Building cities on sand: The normative basis of journalism in Cambodia

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Abstract

Building cities on sand? The normative basis for journalism in Cambodia.

This thesis examines the relationship between normative emphases in journalism training programmes and the subsequent work practices and conceptualisations of journalists who participated in them, and how this happens where programmes are part of international aid strategies in emerging democracies. It hypothesises that particular normative emphases whose bases are contested — whether due to perceived politicisation, culturally hegemonic tendencies or other reasons — adversely affects the fulfilment of particular journalistic ideals.

This study uses a qualitative research methodology to examine the example of Cambodia from 1993 to 2011. 54 interviews were carried out with key respondents, followed by a thematic analysis of the data generated. A number of tendencies have emerged from this which broadly support the hypothesis. These include correlations between normative emphases at programme level and politically polarised normative orientations among working journalists. A vocational “western-oriented” approach to journalism training also correlates with limited understanding of critical ethical concepts and low occupational confidence among journalists. This in turn contributes to poor ethical practices and a negative overall perception of the local press. Data also suggests that the international orientation of journalism programmes contributed to the development of a two-tiered press system, which subsequently affected the press’ overall impact.
Acknowledgements

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Background and purpose of study

“Civilisation has produced one idea more powerful than any other — the notion that people can govern themselves. And it has created a largely unarticulated theory of information to sustain that idea, called journalism. The two rise and fall together” (Kovach, 2001, p.193)

The presumption that a liberal media landscape helps strengthen good governance and human development has approached normative orthodoxy in the western world and in the many globally spanning aid institutions that have emerged from it. Consistent with this view, encouraging journalism is regarded as a vital component in ensuring media support and propagation initiatives function effectively as part of overall aid strategies in the developing world and emerging democracies (Clarke 2005, Merrill 2009, Foley 2010). Due in large part to such strategies, a rapid growth in media in these regions has taken place in recent years which has stoked demand for journalism training and education (Anon, Economist 2007, Josephi 2010). This has taken place during a period which has seen the triumph of global capitalism, the end of the Cold War, the discrediting of the New World Information and Communications Order and the dominance of a Westernised approach to journalism and journalism training (Foley 2006, p.6).

From this, a number of questions arise which this research explores.

- What are the functions and expectations of journalism within such media aid strategies and what is the basis for them?
- Is journalism fulfilling these functions and expectations and are there particular roles and values associated with journalism which make it more
or less useful in this regard?

- What is the nature of journalism training and education programmes in these scenarios?
- How do specific elements of different programmes impact on the type of journalists produced?

The epistemology of the normative ideals on which journalistic practice is based is a key element in any attempt to answer these questions. The term ‘norm’ refers to how things should or ought to be, or an ideal standard or model (Bromley 2007). Journalism norms are integral to the construction of particular expectations of journalism programmes. Studies on the structure, nature of and aims of such programmes in the developing world by Josephi (2010), Deuze (2005) and Frohlich & Holz Bacha (2003) concur that a primary starting point for them is the presumption that, once education is complete, a journalism graduate helps to serve society “by informing the public, scrutinising the way power is exercised, stimulating the democratic debate, and in those ways aiding political, economic, social and cultural development” (UNESCO 2007).

There is, however, much debate on whether such presumptions are borne out by reality. According to Merrill (2000), much of the underlying basis for the construction of these types of programmes in the last 30 years is that a liberal Western-style press system benefits the rest of the world. Rather than interrogating the veracity of this, Merrill argues (p.33), the majority of scholarship has limited itself to defending and solidifying assumptions that back it up. Such assumptions include that a diversified press system which gives the public a realistic and socially responsible view of society can only exist under a capitalist system, that democracy as it is understood in the western world will and should triumph and that the truth will always win out in a free marketplace of ideas and information. Alternatives, Merrill and others argue, exist. This
research examines the implications of this debate in the context of journalism training and education. It looks at the basis for journalistic normative ideals and the means by which they are integrated into journalism programmes in broad terms, before exploring the experience of this in emerging democracies. Ultimately, it asks whether aims and objectives sought by journalism training and education programmes place too much emphasis on ideals whose bases are contested.

This chapter defines the key terms and parameters of what is being examined, as well as summarising the approach taken to the research. It introduces a number of key ideas which are further expanded upon in the literature reviews. These include the epistemology of communications and press theory and the evolution of journalistic normative ideals and the debate over whether quality journalism is best served by a more vocational or institutional education approach in different environments. The key objectives of the research questions and a methodological approach to answering them are then outlined and a context is given for the choice of Cambodia from 1993 to 2011 as a case-study.

1.2 Normative ideals of journalism and democracy
The intersection between norms of journalism and ideas about democracy are outlined here under three sub-headings. The first examines some primary frames through which the meaning of the term journalism can be understood. A second sub-heading expands this in terms of norms and a final sub-heading looks at this specifically in terms of how it relates to democracy.

Meaning of journalism
Before continuing, it is necessary to clearly define key terms. A first key differentiation is that between the media, the press and journalism. The term “media” embraces TV and film entertainment, a vast array of regularly
published printed material, and even public relations and advertising. The “press”, on the other hand is supposed to be a serious member of that family, focusing on real life instead of fantasy and serving the widest possible audience, with an overall emphasis on content, rather than the means of delivery (Krimsky 2009). Journalism, then, is the system societies generate to supply news, or the content of the press (Kovach 2001, p.10). It is defined by Zelizer (2004, p. 22) as the actions that have come to be associated with news work and the organised and public relay of what is happening in the world. While empiricism remains the central paradigm of journalism research (Loffelholz 2008), the norms, practices and values of professional journalism are at the core of how we think of the profession.

How we define what journalism does or does not do depends to a large degree on the type of frame we use to examine it. Of these, the sociological frame predominates and is a primary influence on the approach to this research. This frame, according to Zelizer (2004), emphasises systematic actions, practices and interactions of journalists using politics and economics in an attempt to connect them with their environment. Such studies run the gamut from an affirmative acceptance of its practices and institutions as the best possible, ending with highly critical views according to which journalism is an agent of ideological control and subordination (Heinonen and Luostarinen, 2008, p.230). Sociological studies of journalism attempt to define journalists’ behaviour and their implicit sense of the “ideal” journalist. Questions they asks, which are key to this research, include how does the practice work outside of a western context? Is there a genuinely shared sense of what journalism can achieve? Research using the sociological frame has helped establish notions of journalistic professionalism with set standards and values including responsibility, accuracy, impartiality, balance, objectivity and truthfulness. Even when such standards were not followed, they struck a profound resonance and
influenced journalism scholars everywhere (Hallin and Mancini 1984).

Even as such norms and standards became accepted as principle drivers of the journalistic impulse, other currents within the sociological frame demonstrate that the actual strategic aims of journalism are based on something else entirely. A highly influential study by Breed (1955) concludes that, while newspapers should be democracies, in fact publishers set policy and reporters follow it. Other sociologically oriented studies such as Elliott’s (1982, p.141-42) found that journalism’s focus on particular stories is evidence of an enactment of political ritual. News can thus be seen as a constructed reality shaped according to underlying notions of social power (Zelizer 2004, p.60). Research on the effect journalistic practices have on the public, such as those of Lang and Lang (1953) highlight journalism’s “unwitting bias” and how TV viewers get a more exciting version of an event than real viewers.

While a sociological frame predominates in the conceptualisation of journalism within this research, other frames must also be acknowledged as key. Outside of studies which focused on individual journalists or news consumers, organisational studies of journalism (Altmeppen 2008, p.26) look at broad organisational and institutional settings as a means of examining journalistic behaviour, highlighting “social control” within newsrooms, and the way ‘news’ derives from organisational tensions involved in production of news. Such studies see journalists as agents of a dominant ideological order external to the news world itself. Gatekeeping theory is critical to this conceptualisation of journalism. Formally identified by Lewin (1947), gatekeeping was first applied to news by White (1950) in his seminal study of the factors which one editor in a US newspaper took into consideration when deciding on the news agenda. A further study by McNelly (1959) points out how reporters serve as the first of multiple gatekeepers between a news event and ultimate publication. Bass
(1969) brought the theory on by differentiating between news gatherers, while Shoemaker (1996) refined the concept further with a model that acknowledges effects from the individual journalist on the organisation the journalist works for, onto society. Gade (2004) contributed to the concept further in his analysis of attitudes to restructuring within media organisations, where he found that while media managers conceive of their role as enabling necessary change to succeed, journalists see such restructuring as a mechanism that affords them fewer resources to practice journalism (p.42). Countering some of these perspectives, Berger (2000, p. 83) argues that while journalism operates within a media institutional environment, the practice of it has a degree of autonomy from — and often contradicts — its institutional context.

A political science frame, which is second only to the sociological frame in terms of its influence on this research, assumes an interdependency between journalism and politics and is generally concerned with how journalism can better serve the public (Zelizer 2004). Studies by Lippmann (1960), McQuail (1992) and Inglis (2002) were key in formulating this approach, arguing that the crisis of modern democracy is a crisis of journalism. Using this frame Hess (1981) characterises journalism as merely “another public policy institution”, while Schudson (2002) (Cited in Zelizer 2004) outlines three press models: In the market model, journalists gave the public what it wanted; the advocacy model had journalism transmitting political party perspectives; while a trustee model conceptualised journalists as providing the news citizens needed so as to be informed participants in a democracy. Marxist critiques of journalism using the political science frame include Cole and Harcup’s (2010) suggestion that, in Western capitalist societies, journalists help spread and reinforce a ruling class ideology. Gramsci’s hegemony theory (Cited in Foley 2010, p.31) argues that the ruling class needs the consent of civil society to maintain its dominance. Journalism, according to this theory, influences and informs the degree and
extent of acquiescence. Other research which fits broadly within this frame includes that of Mickiewicz’s (1998) examination of the way journalistic roles differed across eastern Europe, particularly in the post-Soviet era, and Harcup’s (2003 p.6) case that the ideological constraints and other structural pressures felt by journalists do not entirely undermine their individual actions.

A political economy frame blends an interest in the political domain with a tendency to relate news production to the economic structure of the news organisation (Zelizer 2004). Many of these types of studies relate news production to the economic structure of news organisations, with several pointing out how the business orientation of media organisations tend to corrupt journalism’s public service function (McChesney 1999). Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda model concept is influential here. This model theorises how popular consent for economic, social and political policies is ‘manufactured’ via propaganda disseminated by the media through the work of journalists. Other studies, which relate to such political economy frames, such as Hallin (1994) and Schudson (2002), counter some of Herman and Chomsky’s conclusions, arguing that professional values of journalists can counter such economic imperatives. Elements of this study concur with this argument, as can be seen in Chapter 8.

While elements of historical, language and cultural analysis frames for examining journalism provide important context, they are less salient to this research. The historical approach seeks to put journalism in its correct historical context, connecting the evolution of certain practices to particular nations. Chalaby (1996), for example, argues that journalism itself is an Anglo-American invention, while their European counterparts repair to a more literary ideal. A language frame considers the way the language used in journalism has evolved and why. Elements of this are explored using tools like content
analysis, semiotics, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, or visual aspects. A cultural analysis frame examines the moment when journalistic cultural identities are forged symbolically and economically (Hartley 2008, p.45) using diverse research perspectives with starting points such as Marxism, critical theory, semiotics, linguistics and theories of action. Such approaches question givens behind journalism’s own sense of self, as well as the belief systems under which they make sense of their craft and profession (Zelizer 2004, 2008).

While data generated by empirical studies gives us useful information about the nature of journalism, comparative analysis goes further in terms of understanding the varying contexts in which the practice must function. It does so by trying to answer questions about why the press is the way it is and why it tends to serve different purposes and appear in widely varying forms in different countries. For example, what shapes structures of journalism most? Do conventional western values of journalism fit with non-western cultures? Does the dissociation of journalism from political systems in all cultures lead to reliance on economic rationalities (Hanitzch 2008)? The best known example of this approach is Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) “Comparing Media Systems”, where variations among western democracies in the structure and political role of the news media, and their consequences for democratic politics are considered. In doing so, Hallin and Mancini demonstrate that media model differences are rooted in broader differences of political and economic structure. However, a major weakness of these types of comparative studies is their marked tendency to focus only on the developed capitalist democracies of western Europe and north America in a way that is highly ethnocentric yet are referred to as though they were universal (Reese 2001). It is hoped that studies such as this one will go a small distance in redressing this imbalance.

To make sense of where normative ideals of journalism come from, they must
be placed in the context of the evolution of wide-frame normative theories of public communications. This type of theorising examines why public communicators behave in certain ways in particular contexts, and attempts to define the differing roles they play or ought to play. Four Theories of the Press (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1962) outlines authoritarian, Soviet totalitarian, libertarian and social responsibility models of how the press behaves. While numerous critics such as McQuail (1987) and Christians (2009) point out gaps in the framework, (McQuail, for example, exposes how its overly west-centric perspective fails to acknowledge the developing world experience), in general they acknowledge the model, while adding to it. The primary models can be broken down as follows: Within the authoritarian model, the press advances policies of the government in power. For example, under the Soviet totalitarian model, the publicly owned press has the sole purpose of continuing the Soviet socialist system. Under the libertarian model on the other hand, the press’s function is to inform, entertain, sell as well as discover the truth and act as a check on the government. Guaranteeing some level of genuine truth within this tradition, requires free, open and unchecked debate, premised on expectations that truth “naturally” overcomes falsehood when they compete (Christians 2009, p.49-50).

A separate, but interconnected culture social responsibility arises from concerns over what happens when the demands of the libertarian tradition of public communication are at odds with other, equally important prerogatives. The influential Hutchins report (1947) suggests a move beyond ‘objective’ reporting — which stresses facts, procedures and impartiality as a means of separating news from commentary — toward reporting that is more interpretive. To properly contextualise the implications of this, one must understand the debate on objectivity in terms of journalism. Ward’s (2004) examination of what he terms the “doctrine” of objectivity finds that the objectivity ideal adheres, in the
main, to a US-developed tradition, with its central tenet that journalists report unbiased information. However, Ward shows how the notion developed in a completely different way in European journalism, where the emphasis on the norm is lessened. Instead of an unworkable ideal of journalistic objectivity, Ward advances a model of ‘pragmatic’ objectivity, which stresses interpretation as well as the facts in reporting. This attack on the objectivity concept, further advanced by the likes of Bell (1997), feeds into a social responsibility tradition which also seeks to sideline the idea of objectivity. This model puts less confidence in the rationality of man than the libertarian tradition does, arguing that to encourage man to seek truth “the more alert elements of the community must goad him into the exercise of his reason” (Hutchins report 1947). The press, in other words, must be the “more alert” element.

Other press models have since emerged which complement the Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm version. From the 1970s on, the citizen participation press tradition attempted to respond to the widespread criticism that the public service media lacked credibility due to its being too tightly connected to the culture of the privileged classes. It argues that participatory media opened more space for marginal and less powerful members of the community such as women, youth, ethnic groups and immigrants (McChesney and Nichols 2002). Separate to this, Bourdieu’s (1998) critique of journalism emphasises intellectual and artistic production sheltered from external economic or political pressures. His theory esteems the specialised forms of journalism that maintain the greatest autonomy from external pressures, for example science journalism. According to Bourdieu it would serve society better if journalism lost its monopoly over public communication so that non-journalist experts could communicate more directly with the public. However Schudson (2005) warns that this could lead journalists to pursuing only their own private personal interests or agendas over matters of legitimate public concerns.
While the authoritarian and Soviet totalitarian traditions have been debunked in most forms at this stage, various elements of the other two main traditions and their offshoots are still being debated. How to resolve conflicting moral claims of media autonomy with accountability to the public’s needs, remains one of the most contentious issues of normative theory of public communication (Glasser 1989, McQuail 2003).

**Journalism norms and values**
There has long been debate about how the practice of journalism can best serve the differing models. Throughout the 19th century, for example, a frequent proposal for improving the overall quality of the press was to make it a profession (Marzolf 1991, p. 50-61). This was despite journalism not being a profession in the classic sociological sense due to it lacking the type of objective criteria seen within the so-called “true professions”, such as medicine and law (Splichal and Sparks 1994). Professionalisation, according to this strand of argument, brings the assurance that following training, journalism professionals who have genuine codes of ethics and who are part of corporate associations, could be trusted by the public. The conceptualisation of professionalism has interesting implications for this research in terms of its relationship with normative ideals and with training and education programmes. One means of examining this concept more closely is to use a ‘sociology of professions’ and ‘journalism professionalism’ frame. The three basic perspectives of the former are functionalist, phenomenological and power-relations. The functionalist perspective regards professions as advancing societal causes such as stability, consensus and moral order (Johnson 1972), with core attributes including skills based on specialist and theoretical knowledge, training and education, the presence of an occupational organisation whose entry is regulated, a code of ethics and altruistic service (Johnson 1972;
A more phenomenological perspective looks at how the term is invoked in the everyday life of members of a certain occupation, through values, norms and practices (Beam 1990). A power relations perspective, on the other hand, emphasises the exercise of power in professionalisation, and the relationship between it and political, economic and social-environmental factors (Johnson 1972, Beam 1990). These sociological models are very important in the debate about the professional orientation of journalists, including their values, ideologies, socialisation and practices (Magiya 2008, p.15).

The idea of professionalism as it applies to journalism is itself highly normative, with attempts at definitions often linked to specific interests (Reese, 2001, p.175). Reese argues that the press and media encourages professionalisation in order to shore up the declining prestige of journalism. In his study of the process in Uganda, Magiya (2008) outlines two distinct conceptualisations of what it means which are fundamentally at odds with each other. Statutory professionalisation as espoused by politicians, he explains, is where the state plays a primary role in the process, mainly by means of regulation. Ultimately, Magiya points out, this conceptualisation sees the process primarily as a means of control. Journalists themselves, on the other hand, perceive professionalisation as something which is nurtured voluntarily and by socially inculcated professional values, hence as a value system (p.2). However tensions arise within the statutory approach about how values can be imposed through legislation and tensions also arise with the voluntary approach between the journalist and the news organisation within which they work about what constitutes professional practice. Reese (2001, p.176) argues that in addressing the question of the professionalisation of journalism, we need to ask what interests are served by supporting one view of it over another. Knudson (1996) notes a number of controversies in Latin America over professional associations.
requiring qualifications in order to be allowed to practice journalism, while Magiya (2008, p.12) notes that “mandatory professionalisation has been linked to violation of human rights, especially freedom of thought and expression”.

A professionalised conceptualisation of journalism then, is a key part of the construction of ‘ideal’ functions of the press. The normative ideals at the heart of this process, particularly within the functionalist and phenomenological approach, relate very closely to how journalistic ethics are talked about. Both normative ideals and ethics are concerned primarily with what ought to happen, as opposed to what does. Today, research has firmly established the notion that western journalists, repairing to a primarily US model of professionalism, set standards of action in terms of journalism around values like responsibility, accuracy, impartiality, balance, objectivity and truthfulness (Zelizer 2004, p. 55). Balance, in this context, means competing interpretations of facts are presented, that information is verified as truthful and accurate and comment is ascribed to specific sources, while objective in this context means there is no underlying agenda. Sparks (1998) describes this Anglo Saxon model of journalism as “characterised by fearlessly independent media employing brave investigative journalists who are dedicated to the separation of fact and opinion in their reporting, who are even-handed and impartial between contending viewpoints and whose main task is to inform their readers and viewers without fear or favour about all that is most important in the world today” (p. 175).

A key element of this study is how ideas about journalism, professionalisation and normative ideals interact with how the subject is taught and learned in journalism programmes. In theory, journalism programmes are concerned with outlining ethical and normative frameworks for participants that they can apply in work environments in a way that makes them more professional. However, these taught frameworks evolved in very different environments to where they
are being applied. An increasing body of work, to which this research aims to contribute, argues that journalistic norms and value systems that result from such frameworks are overly rooted in western concepts and philosophical foundations. Christians (2008), for example, argues that enlightenment rationalism, which most of our western based ethics structure has been built upon, is oppressive of non-western perspectives. Accordingly “the subjective-objective dichotomy on which this ethics structure is based is no longer epistemologically viable” (Christians 2008, p.7).

Research suggests that the acceptance of fundamental journalistic norms on which much of our understanding of the effects of journalism is based can be problematic in countries which are culturally dissimilar. The point is underlined when considering several different developing countries’ experiences. Banda’s (2008) study of aid-funded press development initiatives in Zambia finds that it was an elite project, “reproducing a typically western-oriented libertarian ethical framework and reinforced by local elites socialised into the culture of liberal journalism” (p. 130). Rao and Lee’s (2005, p.118) study of attitudes among Asian and Middle Eastern journalists also reveals concerns that any global journalistic ethics code would be dominated by western ideals and values. Byun and Lee (2002) ask what a journalistic ethics model would be based upon in China, given that its dominant ethical philosophy of Confucianism is premised on values of consensus and individuality that are different from the dominant philosophies in the west. Tsukamoto (2006, p. 56) observes that journalism norms influenced by the US-oriented social responsibility model adopted in post-WWII Japanese media ended up stressing freedom less and restraint more than they did in the US. Ward (2008) describes how ethical issues in India — invasion of privacy in the context of picturing a dead body for example — has different meanings and implications there (p.102). The likes of Blankenberg (1999), Christians (2008) and Wasserman and De Beer (2004) explore how an
ubuntu-based (an African ethical concept which emphasises participation and social solidarity) normative framework would require a media and journalism whose primary role would be to provide a space for the concerns, ideas and opinions of the community (Ward, 2008, p.109), while other core values in western ethics, such as objectivity, take a back seat. Other key studies, such as Cortadi, Fagan and Garretton’s (1992) exploration of problems faced by citizens and journalists of living under authoritarian rule, also suggest that ethics in certain contexts need rethinking.

**Connecting journalism and democracy**

This research explores the way in which an emerging democracy environment interacts with the development of journalistic normative ideals. A critical element of understanding this is how democracy relates to journalism specifically. The democratic norm is linked closely to the social responsibility press tradition, which evolved as part of social reform movements through the 19th and 20th centuries. These, as the name suggests, gradually established a consensus that the press accept their social responsibilities (Hocking 1947) to which the media business and the press responded by seeking moral grounding in terms of their importance as defenders of democracy (Gans 2004, McChesney 1999). The democratic norm encompasses two distinct but interrelated assumptions. The first is that a key role of journalism is to defend democracy, while the second sees journalism as an integral part of what helps bring democracy into being. Habermas (1962), for example, argues that analysis and debate in an evolving European media in the 18th century helped to create a public sphere which made democratic development possible.

Berger’s observations on how this process impacted upon the development of democracy in Africa, as well as his synthesising of the various streams of thought that have fed into this debate is particularly useful here. A key question
asked by this research is whether the democratic normative ideal predominated in the conceptualisation of journalism propounded by media aid organisations in Cambodia in the early 1990s, an idea which has strong parallels with Berger’s observations on journalism programmes carried out in Africa. Berger (2000) acknowledges, as this work does, the democratic norm as a central element defining journalism, but adds depth and range to this idea by outlining four different variants of the norm — liberal, social democratic, neoliberal and participatory — that lead to changes in emphases thereafter.

He describes the liberal variant of the democratic norm as seeing journalism as an active, autonomous force, with journalists as key players in safeguarding the citizen’s rights and holding the powerful accountable. The watchdog role is a key element of its normative conceptualisation in this context, the presumption being that “openness and transparency in the state is a prerequisite for democracy” (Berger, 2000, p.84). However, the kind of rhetoric which explicitly positions journalism in this way is undermined by studies which highlight the inherent bias in terms of who the press targets. Instead of a watchdog working in the interests of the people for a better democracy for example, Donahue et al (1995) see the press acting as a guard dog, defending the interests of the establishment. Berger (2000, p.84), however, counters that the watchdog role of journalism in a general sense can, and must, be decoupled from roles played by the media as a whole.

The social democratic variant, meanwhile, sees the press as having public obligations encompassing a range of responsibilities (McQuail, 1992, p.116). This variant stresses citizenship and emphasises journalism as having a guiding, and educational role traditionally linked, according to Berger (2000, p.85), to public service broadcasting. As with the watchdog role, however, Berger argues that this function should also be de-linked from a specific institutional role,
because, just as public service broadcasters have retreated from adherence to this philosophy in order to compete in a tough market, journalists motivated by this role are found in all types of media institutions.

The neoliberal variant of the democratic norm sees journalism’s contribution to democracy as containing a commitment to reflecting pluralism and diversity and providing a platform for debate between divergent and independent voices. According to Berger, journalists coming from this perspective tend to see themselves less as messengers than as neutral referees in the contest of political forces, with a duty to the public to ensure equitable exposure of what is on offer to consumers.

A fourth participatory variant, as propounded by McQuail (1992, p.121-3), replaces the incomplete form of democracy that the neoliberalism variant helps to uphold with a more participatory version. Here journalism centres on the ‘civil society’, where participation in the democratic process by grassroots and elites is deliberative and ongoing. This variant sees journalism as serving the information poor as well as the information rich elites by fostering dialogue between governments and its citizens and organisations and has gained currency in the US with the idea of civic (Pew Centre 2012) and public journalism (Rosen 1996, 1997; Poynter Institute 1999). Journalists in this tradition are expected to take a position with community campaigns and causes and help make their media institutions into social players.

While Berger (2000, p.87) sees the general role of journalism in terms of creating a democratic environment as a variable and ever-shifting combination of the four variants, a critical element of his theory in relation to this study is his observation that the chances of fulfilment of these variants differs profoundly between the third world and the first. In a first world context, he argues that an
expanding media menu, where journalism is crowded out by entertainment, ads and other communicational activities poses a challenge to the fulfilment of the democratic journalistic role (Berger 2000). This is exacerbated by the rise of the internet, where the sharing of information bypasses the classical role of journalism (Dahlgren 1997, p.70). Berger (2000) also highlights an increased individualism and materialism that the globalisation process has encouraged, giving rise to a journalism coloured by emotion, sensation and pleasure-orientation which has ultimately lead to “me-generation prejudices and political apathy” (p.90). This is only partly countered, he argues, by the fact that the same developments also highlight journalism’s democratic value as part of the information society (p.88). The media deregulation that the globalisation process has given rise to (Hills 1998, Raboy 1998) has also seen the supercession of private over public broadcasters and subsequent dominance of a more neoliberal conceptualisation of the norm over the social democratic variant (Berger 2000, p.89).

In a developing world context such as that in which this study is located however, some of these issues are less important, as trends such as information overload or the rise of the ‘me-generation’ have not taken place on anywhere near the same scale (Berger 2000). The more traditional liberal variant of the democratic norm in particular retains its vibrancy in a developing world context because of a shortage of democratic preconditions such as universal franchise, credible elections, independent judiciary or effective parliaments (Ronning, 1994, p. 12). However, this emphasis has led to other extremes. For example, the watchdog journalistic role has been interpreted as a mandate for journalism to unseat undemocratic governments, with journalists tending toward actually becoming political opposition in the sense of trying to form an alternative government. This goes beyond the limits of journalism’s democratic role, and can entail accepted journalistic ethics becoming over-determined by a political
agenda (Berger 2000, p.92). A USAID (1999) report notes the dangers inherent in this when it acknowledges that “democratic transitions may not be strengthened through the creation of a media, which, while free from its own government control, espouses views of foreign governments and reflects their interests” (1999, p. 9). Other voices in the Third World such as Ogbondah (1997) and Kasoma (1997) argue that the liberal conceptualisation of journalism has gone out of control due to lack of self-regulation and has provoked the government reaction which has resulted. This phenomenon is also noted by observers of the Cambodian press such as Mehta (1997).

There have been attempts at a different vision for roles and functions of journalism that avoid such traps. Theorists like Galtung (1990), James (1990) and Edeani (1993) argue for a type of journalism in the developing world that is more focused on development than democracy. With ‘development journalism’, its proponents argue, politics should come second to educational objectives in the interests of economic expansion and development (Wimmer and Wolff 2005). However, in recent years, this developmental emphasis has been undermined (Blake 1997, p.254) by studies which expose the ease with which such journalism is manipulated into being little more than government propaganda, as well as its inability to confront problems such as governmental corruption and mismanagement (Rogers 1976, Okigbo 1985, Servaes 1986, Sonaike 1988, Kariithi 1994). A developmental emphasis, with its intrinsic link to authoritarian versions of journalism, is ill-suited to confronting the challenge posed by governmental attempts to control information flow. The persistent tension in this regard is highlighted in Magiya’s (2008) study of the professionalism of journalism in Uganda, which shows how the democratic norm of journalism is threatened by state involvement in statutory professionalism. In such environments, neoliberal pluralism remains a useful advance for a democratic space previously monopolised by an authoritarian
state (Berger 2000). However, Ungar (1990, p.369) warns that this neoliberal variant, especially when operating in a semi-liberal political system, can lead journalism to end up serving as an aid for governments to monitor the governed, ultimately playing a guard-dog role to non-democratic governance, as happened (Berger 2000, p.92) in apartheid South Africa.

Ultimately then, what variant of its ideals are required to maximise journalism’s democratic potential in the developing world? According to Ansah (1988) and Running (1994), the social democratic journalistic ideal retains importance in the Third World. However, they argue that the struggle should be not to privatise government controlled media, but to transform it into publicly owned and politically independent media. Too much regulation of the media can result in replacing government monopolies with other commercially led monopolies, without a proportional rise in domestic voices in local media (Mattelart and Mattelart 1992). Thus, the role of journalism in this context is not the guiding of audiences through neoliberal information abundance, Berger (2000) argues, but to add to the volume and diversity of information with locally relevant information (p.94).

Berger (2000) suggests that concerns over liberal variants of journalistic norms in a developing world context as outlined above can be allayed by more careful observance of journalistic ethics. However, he argues that the more participative democratic normative variant is particularly important in this environment. Progress in this regard, he argues, is “conditional” upon journalists forging alliances with other sectors of society and being part of a broader thrust for democratisation. Thus, it is a “kind of political mobilisation activity, providing expression to the natural affinity with professions and marginalised social strata that may share an interest in aspects of democracy” (p.95).
1.3 Journalism training versus education

As is mentioned in the previous section, this research is concerned with the influences on the formation of journalistic normative ideals by journalism training and education programmes. Important distinctions must be made between the two approaches, which relate closely to the professionalisation debate previously discussed. Following a review of the literature on the topic in Chapter 4, this study characterises journalism education as emphasising theory via long-term programmes in institutional settings. Journalism training, on the other hand, is more short-term, vocational and emphasises practical skills in a variety of settings. In the US, Carey (1979) writes that the debate on the merits of both approaches centres on struggles between “professional studies versus practical ones, academic studies versus the apprenticeship system, social science knowledge versus common sense, ethical practitioners versus amoral hacks” (p. 850).

According to Foley (2010, p.49) western style press systems tend toward a more vocational approach to journalism programmes than has been traditional in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. This vocational emphasis is questioned by the likes of Parisi (1994), who points out that in western universities, journalism programmes tend towards overly narrow practical training that oversimplifies intellectual complexities explored in other disciplines. The housing of journalism schools in communications departments has also led to concerns over journalism education losing its public service function due to students being trained simply as communicators who could serve any interest (Medsger, 1996, p.5), or as Carey (2000, p.21) puts it, levelling journalism down to a signalling system. An alternative approach, which conceptualises journalists’ needs in a more general educational sense, tended to predominate in Eastern Europe under socialist governments. Aumente et al (1999), Mill (1994) and Hiebert (1994), characterise journalism education in this setting as being highly
theoretical. The entire edifice of such programmes was problematic though, because in a socialist setting it meant journalists receiving a political education coupled with propagandist techniques (Aumente et al 1999) while educators were “ideological gatekeepers and agents of the Communist Party and government” (Ognianova, 1995). A tradition of journalism education in Eastern Europe predated the communist system, however, where nascent journalism training programmes viewed general intellectual ability and a talent to present information as more important than the news itself (Foley 2010, p.65). The division between vocational and academic approaches is not always clear cut, of course, with the educational model also strong in a western context. Attempts to bridge the gap between the two are exemplified by Schon’s (1987) articulation of the idea of a reflective practitioner of journalism who retains a presence at the centre of professional schools, linking universities with the world of practice in an effort to resolve some of the conflicts between academic and vocational dimensions (p. 309).

While the debate about the merits of journalism training versus education may have mainly taken place in a western context, the outcome has had a significant impact on the approach taken to implementing programmes in emerging democracies and developing world environments. Given the dominance of the vocational approach in the western press tradition, it follows that most of the journalism programmes which are supported by aid emanating from these countries adhere to this model. Writing about western-funded programmes in Eastern Europe in the 1990s after the collapse of the Socialist system, for example, Foley (2006, p.4) notes that most were vocational and skills-based, with many of the trainers working journalists, consultants and trainers rather than educators. Thus, the debate on the effectiveness of the vocational approach to training is cast in a different light due to its operating in a different context. Research by Shafer, Freedman and Rice (2005, p.8) has noted that non-
professional trainers, generally ex-journalists, who predominate in the vocational approach to training tend to have a more ingrained presumption of a ‘West is best’ than among journalism academics who possess both teaching and research skills, and a high level of theoretical and historical knowledge related to mass media.

Berger (2000) argues that the varying democratic potential of journalism in the First and Third Worlds, as discussed earlier in this chapter, has a bearing on how journalism is understood and how it is taught, and how journalists and journalism teachers are organised. Activity in both spheres is needed, he suggests (p.95), so that the full potential of this role is realised. It is also necessary that normative ideals of democracy are not over simplified at training and educational level or intertwined too closely with particular political affiliations in a way that damages it in the long term. Chakrabarty (2000) and Nyamnjoh (2005) are among those who have demonstrated how difficult it is to separate western based assumptions regarding liberal democracy from journalistic concepts. There are echoes here of the modernisation paradigm of development communications, with its presumed superiority of ‘modernity’ over ‘traditional’ (Lerner 1958), which in reality meant an unquestioning acceptance of the economically stronger country’s way of doing things (Thussu 2006, Inayatullah 1967). This danger is exemplified in Vaughn’s (2007) assertion that the Hutchins report and what followed became “a call for American journalists to help impose democratic ideals on the world” (p.219).

In his study of press development in Bulgaria, Foley (2010) posits that an educational, rather than a training model, working through journalism faculties of the major universities in the transitional states in question can better provide the type of “critically aware journalists [which are] desperately needed in transitional democracies” (p.146). Any inculcation of journalistic normative
ideals such as truth, accuracy and verification, should take place “in an intellectual context that will allow new journalistic voices to emerge within the parameters of those values” (p.146-47). This longer-term approach based in higher education institutes, according to Foley, can help improve journalistic professionalism and by extension, democratic values. In this way, he argues, countries can develop their own press systems on their own terms rather than attempting to achieve a western model that is itself an idealised system.

1.4 Statement of the problem and theoretical approach
This research examines the way in which journalism training and education programmes in Cambodia from 1993 to 2011 emphasised normative ideals whose bases are contested.

As a means of doing so, three primary questions are asked:

1. What kind of normative ideals about journalism (as a practice and a profession) predominated in journalism education/training programmes in Cambodia during the period being examined?
2. How and to what extent are these ideals grounded in assumptions about the link between journalism and democracy?
3. What is the relationship between normative ideals (of practice and profession) as emphasised by the programmes and the subsequent working lives of Cambodian journalists who participated in them?

The degree to which the values that underpin the press are universalisable, as many journalism programmes assume, is a critical element of this thesis. The rapid spread of programmes globally in recent years has led to numerous writers expressing unease about the one-way, top-down nature of their ethos. Much of the discussion echoes those related to the Imperialism Paradigm of development communications, which claimed the structure of international communication
itself was partially responsible for the continued subordination of developing countries (Boyd Barrett 1977). Carey (1979), for example, argues that while American journalists and intellectuals have been busy spreading the press gospel in areas that had had their freedoms restricted, “we are less open to the thought that we might have something to learn from them about democracy and civic culture” (Carey 1991, p. 207). Merrill (2002) argues that the insistence the press everywhere conforms to Western ‘capitalistic and pluralistic’ media structures is arrogant, ethnocentric and betrays a stultified view of reality. As Merrill (2002) puts it: “Cultures are different; the values that shore up such cultures are different. Stages of national development are different, citizens’ expectations are different” (cited in Shafer and Freedman 2003, p.93).

The theory of journalism interacts and flows with the teaching of it. Loffelholz (2008) argues that journalism’s epistemological development lacks a clear “core” of ideas or “main” trends in theoretical work, but is instead an intermittent development of multiple perspectives. “Progress is not based on the substitution of ‘outdated’ theories, but on the gain in complexity through the emergence of new theories and modification of older theories” (p.26). It follows then that the epistemology of journalism education and training may progress in a similar fashion. This raises the question — does the content of journalism programmes which are being carried out in the developing world reflect the strong and sustained challenges which have been made in recent years to the dominance of the Western journalistic paradigm? Deuze (2008, p.279) is among those who argue that journalism education that has an overly simplistic view of journalism as defined by “occupational ideology, history and professionalisation and its self-proclaimed role in democratisation” might be problematic. Foley (2010, p.65-66) also points out the danger that media aid to post-socialist environments (of which journalism programmes are an integral part) can end up simply replacing one ideologically-oriented position for another. Thus,
journalists who had been forced to conform to a Leninist press theory which
advocates authoritarian control and propagandist techniques, are told to swap it
for another equally ideological model which blindly cheerleads for democracy
and the free market. Indeed Sparks (1998) suggests that the Anglo-Saxon ideal
of the media that training agencies strive for is itself an imaginary construction,
an “impossible amalgam of two incompatible systems… which might be
characterised as The New York Times and the BBC — with both presented in an
idealised form” (p.176).

Plenty of evidence exists from developing democracies that have experienced a
high level of journalism training that an expected increase in the quality and
ethical character of journalism has not necessarily resulted. Foley’s (2006) study
on the outcome of journalism training programmes in Bulgaria after the fall of
communism showed how the breakdown of socialist ideological beliefs
specifically affected the formation of journalistic ethical systems, a process
which has numerous parallels with Cambodia. According to Foley (2006), 17
years after the first journalism training and media-reform initiatives in Eastern
Europe, journalism practice was still characterised “by a lack of
professionalism, little understanding of the need for accuracy, a willingness to
accept bribes and a lack of understanding of the journalist’s ethical role” (2006
p.4). This view is backed up by the IREX Country report for Bulgaria (2001)
and Gross’s (1996) study of Romanian journalism. According to LaMay (2007),
funding for media and journalism assistance is beginning to diminish, at least in
part due to a growing belief among donors and recipients that programmes have
not produced lasting or worthy results.

So what are the reasons for this? Some studies emphasise that wider cultural
and structural factors have inhibited the development of journalism. Hume
(2002), for example, argues that in the former USSR, part of the reason for the
failure is the underdevelopment of an independent media in which quality journalism can prosper (p.9). Ognianova (1995), meanwhile, points to deficiencies in the training itself, where sessions are short and generalised and visiting teachers often ignorant about the countries in which they are working. Analysis of the data gathered for this research will help to advance or disprove the argument that attempts to inculcate journalistic normative ideals which do not take into account local historical and cultural specificities in an emerging democracy environment has a negative effect on the kind of journalists and journalism produced, which in turn has implications for the fulfilment of certain journalistic normative ideals, in particular that of democracy.

1.5 Case for investigation
This research examines the way journalism training and education programmes in Cambodia from 1993 to 2011 emphasised normative values about journalism (as a practice and as a profession) whose bases are contested and how such emphases interacted with the subsequent working lives of participants. Comparing the experience in Cambodia with emergent patterns or outcomes in other countries with similar characteristics can help contextualise findings and observations.

Before outlining further specifics about the Cambodian media and the factors that have influenced this process, I must first outline my own personal experience which both inspired this study and lends it a particular bias (implications for this bias are explored in more detail in Chapter 5). For two years between 2006 and 2008 I worked as a journalist with the Phnom Penh-based Cambodia Daily newspaper. The Daily was set up primarily as a means of local journalists being trained in ‘best practice’ by western trained reporters who work alongside them and represents an unusual experiment in combining a profit making newspaper with an NGO-style media training ethos. While Khmer
journalists there worked in an encouraging atmosphere, with many showing outstanding ability in what was a fairly successful and constantly evolving newspaper, I also noted evidence of severe and deeply felt frustrations among them. While such issues were often based on causes (difficulties with management, pay and conditions) which are common in any work environment, elements of deeper-seated worries among Cambodian colleagues were also noted. These included concerns about perceived west-centric news agendas at the paper, that aspects of the training of Cambodian journalists were ideologically influenced, that western colleagues did not understand the realities of what native reporters experienced on the ground and that the ethical standards expected by the paper were unrealistic. These issues tended to be expressed more forcefully by the longer-term members of staff. Thus, the choice of Cambodia as a case-study is in part opportunistic, but it also would not have come about in the first place were it not for the observations I made while working with the Cambodia Daily.

Cambodia is also useful as a case study due to the unusual nature of its experience regarding the development of journalism there. The country became a focus of global attention when, having won independence from France in 1953, it became drawn into regional unrest to catastrophic effect. Over the following decades, Cambodia experienced almost continual warfare and regime change before the Ultra-Maoist Khmer Rouge’s disastrous agrarian communism social experiment in the 1970s left millions dead and displaced (Peou 2000). Vietnam occupied a devastated territory through the 1980s, before the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, after which the UN agreed to administer the country in advance of free and fair elections.

From 1993 onwards three main reasons made it particularly pertinent for this research. Firstly, it offers a vivid example of a place and a period in which
international best practice in terms of journalism education has been applied for a sufficient period of time that such an assessment can be useful. A crucial aspect of the process undertaken by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in the 1990s, according to documentation from the time, was to encourage a media climate which would support and help consolidate a genuinely liberal democratic government structure. “Cambodians should enjoy the benefits of freedom of expression and opinion through all media administered by existing administrative structures as well as other media” (UNTAC 1991). Supplementing these constitutional efforts, numerous international and western aid organisations became involved in media development projects and journalism training/educational programmes and both media and journalism education sectors experienced a boom (Clark 1995, Hiang-Kheng Heng 2002).

Secondly, efforts at training journalists in the 1990s in Cambodia were attempted on what might be regarded as a clean slate. What little experience the country had of a journalistic culture historically was wiped out under the Khmer Rouge regime and the period of unrest which followed. Following the arrival of UNTAC, a boom in journalism education programmes, new media-friendly legislation and a more amenable economic environment resulted in a dramatic resurgence of news media (Clark 1995, Marston 2000, Ministry of Information 2011). Thus, large numbers of journalists, who began their careers around the same time and had a significant influence on the media that subsequently developed, were more influenced by particular dominant normative values than might have been the case in a country with a more established pre-existing journalistic culture. The fact that Cambodia experienced a number of different types of regimes in the 30 years prior to the UN intervention — including socialism, Ultra-Maoism, a monarchy and a right-wing military dictatorship (Marks 2000, p.115) — gives it added value for comparative purposes.
A third factor which makes Cambodia a suitable case study is that there is ample evidence on the ground that a liberal media climate has not taken root there to the extent that proponents of media and journalism programmes there might have hoped. Special attention was paid by UNTAC in the 1990s to the development of a legal climate in which the free press could flourish, while the principle forces of civil society were recognised as being “the Buddhist clergy, the free press and NGOs” (Marks 2000, p.163). An emphasis on the development of a free press was underlined elsewhere in the UNTAC (1991) mandate where it made specific dispensation for “Ensuring Free Access to the Media....for All Political Parties Contesting in the Election”. The information and education division of UNTAC drafted media guidelines to give effect to this (UNTAC 1991). These efforts appeared to meet with success initially with Ojendal (2000) describing how after the 1993 elections “Cambodia enjoyed the freest press in Southeast Asia” (Ojendal 2000, p.311).

However, the media environment when the data for this study was being gathered in 2011 is very different, with almost all mediums dominated by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party. Almost every reputable country media analysis, whether from rights groups such as Licadho (2009) or annual reports such as those in the Asian Communications Handbook (2008) and by Freedom House (2011) have concurred with this view. The Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index and the Freedom House Freedom of the Press rating, for example, have all shown a gradual, but almost constant downward trend in the period since the table was first collated in 2002. This is reflected across the board in measures of instrumentalisation of the press for political objectives such as various media organisations’ political leanings, political content and diversity of ownership.
This instrumentalisation is due to a mix of factors. Among the more overt means by which pressure is exerted on journalistic independence are the use of existing and new legislation as a means of restricting space for free expression and the use of criminal charges to punish opposition press (Mehta 1997). A Cambodian Club of Journalists report (2005) for example, showed that the number of lawsuits against journalists per year rose from nine to 19 in a three-year period. While on the surface journalists’ rights and freedom of expression seem protected under the 1995 Press Law, this law also contains various provisions which are plainly intended to regulate, or control, the press. The law’s failure to define concepts like “national security,” “political stability,” “honour” and “dignity” means certain articles can be, and are easily being used against journalists (RSF 2010). Cambodian journalists must also contend with a lack of cooperation by officialdom and limited access to information, leaving media outlets and their reporters highly vulnerable to political patronage (Loo 2006, p.3). Sothearith’s (2011) analysis of whether conditions in Cambodia are conducive to the establishment of independent media concluded that the political climate and culture was a key negative element in this regard. Directly related to this problem is a licensing system for media outlets which is highly politicised and geared toward perpetuating the message which is most advantageous for the ruling CPP (Licadho 2008, Sothearith 2011, RSF 2010).

The state has also failed to regulate politically oriented media ownership. Private media is not subsidised by the state, but “media that is pro-CPP or close to the royalist FUNCINPEC party are provided financing or material support” (Kea, 2008, p.158). A more in-depth political economy analysis of the media environment in Cambodia, which elaborates on the constitution of power-relations within the production, distribution and consumption of communication resources in the relevant period is given in Chapter 6.1.
There are a number of other factors which make the press in Cambodia vulnerable to instrumentalisation which for the purposes of this research I will term ‘less overt’, meaning they are not necessarily explicitly deliberate. First among these is a lack of diversity in media ownership. The promotion of media diversity has long been a primary public policy objective of western democratic governments (Schultz 2005, p.1). While consensus on an exact measurement of this is lacking, the US Federal Communication Commission identifies diversity of viewpoints or perspectives, outlets, programmes, sources, and minority and female ownership diversity as key signifiers (Schultz 2005, p.2). All these are lacking in the Cambodian environment. Due to the lack of independence of the judiciary in what is a politically polarised environment, it is easier for the Government to bypass legal considerations with regard the press. Laws, in this kind of environment, are a powerful weapon for those who want to fend off press revelations (RSF 2010, p.4, Licadho 2008). A lack of funding has also hindered the development of a genuinely independent press, with a degree of political patronage necessary for most media outlets. It can also be argued (Clarke 1995, Mehta 1997) that this extreme polarisation and politicisation in the media throughout the post 1993 period is a continuation of a historic dependence of Cambodian media on political leaders for financial support. A degree of political bias in the press appeared acceptable to most international observers, as long as there was a general political diversity within the media. But as the CPP became politically more dominant, the media, and the journalists who worked for them, became more uniform also.

Of particular interest to this study are a number of other interconnected factors relating to media instrumentalisation, which link directly to normative values. For example self-censorship has long been sign-posted as an important feature of Cambodian journalism (Mehta 1997), but one that is difficult to quantify (Sisovann 2003, p.30). Self-censorship is due in part to journalists fearing their
editors (Sisovann 2003) and in part due to fear of violence against journalists, not necessarily as a result of violence they have experienced themselves, but of violence they have seen or heard about in the relatively recent past (RSF 2010). Self-censorship is also an issue within the international press, with pragmatic and conservative decisions often taken to favour long-term benefits of remaining in business over short-term effects of publishing a particular story. A lack of media financing also impacts on levels of pay for employees, including journalists, whose social and economic background often leave them very exposed to bribes and blackmail (RSF 2010, Sisovann 2003, Sothearith 2011, Kea 2008, Licadho 2009).

The ability of the Cambodian press to retain their independence is also hampered by what observers describe as a lack of professionalism (Licadho 2008, Bainbridge 2001, Sisovann 2002, Sothearith 2011, Gershon 2000, Clarke 1995). “Sometimes they make a phone call, but other times they just dream [stories] up” (Bainbridge 2001). In the early days after the UNTAC intervention, this kind of practice led to a perception of the press being a ‘mad dog’ rather than a ‘watch dog’ (Tenove 2001). But the definition of professional practice within such analyses is itself problematic, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Several studies (RSF 2010, Sothearith 2011, Licadho 2009) define a lack of professional practice as a lack of grounding in journalistic ethical concepts. For example, an RSF (2010) report cited a CCJ representative commenting that “80% of media employees have no notion of professional ethics” (p. 8). The various definitions of professionalism and ethical ideals are explored more thoroughly in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. Culturally, there has been no precedent in Cambodia for a free press and it represents a profoundly different environment to that in which normative journalism ideals evolved. Political pluralism is a relatively recent development and the notion of the media as society’s watchdog is not well understood by the government or even by many
media practitioners themselves (Sothearith 2011, p. 8). Among cultural practices cited as potentially impacting upon the ability to foster an independent journalistic culture in Cambodia is the Indian religious philosophy of Brahmanism and belief system of Theravada Buddhism, which predominates (Peang-Meth 2000, p.70). Mehmet (2000, p.567) and Peang-Meth (2000, p.73) have argued that such a culture cultivates “silent submission” (Mehmet 2000, p.567) and an ambiguity toward corruption that is antithetical to the type of culture required for a free press to function effectively. A more complete understanding of the interrelationship between these characteristics of Cambodian journalistic culture and particular normative values of journalism and how these were emphasised by journalism programmes can shed new light on the significance of such factors.

1.6 Methodology overview and thesis structure

Two key loci have been examined by this research. The first explores links between the development and implementation of journalism training programmes and the belief in and adherence to particular journalistic normative ideals by facilitators, donors and other relevant stakeholders involved in this process. The second key locus examines the way the normative ideals which were found to predominate at the programme formation level correlate with norm conceptualisations among participants in terms of their work practices. Analysis of data generated from interviews combined with a review of the available literature has highlighted specific predominant values on the part of key stakeholders in this process.

Interviews have been carried out with a number of key stakeholders in this process including journalism programme donors and facilitators, participants and other media experts and commentators. A first phase of interviews examined perspectives of organisers and facilitators of journalism training
programmes on their influences, both explicit and implicit, when constructing and implementing key programme objectives. This helped establish which ‘hoped-for outcomes’ or objectives, were most influenced by particular journalistic ideals. A second phase focused on the perception of participants of the most important normative ideals of journalism and how these influence their role perception and work practices. Given that this research is primarily concerned with examining journalistic normative ideals, it follows a more phenomenological approach. This, as previously described in this chapter, looks at how journalism as a profession is invoked in the everyday life of journalists through values, norms and practices.

A thematic analysis, as described by Braun and Clarke (2006), was used to make sense of the most significant ideas which emerge from the interviews. This type of analysis, which is described in more detail in Chapter 5, identifies, analyses, and reports dominant patterns (themes) within data, and is a recognised means of organising and describing data in a rich and detailed fashion. By identifying and interpreting recurring thoughts, experiences, feeling and meanings, a thematic analysis helped me to understand programme facilitators’ and participants’ perceptions of normative ideals of the profession and how they connect to programmes that are often not explicitly acknowledged by subjects. Once the strongest emergent themes were reviewed and analysed among all categories of interviews, the interplay between emphases on normative ideals within programmes, and adherence to, and belief in such ideals among programme participants is examined and put in the context of the literature and particular outcomes for the press on the ground in Cambodia.

Analyses of studies of comparative media environments to Cambodia helped contextualise findings and are brought into play primarily in Chapter 8. These include African countries such as Kenya and Tanzania (Ogongo Ongong’a 2010, Mfumbusa 2010), who experienced similar levels of poverty combined with a
low base from which media development started from, as well as a high influence of ‘foreign’ media models. Eastern European countries such as Romania who also experienced a transition from a repressive, Soviet influenced media environment to a more Western-oriented one (Vlad and Balescule 2010) are also useful, as are countries emerging from, or attempting to emerge from a conflict environment such as Bosnia and Herzegovena and Palestine (Jallov’s 2005, Dokic et al 2005).

1.7 Outline of chapters
This study is split broadly into a theoretical overview of the key literature (Chapter 2-4), an overview of the methodological approach and case study chosen (Chapter 5,6) and a presentation, analysis and discussion of the data collected and findings yielded (Chapters 7-10). In Chapter 2, the epistemology of journalism is examined, focusing primarily on how normative theories of the press evolved and how they operate within differing media systems. This chapter also examines how key characteristics of journalism practice vary according to different cultural settings and analyses the foundation established within the literature for what a more culturally inclusive and adaptable model of journalism might look like. Chapter 3 contextualises one of the key assumptions of western press theory in terms of this study — that the liberal media landscape helps strengthen the democratisation process. It outlines the evidence for this, teasing out some of the empirical gaps that exist and highlighting the variations in the process that have resulted from different settings and contexts. Ultimately, this emphasises some of the literature suggesting a more problematic and complex linkage between free press and democratisation than has historically been assumed.

The ways in which normative ideals of journalism and democracy interact in a media development environment is particularly relevant to this study. Chapter 4
contextualises how media development models and paradigms of development communications interacts with journalism training models in particular, and how this has been affected in differing types of developing world environments. It also shows how particular journalism cultures are heavily influenced by the training or education models put in place to disseminate key ideas.

Chapters 5 and 6 set out the methodological approach taken to answering the key research questions and give a political economic overview of the media and press environment in the case study being used, that of Cambodia. Chapter 5 outlines why a qualitative approach to data collection along with a thematic analysis of the data generated is appropriate for this study, as well as the main reasons why Cambodia is a suitable case study. Chapter 6 gives a comprehensive overview of the development of the media and press in Cambodia during the period being examined, as well as the journalism education programmes which were implemented.

In Chapter 7, the data yielded by the qualitative interviews is presented both descriptively using interview extracts, and in table form, for added clarity and ease of navigation. It then undergoes a thematic analysis in Chapter 8, with the key emergent themes discussed alongside an explanation of their overall relevance in relation to each other. Chapter 9 discusses findings emanating from the thematic analysis in the context of the literature and examines the implications of same, both in terms of Cambodia specifically and in the journalism field generally. The conclusion chapter further contextualises how the study findings fit in to the overall body of knowledge about how conceptualisations of normative ideals of journalism interact with the teaching of it and how this impacts on work practices of participants. Findings from this study suggest that journalism programmes which adapt their curricula in a more culturally sensitive fashion in developing world or post-conflict environments
are likely to be more effective in achieving objectives such as the facilitation of a deeper and richer level of democratisation, than programmes that do not. A focus on Cambodia demonstrates that adaptations by participants of journalism norms such as ‘inform’, ‘improving democracy’, ‘improving governance’, ‘independence’ which resulted from a ‘one size fits all’ mentality toward programme implementation meeting a setting in which the ‘one size’ simply did not fit, links to tendencies within journalism work there which add to political polarisation in general, and negatively impacts on the achievement of core ideals via journalism practice.
CHAPTER TWO
Toward a more culturally inclusive journalism model

2.1 Introduction
This research examines how an emphasis on particular normative ideals of journalism in training programmes in Cambodia related to subsequent work practices of participants. A number of the questions this raises about journalism are founded on the idea that there are varying conceptualisations of what the practice entails. This chapter comes to an understanding of the reasons for, and implications of, this by exploring the epistemology of journalism as a subject and the frames through which it can be analysed. It compares the place of journalism within differing media systems, before examining characteristics of the practice around the world and assessing how these models developed. It then tentatively suggests an outline for what a more globally-oriented model of journalism, which also allows for local cultural specificities, might look like.

By outlining this type of models here, a framework can be constructed through which it can be established the degree to which elements of this model was present or absent in Cambodia, either in a journalism training or practice context.

Before continuing, it is necessary to clearly differentiate between the terms ‘press’, ‘journalism’ and ‘media’ in this study. ‘Media’ includes all means of mass communication, from TV to advertising. The ‘press’ is the serious member of that family, with a focus on real life and an emphasis on content (Krimsky 2009). Journalism is the system generated to supply news content (Kovach 2001), the organised and public relay of what is happening in the world (Zelizer 2004).

The widening definition of what journalism entails is a common theme of much
of the recent literature on the subject, which describes how the locus of the practice is moving from being an institutionalised profession, practised within specialised organisations towards wider communication spheres (Heinomen and Luostarinen 2008, Carr 2007). As Hargreaves (1999, p.4) puts it: “In a democracy, everyone is a journalist, because everyone has the right to communicate a fact or a point of view.” This kind of democratisation of the practice has lead to debate over whether the practice retains its centrality within communications studies. Prominent journalism advocates such as Kovach (2001) argue that it continues to be a special case, because it provides something unique: “independent, reliable, accurate and comprehensive information that citizens require to be free” (p.11).

This study is situated at the heart of re-examinations of different context-dependent journalism practice. It takes as a given that journalism is responsive to social and technological change, agreeing with Splichal and Sparks’ (1994) description of journalism as something whose “concrete content” varies from one historic period to another and from one country to another. Ultimately, this research is more engaged with the idea that, even where a reasonable definition of journalism is arrived at, it is still crucial to elaborate on what this means in different cultural contexts.

2.2 Frames for examining journalism
How journalism is conceptualised depends to a large degree on the angle from which it is examined. The literature can be broadly divided into studies which focus on the practice, agencies, practitioners and products of journalism and those which examine journalism from a social, political or economic perspective. Zelizer's (2004) structuring of the literature on the different frames provides an excellent overview which is an influence here. Her sociological perspective is the dominant frame for examining journalism and is a primary
influence on this study. Studies using this frame emphasise the systematic actions, practices and interactions with which journalists position themselves in their environment (Zelizer 2004) and differentiate themselves from other public communicators — for example, propaganda and public relations (Ruhle 2008). This social capability is evaluated differently, from an acceptance of journalistic practices and institutions as the best possible, to highly critical views of journalists as agents of ideological control and subordination (Heinomen and Luostarinen 2008).

Sociologically oriented studies have revealed patterns of journalists’ behaviour and their sense of the ‘ideal’ and establish notions of journalistic professionalism, with standards and values including responsibility, accuracy, impartiality, balance, objectivity and truthfulness (Zelizer 2004, Hallin and Mancini 1994). The latter category includes studies which show how norms and values of individual practice were undermined by other factors, including studies by Breed (1955) demonstrating how newsroom ‘socialisation’ set policy for reporters, and Elliott’s (1982) which show how journalism helped maintain social and political order and “Effects research” studies which show journalism’s “unwitting bias” (Lang and Lang 1953) in affecting the public.

Organisational studies, which also fit within the sociological frame, focus on the broader institutional settings of journalism and how societal roles of journalists conflict with their membership of media organisations (Altmeppen 2008). Gade (2004) uses this approach to show a divergence between managers’ and journalists’ attitudes to organisational restructuring, while Gatekeeping theories’ examination of the factors which decide news agendas (Lewin 1943, White 1950, McNelly 1959, Bass 1969) tend to see journalists as agents of a dominant ideological order external to the news world itself. Other studies counteract some of the more negative conclusions of organisational studies,
with Shoemaker (1996) and Berger (2000) emphasising how journalists have a
degree of autonomy which can often be used to contradict the institutional context.

While a sociological frame predominates in the conceptualisation of journalism
within this study’s examination of the varying influences on journalism practice
in Cambodia, other frames are also key. A political science frame assumes an
inter-dependency between journalism and politics and is generally concerned
with how journalism can better serve the public (Hess 1981, McNair 2000).
Studies by the likes of Lippman (1960), McQuail (1992) and Inglis (2002)
linked discourses on freedom of expression with those of democracy,
positioning a free press as a vital guardian of civil liberties. Schudson’s (2002)
model, meanwhile, outlined three distinct orientations. In a market model,
journalists give the public what it wanted, an advocacy model has journalists
transmitting political party perspectives, while in a trustee model journalists
provide the news citizens needed to be informed participants in a democracy.
These types of study provided a framework from which competing impulses of
journalism within political systems were tracked, while the degree of
partisanship, objectivity and critical perspective among journalists was queried.
However, as Zelizer (2004) points out, the ways in which the journalistic-
political relationship differed in emerging democracies and in non-democratic
regimes, which is a crucial aspect of this study is interested in, was left unexplored.

As such, some of the literature generated using a broad political science frame is
helpful to this research. These include studies highlighting other models of
journalism and how they interacted with different political climates, particularly
across eastern Europe in the post-Soviet era. Mickiewicz (1998) shows how the
post-Soviet transition forced a rethinking of journalistic norms, such as that of
objectivity. In a post-authoritarian environment, she explains, subjective reporting can be seen as a bold attempt by journalists to strive toward accurate reporting and countering the state-dominated message. Cortadi, Fagan and Garreton (1992) also demonstrate how journalism under authoritarianism can puncture the type of fearful and uneasy climates perpetuated under such regimes. This mentality is particularly relevant in a Cambodian environment in which reporters in many cases had experience of both an extreme authoritarianism (under the Khmer Rouge) and a less extreme degree of the same (under the Vietnamese).

Other studies using a political science frame take a more critical view on the effects of journalism, arguing it helps spread and reinforce a ruling class ideology and dominance, as well as working class acquiescence (Cole and Harcup 2010, Gramsci 1982), although these are countered by studies, which — echoing some of the critiques of organisational studies — emphasise a journalist’s potential for individual action (Harcup 2003). ‘Developmental journalism’ and ‘Asian values’ journalism studies which critique some of the values and standards of traditional journalism also fit broadly under the political science frame and are explored in more detail later in this paper.

Three other frames which Zelizer (2004) uses to organise the study of journalism practice are drawn upon, but are not central to this research. The political economy frame blends an interest in politics with the sociology and economics of journalism as a practice. These include McChesney’s and Nichols’ (2003) findings that the business orientation of the US media undermines the public service function and professionalism of journalism, as well as Hallin’s (1994) and Schudson’s (1995) argument that this could be countered by professional values. A history frame puts the origins of journalism into historical context, with a tendency to emphasise its aims rather than practice.
According to Chalaby (1996) journalism as currently practised is primarily an Anglo-American invention emphasising a professional ideal, in contrast to the more literary ideal favoured by European-style journalism. Kaplan (2002), McGerr (1986) and Schudson (1995) argue that fundamental changes in the actual purposes of news are rare. Cultural analysis frames focus on how journalism as a culture communicates meaning and forges cultural identities (Green and Sykes 2004, Hartley 2008). This frame focuses upon news consumers and tends to question the belief systems within which journalists makes sense of their craft (Hartley 2008, Zelizer 2004, 2008). This study draws on aspects of the history, political economy and cultural frames primarily in terms of how it interprets some of the data (Chapters 7, 8), relating to the place of journalism in Cambodia historically, the degree to which conditions experienced by journalists are as a result of economic pressures and in terms of the belief systems by which journalists make sense of the craft.

2.3 Evolution of normative theories of the press
To make sense of where norms, practices and values of journalism come from, they must be placed in the context of wider-frame normative theories which examine why public communicators behave in certain ways and the differing roles they ought to play. Siebert’s, Peterson’s and Schramm’s (1962) Four Theories of the Press is still the key text in this regard, and while the likes of McQuail (1987) and Christians et al (2009) point out gaps in the framework, for example its west-centric perspective, in general they acknowledge the model, while adding to it. Siebert, Peterson and Schramm contrast four main models. An authoritarian, or Soviet totalitarian model, sees the press as functioning only to advance the policies of the government in power. A libertarian model aims to guarantee a level of genuine truth within the press by allowing free, open and unchecked public discourse in which both error and truth have equal access (Smith 1988, Christians et al 2009). A separate, but interconnected social
responsibility tradition arises from concerns over what happens when the
demands of the libertarian tradition of public communication are at odds with
other, equally important prerogatives. Resolving the conflicting claims of media
autonomy with accountability to the public’s needs is one of the most
contentious issues of normative theory of public communication (Glasser 1989,
McQuail 2003).

Key in terms of this study’s examination of how journalism norms and practice
were impacted within an aid environment is how ideals of the practice relate to
democracy. The literature shows how this is strongly interlinked with a social
responsibility tradition which established a consensus about moral obligations
of the press (Hocking 1945, Hutchins 1947), to which the press responded by
seeking moral grounding in terms of their being defenders of democracy (Gans
2004, McChesney 1999) and moving from ‘objective’ reporting towards a more
‘interpretive’ variety. This model puts less confidence in the rationality of man
than the libertarian tradition does, arguing that press’s role is to “goad [the
public] into the exercise of his reason” (Hutchins 1947). Important alternative
viewpoints include the citizen participation press tradition, which argues that a
more participatory media provides space for the marginal members of the
community (McChesney and Nichols 2002) who are sidelined by a public
service media. Bourdieu’s (1998) argument that more specialised forms of
journalism by non-journalist experts (scientists for example) can enhance
autonomy from external pressures is also interesting. A better understanding
about how these differing conceptualisations relate to each other may add to the
understanding of how autonomous and representative journalism is, or can be,
in environments like the Cambodian one.

2.4 Journalism roles
The role played by journalists in society relates closely to the norms of
journalism as a profession. These roles can be described firstly in terms of its tasks or practices, for example the collection and selection of information and processing it into news, or secondly in terms of its normative dimension — describing the larger purposes and obligations of journalists. The latter is more relevant for this research. What journalism means in normative terms is outlined by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) as being that it is truthful, loyal to citizens, adheres to principles of verification, is independent, committed to monitoring power, provides a public forum, retains relevance, is comprehensive and proportional and allows practitioners to be personally conscientious.

An examination of the literature reveals complexity and implications for these values. For example, the promise of truthfulness and accuracy — a powerful aspect of the justifications for journalism (Lippman 1960) — relates to discussions facilitated by the press being of a high standard. Thus, hard facts are paramount. As Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) puts it: “A debate steeped in prejudice and supposition only inflames” (p.136). However, having an obligation to the truth is not as straightforward as it sounds. Does it mean a commitment to absolute, philosophical truth or simply a degree of truth with which we can function day to day? In the sense of the latter, is a commitment to accuracy, fairness and balance adequate, given that both are subjective? Kovach (2001) and Ward (2004) interpret truth as a process which builds over time, but which is strictly adhered to as an ideal.

The watchdog, or monitorial role as described by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001), positions the press as a vigilant informer and a check and balance on power (Kocher 1986). As a watchdog, journalism promotes government transparency, accountability, and public scrutiny of decision-makers, “by highlighting policy failures, maladministration by public officials, corruption in the judiciary, and scandals in the corporate sector” (Curran 1996). This role has
practical merit with a correlation between lower rates of corruption and a free press due to journalism’s watchdog role promoting transparency in the governmental decision-making process, and exposing and hindering abuses of power (Brunetti and Weder 2003).

The facilitative role, as described by Christians et al (2009), of journalism emphasises that the press does not only report on civil society’s associations and activities but supports and strengthens them by helping to consolidate a public sphere or civic forum. According to Dahlgren and Sparks (1995), journalism creates this forum by mediating between citizens and the state, facilitating debate about important issues, and informing the public about their leaders. This role is particularly important during election campaigns, when it provides citizens with information to compare and evaluate parties and candidates, and in doing so provides the required conditions for people to make an informed choice (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).

The effects of the success or failure of this facilitative role have been recorded in numerous studies. For example the ACE Project, a collaborative network of electoral information, recognises the facilitative role of the press as influential in Ghana, Sri Lanka, Belize, India, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia (Norris 2006). In contrast, the non-fulfilment of this role resulted in bias during electoral campaigns in Russia, Belarus, and Mozambique (OSCE 2000).

As well as truthfulness, monitoring and facilitative roles, independence has also been linked empirically to the effectiveness or otherwise of the press. While Andriantsoa et al (2005) report that the process of liberalisation and privatisation of the media undermined the older state-controlled media across much of Africa and contributed to multi-party electoral democracies in Madagascar, Tunstall and Palmer (1991) also report that media pluralism,
meaning that various interests independent of the state are represented by the
media, is threatened by over-concentration of private ownership of the media,
whether oligopolies within each nation, or major multinational corporations
with multimedia empires. Hughes and Lawson (2005) have found this to be
problematic in Russia, Brazil and Peru.

According to Christians et al (2009), a key means of classifying press roles is in
terms of whether it is more collaborative or radical in character. This refers to
the relationship between the press and the state, where the press provides
information about urgent social problems and channels citizens’ concerns to
governmental decision-makers, for example in the case of natural disasters or
other major crises (Norris 2006). Besley and Burgess (2001) directly link a
collaborative role of the press to quicker responses to national disasters in India
in areas where there was a greater concentration of newspapers. By contrast, a
radical role of the press (Christians et al 2009) is where it provides a platform
for more critical and reformist voices. This role, they argue, is the one which
most facilitates participatory democracy, and tends to be the main justification
for freedom of publication.

An emphasis on one role or another depends on a number of factors, according
to Christians et al (2009). One of these is the intensity of the community
attachment to the media in question. The more intense the attachment, the more
likely the press is to be active participants and partisan in accordance with
audience expectations. The dimension of power also comes into play, whether in
the form of a direct influence on information and opinion that is released, or the
means by which governments or big business must take the press into account.
This relates strongly to a final factor, which includes dimensions of legitimation
and accountability, or the means by which media can be called to account
including legal regulation, the market as a ‘hidden hand’, public pressure and
professional self-regulation. An examination of the presence or absence of these factors gives a sense of the type of press culture which exists in a particular country and the possible effects of this.

2.5 Professionalisation debate
There has long been debate about how the practice of journalism can best serve the differing models and roles. One frequent proposal for improving levels of press responsibility is to increase levels of professionalisation among practitioners, with training and codes of ethics contributing to the development of a more trustworthy press (Marzolf 1991). Sociology of professions and journalism professionalism models are critical elements of the debate about the professional orientation of journalists, including their values, ideologies, socialisation and practices (Mayiga 2008). The three basic perspectives of this debate are functionalist, phenomenological and in terms of power-relations.

The functionalist perspective sees professions as advancing societal causes such as stability, consensus and moral order (Johnson 1972, Marshall 1963) and is premised on the concept of professional knowledge and the social control of expertise (Eraut 1994). According to this perspective core traits or attributes shared by professions include in-depth skills based on specialist and theoretical knowledge, training and education, an occupational organisation whose entry is regulated, a code of ethics and altruistic service (Johnson 1972, Beam 1990, O’Sullivan et al 1997).

Studies using the phenomenological approach attempt to reveal the nature and meaning of human experience of a profession (Moustakas 1994, Van Manen 1990, Bogdan and Taylor 1984) by looking at how the term is invoked in the everyday life of members of a certain occupation, through values, norms and practices (Beam 1990). This approach is highly subjective and rejects the ideal
type approach used in functionalism (Mayiga 2008). However, it is limited, according to Beam, by the fact that it makes cross-occupational comparisons difficult due to its refusal to accept a common definition of the concept of profession.

A power-relations perspective emphasises the exercise of power in professionalisation, looking at its relationship with political, economic and social environment factors (Johnson 1972, Beam 1990) and examining what is at stake when occupations seek professional status. This approach conceptualises the struggle for professionalism less as the simple acquisition of core attributes and more as an ongoing process of securing and consolidating privilege and prestige, with professional attributes analysed in terms of how they serve the professional community (Allison 1986). Codes of ethics are particularly important here, he argues, as they can be used as a means of formal social control within a profession and for disciplining deviant comrades.

The idea of professionalism as it applies to journalism is itself highly normative, with attempts at definitions often linked to specific interests or as a means of shoring up the declining prestige of the profession (Reese 2001). Strands of this type of reasoning feature in attempts by members of more traditional ‘old’ media organisations to undermine the rise of the less “professionalised” online competitors providing cheaper content (Masters 2009). While issues like this are prominent in the debate on journalistic professionalism in the west, from a developing world perspective such as is being examined by this study, Mayiga’s (2008) study of the professionalisation process in Uganda is more relevant. This study outlines two distinct conceptualisations of professionalisation which are fundamentally at odds with each other. Statutory professionalisation as espoused by politicians is where the state plays a primary role in the process, mainly by means of regulation. Ultimately, he points out, this conceptualisation sees the
process primarily as a means of control. The alternate conceptualisation comes from journalists themselves, perceiving it as something which is nurtured voluntarily and by socially inculcated professional values, hence as a value system (p.2).

A number of studies have highlighted the tensions that arise within the statutory approach about how values can be imposed through legislation. Knudson (1996) notes a number of claims of the independence of journalists in Latin America being compromised due to professional associations requiring qualifications in order to be allowed to practise journalism. As Mayiga (2008) points out: “Mandatory professionalisation has been linked to violation of human rights, especially freedom of thought and expression,” (p.12). The continuing pertinence of what is at stake in this regard can be seen in a westernised context with the intensity of debate surrounding the Leveson Inquiry (2012) into problems with the culture and ethics of the British media and the Hutton Inquiry (2003) into the use of sources by the BBC to report on the lead-up to the war in Iraq. The abuses of ethics and standards highlighted by the Leveson Inquiry also underline the kinds of problems associated with a more voluntary adherence to journalism standards and ethics.

Overall, a professionalised conceptualisation of journalism is shown by the literature as a key part of the construction of ‘ideal’ functions of the press, closely related to the idea of journalistic ethics. Both are concerned primarily with what ought to happen, as opposed to what does, with research having firmly established the notion that western journalists repair to a primarily US model of professionalism (Sparks 1998). This interlinking of professionalism with a place and time-specific press culture has implications for content of journalism programmes in different cultures which are examined in more detail in Chapter 4.
2.6 Comparative analysis and journalism

While data generated by empirical studies generates useful information about the nature of journalism in individual countries, comparative analysis helps understand questions which are relevant to this study such as why the press serves different purposes and takes varying forms in different countries, and whether conventional western values of journalism fit with non-western cultures. According to Hanitzch (2008), a study can be called comparative where two “cultural populations are compared according to at least one functionally equivalent concept” (p.95) with Hallin’s and Mancini’s (2004) outline of variations in the structure and political role of the news media rooted in broader political and economic differences being the most prominent example of this approach which relates to journalism studies. They outline three primary media models. The first, the Liberal model is characterised by a dominance of market mechanisms and commercial media. The second, the Democratic Corporatist model combines an historical coexistence of commercial media and media tied to organised social and political groups with an active, but legally limited state. The third variation, the Polarised Pluralist model is characterised by the integration of the media into party politics in the context of weaker historical development of commercial media and a strong role of state.

A weakness of these types of comparative studies, as Hallin (2004) himself acknowledges, is a tendency to focus only on the developed capitalist democracies of western Europe and north America in a way that is highly ethnocentric yet is referred to as though it were universal. Even as media theory has become more global in its perspective, with a shift in emphasis to a more communitarian theory of interdependence and participatory development (Bourghalt 1995), critics such as Nyamnjoh (2005) illustrate how media theory inherited from discourses of modernisation and liberal democracy remain
dominant even though they are unsuitable for the lived reality of journalists and media workers in other contexts.

While Asian media systems are not included in Hallin and Mancini’s analysis, elements of it are still useful in describing characteristics of the media in Cambodia. A high level of clientelism, the strong role of the state, the limited development of the mass circulation press and the relative weakness of common professional norms are all reminiscent of the Polarised Pluralist model. This model is associated with high degree of political parallelism, whereby newspapers are identified with ideological tendencies and traditions of advocacy and commentary-oriented journalism (Hallin and Mancini 2004). This tends to lead to lower levels of belief in ideas like the ‘common good’ and journalistic ‘neutrality’. In general, such systems have been shown to dampen the enthusiasm of journalists for the ‘watchdog’ role, due to their being overly worried about political stability. Some of the literature outlined in Chapter 6 and the data in Chapter 7 links some of these characteristics to the Cambodian press environment and the implications of this in terms of normative conceptualisations and work practices are discussed further in Chapter 10.

Given their geographical closeness and cultural similarities, it makes sense to draw comparisons between Cambodia and other countries in the region. China and Singapore are useful comparisons, in particular with regard to the development of journalism programme norms in a socialism-influenced climate in China’s case, and, in the case of Singapore, for the development of an “Asian values” press model — discussed later in this chapter — which has proven to be highly influential across the rest of Asia. Before examining these in more detail, the cultural specificity of journalism norms must be established.
2.7 Cultural specificity of journalism ideals

The idea that aspects of journalism might be specific to certain parts of the world, or the west in particular is one is fraught with difficulty in the academic community. The presumption in most journalism schools, for example, is that there are ideals or ethics within journalism that are unassailable — objectivity for example (Schudson 1978) or truthfulness (Ward 2004). An increasing body of work, to which this study aims to contribute, argues not simply that these concepts are untrue or wrong but that the way in which they are framed and conceptualised might be more subjective than was previously thought. It suggests that the journalistic norm and value systems that result from such frameworks are overly rooted in western concepts and philosophical foundations. Christians (2008), for example, argues that enlightenment rationalism, which most of our western based ethics structure has been built upon is oppressive of non-western perspectives and “is no longer epistemologically viable” (p.7).

Research suggests that the acceptance of fundamental journalistic norms on which much of our understanding of the effects of journalism is based, can be problematic in countries which are culturally dissimilar. This line of argument runs parallel with the one that says that while symbols associated with liberal democracy — for example freedom, rights, welfare, sovereignty, elections, representation, environmental protection, cosmopolitanism and democracy (Appadurai 1996, Sardar and Van Loon 2004) — are projected from the western world via a global media, the reality has been “the deepening of the ideals of freedom and human dignity only for an elite, while increasing the misery of the rest” (Harvey 2005, p.37). Instead of truly advancing the core principles of liberal democracy, this mediation instead acts as the new missionary for global corporate capitalism (Herman and McChesney 1997). The counter-reaction to such mediated symbols is often revolutionary, for example the violent
destruction of the symbols of capitalism by anti-globalisation movements. At other times resistance is manifested through an affirmation of cultural specificity, as evidenced through the discourse of ‘Asian Values’ in society generally (Pye and Pye 1985) and then to journalism particularly (Dissanayake 1988, Mahathir 1985).

A number of different countries’ experiences have echoes of Cambodia’s. In Zambia, for example, journalism and ethical standards were dictated by libertarian principles of press freedom, individual liberty and the free market, which followed the media in colonising the nation (Hachten 1971, Gecau 1996). According to Banda (2008), while foreign backed press development initiatives were instrumental in establishing a more professional basis for the press and linking literate Africans with their new nationalist leaders, ultimately they were an elite project, “reproducing a typically western oriented libertarian ethical framework and reinforced by local elites socialised into the culture of liberal journalism” (p. 130).

Rao and Lee’s (2005) study of attitudes among Asian and Middle Eastern journalists also reveals concerns that any global journalistic ethics code would be dominated by western ideas and values. What, Byun and Lee (2002) ask, would a journalistic ethics model be based upon in China, given that its dominant ethical philosophy of Confucianism is premised on values of consensus and individuality that are different from the dominant philosophies in the west? Tsukamoto (2006, p. 56) observes that journalism norms adopted in post-WWII Japan influenced by US-oriented social responsibility worked radically differently in Japan to the US. Coming thorough the filters of different cultural and historical context, Japanese journalists ended up stressing freedom less and restraint more than did their US counterparts. According to Ward (2008) ethical issues in India, such as the invasion of privacy in the context of
picturing a dead body for example, have different meanings and implications there. There, he writes, “death is a form of moksha, or the highest state of liberation and the public exhibition of a dead body is not a matter of privacy for the individual or his family” (p.102). Blankenberg (1999), Christians (2004) and De Beer and Wasserman (2004) explore how a normative framework based on Ubuntu (an African concept emphasising participation and social solidarity) would prioritise community oriented values while other core values in western ethics, such as objectivity, take a back seat. Cortadi, Fagan and Garreton’s (1992) exploration of problems faced by citizens and journalists living under authoritarian rule also suggest that western style journalism ethics in certain contexts need rethinking.

2.8 Asian values press model

Given that this study uses Cambodia as a case study, an Asian perspective is hugely valuable to the questions raised here. The most important attempt to adapt journalism values to a more Asian viewpoint has been the debate on ‘Asian values’ journalism. Proponents argue that this type of model, which incorporates a more developmental journalism oriented perspective, was an authentic expression of indigenous culture and a means of protection against manipulation by former colonial masters. Dissanayake (1988) was among those who argued that Asian approaches to communication theory — and journalism by extension — are necessarily different from western approaches and are more angled toward groups over individuals, the family, frugality, filial piety, reverence for education, hard work, respect for authority and hierarchy, state interventionism, teamwork and “self-effacement, self discipline and personal sacrifice” (Richstad 2000).

Leaders of Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore promoted ‘Asian values’ journalism as upholding a deference to
order and authority, twinning press freedom and responsibility and privileging national interests over individual ones, where journalism was harnessed to aims of national betterment (Xu 1998). According to Mehra (1989), the role of the press in nation-building and national independence gave it a special role in developing countries, where the ‘Asian values’ journalism model was contrasted to Western liberal press model, with its principles of independence, objectivity and neutrality. The idea that the actions of or products of journalism must conform to the national interest, or patriotic duty is certainly not unique to Asia, and it features strongly in descriptions of the actions of high-profile whistleblowers Edward Snowden and Julian Assange as traitorous (Seidle 2013, Collins 2010). But such reasoning appears particularly prevalent in Asia, as Chua (1998, p.147) describes: “Patriotism has a large following in Asia, and needs no justification.”

Models of journalism which incorporate ideas of patriotism and the national interest as the ‘Asian Values’ model tends to have faced strong criticism. Lee (2001) points out the fundamentally authoritarian nature of countries in which such a press model is perpetuated precludes the practice of effective journalism, while Nain (2000) describes ‘Asian Values’ press models as conservative, jingoistic and anti-west. Such models, he argues, have tended in Asia to end up legitimising repressive regimes, undemocratic practices and tightly controlled media systems “whose raison d’etre is to uphold and help perpetuate these regimes” (p.149).

The character and evolution of the press in China and Singapore is particularly relevant in attempting to describe the type of press model emerging in Cambodia. The Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP), which has ruled Singapore 1959 has “one of the world’s most efficient engines of media control” (CPJ 2005, p.118), with nearly all print and broadcast media outlets either
owned or controlled by the state or companies with close ties to the ruling party (Duffy 2010). According to Information Minister Lee Boon Yang (2004), this is due to Singapore rejecting the adversarial the press model of the west in favour of a “free and responsible press whose role is to report news accurately and objectively...At the same time our media has to be sensitive to our national interests”. Or, as a BBC country analysis of Singapore put it in 2007 “the concern for stability outweighs the quest for media freedom”.

What is unusual about the Singaporean situation, and which makes it compelling for other leaders in the region, is that this tightening of press freedoms has been achieved primarily by non-violent means and has helped provide, according to advocates, unprecedented economic growth. George (2007) says the government press policy “balances the political interests of the PAP government, the profit motives of publishers, the professional and pecuniary needs of journalists, and the public’s demands for information and analysis” (p.135). This type of carefully-calibrated coercion appears to have earned the tacit approval of both the public, and journalists themselves, according to Duffy (2010). The vast majority of journalists practise self-censorship rather than risk being charged with defamation or breaking the country’s criminal laws on permissible speech, and a mind-set has evolved that only news which shows the country to best advantage, should be published” (p.41).

China’s enormous financial and political muscle in the region (Winfield and Peng 2005), has seen it gain increasing influence across Asia economically and politically. Similarly to Singapore, China’s emergent journalistic culture is very much subservient to an overall aim of stable society and government. Zhongzhi (2010) describes the term “journalism” in China as typically evoking a leaning “toward idealistic principles rather than realistic practices” (p. 16). This
contradiction manifests itself in journalism programmes, as described by Zheng (1996) and Zhongzhi (2010), where on one hand there is an emphasis on communist ideology and persuasive propaganda, while on the other an increasing commercial self-determination is granted to mass media which drives a form of journalistic professionalism driven by news values. Fang and Zhang (1995) describe a layered content to Chinese journalism education, ranging from emphasis on Marxist principles and propaganda, to softer and more relaxed content covering ‘skills’ such as news gathering or copy-editing and a final layer relating to the role and functions of mass media which allows for vast room for improvisation.

But even within China there are significant differences in journalists’ perceptions of media roles, in keeping with the degree of western influence. Lo, Chan and Zhongdang’s (2005) comparative studies of the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong found that while in all three cases, while journalists value their role of disseminating factual information accurately and rapidly, they demonstrated a stronger belief in the role of journalism in explaining government policies to the public, in helping the public to ‘understand’ such policies and in ‘guiding’ public opinion. The investigative role of journalism was also less evident compared to similar studies in the west. Differences were also evident in terms of ethical values. While the deliberate and knowing acceptance of a monetary reward for writing a story in a certain way, a lot of shading is evident in terms of other practices which might be regarded as problematic in the west, such as accepting free gifts and trips from sources, moonlighting for other organisations, and toning down negative reports on government agencies or big advertisers.

Pan and Chan (2003) show evidence of coexistence of two journalistic paradigms — the Party-press and the professionalism paradigm — which lead
journalists to emphasise different factors when evaluating their own professions and deriving job satisfaction (Chan, Pan and Lee 2004) with professionalism increasingly becoming a lens through which China’s journalists view their craft. This lead to an increase in media workers “who know the party line well enough to sidestep it without jeopardising the media institution” (Cui 1998). This line of research demonstrates the adroitness of Chinese journalists at improvising in terms of values, ethics and professional norms, in order to operate in politically, economically and ideologically uncertain terrain. As Pan and Chan (2003) put it: “They appropriate the official stipulation of journalism and media roles to coat their innovative practices in dealing with multiple and contradictory sources of pressure”.

2.9 Towards a new model
Given the differences in press cultures outlined in this chapter, the question arises as to what a more culturally inclusive and more adaptable model of journalism might look like. According to Ward and Wasserman (2008), whose nuanced and cosmopolitan approach to the subject is a big influence on this research, a more responsible and inclusive form of globally-oriented press which acknowledges how ethical perspectives are influenced by their own cultural, historical or political positioning, would be hugely beneficial in counteracting the damage done by biased and parochial media. The task, according to Chakrabarty (2000) is not to dismantle all that is European or western about journalism, or to engage in cultural relativism that assigns reason or democracy only as synonymous with the west, but to grasp “the cultural and spatio-temporal location of the Enlightenment steeped in its own biases, possibilities and conditions”(p.96).

Ward and Wasserman describe a more cosmopolitan-minded journalism, which could report issues and events in a way that reflects this global plurality of
views and power-relations, thus helping different groups understand one another better. But what values would this more “cosmopolitan minded” model of journalism have? Some argue that a key element of building such a model is rooting journalistic ethics in globally recognisable concepts while adding them to foundations based in other philosophical traditions. This would limit parochial attachments and mentalities “by drawing a ring of broader ethical principles around them” (Ward and Wasserman 2008, p.54). Christians (2008) argues that to begin to do this, we need to be certain about our moral foundation. “Without a defensible conception of the good, our practices are arbitrary. A credible ethics, as a minimum, must be fundamentally transnational in character,” he argues, adding that an ethics of “universal being” could enable us to start over intellectually with the holistic notion of humans in relation to each other, rather than a truncated notion of humans as rational individuals. Such an ethical system would see principles of human dignity, truth and non-violence grounded in the sacredness of human life (p.7).

Christians’ and Traber's (1997) comparative study of ethical principles in thirteen countries on four continents highlight a number of transnational values, including the sacredness of human life, truth-telling and nonviolence, or a commitment to living together peacefully. Christians and Traber describe these as universal values or “protonorms”, which provide a response to some of the dangers associated with relativism, “while allowing for multiple realisations in different cultures” (p.15). Ward and Wasserman (2008) agree that universal norms reflect our common condition as a species, but any global ethic must be founded on an understanding of the factors that have obscured the ‘unpeople’ from the attention and compassion of the press.

However, critics point out that any path which seeks ‘universal’ or ‘fundamental’ ethical concepts is fraught with danger. Even concepts such as
human dignity can result in a considerable degree of local interpretation (May 2006). For example, where African traditions are invoked, human dignity “has taken on a communitarian aspect, bringing it in confrontation with what is seen as Western individualism” (Rao and Wasserman 2007). The notion of universal values in itself is problematic, according to Ang (1998), who argues that concepts such as truth, arrived at through a rational knowledge of reality, “have become suspect in a complex, diverse postmodern age” (p.81). Clifford (1988) points out that incorporating ideas and concepts from localities into an overarching narrative claiming to be universal, is that these concepts and values become divorced from the dynamic processes in which they obtain their meaning.

In terms of the construction of an ethical system in a former French colony like Cambodia, a post-colonial perspective is also useful. Issues central to this perspective, according to Dirlik (2005, p.583) includes questioning the relationship between eurocentrism, capitalism and modernity, ideas of nationhood, borders and boundaries. A postcolonial approach to global media ethics would therefore be concerned with the origins of current media ethical thought, but would also have as its aim the search for hidden knowledge, that which is left out (Venn 2006). In terms of a concept like human dignity, postcolonial criticism provides the necessary vocabulary required to properly situate this kind of value in terms of history and power relations (May 2006).

One interesting offshoot to the discourse on more universalised journalism ethics, is whether ideas about patriotism can be properly incorporated into such a value system in a way that includes, yet transcends, notions of duty to ones country? Ward and Wasserman’s (2008) conceptualisation of democratic patriotism is particularly relevant here. Rather than an open-ended idea of patriotism which is primarily defined by national self-interest, they advocate a
type of patriotism which has specific goals. In terms of journalism, these relate to the free, equal and respectful participation in social and political life and perfecting the critical powers of citizens to meaningfully participate in a society which is defined not only by competing interests but also by deliberation on the common good. In this way the object of democratic journalism becomes not only the promotion of national democratic community but also global democratic community. “Journalists’ loyalty extended to humanity at large” (Ward and Wasserman 2008, p.55). For this, Putnam (1992) argues, liberal values which encourage the unimpeded flow of information and the freedom to offer and criticise a hypothesis in politics, science or journalism is required.

Another example of how a more universalised approach to the formation of journalistic ethical frameworks might work is with regard to bribery. A key journalism norm is that of editorial independence, which proscribes against reporters taking bribes. However, the practice is still very widespread among journalists in developing countries such as Cambodia, where low salaries and insecure conditions have resulted in journalists taking payment from news sources for coverage (RSF 2010). A more globally minded approach to the issue, according to Wasserman (2008), would say that instead of simply condemning the practice in journalism programmes outright (applying a more westernised ethical framework uncritically) or doing the inverse by viewing this as a ‘local’ or ‘cultural’ practice about which an ethical framework for press practices have nothing to say, a judgement could be reached by applying a hybrid ethical framework.

Such a hybrid framework would acknowledge the ways journalists must negotiate their professional conduct in such a way as to cope with the material conditions of their work, while retaining an ethical means of providing fair and independent news reports. Such an approach would incorporate global ethical
notions within a framework that acknowledges the ‘local’ socio economic conditions under which proponents of journalism must live. However, Wasserman warns against linking these kinds of objectives with a developmental media model, which entails the possibility of restrictions on press freedom by the government in order to contribute to developmental goals. Any appropriation of postcolonial concepts as a means of justifying new forms of exclusion or privilege for a postcolonial elite “should be distinguished from attempts to create a new society where dignity is restored for the formerly oppressed in a broad based way” (Wasserman 2008, p.84).

2.10 Conclusion
The literature establishes conclusively that there are some serious problems with overly simplistic views of journalism as defined by its occupational ideology, history and professionalisation. Variations in practice are particularly relevant in the area of journalism ethical norms. In this regard, as Hafez (2007) puts it, the question is no longer whether globalisation impacts on the local practices of journalism ethics, but the degree of globalisation or hybridisation of the criss-crossing experience.

The literature, in particular on “Asian values” journalism, cautions against what Kasoma (1996) describes as an overly idealistic view of ‘local’ ethics, or views which suggest that local spaces are populated with pure, unadulterated cultural values that westernised standards of journalism somehow render imperfect. This type of reasoning is as reductive in its way, as that which concludes that a one size and shape of journalism model should fit all. Thus, it may be short-sighted to think of a specific indigenous moral philosophy such as Ubuntuism as an answer to the global questions and problems of journalism ethical norms.

Acknowledging this does not however, as Ward (2008) and Gunaratne (2005) suggest, exclude the possibility of assimilating principles of Ubuntu morality, or
Buddhist and Chinese philosophies’ recognition of the validity of a rightness which is derived through social consensus in a more global version of journalism ethics. It is not possible to unequivocally state that all codes of journalism ethics are highly culturally sensitive. But there are indications that it could be true that, as Simon (2008) puts it, local circumstances and realities are binding in terms of its general practice.

Recognition of the above can lead to a more culturally sensitive approach to journalism studies in general, which sees the practice as taking in from its local environment in the same way as it contributes to it. Such a provincialising of journalism theory, according to Gunaratne (2005) might ultimately make it more appealing to non-European audiences and help improve the visibility and effectiveness of the practice. The literature shows that useful comparisons can be made between less developed non-western democracies and Cambodia, which is the case study examined by this research, not least because a cursory examination reveals they have significant characteristics and experiences in common. Looking at these commonalities in further detail is likely to reveal more about a journalism model that can have a more genuinely transnational appeal and which may help the profession fulfil what is, ultimately, its stated aim, the betterment of the human race through a better knowledge of its material conditions. Chapters 3 and 4 explore the extent to which ideas about journalism and democracy, development communications and paradigms of journalism education play a role in this regard.
CHAPTER THREE.
Re-examining the link between the free press and democratisation

3.1 Introduction
The presumption that a free press improves the chance for democratic development has approached normative orthodoxy in the western world and in the many globally spanning aid institutions that have emerged from it. The European Commission and Court of Human Rights, for example, has stated that “freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of democracy,” and that a free press “affords the public one of the means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders” (Jakubowicz 1998). This chapter interrogates the foundations and evidence for this link as a means of contextualising certain emphases on the democracy/journalism link made in training programmes in Cambodia.

Chapter 2 has already outlined some of the core elements of journalism in terms of normative ideals like truthfulness, fairness and balance and role conceptualisations such as monitorial, facilitative, radical and collaborative. In doing so, it lays some of the groundwork for an understanding of how many of these types of definitions put journalistic practice firmly into the realm of the political. These include the facilitative role’s strengthening of civil society and helping provide a civic forum (Christians et al 2009, Dahlgren and Sparks 1995), the radical role’s provision of a platform for criticism and reform of the established order (Christians et al 2009) and a collaborative role, which helps connect the government to the governed (Norris 2006, Besley and Burgess 2001). This chapter explores further how these types of roles are the genesis of where journalism connects to the concept of democracy, building on the framework provided by the literature on public communications (discussed in Chapter 2). A key element here includes the corporatist tradition’s concept of
citizenship as a means of helping participatory democracy to work (Siebert 1965). This encompasses libertarian — emphasising a free market of both truth and falsehood — and social responsibility — connecting the press’ social responsibilities with demands for press freedom — orientations (Hocking 1947, Gans 2004, McChesney 1999).

The democratic norm, as it arises in the latter orientation in particular, gives rise to two distinct but inter-related assumptions. The first sees journalism as defending democracy, while the second sees it as an integral part of what bring democracy into being. Both contribute to a general understanding that democracy and press freedom are strongly connected and mutually reinforcing. However, De Smaele (2002) highlights a vagueness about this kind of theorising which can lead to misapplication or inappropriate co-optation of these terms due to their positive emotional meaning, ultimately leading to “a shift, and in the end an emptiness, of meaning” (p.2). This chapter re-states and clarifies these definitions as part of providing a theoretical framework on which to ground an interrogation for the basis of normative emphases on the connection between the press and democracy in journalism programmes.

3.2 Variants and measures of democracy and democratisation
Before examining how the press impacts on this process, variances and differences within democratic systems need to be better understood. Democracy, as it is understood in this research, refers to a form of government in which all citizens participate equally in the creation of laws, either directly or via elected representatives. Power is held by the people, in contrast with monarchies or oligarchies where it is held by a small number of individuals. Today, there is a more or less united global commitment to the general idea of democracy (or at least the language associated with it), in contrast with a historically high level of criticism of it as a political system (Held 1995). Mayer
(1989) argues that the choice now is less between democratic or non-democratic than between more or less democracy. However, analysis of systems of governance around the world in the literature suggest wider degrees of differentiation.

Before examining this more closely, a breakdown of the characteristics that differentiate a democratic system from other forms of governance is required. Rozumilowicz (2002) identifies the two central features of a democracy as competition among political actors and a level of participation which ensures proper constituent representation. These echo Linz’s (1975) criteria — that basic freedoms of association, information, and communication encourage this kind of competition — while Schumpeter (1979) adds that an electoral democracy presumes space for political opposition movements and political parties that represent a significant range of voter choice.

Schmitter and Karl (1993) attach a central significance to the ability of political elites to communicate in the public sphere in such a way as to gain legitimacy from civil society. Within this formulation, the public sphere is where the state and its citizens come together, to agree upon collective norms. The concept of “liberal” (Diamond 1999), or “substantial” democracy (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1999) extends the element of free competition to a number of political and civil rights (freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion) and notions of rule of law, inclusive citizenship and civil society. Kaldor and Vejvoda (1999) describe substantial democracy as regulating power relations to maximise opportunities for individuals to influence conditions under which they live (p.3-4). According to De Smaele (2002), democracy in this sense is not a dichotomous but a continuous variable.

Different models of democracy begin with the idea that democracy is
governance by the people, for the people and of the people, but also encompass many other ways people act together to influence their rulers and their own lives. Several interpretations of these divisions are outlined in the literature, of which Christians et al (2009) has proven most useful to this study. They identify four main models; pluralist, administrative, civic and popular direct.

The pluralist model derives legitimacy from the idea that individuals assert their interests and preferences most effectively by coming together in groups, which compete to find mutually satisfying policies or programmes. An administrative model emphasises leadership, beginning with the assumption that democracy demands more knowledge than most citizens possess, and progressing toward the position that democracy is best practised by competition among elites. A civic model rejects the position that an aggregation of personal preferences constitutes a legitimate form of popular consent, instead arguing that citizens give consent through a distinctively public judgement. This places a particular burden on journalism as being required to keep citizens informed and to maintain the quality of public discourse. Finally, the popular direct model of democracy takes the concept of self-government literally by accentuating an unmediated involvement by the people in public affairs. According to Christians et al (2009), the principle distinction is between individual rights and liberty on one hand and equality and the collective rights of the community on the other. An emphasis on the former, they argue, is typical of Anglo-American tradition of democracy, while the latter is associated with a more continental, French-type model. The degree of variation in this regard is reflected in the fact that a number of different scales arose with which they measure democracy.  

2These include the Pro-democracy NGO Freedom House’s (2001) criteria for gauging democratic status, including measures of political, legal, and economic systems as well as civil society, such as governance and public administration, levels of corruption, privatisation, rule of law, and economic liberalisation, among others. Other measures include
3.3 Democracy from ‘outside’

An important element in the experience of democratisation in Cambodia is the fact that it was externally imposed, as opposed to something which sprang primarily, or naturally from within. Biechelt (2012), whose synthesis of the literature in this area has been useful to this research, defines what he terms “democracy promotion” as actions of non-domestic actors who intentionally try to overcome authoritarian power by supporting domestic actors who share the same objective.

This includes incidences of linkages between external and domestic actors and more free, liberal or stable domestic regimes, with an associated assumption that the external actor intentionally tries to influence the relevant domestic political regime (Lawson 1999, Ethier 2003). The likes of Bunce & Wolchik (2006) Brinks and Coppedge (2007) see the process more in terms of diffusion (including emulation, mimicry, imitation, inspiration), thus unintentional. According to Schraeder (2003), national governments, international organisations, and transnational and other societal actors engage in this kind of democracy promotion using instruments like diplomacy, foreign aid, political conditionality, economic sanctions, covert intervention, paramilitary intervention and military intervention, while Merkel (2010, p.456) additionally arranges these by degree of coercion – diplomacy being least and military intervention being most coercive.

Whitehead (2001b) develops three models of external democratization. 1. Contagion (ie. In regional neighbourhoods such as central Europe in 1990s) 2. Control (ie. By an external actor, for example US in Latin America) 3. Consent
(in societies with external assistance that only accompanies an ongoing process i.e. Southeast Asia in 1980s). Kubicek (2003) splits the control category into sub-categories of “control” – where there is little room to manoeuvre for the democratising country, and “conditionality” – where the democratising country’s can accept the offered incentives or turn them down.

According to Borzel and Risse (2009) coercive external democratisation is based on the democracy sender imposing its ideas on a country where no democracy exists, with too few oppositional actors on the receiving side to make a domestic regime change probable, and/or unfavourable conditions for democratisation. Coercive democratisation tends to emanate from democratic states (usually the US in global politics and larger European states in the European context) and is accompanied by international organisations such as the OSCE, UN, which legitimise external action and try to safeguard the new order that emerges after an intervention (Croissant 2009, Jawad 2009, Suhrke 2009). Sceptical conclusions have been drawn about the outcomes of this process with likes of post WWII German and Japan contrasted with less successful cases such as post-Yugoslavia, Georgia, Afghanistan and Cambodia (Biechelt 2012).

Failure in this regard tends to be linked to unfavourable preconditions such as on-going security problems, internal state failure, ethnic and minority conflicts, and a lack of internal societal trust (Grimm 2009, p.89). Grimm (2010) systemises four main “dilemmas” for coercive democracy promotion (P.119-126). They are 1. a “benevolent intervention dilemma”, which refers to the conflict between external support and aspired self-determination. 2. A parallel democratisation dilemma of all parts of a transformation, for example a legitimate state’s need for a functioning election mechanism which is turn requires functioning state insitutions and 3. A radicalizing democratisation
dilemma’, which exists in cases when democratic competition intensifies societal conflicts 4. ‘Forced cooperation dilemma’, which refers to the need for recipients to voluntarily cooperate and compromise. Grimm concludes that not all of these dilemmas can be dealt with constructively by foreign actors, with no guarantees for success of external democratisation attempts. “In the end, the abilities of an external actor to consolidate peace and establish democracy and rule of law are limited” (Grimm 2010, p.339).

Cambodia in the period examined here was on the receiving end of an external democratisation attempt which was very deliberate and intentional, rather than a process of diffusion. As such, Cambodia’s experience conformed to Whitehead and Kubicek’s version of “control” or Borzel and Risse’s “coercive” model of external democratisation, where the domestic political actors had little room for maneuver and where the democratisation process was implemented and legitimised by international organisations (ie. The UN). The Cambodian experience suggests that unfavourable conditions for democratisation there, which are discussed elsewhere in this chapter, added to the likelihood that all four dilemmas experienced in coercive democracy attempts as described by Grimm (2010) are not resolved. The likelihood of a resolution in this regard may have been lessened by developments within Cambodia in the time since the UNTAC process was completed, whereby the instruments being used by external agencies to facilitate the democratisation process have become progressively softer, for example conditional aid and threats of sanctions which are rarely, if ever implemented. Beicelt (2012) suggests that democracy promotion only becomes sufficiently effective if adequate instruments considering both the case and the situation are implemented. He contends that the prospects of success increase when logics of action for the different modes of democracy promotion are recognized and consistently followed by donors and receivers. It is unclear as to whether this can be said to have been the case
in a Cambodian context, but the degrees to which measures of democracy have declined, as discussed in Chapter 6, would suggest that such logics of actions were not followed in this case.

3.4 The Democratisation process
The process of democratisation, whereby a democracy is formed in the aftermath of a different political system, is of particular interest for this research which is interested in emphases in journalism training while this process took place Cambodia. McConnell and Becker (2002) describe this process as less a movement in a smooth, single direction than a process of starts, stops and regressions, which is divided into four distinct phases — pre-transition, transition, consolidation and stable (or mature). The pre-transition stage focuses on societal conditions under the old regime, while the transition stage focuses on what Linz and Stepan (1996) term the “historical moment when the previous regime, with its various coalitions and factions, no longer maintains political power”. Democracy becomes consolidated, according to McConnell and Becker, when ideals of democracy are accepted and adhered to and can only be considered stable once it has functioned over a period of time.

A country’s past is a key element in deciding what path it takes in this regard. According to Bunce (1997), history matters as much to the chance of a successful democratic transition as the general political or institutional choices made. Relevant history in this regard, according to Lowenthal (1986) and Linz, Stepan, and Gunther (1995) includes the nature of the previous regime, how it lost power, the nature of liberalisation, the status of existing elites, and the conditions of existing financial and institutional structures, while previous experience with democracy, better developed economies and civil societies increase the speed of transition.
Three primary elements, the state, civil society and economic society, must be in place for consolidation to take place. The most important of these is a strong, working state which is fully committed to the democratic process, and has gained the confidence of its citizens. Democracy, as Linz and Stepan (1996) put it, must become the only game in town. Diamond (1999) concurs, adding three further requirements. The first, he terms “deepening” — meaning the structures of democracy become more liberal, accountable, representative and accessible. In the second, political behaviour obeys the common rules and procedures of democratic political competition and action. Finally, successive regimes must produce sufficient positive outcomes to build legitimacy for the democratic process. Mishler and Rose (2005) and Shin and Wells (2005) add that for stabilisation to take place, the populace must believe that democracy is an appropriate and effective political system for their country and secondly, citizens must prioritise it over other societal goals such as economic development. While a democratically-oriented press would appear on first glance to be the critical factor for either of these things to happen, the next section examines another key factor which contributes to this kind of acceptance — the surrounding political culture.

**3.5 Democratic ‘cultures’**

This study examines assumptions about the link between journalism and democracy, in particular in Cambodia, and hypothesises whether elements within existing political culture affect how certain normative emphases at a programme level were conceptualised thereafter. As a means of suggesting possible effects in this regard in Cambodia, the literature describing how political cultures, as described by Almond and Verba (1963), impact on democratic “suitability” is particularly relevant. Merrill and Lowenstein (1990) compare a “democratic orientation” (as described by philosophers Locke and Milton) with an “elitarian orientation” (as described Plato, Machiavelli, Hegel,
or Nietzsche). De Smaele (2002, p.4) links the former to individualism, pluralism and trust and the latter to collectivism, dominance and distrust. For Siebert et al (1956) a democratic culture is one where the individual is considered a rational being, capable of making independent judgements (e.g. voting) and constructing a ‘truth’ from widely divergent messages (p.40). From this perspective, truth and trust go together and institutions which are trusted are those in which truth is thought to reside.

Authoritarian political cultures, by contrast, place trust and truth in the hands of a few wise men. Inglehart (1997) argues that any kind of fundamental value change in this regard can only happen gradually, if at all. Russia offers an example of this, where failures of socialism and democracy have been linked to elitist tendencies and a lack of an egalitarian tradition in Tsarist, Communist (Krug 1990, McDaniel 1996) and post-Communist Russia. The type of democracy that developed in Russia in recent years, is characterised as being more “delegative” — with power concentrated in the hands of elected presidents — (Weigle 2000, Remington 1999), “totalitarian” (Goble 2000) or “authoritarian” (Sakwa 1998) in character.

This research uses Cambodia as a case study, thus, is particularly interested in factors pertaining to democratic culture in countries similar to it, historically, geographically or culturally. While Russia is an interesting example of how an authoritarian culture can continue to persist despite what is ostensibly a democratisation process, classic Asian 'strongman' figures like Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, or Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, are more pertinent comparisons when analysing the rise of Cambodia’s current ‘strongman’, Hun Sen.

This research posits that popular belief in ‘strongman’ leadership might be a
manifestation at a national political level of tendencies highlighted by Migdal (1988) at a more localised level. According to Migdal, 'strongman'-type figures seize control at a local level in developing world countries by establishing leverage and influence in countries where social control is fragmented, before consolidating support by delivering key components to the local population in a kind of patron-client relationship (Eisenstadt and Roninger (1984) identify such relationships as being in themselves indicative of a low level of social cohesion). Sidel (2004) adds to this idea by arguing that the State, as much as society, create conditions from which strongmen emerge and become successful, using tactics like violence and intimidation, vote-buying and electoral fraud can then work in tandem with the mobilisation of local machines for self-perpetuation of the strongman in office.

Helbardt et al (2008) also link a dominance of personalised over procedural politics in Thailand to shallow democratic consolidation. A sense of institutional dysfunctionality, they argue, leads the electorate to rely less on their rights than look for powerful and decisive leaders who might be able to deliver what they want. A personalisation of social and political relations and orientation towards 'strong' leaders over self-reliance is associated with an “authoritarian personality” type (p.2). At an electoral level, this tendency is intensified by its correspondence with authoritarian inclinations among political elites. ³

Chang et al’s (2007) analysis of data from the Asian Barometer Surveys also links a stagnation in democracy in East Asian region to a continuing attachment to authoritarian alternatives. This links with Rose et al’s (1998) observation that robust democratic legitimacy comes about often not because most people believe in it intrinsically, but because they do not believe that there are

³ There are echoes here of Eckstein’s Congruence theory, discussed later in this chapter.
preferable alternatives. Thus, aversion to authoritarianism may be as important as attachment to democracy in sustaining a democratic regime. Chang et al (2007) find that, while most East Asians support the general idea of democracy, they do not necessarily see it as superior to all other kinds of government, with large numbers rating economic development as more important. These tendencies are more pronounced in less well-developed countries such as Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand. Here, also, a yearning for decisive, strongman leadership exists in tandem with a strong support for democracy in principle. The data also shows a significant difference between more developed countries in East Asia and their less developed neighbours in terms of support for political liberty, the separation of powers and the rule of law, with a decreasing minority in Thailand, Mongolia and the Philippines (between 2001 and 2006), for example, defending freedom of expression or judicial independence. This also suggests a deterioration in democratic political culture.

The concept of ‘Asian values’ was outlined in Chapter 2 as an inhibiting factor for western-style journalism culture in an Asian context. This value system has also been put forward by numerous theorists as an important factor inhibiting the spread of democracy in the region. According to this argument, a Confucian cultural tradition which is more paternalistic, hierarchal and community and consensus-oriented is more consistent with an authoritarian political approach (Kim 1997, Pye and Pye 1985) than it is with democratic cultures that are rights-based and individualistic and in general more conducive to the kind of atmosphere needed for democratic competition (Scalapino 1989).

Eckstein’s (1998) congruence theory is an interesting means of framing this, with its argument that new governmental authority patterns perform better where these patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other units of society. Ergo, a democratic government must adapt to the pre-established order
in that society in the same way, for example in Norway, where liberal democratic traits were modified by a non-democratic deference to technical experts evident in other realms of Norwegian social life (p.22). In Asian values terms, this would mean that Confucian authority patterns may be more congruent with authoritarian political structures than their democratic equivalent.

There are, however, strong counter-arguments against such a conclusion. One is that social modernisation as well as conflicting Islamic, Catholic and Buddhist philosophies change social and political norms in a way that erodes the Confucian appeal, and, by extension, that of Asian values. Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc (2005) found that social authority attitudinal norms in East Asia were not dramatically different from established western democracies, with citizens in Singapore, China and Vietnam often critical of oligarchic and autocratic principles. They also warn against the generalisation that the patterns of actions of authoritarian elites represent the values of the citizenry. A second counter to the Asian values hypothesis is that democracy may actually be more congruent with particular Confucian values — for example an emphasis on harmony and the responsibility of leadership — than proponents of Asian values acknowledge (Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc 2005).

Chang et al (2007) argue that authoritarian-oriented attitudes to democracy in East Asia are not in themselves proof of the Asian Values hypothesis. Both Chang et al (2007) and Flanagan and Lee (2000) find evidence of a strong liberal-democratic culture emerging in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are more thoroughly imbued with Confucian principles and ideals than many Southeast Asian countries. This backs up the point made by Park and Shin (2006) in their study of South Korea, that while a Confucian legacy might not have been conducive to liberal democratic values, it was not significant in
hindering them either. Thus, the dominant variable in terms of the Asian Values hypothesis may be less the degree of Confucianism than the level of development within a given country. The data on Cambodia offers an insight into this which is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Another important factor impacting the development of democratic political systems in parts of Asia is the influence of the dominant power in the region – China. According to Fukuyama (2012), the regional appeal and legitimacy of democracy depends less on how democratic countries stack up on a global scale, but how they are seen in relation to the region’s dominant authoritarian authority. China, Fukuyama argues, has shown a viable path for growing out of a planned economy, and proving (so far, at least) that sequenced transition from communism to a form of authoritarian developmentalism is possible. As a means of understanding how the evolution of the Chinese political system might have resonated in the East Asian sphere, the debate on neo-authoritarianism in China during the 1980s is interesting.

This debate emphasised ‘strongman’ politics over political systems (Sautman 1992, Petracca and Xiong 1990) and was influenced by Shils’ (1962) conceptualisation of “tutelatory democracies” that are attached to democratic institutions, but lack confidence in people's capacity to operate them effectively, and Myrdal’s (1968) conclusion that neo-authoritarianism is the best a developing country can hope for. In China, the likes of Bingjiu (1986) (cited in Sautman) argued that it was more feasible and realistic for powerful leaders to push ahead forcibly with modernisation than to implement democracy all at once. Proponents argued that a necessary relationship existed between the substantial economic progress and the authoritarian rule that each experienced prior to and during periods of rapid development (Chen (cited in Sautman 1992), Wu 1989).
Within the varying schools of thought on neo-authoritarianism in China, there was a general agreement that democracy could not be established immediately after a transition from imperial, colonial or other authoritarian rule. Any premature establishment of democracy, they argued, might put a brake on economic development, which would provoke sustained crisis (Sautman 1992). While proponents saw democracy as a more advanced type of regime, they felt neo-authoritarianism was the best system for promoting social progress in developing nations. The debate has been extremely influential on China, with Hu Jintao, president of the PRC from 2003 to 2013, regarded by many as being in the neo-authoritarian mould, and one of a generation of Chinese politicians “who saw full western-style democracy as a very distant goal” (Economist 2005).

The case study being used in this research, that of Cambodia, is a useful prism through which to examine the extent that authoritarian cultures, which are embedded both philosophically and regionally, influence the democratisation process. The literature suggests that while values such as authoritarianism, Asian values and regional influences impact on the development of political cultures generally, and any possible democratisation process by extension, the degree to which these values affect this is questionable. Data generated by this study, which is discussed in Chapter 8, suggests that the character of the press culture which exists during the democratisation process is a key variable in terms of an outcome which supports or refutes democratic values over more authoritarian-oriented ones. The next section explores the specific connections between the press and democracy further.
3.6 Linking the press and democracy

As stated earlier in this chapter, the debate about the place of journalism within the development of democracy is an old one. For Garnham (1992) it is unquestionable that some version of communicative action lies at the heart of both the theory and practice of democracy, while O’Neil (1998) states that without the freedom of communication mass media provide, the foundation of democratic rule is undermined. Gunther et al (2000) describe the media as the connective tissue of democracy, while Linz (1975) cites freedoms of association, information, and communication as the key components of a liberal democracy. Other theorists link the practice of democracy to journalism specifically, and in particular a ready access to reliable information. For Carey (1997, p.233) the struggle for democracy against propaganda is “a struggle inevitably waged by an ‘objective’ and ‘independent’ press”. While the concepts of media and journalism are closely interrelated and often used interchangeably in the literature, this chapter attempts to differentiate between them inasmuch as is possible.

The literature tends to assume that any connection between the press and democracy, requires as a given that the press is free. While definitions of the press have already been discussed, a precise definition of the term, ‘free press’ has not. McQuail (2000) defines this as a press in which there is freedom from government regulation or control, with no limits on the freedom to disseminate information, news and opinion. In addition, media organisations within which the press exists should have economic and political independence, access to an audience and provide a benefit to the audience. Jakubowicz (1998) distinguishes three levels of press independence. The first is where media organisations are externally independent and free to operate without legal, political, or administrative interference. The second is where there is internal independence of editorial staff, which is respected by owners, publishers and managers. A
third level implies practitioners’ impartiality and detachment from social, political and economic interests while doing their jobs. Whereas laws, codes and institutions can contribute substantially to the first two levels of independence, according to Jakubowicz (1998) the third, individual level is situated more on the field of (political) culture, including attitudes, norms and values. Responding to Jakubowicz’s categorisation, De Smaele (2002, p.5-6) points out that the first two levels can exist without the third, the absence of the third makes external and internal independence to a large degree meaningless. The annual Freedom House Index of Press Freedom measures press freedom by gauging the degree news content is influenced by factors such as the structure of the news industry, legal and administrative decisions, political influence or control, economic influences and actual incidents violating press autonomy such as censorship, harassment and physical threats to journalists. Its findings have been found to correspond strongly with the Press Freedom Index, compiled separately by Reporter’s Without Borders, which enhances confidence in both measures’ reliability.

A more in-depth examination of the history of the linkage between the free press and democracy helps break it down into its constituent parts. A long tradition of liberal theorists, from Milton to Locke to JS Mill, argued that the existence of an independent press protects the right of freedom of expression. Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) link degrees of control of the press with different types of political systems and argue that the press reflects the system of social control with which relations between individuals and institutions can be adjusted.

Modernisation theories of mass communication of the late 1950s and early 1960s assumed a fairly simple and unproblematic relationship between the spread of access to modern forms of mass communications, economic
development, and the process of democratisation. Such accounts, according to Norris (2006) suggested that the diffusion of mass communications “represented one sequential step in the development process” (p.3). Lerner (1958) typifies this type of position in his description of the progression to modernity from reading to producing newspapers. “Out of this interaction develops those institutions of participation (eg voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies” (p.60). These types of assumptions appear to strongly influence the likes of the US Agency for International Development (1999) in their argument that access to information is essential to the health of democracy. Such access, they argue, ensures citizens make responsible, informed choices, and ensures elected representatives uphold their oaths of office and carry out the wishes of those who elected them. In addition, USAID say independent media strengthen the rule of law by keeping a check on the judiciary, and contribute to transparent elections by making all candidates heard and by reporting on relevant issues objectively.

Language used within organisations like USAID does not, however, reflect the strong challenges made to the modernisation paradigm which undermined this linear link between the press and democratisation. In the 1960s and 70s, faced with numerous incidences of backward progress of democratisation processes around the world (Huntington 1993), there was growing recognition that, rather than providing a democratic channel for the disadvantaged, the media, and by extension the press, could also be used to maintain autocratic regimes, reinforce crony capitalism, and to consolidate the power of media oligopolies (Norris 2006). While it is well established that the media was an intrinsic component of the societies in which democracy developed in the west, the question is, which came first? Did the free press develop as an offshoot of the democratisation process or did the development of the free press support the development of democracy? Is there any systematic evidence that supports either of these
McConnell and Becker (2002) attempt to stratify arguments about the role of the media in democratisation into six different positions.

1. A media-supremist position assumes that media freedom and independence produce democracy.
2. A democracy-supremist position holds that democratic reform determines and produces media freedom and independence.
3. A third position argues that media freedoms are an element of democracy and, as such, have no causal force leading to democracy.
4. A null-effect position holds that there is no relationship between media freedom and democracy.
5. A fifth position argues that media freedom hinders democracy, suggesting that a free press can serve as the voice of anti-democratic forces as easily as the voice of civil society.
6. A final position argues that the democratisation process may actually hinder media freedoms, in that the idea of democratisation as a national project is in itself antithetical to the idea of freedom of political thought.

Disagreement on what role the mass media play in the democratisation process also stems from a common divide between theorists who take macro or micro level approaches to the question. Macro-level approaches look at media systems and how they affect politics, while micro-level approaches examine how political communication affects the individual, such as during elections.

McConnell and Becker (2002) conclude that, empirically, only position number four – that there is no relationship between media freedom and democracy – can be eliminated. The order and extent of other effects, they argue, can only be found through accumulation of more data and more study. Jakubowicz (2002) also acknowledges that the issue of whether mass media leads or follows
democratic change in society has yet to be resolved. McQuail (1992) has no such reservations, arguing that the media follows, rather than leads, in terms of its societal effect. He argues that the power of the media to advance collective ends is generally latent due to the fact that the goals of the media organisation tend to take primacy over other social goals; and that the media are generally instruments of social forces rather than primary social actors. Wimmer and Dominick (2000), also throw doubt on the nature and extent of the effect of the media on social change, arguing that politicians, public interest groups, industry lobbying groups, and other social actors influence media at least as much as media influence the different realms of society.

The literature outlined above shows the doubts raised over the nature of the relationship between democracy and the media. These doubts have clear implications for the relationship between the press and democracy. A key facet of debate in this regard, is the model of journalism being exported to developing countries in particular, which some theorists argue is overly supportive of established, neutral forms of democracy and less accessible to more radical voices. Such a cautious and conservative approach, it is argued, limits journalism’s social purpose, a concern accentuated by the agendas of commercial interests. The then World Bank President James Wolfensohn (quoted in Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001, p.193) is among those who notes a global press which is in service to private profit rather than the public interest. Media magnate Rupert Murdoch’s observation that “90% of the Chinese are interested more in a better material life than in the right to vote” (cited in Dahrendorf 1997) articulated a growing belief that the media can function without a free press or democracy. According to Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001), a number of factors explain the increased displacement of independent, accurate news by self-interested commercialism. These include the nature of new technology, which has a tendency to dissociate journalism from geography, the
impact of globalisation, where global communication companies render traditional notions of citizenship and community commercially obsolete and corporatisation of news business, with journalism increasingly situated within large corporations grounded in other businesses.

Aside from models of journalism and commercial pressures, another line of enquiry investigates the extent of the empirical evidence that a free press improves democratic prospects. The literature shows that democracy correlates to other factors outside of press freedom, in ways that are sometimes easier to quantify. Norris, (2006) for example, points out a long-standing link between wealth and democracy, while an association between certain types of past colonial rule and ethnic homogeneity and democracy is noted by several observers, for example, among poor nations in ex-British colonies (Clague, Gleason and Knack 2001). Population sizes are also found to have a significant impact on democratic development (Alesina and Spolaore 2003).

While relatively little comparative research has fully isolated and comprehensively proven the linkage and precise relationship between free press and democratisation, that is not to say no evidence of the link exists at all. Berman and Witzner (1997) argue the very nature of democracy as a political system suggests that free and open communication, through a variety of channels, is necessary to foster the critical practices required for democratic societies. McConnell and Becker (2002) concur that within a stable democracy, the press is the principal institution through which the public can better understand their society. Without that understanding, they argue, it cannot be said to be stable.

A free press supports the democratisation process, Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst (2002) argue, in five ways: 1. It is free of interference and better able to
maintain and support the competitive and participative elements that define democracy and the related democratisation process. 2. It buttresses the societal objectives of democracy, a particular economic structure, greater cultural understanding and general human development. 3. It allows for a public forum. 4. It provides for an expression of options so meaningful decisions can be made 5. It guarantees access to the less privileged in society.

Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu (2002) describe a relationship between the free press and democratisation that is reciprocal and encompasses distinct stages. According to them, a first stage of transition sees the opening up of state control of media to private ownership, which reduces official censorship and government control of information. A second stage sees the strengthening of democratic consolidation and human development as journalists facilitate greater transparency and accountability in governance by being watch-dogs, providing a civic forum for public debate and highlighting social problems.

In their study of Spain, Gunther, Montero, and Wert (2000) find that the press aids in the transition to a consolidated democracy by helping to legitimate the new regime and by contributing to the adjustment of the public in democratic behaviours. This study confirms a significant association between the free press and levels of democracy, even after employing the battery of economic and social controls, with media liberalisation the most consistent predictor of democracy out of any of the factors. According to Norris (2006, p.10-11) this model shows that access to the free press usually results in greater political stability, rule of law, government efficiency and less corruption. Overall, the literature outlined here underlines the linkage between the press and democratisation, but reveal it as a complex two-way flow, as opposed to a single channel of influence. The presence or absence of a number of other variables is the key to better understanding the implications of this. These variables include
the democratic model in a country, the point of transition toward democracy it is at, and the particular role emphases in the press culture which has developed there.

3.7 **Variables which impact on the democracy, press relationship**

The first of these variables is the model of democracy, variations of which are divided earlier in this chapter into pluralist, administrative, civic and direct democracy (Christians et al 2009). Within a pluralist model which emphasises a free market with little state intervention, the media chooses or avoids particular societal roles as they wish and the character of the press reflects this, while administrative models, where ‘expert’ administrations are a means of protecting the people’s welfare, tend to keep the press on a tighter leash. A civic model is characterised by the active involvement of citizens and requires a more participatory and localised press, while direct democracy models’ requirement for a greater variety of voices to be heard tends to have a diversifying effect on the press.

A second variable impacting the relationship between the press and the democracy, which is more central to this research, is the point in the transition to democracy the particular country is at. Rozumilowicz’s (2002) analysis, which divides the democratisation process into stages, is useful here. In this analysis, a pre-transition stage frees up a previously constrained media system, before a primary transition disrupts the culture of censorship. This is followed by a secondary stage in which politicians and journalists attempt to clarify the new institutional and legal order, before a mature stage, when legal and institutional questions have been resolved. When considering how the press is likely to develop in these scenarios, Randall (1998) argues its role under the previous regime impacts on its ability to gain credibility with the public during the transition and consolidation phases. During these phases, the press,
according to McConnell and Becker (2002), goes through a “euphoric” stage where the novelty of new-found freedom is still sinking in, to a higher degree of cynicism as it moves more toward consolidation within the slow pace of change and other realities of political life in a democracy. According to Downing (1996) media and press of all types facilitate the struggle that emerges during this process between political movements and the authoritarian state in the process of regime change, and continues through all these stages.

This research is primarily interested in the area of normative ideals and roles of journalism and how these impact on democratisation. Among expectations associated with the monitorial role, for example, is that it helps create monitorial citizens (Schudson 1998) who actively seek information in order to participate in the democratic process. The press provides the impartial and objective information with which the citizen can participate. Bennett (1998) describes this as a “witness” role”, with the press outlining the transformation taking place in society. Critics such as Hackett (1984) and Donahue et al (1995) tend to focus on how objective the press’ information is, (This critique is outlined in more detail in Chapter 5) and whose interests the press serves. However, if one is to accept at least the desirability of objective reporting, then it does seem to be one of the roles most appropriate to a developing democracy, in particular, the liberal-pluralist variation where citizens are presumed to need and create a demand for information relevant to their circumstances. According to Christians et al (2009), the monitorial role is required under all four democracy models conceptualised by them, but is the dominant role in a pluralistic democracy. In civic or direct democracy models, the role is more fragmented and less objective.

The facilitative role of the press requires the press to bring social, administrative and financial issues from the political to the public realm, providing the
information that moves a public to meaningful judgement and action (Denzin 1997). Bennett (1998) calls this a confirming role, in that information is provided by the press which makes the shift in society seem real. The radical role of journalism insists on the equality and freedom of all members of a democratic society in a completely uncompromising way. Journalism with this type of emphasis is unthinkable in the absence of a dominant power at which it is directed and is very prominent under conditions of contested pluralism, according to Christians et al (2009). The administrative model does not in principle require a strong adversarial voice in the media, while the deliberative model clearly needs critical journalism. Direct democracy needs critical voices, but not necessarily stemming from media institutions that are remote from the people.

An examination of the collaborative role, whereby the press defers to the state on various different levels, raises important questions about how autonomous journalism is at its core. According to Held (1995) there are three levels of collaboration. The first is compliance, either due to coercion, apathy or tradition. A second level of cooperation is either pragmatic or via being instrumentalised, while a third level involves an accepted level of collaboration – either by practical or normative agreement – where due to particular circumstances or through general agreement, journalists choose to cooperate. This role can be very much up for grabs, according to Bennett (1998), in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of a previous regime which often results in a political free-for-all and struggle to secure media as a means of gaining support and legitimacy. According to Christians et al (2009) the collaborative role is not very prominent under pluralistic democracy, while, in a direct democracy, the press is more subordinate to, than cooperative with the elected authorities. However, it connects very strongly to developmental journalism — often thought appropriate for countries whose political, economic and cultural
institutions lack the maturity that a truly free press arguably requires. Developmental journalism tends to work with the state to develop and strengthen existing institutions and pursue the benefits of modernisation for themselves and for the nation as a whole.

**Variations within democratic norm**

This research acknowledges the democratic norm as a central element defining journalism, a conceptualisation which is deepened by Berger’s (2000) description of four different variants of the norm that lead to changes in emphases thereafter. The role of journalism in creating a democratic environment is, thus, an ever-shifting combination of these. The liberal variant sees journalism as an active, autonomous force, with journalists as key players in safeguarding the citizen’s rights and holding the powerful accountable, with the watchdog role a key element of its normative conceptualisation in this context. Responding to critics of the watchdog role, Berger (2000, p.84) argues that this role can, and must, be decoupled from roles played by the media as a whole.

The social democratic variant, meanwhile, sees the press as having public obligations encompassing a range of responsibilities (McQuail, 1992, p.116), stressing citizenship and a guiding, educational role of journalism which is traditionally linked, according to Berger (2000, p.85), to public service broadcasting. As with the watchdog role, however, Berger argues that this function should also be de-linked from a specific institutional role, because, just as public service broadcasters have retreated from adherence to this philosophy in order to compete in a tough market, so journalists motivated by this role are found in all types of media institutions.

The neoliberal variant of the democratic norm sees journalism’s contribution to
democracy as containing a commitment to reflecting pluralism and diversity and providing a platform for debate between divergent and independent voices. Berger argues that journalists coming from this perspective see themselves less as messengers than as neutral referees in the contest of political forces, with a duty to the public to ensure equitable exposure of what is on offer to consumers. A fourth participatory variant, as propounded by McQuail (1992, p.121-3), replaces the incomplete form of democracy that the neoliberalism variant helps to uphold with a more participatory version. Here journalism centres on the ‘civil society’, where participation in the democratic process by grassroots and elites is deliberative and ongoing. This variant sees journalism as serving the information poor as well as the information rich elites by fostering dialogue between governments and its citizens and organisations and has gained currency in the US with the idea of civic (Pew Centre 2012) and public journalism (Rosen 1996, Poynter Institute 1999). Journalists in this tradition are expected to take a position on community issues and make their media institutions into social players.

Post-conflict, post-socialist, developmental journalism variations
This study uses Cambodia as a means of examining the implications of emphases of one variant over another as described by the likes of Berger. An examination of the experiences of other countries with similarities to Cambodia helps provide a degree of context for the Cambodian experience. An examination of the relationship between the press and democratisation in Bosnia, where attempts were made to build a new media and press in the aftermath of a particularly violent and destructive conflict situation, and Russia, where an attempt was made to transition from socialism to democracy, sees evidence of other political economic and cultural influences which affect whether the press can set the agenda for the transition, or are instrumentalised as part of a failed process. In his study of Bosnia and Herzegovena’s experience in
the 1990s, Price (2002) outlines the paradox inherent in post-conflict interventions, which have a tendency to assume that controlling and shaping the media is a necessary part of building a democratic state. In Bosnia, for example, the international community attempted to structure the media along Western standards by establishing a commission to monitor media and investigate complaints, license media operations, and impose sanctions where appropriate. Such control is inconsistent with general principles of media freedom and independence in a democratic state. “Yet the stated goal was democratisation” (Price 2002, p. 91).

In Russia, De Smaele (2002) claims, the attempt at democratisation which followed the collapse of socialism there, also became a justification to curtail press freedom. While speeches by leaders from Yeltzin to Putin advocate free press (Mereu 2000, Yeltzin 1997), analyses suggest that such statements have not been borne out by reality (Reporters without Borders 2010). According to analysts, one seed for the subsequent curtailment of press freedoms was contained within a poor understanding of what freedom of the press actually means. This, according to Richter (2000), was exemplified in Yeltzin’s presidency, where he presented himself as the personal guarantor of democracy and press freedom. As Chugaev (1992) pointed out, while Yeltsin allowed more freedom than his predecessors, he never questioned his presumed right to “allow” such freedom and in exchange he expected loyal press support for his policies.

There is also evidence from Russia, that the means by which the press is controlled under a socialist system, can be transferable to a democratic one. De Smaele (2002, p.8) describes these as including the reliance of many media outlets on economic sponsorship, either via state subsidies or by businesses, the use of courts as weapons deployed against journalists (especially libel and
slander), a dependency on the Kremlin for broadcast and publishing licenses, dependency on state facilities such as printing houses, transmission facilities, and distribution systems, requirement for the state to accredit journalists and ensure access to information, the use of violence against journalists and legal insecurity caused by unpredictable changes in policy.

This is also seen in the Russian case, to have been impacted upon by the a political culture characterised by secrecy and obfuscation. Free access to reliable information is a vital element of the democratising function of the press (Price and Krug 2000), but socialist countries are characterised by a culture of secrecy where information is regarded as a privilege — although it could be argued that the Wikileaks and Edward Snowden cases ask difficult questions of western powers in this regard also (Collins 2010). A change from a culture of secrecy to one of openness, with information regarded as a universal right can be slow, and is markedly absent in Russia, where according to Gulyaev (1996, p.14), “postcommunist leaders continue to see secrecy as a method to control the information flow” and tend to ignore laws which are in place to protect such rights in order to do so. For example, Article 38 of the Russian Mass Media Law gives the right to efficient reception through the mass media of correct information on the activities of state organs, societal organisations and their functionaries (Article 38), while Article 144 of the Penal Code states that unlawful refusals from government or administration functionaries to communicate information requested are punishable by law. In reality though, according to Gray and Hendley (1997), refusal of media requests for information remains a problem. Thus, a culture of secrecy is magnified by a lack of judicial independence, in a way which severely curtails the information flow and restricts the contribution of the press to the democratisation process.

Particular characteristics of the press culture in “post-socialist” environments
which relate very strongly to normative ideals, also have an effect on its vulnerability to instrumentalisation during an attempted democratic transition. De Smaele (2002, p.9) found a significant majority within the press in Russia as voluntarily opting for the new, democratic partiality. NTV President Igor Malashenko (cited in De Smaele 2002, p.9) explained this logic when recalling an impossible choice faced by the media in the run-up to the 1996 election. “If the private media provided unbiased, professional, and objective campaign coverage, (the then Opposition leader Gennady) Zyuganov would win the election, and journalists would lose their freedom permanently. Better to become a temporary “instrument of propaganda” in the hands of the Kremlin”. Thus, in the name of democracy, journalists voluntarily gave up their autonomy and their freedom. In this way, the instrumentalisation of the media and the press is a continuation of the communist past, where the press is mobilised for the purpose of building a democratic society, as opposed to a communist one. This has echoes of the collaborative role, discussed earlier in this chapter.

Other variances within Russian journalistic culture also may have contributed to this. For example, research by Manaev (1995) and Juskevits (2000) suggest that many Russian journalists do not reject the paternalistic character of power and therefore have a tendency to accept its tutelage in mass communication. The journalist in this tradition sees himself less as a neutral and autonomous observer, but as a missionary of ideas. This idea relates to the idea of the active or participant journalist, as described by Horvat (1991), who wants to influence politics and audiences according to his political beliefs. As Voltmer (2000, p.478) puts it: restricting oneself to the presentation of facts is regarded by adherents of this conceptualisation of journalism as a devaluation of the profession.

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4 This has echoes of Hallin’s and Mancini’s (2004) Polarised Pluralist model
A crucial element of this research is Berger’s (2000) observation that chances of fulfilment of democratic norms of journalism differs profoundly between the third world and the first. In a first world context, he argues that an expanding media menu, where journalism is crowded out by entertainment, ads and other communicational activities poses a challenge to the fulfilment of the democratic journalistic role, which is exacerbated by the rise of the internet, where the sharing of information bypasses the classical role of journalism (Dahlgren 1997, p.70). The media deregulation that the globalisation process has given rise to (Hills 1998, Raboy 1998) has also seen the supercession of private over public broadcasters and subsequent dominance of a more neoliberal conceptualisation of the norm over the social democratic variant (Berger 2000, p.89).

Such issues are less evident in a developing world context, Berger (2000) argues, where a more traditional liberal variant of the democratic norm retains its vibrancy due to a shortage of democratic preconditions such as universal franchise, credible elections, independent judiciary or effective parliaments (Ronning 1994, p. 12). However, this emphasis has led to other extremes, with, for example, the watchdog role being interpreted as a mandate for journalism to unseat undemocratic governments, with journalists tending toward actually becoming political opposition in the sense of trying to form an alternative government. This goes beyond the limits of journalism’s democratic role, and can entail accepted journalistic ethics becoming over-determined by a political agenda (Berger 2000, p.92). USAID (1999) notes the dangers inherent in this when it acknowledges that “democratic transitions may not be strengthened through the creation of a media, which, while free from its own government control, espouses views of foreign governments and reflects their interests (1999, p. 9). Other voices in the Third World such as Ogbondah (1997) and Kasoma (1996) argue that the liberal conceptualisation of journalism has gone out of control due to lack of self-regulation and has provoked the government
reaction which has resulted.

As a means of avoiding such traps, several theorists (Galtung 1990, James 1990, Edeani 1993, Wimmer and Wolff 2005) have advocated a type of “development journalism”, where politics come second to educational objectives in the interests of economic expansion and development. However, in recent years, this developmental emphasis has been undermined (Blake 1997, p.254) by studies which expose the ease with which such journalism is manipulated into being little more than government propaganda, as well as its inability to confront problems such as governmental corruption and mismanagement (Rogers 1976, Okigbo 1985, Servaes 1986, Sonaike 1988, Kariithi 1994). A developmental emphasis, with its intrinsic link to authoritarian versions of journalism (Section 2 of this chapter explores this further in its examination of the debate of “Asian Values” journalism), is ill-suited to confronting the challenge posed by governmental attempts to control information flow. Mayiga’s (2008) study of the professionalism of journalism in Uganda, for example, found the democratic norm of journalism threatened by state involvement in statutory professionalism. In such environments, neo-liberal pluralism remains a useful advance for a democratic space previously monopolised by an authoritarian state (Berger 2000). However, Ungar (1990, p.369) warns that this neoliberal variant, especially when operating in a semi-liberal political system, can lead journalism to end up serving as an aid for government to monitor the governed, ultimately playing a guard-dog role to non-democratic governance, as happened (Berger 2000, p.92) in apartheid South Africa.
3.8 Conclusion
On the basis of the literature examined here, a number of conclusions can be reached. A strong belief in the connection between journalism and democracy exists, which is backed up by the majority of the literature. An analysis of the literature contends that the argument for a link between the press and democracy retains plausibility on balance. However, it is less clear what precise role the free press has in the several distinct stages that make up the democratisation process. Among the questions raised in the literature which are key in this regard is whether it really can be said that a libertarian press system — where the market is the only barrier to media monopolies developing — always contributes toward space being provided for the representation of a range of political orientations and choices which is required for a healthy democracy? Also, does the press actually play that important a role in pluralist or administrative style democracies? This chapter outlines persuasive arguments which challenge any simple formula that a free press is an essential precondition that helps to bring about democracy. Instead, it contends that a large number of variables feed into the importance of and precise role the press has in the democratisation process, including the stage of democratisation, the degree of democratic orientation within that political environment and the emphases on particular roles or models of journalism among others.

Much of the literature on the presumed linkage between the press and democracy is characterised by what Mancini (1996) termed “exacerbated normativism”, where ideals or norms associated with a concept bear little relation to cultural, sociological, historical and other basically empirical accounts of conditions and circumstances of everyday life. Such mythologising could have (and may already have had) a damaging effect on the credibility of the profession in the developing world. This is due to an over-simplified linking of a model of democracy (based mainly on the Anglo Saxon example)
and a particular model of journalism, with associated normative aspirations and institutional requirements that are inappropriate to that form of democracy. While some of the challenges to this model, such as the theory of an objective historical truth used by communist regimes to justify controlling the press, were dismissed quickly, other challenges have carried more weight. According to Christians et al (2009), from the developing world perspective, western journalistic practice's account of truthfulness, for example, looked unimpressive when tested against its own reality. From this perspective, “the omissions from and ethnocentricity of what passed for accounts of what was happening in the world were just too glaring” (p.234).

Socialist critiques of media roles in western societies also raise fundamental questions about the lack of western media theory’s lack of a prescriptive character, which leaves it vulnerable to being exploited by market forces which do not have the common good at heart. Within socialism, the Soviet mass media were freed from the profit motive to “do their duties as instruments of the state” (Siebert et al. 1956, p.140- 141). McQuail (1976) points out this type of model embraced the notion of “positive freedom”, or freedom to, whereas in the West, the concept of “negative freedom” or freedom from prevailed (for example from external control eg. government). It does not, according to McQuail (1976, p.9) have much to say about what the press ought to do. This critique carries extra weight in the developing world, where security is lower, the prospect of violence is higher and there is more pressure on societal actors to have a clear purpose.

While challenging assumptions about the strength of the link between the free press and democratisation in a non-western environment, it is not the intention of this chapter to suggest that the democratic norm is irrelevant. In particular, the social democratic variant (Berger 2000) of the norm would appear to retain
usefulness in that context, but only if overly collaborative tendencies which can lead to the press being instrumentalised are avoided. In order to facilitate such a press, government-controlled media should be transformed into publicly owned and politically independent media. Thus, the role of journalism would be less to guide audiences through neoliberal information abundance, Berger (2000) argues, but to add to the volume and diversity of information with locally relevant information (p.94). Ultimately Berger argues that this social democratic variant of the norm must be combined with a participative variant which encourages journalists to forge alliances with other sectors of society and become part of a broader thrust for democratisation (p.95).

Ultimately, the literature makes a case against a “one-size fits all” model of free press encouragement in a developing democracy environment such as that of Cambodia in the early 1990s. It also suggests that an over-emphasis on a democratic norm at a training level could be counter-productive, or encourage a model of democracy which is unlikely to stabilise in that particular environment. This ties in closely to the hypothesis of this research, which suggests that this kind of over-emphasis in a Cambodian context, may have contributed to a shallower democratic consolidation than might have been hoped for\(^5\). Rather than focusing on the democratising role of the press per se, it may instead be more beneficial to try and come to a better core understanding of what democracy and the function of the press might truly mean in other areas of life and society. This might require building enhanced connections between the rights and duties of news producers and the wider issues of human rights in relation to the society which is consuming the news, is affected by it, or is the subject of it. The next chapter puts this in the context of development communications paradigms and how these relate to journalism education.

\(^5\) A more detailed examination of how this was the case is included in Chapters 7 and 8.
CHAPTER FOUR
Examining the relationship between development communication and journalism education paradigms

4.1 Introduction
This research is interested in normative ideals emphasised in journalism education programmes in Cambodia during a particular time period and how these influenced the subsequent work practices of participants. The two key variables which this chapter examines are the evolution of varying development communications paradigms and the differing approaches to journalism education and training during the period being examined.

Examining these helps interrogate the hypothesis that emphases and influences associated with particular dominant development communications paradigms have affected how journalism programmes were constructed, which in turn impacted upon belief-systems and work practices of participants. This chapter provides context for this process, as well as outlining tendencies and influences which can be used to construct an analytical framework with which data gathered from field research in Cambodia can be examined.

The chapter is broken down as follows: It first defines development communications and outlines the evolution of the varying paradigms, as well as giving a sense of emerging paradigms in the field. Acknowledging and understanding each individual emergent paradigm is important in terms of how they critiqued and built upon those which preceded them. This section also examines whether the influence of particular paradigms is greatened or lessened in particular geographic or socio-economic contexts. The second section examines varying approaches to, and influences upon, the implementation of journalism programmes in the developing world in particular. The remainder of
the chapter finds linkages between development communications and journalism education paradigms, with a particular focus on the echoes of the Modernisation Paradigm in the approach to journalism education in the developing world, the new directions the literature suggests that journalism curricula should take in the future, and the impact of foreign aid culture on approaches to journalism education.

4.2 Evolution of development communication paradigms
A general consensus has been established (Clarke 2005, Merrill 2000, Foley 2010) that encouraging journalism is a key foundation block for the effective functioning of overall aid strategies in the developing world and emerging democracies. The watchdog function in particular is thought to contribute to the establishment of better governance, which in turn helps ensure the effectiveness of aid strategies in contributing toward the establishment of a more secure and viable nation state.

The concept of development communication is a central element of the evolution of media development strategies, for which journalism programmes became a key element. Development communication is the use of communication to facilitate social development. The use of the mass media has long been identified as a means of addressing the problem of global inequality (as discussed in Chapter 3) and various paradigms evolved to explain how media can best be encouraged in a development context. Development communications refers to the field within which this debate takes place.

The history of the field can roughly be divided into four phases. Theorists of what became known as the Dominant Paradigm believed the mass media had a crucial role to play in the fostering of modern attitudes and beliefs. A second phase of theorising, known as the Imperialist Paradigm, focused on the structure
of international communication itself. The Participatory Paradigm critiqued what it saw as top-down approaches previously taken, arguing that objects of development must become more actively engaged in the process, with the function of the media being to give them a voice within that process. A fourth major phase of debate saw Globalisation Paradigm theorists stress how unprecedentedly global flows of media content create new development communications opportunities. Before discussing the shape of emerging or future paradigms, these four main paradigms must be critically assessed with their weaknesses and enduring influences taken into account.

**Modernisation paradigm**

Modernisation Paradigm theory (also known as the Dominant Paradigm) coalesces around a rather rigid type of “traditional” versus “modern” outlook. “Traditional”, according to early development communications theorists like Daniel Lerner, was associated with poor, undeveloped communities, where discontent about primitive conditions was generally outweighed by fear of upheaval, while “modernity” tended to describe communities who were more literate, empathetic, fluid and open to change, betterment and self-advancement. The “modern” personality type, it was assumed was the one needed for development, with mass media highlighted as the most effective way of disseminating this way of thinking. As Lerner (1958, p.405) puts it: “The symbols of race and ritual fade into irrelevance when they impede living desires for bread and enlightenment.” The function of development communication within this paradigm was profoundly top-down and geared toward identifying and empowering sections of the elite thought to be the most orientated toward change. They would then, it was argued, articulate a new vision which the rest of the society would follow.

By the 1970s, the Modernisation Paradigm was being increasingly challenged
by critics, who pointed out how its application had done little to lessen inequality in the developing world, and that intractable social structures could not be changed by a media preaching ‘modernity’ alone. Experiments which undermine the paradigm include the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE), where the Indian government used modern satellite television technology in the 1970s as a means of educating the poor about population control, family planning and modern agricultural practices. These efforts failed to make any perceptible impact upon behaviours, according to Thussu (2006), despite high viewing figures and interest on the ground. Knowing about modernity, it seemed, was not enough to change behaviours. Critics of the Modernisation Paradigm increasingly argued that, rather than an acceptance of development messages precluding economic development, it could be the other way around, with economic development a necessary precondition for the acceptance of development messages.

One fault-line increasingly highlighted by this paradigm was the relationship between development and media freedom. Modernisation Paradigm proponents had from the outset stressed the close links between development, democracy and press freedom. However, in practice, developmental pressures tended to necessitate greater stress on material/ economic progress, and in many countries (Singapore and China for example) this emphasis came at the expense of political and civil liberties. The likes of Schramm (1964) argue that given that developing countries were more or less constantly in crisis, their governments were justified in asking its press to enlist in the national effort. Ultimately, many Modernisation Paradigm advocates found that, by way of arguments such as Schramm’s, what they had set out in opposition to such as state control, media restrictions and undemocratic principles, ended up being what they helped propagate.
Another paradox at the centre of the theory was a lack of agreement on a definition for “modernity”. Theorists like Inayatullah (1967) question whether such a concept can be universalised, while Thussu (2006) points out that a dichotomy of modern and traditional was not inevitable – using the example of how Islamic traditions maintain their strength in the otherwise modern Muslim world. Schulze (2000) argues that modernity as understood in Modernisation Paradigm terms, had taken thousands of years to evolve in a uniquely western context, but a more inclusive concept of modernity more appropriate to cultures in which development was taking place, has not been given time to evolve.

Dominant Paradigm theorists ultimately came to be seen as suggesting that the modern outlook was everything, culturally and economically, that the developing world was not. This had the effect of alienating developing world leadership, who came to see the concept of modernity as intrinsically allied with increased western cultural and economic dominance and began to seek their values elsewhere. As Tehranian (1980, p.6) puts it: “When modernity is understood as a separate concept and set against tradition, the chain of empathy is tragically broken”.

**Imperialism paradigm**

As limitations in the Modernisation Paradigm were exposed, a newer strand of thinking emerged which asked more fundamental questions about why the developing world was trapped in a cycle of poverty and perpetual unrest, while the First World basked in prosperity. The Imperialism Paradigm, which emerged from various strands of post-colonial thinking combined with radical movements of the 1960s, lay the blame for continuing sub-standard conditions in the developing world at the feet of the First World itself. Development, according to the Imperialism Paradigm perspective, is less about the problems of Indian villagers or African farmers, than it is “to do with global economic
power and the purposes of the mass media” (Stevenson 1992, p.47). Imperialism came to be identified as embedded within media communication itself, its organisation, its technology, the norms of media production and in the actual content of programming itself. Within this perspective Boyd Barrett (1977) describes a development communications process whereby the media in one country is influenced by the media interests in another without proportionate reciprocation. As such, communication becomes a one-way street, ultimately serving a western cultural hegemony, according to Katz (1973) and Patterson (1998).

Advocates of this theory tend to have a core view that the exportation of Anglo-American media models along with development communications was predatory and destructive of local cultures and vulnerable populations. Imperialism Paradigm advocates argue that the expansion of the US media model, categorised by Schiller (1970, p.93) as a “commercial model of communication”, was less about democratisation and enlightenment of oppressed populations than as the survival and propagation of the capitalist economic system. The news that was circulated as a result of these structures was itself inherently flawed, the thinking went, and framed in a west-centric context. Ultimately, developing world populations were starved of the kinds of information they needed to help plan policies for national development. Thus, the people of Nigeria got news of Africa which was actually designed for a non-African audience (Golding and Eliot 1979).

The Imperialism Paradigm has been profoundly influential within development communications, particularly from the post-colonial perspective shared by many countries in the developing world. However, a number of problems with it as an approach also became apparent. Firstly, its theorists tend to offer more of a negative critique of the faults within the existing Modernisation Paradigm than
they offered a positive sense of an alternative system. They also tend to focus, as Sparks’ (2007) analysis put it, on structural constraints to development and styles of governments, with debates going “beyond the scholarly community” (p.104). UNESCO, the main body concerned with interstate cultural relations, became a centre of attention and activity, in particular during the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debate over media representations of the developing world during the 1970s and 80s. This debate emanated in part from Schramm’s (1964) and Schiller’s (1967) observations about the lack of input and distorting effect a one-way news flow has on the developing world and culminated in the explosive MacBride report (1980), which identified deepening inequalities with media concentration, commercialisation and information access. This shift meant the paradigm was exposed to radically different set of forces and theorists found themselves increasingly compromised by the geopolitical manoeuvrings of the Cold War period. The NWICO argument, for example, was undermined as advocates of the imperialism thesis found themselves championed by interests within a number of state socialist and developing countries as a means of clearing themselves of responsibility for the lack of transparency and freedom in the Third World (Roach 1993).

Outside of the NWICO debate, a number of other theoretical advances have taken place which undermine some of the Imperialism Paradigm’s foundations. Several influential studies undermined its presumption of media audiences in the developing world as being passive consumers, deriving the same meaning regardless of the context (Hall 1980). In fact, it was found that similar shows broadcast in different countries elicited entirely different cultural responses and interpretations. According to Hafez and Skinner (2007), this suggests that western cultural goods are little more that the raw material which the different forces within the various market did what they wanted with. Tracey (1985)
argues that the Imperialism Paradigm assumed a culturally top down media consumption process which, perversely, echoed some of the thinking within the Modernisation Paradigm. Tracey suggested instead that there are “flows within flows and patterns of distribution that do not fit into the familiar and simplistic model” (p.23).

**Participatory paradigm**

Participatory Paradigm advocates attempt to remedy problems with previous theories, by putting the emphasis on developing countries seizing the direction and impetus of the future direction of their development, rather than by having the agenda set for them by outside “expert” elites. In this spirit, theorists attempted to democratise the concept of development theory and by extension, the situating of development communications within it. Similarly to Imperialism Paradigm advocates, Participatory Paradigm theorists reject the idea of a universal development model, instead, conceptualising development as an “integral, multidimensional and dialectic process that can differ from society to society” (Servaes 1989, p.32). Within development communications, the Participatory Paradigm manifests itself as being less about the dissemination of innovation, than it is, about the “grassroots expression of its needs” (Bessette 1995, p.123). Advocates recognise that imposed top-down projects were fundamentally compromised as they lack a mandate from the people that they purported to help. The media was regarded as a crucial part of this type of strategic approach, but only as “the means of expression of the community, rather than for the community” (Berrigan 1981, p.8). Out of this came the idea of developmental journalism, which focuses on community and journalism's role in enhancing that sense of collective identity (Gunaratne 1998).

However, the Participatory Paradigm's intellectual logic tends not to be matched by its field application, with little in the way of empirical evidence showing
noteworthy results where attempted (Muniz 2008, Braden 1998). According to Sparks (2007), whose comprehensive overview (2007) of the evolution of development communications paradigms has been a key guide here, the number of development projects that demonstrated a manifest commitment to ideas contained within the Participatory Paradigm was in fact very small. A UN Research institute for Social Development paper highlighted this when noting that while, in theory, project managers involved in trying to rebuild war-torn societies recognise that responsibility and control of assistance should remain local, in reality external assistance in all its forms, becomes a substitute for local participation, and worse, “destroys local coping and resistance mechanisms and controls emerging local institutions and solutions” (UNRISD 1993). In other words, where external help is involved, it is almost impossible to avoid it being top-down in nature to some degree.

Aside from difficulties with applicability, the paradigm also rests on some fragile theoretical underpinnings – in particular regarding the relationship between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ sources of knowledge and culture. The Participatory Paradigm calls for structural transformation to take place along with the preservation of tradition. However, Ang and Dalmia (2000, p.25) point out that these are inherently antithetical goals. According to Curtis (1998), the process of reconstruction and development extends beyond mere rehabilitation of infrastructure or the establishment of institutions to the very recreation of many aspects of traditional society.

There are also challenges to the theory that knowledge and progress could be gotten from within communities themselves alone, rather than attempting to inculcate knowledge associated with elites and economically powerful groupings. Ultimately, this kind of logic can end up suggesting that scientific, health or farming knowledge for example, has no more validity than traditional
knowledge passed down through generations in a particular area. Where these contradict each other, there is little in the way of prescriptive guidance as to how to determine what aspects of the different systems might be useful in a particular situation. The pragmatic solution, that it might be reached on a case by case basis, is rendered redundant by the fact that the only people who qualified to make such a judgement are the “expert elites” whose influence the paradigm rejects (Sparks 2007). Participatory Paradigm advocates seek to facilitate change for the better, but if “expert” elites are excluded from decision making within this process, changing is more difficult because, as Rao (1997) puts it: “who knows what is better?” (p.2)

Attempts by Participatory Paradigm advocates to stress particular purposes or universal values as a way of getting around this, for example Nair and White's (1995) suggestions of liberation, freedom, justice and egalitarian ideologies, have found themselves caught within the same paradox. The overt or implicit encouragement of “universal” values which are necessary to underpin the application of the paradigm's ideas in a development context – and by extension in terms of facilitating media development – end up occupying the same space in Participatory Paradigm theorising as 'modernity' does within the Dominant Paradigm. Advocates of the Participatory Paradigm also split into various offshoots arising from the fact the theory has very radical implications were it to be fully and comprehensively applied. These include questions as to whether its ultimate expression should encourage populations to confront those in power to affect change, or work with those in power to encourage more popular participation. While, as Berrigan (1981) shows, politicisation through community media is appropriate in countries where a high level of development has been achieved, in the developing world it can have a more radical effect, which includes leading to the overthrow of the governing elite without providing the means improving conditions afterwards (Bessette 1995).
Sparks (2007) identifies and describes two variants within the Participatory Paradigm approach. A negotiated variant attempts to depoliticise the participatory model and set more modest goals for media development. But this kind of approach contains deeply conservative implications in that by not confronting what it recognises as key determinants, it ends up engaging only with the type of change projected to produce outcomes which benefit those in power. A more radical variant on the other hand, consciously tries to find ways for groups that suffer developmental disadvantage to articulate their views and interests. Rather than a pre-determined view of modernity or development, this variant proceeds from a core definition of social reality which is provided by the poor and dispossessed (p.76). This approach, however, tends inevitably to strain relations with the state, and runs contrary to journalism's core function of providing objective commentary. It is also not always possible to discriminate between demands and issues, as “not all popular expressions are valuable or desirable” (p.77). Ultimately, while the Participatory Paradigm constitutes an extremely valuable advance on the obvious limitations of previous paradigms, its weaknesses are highlighted by an inability to address these questions.

**Globalisation paradigm**

While the three theories outlined above represent the core of development communications theory, the most prominent of the paradigms which has arisen more recently to challenge them is the Globalisation Paradigm, which is centred on a re-imagined conceptualisation of the spheres of influence in a global context. Globalisation can be defined as the tendencies of regional economies, societies, and cultures to become integrated through a globe-spanning network of communication and trade, meaning new digital technologies can bring a wider range of specialised channels anywhere. In theory, this gives more choice to consumers and opens up a window to the wider world, particularly so in
developing countries (Thussu 2006). The likes of Elster (1997) and Jenkins and Thorburn (2003) attribute a “liberatory potential” to this opening up of borders to western media, which according to Kapur (1997, p.21) has the ability to strengthen liberal democratic culture, and free gender equality and freedom issues from national “straitjackets”.

Strong theories of globalisation argue that the world is “strikingly new” as a result of globalisation, with media and communication central to contemporary social reality, while de-emphasising state structures, or indeed the existence of any dominating or controlling centre to the contemporary world. Peiterse (2000) typifies this outlook when he argues that the State today is “a weaker determinant of social organisation than it was in the immediate past” (p.10). The Globalisation Paradigm approach sharply contrasts with Imperialism Paradigm theorists. For the latter group, the US in particular, was the ringmaster of global communications, but within globalisation theory, the US is just one element of what Appadurai (1996) calls “a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes” (p.31).

While ‘strong’globalisation theory insists on the transformative nature of the process, ‘weak’ theories of globalisation are much more agnostic about its potential and critical of the process. While acknowledging the paradigm’s revolutionary implications, theorists also recognise that aspects of the process remain ill-defined. For the likes of Appadurai (1990), the complexity of a new, global economy and all that is associated with it contains major disjunctions that have barely begun to be theorised fully. While the language of the Globalisation Paradigm has begun to dominate much of the discussion about development communications, closer examination reveals significant weaknesses.

While the theory is based on some solid assumptions, for example, a growth in
the international flow of capital (IMF 2003) and the frequency of movement of people between countries (Button 2008), these are not enough to establish the validity of the paradigm. In fact, many of the grander claims of these tendencies’ significance appear to reside more in fantasy than in the real world. Several critiques focus on the tendency of globalisation to be used by many different sectors in order to justify widely varying actions. According to Hafez (2007), these include political pressure for State reforms, and private sectors attacks on workers’ rights in the guise of international competition. Hafez argues that such a confluence of agendas creates what he describes as a perfect social climate for mythmaking, concluding that the Globalisation Paradigm placed too much faith in a theory which “fuses truth and falsehood” (p.1). As Sakr (2001) puts it, the long reach of globalisation as a process disguises its essential shallowness.

According to French and Richards (1996), criticising the relentless advocacy of globalisation as a revolutionary new process has become akin to “blowing against a hurricane” (p.33). Yet, while Globalisation Paradigm advocates a critique of alternative paradigms’ tendency to offer a single explanation for media or social dynamics, their own counter-theories tend not to be anchored to any clear practical consequences. Ultimately, the critics argue, the Globalisation Paradigm shows a fundamental lack of empirical clarity and/or workable theoretical concepts. Aside from this, the general “uniqueness of the globalisation phenomenon has also come under attack. Theorists made grand claims of about the “strikingly new” “radically different” nature of a new globalised world. But many of the claims made by globalisation theorists had been noted long before this. According to Robertson (1992), a characteristic feature of the global age is a tendency to generalise features as being new signifiers of the globalisation process which had been fragmentarily present in earlier epochs. Hafez (2007) argues that when properly scrutinised, many of the
phenomena association with cross-border mass communication — for example system change, hybridisations or glocalisations of national culture — are more blurred projections of the future than adequate descriptions of the present.

The Globalisation Paradigm also has a tendency to become overly intertwined with an uncritical acceptance of the idea of market liberalism as the ultimate truth. According to Dirlik (2003, p.275), globalisation primarily means including different societies within a capitalist modernity, with its associated economic, social, political and cultural “realities”. This suggests a vision of international communications shaped more by trade and market standards than by political considerations. This is demonstrated by the shift in the ground on which the debate on the relationship between globalisation and development communications was taking place, from UNESCO, where it centred on education and cultural aspects, to the World Trade Organisation, which is concerned primarily with economics.

The recent economic collapse has made it abundantly clear that unfettered market liberalism is far from the ‘fix -all’ solution it had come to be seen as (Whitehead 2014). Both the economic and ethical logic of this approach has been laid bare by critics, who point out that the market is not inherently democratic in its impulses. While technological advances within globalised communication networks contain potential for democratic communities, as McQuail (2002) points out, there is little reason to expect the internet to serve democratic ends if it is left to the market to encourage it to do so. Market liberalism fails as a means of actualising democratic values because, as Keane (1991) puts it: “It is in love with the arcane and ‘invisible’ state power” (p.114). Within a development communications context, critics like Thussu (2006) find evidence of this in the side-lining of the media’s public service imperative.
In general, globalisation theories have tended towards overestimation of the effects and impact of the process on the ground. What is actually little more than a regionalised and noticeable trend with interesting implications for certain parts of the world has been twisted into something resembling orthodoxy. Recent events have disproven many of the grander claims about globalising technology either bringing us closer together, or having a genuinely globalising effect. Hardt and Negri (2004) point out, for example, the rise in ethnic and religious conflict resulting from an open-ended war on terrorism, while Morley and Robbins (1995) also point out the paradox in the middle of the era of globalisation a counter-tendency has arisen, whereby people are increasingly asserting their national identity, with a consequent revival of xenophobia and racism.

An expected rise in press freedom as a result of globalisation has also failed to materialise. Monitoring groups such as Freedom House, Reporters Sans Frontieres and Committee for the Protection of Journalists concur that improvement in media freedoms in the last 30 years has been closely linked to political upheavals in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s. By contrast, the following decades, within which the process, according to theorists, has been thought to be at its most intense has been characterized by preserving the status quo and even regressive tendencies (Hafez 2007). The suspicion remains that there is a naivety about much globalisation theory, which mistakes some rather fuzzy, if seductive theorising, for manifestations of concrete reality. As Harman (2003) notes, the world is still dominated by large-scale capital, and by the international circulation of capital, which is as pronounced today as it was in 1914. With respect to the classic state function of the ability and preparedness to wage war, “there is no evidence that the epoch of globalisation has witnessed any decline of the state’s powers” (SIPRI 2003). When faced with a challenge to what it perceived to be its central interests, the
state retains the resources to impose its will. While globalisation theorists conclude that the contemporary state now defers to the interests of the global market in a way that democratises it more completely, Sparks (2007) points out that, far from undermining the state, in some ways the concentration of capital and market logic reinforces it due to the state providing the necessary infrastructure to copper-fasten capitalistic machinations. The interests of the market and the national interest come to be communicated as one and the same.

Perhaps it is less of the idea of a globalised media and a globalised approach to development communication, but its application which is problematic. While media companies show characteristics of being globalised in a market sense, they lack true globalisation in that they remain concentrated on national markets. According to Hafez (2007), the interests and stereotypes produced by media companies pertain to these markets that they largely reproduce. Local media has also proven more resilient than had been expected, in fact showing signs of growth, particularly in the developing world (Sparks 2007). The vision by some globalisation theorists of new technologies leading to one giant global super-culture, in which modernising ideas would be easily propagated in the developing world, has also run aground. Such a world culture, if it can be seen to exist today at all, is marked less, as Hannerz (1990) points out, by an organisation of diversity than it is by a replication of uniformity. Doubts are also growing about the degree to which the use of the internet — the core technology on which a lot of globalisation theory is built upon — is a genuinely globalising force (Morozov 2012). Hafez (2007) argues that the actual use of internet technology, despite its global network potential, has never been primarily global. Instead, he notes a tendency for national and regional interconnections to increase more rapidly than the international ones.
Towards a new paradigm
Though all of the main paradigms that have emerged contain weaknesses, each one identifies features of the contemporary world that are important and valuable in terms of development communications. In terms of speculating about the shape any viable new paradigm might take, it is important to note the aspects of the previous ones that still retain usefulness. One point that must be emphasised is the danger of development communication theories that have poor empirical foundations. Development communications theorists have tended to be ahead of what verifiable data can back up, and the applicability of their ideas has suffered because of it. Globalisation theory in particular imagined that what made sense in economic terms made sense in developmental communication terms also. Theorists looked at what was immediately apparent from their perspective and assumed that this was typical of what was going on globally. Any new theory must test its veracity with rigour on the field where possible. Methodological techniques more commonly associated with the social sciences, that can accurately measure impact, and cause and effect must again take centre stage in development communications theory.

The Dominant Paradigm, whether theorists like to admit it, is still probably the most used on the field, whether consciously or by default. Rogers is among those who have noted that the paradigm has not passed, “but continues, in one form or another to have a robust life” (1998, p.66). Wie’s (1998) study of development scholarship found that, whatever the theoretical citations, 54% of studies still continued to use development measures associated with the dominant paradigm. In particular, Sparks (2007) draws attention to how what he terms the paradigm’s continuity variant — which favours the superiority of modern over traditional ideas, and continues to seek change at the level of the individual rather than the social structure — appears to retain a practical usefulness. This is especially so in the area of health communications, as
developments in the area of health are one of the least contentious aspects of modernity. It cannot be entirely rejected that in some aspects of human life, the ‘modern’ world view might provide the best answers currently available and the media plays a role in spreading these ideas and practices. Thus the Dominant Paradigm must continue to be taken seriously as a central element of the current shape of development communications.

The fundamental message of the Participatory Paradigm, that those being helped via development communications must have a full and genuine engagement at all stages of any process being put in place to ‘help’ them remains valid. New technological advances have clear potential in terms of advancing some of the ideas advocated by Participatory Paradigm theorists. For example, the blogosphere and Twitter have genuine potential for helping the voices of those usually ignored in the mainstream media to be heard (Harlow and Johnson 2011).

Whatever the oversimplification of cultural and geopolitical processes the original Imperialism Paradigm advanced, its recognition of the fact that the global circulation of media products is dominated by wealthy countries in a way that limits the ability of the poor to express themselves remains true. Some of the observations made by the MacBride Commission (1980), discussed earlier in this chapter, remain pertinent and must be re-examined in terms of any future paradigm. In particular, the following definition of development communications is relevant.

“Communications should be seen as a major development resource, a vehicle to ensure real political participation in decision-making and a central information base for defining policy options and an instrument for creating awareness of national priorities” (MacBride 1980, p.258)
While a lot of the theory associated with NWICO has been compromised for reasons previously discussed, the debate it helped generate persists and retains relevance. The central idea of US media domination, for example, played a role in debates on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO, as well as in debates over whether the EU should protect French film, while organisations like World Association for Christian Communication (WACC) have also continued to debate the issue. A key difference in recent years though, as Hamelink (1994) points out, is that the emphasis within this debate is less on state machinations than on human rights and freedom. Sparks (2007) argues that to avoid the mistakes of the past, the overemphasis on geopolitics and the spread of telecommunications must be avoided, with a discussion on the relationship between contemporary media and imperialism in terms of competing centres and states.

While a lack of empirical evidence has been highlighted as a significant weakness within the Globalisation Paradigm, its critique of approaches within development communications which focused exclusively on existing state systems and organisations, was invaluable. The developing ‘anti-globalisation’ current of thought and action, which accepts that a process of globalisation is underway, but is critical of the economic impetus which has dominated (Chomsky 1999, Klein 2008), is also important. However, one key aspect of modern trends which was side-lined in the globalisation debate is that stubbornly localised characteristics remain prevalent around the world. This has important implications for any new development communication theory. McNair (2006) implicitly acknowledges this in his attempts to marry aspects of globalisation and participatory paradigms. He conceptualises a Chaos Paradigm, whereby journalists are agents of democratisation and progressive social change and advocates a deeper level of local connectedness and individual participation, which in turn is better linked to a global network.
However, theories such as McNair’s do not fully address the problem of what constitutes the “local” and what is the makeup of the communities that need to be reached in the modern communications environment.

Some theorists argue that links between smaller, fragmented “communities” which are not close physically but are connected through new technology in ways that give them many of the features associated with being local, may be coming to the fore. For Ohmae (1995), these are the kinds of borders and connections that increasingly count. Sparks (2007) argues that if this tendency is accepted, the entire impetus of development communications will change radically. Rather than the need to help the poor in the developing world being conceptualised as separate, these groups must be joined with groups that have much in common with them in the First World. Alliances of this sort can be cultivated, he argues, and rendered meaningful politically and culturally by reducing the traditional division between discussions of development communication and theories of radical and alternative media in the developed world.

Though it may not be the fix-all solution to all problems of proportional media representation that some techno-utopians might have once suggested, the web retains an impressive ability to generate alternative publics. As Hafez (2007, p.16) puts it, it has the potential capacity to unite political actors and oppositional landscapes worldwide to form a global ‘civil society’, as has been seen in the recent Arab Spring and Occupy movements. While these voices cannot compete directly with commercial media, they can represent issues and perspectives that will otherwise not be reflected in the mainstream. According to Thussu (2006), there is a need for a news agenda which covers issues of

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6 This is a highly qualified view, however, with the likes of Morozov (2012) arguing strongly that this effect is vastly overstated
 relevance to the majority of the world and examines the impact of processes such as globalisation (of the type encouraged by the policies of the World Bank, IMF and WTO) on the world’s poor. Such an alternative to corporatised global communication, he argues, is both “a moral imperative and a necessary democratic requirement” (2006, p.242). As well as a symbolic value, these kinds of ‘glocalised’ networks have the capacity to re-energise the off centre forums of international opinion such as the World Social Forum (the annual gathering of civil society organisations) as a means to influence people who might help affect real change. In a sense then, this new orientation of development communications attempts to set itself realistic targets. While it accepts that facilitating the presentation of alternative sources of information can only achieve only so much, it attempts to form a critical element of a political dynamic, which can interact with economic, cultural and other environmental factors to create the conditions for progressive change.

4.3 Paradigms of journalism education

Having examined the evolution of various development communication paradigms, this section looks at differing approaches to, and influences upon, the construction of journalism programmes, in particular those outside of the western world. It examines the different debates on, and paradigms of, the subject, with a focus on journalism curricula in the developing world, aid-influenced environments. The key headline issues that have dominated the debate of the make-up of journalism curricula are as follows.

Education versus vocational approach

A major division in the approach to setting up journalism programmes is whether they should be based on a more vocational/craft model, which is more concerned with the development of skills required for practical journalism purposes or be more educational/professions oriented, emphasising the
development of critical thinking. One reason for journalism programme’s vocational focus historically, is that for a long time journalism was seen more as a trade than a profession. The British, for example, rejected the Unesco (and US) model of a critical liberal education for journalists in the 1950s in favour of industrial training, drawing on the “trade school” model (Bromley 1997), while in Asia journalism developed as a political, social and cultural vehicle to reach people, rather than as a profession (Muppidi 2008, Ullah 2010, Wu 2005).

According to Lee (2005) the relationship between the media industry and the approach taken to journalism training varies from country to country. In some, the media relies on apprenticeships for the training of their people, while in others the industry relies on universities for a supply of graduates who are trained in-house before assuming full duties, while other countries have seen a switch between the two approaches. In Japan for example, an initial vocational emphasis declined as the media industry complained that such training did not add anything to the training the company itself provided (Ito 2005).

There is much debate as to which approach is more effective. While industry figures repeatedly insist that graduates should be better equipped to make an immediate impression in the newsroom with specific training tailored to that end (McAllister 2012), the likes of Eapen (1991) and Skinner (2001) advocate a more educational approach, arguing journalism programmes need to produce journalists with a critical awareness of the power as well as the responsibilities of the media. While there is currently a growing consensus that a mixture of both approaches is best (Datta Ray 2006, Muppidi 2008, Murthy 2010, Lee 2005), what proportion of each is required remains contentious.

One problem with programmes, into which the debate about vocational and educational approaches also feeds, is their perceived disconnect with a fast-
changing media industry. According to Ullah (2010), this has led to a managerial belief that graduates’ training is sub-standard. However, the question which arises from this is whether graduates should blindly serve the industry they are about to enter, or whether they should be equipped to reform it. A number of factors are related to this theme, such as the rise of new Information and Communications Technologies, and the use of instructors and trainers who have industry experience which are fleshed out later in this chapter.

**Western influence on curricula**

The western dominance of the production, organisation, and dissemination of the world’s knowledge and information (Kawagley and Barnhardt 2006, Mar Rhea 2004, Thaman 2003, Tuhiwai-Smith 2003) contributes to the heavy reliance of developing countries on this knowledge and information (Teferra 2001, Lee 2008). The fact that journalism curricula in the developing world have closely followed curricula designed for the production of practitioners within the Anglo-US model of journalism is, this research contends, another manifestation of this tendency.

Before examining this further, factors contributing to this dominance must be outlined. The first factor is that western oriented books and materials dominate the journalism education field. This is due to the high concentration of academic and textbook publishers in the journalism/media studies field in Great Britain and the US (Lee 2005), where higher education systems incorporated journalism studies into their curricula first. However, the canonic texts which emerged from this represent a very narrow focus, and are limited to representing major Western “schools” of communication research, namely Columbia, Frankfurt, Chicago, Toronto and British Cultural Studies (Buxton 2007, p.132).

Josephi (2005) argues that books like *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert et al
1956) and Merril’s (1991) *Global Journalism* leave little space for journalism and media’s role outside the binary libertarianism-authoritarianism and little or no interpretation of journalism practices outside the West. UNESCO’s (2013) report on the adaptation of their model curricula acknowledges this as a problem when it suggests that a new, more universal version of the syllabus should include materials from a wide variety of national contexts, including developing countries (p.14).

According to Papoutsaki (2007), the impact of western hegemonic practices on a societal level is reinforced by the effect of globalisation on higher education. The globalisation process has increased competition for communication/journalism programmes in non-western countries from Western universities — mainly British, North-American and Australian. However Boyd-Barrett observes that this reinforces the dominance-dependency relationship in educational structure (cited in Lee, 2005, p.9), an effect which is underscored by scholarships, fellowships and other programmes bringing talented students from the developing world to western institutions for further training. A study by Adhikarya (1980) on the profile of Asian communications scholars, for example, finds that over 75% of lecturers were trained in the US and were strongly influenced by US communication scholars in their intellectual development and thinking. However, among the dangers inherent in this approach, is that it pushes participants away from local institutions in their own country, while lessons learned abroad may not be applicable in a local setting (Boeren 2005).

Globalisation has also contributed to the intensifications of the challenge faced by journalism curriculum developers of what Lee (2005, p.8) calls the onslaught of the market imperative, where economic efficiency overrides the philosophy of funding education as a social investment. This factor is slightly less of an
influence in the foreign-aid dominated environments such as the Cambodian one. Papoutsaki (2007) also highlights the influence of donor agencies in forcing local Higher Education institutes to follow prescribed western curricula as a means of staying “competitive” and winning donor funding. Another factor which adds to the Anglo/US dominance of journalism curricula is that many governments in Asia and the Middle East attach high status to western knowledge as being important for capacity building in national education systems (Langton and Ma Rhea 2003). This heightened status makes the incorporation of local knowledge in local curricula less likely, a tendency likely to be intensified in a foreign aid dependent environment, such as Cambodia’s. Any development of a localised journalism curriculum requires enough research and accumulation of findings and experiences in one’s own social contexts is constrained by a lack of local, specialised communication researchers in the developing world (Lee 2005, Ullah 2010).

The debate over the UNESCO model curriculum for journalism education — initiated in 2005 as a means of introducing a generalised curriculum for the subject — is at the centre of any discussion on western influences on journalism curricula in the developing world. While the UNESCO model curriculum claims to be a generic model which can be adapted to each country’s specific needs, in fact it demonstrates a strong emphasis on western-style journalism over one which is specifically targeted for developing countries. Of the 23 topics for electives, Ullah (2010) points out, only seven are related to the UN Millennium Development Goals, with the remaining taken from syllabi from the west. According to Freedman et al (2009), a closer examination of the UNESCO curriculum reveals it to be “inherently western in ideology, content and preferred practice (p.16)”’. This is shown, he argues, in its use of “western model” as a generic term to refer to mainstream press organs that are independent, financially viable and display a professional commitment to
fairness, balance, accuracy and ethical conduct. Saleh (2011) argues that it is impossible to have a single curriculum which could address the needs in a large group of Arab countries which are very different. Instead, he argues, curricula which do not recognise local realities are the equivalent of “parachute journalism”, where foreigners make quick judgments based on a shallow levels of understanding. A chauvinistic approach to journalism teaching, as represented by UNESCO model approach, Lee (2008) argues, inhibits the overall development of the field.

Importing western models of journalism practice uncritically creates numerous problems. The kind of abrasiveness and confrontation which typifies UK or US journalism does not work in Asia for example, where Murray (1996) argues, the press can support a government in the interest of national development while still retaining credibility by speaking for the people. Sharp and Papoutsaki (2006) concurred with this when they found evidence in Papua New Guinea that students rejected the western confrontational reporting style as taught in class as culturally inappropriate. A tendency by journalists in developing countries to adopt a conventional western approach to what constitutes newsworthiness also results in a media which can end up serving the ruling elite by concentrating almost exclusively on speeches and statements of the prominent, controversies involving politicians in major cities and rituals of public life (Traber 1985). An added effect is that such news criteria exclude ordinary people unless they are subjects of accidents, violence and catastrophes. (Rooney, Papoutsaki and Pamba 2004). According to Loo (1997), teaching concepts like the ‘inverted pyramid’\(^7\), risks moulding in students “an event-oriented reporting mindset based on conventional news values”.

A number of concepts associated with western style journalism are also

\(^7\)A well-known journalistic concept whereby the most important elements of a story come at the top and they decrease in order of importance as the story continues
problematic in that they are open to varying types of interpretation. The idea of a free press for example, presupposes a universal standard of freedom which applies equally to all, but as Papoutsaki (2007) points out, “the understanding of the conditions that constitute freedom is contingent upon our own ideological framework” (p.6). Loo (1997, p.7) is also critical of the way journalism students are introduced to concepts like objectivity, with what he calls its “strategic rituals and focus on mainstream sources as the pinnacle of professional journalism”. Papoutsaki’s observation about the ideological orientation of some journalism norms relates to a general debate about ideological undertones to journalistic. The hiding of ideology is a key element of what makes a dominant paradigm so powerful according to Burnham. As Burnham (1974, cited in Papoutsaki 2007) points out, “no major ideology is content to profess openly that it speaks only for the group whose interests it in fact expresses. Each group insists that its ideologies are universal in validity and express the interests of humanity as a whole; and each group tries to win universal acceptance for its ideologies”.

A key aspect of the type of Enlightenment-influenced universalism applied to curriculum building by the likes of UNESCO is the normative role of journalism as promoting the development of democracy and freedom. In UNESCO’s (2013) report on the implementation of the curriculum, the introduction clearly states that the effort derives from a “conviction that professional journalistic standards are essential to a media system that can foster democracy, dialogue and development” (p.5). However, the interpretation of these ideas is very contingent on one’s ideological perspective. Doody (2004) situates the linkage firmly within a western perspective on the ideal of freedom, premised on the idea that the individual has control over society and societal structures and seeing journalism’s function as contributing to the freedom of action of the individual. This relationship, however, is not shared and
understood in the same way by all (Josephi 2005, Tihiwai-Smith 2003, Jacobson 1993). This has other effects. According to Josephi (2005, p.575), journalism’s strong association with democracy has made the practice seem more the prerogative of western nations, as many countries do not seem to provide the democratic basis which seems necessary for journalism. The next section examines possible implications of this.

4.4 Modernisation paradigm and journalism education

The literature has shown how the continued dominance of the Anglo-American model of journalism at a conceptual/ theoretical and practice level, as discussed in Chapter 2, has been echoed in the approach taken to the development of curricula for journalism programmes in the developing world. The way this “one-size-fits-all” approach is increasingly being challenged by a growing mass of research from the developing world, has strong parallels with the challenges to the modernisation paradigms of development communications. However the literature also suggests these challenges have not been incorporated into the approach to curriculum development, in the way that they have been in the larger field of development communications theory generally.

Papoutsaki (2007) shows the ongoing strength of the modernisation paradigm in journalism curricula development in the internalisation within curricula of ideas which equate western ideas, values and practices with modernity, and which are in turn expressed within educational systems and media content in a deceptively rigid fashion. As Josephi (2005, p.576) puts it, the dominant western “universalistic” model of journalism does not allow much space for other interpretations. Hartley (1996) sees journalism and the idea of modernity as products of European and eurocentric societies over the last three centuries. He associates both with colonialism through the development of exploration and imperial expansion, and through their promotion of notions of freedom,
progress and universal enlightenment which was associated with the breakdown of traditional knowledge and its replacement with abstract bonds of virtual communities linked by the media (cited in Windschuttle 1999).

The Imperialism Paradigm critique, which pointed out capitalistic orientations of commercial communications models (Schiller 1970, Katz 1973, Paterson 1998, MacBride 1980) and undermined the entire basis for the expansion of media and press systems into the developing world, appears not to have been acknowledged in journalism curricula in the developing world, which continue to trumpet the “self-evident” superiority Anglo/US journalistic systems. The dominance of external, expert elites in the construction of journalism curricula (Papoutsaki 2007) shows the Participatory Paradigm approach has rarely been applied.

The literature does suggest that assumptions of Globalisation Paradigm theorists, with its belief in the belief in the “liberatory” and “transnational” potential of new communications technologies and state-undermining potential in the developing world (Elster 1997, Jenkins and Thorburn 2003, Kapur 1997, Appadurai 1996) has found its way into much of the core approach to journalism curricula development, for example, the sense that core journalism norms can be globally applied.

However, the influence of this paradigm’s core concepts in journalism curriculum development has not included a consideration of the severe weaknesses of such theorising, in particular its tendency to vastly overstate the depth and diversity of the process (Hafez 2007, Sakr 2001). There is a growing body of work which has called for alternative approaches to journalism curriculum development which avoid some of the shortfalls described here.
4.5 Future models of journalism curricula

There is an increased acknowledgement that overly western approaches to designing journalism curricula for the developing world have limitations, which has fuelled a search for alternative models. A number of factors have been highlighted within the literature as being key elements of any alternative model. A first element to take into account, according to Saleh (2011) is that curricula are rooted in local realities and experiences of practitioners on the field. Journalism everywhere, he argues, “reflects its historical memory and current settings”. Thus, it is critical to work toward developing an approach which adds more domestic variations to curriculum building so that they truly work well, both in the class room and the newsroom. As Hume (2002) puts it: “If all politics is local, so is all good media development” (p.57). In the context of journalism education programmes, local issues can include numerous circumstances that affect journalists in particular environments, for example, the degree of democracy or social divisions and the level of economic prosperity. These types of local conditions which inhibit or restrict journalism, discussed at more length in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, must also be taken into account when considering whether journalism curricula, for example the UNESCO model discussed earlier in this chapter, can be effective.

Curricula must not only be attuned to a local environment, but in the case of a developing world environment such as that experienced in Cambodia, it must also be prepared to adapt to rapid changes within that local environment, particularly in the area of communications and information technologies. Lee (2005) and Ullah (2010) advocate journalism curricula models that are more future oriented, with skills appropriate to the emerging “information” society and incorporating skills needed for using new communication technology. This may entail training in new skills, related to blogging and social media for example and, according to Lee (2005), students need to be alert to the increasing
frequency of consultation (meaning the mode of communication where information is sought from a central source) and registration (where the centre retrieves information from an individual at the periphery with or without the individual’s knowledge) modes of communication in the use of new media. While it is difficult to be reactive enough to achieve this fully and adapt quickly to these changes, particularly in a developing world environment, Lee argues that programmes should at least aspire to constantly re-examine what they are offering in this regard and engage with the industry in an attempt to gear their programmes to these needs.

A more localised perspective on this also requires an academic shift towards local achievements, the needs and ways of acquiring knowledge, as well as an increased interrogation of the accepted Western journalistic world view (Botha and de Beer 2006). UNESCO’s (2013) report on the adaptation of its model curricula acknowledges this as a problem in its suggestion that its syllabus should be adapted to highlight case studies or examples from as wide a range as possible in such a way that broadens the horizons of each national application (p.14). However, to get quality examples of this sort requires more research in a local context which is based on and reflects that societal knowledge, rather than only pursuing topics of interests to the West and for Western publication. The lack of local research on journalism practice, Botha and De Beer (2006) suggest, perpetuates a lack of confidence in the ability to deviate from the established paradigm.

One means of encouraging more locally based research is an increased emphasis within journalism/communications curricula on research skills so that students can carry out research not only in formal academic circles but in their work environment such as with the media and NGOs (Neave 2002). According to Burgh (2003), an emphasis on research skills would have the added bonus of
enhancing the ability of journalists in developing countries — who are constantly confronted with proposals and policies purportedly from social scientists — to evaluate and interrogate them more comprehensively. In order to maximise these benefits, alternative research approaches, focusing on subjectivity, closeness to subject, uniqueness, qualitative methods, local self determination and solidarity and action, as described by Maguire (1987) should be used.

As Tanton puts it, modern technology and science have developed the myth that the ability to generate knowledge is reserved for trained experts (cited in Conti 1997). New forms of research, such as participatory research, are based on the belief that people are capable of creating their own knowledge and that the researcher is a collaborative learner in this process (Conti 1997). Issues over research practices having a place in journalism curricula relate to the debate over vocational and academic approaches to journalism training discussed earlier in this chapter.

While much of the literature emphasises that a balance should be found between a vocational and educational approach, as previously outlined, in a developing world context, the latter, in particular tend to be absent. As an alternative to this, Skinner et al (2001) propose emphases within journalism education that foreground questions of epistemology and the social construction of “facts” and knowledge in a way that enhances critical thinking and reflexivity. For Wickham (1996, p.3), journalism programme curricula must facilitate high levels of study and research, while being firmly grounded in a philosophy that recognises the uniqueness of the people for which they are designed.

According to Fourie (2005), a number of nettles must be fully grasped before the ways in which journalism is taught can truly be changed at a local level.
Firstly, concepts like freedom of expression, objectivity, news values and newsworthiness must be reinterpreted locally and it must be considered how these interpretations can be implemented as a foundation for locally-conceptualised media and journalistic practices. Such a “decolonising of the mind”, he argues, would entail an intellectual exercise through which both educators and students would need to reconsider their own world and life view. According to Fourie, placing journalism curricula within a higher education setting has a better chance of achieving this.

The literature also accentuates a need for more of an emphasis in journalism teaching on alternative models of journalism, such as development journalism (as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Development journalism stresses participation by, and interaction of, communicators with the local people and is tailored to guide people towards self-reliance and respect traditional, indigenous and local knowledge, with advocacy as a strong component (Loo 1994). Ultimately, the product of journalism emphasises development processes rather than events, with social and cultural cohesion taking precedence over commercialism. While Chapters 2 and 3 show how this model can be overly subjective and vulnerable to government instrumentalisation, the literature also suggests that its emphasis on responsible advocacy over ideas like objectivity, help it maintain a closer relationship to ideals of social responsibility. A renewed emphasis on journalism’s social development role, can particularly benefit from more participatory research (as alluded to earlier in this chapter), in accordance with Jacobsen’s (2006) description of it as firstly, placing a central significance on people’s own way of seeing their own lives and interests, secondly, as a process where both researchers and research subjects learn about each other, and thirdly, aims for a satisfactory action towards a better life, rather that the search for objective scientific laws.
Ignoring the developmental model of journalism is part of a general tendency within journalism programmes to ignore alternative journalism practices, according to Atton (2003). On the rare occasions when they are alluded to, he points out that they are presented as “extreme” case studies, as opposed to being properly outlined as legitimate alternative ways of practicing journalism. Skinner et al (2001, p.345) argue that placing concepts and practices associated with alternative journalism models within curricula can invigorate journalism teaching, journalism students and the profession in general.

4.6 Aid cultures and journalism education

Some literature suggests that the limited approach to education in, and research on, journalism in the developing world is tied to wider problems in academic cultures that evolve in an aid-dominated culture. These problems manifest themselves in various ways. For example, Saleh (2010) points out that departments and schools in developing world environments tend to be run by “patrimonial mechanisms” that colour them with factional manoeuvring, clientelistic relations and the exclusion of real experienced educators at the expense of nepotism, and the selection of students and teachers based on connections rather than talent.

Saleh argues that this kind of environment is also not conducive to innovative teaching methods, which requires an environment in which information needs, once identified, to become a catalyst for creative production, harnessing the capacities and collective wisdom of communities. Instead, the model in an aid-dominated environment simply transfers the received wisdom of foreign donor agencies and consultants, reinforced by media technocrats. Kawagley and Barhardt (2006) identify a tendency within education in broader terms to look for immediate solutions to more complex problems that are often the product of long-term generational shifts, for which the solutions, too, must be understood
at a multi-generational level. This is particularly so with journalistic curricula which focus more on vocational training at the expense of an in-depth education, and may be accentuated even further in an aid-dominated environment.

According to Lee (2005), for journalism programmes to become more independent and better attuned to local needs, they must be more independent of foreign finance and its accompanying agendas and emphases. Within the broader context of higher education he (p.12) advocates developing other courses within universities, such as advertising and public relations, or short-term skills courses run by part-time instructors to generate more finance. Lee argues that a combination of full-time academics and part-time professionals suits the needs of students, the university, the industry and the teachers of both the academic and professional world better. More locally oriented content, he suggests, might also make programmes more competitive when faced with western programmes offering generic content.

4.7 Conclusion
The presence or absence of all of the above variants and emphases must be taken into account, the literature suggests, when analysing whether a journalism programme is likely to fulfil its objective of helping to propagate good journalistic practice in the industry. While many of the factors discussed in this chapter related to some degree to the idea of “localising” knowledge, it also shows that vigilance must be exercised that this kind of logic does not fall into the same traps that many Imperialism Paradigm theorists fell into, whereby they ended up rejecting all west-centric models of journalism education (Roach 1993). A search for a local perspective does not imply the outright rejection of Anglo/US model, but rather against its uncritical acceptance. Because Western models of journalism education have had more time to develop, they do provide
a basic education platform for developing journalism locally, a fact which must always be acknowledged. As Kawagley and Barnhardt (2006) put it, you cannot deny the need for people to understand western ways of learning, but it should not come at the expense of what these people already know. It is hoped that this study’s focus on how this process unfolded in a Cambodian setting will contribute toward finding a more successful balance between these opposing tendencies.
CHAPTER FIVE
Methodology and data analysis approach

5.1 Introduction
This research examines whether journalism programmes in Cambodia from 1993 to 2011 contained emphases on journalistic normative ideals whose bases are contested, which in turn affected the fulfilment of the objectives of such programmes. The literature has provided a foundation for suggesting that this may have taken place in Cambodia by showing how normative ideals emphasised within the dominant western paradigm of journalism are transplanted unchanged, via international aid-funded programmes, to culturally dissimilar countries. Such ideals tend to contain overly simplistic views of journalism as defined by its occupational ideology, history and professionalisation and its self-proclaimed role in democratisation embedded within them (Deuze 2008).

Studies by the likes of Downie (2000) and Clarke (2000, 2010) expressed concern that vast amounts of money spent on journalism programmes in Cambodia have not resulted in the development of a healthy journalistic culture. However, it is unclear whether this is due to problems within the programmes themselves or the wider socio-cultural and institutional environment in which journalists must operate after completing programmes and how these factors interrelate with each other. By empirically linking specific normative ideals at programme level with particular outcomes of the journalism development process of Cambodia, this study aims to shed light on how this process works. The experience in one country cannot offer conclusive proof of how these factors influence each other. However, a more comprehensive understanding of the process in a single instance can offer a useful grounding and starting point from which further comparative studies can build upon.
I accept, as Sanders (2008, p.148) did while conducting similar research on the connection between Spanish and English journalists’ role perceptions and training, that this project will provide only a first step in what should become a wider comparative and longitudinal project aimed at understanding the role of journalism education in the matrix of factors influencing the development and practice of journalism. This chapter outlines the rationale for locating this research in Cambodia in a particular time frame. It then breaks down the research question into its key constituent parts in terms of a methodological approach, explaining each decision and acknowledging problems which were encountered.

5.2 Establishing a methodological approach
This research takes a case study approach. Cambodia was chosen due to its recent history — during which it can be termed an emerging democracy — and also due to the almost complete destruction of its media and the nascent journalistic culture contained therein prior to that point. As a case study, it offers an opportunity to assess the effect of specific types of journalism programmes in a very particular environment over a sufficient amount of time to make such an assessment useful. Cambodia’s experience of various types of governmental structures prior to 1993 gives it added value in comparative terms to a range of similarly damaged and traumatised post conflict societies in which attempts were made to establish a democracy. The period examined is limited to 1993 onwards as this was ‘ground zero’ for journalism programmes, as discussed above, with significant growth in the sector thereafter. Due to the fact that a journalistic structure was being built from the bottom up in Cambodia, the influence of the approach taken by programmes on subsequent belief systems and practices of participants can be seen more clearly than might be the case in a country which had a pre-existing culture.
A qualitative research method has been used, incorporating in-depth interviews with a sample of key stakeholders in the process as a means of collecting data. Two issues within key loci have been examined. The first explores links between the development and implementation of journalism training programmes and the belief in and adherence to particular journalistic normative ideals by facilitators, donors and other relevant stakeholders involved in this process. In-depth interviews sought to highlight predominant normative ideals and how they were expressed at this stage. The second examines the way the normative ideals which were found to predominate at the programme formation level correlate with norm conceptualisations among participants and how this affects work practices. In-depth interviews were also used here. A thematic analysis was applied to data collected, with links sought between results of the analysis of the data emanating from both categories of interviewee. Literature relating to comparative countries or periods helped to contextualise and further make sense of the data.

A documentary analysis approach was attempted as a means of complementing the interview approach but was abandoned due to being unfeasible. For qualitative researchers, documents such as reports, needs assessments, newspapers accounts etc are the paper trail left in the wake of historical events and processes and are another invaluable source of information (Hoepfl, 1997, Lindlof and Taylor 2002). Past events or ongoing process can be reconstructed by a researcher through documents (Lindlof and Taylor 2002) while Miller (1997, as cited in Sothearith 2011) said they can help in understanding social contexts that a researcher is studying. With this in mind, documents were sought from organisations involved in journalism programmes, funders and on-the-ground facilitators whose representatives are interviewed for the study. Government documents, such as decrees, ministerial reports, and other
brochures and booklets from organisations involved in the monitoring of media activities in Cambodia were also sought.

However, the lack of documentary evidence and the difficulty in obtaining that which was available proved problematic to the degree that this approach was abandoned. Random documents were made available in some cases, but they were available to nowhere near the degree to make them useful in terms of an analysis of the sector overall. Overall, there is a general lack of data resulting from coherent and prolonged evaluation procedures by the programs themselves during the period being studied, in some cases, because they were never carried out or in some cases, because they were never properly digitised and collated afterwards. This is due in the main to a chaotic general infrastructure within the country in 1993, when many of the journalism programs being studied began, was further aggravated by the 1997 coup and subsequent unrest, which meant that many of the projects operational around this time were severely interrupted, or in other cases abandoned altogether. Many programmes in this period were of the short-term variety and considering the impact of their efforts was low on their list of the priorities of organisations who were funding them, as acknowledged by Clarke (2000, p.9). Where evaluations did take place they tended to be quite basic, as noted by Doug Cosper, a journalism trainer from 1995 to 2003 (Cosper, personal communication, 2011) and Sue Downie’s (2000, p.110) report on a training program she ran in Phnom Penh in the early 1990s with the CCI. Overall, the lack of documentary evidence from the period underlines the need for data as generated by interviews with key stakeholders in this research.

In considering the influence of normative ideals within programmes on the conceptualisations of journalism by individual participants and how this relates to the fulfilment of overall programme objectives, this research enters
tentatively into the area of impact assessment. Journalism programme impact assessment seeks to measure achieved effects, consequences and results with respect to the goals and objectives as outlined in the planning process (Nielson 2005, Dokic et al 2005). Nielson (2005) outlines how this can take place on an individual level (knowledge, skills, and attitude), a newsroom level (implementation of new skills, routines and ethical standards), professions or general media level (new professional standards and changed output in the media) and on a societal level (transparency, range of voices, levels of public enlightenment). However, I acknowledge and concur with Nielson’s (2005) conclusion that, while impact can be easy to spot, for example where exposure of corruption or political wrongdoing leads to change on a societal level, it is extremely difficult to link to a specific programme. This is due to the number of variables in the equation which makes direct cause-effect relationships too complex to establish (Jallov 2005, p.18). The more remote the impact from the cause, the less it is likely to directly link the two (Dokic et al 2005).

While there have been significant strides in the area of assessing the impact of journalism programmes in recent years, according to Berger (2000), this field still has a long way to go. A key element to better being able to assess impact, most research in the area has concluded (Jallov 2005, Dokic et al 2005), is that rigid evaluation techniques are incorporated into programmes early on. These can generate data which can better overcome some of the problems outlined above and can, according to Angheli-Zaicenco (2005, p.222) better define international organisations’, donors’ and other actors’ understanding, and expectations, of journalism programmes in specific environments. While such an approach feeds into suggestions for a future direction of journalism programmes, they do not help to analyse the effect of those that have already taken place which did not follow such procedures, as was the situation in the case study being examined here. The approach taken by this research and the
boundaries and limitations within which it situates its methodological approach overcomes these problems insofar as is possible by using a qualitative, interview-based approach focusing on the main stakeholders in the journalism development process. This, according to Jallov (2005), is the best means of overcoming problems associated with evaluating the influence of programmes. A more quantitative approach, for example using surveys, questionnaires, was discounted as it was felt that answers elicited in this way would lack the depth required. There were also concerns that questionnaires might ‘direct’ answers in a way that would render results less accurate. Evidence had been noted by the researcher (from his time working as a journalist in Phnom Penh) that Cambodian journalists — often due to their experiences in ‘western’ oriented journalism classes or papers and the influence of relevant NGOs in debates over the role of the media — are highly cognisant of the ‘correct’ answers to questions relating to journalistic values or ethics, while having little belief in them in practical terms.

The use of focus groups, described by Babbie (2004) and Krueger and Casey (2000) as suitable for exploring an issue rather than describing or explaining it, was also considered. However, a more individualised approach was deemed more suitable for a number of reasons. Firstly, a restrictive political environment makes honest opinions to hard questions difficult to elicit in group settings. Secondly, a strong face-saving tendency within Asian and Khmer culture (Kim and Nam 2008) also makes opinions regarding negative aspects of work practices less reliable in a group scenario.

Over-estimating training influence is problematic for different types of professional values research. Nielson (2005) recorded a tendency by journalism trainees to over-estimate how much training has improved their skills as a means of enhancing their self-esteem. Such problems, he argues, can be
overcome by asking additional questions requiring specific examples, which can then be supplemented by interviews with colleagues, editors, and management (p.13). Qualitative techniques is an effective means of doing this. A qualitative researcher acts as both a miner and a traveller (Kvale 1996, p. 3-5), with miners assuming respondents are knowledgeable and information can be obtained by interviewing them, while travellers wander around and get information through conversation with respondents. Elements of both approaches are contained within this research.

Using interviews also addressed the other main point of this research, interrogating the normative basis on which such programmes are constructed. As opposed to the definite, clearly-defined measurable which are required by more quantitative approaches, this research seeks to understand how programme facilitators and former programme participants who are now working as journalists in Cambodia have internalised and applied principles which were learned, in many cases, a number of years previously. This type of impact can be termed ‘latent’, in that the degree to which trainees have been influenced is not clearly defined (Nielson 2005, p.15-16). Thus, interviewing people directly involved is a direct way of seeking information about it (Tuckman 1999). Qualitative ‘depth’ interviews are more flexible and provide personalised experienced perspectives (Jallov 2005, p.18), with a greater chance that responses reveal latent content which the subjects may not fully understand or articulate themselves.

Semi-structured interviews are used in this study — whereby the topic to be studied is determined in advance but the sequence of questions is decided upon during the interview (Patton 1990). It was felt this better conformed with Rubin and Rubin’s (1995, p.43) vision of qualitative interviewing as flexible, interactive and continuous, rather than prepared in advance and set in stone. In
order to elicit the best possible data in the particular context in which this research had to operate under, interviews were conceptualised as a guided dialogue which were adapted in as informal a way as possible to the subject’s environment.

Creative interviewing techniques were considered to be a useful means of allowing for the ‘co-production’ of knowledge in the interview and reach what Bagnoli (2004) describes as ‘creative’ and ‘non-standard’ knowledge. It was felt that this technique would be particularly useful when interviewing programme participants, who might not be accustomed to thinking deeply about how they conceptualise what they do. Of the various creative interviewing techniques examined, photo elicitation was deemed to be the most suitable for this study. This involves interviewees bringing a picture, or object which is significant in terms of their job. These were intended as ‘triggers’ for subsequent discussion in a way which, as Croghan et al (2008) described, might be useful in terms of uncovering contentious or problematic identity positions which are usually silent. These techniques, it was hoped, would generate richer and better quality data than would have been possible otherwise. An engagement with creative interviewing techniques was an important part of the planning process for this research. However, they did not prove to be a viable technique in the field and had to be abandoned. This is discussed in more detail later (5.3B).

5.3 Sampling strategy
Choosing the correct approach to sampling is particularly important in qualitative research given the relatively small size of the sample, compared to quantitative research. Random, or probability sampling is not possible in qualitative research due to small sample sizes and the fact characteristics under study are not normally distributed within the population. Judgement, or purposive, sampling (Hoepfl 1997, Babbie 2004, Miller and Salkind 2002,
Lindlof and Taylor 2002) — whereby the most productive sample of a relevant population to answer the research question — was used in this research. Elements of snowball sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981), whereby subjects identified other suitable respondents for interview, were also incorporated. This was particularly useful where seeking interviews with facilitators working with government-affiliated organisations, who in many cases were suspicious of outside contact and/or difficult to get access to.

A total of 54 qualitative in-depth interviews were carried out between August and September 2011\(^8\). A guiding principle was simply to make the best selection of interview subjects possible given the difficulties presented by fieldwork in this environment, as is discussed at the end of this paper. Among the groupings laid out here, there was overlap in many cases, which was expected given the conditions under which journalism has had to evolve in Cambodia since 1993. Thus, several former or working journalists became trainers/facilitators. In terms of how this was analysed, only the data relating to any interviewee’s current occupation was taken into account. For example, an interviewee who had been a journalist in the past but was currently working as a trainer was categorised as the latter.

5.3A Donor/ facilitator/experts

The first phase of semi-structured interviews examined influences of particular journalistic normative ideals on the construction of, and attempts to implement, certain key programme objectives. A judgement sample was made of managers and trainers in media education and training institutes, as well as those involved in the donor community active in the period being examined. As a means of enhancing the spread of interview subjects in this section, a list of all the journalism training programmes during the relevant period in Cambodia was

\(^8\)One other interview was carried out via Skype video call in early 2012.
drawn up.\textsuperscript{9} These consisted of all journalism programme facilitators, including Cambodia-based organisations (locally based facilitators) that provided training during the period being analysed, and other organisations who provided training both in Cambodia and other countries (International facilitators). A second main group from which interviewees were chosen were representatives of funding organisations (donors), either local or international, who provided money to programme facilitators. Table 1 lists all of the prominent groups in these categories during the period being examined.

\textit{Table 1. Prominent programme facilitators and donors}\textsuperscript{10}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locally based programme facilitators</th>
<th>International facilitators</th>
<th>Donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian Communication Institute (CCI)</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>DANIDA (Denmark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal University of Phnom Penh</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
<td>AIDAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Journalists’ Association (KJA)</td>
<td>Internews</td>
<td>CIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cambodian Institute for Media Studies (CIMS)</td>
<td>Independent Journalism Foundation (IJF)</td>
<td>IMPACS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian Centre for Independent Media (CCIM)</td>
<td>The Indochina Media Memorial Foundation (IMMF)</td>
<td>The Dag Hammarsjold Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Konrad Adenauer Foundation</td>
<td>Japan Relief for Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BBC World Service Trust</td>
<td>SIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)</td>
<td>USAID\textsuperscript{12}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American Assistance for Cambodia\textsuperscript{11}</td>
<td>Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IMPACS (Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society)</td>
<td>Canadiend’Etude et Cooperation Internationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EcoleSuperieure de Journalisme (ESJ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom Forum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{9}Appendix D outlines activities of all the prominent facilitators. 
\textsuperscript{10}This list is as comprehensive as possible but given the sporadic and transitory nature of the sector, it is likely that some groups are omitted.
\textsuperscript{11}Varying names throughout period
\textsuperscript{12}Formerly USIS (United States Information Service)
Given that there are a relatively small number of projects involved, semi-structured interviews with a fairly large proportion of key stakeholders in the above categories were possible, with representatives from almost all of the organisations listed included.

A total of 25 interviews have been carried out in the facilitators/donors/experts category, 16 of whom come under the “trainer/facilitator” category. Trainers are sub-divided into those of Cambodian (TL= Local Trainer) and non-Cambodian (TI= International Trainer) nationality. Six come under the “funders/donors” category. Three additional interviewees, termed ‘Expert Commentators’, are also included here. These are defined as interviewees with a special degree of knowledge on the subject, whether through involvement with policy making or media freedom advocacy, but who did not fit into any of the other categories. A combination of purposive and convenience sampling has been used for selection of this category of interviewees. Many of the interviewees, in particular the Khmer journalism trainers, were involved in several of the various projects being examined.
The interview sheets which were constructed as guidelines for the interviews are included in Appendix A and Appendix B. These are based on questions arising from analysis of the main research questions, as well questions arising from the literature review. Some questions are also based on a number of journalism programmes evaluation outlines as suggested by Danov (2005), IJC Chisnau study (2005), Berger and Matras (2007), Jallov (2005), Knight International and ICJ (2010 and 2011). Following the selection of interviewees, contact was made via email initially (see Appendix E) and then via a follow-up phone call. Semi-structured interviews were carried out and questions were, in most cases, used as jump-off points for more generalised discussions.

In Appendix A: “Interview sheet 1 - Trainers, programme facilitators”, Q\textsuperscript{13}1-10 seek details about the programmes, trainers, participants in the programmes in general terms. Q11-20 address the main focuses of the curriculum and how this was decided upon. Q20-25 relate to ideals of journalism in broad terms, while Q25-28 seek details about programmes objectives and whether they can be said to have been achieved. Interviews with donors and funders of journalism

\textsuperscript{13}Q=Questions
programmes followed a similar pattern, as is outlined in Appendix B, “Interview sheet 2 - Donors and funders”. Q1-4 are about the nature of the financial help given and the strategy taken by the organisations in terms of donating money. The remaining Q5-13 relate generally to how the fulfilment of objectives of the funders is measured and the degree to which objectives are felt by funders to have been achieved. Interviews lasted between one and two hours and were carried out at a location of the interviewee’s choosing. The standard of English was high among this category of subject given that almost all journalism training which took place in Cambodia was through English. All interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewee on the day of the interview, except where it was specifically requested otherwise.\textsuperscript{14}

5.3B Programme participants

The outcome-oriented part of this research is at the heart of the approach to the second phase of interviews, which focuses on the conceptualisations of programme participants of journalistic normative ideals in a general sense and how this is reflected in work practices. This helped test in a Cambodian context whether, as Fröhlich and Holtz-Bacha (2003) contend, the way journalists are educated influences their self-perception and their perception of their role in society, which in turn leads to differences in journalistic practice.

A judgement sample (Hoepfl 1997) was taken as a means of selecting as wide a spread of programme participants as possible in terms of types of media worked in, age and gender profiles and levels of experience. This was done as a means of getting as good a spread of opinions and perspectives as possible. It also attempted to be proportionate in terms of the profile of participants who took part in the early training courses. Clarke (2000) identifies several groupings of journalists who appeared in the period immediately after the 1993 peace

\textsuperscript{14}None of the interviewees in this category of interviewee asked that they not be recorded
agreement. One was comprised of those who had worked in the pre-Khmer Rouge media. A second was made up of PRK/SOC journalists, some of whom had been trained (though not always in journalism) in Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A third group had worked on the resistance radio stations or on border camp newspapers. However, the largest group by far were those who had “no experience of journalism at all” (Clarke 2000, p.83). The broadest sub-categories from which interviewees were drawn for this study included locally funded Khmer language media and foreign funded English language international media. A breakdown of the press, radio and television outlets in Cambodia during the time this study examined is outlined in Chapter 6.

Accessibility and willingness of subjects to speak on the record also impacted on subject choice. During the field work period, a snowball approach was used to expand this category, in particular among the government media, where access to interviewees was more difficult to obtain. Biernacki and Waldorf (1981, p.141) describe this type of sampling as being made through referrals made among people who know others with relevant characteristics for the research interest. Snowball sampling is a useful means of identifying members of elusive populations or engaging informants about a sensitive subject (Carlson and Hyde 2003, Lindlof and Taylor 2002).

A total of 29 interviews were carried out in this category. 18 of these were from Khmer language media (JL) with the remaining coming from English language/international media (JI).
Many of the interviewees had taken part in several different journalism education and training programmes. Participants from all of the prominent programmes, and from all of the most prominent press outlets in Cambodia are represented in the sample. The pie charts below represent a more detailed breakdown of the gender and background of both categories of programme participants.

The range of interviewees in both subcategories are predominantly male, which is representative of the current gender breakdown among journalists.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{15}\)This conclusion is reached anecdotally, as opposed to hard data being available. For example, one woman interviewed among the Cambodian language press is, in fact, the only female journalist in the sector.
A larger proportion of the interviewees in the local journalism category tend to be older overall, with more of those interviewed among the international press aged between 20 and 30 years old.

The majority of those interviewed among journalists who were relatively experienced (over 10 years). This was not a deliberate strategy, but may have reflected a sense that those who were willing to talk, in particular in the local press, were those who were longer in their jobs and were subsequently more secure in their positions. The lack of spread in this regard (among JL in particular) also reflects the relative difficulty experienced in terms of getting interview subjects among the local press.
Overall, print journalism predominates in both sub-categories, due to a larger number of journalists working in this sector. A larger number of broadcast journalists were interviewed in the JL subcategory as there is a greater range of local broadcast media, which, as is discussed in Chapter 6, tend to be predominantly pro-government.

**Chart 8: Programme participants’ education level**

Significant variation can be seen in these two categories in terms of education level. Journalists working for international media (JI) are much more likely to have attained a level of third-level education than those working for local media.
Chart 9: Category 2 interviewee’s training in journalism specifically

In terms of journalism specific training, all of those interviewed who worked with international organisations had experienced either two or more short terms courses in journalism or had gotten third level, longer-term training. The breakdown is quite different among journalists who work for local organisations (JL) with the majority have experienced between 0-2 short term training courses and just two who received third level training in journalism. Four out of the 18 interviewed had received no journalism training of any sort.

Table 10 breaks down further all of the above details on the basis of each individual interviewee. This is done in such a way so as to maintain the anonymity of the participants in this study and is included here as a means of the reader being able to reference quickly details of each individual interviewee where relevant in the data analysis chapters.
Table 10: Individual breakdown of Category 2 interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>JI Cat</th>
<th>Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JI1</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Five-10</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>LTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI2</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>LTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI3</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
<td>JIA</td>
<td>LTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI4</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Broadcast 3rd level</td>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI5</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>2nd level</td>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>STC 2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI6</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Five-10</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>STC 2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI7</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>STC 2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI8</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Five-10</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
<td>JIA</td>
<td>STC 2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI9</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>2nd level</td>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>STC 2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI10</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Broadcast 3rd level</td>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI11</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>STC 2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JL1</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JL2</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Five-10</td>
<td>Broadcast 2nd level</td>
<td>STC 2+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JL3</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10+</td>
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<td>STC 2+</td>
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<td>JL4</td>
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<td>JL5</td>
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<td>STC 2+</td>
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<tr>
<td>JL6</td>
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<td>STC 0-2</td>
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<td>JL11</td>
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<td>STC 0-2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>10+</td>
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<td>STC 0-2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JL13</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Five-10</td>
<td>Broadcast 2nd level</td>
<td>STC 0-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>10+</td>
<td>Print</td>
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<td>STC 0-2</td>
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<td>JL16</td>
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<td>JL17</td>
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<td>10+</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>3rd level</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Coding categories for Table 10 are as follows:

**Journ cat (Journalist category):** Individual interviewee identification code

**Gender:** M= Male; F= Female

**Experience:** 0-5 years = 0-5 years in journalism; 5-10 = 5-10 years in journalism; 10+ = Over ten years in journalism

**Education level:** 2nd level or lower ; Third level (in any subject).

**Education** (Level of education received)

**JI cat (JI Category):** JIA = International organisation which specialises in news in Cambodia for int audience, JIB = Foreign funded media for local audience in foreign language. JIC = Internationally funded media with local language service

**Training (Level of training received in journalism specifically):** STC 0-2 = 0-2 Short term course (0-6 months in length). STC 2+ = 2+ Short term course (0-6 months in length). LTC = Long term courses. Third level courses specifically on journalism

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Nielson’s (2005) advice on formulating questions for training evaluations proved useful in terms of the general approach taken by this study. In particular his advice on framing questions so that they do not ask in an overly direct way where possible, so as not to elicit answers which interviewees may think you “want to hear” as opposed to what they believe to be true. For example, information about whether journalists ever took bribes themselves can be better elicited by exploring the topic generally and whether they had ever heard of such a practice and whether one could survive as a journalist without taking bribes. Questions described in the interview sheet outline (Appendix C) are as follows. Q1-2 sought biographical details and attempted to use creative interviewing icebreaker methods. Q3-15 attempted to find out about subjects’ conceptualisation of journalistic normative ideals. Q16-32 sought to understand subjects’ perceptions of training experiences, and the degree to which programmes influenced their subsequent work practices. Another underlying focus for all of the interviews sheets was on whether particular programme objectives have been achieved. This line of questioning is incorporated into all interviews. Questions relating to this topic focused more on the general sense of stakeholders about what have been the achievements of journalism training programmes in Cambodia at the data analysis stage. This was then checked for correlations with data extracted from interviews with facilitators about the key objectives of journalism programmes.

A number of steps were followed with each subject in advance of the interview meetings. Firstly, a project explanation, which was translated into Khmer, was given to participants (See Appendix E). A second email responded to any questions subjects had and asked them to bring photos of something that is significant to what they do as a journalist to the interview (can be stored on phone etc) or an object that they associate with their work, or which they believe encapsulates the work that they do in some way. It was hoped to use
these photos or objects as ‘starting points’ for conversations as part of an attempt to use creative interviewing techniques as discussed previously in this chapter. However, a conclusion was reached after five interviews that while this technique was promising, it was not viable for this study. The experience up to that point had shown strengths and weaknesses in terms of it as an approach. For example, in two cases the technique worked very well. JI11 discussed how for him, his dictaphone was like a symbolic “weapon” which he felt defined him as a journalism and protected him while doing his job. JI8 discussed the significance of his “wall” of photos, an extraordinary collage of photographs pinned up in his work cubicle documenting some of the things he had seen in the line of his work. However, in other cases, due to time constraints and in many cases, poor communication (sometimes related to language issues\textsuperscript{17}), trying to get interviewees to bring objects became a distraction and an unnecessarily confusing introduction. After five interviews—three in which interviewees had not brought any object to discuss due to forgetting, or misunderstanding what was required—for the sake of consistency it was decided to abandon this element. The experience with creative interviewing in this research highlighted aspects of its potential, but also its limitations in environments where time constraints and language difficulties are a factor, as was the case for this fieldwork.

Locations for interviews were left up to the interviewees in each case although a neutral place, for example a café, was suggested as opposed to a space where colleagues could overhear. Where interviewees preferred to meet in their place of work, a private room was sought so that views could be freely expressed. Interviews normally lasted between one and two hours. In general, the interviewees’ wishes were facilitated as much as possible. Journalists’ schedules

\textsuperscript{17}Spoken English tended to be better than written English in many cases, resulting in misinterpretation of elements of introductory email in some cases
tend to be unpredictable and busy so I tried to be as flexible as possible in terms of meeting them when a free slot in their schedule arose. Again, all interviews were recorded except where specifically requested otherwise.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{5.4 Data analysis}

All interviews were transcribed manually in the months following the field-trip to Cambodia. A thematic analysis, as described by Benner (1985), Leininger (1985), Taylor and Bogdan (1984) and Aronson (1994), was then applied to the data as a means of understanding the dominant ideas within the interviews. According to Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis is an adaptable method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data, a means of organising and describing data in a rich and detailed fashion. It is suitable for this research because of its ability “both to reflect reality, and to unpick or unravel the surface of ‘reality’” (Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 10). Data generated in this way deals with “meanings expressed through words” and “non-standardised data requiring classification into categories” (Saunders et al. 2000, p. 381).

By identifying and interpreting recurring thoughts, experiences, feeling and meanings, thematic analyses offer a way to understand training programme facilitators’ and journalists’ perceptions of normative ideals of the profession and how they connect to programmes that are often not explicitly acknowledged by subjects. I took a deductive approach to this thematic analysis, using existing theory and framing schema to analyse and search for meaning in the data (Callard 2011). This approach was used due to it being more detailed and having more of a focus on the relevant aspects of the data (Braun and Clarke 2006). It also differs from the more bottom-up inductive approach, whereby identified themes are more linked to the data itself (Patton 1990) and less driven

\textsuperscript{18}In two cases, interviewees asked that they not be recorded.
by the researcher’s theoretical interest (Braun and Clarke 2006). In keeping with deductive approach, themes were sought from the interview data which are what are relevant to the journalistic normative ideals outlined in the literature review. A theme in this context, as described by Braun and Clarke (2006), captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set. Once a selection of the strongest emergent themes were reviewed and analysed, the interplay between emphases on normative ideals within programmes, and adherence and belief in such ideals among programme participants was examined and put in the context of the literature and outcomes for the press on the ground in Cambodia. This is described in Chapter 8.

5.5 Methodological difficulties and limitations
A number of problems arose while using this methodological approach which are outlined as follows.
1. Geography and finance: The distance of Cambodia from the place of study (Dublin) and the cost of travelling and working there has limited the amount of time which can be spent doing field research. However, these difficulties did not fundamentally affect the research. The majority of interviews were done in a single five-week period in August-September 2011. In order to maximise the use of time and finances, intensive preparation work was done in advance of trip, for example setting up interviews and arranging a strict timetable. My prior experience as a journalist in Cambodia from 2006 to 2008 was useful in this regard, as I had retained extensive contacts in Cambodia amongst the journalism and NGO communities. Thus it was easier for me to gather contact details, and be given introductions to potential interview subjects. Interviews with some subjects, in particular the donors and facilitators, many of whom are no longer in Cambodia, were also possible via Skype, from Ireland. My experience within Cambodia also enabled me to maximise financial resources.
2. Language: I am not fluent in Khmer. This presented obvious difficulties in terms of carrying out qualitative research in a country where the first language is Khmer. However, one of the circumstances which mitigated this difficulty is that proficiency in English is fairly widespread among Cambodian journalists, in particular among those working with international organisations. In order for consistency a translator was present for all of the interviews where subjects’ first language was Khmer. Overall, about a quarter of the interviews were conducted through a translator. This, however, presented difficulties. Yelland and Gifford (1995) are among those who have reported that conducting interviews in interviewees’ second languages negatively affects the quality of the data, with concerns that form and accuracy of translation and transcription has a major bearing on its dependability. With this in mind, a well-qualified translator was employed. Interviews were taped and translated on the spot with contextualising notes describing emotionality of response, while transcription was carefully undertaken to minimise the degree of error. This type of approach is cited by MacLean et al 2004 (p.113) as critical to the reliability and trustworthiness of qualitative research. The interpreter was also bound to a confidentiality agreement, and all interviewees were made aware of this. Interviewee anonymity is being strictly protected by the researcher for the entirety of this project and beyond.

3. Limited interviewee sample: The depth and time requirements needed for qualitative research means that the number of subjects being examined is lower than where using a more quantitative methodology. However, the lower number of participants is countered by advantages of this approach in other respects, as outlined earlier. It must, however, be noted that findings or observations are intended to be generalised to theory rather than to representative populations. Bryman (2008) and Marshall (1996) observe that it is less the size of the population, but the quality of the theoretical inferences taken from analysis of qualitative data that is important in assessing generalisation.
4. Access to interviewees, reliability of data: Getting access to pro-government media journalists was difficult, in particular given their tendency to equate western-based researchers with an anti-government perspective. However, experience and depth of contacts with journalists in Cambodia were useful in overcoming this difficulty. A politically charged and fearful environment also meant interviewees tended to be guarded, or evasive, on the subject of politics affecting the reliability of answers to certain questions. However, this can be a problem in any setting, and interviews were conducted in as neutral a fashion as possible, with a “build-up” to sensitive questions where possible.

5.6 Conclusion

While the methodological approach presented numerous difficulties, it was the best one possible in terms of examining the questions raised and in light of the specific set of circumstances presented by Cambodia as a case study. A qualitative approach renders this a richer and more detailed exploration of this topic than might have resulted from using other approaches, as well as a means of teasing out subtle undercurrents within the subject. This is demonstrated by the breath and range of in the data which resulted, as presented in Chapter 7. In advance of that however, Chapter 6 presents an overarching view of the case study being used here, that of Cambodia.
CHAPTER SIX
Overview of the Cambodian media and journalism education sector

6.1 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter 1, Cambodia from 1993 to 2011 is a suitable case study as it had little or no experience of a press culture historically and efforts at encouraging one were attempted on what might be regarded as a “clean slate”. This chapter gives an overview of the Cambodian media as a means of contextualising the development of the press which exists within that media. It also describes the environment in which the media developed – historically and during the period in which the study is situated. It then describes the development of the media market before analysing, using a political economic frame, interactions between political and economic factors and this process and how certain factors influenced the instrumentalisation of the Cambodian media. Instrumentalisation is defined here as the ownership of news organisations by groups who use them to advance political or business interests. A separate, but connected, final section of this chapter aims to give an overview of the journalism education sector in Cambodia during the relevant period.

6.2 Cambodia overview, history

Table 1. Country factbox

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Southeast Asia borders with Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>181,035 square kilometres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 All from CIA factbook, except where otherwise stated
To fully understand the crossroads Cambodia found itself at the time of the UNTAC intervention which bookends the period this study focuses upon, it is important to consider all of the country’s complex history. While the bloody purges of the Ultra-Maoist Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s seared themselves onto the 20th century global historical narrative, this was only a portion of a particularly complex 40-year period of unrest and upheaval up to 1991. It was an era which saw styles of government ranging from “constitutional monarchy, to presidential regime, to radical Marxism-Leninism, to Soviet-style communist

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20 1998 census  
21 UNICEF 2010
party rule” (Marks 2000, p.115). As Sothearith (2011) puts it, Cambodia was a laboratory for ideologies and different types of political structures.

It was not always thus. For much of its history Cambodia was regarded internationally as a quiet and somewhat insignificant corner of the Indochinese peninsula. Having gained its independence from France in 1953, Cambodia got drawn into the regional unrest that was an offshoot of the Cold War, culminating in the Khmer Rouge’s disastrous agrarian communism social experiment which left millions dead and displaced. It is estimated that about 2.5 million Cambodians perished out of a population of around seven million in 1975 (Peou 2000). Rising tensions between the Khmer Rouge regime and neighbouring Vietnam culminated with the latter invading in 1978, installing the puppet regime the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), who governed the crippled country while sporadic fighting continued throughout the 1980s.

On October 23, 1991 the Paris Agreements were signed after which the UN was invited to help organise elections, which it was hoped would define the country's political future. From here, the international community, in the form of UNTAC, engaged in a rebuilding programme tasked with the creation of a neutral political environment for free and fair elections (Peou 2000). Though the 1993 elections which resulted were inconclusive, relative peace was maintained from then on, although sporadic fighting between the newly-elected government and remaining Khmer Rouge guerrillas continued until 1998.

The UNTAC period, from 1991 to 1993, is key to understanding media development in Cambodia because it is here when the process by which media was evolving in Cambodia went from being somewhat peripheral to the country’s overall development to being regarded as a central element. UNTAC outline their primary challenge in terms of rebuilding the country's physical and
political infrastructure as having three main components: 1. Forging a new political culture 2. Reconstructing and developing the country’s economy, infrastructure and human capital 3. Giving rebirth to Cambodian society and developing a new state which avoids in particular, the practices of the recent past (Curtis 1998). A crucial aspect of this process, according to UNTAC, was to help encourage a media climate which would support and help consolidate a genuinely liberal democratic government structure.

6.3 Development of the media in Cambodia pre-1993

This section provides an overview of the development of the separate media markets in Cambodia and the political economic climate in which this took place prior to 1993. Prior to the Khmer Rouge era which so severely stunted the media and many other sectors in Cambodia, only the print media existed to any kind of developed degree in Cambodia, with broadcast media still very much in its infancy. Print media was introduced to Cambodia during the French colonial period (1863-1953) but was tightly controlled and had a very limited reach. Early French-language journals such as Bulletin officiel du Cambodge (first published in 1884), the Annuaire illustré du Cambodge (from 1890) and Le Petit Cambodgien (from 1899) were used primarily to report official French activities and decisions (Jarvis et al 2001). There were little or no Khmer language publications at this point. A lack of distribution infrastructure and low literacy levels contributed to poor media access among the rural population, representing some 80% of the country (Mehta 1997). More Khmer publications began to emerge later.

The first official Khmer-language gazette, Reachkech, began in 1911 (Sothearith 2011), while a first periodical in Khmer, Kambuja Surya (Cambodian Sun), appeared in 1926 with a Khmer-language newspaper Nagaravatta following in 1936 (Jarvis et al. 2001). Nagaravatta mainly acted as a public mouthpiece for
facilitating negotiations between the French rulers and Cambodian elites before becoming an anti-French and pro-Japanese newspaper when the Japanese invaded in the early 1940s (Sothearith 2011, Clarke 2000). A fairly vigorous print media industry of some 30 newspapers and weekly magazines developed during the era of King Sihanouk (which spanned from the 1950s until his exile in 1970). However, their content was closely monitored by a regime, which in the same period merged all political parties into one Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community) headed by Sihanouk. Information about what was going on politically, both inside and outside Cambodia, was severely limited and all foreign journalists were banned in the mid-1960s (Clarke 2000). The likes of Kambuja magazine — one of the best-known and high-profile publications at this time — was little more than “an exercise in the suppression of news” (Mehta 1997, p.90).

One of the first acts by the US-backed Lon Nol government after ousting Sihanouk in 1970 was to relax the laws of media ownership and content. About 30 daily newspapers were operating within two years of Lon Nol taking power (Sothearith 2011), most of which were broadly supportive of government policies which had helped bring them into existence. As the regime grew more unpopular, however, the tone of press coverage began to change and by 1972 many were dwelling on the various hardships facing a populace increasingly crushed by a worsening civil war and entrenched administrative corruption (Mehta 1997). This was a period in which Cambodian journalists got their first taste of real freedom and the press was a powerful institution (Sisovann 2003) and played an important watchdog role criticising governmental corruption and mismanagement (Sothearith 2011). The Lon Nol administration proved intolerant of this evolution however and in 1972 it closed down several of the more outspoken newspapers, enacting a tough new press law that punished journalists for damaging a person’s ‘honour’, morality or national security
Mehta 1997, Clarke 2000). These measures as well as the fear of being jailed, or ‘disappeared’ by an increasingly repressive regime, kept the press from continuing to expose corruption and forced many to practice self-censorship (Mehta 1997).

Broadcast media in this period was limited, mainly due to the lack of electricity and technology (radio, TV sets) required to access them. The total number of radio sets in Cambodia in 1951 was about 3,500, increasing to about 7,000 by 1958 (Clarke 2000, p.249). At the time of the launch of the first Government TV station in 1965, there were only about 300 TV sets, with the number having increased to 25,000-30,000 by 1974 (Lichty and Hoffer 1978, p.119). The first Cambodian radio station, Radio Cambodge was established in 1946 (Clarke 2000). Four AM radio stations began broadcasting in 1955 from within the Ministry of Information, while a government TV station (TVRK) began broadcasting in 1966.

The picture by the mid to late 1970s then, was of a growing print and broadcast media within which the print media in particular had begun to develop a tentative but fairly potent press culture, with experience of working alongside regimes and in the case of the Lon Nol administration, holding it to account. The coming of the Khmer Rouge, however, marked the end of all that. There is little precedent anywhere for the extent of the destruction of the press under the Khmer Rouge — who counted among its casualties a great many journalists. An atmosphere of terror and paranoia ensured that any media which was allowed to exist towed the party line in absolute terms. There was no room for any kind of dissent and Cambodian journalism, such as it was, was utterly subjugated to the ‘Angkar’s’ propaganda requirements. Two news pamphlets — Yuvachun Ning Yuveakneary Padevat (Boys and Girls of the Revolution) and Tung Pakdevoat (National Flag) — were intended for circulation only among party cadres.
The regime also put an end to all TV broadcasting, while a ban on private possessions meant very few risked owning a radio or TV set. The Khmer Rouge retained the previously state-controlled Phnom Penh Radio purely as an instrument for mass mobilisation and a means of broadcasting ideology (Mehta 1997, Clarke 2000).

After the fall of the Khmer Rouge, print and broadcast media began to reappear during the reign of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). While the brutal repression of the previous regime eased, all media remained under the tight control of Vietnamese puppet regime of Heng Samrin and was still used primarily as a means of propagandising for the Central Committee of the People’s Revolutionary Party — now known as the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Hiang-KhengHeng (2002) describes the media at this point as essentially a party-controlled socialist styled media which, though with more freedom than under the Khmer Rouge, was driven by a similar monolithic ideology (p.29).

Print publications in this period included the weekly Kampuchea newspaper, established in January 1979; the military journal Kangtoap Padevoath (Revolutionary Army), the municipality newspaper Phnom Penh and a party newspaper Pracheachun (The People), which first appeared in 1985 (Jarvis et al 2001). National news agency SPK (which survived as L’Agence Khmer de Presse (AKP)) was established, but was closely supervised by Vietnamese “experts”. The PRK also allowed the re-establishment of a broadcast media sector, but again retained a tight control over it. They combined all broadcast media as Radio and Television of Kampuchea (Sisovann 2003) and also set up a national AM radio station called Voice of the Kampuchean people. TVK began to transmit for the first time in 1984, with colour transmissions beginning in 1986. At that time, Cambodia had about 200,000 radio receivers and 4,000 TV sets (Clarke 2000). UNTAC’s arrival in 1992 signalled a period in which the media landscape was quickly, and irrevocably transformed.
6.4 Media development from 1993 to 2011

This section examines the Cambodian media sector by sector between 1993 and 2011. The 1993 UNTAC-influenced constitution put in place a number of measures to help encourage media development, while specific dispensation was made for “Ensuring Free Access to the Media....for All Political Parties Contesting In the Election” (section D 'Elections', paragraph 3F), while the information and education division of UNTAC drafted media guidelines to give effect to this (United Nations 1991). Supplementing these constitutional efforts, many international and western aid organisations became involved in media development projects, including training/educational programmes and the establishment of a number of professional journalism organisations.

A free market economy also made the Cambodian media market accessible to outside companies. Such measures helped media outlets proliferate in the period, with Clarke (1995) estimating there were about 45 publications and broadcasters — utilising around 500 journalists — disseminating the news in Cambodia by 1994. She describes this sudden resurgence of the independent news media in Cambodia as “nothing short of remarkable” (1995, p.4). John Marston, who worked for UNTAC’s Cambodian News Media, concurred: “The media clearly changed rapidly and dramatically between UNTAC’s arrival and departure” (Hiang-Kheng Heng 2002, p.31). By 2011, which is the end point of the period being examined here, Cambodian media had changed utterly from pre-UNTAC days, with a total of 340 media establishments of varying sizes (Ministry of Information 2011). However, this figure is offset by the fact that the proportion of the population with access to media remained small, as the following table shows.
Table 2. Cambodian media access 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Population access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there is a general upward curve in terms of media proliferation from the point where UNTAC-influenced media legislation was adopted to the end of the period being looked at, its development in terms of reach, variety and effect is inconsistent. To examine why this is so, we must look at the process in closer detail. Comprehensive breakdowns of the development of the overall market with accurate circulation numbers and viewing figures for Cambodia are lacking, but a clearer picture can be established by examining changes and developments in the market in the main print, television, radio and internet outlets.

**Print media**

Within a year of UNTAC’s arrival, dozens of newspapers were appearing on the streets of Phnom Penh. These included a mix of foreign language press based in Cambodia with foreign funding (for example the Phnom Penh Post and the Cambodia Daily) and a Khmer language press with locally based funding. In 1993 there were about 30 newspapers, the following year 45 and by 1995 about 90 (Licadho 2008). Minister for Information Ieng Mouly estimated a total readership in 1994 of between 50,000 and 100,000 (Clarke 1995) while Clarke estimated a total print circulation of about 70,600 (1995). She lists about 38 regularly published newspapers, with numerous others which came and went without being documented.

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22 World Bank (Kea 2008)
23 Readership includes all readers of a newspaper, while circulation refers to the actual number of the publication which was bought
From the limited available data, a surge in the numbers of publications is evident in the period being looked at, although overall readership remains static. Figures obtained from 2002 show a marked rise in the numbers of newspapers, while 2007, 2008 and 2010 figures show a rise peaking in 2008 before declining again in 2010. A reduced Ministry of Information figure of 264 in 2010 may be due to the applications of a more rigorous definition of ‘newspaper’, although more detailed analysis in this regard has not been forthcoming by the ministry.

Table 3. Print media 2002-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International press</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall circulation or readership of print media is more significant than ebbs and flows in the numbers of publications. As noted previously, the early circulation figures of the print media during the initial surge of media in the mid 1990s were estimated at between 60,000 to 100,000 readers. The evidence gathered in the subsequent years would suggest that these

24 These figures are not entirely reliable due to inconsistent definitions within the Ministry of Information as to what defines a newspaper. Kea (2008, p.155) notes that while 327 newspapers are registered by the Ministry of Information at that time less than a dozen are regularly published. “The Ministry for Information itself acknowledged this in 2005, when it noted that many newspapers are only activated on New Years, the birthdays of Government leaders, and other important events at times when the publishers believe they will be able to make a profit” (Kea 2008, p. 155-6).
25 Asian Community Handbook 2003
26 Ministry for Information (Cambodian Communications Review 2010, p. 6)
27 Ministry for Information (2008)
29 This figure by the Ministry for Information is incorrect. It is amended to five known international publications, although the actual figure may well be higher
numbers have remained fairly static since. This is based on figures from the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (2009), which found that Cambodia had a combined paid-for and free daily circulation of 6.3 newspapers per 1000 adults nationwide. Based on CIA Worldbook figures of around 9 million people in Cambodia over the age of 18, this gives a total combined daily and free sheet newspaper circulation of 56,700. It is the second lowest newspaper circulation per head in the region, compared to Hong Kong (580 newspapers/ 1000 adults), Thailand (144/1000), Vietnam (43/1000), Myanmar (11.8/1000) and Laos, which has a similarly low figure (6.3/1000) (WANNP 2009).

The types of papers which thrived in this period varied considerably. Outside of the comparatively well-funded international press, the economics of survival forced most commercial Cambodian publications to be run guerilla style, usually operating with very basic facilities and rarely more than a handful of reporters. A few Khmer language publications raised what was a fairly low bar in the sector, with the leader among these Rasmei Kampuchea (Light of Cambodia), which sold an estimated 13,000 copies a day (Mehta 1997) on the strength of sensationalist stories, and front page pictures of grisly car crashes and violent deaths. Rasmei also built up a reputation for taking on the authorities — going so far during the 1993 elections, as to carry blank spaces in protest against censorship (Mehta 1997). Another significant player among Khmer language newspapers was Koh Santepheap, which established itself as the best selling daily Khmer-language paper, with its primary focus on crime and accident stories, with politics rarely high on its news agenda.
**Table 4. Newspaper circulations 2002-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koh Santepheap</td>
<td>14000</td>
<td>17000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasmei Kampuchea</td>
<td>14000</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampuchea Thmey</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia Daily</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodge Soir</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinhua Daily</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BROADCAST MEDIA**

*Radio*

In terms of broadcast media, radio had the most significant reach in the years following the arrival of UNTAC. Radio UNTAC was established in 1992, while Clarke (1995) lists National Radio of Cambodia, Radio & Television Phnom Penh and Radio FM90 as the main players in 1994. Evidence of the consistent popularity of the medium is mostly anecdotal or based on broad brushstroke analysis, with exact listenership numbers for the various stations, both in the 1990s and later, lacking. According to the Ministry of Planning (1999), in 1997 about 20% of all households possessed TV sets while 41% of total households had a radio. In 2008, according to the Ministry for Information (Cambodian Communication Review 2010, p. 6), over 40% of Cambodian households owned at least one radio set. Marston (2000) found that radio was the single

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30 All figures per day
31 Asian Communications Handbook 2002
32 Asian Communications Handbook 2008
most important medium in Cambodia to truly reach all parts of Cambodia and all segments of the population. A TAF (2003) study found that 38% of those surveyed had tuned in to a radio station more than three times in the week previous to the survey.

Table 5: Number of radio stations 2003-2010

2003 onwards shows a continued rise in the numbers of radio stations broadcasting to the Cambodian market. The table below shows a slight dip in the numbers of stations broadcasting in 2008, but this had bounced back to the highest number of stations yet (74 in total) by 2010.

Television

Television was slower to take off than print or radio, but had become the dominant medium in Cambodia by the end of the period being studied. Clarke (1994) lists Cambodian Television 9 (CTV9), Television of Khmer (TVK), IBC-TV Cambodia as the three television stations which were operating domestically

in the immediate aftermath of the UNTAC period. By 2002 there were a total of 28 channels available in Cambodia (Asian Communications Handbook 2003). A TAF (2003) study found that 52\% of those surveyed had watched TV more than three times in the past week, concluding that TV is the most powerful medium in terms of reach (TAF 2003). The number of television stations in the market was continuing to rise in 2008 (Asian Communications Handbook 2008).

**Table 6. Overall television reach 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of TV stations</th>
<th>33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of TV equipped households</td>
<td>4.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable subscribers</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite antennas</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2011, there were nine broadcast TV stations in Cambodia. These included one state-operated station broadcasting from multiple locations and six stations either jointly operated or privately-owned. Multi-channel cable and satellite systems were available; one state-owned broadcaster with multiple stations and a large mixture of public and private broadcasters, while several international broadcasters were also available (CIA 2009). Three television stations — Television Kampuchea (TVK), Bayon and Cambodian Television Network (CTN) — have near-national coverage. There are no comprehensive independent audits of which stations have the most viewers. However, it is generally accepted that CTN is the most watched. According to an InterMedia (2010) survey 61.8\% of TV viewers had watched CTN in the previous 12 months, the highest percentage achieved by any TV station in Cambodia (InterMedia 2011).

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34 Asian Communications Handbook 2008
**Internet**

The impact of internet media has been limited in Cambodia until recently\(^{35}\), when mobile technology allowed internet access without fixed phone or data lines. While the rate of growth in this area has grown, as can be seen in Table 7 (below) it can certainly be stated that its impact is marginal during the period being examined here.

**Table 7: Internet usage 2002-2011\(^{36}\)**

![Number of users](image)

Though the growth rates are impressive, relative to the overall population, the numbers in Cambodia using the internet were still very low at the end of the period being examined, with 450,000 users in 2011 representing just 3% of the population.

\(^{35}\) There has been a rapid growth in internet access in the last four years in particular

6.5 Political economy analysis of the development of the Cambodian media

This chapter has examined the history of the Cambodian media and broken down how the different elements of the market expanded and grew up to, and during, the relevant period. To summarise, since UNTAC's 1993 arrival, the numbers of print media outlets, after an initial surge, continued to grow while its reach and readership stagnated. Meanwhile, broadcast media, and television in particular, saw growth in terms of reach and influence while internet usage also made inroads.

A political economy frame is useful for examining and explaining trends within various types of media organisations in Cambodia since 1993. This kind of approach focuses on structures for the production of media and communication industries under capitalism and their impact on the production and consumption of media and communications and on flows of information (New Influencer 2013). As such, it looks at how different types of values are produced, distributed, exchanged and consumed; how power is produced, distributed, exchanged and used; and how these aspects are related (Graham 2013). Examining media structures through this frame sheds light on some of the other influences brought to bear on journalistic values and behaviour in a Cambodian context.

Politically, Cambodia is, ostensibly at least, a multi-party democracy under a constitutional monarchy. However, the reality more closely resembles an authoritarian state (Bumille 2012) ruled by Prime Minister Hun Sen. Outside forces have been a major influence in its political and economic formation. Historically, France is important in this regard, acting as its coloniser and administrator until the mid 20th century. More recently, the US and China have had a powerful (Bumille 2012, Reuters 2013), though rarely explicitly acknowledged, influence on the basis of being significant financial donors. Vietnam, the powerful next-door neighbour which occupied Cambodia between 1978 and 1993, retains considerable economic and political power (some would say control) (Ferrie 2010) in the upper echelons of the Cambodian People’s
Further international political influence is exerted through the UN and associated agencies. This was at its height in the period after 1993, where UNTAC actually administered the country and even today, Cambodia remains heavily dependent on donor country subsidies to keep it afloat (Ear 2012).

Given the multitude of different influences then, it is difficult to connect any in particular to a specific outcome or political value, but it can be hypothesised that such a variety of influences may have resulted in a degree of fragmentation in the foundation of the political culture which developed. This may have had a bearing on the way in which a well-organised and astute CPP political leadership seized control and established what is an almost total dominance today. Economically, Cambodia relies on agriculture, tourism and the garment industry, but an estimated 50% of the country’s budget still comes from foreign donors. The majority of the population is still rural, and is, in general, lacking in infrastructure, education and productive skills (CIA). While its political system is authoritarian in nature, the Cambodian economy is a free market. A basic political economy analysis on Cambodian media in 2011 suggests that it is not free. Most mediums and channels are dominated by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (Kea 2008). Almost every reputable analysis of the country, whether from rights groups such as Licadho and Reporters Sans Frontiers or annual reports (Asian Communications Handbook, Licadho 2009, Freedom House 2011) have concurred with this view. This is evidenced not only in terms of ownership and content of the various media companies, but also in terms of measures of press freedom. The next section breaks down further the implications of this.

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37 The CPP emerged from the vestiges of Vietnamese socialism and has a similarly authoritarian, anti-intellectual character (McCargo 2005).
Measures of press freedom 1993-2011

Outside of anecdotal evidence, of which there is plenty, the main data suggesting a lack of press freedom in Cambodia is 1. the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index and 2. the Freedom House Freedom of the Press Rating, which measure sources of pressure and attacks on the press and the economic, political and legal environment in the country in question.

Table 8. Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>35.83</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37.75</td>
<td>34.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>43.83</td>
<td>35.17</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>25.33</td>
<td>27.25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>56.83</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38.25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44.75</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36.63</td>
<td>35.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>75.75</td>
<td>81.67</td>
<td>86.17</td>
<td>79.25</td>
<td>67.25</td>
<td>73.75</td>
<td>86.88</td>
<td>89.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>64.33</td>
<td>94.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>104.75</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>108.75</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>107.5</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index measures freedom of the press by gauging the regularity of direct attacks on journalists and the media as well as other indirect sources of pressure against it. In this Cambodia was ranked 128 out of 178 countries in 2010. The annual figures show a gradual, but almost constant downward trend in the period since the table was first collated in 2002.

The Freedom House Freedom of the Press rating examines how conducive conditions are to press freedom in terms of the economic, legal and political environment. The higher the score awarded, the less free the press in that country is. The 2011 report saw Cambodia retain a “Not Free” rating of 63, with the agency noting a slight decline in the legal and political environment in terms

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*The higher the score, the lower the level of press freedom*
of press freedom. According to this index, Cambodia’s print and broadcast media were rated as not free from 1980, when scores were first collated by the organisation, up until 1993. In 1994, after the arrival of UNTAC the rating was 50, or “Partially Free”, but the scores kept rising until 1996, when Cambodia’s press was downgraded to “Not Free”, until 2007. The rating was upgraded to “Partially Free” (Freedom House 2008) in 2008, before declining to “Not Free” again in 2009.\textsuperscript{39} The status remained “Not Free” in 2010 with an overall score of 61.

Simply stating the levels of freedom of the press in Cambodia according to these measures gives an incomplete picture. The tightening of the sphere in which the media can be independent in Cambodia only reflects general trends across Southeast Asia and in comparative terms, the annual Reporters Without Borders’ surveys shows Cambodia as performing well. Figures in Table 8 shows Cambodia as significantly freer than Laos, Vietnam, Burma, as well as the far more developed Thailand and the Philippines. The Freedom House rating also shows a mixed picture in comparative terms. Thailand’s press fluctuates between free and partially free in the period being studied, as does the Philippines, while Vietnam’s and Laos’ rating remains at “Not Free” throughout the period. According to Kea (2008), there has been some improvement in the reporting environment due in part to the activity of media groups and journalists’ associations and efforts by the international community to protect journalists (Kea 2008, p.157-158). In terms of comparing Cambodia with other countries in the region, while Cambodia began at a lower base in terms of its media infrastructure, more resources\textsuperscript{40} were invested in journalism training. Even the most optimistic readings of the data must conclude that while the media environment in Cambodia is better than many countries in the region —

\textsuperscript{39} 2009 also saw the first murder of a journalist in Cambodia since 2003).
\textsuperscript{40} The vast majority from foreign donors
and is certainly an improvement on the Khmer Rouge and post-Khmer Rouge eras—“it should not be considered a free press” (Licadho 2009, p.7). The next sub-section breaks this down further in terms of sector.

**Political economy analysis of print media**

The overall trend in terms of the Cambodian print media is of a rapidly growing but fairly diverse print media to begin with — albeit one in which intense political polarisation was evident very early on — which became less so over time. Conditions which help sustain single-party dominance in Cambodian print media are most clearly evidenced by tendencies of ownership and control of newspapers, which in turn influences the political leanings and content contained within them (Curran 1996). While there remains a strong, neutral and fairly influential international press, amongst the locally based Khmer-language newspapers, almost all overtly support the Government.

While an important element contributing to growth in the print sector in the mid 1990s was the introduction of new legislation under UNTAC, other economic conditions also made it ripe for expansion. In Sihanouk’s time, when the first significant print press media emerged, a depressed industrial environment meant newspapers had to rely on sales rather than advertising for income, meaning newspaper prices were beyond the reach of most Cambodians. But by the mid 1990s, foreign investment was impacting positively on the economy and advertisements began appearing in the press (Mehta 1997). This meant a drop in newspaper prices, which contributed to what became an increasingly lively market. However, though the commercial and legal environment was amenable to the establishment of newspaper titles in the early to mid 1990s, staying the course afterwards proved tougher for many. This was particularly the case for a Khmer press which was lacking in business nous and experience and had to compete for locally based revenue in an increasingly saturated market (Mehta
A number of reasons stand out for stagnant growth in local and international press readership after the mid 1990s. The majority of the readership for the international press market was based in urban areas among the business and NGO sectors. The NGO market peaked in the mid 1990s, with readership stabilising after an initial surge. Khmer language press readership, meanwhile, was stymied by poor distribution networks outside of the cities and low literacy rates. Similarly to patterns elsewhere in the world however, as literacy rates (See Table 1) and distribution networks improved, media consumers were increasingly gravitating toward other mediums such as radio and television. This rather stagnant level of readership had important implications. According to Clarke (1995) it lead to a fall-off in foreign-owned print media, leaving the field more open to the “pre-1975 type” newspapers, typified by editor/director, senior staff owned model. However, as discussed later in this chapter, such ownership structures were vulnerable to political instrumentalisation.

During the period researched here, the number of government-affiliated, or owned, print media increased exponentially. This is shown most starkly when a comparison is made between Clarke’s (1995) analysis of print media ownership and analyses by Licadho (2009) and Sothearith (2011) a few years later. According to Clarke, two print publications were official Government media, three newspapers were owned by particular parties, 23 print outlets were either owned by editors or businessmen, three newspapers owned by foreign companies and five which fell into other categories. Out of a total circulation of just 70,685, 3.5% was Government media, 1.6% by other political parties, 54% “independent” editor- or businessman-owned newspapers, 30.4% by “international” or “foreign-owned” press, with the remaining 10.4% falling into the “other” category (Clarke 1995). Recently, according to a Licadho (2009)
report, nearly all Cambodian-owned newspapers, big or small, were owned or backed by powerful politicians or businessmen and reflect their patrons’ political biases in their editorial content. Sothearith’s (2011) analysis of the newspaper scene in 2008 concluded that “most print media outlets—excepting a few foreign language newspapers—have been directly and indirectly funded by political parties” (p. 11).

How did this tendency progress during the period being examined? As previously outlined, the print media that emerged in Cambodia can be divided into the pro-government Khmer press, the opposition-supporting Khmer language press, and the “international” press, which primarily refers to the English language Cambodia Daily and Phnom Penh Post, the French-language CambodgeSoir plus a few other papers which came and went during the period. This latter group enjoy a good reputation generally and were regarded as setting an important standard among print media (Sisovann 2003). The Khmer language press, however, was markedly different.

A lack of political independence within the Cambodian media and the reasons for this lies at the heart of what this study is about. Political parallelism — in the sense that the media is strongly affiliated with and biased toward particular political parties — in this sector is noted (Clarke 1995) during the initial strong growth in the number of outlets in the early to mid 1990s, a tendency which Clarke (1995) notes, was also characteristic of newspapers in the 1970-1975 period. Indeed, the print media in the late 1990s bore similar characteristics to the “polarised pluralist” media model described by Hallin and Mancini (2004), in particular its low newspaper circulation, commentary oriented journalism, weak levels of professionalism and strong state intervention. While lacking in neutrality or balance, Licadho (2008) notes that the press at least provided a variety of political viewpoints. But as is often the case in such environments, as
one party (The CPP in this case) consolidated their political dominance, the
media followed suit. Today the Khmer language press is dominated by
publications which support the government. The opposition press has been
whittled down to three newspapers – Moneakseker Khmer, Khmer Machas Srok
and Serey Pheap Thmey (New Freedom) (RSF 2010). Licadho’s (2009)
breakdown shows the extent of this dominance.

Table 9. Ownership/alignment of newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KohSantepheap</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasmei Kampuchea</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cambodia Daily</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodge Soir</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakraval Daily</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phnom Penh Post</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Sethakech</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Yuvachun Khmer</td>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilisation</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheat</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wat Phnom</td>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moneakseker Khmer</td>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>SRP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Licadho 2009

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As well as ownership and control, the literature suggests a decline in the amount of political reportage in newspapers over the period being studied. In his 2003 analysis, Sisovann notes a marked drop in this regard from prior to 1997, when faction fighting between the CPP and its rivals broke out. Before this point, he writes that Khmer newspapers devoted around roughly 70% of their stories to political issues (Sisovann 2003) but a few years later this was significantly less. However, more detailed statistics are lacking.

**Political economy analysis of broadcast media**

As described earlier in this chapter poor access affected the reach and popularity of broadcast media in the early 1990s, before it overcame these hurdles to become the dominant media type in Cambodia. However, broadcast media also tended to be the most under government control from the start and few opposing voices were allowed access to the airwaves (Sisovann 2003).

**Radio**

Radio’s initial popularity in the early 1990s, due to its cheapness and accessibility as a medium, has tailed off with the growth of television. But Licadho (2008) argues for the medium’s continued importance as a news source in Cambodia. TV, according to their survey of journalists and media practitioners, is viewed mostly for entertainment, while people tune in to radio to hear news. Thus, the report argues “radio has more influence on public opinion” (2008, p.15). In

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kampuchea Thmey</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sna Day Khmeng Wat</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasmei Angkor</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong Cambodia</td>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deum Ampil</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Machas Srok</td>
<td></td>
<td>SRP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
terms of the political leanings of radio stations, the CPP, as in other mediums, is dominant. However, the medium still retained slightly more political diversity than television, a tendency which is more marked more evident in internationally funded operations.

A growth in political parallelism is increasingly evident over the time being looked at here. Clarke (1995) finds that of the five main stations then operating, two were State media, another was party owned and one was run by an NGO, but by 1997, Edman (2000) concludes that almost all radio stations were owned by or aligned with political parties. A few years later Sisovann (2003) notes that all locally funded radio stations were known to be pro-Government except two — FM102 and FM105 Beehive Radio — whose content adheres to a more independent viewpoint. This situation was unchanged in Licadho's 2009 report which reports that the vast majority of stations are affiliated to the ruling party, usually through owners who associate with and/or have a close relationship with CPP party members. Of the ‘international’ radio stations, the Khmer-language news bulletins, telephone call-in shows and forums of RFA, VOA and VOD, along with Radio France International, are popular and provide the only other “independent, vigorous reporting and commentary” (Licadho 2008).

Table 10. Ownership/ alignment of radio stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FM88</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Run by the non profit Women’s Media Centre
Beehive Radio has never been far from controversy. Known for airing dissenting viewpoints and critical voices (Licadho 2008), it has been closed down by the government on several occasions and its owner Mam Sonando imprisoned (Peter and Narim 2012).
One example is Bayon FM (95 FM), believed to be operated by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s daughter Hun Mana, which broadcasts a morning show which openly criticises opposition parties (LICADHO 2009).
Edman (2000), Licadho (2009)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FM90</td>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>FUNCINPEC/CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM95 Bayon</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM540</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM740</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>N/A&lt;sup&gt;46&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVK radio</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM97 Apsara</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 103</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM105 Beehive</td>
<td>SRP/ Neutral</td>
<td>SRP/ Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM107 Khmer Radio</td>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM102</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet FM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta Prohm</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>FUNCINPEC/CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 93.5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>SRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Cambodian Friendship Radio</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military FM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 102</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE Asia Radio 106</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SovanPhum FM</td>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>SRP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the general perception is that there is better news content in general on radio, most of the evidence in this regard tends to be anecdotal, though a 2003

<sup>46</sup> Not available/closed/status unknown
study shows a significantly higher percentage of content related to ‘news’ on the radio than television (As outlined in Table 14).

*Figure 11. Radio programming content*

![Programming content](image)

### Television

While the degree of professionalism in terms of home-produced news content on Khmer-language television has improved rapidly between 1993 and 2011, it remains somewhat basic, with a typical news report consisting of a narrated account of a government official travelling to the countryside to inspect a road, or to donate food (Licadho 2008). Speeches by Prime Minister Hun Sen are replayed in full by almost all television stations and stations run only officially sanctioned stories (Sisovann 2003, p.28), while controversial stories are either directly censored by the government or self-censored by journalists and their producers (Licadho 2008). Lower costs have helped boost the numbers of people with TV access and lead to a rise in viewing figures, however, TV stations still face difficulties overcoming a lack of commercial revenue (Freedom House 2009). Sothearith (2011) posits that a lack of any form of Public Service Broadcasting

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hampers the development of a quality, domestic television news service.

Almost all commentators agree television media in Cambodia strongly favoured the government between 1993 and 2011. Clarke (1995) finds that all TV stations in 1994 were either government/state media, party owned or owned by foreign companies while five years later Edman (2000) concludes that all TV stations were owned by, or aligned with, political parties (See Table 11). Sisovann (2003) concurs: “[TV] is vicariously controlled by the government. Stations only run officially sanctioned news stories, many of them virtually identical with the same tape apparently sent from one TV station to the other” (p. 28).

Table 12. Ownership/alignment of TV stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayon TV</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVK</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apsara TV</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV5</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV3</td>
<td>Informational</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV9</td>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTN</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CPP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All TV stations are all controlled by the ruling party and Hun Sen’s family (RSF 2010). In some cases, the party owns key televisions stations outright, for example, APSARA TV and Bayon TV. This analysis is backed up by Licadho’s 2009 report on the media, while Sothearith (2011) notes that in the absence of any kind of Public Service Broadcasting, state TV stations are simply government mouthpieces. In terms of how bias toward the Government is demonstrated in TV programming,

---

48 Edman (2000), Licadho (2009)
more thorough content analysis is required. From the research that has been done (Asian Communications Handbook 2003), it appears bias is achieved almost as much by depoliticising the content overall as it is by being strongly pro-government, as is demonstrated below.

*Figure 13. TV programme content*

![Programming content](image)

*Internet-based media*

While the internet is a growing influence in Cambodia, how it is used and the degree to which it is used to access news is difficult to quantify. As is the case for most online media, locally based online newspapers tend to be short of capital. However, Cambodia has produced a couple of good quality internet news providers such as everydaynews.com, Cambodian News, as well as successful online editions of Koh Santepheap and Kampuchea Thmey (Kea 2008). Several websites and blogs, for example KI Media, CEN.com and FPM Online are also able to publish independent news and commentary (RSF 2010 report 7). Internet-based media in Cambodia has enjoyed far less regulation than traditional media forms (Kea 2008, RSF 2010), possibly due to it not being perceived as a threat due to low internet access among the public (Licadho 2009, Freedom House 2011). However, there are signs that as the numbers of internet users rise, this is changing. Freedom House (2010), for example, notes

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49 Ministry of Information (Cited in Asian Communications Handbook 2003, p.38)
the introduction of a new Bill that would extend print media regulations to the internet. While internet media was not a significant player from 1993 to 2011, it is likely to be central to future studies in Cambodia of this kind.

6.6 Political instrumentalisation and the Cambodian media
The previous section outlines how the Cambodian media has operated with decreasing levels of independence in an increasingly restrictive and authoritarian political climate. This is evident in patterns of ownership — which were increasingly dominated by the CPP — and was reflected in terms of content, manifesting themselves either in a preponderance of politically biased news reporting, or in the absence of political news reporting entirely. This section examines the inter-relationship between the effect of political economic factors and instrumentalisation tendencies within Cambodian media.

Political climate and culture
The prevailing political climate is a critical factor influencing the degree to which the media can operate freely. Sothearith’s (2011) analysis of whether Cambodia is conducive to the establishment of an independent Public Broadcasting System (PBS), for example, concludes that four external factors — political circumstances, economic conditions, civil society and social cultural compatibility — play a key role in creating the optimum conditions for a PBS in a developing country. Of these, he says politics is the most important. Freedom House (2011) describes an environment where most media outlets are openly aligned with various political factions, “leaving little space for balanced views and journalism conducted in the public interest”.

Cambodia’s key characteristic in terms of political influence on the media is the

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50 A significant statement of intent in this regard took place in December 2010 when the government blocked access to opposition website K1-Media (Freedom House 2011).
overall dominance of one party – the CPP. This has an effect in terms of the type and degree of influence exerted. An overly dominant ruling party, for example, “will likely use the existing media system to victimise its opponents and will not allow the establishment of an independent media for fear that this could harm its popularity by revealing scandals and criticising its policy actions” (Sothearith 2011, p.223). In Cambodia, threats and tempting financial offers from the authorities have been used extensively against newspapers to get them to change political sides (RSF 2010). Examples include that of KeoSothea, director of the Samleng Yuvachon Khmer (Voice of the Khmer Youth), who began to support the government prior to the 2008 elections and was subsequently appointed to a high-level government position. After a similar about-turn, Thach Ket, editor of opposition aligned Sralang Khmer, obtained a post in the information ministry (RSF 2010, p.6).

An interlinking of politics and the media has strong historical precedents in Cambodia, which has little experience of an objective and balanced press as it is understood in the west. It is too simplistic to say that the prior press culture was simply wiped out under the Khmer Rouge. The pre-Khmer Rouge culture is also important. Historically, Khmer-language newspapers developed as party organs, (Clarke 1995, p.9) and political upheaval and a flowering of press outlets appeared to go hand in hand.

“The most outstanding peculiarity of the Cambodian press is that it mushroomed during political turmoil, or on the eve of political change. That’s why we had a lot of newspapers before the elections in 1955-56, and we also had a lot of newspapers emerging before 1970s, as well as before the 1993 elections.” Information Minister Khieu Kanharith (cited in Mehta 1997, p.38).

The concept of political pluralism in Cambodia is a relatively recent
development and the notion of the press as society’s watchdog is not well understood by the government or even by many media practitioners themselves (Sothearith 2011). A tendency among politicians to see the media as an instrument represents the continuation of a mindset that, to varying degrees, existed since colonial times, when the French policy in Cambodia was to aggressively restrict access to information and education (Mehta 1997). According to Mehta (1997) the tragedy of the Cambodian press, since the 1950s, had been one of the denial of freedom by various regimes on one pretext or another. Cambodian politicians, he writes, see the press as a slave through which to get their political ideas across and a reticence against openly criticising the government reflects this historical tendency.

The emergence of a freer regime in the aftermath of 1993 did not mean that such practices or attitudes changed overnight. The majority of news directors and managers only had experience of a socialist regime. Thus centralisation and bureaucratic red-tape still persisted in almost all broadcast stations (Sothearith 2011). Clarke (1995) argues that the pre-1975-style newspapers which were highly susceptible to political influence were likely to become dominant in the Cambodian media landscape. This prediction can be seen to have largely come true, and partially explains the degree to which the CPP has become ever more dominant in that field. In general, Cambodia’s history of civil war and bitter factionalism made it extremely difficult for Khmer language outlets to be neutral and impartial post 1993. A degree of bias among individual outlets appeared acceptable to most international observers, so long as in general terms, there was political diversity within the media. However, as the CPP more and more dominant politically, the media began to become more uniform also.

Flawed media licensing system

A political culture that is not conducive to a neutral and independent media
manifests itself in a number of ways. Among the most important of these in Cambodia is the system by which licences are granted, which became highly politicised. As Galabru (2008) points out, media ownership is directly linked to licensing of media, controlled by the government, which in turn creates an institutional political bias within most media outlets (2008, p. 27). The means by which licensing procedures are manipulated have several different shadings, with licences granted strategically in order to maximise CPP influence while drawing as little negative attention as possible, which retains importance for a country which remains reliant on foreign donors. According to Licadho (2008) a policy of granting lots of print licences, both to known government sympathetic sources and some opposition figures, while tightly controlling the granting of licences for electronic media, is deliberate.

“It is no coincidence that the government has been prepared to permit the existence of many newspapers – which have an extremely limited impact because of lack of distribution and Cambodia’s high level of illiteracy – but tightly controls the electronic media” (Licadho 2008, p1).

With broadcast media, licences were not given to those known to be critical of the government and the threat of not renewing a licence was used as a stick to encourage others to tow the line (Licadho 2008, RSF 2010). RSF (2010) reports how a request by Mam Sonando of Sombok Khmum for permission to install relays in the provinces was rejected in 2006. “The information ministry gives licences to the government’s allies in order to take up the entire FM waveband. The SRP opposition party is unable to obtain a TV station licence but Soy Sopheap, a journalist who supports the prime minister, got a licence in 2009” (RSF 2010, p.7).

Another element of the licensing laws is the fact that media guidelines put in
place under UNTAC, which were designed to encourage a proliferation of media outlets, have not proven fit for that purpose. Article 13 of the UNTAC guidelines, for example, states that existing administrative structures should facilitate the profusion of publications and broadcast stations by processing without delay applications for registration or assignment of broadcast frequencies. If an application has not received an answer within one month, UNTAC encouraged the automatic approval of that application (UNTAC 1991, p.2). Such guidelines were intended to not only guarantee freedom of expression, but also to encourage the government to issue as many licences as possible to commercial media applicants. However, this proved problematic, as it meant that “the government granted licences to applicants even though clear standards for frequency allocation and criteria for granting licences were not in place” (Sothearith 2011, p.14). In the print media in particular, this resulted in political parties taking the opportunity to establish their own newspapers which acted as propaganda machines (Sothearith 2011).

*Lack of diversity in media ownership*

A lack of diversity in media ownership is closely associated with the instrumentalisation of communications structures (Stetka 2010). The promotion of media diversity has long been a primary public policy objective, of western democratic governments (Schulze 2005, p.1). However, as Schulze (2005) notes, the question of how one can effectively measure it is difficult. This is due to there being little consensus on precisely what “media diversity” is and whether it simply means a “variety” of media or a genuinely pluralist media containing a number of different and independent voices, and differing political opinions and representations of culture (Doyle 2002, p.11). The US Federal Communication Commission lists the five types of diversity it considers the most important as diversity of viewpoints or perspectives, outlets (or that there are multiple, independently owned firms), programmes (that there is a variety of
programming formats and content), sources (that there is content from a variety of producers), and minority and female ownership diversity (Schulze 2005, p.2).

As is outlined in this chapter, all these are lacking in the Cambodian media environment. Media ownership has been noted to have a direct effect on what journalists write about. A Licadho (2008) survey finds that when journalists were asked if media owners influenced their reporting, 29% responded “sometimes” while 32% said “often” or “always”. One of the reasons for the lack of diversity in terms of media ownership in Cambodia is a lack of regulation of who is allowed to own or fund media outlets. While private media are not directly subsidised by the state, media that are pro CPP or close to the royalist FUNCINPEC party are provided financing or material support (Kea 2008, p.158).

Lack of independence of the judiciary
Legislation only functions when an effective judicial system exists to implement it. However, evidence suggests the independence and impartiality of the Cambodian judicial system is profoundly compromised, allowing political power to undermine or bypass legal considerations (RSF 2010, Licadho 2008). “Judges are unable to resist the pressure when the legal action comes straight from the government,” according to Um Sarin of the Cambodian Association for the Protection of Journalists (CAPJ) (RSF 2010, p.4) The politicisation of the judiciary has profound implications for the media. Laws in this kind of environment become a powerful weapon for those who want to fend off press revelations (RSF 2010, p.4, Licadho 2008). “Journalists of certain political stripes — those from pro-CPP newspapers — are usually free to defame, lie and propagandise in their pages with impunity. But those with a non-CPP political bent have regularly faced severe consequences for doing much the same.” (Licadho 2008, p.20).
A second element of a legal climate which is counter-productive for media diversity and freedom is flaws within the laws themselves. The use of existing and new legislation against journalists is noted in numerous reports on the freedom of the press in Cambodia throughout the period being examined. Freedom House (2011) describes continued use of new legislation to restrict space for free expression and the use of criminal charges to punish opposition media. Sisovann’s report in the 2003 Asian Handbook of Communications (p.30) outlines several incidents of this between 1997 and 2001. The rise in incidence from 2002 to 2004 can be seen in the table below.

Table 14. Incidences of lawsuits against journalists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Lawsuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are as follows: 1997: Newspaper suspended for 30 days for allegedly printing inflated numbers of casualties in factional fighting. Strongly pro-CPP newspaper accuses VOA of ‘twisting the truth’ and threatens Phnom Penh office will be destroyed. Minster of Information Khieu Kanharith threatens to expel a Canadian journalist for “unfair” year-end review. 1998: Government suspend six newspapers — Neak Tasou, Kolbot Angkor, Samleng Samaheap, Atarakum, Kumnit Koun Khmer, Prayuth — on same day, charging them with violating Press Law, printing defamatory remarks and printing false information that affects national security. 2001: Foreign Minister Hor Namhong sues three journalists at Cambodia Daily for $1m for articles alleging he had run a Khmer Rouge prison camp. Case later settled. 2002: Businessman Mong Rethy and two army generals sue Voice of Khmer Youth over printings of findings of report by Global Witness on illegal logging. Lawsuit is later dropped. 30 parliamentarians sue Moneakseker Khmer editor Dam Sith for misinformation, defamation. Trial later suspended. King Norodom Sihanouk asks Ministry of Information to act against Sangros Cheat newspaper after allegations of misuse of Royal finances. Newspaper later ‘pardoned’ and charges dropped.

51 These are as follows: 1997: Newspaper suspended for 30 days for allegedly printing inflated numbers of casualties in factional fighting. Strongly pro-CPP newspaper accuses VOA of ‘twisting the truth’ and threatens Phnom Penh office will be destroyed. Minster of Information Khieu Kanharith threatens to expel a Canadian journalist for “unfair” year-end review. 1998: Government suspend six newspapers — Neak Tasou, Kolbot Angkor, Samleng Samaheap, Atarakum, Kumnit Koun Khmer, Prayuth — on same day, charging them with violating Press Law, printing defamatory remarks and printing false information that affects national security. 2001: Foreign Minister Hor Namhong sues three journalists at Cambodia Daily for $1m for articles alleging he had run a Khmer Rouge prison camp. Case later settled. 2002: Businessman Mong Rethy and two army generals sue Voice of Khmer Youth over printings of findings of report by Global Witness on illegal logging. Lawsuit is later dropped. 30 parliamentarians sue Moneakseker Khmer editor Dam Sith for misinformation, defamation. Trial later suspended. King Norodom Sihanouk asks Ministry of Information to act against Sangros Cheat newspaper after allegations of misuse of Royal finances. Newspaper later ‘pardoned’ and charges dropped.

52 CCJ 2005 report
The press regularly voices its concerns about the avalanche of lawsuits, but are rarely listened to. The Cambodia Daily ran several editorials sounding the alarm while a headline in Cambodge Soir asked: “Can you still criticise the government?” (RSF 2010, p.5).

“The series of lawsuits [in the years previous to 2010] has placed further limitations on the ability of local journalists to name offenders in their coverage of corruption or deforestation,” Stephanie Gee, French news correspondent (Cited in RSF 2010). Overall, this phenomenon, which is particularly marked in the provinces, undermines the media’s ability to fulfil its role, according to RSF (2010).

Having established a rise in the numbers of cases taken by government officials against individual journalists or media organisations, problems with the laws themselves must also be examined. Some argue that laws enacted in the constitution were unrealistic in terms of their application in a Cambodian environment. “The UNTAC press law, reflected an idealism that…was at odds with the reality of a country at war with itself, a country lacking a professional corps of journalists, and a legal system to deal with libel cases” (Mehta 1997, p.218).

The evidence also suggests that laws were not strong and foolproof enough in themselves, even had they been applied in a fair and neutral way. At first glance, journalists’ rights and freedom of expression seem fairly well protected under Cambodian law. Article 41 of the Cambodian Constitution makes clear that freedom of expression is a right which applies to every citizen without distinction. The 1995 Press Law also appears to provide considerable protection to any journalist from going to prison for press offences. Articles 2 and 3 maintain the confidentiality of sources, as well as “prohibiting pre-publication
censorship‖, while Article 5 stipulates that the press “has rights of access to information in government held records”. Article 20 stipulates that “no person shall be arrested or subject to criminal charges as result of expression of opinion”.

However, the law also contain various provisions which can be used to regulate, or control, the press. For example, a report by Article 19 (2004) points out that various articles contain broad and vaguely-worded content restrictions with a clear potential for restricting expression. These include obligations on content and registration “which may subject the press to arbitrary denials of the right to publish or to equally arbitrary shutdowns (Article 19, 2004, p.2). A failure to clearly define such concepts as “national security,” “political stability,” “honour” and “dignity” means these articles can easily be used against journalists (RSF 2010, p.4). Article 12, which stipulates “that the press shall not publish or reproduce any information that may cause harm to the National Security and Political Stability”, has also been exercised to suspend the operation of numerous newspapers based on critical comments made in some articles relating to high government officials.

Specific content restrictions contained within the 1995 Press Law include Article 11, which prohibits publication of “anything that may affect public order by directly inciting one or more persons to commit violence”. This article also gives “victims” of such publications the right to bring civil suits with respect to the offending material. In addition to possible criminal penalties (not specified by this article), the “employer, editor or author” may be fined up to around €1000. Article 13 prohibits the publication or reproduction of “false information that humiliates or contempts [sic] national institutions”.

Laws such as these make it easy to prosecute the media, particularly where the
judiciary is politically compromised, while not achieving much in terms of enabling the media to function better. Laws on information access, for example, are easily circumvented by officialdom. For example, Article 5(A) recognises the “right of access to information in government held records”, subject to a number of exceptions, including where release of requested information would cause “harm” to national security. However, the form such “harm” might take remains vague. Article 19 (2004) recommended that a specific Freedom of Information law was required to make this stipulation truly meaningful. However, no such law was introduced in the period being examined (or has come much closer to existence at time of writing (2013). The lack of specific legislation means the media have to rely on the goodwill of officials when obtaining information. Government officials can easily refuse to give reporters information, or favour journalists from papers more politically amenable (Loo 2006). This leaves journalists vulnerable to political patronage.

As well as a press law that is not quite as strong or as rigorous as it needs to be, the press and media have come increasingly under attack by legal actions brought under a criminal code inherited from UNTAC, “which punishes defamation, disinformation and incitement (RSF 2010, p.4). Although Article 20 stipulates that no one can be arrested or imprisoned for expressing opinions, several other articles provide for heavy fines or jail sentences for poorly defined offences. Article 62, for example, warns against the publication of “wrong, fabricated or falsified” information or information liable to pose a threat to public order” while another allows that a person can be charged with incitement to commit a crime even if no crime was committed (RSF 2010, p.4).

Lack of revenue sources
Most observers concur that a viable and healthy locally funded media is important in terms of it reaching a greater number of people. However, local
sources of funding were limited between 1993 and 2011, as Kea (2008, p.158) points out: “The markets for private media are very small… and generally it is not a profitable business to run a newspaper in Cambodia.” This has the knock-on effect of leaving the media vulnerable to instrumentalisation. The temptation to accept funding from politically oriented sources, thus compromising their ability to remain neutral and impartial, is very high. For smaller publications patrons — and editorial lines — can and frequently do change. In 2000, for example, it cost as little as $400 a month to buy the loyalty of a newspaper which published several times a week (Licadho 2009).

Political affiliations also influence who gets the limited advertising revenue that is available. According to Loo (1996, p.3) 99% of local advertising revenue goes to just ten newspapers, all of whom were loyal to the ruling party to varying degrees. Opposition press, on the other hand, is often boycotted by advertisers, and those who do advertise in them are themselves targeted, as in the example of a traditional medicine retailer, which was subjected to a sudden tax control after placing ads in an opposition newspaper (RSF 2010, p.6).

A lack of funding within outlets leads to poorer pay for employees, which has other very important implications for journalists. According to Kea (2008, p.155) there is a large discrepancy between salaries of journalists working for local media (around $40-$100 per month) compared to those working in internationally funded media (between $200-$1000 per month). This feeds into exposing journalists — whose social and economic background already make them vulnerable — to bribes, blackmail, direct and indirect corruption (RSF 2010, p.5) as they seek ways to supplement their income. These include taking gifts, asking for “gas” or “coffee” money, or receiving direct payments to cover events (Kea 2008, p.155). This pattern of activity appears consistent throughout the period being covered (Sisovann 2003, p.30) and contributes to widespread
corruption throughout the media, which has had a severely detrimental effect on the overall credibility of the sector. In the print industry, for example, according to Licadho (2008, p.19) there are a host of titles which seem to exist mainly for the purpose of extortion. Examples include “Blocking papers”, where editors extort money from prominent figures or businessmen in order to not publish stories, while the “jun-bo” or “wishing paper” is where a publisher will publish an edition devoted to the birthday (promotion or marriage) of a senior politician and attribute the sponsored advertorial to a middle-ranking official or businessman, as a means of extorting money from the latter in the expectation that he will not want to lose face by denying his involvement (Licadho 2008, p.19).

The nature of corruption makes it hard to accurately quantify, but a survey of 141 journalists by Licadho (2008) found that 25% of respondents said they knew journalists who took bribes in exchange for favourable reporting, while 34%, said they knew a colleague who took bribes for not reporting stories. 35% of those surveyed didn’t want to answer the question suggesting the actual percentage is far higher. According to the survey, a third of journalists admitted accepting “expenses”, with 13% more refusing to say. It is not only politicians and businessmen who pay money in this way. Licadho (2008, p.22) notes that many NGOs also pay journalists to attend their events, a practice which encourages and reinforces the problem.

6.7 Overview of journalism training 1993-2011

The previous section gives a historical context for media and press development in Cambodia, as well as some of the political economic factors that contributed to its vulnerability to instrumentalisation. This section outlines another important element of the development of the press — the journalism training sector. A key element of the process attempted by UNTAC in Cambodia was to
encourage a media climate which would support and consolidate a genuinely liberal democratic government structure (UNTAC 1991). The press, and the journalism programmes that supply its practitioners, were seen as key to this process.

There is little or no history of journalism programmes in Cambodia before 1993. Those who worked in the print media, as it established itself from the 1960s on tended not to have specific journalism qualifications (Mehta 1997) and any fledgling infrastructure that might have been developing by the 1970s was obliterated during the Khmer Rouge years. Some efforts were made to train journalists during the Vietnamese occupation in the 1980s, but these were mostly on an individual basis. Such limited attempts to journalism education included basic skills training along with a general education, usually given by Vietnamese or Russian experts either in Cambodia or abroad.53

In the 1990s, following the Paris Peace Accords and the adoption of the new UNTAC influenced constitution, there was little or no Cambodian funding to support media development activities. Numerous foreign funders colonised the sector, reflecting a general global tendency in the aid industry to assist news media as a form of encouragement to democratic government (Clarke 2000, Hiang-Kheng Heng 2002). Due to the low capacity of journalists at the time, efforts usually involved short training courses focusing on basic journalistic skills. Concerns raised about this approach centred on the short-term nature of the courses, the lack of recognised qualifications, training lacking in depth and range, a lack of coordination between bodies carrying out training, and a lack of attention paid to the prior education, qualifications and aspirations of programme participants (Clarke 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, Loo 2006). However,

53 Several interviewees described this training during the 1980s during interviews carried out to gather data, described in Chapter 7. However these informants must remain anonymous, for reasons outlined in Chapter 5
the sector has become increasingly sophisticated in recent years, with an increasing emphasis on a broader education and specialisation.

Before going further, it is important to differentiate between key terms. “Journalism programme” is used here as an umbrella term for any programme which attempts to contribute toward the production of journalism, and encompasses both those which can be termed “journalism education” and those which can be called “journalism training”. Distinctions between the two approaches relate closely to the professionalisation debate (See Chapter 2), with “journalism education” characterised by an emphasis on theory, a more long-term approach and an institutional setting. “Training”, on the other hand is characterised by a more vocational orientation, an emphasis on practical skills, is short term and takes place in a variety of settings.

This study has identified 19 main organisations involved in carrying out and implementing training programmes within Cambodia to a reasonably sustained level between 1993 and 2011. These include eight primary 'on the ground' facilitators of journalism education and 11 prominent outside facilitators, some of whom were more involved in implementing projects and some of whom focused primarily on funding. Tables 1A and 1B breaks them down as follows. 1A. Programme facilitators, includes Cambodia-specific organisations that provided training within the country during the period. Other international organisations who did similarly — whether in partnership with groups within Cambodia or simply by sub-contracting them from outside — are termed 1B. International facilitators. The activities of some of the main organisations involved in journalism training programmes in the period being studied are outlined in more detail in Appendix H.
## 1A. Locally based programme facilitators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organisation</th>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian Communication Institute</td>
<td>Provider, short- and long-term courses, vocational emphasis, local and international trainers, sustained involvement, institutional setting[^54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal University of Phnom Penh</td>
<td>Provider, long-term courses, educational emphasis, sustained involvement, local and international trainers, institutional setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Journalists’ Association</td>
<td>Provider, short-term courses, vocational emphasis, primarily local trainers, in-house setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Training Centre</td>
<td>Facilitator, provider, short-term courses, vocational emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club of Cambodian Journalists</td>
<td>Provider, short-term courses, vocational emphasis, in-house setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cambodian Institute for Media Studies</td>
<td>Provider, short-term courses, specialised workshops, local trainers, in-house setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Council of Cambodia</td>
<td>Provider, facilitator, short-term courses, vocational emphasis, basic skills training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry for Information</td>
<td>Donor, facilitator, short-term courses, vocational emphasis, in-house setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian Centre for Independent Media</td>
<td>Provider, short-term courses, once off training, vocational emphasis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^54]: Meaning workshops were in a specially assigned building, for a period in the Ministry of Information and later in its own specialised premises.
### 1B. International funders, facilitators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organisation</th>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Funder and provider, sustained work in area, vocational and educational emphasis, short-term courses, sustained involvement, aimed at working journalists primarily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Konrad Adenauer Foundation</td>
<td>Funder and provider, educational emphasis, long-term courses, sustained involvement, foreign and local trainers, aimed at students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internews</td>
<td>Funder and provider, aimed at working journalists, vocational and specialised training, long-term courses, regular involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Journalism Foundation</td>
<td>Provider, vocational and specialised training, short-term courses, aimed at working journalists, regular involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indochina Media Memorial Foundation</td>
<td>Provider, specialised topics, short-term courses, aimed at working journalists, intermittent involvement, regional focus, foreign trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
<td>Funder and provider, short-term courses, vocational emphasis, aimed at working journalists, intermittent involvement, foreign trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
<td>Funder, short-term courses, intermittent involvement, vocational emphasis, aimed at working journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC World Service Trust</td>
<td>Funder and provider, short-term courses, intermittent, development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An overview of the field of journalism training demonstrates strongly how an early proliferation of journalism programmes focusing on basic skills development, as lead by the likes of UNESCO and TAF has given way in the 2000s to an emphasis on more specialised training, in particular ‘key’ topics, as highlighted by the approaches of the CCJ and MTC. There has also been a separate push, primarily through the activities of the KAF, toward a more “journalism education” as opposed to “vocational training” approach, meaning longer term courses in more institutional settings. The degree to which the education, training and specialised approaches to journalism programmes emphasised different normative ideals and the implications of this is further examined through analysis of data emanating from interviews with participants and key players in the field, which are outlined in Chapter 7.

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the interaction between political economic factors and the instrumentalisation of Cambodian media, and the nature of the type of training that Cambodian journalists experienced. It looked at how political

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Appendix H gives a more detailed breakdown of the times in which the various facilitators were most active.
economic factors related to the means by which the media was instrumentalised in overt ways, such as authorities exerting control through misuse of its position as media regulator, or in a more indirect fashion, for example a lack of advertising revenue leading to vulnerability to corruption. The political economy of the sector creates an important context within which the impact of other culturally-oriented factors (examined in Chapter 2) on the development of the press in Cambodia can be explored. While the factors outlined in this chapter relate to the media and press at a more organisational level, this study’s primary research questions pertains to press development on a more individual level. It is in this latter area that an understanding of the journalism programme sector is most crucial. The next chapter presents data gathered from interviews with programme participants and facilitators as a means of answering the question of how the intermingling of all of these factors, both cultural and political economic, manifests itself in terms of normative emphases at a training level and at a work practice level and what effect this ultimately has on journalism practice.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Presentation of data

7.1 Introduction
This study has collected data from 54 semi-structured interviews about normative ideals of journalism in Cambodia from 1993 to 2011 as conceptualised by journalism programmes facilitators and working journalists who participated in these programmes. Interviews have been chosen as a data-collection method due to their being a direct way of seeking information about a subject and as the best means of overcoming problems, outlined by Jallov (2005), associated with evaluating the influence of programmes, as detailed in Chapter 5. Chapter 7 presents the interview data in the form of tables detailing the frequency of particular responses to questions, along with an accompanying descriptive narrative containing examples of interview segments which gave rise to particular codes. A thematic analysis of the data, ordering the most significant codes in terms of the research question into overarching themes and subthemes, is carried out in Chapter 8. These are further distilled within Chapter 9 into discussion points which address the research questions.

Interviewees are divided into two primary categories. Category 1 includes trainers (T) and donors (DR) directly involved in funding and facilitating journalism programmes, along with several expert commentators (EC), chosen due to their particular expertise and knowledge of the sector. Trainers are sub-divided into those of Cambodian (TL= Local trainer) and non-Cambodian (TI= International trainer) nationality. Category 2 interviewees include working journalists who had previously participated in journalism programmes (J). These are sub-divided into those working for international media organisations (JI= Journalist working with international media organisations) and those who work for local organisations (JL=Journalist currently working with local media
organisation).

“International media organisations” (JI) here refers to organisations funded in part, or fully, via sources which come from outside Cambodia. These can be further sub-divided as follows. A. International news organisations who gather news in Cambodia for distribution to international audiences eg. Agent France Press (AFP), Reuters, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA). B. Publications that receive funding from outside Cambodia but are primarily aimed at a local market, albeit in a foreign language eg. Phnom Penh Post (English-language), Cambodia Daily (English-language), and the now-defunct Cambodge Soir (French-language). C. Internationally-funded outlets that provide local-language services. Example of these are primarily radio based and include the likes of Voice of America (VoA), Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Radio France International (RFI). “Local media organisations” refer to organisations which are entirely reliant on local revenue sources, and tend to be Khmer\textsuperscript{56} language and aimed at a Khmer market. Table 1 shows the full breakdown.

\textit{Table 1. Breakdown of interviewees}\textsuperscript{57}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JI\textsuperscript{58}</td>
<td>Journalism programme participant who works for an international media organisation\textsuperscript{59}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JL</td>
<td>Journalism programme participant who works for local media organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>Cambodian trainer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{56}Khmer refers to the local language in Cambodia as well as to the dominant ethnic grouping within Cambodia
\textsuperscript{57}Participants have been kept anonymous
\textsuperscript{58}Type of media (local or foreign) which interviewee is employed with is only listed according to their current, or most recent job
\textsuperscript{59}A breakdown of the numbers within each sub-category of International media organisations are given in Appendix H
The analysis of interview responses in this section is split into three primary sub-sections. Sub-section 7.2 looks at programme facilitators’ perceptions of key functions and needs of journalism. Sub-section 7.3 looks at normative conceptualisations of former programme participants who are now working journalists. Sub-section 7.4 focuses on the impact of journalism training and the practice of journalism, and the future prospects of the press in Cambodia.

The data outlined in sub-section 7.2 is from questions focusing on how journalistic conceptualisations were emphasised within programmes by those involved in their construction and implementation. Only responses from Category 1 interviewees were used here. Responses to questions in this sub-section were organised according to two main groupings. These include what Category 1 interviewees see as (7.2.1) emphases within training programmes and (7.2.2) the main Barriers to journalism practice in Cambodia.

The data broken down in subsection 7.3 is taken from Category 2 interviewees, working journalists who had previously taken part in journalism training programmes. Interviews here focused on (7.3.1) what they think are the key functions of journalism, (7.3.2) what they believe to be the most important journalistic skills and ethics and the degree to which these were applicable during work and (7.3.3) barriers to journalism practice and ethics in Cambodia.

Category 2 interviewees (Programme participants) were not asked about their
opinions on training programme emphases due to concerns which arose during the early part of the data-gathering process that their testimonies on this subject were skewed for a number of reasons. Firstly, a trend was observed among former programme participants to be over-positive about training generally. This tendency to be uncritical as a means of saving face is a particular feature of Asian society (Huang et al 2008) and is noted by several trainers and donors as making programme evaluations difficult\(^6\). Secondly, a desire to project themselves and their training levels positively lead to what I felt was a tendency by participants to recall current work practices and remembered training emphases as one and the same. Thirdly, memories of programmes emphases were felt to be unreliable given that the majority of participants took part in a wide variety of programmes, often several years before this study, thus making it difficult to separate training emphases from what they had learned on the job since then. Overall, I felt that focusing on normative ideals of current work practices alone would lead to a more unvarnished account of their current conceptualisations of journalism norms, which could then be compared to accounts from Category 1 interviewees. Discussing both current work practices and training programme emphases in the same interview, on the other hand, ran a significant risk of eliciting misinformation on both.

Responses from both Category 1 and Category 2 interviewees are taken into account in sub-section 7.4, which examines the effect of journalism programmes and the future viability of journalism in Cambodia. Interviews here focused on the effect of journalism and journalism training programmes and the future prospects for journalism in Cambodia.

Data is presented in the form of frequency tables outlining how often particular responses arose in interviews numerically and in percentage terms. For\(^6\)

\(^6\)Interviewees who participated in this study have been assured anonymity
example: TI; Inform; 5 (62%) is broken down as follows: TI refers to “international trainer”. Inform refers to an emphasis on the “inform” function. “5” denotes the number of times this response was recorded among the “International trainer” category of interviewee. “(62%)” refers to the percentage of that category of interviewee overall who gave this response. Tables are accompanied with descriptive narratives. Within the narrative, frequencies of particular responses are further referenced in the following style: eg. “JIx2” means “two incidences of this occurred in the category of “Journalist working with international media organisation”. “Jx10” means “ten incidences of this occurred in the category of ‘journalists overall’”. Frequency tables offer a useful foundation from which to pick out dominant tendencies or patterns in the data. These form the basis for the themes, as described in Chapter 5, which are used in the thematic analysis.

7.2 Programme facilitators’ perceptions of journalism functions, needs
Responses in this section relate to what a total of 25 Category 1 interviewees, including trainers, donors and observers see as the main functions and needs in terms of skills and ethics of journalism and how these were emphasised within the programmes. Responses were given to questions asked via semi-structured interviews sample questions include: Describe your curriculum? What topics are covered? In what way is your curriculum adapted to specific local realities in Cambodia? What role should be played by journalists in Cambodia? What are the most important values journalists should have and where do they come from? How are these different to values and roles that journalists in other countries have (if at all)? What are the biggest challenges faced by Cambodian journalists? How does this course help overcome these
### 7.2A Emphases within training programmes

**Table 2. Function of journalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TI</th>
<th>TL</th>
<th>DR</th>
<th>EC</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inform</td>
<td>5 (62%)</td>
<td>5 (62%)</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
<td>16 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve democracy</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>5 (83%)</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
<td>14 (56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>9 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect change (general)</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>5 (62%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve Society</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve human rights</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve the government</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exert political influence</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage free market</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (16%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage development</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question authority</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (16%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve popular participation</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (16%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (12%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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61 Overall number of interviewees in this category
62 Percentage of Category 2 interviewees overall
Table 2 focuses on what programme facilitators (Category 1 interviewees) see as the primary functions of journalism. The ‘inform’ function, meaning that the function of the press is to give information to the people, is referenced by the majority (60%) of this category of interviewee. As TL7 puts it: “The idea of writing a story is to inform the public.” This function is regarded as important so that people can make better choices based on the correct information, or as TI2 notes: “[Journalists] give information to people so people can make their value judgement.”

The second most important function (56% of interviewees) of journalism emphasised here is to ‘improve democracy’. TL5 puts it: “[The press] has to bring society to a point where the democracy level will change.” A ‘watchdog’ or monitorial role — whereby the press promotes government transparency and accountability via public scrutiny of decision-makers — is referenced by 36% of interviewees. TL4 notes: “Journalism monitors the work and policy of the government...If [policy] it has not been implemented well, the press works for the interests of the public to expose the problem.” According to 32% of interviewees, the primary function of journalism is to ‘affect change’. DR2 says: “We wanted to empower them.... [show them] that the use of the pen, writing skills were very important if you wanted to bring about change.” Change is perceived specifically in terms of ‘improving society’ (32%), ‘improve the government’(28%) and ‘improve human rights’ (32%). Among 20% of interviewees, a key function of the press is to ‘exert a political influence’, or even, in some cases as a means to enter politics. TL5: “Before you jump into politics, you (do) journalism first.” 20% conceptualise journalism purely in business terms (‘Encourage the free market’). According to TL6, “you
are selling your news, like you sell your goods.” ‘Helping development’ is highlighted by 20% of interviewees, with DR1 describing journalism’s “huge role” in this regard. “We utilise journalists to help achieve these [development] goals.”

The ‘bridge’ function of the press — meaning the press facilitates dialogue between the governing and the governed — is referenced by 16% of interviewees. Other functions of the press highlighted in the data include to ‘question authority’ (12%), ‘improve popular participation’ (which relates to the improvement of democracy) (12%), and to ‘advocate’ for worthy causes (8%). Other functions of the press mentioned by respondents — but only once, suggesting they are not relevant to overall trends — include ‘serving the government’, ‘increasing happiness’, ‘finding a centre ground between political extremes’, ‘being a mirror to society’ and ‘educating the populace’.

Table 3. Key skills emphasised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TI (8)</th>
<th>TL (8)</th>
<th>DR (6)</th>
<th>EC (3)</th>
<th>Total (25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical skills</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
<td>7 (88%)</td>
<td>5 (83%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>21 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western journalism skills/curriculum</td>
<td>6 (75%)</td>
<td>5 (63%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>14 (56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics training</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>4 (66%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>13 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>5 (63%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>11 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the job training</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>10 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General knowledge</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialised skills/knowledge</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical skills (technology oriented)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News values</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial/economic knowledge</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative reporting</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal knowledge</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table outlines what Category 1 interviewees believe are the most important skills emphasised in training. 72% mention ‘practical’ or basic journalism skills (for example taking interview notes, or the 5Ws+H, or the “why, where, when, who and how” of a story) as being important. This emphasis on basic skills appears to be indicative of a widespread belief among this category of interviewees in a vocational approach to training. For example, 40% say students learn most about journalism “on-the-job” rather than in actual training. 56% say ‘western journalism skills/curricula’ were the best source of information of journalism programmes in Cambodia. TL1 is typical in this regard, describing journalism skills as "completely western" in origin. 52% of those interviewed say ‘journalism ethics’ was emphasised in training programmes. 64% say ‘English language skills’ are vital, while 32% say ‘general knowledge’, or a broad educational base was an important requirement for student journalists.

28% of interviewees emphasise that specialised training in particular areas was

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63 A more detailed outlining of this is given in Table 5.
needed for journalists to be more effective, with training in ‘economic, or financial reporting’ (16%), ‘media law’ (8%) and investigative reporting (16%) seen as particularly important. 20% of interviewees highlighted the development of ‘news values’ as important.

Table 4. Skills specific to Cambodian journalists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill</th>
<th>TI (8)</th>
<th>TL (8)</th>
<th>DR (6)</th>
<th>EC (3)</th>
<th>Total (25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowing journalistic ‘limits’</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
<td>11 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to ask questions in particular way</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No special skills needed</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses here detail what Category 1 interviewees feel are specific skills needed by Cambodian journalists. According to 44% of interviewees, the most important special skill required is an ability to ‘know the limits of journalism’, meaning that journalists must be aware of certain “out-of-bounds” topics that exist in Cambodia. TI6 states: “People need to realise that [Cambodian journalists] are living in a communist police state, with superficial freedoms. I tried to organise a curriculum that reflected that reality.”

‘Flexibility’, meaning journalists, must be more adaptable and subtle to work in what is a particularly difficult environment is mentioned as a particularly important skill in Cambodia by 20% of interviewees. TI11 puts it: “It’s about being able to weave in between what’s expected of them. Being polite, but also
being persistent.” A further 20% see the ‘ability to ask questions in a particular way’ as being specific to Cambodian journalists. TI2 is one of 20% of interviewees who that ‘no special skills’ are needed by Cambodian journalists. “I don’t think they need any different skills…the principle are still the principles.”

Table 5. Key ethical values emphasised in training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TI</th>
<th>TL</th>
<th>DR</th>
<th>EC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truthfulness, accuracy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(63%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(75%)</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality/objectivity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(38%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13%)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom from corruption</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table outlines interviewees’ perceptions of key ethical values. ‘Truthfulness’ and ‘balance’ are the most referenced (48% each). Truthfulness is typically described by respondents as simply accurately representing the facts. TI5 puts it: “The first thing we have to do is to make sure what we write is true.” Balance, meanwhile, means that competing interpretations of facts are presented equally. According to TL5, journalism training had a significant impact in this regard. “[Prior to training], Cambodian journalists were just writing about their own thinking. But after the training, people learned [to put both sides].” To be neutral, or ‘objective’ in reporting, to be ‘independent’ and to be ‘free from corruption’ are the other most prominent ethical values which

65Differences between neutrality and objectivity are outlined in more detail in Chapter 9
are mentioned here. The significance of these values and the nature of possible variations within them are further discussed in Chapter 8.

Table 6. Source of ethics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Ethics</th>
<th>TI (8)</th>
<th>TL (8)</th>
<th>DR (6)</th>
<th>EC (3)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning from the west</td>
<td>1 (12%)</td>
<td>5 (63%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (12%)</td>
<td>9 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (12%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleagues/ Work</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (12%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (12%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (12%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readers’ demands</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (12%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 outlines responses from programme facilitators about what they believe is a primary source of journalism ethics. According to 36% of interviewees, they are learned primarily by learning from western standards. A spike in this regard (63%) is seen among local trainers. ‘Society’, meaning ethics are leaned from the surrounding social environment, including family and friends, is the second most popular response (28%). 12% say ‘colleagues’, or ones work environment as most important while ‘training’, ‘law’ (meaning the presence or absence of suitable laws encourage journalists to be ethical) and the demands of readers feature once each.
7.2B Barriers to journalism practice

This sub-section examines responses by Category 1 interviewees' to questions about what the primary obstacles to journalism and good ethical practice are.

Table 7. Barriers to practice of journalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>TI</th>
<th>TL</th>
<th>DR</th>
<th>EC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of freedom of speech</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access information/official cooperation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best people leave journalism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor perception/low respect for profession</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative managers/editors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western practice doesn’t function in Cambodian context</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial climate/legal structure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of opportunity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training/low education level</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-censorship</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low readership/lack of revenue</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer character</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table examines what interviewees regard as the main obstacles to practising journalism in Cambodia. The largest number (72%) cite the ‘lack of freedom of speech’ as the biggest obstacle, locating this within a general reporting environment which they say is tightly controlled by the government. A difficulty in accessing information, accentuated by a lack of cooperation from officialdom is referenced by 44% of interviewees as a problem. A lack of quality people in journalism is mentioned by 44% (including a proportionately higher number of local trainers (75%)) as an obstacle to the profession. This encompasses a tendency for good people to leave journalism due to poor conditions, or a tendency to not go into journalism in the first place. Such tendencies are strongly connected to a generally ‘poor perception of the profession’, which is referenced by 44% of respondents. According to DR2, “the reputation of journalists is bad. They are perceived as corrupt or dangerous.”
40% of interviewees say ‘conservative management/editorial staff’ is a primary obstacle to journalism in Cambodia. According to TL7, “we need the editors to be involved in promoting the standards of Cambodian journalists.” A sense that western journalism practices, as emphasised in journalism programmes, simply do not function in a Cambodian environment, is referenced by 40% of interviewees. A similar number, 40% of interviewees, also cite the ‘judicial climate’ as problematic. While laws exists on paper, its application and the lack of independence of the judiciary from government interference, puts journalists under threat. As TI2 puts it, the laws are fine, “but the implementation of the law is rubbish”. A ‘lack of opportunity’ for graduates to work in quality news outlets is cited by 40% of interviewees as a major reason for their inability to practice good journalism. TL3 describes: “Some were good in the class but never got the opportunity afterward.” 36% cite a ‘lack of training’ and education as an obstacle to effective journalism practice.

‘Self-censorship’, meaning a tendency among journalists to internalise censorship or impose it implicitly on colleagues, is mentioned by 36% of interviewees as an obstacle to the practice of journalism, with numerous ‘out-of-bounds’ subjects such as the king, high-level corruption and certain areas of politics. High levels of self-censorship may be added to by what 20% describe as the fear of violent reprisal. This, TI8 explains, need only be through an implied threat. “The older ones remember when [journalists] just disappeared.”

32% of interviewees say ‘low newspaper readership’ translates into low revenue and operating budgets for press organisations. Another barrier to journalism, according to 24% of interviewees, is a perception that the Khmer character is unsuited to journalism. DR2, for example, compares Khmer student journalists negatively with others in the region. “I don’t think they are as motivated as the

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66 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6
Burmese frankly, they haven’t got the energy, and they are not readers.” Related to this, and referenced as a factor by 16% of interviewees, is a lack of confidence among Cambodian trainees. This lack of confidence may have implications in terms of the ability to progress for those working in international media organisations, with 8% describing a ‘glass ceiling’ for Khmer reporters at such organisations. The trauma of recent Cambodian history has also had an effect on journalists and their ability to do effective work, according to 12% of interviewees, while ‘xenophobia’ (8%) is also mentioned as a factor which reduces Cambodian journalists’ effectiveness. A proliferation of journalist representative organisations, often at odds with each other, is highlighted by 16% of interviewees as a factor that sets the practice of journalism back.

Table 8. Obstacles to good ethical practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>TI (8)</th>
<th>TL (8)</th>
<th>DR (6)</th>
<th>EC (3)</th>
<th>Total (25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor work environment</td>
<td>5 (63%)</td>
<td>5 (63%)</td>
<td>5 (83%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>15 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low pay</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>11 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture of bribery/corruption</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of ability to analyse ethically</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
<td>7 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western ethics fail in Cambodia</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor management ethics</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of code of conduct/ regulation</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (12%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 examines what interviewees see as an obstacle to ethical journalistic
practice specifically. 60% mention ‘poor work environments’ with generally poor conditions as a primary reason for poor ethical practice among Cambodian journalists. 32% — proportionately higher (54%) among international trainers — feel a ‘culture of corruption’ in society generally was an obstacle to ethical practice. As TI8 puts it: “If you are just talking about survival then you don’t really talk about ethics.” Even where knowledge of ethical behaviour exists, 28% of interviewees say its implementation is poor in part due to an inability to critically analyse an ethical scenario.

44% of interviewees say low pay is a key obstacle, which is connected to an ability to focus on the job, but also to vulnerability to taking bribes. According to 24% of interviewees, ethical systems taught in journalism programmes in Cambodia emanate from western-based systems which are not applicable in Cambodia. TI6 describes a lack of recognition about the need to be flexible among many trainers: “Too many trainers have a missionary zeal about the way they train which is not helpful. You must be sensitive to local environment and cultural realities”. Management and editors who have poor ethical standards themselves have a negative effect on more junior journalists, according to 20% of interviewees, while 12% argue that a lack of an official code of ethics or regulation body for ethics has a negative impact.

Table 9: Problems with programme implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>TI (8)</th>
<th>TL (8)</th>
<th>DR (6)</th>
<th>EC (3)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignore cultural setting</td>
<td>6 (75%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
<td>13 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many programme topics lack relevance</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (48%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9 presents interviewee’s responses to questions about the biggest problems with journalism programme implementation in Cambodia. 52% of interviewees feel journalism programmes should be better adapted to local settings. A key part of this process, according to TL4, was using more local trainers: “I would prefer the local trainer, because they know better about the situation here.” According to 48% of interviewees, journalism programmes in Cambodia are overly focused on less important topics — basic journalism skills for example — when more specialised training on subjects like financial reporting and IT skills are needed. A number of interviewees (36%) claim that too much journalism training focused on ‘advocacy’, due to donor funding requirements being prioritised over actual needs on the ground.

18% said a ‘lack of evaluation’ was problematic. DR1 admits: “We have been having workshops after workshops but we haven’t really been following up to what the journalists have been able to accomplish after the journalists have gone back to their work.” A major reason for this lack of evaluation relates to what 20% of interviewees pin-point as a lack of sufficient resources. According to DR6: “[evaluation] is something that just falls into the ‘too hard’ basket. Because it takes a hell of a lot of resources.” A number of Category 1
interviewees (20%) also refer to the difficulty in reaching the older generation, who retain control in the local press in particular. TI1 says: “The younger they are, the smarter they are. There are new generations in Cambodia every five years now.”

7.3 Normative conceptualisations of working journalists

Tables in this sub-section relate to what 29 Category 2 interviewees, journalists working at local and international media see as the main functions, skills and ethics of journalism. Responses here are to questions including: Why did you want to become a journalist? What are the most important roles of a journalist? What are the main values a good journalist should have? What is the most important skill for a Cambodian journalist to have and what skills are specific to Cambodia? What are conditions like as a journalist? What are the biggest problems that face Cambodian journalists in doing their job? What kind of training should be given to Cambodian journalists in the future?

7.3A Key functions of journalism

Table 10. Normative beliefs of working journalists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>JI (11)</th>
<th>JL (18)</th>
<th>(29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inform</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>16 (89%)</td>
<td>24 (82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect change</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>13 (72%)</td>
<td>21 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve democracy</td>
<td>9 (82%)</td>
<td>9 (50%)</td>
<td>18 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>7 (39%)</td>
<td>11 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>7 (39%)</td>
<td>10 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>7 (39%)</td>
<td>9 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve human rights</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>7 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack government</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>5 (28%)</td>
<td>7 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve society</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help development/promote Asian values</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>4 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exert political influence</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>4 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for worthy causes</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage free market</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table breaks down journalists’ opinions on the primary functions of the press. ‘Inform’ is seen as dominant by 82% of interviewees. This is described in various ways, such as giving people information so that “they know what is going on” (JI1), which in turn helps them to make informed decisions about their governance. As JI11 puts it: “They need to know what their country looks like”. According to 72% of interviewees, the main function of journalism as to ‘affect change’. JL2 notes: “I can change my country by becoming a journalist in a way that I cannot by being a teacher”. This idea of affecting change varies from improving society as a whole to changing individual laws, for example on forced marriages (JI6).

Linking journalism to the encouragement of democracy is referenced by 62% of interviewees, in particular among the international and opposition press (82%). As JL5 puts it: “The journalist and those who want democracy must work
together.” 37% conceptualise journalism in terms of a ‘bridge’, with the press a conduit between the Government and the people, or as JL3 says: “to help communicate to the government what is happening.” A number of interviewees (34%) describe what can be identified as a ‘watchdog’ conceptualisation of the press. JL11 describes: “The journalist…if they are doing the job well, are a check and balance. This is the gate. To protect. To be a safety”.

Journalism as something which ‘educates’ the people is referenced by 31% of interviewees, the majority among local journalists (39%). JI10 describes: “We would try to explain to the audience… to make them understand why it is important.” ‘Improving human rights’ is mentioned by 24% of interviewees, while the same number (24%) see their function specifically in terms of attacking the government. This is particularly apparent among the opposition-supporting local press. According to JL9 and JL13 it is the job of the opposition press to attack the government in the same way that the opposition are attacked by pro-government mouthpieces. Others (17%) describe a chief aim of journalism as improving society. JI5 recalls: “I saw how many senior government officials spend their time [in nightclubs], spending a lot of money with young girls. There are poor people who are starving.” Improving awareness of human rights is seen by JI5 as key in this regard. “If you don’t have a sense in your mind when you see people who are having their lives destroyed by the authorities — you will see these things happen and think: ‘I don’t care. It is not my problem’.”

13% of interviewees overall (22% within the local press) believe helping development is the most important function of the press. Playing a directly political role is seen by some (13%) as being an important function. JI5 equates journalists and politicians directly. “In the future journalists have to know, not only how to write articles, they have to be themselves like a doctor… cure the
problem.” Advocating for particular points of view is explicitly referenced by 6% of interviewees. Two respondents conceptualise journalism primarily as being about promoting market development and consolidation, or as JL18 puts it “a good secure, stable, business environment.”

7.3B Key journalism skills, requirements
This section examines Category 2 interviewees' opinions on key journalism skills in a general sense, as well as those specifically needed to practice as a journalist in Cambodia.

Table 11. Key skills needed for journalists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JI (11)</th>
<th>JL (18)</th>
<th>(29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical skills</td>
<td>10 (91%)</td>
<td>14 (78%)</td>
<td>24 (82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the job/ practice training</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>15 (83%)</td>
<td>22 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western skills/ curriculum</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>8 (44%)</td>
<td>16 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language skills</td>
<td>6 (55%)</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>9 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal knowledge</td>
<td>5 (45%)</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>8 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good general knowledge/ education level</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialised knowledge/ skills</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics training</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passion/ commitment/ courage</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table examines interviewees’ perception of the most important skills needed for journalism. The majority (82%) believe basic, practical journalism skills are most important. JL2 emphasises “practice and practical work, assignments and having to go in the field”, while for JL3 the most important skill is being taught “how to do interviews, the techniques of writing… choosing angles and [story] topics.” On-the-job training and practical experience are regarded as the most valuable training by 75% of interviewees. 51% of those interviewed identified key skills needed as being ‘western’, or that Cambodian journalists could improve simply by observance of international media. JI3 describes journalism as a “purely a western concept”, while JL4 argues that skills and codes of conduct for Cambodian journalist should be “based on international ones”.

‘English language skills’ are regarded by 31% as a key skill, predominantly, among international journalists (55%). As JI3 puts it, being able to write and speak English well “opened doors”. 26% of interviewees say ‘legal knowledge’ is a particularly useful skill, due to the need for journalists to protect themselves against a system which is skewed against them. JL8 puts it: “When we do everything correctly it is difficult for the government to do lawsuits
against us.” 21% of interviewees cite ‘good general knowledge’ and education level as important. According to JI10, when training first began in Cambodia, the level of general knowledge among students was particularly poor: “I did not even know where Tel Aviv was”. According to 21% of those interviewed, ‘specialised knowledge’ and skills are key for journalists, with technology and ‘investigative reporting’ mentioned specifically by 14% of interviewees each. 10% of informants place particular significance on specialised skills in financial or ‘economic knowledge’. JL7 describes how many Cambodian journalists “barely know the meaning of stock”. Having a strong code of ethics is mentioned by 17% of interviewees, with several signposting a current lack in this regard. As JI11 puts it: “Khmer journalists just work for their lives, not for journalism. They go and get money whatever way they can.” Several interviewees speak of requirements to be a successful journalist in terms of personal characteristics. 17% mention passion or commitment or courage, while 10% mention creativity, imagination and curiosity as critical.

Table 12. Skills specific to Cambodian journalists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>JI</th>
<th>JL</th>
<th>(29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the limits of profession</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>(59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to question in a particular way</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 shows responses to questions about journalism skills which are specific to Cambodia. ‘Knowing the limits’ of what can and cannot be reported upon is highlighted by the highest number of interviewees (59%). Understanding these limits and being careful to work within them is vital, they
say. JI4 puts it: “Your theories give you a limit, a way to work as a journalist, but you cannot apply 100%”. 10% of respondents highlight being able to ask questions in a particular way as key. As JI8 puts it; “you have to be good at convincing them to talk to you”. 10% of interviewees say that a particular kind of flexibility or resourcefulness is needed. According to JI8, this means sometimes having to compromise. “I never took a bribe. Compromise? I’m not so sure.”

**Table 13. Key influence on work practice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JI (11)</th>
<th>JL (18)</th>
<th>(29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colleagues (in general)</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>9 (50%)</td>
<td>17 (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observing international outlets</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>5 (28%)</td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where you work</td>
<td>6 (55%)</td>
<td>7 (39%)</td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western colleagues specifically</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>12 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (28%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of who interviewees felt were the primary influences on work practice, 59% said ‘colleagues’. There is a strong sense among Khmer journalists (45%), in particular among those working in international media (73%), that they can improve their practice level by watching how international outlets work. According to JL2, “Cambodian journalists improve because they watch CNN and Reuters.” Related to this, among journalists working with international media, western colleagues were singled out as being a key influence (73%).

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67 The type of limits which are set in this regard are discussed further under Table 16 Barriers to journalism: Self censorship
45% say the quality of the outlet in which they work is a key influence. This encompasses the quality of colleagues, particularly management and editors.\textsuperscript{68} Five interviewees in total (17%), all of them working in the local press (who experienced the least journalism training) believe training is a key influence on work practice.

\textit{Table 14. Most important ethics}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JI (11)</th>
<th>JL (18)</th>
<th>(29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>13 (72%)</td>
<td>20 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truthfulness, accuracy</td>
<td>6 (55%)</td>
<td>10 (56%)</td>
<td>16 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free from corruption</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>5 (28%)</td>
<td>8 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respecting/defending sources</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respecting the law</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the data in the table above, ‘balance’ rates highest among Category 2 interviewees (69%). According to JI10, a measured approach is vital. “You can criticise but be balanced, and you survive to write more stories like this.” ‘Accuracy’ and truthfulness is referenced by 55% of interviewees, described by JI8 as “bringing the real message to the people”. In a press environment in which many interviewees regarded as corrupt, to be ethical was

\textsuperscript{68} The effect of the work environment on practice is broken down in more detail in Table 16. Barriers to journalism practice
conceptualised by 28% of interviewees in terms of being ‘free from corruption’. For example, JI4 describes the most difficult ethical task facing journalists as “that he must not be corrupted by the sources”. Being ‘independent’ is highlighted by 17% of respondents. JL8 describes: “The listeners like that we give the information professionally and independent”. ‘Respecting and defending sources’ (17%), ‘neutrality and objectivity’ (14%) and ‘respecting the law’(14%) are also referenced.

Table 15. Primary source of ethics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>JI (11)</th>
<th>JL (18)</th>
<th>(29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work colleagues</td>
<td>6 (55%)</td>
<td>6 (33%)</td>
<td>12 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training/general education</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>7 (39%)</td>
<td>11 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>6 (33%)</td>
<td>9 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western knowledge</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>5 (28%)</td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data here details interviewees’ sense of the most important influences on ethical practice. ‘Work colleagues’ are seen by 41% of interviewees as the most important source of good ethical practice in Cambodia. In contrast to its perceived influence on work practice, ‘training’ is seen by 38% of interviewees as being an important source of good ethical behaviour. Training in ethics can show you clearly how it benefits you in the long term, according to JI5. “If a big company sees that you are good and not corrupt you can do better in the long run.” ‘Society’, including friends, family and other cultural influence, is seen by 31% of interviewees as the most important source of ethics. According to JI4, for example, poor ethics among journalists simply reflects poor ethics
across society. 27% see ‘western knowledge’ as the exclusive source for journalistic ethical standards.

7.3C Barriers to practice of journalism in Cambodia

The following section outlines Category 2 interviewees’ perception of key obstacles or barriers to journalism practice, in terms of practical realities and ethical practice.

Table 16. Barriers to journalism practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>JI (11)</th>
<th>JL (18)</th>
<th>(29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low pay</td>
<td>8 (72%)</td>
<td>16 (89%)</td>
<td>24 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor access to information</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>17 (94%)</td>
<td>21 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-censorship/ Out of bounds issues</td>
<td>9 (82%)</td>
<td>11 (61%)</td>
<td>20 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of attack/ punishment/ violence</td>
<td>6 (55%)</td>
<td>12 (67%)</td>
<td>18 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of freedom of expression</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>10 (56%)</td>
<td>17 (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western practices incompatible with Cambodian reality</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>10 (56%)</td>
<td>17 (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough training, ineffective training</td>
<td>5 (45%)</td>
<td>11 (61%)</td>
<td>16 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty of working in local media</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>12 (67%)</td>
<td>16 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of quality press outlets to work in</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>8 (44%)</td>
<td>15 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor legal environment</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>10 (56%)</td>
<td>14 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor perception, low respect for occupation</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>9 (50%)</td>
<td>12 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor quality management/ editors</td>
<td>6 (55%)</td>
<td>6 (33%)</td>
<td>12 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of readership, audience, resources</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>6 (33%)</td>
<td>9 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best people leave journalism</td>
<td>5 (45%)</td>
<td>3 (16%)</td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial glass ceiling for Khmer reporters</td>
<td>6 (55%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of confidence</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysfunctional Journalists’ organisations</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data outlined above describes what interviewees see as the main barriers to effective journalism practice. ‘Poor pay’ is seen a major factor for bad journalism practice by 83% of interviewees. This low pay leads to poor quality journalism, which relates to ethical journalism or the lack thereof. The second most commonly perceived obstacle (72%) to journalism is the difficulty in accessing information. JL3 notes: “When you want to do a story or get an interview [officials] keep saying: ‘I am busy’.” This is added to by the lack of a Freedom of Information law. “If the official does not give it in other countries you can complain and they have an obligation. Here it is different” (JL1). Laws governing access to information is one element of what 48% of interviewees say is a poor legal environment in which to be a journalist. Self-censorship is cited by 69% of interviewees as a significant barrier to journalism practice. Journalists themselves avoid taking on particular issues. According to JL7, it is hard to risk offending anyone, management or officials when there is little or no
The fear of punishment or reprisals has a major negative impact on the practice of journalism, according to 62% of interviewees. This has an impact particularly on younger journalists and sources. “The people who know about the corruption or who are the victims, they often do not want to cooperate because they are fearful” (JL12). According to 58%, the journalism practice is hampered by the fact that that the environment in which they work is not a truly free one. JL1 says: “If you work in an environment where you have no freedom, how can you perform your role as a watchdog or educator?” 58% of interviewees point out that journalism practice as they understood it lacked connection with the environment in which it had to be applied. JL4 puts it: “If you train Cambodian journalists it should be based on Cambodian culture.

One barrier to effective journalism remains a lack of training, or relevant training, according to 55% of interviewees. JI1 recalls: “I went to [a course in) Sweden. It was about journalism and democracy. I don’t think I learned anything about journalism. We only did one article.” 55% of interviewees mention major differences between working at a local or an international newspaper. JI8 recalls starting work with an international newspaper: “[The editor] took me and he gave me interesting work. To make calls. Not just doing propaganda stories about officials opening this or that.” A lack of quality press outlets to work in means fewer opportunities for young graduates, according to 51% of interviewees. JI8 says good journalists with good ethical values are forced into working in poor quality outlets, which affects them negatively. JI1 concurs: “I did not get any knowledge from working at [that] station. I still did not fully understand what a journalist is.”

69 Referring to notoriously pro-Government television station
41% of interviewees cite a lack of respect, or a poor perception, of journalism as being a significant barrier to it as a practice, in particular those who work with local media (50%). This connects to what eight interviewees mention as the poor standard of person attracted to journalism and the tendency of good people to leave the profession. As JL1 puts it, “the students who graduate from [well known journalism college course] are capable, but most of them do not work as journalists. The brains flow out, but not into journalism.” This relates to ‘high levels of stress’, which are reported as a barrier by 14% of respondents. Poor standards among owners, managers and editors are regarded by many 41% of interviewees as being a barrier to journalism. In local media organisations in particular, journalists “have to follow the boss, not follow the training” (JL5).

Economic difficulties also impact on the quality of journalism in Cambodia, according to 31% of interviewees, with low readership levels\(^{70}\) contributing to a lack of revenue, which in turn leads to less expenditure on journalism. JI3 argues that this stymies the development of quality staff and good conditions. “The market lacks incentive to encourage people to work as journalists here.” A significant issue among international press journalists (21%) is a perceived lack of opportunity at the top levels of their organisations for Khmer journalists and a lack of trust in them. “[In the end] It was like we were working under barang\(^{71}\)....when we fight with them we do not win” (JI1). A ‘lack of confidence’ and belief in Cambodian journalist's own skill levels is pinpointed by five interviewees as a barrier to journalism. According to JI3, this was due in part to the lack of Cambodian peers to looks up to. “We were the first generation of real journalists in Cambodia. We were on our own.” 10% of interviewees believe that a lack of coordination among journalist representation organisations have hindered the profession.

\(^{70}\) See Chapter 6, Part ?
\(^{71}\) Khmer slang for ‘foreigner’
Table 17. Barriers to ethical practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JI (11)</th>
<th>JL (18)</th>
<th>(29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low pay</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>16 (89%)</td>
<td>24 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western ethics fail in Cambodian context</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>10 (55%)</td>
<td>17 (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture of corruption</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>12 (67%)</td>
<td>16 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work environment</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>7 (39%)</td>
<td>14 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor management ethics</td>
<td>5 (45%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>9 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of knowledge/ training</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of ability for ethical analysis</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data here describes what informants say are the barriers to good ethical practice. Low pay is linked by 83% of interviewees to poor ethical practice, due to it increasing vulnerability to bribery (highlighted by almost every respondent as the single biggest ethical malpractice in Cambodia). JI1 recalls: “Sometimes I would run away from the gift. But sometimes when they handed it to me I would take it. Because it is money — I need to have money to live.”

Ethics, as taught to Cambodian journalists, are thought by 59% of interviewees to be overly western in origin in such a way that does not work in a Cambodian context. This is tied to what 48% describe as a difficult work environment in which to practice journalism ethically.

JL2 describes, for example, that it was very difficult to get balance in a story, when officials refuse to talk. “The problem is not on the journalists side because...
they try to call them to get the balance.”

Poor ethical practice is linked by 55% of interviewees, the majority (67%) among local journalists, to a wider societal acceptance of, or resignation toward, corruption. As JL8 puts it: “Corruption is the system”. Poor ethical practice among management was found by 31% of interviewees to have a negative effect on the quality of journalism practised. Several interviewees describe how they are repeatedly asked to do things which are troubling in ethical terms by managers. A lack of depth and specialisation of training is connected in particular to ethics, according to 14% of respondents, while 14% (36% among JI) argue that training, even when available, lacks enough depth to make it useful.

7.4 Impact of training; future prospects for journalism

Responses in this section relate to what all 54 interviewees in both categories of interviewee — including programme facilitators and working journalists who participated in programmes — believe is the effect of journalism, and journalism training in Cambodia and the prospects for the press in the future. Questions include: What challenges lie ahead for journalism programmes? Has training had an effect on press practice? Do Cambodian journalists do a good job overall? Has journalism affected change in Cambodia and in what way? What kind of training should be given to Cambodian journalists in the future?
Table 18: Effect of training on current press practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>J (29)</th>
<th>T/D/EC (25)</th>
<th>(54)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard of press improved</td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
<td>7 (28%)</td>
<td>20 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard improving slowly</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
<td>11 (44%)</td>
<td>16 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists’ education level better</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>7 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No improvement</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>3 (12%)</td>
<td>6 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical practices improved</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (12%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No impact on local press standards</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18 examines responses from interviewees on the effect journalism training has had on journalism practice. 39% of interviewees believe press standards have improved as a result of journalism training programmes, although this is qualified by 30% who say this was a very slow process. According to JL18: “[Improvement] is not as fast we would want, but we see it changing all the time”. As TL3 puts it: “We don’t want to change 180 degrees. We want to do it slowly, because we understand it to be about development.” 13% of interviewees say that journalists in general have a better education level than previously.

11% of interviewees, meanwhile, say programmes have had no impact on press practice, which some even say have gone backwards. JI3 feels the millions of dollars spent on training had, on the whole, been wasted. “I just feel sad because many guys who I know who have gone to several trainings, yet they don’t seem to improve themselves”. According to 5% of interviewees, this lack of
improvement is more apparent in local press, where there has been little or no improvement in standards.

Table 19: Effect of journalism on society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>J (29)</th>
<th>T/D/EC (25)</th>
<th>(54)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People/government better informed</td>
<td>10 (34%)</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
<td>14 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better cooperation from officials</td>
<td>7 (24%)</td>
<td>6 (28%)</td>
<td>13 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small changes due to work of press</td>
<td>9 (31%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>11 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved perception of journalism as occupation</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>5 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure better</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big changes due to work of press</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (13%)</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table outlines data related to the effect journalism has had in Cambodian society. According to 26%, the biggest perceptible changes due to the press is that people on the ground are better informed. JI9 explains: “[The public's] understanding is better than before… they show their own opinions more and express themselves.” A better informed public has meant certain specific issues have improved on the ground. JI8 credits stories about garment factory standards as having helped improve worker conditions, while JL4 is among two respondents who say there is better environmental and drug awareness due to the press journalism fulfilling its informational function. TI1 agrees. “[The press] is changing people’s minds by giving them an alternative source of information. The political speak, the government speak has huge holes
in it and we point that out.” 7% of interviewees mention general infrastructure or roads, for example, have improved due to the press drawing attention to it.

According to 24% of interviewees, officialdom is more mindful of the press than previously. “They might not resolve or take action but they start thinking a little bit more on that issue” (JI10). JI11 agrees: “Officials and police are scared of journalists. The government responds [to press criticism], quickly or slowly but they respond.” (JI11). Part of the reason for this is that the press gets better access, according to JI8. “Before, you could not get access to the Ministry of Defence, but now they are open. They understand the media plays a very important role.” This is related to what 9% say is an improved perception of journalists overall. According to 20% of informants, only small changes can be seen in Cambodia due to the press. “Maybe not 100% [impact], but even 2% is a good achievement for a journalist“ (JI6). TI5 agrees: “The journalists contribute to a change, but only a little. It is about preparing for a real change that will come eventually.” 6% of all interviewees ascribe “big” or “major” changes in Cambodia to the press.

Table 20: Future of Cambodian press

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>J</th>
<th>T/D/EC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive future for journalism</td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western help needed in future</td>
<td>10 (34%)</td>
<td>6 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western help no longer needed</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative future for journalism</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The highest number of interviewees (31%) felt confident that the press in Cambodia would continue to retain its freedom and have an impact. TL1 says Cambodia has good potential compared to other countries in Southeast Asia. “In the future the press and journalism [here] will get better and better.” However, this confidence is tempered by other responses. While just 7% of interviewees predict a negative future for journalism outright, 30% feel press freedom will only be maintained as long as help continues to come from the west. According to JI1, it is “still some more years, ten maybe [Before we can survive alone].” It is not only funding which is required, but also the presence of international media outlets, who Cambodian staff feel act as a buffer and a protection between them and the government (JI8). According to JI9, if foreign staff left, the press system in Cambodia would not last: “If we have no foreign support, we [will] become like local newspaper journalists who are just writing to extort money.” There is, however, some disagreement on this, with 11% of interviewees arguing that the press had enough of a foothold in Cambodia to survive on its own. “The government is used to the culture of free press” (TL1). TI1 expands on this: “The international press has set an example and a standard. We have injected that into the culture of journalism in Cambodia. That can never be taken out again.”

This section has described the data generated from interviews in terms of the frequency of responses to key questions in each sub-section. The next one conducts a thematic analysis of that data, ordering the most frequently occurring responses into overarching themes and subthemes. These are then considered in terms of their significance relative to the key questions raised by this study.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Thematic analysis of the data

8.1 Introduction
This chapter examines how data from the different categories of interviewees relate to each another. It does this by means of a thematic analysis, as described in Chapter 5, which orders data into overarching themes and subthemes. Related data in the frequency tables in Chapter 7 is compared and contrasted with each other in this chapter under a series of primary theme and subthemes. Each theme and subtheme is accompanied by a narrative in which observations from both categories are combined, noting and describing the various differences in this regard. These are then related to the research question and outlined as a series of findings whose significance is analysed in the context of the literature in Chapter 9. What is here denoted as a theme, or a subtheme, is primarily drawn from what is described as code in Chapter 7. These codes were generated by responses to similar questions from separate categories of interviewees about firstly, programme emphases and secondly, work practices. The approach taken by this study draws on a similar one to Bigi’s (2011) thematic analysis of Swiss journalists’ experience of off-the-job training and journalism practice, as well as Bryman’s (2008, p.554) acknowledgement that a theme and a code are more or less the same thing.

The primary themes are broken down as follows:
8.2 Norms, functions and skills of journalism
Theme A: Normative conceptualisations of journalistic roles/function
Theme B: Key ethical beliefs
Theme C.1: Key skills
Theme C.2: Skills specific to Cambodia
8.3 Influences on, barriers to good journalism practice

Theme D.1: Influence on work practice
Theme D.2: Influence on ethical beliefs
Theme E.1: Barriers to good work practice
Theme E.2: Barriers to good ethical practice

8.4 Effects of programmes, press; future of journalism

Theme F.1: Effect of programmes on current press practices
Theme F.2: Effect of the press on society in general
Theme G: Concerns about journalism programme implementation
Theme H: Future prospects for journalism

8.2 Norms, functions and skills of journalism

Theme A: Normative conceptualisations of role/function of journalism

What interviewees from both categories see as the most important functions or roles of journalism are outlined here as a series of subthemes, with indicators sought for links with responses in both categories to norms whose bases are contested. As previously explained, ‘Category 1’ interviewees refers to programme facilitators including trainers, donors and expert commentators (TL, TI, DR, EC), while ‘Category 2’ interviewees refers to working journalists (JL, JI) who had been programme participants. Percentages here are drawn from tables in in Chapter 7 (Sections 7.2A and 7.3A).

Subtheme A1: The meaning of ‘Inform’ differs depending on the category of interviewee

The dominant response among both categories of interviewees(60% of Category 1 compared to 82% Category 2) regarding the main function of the press was a relatively straightforward conceptualisation of journalism as something which gives people important information, typified by JI8’s response that “The idea of
being a journalist is that I want to tell people what is going on.” The high occurrence of this norm in both categories of interviewee suggests a strong connection between what was emphasised in journalism programmes and working journalists’ role conceptualisations. The higher occurrence of it among working journalists than among facilitators would suggest this norm was enhanced via the working environment. However, another aspect of this comes into play when it is noted that that 31% of respondents in Category 2 (compared to none in Category 1) also believe that the role of the press is to educate — a subtly different adaptation of the inform function. This adaptation is particularly strong among JL (39%). For example JL10 describes the role of the press as “to take part in rebuilding the country….and to help in the re-education of the people”.

Subtheme A2: ‘Improving democracy’ seen as a key journalism function

Improving democracy was seen as a primary journalistic role among both sets of interviewees (56% of Category 1 and 62% of Category 2), and is particularly high among donors (83%) and JI (82%). DR2 describes how almost all the money available to do training was from groups which believed that the improvement of democracy was a central tenet. “They all felt free and fair and open media would help to bring about the democratic process. In some countries it’s been more apparent than others.” This emphasis is reflected by trainers like TI8 who says of the journalists he helps to train. “They don’t understand the role journalism could play in democracy or building it up. They think journalism is just reporting about things, just information.” Among journalists, the kind of thinking is echoed by the likes of JI2’s observation: “I think it is very important [for journalism] to bring democracy. If [Cambodians] don’t know about [democracy] it is easier to boss them.”

The strength of the ‘improve democracy’ ideal among international journalists
would suggest that this emphasis in training was underlined afterwards within international organisations where the journalists worked. Among local newspapers, this appears to have happened to a lesser degree (50% mention it). It can be argued that the norm of ‘improving popular participation’ is a less loaded and less political interpretation of the role the press can play in improving democratic preconditions. However, this is only mentioned by a small number (10%) of Category 1 interviewees, and 0% of Category 2.

Subtheme A3: ‘Affect change’ function features more strongly among journalists than facilitators

Seeing the role of journalism as something which affects change is a strong normative ideal among journalists interviewed (72% of Category 2), but is much less prominent in Category 1 at 32%. There is significant deviation within this between the local (TL) category (62%) and international trainers (TI), at 12%. This suggests a number of things, one of them being that journalists view journalism as an active, politicised practice. As JI5 puts it: “You don’t just wait and see what happens and write about the public reaction. Sometimes you have to play a role to find something that will help the society.” This relates to TL3’s description of his role as a trainer as being “to work in politics”. The data also suggests that a more sophisticated conceptualisation exists among trainers and donors than is communicated second hand, for example to local trainers and programme participants. Variations of the norm such as “improve human rights” (32% in Category 1 versus 24% in Category 2), “improve society” (32% in Category 1 versus 17% in Category 2) and “improve the government” (28% in Category 1 versus 0% in Category 2) are much more common among trainers than journalists. The dominance of the ‘affect change’ norm within journalism, compared to trainers also suggests the norm becomes more entrenched in the workplace.
Subtheme A4: Watchdog norm features strongly across all categories

Conceptualisations of the ‘watchdog’ function of journalism are referenced by about a third of all respondents across all categories. 36% among Category 1 interviewees reference the norm, compared to 34% in Category 2. Conceptualisations of the watchdog role range from explicit references to being a ‘watchdog’ as a general means of keeping a closer eye on the government, to allusions to the practice combating corruption and malpractice by those in authority. JL11 describes it as: “The journalist…if they are doing the job well, are a check and balance”, while JI8 sees his job primarily as fighting corruption. “[I want to] bring the real message to the world. That these people are bad.” Overall, the emphasis on this norm among working journalists and programme facilitators is very similar, but it is noteworthy that the 36% who emphasise the watchdog role among Category 1 interviewees, which would be regarded as a key normative ideal of journalism (as is outlined in Chapter 2), is significantly lower than the “Improve democracy” norm in the same category (56%).

Subtheme A5: Significant variation is seen among interviewees in the meaning of ‘bridge’ function

The ‘bridge’ function, meaning that the press facilitates interaction between the government and the governed, is referenced much more often among journalists (37%) than programme facilitators (16%). 37% of journalists refer to it as a primary function, compared to 16% among Category 1 (much higher at 37%, among local trainers). However, significant deviation can be seen in responses in terms of the understanding of what the ‘bridge’ function is. TL4 for example describes how “since 1993, we follow the democratic countries in that the media follows the dialogue system. Before 1993, the media is a monologue system.” International journalists such as JI2 tend to mirror this interpretation: “The journalist… they take [information] from the people — their needs, their complaints— to the government. And then they bring back from the government
what they plan to do for development.” However, a tendency is noted among local journalists to conceptualise the ‘bridge’ function in terms of a one-way conduit to bring information from the government to the people, rather than the other way around. JL2 typifies this when he says: “[The media] bring back from the government what they plan to do,” while JL8 describes: “It is so that [the people] can listen to the official explanation for the problem”.

Subtheme A6: Journalism seen by many in explicitly political terms
Seeing journalism in explicitly political terms is common among interviewees, but there is a good deal of variation within this as a concept. TL6 draws attention to the fact that Cambodian journalism was always strongly linked to politics. “[The first journalists] were not so much interested in the news side of journalism but they were interested in the political side of writing.” Thus journalism is linked to an interest in politics, both in terms of putting forward political points of view and/or questioning dominant political viewpoints. ‘Exerting political influence’ is seen as a function of journalism by 20% of Category 1, (50% of these among TL), compared to 13% in Category 2. Variations on this norm are articulated by Category 1 interviewees generally in fairly neutral, or positivist terms, for example as a ‘questioning authority’ norm (10% of Category 1 versus 0% in Category 2), or to ‘improve the government’ (28% of Category 1 versus 0% in Category 2). However, a more polarised interpretation of journalism’s relationship with politics can be seen among journalists. For example, an ‘attacking the government’ norm is described by 29% of Category 2, while not being mentioned by any interviewee in Category 1.
Subtheme A7: Developmental role of journalism emphasised in both categories of interviewee

A conceptualisation of journalism as something which should help development features in both categories of respondent (20% of Category 1 versus 13% of Category 2). TI2 is typical in this regard as he describes: “When you have more transparency. The whole development of the country is better”. This idea is tied in strongly, sometimes implicitly with an Asian Values conceptualisation of journalism (as described in Chapter 3), whereby the function of the press is seen more as something which serves development and the national interest more than criticising and holding power accountable. JL18 describes: “As a newspaper we are not just reporting the news but we have to see, is it useful for Cambodia or not?” TI7 describes this mind-set as meaning “that you don’t need a free and independent press to progress. When people see progress around them…they are happy to say ‘all is ok’.”

Subtheme A8: Market orientation of journalism more evident among programme facilitators

The idea of journalism as being something which encourages business, or the function of the free market, is mentioned by 20% of Category 1 interviewees, compared to 6% in Category 2. For example, as DR4 puts it, trade is a way for Cambodians to get out of poverty. “That’s why we want to promote trade.” The higher incidence in Category 1 may suggest a neo-liberal orientation to the approach to journalism training in Cambodia. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

Theme B: Key ethical beliefs

Ideas about journalistic professionalism have set ethical standards and values of journalism such as responsibility, accuracy, impartiality, balance, objectivity and truthfulness. This section seeks to establish the key ethical emphases among
programme facilitators and the degree to which these values were echoed by working journalists. Both categories of interviewees show a general lack of diversity in terms of what they consider to be key ethical values. Aside from ‘truthfulness’ and ‘balance’ being referenced by large numbers in both categories, ‘neutrality’, ‘objectivity’, ‘Independence’, ‘respecting the law’, ‘defending sources’ and ‘freedom from corruption’ only feature to minor degrees. Percentages here are drawn from tables in in Chapter 7 (Sections 7.2A, 7.2B and 7.3A, 7.3B, 7.3C).

Subtheme B1: ‘Balance’ articulated as a value but difficult to follow in practise
In terms of ethical values, ‘balance’ rates highly in both categories (48% of Category 1 and 69% of Category 2). However, there is also evidence that while this is articulated clearly as a value, it is very difficult to follow in practice. Interviewees suggest that while there has been an increase in professionalisation in the Khmer language press in recent years (JL6), the political perspectives taken by those papers remain polarised. According to TI5, despite so many journalists claiming to value balance highly as a critical ethical value, it is very difficult for Cambodian journalists to understand the concept, let alone apply it. “It was difficult to explain that a newspaper works only to give the reader information, not direction. In France we know how to balance information. Here it is not the case. All the newspapers are politically biased” (TI5). This is true, not only among local press, but among the international and ‘independent’ press, who also come in for criticism due to what is regarded as their anti-Government stance. According to some local press interviewees, there is also a tendency among international media to exaggerate one side of the news. “If [the story] is about the land conflict — there are two sides. But if the journalist or reporter want to invent a stand-off, to incite, that is the problem.” (JL2). JL18 agrees: “In some ways they tend to be more anti- government, on the negative

72 Patterns of political polarisation in the press are outlined in more detail in Chapter 6
side of reporting. Personally I believe you can’t just have all of the newspapers who are anti-government.”

Subtheme B2: Accuracy regarded as a key journalism value
Telling the truth, or being accurate in terms of the presentation of the facts features strongly among both categories of interviewee (55% among Category 2 versus 48% of Category 1). According to TI2, truthfulness is a concept that is easy to communicate in Cambodian culture and is related to getting the facts right at all times. “A journalist’s job is to seek the truth and tell the truth. What is truth? Seek the facts, get the facts. [Cambodian] journalists understand the concept of truth.” Among programme participants there is little deviation from this description. JI11, for example, describes: “A journalists most important ethics are to be accurate and tell the truth to the people…fast.” JL6 also notes a commitment to truth over beliefs or feelings, as a key ethical concept for journalists. “Before we would write any story by following our feelings but that has changed. We will criticise someone only when we have evidence and a witness.”

Subtheme B3: Interviewees show strong awareness of the threat of corruption to journalism values
The idea that being ethical is primarily to remain free of corruption registers more strongly among programme participants (Category 2) with 28% of interviewees citing it, spread fairly evenly amongst local and international journalists. This suggests a keen awareness among journalists that the key ethical challenge facing Cambodian journalists is to remain above the corruption which is endemic in society. According to JI6, “To change the society and help it improve, you need to be 100% honest with your professionalism and not write stories based on anyone’s favour.” JL12 describes similarly. “[The most important ethic is that] we don’t ask for money… people
think all journalists are corrupt.” While numerous Category 1 informants showed a strong awareness of bribe taking as a problem among Cambodian journalists, just one interviewee (4%) mentions avoiding such practices in terms of something which can be connected explicitly to an ethical value. Again, this suggests a significant disconnect between the understandings of programme facilitators and journalism practitioners, in particular in relation to ethical practice.

Subtheme B4: Divergence is seen within categories about the importance of neutrality, objectivity and independence

There is significant divergence within different groups of respondents in terms of a belief in concepts like independence, neutrality and objectivity as key ethical values. These terms are gathered together into one value for the purposes of this study, even though there are crucial differences between them (as described in Chapter 2). In simple terms, objectivity refers to an attempt at being as impartial as possible while striving to reach a version of truth, while being neutral leans toward allowing for the expression of all perspectives while not expressing any preference in your writing. Independence means being free from any power forcing a journalist to lean in one direction or another.

The ‘neutrality’ value is much stronger (37%) among international trainers, while no local trainers reference it. Among trainers, this value veers a little more toward objectivity, but the difference is not very clear. TI1 for example, speaks of impartiality as a key ethical value, which is closely related to objectivity. “The ethics of how you approach a story [are important], such as impartiality… [we teach them] not to take sides politically. The newsroom is a non-political area, even though some people have strong views.” TI7 also states that objectivity is important, but does not explain what it is. “I think [journalists] can take on board and understand the need for …objectivity and all
of that. It is common sense.” Among journalists (Category 2) then, this value tends to be expressed more in terms of neutrality. Amongst international journalists it is much stronger (27%) than with local (5%). JI2, for example, is typical in conceptualising the value as simply presenting both sides of the story without differentiating between the truth of either side. “You did not write opinion in the story. Opinion is in separate pages.” JI11 describes similarly: “You can’t do any favour. You must stay neutral.”

Independence as a value is skewed in the opposite direction, with TL (25%) versus TI (12.5%). This is echoed among journalists, with independence seen as an important ethical value by 17% of Category 2 respondents split into JL (22%) and JI (9%). JL15 describes this as: “You must not be biased to the government, or NGOs or any political party… you must be independent.” However, there is a strong tendency among JL to equate being ‘independent’ with being against the government or pro opposition. For example JL4 describes: “I don’t want to write a story to support the government because such a story would be the opposite of my opinion”.

Subtheme B5: Journalists reference protecting sources, respecting law as important values
Two ethical values feature only among Category 2 respondents but are not mentioned at all by programme facilitators. They are ‘defending/protecting sources’, which is referenced by 17% of respondents in this category (stronger among JL). This is described in a very “people-centric” way. JL11 puts it, for example as: “You try to protect the safety of the people in the story.” ‘Respecting the law’ features among 14% of Category 2 respondents (also much stronger among JL). The non-appearance of both of these sub-themes among Category 1 interviewees may, again, suggest a degree of detachment among this sector from realities on the ground, such as responsibilities toward the people
who are the sources of your story and the fact that the laws of the land must be obeyed, even if you are in disagreement with them.

**Theme C.1: Key skills**

This section focuses on what Category 1 interviewees believe are the most important emphases in training, versus what Category 2 respondents feel were the most important skills or knowledge to be an effective practitioner. Responses in this regard (percentages here are drawn primarily from tables in Chapter 7; Sections 7.2A, 7.3B, 7.3C) tend to coalesce around specific skills, but include some more knowledge-oriented abilities — ethics training, for example. It is important to note that responses by Category 1 interviewees generally refer to skills which *should* be emphasised in training, as opposed to the ones which *were* emphasised. One would expect that beliefs by facilitators would have translated to some degree into emphases within programmes which they took part in. However, to regard them as equivalent would be erroneous. For example, trainers’ belief systems might have evolved in the time from when they first started training journalists, to the time these interviews took place. Responses by Category 2 interviewees relate not only to skills, but also to characteristics, or important personal attributes.

**Subtheme C.1A: Basic skills versus specialised higher-level skills**

Among the most important skills needed for journalism, practical or basic journalism skills are by far the most prominent among respondents (72% in Category 1 versus 82% of Category 2). High numbers referring to this are significant, but are also due to the fact that this term covers a wide range of meanings. A belief that only basic, or practical skills are needed is evident in the response of TI2, who claims: “I could teach [programme participants] in two

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73 Themes C.1 and C.2 are split in this way as a means of acknowledging that they are both related to ‘skills’, but one relates to skills in a general sense, while the other relates to skills which are specific to Cambodia
days how to be a news journalist. Doing good structured, news journalism….the skills are not actually that difficult at all.” DR2 expresses concerns about blasé attitudes toward journalism training among trainers and facilitators. Recalling how a senior figure within an International journalism training organisation had told her three days was sufficient to impart basic journalism skills she recalls: “I thought — what kind of training did they get? What can you learn in three days, frankly, that can be any good or make any kind of impact?” However, any counterpoint to a ‘basic skills’ conceptualisation of what is required to be a journalist is weak, with just 20% of working journalists and 34% in Category 1 believing that high levels of general knowledge and education are important for journalists.

While a belief that journalists only require simple, practical skills predominates, there is also an increased recognition among respondents of a need for more specialised types of training. A significant number (28% Category 1 and 20% Category 2) argue that specialised skills are becoming more important. References to this include “more specialised” in a general sense, but also specifically training in technology or IT (20% of Category 1 and 13% in Category 2), financial/economic reporting (16% of Category 1 respondents and 10% in Category 2), investigative reporting (13% of Category 2 and 16% in Category 1).

Subtheme C.1B: Higher belief in vocational approach to journalism training over educational
A belief in practical and on-the-job training is strongly linked to the belief that short-term vocational training is more relevant for journalists than a longer term, more education-oriented approach. On-the-job, or practice training is seen as a key requirement for upcoming journalists by 75% of Category 2 respondents (particularly high among local journalists at 83%). “[In college]
you only learned the theory. We did not know the practice. The job teaches” (JL2). Among Category 1 respondents, this emphasis is lower, at 40%, suggesting that these respondents have much less faith in the quality of this type of training. This lack of faith is likely due to the problematic nature of the quality and depth of on-the-job training, as suggested by JI3, who recalls how at the international newspaper he worked with, “I didn’t get anyone to sit down with me and tell me how to structure it etc.”

Subtheme C.1C: Belief that journalism skills and curricula should originate exclusively from the west
A belief that journalism skills and curricula emanate exclusively from western practice and curricula is seen among 56% of Category 1 and 51% of Category 2 interviewees (highest among international trainers at 75% and international journalists at 73%). This is typified by TI4’s argument that Cambodian journalists should simply focus on what is being done internationally in order to learn journalism skills: “The journalists here are exposed much less to what we regard as good journalism. I keep telling them to read the international press.”

This data provides further evidence that international trainers’ belief systems have greater impact where programme participants go on to work in international press, in which such belief systems are underlined. JI5, most of whose training was in international newspapers’ newsrooms, typifies this tendency: “I think Cambodian journalists can learn this from the western journalists.” This belief in western-oriented skills and the sense that the environment in which interviewees think journalism is best practiced is a western one, is even more explicitly referenced in terms of key skills, where English language skills are seen by 44% of Category 1 respondents (highest among international trainers at 62%) overall as a key skill, compared to 31% in Category 2. These figures are much higher (55%) among international
journalists, as opposed to local (16%).

Subtheme C.1D: Ethics training is not classed as being an important element of journalism programmes
While ethics cannot be classed as a skill, it is included here mainly as a means of examining how interviewees perceive journalism ethics relative to other key knowledge and skills imparted within journalism programmes. Responses here were to questions relating to the degree to which ethics should be prioritised in training relative other key journalism skills, as opposed to whether they believe journalism ethics are important in themselves. When asked directly whether ethics are important for journalists almost all interviews replied in the affirmative. However, the data here highlights that belief in ethics as a key component of journalism programmes is seen to be very low relative to other skills among working journalists, with just 17% of Category 2 respondents mentioning it (9% of JI versus 22% of JL), while being stronger among Category 1 interviewees (52%). The lower score among international journalists may connect to the fact that journalists with international organisations have had a better experience in terms of learning ethics in a work environment than local journalists, thus less of a connection to the concept as something that needs to be learned in training.

Subtheme C.1E: Legal knowledge seen as more important by journalists
Instruction in law is referenced by 26% of respondents in Category 2 (higher among international journalists at 45%), compared to just 8% in Category 1. This difference suggests two things; Firstly a higher proportion among international journalists suggests that legal means are the primary means of those in power of putting pressure those working for international media, as opposed to other means (intimidation, work pressures) which tend to be more significant in the local press (see E.1.1 for more on this). Secondly, the low
percentage among Category 1 interviewees suggests further evidence of a detachment from the reality of the problems being faced by journalism practitioners on the ground.

Subtheme C.1F: Little importance placed by journalists on the importance of ‘News values’ as a component of training

There is a wide divergence between the two categories in terms of the importance of news values in training. 25% of respondents in Category 1 (all among local trainers and donors) see it as important, while no one among the Category 2 respondents mentions news values. TL6 describes how this was important for journalists in particular coming from a propagandist environment. “Before, an official opening a pagoda was newsworthy. Now people had to know how to identify a story that is newsworthy.” TL5 describes similarly. “If they go to a news conference, they come back, after listening and cannot write anything. They cannot make it news.” The only time news values as a skill is mentioned by programme participants is by JI5, who speaks of the tension which arose between western and Cambodian colleagues over which stories are prioritised. “We Cambodians have our own idea of what is important in this country, our own people, our own readers.”

Subtheme C.1G: Journalists tend to emphasise personal characteristics as important

The personalised, human characteristics emphasised by Category 2 interviewees as important for journalists give an interesting insight into how they view journalism. 17% mention passion/commitment or courage as being key for journalists, while 10% describe characteristics like creativity, imagination or curiosity as important. Just two respondents in this category (6%) mention resourcefulness as being particularly important. Category 1 interviewees tended not to connect personal qualities to journalism in this way.
Theme C.2: Skills specific to Cambodia
This theme focuses on what interviewees believe are the most important skills needed by journalists, which are unique to those working in a Cambodian environment, with the specific challenges that they face there. Figures here are taken from tables in Chapter 7 (section 7.2A and 7.3B).

Subtheme C.2A: Acceptance of ‘limits’ of journalism seen across all categories
The idea of knowing where the ‘limits’ of journalism are, or that you must not expect too much or aim too high as a journalist, is mentioned by the majority of respondents in both categories, but is particularly strong among journalists (59% of Category 2). According to JL8 it is not realistic to expect to be able to practice journalism the same as in the US or France: “We cannot import something 100%. They get cooperation [from politicians]. Here it is not like that.” The idea of knowing the limits of journalism is also significant among Category 1 interviewees (44% overall), with spikes among donors (66%) and expert commentators (66%). This dichotomy raises several interesting issues. Could the attitude among donors and commentators be due to a cynicism about how much journalism can do? This is examined in more detail in Chapter 9.

Subtheme C.2B: Tendency among facilitators to deny that there is a need to adapt journalism to Cambodian environment
While there is a broad consensus among Category 2 interviewees that there is a need for certain specialised skills in order to work effectively in Cambodia, 20% of Category 1 interviewees deny that this is the case. Several of these argue strongly that saying Cambodia is a special case falls into the same kind of logic used by those who wish to see free speech limited. According to TL3, for example, teaching specific skills to Cambodian journalists, would be an endorsement of sub-standard journalism. “[We want] the international standard. Don’t say this is Cambodian way or Australian way. That is bullshit. [The
Subtheme C.2C: Tact, flexibility seen as important for journalists
In terms of specialised skills needed for Cambodian journalists, two types of responses can be broadly put in the category of “tact”. Firstly, flexibility — meaning journalists must be resourceful and flexible in terms of how they approach their work (20% of Category 1 versus 10% of Category 2). TI3 describes how “when you deal with journalists sometimes you must be flexible but certain things have to be sacrosanct.” The ability to ask questions in a particular way, or in a “soft” manner, as opposed to being overly direct initially, is referenced by the same number of respondents (20% and 10% respectively). JL18 describes how good journalists “would go in there and know the official and be able to talk to him. Basically it is just a human skill”. A “softer” approach to asking questions and being a journalist is important in the context of working in an authoritarian environment, and is mentioned in various places within the literature related to “Asian values” in particular. This phenomenon, and the implications of this in terms of journalism programmes, is discussed in more depth in the next chapter.

8.3: Influences on, barriers to good journalism practice
This section outlines key influences in terms of work and ethical practice. Only Category 2 respondents (See tables in Chapter 7, Sections 7.2B and 7.3C) were asked about work practices, given they were the only ones who had insight in this regard. This is outlined in Theme D.1. However, the question as to where ethics come from was also put to Category 1 informants and this is used as a means of comparison in Theme D.2.

Theme D.1: Work, more than training cited as key practice influence
What is most striking about this portion of data is less that so many journalists
feel their work practice is influenced by where they work and who they work with, but that so few of them cite the training they received as having a particularly strong impact. Training is considered to be the key influence on work practice by just 17% of Category 2 interviewee (0% of JI category versus 27% of JL). Instead, the data suggests that interviewees place more importance on where one works (45%) and who one works with (59%). JL2 describes: “I was lucky [in my first job]. It was a good standard. I started my journalism career with professional co-workers”. JL15, by contrast, recalls: “At the [local] Khmer newspapers, there was no one who had good levels of specific knowledge.” Observing the international media is seen as an important influence by 45% of interviewees. The fact this is significantly higher among JI (72%) than JL (27%) suggests a stronger belief in western journalistic practice among people working with the international press. It also stands out that no respondents mentions that observation of local Khmer press was an influence on their work practices.

**Theme D.2: Training thought to have an influence on ethical practice**

The most notable aspect of the data comparison here is the contrast between perceptions of the influence of training on work practice, compared to ethical practice. Here, 38% of Category 2 interviewees (39% of JL and 36% of JI) see training as an important source of ethics, compared to 17% who see training as influential on work practices (see Theme D.1). Most striking, however, is the extremely low belief among programme facilitators (Category 1) in training as an influence on ethical practice. Just one respondent in this category says training is a key influence on ethics. Instead, Category 1 interviewees show a strong belief that ethics emanate from watching western media outlets (36% overall) and from society in general (28%). Among Category 2 interviewees, the work environment/colleagues is seen as the primary influence on ethics by 41% (compared to just 12% of Category 1 interviewees), with western knowledge
(27%) and general societal values mentioned by 31%. As JI2 argues: “You learn about ethics from three places, the mother, society and school”.

**Theme E.1: External and internal barriers to good work practice**

This theme examines responses to the question of barriers to journalism practice are divided up in this section into “external barriers”, referring here to factors which journalists themselves have no power to counteract. “Internal barriers” refer to barriers which are internal to journalism culture itself, either within journalists themselves in terms of self-perception or other reasons, or within their organisation as a group. Figures here are taken from tables in Chapter 7 (Sections 7.2B and 7.3C).

**Subtheme E.1.1: Among external barriers, the most divergence is seen in attitudes to low pay, access to information, training**

In terms of external barriers freedom of expression, low pay, poor access to information, lack of training, difficulties of working in local press, legal environment, poor perception of journalism and the lack of revenue generated by the media are cited as dominant. There is a striking divergence between responses in different categories on low pay, access to information, lack of training, with Category 2 respondents seeing this as a much bigger issue than those in Category 1 interviewees. There are also some interesting deviations of interpretations of the difficulties of working in the local press, which reflect on the ways in which they are viewed.

A lack of freedom of expression, connected explicitly to political pressure being brought to bear on the press, is referenced as a barrier to good journalism practice by 72% of Category 1 interviewees, compared to 58% of Category 2. The situation in this regard is worsening, according to JI3: “The government is tightening control… so freedom of expression, alongside freedom of assembly,
is shrinking”. Low salaries are cited by the vast majority of Category 2 interviewees (83%, compared to 44% of Category 1). As JI3 puts it, it is very hard to commit fully to journalism when the salary is so low: “You have to have a balance between career and the means to support your family.” 72% of Category 2 respondents see a lack of access to information and poor cooperation by government officials in this regard, as being a significant barrier to the press. This is a much bigger problem for JL (94%) than JI (36%). This compared to 44% among Category 1.

A lack of training or a low education level, or a lack of training in relevant areas is referenced by 55% of Category 2, with several noting that specialised training was given on topics which were not useful. JL1 describes: “Sometimes, the money talks [laughs]. If the NGO is about fighting corruption, you will not train the journalists on disaster reporting.” Among Category 1 interviewees, however, these numbers are lower (36%). The poor quality of local press outlets registers as a significant barrier among Category 2 respondents (55%), in particular among JL (66%), compared to 36% of JI. JL7 describes: “For the sensitive story sometimes [international and local journalists] live in a different world.”

The idea of local press being difficult to work in is not referenced directly among Category 1 respondents. Instead, it is articulated by these interviewees (40%) as a “lack of opportunity”, meaning a lack of opportunity to work in good-quality organisations. “Good-quality” organisations in this context are generally equated with organisations which are independent and balanced, encompassing both international and local press. However, among Category 2 informants, in particular among local journalists, there is a stronger leaning toward “difficulty of working in local press” as a barrier whereby all local press is seen as problematic, with moving to an “international” outlet seen as the answer to that problem.
Among Category 2 respondents, 48% mention the legal environment as a barrier to journalism practice. This relates to the existence or absence of laws themselves, or their inadequate implementation. As JL6 puts it, “we have the law only on paper.” JI11 recalls how his biggest fear was of being sued, “but now I am getting used to it”. The risk of this is heightened, they say, due to political manipulation of the legal system. Inadequate laws for media company ownership and press card registration is another aspect to the problem. JI2 says: “The Information ministry needs to crack down on this stuff”. This correlates fairly evenly with Category 1 informants (40%).

The poor perception of journalism as an occupation is referenced by 44% of Category 1 interviewees and 41% of Category 2 as problematic. This poor perception reduces the overall reputation of the profession, and contributes to a “lack of trust” in journalists overall according to JL6. The lack of revenue generated by media companies, due to low sales, high levels of competition, and lack of advertising and other sources of revenue is alluded to by 32% of Category 1, compared to 31% among Category 2 interviewees, as problematic.

Subtheme E.1.2: Lack of understanding among facilitators of the types of internal barriers which face Cambodian journalists

Self-censorship, fear, cultural incompatibility, poor quality of personnel, bad management, “glass ceilings” for Khmer reporters, dysfunctional journalists’ organisations and aspects of what is described as the “Khmer character” are cited as examples of what this study terms “internal barriers” to work practice. Among Category 2 interviewees, a high incidence of self-censorship, fear, cultural incompatibility, management glass ceilings is cited compared to facilitators and donors. Other internal factors such as poor quality of personnel and flaws in the Khmer character are mentioned with much greater regularity among Category 1 interviewees. The divergence within the data here suggests
firstly, high levels of disconnect between programme facilitators and realities faced by practitioners and secondly, that a low opinion of the “quality” of Cambodians as journalists, and a tendency to link this to inherent flaws in the Khmer character exists among facilitators and donors. This may be a contributory factor to lower levels of self-confidence among international journalists in particular, whose responses tend to mirror those of Category 1 interviewees in these questions.

The data suggests that a lack of confidence on the part of journalists themselves, combined with a subtly threatening environment in which they must work, may be linked to high degrees of self-censorship among Cambodian journalists. According to JI10, “I have to think when it is a very sensitive story. You cannot make something different if you are dead.” There is wide divergence between Category 2 (69%) and Category 1 (36%) about the degree to which self-censorship has an impact (within Category 2, this is higher among JI (82%) than JL (61%)). Self-censorship manifests itself in terms of topics which are regarded as “out of bounds” to report on. JI2 says of political reporting: “They can criticise up to here [gestures with hand] but cannot go higher. The big four guys – you cannot say anything.” Writing about the King is another area recognised as ‘out of bounds’, as is writing about the police or complex corruption cases.

A similar divergence between the two categories of interviewees occurs in the incidence of ‘fear’ as a barrier to journalism practice. Although, there has been a reduction in attacks on journalists in recent years (Chapter 6 outlines these numbers in more detail), several interviewees make it clear that the implied threat is enough. JI3 describes: “I have that fear because I don’t have a free ticket to fly out of here (laughs)”. 62% of Category 2 respondents cite fear as a major barrier issue restricting journalism (66% of JL versus 50% of JI),
compared to just 20% among Category 1 interviewees.

The idea that journalism as a western-style construct, with elements which do not fit with practising in a Cambodian context, is referenced to a significant degree in both categories (59% of Category 2 versus 40% of Category 1). JI3 describes how courses teaching western-style journalism practice is an “instant noodle” which did not consider realities on the ground in Cambodia. This manifests itself in various ways. JI10 describes how the concept of a journalistic “story angle”—telling the story from a particular perspective or using a particular emphasis—has no equivalent in the Khmer language. The abrasive and confrontational nature of western style journalism is also unsuited to the patriarchal nature of Cambodian culture, according to JI7: “Cambodians have to always respect the old people—even when they are stupid.” This also manifests itself in the area of story values. “We have contrasting ideas between Khmer and barangs [foreigners] as to what is and is not news” (JI1). Several interviewees call for a press model that is less “western” in character. TL5 says: “The western model [of journalism] is not the only one. We are in Asia.”

Among Category 1 interviewees, the quality of people who work as journalists is referenced as problematic by 44% of respondents, compared to 27% in Category 2. This is usually articulated in terms of the fact that the best quality people leave the occupation. It has also been observed during the course of data collection that many of the most successful Cambodian journalists have also tended to leave the profession while still quite young. JI3 explains that he left journalism to work as a communications officer because he felt “worn out and tired”. JI8 concurs: “Nothing changes. It makes you crazy.” Among Category 2 interviewees, international journalists are more likely to mention this (45%) than local journalists (16%).
Another barrier to good journalism practice is that conservative managers and editors follow poor work practices themselves (40% of Category 1 versus 41% Category 2). Management care little about journalists' working welfare, according to JL1. “We write a lot of stories that other companies violate the labour laws, but we never write stories about the media companies who violate the rights of the journalists.” One barrier mentioned almost exclusively by International journalists (54% of JI versus 0% of JL, or 21% of Category 2 overall) was that a glass ceiling existed for Khmer journalists at international organisations. JI1 describes: “We live in our country but we work for barangs [foreigners].” However, other interviewees, such as JI6 argue that newspapers require foreign management to resist negative forces. “I think if [place of work] did not have foreign publishers or editors it would be like the other local newspapers… it would not be the leading newspaper.”

Again, this does not appear to be recognised as a problem among Category 1 respondents, just 8% of who allude to it as a problem. This may also be a factor in a barrier reported by 8% of Category 1 interviewees, that the lack of Khmer journalists or managers in high positions has a negative effect on ambitions of incoming journalists. Dysfunctionality among journalists’ organisations is mentioned as a barrier to good practice by 16% of Category 1 interviewees, compared to 10% of Category 2.

Various types of “character” flaws among Khmer reporters are described as barrier to good journalism practice, with a significantly higher incidence here among international trainers (TI) and journalists (JI) than among local journalists (JL). 24% of Category 1 interviewees mention (38% of TI and 33% of donors) innate issues within the Cambodian character. Variations on this theme are expanded upon in this category in terms of ‘lack of confidence’ in general terms (16%), while 12 % refer to psychological issues within reporters
connected to the ‘trauma of the past’. TI8 ascribes a particular fatalism to Cambodian journalists. “People here feel they can’t change anything, even though they do not like it. The journalistic ideal where people fight for their story, the truth, to be heard — this is rarely to be seen.” Xenophobic tendencies within Cambodian reporters are also referred to by 8% of Category 1 interviewees (similarly to “trauma of the past”, this was used exclusively by non-Khmer JI and DR). Among Category 2 respondents, issues connected to specificities within the Cambodian character, are conceptualised in terms of a ‘lack of confidence’ among 17% (higher among JI at 27%) and ‘stress’ by 14% (again higher among JI at 27%). JI2 describes: “They [journalists] have problems with drinking, remembering and the system they have to work in. It is a stressful job”. Stress in this regard tends to be related by Category 2 interviewees to external conditions in which journalists must work, rather than due to innate character flaws. There is a much lower likelihood overall of these issues being mentioned by local journalists.

**Theme E.2: External and internal barriers to good ethical practice**

This theme relates to perceived barriers to ethical practice of journalism specifically. As with the previous section, these are divided into external and internal barriers and statistics and percentages refer to tables in Chapter 7 (Section 7.2B and 7.3C)

**Subtheme E.2.1: Pay, work environments and societal corruption the most recurrent external barriers to ethical practice**

Low pay, poor work environments and general societal corruption all feature strongly in the data as barriers to ethical practice of journalism. Another notable aspect is that very few interviewees connect poor ethical practice with a lack of training. Another striking difference between responses about barriers to ethical practice is the linkage between low pay and ethical practice. Among journalists
low pay is seen as the biggest obstacle to good ethical practice by the vast majority of respondents (83%), in a way which is specifically linked by interviewees to vulnerability to taking bribes. JL12 says: “[They take bribes] because they do not have salary.” This compares to 44% of Category 1 respondents, for whom low pay is acknowledged as significant, but mostly in terms of being a barrier to good practice in general, as opposed to ethical behaviour specifically.

The type of environment in which journalists must work is seen as a key factor in terms of whether journalists behave ethically (60% of Category 1 versus 48% Category 2). DR1 describes this as “a sort of divide between what they learn [about ethics] and their capacity to actually utilise this when they go back to their work”. JL2 describes how journalists can learn about ethics in the class “but if it is not practiced in the working place or the station then it does not develop”.

The idea of a “culture” of corruption existing in Cambodia, across society, politics and the media, is something which registers strongly across all categories, but is strongest among local journalists and international trainers. This type of “culture”, which is conducive to the spread and the deepening of corrupt ethical practices is referenced by 55% of Category 2 (67% of JL versus 36% of JI) and 32% of Category 1 (50% of TI versus 25% of TL). One aspect of this culture of bribe-taking, is fed into by NGOs themselves with the habit of many of paying journalists to attend their workshops or meetings, or indeed publish stories about donor activities if they help fund the newspapers. According to JL1: “[The NGOs] are also the one who bribes the journalist, so you are also being unethical in your approach.”

A strikingly low number of respondents connect a lack of training in ethics with
poor ethical practice. Among Category 1 respondents, no one mentions this as a factor at all, while in Category 2, 14% of interviewees mention it overall. This would suggest a lack of belief that an improvement in ethics can be achieved via training, a belief which is likely to have added impact among programme participants. A lack of an ethical code of conduct is mentioned only by Category 1 interviewees (12%), with no Category 2 interviewee mentioning this.

Subtheme E.2.2: Cultural incompatibility, management, lack of critical analysis skills cited as key internal barriers to ethical practice
Among the internal barriers to ethical journalism practice cited by interviewees, cultural incompatibility, poor management, inability to critically analyse situations are cited the most. Category 2 interviewees tend to be much more likely to view cultural incompatibility as a problem, while Category 1 informants tend to allude more strongly to a ‘lack of ability to ethically analyse’ situations as a barrier.

The idea that journalism ethics is a primarily western-oriented concept which does not work effectively in a Cambodian context is mentioned by 59% of Category 2 interviewees. For example significant variation is observed among journalists who work for local (JL) and international press (JI) in terms of the acceptability of taking bribes. Prevalent among JL was a tendency to regard the acceptance of gifts as being ok, while actually asking for money is less acceptable. JL3 says: “It is like the monks. If the people want to get the monk to come and make prayers and bless the house they will also give them a small gift or a present. This is not corruption,” while JL12 outlines: “If they want to give the money, it is ok. It is only a problem when [journalists] ask for money.”

As seen in the next section, a number of Category 1 respondents do mention a lack of ethics training as an issue, but more as a general observation on journalism programmes, rather than being perceived as a barrier to ethical journalistic practice specifically.

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Cultural incompatibility of ethics is referenced to a much lower degree among Category 1 respondents, (24% overall). TI1 alludes to the difficulty of an effective ethical code for taking bribes in Cambodia. “An official … may send across a basket of fruit. To actually stand up and say: ‘I now have to reimburse. I have to stop eating now!’ It would not work. It would be impossible.” The numbers of interviewees who see ethics as being incompatible are almost identical to those who see journalism practice as taught in the west as being culturally incompatible. This suggests that a key element within this “incompatibility” of journalistic practice is the ethical component specifically.

Poor ethics among managers and editors is seen as a barrier by 31% of Category 2 interviewees (45% of JI versus 22% of JL). JL7 describes how young journalists can try to be ethical, but it is difficult if they are not encouraged by management. “Maybe the environment changes them.” This is less likely to be seen as an issue by Category 1 interviewees (25% overall with a spike in the local trainer (TL) category). An inability by Cambodian journalism practitioners to analyse complex ethical scenarios effectively is seen as a barrier to good ethical practice by 28% of Category 1 informants (including 38% of TI) versus just 14% of Category 2 informants (36% of JI versus 0% in JL). According to JI1, ethics training is useless unless it is in tandem with an ability to analyse situations on a more complex level. “For example, I want to write about a very corrupt military official. But I get a death threat from the official. Now two values come into play. One is your own life, and then there is the role of the journalist to serve the public interest. The two values clash.”

8.4 Programme, press effects, future
The final section of the thematic analysis examines perceptions of interviewees of the effect, or impact of journalism training programmes on society and the standard of the press itself, as well as some general observations by
stakeholders on strengths and weaknesses of these programmes. It also examines interviewees’ opinions on the future prospects of the Cambodian press. Figures and statistics drawn upon here can be found in Chapter 7 (Section 7.4).

Theme F.1: General agreement that programmes have improved press practices overall
There is a high level of agreement among interviewees that journalism programmes have improved press standards overall (62% of Category 2 versus 72% of Category 1) but in general, a higher level of confidence in the degree and rate of that improvement is seen in Category 2 interviewees. There is also a higher tendency among Category 1 interviewees to be more negative about the effect of journalism programmes on practices (22% of Category 1 versus 13% of Category 2).

Theme F.2: People, government seen as better informed due to press
Overall, the most common changes caused in Cambodian society which are ascribed to the press are that people and the government are better informed (34% of Category 2 versus 16% of Category 1), more cooperation between officials and the press (28% of Category 1 versus 24% of Category 2), an improved perception of journalism (10% of Category 2 and 8% of Category 1). A stronger belief in the impact of the press on Cambodian society can be seen among Category 2 interviewees. 31% of Category 2 (versus 8% of Category 1) interviewees say small changes in society have been due to the work of the press.

Theme G: Concerns about journalism programme implementation centre on too much advocacy, lack of cultural engagement, lack of relevance and poor evaluations
In terms of general observations about journalism programme implementation by those involved (Category 1 respondents only), a number of tendencies are evident. Firstly, there is a sense (52%) that journalism programmes during the period did not engage very strongly with the cultural setting in which they were situated, particularly among international trainers (75%). According to 48% of interviewees one problem with programmes they were involved with was that topics tended to lack relevance. DR2 admits that this sometimes happened: “We had one couple who were talking about energy. We hoped they’d talk about hydroelectric dams, which are relevant here. But they talked about nuclear energy which was like talking about energy from outer space in this part of the world.”

Another concern raised about programme implementation was that there was too much focus on advocacy (36%). Overall, the mix of advocacy training on particular topics and journalism training had a negative effect on the latter, according to TI2. “Journalism is not advocacy. In journalism you look at the facts and then you get your angle from the facts, you don’t get your angle and then put the facts around it.” DR4 describes how training he was involved with was geared specifically in order to attract funding: “If we want to use the human rights budget, you have to go with that agenda otherwise you will not get the funding.” In general terms, according to EC2, too many different funding sources and NGOs offering too many different types of training with varying agendas was problematic. “We have many different models … which disturb and confuse. It goes back to too many donors in the country who all want to implement their best ideas.”

A need for better evaluation of the effect, or outcome of journalism programmes

75It must be noted that responses to a direct question along the lines of: “What kind of problems or issues did you observe during your experiences as a programme facilitator?” tended to elicit quite different responses than more generalised ones about “journalism barriers etc”.

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was cited by 28% of interviewees. However, they also acknowledge that the level of evaluation required is difficult, according to interviewees, due it being time consuming and difficult to do accurately. DR2 speaks of difficulties in this regard. “Asians are loathe to criticise and all of our feedback was marvellous…You almost never got a negative comment, even though I know some things were not as good as others.” Difficulties in this regard are added to by a lack of resources, which is cited by 20% of interviewees. 20% allude to a generation gap as being a problematic issue with training. This was articulated in terms of it being difficult to teach or make an impression upon older journalists who were in managerial or editorial management positions. According to TI6, a price was being paid for earlier programmes not reaching that older generation, either deliberately or not: “It was a mistake to assume these [older] ones are unreceptive to change. Many of them were very curious and receptive and were in a position to affect change.” 16% of respondents cited a lack of prioritisation of ethics in training as being problematic, which is in keeping with earlier data showing that a lack of training is rarely cited as a barrier to ethical practice among programme facilitators.

Theme H: Lack of confidence among facilitators, donors in future prospects for journalism

A lack of confidence in the future prospects of journalism in Cambodia is strongly evident among Category 1 interviewees (programme facilitators) compared to Category 2 (working journalists). 45% of Category 2 respondents predict a positive future for the press in Cambodia, compared to 16% in Category 1. On the question of whether further support for journalism programmes is required for it to survive, 34% of Category 2 interviewees said it was, compared to 7% who said specifically that it was not needed in order for journalism to prosper. Among Category 1 interviewees, 24% said western help is still needed, compared to 16% who say it is no longer needed. However, this
relatively high number of Category 1 interviewees saying western help is no longer needed, compared to the lack of confidence suggested by indicators elsewhere, suggests that this may be less an expression of a belief in the strength of the press sector, than it is a submission that western help should no longer be given because it is ineffective.

8.5 Conclusion
A first-level thematic analysis of the data has shown a number of tendencies. These include links between what interviewees describe as vocational orientations of programmes and simplistic conceptualisations of journalistic normative concepts such as ‘inform’, ‘improve democracy’, ‘affect change’, ‘watchdog’, ‘bridge’ and ‘development’. New conceptualisations are often seen as being more politically oriented and affect ideas about journalism ethics in ways that specifically relate to balance, accuracy, corruption, neutrality. Vocational tendencies are also evident in attitudes toward skills, where work skills and western influences are seen as the most important sources of journalism knowledge, while a broad divergence is seen between attitudes of facilitators and participants on these issues. Ultimately, analysis of the data finds that there are parallels between what those interviewed found were tendencies within programmes and a poor adherence to ethics, low professional confidence, a polarised media and signs of an aid dependency culture among Cambodian journalists. The next chapter discusses these findings in more detail, putting them in the context of comparative research and interpreting what this means in terms of the research questions.
CHAPTER NINE
Discussion of findings

9.1 Introduction
This chapter synthesises the summary of the literature in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and the description and analysis of the data generated by fieldwork described in Chapter 7 and 8 into a series of key findings. While this study is exploratory and does not seek or expect to draw firm conclusions, it does seek to uncover tendencies or patterns within the data set which tie in with the hypothesis that particular normative emphases whose bases are contested — whether due to perceived politicisation, culturally hegemonic tendencies or other reasons — adversely affects the fulfilment of particular journalistic ideals. The thematic analysis in the preceding chapter suggests a number of findings that relate to specific normative ideals of journalism and their relationship with democracy theory and work practices. The analysis highlights links between what those interviewed for this study saw as vocational tendencies within programmes and simplistic conceptualisations of complex journalistic concepts that appear to have contributed to tendencies such as poor ethical practice, low professional confidence, a media characterised by political parallelism and the development of an aid dependency culture. This chapter discusses these findings and highlights several substantive connections between the experience of Cambodia and other comparative research in the literature.

9.2 Key findings
This section is split up into a series of eight key findings, with each one discussed in terms of the occurrence of the various elements which make up the finding within the data, an outline of how this connects to the literature review, and a discussion about the possible implications of this.
9.2A: Vocational orientation of journalism programmes in Cambodia led to simplistic interpretations of journalism norms in a way which affected work practices

Responses by interviewees suggest a strong overall belief in journalism as a practice which is better derived from ‘training’ — characterised here as being vocational with an emphasis on practical skills, short-term in duration and carried out within a variety of settings, including on-the-job — than from a more ‘educational’ approach, which emphasises theory, a more long-term approach and an institutional setting. This is in keeping with the generally strong emphasis on a vocational approach to journalism training described by interviewees and the literature which was present in Cambodia for two main reasons. Firstly, the environment in which programmes had to operate in during the early 1990s made this strategy practical (as discussed in Chapter 6). Secondly, a more vocational emphasis is in keeping with the western press tradition (Foley 2010), so it follows that journalism programmes supported by western aid in developing countries such as Cambodia followed this type of model.

The data generated by this study supports the hypothesis that emphases on particular norms and ethical values in an overly simplistic way — as tends to be the case in particular during short-term vocational-style training — contributes to a negative outcome for the fulfilment of particular normative ideals. This outcome is in keeping with concerns about the vocational approach to journalism training which have already been raised in western settings, whether due to its lessening of journalism’s public service function (Medsger 1996, Carey 2000) or due to it oversimplifying intellectual complexities (Parisi 1994).

The data here suggests that journalists who are more exposed to certain environments after their training, such as the politically polarised one
experienced by local press journalists, are most affected in this manner. This is illustrated in several ways, including a strong tendency for the ‘inform’ function as outlined by programme facilitators, to be interpreted as ‘educate’ (See Chapter 7.2: Subtheme A.1). This interpretation exchanges a function, which in the west is understood as to receive and communicate accurate, pertinent and unbiased information in a clear and unvarnished way to readerships, for a more top-down or one-way function with the journalist as an ‘educator’ passing on his knowledge and beliefs, along with particular political orientations either implicitly, or explicitly, to the reader. ‘Inform’, as a function, suggests a peer-to-peer relationship, with the press having the same interests at heard as those who they are informing. ‘Educate’ implies information coming down the chain from someone more senior at the top. The data shows that local press practitioners (39% of JL versus 18% of JI) are more likely to ascribe to the ‘educate’ interpretation of this press function. This category of interviewee also tends to have received less training overall compared to their counterparts in the international press. These findings have strong echoes of Chan’s and Pan’s (2005) comparative studies of the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong, which found that in both cases, while journalists value their role of disseminating factual information accurately and rapidly, they also demonstrate a stronger belief in the role of journalism in explaining government policies to the public in order to help them “understand” such policies and to “guide public opinion”.

Further evidence of oversimplifications or unexpected adaptations of particular journalism functions can be seen in the frequency, and interpretation of the ‘bridge’ function (See Chapter 7.2: Subtheme A5) in the data. This function, which relates to that of ‘inform’, conceives of the press as a ‘bridge’ or a connecting body between the government and the governed, passing mutually beneficial information over and back between them. This is mentioned by 37%
of local trainers, compared to 0% international (JI), and is also noted by 37% of Category 2 interviewees. However, as is outlined in Chapter 7, there is a divergence in terms of how this role is described which can be divided into two main sides. One side consists of those who see it in terms of the press being both a bridge to and from the government, carrying information to the people from the government and facilitating a dialogue between both. The other side, in contrast, sees this process as more of a one-way street. The former conceptualisation tends to be more common among the international journalist (JI) category, while the latter is more common among journalists working in the local press (JL).

Another example cited by interviewees of press values being subtly adapted or changed is the way in which an emphasis on ‘development’ is modified into a belief in an ‘Asian Values’ conceptualisation of journalism. The data (see Subtheme A7) shows a correlation between what from what both categories of study participants perceive as an emphasis on ‘development’ at a journalistic programme level, and a subsequent belief by practitioners in Asian Values journalism. ‘Development’ in the first instance refers to journalism as helping to facilitate development in the country overall while supporting the idea of popular participation and representative democracy. However, ‘Asian values’ journalism is a type of development journalism, characterised by Galtung (1990), James (1990), Edeani (1993) and Wimmer and Wolfss (2005) in which an engagement with subjects such as democracy or freedom of speech is subjugated to particular educational objectives in the interests of economic expansion and development. Such ostensible depoliticisation of the public sphere is in itself a deeply political act, and the likes of Rogers (1976), Okigbo, (1985), Servaes (1986), Sonaike (1988), Kariithi (1994) and Blake (1997) — as described in Chapter 3 — show how easily a press in which this kind of model predominates can be manipulated into becoming a government mouthpiece.
These three adaptations of key press functions, from ‘inform’ to ‘educate’, or from a two-way to a one-way ‘bridge’, and from the encouragement of development and free speech to a reduction of free speech as a means of enhancing development, all contribute to the development of a propaganda model as described by Herman and Chomsky (2002). This type of model is characterised by the collaboration of the press with undemocratic forces as a means of manufacturing a type of consent in the public mind via propagandist messages, in order to manipulate the population into accepting government policies. Such a model is antithetical of the stated function of the press outlined by UNESCO (2007) as being to keep the public informed, scrutinise the exercise of power and stimulate democratic debate.

Other examples of simplification or adaptations of journalism norms that can be connected to short-term training which is lacking in depth, include the ethical norm of ‘independence’ by local journalists (JL8 for example) being changed to meaning that you are against the government, as opposed to being independent of any political affiliation (Subtheme B4). A similar example in this regard is the adaptation of the journalistic function described by programme facilitators of ‘improving governance’ to ‘attacking the government’ by programme participants (Subtheme A6). More evidence of subtle delineations of related but significantly different normative concepts being lost in translation can be seen in other categories such as those of ‘improving democracy’, versus ‘improving popular participation’. ‘Improving popular participation’, which is cited only among programme facilitators (See Subtheme A2), is a more neutral conceptualisation of the democratic journalistic norm, focusing on the role that the press can play in improving democratic preconditions. This is opposed to some more politically adversarial interpretations of ‘improving democracy’ (as described later in this chapter), in particular its liberal democratic manifestation.
Proof that fulfilment of particular journalism ideals may be affected by adaptations discussed here can be seen in the high degree of political polarisation and political parallelism (as described by Hallin and Mancini) within the Cambodian press (Licadho 2008, RSF 2010), whereby extremes of opinion within the press are aligned with particular political affiliations as opposed to the press being objectively engaged with the issues at hand. Ultimately, the existence of this type of polarisation within the media (which can be seen to have been, if not created by, then certainly intensified by tendencies described above) means that the ‘inform’ function, described within Schudson’s (2002) trustee press model of journalism as a model in which journalists provide the news citizens need to be informed participants in a democracy, is not being properly fulfilled.

9.2B: Overemphasis on particular variants of the democratic norm at programme level had a negative impact on the fulfilment of the democratic ideal

A key part of what this research investigates — that the democratic normative ideal predominated in the conceptualisation of journalism propounded by media aid organisations in Cambodian in the early 1990s — is evidenced by the data. ‘Improve Democracy’ is the second most cited function of journalism overall among programme facilitators and third most cited among journalists (in first place amongst JI and donor category, as described in Chapter 7: Subtheme A2).

Such a presumption of an inherent connection between journalism and democracy is in keeping with a political science approach to studies by the likes of Lipperman (1960), McQuail (1992) and Inglis (2002), while the democratic norm is closely linked to the social responsibility press tradition (Gans 2003, McChesney 1999), both in terms of the defence of democratic values and in terms of what brings democracy into being. However, these presumptions about
a linear link between the press and democratisation have been undermined by a series of strong counter-arguments. These show the many instances of the backward progression of democratisation (Huntington 1993), how the press can also be used to maintain anti-democratic regimes (Norris 2006) and that the order and extent of the degree to which the establishment of a free press precludes democratisation or vice versa has not been conclusively established (McConnell and Becker 2002, Jakubowicz 2002). The question that arises from this is whether this doubt over the link between the press and democratisation is borne out by the Cambodian experience. Chapter 6 outlined in detail the degree to which the press in Cambodia has been instrumentalised, in part due to a series of political economic factors, but it is difficult to quantify from an initial analysis of the data the degree to which a belief in the democratic norm among journalists and facilitators might have impacted on this.

However, this study highlights a number of other tendencies present in a Cambodian environment which the literature suggests might have impacted upon the democratisation process. One example of this is the influence that authoritarian cultures that are embedded both philosophically and regionally have on any progression in this regard. While the literature shows that values such as authoritarianism, Asian values and regional influences impact on the development of political cultures generally, and within journalism practitioners by extension, the degree to which these values affect the process is unclear. The data emanating from this study, however, offers evidence that the character of the press culture which supports this process is a key variable in terms of an outcome which supports or refutes democratic values over more authoritarian-oriented ones.

According to Misheler and Rose (2005) and Shin and Wells (2005), for democratic stabilisation to take place, the populace must believe that democracy
is an appropriate and effective political system for their country and citizens must prioritise it over other societal goals such as economic development. While on first glance, the data which shows a strong belief among journalists and journalism programme implementers that ‘supporting democracy’ is a key press function, other currents are evident in the data, which suggest that such beliefs may not be deeply held, or are being countered by other tendencies such as a belief in development (25% of local trainers, 22% of local journalists and 50% of donors) and free trade (20% of Category 1 and 11% of local journalists).

The data in this study finds that cultural factors also have an effect on the democratisation process, in particular where they are amplified by the press. The literature in Chapter 3 shows that many of the arguments about ‘cultural unsuitability’ for democracy are coloured by sectors which are content with the concentration of power and who use nationalistic rhetoric as a means of consolidating this position. Studies about the congruence of Confucianism, the depth of the foundations for Asian Values as a concept and other cultural specificities required for liberal democratic cultures to develop have also shown that these factors may not have the inhibitory effect than might have been thought. However, doubts over the degree to which they inhibit democratisation do not undermine the fact that these factors almost certainly can have that effect. This study suggests that a key factor in this regard is a press culture whose simplistic understandings of journalistic norms feed into a scenario whereby these factors do have an impact and gain popular credibility. A belief in democracy among press practitioners is not the same as actually contributing to an environment in which democracy can come into existence. Conceptualisations of journalistic roles which are more facilitative in character, for example which reference the creation of a public sphere, or which enhance popular participation, are notable by their absence in the data, across all sectors. The preceding paragraph addresses how some alternative tendencies and beliefs
may have impacted upon the way democracy is conceptualised by journalists. Berger’s (2000) outlining of variants of the democratic norm — liberal, social democratic, neoliberal and participatory—also offers a means of considering more closely the implications of democratic norm emphases at programme level in a developing world environment. Thus, links between the data and the variants as described by Berger have been sought as a means of analysing which of these are more common in Cambodia. The social democratic variant stresses citizenship, public obligations and responsibilities and a guiding, educational role. The neoliberal variant is committed to reflecting pluralism, with journalists as neutral referees in the contest of political forces, while the participatory variant centres on civil society, fostering dialogue between government and citizens. While some evidence can be seen of these three variants — for example a business oriented role conceptualisation (See Subtheme A9) pointing toward a neoliberal variant, or the “educational” emphasis among some Category 2 interviewees (Subtheme A1) offering limited evidence of the social democratic variant, it is the liberal variant of the norm which can be seen to be more dominant. This variant sees journalism as an active, autonomous force (even where existing within a polarised media), safeguarding citizens’ rights and holding the powerful accountable, with high levels of belief in the watchdog norm (See Subtheme A4), as a key element needed for democratic openness and transparency (Brunetti and Weder 2003). Such an outcome is predicted by Berger (2000) and Ronning (1994) in their argument that the liberal democratic variant would be strong in environments where there is a shortage of democratic preconditions such as universal franchise, credible elections or an independent judiciary, as is the case in Cambodia (See Subthemes E.1.9, E.1.1).

However, evidence is also seen of other tendencies connected by Berger to the liberal democratic variant, for example the watchdog role being interpreted as a mandate to unseat undemocratic governments, and journalists tending toward
becoming political opposition. Such practices, according to Berger (2000, p.92), go beyond the democratic role and entail accepted journalistic ethics becoming over-determined by a political agenda, thus contributing to overall levels of political polarisation. Evidence of a tendency by participants to interpret the liberal variant of the democratic variant, which according to the data gathered for this research was espoused in training, in a more overtly politicised fashion can be seen with the wide divergence of other journalistic norms across both categories, with much stronger incidence of ‘Attack the government’ (29% in Category 2 versus 0% in Category 1) and ‘Affect Change’ (72% in Category 2 versus 32% in Category 1) among Category 2 interviewees (As described in Subthemes A3 and A6). These patterns are in keeping with warnings by the likes of Chakrabarty (2000), Vaughn (2007) and Nyamnjoh (2005) that the long term health of a democratic climate can be compromised by the over simplification of normative ideals of democracy at training and educational level (This overlaps with some of the observations noted in Finding 9.2A).

9.2C: Mixing advocacy with journalism training contributed to high levels of political parallelism in Cambodia
A significant incidence of belief in normative ideals such as ‘affect change’, ‘exert political influence’ and ‘advocate’ among programme facilitators and donors seen in the data suggests that journalism programmes which developed in Cambodia were founded on belief systems similar to those ascribed to Schudson’s (2002) advocacy press model, in which journalists tend towards a partisan role, and are less focused on informing as they are in exhorting participation or adherence to a particular perspective or viewpoint. This advocacy tendency is a feature of a more interpretive, commentary-oriented or politically polarised style of journalism, which can itself be linked to political parallelism (as described by Hallin and Mancini 2004) whereby media organisations reflect political tendencies.

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High levels of political parallelism, clientelism (related to ideas about political patronage), the strong role of the state, a limited development of the mass circulation press, traditions of advocacy and commentary-oriented journalism (Hallin 2004), and the relative weakness of common professional norms in Cambodia, are all reminiscent of the Polarised Pluralist media model, as described by Hallin and Mancini (2004). This type of model tends to lead to lower levels of belief in ideas like the ‘common good’ and journalistic ‘neutrality’ and have been shown to dampen the enthusiasm of journalists for the ‘watchdog’ role, due to their being overly worried about political stability.

Evidence from the data suggests that the increased incidence of this type of media model and associated tendencies in journalism was a side effect of the means by which much journalism training was funded in Cambodia, particularly in the early part of the period being examined. As is outlined in Chapter 6, much of the funding in this area came from organisations who did not specialise in media specifically, but whose main focus was on raising awareness about social, health or environmental issues. These groups would often fund more established facilitators such as the Cambodian Communication Institute or the Media Training Centre for once-off short training courses. According to interviews with donors carried out as part of this study, the funding process during this time often progressed as follows. An NGO that wanted to draw attention to a particular issue — human trafficking or AIDS awareness for example — would finance a journalism training course, within which education on that topic would be integrated with other journalism training modules or segments. DR4 outlines a typical example of this. “That fund usually went for [xxx] visibility in Cambodia, not to train journalists. But we found we could benefit both. Not only promote the [xxx], but also to train journalists.” This approach suited both

76Name of organisation blanked out as means of protecting the anonymity of informant
parties, as means of, in the case of facilitators, getting funding, and for the donors, as a relatively cheap means of publicising their cause.

However, as is suggested by the data in Chapter 8: Theme G, this approach led in many instances to an over-emphasis on advocacy for the topic at the expense of the journalism focus (36% of programme facilitators express concern that this happened in programmes they were involved with). As well as a shortfall in terms of the actual journalism knowledge imparted to participants in this type of training, the association between advocating for particular causes or issues and being a journalist had the effect of journalists increasingly seeing their role in terms of advocating for particular causes. J15 describes: “You think a cause is right and you can write an opinion piece to help to change a little. The journalist can say: ‘It should be like this’.” This is reflected in low levels of belief in values such as ‘neutrality’ among journalists (just 14% of journalists mention it as a key value), combined with high levels of belief in partisan-oriented journalistic functions such as ‘affect change’ (72%), ‘improve human rights’ (62%), ‘improve human rights’ (24%), ‘attack government’ (24%) and ‘exert political influence’ (13%), among others. Overall, the data suggests that emphases on a more partisan conceptualisation of what journalism means, both explicitly and implicitly, leads to a reduction in a more neutral press, which in turn increases the degree of political parallelism within the Cambodian media sector. The impact of this kind of political parallelism is more far-reaching where there are low levels of ‘rational legal’ authority — which Weber (1958) defines as a form of rule based on adherence to formal and universalistic rules of procedure — with the effect that the civil service and the judicial system is vulnerable to manipulation by political or other self-interested parties (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Overall, these two interrelated factors contribute to the press in Cambodia being vulnerable to instrumentalisation, as described in Chapter 6.
There are indications also that the depth of suspicion among officialdom of a press (72% of journalists cite a lack of cooperation from officialdom as one of the biggest barriers to the press in Cambodia), is in part as a result of a perception that the nascent press sector was advocating for political and social agendas on behalf of foreign interests. TI6 concurs with this view: “I think the NGO training often sacrifices ethics for the advocacy of political agendas and encouraging journalists to follow those agendas.” A USAID (1999) report acknowledges this in terms of the media in general, when it says that “democratic transitions may not be strengthened through the creation of a media, which, while free from its own government control, espouses views of foreign governments and reflects their interests (p. 9). While a tendency toward a lack of transparency is due to an authoritarian and top-down political culture, the data also suggests that suspicions of officialdom that even the independent press lacks impartiality, is at least partly based on reality. Ultimately, this study posits the view that a partisan conceptualisation of journalistic roles does not serve the fulfilment of a media climate in which the free and open debate which serves genuine political pluralism and participatory democracy can flourish. A partisan press, even in terms of being ‘pro-human rights’ or ‘pro-democracy’, may in fact be counter-productive in the long term toward the overall achievement of those ends.

9.2D: Sub-standard ethics training in Cambodia resulted in poor ethical practice among journalists

The data generated by this research supports previous findings (RST 2010, Sothearith 2011 and Licadho 2009) about poor levels of ethics among Cambodian journalists in terms of the commitment to accuracy, balance and avoiding corrupt practices such as taking bribes. This is in keeping with studies

77 All NGOs involved in journalism training were funded from abroad
of press practices in other post-Socialist countries in Eastern Europe who received similarly high levels of investment in journalism training (Foley 2006, Gross 1996). Poor ethical practice can be seen among Cambodian journalists — in particular those in the local press — in spite of a high level of awareness of ethical values.

The question which arises from this is whether poor ethical practice is due more to external factors (lack of press freedom, poor ethics in society generally and low pay are examples) or whether it is more due to the way ethics are taught in journalism programmes? The data suggests strongly that various external factors such as the general political and legal climate (See Subthemes E.1, E.2) strongly affects the degree of applicability of ethical awareness in a work environment. However, it also suggests that at least three other significant factors which relate to journalism programmes implementation also impacts upon subsequent work practices. These are that firstly, facilitators lacked belief that training can improve ethical practices. This tendency was found in the data to be particularly strong among trainers and donors (Themes D.2, E.2) and is likely to have contributed to ethics not being emphasised within programmes, which in turn lead to a decrease in the quality of how Cambodian journalists approach difficult ethical issues (Theme E.2). Secondly, the scepticism expressed by facilitators and donors, when combined with the vocational emphasis within journalism programmes, suggests that ethics were not taught in any meaningful fashion, which in turn affected the quality of ethics in work practice. Thirdly, the data suggests that ethical press practices as taught within journalism programmes came increasingly to be seen by journalists in Cambodia as being culturally incompatible, in particular by those who worked in the local press.

Given the multi-faceted nature of the application of journalistic ethics in complicated work scenarios, ethical training in particular suffers through short,
or incomplete, training. The data suggests that this may have had a greater effect on the Cambodian press environment than might previously have been anticipated. One example of this is the value of ‘balance’. ‘Balance’ is cited by the highest numbers of interviewees as an important ethical value and is usually understood to mean that competing interpretations of facts are presented in equal measure. However, studies by RST (2010), Sothearith (2011) and Licadho (2009) argue that the Cambodian press is highly polarised and split very obviously into pro-government and pro-opposition. Having a vague idea of what balance meant, would not have equipped a journalist attempting to be balanced on a story while working in a newspaper which was politically partial. A poor understanding of ideas like ‘balance’, ‘neutrality’ or ‘objectivity’ among journalists is connected to high levels of belief among journalists in the idea of ‘affecting change’ as a key press function (Subtheme A3) and in low levels of belief among both journalists and programme facilitators in ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’ as key ethical values (Subtheme B4).

An inability to recognise the subtle ways in which concepts such as balance can be compromised while working, even while theoretical awareness of the concept is high, may be connected to what several informants point out as a low level of critical analysis abilities among Cambodian journalists. This lack of higher-level critical engagement may be connected in broader terms with an education system in which, according to TI4, “the best students are those who are best at repeating what the teacher says. You listen, you note, you repeat.” This approach has deep historical roots, as observed by Prud’homme (1968 – cited in Ear 2012) when he writes that the Cambodian education system historically “emphasised the creation of functionaries, not agronomists, economists or entrepreneurs”. A repository of relevant knowledge and case study examples which could be imparted in training and which might help Cambodian journalists navigate certain difficult situations that arise is
conspicuous by its absence. TI8 describes: “All the western values flowing in, including journalism and ethics and all that, it comes unfiltered. And people don’t have the means to judge what is right and wrong, what is important and not important.” According to JI3, short-term ethics training simply does not encourage the degree of critical analysis skills which are required. “If anyone was to ask me about my opinion on holding a one week training course for journalists on this or that topic I would tell them — don’t waste your time.”

The other factors mentioned above which contributed to poor ethical practice, that trainers lacked belief that training could affect the ethical work practice of Cambodian journalists, and that journalism ethics as taught in journalism programmes were incompatible with too many oriented toward western experience rather than local realities, are outlined in more detail in the following Findings 9.2E and 8.2F.

**9.2E: Over-emphasis on the western orientation of journalism norms and practices within journalism programmes impacts negatively on outcomes for participants**

Data emanating from both categories of interviewees shows a strong belief that journalism, both in terms of its skills, practices and ethical values is strongly western in orientation in terms of skills (Subtheme C.1.3), the advantage of learning from western colleagues (Theme D.1) and in terms of ethical practice (Theme D.2). This is in keeping with historical frame analyses such as Chalaby’s (1996) which link the dominant journalism model to Anglo-American practices, and more sociological normative press frameworks, as described by Zelizer (2005), which link values like responsibility, accuracy, impartiality, balance, objectivity and truthfulness to a primarily US model of professionalism.
However, the data also suggests that beliefs among interviewees that journalism and journalism ethics are inherently ‘western’ in character are linked to poor application or adherence to good journalistic practice on two levels. The first is that strong belief in a ‘western’ orientation of journalism among facilitators contributes to increased levels of disengagement with cultural settings and local realities at a programme level. The second is that experiencing the dichotomy of what they were taught in programmes and what they find to be the reality of work practice, has led to an increased belief among programme participants that certain taught ethical beliefs are simply incompatible with Cambodia culturally (E.1, E.2), which in turn led to their abandonment entirely in some cases.

To start with, I will focus on the effect of the belief in a ‘western’ orientation of journalism among facilitators. The data shows a striking lack of programme facilitators (Theme E.1, E.2) who prioritise linking concepts taught in programmes to local realities. For many facilitators interviewed here, what is good practice journalistically in England, France or the US, should be the same in Cambodia. Tendencies in data generated by this study are in keeping with observations by Shafer, Freedman and Rice (2005, p.8) that the type of trainers, generally ex-journalists and non-professional educators, who predominate in the vocational approach to training tend to have a more ingrained presumption that ‘west is best’ than among journalism academics. This study builds upon these observations by showing the effect of this in a developing world environment and shows the repercussions of this in terms of the fulfilment of journalism ideals.

The type of approach highlighted by Shafer, Freedman and Rice has strong echoes of the “top-down” imperialistic mentality commonly associated within the Modernisation Paradigm approach to development communications, as described by Lerner (1958), Schramm (1964) and Rogers (1962). These types of
approaches, which have been largely discredited by the other paradigms which came after tend to define anything non-western as being primitive, and are typified by the type of comment made by TI2: “I don’t think there is a word in Khmer for ‘ethics’.”\textsuperscript{78} The evidence from the data suggests that, while many of the counter arguments for a more participatory and localised approach are paid lip-service to by the likes of the UNESCO model journalism curriculum, in practice, the Modernisation Paradigm approach continues to predominate in the sector. While facilitators increasingly seem to be acknowledging that a lack of training which acknowledges Cambodia cultural specificities is problematic (Subtheme G), their earlier answers in terms of where their main priorities lie suggest a general lack of awareness as to how deeply such assumptions are ingrained within them, or indeed, how they can be addressed in the future.

Sparks (2007) conceptualisation of the “continuity variant” of the paradigm provides a compelling explanation for why the Modernisation Paradigm’s top-down approach continues to prosper in journalism education. He argues that the justification for what he terms the “continuity variant” lies in instances where the information being communicated is seen by programme implementers to be “self-evident”, for example in certain areas of health communications. The evidence of the literature and the data relating to journalism education outlined in this study would suggest that a similar logic is applied in much of the approach to journalism curriculum building in developing world countries such as Cambodia. Certain core journalism norms and values are seen as ‘self-evident’, while counter perspectives are not properly examined.

This may have impacted on another factor this study connects to press development in Cambodia — the tendency to hold up the economic journalism

\textsuperscript{78} The closest translation of the word “ethics” in Khmer is to a slightly more generalised word which broadly means “morality of the approach to a practice”
model in the US as the best possible. The market-oriented free-for-all described in the Cambodian media in the aftermath of the UNTAC years in Chapter 6 is reminiscent of a US-style libertarian tradition in which there is open and unchecked public discourse. However, this study suggests that the problems which are associated with this approach within the US could be intensified in a developing world environment. Critics such as McChesney (2003) connect particular political economic structures of media organisations in the US to an ideologically conservative or depoliticised journalism there. Even more pertinent to the Cambodian experience is the observation by Smith (1988) and Christians et al (2009) that allowing truth and error to have equal access might not work in a context where the legal judicial framework is not strong enough to regulate fairly where the line is crossed. Ultimately, a libertarian free-market approach to media development in Cambodia succeeds only in creating an environment in which the political and economically dominant forces aligned to the government coerces the media and the press contained therein to follow suit. As Mattelart (1994) puts it: “Free flow is like a free fox through free chickens”. In the west, the Hutchins report (1947), as discussed in Chapter 2, led to the acknowledgement of the social responsibility tradition, which had a critical counterbalance, for a time at least, against this libertarian tendency. However a similar adaptation has not had a chance to develop in in Cambodia.

Another important aspect to this finding relates to how programme participants’ experience of the dichotomy between what they were taught in programmes and what they find to be the reality of work practice, leads to an increased belief among them that certain taught ethical beliefs are simply incompatible with Cambodia culturally (E.1, E.2). A belief in the cultural incompatibility of western norms and ethics is in keeping with work by the likes of Christians (2008), Ward (2010) and Rao and Lee (2005) which argues that journalistic norm and value systems rooted in western concepts and philosophical
foundations can be problematic in culturally dissimilar countries (Rao and Lee 2005, Byun and Lee 2002). In Cambodia specifically, cultural practices cited (Peang-Meth 2000, Mehmet 2000) as impacting on their ability to foster independent journalistic culture in Cambodia include the Indian religious philosophy of Brahmanism and the belief system of Theravada Buddhism, which are linked with a culture of “silent submission” and an ambiguity toward corruption. This has echoes of the personalisation of social and political relations and orientation towards ‘strong’ leaders’ over self-reliance described by Helbardt (2008) as an explanation for shallow democratic consolidation in southeast Asian countries. Ultimately, according to TI8, a cultural inability of journalists to directly question the powerful restricts the overall ability to do journalism. “As long as people don’t express themselves … and try not to make any enemies with people who can harm them, journalism is still in its infancy”.

Difficulties experienced by Cambodian journalists in terms of trying to follow ethical rules formulated in a free and westernised environment echoes problems faced by journalists attempting to apply ethical concepts under authoritarian rule (Cortadi, Fagan and Garreton’s 1992). One example of this is the idea of objectivity, emphasised as a key ethical skill by 27% of international journalists, despite the fact that this has already been critiqued extensively in a western context as being unworkable (Ward 2004, Bell 1997). Mickievicz (1998), for example, shows that journalists in countries shedding an authoritarian past, subjectively reporting news was “the first bold step towards accurate coverage and an alternate meaning to the state dominated message” (p.52). Also pertinent to the Cambodian experience are studies by the like of Duffy (2010), which show that certain press practices and values are unworkable in authoritarian environments. This chimes with the strong sense among 59% of Category 2

A strong counterpoint to this view is made by Gunaratne (2009), in his argument that a normative model of journalism which is based on Theravada Buddhist principles, which focuses on principles such as “healing” and of “helpful speech” could transform news “from a commodity to a social good”.

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interviewees that knowing the ‘limits’ of journalism — both in the sense of how much it can achieve in an authoritarian environment, and also in terms of its applicability in a practical sense — is regarded as a critical “Cambodia-specific” skill.

Whatever about the validity of cultural obstacles to the application of journalistic principles in non-western settings, the data described in this study suggest that a sense of engagement with these issues, for example playing out in a classroom setting how Buddhist principles might feed into journalistic ethical practice, might have a beneficial effect on programme participants in terms of their overall engagement with certain core journalistic principles, and even more importantly, might make them more likely to practise them more carefully in a work setting. The data suggests that up to now, this kind of journalism training has been rarely, if ever carried out in a Cambodian setting.

9.2F: Overall approach to journalism programme implementation contributed to low professional confidence in participants

One tendency shown by the data is that the means by which programme facilitators and participants described journalism being taught in Cambodia may have contributed to lower professional confidence among programme participants. According to Martin (2010), professional efficacy is based on a belief in one’s professional abilities and a sense that these professional activities produce some kind of desirable result. This kind of professional confidence is regarded as a key element of journalists’ ability to do an effective job (implications of this are examined in Chapter 2) and is linked in particular to their ability to make ethical decisions (Berkowitz and Limor 2003). Higher levels of professionalism which result from better levels of professional confidence are also thought to erode political parallelism, “diminishing the control of parties and other political organisations over the media, and creating
common practices that blurred political distinctions among media organisations” (Hallin 2004, p.38). Numerous signifiers in the data suggest firstly, low levels of confidence among journalism practitioners in Cambodia in their ability to apply key skills and ethics in a work environment in a way that would produce a desirable outcome and, secondly, that aspects of the implementation of journalism programmes themselves may have contributed to this.

A lack of professional confidence by programme participants is seen in high levels of self-censorship, poor perceptions of the quality of their peers, a negative sense of their own culture (as seen in the belief that Cambodia in particular fostered a particular ‘culture’ of bribery), high levels of fearfulness and high stress levels (More details on these can be seen in Subthemes D.1, D.2, E.1, E.2). A high incidence of self-censorship, whereby journalists themselves exercise control over what they say or investigate as a means of avoiding criticism, has been linked to a general role uncertainty and a lack of professional confidence (Skjerdal 2010). This has previously been sign-posted as an important feature of Cambodian journalism (Mehta 1997, Sisovann 2003) and is evidenced strongly by the data here (See Subtheme E.1.2), typified by JI3’s admission that journalists think twice before reporting on a wide range of topics. “There is a certain amount of fear….to have a free mind to report about [some] issues.”

There is little evidence of awareness or sensitivity demonstrated by donors and facilitators that low confidence levels among programme participants is a potential barrier to their becoming good practitioners. In fact the data suggests that a key factor in this lack of confidence may be the ‘top-down’ conceptualisations of cultural norms and ethical associations (as discussed earlier in this chapter) as taught in journalism programmes and the generally
poor opinion of the abilities of Cambodian journalists among programme facilitators themselves (See Subtheme E.1, F.1). A striking element of this is descriptions, or insinuations, by interviewees (very strongly among donors and international trainers) of the Khmer ‘character’ as being inherently unethical (See Subthemes E.1.2, E.2.2). The strong incidence of this among international trainers (38%) and donors (33%) supports Imperialism Paradigm critiques of development communication models (Schiller 1970, Paterson 1998, MacBride 1980) which highlight a continued belief in the ‘self-evident’ cultural and theoretical superiority of Anglo/US approaches to journalism and media development in general.

Implications of this outlook can be seen in the lack of confidence in Cambodian journalists which are evident in pessimistic predictions about the future of journalism practice or its prospects for ever being self-sufficient. This is seen most starkly in the figure of just 16% of facilitators and donors who predict a positive future for journalism in Cambodia, but also in the low number of journalists (7%) who could see a future in the country in which journalism could survive without western help. Low professional confidence may also be a contributory factor to a deepening of the aid dependency culture which is discussed in more detail in finding 8.2F.

A lack of belief in the ability and potential of Cambodian journalists among facilitators and donors is also evident in high levels of the belief that a key journalism skill which is specific to Cambodia is to ‘know the limits’ of how far journalism can go, or what they can realistically expect of themselves. One example of this is TI2’s concern that it is dangerous to train journalists to think they can be too ethical in such an environment. “If you’re teaching a journalist to be ethical and he has to do this and this, that journalist could be shot”. While aspects of this kind of reasoning are based on pragmatic and realistic
assessments of the particular environment in which journalists must work (Duffy (2010) points out similarly when writing about press practice in Singapore), elements of the data in this study also suggest that such beliefs are due to a deeply felt cynicism about what journalism can achieve that amounts to a degree of complicity with the political status quo.

DR3, for example, describes how training should avoid topics which might be construed as “political hot potatoes”. “As long as you can keep your work within an arena which isn’t critical, isn’t threatening, that it actually has a positive message that these are things that people can do…. to make things better, then I think you are on the right side of that editorial line.” There is a danger in this approach that it can end up serving the same agenda as that which Asian Values journalism advocates are criticised for (See Lee 2001, Nain 2000), and encourage a type of journalistic culture which prioritises development and the national interest over free speech and freedom of information and a genuinely democratic environment.

The lack of confidence among Cambodian journalists highlighted here also raises concerns about the prospect for any future self-sufficiency of the press there, which is the stated long-term aim of most development projects. Low levels of awareness of the factors which contribute to this lack of confidence among programme facilitators and donors suggests that this is not something which was likely to be addressed to any serious degree within journalism programmes in the past or in the future. Only 16% of Category 1 interviewees mention ‘Lack of confidence’ as a barrier to practise as an issue, and even these tend to link this to internal Cambodian ‘character’ issues as opposed to fundamental flaws in the approach taken by the media aid industry itself. DR2 was one of the very few interviewees to draw attention to this lack of confidence as a factor which training they were involved with sought to counter.
“I [wanted] to create awareness in the journalists of how important their job really was. A lot of them thought of themselves as being quite insignificant. To be a reporter wasn’t a great thing like to be a doctor. They didn’t have any great faith that journalism was a great profession.”

9.2G: Journalism programmes in Cambodia added to the development of a two-tier press system, which contributed to a more politically polarised press culture

This study has found that the approach taken by aid organisations to the implementation of journalism training programmes, as described by facilitators and participants, may have contributed to the emergence and subsequent deepening, of a ‘two-tier’ Cambodian press, divided between what I have termed the ‘international press’, which is primarily financed and run by media organisations or figures from outside Cambodia, and the ‘local press’, which is funded and run from within the country. Evidence from the data suggests that there is limited engagement between an English-language international press which is aimed at an elite, international audience, and a Khmer-language local press, which is aimed at, and is more influential among, the local populace. Journalists who work in the local press tend to have less training, are less likely to have a high level of education, are poorer paid and are much less likely to speak English, while the organisations with which they work tend to be have much lower levels of financing, and are less secure in terms of employment.

While the levels of professionalism among local press journalists have improved in recent years (Licadho 2008), a level of distrust and antagonism exists among those on both sides toward each other. Those working in the international press tend to see their peers in the local press as corrupt government propagandists. JI9 puts it: “A lot of them, especially the editors, are focusing only on money. Some do not write at all….they only go around
extorting money.” On the other side, those working for the local press tend to believe that those working for the international press are simply instruments for foreign interests and have lost touch with the needs of the Cambodian people. TL4 puts it: “You must be careful about the journalism training. [International press journalists] become like communications officers for NGOs.”

Evidence of this two-tier press system, both ostensibly populated by journalists, but categories of journalists who are regarded differently by programme facilitators, officials and journalists themselves, is also seen within the data in the high levels of disparity between what journalists working for international organisations (JI) say are barriers to good practice, compared to what journalists who work in local organisations (JL) say. This is seen across numerous categories, for example self-censorship, vulnerability to corruption, workplaces standards and access to information (See Subthemes E.1.1, E.1.2 and E.2.1), among others. The disparity between these two sectors is also seen clearly when they are compared with facilitators and donors, whose views are much closer to those of international journalists than they are to local journalists. This suggests a general lack of engagement among programme facilitators with the problems experienced in the local press.

The data shows a tendency to regard the local press, rather than as a sector which should be reformed or improved, as something which should be escaped from. Thus the data suggest that programme facilitators’ solution to the problems experienced by those working in the local press is that practitioners should simply to move to international press organisations, rather than trying to improve conditions faced by those working there (Theme E.1, E.2). There is a general lack of acknowledgement, which sometimes veers into dismissiveness, among Category 1 interviewees of the local press in general, which again is reminiscent of a Modernisation Paradigm-oriented mentality which disregards...
local (Cambodian) expressions of a culture (in this case that of journalism) as primitive compared to international (westernised) expressions.\textsuperscript{80} TI8 presents a somewhat extreme, but also partially representative viewpoint in this regard: “Khmer newspapers are terrible. They are just awful. I remember an English guy who was killed here… stabbed. A newspaper at the time … blasted all over every front page were naked pictures of the victim. It sickened me.”

On first glance it is difficult to defend the practice of showing gratuitous pictures of crime victims in newspapers in a way that appears highly insensitive to the victim and the victim’s family. This is particularly the case when viewing them from a western perspective. However, the language used here “terrible”, “awful”, “sickened” exhibits a visceral, emotional response that shows little appreciation or interest in the particular culture and context within which such pictures are, if not excusable, significantly more understandable. The interviewee makes no attempt to assume a non-western perspective in analysing why this practice is so prevalent, which may have allowed him to come to a more balanced conclusion. Firstly, the interviewee fails to acknowledge very similar practices among western media when showing the aftermath of atrocities or disasters on foreign soil, for example pictures from Haiti, Libya, Iraq or Afghanistan (Rogers 2014).\textsuperscript{81} Secondly they fail to take into account any possible cultural aspects which may make such a publication, if not entirely excusable, then at least more understandable. Ward (2008) points out that the invasion of privacy in the context of picturing a dead body in India, for example, where the public exhibition of a dead body is not a matter of privacy for the individual or his family. Cambodian culture is influenced strongly by India, and, in this regard in particular, shows strong similarities, as do other...

\textsuperscript{80}This observation also relates to Finding 8.2E: Over-emphasis on the western orientation of journalism norms and practices within journalism programmes, which is outlined earlier in this chapter
\textsuperscript{81} Among the examples cited is the controversy surround the picture released by Associated Press entitled “Death of a marine in Afghanistan” or the images released in a number of western newspapers of the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake of 2010 (Rogers 2014)
countries in the region, such as Thailand. The type of response as represented by TI8’s here, while perhaps slightly more extreme than average, is certainly representative of an overall view of local practices, and is unhelpful among those who are involved in training journalists.

The evidence presented supports the view, which is backed up anecdotally by key informants interviewed as part of this study, that little attention was paid by those involved in journalism programme implementation to targeting journalists who worked in the local press, either at management or lower levels. The creation and subsequent contribution to the deepening of this two-tier system by those involved in journalism programme implementation has a number of far-reaching effects. These include a tendency in such scenarios for the press to underline dominant class ideologies. Banda’s (2008) study of press development initiatives by foreign aid organisations in Zambia, elements of which makes it a comparable case study to that presented by Cambodia, found them to be an elite project, “reproducing a typically western oriented libertarian ethical framework and reinforced by local elites” (p. 130). This echoes Marxist critiques of journalism such as Cole and Harcup’s (2010) and Gramsci’s hegemony theory (Cited in Foley 2010) both of which argues that journalism has a tendency to influence the degree and extent of the acquiescence needed by the ruling class from civil society to maintain social control. Such an outcome is hardly in keeping with purported ideals of the press, as conceptualised by journalism programmes in Cambodia, as being an agent of democratisation and participatory politics.

9.2H: Lower levels of aid dependency characteristics seen among local press practitioners compared to international press journalists and facilitators

Attitudes of programme facilitators which developed within a foreign-aid
dominated climate contributed to beliefs among programme participants that are associated with aid dependency, according to patterns within the data. Aid dependency refers to a situation where a country needs aid to obtain an objective for the foreseeable future (Lensink and White 1999). Ear (2013) relates this to Cambodia specifically, when he argues that aid dependence “has made it difficult, if not impossible, for Cambodia to take ownership of its own development”. Findings emanating from this study suggest that aid dependency tendencies within the press sector are in part due to the two-tier press system and low levels of professional confidence as discussed in Findings 8.2F and 8.2G. It also connects this with the low levels of confidence in the future sustainability of the Cambodian press among practitioners and training facilitators. The data shows low levels of belief in the self-sufficiency of the press among both categories of interviewees, with striking differences in those among local journalists as opposed to international. Among journalists overall, 34% believe western help will continue to be needed for the press to survive. Among facilitators this is lower, at 24%. Among local journalists (JL), however, just 15% say western help is needed for journalism to survive, compared to 58% of international journalists (JI).

This suggests the following. Firstly, a lack of confidence in the viability of journalism among international journalists has not been alleviated by their higher training levels. In fact, this lack of confidence may have been exacerbated by the exposure to negative assessments of the quality of the Cambodian press among programme implementers. This was further added to by working in international oriented press organisations where western managers and funding models dominated (Theme E.1). The picture given by international journalists in this study is of Khmer reporters in international organisations who lack power and representation at high-level editorial and management levels. JI5 says: “Encouraging the reporters to come up with their
own story ideas is very important. It empowers the reporter.” By contrast local journalists, despite experiencing poorer practice standards on several levels already described (Subtheme H) are less prone to an ‘aid dependency’ mentality. Local journalists appear to have attained a higher level of confidence in their profession through having made progress, however small, on their own terms. This has echoes of Fals-Borda’s (1991) observation that people cannot be liberated by a consciousness and knowledge other than their own.

This idea about certain factors contributing to the deepening of aid dependency and the need to be liberated by a consciousness over which local actors retain ownership of, has parallels with Magiya’s (2008) study of the professionalisation process in Uganda. Magiya describes two conceptualisations of professionalization — one espoused by politicians, and one espoused by journalists themselves — which are fundamentally at odds with each other. Statutory professionalisation as espoused by politicians, he explains, is where the state plays a primary role in the process, mainly by means of regulation. Ultimately, he points out, this conceptualisation sees the process primarily as a means of control. Journalists themselves, on the other hand, perceive professionalisation as something which is nurtured voluntarily and by socially inculcated professional values, hence as a value system (p.2). Tensions arise within the statutory approach about how values can be imposed through legislation and with the voluntary approach between the journalist and the news organisation within which they work about what constitutes professional practice.

The professionalisation process which developed in an aid-dominated Cambodian environment is neither statutory in terms of state control or something which is nurtured voluntarily within journalists themselves. Some of the data here, in particular that which shows poor levels of professional
confidence and pessimism about future prospects relates to the fact that both the state and journalists themselves were removed from this process. Instead a professional value system was inculcated almost exclusively from agencies (NGOs) and agents (foreign journalists working in Cambodia) who are external to that culture and the instinct of journalists, particularly those working in the international press, appears to be to continue to seek it from these external agencies. This study suggests that this contributes to the undermining of the development of that press culture and a continued dependency on the supporting external structure that could have a negative impact on its future prospects for self-sufficiency. TI4 highlights a tendency for western development aid to create its own sphere. “A lot of people in these donor countries are not really aware that a good part of their money is spent on maintaining an infrastructure and a lot of highly qualified people end up providing their services, serving this apparatus, rather than … where we would like them to work.”

The poor outlook for journalistic self-sufficiency has other important implications, in particular given changes in the sources of foreign aid to Cambodia. Instead of aid from the US, the EU and Japan, with their associated emphases on democracy, poverty reduction and the rule of law, it is increasingly coming from China, who provides financial assistance in exchange for resources and strategic regional assistance without any ethical dimension (Ear 2013). This is likely to result in significantly less funding being made available for media development projects in the future, in particular those which place a high priority on journalism practice. This accentuates the need for self-sufficiency among press practitioners and an ability to continue to practise in the event of a worsening political and financial climate. A lack of confidence in this regard, in particular given that this is most prevalent among those who have received the highest levels of training already, may negatively impact on the future prospects of journalistic self-sufficiency and the practice in general.
9.3 Conclusion

A thematic analysis of the data has led to a number of findings which support the idea that normative emphases whose bases are contested — whether due to perceived politicisation, culturally hegemonic tendencies or other reasons — adversely affects the fulfilment of particular journalistic ideals. Findings outlined here show how what interviewees perceived as vocational ‘western-oriented’ approaches to journalism training failed to take into account and prepare journalists for local cultural and practical specificities, resulting in a decrease in occupational confidence among working journalists. Low levels of professional efficacy contributed to poor ethical practices, a negative perception of the Cambodian press and a growth in the influence of alternative conceptualisations of journalism which emphasises the national interest and development over democratic values and freedom of information. Findings also suggest a connection between normative emphases at programme level such as that of democracy, and politically polarised normative orientations among programme participants, which may have contributed to an increase in political parallelism within the Cambodian media sector. This political parallelism was added to by elements of programme implementation, which encouraged the development of a two-tiered Cambodian press system, with limited engagement or solidarity between journalists working with the English-language ‘international’ press and a Khmer-language ‘local’ press. This study also suggests, albeit in a very qualified way, that ‘international’ and ‘local’ divisions in the Cambodian press system\(^8\) inhibited the development of a sustainable by adding to the perception that journalism is something which is inextricably linked with foreign interests. Overall, such emphases contributed to the development of a press in Cambodia that is vulnerable to instrumentalisation, as

\(^8\) There are, of course, several other factors which contributed to the development of a two-tier system outside of training, which are discussed in Chapter 6.
has been the case during the period being examined (as outlined in Chapter 6).

While the Modernisation Paradigm approach to development communications theory is largely thought to have been replaced by theories with more sophisticated conceptualisations of the relationship between those in the developed and the developing world, the data emanating from this study suggests it continued to have an effect in Cambodia between 1993 and 2011. Ideas strongly influenced by Modernisation Paradigm, including an assumption of the superiority of all westernised approaches to communications theory, continues to have a strong effect in terms of the approach taken to building programmes by facilitators, which in turn impacts on the likelihood of ideas taught in programmes being adopted by participants. The next chapter, which concludes this study will examine some of the implications of these findings and also suggests further lines of research which may be useful in drawing out in a more complete fashion, some of the findings and observations that emerged from the data here.
CHAPTER TEN
Synopsis and Conclusion

10.1 Introduction
This chapter puts key findings and implications outlined previously into the context of the overall study and progresses as follows. Firstly it synopsises the key steps that established the basis for this investigation and summarises the main findings arising from what the data says about the key research questions. It examines the implications of these for journalism education programmes in general terms, and in scenarios similar to that faced by Cambodia, before considering these implications specifically in terms of links between normative emphases at programme level and subsequent work practices of journalists and how these relate to ideas about the link between journalism and democracy. It then addresses the limitations of this study and suggests a number of propositions which arise from it, before considering how these might be further tested by future research.

10.2 Establishing the basis for the investigation
This study tests the idea that journalism programmes emphasise contested normative ideals in a way that affects subsequent work practices of programme participants. It also scrutinises how this process is affected by presumptions and expectations that predominate in an aid environment. A foundation is sought from the literature on which to base an examination of key variables in this regard using Cambodia from 1993 to the present as a case study. Firstly it attempts to come to a better sense of what journalism means, by examining its practice within various media systems and frames, while establishing its historical and sociocultural context. Journalism’s uniqueness in terms of core norms, values and practices is then put in the context of wider-frame theories of public communication, while key debates about press’ obligations to the
government, the market and general society, are outlined.

As well as seeking a better understanding of the core characteristics of journalism, this study is also interested in the degree to which these can be universally applied. As a means of doing this, it establishes geographical and cultural norm and role variations, which form the basis of arguments by the likes of Ward (2008), Gunaratne (2005), Christians (2008) and Chakrabarty (2004) that a more responsible and inclusive form of globally oriented journalism is needed, with an associated ethical framework that acknowledges and incorporates non-western belief systems. Ultimately this helps re-configure a fixed vision of journalism defined by occupational ideology, history and professional practice into a more multi-faceted conceptualisation of the practice as something constantly developing, changing and responding to differing political, social, cultural and technological streams (Hafez 2007, Loofelholz 2008). However, it also makes clear that any progression toward this kind of conceptualisation remains partial and suggests that a key question arising from this research, whether challenges to journalistic paradigms have been reflected in the approach to journalism training in the developing world, is likely to be answered in the negative.

The way in which journalistic practice enters the political realm, in particular its relationship with democratic political systems, is particularly relevant to this study given that a key condition of foreign aid to journalism programmes in Cambodia was that it contribute toward building a democratic environment. This research firstly establishes the idea that democracy and a free press are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, before examining factors which contribute to overall democratic (or authoritarian) ‘suitability’. However, it then shows how the journalism/democracy relationship was conceptualised differently within varying streams of mass communications theory and that
while the idea of a link between journalism and democracy retains plausibility, the literature on the subject tends toward an “exacerbated normativism” (Mancini 1996) which over-simplifies and exaggerates the depth of and extent of the connection.

Having established that the link between journalism and democracy is more tenuous than is often assumed, other crucial variables which impact on why particular normative ideals were emphasised in journalism programmes in Cambodia are examined. These are firstly, the means by which journalism is taught and secondly, how varying development communications paradigms impacted on this. Key elements of this discourse are the questions of whether journalism programmes should be based on a more vocational or educational model and whether the dominance of western knowledge within journalism curricula in the developing world excludes local knowledge (Ullah 2010, Freedman et al 2009).

The implications of this are examined here via the case study of Cambodia, which was chosen due to its experience of a foreign-aid driven journalism development and its lack of a pre-existing journalism culture pre 1993 which makes it easier to analyse the effect of journalism programmes on work practices after that time. It was also chosen due to my own observations as a journalism practitioner in Cambodia, an experience which both inspired the research, and gave me a useful insider perspective. A qualitative approach examines two key variables. Firstly, links between the development of training programme objectives and the belief in and adherence to particular journalistic normative ideals by facilitators, donors and other relevant stakeholders are examined. Secondly, it looks at the way normative ideals found to predominate at programme level impacts upon norm conceptualisations of participants in terms of their work practices and the implications this had for the fulfilment of
10.3 Relating the key findings to the research questions

An examination of the data generated from using Cambodia as a case study suggests the following answers to key research questions.

1. What are the functions and expectations of journalism within media aid strategies and what is the basis for them? What is the nature of journalism programmes in these scenarios?

This study has found that journalism programmes in the aid environment experienced in Cambodia, as described by interviews with facilitators and participants, were primarily vocational in orientation and propagated a view of journalism as defined by occupational ideology, history, professionalisation and a self-proclaimed role in democratisation (Deuze 2008). This conceptualisation, as seen in the data across both categories, was strongly western in orientation in terms of its skills, practices and ethical values, in keeping with analyses by the likes of Chalaby (1996). Facilitators are also seen to have strongly emphasised values like responsibility, accuracy, impartiality, balance, objectivity and truthfulness, which are reminiscent of a US model of journalistic professionalism.

2. Is journalism fulfilling these functions and expectations and are there particular roles and values associated with the practice that make it more or less useful in this regard?

This study suggests that one of the factors for journalism’s failure to fulfil the functions and expectations expected of it in Cambodia is a failure by facilitators to incorporate into their programmes challenges to western-oriented paradigms of journalism’s societal function and previous conceptualisations of its place within media systems. This is typified by the lack of acknowledgement by
those involved in journalism programme implementation in Cambodia of previous concerns that vocational approaches in the west had over-simplified intellectual complexities (Parisi 1994) and damaged the public service function of journalism (Medsger 1996, Carey 2000). Data generated here suggests that this kind of unreconstructed approach within the journalism training sector has contributed to the deepening of a two-tier press system in Cambodia, with an associated reinforcement of dominant class ideologies and elite agendas (Banda 2008, Harcup 2010) within the press which does not fit with the journalistic ideal that it serve the common interest.

Patterns in the data also show that an over-reliance on the liberal variant of the democratic norm at a programme and work practice level has led to tendencies within the press in Cambodia which undermines its ability to fulfill its democratisation function. The liberal variant of this norm, which sees journalism as an active, autonomous force in safeguarding citizen’s rights and holding the powerful accountable, has been found to predominate over other variants, in a way which can result in politically polarised interpretations of roles such as the ‘watchdog’ one (as outlined in Chapter 8: Finding 8.2B).

3. Do specific normative emphases within journalism programmes affect work practices of participants?
Several instances are highlighted in this research of how simplistic emphases on norms and ethical values, which may have resulted from their being taught in short-term, vocationally oriented programmes, contribute to their being poorly applied in practical scenarios. Examples include the ‘inform’ function as described by programme facilitators re-interpreted as ‘educate’ by some participants. A similar reinterpretation of the ‘bridge’ function is also given by participants as meaning to carry information to the people from the government, in the contrast with the more two-way system as was originally conceived. An
‘Asian Values’ emphasis by programme participants also prioritises economic development over press freedom. ‘Improving the government’, as emphasised by facilitators, is reinterpreted as ‘attack the government’ by participants, while the ‘watchdog’ role is interpreted as a mandate to unseat undemocratic forms of governance. All of these characteristics suggest a type of journalist being produced by programmes who are not only ill-equipped to function effectively within what is a highly politically polarised environment, but may in fact add to this polarisation.

Poor observance of ethics among journalists also suggests that ethics training at programme level did not have the required effect on participants. The data shows poor adherence to ethical practices related to accuracy, balance and avoiding corrupt practices, despite a reasonably high level of awareness of them. This is linked by the data to low levels of professional confidence, with signifiers including high levels of self-censorship, poor opinion of peers, high levels of fear and stress levels. There is also evidence of low levels of belief among facilitators in the ability of training to improve journalistic ethics, an attitude which epitomises the kind of “top-down” interaction between western press models and journalism training (criticised by Carey, 1979, and Merrill, 2002). These have particularly strong implications for the ability of programme participants to apply concepts like objectivity, particularly in authoritarian or post-authoritarian environments (Duffy 2011, Mickiewicz 1998).

10.4 Conclusions
Findings emerging from this research suggest the following lessons for journalism programmes in a developing world environment.
1. Alternative normative frameworks of journalism which take local and practical cultural specificities into account are needed so that journalists can work more effectively

Teaching journalism using normative frameworks and ethical and work practice concepts which better reflect local realities may lead to better adherence to ethical values in work practice situations. This study also tends toward a conclusion that a social responsibility press orientation provides a better normative framework than those generated within the more currently predominant libertarian approach in terms of counteracting the challenge posed by polarised political environments in developing countries. This would mean certain norms which are currently emphasised in a more western-oriented Libertarian journalism tradition — for example that of objectivity — being de-emphasised. According to Ward (2004) and Bell (1997), more European approaches to journalism downplays what they describe as an “unworkable” ideal of objectivity, in favour of a more interpretative approach to news, which feeds into a more social responsibility tradition.

While elements of the social responsibility tradition, with its emphasis on the press as something apart from and superior, to the public, fed into currents which may lead to the press becoming too embedded with the dominant powers in a society, this type of model, particularly where it incorporate some of the criticisms of the citizen participation model, can be effective in a developing world scenario by acting as the key step from an authoritarian environment toward an environment in which a more libertarian tradition can fulfil its function effectively by establishing a public sphere in which all voices can be heard equally. A delinking of objectivity as a value within the more libertarian tradition and a reemphasis of it as a value within a social-responsibility-oriented journalism as a value which can help separate information from propaganda, may be useful in this regard.
An alternative normative frameworks approach may also be useful in re-conceptualising of ideas related to patriotism within journalism programmes, in a way which also might be a useful counterpoint to an ‘Asian Values’ led ideas of journalism which runs counter to ideals of free speech and popular participation. The ‘Asian Values’ discourse relates strongly to the idea of patriotism, a concept often used to attack journalists and subvert their purpose which is particularly prevalent in Asia (Chua 1998) and features strongly in the data. TI1 recalls: “One journalist said to me: ‘Every time [Thais] write about Cambodians, they say we are thieves and beggars.’ I said: ‘Do you want to be like that? The answer was: ‘We’re Khmers first and journalists second’.”

Alternative normative frameworks within journalism curricula could emphasise elements of a value system that includes, yet transcends, notions of patriotic duty to one's country. An example of this is Ward and Wasserman’s (2008) idea of democratic patriotism, which is distinguished by adopting a more specific object, or goal for patriotism, such as the common good, rather than it being exclusively tied to the interests of one country.

Other emphases which better allow for cultural differences presented by a developing world environment include a more ubuntu-based (an African ethical concept which emphasises participation and social solidarity) normative framework, as described by Ward (2008). This contributes to a more community oriented conceptualisation of the function of the press, which in turn also feeds into a more social responsibility and participatory press function conceptualisations.

Tendencies associated with emphases on the liberal variant of the democratic norm, such as the interpretation of the ‘watchdog’ role as a mandate for political action, contribute to a polarised environment which does not facilitate the kind of healthy political dialogue which is required for a functioning participative
democracy. This study posits that an increased emphasis in journalism programmes on a more social democratic variant of the democratic norm, stressing citizenship, the creation of a public forum, public obligations and a more educational role of journalism in the facilitation of democracy, will improve the chances of the press fulfilling its democratisation role.

2. **Globalisation Paradigm influences on journalism education sector has enabled the continued dominance of modernisation paradigm approach**

Conclusions in this study chime with critiques of essential shallowness of the Globalisation Paradigm (Appadurai 1990, Hafez 2007), in finding that in the area of journalism education — particularly in a developing world environment — it has many similarities to the Modernisation Paradigm. Education curricula are open to more external influences via a range of new communications technologies, it is true, but the range and variety of them are not as wide-ranging and diverse as strong globalisations theorists (Peiterse 2000) might claim, and they are less revolutionary in nature. Ultimately, emergent patterns from the data suggest the main effect of globalising tendencies in journalism education is that they open new pathways through which the weaker party — or the developing country — can be influenced by the cultural power of the dominant one, which in journalism curricula terms is overwhelmingly the Anglo/US model. The Globalisation Paradigm has had the added effect of further underlining an uncritical conflation of ‘progress’, with ‘market liberalism’ in a way that contributed to the Modernisation Paradigm’s continued strength in the area of journalism education. The experience of Cambodia would seem to bear this theory out.

While Participatory Paradigm approaches, though solid theoretically, have a tendency to fall short in terms of practical applicability (as discussed in Chapter 4), a different approach to journalism curricula, which puts more of an emphasis
on community based research methods (discussed in Chapter 4) might offer a means by which it can impact upon journalism curricula in a positive fashion. A more participatory approach can be a means of re-engaging these programmes with their native settings in a way that might make them more successful in producing critically aware journalism practitioners who can weather the very specific challenges faced when working in difficult political and socio-economically under-developed environments, while also being of use to the industry in which they hope to find employment.

3. A more educational orientation for journalism programmes is required in order for the fulfilment of journalism ideals

The experience of Cambodia shows that the predominant approach taken to journalism programme implementation there, as described by those with knowledge of it, was ‘basics-up’ — meaning an emphasis on basic journalism skills and building from there. This approach, while understandable given the difficulties presented by the Cambodian environment in the early 1990s (as outlined in Chapter 6), may have contributed to problems for the fulfilment of the stated aims and ambitions of these programmes, particularly where it was the only approach used. Institutional and political economic conditions existed in Cambodia, which contributed to strong levels of media instrumentalisation. The literature argues persuasively that the effect of journalism practice can counteract some such tendencies. Berger (2000, p. 83) argues that while journalism operates within a media institutional environment, its practice has a degree of autonomy from — and often contradicts — its institutional context, while according to Harcup (2004, p.6) the ideological constraints and other structural pressures felt by journalists do not entirely undermine their individual actions.

However, patterns evidenced by the data from Cambodia suggests that over-
emphasis on a vocational approach to journalism programmes contributed to the creation of a more ‘functionary’ type journalist lacking in critical awareness and strong ethical beliefs, with a subsequent lessening of his or her ability to operate autonomously and separately from a dysfunctional institutional context. Instead of driving the creation of a public sphere in which reasoned debate and argument could take place, journalists instead tended to become agents of and contributors toward a politically polarised environment, where misinformation and distraction are weapons of competing ideological forces.

Overall, the findings emanating from this study suggests individual journalists must be educated to a degree which goes beyond the learning of basic journalism practice, in order for them to better fulfil particular roles, such as the democratic one. One means of achieving this may lie in the examination of alternative approaches to journalism programmes, such as the highly theoretical approach that predominated in Eastern Europe under socialist governments (Aumente et al 1999, Mill 1994, Hiebert 1994). This model was rejected to a large degree due to it being compromised politically (Aumente et al 1999, Ognianova, 1995). However, a journalism education tradition which viewed general intellectual abilities and competence, and a talent to present information as more important than the news, predated the communist system (Foley 2010). This approach should be examined again for useful elements that might be considered in future approaches to journalism programmes in a developing world environment. This would be in keeping with the encouragement of what Foley (2010) describes “critically aware journalists [which are] desperately needed in transitional democracies” (p.146), or Schon’s (1987) “reflective practitioner”, who look to their own experiences and feelings, and build new understandings to inform their actions in a given situation as it unfolds.

Some elements of these tendencies can be linked to the standard of journalism
trainers. While some concepts, as explained above, tend to be adapted by journalists via their experiences in work environments or due to their lack of in-depth training, others are emphasised by trainers (particularly local ones) as much as they are re-interpreted by journalists. The experience in Cambodia suggests that conceptualisations of press functions get adapted via several distinct stages. This takes place firstly in the programme facilitation process, via emphases from donors which are then communicated in the training of trainers themselves. Evidence is described in Finding 8.2A of an increased emphasis upon more politically polarised interpretations of certain norms among local trainers and donors — ‘improve democracy’ for example — than among international trainers. These are then communicated to programme participants who, particularly in the case of local journalists, tend to have these views polarised further via work practices. This study’s findings suggest that more robust conceptualisations of such norms are needed, which are clearly communicated to trainers, who can then communicate them to programme participants via more long-term, in-depth courses than interviewees suggest were available in Cambodia for most of the duration that this study examined.

4. **Better programme evaluations will lead to an improvement in terms of the fulfilment of normative ideals of these programme**

A disconnect between facilitators and programme participants can be seen in the lack of awareness among facilitators about the problems programme participants experience working in the Cambodian media environment, for example those related to vulnerability to corruption, workplace standards and poor access to information. This disconnect can be addressed by improving evaluation procedures of journalism programmes. An analysis of the data generated here suggests that evaluations of programmes carried out in Cambodia, if they took place at all, tended to be perfunctory and lacking in depth, with little or nothing built into programme frameworks in terms of
analysing or acting upon the results of evaluations (See Chapter 7.2: Theme G). Evaluation procedures which incorporate in-depth feedback (perhaps six months after training) on how training impacted on practice were rarely, if ever carried out. This is shown both in the data and by the almost complete absence of documentation made available to this researcher where sought. Better quality evaluation and analysis of feedback might have alerted programme facilitators to a number of factors seen in the data which impacted negatively on the applicability of lessons taught within programmes — for example the need to target more senior management and editors working in the local press for training, or the degree to which other external factors, such as legal obstacles and low pay, put journalists under pressure in Cambodia.

**10.5 Limitations of this research**

The outcomes of this research are qualified by a number of limitations.

1. Methodological problems are described in Chapter 5 which include the location of the case study and a lack of fluency in Khmer. However, these limitations were anticipated and overcome in as much as is possible.

2. Events in Cambodia have moved on in the last 12 months while this study was being written up. The country was thrown into a political crisis with the 2013 National Assembly election results, which showed a huge and unexpected gain in the opposition\(^{83}\) support against the dominant CPP (Buncombe 2013). A number of large protests disputed the results of the election, claiming the CNRP had won the vote and while a compromise was reached, the position of the ruling CPP appears damaged. A discussion of the influence of the media and journalism on what took place in the lead-up to this election and afterwards would have been a useful addition to this study, but was beyond its scope given

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\(^{83}\) The opposition consisted of a coalition party which combined the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party into the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP).
fieldwork was done in 2011. It would be useful for any future study to consider the implications of findings here in light of what took place in 2013.

3. I must also acknowledge that, regardless of efforts and steps taken to avoid it, a degree of normative bias is inevitable in terms of the approach to and framing of this study. This is due to my background, both formerly as a journalist in Cambodia and Ireland, as well as having been educated and living in a western environment. I have rigorously examined all questions for bias in a way that I believe has achieved a degree of neutrality in terms of study. I believe this has overcome the challenge of as Hornig Priest (2010, p.161) puts it, selecting and reporting only the themes and examples that fit the researcher’s preconceptions. Also, a number of advantages also come from associations with the subject being examined which counters the dangers represented by normative bias. Firstly, it allowed me to empathise to a greater degree with some of what was being discussed and in doing so extract deeper information from participants than might have been possible without my background as a journalist. Secondly, my experience as a journalist in Cambodia allowed me to gain access to subjects to a degree that might not have been possible for another researcher based in the west. Overall, I feel these advantages helped counter the inevitable bias which arose from my journalistic and cultural background.

4. I have not managed to integrate and fully analyse developments within digital journalism in Cambodia to the depth and rigour that I would have liked. This is, in part, due to the fact that this sector was only really beginning to take off in the very latter part of the period being studied, but was also due to a lack of feasibility. Any future research in Cambodia would have to take digital journalism into account, and in particular, consider whether it was a factor contributing to the political upheaval in 2013.

5. This study’s findings relating to what was and was not done within journalism programmes in Cambodia must be qualified by the fact that the researcher’s understanding of these programmes is based almost entirely on
interviews with facilitators and participants and their understanding of the programmes, as opposed to an entirely unvarnished and comprehensive account of what was actually carried out by these programmes, which would only be possible by combining a documentary analysis of all programmes at the time, including their mission statements, teaching plans, evaluations etc, with the kind of qualitative approach done here. However, the piecemeal nature of the sector and poor record keeping in programmes made it impossible to gather the amount of documentary evidence required for such a study. A qualitative interview-based methodology offers a good overview of what happened in the sector, the justification for which is more fully outlined in Chapter Five. However, it is not intended to make blanket assumptions about all actors in the sector. As such, the research accepts that there may well have been programmes which did not conform to the tendencies and weaknesses highlighted here.

10.6 Suggested propositions

A number of propositions are suggested by the conclusions which arise from analysis of the data. These are listed firstly in relation to norm emphasis and work practice, and secondly, in terms of linkages between journalism and democracy.

Norm emphasis and work practice: 1. Alternative ethical frameworks should be incorporated in journalism training programmes in the developing world. Teaching alternative ethical journalism frameworks which take cultural differences into account will lead to better occupational confidence and ultimately better adherence to ethical values in work practice situations. 2. A more educational orientation for journalism programmes, which also incorporates key vocational elements, is needed to maximise the effectiveness of such programmes and increase the chances for the fulfillment of journalism ideals.
Journalism and democratic ideal fulfillment: 1. An overemphasis on particular variants of the democratic norm, or the over-simplistic interpretation of them, at programme level contributes to a politically polarised two-tier press environment which reduces the chances of fulfilment of the democratic ideal. 2. Better adherence to ethical principles which reflect the environment in which journalists work can contribute to fulfillment of the democratic norm in a developing world context.

10.7 Suggestions for further research
A number of further avenues for research are suggested by the conclusions of this study.

1. A study of the work practice outcomes for journalists who have only been exposed to a more educational approach to journalism training versus a group of students who only participated in vocational training would interrogate further whether more educational orientated journalism programmes increase the chances of the fulfillment of journalism ideals in terms of subsequent work practice. One opportunity for such a study might be an examination of the differences in work practice outcomes for students of the Bachelor’s Degree in Media Management at the Department of Media and Communications in the Royal University of Phnom Penh, compared to students of a similar age group, who only received vocational style training. The DMC course is the first serious attempt at a more sustained educational approach to journalism training in Cambodia. The results of this emphasis at the time in which this research was being carried out is still unclear, but there are signs from the limited data that is available at the time of writing, that graduates have had a tendency to not work in journalism after qualifying, echoing concerns raised by Medsger (1996), and Carey (2000) that situating journalism schools within general communication departments could result in students being trained simply as communicators who could be hired to serve any interest.
2. The findings of this study have implications for organising journalism programmes in environments similar to that presented by Cambodia in the early 1990s — specifically post conflict, developing world environments which can be termed transitional democracies. A comparison between findings here and those from projects in similar countries would reveal more about the effect of training emphases in particular environments on work practice outcomes. Examples could include culturally similar countries in the same region, such as Burma or Laos. In Burma, journalists must practice within an ostensibly a free press, under an authoritarian regime which appears to be transitioning toward a more open and democratic environment. Laos, which has cultural similarities to Cambodia, as well being a former French colony, would also be a useful comparison. This type of project would not be restricted to single levels of analysis of traditional news institutions, western countries or states or single disciplinary traditions without considering education and socialisation of journalist, and would be truly comparative across national and cultural boundaries. In this way, it might be possible to, as Xu (1998) puts it, to pick through ideologies of press systems, situational differences and histories of journalism to get a more authentic expression of Asian journalism culture.

Comparative studies might also usefully be done in countries such as Afghanistan, which is regarded as transitional democracy with issues similar to those faced by Cambodia in the early 1990s, and also has a high degree of emphasis on media development projects as part of rebuilding efforts there. A comparative study with a country in which training programmes incorporated ethical frameworks in which a greater effort was made to incorporate local ethical normative frameworks would also be a useful means of seeing whether this impacted on work practices.
3. A more detailed, two-pronged study analysing conceptualisations about norms and roles of journalism in the immediate aftermath of training versus how these same norms were conceptualised after a period working in the media would be useful in terms of the interrelationship between influences of journalism programmes and media systems. Several more recent journalism training programmes in Cambodia are incorporating more detailed evaluation procedures which might make such a project more feasible than it was in the period being studied here.

**10.8 Concluding statement**

It is hoped that findings generated by this study can make a contribution to current efforts in international journalism education research to deepen and diversify the developing global network of journalism education. In doing so, this might help to right some of the imbalances in the field and in particular the portrayal of western-oriented conceptualisations of journalistic norms and practices as ‘universal’. This study’s findings suggest that not acknowledging the impact of local cultural variations on journalism practice and journalism education in the developing world undermines the edifice of what it is hoped the promotion and development of journalism will achieve. There is a strong argument that a ‘universal’ conceptualisation of journalism is needed for the practice to survive the political economic and technological challenges it faces. However, this study suggests that such vision a can only be achieved by re-conceptualising and re-defining core journalism values in a way which, while acknowledging fully what journalism is and should aspire to, allows for differences in its practice and norms in different environments.
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**Appendix A**
Interview sheet 1. Trainers, programme facilitators

1. Name of programme, contact details, status
2. Courses offered and qualification levels received
3. Who funded the programmes and on what basis was funding received?
4. How many students/professionals are successfully “outputted” annually?
5. Did you carry out a needs assessment in advance of course? Describe this?
6. What is the training/ background of trainers?
7. Describe curriculum? How did you formulate the curriculum?
8. What lengths do courses run for? What was covered? Are there practical elements to your training?
9. Can you break down the time spent on particular topics?
10. What training manuals do you use? Why were these chosen?
11. In what way is your curriculum adapted to specific local realities?
12. What role should be played by journalists in Cambodia?
13. What are the most important values journalists should have?
14. How are these different to values and roles that journalists in other countries should have (if at all)?
15. What are the biggest challenges faced by Cambodian journalists? How does this course help overcome these?
16. What are the objectives of your programme? Have these been achieved?
17. Outline to me how you evaluated the success of your courses? How did you measure their overall impact?
18. What plans do you have to develop programs in the future?
19. What challenges lie ahead for the school/ programme and how can they be overcome?

Appendix B

84 Questions in Appendix A also applied here, with additional questions as follows
Interview sheet 2. Donors and funders

1. Tell me about your organisation’s policy in terms of supporting the media here in Cambodia?

2. Where does support for journalism fit within this strategy?

3. How has this strategy changed during your organization’s time here?

4. Has the strategy been successful in general? On what basis can you say this?

5. What is your current assessment of the Cambodian media sector?

6. How much is it improving?

7. What about the standard of journalism?

8. What role does journalism play in Cambodia?

9. On what basis do you fund certain organisations?

10. How do you evaluate whether your money is being spent effectively?
Appendix C

Interview sheet 3. Programme participants

1. Name, Age, Sex, place of work, Full history of career, journalism training
2. Use creative interviewing ‘icebreakers’ where appropriate
3. Why did you want to become a journalist?
4. What has been the main influence on your idea of what it is to be a journalist?
5. What was your background before journalism, what training did you receive?
6. What do you think are the most important roles of a journalist?
7. What is THE most important role of journalists?
8. What are the main values a good journalist should have?
9. What is the most important skill for a Cambodian journalist to have?
10. What are your ambitions as a journalist?
11. What are conditions like as a journalist?
12. Would you want your son/ daughter to be a journalist?
13. Do you think Cambodian journalists do a good job overall? In what way?
14. What are the biggest problems that journalists face in doing their job?
15. Do you believe Cambodian journalists have affected change in Cambodia…. In what way?
16. Are there aspects to journalism training for Cambodians that are bad/ not useful?
17. What kind of training should be given to Cambodian journalists in the future?

A number of questions were included in earlier interviews but abandoned due to concerns that they were skewing results. This is discussed in Chapter 7.1. The questions are as follows: Did your training prepare you well to be journalist? In what way? Was the training relevant for being a journalist in Cambodia? Is it better to learn about being a journalist from training or is it better to learn ‘on the job’. How would you regard your performance level at your job following the course? Was there a noticeable improvement in specific skills as a result of the training? What were the most important things you learned in that training? Do you remember the modules that were taught? How long did it go on for? What was the best/ worst trainers in journalism that you had? What was good and bad about their performances?

As outlined in Chapter 5
Appendix D
Organisations involved in journalism training 1993-2011

1A. LOCALLY-BASED PROGRAMME FACILITATORS

Cambodian Communication Institute
The CCI, which is probably the most significant player in terms of journalism training in Cambodia (Clarke 2000), was set up in 1994 by UNESCO, initially under the Ministry of Information. It developed its own team of local trainers, who conducted classes in Khmer and put on hundreds of short-term journalism courses and workshops. The CCI aimed initially at improving the basic skill levels of journalists who were working in the media without having received any kind of formal training. While there was a recognition that needs may have been more complex than had been initially thought, the completion of a survey of the training needs within the Cambodian media sector was hindered by the 1997 coup and never used (Clarke 2000). Courses themselves continued to be run, with the Institute saying it provided 32 in 1998 and 26 in 1999 while early in 2000 a year-long part-time course was set up. Among its main funders and partners were Danida, UNESCO and the French Government. There have been concerns over the CCI’s independence (Clarke 2000), however, and in 1999 Danida cut their funding due to its location as part of the Ministry of Information. In response, the CCI moved to Department of Media and Communications at the RUPP, where it continues to act as an arm within the department aimed more at working journalists, but with more of a commercial emphasis.

Royal University of Phnom Penh
In 1992, a journalism course was set up in the RUPP. Two years later it was incorporated into the French degree programme and student numbers in this

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87 In-depth examination has been confined to the more established or sustained efforts.

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programme varied from between 10 and 15 a year up until 2000 (Clarke 2000). A 1997 evaluation reported that students, professionals, university staff and government officials were “enthusiastic” the course (Clarke 2000). In 2001 RUPP, in association with the KAF, set up a Bachelor diploma for working journalists in media management (BMM) and in 2002 it opened the Department of Media and Communications to run the degree. This is the only degree course in journalism in the country (Baumgartel 2012). A small full-time German and local staff run the course and they bring in Khmer and foreign journalists to teach part-time on some professional courses (Josephi 2010). Modules include practical skills, media law, ethics and mass communications and 91 students have been awarded the degree since 2005 (Baumgartel 2012). The degree has become highly prestigious with an excellent employment record for graduates, although most choose to take up employment in NGOs, most often in public relations capacity (Josephi 2010).

**Khmer Journalists’ Association**

The KJA was set up with the help of UNESCO in 1994, initially as a support group for journalists but later began holding training sessions and workshops. The Asian Foundation (TAF) provided most of the funding for the courses, under an American trainer initially, and later under Khmer trainers (Clarke 2000), which later became a three-month course at the RUPP. A split occurred among KJA members between CPP and opposition supporters which lead to the departure of UNESCO as a funder. This combined with more competition for funding from the likes to the CCI and DMC lead to the KJA becoming much less active in recent years.

**Media Training Centre**

Courses are provided by the Media Training Centre within the grounds of the Ministry for Information. UNESCO, who support the organisations, describe
the MTC as “a governmental institution working towards strengthening the capacity of both governmental and private media in Cambodia” (UNESCO website). Course have tended to focus on basic practical journalism skills, but there has been an increased tendency in recent years toward workshops in specialised topics, such as investigative reporting, freedom of expression and legal procedures (UNESCO 2013). Doubts over its independence have been raised due to its proximity to the Ministry for Information.

Interviews with opposition press journalists (all of whom asked not to be named) alleged that selection of participants for courses is politically motivated. In an interview (2011) MTC Director Mean Kimsuon said that participants for training sessions were individually invited for training by management of the centre but did not offer details of how these were selected. According to Jamie Hyo-Jin Lee of UNESCO in Phnom Penh, the organisation was worth supporting because it had the backing of the Ministry for Information. “[This makes it] more effective to get a good range of participants and working journalists” (Hyo-Jin Lee 2011).

Club of Cambodian journalists
The Club of Cambodian journalists, a journalists’ representation group, also carried out a number of training initiatives, generally with the help of funding from the KAF, the Ministry of Information and the EU. According to a Pok Poun, Information officer with the EU (2011) they pinpoint particular areas in which few stories are being written, for example economic stories, and they fund CCJ workshops specifically to address these issues. According to senior German advisor at the National Assembly Wagner Mattias, Germany supporting the organisations financially despite doubts over its independence. “They have become more professional. Officially they have nothing from ruling party on their agenda. They are a neutral institution to train journalists” (Mattias 2011).
Jamie Hyo-Jin Lee of UNESCO concurs with this view. “The CCJ is good in terms of its quality and effectiveness at delivering its mission [of improving the overall professionalism of journalists]”. CCJ committee member Nguon Serath (2011) says CCJ training attempts to marry an academic approach to the subject practical needs among journalists and local trainers are used where possible (Serath 2011).

Press Council of Cambodia
The PCC also acts as a journalists’ representation organisation and helps facilitate and organise skills training, primarily funded by UNESCO. The organisation is an umbrella group for more than 16 different journalism groups, and is strongly affiliated (some suggest run by) the Ministry of Information and the Media Training Centre. According to Jamie Hyo-Jin Lee, while the PCC on paper has a lot of members, the CCJ is a more effective and professionalised organisation. However, the PCC is useful in term of a means of advocating for the release of jailed journalists (Hyo-Jin Lee 2011) due to its closeness with the government. Detailed information on activities of the PCC were very difficult to access.

Cambodian Institute for Media Studies
Funded primarily by the Asia Foundation (TAF), the CIMS is a local NGO founded by Cambodian journalism trainers and journalists which operated between 2007 and 2009. According to its website, the CIMS is dedicated to promoting freedom of information as well as improving journalists’ professional skills. Among its activities are a number of journalism training workshops on a range of topics including anti-corruption, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, reporting legal processes and media law. Roberts (2011) reports that the organisation received funding for a pilot study to train 60 journalists in three provinces and compile a newsletter, but none of the stories were published.

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Ministry for Information

The Ministry for Information has facilitated journalism training, primarily through supporting the Media Training Centre, the RUPP and the CCI. Major doubts have been raised by several interviewees and in the literature about the degree of independence organisations who are supported by the ministry are allowed.

Cambodian Centre for Independent Media

The CCIM was established in June 2007 as an offshoot organization of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR) in order to continue broadcasting the Voice of Democracy radio station. CCIM receives core funding from the Open Society Institute, International Republican Institute and Radio France International. It carried out training of journalists in partnership with Internews focused mainly on basic skills and investigative journalism.

1B. INTERNATIONAL FUNDERS, FACILITATORS

UNESCO

UNESCO has been the most prominent of the aid agencies involved in media development during the period. It has acted as a facilitator and funder to numerous training and education programmes, initially directed toward improving basic journalism skills, often in funding partnership with other agencies (such as AIDAB (Australia), USIS and Danida ). Its flagship project was the CCI. A report dated October 1994 listed in the previous year 37 courses involving 590 attendees from Agence Khmère de Presse (AKP)\textsuperscript{88}, six broadcast stations, 22 local newspapers, five foreign news organisations, 12 government ministries and other bodies and 21 NGOs (Clarke 2000, p. 85-86). Other initiatives included a journalism course at RUPP in 1992, which was later

\textsuperscript{88} Formerly the SPK
incorporated into the French course in the Languages Department (Baumgartel 2012), funding the Khmer Journalists Association and helping fund the DMC. According to UNESCO Communications officer Jamie Hyo-Jin Lee (2011) journalism training remains central to the organisation’s mandate in Cambodia, with the aim of improving the general levels of skills and ethical practice in a way that would lead to more freedom of expression. UNESCO has also worked with the Press Council of Cambodia to produce a code of ethics for use by journalists. Initial focus on basic skills has given way in recent years to an emphasis on more specialised training (Hyo-Jin Lee 2011). However there are concerns, a lack of a consistent overall strategic approach and poor levels of evaluation of programmes carried out may have hampered the overall effectiveness of UNESCO’s work in Cambodia (Hyo-Jin Lee 2011).

The Konrad Adenauer Foundation
The German-funded KAF first became active in the journalism training sector in 1995, when it funded courses for about 100 local working journalists through AKP and at the Phnom Penh Post. It also helped extend an Australian-funded programme for information officers in the ministries. This initial phase of KAF’s help stopped after the July 1997 coup but in 2000, the organisation’s interest returned but with a different focus. It partnered with UNESCO in helping form the KJA and also became the main funder of RUPP’s four-year BA course in media management since 2001, as well as supporting the Club of Cambodian Journalists (a journalists’ union organisation).

Internews
US based Internews - long active in Eastern Europe, Russia and Asia - was a prominent provider and funder of training courses in Cambodia. From 2005-2008, it worked closely with Khmer-language print journalists and editors on a series of investigative journalism trainings aimed at engaging the media in the
fight against corruption. Programmes centred around one-on-one mentoring between journalists and Internews advisers, with the distribution of small scholarships to offset the high costs of pursuing in-depth stories on corruption issues. Internews managed a series of intensive thematic training courses; developed a training resource specific to investigative journalism in Cambodia and awarded a prize for excellence in investigative reporting. At the same time it engaged print, TV and radio journalists as well as NGO leaders in training on HIV/AIDS and health reporting (from Internews website). According to one of its trainers quoted in Josephi (2010, p.?), its training “focused on how to carry out investigative reporting in the local sphere and was designed to contradict the widely held view that such stories inevitably involve political criticism and therefore bring trouble for reporters”. According to Roberts (2011) Internews’ approach was unique in terms in that it was one of the only organisations who engaged in long-term structured training of working journalists.

Independent Journalism Foundation
Active in Cambodia since 2001, examples of IJF’s work included an International Workshop in Advanced Journalism in RUPP and a three-month course of intensive English and journalism training which was offered ten times. The IJF helped publish media guides on specific issues (including AIDS) and ran training programmes at the RUPP for journalists on the same theme. It also ran courses in 2007 on reporting at the Khmer Rouge War Crimes tribunal.

Indochina Media Memorial Foundation
The IMMF set up in Bangkok in 1993 with the aim of training journalists from the region. Its first course, in basic journalism, took place in Bangkok in 1994. It then ran at least twice a year (McCLean 2011) until 2009, covering photojournalism, business and economic reporting and environmental reporting. Intensive, month long courses were attended usually by 16 people per time, with
some coming from Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. By the start of 2000, 40 Cambodian journalists from 25 local and international news organisations had been on IMMF courses and reported positively on the experience (Clarke 2000, p. 87-90). Evaluations were carried out in the form of feedback sheets by each participant, although Sarah McClean, who helped run the IMMF for much of its lifetime, did not have much faith in its accuracy (McClean 2011)

**Australian Broadcasting Corporation**

From 1996 to 1998 ABC, with the support of AusAID, provided five short courses in state-run TVK in various aspects of television production, including journalism. ABC also did a radio course for the Phnom Penh municipal radio station and is currently involved in training working journalists in the state-run RNK radio station within the Ministry for Information. The project, initially in partnership with the World Bank, is aimed at the development of news bulletins and a talkback programme on the station, whereby members of the public call in and discuss some of the issues that effect them (Clarke, B. 2011) and has begun to branch out around the country.

**The Asia Foundation**

Funded primarily by USAID, TAF started journalism workshops with the Khmer Journalists’ Association in 1994. It also established a series of three-month full-time journalism training courses in RUPP. By 2000, 444 people had done the course, but only 40% of those were journalists (Josephi 2010). TAF also funded a Khmer language newspaper for a number of years in the late 1990s, early 2000s. However, details on this project have been difficult to uncover and little formal evaluation of the project appears to have been carried out.
BBC World Service Trust

According to their website, the BBC World Service Trust carried out a number of journalism training programme in Cambodia. However, their focus has changed to a more development communications bent, or according to country director Charles Hamilton. “We haven’t editorially taken decisions that would have gotten us into trouble with the Government. That is really important here, if you are seen as a threat, or overly critical, you can’t continue to work here.” Workshops are also carried out to help improve skill levels, but these are primarily about technical skill capacity building, for example for people who work in television. According to Emily LeRoux, Research Manager with the organisation, here is a blurring of the approach taken by the BBC in Cambodia between development communication and media development. “In order to do the development communication you also have to build skills” (Le Roux 2011).

Reuters

The British news agency conducted several short-term training course in business reporting in 1993 and 1994. Little detail has been uncovered on the exact nature of the training carried out, except from some of those who participated in this training who said it focused primarily on basic skills training.

American Assistance for Cambodia

AAC organised training programs for journalists in Phnom Penh. The organisation also set up a desktop publishing course at RUPP with the help of TAF and Japanese funders (Clarke 2000, p. 87). Courses began in April 1995. The KJA was initially involved but dropped out after two years. With the end of the eighth course in 2000, 444 students had graduated with a TAF/RUPP

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89 Known by various different names during period
European Union
As well funding the CCJ, the EU also organised and provided training on specific issues which they identified in the Cambodian media, for example, in economic reporting and reporting on human rights. The EU also, in partnership with the KAF, also set up a Media Extension Project, aimed at improving the role of journalists in promoting democracy by establishing two provincial newspapers which operated for a three year period. According to Pok Poun, a representative at the EU office in Phnom Penh, evaluation of the success of their support for journalism is carried out primarily in the form of media monitoring of topics covered by the press in Cambodia.

There is a lot of overlap between funders were involved in journalism programmes by sub-contracting to local implementers, and organisations who both donated and were directly involved in implementing programmes on the ground themselves, either by providing facilities or trainers. The majority of the most active donors in media development, who were also implementers such as UNESCO and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Foundation (KAF) are outlined previously. Others who were funders and implementers on an intermittent or once-off basis (almost always in partnership with organisations outlined above) include Southeast Asian Press Alliance (Seapa), the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), Western Kentucky University, The Thompson Foundation, Asia Pacific Institute for broadcasting in Malaysia, Ecole Superioure de Journalisme (Lille-based journalism school), Northern Territory University in Australia, Singaporean Asian Media Information and Communications Centre, Women’s Media Centre, Knight Foundation and Freedom Forum.
Organisations who worked only as funders include the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the World Bank. DANIDA (Denmark), AIDAB, CIDA, IMPACS, the Dag Hammarsjold Foundation, Japan Relief for Cambodia, Open Society Institute, The Japan Foundation, SIDA, USAID, the now defunct USIS (United States Information Service), Centre Canadien d’Etude et Cooperation Internationale, International Republican Institute (IRI), Open Society Institute (OSI), German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and the German Development Service (DED). Division between media development and development communication projects are also not clear-cut. Organisations who come under the latter category, but which also crossed into media development on occasions, include the likes of the UNDP, USAID, Global Funs and Oxfam Netherlands Organization for International Assistance (Oxfam Novib).

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90 This list is still being added to
Dear Sir/ Madam
My name is Fergal Quinn. I am a researcher from Dublin City University, Ireland. I want to understand the ways in which journalists in Cambodia were trained in the period from 1993 and 2008 and the impact this training had on them.

This study is not for a newspaper article or any kind of market, government or NGO survey. It is for an academic journal and will contribute to the improvement of journalism training for young journalists in Cambodia and in other countries with similar backgrounds.

I would very much like if you would give the time to participate in this study. Participation will require a one on one interview with me, in which we will discuss your experiences of journalism training and your opinions on journalism in Cambodia today.

Please keep in mind the following:
1. All opinions expressed in this paper can be made in complete anonymity.
2. Please be absolutely frank in your answers. My study is trying to give an accurate assessment of the full range of journalists’ experiences. Full and honest answers will increase the accuracy of the findings, making them more useful.

I can arrange a suitable time for interview on any time or day that suits you. I am available by email at fergal.quinn@dcu.ie or by phone on 012931840 for any questions you have about the study both before and after the interview.

Thanks for your time
Fergal

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91 Translated Khmer version to be included in final version of thesis
### CODING SHEETS

#### 1. VIEWS ON JOURNALISM PROGRAMMES

**Training organisation type**
- **WSB-GOV** Western state broadcaster working directly with government/state broadcaster
- **NGOW-GOV** NGO which works closely with government

**Route to training of programme participants**
- **TLBJ** Some third level, combined with short journalism courses
- **NEBT** No experience of journalism prior to training
- **WJFT** Worked with no qualifications for a period
- **WJ** Working journalists
- **HS-MIN** Minimum requirement that they finish High School
- **EXAM** Exam before being selected for training
- **INVITE** Participants invited to training

**Type of training received**
- **STC** Short training courses (under 12 months)
- **LTC** Longer training courses (under 12 months)
- **TLJE** Third level Journalism education courses
- **OTJT** On the job training
- **NOTRAIN** No training
- **TGOVS** Training for government spokespeople
- **T-MANAGE** Management training included
- **UNIV** University setting

**Training emphasis**
- **PS** Practical skills/ vocational emphases
- **PS-TECH** Practical skills with emphasis on new technology
- **T-WES-SK** Western journalism skills emphasis
- **WEST-CURR** Curriculum taken from western universities
- **TTK, TTE, TTF** Training through Khmer, English, French
- **T-ADVOCACY** Emphasis on advocacy training
- **LEET (E-LOW-PRI)** Lack of emphasis on ethics in training
- **PEET** Positive emphasis on ethics in training
- **T-DEM** Journalism linked to democracy specifically
- **T-PROP** Training emphasis on propaganda/ socialism/ ideology
- **T-HR** Training linked to human rights
- **T-SPECIAL** Specialised training (various areas)
- **T-SPECIAL-ECON** Specialised training in finance, business, economics
- **T-INVEST (T-INV)** Investigative reporting
- **INT-PERSP** Gaining an international perspective through working with journalists from other countries
- **T-GEN-KNOW (T-INC-GEN-KNOW)** General knowledge emphasis
- **T-GOV-TRANS** Emphasis on good governance and transparency
- **T-MANAGE** Media management emphasis
- **T-MEDIA-PROF** Training in media broadly ie. PR, journalism, management
OTJT-PRAC  Working on the job, training involved with journalism practice  
OTJT-PRACT-GOVT Working on the job, journalism practice, Govt oriented media  
ODJT-PRACT-IND Working on the job, journalism practice, independent media  
LAW  Training on media law  
REGIONAL  Learn about other journalism in the region  
CREATE  Creative writing  

**Opinion on trainers**  
TIT, TLT  Trained by international trainers/ local trainers  
TIT-TLT  Trained by both local and international trainers  
POS-IT  International trainers better  
POS-LT  Local trainers better  
MIXED-ITLT  Mixed opinion  
BOTH-BEST  Mix of international and local is best  
FAMOUS  Famous guest lecturers preferred, not necessarily anything to do with journalism  

**Overall view of training experienced**  
POS-T  Positive views of training received/ Training in Cambodia generally  
NEG-T  Negative views of training received  
MIX-T  Mixed views of training received  
NO-IMP  Money spent on training wasted. No improvement in overall standard of journalism in Cambodia  
ALLTRAIN-POS  All training is good  

**Lacking in training**  
LULR (IGN-CULT)  Lacks understanding of local realities/ ignores Cambodian culture  
LUWR  Lack of understanding of practical work realities  
KH-T (L-LANG, T-FOREIGN-ENG)  More Khmer trainers needed  
BETTER-T  Better quality of trainers in general/  
FULL-TIME-ST  More full-time staff needed  
B-EVAL  Better, more coherent evaluation of training impact needed  
T-REL (T-IRR-TOPICS)  More relevant training  
T-DONOR-FIN (T-USEFUNDS)  Donors not using their money wisely  
L-ADVOC  Less advocacy training  
SELF-SUFF  Self-sufficient financially  
INSTIT (T-SHORT)  More institutional training better/ too many short term-training courses  
REACH-MANAGE  More training aimed at management  
T-REP  Too much repetition  
IN-HOUSE  More in house evaluation of journalism needed  
FOLLU-T  More follow-on training  
LACK-CAP  Lack of capacity, staff, funds etc  
TMTS  Too much too soon  
OVERLOAD  Danger of overloading older journalists in particular  
TGOVS  Training for government spokespeople also  
T-TV  More TV training needed  
T-POL-INF  Selection of training for participants is politically influenced  
T-WORK-EMP (THEOR-NEG)  Training too theoretical  
T-SHORT  Training is too short  
FOCUS-NEXT-GEN  More focus should be on next generation of journos
FOCUS-NEXT-GEN  More focus should be on next generation of journos
BAD-OTJT  Too much on the job training
T-PRECOND  Precondition of training should be that you HAVE to work in journalism for period
REACH-WJ  More effort to reach working journalists
REG-CONTEXT  Training needs more regional contextualisation
GOV-PRESSURE  Government pressure has a negative effect
LACK-RES  Lack of resources/ finances

(International trainer (TI), Local trainer (TL), Donor (DR) only)

Background of trainer (TL and TI only)
JBG  Former/current journalist, no other qualification
JBG-EDUC  Former/current journalist, along with other qualifications
QUAL-JBG  Current journalist with high level education in journalism/ related activity
LITTLE-J-EXP  Little /no practical journalism experience
TL  Third level education w little/no journalism
TL-J  Third level education with journalism qualification
TEACH  Trainer with number one focus on training
ADMIN  Trainer with administrative role
MULTI-COUNT  Trainer has experience training journos in numerous countries
CAMB-EXP-LONG  Long term training in Cambodia (three years plus)
CAMB-EXP-SHORT  Short-term training in Cambodia (three years under)

Evaluation techniques
T-WP  See if work practices improved
T-CAR  Career of trainee should have improved
T-EVA-AWA  Evaluation by competition/ award/vote at end of course
T-EVA-Q  Qualitative, quantitative evaluation of participants/audience after programme
REP-DON  Regular report to donors on activities
EVA-NO-REC  Evaluation done but no records of this were kept
OUTPUT-ANAL  Analysis of output, ie. Has newspaper, station improved?

Hoped for outcome of training
CH-NGJM  Help to change the next generation of journalists’ mentality
CH-WORKE  Help to change the environment in which journalists must work
CH-MED-PROF  Produce competent media professionals
CH-JOUR-PROF  Help to produce competent journalism professionals
CH-EDUC-PROF  Produce people with good education, add to middle classes

Funding sources (TI, TL, DR only)
FUND-ngo  Funded by NGOs
FUND-GOV  Funded by the Government
FUND-FEES  Funded by fees from the students
FUND-VARIED  Varied/ changing sources of funding
PRIV-COMM  Commercial business
PRIV-COMM-ngo  Commercial business not for profit/ NGO
2. NORMATIVE CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF JOURNALISM

Why become a journalist? (JI and JL only)

- **MJC**: Motivation to become journalist from childhood idea
- **MJP**: Motivation to become journalist inspired by parents/ family
- **MJF**: Motivation to become journalist inspired by friends
- **MJC**: Motivation to become journalist inspired by hearing about course in college
- **MJO**: Motivation to become journalist inspired by random job opportunity/ offer/ idea in college/ family business
- **MJGEN**: Motivation to challenge gender inequality in profession
- **MJ-AFF-CH**: Wanted to improve poor conditions in country
- **MJ-TR**: Motivation to become a journalist to find out truth about the country's past/ present
- **MJ-INT**: Motivation due to interest in profession/ news business
- **MJ-PERS-EXP**: Motivation arising from personal experience
- **MJ-SUPP-GOV**: Motivation to support the govt
- **MJ-FIGHT-GOV**: Motivation to fight the Government

Functions of press?

- **INFO**: Inform the public
- **EDUC**: Educate the public. NB: Speak a little about concept of word ‘educate’ in Cambodian context. For example Implied threat from Khmer Rouge time. To be ‘re-educated’ is sometimes to be tortured into accepting new reality… this may be tenuous idea/ also refers to giving analysis of situation, not just information alone
- **BRIDGE**: Bridge for information to be passed between public and government
- **ATTACK-GOV**: Tell people negative information about Government/ represent the opposition
- **AFF-CH**: Affect change in the country/ help country
- **IMP-SOC**: Improve the society/ country
- **IMP-GOV**: Improve the standard of governance
- **IMP-POP-PARTIC**: Make society more participatory
- **IMP-TRANS**: Improve levels of transparency
- **DEM-IMP**: Help bring democracy to Cambodia
- **COM-CORRUPT**: Combat corruption
- **WATCH**: Watchdog role
- **MIRROR**: Mirror to society
- **NO-SOC**: No societal role
- **QUEST**: Question the powerful
- **HR-IMP**: Uphold and improve human rights
- **ADVOCATE**: Advocate for change
- **DEVEL**: Development
- **GET-COMPO**: Get compensation for those mistreated
- **CENTRE**: To find the centre between political extremes
- **POLITICS**: Exert a political influence
- **SERVE-GOV**: Serve the government/ country
- **SHOW-POS**: Show the country in a positive light
- **ASIAN-VALUES**: Elements of ‘asian values’ journalism here
- **FREE-MARKET**: Business orientation, free press equals free market, news as commodity, helps business to be done by giving accurate information
Most important skills/requirements needed to be a journalist?

**BAS-SKILLS**  Basic skills
**GK**  General knowledge
**CC**  Creative, imaginative, curious
**RES**  Resourcefulness
**TLE**  Third level education/ degree/ general education level must be high
**COM-T**  Computer/ IT skills
**EXP**  Experience
**INV-R**  Investigative reporting
**COUR**  Courage
**QUES**  Ability to ask questions
**AMB**  Ambition
**COMM (PASS)**  Commitment, passion
**ETHICS**  Ethics
**LEGAL-KN**  Knowledge about legal issues
**ENG (LI)**  English language skills. Locals ‘inferior’. Khmer journalists inferior as they lack English language skills
**CS**  Good communication skills
**INCR**  Being incredulous, not believing everything they are told
**SP-KNOW**  Specialised knowledge
**NEWS-VAL**  Understand news value

Skills that are specific to working in Cambodia

**NSS**  No special skills
**CDSS**  Can’t define special skills
**MLT**  More training on media law
**TAL**  Talent, natural ability (ie. At writing)
**Q-ABIL**  Cambodian journalists have to ask questions in a specific kind of way
**LEGAL-KN**  Must have knowledge of legal issues
**POS-EMPH-ST**  Must have a balance of positive and negative in stories
**FLEX**  Flexibility
**KNOW-LIM**  Recognising limitations of working in this environment, being strategic and pulling back from sensitive stories at certain times
**SLOW-APP**  Slow approach to bigger stories, start small and work up

3. JOURNALISM PRACTICES

**Influences on practices?**

**COLL-PRACT**  Colleagues have strong influence on practices
**TR-PRACT**  Training has strong influence on practices
**COLL-TR-MIXED**  Mix of training and colleagues
**MAN-PRACT**  Management influence on professional practice
**WEST-PRACT**  Western model of journalism influences Cambodian practice
**IC**  International/ western colleagues have bigger influence
**LC**  Local colleagues have bigger influence
**MIX-ILC**  Mix of local/ international have influence
**SOC-PRACT**  Socialist model influenced journalism practice

Negatively perceived practices?
TSS Taking stories directly from officials, not questioning them
LACK-B Stories lacking balance
T-LACK-E Lack of ethics
T-HA-PI High awareness of good journalism practices but poor implementation of them

Khmer vs International journalists
DNV Int and Khmer journalists have different news values
IBKJ International journalists have better knowledge of journalism
T-LI Locals ‘inferior’. Khmer journalists inferior as they lack English language skills
PROF-PRAC International media/journalists followed better professional practices
MIX-BEST Mix of international and local colleagues is best
MIX-PR Mix of Khmer, int lead to problems and arguments at times
GEN-DIFF Difference between different generations
IM-NEG-TEND International media tend to focus too much on negative stories

Overall perceptions of journalism in Cambodia?
NEG-JOURN negative
POS-JOURN positive
MIXED-JOURN Mixed view of journalism in Cambodia
JOB-NEG Negative perception of job done by them
JOB-NEG-ETH [E-NEG] Negative perception of level of ethics in job
JOB-POS-ETH positive perception of journalistic ethics
MIX-ETH (LULR, FDUC-JOURN) Ethics issues more complex than foreigners understand
TWO-TIER Two tiered press system, Int and local, old and new attitudes POS-JOURN-
RELATIVE Journalism in condition relative to neighbours in region (generational)

4. ETHICS

Most important ethics
ACC Accuracy/Truthfulness/honesty
INT Integrity
BAL Balance/fairness
OBJ Objectivity/neutrality
FFC Free from corruption
IND Independent
DEF-SOUR Defend/respect/ protect Sources
RES-LAW respect the law
COMPROM To find compromise between rich and poor
GEN-MORAL Morality in general important

Obstacles to better ethical practice/ examples of poor ethical behaviors
TB Taking bribes/ extortion
WR Work realities at odds with applying good ethics
ME Management/ owners/Gov have poor ethics
CULT-GB Culture whereby journalists are paid to attend things (NGOs do this also). General culture in Cambodia of bribing people to get things done
CONFLICT conflicting ethical ideas
LEANALY  Lack of ability in Cambodian journalists to ethically analyse an issue
E-NO-PROB  No major problems of ethics in profession
E-F  Bad ethics due to financial reward of taking bribes
CODE-EP (CODE-CON)  No code of practice for ethics
WEST-FAIL  Western ethics fail in Cambodian context
SENSATION  Focus on dead bodies etc. emphasis on sensationalism
BLACKMAIL  Newspaper publishers blackmail people over whether they will publish story or not

Influence on ethics
E-TRA  Training/reading was big influence on ethical formation
E-F  Bad ethics due to financial reward of taking bribes
E-FAM  family
E-SOC  Society/ Religion
E-TR  Training/education
E-COLL  Your colleagues/ boss
E-WEST  Ethics come from west training/ influence
E-INSIDE  Ethics come from within the people themselves
E-READ-RES  Response by readers to certain practices

Ways of improving ethical practices
MOVE-INT  Move to international media. Ethical practices cannot be followed working in local media
LONG  Change in ethics will take a long time
KNOW  Improvement in knowledge, skills, training
LAW  Better laws discourage poor ethical practices
I-REG  Internal regulation via a type of press commission
INC-SAL  Higher salaries

5. PROBLEMS FACED BY PRESS IN CAMBODIA

Obstacles to good journalism?
STRESS  Too much stress
SYSTEM  Difficulty of working in journalism system
LP  Low pay
ACCINFO  Access to information, documents, officials/ Lack of a freedom of information law relates to this
LEAVE  Good people leave journalism/profession
FB  Foreign bosses
KC  Khmer character
LOW-READ  Low readership means people poorly informed/ More gov attention paid to tv, radio than on press
LACK-FREE  Lack of press freedom
LACK-INMD  Lack of independent media
LACK-TR  Lack of training/ Not enough of right type of training
PPERC  Poor perception of journalists/ press means good graduates don’t want to work in it/ officials don’t want to speak
ENVIRO  Bad working environment/ general, political/work/society
SAFE  Safety of journalists from attack
FEAR  Fearful
WORK-ENV Working environment, the company journalist works in
LAW Legal environment/ laws not enforced/ Law easily manipulated
OFF-COOP Lack of cooperation from officials with journalists
SELF-CENSOR Self censorship
LOW-OPP Lack of opportunity for journalists
FOR-PR-MISREP Foreign press misrepresenting issues
EQUIP Lack of equipment. IT training
NO-PROB No major problems for Cambodian press
VIOL Violence/ being attacked
WEST-NFUNCT Western ways of doing journalism does not function in Cambodian context
LEAVE Good people leave journalism/profession does not attract good quality people
JOURN-TRAUMA Older journalists with traumatic pasts, leading to dysfunctionality
NO-PEER No peers to be influenced by (especially for first generation of journalists)
LCONF Lack of confidence of Khmer journalists
BAD-ATT Bad attitude of journos, resistant to change and evolution
TOO-MANY Too many bad quality papers
TRAD Traditional values of Cambodian society hard to bypass
PEOPLE-FEAR People in general fearful about talking to journalists/ Shy also (cultural thing)
LOCAL-HARD Local press hard to work in, too much pressure, poor standards
OFF-MIS Misinterpretation, lack of understanding among officials/ government about the actual function of journalism and the media
CONS-MANAGE Conservative management
J-ORG-DYS Journalism organisations dysfunctionality
LACK MEDIA REV Lack of revenue in the Cambodian media/ advertising revenue low
PRICE-NEWSP Cost of newspapers too high
POLITICAL-ROLE Too many journalists want to play political role
LACK-ENTREP Journalists lack initiative/ entrepreneurial spirit
CULT-BARR Cultural barriers to journalistic practice
XEN-TEND Xenophobic tendencies, ie. Anti-Vietnamese sentiment
GLASS-CEIL Glass ceiling facing khmer journalists in western run newspapers
KH-EMP JOUR Important for editor to empower khmer journalists by letting them come up with own story ideas, also khmer bosses helps to empower local journalists

Limitations of journalism/ ‘out of bounds’ issues
KING Don’t write stories about the King
POL-LIM Limitations on criticising more powerful politicians. Soft approach more affective
LIM-N-SPEC Won’t specify
POL-EC-LIM Political, economic stories hard to write about due to lack of education
LIM-BEAT You have to stick to your own beat
NO-LIM
LIM-MANAGE Limitation set by management. Khmer managers influenced by govt
LIM-POLICE Stories about police dangerous
LIM-CORR Corruption stories
LIM-COURTS Stories critical of the court
Current press environment
POS-PENV Positive environment for the press
NEG-PENV Negative environment for the press

6. FUTURE OF CAMBODIAN PRESS

Future of Journalism/ Press Freedom in Cambodia
POSFJQ Positive future for journalistic quality in Cambodian predicted
POSPF Positive future for press freedom
NEG-JQ Negative future for journalism quality

Does Cambodian press still need western money/ help?
WHN Western help needed for press to survive
NWHN Cambodian journalism could survive on its own
WMMN Western managers needed in media

Changes Affected by press
CAP-PBINF Changes Affected by press, people better informed
CAP-GBINF Changes Affected by press, gov better informed
CAP-SMALL Small changes
CAP-BIG Big changes due to press in numerous aspects of country
CAP-INFRA Changes affected by press, infrastructure better
CAP-ENV Changes affected by press, environmental issues dealt with
CAP-SAFE Changes affected by press, traffic/ health/ road safety
CAP-RED-CORR Changes affected by press, corruption levels reduced
CAP-EMPLOY Changes affected by press, some employment conditions improved
CAP-OFF-FEAR Changes affected by press, officials more fearful of power of media

Changes in Cambodia
PROP-INC More pro government propaganda
RAJ Reduction in attack/ deaths of journalists
INF-ROLE-PRESS People better informed about the role of the press
INC-PRESS-FREE Increase in press freedom
SL-IMP General standard of living better
INFO-HUNGER Greater desire among people/ readers for more information
PR-ENV-IMP Improvement in press environment
T-NO-IMP-LP No improvement in local press standards
T-NO-IMP-FREE No improvement in levels of democracy, standards, environment

Changes in Cambodian press
STA-IMP Standard improved in recent years
OFF-COOP-IMP Official cooperation improving
J-ED-INC (IMP-TR) Education levels of journalists higher than before, Training options have improved
STA-IMP-SLOW Standard can improve, but only very slowly
IMP-PERCJ Perception of journalists is improving
TR-NO-IMP Training has had no impact
STA-NEG-IMP Standard has not improved
MORE-ORG More media organisations/ competition
ENVIRO-IMP General reporting environment/ Freedom to report has improved
ETHIC-STA-IMP Standard of ethics has improved

Ways of improving journalism in Cambodia
LP Improve pay (clearly implied by references to low pay)
RFB Reduction in foreign bosses. More power to Cambodian journalist
TVFP Television journalism should follow press journalism practices
IJT Increase in number of journalism training programmes/ Improve what is there
GOVAMC Government action on corrupt journalism activities
RED-BRIBE Reduce levels of bribery
B-PROF-PRAC Better professional practices
MANAGE better standard of managers/ owners/ and better education of Government officials. That change must come from top
IJORG Increase in number/ quality of journalism organisations
GOV-ACT Government regulation to help journalists more, ie. Freedom of information law needs to be introduced, change licensing laws
LEARN-IM should learn from watching international media
PSB Public service broadcaster needed
LOCAL-IN More local input. More of a sense of local involvement from beginning
INC-KH-MANAGE More Khmer managers needed
INC-EDUC Increase the education level of journalists
TIME Journalists in Cambodia must be given time to change themselves
GENDER More gender balance in journalism
FUND-IND-NEWS Westerners should help fund independent newspaper

Other themes:
Theories: Problems of working in International Media
FB Have to follow ‘barang’ (foreigner) way of doing things/ international media dominated by western journalists, do not trust khmers.
International press v local press
POS-LP Positive views on local press
NEG-LP Negative views of local press
NEG-IP Negative views of International press
POS-IP Positive views on International Press
Factors affecting story importance (News values)
IMPACT Impact of story nationally
POP Audience desire
STORY AGENDA How story agenda is chosen
### APPENDIX G

**TV station ownership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of station</th>
<th>Ownership structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Apsara TV</strong></td>
<td>Owned by the Apsara Group, reportedly owned by the CPP (Licadho 2008). General director is Sok Eysa, who is a CPP Central Committee member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bayon TV</strong></td>
<td>Reportedly owned by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s family (Licadho 2008). Run by Hun Sen’s daughter Hun Mana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CTN</strong></td>
<td>Owned by Royal Group, headed by tycoon Kith Meng, close links to Government (Levy and Scott-Clark 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TVK</strong></td>
<td>State broadcaster, strictly censored (Licadho 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TV3</strong></td>
<td>Co-owned by PP Minicipality and Thai company. General director, Kham Poeun Keomony, is an adviser to State President Chea Sim (CPP) (Licadho 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TV5</strong></td>
<td>Co-owned by military and MICA media. Run by Kem Kunvoth — CPP central committee member (Licadho 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TV9</strong></td>
<td>Claims to be 100% private sector company, but believed to be owned by family of Khun Haing (Minister of Cults and Religious, FUNCINPEC) (Licadho 2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX H

Breakdown of International media organisation sub-categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JIA</td>
<td>International news organisations who gather news in Cambodia for distribution to international audiences</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>Publications that receive funding from outside Cambodia but are primarily aimed at a local market, albeit in a foreign language</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Internationally-funded outlets that provide local-language services.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>