social Justice Committee in Canada, PARC in Japan and Eurodad to an Evaluation of FDC 1995 carried out by Christian Aid (Christian Aid Archives).

\textsuperscript{11} For example, Christian Aid invited a speaker from TASOET to Britain in 1998 to participate in Christian Aid week – a major annual awareness raising and fund raising series of events - to give talks to church groups and supporters. The TASOET speaker got a speaking slot at the high profile Jubilee 2000 events at the Birmingham G7 Summit 1998. (Documented in Christian Aid Archives).
All effort is channelled through a formula – sometimes this formula is not what captures people as they live in different social and political situations, they have different politics and visions. (ibid.)

While the short time line arose from the symbolism of the year 2000, this was in line with NGO practice of moving to new campaign issues every couple of years. The 2000 deadline, however, was central to the dynamic of the campaign, as it enabled organisations to commit for a short period (Pettifor 2006). For the south, however, issues were “goal bound not time bound” (Jubilee 2001b) and:

There was a hullaballoo in Africa who said no this campaign can’t stop, these issues are still here… We strongly protested… Many people would be distrustful…of campaigns coming from the north and two years action. (Interviewee Uganda)

Further, many southern campaigns were only getting off the ground by the millennium, and, given the particular resource and physical and communication infrastructures limitations faced, they needed time to build popular campaigns. Information received by UDN via the Internet, for example, had to be simplified, translated into at least five languages before being disseminated (Buxton 2002). In this context, the call was that the south should lead, given that they were the most seriously affected by the problem. The situation however is complicated by the fact that northern groups are not just working on behalf of the south, they are also speaking for themselves as citizens:

The south is leading and we never understood that because we thought ...we don't want our government to be involved in what we perceive to be a very unfair practice, why would we need approval to target our governments? (Interviewee Germany No. 3)

The lack of a transnational decision making process proved to be a serious fault-line when some northern campaigns gave a qualified positive responses to the Cologne debt deal without discussion with southern campaigns. According to the Director of Jubilee 2000 UK:

...the package was a significant step which showed the power of the debt-relief movement. 'But we are not there yet,' she added. 'We are at stage one.'(Elliott 1999).

This was seen as northern campaigns speaking for the south, and evoked serious anger among southern campaigners in Cologne. Jubilee Zambia articulated southern concerns
Supporters in the north ...must not be misled by claims made by G-7 leaders or officials of the World Bank and IMF that "major breakthroughs" have occurred... Equally urgent is the need to listen to the voices in the south that flatly challenge the HIPC and ESAF approaches as unacceptable. (Henriot 1999)

Plans to set up Jubilee South, an autonomous movement of southern groups, emerged from consultations among Latin American/Caribbean, African and Asia/Pacific groups at various southern meetings on debt: Tegucigalpa (January 1999), Gauteng (March 1999), Lusaka (May 1999) and the Asia Pacific meeting12, and also from the south/south meetings which took place at the Jubilee Summit in Rome 1998. Jubilee South was launched at a south/south summit in November 1999, to ensure southern perspectives were articulated, involving representatives of southern Jubilee campaigns and social movements (Jubilee South no date b). Jubilee South aimed to rearticulate south/north relations, rather than to break them. Regional south/north dialogues were organised to find common ground for mutual support and solidarity, and a south/north dialogue convened by Jubilee South took place in Dakar December 2000 (Jubilee South 2000). A significant innovation was that northern groups were invited to co-convene the latter event, thus modelling a more equitable form of engagement. The south/north conflict can be seen as southern groups contesting the ‘second face of power’13 within Jubilee 2000, that is, challenging the rules of the game within organisations, which determine whose priorities appear on agendas (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). This led to a reconfiguration of south/north relations, in terms of who spoke for the movement and how agendas were set, resulting in illegitimate debt14 becoming central to the agenda after 2000. While the issue of odious/illegitimate debt had been highlighted by northern campaigns, it had not been the central argument. Northern campaigns now taking up illegitimate debt, were not expected to take on the full Jubilee South position that all debts were illegitimate and should be repudiated, and that reparations were due (Interviewee Philippines/Jubilee South). The German approach, for example, was very pragmatic, “...away from this global call that all the debt is unjust and illegal into okay let’s work on

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12 No date could be found for this meeting.
13 The first face of power is exercised through concrete decisions. It focusses on behaviour within decision making in relation to issues over which there is observable conflict of interests (Lukes 2005, p. 19).
14 Odious debt arises from lending to oppressive regimes. Illegitimate debt is a wider concept including loans given to support dictatorships, loans that fuelled corruption, and loans for infrastructural projects that caused environmental and social damage. Debt linked to bad policy advice, failed projects and where private loans have been socialised under duress to bail out lenders has also been deemed illegitimate by campaigners (Hanlon 2006, p.218).

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individual contracts and let us discern legitimate from illegitimate debt” (Interviewee Germany No. 2).

This was not a simple south/north ideological division, as differences also existed between southern groups. Differences in Latin America led to the establishment of Latindadd parallel to Jubilee South America. Jubilee Zambia made common cause with Jubilee South on apartheid debt and the role of the IMF and World Bank, but “made it very clear that we would be inside as well, engaging with the IMF and World Bank, we would be engaging in the process of debt reduction (Interviewee Zambia). A number of efforts were made to mend the fractures. The World Council of Churches brought together J2000 UK, Jubilee South, CADTM and others to see if relationships could be re-established (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1). Eurodad also played a bridging role:

I saw it [the south/north relationship] as dysfunctional and messy, when I first came to Eurodad …I was really concerned about that....it was going to be a big weakness in the debt movement.. so I put time and energy into trying to bridge with some of key figures [in Jubilee South] ... we organised joint meetings together. I took time to… see how we could work together. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.2)

Jubilee 2000 demonstrated the ability of transnational civil society to develop strong common cause through a decentralised campaign with broad support among different social sectors, and significant global reach. At the level of mobilising, therefore, Jubilee 2000 operated as a network of autonomous groups. When it came to the interface with international decision makers and the media, however, Jubilee 2000 became re-centred with the UK, the strongest campaign and the initiator of Jubilee 2000, being sought as spokesperson. This poses challenging questions about organising transnational civil society campaigns. The network structure is the easiest formation within which civil society groups can make common cause transnationally, as it calls for a minimal level of negotiations and agreements between members. Problems arise, however, when more diffuse civil society groups as part of ‘globalisation-from-below’ meet the more united, homogenous ‘globalisation-from-above’ (Falk 1997). While the tensions which this generated within Jubilee posed serious difficulties, and were very painful for many, the intensity of the debate about the respective roles of southern and northern groups reflected the success of the campaign in engaging strongly across the south and north, and also diverging political positions. The fact that these tensions led to a reconfiguration of power within debt movements, rather than disengagement, can be seen as a significant development along the south/north interface.
7.3 Geography of power

As a transnational campaign made up of a wide range of national groups and without any international organisational structure, how did Jubilee 2000 seek to leverage the national/international interface? Formally, the G7 was the main body targeted, but there are discontinuities between where major power lies in the internationalising state and where campaigns in different countries have the most leverage, and this affected where campaigns put most of their efforts. For campaigns in G7 countries, the fact that the national and transnational were fused meant that their national based campaigns were directly channelled into the most powerful transnational decision maker on debt. For the German debt campaign:

…because Germany was the centre of the G7 in 1999…we never had to decide whether we wanted to lobby the German government or the G7, it was basically the same. So, we never made a deliberate decision to be an international thing or a German thing, we were a German campaign definitely. (Interviewee Germany No. 2)

While groups from G7 countries were involved in mobilisations at the G7 meetings during the 1990s, they did not form a ‘G7 NGO sub group’, as this would give legitimacy to the G7 (Interviewee France No. 2). After the year 2000 the French campaign took a lead role in facilitating transnational engagement with the Paris Club, which was virtually fused into the French state in institutional terms. In November 2004, for example, when Iraq’s debt was before the Paris Club, the French campaign operated as a “privileged interlocutor for a meeting between ‘Bercy’ [seat of the French Treasury where the Paris Club is based] and international networks working on the debt” (Merkaert 2005).

Inevitably, the debt nébuleuse power relations were replicated within the debt campaigns. It was more important, for example, to get the Germany government on board than the Irish government:

It is not because we like it but because it is like that … Maybe it has importance in its own right to do things differently, …but that is may be not the most effective political campaign because our campaigns are related to the official power politicking. (Interviewee Germany No. 3)

But the G7 country campaigns, on their own, would not have been sufficient:
We needed all the creditors in the deal. For example Holland was kept out of the G7 debate but they had a lot of debt and they were very difficult about the G7 decision, saying who are you to decide to cancel debt on our behalf; we aren’t going to go along with you… Holland and Scandinavia were important; they did start to put sand in the wheels, so it was important to have it [Jubilee campaigns] beyond the G7. (Interviewee UK No. 6)

In terms of mobilising, the G7 was not so central in non-G7 creditor countries. The G7 was not “appealing to the Dutch public” (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1), nor for Austria (Interviewee Austria). Indirect leverage could be exercised by joining a transnational network which contained members from G7 countries. By joining Oxfam International, Spanish NGO Intermon felt that this would increase the impact of their advocacy (Vivas 2008).

The G7 was not privileged as a central target by southern groups. Notably two key Jubilee 2000 declarations, the Accra Declaration issued at the launch of Jubilee 2000 Afrika, and the Tegucigalpa Declaration issued at the launch of Jubilee 2000 Latin America, did not mention the G7. A key nexus linking debtor countries to the internationalising state are IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes. For UDN, IMF and World Bank “loan conditionalities under SAPs have undermined the decision making processes and capacity of government” (Gariyo 1999, p.127). In the Philippines the pressure from the IMF meant that “the government wants Fund approval more than approval of people ….they are prepared to sacrifice people’s interests, do anything to get seal of approval” (FDC 1994a). While southern declarations generally denounced debt as the mechanism which enables the continuation of imperial pillage and plunder into a post-colonial age, they also recognised that the internationalising state had its allies at the heart of southern states:

Likewise, these forces [rich countries transnational corporations, international financiers, IMF, World Bank, WTO] have instruments in the South; namely some of our own technocratic, political and commercial elite who are in the tiny minority of Africans who continue to promote the Washington Consensus. (Lu-saka Declaration 1999)

*Re-articulating national governments*

In spite of the vastly differing power positions of debt campaigns in relation to the internationalising state, they all sought to re-articulate their governments towards their domestic societies, “reclaiming power at national level” (Interviewee Italy). Northern campaigns pressed their governments to cancel their bilateral debt, and also to position
themselves internationally in favour of debt cancellation (e.g. Sweden, Spain, and Netherlands):

..for us it was mainly a national campaign to reach the public and we used the transnational to get information, to learn positions, to have a network but mainly we saw our focus on the Swedish public and politicians. (Interviewee Sweden)

The Italian campaign pressed the government to delink the Italian position from the existing G8 consensus at the Paris Club. As a result a law was passed by Parliament in July 2000, under a centre-left government, and strongly influenced by the Vatican, agreeing to cancel debt covering more countries than HIPC, and with less onerous conditions (Gerbaudo and Pianta 2012, Interviewee Italy). Spanish groups campaigning on debt (DEDE, RCADE and Intermon), pressed for national legislation on debt following the socialist party electoral victory in 2004, and this resulted in the adoption of a Spanish debt law in 2006 (Vivas 2008). Jubilee 2000 UK urged its supporters to call on the British government to unilaterally cancel debt of poor countries to Britain if the G8 failed to agree on debt cancellation (Jubilee 2000, 1999a). In January 2005, Britain took unilateral action agreeing to write off Britain’s share of the multilateral debt of a number of countries (BBC News 2005).

Action at national level in northern countries involved calling governments to account for their actions internationally – as bilateral creditors and as members of the IMF and World Bank. Southern campaigns also saw their governments as a central target:

We are very clear that our power and credibility can only come from how strong we are in our own countries, and in our movements. Our main audience is our governments – and through the national to the international. …..very radical to say the extent to which we can influence the IMF is the extent to which we can influence our own governments. (Interviewee Philippines/Jubilee South)

The declaration from the first Jubilee South Summit 1999 prioritises action by southern governments, for example, repudiation of odious and onerous debt; formation of a southern debtors' alliance; and allocation of freed-up funds to benefit people of the south. In terms of strategy, Jubilee South encouraged national campaigns to focus on challenging the policies of southern governments (Jubilee South 1999).

Southern groups also looked to stronger regional action from their governments. There was recognition that the lack of a debtors’ coalition weakened the bargaining power, and negotiating abilities of African governments on debt issues (Oxfam Mozambique 1998). The African Union was a specific target of Afrodad, which aimed
to get African leaders to come up with a position on debt (Interviewee Zambia). The Lusaka Declaration (1999) called for a new "Africa Consensus" on debt and sustainable development (to replace the bankrupt Washington Consensus). In Latin America, from the end of the 1990s there was a move to the left among South American governments 15 keen to change the international financial architecture, for example, the introduction of Banco Sur (Rosales 2013), and there was support for civil society positions on some issues such as debt audits (Interviewee Peru).

**Relationship between the national and transnational**

Somewhat paradoxically, in spite of the substantial national focus, Jubilee2000 was a high profile transnational campaign and provided significant ‘transnational space’ to debt campaigns. As mentioned above, much of the south/north relationship operated through bilateral relationships:

> We had some countries we would focus on more than others, Niger, Mozambique, Ecuador, Nicaragua and then normally Bolivia. We would work face-to-face with people and this is how being part of a global movement materialised. (Interviewee Germany No. 2)

Regional networks – Latindadd, Afrodad and Eurodad - enabled the development of proposals within a ‘united front’ which could then be taken to the IMF, World Band and the Inter-American Development Bank (Molina Vera 2008, p.54). Information disseminated through Jubilee 2000 sometimes provided information on debt negotiations to national campaigns before their Ministers of Finance had this information - giving the campaigns greater power and credibility at national level (Reitan 2007, p.80). Transnational action to pressure key governments at critical times could be mobilised where campaigns within countries were relatively weak. Postcard campaigns to the Japanese government, host to the 2000 G7 Summit, were organised from the UK (Jubilee 2000, 2000b), and weekly rallies were organised outside the Japanese Embassies in the UK (Holmes 2006). Zambians demonstrated at the Japanese Embassy in Lusaka, and presented a petition calling for total cancellation of Zambia’s debt to Japan (Jubilee 2000. 2000a).

The discursive spaces at international level (Dryzek 1999) were leveraged although these were not as significant as national level action. There were a range of cross-

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15 Chavez was elected in Venezuela 1999; Lula in Brazil 2003; Kirchner in Argentina 2003; Morales in Bolivia 2006; and Correa in Ecuador 2007.
sectoral transnational events involving Jubilee 2000 groups, other civil society debt groups, and representatives of different elements of the debt nébuleuse. Some took place in Washington as part of the World Bank and IMF annual meetings. An event at the 1998 IMF World Bank AGM, for example, involved speakers from Jubilee 2000, Eurodad, the IMF, World Bank, the Paris Club secretariat and a representative from the Vatican (Eurodad 1998). Events were also hosted by the softer end of the debt nébuleuse, such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the Commonwealth, involving Jubilee groups from the south and the north (Collins, Gariyo and Burden 2001). Other events were organised by civil society groups, for example, a conference in Maputo organised by the Mozambican Debt Group in 1998 in collaboration with Afrodad and Eurodad. In addition to civil society groups from Mozambique, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda, speakers included the president’s wife, government officials from Mozambique and Uganda, the World Bank and IMF resident representative to Mozambique (Oxfam Mozambique 1998). The impact of these events are hard to measure; they are not examples of communicative action where each side is willing to hear the other’s arguments, with a view to coming to a consensus based on the power of the better argument (Habermas 1984). As neither side enters in this spirit, the question arises, why do civil society groups and representatives of the debt nébuleuse come together, what are their expectations of these events? As pointed out by Sikkink (2002), where power and norms are not fused, there is space for civil society influence. It is therefore likely, from civil society’s point of view, that aspects of their knowledge and expertise which can be included within the current model, leading to improvements, will be heard and have an influence.

The Jubilee 2000 transnational profile impacted at national level, giving campaigns greater credibility with their governments and the public (Interviewee INGO Central America, Interviewee Zambia, Interviewee Uganda). This arose partly from peer pressure between creditor countries. Spanish officials, for example, felt they had to dialogue with NGOs as colleagues from other countries were doing so:

We would have been less in the political and media side if we only asked for Spain to eliminate all the debt from the poorest countries... we gained credibility.. because we were part of something which was happening globally. (Interviewee Spain)

Jubilee 2000’s profile had an impact also on southern governments:
Governments would have been paying attention after Cologne, they suddenly woke up and saw that international civil society had links with their civil society groups, mounting pressure, the way they were able to mobilise citizens. (Interviewee INGO Central America)

Transnational campaigning also opened up contacts between civil society groups in debtor groups and creditor governments. Facilitated by their links with creditor country campaigns, meetings were held by Jubilee Peru with the German, Swiss and Italian embassies on debt reduction for social development funds:

These countries were more open to contact with civil society than the Peruvian government itself. …The Peruvian government, however, opened its doors to conversation with civil society because of that international pressure. (Interviewee Peru)

There were also direct links between southern governments and the transnational debt movement. Debtor governments leaked documents to Jubilee 2000 UK (Buxton 2004), and the Guyanese Minister for Finance accompanied Jubilee 2000 to their meeting with Prime Minister Blair on the evening of the mobilisation at the Birmingham G7 Summit (Interviewee UK No. 6). The Ecuadorian Government invited advisers from Eurodad, Erlassjahr, CADTM and civil society experts from Argentina, Peru and Brazil, as advisers to its 2007 debt audit (El Universo 2007). Eurodad was encouraged by southern governments to raise issues which it was difficult for them to raise, such as illegitimate debt “as they may get ostracised from proper circles where debt is talked about not in those terms”. Eurodad was also able to articulate southern governments concerns on the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative adopted in 2005 (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2).

Rather than an example of global civil society in a post sovereign world, Jubilee 2000 was a mosaic of national campaigns, regional networks and INGOs, which simultaneously aggregated up into Jubilee 2000 transnationally and disaggregated back into its largely national component parts. Rather than focus on the G7 (other than campaigns based in G7 countries where the national and international were fused), groups prioritised changing national level policy and practice, centring themselves where they saw they had most power, in their own states. Debt groups can be seen as struggling to rearticulate power within states towards domestic societies, demanding accountability from governments for the policies they pursued at national and transnational levels in their name. Rather than passively operating within the given world order, transnational civil society was actively seeking to reshape this order, confirming the argument that
the state is still a valid site for struggle (Panitch 1994). The main mechanism to operate
across the national /international divide was to influence government policy within the
debt nébuleuse. National government representatives brought the views of their national
civil society groups to the debt nébuleuse, or were influenced by the engagement that
their colleagues from other countries were having with civil society, and this led to an
opening up of access to civil society at national level. From a debtor country civil societ-
ity perspective, the first step is to change national governments. “No matter how much
we [FDC] globalise our struggles, if the government is not responsive, campaigns will
never get anywhere” (former FDC secretary general, quoted in Arias and Molmisa
2009, p.54). The second mechanism was the major collective action at international lev-
it would be too big a leap to describe these as wars of manoeuvre at international level
(Drainville 2005b), situating these within the development of the broader anti-
globalisation/global justice movements is a study yet to be undertaken. Transnational
mobilisations captured the attention of international media, gained celebrity support and
created Jubilee as a transnational actor. Thirdly, a weaker mechanism was the interna-
tional, cross-sectoral transnational discourse events organised by civil society groups,
both central institutions of the debt nébuleuse (IMF and World Bank), and weaker
members such as the Commonwealth and UN bodies.

7.4 Knowledge, norms, frames

This section examines how Jubilee 2000 framed the debt issue to win public support
and challenge debt nébuleuse policy. Different levels of change were sought by differ-
ent groups within Jubilee 2000, and therefore there were different framings, in terms of
human development/human rights or more anti-systemic framings, positing debt as ille-
gitimate and a tool of an exploitative system (Tagle and Patomaki 2007).

Within the multiplicity of arguments run – moral, structural, technical – the
moral authority of NGOs is identified as central to how Jubilee 2000 exercised power
(Friesen 2012; Broome 2009; Busby 2007; Yanacopulos 2004). This relates to the call
for cancellation of unpayable debt by the millennium, which was the basis of the high
profile achieved by Jubilee 2000. The moral argument was largely Christian, based on
the central principle of the dignity of the human being which must take precedent over
debt repayments (DEDE 2001). This moral analysis calls for personal responsibility to
tackle factors which diminish the dignity of the human person “to be properly ourselves ….our own integrity calls on us to stand up” (Interviewee Ireland No. 2) and that:

[y]ou have to find ways of making this issue of global justice a full life involvement for people. It is an existential issue: What kind of human being am I when I’m neglecting how the world is run. (Interviewee Sweden)

NGO moral authority is seen as arising from public recognition of this ‘other regarding’ dimension of NGOs (Broome 2009), and this is what gives them power in the public arena (Risse 2000).

The specific linking of the campaign message to the Jubilee principle set out in the Bible had historical resonance from the anti-slavery and US civil rights campaigns:

When we went out with the Jubilee principle all those people of faith who had any understanding of their faith connected with it very well. So I think the churches were fundamental to picking it up across the world. (Interviewee UK No. 6)

But the religious basis of the message did not resonate everywhere. In France, because the separation of state/church still had ‘strong salience’ (Josselin 2007), the secular slogan “for the year 2000, let us cancel the debt” was used although faith groups, such as CCFD, were major actors. In Japan, an alternative framing linked to a strongly held Japanese value, the country’s good international standing (Busby 2007) was used: “Together let us cancel the debt” (Holmes 2006). As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the religious message did not always resonate across the religious/secular interface either.

*Meshing moral and structural arguments*

Moral arguments did not stand alone but were complemented by structural arguments. While moral discourse is based in general ethical principles which shape the rights and responsibilities of individuals, structural arguments relate more to the fate of collectivities of people, and are based on critiques of the ideological, institutional and material basis of power. While the dominant arguments originally were based on moral/human development arguments, a thread of structural critiques permeated the campaign. “Debt is the most dramatic manifestation of the subordination of the south to the international economy” (DEDE 2001) and “Africa’s debt problem is perpetuated by an unjust inter-
national economic system” (UDN 1998b). For those for whom structural arguments are central, debt was seen as an instrument of an oppressive system, providing a

..prism through which to expose to wider public view the full spectrum of international financial relations, particularly North–South relations, the functioning of global financial institutions, and the global economic system. (Keet 2000, p. 473)

From this perspective structural change is needed otherwise even if the debt is cancelled, it will recur (RCADE 2000). Moral and structural arguments meshed together. The Religious Working Group on the IMF and World Bank, which was set up in 1994 in the US (Donnelly 2002), integrated a structural dimension into a moral analyse within which sin is defined as ‘social and institutional, as well as personal’. Social sin is present where there are growing economic disparities, increasing concentrations of economic power, and accelerating environmental abuse’ (Religious Working Group 1997). While Jubilee South takes an anti-systemic approach, debt is illegitimate also from a moral perspective and the call for repudiation is seen as the “appropriate moral and political response where justice is denied” (Jubilee South 2002).

Renegotiated frames – frame slippage

The original frame of ‘unpayable debt’ was renegotiated at the Jubilee 2000 conference in Rome 1998, under strong pressure from southern groups to include a number of structural dimensions. Debt to be cancelled now covered:

a) Unpayable debt, which is debt that cannot be serviced, without placing a burden on impoverished people.

b) Debt that in real terms has already been paid.

c) Debt for improperly designed policies and projects.


This more radical framing can be seen in southern debt declarations:

The debt is illegitimate because, in large measure, it was contracted by dictatorships..., as well as by governments which were formally democratic, but corrupt. Most of the money was not used to benefit the people who are now being required to pay it back. (Tegucigalpa Declaration 1999)
Prefiguring the tensions to come the declaration ends with an appeal to northern campaigns not to propose solutions calling for less than southern groups were proposing (Tegucigalpa Declaration 1999). From an African perspective:

We reiterate the call for total debt cancellation, and we insist that creditors and G7 countries cannot be allowed, anymore, to dictate the terms of cancellation. ..We endorse the collective repudiation of illegitimate foreign debt payments. (Lusaka Declaration 1999)

But there can be a fault line between agreed discourse and how this is actually operationalised. Keet points to slippage from more radical frames agreed at the Rome conference, to calls for ‘debt relief’ and ‘debt reduction’, which happens when debt groups are ‘grappling’ with their governments (Keet 2000, p.462). A particular slippage was privileging ‘unpayable’ over ‘odious’ or ‘illegitimate’ debt. Should the aim be to delegitimise the debt or focus on its terrible human impact? Where did the solution to the crisis lie – in debtors repudiating illegitimate debt or in creditors cancelling unpayable debt? While no Jubilee group rejected the unpayable debt argument, Jubilee South pointed out that this argument bypasses the question of how the debts were accumulated and who benefited (Nacpil no date). To focus solely on unpayable debt could lead campaigns in the north towards a charity approach, while disempowering southern people who would have to plead for cancellation on the basis of their poverty, rather than assert their right to repudiate illegitimate debt (Keet 2000).

In practice, the legitimacy of debt had been challenged in the south from the start of the crisis in the 1980s. For FDC, freedom from illegitimate debt was always central to their campaign, and they raised the issue within the transnational debt movements from the 1980s (Mendoza 1988). In the early 1990s they documented the fraudulent nature of some of their loans and opposed their repayment (Pineda-Ofreneo 1991). Jubilee South Africa delegitimised both the debt run up by the apartheid regime and that incurred by neighbouring countries, as a result of aggression from the South African regime, as ‘apartheid debt’ (Rustomjee 2004). Given the heavy price paid by Zambia, as the leader of the front lines states, in the struggle against apartheid, Jubilee Zambia asked:

Is it ethically acceptable to expect Zambia to pay back debts entered into because of a moral fight against apartheid? ….should not some form of reparations be expected from those who profited from investments, trade and political support that maintained the Pretoria regime in power for so many years? (Jubilee Zambia 2003a)
In Argentina a court decision in 2000 recognised the illegitimate nature of much of the debt dating from the military regimes. The case had been initiated by journalist A. Olmos in 1982 (Pettifor, Cisneros and Olmos-Gaona 2001). Nicaraguan and Honduran Jubilee campaigns were fuelled by the odious/illegitimate nature of their debts – in the case of Nicaragua, debt from the Somoza era and in the case of Honduras a massive debt arising from a mismanaged mega infrastructural project. This motivated:

…a wider variety of organisations for whom technical issues on debt… normally been something they would’ve disengaged from. Something so complex, with the locus of power around it so far away. (Interviewee INGO Central America)

Credit country campaigns also questioned the legitimacy of their country’s claims. They pointed to the use of export guarantee agencies to promote lending in the interest of the creditor country. The French campaign highlighted that almost half of debt cancelled by France resulted from “irresponsible if not criminal” export guarantees by COFACE to countries at war, notorious dictatorships such as Iraq, Nigeria and Zaire (Merkaert 2005). 95% of British debt was also run up through its Export Credit Guarantee Department most of which “aggressively promoted British exports particularly arms. This is part of creditors’ instrument in their competition against other OECD countries” (Pettifor 1998, p.119).

*Jubilee 2000 and the debt nèbuleuse: clashing frames*

While the moral and structural arguments resonated strongly in the public arena, the need for technical capacity to back up moral arguments was called for when engaging with the debt nèbuleuse. For the German campaign, it was imperative to develop strong technical capability in order to avoid being “pushed into a moral corner”, with moral discourse lower down the hierarchy than economic discourse. At a debate the campaign organised between a number of Catholic bishops and the president of the Bundesbank, the bishops “struggled for the right to have moral imperatives” against the Bundesbank’s economistic arguments (Interviewee Germany No. 2). This hierarchy operated also in other countries:

For those talks [with the Minister for Finance and Parliament] to be fruitful, with only ethical arguments, what we could get was, yes, people you are nice but you don’t understand so thank you for your asks. It was through knowledge and this
mixture of senior economists and more detailed analysis, and showing that we had good proposals and that they were supported by others, that we gained this space. (Interviewee Spain)

Strong research capacity became a bedrock of the campaign with many national campaigns producing technical reports such as *The Role of Parliament in the Management of External Debt in Uganda* (UDN 1999), and *Social and Economic Implications of HIPC in Zambia* (Jubilee Zambia 2001a). One point of leverage for the Irish campaign was research highlighting the impact of debt and SAP on Ireland’s Aid programme in Tanzania, as this was a sensitive issue (Interviewee Ireland No. 2). According to ODI, the success of the popular pressure of Jubilee 2000 arose from the fact it was based on credible evidence, and this forced decision makers to respond (Pitt et al no date).

Jubilee 2000 arguments – whether focussing on unpayable or illegitimate debt - clashed with the debt nébuleuse key concept of ‘sustainable debt’, which was central to the HIPC initiative. This concept was mainly operationalised in terms of debt-to-export ratios, that is a ratio of over 200/250% was considered unsustainable in the 1996 HIPC. Moral issues for the debt nébuleuse were the sanctity of contracts and moral hazard. For the IMF the “sanctity of contracts was a key component of a secure economic environment” (IMF 1997, p.11). There were also concerns about the moral hazard of cancelling debt as it might provide ‘perverse incentives’ to debtors to run up more debt in the hopes of also getting this cancelled.

Jubilee 2000’s counter-frames of unpayable debt and illegitimate/odious debt were pitted against the debt nébuleuse’s economicist concept of ‘sustainable debt’. The Jubilee concern with the sanctity of life came up against the debt nébuleuse’s privileging of the sanctity of contracts: moral arguments based on the dignity of the human person clashed with concerns about moral hazard (Broome 2009, p.71). A human development approach to debt cancellation was developed by a number of organisations including CAFOD, Afrodad, and Eurodad (UNDP 1999). CAFOD’s approach provided a bridge between the moral arguments of Jubilee 2000, and the technical HIPC framework. Within this approach, the criteria used to determine the amount of debt reduction was the financing of basic social needs. The expenditure to meet these needs would have first call on government revenue. After adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the finance gap for meeting these goals was used by debt campaigns to highlight the need for further cancellation (Northover 2008). While the G7 Cologne

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16 While the main indicator is debt to exports, for countries which are very open in terms of trade, a further indicator was added but this was less central: the ratio of debt-to-government revenues exceeded 280%. The test of openness was the an export to GDP ratio of at least 30% (Gunter 2002).
debt deal accepted that there should be further debt cancellation, this was achieved by lowering the debt-to-export criteria from 200/250% to 150/200%, rather than integrating the moral case for cancellation at the centre of the HIPC framework.

Illegitimate debt fell even further outside the debt nébuleuse’s regime of truth than did the concept unpayable debt, making it difficult to be heard by decision makers (Foucault 1980). The perception of the Swedish churches was that the “don’t owe won’t pay position is unrealistic and if you put this demand forward, you won’t be invited to parliament or government, and then you are out” (Interviewee Sweden). The then Norwegian Minister for International Development advised debt groups working on illegitimate debt that they ran the risk of “not being heard.. of becoming irrelevant” with an official describing working on illegitimate debt as “shouting in the woods with a high risk of getting one’s mouth filled with cones” (Abildnes 2007, p.6). According to the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, “that is pulling on a dead horse asking to do something about odious debt; it is so far away and it is no use asking these kinds of things” (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1).

Progress was eventually achieved on illegitimate debt. Influenced by Jubilee South, debt campaigners in Norway convinced their government to cancel debt arising from a lending programme deemed illegitimate (Abildesnes 2007). Norway also made funds available to UNCTAD and the World Bank to research the concept of odious debt in international law (Jubilee USA 2008), bringing the issue of illegitimate debt to the heart of the debt nébuleuse. Following a debt audit set up by the government to determine the legitimacy of their debt, Ecuador repudiated part of its debt in 2008 (Molina Vera 2008). This shift on illegitimate debt led the Dutch activist quoted above to conclude:

..you see it has become a very normal issue and is part of the official policies and that is wonderful to see.... and next time ... nobody can tell me it is pulling a dead horse when I have new items to put on the agenda. (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1)

While there is an emphasis in the literature on the moral framing of debt used by Jubilee 2000, a range of approaches were actually used – moral, structural and technical. The illegitimacy of debts had a particular resonance across debtor countries and there were discourse struggles between Jubilee 2000 groups and the debt nébuleuse, and within Jubilee 2000. The outcome was some progress on both fronts. Resources for human development were achieved through policy change by the central forces of the debt nébuleuse, the G7. Some progress was also achieved on illegitimate debt, through action by individual governments more weakly placed within the internationalising state which
broke the dominant consensus on debt as a technical, economic and to some extent human development issue, by taking unilateral action on illegitimate debt.

### 7.5 Engaging with the state/internationalising state

This section examines the repertoire of action used nationally and transnationally to mobilise publics, the nature of the engagement with the state/internationalising state, and the debates thrown up within the campaign on how to achieve change.

**Transnational Repertoire:**

The aim was ambitious – to mobilise to the international level at which debt decisions are made (in the G7, Paris Club, IMF and World Bank). Transnational mobilisations are not easy to sustain as shown by the experience following the protests at the IMF/World Bank AGM in Berlin 1988:

> When we tried to do follow up with some people we had worked specifically with within church and NGO contexts in 1989, we had a very poor turnout. So the movement grew very rapidly up to 1988, but when the big highlight event was over it disappeared as quickly or faster than it had grown up. (Interviewee Germany No. 2)

The dilemma of transnational mobilisation was resolved by developing a petition to be presented to the G7 in Cologne June 1999, the last G7 summit before the new millennium. While less dramatic than high-profile street mobilisations, the more routine petition aimed to broadly represent the people making the claim for debt cancellation – across debtor and creditor countries - and could be seen as a quasi-referendum in the absence of any formal democratic processes at international level. Contentious or carnivalesque type events capture media attention, but while their focus may be on institutions of the debt nébuleuse (G7, World Bank, IMF), most participants come from the host country. As international summits take place disproportionately in northern countries (G7 and Paris Club always; and most IMF and World Bank summits), this can lead to a situation where people in one place are speaking on behalf of people in distant places (Florini 2000). The petition overcame this divide, enabling people across the globe to participate. The other major transnational repertoire was the human chain encircling global/regional summits, symbolising both the chains of debt which had to be broken, and the solidarity links between people which would bring this about. The British cam-
campaign became a transnational information hub and catalyst for action and employed people to liaise with campaigns in Africa and Latin America (Eurodad 1998). The British maintained a broad transnational repertoire, putting Jubilee 2000 on the map when it mobilised 70,000 people, who formed a 10 kilometre chain around the centre of Birmingham for the G8 Summit 1998 (Eurodad 1999). They promoted direct people to people contacts between British and German activists via local transnational links such as twin town arrangements, trade unions and churches, in order to strengthen the German campaign (Jubilee 2000, 1998a). The 35,000 strong human chain at the G8 Summit in Cologne, with a further 15,000 mobilising in Stuttgart where a major Protestant church event coincided with the Cologne summit, and the announcement of a new debt deal (HIPC11) by the G7, maintained the Jubilee 2000 transnational profile. Following Cologne, the UK aim – bridging the national/transnational – was “to maintain pressure on the UK government but also to target the US and Japan more actively and to create a stir at the IMF and World Bank in September” (Jubilee 2000, 1999b). While Jubilee mobilised at the 2000 IMF and World Bank AGM in Prague, and the Genoa G7 Summit 2001, the broad, loose anti-globalisation/global justice movement set in train at the WTO 1999 meeting in Seattle, had entered the arena. Jubilee 2000 was therefore one of a range of groups mobilising at these events, with many debt campaigns avoiding the more contentious actions organised.

A number of methods were used to create a sense of global mobilisations which did not involve mass gatherings in one place. In the run up to the Cologne G7 Summit, a ‘Global chain Reaction’ was proposed to build momentum with every action aimed to trigger a reaction or an event (Jubilee 2000, 1998a). The human chains at Birmingham and Cologne could not be reproduced at the G7 Summit Okinawa in 2000 – partly because US military bases in Okinawa were a stronger mobilising issue for Japanese activists than debt. A virtual human chain was promoted: ‘Let G8 know the world is watching’, and over 600 summit watch events took place around world (Jubilee 2000, 2000a).

The emergence of the World Social Forum (WSF) in 2001 provided debt groups with a new transnational space within which to coordinate action/engage broader sectors with the debt issue. Jubilee South organised a Debt Tribunal at the WSF 2002 in which 5,000 participated. Former chief investigator of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was one of the judges, with banks, corporations, northern governments, IMF, World Bank, Export Credit Agencies and southern collaborators standing accused. The jury recognised that debt was unpayable, illegitimate, unjust and immoral (Jubilee South 2002b).
The other strong element provided by the British campaign was the engagement of celebrities and the entertainment industry. The rationale for this was:

...in a world where membership organisations are generally on the decline it was clear that building a mass popular campaign would also mean securing coverage on mass media ....To reach an international mass audience, Jubilee 2000 was forced to work hard at courting the mass media's favourite partner: the entertainment industry, and international celebrities. (Buxton 2002, p.4)

Among celebrities involved were U2's Bono, musician Ryuichi Sakamoto in Japan and opera singer Pavarotti in Italy (Buxton 2004, p.11). Other well-known figures/groups involved were Youssou N’dour, Los Kjarkas (Bolivia), Muhammad Ali, and the Pope who met a delegation from Jubilee 2000 in September 1999.

National level actions

The transnational dimension was undergirded by a mosaic of national campaigns, held together by their commitment to debt cancellation and a limited common repertoire, rather than by formal transnational organisational structures. As well as the tried and tested methods (popular education, street events/protests), national groups used spectacles, leveraged significant moments/events, and keyed off historical memories. In Sweden where a huge number of people sing in choirs, the campaign worked with an association of choirs to raise awareness. Jubilee Sweden supporters who sang their way to the G7 Summit in Cologne became known as the ‘Singing Swedes’ (Interviewee Sweden). In Uganda and Zambia popular drama and radio programmes were major methods of raising awareness. Jubilee Uganda collected its highest number of signatures on Ugandan Martyr’s Day when they organised a human chain at the shrine, as thousands of pilgrims from all round Uganda and beyond, visited (UDN no date). Brazil organised a Tribunal on debt in 1999, with about 2,000 participants from over 15 countries. This determined the debt to be unjust, called for a break with the IMF and a debt audit (Bassagio 2002). Norway’s debt campaign also organised a tribunal in 2001 on Norway’s illegitimate debt, led by the head of Norway’s Supreme Court, which concluded that this debt should be cancelled immediately and unconditionally. This was accepted by the Norwegian government in 2006 (Abildnes 2007). In Britain where the debt campaign was linked to memories of the anti-slavery campaign, chains were a potent symbol with
breaking the chains events taking place across the country. Their generous 1953 debt deal continued to fuel the German campaign, and other campaigns were encouraged to leverage the German debt deal in their own countries on key anniversaries. Events were held outside German Embassies in Dublin and Oslo in 1998 on the 45th anniversary of the German deal (Eurodad 1998).

Some campaigns used a plebiscite rather than a petition. In Spain, RCADE mobilised 25,000 activists to carry out a debt plebiscite in 458 municipalities in which one million people voted. RCADE’s popular consultation asked three questions: did the participant agree that a) Spain should cancel debt; b) that savings should be used by people of poor countries for their development; c) that there should be a tribunal to investigate how powerful bodies in the north and south illegally enriched themselves with loans, and that these should be returned to communities (Vivas 2008, p.106). Activists hung themselves from the Arco del Triunfo and Sagrada Familia Cathedral in Barcelona and from the Torres Kio in Madrid to advertise the plebiscite which was timed to coincide with the 2000 general election. RCADE planned to set up stalls near polling stations but this was prohibited by the Electoral Commission, turning the plebiscite into an act of civil disobedience (Vivas 2008). In Brazil, following the tribunal mentioned above, over 100,000 people took part in organising a vote on debt in 3,500 municipalities, with 6.3 million voting. Questions covered in the Brazilian plebiscite were: should the government maintain its agreement with the IMF; should they pay the debt without first having a public audit of the debt as is provided for in the Brazilian constitution; and should they continue to pay internal debt to speculators, using a large part of the budget for this (Bassagio 2002). In both Spain and Brazil well over 90% voted ‘yes’ to the questions put.

Key events involving parts of the debt nébuleuse provided opportunities for mobilisation and to get media coverage. UDN organised a massive media campaign when President Clinton visited Uganda in March 1998, with a view to ensuring debt was on the agenda of discussions between President Clinton, President Museveni and visiting African heads of state (UDN 1998b). The Guardian newspaper virtually joined Jubilee 2000, providing substantial coverage in the run-up to the Birmingham Summit. Jubilee Scotland organised a break the chains event to coincide with a Commonwealth Heads of

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17 Leeds: campaigners chained up the Mayor and his limousine; Macclesfield: a chain gang made giant cheque payable to richest countries; presented to their MP to cut up; Nottingham: chain gang marched across city led by town crier and chained the lions outside Council house; Manchester: stretcher bearers carried metal bed made from chains across town. (Jubilee 2000.1998)

The high level of activity, generated at local national and transnational levels, resulted in Jubilee 2000 receiving high recognition. In Zambia: 60% had heard of Jubilee Zambia (Jubilee Zambia 2002); in Peru 40% of the populations had heard of Jubilee 2000 (Jubilee 2000, 1999a) and in Britain 50% recognised the name ‘Jubilee 2000’ (Barrett 2000). 24 million signatures were collected globally from 166 countries – 2.9 million in Britain, 1.8 million in Peru, 300,000 in Zambia, 521, 319 in France, 870,000 in Ireland; 1,200,381 in Germany, 2, 005,895 in Bangladesh (Barrett 2000).

The repertoire of action had a strong national basis, both in terms of where most mobilisation took place, and in terms of the symbolism and cultural understandings used to mobilise the public. This diversity of national approaches was woven together by a limited but important transnational repertoire – significant among which was the petition which directly linked the demands of the campaign to the debt nèbuleuse, enabling what could almost be seen as a global plebiscite on debt cancellation.

Engagement: civil society and the state/internationalising state

The high international profile achieved early on by Jubilee 2000 through its significant mobilising power and the breadth of the alliances underlying the campaigns had a magnetic attraction for political leaders. Many northern governments sought to capture for themselves some of the legitimacy of Jubilee 2000. French Minister of Finance, Strauss Kahn, received the French debt campaign, Annulons la Dette, a few days before the Cologne G7 Summit “with great pomp” and echoed the rhetoric of the debt campaign (Lavignotte 1999). Meetings which took place between Ministry of Finance and French debt campaigners wouldn’t have happened without the “power of Jubilee” (Interviewee France No. 2). Speaking at a Jubilee 2000 meeting in St. Paul’s Cathedral London, in March 1999, Chancellor of the British Exchequer Gordon Brown said:

I come tonight not as chancellor but as a fellow marcher in the campaign for justice for the poorest of world…let us as a world community cut the debt; cut it in 2000 by 50 billion; to help do this, let us sell IMF gold…. Let us resolve to stand together and work together, churches, political leaders, people of Britain and from everywhere in the world. (Brown 1999)

German government ministers acknowledged that Erlassjahr 2000, the German Jubilee Campaign, had been instrumental in the launch of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s debt
initiative in January 1999 (Josselin 2007). The Under-Secretary of the Swedish Foreign Department (later a World Bank Vice President), accompanied Jubilee Sweden part of the way to the G7 Summit in Cologne, wearing the Jubilee Sweden t-shirt, and spoke at a mass meeting they organised on the way (Interviewee Sweden). Jubilee 2000 Uganda was launched by the wife of the President with 1,500 people in attendance, including cabinet ministers, government officials, religious leaders, MPs, NGO leaders, university and school students (UDN 1999). According to the then U.S. Treasury Secretary, Larry Summers, they were grateful:

.. to the many committed NGOs and others in the development community who have kept debt relief high on the international agenda this year and helped to generate the political will for action. (Callaghy 2002, p.44)

IMF former Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, noted:

.. how fragile our collective commitments are, and how small the chances that they will be fulfilled without a universal mobilisation of public opinion, as has been the case with Jubilee 2000. (Callaghy 2002, p.44)

The World Bank claimed that Jubilee 2000 together with other groups:

.. worked closely with IFIs and industrial country governments to forge a consensus for deeper, broader, faster debt relief for HIPC. (World Bank 2000, p.187)

These reactions from the debt nébuleuse demonstrate the power of mobilisation. Once Jubilee 2000 had won the argument across a wide range of civil societies transnationally, key decision makers bowed to the imperative for a new policy on debt. They signalled this by appearing to align with Jubilee 2000, blurring the image of themselves as the obstacles to debt cancellation, and blurring the difference between the cancellation called for by Jubilee 2000, and what they as decision makers were prepared to give.

Engagement at national level

As was stated above, the focus was mainly on action aimed at the state. In creditor countries, the issue was to hold governments publicly to account for the policies they pursued in the international arena, and for their national debt policies including their export credit lending. A major mechanism used in seeking accountability from govern-
ments was strengthening the watchdog role of parliaments. Groups in France launched a campaign calling for parliamentary control on France’s policy in the IMF and World Bank (Pour l’an 2000, 1999). In Ireland, an amendment proposed by the debt campaign for an annual report to the Dáil on Ireland’s involvement in the IMF and World Bank, was included in a Bill which enabled an Irish contribution to the IMF’s programme in low income countries (DDCI 1999). The Austrian government agreed that the Subcommittee on Development would scrutinise Austrian policy towards the IFIs, with meetings to be held between NGOs, policy makers and MPs prior to IMF and World Bank meetings to define Austria’s stance (Eurodad 1997). For debt groups in debtor countries, action aimed at the state was also the priority. FDC’s Jubilee petition was directed at the Philippine government, calling for the repeal of the law which allowed automatic appropriation of debt servicing from budgets. “We call upon the leaders and legislators of the Philippines to repeal Section 26(b) Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987” (FDC no date b). This law is based on a decree introduced by Marcos in 1977. FDC leveraged their long standing relationships with Congress gaining the support of senators and house of representative members – with one representative filing a bill to repeal the law (FDC 1999). The Ugandan and Zambian campaigns directed two major concerns at their governments – that debt savings should benefit people at community level and that steps should be taken to prevent further crises, by putting the loan contraction process under democratic control. UDN got involved in monitoring spending at both national and district level and also launched the Anti Corruption Coalition (UDN1999, 2000a + b, 2002; Gariyo 1999; Kamuli PMC no date). Zambia called for debt cancellation with ‘conditionality-from-below’, arguing that civil society should be involved in monitoring how resources saved through debt reduction were used (Jubilee Zambia 2001b and 2003b; Henriot 1999). They also called for a constitutional amendment that loans beyond a certain level had to be agreed by Parliament. While civil society/state relations in Honduras and Nicaragua were adversarial, alliances emerged with parliamentary commissions and individual MPs and this started a call for new loans to be submitted to parliament before being agreed (Interviewee INGO Central America). Subsequently, debt groups across the south got involved with budget advocacy, for example, UDN, Jubilee Peru and Honduran civil society groups.

Institutional advocacy continued parallel to Jubilee 2000’s mobilisations, with regular meetings with relevant ministries – Finance, Foreign Affairs, Development- Cooperation, in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and UK (Eurodad 1998-2003), and with meetings taking place with prime ministers in Sweden
and Britain (Eurodad 2000). In terms of lobbying the IMF and World Bank, much of this took place at national level with IMF/World Bank country representatives (Belgium, Ireland, and Austria), but there was also considerable engagement with officials at IMF and World Bank annual meetings (Eurodad 1998-2003), and other discourse events.

The high profile role of Jubilee 2000 UK as the transnational catalyst and the huge mobilisations in Britain – with local Jubilee 2000 groups active across the country - situated the campaign strongly vis-à-vis the government and parliament. In Westminster, an all-party group on debt was set up with 108 members, the biggest of such groupings at that time:

The Group has its roots in the Jubilee 2000 campaign and was inspired by the overwhelming call from the public to cancel Third World Debt. It was set up by a group of concerned MPs to campaign for greater debt relief in Parliament. (UK All Party Report 2004, p.61)

The British tradition of reverse lobbying continued:

It was, look put pressure on the Japanese because we are trying to get this done inside the Bank and Fund, but the Japanese are blocking it so you ought to go to... so we would then go to [Japanese debt campaigner] and say, you’re blocked on this particular point; and will you raise that; and similarly with the Germans and French. (Interviewee UK No. 6)

There is evidence that over time the civil society/state relationship went beyond the fairly instrumental one of exchanges of information on blockages by other creditor countries. During the Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign 2004/5 there was:

.. a lot of toing and froing [between NGOs and the Treasury] .. there was a very interesting dynamic there. He [Gordon Brown] had seen the magic of Jubilee 2000 and wanted to keep it going or replicate it - so that there would be a public outcry to the G8 in 2005. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2)

The Chancellor urged activists at Labour’s Scottish Conference to join the MPH demonstration in Edinburgh (Socialist Newspaper 2005), and the Minister for Development Cooperation participated in a MPH demonstration. This was seen as the government blurring the boundaries with civil society:

…implying that civil society had more power than government and that’s not true. “We’re just the minister, we can’t do anything, but you can”. Even when it
is true, the Minister can’t get all the churches out on their hind legs, it’s still not true. Civil Society doesn’t have its hands on the levers of power and they do. …Gordon Brown, although he was sincere in many ways, he realised this was middle England and he wanted to have middle England on his side. And he wanted to be seen to be on the side of middle England. (Interviewee UK No. 6)

Given the propensity of the chancellor to be a “suffocating ally” (Meyer 2007), it was important that civil society maintain their distance and also “constantly raise the game” pressing the chancellor for greater action. Otherwise there was a danger of losing their credibility (Interviewee UK No. 6).

While the relationship between British organisations and the government were seen as the ‘tightest’, a similar relationship could also operate in other countries particularly when there was convergence of interest. In Norway:

…at certain times Norway had incredible insider contact with the Minister and with officials, with officials playing a similar game as Gordon Brown... chatting about the campaign ...and can the campaign spread that message to colleagues in other parts of Europe. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2)

On the debtor country side, a complex nexus of relationships could also operate between debt campaigners, their governments and creditors. As stated above, among the objectives of debtor country campaigns were to get the debt cancelled, to make sure that savings which ensued were used for the benefit of the population and to prevent a recurrence of the debt crisis. Against this background, debt groups played a dual role of ally of and watchdog on governments. The interests of the debt campaign and government coincided on the urgent need for debt cancellation. At these times, debt campaigns were able to use their particular power as a civil society group to mediate between government and creditors:

It was very clear at that time that ministers and their technocrats, we can’t say this to donors, but you are able to say the same information. So they would come to us and say, can you please help us build an understanding on this particular issue on debt… We also had the numbers to put pressure on donors on the need for debt cancellation. On their own as government, they didn’t have the numbers, they had the authority and power to make decisions but they needed that pressure which only came from the people as organised by the debt campaign. (Interviewee Zambia)

In Uganda, senior finance officials attended UDN meetings and made presentations (Interviewee Uganda), and shared correspondence to the IMF and World Bank (see Chap-
ter 6). The role of the UDN at the time of President Clinton’s visit was acknowledged by the Minister of Finance in a letter to the network:

..domestic NGOs have played a unique role in mobilising public concern at home while coordinating their efforts with international NGOs abroad. Your supplement in the New Vision recently is testament to the impact this kind of action can have and ensured that debt issues were brought to the attention of the public prior to the visit of Mr. Clinton…. The contribution of organisations such as yours has therefore been of immense value. (UDN 1998b)

In Tanzania, NGOs were members of a Government Task Force which drafted a national strategy on debt. Following on from a proposal from Tanzanian Social and Economic Trust (TASOET), a seminar was held for embassy officials in April 1999, in order to increase diplomatic activity on economic issues, as Tanzania moved through the HIPC process (TASOET 1999a). The seminar was opened by the President and NGO proposals on how government and NGOs could work together in lobbying on Tanzania’s debt, were accepted (TASOET 1999b). Subsequently meetings took place at Tanzanian embassies in creditor countries with debt groups to discuss progress on debt reduction for Tanzania, for example in Britain.

The interests of debt campaigns and governments also clashed. While there was good exchange of information, there were also restricted areas. In Zambia one such area related to the debts of particular government ministries. Asking for information on this resulted in “a cooling off from the Ministry, as these were considered sensitive issues” (Interviewee Zambia). There were also differences over civil society’s watchdog role. In 2001 Jubilee Zambia became a member of an independent team monitoring the use by the government of resources released by debt reduction under HIPC. The establishment of the team was seen as the government agreeing to “cede part of its policy space and open its “wardrobes to outside scrutiny!” (Zulu Jones 2007, p.17). In 2003 the HIPC Monitoring team was dissolved, with the government arguing that there was duplication of efforts (Zulu Jones 2007).

The relationship between debt groups and creditors, in particular the IMF and World Bank, was also multi-directional and shot through with coincidences of interest and conflict. Entry by debt groups into monitoring processes on the use of debt savings was achieved largely through donor conditions:

….that government must consult with people for the donors to do their part… because we were negotiating for debt reduction, we were also largely financed
by donors, that is what pushed these ministers to consult but at another level, on a personal level, they saw the rationale. (Interviewee Zambia)

But the debt groups did not see themselves as agents of the creditors when monitoring the use debt savings by their governments; for them the important thing was to reclaim power back into their state, that accountability should be to the public, not just to donors:

When you are talking about conditionality-from-below [a key demand of Jubilee Zambia]. we didn’t want government to account only to donors , reporting to them, ensuring benchmarks were met. At community level government should be able to be account to people openly. (Interviewee Zambia)

Finally, while there may have been a coincidence of interest between debt groups and external creditors on the need for processes to ensure public money was well spent, there was huge divergence in terms of the substantial policies being promoted through adjustment programmes, now renamed Poverty Reduction Strategies. Major concerns for Jubilee Zambia were in relation to the privatisation programme (Jubilee Zambia 2003b). Privatisation conditions attached to HIPC were causing disharmony leaving “Zambia with a political choice between keeping people happy or international institutions happy” (All Party Parliamentary Group on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. 2004, p.57).

Campaigning is usually presented as operating in one direction, with groups - whether powerful industrial groups or civil society activist groups - pressing government to adopt their proposals. A striking dimension of relations between civil society and the state/internationalising state which emerges from Jubilee 2000, however, is its two-way and multi-layered nature, with relationships shifting from consensual to adversarial as gaps open up between civil society concerns and those of government, as was the case with Jubilee Zambia. It is not a simple case of civil society as weaker actors facing strong governments, but each holding different power in particular situations. Creditor and debtor governments sometimes sought Jubilee 2000 support in shifting other international actors (G8 countries, the World Bank) towards a position supported by both government and civil society. The danger in this, as demonstrated by the British case, is the blurring of boundaries between civil society and the state which may damage civil society. The tension created by the instability of the relationship, its tendency towards adversarial engagement in order to protect the perceived autonomy of civil society, probably helps to limit this blurring.
Waxing and waning of political support

The power of Jubilee was not permanent but rather waxed and waned – both in terms of institutionalised spaces for engagement, and government commitment to debt cancellation. Institutionalised engagement took place in a number of countries – Spain, France, Zambia and Uganda, for example - but was short-lived in all except for Uganda, where UDN became embedded in a number of policy processes, including monitoring the Poverty Action Fund (PAF). This fund was set up by the Uganda government in 1998/99 to mobilise resources from debt reduction for the social sectors. Monitoring meetings convened by the government involved international donors, civil society and the media (UDN 1999). In Spain, a sub-commission on debt was set up in the Spanish Senate in December 1999 in which DEDE participated, but the sub-commission was dissolved after the 2000 elections (Vivas 2008). The absolute majority won by the Partido Popular (PP) in 2000 removed the need for political consensus, and the PP was not open to formal processes with civil society (Oliveres 2002). Implementation of the debt law passed by a centre-left government in Italy slowed down following the election of a right-wing government under Berlusconi in 2001 (Gerbaudo and Pianta 2012). Although engagement between civil society and government had not been an established practice in France, Platform Dette et Developpement achieved:

…almost institutional recognition by the Comité coopération développement (CCD) et le Haut Comité à la Coopération Internationale (HCCI), the formal spaces for cooperation between civil and political society. (Merkaert 2005)

This ended with the election of the UMP government in 2002 (Josselin 2007). In Zambia, where the government had cooperated with civil society, the Ministry of Finance withdrew from active engagement with the debt movement once debt reduction was achieved. Geopolitical interests were the cause of the waxing of US support for debt cancellation in 2003, when cancellation of Iraq debt became a requirement to get the US Congress to agree funds for reconstruction in Iraq. Congress was unwilling to provide funds to Iraq in case some of this might be used to repay other creditors, especially G8 countries who had refused to join the ‘coalition of the willing’ in its war against Iraq, such as France, and Germany. France took the position that they could not justify providing enormous debt reduction to Iraq, while refusing to do so for much poorer countries, and was backed by Germany. As a result, the US declared its support for 100% multilateral debt cancellation for HIPC's (Helleiner and Cameron 2006). Debt
reduction for Iraq was agreed in 2004, and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative for HIPC was announced by the G8 in 2005.

Government commitment to debt cancellation also waned. While German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s policy shift set in motion the debt ‘norm cascade’ in January 1999 (Yanacopulos 2004), by the 2000 G7 summit in Okinawa, he was reluctant to support more debt cancellation, and this hardening of position continued into later years. In France, debt was rarely mentioned by French political figures before 2001, but by January 2002 party leaders expressing support for debt cancellation ranged from the National Front to the Socialist Party. By 2005, however, the French government was hostile to UK/US proposals for multilateral debt cancellation (Josselin 2007). While the Irish government broke the debt nébuleuse consensus, launching a policy supporting total cancellation of IMF and World Bank to the HIPC in July 2002, they took virtually no action to promote that policy (Dáil Éireann 2002).

There appears to have been a definite relationship between left/centre-left governments holding power and progress at national level on debt - in Italy, Spain, Germany, France, and Britain - suggesting greater space for civil society/state alliances at such times. The relationship should not be overstated, however, as, for example in Britain, conservative governments had already been very proactive on debt throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and German SPD government support for debt cancellation was short-lived. UK and US support for 100% multilateral debt cancellation in 2005 can be seen as a mixture of the continued waxing of Gordon Brown’s support for Jubilee 2000, and new geopolitical issues which arose for the US from 2003, a historically specific event.

Reflections on Modes of Engagement

As the campaign spread widely across the south and north of the globe, involving various cultures, historical and political contexts, Jubilee 2000 was finely balanced between different perspectives partially reflecting a south/north divide. Apart from issues discussed above, there were also differences on how to pursue debt cancellation. The debate was between whether the important thing was to build Jubilee 2000 as a social movement over time, so that it could contest power rather than policy (Bendaña 2006), or whether the aim should be to maximise short-term gains through campaigning and lobbying tactics. The emergence of Jubilee South as an autonomous southern voice using a structural analysis reflected this debate on the degree of change sought and how this could be achieved.
For Jubilee Peru the art was to combine mobilisation and engagement – with greater emphasis on mobilisations when governments were unresponsive:

Jubilee Peru tried to always do technical work articulated with mobilisation. Without dialogue with officials and without proposals we aren’t going to advance. (Interviewee Jubilee Peru)

Different actors can play different roles as was the case in Spain with DEDE consisting of four Catholic bodies (Oliveres 2002), and RCADE, a radical citizens’ movement (Vivas 2008), taking very different approaches:

There is an advantage in having different kinds of actors doing things which are somehow complementary to each other. And I think the role of social movements [RCADE] is building this kind of anger, this kind of radical sense of injustice, and we can do this as NGOs in a different way and have more pragmatic, constructive proposals. (Interviewee Spain)

How a mixed engagement/mobilisation approach operated was elaborated on by an Irish interviewee:

There was this public support in a certain cohort of the population that was always dogged, a bit blunt ‘I am everyman/woman and this is what I think’. The ordinary person’s campaign, on the street or writing letters, meeting officials. I think maybe that was something that mobilised the government... they were aware that this wasn’t a flash in the pan. and then I think the good technical relations with the debt policy people. (Interviewee Ireland No. 4)

Insider/outsider alliances may emerge, as officials in Departments of Finance, World Bank and IMF are not monolithic but have people within:

.. who are frustrated at the pace of change, about the policy line which was coming down and for whom sometimes the only way forward is to ‘call on external persons to sound alarm bells’. This is done by discreetly building up trust with key organisations, for example Eurodad, and this is a reasonable role for Eurodad to play. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2)

Some large NGOs have employees whose role it is to:

…build insider relationships. Getting too close to power means that groups...know more of the details of official debates, and that knowledge is power, but proximity to power can also be negative because it means that they are too much in sway of current realpolitik rather than the point view of people in groups which debt reduction is meant to help. So there is a danger of some
NGOs becoming an extension of the civil service rather than an extension of the activist base. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2)

The danger of being transformed by power rather than transforming power has a cultural as well as a political dimension:

As NGOs became more professional they are employing people who spend time at committees and in meetings….if you put people together, over time, people internalise the discourse, the same language in policy circles.. how people dress, behave in a certain way, and move from a radical to a polished policy person. (Interviewee Ireland No. 3)

Lobbying could also be seen as having more prestige than mobilisation “coming back to your office, saying you have seen the Prime Minister, rather than saying I met with a group of 5 young people who are organising…” (Interviewee Sweden), but this was balanced by the fact that these engagements with the state/internationalising state were unattractive to some activists: “I got fed up with these closed meetings with IMF/World Bank/Finance, they were so dull” (ibid.). Significant cultural differences were perceived between north and south of Europe in approaches to the recruitment of people:

…but because they were very good communicators, good organisers, but not recruited because they were politically engaged or they were activists in campaigning. In France, Belgium, Spain the culture is people who are leading this type of coalition are more militant, more activist. (Interviewee Belgium No. 2)

Engagement was seen as having a motivational impact on supporters, giving them “a sense that things are happening, people are listening to us; it isn’t only that we are right but we have influence” (Interviewee Spain). Access to decision makers also gave credibility to campaigning groups with their funders, and with the media (Interviewee Ireland No. 5). Even from a conflictual perspective, while the long-term aim may be “to strengthen our power and weaken theirs”, but “it is difficult to sustain mobilisation without engagement and victories. The art is to judge when the time to engage is, and when to mobilise” (Interviewee Philippines/Jubilee South). There were costs to engagement, however. Access is usually to the few: “when the door is opened, there are a lot stuck behind the door, being excluded by the fact that the door is being opened” (Interviewee Ireland No. 5). While UDN was afforded significant access to monitor government policy, supporting the community based monitoring teams came at a high cost, putting:
...pressure on the financial, technical and material resources of UDN. Sustaining the interests of the communities in budget monitoring is another challenge. Since monitors are volunteers, some of them have either got compromised or abandoned the work whereas others have been bribed not to reveal monitored mal-practice. (UDN 2003, p.6)

Further, the space achieved by UDN is a ‘donated one’ - while some civil society inputs can be seen in government plans, endorsement by key donors is necessary before items are included. “Someone once joked that donors have become citizens of Uganda given their influence” (Kandyomunda 2004).

The mobilisation/engagement debate is one which cuts across many social movements and campaigns. There are irreducible differences due to different political perspectives, involving different levels of change aimed at, different understandings of how change takes place, and also the fact that the debt problem impacted very differently in the south. These differences could be modified by maintaining a sharper, unpredictable edge; avoiding engagement led by ‘polished policy’ people; and pursuing engagement in the public arena as far as possible, rather than behind the scenes lobbying.

7.6 Conclusion

Jubilee 2000 emerged as a new moment in debt campaigning, as a transnational social movement. Particularly significant was the degree of mobilisation – across a wide range of social sectors and a very wide geographic span, including a significant southern involvement. A further striking feature was that Jubilee 2000 was not a homogenous actor, but contained within itself conflicting analyses of the debt crisis, and the degree of change sought. This concluding section first assesses how Jubilee 2000 exercised power to bring about change through knowledge, geography and modes of engagement. This is followed by an assessment of what was achieved by Jubilee 2000.

*Exercising power to bring about change*

Jubilee 2000’s impact on debt policy resulted primarily from their power of mobilisation, rather than the persuasiveness of their better argument, or their moral authority. The argument was won in the first instance with the public due to mobilisation rather than through persuasion via the myriad of engagements which took place with the state/internationalising state. The fact that the biblical basis of the message resonated with the cultural values (Christian) of major world leaders, however, made the argument
more persuasive to some decision makers. Among the individuals for whom the Christian message resonated were: Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mayo 2005); Michel Camdessus, IMF Managing Director 1987-2000 (Interviewee Ireland No. 4); and Jesse Helms, Chair of the US Foreign Relations Committee (Busby 2007). It was, however, the wish to be associated with the legitimacy of the mobilised power of Jubilee which led political leaders to make new debt proposals.

In terms of the geography of power, while Jubilee 2000 confirms the domestic embeddedness of transnational campaigning (Josselin 2007), the existence different national political and cultural contexts, do not provide the full explanation of the centrality of domestic action. Debt groups were attempting to pull states back from the non-transparent debt nébuleuse, and to situate the struggle over debt within established national political processes. While the particular issues were different for debt groups in debtor and creditor countries, it is significant that the national focus was equally true for all.

The paradox is that parallel to its domestic embeddedness, Jubilee 2000 was a very high profile transnational campaign. Applying the explanations of the national/transnational interface provided by Dryzek (1999) and Drainville (2005b), neither is fully satisfactory. Dryzek’s argument that the lack of strong institutionalisation at international level provides transnational civil society with greater discursive opportunities does not fit with the domestic embeddedness of Jubilee. Drainville’s distinction between national and transnational levels in relation to the presence or absence of social hegemony offers the potential for a deeper analysis of the different approaches possible based on a wider set of factors than institutional openness or discursive opportunities and most importantly how these interact. This distinction, however, needs to be further developed.

In terms of the south/north interface, Jubilee 2000 involved ‘advocates for’ those directly affected and ‘activists from’ those directly affected. Networks with this composition are seen as vulnerable to break down (Reitan 2007, Keck and Sikkink 1998). Tensions within Jubilee led to a reformulation of the relationship, with the establishment of an autonomous Jubilee South. The emergence of Jubilee South challenged the second face of power in terms of opening up the agenda setting process (Bachrach and Baratz 1962), and resulted in illegitimate debt gaining a higher priority. As a result, some progress was achieved in terms of repudiation of illegitimate debt (Ecuador), cancellation of illegitimate debt (Norway), and breaking the taboo on illegitimate debt by placing it on the agenda of the debt nébuleuse, albeit not centre stage.
In relation to modes of engagement, the mobilisation versus engagement debate within Jubilee 2000 brings to the fore again the question of the relationship between civil society and the state/internationalising state. The relationships between Jubilee 2000 and the state-internationalising state were different from those in the previous case study. Rather than relationships resulting largely from the emerging global norm of participation as in the early part of the 1990s, in the case of Jubilee 2000, the legitimacy gained because of its mobilising power drew parts of the debt nébuleuse towards the debt campaign. Alliances which emerged can be seen as of convenience when there are overlapping or coinciding interests, or of conviction where there are shared beliefs. In terms of alliance of convenience, Evans (2000) and Friesen (2012) both of whom apply Polanyi’s double movement to transnational activism, highlight defensive reasons for why parts of the internationalising state might ally with global justice movements. Evans argues that if transnational economic elites want to ensure global governance protects global markets, “they may have no choice but to ally with groups that want to use global governance to institutionalise social rights, and improve well-being” (Evans 2000, p.240). According to Friesen (2012), the WEF became advocates for debt cancellation in the run up to the G8 in 2005 because they feared a backlash against global capitalism, but also because they believed this was the right thing to do. In this context, Friesen defines the WEF as part of a Polanyian double movement. Some muddying of the waters may be happening here. Polanyi’s counter-movement was made up of very different social forces (landed class and working class), but both were threatened by the self-regulating market. Today this would probably translate into alliances of convenience between non-globalising capital, manufacturing in particular, and civil society groups and social movements critical of current globalisation. We need to keep a distinction between Polanyi’s counter-movement and Gramsci’s consensual civil society if both concepts are to maintain their analytical sharpness. Rather than see the WEF as part of a double movement as does Friesen, this research places this body as part of the internationalising state, playing a role as part of consensus-making civil society.

Regarding alliances of conviction, as can be seen from Jubilee 2000, progress on debt at national level was more likely to happen under a left/centre-left than a right-wing government. But even when there are shared values and beliefs, civil society and states have different logics. In Latin America, while there was ideological congruence with progressive governments over issues such as debt audits, difficulties arose in relation to government support for mining projects, which caused serious conflicts with indigenous people (Interviewee Jubilee Peru). In the UK, Gordon Brown became a
“smothering ally” (Meyer 2007) to MPH, to the consternation of NGOs who were in conflict with Labour over its neoliberal trade policies (Nash 2008, p.175). Civil society and the state/internationalising state are therefore in permanent tension with each other – with some parts of civil society engaging with decision makers and more radical elements acting as a rebalancing force, pulling the former groups towards more radical positions, as did Jubilee South. reviewing a number of transnational campaigns including Jubilee 2000, Cox (2011, p.5) states that radical groups “have a strong record of trailblazing, shifting the political centre of gravity, and investing in controversial policy areas and making them safe over time”. Jubilee 2000 shows how radical positions can rebalance movement towards new ‘good sense’ and away from framings too closely with current ‘common sense’, which, while challenging decision makers on particular policies, can at the same time legitimise their power.

Assessing Jubilee 2000

There were a number of significant shifts in debt policy as a result of Jubilee 2000, namely the Cologne debt deal 1999, and the MDRI 2005 emanating from the debt nébuleuse. The former increased the amount of debt cancellation available, releasing money into government budgets. The MLDRI agreed to write off 100% of debt owed to the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank by countries which had completed the HIPC process. This led to further debt reduction and the end of IMF programmes in countries such as Zambia. Shifts on illegitimate debt took place outside the central forces of the debt nébuleuse, as a result of action by Norway and Ecuador (Molina Vera 2008; Abildnes 2007). The progress on illegitimate debt can be seen as fracturing the dominant paradigm which shapes the creditor/debtor relationship, resulting in cracks from which greater change may be leveraged (Holloway 2010).

There were limitations to this change. While the moral arguments of Jubilee are seen as causing norm change (Friesen 2012, Yanacopulos 2004, Broome 2009), this was applied to increasing the amount of debt cancellation, but HIPC continued as a creditor dominated mechanism, with no acceptance of co-responsibility for the crisis or the need for a fair and independent procedure to deal with debt. Nor did debtor governments set up a debtor cartel to repudiate debt. Adjustment conditions attached to debt cancellation continued in place, and new social conditionality was introduced requiring governments to spend debt savings through Poverty Reduction Strategies developed together with civil society. This fits with Sikkink’s argument that the degree of independence of norms and power affects the possibility of changing international policy. Power and
norms are fused in the case of adjustment, which can be seen as part of the “new constitutionalism” through which neoliberal policies are “locked in” into the future (Gill 1998). This insulates dominant economic forces from democratic rule. In the case of debt, however, there is space to challenge the norm against cancellation.

To what extent can these changes be attributed to debt campaigning, and to what extent were creditors driven by other interests? It seems indisputable that the shifts on illegitimate debt resulted from pressure from Jubilee 2000, as the issue was not even open to discussion until pressure was mounted by campaigners. The increase in debt cancellation at Cologne can also be attributed to Jubilee 2000, given that the debt issue was considered closed after HIPC was adopted in 1996, and the role of Jubilee 2000 in changing international debt policy was acknowledged by parts of the debt nébuleuse. The reasons for the adoption of the MDRI are more complex and it is difficult to disentangle the relative contributions of the Jubilee 2000 element within MPH/Global Call to Action against Poverty, the continued support for debt cancellation by Chancellor Gordon Brown, and the geopolitical interests of the US in relation to Iraq’s debt. The key question is: to what extent did the high-profile for debt gained by Jubilee 2000 contribute to low-income country debt becoming an issue in the power struggle within the G7 over the cancellation of Iraq’s debt (Helleiner and Cameron 2006)? In a parallel situation, in 1991, there were overwhelming political reasons to write down Polish and Egyptian debt (Evans 1999, p.276). In the case of Poland, the motivation was to support the free market reforms being implemented, and Egypt was rewarded for its support to the West in the Gulf War (Nduru 1991c). The G7 Communiqué in 1991 referring to Poland and Egypt’s generous debt deals stresses that these were exceptional cases (G7 1991). Debt cancellation for Iraq, however, could not be treated as an exceptional case because of public awareness about the debt of low-income countries generated by debt campaigners. In this context, US support for the MDRI was a quid pro quo for G7 support for debt cancellation for Iraq.

While J2000 partially demobilised at the end of 2000, many campaigns continued to operate and positioned themselves with, and contributed to, the development of the emerging anti-globalisation/global justice movement and the WSF. Debt campaigners were part of the mobilisation at the WTO in Seattle in 1999, the mobilisations in Prague 2000 (anti-IMF and World Bank) and in Genoa 2001 (anti-G7). The actual contribution of Jubilee 2000 to the development of globalised resistance to neoliberalism needs a study in itself.
Conclusions

Everything has been globalised except our consent. Democracy alone has been confined to the nation state. It stands at the national border, suitcase in hand without a passport. (Monbiot 2003, p.1)

Monbiot’s quote above resonates with the quote from Beck at the start of this thesis regarding the lack of democracy and accountability in a globalising world. The absence of such formal global representational processes has not, as shown by this study, prevented human agency and ingenuity from finding ways to challenge governments and IGOs. The main findings of a study of one example of such human agency, transnational debt campaigning, are summarised below, followed by a more detailed discussion.

Firstly, in terms of the nature of the power of transnational civil society, the study has expanded our understandings of the south/north relationship, a key fault-line in the common cause on which the power of transnational civil society is based. It has revealed this relationship as a dynamic one driven by solidarity and conflict, where southern groups’ challenges to northern dominance have reconfigured the relationship, adjusted the nature of the engagement and changed the agenda.

Secondly, as regards the uses of knowledge, the study has shown that it is the power of mobilisation rather than the power of ideas which most impacted on decision makers. Further, rather than moral discourse being the dominant use of knowledge by debt campaigns, discourses situating the debt problem in the context of structural inequalities were also used, both linked with moral discourse at times and submerged in more ambiguous discourses of ‘justice’ at other times when structural discourses could not be heard.

Thirdly, using the concept of the internationalising state, the operation of transnational civil society across the national/international interface has been explained not just as the domestic embeddedness of transnational campaigning, but as a form of resistance to the internationalising state, with debt campaigns seeking to rearticulate how states mediate between the international arena and domestic societies.

Fourthly, the examination of the mechanisms through which debt campaigns engaged with the state/internationalising state revealed how these two sectors can become interlinked. The ensuing blurring of boundaries is resisted by civil society determination to protect its self-identity as an independent autonomous sector and by the state wishing to protect its authority. This highlights the importance of taking into account civil society’s own narrative of its autonomy and the continual rebalancing which takes place within civil society because of the interaction between more contentious and more con-
sensual forces. In the context of the dominant explanation of social movements, political opportunity structures, this study provides strong evidence that opportunities are created in the interaction between civil society campaigns and the state/internationalising state over time, rather than mainly appearing as factors external to civil society.

The understanding of power used bridges between Lukes’ (2005) understanding of power as potential and Foucault’s (1980) insistence that studies of power should concentrate on the exercise of power. Power as potential was operationalised by debt campaigns making common cause on the debt crisis and how to solve it, and this common cause was then leveraged through different discourses on debt, how debt campaigns operated across the national/international interface and different modes of engagement with decision makers. The focus of the study is on the agency of transnational civil society actors and how they create and exercise power, but agency always operates within a context, and the structural context highlighted in this study is the internationalising state. This involves a changing relationship between the national and international arenas and between the state and capital with state accountability reoriented externally. The contrast between the consensus making processes at international level and institutional political processes at national level provides a further element to this multilayered concept. It is against and in interaction with this structural backdrop that transnational civil society campaigning for debt cancellation is analysed.

Through leveraging the power of their common cause, debt movements contributed to changing debt policy over the course of the period studied, though they did not achieve all of their desired solutions. Changes fell far short of what was being sought by debt campaigns both in terms of the level of cancellation called for and in the power relations in relation to debt including an end to IMF/World Bank conditionality and to creditor domination of the processes through which international debt policy was implemented. Other than the 1999 Cologne debt deal, where the impact of Jubilee 2000 can be seen as a dominant influence, there were other factors influencing the adoption of the various debt deals. Among the influences leading to the adoption of the 1988 Toronto Terms were civil society campaigning, competition between Britain and France over which would lead on initiatives in relation to Africa (Lawson 1992), and other action such as that taken by the OAU. The stimulus for the 1989 Brady Bonds were uprisings in Caracas against debt-related austerity programmes giving rise to US security concerns at such serious unrest in a close neighbour and general ‘debt fatigue’ in the international system after a decade of the debt crisis. The introduction of HIPC in 1996
resulted from pressure from a number of smaller European creditor countries as well as from debt campaigns. The 2005 MDRI again resulted from a complex interaction between past and contemporaneous debt campaigning and US policy priorities arising from its war with Iraq.

**Struggling for debt cancellation within and against the internationalising state: an overview**

Debt campaigns interacted with and were impacted on by a dramatically changing world order over the period covered in this study. The relationship, however, was neither a simple adversarial one, nor can civil society be seen as an integral part of global governmentality (Foucault 2008), nor as part of consensus making civil society (Gramsci 1971). Not only did the relationship differ over different periods of world order, but there was a dynamic within civil society which continually rebalanced the relationship between those who were engaging deeply with the debt nôbuleuse and those seeking to shift debt campaigning towards more radical positions. As the neoliberal counter-revolution gathered speed during the 1980s, some civil society groups resisted, holding on to radical discourses such as the NIEO, liberation theology and continuing solidarity with revolutionary governments and struggles. When it became clear that a major shift in world order was underway, while some debt groups still had their hopes for a different world, they became more pragmatic, looking for incremental change rather than transformation. With the emergence of the global norm of civil society participation, many debt groups became deeply engaged with the debt nôbuleuse. During this period debt campaigning came close to a Foucauldian understanding of civil society as “the correlate of a political technology of government” (Foucault 2008, p.296). Working from their position as relatively autonomous civil society, campaigns formed alliances with progressive debt nôbuleuse insiders in order to solve the debt crisis. This relationship was balanced, however, by other forces within civil society who maintained an anti-systemic discourse on debt and did not get deeply enmeshed in the debt nôbuleuse. Consensual and adversarial elements within civil society were not parallel forces, but cooperated from time to time and through this, created rebalancing spaces which re-centred consensual debt groups within a broader spectrum of civil society.

Triumphant neoliberalism began to fracture as early as 1994 due to a cycle of financial crises and challenges from social movements nationally and transnationally. Rather than emerging as a response to these strains in world order, however, Jubilee 2000
created a new opportunity to mobilise public support through leveraging the symbolism of the millennium and achieving a high international profile. Through its success in popularising the debt issue, Jubilee 2000 shifted the centre of gravity from the power of the global norm of participation emanating from the debt nébuleuse to the power of public mobilisation. Rather than debt groups being pulled towards engagement with the debt nébuleuse, political leaders were drawn to associate themselves with the legitimacy arising from the huge public support generated by Jubilee 2000. As in the previous phase of campaigning, Jubilee 2000 was not homogeneous, but contained both consensual and anti-systemic elements. The interaction – and sometimes clashes – between these different positions rebalanced debt campaigning towards a more radical position which framed debt as illegitimate and created a fracture in the power relations on debt by succeeding in getting some illegitimate debt cancelled.

Creating power, exercising power

While few debt campaigners could have envisaged the long journey which lay ahead as they took up the debt issue in the 1980s, the ability to create and maintain common cause over the long terms was central to how they actualised power as potential. This involved negotiating different political, cultural and historical contexts and the power relations which resulted from the fact that campaigns were based in countries positioned differently within the internationalising state. While Northern NGOs were criticised for their over focus on short-term success (Interviewee Italy; Interviewee Uganda; Jubilee Zambia 2003), many of them maintained their involvement over the period albeit that their support ebbed and flowed. It is significant that, other than in the case of the Debt Treaty Movement, there was no effort to set up an overarching transnational structure beyond regional networks such as Afrodad, Eurodad, and Latindadd. Even in the case of Jubilee 2000 with its wide geographic reach, members opted to operate through horizontal communication channels rather than set up an international secretariat (Buxton 2002). The value of this loose, decentred form is that it can recede and regenerate itself and can also absorb tensions and conflicts. Unlike political parties with centralised organisational structures, and manifestoes demanding consensus, the horizontal form of the network structure was seen as facilitative, enabling people to work together without spending a lot of time making agreements and resolving differences. A weakness was the inability of the network structure to deal with inequalities between members, particularly those which were a reflection of the structural inequalities generated from outside
the network, and therefore the south/north interface became a particular fault line. Over the case study period, there were two efforts to set up structured south/north working, through Fondad in the 1980s and Jubilee 2000 from the late 1990s. Both of these efforts foundered on issues of leadership and decision making with northern groups seen as dominant, reflecting their more powerful position of their states within the internationalising state.

Turning to the exercise of power, the questions asked in relation to the geography of power were: how did debt groups operate across the national/international interface; did they focus on their states or bypass the state; and were their strategies affected by how their respective countries are integrated into the internationalising state? The findings in relation to these questions were very clear. The focus of campaigning across the three case study periods was primarily on changing policies of national governments. This applied to all campaigns, irrespective of their country’s position within the internationalising state and also irrespective of ideological positions. The importance of this finding is not so much that it confirms the domestic embeddedness of transnational campaigning (Josselin 2007; Tarrow 2005), but that while contesting international policy on debt, campaigns were also contesting the national/international interface by seeking to rearticulate their governments away from the internationalising state consensus and towards accountability to their citizens. The demands made by campaigns on governments, however, did vary in relation to their positions within the internationalising state. For debtor country campaigns, the focus was on changing national policy in relation to the country’s debt problem. FDC called for repeal of the law enabling automatic appropriation of debt servicing from the budget and Jubilee Guayaquil pressed the Ecuadorian government not to repay illegitimate debt. Campaigns from creditor countries weakly positioned within the internationalising state pressed their governments to break the international consensus, for example, Ireland on funding ESAF and Norway on illegitimate debt. Campaign groups in G7 countries where the national and international arenas were fused could press their governments and the debt nébuleuse simultaneously, as in the case of Oxfam’s 1986 campaign when they pressed the British government both as national government and as a member of the G7, IMF and World Bank (Clark 1986). Campaign groups, therefore, chose to operate mostly within the formal processes/social hegemony at national level (Drainville 2005a) rather than dedicate themselves to the discourse opportunities available at transnational level (Dryzek 1999).

Discourses were key to mobilising the public and to challenging decision makers. The questions for this research were to what extent did debt campaigns a) engage in
contestation on the technical understandings of the debt nébuleuse; b) frame the debt issue to resonate with cultural understandings; and c) introduce alternative counter-discourses? Underpinning these questions is another question, who was the main campaign target; the public, elected decision makers, or the technical experts of the debt nébuleuse? While debt movements are best known publicly for their ‘moral discourse’ (Broome 2009; Busby 2007; Yanacopolus 2004; Grenier 2003), structural, technical and moral discourses were all used. During the 1980s the debt problem was presented as a symptom of unequal south/north relations and linked to calls for a NIEO. When conjunctural conditions at the beginning of the 1990s placed structural discourses outside of the neoliberal ‘truth regime’, so that those discourses could not be heard even as oppositional positions, technical analysis became a strong part of transnational civil society’s approach. During the Jubilee 2000 campaign, there was a particular intermingling of moral and structural critiques, but the power of mobilisation rather than the power of their moral discourse was what impacted on decision makers. This shifts the emphasis away from the power of ideas, based on the attractiveness of the norms promoted, and towards power based in the legitimacy gained because of the levels of mobilisation which those ideas generated. Winning the argument at this broader public level enabled more radical discourses on illegitimate debt to be (partially) heard by the debt nébuleuse.

Modes of engagement also shifted over the decades from adversarial action against austerity in debtor countries, against banks in creditor countries, and against internationalising state summits in the 1980s to more consensual engagement in the early 1990s, followed by a complex mixture of mobilisation and institutional advocacy by Jubilee 2000. An examination of the long struggle for debt cancellation reveals the interlinked nature of the relationships between civil society and the state/internationalising state which lies behind this shifting repertoire of action. It was not a case of an autonomous normative civil society, as conceptualised in liberal theory, leveraging political opportunities, as claimed in social movement theory, but through continual contestation over time campaigners generated the opportunities and relations with the state/internationalising state which contributed to policy change. While key events are cited as political opportunities for debt campaigns, for example, the appointment of James Wolfensohn as President of the World Bank in 1995 and the election of a Labour government in the UK in 1997, their support for debt cancellation was not an external factor introduced by these new actors, but was generated by past and contemporaneous campaigning. Nor was the relationship between civil society and the
state/internationalising state one way. Debtor country governments sought debt campaigns’ support in putting pressure on the country’s creditors, while creditor governments used their relationship with debt campaigns to seek to influence oppositional governments. Progress was also made on national debt policy in the context of ‘alliances of conviction’ with left-wing governments in Europe and in Latin America. In the Philippines FDC was able to leverage links with government members who came from the progressive movement (Encarnacion Tadem 2009, p.228). It was, however, the interaction of the mobilising power of debt campaigns with the ‘alliances of conviction’ between debt movements and governments which was a key factor. Left-wing governments choose from the myriad of issues being promoted by civil society the ones with which they will engage most positively, and their decisions are likely to be influenced by the degree of public support for a particular issue. Given civil society’s strong self-identity as an autonomous sector, there are fears that too close relations with the state/internationalising state will lead to a blurring of boundaries. Those interviewed during this study, for example, generally rejected the term ‘alliance’ as describing their relationships with governments; even when there was a degree of consensus. While state and civil society may not be as autonomous of each other as civil society narratives suggest, both sectors operate within different logics and exercise different forms of power. While the state has the authority to make decisions, civil society has the power of mobilisation. There are continual tensions with civil society groups seeking to evade the blurring of boundaries with the state-internationalising state by reaffirming their autonomy while seeking to maintain and extend access achieved. In contrast, states may be happy to blur boundaries when they seek to associate themselves with the legitimacy of mobilised civil society, but maintain their authority to reset these boundaries.

**Further questions in relation to the power of transnational civil society**

There are a number of further questions raised by this study relating to the two research questions. The question in relation to the source of power is what does this study reveal about the south/north relationship, key to the creation of transnational common cause? In terms of the exercise of power, a key question is what level of challenge did the debt campaigns pose to the internationalising state?

This thesis demonstrates that the south/north relationship was a dynamic one driven by the continual interaction of solidarity and conflict in an effort to escape the impact of the inequalities of the internationalising state. This process meant that power
differences were continually challenged, and new solidarities were developed in an effort to address these inequalities, leading to new contradictions. Difficulties were not only due to power differentials between the south and north, as these existed also within the north between G7 and non-G7 countries, for example, but were also due to the different mechanisms through which southern states were restructured within the internationalising state. These differences were reflected back into transnational civil society along the south/north interface, and in the case of debt, structural inequalities created a stark divide between creditor and debtor countries. Tensions arising from these differences related to both northern dominance within debt campaigning, but also to the levers of power which could be operated by northern groups within the internationalising state. Conditionality was a key disciplining tool of the debt nébuleuse and a major area of contention within transnational debt movements. Some northern groups advocated ‘positive conditionality’ in order to pressure southern governments to direct resources towards marginalised people, while southern groups resisted the redirection of state accountability outwards towards the debt nébuleuse.

A number of the processes which promote or maintain the unequal south/north relationship were highlighted by this study. There is the fundamental difficulty in maintaining networks made up of participants who are directly affected by the problem (debt) and participants motivated by altruism, as highlighted in chapter 1. This difficulty was confirmed in this study, with both coordinated south/north networks Fondad and Jubilee 2000 fracturing along the south/north fault line. There were a range of issues in relation to how campaigns were designed and how they operated, which contributed to the emergence of these fractures. An underlying question is: to whose strengths did the campaigns play, to the celebrity/media-dominated northern arena or to the greater mobilisation potential, knowledge and experience of groups in the south? In terms of understandings of the debt crisis used, where did these resonate most? While the concept of illegitimate debt was a strong mobilising force in the south, human development framings which resonated better with northern decision makers and media dominated campaigning in the 1990s. Northern NGOs tended to assume leadership and were therefore better able to leverage the power of their greater access to powerful decision makers, international media and celebrities and to design campaigns to fit with their own organisational need for short-term success. There was also the ambiguous role of funding of southern groups by northern NGOs. While funding was a form of solidarity, it could also operate as a form control. As pointed out by Buxton (2002) and Keet (2000), both of whom were involved in debt campaigning, in the UK and South Africa respectively,
northern NGO donors could choose to support groups most closely aligned with their own perspectives and so strengthen an NGOs’ overall power position within debt campaigns. A further issue was the tendency of northern groups to claim the universal – their campaigns were ‘international’ while southern campaigns were defined as ‘southern’.

While some theorists identify action to be taken by northern groups as the way to rebalance inequalities between south and north within civil society (de Senillosa 1998, Katz 2006), debt movements point to the importance of southern agency in the relationship. It was southern groups’ initiative in setting up an autonomous southern movement, Jubilee South, which helped rebalance the relationship within Jubilee 2000. This rebalancing took place through a contestation of the ‘second face of power’, challenging northern-dominated design and framing of campaigns and how decisions were made. This led to a reconfiguration of power within debt movements, with different forms of south/north engagement, greater emphasis on southern priorities (illegitimate debt) and dispersed leadership.

Looking to the future of the south/north relations within transnational civil society common cause, a number of questions can be raised following on from this study. One question is whether the south/north relationship will continue to evolve through a process of struggle, as occurred within debt movements, or to what extent will the relationship change with the reconfiguration of world power, as countries like India and Brazil are now members of the G20? A further question is the extent to which southern groups are now able to represent themselves directly to international decision makers, rather than relying on northern advocacy, given the wider access to information and communication technologies.

Looking more deeply into the power of transnational civil society, the question arises to what extent debt campaigns have posed a transformative challenge to dominant neoliberalism. This question translates broadly into the familiar dichotomy of reform/revolution. Reforms are changes which can be contained within current power relations and which may reinforce the system by alleviating some of the strains which, if left to fester, could lead to deeper fractures. Revolutionary change brings about fundamental change to existing power relations. Given the remarkable survival capacity of capitalism illustrated by its long history compared to the seventy-odd years that communism survived, established categories of the 19th and early 20th centuries (revolution and reform) have lost their sharp definitions. Further, as highlighted by Gramsci, transformative strategies do not necessarily involve a full frontal attack on dominant power,
but rather a long struggle to change current public understandings into a new ‘good sense’. For such a struggle to be maintained, milestones are needed on the way, many of which will coincide with reformist single-issue demands such as debt cancellation, with interim victories boosting the motivation for struggle. Judging whether movements or campaigns reinforce or challenge the system is often a politically charged question and unleashes power struggles between activists. Foucault highlights how contentious these distinctions can be for left-wing movements, pointing to the difference between “the critique of reformism as a political practice and the critique of a political practice on the grounds that it may give rise to a reform”, pointing out that a critique of a strategy on the grounds that it may give rise to a reform “is frequent in left-wing groups and its employment is part of the mechanisms of micro-terrorism by which they have often operated” (Foucault 1980, p.143). Such power struggles do not assist in helping answer the question how well we can at this time read what are likely to be, in the longer term, system-supporting and system-challenging elements, given that there are no longer any revolutionary certainties (Holloway 2005). The degree to which theorists of anti-systemic challenges have recourse to Gramscian and Polanyian explanations suggests that our thinking on this issue may be over influenced by categories which need to be rethought.

Further, there is an ethical as well as a political dimension to the question of reform and revolution: which takes priority, a long struggle to challenge the system or tackling the immediate and serious threats to people’s welfare and their very survival? This is the context within which the question of the level of challenge of transnational debt campaigns is set.

Overall, although they contained radical elements, debt campaigns did not pose a fundamental challenge to the system, but neither were they an uncritical part of apolitical global problem-solving. Rather, they created fractures in the dominant system by how they operated across the national/international interface, rearticulating the relationship between states and the internationalising state, through their counter-discourses and in their contribution to the emergence of and participation in the wider anti-globalisation movement.

In terms of operating across the national/international interface, the priority given to national decision makers has emerged strongly in this research. Rather than accept the shrinkage of space for contestation at national level due to economic globalisation, debt groups sought to enlarge this space by pushing issues of debt and adjustment into the national public arena, pressing parliaments to take responsibility to monitor gov-
ernments’ involvement in the debt nébuleuse (creditor countries) or for accepting lending from the debt nébuleuse (debtor countries). Debt campaigning can therefore be seen as posing a challenge to the internationalisation of the state, seeking to shift government accountability back to citizens through instituting ‘conditionality from below’. This contributed to a politicisation of international policy on debt, highlighting the unequal power relations within which the crisis was generated and dealt with. Part of this process involved revealing the unaccountable operation and lack of transparency of the institutions of the debt nébuleuse, the IMF and G7 in particular.

The emphasis on the moral discourse of debt campaigns conceals their underlying structural dimensions. A striking finding of this study is how structural and moral discourses were interlinked, raising questions as to whether they can be totally separated. The meshing of moral and structural discourses in the 1980s can be seen from the strong moral discourse at the debt conference convened by Castro in 1985 (Osorio 1987). Later in the 1990s, the Religious Working Group (1997) included moral and structural elements in their critique. While Jubilee South’s discourse was based on a strong structural critique, they did not distance themselves from the religious basis of Jubilee, but rather identified aspects which resonated with their analysis (Jubilee South 1999). In this context it can be argued that, in the face of the closure of discourse space in the early 1990s, the structural discourses of the 1980s were partly submerged in moral discourse with the emphasis on looser concepts of justice rather than on unequal power relations. Arguments about the illegitimacy of debt while containing a moral dimension – it was ‘wrong’ to reclaim debt which had not benefited people – also strongly challenged the power relations of debt by shifting responsibility to the creditors.

The final question to be explored in this section is the extent to which debt campaigns can be seen as part of the anti-globalisation movement/global social justice movements. Single-issue campaigns tend to be examined in the literature separately from the broader multi-issue movements. As highlighted in Chapter 1, however, Bennett (2005) brings together these two forms of activism, arguing that while there are major differences and tensions between them, they operate within overlapping networks. As pointed out by Reitan (2007), Jubilee 2000 contained elements of both forms of activism, bridging the two approaches, with both forms involved in the World Social Forum, and as can be seen from chapter 7, Jubilee South contributed a counter-systemic understanding of debt through activities on illegitimate debt. But the link between transnational debt groups and mobilisations against neoliberal globalisation did not start with Jubilee 2000. Over the course of its history, debt campaigns were part of the
emerging anti-globalisation/global social justice movements taking part in contentious
protests against debt nébuleuse summits from the 1980s onwards.

The activities of debt movements identified above are best described as fractur-
ing neoliberalism, in line with Holloway’s (2010) method of the crack, rather than being
part of an organised counter-systemic challenge. These cracks may, of course, over
time, join up and present such a challenge.
Afterword

While this study covers the period up to 2005, debt campaigning continues today, with new campaigns emerging e.g. across Europe to contest how the debt crisis on that continent is being dealt with and new south/north linkages are developing in the context of this major redrawing of the line between debtor and creditor countries. Rather than seek to create the passport to enable democracy to travel, an elected world parliament as posited by Monbiot (2003), being in the debtor role, whether in a northern or southern country, highlights the fragility of sovereignty, and creates new hierarchies within the internationalising state. This is illustrated by the emergence of the debtor PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain) of Europe. This may enable new transnational solidarities based on ‘communities of fate’ rather than altruism to emerge. A quote from an Aboriginal woman addressed to people coming to offer solidarity expresses the importance of this distinction:

If you have come here to help me,
You are wasting your time
But if you have come because
Your liberation is bound up with mine
Then let us work together (quoted in Holloway 2010, p. 271).
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**Belgium**
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**Central America**
Interviewee INGO Central America, interviewed by Skype, 27 August 2012.

**Eurodad**
Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 1: interviewed in Nijmegen, Netherlands, 3 December 2010.

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**France**
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Ireland
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Interviewee Ireland No. 3: civil society debt informant, interviewed in Dublin, 30 March 2012.

Interviewee Ireland No. 4: civil society debt informant, interviewed in Maynooth, Ireland, 1 August 2012.

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Italy
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Netherlands
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Peru
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