The Security-Development Nexus as Risk Management: *A Multiple-Donor Case Study of the Coordination of Security and Development in US, UK and Canadian policy.*

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List of abbreviations

9/11	The attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on 11th September 2001
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CHASE	(UK) Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department
CJTF HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
DFAIT	(Canadian) Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DfID	(UK) Department for International Development
DND	(Canadian) Department of National Defence
DoD	(US) Department of Defence
DoS	(US) Department of State
FCO	(UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GoC	Government of Canada
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GoK	Government of Kenya
HMG	(UK) Her Majesty's Government
HOA	Horn of Africa
MoD	(UK) Ministry of Defence
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation on Development
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation on Development-Development Assistance Committee
QDR	(US) Quadrennial Defence Review
QDDR	(US) Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

START	(Canadian) Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WoT	War on Terror

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Abstract

The Security-Development Nexus as Risk Management: A Multiple-Donor Case Study of the Coordination of Security and Development in US, UK and Canadian policy.

Eamonn McConnon

The last twenty years has seen calls for greater coordination between security and development policy, based on assumptions of the interconnectedness of security and development. Since 9/11 and the War on Terror (WoT), the national security of Western states has been added to this relationship. This research seeks to understand this dimension of development aid contributing to donor national security: as part of mainstream development policy, over an extended period of time and across multiple donors. This is done through content and discourse analyses of donor policy documents complemented with interviews with key informants in donor development agencies and fieldwork interviews in Ethiopia and Kenya. This case study approach: looks at a time period from the late 1990s to 2012 to capture the merging of security and development both pre and post-9/11; looks at the US, the UK and Canada to separate out the differences between donors approaches; looks at both the development and security policy of these donors to capture any influence development has on security in addition to security influencing development; and looks at how these donors have dealt with security in their development programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya. From this it is argued that in the security-development nexus, development aid is expected to manage long-term risks to the national security of donors.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Resolving protracted civil conflict is arguably the key issue in international security. Its magnitude is reflected in the estimated 1.5 billion people[1] living in conflict affected areas, often the poorest and most vulnerable. The impacts of these conflicts are far reaching across national boundaries and across time impacting on the future life chances of those affected by conflict. The last two decades have seen increasing efforts to address these conflicts through a coordinated approach involving military, foreign policy and development actors leading to the expansion of development into matters of conflict. The efforts of development aid to resolve existing conflict and prevent future conflict have provided a renewed purpose for development as a concept and a practice at a time when its purpose has been called into question. With this expanded purpose of development aid comes greater responsibilities and expectations of what development aid should achieve. This now includes, not just resolving existing conflict and preventing future conflict, but also ensuring greater national security for donor countries. The process of merging security and development is the subject of much contention with advocates arguing that it represents a common sense means of addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity and critics arguing that development has become a tool to further military and foreign policy objectives. As a result it is essential to better understand the processes involved in merging security and development, the arguments behind these processes and how they operate in certain contexts. This thesis illuminates the workings of the merging of security and development in specific donor policy.

The merging of security and development is not a new phenomenon, but the form it has taken during the War on Terror (WoT) is distinct from its previous incarnation during the Cold War (Duffield 2010a; Hettne 2010). Following the mantra "no security without development, no development without security", the interests of both security and development were seen to overlap significantly. Conflict and insecurity can wipe out hard won development gains and hold back future progress. In turn conflict is often caused by long-term development problems. A further dimension of the national security of Western states has been added to this relationship since 9/11 and the War on Terror. From this view, due to the

[1] Figure cited by Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon (26/2/2013) in a speech on shaping development priorities post-2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44233#.VDUOExa9ZpM

interconnectedness that globalisation has brought, instability in the developing world can impact directly on the security of the developed world through problems such as terrorism. The identification of the failed state of Afghanistan as the source of the attacks of 9/11 resurrected the idea of chronic development problems being a security risk for Western states. Following this logic, spending on development is seen as contributing to the national security of donors and a closer coordination between security and development actors is necessary to resolve conflict in the long-term. This chapter outlines the main aspects of the security development nexus and argues that a case study approach focusing on multiple donors will lead to a greater understanding of this complex research area. The first section highlights the complexities and multiple dimensions of the security-development nexus. The second section argues that this research area has relevance for a number of different fields of research especially international relations, security studies and development. The third section outlines how the merging of security and development has gained prominence in the War on Terror (WoT). The fourth section outlines the approach of this dissertation. The final section is an outline of the thesis structure.

The complexities of the security-development nexus

The "security-development nexus" as it is often referred to, is the subject of much contention. Whilst the term "security-development nexus" may suggest a singular phenomenon, this is certainly not the case. Individually both security and development are contested concepts and so there is even further complexity when they are brought together, resulting in a web of possible connections and interactions. For example, Spear and Williams (2012: 9-19) identify four different functions that both security and development serve in addition to 11 different characteristics of security and development. Similarly, Stern and Öjendal (2010: 9) outline six different narratives through which the security-development nexus can be understood. Each of these six narratives applies to both security and development separately and they can all be connected to each other to form several contrasting and competing ideas of what the security-development nexus is. This demonstrates the complexity of the field in which the research on security and development operates. The security-development nexus is a research area at the intersection of a number of different disciplines and has implications for international relations, security studies and development studies.

In the area of international relations, the post-9/11 international system means that the inner workings of developing states and local level conflict are now of interest to Western states. Similarly, security studies is concerned with ideas about the broadening and deepening of security and the concept of human security. This is viewed from many different perspectives. For some it is an acceptance of the importance of human security and a greater prioritisation of long-term development challenges that impact on the security needs of ordinary individuals. Connected with this is the idea of changing conceptions of the role of militaries and the expectation that they must now engage with 'soft security' through development projects. From different ends of the security studies perspective this is seen as either a necessary step for a comprehensive approach to resolving insecurity or as a diminishing of military power which will undermine combat capabilities. From a development perspective some are concerned about the possible militarisation of development and the subversion of development goals by hard security concerns. Others see it as a necessary step to resolve development problems through greater resources and a greater range of expertise harnessing the best of diplomatic, development and military skill. This thesis examines the issue primarily from the perspective of development policy, but it also takes into consideration changes in both security and foreign policy in order to best understand this phenomenon.

The renewed purpose of security and development aid post-9/11

Spear and Williams (2012: 1) assert that "Security and development matter; they often involve issues of life and death, and they determine the allocation of truly staggering amounts of the world's resources." However, when studying the security-development nexus it is important to remember that this was not always the case. The origins of the current incarnation of the security-development nexus are in the post-Cold War world of the 1990s and during this time security and development did not 'matter' as they do now. During the early 1990s ODA flows had fallen and remained low and there were doubts about whether aid still had a purpose, having failed to bring development over the previous decades (Abrahamsen 2000: i; Howell and Lind 2009: 285). Similarly, the security environment in the post-cold War world had moved from a bipolar international system based on military

competition to one where civil conflict proliferated in the developing world (Buzan and Hansen 2009; Kaldor 2013). Conventional military means were inadequate for addressing these conflicts, highlighted by the withdrawal of the US from Somalia following the "Black Hawk Down" incident in Mogadishu in October 1993. However, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent WoT changed this view of both security and development. If security and development "matter", as Spear and Williams (2012) assert, it is because of their elevated importance in the post-9/11 environment. Security once again involved increased military spending to facilitate land wars, airstrikes and the military occupation of countries. The realisation that poverty and instability in the developing world could be a source of insecurity for the developed world through terrorist attacks originating from failed states provided a renewed purpose for development aid in addressing the root causes of conflict. The security-development nexus is situated within this renewed importance of both security and development. As such it is important to consider changes from the period prior to 9/11 into the WoT and the post-9/11 period.

Going beyond direct coordination of military and development actors

This overlap between national security and development in the WoT has been the subject of a growing body of literature. Most of this literature focuses on the instances of direct coordination between militaries and development agencies whether in humanitarian crises such as the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 or as part of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition there is an overriding focus on the US and its policy during the WoT. This has led to the utilisation of structures such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which coordinate development and military actors in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of both military operations and development programmes to create stability. However, more research needs to be done to understand the lasting impacts of these connections between security and development and how they have influenced mainstream development policy beyond *ad hoc* contingency operations.

The key research question of this thesis is: **how has the security-development nexus changed from the pre to post 9/11 period?** From this central issue, a number of sub-questions also need to be addressed.

- If the US has driven the agenda of the WoT how has it merged its security and development polices and how does this compare with other bilateral donors?
- To what extent have security considerations been brought into mainstream development policy outside of conflict and humanitarian situations?
- Has development policy also influenced security policy?
- How is security defined in development policy?
- What motivates states to merge security and development?

This research addresses these questions by looking at the merging of security and development over a longer time period than just the WoT, as part of mainstream development policy rather than just the exceptional circumstances of war or disaster, and across multiple donors. This is done by examining a time period from the late 1990s to 2012 to capture the merging of security and development both pre and post-9/11; examining the US, the UK and Canada, to separate out the differences between donors' approaches; analysing both the development and security policy of these donors to capture any influence development has on security in addition to security influencing development; and studying how these donors have dealt with security in their development programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya. Within this framework the key issues of how security is defined, who security is for and what arguments are used to bring security into development policy are examined. The key arguments of this thesis are:

Security considerations have been brought into mainstream development policy. For all three donors conflict and security are now part of development policy to some degree. This is not just a one-off contingency confined to actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also part of on-going development policy. It is evident in shifts in ODA spending to conflict affected regions, policy discourse and programming in specific countries.

This may have been accelerated by the WoT, but it has not been bound by the WoT. The coordination between security and development has actually increased as the military aspects of the WoT have been wound down.

The security of donor countries is prioritised in the merging of security and development: Security is defined broadly to include the security of individuals in developing countries, the stability of regions in the developing world and the security of Western states. Discursive arguments are made to bring these together and claim there is one "security" to benefit everyone. However, the attention given to the security of individuals is justified in terms of how it can serve the security of donor states.

The security-development nexus is an example of security risk management. Security is about stability and predictability of outcomes. Development aid is expected to insure greater predictability of outcomes through management of long-term security risks rather than just short-term security threats. Variations in how donors deal with merging security and development are due to variations in the security risk identification of donors.

Thesis outline

Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework for this research. It reviews the literature and identifies three different strands of 'optimists', 'sceptics' and 'denialists'. It argues that Ulrich Beck's (1992) idea of the 'risk society' is the most appropriate theoretical position to examine multiple cases over an extended period of time as it allows an analysis of multiple contexts to address the gaps in the three main strands in the literature.

Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methodology of this thesis. It discusses how a mixed methods approach of descriptive overseas development aid (ODA) statistics, content and discourse analyses of policy documents, and interviews with key informants in each development agency including field work in Ethiopia and Kenya are appropriate for this study. It also details an original framework for content analysis allowing a comparison between security and development and other key ideas in development policy of the Washington Consensus and the post-Washington Consensus. It justifies the selection of the

US, the UK and Canada as donor case studies and the selection of Ethiopia and Kenya as recipient countries.

Chapter 4 presents the findings of content and discourse analyses of key US policy documents from 1997-2012 in addition to findings from interviews and fieldwork. It argues that the coordination between US military, foreign policy and development wings of government has heightened in the post-9/11 period and has resulted in a closer relationship between USAID, the DoD and the DoS in national security policy. Within this, development is expected to contribute to US national security by addressing the root causes of security risks and development policy is supposed to inform security policy.

Chapter 5 discusses the findings of content and discourse analyses of key UK policy documents from 1997-2012 in addition to interviews and fieldwork. It argues that DfID has brought UK national security into the core of its policy through a gradual process over this period by linking poverty and instability in the developing world to risks to UK national security such as terrorism and religious extremism. DfID has justified this shift through claims of common interest between development for people in the global South and security for the UK by drawing on the broader concept of security for individuals in developing countries, wherein development is offered as a means of managing national security risks.

Chapter 6 examines Canada's merging of security and development from 1997-2012 through content and discourse analyses of key Canadian policy documents in addition to interviews and fieldwork. It argues that while the Canadian government has merged security and development in its defence and foreign policy discourse, its development agency CIDA has not brought security into development policy in a significant way. Unlike the cases of the US and the UK where there is an increase in references to merging security and development after 9/11, the pattern of CIDA is the reverse with a decline after 9/11. Whilst CIDA does refer to the importance of security and development prior to 9/11 at a time when Canada was not involved in active conflict, following 9/11 and Canada's military involvement in Afghanistan, CIDA does not engage with issues of conflict and security in its policy discourse.

Chapter 7 synthesises the findings of the three case studies and argues that merging security and development prioritises the security of donor countries. This is done to varying degrees between the US, the UK and Canada. This variation can be understood through Ulrich Beck's (1992) theory of the risk society. The different degrees to which these donors have merged security and development and used their development programmes to address security problems is a reflection of the different risk priorities and assessments of these donors.

Chapter 8 is a conclusion arguing the relevance of this thesis to the broader fields of development, security and conflict resolution, and outlining avenues for further research.

Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The security-development nexus, as it is often referred to, is the subject of much contention. As discussed in the previous chapter, rather than being a single entity the "security-development nexus" is instead a complex web of multiple interactions and possibilities. The literature on the security-development nexus often fails to make these distinctions. This chapter reviews the literature, and identifies three principle strands of argument: those optimistic about the relationship, those sceptical of it and those who question its existence. These three positions all have different starting assumptions and views on the nature of the merging of security and development. A key point across all this literature is the issue of whether 'security' in the security-development nexus is for the donor country or for the recipient country. The issue of human security cuts across this debate, its focus on the security of individuals is drawn on by advocates of the merging of security and development to argue that the merging of security and development is for the benefit of individuals rather than a means of bolstering conventional state-centric security. The gap in the literature that this thesis fills is a study of multiple donor countries' development agencies and how they have dealt with the merging of security and development, in mainstream rather than just exceptional policy and in their interaction with specific African recipient countries. This study is based on systematic empirical research drawing on these multiple case studies. It argues that the merging of security and development is best understood through the concept of risk.

This chapter is divided into two parts, the first one reviewing the existing literature on security and development and the second one reviewing the literature on the concept of risk. The first section looks at the concept of human security and how it relates to coordination between security and development. The second section sets out three different perspectives on merging security and development: optimists, pessimists and sceptics. The third section examines the broader literature on merging security and development on the basis of these three perspectives. The fourth section examines specific literature on the US, the UK and Canada. The fifth section is a discussion of the theory of risk and the debates around it. Lastly

is a discussion of how this thesis draws on Ulrich Beck's (1992) theory of the risk society in order to analyse the issue of the merging of security and development.

The human security debate

The concept of human security looms large in the literature on the security-development nexus, and so firstly it is necessary to examine the literature on human security, before addressing the broader literature on security and development. The concept of human security sought to merge security and development as a way of gaining greater attention for development issues. The principal aim of human security was to place the individual as the referent object of security and not the state (UNDP 1994; Henk 2005; Newman 2001: 239). The concept is split between those who favour a narrow approach prioritising immediate threats to safety (Human Security Centre 2005; Kaldor 2007) and those who favour a broad approach that includes more systemic long term threats to security (UN 2010; Institute for Democracy and Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006). While the broad approach focuses more on development solutions, the narrow approach advocates military intervention on the basis of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The broad approach argues that only by addressing long-term systemic threats to people's well-being can the root causes of human security be addressed (Axworthy 1997; Leaning & Arie, 2000). They argue that the narrow focus runs the risk of prioritising military or terrorist threats (Bellamy and McDonald 2002: 374). Advocates of the narrow approach argue that a definition of human security that focuses on immediate threats to people allows a more focused and analytical research programme and offers greater coherence in trying to influence policy change (King and Murray 2001; Thomas and Tow 2002, Mack 2004). This division in the concept has led to criticism of its usefulness. As Roland Paris (2001: 93) argues "if human security means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing." Aside from these two different ideas of what human security should be, there are also divisions over the extent to which the concept of human security can actually influence policy**.**

Advocates of human security argue that it represents a new paradigm and can challenge conventional approaches to security (Axworthy 1997; Newman 2001). These authors point to

initiatives such as the Ottawa Convention to ban landmines, the Kimberley Process to prevent the sale of conflict diamonds and the establishment of the International Criminal Court as examples of international cooperation on security issues that address human security concerns (Axworty 2001; Newman 2001: 242; King and Murray 2002: 590) . There is debate within the literature as to the extent to which human security has been adopted by states or whether states have merely appropriated the language of human security to facilitate conventional state-centric hard security concerns. David Chandler (2007) argues that human security does not offer a direct counterpoint to state-centric realism. By framing human security as not just a moral imperative but also as the best strategy to provide security in the international system, the concept is brought closer to the self-interest of realism (Chandler 2008: 430). Chandler argues that human security has been easily appropriated by mainstream policy because it exaggerates new security threats, it enables short term policy making and it locates threats to Western states in the developing world (Chandler 2008: 428). Ambrosetti (2008: 442) disagrees with this and states that if human security is appropriated by states, it means there is a tacit acceptance of some of the tenets of the concept. Moreover, Taylor Owen (2008: 447) disputes the assertion that states have adopted human security policies claiming that it is seldom used in foreign policy narratives (Owen 2008: 450). Whilst Robert Picciotto asserts that human security "puts military, policing and diplomatic functions at the service of development" and brings development policy to bear on conflict management (Picciotto 2010: 8), others such as Mark Duffield (2006, 2010a) have argued that rather than attracting greater finance and attention for development issues in their own right, they have been subsumed into security concerns. Furthermore, other critics of human security fundamentally question the merit of placing the individual as the referent object of security because it ignores the important relationships between individuals and collectives, communities and even states as part of ensuring security (Spear and Williams 2012: 14).

As this brief discussion of the literature on human security shows – there is no singular human security. As a result, assertions that when states discuss security in their development policy they are in fact talking about human security is problematic. Even when human security is referred to by states specifically it can mean any number of things. Human security can be used as a concept to justify military intervention, the clearance of populations from land to ensure environmental protection, military involvement in development projects, development involvement in military actions and numerous other actions and scenarios. All

these actions have different dynamics and can potentially either reinforce or undermine the security and prosperity of individuals and the use of the label human security tells us little about what impact these actions will have. As a result of this, basing empirical research on a human security framework and trying to assess whether donors subscribe to the broad and obscure concept of human security is problematic. Following David Chandler's (2012: 214) assertion that the common factor in most understandings of human security is the focus on security for the individual rather than the state, this study manages this difficulty by assessing who is identified as the referent object of security. In this way, the focus of this study is on whom security is for in the merging of security and development. Examining whether security is for individuals in the Global South, recipient states or donor states allows an analysis of the nuances of the nature of the relationship between security and development.

Three perspectives on the security-development nexus

The literature can be categorised into three groups based on the assumptions around whether the merging of security and development is desirable and can work to bring security and development for all, or whether it is another form of control and domination by Western states. From this perspective, three categories emerge: 'optimists', 'sceptics', and 'denialists'. The core features of these positions are outlined below in Table 2.1. For optimists, the starting assumption is that the merging of security and development is something necessary and desirable and can lead to greater security and development for everyone. Sceptics, question the very assumption that the merging of the two can overcome security and development problems. Instead the relationship is one extending the power of western states over developing states in order to ensure security for donor states. Denialists, on the other hand, question whether the merging of security and development extends beyond policy rhetoric to actually shape policy.

Table 2.1: Three main arguments in the literature on security and development

	Key arguments	Main authors	Types of research
Optimists	Merging security and development is necessary and can lead to a mutually beneficial relationship	Stewart, Picciotto, Wild and Elhawary, Beall Goodfellow and Putzel, Jackson	Theoretical arguments, NGO research reports.
Sceptics	Merging security and development is another form of Western states attempts to control developing states. It will lead to a military focus of development aid and will not bring greater development.	Duffield, Abrahamsen, Pupavac	Theoretical, Country case studies, NGO research reports
Denialists	Merging security and development does not extend beyond policy discourse	Chandler, Lacher	Theoretical

Perspectives on the merging of security and development

Optimists

The starting assumption of literature that is optimistic about security and development is that the complex problems of conflict and stalled development in the Global South can only be overcome through a close coordination of development and military actors. Therefore, the merging of security and development is necessary and the truism "no security without development, no development without security" is the central tenet of this understanding of the merging of security and development. Robert Picciotto (2004: 543) argues that a closer relationship between security and development is imperative for the future of development aid. Frances Stewart (2004: 277) articulates this through the idea of a 'virtuous cycle' where development policies have the potential to address the underlying causes of conflict such as poverty, a lack of social service provision and horizontal inequalities. A "virtuous circle" can be started; by preventing conflict greater development is facilitated, which in turn will lead to a more secure state which will permit further development still (Stewart 2004: 278). Stewart (2004: 278) acknowledges that this relationship is precarious and the virtuous cycle can easily be broken with conflict arising from either high security but low economic growth, or economic growth that excludes some groups leading to 'horizontal inequalities'. Stewart (2004: 284) recognises that foreign policy interests of states may hinder this positive outcome

by ignoring exclusionary policies of strategically important recipient countries. However, the 'optimist' position does not see the relationship between security and development as being fundamentally about ensuring Western security only.

In the 'optimist' literature, the merging of security and development is also important for security policy. That is because within this closer relationship, development will be influenced by security policy, but in turn security policy will be "developmentalised" to counteract this (Picciotto 2004: 545). This perspective is reinforced by research arguing that in some cases, certain development agencies, such as the UK, have been able to maintain a poverty focus and resist a militarisation of development (Beal et al 2005: 61; Wild and Elhawary 2012: 5). It is also argued that the WoT has shown the limits of a military approach to foreign policy and that development thinking now has a greater influence on foreign and security policy (Pugh et al 2013: 199). Pugh, Gabay and William (2013: 195) argue that in the case of the UK, the coalition government has overseen a shift to the 'developmentalisation of security.' They argue that this is evident in the intervention in Libya to remove Colonel Gadhafi in 2011, where the limits of conventional approaches to security have been addressed by support for 'non-Western' actors (Pugh et al. 2013: 195). The main assertion is that human security is now in the mainstream and the main evidence offered to support this is that NGOs have expressed approval for this (Pugh et al 2013: 199). Central to these arguments is the view of human security as a paradigm shift. For Picciotto a closer relationship between security and development will lead to "developmentalisation of security" rather than a "securitisation of development". In this relationship "security" will become "human security" and Picciotto (2004; 2010) uses the two terms interchangingly. For Picciotto and Stewart human security genuinely represents a shift in how security is viewed by states, whereas, for the more critical writers, human security is only a paradigm shift for those who advocate for it, but not for states. As a result rather than changing the behaviour of states and security apparatus, it will reinforce existing behaviour.

Some of this literature is critical of the coordination of security and development in certain contexts and the purpose of this research is to outline ways in which this relationship can function better. Examples of this are studies from the 'International Peace Academy' (2004; 2006) that argue for greater clarity on how the interaction between security and development

should actually work in policy, rather than just assuming greater security will lead to greater development. These studies call for closer, but more coherent and focused coordination between security and development actors based primarily on reform of security institutions and services based on the rationale that it will prevent conflict by creating a more democratic society with security services that are accountable to civil authority (Hurwitz and Peake 2004: 3; International Peace Academy 2006). Similarly White (2010) argues that in the case of Sierra Leone there was insufficient long-term development commitment to reforming the security sector. As a result the short-term gains of ensuring security were not built on to ensure greater development (White 2010: 74).

The common thread of this 'optimist' literature is that with the correct policy changes, there is the potential for a mutually beneficial relationship between development and security to arise from the security-development nexus. Implicit in these arguments is the idea that states will possibly adopt policies that will cost them economically in the short term for greater security in the long term. For example, possibly alienating key allies in geopolitically strategic positions, by imposing conditionalities such as respect for human rights, the equitable distribution of resources and other governance issues. In the 'optimist' literature, even those critical of the security-development nexus still assume that it can work given better research, greater clarity and more focused policy. These contributions are useful for understanding ways in which the security-development nexus could possibly lead to a mutually beneficial relationship. Especially the work of those such as White (2010) who draws from first-hand experience of trying to implement and shape policy in this area. However, in their assumptions that the nexus is necessary and inevitable, the dynamics of unequal power relations at play are missed, for example, the dynamics between development and security actors and those between donor states and recipient states. The theoretical studies describe a positive scenario that may never materialise (Stewart 2004, Piccotto 2004; 2010). The practical policy focused studies are essential in understanding specific instances where these policies interact but they are perhaps too focused to help us to understand the broader picture across time and across donors (Beal et al 2005; Wild and Elhawary 2012; Pugh et al 2013). The 'sceptical' literature addresses this somewhat by examining the broader power relations involved in the security-development nexus. This is the subject of the following section.

Sceptics

In contrast to the 'optimistic' view of the security-development nexus, the 'sceptical' approach does not see the merging of security and development as essentially necessary or desirable. Instead, 'sceptics' view it as something driven by the security interests of donor states and the need to contain instability in the developing world. This literature looks at both the broad theoretical understanding of the merging of security and development and also specific donor and recipient contexts.

Mark Duffield (2001, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2011) has published extensively on the topic and is one of the main authorities on the subject. Duffield is sceptical of the potential of the closer relationship between security and development to improve the lives of those in the developing world. For Duffield, it is an exercise of control and power by donor states. Populations in the developing world are viewed as dangerous and the aim of development aid is to increase the resilience and self-sufficiency of developing states, in order for them to contain danger in the developing world (Duffield 2005: 153; 2011: 757). Duffield argues that the concept of sustainable development marked the end of the modernist ideal that all development needed was time for poorer states to "catch up" (Duffield 2005: 152). In return for development aid, developing states are expected to protect the developed world from terrorist and rebel groups that threaten the security of the West through the interconnectedness of globalisation (Duffield 2005: 148). For Duffield, development has been connected to ideas of security from its inception (Duffield 2008: 161). However, in this latest merging of security and development the focus has switched from the geopolitical approach of controlling the actions of states to a "biopolitical" approach to controlling whole populations (Duffield 2006: 15). Duffield draws on the work of the philosopher Michel Foucault in framing this biopolitical approach. Foucault explained biopolitics as the state's engagement with society and how this relationship enabled the liberal state to secure and legitimise itself. The state gained its legitimacy through controlling society and providing greater security and wellbeing for its citizens (Foucault 2003: 239-264). Duffield elevates this idea from the state level to the international level where, he argues, development is about biopolitics; managing the uninsured populations of the developing world to insulate

themselves from insecurity that arises from a lack of development. As a result of this, the focus is on areas where a direct causal link between "their" security and "our" security can be established and a neglect of areas where there is no security benefit for "ourselves" to be had (Duffield 2006: 28). In contrast to Robert Picciotto (2004; 2010), Duffield (2006) views human security as part of the broader biopolitical control of developing states, rather than placing security institutions under the control of development actors.

Drawing heavily on the work of Duffield, Vanessa Pupavac (2010: 707) argues that development and security strategies have abandoned earlier hopes of securing populations in the global South through sustainable economic development and the establishment of welfare states. Instead, development and security are now about managing the lack of wealth through limiting expectations in the developing world in a way that limits the horizons of development, avoids the disruption of frustrated ambitions to ensure greater stability (Pupavac 2005: 172). Pupavac (2005: 177) argues that human security, rather than bringing greater security and development to the most vulnerable, instead means that development has become a means of ensuring security through managing expectations and offsetting frustration in the developing world. The work of Duffield and Pupavac deals in over-arching theory rather than specific examples, as such it does not give us a detailed picture of how these relationships work or the specific mechanisms involved in these attempts to control.

Coming from a different theoretical perspective than Pupavac or Duffield, Rita Abrahamsen (2004, 2005) argues a nonetheless similar point; that the merging of security and development will not work for the benefit of developing states as it is fundamentally about the security of the donor state. Rather than a biopolitical or global governance perspective, Abrahamsen (2004, 2005) draws on the Copenhagen School's idea of securitisation to examine UK foreign policy towards Africa. She argues that UK relations with Africa have become securitised and Africa is now represented as a source of fear and danger for the UK (Abrahamsen 2005: 56). Within this process, development aid functions as a means of ensuring that African states are better able to contain instability and insecurity that may threaten the security of the West (Abrahamsen 2005: 71). This work is useful in that, unlike Duffield and Pupavac, Abrahamsen does not assume homogeneity between different donors

and looks at the merging of security and development from the perspective of a single donor and separates out the policy actions of the UK from the US allowing contrast between them.

This sceptical approach is also evident in literature at the more micro level of specific African countries. Lisa Denney (2011: 291) questions the validity behind the assumption of a mutually reinforcing relationship between security and development in the case of Sierra Leone. Both Denny (2011) and Krogstad (2012) are critical of DfID's engagement with the security sector in Sierra Leone arguing that while state security has been bolstered, the security needs of individuals have not been adequately addressed. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zoe Marriage (2011) argues that the approach to coordinating security and development is based on the erroneous assumption of common interest between the needs of ordinary people and donor countries. However, this has only served to reinforce existing unequal power structures both between the DRC and the West and also within DRC between elites and those excluded from opportunities through conflict (Marriage 2011: 1903). Bachmann and Hönke (2010) highlight how merging security and development in Kenya has led to development programmes being used to prevent radicalisation in order to assist counter-terrorism. This literature gives a greater understanding of how the security-development nexus influences policy in specific country contexts. By its focused nature, it is however, limited in what it tells us about different donors' broad policy on merging security and development, and so the motivations behind these connections remain unclear. This study builds on this literature by examining multiple donors' policy over an extended period of time in addition to their security and development policy towards specific recipients.

Assessing this literature, the over-arching theoretical approach of Duffield and Pupavac is helpful in placing the security-development nexus in a broader theoretical understanding of Western notions of governance. However, it is of limited use as a framework for empirical analysis as it is difficult to assess whether actions and language around security and development are *not* biopolitical. If they are all about biopolitics and governance, this makes it difficult to separate out differences between donors and recipient relationships. All actions related to development and security could be considered to be biopolitical in some way and this does not help us to understand different nuances in different contexts. Abrahamsen

(2005) uses the securitisation framework for analysis which provides a clearer means of analysis. However, she uses it for assessing UK representations of Africa in foreign policy more broadly rather than development policy specifically. The securitisation framework is more useful for analysing how certain issues are elevated to the level of existential security threats. However, in the merging of security and development policy, development problems are seldom framed as immediate security threats and are more often framed as long-term security risks. As a result, the securitisation framework is less applicable. This will be discussed in greater depth below.

Denialists

In contrast to arguments that merging security and development will either lead to greater security and development or will reinforce existing global power structures and inequality, there is another argument that the merging of security and development does not exist beyond policy rhetoric to any significant degree. From this 'denialist' position, talk of a security-development nexus is misleading and distracting and the merging of security and development has had little impact on donors' policy (Chandler 2007; Lacher 2008). For example, Wolfram Lacher claims that USAID has simply repackaged its existing programmes in the Sahel as counter-terrorism, rather than initiating a new relationship between security and development (Lacher 2008: 399). Rather than the security-development nexus being an exercise of power by states, as the 'sceptical' literature would argue, for David Chandler (2007: 364), it is a retreat from the use of power by donor states. It is a part of a broader phenomenon that Chandler (2007: 379) calls "anti-foreign policy", where policy becomes a list of contradictory statements identifying problems but not solutions, the purpose being to generate an internal sense of high moral standing and ethical political purpose. There is a diffusion of responsibility for foreign policy decisions through numerous actors leading to a disconnect between policy formulation and the responsibility for carrying out policies (Chandler 2007: 373). Similarly, Wolfram Lacher (2008) disagrees with Duffield and Abrahamsen and argues that they assume a level of consistency and government control in the security-development nexus, which does not exist. For Lacher (2008: 384) it stems from a fear of unknown threats which security seeks to reveal. From this a number of different actors compete to define security threats: donor states, international organisations, NGOs, private

security firms, and African states who have become the subject of security (Lacher 2008: 388). All these actors have different interests and so the security-development nexus is a result of interaction and competition between these agendas resulting in something that is random, incoherent and "radically open ended in its consequences" (Lacher 2008: 399).

While these arguments are useful in challenging assumptions around the nature of the security-development nexus and its impact on policy, they do not draw on a convincing body of evidence to bolster the 'denialist' view. Lacher is correct in highlighting the limitations of focusing on a narrow discourse in order to make conclusions about the merging of security and development. However, he bases his research almost exclusively on the policy and discourse of the US and to a much lesser degree the EU. As a result, the scope of his research is not wider than either Abrahamsen or Duffield. Chandler's argument is largely theoretical, it is not supported by any significant empirical research and he does not engage with the idea of ODA being directed to manage insecurity at the level of shifts in aid flows. This, at a minimum level, suggests some policy action rather than a retreat from decision making. The weight of evidence presented by other sections of literature suggests that there has been at least some shift in donor policy to address security concerns through development programmes which undermines the denialist position. This will be discussed in more detail following the next section which examines the literature that separates out different donors actions, specifically the three donor cases of the US, the UK and Canada.

Security in specific donor development policy

This thesis seeks to separate out the different ways in which different donors merge security and development policy. Whilst bilateral donors such as Denmark and Japan (Beall et al 2005; Aning 2010) have received some attention in the literature, in addition to multilateral actors such as the EU and the UN (Chandler 2007, Youngs 2008, Hettne 2010; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Keukeleire and Raube 2013), the bulk of the existing literature is on the US, the UK and to a lesser extent Canada. This section looks at the literature on these three countries.

US-specific literature

The literature on US development policy focuses on the weakness of its development agency USAID, which draws its policy from the rest of government rather than establishing policy itself (Atwood, et al. 2008; Lancaster 2008; Howell and Lind 2009). While Ngaire Woods (2005) points out that the blending of security and development has coincided with an increase in US development aid flows in terms of overall volume but not as a percentage of GDP, US development spending lags far behind military spending. For example, in 2005, $2.5 billion was provided by the US for development aid compared with the $2 billion spent the previous year on private military companies hired to protect contractors in Iraq (Woods 2005: 5). During the WoT the US established a number of new aid institutions, such as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) in order channel this increase in ODA. However, critics of these programmes argue that they serve as the more humane face of the WoT, they undermine USAID by bypassing existing programmes and they are based on reductionist understandings of linkages between poverty and security (Woods 2005: 398; Chhotray and Hulme 2007; Ingram 2007; Mohan and Mawdsley 2007; Mawdsley 2007: 489). Alan Ingram's (2007) study of the PEPFAR highlights the fact that a disproportionate amount was spent on treating military personnel rather than civilians (Ingram 2007: 516). In the case of Nigeria, a key state of national interest for the US in Africa, PEPFAR paid for the anti-retroviral drugs directly for treatment of the military but not for civilians. Rather than dealing with it as a human security threat the US has treated it as a conventional security threat that fundamentally undermines the state and the military (Ingram 2007: 516).

The closer coordination between development and security in US policy has led to direct involvement of USAID in military operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq and US military involvement in development programmes (Bachmann and Hönke 2010; Barakat et al 2010). The majority of the literature on Iraq and Afghanistan is critical and argues that development policy has been militarised and has compromised humanitarian actors, placing them in danger through association with an occupying military (Darity 2009; Munslow and O'Dempsey 2009; Shannon 2009). US military involvement in development projects has also

been highlighted by Bachmann and Hönke (2010) in the context of Kenya where US counterterrorism has involved addressing development problems in parts of the country deemed to be a source of extremism.

The US's policy of increasing a developing state's military capacity is also problematic. In reference to the Pan Sahel Initiative, set up by the US in the wake of 9/11, Stephen Ellis (2004: 464) sees the development-security link as providing a military solution for problems such as economic distress, failed states, weak governance and human rights abuses which is inadequate and may even lead to future civil unrest and conflict. The case of the US military training of Rwandan soldiers, following the 1994 genocide, who were later involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, illustrates this point (Carmody 2005: 104). Previous instances, such as Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo, have shown that resource rich countries with authoritarian rule and a strong military can be highly prone to civil war (Carmody 2005: 103). As a result, the militarization of Africa in the WoT conflicts with donors stated goal of developing democratic governance. This is highlighted in Paul Jackson's (2009: 45) work on the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). While it asserts that it does not represent a militarisation of policy but is about addressing development problems such as HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping, it also has strategic military and economic goals such as securing oil reserves and fending off competition from China. The focus on strong militaries ignores the difficulties of the proliferation of arms as causing conflict and the past incidence of strong military led states becoming oppressive societies and a source of insecurity for their own citizens (Duffield 2005: 157). This literature is overwhelmingly critical of how the US has merged security and development policy. However, the process by which this has unfolded from the pre-9/11 period to the present and in the context of multiple recipient programmes has been underexplored in the literature.

UK-specific literature

There is disagreement in the literature around DfID's engagement with security post-9/11. On the one hand Fitz-Gerald (2006: 118), Waddell (2006: 543-546) and Youngs (2007: 11) argue that DfID has maintained a firm stance on poverty alleviation over security concerns. They point to clashes between DfID and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) over projects that

prioritised foreign policy over poverty alleviation as evidence of this. Furthermore, others claim that DfID's leading principle is that the security of the world's poorest and most vulnerable is of utmost importance and should be prioritised over the security of Western donor countries (Beall et al 2006: 58). Still others claim that the closer relationship between security and development has led UK security policy to have a greater focus on development issues, stemming from a realisation of the limits of military power for ensuring global security (Pugh et al., 2013: 196; Ritchie, 2011: 370). However, as Howell and Lind (2009: 1288) point out, rather than a renewed poverty focus, a clear shift of development spending to meet WoT demands can be seen in the status of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan as DfID's top recipients, whereas prior to 2001 they were not in the top 20 recipients. Similarly, studies on DfID's policy discourse argue that aid has become linked to UK national security (Noxolo (2012: 35). It is argued that developing countries are now seen as a source of insecurity to the West and that development aid is now used as a conflict resolution tool to shape the behaviour of African states so that they conform to liberal values of the free market economy and democracy (Abrahamsen, 2004; Duffield, 2005, 2006, 2010; Duffield and Waddell, 2006; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). Of the existing studies on security and development in UK policy, none analyses a comprehensive sweep of UK development, foreign policy and development policy discourse over an extended period of time, although the contributions of Abrahamsen (2004, 2005) analysing some DfID, FCO and MoD documents and the public speeches of key state officials, Duffield and Waddell (2006) who draw on interviews with DfID officials and Stern and Öjendal (2010), Beall et al (2006) who examine excerpts of DfID's 2005 security document, Noxolo (2012) Pugh et al (2013) and Ritchie's (2011) analyses of single documents released by the coalition government offer interesting insights into the subject.

Canada- specific literature

The literature on Canada's development policy focuses largely on the need to reform CIDA. Canada's aid institution is independent from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), unlike USAID which is a largely a receiver of policy set by the US Department of State (DoS). Similar to DfID, CIDA has a cabinet level Minister for International Cooperation who oversees development policy. Unlike DfID, however, CIDA is seen as having weak ministerial powers at the government level with decision making on

development policy centralised in the office of the Prime Minister (Brown 2008: 6). Furthermore, it is argued in the literature that its policy suffers from swings between different Prime Ministers objectives and the divergent ideological positions of the Liberal and Conservative governments (Brown 2008: 173). At an operational level it is argued that CIDA has no overall vision for its role in the international system as a donor and it has too broad a programme involving too many countries, as a result it gives too little money in each country to make a difference (Gulrajani 2010: 41). On the basis of this, in 2007 the Canadian Senate issued a report on aid effectiveness suggesting that CIDA in its current form should be either abolished or improved with a statutory mandate[2] (The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2007). CIDA has also been criticised for its use of tied aid. Whilst it has pledged to untie aid by 2013, in 2005 40% of CIDA's aid was tied (Brown 2008: 174). Under the Conservative government elected in 2006, Prime Minister Harper has sought to bring greater focus to Canada's aid policy by concentrating on fewer countries. This has resulted in accusations that Canada is shifting its attention away from Africa and focusing more on Latin America (Clark 2007: 4; Black 2009: 41). It is argued that this move represents a broader trend of a turn away from poverty as a focus for CIDA, resulting in greater attention for middle-income countries for trade purposes (Nelles 2002: 463). There are arguments around this over whether Canada uses its overseas aid to pursue foreign policy goals.

Canada's position on foreign policy is portrayed as being based on ethical considerations and Canadian values (Pratt 2001: 40). On the one hand it is argued that Canada's role in the international system is as a middle-power state that seeks to resolve problems of conflict through international cooperation (Riddell-Dixon 2005: 1068). Examples of this are the Ottawa Process to ban the use of landmines, the founding of the International Criminal Court, in which Canada played an instrumental role, and the championing of the concepts of human security and the Responsibility to Protect (Riddell-Dixon 2005: 1091). A more critical view of this is that Canada's focus on these issues ignores the more intractable problems of extreme poverty, sustainable development and social equality (Nelles 2002: 462). As in some of the literature on the US and the UK, it has also been argued that Canada has adopted security in its development policy in a way that prioritises national security concerns (Brown

[2] In July 2013 CIDA was abolished and incorporated in the ministry of trade and foreign affairs to form a new Department for Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD).

2007; Beall et al 2006 and Aning 2010). Afghanistan was CIDA's top aid recipient for a number of years in the 2000s and Kwesi Aning (2010: 20) argues that most of the increase in Canada's overseas aid during the 2000s has gone to Afghanistan and Iraq. Whilst Beall et al (2006: 56), cite CIDA's 2005 policy statement as framing development as the first line of defence for security, Stephen Brown (2007) questions the actual importance of Afghanistan and Iraq to Canada's national security. Instead, Brown (2007: 189) claims that CIDA's use of development aid for security is actually about US security and not Canadian national security. However, Brown does not elaborate on this point or explore why US security is so important to Canada as to shape its development policy. One possible explanation for this is the importance of the trade with the US and the role of the US as a gatekeeper to the American continent for Canada's economy (Sjolander 2009: 83). This is explored by Jonathan Paquin (2009) who argues that 9/11 has shaped Canada's foreign policy dramatically as it has had to maintain close diplomatic relations with the US. Examples of this are stricter Canadian immigration and border policies and Canada's involvement in the invasion of Afghanistan (Paquin (2009: 100). This has had such an influence that Paquin claims that the US reaction to 9/11 has had a far greater impact on Canadian foreign policy that the event of 9/11 itself (Paquin 2009: 101). These issues have not been investigated through a systematic examination of Canadian development policy over the period of the late 1990s to present day.

Balancing theoretical perspectives in the merging of security and development

Overall, two things stand out in this body of literature: the lack of systematic empirical research to examine possible differences in the merging of security and development across time and between different countries, and the diverse theoretical perspectives from which this literature comes. To address the first issue, this research looks at the merging of security and development across three donors (the US, the UK and Canada) and two recipient countries (Ethiopia and Kenya) over the period of time from the late 1990s to 2012. The rationale behind these case selections is discussed in greater detail in the Chapter 3. In relation to the second issue, these three theoretical perspectives of 'optimists', 'sceptics' and 'denialists', taken separately, are useful for understanding partial elements of the security-development nexus, but are limited for analysing the merging of security and development in a comprehensive way over time and across donors and recipients.

The ‘denialist’ approach is somewhat problematic given the growing body of evidence in the literature of an actual phenomenon of merging security and development that extends beyond policy rhetoric. The ‘optimistic’ approach does not question the logic and motivations behind the merging of security and development and does not adequately address the power relations behind the security-development nexus. The ‘sceptical’ literature tends to deal with this broad relationship as a singular issue rather than differentiating between different donor’s behaviour. It is very difficult to argue that any actions are not about biopolitical management of populations for security ends because it is such an all-encompassing theory. The same action, for example, funding education programmes in a conflict affected area, could be interpreted as either part of a virtuous cycle of addressing the root causes of human insecurity (Picciotto 2004; Stewart 2004) or as part of an unending global civil war caused by the West’s attempts at biopolitical control of the developing world (Duffield 2010a). This is due to the very specific starting assumptions of these two groups of literature. On the ‘optimist’ side there are assumptions of the non-political, functional nature of coordinating security and development which does not give adequate space to the power relations between donors and recipients. On the ‘sceptic’ side there are assumptions that the biopolitical nature of the merging of security and development is about controlling dangerous populations which largely precludes the possibility of any benefits the relationship might have for developing countries. Both sets of assumptions make it difficult to examine the differences and nuances between different contexts and allow a move away from a singular understanding of security and development.

This thesis is situated between the ‘optimist’ and ‘sceptic’ positions in the literature. The starting assumption is that there is a connection between development being held back and insecurity. The merging of security and development could potentially address these problems. However, the closer relationship between security and development aid should not be accepted uncritically and the power dynamics between donor and recipient countries need to be held up to scrutiny. In addition, how security and development is defined and whose security takes priority are also key factors. But this thesis examines them without a prior assumption that they are part of a biopolitical system of control and management of security. An alternative way of looking at the merging of security and development is as a form of risk

management. In identifying the security problems that development issues pose there is the identification of security risks and the proposal that development aid has a role in managing those risks. From the perspective of risk management there are a range of possible motivations and outcomes. Development actions to address risk can be aimed at: addressing risks that impact on ordinary citizens in developing states; they can be aimed at addressing security risks to the integrity of the developing state; they can be targeted at mitigating against security risks that effect the donor state; or they can be a blend of all three. In this way the policy discourse and behaviour of different donors can be analysed from a more open perspective allowing for different levels of risk identification, different actions to address risk and different levels of and motivations for merging security and development. The concept of risk is useful for this as the management of risk can result in different identifications of risk and the prioritisation of different actions across different donors and different recipient contexts. This allows a richer picture to emerge which is not tied to assumptions about the necessity of the relationship between security and development or about the motivation of biopolitical control behind these actions. Before outlining why risk theory is appropriate, this section discusses the ubiquitous use of securitisation theory in studying the merging of security and development.

"Securitisation" of development

The closer coordination between security and development is often described as a 'securitisation of development' or accompanied by assertions that development has been 'securitised' (Duffield 2001; Pupavac 2005; Waddell 2006; Lacher 2008). In some cases this is used to describe the prioritisation of security goals over development goals (Waddell 2006) in other case it draws on the Copenhagen School theory of securitisation (Lacher 2008; Keukeleire and Raube 2013). The theory of securitisation is a very specific approach and it came out of post-Cold War approaches to open up security studies away from traditional realist conceptions of security. Rather than viewing security threats as pre-existing and tangible phenomena in the international system that states need to navigate, security threats are socially constructed. The key scholars in securitisation theory are Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Japp de Wilde and their 1998 book *Security: a new framework for analysis* is the seminal work in this area. Their position is not that security threats do not exist per se but that

the identification, prioritisation and call for action on these threats are socially constructed (Buzan et al. 1998: 205). The problem with this is that security processes are non-transparent and non-democratic and Waever (1995: 57) argues that security threats should be 'desecuritised' and brought back into the political realm where greater transparency and deliberation are possible. Securitisation theory has been criticised: for being heavily gender biased and ignoring security issues effecting women by focusing on dominant voices only (Hansen 2000); for ignoring how securitisation impacts differently at a domestic to an international level (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008: 7); for focusing on the use of language rather than the strategic actions of states (Balzacq 2005, 2010); and for failing to recognise the possible emancipatory potential for elevating neglected social issues to prominence through securitisation (Booth 1991; Wyn Jones 1999).

In relation to the merging of security and development, securitisation theory is a very specific framework, and sets out certain specific criteria for an act to be described as a securitising action. With the exception of Abrahamsen (2005) there is little in-depth discussion of how the closer relationship between security and development conforms to the standards set out by Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998). Their framework asserts that a particular issue can be framed as a security issue and taken outside of the realm of normal politics to enable immediate and exceptional action to deal with the securitised issue (Buzan et al 1998: 5). This is done by a series of speech acts which frame a particular issue as an existential threat to the state (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-4). When a speech act is successful the issue is accepted as a security issue by the target audience, whether other parts of government or the general public, and it is elevated as a priority for immediate action (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). However, a speech act may not be successful if the audience does not accept that it represents an existential threat. This comes down to the authority of the speaker and how convincingly they argue that a certain issue is an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). Rita Abrahamsen (2005: 59) argues that rather than a successful/unsuccessful binary, securitisation can also operate on a spectrum. Rather than a failed securitisation attempt, instead it may be pushed further along the spectrum, but may still not be accepted as an existential threat. Abrahamsen (2004, 2005) makes a convincing case that the UK has securitised Africa in its foreign policy in the WoT, highlighting examples of Africa being framed as a security threat and a source of Islamist extremism.

However, the securitisation framework is of only limited use for assessing the role of security in ordinary development policy. Whilst certain specific interventions have involved a coordination of development aid and militaries on the basis that extraordinary measures were required, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, these are high profile exceptional circumstances that while important, do not tell us much about how security considerations have penetrated into mainstream policy outside of exceptional circumstances. Since 9/11, development problems have certainly gained greater political importance and have received greater funding but it is difficult to argue that they have been successfully securitised and placed as existential threats to donor states. Instead, development issues are framed as security threats through indirect causal claims such as, poverty creates conditions that allow terrorism and extremism to prosper or HIV/AIDS undermines security because it undermines militaries in the developing world (Duffield 2006; Ingram 2007; Denney 2011). As a result, development problems are second order, rather than immediate security threats and do not represent existential security threats. Taking this into account a better way to understand the framing of development issues as indirect security problems that unfold over the long-term is as security risks rather than threats.

While development problems are rarely framed as immediate threats to state security, the merging of security and development is occurring in a context of overt securitisation. For example, military action in Afghanistan and Iraq has required coordination of development actors with the military. As a result, the merging of security and development does not meet the criteria of securitisation – an existential threat to the state. Olaf Corry (2012: 237) argues that securitisation has been over-used to describe responses to risks. In doing this securitization theory loses its analytical precision. Instead there should be a separation of securitization of immediate existential threats and what Corry (2012) calls a 'riskification' of more long-term security risks. These 'riskification' speech acts are different focusing on long-terms risks and making different causal claims (Corry 2012: 246). Referent objects in 'riskification' are also different including different actors other than the state (Corry 2012: 239). In addition there is a shift from defending threats to managing risks. Looking at the merging of security and development in this way is a more useful approach because it allows an examination of how development problems can be defined as long term security problems

rather than existential threats. This issue of risk in the security-development nexus although referred to in the security and development literature (Pupavac 2005: 178; Ritchie 2011; Duffield 2010b) is not sufficiently developed in a way that helps us to understand the merging of security and development. The idea of risk is a broad one, but in particular, Ulrich Beck's (1992) risk society theory is useful for examining the merging of security and development across multiple contexts. This is the subject of the next section.

Theories of Risk

The idea of risk in society is broad and is addressed from a number of different theoretical angles (Heng and McDonagh 2011: 315). This literature can be divided into four broad categories: economics (Adams 1995), sociology (Douglas 1990; Beck 1992, 1999, 2002, 2003,2009; Giddens 1998; Luhmann 1998), criminology (O'Malley 1998; Ericsson and Hegarty 1997) and governmentality (Ewald 1993; Aradau and van Munster 2007, 2008; Dillon 2008). This section draws on the sociological understanding of risk and in particular the work of Ulrich Beck. In one other sociological understanding of risk Mary Douglas (1990) argues that risk is culturally embedded and has superseded other forms of social control in earlier societies such as the idea of sin. Therefore risk is something that is culturally received and negotiated in different societies. Niklas Luhmann's (1993) study on risk is a historical analysis of risk discourse in modern society which is based on the ideas of individualism, economy of control and progress. Both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1993) build on Luhmann's work by looking at society as having moved beyond modernity in the realisation of the limits of society in predicting and defending against risk. As Karen Lund Petersen (2012: 700) points put, risk is not a coherent discipline but a pluralist field of debate where the concept is debated in terms of its status and its core features. Within this broad debate on risk, this study draws on Ulrich Beck's idea of the risk society as a way of understanding the merging of security and development, because it allows for a flexible approach which can accommodate multiple variations in the merging of security and development across time, donor and recipient contexts. This section firstly outlines the main aspects of Beck's risk society, secondly is a discussion of how risk has been brought into security studies, thirdly is an examination of the criticisms of Beck's theory and lastly is a

discussion of how the risk society can be used to understand the merging of security and development.

Beck's risk society

Beck's risk society thesis is based on two key concepts: the increase in risks associated with technological advancement and the idea of reflexive modernity. Beck's main argument originated from concern over environmental disaster and risks associated with the unforeseen consequences of technological advances such as nuclear disasters and illnesses caused by the use of chemicals and fertilizers (Beck 1992: 22, 25). These risks represent the unintended consequences of industrial advancement and modernity and the failure of established scientific thought to predict these events has led to uncertainty over the future (Beck 1992: 21). Beck does not dispute that risks have always existed and that they are not new to the modern age. However, his key point is that these dangers in the risk society are consequences of the conscious decisions and actions of industry to make profit and that their magnitude is incalculable (Beck 2009: 25). In this way, risks are viewed as a necessary consequence of industrial advancement (Beck 2009: 25). Prior to the latter half of the 20th century, risks could be predicted and insured against through a combination of state and private sector management, for example a fire service to put out fires and insurance to compensate for damage (Beck 2009: 27). In the narrative of modernity, the state gains its legitimacy by shielding its citizens from these risks (Beck 2002: 41). The difference in the risk society is that catastrophic risk cannot be insured against in this way, for example, nuclear fallout cannot be covered by the traditional forms of risk management and the effects cannot be calculated by expert knowledge (Beck 2003:257). In addition, risks do not respect national boundaries and their transnational nature limits the state's ability to mitigate against these risks. While greater wealth may offer protection from some risks, at the domestic level, risks do not respect class boundaries "poverty is hierarchical, smog is democratic" (Beck 1992: 36). The result of this is the public's loss of confidence in the ability of society to predict and respond to risks.

Beck's idea of reflexive modernity (1992) is that society becomes self-aware of the risks that it has created for itself. There is a realisation that industrialisation and modernity do not represent linear progress and advancement of society, but on the contrary have created global inequalities and a number of risks (Beck 1999: 4). Due to the globalised nature of modernity, advanced communications, increased movement of people and economic interdependency have meant that states are interconnected to a degree previously unseen (Beck 2003: 257). Beck (1992: 13) argues that in reflexive modernity risks are not accidental or external, but created by society itself. As Spence (2005: 286) points out, this view was inspired by a number of catastrophic industrial disasters such as the chemical leak at Bhopal (1984), the nuclear meltdown in Chernobyl (1986) and the Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989). Risk society is made up of three 'pillars': ecological disasters, financial collapses and terrorism (Beck 2003: 256). Risks in the risk society have not become more dangerous *per se*, but their globalised nature has led to a 'de-bounding' of risk across three dimensions: spatial, temporal and social (Beck 2002: 41). Spatial, because dangers impact across national boundaries. Temporal, because dangers can arise because of actions taken at a previous time, such as fallout from nuclear waste material. Social, because upholding the appearance of control of these risks is now a key political issue in social life (Beck 2002: 41). The expert scientific knowledge that was previously relied upon to predict and guard against risk lost its legitimacy and instead decisions on risk are taken by governments.

The politics of defining risk.

While risks are now globalised, this does not mean that they are homogenised and risks are often experienced differently in different parts of the world. Poorer countries often experience risk as something inflicted from the outside often suffering the consequences of actions taken in industrialised countries (Beck 2002: 42). For example, climate change as a result of decades of pollution from industrialised countries has had a disproportionately negative impact in the global south (Stern 2006; UNDP 2013). Given the unpredictable nature of risks, the uneven way in which they are experienced and the subjective nature of imagining future dangers, the issue of who defines risk is key (Beck 2002: 44). Beck argues that scientists and experts are no longer able to define risk. This is because understanding the past no longer tells us about the future, as risks are dangers beyond our previous experience

whose odds of occurrence are incalculable (Beck 2000: 214). As a result, the definition of risks is highly politicised being created by states and governments rather than experts (Beck 2002: 44). States and political actors have vested interests in defining who and what risks are: "believed risks are the whip to keep the present day moving along at a gallop" (Beck 2000: 214). In the 1990s Beck's idea of risks were mostly environmental disasters (1992, 1999), however following 9/11 he incorporated terrorism into his risk society thesis (2002, 2003, 2009). Fear of the unknown and unpredictable is central to the classification of risks. This argument of defining risk is particularly relevant to the issue of terrorism as states have a vested interest in defining who their enemy is and who the 'terrorists' are. An example of this is the speculation in the early 2000s of Islamic extremism emerging from Asia and Africa, which would require preventive action (Beck 2002: 45). This vision of the future of Islamic extremism was something presented by both Western states and certain Asian (Phillipines) and African (Algeria, Nigeria, Somalia) states to meet domestic political agendas (Bhatia 2005; Obi 2006; Marchal 2007; Keenan 2009). How these risks are acted upon is the basis for Beck's idea of the 'world risk society' of international cooperation. Risks should be managed through international cooperation creating a cosmopolitan international system where states cooperate to manage risks in a coherent and inclusive manner (Beck 2006: 3). Rather than seeking to make the world more predictable through attempts to make the rest of the world more like the West, a cosmopolitan society should be founded on the basis of the recognition of difference and otherness. However, the transition to a cosmopolitan society is hampered by states pursuing narrow short-term interests in a way that creates further global divisions and exacerbates risks rather than addressing them.

The shift from threats to risks in international relations

Over the past decade or so, risk has become more prominent in the study of international security and of international relations more broadly. There is no consensus on this crossover between sociological theory and international relations theory and as the concept of risk is a broad one, it has led to a plurality of approaches often drawing on a number of theoretical positions (Heng and McDonagh 2011: 315). This thesis also does this, drawing on Beck's idea of the risk society only to a point. The constructivist turn in security studies following the end of the Cold War has found congruence with the idea of risk. Security studies were traditionally focused on a narrow conception of state security where the main referent was the

state and security threats were defined as threats to the state (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 187). The move to broaden security (to include a wider range of threats beyond the military) and deepen security (to include referents other than the state) was consistent with an understanding of security that highlighted long-term risks rather than short-term threats to security (Buzan and Hansen 2008: 188). The idea of risk is consistent with an understanding of security that looks at long-term systemic security risks that transcend national boundaries, rather than short-term military threats (Hansen and Buzan 2008: 190). While most of the scholars that subscribe to Beck's theory of risk disagree with certain aspects of it, for example, the cosmopolitan nature of how societies manage risk (Spence 2005; Heng and McDonagh 2011) or the incalculability of future risks such as terrorism (Petersen 2008), it is not an exaggeration to say that Beck's risk society thesis dominates the study of risk in security studies. Even scholars who do not subscribe to Beck's idea of risk still engage with his work in order to set up their counter position (Aradau and van Munster 2007, 2008; De Goede 2008; Dillon 2008). This section looks at how risk has been brought into security studies.

The earliest works drawing Beck into security studies are those by Anders Rasmussen (2001) and Christopher Coker (2002). Rasmussen (2001) draws on Becks idea of the risk society to explain how NATO redefined its purpose in the context of the post-Cold War World. Similarly Coker (2002) argues that NATO is now a 'risk community' rather than a 'security community' and that rather than solving security problems, NATO now seeks to manage security risks. Following this a number of scholars have drawn on Beck to understand security practices in the WoT, in some cases to examine military practices (Heng 2006; Rasmussen 2004 Coker 2013) in other cases to examine non-military practices in the WoT (Amoore and De Goode 2005; Heng and McDonagh 2009, 2011). This study draws on this idea of the aspects of the WoT that do not involve pre-emptive air strikes or military invasions. Heng and McDonagh (2009, 2011) look at international cooperation on financial regulation as a risk management technique in the WoT and Amoore and DeGoede (2005) look at the collection of information as a form of risk management in the WoT. Whilst these analyses draw inspiration from Becks idea of the risk society, they do not all subscribe to the idea of the cosmopolitan world risk society where risks are managed through international cooperation based on respect for otherness and equality (Beck 2009: 56). Spence (2005) maintains that risk management is still rooted in modernist understandings of risk.

Rasmussen (2001, 2004) and Heng and McDonagh (2009, 2011) assert that while international cooperation may be evident in areas such as financial regulation to combat terrorism, this does not necessarily mean that they have been derived from thought processes consistent with Becks vision of cosmopolitanism.

Criticisms of Becks work centre on: the limited scope of risk that Beck identifies (Aradau and van Munster 2007), the misconception of transition from modernity to reflexive modernity (Elliot 2002: 299; Aradau and van Munster 2007: 94) and the omission of a positive view of risk that can lead to profit (Dillon 2008). Aradau and van Munster (2007: 91) argue that Beck's idea of risk is too narrow in scope. In only dealing with catastrophic transnational threats, it fails to address the ways in which risk is defined at a domestic level on issues such as crime and health (Aradau and van Munster 2007: 91; Bigo 2002). In addition, Beck's concept of risk ignores the way that states and private companies still try to calculate the possibilities of terrorist attacks and insure against them (Aradau and van Munster 2008: 195). The response of these criticisms is to reject Becks notion of risk society and subscribe to an idea of risk that draws on Michel Foucault's (1980) concept of governmentality. For Michael Dillion (2008) the concept of governmentality and biopolitics is the best way to understand risk. Governments seek to ensure security at the level of everyday life using institutions and mechanisms of the state to offset and mitigate danger (Dillon 2008: 311). Human life can never be fully insulated from risk and so risk must be managed. This is done through social and financial institutions drawing on legal and insurance methods. Similarly, Aradau and van Munster (2007, 2008) argue that risk is a form of *dispositif*. A *dispositif* is made up of 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions' (Foucault 1980: 194). A risk *dispositif* identifies risks and controls them through social action and control covering both exceptional catastrophic risks and also everyday risks at the domestic level. Whilst there is merit in these approaches, they are from the same theoretical grounding as the 'sceptical' approach of Pupavac (2004, 2010) and Duffield (2005, 2008, 2010a, 2011) in that they draw on Foucault's ideas on governmentality. As such they are problematic for the same reasons as a biopolitical approach is problematic as outlined above. Governmentality is an all-encompassing theory and involves a number of prior assumptions about the nature of institutions to control behaviour and their power dynamics which this study does not take as its starting position. This study argues that Beck's approach is most

appropriate for analysing the merging of security and development as it can help us to understand the varying political processes around the merging of security and development policies and the different ways in which this has unfolded in different donor and recipient country contexts. The next section outlines how.

Development and security as risk management

The idea of development aid serving a role of security risk management has not been adequately explored in the literature. Duffield hints at the issue when discussing the 'dangers' (rather than risks) that the developing world pose for the developed world (2005, 2010a), but he does not directly address the role of development aid in managing security risks for donors. When he does address the idea of security risk management directly it is in terms of how aid workers manage risks to their safety through the fortification of aid compounds (Duffield 2010b). Similarly Pupavac (2005) highlights how a lack of development is understood by donors to be a risk to Western security, but she does not explore the nature of this risks assessment and how it may differ across donors. To address this gap, this study draws on Beck's idea of risk and Olaf Corry's (2012) idea of the coexistence of both securitisation which elevates issues to existential security threats to the state and 'riskification' which elevates issues to the level of long term security risks. Drawing on Beck's idea of the Risk Society, it can be argued that the starting point of the current phase of the merging security and development is a reaction to the proliferation of civil conflict in the post-Cold War world, the reflection that these conflicts resulted from the actions of the West during the Cold War and a realisation that a coordinated approach between military, foreign policy and development was necessary to deal with these problems. The concept of risk allows us to look at these events and further changes occurring after 9/11 as different ways of assessing and managing risk which occur alongside incidences of securitisation such as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Using this as a framework through which to examine the merging of security and development policy empirically through a study of three donors (the US, the UK and Canada) and their policy and programming in two specific countries (Ethiopia and Kenya) provides a number of different openings for exploring the security-development nexus.

This framework allows the exploration of a number of different scenarios in terms of whether development problems are identified as security risks, the arguments offered to make these claims, the actions taken to manage these risks and whether these risk analyses are cosmopolitan in nature or whether they still adhere to the conventional approach of modernity. This allows the merging of security and development to be examined without prior assumptions that it is for the benefit of populations in the developing world or that it is part of a process of biopolitical management of the global poor. Security risks in development policy can be identified in terms of how they impact on the recipient country, the donor country, people in the recipient country, or a combination of these. Examining how these arguments are presented, how risks are identified and the actions that are suggested to manage these risks will provide a more nuanced understanding of the merging of security and development. Furthermore, examining changes in institutions, shifts in aid flows and policy towards specific recipient countries in relation to security and development can provide a picture of the extent to which this extends beyond policy to practice and whether they function as a form of risk management. This allows the key issue, identified in Chapter 1, of what motivates states to merge security and development to be addressed through the following questions: How is risk identified in development policy and what are the arguments around this? Who is identified as being at risk? How are development interventions expected to manage these risks? From these questions a number of scenarios are possible: the donor state may be prioritised as the focus of risk management, or the individual in the developing world may be the object of risk; development issues may be highlighted as security risks but not have much impact on policy, or have significant impact on policy etc. These multiple possible scenarios can all be understood as a variation of risk management drawing on Beck's concept of risk and incorporated within the study to produce a nuanced and complex analysis. Drawing on this understanding of risk in an examination of the merging of security and development in the policy of the US, the UK and Canada and their specific programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya allows a detailed picture of similarities and differences across these multiple contexts.

The advantage of an understanding of the security-development nexus that draws on Beck's idea of the risk society is that it can address aspects of the nexus that do not have meaningful security identification and are only indirectly connected security priorities. From the binary perspective of Buzan et al. (1998) securitisation theory, where securitising speech acts either

succeed or fail, most of the instances in the literature do not represent a 'securitisation' of development as they do not frame development problems as existential threats. Even the more nuanced approach to securitisation taken by Abrahamsen (2005) and Bigo (2002) which, rather than a binary, presents a scale of securitisation where issues are moved closer to being an existential threat as they move up the scale, does not adequately account for the merging of security and development. This is because even a scale of securitisation assumes a minimum level of proximity to an issue being framed as an 'existential threat' and for an issue to be registered on such a scale there must be some possibility of a securitisation outcome. The key issue with such a securitisation scale is how far down the scale does a development problem have to be before it is still reasonably be considered to be a case of 'securitisation'? Herein lies the difficulty with securitisation. Many of the interactions between security and development do not involve direct connections between development problems and security threats to donor countries. Instead donors often make a series of causal arguments connecting development problems in a particular country to conflict in that country, to instability in a region, which in turn may result in a national security problem for the donor. The dilemma faced when applying a securitisation scale is whether to exclude these interactions between security and development from the analysis because they are not examples of securitisation, or to insist from a rather weak theoretical position that they should be included even though they are removed from even a minimal definition of securitisation. Ulrich Beck's risk society perspective addresses this dilemma.

Viewing these indirect connections between security and development as risks rather than threats opens these issues up for analysis and also allows them to be investigated empirically and understood from a theoretical perspective. From the perspective of risk, development problems that are only indirectly linked to the national security of donors are still important and need to be analysed. The identification of development problems as potential risks to, rather direct threats to, the national security of donors is a key element of the security-development nexus which can be addressed from this theoretical perspective. Furthermore, an approach based on Ulrich Beck's risk society allows a focus on top-level policy changes of donors across time and how this relates to changes in the identification of risk. A governmentality approach which would follow in the tradition of Duffield (2005, 2008, 2010a) and Pupavac (2005) would be useful for examining specific technologies of control involved in the security-development nexus, but would involve the prior acceptance of the

nexus as a form of governmental control. This would serve to shift the focus of this thesis away from its aim to examine the macro level of policy change, aid flows and mainstream policy discourse over an extended period of time. Instead, Beck's risk society allows an examination of macro-level policy changes in the form of aid flows, variations in policy discourse within governments, between governments and across time from a perspective of the identification of security risks. The identification of development problems as security risks can possibly operate at a number of different levels and does not necessarily result in actions of biopolitical control. There is the possibility that risks can be managed in a way that prioritises the national security needs of the donor, but there is also the possibility that risks can be managed in a way that prioritises the needs of those at a local level in recipient countries. Alternatively, there is the possibility that risks are identified at a discursive level, but are not acted upon in specific policy practice. A theoretical approach that draws on Beck's understanding of the risk society allows for the empirical investigation of the variations between donor and over time in the security-development nexus and the analysis these findings without adopting prior assumptions as to the positive or negative characteristics of the security-development nexus.

Contributing to the debate on the merging of security and development, this study speaks to the diverse debates on the subject from those who deny it exists beyond policy discourse (Chandler 2007), to those who argue that it can lead to a beneficial relationship for all (Picciotto 2004, Stewart 2004), to those who argue that it has changed security policy to be more development focused (Pugh, Gabay and Williams 2013) and to those who argue that the merging of security and development is a form of biopolitical control (Duffield 2005,2006, 2011; Pupavac 2005). The starting assumption for this research is that the closer relationship between security and development is something concrete and definite in policy. However, there is not sufficient understanding of how this merging has been adopted by different donors and in actual policy towards specific countries. Beck's understanding of risk allows an approach where multiple variations in the merging of security and development can be understood in terms of the connections between development and the management of security risks.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted some limitations in the current theoretical explanations for the merging of security and development across different donors and in different contexts. This study operates within a space between the 'optimist' approach and 'sceptic' approach in the literature. This is examined by following Ulrich Beck's idea of the risk society and Olaf Corry's idea of the connection between securitisation and the identification of risks. Ulrich Beck's risk society thesis has been introduced into security studies as a way of understanding post-9/11 changes in security during the WoT. Rather than a dichotomy of securitisation or risk management, this study follows Olof Corry's (2012) framework where identification of issues as immediate existential threats through securitisation and identification of other issues as long term possible security threats operate on the same spectrum. On this spectrum, the logic and arguments used to identify threats or risks is different and should be disaggregated. Development problems more often fall into the category of long-term systemic problems rather than immediate threats. Rather than a starting assumption that merging security and development is a rational and common sense step, necessary to solve problems shared by the 'optimists', or a starting assumption that merging security and development is another technique of governmental control focused at the biopolitical level shared by 'sceptics', risk theory allows a more open starting assumption. In managing risks, the relationship between security and development will change with the context. It may be a case of security policy dominating development policy in certain contexts, or security policy may be influenced by development policy in others. Similarly, states may use development aid for overt political purposes in some cases or they may use it in a way that targets the security and development needs of citizens in recipient states.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a dearth of systematic research which examines how security and development policy have been merged over time, across a number of different donors and in different recipient contexts. In addition to this, there are a number of assumptions in the literature around whether this is a necessary connection to overcome development problems, or whether it is an extension of the WoT and a militarisation of donor relations with recipient countries. This study draws on Ulrich Beck's concept of risk as a way of examining the nuances and variation in the security-development nexus across time, between donor countries and between country programmes. To address this, this study asks a series of questions to build up a clearer picture of the security-development nexus, and how it has unfolded from the late 1990s to 2012.

The first question asked is *if the US has driven the agenda of the WoT how has it merged its security and development polices and how does this compare with other bilateral donors?* The WoT is argued to have shaped the current form of the security-development nexus. As the US has played a key role in shaping this understanding how they have merged security and development and how this compares to other bilateral donors is important for understanding how the security-development nexus has arisen in different contexts. The second question to ask is *to what extent have security considerations been brought into mainstream development policy outside of conflict and humanitarian situations?* The 'denialist' approach in the literature asserts that it is to a far lesser extent than assumed and does not extend deeper than policy rhetoric. Examining how this has been done across different donors establishes a clearer picture of this. In addition, looking at how this has unfolded over a period of time encompassing the pre and post-9/11 periods provides a better understanding of how the arguments and justifications for merging security and development have evolved over time. The third question to ask is *how is security defined in development policy?* Security is an abstract concept and can mean a number of different things. At its essence, calls for security actions are to protect a referent from a threat. Examining how security is defined in development policy will establish a better understanding of whose

security is prioritised in development policy. The fourth question to ask is *has the understanding of security been influenced by development in the security-development nexus?* Advocates of the merging of security and development have argued that it will result in a change of security policy to address long-term causes of insecurity for individuals rather than just the narrow interests of states. Analysing how foreign policy and defence agencies of donors have engaged with the security-development nexus will establish a better understanding of this. The last question is *what motivates states to merge security and development?* Examining these key questions across three donors' broad development policy discourse over a 15 year period and their current programmes in two recipient countries establishes a more comprehensive picture of the security-development nexus.

This chapter outlines the research design and methods used in this study. First is a discussion of why a multiple-donor case study approach is appropriate for this research. Second is a discussion of why the methods of content and discourse analyses and interviews complemented by descriptive ODA statistics are appropriate for examining these cases and a justification of the sources of data chosen for these analyses. Third is a discussion of the donor countries of the US, the UK and Canada and recipient countries of Ethiopia and Kenya chosen for analysis and the time period of the late 1990s to 2013 which this analysis covers. The last section details how these methods applied to these cases will advance the study of the merging of security and development.

A multiple-donor case study analysis

The purpose of this research is to examine the usefulness of existing theories in the literature and to build on these theories in understanding the motivations behind and the implications of the merging of security and development. The three theoretical perspectives of 'optimists', 'sceptics' and 'denialists' as they stand offer only a limited understanding of the security-development nexus. Part of the problem is that broad theoretical claims are made based on a narrow scope of research which does not examine multiple donors, an extended time period or programmes in recipient countries. This study addresses this through a case study approach focusing on the policy of donor states of the US, the UK and Canada, over the period of the

late 1990s to present day and their programming in Ethiopia and Kenya. This allows a comparison of approaches to merging security and development aid across countries and across time.

These case studies draw on descriptive statistics of aid flows, an analysis of official donor policy discourse, interviews with key figures within these agencies and field work in Ethiopia and Kenya to provide a more complete picture of how security and development have been merged. Analysing policy discourse over time and across countries gives a picture of how the acceptance (or not) of the relationship over time has changed and how different countries have engaged with it in different ways. The advantage of this approach is that it clearly defines what George and Bennett (2004: 25) describe as the scope conditions of the study. Unlike other studies in this area where the scope conditions are not clearly stated, the donor countries are set out as the USA, the UK and Canada, the time frame is the late 1990s to 2013 and the manner in which development agencies have brought security concerns into their policy is what is being examined. Any conclusions that are derived from the study are placed within these boundaries. A multiple case study approach is appropriate for exploring the relevance of risk theory for the security-development nexus. By separating out how different donors have dealt with this over an extended period of time both at a broad policy level and in specific programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya, both variation and uniformity can be assessed across time, donors and programmes. In this way, the processes and arguments surrounding the merging of security and development and how they relate to the security risk assessment of donors can be studied. In the identification of development problems as security risks there may be a priority placed on how these risks impact on people in the developing world, or the security needs of donor countries may be prioritised, or there could be a mixture of these two scenarios. Investigating the security-development nexus through a multiple case study approach allows these issues to be explored in depth. The next section explains how the methods of descriptive aid statistics, content analysis, discourse analysis and interviews can illuminate these issues.

Methods of analysis

This study uses a mixed methods approach which includes descriptive statistical analysis, content analysis, discourse analysis, and interviews to address the research questions of how security and development policy have been merged by different donors. These methods compliment and build on each other to establish a comprehensive picture of the research area. The descriptive statistical analysis is used to examine shifts in patterns of aid flows over an extended period of time, content analysis is used to establish broad patterns of word use over time, the discourse analysis is used to explore the way in which these patterns of word use are framed, the interviews – some of which are conducted during field work in Ethiopia and Kenya - are conducted using questions derived from this analysis and investigate how these themes are articulated in programming at a local level. In this way, these methods complement each other and collectively they help to address the shortcomings that each method has when taken in isolation. Content analysis provides a broad perspective and establishes clear patterns in word use allowing comparison of security and development with other phases in development thinking in a way that discourse analysis cannot. In turn, discourse analysis allows a deeper examination of how words are used to construct arguments and the assumptions behind these arguments rather than just counting them as content analysis does. Interviews are informed by the findings of the content and discourse analyses and add another layer of analysis by investigating the merging of security and development beyond policy documents in development practice. This section outlines why these methods are appropriate, how they are used and the sources of data to which they are applied.

A criticism of discourse analysis is that it only operates at a micro level of language use and can lead to an over representation of what are minor shifts in language use. Content analysis is useful because it allows micro level discourse analysis to be placed in the context of broader shifts in language use over time, across agencies, across document and across donors. In turn, content analysis has been criticised for placing too great an emphasis on how often words are used leading to false assumptions about the frequency of words used representing greater importance. Or in some cases, changes in frequency and volume of words used reflecting changes in values. The strength of discourse analysis is that it gives a deeper level of examination to broad patterns in word use allowing an investigation into the way in which

these words are used, the ideas they represent and how they are used to construct arguments. Another level of analysis is added by using interviews. A criticism that may be made of both content and discourse analyses as they are used in this study is that they deal only with policy. Policy documents could be criticised for being too self-referential and bearing no resemblance to the local articulation in development programming. By conducting interviews based on key issues raised in the content and discourse analyses, with both informants in development agencies headquarters and also in the field in Ethiopia and Kenya, the penetration of security and development policies beyond just policy discourse is investigated.

Descriptive aid flow statistics

ODA figures are used in this study to examine patterns in the aid distribution of the US, the UK and Canada from the late 1990s to 2012. These ODA figures are examined for patterns in shifts in spending over time to particular countries or regions, shifts in spending on certain programmes and shifts in the make-up of the top 20 recipients for each country over the period 1997-2013. These patterns help to establish whether any shifts in discourse in relation to security and development have been associated with an accompanying shift in ODA spending. These shifts may include increased spending overall, a shift to spending in certain countries and in certain regions and in the creating of new funding streams to address conflict. These aid flow statistics are taken from the OECD-DAC website and in some cases donor development reports. Whilst aid flow statistics can establish an overall pattern of aid flows, standing alone they cannot address the questions of how and why security and development are being merged. As Robert Yin (2003: 15) argues, statistical evidence can be limited in understanding the more complex nature of social relationships. In addition to this as Neclâ Tschirgi (2006: 61) points out, when it comes to development aid flows, it is extremely difficult to trace how much money is being spent on which project and with whose support for any individual country. As a result, this study recognises the limitations of ODA flows as evidence and so they are used to establish part of the picture along with policy discourse and interviews.

Sources of data for content and discourse analyses: Policy documents

Both the content and discourse analyses examine the merging of security and development in donor policy by looking at the official policy documents of The US, the UK, and Canada for the period 1997-2013. The data used for examining the merging of security and development in donor policy are key policy documents from development agencies such as white papers, country strategy papers for Ethiopia and Kenya and any documents concerning security. In addition to this, national security documents, and key foreign policy and defence policy documents for each donor are included in the sample. These major documents are usually written by committee, include a number of different perspectives on key issues of security development and foreign policy, and are largely targeted at a national audience to justify policy positions. As such they offer a useful snapshot of particular donors' positions on merging security and development at a particular time. Also considered for inclusion were public speeches by heads of development agencies and parliamentary discussions on development policy. However, initial examination of this data found that the key points of speeches and parliamentary debates were included in white papers. This results in a replication of information rather than something new. As a result, this study limited policy discourse to key policy documents. Based on the issues and themes that emerge from the analysis of discourse, interviews are conducted with figures within the aid agencies to gain another level of information.

Content analysis: Selection of key words and concepts

The method of content analysis is used to reduce large bodies of text to smaller categories based on explicit rules of coding (Stemler 2001: 1). The basis of this analysis is counting the frequency with which certain words or phrases are used within documents (Wilson 1993: 1). Content analysis can reveal patterns of word usage within documents over time. These patterns can be used to infer meanings from the text and the emergence of ideas and concepts (Krippendorf 2004: 18). The advantages of content analysis are that it is systematic and the boundaries of the analysis are clearly set, thus making it replicable. As this study examines a large number of documents over a 15 year period across multiple donors and agencies,

content analysis is useful for establishing broad patterns of how security language is used in development policy and how development language is used in security policy. This content analysis is based on a framework designed to isolate key words associated with three main phases in development thinking over the last 30 years: the Washington Consensus, the post-Washington Consensus and the security-development nexus. The key words associated with each theory are derived from a review of the literature on this subject as set out below in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 below details the words selected, the development theory they are derived from and the synonyms that are also counted. This framework places the phenomenon of the merging of security and development within the context of broader development policy over the time period 1997-2013. It allows comparison with the other development agendas of the Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus over this time. The content analysis complements the other methods used. A criticism of discourse analysis is that because of its detailed focus it can result in the over-interpretation of possibly minor shifts in language as having broader significance. Similarly interview data is narrow in scope in that it tells us about the experience of individuals only. The advantage of content analysis over just discourse analysis or interviews is that it allows micro level discourse analysis and interview data to be placed in the context of broader shifts in language use over time, across agencies, across document and across donors. These broad patterns of word use form the basis of the discourse analysis and interviews and in turn they add a detailed level of understanding of these broad patterns. The following section draws from the relevant development literature to provide the rationale behinds the selection of these terms.

Table 3.1: Terms for content analysis

Phases in development thinking	Terms	Synonyms
Washington Consensus	Liberalization	liberalize, liberalization
	Deregulation	deregulation; deregulate; negative references to 'regulation'
	Privatization	privatize; privatizations
	Private Sector	Private sector
	Market	markets; market
	Basic Needs	basic needs; basic human needs
Post-Washington Consensus	Poverty	poverty
	Institutions	institutions; institution; institutionalise; institutionalisation
	Governance	governance; governing; government
	Inequality	equality; inequality; equal; unequal
	Human rights	human right; human rights
	Civil Society	civil society
Security-Development Nexus	Security	secure ;security
	Human security	human security
	Conflict	conflict; conflicts; post-conflict; pre-conflict; war; strife
	Terrorism	terror; terrorism; terrorist; terrorists; anti-terrorism; counter-terrorism
	Failed States	failed states; fragile states; failing states; state failure; state fragility
	Stability	stability; instability
	Radicalism	radical; radicalisation; radicalism; extremist; extremism

The Washington Consensus

This study takes the so-called 'Washington Consensus' of the 1990s forward as the starting point for assessing ideas about development from the past three decades. The debt crisis of the 1980s brought about a reassessment of development policy. Following several decades of Modernist-inspired policies with little progress towards developing into Western-style states and leading to spiralling debt that could not be repaid, the consensus was that the post-War development project had failed (Willis 2005: 51; Sumner 2006: 1403). This crisis paved the way for a new approach to development which questioned the role of the state in economic development. Often referred to as 'Neoliberalism' it identified governments in developing states as the source of the problem, seeing them as corrupt, lacking in capacity and inefficient, and playing too big a role in shaping the economy and providing services (Sumner 2006: 1403; Broad and Cavanagh 1999: 85). The proposed solution was to reduce the size of government, allowing a more efficient private sector to run industry and service provision, and remove all barriers to external trade and restrictions of capital flows (Grieg et al 2007: 104; Broad and Cavanagh 1999: 85; Storey 2000: 362). In this way the state could join the global economy and allow market forces to create economic growth. This approach became known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990) and influenced policy

significantly, informing development policy through much of the 1980/90s (Sumner 2006: 1403).

The term Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson (1990: 1) who outlined 10 policies that reflected the development thinking of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), US Congress, senior members of the US administration, economic agencies of the US government the Federal Reserve and think tanks. These 10 policies were: fiscal deficits, public expenditure priorities, tax reform, interest rates, exchange rates, trade policy, foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and property rights (Williamson 1990). Whilst Williamson (1990) did recognise that the consensus was not shared outside of these institutions, Naim (2000: 508) argues that there was disagreement even amongst those who advocated free market reforms, but the label "Washington Consensus" stuck because it was a simple message, it was easy for politicians to use and it filled an ideological vacuum. Even allowing for this divergence of opinion the Washington Consensus dominated development policy throughout the 1980/90s and can be seen in the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) of the IFIs.

The idea behind SAPs was to bring about economic growth through two stages. Firstly, stabilisation of the economy through a series of reforms and secondly these measure would allow the country to join the global economy resulting in increased growth (de Haan 2009: 75). These reforms followed the form of the Washington Consensus with a reduction in the size of the government, cuts in public expenditure, privatisation of services and industry, an emphasis on the private sector removal of trade barriers and deregulation of the financial sector. The overall aim was to reduce government involvement in the management of the economy and the provision of services and opening the country up to trade with the global economy.

Andrew Sumner's (2006) content analysis of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers measures Washington Consensus policies through the categories of: strict monetary policy; strict fiscal policy; privatisation; trade liberalisation; agriculture liberalisation; FDI deregulation; capital account liberalisation (Sumner 2006: 1408). From this list a grouping of three key terms can

be extracted: “liberalisation”, “deregulation” which applies beyond Sumner’s category of foreign direct investment (FDI) to areas of the labour market and the financial sector and “privatisation” and “private sector” as these represent the cornerstone of Washington Consensus thinking and of many SAPs. This analysis will also include three other related terms to further capture the presence of these policies. The term “market” is used as a reflection of opening up the economy and joining the global market as the main goal of liberalisation. The term “basic needs” is included to measure the Washington Consensus approach to poverty reduction. In summary, six terms can be extracted from the literature on the Washington Consensus: “liberalisation”, “deregulation”, “regulation”, “privatisation”, “global market” and “basic needs”. These terms capture the main tenets of the Washington Consensus and measuring their use in development policy documents will reveal the extent to which these ideas have endured.

Is there a post-Washington Consensus?

As Joseph Stiglitz (2004: 1) argues, the Washington Consensus fundamentally failed to provide the answer to development problems and by the late 1990s the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus were being called in to question. The Washington Consensus policies were argued to have exacerbated extreme poverty and increased inequality in developing countries (Gore 2000: 795; Naim 2000: 518). Joseph Stiglitz (1998), then World Bank chief economist, criticised the Washington Consensus as too narrowly focused on economic growth and called for a broader approach to development including sustainability and equality. Similarly Jeffrey Sachs (1998: 17) criticised the IMF for its handling of the Asian financial crisis, arguing that it exacerbated the problem rather than abating it. Academics such as Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia and Paul Krugman of MIT criticised the approach of financial firms that assumed what benefitted Wall Street was a common good, whilst ignoring unequal trade with the developing world (Broad and Cavanagh 1999: 83). However, there is little agreement about what a post-Washington Consensus represents. There has been a plurality of approaches labelled the ‘Monterrey Consensus’ or the ‘New York Consensus’. Whilst there is debate about how different these approaches are from the Washington Consensus (Gore 2005: 280; Stiglitz 2004: 1; Soederberg 2005; Önis and Senses 2005: 278; Sumner 2006: 1404), nevertheless they have in common a broadening of the development agenda away from solely economic concerns.

Poverty and inequality were not addressed directly under Washington Consensus policies (Willis 2005: 93; Montiel 2007: 117). By the mid-1990s these issues came into focus for development policy due to political instability as evident in the failed coup attempt by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1992 and the Chiapas uprising in Mexico in 1994. This showed that poverty and inequality threatened instability even in countries that were deemed to have had successful structural adjustments (Önis and Senses 2005: 272; Naim 2000: 514). As a result, poverty and inequality issues were incorporated into development policy. For example, when the UK's development agency DfID was established in 1997 it stated poverty elimination as its main policy focus (DfID 1997). In addition the UN Human Development Index, in 2010, introduced inequality as one of its core indicators in addition to health, wealth and education. In addition to this, there has been a new focus on democratic governance and institutions. The Washington Consensus sought to reduce the role of the state and the democratic qualities of the regime were not of principle importance (Önis and Senses 2005: 277). However, with the economic collapses mentioned above, the idea that the state was important to regulate the impact of markets and to provide services came back into development thinking. The solution was seen as being independent institutions which would ensure more efficient distribution of resources, greater protection from the vagaries of the market, enforcement of the rule of law and greater provision of welfare for the most vulnerable (Naim 2000: 514; Montiel 2007: 111). These institutions would lead to better governance. 'Good governance' was seen as a state being accountable to all of its citizens and being transparent in its distribution of resources (Weiss 2000: 796-7). Donors and IFIs argued that his legitimacy would bring stability and would give the state the authority to implement change when needed (Woods 2000: 824). From this the term 'good governance' became a common catch-phrase in development discourse.

Another feature of post-Washington Consensus approaches is the move away from economic measures as a definition for development to a broader definition of development articulated by the idea of 'human development', which defined development in terms of how it improved the lives of individuals, rather than the economic growth of the state (Welzel et al. 2003: 345). These ideas can be seen in development policy with the launch of the UN Human Development Report (HDR) in 1990. This compiled a Human Development Index (HDI)

based on health and education indicators as well as economic. The idea was articulated in the phrase "People are the real wealth of a nation" (UNDP 1990). Furthermore, the launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the UN sought to institutionalise a broader approach to development and established eight goals[3]. To trace this broader agenda the terms 'human rights' and 'civil society' are also included to reflect the broader agenda that emerged post-Washington Consensus. Bringing these key issues together, this analysis identifies six key terms to represent the post-Washington Consensus: 'poverty', 'inequality', 'institutions', 'governance', 'civil society', 'human rights'.

Security and development

As Chapter 2 has discussed at length the key arguments and debates around the security-development nexus, there is little need to reiterate them here. In brief, there are three rough divisions in the literature between: those 'optimistic' that merging security and development is necessary and can bringing greater security and development (Picciotto 2004, Stewart 2004), those 'sceptical' that it will benefit the poorest and rather that it will prioritise Western security (Abrahamsen 2005; Duffield 2005, 2006, 2010a) and those who 'deny' that the merging of security and development has extended beyond policy rhetoric (Chandler 2007; Lacher 2008). From this literature the following terms have been extracted to trace these ideas in policy discourse: the term "security" is used to capture the presence of security issues in development policy, the variant "human security" is included as a sub-count of the term 'security' in order to separate out any distinctions made from hard security concerns; "terrorism" and "radicalism" are taken to imply a focus on conventional hard security concerns of the WoT ; the terms "conflict" or "stability" are considered to reflect either development or security concerns.

[3] These eight goals are eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowering women reducing child mortality rates, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development

A framework for assessing trends in development policy

From this review a framework for content analysis has been established which includes the following words: 'liberalisation', 'deregulation', 'privatisation', 'private sector', 'global market' and 'basic needs' to trace a Washington Consensus approach; 'poverty', 'institutions', 'governance', 'civil society', 'inequality' 'human rights' to trace a post-Washington Consensus approach and 'security' 'terrorism' 'radicalism' 'human rights', 'conflict' and 'stability' to trace the merging of security and development policy. This framework is applied to policy documents of development agencies across the three donor case studies. These terms operate as frames and a number of synonymous terms and variations are also counted. Care is also taken to avoid inaccurate counting by focusing solely on the body of text and excluding page headers and footers and bibliographies. As these documents are of varying lengths, the absolute count of a word in any document is only useful for comparison within that document and not across other documents. For example, if a word is used 20 times in both a 100 page document and a 25 page document, it is difficult to make an accurate comparison. Similarly, calculating word use as a percentage of the total word count of the document is problematic as it gives very low percentage counts, for example .25%, which again make comparisons difficult. To resolve this, word frequency is calculated by taking the total word count for a particular term in a particular document and expressing it as a percentage of all terms counted in that document. For example, if 10 terms are counted in a document and they all appear once the percentage value for each term would be 10%. This method allows a comparison of how frequently Washington Consensus, post-Washington Consensus and Security-Development Nexus terms are used in relation to each other within documents, across documents by different agencies, across different donors and over time. From this, a pattern of which policies certain donors adhere to most in their policy discourse is established. It can also establish exactly how this pattern of using words associated with merging security and development compares with other ways of thinking about development.

Rather than making broad but largely unsupported assertions that security is now prominent in development policy, or that development is now prominent in security policy this content analysis provides a more detailed picture of these issues. This analysis establishes the

frequency with which words associated with merging security and development are used over time, across different government agencies of donors and across different donors. In addition to this, it allows direct comparison with other trends in development thinking of the Washington Consensus and the post-Washington Consensus. If security has become prominent in development policy, this analysis will establish whether it is more or less prominent than other ways of thinking about development and how this varies over time and between donors. In addition, if security and foreign policy have been influenced by development policy, this content analysis will establish which way of thinking about development is subscribed to. The weakness of content analysis, however, is that while it is useful for establishing broad patterns of word use, it does not tell us how those words are used and what arguments are constructed around those words. Reducing words to numbers cannot cope well with nuances of meaning and subtlety of argument. It is for this reason that discourse analysis is also applied to these documents as a means of assessing the detail and nuance of these arguments that content analysis cannot provide. This content analysis provides an empirical grounding for the more in-depth discourse analysis.

Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is useful because it can address the ideas and arguments behind the merging of security and development over this extended time period in a way that content analysis cannot. Rather than broad patterns of word use only, discourse analysis adds another level of analysis to this study and addresses the substantive element of the research questions around the nuances of how security and development are defined, how connections are made between them and the motivations behind these actions. As Corry (2012) argues that the identification of security risks rather than threats involves different arguments and causal claims, discourse analysis is the best means of separating these different arguments out. Discourse analysis enables an examination of the context in which words identified through the content analysis are used. In turn it enables an examination of the arguments which these words are used to construct and the assumptions behind these arguments. Across donors, across agencies and across time, building on the content analysis, this discourse analysis provides a rich picture of how the security-development nexus has unfolded.

The field of discourse analysis is extremely broad, but at its essence is the idea that the study of how language and symbols are used is essential for understanding the social world. Through the use of language, arguments are constructed by drawing on certain established ways of thinking about the world – discourses. David Howarth (2000: 3) describes discourse as "frames…primarily instrumental devices that can foster common perceptions and understandings for specific purposes". The use of language is not neutral and is used to establish or legitimatise social values and practices (Van Dijk 2001: 355). Discourse analysis is appropriate for this study because it builds on the content analysis by examining how these broad frames of security language are used in development policy and in return, how development is discussed in security policy over an extended period of time. This study operates at this broad understanding of discourse and does not adhere strictly to a specific type of discourse analysis. However, it draws on a number of elements of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in particular the work of Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak because they are useful for analysing changes in discourse over time and analysing the connection between discourse and behaviour.

Fairclough's (1992: 73) analytical framework involves three levels which make up the discursive event; text, discursive practice and social practice. Discursive practice is how texts are produced and how texts are consumed. Social practice represents the non-discursive element (everything that is not in the discursive field) of institutions and is connected to the text by discursive practice (Fairclough 1992: 73; Fairclough 2003: 16). In this way discourse can influence social practice but it is also shaped by social practice. This is useful for the study of the merging of security and development in policy discourse and policy practice as it addresses the issue of how policy and practice are related. Ruth Wodak's (2001) discourse-historical approach to CDA views every discursive act as being embedded in a number of previous discursive acts that it refers to and builds upon. Therefore it is necessary to have an understanding of the historical context behind the discourse (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 11). Although different documents may be written by different authors over a long period of time, it is still possible to trace the common ideas that are drawn upon (Wodak 2001). This understanding of discourse is useful for studying a number of different documents, written by different authors from different government agencies over an extended period of time.

Unlike CDA, this research does not start with an established normative agenda. As Teun Van Dijk (2001: 353) asserts, the starting point of CDA is social problems (Van Dijk 2001: 353). CDA is often described as a method and a theory (Gee 1999: 1; van Leeuwen 2009 : 277-8) firmly rooted in the Critical Theory approach of the Frankfurt School. Fundamentally it is concerned with unequal power relationships in society. By analysing discourse, these relationships can be exposed and ultimately changed (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 448). The starting point of this study is to examine how and the extent to which security and development policy have been merged. Whilst it may be considered a social problem based on unequal power relationships, more needs to be known about this phenomenon before a judgement can be made. Adopting a CDA approach wholesale would restrict this study to starting from a Critical Theory perspective which is counter to the aims of this research. As a result this study does not adopt a CDA approach along with the theoretically grounded assumptions associated with it. However, this discourse analysis does draw on these elements of CDA of the dialectical relationship between discourse and practice and the idea of common themes between documents written by different authors at different times to analyse the policy discourse of the US, the UK and Canada. Drawing on this method, key policy documents from the three donors are read to answer the questions of: how is security spoken about in development policy? How is development spoken about in security policy? and who is "security" for in development and security policy? The results of this discourse analysis are then used to establish a framework for interview questions applied both in telephone interviews and in field work interviews in Ethiopia and Kenya (see Appendices 1 and 2).

A potential weakness of both the content and discourse analyses is that they are focused on how the merging of security and development is discussed in policy. This could lead to the criticism that these analyses do not tell us anything about how the merging of security and development operates in practice. This challenge is addressed by using the issues that emerge from the findings of the content and discourse analyses as a basis of a framework for semi-structure interviews with key informants within the relevant government agencies of donors. In this way, this research explores the extent to which discourse on merging security and development relates to the experiences of those directly involved in development practice. These interviews are the subject of the next section.

Interviews

Sources of data: Interviews

Over 50 key figures were identified as ideal subjects for interview across the three agencies. This list included current ministers, former ministers, and directors/deputy directors of relevant divisions within these agencies and Heads of Country Programmes for Ethiopia and Kenya. The response to requests for interviews was uneven across the agencies of these three donors and eventually yielded a total of 28 interviewees. Of these respondents, few were on the initial list of key figures. This was because response rate was low even with persistent follow-up emails and phone calls. Typically Ministers and former Ministers did not respond. The response rate of Directors, Deputy Directors and Country Programme Heads was slightly better, but they would not speak to me directly and instead referred me on to senior civil servants working in the relevant areas. From this small number of respondents, a 'snowball' was built up by asking every respondent to refer me to someone else. This was done until all avenues were exhausted producing 28 interviewees in total. Canada was the least responsive and only yielded five interviewees in contrast to the US who produced 13 interviewees and the UK who produced 10 interviewees. (For a full list of interviewees see Appendix 3). These interviewees provide a good sweep of different levels of involvement from former ministers, heads of division to people in the field implementing programmes and all together give a broad picture of the merging of security and development beyond top level policy discourse.

Interviews as a method

Interviews add another layer of depth to the content and discourse analyses. Interviews were semi-structured in format with a set series of questions derived from issues raised in the discourse and content analyses asked across interviewees from all three donors (see Appendices 1 and 2). In addition to this, other questions were asked in response to issues raised during each interview depending on the individual respondent. This moved the level of analysis from broad patterns of how arguments around security and development are framed in policy discourse to how they impact on programmes and the work these agencies do, as told by people who are directly involved. As it was not feasible to travel to the UK, the US

and Canada for interviews, they were instead conducted by phone, or Skype where permitted. The preference was to conduct interviews over Skype because face to face contact makes it easier to establish a rapport with the interviewee. However, government agencies within all three donors do not allow the use of Skype, so telephone interviews had to suffice. In all, 16 interviews were conducted in this way. Interviews with development actors in Ethiopia and Kenya were conducted in person during field work over the month of June 2013 spread equally between the two countries. A further 12 interviews were conducted during this period of field research making a total of 28 interviews. Interviews were recorded with the permission of respondents, under the condition that they remained anonymous. These recordings were transcribed and analysed in detail. The only interviews not recorded and transcribed were with US respondents in Ethiopia and Kenya. This is because guests are not permitted to carry electronic devices within US embassies. For these interviews detailed hand-written notes had to suffice. When interviews are referenced in the text, care is taken to distinguish between telephone and personal interviews. Table 3 below shows the number of interviews conducted for each donor including their location and position. These interviews add in-depth understanding to the ODA statistics, content analysis and discourse analysis.

Table 3.3: List of interviewees, locations and positions

Donor Country	Location	Total No.	Position
US	US/Washington, D.C.	7	6 Senior Civil Servants USAID; 1 Member of Civilian-Military Affairs Bureau
	Ethiopia	3	3 project managers USAID
	Kenya	3	2 Project Managers USAID; 1 Project Manager DoS
UK	UK/London	7	4 Senior Civil Servants DfID; 2 Former Secretaries of State for international Development; 1 Retired Major General, British Army
	Ethiopia	1	1 Project Manager DfID
	Kenya	2	2 Project Managers DfID
Canada	Canada/Ottawa	2	1 Senior Civil Servant CIDA ; 1 CIDA Coordinator with Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START)
	Ethiopia	2	2 Project Managers CIDA
	Kenya	1	1 Project Manager CIDA

Donor case study selection

These case studies examine the development agencies of the USA's Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK's Department for International Development (DfID) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), in addition to foreign policy and military agencies that are also responsible for distributing development aid. In this study, the cases have been purposively selected because it allows a variation in the cases being studied. These three aid agencies all demonstrate variation according to George and Bennett's (2004: 24) categories of "crucial", "most-likely" and "least-likely" case studies.

The USA

The USA has received the most attention in the literature on the merging of security and development and the consensus is that development policy is dominated by security considerations (Carmody 2005; Woods 2005; Ingram 2007; Lancaster 2008; Shannon 2009; Aning 2010). For this reason it may seem that there is little added value in including USAID as a case study if it will serve only to reaffirm the existing literature. However, none of this literature draws on systematic research combining both development policy and development programmes as the basis for this argument. For this reason, there is merit in producing a systematic study of security in US development policy over this time as it will provide a solid platform upon which to base theoretical understandings. In addition, it meets the criteria of a crucial case study in that there is consensus that security concerns dominate in US development policy. Examining this in greater detail and how it has unfolded over time builds on the existing literature. Placing USAID as a crucial case study also allows comparison with other countries in the analysis.

The UK

The UK has received less attention in the literature than the US, but there is a growing body of literature in this area. Opinion is split in regard to whether the UK has prioritised security in its development policy. Whilst Abrahamsen (2004, 2005), Marriage (2006) and Biccum (2005) all argue that the UK has placed a greater security emphasis on its development aid,

Beall et al (2006), Fitz-Gerald (2006), Waddell (2006) and Wild and Elhawary (2011) argue that DfID has resisted the merging of security and development and maintains a poverty eradication focus to its policy. In addition to this, DfID is different in nature to USAID. Established in 1997, it is an independent agency in charge of its own budget and has a cabinet level minister at its head. As such, it has been argued that DfID has been able to operate independently of foreign policy concerns to a far greater extent than its predecessor the Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) which was controlled by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). In contrast, USAID has little political independence and no authority for discretionary spending beyond its budget (Chotray and Hulme 2009: 38; Lancaster 2008). As a result of these contrasting opinions, a systematic study of DfID's aid flows and policy discourse is essential for understanding the nature of the relationship between security and development. DfID would fit into the category of most-likely case study. The UK is the US's primary partner in the WoT, is involved in two overseas conflicts and was the subject of Islamic terrorist attacks in July 2005, which would suggest that it has numerous hard state security concerns which may take precedent over the ideals of development. However, DfID is viewed as an innovative development agency with successive secretaries Claire Short and Hilary Benn showing a strong commitment to poverty reduction. In addition, its decision making processes are decentralised with country programmes often setting the agenda in contrast to both the US and Canada where decision making is centralised in headquarters. In this sense a case can be made either way and none of the literature has conducted an analysis of the merging of security and development across all government agencies involved in development in addition to DfID's development programmes. This study addresses this issue.

Canada

There is a dearth of literature on CIDA's approach to the merging of security and development. Canada is viewed as a middle power state that champions international cooperation on peace and security issues (Potter 1996; Suhrke 1999). Examples of this are the Ottawa process to ban the use of landmines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court in which Canada played a leading role. In addition to this Canada has been a proponent of the concept of human security (Riddle-Dixon 2005: 1067). Taking this into account it would be surprising if Canada demonstrated a shift to hard security concerns in its

aid distributions, policy discourse and programming. However, Wayne Nelles (2002) and Kwesi Aning (2010) have both argued that CIDA development policy has shifted away from poverty towards security issues with increased funding for Iraq and Afghanistan. However, none of these authors engage directly with CIDA policy discourse and they refer to isolated policies to support their points. Taking this into account Canada is not a most-likely case study, but neither is it quite a least-likely case study because there is suggestion in the literature that its development policy has become more concerned with security. For this reason it is a worthwhile case study to look at, as its position towards international security appears very different to both the US and the UK.

The exclusion of other possible donor selections

Other possible candidates for case study countries are Japan, France, and China, because they are large donors of ODA, and Sweden, Norway and Denmark, because they are culturally different to the three Anglophone, North American/Western European countries selected. The reason for omitting Japan is that it is too similar to the USA in that it has overtly politicised development aid. As Beall et al (2006: 57) point out, a 2003 white paper titled *The Revision of the ODA Charter and Japan's New Approach* states that Japan's previous poverty focus to development should be changed to placing Japanese national security and trade concerns as the primary purpose of development. This would place Japan as a crucial case study, and for the reasons stated above, the US is a better choice as a benchmark case study. The example of France whilst interesting, is similar to the UK in that France is also a European ex-colonial power and so there is little merit in including them both in the study. Due to the ambiguity over the UK's position with its security concerns countered by the independent status of its development agency, it is likely to be a more illuminating example than France. Similarly, Denmark is an example of a country that could be considered culturally very different to the English-speaking Western countries chosen. However, work by Beall et al (2006) suggests that Denmark has adopted a security focus to its development policy. This means that it would serve as a most-likely case study similar to the UK or Canada and for the reasons outlined above they are more interesting examples to look at. Sweden and Norway are not viable case studies due to an inability to speak the language and a dearth of English language publications on their respective development policies.

China is a potentially interesting case to look at. It is a country that until recently was viewed as a developing country itself and is now a major donor of aid to the developing world (Jiang 2009: 586; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009: 554; Samy 2010: 87). In addition, in the context of Africa it has significantly influenced the dynamics of the relationship between donor and recipient countries, with China presenting itself as a rival and competitor to traditional donors (Jiang 2009: 597). However, the complexity of the Chinese example makes it a case that is difficult to study and draw any convincing conclusions about. For example, it does not distribute aid in the same way as other donors with aid and trade being closely linked. The actual aid figures are not always publicly available and what is called aid may actually be a commercial venture. Further complexity is added by a proliferation of different actors in the Chinese overseas commercial sector. Some companies are a direct institution of the Chinese state, while others are separate companies, but are still owned by the Chinese government (Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris 2007: 22). So Chinese funded aid projects such as railways and deep water harbours are also commercial activities. For the purposes of this study, the conception of what development aid actually represents to China presents too big a puzzle to solve within the parameters of this research. In addition to this, issues of transparency of information, getting access to data and a language barrier make China an inappropriate case for this study.

Selecting recipient countries

Whilst the geopolitical shift in attention to the Middle East and Central Asia during the WoT has been the focus of much attention (Cooley 2002; Ayoob 2013), the geopolitical significance of Africa has also changed over the post-9/11 period which has coincided with an increase in development aid to Africa, as Figure 3.1, below, shows. This is due to a number of factors including access to natural resources, competition with China and attempts to address conflict on the continent and the risks to Western national security associated with it, such as Islamic extremism, terrorism, migration and spread of disease (Abrahamsen 2005; Keenan 2009). The renewed security focus on Africa has coincided with this increase in ODA flows. This security focus has centred around a fear of African Islamic extremism based on the "banana curve theory" of the spread of violent extremism from Central Asia, down through the Middle East to North Africa, the Horn of Africa and across the Sahel

(Keenan 2009: 167). Given these international security and development dynamics in Western-African relations an examination of the African context of the merging of security and development policy will advance our understanding of this phenomenon. This study recognises that in a continent of 54 states, there is no singular "African" context to be studied but there is much to be learned about the dynamics of the security-development nexus in practice in the two ODA recipients of Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia and Kenya are illuminating examples to study the context of merging security and development in donor programming. Both countries have historic connections to the donor countries, are identified as security risks for all three donors, are seen as stabilising influences in the region and are the recipients of significant amounts of ODA. Within these similarities there are differences in the historic relationship with donors, the domestic political context and the history of state formation.

Figure 3.1: OECD countries total ODA to Africa from 1997-2012.*



*** Source OECD-DAC www.oecd.org/dac**

The selection of Ethiopia as a recipient country

Ethiopia and Kenya have different histories of state formation. Ethiopia was never colonised and was ruled as an empire before the removal of the last Emperor, Haile Selassie, in 1974. As Christopher Clapham (2004: 73) notes, Ethiopia does not have a history of the peaceful transfer of power. During the time of the Empire (1137-1975) power was through succession. The termination of the Empire came about through a violent uprising by the military committee of the Derg in 1975 and, in turn, Mengistu was overthrown through armed struggle by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1991. The country is now effectively a one party state with contentious elections in 2005 and 2010 marked by a crackdown on opposition parties, civil society groups and independent media (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 195; Gill 2010: 146; Lefort 2010: 440). Ethiopia sees itself as a developmental state taking an active role in managing its own economic and social development which has put it at odds with donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). However, it has achieved significant GDP growth in recent years and is a recipient of significant amounts of ODA from a number of donors. It is consistently among the top 5 recipients of ODA from the US, the UK and Canada. Ethiopia is an example of a non-democracy which, despite its history of internal and external conflict, has achieved relative stability. As a result, it may be expected that security considerations play a large part in donor policy towards Ethiopia both in terms of internal security and the external security in the region.

Since 9/11, Ethiopia has been seen as a key ally in the region, as a secular country with a large Muslim population, politically stable and with strong military capabilities (Bamfo 2010: 60). In the War on Terror it has formed part of George W. Bush's 'coalition of the willing' (Nyambura 2011: 100). Ethiopia houses the African Union (AU) headquarters and its military and diplomatic interventions in the region have been extensive. Examples of this are the military invasion of Somalia in 2006 to oust the Union of Islam Courts (UIC) and reinstate the Western backed Transitional National Government (Bamfo 2010: 59; Samatar 2007: 158) followed by an extended military presence in the country, the brokering of the Sudan peace agreement leading to the secession of South Sudan and the recent attempts to mediate in the civil conflict in South Sudan in January 2014.

The selection of Kenya as a recipient country

Kenya was colonised by England but maintained favourable relations with the West after independence 1963, notably during the Cold War when successive Presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978) and Daniel Moy (1978-2002) maintained a strong pro-Western and anti-Soviet stance (Branch 2012). Unlike in Ethiopia, power has changed hands through electoral processes and retiring or defeated presidents maintain respected and comfortable positions in society rather than being executed or exiled. Despite Kenya's seeming to be a success story of African democratisation, it also has a history of political assassination and internal violence, in particular the violence following the 2007 elections (Bachmann and Hönke 2010; Wrong 2009; Branch 2012). At the domestic level, it also has a large Muslim population which has been the subject of repressive security policies of successive governments (Bachmann and Hönke 2010: 99). Kenya is a wealthier country than Ethiopia with a per capita GDP for 2011 of US$819 compared with Ethiopia's US$357 for the same year[4]. However, it also suffers from inequality with a large gap between the wealthy elite and a large proportion of its population living in extreme poverty (Branch 2012). Whilst Kenya does not receive the same level of ODA as Ethiopia, it is nevertheless in the top 20 of each of the three donor countries chosen. Kenya is an example of a democracy that does not have a history of large scale conflict as Ethiopia does. As a result it can be expected that the security needs as they interact with development needs will be different in Kenya than in Ethiopia.

Kenya does not play the same regional security role as Ethiopia, but was a consistent ally of the West during the Cold War. Since the terrorist attack on the US embassy in 1998, Kenya has been viewed as a source of insecurity for the US. But Kenya is also viewed as a stabilising influence in the region and has also been instrumental in containing the fallout of Somalia's state collapse (Bachmann and Hönke 2010: 100). Kenya has contributed troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia and in 2011 it invaded southern Somalia. Whether this was sanctioned by US or the UK as was the case with Ethiopia's actions in 2006, is the subject of much discussion (Hughes 2012: 472) but at the very least it was not met with

[4] According to the United Nations Development Project statistics http://data.un.org/

outright condemnation. This occupying force has since been integrated into the AU/UN peacekeeping mission.

Both countries have suffered internal unrest. There are a number of insurgency groups in different regions of the country that do not see themselves as part of Ethiopia and do not accept the EPRDF as the legitimate authority of rule. Kenya also has long had low-level conflict between tribal groups in regions such as Lake Turkana and the North East region bordering with Somalia. In recent years there have been a number of terrorist attacks by groups claiming retribution for Kenya's actions in Somalia. For example, the attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi in September 2013 and numerous bombings in Mombasa in Spring 2014 which resulted in a travel ban on the region being imposed by the US and the UK. This shows that both countries have different conflict dynamics both at the internal and external level. Both countries are viewed by the US, the UK and Canada as a source of potential insecurity, but also as a means of containing further security risks in the region.

In sum, these two countries represent different types of states, a one party developmental state in the case of Ethiopia and an electoral democracy committed to free market capitalism in the case of Kenya; they have different internal security dynamics and yet have both been expected to maintain stability in an unstable region. As a result, the merging of security and development in the policy of the US, the UK and Canada towards these two countries will add in-depth knowledge of how the security-development nexus operates in different contexts.

Over what time period?

Most of the literature focuses on the merging of security and development in the post-9/11 WoT era (Howell 2006; Fowler and Sen 2010). However, others such as Duffield (2010a) and Hettne (2010) frame the merging of security and development in the WoT as a continuation of earlier trends in development aid such as the support of allies in the Cold War. Taking this into account, the time period of this study starts in the late 1990s and

finishes in 2013 which is the most recent date this project can encompass due to the constraints of writing up. This captures the end of the post-Cold War period and also the post-9/11 WoT period. In this way a more comprehensive assessment of the merging of security and development and the extent to which it has changed during the WoT is obtained. The time period for the recipient countries is shorter and covers policy for a short time up to 2013. This study is limited to the current policies towards those countries. This is due to the limitations of speaking with staff who worked in these countries over a long period of time. Postings overseas for development workers tend to be for a relatively short period of time, as a result at any given time any interviewees are unlikely to have more than a couple of years' experience of working in either Ethiopia or Kenya. However, this study examines the context of Ethiopia and Kenya as the latest point in the evolution of the security-development nexus and so this is sufficient for this purpose.

Conclusion: Towards a comprehensive picture of merging security and development

As this chapter has demonstrated, the best way of exploring the merging of security and development policy is through a pluralist approach analysing trends in ODA spending, policy content and policy discourse of the US the UK and Canada across an extended period of time and their contemporary programming in Ethiopia and Kenya. This provides a comprehensive and nuanced picture of the security-development nexus and how this relates to the assessment and management of risks. This approach allows the investigation of how risks are identified, who is deemed to be at risk and the actions taken to address these risks. These case studies draw on a number of different methods: an analysis of descriptive aid figures; a content analysis based on an original framework which will situate the merging of security and development in the context of other major trends in development policy; a discourse analysis; interviews with key personnel working on mainstream policy of these donors; and interviews from fieldwork in Ethiopia and Kenya with personnel involved in programming. These methods complement each other and when used together address the possible shortcomings of each individual method. ODA statistics provide the bigger picture of how and where development aid is spent over this time period and provide a broader context to changes in discourse on security and development. Content analysis establishes a broad pattern of how security language has been used in development policy and allows a comparison with the

other ways of thinking about development of the Washington Consensus and the post-Washington Consensus. Discourse analysis provides a detailed examination of how the words counted in the content analysis are used and the arguments they are drawn on to construct. The possibility that policy exists in isolation from practice and that the content and discourse analyses cannot help us to understand practice is addressed through interviews. Interviews with both people in head office in the US, the UK and Canada and in the field in Ethiopia and Kenya add an understanding of how discourse relates to practice in the merging of security and development.

The three donor cases of the US, the UK and Canada represent different types of donors with variation in makeup of their development institutions, their development agendas and also their identification of national security risks. As a result they are good comparators through which to analyse the merging of security and development and how it relates to risk. Ethiopia and Kenya are good examples through which to examine the merging of security and development in programming. They are both recipients of large amounts of ODA and are identified as key stabilising influences in a volatile region. In addition to this, they have contrasting political systems and security and conflict risks. Examining the extent to which donors use their development programmes to address security concerns in these countries and the extent to which they are focused on security within the country or the security of the donor will provide a more comprehensive picture of the workings of the security-development nexus. Taken together this will establish a clearer picture of the merging of security and development in multiple contexts: as a historical phenomenon and across donor countries and recipient countries.

Chapter 4: US Development Policy in the on-going War on Terror

Whilst USAID is the principle agency responsible for distributing development aid, it is not the only body that does so within the US government. As the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) 2011 peer review points out, US foreign aid is controlled by 27 different entities (OECD-DAC 2011: 16). This proliferation of agencies distributing US foreign aid accelerated following 9/11 with new agencies established by the Bush administration, such as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), delivering significant amounts of aid and bypassing USAID completely. This proliferation of agencies responsible for distributing US overseas development aid (ODA) has implications for the coherence and focus of US development policy. As a consequence of this it is necessary to go beyond USAID when examining the US's development policy. For example, the Department of Defence's (DoD) share of foreign aid has increased in the post-9/11 period rising from 3.5% in 1998 to 21.7% in 2005 (Lancaster 2008: 40). Although this share has fallen to 8% for 2009 (OECD-DAC 2011: 43), it is still a significant proportion and so the policy discourse of the DoD during the 2000s period is also examined in this chapter. In addition to this, broader US security policy is examined through the National Security Strategy (NSS) documents and the Department of State (DoS) documents on development for the post 9/11 period.

This chapter argues that the US has sought greater coordination between its military, foreign policy and development wings of government. This has heightened in the post-9/11 period and has resulted in a closer relationship between USAID, the DoD and the DoS in national security policy. Within this, development is expected to contribute to US national security by addressing the root causes of security risks and development policy is supposed to inform security policy. This chapter shows that, in practice, dominant voices within the Department of Defence (DoD) and other security agencies within the US government set the agenda for security and development, which USAID has to follow. Whilst USAID engages in analysis of conflict situations and seeks to mitigate these through its policy, ultimately development

policy is decided at the top level of US government. As such, security and foreign policy considerations influence development spending considerably and US national security is prioritised in this relationship. This is evident in the way that USAID is expected to offset risks to US national security at a broad level, but at the micro level of addressing security concerns of individuals in developing countries, its programmes to prevent conflict are uneven. This research builds on the existing literature by examining how the US has merged security and development over an extended period of time and across a number of different government agencies. Through an analysis of ODA flows, policy documents and interviews with people within the agencies involved, this chapter examines how the US has merged security and development. First is an examination of patterns of US ODA over the period 1997-2012, second is a description of documents chosen and the method used, third is a discussion of the patterns of words used across documents, fourth is an analysis of the themes that emerge from the discourse analysis and interviews and last is an examination of how security has impacted on US development policy towards Ethiopia and Kenya.

Shifts in US ODA flows 1997-2012

The four main patterns that emerge in US ODA over this period are: an increase in aid to states designated as failed or fragile; an increase in aid to front line states in the WoT; an increase in aid to Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) and the emergence of new aid programmes aimed at dealing with conflict and security. All these changes occur in a context where US ODA has become increasingly diffused, as mentioned above, and its principal development agency, USAID, is only partly responsible for distributing ODA. This section will examine these trends in greater detail.

Table 4.1: Top 20 Failed States 2005-2012 including states among the top 20 recipients of US ODA*

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Cote d'Ivoire	Sudan	Sudan	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia
2	DRC	DRC	Iraq	Sudan	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	DRC
3	Sudan	Cote d'Ivoire	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
4	Iraq	Iraq	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	Zimbabwe	DRC	Chad
5	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Chad	Iraq	DRC	DRC	Haiti	Zimbabwe
6	Sierra Leone	Chad	Cote d'Ivoire	DRC	Iraq	Afghanistan	Zimbabwe	Afghanistan
7	Chad	Somalia	DRC	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Afghanistan	Haiti
8	Yemen	Haiti	Afghanistan	Cote d'Ivoire	CAR	CAR	CAR	Yemen
9	Liberia	Pakistan	Guinea	Pakistan	Guinea	Guinea	Iraq	Iraq
10	Haiti	Afghanistan	CAR	CAR	Pakistan	Pakistan	Cote d'Ivoire	CAR
11	Afghanistan	Guinea	Haiti	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire	Haiti	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire
12	Rwanda	Liberia	Pakistan	Myanmar	Haiti	Cote d'Ivoire	Pakistan	Guinea
13	N. Korea	CAR	North Korea	Bangladesh	Myanmar	Kenya	Yemen	Pakistan
14	Colombia	North Korea	Myanmar	Haiti	Kenya	Nigeria	Nigeria	Nigeria
15	Zimbabwe	Burundi	Uganda	North Korea	Nigeria	Yemen	Niger	Kenya
16	Guinea	Sierra Leone	Bangladesh	Uganda	Ethiopia	Myanmar	Kenya	Ethiopia
17	Bangladesh	Yemen	Nigeria	Ethiopia	North Korea	Ethiopia	Burundi	Burundi
18	Burundi	Myanmar	Ethiopia	Nigeria	Bangladesh	Timor-Leste	Myanmar	Niger
19	Dominican Rep.	Bangladesh	Burundi	Lebanon	Yemen	Niger	Ethiopia	Uganda
20	CAR	Nepal	Timor-Leste	Sri Lanka	Timor-Leste	North Korea	Guinea Bissau	Myanmar

***Source: The Fund for Peace Failed States Index. www.fundforpeace.org**

Table 4.1, above, shows the top 20 states in the *Failed States Index* for the years 2005-2012. This index is compiled by the Fund for Peace organisation annually since 2005 and is a composite of twelve economic, social and political indicators and compiles a single score which is a comparison between countries over time[5]. Whilst this index and indeed the very merits of labelling states as failed or fragile, has been contested (Nay 2013: 332), it is useful as a measure for the concept of failed states that is produced in the US and is in the public domain. The states highlighted in red are also in the top 20 recipients of US ODA for the same year. As Table 4.1 shows, there is significant overlap between the top 20s of the Failed States Index and the top 20 recipients of US ODA, with as many as 10 for the years 2007 and 2010. This clearly demonstrates the prioritisation of failed or fragile states in US ODA. Included in this index are the front-line states in the WoT of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Table 4.2, below, shows the top 20 recipients of US ODA over the period 1997-2012. The impact of the WoT can be clearly seen with funding to key states in the WoT increasing after 2001 with Iraq and Afghanistan alternating between the number No.1 and No.2 recipients from 2004 to 2010. Both these states received little or no funding prior to US military

[5] For more information see the Fund for Peace http://ffp.statesindex.org/

invasions in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Similarly, Pakistan was not amongst the top 30 recipients of US ODA prior to 2001 but receives significant funding thereafter. This shows a mirroring of US foreign and military policy priorities in its development spending.

Figure 4.1: US ODA by region 1997-2012*



***Source: OECD-DAC www.oecd.org/dac**

However, it is not only states where the US has a direct military and security interest that get an increase in funding over this period. Another trend in US ODA is a shift to spending in states located in SSA. As Table 4.2 shows, there were no SSA states among the top 10 recipients of US ODA in 2001. Following this there are consistently 3 or 4 SSA states in the top 10 and in 2012 there are 5. As well as this, as Table 4.2 shows, there is also a significant increase in US ODA to the SSA region in comparison with other regions. As Figure 4.1 shows, ODA to SSA increases significantly over this period of time and it receives more than the other regions of the Middle East, South America and North and Central America. This shows a marked change from the 1990s when Africa was largely neglected in US development and foreign policy during the Clinton administration (Taylor 2010: 25). This is a reflection of the intensification of the security focus on Africa during the Bush Jnr. administration (Taylor 2010: 24), as discussed in Chapter 3.

Figure 4.2: Breakdown of selected USAID sectoral spending 2004-2012*



***Source www.usaid.gov/resultsanddata/dataresources**

The fourth factor in US ODA during this period is creation of new programmes aimed at Conflict, Peace and Security in 2004. As Figure 4.2, above shows, USAID Conflict, Peace and Security programmes receive less funding than either Basic Health or Basic Education. However, they still receive more funding than other core development issues such as Water Supply and Sanitation. This shows that while development programmes addressing security issues are very much part of US development policy they have not become dominant and funding for them has declined slightly over time.

Taken together this examination of US ODA flows over the period 1997-2012 shows a shift towards spending in fragile states, key states in the WoT, and in the region of SSA. This period has also seen the creation of programmes dealing specifically with conflict, peace and security. This is consistent with the merging of security and development in US policy over this time. Coinciding with this is the diffusion of US ODA through multiple agencies as discussed above. Is this a shift towards addressing chronic development problems that exist in fragile states? Or does this indicate the use of development aid to address security problems in the WoT? The remainder of this chapter will investigate how this shift in spending is addressed in policy discourse and in policy practice towards two SSA countries, Ethiopia and Kenya. Both of which receive significant ODA over this period and are in the top ten recipients of US ODA over the period.

Table 4.2: Top 20 recipients of US ODA 1997-2012*

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Pakistan	Egypt	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
2	Bosnia-Herz.	Bosnia-Herz.	Bosnia-Herz.	Jordan	Egypt	Serbia	DRC	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Iraq	DRC	Kenya
3	Bolivia	Jordan	Indonesia	Indonesia	Colombia	Afghanistan	Jordan	Egypt	Sudan	DRC	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Pakistan	Pakistan	South Sudan
4	Peru	Peru	Colombia	Ethiopia	Serbia	Colombia	Colombia	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Nigeria	Egypt	Ethiopia	WB and Gaza	Haiti	Iraq	Ethiopia
5	South Africa	Bolivia	Jordan	Mozambique	Honduras	Jordan	Ethiopia	Sudan	Colombia	Sudan	Pakistan	Colombia	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Kenya	Pakistan
6	El Salvador	South Africa	DR Korea	Honduras	Peru	Indonesia	Afghanistan	Colombia	Egypt	Colombia	Colombia	WB and Gaza	Colombia	Sudan	South Sudan	Iraq
7	Haiti	Haiti	Peru	Serbia	Jordan	Pakistan	Egypt	Jordan	Jordan	Pakistan	Ethiopia	Egypt	Pakistan	WB and Gaza	Ethiopia	Tanzania
8	Mozambique	Palau	Bangladesh	South Africa	Indonesia	Mozambique	Bolivia	WB and Gaza	Pakistan	Jordan	Kenya	Kenya	Kenya	Kenya	WB and Gaza	Jordan
9	Micronesia	WB and Gaza	Bolivia	Colombia	Bosnia-Herz.	Ethiopia	Indonesia	Uganda	Uganda	Ethiopia	Uganda	Georgia	South Africa	South Africa	Haiti	South Africa
10	WB and Gaza	Mozambique	Micronesia	Armenia	Micronesia	Turkey	Serbia	DRC	Serbia	Zambia	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan	Tanzania	South Africa	Mozambique
11	Jordan	Nicaragua	Haiti	Bolivia	Bolivia	Peru	Peru	Serbia	WB and Gaza	Kenya	Nigeria	South Africa	Uganda	Nigeria	Tanzania	Haiti
12	Ethiopia	Micronesia	Honduras	Peru	Nicaragua	WB and Gaza	WB and Gaza	Peru	Indonesia	Uganda	South Africa	Nigeria	Nigeria	Colombia	Colombia	Nigeria
13	Vietnam	Kazakstan	WB and Gaza	Haiti	Ethiopia	Georgia	Sudan	Kenya	Peru	WB and Gaza	WB and Gaza	Uganda	Haiti	Uganda	Jordan	Uganda
14	Zambia	Ethiopia	South Africa	Pakistan	Georgia	DR Korea	Uganda	Bolivia	Kenya	Egypt	Haiti	Pakistan	Tanzania	Jordan	Nigeria	Mali
15	Marshall Is.	Honduras	Ethiopia	Bosnia-Herz.	Mozambique	Bolivia	Angola	Angola	DRC	Bolivia	Tanzania	Liberia	Georgia	Mozambique	Uganda	Colombia
16	Ghana	Colombia	Pakistan	Micronesia	Bangladesh	Sudan	Mozambique	Nigeria	Eritrea	Haiti	Zambia	Haiti	Mozambique	DRC	Mozambique	Lebanon
17	Nicaragua	El Salvador	Philippines	Philippines	South Africa	Armenia	Kenya	El Salvador	Haiti	Indonesia	Mozambique	Tanzania	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Mexico	Zambia
18	Mali	Indonesia	Sudan	Georgia	WB and Gaza	Uganda	South Africa	Honduras	Bolivia	Peru	Zimbabwe	Somalia	DRC	Ghana	Ghana	DRC
19	Kazakstan	Uganda	Mozambique	Nicaragua	Philippines	Angola	Pakistan	Mozambique	Mexico	Mexico	DRC	Botswana	Zambia	Mexico	Libya	WB and Gaza
20	Uganda	Armenia	Nicaragua	Ghana	Haiti	Kenya	Micronesia	Liberia	South Africa	Serbia	Lebanon	Mozambique	Cote d'Ivoire	Georgia	Zambia	Ghana

***Source: OECD DAC. www.OECD-DAC.org**

Key US policy documents for examining the merging of security and development

This section draws from a content analysis and discourse analysis of USAID, DoD, DoS and US Government policy documents from the period of the late 1990s up to 2011. The late 1990s is chosen as a starting point to give a pre-9/11 representation of how development and security are connected. Documents from USAID include Annual Performance Reports, a White Paper and key documents proposing policy reform within the agency over this period. The DoD's *Quadrennial Defence* documents are included as examples of how the DoD presents its policy over this period. Similarly the *National Security Strategies* are included as representations of broader US national security over this time. Documents which outline the merging of USAID with DoS at this time are also included. In total this analysis includes 18 documents spanning this time period. Together they provide a comprehensive picture of how development and security are engaged in policy discourse at a broad level across the US government. The titles of these documents and the reasons why they were chosen are contained in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Sample of US documents

Agency	Year	Title	Description
USAID	1997	USAID Performance Report	These three reports provide a detailed account of USAID activities and policy for the period of the late 1990s. They provide a pre-9/11 benchmark for USAID's engagement with merging security and development.
USAID	1999	USAID Performance Report	
USAID	2000	USAID Performance Overview	
DoD	2001	Quadrennial Defence Review	The Quadrennial Defence Review is a useful benchmark of US defence policy as it justifies budget spending and articulates the main ideas behind policy. Issued soon after 9/11 this document is a good starting point for US defence policy post-9/11
USAID	2002	USAID Foreign Aid in the National Interest	This is the first USAID document published after 9/11 and is important as USAID's response to the WoT
White House	2002	US National Security Strategy	This document elevated development as one of the three pillars of American foreign along with Diplomacy and Defence. This framing of development is referenced heavily in later documents.
USAID	2004	USAID White Paper: US Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century	This is the 1st White Paper issued by USAID and so is essential to analyse. It sets out a framework for how US foreign aid should be reformed which is heavily referenced in later documents.

DoS USAID	2004	USAID DoS Strategic Plan 2004-2009 Security, Democracy, Prosperity: Aligning Diplomacy and Development Assistance	This document is important because it sets out a plan for a closer relationship between development policy and foreign policy.
USAID	2005	USAID Fragile States Strategy	Intervention in fragile states is the main crossover area between the different agencies involved in development in the US. As a result USAID's strategy in this area is of importance.
White House	2006	National Security Strategy	The second national security strategy issued by the Bush administration is revealing in how development is treated as a security issue.
DoD	2006	Quadrennial Defence Review	The second QDR after 9/11 is important for the continuation and evolution of themes relating to security and development
USAID	2006	USAID Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid	One of the criticisms of US development policy in the literature is that it is not coordinated with other donors and not in keeping with the consensus of the broader development community. Its policy on bilateral action is important in this context.
DoS USAID	2007	USAID DoS Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012.	The second strategic plan is important to compare to the earlier document.
USAID	2008	USAID Annual Performance Report	This report provides a comprehensive snapshot of USAID in 2008, at the end of the Bush administrations time in office.
DoD	2008	National Defence Strategy	This document provides a snapshot of defence strategy at the end of the Bush administration's time in office. This is interesting for how it engages with development.
White House	2010	National Security Strategy	The first NSS of the Obama administration is for comparison with previous engagement with development in Bush's NSSs.
DoS USAID	2010	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power	This document calls for the full integration of development and diplomacy. It argues for the expansion of civilian involvement in US foreign policy.
DoD	2010	Quadrennial Defence Review	The first QDR of the Obama administration is important for examining shifts in how development is dealt with.
USAID	2011a	USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015	This document is important as a snapshot of USAID policy at the end of the chosen time period.

The aim of this analysis is to examine the extent to which security concerns have influenced development policy discourse, whether development has influenced security and defence policy discourse and to highlight the key arguments offered for merging security and development. To this end, this chapter examines how security and defence policy discourse represent development and also how USAID represents development as a solution to security

problems. This is done through both a content analysis and a discourse analysis of these documents in addition to interviews with key actors in USAID.

Content analysis of US development aid from 1997-2011

This section draws from a content analysis applied to documents produced by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US government agencies responsible for distributing overseas development aid (ODA) in the period of the late 1990s to 2011. As outlined in the Chapter 3 the framework isolates key words that represent the three theoretical approaches to development of: the Washington Consensus, the post-Washington Consensus and the merging of security and development. As the documents are of differing lengths, varying from 30 pages to 300 pages Table 4 shows a percentage value for each count that can be contrasted across documents. This was calculated by dividing each count by the total sample count for that document. (For the full word count, see Appendix 4, Table A4.1.)This gives a picture of what proportion a certain word count represents allowing it to be compared within the document and across documents. Table 6 then takes the aggregate percentage value for each frame and for each document, allowing comparison across time. Figure 3, is a bar chart visualising this percentage breakdown. The most striking pattern is the decline in the use of words associated with the post-Washington Consensus and an increase in the use of words associated with the merging of security and development. This section will firstly examine the pattern of decline in the use of post- Washington Consensus terms, secondly it will look at the prominence of governance and institutions in the post-Washington Consensus and lastly will be an analysis of the increase in terms associated with security and development.

Table 4.4: Breakdown of words used in US documents as percentage values

	1997 USAID	1999 USAID	2000 USAID	2002 USAID	2002 NSS	2004 USAID	2004 DoS	2005 USAID	2006 NSS	2006 QDR	2006 USAID	2007 DoS	2008 DoD	2008 USAID	2010 QDDR	2010 QDR	2010 NSS	2011 USAID
Liberalization	1.63%	2.03%	0.65%	1.55%	0.42%	0.00%	0.21%	0.00%	0.00%	0.26%	0.00%	0.53%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Deregulation	0.18%	0.13%	0.00%	0.16%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Privatization	3.08%	0.89%	2.59%	0.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Private Sector	6.88%	4.31%	5.83%	1.55%	1.67%	0.00%	2.34%	0.65%	2.11%	0.26%	1.49%	3.37%	2.47%	7.60%	2.37%	1.38%	3.45%	9.65%
Market	20.47%	11.55%	12.80%	10.10%	10.88%	0.95%	4.03%	1.96%	11.74%	1.06%	0.00%	4.44%	1.23%	9.89%	2.46%	1.21%	3.62%	5.41%
Basic Needs	0.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.24%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.36%	0.00%	0.38%	0.17%	0.00%	0.69%	0.39%
	32.43 %	**18.91 %**	**21.88 %**	**13.93 %**	**12.97 %**	**0.95%**	**6.58%**	**2.94%**	**13.85 %**	**1.58%**	**1.49%**	**8.70%**	**3.70%**	**17.87 %**	**5.00%**	**2.59%**	**7.76%**	**15.44 %**
Poverty	5.62%	6.98%	6.97%	7.08%	5.86%	1.90%	2.97%	1.31%	2.11%	0.00%	4.48%	3.37%	0.62%	6.08%	1.35%	0.17%	1.38%	6.95%
Institutions	23.37%	21.95%	19.77%	14.33%	10.04%	15.64%	9.34%	7.52%	11.50%	3.69%	8.96%	10.83%	4.94%	7.60%	12.19%	8.79%	12.41%	11.58%
Governance	8.51%	9.77%	12.32%	19.06%	1.67%	10.90%	6.58%	7.19%	2.82%	5.01%	13.43%	8.17%	3.09%	9.51%	4.23%	1.38%	2.07%	9.65%
Inequality	1.09%	0.89%	1.94%	1.47%	0.42%	0.00%	0.21%	0.00%	0.23%	0.26%	0.75%	0.36%	0.00%	0.00%	1.69%	0.00%	0.52%	4.25%
Human rights	5.07%	4.06%	6.81%	2.85%	2.09%	0.47%	6.79%	1.31%	2.11%	0.00%	0.00%	7.28%	0.00%	5.70%	3.73%	0.17%	5.52%	3.09%
Civil Society	8.33%	7.36%	5.35%	3.01%	0.42%	0.47%	2.76%	0.98%	0.94%	1.06%	0.75%	5.15%	0.00%	7.60%	4.32%	0.34%	2.24%	4.25%
	51.99 %	**51.02 %**	**53.16 %**	**47.80 %**	**20.50 %**	**29.38 %**	**28.66 %**	**18.30 %**	**19.72 %**	**10.03 %**	**28.36 %**	**35.17 %**	**8.64%**	**36.50 %**	**27.52 %**	**10.86 %**	**24.14 %**	**39.77 %**
Security	4.17%	6.47%	9.89%	6.92%	16.32%	13.27%	28.87%	14.38%	19.48%	35.62%	19.40%	28.95%	35.19%	19.01%	35.14%	51.55%	44.83%	17.76%
Conflict	8.51%	20.81%	12.16%	23.29%	5.44%	7.11%	7.22%	19.28%	10.09%	7.92%	11.94%	9.77%	17.90%	15.59%	21.00%	12.59%	5.17%	17.76%
Terrorism	0.72%	0.25%	0.00%	3.26%	39.33%	3.32%	17.62%	0.65%	29.11%	35.09%	2.24%	10.83%	9.26%	6.08%	4.40%	9.14%	9.83%	1.54%
Failed States	0.54%	0.13%	0.16%	1.38%	0.42%	39.34%	1.70%	38.89%	0.47%	0.26%	20.90%	0.36%	0.00%	0.38%	3.22%	1.03%	0.69%	1.54%
Stability	1.63%	2.41%	2.76%	2.12%	3.77%	6.16%	8.70%	4.90%	6.34%	6.07%	15.67%	3.73%	6.17%	3.80%	1.61%	9.31%	3.79%	4.63%
Radicalism	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.22%	1.26%	0.47%	0.64%	0.65%	0.94%	3.43%	0.00%	2.49%	19.14%	0.76%	1.44%	2.93%	3.79%	1.54%
	15.58 %	**30.08 %**	**24.96 %**	**38.19 %**	**66.53 %**	**69.67 %**	**64.76 %**	**78.76 %**	**66.43 %**	**88.39 %**	**70.15 %**	**56.13 %**	**87.65 %**	**45.63 %**	**66.81 %**	**86.55 %**	**68.10 %**	**44.79 %**

Figure 4.3: Aggregate percentage for each policy approach in US documents



Decline in the use of post-Washington Consensus terms

As Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 show, engagement with Washington Consensus terms is consistently low across this sample. This is to be expected as, as discussed in Chapter 3, there had been general move towards a Post Washington Consensus in the late 1990s. Although there is an increase in the use of these terms in 2008 and 2011 USAID documents, it can be said that the use of these terms has declined significantly over this time period. Similarly, post-Washington consensus terms are used with less frequency after 9/11. While they make up the biggest proportion of words used from 1999, 2000 and 2002, as Table 4.4 shows, this declines to 29% for both USAID and DoS documents for 2004 and falls to a low of 9% for the 2008 DoD document. The breakdown of these words in Table 4.4 shows that the use of the terms reflecting a human development focus; poverty, inequality, human rights and civil society, have all declined. Of the six terms chosen to gauge the presence of post-Washington Consensus policies, 'governance' and 'institutions' are mentioned the most through all documents, as can be seen in Table 4.4. This suggests that the strongest element of the post-Washington Consensus in US development policy documents is the state capacity norms of 'good governance' and efficient institutions. Rather than a broader definition of development encompassing human rights, poverty and equality, the focus is on the institutional part of democratic reform. This is consistent with the ideas around the primacy of institutions in

development espoused by scholars such as William Easterly (2008) and Rodrick and Subramanian (2003). Similarly the merits of focusing on good governance as an essential part of development have been discussed at length by scholars and International Financial Institutions (IFI) (World Bank 1994; IMF 1997; Woods 2000). Coinciding with this decline in the use of both Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus terms is a corresponding increase in the use of terms related to security and development. This is the subject of the next section.

Development, security and the WoT

As Table 4.4 shows, from the count of 30% and 25% in 1999 and 2000, the proportion of security and development terms increases slightly to 38% in the 2002 USAID document and then dramatically increases thereafter. As Table 4.4 shows, the three highest counts of 88%, 88% and 87% are all from DoD documents from 2006, 2008 and 2010 respectively. It is perhaps expected that DoD documents would give greater space to security issues, however, this pattern is also reflected in documents specifically on development issued by both USAID and the DoS. As Table 4.4 shows, in the 2004, 2005 and 2006 USAID documents the proportion of security and development terms is 70%, 78% and 70%. This is a significant change from the pre-9/11 documents with the large majority of terms counted being given over to security and development issues. Although this drops in the 2008 and 2011 USAID documents there is still a 46% and 45% proportion in each given over to these terms. A clearer picture emerges when the breakdown of these terms is analysed more closely.

It is noticeable in Table 4.4 that the term security is used in greater numbers following 9/11. As mentioned above this is to be expected in NSS and DoD documents, but it is also the case in development documents. In addition to this, the term 'human security', which represents a broader definition of security, is only mentioned in one document – the 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Defence Review*. As a result the proportion of references to 'security' increases following 9/11 and is used in conventional terms rather than the broader definition of 'human security'. The term 'stability' is also mentioned in greater numbers following 9/11. This word is often used in the context of economic or political stability which is not necessarily a hard security concern, but it ties in with the idea of instability in the developing

world being a source of insecurity for the developed world. The use of the term ‘conflict’ is relatively high before 9/11 and only increases sporadically afterwards as can be seen in Table 4.4. The other three terms ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalism’ and ‘failed states’ show an interesting pattern which requires further examination.

As Table 4.4 shows, prior to 9/11 the term ‘radicalism’ was not used in US development documents. Similarly, the term ‘failed state’ was used only once in each document in 1999 and 2000 and the term ‘terrorism’ was used only twice in 1999 and not at all in 2000. Following this, there is an increase in the use of these terms. As Table 4.5 shows, of the words counted in the 2002 USAID document ‘terrorism’, ‘failed states’ and ‘radicalism’ make up over 3%, 1% and 1% respectively. As Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4 show, this pattern is most pronounced in the documents on defence and security, with ‘terrorism’ making up 40% of the 2002 NSS and 35% of the DoD’s 2006 *Quadrennial Defence Review*. However, the pattern is also present in USAID and joint USAID-DoS development policy documents. As Table 4.5 shows, of the words counted, ‘terrorism’ represents 18% in the 2004 USAID-DoS document, 11% in the 2007 USAID-DoS document and 6% in the 2008 USAID document. Similarly, the proportion of words counted given to ‘failed states’ is 39% in the 2004 USAID White Paper and 21% in the 2006 USAID document. The use of these words is not constant and fluctuates during this time, for example ‘terrorism’ is less than 1% in the 2005 USAID document and ‘failed state’ is less than 1% in the 2007 USAID-DoS document. There is also a fall-off in the use of the term ‘failed state’ after 2006 as can be seen in Table 4.5. However, the emergence of these terms after 9/11 indicates that ideas about instability in the developing world being a source of insecurity for the developed world have been incorporated in development policy. The term ‘radicalisation’ is present in a relatively small proportion in USAID and joint USAID and DoS documents. However, use of the term in development policy documents is significant and is an indication that the national security issue of Islamic radicalisation has been incorporated in development policy.

Figure 4.4: Aggregate percentage for each policy approach, USAID only



Figure 4.5: Aggregate percentage for each policy approach, agencies except USAID



Development in security policy

One of the main arguments in favour of a closer relationship between security and development is that it would allow development actors to have a greater influence on security policy (Stewart 2004; Picciotto 2004). This content analysis demonstrates that US development policy has adopted security concerns. The next question is whether US security

policy has adopted development concerns? Figures 4.4 and 4.5, above, show the breakdown of percentages for USAID documents and for DoS, DoD and NSS documents separately. As Figure 4.4 shows, development terms, whether Washington Consensus or Post-Washington Consensus, are not used with great frequency. As Table 4.4 shows, the terms 'market', 'institutions' and 'governance' are used consistently in security documents. This shows the presence of development issues, but in a technocratic form focusing on the institutional functions of the state and the importance of integrating with the global economy. The terms 'poverty', 'inequality', 'human rights' and 'civil society' representing broader concepts of social and political development are not used in significant numbers in DoD or NSS documents. This suggests that while development policy has adopted security concerns, security policy has not necessarily adopted development concerns. The context in which these words associated with merging security and development are used needs to be examined further to understand this change.

Merging security and development in US development policy discourse

Drawing from a discourse analysis of the above documents together with data from interviews with key actors, this section outlines several key patterns in the US merging of security and development: the prioritisation of US national security in all agencies distributing ODA including USAID; the adherence of the DoD and DoS to a narrow definition of development focusing on economic development; and the conflation of development and national security goals as being the same. The first section looks at USAID's approach to merging security and development pre-9/11. The section following this discusses the themes that emerge after 9/11: firstly the idea that development is a security priority, secondly the contrasting definitions of development that are used across the different agencies, thirdly the framing of development goals as being the same as national security goals and finally how difficulties in coordinating these agendas are managed in policy.

USAID and the national interest pre 9/11

In the pre-9/11 documents USAID justifies development spending by arguing that it serves the national interest. As these documents are used as a means of justifying USAID's programmes to a national audience, this is perhaps to be expected. At this stage the national interest is defined primarily in economic terms. At the beginning of every chapter of these two documents is a section entitled "Benefits to the American Public" explaining how this development policy will benefit the national interest. US national security is referenced as a justification in terms of the benefits of economic growth in the developing world for US national security: "Rapid, broad-based economic growth in developing and transitional countries has improved the lives and wellbeing of the citizens of those countries while serving U.S. economic, humanitarian, and security interests" (USAID 2000: v), and identifying HIV/AIDS as a threat to US national security (USAID 2000: 50). In addition to this, there is an overt connection made between conflict and development and acknowledgement of the importance of conflict prevention to long-term development (USAID 1999: 140, 142, 148). However, these points are not elaborated upon in any depth and there is no engagement with how these issues actually impact on US national security or of how development interventions can address them. Consistent with this, when failed states are mentioned they are purely a development problem and not connected to US national security: "In addition, the phenomenon of failed states is of profound concern to the United States. Lack of democratic institutions is a common factor among nations that have succumbed to crisis. Too often, these countries lack the institutional capacity necessary to avoid escalating violence" (USAID 1999: 31). However, the idea of linkages between development and security is brought to the core of policy and expanded on in the post-9/11 period.

Development in failed states as a national security priority

The following section examines the way in which USAID, the Department of Defence, Department of State and broader US government frame the idea of development as a means of security. The overlap in how these departments define development represents a narrow conception of development and is not in keeping with broader consensus on the goals of long term sustainable development. Of the themes that emerge from US policy discourse in the

2000s the one common to all agencies examined is that failed states represent a threat to US national security, with 'failed states' cited in increasing numbers after 9/11. Moreover, the framing of this concept is revealing in that failed states are referenced in the context of the 9/11 attacks and they are framed as a source of potential terrorist attacks. From this idea comes the argument that development aid must be used to manage the national security risks arising from failed states. Starting with the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) the DoD makes the connection between insecurity in the developing world leading to insecurity in the US because weak or failed states can provide a haven for terrorists to operate from "In several regions, the inability of some states to govern their societies, safeguard their military armaments, and prevent their territories from serving as sanctuary to terrorists and criminal organizations can also pose a threat to stability and place demands on U.S. forces" (DoD 2001: 5). This connection is articulated again by President George W. Bush in the 2002 *National Security Strategy*: "The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states" (White House 2002: Introduction). This mantra of weak states being a bigger threat than strong states is repeated across development, security and foreign policy documents (USAID 2002: Introduction iv; 1; 125) and it is at the core of the connection between security and development in US policy. The importance of addressing state fragility from a development perspective is also addressed in interviews: "those sorts of issues matter for development because we increasingly see that the majority of the world's people are- the world's poorest people are concentrated in fragile states."[6]

It is this connection between failed states and terrorist attacks that is used as a justification for elevating development as a necessary process for ensuring greater security (Whitehouse 2002: 17, 21). This is referred to as the "3 D policy" of "defence, diplomacy and development" and is referenced heavily in policy documents throughout the 2000s. The 2004 USAID White Paper also reiterates this point: "Development is now as essential to U.S. national security as are diplomacy and defence" (USAID 2004: 3). The assertion that development is an equal facet of national security the same as development and diplomacy is repeated frequently (DoD 2006a: 33; USAID 2008: 4). This is asserted in interviews where respondents reference the importance of development as a key 'pillar' in the US national

[6] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 6, 30/10/2013

security policy "the military has gone on record testifying to Congress just a few weeks ago how critical it is to fully resource State Department and USAID in order for the military to do its national security mission".[7] From the above discourse it can be seen that development is elevated to a security issue through the illustrative example of failed states, where chaos, disorder and a vacuum of authority can allow terrorists to operate and threaten the US. In this way, development is offered as a means of resolving this problem of failed states and mitigating against the potential security risks they pose. While it may be argued that this represents a 'developmentalisation' of security policy, contested understandings of the concept exist across different agencies. This is the subject of the next section.

What is meant by "development"?

USAID's documents include broad, long-term development goals such as education, health care and structural capacity (USAID 2002; USAID 2004; USAID 2006; USAID 2008). However, the *National Security Strategy (NSS)* documents have a narrow definition of development that is confined to economic development through liberalisation of the economy: "When nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no amount—no amount—of development aid is ever enough. When nations respect their people, open markets, invest in better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively" (White House 2002: 17). Lack of development is portrayed as the fault of developing states for not opening their markets to the global economy. Problems of healthcare and poverty are secondary to economic reforms. This perspective is reiterated in the 2006 *NSS*: "Greater economic freedom also leads to greater economic opportunity and prosperity for everyone. History has judged the market economy as the single most effective economic system and the greatest antidote to poverty." (White House 2006: 25). This understanding of development draws heavily from the Washington Consensus rather than the post-Washington Consensus. The DoD documents of the 2001 and 2006 *QDR* do not refer to development at all despite the fact that the Pentagon was distributing increasing amounts of ODA during this period. When development is mentioned in the 2008 *National Defence Strategy* it is in reference to economic development, governance, institutional reform and training the police and military

[7] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 3, 30/4/2013

"Beyond security, essential ingredients of long-term success include economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications" (DoD 2008: 17). In summary, up until 2008 the definition of development adhered to by the DoD and the White House is that of the "Washington Consensus". This is consistent with criticism of Bush's development policy by authors such as Carol Lancaster (2008: 49) that policies such as "Transformational Diplomacy" are a return to the market growth based policies of the 1970/80s.

However, following Barak Obama's success in the 2008 Presidential election, there is a discernable shift in how the DoD and NSS documents define development. Whilst the 2010 *NSS* does refer to the narrow definition of development as economic reform, it also discusses broader development principles such as healthcare and food security (White House 2010: 33). This is the first reference to health care and food security as important in their own right in US Government documents during this period. This could be seen as a reflection of the Obama administrations attempt to increase the authority of USAID and the civilian capabilities of US foreign policies in general as reflected in the 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power* (QDDR) document. Here a broader definition of development is drawn on to include not just economic development, but also food security, global health, climate change, democracy and governance, and humanitarian assistance (DoS/USAID 2010: 76). In interviews, USAID officials stated that there has been greater consultation with USAID on security issues during the Obama administration:

> Secretary of State Clinton was very laudatory towards USAID and reached out and I think recognised the importance of development. Bob Gates who was Secretary of State for defence also recognises the importance of development ….USAID is very much an integrated partner in all of our interagency efforts here so when we have discussions with the national Security Council, when we have discussions with Department of State, USAID is always in the room as well.[8]

The argument is made that under the Obama government, rather than just receiving policy, USAID now plays an active role in contributing to foreign policy and security policy "the development agency is now in that larger policy conversation in a way that we didn't used to

[8] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 1, 19/4/2013: 5

be".[9] However, as discussed above in the content analysis section, use of the term 'poverty' decreases in US policy documents following 9/11, as Table 4 shows. This is also reflected in the analysis of discourse, the White House, DoD and DoS documents do not give significant attention to poverty as a development problem during the 2000s. Whilst there is a broader definition of development used in the 2010 *NSS* and *QDDR* there is no specific poverty reduction agenda. This suggests that while USAID may be given greater input into security policy as interview respondents suggest, their influence is limited and does not extend to establishing a poverty focus to development policy as DoS and DoD engage with it.

Development in security policy

As outlined above, the DoD and NSS documents draw on a narrow definition of development which is framed as part of a combined process of assisting other states and is placed at the same level as "training and equipping indigenous military and police forces" (DoD 2008: 17). Whilst USAID has a more expansive definition of development than DoD, the White House or DoS, it nevertheless frames development as important because of how it relates to security. Furthermore, the policy decisions on which countries receive aid are not made by USAID, but by other agencies. What is consistent across all the agencies covered is the argument that development aid will provide greater national security for the US. This section will firstly look at how agencies other than USAID have engaged with this and secondly how USAID itself has engaged with this idea.

As mentioned above, the 2001 and 2006 *QDR* do not discuss development at all. It is the 2008 National Defence Strategy that discusses most the idea of development, defining it as: "economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications" (DoD 2008: 17). Here development is again restricted to economic development, institution building and good governance and it is one of a number of facets of US strategy to ensure security. It is part of the same process of ensuring security as training security forces in developing countries:

[9] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 1, 19/4/2013; Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 5, 30/10/2013

"Supporting U.S. diplomatic and development efforts to foster a range of governance efforts and to counter radicalization, including working with civilian agencies on security assistance and police training programs" (DoD 2010: 13). Development and security are directly linked. In the *NSS* documents development is elevated to a pillar of national security along with diplomacy and defence (White House 2002: Introduction; 2006: 33) and is important because it can contribute to national security by reducing conflict and bringing greater stability to the international system (White House 2010: 15). Again development is important primarily because of how it can address potential risks to US national security.

The combined Department of State (DoS) and USAID documents also place development as being important for advancing national security. The justification for a closer relationship between DoS and USAID is to bring policy coherence in advancing the National Security Strategy (DoS/USAID 2004: Introduction). In addition, tackling long-term social and environmental development problems is justified as a means to prevent instability from impacting on the US directly (DoS/USAID 2004: 24). This merging of security and development is expressed again in the DoS/USAID 2007 *Strategic Plan*, overseas development is important because it will ensure US national security (DoS/USAID 2007: 15). Even though the 2010 QDDR has a broader view of development it still adheres to the idea of national security as the main justification for development spending: "When we help other nations develop the capacity to solve their own problems and participate in collective solutions to shared problems, we advance our own security and prosperity" (DoS/USAID 2010: 21). The common theme that emerges is that when development aid is elevated as important, it is because of how it can help offset risks to US national security. This may be expected of agencies with agendas other than development such as military or diplomatic goals. It is interesting that USAID has also accepted this logic of development serving the overall national security strategy. Whilst this may be expected in documents aimed at justifying aid to a national readership, USAID has not tried to alter the discursive connection between development and national security in a way that may give greater priority to development issues.

In USAID documents post-9/11 the role of development in foreign and security policy is discussed repeatedly (USAID 2002: iv; USAID 2005: 1,2; 2006:11; 2008: 10). This is

elaborated on in terms of how development interventions can offset the threat that instability in the developing world represents to the US because of a globalised world (USAID 2002: 1). Similarly, failed states are highlighted as important because: "They have destabilized entire regions and provided recruiting grounds and safe havens for criminals, extremists, and terrorists- a point that takes on new salience in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks." (USAID 2002: 125). This strong assertion of the interconnection between development aid and national security is also framed in terms of supporting military allies in order to form alliances more readily (USAID 2002: 130), and to support states that will help achieve specific U.S. foreign policy goals (USAID 2004: 15; USAID 2006: 11). Exactly what these foreign policy goals are is not specified, however, in this context it can be assumed they refer to US national security. This is an overt framing of development aid as a political tool to aid national security.

It is also acknowledged that the countries in which USAID will operate will not be chosen by USAID itself but by other agencies "For strategic states the objectives of assistance will be determined principally by the State Department and the National Security Council." (USAID 2004: 21) In effect, USAID will not choose which states to focus on. Therefore broader policy is out of USAID's hands and is instead a Department of State issue. Where there are strategic concerns, USAID is merely a local coordinator of that aid. This is an extraordinary admission by USAID that the policy that it advocates, coordinating development and security policy, means that its say in what countries should receive aid is greatly reduced, and that in effect it will merely distribute aid wherever it is allowed. This is confirmed by interviews with USAID officials where it is asserted that key decisions on development policy are decided at a foreign policy level "most of our planning is done by the State Department that sets foreign policy. USAID, in the 1990s our capacity was extremely small but our capacity for strategy development and planning was completely eliminated by Congress it's now starting to re-form".[10] Again there is a slight shift in policy under the Obama administration to give more responsibility for decision making to USAID. The merging of security and development policy presents problems of conflicting goals which are rarely addressed in these documents. The next section will look at how possible differences between security and development policy priorities are either addressed or ignored.

[10] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 3, 30/4/2013

Navigating the space between security and development goals

In terms of development influencing security policy, some interviewees argue that, as the WoT has unfolded, security agencies have sought to understand the development perspective on how long-term development issues impact on security[11]. This is prevalent in particular under the Obama administration and this is something that can be seen in the efforts of Hilary Clinton to give greater authority to civilian wings of government in security issues as outlined in the *QDDR 2011.* However, as described by one interviewee: "a lot of assumptions were made by the military which then rose to the level of policy and then we had to implement it. So what we are trying to do is have those discussions now so those things don't rise up to become policy which we then have to implement and we don't think are going to work."[12] These assumptions were that the best way to proceed was to use development for short-term goals of stability and counterinsurgency, rather than a long-term approach of broad based economic and social development[13]. The difficulty is that whilst the overall goal of each agency at the top level is US national security, when it comes to specific actions "then those objectives are not necessarily the same. Then we each have our own goals and objectives that will then lead off to the ultimate national security objectives. Sometimes those are inconsistent."[14] In the process of working out these objectives, political issues and development issues are mixed together. As a result, development interventions are carried out for political and security purposes rather than development purposes[15]. In some cases coordinated military and development actions have been planned in consultation with USAID. However, the dominant voice and decision within this is reported to be in the security wings of government. These decisions are dominated by the military but presented to policy makers as a consensus.[16] As a result, these issues become mainstream policy on coordination between security and development. This suggests that while Afghanistan and Iraq are presented as exceptional in the merging of security and development, the approach taken is now part of a broader trend in policy. While development is seen as important for

[11] Telephone Interview with Anonymous USAID official 2, 22/4/2013; Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 1, 19/4/2013
[12] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 7, 20/11/2013
[13] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 7, 20/11/2013
[14] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 7, 20/11/2013
[15] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 7, 20/11/2013
[16] Telephone interview with Anonymous USAID official 7, 20/11/2013

addressing possible long-term risks to US national security, at the broad policy level USAID does not have as much influence as other agencies on policy in how security and development connect. As demonstrated above, the DoD and the DoS define development in a narrow way which does not give space to chronic problems of long term development which USAID prioritises. Taken together this demonstrates a dominance of national security in US development aid. The next section examines how these issues have played out in the specific contexts of USAID programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya.

From discourse to practice: security in USAID development policy in Ethiopia and Kenya

As discussed in Chapter 3, the US has identified both of these countries as being of strategic significance. The Horn of Africa (HOA) has been identified as a region vulnerable to state collapse and a potential haven for terrorist activity. As a result, Ethiopia and Kenya are framed as key stabilising influences within the region and US ODA is seen as an important part of ensuring greater stability in the region and off-setting risks to US national security (USAID 2011a: 12). This section argues that the merging of security and development is not just confined to policy discourse, but is evident in US development policy practice. The discursive connections between US national security and development aid in both US development and US security discourse is evident in its programmes in both Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia places greater restrictions on external involvement in security matters and so USAID spending in this area is relatively small. In contrast, Kenya is more open to external involvement in security issues and so USAID has a broader range of projects and a bigger budget.

Ethiopia

In the context of Ethiopia the merging of security issues is apparent in USAID policy demonstrating that the traction these issues have extends beyond high level policy documents to policy practice. As Table 1 shows, Ethiopia has consistently been amongst the top ten recipients of US ODA since 1997 in particular following 9/11 it has often been in the top five

recipients of US ODA. As discussed in the Chapter 3, the strength of the Ethiopian government and its restrictive approach towards involvement in its national security has prevented the US from getting involved in hard security issues such as border security, reform of the security services etc. As a result, the US cannot use its development programmes to manage security risks in these conventional ways of bolstering or reforming the police or military, or assisting with border control. However, there is space for USAID to manage security risks at the micro level by getting involved in local conflict resolution[17]. Development projects are shaped around processes of mediation between groups involved in conflict. There is an attempt to address conflict at the local level through bringing groups together and working through their respective demands[18]. Development spending funds support for groups during the time spent together in the mediation process[19]. Development spending is also used to reinforce these processes through providing development projects in order to build and maintain local peace processes[20]. This demonstrates that the merging of security and development in US programming in Ethiopia is also about addressing conflict at a micro level rather than just the top level of institutional support. These local conflicts are identified as a problem for the stability of Ethiopia and therefore the stability of the region and as such are framed as a national security priority for the US (USAID 2011b: 8). In this discursive connection between development and insecurity in the Horn of Africa, development programmes are expected to address this potential risk to US national security. In addition to this, interviewees also emphasise that these projects should present a positive image of the United States in order to counterbalance the negative image associated with US involvement in other countries.[21] This shows the complexity of the multiple functions that US ODA to Ethiopia is expected to serve: addressing regional security risks by resolving local conflict and reducing resentment towards the US by presenting a more positive image of the US in the region.

However, despite the multiple issues these programmes are expected to address, they are of limited effectiveness due to a number of factors. The time-frame and budgeting of these

[17] Personal interview with USAID Ethiopia official 3, 13/6/2013
[18] Personal interview with USAID Ethiopia official 2, 13/6/2013
[19] Personal interview with USAID Ethiopia official 2, 13/6/2013
[20] Personal interview with USAID Ethiopia official 2, 13/6/2013
[21] Personal interview with USAID Ethiopia official 3, 13/6/2013

projects is decided from Washington[22]. As a result, whilst there is a focus on local level projects, the budget and timeframe for these projects is decided at the top level rather than in-country. Budgets are decided on an annual basis and one interviewee reported that these projects were hampered by a lack of consistent funding. They felt that in order to build trust within these communities, a longer commitment to funding projects was needed[23]. In this case a project aimed at mediation between groups near the border with Sudan received no funding for the year in question.[24] Overall, working on local-level disputes is identified as important because of the national security goal of ensuring greater stability in the Horn of Africa. Table 4.5 shows a breakdown by sector of US ODA to both Ethiopia and Kenya for the year 2011. As Table 4.5 shows, funding for 'Conflict, Peace and Security' in Ethiopia is quite low compared with other sectors such as Basic Education and Health or Food Security Assistance. So whilst the US claims that addressing small scale local conflict issues is important for both development and its own national security, in the context of Ethiopia, this area is not funded on the same level as other sectors such as health or education. However, it is asserted by interviewees that issues of conflict and security sensitivity are now mainstreamed within broader development policy: "one of the things we do is work with a lot of the other sectors in USAID whether it's economic growth, education, health, land reform you name it we work with them to try and heighten their awareness of the importance of conflict analysis and the conflict dimension"[25]. So whilst healthcare and education may get bigger funding than specific conflict resolution projects, issues of conflict and security are still addressed when planning development projects in those areas. The nature of the US's engagement in Kenya follows a different pattern which is the subject of the next section.

[22] Personal interview with USAID Ethiopia official 2, 13/6/2013
[23] Personal interview with USAID Ethiopia official 2, 13/6/2013
[24] Personal interview with USAID Ethiopia official 2, 13/6/2013
[25] Telephone interview with USAID official 1, 19/4/2013 :6

Table 4.5: US ODA to Ethiopia and Kenya 2011 by Selected Sector*

Sector	**Ethiopia**	**Kenya**
Basic Education	14,541	7,384
Basic Health	28,876	41,197
Population Policies/Programmes and Reproductive Health	253,983	406,111
Water Supply and Sanitation	2,318	2,762
Government and Civil Society, General	4,073	17,153
Conflict Prevention & Resolution, Peace and Security	3,728	12,726
General Environmental Protection	2,945	7,330
Developmental Food Aid/Food Security Assistance	92,610	9,261
Emergency Response	251,113	179,037
TOTAL	*706,672*	*715,473*

***Source: www.USAID.gov**

Kenya

> At US $700 million, the 2011 USAID program in Kenya represents an enormous commitment from the American people. It is not a gift, nor a grant, nor a generous outpouring of humanitarian assistance. It is an investment; an investment in developing a peaceful and prosperous Kenya to serve both as a trading partner and an anchor of stability in a region that increasingly threatens the security of the United States (USAID 2011c: iv).

As the above quote shows, US ODA to Kenya is identified as playing a key role in ensuring US national security. The above quote is couched in the language of risk and highlights the positive benefits of all parties involved for aid spending in Kenya, both in economic terms through trade and in off-setting risks to US national security through ensuring regional stability. This section argues that when these ideas have been put in to practice in development programmes, there is a greater focus on the security of the Kenyan state than on ordinary citizens. The first thing to note is that US ODA to Kenya increased significantly after 9/11. As Table 4.1 shows, prior to 2002 it was not amongst the top 20 recipients of US ODA, but from 2002-2006 it was in the top 20 recipients and from 2007 onwards in was amongst the top 10. Within this overall budget, the specific US security and development programmes in Kenya receive over three times the funding as in Ethiopia for a similar size overall budget, as Table 4.5 shows. Relative to other projects, spending on 'Conflict, Peace and Security' projects is significant. As Table 4.5 shows, in 2011 they received more than

either ‘Basic Education’, ‘Environmental Protection’ or ‘Food Security’. The focus of these projects is largely to ensure the stability of the Kenyan state which is highlighted as a key national security goal for the US (USAID 2006: 3; USAID 2011c: iv). The crisis following the 2007 elections in Kenya undermined the assumption that Kenya was a stable democracy regardless of its political problems. The post-election violence raised fears that Kenya could suffer state collapse. The wish to avoid a repeat of this violence at the 2013 elections was the focus of merging security and development in US policy towards Kenya and there was an increase in US development spending in Kenya in the run up to the March 2013 elections[26].

Similar to the approach in Ethiopia USAID is involved in local level projects aimed at resolving and mitigating conflict[27]. These aim to resolve ethnic disputes through mediation which would include building health clinics and key infrastructure in those regions as part of the process. In addition, ‘peace monitors’ were trained to try to offset potential conflict[28]. Unlike the case of Ethiopia, USAID also operates programmes in the areas of civil society and in policing. Civil society programmes were shaped around the election and aimed at encouraging groups to mobilise in a non-violent way in order to air their grievances.[29] USAID involvement in policing was a joint project with the DoS and focused on reform of the police force encouraging greater respect for human rights and bringing about a less adversarial relationship between the police and the public[30]. This involved training in policing demonstrations and managing low-level civil unrest without resorting to violence[31]. Unlike the other conflict mediation programmes, police reform was focused at the government level of policy in Nairobi and not at the regional level. In an interview, one DoS official asserted that US police reform projects were focused on ensuring the security of the state and that the security of ordinary citizens was not the focus of these reform projects[32]. Taken together, this shows that US ODA in Kenya is used to address issues of conflict, security and stability in a number of ways. While there are some projects aimed at addressing conflict at a local level, the primary aim is the stability of the Kenyan state which is highlighted as important for regional stability and US national security. In the case of police

[26] Telephone interview with USAID official 5, 30/10/2013
[27] Personal interview with USAID Kenya Official 1, 18/6/2013
[28] Personal interview with USAID Kenya Official 1, 18/6/2013
[29] Telephone interview with USAID official 5, 30/10/2013
[30] Personal interview with DoS Kenya official, 18/6/2013
[31] Telephone interview with USAID official 5, 30/10/2013
[32] Personal interview with DoS Kenya official, 18/6/2013

reform projects, the focus is entirely at the elite level in Nairobi. As is the case in Ethiopia, decisions on policy and budget are made in Washington and not in-country. The emphasis is on the importance of Kenya to US foreign policy and development projects have resulted from this.

Ensuring stability in the Horn of Africa

The high level policy discourse on development as being important for national security is also evident in policy programming in Ethiopia and Kenya. Both countries are identified by the US as key players in off-setting US national security risks around regional instability in the Horn of Africa. Development aid is highlighted as key to managing these risks to US national security by addressing both root causes of conflict and bolstering the state in Ethiopia and Kenya. However, greater resources and policy focus is given to ensuring the security of the state rather than the security of individuals. In the case of Ethiopia, the ruling government restricts USAID's ability to get involved in hard security issues however, it does get involved in local level conflict mediation, but these projects receive minimal funding. In contrast, the Kenyan state is more open to external involvement in security issues and US development involvement in these issues is greater. This is reflected in the larger budget to Conflict, Peace and Security Projects and also in the types of projects it is involved in such as policing. This demonstrates that the merging of security and development extends beyond policy discourse and is part of policy practice. In practice, whilst development is expected to address security risks by resolving conflict at a local level, the policy and budgetary focus is on enhancing the developing state, rather than improving the lives of ordinary citizens affected by conflict.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that since 9/11 the US has sought to use its development policy as a means of addressing potential national security risks. This has involved a closer relationship between security and development evident in three inter-related shifts in US ODA spending: increased spending in states deemed crucial to the WoT; increased spending

in failed or fragile states and increased spending in SSA. Coinciding with these shifts in spending, the US overtly connects security and development aid in its policy discourse. There is consensus across USAID, the White House, the Department of State and the Department of Defence that development aid should be used to advance US foreign policy and national security goals. However, the national security of the US is prioritised over the security of citizens in developing countries. Whilst USAID uses a broader definition of development to include issues such as health and education, the other agencies use a narrow definition referring primarily to economic development. This is significant, as during a period when the DoD was responsible for a large share of development aid it rarely mentioned development in its policy documents and when it did, it was focused singularly on the economic side of development. As a result, there has not been the reverse 'developmentalisation' of security in the closer relationship between the two. Whilst USAID does use a more inclusive view of development, it still frames development as being primarily for the purpose of advancing broader foreign policy goals to off-set risks to US national security. Under the Obama administration, however, there have been efforts to address USAID's deficit of policy making capabilities, and security documents have drawn on a broader definition of development. This shift towards national security as a priority for development is not just confined to discourse and can be seen in policy towards Ethiopia and Kenya.

In the context of Ethiopia and Kenya, security considerations have become part of development programmes. The contrasting approaches towards these two countries show a prioritisation of US national security over the security of individuals in these countries. In Ethiopia there is less opportunity to get involved in top level policy and hard security concerns, whereas, in Kenya there is more opportunity to get involved in security issues. When development is used to address conflict at a local level in Ethiopia, it receives little funding. However, when development is used in Kenya to address security at the state institutional level it receives greater funding. The US focus on the national security side of merging security and development can be seen in the greater funding for Conflict, Peace and Security programmes in Kenya. Taking all this together, the US has merged its security and development policy to a significant degree both in policy and in its programmes. Within this, development is defined in terms of how it can address further US national security goals. This suggests that the motivation behind merging security and development in US policy is to off-set risks to national security. Whilst the US makes the connection between chronic

development problems faced by individuals and risks to its own national security, its development programmes are aimed to a greater degree at bolstering the security of developing states rather than addressing the root causes of insecurity for citizens within these states. USAID is expected to address these security risks, but more at the level of the state rather than individuals. A key issue is whether the US instance of the security-development nexus is typical, or whether there is variation across other donors. The next chapter investigates this through examining the case of the UK.

Chapter 5 - Fighting Poverty to Fight Terrorism: The UK's Development Policy in the War on Terror

This chapter examines the merging of security and development in UK policy over the period 1997-2012. Through content and discourse analyses of major policy documents from DfID and other UK government agencies involved in development, together with relevant interview data, it argues that DfID has brought UK national security into the core of its policy through a gradual process over this period by linking poverty and instability in the developing world to threats to UK national security such as terrorism and religious extremism. DfID has justified this shift through claims of common interest between development for people in the global South and security for the UK by drawing on the broader concept of security for individuals in developing countries, wherein development is offered as a means of managing national security risks. Whilst DfID draws on this broader understanding of security, the well-being of individuals in the developing world is understood and acted upon from the perspective of UK national security.

The first section of this chapter is a brief discussion of the structure of the UK's ODA. The Second section gives an explanation of the documents chosen for this sample. The third section sets out the findings of a content analysis of these documents based on the framework outlined in Chapter 3. The fourth section provides an analysis of the discourse within this sample of documents together with findings from interviews with key DfID officials. The fifth section examines how security considerations have influenced DfID programming in Ethiopia and Kenya.

The structure of UK ODA

In 1997 Tony Blair's Labour government established DfID as an independent department with Clare Short as its head in a cabinet level ministerial position. DfID thus replaced the

Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) which was previously under the authority of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (Vereker 2002: 134; Barder 2007: 288). The main changes in approach were a focus on evidenced based policy making and on poverty reduction (DfID 1997). In addition, DfID untied aid from the purchase of British goods and services and established a broader mandate which involved acting in the areas of trade and foreign policy (Schümer 2008). Furthermore, decision making on specific country programmes was decentralised in DfID, with key decisions now made in-country rather than back in Whitehall. This was part of a wider policy of coordination between government departments labelled the 'joined-up government' approach by Labour. This approach resulted in closer coordination between DfID, the FCO and MoD leading to tensions over DfID engagement in areas that had previously been the remit of other government departments (Short 2004: 111). This research takes the establishment of DfID as a starting point for analysis of engagement with security and conflict as development issues in UK development policy. Over this time, UK ODA has increased both in volume and in terms of % of GNI as Table 5.1 below shows. Coinciding with these increases are shifts in spending in SSA and in states defined as fragile. In addition there have been changes in how DfID is structured, with a greater focus on addressing conflict and security issues and on coordinating with the foreign policy and military agencies of government. This section looks firstly at shifts in ODA spending and secondly looks at institutional changes within DfID.

Table 5.1: UK ODA from 1997-2013 in total and as % of GNI. Amount in US$ millions*

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
UK ODA	3433.10	3863.51	3426.25	4501.26	4566.20	4929.04	6261.75	7904.70	10771.70	12459.02	9848.53	11499.87	11282.61	13052.97	13832.36	13891.44	17881.48
ODA % GNI	0.26	0.27	0.24	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.43	0.36	0.47	0.51	0.36	0.43	0.51	0.56	0.57	0.56	0.72

Source: OECD-DAC www.OECD-DAC.org

Figure 5.1: UK ODA by region, 1997-2012 in US$ millions*



*** Source: OECD-DAC. www.oecd.org/dac**

The first thing to note in DfID's ODA is a shift to spending in SSA. As Figure 1 above shows, from 1999 onwards DfID spent more ODA in SSA than other comparable regions such as South America or the Middle East. From 2009 onwards, in particular, spending in SSA outstripped that of any other region. Within this greater volume of ODA there is also a shift to spending in states classified as failed or fragile. Table 5.2 shows the top 20 countries on the Failed States Index from the commencement of the index in 2005 to 2012, the countries highlighted in red are also in the UK's top 20 recipients of ODA for the same period. This overlap rises from 5 in 2005 to 9 in 2012. This is consistent with the Coalition government's commitment in 2010 to spend 30% of ODA in fragile states. However, whilst the fragile states concept is very much linked to the WoT and the dangers of terrorism (Nay 2013), DfID spends in countries such as Bangladesh and Zimbabwe which do not have an immediate connection to countering regional terrorism. Similarly, while there has been a shift to spending in the frontline states in the WoT of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan this follows a slightly different pattern to the case of the US. Table 5.3 below shows the UK's top 20 ODA recipients from 1997-2012 and shows that Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are all consistently in the top 10 of DfID ODA recipients following 2001. However, unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan is in the top 20 recipients from the beginning of this sample in 1997 and so this is a continuation of an earlier pattern of the UK maintaining close post-Colonial links (Alesina and Dollar 2000: 45). In addition, the UK's involvement in Iraq is not as extensive as that of

the US. Prior to 2003 it is not in the top 20 of ODA recipients, and following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it is consistently in the top 10 recipients. However, following 2008 it drops out of the top 20 recipients of UK ODA. Afghanistan does not drop outside of the top ten following 2001. This snapshot of the UK's ODA demonstrates that there have been tangible shifts in UK ODA over the post-9/11 period to spending in frontline states in the WoT, fragile states and overall an increase in spending in SSA.

Table 5.2: Top 20 Failed States Index 2005-2012 including Top 20 Recipients of UK ODA*

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Cote d'Ivoire	Sudan	Sudan	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia
2	DRC	DRC	Iraq	Sudan	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	DRC
3	Sudan	Cote d'Ivoire	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
4	Iraq	Iraq	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	Zimbabwe	DRC	Chad
5	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Chad	Iraq	DRC	DRC	Haiti	Zimbabwe
6	Sierra Leone	Chad	Cote d'Ivoire	DRC	Iraq	Afghanistan	Zimbabwe	Afghanistan
7	Chad	Somalia	DRC	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Afghanistan	Haiti
8	Yemen	Haiti	Afghanistan	Cote d'Ivoire	CAR	CAR	CAR	Yemen
9	Liberia	Pakistan	Guinea	Pakistan	Guinea	Guinea	Iraq	Iraq
10	Haiti	Afghanistan	CAR	CAR	Pakistan	Pakistan	Cote d'Ivoire	CAR
11	Afghanistan	Guinea	Haiti	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire	Haiti	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire
12	Rwanda	Liberia	Pakistan	Myanmar	Haiti	Cote d'Ivoire	Pakistan	Guinea
13	N. Korea	CAR	N. Korea	Bangladesh	Myanmar	Kenya	Yemen	Pakistan
14	Colombia	N. Korea	Myanmar	Haiti	Kenya	Nigeria	Nigeria	Nigeria
15	Zimbabwe	Burundi	Uganda	North Korea	Nigeria	Yemen	Niger	Kenya
16	Guinea	Sierra Leone	Bangladesh	Uganda	Ethiopia	Myanmar	Kenya	Ethiopia
17	Bangladesh	Yemen	Nigeria	Ethiopia	North Korea	Ethiopia	Burundi	Burundi
18	Burundi	Myanmar	Ethiopia	Nigeria	Bangladesh	Timor-Leste	Myanmar	Niger
19	Dominican Rep.	Bangladesh	Burundi	Lebanon	Yemen	Niger	Ethiopia	Uganda
20	CAR	Nepal	Timor-Leste	Sri Lanka	Timor-Leste	North Korea	Guinea Bissau	Myanmar

***Source: The Fund for Peace: www.fundforpeace.org**

Beginning in the late 1990s with Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes, the UK government has sought to establish greater coordination between DfID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the purpose of resolving issues of conflict and insecurity. This has resulted in a number of different institutions being created to facilitate this coordination. The Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools were set up in 2002 as a way of pooling funding between the three agencies

to allow a flexibility of approach to resolving complex security problems. The nature of the collaboration allows DfID to spend money on areas not considered as Overseas Development Aid (ODA) under the OECD DAC definition (Independent Commission for Aid Impact 2012: 7). Similar bodies were established over the post-9/11 period including the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Stabilisation Units (SU) which were initiated in Afghanistan and Iraq as a means of coordinating development actions with military operations. In addition to this a specific Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) has been created to address conflict and poverty in fragile states and to ensure DfID's compliance with UK government national security policies (DfID 2012: 2). In addition to this a new funding stream was created in 2006 within DfID ODA specifically to deal with "Conflict Peace and Security". Furthermore, the head of DfID sits on the National Security Council (NSC) which was set up by the Coalition government in 2010. In this NSC, DfID is supposed to both advise other parts of government on national security issues and in turn take counsel from these parts of government on development issues. This demonstrates that DfID has undergone significant institutional change over the period in question with the aim of addressing conflict and insecurity. This is the context in which the following analyses take place.

Table 5.3: Top 20 recipients of UK ODA 1997-2012. Ethiopia and Kenya highlighted*

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	India	India	India	Uganda	Tanzania	Serbia	India	India	Nigeria	Nigeria	India	Iraq	India	India	Ethiopia	India
2	Guyana	Tanzania	Bangladesh	India	Mozambique	India	Tanzania	DRC	Iraq	India	Ethiopia	India	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	India	Afghanistan
3	Zambia	Uganda	Uganda	Tanzania	India	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Zambia	India	Afghanistan	Nigeria	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Afghanistan	Ethiopia
4	Uganda	Bangladesh	Ghana	Zambia	Bangladesh	Ghana	Iraq	Ghana	Tanzania	Tanzania	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Sudan	Nigeria	DRC	Nigeria
5	Mozambique	Montserrat	Tanzania	Bangladesh	Ghana	Tanzania	Ghana	Iraq	Afghanistan	Sudan	Bangladesh	Tanzania	Banglad esh	DRC	Bangladesh	Bangladesh
6	Bangladesh	Ghana	Malawi	Malawi	Uganda	Bangladesh	S. Africa	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Uganda	Tanzania	Ethiopia	DRC	Tanzania	Pakistan	Pakistan
7	Tanzania	Malawi	Zambia	Frmr. Yugo	Malawi	Peru	Pakistan	Afghanistan	Sudan	Pakistan	Sudan	Bangladesh	Pakistan	Afghanistan	Nigeria	Tanzania
8	Indonesia	China	S. Africa	China	Zambia	Uganda	Malawi	Tanzania	Zambia	Iraq	Pakistan	Sudan	Tanzania	Bangladesh	Mozambique	DRC
9	Frmr. Yugo	S. Africa	China	Mozambique	Kenya	Pakistan	Uganda	Ethiopia	Ghana	Serbia	Uganda	Mozambique	Nigeria	Uganda	Tanzania	Zimbabwe
10	Kenya	Kenya	Kenya	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Kenya	Afghanistan	Nigeria	Malawi	Malawi	China	DRC	Ghana	Ghana	Sudan	Malawi
11	China	Mozambique	Mozambique	Kenya	China	Sierra Leone	Kenya	Malawi	Vietnam	Cameroon	Ghana	China	Kenya	Malawi	Somalia	South Sudan
12	Montserrat	Pakistan	Dominican Rep.	Sierra Leone	Bolivia	Rwanda	Zambia	Sudan	Serbia	Ghana	Malawi	Ghana	Uganda	Sudan	Uganda	St. Helena
13	Pakistan	Indonesia	Bolivia	Rwanda	S. Africa	Malawi	Mozambique	Uganda	Kenya	Ethiopia	DRC	Malawi	China	Zimbabwe	Kenya	Kenya
14	S. Africa	Zimbabwe	Indonesia	S. Africa	Rwanda	Mozambique	Ethiopia	Pakistan	Rwanda	DRC	Mozambique	Vietnam	Malawi	Rwanda	Rwanda	Uganda
15	Ghana	Guyana	Montserrat	Guyana	Afghanistan	S. Africa	Zimbabwe	S. Africa	Mozambique	Bangladesh	Kenya	S. Africa	Zimbabwe	Kenya	Ghana	Somalia
16	Nepal	Zambia	Pakistan	Indonesia	Nepal	Montserrat	Sierra Leone	Egypt	DRC	Kenya	Vietnam	Indonesia	Nepal	Nepal	WB & Gaza	Mozambique
17	Malawi	Sudan	Belize	Montserrat	Nigeria	Ethiopia	Nepal	China	Ethiopia	Indonesia	Nepal	Rwanda	WB & Gaza	Mozambique	Nepal	Nepal
18	Zimbabwe	Frmr. Yugo	Frmr. Yugo	Serbia	Montserrat	Cameroon	China	Vietnam	S. Africa	Mozambique	Rwanda	Nepal	Vietnam	WB & Gaza	Malawi	Sierra Leone
19	Ethiopia	Nepal	Rwanda	Pakistan	Ethiopia	Nigeria	Rwanda	Mozambique	Pakistan	Rwanda	Zimbabwe	Sierra Leone	Rwanda	China	Zambia	Zambia
20	Philippines	Rwanda	Nepal	Guatemala	Pakistan	Nepal	Nigeria	Nepal	Nepal	Zambia	Sierra Leone	Kenya	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	South Sudan	Ghana

*** Source: OECD-DAC www.oecd.org/dac**

Selecting UK development, foreign policy and security documents

Table 5.4: Sample of UK documents

Agency	Year	Publication Title	Description
DfID	1997	Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century	This White Paper is a key policy statement of the development policy of the newly elected Labour government establishing the newly founded DfID's remit
DfID	1999	Poverty and the Security Sector	This Security Policy Paper provides an insight into DfID's early engagement with security and conflict issues
DfID	2000	Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor	This White Paper provides an insight into how DfID further developed its policy position soon after its first White Paper
DfID MoD FCO	2003	The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to Reducing Conflict	These two documents provide an example of joint policy between DfID, the MoD and the FCO on the establishment of the collaborative Conflict Pools
DfID MoD and FCO	2004	The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: An Information Document	
DfID	2005a	Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development	This Strategy Paper represents a key revision on DfID stance on issues of security and conflict post-9/11
DfID	2005b	Failed States Strategy	This Strategy Paper is a statement on DfID's approach to the security and development issue of failed and fragile states
DfID	2006	Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor	This White Paper is another major policy statement from DfID
UK	2008	The National Security Strategy of the United	This National Security

Cabinet Office		Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World	Strategy presents the UK's whole of government approach to security including development policy
DfID	2009	Eliminating World Poverty: Building Our Common Future	This White Paper is another key policy statement from DfID
UK Cabinet Office	2010	Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty	This document represents a key policy statement on the UK coordinated approach to security
DfID MoD and FCO	2011	Building Stability Overseas Strategy	This collaborative document is a central policy statement of the Coalition government elected in 2010
DfID	2011a	UK aid: Changing Lives, Delivering Results	These two documents establish the Conservative Party's position on development policy
DfID	2011b	Multilateral Aid Review Ensuring maximum value for money for UK aid through multilateral organisations	

Table 5.4 above shows the sample of documents chosen for this analysis. Due to the coordination between DfID and other government departments outlined above this sample includes policy documents not just from DfID, but also collaborative documents with the FCO and the MOD and also broader UK Government documents dealing with national security. In this way both DfID's policy and broader UK government policy on security and development are examined. This chapter contains an analysis of all DfID's White Papers from 1997 to present, (1997, 2000, 2006, 2009), key DfID strategy papers on issues of conflict, its bilateral and multilateral aid reviews from 2011 and all its security documents from 1999 and 2005. The four white papers straddle the 9/11 period and provide an indication of any change in policy approach that may have occurred during this time. The documents dealing specifically with the issue of security from 1999 and 2005 also provide insight into DfID's stance on security. The DfID paper on failed states from 2005 is important as it represents the UK's growing concern with the security and development challenges posed by failed states. The three DfID documents from 2011 are included because they are the first development policy statements of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government (hereafter the Coalition) elected in 2010. The collaborative documents from DfID, the FCO and the MoD from the years 2003 and 2004, covering the establishment of Global Conflict

Prevention Pools by the UK government, are also included in the sample. In addition to these two documents, the collaborative document from 2011, *Building Stability Overseas*, is also included. These three documents are important as they represent the articulation of the 'whole of government' approach and set out the UK's vision for conflict prevention. The UK government documents on national security from 2008 and 2010 are important for providing a broader picture of UK security policy and how it incorporates development issues. Below are the findings of a content analysis of these documents

Bringing security in: a content analysis of UK security and development policy

This content analysis applies a framework developed in Chapter 3 which focuses on key words associated with three main trends in development policy over the past 30 years; the Washington Consensus (liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, global market, private sector, basic needs) the Post-Washington Consensus (poverty, institutions, governance, inequality, human rights civil society) and the Security-Development Nexus (security, human security, conflict, terrorism, failed states, stability, radicalism). This allows a comparison between the three trends at two levels: both within documents and across time. In this way the content analysis investigates whether the UK's development policy has shifted over time. The findings of this content analysis reveal two key results: 1) an increase in the security frame within development policy in comparison to the Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus frames; and 2) significantly, a very weak development frame in collaborative documents between DfID and other government agencies. This may indicate that, in merging security and development policy, the UK has brought security issues into development policy to a far greater extent than it has brought development considerations into security policy. This is consistent with arguments in the literature about the "securitisation" of aid (Abrahamsen 2004, 2005; Duffield 2005, 2006, 2010a) and is counter to claims in the literature of a mutually reinforcing relationship between the two (Picciotto 2004; Stewart 2004). Table 5.5 shows the word count for each term expressed as a percentage of words counted for each document in order to allow comparison across documents with the percentage values to give a total for each frame in bold. Figure 5.2 is a bar chart visualising this. (For the total word count see Appendix 4, Table A4.2).

Figure 5.2 Bar chart of grouped % values in UK documents



Table 5.5: Total count of words as percentage for each UK document. DfID documents specified, other documents are UK government or MoD and FCO

	DfID 1997	DfID 1999	DfID 2000	2003 GCPP	2004 ACCP	DfID 2005a	DfID 2005b	DfID 2006	2008 NSS	DfID 2009	2010 NSS	DfID 2011a	DfID 2011b	2011 DfID MoD FCO
Liberalisation	2.65%	0.00%	2.34%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.54%	0.16%	0.31%	0.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Deregulation	1.18%	0.00%	4.30%	0.28%	0.35%	0.26%	1.07%	1.98%	0.16%	0.47%	0.18%	0.00%	0.92%	0.26%
Privatization	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.54%	0.00%	0.31%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Private Sector	6.49%	0.00%	5.47%	0.28%	0.00%	0.52%	0.53%	4.50%	1.30%	5.81%	2.03%	5.15%	7.93%	3.33%
Market	7.96%	0.00%	13.09%	0.28%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.95%	1.78%	11.62%	1.48%	5.15%	1.85%	0.51%
Basic Needs	0.88%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.18%	0.00%	0.16%	0.00%	3.09%	0.18%	0.77%
	19.17%	**0.00%**	**25.20%**	**0.85%**	**0.35%**	**0.78%**	**1.60%**	**13.69%**	**3.40%**	**18.68%**	**3.87%**	**13.40%**	**10.89%**	**4.87%**
Poverty	32.45%	5.45%	28.71%	1.42%	1.77%	12.66%	12.30%	21.80%	3.08%	17.27%	0.74%	45.36%	10.52%	0.51%
Institutions	9.73%	1.82%	14.26%	3.41%	2.83%	3.10%	9.09%	6.31%	6.00%	6.91%	2.03%	2.06%	11.81%	0.77%
Governance	2.06%	1.82%	0.59%	2.56%	1.06%	3.36%	7.49%	17.12%	4.05%	6.12%	1.48%	1.03%	7.01%	1.28%
Inequality	7.37%	0.00%	6.25%	0.28%	0.00%	3.10%	0.53%	2.88%	1.62%	3.14%	0.18%	0.00%	17.53%	0.26%
Human rights	7.08%	5.45%	4.30%	7.10%	0.00%	1.55%	0.53%	3.78%	0.65%	2.35%	0.55%	0.00%	1.29%	3.08%
Civil Society	1.77%	2.73%	4.10%	2.56%	2.12%	0.52%	2.67%	5.05%	0.81%	5.34%	0.18%	2.06%	11.62%	2.56%
	60.47%	**17.27%**	**58.20%**	**17.33%**	**7.77%**	**24.29%**	**32.62%**	**56.94%**	**16.21%**	**41.13%**	**5.17%**	**50.52%**	**59.78%**	**8.46%**
Security	4.42%	62.73%	3.71%	20.17%	19.79%	38.76%	2.14%	8.11%	38.74%	12.56%	60.15%	11.34%	2.95%	16.92%
Conflict	9.73%	16.36%	9.77%	52.84%	69.26%	25.32%	2.67%	14.95%	12.64%	16.17%	9.23%	17.53%	10.52%	40.51%
Terrorism	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.42%	0.35%	6.46%	2.14%	0.90%	16.69%	1.10%	14.58%	1.03%	0.00%	2.82%
Failed States	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.28%	0.00%	1.03%	47.59%	3.24%	2.27%	7.22%	0.18%	2.06%	15.13%	4.87%
Stability	6.19%	2.73%	2.93%	6.25%	2.47%	2.33%	11.23%	1.62%	7.13%	2.51%	6.09%	3.09%	0.55%	21.03%
Radicalism	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.57%	0.00%	0.26%	0.00%	0.54%	2.92%	0.63%	0.74%	1.03%	0.00%	0.51%
	20.35%	**81.82%**	**16.41%**	**81.53%**	**91.87%**	**74.16%**	**65.78%**	**29.37%**	**80.39%**	**40.19%**	**90.96%**	**36.08%**	**29.15%**	**86.67%**

Merging security and development

The first pattern that emerges is the increase in the use of terms associated with the security-development nexus. As can be seen in Table 3, the pre-9/11 White Papers have 20% and 16% in 1997 and 2000 respectively, post-9/11 this rises to 29% in 2006, 40% in 2009 and 37% in 2011. As Table 3 shows, despite this increase, terms associated with merging security and development are still used in lower numbers than post-Washington Consensus terms in DfID's documents on broader development policy. However, as can be seen in Table 3, in the two documents on security that DfID published in 1999 and 2005, terms associated with merging security and development are used with far greater frequency than those associated with the post-Washington Consensus. This is understandable for documents dealing specifically with the inclusion of security issues in development policy, with security being the main focus the counting of words is bound to be skewed towards terms associated with these issues. However, the pattern of words for the 2005 fragile states strategy paper is revealing. Again the count of 65% for security associated words is misleading as the term fragile states counts for 47% of words counted in that document as can be seen in Table 4. However, terms associated with security are still used in large frequency. This document, together with the 1999 and 2005 DfID security strategies is indicative of the wider pattern that also emerges in the collaborative documents where DfID does not give the same space to long-term development concerns when it merges security and development. This can be seen in broader UK development policy in the collaborative documents between DfID, FCO and MoD.

Also of significance is the emergence of new terms following 9/11. As Table 2 shows, the words 'failed state' and 'radicalisation' do not appear before 9/11. Similarly, 'terrorism' appears only once in the 2000 white paper and not at all in the 1997 white paper and the 1999 security document. These three terms are then used in increasing numbers after 9/11 across both DfID, collaborative and government documents, as can be seen in Table 2. The emergence of these three terms, even though they represent a small percentage, is significant in that they reflect security concerns of the WoT – Islamic extremism that emerges from failed states and leads to terrorist attacks. The use of these terms suggests a clear incorporation of hard security concerns in the UK's development policy. The context in which these terms are used is examined in greater detail in the discourse analysis section.

Marginalisation of development in collaborative documents

The three collaborative documents between DfID, FCO and MoD in this sample show a heavy focus on terms associated with security and a marginalisation of terms associated with development. As Table 3 shows, the 2003 document on the establishment of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP)[33] uses post-Washington Consensus terms in 17% of cases and security terms in 82% of cases. Similarly, the 2004 document on the establishment of the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP)[34] only uses post-Washington Consensus terms in 8% of cases and security terms in 92% of cases. This suggests that while DfID is involved in these collaborations, there is little room made for development policies that act as long-term solutions to conflict with these documents. For example, the 2004 ACPP document does not mention human rights or inequality, two issues that have been highlighted more broadly as key to resolving the underlying causes of conflict (see for example UN 2005: 5; OECD 2007). Similarly the 2011 document on creating stability overseas, issued by the coalition government, gives far greater weight to security issues, as can be seen in Table 3, with 9% for post-Washington Consensus terms and 88% for security terms. In addition, as Table 2 shows, the term 'terrorism' is mentioned on 5% of occasions which is in greater frequency than either 'poverty', 'institutions', 'governance', 'inequality', 'human rights' or 'civil society'. This shows that while DfID may maintain a strong commitment to long-term development policies; when it comes to broader UK foreign policy, development issues are given less attention than security issues.

When examining how security has influenced development policy, it is also useful to examine the reverse – how development thinking has influenced security policy. Looking at the 2008 *National Security Strategy* (*NSS*) post-Washington Consensus terms are used 16% of the time compared to 80% of the time for security terms. In the 2010 *NSS* this falls to 10% for post-Washington Consensus terms and increases to 90% for security terms. This suggests that development policies espoused by DfID have not had a big impact on other government agencies. This point is important as it is assumed by commentators (Picciotto 2004; Stewart 2004; Pugh et al 2013) that the collaboration between DfID and other agencies and the

[33] The Global Conflict Prevention Pool was a collaborative body set up to deal with conflict through close collaboration between DfID, the FCO and the MoD

[34] The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool was a collaborative body set up to deal specifically with conflict in Africa through close coordination between DfID, the FCO and the MoD. Both bodies have been consolidated into one institution called the Conflict Pool.

broader ‘whole of government approach’ that has been a feature of UK foreign policy over the past decade would result in greater attention for development issues. From this content analysis it can be seen that development issues are given less attention in broader foreign policy documents.

Bringing security into development policy discourse

As demonstrated above, two key patterns that emerge are: the increase in the use of terms associated with the merging of security and development - including terms associated with hard security in the WoT; and a marginalisation of the use of development terms in collaborative documents and no real impact of development terms in security documents. These findings suggest that, in collaboration with other government agencies and in the broadening of development to other foreign policy areas, long-term development policies are not given the same attention as traditional security concerns. This is important, because, contra to the claims of commentators that a broadening of development to include security issues would ‘developmentalise’ security, instead development appears to have become securitised (Picciotto 2004; Stewart 2004, Pugh et al. 2013). How and why has this come about? This is the focus of the next section which, through a discourse analysis of these same documents together with interview data, uncovers three distinct phases in the merging of security and development in DfID’s development policy.

Merging Security and Development: Three phases of DfID engagement with security

As demonstrated in the above section, the UK has used the language of security in development policy increasingly over the period of 1997-2012. In addition, it has introduced words associated with the WoT such as ‘terrorism’, ‘fragile states’ and ‘extremism’ into its policy discourse. A closer analysis of this merging of security and development reveals three phases of engagement with security in DfID’s development policy documents. The first phase can be described as ‘security as an exception’ and covers the pre-9/11 documents, from 1997-2000, where security is tentatively dealt with and a number of restrictions are placed on DfID’s involvement with it. The second phase, from 2003-2009, can be called ‘security as a core development problem.’ This emerges post-9/11 and involves a heavy engagement with security putting it at the heart of DfID policy. The third phase, from 2010-present, can be

called ‘national security as a development issue’ and emerges in the late 2000s and involves the introduction of UK national security as a development problem. Each successive phase contains elements of the previous one and while they are not discrete analytical categories, they are a way of tracing the evolution of security in DfID’s policy. Within this change, two different conceptions of security are drawn on: hard security concerns associated with the WoT and broader security concerns associated with human security. In bringing national security into development policy, DfID brings these two different conceptions of security together through a series of arguments around common interest between the Global South and the Global North. National security risks are expected to be managed through addressing development concerns. This section will examine these three phases of engagement in detail. Following this is an examination of the arguments around common interests that are constructed to link development spending to UK national security.

1) Security as an exception

When security is introduced into DfID’s policy discourse in the late 1990s there are clear limitations placed on its involvement in this area. It is made clear that the focus of security is people in the developing world and development involvement in security is only to meet that end “The poor must benefit (from DfID's involvement in security) and DFID will assess this before any activity can proceed.” (DfID 1999: 3). The limits for DfID’s involvement in security are set at the poorest being the focus of the policy and sufficient civilian oversight of the armed forces (DfID 1999: 2) due to a recognition that security forces in developing countries are often a source insecurity for the poorest and most vulnerable “The poor worldwide also tend to be very distrustful of existing police and criminal justice systems. Far from protecting people from violence, too often elements within the police and justice systems are themselves sources of violence and abuse” (DfID 2000: 23). In addition to this, DfID distances itself from getting involved in traditional hard security concerns for fear of development goals being subverted (DfID, 1999: 6). As highlighted previously in Table 3, there is only one reference to ‘terrorism’ prior to 9/11. It is identified as a problem for DfID because of how it affects people in the developing world (DfID, 2000: 7). In this phase, even when terrorism is mentioned, it is only in reference to the wellbeing of developing states, and the security of the UK is not a consideration.

In interview, Clare Short - DfID's Secretary of State for International Development from 1997-2003- revealed that DfID's expanded role in addressing foreign policy issues happened quickly and it became involved in conflict situations in the Balkans and Sierra Leone before it had formulated a clear policy[35]. This could be seen as the formative stage for merging security and development in UK policy. In 2000 the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool were established as a means of coordinating funding between DfID, the MoD and the FCO in order to resolve conflict through combined efforts. Coordinating funding in this way allowed DfID to get involved in activities deemed to be outside of official ODA limits, such as military and police reform programmes (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2012: 2). As a result, policy was formulated after these interactions and clear limits were placed upon it in order to maintain a clear focus on poverty reduction. In particular, the intervention in Sierra Leone was influential in shaping top level UK development policy through the influence of actors on the ground and trends first noted there "such as the privatisation and militarisation of emergency assistance" were later seen in Iraq and Afghanistan (Schümer, 2008: 9). For example, the supply by DfID of equipment to Sierra Leonean police as part of the reform process came out of consultations in-country (Horn et al., 2006: 115). From this perspective DfID's engagement with security arose out of involvement in specific events rather than from an existing policy position. As a result clear limits are placed on DfID's involvement in security to confine it to specific instances where poverty reduction is still prioritised.

Within this frame, even a hard security concern such as terrorism is presented as a problem for DfID because of how it impacts on ordinary people in the developing world, not because of how it impacts on the security of states in the developed world "…terrorism and the illicit drugs trade; the spread of health pandemics like HIV/AIDS; and environmental degradation- are caused or exacerbated by poverty and inequality" (DfID, 2000: 7). This understanding of security is consistent with the concept of human security where the focus is on the rights of individuals in developing countries, and where there is a recognition that the state can be a source of insecurity for its own citizens. In this phase security is at the periphery of development policy and is focused solely on people in the developing world. The developing world is not portrayed as a source of insecurity for or a threat to the developed world. Elements of this understanding persist within subsequent frames.

[35] Telephone interview with Clare Short, 23/1/2013

2) Security as a core development problem

While DfID makes continuous reference to the security of individuals approach of the earlier phase and to the restrictions placed on DfID's involvement in security, this second phase still sees security brought to the core of DfID policy discourse. There are repeated assertions that poverty reduction will not be subordinate to security concerns of counterterrorism (DfID, 2005: 5, 6, 13) and that the poorest people rather than states will remain the focus of DfID's policy (DfID, 2005: 5; 2009: 75). In this second phase of merging security and development, security is brought from the periphery into the core of UK development policy. In addition to this, the definition of security is widened to include issues of terrorism and religious extremism. Moreover, the referent object of security is now global rather than just individuals in developing countries and the developing world is represented as a source of insecurity for the developed world. The issue of UK National security as a development concern is strongly suggested but not explicitly stated.

In the documents published after 9/11 security is brought into the core of DfID's development policy discourse rather than something that is exceptional and contingent. This is most evident in the 2005 DfID security document:

> Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as they need clean water, schooling or affordable health. In recent years, DFID has begun to bring security into the heart of its thinking and practice. (DfID, 2005: 3)

Here security is placed at the same level as health, education and access to clean water. This shows a dramatic change from the restrictions placed on DfID's involvement in security prior to 9/11, detailed above. In this same document the definition of security includes threats such as terrorism and extremism. While the human security agenda sought to elevate development issues to the same level as security issues, instead DfID has adopted a broad definition of "security" which includes hard security problems, as a development problem on the same level as education and healthcare. Whereas advocates of human security distinguished security problems facing states from those facing individuals in order to prioritise the latter, here DfID brings these interests together. This position is reaffirmed with the assertion that "security is a precondition for development" (DfID, 2006: 45).

In addition to this adoption of security as a core development problem, the definition of security is expanded to include threats associated with the WoT such as terrorism and religious extremism (DfID, 2005: 12; 2006: 47; 2009: 5). For example "violent conflict and insecurity can spill over into neighbouring countries and provide cover for terrorists or organised criminal groups" (DfID, 2006: 45). In this way the argument is constructed that terrorism is caused by poverty, therefore fighting poverty will fight terrorism. In addition, the argument is made that terrorism impacts on developing countries directly, therefore fighting terrorism can help to fight poverty. At this stage, the issue of development as important for UK National Security is strongly suggested but not stated explicitly. This is evident in the way that fragile states are discussed. The argument is made that they are a development problem because they suffer from poverty, thereby providing the space for terrorism and extremism to develop and therefore they are a global security threat as well as a development problem (DfID, 2005: 5 2006: 7; 2009: 6). When fragile states are referred to, the examples given are Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia and they are referenced in terms of the danger they pose due to attacks on London, Mumbai and New York, rather than the security of citizens in these fragile states (DfID, 2006: 7, 47; 2009: 6). This is most evident in the following quote: "State failure and radicalisation such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan has brought terror to New York and London as well as Mumbai and Islamabad" (DfID, 2009: 16-17). Here fragile states in the developing world are represented as a threat to security in the West. This is revealing as fragile states that do not represent a terrorist threat, for example Haiti or Niger, are not given space in DfID's policy documents. As discussed above, coinciding with this shift in discourse, the frontline WoT states of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are consistently among DfID's top 10 recipients following 2001. In addition states identified as conflict affected and fragile such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan are also among DfID's top 10 recipients over this time.

3) National security as a development issue

In the third phase in the merging of security and development, UK National security is highlighted as a development concern for DfID. This issue is raised directly for the first time in the 2008 National Security Strategy "we are also looking at the ways in which our overseas aid policy contributes to the security of the citizens' countries and regions concerned, and

also to our own national security" (UK Cabinet Office, 2008: 52). This is the first direct reference to UK national security in this sample of documents. This is not brought into development policy until after the election of the Coalition government in 2010: "their (fragile states) instability has the potential to affect our own security" (DfID, 2011b: 59); and again "Aid is vitally important to tackling the root causes of those global problems – disease, drugs, terrorism, climate change – that threaten our own future" (DfID, 2011a: 2). In the previous phase, when the issue of global security as a development problem was raised it was also balanced out by assertions that development aid would not be overtaken by these concerns. There was a recognition that there may be a conflict of interest between the two agendas of UK national security and overseas development. However, in this third phase the issue of UK national security is adopted unproblematically. It is still the case that contradictions may arise when coordinating development and security agendas[36], so the absence of this in policy discourse is an omission, rather than an indication that the issue has been resolved and no longer worth discussing. It is asserted that the national security interests of the UK and the interests of people in developing countries are the same and are mutually reinforcing "Helping the world's poorest people is not only the right thing to do, it also makes sense for us here in Britain. Development makes a real difference to problems which might otherwise arrive on our streets, such as drugs, extremism and disease." (DfID, 2011a: 36). The centrality of National security in DfID policy is justified through a series of claims of common interest.

The claim of common interest between development and security in the global South and UK national security is strongly adopted and everything within this is assumed to reinforce this common objective. As a result there is now no attempt to offer reassurances that development goals will not be side-lined. This is most evident in the consolidated focus on fragile states. A commitment has now been made to spend 30% of UK overseas aid on fragile states (DfID, FCO & MoD, 2011: 2). The logic presented is that a vast number of poor people live in these states, and so spending in these countries conforms to the poverty focus set out in the 2002 Development Act[37] "sustainable development includes any development that is…prudent having regard to the likelihood of its generating lasting benefits for the population of the country or countries in relation to which it is provided" (UK Government 2002: 2). In

[36] Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012; Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013

[37] The 2002 International Development Act reformed UK aid policy to make sustainable development the explicit goal of aid and to remove the practice of using aid to further UK commercial interests.

addition to this, these states are described as "ungoverned spaces" from which terrorism, religious extremism, migration and trade in illicit narcotics flow and so resolving these issues contributes to UK national security (DfID, FCO, MoD, 2011: 8; DfID, 2011a: 36). Fragile states are the sites where development and national security interests of poverty, poor governance, terrorism, criminality and extremism all overlap.

Chandler (2012: 220) has argued that during this period there has been a shift in security policy from imposing solutions from the outside to providing support for agency within recipient countries to overcome security problems. Pugh et al. (2013) take this further and argue, through research focused mostly on interventions rather than mainstream development policy, that the coalition government has overseen a shift to the 'developmentalisation of security.' The assertion is that human security is now in the mainstream, and the evidence offered to support this is that NGOs have expressed approval for this rather than objecting to it as may be expected if it was subverting development (Pugh et al., 2013: 199). Whilst this argument may hold for the intervention in Libya, the above content and discourse analyses show at the level of policy discourse UK security documents have consistently low engagement with core development ideas such as poverty. This is consistent over this period of time and has not changed in the most recent security documents published under the Coalition government, as Table 5 shows.

This merging interests approach is also clearly evident in interviews conducted with DfID officials. The clearest example is in an interview with Andrew Mitchell, Secretary of State for International Development from 2010-2012:

> Security is not only achieved by armies and navies. It's also achieved by training the police in Afghanistan and building up governance structures in the Arab Spring countries and getting girls to school in the Horn of Africa. These are things which are paid for by development spending but they contribute very much to our security in the end. If you follow that logic you can understand that development and defence and diplomacy all go together [38]

UK security is framed in terms of governance and education and the argument is made that development spending on these issues will benefit all sides, both within the UK Government and in the developing world.

[38] Telephone interview Andrew Mitchell, 29/1/2013

This claim to merging interests between development in the South and security in the North heavily draws on a language of human security and frames security as being important because of how it impacts on individuals in the developing world. Interviews with DfID officials make repeated references to education as a security agenda[39]. The implication is that the UK now sees security in terms of broader problems relating to the welfare of individuals in developing countries rather than in a zero sum way of conventional state-centric security. This is reinforced by repeated references to the individuals in developing countries as the referent objects of security by interviewees, for example: "security, health, food crises, you know water hygiene, nutrition the well-being of people, these are all part of our policy"[40] This focus on the welfare of the individual notwithstanding, the state remains a principle referent object of security. The focus on fragile states is with the intention of rebuilding the state. In addition to this, the aim is to ensure regional stability. For example, the importance of supporting Ethiopia and Kenya in order to contain the fallout from Somalia is emphasised by DfID officials[41]. In this third phase of merging security and development, the connection between the development needs of poor countries and the security of the UK is treated as unproblematic and based on common sense. This is the subject of the next section.

Security in DfID policy in Ethiopia and Kenya

This section examines the third phase in the merging of security and development in the context of DfID development programmes in two East African countries, Ethiopia and Kenya, as outlined in Chapter 3. Through this, a clearer picture of how these broader policies impact in specific contexts emerges. In effect this examines how far 'downstream' top level policy on security and development travels in the highly decentralised structure of DfID. This section draws on DfID policy documents on Ethiopia and Kenya from 2011 and interviews conducted with officials from DfID programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya in June of 2013. Two key issues emerge: the broader foreign policy importance of each country for UK national security and the way in which DfID's programmes are expected to address these national

[39] Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 1, 6/11/2012; Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012

[40] Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 1, 6/11/2012 also Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012; Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 3, 23/4/2013.

[41] Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 1, 6/11/2012; Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012; Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 3, 23/4/2013.

security risks. Drawing on this broader conception of security, DfID makes connections between the national security of the UK and security and development for the poorest and most vulnerable in Ethiopia and Kenya. However, the national security of the UK is of primary importance in this relationship. Development aid framed as important because of how it can offset risks to UK national security. While the security of individuals is highlighted as important in policy discourse and by interviewees, the means of providing greater security for ordinary citizens is primarily through building up stronger government institutions in these countries. This section firstly examines these issues in relation to Ethiopia and secondly, in relation to Kenya.

The UK and Ethiopia

DfID policy on Ethiopia highlights the strategic significance of Ethiopia for the UK in maintaining regional stability: "Ethiopia matters to the UK for a range of development, foreign policy and security reasons. It is populous, poor, vulnerable but comparatively stable in the Horn of Africa" (DfID 2011d: 2). DfID identifies poverty and instability in the Horn of Africa as a national security risk for the UK because it leads to migration of people to Europe and also it creates an environment where violent extremism can prosper (DfID 2011d: 2). DfID's development programmes in Ethiopia are framed as a means of addressing these security risks by targeting poverty in Ethiopia. This position is reiterated by several DfID interviewees who point out that the issue of UK national security as a priority for development aid gained prominence in DfID policy following the Conservative Party's accession to the ministerial portfolio of international development in 2010[42]. This is best summed up as follows: "The Tories view these things much more through a sort of domestic security lens. You know if you get security abroad sorted out you will get security at home sorted out"[43]. This idea although strongly implied by the previous Labour government, was not stated explicitly in policy. The connection between UK national security and development has allowed a stronger claim to be made for development in Ethiopia within the rest of government:

[42] Phone interview with Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012; Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013; Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013; Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 2, 25/6/2013,.
[43] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013.

> The sort of security and justice programming within development plays a bigger part in the bigger sort of national security picture. Which actually makes it easier for us to get that message back up through government because of the higher priority than it was with the last government who were- who didn't have that kind of narrative going on.[44]

Table 5.6: DfID Programme spending in Ethiopia. Amount in £'000

Programme	**Ethiopia**		
	2010/11	*2011/12*	*2012/13*
Wealth Creation	26742	21749	7467
Climate Change	3516	4320	8276
Governance and Security	22361	193897	12877
Education	75882	64630	70489
Reproductive/Maternal/ New Born Health	10303	28053	26296
Malaria	2341	8761	10200
HIV/Aids	5048	722	1146
Other Health	19159	40507	51254
Water and Sanitation	5460	20193	5646
Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability	42601	53449	34736
Humanitarian	6130	57010	32043
Global Partnerships	1518	1073	2327

Source: DfID (2013) *Operational Plan DfID Ethiopia 2011-2015,* London: DfID.

As Table 5.6, above, shows "Governance and Security" is a strategic priority of DfID's Ethiopia programme. Looking at the total spend over this period, while spending in this sector falls behind that of 'Education' or 'Healthcare' it nevertheless outstrips areas such as 'Climate change' or 'Water and Sanitation'. Whilst the amount of money spent on a programme does not necessarily reflect its importance, this nonetheless shows that 'Governance and Security' programmes are a significant part of DfID policy in Ethiopia. In sum, DfID's involvement in issues of security in Ethiopia is justified in terms of ensuring stability in a region where neighbouring countries are fragile states, which in turn will ensure greater national security for the UK. This section looks at how security problems in Ethiopia are framed by DfID and the policy it prescribes to address those problems.

[44] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013

Securing citizens in Ethiopia

This section examines the central issue of how security is defined. DfID frames its involvement in security in Ethiopia as focused at the level of the individual:

> …what is it that gets families to send their girls to school? what is it that gets people out of the house to go start of a business? or go and collect water? or attend vocational education training facility? you know or what stops them rather?[45]

Here the definition of security is one which focuses on the concerns of ordinary citizens rather than on the national security of states. DfID's understanding of security is represented at this level. However, this focus on 'human security' is also presented as being contingent on strong Government of Ethiopia (GoE) resistance to DfID's involvement in more conventional security issues, as discussed in Chapter 3.

> Interviewer: so is it that DFID's approach towards security issues is guided by the concept of human security?
> Respondent: I wouldn't say that it's necessarily guided by it. I would say we've had to sort of really find our way in terms of what the government (of Ethiopia) will accept and won't accept[46]

Here, there is a distinction made between human security and conventional security and it is suggested that human security is adhered to in the Ethiopian context because the GoE maintains a monopoly on conventional security issues:

> Now Sudan and Somalia might want some help with border issues and so on but Ethiopians think they have a handle on that and they probably have and they don't want us messing around in it. So when we're talking about security here we're talking very much about human security[47]

This quote suggests that in other countries, such as Sudan and Somalia, security would be defined not only as the well-being of individuals, but also more conventional security such as border security. This would seem to suggest that in addition to UK national security, DfID subscribes to two other meanings of security: 'human security' - focusing on the individual, and conventional security - focusing on the state. The next section explores this issue further

[45] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013
[46] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013
[47] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013

by looking at the policies that DfID proposes as solutions to problems of individual's insecurity.

Resolving insecurity in Ethiopia

The issue of security is sensitive to the extent that the "security and justice" programme is referred to euphemistically as "safety and justice":

> we call it "safety and justice" which I think is actually a more honest way to call it than 'security and justice' because we're not doing so much of that. But you know part of the reason for calling it 'safety and justice' is just you cannot have a conversation here about security without meeting a very sort of sensitive take on things[48].

The aims of DfID's programmes are to address the lack of development in marginalised states within Ethiopia that have not benefited from recent economic growth. In many cases, there are long-running armed insurgencies against the government in these states and as a result conflict resolution is a key part of these programmes[49]. The aim is to provide access to justice systems for these communities. There is a strong gender focus to these policies with the stated goal of providing 3.5 million women and girls with "improved access to security and justice" by 2015 (DfID 2011d: 14). This approach connects security to economics to development and to UK national security. The aim is to provide a stable environment where children can go to school, adults can participate in the economy and this will lead to greater economic development for the rest of Ethiopia and this in turn will lead to greater security for Ethiopia and for the UK[50]. In this way DfID's understanding of security in Ethiopia brings together a number of different issues all connecting back to UK national security.

DfID's solution to these security problems is to help the GoE improve its relationship with these marginalised regions by changing its policy towards them. An example of this is in the Somali region of Ethiopia :

> You know they can't build schools because the ONLF will blow them up! There is a sort of catch 22 element which is part of it, so you're trying to work with the government of Ethiopia to make its

[48] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013
[49] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013
[50] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013

> development more sustainable but also build an element of risk management into our program because we can't continue with a basic services program where they only deliver to certain people that's just not sustainable[51].

This suggests that DfID's solution to these problems is to help the GoE to have a greater sensitivity to the human rights and social needs of these marginalised regions. The policy of the GoE has been to bring development to these regions by building infrastructure. This has failed because these projects have been treated with distrust and are often a target for attack by insurgent groups[52]. Strengthening of GoE institutions is also evident in the way that DfID Ethiopia funds an MA programme in Security Sector Management at Cranfield University in Addis Ababa. The aim of this programme is to educate members of the Ethiopian government on more human rights based approaches to security: "…the Ministry of Defence, the chief of staff of the army, the national security adviser have all been on this course and now they are starting to make some changes to their policies and the way they look at things"[53]. For DfID, the security concerns of marginalised individuals are addressed at the macro level through support for the GoE institutions.

Developing Ethiopia to secure the UK

DfID demonstrates depth to its analysis of security problems by identifying the micro level of constraints and dangers that ordinary individuals face on a daily basis. However, these problems are highlighted as important because they represent risks to UK national security. The solution offered to these problems is at the macro level of the state and DfID frames security both at the level of the individual and at the conventional state institutional level. However, this is consistent with the UK's approach in UK policy discourse of merging multiple security and development interests together. This narrative connects poverty to insecurity to state fragility to UK national security and subsumes these disparate elements into one single goal that will benefit everyone –security and development for all. In the context of Ethiopia the daily struggles of individuals are understood from the perspective of stability and development in the Ethiopian state, which then helps mitigate against possible risks to UK national security:

[51] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013
[52] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013
[53] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 2, 25/6/2013

> The Tories view these things much more through a sort of domestic security lens. You know if you get security abroad sorted out you will get security at home sorted out. And again Labour used to come out with that stuff as well but they didn't consolidate it quite as much as the Tories have done[54]

In this way security for individuals, more conventional security and national security are all connected to each other and addressed through policy.

UK Development policy in Kenya

UK national security risks are clearly prioritised in DfID's policy towards Kenya on the basis that it is a "regional anchor for peace and stability in a volatile part of Africa" (DfID 2011e: 2). The issue of regional stability is also highlighted in interviews with DfID officials in Kenya where the role that Kenya plays in efforts to bring stability to Somalia is also identified as important [55]. Another key factor prior to 2012 was the fear of a terrorist attack at the 2012 London Olympics emerging from Somalia[56]. Kenya's role in ensuring regional stability is seen as key to efforts to both contain and develop Somalia and this adds to the complexity of the UK's involvement with Kenya. The issue of security is also key because there are concerns expressed over the fragility of the Kenyan state and the possibility of a return to the type of violence witnessed after the 2008 elections (DfID 2011e: 2). Development is offered as a means of managing these security risks. This section looks at UK development policies that have sought to address problems of conflict and instability, and how security is understood within these policies.

[54] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013
[55] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013; Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 2, 25/6/2013
[56] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013

Security for individuals in development policy in Kenya

Prior to the post-election violence in 2008, security in UK policy towards Kenya was centred on the containment of instability in Somalia. Following this period of upheaval and instability there was a greater focus on the internal security of the Kenyan state:

> I came to Kenya in 2008 which was straight after the post-election violence…. there was a time when most of the donors were beginning to say 'we've paid too little attention to security issues inside Kenya'…Up to then I would say the strategy had been about containing- keeping Somalia inside Somalia[57]

There is a shift again after the 2013 elections passed off peacefully, and a greater focus on security for the poorest has emerged. DfID policy now looks at the issue of "what does security actually mean for people in Kenya?"[58] There is a focus on addressing security concerns of the poorest and most vulnerable in society including a focus on violence against women.[59] DfID looks at how security impacts on the daily lives of individuals at a micro level:

> … it's personal security, it's violence against women which is kind of increasingly coming on the agenda but the overall thrust being, people here won't participate in the economic growth of the country if they are scared to go out and trade during the day, during the night[60].

It therefore appears that fears over a repetition of the violence and state fragility seen in 2008 meant that DfID's immediate security concerns overshadowed a security approach that focused on the individual. Whilst top level DfID policy insists that its approach to security is always to benefit the poorest, in the context of Kenya, security has been defined as containing Somalia prior to 2008, preventing state collapse prior to the 2013 elections and finally the security of the poorest following the relative success of the March 2013 elections. This demonstrates a fluidity to how DfID defines 'security' in the context of Kenya. There is an

[57] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013
[58] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013
[59] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013
[60] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013

insistence that DfID does not get involved in hard security, however, this does not mean that its focus is necessarily on human security. The next section looks at how DfID seeks to address these security risks in Kenya.

Addressing Kenyan insecurity through development

As Table 5.7, below, indicates, 'Governance and Security' programmes are now one of the key pillars of DfID policy in Kenya. Whilst spending in this area does not outstrip that of 'Wealth Creation' or 'Poverty and Hunger', it nonetheless receives far more than 'Climate Change' and more than 'HIV/Aids'. This suggests that whilst 'Governance and Security' does not get the most funding it has become prominent in DfID policy in Kenya.

Table 5.7: DfID programmes and projected spending in Kenya. Amount in £'000*

Programme	**Kenya**		
	2010/11	*2011/12*	*2012/13*
Wealth Creation	4730	5940	12910
Climate Change	240	4050	3410
Governance and Security	6240	9230	10560
Education	6270	4360	3440
Reproductive/Maternal /New Born Health	3860	3030	6270
Malaria	6300	11540	13630
HIV/Aids	11050	10500	0
Other Health	5730	4600	4800
Water and Sanitation	0	0	0
Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability	17800	18050	21820
Humanitarian	7070	23000	15160
Global Partnerships	0	0	0

***Source: DfID (2013) *Operational Plan DfID Ethiopia 2011-2015*, London: DfID.**

Policies on resolving insecurity sit within the goal of 'Governance and Security'. Regardless of whether security is identified as important for the individual or the Kenyan state, DfID's policy response is primarily reform of security and justice institutions, primarily the police force. After the 2008 post-election violence, the aim was initially to work on the area of

police reform on issues of crowd control, and communications between command structures in the form of ranking officers and police on the street – two areas that were deemed to have exacerbated the 2008 violence[61]. The principle aim was to prepare for the March 2013 elections and ensure that the police were able to maintain order adequately and not instigate or contribute to violence[62]. These policies were at the level of institutional reform and aimed at instilling greater respect for human rights and the public's right to protest in the police force, while also maintaining public order and preventing instability.

> Actually a large part of it (insecurity) is the police and the response to (of) the police to rising incidents therefore you've got to tackle police reform even though it's a very tough job with large numbers of risks associated with that[63]

The best way of addressing these insecurities is presented by DfID as reforming the institution that has been partly responsible for many of the insecurities faced by ordinary people in Kenya.

However, this policy on police reform focuses on marginalised areas of Kenya, namely North-Eastern Kenya and involves efforts "...to help very poor people become secure in their livelihoods and the services that are provided to them and how they access them and getting forms of justice and so on"[64]. Following the 2013 elections this police reform focuses more at a local level "…the focus is moving away from institutional security, state security if I could put like that, towards traditional sort of conflict management conflict programming looking at the bits of police reform that actually might have an impact on people living in Korogocho slum"[65]. One of the difficulties of DfID getting involved in police reform is that judging how far to engage with the police is problematic. In this case DfID has limited its involvement to training and not the supply of equipment or capacity building. In this way, following 2008, DfID subscribes to the idea of security for the individual, but in a more

[61] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013
[62] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013
[63] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013
[64] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 2, 25/6/2013
[65] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013

conventional way than described in Ethiopia. Furthermore, security for individuals in Kenya is framed as important because of how it relates to UK national security. It is assumed that addressing insecurity for both the state of Kenya and the individual will result in greater national security for the UK. The best way of addressing these insecurities is presented as reforming the institution that has been partly responsible for many of the insecurities faced by ordinary people in Kenya.

Managing risks to UK national security through development in Kenya

The security interests of Kenya are connected to the national security of the UK in DfID policy. This is an indirect connection primarily based on Kenya's role in providing regional stability and containing threats emanating from Somalia such as terrorism, piracy and migration[66]. Connections are made between the desire of Somalis living in the UK to return home, the development that needs to occur in Somalia in order for that to happen, and the role of Kenya in ensuring the security and stability that will allow it to happen[67]. DfID's role within Kenya is to manage possible risks to UK national security by addressing problems of insecurity for the state of Kenya and for the poorest individuals living within the state. In this way, DfID development activities will lead to greater security in Kenya and greater security for the UK. Central to this argument is the need to address security beyond the state and at the level of the poorest and most marginalised in society. However, the means of doing this for DfID is still through state institutions. Similar to the case of Ethiopia, interviewees confirm that the direct connection between development spending and national security that the Conservatives make has opened up space for DfID to get involved in areas of security. The security interests of the Kenyan government and the UK are also presented as being the same. The next section looks at how development policy in both Ethiopia and Kenya ties in with broader DfID policy.

[66] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013, Appendix: ; Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 2, 25/6/2013, Appendix:
[67] Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 2, 25/6/2013, Appendix:

Development for UK national security in an East African context

As outlined above, DfID has justified involvement in security issues through claims of common interest between development for people in the global South and security for the UK. In the context of both Ethiopia and Kenya, DfID's programmes are expected to address possible risks to UK national security by addressing the security concerns of individual citizens. Interviewees in both countries assert that the Conservative Party's overt connection between development and national security has opened up space for them to get involved in security issues. In all interviews this is viewed as enabling rather than constraining. Rather than a security agenda being imposed upon DfID, instead DfID interviewees express the opinion that resolving conflict is essential for development and therefore getting involved in issues of security and conflict will allow DfID to make more of a positive impact. The previous unwillingness to get involved in conflict and security matters is portrayed as limiting DfID's effectiveness.

DfID asserts that the focus is on the well-being of the poorest and most vulnerable in society, rather than state security. Whilst at an analytical level DfID do identify key human security concerns that impact on individuals the policies they prescribe as solutions are aimed largely at the institutional level. In both cases the means of pursuing this are through the existing state institutions. Ethiopia differs in that the type of police reform implemented in Kenya is not possible there due to the strong control of the GoE over security issues. This highlights the difficulties of working with the state to ensure human security. The approach is effectively to reform the very institutions that have been responsible for human insecurity in those states. This is a result of the expanded role of DfID under the Conservative Party's stewardship and the greater desire to tackle issues of insecurity. The complexity of this comes across consistently in interviews. On the one hand it is acknowledged that security services in developing countries can be corrupt and predatory in their behaviour towards citizens. As such engaging in development activities with them is controversial. On the other hand the logic is that long-term reform is necessary and that engaging with these institutions is the only means of ensuring greater human security for individuals. In contrast to the US however, DfID does engage with government institutions at a local level rather than just a central government level. In addition to this, these programmes are given consistent funding through

5 year programme cycles and programme managers in-country are given a significant level of autonomy to decide how programmes operate and how budgets are spent.

In the context of Ethiopia and Kenya, regional stability is a key issue. Both are recognised as essential for ensuring regional stability in East Africa, containing insecurity in Somalia and ensuring greater security for the UK. The UK seeks to address these security risks through its development policy. Whilst in both countries the welfare of individuals is considered part of security, the solution to this problem of insecurity is to support state institutions. The fear over Kenya becoming a failed state is more greatly pronounced than in Ethiopia. From this perspective the stability ensured by the authoritarian regime is effective for regional stability, DfID offsets the potential problems for ordinary citizens that this creates through training and support for the GoE. In the context of Kenya whether the security is defined as the well-being of the poorest, or the stability of the state, the solution is still assistance to security institutions.

Conclusion

This chapter argues that the merging of security and development in UK policy places greater emphasis on the role of development aid in managing risks to UK national security. DfID has brought UK national security into the core of its policy through a gradual process over this period by linking poverty and instability in the developing world to threats to UK national security such as terrorism and religious extremism. DfID has justified this shift through claims of common interest between development for people in the global South and security for the UK wherein development is offered as a solution to national security risks. This is demonstrated in two ways: the increasingly high word count for terms associated with security in policy documents and the three different phases of engagement with security which are revealed by the discourse analysis and interviews. This involves a shift from an initially cautious and restricted approach to one which places UK national security as a development priority. In the case of both Ethiopia and Kenya, UK national security goals are identified as key functions of DfID's programmes. Whilst issues of how security impacts on the most vulnerable in society are highlighted by DfID, the solutions for these problems are through conventional state security institutions. This is an example of the merging of interests in policy where UK national security, the security of the developing state and the security of the individual are all considered to be joined up.

This shift, within UK policy, to claiming that it now sees its own national security in terms of the security and development of individuals in the developing world, now means that DfID is expected to contribute to national security. But rather than being overrun by security concerns, the opinion within DfID is that the merging of security and development in UK policy has given DfID renewed purpose in contributing to national security. This has resulted in greater funding for DfID, during a time when other departments have endured successive budget cuts. In addition, it has allowed an extended mandate to get more deeply involved in areas related to conflict resolution that was previously not possible. As a result there is a clear interest for DfID to sustain this closer connection between security and development making its enthusiasm for this policy change understandable. Where policy has changed over this period is that more space has opened up for DfID to get involved in issues of conflict and security during this third phase. Interviewees have asserted that framing national security as a function of development aid has opened up more space for DfID to address security issues that affect ordinary citizens and has made a stronger case for development within UK government. However, this is all based on the assumption that UK national security and the security and development of the poorest individuals are one and the same. The UK does not reflect on how its other national security goals of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism could possibly exacerbate the development and security problems that it seeks to address. Whereas DfID expressed concerns over these issues prior to 9/11 it has now embraced the idea of a connection between development and national security. Of the three cases, DfID offers the clearest articulation of how its policies address conflict at a local level to help both individuals in poor countries and UK national security. In contrast to the US, its development programmes also seek to manage security risks by addressing the security concerns of ordinary citizens in developing countries and not just the developing state. This also differs from the case of Canada which is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 6: Development in Denial: Conflict and National Security in Canada's Development Policy

Whilst Canada's reputation on the international stage is that of a middle-power state that uses its influence to support collaborative efforts towards peace and stability, the agency responsible for its overseas aid, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has been criticised for being weak and ineffectual (Brown and Jackson 2008). A Senate report in 2007 recommended that CIDA in its current form should be abolished due to its failure to make a positive impact on the development of post-independence Africa over the past 50 years (The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2007). Criticisms of CIDA centre on its lack of geographical and thematic focus and the weak position of its Minister for International Cooperation within the government (Brown and Jackson 2008; Brown 2008; Black 2009). Critics claim that Canada's overseas development aid (ODA) is focused on too many countries, giving too little an amount to each to make any real impact and that it lacked an overall goal for its foreign aid (Gulrajani 2010). Over the past 10 years or so there have been successive attempts to reform and restructure Canada's aid policy. The latest attempt to restructure Canada's ODA has been the abolition of CIDA as a separate government agency in August 2013. A new department has been created bringing foreign affairs, trade and development under one umbrella – the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). Whilst this is outside of the timespan of this dissertation, it provides a context for the decline in CIDA's influence over this period which has resulted in the loss of its status as a separate agency within government.

This chapter argues that, while the Canadian government has merged security and development in its defence and foreign policy discourse, its development agency CIDA has not brought security into development policy in any significant way. Unlike the cases of the US and the UK where there is an increase in references to merging security and development after 9/11, the pattern of CIDA is the reverse, with a decline after 9/11. Whilst CIDA does refer to the importance of security and development prior to 9/11 at a time when Canada was not involved in active conflict, following 9/11 and Canada's military involvement in Afghanistan, CIDA does not engage with issues of conflict and security in its policy

discourse yet. Despite the lack of discursive engagement by CIDA, it is involved on the ground in conflict and security in the context of Afghanistan. Canada's involvement in Afghanistan is largely due to its close economic and foreign policy ties to the US rather than a distinct foreign policy agenda of its own. As the key decisions on development policy are made at the level of the Prime Minister, the emphasis on merging security and development can be seen as the priority of the Canadian government. At the government level there are assertions that development is important for addressing risks to global security, but there is no articulation by CIDA of how its development programmes can in practice address security risks. While strategic shifts are evident in CIDA's disbursement of ODA, there is no discussion in policy discourse of how development and security are connected. Canada's merging of security and development is more subtle than the other two case studies and this sheds light on the variance across countries of this relationship and challenges the idea of a singular 'security-development nexus'. The chapter is structured as follows: firstly is a brief discussion of Canada's ODA flows, secondly is an outline of the documents chosen for this sample, thirdly is a content analysis followed by a discourse analysis of these documents, following this is an examination of Canada's development policy in Ethiopia and Kenya, and lastly is a conclusion.

Canada's overseas development aid 1997-2012

There are three noticeable patterns in Canada's ODA over the period 1997-2012: the increase in the volume of aid, but not in terms of % of GNP; the increasing engagement in fragile and failed states; and an increasing geographical focus on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Table 6.1, below, shows the total amount of Canada's ODA disbursements from 1997-2013 and its aid as percentage of GNI. Canada's ODA has increased significantly in the post-9/11 period from a low of US$1.5 billion in 2001 to a high of US$5.7 billion in 2012 as can be seen in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Canada's ODA from 1997-2013*

	1997	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	*2011*	*2012*	*2013*
ODA Total	204 4.61	170 6.64	170 6.29	174 3.6	153 2.75	200 4.16	203 0.6	259 9.13	375 6.34	368 3.16	407 9.69	479 4.71	400 0.07	521 4.12	545 8.56	565 0.26	491 1.14
ODA % GNI	0.34	0.3	0.28	0.25	0.22	0.28	0.24	0.27	0.34	0.29	0.29	0.33	0.3	0.34	0.32	0.32	0.27

*** Source OECD DAC www.oecd.org/dac**

As Table 6.1 shows, overall this represents an increase of less than .1% of Gross National Product (GNP), from .25% in 2000 to .32% in 2012. Within this, aid has increased to fragile and conflict affected states. Table 2 shows the top 20 countries on the *Failed States Index* from the commencement of the index in 2005 to 2012, the countries highlighted in red are also in Canada's top 20 recipients of ODA for the same period. As Table 6.2 shows Canada engages with these states in its ODA increasingly over this period. In 2005 and 2006 six of the top 20 were also in Canada's top 20 recipients of ODA. Whereas, from 2007-2012 this varies between eight and ten. Table 3 shows the top 20 recipients of Canada's ODA from 1997-2012.

Table 6.2: Top 20 *Failed States Index* 2005-2012 including top 20 recipients of Canadian ODA*

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Cote d'Ivoire	Sudan	Sudan	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia
2	DRC	DRC	Iraq	Sudan	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	DRC
3	Sudan	Cote d'Ivoire	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
4	Iraq	Iraq	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	Zimbabwe	DRC	Chad
5	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Chad	Iraq	DRC	DRC	Haiti	Zimbabwe
6	Sierra Leone	Chad	Cote d'Ivoire	DRC	Iraq	Afghanistan	Zimbabwe	Afghanistan
7	Chad	Somalia	DRC	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Afghanistan	Haiti
8	Yemen	Haiti	Afghanistan	Cote d'Ivoire	CAR	CAR	CAR	Yemen
9	Liberia	Pakistan	Guinea	Pakistan	Guinea	Guinea	Iraq	Iraq
10	Haiti	Afghanistan	CAR	CAR	Pakistan	Pakistan	Cote d'Ivoire	CAR
11	Afghanistan	Guinea	Haiti	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire	Haiti	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire
12	Rwanda	Liberia	Pakistan	Myanmar	Haiti	Cote d'Ivoire	Pakistan	Guinea
13	N. Korea	CAR	North Korea	Bangladesh	Myanmar	Kenya	Yemen	Pakistan
14	Colombia	North Korea	Myanmar	Haiti	Kenya	Nigeria	Nigeria	Nigeria
15	Zimbabwe	Burundi	Uganda	North Korea	Nigeria	Yemen	Niger	Kenya
16	Guinea	Sierra Leone	Bangladesh	Uganda	Ethiopia	Myanmar	Kenya	Ethiopia
17	Bangladesh	Yemen	Nigeria	Ethiopia	North Korea	Ethiopia	Burundi	Burundi
18	Burundi	Myanmar	Ethiopia	Nigeria	Bangladesh	Timor-Leste	Myanmar	Niger
19	Dominican Rep.	Bangladesh	Burundi	Lebanon	Yemen	Niger	Ethiopia	Uganda
20	CAR	Nepal	Timor-Leste	Sri Lanka	Timor-Leste	North Korea	Guinea Bissau	Myanmar

*** Source: The Fund for Peace Failed States Index: www.fundforpeace.org**

As Table 6.3, below shows, from 1997-2000 Bangladesh and China most often made up the top 2 recipients of Canada's ODA. However, following 9/11 there is a shift to funding frontline states in the WoT of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This shift is not as pronounced as in the other donor case studies of the US and the UK. Whilst Afghanistan is in the top 10 recipients of Canada's ODA from 2001 onwards, and the number one recipient from 2007-2009, this is to be expected as Canada was involved in the intervention and has had a sustained military presence there over this period of time. Iraq receives an increase in ODA following the intervention there in 2003, but following 2008 it does not feature in the top 20 recipients of Canada's ODA, as Table 6.3 shows. This is to be expected, as although the Canadian military were not involved in Iraq, Canada remained keen to support their US allies (Paquin 2009: 100). The strong development commitment to Afghanistan over the period of five years is indicative of this. As Table 6.3 also shows, Canada has consistently been involved in Pakistan and it was among the top 20 recipients of Canadian ODA from 1997 onwards. This was at a time when both the UK and the US had little involvement with

Pakistan. In sum, the impact of 9/11 on Canada's ODA is evident in the shift to spending in Afghanistan and Iraq. In terms of Iraq, this is not sustained beyond 2008. Pakistan has been a big recipient for some time, so it does not represent a shift influenced by the WoT.

In terms of the composition of Canada's ODA, CIDA is responsible for the largest share. According to the *Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada's Official Development Assistance 2010-2011*, CIDA distributed 70% of ODA, the Department of Finance distributed 16% and DFAIT distributed 6% (GoC 2011: 2). Whilst the Department of Finance's share of 16% is substantial, this was mostly debt relief and multilateral contributions to the World Bank and IMF. Whilst CIDA distributes the largest portion of Canada's ODA, it has been argued in the literature that CIDA does not have the majority say in how and where that money is spent. Instead, Canadian ODA is guided by foreign policy objectives set by the top level of government (Brown 2008; Brown and Jackson 2008; Swiss 2012). Under the Conservative government elected in 2006, Prime Minister Harper has sought to bring greater focus to Canada's aid policy by concentrating on fewer countries (Clark 2007: 4; Black 2009: 41). Interviewees have expressed the view that under the Conservative government, CIDA's decision making powers have been greatly reduced with decisions on development being increasingly made by the Prime Minister's office. These decisions are not transparent and as a result it is difficult for people within CIDA to have a clear picture of overall development policy.[68]

[68] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia official 1, 6/6/2013.Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia official 2, 14/6/2013.

Figure 6.1: Canadian ODA by region 1997-2012*



***Source: OECD-DAC www.oecd.org/dac**

One clear pattern over this period of time is an increase in ODA to SSA countries. As Table 6.3 shows, SSA countries make up 9 of the top 20 recipients of Canada's ODA from 1998-2000, there is a decline to 5 of the top 20 in 2001 and an increase again thereafter to a high of 14 of the top 20 in 2010. Figure 6.1 shows the dramatic increase in ODA to SSA in comparison with other regions over this period of time. As Figure 6.1 shows, this is not a before and after 9/11 pattern as is the case with the US and UK ODA to SSA. Instead ODA to SSA increases dramatically following 2007, while ODA to the other regions remains stable, with the exception of South America which gets a slight increase in 2012. This shift is consistent with attempts to refocus CIDA's geographic policy priorities and the shift to prioritising SSA after 2007, as outlined in Chapter 3. Taken together, this examination of Canada's ODA from 1997-2012 shows a shift to spending in fragile states, in frontline states in the WoT and in SSA countries. How these shifts in spending are addressed in policy discourse and how they relate to the merging of security and development are the subjects of this chapter.

Table 6.3: Top 20 recipients of Canadian ODA 1997-2012*

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Banglade sh	Banglade sh	China	Banglade sh	Bangladesh	Sts Ex-Yugo.	DRC	Iraq	Iraq	Cameroo n	Afghanist an	Afghanist an	Afghanist an	Haiti	Haiti	Haiti
2	China	China	Serbia	Sts Ex-Yugo.	China	Cameroo n	Afghanist an	Ethiopia	Indonesia	Afghanist an	Haiti	Ethiopia	Haiti	Afghanist an	Afghanist an	Cote d'Ivoire
3	Haiti	Cote d'Ivoire	Banglade sh	China	Jamaica	Cote d'Ivoire	Iraq	Afghanist an	Afghanist an	Haiti	Ethiopia	Iraq	Sudan	Ethiopia	Mozambi que	Mozambi que
4	Rwanda	Cameroo n	Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia	Afghanist an	Banglade sh	Banglade sh	Haiti	Sudan	Ghana	Haiti	Ghana	Ghana	Ethiopia	Ethiopia
5	Indonesi a	Haiti	Haiti	Haiti	Sts Ex-Yugo.	Banglade sh	Ethiopia	Ghana	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Sudan	Mali	Tanzania	Tanzania	Mali	Tanzania
6	Pakistan	Indonesia	Honduras	Ghana	Philippines	China	Tanzania	Mali	Mozambi que	Banglade sh	Banglade sh	Sudan	Ethiopia	Sudan	Tanzania	Afghanist an
7	Peru	Ghana	Cote d'Ivoire	Vietnam	Afghanistan	Vietnam	China	Cameroo n	Ghana	Ghana	Mozambi que	Indonesia	Mali	Pakistan	Pakistan	DRC
8	Egypt	Pakistan	Mali	Pakistan	Pakistan	Nigeria	Mozambi que	Haiti	Pakistan	Serbia	Tanzania	Banglade sh	Mozambi que	Mali	WB & Gaza	Ghana
9	India	Peru	Cameroo n	Mali	Mozambiqu e	India	Mali	China	Banglade sh	Mozambi que	Mali	Mozambi que	Senegal	Banglade sh	Ghana	Mali
10	Philippin es	Egypt	Senegal	Tanzania	India	Philippin es	Vietnam	India	Zambia	Pakistan	Indonesia	Ghana	Banglade sh	Mozambi que	Senegal	Ukraine
11	Vietnam	Philippin es	Ethiopia	Senegal	Haiti	Bolivia	Indonesia	Tanzania	Sri Lanka	Tanzania	Senegal	Senegal	DRC	WB & Gaza	Banglade sh	South Sudan
12	Senegal	India	Bosnia-Herz.	Costa Rica	Ethiopia	Mali	Ghana	Mozambi que	Mali	Indonesia	Pakistan	China	Cote d'Ivoire	Rwanda	Sudan	WB & Gaza
13	Ghana	Nicaragu a	Egypt	Ethiopia	Vietnam	Ghana	Cameroo n	Sudan	Cameroo n	WB & Gaza	Iraq	Tanzania	Pakistan	Senegal	South Sudan	Senegal
14	Bolivia	Mozambi que	Tanzania	South Africa	Ghana	Zambia	Senegal	Vietnam	India	Vietnam	WB & Gaza	WB & Gaza	WB & Gaza	Niger	Kenya	Kenya
15	Ethiopia	Bosnia-Herz.	Ghana	Philippin es	Malawi	Indonesia	Zambia	Zambia	Tanzania	China	DRC	Sri Lanka	Vietnam	Sierra Leone	DRC	Nigeria
16	Afghanis tan	Senegal	Pakistan	Egypt	FYR Macedonia	Guatemal a	Malawi	Senegal	China	DRC	China	Pakistan	Kenya	Burkina Faso	Honduras	Pakistan
17	Zambia	Mali	Mozambi que	Zimbabw e	Bosnia-Herz.	Haiti	Haiti	WB & Gaza	Honduras	Mali	Sri Lanka	Vietnam	Zimbabw e	DRC	Colombia	Honduras
18	South Africa	Ethiopia	South Africa	Peru	Egypt	Egypt	Philippin es	DRC	Vietnam	India	Vietnam	Burkina Faso	Somalia	Kenya	Vietnam	Banglade sh
19	Thailand	Guinea	Vietnam	Zambia	Peru	Senegal	Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya	DRC	Kenya	Zambia	Nigeria	Colombia	Vietnam	Nigeria	Colombia
20	Guinea	South Africa	Philippin es	Burkina Faso	Mali	DRC	Pakistan	Madagas car	Senegal	Philippin es	Bolivia	Kenya	Sri Lanka	Togo	Bolivia	Somalia

*** Source: OECD-DAC www.oecd.org/dac**

Canada's development and foreign policy documents

To capture the merging of security and development in broader Canadian policy, in addition to CIDA documents, broader Government of Canada (GoC) documents on security policy, defence policy and foreign policy from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND) are selected for analysis. These documents represent a broad sweep of different types of documents from 1995 to 2011 and these different types of documents give a broad picture of the different ways in which CIDA discusses and assesses its development policy. The full title and descriptions of these documents are shown in Table 6.4 below.

Table 6.4: Sample of Canadian policy documents

Agency	Year	Title	Description
DFAIT	1995	Canada in the World: a Government Statement	Foreign policy agenda that influenced subsequent documents
CIDA	1996	CIDA's Policy on Poverty Reduction.	This is a statement of CIDA's policy on poverty which follows on from the 1995 foreign policy statement. Important as a snapshot of how CIDA engaged with the idea of poverty reduction in the mid-1990s.
CIDA	1996	Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance.	This document sets out criteria for an extended role for development in areas of human rights and governance.
DFAIT	2000	Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human security.	Outline of Canada's human security policy
CIDA	2000	CIDA's Social	This major policy

		Development Priorities: A Framework for Action	statement at the beginning of the millennium set out a framework for CIDA's engagement with social development.
CIDA	2001	CIDA's Sustainable Development Strategy 2001-2003: An Agenda for Change.	Published prior to 9/11, the purpose of this document was to establish reform and a new agenda for CIDA in the new millennium.
CIDA	2002	Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness.	This document is an example of CIDA trying to engage with criticism of its development policy and to adapt to changing international norms.
CIDA	2004	Sustainable Development Strategy: 2004-2006	Continued attempts to reform Canada's policy through a three year plan
Privy Council Office, Canada	2004	Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy.	The first National Security Strategy produced by Canada, it responds to national security threats post-9/11
Government of Canada	2005	Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World	This foreign policy statement seeks to adjust policy for changes in the international system post-9/11.
CIDA	2007	Sustainable Development Strategy 2007-2009	This sustainable development strategy is the first major document on development policy from the conservative government elected in 2006
DFAIT	2007	Report on Plans and Priorities 2006-2007.	Annual report on trade and foreign policy
CIDA	2008	Canada's International Assistance at Work: Development for Results 2007	1st annual report on development. An initiative by the Conservative government

			to report to the public on development activity.
CIDA	2009	CIDA's Aid Effectiveness Action Plan (2009-2012).	A further attempt to clarify the focus of CIDA's aid policy.
Auditor General of Canada	2009	'Chapter 8: Strengthening Aid Effectiveness- Canadian International Development Agency'. *In: Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons.*	Auditor Generals' assessment of Canadian ODA
DND	2008	Canada First Defence Strategy.	Outlining a 20 year plan for Canada's defence spending
CIDA	2009	Development for Results 2009: At the Heart of Canada's efforts for a Better World.	2nd annual report
CIDA	2010	Development for Results 2010: At the Heart of Canada's efforts for a Better World.	3rd Annual Report
Government of Canada	2011	Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada's Official Development Assistance 2010-2011	This report is on the whole of Canada's ODA and includes aid distributing agencies other than CIDA
CIDA	2011a	Rolling Five Year Evaluation Work Plan FY 2011/2012-2015/2016	Plan reporting on performance for the previous year and setting out targets for the next 5 years
CIDA	2011b	Development for Results 2010-2011: At the heart of Canada's efforts for a better world.	4th annual report
DFAIT	2011	Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada: Report on Plans and Priorities 2011-2012.	Annual report of DFAIT on its overseas spending

Adherence to the post-Washington Consensus: Word frequency in CIDA and broader Canadian government documents

This section discusses the results of the content analysis, which is based on the framework discussed in Chapter 3. The main findings are that there are differing patterns of word use for the CIDA and other GoC documents. There is little coherence across departments. In CIDA documents there is no significant engagement with terms associated with merging security and development, instead Post-Washington Consensus terms dominate. This reinforces suggestion that economic issues are of greater priority than security in development policy. However, in broader GoC documents there is strong engagement with security and development terms. Unlike with the cases of the US and the UK there is no clear post-9/11 shift in patterns of word use across all documents. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the overall distribution of the three categories of words over this period separated in to CIDA documents and broader GoC documents on development. Table 6.5 shows each count as a percentage of the words counted for each document for CIDA and broader GoC documents respectively. (For the total word count, see Appendix 4, Table A4.3). First is an examination of Canada's development policy in the context of the three development policy trends of the Washington Consensus, the post-Washington Consensus and Security-Development Nexus. Second is an examination of broader Canadian Government foreign policy and how it engages with development.

Figure 6.2: Word count as % of each word counted in CIDA documents



Figure 6.3 Word count as % of each word counted in documents from agencies other than CIDA



Table 6.5: Word count as % of each word counted in all Canadian documents

	GoC 1995	CIDA 1996a	CIDA 1996b	DFAIT 2000	CIDA 2000	CIDA 2001	CIDA 2002	CIDA 2004	GoC 2004	GoC 2005	CIDA 2007	DFAIT 2007	CIDA 2008	DND 2008	CIDA 2009b	CIDA 2010	GoC 2011	CIDA 2011a	DFAIT 2011	CIDA 2011b
Liberalisation	3.14%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.27%	0.83%	0.88%	0.00%	1.87%	0.00%	0.82%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.27%	0.00%
Deregulation	0.00%	0.00%	0.61%	0.00%	0.00%	1.82%	1.67%	0.58%	0.50%	1.87%	2.03%	3.43%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.63%	1.31%	0.00%	3.41%	3.51%
Privatization	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Private Sector	5.97%	2.97%	1.21%	1.97%	2.56%	5.09%	8.33%	8.48%	4.03%	3.74%	3.04%	1.92%	5.62%	0.00%	3.92%	4.47%	6.55%	3.17%	0.00%	3.51%
Market	14.78%	1.98%	0.00%	0.39%	0.00%	3.27%	5.83%	2.34%	0.00%	6.78%	3.04%	20.71%	6.74%	3.28%	15.69%	16.26%	3.06%	3.17%	13.64%	19.30%
Basic Needs	0.63%	2.97%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.82%	0.83%	0.58%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.25%	0.00%	0.00%	0.81%	0.87%	0.00%	0.00%	0.88%
	24.53%	***7.92%***	***1.82%***	***2.36%***	***2.56%***	***15.27%***	***17.50%***	***12.87%***	***4.53%***	***14.25%***	***8.11%***	***26.89%***	***14.61%***	***3.28%***	***19.61%***	***23.17%***	***11.79%***	***6.35%***	***19.32%***	***27.19%***
Poverty	2.52%	81.19%	0.61%	0.39%	23.08%	27.27%	25.83%	8.92%	0.00%	20.56%	19.26%	0.55%	23.60%	0.00%	29.41%	14.23%	15.28%	1.59%	0.00%	13.16%
Institutions	11.01%	7.92%	15.15%	8.27%	18.80%	10.91%	15.00%	26.32%	2.27%	8.88%	8.78%	3.84%	8.99%	1.64%	7.84%	15.45%	21.40%	49.21%	5.11%	12.28%
Governance	2.52%	0.99%	32.73%	4.33%	1.71%	6.18%	15.83%	8.63%	0.25%	9.11%	15.20%	6.17%	11.24%	0.00%	9.80%	11.38%	10.92%	11.11%	18.18%	8.77%
Inequality	0.31%	0.00%	4.24%	0.39%	21.37%	10.91%	5.83%	10.96%	0.00%	2.57%	19.93%	0.27%	4.49%	1.64%	1.96%	8.54%	3.93%	0.00%	0.00%	9.65%
Human rights	11.64%	0.99%	30.30%	14.17%	6.84%	9.09%	4.17%	6.29%	1.51%	4.67%	15.88%	5.21%	12.36%	0.00%	5.88%	5.69%	5.68%	0.00%	7.95%	6.14%
Civil Society	1.26%	0.00%	10.30%	0.79%	0.85%	5.45%	8.33%	5.70%	0.25%	1.17%	3.04%	0.55%	3.37%	0.00%	5.88%	2.03%	3.93%	0.00%	0.00%	1.75%
	29.25%	***91.09%***	***93.33%***	***28.35%***	***72.65%***	***69.82%***	***75.00%***	***66.81%***	***4.28%***	***46.96%***	***82.09%***	***16.60%***	***64.04%***	***3.28%***	***60.78%***	***57.32%***	***61.14%***	***61.90%***	***31.25%***	***51.75%***
Security	30.19%	0.00%	3.64%	18.11%	2.56%	4.36%	0.83%	6.73%	73.05%	19.86%	2.36%	31.69%	11.24%	63.93%	3.92%	9.76%	11.79%	4.76%	38.07%	11.40%
Human Security	1.26%	0.00%	0.00%	23.62%	4.27%	6.18%	0.00%	0.44%	0.00%	0.70%	0.34%	4.80%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.41%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Conflict	5.97%	0.00%	1.21%	23.23%	17.95%	4.00%	5.00%	10.23%	2.02%	2.57%	4.73%	2.06%	10.11%	4.92%	9.80%	4.88%	4.80%	3.17%	0.57%	6.14%
Terrorism	0.63%	0.00%	0.00%	30.77%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.29%	13.60%	8.64%	0.00%	11.25%	0.00%	13.11%	0.00%	0.00%	1.31%	0.00%	3.98%	0.00%
Failed States	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.02%	0.25%	3.74%	1.35%	3.70%	0.00%	4.92%	1.96%	0.00%	3.49%	19.05%	1.14%	0.88%
Stability	6.92%	0.99%	0.00%	1.18%	0.00%	0.36%	1.67%	1.61%	0.76%	3.27%	1.01%	2.88%	0.00%	6.56%	3.92%	4.47%	5.68%	4.76%	5.68%	2.63%
Radicalism	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.51%	0.00%	0.00%	0.14%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	44.97%	***0.99%***	***4.85%***	***96.91%***	***24.79%***	***14.91%***	***7.50%***	***20.32%***	***91.18%***	***38.79%***	***9.80%***	***56.52%***	***21.35%***	***93.44%***	***19.61%***	***19.51%***	***27.07%***	***31.75%***	***49.43%***	***21.06%***

Canada and the post-Washington Consensus

As Table 6.5 shows, CIDA predominantly uses terms associated with the post-Washington Consensus development policy approach. The highest count is 93% for the 1996 *Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance* (CIDA 1996b), and the lowest count is still 52% in the *Development for Results 2011* (CIDA 2011b), as Table 5 shows. The Washington Consensus terms do not fall out of use entirely and are still used 27% of times in the *Development for Results 2010-2011* (CIDA 2011b), as can be seen in Table 6.6. In addition to this there is no significant swing towards using Security-Development Nexus terms in CIDA's documents. This is clearly apparent in Figure 6.2, where Security-Development Nexus terms are used significantly less than the other frames across all CIDA documents. In contrast to the cases of the UK and the US, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 the use of terms associated with the security-development nexus does not dominate following 9/11. There is an increase in the use of these terms to around the 20% mark from 2008 to 2011, with a high of 32% in CIDA's 2011 document *Rolling Five Year Evaluation Work Plan FY 2011/2012-2015/2016*. However, the use of these terms is still in the minority and the post-Washington Consensus terms still dominate. In addition to this, the term 'terrorism' is used only in one document- the 2004 *Sustainable Development Strategy: 2004-2006*, and the term 'radicalism' is not used in any CIDA documents, as Table 6.5 shows. The lack of any dramatic change in pattern following 9/11 and the absence of terms associated with hard security concerns suggests that CIDA did not incorporate security and conflict concerns into its development policy during the War on Terror. However, reflecting a lack of coherence across departments, broader GoC documents do use terms associated with merging security and development.

The role of development in Canadian foreign policy

Consistently, Security-Development Nexus terms are used in greater numbers than either Washington Consensus or post-Washington Consensus terms in the sample of documents from the DFAIT, DND, Privy Council Office (PCO) and Government of Canada, as Table 6.5 and Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show. Whilst there are exceptions to this in the Government of Canada's 2005 document, *Canada's International Policy Statement,* and its 2011 *Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada's Official Development Assistance 2010-2011*

documents, where post-Washington Consensus terms are used with the greatest frequency, this pattern is largely consistent, as Table 6.5 shows. Washington Consensus terms are still used, but this varies from a low of less than 3% in DFAIT's 2000 document *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human security* to a high of 27% in DFAIT's 2007 document as Table 6.5 shows. There is no discernable change in word use post-9/11. Indeed, the highest count for the use of the Security-Development Nexus terms is in the pre-9/11 DFAIT 2000 document on human security, as can be seen in Table 6.5. Going back as far as 1995, the Government of Canada document *Canada in the World: a Government Statement* uses security-development nexus terms 45% of times as Table 6.5 shows. This suggests that, while the non-CIDA documents in this sample do use the language of security and development with greater frequency, this is part of an earlier pattern and not necessarily connected with 9/11 and the WoT. However, while the term 'terrorism' is used in all of these documents both pre and post-9/11, the terms 'failed state' and 'radicalism' are used only post-9/11, as Tables 6.5 shows. These agencies are partially responsible for administering development aid and have a significant say in setting development policy. In addition, in the case of Afghanistan, they directly coordinate with CIDA through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Taking this into account, it is significant that they use Security-Development Nexus terms consistently and that they introduce two terms associated with the WoT in 'failed states' and 'radicalism', post-9/11.

The pattern of word use in Canada's development and foreign policy documents contrasts strongly with that of the UK and the US. Whereas the US and the UK show a post-9/11 move away from the use of post-Washington Consensus terms towards the use of Security-Development terms in their policy documents, Canada does not. Instead, Canada's development agency, CIDA, consistently uses words associated with the post-Washington Consensus in greatest numbers. The documents from other agencies do use Security-Development Nexus terms, but this trend is consistent and does not change significantly in the post-9/11 period. Even though there is no evident 9/11 effect and even though security and development terms do not dominate, Canada has merged security and development in its policy discourse to some extent. The next section examines Canada's engagement with the idea of security as a development issue in more depth, drawing on a discourse analysis of these documents and interviews with key CIDA officials

Canada's foreign policy and development discourse

Whilst the content analysis shows no clear change in word patterns from pre to post-9/11, a closer examination shows a pattern in the way words are used. At a time when CIDA has no direct involvement in issues of conflict and security pre-9/11 it engages directly with the idea that development is important for its own national security. Following 9/11 and its involvement in conflict situations in Afghanistan, CIDA's discourse changes and it makes only broad references to connections between its development actions and global security. In foreign policy and security documents, the 'whole of government' approach is discussed in policy as a means of coordinating action between development, military and foreign policy agencies of the Canadian government. Within this argument development should contribute to the national interest, which is defined broadly to mean either or both national security or spreading democracy and respect for human rights across the globe. Outside of ad hoc responses to humanitarian emergencies, Afghanistan is the only context where CIDA is involved in providing long-term development programmes in a conflict-affected area alongside military actors. While CIDA is involved in Afghanistan as part of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) coordinating with the DND and DFAIT, it does not acknowledge the military or conflict context in its policy discourse. Instead it focuses on technical issues of education and healthcare rather than on the political context. This is in contrast to both the US and the UK. The US openly discusses how development will serve national interests and the UK engages in extensive argumentation around the communal benefits of merging security and development. This discourse analysis examines these issues. Firstly is an examination of how CIDA documents address issues of security and development. Secondly, is an analysis of how non-CIDA policy documents engage with merging security and development. Thirdly is a discussion of CIDA's role in the 'whole of government' approach. Lastly is a discussion of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan.

Canadian development for global security

There are explicit references to Canadian national security in CIDA policy discourse prior to 9/11. An example of this is the following quote from the 1996 document on human rights, democracy and governance: "Objectives for CIDA are tied closely to the three key objectives the Government has identified for its international actions in the years to come: the promotion

of prosperity, the protection of our security within a stable global framework, and the projection of Canadian values of democracy and the rule of law, and culture" (CIDA 1996b: 2). Here the connection is made between Canadian national security and CIDA's objectives as a development agency. It is not framed as a specific threat, but rather creating global peace and stability through development actions which will ensure national security. This objective is reiterated in stronger terms five years later in the *Sustainable Development Strategy* which was published in February 2001, before 9/11: "International assistance….contributes to global security, and Canada's long-term security, by tackling many key threats to human security, such as the abuse of human rights, disease, environmental degradation, population growth, and the widening gap between rich and poor" (CIDA 2001: 2). Here the connection is made between Canadian national security, human security in the developing world and a diverse range of development problems that threaten human security. These causal connections made by CIDA represent a direct merging of national security and development goals using the language of human security as a driver for this commonality.

National security as 'global security' post-9/11

CIDA rarely engages with issues of conflict and security post-9/11, and when it does, the focus is on the challenges faced by the recipient country, not on how it connects to Canadian national security (CIDA 2002: 22,25). As noted in the content analysis, CIDA speaks only about fragile states in its policy post-9/11. However, this is done by framing fragile states as suffering from extreme development challenges rather than as a source of insecurity for Canada (CIDA 2007a: 21; 2007b: 3,14). This stands in contrast to the cases of the US and the UK where direct connections are consistently made between fragile states, terrorism and national security. In the sample of documents chosen there are no references to conflict as a development issue after 2007.

Following 9/11, rather than development being connected directly to Canadian national security, it is referred to only in terms of broad global security. Examples of this can be seen in the 2004 *Sustainable Development Strategy* : "CIDA's investments in poverty reduction, health (including HIV/AIDS), education, environmental sustainability, peacebuilding and conflict resolution, human rights, and good governance also contribute to increased stability and security, an important issue for all the world's countries" (CIDA 2004a: 9). This

connection between poverty and security for all countries is made a number of times in different documents (CIDA 2004a: 23; CIDA 2009a: 1). These references to the security and prosperity of all the world's countries shows a move away from framing development as important for national security towards arguments of commonality of interest for all countries, which Canada can achieve by pursuing its development policy. In contrast to the US and the UK where the issues of terrorism and religious extremism are used to connect security in the developing world to security in the developed world, CIDA does not engage with the idea of terrorism or religious extremism in its policy discourse. To understand this in a broader context the next section will examine how documents from agencies other than CIDA have engaged with these issues.

Development and security in the 'whole of government approach'

As mentioned above, the content analysis revealed no clear shift in patterns of word use from before to after 9/11 in GoC, DFAIT and DND documents. However, taking a deeper look through the discourse analysis reveals a shift to making connections between development, state fragility, terrorism and Canadian national security. Similar to CIDA documents, DFAIT, DND and GoC documents comment on issues around security and development from the beginning of this sample in 1995. The 1995 foreign policy document makes the connection between development aid as an expression of Canadian values and as a means of addressing security issues (DFAIT 1995: 25, 36). It argues that development serves multiple functions as an articulation of the Canadian values of assisting those less fortunate and as a means of ensuring common security. In the context of the post-cold war decline in levels of ODA at this time, this could be viewed in terms of broadening the appeal of aid by arguing that it can serve multiple purposes. Even when a hard security issue such as terrorism is mentioned by DFAIT pre-9/11, it is in relation to how it impacts on developing countries, not on Canada directly (DFAIT 2000: 13). However, in contrast to CIDA, the other agencies of DFAIT, DND and the broader government of Canada continue to discuss the merging of security and development following 9/11. This section examines this in terms of how they address issues of national security, terrorism and failed states.

Whereas CIDA documents post-9/11 do not make the case for merging security and development, the 2004 Government of Canada (GoC) national security strategy states:

> This may require the deployment of military assets to protect against direct threats to international peace and security or the provision of development assistance to strengthen public institutions in weak or failing states. It will certainly require Canada to continue to play a leading role in strengthening and modernizing international institutions so that they can contribute to international security (GoC 2004: 6)

Here the case is made for a coordinated approach between security and development actors to ensure both security and institution building in fragile states which will in turn contribute to global security. This connection is made again in the 2005 DFAIT foreign policy statement: "In short, our official aid programs and our broader international policies must operate in tandem" (GoC 2005: 20). Again it is argued that development policy must contribute to broader foreign policy. This contrast between CIDA and non-CIDA documents is most pronounced on the issues of terrorism and failed states.

In the post-9/11 broader GoC documents, terrorism is framed as a problem that directly affects Canadian national security: "The Bali bombing of October 2002 and the attacks of September 11 are part of the same phenomenon. In a taped message released on November 12, 2002, Osama bin Laden identified Canada as a target for attack" (GoC 2004: 6). This quote from the GoC 2004 national security strategy makes the argument that Canada is now vulnerable to a terrorist attack similar to those that happened in the US and Bali. Two recent terrorist attacks grouped together as Islamic terrorism and a message from bin Laden identifying Canada as a target for attack are used to argue that Canada is vulnerable to terrorist attacks. This framing of terrorism as a direct threat to Canadian national security is reiterated several times in this and subsequent documents (GoC 2004: Foreword, 1, 6; DFAIT 2007: 36, 37, 58, 59). Interviews reveal that national security concerns are an issue for Canada due to the diverse make-up of its population. In particular the large Somali community within Canada is viewed as a potential terrorist risk and this is a factor in development and foreign policy attention towards Somalia[69]. From a development perspective this is important, as the focus on failed states as a development priority is not

[69] Telephone interview with Anonymous CIDA official 1, 7/10/2013; Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia official 2, 14/6/2013.

explained or justified in terms of terrorism in CIDA documents, but it is in non-CIDA documents.

The 2004 GoC national security strategy refers to fragile states in the following way:

> These states contribute to spreading instability and can be a haven for both terrorists and organized crime groups that exploit weak or corrupt governing structures to pursue their nefarious activities. These activities have had consequences far beyond their borders, including for Canada (GoC 2004: 7)

This statement makes the direct connection between failed states as a haven for terrorists and threats to Canada's national security. This connection between terrorism, failed states and Canadian national security is reiterated several times (GoC 2004: 7; GoC 2005: 11, 12, 13, 22; DND 2008: 6). This framing of terrorism as a national security problem and of failed states as a haven for terrorism at the level of broader government policy is interesting as Canada's principle development agency CIDA does not engage with security issues when it discusses fragile states. Instead CIDA discusses only the post-9/11 increase in aid flows to fragile states in terms of the development problems facing those states. The conflation of development and security goals in broader government documents suggests that CIDA's lack of framing of development as a security issue represents an incomplete picture of Canada's merging of security and development policy at the broader government level. The other issues at play are CIDA's limited power to influence policy across government and the considerable role the Prime Minister has in dictating policy.

CIDA's role in the 'whole of government' approach to security

A key issue in merging security and development and the coordinated approach to addressing security problems whether global or local, is CIDA's capability to operate in conflict areas and to carry out programmes addressing peace and security issues. In interviews, CIDA's lack of capabilities and experience of working in conflict affected areas has been highlighted as a major problem. Afghanistan is the sole context in which CIDA works directly in conflict affected areas. As described by one interviewee, as CIDA does not have expertise in these areas, in order to get involved it either contracts out to a partner NGO or it makes it a part of multilateral contributions to big agencies such as the UN: "it's very very difficult to evaluate and monitor it properly so you don't build up an expertise within an agency, in our agency for

example on how to work in that area. Expertise is developed and resides somewhat usually in the UN body. So you have to pass off a lot of trust to them."[70] As a result, within conflict-related interventions, CIDA remains at a distance from actual projects. It cannot adequately oversee and monitor the project, its ability to learn from this is diminished and it does not gain any expertise from it. The example of Somalia illustrates this:

> An evaluation mission was supposed to go to two spots in Somalia and it was cancelled two weeks ago because of security concerns. And this just keeps happening and happening, which means the officer responsible, the guy at headquarters has never been into the country. But he has been responsible for putting over $100 million into that country.[71]

This is a key feature of CIDA's attempted engagement with issues of conflict and security and is notable in the two contexts of Ethiopia and Kenya below. While at the policy level Canada's development policy is supposed to address global security concerns, on the ground its development agency CIDA does not have adequate capabilities to programme in conflict areas. As mentioned above, whilst CIDA is a separate government department, overall development policy is dictated by the Prime Minister's office.[72] As a result, the agenda for the 'whole of government approach' is not driven by CIDA, but by the Prime Minister, DFAIT and the DND.[73] So while CIDA is not strong enough within government to set a particular development agenda, neither is it capable of engaging significantly in a conflict and security agenda set by other parts of government. Whilst this dissertation is not primarily about security in development policy in Afghanistan, given the increasing levels of ODA it has received and CIDAs direct involvement with military and foreign policy actors over the past decade it merits a closer look in order to better understand security in Canada's development policy.

Afghanistan

It has been argued in the literature that Canada's involvement in Afghanistan is more to do with ensuring US national security than its own (Brown 2008: 78; Black 2009: 42; Swiss 2012: 156). There has been controversy over this within the Canadian government,

[70] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013
[71] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013
[72] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia official 2, 14/6/2013.
[73] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia official 2, 14/6/2013.

particularly within CIDA who were reluctant to engage in a military operation overtly linked to the WoT. This section looks at the contrasting ways in which CIDA and other government agencies communicate their activities in Afghanistan. While CIDA ignores the issue of its involvement in conflict, DFAIT, DND and GoC connect development with combating terrorism and national security threats. Canada's ODA to Afghanistan increased significantly over the 2000s - from $US6.6 million in 2000 to a high of $US345 million in 2007 (OECD DAC 2013b). As Table 3 shows, from 2003 onwards it is consistently among the top 3 recipients of Canada's ODA. This increase in ODA to Afghanistan coincided with an increase in Canada's military involvement in Afghanistan from an initial deployment of 750 troops for a 6 month contingent (Sjolander 2009: 83) to leading the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar province with a mandate to extend NATO presence in Afghanistan into areas not controlled by the Kabul government (Sjolander 2009: 86). Involvement in the PRT required the deployment of thousands of Canadian troops coordinating with development actors and brought Canadian troops into direct combat. From 2002-2006, 8 Canadian troops had died in Afghanistan, whereas in 2006 alone 37 troops were killed (Sjolander 2009: 87). In sum, during this time of increased development spending in Afghanistan, Canada's military became increasingly involved in combat and suffered greater casualties.

CIDA in Afghanistan

In CIDA's policy documents, there is no discussion of its role in supporting military operations in Afghanistan and no explanation of its role in the PRT. The focus on Afghanistan is primarily on development challenges such as health care and education (CIDA 2004a: 8, 30; CIDA 2007a: 20). The only reference to security is in the 2007 *Development for Results* document: "It (CIDA's role in Afghanistan) means establishing secure and stable conditions in which reconstruction and development can flourish" (CIDA 2007a: 20, 21). Here, primacy is given to the importance of establishing security as a precondition for development. Outside of this, Afghanistan is referred to by CIDA only in terms of technical aspects of development such as strengthening governance institutions (CIDA 2009a: 18), polio vaccinations and the importance of education for girls (CIDA 2009a: 2, 19) and not the broader political context. Development issues are the sole focus of discussion. There is no discussion of how CIDA uses its development programmes to address conflict and insecurity

in Afghanistan, or of how its activities contribute to broader foreign policy and military goals. There is no reference to Canadian troops being involved in combat or the broader political context of international involvement in Afghanistan.

Broader Canadian policy in Afghanistan

In contrast to this the non-CIDA documents frame Afghanistan as the subject of both military and development interventions in the WoT. The broader GoC and DFAIT documents frame Canada's intervention in Afghanistan in terms of failed states and a threat to national security. The 2004 GoC national security strategy states that: "In Afghanistan, where Canada has already made a significant contribution—from military action to election support—we will soon establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, bringing together our diplomatic, military and development instruments to deliver a better life to people there" (GoC 2005: 13). It is argued that the combined efforts of Canada's development, military and foreign policy parts of government are contributing to combating terrorism: "Priority will continue to be given to contributing to international efforts, led by the UN and NATO, to leave Afghans a country that is better governed, more stable and secure, and no longer a safe haven for terrorists." (DFAIT 2011: 2). Here the connection is made between Canada's efforts to ensure stability and security and the combating of terrorism. The broader context of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, where Canadian troops were subjected to increasing attacks leading to a rising death-toll, is not discussed in any substantial way in either CIDA or non-CIDA documents. There is no acknowledgement that the PRT of which Canada's development actors are part is also involved in armed combat.

A key factor in this is the controversies within Canadian society attached to CIDA working in Afghanistan. This was highlighted in an interview with one CIDA official. In addition to the broader controversy in Canadian society over Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, there were also issues internally over CIDA's involvement in this highly politicised conflict-affected area:

> A lot of development, regular development people did not want to do it. So for a lot of people that (were) offered these sweet packages[74], (they) weren't really eligible for to go into the programme. Essentially it raises the level of suspicion people …ehm it was very, very tough on CIDA organisationally. Very stressful. There was a very senior, a very good person at a high-level who was appointed to run that shop with pretty much direct weekly access to the Prime Minister's office[75]

CIDA did not have the operational capabilities to operate in conflict environments and additional resources required for this were taken from other programmes: "We weren't organisationally set up to do it. There was new money put in for Afghanistan but we didn't really get a lot of new resources. So we were pulling from other programs."[76] Essentially CIDA had no previous experience of operating in conflict environments, but was compelled to do so due to broader political factors. As a result, it is not surprising that there is little mention of conflict in CIDA development policy in Afghanistan. It is significant that there are several references to US national security as a foreign policy priority in Canada's policy discourse. This is the subject of the next section.

Development in whose national interest?

The importance of US national security is referred to a number of times in Canada's foreign policy. It is argued that trade with the US is essential for Canada's economy and disruptions to this due to security problems could have a negative impact on the economy (Brown 2008: 78; Black 2009: 42; Swiss 2012: 156). There are numerous examples of this in the broader Canadian Government documents. For example, the 2004 GoC national security strategy states: "The September 11 attacks demonstrated the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians and the need to work together to address threats" (GoC 2004: 5). Here, the interests of US national security and Canadian security are merged and treated as the same. Similarly, the 2008 DND national defence strategy document states: "Indeed, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and those carried out since demonstrate how instability and state failure in distant lands can directly affect our own security and that of our allies" (DND 2008: 6). The connection is made between instability in the developing world,

[74] This refers to increase pay packages and benefits offered as an incentive to CIDA staff to go and work in Afghanistan
[75] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013
[76] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013

US security and Canada's national security. There is little supporting evidence for such a connection, but it is one that is used on a number of occasions as a justification for Canada's involvement in Afghanistan.

The importance of US national security is also justified in terms of Canada's economic status, rather than its own security. The level of Canada's trade with the US is significant as GoC figures for 2012 show that 73% of all Canada's exports were to the US and 63% of all imports were from the US (GoC 2013). This is explored by Jonathan Paquin (2009) who argues that 9/11 has shaped Canada's foreign policy dramatically as it has had to maintain close diplomatic relations with the US due to its importance as a trade partner. The 2005 GoC policy statement of foreign affairs states:

> All Canadians understand that our most important relationship is with the United States. As a government, we treat it that way, devoting energy and effort to ensuring the relationship remains strong, sophisticated, productive and focused on common goals, such as the security of our borders, the health of the North American economy and the free flow of trade between our nations (GoC 2005: Foreword).

In this case the importance of free trade across North America is mentioned as a salient issue in ensuring US security. This is important as it shows the complexities of Canada's involvement in the WoT. It justifies its development involvement in Iraq and its military and development involvement in Afghanistan in terms of ensuring its own national security. Interviewees have expressed the view that Canada's national security goals are closely aligned to those of the US.[77] Allied to this is the claim that US national security is essential for Canadian trade and its economy. These complex arguments merge: insecurity in the developing world to Canadian national security, Canadian and US national security, US security and the Canadian economy, and – at the micro level - development and military actors in Afghanistan and Iraq. This lends weight to Jonathan Paquin's claim that 9/11 has had little impact on Canada, but the US reaction to 9/11 has impacted significantly (Paquin 2009: 100). This is evident in the way in which Canada has attempted to merge its security and development policies. its military, development and foreign policy in Afghanistan , has been influenced to a certain extent by US national security concerns and the importance of these to Canadian economic, security and foreign policy. It has resulted in CIDA getting

[77] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013; Telephone interview with Anonymous CIDA official 1, 7/10/2013

involved in a conflict affected area in which it has little capacity or desire to operate. While agencies outside of CIDA make causal claims to justify involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 'whole of government approach' applied in these countries, CIDA does not address the issue of merging security and development, or acknowledge that it is involved in coordinated efforts with military actors in a conflict zone. A key question remains in relation to how CIDA uses its development programmes to address security risks outside of the context of Afghanistan.

Security in CIDA's policy in the Horn of Africa

This section looks at how CIDA's top level policy approach to security and conflict has impacted on policy in the specific contexts of Ethiopia and Kenya. Another layer of depth is added to the analysis by examining how CIDA's policy discourse relates to policy programming in these countries.

CIDA' programming in Ethiopia

As Table 6.3 shows, Ethiopia has consistently been among CIDA's top 20 recipients over the period 1997-2012. While CIDA identifies Ethiopia as important for ensuring regional stability and it recognises the presence of internal conflict in Ethiopia, it does not engage in any discussion of why these issues are important for its development activities and it does not engage in any development programmes that may address these issues. CIDA's policy in Ethiopia is not decided in-country, but back in Canada, and, in turn, these policies are closely aligned to those of the GoE. From 2003 onwards, funding to Ethiopia increased and it has remained among the top 10 recipients of Canadian ODA thereafter. This increase in aid resulted from the initiation of a 'Country Development Programming Framework' which sought to refocus Canada's ODA priorities and reduce the number of countries in which it was involved in order to concentrate efforts better. This resulted in an increase in funding to SSA more broadly and to Ethiopia specifically (CIDA 2010b: 3). This section firstly examines CIDA's main policy priorities for Ethiopia and secondly discusses the absence of engagement with issues of conflict and security.

In terms of justifying Canada's development presence in Ethiopia, the issue of regional stability is given as a justification in documents published in 2004 and 2005. The explanation being "Canada supports Ethiopia's development vision, and will deepen its engagement in Ethiopia due to its level of need, its potential for progress, and its strategic importance in the Horn of Africa" (CIDA 2004b: 4). "Its regional importance: Ethiopia plays an important role in African multilateral diplomacy and is critical to the stability of the region" (CIDA 2004b: 5). This point is reiterated in 2005 and 2010 documents (CIDA 2005: 5; 2010b: viii). Whilst the stability of the region is highlighted as important, there is no elaboration on how Canada will address this through its development efforts. Equally, there is no discussion of why regional stability in the Horn of Africa is important for Canada. Instead, the main policy priorities for CIDA in Ethiopia are highlighted as 'food security and agriculture' and 'governance and capacity building' (CIDA 2010b: 8). There are no connections made between Ethiopia's role in regional stability, global security and how development efforts can contribute to these.

The issue of internal conflict *is* highlighted as a hindrance for development: "There have also been clashes between ethnic groups competing for scarce resources in a number of areas. Two years of consecutive drought, with only minor recovery in the highlands and midlands, have depleted household assets, increased debt and undermined health" (CIDA 2004b: 10). However, there is no significant discussion of CIDA's role in addressing this problem of internal conflict. Furthermore, this issue is not highlighted in subsequent documents from 2005 and 2010. This is not because the issue of internal conflict is no longer relevant, as subsequent events such as the election unrest in 2005 have shown.

Added to CIDA's lack of explanation as to how development can address internal conflict or regional stability is the lack of recognition of conflict as a cross-cutting issue. For other donors, Ethiopia is viewed as a highly politicised society with sensitivity over social division and a lack of equality in the distribution of resources as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. As a result, programmes that are not directly related to conflict and security still have to take these issues into account as they can exacerbate these tensions through possibly favouring some communities/regions over others, as outlined in the previous two chapters. In interview it was explained that in areas such as food security, CIDA follows the lead of the Government of

Ethiopia (GoE) in where and how to distribute resources.[78] As a result, there is no consideration of conflict and security issues even in politicised aspects of development. Interviewees expressed the view that conflict and security are not a consideration for policy planning and implementation in specific local contexts in Ethiopia, whether in the area of food security, health or governance and human rights.[79] The reasons given for this are that policy is decided at the top level back in Canada and also CIDA's development objectives are still closely aligned to the GoE objectives despite the cessation of Direct Budget Support. As discussed in the previous two chapters, the dominance of GoE over Ethiopian national security and the lack of donor policy autonomy in-country are not unique to Canada's Ethiopia programme. As the Government of Canada is concerned about issues of security in East Africa, in particular state failure and terrorism[80], it is unusual that there is little engagement with these issues in development programmes at the local level.

CIDA programming in Kenya

Canada identifies key security and conflict issues in Kenya as being important for regional stability and internal conflict and, in contrast to Ethiopia, it shapes some of its development interventions to address these problems. However, due to its lack of ability to operate in conflict affected areas as discussed previously, CIDA is only indirectly involved in these programmes. There is no significant discussion of Kenya in CIDA's publications. A rigorous search could find no publicly available CIDA documents on Kenya over the past 10 years. As Table 3 shows, prior to 2004, Kenya was not amongst the top 20 recipients of Canadian ODA, however from 2004-2012 Kenya is consistently among the top 20 recipients of Canadian ODA. As there are no significant communications from CIDA on its policy towards Kenya over this period, it is difficult to conclude as to why this is the case. However, it is possibly another factor of CIDA's incoherent aid policy. While it focuses on a number of countries it does not actively communicate with its public about its activities in those countries. Its main policy priorities are "Children and Youth" and "Democratic Governance" and there is no mention of issues of conflict, peace or security in CIDAs public communication on Kenya.[81] In comparison with Ethiopia, Kenya is a much smaller

[78] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia official 2, 14/6/2013.
[79] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia official 1, 6/6/2013.Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia official 2, 14/6/2013.
[80] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013
[81] CIDA website on Kenya http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/kenya-e#a4

programme, for example in 2012 Kenya received US$46 million, whereas Ethiopia recieved US$123 million. However, it makes an interesting comparator with Ethiopia for how similar policy priorities are engaged with differently in the same region. This section looks firstly at how Canada justifies its development presence in Kenya from a foreign policy perspective and secondly how development is understood to play a role in addressing these issues.

The role that Kenya plays in bringing stability to the region is highlighted as justification for Canada's development programme in Kenya "Kenya is the economic engine and key driver of stability in East Africa... Kenya's diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts also reinforce its role as a regional stabilizer." [82] Similar to Ethiopia it is seen as a key stabilising influence in the Horn of Africa and is seen as important in managing instability in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia.[83] As a result, the post-election violence in 2007 (as discussed in Chapter 3) was a cause of concern for Canada. The realisation of the fragility of the Kenyan state and fear of the regional fallout if Kenya suffered state failure further emphasised the importance of development interventions in Kenya for Canada:

> Everyone is surprised a little bit when you look at its place on the fragile states scale it's actually a lot higher than people would have normally thought. So this was a reminder to people that the state still doesn't have as much control as it would like and the degree of inequality in the country is very serious including between some ethnic groups. Real or perceived. Which makes it quite fragile[84].

Somalia is highlighted as the key national security issue for Canada in the region. One of the fears for Canada was that a recurrence of civil unrest at the 2013 elections would result in Kenya needing to withdraw its peacekeeping force from Somalia in order to manage its domestic security concerns: "If this last election hadn't gone well, the Kenyan defence forces might have had to become involved domestically which meant they couldn't contribute as much to Somalia"[85]. Here, Kenya is important because of the role it plays in containing instability in the region. Addressing these problems is highlighted as important because of Canada's economic interests in the region. Furthermore, the 2007/8 unrest demonstrated the potential fallout across the region if Kenya descended into state failure:

[82] CIDA website on Kenya http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/kenya-e#a4
[83]Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013
[84] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013
[85] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013

> In 2007/8 after the election an entire region went down very noticeably especially in Uganda and Rwanda even and a little bit in Burundi because the transport corridors were cut off because of the post-election violence. We really took note of that and that's one of the main arguments we use for investing in something like elections it is helping create a stable platform here that protects our other investments as well as security.[86]

The next issue to examine is what role CIDA plays in offsetting these risks.

Unlike in the case of Ethiopia, issues of conflict and insecurity at a local level are given attention in development policy. This is done through support for groups within certain regions who are embedded there and are trying to resolve conflict. Usually this involves churches and religious groups. One example given is the organisation of soccer tournaments for youths and children as a way of diffusing possible tensions among different groups: "they tend to go out and do everything from the basic football match amongst kids when they find kids getting a little you know - hurling racial slurs at each other and they can feel the tension they will go out and do little events like that" . Unlike in Ethiopia, programmes such as health and access to food are subjected to conflict sensitivity analysis in how they may exacerbate existing social tensions. However, the nature of how CIDA operates through delegation of projects and programming to NGOs means that firstly the analysis is done by someone back in Canada, because they do not specialise in conflict issues in-country "it's not like health where we have specialist placed all around the world and in headquarters. We don't for security. We have one guy in headquarters to deal with it really and it's limiting, it's definitely limiting" . Secondly, the project is contracted to a partner NGO and it is then the project manager's responsibility to see that it is implemented. As a result, CIDA does not have any significant engagement with managing conflict through their development programmes. This comes back to the issue of CIDA's lack of capacity to engage in conflict affected areas, or to programme in mitigating conflict as discussed above. So while at a foreign policy level development is seen as important in offsetting security risks, outside of Afghanistan, CIDA itself has no capacity to get involved in these areas. This is highlighted in the area of North Eastern Kenya, which has been marginalised and conflict affected for a number of years. Canada recognises the need to address this through development interventions, but it lacks the expertise to do so. As a result, programmes in that area are

[86] Personal interview with Anonymous CIDA Kenya official, 19/6/2013

conducted through partner NGOs or multilateral organisations which CIDA has little involvement with these projects and the status quo of no practical hands on expertise in the area is maintained.

The examples of Ethiopia and Kenya demonstrate that at the foreign policy level Canada identifies both countries as important for managing international security risks by maintaining stability in the region. The Ethiopia programme is significantly bigger financially but does not address issues of conflict and security in any way. Decisions around avoiding tension through unequal distribution of resources are left to the GoE. In contrast Kenya is a smaller programme and there is more thought by CIDA on how its programmes may impact on security and conflict, but it is not a specific policy priority, there is no expertise in this area in-country, and CIDA only acts through other agencies in this area. As a result, its approach is very much hands off and does not involve significant engagement in the area. This is consistent with the findings from the content and discourse analyses. While at the level of foreign policy Canada's engagement with merging security and development can be seen in the references to regional stability and security as justifications for Canada's involvement in both countries. Similarly CIDA's lack of argumentation around the connections between security and development in its policy discourse are reflected in lack of engagement in these issues in Ethiopia and its restricted engagement in conflict issues in Kenya.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that unlike the US and the UK, CIDA does not justify development spending by connecting it to national security. Nor does its discourse reflect an overt merging of security and development. However, in practice, it has increased aid flows to fragile and conflict affected states and is involved in coordinated military efforts in Afghanistan. From this it is apparent that there is a facet of CIDA's development policy and practice that is not discussed at all in its development policy documents. In policy documents outside of CIDA – the DND and the DFAIT- these issues are addressed in terms of ensuring Canadian national security, US national security and also sustained trade relations with the US. In foreign policy discourse, Canada's development policy is expected to offset risks to its national security. However, the assessment of these risks is complex as direct threats to

Canadian national security are only part of the picture. The other part is economic risk which is evident in the consideration given to US national security which is justified on the grounds that the US is its biggest trading partner. Within this argument, the risks are that an attack on the US might have an adverse economic knock-on effect to Canada, such as the border closure after 9/11. In addition to this, a deterioration of international relations between the two countries could damage Canada's economy through a restriction of trade. As a result both security and economic risks are closely intertwined in Canada's merging of security and development. This leads to a complex picture where Canada's development policy in Afghanistan is merged with military and foreign policy and this is justified both in terms of its own national security, US security and also the importance of US security for the Canadian economy.

Amidst this complex web of policy arguments, CIDA ignores issues of conflict and national security in its development policy and instead focuses on social development, discussing it in terms of education, healthcare and infrastructure projects. The examples of Ethiopia and Kenya demonstrate that although at the foreign policy level Canada identifies both countries as important for managing international security risks by maintaining stability in the region, there is little local articulation of these security and development issues in either country programme. While in Kenya there is more space for CIDA to consider these issues in its policy, there is a lack of direct engagement with conflict and security. At the broader government level, CIDA is highlighted as important for addressing national security risks through development programmes. However, CIDA is not strong enough within government to set a particular development agenda, neither is it capable of engaging significantly in a conflict and security agenda set by other parts of government. Key to this is the lack of CIDAs capability to operate in conflict affected environments outside of the context of Afghanistan.

Overall, Canada's policy discourse on the merging of security and development follows a different pattern to either the US or the UK. It moves away from using the language of security and development post-9/11 as shown in the content analysis, whereas the US and the UK increasing use this language post-9/11. In addition where the US argues for the direct relevance of development aid for national security and the UK goes to great lengths to justify and qualify its involvement in security issues, Canada does not engage with these issues at all, despite being involved in coordinating development and military actors in a conflict zone.

Where USAID discourse could be characterised by arguments for its relevance and DfID's discourse could be characterised by justification and explanation, CIDA's policy discourse could be characterised by denial of involvement in conflict and security. In contrast to both the US and the UK, while Canada identifies connections between development problems and its own national security, its development agency, CIDA, does not address these risks either at the level of supporting the developing state or of addressing security problems for ordinary citizens within these states.

Chapter 7: Security and Development in the Risk Society

Recognising the complexity of the security-development nexus as argued by Stern and Öjendal (2010) and Spear and Williams (2012), this thesis has mapped out a small corner of this phenomenon. The existing body of literature has been expanded by a systematic examination of the merging of security and development by the US, the UK and Canada and how this has influenced the actions of each donor towards Ethiopia and Kenya. This has been done through comprehensive content and discourse analyses of policy documents over a 15 year period, interviews with key figures involved in development policy of these donors and field work in Ethiopia and Kenya. The content analysis employs a novel framework which highlights words associated with the security-development nexus in addition to two other significant phases of development; the 'Washington Consensus' and the 'post-Washington Consensus'. This framework allows the comparison of these three major frames over a 15 year period. Based on this foundation, the previous three chapters demonstrate that the US, the UK and Canada have merged their security and development policy to differing degrees and in different ways in both Ethiopia and Kenya. Within each donor there is variation in how the issue is dealt with over time.

As discussed in Chapter 2, in Ulrich Beck's (1992) idea of the risk society, states reflect on how dangers in other parts of the world are inescapable given the interconnected nature of the globalised world. Recognising this, states reflect on the nature of these risks and on the role they themselves have played in creating them and strive to provide long-term solutions to these risks through international cooperation. Beck's idea of risk is useful in that it identifies long-term dangers different to more immediate short-term 'threats'. In the merging of development and security, development problems are identified as long-term security risks rather than immediate security threats. Drawing on Beck's idea of the risk society, this chapter argues that these differences reflect the contrasting security risk priorities of these three donors and how they assess the level of risk in a recipient country. From this perspective, donor states view conflict and instability in the developing world as a source of future risks for their own countries. Therefore, using development aid to address systemic

development challenges which act as drivers of conflict and instability in developing countries can mitigate against future risks for their own national security. As Beck (2002) argues, risk management does not represent a single logic and is contingent on the highly politicised process of identifying risks and singling them out for action. Consequently, while all three donor states may identify risks and seek to address them through their development policy, this will follow different logics and result in different actions depending on the different donor context. While donor states may reflect on the nature of development problems as security risks, they have not progressed to Beck's idea of 'reflexive modernity' to manage risk in a way that addresses not just the risks of the these states, but also risks to parts of the world "excluded from the benefits of globalisation" (Beck 2002: 48). Key to the idea of cosmopolitanism and the 'reflexive modernity' is the recognition of how their previous actions have actually generated further risk for other parts of the world. Instead, these states do not reflect on how their behaviour contributes to the generation of these security risks. Instead, development problems as security risks are viewed as external to the previous actions of states. As a result, the US, the UK and Canada's understanding of development problems as security risks is still rooted in modernity.

This chapter firstly discusses how risk theory offers a better understanding of the closer relationship between security and development. Secondly, it looks at who is identified as the referent object of security in development policy and how arguments are constructed to connect security to development. Thirdly, it examines how merging security and development has impacted on policy. Fourthly is a discussion of the implications for understanding the merging of security and development as risk management. Lastly is a discussion of how security and development contributes to a better understanding of the theory of risk.

From threats to risks

The assertion made in Chapter 2 that the securitization theory framework is not applicable to the merging of security and development policy is reinforced in the study of these three donors. The securitization of development would involve a speech act identifying

development problems as existential threats to the donor state, removing them from mainstream politics and placing them as security issues. This is certainly applicable for military actions in the WoT such as the invasion of Iraq (Hughes 2007; Roe 2008; Donnelly 2013). It may also be applicable for development actions in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan where coordination with the military was justified on the basis of the extraordinary conditions of the WoT by all three donors. However, in terms of long-term development policy, for both the UK and the US, addressing security concerns through development policy has now become 'ordinary' and long-term, rather than 'extraordinary' and contingent on a specific time. Although the national security of donors is referred to in development policy, development problems are not framed as immediate, existential threats to the security of the state. However, Olaf Corry (2012) asserts that securitisation and risk can be understood as different processes that operate on a spectrum rather than an either/or action. A speech act may identify a risk rather than a threat. This 'riskification' speech act will draw on different referents, follow a different logic and require different action than a securitization (Corry 2012: 239). The merging of security and development in US, UK and Canada policy is best understood as part of a management of security risks.

Rather than a security threat which refers to something immediate, a security risk is something that may happen in the future (Beck 1992 1999, 2002, 2003, 2009a). It is a possibility of future danger that states may seek to offset by certain actions in the present. In this sense the management of risk is something that is generally of a lower priority than threats and receives less political attention and fewer resources. Development problems are identified as security problems in a manner consistent with this, as second order security risks rather than first order immediate security threats. Development problems receive less attention and less funding than conventional military operations which are aimed at dealing with threats (Fowler and Sen 2010: 12; Spear and Williams 2012: 8-9). Instead, development aid is expected to resolve long-term development problems which represent possible risks to US, UK or Canadian national security. The national security argument is raised as an indirect issue where several causal connections between development problems and eventual threats are argued. For example, development problems can lead to state collapse, which can provide a vacuum in which religious extremism and terrorism can emerge, undermining the security of the West (USAID 2002: 1; 125). Similarly, fragile states can lead to unpredictable flows of migrants which can cause instability in other countries (DfID, FCO, MoD, 2011: 8; DfID,

2011a: 36). Again, lack of development can lead to the spread of disease which can also be a security risk (DfID, 2011a: 2; CIDA 2001: 2). The role of development aid is in managing these risks or stopping them before they emerge.

Beck's (1992) risk society helps us to understand the merging of security and development because security is brought into development policy through the identification of risk. Initially this risk was to the well-being of individuals in the developing world, and increasingly this has meant risk to the national security of donors. The proposed solution to these risks has been to increase coordination between security and development actors and make development aid more conflict sensitive. While this assessment of risk highlights individuals as the referent object of security the principle justification is the security of the donor country. Different donor states have acted upon this in different ways. This variation tells us about how states view security and development problems for developing populations. Canada engages little, the US is focused at the level of the state, the UK also focuses on the state, but does address more decentralised issues that impact on individuals.

As described above, all three donor states identify these risks and engage with them through development policy to differing degrees. In order to better understand this process of risk management the differences in how each donor identifies risks and the complex causal process involved need to be examined. In addition to this, as Beck (2009b: 296) asserts, the identification of a risk is also a call to action to address these risks, and so the issue of how actions taken to incorporate security into development policy programming relate to the management of risk also needs to be examined. The key questions are: How is risk identified in development policy and what are the arguments around this? Who is identified as being at risk? How are development interventions expected to manage these risks? The next section looks at the different referents for security that are drawn on development policy and how they connect to managing risks. Following this is an analysis of overall aid flows, institutional changes and programming in Ethiopia and Kenya.

Whose security?

If security and development are merged in order to manage security risks associated with chronic development problems, a key question is who is identified as being at risk? This question speaks to a central issue in the security-development nexus of who the referent object for security is when security and development are merged. Many different adjectives are attached to the word security in order try and separate out different types of security from each other– hard security, soft security, human security, national security etc. The suggestion is that 'security' is no longer a conventional focus on military issues and threats to the integrity of state's borders (Picciotto 2010; Pugh et al. 2013). Instead these adjectives infer that security is now viewed in a sophisticated, multi-dimensional way, encompassing multiple providers, threats and referents (Pugh et al 2013). From these adjectives, inferences are made about the influence of human security on security policy. Rather than reproducing these categories and inferring meaning from them, greater clarity can be achieved in analysing the interaction between security and development by breaking down security in terms of who is supposed to be the beneficiary, who is the 'referent object' to use the language of security studies. Duffield and Waddell (2006: 5) assert that in the case of human security, when security and development are coordinated, security refers to civil conflict in the developing world. Building on this point, more specific levels of security can be identified in policy. As Table 7.1 below shows, in this thesis three levels of security with three different referents can be identified – 1) the national security of the donor state, 2) the national security of the recipient state and 3) the well-being of individuals in recipient states. The security-development nexus operates across these three levels. Development problems are connected to the national security of donors through causal arguments encompassing these three levels. The national security of the recipient is argued to be essential for the well-being of individuals within that country and also the national security of the donor country. Likewise, threats to the security of individuals in recipient countries are argued to also be disruptive to the security of the recipient state and in turn represent a potential security risk for the donor state. But within this narrative of causal connections between the three levels, there is a prioritisation of the security of the donor. Separating security out in this way allows an analysis of which levels of security are addressed in development policy discourse and the arguments that are used to link these levels of security to one another. This in turn helps us to understand the arguments offered for managing risk through development and the logic

behind them. This section discusses how each donor has merged its security and development policies and the identified referents for security and argues that while all three levels are referenced across the three donors, the first category of donor national security is dominant in all agencies.

Table 7.1: Three levels of security and associated development frames

Level	Referent of security	Development frames
1st Level	Donor national security	National security, terrorism, extremism
2nd Level	Recipient national security	Regional stability, integrity of borders, human security
3rd Level	Individuals in developing states	Human security, conflict resolution

Whom to develop and whom to secure

From the beginning of this sample, in the late 1990s, rather than presenting an altruistic vision of development aid that appeals to the need to help poorer states, USAID argues that development policy should address the US national interest. Not surprisingly, following 9/11 and the WoT, US national interest is defined as national security and this is reflected in a focus on conflict and security in USAID policy discourse. The focus on the first level of donor national security as a referent object is evident in assertions that development aid is one of the 'core pillars' of US national security policy along with diplomacy and defence. In USAID documents and in interviews it is asserted that development is essential for US national security. Whilst there is space given to addressing security at the second and third levels of developing states and individuals within those states, this is always justified in terms of assisting US national security. Following 9/11 and the WoT, when the US DoD, DoS and the White House argue for the merging of security and development, both US national security and the security of the recipient state are the referent objects of security. Following

the election of Barak Obama in 2008, there is a shift to defining development in broader terms in these agencies. Issues such as climate change, food security and healthcare which address the wellbeing of individuals in developing states are introduced into military and foreign policy discourse. However, these are still framed in terms of how they can assist US national security. So while at the latest point development problems are identified as representing risks to all three referents in policy, risks to individuals and to the developing state are all understood in terms of how they relate to risks to US national security.

In contrast to USAID, DfID does not refer to UK national security pre-9/11. At this stage, DfID defines security in terms of the 3rd Level of security in Table 7.1, how conflict impacts negatively on development and how development can bring greater security for ordinary citizens in the developing world. There is a shift following 9/11 to strongly suggesting that development aid can address UK national security risks through references to terrorist attacks and the claim that poverty is a cause of terrorism. When the Conservative Party assumes control of DfID following the 2010 election this is taken further to overtly connecting UK national security to DfID development policy consistent with the 1st Level. At this point the term 'security' is argued to encompass all three referents of security. Less care is given in discourse to distinguish between different referents for security across these three Levels. Unlike the US, the UK FCO and MoD take a broader view of security and development and all three levels are identified as important for merging security and development. The 3rd Level of how security impacts on ordinary citizens in recipient countries is given space in policy discourse. Across all agencies, the argument is made that these three levels of security are all inextricably linked to each other and so addressing problems of conflict and instability in the developing world will address UK national security problems. As such, these three referents of security are brought together to encompass a single 'security-development nexus' where risks are identified as impacting at all three levels and it is argued that everyone's interests are met by ensuring greater security through development. However, the 1st Level of UK national security is consistently dominant and the importance of the other two Levels is framed in terms of how they relate to this.

Prior to 9/11 CIDA addresses the 1st and 3rd Levels and argues that development can improve Canadian national security by addressing human security concerns such as

inequality, disease and human rights. As with USAID, however, there is no clear discussion of how CIDA's development programmes can address these national security problems. However, following 9/11 there is a withdrawal from this position and CIDA does not reference Canadian national security as a justification for development aid, referring only to the 2nd and 3rd Level of the security of the developing state and security for ordinary people. However, the government agencies of foreign policy and military agencies consistently define security at the 1st Level and connect development policy to Canadian foreign and security policy goals. Following 9/11 this is extended to include issues such as terrorism and failed states. Whereas CIDA refers to fragile states in purely development terms drawing on the 2nd and 3rd Levels, the GoC, DND and DFAIT refer to them in terms of terrorism and religious extremism drawing on the 1st Level of Canadian national security. However, while the DFAIT, DND and GoC assert that the 1st Level in this category is important for development, there is no elaboration or discussion of how development can address the other two levels of security. So while Canada identifies development problems as representing risks to the security of individuals, developing states and its own national security, there is no clear articulation of how its development programmes can address these risks. Given that CIDA no longer exists as a separate agency since 2013 when it was subsumed into the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, it is likely that this focus on national security as a referent object of merging security and development will now dominate. Overall, Canada's merging of security and development appears shallow without any detailed discussion, but risks to its own national security are still referenced.

Overall, while these three levels of security are all present in policy discourse, the 1st Level, donor national security, is the main referent of security across all 3 donors. When the 2nd and 3rd Level referent objects of recipient states and individuals in recipient states are used, they are still justified in terms of the 1st Level and how they contribute to the security of the donor state. This is important because in interviews with representatives of all three agencies, it is asserted that the term 'security' in development policy refers to human security. Contrary to arguments in the literature that human security is now mainstreamed in the merging of security and development (Picciotto 2010; Pugh et al 2013) this analysis has shown that this is not strictly the case and that, for all three donor states, 'security' does also mean their own national security. Even when the security of individuals is referred to specifically as a referent, it is still from a perspective shared by all three donors that frames this view of

security in terms of how it relates to the 1st Level of security of the donor state. Even Canada, which does not engage in substantial argumentation round the merging of security and development, still references its own national security as a priority for development aid, albeit in a undefined way. So when security and development are merged in development policy, 'security' is principally for the national security of the donor state. This use of multiple referents in development policy can be understood as part of a process of establishing development problems as national security risks for donors.

Multiple referents = multiplied legitimacy?

Jocelyn Vaughn (2009) argues that drawing on multiple referents lends greater legitimacy to securitization claims. Following Corry's (2012) understanding of securitisation and 'riskification', this principle can also be applied to arguments identifying security risks. From Vaughn's (2009) perspective, this could be understood as a way for each agency to gain greater legitimacy for their claim of the importance of merging security and development by arguing for multiple referents. Development agencies make their claims for the urgency of development by connecting it to national security. In turn by using the individuals in developing states as referents, foreign policy and military parts of government can gain greater legitimacy for their national security claims among a wider development and humanitarian community and among members of the NGO sector who may have reservations about the militarization of development policy (for example a number of NGOs have published reports criticising the merging of security and development. See Cosgrave 2004; Reality of Aid 2006 and OXFAM America 2008).

In all three cases, the use of multiple referents is an exercise in consensus building to facilitate the merging of security and development. Within this narrative, elements of the two main perspectives outlined in Chapter 2 are both present. As the security of the donor is the most important at an existential level, it is used to frame the other two levels of security. 'Sceptics' could argue that merging security and development is a form of biopolitical governance seeking to control populations in the developing world with the aim of ensuring security for the West (Duffield 2005, 2010a; Pupavac 2005). But in turn 'optimists' could

argue that military and government actors still seek to resist claims of imperialism and the militarization of foreign policy in the WoT by framing developing states and their citizens as the referent object of security. This is consistent with arguments that merging security and development is for the benefit of ordinary citizens in the developing world (Picciotto 2004; Stewart 2004; Pugh et al 2013). However, neither of these approaches adequately captures the nuances of the relationship outlined in this study where both these processes coexist in policy to differing degrees. At the level of policy discourse all three referents are merged into a singular security-development nexus. But the benefit of this analysis, looking at three different donors and the full sweep of government agencies involved in development rather than just development or security agencies allows a broader understanding. These multiple referents are used to establish a consensus on the identification of development problems as security risks. As the preceding chapters show, different donors go into different levels of sophistication and complexity in arguing the causal connections between these three referents – the UK to the greatest extent, Canada to the least extent. Security risks are identified at multiple levels and development aid is offered as a solution to those risks. But common to all is the argument that development problems can be long term security risks for donor states. The arguments around this claim are articulated to varying levels across donors and so a key issue is how far this idea has penetrated into practice. If development aid is highlighted as key to addressing security risks for multiple referents, what changes have occurred within aid institutions and practices to allow it to address these risks?

Security in development policy

In practice the merging of security and development has led to the US and the UK using development aid to offset long-term security risk on the one hand and, on the other hand, it has provided a new purpose for development aid at a time when the usefulness and very purpose of aid has been called into question (for example, Calderisi 2007; Moyo 2009). In contrast, in the case of Canada, there has been little coordination or commonality of purpose between development, foreign policy and military agencies. This section examines the impacts of this focus on donor national security from the perspective of ODA flows, changes in the institutional make up of development agencies and specific country programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya.

Using ODA to address state fragility

The patterns in ODA flows common to all donors are: an increase in the volume of aid; a shift to prioritising fragile states and a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). All countries have increased their aid flows in absolute terms over this period of time. However, only the UK has increased its ODA in terms of percentage of GNI. Within this increase in ODA a shift to focusing ODA on security and conflict is evident. Both the US and the UK have created funding streams specifically for conflict and security. All three countries have given increasing amounts of ODA to states classified as failed or fragile. In addition, all three have prioritised three principal frontline states in the WoT – Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Furthermore there has been a shift to spending in SSA across all three donors. Whilst the prioritisation of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan has declined as military operations began to wind down in two of these countries since 2009, the shift to fragile states and to SSA has increased over this period. In the case of the UK 30% of its ODA is now committed to fragile states. From one perspective it may be argued that this shows a commitment to poverty alleviation as all three states assert that the majority of the world's poorest live in fragile states[87]. As a result, spending in these countries is necessary to address poverty. However, all three donors also identify fragile states as national security risks. In addition, Sub Saharan Africa is also identified as a possible source of insecurity for these donor states. Taking this into account these three shifts in ODA spending are consistent with the discourse of merging security and development and highlight a common geographical and thematic focus to ODA despite the differences in discourse on the merging of security and development. This discourse of identifying areas of risk is accompanied by a shift in ODA spending to those areas of risk both programmatically and geographically.

[87] The extent to which this is the case is debateable. For the year 2012 twelve of the top 20 fragile states were also among the 20 lowest countries on the Human Development Index. Which suggests a degree of overlap, but not a direct connection between state fragility and poverty.

Institutional changes in development agencies

The deeper impact of the merging of security and development on US development practice is evident in the establishment of a number of structures within USAID to address the issue of conflict such as the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), the Food for Peace Programme (FFP) and the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC). The purpose of these structures is to mainstream conflict and security across development programming and to align policy priorities with the DoD. In addition to this, USAID has representatives on the National Security Council (NSC). The establishment of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) also involved coordinating military and development capabilities to address security risks in Africa. AFRICOM security risk management functions are evident as its remit is to secure oil reserves, combat terrorism and to offset China's expansionism while also addressing issues such as HIV/AIDS and conflict resolution (Jackson 2009: 45). So whilst, the merging of security in the US's development policy may have been a response to the WoT, the way USAID coordinates with the rest of government has been changed and new structures have been created which have further intensified the coordination between development and security and foreign policy. These structures do aim to address security at the 2nd and 3rd Levels of developing states and individuals, but again this is justified because of how it will ensure security at the 1st Level of US national security. This suggests that the identification of development problems as security risks is not confined to discourse and structures have been created to assess those risks, coordinate development action across the board and align those actions with overall US national security policy.

Coinciding with the identification of development problems as security risks, the UK government has sought to coordinate between development, foreign policy and security policy in a way that addresses all three levels of referents of donor state, recipient state and ordinary people. This is evident in a number of institutional changes both across UK government and within DfID. A specific Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) has been created to address conflict and poverty in fragile states and to ensure DfID's compliance with UK government national security policies (DfID 2012: 2). Within DfID the positions of Conflict Analysts have been created to mainstream conflict sensitivity across development activities and also to formulate DfID's response to conflict situations and

a Conflict Advisor to oversee that development aid conforms to standards of poverty alleviation set out by the UK International Development Act 2002. Across the UK government, the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools (ACPP and GCPP) and the Stabilisation Unit were established to coordinate the actions of DfID the MoD and the FCO on conflict and security. In addition to this, a National Security Council (NSC) was set up in 2010 modelled on its US counterpart. The head of DfID sits on the NSC and DfID is expected to contribute to planning and actions on UK national security. While the logic of conflict sensitivity is to address security at the 3rd level for ordinary people, the overriding justification is that it contributes to the 1st level of UK national security. So while development problems are identified and acted on as security risks for ordinary citizens and developing states, managing these risks is understood in terms of managing risks to UK national security.

In contrast to the other two donors, CIDA's adoption of security and conflict into policy programming has been shallow with the sole context of its involvement in the PRT in Afghanistan as its only sustained engagement in policy practice. CIDA has no specific programmes related to conflict and security. As Canada's identification of the connections between security and development are not strongly argued or well-formed in Canada's policy discourse, so too its institutions have not changed to address issues of security and development in any significant way. Rather than bringing security into the mainstream of development policy, the merging of security and development is at the level of ad hoc responses to specific contexts of humanitarian emergencies such as the Haiti earthquake in 2010 or the military involvement in the PRT in Afghanistan. The coordinated body the Strategic Tactical Assistance Response Fund (START) brings together CIDA, the DND and DFAIT for the purpose of rapid response to humanitarian emergencies. However, CIDA does not get involved in long-term development projects with START, instead it is aimed at a short term response and providing relief in emergency situations. Whilst these may address the needs of ordinary citizens in recipient countries at the 3rd level, they are mainly from the perspective of securing the developing state at the 2nd level, whether through the provision of aid to assist the state in coping with a systemic shock or assisting in military efforts to extend the reach of the state over uncontrolled areas. This is a reflection of Canada's national security priorities which are different to the US and the UK and therefore placing

development problems as lower order security risks. As CIDA has been wound up, the future direction of this minimal involvement in security is uncertain.

While all three donors identify development problems as security risks and have responded to the WoT with a merging of security and development, the US and the UK have made changes to their aid institutions to facilitate greater involvement in security in order to manage these risks. These changes come from a logic of security risk management that draws together the interests of all three referents of security identifying development problems as security risks at all three Levels, but again the referent of the donor state is dominant. These changes have gathered pace as the military activities of the WoT have been wound down. The next issue is how these changes have impacted on the specific cases of Ethiopia and Kenya.

Containing state fragility in East Africa

This section looks at specific programming in Ethiopia and Kenya and argues that although all three donors identify both countries as a source of risk for their own national security, only the US and the UK implement specific development programmes to address conflict and security at either the level of the recipient state or the level of the individual. Whilst Ethiopia receives greater funding than Kenya, there is a greater prevalence of conflict and security programmes in Kenya due to the more open political environment there. All three levels of security are addressed in programming where possible. Where this is not possible in the case of Ethiopia there are still programmes to address the security needs of individuals. These security needs are still framed as important because of how they address risk to donor national security. This section looks at all three donor's programmes in Ethiopia firstly and in Kenya secondly.

Development and risk in Ethiopia

For all donors, involvement in conflict and security is problematic in Ethiopia due to the high level of control the government has on matters of Ethiopian national security. All security matters related to border control and the security services are seen as the remit of the Ethiopian government. All three donors identify Ethiopia as important for regional stability and their own national security. But the role of development in offsetting that security risk is different for each donor. None of the three donors can get involved in issues such as reform of the security services or border control. However, both the US and the UK use their development programmes to address conflict at a local level. These development efforts conform to the 3rd Level of security for ordinary citizens in developing states. The difference between these countries is that the US does not give consistent funding to these projects and decisions on funding are made outside of the country back in Washington. In contrast, the UK plans programming and decides levels of funding within its Ethiopia country programme. In addition, the UK programmes go further to address issues such as gender equality and education for girls. The UK's programmes are given a five-year funding commitment and have expanded significantly in the past five years. This shows that in the case of Ethiopia both the US and the UK identify security risks at the levels of their own national security and regional stability but they also seek to address these risks through addressing root causes of conflict at the local level. This is consistent with an understanding of conflict caused by a number of local drivers (O'Gorman 2011; Beswick and Jackson 2013). In contrast to the US and UK, Canada does not implement any development programmes aimed at offsetting its national security risks at a local level. Instead it aligns its development programmes to the priorities of the GoE and it does not address the issue of conflict sensitivity in its development programmes.

Development and risk in Kenya

All three donors identify Kenya as a source of potential national security risks and as important for ensuring stability in the horn of Africa. In contrast to Ethiopia, Kenya has a more open political environment and its government does not maintain a monopoly on national security concerns. For all donors, the 2013 general election was a cause for concern

as a repeat of the 2008 post-election violence could lead to civil unrest and possible state collapse. The US shows concern with the integrity of the Kenyan state and its development programmes are targeted at bolstering this through police reform and partnerships with civil society. On the one hand the US uses development aid as part of conflict mediation processes to assist in bolstering peace settlements through development projects. On the other hand in its police reform programme there is no focus on the 3rd level of addressing the security needs of ordinary citizens. Instead the focus is on how a functioning police force can address the 2nd level and ensure greater stability of the state. In contrast to this, the UK, while also focused on policing, seeks to address the 3rd level of the security needs of ordinary citizens through its development programmes. An example of this is its programmes in the north-east of Kenya. This is a conflict affected region, its people are marginalised within Kenya and suffer from the overflow of conflict in Somalia. DfID runs programmes in this area to mitigate and resolve conflict using development aid as a means of bolstering peace agreements. In contrast to both the UK and the US, Canada does not engage at all in development programmes targeted at conflict resolution. As highlighted in Chapter 6 this is due to Canada's weak capacity in terms of overall development planning and also its inability to operate in conflict affected environments and, its different risk perception of the dangers of instability in the region. So while it identifies key issues for Canadian national security such as Kenya's capacity to manage and contain instability in Somalia and the cohesion of the Kenyan state in order for it to do this, it does not use its development aid to address issues of conflict and security that impact on ordinary citizens.

While the focus on ordinary citizens as a referent for security is evident in the programming of the UK and the US, consideration of donor national security as a referent for security dominates. Whilst it is further down the ranking of top recipients than Ethiopia for all three donors, Kenya is still among the top 20 recipients for all three countries. As Table 4.5 shows, the US gives over three times as much to peace and security programs in Kenya than it does in Ethiopia, and as Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show, the UK gives about the same level to "Governance and Security" programmes in both countries although its budget for Ethiopia is almost three times the size of that for Kenya. In Ethiopia where it is not possible for donors to address the top two levels of donor national security and recipient state security directly through these specific security and conflict programmes due to the monopoly of the GoE on these issues, these projects are smaller. However, in Kenya there are no such restrictions and

both donors can get directly involved in issues of state security including border control and counterterrorism, and these projects are bigger. This suggests that while both donors address security at the level of ordinary citizens in both countries, when it is permitted for them to get involved in national security concerns they give more money to peace and security programs. This indicates that these programs are focused more on the top two levels of security than at the third level addressing the well-being of ordinary citizens. While the UK does seek to bolster the Kenyan state and avoid state collapse, it also uses its development aid to address security problems that impact on the lives of ordinary citizens. In sum, all donors identify Kenya and Ethiopia as important for their own national security in their policy discourse. However, in practice only the US and the UK actually use development programmes to offset the security risks. The UK has a deeper engagement in this than the US and its programmes address the level of security of ordinary citizens to a greater extent than the US. Having established this, the next issue is why this is the case.

The security-development nexus as risk management

Each country's merging of security and development as risk management is reflected in their security priorities and in the overall agenda of their development agency. The US identifies terrorism and instability in the developing world as national security threats following 9/11. This is consistent with the merging of security and development in its policy. Canada also highlights terrorism, religious extremism and instability in the developing world, but not so much as national security threats for itself, but rather for the US. As is argued in the literature, the national security of the US is highlighted as important for Canada due to trade reasons (Black 2009: 42; Brown and Jackson 2008: 78; Swiss 2012: 156). From this perspective, the identification with these security risks is not as strong for Canada as it is for the US and the UK, rather it is tied up with Canada's economic risks. As a result Canada's use of development aid to offset these risks is not as comprehensive. The UK identifies terrorism and migration as strong security risks. Its shift to managing these risks through its ODA is evident and the most clearly argued and debated of the three cases. The national security priorities also interact with the role of the particular development agency within government.

What the merging of security and development tells us about the risk society

As this chapter has argued, the merging of security and development is best understood from the perspective of Ulrich Beck's risk society thesis. States have realised the limits of military solutions alone for managing security problems, furthermore there is a perception that neglect of development problems will lead to future risk of unknowable consequences for Western states. The response to this has been to increasingly focus development aid on fragile and conflict affected areas and on addressing development problems that are believed to be the root causes of conflict and instability and institutional changes within donors to coordinate development, foreign policy and military actors. The next question is whether these actions conform to Beck's ideal situation of a world risk society based on cosmopolitanism and international cooperation. This research suggests that this is not the case and rather, as Spence (2005) has argued, that states manage risk in a way that is still rooted in the values of modernity rather than in reflexive modernity. The merging of security and development to manage risk still operates on modern conceptions of the nation state, and ideas of security as attack and defence. It is not based on the principles of recognising difference in the context of the developing state and the role of the West in contributing to instability rather than just being at risk from it. Security risks are something that exist out there in the developing world and it is up to "us" to manage those risks through ensuring greater stability and predictability of security outcomes in the developing world. Even when individuals in the developing world are referents of security, it is principally because of how greater security for "them" will lead to greater security for the donor country.

A key element of Beck's (1992) world risk society thesis is the transition to a second modernity or reflexive modernity where risks are managed through international cooperation in a way which addresses the long-term root causes of risk and does not create further risk through short-term responses. The merging of security and development demonstrates elements of reflexivity, but it does not represent a progression to a second modernity as Beck outlines. These elements of reflexivity are evident in some of the arguments behind the merging of security and development such as the recognition of the role of Western states in contributing to conflict. For example, the geopolitical support for dictatorial regimes friendly

to the West during the Cold War leading to conflict, in addition to the withdrawal of foreign policy interest and development funds to conflict affected countries in the post-Cold War period further exacerbating conflict. Following a problem solving logic, merging security and development is a reflexive response to addressing security risks which have been partly caused by the previous actions/inactions of donors, recognising the necessity of a comprehensive approach coordinating the actions of development, defence and foreign policy agencies. It is this logic which the 'optimist' literature draws on in arguing for the positive potential of the security-development nexus. This thread of logic can be seen in the 'virtuous cycle' of security and development proposed by Stewart (2004) and Picciotto's (2010) assertion that conventional understandings of security will be subsumed by human security and the arguments for closer coordination between military and development actors (Hurwitz and Peake 2004; International Peace Academy 2006). However, this study has revealed varying levels of reflexivity in the US, the UK and Canada's merging of security and development, none of which conforms to Beck's standard of moving to a second modernity.

The adherence to conventional notions of security in terms of defending the homeland is evident in all three donors merging of security and development. As detailed above, to varying degrees all three donors frame development problems as risks to their own national security. While security risks are identified at the level of the developing state and individuals within developing states, and development aid is identified as the solution to these risks, these actions are still framed in terms of how they address the national security of the donor. While the actions of the past are referred to in terms of creating conflict and security problems in the developing world, there is no reflection of how more recent actions by donor states may contribute to instability and conflict in the developing world. For example, Somalia is highlighted by donors as a security problem for both Ethiopia and Kenya and development interventions are targeted at assisting both countries to manage this risk. However, there is no mention of how the actions of the US and the UK in combating Islamist groups in Somalia have contributed to these security risks for Ethiopia and Kenya. Instead, these development problems and security risks are treated as external to donor states and requiring development intervention to address them. In the case of the UK, as the merging of security and development has deepened in policy and practice, there has been less reflection on how these actions could create further security risk. Prior to 9/11, DfID articulated these concerns in policy referring to the dangers of development aid exacerbating security risks by supporting

dictatorial regimes who pose a threat to their own citizens (DfID 2000: 23). In addition to the concern that merging security and development could result in development priorities being side-lined by military considerations (DfID, 1999: 6). The most recent policy position of the UK no longer identifies these issues as problems and instead asserts that development and security interests are for the benefit of both UK national security and the developing world. Adherence to what Beck would describe as notions of modernity are evident in the representation of security risks existing in the developing world, needing to be managed through development actions and being subsumed within arguments of common interests between all parties.

This focus on donor national security would appear to fit with 'sceptical' ideas in the literature resonating with Duffield (2005) and Pupavac's (2004) arguments around development as a form of biopolitical control to manage insecurity for the West. However, this understanding of merging security and development does not capture the complexities and variation in this study. While all three donors identify development problems as security risks, and all donors have directed aid flows to conflict affected regions and states, there is significant variation in how states define the connections between security and development in policy, and how their development programmes are used to address security risks. Canada states the importance of development for its own national security, but it does not argue in policy discourse how the two are connected and can support each other. In addition, outside of Afghanistan, it does not address issues of conflict in its development programmes. In the case of the US the connection between development interventions and US national security is repeatedly asserted in policy, however, there is little discussion of how this operates in practice. In development programmes, there is a greater focus on addressing development problems at the level of the state, rather than addressing insecurity for ordinary citizens. The UK goes to greater lengths to articulate the connections between long-term development problems as insecurities, using its development programmes to address these insecurities and UK national security. In its programmes it goes further than the US to target development programmes in order to address security risks for ordinary citizens. From the perspective of biopolitics and governance it is difficult to understand this variation, as all examples can be subsumed into a process of biopolitical management of developing populations in order to contain danger in the developing world. But the idea of risk management offers a different perspective on this.

As the foreign policy priorities of the US are to maintain its supremacy on the international stage, it is not surprising that it seeks to utilise its development aid as a means of addressing security risks. However, while it identifies the importance of addressing long-term development problems in order to manage risks to its own national security, it does not adequately use its development programmes to address these risks. Programmes aimed at addressing the root causes of insecurity for ordinary citizens are given little funding and have little predictability in funding from year to year. Instead, the US uses its development aid to address development problems that represent security risks to the developing state. In contrast, the UK identifies terrorism and migration as security risks emanating from the developing world, but similar to Canada, many of its security priorities are connected to its support for the US in the WoT. However, the UK argues for connections between development problems and insecurity and uses its development policy to address root causes of security risks at the 3rd Level of ordinary citizens. Examples of this are the programmes aimed at education for girls in the Somali region of Ethiopia and programmes aimed at resolving conflict in North Eastern Kenya, a region neglected by other donors. These programmes are given five year funding commitments. While the UK still frames these programmes in terms of its own national security, they nonetheless hold out the potential for addressing insecurity faced by ordinary citizens rather than just ensuring a stronger state. While this is unlikely to happen in the way that 'optimists' frame the relationship due to the prioritisation of UK national security goals, neither is it an necessarily a destructive action contributing to a deepening unwinnable conflict as Duffield (2010a) describes the security-development nexus. At the very least, the approach of the UK is far more likely to address problems of insecurity for ordinary citizens than that of the US.

In contrast to both the US and the UK, Canada does not use its development programmes to address causes of conflict outside of the context of Afghanistan. Its development agency CIDA does not engage in discussion around the coordination of development and security. The case of Canada does not fit with either the 'optimist' or 'sceptic' perspectives. From the 'optimist' perspective Canada has not strongly articulated how security and development can be brought together in a mutually reinforcing way. As it was at the forefront of a number of initiatives inspired by the concept of human security during the 1990s, it could be expected

that Canada would try to shape connections between security and development in a manner consistent with these initiatives. Instead, Canada has retreated from coordination between security and development to a large extent. From the 'sceptical' perspective, Canada does not use its development programme in a way consistent with biopolitics or governance. Instead, while it identifies the importance of development for its national security, it has a weak commitment to development overall with consistently low levels of funding for its aid programme and its development agency being ultimately subsumed into a collective agency with trade and foreign policy. But from the perspective of risk management, Canada's identification of national security risks is closely connected to the US and its importance to Canada as a trading partner. For Canada, national security risks are closely connected to economic risks. As a result, while there is a discussion of the security-development nexus at the government level, there has been no great drive or impetus to try and off-set security risks through its development aid programme. Taken together, the variation in cases can be accommodated within an understanding of Ulrich Beck's risk society. The purpose of the security-development nexus is to ensure greater order and predictability of outcomes in the developing world. How these risks are assessed and acted upon by donors leads to variations in the merging of security and development. The way in which risk is managed through development policy is thrown into sharp relief in the way the US and the UK have sought to use development aid to prevent violence in the 2013 Kenyan general elections.

Managing risk through managing expectations

A common factor of these three donors security risk assessments is their involvement in Ethiopia and Kenya is driven by concern over state fragility in both countries. This risk is assessed differently in both countries. In the case of Ethiopia, during interviews, all donors express concerns over human rights abuses and the complete domination of the ruling party over electoral politics. However, the stability and integrity of the state is less of a concern. While, direct budget support was terminated by all three donors after the 2005 election violence, overall aid to Ethiopia has increased since then. In contrast, the fragility of the Kenyan state is the main concern for all three donors. The 2008 post-election violence is repeatedly referred to in policy discourse and interviews and significant development efforts went into avoiding a repeat of this at the 2013 elections. These efforts reveal a pessimistic

view of the nature of the Kenyan state where real change of domestic politics away from factionalism and corruption is believed unlikely. As a result the focus is on managing the expectations and behaviour of the public and the response of the security services to civil unrest. US and UK development projects were aimed at working with civil society groups to encourage them to respond to injustices through means other than violence. This included peaceful demonstrations and the use of the media to air grievances through debate. In addition to this, development projects were also aimed at encouraging the police to respond in a non-violent way to public protests. Rather than viewing it as a form of unrest that needs to be repressed through violence, training programmes sought to change the perception of protest as a legitimate right of citizens that needed to be managed and overseen by the police.

While the 3rd Level of security is addressed within these policies, it is from the perspective of maintaining stability within the state through the management of the possible destabilising effects of civil disobedience. Overall, rather than focusing on the big step of democratic reform, instead the focus is on mitigating the risk of state fragility through management of the reaction of the public and the security services to questionable electoral procedures and results. Indeed, in interviews the success of these development programmes is argued by highlighting the similarities between the irregularities in both the 2007 and 2013 elections and the differences in the response to them with minimal unrest following the 2013 election. Overall this suggests a prioritisation of stability over democratic reform. In the past, the idea of the developmental state was viewed by donors as counterproductive. Under the liberal democratic model, the state should have minimal involvement in economic matters and service provision, this should be left to the private sector and the liberal global economy (Williamson 1990). However, from the perspective of risk management, the developmental state offers potentially greater stability than the democratic state. In Ethiopia the benefits of the developmental state for the public are highlighted by donors, in Kenya state collapse is a concern for donors and the public are encouraged to change their expectations of a more equitable political system. The role of development is not just to bring prosperity and eliminate the causes of conflict, it is also to manage the potential risk of state failure by conditioning how citizens react to the failure of the democratic process. These actions may seem consistent with biopolitics, in particular Pupavac's (2005: 172) around the management of expectations as a form of governance. However, looking at them as part of a broader process of risk management gives an understanding of these actions as part of the

identification and management of risk operating in a specific context. In this case, the strong identification of state collapse in Kenya as a risk for both US and UK national security has led to concerted efforts to address these risks through security and development policy. In other contexts the identification of risks may be different and lead to different actions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the merging of security and development is now a part of mainstream development policy and has developed its own policy space and logic as part of security risk management. Rather than just an *ad hoc* relationship between military and development actors in either humanitarian disaster or conflict contexts, it is now part of long-term mainstream development policy. This has given a renewed purpose to development aid and is justified through a problem-solving logic of a mutually beneficial relationship between the development and security of the poorest in the developing world and the security of Western donor states. Rather than development actors being unwilling participants who are overrun by military considerations, both the UK and US development agencies have been enthusiastic about the extended role of development policy to address conflict and security concerns and have embraced a humans security discourse. There is a consensus that development programmes can address the long term problems that can lead to conflict. The narrative of these actions in turn offsetting donor national security risks is something that has been accepted by DfID and USAID although to a far lesser degree CIDA. Yet, as this research has also shown, the national security of the donor country also features heavily in this relationship. The merging of security and development operates as a means of risk management for instability in the developing world that may unfold as a security threat for donor states. Development aid is expected to address root causes of conflict before they emerge, contain disquiet or help resolve existing conflict through bringing greater prosperity. In the context of Kenya and Ethiopia, the priority of the security-development nexus is to bring about stability through encouraging more predictable security outcomes. This is evident in the policy focus on managing expectations around the failure of the democratic system rather than bringing about democratic change. As Björn Hettne has argued, "Order rather than justice became the predominant neoconservative concern after 2001" (Hettne 2010: 50). From this perspective development, rather than being a process of transformation that will

bring greater democracy and justice, is a process that can bring about greater stability by managing security risks.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The opening that this thesis seeks to fill is the lack of detailed contextual understanding of the security-development nexus grounded in systematic research. In addressing this gap, this thesis has established a number of characteristics of the security-development nexus: for both the US and the UK security is now part of mainstream development policy, whereas for Canada it is still on the margins of development policy. In addition, contrary to claims in the literature, the reverse has not happened and there has been no significant 'developmentalisation' of security policy (Ritchie 2011: 370; Pugh et al. 2013: 196). All three donors identify development as important for their own national security, but only the US and the UK have made changes to their aid institutions and programmes to address this. In their specific aid programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya the UK address security risks to ordinary citizens and the respective states, the US focus more on the level of the state than the individual and Canada do not use their aid programme to address issues of conflict at either level. At the outset, this thesis stated that resolving and preventing protracted civil conflict is possibly the main challenge to international security. Given what this thesis has shown, key questions are: what does this research tell us about the drive to use development aid to resolve and prevent conflict? What are the implications of this for broader development and security policy? This chapter will address this by firstly discussing the core contributions of this thesis. Secondly by analysing what these contributions tell us about attempts to resolve conflict. Thirdly by examining the implications of this for future changes in development and security policy. Lastly is a discussion of openings for future research in this area.

The security-development nexus in context

This thesis makes two different contributions, one empirical and the other theoretical, to the existing body of research on the security development nexus. The empirical contribution of this thesis is to move beyond broad assertions about a collective security-development nexus to look at how specific donors of the US, the UK and Canada have merged security and development. Analysing policy documents across multiple government agencies rather than just development agencies through both a discourse analysis and a content analysis, based on a novel framework, have drawn a comprehensive picture from existing data. In addition to

this, new data have been generated through interviews with key figures including interviews conducted in-country through field work in Ethiopia and Kenya. From this systematic research a clearer picture has been established of how the security-development nexus functions in specific donor and recipient contexts. Building on this empirical contribution, the theoretical contribution brings a novel theoretical perspective drawing on Ulrich Beck's idea of the risk society to understand these findings. Security has been brought into development policy through the identification of security risks and variations in the risk assessment and priorities of donors is reflected in how they have merged security and development and the extent to which they have acted to address these risks. From the perspective of risk management, merging security and development can be used to address security risks to the poorest and most vulnerable or it can be used to address risks to the national security of donors.

The role of the security-development nexus in conflict resolution and prevention

If development aid has a part to play in conflict resolution, then what is its role? This thesis has shown that development has been tasked with resolving existing conflict and preventing future conflict in a number of ways: by spending money in states deemed to be fragile and conflict affected; by providing resources to bolster peace agreements between warring factions; by ensuring that the distribution of development resources within a country does not contribute to conflict by disrupting relations between groups; by addressing chronic problems of low education, gender imbalance and youth unemployment to prevent future conflict; by strengthening government institutions; and by encouraging security services to have greater respect for human rights. This represents a diverse range of actions beyond the core development aim of poverty reduction. The arguments for these individual actions are logical and highlight the connections between these actions and poverty reduction. However, taken collectively they represent a problematic picture of development's role in conflict resolution. A pattern that emerges from this thesis is that the deepest coordination between security and development is in the case of the two donors that most strongly connect their development actions with their own national security – the US and the UK. Canada has minimal merging of security and development and minimal discussion connecting its national security with development aid. In addition to this, there is little evidence of a coinciding 'developmentalisation of security'.

Whilst the discourse on the connection between national security and development highlights a long-term view of national security which sees the well-being and prosperity of the world's poorest as central to national security, this thesis has also shown that national security priorities are also to ensure short-term stability and greater predictability of outcomes in developing countries. The importance of addressing insecurity for individuals in both policy and practice is understood in terms of how it can address national security risks. While both the long-term development and immediate stability goals coexist in programming, national security goals take priority and can undermine the long-term goals of development in addressing conflict and insecurity. The prospect of development successfully addressing the long-term causes of conflict is unlikely given that the national security priorities of states still include combating terrorism and extremism and involve the targeting of specific groups, restricting their movement, targeting them for surveillance, or targeting them for military action. In the contexts of development aid reinforcing the developing state, the security agencies of these states are expected to assist donor countries in these actions, causing further marginalisation and alienation of conflict affected populations. This issue is also important when considering the possibility of security being formalised as a goal of international development.

The implications of security and development as risk management

The current common development standards of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been criticised for the absence of security and conflict indicators by advocates of the merging of security and development (Picciotto 2010: 2). In response to this, security is likely to be formalised as a priority in some form in the post-2015 UN development goals. The UN High Level Panel report highlights conflict as "development in reverse" and asserts the need for peace and security to be considered as a cross-cutting issue which impacts on a number of different goals (UN 2013: 16). In addition, the Secretary general of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, has argued for their inclusion asserting that "The 1.5 billion people who live in fragile and conflict-affected areas have been largely left behind in our work towards the MDGs."[88] This is important because it is assumed that peace and security programmes are aimed at resolving

[88] Speech by the Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, on shaping development priorities post-2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44233#.VDUOExa9ZpM

conflict at a local level. However, as this thesis has shown, donors are likely to be receptive to this idea but will still understand local conflict from the perspective of addressing risks to their own national security. As a result, formalising security issues as development goals is likely to meet the same difficulties highlighted above. So whilst consensus may be reached on this development goal, it is likely that donors will continue to frame this and act upon it in terms of their own national security. In addition to the difficulties outlines above, the connection between resolving conflict in the developing world and the national security of donors is also problematic in the way that it frames the developing world as a source of danger for the developed world.

This research has implications for how populations in the developing world are perceived by the West. Rita Abrahamsen (2004) argues that the framing of Africa as a source of danger has led to an increase in racism in the UK and encouraged more restrictive immigration policies. In the case of the US and the UK, even when security and development are connected in a positive way such as the development benefits of resolving local conflicts, this is still framed in terms of why it is important for the national security of the donor. As argued in Chapter 7, security risks are understood by states as something that exist 'out there' in the developing world and need to be managed. Attempts to justify development programmes in terms of realist appeals to security and self-interest are likely to perpetuate negative stereotyping of developing populations as a source of danger and insecurity, rather than a perspective of solidarity and compassion. This may garner greater support for development in the short-term, but it may undermine core development values in the longer-term. As the possible dangers of risks recede so too may interest in development objectives with no direct causal connection with security risks.

The findings of this thesis are also relevant for security studies literature. As discussed in Chapter 2, much has been written about the broadening of the security agenda to include long-term development problems as security threats. In particular, advocates of human security (Axworthy 1997; Leaning & Arie, 2000) argue that this move to address long-term causes of insecurity at a systemic level is an indication of a paradigm shift away from conventional understandings of state-centric security. However, this study demonstrates that addressing security at the level of long-term development problems is still rooted in conventional understandings of defending national security. In the case of all three donors, security agencies refer to the importance of addressing development problems to some

degree. In addition, all three donors justify their development activities in Ethiopia and Kenya because of national security threats. Development aid is expected to contribute to national security by addressing security risks in these countries. In the case of the US and the UK, development agency members sit on the national security councils and they are expected to inform policy on how addressing long-term development problems and security actions can complement and reinforce each other. However, the overarching understanding is the importance of national security and how development aid can offset risks associated with this, rather than a shift to security being defined as threats to the poorest and most vulnerable.

Openings for further mapping of the security-development nexus

This understanding of security and development as a form of risk management opens up a number of further avenues of study. Key issues to be explored are the approach of new donors, in particular China to security in development policy, the approach of multilateral actors and international NGOs such as the UN and the World Bank and the approach of recipient governments in framing security issues as part of their development priorities. The UN plays a significant role in setting development agendas and standards for conflict interventions. The World Bank has also highlighted the importance of security for development and has articulated its approach to this in it 2011 *World Development Report: Conflict Security and Development* (World Bank 2011). A further study tracing how the UN and the Word Bank have addressed the coordination of security and development over an extended period of time following the same method of content and discourse analyses of policy documents in addition to interviews with key figures in the UN and the World Bank and case studies of specific UN and World Bank security and development interventions would add another dimension of understanding.

A study of Asian donors such as India and China's policy on security and development would also provide a contrast to that of Western donors. The three donors in this sample are all traditional donors coming from a Western perspective. A study of how new donors from the East have brought security into their development policy, in particular in Africa would add further depth to the understanding of the security-development nexus. This subject was broached during field work in Kenya and interviewees from NGOs expressed concerns that China's domestic human rights record and its primary focus on economic development

suggested that it had less concern with the security of individuals and more concern with state stability. Whilst critical of Western donors behaviour in many aspects, these NGOs felt that they had a greater concern for the wellbeing of individuals and human rights than China. The same interviewees expressed the concern that the Kenyan government were less concerned about local conflict than Western donors were. This leads to another possible avenue of research on how recipients of development aid frame security and development issues.

This study has taken the donor perspective, but the other side of the relationship is how recipient states deal with domestic issues of conflict and security and how these are presented to donors. In the case of Ethiopia, the government places itself as an important partner in the WoT for the West, but it also seeks to play down any domestic conflict and maintains a monopoly on issues of its own domestic security. Other countries such as Nigeria have openly portrayed its problems of internal conflict as part of a broader international Islamic extremist threat. A study of how recipients frame issues of security and development could be contrasted with this study of donors and add another level of understanding of the security-development nexus.

This thesis has examined the varying degrees to which the US, the UK and Canada have merged their security and development policies and argued that the overarching motivation behind this is to address risks to their own national security. These variations can be understood as variations in different donors' identification of risks to their own national security and variations in the actions they take to address those risks. Even when development is used to address the wellbeing of individuals it is from the understanding of how this can address risks to the national security of the donor. This thesis makes an empirical contribution through the use of different methods, including a novel framework for content analysis, to analyse different types of data establishing a solid basis for the theoretical contribution of understanding the merging of security and development as a form of security risk management for donors. This research is important in its own right and is also valuable as a basis on which to build further research.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Framework of questions for interviews with respondents in agency head offices

Questions for US Interviewees

- Failed states have become a focus of US Development policy in recent years. Why do you think that is?

- The definition of development used in USAID documents seems to be broader than that used in DoD and DoS documents. How do you think this effects collaboration between these organisations?

- What are the main challenges in collaborations between the military and development agencies?

- Some argue that in merging security and development, there is now a greater emphasis on security rather than development imperatives – your view on this?

- Some have argued that broader international security concerns such as terrorism and religious extremism are now development problems. What is your view on this?

- Do you feel that the role of USAID has changed under the Obama administration? In what ways?

- What is USAID's understanding of the concept of human security?

Questions for UK Interviewees

- One of the main aims of DfID upon its founding was to expand the influence of development into other areas of foreign policy such as trade etc. What differences have you seen in how development has influenced foreign policy moving from the Oversees Development Administration (ODA) to DfID? (Question for ministers or long serving civil servants).
- What has been the impact of DfID's greater focus on failed/fragile states?
- What role does DfID play in coordinated approaches with PRTs, SSR programmes and GCPP?
- What are the challenges of balancing more long-term development and more short-term foreign policy/security agendas?
- What role does security play in development policy?
- Are broader international security concerns such as terrorism and religious extremism now development problems? How can these be balanced against other development challenges?
- What is DfID's approach to the concept of human security?

Questions for Canadian Interviewees

- Do you think security has become a part of CIDA development policy in recent years? Why/why not?
- Do you think that development thinking has had a reciprocal effect on influencing foreign policy - what examples can you give of this?
- What are the main challenges of coordinating with the DFAIT and the DND?
- What is CIDA's role in the PRT in Afghanistan?
- Some argue that in merging security and development, there is now a greater emphasis on security rather than development imperatives – your view on this?
- Some have argued that broader international security concerns such as terrorism and religious extremism are now development problems. What is your view on this?
- The concept of human security is a broad one. How would you explain CIDA's engagement with the concept?

Appendix 2: Framework of questions for interviews with respondents in Ethiopia and Kenya

Ethiopia Questions

General Questions

- Why does your country have a development programme in Ethiopia?
- Are security and conflict issues part of your country programme? Why? How did this come about?
- What are the challenges of balancing more long-term development and more short-term foreign policy/security agendas?

USAID Questions

- How is conflict mitigation mainstreamed in Ethiopia policy?
- How has USAID assisted the transition from armed response to conflict towards more sensitive approaches?
- How does development support US strategic goals in Ethiopia?
- How has domestic counter-terrorism in Ethiopian legislation aided with the WoT or hindered good governance?

DfID Questions

- It has been said that DfID country offices have significant influence in overall planning. Do you agree with this? Can you give me an example?
- Do you think Ethiopian development impacts on UK security?
- How important are issues of extremism in DfID policy in Ethiopia?
- How does regional stability fit in with DfID policy in Ethiopia?

CIDA Questions

- Why is Ethiopia important for Canada's interests? Why is it a priority country?
- Why does Canada not engage with ideas of conflict and stability in its Ethiopia policy? Is it because it is not a relevant issue? Why is it not relevant when other donors deem it so?
- How can governance programmes lead to greater security?

Kenya Questions

General Questions

- Do you think that Kenya's country programme is important for national interest?
- Are security and conflict issues part of your country programme? Why? How did this come about?

USAID Questions

- Kenya is described in US policy as an anchor of stability in a region that threatens the US, how do USAID activities fit in with this?
- What are the key issues for USAID in mitigating conflict in Kenya? How do these tie in with broader development goals?
- How does conflict mitigation in Kenya fit in with broader regional stability?

DfID Questions

- It has been said that DfID country offices have significant influence in overall planning. Do you agree with this? Can you give me an example?
- Do you think Kenyan development impacts on UK security?

- How important are issues of extremism in DfID policy in Kenya?
- How does regional stability fit in with DfID policy in Kenya?
- Under the Value for Money policy rationalisation a number of programmes in Kenya have been cut? Do you think any of them should have been kept on?

CIDA Questions

There are no substantial CIDA policy documents on Kenya. On its website CIDA does not discuss conflict and security issues in its policy for Kenya. So aside from the broad question of why does CIDA not engage with security and conflict issues, a question on the elections may help to get another angle on it.

- Did CIDA have any role in ensuring stability in the run-up to the March 2013 elections? How/why not? Did other Canadian agencies in Kenya get involved?

Appendix 3: List of all Interviewees

	Referenced Title	Date	Interview Type	Location	Agency
USA	Anonymous USAID Official 1	18/04/2013	Telephone	Washington, D. C., USA	USAID
	Anonymous USAID Official 2	22/04/2013	Telephone	Washington, D. C., USA	USAID
	Anonymous USAID Official 3	30/04/2013	Telephone	Washington, D. C., USA	USAID
	Anonymous USAID Official 4	30/04/2013	Telephone	Washington, D. C., USA	USAID
	Anonymous USAID Official 5	30/10/2013	Telephone	Washington, D. C., USA	USAID
	Anonymous USAID Official 6	01/11/2013	Telephone	Washington, D. C., USA	USAID
	Anonymous USAID Official 7	20/11/2013	Telephone	Washington, D. C., USA	USAID
	Anonymous USAID Ethiopia Official 1	07/06/2013	Personal	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	CDC/USAID
	Anonymous USAID Ethiopia Official 2	13/06/2013	Personal	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	USAID Ethiopia
	Anonymous USAID Ethiopia Official 3	13/06/2013	Personal	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	USAID Ethiopia
	Anonymous USAID Kenya Official 1	18/06/2013	Personal	Nairobi, Kenya	USAID Kenya
	Anonymous USAID Kenya Official 2	18/06/2013	Personal	Nairobi, Kenya	USAID Kenya
	Anonymous DoS Kenya Official 1	18/06/2013	Personal	Nairobi, Kenya	DoS Kenya
UK	Clare Short	23/01/2013	Telephone	London, England	Former DfID Head
	Andrew Mitchell	29/01/2013	Telephone	London, England	Former DfID Head
	Anonymous DfID Official 1	06/11/2012	Telephone	London, England	DfID
	Anonymous DfID Official 2	07/11/202	Telephone	London, England	DfID
	Anonymous DfID Official 3	23/04/2013	Telephone	London, England	DfID
	Anonymous DfID Official 4	04/04/2014	Telephone	London, England	DfID
	Anonymous British Retired Major-General	20/03/2013	Telephone	London, England	UK Military

	Anonymous DfID Ethiopia Official 1	10/05/2013	Personal	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	DfID
	Anonymous DfID Kenya Official 1	17/05/2013	Personal	Nairobi, Kenya	DfID
	Anonymous DfID Kenya Official 2	25/06/2013	Personal	Nairobi, Kenya	DfID
Canada	Anonymous CIDA Official 1	07/10/2013	Telephone	Ottawa, Canada	CIDA
	Anonymous CIDA Official 2	18/10/2013	Telephone	Ottawa, Canada	CIDA
	Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia Official 1	06/06/2013	Personal	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	CIDA
	Anonymous CIDA Ethiopia Official 2	14/06/2013	Personal	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	CIDA
	Anonymous CIDA Kenya Official 1	19/06/2013	Personal	Nairobi, Kenya	CIDA

Appendix 4: Content Analysis Total Word Count

Table A4.1: Total Word Count for all US Documents

	1997 USAID	**1999 USAID**	**2000 USAID**	**2002 USAID**	**2002 NSS**	**2004 USAID**	**2004 DoS**	**2005 USAID**	**2006 NSS**	**2006 DoD**	**2006 USAID**	**2007 DoS**	**2008 DoD**	**2008 USAID**	**2010 DoS**	**2010 DoD**	**2010 NSS**	**2011 USAID**
Liberalization	9	16	4	19	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deregulation	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privatization	17	7	16	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Private Sector	38	34	36	19	4	0	11	2	9	1	2	19	4	20	28	8	20	25
Market	113	91	79	124	26	2	19	6	50	4	0	25	2	26	29	7	21	14
Basic Needs	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	4	1
Poverty	31	55	43	87	14	4	14	4	9	0	6	19	1	16	16	1	8	18
Institutions	129	173	122	176	24	33	44	23	49	14	12	61	8	20	144	51	72	30
Governance	47	77	76	234	4	23	31	22	12	19	18	46	5	25	50	8	12	25
Inequality	6	7	12	18	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	0	20	0	3	11
Human rights	28	32	42	35	5	1	32	4	9	0	0	41	0	15	44	1	32	8
Civil Society	46	58	33	37	1	1	13	3	4	4	1	29	0	20	51	2	13	11
Security	23	51	61	85	39	28	136	44	83	135	26	163	57	50	415	299	260	46
Human security	*0*	*0*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*8*	*0*	*0*	0
Conflict	47	164	75	286	13	15	34	59	43	30	16	55	29	41	248	73	30	46
Terrorism	4	2	0	40	94	7	83	2	124	133	3	61	15	16	52	53	57	4
Failed States	3	1	1	17	1	83	8	119	2	1	28	2	0	1	38	6	4	4
Stability	9	19	17	26	9	13	41	15	27	23	21	21	10	10	19	54	22	12
Radicalism	0	0	0	15	3	1	3	2	4	13	0	14	31	2	17	17	22	4
Total	**552**	**788**	**617**	**1228**	**239**	**211**	**471**	**306**	**426**	**379**	**134**	**563**	**162**	**263**	**1181**	**580**	**580**	**259**

Table A4.1: Total Word Count for all UK Documents

	1997 WP	1999 Security Strategy	2000 WP	2001 DfID MoD FCO	2003 GCPP	2004 ACCP	2005 Security Paper	2005 Fragile States	2006 WP	2008 NSS	2009 WP	2010 Security Strategy	2011 UK aid	2011 Stability Overseas	2011 Multilateral Aid Review
Liberalisation	9	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	1	0	0	0
Deregulation	4	0	22	2	1	1	1	2	11	1	3	1	0	1	5
Privatization	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0
Private Sector	22	0	28	1	1	0	2	1	25	8	37	11	5	13	43
Market	27	0	67	7	1	0	0	0	33	11	74	8	5	2	10
Basic Needs	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	3	1
Poverty	110	6	147	3	5	5	49	23	121	19	110	4	44	2	57
Institutions	33	2	73	11	12	8	12	17	35	37	44	11	2	3	64
Governance	7	2	3	2	9	3	13	14	95	25	39	8	1	5	38
Inequality	25	0	32	10	1	0	12	1	16	10	20	1	0	1	95
Human rights	24	6	22	0	25	0	6	1	21	4	15	3	0	12	7
Civil Society	6	3	21	6	9	6	2	5	28	5	34	1	2	10	63
Security	15	69	19	40	71	56	150	4	45	239	80	326	11	66	16
Human security	*0*	*1*	*0*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*3*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*1*
Conflict	33	18	50	247	186	196	98	5	83	78	103	50	17	158	57
Terrorism	0	0	1	0	5	1	25	4	5	103	7	79	1	11	0
Failed States	0	0	0	3	1	0	4	89	18	14	46	1	2	19	82
Stability	21	3	15	6	22	7	9	21	9	44	16	33	3	82	3
Radicalism	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	3	18	4	4	1	2	0
Total	339	110	512	339	352	283	387	187	555	617	637	542	97	390	542

Table A4.3: Total Word Count for all Canada Documents

	GoC 1995	CIDA 1996a	CIDA 1996b	DFAIT 2000	CIDA 2000	CIDA 2001	CIDA 2002	CIDA 2004	GoC 2004	GoC 2005	CIDA 2007	DFAIT 2007	CIDA 2008	DND 2008	CIDA 2009a	CIDA 2009b	CIDA 2010	GoC 2011	CIDA 2011a
Liberalisation	10	0	0	0	0	9	1	6	0	8	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deregulation	0	0	1	0	0	5	2	4	2	8	6	25	0	0	0	0	4	3	0
Privatization	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Private Sector	19	3	2	5	3	14	10	58	16	16	9	14	5	0	0	2	11	15	2
Market	47	2	0	1	0	9	7	16	0	29	9	151	6	2	0	8	40	7	2
Basic Needs	2	3	0	0	0	5	1	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	0
Poverty	12	82	1	1	27	75	31	61	0	88	57	4	21	0	2	15	35	35	1
Institutions	35	8	25	21	22	30	18	180	9	38	26	28	8	1	1	4	38	49	31
Governance	8	1	54	11	2	17	19	59	1	39	45	45	10	0	0	5	28	25	7
Inequality	1	0	7	1	25	30	7	75	0	11	59	2	4	1	0	1	21	9	0
Human rights	37	1	50	36	8	25	5	43	6	20	47	38	11	0	0	3	14	13	0
Civil Society	4	0	17	2	1	15	10	39	1	5	9	4	3	0	4	3	5	9	0
Security	96	0	6	46	3	12	1	46	290	85	7	231	10	39	0	2	24	27	3
Human security	*4*	*0*	*0*	*60*	*5*	*17*	*0*	*3*	*0*	*3*	*1*	*35*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*0*
Conflict	19	0	2	59	21	11	6	70	8	11	14	15	9	3	1	5	12	11	2
Terrorism	2	0	0	8	0	0	0	2	54	37	0	82	0	8	0	0	0	3	0
Failed States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	1	16	4	27	0	3	3	1	0	8	12
Stability	22	1	0	3	0	1	2	11	3	14	3	21	0	4	0	2	11	13	3
Radicalism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**318**	**101**	**165**	**254**	**117**	**275**	**120**	**684**	**397**	**428**	**296**	**729**	**89**	**61**	**11**	**51**	**246**	**229**	**63**