Nommo-Sexuality:

Naming Homo/sexual Desire: A Dis-story


Ph.D. Thesis

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Nommo, an African term which the cultural theorist, Asante, calls “the generative and productive power of the spoken word” means the proper naming of a thing which in turn gives it essence. (Asante, 1998: 17)

“Definitions belonged to the definers, not the defined.” (Morrison, 1997: 190)

Abstract

This thesis interrogates denotations and connotations the signifier ‘homosexual’ has had on like-kind desiring men and their desiring; how their identities have culturally and psychoanalytically been subject-ed/structured by/around/through this signifier. Unlike other texts’ attention to the history of the ‘homosexual’ as a personage, this thesis attends more pointedly to the cultural contingencies, most especially Freudian psychoanalytic discourse, which initiated and propagated this signification ‘homo-sexual’ over other possible terms and discourses. This thesis explores within three subjective epochs how homo-sexual signification, came to represent and be performed within cultural practices: the fin de siècle nativity of psychoanalysis; the Lacanian post-war world theorisations of desire and language; and the contemporary enactments of homo-sexuality within an increasingly porn-informed and subjected sexual discourse.

Note: Throughout this thesis, all German Translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own; and all French translations, unless otherwise indicated, are courtesy of Corinne Gavenda.
"They exchanged the glory of the immortal God for an imitation, for the image of a mortal human being. That is why God abandoned them in their inmost cravings to filthy practices of dishonouring their own bodies because they exchanged God’s truth for a lie and have worshipped and served the creature instead of the Creator. That is why God abandoned them to degrading passions: the men giving up normal relations with women, are consumed with passion for each other, men doing shameful things with men and receiving in themselves due reward for their perversion … without brains, honour, love or pity. (The Bible, Romans 1: 23-31)

Introductions: An Extraction

Me: “No. Actually, I’m gay.”
Other: “Oh, sorry, I never would have known.”
Me: “How could you?”
Other: “You don’t look very gay.”
Me: “Hmmmm.”
Other: “You should meet my friend Michael.”
Me: “Because?”
Other: “You just have so much in common.”
Me: “Besides my being, somewhat belatedly, identified by you as gay, what exactly else do you think we have in common?”

Variations of such exchanges happen throughout my life, sometimes to bemusement, sometimes to frustration, but always with an irritation as to inherent discursive practices implying one’s sexual orientation is, or should be, transparent; that ‘gayness’ should be ‘known’; discursive demands which incorporate narcissism, effeminate mannerisms, camp humour, big handbags and pink triangles. Within various histories of ‘homosexual’ emergence, this thesis specifically attends to implicit discourses through and from which this fixture ‘homosexual’ emerged. The legacy this name signified/constructed necessitates ‘homosexuals’ be recognised, identified in this name very specifically as ‘homo’ and ‘sexual’.

The discursive demands within this naming ‘homosexual’ is equally problematised and problematic for/within the gay ‘community/ghetto’. I have always been baffled by the gay homogenous sexual desiring of ‘straight-acting’ men; the pathos of which seems unapparent to most. In desiring a man, the last thing I would want is his being ‘straight-acting’. In wanting a man sexually/emotionally I desire a man who desires men, who knows how to experience and enjoy that desire. It has always struck me as truly perverse to strive for one who not only doesn’t desire you, but likely despises you, and your desire.
This thesis, examines and critiques the historical encoding of practices informing and instituting homo-sexual signification where gay identity/image are grounded in homo-sexual discourses propagating something being visibly wrong with you, (evil, criminal, or pathological). The term homosexual’s cultural, legal and social functionings are inherited through a medical pathologising. Despite significant recent developments, such cultural discourses still over-encumber gay male identity, lives and practices for gays themselves and for those that wish to define/identify them. Such medico/judico/cultural discourses still locate identifying homo-sexual men around discourses of their homogeneity, their all being alike, their un-natural, non-hetero perversion, and their degenerate sexuality, all allusions within memes of their effeminacy, their diminished masculinity. Within this naming a gay-male mandate polices our desire around our offensive presentation, our desire/love/sexuality, and our very appearance. As Ireland’s Panti Bliss outlined in her celebrated Noble Call speech:

Have you ever been standing at a pedestrian crossing when a car drives by and in it are a bunch of lads, and they lean out the window and they shout “Fag!” and throw a milk carton at you? Now it doesn’t really hurt. It’s just a wet carton and anyway they’re right – I am a fag. But it feels oppressive. When it really does hurt, is afterwards. Afterwards I wonder, worry and obsess over what was it about me, what was it they saw in me? What was it that gave me away? And I hate myself for wondering that. It feels oppressive and the next time I’m at a pedestrian crossing I check myself to see what is it about me that “gives the gay away” and I check myself to make sure I’m not doing it this time (O’Neill, 2014).

Supporting LGBT Lives, the first Irish study on LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered) mental health identified 46% of those surveyed facing hazardous drinking (82). 27% had self-harmed at least once, 85% of these more than once, with sixteen being the average starting age (86). 17.7% had attempted suicide at least once, with 60% of these attempting suicide more than once, with seventeen and a half being the average starting age. One third of under twenty-fives seriously contemplated suicide in past year, with 50% overall seriously contemplating it (95).

Similarly, Guasp’s 2012 research indicates 56% of LGBT youth have deliberately harmed themselves, against the NSPCC estimate of 7-10% of young people in general. 23% of young LGBTs have tried to take their lives against the Samaritans’ average of 7% (2012: 4). Fergusson et al. similarly account young Gay men as four times more likely to suffer major depression; three times more likely to suffer generalised anxiety disorder; seven
times more likely to attempt suicide than heterosexual counterparts (1999: 877).

To be named ‘homo-sexual’ is to be pathologised. Each study pinpointed low self-worth and poor self-esteem for being stigmatised as part of a reviled minority as core to what Downs identifies as the ‘velvet rage’, “a toxic cocktail of anger and rejection”.

“When a gay man forecloses on his crisis of identity, and represses his feelings in an attempt to live a straight life, his distress is immense. This becomes the root of depression or other ailments, and if not resolved, can grow into a variety of chronic and troubling psychological symptoms.” (2012: 69)

This foreclosing of a gay man’s crisis of identity involves a self-surveillance, a policing of self, particularly within performances of masculinity when something in the homosexual discourse imparted within this word are implications of one being sick, pathologised, perverse, less a man, effeminate, camp. Hence the pressure on gay men to masculinise, indeed hyper-masculinise, so not be emasculated by self or others within these discursive practices aligning homo-sexuality with effeminacy.

Have you ever been on a crowded train with your gay friend and a small part of you is cringing because he is being SO gay and you find yourself trying to compensate by butching up or nudging the conversation onto “straighter” territory? This is you who have spent 35 years trying to be the best gay possible and yet still a small part of you is embarrassed by his gayness.

And I hate myself for that. And that feels oppressive. And when I’m standing at the pedestrian lights I am checking myself (O’Neill, 2014).

Steven Sharpe sings of this masculine predicament within homosexual identity (2013) referencing his father’s asking him “Are you gay in your dreams? And what’s with all the dancing? What kind of baby are you going to adopt?” but the ultimate question the father wants answered is in his relations, “Who’s the man?”

This question dominates homosexual discourse, where identity and practices are interpreted and understood only in terms of ascertaining maleness and femaleness, with underlying presumptions of activity and passivity; top or bottom.

‘Homo-sexual’ inferiority relates to its alignment with femininity. Masculine, butch, ‘straight-acting’ rugby players, with muscled bodies are the objects of desire, marketed and consumed, creating such body anxieties and emotional/psychological angsts for men dominated by a dictate of ‘No pecs, no sex’. Men defined only as sexual and never amorous; love foreclosed from their very naming.

My research’s first interrogations around gay men’s desire/mandate for masculinity, for hommo-ness, in themselves and others, brought me to imagine/hope/fantasise a gay cohort exempt/unencumbered from this gendered visual dictatorship discourse of how and what gays desire. So I interviewed gay
men born blind to ‘see’ what their exclusion from the visual dictates of seeking masculinity might disclose. Only to hear these men just as bound to discourses of fetishised masculinity, and self-effeminity shaming and anxieties. They too desired men with more ‘masculine’ voices, hairier arms; heeding sighted friends’ criticisms of potential partners as being too camp, too effeminate.

The power of naming binds gay men as ‘homo-sexual’ within discourses of desiring homogenously, the same way, the same negations; and to desire through and in sex alone. These are never men who love, who are love-able, never homo-amorous.

“is the deep and abiding anger that results from growing up in an environment when I learn that who I am as a gay person is unacceptable, perhaps even unlovable. This anger pushes me at times to overcompensate and try to earn love and acceptance by being more, better, beautiful, more sexy – in short, to become something I believe will make me more acceptable and loved.”

This thesis explores some of the exigencies contributing towards gay men being defined discoursed and incessantly pathologised as homo-sexual; and how such exigencies facilitated a consumerist pornified culture around contemporary gay identities, grounded within a fetishisation of phallic masculinity and a rejection and shaming of any markers of effeminacy. Sharpe’s song recognises “The question my father was really asking”; and his answer of “Well it’s a 50/50 give and take relationship is what I got going” was not what either his father, or patriarchal heteronormative society want/value/understand. So all he can answer is the lie “I’m the man”.

Being a man, the man, and homogenously desiring only men, when desiring a man is inherently feminine, is the impossibility around which homo-sexual desire is constructed discoursed and pathologised. This homo-sexual desire for men, hommos, marks gay men as unnatural/sick/wrong, pathologised as ‘homosexual’. This thesis aims to explicate some of this pathologisation, proffering awareneses and resistances, however naively.

I hold this thesis to one whose words in the 1980s, “I think my parents would prefer a dead son, to a gay son” inspired me, professionally and personally, to vindicate his loss and to attempt to do all in my power, knowledge and passion to prevent any other such loss, shame, death.

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Section One

Bearing The Same Old Story
Chapter One:  
Methodology:  
Unearthing Unconscious Structurings

“What cannot be said above all must not be silenced but written.”  Jacques Derrida

Chapter Synopsis

Recognising humans as subjected to discourse, this Chapter establishes Foucauldian Archaeological and Genealogical discourse analysis, to interrogate processes of homo- sexual signification, rather than its product; examining not the history of homosexuals but the historical emergence of like-kind passionate men’s identities and practices under discourses continually culturally constructed in this name homo-sexual. Such ‘naming’ inaugurates specific problematisations and explicit subjectifications which regulates gay men in a homogenous genital-sexual manner, bound to sameness, and anxieties around masculinity. In limiting and defining prevailing formations of homosexual selfhood and subjectivity as narcissistic and effeminate, power is evidenced not through physical coercion, but through individual self-surveillance and self-correction to norms.

Post-Structuralism: “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte”

“We shall make thought-crime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one word ... Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller” (Orwell, 1989: 55).

Language/Discourse’s power produces thought/identity/subjectivity. Post-Structuralism critiques such regulation and structurings within a “central premise that all language is internally contradictory and has no fixed meaning” (Wolf, 2013: 141). Orwell recognised “Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind” (2013: 20). The words we use, discourses we have access to, language we’re allowed, are politically dictated. Discourse produces power; around who speaks; around what can be said.

In 1984 power operates not only through language, but through image, media, ritual and practices, through silence. This thesis uses the term

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2 My own loaded term evoking significations of sameness but also liking; a genus, but also a kindness; and symbolically proffering the generation of passion against the over-encumbered designation ‘sex’.
3 There is no outside-text
"‘discourse’ in preference to ‘language’ because it refers beyond language to sets of organised meanings (which can include images as well as words). The term ‘discourse’ has been used to emphasise the organised way in which meanings cohere around an assumed central proposition, which gives them their value and significance (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013: 13).

Poststructuralism theorises relationships between the human world and the re/production of meanings; recognising how discourse structures our thinking and practices. Discourse does not contain ‘truth’ or ‘meaning’ but is itself an inter-dependant system where meaning is constructed through other structures and discourses. The Post-structuralist project contends ‘human’ as a construction, utilises the term ‘subject’ instead, analysing discourse to deconstruct formations and beliefs of ‘human’ as subject-ed to signifying activities which are both culturally located and largely unconscious. “My objective ... has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault, 1982: 208).

Using post-structuralist methodologies, this thesis’s data attends to the processes of ‘homo-sexual’ signification, rather than its product. The data selected considers various interpretative processings of ‘homo-sexual’ identity have been produced, prioritised and transmitted through cultural, most especially psychoanalytic discourses, and how these layers of discourses influenced each other.

“There is nothing to be gained from describing autonomous layers of discourses unless one can relate it to other layers, practices, institutions, social relations, political relations, and so on” (Foucault, 1967: 284).

“While structuralism sees truth as being ‘behind’ or ‘within’ a text, post-structuralism stresses the interaction of reader and text as a productivity.” (Sarup, 1988: 3) This thesis utilises as data not only different homosexual ‘texts’ (scientific, psychoanalytic, literary, cyber) but their various readers/interpreters and interactions to interrogate the ‘homo-sexual’ productions such interactions construct/ed.

My clinical training, practice and discourse as a Lacanian Psychoanalyst is established in an unconscious; the part of mind inaccessible to consciousness but nonetheless affecting behaviour and emotions. Freud didn’t invent the unconscious: “Poets and philosophers before me discovered the unconscious; what I discovered was the scientific method by which the unconscious can be studied.” Poststructuralism assumes levels of unconscious operations in how structures establish meanings beyond individual words’ ‘purpose’.

“Post-structuralism ... suggests that language users do not pluck words out of thin air or thesaurus when trying to convey meaning, fitting them to the objects or feelings being conveyed. Instead, the meanings of words are largely imbedded in

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4 On his seventieth birthday (1926); as quoted in The Liberal Imagination (1950) by Lionel Trilling.
language use itself such that how we talk, write, and read largely determines what we end up saying. Derrida argues that meaning is forever elusive and incomplete in the sense that language can never perfectly convey what is meant by the language user” (Agger, 2014: 93).

Where the unconscious is structured like a language, Lacanian psychoanalysis is located as a post-structural practice. Psychoanalysis understands client’s words are never arbitrary but reflect meanings imbedded in unconscious determinations. Within Poststructuralism, reality is itself textual; the verbal sign (signifier) is constantly floating unhampered from its designated concept (signified) within larger systems and structures. Parallelizing Freud’s ego as not master of its own house, post-structuralism argues us as not masters of language; as writers/speakers we may craft it, but it is always crafting us. All that is known is mediated by discourses, and their meanings never represent the world neutrally. “This shift is variously referred to as the shift from ‘world’ to ‘word’, the ‘turn to language’ to the ‘hermeneutic turn’.” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013: 13)

“This thesis’s post-structuralism investigates such production of signifying structures, not merely to reproduce speculative interpretation on what was thought, a Derridean ‘doubling commentary’, but to produce through deconstruction over reconstruction, and uncover unconscious rather than conscious dimensions of the ‘homo-sexual’ in texts, things which the ‘homo-sexual’s’ overt textuality glosses over or fails to recognise.

Deconstructing ‘homo-sexual’ discourse is not destructive but a very deliberate analytical undoing. “The deconstruction of a text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text” (Johnson, 1980: 5). Such “warring forces” Foucault terms surfaces of emergence where the hidden/concealed is revealed/exposed. Deconstructive readings “must always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not command in the patterns of language that he uses. … a signifying structure that critical reading should produce” (Derrida, 1997: 158).

Reading cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it or toward a signified outside the text whose content could take place, could have taken place, outside of language, that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in general. There is nothing outside of the text. (ibid.)
sexual’ discourse. In all discourses, there is a plurality of significance, a saying of many different things, subverting ‘homosexual’ as having a single, stable, neutral meaning, but nonetheless reveals designs, origins and effects.

**Self Designing Homo-sexuals**

The ‘Homo-sexual’ established discourses constructing, not merely sexual orientations, but systematising and defining sets of bodies, desires, persons, groups. Though ‘homo-sexual’ discourse potentially ‘narrowed the range of thought’ in how like-kind desiring men came to view and be viewed, specifically in relation to their image, to narcissism and ideas of masculinity and femininity; in true Foucauldian thought this ‘narrowing’ homo-sexual discourse produced other discourses and systems, including this thesis, which designated and decided how this ‘homo-sexual’ would come to structure and be structured by other discourses, the masculine/feminine; the natural/unnatural, the normal/abnormal.

Such male homosexual constructions could undoubtedly be utilised to analyse lesbian edifices, particularly the legacy of butch/femme. However the term homosexual came to more particularly designate same-sex desiring men over women, who became discoursed more as ‘lesbian’. Freud significantly discourses female homosexuals; the gendered adjective evidencing the discursive practice and tradition that ‘homosexuals’ are male.

Explicitly, exploration of Freudian psychoanalytic discourse’s influence on, and in turn, influence by the ‘homo-sexual’, identifies both discourses as contemporaneous emergences grounded within discourses of sexuality and language, products and producers of further discourses, images, constructions and systems of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’; healthy and perversion; masculine and feminine.

As a psychoanalytic practitioner and practising homosexual, I have my experiences both professional and personal, on both sides of the couch, of having myself, my sexuality, my gender, and my desire constructed, indeed constricted, by this term ‘homo-sexual’; never merely through its ‘meaning’ but within systems and structures it evokes/demands. Like Foucault, “I’m not making a problem out of a personal question; I make of a personal question an absence of a problem” (Foucault, 2013: 22). Just as psychoanalysis questions the Cartesian cogito ‘I’ that speaks, this thesis challenges identity where: “I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking” (Lacan, 2006: 430).

“It’s my hypothesis that the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces” (Foucault, 2007: 180).
The ‘I’ presenting this thesis, constructed through many discourses, focuses on data/productions from/within/through ‘homo-sexual’ discourses in which I am, and am not. Numerous Lacanian cultural readings ignore the psychosocial character of people, or that the interpreters themselves are psycho-socially constructed. As a Lacanian psychoanalyst, the social can never be neglected when implicated discursively in everyone’s psychic life. And poststructuralist social awareness only adds further levels of understanding impossible to achieve without attending to structures which in/form us, and which we in/form in turn: “the psyche dynamically alters that which society imposes upon it (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013: 146). “Psychoanalysis should be seen as first and foremost an epistemology and a methodology” (Devereux, 1967, 294).

I am no neutral vehicle representing knowledge in an uncontaminated way. My writing is structured consciously and unconsciously by subjective experiences as a human homosexualised subject, a subject of and in Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis. An awareness to how my own vocabulary, experiences and prejudices directly affected and effect this thesis, qualifies my voice alone rather than patronisingly ‘giving voice’ to others; research data, texts, experiences. I have no direct access to another’s experience and can only relate my own ambiguous representations. This thesis attends to my awareness of being a socially constructed subjectivity of ‘homo-sexual’ discourse clinically and personally.

(The researcher’s feelings) tell us about how a researcher comes to produce such an account and opens it up to the possibility of different readings of the same material. It tells us that the process of reading itself is not all in the text, but is produced out of a complex interaction between reader and text. But perhaps it tells us more than this: as a researcher I am no more, no different from the subjects of my research (Walkerdine, 1998: 73).

The Etymology of the Homo-sexual Species

Foucault established the nineteenth century as forming the homosexual within a specific nativity and new propagation:

This new persecution of the peripheral sexualities entailed an incorporation of perversions and a new specification of individuals…sodomy was a category of forbidden acts…a juridical subject. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away. We must not forget that the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was constituted from the moment it was characterised less by a type of sexual relations than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility, a certain way of inverting the masculine and the feminine in oneself. Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyne, a hermaphrodisim
of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species (Foucault, 1990: 43).

Distinct to other histories or Foucauldian analyses of homosexuals, this thesis specifically interrogates inferences ‘homo-sexual’ denotation has had for cultural, most particularly psychoanalytic, discourses on homosexuality. This thesis’s Foucaudian analysis focuses not on the speciation of homosexuals, but the etymological origins, evolution, and categorisation of like-kind passion as ‘homosexual’; the signifieds that consciously and unconsciously formulated this signifier. Foucault’s contention that “nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality… the root of all his actions” follows through into the composition of this name. Within this thesis, this signification of the *homo-sexual* is explored within three correlative epochs of psychoanalytic and cultural history: the Freudian turn of the century; the Lacanian mid-century; and contemporary times. It explores the discourses, ideologies and practices which flow into and from such *homo-sexual* ‘species-ification’, particularly in relation to psychoanalytic discourse’s contribution to ideas, practices and constructions around homosexuality.

This thesis is divided into four sections. This First Section, Chapters One and Two, outlines the post-structuralist methodologies employed.

The Second Section’s Chapter Three etymologically explores the *fin-de-siècle* (end of the nineteenth century) emergence of *homo-sexual* as the dictated designation from a range of alternatives precisely because its *homo*-ness is a product of two-sex binary discourse. Chapter Four explores the problematics of hermaphroditic discourse, a potential grey area for two-sex discourse proffering a ‘gay’ area for emerging homosexual identity to be scientifically legitimated. Chapter Five explores the history of narcissism within emerging psychoanalytic theories on homosexuality. Chapters Six and Seven consider the productions of/by two (in)famous scandals of this epoch, how they contributed to cultural ‘knowings’ of like-kind desire being defined and dictated around effeminacy.

Section Three investigates Lacanian impacts to/on *homo-sexual* discourse. Chapter Eight considers the triangle of Freud, Dalí and Lacan and their metamorphosis of Narcissus within discourses on doubling images, homosexuality and paranoia. Chapter Nine explores how narcissism discourse within Lacan’s Mirror Stage leans on social discourses where such homo-mirroring constructing the ego is not only a psychological theorisation of human subjectivity, but an implicit socialisation. Chapter Ten explores the Hetero/Other character of desire being the desire of the other. Chapter Eleven explores Lacan’s argument of HommoSexuality, how his sexuation theories ‘queers’ sexuality yet
perpetuates the binary oppositional of masculine and feminine.

Section Four interrogates how implicit constructions of sexuality have had on contemporary *homo-sexual* expression and identities. Chapter Twelve examines how modern images for male homosexuality are saturated in anxieties around effeminacy and the impossible desire for masculinity. Chapter Thirteen considers pornography as a knowledge of sexuality, especially within the discourses it presents gay men. Chapter Fourteen examines how anxieties around masculine bodies are enacted through the cyber-sexual marketplace. Chapter Fifteen concludes in summarising the contemporary history and its implications for gays being designated *homos*, the same.

This thesis unearths Foucauldian contingencies surrounding the homosexual genesis from cultural constructions and assumptions of male and female to deconstruct the compulsory hetero-ness within the mythology of male/female opposition as the contingency that must be negotiated/re-enforced through the ‘homosexual’s’ nativity.

**Whose-Story is (His)Story?**

Producing history is a key weapon/tool in the control of thought/thinking. Exclusion from historical discourse establishes and defines not just visibility or invisibility, but potential for power. There is political reasoning why most struggle to name three women in history who were not wives or mothers, when ‘historically’ this is all women have ever been, and thus can ever be. Whoever writes history excluding or limiting peoples does so in the present to produce the past. Comparing an Irish schoolbook on Ulster history to one produced in England evinces how controlling/discoursing the past can limit/dictate the future. Only archaeological acts aiming to unearth that buried/discarded below the surface can create new knowledge/evidence/questions.

“Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the present, controls the past” (Orwell, 1989: 37). History is never concerned with the past, but the present; more of the here/now than the there/then; always a history of the present. Hence why Foucault’s philosophical interrogations, his archaeologies and genealogies are critical.

Foucault’s methodology operates more as guiding strategies than a prescribed method for analysis, a “problematisation of truth ... ensuring that the process of reasoning is correct in determining whether a statement is true or concerns itself with our ability to gain access to the truth” (Foucault, 2001: 170). There is a critical approach to truth “concerned with the question of the importance of telling the truth, knowing who is able to tell the truth, and knowing why we should tell the truth” which founds the “roots of what we could call the ‘critical’ tradition in the West” (ibid).
It is not interrogating the ‘truths’ that ‘gay men are narcissistic’, or ‘effeminate’ that draws Foucauldian analysis, but how certain discourses, significantly psychoanalysis, came to be authorised as ‘truth-tellers’, and the effects the production and circulation such ‘truths’ has had for *homo-sexuals* as both objects and subjects of knowledge. Foucauldian analysis aims to map the relations between the production of truths and the formation of objects and subjects that discloses the conditions of their emergence as “historical constructs” (Foucault, 2000: 462) within a culture and discourse of “disreputable origins and unpalatable functions” (Rose, cited in Kendell & Wickham, 1998, 29).

Against other Foucauldian studies of homosexuals/homosexuality, this thesis specifically analyses productions and producers of the term ‘homosexual’ and critiques implicit constructions such signification has had on like-kind identities and presentations. It critiques and analyses the ‘truth-tellers’ and ‘truth-telling’ practices that came to name and subjectify such men and their desires primarily as homo-sexual.

“People know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does” (Foucault, in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986: 187). Kendall and Wickham suggest two Foucauldian methodological concepts for critique this “what what they do does”. Firstly unearthing/exploring contingencies rather than causes, and secondly maintaining healthy scepticism regarding all political arguments or historical interpretations (Kendall & Wickham, 1998: 3).

**Foucauldian Ruptures: Contingencies Not Causes**

Foucault’s methodology considers discontinuities fault-lines in how practices and ideas become conceptualised, querying contingencies which enabled such disruptions, and mapping out such *surprises* of history within particular domains. Standard historical semblance displays timelines, progressive coherent arrows of how x led to y causing z; how subordinate actions on the ground lead to super-ordinate *historical* events. But, Foucault argues effects are causes, all directional arrows are double-ended, with each component relating to every other.

Deleuze and Guattari (1988) argued against patterns of knowledge being analogous to a tree’s unidirectional growth from roots to branches/leaves via a solid trunk, but instead
like a rhizome: a collection of pattern-less root-like tentacles, irregularly emerging, even growing back into each other. Sodomy evidences such rhizomic change, being originally any sex acts not involving male/female genital union, including oral sex, bestiality; non-natural vices associated with the biblical Sodom. But as Sodomites became homosexual, so homosexuality reconfigured ‘sodomy’ culturally, legally and medically to be circumscribed as anal sex.

With contingencies, every relationship is subject to every other without a necessary pattern to their relating, or indeed that they must relate. History’s standard meta-narrative is grounded in cause and effect, but exploring contingencies instead of causes re/views developments as accidents of history. A contingent historical event is never compelled or predetermined, but only one emergence from a series of complex relations between other events. Such methodology deconstructs the explicit ‘truth’ of historical progress, demanding greater interrogation, beyond simple linear successions into a more chaotic, random range of possibilities and potentially liberating, outcomes and considerations.

Foucault rejects the linear cause and effect timeline of standardised history, investigating “histories of the present”: the history of a problem, rather than the history of a period. Section Two unearths the Freudian ‘homosexual’ from an amalgam of contingencies: new technologies, old binary oppositions, scandalised trials, which qualified specific forms of ‘like-kind’ desire to emerge, defined and discoursed as homo-sexual, whose legacy continues. That this term Homo-sexual should emerge to define like-kind passionates was not necessitous, but a contingent possibility from among a catalogue, each of which produced different discourses, other possibilities, ways of speaking, being, doing ‘like-kind desire’. This term homo-sexual investiture as the dominant term had a very distinct influence on how like-kind desire was seen, spoken of; how bodies, personages and desires identified or threatened with identification as homosexual were perceived.

Foucault’s methodologies specifically examine the impact such fortuitous occurrences have on the problem of how power relations and the body came to be viewed/treated/contained differently while tracing the continuities enduring through such ‘transformations’, what elements are carried/continued and what is left aside. Though the late nineteenth century ‘homosexual’ species in becoming “a personage, a past” marked a significant rupture from “categories of forbidden acts”, in defining like-kind passion...
through and within discourses of non-hetero, abnormal pathologising homosexuality, the legacy of sodomy transferred into this homo-sexual signification; where he may no longer be culturally or scientifically defined sodomite, but he still wants it up the bum.

**Dubito Ergo Sum: Maintaining Scepticism**

Foucault’s scepticism isn’t cynicism, but a philosophical thinking deliberately akin to the Buddhist discernment of authentic truth: “Believe nothing, no matter where you read it, or who said it, no matter if I have said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your own common sense.” An academic scepticism built around the impossibility of our knowing anything, substantiates the post-structuralist radical rejection of all truth claims.

Sceptical pragmatic suspension of judgements enable questions to be considered anew. Kendall & Wickham (1999) argue the process of scepticism as more significant than any outcomes; value lies in critiquing rather than a critical end. Critiquing homophobic or heterosexist operation in judgements which created this homo-sexual species is too obvious; of greater investigative interest are the contingencies, enactments and discourses that allowed such ‘homophobic’ orthodoxy to be reinforced as natural and normal.

**Unearthing Foucault’s Archaeology:**

Foucauldian analysis digs archaeologically, excavating “differences, transformations, continuities, mutations” (Foucault, 1972, 9-10) uncovering alterations in different layers of discursive and non-discursive practices (institutions, economic processes, social processes, patterns of behaviour). This thesis’s archaeology is not grounded within a Foucauldian history of homosexuals per se, but attends to unearthing the layers/discourses which entitled this particular designation ‘homosexual’ and the attendant implicit layers of meaning/discourse/bodies/acts thus fabricated through this naming. This thesis accounts specific subjectifications this assignation inaugurated in constituting like-kind desiring men as ‘homosexual’, subjected to ‘homo-sexuality’.

Foucault’s Archaeology analyses the system of unwritten rules producing and circulating the “statement” [the authorised utterance] occurring within an archive, the organised “general system of the formation and transformation of statements” (Foucault, 1972: 130) Archaeology attends to underlying structures forming the context for what can be thought. This thesis surveys, neither homosexuals, nor homosexual history, but examines what made defining such personages as ‘Homo-sexual’ possible, and implications such assignation has had on such personages, their identity and practices.
Within an archaeology, maintaining scepticism interrogates established accepted ‘truths’, presented historically or contemporarily as taken for granted, and critiques how they came to occupy such positions and constitute knowledge.

Defining personages as ‘homosexual’ produced a visibility; once known, they could be seen, thus producing further statements about ‘homosexuality’, what they do or look like, further reinforcing a ‘homo-sexual’ identified species. Statements and visibilities propagate each other. Unearthing the mutual conditioning of statements and visibilities forms a framework, Foucault terms an episteme, around what contains and constructs ‘homosexuality’, most especially within this naming itself.

**The Homo-Sexual Episteme:**

An episteme is the set of underlying assumptions beneath something being realised within a particular culture, characteristic to that particular age. The episteme establishing the *homo-sexual* could only have happened through available nineteenth century knowledge and discourses. An episteme forms the basis for distinguishing true and false knowledge:

“I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific” (Foucault, 1977: 197).

An episteme encompasses the historically contingent possibilities of knowledge within a particular time and place. Section Two’s exploration of nineteenth century homosexuality discoursed as a third sex, is/was part of an episteme constructing the two sexes, men and women, as opposed. Locating homosexuality on a two-sex model ensures homosexuality becomes discoursed around one’s subjective gender (being less manly, effeminate) rather than their sexual orientation. Thus bisexuality as a desire becomes foreclosed, which is different from censorship as censorship creates discourse of that being censored. Demanding one not think of a pink elephant, ensures they will. Hence the claim Queen Victoria refused to outlaw lesbianism from fears that adding female homosexuality to the law criminalising male homosexuality would give people/women ideas.5

**Powering Foucault’s Genealogy**

Archaeology tackles levels at which differences and similarities are determined/organised in constructing forms of knowledge. Genealogical analysis addresses the same substrata to emphasise mechanisms of power emerging in transformed knowings and practices.

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5 [http://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,5753,-19315,00.html](http://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,5753,-19315,00.html)
“Since it is a matter of studying the different modes of objectification of the subject that appears through these practices, one understands how important it is to analyse power relations” (Foucault, 1982: 142).

It is through the analysis of relations of power regarding those “methods and techniques used in different institutional contexts to act upon the behaviour of individuals … so to shape, direct, modify their way of conducting themselves” (ibid) that we come to appreciate the ways in which “men are ‘governed’ by one another” (ibid) and most especially, within this thesis, how we come to govern, or police ourselves.

Foucault’s genealogy reverses and subverts history’s attentions, presenting “interpretative significance of the marginal over the ostensibly central; the constructed over the supposedly natural and the originaire importance of the accidental over the allegedly inevitable” (Prado, 2000: 33). Genealogy is not invested in the essential beginnings of history and “opposes itself to the search for origins” (Foucault, 1971: 77), seeking to unearth marginal and neglected elements proffering alternative accounts to History’s meta-narratives. Foucauldian archaeology provides “a snapshot, a slice through the discursive nexus; genealogy pays attention to the processual of the web of discourse, its ongoing character” (Foucault quoted in Kendall & Wickham: 1998, 30-1).

Genealogically problematising how terming like-kind passionates as homosexual evokes, indeed induces related discourses on narcissism and effeminacy challenges the relationship between the production of scientific/cultural ‘truths’ and the formation of objects and subjects concerning ‘homo-sexuals’. This thesis interrogates the location of narcissism and effeminacy within nineteenth century sexological and psychoanalytic discourse of same-sex passion, and their subsequent legacies on gay identity and practices within contemporary hyper-real epoch, as a product of this naming of homosexual.

The research does not intend to interpret, but highlight how such constructions implicate power relations operating within contemporary cultural formations of homosexuality, the ontological and epistemological legacy of the Narcissism episteme and discourses of effeminacy. The legacy of such power relations are mirrored in specific practices encoded in the paranoid self-surveillance practices of gay men’s checking of their image, their being conscious of how that image/being is reflected back by/to society.

Foucault believes (1980: 85) archaeology as apt for analysing local discursivities, while genealogy utilises such analysis to expose subjected knowledges such local discursivities institute. Archaeology discloses the subject as a fictitious construct, while genealogy highlights the material contexts of such construction, unearthing the political consequences of ‘subjectification’, to facilitate resistances to subjectifying practices.
Archaeology theorises the birth of the human sciences in the context of the modern episteme and the ‘Human’ subject, genealogy underscores the power relations produced.

**Self-Surveillance: Big Brother is Watching You Watching You**

Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralisation of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power, it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies (Foucault, 1977: 217).

*1984*’s ‘Big Brother is watching you’ telescreen surveillance manifest Foucault’s panopticon, an enactment of power generating anxious assumptions of our always being watched/seen. Rather than any actual total observation, it is one’s constant fear/desire/belief of this which creates the power/fear/surveillance.

When Winston asks “Does Big Brother exist in the same way I exist?” O’Brien replies “You do not exist” (Orwell, 1989: 272). Big Brother exists because he is believed, sustained, seen; Winston confined in the Ministry of Justice is an ‘unperson’ no longer existing, because he is concealed, censored, invisible. Big Brother *exists* because the proliferation and dominance of his image, his discourse is lived/experienced. His existence is of the hyper-real order, a reality beyond consciousness, something delineated further in Section Four utilising Baudrillard’s Hyper-reality theories to explore how homo-sexual desire *exists* in contemporary times.

Big Brother’s ‘power’ lies in how he is perceived, not in what ‘he’ does. Power is maintained, like Foucault’s Panopticon, through ubiquitous internalised surveillance; in controlling language, thought and ultimately knowledge.

**The Object of Power is Power**

“The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. Power is not a means; it is an end. The object of power is power” (Orwell, 1989: 275-6).

Foucault understood power as not hierarchical, operating from top down, but something internalised, pervasive, operating through channels of self-surveillance and knowledge. Foucault’s methodological practices aim to discourse and expose the object of power as power, determined through discursive language and practices. Like Orwell, Foucault utilises the significance of language and discourse to demonstrate power effects; history as something only ever discoursed in the present; seeking out the lost/censored/slipped moments or fault-lines in history to expose alternate histories, other stories.
Foucault in 1976 summarised the general purpose of such post-structuralist interrogation:

“For the last ten or fifteen years, the immense and proliferating criticisability of things, institutions, practices, and discourses; a sort of general feeling that the ground was crumbling beneath our feet, especially in places where it seemed most familiar, most solid, and closest to us, to our bodies, to our everyday gestures. But alongside this crumbling and the astonishing efficacy of discontinuous, particular, and local critiques, the facts were also revealing something... beneath this whole thematic, through it and even within it, we have seen what might be called the insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (Foucault, 2003: 6–7).

Foucault argues against imagining power as possessed, something people ‘have’, instead viewing its operation as a dynamic network of non-centralised forces which do not operate randomly, but are structured to assume certain historical forms, evidenced, he argues, most significantly in the mechanisation and later scientification of ‘man’. This governance and authority is never achieved through something so tangible as political design or legal decrees but rather through several various processes, usually originating quite differently and dispersed, but which nonetheless gather to regulate and construct the most intrinsic elements of our material, social and physical ‘selves’ and lives.

“There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself.” (Foucault, 1980: 155)

Like 1984, Foucault’s conception of Power does not always overtly prohibit but proliferates more insidiously in the production of “bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations and pleasures” (Foucault, 1990: 155). Prevailing formations of selfhood and subjectivity are established and sustained not through physical restraint or coercion, but through individual self-surveillance and self-correction to norms. As Panti Bliss outlines through and within this anxiety/desire, we police ourselves, our appearance, our words. “I check myself to see what is it about me that “gives the gay away” and I check myself to make sure I’m not doing it this time” (O’Neill, 2014).

Resistance/Power is in knowledge but this knowledge is always contingent on its being granted, on something else allowing such thought. “Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows” (Orwell, 1989: 84). Power is knowledge and knowledge is power.

“I understand HOW, I do not understand WHY” (83). Foucauldian analyses avoid, indeed evade, understanding why, to focus on how. Why, perilously involves interpretation and re-establishment of power relations; understanding ‘how’ both unearths knowledge and exhumes power relations. Despite my own politics, beliefs, desires to construct whys to establish positions of power/defence, this thesis’s explicit Foucauldian enterprise is to
explore how gay men have come to be defined and define themselves in a homogenous genital sexual manner, as homosexual, trapped in an image, a mirrored narcissism; in which self-surveillant anxieties around effeminacy are enacted and performed.

**Resistance is Futile, but Necessitous?**

The Holding of Power is impossible, beyond ‘control’, especially for those who ‘believe’ they possess it. Despite Big Brother’s dominance there is always a Winston; a resistance, an unpredictability; there are always unanticipated events, acts, thoughts. The products of defining same–sex desire as *homo-sexual* continue to be formed, informed and produced, in ways and means that ‘Authority’ would not have wished, as the same-sex marriage debate clearly demonstrates.

*1984* proffers points of resistance which although ‘failures’, do not belittle their significance. The first is Winston’s diary marking/signifying his own individuality, his own knowledge. The second is sexuality; in three simple written words ‘I Love You’ that instigate Winston’s rebellious sexual relationship with Julia. In sexuality, in pleasure, in love something can rebel, something Big Brother tries to control, limit, destroy, fearing its enactment of private bonds, unions, desires that may threaten and subvert.

“We have cut the links between child and parent, between man and man, between man and woman. No one dares trust a wife or a child or a friend any longer. But in the future there will be no wives and no friends. The sex instinct will be eradicated. Procreation will be an annual formality like the renewal of a ration card. We shall abolish the orgasm. Our neurologists are at work upon it. There will be no loyalty, except loyalty towards the Party. There will be no love’” (Orwell, 1989: 280)

And so in the infamous Room 101 “the thing that is the worst thing in the world” sexuality, love and desire, the last piece of resistance/defiance/individuality must be destroyed for Winston to be completely controlled, defined, dictated by Big Brother:

“‘I have not betrayed Julia,’ he said. For what was there that they had not screwed out of him under the torture? He had told them everything he knew about her. And yet, in the sense in which he intended the word, he had not betrayed her. He had not stopped loving her; his feelings towards her had remained the same.” (286)

**1984 – Thirty Years On?**

Orwell’s *1984* enacts Foucauldian practices, the acts of self-surveillance, the hazardous mythology of history, the hyper-reality of hierarchical power, the control of language and thus knowledge, the resistance of writing, of sexuality. *1984* functions as a portent; so much of Orwell’s text has entered popular discourse: Big Brother, Room 101, doublethink, thoughtcrime. But more insidious has been Orwell’s anticipation of surveillance, ongoing war constructing a stability called ‘peace’, ‘freedom’ demanding slavery, the use of language to consciously regulate thought.
Such were the politics I began with, but in Picasso’s words: “If you know exactly what you are going to do, what is the point of doing it?” and in researching the how, rather than the why, I appreciated Foucault’s “I’m not making a problem out of a personal question; I make of a personal question an absence of a problem.”

This thesis problematises the naming of like-kind passionates as Homo-sexual. This name’s ‘natural’, ‘obvious’ prominence should be unsettled, because for gay men within our culture and its discourses, love is often foreclosed and a sexual instinct ignobly emphasised bound to sameness, genital sexuality and anxieties around maleness. Defining men as ‘homo-sexual’ demands levels of self surveillance, both before and after coming out which are exhausting, and exhaust, emotionally, socially, personally. Power operates in limiting/defining ‘homo-sexuals’ as narcissistic and effeminate; a power that in the twenty first century has become hyper-real with even more impossibility and new technologies to ‘meet’ this impossible desire and enshrine this desire’s impossibility.

“Those that do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it.” In 1984, against Thatcherism, Moore and Lloyd published V for Vendetta, set in an imagined near-future Fascist Britain which due to disarmament survives nuclear war, a text adapted by The Matrix’s Wachowskis into a 2005 film.

In both texts the figure of V seeks to wake the general population from their apathy and collusion with the fascist system that denies them basic liberties, freedoms and thought:

There are of course those who do not want us to speak. Why? Because while the truncheon may be used in lieu of conversation, words will always retain their power. Words offer the means to meaning, and for those who will listen, the enunciation of truth. And the truth is, there is something terribly wrong with this country, isn't there? Cruelty and injustice, intolerance and oppression. Where once you had the freedom to object, to think and speak as you saw fit, you now have censors and systems of surveillance coercing your conformity and soliciting your submission. How did this happen? Truth be told, if you're looking for the guilty, you need only look into a mirror. I know why you did it. War, terror, disease. There were a myriad of problems which conspired to corrupt your reason and rob you of your common sense. Fear got the best of you, and in your panic you turned to the now high chancellor. He promised you order, he promised you peace, and all he demanded in return was your silent, obedient consent. (Wachowskis, 2006: 29-33)

V identifies people’s complicity in their own imprisonment, with security and structure offering stability and ‘safety’. But for a population to be secure, another must be marginalised; the normal only safe/controlled, through categorising the unsafe, abnormal; the desirables against the undesirables. Prothero, the Propaganda minister declares:

“No one escapes their past. We did what we had to do. Immigrants, Muslims, homosexuals, terrorists. Disease-ridden degenerates. They had to go. Strength through unity. Unity through faith.” (4)

http://www.wow247.co.uk/blog/2014/02/07/phoenix-interview-383921/
It is the homosexuals “disease-ridden degenerates” who inevitably are first amassed. As the lesbian, Valerie, writes from the detention camp where she is being experimented on:

“In 2002, I came out to my parents. My father wouldn’t look at me, he told me to go and never come back. My mother said nothing. But I had only told them the truth, was that so selfish? Our integrity sells for so little, but it is all we really have. It is the very last inch of us, but within that inch, we are free. … I remember how the meaning of words began to change. How unfamiliar words like ‘collateral’ and ‘rendition; became frightening. I remember how different became dangerous. I still don’t understand it, why they hate us so much. They took Ruth while she was out buying food. I’ve never cried so hard in my life. It wasn’t long till they came for me. It seems strange that my life should end in such a terrible place, but for three years, I had roses, and apologised to no one. I shall die here. Every inch of me shall perish. Every inch, but one. An Inch, it is small and it is fragile, but it is the only thing in the world worth having.” (103 - 108)

Words change meaning, some become powerful; different becomes dangerous. Those that fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it. Homo-sexual is no neutral signifier, but carries a weight of pathologising, of marginalising, of demeaning precisely in its various meanings. This thesis is a historical one, one attempting to learn through a genealogical analysis of history. V represents a point of resistance, not as a man, but as an idea. Police Chief Creedy demands “Die! Die! Why won’t you die?” to which V replies “Beneath this mask there is more than flesh. Beneath this mask there is an idea, Mr. Creedy, and ideas are bulletproof.” This thesis is dedicated to ideas and maintaining the freedom to think them. It is but an inch.

**Conclusion**

This chapter inaugurated Foucault’s tools of archaeology and genealogy as methodologies to unearth and interrogate assumptions of ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ in inaugurating like-kind desiring men as ‘homo-sexual’. The following chapter highlights a key site for such unearthing, the male/female binary opposition which founds and grounds so much discourse on gender and sexuality and is of critical import for underpinning both like-kind men’s homo-ness and sexuality.
Chapter Two: Bi the Binary: You Know It Takes Two

Chapter Synopsis

This Chapter critiques the pervasive and persuasive binary opposition of male/female which so imbeds homo-sexual naming as to question gay men’s gender identity, their masculinity and femininity. This binary structure and its underpinning and structuring generative ‘power’ implicates homo-sexuality as degenerative, criminal and abnormal. Deconstructing the male/female binary utilising Foucauldian archaeology and genealogy unearths and interrogates assumptions of ‘truth’ and ‘power’ the male/female opposition has employed to found and ground so much discourse on gender and sexuality which has signified and structured both like-kind desiring men’s homo-ness and sexuality.

Levi-Strauss and Binary Structurings

Levi-Strauss’s dedication to anthropologically uncovering “underlying patterns of thought in all forms of human activity”\(^7\) proffered language’s structuralism as operating through various binaries, where what something ‘is’ can only be ‘understood’ through examining pairings within structures of discourse in constant relation to each other; their differences, exchanges and substitutions. 1984 recognises language’s inherent binary structuralism where “a word contains its opposite in itself”:

“If you have a word like ‘good,’ what need is there for a word like ‘bad’? ‘Ungood’ will do just as well – better, because it's an exact opposite, which the other is not. Or again, if you want a stronger version of ‘good,’ what sense is there in having a whole string of vague useless words like ‘excellent’ and ‘splendid’ and all the rest of them? ‘Plusgood’ covers the meaning or ‘doubleplusgood’ if you want something stronger still. In the end the whole notion of goodness and badness will be covered by only six words – in reality, only one word” (Orwell, 1989: 54).

Utilising Saussurean linguistics, Lévi-Strauss argues all knowing/reality as derived within binary pairings of similarity and/or difference corresponding to Saussure’s paradigms and metaphor (exchange through similarity) and syntagms and metonymy (exchange through contiguity). Relations between units of a system can only be analysed in pairs; knowing A is A is grounded in A not being B, or not being R, and not being 6. ‘A’ can only be processed (understood) through/within separate binary pairings: A:B, A:R, A:6. Levi-Strauss emphasises, not the significance of any individual unit, what ‘A’ actually ‘is’, but the correlations drawn through collective binary pairings: A:B, A:R, A:6.

\(^7\) http://www.legacy.com/ns/obituary.aspx?n=claude-levi-strauss&pid=135404720
Binary structurings can be evidenced within the three terms of traffic lights: red, orange and green, where each term’s meaning is only understood within binary distinctions. Red (Stop/Danger) is drawn in opposition to Green (Go/Safe); while Orange has no independent meaning other than binarily through one of the others. On Orange people either slow because associated with Red implies an imminent stopping; or they accelerate because associated with Green (Go/Safe) facilitates driving through. Orange is binarily structured as either indicating Red or Green but never both simultaneously.

Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism asserts meaning as generated not only in what both elements in a binary (A/B) represent but through the relationship within the binary, their differences and similarities (A’s relationship to B, and B’s relationship to A). Man and Woman represent distinct ideas, but both their syntagmatic (different) and paradigmatic (similar) relationships produce supplementary layers of meaning. Meaning is not just within the binary structure; “Man and Woman are both sexes, but Man is not Woman; Woman is not Man”, but derived from other binary structures: Man is also binarily associated to ‘masculine’, ‘active’, ‘rational’; thus ‘Woman’ is correlative designated as ‘feminine’; ‘passive’; ‘irrational’. Subsequent structures facilitate aligning ‘Woman’ with passive emotionality, sentiment, madness, against ‘Man’s’ active ‘reason’ and ‘logic’.

Conscious and unconscious knowledge/understanding is binarily produced, Levi-Strauss argues, where one cannot be ‘fully’ comprehended without the other. Binary structures seductively comfort through their either/or certainty and reassuring containment, without ambiguity. Everything is literally black or white, therefore unnecessary, if not impossible, to challenge. Levi-Strauss recognised the distinctions and similarities within binary structuralism produce a hierarchy of meanings fundamental and critical to all cultural narratives, discoursing a politics of marginalisation, degradation and invisibility.

Derrida and Binary Deconstruction

Derrida’s deconstructionism addresses such knowledge structured through hierarchies of meanings within binaries. Derrida contends that binary pairings require distinctions to be made between them, necessitously inferring relationships of superiority and inferiority; dominance and subservience. His deconstruction explores such reversals for structures’ un/conscious meanings and associations, identifying his philosophy as post-structuralist.

Of Grammatology argues philosophical and cultural discourse as structured around binary juxtapositionings ‘clearly’ establishing privileged terms with ‘full’ meaning; the second thus subordinate, delineated as attenuated presence, the absence of the first. ‘Primary’ term are structured as the original, thus authentic and superior; the second inferred as
secondary, derivative, inferior. Human subjectivity (gender, sexuality, class, race) is structured within such ingenuous binaries, male/female; wealthy/poor; white/black; straight/gay ascribing a superior possession/position for the ‘haves’; so the second, either overtly or covertly, is discoursed as less/lacking – the ‘have-nots’.

Only two sexes, male and female, organise and decide all that can be discoursed around gender and thus sexuality. ‘Male’ is the privileged, primary, self-evident, ‘full’ term. ‘Female’ is the subordinate signifier derived from ‘male’; Adam’s Rib. Thus, anything classified not ‘male’ must be ‘female’ and ‘female’ is never defined, but understood as the absence of full ‘male’-ness. Within westernised, therefore phallocentric, discourses, most differentiations between the sexes will declare a man has a penis, and a woman does not. The man has presence, the woman an absence of that presence, despite organic presence of both clitoris and vagina. Within Westernised structuring binary discourses, only one term can ‘have’, and the other can only be defined as not having ‘that’, whatever other ‘realities’ may be.

Clearly there are different races, skin pigmentation shades, and multiple racial identities but, ultimately, all are ‘structured/understood’ within the binary white/black. This binary discursively imparts ‘White’ as privileged, against which ‘Black’ is not only inferior, but understood/structured as the lack/absence of ‘whiteness’. White privilege is primary and anything else non-Caucasian regardless of ‘actual’ colour is deemed non-white or black. This racial signifier ‘black’ does not signify ‘black-ness’ but the absence of ‘whiteness’ therefore signifying/containing not just people of Negroid or African origins, but anyone not designated/recognised “white”: Asian, Aboriginal, Jewish, Gypsy, Irish.

Further obfuscation emerges as this distinction black/white is not decided/dictated through measure of skin melanin, but by power; social discourses dictate whether a person is ‘white’ or not. Virginia’s 1924 Racial Integrity Act’s ‘one drop rule’ dictated one drop of ‘negro blood’ sufficient to denoted one non-white, therefore black; so persons with a distant ‘coloured’ (African or Native American) ancestor were legally defined as black/non-white thus bound within discourses such as laws criminalising marriage between ‘whites’ and ‘non-whites’. Similarly 1935’s Nazi Nuremberg Laws defined Aryans as Reichsbürger (Reich citizens) but Jews as Staatsangehörige (second class state subjects); distinctions defined according to one’s ‘pure’ Aryan ancestry percentile.

The SS’s standard was more stringent; applying candidates had to prove no single Jewish ancestor since 1750. But power can ‘change’ your race. Nazis provided German Blood
Certificates for those defined *Mischling* (mixed-race), who attested an Aryan interloper ‘proving’ a Jewish grandfather was not really their father’s father. The Nazis also created Honorary Aryans from Jewish *Mischlings* such as Maurice, an SS founder, and Milch, Göring’s Luftwaffe lieutenant; as Göring declared “Wer Jude ist, bestimme ich” (*I decide who is a Jew*). The title of Honorary Aryan was also bestowed on the Japanese people with 1936’s Anti-Comintern Pact and on the Finns for their assistance reconquering Finland from Russia in 1942.

South Africa’s Apartheid system similarly designated status of *Honorary White* to the Japanese in the 1960s, the Chinese in 1984, Cricketers of 1982’s West Indian rebel team, the 1970’s All Blacks Maori and Samoan players and the Guyanese author Braithwaite (*right*). Within such political racial binary logic, English scientists went to Ireland in the early twentieth century to *prove* they were not European (white) but actually of negroid (non-white) origin, hence unable to govern themselves.  

Derrida exposes “understandings of certain deeply hidden philosophical presuppositions and prejudices” (1974: 23) in Western Philosophy’s Logocentric over-reliance and privileging of presence over absence; as the presence of a penis, one drop of negro blood, or one Jewish grandparent accentuates. He argues how whole philosophical traditions rest on arbitrary dichotomous categories and their implicit hierarchies, “by which an order is imposed on reality and by which a subtle repression is exercised, as these hierarchies exclude, subordinate, and hide the various potential meanings” (Lamont, 1987: 602). Deconstructionism uncovers and unsettles the hierarchies within such binaries.

**Opposition to Binaries: Masculine and Feminine**

The binary signifiers heterosexual/homosexual define sexual orientation but only through their hetero-difference and homo-similarity being grounded within the binary male/female. This thesis critiques a conglomeration of binaries, some old, some new, some borrowed and problematically un/true evoking thought around the orthodoxy, not

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8 http://www.victorianweb.org/history/race/Racism.html
only on ‘homosexual’ or indeed ‘heterosexual’ identity, but more especially on related
binary oppositions, male/female, masculinity/femininity, active/passive which construct
and constrict so much cultural discourse on like-kind desire.

Of all binary oppositions cultural discourses of masculinity and femininity are perhaps
most treacherous. At least male/female, black/white allude to anatomy; straight/gay
reference desires; even haves'/have-nots’ possessions are equated. But masculine and
feminine are pure cultural illusory interpretations, yet pose so self-evidently as requiring
no reference to an actuality. In this, they demonstrate Baudrillard’s fourth order of
simulacrum outlined in Chapter Twelve. The most self-aware and politically discoursed
are aware of the emptiness of masculine and feminine as signifiers, yet each of us live
and operate under their shade. Freud identified masculinity and femininity: “whose
meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people, (as) among the most confused that
occur in science” (SE VII: 219), but their confusion never has thwarted their unambiguous
absolute authority within ‘ordinary’ (i.e. socially normalised) discourse.

Section Two’s exploration of third-sex discourse evidencing the new episteme of the
homosexuality as a person rather than an act, forecloses discourses on bisexuality.
Bisexuality which etymologically, especially in Freudian discourse, implied organic
hermaphroditism, becomes impossible because either one is homosexual or not (under
the law, medicine, society). But also this third-sex’s hermaphroditic bisexuality
ultimately gets realigned within a two-sex privilege to a discourse of like-kind men being
‘not’ men but feminine, effeminate.

**Hetero – Binary Oppositions**

Derridean deconstruction seeks to collapse discursive practices inherent in binaries’
privilege and inferiority. In the late nineteenth century to meet emerging discourses of
‘other’ monstrous desires heterosexuality had to be established as the absolute self-

evident ‘full’ term, beyond necessitating definition or elucidation. Like maleness,
heterosexuality can only ever balance on a vigorously enforced and reinforced, but very
tentative, binary opposition. Chapter Three’s Foucauldian analysis explores this
temporary and inconsistent history of the ‘heterosexual’.

Derrida subverts binaries, not merely in deconstructing either term, but seeking points of
instability therein to introduce a third ‘viral’ Undecidable, to derail binary oppositions
which structure/limit our discourses. His example of a Zombie, unable to possess ‘full’
sense of either alive nor dead, remaining thus an ‘Undecidable’, inevitably short circuits
our logic of distinction. Binary oppositions comfort with their ‘Either/Or’ logic, but the
‘Neither/Nor’ Undecidable of a ‘Third Sex’, Hermaphroditism or Bisexuality might act as contagion within discursive binary conceptual edifices.

A contemporary Irish example of how cultural binary opposition defies logic yet define/limit/inhibit discursive practices is the termination of pregnancy debate which is only discoursed as Pro-life in opposition to Pro-choice. Through its binary opposition against pro-life, Pro-choice can only ever denote ‘death’; ‘murder’; ‘killing’, without escape from this discursive practice. The death of Savita Halappanavar\(^9\) became a cultural discursive point of instability because the ‘Pro-life’ absolutist position resulted in death.

Undecidables destabilise absolute ‘truth’ of metaphysical concepts structured through binary opposites, terrorising their claim to full presence/meaning. To deconstruct hetero/homosexual binary opposition Section Two exposes both the myths in their origins, and targets their hidden instabilities; how all sexuality become defined/categorised/named as either heteronormal or degeneratively ‘other’. How any threat of intermediacy must be merged back within the binary discourse, purging homosexuality as a hermaphroditic third or intermediate sex, to realign it with the feminine and effeminacy.

**The Importance of “Sexual Difference”**

Our understandings of the body are socially inscribed by scientific and cultural discourses. Foucauldian methodologies question how culture came to produce a historical discourse of heterosexual complementarity “sexual difference” rather than a discourse focused on sexual similarity? There was not always an emphasis on sexual difference (hetero) over similarity (homo). Before the seventeenth century sex was not an ontological category but sociological, as we would now understand gender. Every body was considered a constant struggle between female and male seed. All bodies were positioned on a single “sex” axis across masculinity and femininity.

Prior to the seventeenth century, male and female bodies were two comparable variants within this single-sex continuum, allowing sexual graduations and possible fluidity of movement. Since antiquity, doctors evidenced Pliny’s “transformation of females into males as not an idle story” (Laqueur, 2001: 128). The modern question of a person’s ‘real’ sex made no sense, not because the two sexes were mixed, but because there was only one common ‘sex’. Genitals did not denote the founding “essence” of sexual difference.

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There was no hetero-(opposite) sexuality; separate words for ovaries and testicles were only invented within later two-sex opposite models. Renaissance drawings (below) depicting the vagina as an interior penis demonstrate the dominant discourse of all having the same genitals but borne differently. Only male bodies held necessary heat to display their genitals externally; lacking heat, female bodies bore theirs internally. “A bit more heat or acting the part of another gender can suddenly bestow a penis, entitling its bearer to be designated a man.” (126)

Paré, the father of modern surgery, details stories of people’s genitals changing from internal to external presentation; Marie became Manuel when her penis was expelled “at a time of life when girls begin their monthlies while disporting himself and frolicking” (127) with a chambermaid, as if making love as a man suddenly gave her the organs to do it ‘properly’. Another Marie jumped a fence in puberty and “at that very moment the genitalia and the male rod came to be developed in him, having ruptured the ligaments by which they had been held enclosed” (127). Paré explained this transformation entirely naturalistically “women have as much hidden within the body as men have exposed outside; only, that women don’t have so much heat, nor the ability to push out what by the coldness of their temperament is held bound to the interior” (127).

Bauhin a Swiss botanist who worked on human anatomical nomenclature wrote “Women have changed into men…the heat, having been rendered more vigorous, thrusts the testes outward” (127). And Harvey who first described cardio circulation warns girls not “to stretch their legs too wide for fear of becoming males, like Marie-Germaine” (ibid).

Within this single sex continuum, a binary rule exists declining from male to female, implying female inferiority; the male as ultimate focus. So although Laquer argues that “in this imaginative world, there is no ‘real’ sex that in principle grounds and distinguishes in a reductionist fashion two genders” (128) this does not prevent two oppositional genders being established, one as inferior.

Sexual orientation discourse evoked sexual temperament rather than sexual genitals. Orientation was mapped on this continuum, not defined by polar opposites. Desire was towards degrees of masculinity and femininity not towards hetero-opposite genitals.

As Columbus’s 1492 ‘discovery’ redrew the global map and discourses, so his namesake, Renaldus Columbus’s 1559 ‘discovery’ of the clitoris “this small protuberance … the seat
of the patient’s delight” (Andahazi, 1998: 139) redrew sexual cartography. Columbus tried to explain his discovery within the single-sex system, even describing female sexual lubrication as “semen flows hither and thither” (139) and ascribing the clitoris as “the female penis (which) appears to concentrate in itself all manifestation of sexual pleasure to the detriment of the interior organs which do not betray a response when stimulated ... this organ rises and falls like a penis before and after coitus or manual stimulation” (140).

However females could not have two penises: an inverted penis vagina, and an active clitoral penis. Around this juncture ‘sexual difference’ began to pervade the entire human body with anatomists presenting male and female bodies as now having distinct telos, centring on male physical/intellectual strength, and female motherhood. Redefining the over-arching shift from pre-modern religious revelation-based beliefs, to modern scientifically based knowledge the Enlightenment aimed to distinguish fact from fiction. Under this system the sexes are different, absolutely separate and drawn in opposition.

Just as current advocates against gay marriage, utilise discourses of ‘natural authority’ to strategically circumvent ‘equality’ issues, the Hugenot Doctor de Jaucourt wrote:

“It appears at first difficult to demonstrate that the authority of the husband comes from nature because that authority is contrary to the natural equality of all people.” (quoted in Schiebinger, 1991: 215)

Thus through the eighteenth century “the greater shift towards biology and science as the ultimate purveyors of truth, and thus nature revealed women and men to be on opposite ends of completely different scales” (Hird, 2005: 23).

This separate two-sex structure permeated scientific discourse. In Botany, Mendel, the father of genetics, insisted on plants’ sexual difference despite their being intersexed. Although plants pollinate to reproduce, he argued botanical monogamous marital bonds between plants, his term ‘gamete’ derived from the Greek ‘gamien’ to marry; as well as arguing plants’ active male and passive female sexuality with *male* stamens displaying visible orgasms against *female* pistils showing little sexual excitement and modesty (20).

Gender differences had always been recognised, but throughout the eighteenth century these differences were increasingly portrayed as ‘natural’ as biological ‘sex’ replaced cultural ‘gender’ as the origin of difference. As humoral discourse waned, late eighteenth
century wax models demonstrated how deeply gendered sexual differences were emphasised muscles exhibited using male models, nerves using female (Barker and Chalus, 2005: 90); musculature was masculinised, the nervous system, feminised. What is ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ becomes increasingly inscribed on the body.

Enlight(Him)ment?

In the fin-de-siècle emergence of both sexological and psychoanalytic discourses, The Evolution of Sex by two eminent British biologists Geddes and Thomson argued men and women as different to a cellular level. Women evidenced the ‘anabolic’ tendency to store and conserve energy, which led them to be nurturing and kind; the ovum a quiescent cell compared to men’s ‘katabolic’ cells spent energy, making men forceful and aggressive, exemplified by the hungry, active sperm: Men are active, women passive.

In 1889 Geddes and Thomson utilised such ‘scientific’ argument against women’s suffrage: “What was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa cannot be annulled by an act of parliament” (Hird, 2005: 23). The basis for such politicians and scientists was that it was not a human-made political order that maintained women’s subordination and disenfranchisement, but ‘nature’ itself. Such discursive practices, inherited through this episteme of two opposite incommensurable biological sexes, are continually marshalled against same-sex passionates in naming them as ‘homosexual’. This can be evidenced within current same-sex marriage discourse where the argument of a child being best placed with two parents of opposite sex continually references fundamental ‘natural’ and thus ‘proper’ differences in the temperament and biology of men and women.

Even in contemporary society ‘sex’ signifies biological difference against gender’s socio-cultural differences. Rather than seeing sex as the baseline from which gender emerges through sociality, “sex becomes the natural that initiates the social” (Delphy, 1984, 144). If anatomy is destiny, the question begs who is destined to write and define anatomy.

This Scientific Paradigm grounds three interrelated assumptions: First, biological distinctions between women and men assume distinctions made between biology (sex) and culture (gender). Second, while gender’ is changeable, ‘sex’ is immutable. And third, this binary depends on the idea that biology itself consistently distinguishes between females and males. Hence gender discourse eventually distil into assertions of biological sex differences. “Even gender which was meant to escape nature traps is becoming as rigid as nature in its exploratory capacity” (Hird, 2005: 26).
The Third Sex?

One of the obvious effects of this two-sex system was the late nineteenth century discourse by Hirschfeld, Ulrichs and others of Homosexuality as a third sex, to seek scientific standing and recognition for like-kind desire within the two-sex scientific model. What this third sex ideology signifies for both scientific and cultural discourses is the ongoing confusion of sexuality, gender and sex. Through the twentieth century the object of your desires somehow implicates both something of your gendered social identity, and your scientific biological identity; an enigmatic impasse that even the genderbread person has not resolved.

Within gay male culture much of gay men’s practices and enactments of sexuality seem informed by gender rather than desire. Cultural assumptions around heterosexual ‘male’ sexual behaviour, (disengagement, unfeeling, promiscuity) are literally doubled in male/male homosexual practices. As Shilts argues,

“the whole cruising ritual, seemed more defined by gender than sexual orientation… the attraction to promiscuity and depersonalisation of sex rested on issues surrounding a fear of intimacy... not gay issues, but male ones” (1988: 89).

This thesis critiques cultural and scientific discursive structures of ‘sex’ that continually emphasise difference over similarity, in order to alienate, marginalise and criminalise those defined as abnormal, deviant and subversive, as binaries shadow binaries, reiterating the superiority of male/masculine/heterosexual/generative/normal/natural against the female/feminine/homosexual/degenerate/abnormal/unnatural.

Where sex is scientifically defined through male/female biological difference, sex is not discoursed in terms of pleasure, but under heterosexual procreational function; “the presumption that the nature of heterosexuality is ‘nature’ itself” (Hird, 2005: 27). This thesis complicates our understandings of social ‘normalisation’ to unearth a Foucauldian genealogy of Heteronormativity’s dominance and primacy.

Homo-sexual Effeminate Passivity

Freud’s warning “we far too readily identify activity with maleness and passivity with femaleness” (SE XXI, 106), is an identification enforced and reinforced by scientific discourses, psychoanalysis being no exception. Freud’s founding epoch of psychoanalytic discourse is one where the episteme of masculine/feminine alignment to activity/passivity is strictly policed, prescribed and inscribed against emerging feminist, suffragette threats
for equality, recognition, power; a locus in which no middle ground can be afforded.

Bisexuality’s first recorded use by Samuel Taylor Coleridge originally signified being physically dual-sexed. Bisexual was a body, not a desire; as first defined in 1859 in The Cyclopaedia of Anatomy and Physiology. Bisexual’s modern signification of sexual attraction to both sexes was first used by American neurologist Chaddock’s 1892 translation of Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis. Freud’s discoursing bisexuality in a somatic sense to communicate something of a psychic sense, evidences the discursive demand for sexuality to be written on the body.

Science next tells you something that runs counter to your expectations and is probably calculated to confuse your feelings. It draws your attention to the fact that portions of the male sexual apparatus also appear in women’s bodies, though in an atrophied state, and vice versa in the alternative case. It regards their occurrence as indications of bisexuality, as though an individual is not a man or a woman but always both (SE XXII, 114).

Confounding hermaphroditic discourse with “indications of bisexuality”, Freud continues trying to make visible ‘psychological’ desire with/in the observable anatomical body by aligning the terms ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ with its correlative binary ‘active’ and ‘passive’, though simultaneously warning against this alignment. But as Lakoff’s ‘pink elephant’ discourse evidences, (Barwise, 1989: 35) telling people to not think of something only guarantees its perpetuation. Despite Freud’s best warnings, a clear well-trodden pink elephant trail between binaries from male/female to masculine/feminine to active/passive within emerging discourse of the male homosexual materialises; an image evoking sodomitic passivity and effeminacy.

“We are accustomed to employ ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ as mental qualities, and have in the same way transferred the notion of bisexuality to mental life. Thus we speak of a person, whether male or female, as behaving in a masculine way in one connection and in a feminine way in another. You cannot give the concepts of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ any new connotation. The distinction is not a psychological one; when you say ‘masculine’, you usually mean ‘active’, and when you say ‘feminine’, you usually mean ‘passive’. But I advise you against it. It seems to me to serve no useful purpose and adds nothing to our knowledge” (SE XXII, 115).

**Homo-Sexual – Narcissists – Near Sissies**

Section Two relates two particular contemporaneous contingencies generating ‘homo-sexual’ naming. First, the instituted pathological connection, explored in Chapter Five, between male homosexuality and narcissism, derived through their simultaneous emergence within fin-de-siècle psychiatric sexual discourses. The second, explored in Chapter Four, is aligning homo-sexual men with discourses of feminine practices/bodies. Culture’s conjoining these two exigencies, initiates gay men’s naming into a carnival hall of mirrors where self-observation, so often interpreted as narcissistic, might indeed be an anxious self-surveillance of gendered identity, to quash or privilege the ‘appearance’ of
effeminacy Panti (left) spoke of (O’Neill, 2014). ‘Effeminate’ anxiety is evidenced in homo-sexual men’s relationship with their image, displayed and discoursed through pornographic technologies and how their hyper-real virtual culture captivates/captures gay men’s sexual and social identities. The power at work within such technologies, discourses and practices are analysed in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen.

**HeteroOrthodoxy – Only Opposites Can Attract**

By the twentieth century heterosexual desire is instituted as the norm, because discourse’s binary oppositional structuralism demands it to contain/structure emerging discourses of inversion, and other ‘abnormal’ sexual practices. This ‘hetero’ signifier was deliberately elected, for within Victorian electro-magnetic scientific discourse only opposites produce/generate. As Hegel’s quintessential nineteenth century philosophical discourse exemplifies and indeed dictates, for any production of meaning/power, this binary must be in opposition. Only an opposing pair of poles, thesis and antitheses, can produce.

Around 391 BC, Plato developed Empedocles’ conception of *philia* and *neikos* (attractive and repulsive force) advancing his law of affinity that “like tend toward like”; that earth is drawn to earth, or elements of water to water. In 1250 Magnus applied this affinity idea to chemical systems establishing his four laws of affinity used in 1687 by Newton, ‘The Father of Modern Physics’, to argue his three laws of planetary motion; thus popularising and entering ‘laws of attraction’, grounded in likeness, into cultural scientific discourse.

However by 1873, Clerk-Maxwell united all prior unrelated observations and equations of electricity, magnetism and optics into one consistent theory, the electromagnetic laws of attraction and repulsion, which Einstein ascribed the “most profound and the most fruitful that physics has experienced since the time of Newton” (Sprouse, 2012: 2). What Hegel achieves for binary oppositions in philosophical discourse, Clerk-Maxwell establishes scientifically, so by the nineteenth century for anything claiming scientific truth the supervention of the structural magnetism of opposites is both critical and ‘natural’. For emerging sciences of psychoanalysis and sexology the ‘heterosexual’ must be regarded not only as the norm, but the only signifier that communicates this normativity; anything homo is named as non-generate, degenerative, repellent.
Lawful and Criminal Sexuality

Lombroso’s medical practice within nineteenth century asylums and prisons drew him to the study of criminality and sexual deviancy. He exhibited criminality as an inherited physiognomy, postulating ‘born’ criminals’ physical features evidence biological degeneration, an atavism to a more primitive, subhuman man. Chapter Four relates how this physiognomic discourse of the body revealing the mind in/forms the ‘image’ of the homo-sexual; a legacy still evidenced in contemporary homo-sexual on-line profiles and practices explored in Chapter Fourteen.

Regarded as the founding text of modern criminology, Lombroso’s *L’uomo delinquente* intermixed criminal and sexological discourses. He associated criminals with degrees of sexual deviancy; sexual criminals particularly evidenced not only insanity but displayed a “perverted instinct” enduring “sexual instincts as if they were female” (1883, 169).

“He consistently described offenders as men with no control over his passions who indulge in wine and orgies, and whose body did not present typically male secondary sexual characteristics and thus resembled a woman’s” (Beccalossi, 2011, 122).

Lombroso popularised sexology, supporting translations including *Psychopathia Sexualis* into Italian. His 1881 paper *L’amore nei pazzi*, (Love in the Insane) outlined five different sexual taxonomies, one of which ‘amore invertito’ (inverted love) included eight case-histories; two his own, the other six summarised from Westphal, Tamassia, Gock and Krafft-Ebing. These case-histories identified feminine physical stigmata identifying each subject as degenerate specifically in his distinction of one common psychological trait, the tendency to display feminine behaviour or dress as a woman. He interpreted the sparse beards of many sexual inverts as evidence of “an impediment in cerebral development”, and referenced Casper’s 1852 paper of “a kind of mental hermaphroditism (124).

“perhaps sexual inversion … is linked to the hermaphroditism that Darwin recognised in our oldest ancestors; and we can have a vague idea of the hermaphroditism in the first months of the foetal period … and also in the analogy of sexes that I have discovered in criminals” (Lombroso, 1881: 31-32).

Another consequence of aligning homosexuality with criminality is his differentiation of ‘occasional criminals’ and ‘born criminals’ which infers ‘occasional homosexuals’ and ‘born homosexuals’. Occasional homosexuals act out only from environmental exigency, single-sex situations and his 1906 paper on congenital homosexuality significantly claimed “temporary homosexuality” akin to “temporary criminality” as implicit in every childhood (378). Lombroso argued both ‘born’ criminals and ‘born’ homosexuals exhibit unique common physiognomies, characteristically feminine, as well as shared psychological traits such as vanity, selfishness, triviality, jealousy and impulsiveness; traits culturally designated feminine.
With Lombroso, the emerging Homo-sexual, incapable of hetero-producing, inherits discursive practices in his degenerate alignment with criminality and physical alignment with effeminacy which will be explored more in Chapters Four and Five.

**Generation and Degenerates**

Degeneracy betrays itself among men in certain physical characteristics, which are denominated stigmata, or brandmarks such stigmata consist of deformities, multiple and stunted growths in the first line of the face and cranium; then imperfection in the development of the external ear, which is conspicuous for its enormous size. In particular, Lombroso has conspicuously broadened our knowledge of stigmata, but he apporitions them merely to his ‘born criminals’ but a subdivision of degenerates. Féré expresses this very emphatically when he says “Vice, crime and madness are only distinguished from each other by social prejudice” (Nordau, 1895: 17).

Nordau, whose 1892 *Degeneration* dedicated to Lombroso, was a rallying cry against fin-de-siècle decadent “contempt for traditional views of custom and morality” (6) accuses society of becoming increasingly susceptible to imitate art, artists and the fashionable.

Every single figure strives visibly by some singularity in outline, set, cut or colour, to startle attention violently, and imperiously to detain it. Each one wishes to create a strong nervous excitement, no matter whether agreeably or disagreeably (9).

As a doctor, Nordau diagnoses such temperament as illness, appealing to medical experts, not least of all Lombroso and Féré, a fellow researcher with Freud under Charcot who wrote his own *Dégénérescence et Criminalité* in 1888. Through Nordau, ‘degeneration’ discourse, armed with medical lexicon and criminal inheritance, rallied against influential cultural performers, chiefly Wilde, though this was three years before his trials.

In the tendencies of contemporary art and poetry, in the life and conduct of men who write mystic, symbolic and ‘decadent’ works and the attitude taken by admirers in the tastes and aesthetic instincts of fashionable society, the confluence of two well-defined conditions of disease, with which the physician is quite familiar, degeneration and hysteria, the minor stages being designated as neurasthenia (15).

In a scientific cultural discourses where electricity powers this Industrial age; in an epoch where eugenics and racial purity are culturally proliferating, and scientific physiognomy is displayed as a warning against the collapse of civilisation; in this episteme of generative natural hetero-reproduction, emerges the degenerate *homo-sexual* name, constructed from case histories of criminals and asylum inmates, as Chapter Three develops.

*Degeneration*’s first English edition published coincidently following Wilde’s 1895 trials, argued society as an organism ideally composed of productive cells, but threatened with degeneration. “Decadence denotes a state of society which produces too great a number of individuals unfit for the labours of common life” (301); “enemies of all institutions which they do not understand, and to which they cannot adapt themselves” (302),

“I consider it absolutely impossible, and given attention, you will perhaps agree with me, that a person who is susceptible to the love of women can divert the direction of his love toward men by his own will power, or that he can generate love toward men, or even create a sensibility for love toward men by his own will power” (69).
Using degeneration discourse to name, abnormalise and criminalise non-generating homosexuals continues. In September 2014 Babamuratov (below), leader of Kazakhstan’s nationalistic Bolashak (Future) Party denounced Gay visibility “One can see a lot of people in the city’s malls and other public places, these are young people in coloured pants. They no longer hide their orientation.” He argues for eugenic screenings against such degeneracy: “It is very easy to identify a homosexual person by his DNA. A blood test can show the presence of degeneratism in a person”\(^{10}\); a demonstrable ‘imitation’ of Russia’s “gay propaganda” laws in which homosexuals are degenerate, unnatural, criminal recruiters.

**Masculine and Feminine**

Sexologists and psychoanalysts indubitably proffer something original for Western sex conceptions, but always mired in the treacherous binary of sexual difference. Freud says “When you meet a human being, the first distinction you make is ‘male or female?’ and you are accustomed to make the distinction with unhesitating certainty” (SE XXII, 113). The discursive demand that everything falls visibly into either/or means nothing can be discoursed about gender/sexuality without falling into and operating within the ‘truth’ of this primary binary of sexual difference. To seek legitimacy is to find the limitary.

Psychoanalysis, as another discourse conceived within this epoch, aims to highlight the problematics of sexual difference, yet ultimately mirrors them. Freud recognised their inherent sheer complexity, despite their seeming unambiguity:

“It is essential to understand that the concepts of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, whose meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people, are among the most confused that occur in science. It is possible to distinguish at least three uses. ‘Masculine’ and ‘feminine’ are used sometimes in the sense of activity and passivity, sometimes in a biological, and sometimes, again, in a sociological sense” (SE VII, 219).

Within structuralism one cannot use such *founding* signifiers without *confounding* their confusion. Freud may intend biological meanings in these words, but they always signify and transmit other binaries. One cannot say masculine without implying active/male; and therefore not being feminine, passive, female. Within Lacanian post-structuralism signifiers carry all their signifieds, one meaning cannot be isolated from others, nor their diametric opposites. Words can never be insulated from the binary relations producing both conscious and unconscious meaning. This is why in post-structuralist discourses the

binary opposition of *masculine* and *feminine* must continually be ruptured precisely because their “meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people”.

Sodomy has always threatened not just because it manifests unproductive, degenerative sexual desire, but because it subverts male desire as being absolute, self-apparent, active and ‘dominant’. How can discourse allow ‘male’ pleasure to be ‘passively’ experienced? This must involve something ‘feminine’ or less male? Ulrichs’ *Mannmännliche Liebe* is translated into English as ‘Man-Manly’ Love highlighting something ‘not male or masculine’ about like-kind desire. Labelling someone ‘male’ as manly or masculine already questions their gender absolute. Describing a male as manly, ostensibly complementing their masculinity, conversely highlights their forfeiture of any *genuine* naturally self-evident maleness. This desire, and anxiety, informs much gay-male discourse within the sexual marketplace as Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen analyse.

Such gendered anxiety endures in *homo-sexual* discourse around who the woman in the relationship is, and *who’s the man*; the femininity of passivity; demonstrated in prison sexual discourse where ‘the bitch’ is he on the receiving end of sexual assault. It is evidenced in a 2008 interview with Brendan Behan’s niece who argued that same-sex sexual activities Behan engaged in during his time in borstals and prisons cannot be seen as homosexual, as “There are lots of men in prison who have what we, on the outside, would call gay sex but they certainly don’t regard it as gay sex in prison. The men are sort of temporary women.”11 The term *homo-sexual* is important because it blankets over such gender questions and ‘undecidables’, it absolutely is not hetero-sexual and therefore is easily discursively dismissed as ‘abnormal’; never ‘full’; productive or generative.

**Conclusion**

Naming the ‘Homo-sexual’ is embedded in a web of discursive binaries, critical amongst them the masculine/feminine of sexual difference which this thesis both unearths and explicates using Foucault’s genealogy, and deconstructs through highlighting the Derridean fragile edifices upon which this male/female binary’s discourses are grounded as natural, scientific and ‘real’ and thus utilised to form and inform gender and sexuality discourses which produce and sustain gay men’s homo-ness and sexuality. The next Section continues exhuming and analysing the ubiquitous male/female, masculine/feminine binary vestiges in the creation and evolution of like-kind desiring men becoming named defined and instituted as homo-sexuals.

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11 [http://www.brendan.co.uk/archive-behan.html](http://www.brendan.co.uk/archive-behan.html)
Section Two

A Terrible Beauty is Born
Chapter Three:
The Love That Dares Not Seek Its Name

Caliban.  You taught me language; and my profit on't
Is, I know how to curse. The red plague rid you
For learning me your language!

_The Tempest, Act I, Scene ii, 369-70, Shakespeare_

**Chapter Synopsis**

The signifier ‘Homosexual’ cannot signify love, so Wilde’s ‘love that dares not speak its name’ continues having no name. This chapter surveys the etymology, and power implicated therein, of how like-kind passionates came to be identified and defined as _homo-sexual_ over other available nineteenth century designations. How did compounding ‘homo’ sameness with ‘sexual’ come to discourse such men, while other significations were excluded/silenced? Within dominant only male/female opposites generate discourse explicated previously homos can only be deemed degenerative, ‘abnormal’, ‘monstrous’.

**Nommo means Word**

Nommo is the force that makes things live as what they are. Nommo means word. The rabbit has the life it has – not a rat life or mongoose life – because it is named rabbit, mvundla. A child is not alive, claims Nelson, until it is named. I told him this explained a mystery for me. My sister and I are identical twins, so how is that from one single seed we have two such different lives? Now I know. Because I am named Adah and she is named Leah (Kingsolver, 2000: 238).

Nommo, an African term Asante defines as “the generative and productive power of the spoken word” meaning the proper naming of a thing which in turn gives it essence. (Asante, 1998: 17)

I am a homosexual. In 1900, as Freud grounded his psychoanalytic talking cure discourse where every word carries significance, how more diverse I was in being named Sodomite, Pederast, Same-sex Passionate, Homogenicist, Urning, Uranian, Invert, Intermediate Sex, Third Sex, Antipathicist, Intersexualist, Psychosexual Hermaphrodite, or Similisexualist.

Now in 2015, I am sometimes queer, oftentimes fag, but irreversibly homosexual. This scientific binomial nomenclature accentuates two significations; my _homo_-ness, and my _sexual_-ness. Homo-ness transmits through Greek, discourses around sameness, mirroring and narcissism; through Latin, discourses of masculinity/manhood. Delineated sexual, demarcates my desire as genital, evoking perverse, predatory and criminal discourses.

Hiller, Hirschfeld’s successor, held in concentration camps for his political and homosexual activism, decried:

“‘The current and most popular name, ‘homosexual’ is most abominable. It is a hybrid idiom, half Greek, half Latin. The most stupid jumble arises because ‘homo’, besides
having the Greek meaning ‘same’ as used here, also has the Latin meaning ‘man’, not to mention that ‘sexual’ has characterised the uncouth and more animalistic in our language for the longest time, not, at the same time, the finer and more human, such as the Greeks’ use of the word ‘Eros’ and ‘erotic’ (Hiller, 1946: 121).

Recognising “a good thing can be served exceptionally well by having a suitable name, especially since it can be terribly damaged by an incompetent, hideous or misleading label” (121), Hiller bemoans other like-kind significations and etymologies, ultimately proffering in frustration, his own: the androtrope (126).

**Coming-Out Into Words**

Who are we, we who speak a language such that it has powers imposed on us in our society as well as on other societies? What is this language which can be turned against us, which we can turn against ourselves? (Foucault, 2004: 95)

We all come-out into Language’s pre-determined significations. Being Irish easily slides from gingerness into being a paddy, idiot, drunk, terrorist, signifying different discourses depending on geography and history, culture and class; on power.

Richard Harris was heralded, as Cannes’ best actor, by a London Newspaper as “British Actor Wins Major Award”, only for a few days later the same newspaper, following a drinking binge with Richard Burton, to headline “Irish Actor in Brawl”12. Only Harris noted the contradiction, but perhaps there wasn’t one when culture defines, names and denotes you according to its discourses’ agendas.

No Irishman recognised this more than Wilde, the ‘outed’ archetype. Central to Wilde’s philosophy is the power of ‘naming and claiming’ his *The Importance of Being ‘Earnest’* exemplifies; a power mirrored in Freud’s talking cure; in the importance of Ida Bauer being ‘Dora’ (*SE VI*: 241), or Mathilde being injected as ‘Irmã’ (*SE IV*: 106). Both men ground their discourses on the significance of words/names. Is not ‘coming out’ coming into a name, assuming an identification as ‘homosexual’ with all that it bears? But as Morrison cautions, “Definitions belong to the definers, not the defined” (1997: 190).

Wilde’s racial degeneration from English to Irish parallels his relocation from aesthete to pervert, from well-spoken husband to ‘unspeakable’ sodomite. An analogous threat for the Jewish Freud, both at the heart of, and marginalised within, Viennese society; positionings beyond his control, for others to name, or not. Just as my attraction to men labels me homosexual, bound in meanings beyond my choosing, which designate me.

Wilde’s trial first publicised like-kind passion as the “love that dares not speak its name”:

> “a great affection of an elder for a younger man as there was between David and

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Accessed 11/4/2015
Jonathan, such as Plato made the very basis of his philosophy, and such as you find in the sonnets of Michelangelo and Shakespeare. It is that deep, spiritual affection that is as pure as it is perfect. It is in this century misunderstood, so much misunderstood that it may be described as the ‘Love that dare not speak its name’, and on account of it I am placed where I am now. It is beautiful, it is fine, it is the noblest form of affection. That it should be so the world does not understand. The world mocks at it and sometimes puts one in the pillory for it. (Loud applause, mingled with some hisses)” (Ellmann, 1988: 463).

“Loud applause, mingled with some hisses” gages Wilde’s signifying this unnameable, accentuated in Justice Charles’s immediate interjection: “If there is the slightest manifestation of feeling I shall have the Court cleared. There must be complete silence preserved.” When ‘the love that dares not speak its name’ is evoked, complete silence must be upheld especially when correlated with “the slightest manifestation of feeling”. Discourse emphasises ‘no name’ and ‘silence’ for like-kind passionates, foreclosing discourses on love. Culturally permitted discursive namings of this identity must exclude “slightest manifestations of feeling”. Like-kind passionates never love, only fuck; hence the threat within gay-marriage for conservatives. Feelings and emotions are aligned with discourses of humanity; being sexual, to fuck, is located within the diametric opposite of animal. Being homosexual, ‘one who fucks the same’ is to be animalistic.

**Freud Names Homosexuals**

Underlining Freud’s ‘naming’ of like-kind passionates was that signifiers of perversion or pathology always assume ‘normalcy’; hence his intent against stigmatising homosexuality further. He consequently and continually differentiated between “perversion” and “inversion”: “I am of the firm conviction that homosexuals must not be treated as sick people. Homosexual persons are not sick” (Lewes, 1995: 20).

Prior to 1905 Freud uses inversion and homosexual interchangeably; homosexual used eleven times, inversion nine. However Freud’s *Three Essays* uses the term inversion exclusively, to never publish it again thereafter, always replaced with *homosexual*.

Freud’s endeavours within silent, silencing anxious unnameability is evidenced in his letter to the American mother seeking treatment for her son:

“I gather from your letter your son is a homosexual. I am most impressed by the fact that you do not mention this term yourself. May I question you, why you avoid it? Homosexuality, is assuredly, no advantage but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness. It is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime, and cruelty too” (Lewes, 1995: 20).

Freud recognises homosexuality as a “variation of the sexual function”, that most homosexuals appear for treatment not because of their desires, “choice of object”, but because of the cultural signification the name their desiring has: “external motives such
as social disadvantage, and danger attaching to his choice of object” (22). Freud underlines psychoanalysis should never ‘cure’ homosexuality, but “bring harmony, peace of mind, full efficiency whether he remains a homosexual or gets changed” (ibid).

“From the point of view of psychoanalysis the exclusive sexual interest felt by men for women is also a problem (my italics) that needs elucidating and is not a self-evident fact” (Freud, SE VII: 146).

Homosexuality is only a problem in the context of heterosexuality being problematised. With such awareness Freud exemplifies a queer methodology of the 21st century. For Freud’s discourse, the heterosexual, that most ‘natural’ and obvious of identities, is equally as problematic and unsteady as the homosexual identity it is identified against. But neither psychoanalysis nor patriarchy is invested in elucidating this ‘problem’ of heterosexuality from its ‘natural’ self-evident ‘norm’.

**‘Know Thyself’ and Know Thy Name**

In 1735 Linnaeus’s, ‘the father of modern taxonomy’, *Systema Naturae* established modern binomial biological nomenclature. His system established an authoritative ‘natural’ order of things grounded so unassumingly within dual Latin classifications that the implications of expending such categorisations go unchallenged.

Linnaeus’s nomenclature was constructed on his subjective gaze of species’ appearance. *Mammalia* are named for visible female glands, despite only half having functioning mammae. Equally they could have been characterised by unique possession of sweat glands, hair, three middle ear bones, or a neocortex; less ‘obviously’ seen characteristics, but more ominously not conveying a gendered agenda.

There is a political discourse in every naming. This new classification ‘mammal’ highlighted women’s association with ‘natural’ maternity, precisely as politicians agitated for middle-class women to breastfeed, with Linnaeus himself writing against the evils of wet nursing (Schiebinger, 1993: 405). *Mammalia* discoursed women as nearer in form to animals and within the gendered discourse outlined previously, establishes the breast, not the less visible or portentously potent clitoris, as ‘the’ signifier of femaleness.

The binomial nomenclature ‘homosexual’ coined by Kertbeny in 1868 has, as Ellis underlined “philologically, the awkward disadvantage of being a bastard term compounded of Greek and Latin elements” (1927: 114). Carpenter, the socialist ‘like-kind passionate’, proposed ‘homogenic’ for shifting the focus from “sex” towards the Greek “of the same kind”. But the bastardisation stuck, isolating such men politically/culturally within significations of sameness and sex.
1868 sees Kertbeny name the homosexual and Griesinger first classify like-kind desire as a “constitutional nervous disease” (Oosterhuis, 2000: 43). 1869 sees Ulrichs complete Man-Manly Love and Westphal publish his diagnostic category ‘contrary sexual feeling/sensations’. To then, discourses on homo-sexuality had been limited to medical pederasty and/or criminal sodomy. Now a contrary psychiatric discourse endures, evidenced in Schrenck-Notzing’s 1892 Die Suggestionstherapie bei den krankhaften Erscheinungen des Geschlechtssinnes, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der conträren Sexualempfindung and Moll’s 1891 Die Konträre Sexualempfindung, a sexologist who expounded the most erudite general theory on sexuality until Freud’s Three Essays.

**Inversion**

“Those who read these lines will hardly doubt what passion it is that I am hinting at - surely it deserves a name. Yet I can hardly find a name which will not seem to soil this paper. The accomplished languages of Europe in the nineteenth century supply no term for this persistent feature of human psychology, without importing some implication of disgust, disgrace, vituperation” (Symonds, 1891: 108).

By the turn of the century, invert was homosexual’s prime scientific discursive rival for inscribing like-kind passionates. For Symonds, Inversion is “a convenient phrase” which “does not prejudice the matter under consideration”, a “neutral nomenclature” (112). But like ‘homosexual’, invert is bound to discourses of binary oppositions; located as opposite/inferior to whatever it is inverting (upsetting/reversing) - the ‘right’ way round.

‘Inversion’ was first medically published in Chevalier’s 1885 De l’inversion de l’instinct sexuel au point de vue médico-légal, the year Freud arrived in Paris to study at Charcot’s Salpetriere. Davis argues Chevalier’s 1893 “Une maladie de personnalité: l’inversion sexuelle” as “a crucial source for writing Freud’s Three Essays” (2010: 199). By the 1900s ‘Inversion’ was associated with the English sexologist, Ellis, who with Symonds published Sexual Inversion originally in German as Das Konträre Geschlechtsgefühle, significantly translating like-kind discourse from Westphal’s ‘contrariness’ to inversion, and from his sexual-sensations to ‘sexual-emotions’.

Sexual inversion means sexual instinct turned by inborn constitutional abnormality toward persons of the same sex. It is thus a narrower term than homosexuality, which includes all sexual attractions between persons of the same sex, even when seemingly due to the accidental absence of the natural objects of sexual attraction, a phenomenon of wide occurrence among all human races and among most of the higher animals. We have further to distinguish sexual inversion and all other forms of homosexuality from another kind of inversion which usually remains, so far as the sexual impulse itself is concerned, heterosexual, that is to say, normal. Inversion of this kind leads a person to feel like a person of the opposite sex, and to adopt, so far as possible, the tastes, habits, and dress of the opposite sex, while the direction of the sexual impulse remains normal. (Ellis, 1927: 98)

Ellis utilises ‘inversion’ as a subset, “a narrower term than homosexuality” defining and distinguishing it as “inborn” and “constitutional”. Inversion is the congenital form against
wider homo-sexualities which occur because of geography (prisons) or history (single-
sex education): “the accidental absence of the natural objects of sexual attraction”.

Ellis then distinguishes such sexual inverts and “all other forms of homosexuality from
another kind of inversion”, what we would now signify as trans-genderism, what he terms
“sexo-esthetic inversion”. However confusing it is that all inverts are homosexuals but
not all homosexuals are inverts, matters are only confounded if there are inverts who
aren’t inverts, but inverted another way. Like-kind desire is signified within the same
discursive practices as trans-genderism, a confusing inheritance via Ulrichs, whose legacy
of inscribing effeminacy in like-kind passionates informs the next chapter.

Using inversion exclusively in his name-making *Three Essays*, to never thereafter use
again, might Freud have desired aligning his text alongside Ellis’s recognised sexological
discourse, only to later wish to distinguish himself? A key difference between Freudian
discourse and sexologists like Ellis and Hirschfeld is his refutation of Inverts as
congenital, born with same-sex desire. Psychoanalytic discourse and how it is evolving
and the culture in which it is being evolved may indeed account for the Freudian shift
around 1905 from inversion to homosexuality, as Chapter Six considers.

**The Invention of Heterosexuality**

Kertbeny conceived heterosexual alongside, not against, homosexual amidst
monosexuals (masturbation), heterogenits (bestiality) and ‘Normalsexualität’. ‘Homosexual’ defined same-sex erotic *acts*; ‘Heterosexual’, the erotic *acts* of men and
women, while *Gleichgeschlechtlichen* (those of the same sex) defined the persons who
engaged in *Gleichgeschlechtlicher* (the same sex act). ‘Normalsexualität’, was delineated
as normal sexuality, the innate form of sexual satisfaction of the majority of the
population and ‘heterosexuality’ was pointedly defined against this normalcy.

Heterosexuality was originally associated with perversion and unnatural discourse. For
Kertbeny heterosexuals threatened because of “unfettered capacity for degeneracy”:

> “driven by their nature to opposite sex intercourse in so-called natural as well as
unnatural coitus… also capable of actively or passively giving themselves over to
same-sex excesses. And they are equally likely to assault male but especially female
minors who have not reached maturity; to indulge in incest; to engage in bestiality
and the misuse of animals; and even to behave depravedly with corpses if their moral
self-control does not control their lust.” (quoted in Feray-Herzer: 1990: 34-6)

1892’s first coining of heterosexual in the United States by Kierman was still equated with
perversion; “abnormal manifestations of the sexual appetite in a list of sexual perversions
proper”, a tradition “lasting in middle-class culture into the 1920s” (Katz, 2007: 20).
Kiernan’s heterosexuals were “psychical hermaphrodites” who felt “inclination to both sexes”; both ‘male’ erotic attraction to females and ‘female’ erotic attraction to males; with erotic attraction being discoursed in gendered terms directed to its ‘opposite’. Their desire was not homogenous, but hetero, therefore dangerous. A standard was demanded in order to police, boundary, structure these ‘hetero/different’ desires. Ironically, ‘heterosexual’ came to be re-discoursed and re-positioned into providing this function.

Krafft-Ebing’s 1889 *Psychopathia Sexualis* discoursed heterosexuality in this normal function, no longer hetero-desiring, being attracted differently, but now strictly defined within two-sex discourse as the natural, *generative* desire grounded in hetero/opposition rather than hetero/difference. Krafft-Ebing initiates Heterosexuality as the pre-supposed, though clearly not pre-existing, construction of ‘normal’ sexuality for any lexicon of other ‘Psychopathia Sexualis’ desires to be inverted from, or contrary to. From Krafft-Ebing all non-hetero-sexual “antipathic sexual instincts” are discoursed within a non-generating sickness model; be it homosexuality, transvestism, sadism, necrophilia, transsexualism, fifty shades of one degenerative continuum of ‘abnormal’ desire, defined collectively against instituted ‘normalised’ heterosexual.

**Ulrich’s Urning Yearning**

Kertbeny’s *homo-sexual* originated within social reforming discourses where liberty is grounded on equality, sameness, on being alike.

“The state does not have the right to intervene in what is happening between two consenting people aged over fourteen, not hurting the rights of any third party. (Kertbeny, 1868: 227; letter from May 6, 1868)

Kertbeny was writing to Ulrichs author of ‘Man-Manly’ Love “the first scientific theory of sexuality altogether” (Müller, 1991: 24) written from 1863 to 1869, whose intention was similarly emancipatory, but utilised a hetero-generative scientific discourse to establish scientific ‘legitimacy’ for his ‘man-manly’ desire, thus rejecting the implicit sameness of Kertbeny’s ‘homosexual’ to cultivate his own hetero-lexicon.

Ulrichs first theorised like-kind desire within electromagnetic discourse; a “mental-physical passive animal magnetism for the reason that the person for whom it is a characteristic does not attract, but rather feels himself attracted” (cited in Kennedy, 1988: 44). First postulated by Mesmer in the eighteenth century, Animal magnetism’s scientific acceptance was boosted with von Reichenbach’s 1845 discovery of a magnetic force termed Od. In 1864 Ulrichs utilised such electromagnetic discourse, questioning a correspondent’s report of his penis sparking when touched by a soldier: “Was this spark Reichenbach’s Od? Was it positive animal electricity?” (1994: 178)
The challenge for Ulrichs’ scientific utilisation of opposite attracting electromagnetism is where is hetero-difference in one man’s attraction to another to justify its legitimacy? Ulrichs thus posited same-sex attraction as hetero because at heart they were a ‘third sex’ with an inborn *anima muliebris virili corpore inclusa*, female psyche confined in a male body (cited in Rosario, 1997: 27). In this compromise formation electro-magnetic discourse’s hetero-dictate is preserved:

“The Urning is not a man, but rather a kind of feminine being when it concerns not only his entire organism, but also his sexual feelings of love, his entire natural temperament, and his talents” (Ulrichs, 1994: 36).

The conundrum of locating like-kind desire within this ‘natural’ male/female heteromagnetism which justifies Victorian science haunts Ulrichs’ discursive navigations and epistemology of his Urnings. For him, Urnings are ‘naturally’ attracted to their opposite; but this ‘naturalising’ of Urning desire within a binary sex constructed discourse, isolates them only ever in an ‘effeminacy’, against their opposite, the masculine male. Urnings are feminised, and positioned against ‘real’ men:

“The analogy of the magnetic needles affects not only your love, but also ours. … unlike poles are obviously attracted to each other by an invisible natural power. Conversely, like poles are repelled by and avoid contact with each other; indeed, like poles are repelled by and avoid all contact with each other. I say, ‘attracted by an unlike pole and repelled by a similar pole’ and find in this an analogy to us. For we have a feminine element in us, not a masculine one. It only appears that men are similar to us, who are in truth unlike poles to me, but like poles to women” (65).

**Urning Taxonomy**

Ulrichs presents Urnings not as men who desire men, but a third sex, both male and female, which “have existed in all areas, in antiquity, among uncivilised nomads, indeed, actually among animals” (34). Ulrichs introduces hermaphroditic undecidables which defy the critical binary opposition of male/female outlined previously; though concurrently he establishes a further binary opposition, Urning/Dioning. By his seventh treatise on man-manly love, as more contributors articulated their desire, Ulrichs’ elaborate nomenclature system could not contain the various permutations. For desire itself, as psychoanalysis recognises, is always an undecidable, too complex and ultimately deconstructing to fit within ‘legitimate’ scientific discourse’s binary determination where only the strictly defined opposition of male/female can generate and produce.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Men</th>
<th>II. Women</th>
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<tr>
<td>III. Urnings</td>
<td>(male homosexuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mannlings</td>
<td>(male virile homosexuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Intermediaries</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Weblings</td>
<td>(male effeminate homosexuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Urningins</td>
<td>(female homosexuals)</td>
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Ulrichs’ ever-expansive/expanding taxonomy (314) pre-figures the post-modern challenges in the Gay community’s evolutions through LGBT, LGBTQ, LGBTQIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, Queer, Intersexed, Questioning) etc.; forever adding another letter, another group/identity whose gender/sexuality evades the definitions/names already termed. It is because of this impossible containment of desire that a heterosexist and hetero-invested culture repeatedly demands a single necessary binary limiting all gender and sexuality within straight and narrow discursive practices.

As outlined previously, binary oppositions are always structured in association/collusion with other binaries, a veritable structuralist House of Cards. The binary opposition of male/female carried edifices of masculine/feminine; virile/effeminate; active/passive. Ulrichs’ attempts to partition Urnings into further binary subsets of internally opposed types: Mannlings (virile males) and Weblings (effeminate males) (306) is doomed, when almost immediately a further deconstructing third term is interposed, Intermediaries; a significantly liminal category attempting to classify why a virile Urning might take a sexually passive role, or an effeminate Urning might adopt the active position. Clearly, homosexuals are not homogenous in their desires. All sexuality is hetero-different, despite what the missionary positioning, biologically reproducing, pleasure inhibiting, woman lying under sheet discourses of ‘normal’ ‘generative’ sexuality discourse.

“It is impossible for Ulrichs to construct his model of erotic identities without taking for granted all sexualities are grounded on a principle of sexual difference. Ulrichs always assumes that the desire of any one person is predicated on an attraction to an opposite pole. In his first analysis, he renders Uranian or man-manly love intelligible because it reveals how a feminine soul seeks a masculine object. Likewise, when pressed to account for active and passive homosexual behaviours, Ulrichs interprets the positions taken up by each partner as either masculine or feminine. In his schema, feminine desires require masculine complement, sex always splits into two antithetical but nonetheless complementary forms.” (Bristow, 2006: 24)

Within Ulrichs’ binary-dictating, hetero-compulsory generative taxonomy the folk walk two by two, as one and its opposite. The more it strives to contain all, the more it collapses, evidencing the hollowness in resolving and limiting all orderings of life, and desire within that most over-determined of binary oppositions, delineated previously, male/female.

The discourse most often used against gay marriage, the breaking of natural heterosexual union, opens the floodgates to all sorts of perversions and immorality: “Same-sex marriage will lead to fathers marrying sons.”; “If we have no laws on this, people take it
to one extension further, does it have to be humans, you know?”; “If gays are granted rights, next we'll have to give rights to prostitutes and to people who sleep with St. Bernards and to nail biters.” “Where do you draw the line? People wanna marry animals, children, siblings, multiple husband/wives, etc.?” 13 And the line always discursively demarcates non-heterosexual relations as ‘unnatural’.

**Urning Are Not Homosexual**

Complicating matters further, Ulrichs emphasised Urnings as not homo-sexual, attracted to sameness. Being feminine, under a heterosexual hegemony, they can only be attracted to masculinity, their binary opposite, which of course another Urning cannot possess.

“‘Does an Urning sexually attract another Urning?’ Little or not at all; at least as soon as our feminine traits become apparent. The reason is made clear above. He is lacking what is truly masculine.”(Ulrichs, 1994: 68)

Not being ‘homo-sexual’, Urnings are only attracted to their opposite, Dionings, heterosexual men. The price of hetero-ising Urnings is their further feminisation and compulsion to desire the masculinity they so clearly ‘lack’; “Everyone loves what is lacking in themselves.” (68) Urning desire is made impossible, as how could a Dioning be attracted to an Urning, when women are their opposite.

“Just as women, we are attracted only by truly masculine young men. Unmanly ones leave us cold.” (68) This initiates a powerful legacy from hetero-discursive dictates, where such impossibility borne and enacted in contemporary gay life, with masculinity fetishised as the desired ‘lack’ of gay sexual desire, informs Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen.

Because a young Dioning, on the other hand, considers an Urning simply as a man, this is a singular and very unfortunate situation for us, because the Dioning is dissimilar to the Uranian, who is therefore attracted: the Urning, considered similar by the Dioning, is therefore repelled. The one who is attracting will feel repelled, and the one who is repelling will feel attracted. … In the love ties between an Urning and a Dioning this conflict finds reconciliation. (65)

There is always and only hetero-attraction and homo-repulsion but Ulrichs proffers love rather than sex as a higher, more noble reconciliation. By nodding to hetero-normativity, but rejecting Kertbeny’s ‘homosexual’ nomenclature, Ulrichs seems to locate Urnings both within, but beyond, desire and heterosexuality.

**A Nobler Kind of Love**

Ulrichs rejects Kertbeny’s ‘homosexual’ nomenclature given its scientific degenerating discourse, to propose his own Urning taxonomy derived from Plato’s *Symposium*:

“Love is inseparable from Aphrodite, and if there were only one Aphrodite there would be only one Love; but as there are two goddesses there must be two Loves. The elder one, having no mother, is called the heavenly Aphrodite - she is the daughter of Uranus; the younger, who is the daughter of Zeus and Dione - her we call common … The Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially common, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be of women, and is of the body rather than of the soul … But the offspring of the heavenly Aphrodite is derived from a mother in whose birth the female has no part, she is from the male only. Those who are inspired by this love turn to the male, and delight in the more valiant and intelligent nature.” (Plato, 2012: 550-9).

Ulrichs’ model differentiates Uranian and Dionian loves. Uranus’s daughter Aphrodite springing to life from the foam gathered around his castrated member; was therefore generated without sex or woman; such is Urning love: men who love men. In contrast, the Dionian Aphrodite born of the hetero/sexual activity of Zeus and Dione names Dionings’ opposite sexual attraction necessitating women.

Ulrichs’ lexicon refuses Kertbeny’s homosexual through two tensions, neither of which suit scientific or psychoanalytic discursive practices, although significantly Urning was the term most used by nineteenth century like-kind desiring men to describe themselves. He demarcates Urnings firstly as hetero-desiring female psyches in male bodies and not homo-sexual; and secondly their desire is not sexual but a higher ‘Heavenly’ union.

Within Platonic discourse not all love is honourable, only heavenly (Uranian) love pursued properly. Plato distinguishes love as physical gratification (common/Dionian) and love as moral development (heavenly/Uranian). Uranian Love takes place when the lover educates the beloved teaching him virtue and wisdom, reserved only for older youths as within Greek cultural discourse they alone are designated rational and virtuous. Women and younger boys are both deemed non-rational, thus incapable of acquiring the virtue a lover might bestow, disdained as mere objects for physical gratification.

Ulrichs’ deliberate choice of Platonic discourse to substantiate Uranian love bestows Urning desire a philosophical progenitor, a ‘respectable’ antecedent. It establishes this taxonomy within classical discourse, and by association, as civilised, valued.

**Urnings and Uranians**

Ulrichs originally entitled his research ‘The Race of Uranian Hermaphrodites’

Ulrichs who used the appellation ‘Uranian’ (Uranier), based on the well-known myth in Plato’s Banquet later Germanised this term to Urning for the male, and Urningin for the female, and referred to the condition itself as ‘Urningum.’ It is scarcely legitimate to use the term ‘Urning’ in English. ‘Uranian’ is more correct. (Ellis, 1927: 104)

In England, a group of same-sex writers designated themselves Uranians through the same Platonic discourse as Ulrichs. These Uranians were Oxbridge educated, well trained
classicists who proselytised higher love and heavenly beauty and included aestheticists like Pater and later Wilde. Their founding could be dated from the 1858 publication of Cory’s *Ionica* poetry, and their desires became a classical allusive coda, an interpretative strategy Uranians adopted to promote an Eros that could be read both as historical, and/or ‘same-sex desiring’ depending on the reader, or their desire. The Uranians signified same-sex desire academically and poetically within classically referencing discourses as ‘Greek love’, Ganymede, Catamite or “chimeric” love; the chimera being a hybrid creature.

We must re-evaluate the Uranians’ use of these [Greek] allusions, not as a means of evasion [as d’Arch Smith argues] but precisely as a very conscious and deliberate strategy for a sexual cultural politics through art. [...] Far from a means of evasion, allusions to the Greeks were a tool for valorisation in a strategy for social acceptance. Surveying the allusions, one sees that they are largely to asymmetrical relationships, [...] Yet this inequality is part of the objective outline that Uranians saw in their Greek mirror; the Greek relationships were asymmetrical, and the Uranians saw themselves in this outline and filled in their own features. (Mader, 2005: 388-90.)

Wilde’s trials evidences the ‘Love that dares not speak its name’ as a product of such platonic idealism “a great affection … as Plato made the very basis of his philosophy. It is that deep, spiritual affection that is as pure as it is perfect.” (Ellmann, 1988: 463)

What awareness or knowledge earlier Uranians had of Ulrichs’ writings is unlikely, but they would have taken issue, as later Uranians did, with his denotation of “a female psyche in a male body”. Undoubtedly connections were drawn between Ulrichs’ lexicon and Uranian circles but such connections appeared long after Uranians had named themselves. The terminology shares a common source and is a contingent emergence: “not a ‘borrowing from’ but a ‘bridge to’ the like-minded across the Channel by apologists such as Symonds.” (Kaylor, 2006, xiii)

Carpenter renounced both the terms invert and homosexual, arguing what was significant in naming the love that dares not speak its name, was love.

“I use the word Uranians to indicate simply those whose lives and activities are inspired by a genuine friendship or love for their own sex, without venturing to specify their individual and particular habits or relations towards those whom they love.” (Carpenter, 1908: 891)

**What’s In a Name?**

The different names inscribing like-kind desiring men reveal temporal and geographic sites as well as politics. Most men in late nineteenth century Germanic sexological case studies self-describe as Urnings. It is the term Engels used in 1869 responding to Marx’s sending him Ulrichs’ writings: “The Urning you sent me is a very curious thing. These are extremely unnatural revelations” (Kennedy, 2003: 29)
Uranian is the term treasured by English men of certain class and education. In 1898, after his imprisonment, Wilde wrote to Robert Ross “To have altered my life would have been to have admitted that Uranian love is ignoble. I hold it to be noble, more noble than other forms.” (Wilde, 2000: 1019). In 1896 Raffalovich published a book in France entitled *Uranisme et Unisexualité*, which included a chapter on Wilde.

Post-Wilde, Uranians are displaced by Inverts as the customary English term, promoted by Ellis and Symonds, writers who promoted an identity politics agenda of recognition, and justice, where the invert’s congenital nature makes him human, a victim of his birth, therefore deserving of recognition not condemnation. ‘Invert’ came to common parlance with 1928’s *The Well of Loneliness* obscenity trials.

The term gay emerged as another product of Wilde’s trials to colloquially define like-kind desire. ‘Gay’ had always meant being joyful or carefree, but by the mid-seventeenth century it signified “addicted to pleasures and dissipations. Often euphemistically: Of loose and immoral life” 14. By the Victorian era, gay women were loose and immoral women, prostitutes one went to for pleasure and dissipation. Late Victorian Police reports and scandals such as The Cleveland St. Scandal evidenced the existence of ‘gay’ men alongside ‘gay’ women. The Wilde Trials put these ‘gay’ male prostitutes into the courts and the press so the public came to associate ‘gay’ with male same-sex behaviour.

‘Schwul’ which since the nineteenth century carries colloquial Germanic meanings of ‘gay’ is etymologically related to/from the german word ‘schwül’ meaning hot, sultry, warm. The use of ‘schwul’ in the sense of ‘homosexual’ is attested as early as 1847. 15 Hirschfeld explains this usage biologically evoking a discourse where body temperature, being in heat, again implicates alternative gender and sexual identities as delineated in the previous chapter’s sex-changing Marie cases:

“In general the skin of the Urning is warmer to the touch than that of persons around him. It appears that the designation ‘warmer Bruder,’ which is widespread in popular usage, has its physiological foundation in this phenomenon. (Hirschfeld, 1914: 146)

‘Warmer Bruder’ (warm brother) signifying gay is established as early as 1669 in Grimmelshausen’s *Simplicissimus*, continuing in use today. (cited in Kennedy, 2003: 94) Obviously all terms describing or indeed inscribing like-kind passion indicate differentiated meanings depending perhaps less on the terms than those using the terms.

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Ulrichs’ taxonomy was derived from and through his own experience providing ample mythological, literary, historical, and physiological data. But this Urning naming was ultimately unacknowledged and nullified, partly because he was ‘homosexual’ and thus not an expert doctor, but more significantly because his taxonomy was based on notions of love and failed to endorse the necessary concrete binary oppositions. Both Westphal and Krafft-Ebing acknowledged Ulrichs as a basis for both information and conceptualisation, but chose to ignore his taxonomy as not corresponding with science’s illness orientated approach. Those who adopted Urning/Uranian discourses were like-kind passionate men: Wilde, Symonds, Carpenter, the men in Krafft-Ebing’s case studies; but medical discourse never regarded it, only Kertbeny’s homo-sexuals would suffice to pathologise within their ‘illness’ scientific discourse.

Homosexual as a scientific/legal term, can claim a neutrality, in disinterestedly ascribing/describing an identity, but as this thesis explores no naming is ever strictly objective. As the previous section outlined, the term homosexual owes its origin and propagation to discourses of binary oppositions within a two sexed discourse of male and female, implying both a non-hetero opposite degeneration, and a less than male effeminacy. Homosexual has significantly never been reclaimed by contemporary gay or queer movements, but continually is used to demarcate by those with a conscious or subtle intent to depreciate, criminalise or pathologise.

Krafft-Ebing described Ulrichs as “afflicted with this perverse drive”; who “still has not furnished proof that he, as an inborn phenomenon, is eo ipso a physiological and not perhaps a pathological one” (cited in Rosario, 1997: 35), a statement held in each edition of his enduring influential bestseller Psychopathia Sexualis (1886, 58), which established absolutely the binary opposition of normal heterosexuals and perverse ‘homosexuals’.

Krafft-Ebing’s deliberate adoption of homosexual contrasts markedly against how men within his case studies described themselves, which was exclusively as Urnings. Ulrichs, ultimately came to oppose both Westphal and Krafft-Ebing, arguing their observations consisted only of individuals in asylums or jails, that neither they nor their medical colleagues ever saw healthy Urnings. But so much of psychiatric and indeed psychoanalytic discourses have emerged and evolved through engaging psychopathologies.

“Other terms were developed, such as Havelock Ellis’s sexual inversion; the term third sex was sometimes used, but it was homosexuality which was adopted as the medical term primarily because of the influence and prominence of Krafft-Ebing. (Bullough, 1994: 27)

Krafft-Ebing, though not the progenitor of homosexual, adopted and reproduced this term
so efficiently, with its implications of the unproductive and non-generative, that by his death it is the dominant term by which like-kind passionate men are medically defined. His best-selling book establishing the cultural and scientific binary oppositional identities of the heterosexual and the homosexual undoubtedly instituted any discourses of ‘abnormal’ sexuality, read by Wilde, influencing Freud, Jung, Ellis and Hirschfeld. And it is Krafft-Ebing who in his last decade held what was considered ‘the most important professorship of psychiatry in the world’ at the University of Vienna, who would teach, mentor and significantly influence one Sigmund Freud.

**Inverted Homosexuals**

The turn of the century witnessed the development not only of a new explanation of homosexual behaviour, but also, and more centrally, of the very concept of homosexual desire as a discrete sexual phenomenon. Sexual inversion, the term most commonly used in the nineteenth century, did not denote the same phenomenon as homosexuality. “Sexual Inversion” referred to a broad range of deviant gender behaviour, of which homosexual desire was only a logical but indistinct aspect, while ‘homosexuality’ focused on the narrower issue of sexual object choice. The differentiation of homosexual desire from ‘deviant’ gender behaviour at the turn of the century reflects a major reconceptualization of the nature of sexuality, its relation to gender, and its role in one’s social definition. (Chauncey, 1982-83: 116)

‘Sexual inversion’ only emerged in the 1880’s and endured throughout the twentieth century, implying reversals of normal ‘heterosexual’ and gender behaviour. Certainly the term ‘homosexual’ moved the focus to “the narrower issue of sexual object choice” but so too did policing hermaphrodite’s object-choice as the following chapter explores.

Being homosexual continues to carry interrogations around ones gender role, perversion and inversion, as a direct product of the hetero-generative binary outlined in the previous chapter. ‘Homosexual’ may be a new term, but its name and image carry the legacy of sodomy, perversion, inversion and hermaphroditism explored in the next chapter. Chauncey’s claim of ‘homosexuality’ as a completely different concept, free of this legacy seems not only naïve, but oblivious to the contemporary sexual discourses still locating homosexuality as perversion, identifying effeminacy as its visual signifier.

Halperin believes the term ‘inversion’ emerged from so-called Molly Houses where men dress as women and assume women’s names. This phenomenon contributes to the formation of the great nineteenth century experience of ‘sexual inversion’ or sex-role reversal, in which some forms of sexual deviance are interpreted as, or conflated with, gender deviance. The emergence of homosexuality out of inversion, the formation of a sexual orientation independent of relative degrees of masculinity and femininity, takes place during the latter part of the nineteenth century and comes into its own only in the twentieth. (Halperin, 1990: 9)

The homosexual is far from “independent of relative degrees of masculinity and femininity”, its ‘homo-ness’ being thoroughly immersed in it. Homosexuality did not
‘emerge’ from 1880’s inversion, but was another contemporaneous contingent signifier and lexicon. The importance of being an invert, having Ellis’s ‘contrary sexual feelings’ is that both names emanate meanings of reversal, and implications of opposition and difference. This lexicon for ‘like-kind’ desire is originally a heterodox-sexual glossary, because they desired differently, in a contrary/inverted way and had nothing to do with the object of their desire. Being an ‘invert’ still discourses something opposite and hetero.

**Conclusion**

The name ‘Homo-sexual’ emerged as the ‘dominant’ term from a range of available terms through the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, despite, or because of the fact that most like-kind desiring men ascribed and described themselves within Urning/Uranian discourse, evoking Platonic philosophies of higher love. The specific concentration of this thesis on the origins and etymology of this name ‘homosexual’ argue psychoanalytic discourse as a prominent cultural transmitter and propagator of both this signifier and more importantly the pathological constructions, narcissism, effeminacy and degeneracy, explored in the following chapters that this naming communicates. Both science, and thence psychoanalysis, would come to classify and delineate such men as inverts, later homo-sexuals; both terms bound to a binary-opposite generating discourse which by inference denies them not only a name of love, but establishes them as both unnaturally monstrous, and unmanly and effeminate as the next chapter specifically elaborates.
Chapter Four:  
(His and Her)maphrodites and Its Monstrous Legacy in the Vision of Homo-sexuals

“The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.”  (Wilde, 2012: 78)

Chapter Synopsis
The previous chapter surveyed how ‘homosexuality’ emerged as the primary term in which like-kind desire was signified, conveying the necessary discursive practices and dictates of generative heterosexual binarism. Policing the homosexual, requires not only a category but an image for demarcation, especially within scientific discourses grounded on observation. Ulrichs’ emphasising the Urning’s “singular feminine being unmistakable to those who would only see” (Ulrichs, 1994: 58) verifies a discursive mandate visually delineating homosexuals within discourses of femininity, or lacking masculinity, both now synonymously aligned, and more significantly, ‘seen’.

Science Is Knowledge
‘Science’ has an unequivocal relationship to both signifiers and signifieds of knowing, underscored in its Latin etymology scientia, meaning knowledge. “It has been scientifically proven”, denoting ‘it has been seen by scientists’, operates culturally as the definitive verification of reality. “In Science the credit goes to the man who convinces the world, not to the man to whom the idea first occurred”16 evidences how Science’s modus operandi; observation, experiment, evidence, are visually mediated through data, reports, theses. As Doubting Thomas evidenced, only seeing sanctions knowledge.

He Looks Gay
In 2012 Malaysia’s Education Ministry “endorsed guidelines” identifying gay ‘symptoms’: “Likes having a fit body; Likes to show off by wearing V-neck and sleeveless clothes; A preference for tight, bright-coloured clothes; Attracted to men; and Has big handbags.”17 Significantly, these ‘symptoms’ evidence a visual policing discourse correlating gender and sexuality. Same-sex attraction is only listed fourth, as desire is

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too ‘invisible’, particularly when tracking someone with a big handbag. ‘Big handbags’ outraged conservatives in their ‘outing’ of children’s Teletubby character Tinky Winky (above). This thesis contends the emergence, evolution and proliferation of the ‘homosexual’ image is a critical product of and producer of the discursive masculine and feminine binary, within which the ‘homosexual’ is effeminised, never fully male.

Could the two contingencies of being labelled gay, effeminate, not manly, queer as the primary bullying discourse against young males, and suicide being the leading cause of death for young old males correlate? In November 2012 Tim Ribberink, a Dutch twenty year old, killed himself because of ten years of systematic bullying for being effeminate, implying his being gay. Even his funeral was haunted by the bullies’ discourse, as his parents asserted Tim’s masculinity: “Tim was not weak or pathetic. He was strong.”

There is a cultural anxiety, a historical ‘lavender scare’, around passing; that to be policed, degenerate homosexuals must be obviously recognised. Hence, gay men’s own desire to pass, to be straight-acting, central to Chapter Fourteen. For now, it is sufficient that to pass, not be read homosexual demands gender performances dictating masculinity.

**Three Times A Lady**

In 1892, Louise-Julia-Anna (not once, twice, but three times named a lady) presented herself to Dr. Guermonprez seeking treatment for an inguinal hernia by referral from Dr. Reumeaux, whose statement “subject interesting from a psychological point of view” (Guermonprez, 1892: 337) instituting her ‘problem’ within emerging ‘psychological’ discourse contingent with Freud’s psychoanalysis. Guermonprez’s initial examination significantly is visually focused:

> “Her outfit is rather badly adjusted, lacking in grace and lightness … her broach is placed poorly to the side; her girdle goes more to one side than the other; the flowers and the ribbons of her hat are disposed without taste and the entire ensemble bespeaks a sort of negligence.”(338-339)

Louise-Julia-Anna’s poor ‘feminine’ attire did not denote her ‘psychologically interesting’, but her desiring of men. Reumeaux’s examination revealing undescended

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testicles and a rudimentary penis, her choice of men did not match the medics’ heterosexual demand for her ‘true’ sex.

“Stupefied (Reumeaux) interrogated (Louise) with prudence. This person thought herself a woman; she had had sexual relations with men and showed no attraction toward persons of the feminine sex. There was nonetheless no doubt anatomically about the masculine sex of the subject.” (338)

The visible presence of testes dictated “no doubt anatomically about the masculine sex”. Disregarding Louise-Julia-Anna’s phenomenological experience, they diagnosed a “bizarre contradiction between the anatomical worth of the subject and the psychic characteristics of her sexual tendencies” (338); where Louise’s ‘psychologically’ wrong ‘feminine’ desires formulated her “truly a teratological being, morally as well as physically” (370). The alignment of hermaphrodites to ‘perverted’ desires, because whatever the reality of her physical ‘dual-natured’ body the truth of her desires are psychologically wrong. Discourse obscures both marginalised bodies and desires.

This case evidences scientific discourse’s pre-eminence of the physical (visible) over the psychological (invisible) where that seen on the body dictates/diagnoses what should be experienced in the mind. Sexual desire and orientation being invisible components of a subordinate ‘psychology’, they must be made physically visible by science/culture, evinced in this epoch’s scientific discourses of physiognomy, palmistry and phrenology, where personality, criminality, psychology are indubitably inscribed on faces, hands, head-shapes; a challenging exigency for the emerging homo-sexual species to be seen.

**Seeing Freudian Genitals**

“Freud … the first to consent not to look away nor to investigate elsewhere, the first not to attempt to hide it in a psychiatric theory that more or less harmonised with the rest of medical knowledge. Freud demystified all the other asylum structures: he abolished silence and observation, he eliminated madness’s recognition of itself in the mirror of its own spectacle.” (Foucault, 2006: 263).

Though Foucault locates Freud as original, stepping beyond psychiatric discursive theories and practices, he refers to him in the visual, acquiesing to scientific discursive visual demands. From Freud’s 1895 *Project for a Scientific Psychology* through to 1933’s *New Introductory Lectures On Psycho-Analysis*, his priority is to institute psychoanalysis as “a specialist science, a branch of psychology” (*SE XXII*: 158) which “can adhere to the scientific Weltanschauung” (181); a “knowledge of the universe (from) the intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinised observations”. (159)
Freud revered his key teacher Charcot as:

“a ‘visuel’, a man who sees … He used to look again and again at the things he did not understand …. In his mind’s eye … the greatest satisfaction a man could have was to see something new; and he remarked again and again on the difficulty and value of this kind of ‘seeing.’” (SE III: 12)

Charcot’s focus was concomitant with the scientific demand to ‘see’, the physical dominating over the psychological. Though Freud’s investigation of hysteria gradually disassociated him from Charcot, this legacy of visual primacy persisted unfalteringly in his developing psychoanalysis, through his clinical observations inherited through Krafft-Ebing, or visual fantasies, or the ocular symbolism in Oedipus or the Sandman, or defining the ‘Uncanny’ as “the name for everything that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light” (SE XVII: 224)

Freud’s vision inaugurates civilisation with the exposure and visibility of the genitals, similar to the creation myth of Eden, where the apple gives Adam and Eve the ocularcentric knowledge to see themselves as naked. Both myths discourse the visual and genitals with knowledge, subjectivity and civilisation:

“a consequence of man’s raising himself from the ground, of his assumption of an upright gait; this made his genitals, which were previously concealed, visible in need of protection … when visual stimuli were paramount and the genitals became visible, and thence to the continuity of sexual excitation, the founding of the family and so to the threshold of human civilisation.” (SE XXI: 99-100).

Seeing genitals was Freud’s first scientific endeavour, 1877’s ‘Observations on the Finer Structure of the Lobular Organs of the Eel, Described as Testicles’. Eels’ reproductivity and identifying male eels had been a perpetual enigma. Freud dissected 400 specimens to ‘solve’ the mystery and ‘illustrate’ testicles, but “all the eels I cut open are of the gentler sex” (1990: 149). Though his paper proposed “a likely candidate he could not definitely decide whether this organ he had dissected was the elusive testicle or not.” (ibid)

Science demands to see. The visual is critical for legitimising scientific discourse, and within Freudian science seeing or not seeing genitals denotes so much of psychoanalytic doctrine. Hence feminist criticism of Freud visually discarding the clitoris as “an atrophied penis” (SE XXII: 65) “the normal prototype of inferior organs” (SE XXI: 157) How unheimlich/uncanny that Freud who ascertained the Castration Complex should originate his scientific investigations searching for ‘missing’ testicles? More uncanny is Freud’s inability to recognise or identify the intersexuality of the eel; hermaphroditism incapable of being scientifically ‘real’ unless ‘true’ sex and missing testicles are seen; a Freudian blindspot indicative of a wider discursive erasure, a more ominous disavowal of hermaphroditism; significant for how Freud would come to see ‘homosexuals’, their desires, and the testes-imony of their gendered identity, as visual science demands.
**Homo-Sexual Her-maphrodites**

“For centuries, knowledge has been pursued as a defence against truth” (Lacan, *Sem XIII:* Jan 19, 1966) Lacan argues knowledge within the university discourse never contends nor grasps with ambiguities or contradiction, but instead operates as an encyclopaedic enterprise endeavouring to exhaust a subject. “Scientific discourse is a university discourse” (Lacan, 2007: 119) producing illusions of consistent, authentic knowledge.

Post-Darwin, legitimating something ‘new’ within University/Scientific discourse, requires evolution from something already discursively present; authority through consistency. Thus the Higgs-Boson particle’s designation as the ‘God-particle’ underscores its importance, elusiveness, yet power, within dominant deistic discourse.

As espoused previously, *homo-sexual* classification was inaugurated within science’s University discourse rather than Uranian/Urning discourses experienced by like-kind subjects themselves. However this University discourse utilised Ulrichs’ discursive preservation of binary heterosexual attraction in constructing Urnings not really as men, but feminine psyches trapped in a male body. Thus *homo-sexuals* could be ‘seen’ alongside something already scientifically ‘recognised’, hermaphrodites. Consequently, in homosexual desire becoming visible, the *psychological* was both confounded with gender, the body, and anatomically written; science will discourse that you can see someone is homosexual from how gender is inscribed on their bodies. Foucault distinguished the hermaphrodite as the midwife birthing the homosexual through sodomy:

> “Homosexuality appears as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul.” (Foucault, 1990: 43)

Ulrichs’ lexicon never came to ‘name’ homosexuality, but his discursive legacy of hermaphroditic Urnings endured. Like-kind desiring men are not ‘real’ men, but seen as effeminate, aligned and seen within science’s ‘monstrous’ hermaphroditic discourse.

To warrant ‘scientific legitimacy’, Ulrichs naïvely employed hermaphroditic discourse. Urnings possess an organic hermaphroditic germ instigating “an inversion of sexual desires”. Ulrichs ‘inversion’ correlates the bastardised like-kind desire of his Urning into a legitimacy seeking scientific lexicon through hermaphroditic discourse:

> “Just as the germ (*Keim*) of the female sexual organs is present in every … so there is in every embryo, and therefore in the embryo of the subsequent Urning, the existence of the germ of female sexual desire, and the germ of that sexual love which is latent in it is capable of assuming a female development. This female germ of sexual love and this ability corresponds to the physical substratum of the germ of the female sexual organs and that germ’s ability.” (Ulrichs, 1994: 56)
In an exigent discursive realignment, Ulrichs threatens to ‘normalise’ monstrous hermaphroditism through underscoring the emptiness of strict gender differentiation, when all bodies evidence ‘natural’ hermaphroditism. “Just as a hermaphrodite, a man has undeveloped mammary glands for his entire life, a woman an undeveloped penis, the so-called clitoris.” (55) The threat in normalising hermaphroditism is that it both compromises the culturally critical ‘natural’ hetero male/female binary, but also unfastens a naturalisation of bi-sexual desires.

Ulrichs’ Urning discourse inaugurated an unstable monstrous hermaphrodite where “in spite of all the artificial masculinity of our being, the feminine element obviously breaks through at every opportunity” (58) The price demanded by science and culture for ‘legitimising’ Ulrichs’ “would-be man or ‘half-man’…kind of feminine being” (35) is that the ‘homosexual’, like his hermaphrodite progenitor would have to be judicio-scientifically regulated, castrated and desexualised; to never being ‘male’. Binary oppositions do not tolerate grey areas in-between. The homo-sexual will never be a man.

**Regulating Hermaphrodites**

By the mid-nineteenth century the hermaphrodite is under increasing legal-scientific discursive mandate to demarcate a ‘true sex’. Within the critical binary opposition of male and female, the hermaphrodite’s twin threat lies in the visible ‘undecidability’ of their dual-sexed body, but more ominously, the threat their invisible desires have against ‘natural’ binary ‘hetero-opposites’. Permitting an indeterminate gender, countenances the objects of their desire to be equally indeterminate, thus self-elected.

Hermaphrodism could too easily become interpreted as evidence of, or licence for a dual-sexual desiring, modern bisexuality, a further deconstructing indeterminate. Discourses constructed through absolute separate poles of male/female could not afford to sanction, another such ‘grey’ uncertainty, especially within an epoch of emerging like-kind sexual discourse, and more portentously feminist suffragettism. What is written in the body must be dictated in order to control what they (hermaphrodites, homosexuals, women) desire. Policing desire demands policing the body to eliminate all ‘undecidability’, satisfying a dictated ‘true’ sex to reinforce subsequent ‘natural’ desires, just as the discourse against gay marriage polices desire through evoking similar language of the ‘true’ and ‘natural’.

Lacan’s Master discourse operates as the Law’s discourse, to which all are subjected; breaking the law carries real threat in terms of a castrative sanction or punishment. Ireland’s Gender Recognition Bill (2014) evidences this same discursive policing in
assigning transgendered legal recognition to those in existing legal relationships only upon divorcing. People can only have one gender and those that ‘choose’ their gender, must pay with their desire. For cultural governance, the monstrosity is never just the ‘indeterminate’ body, but undetermined (abnormal) desires. The ongoing system of hermaphroditic ‘recognition’ is always at a price to their jouissance; a discursive practice that correlatively informs the policing of nineteenth century ‘homo-sexuality’.

Nineteenth century gender control restituted the normal and ‘true’, marginalising others. À là Foucault further discourses and practices were instituted reflecting this anxious mandate for gender normalcy in both amplified medical articles on hermaphroditism and increasing public demand for visual display of hermaphrodites and bearded ladies in circus freak shows. For normalcy to be reassured, the abnormal must be displayed scientifically and culturally.

Herculine Barbin, born female in 1838, whose ‘unlawful’ love for Sara led to an 1860 medico-legal mandate to transform into her male “true sex”, though both the scandal and her inability to live this transition, led to her suicide in 1868. The publicity surrounding her memoirs publication, and a German psychiatrist’s text ‘A Scandal at the Convent’, evidence this Victorian enthralment which moved hermaphroditism from comparative acceptance to distinctive levels of control demanding definition, or spectacle as ‘freak’.

Louise-Julia-Anna’s medical cataloguing as “truly a teratological being morally as well as physically” (Guermonprez, 1892: 370) evidences Foucault’s argument that inherently most ‘monstrous’ in the hermaphrodite is their indeterminate desire (‘morally’). Policing gender is thus a key objective of social institutions, to restrict “the free choice of indeterminate individuals”. Emerging contingencies for ‘policing’ both desire and gender are both psychoanalysis and homo-sexual discourses.

**The True Sex Discourse**

Foucault notes nineteenth century legal delineation of “a ‘true sex’ in the order of things” (2010, vii) occurred despite centuries of relative acceptance of hermaphroditism. In the Middle Ages hermaphrodites decided their sex upon adulthood (viii) thus deciding their object choice, and containing their desires. There was a command on ‘abnormal’ bodies to ‘normalise’ into one gender to eradicate any potential for ‘abnormal’ desires.
By the mid-nineteenth century, such self-election was prohibited through increasing control of “the biological theories of sexuality, the juridical conceptions of the individual, and forms of administrative control, led little by little to rejecting the idea of a mixture of the two sexes in a single body, and consequently to limiting the free choice of indeterminate individuals” (viii). These three significant defining modern topographies, medicine, the law and bureaucracy, formed a “juridico-biological domain” (2003b: 56) now collectively dictating “everybody was to have one and only one sex” (Foucault, 2010: viii), legally determined through medical observation. A legacy contemporarily evidenced in the gender discourses and regulation of athlete, Caster Semenya (left). (Smith, 2009)

Ulrichs establishes his hermaphroditic Urnings within an episteme whose anxiety over ‘abnormal’ desires can only be contained/demarcated through absolutist ‘normal’ desire, the ‘heterosexual’ discoursed in the previous chapter. Within this episteme, what is written on the body always dictates what must be inscribed in the mind, ‘true’ desire. These three topographies, the law, medicine and government, discourse and control, not only indeterminate bodies, but abnormal desires.

Foucault’s Abnormal lectures outline two cases; 1601’s Rouen hermaphrodite, Lemarcis, who having lived as a man and married a local woman was denounced and sentenced to be hung and burned, but pardoned on medical appeal, ordered to dress and live as a woman, though, significantly, banned from all sexual relations. The second 1765 Grandjean case, who “as she approached her fourteenth birthday, a certain instinct for pleasure drew her to her girlfriends” (2003b: 71), chose to live as a man and marry a woman. This “profaning of the marriage sacrament” sentenced her to pillorying and whipping. But again, a medical appeal revised the sentence ordering ‘presentation’ as a woman, and “banned from spending her time with women, only with women”. (72)

The hermaphroditic Lemarcis’s undecidability was best controlled by a medico-judiciary discursive ban on all sexual relations, but Grandjean’s ‘natural’ desire was enforced by banning female sexual relations, with men prescribed as ‘true’ objects of her ‘true’ sex’s desire. This shift in both jurisprudence and medical gaze controls object choice, any potential for same-sex desire. Gender, and its hermaphroditic indeterminate, have to be policed mainly as monstrosity lies now not in their bodies but in their desires. Similar strategies are utilised to dictate how/when/where indeed if gay men can desire, or love.
Monstrous Bodies

Foucault notes differences in both cases’ medical expertise. With Lemarcis, Riolan, “the specialist on monsters at the time” (68) said “the hermaphrodite is a monster because he/she is counter to the order and general rule of nature that has divided humankind into two: male and female.” (71) At this juncture having signs of both sexes, being genuinely inter-sexed, evidences monstrosity, which is nonetheless scientifically designated real, a “confusion of nature”, not perhaps a subject to be executed, but an identity to be executed.

By Grandjean, the hermaphrodite is no longer medically discoursed as the monstrous mixture of two sexes, but deemed fictional, evidenced in its explicit *Dictionnaire de Médecine* reference: “I consider all the stories about hermaphrodites as so many fables.” (72) By this epoch being inter-sexed was no longer scientifically possible; a ‘true’ sex always lay behind anatomical discrepancies. Instead of hermaphroditic monsters are persons of monstrous, ‘impotent’ anatomy, their body/sex not dual but “defective”, ungenerative; subject only for ‘freak-show’ display. Their impotence is significant because these people and their desires are being marginalised against reproductive and generative sexuality, within the same discursive practices *homo-sexuals* will be.

“For most doctors at the time, there is no mix of the sexes; there is never the simultaneous presence of two sexes in a single organism and a single individual. But there are individuals “who have a [predominant] sex, but the generative parts of which are so badly formed that they cannot engender. Consequently, what we call a hermaphrodite is only a defective structure accompanied by impotence.” (72)

Hermaphroditic bodies didn’t alter; the culture defining them did. “Changes of option, not the anatomical mixture of the sexes, were what gave rise to most of the condemnations of hermaphrodites”. (Foucault, 2010: viii) A discourse of the ‘true sex’ gonadally attested by doctors and legally testes-fied transforms reality so what had been a ‘natural’ identity written on the body, becomes an abnormal behaviour, a freakish performance.

Monstrosity and abnormality discursively shifts from the physical body, to conduct and psychology. The hermaphrodite as classification is removed, rendered a non-reality and instead the category of *pseudo*-hermaphrodite is installed; the truly inter-sexed no longer exist. The issue of monstrous bodies is overwritten by monstrous criminal and perverse behaviour across the entire discursive spectrum of ‘power’. So it will be for the *homo-sexual*, whose ‘existence’ and desires will similarly be dismissed as pseudo and unnatural.

Monstrous Desires

Thus, monstrosity as the mix of sexes, as transgression of everything that separates one sex from another, disappears. However, and here the notion of monstrosity that we find at the start of the nineteenth century begins to be developed, there is no
mixing of the sexes: There are only eccentricities, kinds of imperfection, errors of nature. These eccentricities, these poor structures, errors, and stammerings of nature are, or at any rate may be, the source or the pretext for a number of forms of criminal conduct. … it is the simple fact that for a woman (Grandjean) has perverse tastes, that she loves women, and it is this monstrosity, which is not a monstrosity of nature but a monstrosity of behaviour, that calls for condemnation. (72-3)

Into such “stammerings of nature” discourse Ulrichs rounded his Urnings. Westphal and Krafft-Ebing’s notes of homosexuals from asylums or jails further aligned like-kind desire to hermaphroditic “criminal conduct” supporting illness orientated discourse, despite Ulrichs’ criticism that they never observed healthy Urnings. (Kennedy, 1980: 68)

Pathologising scientific discourse was not interested in ‘healthy’ Urnings, only monstrous hermaphroditic perverse homo-sexuals. This false correlative discursive practice aligning homosexuality and mental illness continues. Only from Hooker’s 1957 ‘The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual’ scientifically establishing no evidence of homosexuals being developmentally inferior to heterosexuals, was homosexuality’s 1974 removal from the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-II manual granted.

Ulrichs’ hermaphroditic theory of homosexuality, though medically dismissed, still influenced; both Westphal and Krafft-Ebing reference him, and an 1885 medical encyclopaedia five-page entry on “contrary sexual feeling”, prints Ulrichs’ name in boldface (Rosario, 1997: 36). The Scientific discursive practice of uncovering physiological indicators of homosexuality, what can be ‘seen’, written on, or (in an age of eugenics) in the body, is a practice that inevitably evokes discourses of determining masculinity and femininity with an end result always discursively sought, consciously or unconsciously, to reveal a bodily substrate, disclosing effeminacy/passivity.

“Casper and other forensic experts, for example, Ambroise Tardieu in Paris, identified the “pederast” by telltale signs, such as a funnel-shaped anus in the receptive partner and a pointed penis in the penetrator.” (31)

Authorities since this epoch, evidenced in the Malaysian Government’s guidelines, have argued homosexual ‘monstrosity’ can be seen, written on/in his body; continually comparing heterosexuals’ and homosexuals’ weight, stature, length of trunk, shoulder and hip width, size of skeleton and musculature, layering of fat, hairiness, the diameter of the nipple’s areola, the prostate, the length of the flaccid penis and the longitudinal axis of the testicles, even their vocal apparatus. Such exhaustive investigations have found no differences in bodily measures other than homosexuals are somewhat lighter and have a significantly “larger penis” than heterosexuals. (Parker, 1995: 42-3)
Westphal’s ‘Homosexuals’

Westphal’s 1869 Konträre Sexualempfindung which established the diagnostic ‘contrary sexual feeling’ and marked the beginning of the medicalisation of homosexuality quoted extensively from Ulrichs, but emphasising “disease cases” adhering to illness orientated discursive practices “an inborn reversal of the sexual feeling with consciousness of the morbidity of this manifestation.”19 ‘Homo-sexuals’ are physically discoursed against a natural hetero gendered binary as monstrously hermaphroditic and sexually perverse.

Miss N. an asylum inmate who “suffered since the age of eight from a fury to love women” and “never wants to do with men” is sexually described as ‘unfemininely’ active: “In playing around with women, such a feeling of delight is awakened in her, that she positively ejaculates her seed. (my italics)” Such monstrous masculinity has an ontology: “as a child she enjoyed playing boys’ games and liked to dress as a boy” and an unconscious: “In her lustful dreams she always appeared in the position of the man”.

The discursive demand for medical observation to uncover hermaphroditic markers of monstrous sexuality, assessed through highly gendered language enables medico-judicial power to recognise abnormal deviance and thus concealed ‘contrary sexual feelings’.

Her physiognomy and clothing do not deviate from the feminine type, her head is small without exhibiting anything unusual in shape, hair growth is normal, no deformities in the ears, the two halves of the face are not noticeably asymmetrical….

Such observations presume her genitalia evidencing unfemininity:

There are no deformities of external appearance, in particular not on the genitalia. The large labia gape somewhat, so that the small ones are visible in the genital split, the clitoris is of normal length, the hymen totally intact and scarcely allows penetration by the tip of the little finger. The mucous membrane of the external genitals is neither eroded nor reddened, but there was great sensitivity in the examination. An exploratio per vaginam had to be dispensed with due to the pain caused by the attempt with the finger.

And signs of ‘ perverse’ activity, monstrous masturbation are sought written on her body:

Small scratched places are visible on the inside of the upper thighs, where there was supposed to have been severe itching.

Westphal’s second case provided “a different picture”, while still seeking ‘abnormality’ written on the gendered body. G.B., an imprisoned “man wearing women’s clothing” whose “almost effeminate demeanour, an effeminate tone” description by the jail doctor “aroused my attention immediately”; the contradiction between his

“general posture and the feminine embroidery work I found him occupied with. He is a well-nourished man of strong build, tall stature, well developed muscles and fat layer. His face has characteristics in which one may detect a certain femininity, his

19 All quotes from Westphal (1870) are taken from an online translation available at http://www.well.com/~aquarius/westphal.htm Accessed 13/4/2015.
hair is blond, very abundant, long, slightly curled, the patient is clean shaven, and traces of a beard are visible all over in the usual way. His body is abundantly hairy overall, the hair of the genitals extends up to the navel; the genitals themselves are well-formed, the scrotum and the skin of the penis pigmented and wrinkled, testicles are of only moderate size and are easily pushed up into the inguinal canal. The voice of the patient is queer, difficult to describe, somewhat soft - Examination of the anus shows nothing unusual, namely no abnormal depressions, the anal folds are present in the usual manner.”

Again a hermaphroditic discourse is utilised, the size of his testes, their potential to be “pushed up into the inguinal canal”, (tucking in contemporary Drag parlance); his “well-developed” musculature contrasted with his “theatricalness”; his indeterminate “queer” voice; and not insignificantly the “examination of the anus shows nothing unusual, namely no abnormal depressions”. The implication is his cross-dressing and voice must signify perverse, contrary sexual feelings, and hence demands anal examination.

“He allegedly has no sexual tendency toward men, and claims never to have let himself be used by them; the fact that he did not shy away from sexual intercourse with women is apparent partly from his own testimony and partly from the fact that at the time of his arrest he was suffering from gonorrhoea.”

But G.B. is repeatedly presented as dishonest, a mendacious swindler. His claim to having “felt a tendency to have sexual intercourse with women, but rarely, because I feared that it would make me ugly” is immediately followed with the adjunct “He says (my italics) he never let himself be used by men and never had anything to do with them sexually, although many offers were made to him.” And again “He claims to have masturbated only as a very young person.” G.B. is not trusted, his monstrous, criminal ‘gender play (he “owned false breasts”) clearly evidences a perverse sexuality, despite his homo-phobic “complain(ing) vehemently about caresses from another patient”.

“Is here the perverse sexual feeling, as it were, stuck at a lower stage of development, so that only a general condition of feminine feeling and feminine tendencies occurred, a need to act like a woman?”

Without further, indeed any evidence, a stunted monstrous sexuality is presumed as all indicators of ‘unnatural’ contrary sexual feelings are conjointly bound, indicating each other, in an explicit ‘monstrous’ challenge to heterosexual normality, a legacy still instituted in the corraling of all non-heterosexual identities as one. If you are abnormal in your gender presentation, you must have ‘contrary sexual feelings’. If you have ‘contrary sexual feelings’ then you must be abnormally gendered.

Westphal references Ulrichs’ case of Süskind Blank who:

“Subsequent to his occupation with feminine work, surrendered to feminine vanity, meticulously destroyed his beard, set his hair in locks, created stuffed breasts and hips for himself and used every opportunity to disguise himself as a female. What may at first have been a silly affectation, gradually became second nature, the tone of his voice, deep by nature, became fine and shrill and his walk became tripping ... Blank applied for an official permit to dress and introduce himself as a female.”
Blank is again genitally assessed with “sexual organs normally shaped” but “demonstrably a passive pederast” his anus being “greatly expanded and fissured.” Westphal diagnoses Blank’s “obvious imbecility”, questioning “the level of intelligence of a man applying for a state permit to use a female name and announces his engagement as ‘Frederica’?” Ulrichs’ case is ascribed as being “very analogous to ours”, despite no evidence of G.B.’s “passive pederasty as far as we know” (my italics). But within scientific discourse acts/identities/personages of same-sex desire, hermaphroditism, cross-dressing, masturbation and criminality “are probably only differences of degree.” The discursive confusing and confluencing of hermaphroditism and homosexuality is borne.

**Krafft-Ebing's Psychopathia Sexualis**

Krafft-Ebing acknowledged Ulrichs’ influence: “The study of your writing of love between men interested me in the highest degree, it was the knowledge of your writings alone which led to my studies in this highly important field.” (Ulrichs, 1994: 25) In-line with Ulrichs, Krafft-Ebing argued a universal hermaphroditic body and mind “every individual’s bisexual disposition endows him with masculine and feminine brain centres as well as with somatic organs of sex.” (cited in Freud, SE VII : 142-3)

Krafft-Ebing’s discursive practices endorsed the case history’s physiognomic gaze demanding evidence of hermaphroditism, to such extent that, within Lakoff ironic ‘pink elephant’ discourse, it is presented as significantly not being present. Thus Case 156, a 38 year old homosexual governess who “to revel in looking at (girls) was the acme of pleasure” is described “in appearance thoroughly feminine and modest. Feminine pelvis, large mammae, no indication of beard.” (Krafft-Ebing, 2012: 7345) Case 135, a man who “in women found only moderate animal satisfaction, psychical gratification being totally absent” is similarly visually engendered as “excepting an abnormally broad pelvis (100cm) nothing in his character or personal appearance lacked the qualities of the masculine type.” (6460)

For Krafft-Ebing all ‘antipathic sexual instincts’ were on ‘monstrous’ par and this legacy endured; *Psychopathia Sexualis* went into twelve editions within his lifetime alone, regarded for a century “as the world’s most informative volume on the subject of sexual deviation” (35); “a ground-breaking examination of sexual aberrations.” (41) It was Krafft-Ebing who propagated the term *homo-sexual*.

Krafft-Ebing depicted sex in almost all its expressions as an assortment of abhorrent ‘monstrous’ diseases, gathered around four broad taxonomies—fetishism, homosexuality,
sadism and masochism; all considered conjoined stages in a single disease, antipathic sexual instinct, inaugurated against *generative* ‘heterosexuality’.

Krafft-Ebing’s organisation alone pathologises all ungenerative ‘monstrous’ desire: mild handkerchief fetishism is presented against a backdrop of horrifying case histories of lust murders and cannibalism. The opening case histories, 15, 16, and 22 are undoubtedly the most threatening and violent of the total 238. And having thus wrested the reader’s horror and abhorrence, he then outlines in similar tone a fetishist’s attraction to white kid gloves.

Krafft-Ebing establishes through horrific discourse, a threatening continuum of psychopathic sexuality, an inevitable slide from any perversion to all perversions; how the seemingly innocent customary couples’ “striking, biting or pinching each other” (9607) during sex, is outlined before a case study of homicidal necrophilia. The most innocuous sexual acts are aligned with aberrations; even kissing can “degenerate into biting.” (1588) Krafft-Ebing uses common instances to stir apprehensions of ‘unnatural’ expression of sexuality: “The transition from these atavistic manifestations to the most monstrous acts can be readily traced.” (1597) Best stay on the straight and most narrow. And thus it is Krafft-Ebing who initiates Heterosexuality as this straight and narrow that will contain and define all other sexualities and against which homosexuality will come to be the term that will name like-kind passionates. A legacy bequeathed to his student, colleague and mentee, Sigmund Freud.

**Freud’s Inverts**

“I am finishing ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’, in the explanation of sexual inversion - I go as far as the literature permits (Krafft-Ebing and predecessors).” (Masson, 1985: 464) 1905’s *Three Essays* introduces several key discursive developments evincing the homosexual. Firstly, only the term invert is used, though significantly not thereafter, to clearly distinguish it from perversion, while defining both within relation to a new classification, sexual ‘aberration’. “Let us call the person from whom the sexual attraction proceeds the *sexual object*, and the act towards which the instinct tends the *sexual aim*.” (*SE VII*: 135-6) With same-sex object choice, “people of this kind are described as having ‘contrary sexual feelings’, or better, as being ‘inverts’.” (136) Perversion involves “deviations” from “the normal sexual aim” which Freud regards as “the union of the genitals in the act known as copulation” (149) - the ‘generative’ definition. That a man desires another man concerns object-choice (the mind); what acts they adopt involves their sexual aim (the body).
In deliberate opposition to prevalent degenerate discourse, Freud underlines both perversion and inversion as not being degenerate:

“It may well be asked whether an attribution of ‘degeneracy’ is of any value or adds anything to our knowledge. … In this legitimate (my italics) sense of the word inverts cannot be regarded as degenerate. Inversion is found in people who exhibit no other serious deviations from the normal.” (138)

Freud clearly marks a place for inverts, distinguishing them from perverts, disassociating them from degenerate discourse and noting, fifty years ahead of Hooker’s 1957 paper

“the inversion is found among persons who otherwise show no marked deviation from the normal, who on the contrary are distinguished by especially high intellectual development and ethical culture.” (139)

However, bound to science’s visual demands, Freud recognises discourses of seeing on/in the body biological markers “amphigenously inverted (psychosexually hermaphroditic)” (136) à la Ulrichs to explain/contextualise the congenital nature of inversion desire where again only what is written on the body justifies/legitimises ‘ab-normal’ desires:

Science knows of cases in which the sexual characters are obscured, and in which it is consequently difficult to determine the sex. This arises in the first instance in the field of anatomy. The genitals of the individuals concerned combine male and female characteristics (hermaphroditism). In rare cases both kinds of sexual apparatus are found side by side fully developed (true hermaphroditism) … A certain degree of anatomical hermaphroditism occurs normally. … leading us to suppose that an originally bisexual physical disposition has, in the course of evolution, become modified into a unisexual one.

It was tempting to extend this hypothesis to the mental sphere and to explain inversion in all its varieties as an expression of psychical hermaphroditism, … the question was that inversion should be regularly accompanied by the mental and somatic signs of hermaphroditism.

But this expectation was disappointed. It is impossible to demonstrate so close a connection between the hypothetical psychical hermaphroditism and the established anatomical one. (141)

Freud recognises discursive practices of aligning physical hermaphroditism with inversion referencing Ulrichs “a spokesman of the male inverts (theory of) ‘a feminine brain in a masculine body’” but Freud dismisses this “tempting” alignment as “disappointed expectation … impossible to demonstrate”.

Significantly, the first translator of Freud into English, Abraham Brill’s 1910 translation of the Three Essays translates these last two paragraphs quite differently, as what was tempting, es lag nahe in the original German; (it lies nearby), now becomes natural; and “inversion and all its varieties” becomes “inversion in its aberrations” and the impossible disappointing expectation, Erwartung schlägt fehl in the original German; (such expectations backfire) become “not realised” as if still allowing or holding open a possibility of their yet being realised.
It was *natural* to transfer this conception to the psychic sphere and to conceive the inversion in its aberrations as an expression of psychic hermaphroditism. In order to bring the question to a decision, it was only necessary to have one other circumstance, viz., a regular concurrence of the inversion with the psychic and somatic signs of hermaphroditism. But this second expectation was not realized. The relations between the assumed psychical and the demonstrable anatomical androgyny should never be conceived as being so close. (Freud, 1920: 7)

Brill propagates this discursive alignment of hermaphroditism and bisexuality where Freud has tried to move on from this confusion, though recognising their contingencies within scientific discourse: “I was already familiar with the references in the literature in which the idea of bisexuality is used to explain inversion. You will certainly find it in *Psychopathia Sexualis* by Krafft-Ebing.” (Masson, 1985: 467)

Brill founded the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, whose library is named in his honor, and later helped found the American Psychoanalytic Association. Brill’s homophobic views evidenced in his 1940 belief that “even so-called classical inverts are not entirely free from some paranoid traits.” (Terry, 1999: 292) hugely re-represented, and mistranslated Freud, and significantly influenced American Psychoanalysis where his English translations dominated over Strachey’s.

In *Civilisation and Its Discontents*, Freud continues evidencing discursive alignments of the visible and invisible, body and mind, desire and physique, in a footnote aligning bisexuality (psychological desire) with hermaphroditism (physiological corpus), but now also with (and further confusing) discursive questions/issues of passivity and activity:

> “Man is an animal organism with an unmistakably bisexual disposition (*bisexueller Anlage*). The individual corresponds to a fusion of two symmetrical halves,... each half was originally hermaphroditic (*hermaphroditisch*). Sex is a biological fact which, although it is of extraordinary importance in mental life, is hard to grasp psychologically. We are accustomed to say that every human being displays both male and female instinctual impulses, needs and attributes; but though anatomy, it is true, can point out the characteristic of maleness and femaleness, psychology cannot. For psychology the contrast between the sexes fades away into one between activity and passivity, in which we far too readily identify activity with maleness and passivity with femaleness.” (Freud, *SE XXI*: 105-6)

**A Man In Front, A Woman Behind**

Norton’s comprehensive *Mother Clap's Molly House: Gay Subculture in England, 1700-1830*, argues that “As far as we can tell, gay men did not think of themselves as women trapped in men’s bodies until the sexologists began popularising this theory.” (1992: 104)

Thus only in 1895’s *Teleny* a homosexual pornographic novel attributed to Wilde, could one protagonist lament “Why was not one of us born a woman?” (1894: 171-2) while the other says, “One of his hands which had been caressing my testicles slipped under my bum – a finger was slipped in the hole. I seemed to be a man in front, a woman behind,
for the pleasure I felt either way.” (118) The alignment of same-sex desire with ‘being a woman’ effeminacy and passivity is evidenced which contemporaneously still gets discoursed around the question “Who’s the man?” and the ‘woman’ in a male same-sex relationships as Chapter Fourteen expands on.

Ellis’s Sexual Inversion counters the presumption that “in homosexual relationships one person is always active, physically and emotionally, the other passive” arguing that “between men, at all events, this is very frequently not the case” (1927: 5466). Yet Ellis still discourses a cross-sex binary opposite model where “the invert cannot tell if he feels like a man or like a woman.” (ibid) implying that feeling like either or only a man or a woman are the only options available within like-kind passionate desire.

Ellis then significantly quotes an invert: “In bed with my friend I feel as he feels, and he feels as I feel. The result is masturbation, and nothing more or desire for more on my part. I get it over, too, as soon as possible, in order to come to the best—sleeping arms round each other, or talking so.” (ibid) It is the intimacy of same sex desire that gets lost/foreclosed in homosexual taxonomy and its related discourses of fucking, effeminacy, active and passive, male and female.

**Wilde Transvestism: The Importance of Not Being Salome**

The photograph below is discoursed as a picture of Wilde dressed as the biblical seductress Salomé, so included and captioned in Ellman’s definitive biography and published alongside an article on Wilde in *Le Monde* in 1987. Over the years it has been used as evidence of a little known aspect of Oscar Wilde's flamboyant life story - that of his transvestite tendencies. After all, as this chapter has explored, are homo-sexuals not self-evidently cross-dressing, effeminate, secret women?

Subsequent research by Wilde’s grandson, Merlin Holland, and Horst Schröder revealed the figure as not Wilde but a Hungarian soprano Alice Guszalewicz whose promotional photography for the opera *Salomé* in Cologne in 1906 matched, in jewellery and clothing, that of this ‘Wilde’ figure. Mr Holland said: “Whatever anyone has said about Oscar and his naughtiness, he wasn't the sort of person who would dress in women's clothes and have himself photographed.” Yet despite Holland’s request and evidence, Penguin, publisher of the Ellman biography, have yet to considering removing the image from future editions.

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Conclusion

The Homosexual image grounded in its naming as homo-sexual, is presented in gendered terms, their desire written on their body, evidencing a monstrous hermaphroditism, clear signs of sodomitic passivity, and exhibiting effeminacy. Under hetero-prerogative discourse where only opposites generate and homo-likeness is degenerative, another contingency emerges in late nineteenth century signification of the homosexual grounded in the pathology of sameness where the worst kind of sameness is being attracted to yourself, something deemed feminine, and masturbatory. The image of same love the homosexual would come most to inhabit through these discursive practices, then as now, is the ultimate homo-sexuality, the definitive same-desiring narcissist.
Chapter Five
Mirror, Mirror On The Wall
Why Are Homosexuals The Most Narcissistic Of All?

“To Love Oneself is The Beginning of a Lifelong Romance.” (Wilde, 1894a: 19382)

“It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances.” (Wilde, 2012: 78)

Chapter Synopsis
Narcissism is discoursed by both early psychoanalysts and sexologists as aligned with the feminine which ‘somehow’ subsequently comes to be aligned with, then defined in/as homosexuality; pathologising both. Narcissism is the ultimate homo-sexuality, a mirrored desiring marker of homo-sexuality, which operates as a prodigious discursive tool for ensuring self-policing in the modern age. Within psychoanalytic discourse Narcissism both names and is named as the decisive homo-sexuality. This chapter examines the discursive path that aligned the previous two chapters’ explorations of homo-sameness and effeminacy in the narcissistic homosexual, embodied in Wilde, who as the following chapter explores, post-trials establishes an epistemic legacy of degenerate narcissistic effeminacy carried into contemporary homo-sexual discourse.

Queer Eyes
Homosexuality is visually recognisable, superficial appearance, clothes, products, body, big handbag. Homosexuals epitomise narcissism, a ‘queer eye for the straight guy’. Being homo is vanity, just narcissistically hump anyone the same as you, and be hated for it.

Of course not finding someone the same as you to hump, just use yourself. As within cultural discourse, if you’re gay you turn yourself on; the sight of your own penis or mirrored reflection guarantees satisfaction. This alignment between masturbation, auto-eroticism, narcissism and homosexuality is entrenched within the contemporary cultural sexual discourses that historically constructed it. As the previous two chapters outlined, discourse aligns and obscures the physical with the psychological; the bodily act of masturbation with the mental formulation of narcissism, all of which are associated and aligned with homosexuals, the ultimate wankers of heteronormativity.

Traditional Narcissism
Only with the emergence of fin de siècle sexological and psychoanalytic discourses did narcissism become something shameful or aberrant. Classical Narcissus’ history prefigures its pathological positioning within modern psychological discourse.
Classically, Narcissus represented a praiseworthy abstinence, philosophers of the Platonic schools found in him a figure of deep sensibility and morality for life. (F. Wieseler, 1856.) An aesthetic legacy evidenced in Coelho’s The Alchemist’s allegory of self-discovery and personal awareness in which Wilde’s Narcissus poem acts as prologue.

Ovid’s archetypal Narcissus myth opens with Liriope, Narcissus’ mother, appealing to Tiresias, the blind hermaphrodite seer (uncanny, how hermaphroditicism informs each constituent of contemporary homo-sexual discourse!) whether her son would live long, to which he responds ambiguously “si se non nowerit” (“yes, if he does not come to know himself”).

The curse of self-knowledge haunts both Narcissus and that other psychoanalytic origin myth Oedipus. Both are Theban fatal love myths from Ovid’s Metamorphoses exploring transformation, involving divine wrath and hermaphroditic Tiresias’s prophecies; both result in lost vision, and ultimately caution against knowing yourself, of self-reflection.

Ovid’s assimilation of Echo into the Narcissus myth, auditorily duplicates the visual mirror; “the personification of corresponding acoustic self-mirroring”. (Ellis, 1928: 130) Echo was also the object of love and desire she could not return, from the God Pan, who pitied by his father Hermes, is taught hitherto unknown masturbation to relieve his suffering. So with Echo masturbation and auto-eroticism enter Narcissus discourse, echoing a failed sexual encounter.

Narcissus, is desired by both men and women. It is the unrequited love of Ameinias, who taking his own life with Narcissus’s dagger demands the wrath of Nemesis: “Let him, too, be consumed by love ... denied the one he craves!” (Calimach, 2002: 96) The Narcissus myth rests on homosexual castigation, punishment for not respecting such love. Narcissism is produced through intolerable same-sex desire.

Narcissus entered European poetic tradition from Ovid, and through the Renaissance and Romantic eras discursively serving as a celebration of beauty and aestheticism, echoing the Platonic search for our other half, not in cave shadows but in mirrored reflections. Narcissus Marsh, archbishop of Dublin, founder of Ireland’s first public library, philosopher and provost of Trinity College, proudly bore this name. The name Narcissus
was noble, naming at least four Christian saints. In Hesse’s *Narcissus and Goldmund*, Narcissus is the medieval composed individualist Apollonian monk in opposition to the artistic adventurous Dionysian Goldmund.

But in the late 1890s Narcissus discourse shifts from such earlier self-reflection and aestheticism, to damaging degeneracy, its current legacy; a mental condition, subject of sexual psychology; a discursive shift with both contingencies of ‘psychologically’ degenerate narcissism and homo-sexuality emerging contemporaneously as subjects of scientific, especially psychoanalytic discourse.

**Looking Back On The Mirror**

“O sweet mirror, invented in order to know that which our own gaze cannot see”. D’Albenas’ sixteenth century poem ‘The Mirror’ evokes this earlier epoch’s narcissistic potential for self-reflection and evidences the mirror’s position as both producer of, and product of rising capitalist consumerism. Mirrors were luxury goods, associated with the visual, creating light, space; and evidencing status as they literally and figuratively reflected the homes and lives of those that owned them, witnessed in Van Eyck’s 1434 ‘*The Arnolfini Wedding*’, Parmigianino’s 1524 *Self-portrait in a Convex Mirror*, Velazquez’s 1656 *Las Meninas* and Vermeer’s 1662 *The Music Lesson*.

To the mid seventeenth century Venice controlled a technical and commercial monopoly over the world’s mirror production. However in 1665 to strengthen the national economy and make France self-sufficient in such luxury goods, the minister of finance, Colbert, established the *Manufacture royale de glaces de miroirs*, producing in 1678 the glass for the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, the zenith of grandiose mirror reflecting status. The production of significantly larger French mirrors was such a threat to Venetian monopoly that the Venetian Republic criminalised any glass artisan practicing their trade elsewhere. To the 1820s, this company continued producing high-quality luxury mirrors but the 1824 establishment of a new Commentry glass manufacturer, and the 1837 founding of Belgian glass manufacturers, who concentrated on affordable mirrors, led the Saint-Gobain company to extend its products to more common quality mass-market appeal.
By the mid-nineteenth century, Saint-Gobain controlled 25% of European mirror production; and responding to growing international competition, opened new foreign manufacturing facilities. From 1852 to 1862, production grew from about one million to more than two million square feet cast glass annually, and from 1878 to 1898, production doubled once again. (Melchior-Bonnet, 2001: 97)

**Nineteenth Century Psychés**

By the late nineteenth century, mirrors were ubiquitous markers of design and modernity in luxury hotels, restaurants, cafes, train stations. They were central show pieces at the 1867 Paris Universal Exposition, in the architecture of London’s Crystal Palace, Le Jardin des Plantes and Les Halles in Paris, the central train station in Milan; a consumerist domestic necessity in every well-placed home. Even their use in art is larger, more public, more ‘ordinary’ evidenced in Manet’s *Un bar aux Folies Bergère*. One 1870 observer noted “They are the first luxury that frugality will allow itself; they form one of the most gracious arrangements of modern apartments.” (97).

Mirrors known as ‘psychés’ were “pleasing inventions” (85); a central pane of mirror pivoting on a horizontal axis, allowing modified angles of vision, by which they are still known. Improved and cheaper mass-production by the nineteenth century’s close presented the psyché as a commonplace, accessible item in every bourgeois home. By then mirrors had conquered both urban exteriors and interiors offering what these spaces lacked, enlightening and enlarging limited space, thus offering, necessitating, new ways of seeing, and being seen; ‘psychés’, a new technology of surveillance.

Baudrillard analyses the nineteenth century success of mirrors:

“It’s an opulent object which affords the self-indulgent bourgeois individual the opportunity to exercise his privilege – to reproduce his own image and revel in his possessions… It is no coincidence that the century of Louis XIV is epitomised by the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, nor that, in more recent times, the spread of mirrors in apartments coincided with the spread of the triumphal Pharisee-ism of bourgeois consciousness, from Napoleon III to Art Nouveau.” (2008: 22)

Mirrors and ‘all-seeing’ ‘psychés’ allowed opportunities for display and advancement but were also feared; associated with bourgeois opulence, superficiality and sin. The Republic
of Geneva went as far as enacting a law that prohibited its citizens, under penalty of a fine, “from having more than one mirror in each room and from having any in excess of thirty two inches in height.” (Melchior-Bonnet, 2001: 86).

Access to mirror technology carried older fear-filled discourses of mirrors paradoxically having power to take souls as well as reflecting them; mirrors were turned into the wall in the presence of death. Their anxious value is reflected in the fear that breaking one imposes seven years bad luck. Stoker’s Dracula propagates the mythology of vampires having no mirrored reflection (soul?) with Harker noting in Dracula’s home:

“There are certainly odd deficiencies in the house, considering the extraordinary evidences of wealth. The table service is of gold, and so beautifully wrought that it must be of immense value. The curtains and upholstery of the chairs and sofas and the hangings of my bed are of the costliest and most beautiful fabrics, and must have been of fabulous value when they were made, for they are centuries old, though in excellent order. But still in none of the rooms is there a mirror. There is not even a toilet glass on my table.” (Stoker, 1897: 17)

Contingent with threatening enjoyment, anxious luxuriousness and burgeoning markets of mirrored psychés, within evolving sciences of psychology and sexology a diverse range of sexual ‘perversities’ were being observed which utilised mirrored technology of to enjoy and satisfy. Though not initially deemed narcissistic, retroactively what would now be discoursed a narcissistic sexuality or desire was emerging.

**Mirrored Desires**

Niceforo, an Italian sociologist, criminologist, and disciple of Lombroso’s, in 1897 described several cases of self-image arousing Italian adolescents including a healthy boy of fifteen who derived pleasure from watching his penis becoming erect, to the extent that he drew pictures of his organ to gaze upon when masturbating. Another could only enjoy masturbating when watching his legs at the same time. A third, enjoyed masturbating before a mirror to see his sexual organs, describing this behaviour as common in his college (Ellis, 1928: 135). But despite such common accounts, it enters scientific/psychological discourse as a psychopathic sexuality, a sexuality ‘enjoyed’ selfishly through a masturbatory mirrored image of self.

Moll’s 1898 *Perversions of the Sexual Instinct* described instances of erotic self-admiration, now being associated to homosexual case studies, including a man of forty-three whose pleasure drew from gazing at his mirrored naked image, and comparing his body to those of other men (124). Moll also quoted a case history of Krafft-Ebing’s where “since he could not find a lover placed himself before a large mirror and masturbated while regarding his own image; but at the same time thought how much more agreeable
it would be to have a real lover.” (106) This latter meme of sexually using an image in the place of a ‘real’ person is critical to one of the functions of pornography that will be explored in Chapter Thirteen, operating within this same discursive practice of there being a certain safe or secure detachment in the image.

That same year in France, Féré, a doctor and co-assistant to Charcot with Freud, used the term auto-fetishism to describe a girl who experienced sexual excitement from kissing her own hand. (Ellis, 1928: 135). Féré’s beliefs in the generative science of *Le Magnétisme Animal* were published as in 1887, before *Dégénérescence et criminalité* in 1888, and *La Pathologie des émotions* (1892); *La Famille névropathique* (1894) and *L'instinct sexuel: évolution et dissolution* (1899). Evidencing again the well-trodden discursive path from animal magnetism to degenerate criminality, to sexual perversion.

Frazer’s 1894 anthropology ‘The Soul as a Shadow and a Reflection’ much quoted by Rank, narcissism’s first theorist, explored indigenous peoples “often regarding his shadow or reflection as soul” (1950). Frazer’s text connected the Narcissus myth to the aforementioned superstitious turning of mirrors to the wall around death, and also to the Greek taboo against looking at your reflection in water lest water spirits take your soul. “This was probably the origin of the classical story of the beautiful Narcissus, who languished and died through seeing his reflection in the water.” (1987)

**Narcissus-Like Tendencies**

In 1898 Ellis, the first English medical writer on homosexuality, first ‘names’ a “Narcissus-like tendency” within pathologised sexuality as “the extreme form of auto-eroticism, (where) the tendency for the sexual emotion was to be absorbed and often entirely lost in self-admiration” significantly noting this tendency “more especially perhaps in women” and though “found in minor degree in some feminine-minded men, very rarely found in men” (Ellis, 1898: 280.)

In 1899 Näcke, a psychiatrist and translator of Ellis’s was the first to use this particular term: “Viel seltener als das Tagträumen ist der *Narzissismus, die Selbstverliebtheit.*” *(much rarer than the daydreaming is narcissism, a self-loving)* Näcke’s ‘Narcissism’ is defined by him as the loving of self, more than vanity as it crosses into orgasm and sexual pleasure, relating to Ellis’s “auto-eroticism”, but again described as a rare phenomenon, associated more with women.

Freud first employs auto-eroticism, the “happy term invented by Havelock Ellis”, in 1899 *(SE VII: 181)*, though later criticising Ellis’s open use of the term. Pre-1920 editions of *Three Essays* had the following footnote, deleted thereafter: “Havelock Ellis has spoilt
the meaning of the term he invented by including the whole of hysteria and all the manifestations of masturbation among the phenomena of auto-erotism.”

While for Ellis and Näcke narcissism is a rarity, Freud, assisted by Rank, Ferenczi and Sadger, forefronts it, metamorphosing Narcissism into a central tenet of psychoanalytic discourse, one categorically aligned with homosexuality. 1905’s *Three Essays* contained no reference to Narcissism, though Freud had recognised it. However 1910’s second edition footnoted Narcissism as a developmental stage of male sexual inversion, where the subject supposedly acquires self-love through identifying himself with a woman (his mother). Ferenczi first used the term *narcissism* in 1913, though his 1909 ‘Introjection and Transference’ argued the infant as experiencing everything in a monistic way.

**Isodor Sadger**

In 1908 Sadger, a degeneracy proponent, introduced narcissism into psychoanalytic discourse (Sadger, 2005: xxxviii). On November 10th 1909 he observed the “large role played by autoerotism in the form of narcissism” (Nunberg & Federn 1967: 307) with Freud remarking “Sadger’s comment with regard narcissism seems new and valuable” (312). On October 12th 1910, Freud avowed Sadger’s claim “A prolonged remaining at the transitory stage of narcissism definitely predisposes to homosexuality.” (1974: 13)

Sadger first attended Freud’s lectures in 1895-96 and by November 1906 was proposed by Freud for membership of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, where with the exception of Freud, no one made more presentations (Sadger, 2005: xvi). His debut presentation on November 28th 1906 concerning Austrian writer Lenau reflected both his principal research interests: his ‘pathographies’, psychoanalytic profiles of authors; and theorising homosexuality: “In the course of Lenau’s insanity, homosexual tendencies also became manifest. He took a liking to the gardener’s helper, to stable boys and the like.” (xvii)

Sadger was amongst the limited speakers at the first psychoanalytic congress in Salzburg 1908, with his “Contribution to the Etiology of Psychopathia Sexualis”. As one of the earliest practising psychoanalysts in May 1898, Freud compared him against Adler and Federn, as “the ablest practitioner.” (xxiv). Ominously he was one of the few early psychoanalysts who didn’t undergo a psychoanalysis, despite Freud’s oft-repeated dictum that “The only way to learn analysis is to be psychoanalysed.” (xxv)

Sadger believed homosexuality could be psychoanalytically cured, just like sleepwalking (1920b). His ‘Ist die Konträre Sexualempfindung heilbar?’ understood psychoanalysis cured “contrary sexual feeling” concluding, “Freud’s psychoanalytic method gives us for
the first time a technique that provides a basis to cure homosexuality” (Sadger, 2005: xxi). His Salzburg paper, reported by Jones as ‘The Aetiology of Homosexuality’, “was able to report the first case in which a homosexual had been cured by psychoanalysis” (Wittels, 1924: 136). Published as “Fragment der Psychoanalyse eines Homosexuellen” in Hirschfeld’s *Jahrbuch für sexuellen Zwischenstufen* it described in hundred page long detail the analysis of a homosexual melancholy Danish count. However the reality was the analysis lasted only thirteen days before being terminated by the patient, whose sexual orientation had not changed. Sadger’s papers were never translated into English, but his ‘homosexual’ curative legacy was internationally discoursed.

Sadger declared homosexuality could be cured in patients who were moral and determined “mit einem runden Ja!” (“with a definitive Yes!”) believing a spurious kind of heterosexual functioning or “*masturbatio per vaginam*” was insufficient, wanting instead to convert a patient’s “*Sexualideal*”, the internal image of his sexual object.

“The best chances favoured those at whose throat the knife stood, who truly wanted to become healthy at any price and last but not least who were also honourable (ehrlich). Whoever is of a willing and honourable spirit with respect to his physician, who swears himself to discretion and silence, and who shrinks from no uprightedness will find liberation from his perversion.” (Sadger, 1908: 718)

Freud continually acknowledged his indebtedness to Sadger’s studies of homosexuality: “The data obtained from the psychoanalytic investigation of inverts are based upon material supplied to me by Sadger and upon my own findings.” (*SE VII*: 135) His analysis of da Vinci (*SE XI*: 99n.1), and both the cases of Little Hans (*SE XI*: 109) and the Female Homosexual similarly credit Sadger’s sexual theorisations. (*SE XVIII*: 157)

From Sadger’s theorisations emerged the homosexual aetiology of the strong mother and weak/absent father. His observations noted homosexual analysands’ childhood memories of a precocious love for a woman, most often the mother, a theme carried in his 1910 biography of von Kleist, which Freud utilised in his *Leonardo* text.

Sadger never married and misogynistically opposed female members of the Viennese Society. Sadger’s comment that “the significance of the homosexual tendency in neurosis which he called attention to as early as in 1897 when he laid special stress on the bisexuality of every neurotic symptom” evoked Freud’s response, “To Sadger, one has to reply that it is not all true that every symptom in addition to its other roots, also has to have homosexual roots.” (Sadger, 2005: xxix) Sadger’s writings always discourse homosexuality alligned as “the Narcissistic perversion par excellence, the chief homosexual trait is their vanity, evidenced in their attachment to mirrors and their appearance, that they never forgive a wound to their Narcissism.” (Sadger, 1921: 148.)
Sadger, the central vein for Freud’s homosexual theories, aligns homosexuality, vanity, mirrors and narcissism. This from an unanalysed psychoanalyst whose pathographies on famous writers reveal homosexuality, and who attends Freud’s teachings, beginning his psychoanalytic cure for homosexuality the winter after Wilde’s trials.

**Psychoanalytic Narcissists**

Rank’s 1911 ‘Ein Beitrag zum Narzissismus,’ defines Narcissism as a “pathological condition” decrying “nothing has become known as to the origin and deeper significance of this singular phenomenon”. He details a young woman’s remark assigning her desired object as “I can only love him when he loves me, else I couldn’t” (415) as significant for implying she can only experience love when coursed through herself. (As Chapter Ten explores, such ‘discoursing’ of desire fits with Lacan’s theory of desire being the desire of/for the Other). Rank’s underlining of the jouissance she experienced when sitting before her mirror doing her hair, evidences “the apparently very intimate connection between Narcissism and masturbation” (417). It is Rank, not Sadger, whom Freud credits with giving Narcissism’s “place in the regular development of human beings”.

In 1910 Freud first writes on narcissism in both the long note added to the second edition of *Three Essays* (*SE VII*: 145n) but more significantly in his volumes analysing both Da Vinci’s homosexuality through his narcissistic “high value set on the genitals” (*SE XI*: 97), and Schreber. Both similarly informed by burgeoning contingencies of narcissism, autoeroticism and homosexuality.

“There comes a time in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual instincts (which have hitherto been engaged in autoerotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; and he begins by taking himself, his own body as his love-object.” (*SE XII*: 60)

This body Schreber takes as his love object is feminised and appreciated in the mirror:

“(I was) bold enough to assert that anyone who should happen to see me before the mirror with the upper portion of my torso bared … wearing feminine finery… would receive an unmistakable impression of a female bust.” (33)

With both his Da Vinci and Schreber texts, narcissism is invested in both image, either portraits or mirrors, and in producing art: paintings or memoirs. Narcissism is explored within a pathologising discourse, with an implication there is something ‘homo-sexual’ about narcissism and something narcissistic about being homosexual.

“We are far from wishing to exaggerate the importance of these explanations of the psychical genesis of homosexuality. It is quite obvious they are in sharp contrast to the official theories of those who speak for homosexuals. ... What is for practical reasons called homosexuality may arise from a whole variety of psychosexual inhibitory processes; the particular process we have singled out (Narcissism) is perhaps only one among many, and is perhaps related to only one type of ‘homosexuality’.” (*SE XI*: 100-1)
By 1910 Freud’s inverts have narcissistically become discoursed as *homosexual* for “practical reasons”; trapped Dorian Gray-like in their mirrors/paintings, their gendered sameness reflected, their narcissism instituting them as *homo*.

“The boy represses his love for his mother: identifies himself with her, takes his own person as a model in whose likeness he chooses the new objects of his love. In this way he has become a homosexual. What he has in fact done is to slip back to auto-eroticism: for the boys whom he now loves he loves in the way in which his mother loved him when he was a child. He finds the objects of his love along the path of narcissism; for Narcissus, according to the Greek legend, was a youth who preferred his own reflection to everything else.” (100)

In explicitly citing Narcissus, Freud dictates a psychoanalytic discourse where Narcissism is presented as the ultimate *homo*-sexuality, the definitive sexualised sameness that defines like-kind desire. All done in marked contrast and distinction to Hirschfeld, Ellis and Carpenter “the official theories of those who speak for homosexuals” (100), though at this juncture such theorists named and spoke of/for Urnings and Uranians.

Freud correlates narcissistic identification with hysterical identification (*SE XVI*: 428) and ‘On Narcissism’ discourses narcissism as aligned with femininity as Freud sexuates differences between female ‘narcissistic’ object-choice based on original self-love and a male ‘anaclitic’ object-choice modelled on the more advanced love for the “mother or her substitute”. Freud then explicitly identifies narcissistic ‘female’ object choice as characteristic of “perverts and homosexuals” (*SE XIV*: 88), as again the homosexual is aligned with femininity, and indeed perverts. This Freudian feminisation of Narcissism is both a direct product from and producer of narcissism’s link to homo-sexuality.

Significantly Ulrichs did not ascribe narcissism or anything self-ish to Uring desire, instead discoursing Uranian noble love as being all about the Other à la Lacan:

“The embrace of a mature young man is not entirely a cold and unemotional sexual act, but a true act of love. We experience bliss because of him, not at all because of ourselves. [my italics] The reason for our bliss is not only our subjective situation of sexual arousal or the satisfaction of love, but rather because he is there. Even when he does not promise us intercourse, indeed, even if we do not give this promise the slightest thought, he and his total personality are the objects of our enchantment and the sources of immeasurable desire and bliss.” (Ulrichs, 1994: 62)

The *fin-de-siècle* Narcissus myth is thus metamorphosed from masculine to feminine, from beauty to perversion, from self-reflection to self-delusion, from unsexed to homosexual. But how in emerging psychoanalytic discourses does narcissism so swiftly come to infer something dangerous, degenerative, and something evoked in/through this new accessible technology of the mirror?

**Narcissism and Literature**

Sadger’s theories on homosexuality and on narcissism were explored through literary
pathographies. Rank’s 1914 study of the ‘double’ contains extensive literary discussions of the doppelgänger (the shadow, the mirror image) in both the works and lives of writers such as Goethe, Shelley, de Musset, arguing something literary about narcissism “the poet is always a Narcissus,” and something narcissistic about literature. Rank bestows on Wilde’s *The Picture of Dorian Gray* the most overt and frequent invocation of literary Narcissism, quoting Halward’s description of Dorian as a Narcissus “He has leaned over the still pool of some Greek woodland, and seen in the water’s silent silver the wonder of his own beauty.” (Wilde, 2012: 66) In many ways, it is through Rank’s combining of the different discourses of Narcissism, the literary, the sexual, the pathological and the anthropological, all culminating in *Dorian Gray* and best exemplified through Wilde that something Wildean begins to inform, and be informed by Narcissism.

By the 1890s the classical Narcissus self-reflective discourse reached its last epoch within aestheticism. Wilde produces two versions of his *The Picture of Dorian Gray* in 1890 and 1891, Gide publishes ‘Traité du Narcisse’ in 1891. Wilde explicitly returns to the myth in 1893’s ‘The Disciple’ which forms the prologue to Coelho’s *The Alchemist*. In 1894 Wilde writes “Nero and Narcissus are always with us. To love oneself is the beginning of a life-long romance.” (1894a: 19389) In 1897 Conrad publishes his novella *The Nigger of Narcissus*. Through the nineteenth century Narcissus moves from the symbol of the ascetic to the symbol of the aesthete; but by the century’s turn it is linked to degeneracy and perversion. A journey traversed by one Oscar Wilde.

What made Wilde a unique individual and character, was Wilde, he was his own finest creation; “Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth.” (1891a: 17877) And through many masks, he told many truths. Wilde only became a famous writer in his late thirties, to then he was a sometime journalist, but mainly famous for being famous. With razor sharp wit, colourful dress and charming conversation, Wilde became one of the best-known personalities of his day. On his 1882 tour of the United States asked if he had paraded down Piccadilly carrying a lily, long hair flowing, he replied, “It’s not whether I did it or not that's important, but whether people believed I did it”. (Mendelsohn, 2002) Wilde understood, manipulated and in turn was destroyed by the power of popular perception, the media, and the cult of celebrity.

**Dandysm**

At one metre 91cm, with a broad former University boxer’s build, Wilde was far from a shrinking violet. In the 1880s, Wilde was identified as a ‘man’ about town, his posings and posturings as an aesthete and dandy fostered to fit the ‘image’ of an upper class man
of leisure and refinement. The Dandy places excessive import on physical appearance, refined language, and leisurely hobbies, all of which are pursued with the appearance of nonchalance in a cult of Self. They are often middle-class self-made men seeking to imitate an aristocratic lifestyle. Baudelaire defined the dandy as one who elevates aesthetics to a living religion; (1964: 28)

“Dandyism in certain respects comes close to spirituality and to stoicism. …These beings have no other status, but that of cultivating the idea of beauty in their own persons, of satisfying their passions, of feeling and thinking …. Contrary to what many thoughtless people seem to believe, dandyism is not even an excessive delight in clothes and material elegance. For the perfect dandy, these things are no more than the symbol of the aristocratic superiority of his mind.” (28)

The Dandy’s emergence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century reflected increased class instability and subsequent snobberies, insecurities, and anxieties reacting to the new bourgeoisie. Dandyism might thus be enacting political protestation against a post-French Revolutionary classless egalitarianism, by evoking nostalgic observance to pre-industrial discursive practices of ‘the ideal man’ or the ‘real gentleman’.

And these gentlemen were undoubtedly male, it was a gentrified masculinity they enacted, encoding them as men of refinement, class and taste, like Byron, d'Orsay, Disraeli, Baudelaire, Swinburne, Whistler. It was within such political subversion that the Irish Wilde launched his so cleverly and successfully marketed life, as more English than the gentry themselves. His life was enacted for and before an audience, the original proto-celebrity, famous for being famous; “There is only one thing worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.” (Wilde, 2012: 58) Wilde wrote that, “One should either be a work of Art, or wear a work of Art.” (1894b: 19385)

In 1836 Carlyle defined the dandy as

“a Man whose trade, office and existence consists in the wearing of Clothes. Every faculty of his soul, spirit, purse, and person is heroically consecrated to this one object, the wearing of clothes wisely and well: others dress to live, he lives to dress … you would recognise his existence; would admit him to be a living object; or even failing this, a visual object, or thing that will reflect rays of light.” (2010: 139)

Dandies were aligned to mirrors and Narcissus, but within a sublime discourse of self-reflection. Baudelaire’s dandy has “no profession other than elegance, no other status, but that of cultivating the idea of beauty in their own persons. The dandy must aspire to be sublime without interruption; he must live and sleep before a mirror.” (1964: 14) But this life lived before a mirror is not superficial, but a life in search of unity, lived in opposition. Baudrillard argued dandyism as “an aesthetic form of nihilism”. (2010: 160) Camus said:

The dandy creates his own unity by aesthetic means. But it is an aesthetic of negation. The dandy is, by occupation, always in opposition. He can only exist by defiance.
Up to now, man derived his coherence from the Creator. The dandy rallies his forces and creates a unity for himself by the very violence of his refusal. He can only be sure of his own existence by finding it in the expression of others’ faces. Other people are his mirror. A mirror that quickly becomes clouded, it’s true, since human capacity for attention is limited. It must be ceaselessly stimulated, spurred on by provocation. The dandy, therefore, is always compelled to astonish. Singularity is his vocation, excess his way to perfection. (2012: 51)

Dandified philosophy is closer to classical Narcissus than contemporary metrosexual image obsessed narcissists. Dandies were following the aesthetic movement’s appeal for art for art’s sake. Both Aestheticism and Wilde were significantly influenced by Pater who argued for life being lived intensely, with an ideal of beauty; a theme that came not only to inspire The Picture of Dorian Gray, but to define homosexual narcissists and their picture of drawing a gay. Aestheticism under Pater is exquisite, but sexless: “The beauty of the Greek statues was a sexless beauty; the statues of the gods had the last traces of sex. Here there is a moral sexlessness, a kind of ineffectual wholeness of nature, yet with a true beauty and significance of its own.” (quoted in Dellamora, 1990: 67)

**Wildean Threat to Women**

Frith’s 1881 *Private View at the Royal Academy* (right) depicts eminent Victorians, with Wilde complete with lily buttonhole and well-dressed female entourage central amongst them.

> “Beyond the desire of recording for posterity the aesthetic craze as regards dress, I wished to hit the folly of listening to self-elected critics in matters of taste, whether in dress or art. I therefore planned a group, consisting of a well-known apostle of the beautiful, with a herd of eager worshippers surrounding him.” (Frith, 1887: 256)

At this juncture Wilde’s celebrity and aestheticism were seen as threatening not as indicators of homosexuality, but for indicating a seductive heterosexuality evoked in Wilde’s female entourage. In reviewing Wilde’s *Poems* Higginson feared Wilde’s effete writing made him desirable to “women of high position” inducing himself into “ladies’ boudoirs (to) write prurient poems which their hostesses must discreetly ignore.” (quoted in Edsall, 2003: 82) Wilde, as effete aesthetic, was seductive and sexually threatening, but at this juncture these discourse a subversive heterosexuality.
In 1882 Wilde began a yearlong American lecture tour on aestheticism. Labouchère whose 1885 criminalisation of male same-sex acts in private would later imprison Wilde, helped promote his tour, declaring in an article, that hyper-aestheticism might be just what America needs as antidote to its hyper-materialism (Ellman, 1988: 156).

Following his US tour Wilde’s aestheticism now moved into an increasing dandification, perhaps fearing his persona being lost in his philosophy; his aestheticism becoming more famous than he. Labouchère now turned emphatically against Wilde describing him as ‘the epicene youth’ and ‘an effeminate phrase-maker’ (Mc Kenna, 2004: 54) but none of this yet implied same-sex desire, but was certainly feminising dandified aestheticism. Wilde was sharp enough to be aware of the cult of celebrity, but wary enough of becoming lost therein. There is an art for art’s sake, but Wilde would never want to lose the artist.

Earlier that century, fashion’s threat for making people unseen was parodied as ‘Les Invisibles’; though significantly, within this discourse, people may be invisible, their desire is not, as fashion clearly encodes sexuality, evidenced in the phallic umbrella handle of the male figure in the middle image above. Fashion may make people invisible but it proffers an encoding which makes desire visible. Hence the third ‘Les Invisibles’ image, now discourses as ‘Monstrosities’. Something is monstrous in a display that hides the person but makes desire visible.

This 1818 picture on the above left again to our modern eyes might seem very ‘gay’ with an all male grouping preening and grooming, but this is all being done as the image itself states “to charm the girls to a ninety”; it is all manly and heterosexual even when such preening necessitates the mirror. Within this epoch the episteme of fashion and the mirror evoke heteronormative discourses of desire, self-image, classist manly enactments of how
one is seen and discoursed. We may like to consider the modern metrosexual, beautiful, beautified man as a modern invention, but as Foucault reminds us, histories are written from a present perspective which forgets the contexts events happened in.

**Degenerate Artists**

“‘How did the association of homosexuality with creativity arise?’ It arose partly from the belief that an interest in the finer things of life: art, music, poetry, fashion, is a feminine characteristic, and form the corresponding belief that ‘homosexuals’ are more feminine than ‘heterosexuals’. Both beliefs are relatively recent in Western society but were firmly established in Proust’s time.” (Sinfield, 1994, 84)

As established in Chapter Two, Degeneration discursively evokes the ‘natural’ generative production of heterosexuality, which post-Darwin is presented as something threatening regressive primitivism in society. To the 1880’s masturbation was discoursed as degenerative; ‘wasting’ generating sperm and reproductive energy, corrupting and a dangerous perversion. Maudsley, the pioneering British psychiatrist referred to masturbators as “unmanly … degenerate stock”. (Cohen, 1993: 65) The problem was that masturbation was private and unseen, an invisible act. Its danger was physical exhaustion and psychological self-absorption. “types of individuals … that violate normative middle-class expectations for ‘maleness’.” (66)

Nordau’s *Degeneration* outlined in Chapter Two, widened and propagated degeneration as a meme through the 1890s. Though the first English edition was published only after Wilde’s trials in 1895, it had already associated and aligned idleness, immorality, aristocracy and aestheticism; and had purported a relation between genius and insanity: “Degenerates are not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists and pronounced lunatics; they are often authors and artists.” (Nordau, 1895: vii) And in his listing of artists Nordau includes a full chapter on Wilde.

Homosexuality is not a central theme within *Degeneration*. Indeed throughout this large text Nordau makes only one mention of same-sex practices: “Vice looks to Sodom, and Lesbos, to Bluebeard’s Castle and the servants’ hall of the ‘divine’ Marquis de Sade’s *Justine*, for its embodiments.” (13) At this juncture same-sex behaviour is not being overtly discoursed as ‘degenerate’ but post Wilde’s trials, Nordau’s discoursing of Wilde’s aestheticism and personality now reads Wildean decadence with degeneration and same-sex practices, all within an emerging 1890s ‘homosexual’ nomenclature.

Wilde’s texts are filled with dandified aesthetes including Lord Wotton, Dorian Gray, Lord Goring, Lord Illingworth and Algernon but to his audiences none of this dandyism or aesthetic concerns with beauty or art in any way discoursed narcissism, homosexuality
or perversion. They were seen, celebrated, criticised as men, men of leisure, heterosexual cads, but men absolutely. Post Trials all of this fashionable dandified behaviour, becomes narcissistic, effeminate and homosexual. Hence Rank’s deliberate emphasis on Wilde’s *Dorian Gray* in his essay on ‘The Double’, something that would not necessarily have presented itself so clearly had Wilde’s trials not made this overt.

Part of the evidence used against Wilde in his trials were his writings. *The Picture of Dorian Gray* was quoted extensively, for though Basil’s desire for Dorian, is written as an aesthetic, sexless love, the ideal heavenly Uranian love of Ulrichs’ discourse, within the trials it is presented as evidence of perversion and sodomy.

“The love that he bore him--for it was really love--had something noble and intellectual in it. It was not that mere physical admiration of beauty that is born of the senses, and that dies when the senses tire. It was such love as Michaelangelo had known, and Montaigne, and Winckelmann, and Shakespeare himself.” (150)

Basil’s feelings prefigure Wilde’s own defence of ‘The Love that Dares Not Speak Its Name’ but alongside such heavenly Uranian ideal love, were a row of rent boys, the original ‘gay’ men, who would testify as to another reality of such desire.

Dorian Gray’s sins and vices go unnamed in the text but what is most subversive about his crimes is that they leave no mark, they are invisible; borne only by the portrait in the attic. Within physiognomy discourse, this is what marks both Dorian and, by correlation, Wilde as dangerous, you cannot see their sins/desires on their bodies.

“Sin is a thing that writes itself across a man’s face. It cannot be concealed. People talk sometimes of secret vices. There are no such things. If a wretched man has a vice, it shows itself in the lines of his mouth, the droop of his eyelids, the moulding of his hands even.” (182)

**Conclusion**

*Fin-de-siècle* narcissism moves from naming aesthetic self-reflection to signifying perverse homo-sexuality. The differing aesthetic correlates of narcissism, dandyism, aestheticism, mirroring technologies, all coalesce around Wilde and post Wilde’s trials determine a very *homo*(same)sexuality. For Wilde’s posing as a sodomite to discursively make sense by 1895 there must be markers one adopts or assumes in order to be so identified. Wilde’s trials, not only made same-sex desire visible, but proffered a visible constellation that post-Wilde, one recognises as indicating homosexuality, which incorporate effeminacy, narcissistic mirrors, posing and of course, sodomy. Meaning is contextual, and once Wilde enters the dock, everything about Wilde, his narcissism, appearance and desires become deafeningly homosexual as the following chapter explores.
Chapter Six:
Scandalising Homosexuals and Naming Wilde:
The Wilde Trials and Freudian Tribulations,

**Chapter Synopsis**

Bakhtin has argued that historically legal trials evidence a critical element for narrative development by linking the knowledge effects of juridical authority to more diffuse cultural practices (2004: 388). Both these next two chapters explore discourses around two very significant trials, both located within a historical pattern of interpretation that privileges legal discourse as the site for the production of meaning. Wilde first sued for libel against his posing as a sodomite. This trial evidenced discursive practices which publically identified sodomitical posturings. In his second and third trials Wilde is prosecuted for ‘gross indecency’, not sodomy, as like-kind desire becomes discoursed no longer as an act but a personage, an identity. Wilde’s trials are not isolated but precede and proceed within a backdrop of other trials including the Eulenburg Affair which informs the next chapter. Against such formative and informing trials the burgeoning psychoanalytic movement is emerging, as legal discourse creates and informs public perceptions of/in the continuing emergence of like-kind desire, the identification of his image as an effeminate, feminine degenerate man, signifying him as ‘homo-sexual’, a meme psychoanalysis reflects and directs.

**“An Unspeakable of The Oscar Wilde Sort”**

Seven years ago, if asked to name a black president, people would more likely consider Morgan Freeman, than Motlanthe of South Africa or Mugabe of Zimbabwe; but now it is Obama, so significant has his image changed how politics and African-Americans are viewed, despite his being biracial. In the early 1890s, no one knew homosexuals, but after 1895, they may not have known what a homosexual was, but they knew Wilde was one. The public naming and shaming of Wilde, his imprisonment and death impacted European sexual politics so profoundly that in 1914 Forster’s eponymous hero Maurice can only give a naming to himself while still recognising its impossible un-namability as “an unspeakable of the Oscar Wilde sort” (1972: 139).

On January 9, 1898, just as *The Ballad of Reading Gaol* went to press in England, Wilde wrote to Leonard Smithers, the London publisher:
“As regards America, I think it would be better now to publish there without my name, I see it is my name that terrifies … the withdrawal of my name is essential in America as elsewhere.” (Wilde, 2000: 1011)

And his name did terrify; not just in the United States where in the 1880s, following Wilde’s tour, it was the 29th most popular boys’ name, before dropping to 37th in the 1890s, then 57th in the 1900’s, then collapsing into obscurity until 1969 from whence it has continued to increase in popularity. Similarly in the UK, Oscar was a popular Victorian name moving from 118th in the 1880s to 97th in the 1890s (remembering Wilde’s trials take place halfway through this decade) before collapsing to 199th in the 1900s and then out of the top 200 until 1996 when rated 128th and it increasing year on year since the centenary of Wilde’s death to becoming the 7th most popular name in 2013.

After the trials, Oscar and Wilde became bywords for immorality:

“One time I happened to be at the Alhambra when Brian and Harold walked into the stalls, in full evening dress, with long white gloves draped over one arm, and carrying silver-topped canes and top-hats, looking perhaps like a couple of Oscar Wildes.” (Sinfield, 1994: 135)

Sometimes it was unnamed, alluded to by image/association:

“his chaffing smile; his thick, sleek hair, brushed with water and parted in the middle, his neat moustache and admirable waistcoat, suggested the sort of dandyism that despises women.” (134).

Sinfield assesses “during the 1920’s, this homosexual Wildean stereotype was settled for two generations.” (135) “‘Oscar’ became a word that could be used as an accusation of homosexuality but also a way for gay people to talk of themselves.” (Eribon, 2004: 145)

Ellis’s 1927 Sexual Inversion demarcates this discursive visibility the Wilde trials made for homosexuals, to themselves, as much as to others.

English homosexuality has become much more conspicuous during recent years, and this is sometimes attributed to the Oscar Wilde case. No doubt, the celebrity of Oscar Wilde and the universal publicity given to the facts of the case by the newspapers may have brought conviction of their perversion to many inverted who were before only vaguely conscious of their abnormality, and, paradoxical though it may seem, have imparted greater courage to others; (1927: 996)

It was, however, the Oscar Wilde case which first opened his eyes to the wide prevalence of homosexuality, and he considers that the publicity of that case has done much, if not to increase homosexuality, at all events to make it more conspicuous and outspoken (2361).

Hirschfeld’s opening chapter in 1914’s The Homosexuality of Men and Women says, in considering various etymologies and historical understandings of homosexuality:

“In England, long after Oscar Wilde’s trial, a homosexual was called an ‘Oscar’, and to have anal intercourse “to Oscar”, expressions that according to Pavia are still used today. A German servant who worked for prominent British families recently wrote

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21 As an example of Wilde’s reclamation, the Oscar Wilde Memorial Bookshop opened in New York’s Greenwich Village in 1967, one block from where the Stonewall rebellion would take place two years later.

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to me that because of his feminine nature, he often would hear the maids pester him with the phrase, ‘that is an Oscar’” (58).

This consciousness the Wilde Trials generated evidences the productive power of censorship. All discourse, no matter how negatively delivered, produces. Silencing may be the loudest suppression, evidenced in the earlier example of Queen Victoria’s removal of lesbianism from the Labouchère Act that condemned Wilde, fearing the adding of women to laws criminalising same-sex acts would only give people/women ideas.

“The Oscar Wilde case was bruiting about. Here and there a newspaper allusion still too recondite was painstakingly clarified by an effeminate fellow-student, who, I fancy now, would have shown no reluctance had I begged him to adduce practical illustration. I purchased, too, photographs of Oscar Wilde, scrutinizing them under the unctuous auspices of this same emasculate and blandiloquent mentor. If my interest in Oscar Wilde arose from any other emotion than the rather morbid curiosity then almost universal, I was not conscious of it.” (Ellis, 1927: 3433)

From the very first Wilde trial reports silence dictated what was being discoursed, but a deafening silence. Reynold’s Newspaper reported on March 3rd 1895, “Lord Queensbury Arrested: Charged with Libelling Oscar Wilde” that the libel contained “words unfit for publication”. (Goodman, 1988: 34) but this level of censorship only created its own momentum of curiosity intrigue and further discoursing. The Star’s report on April 3rd only referenced the libel as a “very grave and serious allegation against Mr. Wilde’s character.” (43) The Evening News on April 5th would only testify “The Wilde case is sinking deeper and deeper into a foul morass … a horrid nocturne of terrible suggestions, a thing of blackness, only half defined, but wholly horrible.” (71)

With the Marquis of Queensbury’s acquittal from the charge of libel and Wilde’s immediate subsequent arrest, again newspapers reported by allusion rather than by fact. April 6th’s Daily Telegraph merely mentioned his arrest on “on a charge of a very grave character” (75) but references Wilde as “inflicting upon public patience as much moral damage of the most offensive and repulsive kind as any single individual could well cause” (75) citing his narcissistic “inflated egotism” and “diseased vanity”.

The trials significance cannot be overestimated. The Star referring to “the startling episode of yesterday, the moment involved as more important than any that had proceeded it.” (78) Illustrated Police News called it “the most gruesome tragedy of the nineteenth century” (78) The Pall Mall Gazette is torn between whether “absolute reticence or modified publicity is the better in the interests of public morality” holding the middle ground of reporting shock without stating what is shocking, “more than that, mercifully, we need not at present say.” (79). The Echo wished only that “the best thing for everybody now is to forget Oscar Wilde, let him go into silence, and be heard of no more.” (79)
They wished he would flee, but he did not. It is said Wilde’s arrest was delayed by several hours to allow him to catch the last boat-train and escape to the continent. This silent escape would have facilitated social authorities, but Wilde did not flee; the trials had to happen, and it all became public, spoken and visible.

**Oscar Wilde Posing Somdomite**

This calling card of Queensbury’s (right) initiated the set of trials that led to Wilde’s ruin, and the proliferation of discourse around ‘homo-sexuality’ in ‘libellously’ accusing Wilde as ‘posing somdomite’. Significantly, Wilde is accused of ‘posing’ as a sodomite rather than being one, and the Marquis’s neologistic misspelling parapraxically may slip something of his paternal ‘son-domite’ homophobia.

Nonetheless Wilde responds with a calamitous libel trial, urged on, not only by Bosie and his family, but by Wilde’s own outrage. “Bosie’s father has left a card at my club with hideous words on it. I don’t see anything now but a criminal prosecution.” (McKenna, 2004: 454) Something in this “hideous” word *somdomite* disgusts Wilde, railing immediately to his former lover and continuing friend, Ross, against this ‘libellous’ claim. There is a clear discontinuity between how Wilde sees and identifies his self and how the Marquis, the courts and the media ‘name’ and ‘libel’ him, his ‘desire’, his identity.

Queensbury was absolutely vindictive in his determination to destroy Wilde, forwarding the evidence gathered against Wilde for the libel trial to the office of Public Prosecutor, with a cover letter, simultaneously released to the London Newspapers:

In order that there may be no miscarriage of justice, I think it is my duty at once to send you a copy of all our witnesses’ statements, together with a copy of the shorthand notes of the trial. Yours faithfully, Charles Russell. (Cohen, 1993: 174-5)

In circulating this information, Queensbury wanted to force Wilde to separate from his son and leave England, rather than risking another trial which might expose Bosie. “If the country allows you to leave, all the better for the country; but, if you take my son with you, I will follow you wherever you go and shoot you.” (Hyde, 2001: 222)

**The Importance of Not Being ‘Earnest’**

Queensbury’s threat of avoiding any “miscarriage of justice” may refer to two other same-sex scandals of the period. Firstly the infamous 1889 Cleveland Street Scandal, where a gay brothel in London was discovered by police with clients rumoured to include Prince Albert, eldest son of the Prince of Wales and heir to the throne. The government was
accused of covering up by delaying prosecution in order to protect names of aristocratic patrons such as Lord Somerset, the Prince of Wales’ equerry, and the brothel keeper, Hammond, who both managed to flee abroad before a prosecution was brought.

An earlier infamous media “miscarriage” or skirmish in the battleground between same-sex desire and the legal/political realm was the 1871 trials of Frederick Park and Ernest Boulton, men arrested while attending the theatre in women’s clothes and charged “with conspiring and inciting persons to commit an unnatural offence”. (Mc Kenna, 2013: 237) alongside Ernest’s lover, former MP Lord Arthur Clinton, who subsequently committed suicide. After the prosecution failed to establish the crime of anal sex, or that wearing women’s clothing was in any sense a criminal both men were acquitted.

Just as Wilde’s Trials were to define homosexuality for over a century, so the Fanny and Stella 1871 trials (their adopted cross-dressing personae names) would define same-sex visibility and discourse; one in which anal sex, effeminacy, cross-dressing, and aristocratic corruption is presumed. The Importance of Being Ernest in this late Victorian time is that Ernest became a by-word among those in the know for identifying or being identified as like-kind desiring, for evoking Uranian (Earn-ian!!) desire. Critics doubting ‘Earnest’ as a code-word for ‘homosexual’, arguing this as conveniently invented years later with little or no foundation. And that had it been true, Carson, Queensberry’s libel defense lawyer, would certainly have pinpointed this, as he did the overtly ‘homosexual’ passages in the magazine publication of The Picture of Dorian Gray (which were later suppressed). Clearly, any ‘homosexual code’ would not be within Carson’s knowledge and such arguments evidence their own heterosexist presumptions of all knowledge being within heterosexuality’s knowing and a possibility of a subculture, and linguistic resistance, is denied. Jack Worthing address in The Importance of Being Earnest - E4, The Albany; Piccadilly - was the home of Wilde’s friend George Ives, an unrelenting campaigner for homosexual rights whose secret homosexual Order of the Chaeronaea, which Wilde may have been a member of, having provided some of the lines for the vow sworn by new recruits, convened at this address.

Whether or not Wilde was encoding his texts with significations of like-kind desire, his texts can only be read this way once the enigmatic cipher of Wilde himself as ‘homosexual’ was unlocked, or ironically locked in prison. Wilde’s trial is built up on several layers of homosexual discourse then current and over-written: corruption of youth, dangerous texts, cross-dressing, effeminacy, narcissism.
To ensure his association with the key marker of ‘homo-sexuality’, effeminacy Wilde was not tried in isolation, but alongside Alfred Taylor, a more ‘obvious’ unmasculine type. In Wilde’s trials several codified signifiers of ‘homosexuality’ are underscored: (i) Anal sex “a boy lying in his bed … the disgusting filth in which they found the bedclothes on more than one occasion” (Holland, 2003: 277); (ii) Cross-class relations alluding to pedophilia “not one of these cases were the parties upon an equality in any way with Mr. Wilde; they were none of them really educated parties with whom he would naturally associate; they were none of them his equal in years; and there was, you must have observed, a curious similarity in the ages of each and every one of them” (274); (iii) Implications of prostitution: “Had you any particular business with Taylor?” (274); (iv) Effeminacy and cross-dressing: “Did his (Taylor’s) rooms strike you as being peculiar at all? … elaborate furniture … luxurious … He never admitted any daylight into them at all (154) … highly perfumed? … (156) Did you know whether Mr. Taylor had a lady’s costume there? Did you ever see him with a costume on – a lady’s fancy dress.” (158) Wilde cannot just be convicted of ‘gross indecency’ with men alluding to ‘sodomy’, he must be outed as narcissistic, effeminate, womanly, cross-dressing when this epoch’s key marker designating same sex desire is, and continues to be effeminacy.

‘Gross Indecency’

The law was not merely putting Wilde on trial but like-kind desire itself; precisely just as it is emerging within scientific discourse. The establishment of Section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, the Labouchère Amendment, under which Wilde was prosecuted, marked a movement of like-kind desire being understood as anal sodomy to a wider implication undefined but categorised legally as ‘gross indecency’. The Act did not define ‘gross indecency’, partly because Victorian morality baulked from precise descriptions of ‘immoral’ activity, but also because it evidences this movement Foucault implicated of “the nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, … a type of life… It was consubstantial with him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature.”

“Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the commission of, or procures, the commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof, shall be liable at the discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour.” (Moran, 1996: 206)

The vagueness of the term “gross indecency” allowed the law to prosecute virtually any like-kind behaviour, kissing, holding, embracing; as not just sex acts but sexuality, desire becomes criminalised. It is no longer sodomites who are criminal, but the grossly indecent emerging homo-sexual. These undefined acts were unmentionable, unspecified, but
morally denoted ‘indecent’. In Wilde’s trials, it was not his ‘indecent’ sexual acts that sentenced him, but the indecency of his books, his wit, his persona, his cross-class relations; the indecency of spending time with men less educated and lower-classed.

Given that the penalty for sodomy was life imprisonment, and had been the death penalty until 1861, successful prosecutions were rare and loath to be pursued. In practice sodomy was difficult to prove, as 1870’s Fanny and Stella trials demonstrated where the police failed to provide witnesses to any sodomy, nor could their doctors evidence semen or contusions within or on their asses. Nonetheless, a trial was ordered as their cross-dressing was ‘evidence’ enough of a perverse nature. They were acquitted by arguing they were mere actors and performers. Posing is threatening.

In July 1885, *Pall Mall Gazette* editor W.T. Stead published an article condemning the ease with which young girls could be ‘bought’ on the street, eliciting the moral outrage that yielded the Criminal Law Amendment Bill defence of women from brothels and prostitution, and raised the age of consent from 13 to 16. Sir Howard Vincent, Director of Criminal Investigations at Scotland Yard, had called homosexual acts a modern “scourge” (Kaplan, 2012: 173) Stead had written to Labouchère of this rise of male prostitution to which Labouchère presented his last minute amendment outlawing all male homosexual activity, while disregarding lesbianism, within a four minute debate in which he pushed for strong action against “deviants”. This same Labouchère whose *Truth* magazine had called for greater investigation into the Cleveland Street scandal. (175)

Wilde’s prison sentence politically motivated him into engaging with the battle against ‘homosexual’ persecution, writing to Ives in March 1898:

“Yes, I have no doubt we shall win, but the road is long and red with monstrous martyrdoms. … Nothing but the repeal of the Criminal Law Amendment Act would do any good. That is the essential. It is not so much public opinion as public officials that need educating.” (Wilde, 2000: 1044)

**The Wilder European Front**

Wilde’s trial was not just an English affair. Years later Wilde’s son Vyvyan recalls:

“my main recollection is of my mother, in tears, poring over masses of press cuttings, mostly from Continental newspapers. I was, of course, not allowed to see them, though I could not help seeing the name OSCAR WILDE in large headlines.” (Holland, 1999: 61).

Cohen describes the Wilde trials as “splashed across the front pages of most newspapers throughout Europe” (Cohen, 1993: 129).

Ivory specifically examines German Press reporting of Wilde’s Trials, in this time of sexologists and psychoanalysts beginning their discursive practices of naming the ‘homo-
sexual’. Her analysis demonstrates the impact the Wilde scandal had on like-kind discourse, not least its influence on the Germanic homosexual rights movements. Her research included the Vienna-based Neue Freie Presse, an oft cited source for other German-language press and a daily newspaper of Freud’s, one he wrote for (Solms, 1989: 397). On March 10th 1895, Neue Freie Presse was the first Germanic newspaper to report Wilde’s upcoming libel trial as “Prozeß Queensberry” (Ivory, 2012: 223).

Ivory notes key differences in how Germanic newspapers, though utilising euphemisms, name Wilde’s crime less indirectly than the British press. They openly name the German statute Wilde would be tried under, Paragraph 175, and regularly ascribe Wilde’s crime as involving acts with other men. One paper used Westphal’s term, in how Carson “suchte aus Wilde’s Schriften dessen kontrasexuelle Eigenschaften zu beweisen” (seeks to prove from Wilde’s writings such ‘contrary-sexual’ characteristics) (227).

The Germanic press tended towards denoting Wilde ill rather than criminal through medical discourse of “krankhafte Belastung” (pathological encumbrances) (230), rather than the mere moralistic language of degeneration and perversion. Erber notes similar patterns in French reporting, with the Echo de Paris published an article using “the two dominant explanations of sexual orientation current in French sexology” (1996: 571) and another French journal publishing an interview with Max Nordau, who claimed his Degeneration predicted Wilde’s demise (569).

In Ivory’s analysis, most Germanic reports on Wilde’s trials, (graph below) appear

through the first trial. Though reporting peaks occur directly after the first and second trials, and following the start and end of the third trial (23rd May saw the highest number of reports, fifteen), she argues that with a few exceptions, reporting on the second and third trials, though more frequent, is telegraphic in nature, printing only the bare facts, the verdict for instance, with no commentary. The Germanic Press and readership seem less interested in Wilde’s trials than in what he was being tried/libelled for, and once this is discoursed, the trial and punishment are comparatively irrelevant. “Wilde’s real fall happens in April rather than May in Germany.” (231)

Again significantly, the German Press uniquely focused on the ‘awful’ nature of Wilde’s sentence, not his ‘guilt’. Through almost identical descriptions Wilde’s conditions in Pentonville Prison, as well as the demands and restrictions placed on his serving “hard labour” were censured in most of the main newspapers in early June 1895. The Viennese magazine Die Zeit, another Freudian stable, explicitly criticised Wilde’s punishment, with Handl, arguing the British as too bourgeois and conservative in matters of art.

“Too naive to appreciate Wilde’s work, they have poured on him all their hatred and fear of ‘decadent’ artistic movements and thus made him a scapegoat for the ills of their own society. The whole scandal and the sentence and punishment that followed was simply, for Handl, ‘very English’ (232).”

**Freud and Wilde**

Freud’s 1919 ‘The Uncanny’ argued Rank’s ‘double’ as having its origins in the period of primary narcissism, invented on the basis of “unbounded self-love” as “an assurance of immortality”; only later becoming a “harbinger of death” (Freud, SE XVII: 235). Such quotes would summarise the tragedy of Wilde’s publicised downfall, his “unbounded self-love” which proffered him an immunity, “an assurance of immortality” which ultimately became his “harbinger of death”.

Freud and Wilde, born nineteen months apart, shared not only a contemporaneous cultural collision between Victorian sensibilities and modern sexuality, but both recognised the importance of being earnest. Wilde argued that though “‘Know thyself’ was written over the portal of the antique world; Over the portal of the new world, ‘Be thyself’ shall be written” (1891b: 18953) moving the philosophical message from self-awareness, to ‘self actualisation’: “Be yourself; everyone else is already taken”. Freud believed “Being entirely honest with oneself is a good exercise.” (Masson, 1985: 272) Both recognised self-actualisation as realised through suffering, tragedy and pleasure with Wilde arguing in his own trial “realisation of one’s self is the primal aim of life; to realise one’s self through pleasure is finer than to realise one’s self through pain.” (Holland, 2003: 75)
Both appreciated the cost of lying, the value of illusion. “Illusions commend themselves to us because they save us pain and allow us to enjoy pleasure instead.” (Freud, *SE XIV*: 280) For Wilde, “Illusion is the first of all pleasures”; the liar “the very basis of civilised society.” (1891c: 16850) And psychoanalytically: “Truth is what’s left over when you run out of lies. The pure and simple truth is rarely pure and never simple.” (1895: 4604)

The two men clearly shared ideas, if not philosophies, and both were masters of the power of language, the importance of names. Though Freud edited Rank’s 1914 essay ‘The Double’ with its explicit Wildean demonstrations of Narcissism, and Freud was himself very much a literature and especially theatre buff, interestingly, Freud in all his collected works and correspondence so far reviewed, only makes reference to Wilde twice, the second, not uncannily, in the aforementioned ‘The Uncanny’.

Jones states Freud loved theatre, and “waxed ecstatically” on Sarah Bernhardt, a theatrical crush he shared with Wilde; Arthur Schnitzler, was a life-long correspondent. In the 20th Century’s first decade *An Ideal Husband* was the most frequently performed English play in Vienna. *The Importance of Being Earnest*, is overall the most frequently produced English drama there. These along with *Lady Windemere’s Fan, A Woman of No Importance, Salome* and *A Florentine Tragedy*, and two different stage versions of *The Picture of Dorian Gray* were all running in Vienna through 1907 to 1910. So popular was Wilde’s oeuvre that Lothar, chief Viennese critic, remarked in 1907 “Nowadays, Oscar Wilde has become a theatrical trump card in Vienna.” (Mayer, 2010: 208)

In 1905 in *Neue Freie Presse* Bernard Shaw wrote of Wilde’s reception in Vienna:

> “Vienna will more easily get used to the style of Oscar Wilde, for Wilde embodied the artistic culture of the 18th century. Seeing that Vienna, apart from Paris, is the most regressive city in Europe it ought to appreciate Oscar Wilde far more greatly than he will ever be appreciated anywhere in Germany or England.” (203)

Yet neither Freud, nor as explored previously his main vein on homosexuality Sadger, whose ‘pathographies’ were psychoanalytic profiles exploring authors’ homosexualities, ever mention Wilde. In 1910, with all Wilde’s plays in production in Vienna and journalists and critics alike marking the tenth anniversary of his death, both men are writing pathographies involving narcissism and homosexuality in relation to different artists: Freud on Da Vinci, and Sadger on von Kleist.

But in 1910 Freud also publishes ‘Über ‘Wilde’ Psychoanalyse’ translated as ‘Wild’ Psychoanalysis, which alas is not an analysis of Wilde, but explores masturbation and the “rejection of sexuality, or a repression which is over-severe” (*SE XI*: 223) against the
backdrop of unanalysed doctors adopting ‘wilde Psychoanalyse’ theories in their work. Could Freud unconsciously be alluding to the unanalysed Sadger? At this juncture Freud is becoming increasingly frustrated with Sadger’s orthodoxy, writing in 1910 to Jung “I should like to incite you to stem the interminable flow of Sadger’s rubbish” (McGuire, 1974: 283); in another saying “Sadger’s writing is insufferable” (291) Freud was having difficulty with how Sadger was utilising psychoanalytic theory like a “congenital fanatic of orthodoxy, who happens by mere accident to believe in psychoanalysis rather than in the law given by God on Sinai-Horeb.” (quoted in Rose, 1998: 71)

Freud utilises the word ‘wilde’ in this paper implying the English ‘wild’ meaning ‘uncontrolled or unleashed’ for which the German ‘ausgelassen; fetzig; entfesselt’ would seem more fitting, rather than ‘wilde’ meaning ‘brutal, prohibited, unlawful, criminal’. Thus, the German ‘wilde Ehe’ means concubine; the German ‘wilde Blick’ means glare. But the German word and spelling clearly evoke the unlawful, criminal, homosexual author Oscar at a time when Freud may not only be questioning Sadger’s ‘wilde psychoanalyse’ but also his Wilde literary pathographies which in exploring narcissism always expose homosexuality. Surely Freud was too astute to not have wondered if there was not something Wildean about this wilde unanalysed psychoanalyst, Sadger.

**Wilde and Freud**

Wilde died in 1900 so never got to comment on the Freudian revolution, or did he? Alfred Douglas in the Noel Pemberton-Billing libel trial testified that before Wilde wrote Salome in 1890 he had been reading Krafft-Ebing’s *Psychopathia Sexualis*. (Bristow, 2008:195) And Wilde may well have been thinking of Krafft-Ebing, or indeed Freud himself when, after his imprisonment, he bemoaned the fact that “I am a pathological problem in the eyes of German scientists and even in their works I am tabulated.” (2000: 1006)

However in 1924 the infamous Irish psychic Hester Travers Smith published *Oscar Wilde from Purgatory*, her witnessed medium sittings for the spirit of Wilde who alongside very Wildean comments: “Being dead is the most boring experience in life. That is, if one excepts being married or dining with a schoolmaster.” (7); “Yes, I have seen my mother. She has not really improved in the process of dying” (9) interestingly this Wilde ‘spirit’ comments on Freud’s theory of Dreams: “Dreams dwell far from the world, and in your gross age they live on those who know that life is faded and without form, unless the dream comes which creates for us the veritable image of beauty as she is. We, who have passed beyond your ken, we only know what these men (Freud and Jung) guess at.” (33) And on this last commentary on Freud, Wilde from purgatory ceased to speak. Perhaps,
in true Freudian tradition, the medium said “Let’s leave it there for this week”; or perhaps in true Wildean fashion, he neglected to pay his bill.

**Conclusion**

Wilde’s naming of the love that dares not speak its name, in utilising both Ulrichs’ Uranian terminology and Krafft-Ebing’s theories, was undoubtedly a prime channel to and for sexological discourse of such ‘German scientists’. From prison, his letter of petition to the Home Secretary quoted the names and works of Lombroso and Nordau and utilised discourses of “sexual madness”; “pathological science” “erotomania”; “sensual monomanias” referring to his predicament as “diseases to be cured by a physician, rather than crimes to be punished by a judge.” (2000, 656)

The utter prominent notoriety of Wilde’s life, trials and downfall provided, in turn, these ‘German scientists’ with this most visible ‘decadent narcissist’ to establish *homo-sexual* as naming a same-sex discourse grounded in Wilde. Both legal and medical discourses publicised an ‘Oscar-Wilde’ type bringing *homosexuality* to general public consciousness. Another trial, much closer to Freud geographically and theoretically, would enforce a homo-sexuality more obviously ‘recognised’, seen and controlled in evidencing effeminacy. The Eulenburg Trials made publically transparent the effeminacy of these emerging *homo-sexuals*. 
Chapter Seven:
Germanic Trials of Homosexuality:
Freud, Hirschfeld and the Eulenburg Affair

“Time will tell whether the word ‘homosexual’ will prove irreparable or can be rectified.”
(Hirschfeld, 1908: 16)

Chapter Synopsis

In 1896 Hirschfeld, incited by Wilde’s injustice and more immediately compelled by a patient’s pre-wedding suicide ‘cursed’ with ‘abnormal’ desires, published ‘Sappho und Socrates: How can one explain the love of men and women for people of their own sex?’ with the publisher Spohr, then publishing the first text on Wilde’s trials: Der Fall Wilde und das Problem der Homosexualität. Hirschfeld’s “iconoclastic” pamphlet which “made Hirschfeld’s future … a landmark in sexological history” (34) directly references Wilde:

“The married man who seduces the governess of his children remains free, but Oscar Wilde, this genius of a writer, who loves Lord Alfred Douglas with a passionate love, has been put into prison at Wandsworth. And this because of a passion which he shares with Socrates, Michelangelo and Shakespeare.” (Wolff, 1986: 33)

Hirschfeld’s grounding his research on the biological nature of ‘same-sex’ desire, invests him as a key conduit for sexological thinking, the ‘Einstein of Sex’ where undoubtedly mutual fame, esteem and research drew he and Freud together. But, because Hirschfeld argued love over sex, homoamorosity over homo-sexuality; because he argued homosexuals as hermaphroditic ‘third sexed’ à la Ulrichs’ discourse; but, most especially because of his involvement in a notorious German libel trial involving politicians of the Kaiser’s inner circle, Hirschfeld’s theories and namings would never suit early twentieth century ‘scientific’ dominant sexual discourses, most especially Freud’s psychoanalysis.

“A Unique Classical Ancestry”

In his 1896 pamphlet, though recognising Moll and Krafft-Ebing’s influence, Hirschfeld utilised a discourse of ‘eigene Geschlecht’ (one’s own gender) in ascribing like-kind desire. Eigene infers both ‘unique, distinctive’ and ‘self-owned, self-possessed’; Geschlecht signifies sex as gender rather than sex as fornication, and conveys meanings of lineage and dynasty. With such lexicon Hirschfeld sought to establish a unique classical lineage from Sappho and Socrates to which Wilde contributes.

1896 saw Brand establish the first ongoing homosexual publication, Der Eigene, which ran until 1931, adopted this signification through Stirner’s philosophical writings on ‘self-ownership’ and individual autonomy. Though Hirschfeld’s discourse evolved through
different influences and political expediencies, his ‘unique’ discourse of like-kind desire endured: his 1913 magnum opus, *Die Homosexualität des Mannes und des Weibes* has a chapter ‘Classification on Homosexuals according to Their Personal Uniqueness’. (325)

It took Ellis to highlight Ulrichs as the first to discourse ‘sexual intermediaries’ (*sexuelle Zwischenstufen*) which omission Hirschfeld addressed immediately, sponsoring the 1898 republication of all Ulrichs’ texts, acting himself as editor, and in the first Sexological journal, he reproduced four of Ulrichs’ most important letters. Post-editing Ulrichs, this third sexed/gendered discourse was accentuated, evidenced in Hirschfeld’s naming of this Journal, his 1901’s *Was soll das Volk vom Dritten Geschlecht wissen!* (What must People know about the Third Gendered Sex!); 1903’s *Der urnische Mensch*, (The Urning Person) and 1904’s *Berlin’s Drittes Geschlecht*, (Berlin’s Third Gendered).

Hirschfeld manifestly discourses ‘homosexuality’ only with *Die Homosexualität des Mannes und des Weibes*, while delineating in his opening chapter various taxonomies and etymologies of same-sex desiring. Pointedly, in 1901, his ‘Die Homosexualität in Wien’ for the *Wiener Klinische Rundschau*, the journal that famously published Freud’s subsequently disregarded seduction theories in 1896, could raise a lexical question as to why Vienna has ‘homosexuals’ but Berlin has ‘third gendered’?

Like Ulrichs, Hirschfeld’s adoption of ‘sexual intermediary’ discursive practices was to utilise science not merely as an end, but a means for justification and justice. His motto ‘*per scientiam ad justitiam*’ (through science to justice) (Rosario, 1997: 133) evidences scientifically establishing a unique sexual/gendered identity would advance legal and social recognition/protection. Again, like Ulrichs, Hirschfeld emphasised love, ‘*Lieb*’, not mere biological desire, evidenced in his entitling of homo-amorosity: ‘Of The Character of Love. A Contribution to Answering the Question of Bisexuality’ (1906); *The Natural Laws of Love: A Popularised Study on Love Effects, Love Urges and Love Expressions* (1914) In favouring ‘sexual intermediary’ discourse over ‘homosexual’ he exemplifies Foucault’s decree of personal identity over acts, especially with *homosexuality*’s association with specific sexual acts. (Bauer: 2006, 7)

**“The Third Sex?”**

Hirschfeld was most associated to the term ‘Third sex’, especially by Freud, although he only used it to title two of more than 500 texts published in his lifetime. Always, his preference was for either sexual ‘intermediaries’ or ‘transitions’, naming a break from the polar opposites inherent in homo/hetero sexual discourse.
In 1897 Hirschfeld evidenced his scientific justice-ification in establishing the first homosexual rights organisation, the Scientific Humanitarian Committee, or WhK), whose primary aim was the abolition of Germany’s anti-homosexual law, Paragraph 175.

“Die widernatürliche Unzucht, welche zwischen Personen männlichen Geschlechts oder von Menschen mit Thieren begangen wird, ist mit Gefängniß zu bestrafen; auch kann auf Verlust der bürgerlichen Ehrenrechte erkannt werden.”

However within the WhK some members, though seeking decriminalisation, despised Hirschfeld’s scientific justice-ification of homosexuals as persons to be tolerated through biological dictates as being different or lesser. The vast criticism focused on what was interpreted as Hirschfeld’s (and Ulrichs’) third-sex discourse of male homosexuals as naturally sexual intermediary and consequently effeminate.

From such insulted frustration, men like Friedlaender left the WhK to form the ‘Bund für männliche Kultur’ or League for Manly Culture, which even in name presented male-male love as virile manliness rather than the demasculinised effeminacy tacitly implied within ‘third-sex’ discourse. Brand and Friedländer, like Hirschfeld, believed homosexual orientation did not necessary manifest in physical sexual acts among males. They focused on male friendship and bonding in culture, while Hirschfeld accentuated medicalised (and psychoanalytic) concepts of “unconscious homosexuality.” But their critical difference was the ideological conflict between effeminacy and virility. Friedländer bluntly rebuffed Hirschfeld’s feminised discourse as antithetical to the masculinity they represented:

“Our conception can from the beginning count on the sympathy in the circles of the more virile friends of male youth – no matter whether they have ‘sexual’ intercourse or not, since that is for the unbiased a relatively secondary matter and at any rate a purely private affair; whereas the extremely feminine ‘homosexuals’ will, on the whole, feel more comfortable in Hirschfeld’s camp.” (Oosterhuis, 2010 :72)

The German homosexual movement becomes split/divided along an axis of hyper-masculine virile homosexuals against concepts of third-sex, intermediate effeminacy. These representations are discoursed and enacted in culture and the media to present very different specific homo discourses and imagery, one homoerotically triumphalised by Nazism, but at the price of horrifying homosexual oppression, brutality and death.

For Hirschfeld, ‘third-sex’ discourse was problematic but necessary against the fiction of the binary opposed gender model. For him, only a spectrum of male and female ratios located any individual, evoking the single-sex discourse explored in Chapter Two.

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23 “Unnatural fornication, whether between persons of male gender or of humans with beasts, is to be punished by imprisonment; a sentence involving loss of civil rights may also be enacted.”
“Strictly scientifically speaking, one is unable in this sense to speak of men and women, but only of people who are largely male or largely female.” (Hirschfeld 1904: 4)

Hirschfeld never considered, and continually emphasised the signifier ‘third-sex’ was “der niemals als etwas Vollständiges oder auch nur nahezu Abgeschlossenes dastehen kann” (never something complete and closed in itself), but in true deconstructionist style, a critical obligatory “Notbehelf” (makeshift) designed to interrogate “nur allzu oberflächliche Einteilungsschema der Sexuskörperstruktur in Mann und Weib hinaus” (the extremely superficial scheme of classification in man or woman). (1923: 23)

Hirschfeld’s ‘third-sex’ also functions as a provisional recognition for those deprived of rights in a society structured by sexual binarism. Thus, despite its fictional tentativeness, ‘third-sex’ connects Hirschfeld’s theoretical insights with his libertarian activism for the marginalised and oppressed. Though significantly his 1919 ‘The Alleged Third Sex of Human Beings. A Reply’ suggests cautious usage of the term. (Bauer, 2006: 24)

**Paragraph 175**

Like the Labouchère Amendment’s “gross indecency” discussed previously, Paragraph 175 criminalising male same-sex relations but not female, presented a similar challenge in how “Die widersätzliche Unzucht”, (Lewdness against nature) was interpreted. A separate statute (Paragraph 175b) concerned ‘Sodomie’ understood strictly as bestiality demarcated German same-sex desiring men not as sodomites, as Englishmen were.

Like the Labouchère Amendment, Paragraph 175 inferred a criminalisation of sexual expression in the widest possible sense. The 1935 Nazi codifying of Paragraph 175 underlined this: “Ein Mann, der mit einem anderen Mann Unzucht treibt oder sich von ihm zur Unzucht mißbrauchen lässt, wird mit Gefängnis bestraft” (A man who engages with or seeks engagement from (active/passive) another man in lewdness/fornication with another man is to be punished by imprisonment). The Nazi removal of the adjective “widernatürliche” widened the law’s discursive reach, when ‘against nature’ no longer had meaning under Nazified dictations of natural and unnatural as self-evident. The Nazi codifying of Paragraph 175 made the discursive crime one of the idea/concept/practice of Unzucht treiben which specifically suggests discourse defined in active and passive terms as a man doing something to another; or a man having something ‘done’ to/with them.

The Nazi encoding also moves 1871’s “zwischen Personen männlichen Geschlechts” to “Ein Mann, der mit einem anderen Mann”, a discursive shift from ‘between persons of male gender’ to ‘one man with another man’. Potentially Hirschfeld’s arguing same-sex
desiring men as a third sex would scientifically justice-if-y their exclusion from Paragraph 175 as the *Drittes Geschlecht* could not be presented as persons of male gender, as that paragraph delineates; a concession the Nazi discursive changes forecloses.

Paragraph 175 was inherited directly from Paragraph 143 of Prussia’s 1794’s *Allgemeines Landrecht*. With 1871’s German unification this law was extended throughout Germany. Prior, states such as Hannover, Württemberg and Bavaria, like many transformed by the Napoleonic Wars, had been liberalising by the Napoleonic Code, the first modern legal code adopted with a pan-European scope. This civil code forbidding privileges based on birth and allowing freedom of religion, had decriminalised homosexual relations, defining sex crimes only as violations with reference to age and consent, rather than anything about gender and orientation of the parties involved. (Sibalis, 2014) Aggressive Prussian, then German, later Nazi nationalisms would locate national identity, pride and masculinity against such ‘French/foreign/traitorous’ codes that legalised or legitimated perversion.

Pointedly the Prussian government assigned a ‘Deputation for Medical Knowledge’ to establish a scientific basis for Paragraph 175. However, the physicians Virchow and von Bardeleben’s March 1869 appraisal presented none. Regardless Bismarck submitted the law to the North German Confederation in 1870 retaining relevant Prussian penal provisions, justified from concern for ‘public opinion’. Though likely conservative nationalism contributed in removing liberal and indeed libertarian French influence from the German Empire, having just defeated the French and seized Alsace-Lorraine.

**Signing Psychoanalysis**

In 1897 Hirschfeld’s WhK petitioned the Reichstag to abolish Paragraph 175 with over 2,000 names including prominent medical experts, scientists and authors such as Einstein, Hesse, Krafft-Ebing, Heinrich and Thomas Mann, Hauptman, Rilke, Schnitzler, even Berlin’s police chief and the Prussian and Federal Justice Ministers, but was rejected.

Another prominent signatory was Freud, whose personality and new psychoanalytic discourse was intensifying in parallel to Hirschfeld’s sexology. The early phase of both their personal, professional and disciplinary acquaintance was distinguished through mutual influence, dynamic theoretical exchanges and affable, respectful professional collaboration. Both contributed to each other’s journals and participated in one another’s professional organisations. Hirschfeld was an active member of the Psychoanalytic

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Association and helped found the Berlin chapter of the Psychoanalytic Society in 1908. Freud was a member of the Institute for Sexual Sciences.

Freud openly acknowledged Hirschfeld’s achievements in sexology, despite their conceptual and methodological differences which became increasingly apparent over time. Freud’s *Three Essays* (1905) explicitly identified sexual intermediaries as existing in abundance, being “driven to conclude that we are dealing with a connected series (*Reihenbildung*)” (49) Yet, as earlier stated, though questioning ‘male’ and ‘female’ essence, Freud establishes and builds his psychoanalytical theories precisely on such binary oppositional mythological ‘foundations’ without assessing the potential consequences for psychoanalytic discourse.

“Psychoanalysis cannot elucidate the intrinsic nature of what in conventional or in biological phraseology is termed ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’: it simply takes over the two concepts and makes them the foundation of its work.” (*SE XVIII*, 171).

Freud’s adoption of binomial sexuality was a momentous theoretical decision when psychoanalytic discourse’s uncritical acceptance and undeconstructed proliferation of the myth of binary oppositional structures of male and female underwrites the unwarranted recognition of heterosexual teleology and thus proffers psychoanalytic sanctioning of its structural distribution of sexuality and power.

**Otto Weininger**

In 1901 Weininger, a doctoral student, approached Freud with his thesis *Geschlecht und Charakter* (*Sex/Gender and Character*), which left Freud unimpressed, recommending Weininger spend “ten years” gathering empirical evidence for his theses: “The world wants evidence, not thoughts”. Weininger retorted he would prefer to write ten other books in the next ten years. (Sengoopta, 2000:16-17).

Weininger, recognising Hirschfeld’s influence, treaded new ground claiming complete male-man or female-woman as non-real idealised abstractions. In *Geschlecht und Charakter* Weininger argues in accord with universal principles of natural transition,


Such sexual conditions should not be interpreted as mere “*bisexuelle Anlage*”, bisexual disposition, but a “dauernde Doppelgeschlechtlichkeit”, permanent double sexuality. (10)

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26 There are countless degrees of sexual intermediary forms between men and women. … And therefore there are all possible intermediaries between the perfect entire man and the perfect entire woman, ideal approximations that are never reached in nature.
However later in his book Weininger recanted this disavowal of binary opposition sex/gender: “Trotz allen sexuellen Zwischenformen ist der Mensch am Ende doch eines von beiden, entweder Mann oder Weib”\(^2\) (98). This restoration of either/or gender binary opposition structures is reached not through scientific argument, but metaphysics, with his thesis being that no matter how neither/nor double sexed the human body may be, metaphysically each human’s spirit should drive towards a single sex of man or woman. Thus Weininger does not merely reinstate but restitutes the ‘ideal’ validity of the man/woman binary opposition. Despite such metaphysical constrictions, Weininger is recognised as an early theoretician who assessed the relevancy of conceptualising biological sexuality within the framework of a spectrum of gendered identities.

**Freud and Fliess**

Weininger is significant in early psychoanalytic discourse for his part in the breakdown between Freud and Fliess, Freud’s early significant collaborator and confidante, whose correspondence Freud ordered to be destroyed after their split. On July 20\(^{th}\) 1904, Freud received a letter from Fliess who having read Weininger’s book pronounced:

“in the first biological part of which I find, to my consternation, a description on my ideas on bisexuality and the nature of sexual attraction consequent upon it ... I have no doubt that Weininger obtained knowledge of my ideas via you and misused someone else’s property. What do you know about it?” (Masson, 1985: 463)

Weininger not only corresponded with Freud but was good friends with Swoboda, an analysand of his. Fliess could not have been more cutting, rebuffing Freud’s subsequent equivocations of Weininger as a “burglar … who allegedly killed himself out of fear of his criminal nature” (464), and accuses Freud in his final ever letter to him “I developed for you an explanation which down to every detail corresponds to Weininger’s”. (465) Fliess subsequently published an angry pamphlet on Freud/Weininger’s plagiarism for which he was unsuccessfully sued for libel by Swoboda. (Sengoopta, 2000: 138)

With Fliess’s relationship over, plagiarism accusations and subsequent legal actions, all theorisation of sexual intermediaries and dual-natured bisexuality became anxious for Freud in the final preparations for publishing his already to be controversial *Three Essays*. Freud wrote to Hirschfeld who in 1906 published a vindication ‘Die gestohlene (stolen) Bisexualität’ in the *Wiener klinische Rundschau*. (n.8, 220) Freud also assured Fliess “At present I am finishing ‘Three Essays’ in which I avoid the topic of bisexuality as far as possible” though significantly says he cannot avoid this theory “in the explanation of sexual inversion” and “the homosexual current in neurotics” (Masson, 1985: 464)

\(^2\) Despite all sexual intermediary forms, people are in the end one of the two, either men or women.
Freud’s *Three Essays* specifically outline a literary review for his utilisation of bisexual discourse including Krafft-Ebing, Chevalier and Hirschfeld. (*SE VII*, 143) Later editions took more chances discussing bisexuality, and more suggestively distanced Hirschfeld’s sexual intermediary interpretations of natural bisexuality.

“Psycho-analytic research is most decidedly opposed to any attempt at separating off homosexuals from the rest of mankind as a group of special character.” (145)

Both the *Three Essays* and Freud’s own theorisations elaborated over subsequent years to maintain this male-female bi-dual-sexuality rather than explore the inferences against human gendered structures, readily recognised earlier. Hirschfeld however continued refining sexual-intermediary theories as natural/biological enabling a key discursive tool for social empowerment not only for homosexuals, but women. Freud eschewed such discourse, needing something original to distinguish his theories to avoid plagiarism scandals and traumatic associations with Fließ and Weininger’s *bisexual* theories.

Indeed such was Freud’s blind spot around Fließ that his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* evidences his parapraxis (Freudian slip) of forgetting knowledge in an illustration involving Fließ, bisexuality and Freud’s association with its originality/origins:

“One day in the summer of 1901 I remarked to a friend with whom I used at that time to have a lively exchange of scientific ideas (In the 1901 and 1904 editions Freud wrote this as ‘I remarked to my friend Fl. (Fließ), with whom I have a lively exchange’). ‘These problems of the neuroses are only to be solved if we base ourselves wholly and completely on the assumption of the original bisexuality of the individual.’ To which he replied: ‘That’s what I told you two and a half years ago at Breslau when we went for that evening walk. But you wouldn’t hear of it then.’ It is painful to be requested in this way to surrender one's originality. I could not recall any such conversation or this pronouncement of my friend’s. …In the course of the next week I remembered the whole incident, which was just as my friend had tried to recall it to me; I even recollected the answer I had given him at the time: ‘I’ve not accepted that yet; I’m not inclined to go into the question.’ But since then I have grown a little more tolerant when, in reading medical literature, I come across one of the few ideas with which my name can be associated, and find that my name has not been mentioned.” (*SE VI*, 144)

Hirschfeld in later editions of *Three Essays* and subsequent psychoanalytic writing is similarly tarred, his theories analogously misrepresented and blacklisted, with Freud again significantly reframing Hirschfeld’s *third-sex* discourse in 1910:

“Homosexual men, who have in our times taken vigorous action against the restrictions imposed by law on their sexual activity, are fond of representing themselves, through their theoretical spokesmen as being from the outset a distinct sexual species, as an intermediate stage, as a ‘third sex.’” (*SE XI*, 98)

In 1916 Freud again rails against homosexuals being depicted by their “scientific spokesperson” as a “special variety of the human species, a ‘third sex’.”

Through the mouth of their scientific spokesmen they represent themselves as a special variety of the human species – a ‘third sex’ which has the right to stand on
an equal footing beside the other two. .. Of course, they are not, as they also like to assert, an elite of mankind: there are at least as many inferior and useless individuals among them as there are among those of a different sexual kind.” (SE XVI, 304-5)

Such slurs on ‘scientific spokesmen’ pointedly refer to Hirschfeld, neglecting the reality that he never upheld Ulrichs’ specific discoursing of a separate third sex, instead utilising a discourse of natural bi-dual sexual intermediacy for all humans. Freud deliberately mistakes (another parapraxis?) Hirschfeld’s theories partly to distinguish psychoanalysis from sexological discourse, and partly to disassociate from certain interpretations of Hirschfeld’s person and theories post the Eulenburg Affair, opting to instead restore and reinforce the discourse of sexual binary-opposition upon which heterosexuality, and its power, prominence, ‘naturalness’ depends. In 1910 Freud says:

Far from wishing to exaggerate the importance of these explanations of the psychical genesis of homosexuality. It is quite obvious that they are in sharp contrast to the official theories of those who speak for homosexuals, but we know that they are not sufficiently comprehensive to make a conclusive explanation of the problem possible. What is for practical reasons called homosexuality may arise from a whole variety of psychosexual inhibitory processes; the particular process we have singled out is perhaps only one among many, and is perhaps related to only one type of ‘homosexuality’. (SE XI, 100-1)

But a 1919 footnote chooses to distinguish:

Psychoanalytic research has contributed two facts that are beyond question to the understanding of homosexuality, without at the same time supposing that it has exhausted the causes of this sexual aberration. The first is the fixation of the erotic needs on the mother which has been mentioned above; the other is contained in the statement that everyone, even the most normal person, is capable of making a homosexual object-choice, and has done so at some time in his life, and either still adheres to it in his unconscious or else protects himself against it by vigorous counter-attitudes. These two discoveries put an end both to the claim of homosexuals to be regarded as a ‘third sex’ and to what has been believed to be the important distinction between innate and acquired homosexuality.” (99)

The psychoanalytic discovery of narcissism allows Freud to finally put to rest the ghosts of Weininger, Fließ and Hirschfeld, to extricate his own original psychoanalytic theory for explaining homosexuality, freed of sexual intermediacy and bisexual dispositions, but one which restores and reinforces binary sexual oppositions of male/female (SE VII, 145).

The Eulenburg Affair

The Eulenburg Affair was a political scandal between 1907 and 1909 involving dominant headlines not merely concerning prominent government figures but about “abnormal sexuality”. For the first time in German history, the Eulenburg affair repeatedly and extensively pushed a ‘knowing’ of same-sex desire into German public discourse.

Just as previously stated ‘an Oscar’ became a euphemism for naming effeminacy and/or suspected homosexuality so Hirschfeld highlights “In Germany recently a man was found guilty of slander, who in a like manner called someone a ‘Eulenburg’” (2000: 58).
At the centre of the scandal were the figures of Phillip Eulenburg, Wilhelm II’s unofficial advisor and close friend who maintained a large influence over policy-making decisions; General von Moltke, an adjutant to the Kaiser and military commander of Berlin; and thirdly, Maximilian Harden, a prominent Jewish journalist, who had published a series of news articles alleging homosexual behaviour on the part of both Eulenburg and Moltke with other members of the Kaiser’s entourage. And into this cultural and political uproar Hirschfeld became a central character, when as the leading expert on ‘homosexuality’, he testified at Moltke’s trial that the Count was indeed ‘homosexual’. The Eulenburg Trials would specifically utilise, propagate and fasten the ‘homo-sexual’ discourse.

Throughout the 1890s Harden had felt the Kaiser lacked not only crucial leadership skills, but was severely irresponsible, arrogant, immature, and inept (Young, 1959: 56-7), and believed Eulenburg as chief advisor was having a detrimental influence on the Kaiser’s increasingly absolutist and impulsive rule; thus Harden continually sought to discredit Eulenburg and demand his resignation. (93) From 1906, Harden wrote politically motivated pieces in his Die Zukunft, alluding to the “abnormal inclinations” (90) of Eulenburg’s suspicious closeness to the Kaiser.

“He loves the Kaiser dearly; he lives only for the sight of him, how comforting is such enthusiastic attention! A trembling passes through the ranks when Phili’s name is heard. (90)

By November 1906, General Moltke was now also a target, with Harden describing Moltke’s relationship with Eulenburg as “perverse.” (99)

“He has provided for all his friends. One Moltke is Chief of the General Staff … musical, poetic, spiritualistic…and in their intercourse, oral and epistolary, of a touching intimacy. All this would be their private affair if they did not belong to the Kaiser’s closest circle.” (91)

Harden did not specifically pronounce Eulenburg homosexual but suggested his relationship with Moltke as suspiciously intimate through their associations with art and music, key signifiers in ‘homosexual’ discourse. Harden was not concerned with a homosexual witch hunt per se, but with Eulenburg’s “unhealthy” influence over the Kaiser. The administration’s responded with Eulenburg and Moltke temporarily forsaking their positions, only further fuelling media rumour. But again, a charge of libel brings everything to the fore with Moltke’s decision to sue Harden in October 1907, detonating national discourses on homo-sexuality for which the Affair would become infamous.

For Harden to defend the libel accusation, he had to prove Moltke’s homosexuality, and thus his legal team relied on the General’s ex-wife, Lili von Elbe’s testimony that “in two years of marriage, conjugal relations had occurred only on the first two nights; on the few
other nights they had shared a bed, Moltke had sometimes placed a pan of water between them to discourage her advances.” (Steakley, 1989: 241) She testified that Moltke addressed Eulenburg in overly demonstrative terms; “my soulmate, my old boy, my one and only cuddly bear;” and that both had referred to the Kaiser as their “darling”. (241) She once witnessed her husband with “a handkerchief left behind by Eulenburg warmly pressed to his lips, murmuring ‘Phili, my Phili.’” (241)

Drawing on von Elbe’s revelations about her husband, his asexual feelings towards her, his salient devotion to Eulenburg, his ‘sensitivity’ for the arts and on Hirschfeld’s own observations of Moltke “wearing women’s makeup” (343) while in court, Hirschfeld concluded the General indeed:

“If he felt that all women, and not only his wife, disgusted him, and thought the married state altogether undesirable, while he addressed some of his men friends with ‘my beloved’ and other tender terms, then I have no doubt of his psychological homosexuality.” (Wolff, 1986: 81)

Notably, Hirschfeld didn’t ‘out’ Moltke as homosexual but instead proffered he “must be considered a feminine man with abnormal sexual reactions” (Young, 1959: 104). He defined his sexuality as “psychological homosexuality” rather than practiced, centred on acts. Hirschfeld argued that from the descriptions of Moltke, his homosexuality could be presumed as an “unconscious orientation” only (Steakley, 1989: 242) with no evidence of crimes against Paragraph 175.

Hirschfeld thus presented homosexuality as psychological rather than acts or a personage, that someone could be unknowingly homosexual. In so identifying homosexuality, Hirschfeld perhaps hoped to destabilise the common image of homosexuality as predatory but as a “psychical disposition by no means rare, [inclining Moltke to] prefer ‘friendship of men’ to intimacy with women.” (Wolff, 1986: 71); a discursive twist not unlike Freud’s discourse of homosexual narcissism operating within homosocial relations.

The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation. It binds not only a person's narcissistic libido, but also a considerable amount of his homosexual libido, which is in this way turned back into the ego. (SE XIV, 101)

Such discursive testimonies, most especially Hirschfeld’s argument of “psychological homosexuality”, were reported and circulated throughout the media and culture. Harden was cleared from all libel charges but the Eulenburg Affair did not end there as Moltke appealed the decision and at the second trial, Frau von Elbe was discredited, forced to recant her previous testimony, so Hirschfeld whose analysis was based solely on her evidence had to retract his testimony and Harden was convicted for libel.
From prison Harden took Eulenburg to court claiming he had perjured himself in swearing he had never engaged in sexual activities with another man. In this Eulenburg-Harden trial, Harden presented witnesses detailing homosexual acts they had with Eulenburg, all again recounted and reported in the media, giving Germans their first candid descriptions on sexual relations and acts between men. This third trial was eventually postponed for ten years, by which point Eulenburg had died, though its effects and legacy continued.

Steakley argues the political cartoons of the Eulenburg Affair specifically echoed German anxieties around nationhood, virility and degeneracy:

“The representations provide vivid insights into the nation’s values, anxieties, and cultural norms, revealing that homophobia was yoked with anti-Semitism and antifeminism as a part of a broader antimodernist backlash that ultimately led to Germany’s entry into World War I.” (1989: 233)

The Eulenburg Affair ultimately moulded public perceptions of “the homosexual” fundamentally grounded on pre-existing discourses of effeminacy, wholly at odds with ideological notions of hyper-masculinity and virility central to the German/Prussian discourse of might and power. Homosexuality thus came to be positioned as ‘anti-German’ and traitorous, associated with the Napoleonic code. Harden’s language describing Eulenburg and Moltke highlighted their lack of Germanic masculinity positioning them thus as anti-patriotic, anti-German. Mosse’s *Nationalism & Sexuality* focuses on a German national consciousness which began to emerge in the wars of liberation against Napoleon, and further developed with unification in 1871:

“New ideals of manliness and virility destined to play a vital role in the development of ideas about sexuality and respectability spread the message that things Germanic were inseparable from middle-class morality. … The antithesis of abnormality could be found in the new national stereotypes…Manliness meant freedom from sexual passion, the sublimination of sensuality into leadership of society and the nation.” (1985: 7)

Throughout the scandal’s trials the image of the effeminate homosexual was repeatedly reinforced and propagated through the media into a greater definitive ‘truth’.

Hirschfeld’s motivation for assisting Harden was because he favoured Paragraph 175’s abolition though his writings nonetheless disseminated the same standard stereotypes of homosexuals as “mawkish,” “unmanly,” “sickly” and “weak”, (Harden: vol. 61, 185) Harden emphasised these stereotypes in his court statements: “I cannot recognise the equality of homosexual persons in every direction…They almost always have the unpleasant sides…of femininity.” (Hull, 1982: 135) In September 1907 he wrote,

“Their character is mostly weak, suggestible, dependent…undependability, lack of veracity, tendency to boastfulness, and petty jealously are typical vices. The man
becomes feminine in his movements, walk, bearing, taste. He shows a sickly sweet, fragile essence, becomes vain, flirtatious, lays much worth on externals, clothes himself with care (again narcissism!!!) ... writes tender letters on perfumed paper... etc. There is not a slightest doubt that contrary sexual tendencies develop from the foundation of degenerate personality.” (134)

Through press coverage the public accessed not only courtroom events, but the ‘nature’ of homosexuality as its identity/image is discoursed and ‘seen’ for the first time. Because “abnormal sexuality” had never been so publically discoursed there was no pre-existing public German image of the homosexual. Harden’s portrayals of ‘the homosexual’ as overly-feminine, “unmanly”, which both nationalist political discourse and indeed scientific discourse were invested, were eagerly embraced, propagated and legitimised. Ironically Hirschfeld’s scientific theories were being used against him and like-kind men when Hirschfeld’s undertaking “to enlighten the public on that subject of the ‘Intermediate Sex,’ in the hope of removing a widespread prejudice and subject of this judgment.” (Blasius & Phelan, 1997: 139) Hirschfeld believed increased awareness and education would allow greater public tolerance of homosexuality. Believing the trial’s high profile would reach a large audience who would recognise the ‘legitimised’ platform within the legal discourse was inevitably why he agreed to act as an ‘expert’ witness.

The difficulty with Hirschfeld’s testimony was that three markers of homosexuality are outlined as main tenets of his scientific theories: Firstly homosexuality is identified through signifiers of effeminacy. Secondly, it continued to be defined as abnormal and/or deviant. And thirdly, and most significantly from a psychoanalytic point of view, the idea that homosexuality could be an unconscious condition.

Like Freud, Hirschfeld believed homosexuality was a psychological condition, deviating from normal heterosexuality, but nonetheless naturally occurring. Both upheld homosexuality as neither produced through behaviour, nor perverted from outside forces, and had nothing to do with an individual’s choice. However both Freud and Hirschfeld were bound within discourses where however ‘natural’ they upheld homosexuality, they nonetheless ascribed it in terms of abnormality and deviance in their writings and in Hirschfeld’s. Hirschfeld’s courtroom testimony of a homosexual as a “feminine man with abnormal sexual reactions,” (Young, 1959: 104) only supports and propagates the image of the homosexual as effeminate, deviant, unnatural and unpatriotic.

Hirschfeld “naively hoped to advance the cause of enlightened tolerance, but the court’s verdict had precisely the opposite effect.” (Steakley, 1989: 251) Though the first trial considered Moltke a homosexual and Harden thus not guilty of libel, the immediate media
backlash unreservedly condemned the trial’s outcome. The idea that the testimonies of a hysterical ex-wife and a “pseudo-scientist” now circulating throughout the nation staining Moltke’s, and the German Volk’s honour and name was unbearable. The original judgment was directly annulled and the District Attorney Isenbiel ordered a second trial.

Just as Freud’s notion of unconscious sexual desires would subvert and threaten society, so the media whipped into a frenzy to denigrate Hirschfeld’s and his “pseudo-science” of unconscious, effeminate homosexuals. On November 7, 1907, the prominent national Die Vossische Zeitung portrayed [Hirschfeld] as a freak who acted for freaks in the name of pseudo-science.” (Wolff, 1986: 73) Die Deutsche Zeitung and Die National-Zeitung printed identical criticisms of Hirschfeld, stating reproachfully:

We are of the opinion that the scientific method of Dr Magnus Hirschfeld is more madness than method. We do not know what motivates him to make such statements which must be considered dangerous for the community. Dr Hirschfeld’s attitude towards homosexuality is a constant source of disturbance. (73)

The comparatively liberal Die Münchener Neusten Nachrichten recognised the potential discursive power in Hirschfeld’s pseudoscience and demanded ‘legitimate’ science intercede: “Dr Hirschfeld makes public propaganda under the cover of science which does nothing else but poison our people. Real science should fight against this.” (73)

“The overt demonisation of Hirschfeld’s sexological theories and the characterisation of his work as a poisonous force that endangered ‘the community’, and ‘our people’ in the media presumed a distinct demarcation between ‘German people’ and the homosexual population who were portrayed and understood (by Hirschfeld himself too) as sexually abnormal.” (Butler, 2009: 20)

Even more socialist newspapers who recognised aspects of Hirschfeld’s theorisation such as ‘natural drive’ discourse, still employed degeneration and decay discourse to argue homosexuality as not exclusively inborn, but a corrupting vice acquired/spread through deviant behaviour, thus threatening the nation at its very roots.

What does the Moltke vs. Harden trial say about the psychological make-up of these men? It shows us irreparable degeneracy. A flight from the mind into the mists of mysticism, a degeneration of feeling and of sexuality into the abnormal…We are opponents of the punishment of homosexual love, because it indeed is an irresistible, natural drive in many cases. But that cannot close our eyes to the fact that beyond the inborn there is also the acquired type, or let us say an artificial type, which is the product of decay. (quoted in Hekma et al., 1995: 137)

Such discourse hangs on the critical binary oppositions which dominate discursive practices and images of male homosexuality: the abnormal threatening the normal; the deviant menacing the pure; and the effeminate subverting the masculine.

In the second trial Frau von Elbe’s original testimony regarding Moltke’s relationship with Eulenburg was argued by the prosecution as “hysterical” evidence, marking how
‘proper’ scientific discourse is manoeuvred against threats to patriarchal supremacy. Her “confused and contradictory testimony had to be discounted.” (Young, 1959: 106-7) thus Hirschfeld had to retract his arguments on Moltke’s “unconscious homosexuality”.

Hirschfeld’s retraction evidenced to the German press/public just how “pseudo” his scientific theories were. His position as a scientific authority, continued to diminish, as criticisms of him persisted in the German press.

“Intimidated by the about-face in public opinion and the obvious direction of the proceedings, Hirschfeld was reduced to a national laughingstock when he formally retracted his initial forensic opinion, feebly asserting that it had been predicated on the assumed truth of Elbe’s testimony.” (Steakley, 1989: 241)

Hirschfeld described his own experience from the Moltke-Harden trials:

The terrible aggression the homosexuals were exposed to during the last year was transferred on to me with pointed acrimony, on to me who had made the subject of these persecuted people my own task. I was exposed to poisonous invectives of such a kind I had not thought possible after my long period of scientific research, and the many tasks I have undertaken on their behalf. I was even more hurt by the bad results of my work than the personal grief it caused me. (Wolff, 1986: 80)

He implicated the German government’s reaction to the trials as mirroring the media’s, taking especial offence to Belzer of the Catholic Centre Party’s insinuation that the healthy state of the nation was being victimised by homosexuals, whom he defined ‘sick’:

Today, it is nearly more proper than ever to condemn homosexual tendencies and to expose the guilty parties to public contempt, even the sick persons who have manly tendencies (and anyway, they may not be as numerous as the petition would have us believe); after all, in popular sentiment there is the firm belief that those kinds of people are not worthy of respect. (Hirschfeld, 2000:1097)

Though such homosexual discourse might fill “the entire German people with revulsion and loathing” (Steakley, 1989: 246) both governmental and media anxiety was that

“many hundreds and thousands of people who earlier hadn’t the foggiest notion of the things now being discussed in public will, after having been enlightened about these things, be tempted to try them out with their own bodies.” (256)

This Steakley recognises as evidencing Foucault’s argument of discursive practices:

“With rare directness, this politician’s remark points to what Foucault described as the nub of sexual politics: ‘the fact that sex is located at the point of intersection of the discipline of the body and the control of the population.” (256)

Both trials’ aftermath led to a severe delegitimisation and loss of authority for Hirschfeld and his efforts to decriminalise homosexuality. Hirschfeld’s utilisation of medical theories as his main weapon to fight for the abolition of Paragraph 175 was disparaged.

Hirschfeld’s preoccupation with proving scientifically that homosexuality was a biological phenomenon and that the psychological makeup of [homosexuals] differed from that of ‘normal men’ linked him with contemporary psychiatrists. It was exactly this supposed continuity between medical explanations of
homosexuality and Hirschfeld’s biological approach that was the bone of contention for Adolf Brand and the other authors of Der Eigene. (Oosterhuis, 1991: 8)

Paradoxically, Hirschfeld’s unrelenting emphasis on effeminacy as a definitive characteristic of homosexuality, is taken up and disseminated further into a cultural truth.

Friedländer stated plainly:

“As long as the love for a male being is presented as a specific and exclusively feminine characteristic—something that applies to non-social creatures, to be sure, but not to highly social human beings—it will not help to deny sickness: there remains an unavoidable image of a partial hermaphrodite, that is, a kind of psychic malformation.” (Blasius and Phelan, 1997: 155)

In essence, Brand and Friedländer rejected the medical categorisation of homosexuality as effeminate, promoting homosexuality in terms of male culture and virility. “The love of one man for another was for them, not a matter of biology, but of culture.” (ibid) Like Hirschfeld’s media and government critics, Brand and Friedländer believed that feminine homosexuals did not embody genuine German virtues, most importantly masculinity. In condemning Hirschfeld, they and their supporters effectively aligned their notions of homosexuality with German nationalism. Refuting this homo-sexual grounded in effeminacy, and subsequently promoting a strong, virile homosexual community and culture marked this ideological break within the early homosexual rights movement.

The Reichstag considered petitions for Paragraph 175’s abolition for the final time in December 1907. In the wake of the Eulenburg Affair and the spread of an image of homosexuality which emphasised abnormal effeminacy, thus threatening the masculine virtues of German culture and nation, the Reichstag was

“more than ever convinced that homosexuality must be punished and, if possible, eradicated, as it weakened the courage and self-confidence of the German people.” (Wolff, 1986: 84)

The number of convictions under the same-sex provisions of Paragraph 175 increased nearly fifty percent in the aftermath of the scandal. “In the five-year span 1903-1907, the annual average was 363 convictions; the average rose to 542 in the years 1909-1913.” (Steakley, 1989: n84) Additionally, after the trials, a greater percentage of military officers were convicted of homosexual conduct, resulting in a number of those men committing suicide. (239)

**Conclusion**

Like Wilde’s trials, the Eulenburg Trials further culturally propagated the term homosexuality, creating discursive visibilities but with the added contingency of the direct involvement of Hirschfeld, carefully watched by Freud and the early psychoanalysts who post-Eulenburg, would increasingly turn, not only against Hirschfeld’s intermediate
discourse for sexualities, but against Hirschfeld himself who Freud wrote in 1911 left “our ranks in Berlin. No great loss, he is a flabby, unappetizing fellow, absolutely incapable of learning anything.” (Mc Guire, 1974: 453)

Ominously psychoanalytic theories regarding homosexuality came to dominate and lent themselves to nationalist homophobic rhetoric. Strathman, a deputy of the German National People’s Party (DNVP), which would later merge with the Nazis, discredited Hirschfeld’s theory of inborn homosexuality as a suspect cult, using as support quotes from Adler and Placzek’s psychoanalytic theories of homosexuality.

These emerging German Nazis armed themselves with such psychoanalytic discoveries to further regulate and criminalise the practice of homosexuality. Strathman argued that as psychoanalysis maintained people’s natural bisexuality, then all the more necessity to safeguard the general heterosexual population from homosexual corruption. Any tolerance of homosexuality, especially in 1920s Berlin, was evidence of a cultural and biological degeneracy the Nazis were determined to utilise and stamp out, as the following conduit into the next section of the thesis outlines.
First Conduits: The Gay 1940s

“Dort, wo man Bücher verbrennt, verbrennt man am Ende auch Menschen”: “Where they burn books, they will eventually also burn people.” Heinrich Heine Almansor

“The homosexual is a traitor to his own people and must be rooted out. Like stinging nettles we will rip them out, throw them on a heap, and burn their exterminating abnormal existence”
(Himmler quoted in Plant, 1986: 99)

Summary

One definite and definitive legacy of the degenerative discourses in naming homosexuals as pathologically sick, criminal and perverse is the Nazi holocaust of gay men that took place with full European-wide complicity, not only throughout the war, but after, as ‘homosexuals’ were inimitably re-imprisoned following their 1945 ‘liberation’, and denied any victim compensation or recognition until well over fifty years later. Within ‘degenerate’ discourse, homosexual prisoners were experimented on as having something wrong with their testicles, their masculinity, their maleness, ideas that persist and endure in cultural value, especially within gay-cure discourses that contentiously remain.

Identifying Minorities

There is a long history of Jews having to visibly demarcate themselves from ‘normal’ European populations through wearing different insignia dating to Innocent III’s 1215 declaration that “Jews of both sexes in every Christian province at all times shall be marked off in the eyes of the public from other peoples through the character of their dress.” (Fourth Lateran Council, Canon 68)

Nazi occupied territories forced Jews to sew a yellow Star of David onto their clothes when in public, for immediate recognition. Not for Nazi or police authorities but so ‘ordinary’ people could ‘see’ their difference and police that difference accordingly. Medieval Jewish insignia were generally coloured blue or red. The Nazi choice of yellow could infer discourses of stolen Jewish gold, or yellow cowardice in the humiliating Treaty of Versailles. Two memes of anti-Semitic prejudice that discursively persist.

The Nazi’s Pink Triangle was the insignia homosexual prisoners had to wear, again, not to necessarily identify the prisoners, but their crimes. To make homosexuals more readily distinguishable they were an inch larger than the yellow stars worn by Jews or red triangles worn by political prisoners. It is not a discursive leap that this insignia and colour were chosen, when pink as the feminine associated colour
discursively brands a homosexual’s effeminacy. Could the triangle, somehow
discursively relate to ‘third sex’ discourse, Ulrichs’ and Hirschfeld’s arguments of like-
kind desire being a medium/third point place within binary sexual oppositions?

Hitler’s hatred for Berlin’s liberalism, as well as his determination to rebrand Nazism
from Rohm’s SA and appease the German generals, saw his persecution of homosexuality
begin within a month of becoming Chancellor. The elimination and banning of gay
venues, groups and publications in Germany began in February 1933.

May 6th 1933 saw the Nazi Student
movement attack Hirschfeld’s Institute of
Sex Research, publicly burning over
20,000 books and journals, and 5,000
images. They also seized the Institute’s
extensive lists of names and addresses of
clients, subscribers and supporters.

Under Nazism, from 1933, an estimated 100,000 men were arrested as homosexual, an
estimated 15,000 of those incarcerated in the first Nazi concentration camps. In 1934,
soon after the Night of the Long Knives purge, a special Gestapo division was instituted
to compile lists of gays who under Himmler’s Reichszentrale zur Bekämpfung der
Homosexualität und Abtreibung (Reich Central Office for the Combating of
Homosexuality and Abortion) were compelled to sexually conform to the ‘German norm’.
The legacy of a traitorous degeneracy discourse continued with homosexuals located
against the Nazi plan of creating a ‘master race’. “This imbalance of two million
homosexuals...has upset the sexual balance sheet of Germany, and will result in a
catastrophe.” (Himmler quoted in Burleigh & Wippermann, 2003: 192)

Geoffrey (2002) outlines prosecutions where judges could be swayed by evidence
demonstrating the homosexual accused’s “Aryan-ness” or “manliness”. Under Himmler,
homosexuals were given an opportunity to undergo “renunciation tests”, but even if they
“passed” and succeeded in fucking the prostitutes provided, they were not released. Gay
men who would not ‘convert’ and ‘prove’ their ‘manliness’ were either castrated and/or
sent to concentration camps under the ‘Extermination Through Work’ campaign.28

“We must exterminate these people root and branch. Just think how many children
will never be born because of this, and how a people can be broken in nerve and
spirit when such a plague gets hold. ... the homosexual must be entirely eliminated.”
(Himmler quoted in Plant, 1986: 99)

Homosexuals were sent to Level 3 camps where chances for survival were already low, disregarding that homosexuals were treated distinctly cruelly. We cannot know how many of the 15,000 eventually perished in the camps, but Lautmann (1975) estimates their death rate as being as high as 60%. Homosexuals were also subjected to medical experiments to ‘cure’ their effeminacy, including castration, and gonadal transplantation. At Buchenwald, Nazi doctors claimed to have developed an artificial male sex hormone used on homosexual inmates, despite never ‘curing’ only killing. At Auschwitz Dr. Vaernet surgically inserted testosterone to rid homosexual tendencies. Such medical abuses were never cited at the Nuremburg Trials and none of the Nazi doctors involved were ever prosecuted. Vaernet was actually aided in his escape to Argentina by the British claiming the importance of continuing his research into ‘curing’ homosexuals. (Tatchell, 2015)

After the camps’ ‘liberation’ homosexuals were the only class of concentration camp survivors to be re-imprisoned to complete their sentences regardless of time spent in concentration camps, and held on ‘sex offenders’ lists. Homosexual survivors were excluded from financial compensations for victims of the Nazi regime. No SS-man ever stood trial for the murder of a homosexual man inside or outside the camps. And these same SS men would enjoy the pension rights for their ‘work’ in the camps, while homosexual survivors had their time in incarceration taken off their pension earning income.

Commandant of Auschwitz, Hoess’s autobiography notes that “It was often not easy to drive them to the gas chambers”, that many homosexuals in the camps formed deep and lasting relationships:

“You should one of these lose his ‘friend’ through sickness, or perhaps death, then the end could at once be foreseen. Many would commit suicide, To such natures, in such circumstances, the ‘friend’ meant everything.” (quoted in Rector, 1981: 138)

Nazis took implications of ‘homosexual’ discourse to the limit, where effeminate degeneracy must be cured, incarcerated, exterminated, a discourse sustained beyond Nazism, within pathologising psychoanalytic/cultural discourses which Lacan, significantly acted counter to, fairly inimitably noting the ‘love’ and ‘nobility’ such like-kind desiring men could act in and from.
Section Three

A Terrible Beauty is Borne
Chapter Eight:

“Metamorphosis of Narcissus”:
Dalí’s Paranoid Doubling with Freud and Lacan

"We resembled each other like two drops of water, but we had different reflections, he was probably a first version of myself but conceived too much in the absolute." (Dalí, 1993, 3)

"Wo es war, Soll ich werden." Where it was, I am to become. (Freud, SE XXII: 80)

Paranoid phenomena are well-known images with a double figuration—the figuration can be multiplied theoretically and practically everything hinges on the paranoid capacity of the author. Different spectators see different images in the same painting; the realisation is scrupulously realistic. (Dalí quoted in Bosquet, 2003: 62)

Chapter Synopsis:

Freud’s 1922 ‘Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality’ moved psychoanalytic discourse outside narcissism as the structuring bedrock for homosexuality, naming another common homo-structuring as within paranoid neurosis. This was Freud’s first paper Lacan officially translated in 1932 just as his doctoral research, utilising Freud’s theories, investigated homo-doublings and homo-sexuality within paranoid structures, delusions and manifestations. As Freud homogenises ‘neurosis’, indeed universalising ‘homosexual’ unconscious wishes, so Lacan normalises paranoid delusions, as not ‘false’ meanings but ‘personal’ meanings, “psychical functions of representation” (1975: 291). Both Freud and Lacan would attract the attention of Dalí, precisely because of these theorisations on paranoia, narcissism, ideal-egos, with not a little sublimated homosexuality being named and signified. In many ways, Dalí painted these psychoanalytic convergences, in his Metamorphosis of Narcissus, which was consciously and unconsciously motivated by his own questions, paranoia and sexuality.

When Dalí Met Freud

1922’s first Spanish translation of The Interpretation of Dreams kindled Salvador Dalí into a fanatical Freudian enthusiast: “It presented as one of the capital discoveries in my life, and I was seized with a real vice of self-interpretation, not only of my dreams but of everything that happened to me, however accidental it might seem at first glance.” (Dalí, 1993: 167) In June 1938 upon reading in Paris of Freud’s flee from the Nazi occupation of Austria to London, Dalí, who had thrice already attempted to see Freud, wrote to a recent admirer Zweig asking...
to meet Freud. Zweig arranged the visit for July 19th 1938, describing Dalí to Freud as:

“the only painter of genius in our epoch … he is the most faithful and most grateful disciple of your ideas among the artists” and “For years it has been the desire of this real genius to meet you. He says that he owes to you more in his art than to anybody else, and therefore will bring his last, and, as it seems to me, his most beautiful picture to your home.” (Brown, 2012: 295)

As Dalí spoke neither German nor English, and Freud had, not only no Spanish, but increasing deafness, they spoke little, yet Dalí described the encounter as a visual indulgence: “We devoured each other with our eyes.” The painting Dalí brought for Freud was his *Metamorphosis of Narcissus*, inspiring Freud’s remark to Zweig:

“I was inclined to regard the Surrealists who seem to have adopted me as their patron saint – as 100 per cent fools (or let’s rather say, as with alcohol, 95 per cent). This young Spaniard, with his ingenuous fanatical eyes, and his undoubtedly technically perfect mastership, has suggested to me a different estimate. In fact, it would be very interesting to explore analytically the growth of a picture like this.” (295)

Dalí defined this meeting as one of his most important experiences, forcing him to reconsider his view of surrealism. He quoted Freud to Breton, surrealism’s founder.

“in the paintings of the Old Masters one immediately tends to look for the unconscious, whereas when one looks at a Surrealist painting, one immediately has the urge to look for the conscious” which Dalí interpreted as “a death sentence on Surrealism as a doctrine, as a sect, as an ‘ism’, while simultaneously confirming the movement’s validity as a ‘state of spirit’.” (295)

Breton himself, having worked with shell shocked soldiers during World War One, was deeply interested in Freudian discourse and techniques, and visiting Freud at Berggasse in 1921 led to a subsequent correspondence and a debt acknowledged in both his first Surrealist Manifesto and naming his surrealist Paris gallery Gradiva after Freud’s essay.

“We must give thanks to Freud for his discoveries. On the basis of his research, a current of opinion is at last flowing, by means of which the explorer of humanity will be able to push his investigations much further, authorized as he will be to take account of more than merely superficial realities.” (Breton, 2007:10)

**Dalí and Freud’s Paranoia**

Dalí acknowledged surrealism as the only “adequate outlet for [his] activity” (Dalí, 1993: 250-51) but criticised surrealist practices such as automatic writing, as “a genuinely passive state”, advocating more his active “paranoiac-critical method of interpretation” (Dalí, 1998: 95), fashioned after the paranoid patient’s unwavering personal system of interpreting reality which structures them alone uniquely. Dalí recognised paranoia as an alternative parallel mental processing, being closer to its original ancient Greek meaning, formed through παρά meaning ‘beside’ and νους ‘mind’. (*OED*)

Dalí and Freud both reject psychiatry’s definition/dismissal of paranoia as ‘madness’, ‘irrational’, thus socially unacceptable. Freud discoursed paranoia in his Schreber Case’
as the ‘paranoid’ unconscious structuring the interpretation of perceived objects through projecting onto the external world unconscious undesirable phantasies. Through analysing Schreber’s own language, Freud argues his paranoia not an illness as such, but actually an “attempt at recovery”, evidencing an attempt by his paranoid ego to re-connect to reality through its integration with a fictional world. (SE XII, 209).

Significantly, Freud deemed repressed homosexuality as the cause of paranoid psychosis, regression to the early libidinal stage of narcissism consequently withdraws libido from the external world attaching to the narcissistic ego. (196-219) Despite Freud’s theorisation on narcissism being the bedrock upon which homosexuality comes to be in/formed within/by psychoanalytic theory, his last major contribution to the subject, 1922’s paper, ‘Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality’ recognises a wider discoursing of varying subjects, than a generic species:

“I never regarded this analysis of the origin of homosexuality as complete, and I now point to a new mechanism leading to homosexual object-choice” (SE XVIII: 231)

This “new mechanism” was the operation of paranoia in neurotic homosexuality, a form of homo-sexuality that need not be exclusive, as later heterosexual object are still quite possible. Freud’s arguing of paranoia having a common structuring that in/forms homosexual desires and anxieties not only opens up the closet door that little bit wider in implicating homosexuality within other neurotic mechanisms, but also recognises narcissism as not explaining all Homo-sexualities.

This theory differs significantly from his other homo-sexual theories as being without either an identification with the mother and a fear of female genitals caused by castration anxiety, or involving a narcissistic object choice. It begins with an intense love for the mother, leading to jealousy of “great intensity” towards rivals, brothers and the father that mobilises hostility and death wishes towards them. But these “impulses yielded to repression and underwent transformation” into “the first homosexual love objects”. (231) Freud sees such defence “reaction formations” as the inverse of the process by which passive homosexual love is transformed into persecutory or delusional paranoia. In this latter case, explored in Schreber’s case, the unbearable homosexual impulse, “I love him”, is transformed by negation into “I hate him”, and then rationalised through projection into “He hates me”, so that paranoia keeps the subject from becoming homosexual.

Freud accounts this theory of homosexuality in their “special development of their social instinctual impulses and by their devotion to the community” (232) This argument of “social feeling as a sublimation of homosexual attitudes towards objects” (232) implicates
all homosocial groupings and activities, as well as all homoerotic pleasure derived from sport, culture and the arts; homologating that these homonyms homosexuality, homosociality and homoeroticism have perhaps a far stronger homogenous and homologous homomorphic nature than either analyst or analysand may wish to face. Or aren’t there a lot of homo-structurings in the clinical picture underlining social structures and varying erotic, social and sexual desires? Something that will be returned to later in considering Lacan’s socialisation of desire.

**Metamorphosis of Narcissus**

The painting Dalí presented Freud signifiies something Dalí wanted to communicate to Freud about Freud, about psychoanalysis, and most importantly perhaps, about Dalí’s desire vis-à-vis Freud himself; something in relation to his and the Other’s desire. Dalí is of course aware, not only of the metamorphosis of Narcissus by psychoanalytic discourse, but how psychoanalysis metamorphosed discourse around sexuality, desire, libido and paranoia. For Dali, psychoanalysis’s recognition of the ‘double’ was critical not only for his art, but for his very self.

The *Metamorphosis of Narcissus* doubles, not only the figure of Narcissus on the left looking at this reflection in the body of water, echoed with the image of the outreaching hand holding an egg from which a narcissus flower is emerging; but Dalí’s very canvas was also doubled with a poem written to accompany his painting. (Dali, 1937) Like mirroring like; language augmenting art; signifiers doubling the image, this first work Dalí ascribed as being painted in his paranoid, critical interpretive methodology.

Dalí’s accompanying poem metamorphacly doubling his Narcissus, explicitly calls the group of people in the mid-space between the dual Narcissus forms as ‘the heterosexuals’:

> “Already the heterosexual group, in the renowned poses of preliminary expectation, conscientiously ponders over the threatening libidinous cataclysm, the carnivorous blooming of its latent morphological atavisms.” (1937)

The Narcissus figure is significantly described as “Far from the heterosexual group”; separate, excluded marginalised, different. There are two Narcissus but only one group, a heterosexual one, as if being your own subject demands separation from the group, the ‘heterosexuals’?
Why would/did Dalí choose this signifier ‘heterosexual’ to designate this group drawn in opposition to Narcissus? They are only mentioned following a description of “the germination of the narcissi”, a propagation “from which rise” the reproducing narcissus, “erect, tender, and hard”. Marginalised as it may be from the ‘heterosexuals’, this “erect, tender, and hard” Narcissus is well capable of generation, reproduction, fertility, desire.

The doubling poem describes the lake Narcissus leans over as “the obscure mirror” in which his own body “fixes itself, frozen, in the silvered and hypnotic curve of his desire”. Within this mirrored, obscured desire “Narcissus loses his being in the cosmic vertigo in the deepest depth of his own image.” Within this mirroring “The body of Narcissus flows out and loses itself in the abyss of his reflection”. Dalí warns “Narcissus, you are losing your body, carried away and confounded by the millenary reflection of your disappearance your body stricken dead, your white body, swallowed up.” (1937)

This notion of Narcissus’s mirroring as a location where the body is seen and lost, where the price of confronting desire is loss, the mirror as place where we find ourselves only to be metamorphosed into a being, alienated, lost, dead, swallowed up. All of this prefigures some of the dynamics and movements of Lacan’s Mirror Stage, the original version of which was delivered at Marienbad in 1936, the very year Dalí begins this painting and which will be the subject of the following chapter.

1936: The Year It All Began – And Ended

“You’re well aware that the profound structure of my personality is binary: I’m double-headed and twofold. There are two Dalí’s.” (Bosquet, 2003: 15)

1936 was also the year in which Lorca, Dalí’s great ‘friend’, fellow artist and love was assassinated by right wing nationalists a month after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Lorca and Dalí met at the Residencia de Estudiantes, a prestigious institution in Madrid which fostered an intellectual, creative milieu for Spain’s emerging young thinkers and artists. Theirs (right) was an intense and passionate relationship, construed by Dalí in 1969 as:

“He was homosexual, as everyone knows, and madly in love with me. He tried to screw me twice .... I was extremely annoyed, because I wasn’t homosexual, and I wasn’t interested in giving in. Besides, it hurts. So nothing came of it. But I felt awfully flattered vis-à-vis the prestige. Deep down, I felt that he was a great poet and that I did owe him a tiny bit of the Divine Dalí’s asshole. He eventually bagged a young girl, and she replaced me in the sacrifice. Failing to get me to put my ass at his disposal, he swore that the girl’s sacrifice was matched by his own: it was the first time he had ever slept with a woman.” (19-20)
Dalí forever performed, and part of that performance is to rewrite history, his story, and Lorca is undoubtedly a part of this rewriting. One can read and interpret for themselves the ‘nature’ of Lorca and Dalí’s relationship from their many letters. In 1928 Dalí wrote: “I love you for what your book reveals you to be”, believing Lorca can “produce witty, horrifying…intense, poetic things such as no other poet could”. (Stainton, 1999: 192-3)

Soon after they became estranged, with little information about what caused their separation, undoubtedly the fear and discomfort around their feelings for one another which both struggled with differently, contributed. Although by 1925 Lorca identified his love for Dalí as homosexual, he suffered greatly in his awareness of his desires being labelled by Church and State as “perverse”, as well as his own personal fear of sex (138). Dalí similarly was “obsessed by Lorca, but troubled by this obsession” (166). Allegedly, Buñuel “was appalled by the intensity of Dalí’s attachment to Lorca” (Maurer, 2005: 16), and Maurer significantly locates Buñuel’s disgust with Dalí’s love, not the ‘out’ Lorca. Dalí refers to both himself and Lorca as St. Sebastians throughout his letters, and in one such letter remarks, “Didn’t you ever think how strange it is that his ass doesn’t have a single wound?” before finishing with his usual, “I love you very much” (62).

Whatever the ‘nature’ of their relationship, Dalí’s 1969 comments are interesting in his identifying Lorca as homosexual, while refuting his own desire, though significantly using the past and not the present tense: “because I wasn’t homosexual”. He arrogantly is flattered by Lorca’s attention, but significantly again associates this/his/homosexual desire with anal sex, but with Lorca as penetrator, himself as recipient: “He tried to screw me twice .... I did owe him a tiny bit of the Divine Dalí’s asshole … Failing to get me to put my ass at his disposal”. (Bosquet, 2003: 19) However their sexuality was or was not enacted, Dalí significantly perceives his own desire vis-à-vis Lorca’s as a “giving in” and seems to have an awareness that this desire demands painful “sacrifice” whether involving anal sex or not: “Besides, it hurts.”

Dalí references an event when Lorca “bagged a young girl, and she replaced me in the sacrifice” (20) Dalí himself participated by being present in the room and voyeuristically watching Lorca’s first sexual act with a woman. Dalí views the object of his desire sacrifice himself to the heterosexuals. Again there is a doubling, both participating, one actively, the other narcissistically; both bound in the desire of the Other.
Another defining relationship of Dalí’s was his relationship to his own older brother, also named Salvador who had died of gastroenteritis two months before he turned two, and nine months before Dalí was born. In other words, Dalí was conceived in his parents’ grief at the loss of their first born son. His brother’s loss was in his own conception; his brother’s name, memory and identity, waited for him at this birth; given his dead brother’s name, clothes to wear and toys to play with.

When he was five, Dalí was brought to his brother’s grave and there told by his parents he was his brother’s reincarnation, something Dalí came to believe, and incorporate, saying of his brother, “(we) resembled each other like two drops of water, but we had different reflections … (he) was probably a first version of myself but conceived too much in the absolute.” (Dalí, 1993, 3) This written in 1942, following his Metamorphosis of Narcissus, evoking his brother in water, in reflections, in the mirror.

The mirror image/identity of Dalí’s long-dead brother repeatedly reappeared embedded in various works throughout his life, most ominously in 1963’s Portrait of My Dead Brother. Painted when he was 59, the image is clearly not of a two year old but a much older boy, whose hair morphs into a crow, a harbinger of death. Dalí continually spoke of his challenge to establish his own identity in order to free himself from his parents’ inevitable and persistent comparisons with the deceased and therefore idealised sibling.

Dalí continually asserted his parents wanting him to be a replacement for his dead brother, a spectre which affected and indeed threatened him, compelling him, he maintained, to cultivate his eccentric behaviour, what he identifies as “dandyism” in order to establish, indeed prove that he was different from the first, perhaps better-loved version of Salvador Dalí. The group of lance bearing conquistadors in the bottom right of the painting could evoke Dalí’s desire to dispel and vanquish his brother’s enduring memory that continued to overshadow him. Dalí said of this double/twin/brother:

“Every day, I kill the image of my poor brother, with my hands, with kicks, and with dandyism. Today, I made him take flowers to the cemetery. He is my dark God, for he and I are Pollux and Castor; I am Pollux, the immortal twin, and he is the mortal one. I assassinate him regularly for the “Divine Dalí” cannot have anything in common with this former terrestrial being.” (17-18)
The double/mirror is a threat, Dali maintains himself in performing/becoming highly unique, an original, the original and part of that maintaining him-self and ‘killing’ his brother is performed/lived through dandyism, which, as argued previously, has its own connotations and discursive alignments with sameness, homo-sexuality and narcissism.

In the lower left of Dali’s painting is a variation of Millet’s famous, The Angelus, which long obsessed Dali, being continually repeated throughout his oeuvre. This was because Dali believed Millet had originally painted the couple bowing over the coffin of their dead child rather than as they are in the finished version praying over a basket of potato crop. Although a very unpopular view, at Dali’s insistence, the Louvre x-rayed the painting, to indeed reveal a small coffin over-painted by the basket.

**The Double and The Paranoiac Critical Method**

[t]he attainment of … a double image has been made possible thanks to the violence of the paranoiac thought which has made use, with cunning and skill, of the required pretexts, coincidences, and so on, taking advantage of them so as to reveal the second image, which, in this case, supersedes the obsessive idea. (Dali 1998: 224)

Dali’s 1930 essay “The Rotting Donkey” outlined his paranoiac-critical method of interpretation, arguing paranoiac activity systematises the confusion of reality by filtering the objects of perception (reality/the external world) through and in association with unconscious obsessive ideas to bring together an alternative/double/other ‘knowledge’.

In Dali’s own words, “Paranoia makes use of the external world in order to set off its obsessive idea”, utilising it “to control an imaginative construction” (223). Interpreted thus, Dalí presents his famous double/multiple-image technique as equivalent to the formations of a paranoid delirium. In many ways Dalí’s “paranoiac-critical method of interpretation” continues on from Freud’s theoretical considerations of the manifestations and delusions of a paranoid delirium functioning as a “protective fiction” (Masson, 1985: 250). Dalí adopted a theorisation of the paranoid mechanism to function as a creative mechanism which similarly could regulate the representation of the objects of perception.

The image Dalí offers to demonstrate and frame this paranoiac double/multiple was that of a woman, which is unconsciously
associated with and accommodates the image of a lion, which in turn is unconsciously associated with and accommodates the image of a horse. A not coincidental choice, when Dalí earlier in 1930 had painted a number of versions of his famous “Invisible Sleeping Woman, Horse, Lion” (above) Together, contradictory things are seen, multiple and parallel realities, each legitimate, a logical alternative, another possibility, deconstructing the concept of one, or indeed any reality. The new image must be recognisable by all (Dalí 1998: 224) which Dalí related to the paranoid employment of the reality of the external world “as illustration or proof” of the obsessive idea, “with the disturbing characteristic of verifying the reality of this idea for others” (223).

Paranoid phenomena are well-known images with a double figuration—the figuration can be multiplied theoretically and practically everything hinges on the paranoid capacity of the author. Paranoid-critical activity thus reveals new and objective “meanings” of the irrational; it tangibly makes the very world of delirium pass to the level of reality. (Bosquet, 2003: 62)

Dalí identified Metamorphosis of Narcissus as “the first poem and the first painting obtained entirely through the integral application of the paranoiac-critical method” (Dalí 1998: 324). A discursive circle of narcissism, doubling, homo/heterosexuals and paranoia inform a painting conceived in the year Dalí’s beloved dies, by an artist conceived in the wake of his brother’s death, bearing his name, his likeness, this homo hommo.

When Lacan Met Dalí

“When (When) Rouméguère read me his thesis. For the first time in my life, amid incomparable thrills, I felt the absolute truth: a psychoanalytical thesis revealed the sensational conflict at the basis of my tragic structure: the ineluctable presence, deep within me, of my dead brother, whom my parents had been so fond of that when I was born they gave me his name, Salvador. My shock at this doctor’s disclosure was a violent revelation. I now understood the terror besetting me every time I stepped into my parents’ bedroom and saw the photo of my deceased brother: a lovely child all decked out in lace. The photo was touched up regularly, so that I, by way of contrast, spent all night picturing my ideal brother in a state of total putrefaction. I managed to drop off to sleep only at the thought of my own death and by accepting the idea of lying at rest inside the coffin. An experience of the viscera justified the mental structure of my being.” (Bosquet, 2003: 18)

This thesis of Rouméguère’s Dalí refers to was not the first psychoanalytically informed thesis to have made an impact on Dali, nor indeed to have settled a question from him, especially around the doubling from a predeceased sibling from whom one has inherited their name, but more treacherously their legacy, their fantasy, their identity.

It could be argued that before Lacan was a psychoanalyst he was a surrealist. Lacan was friendly with Breton, Duchamp, Picasso, (a sometime patient), Masson, his brother-in-law. A long time collector of art, Lacan utilised
explanatory analogies for his theorisations from the visual arts. In his twenties, training as a psychiatrist and researching his doctorate, Lacan also found time to write articles for the surrealist *Minotaure* magazine. It was here his writings were to meet Dali’s.


**Lacan’s Case of Aimée**

From the outset of his publishing career, Lacan evidenced an interest in paranoid psychosis. It was encountering *Marguerite Pantaine*, a thirty-eight year-old woman, which enabled him to demonstrate his views on paranoia, and on a specific clinical type, namely paranoia of self-punishment. (Roudinesco, 1997: 34) Another likely motive for his choice was the great public interest in Marguerite’s knife attack against the famous actress Huguette Duflos which took place outside a Parisian theatre in April 1931.

“Journalists, writers, actresses such as Sarah Bernhardt were all somehow involved. She herself was being plagiarised. ‘Ces personnages l’ont plagiée, ont copié ses romans non publiés et son journal intime’.29” (Cox-Cameron, 2000: 28)

This widespread sensation was not lost on the surrealists especially as Marguerite “unreasonably” accused the actress of persecution and spreading scandalous rumours about her; “these crimes frequently, though not always, contain elements of the late nineteenth-century obsession with the Doppelgänger or psychic double”. (25)

Calling himself a “partisan of psychogeny”, Lacan utilised Freudian paranoia theories to address Marguerite’s case whom he renamed Aimée, after the heroine of one of her novels. (Lacan, 1975: 107). In diagnosing Aimée’s sufferings as “delirium of interpretation” Lacan argues such “psychical functions of representation” (291) for paranoiacs as not ‘false’ meanings but ‘personal’ meanings.

In paranoid delirium/discourse Lacan diagnosed a key conceptual structure “indicating a principle of *iterative identification*” (296) evidenced in Aimée’s case in her repeated

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29 These people have plagiarised it, copied the novel that she did not publish, and her intimate diaries.
identifications with successful women, who ultimately become her persecutors. In terms of Lacan’s psychoanalytic reading, Aimée’s identifications were identifications with her ego-ideal, the ideal the ego aspires to. For what lies at the heart of paranoia of self-punishment, the object of Lacan’s thesis, as well as of the paranoid delirium/discourse that it generates, was the fact that the paranoid patient engaged in attacking her mirror-images, the women she identified with, realising, in a way, her wish to punish herself.

Lacan’s thesis analysed the distinctive character of Aimée’s female persecutors (her older sister, her female friends, the attacked), as “purely symbolic significance” (252) within Aimée’s “personal signification” (296), interpreting these persecutory women as “the double, triple and successive ‘printings’ of a prototype” (253).

The following year, Lacan employed a similar argument discussing the Papin sisters’ murder case in an article again for Minotaure, returning to Freud’s article “to emphasise the unconscious homosexuality subtending folie à deux”. (Cox-Cameron, 2000: 25) Christine, the elder sister, within her delusions had transgenderingly declared: “I believe that in another life, I was the husband of my sister.” (Lacan, 1975: 394). Her tearing out the eyes of her female victims, as she attempted on herself in prison suggests something not wanting to be seen, to never be perceived.

For Lacan the paranoid discourse inhabits a hall of mirrors, a homo-narcissistic world where all reflect everything of/to oneself, where not only Desire, but subjectivity binds one to/for/in the Other. “The patient did not hesitate to accuse her dearest friend to be her persecutor and the main informant of her enemies. She stops in front of her older sister, who was an instant substitute mother.” (Lacan, 1975: 282)

**The Double Narcissistic Paranoid Mirror**

Lacan’s thesis hinged on his recognition of the importance of doubling effects.

“The gravitational pull of Aimée’s story, told in two different places in Lacan’s thesis, drew Lacan strongly towards the insights which fuelled the Mirror Stage and the Dalínian connaissance paranoïaque which marked his thinking in the thirties and forties.” (Cox-Cameron, 2000: 10)

Dali, like Marguerite/Aimée, is born into a mould, a desire, a name of a deceased older sibling “whose ghost was there at the start to welcome me” (Davies, 1998: 12). Dali’s paranoiac critical interpretative methodology exemplifies the madness which can threaten those ‘born double’, both those born into the homo desire of a dead, same-named sibling, or those born with a homo ‘like-kind’ desire. Thus, Freud’s words below double for paranoiac doublings as well as homo-guilt couplings:
“the sufferer from compulsions and prohibitions behaves as if he were dominated by a sense of guilt, of which however he knows nothing, so that we must call it an unconscious sense of guilt.” (SE IX: 123).

This divided ego where one part is set against the other as judge and critic is theorised in Freud’s ‘On Narcissism’, his essential text for explicating homo-sexuality. The ego carries within itself its own ideal, a homo-perfection, Freud names as ideal ego or ego-ideal. “What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal.” (SE XIV: 94) And this homo-ideal can be equally loved or hated, desired or feared evidenced in Lacan’s doctoral thesis where “the same image which represents [Aimée’s] ideal is also the object of her hatred.” (Lacan, 1975: 253) Such a foundational, if indeed ambiguous relationship to image is precisely what in/forms Lacan’s devising of his ‘Mirror Stage’ theories which is located as a theoretical bridge between his early work on paranoia, and his full commitment to psychoanalysis reframed within structural linguistics.

**Conclusion**

From this point of confluence, of Lacan’s 1931 doctorate, his translation of Freud’s 1922 paper *Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality*, and his surrealist encounters, especially with Dalí, who in parallel is developing his *connaissance paranoïaque* methodology, both men create texts exploring doubling, involving/evoking a homo(same)-sexuality, and a paranoid knowledge of knowing many contradictory things at once. And through and from all of such discursive convergences will emerge Lacan’s own metamorphosis of Narcissus, his first major innovative incursion into psychoanalytic theory, his exposition of the Mirror Stage, which Clement posits:

> “Lacan perhaps has never thought anything else besides the mirror stage. . . . It is the germ containing everything” (1981: 119)

A germ, germinated in the well soaked soil of doubles, narcissism, homosexuality and paranoia, and will sprout into Lacanian constructions of desire and sexuality through his Mirror Stage’s that will have implications for all homo-sexuals. Such doubling, ego-ideal, narcissism linking homosexuality to a paranoid loss/desire for an ideal is a key meme evinced in contemporary homo-sexual lives and livings which will be further explored in Section Four.
Chapter Nine:
Lacan / Lack (in) the Mirror"

“Each to each a looking-glass Reflects the other that doth pass.” (Cooley, 1909: 184)
“If we consider life without the mirror, we are only considering it half-way” (Hockney: 1982)

Chapter Synopsis:
Lacan designates his metamorphosis of narcissus theory, his Mirror Stage, as his ‘portmanteau’ (Lacan, Sem XV: 10/1/68) central theoretical condensation of several Lacanian mantles: the tensions between imaginary and symbolic, the founding/structuring of the ego, as well as the complicated ‘meconaissance’ (misrecognition) of ‘self’ and other. Returning to Freud’s narcissism inherently inherits discursive ideologies around paranoid homosexual doublings, as explored earlier; a mirrored sameness at the core of human subjectivity.

Lacan emphasises a centrality of narcissism in the mirror stage’s subjectification, this first sameness which grounds, founds and alienates us. For those defined and constructed to desire the same, this mirror stage is informative in how we see/alienate from our selves and how we see/alienate from others. Lacan queers sexuality, but for queers sexuality is made queerer because of this homo-ness that inaugurates subjectivity; we are all signified as homo-sexual subjects. This chapter specifically explores Lacan’s debt and reliance on sociology, as Lacan moves from a psychiatric pathologising narcissism discourse into a more philosophically sociological one, where homo-sexuality is reflected in our desire being never ‘our’ own but always socially constructed and informed.

Taking up Freud’s Narcissistic Mantle

“I came into psychoanalysis with a little broom which was called the mirror stage. I took the mirror stage to make a portmanteau. It is even much more emphasised immediately than I was ever able to do it in the course of statements that spared people’s sensitivities, that there is no love which does not derive from this narcissistic dimension” (Lacan, Sem XV: 10/1/68)


“of the mirror stage is regarded as the cornerstone of Lacan’s oeuvre. It appears at the head of the English translation of his major papers, and its conclusions are alluded to or presupposed in nearly all the papers which follow.” (Tallis, 1988: 133)
Lacan himself implicitly centralised his portmanteau: “The conception of the mirror stage that I introduced at our last congress, has since become more or less established in the practice of the French group.” (2006: 93) but this portmanteau’s archive was far from ‘obliterated’ despite Lacan’s decision to never publish it, as it carried the mantles of many discourses: evolutionary science, biology, social psychology, all grounded in a return to Freud’s primary narcissism within a visual portmanteau, relying, grounding and founding a universal existential alienation to the human image.

**Lacan’s Mirror Stage: The Alienating Image**

Lacan’s argument in ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience’ is that the newly born human infant is a fragmented passive object initially trapped in a premature motor incapacity, whose first awareness of themselves as a whole unity is through their experience of a mirrored reflection of themselves between their sixth and eighteenth month. This reflection functions as the form that in-forms the subject and guides its development through an identification “in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image.” (2006: 94). The identification that takes place through this assumption of the reflected image is what Lacan understands by the “I.”

This mirroring reflection, external to the infant, proffers an image of total unity to counteract or supplant their prior experience of fragmentation. This wholeness becomes archetypally idealised into a model for all eventual integration, and as the infant's primary identification grounds for any subsequent “secondary” identifications (94).

This prototype image fixes the subject in a certain permanence diverging from “turbulent movements the subject feels are animating him” (95). This image form must be perceived as “other”, exterior to the subject, prior to their “jubilant assumption” of it through identification. In other words the subject must first be alienated from that which their ego will identify with/through, this defensive armoured image that is them, but not theirs; an alienation that ceaselessly will characterise the subject’s identity and development: “the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development” (97). This armoured image of unity and wholeness is of course a fiction; unattainable, in its projection onto this alienating identity the subject “anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power.” (94)

**Lacan’s Mirrored Antecedents**

Though the original 1936 Mirror Stage paper has been ‘lost’, his writing and interests before and around this time, as explored in the previous chapter, can indicate concerns,
information and informings that likely shape this text. As already presented, this was not Lacan’s first foray into the self’s relationship with alienating images of the other. His psychiatric doctoral thesis *On Paranoid Psychosis and Its Relation to Personality, Monitoring Writings on Paranoia* recognised clearly the ambiguities involved in Freud’s theory of narcissism (1933: 321-322) as well as of the ego (*moi*) (323-326), and promises to return to the subject in later research (326).

1936’s ‘Beyond the Reality Principle’ (2006: 73-92) argues two elements structuring what he calls Freud’s new “psychological reality” (88): firstly, the image; and secondly, the complex. According to Lacan, the core function of an image is that it informs/gives form to something, enabling the subject to identify through it. (77). Identification with an arrangement of images, he argues, leads to patterns of behaviour which reflect the social structures from which those images first emerged; such arrangement he calls a *complex*.

“It is through the *complex* that images are established in the psychic organisation that influence the broadest unities of behaviour: images with which the subject identifies completely in order to play out, as the sole actor, the drama of conflicts between them” (90).

‘The Family’ (1938) further elaborates this argument of complexes in Lacan’s presenting the family more as a social situation than a biological entity which forms the subject, evidenced in his insistence on the significance of complex rather than instinct in the development of psychic mechanisms. Complexes are dictated by social influences, but dictated in/through the unconscious of the subject. The image remains a critical element in the structure of the complex, for example the image of the maternal breast in the weaning complex (6), or the image of the father in the Oedipus complex (11-15).

Lacan, surrounded by the surrealists, and exchanging discursive communications with Dalí, is significantly more drawn to the image than to language and signifiers and structuralism that he will become famous for. At this stage, his grounding as a psychoanalytic theorist is drawn through the power of the image.

**‘On My Antecedents’**

*Écrits* ‘De nos antécedents’ (2006: 65), a recollection of Lacan’s medical and psychiatric origins, significantly translates the French ‘*nos*’ (our) into the English first person singular *my* as the recollection is more a portmanteau of Lacan’s own precursors in his own analytic development than a consideration of the theoretical “obliterated archive” to which Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’ was indebted. This ‘mis-translation’ is pertinent when Lacan’s theorisations on desire and sexuality move from an individual unconscious one structured by personal neurosis and impulses to a more collective, socialised one,
dependant on mirrored reflections of others, where ‘my’ desire can only ever be ‘ours’; desire is the desire of the Other.

Lacan’s non-acknowledgement of any real ‘other’ antecedents, especially sociological theorists, for his mirror stage is evidenced in his crediting himself for the whole idea:

“If I presented the ‘mirror stage’ in 1936, when I had yet to be granted the customary title of analyst, at the first Congress at which I had my first taste of an association that was to give me plenty of others, I was not lacking in merit for doing so.” (67)

Indeed, “one cannot help being struck by Lacan’s stubborn silence concerning this important debt” (Borch-Jacobsen, 1991: 248); a critical debt, not only for image-structuring concepts in human development, but more significantly for how that mirror function informs socialisation, and the subject’s fundamental relationship to the Other. As both Freudian and Lacanian psychology is emerging and being established, so too is the discourse of sociology, to which psychoanalytic considerations of ‘man’ as an ‘individual’ or ‘social creature’ and the perennial nature versus nurture debates, are deeply indebted; as underlined previously in considering the influence of Levi-Strauss.

An early unacknowledged antecedent of the Mirror Stage is Darwin’s ‘A Biographical Sketch of an Infant’ (1877) which noted the necessary correlation between the mirrored image with the signifier of the subject’s own name in observing his eight month old son:

“I may add that when a few days under nine months old he associated his own name with his image in the looking-glass, and when called by name would turn towards the glass even when at some distance from it”. (1877)

Significantly, Darwin considers the infant’s development through a progressive set of headings - vision, anger, fear, pleasurable sensations, to something he terms “unconsciousness”, mirroring Lacan’s own knotting of image, aggressivity, anxiety and pleasure to the notion of a formation of subjectivity in his mirror stage. And more importantly in Darwin’s discourse, the infant looks to the image as the bearer of his name.

Preyer’s 1882, The Mind of the Child, mirrors Lacan’s 1930’s publishing chronology of aggressivity, jubilation and self-identification in observations made at different stages in a child’s development, and the varying degrees of interest the child shows in its reflection:

“Eleventh week, child does not see himself in mirror. Seventeenth week, regards his image in mirror with unmistakeable attention, three days later undoubtedly laughed at his image. (Preyer, 1882: 197)Thirty-fifth week, the child gaily and with interest grasps at his image in mirror is grasped at gaily. (198) Sixty-sixth week, child strikes at his image in mirror. Sixty-seventh week, makes grimaces before mirror (199).”

Baldwin’s 1894 ‘Imitation: A Chapter in the Natural History of Consciousness’ presents the infant as initially unable to properly recognise objects outside themselves as not being part of their own body, therefore treating the other’s body, mother/care-giver as their own.
Nonetheless Baldwin described the infant’s maturation as being dependant on the imitation of the other and recognised the inter-dependence of ego and other:

The ego and the alter are born together. Both crude and unreflective, largely organic, an aggregate of sensations prime among which are efforts, pushes, strains, physical pleasures and pains. And the two get purified and clarified together by this twofold reaction between project and subject, and between subject and eject. My sense of myself grows by imitation of you, and my sense of yourself grows in terms of my sense of myself. Both ego and alter are thus essentially social creations. (1894: 43)

It is this underlining and growing emphasis on the ‘social-creationism’ of ‘individual subjectivity’ that Lacan will argue in his ‘Desire is the desire of the Other’, a thesis grounded through his Mirror Stage Theory.

In 1902, as the commodification, production and popular consumption of mirrors continues, the American sociologist Cooley, argued in his Human Nature and the Social Order the social psychological concept of the ‘looking glass self’ where a person’s self grows out of society’s interpersonal interactions and the perceptions of others. How people shape themselves is based on other’s perceptions, which in turn leads those people to reinforce other people’s perspectives on themselves.

“The social reference takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one’s self, that is any idea he appropriates, appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. A social self of this sort might be called the reflected or looking glass self. As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another’s mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it.” (Cooley, 1909, 183-184).

Cooley’s summary of his ’looking glass self’: “I am not what I think I am and I am not what you think I am; I am what I think that you think I am” (184) foresees Lacan’s “where I think there I am not” and that ‘the signifier represents the subject for another signifier’.

This ‘sociological-isation’ of psychology which Lacan is to become (in)famous for is already being reflected in theorists such as Cooley arguing “the mind is mental” because “the human mind is social” (1902: 90); just as his contemporary, Mead similarly defines self as social in its “taking the role of the other.” (Joas 1997: 118)

Mead presented self as a social process, combining an ‘I’ and a ‘me’, where community existence precedes individual consciousness. ‘Me’ is the social self, the organised set of attitudes of others an individual assumes, and ‘I’ is the individual’s response to this ‘Me’. In other words, the ‘I’ is self as subject; and ‘me’ is self as object. Mead rooted the self’s “perception and meaning” sociologically in “a common praxis of subjects” (166). Through interaction with others, we begin to develop an identity about who we are.
“The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind.” (Cooley, 1902: 183)

But of all these unacknowledged ‘sociological’ antecedents of Lacan’s mirror stage, perhaps none seem more glaring than Wallon’s formulation of the stade du miroir in his 1931 article, ‘Comment se développe chez l’enfant la notion de corps propre’. Borch-Jacobsen, charts the Mirror Stage as:

“already been given a detailed presentation in 1931-32 by the psychologist Wallon, who relied on previous work by Darwin, Guillaume, Preyer, and Buhler. Moreover, Wallon had already drawn much the same conclusions as Lacan.” (1991: 46).

Yet Wallon’s name was neither mentioned in Lacan’s 1949 paper, nor in the bibliography of his 1938 Encyclopedie Francaise article ‘The Family’ which Wallon himself had commissioned Lacan to write.

“In 1931, Henri Wallon gave the name épreuve du miroir (mirror test) to an experiment in which a child, put in front of a mirror, gradually comes to distinguish his own body from its reflected image. According to Wallon, this dialectical operation takes place because of the subject’s symbolic comprehension of the imaginary space in which his unity is created. On 16th June 1936, Lacan revised Wallon’s terminology and changed the épreuve du miroir into the stade du miroir.” (Roudinesco 2003: 29).

**Which Came First? The Chicken or Its Reflection?**

A challenge within Lacan’s mirror theory is if the ego is only formed through such mirror stage misrecognition then who or what agency sees/mis-recognises the image as their own image for the ego to be formed? If the image is “more constitutive than constituted” it could be argued that there is no necessary agency to do this recognising, and Lacan’s presentation of gestalt theory indeed seems to imply a form of automatic cognitive recognition of the reflected image as our own.

“For the total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage, is given to him only as a gestalt, that is, in an exteriority in which, to be sure, this form is more constitutive than constituted…. this gestalt, whose power [prégnance] should be considered linked to the species… symbolises the I’s mental permanence, at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination. This gestalt is also replete with the correspondences that unite the I with the statue onto which man projects himself, the phantoms that dominate him, and the automaton with which the world of his own making tends to achieve fruition in an ambiguous relation” (Lacan, 2006: 95).

Borch-Jacobsen proposes a slightly different solution based on Freud’s work on identification which supplements that of gestalt theory:

“Identification [Freud] says, is the original form of emotional tie with an object” and thus shifts the problem of there being no ‘agency’ away from a question of optical representation and thus the issue of someone or something seeing. Not only is identification “possible before any sexual object-choice has been made”, as Freud also writes, but it must also, by all rights, precede every objection, and every view
in general, because it gives birth to the ‘ego’. How, then, could this ego see anything at all – and particularly any ‘model’ or ‘image’ – since it is nothing before the identification?” (1991: 66).

Freud’s 1922 identification is not dissimilar to how Lacan sees gestalt operating in the mirror stage: “Identification endeavours to mould a person’s own ego after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a model” (SE XVIII: 106). In other words Freud’s view of identification does not imply any level of an ego-to-ego relationship, of one identifying with the other, but instead that the ego is formed via this process of identification: “the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and contains the history of those object-choices” (SE XIX: 29). The formation of an ‘ego’ is grounded in some recognition of sameness, a homo projection which underlines subjectivity and sexuality.

The Mirror Stage Does Not Create The Ego

Fink’s Écrits translation of this paper significantly interprets La fonction du Je (2006: 773) as ‘the function of the I’, mirroring Lacan’s discussing the I function, Je, instead of moi, the French term for ego. The presumption that the mirror stage leads to establishing the ego is unsupported in Lacan’s texts. ‘The Family’ unequivocally states:

“The unity it [the image] introduces into the tendencies will nevertheless contribute to the formation of the ego. However, before the ego affirms its own identity it confuses itself with this image which forms it, but also subjects it to a primordial alienation.” (Lacan, 1938: 22), (my emphasis)

Similarly, 1948’s Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis avoids saying that the mirror stage creates the ego, putting the emphasis on the achievement the imago offers to the child:

What I have called the “mirror stage” is of interest because it manifests the affective dynamism by which the subject primordially identifies with the visual gestalt of his own body. In comparison with the still very profound lack of co-ordination in his own motor functioning, that gestalt is an ideal unity, a salutary imago. Its value is heightened by all the early distress resulting from the child’s intra-organic and relational discordance during the first six months of life, when he bears the neurological and humoral signs of a physiological prematurity of birth. (2006: 113)

The definition of the mirror stage Lacan provides here is of a process that unifies the body image, as a response to the prematurity of birth, not the need for an ego.

In 1951’s ‘Some Reflections on the Ego’ Lacan assigns the mirror stage a twofold value:

“In the first place, it has historical value as it marks a decisive turning-point in the mental development of the child. In the second place, it typifies an essential libidinal relationship with the body-image. For these two reasons the phenomenon demonstrates clearly the passing of the individual to a stage where the earliest formation of the ego can be observed.” (2003: 300)

His clear phrase “the earliest formation of the ego” implies not a formation of the ego by some sort of prototype ego, not fully yet established; an observation echoed in Seminar I.

“As I have often underlined, the mirror-stage is not simply a moment in
development. It also has an exemplary function, because it reveals some of the subject’s relations to his image, in so far as it is the *Urbild* of the ego.” (1991a: 74)

The mirror stage reveals the relation of the child to his image, and that the image is the *Urbild* of the ego:

“It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this context as an identification, in the full sense analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes [assume] an image – an image that is seemingly predestined to have an effect at this phase, as witnessed by the use in analytic theory of antiquity’s term, ‘imago’.” (2006: 94)

There nonetheless remains the question of how we pass from a gestalt imago through the *Urbild* of the ego to the final stage of the ego itself? Lacan seems to trace through to formation of the *Urbild* prototype ego, but then pauses. But his argument that the mirror stage comes to an end at “the time at which the specular I turns into the social I” (98) implicates and implies that the ego is not garnered from the mirror, nor from our own image, but socially. This move from the specular I to the social I is a process which

“inaugurates, through identification with the imago of one’s semblable and the drama of primordial jealousy… the dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations.” (98)

In other words, the mirror stage ceases when one stops looking at the reflection in the mirror and starts looking at other people.

“It is this moment that decisively tips the whole of human knowledge [*savoir*] into being mediated by the other’s desire, constitutes its objects in an abstract equivalence due to competition from other people, and turns the I into an apparatus to which every insti

*Lacan’s Mirror Stage and Transitivism*

In the human subject’s first discovery of them selves through an external image, one informed by theorisations of narcissism due to the homo-nature of seeing sameness, understandably the human subject confuses their own external image with images of other subjects amongst which they find themselves, and so a ‘social dialectic’ begins which has comprehensive and permanent effects, not only on how one relates to and with others but also in how one is informed and knows external things. Lacan calls this “veritable captivation by the image of the other” (Muller, 1991: 180) “transitivism” evidenced in a child’s language development, their speaking in the third person before saying ‘I’.

1948’s ‘Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis’, delivered in the year prior to the ‘known’ mirror stage paper, discusses the creation of the ego *not* in terms of the mirror stage but in connection with a phenomenon concurrent with the mirror stage –transitivism. This transitivism has two important features: demonstrating a certain ambivalence to the other’s image and providing the crucial jump to the formation of the ego:
“There is a sort of structural crossroads here [as transitivism manifests itself] to which we must accommodate our thinking if we are to understand the nature of aggressiveness in man and its relation to the formalism of his ego and objects. It is in this erotic relationship, in which the human individual fixates on an image that alienates him from himself, that we find the energy and the form from which the organisation of the passions that he will call his ego originates” (2006: 113).

What introduces the ego is “the notion of an aggressiveness linked to the narcissistic relationship and to the structures of systematic misrecognition and objectification that characterise ego formation” (115-116). Aggressiveness has a significant role to play in ego formation, more so that the mirror stage proto-ego. Indeed, Lacan elaborates later in this paper a view that implies narcissism and aggressivity go together, that you cannot have one without the other:

“The notion of aggressiveness as a tension correlated with narcissistic structure in the subject’s becoming allows us to encompass in a very simply formulated function all sorts of accidents and atypicalities in that becoming” (116).

The ego is therefore not formed at the point of looking into the mirror, but at a subsequent point in which the image of others, super-imposed onto our own, come into play, evoking Freud’s “precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes” (SE XIX: 29). Lacan recognises the libidinal dynamics at work in the formation of the ego in his reference to the “organisation of the passions”. However, the ambivalence of the erotic relation to the image of the other is the price that is paid for this formation.

This aggression towards the image (of Other/others) is a result of the frustrating alienation and insecurity at the heart of such mirror identifications. Mastery of the body is only asserted through an identification with an external image, which can only ever be ‘other’; and the subsequent evolving ego is founded on images and identifications that are alienating. Lacan’s theories of image, other and identification show a close line of logic mirroring his argument on paranoia in his doctoral thesis. Leader states the infant is

“trapped in an image fundamentally alien to me, outside me. Mastery of one’s motor functions and an entry into the human world of space and movement is thus at the price of a fundamental alienation.” (2005: 22)

Transitivism moves what is at stake in the mirror stage from an image, to something of an interpersonal confusion in the subject’s distorted grasp of reality and their relation to the other; it is a “paranoiac alienation, which dates from the deflection of the specular I into the social I” (2006: 98). This “paranoiac alienation” for Lacan is double alienating, firstly in the subject’s misidentification of itself with its own reflection, and secondly in the process of transitivism.

Though the image dominates this period of Lacan’s thought, ‘his’ theory that the subject is in-formed by his own image, is captivated by the other’s image, and that objects
themselves take on the rigid features of egos, is only a preliminary encounter with

“what I have called paranoiac knowledge … shown, therefore, to correspond in its
more or less archaic forms to certain critical moments that mark the history of man’s
mental genesis, each representing a stage in objectifying identification” (111).

It is these “objectifying identifications” grounded in a “paranoiac knowledge” paralleled
in Dalí’s discursive “paranoiac-critical methods” (Dalí, 1998: 95) that have a core role
both on social relationships, but more significantly on the nature and form of desire.

**Context of the mirror stage theory in Lacan’s work**

That initial accounts of the Mirror stage were more clearly vision based is probable
through the influence of Lacan’s “only master in psychiatry” (Jay, 1994: 340), de
Clérambault, whose own visual preoccupations were extraordinarily intense. He was not
only an acclaimed painter and a professional photographer but his psychiatric legacy was
an erotomania communicated through special glances. Roudinesco describes de
Clérambault’s clinic as being where

“the cult of the gaze reached its paroxysm. Like Freud and Charcot, and so many
other ‘visionary’ men, de Clérambault, the art of observation was mixed with a story
of the eye reviewed by Charcot and corrected by Roussel … Without a private
clientele, he passed his life perfecting his eagle’s gaze; he manipulated and observed
sickness without ever hearing it.” (1990: 105).

De Clérambault reserved his most dramatic visual act for last. Having lost his eyesight
through cataracts, he decided on November 17th, 1934 to shoot himself in the mouth, but
not before inviting his colleagues, after his death, to examine his eyes.

Lacan’s early influence by Gestalt psychology was in the power of the image itself as a
finished form, pregnant with meaning, capable of sustaining the infant’s identity. His
project was an outlining the effects of the imaginary on the formation of the ego and the
body, and the relationship with the counterpart, which is in marked contrast to the
relationship with the “Other” which moved Lacan’s clinical thinking and his theorising
on the mirror stage form the Imaginary to the Symbolic. Nobus reasons Lacan’s
successive reconceptualisations of the mirror stage in the fifties and sixties have this effect
by virtue of Lacan’s privileging the symbolic over the imaginary. In fact in those later
works Lacan had “stripped the mirror stage of its psychological dimensions.”

“Whereas Lacan’s 1949 paper was still largely devoted to what actually happens
when animals and human beings are confronted with their mirror images, in his
subsequent analyses of the experience the physical presence of a mirror was
subordinated to the intervention of the symbolic order (the Other). By 1960, Lacan
even identified the mirror with the Other, a construction which had already been
foreshadowed in Seminar I, where he had claimed ‘that the inclination of the plane
mirror is governed by the voice of the other’” (Nobus, 1998: 120).
The mirror stage now comes to reflect the founding role of the Other’s gaze in forming the subject’s mental organisation. If such an operation was lacking, the mirror stage could not occur, as is evidenced in the autistic child, where there is no relationship in the Imaginary to neither a body image nor any kind of counterpart. From with his seminar on transference [1960-61] on, Lacan took the mirror as a metaphor for the Other’s gaze.

Is The Mirror Stage too Vision based?

This refocusing of the mirror stage away from the imaginary and towards the symbolic seems to shift any dependence the theory may have on vision, given that an obvious problem or challenge would be the case of a child born blind, being unable to see their own image, would be left without an ego, a question raised by Tallis:

“If epistemological maturation and the formation of a world picture were dependent upon catching sight of oneself in a mirror, then the theory would predict that congenitally blind individuals would lack selfhood and be unable to enter language, society or the world at large. There is no evidence whatsoever that this implausible consequence of the theory is borne out in practice” (1988: 153).

Nobus’ reading implicitly argues that it is the symbolic function of the mirror stage, rather than any image/vision bases experience that structures the subject:

“The symbolic control of the imaginary implies that the assumption of a ‘self-image’ can occur outside the field of vision. As such, Lacan’s purification of the mirror stage entails a reduction of its basis in the physiology of perception. Insofar as the symbolic governs the imaginary, a blind child can still assume a self-image, as long as the symbolic is there to replace and control its eyes, for it will then see itself through the words of the Other” (Nobus, 1998:120).

Lacan illustrates enough examples in his Écrits paper to evidence the mirror stage not requiring an actual mirror, but held within any mirroring behaviour the child experiences through/from other children of the same age. For Lacan, mirroring is a social construction and formation the legacy of which we inhabit throughout our lives. This is what Julien refers to as its “morphogenetic” power.

“It is not a pure, passive reflection but the engendering of the infant’s ego. What we call the feeling of one’s own body, or interoceptive sensation of the body, comes from this matrix that is the image of the other. The child does not exteriorise itself. It does not project itself in an image. Rather, the reverse occurs. The child is constituted in conformity to and by means of the image” (Julien, 1994: 32).

The Mirror Stage and Social Paranoia

What is most significant both through Lacan’s own antedents, self and other and in his own development of the mirror stage from 1936 to 1949, and beyond is the ‘social’ aspect to the mirror stage. The mirror stage does not merely include the child’s relation to their own reflection, but to other children, their semblances or fellow beings, who function in the same way as a mirror in presenting an image of physical mastery.
Therefore in considering the importance and the function of the mirror stage, it is more relevant to make reference to mirroring behaviour inherent in mimicry over the child's relation to their reflection. The effects of the mirror stage are observable in phenomena of transitivism in which one finds the infant taking as equivalent his own action and that of the other. He says – François hit me, whereas it was him who hit François” (1991a: 169).

The drama involved here is that the child does not simply accede to mastery over their own body, but to an understanding of how the other sees them, which significantly opens up all kinds of questions about what the other thinks or wants of them. The mirror stage operates as a view onto the Other’s desire:

“It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this context as an identification, in the full sense analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes [assume] an image.” (2006: 94)

The tragic consequence of this, as Lacan points out in the 1949 paper, is that as humans what we identify as our ego – our I function, as Lacan calls it here – will be born from a process that begins with this identification of our image with our being:

“This form situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its social determination, in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single individual or, rather, that will only asymptotically approach the subject’s becoming, no matter how successful the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve, as I, his discordance with his own reality.” (94)

Lacan highlights in our identification with the image we will forever remain ignorant of the artificiality of the image, precisely because of the fact that without that image we would not have the ‘sense of self’ that the ego grants us. This is the mistake the chimpanzee does not fall prey to perhaps, we might say, because an I function resembling the ego is not present in that species. What is important to remember is that it is not that we are just ignorant of the gap that separates the unreality of the mirrored image with our ‘true’ selves; rather, this gap is constitutive of our sense of self in the first place – without it, we are completely stuck in a state of primordial dependency. This identification of the image is thus necessary for the creation of the ego, but not sufficient.

**Conclusion**

As his central portmanteau, the discourses surrounding Lacan’s Mirror Stage underline much of Lacanian theoretical frameworks. The Mirror Stage inherits discourses, discussed in the previous chapter, of surrealism and Dali’s paranoid doubling located within the image and art, alongside Freud’s writings on narcissism, homosexuality and paranoia. But it also builds on ‘obliterated antecedents’ which utilised mirror discourse to evidence more sociological, than individual psychological understandings of human
identity, and subjectification. Our human subjectivity is grounded both in a homo
narcissistic mirrored image, and within a hommo, other community of men.

Our desire is always trapped in a narcissistic paranoid mirror, and manifestly after Freud
both narcissism and paranoia discourses are homosexually informed and informing. The
mirror stage socialises Narcissism, but putting it in a paranoid context which relies on and
is grounded by the Other, making narcissism no longer a private psychology but public,
social structured, a desire that relies on the Other, but an-other that is homo mirrored
reflection. This socialised narcissistic mirroring underpins the following chapter’s
consideration of Lacan’s infamous “desire is the desire of/for the Other”.

Chapter Ten: 

Desire is/as a Social Construct: 
Lacan’s Heter(a)Sexuality

“Desire is the essence of man” (Lacan, Sem XI: 275); “Desire is lack of being” (Lacan, 1991b: 223); “Desire is its interpretation” (Lacan, 2006: 521); Desire is the metonymy of being” (Lacan, Sem XI: 19) “Desire is the desire offfor the Other” (Lacan Sem XI: 235)

Chapter Synopsis

One would imagine naming like-kind passionates’ desire would define/designate them over their physiognomy, image, narcissism or masculinity/femininity previously explored. But in Lacanian psychoanalysis desire is never straightforward. Critically central to Lacan’s psychoanalytic discourse, desire, like the mirror stage, is structured more within a sociology than from an individual psychology. Desire is neither private nor personal, but a social product, constituted in dialectical relationships through both the apparent desires of other subjects, and its emergence through the original Other, language. Being denoted and constructed though/within such Otherness, all desire is thus hetero/other configured.

Wuthering Desires

I cannot express it; but surely you and everybody have a notion that there is or should be an existence of yours beyond you? What were the use of my creation, if I were entirely contained here? My great miseries in this world have been Heathcliff’s miseries, and I watched and felt each from the beginning: my great thought in living is himself. If all else perished, and he remained, I should still continue to be; and if all else remained, and he were annihilated, the universe would turn to a mighty stranger: I should not seem a part of it.—My love for Linton is like the foliage in the woods: time will change it, I’m well aware, as winter changes the trees. My love for Heathcliff resembles the eternal rocks beneath: a source of little visible delight, but necessary. Nelly, I am Heathcliff! He’s always, always in my mind: not as a pleasure, any more than I am always a pleasure to myself, but as my own being. So don’t talk of our separation again: it is impracticable; and— (Brönte, 1987: 122)

Catherine Earnshaw’s declaration in Wuthering Heights, one of Western culture’s most notorious texts on passion, incorporates Lacanian elements and dynamics of Desire. It is premised by the impossibility of her naming the truth of her desire, “I cannot express it, but …” An impossibility nonetheless directed into signification/language to/for the Other’s recognition “Surely you and everybody have…?” A declaration reflected through absolute identification with/in the Other’s desires: “whatever our souls are made of, his and mine are the same; My great miseries in this world have been Heathcliff’s miseries, and I watched and felt each from the beginning.” Desire is immutable and undying “a
source of little visible delight, but necessary”. Never about enjoyment, but about our subjectivity “not as a pleasure … but as my own being”. Catherine’s Lacanian avowal “I am Heathcliff!” enunciates her desire as being that of the Other.

**Desire**

“No doubt a wish-fulfillment must bring pleasure; but the question then arises “To whom?” To the person who has the wish, of course. But, as we know, a dreamer’s relation to his wishes is a quite peculiar one. He repudiates them and censors them – he has no liking for them, in short. So that their fulfilment will give him no pleasure, but just the opposite; and experience shows that this opposite appears in the form of anxiety. Thus a dreamer in his relation to his dream-wishes can only be compared to an amalgamation of two separate people who are linked by some important common element” (Freud, *SE V*: 580, n1).

“Desire is the essence of man” (Lacan, *Sem XI*: 275) core to human subjectivity. Enabling the analysand’s speaking to facilitate recognising the truth of their unconscious desire is fundamental to Lacan’s psychoanalysis: “What’s important is to teach the subject to name, to articulate, to bring this desire into existence.” (Lacan, 1991b: 228) This unconscious desire marking us as human subjects is never directed towards a ‘real’ object, but one “perfectly useless from the biological point of view.” (Kojève, 1969: 6) Whatever desire may be, it is entirely sexual: “the motives of the unconscious are limited to sexual desire … The other great generic desire, hunger, is not represented.” (Lacan, 2006: 432-3) Our sexual desire is never ‘natural’, inherently emanating from within, but is formed, informed and conformed in a dialectical relationship with others, embedded in discourse. “Desire is always inscribed in and mediated by language.” (*Sem XI*: 77).

**Recognising Desire**

“It is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term.” (Lacan, 1991a: 183)

The previous chapter explored the Mirror Stage’s “jubilant assumption of his specular image” (Lacan, 2006: 94), a mis/recognition of one’s ‘unity’ grounding our subjectivity. This is not achieved in isolation for/within the infant themselves, but through/by the presence of another, a mOtherer who identifies the child’s mirrored reflection to/for them: ‘Look there’s Baby’. “Unification is made possible exclusively through the mediation of the other, due to the identification of the ego with its mirror image.” (Harari, 2001: 47) Similar discourses of identification and alienation, self and Other, reflection and power informing Lacan’s Mirror Stage are utilised in his theorisings on desire. Desire is never about the ‘objects’ one desires but a recognition from/through someone else.

“Man’s very desire is constituted, Hegel tells us, under the sign of mediation: it is the desire to have one’s desire recognised. Its object is a desire, that of other people, in the sense that man has no object that is constituted for his desire without some mediation.” (Lacan, 2006: 182).
Desire forms and informs the analytical process asserted and repeated throughout the transference, the client’s intersubjective relationship to the analyst which develops in the treatment. In contrast to other psychotherapies’ promise to diagnose/fix/remove a client’s presenting issue, a psychoanalyst attends to the metaphoric and metonymic flows of desire underwriting and underlying this presenting issue. Curing one’s symptom, explaining their dream, or diagnosing their complaint often misses/avoids an opportunity for something of their desire to be articulated and thus brought into recognition. An analysis allows such underlining desires time and space to unfold, collapse and de-place.

“That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognising something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.” (Lacan, 1991b: 228-9)

Our desire being fundamentally a desire for recognition, structured by/against what we believe others desire, can be evidenced in unfolding competitive or complementary directions which desire the other to recognise my right for possession of their object, and thus correspondingly recognise my equality/superiority to them. In this desire for their desire, we locate the Other in a place/position we wish to be desired/recognised from.

**Articulating Desire**

An infant’s scream expresses needs or demands for food, changing, love, attention; but to articulate such needs the human subject must enter language, the ultimate Other. The mother and child dyad is shattered by the growing awareness/experience that the mOtherer can not intuit/know the infant’s every wish and thus to be recognised they increasingly must enter/use this Other o of language. But language never attains clarity or totality. In attempting articulation of our needs, there are always more words demanding further speech, an impossible and permanent metonymic speaking.

An analysis proffers a unique space for desire to be articulated, again not through objects sought, but within the transference relationship where the analysand must confront limits, impossibilities and unknowings around how far desire can be articulated because of a fundamental “incompatibility between desire and speech” (Lacan, 2006: 641) Despite this we are compelled to articulate desire and this articulation does not so much express pre-existing desires, but actually produces desire. The irreducibility of unconscious desires are confronted in an awareness that they are not merely something unknown, but something which cannot be known. No matter how much the subject speaks or approaches their desire, there will always be an impossibility that cannot be articulated. An analysis qualifies the client to come to terms with desire.
“Although the truth about desire is present to some degree in all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desire: whenever speech attempts to articulate desire, there is always a leftover, a surplus, exceeding speech.” (Evans, 1996: 37)

**Le Désir est Désir de l’Autre**

Our desire is not innate. “Desire is the desire for/of the other” (*Sem XI*: 235). Playing on the French preposition *de*’s ambiguity, Lacan interweaves two meanings. Firstly, human subjects do not desire other subjects when they sexually desire; but desire to be the object of another’s desire, evidenced in the infant’s relationship with the mother. Secondly, our subjective learning/knowing of desire, is defined/structured in a process outside ourselves. Desire emerges originally within the field of the Other, the unconscious.

We are born dependent infants with our basic biological needs requiring continuing satisfaction. Any attempts to satisfy these needs are inevitably bound to/in/with the dialectics/tensions of others. As Lacan’s Mirror Stage establishes our sense of self is only ever harvested through/from identifying with others’ images. Similarly being a human subject, he argues, is to desire as/through another/others.

In our constant striving for recognition from the Other we never ‘simply’ desire, but always desire in the second degree, our own desire and recognition being bound in discourses interrogating what we imagine the Other desires or lacks. “Desire full stop is always the desire of the Other. Which basically means that we are always asking the Other what he desires” (Lacan, 2008: 38).

The effects of desiring from another’s position is that objects achieve status as desirable, not through any intrinsic value, but simply and only because they are desired by another. Through the desire of the Other all objects become alike and metaphorically substitutable; so we can never fully appreciate precisely what the Other desires or why they desire, or how we are implicated in their desiring. For the subject, Lacan argues, this anxiety evokes relentless questionings on what the Other has or desires to have.

The object of man’s desire is essentially an object desired by someone else. One object can become equivalent to another, owing to the effect produced by this intermediary, in making it possible for objects to be exchanged and compared. This process tends to diminish the special significance of any particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number. (2003: 295)

As children’s wrangling demonstrates, an object can gain or lose desirability purely based on its significance within the desires of others. The most wanted toy is one all children want, but only for as long as others desire it. When their desire is withdrawn, the toy loses its allure. The most abject is always that which arouses no one’s interest.
Fashion discourse similarly substantiates this phenomenon, where marketing and markets conspire to create desire through anxieties of not belonging, in not having this year’s ‘must have’. The desire is public, anxiety provoking, and metonymic.

A more personal demonstration lies within the individual sexual quirks, kinks and erotic predilections marking our unique sexualities. Exploring their archaeology, their evolution, something a psychoanalysis would pay significant heed to, would inevitably unearth their introduction through anOther, either by word, act, or image. We embraced this interlocutor’s desire/fetish/position/signifiers as our own to consciously or unconsciously ally ourselves with/to them.

**Need and Demand**

Need, Demand and Desire all describe distinct lacks in human subjects; and for Lacan, recognising and distinguishing their mutual relations is critical. Need is pure biological appetite which can be met and temporarily sated. Being born so prematurely the infant is completely dependent on others for meeting its food and comfort needs. Expressing needs necessitates the Other’s attention, which Lacan terms demand. In vocalising demand, there is a dual mandate, firstly that the need be met; but secondly for the attention/recognition/love of the mOtherer. Although this mOtherer may provide the objects needed, they cannot furnish the absolute love also demanded. In this unachievable, unsatisfied demand for unconditional love is an excess/residue Lacan designates Desire.

Demands can never simply be met with an acceptance/refusal from the Other, they evoke something further from both subject and Other, something of an impossible, unconditional, absolute proof of love.

“In this way, demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted, by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions demand obtains for need are debased to the point of being no more than the crushing brought on by the demand for love” (Lacan, 2006: 691).

The interrelationship between need, demand and desire is quite complex. Desire is not demand, although Desire uses the vehicle of demand to transport itself “Although it always shows through in demand, desire is nevertheless beyond demand” (Lacan, 2006: 634). Lacan recognises how biological needs can become subservient to a subject’s demand for the Other’s recognition and love. A hungry child can refuse food if they perceive/imagine it not signifying the parent’s love. An amplified demonstration of this can be evidenced in an anorectic’s relationship to food being bound in supplementary relationships to Others (family, society, sexuality) where one will starve dietary needs, in order to feed the recognition of their desire.
Being constructed through the unconscious order of language, our desires are completely separate from actual bodily needs, impossible to be met/matched, articulated. Desire being always a metonymic deferral; “the desire for something else”. (Lacan, 2006: 518) We can never desire what we already have. “Desire is a metonymy” (528) as the object which causes it, because it is constituted as lost, permanently displaces desire from object to object, when no single object can ever satisfy. Desire’s permanent ongoing displacement reproduces the logic of the unconscious, where desire shifts through the chain of unconscious signifiers, never captured by any particular signifier, but compelled onward. Thus Lacan argues desire is its interpretation.

“Desire is situated in dependence on demand – which, by being articulated in signifiers, leaves a metonymic remainder that runs under it, an element that is not indeterminate, which is a condition both, absolute and unapprehensible, an element necessarily lacking, unsatisfied, impossible, misconstrued, an element that is called desire” (Sem XI: 154).

Demanding always involves fixation, evinced in ones repeated insistence for the same thing they feel they cannot do without. Within relationships, most especially an analysis, exchanging these fixating demands which ultimately threaten to frustrate both subject and Other, a more shifting metonymy of desiring can be advanced. This can relinquish the subject from demand’s disappointment, offering pleasure in desire’s fluid motion across objects, an ongoing recognised longing. “I don’t know, I’ll never know: in the silence you don’t know. … You must go on. … I can’t go on. … I’ll go on.” (Beckett, 2009: 406)

Desire, being of the unconscious order, has naught to do with physical sexuality but is bound within social structures and strictures, in the governing fantasy of reality that constructs our subjectivities through our entrance into language. As “the unconscious is the Other’s discourse” (Lacan, 2006: 16) our unconscious desires are structured by the linguistic system Lacan calls the Symbolic Order. Thus, and central to the explorations of this thesis’s final section, our desires are never really our own, but created through fantasies structured from cultural ideologies rather than material sexuality. The desires of those named homo-sexual, are obligated to cultural ideologies that structure their desires as sexual and as homo, the same. We are subjected to the language that names us.

**Objects of Desire**

Desire, being metonymic, has no precise object; disappearing when confronted with its professed object, only to reappear to ensure its fulfilment as structurally impossible. Our neurotic destinies are to constantly place obstacles before our desires. Discerning desire as the desire of the other invites attention not to the metonymically shifting objects of desire but to uncover the place from where we are desiring, in other words the subject
with whom we identify in desiring as we do. Leader draws a parallel between these linguistic metonymic operations to what happens a message in Chinese whispers:

“One could define desire as exactly this process: as the difference between the original message and that which arrives at the end. The key here is that desire is not the message itself. It is neither the original sentence nor the final one, but the process or structure of distortion itself” (1996: 108).

In discoursing fantasies, most especially in contemporary porn-informed sexual fantasies, it is good to be able to identify the place/s from which one desires rather than what is ostensibly being desired. One might claim attraction to this kind of person, that distinct fetish, another particular nuance; but more significant is from where this mode of desiring was informed. Pornography is an idyllic space for desire to be enjoyed without challenging ownership: ‘I am only watching their enjoyment I would not actually do these things myself’. As the final section explores, Pornography can be a prudent place for one’s desire to be transported.

The *Fifty Shades of Grey* (James, 2011) phenomenon illustrates when the majority of people downloading these texts didn’t actually read the whole book; the having of the texts was more enjoyable than their reading. Strongest criticism of the film was that it didn’t have enough sexual scenes, only twenty minutes from one hundred, and that the audiences had to wait twenty five minutes for the first sex scene. The *Fifty Shades* phenomenon promises rather than delivers; and in being a phenomenon, it became a greater phenomenon. Few people actually want to have or experience the sexual pleasures of BDSM evoked in these books, but they want to know how/why/who would desire this kind of pleasure. Their desire is not overtly for this desire itself, but have ‘knowledge’ of the desire of the Other (heroine/author/audience/readership).

What is decisive is never the object, the particular person, position or fetish a subject is drawn towards or engaging with, but the largely unconscious certain trait or nuance that arouses their desire. We do not desire because of a sought for nuance in another person/situation; we are drawn to particular persons/situations because a certain nuance in our Desire drives us there: desire always pushes, it never pulls. The potential awareness a psychoanalysis proffers of our investment in our own frustration and unsatisfaction, our own complicity in hampering our desires, may enable a subject to pursue satisfaction through recognising their impossible desire.

**Che Vuoi?**

Desire is a question, never an answer. Desire’s fixation is always directed more to its cause, and this cause alone, over any objects. Desire’s original impetus is our parents’
desires upon which we are born: their wishes for us, their sexuality that ‘created’ us, their naming of us. Our initial modelings are around/in response with their desires; wanting (or not) to be the object of their desire. In true post-colonial discourse, even doing the opposite of our parents’ wishes still binds and constitutes our identity within the nexus of their desires, ensuring our dependence on them.

Our dependency on the Other’s Desire does not merely clone or reproduce it. Within the task in inaugurating our individual subjectivity is to establish some separation/autonomy between ourselves and the Other. Part of this subjectification process is our identifying the mOtherer’s desire and then formulating our own response to this. According to Lacan, the infant asks themselves Che vuoi? - ‘What do you want?’ of the mOtherer, their answer to which enables them a stance to ask, in time, what is it I desire? Neither question gets answered but their asking allows a position to be taken in relation to desire that facilitates one’s own subjective question to be asked.

“IT is the way that the subject has aimed at, has located this desire of the other which is the mother’s desire, and with respect to this desire it is to make him recognise, or pass, or propose to become with respect to something which is an X of desire in the mother, to become or not the one who responds, to become or not the desired being” (Lacan, Seminar V, 12.03.58: 4).

This same subjectification is the psychoanalytic goal where an analysand asks themselves what is it the analyst wants from them as a way of approaching/addressing/discoursing what it is they want themselves.

“This is why the Other’s question that comes back to the subject from the place from which he expects an oracular reply – which takes some such form as ‘Che vuoi?’, ‘What do you want?’, is the question that best leads the subject to the path of his own desire, assuming that, thanks to the know-how of a partner known as a psychoanalyst, he takes up that question, even without knowing it, in the following form: ‘What does he want from me?’” (Lacan, 2006: 815)

We formulate our desire from the answer we give to our question of the Other’s desire. That our desire has been premised on their desire dictates that there will an eternal disparity between what we desire and what we actually want. These two will never coexist. Thus generating a gap between our unconscious desire and the ego desires we believe we want, which we articulate as demands:

“For it is clear here that man’s continued nescience of his desire is not so much nescience of what he demands, which may after all be isolated, as nescience of whence he desires” (Lacan, 2006: 814).

**Desire and Fantasy**

Travelling unconsciously along chains of signifiers, Desire uses not only demand as its vehicle, but fantasy as its mise en scène where the fading subject stages the lost object
causing their desire. The subject’s fading within the fantastic scenario’s chain of signifiers supporting their desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject themselves.

Though fantasy (and pornography) may appear to be a collection of images, fantasy is always bound to the Symbolic Order of language: “an image set to work in the signifying structure.” (Lacan, 2006: 637). The construction of fantasy involves establishing coordinates for our desire in which we situate both ourselves and our object of desire (the ‘objet petit a’), and more importantly the space/distance between them. Our desires therefore necessarily rely on this space/lack, since fantasy, by definition, does not correspond to anything in the real. At the heart of desire is a misrecognition of fullness where there is really nothing but a screen for our own narcissistic projections.

Lacan compares the fantasy scene to a frozen image on a cinema screen; just as the film may be stopped at a certain point in order to avoid showing a traumatic scene which follows, so also the fantasy scene is a defence which veils castration. The fantasy is thus characterised by a fixed and immobile quality. (Evans, 1996: 60)

It is that lack at desire’s core that ensures our continuing to desire. Actually approaching our object of desire threatens uncovering the critical lack necessary for our desires’ persistence. Thus, desire is most interested not in fully attaining the object of desire but in keeping its distance, to allow desire to persist. Because desire is enacted through fantasy, it is driven to some extent by its own impossibility. “Through fantasy, we learn how to desire” (Zizek, 1992: 6).

In considering fantasy (sexual or otherwise) as our answer to the question of what we assume the Other wants, it is constructed as a means by which we carve out a space for our own desire in our belief of where the Other’s lacks. Fantasy thus functions to police, to protect and serve, our desire.

“Let us say that, in its fundamental use, fantasy is the means by which the subject maintains himself at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing inasmuch as the very satisfaction of demand deprives him of his object” (Lacan, 2006: 637).

‘Object a’

Although desire can never be satisfied with an object, Lacan proffers ‘Object a’ as the only object of desire, a contribution he deemed his most important to psychoanalysis. ‘Object a’ is not an object of tangible elements or substance, such as hair, eyes, or a smile, but represented more through diverse partial objects in environs of the body occupying both internal and external margins and lacking specular representation. Desire never relates to an object but to a lack.
The gaze exemplifies object $a$’s formlessness. Although we may perceive the gaze as a look or pair of eyes, it can never be seen, though nonetheless most definitely felt, be it through blackened windows, CCTV camera surveillance, or Ireland’s ‘Valley of the Squinting Windows’ (MacNamara, 1918). As Orwell’s Big Brother evidences, there is not necessarily anyone ‘doing’ the gaze; object $a$ does not even require a subject. We experience being watched precisely when no one is actually watching.

Lacan’s object $a$ is not the object of desire but the object driving our desire. Instead of our desire being to have this object, our desire actually evades it, to maintain its drive:

“You see, the object of desire is the cause of the desire [object $a$], and this object that is the cause of desire is the object of the drive – that is to say, the object around which the drive turns…. It is not that desire clings to the object of the drive – desire moves around it, in so far as it is agitated in the drive.” (Lacan, Seminar XI: 243).

Lacan constantly emphasised the imaginary nature of any object appearing to fulfil desire. It is into/within the gap, the original splitting which structures human subjectivity, inaugurated though the Mirror Stage, that object $a$, as object cause of desire, installs itself.

**The Phallus is the indicator of the desire of the Other**

The infant’s struggle to parley the *Che vuoi?* of the mOtherer’s enigmatic desire, and institute a place for their own desire in the gap they find in the Other, institutes a very particular name to the presumed object of the mOtherer’s desire, what she herself lacks: the phallus. Lacan utilises this Freudian term to evoke its discursive significance as penis, but advances the phallus as the very signifier of desire, the perpetual signifier of the mOtherer’s fundamental lack.

“The fact that the phallus is a signifier requires that it be in the place of the Other that the subject have access to it. But since this signifier is there only as veiled and as ratio of the Other’s desire, it is the Other’s desire as such that the subject is required to recognise – in other words, the other insofar as he himself is a subject divided by the signifying *Spaltung* [splitting]” (Lacan, 2006: 693).

As veiled enigma, the phallus is never the object of desire, but instituted as a signifier denoting this something beyond the mOtherer, they lack. The realisation of the mOtherer’s lack/desire is the crucial turning point in the development of subjectivity:

“Clinical work shows us that the test constituted by the Other’s desire is decisive, not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a real phallus, but in the sense that he learns that his mother does not have one. This is the moment in experience without which no symptomatic consequence (phobia) or structural consequence (*Penisneid*) related to the castration complex can take effect. This seals the conjunction of desire, insofar as the phallic signifier is its mark, with the threat of or nostalgia based on not-having.” (694).
The phallus is not the penis but “is beyond anything which can represent it. It is only ever represented as a reflection on a veil.” (Lacan, 1991b: 223) The phallus depicts lack as ‘more than’ missing, as the tomb of ‘The’ Unknown Soldier, marks more than just the unknown-ness of that entombed individual, but an unknown-ness of all casualties of war, an unknown-ness of war itself. The quest in representing something impossible to represent is substantiated in how different holocaust memorials ultimately can only denote the impossibility of ‘truly’ or ‘actually’ representing the Holocaust.

The phallus is something known to be unknowable, something veiled, thus signifying desire in indicating a presence while maintaining the impossibility of knowing what it is. In discourses on homo-sexual desire which follow, this impossible veiled phallic signification is considerably expressive in apprehending (or not) how Phallic Lack drives desire through innumerable unviable veils, the muscled enough body, the large enough penis, the straight-acting enough gay male, veils of phallic masculinity. Being continually veiled, the phallus functions to sustain desire, through desire’s metonymic signifiers.

Lacan ascribes the hysteric as arousing desire by inducing others to believe the object of desire lies beyond their veil, hence hysterics use the veil to stimulate desire, in full awareness that removing the veil, would empty desire entirely. Hysterical enjoyment demands the veil arouse through promise, but never actualisation. In contemporary pornified discourses of dating apps, sexting, webcams and ‘instant messaging’, technology affords us the hysterical veil.

“The hysteric’s provocation, is precisely something which tends to constitute desire, but beyond what is called defence, to indicate the place beyond this appearance, this mask, something which is essentially what is presented to desire, and which it of course cannot accede to because it is something which is presented behind a veil, but on the other hand of course not being able to be found there. It is not worth your while opening my bodice, because you will not find the phallic there, but if I put my hand to my bodice, it is so that you may designate, behind my bodice, the phallus, namely the signifier of desire” (Sem V, 07.05.58., p.11).

The veiled nature of the phallus is critical for desire. Lacan daringly argues for a woman to be desirable to a man she need only place a prosthetic phallus under her dress to evidence the veiled phallus signifying desire, against the actual penis she obviously does not have. Within contemporary homo-sexual discourses the veils of steroids, sex apps, darkrooms, Photoshop, all extend veiled phallic desire.

“Such is woman concealed behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis that makes her the phallus, the object of desire. Evoke this absence in a more precise way by having her wear a cute fake one under a fancy dress, and you, or rather she, will have plenty to tell us about: the effect is 100 percent guaranteed.” (Lacan, 2006: 825).
**Desire Should Never Be Satisfied**

“Desire, indeed, is there to persist as desire, not as anything else” (Leader, 1996, 108).

Desire being initiated in that space of the Other’s lack, it is critical this lack be maintained for the subject to desire. He illustrates the anorectic’s refusal of food as an endeavour to mark out a space for their own desire in a place where the Other lacks, to hold their own differentiation and Otherness in evidencing to the Other a hunger that cannot be fed:

“It is the child who is most lovingly fed who refuses food and employs his refusal as if it were a desire (anorexia nervosa). … Ultimately, by refusing to satisfy the mother’s demand, isn’t the child requiring the mother to have a desire outside of him, because that is the pathway toward desire that he lacks?” (Lacan, 2006: 628)

Lacan employs this argument into the sexual relationship, which too can only be maintained desire’s critical lack is maintained:

“One can see how a sexual relationship occupies this closed field of desire and plays out its fate there … to put it as simply and clearly as possible, that for each of the partners in the relationship, both the subject and the Other, it is not enough to be subjects of need or objects of love – they must hold the place of the cause of desire. It also constitutes the condition of the subject’s happiness there.” (692)

Demand being primarily a demand for love and recognition, for relationships to endure at their core should be the very inability to satisfy this demand over resolving such demand with objects to verify our love. Rather than believing anything we give or do as proof, we should take the lack of the Other as our object. Most couples misconstrue this lack in the Other as satiable through an object (a mortgage, a baby, an orgasm, a wedding) instead of recognising the demand in their partners’ needs; and accepting this demand as, not for any object, but that which sustains desire.

Lacan maintains that the ability to preserve our desire is so vital that it safeguards us against the experience of satisfaction: “For desire is a defence, a defence against going beyond a limit in jouissance” (Lacan, 2006: 825).

**Desire - I Can’t Get No Satisfaction**

Desire not being a desire for any object that might satisfy, Lacan argues desire as exceeding anything endeavouring its satisfaction. His illustrates this with a man who after sex stands by a railway track drops his pants to flash a passing train-carriage full of people, secure in knowing he won’t be caught:

“What the act in question shows first and foremost, before any other interpretation, is that he has had and has realised his satisfaction; this act indicates what is left over to be desired beyond satisfaction.” (Seminar V, 23.04.58: 2)
However satisfying the sex, he immediately must create a capacity for another desire despite, indeed because of, his realised satisfaction. Desire does not exist to be satisfied, but only to keep itself going for its own sake. Desire is therefore less about meaning something but more a direction which resists meaning.

“That desire should be determined by an act of signification does not at all give us its meaning in any complete sense. It may be that desire is a by-product of this act of signification.” (4)

Fundamental to being able to desire then is being able to experience the sensation of lack.

“Desire is a relation of being to lack. This lack is the lack of being properly speaking. It isn’t the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the being exists. “This lack is beyond anything which can represent it. It is only ever represented as a reflection on a veil” (Lacan, 1991b: 223).

Given that “desire is the metonymy of the want-to-be” (Lacan, 2006: 623) and “the ego is the metonymy of desire” (640), it is through a fundamental experience of a lack in the Other that we identify for ourselves a lack in our own being, which comes to constitute our desire; and thus our ability to form an ego (an ‘I’). If desire has no home, an ego, it can only sustain itself in a want-to-be.

Desire skips between signifiers without ever fixing on one object, to avoid everything that might satisfy, substituting “one term for another to produce a metaphorical effect” (622) where what is desired is substituted by something else in order to maintain an earlier desired object and maintain the impossibility of its satisfaction.

The constant counting or other repeated rituals of obsessive compulsive disorder exhibit attempts for enduring desire, so desire’s challenge never has to be actually encountered. Thus the obsessional’s cursed uncertainty in their impossible choice between two contradictory desires, never decides, but displaces the dilemma onto other objects/choices linked metonymically and metaphorically to the truly terrifying choice, thereby investing in their obsessional rituals.

**Desire Is A Signifying Process Beyond**

As desire is not a wish for a particular object, like caramel salted chocolate or a ‘hot’ boyfriend, but is the process of wishing itself, Lacan locates desire’s manifestation in Freud’s royal road to the unconscious - dreams. What Lacan uncovers through Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams* is that desire cannot be expressed in the form of a sentence – for example, ‘I want a hot boyfriend’ or ‘I want caramel salted chocolate’ but instead desire is the very *process* by which dreams are formed:
Freud outlines how needs in our dreams become distorted to facilitate something beyond the satisfaction of need to be expressed; Polar explorers do not just dream of food they need, but “three course dinners … whole mountains of tobacco”. (SE XV: 133) A dream never merely represents wish fulfilment or need satisfaction, but a need/wish in the process of its satisfaction; there is always something more than the wish/need. Excavating desire from a dream never lies in the expressed wishes but supplementary details that do not necessarily belong to the dream. Freud’s example of Du Prel’s dream “almost dying of thirst on one of his African journeys, dreamt unceasingly of the well-watered, valleys and meadows of his home” (133) indicates more than thirst; perhaps “unceasing” desires for “home” and “wellness”. One never dreams or fantasises of having sex with someone “hot”, without extrapolations indicating the ‘more’ of desire which could be the location of the sexual scene, names associated to the sexualised other, or supplementary acts/words. Indeed, contrary to conscious fantasy, most people’s unconscious sexual dreams involve persons one would not knowingly desire, thus indicating desire’s inordinate unconscious thread. Again, signifiers dispatch the residue recognised as desire.

“Observe that when all is said and done, in the dream, what Freud recognises as desire, is indeed [recognised] by the alteration of need that signals itself, it is in so far as what is fundamental is masked, articulated into something which transforms it, which transforms it into what? Into the fact that it passes through a certain number of modes, of images which are there qua signifiers.” (Lacan, Sem V, 12.03.58: 3)

Both dreams, unconscious phantasies, and conscious fantasies, operate only as vehicles transmitting desire through signifiers. Thus (ph/f)antasies content is not critical, but their narration/signification/staging, the words/signifiers utilised. Images within (ph/f)antasies are never as important as the discourses enveloping such images: “Dream images are to be taken up only on the basis of their value as signifiers” (Lacan, 2006: 510).

“But this structure of the subject, we only recognise it through the fact that what happens in the dream, is submitted to the modes and to the transformations of the signifier, to the structures of metaphor and metonymy, of condensation and of displacement. Here what gives the law of the expression of the desire in the dream, is indeed the law of the signifier.” (Lacan, Sem V, 12.03.58: 4)

Desire is located within our discourse. Analysing the signifiers shrouding desire is precisely the work of a psychoanalysis. Desire is thus not some enigmatic existence independent of our words, but conceived and reproduced through and within discourse.

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” (John 1.1) To discourse desire, particularly homo-sexual desire, is to not only understand our modi for desiring, but to analyse the words in which this desire is enacted. The love that dares not speak its name is named, and named as homo-sexual.
“The locus of the Other is the locus of the word, which creates the whole problematic of desire, of human desire, and which makes it subject to the formations of the unconscious, to the dialectic of the unconscious, which means that we deal with it, that we can have an influence on it by the fact that it is or not articulated in the word in analysis. There would be no analysis if there were not this fundamental situation.”
(Lacan, *Sem V*, 11.06.58: 4)

**Conclusion**

This chapter explored Lacan’s discoursing of desire as heter(a)sexual, being other/hetero constructed both through the desires of others and structured in/by the Other of language. Our desire is transported through signifiers, cultural ideologies we inhabit, and assume. Thus homo-sexual desire is but another signification conceived and inherited through/from the desire of the others/Other. Lacan’s theorisations of desire facilitate an appreciation that however objects of desire, or images of fantasy may appear, they are not the polestars of desire as are the Phallus, lack and object $a$. The following chapter explores the significance of the phallus and object $a$ to Lacan’s formula on sexuation, his theorisation on how human subjects approach the trauma of becoming ‘sexed’ or ‘gendered’, critical discourse for a Lacanian deconstruction on significations inherent in the naming signifiers of hetero and homo-sexuality.
Chapter Eleven:

“Queering Sexuality”: Lacan’s HommoSexuality

Chapter Synopsis

Lacan’s Desire moves sexuality away from discourse on objects, orientations and indeed genders which collapse desire being signified as either hetero or homo. Individuals desire things or sexual acts/persons because of lack and loss structure being. The previous chapter highlighted how desire is indeed hetero Other structured, when desire is the desire of/for the Other. This chapter looks at the homogenous desiring positions within Lacan’s Graph of Sexuation, and the hommosexuality that underwrites desire; a hommosexuality Lacan significantly argues as having more to do with love, than with sex or ‘sexuality’. Yet despite Lacan’s sexuation separating out a discourse of sexuality unencumbered by biology, gender, genitals, he still elected to label the two desiring positions of his graph of Sexuation in the perfidious binary opposition of masculine and feminine.

Lacan and the Perverse Homosexuals

Despite Freud’s opposition, the 1921 International Psychoanalytical Association banned psychoanalytic training for homosexuals, homosexuality being “a repugnant crime: if one of our members committed it, we would be seriously discredited”. (Jones quoted in Roudinesco, 2009: 231) Because of the IPA ban, French homosexuals wanting training often worked with Lacan, who never tried to re-educate them and whose Freudian School of Paris was the first to accept homosexuals training as psychoanalysts in 1964.

Roudinesco argues Lacan’s view of homosexuality “as honouring the role occupied by the homosexual figure in Western society: a figure both damned and sublime” (238) despite contemporary homosexual wishes for ‘normalisation’, for marriage, for children “to the point of imitating the most bourgeois models, and hence the most neurotic structures of family relationships”. (238) Notwithstanding her belief in Lacan’s “astonishment” at homosexuals’ imitation of “those who have never stopped persecuting them since the beginning of time.” (238), she reiterates Lacan would never have adopted a homophobic discourse against such desires.

Atypically, for Lacan, homosexuality was ‘normal’ in its not being a sexual orientation, but a subjective structured position, that of perversion. Categorising homosexuality as
‘perverse’ was not determining it against ‘normal/healthy sexuality, but as a contrary/distorted perversion of desiring, alternative rather than immoral; although ‘perverse’ discourse inevitably implicates such connotations and judgements. For Lacan, Greek homosexuality established the perverse homosexual as a highly transgressive character embodying the highest refinement and cultivation, whilst being socially condemned and marginalised.

“His fascination with Greek homosexuality led him, on one hand, to see the perverse figure as the embodiment of the highest intellectuality, though it be damned, and on the other hand, to consider all forms of love, indeed of desire, as something perverse. Just as Lacan ‘psychoticised’ the clinical handling of neurosis, he also tended to see perversion in all manifestations of love.” (236)

In signifying homosexuality as perversion, Lacan symbolises it as part of a universal structure of personality that “considered homosexual love as the prototype of love” (237). Lacan presents love as having a component, indeed a structure, of a perverse nature, a “sublimated homosexual structure common to both homosexuals and heterosexuals” (241). The perverse desire present in forms of love combining sublimation and physical sexuality, is recognised by Lacan as being decidedly constructive for art, creativity, and the proliferation of new social bonds. Lacan regretted the passing of such classical homosexual positioning from contemporary ‘gay’ lives and livings (237).

Lacan denoted all forms of love, indeed of desire as perverse, presenting homosexuality not as sexually perverse within sexological or psychiatric frameworks of degeneracy, but as structurally perverse. His assertion of “Love is giving something one doesn’t have to someone who doesn’t want it.” (Lacan quoted in Zizek 2006: 44) ascribes all love, homosexual just as much as heterosexual, as ‘perverse desire’ based on a universal “inexhaustible captation of the desire of the other” (Lacan, 1991a: 221).

“The fundamental uncertainty of the perverse relation, the fact that it can find no way of becoming grounded in any satisfying action, makes up one aspect of the drama of homosexuality. But it is also this structure which gives perversion its value. Perversion is an experience which allows one to enter more deeply into what one can call, in the full sense, the human passion … open to this division from himself which structures the imaginary … the specular relation.” (ibid.)

In designating homosexuality as perverse structure rather than orientation, Lacan establishes homosexuality as ‘incurable’:

“I think the key to the problem of the homosexual is this; the homosexual being homosexual, with all the nuances this implies, accords this predominant value to the blessed object, makes it a characteristic that is absolutely required in the sexual partner, in so far as in some form or other it is the mother who, in the sense that I have taught you to distinguish it, lays down the Law for the father. (Sem. V: 29.1.58., 149).

In classic Lacanian discourse utilising Freud’s signifier perversion, though indubitably

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carrying earlier degenerate discourses of immorality and criminality, allows Lacan not just connotations of alternative subjective structures, but to also play/manipulate within the term itself, so that perversion also implies and implicates a père-version to exhibit the pervert’s appeal to the father to fulfil the paternal function.

Perverse structure occurs when a subject has experienced sufficient alienation to perceive themselves as different to the mother, but without a strong enough paternal (père) function to completely separate them from being the object of their mother. They acknowledge castration’s threat, but its ineffectiveness licenses the subject to expose the meaningfulness of the Law while still remaining an object for the mother. The subject thus acknowledges the Law’s existence but denies its import. A perverse individual continuously attempts to exhibit their transgressions of the Law, to underline its inefficacy. Engaging in prohibited behaviour evokes an unconscious wish for the Law to enact its threat and realise castration, to finally individuate the subject.

An important distinction is while for the neurotic individual sexuality is repressed, for the perverse, sexuality is ever present albeit any restrictions are disavowed. Because the perverse structure forms initially through the Oedipal drama, the conscious and compulsive attention of the perverse individual remains in the genital regions, genital pleasure never being repressed during childhood. (Fink, 1997)

“What is perversion? It is not simply an aberration in relation to social criteria, an anomaly contrary to good morals, although this register is not absent, nor is it an atypicality according to natural criteria, namely that it more or less derogates from the reproductive finality of the sexual union. It is something else in its very structure.” (Lacan, 1991a, 221)

**Lacan is Gay**

Lacan’s utilising the term perversion to underscore its père-version evinces his deliberate provocative use/manipulation of language, especially homosexual colloquial lexicon to evoke or provoke, evidenced most infamously in his describing Plato’s Symposium as a “gathering of old queens”. (Roudinesco, 1993: Footnote 21).

Happy to court controversy and shock through his provocative manipulations of language, it should come as no surprise that Lacan outed himself as ‘gay’ on at least two public occasions. On Sunday 22 October 1967, Lacan was at the Maison de la Chimie on the rue Saint-Dominique in Paris, where Mannoni was presiding over a study weekend on psychosis, featuring presentations both by members of Lacan’s École Freudienne de Paris and a number of high-profile external speakers, including Winnicott, Cooper and Laing. During his, the closing speech of the conference, Lacan divulged:
“Everyone knows that I am gay [je suis gai], some would even say that I’m a bit childish [gamin]. I’m having a good time [je m’amuse]. It constantly happens to me that, in my texts, I am giving myself over to all kinds of jokes [plaisanteries], which is not to the taste of academics. But look, it’s true, I’m not sad. Or more precisely, I only have one real sadness, in what has been traced out for me by way of a career, and that is that there are fewer and fewer people to whom I can explain the reasons for me being gay, when I do have them.”

The second time was on 12th May 1971, a month before the first ever controversial French Gay Pride march in Paris, when, in the lecture theatre of the Law Faculty on the Place du Panthéon in Paris, Lacan treated his audience to a performance of ‘Liturerette’, a text he had written for a special journal issue on psychoanalysis and literature. The phrase “je suis gai” does not appear in the published version of the text, but was included in the official French publication of Seminar XVIII, (see p. 120).

Lacan’s punning on being gay evidences not only his capacity for manipulating signifiers to evidence multiple meanings/signifieds, but also an awareness and sensitivity to the power of homosexual lexicon, particularly at this juncture, as ‘homosexuals’ ‘coming out’ and redefining themselves as gay takes on greater cultural import in the post-Stonewall era’s rise of the international gay movement and gay liberation.

Gai Pied was a then contemporary weekly French gay magazine whose name was suggested by Foucault, who contributed throughout the magazine’s existence. Lacan is a man unafraid of identifying as gay, to make a point, to upset and ultimately in true Lacanian discourse to transgress and provoke.

**Lacan’s Love Is Hommosexual**

Soler emphasises Lacan’s use and creation of words in Seminar XX to play with language and discourse, to create other meanings and workings:

“He writes in French, a word that does not exist in French ‘horsexe’. Translated, this is ‘outsidesex’. Love is outsidersex. Another way of saying this is that love is homosexual. This is what Lacan says at the beginning, that love is hommosexual, written with two ‘m’s as a deliberate spelling mistake. … Lacan plays with writing, with a mistake in spelling, to indicate love is outsidersex and hommosexual. These two sentences are equivalent. So you see, we have a thread. Love is outsidersex; love is hommosexual; and, at the end, love is impossible. (Soler, 1993: 3)

Affectively, Lacan in his word play inscribes like-kind desire with the signification it has historically been categorically denied, placing it ‘outside’ sex, and alongside love. Again significantly, in his spelling, Lacan identifies something ‘male’, of man in this outside

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31 I am indebted to Dany Nobus for both these references.
sex loving hommosexuality, in contrast to prevailing homosexual discourses which identify homosexuality with the feminine, with women. Lacan restores an unbastardised binomial nomenclature for his ‘hommosexuals’.

Lacan relates this hommosexuality to the hysteric, who desires from the position of a man (homme) in order to ascertain what he desires (hommosexuelle):

“Hysteria, namely to play the part of the man (faire l’homme), as I have said, being thus hommosexual or beyonddex themselves – it being difficult for them not to sense the impasse that consists in the fact they love each other as the same (elles se moment) in the Other, for indeed, there is no need to know you are Other to be there.” (Sem XX: 85)

As outlined in the previous Chapter, the hysteric does not accept themselves as an object of desire, but identifies with the Other’s desire, what they imagine the Other to want. The classic illustration of the female hysteric, Freud’s Dora, exemplifies this desiring from the position of the man (homme) in order to ascertain what he desires (hommosexuelle).

But this ‘masculinity’ attributed to female hysterics evidences Freud’s difficulty with masculinity and femininity: “whose meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people, (as) among the most confused that occur in science” (SE VII: 219) A confusion that Lacan, could not only be consciously ‘enjoying’ in his utilisation of them for his “framework of desiring ‘positions’” (Watson, 2011: 111) within his graph of sexuation.

**Lacan’s Hommo Sexuation**

For both Freud and Lacan, a subject’s sexual position (gender/sexuality/orientation) is neither given nor ‘naturally’ follows an inscribed or defined course. Because of the divided subjectivity inscription by language, speaking beings come to acquire a sexual position from which to engage in sexuality for desiring without possibility of complete satisfaction. Lacan’s “framework of desiring ‘positions’” is his Graph of Sexuation. ‘Sexuation’ being how divided speaking beings positions themselves within a particular sex in order to desire. As the previous chapter explored desire is not about objects or acts, but about desiring and the positions, the identifications one desires from. Sexuation operates at another level from biological sex or cultural gender, involving posturings of desiring, where regardless of inscribed biological sex, one can be positioned on either side of Lacan’s graph, designated the ‘masculine’ or the ‘feminine’.

“sexuation is not biological sex: What Lacan calls masculine structure and feminine structure have to do, not with one's biological organs, but rather with the kind of jouissance one is able to obtain. There is not … any easy overlap between sexuation and “sexual identity”, or between sexuation and what is sometimes referred to as “sexual orientation”. (Fink, 2004: 158)
Lacanian Sexuation dislocates because the concern is no longer with ‘men’ or ‘women’, thus never with hetero or homosexuality, but relocated beyond sex (horsexe), beyond sexual orientations, gendered or sexed bodies, to address positions taken by human subjects within the symbolic order which enable understandings from whence human subjects identify and position themselves for desiring, and thus their relationship to jouissance. The Graph of Sexuation makes evident the impossibility of our pleasure being fulfilled; the non-existence of the sexual relationship: il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel (Lacan, 1991: 134); why ‘The’ Woman does not exist - la femme n’existe pas (Lacan, 1990: 60); but also this seminar’s ‘Limits of Love and Knowledge’ through discoursing our impossible drive to ‘know’, our compulsion to ‘understand’ why fulfilment evades us.

“We find the pleasures available to us in life inadequate, and it is owing to that inadequacy that we expound systems of knowledge—perhaps, first and foremost, to explain why our pleasure is inadequate and then to propose how to change things so that it will not be”. (Fink, 2004: 158)

Lacan’s reworking of Freud’s Oedipus complex renounces biological entities in favour of language and structures; ‘actual’ mothers and fathers substituted with the Name-of-the-Father and the Desire of the Mother; where, as outlined previously, the phallus is not an ‘actual’ penis but a signifier of desire. ‘Castration’ is thus a symbolic operation establishing a universal paradigm for neurotic desire, which moves from the lack constituted in castration, towards objects given phallic value through the signifier phallus, marking them thus as desired. Desire is always the desire of the Other. That symbolic castration creates ‘Sexuality’ refers only to the subject of the unconscious, the symbolic Other of language, and not to men or woman as social or biological entities. There is no sexuality in human subjects other than that instilled within the field of language, that of speech. Sexual identity and positionings are constructed/formcd/informed by language. The ‘Homosexual’ does not exist until named.

The phallic function denotes and structures ‘men’ and ‘women’ in how the splitting occasioned by the alienating function of language, castration, institutes lack within/for both positions. Admitting sexuality for the human subject involves a coming out of speech, a speaking through language which necessitates a real loss of the jouissance of the body. As speaking subjects there can be no access to the complete jouissance of the Other, because we must speak, and speaking always fails us. For each sex, the phallus
provokes a loss but evokes a choice, a choice regarding the sexual position adopted in relation to the loss evoked by the phallus.

In emphasising the effects signification has on speaking beings, Lacan reframes ‘sexuality’ discourse and the question of sexual difference away from deliberations of psychic effects, towards an appreciation of from where such difference becomes inscribed. There is no sexual relationship, neither gay nor straight, merely ideas of men and women rather than ‘realities’. Yet, despite such innovative Sexuation reinterpretation, Lacan still constructs a binary opposition utilising those most perfidious and interminable signifiers masculinity and femininity: “whose meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people, (as) among the most confused that occur in science” (SE VII: 219)

**Lacan’s Semblance**

Lacan’s semblant carries the connotation of being seductive, therefore deceptive. We believe in semblants, or rather we opt for a semblant over the real because semblants are a means of satisfaction or a way of avoiding unpleasure; when a semblant collapses, anxiety emerges. It fills a lack by coming to the place where something should be but isn’t, and where its lack produces a negative affect of some sort, but focusing on anxiety. Semblants are a form of substitution of something that provides a source of satisfaction for another object that would cause anxiety. (Grigg, 1997)

Lacan ascribes the signifier semblance to key themes of this seminar: objet petit a is a “semblance of being” (Sem. XX, 84), love is addressed to a semblance, (85) jouissance is only evoked on the basis of a semblance. (85) Lacan propounds a discursive turn, that sexuality for human beings is a semblant, an illusion, a make believe. His emphasis is that, in defining sexuality in reference to the phallus, all human sexuality is located in the field of the paraître, appearing or seeming. Thus, the woman seems to the man to be the phallus that he lacks, and a man seems to have the phallus that the woman lacks.

This follows from the intervention of an appearing, which gets substituted for the having, so as to protect on the one side, and to mask its lack in the other. (1985: 84)

Sexuality in seeming to have or be, indicates there is no further truth behind the defences of (mask)ulinity or the mask of femininity. There is but the relation between two phallic positions: the feminine and the masculine, in which castration structurally occupies both, dominating both equally, but masked in different ways. It is not the phallic function that makes the two sexed positions different; this difference must be sought elsewhere.

**Different Modes of Jouissance**

For Lacan, the difference between the sexes isn’t genitally written on the body but lies in different modes of jouissance for two sets of speaking beings. It’s no longer a question of man or woman, or male and female sexuality, but this logic of sexuation which produces two arrangements of speaking beings with separate conditions of jouissance.
The first, named phallic jouissance is linked to the phallus and located in the jouissance of speech to which every speaking being is subjected. The second is designated Other jouissance, being ‘other’ than phallic jouissance, going beyond that which can be signified, a ‘feminine’ jouissance.

“Lacan stated his thesis of the feminine as supplement to the masculine, specifying that a woman ‘is the only one whose jouissance exceeds that of coitus.’” (Glowinski et al, 2001: 176)

**Il n’y a Pas de Rapport Sexuel**

Lacan’s infamous claim that “There is no sexual relation” denies neither sex nor sexuality but the illusion of a rapport, a mutual connection between the sexes, some direct paired relationship between persons. Male and female are not two corresponding parts of a whole, but positions resulting from a failure of symbolisation to signify it all. They are two alternative productions occasioned through symbolisation encountering an impossibility. For Lacan sexual difference emerges at the point where symbolisation fails.

The previous chapter’s elucidation of how that lack that is the cause of the subject’s desire is the origin of their demand for love, is precisely what makes sexual rapport impossible because any ‘union’ or ‘relationship’ ignores these actualities. In desire, we never relate to each other, but each of us relates to the Other, or to the lack in the Other, to castration, and there are only two positions one can adopt in relation to the castration of the Other.

All that is ‘the sexual’ can only be ‘known’, ‘articulated’ in language, thus is phallically determined. Being subjected to language, the jouissance of the signifier blocks direct access between the subject and the body of the Other. The law of castration to which all are subjected dictates all must be mediated through signification. The sexual act, therefore, must always be enacted as a failed encounter and any consequential satisfaction can only be defined in correspondence to the failure of the jouissance of the body. Phallic jouissance makes it impossible for man to enjoy the body of woman taken as Other. “All the needs of speaking beings are contaminated by the fact of being involved in another satisfaction.” (Lacan, *Sem. XX*: 51) The Other is structured around this phallic jouissance limit as traumatic impossibility which bars access to complete jouissance.

The demand for love outlined previously is the demand to fill this lack made by the separation from the Other. Love also endeavours to hide the Other’s castration, as recognising the lack in the Other effectively establishes the subject’s own castration. Love can be conceived of as a fantasy of union and fusion, a fantasy of Oneness with the Other that serves to supplement what is lacking for the subject, the sexual relation.
In attempting to compensate for the missing sexual rapport, the subject’s fantasy constructs the possibility for having sexual relations, but never between a subject and the Other sex. Instead always in a relation between a subject and an object which comes in place of the Other sex, covering up the gap in the Other.

**La femme n’existe pas**

Lacan’s controversial statement, The Woman does not exist, is not a misogynistic denial of female existence, but more a rhetorical annunciation demanding consideration and formulated through Lacanian logic. Unicorns, leprechauns and round rectangles do not exist, but yet they can be signified, spoken about, evoke certain visual representations, even the round rectangle. Language can create signification, an existence, even for phantasmatic or impossible objects, things that do not exist.

Through the mirror stage, the infant experienced the tragedy of separation from the mOtherer and subsequently must recognise themselves as a separate subject who desires the mOtherer as the object of their desire: the mOtherer is their Phallus. The infant can never reunite with the mOtherer because of the incest taboo enforced by castration from the Phallus to which they are subjected. If the subject were ever to regain the Phallus, they would cease to be a subject. Union with the phallic mOtherer epitomised in the phantasy of an unmediated relationship with the other can only exist beyond signification and symbolisation, in the Lacanian Real.

The discovery of the mOtherer’s castration, their not having the phallus, dictates the subject as never able to return to this womblike unmediated union, forever lost.

“Woman, as a result, is identified only by her lack of the phallus. She is different from the phallus. She can know herself only as this difference, as this lack. As lack, she cannot speak of herself directly. As Lacan remarks “There is no woman, but excluded from the value of words’.” (Cornell, 2013: 74)

It is impossible to signify anything of relations between man and woman because “analytic discourse ... brings into play the fact that woman will never be taken up except quoad matrem. Woman serves her function in the sexual relationship only qua mother.” (Lacan, *Sem. XX*: 35) If Woman cannot assume her function within the sexual relation except as mOtherer, then woman does not exist. Being forbidden, the mOtherer may be represented in the unconscious as object of desire, but the symbolic process can never produce a signifier of Woman. It is not that women don’t exist, it is that ‘The Woman cannot be signified’. There is no signifier to designate woman thus woman is taken as that point in the Other corresponding to the lack of signifier, that failure of symbolisation to say it all, where symbolisation encounters an impossibility to produce a signifier of
sex, of woman. In psychoanalysis, femininity is another name for the Other, the Other’s sex, which no signifier can designate.

**Compensating Lack in the Sexual Relation**

In sexuality there is a gap between the One, referring to phallic jouissance connected with the fantasy, and the Other connected with S(А). Jouissance being inured by the impasse caused by the Other, Lacan displays how each sex offsets the absence of the sexual relation in the different ways of missing their targets.

On the graph’s left *masculine* side the divided subject (S), supported by the phallus signifier (Φ) is directed towards the other side to object a, the object cause of desire. This *masculine* compensation for the sexual relation’s failure and dis-appointing the jouissance of the Other, the body, is having access to phallic jouissance (Φ). Within the symbolic Order, the divided subject’s (S) proper sexual partner is the Other. But, as this Other is barred S(А), the divided subject is subjected to fantasy which can only partner the object a, which remains as residue after and beyond symbolisation, operating as cause of desire.

S→a constructs *masculine* fantasy within phallic jouissance for a divided subject where a partner’s role as object a, provides some compensatory value of jouissance against the divided subject’s castration through language. Thus other persons are nothing but objects of desire; a something, a bodily piece (object a) is all that offers erotic consistency.

On the *feminine* side, Lacan locates ThēlLā barred woman with two arrows, indicating something other than the fantasy object compensating for this lack; one aiming at and another aiming at the Α. Linking *feminine* desire and the phallus denotes the Freudian argument, of the *feminine* subject’s desiring the phallus in the form of a child, a house, etc., or be the phallus for the man.

The second arrow aims not to the phallic Other of speech of phallic jouissance, but to another side of the Other, S(А), the Other that is non-existent at the level of the signifier, to the other as the Other sex. *Feminine* jouissance is linked to this lack of a signifier in
the Other, thus cannot be named by the signifying chain structured by castration and the phallic law. This places Woman at the level of radical Other, of the sexed real Other, of which the unconscious can say nothing except lack.

Because there exists in the Other, as the place of speech, a signifier $S(A)$ that signifies some lack, Lacan reasons this lack can be assumed to be real and can be identified, because language includes words such as ‘unutterable’ and ‘unnameable’; that which is impossible to speak: Catherine Earnshaw’s “I cannot express it…”. Thus Lacan frames feminine jouissance as supplementary to phallic jouissance, the jouissance of speech.

Lacan argues this jouissance transcends phallic reference, the feminine position only partners one placed beyond the law of the phallus, a supreme being. The masculine position responds to the lack in the Other with the fantasy object $a$; the feminine position responds with a mode of jouissance relating to a love without desire, without reference to objects of fantasy. Relating oneself to the lack/absence in the Other, they find through covering up the emptiness of the Other the jouissance of this very lack. Lacan relates this to religious ecstasy and to a bodily jouissance not genitally localised as phallic jouissance is. This Other jouissance is asexual, a sublimation through love, in contrast to phallic/sexual jouissance which involves the organ as instrument of the signifier.

**The Graph of Sexuation**

Lacan’s schema’s upper half holds logical propositions defining both masculine and feminine positions as speaking beings, demarcated differently in the split subjectivity generated by language, irrespective of biological anatomy.

The masculine side proposes two statements, $\exists x \Phi x$ and $\forall x \Phi x$, which read as “There exists one entity and this entity is not subjected to the phallic function (castration)” and “For all entities, each entity is submitted to the phallic function”. Delivered together, the deadlock or contradiction these two propositions exemplify is of a subject’s fantasy where though everyone’s jouissance, including their own, is limited and frustrating in being subordinated to the phallic function, there is a belief in ‘One’ for whom complete enjoyment is possible. All are products of symbolic castration falling under the phallic function, but every universal rule requires the existence of an exception to prove the rule; being outside the set creates the boundaries for the set itself.

Freud mythical form of this exception is the primal horde father, the one who has not succumbed to castration. The structural (im)possibility of complete jouissance, produces
fantasies to explain not only why jouissance is lacking but how this lack might be trounced. An illustration of this fantasy is how all bigoted discourse is premised on the imagined jouissance of other groups, Jews, African-Americans, Travellers, Gay men; believing that they both possess a greater jouissance than ‘us’, and that somehow this other group has appropriated their jouissance from ‘us’.

The feminine is neither opposed nor complementary to the masculine side; but established by Lacan as ‘supplementary’. Here Lacan logical propositions utilise negative quantifiers to establish its functioning differently from the masculine side with respect to the phallic law, while still being subject to it. The two statements here are: $\exists x \: \Phi x$ and $\forall x \: \Phi x$ reading as “there does not exist an entity ‘x’ that is not submitted to the phallic function”; and “not all of ‘x’ is submitted to the phallic function”. On the feminine side, Lacan notes something for this subject evading the phallic function, the castrating law of language.

Where the masculine establishes a universal through an exception, the feminine provides neither exception nor universality, proffering instead a “not-all”. Feminine sexuality being structured with no constitutive exception can be ascribed in terms of immanence; an indwelling, a remaining within.

Having no exception to organise the set, women cannot be defined universally but only encountered one by one in an infinite series. The Universal woman does not exist as a defined set in terms of universals and exceptions, when not all her characteristics can be given meaning by the phallus.

While every feminine subject is castrated and subjected to phallic signification, not-all of them is subject to castration. Thus ‘not-all’ of a speaking located on the feminine side is subject to the phallic law; there is always a ‘something’ beyond. Their subjectivity to the signifier is all that can be said of them, but it is not all that they are. The feminine position is not separated from castration but related to it, not through the phallus and the object a, cause of desire, but through the barred Other S(A).

**Sexuation Implications**

In applying the formulae of sexuation to lived experience and practice what is evidenced are encounters with subjects who though possessing male anatomical or social characteristics, can present themselves with feminine structure. Just as subjects with a female biology can position themselves with masculine structure. Thus, it is not anatomy which is crucial, but the signifier. Lacanian Sexuation discourse accentuates each subject’s relation to the signifier and to their particular mode of jouissance.
Such actual lived observations discourse a subject’s various attempts to reach the Other sex and to find a solution to recompense the absence of the sexual relation. Examples of this explored in the next section are evidenced in the forms of (mask)uline masquerade, or phallic answers via fantasy and desire, re-enacted in gay men’s desire and sexualities.

**Masculine-Feminine Opposition**

This polarity is the only way in which the opposition male-female is represented in the psyche, since the biological function of sexuality (reproduction) is not represented. (Lacan, 1964: 204)

Of all the terms, in all the discourses, Lacan had to step into this one of binary sexual opposition, masculine/feminine, to denote his Sexuation graph, and thus while distinguishing itself from the biology of sexed differences it linguistically and discursively locates itself precisely within terms “whose meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people, (as) among the most confused that occur in science” (SE VII: 219)

Complicating things further, Lacan locates, interprets and relates these terms within the same activity/passivity binary Freud warned of: “we far too readily identify activity with maleness and passivity with femaleness.” (SE XXI, 106)

“If, then, there is no symbol for the opposition masculine-feminine as such, the only way to understand sexual difference is in terms of the opposition activity-passivity.” (Lacan, 1964: 192)

One can only postulate why Lacan, the master of language and word-play would utilise such over-loaded, over-determined terms within his Sexuation discourse, given his intention to liberate Sexuation from biological/cultural constructions of binary sexuality.

Though Ragland argues that “Sexuation is never a binary in Lacan’s teaching” (2004: 93) quoting Lacan’s use of logical discourse in Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise: “Achilles can only pass the tortoise, he cannot catch up with it [except] at infinity” (Lacan, Sem. XX: 8), she believes “the tortoise and Achilles will always be in different places vis-à-vis one another, as will the two sexes. (93) But whatever their relative positions or impossible convergence, Achilles and the tortoise are drawn in opposition to each other within a binary paradox. The paradox being of course ‘in reality’ Achilles will overtake the tortoise in the race. Masculine and feminine may not be drawn in corresponding, correlative binary within Lacan’s graph, but utilising these discursive terms re-establishes the potent and treacherous masculine/feminine binary, no matter how paradoxically.

Fink questions sexuation being graphed within such a loaded gendered binary, offering only cultural norms as rationalisation.
“I cannot say why Lacan associates this Other jouissance specifically with women, apart from the oft-repeated point that many women seem to enjoy talking more than men do.” (Fink, 2004: 162).

**Conclusion**

Through sexuation Lacan de/constructs sexual difference away from the biological body, to evince desiring positions underwritten vis-à-vis one’s position to language, regardless of anatomy. Sexuation underlines desire as not about people or objects, therefore exposing a mythology of ‘natural’ heterosexuality, but about postures of desire taken around Lacanian Real traits like the phallus \( \Phi \) object \( a \) and the radical otherness of \( S(A) \). It is desire, not anatomy that determines destiny. This is a radical position for unpacking models and discourses of desiring, most especially within this thesis, for how like-kind men’s sexuality is neither homo-genous, nor solely sexual/genital, when they too, as speaking subjects, can each be positioned differently in their desirings.

However Lacan’s adoption of the signifiers masculine/feminine to delineate the two sides of his Sexuation graph cannot be uncalculated, especially for this master of language and word-play, and especially against the early seventies epoch of rising French philosophical third wave feminism and an emerging gay movement, just when he, always a supporter of homo-equality, was gayfully outing himself.

Whatever Lacan’s logic, the signifiers masculine and feminine undoubtedly carry and inherit discursive practices and ideologies that Freud, not least of all, was wary of. But establishing phallic sexuality as *masculine*, against the not-all desiring *feminine* positions aligned with hommosexuelle, a man who loves Woman as an ideal, can be clearly evidenced in contemporary homosexual sexual enactments and practices where the empty hall of mirrors of phallic desiring is staged and exhibited as the gay ‘norm’ within hyper-real performances of pornified sexuality, and mask-ulinity as will be explored in the following and final section.

The question of what one is to do as a man or a woman is a drama which is situated entirely in the field of the Other. (Lacan, 1964: 204) which is to say that the subject can only realise his sexuality on the symbolic level. (Lacan, 1993: 170)
Second Conduit: Homophobic Psycho-Anal-ists

“Homosexual relations generate only destructive, mutual defeat, exploitation of the partner and the self, oral-sadistic incorporation, aggressive onslaughts, attempts to alleviate anxiety and a pseudo-solution to the aggressive and libidinal urges which dominate and torment the individual.” (Socarides, 1968: 8)

Summary

Revolutionary in Freud’s psychoanalysis was the manner in which sex and sexuality became discoursed, spoken of, considered in a non-discriminatory, more open way. Freud’s psychoanalytic techniques considered the effects and affects negativity, guilt, shame around sexual matters has on the human subject. Very specifically, Freud homogenised homosexuality as part of each human subject’s unconscious, and their sexual/social development. A legacy that within Freud’s lifetime was undermined by the banning of homosexual analysands from a psychoanalytic training, a legacy that continues in the relatively recent removal of the IPA ban and the manner in which homosexuals and their ‘lifestyles’ have continued to be pathologised. Ironically the expressed homosexual desire for homogeneity, for families, marriage, for love disturbs and unsettles most of all, as conservative psychoanalysis continues a need to other homosexuals as a homogenous grouping that must continually be defined as different/other to a normative, natural, productive heterosexuality, utilising the age-old discourses of pathology and degeneration inherent in the naming of homo-sexuality.

Un Gay-lant Psychoanalysis

Freud condemned psychoanalytic misogyny as infantile. In 1907 when Wittels stated a woman doctor “hysterically” risks harming herself in seeking to leave her “natural” condition, Freud criticised his lack of gallantry, noting civilisation’s heavier burden of reproduction on women. (Nunberg & Federn, 1962: 241) Freud adopted similar attitudes towards homosexuality, condemning any discrimination, taking deliberate steps against classifying homosexuality within ‘degeneracy’ discourses as ‘defective/unnatural’.

Within psychoanalytic discourse, it was Ernest Jones and Anna Freud who, in contrast and opposition to Freud, maintained the highly influential regressive attitudes leading to 1921’s International Psychoanalytic banning of homosexuals from training analyses. Across fifty years, the IPA, particularly under increasing American influence, fortified its repressive homosexual discourses, classifying them as sexual perverts, unsuited for psychoanalysis, potentially curable only in valuing complete heterosexuality.
It is not coincidental that Strachey the foremost European Freudian English translator, avowed his homosexuality before marrying Alix, his “melancholic boy” (Roudinesco, 2009: 233); while the foremost American English translator, Brill, not only advanced the term *homosexuality* as diagnostically impossibile (Lewes, 1995: 58) claiming to have cured homosexuals (55), emphasising “the road to homosexuality always passes over narcissism, that is, love for one’s self.” (Brill, 1913: 338). Undoubtedly, things get lost in translation, but as Chapter Four argued, homophobia can be indubitably found there.

Roughton described the struggle of American homosexual analysts for IPA recognition while outlining clinical conditions that would discourse the “undeniable existence of healthy and mature homosexual men and women.” (Roughton, 1999: 63)

Knowing a person’s sexual orientation doesn’t tell us anything about psychological health or maturity, nor about their character, inner conflicts or their integrity.” (ibid.) Diatkine responded to Roughton, in the name of psychoanalytic neutrality, accusing him of “militant, proselytising” (1999: 1306). Botella claimed such militancy as a “denial of the personal drama of the homosexual’s … narcissistic pathology” (1999: 1317). As again within psychoanalysis, homosexuality’s discursive alignment with narcissism continues. Korff-Saussé’s explanation that homosexual ‘marriage’ granted within France’s Pacte Civile de Solidarité is but “the translation in legal terms of what cloning promises in biology: the logic is the same” (1999) calling on psychoanalysis to treat homosexuals as narcissistic disordered clones unable to value anatomical differences between the sexes. Such psychoanalysis presents a ‘norm’ against militant proselytising ‘homosexuals’, ironically accused of what Lacan’s Sexuation proffers for anatomical sexual differences.

“Homosexuality abolishes the difference between sexes and generations and the homosexual, due to his unresolved Oedipus complex, has a highly impulsive nature that puts him at risk of exercising violence and criminality.” (Nicolaidis, 2001)

Historically homosexual psychoanalytic discourse has claimed not to be ‘homophobic’ but merely speaking in Freud, or Lacan’s name. It is not definitions of homosexuality which preoccupy contemporary psychoanalytic discourse, but rather, its social reality as well as its ‘Real’ in the Lacanian sense. Ironically, what unsettles, is that paranoid, narcissistic perverted homosexuals evidence ordinary neurotic behaviours and desires: to have children, live as a family; enjoy rights, etc.

Such anxiety, evidenced in the current Irish ‘No’ Campaign against same-sex marriage, centres on discourses of sexual acts moving from ‘natural’ reproduction, or Freudian primal-scene coitus to a monstrous other sexuality not grounded/defined/designated on the anatomical difference between the sexes, the precise discursive shift Lacan’s graph of Sexuation executes, underlining the centrality sexual difference, the male/female binary,
has for heteronormative, patriarchal discourses and practices.

Melman and Winter use Lacanian notions of symbolic paternity to re-establish the lost authoritarian father they believe displaced against this new homosexual order within discourses not unlike fin de siècle Weininger’s and Bachofen’s fear of change/progress. These anxieties centre on feminism’s indiscriminate feminisation of society to which un-fathered effeminate pathological homosexuals contribute. Significantly, their writings never refer to ‘gays’ but ‘homosexuals’. Winter accusing homosexuals of narcissistically wanting “symbolically modified children”. Melman assigns homosexuals’ children as “stuffed toy animals, destined to satisfy their parents’ narcissism” (quoted in Roudinesco, 2009: 243). Their anxiety focuses on the feared homosexual desire to remove all difference and homo-genise society, gender and sexuality.

Melman defines the “normal” family as one that “allows the child to confront real problems.” Ironic given Lacan’s 1938 evidencing of the worst depravities and greatest anomalies arising within the most apparently normal families.

Legendre, claims homosexual desire for normalisation reveals an unlimited hedonism, a rejection of all taboos, threatening the fabric of family and society:

“Think of the initiatives undertaken by homosexuals. The small PACS episode is proof that the State has relinquished its role as the guarantor of reason. Freud showed that the omnipresence of homosexual desire is the effect of psychic bisexuality. Giving family status to homosexuality is putting democratic principles to work for fantasy. It’s disastrous, in so far as the law, based on genealogical principles, leaves room for a hedonistic logic, which is the heir to Nazism.” (Legendre, 2001).

That contemporary homosexuality seeks a heteronormativity can’t endanger democracy, rather, as in the Irish referendum, it asks even more of democracy.

In Psychoanalysis, Freud’s homosexual theories ceased to be a matter of ideas but increasingly became a matter of prejudice. In the US the institutionally powerful psychoanalyst Socarides, quoted above, argued curing homosexuality through psychoanalysis, while also suggested Jeffrey Dahmer as an extreme example of a common homosexual type, writing:

“Every homosexual who wants to incorporate the body of his male lover is utilising the same mental mechanism: incorporation. Most homosexuals are content to do this symbolically. Dahmer was psychotic; he took his homosexual disorder beyond the limits.” (1995: 109)

Socarides wrote that the removal of homosexuality from the DSM-II was a mistake, and blamed it for the AIDS epidemic. It’s worth noting his son, Richard, is not only gay himself but an activist who served as Bill Clinton’s principal liaison to the gay community. The return of the repressed; Like Father Like Son.
Section Four

A Terrible Beauty is Porn
Chapter Twelve:
‘This is Not a Sexual Relationship’
Baudrillard and The Treachery of Images

“As individuals we now suffer from social narcissism. The beloved Echo of our ancestors, has been abandoned. We have fallen in love with our own image, with images of our making, which turn out to be images of ourselves” (Boorstin, 1992: 257).

Chapter Synopsis:
This Chapter builds from Lacan’s argument that desire is socially constructed as ‘desire of/for the Other’, and opens this thesis’s fourth section in interrogating homo-sexual narcissistic epistemic operation within contemporary hyper-visual image culture. Contemporary images of homo-sexuality are constructed within the underlying assumptions outlined in the second section of narcissism, and anxious effeminacy. The desire for phallic masculinity now hyper-visually re-presented within contemporary pornography, sexual body imagery. Whether the relentless circulation of such homo-sexual pornographic or sexualised images are true or false depictions is redundant, because they don’t depict like-kind passionates but are embedded in a homo-sex strategy, an encoding of power involving alienation and humiliation, ultimately of their spectators. Just as Narcissus was alienated through his enslavement to his own image, so like-kind passionates, in the current epoch, risk becoming alienated through a dependence on seeing everything of themselves, the desires of the Other, in such images of the hyper-real.

Death through Exposure: The Truth of the Hyperreal

Baudrillard epitomises ‘death by exposure’ through the Philippino Tasaday tribe and the mummified remains of Ramses II. The former had allegedly “lived for eight centuries without any contact with the rest of the species, in their primitive state” (Baudrillard, 2010: 7) until ‘discovered’ in 1971. The latter, despite dying in 1213BC, was rushed to a Paris hospital in 1974 after Egyptologists noticed he was suffering from a ‘fungal infection’ and received at Le Bourget airport with the full military honours befitting “one of the world’s great statesmen, a famous war leader” (Pain, 2004). To aid swift travel, Ramses II was issued an Egyptian passport listing his occupation as “King (deceased)” (National Geographic, 2011).
For Baudrillard both of these embodiments “disintegrate immediately upon contact” (2010: 7), a visual contact with Western society he relates to Orpheus’ gaze condemning Eurydice to eternity in the underworld. For Baudrillard the hyper-reality is where we have all become “living specimens in the spectral light of ethnology” (8) which disintegrates us as human subjects, dooming us to Hadean simulacra. There is something fatal in putting things on display, something exposing in over-exposure, which corrupts their essence, naturalness; for indigenous ‘savages’; a mummified corpse; or human sexuality.

Baudrillard’s hyper-reality exhibits a more ‘real’ world obsessed with displaying timelessness and perfection where ‘image is everything’ and authenticity has been replaced and superseded by an excess of copies, and simulacra. And we, captured and captivated in this illusion of artificial ‘reality’, are not only incapable of distinguishing, but no longer even aware there is any distinction. Instead of experiences, we observe spectacles. Instead of anything real, we have simulacra and simulation.

**The Signifier of Image versus the Signifier of Language**

“You shall have no other gods before me. You shall not make for yourself a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; you shall not bow down to them or serve them.” (Exodus 20:3-4).

The second commandment underscores the image’s inherent destabilising and seditious nature. The prohibition against “graven images” is prioritised over other potentially subversive acts such as murder, stealing, or deceit, because, for Baudrillard, the simulacra of imagery only accentuates the death of God. For just as the Coca-Cola corporation killed off the personage of Saint Nicholas through the hyper-visibility of fat, jolly, red and white Santa Clauses; so

“Iconoclasts predicted this omnipotence of simulacra, the faculty simulacra have of effacing God from the conscience of man, and the destructive, annihilating truth that they allow to appear, that deep down God never existed, that only the simulacrum ever existed, even that God himself was never anything but his own simulacrum, from this came their urge to destroy images” (Baudrillard, 2010: 4).

The later prohibition against taking God’s name in vain similarly represses and marks a taboo to maintain a level of sanctity, supra-reality of his presence, but as third commandment this anxiety rates beneath the more treacherous image representation. The difficulty with any signifier; word, image is that one is never certain what signified will be associated with them. Lacan’s ‘primacy of the signifier’ evinces that representation takes on more truth/meaning than ‘the reality’ it is meant to represent. Baudrillard’s argument of “the murderous power of images, murderers of the real, murderers of their
own model” (5) similarly imperils any image signifier used to represent a signified. He apprehends in the visual realm what post-structuralists had established in language that “All western faith and good faith became engaged in this wager on representation: that a sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could be exchanged for meaning and that something could guarantee this exchange” (5). This notion of a distorted truth, that representation would fail, or worse, usurp the position of what it represented, is a fear inherent in iconoclasm. But behind that fear lies deeper, unconscious “metaphysical despair from the idea that the image didn’t conceal anything at all, and that these images were in essence not images, but perfect simulacra” (5). The simulacra is treacherous not because it represents, but because it tangibly exists in a manner, a reality that what it represents (God, Time, Beauty, Desire) can’t ever.

Conscious of this fear within iconoclasm, Baudrillard argued images served in their original symbolic function as part of a ritual, sacred, private like Byzantine icons, limited in both accessibility and visibility to maintain their enigma. The image functioned in maintaining certain levels of social relations.

**Baudrillard and the Four Orders of Simulacrum**

With the advent of capitalism, consumerism, and the modern age, Baudrillard argues a precession of simulacra, through four orders of artificial representation, where each “does not replace those discovered earlier: it simply joins their ranks, takes its place in a hypothetical series” (1993a: 5). The Fourth Order is associated to the multiplicity and expansion of images in late capitalism’s increased commodification, and thus a movement from representation of something real, to simulation with no stable reference to reality. The simulating sign or image not only replaces but usurps the position of the reality it is meant to ‘serve’. Baudrillard’s ‘fatal strategy’ asserts not that reality has been complicated by a profusion of images, but ‘the real no longer exists’ (Butler, 1999: 165). For Baudrillard, hyper-real Existentialism is simulacrated as ‘I consume, therefore I am.’

**First Order Simulacrum**

Baudrillard associates the first order of images with advancements in art technique such as naturalism and perspective in the historical period from the Renaissance through to the Industrial Revolution. This new epoch of art style yielded a rush of ornamentation aspiring to overwhelm the senses. But the drive in such overpowering beauty and realism was to conceal or distract spectators from the symbolic loss at the heart of this image; as it can only simulate the value images had previously generated by their sacred role.
Under this first order, Art moved from being privileged to being increasingly accessible in public display, a display intrinsically connected with capital. Only a person of wealth could commission an art object, thus the image is now an object communicating wealth and personage to the public; its aesthetic value inseparable from its economic value.

Within this simulation order, Baudrillard notes representations, while not being natural, (i.e. not mistaken as real, but clearly an object of art), function to create a sense of universal harmony, order and mastery via re-creating the ‘real’. Their overt and excessive ornamentation is too perfect to be identified as ‘reality’. These image-objects he calls counterfeits, or corrupt symbols can only proclaim status as copy.

Michelangelo’s David (left) would ‘perfectly illustrate’ because it is a perfect illustration, the male form is absolute and complete; proffered as faultless; its dimensions, stature, and proportions idealised. However the difference between the image and what it refers to - the male body - is obvious to its spectators. They are aware the image is a perfection and not genuine, and its aesthetic and economic/cultural value and appreciation is grounded in this knowledge that the image is not real, but ideal.

**Second Order Simulacrum**

For Baudrillard, the Industrial Age’s commercial culture with its onset of techniques of mass-production, crucially alters the way objects and images are made, and thus how they function and are valued, aesthetically as objects of art, and economically as objects of capital. Objects and images are now made within a greater culture of equivalences where similarities and correspondences are generated with and through the things they depict; only understood relative to each other within larger systems of object-images.

An archetypal icon of this second stage would be Warhol’s Campbell’s Cans (below), which clearly exposes a preoccupation with the commodification of culture in depicting regular, consumer objects as indistinct simulacra of one another disputing distinctions between high art and consumer culture. Indeed Warhol’s Campbell’s paintings were a series, reproduced, sometimes not even by Warhol, as a comment on the ‘sacredness’ of art, the image, the artist, value. The focus is shifted away from what was crucial in the first stage, the value of what is being represented, towards what is more
crucial in this second stage which is the modernist question of the value in how something is represented.

The modernists critique the first order artists’ relationship to reality by highlighting their desire to not be real. Picasso’s ‘Male Nude’ (right) draws this distinction clearly by not portending or pretending to any level of reality as Michelangelo’s David had. No male form remotely looks so angular, shaded. In contrast to the first order’s attempt to forge a resemblance between the original and the replica; the image is pure interpretation. Within the second order the original and the replica are equivalent; the image seeks to correspond to, but not mirror what it portrays, blurring boundaries between reality and representation. Representation takes on another reality which reflects back on the real, and questions it. In both orders the image still relates to reality; that reality exists apart from the image endures. The first order aims to reproduce an idealised reality in its form; the second order aims to not reproduce reality by interrogating the issue of form. Third order simulation goes beyond this, to produce “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard, 2010: 1).

**Third Order Simulacrum**

The synchronistic contingencies of post-capitalist consumer culture, vast advances in mass media communication technologies directed a persistent and unrelenting exponentiation and proliferation of images never before experienced, to where any perceptible distinction between images and reality collapses.

“This imaginary of representation disappears in the simulation whose operation is nuclear and genetic, no longer specular or discursive. No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept. No more imaginary co-extensivity. The real is produced from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, models of control and it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times from these. It no longer needs to be rational, because it no longer measures itself against either an ideal or negative instance. It is no longer anything but operational. In fact, it is no longer really the real, because no imaginary envelops it anymore. It is hyperreal, produced from a radiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere” (2).

Hyperreality is where images circulating freely are purely self-referential, removed from distinct relationships with or to objects in the ‘real world’ thus only accruing measures of meaning relative to each other. All knowledge and understanding of the world can only be derived through the inter-relation of signs and images which have now replaced reality. The tableau below communicates something of the male body in the twenty-first century which cannot be easily decided from one image, because it is inseparable from the others; each producing one another culturally, aesthetically. Such image-ining of masculinity and
manhood has significant relevance for how like-kind passionate men’s sexuality, desire and self-image is understood, exhibited and demanded within homo-sexual culture.

Of greater significance within the tableau is what is said about reality, which the simulacra undermine, tendering themselves as a new reality. It doesn’t matter whether any of these images are or are not real, any homo-sexual, desirer of the masculinity of the Other, spectator acts as if they are real and places their own idea, their own living of the male body in relation to and within the tableau of images, because these are what are phallicised, valued, marketed, even if, and especially because, they are unattainable. Chapter Fourteen explores such physical image-inings at work in cyber-space profiles.

This tableau destabilises what author-ised as a normal male body. Under the third order, subjects no longer look to actual physicality to access their own bodies or others’ bodies, but to the excess of such images promoted, marketed, the image of bodies others see. The excesses of this alienation from the actual body and the entrapment in images are corroborated by the current marked increase among men in body-dismorphic disorders: anorexia, bigorexia, and bulimia. We are alienated champions and victims of a body culture where there no longer are actual bodies only a proliferation of images. The next chapter explores this more through contemporary homo-sexual pornographic discourse.

Exemplifying how the proliferation of male body images infect, affect and are effected by other male body images is the G.I. Joe figure. It is not how his body proportions might relate to a/the ‘reality’ of an average man’s form, but more how Joe’s body proportions relate to his own image, trapped within body image simulacra he reproduces. The left depicts the original 1960’s G.I Joe, and the right the 2011 model. Through the interceding years, Joe’s height has remained standardised, but his body has continually increased in bulk and mass. Within a
height/measurements equivalency, his biceps have increased from 12” to 27”, making his upper arms larger than his head; and his chest has increased from 44” to 55”. Significantly, the average man’s chest size is 42 inches, and this has not changed significantly over the years, but the idea of ‘real’ size and build and muscle has been transmuted within the matrix and hyper-real culture of images, where reality is irrelevant. It is not immaterial that Joe is now always fully clothed, so the anxiety of his penisless 1960’s body is concealed beneath the armour of his build and mass, a motif enacted within contemporary male muscle culture as Chapter Fourteen explores.

GI Joe is only a fragment of the myriad of male iconic images to be re-represented, re-packaged, and re-generated in a twentyfirst century hyper-real exhibition of masculinity and maleness, where contact with reality is foreclosed.

The CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) Effect

Another way to illustrate how images operate in this third stage of Simulacrum is through the CSI effect (Ramsland, 2007). CSI is a television show where forensics are the central crime solving plot device whose immense popularity has spawned many versions, through replication - CSI Las Vegas, CSI Miami, CSI New York, CSI Cyber; and through imitation - Forensic Files, Extreme Forensics. These programmes generated how ‘real’ crime scenes should look and what forensic evidence should be there; constructing people’s expectations of criminal prosecution. Criminals are “learning what not to leave behind at crime scenes” (Borger, 2006) and jurors have developed distinct, however unrealistic expectations of forensic evidence in trials (Lawson, 2009: 132).

Because of the demand and expectation CSI has created in audiences, forensic laboratories are inundated, as prosecutors demand forensic DNA evidence to present at trial having observed that without it juries are less likely to convict (142). Forensic evidence has come to replace the timeworn motive and opportunity discourse. As viewers of these crime programmes, jurors are encoded with expectations of objective DNA proof. And when this ‘proof’ isn’t immediately presented in a trial, jurors are troubled, interpreting this as a limitation and potential grounds for ‘reasonable doubt’.

This unfolded in “the social media trial of the century” (Cloud, 2011), the Casey Anthony Trial which was simulacrated “from being a newsworthy case to one of the biggest rating
draws in recent memory” (Shen, 2011). Although, according to a USA Today/Gallup poll, 64% of Americans believed Casey probably or definitely murdered her daughter (Bello, 2011), Casey was acquitted largely because of jurors’ misgivings with the prosecution’s unprecedented forensic evidence. Unprecedented in that such forensics had never been presented at a trial, and more especially on a television show before. The images and signs presented through CSI constructed expectations of reality. The image is real.

The CSI effect is also exhibited within the above male body tableau, where one image generates another, to regenerate the former assimilating/infecting others, and so on. CSI has not only become the reference point for the ‘reality’ of forensics, as criminal behaviour and criminal investigations/trials evidence, but the version of forensics the show utilises is itself modelled from television ratings and audience preferences, what Baudrillard calls simple “simulacrum of public opinion” (1993b: 65) where what is apparently viewer valued is thus further selected and reproduced.

CSI storylines based on past ‘real’ crimes spawn copycat killings following the show’s airing. ‘Original’ CSI plots which were unlikely to happen in real life subsequently do. In this peculiar confluence of televisual images and the discourse of real life, reality is lost in “a liquidation of all referentials” where

“It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor even of parody. It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself, that is, an operation to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes. Never again will the real have to be produced - A hyperreal henceforth sheltered from the imaginary, and from any distinction between the real and the imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence of models and the simulated generation of difference” (Baudrillard, 2010: 2).

It is not that reality or objects don’t exist anymore, but the simulation involved in the third order creates and forges a modification, an alteration in our perception of what reality is. The CSI effect exhibits how the perception of forensic evidence is generated through television images, which in turn are produced by preconceived ideas of the demands of viewers of television crime programmes. Continuing the precession, simulated images of crime on the television screen produce very real effects, where criminals are now more careful about scouring crime scenes to remove evidence, and greater jury demands for forensics. Images on the screen generating our perception and experience of reality can be evidenced in other areas of life, such as the exchanges between pornographic visual imagery and sexual expectations, desires and behaviours which the next chapter explores.

Contrasting how first and second orders maintain the object and its representation as separate, the third order obfuscates this relationship, because the images are now the
reality, generating ‘truth’ and encoding perceptions of what is ‘real’ by taking the place of certainty and assurance. In an era of doubt and paranoid cultural discourse, images give us something to believe in, identify with, trust, love. “The simulacrum is not that which hides the truth, but that which hides the absence of truth” (Baudrillard 2005a: 32).

**Fourth Order Simulacrum:**

Baudrillard likened the fourth order, the current phase, to a fractal or viral stage, where “properly speaking there is now no law of value, merely a sort of epidemic of value. Indeed we should really not speak of ‘value’ at all, for this kind of propagation or chain reaction makes all valuation impossible”(5). There no longer is any point of reference, no longer any equivalence just “a kind of ultra-reality that puts an end to both reality and to illusion.” (Baudrillard, 2005b: 2) The image is so removed from its original function that it can’t even operate as an image anymore; the hyper-real itself has been simulated.

“With the disappearance of the simulacrum as such, a later stage in the process of simulation has been reached, namely the simulation of a real more real than the real, the simulation of a hyperreal”(5).

Our contemporary culture is obsessed, captivated with making everything visible, transparent and knowable; and immediately. Consider the Human Genome Project, the search for the Higgs particle, reality television, celebrity, 24 hour news; and how they are transmitted, the imagery utilised: the paparazzi, live news feeds, gene maps, virtual worlds, digital communications, CCTV. Not only are these media immediate, immersive and immanent, but they force us, demand us, lure us into a complete ‘immersion in the visual’ (Baudrillard, 2005c: 47), to entering the image, this world of hyper visibility, where nothing cannot be seen and therefore there is no longer any mystery. This is why we no longer talk about representations as though they are a reflection of, or response to, the world (45). Because they are the world.

Being barraged with so many images across a ubiquitous range of media risks taking us to where nothing is left to the imagination, thus possibility for genuinely new encounters or fresh perspectives is foreclosed. Baudrillard argues this excess of signifying as violating the image because any ability images once had to capture an illusion of reality is shattered when everything is made visible. This he calls the ‘murder of the Real’; the ‘zero degree’; ‘obscenity’ (2007: 76) characterised by an ensuing disappearance because
there is too much of everything; saturated by an endless parade of images, from the banal to the explicit, appearing incessantly from everywhere; there is no lack. And as Lacan outlined, without lack there cannot be desire; there cannot be human subjects.

**The Precession of Simulacra**

The difference between representation and simulation is that representation maintains some *point de capiton* with ‘reality’. Representation neurotically tries to absorb or limit simulation by arguing/interpreting it as false representation, but simulation psychotically assimilates the whole edifice of representation itself as a simulation. Baudrillard argues the successive phases of the image as “(i) The reflection of a profound reality; (ii) it masks and denatures a profound reality; (iii) it masks the absence of a profound reality; and (iv) it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum” (2010: 6).

The image has no relation to truth, it relates only to appearance; and so appearance is installed as that deemed real and true:

“In the first case, the image is a good appearance – representation is of the sacramental order. In the second, it is an evil appearance – it is of the order of maleficence. In the third it plays at being an appearance- it is of the order of sorcery. In the fourth, it is no longer of the order of appearances, but of simulation.” (6)

In the fourth order we have moved beyond good and evil; beyond malevolence and the super-natural, to a realm where hyper-visual technologies narcissistically offer us images with which to identify, desire, consume, to deflect rather than reflect our primal metaphysical angst of loneliness and alienation. But where Narcissus was captivated by the image, within hyper-reality we are captured by the medium. Hyper-reality advances an easier and lazier flat-packed reality, because it demands nothing of our being. It is pure demand without desire. The Matrix offers comfort, stability, satisfaction, at the price of entrapment and paralysis. In a world few people can reconcile themselves easily to, the hyper-real world tenders the co-ordinates of illusion but only by foreclosing the co-ordinates of our fantasy.

In the 1960’s Joni Mitchell’s *Woodstock* metaphorically lamented our being cogs in someone else’s wheel; but now we are the machine, products of and producing mechanics; sexual cyborgs programmed to desire a mechanised sexuality.

“In the first case, the image is a good appearance – representation is of the sacramental order. In the second, it is an evil appearance – it is of the order of maleficence. In the third it plays at being an appearance- it is of the order of sorcery. In the fourth, it is no longer of the order of appearances, but of simulation.” (6)

Machines produce only machines. The texts, images, films, speeches, and programmes that come out of computers are machine products. They have the

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32 A Lacanian employed term, literally *upholstery button*, meaning a ‘quilting or anchoring point’ where “the mattress-maker's needle has worked hard to prevent a shapeless mass of stuffing from moving too freely about.” (Bowie, 1991: 274) thus *points de capiton* are points at which the “signified and signifier are knotted together.” (Lacan, 1993: 268)
features of machine products: they are artificially expanded, face lifted by the machine; the movies are full of special effects, the texts full of lengthy passages and repetitions, which are the consequences of the malicious will of the machine to function at all costs (for that is its passion), and of the operator’s fascination with the limitless opportunity of operating the machine. Hence the wearisome character of all this violence and ‘pornographed’ sexuality, which are merely special effects of violence and sex that are no longer even fantasized by humans. This pure mechanic violence does not affect us any longer” (Baudrillard 2005b: 6).

The Treachery of Images

John’s Gospel’s argues the post-structural primacy of the signifier in its opening pronouncement “In the Beginning was the Word” diverging from Genesis, where language does not take precedence, but is only generated subsequent to the act of creation in Genesis 1.5 when “God called the light ‘day,’ and the darkness he called ‘night’.” In early written languages such as hieroglyphics, and Oriental scripts the image influences the structure, form and therefore the creation of the word. Which was created first: ‘light’, the signified of light, or the signifier of ‘light’? Which comes first the chicken, the concept of chicken or the Word? And which gets prioritised in our encoded communication?

René Magritte disliked being called an artist, preferring to be considered a thinker who communicated by means of paint.

“My painting is visible images which conceal nothing; they evoke mystery and, indeed, when one sees one of my pictures, one asks oneself this simple question, ‘What does that mean?’ It does not mean anything, because mystery means nothing either, it is unknowable.” (quoted in Wingfield, 2009: 56)

His paintings provoke because Magritte confronts ingrained notions about art, logic and representation. His thematic series The Treachery of Images probe how words and images differ in their modes of signifying, and critiques language through exploring the equivalence/nonequivalence of words and images within paintings that agitate our expectations of correspondence and constancy.

Foucault is captivated by the seeming “strangeness” in these (in)famous paintings between the image and the words, arguing that the incongruity between the pipe and its words illustrates his position that neither language nor image can represent or

“can be reduced to the other’s terms: it is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say. And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors, or similes, what we are saying” (Foucault, 1982: 9).

He argues people as falsely positioned within established systems of seeing which links reality with visual representation. Magritte’s painting of a pipe, combined with the painted words, This is not a pipe, calls into question visual representation, inasmuch as
that painted on canvas is not actually a pipe, but a depiction of a pipe. The words which are part of the artwork and not in its expected marginal frame, serves to highlight the artifice of the conventional equivalency between ‘a pipe’ and the image of a pipe.

Foucault’s essay *This is Not a Pipe*, engages with how the systems of imagery and language, the contradictory text of the imagery and the discourse that ‘names’ it, cancel each other in Magritte’s painting. Foucault asks why it is assumed there is more truth in words than in the image? Why in ‘reading’ Magritte’s text do the words comment on the image, but not the reverse? Foucault argues at least three alternative interpretations: Firstly ‘This’ particular painting of a pipe does not stand for or represent any of that class of objects found in the world, that are called pipes (26). Secondly, ‘This’ the sentence itself could not represent a pipe (27); And thirdly, ‘This’ mixed element of discourse and image, written pipe and drawn text “is not a pipe” (27).

Foucault argues in the apparent contradiction between viewing the ‘Pipe’ and reading the inscription, Magritte’s scrupulous portrayal/s of the ‘Pipe’ is not representational. As discussed, from the Renaissance, imagery in realistic painting implies resemblance; and language discourse merely references naming a painting’s content. But what Foucault illustrates is that in Magritte’s painting, resemblance and discourse are dissociated and ruptured, so he discriminates between resemblance and similitude in visual texts. The contrast between resemblance and similitude is illustrative. Resemblance serves representation which rules over it. In simulacra’s first order resemblance is established upon an original it must return to and reveal; “resemblance presupposes a primary reference that prescribes and classes” (44). When on says an image resembles reality, there is an underlying assumption of the ontological superiority of the latter.

“Similitude obeys no hierarchy, it develops in a series” (44). As with simulacrum’s third and fourth stages, in similitude the objective ‘referent’ is gone; things and images are “more or less like one another without any of them being able to claim the privileged status of ‘model’ for the rest” (10). Foucault argues the pipe be seen as a text/simulacrum:

“this is not a pipe but a text that simulates a pipe; a drawing of a pipe that simulates a drawing of a pipe; a pipe (drawn other than as a drawing) that is the simulacrum of a pipe (drawn after a pipe that itself would be other than a drawing)” (49).

To say the pipe image is a simulacrum is to say it belongs to the order of things that are similar, i.e. other drawings of pipes; it exists within a series, much like the tableau of male musculature forms shown above. “Similitude circulates the simulacrum as the indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the similar” (44).
Foucault’s suggestion of the other possibilities that ‘this’ could refer to involves a new hierarchy where images take primacy over words.

“What misleads us is the inevitability of connecting the text to the drawing (as the demonstrative pronoun, the meaning of the word pipe, and the likeness of the image all invite us to do here)- and the impossibility of defining a perspective that would let us say that the assertion is true, false, or contradictory” (20).

The semiotic rule uncovered is that legends or headings always refer to the visual contents to which they are attached, and never to themselves. A second regulation is that legends and headings stand as authoritative and therefore are exempt from interpretation.

“The death of interpretation is to believe that there are signs, signs that exist primally, originally, really, as coherent, pertinent, and systematic marks … The life of interpretation, on the contrary, is to believe that there are only interpretations” (12).

Foucault argues through Magritte’s painting that firstly, visual imagery and language discourse can be revealed as incommensurable sign systems. Secondly that visual imagery is not compelled to represent, but instead can be an expression of similitude. Thirdly, the deliberate juxtaposition of a visual image against a language discourse which annuls the ‘meaning’ of that text, breaks down previously held beliefs about the function of painting. In not only undermining, but collapsing resemblance, Foucault establishes “this affirming and representing nothing” (49) as a critical moment in how the visual is seen, interpreted which may produce a seismic shift in both the power and the discourse of the image and the spectator’s relationship to it. Nowhere is this more pertinent than in our contemporary relationship to pornified imagery as now will be explored.

**Conclusion**

Baudrillard defines the relentless circulation of images a hyper-real order of simulacra where images are neither true nor false but embedded in a selfREFERENTIAL encoding with no link or relation to reality. In contemporary times, we risk enslavement and alienation to mirror images that neither mirror us nor reality, but only a hyper-real unreality.

This is demonstrably obvious in contemporary Pornography, which aims to make everything visible. All acts, events, desires, fetishes, nuances are portrayed and displayed without distinction, without context or reference. Nothing is hidden. The relentless circulation of pornified images across multi-media take the images of sexuality into another dominion. For the like-kind passionate subject, there is no point asking whether such images are real or true or false depictions, because they don’t ‘depict’ sex but are embedded in a homo-sex strategy, an encoding of power embedded in the historical homo-sex discourses of narcissism, masculine lack and effeminate anxieties which can only alienate and humiliate their spectators, and in the hyper-real contemporary world, all are spectators to this simulacrated display of that named as homo-sex.
Chapter Thirteen: ‘Sexuality Haunted by its Own Disappearance’: Desiring Porn-Malicy

“The internet is for porn! The internet is for porn! Grab your dick and double click For porn, porn, porn!” (Lopez & Marx, 2004: Avenue Q)

Desire, psychologists have found, is not something given to us out of the blue; but constructed through fantasy, through fantasy we learn to desire. Pornographic movies are passports to a fantasy world where sex exists without the everyday encumbrances of social convention, endurance or availability. To imagine a sexual performance in a fantasy or to see one in a porn movie enables us to experience sexual excitement without the side effects of anxiety, guilt or boredom (Escoffier, 2009: 6-7)

Chapter Synopsis:

Within heteronormative culture the pornified internet is a primary re/resource for sexual knowledge for gay men, transmitting and encoding not only sexuality but gendered behaviour and practices which in/form a homogenising of how homosexuality gets discoursed and performed. Pornography is a location, not only for the production of knowledge within Foucault’s scientia sexualis, but a site generated by, and generating images/desires/sex-pectations which lose all reference and substance within a Baudrillardian fourth order of simulacra where pornography is but “Sexuality haunted by its own disappearance” (Baudrillard, 1987: 40). As a critical producer and product of knowledge pornography proffers a desire of the Other, but a virtual one, one without the ambiguous, anxious complexities of an actual bodily other. Neither pornography nor society should be treated as singular concepts.

Pornography: The Beginning?

In 1896, within months of inventing the motion picture camera, one of Edison’s first commercial films caused a scandal, resulting in censuring newspaper editorials and demands for police intervention. The Kiss, (1896) at forty seven seconds, depicts a re-enactment of a kiss between actors May Irwin and John Rice from their stage musical The Widow Jones. The Kiss’s ‘scandalous’ anxiety was its being too ‘real’, too ‘lifelike’, too sexually explicit.
“The spectacle of the prolonged pasturing on each other’s lips was beastly enough in lifesize on the stage but magnified to gargantuan proportions and repeated three times over it is absolutely disgusting.” (De Lafayette, 2011: 256)

The Kiss operated against strict Victorian sexual discursive divisions of public and private in establishing, indeed exhibiting, what hitherto had only been, and could only be pictured in the private realm. Now something had been (in its production), and continued to be (in ongoing screenings) symbolised of how/why two people kiss. Something of sexuality is made visible; the Other’s kisses can be viewed, their wanting to kiss captured. We now can see the Other’s desire.

The film offers, indeed promotes itself as ‘The’ Kiss with Edison’s catalogue advertising: “They get ready to kiss, begin to kiss, and kiss and kiss and kiss in a way that brings down the house every time” (Grieveson & Krämer, 2004: 60).

The New York, Sunday World devoted a full page spread (left) to ‘The Anatomy of a Kiss’ recounting it being forty-two feet long. The Kiss was re-presented in drawings, as within Baudrillardian thinking, images generate more images, discourse produces further discourse.

Of course ‘THE’ Kiss does not exist; there is no such thing as an unequivocally kissing relationship, but the film provides a visual representation/fantasy of how ‘The’ Kiss should look/be. And so the representation is feared for making private desire, public; for representing an ‘objective’ ideal to oceans of subjective anxiety and anxiousness; for letting us see/imagine/image how the Other desires. Precisely what establishes Edison’s film as pornographic is that it makes the ‘The Kiss’ desire of the other, ‘the’ norm.

**Prostituting Text**

Pornography’s etymology comes from the greek pornē, (prostitute) and graphein, (to write/record) thus conventionally meaning ‘an inscribed description/illustration of prostitution’ (OED). But with no known date for its first use, the signifier ‘pornography’ could also have been inaugurated as “a prostituted written description or illustration”. ‘Prostitute’ etymologically originates from the Latin prostituere (to expose publicly, offer for sale; from pro ‘before’ and statuere ‘set up/place’). Pornography etymologically implies a setting forth of an image/text/signifier in public, and this publicisation is perceived as exposing and prostituting.
Both Saussure’s structuralism and Baudrillard’s simulacra orders demonstrate how the act of signification prostitutes reality, given the unadulterated arbitrary nature the signifier has to that it attempts to represent, the signified. *The Kiss* emphasises the prostituting nature of signification, in publically/visibly representing/signifying that which had been unconscious/private/regulated. As spectacle, it publically signifies and visually represents the desire of the Other (actors/producers/audience), a visual exhibition one must watch publicly, with/through an audience of others, further ‘normalising’ such desire.

Since early cinema projected in loops, short films were repeated several times, sustaining an endless kissing continuing long beyond normal human endurance “the performance comes very near to being indecent in its emphasised vulgarity. Such things call for police interference” (33). Viewers juxtaposed *The Kiss* within discourses of other cultural kisses: the kiss in *The Widow Jones*, the stage kiss as genre, the *New York, Sunday World* drawings, or their own, more personal osculatory efforts.

À la Baudrillard, not only is *The Kiss* a product of contemporary thinkings/imaginingings of kissing but itself produces further images/discourses in spawning many reworkings. Rival producers such as the Lubin company remade the film. In 1900 Edison produced *The New Kiss* (left) self-described “as nothing new, but an old thing done over and done well” (Mowll Mathews, 2005: 33). Edison’s 1905 *The Seven Ages* displayed a series of scenes in which heterosexual pairs of different ages kiss. Kissing scenes were also integrated into larger narratives: *Love in a Sleigh* (Edison, 1896); *Interrupted Lovers* (Edison, 1896); *The Husking Bee* (Edison, 1897).

U.S. Library of Congress copyright lodgements for 1897, evince a visual inundation of kissing scenes, expanding exponentially, not just in films, but across all visual media; in cartoons, theatrical posters, photographs. (34). Such reworkings of porno (prostituted)-graphic kissings produces and reproduces further discourses both in different registers and formats and by different methods, evidencing Baudrillard’s third order of images.

“Around 1900 technical reproduction had reached a standard that not only permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to cause the most profound change in their impact upon the public; it also had captured a place of its own among the artistic processes. Nothing is more revealing than the nature of the repercussions these two different manifestations – the reproduction of works of art and the art of the film – have had on art in its traditional form” (Benjamin, 1969: 219-220).
The ‘Truth’ of Sex

Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* differentiates “two great historical procedures for producing the truth of sex” (1990: 57). In non-Western or ancient cultures “the truth of sex” focused on sensual and pleasurable erotic arts, *ars erotica*, evidenced within Tantra, or in the *Karma Sutra* not being the sex-manual Westerners have construed, but a guide to compassionate pleasure-oriented living.

“*Tantra embodies two sanskrit words: tanoti (expands) and trayoti (liberates)... It is the system by which you liberate or separate the two aspects of consciousness and matter - purusha and prakriti*” (Satyananda, 1981: 58).

Such *Ars erotica* aim not at acquiring power/knowledge but expansion and liberation “accumulated as experience” (Foucault, 1990: 57) through practised intermediaries initiating the lover’s enterprises without classifying or documenting such awarenesses.

Pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of permitted and forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul. Moreover, this knowledge must be deflected back into the sexual practice itself, in order to shape it as though from within and amplify its effects. In this way, there is formed a knowledge that must remain secret, since, according to tradition, it would lose its effectiveness and its virtue by being divulged (57).

In contrast, Foucault argues modern Western cultures increasingly construct *scientia sexualis*, a scientific knowledge system, already evidenced in its production of ‘the homosexual’, to identify, categorise and thus ‘normalise’ sexuality as something to be discovered or a problem to be solved. Western cultural practice is

the only civilization to have developed over the centuries procedures for telling the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledge-power strictly opposed to the art of initiations and the masterful secret: I have in mind the confession (58).

Foucault challenges the “repressive hypothesis” (15) of sexual desires contending that sex as an object of knowledge is invested once people began confessing it. According to Foucault, knowledge is expressed through discourse, the way we talk about things, and thus the truth about sexuality became apparent when “something was placed within an unrelenting system of confession. The transformation of sex into discourse.” (61)

True Confessions

Shamefully acknowledging intimate secrets within the privacy of a confessor paradoxically compels admittance, voice, signification to one’s own unique sexualities.

The dissemination and reinforcement of heterogeneous sexualities, are perhaps two elements of the same deployment linked together with the help of the central element of a confession that compels individuals to articulate their sexual peculiarity (61).

Confessional admission of sexuality, admits sexuality to both self/other and the Other of
social discourse, therefore proliferating sexual categories and knowledge. Talking about sexuality does not repress, but produces certain desires and identities.

The confession is a ritual discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship (61). Within confessing, the power relationship exercised is not only “the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner” (61), the confessor’s absolution, but the individual’s admittance of sexuality which creates a narrative knowledge to which they are subjected. Just as my sins when confessed designate me a sinner, so my sodomitical practices when admitted, identify me as homo-sexual. “For centuries, the truth of sex was, at least for the most part, caught up in this discursive form” (62).

The confession was, and still remains, the general standard governing the production of the true discourse on sex. It has undergone a considerable transformation, however. … It gradually lost its ritualistic and exclusive localisation; it spread; it has been employed in a whole series of relationships: children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and experts (63).

In contemporary hyper-reality, where Google has all the answers, where medics and therapy are on-line through Skype and email, where within blogs, Facebook, Twitter one tells the world about oneself, anticipating Likes, Followers and Hits, the confessional no longer demands actual presence but a virtual one.

“The confession lends itself, if not to other domains, at least to new ways of exploring existing ones. It is no longer a question simply of saying what was done, the sexual act, and how it was done; but of reconstructing, in and around the act, the thoughts recapitulating it, the obsessions accompanying it, the images, desires, modulations, and quality of the pleasure animating it. For the first time, a society has taken upon itself to solicit and hear the imparting of individual pleasures” (63).

**On-Line Confessionals**

Confessing/blogging/Facebooking desire requires discursive description, explanation, especially through photographs, gifs and pix, to visually capture everything about the experience. It is not enough to ‘know’ our desires privately, for desire being the desire of the Other, the Other must like our postings. And always more Likes are desired, we can never be liked enough.

Reading posts about someone’s dinner likely gets one thinking about their own appetites and to re-post/perform such eatings against/with discourses of Others’ appetites. Where desire is structured in being the desire of/for the Other, people’s admission/confession of their desires, always admits/generates new ones, for themselves, for others, for the Other.
Under *scientia sexualis* pleasure is secondary to the primary aim for knowledge: “A knowledge of pleasure, a pleasure that comes of knowing pleasure (77). As with Facebook *Likes*, there is less enjoyment in a pleasing dinner than in the pleasure of knowing ‘others’ like what/how I have eaten. Power lies not in *ars erotica* pleasure but in knowledge:

The power which thus took charge of sexuality set about contacting bodies, caressing them with its eyes, intensifying areas, electrifying surfaces, dramatising troubled moments. It wrapped the sexual body in its embrace. There was undoubtedly an increase in effectiveness and an extension of the domain controlled; but also a sensualisation of power and a gain of pleasure (44).

For Foucault, the medico-judicio discourses on/of sexuality function as primary transmission sites of knowledge, power and pleasure where, especially within psych discourses as this thesis argues, sexualities come to be identified, species-ified and solidified, an “extension of the domain controlled; but also a sensualisation of power and a gain of pleasure” (44). There is gratification in the love that has no name finally being named, even as social pariah, criminal, or pervert. Naming Wilde in his trials as ‘homo-sexual’ allowed others a pleasure in knowing themselves as ‘Oscar Wilde’ types. Genet echoes Foucault’s inherent pleasure within repressive social control.

“What is a homosexual? A man who by his nature is out of step with the world, who refuses to enter into the system that organises the entire world. The homosexual rejects that, denies that, shatters that whether he wants to or not. … to live with surprises, changes, to accept risks, to be exposed to insult… for him only pleasure exists” (quoted in Cooke, 1999: 42).

The medico-judicio controls identifying and solidifying sexualities had a double effect. Firstly, the power that took control of sexuality became itself sensualised: “It wrapped the sexual body in its embrace”; and secondly, the pleasure there realised “fed back into the power that encircled it” (Foucault, 1990: 44).

Through this loop of pleasure feeding power, and power feeding pleasure, the “implantation of multiple perversions” gradually took place, as this thesis demonstrates in relation to the homo-sexual, around which “scattering sexualities rigidified, became stuck to an age, a place, a type of practice” (48). In our contemporary hyper-real realm online *pornographic* productions and reproductions circulate a myriad of “multiple perversions” as explored by Williams (2015), all of which allow sexualities, desires, pleasure to be rigidly stuck to this place, this pornographic practice, which makes visible, which prostitutes images and discourse, which allows us to ‘know’ sexuality. Pornography is an increasingly primary discourse in which knowledge of sexuality is transmitted, generated, received, *liked*.

But so many pressing questions singularised the pleasures felt by the one who had to reply. They were fixed by a gaze, isolated and animated by the attention they
Power operated as a mechanism of attraction; it drew out those peculiarities over which it kept watch. Pleasure spread to the power that harried it; power anchored the pleasure it uncovered (45).

**Desiring Porn-malicy**

“A contemporary preoccupation with sexual values, practices and identities; the public shift to more permissive sexual attitudes; the proliferation of sexual texts; the emergence of new forms of sexual experience; the apparent breakdown of rules, categories and regulations designed to keep the obscene at bay; [and the] fondness the scandals, controversies and panics around sex” (Attwood, 2006: 77).

Sex is natural, but it never comes naturally, being overwritten by differing social discourses. Desire being the desire of the Other, all sexual identities, positionings and longings are constructed through cultural discourses, the Lacanian big Other. So ubiquitous are hyper-sexualised Baudrillardian re/presentations of sexuality in advertising, media and the internet, that what is entitled sexually ‘normal’ is a product and producer of such pornified discursive imagery that ‘normal’ is porn-mall.

Media has a big influence on society. Essentially, it provides us with actual model of behaviour which creates ideas or “norms” for society through social constructs (Gamson et al, 1992: 378).

Within todays’ post-capitalist sexual culture one can presume such porn-mall consumerist sexuality as ‘liberating’; but within Orwellian freedom is slavery paradox, our practices and desires have become further and further informed and enforced by the porn-mall. Zimmerman (2008) found less contemporary offence to the sexual objectification of women in advertisements than in 1990 related to growing up in an overly sexualised society where sexual images dominating the media is normal.

In my pre-Internet 1980’s adolescence, porn was more chosen, as one usually had to make an un/conscious decision to look at top shelf magazines, or under a brother’s mattress, or at a peer’s video. With the internet this choice of exposure to porn is radically lost, where statistics indicate that by age eleven a child will have been exposed to some hard core scene of pornography (Dines, 2010: xi). And with such incessant, insistent inevitable pornographic exposure a desiring is encoded and enforced, limited in personal creativity and lacking direct ‘actual’ connection to another. Pornographic discourse is being transmitted among people who never agreed to participate.

The phrase, the ‘sexualisation of culture’ is used to capture the growing sense of Western societies as saturated by sexual representations and discourses, and in which pornography has become increasingly influential and porous, transforming contemporary culture (Gill & Scharf, 2011: 53).

Pornography itself is not the problem, but its ubiquitous proliferation, its on-demand access, the impossibility of being isolated from porn-mall informed sexual mores and practices. Even if one is not a viewer of porn, ones spouse, partners, friends, family,
children are being subjected to and become subjects of a pornified sexuality.

Pornography permeates British gay subculture, together with the identities and practices that it frames. Pornography is written into the code of gay men’s everyday lives and it continues to shape understandings of the Self and Other in increasingly powerful ways (Mowlabocus, 2010:61).

**Porn Transmits ‘Knowledge’**

Within Foucault’s western *scientia sexualis* pornography is a crucial transmitter of knowledge, most especially for gay men. Within heteronormative culture, images, representations/signifiers of heterosexuality are readily available and promoted/endorsed as ‘normal’. One has only to watch any television, film, or read any newsmedia or book, indeed talk to any neighbour, family member, random person to evidence heteronormativity in operation. In ‘older times’, the 1980s and 90s, to find gay representations one had to look further, elsewhere: a faded copy of *Maurice*, an Art House film, a dark-windowed bar, a park.

The recent cultural and technological convergences occurring within the porn industry mean that today there is more pornography, made more readily accessible to an ever-increasing demographic than ever before (63-4).

Though heteronormativity still universally dominates, underwrites, and thus ‘normalises’ sexuality, a few clicks on the internet reveals a world of sexual texts, sexualised bodies, and hook-ups. Pornography always proffered discourses on sex, especially for gays, but its proliferation and ready accessibility now make it a first and always port of call to ‘enjoy’. But as Freud’s joke book evidences within all ‘enjoyment’ are encoded un/conscious messages of repressed desires/anxieties. Similarly, within ‘enjoyment’ of contemporary gay pornography are encoded messages, transmitted knowledge, determining how bodies, desirability, sexual practices are in/formed, and most pertinently for this present work, determinations around masculinity and femininity.

“When men turn to porn to experience sexual arousal and orgasm, they come away with a lot more than just an ejaculation because the stories seep into the very core of their sexual identity” (Dines, 2010: xi).

**Cutting Knowledge**

“The great promise or great hope of the eighteenth century, lay in the simultaneous and proportional growth of individuals with each other (in which) the acquisition of capabilities and the struggle for freedom have constituted permanent elements” (Foucault, 1984a: 47-8).

Increased industrialisation, urbanisation and scientific advancements led to an Enlightenment hope/belief that human advancing and developing capabilities to think, learn and communicate, to manage and master activities and things, would correspond with a growth of human autonomy and freedom. However “the relations between the
growth of capabilities and the growth of autonomy has not been as simple as the eighteenth century may have believed” (48).

In examining the historical development of capacities Foucault questions “the paradox of the relations between capacity and power” (47) as there has not been a parallel growth of freedom and autonomy with developing capacities, but an “intensification of power relations” (48). Thus the contemporary question for Foucault is “how can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations” (48).

The Westernised omnipresence of mobile phone/internet technology, most especially the (pre)dominance of iPhones/Google/Facebook evidence this in their proffering of better/faster communication/knowledge/technology but to which people are increasingly bound in power relations to. ‘Googling’ is now the leading sourcing of information. Under 35s invest more time with on-line Facebook ‘friends’ than in ‘actual’ relationships. “Knowledge is not for knowing: knowledge is for cutting” (Foucault, 1984b: 88).

The named anxiety nomophobia, where users fearing being out of contact fixatedly check their smartphone, evidences underlying fears of disconnection. Apple technology exemplifies having a handset/tablet/computer is not enough when annual ‘new’ product launches create both anxiety/desire around such latest technology, rendering older versions technologically obsolete. Exponentially increasing technological capacities have not enhanced autonomy or freedom, but created continuing dependence on technologies; increasingly subjecting humans within their power relations and control; pointedly evident within the technologies of desire, on-line dating apps/websites and pornography.

**Untraceable Illusions**

“The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist.” Baudelaire.

From Orwell’s Big Brother, and the Wackowskis’ Matrix, for any illusion to work, its operations must be untraceable, although its power relations are most definitely experienced. Porn is now so deeply embedded in our culture that it has almost become synonymous with sex, with the knowledge/knowing of sex.

“There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1995: 27).

Pornography produces visual texts, that themselves further produce and push commodifications and representations of desire, and their inherent expectations. As with Edison’s The Kiss, in pornography we see/experience/’know’ the desire of the Other, what they want/need/expect. Thus pornography induces differing levels of both pornified
sexpectations around what is demanded/desired and anxious fears of disappointing another, not meeting their desire, their own, likely also pornified sexpectations.

Hetero-dating culture creates within women media informed and created rules around what to expect/demand/desire, so within contemporary dating there is increased construction around what one is meant to do, want to do. Similarly, adolescent practices around threesomes, anal sex and bukkake are specifically in/formed by pornography (Perrin et al, 2008). In gay life with historical and continuing limited/denied access to ‘public’ sexual representations, access to knowing about gay sex is increasingly informed/constructed by pornography. The formulaic sequencing of homosexuality mirror their pornulaic representations, starting with kissing, before undressing, then oral, then anilingus, before the inevitable and final anal penetrative act.

“It really is that simple because porn is that formulaic, whatever the plot and characters development, the focus is on the sex acts, and those acts proceed in predictable fashion (Jensen, 2007: 57).

I’ll Have Whatever She’s Having

**Sally:** Why? Most women at one time or another have faked it.  
**Harry:** Well they haven’t faked it with me.  
**Sally:** How do you know?  
**Harry:** Because I know.  
**Sally:** Oh, right, that’s right, I forgot, you’re a man. (Ephron, 1989)

1989’s *When Harry Met Sally*’s legendary fake orgasm scene created/exposed a male anxiety around the desire of the Other for its implicit revelation that women fake orgasms to please men: “It’s just that all men are sure it never happened to them and that most women at one time or another have done it, so you do the math.” (ibid.) Faking an orgasm to please/reassure your partner epitomises desire as the desire for the Other, underlined by the female fellow diner, actually director Reiner’s mother, infamously responding to Sally’s faked orgasm with: “I’ll have whatever she’s having.”

The challenge within pornographic representation is how to visibly produce/represent orgasm so that audiences ‘know’ climax has taken place. In representing penetration it is near impossible for viewers to see how/what is being penetrated. Ejaculation, exhibited as an external shot becomes aligned with orgasm to know/control it. This, despite a reality that orgasm defined by/limited to ejaculation, classically takes place inside another, be it vagina, ass or mouth; and female orgasms are a silent ‘invisible’ disorientating source of
anxiety evidenced through the joke of ‘How do real men know when a woman has an orgasm? Real Men don’t care!’

“This ultimate moment of ‘truth’ can also be seen as the very limit of the visual representation of sexual pleasure. For to show the quantifiable, material ‘truth’ of his pleasure, the male pornographic film producer must withdraw from any tactile connection with the genitals or mouth of the woman so his ejaculate is visible (Williams, 1990: 101).

In contrast to Tantric discourse’s *ars erotica* where orgasm is understood as pleasure that is neither spent nor ejaculated but stored and deepened, *scientia sexualis* orgasms must be known; hence the volume of literature on how to have orgasms, directed exclusively towards women. Within scientific discourse for something to be known, it must be seen, and thus the tyranny of orgasm-demanded sexual discourse is that it is constructed as synonymous with (male) ejaculation. Ejaculation is a ‘spending’, not just in energy in how people/men ‘spend’ their load, but with financial cost. Within pornographic discourse ejaculation is the *money shot*, costing film producers more to produce when actors get paid extra for it, given it can only be done ‘once’ in a while and considerable pent-up energies (fluffing) go into increasing the ‘load’, the amount/quality of ejaculate.

“It is a convention of pornography that the sperm is on her not in her. It marks the spot, what he owns and how he owns it. The ejaculation on her is a way of saying that she is contaminated with his dirt; that she is dirty” (Moore, 84: 2007).

Ejaculation, although but a very specific externalised visual knowledge of orgasm, has through pornographic representation become “the sine qua non of the sexual narrative” (Williams, 1990: 93). The *money shot* extends visibility to become a fetishised perversion. Visual ejaculation overwrites any other forms of pleasure, operating as a visible fetishised knowledge to cover over/conceal anxieties around the unseen and thus mysterious unknowns of the penetrative pleasure of the Other.

Something else has taken its place, has been appointed its substitute, as it were, and now inherits the interest which was formerly directed to its predecessor. But this interest suffers an extraordinary increase as well, because the horror of castration has set up a memorial to itself in the creation of this substitute. (Freud, *SE XXI*: 154)

This substitution of male external ejaculation as climactic signifier can be evidenced in increasing practices of facial money shots or bukkake within regular sexual experiences. Gallop made “men recreating the money shot” (2009) her central complaint in her TED talk launching her website, makelovenotporn.com; The talk went viral.

A ‘new’ growing ‘popular’ discursive practice within pornography is female ejaculation
or ‘gushing’ where woman expel paraurethral duct fluid during orgasm. This is not new. Krafft-Ebing associated it with female homosexual: “produces in sexually neurasthenic females ejaculation” (2009: 218). Freud references it in his Dora case “Abnormal secretion of the mucous membrane of the vagina is looked upon as source of disgust” (SE VII: 84). There is now increasing demand/sexpectation on average women to prove/show their orgasm with visible ejaculations, so men/viewers/they ‘know’ they have climaxed.

**Lazy Avoidance**

The meme of sexually re/placing a ‘real’ person with an image is a critical operation of pornography. The image offering a certain safe or secure detachment mirrors discursive practices explored in Moll’s 1898 descriptions of erotic self-admiration, which he was then aligning to homosexual case studies, including a man of forty-three whose pleasure drew from gazing at his mirrored naked image, and comparing his body to those of other men (124); and a case history of Krafft-Ebing’s where “since he could not find a lover placed himself before a large mirror and masturbated while regarding his own image” (106). The image becomes the Other.

“The charm of a child lies to a great extent in his Narcissism, his self-contentment, and inaccessibility, just as does the charm of certain animals which seem not to concern themselves about us” (SE XIV: 89).

It is Freud’s underlining of both “his self-containment and inaccessibility” that seems to underlie this meme of sexually using the image as Other, which narcissistically avoids involving the actuality of another person. In its ready availability, pornography proffers avoidance of the actualised desire of the Other, whether from fear, laziness or convenience. This disengagement/detachment furthers its compulsive enjoyment, its addictive character.

Within our hypersexualised culture, one can be pressured, manipulated and coerced into conformity. Men either consciously and/or unconsciously expect porn-sex, reducing the other to an Other of image, anonymous, disconnected, and devoid of intimacy easily discarded on. For two gay men, in both being men, this image-inary demand/expectation for anonymity, disconnection and lack/denial of intimacy is doubled. It is no coincidence these very qualities are paradoxically (or not) both associated with the shameful discourse of homosexual expression, yet aligned as celebrated qualities of masculinity. What is most enjoyed about porn, is that you can eject/deactivate it after you’ve come.
Conclusion

The ‘real world’ is heterosexual, and given heteronormative cultural dominance, it continues to be dominated by the norms of heterosexual thinking and being. Gay male identities and lives have therefore been located as unreal or ‘virtual’ in their being constructed, maintained and mapped alongside this heteronormative world. An affinity between gay men and digital sexuality sanctions the internet and pornography to proffer alternative, safe, accessible spaces in which gay men can know/express/experience/see their sexuality. It’s within pornography’s gendered sexual and social constructions that knowledge of homosexuality is forged and encoded. Pornography has become a means to an end; a, if not the, mechanism by which one can achieve orgasm in the most heightened, easy and quickest ways possible; a ‘visual heroin’.

Most gay men are aware they live in a hyper-sexualised world both on-line and in life. Most imagine they can cope, they have gotten used to it. But getting used to something should never be confused with accepting it. Such is how porn-malicy works, you get used to it; you get used in it; you get used by it. What pornography produces for/in gay men is a homonormativity, the price of assimilation is containment; a contemporary homosexuality where all gay men are desired/demanded/sex-pected to look/act/desire homogenously, and where again the sexual becomes discoursed virtually exclusively as desire/demand for genital money shots of orgasm that can easily be ejected after viewing.

Grace questions our place as desiring subjects within this commodification of sexuality: “If we are all desiring subjects, who will be the other we desire?” (2000: 153) Pornography in objectifying the Other; objectifies us.
Chapter Fourteen:
Seeing Sameness:
Do We All Desire Homo-sexually?

“Oppression is easiest to sustain when the disenfranchised internalise their oppression and support rather than resist it.” (Watts, Griffith, & Abdul-Adil, 1999: 257).

Chapter Synopsis:

‘Naming’ homo-sexuals inaugurated specific subjectifications constituting like-kind desiring men within very particular discursive practices subjected to ‘homo-sexuality’. Online-sexuality is a medium of exchange, a currency between gays, where one accepts the pornified commodification of their person, because this is what is expected; the perceived desire of the Other. In their name, homo-sexuals are constructed and constricted to be homogenously sexual in both image and sexual behaviour. Undoubtedly presenting in certain concomitant ways grants people a collective identity, but marginalises others.

Got Pix?

“While there is undoubtedly a level of fatigue generated around using such websites ... dating/sex websites continue to pervade the everyday lives of many gay men.” (Mowlabocus, 2010: 84).

Within the gay on-line world of social/sexual apps and websites, ‘Got Pix?’ is the leading exchange, as opening salve, or for ‘engaging’ another in communication; pix (pictures) being the choice medium of exchange within cybersexual marketplace transactions. Of course pix, are picks, selective choosing of photos to ‘post’ or share; where with modern technologies, the camera may never lie, but Photoshop can certainly bend the truth. Pix, are picks, fragments of the corpus, of the person, defining/limiting one’s desire-ability to an image, a marketing fragmentary pick of the body to be traded within this cyber-sexual exchange.

Da Silva’s Pix (2014) is a series of images of over 2500 gay men’s bodies “in typical male poses”, mirrored exposed torsos, created from cyber-social/sexual profile pictures like Grindr to construct a three minute animation mosaic film of one body, a virtual
homo-sexual body. His film portrays the “endless voyeuristic hunt” within such gay “marketplaces of desire” (Da Silva, 2014) where men must compete to successfully sell. “I have to look at least as good as the competition” (Alvarez, 2009: 118).

Body type is the significant filter in such consumerism, with profiles featuring men with remarkably similar homobodies, toned and developed muscles, even tans and minimal body hair. Pix’s “typical male poses” (Da Silva, 2014) emulate their positionings, use of mirrors, holding of iPhones. Citing such poses as “typical male” highlights the performance of a specific masculinity, “namely the ‘straight-acting’ or ‘regular’ masculinity often found within the narratives of gay-porn” (Mowlabocus, 2007: 68).

Pix interrogates if in 2015 “a mirror, an exposed torso and the promise for NSA” (no strings attached) (Da Silva, 2014) have become the homogenous form of gay male sexuality, and whether gay communication and communion, “the need to connect emotionally has been taken over by the need to push the ‘load more guys’ button?” (ibid.)

Complex Images/Image Complex

In ‘The Family’ Lacan argues that identification with an arrangement of images leads to patterns of behaviour which reflect the social structures from which those images first emerged, in an arrangement of images he calls a “complex.”

“It is through the complex that images are established in the psychic organisation that influence the broadest unities of behaviour: images with which the subject identifies completely in order to play out, as the sole actor, the drama of conflicts between them” (1938: 90).

Such a definition doubly signifies the complex relationship gay men have with their image. Men are socially conditioned to reduce those we desire to object images; and/but for homosexuals, the objects we desire reference us. Da Silva’s film underlines this casting within similar objectification dynamics when gay male viewers identify both with the objects of the camera, and the objectification of the camera. Desire being desire of/for the other has complex significations within a homosexuality.

“The notion of aggressiveness as a tension correlated with narcissistic structure in the subject’s becoming allows us to encompass in a very simply formulated function all sorts of accidents and atypicalities in that becoming” (2006: 116).

Re-considering Lacan’s argument of the mirror stage, the ego is not formed at the point of looking into the mirror, but trails encounters via an other who directs the infant to look at the reflected image, naming the image: “look that’s you”. This inaugurates within subsequent connexions a process of visual identification and symbolic naming in which the image of others, super-imposed onto our own, come into play. The mirror stage only ceases when one stops looking at the reflection in the mirror and begins looking at other
people, but heeding what they say/identify/pronounce.

Da Silva’s film’s mechanics reifies this super-imposition of images, but exposes the underlying discursive practice of tracing one’s desire-ability within framed photographed desires of cyber-real desires, Freud’s “precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes” (SE XIX: 29). Lacan recognises the libidinal dynamics, the “organisation of the passions” (2006: 113), at work in the formation of the ego. Cyber-discourses organise homo-sexual passions, how/what is desired and indeed one’s own desire-ability. The ambivalence of the erotic relation to the image of the other is the price paid for this formation.

You Want a Piece of This? Fragmenting Desire

The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this ideal has a social side. It binds not only a person's narcissistic libido, but also a considerable amount of his homosexual libido, which is in this way turned back into the ego (SE XIV, 101).

Freud’s discourse of homosexual narcissism operating within homosocial relations is a discursive twist supporting the cultural/social roots of a homo-genous gay way of desiring. The images proffered and driven by cybersocial/sexual media present/push ego ideal images which necessarily evoke and provoke our own mirrored desires/anxieties, aggressions, jealousies and subjectivities.

“If we are to understand the nature of aggressiveness in man and its relation to the formalism of his ego and objects. It is in this erotic relationship, in which the human individual fixates on an image that alienates him from himself, that we find the energy and the form from which the organisation of the passions that he will call his ego originates” (Lacan, 2006: 113).

Alongside Da Silva is Marshall’s Torsos (2014a) which similarly explores gay body stereotypes and the lives of men behind/beyond their dating profiles. Marshall utilises the meme of torso faceless body shots dictated by gay cyber-social media and his own experience of marketing himself: “I don’t have ‘the perfect body’ and being on these apps began to bring out insecurities about that” (Marshall, 2014b).

Marshall’s “constant use” of such Apps formed his experience of objectifying others

“With the immediacy and nonchalance of the new types of connection now available to us, maybe we are becoming disconnected from the human behind the pixels in a profile picture. If you can’t sell yourself in the space of a small pixelated square, you end up feeling a lot of rejection.” (ibid.)

Torsos being the cyber-self-presentation ‘norm’, Marshall filmed only torsos when interviewing
men as to how gay cyber-marketplaces perpetuated or shattered stereotypes about body image, and how such self-image marketing personally affected the users. Curiously, his biggest trial was getting men with deemed muscular torsos to interview.

“I ask everyone I interview to tell me about their torso. The answer I almost always get is ‘it needs more work or ‘I’m trying to get a better torso.’ Not surprisingly, we are our own biggest judge.” (ibid)

The gay cyberworld fragments bodies homogenously, where gay men apportion themselves into statistics and numbers; body weight, age, percentage fat, chest size, penis length, like the historical meme of ‘measuring gay men’ outlined in Chapter Two. But now, as then, what is being measured is something more elusive than statistics; with each number a market assessment is being made, quantifying ones desire-ability to and for the Other. But all these measurements are actually assessing/quantifying measures around masculinity and manhood. Are you big enough, strong enough; are you man enough?

We like to tell ourselves that size doesn’t matter because it is the politically correct thing to say. Reality is much different. There are two types of gay men, size queens and liars.” (Alvarez, 2009: 134)

**Using Profiles**

The user-profile is a self-authored primary method of discursive self-representation within the cyber-social/sexual marketplace, customarily involving multiple combinations of text and images. The profile is “the creation of a digital persona which represents an individual and is used as a management tool in fashioning interactions with the individual.” (Philips, 2002: 418). Inevitably such processes locate a person within certain filtering categorisations which “transform them into an identifiable demographic” (Mowlabocus, 2010: 65) branding their cultural legibility within this discursive space.

Through online pseudonyms, Photoshopped images, or body-fragmentation to avoid facial recognition, a digital closet allows desire to be seen, while concealing users ‘real-life’ identities. Such systems proffer an equal opportunity for users to disembody or re-embody themselves, depending on their wish to reveal/conceal/alter.

“The profile allows the user to construct a particular version of himself, but how people translate their offline subjectivity into their online identity through their profile reveals more about that person than a profile could possibly contain.” (92).

For example, Mowlabocus describes a user whose macho, military-style portrait photo contains background cutesy fridge magnets “contradict, though in no way consciously, the machismo the image foregrounds.” (109). Interrogating gay cyber-profile discourses, reveals the homogenous sexualisation of self which divulges the relationship between gay culture and gay-porn.
**Made in One’s Own Image?**

Pornographic viewing is not the critical problematic, but how porn informs/dictates desires, behaviours and sex-pectations around sexual acts, how we view ourselves, how we view our partners, shifting any thinking/experience of sex as a *natural* act between two human bodies. Such are Western sexual anxieties that neither ethics nor personal morals decide behaviour, but rather ones’ peers/others and our desire for knowledge (the Big Other) that overwrite any *real* sexualities. Our original polymorphous perversity castrated by the symbolic of language, creates a desire for knowledge; and desire being the desire of the Other facilitates a porn-formed sexuality which neither person in the sexual encounter may want.

Porn influences not just Men, most particularly those subjects sexuated within the Lacanian *masculine* position. In re-enacting porn sex on their own bodies and the bodies they engage with, they engage with self and other as objects, body parts rather than persons, object *a*. And with such persons, some capitulate, some negotiate, some …..

**Inconvenient Bodies**

“This connection between pornography and the gay identity pre-dates the user profile, but it is through the profile that such a relationship reaches its zenith, as the bodies we produce online (digital bodies through which we are rendered visible, intelligible and knowable) are formed from, filtered through and recognised by codes of pornography, codes which permeate gay male subculture at every level” (116).

Such discursive practices produce a cyber-*homo-sexual* body whose sexuality is bound within *homo* designs of desire-ability and masculinity. This is a shaming discourse in which inconvenient bodies are sought to be blocked. Online Apps and websites’ filtering capacity allows one discern physciality parameters for discrimination: be that height, weight, body-types, penis size or race.

There are always limits to language, especially in our metonymic compulsion to express desire, but cyber-media’s restriction of users’ textual profiles, in Grindr it is limited to 255 characters, further limits symbolic expression, and thus any potential for uncovering in the gaps, the pauses, those critical pieces which cannot be said.

 Rather than self-describing, most profiles’ limited textual space dictates what they don’t want. ‘No Chocolate or Rice’ doesn’t establish dietary preferences, but excludes persons of black or Asian ethnicity. ‘No Fats, no femmes’ is perhaps the most common negative filter, doubly excluding on grounds of body size and discourses of masculinity/femininity, with the implication being that ‘real men’ who are *desire-able* have gym toned bodies.

Self-image determines socialisation, who we socialise with friends/dating/sex/
relationships as much as socialisation determines body and self-image and in few places is this more self-evident than in today’s gay gym culture (Alvarez, 2009: 113).

All bodies are inconvenient. An interpretation of Lacan’s there is no such thing as a sexual relationship, is the impossibility of knowing another’s body. Each body apprehends its own exhausting journey, its jubilance, its pleasures, its shame. And few encounters invite a listening to one’s own body enabling the body to speak, psychoanalysis being one.

“‘Body-fascist’ is often used in criticisms of gay culture’s obsession with the corporeal. The ‘no fats, no femmes’ ethos of urban gay culture is not new but the integration of new media cultures.” (Mowlabocus, 2007: 65)

Mowlabocus highlights new cyber-culture’s incorporation into gay subculture marks a specific, explicit re-inscription of a ‘body-fascist’ obsession, “together with the boundaries of what is (and therefore what is not) acceptable” (ibid.) But the ‘acceptable’ limits/controls what is accessible. Not having financial, cultural access to on-line technologies further marginalises ‘other’ like-kind representations and personages thus reinforcing the bourgeois homo-genous sameness of the homo-sexual image.

**Not the Only Gays in The Village**

Sinfield’s “metropolitan” gay identities and sex-gender systems are “in post-colonial contexts, global centres of capital.” (1998: 6) Metropolitan gay culture is a homogenous socio-economic arrangement, ostensibly providing the most socially recognised, politically active, activated and assimilated ‘communities’ but within a ‘Pink Pound’ capitalist consumerism. Metropolitan gay culture is physical, a proliferating scene/ghetto catering to urban gay men. “But it is also a lifestyle, a way of being and a way of being seen as gay. (Mowlabocus, 2007: 62)

“For those who have felt themselves interested in same-sex passion but somewhat to one side of metropolitan identities, gay has been a constraint.” (Sinfield, 1998: 7)

Sinfield demarcates those “interested in same-sex passion” from homogenised metropolitan homosexual identities of contemporary gay men. Mc Nair discourses a cause and effect construction of a 1970s out gay identity corresponding with a sudden increased production of gay pornography (1996: 16). This contingent loop where both gay pornography and gay identity fed the other’s demand for greater visibility and access, is contemporaneously being re-enacted on-line.

For men outside the gay metropolis, gay pornography and cyber-communications may be their primary, only link to homosexual discourses and the desires of homo-sexual men. The ongoing validation of such homo-sexual culture through both pornography and
cyber-sexual/social infrastructures communicates specific discourses on masculinity, body shape and practices to those marginalised by geography, culture or physicality.

**Anxious Desires**

Within the social anxiety of the Other of language and the others through/from whom we desire are deeply shaming discourses around a homo-normativity that all bodies should look/act/desire the same. Stone asserts that the body is always articulated and regulated through “textual productions” and that society employs these productions in order to “produce physical bodies that it recognises as members” (2002: 524).

Those not matching the normative expectant/ive body of contemporary sexual discourses are belittled, undesired and shamed. Whether bodies of dis/ability, race, shape a discourse operates denying individuals’ sexuality where bodies are sexy/desirable only within homonormativity. This ironically mirrors how homosexual bodies were measured, judged, de-sexed for not meeting/matching hetero-normative demands. While the overweight, the disabled and the non-Caucasian can and do inhabit Gaydar, their inability, their failure, to conform to these pornographic ideals renders them illegible (Mowlabocus, 2007: 68).

Within the same discursive meme of desire being desire of/for another, anxiety around bodies is apprehended through other’s anxieties, fears of being vulnerable, being unsolicited. Becoming Homosexual and coming out of the closet doesn’t release one from the monarchy of normative sexualities, but encodes one within homo-sexual dictates where one either looks the same as others, and desires homogenously, or one is excluded, marginalised, undesired-able.

Gay gym culture carries a lot of weight (not just literally) because it is establishing a social structure and hierarchy and gay men are increasingly using the parameters of gay culture to identify socially (Alvarez, 2009: 4).

**Object a - The Phallus - Lacan’s Sexuation**

Because humans are subjects of language, the jouissance of the signifier obstructs between the subject and the body of the Other. This law of castration subjects all ‘enjoyment’ to mediation through signification. “All the needs of speaking beings are contaminated by the fact of being involved in another satisfaction” (Lacan, Sem XX: 51).

As explored in Chapter Eleven, Lacan’s Graph of Sexuation, $\mathcal{S} \rightarrow a$ constructs masculine fantasy within phallic jouissance for the divided subject where a partner’s role as object $a$, provides some compensatory value of jouissance against the divided subject’s castration through language. The satisfaction of Phallic jouissance structures the Other as
nothing but objects of desire; a bodily piece (object $a$) is all that offers erotic consistency. Both Da Silva’s and Marshall’s texts evidence the discursive practice of fragmented body parts, whether torsos, abs or penises, offering erotic consistency within a homogenous gay sexual economy. These desire-able object $a$’s proffer forms of (mask)uline masquerade, or phallic answers via fantasy and desire, to be re-enacted in gay men’s desires and sexualities. Their communication of a fantasy of wholeness is sustained by the very act of fragmentation; promising more of a person yet to be seen, experienced behind this veil of fragmentation.

Linking processes of visibility with signification practices integrates gay men into a specific mode of self-representation, illustrating the proliferation of a specific ‘brand’ of gay lifestyle and identity. Namely the gay metropolitan gay lifestyle. From tanning to epilation to muscle growth, to posture, the gay male body is simultaneously ‘seen’ in cyberspace and controlled via the practices that construct it online. As a result gay men are instructed to (re)negotiate their relationship with their bodies at a physical, mental and cultural level (Mowlabocus, 2007: 68).

A phallic promise is proffered through such men’s desire-ability, a hollow promise of completion, wholeness, absolutes, concealed behind the veil of smart phone screens and internet browsers. Somewhere out there, is one for whom castration has not taken place, the ideal man, the perfect man, the primal, sexually whole father. Technology evidences the logical statements of Lacan’s masculine sexuation.

Lacan insisted on demarcating the phallus as a function rather than a body part, especially from the biological penis. The phallus is neither a fantasy nor an object, but The signifier, which can only be trailed/traced through constant movements of signification, with

“elements of real copulation..(it) is symbolic in a literal sense and because it is equivalent to logical copula; but most because of ’its turgidity, it is the image of the vital flow as it is transmitted in generation” (Lacan, 2006: 581).

The phallus, like the square root of minus one, $\sqrt{-1}$, exists functionally. It organises, can be traced, but cannot be represented as an actual number. The history of masculine signification indicates something of shifting phallic functionings.

**Fetishised Phallic Bodies**

Testes is derived from the Latin *testis* meaning ‘witness’ as only bearers of testes were allowed access legal discourses, offer testimony, declare a testament. Testes ‘bears witness’ to one’s male position. Since Benedict III’s investiture in 855 prior to their being declared pope, each pope must sit in the seat pictured (*right*) so the presence of testicles could be held/confirmed. The confirmer of the testicles declaring
“testiculos habet et bene pendentes” (*testicles has he and well-hung ones*) (Gould Davis, 1976: 45). This allegedly stems from the disputed papacy of Joan, though it may also relate to the taboo of a eunuch being prince of Rome. It is the presence of testicles and not a penis, that evidence/testify manhood, to being worthy of investiture with power.

The two great Renaissance visual representations of ideal man, Michelangelo’s *David* and Da Vinci’s *Vitruvian Man*, both highlight the musculature and form of the male, but both have unerect relatively unsubstantial penises. Again the mark of a man being his testicles, an erect or enlarged penis would only coarsely take from the true testicular display. Such testicular discourse endures in the taunt/demand of whether one has the ‘balls’ to do something.

The rise of the penis as signifier of maleness/masculinity only transpires within the emerging two-sex model explored in Chapter Two. But maleness and masculinity found other ways of visually being re/presented. Another displayed Victorian gendered performance, alongside the hermaphroditic bearded lady objects, was the strong-man who exhibited ‘pure/whole’ masculinity by lifting dumbbell weights.

By the *fin-de-siècle* period, paralleling the rise of photography, this Victorian strongman becomes less about evidencing his strength with weights and more about displaying musculature; less about vigour and more about image. Eugen Sandow, deigned the father of modern bodybuilding, realised that audiences were more enthralled by his bulging muscles than any weight lifting and so developed the strongman routine as “muscle display performances”. Edison filmed Sandow in such poses in another of his 1894 films.

In 1898, Sandow founded the first physique magazine, *Physical Culture* and established the world’s first male beauty pageants. In 1921 ‘The World’s Most Beautiful Man’ Angelo Siciliano would become Charles Atlas, whose advertisements of the mid twentieth century promised weaklings, “I will make you a man”. Musculature and build become entrenched as signifiers of manhood and masculinity.

The Charles Atlas ads of two generations ago continue to encompass the psychological and mythical appeal of body building. The attraction of that ad lies in the promise of change, in transformation of self from unimpressive and vulnerable to heroic and imposing with psyche following form” (Klein, 1993: 40).
In the nineteen-eighties two significant shifts take place. Firstly, “as gay porn became available, the demand for physique magazines diminished radically” (Alvarez, 2009: 70) and secondly advertising began promoting/producing the pectoral muscled male as object for consumption beginning with Bruce Weber and Sam Shahid’s infamous Calvin Klein Underwear ads in 1981 (left). Both men went on to work on marketing for Abercrombie and Fitch, who notoriously promote topless toned, abs chiselled Caucasian young men as their brand image (below).

“For many young men, to wear Abercrombie is to broadcast masculinity, athleticism and inclusion in the “cool boys club” without even having to open their mouths, that may be why the brand is so popular among some gay men who want desperately to announce their non-effeminacy” (Denizet-Lewis, 2006).

Jeffries the CEO of Abercrombie and Fitch when asked how important sex and sexual attraction are in “emotional experiences” answered “It’s almost everything. That’s why we hire good-looking people in our stores. Because good-looking people attract other good-looking people, and we want to market to cool, good-looking people. We don’t market to anyone other than that.” (ibid.)

“Men are increasingly surrounded with media images of masculine perfection … to make them feel inadequate about their bodies … that capitalise upon their body insecurities. ‘Male body image industries’ now prey increasingly on men’s worries, just as analogous industries have preyed for decades on the appearance-related insecurities of women” (Pope et al, 2000: 5).

With the rise of male objectification in advertising, mass and social media, men have increasingly become objects to social discourses and practices around views on/about/of contemporary men’s bodies. The advancing treacherous images presented in Baudrillardian hyper-muscular images, explored in Chapter Twelve, shape our perceptions of sexual/ised bodies and indoctrinates by exposure, an opportunistic post-capitalist manipulation which we as consumers mirror in or consumption of images and representation of our bodies and the bodies of others.

Gay gym culture is present in just about every aspect of gay media and gay life. Browse through the personal ads online or in any gay newspaper or magazine and you will find only a few out of the thousands that do not use the parameters and ideals of the gay gym to describe their body types (Alvarez, 2009: 3).
Bulking Bodies - Muscling Up

Body building can provide all men with a valuable, if distorted, look at themselves, trying hard to come across as invulnerable and in command, because to be less than that is not living up to advance billing as leaders, dominators, controllers, masters of the universe (Klein, 1993: 9).

Being a man is so self-evident that questioning what that is, is culturally unnecessary. Yet clearly there is no one masculinity, when masculinities get shifted, reinterpreted, depending on class, race, ethnicity, culture and of course sexuality. Connell recognises “hegemonic masculinity” (1995) as enjoying a privileged position and greater status in designating a society’s dominant views on manhood.

“The physical sense of maleness is not a simple thing. It involves size and shape, habits of posture and movement, particular physical skills and lack of others, the image of one’s own body, how it is presented to others and how they respond to it. In no sense is all of this a consequence of XY chromosomes or even of the possession on which discourses of masculinity have so lovingly dwelt, the penis” (84).

Culturally endorsed “hegemonic masculinity” defines men, less within positive terms of what he is (strong, courageous, fierce, etc.), but more ominously along negative traits outlining what he is not; discursively paralleling gay male cyber-profiles. These negative traits are always aligned with femininity i.e. to be a man is not to be a woman. Hegemonic masculinity, defined in this negation, always enforces within men the aggressive negation of any female characteristics of qualities in himself and other males: “NO FEMMES!!”

Masculinity is socially etched onto the body, ones gender appears to emanate from the body in what is often perceived as 'natural'. When the approved form of masculinity is not completely socialised, the male is thought of as having deviated, an unnatural act and condition” (Klein, 1993: 17).

The most obvious unnatural deviation for men is effeminacy and homosexuality, where a man who desires men, is clearly missing the masculine within him and this absence of natural masculinity haunts homosexual discourse. Homophobic psychoanalyst Socarides traces in obligatory homo-sexuality an anxious mandate, a defective masculinity:

“Many obligatory homosexuals sense a defect in their masculinity and take steps to correct that defect. They compensate by being super males. They go in for weight lifting, body building” (1995: 105).

The act of building muscle, a masculine body, purges perceived feminised bodies of any femininity. Where women are culturally constructed to view their bodies with an isolating detachment; “Does my bum look big in this?”, men are culturally constructed as physical beings. Their physicality and existence being one, men are dictated to inhabit bodies that define them. It is not a question of whether a man’s bum looks big in this outfit, but a demand/anxiety of whether I look big (or small) in this body. Within psychoanalytic discourse this relates to relative positions of being or having the phallus.

“Men view their bodies as instruments, in forceful, space occupying ways, all in an
effort to assert masculine ideals, offensively and defensively, (so) a complex set of symbols can be so constructed and presented as to give the appearance of hegemonic masculinity with nothing behind it. The male body can be a chimera, a psychologically defensive construct that looks invulnerable, but really only compensates for self-perceived weakness” (Klein, 1993: 18).

The amplification in muscle building culture parallels rising challenges of feminism and reductions in the economic and cultural visibility of blue-collar masculinity. Men have less control, or at least perceive more, the less control they have. Muscle building offers a promising visible, seductive panacea against such alienating cultural powerlessness.

“Bodybuilding is an accepted means of doing something about yourself. The dead-end job, unfulfilled relationship, or generalised angst many continue, but you can feel better about yourself by controlling the last vestige of your ever shrinking empire, your body. Change comes to be synonymous with physical alteration” (40).

As Fincher’s film Fight Club evidences, the demand/desire to assert authority/power against pervasive feelings of cultural irrelevance drives and finds expression in gym culture, where one “pumps” their bodies to “failure” while obsessively monitoring and controlling dietary consumption and ‘repetitions’ seeking a metamorphosis to erase the scrawny adolescent, the marginalised invisible, the gay loser; a narcissistic metamorphosis doomed to failure, as something always reminds them of who they were/are.

“That’s the thing about Narcissus, it’s not that he’s so fucking in love with himself, because he isn’t at all, he fucking hates himself. It’s that without that reflection looking back at him... he doesn’t exist.” Billy Chenowith, Six Feet Under (S2.Ep. 9).

The genealogy of bodybuilding discourses of metamorphosing your mirrored image invariably evokes discourses of masculinity. After all the Charles Atlas promise is to make you a man in ten days, as “I manufacture weaklings into men” (right). The implications being that weaklings are not men, and that any manufacturing of men, presumes/assumes an a priori man-u-fracturing. “The individual gets a new body, maybe a new self-image, but one so lacking in substance that only constant reassurance from a friendly mirror can allay the fear of not having changed at all.” (Klein, 1993: 41-2)

Alvarez reports the primary response to how working-out influences self-image was “I feel more masculine” (2009, 123-4) though he does not analyse or critique whether ‘feeling more masculine’ was beneficial and/or an improvement. As homo-sexual men, this demand for hommo-ness, for men/masculinity, is for the most part a non-negotiable
demand/desire/sexpectation, inscribed into signification, desires, bodies whether from potential partners or from homosexuals themselves.

Despite ex-gay or reparative therapy discourse, as Freud acknowledged, nothing cures homosexuality, certainly not psychoanalysis, which may only “If he is unhappy, neurotic, torn by conflicts, inhibited in his social life, bring him harmony, peace of mind, full efficiency.” (Lewes, 1995: 22) A homo-sexual cannot ‘fix’ the lack, the sin, the pathology of their being homosexual, but they can re-present their masculinity as a mask to hide/cover over these anxieties and fears. Gay men cannot be cured, but musculature can be built, thus so can masculinity. One cannot alter a body’s physical height, age, skin colour or sexual orientation, but the fantasy of hypermasculine weight lifting is that it can change anyone, make them into a man, an object of desire-ability.

**Pornography Rolls Out Gender Roles**

We think of the call of pornography as crass, crude. But in reality, pornography speaks to men in a whisper. ... Pornography knows men’s weakness; it speaks to that weakness, softly. Pornography ends up being about men’s domination of others … But for most men, it starts with a soft voice that speaks to our deepest fear: That we aren’t man enough (Jensen, 2007: 33).

As a prime discursive knowledge for sexuality, Gay-Porn’s utilising of sexual and gendered stereotypes has symbolic consequences which risk constructing people as ‘non-people’. Very clear orders of sexualised gender hierarchies are evidenced in stereotypical alignment of toned, muscular men as ‘tops’; the active sexual partners, and ‘bottoms’ twinks, younger/slighter men being aligned with passivity, and thus femininity.

Within gay male culture much enactments of *sexuality* seem more informed by gender discourse than with desire as whatever cultural assumptions and discourses of ‘male’ sexual behaviour, (i.e. being disengaged, unfeeling, promiscuous) is literally doubled in male/male homosexual practices.

Within pornography masculinity as dominance, the fucker, the top, is enacted with any relationship qualities or human values erased or lessened to maintain the primacy of control discourse. Within gay-porn it is conquest that gives a sense of power, conquest not only of the other man, but conquest enacted in sodomy, fucking him. Porn as a product does not exist in a vacuum, but in a symbolic discourse and set of real world practices, in which porn is produced and used, and further produces and uses. Porn both mirrors and amplifies our sexually objectifying culture, our understandings of male/female roles, masculine fucker/feminine fucked positionings.

“For me, porn is about controlling human beings, or should I say the illusion of
controlling human beings. That’s what got me off. I felt so out of control in my life and from my childhood; that this was something I could control. There is no vulnerability, no risk.” (Jensen, 2007: 115)

Dworkin’s pornographic critiques apprehending how gender roles and subordination are enacted, has layers of significance for gay men:

“In subordination, inequality itself is sexualised: made into the experience of sexual pleasure, essential to sexual desire. Pornography is the material means of sexualising inequality; and that is why pornography is a central practice in the subordination of women.” (Dworkin, 1988: 264-5)

The anxiety around evidencing effeminacy, or not being masculine, carries extra weight/implication for gay men, because culturally and historically, as this thesis has delineated, effeminate discourses have haunted the exhibition of their homosexuality.

**Bringing Up The Rear: Back to Sodomy**

The distinction is not psychological; when you say ‘masculine’, you usually mean ‘active’, and when you say ‘feminine’, you usually mean ‘passive’ (SE XXII, 115).

Freud’s warning that delineating activity with masculinity and passivity with femininity, “serves no useful purpose and adds nothing to our knowledge” (ibid) falls on deaf ears within pornographic discourse, within patriarchal heteronormative culture, and within the enactments of contemporary homo-sexuals. Active/Passive installs another binary to define/demarcate gay relationships, which is why Sharpe’s father asks him “Who’s the Man?” (2013). Such is the heteronormative dictate that grounds scientific and cultural discourse, where only opposites can complementarily attract, the same discourse that bound Ulrichs Urning/Dioning lexicon, that in every homo-sexual encounter/relationship there must be a man and a woman, an active and a passive, a top and a bottom. Every homosexual practice must contain heterosexuality.

Should *pix* capture sufficient sex-pectations, the standard follow-up cyber-communication is to ask/demand: “Top or Bottom?” This demand “Top or Bottom?” necessitates fixed identification, you are either one or other, never both. And within Foucault’s *scientia sexualis*, knowledge of one’s sexual position, gendered identity, place in the sexual hierarchy establishes politics of control. It is not questioning pleasure, it is demanding positioning; where sexuality can only be defined in ‘knowing’ masculine/feminine roles, where ‘versatile’ translates as really a bottom but afraid to say it. It is the first and final enactment of feminising the homo-sexual; all he really wants is a dick up his ass.

During the Aids crisis, epidemiologists developed the term ‘Men who have sex with men’ (MSM) to incorporate safer sex information and sexual health data from men who...
engaged in same-sex practices but for various cultural reasons, would not identify as gay or homosexual. The term homosexual carrying so much cultural signification, especially around effeminacy, MSM’s terminology doubly affirms men and masculinity.

Heterosexual discourse does not require top/bottom binary significations because culturally the man is always on top, the woman in the inferior bottom role. This is the knowledge that *scientia sexualis* communicates and reinforces. Within *ars erotica*, such terminology and discourse does not exist, as there are two people sharing an experience, rather than an inferior and a superior having separate encounters.

Ostensibly the binary top/bottom evokes power dynamics of penetrator/penetrated and thus active/passive; masculine/feminine. But, as always, sex is a little more complex, desires escape language. During oral sex the penetrator passively ‘gets head’ the penetrated actively ‘gives head’; who is the man and the woman in this scenario, when culturally the cocksucker, the active partner, is the bitch, the feminine?

In gay male sexuality, there are also discourses around *total bottoms*, one who adopts the receptive anal role exclusively; *power bottoms* who aggressively enjoy being the active partner in the receptive role and *versatile bottoms* whose preference is for receptive anal sex, but who also are happy to be the active partner as well. In sexual practices, in an *ars erotica* of pleasure the binary cannot hold, but yet its knowledge/power dictates.

Rod Barry was an unemployed ex-marine married to his pregnant high school girlfriend, when finding work with a photographer looking for models ultimately led to him becoming “one of the best sexual performers in the history of gay porn” (*Escoffier*, 2009: 305). After years of success and indeed excess including alcohol and drug addiction, Barry (*left*) who had exclusively topped in all his gay-porn films agreed to bottom, to “playing a feminine role” (308) as:

“Eventually, any successful top in the gay porn business come under pressure to bottom. Fans frequently fantasise strong tops bottoming, and the fantasy appeals on a number of levels. One is the potential transgression of the masculine code, which a top, to some degree, represents” (307).

The enjoyment of ‘straight’ men doing gay porno or “gay-for-pay” is perhaps the most popular, and definitely the most financially lucrative, form of gay-porn, precisely because of the identifications with power/control and subtexts of masculinility and femininity. The fantasy phallic top is revealed/exposed as really a bottom, who enjoys this even more, he really was gay all along. He was not a ‘real’ man, as what ‘real’ man would accept a
passive, bottoming position? And so the fantasy, the consumer, the studios move onto the next top. A study on gay pornography showed that at least 82.4% of all ‘actors’ ultimately bottom at some point during their career (Michelides, 2009). Bottoming usually denotes the end stage of a pornographic actor’s career.

The same study also found that the actor with the larger penis was more likely to act as the top, as clearly his larger penis gives him that masculine position/identity.

Cathal Mc Carron (right) is a father and Tyrone Gaelic footballer, nominated for an All Star for reaching the 2013 All-Ireland Senior Football Championship semi-final, whose struggle with gambling addiction has been well documented. In April 2014 Gay-for-Pay videos entitled ‘Masculine straight Irishman’s first gay sex video’ emerged with him following the screenplay of gay-porn sex, prescribed on a coaching whiteboard within the scene for him to first kiss, then masturbate, then fellate before finally getting fucked. The media response of supportive horror only exposed a desire that is not exclusively homo-sexual, that a man be belittled, shamed, feminised in being fucked.

In gay porn, all sexuality ultimately leads to sodomy, anal intercourse, to fucking. Within the majority of gay-porn there is a sucker (top) and a fucked (bottom); flip-flop encounters with both swopping roles is minimised. The language top/bottom communicates sexual hierarchies of superiority and inferiority and have nothing to do with the actual sexual positions engaged. Someone sitting astride another man is still a bottom, although he is sexually positioned on top. The man below or beneath him is still the top.

What homosexuals want is outlined in their naming, they want the same things, desires, identities, to be the same as each other; and they want sex, not love, sex. Of course the same sexual thing that homo-sexuals want is and always has been sodomy. That is why in being named homo-sexual, we are also bum-bandits, anal assassins, brownie kings, buggers, bum boys, butt pirates, fudge packers, pillow biters, mattress munchers, sausage jockeys, shirt lifters, shit stabbers, turd burglars, uphill gardeners, sods.

Q. What do you call a gay dinosaur?
A. Mega-saur-ass

What is most threatening and destabilising about like-kind desire is that it challenges the ‘God-given’, ‘natural’ normality not only of heterosexuality, and the binary of
male/female upon which it is based, but it can rewrite sexuality itself back into a pleasure centred *ars erotica* where enjoyment is treasured, over the *scientia sexualis* where knowledge is always sought over pleasure. Within *scientia sexualis* like-kind passionates will always be known as homo-sexual and in that binomial nomenclature bound to degeneracy, perversion, unnaturalness, unhappiness, sentenced to pornified knowledge of reductive male and female binaries.

The reciprocal scenario, where both men take turns fucking each other, is often exercised as a celebration of equality. Versatility is a unique and important feature of male anal sex. Some men consider it liberating; Versatility to them is akin to speaking two different languages. It requires a special kind of playfulness, creativity, curiosity, and coordination (Underwood, 2008: 9).

**Conclusion**

Within online constructions and maintenance of gay subjectivity specific forms of knowledge are at work, a “constrained narration of self” Mowlabocus terms “a discourse of cybercarnality” (2007: 68). Such ‘constrained narrations’ are *homo-sexual* in being both homogenously subjected to discursive machineries that fragment, evaluate and codify him, and sexualised in rendering specific gay male bodies visible and desire-able.

Online profiles operate as both a means of representation, albeit with limited text/script and infinite photoshopped images, and as a technique of surveillance. This surveillance both identifies the gay subject, and subjects them to homogenising metropolitan forms of sexual expression and re/presentation. The proliferation of cyber-sexual/social lives and identities informed and conformed to gay pornographic discourses of what is desire-able, increasingly function in defining and policing, understandings of what it means to be gay in contemporary western life. And this being ‘gay’ is now more than ever *homo-sexual*.

There are bodies and persons marginalised, excluded and shamed for not matching the *homo-sexual* model; deemed not sexual for not fitting the *homo* standard. The reality of a gay lifestyle, image and desiring in/formed through pornography and manufactured through narcissistic surveillance around anxieties of effeminate presentations, where discursively and genealogically all homosexuals are not ‘real men’, “serves to condense homosexuality into a single overarching identity, one that does little to challenge hegemonic norms or to liberate sexuality.” (68) These same anxieties, desires, constructions and paradoxes inform gay male sexual identities and behaviour and the homo-sex homosexuals are constructed to have, sodomy, but with all the discursive, binary-normalising trimmings.
Conclusion:
Keep Checking The Rear View Mirror

“Theory is good; but it doesn’t prevent things from existing.” Charcot (quoted in SE III:13)

Thesis Synopsis:
In contrast to other texts’ analysis of homosexual history, or homosexuals in history, or homosexuality in history, this thesis’s Foucauldian discourse analysis interrogates differing implications the signification ‘homo-sexual’ has had for cultural discourses on how homosexuals and homosexuality came to be realised/practiced. Using Foucauldian archaeological and genealogical practices, it explores not so much this ‘new’ homosexual species’ but the etymological origins, evolution, and categorisation of this ‘new’ species as ‘homosexual’; the signifieds that consciously and unconsciously formulated this signifier. Through evaluating scientific, psychoanalytic and cultural thinkings and representations/images of the ‘homo-sexual’, this thesis traces Foucault’s contention that “nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality” (Foucault, 1990: 43); how in defining him as ‘homosexual’, his homo-ness and his sexuality are the “root of all his actions” What this thesis originally contributes to knowledge is an analysis/awareness of how naming like-kind passionate men as ‘homo-sexual’ instigated implications, practices and discourses which this thesis charts within three different epochs of homo-sexuality being born, borne and now porned. This thesis specifically critiques this loaded, political and incendiary binomial nomenclature with its legacy of the degenerative, the criminal and the pathological that named, accentuated and made visible aspects of same-sex behaviour to repress/deny any like-kind amorous elements. The homosexual is, because it is named. The homo-sexual does, because it is named.

Questioning Sex Solutions
The question of sex is a fundamental solution to who we are. This is the Freudian psychoanalytic fulcrum that advanced enquiries on Hysteria into more expansive explorations on erotic drives unconsciously directing the human subject. Lacan’s theories on Sexuation similarly mirror this Freudian appreciation of questions, positionings of sex being productions attempting to address primary and original issues around desire, lack, the Other, jouissance.

Under Foucault’s scientia sexualis the question of sex produces/demands knowledge, and knowledge is always a product and producer of power. This thesis examines the power
inherent in the kinds of ‘knowing’ like-kind passion that are facilitated and produced in its being named as homo-sexual. The power of ‘naming’ being central within both psychoanalytic and post-structuralist discourses, so it is also to this thesis.

It is the question of sex that proffers a fundamental solution to who we are, not any answer. The answers we adopt, imagine, fantasise are only temporary and illusory, but necessary. The question continues metonymically, like desire, driving us on. This thesis does not patronisingly proffer answers, but instead questions the answers/knowledge that have already emerged in limiting like-kind passion to homogenised sex. In analysing the language and structures establishing and grounding the normative and deviant categories established through discourses of homo/hetero sexuality, this thesis evokes queer deconstructions of gender or sexual acts and identities as any part of an essential self but rather, as socially constructed through language and discourses.

The Homosexual is the answer/knowledge ‘common’ discourse provides to questions around like-kind desire. As queer theory evidences, this answer does not really address the questions/challenges, nature or desire therein, only culturally serving to obscure and supress other questions around sexuality, orientation, gender and desire. Natural heterosexual identity is grounded in the absolute binary opposition of male/female; on social interpretations of biological texts. The homo-sexual is necessary to re-enforce male/female heterosexuality as self-evidently ‘natural’; ‘proper’; ‘generative’, despite Freud’s psychoanalytic deconstruction of these terms:

“From the point of view of psychoanalysis the exclusive sexual interest felt by men for women is also a problem (my italics) that needs elucidating and is not a self-evident fact” (SE VII: 146).

Being homo-sexual, gay men are designated to exhibit themselves sexually that does not represent the complexity of their lives while rarely having places to talk openly about that experience. This thesis tries to unlock such a resistance. Their sexuality must be homogenous, must be homo-sexual, must be the same; never ‘real’ men, against whom they are defined/marginalised/de-meaned. Such categorisations/stereotypes are an obvious way in which heterosexism/homophobia limits not just gay men, but all men.

This thesis demarcates the im/possibilities for discourse, on how or what can be said about men and homosexuality, by men about homosexuality, and most critically of all by homosexual men. How men can talk about sex, about sexuality, about masculinity is always within defined, delineated ways, and this thesis makes visible some of these limits, especially around discoursing ‘sexual orientation’ with its implicit statements about gender, masculinity/femininity, which are used to police desires and limit people.
This thesis is an articulation on how things came to be seen as homo-sexual, through and within this very deliberate, conscious and political naming. A vocalisation of how we have come to be in this particular contemporary place where the most significant and power-ful omnipresent discourse on sexuality, pornography, continues to perpetuate sexual ‘knowledge’ that not only limits pleasure, but enforces power through controlled gender roles and repeated binary oppositions.

Implicit in this narrative is that although sex may be natural, it doesn’t come/cum naturally; this is the core question psychoanalysis interrogates. What this thesis poses for cultural/academic discourse are deconstructions of natural myths of sexuality and desire, and to approach again fundamental questions of sex/sexuality that might yet offer indispensable solutions to who we are by allowing questions to be asked, rather than answered/known. This thesis is invested in queering sexuality as a question, rather than controlling/naming sexuality as a knowledge.

Back to Foucault:

Chapter One’s outlining of Foucault’s methodologies underlined this thesis’s excavations of the ‘homosexual’ as a “new specification of individuals” demarcating a shift in legal/medical “persecution” from the “sodomy of forbidden acts” to “a juridical subject”:

The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away (Foucault, 1990: 43).

The terms hetero and homo are imbedded in a binary oppositional two-sexed model which as Chapter Two explored is neither ‘natural’ nor ‘certain’ but a constructed development from the seventeenth century in opposition to a more fluid one-sex spectrum of sexual identities that pre-existed. Given the enlightenment’s scientific and philosophical hetero-dictate that only opposites could attract/produce, ‘Homo-sexual’ specifically names like-kind passion within a same-repulsion, degenerative, unnatural discourse.

Chapter Three considered how, because this name homo-sexual conformed to scientific hetero-prerogative discourses, was elected over other available signifiers, most especially that of the Urning/Uranian by which most late nineteenth century like-kind passionates identified; significations that communicated classicism, nobility and love. Freud himself, though originally choosing the hetero-prerogative ‘inverts’, by the twentieth century exclusively adopts ‘homo-sexual’. Being classified binomially as homo and sexual;
denies any signification of love, establishing them as unnatural, not only in their degenerate homo-ness, but in their perverse non-amorous sexual-ness.

As scientific discourse accepts nothing ‘new’, but demands evolution from something already discursively present, authority through consistency, Chapter Four explores how this new ‘homo-sexual’ name and categorisation became discursively aligned with hermaphroditism. To warrant ‘scientific legitimacy’, hermaphroditic discourse proffered for Ulrichs a natural basis for Urning desire being anima muliebris virili corpore inclusa, (female psyche confined in a male body) (cited in Rosario, 1997: 27). However this was against scientific enforced absolute sexual opposites denying hermaphroditism and demanding one ‘true’ sex. However a legacy was instituted of something not fully male about homo-sexuals, and that this effeminacy could be visually evidenced on their bodies.

Chapter Five studies narcissism as the ultimate homo-sexuality, one of the primary markers discoursed by both early psychoanalysts and sexologists as aligned with the feminine, which then ‘somehow’ subsequently becomes “the Narcissistic perversion par excellence, the chief homosexual trait” (Sadger, 1921: 148.) Fin-de-siècle narcissism moves from aesthetic self-reflection to a pathological sexual indicator of homo-sexuality. In parallel, the differing correlates of narcissism, dandyism, and aestheticism, shift from designating gentlemen’s philosophies to marking perverse homosexual effeminacy.

The central figure in this discursive shift from thinking gentleman to acting pervert, Oscar Wilde, is discussed in Chapter Six. Because of his prominence, Wilde’s name epitomises the ‘homosexual’ as post-trial all his traits, writings and actions became reconfigured as homosexual indicators, attracting Rank’s attention, whom Freud credits with giving Narcissism’s “place in the regular development of human beings”. Yet, neither Sadger nor Freud, despite their interests in theatre, in language, and in sexuality ever consciously write of Wilde, while the homosexuals they were ‘treating’ increasingly identified as and against being “Oscar Wilde types”.

But closer to home for Freud, both geographically and theoretically, were the Eulenburg trials, explored in Chapter Seven, which publicised within German speaking lands this word homosexual, and thus the nature of homo-sexuals, and the humiliation of their “homosexual spokesperson” Hirschfeld. The trials marked Hirschfeld’s professional downfall, and separation from Freud and psychoanalysis, but discursively propagated cultural notions of “unconscious” threatening, foreign degenerate homosexuality aligned with effeminacy, running counter to Germanic ideals of manhood; discourses of which the Nazis would utilise, for exterminating gay men.
Chapter Eight analyses the paranoid, sexual, image loving triumvirate within Freud, Dalí and Lacan. How all three create metamorphoses of Narcissus, all three are exploring homosexuality in relation to paranoia, and all three are enamoured with the power of signification of language, of the image.

Lacan’s metamorphosis of Narcissus, his Mirror Stage, “the germ containing everything” (Clement, 1981: 119) is traced in Chapter Nine by outlining its “antecedents” beyond Dalfesque and Freudian inspired doubles, narcissism, homosexuality and paranoia, into sociological discourses. The mirror stage’s subjectification grounds, founds and alienates us in an image in which we see but never find ourselves, turning instead to others, the Other, for recognition. Such doubling, ego-ideal, narcissism linking homosexuality to a paranoid loss/desire for an ideal is a key meme evinced in contemporary homo-sexual lives.

Chapter Ten outlines desire never being individual or unique but always sociologically constructed in the desire for/of the other. The narcissism of our desires are no longer a private psychology but public, socially structured heter(a)sexual desires. Desire being transported through signifiers, cultural ideologies we inhabit and assume, homo-sexual desire can only ever be but another signification conceived and inherited through/from the desire of the others/Other. The signification ‘homo-sexual’ identifies it more than the homo objects it ostensible sexually seeks.

Chapter Eleven looked at ‘gay’ Lacan who in moving sexuality away from discourses on objects, orientations and indeed genders collapses desire as either hetero or homo sexual. Lacan deliberated his homosexuality as having more to do with love, than with sex. In examining the homogenous desiring positions within Lacan’s Graph of Sexuation, a discourse unencumbered by biology, gender, genitals, this chapter noted the perfidious binary opposition signifiers masculine and feminine marking its two desiring positions.

Within contemporary hyper-visual image culture Chapter Twelve interrogates the representation of images of homo-sexuality within a pornified multi-media culture, where bodies, desires and persons are lost to hyper-visual images, demands and profiles. Within Baudrillard’s orders of simulacra, the relentless circulation of such homo-sexual pornified re-presentations being true or false depictions is redundant, because their aim is not to portray like-kind passionates but betray their embedding within a homo-sex strategy, an encoding of power involving alienation and humiliation, ultimately of their spectators.

Neither pornography nor society should be treated as singular concepts. Within Foucault’s scientia sexualis heteronormative culture, pornography is a primary re/source for homo-sexual knowledge. Chapter Thirteen critiques Pornography’s commodification
of sexuality which, within the hyper-real sexual marketplace, re/produces and encodes
formulaic gendered discourses and generic practices of debasement, dehumanisation
which in/form a homogenising of current homosexual discourses and practices. It re/presents a sexuality based not on individual fantasy, but an industrial product created
by those excited not by bodily contact, but by market penetration and bottom line profit.

The ‘naming’ of like-kind passionates as homo-sexuals inaugurated specific
subjectifications constituting very particular discursive practices subjected to this name
‘homo-sexuality’. As Morrison’s caveat delineates “Definitions belong to the definers,
not the defined” (1997: 190). Chapter Fourteen argues the currency of cyber-sexuality
where one accepts the pornified commodification of their person as a medium of
exchange. Thus, in their name, homo-sexuals are repeatedly constructed and constricted
to be homogenously sexual in both image and behaviour, yielding a collective homo-
sexual body, but at a cost of marginalises inconvenient bodies.

**Gender Benders**

Within queer practice, this thesis bends dual gender binary opposition to break the
normative positions of cultural sexual identities. Homosexual was conceived as a noun,
it now operates as an adjective. Only two sexes, male and female, organise and decide all
that can be discoursed around gender and thus sexuality. From Derridean deconstruction
of binary’s inherent hierarchies, male is the absolute, so anything classed not ‘male’ must
be ‘female’. And ‘homosexuals’, primarily because of their alignment with and,
inheritance of sodomitic discourse, can thus never be male. Sodomy can only evoke
anxious knowledge of penetrative/passive thus feminine desires rather than anything of a
universal anal eroticism or prostate pleasure.

The binary heterosexual/homosexual being grounded within this male/female binary
demarcates orientation. The homo-ness involves two of the same sex, when there can only
be two sexes. This thesis highlights locating homosexuality within the aged-old (only
three centuries) two-sex model directs homosexuality to become a discourse about
subjectivity, gender (being less manly, effeminate, womanly) rather than desire. To
critique homophobic or heterosexist operation in judgements which created this homo-
sexual species is too obvious; of greater investigative interest within this thesis, and
beyond for further discursive exploration, are the contingencies, enactments and
discourses that allowed ‘homophobic’ orthodoxy to be reinforced as natural.

An obvious consequence of the two-sex system was that Ulrichs and Hirschfeld’s initial
attempts to name like-kind passion could only be discoursed as a third sex. Thus
perpetuating within both scientific and cultural discourses the ongoing confusion where the object of your desires somehow implicates something of both gendered social identity, and biological identity/body. This thesis highlights the discursive meme that if one is abnormal in gender presentation, one must have 'contrary sexual feelings'; if one has 'contrary sexual feelings' then one must be abnormally gendered.

Ellis’s *Sexual Inversion* though countering the presumption that “in homosexual relationships one person is always active, physically and emotionally, the other passive”, still discourses a cross-sex binary opposite model where “the invert cannot tell if he feels like a man or like a woman.” (1927: 5466) implying that feeling only like either a man or a woman are the only options available within a two-sexed model.

In structuralism one cannot use such *founding* signifiers without *confounding* confusion. Male/Female may intend biological meanings, but they always transmit other binaries: masculine implies active/male; thus not feminine/passive/female. Within Lacanian post-structuralism signifiers carry all their signifieds, one meaning cannot be isolated from others. Words can never be insulated from the binary relations producing both conscious and unconscious meaning. Thus, within and beyond this thesis’s post-structuralist discourse the binary opposition of *masculine/feminine* must continually be ruptured precisely as their “meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people” (*SE VII*: 219).

**Looking Gay**

This thesis underscores how aligning abnormal orientation with abnormal gender, manoeuvres discourses of effeminacy to police/shame like-kind desiring men into being considered/deemed/discoursed as unnatural, less manly, less male, lacking. Through Foucauldian analysis of relations of power “methods and techniques used in different institutional contexts to act upon the behaviour of individuals … so to shape, direct, modify their way of conducting themselves” (Foucault, 1982: 142) this thesis establishes ways in which “men are ‘governed’ by one another” (ibid) by language, discourse and practices which demand/expect/require a policing of gender presentation in order to conceal/limit any evidence of an effeminate, narcissistic homo-sexuality.

The Scientific discursive practice of uncovering physiological indicators of homosexuality, the Malaysian Government’s guidelines of what can be ‘seen’ of the body, or indeed in an age of DNA - eugenics in the body, is a practice that inevitably evokes discourses of visibly determining masculinity and femininity; “He looks gay”. The end result always discursively seeks, consciously or unconsciously, to reveal a bodily
substrate, disclosing effeminacy/passivity. This thesis invites any enquiries or research into causes of homosexuality, to make this or any agenda transparent.

**Keep One Eye on The Mirror At All Times**

Policing gendered presentations, in order to reveal/conceal sexual orientations, is no longer overtly established and sustained through physical restraint or coercion, but through individual self-surveillance and personal self-correction to norms. As Panti Bliss righteously named “And when I'm standing at the pedestrian lights I am checking myself, and I hate myself for that. (O’Neill: 2014).

“There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself.” (Foucault, 1980: 155).

Narcissism, which this thesis establishes as deliberately aligned with *homo-sexuality* and the feminine, within contemporary gay lives could be interpreted not as vanity but a constant mirror checking, to curb/rid specific encoded practices that might/would identify gayness/effeminacy. ‘Homo-sexuality’ demands self-surveillance, both before and after coming out which exhaust and are exhausting, emotionally, socially, personally.

Freud recognises most homosexuals appear for treatment not because of their desires, but because of the cultural threats their desiring has: “external motives such as social disadvantage, and danger attaching to his choice of object” (Lewes, 1995: 22).

This thesis exposes the power inherent within paranoid self-surveillant practice is culturally instituted through a self-consciousness of being marked as not ‘normal’, unconscious and overt social conditionings that ensure a fear of how one’s image is reflected back by/to society and thence interpreted/judged as not masculine, evidencing homosexuality. Both Foucault and Lacan would converge in their understanding, albeit for differing reasons, that ‘the subject’ is always under surveillance of the Other.

**Knowledge And Pleasure**

“However Psychology is in its infancy as a science, I hope, in the interests of Art, it will always remain so.” (Wilde, 2000: 1896)

Alas, Psychology did not stay in its infancy, but grew up, to be a dominant discursive practice, a discourse that communicates in, and only knowledge. This knowledge creates grand decisive metanarratives presenting sweeping explanations of sexual matters. This thesis, in being discoursed by a psychoanalyst and not a psychologist, recognises the uniqueness of everyone’s sexual narrative, punctuated by their own subjective place
within language, their own relations to lack and desire. In puncturing some of what these grand sexual narratives decide and dictate, not least in their construction of *homo-sexuals*, this thesis invited and invites a scepticism against any discourse that may inflict profound damage in trying to extinguish or limit or categorise any sexual desire.

“The analysands themselves rarely wish to lose their erotic solutions. A number of patients, under the impact of the analytic adventure, frequently develop richer sexual and love relations, but should this not occur, then to lose the only system of sexual survival they have been able to devise would the equivalent of castration” (McDougall, 1986: 19-20).

It is these individual systems of “sexual survival” that most need to be listened for and to, away from judgements, reparation, or denial. Within differing psych discourses, psychoanalysis is uniquely placed to operate from this place. No one can tell another’s truth/experience about their body. It is not despite one’s body that one can be desire-able, but because of one’s body that one can desire.

The lure of pornography is that it provides a ‘safe’ space to explore desire, a confessional in which knowledge of ones sexuality gets forged. Pornography has historically been strategic for individual like-kind men’s “sexual survival”. Pornography provides discourse of mastery, of control, of unending pleasure and release. It projects the fantasy that not only does the sexual relationship exist, but that every kind of sexual relationship can exist, a harmonious fantasised life of any fetish, perversion, grouping, coupling; everyone comes; everyone enjoys and this cumming of enjoyment can be seen.

“In pornography, the world is a balanced and harmonious place. The sexual requirements of women and/or men are perfectly congruent, symbiotic in relation and polar in definition: all living to fuck or be fucked.” (Baldwin, 1992: 47)

There is no such thing as a sexual relationship, except in the fantasies of pornography. But *fantasy* is the key trope. This thesis is concerned with the ‘knowledge’ pornography institutes that is creating a new sexual ‘reality’ from which survival may not be an option.

**I’mPossible Pleasure**

In being scientifically defined through male/female biological difference, sex is not discoursed in terms of pleasure, but under heterosexual procreational function, evidenced throughout the current equal marriage debate on the Thirty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Bill 2015: “The presumption that the nature of heterosexuality is ‘nature’ itself.” (Hird, 2005: 27) This thesis complicates knowledge of social ‘normalisation’ to unearth a Foucauldian genealogy of Heteronormativity’s dominance and primacy that restricts, limits and controls pleasure.
Sodomy has always been threatening because it manifests unreproductive, de-generative sexual desire, and subverts male desire as being absolute, self-apparent, active and ‘dominant’. How can discourse allow ‘male’ pleasure to be ‘passively’ experienced? Such desire, and anxiety, informs and shames much contemporary gay-male discourse, practices and subjectivities. There is a reason why homosexuals continue to be sodomites.

Within gay male culture much practices and enactments of sexuality seem informed by the enjoyment of gendered positions than bodily pleasure. For homo-sexuals, the attraction to disengaged, promiscuous sexual behaviour is more often inscribed through gender performance than from bodily desire.

Being a man, the man, and desiring only men, when to desire a man is inherently feminine, is the impossibility around which homo-sexual desire is constructed and discoursed. This is the trap that lured Ulrichs’ Uurning discourse:

“‘Does an Uurning sexually attract another Uurning?’ Little or not at all; at least as soon as our feminine traits become apparent. The reason is made clear above. He is lacking what is truly masculine” (Ulrichs, 1994: 68).

Urnings/Homosexuals, being designated feminine under a heterosexual hegemony, can only be attracted to masculinity, their binary opposite, which of course another Uning/Homosexual cannot possess as this is the masculinity they so clearly ‘lack’. Which Ulrichs affirms in a proto-Lacanian manner “Everyone loves what is lacking in themselves” (68).

Uning/Homosexual desire is made impossible, as how could a Dioning/Straight Acting Man be attracted to an Uning/Homosexual, when Straight men desire women only. This thesis explicates some of this impossibility, proffering awarenesses and resistances, however naively, to expose how this powerful homo-sexual impossible legacy initiated from hetero-discursive dictates, is borne and enacted in contemporary gay life, with masculinity fetishised as the desired lack of gay sexual desire.

**Definitions Belong to the Definers, not the Defined**

Of central import to this thesis is that three contemporary namings of like-kind passionate identity should overlap, be discerned and distinguished: homosexual, gay and queer. Obviously all three describe, indeed inscribe like-kind passion but rather than differentiating their meanings, of more significant import is who uses these terms and in what contexts; the definers. Both gay and queer have their origins in a bullying derisive nomenclature whose intent was to belittle and reduce the persons to whom they were denoting, whether such a person was actually a like-kind passionate or not. Unironically
both terms have been reclaimed by like-kind communities to self-describe, where gay has become a positive personal naming and queer a challenging political term.

Homosexual is the scientific/legal term, and thus may claim a neutrality, in not aiming for offence or belittlement but impartially and disinterestedly ascribing/desciribing an identity, a persuasion, a personage. But as this thesis has explored no language, and no naming is ever neutral or impartial. The term homosexual owes its origin and propagation to discourses of binary oppositions within a two sexed discourse of male and female, where it both implies a non-hetero opposite degeneration, and a less than male effeminacy. Significantly, it has not been reclaimed by contemporary gay or queer movements, but is continually used to label persons or groups with an either conscious and overt or subtle or unconscious intent to offend, belittle, criminalise or pathologise.

Homosexual has parallels to the term ‘coloured’ in the United States, archaic, inappropriate and offensive, but of its time discursively powerful and significant. The Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, GLAAD, hold ‘homosexual’ on their list of offensive terms and in 2006 persuaded The Associated Press, whose stylebook is widely used by news organisations, to restrict use of the word. The New York Times resisted the word gay until 1987, preferring homosexual (now, it prefers the word gay in most contexts). The Washington Times set off in quotes the term gay marriage until 2008 and that year updated its stated preference over the term “homosexual marriage.”

This thesis specifically focuses on the origins, etymology and incidence of the term ‘homosexual’ and argues psychoanalytic discourse as a prominent cultural transmitter and propagator of both this signifier and more importantly the pathological constructions, narcissism, effeminacy and degeneracy that it communicates.

Despite Halperin’s infamous 2012 text How to be Gay? there are many ways of being gay, or at least there always should be; but such is an imperative to homogenise those named homosexual. Halperin’s advocacy of how to be gay implicates very white upper middle class American understandings of what being gay is, a very privileged homogenised homo-sexuality. Ways of ‘being gay’ are hugely influenced by wealth, socio-economic position, age, time, geographic location and culture; not least of all, as the previous chapters explored, by internet accessibility. It is a radically queer notion to invite, promote different and differing ways of ‘being gay’. This thesis contests not

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varying notions and ideas of being gay, but the constructions and constrictions imposed and dictated in defining someone as homosexual. One should be wary of unifying and relating all gays as homo/alike, with only one way of being gay, for in reducing human subjects to a single sexual common denominator, one diminishes both desire and all human subject themselves.

This thesis accentuates potential hazards in homo-genising like-kind desire, as contemporary pornified internet sexual culture promotes and propagates, with persons inevitably being marginalised and made invisible. For like-kind desiring men there are as many ways of ‘being gay’, as there are ways of not ‘being gay’. It is up to each to name themselves, their desires, the objects of their desire, forever re-confronting the dilemma of Ulrichs’ Urano-Dioning taxonomy, which the ever increasing contemporary LGBTQIQ rainbows evidences. There are more desires than names, and each name only creates further names, when something always escapes signification. No word can describe everything, desires always escapes: “I cannot express it….”

This thesis takes issue with discourses that in this very act of naming ‘homosexuals’ have established and disseminated constructions of their being sinners, being pathological, being mentally ill, being untouchable outcasts. This is due to like-kind passionate men coming to be named as homosexual, rather than their possessing as homosexual desires.

To be or not to be was the only question. I propose many other questionings, that one can have homosexual desires and still be something else/other, still be someone. To come out is to name ones desire, to define oneself, be that as gay, bi, queer, questioning, whatever. The more names, the more positionings, the more possibility. The legacy of an orthodox homosexual naming desires to limit, to restrict desire to sexuality, to sex, to sodomy; to constrain it as sick, pathological, criminal, unnatural; to regulate sexual and gender presentation and performance, to shame, to belittle, to alienate. This thesis questions the origins, etymology and dissemination of the term ‘homosexual’ to highlight not only the discourses it carries and supports but also, most especially in contemporary debates such as same-sex marriage, to more easily identify the agencies and agendas at work in naming the love that dares to seek its name, homosexual.

Words change meaning, some become powerful; different becomes dangerous. Those that fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it. Homo-sexual is no neutral signifier, but carries a weight of pathologising, of marginalising, of demeaning precisely in the meanings it originated through and publicised. This thesis’s resolve is to deconstructively de-mean the meanings behind/within that de/meaning word, homosexual.
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