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**IS THERE AN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN VARIETY OF
DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM?
A Twenty-Two Country Cluster Analysis**

**Iain McMenamin
School of Law and Government
Dublin City University**

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	<p>Centre for International Studies School of Law and Government Dublin City University Ireland Tel. +353 1 7008084 Fax + 353 1 7008036 Email cis@dcu.ie Web: www.dcu.ie/~cis</p>
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ABSTRACT

The identification of the sub-types of capitalist democracy has been one of the great projects of political science. The issue of the distinctiveness of East-Central European models of capitalist democracy is implicit in much of the literature on this region. Existing studies are based on samples of countries and choices of variables which are too narrow to provide a plausible assessment of the distinctiveness of East-Central Europe. This article compares twenty-two capitalist democracies, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, across fifty-two measures of political institutions, social welfare regimes and economic structures. The data is analysed by cluster analysis. While the cluster analysis cannot tell us how many varieties of democratic capitalism there are, it provides a consistent clustering of countries. If there are six or more varieties of democratic capitalism, the East-Central European cases form a cluster on their own. If there are three or four varieties, they cluster with Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. If there are only two varieties, East-Central Europe is clearly associated with the continental European, as opposed to the liberal, model.

INTRODUCTION

The first wave of post-communist research was concerned with assessing the chances of the survival of capitalist democracy in former communist countries. Capitalist democracy has been consolidated in East-Central Europe in the sense that no significant group, domestically or externally, even considers an alternative system. There is little doubt that East-Central European capitalist democracy will continue into the foreseeable future. The second wave of research is perhaps not as uniformly gathered around a single question. Nonetheless much of the recent work on East-Central European capitalist democracies implicitly addresses the question of their distinctiveness. Given the sharp divergence between the communist states and the capitalist democracies for over forty years, the former communist states make for an intriguing sample with which to investigate the global diversity of capitalist democracy.

There are a number of competing views of the comparative status of East-Central Europe. Many authors emphasise the effects of the era before the transformation of communism. Sometimes this leads to an emphasis on the shared legacy of communism and at other times the impact of the different histories of the countries before and during communism is stressed. Another group of scholars tends to concentrate on the recent post-communist past. One group perceives the neo-liberalism of the “Washington Consensus” to be profoundly important in post-communist development (Williamson 1993: 1329). A different literature investigates progress towards the not-necessarily-neo-liberal norms of the European Union (Ágh 1999; Goetz 2001). The latter has been the clear first preference of most Polish and Hungarian governments, and also some Czech ones. This paper seeks to go beyond

the existing literature by explicitly addressing the distinctiveness of East-Central European democracy. It employs a wider and more appropriate range of variables and cases than is usual and analyses the data using cluster analysis, which is probably the most direct form of numerical taxonomy.

VARIABLES AND CASES

Studies which assess the distinctiveness of East-Central European capitalist democracy tend to be too restricted in their choice of variables or cases. Most authors restrict themselves to the political, economic or social welfare spheres and usually restrict themselves to a smaller number of variables within a given sphere. An interesting body of research focuses on property relations (Eyal, Széleányi, Townsley 1998; Staniszkis 1998; Stark and Bruszt 1998). This is the only literature which even occasionally seems to aspire to a comparison of capitalist democracies as overall social systems. This aspiration is based on the definition of capitalism as an economic, political and social system that privileges private ownership of the means of production and the distinctiveness of East-Central Europe as an area where capitalism was “introduced” in the absence of widespread private ownership. While this is convincing as a justification for detailed research on East-Central European property relations, it is less convincing as an argument that property relations constitute a master variable from which the configuration of the economic structure, political institutions and social welfare is derived. Another valuable literature focuses on political parties, crucial as they are to the new representative democracies (Kitschelt, Markowski, Mansfeldová and Tóka, 1999; Mair 1996; Lewis 2001), and an emerging literature investigates social welfare regimes (Lipsmeyer 2000). Neither

of these latter literatures ever suggests that they are looking at anything but a subsystem of an overall capitalist democracy.

Two related reasons for the neglect of the wider issue of the overall distinctiveness of East-Central Europe, are the difficulty of defining the key elements that distinguish capitalist democracies from each other and of collecting valid data for a variety of countries. Clearly, there can be no single way of conceptualising and measuring the variety of capitalist democracy. However, I suggest the following as reasonable criteria which any useful approach should fulfil. Firstly, the measures should be relatively comprehensive. Capitalist democracies are too complicated and multi-faceted to be reduced to a single “efficient secret”. Secondly, the measures should vary significantly so that they distinguish between types of capitalist democracies, rather than distinguish all capitalist democracies from other regimes. Thirdly, the measures should co-vary significantly. This ensures that systemic characteristics, rather than a haphazard collection of unrelated phenomena are being measured. Fourthly, the validity of the measures should be reasonably equal across cases.

The Varieties-of-Capitalism approach has for decades compared capitalist democracies on the basis of a wide range of well-researched and largely uniformly measured variables relating to politics, social welfare and economic structure.¹ It is this approach I employ in this paper since it fairly clearly fulfils the criteria outline above. However, there are perhaps three possible dangers in applying this literature to East-Central Europe. Firstly, since this literature was explicitly designed to study Western capitalist democracies, it might ignore the sources of distinctiveness in non-

Western (or neo-Western) countries by forcing them into existing categories. While this danger cannot be eliminated, it is important to note that the varieties-of-capitalism approach has been very sensitive to diversity. It has long admitted the difficulty of classifying cases such as France, Italy and Ireland. The addition of Mediterranean cases has led to the formation of a whole new category (Ferrera 1996). A second objection is that this school has focused on long-term patterns in stable countries and is unsuited to the study of transitional societies. The first response to this argument is to say that this is not the early nineteen-nineties. While East-Central Europe may be changing faster than other parts of the world, the next few years are highly unlikely to bring substantially new patterns of politics, economics or social welfare. The era of sudden systemic change and decisions about basic structures is over. The second, and more fundamental, response to the instability argument is that it is not so much the overall validity of the exercise but the manner of its interpretation that is in question. This is a snapshot of East-Central Europe around the turn of the millennium, and as such, is useful in itself. No assertion about the long-term trajectory of these societies is being made. Thirdly, there may be, and should be, concerns about the availability and quality of data. Most of the data had been collected from reputable international sources, notably the OECD. Some primary research has been carried out to fill lacunae. In many instances the missing cases were not the East-Central European cases but Western countries. The quality of the measures is similar to that of other large-scale studies of varieties of capitalism.

In total, fifty-two measures for each case have been included in the study. The individual measures will be familiar to experts in comparative political institutions, social welfare and economic structure and are listed in Table 1, with further

information in the endnotes. Lijphart's ten variables from *Patterns of Democracy* (1999) have been used to capture political characteristics.² Much of the varieties-of-capitalism literature adopts the number of years in government of parties of different ideological hues as the key political variable (Kitschelt, Lange, Marks & Stephens 2000b: 458). I think Lijphart's institutional variables capture much better the structural emphasis of the literature. Moreover, Lijphart's variables can be measured straightforwardly in East-Central Europe, while there are problems in trying to fit the ideological dimensions of East-Central European party systems into Western categories. This applies most strongly to the Polish case (Szawiel 1999; Szczerbiak 1999: 1420-21).³ The variables measure the characteristics of party systems, cabinets, executive-legislative relations, electoral systems, interest groups, federalism, bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review and central banks. In my opinion, the greatest weakness of Lijphart's variables lies in presidentialism, the accommodation of which requires some arbitrary decisions. This analysis only includes one presidential regime, the USA. I would be prepared to argue that the vast majority of the variables say something meaningful and important about the vast majority of the cases in this study. At any rate, the fact that his measures have survived over two decades of intense debate and are used far more frequently than any other overall measures of patterns of democracy makes them the best choice for this research.⁴

In terms of social welfare, the closest equivalent to Lijphart's *Patterns of Democracy* is Esping-Andersen's *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Esping-Andersen 1990). This paper provides data on two of the three main benefits chosen by Esping-Andersen: he analyses sickness benefit in addition to the unemployment

benefit and old-age pension included here. The work of Esping-Andersen and others has been rightly criticised for its failure to address gender issues (Lewis 1992). Here, the extent to which female family-members, as opposed to state institutions, look after the young, old and infirm care is proxied by wage and employment gender gaps and the female labour force participation ratio. Finally, data on some general characteristics of the welfare states are provided. They are designed to capture the overall state effort (social transfers), the balance of state versus market provision (private health spending), corporatism (social insurance contributions) and the effect on equality (Gini index). These general characteristics are indicators of the main variables which distinguish between Esping-Andersen's "Three Worlds". The data suffer from the unavailability of the OECD Social Expenditure database for all cases. However, the range of policies, relative reliance on the market, state, family and corporatist mechanisms, as well as financing and outcomes should produce valid distinctions between welfare regimes.

The economic data eschew well-known indicators of performance such as GDP growth and unemployment, instead concentrating on the structure of the economy. Three elements of economic structure are measured: globalisation, employment and value added. The sectors which account for large numbers of employees often make a much more marginal contribution to a nation's value added figure. Globalisation is measured by imports, exports, and incoming and outgoing direct investment. The employment figures include self-employment, part-time work and employment in the agriculture, industry, trade, finance and other service sectors. Value added figures are provided for the broad agricultural, service and industrial sectors. The final set of measures is the value added figures for the twenty-three two-digit manufacturing

sectors of the ISIC 3 classification. Strengths in different areas of manufacturing have consistently been shown to vary hugely between different countries and to have profound consequences for the rest of the economy (Hall & Soskice 2001b; Soskice 2000).

Whilst these individual measures are in themselves often narrow and/or superficial, together the fifty-four measures give a good overview of the characteristics of capitalist democracies. It should also be noted that the economic and social welfare statistics have survived repeated tests by statistical agencies and that most of the political and social welfare statistics point in the same direction as more detailed and qualitative analyses (Kitschelt, Lange, Marks & Stephens 2000b: 435).

Attempts to evaluate the uniqueness of East-Central European capitalist democracy are undermined as seriously by problems of case selections as they are by problems of variable selection. There are three principal deficiencies. Firstly, there is the lack of a comparator. Some studies seem to falsify the hypothesis of a distinctive East-Central European variety of democratic capitalism by demonstrating substantial divergence amongst East-Central European countries. This type of approach is clearly open to the objection that such differences, important as they may be, are small in comparison to the differences between East-Central Europe and capitalist democracies elsewhere in the world. Not much better is the second situation, in which the comparator is clearly inadequate. A common example is some sort of Western average which precludes the possibility that some Western countries may be more similar to East-Central Europe than others (Mair 1996). Even more dangerous

is a comparator based on not only a homogeneous but also an idealised notion of the West. Much of the literature on “civil society” falls into this latter trap. Finally, there is this approach in reverse, in which East-Central Europe is presented as homogeneous disregarding the important historical and contemporary differences between those societies. This paper’s sample falls into none of the above traps, but does, of course, have other limitations. The cases consist of three East-Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and nineteen other OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA). The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, although all regarded as relatively successful in the post-communist period, have very different histories before, during and after communism. Obviously, the restriction to only three East-Central European countries means that any conclusion about the region as a whole is tentative. The other countries offer a majority, and good spread of, the world’s long established capitalist democracies. However, it is not to be forgotten that many capitalist democracies in Asia and Latin America seem to have consolidated in the 1990s.

DATA ANALYSIS

METHODOLOGY

This section describes the statistical methodology used to analyse the data outlined in the last section. The first step was to standardise the fifty-two variables for the twenty-two countries in terms of the political, social welfare and economic variables. The next step was to produce a proximity measures for each case and all of the other twenty-one cases. The Pearson correlation coefficient and Euclidean

distance are the two most popular choices for proximity measures. Euclidean distance takes more information into account by confounding “elevation, scatter and shape” in a complex and unpredictable manner, while correlation emphasises only shape (Skinner 1978). Since “high” scores do not have similar meanings across different variables, “elevation”, or the mean score of cases, is of questionable relevance to this study. The information provided by “scatter”, or the standard deviation, is contained in the “shape” of a particular case’s profile across variables. What does matter is “shape”, whether variables are positively or negatively associated with each other and the strength of that association. The compound nature of Euclidean distance and the particular nature of the data under examination here make the correlation coefficient a preferable option for the interpretation of the final results of the analysis.

For the political variables all measures were weighted equally. For the economic variables a preliminary step was taken: coefficients for globalisation, employment, value added, and manufacturing value added were computed, weighting all the components of these sub-variables equally. The measure of economic similarity is the mean of these four coefficients. The same procedure was followed for the social welfare data on unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, gender and general characteristics. The proximity scores for the capitalist democracies consist of the mean of the economic, political and social welfare coefficients.


The second main step was to conduct an agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis using SAS version eight.⁵ Cluster analysis is still rather rare in political analysis but has recently been applied to classifications of countries according to their political economies (Chan 2001; Edwards 2003). This procedure starts by treating

each case as a one-country cluster, and then proceeds in a series of steps to amalgamate clusters. Once a pair of countries has been put together in a cluster, they can never be subsequently separated. The agglomerative and hierarchical nature of the technique is clear from the resulting dendrogram, presented in Figure 1 (next page). Cluster analysis is sensitive to both the method of clustering and to outliers (Everitt 1980: 103). Therefore, the analysis was conducted according to both Ward's and complete linkage methods and for three samples, one full sample of twenty-two and two samples of twenty removing outliers according to different definitions. These six procedures provide a good test of the reliability of the results.

The dendrogram provides an interesting set of solutions but does not clearly indicate which number of clusters between twenty-one and two is the most appropriate. There is a wide range of statistics for selecting the number of clusters, two of the most powerful of which are shown in Table 2 (Milligan and Cooper 1985). Even when such statistics provide consistent answers, as they do not here, their status is somewhat unclear. Here I will select the most reliable clustering solutions by comparing the membership of the nine clustering solutions across the three samples for both complete linkage and Ward's method (eighteen solutions in total).

Figure 1:

Dendrogram from Ward's Method of Cluster Analysis (N=22)



RESULTS

Never are the three East-Central European countries in different clusters, even when there are as many as eight clusters and only twenty cases. In all eight solutions with six or more clusters, East-Central Europe forms a cluster on its own. In two out

of six solutions with three or four clusters, East-Central Europe forms a cluster. In the other four solutions with three or four clusters, East-Central Europe forms a cluster with Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. In one of the four two-cluster solutions, East-Central Europe again clusters with the same four countries. In the remaining three two-cluster solutions East-Central Europe combines with a variety of continental European countries. East-Central Europe is never found in the same cluster as Australia, Canada, the USA, Switzerland, or the UK.

Cluster analyses will produce sets of clusters for data in which there is no structure. There are some methods for evaluating the overall fit between clustering solutions and the data but they are even weaker than the statistics used for the selection of clusters. It is clear that the clusters of varieties of democratic capitalism are not strictly separated categories. For example, a plot of the first two canonical variates against cluster membership suggests overlap between the clusters (Everitt and Dunn 1991: 121-122; Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984: 68-74). More reliable than this method or any other is consistent agreement between different methods and samples, as has been demonstrated above. Moreover, this research is a lot easier to evaluate than cluster analyses where little or nothing is known about the structure of the data. For the nineteen Western cases, the analysis concurs with decades of quantitative and qualitative research on various samples of countries. An inspection of the dendrogram in Figure 1 reveals virtually no cluster at any level which would be considered strange or controversial by experts in the field. This is a very strong indication of the validity of the procedure and the credibility of its results.

Next, I very briefly examine the nature of the clusters in which the East-Central European countries are found. I do this by simply contrasting the mean standardised score on each variable for the East-Central European cluster with all other cases. For the twenty-three manufacturing sectors I have computed value added scores according to five categories based on the primary factors believed to affect the competitiveness of an industry. This is a standard way of comparing varieties of capitalism in the literature (OECD 1987; Fioretos 2001: 222).⁶

The purely East-Central European cluster is strongly distinguished by its political characteristics. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are classic consensus democracies in terms of parties and executives: the rarity of single-party governments and minimal winning coalitions is especially striking. Unlike most consensus democracies, they have pluralist rather than corporatist systems of interest groups. All three countries are relatively centralised but they have the independent central banks traditionally associated with federalism. In addition, Poland and Hungary have very powerful constitutional courts.

Their welfare states are not as distinctive as their polities. Most measures point in the direction of relatively generous welfare regimes which crowd out non-state methods of provision. However, their unemployment replacement rates and overall social transfers are fairly low. Their low female labour participation rate contrasts with narrow gender gaps in both wages and unemployment. By far the most unusual aspect of their welfare system is the very high contribution rate of employers to social insurance.

The economic data reveals a high level of distinctiveness. This is straightforwardly encapsulated in a high reliance on industry, in terms of both employment and value added, in contrast to an unusually undeveloped service sector. Manufacturing is characterised by the strength of resource-intensive sectors. Their economies are relatively agricultural overall but here there are huge differences between highly agricultural Poland, moderately agricultural Hungary and the Czech Republic, where agriculture is of little importance. Another feature of their economies is the low rate of part-time employment.

The “late developers” cluster does not have such a strong political identity. Its two most striking characteristics are centralisation (in spite of the presence of Spain) and interest group pluralism. The welfare regimes of this group are far from extensive on most measures. They are most clearly distinguished by the gender figures, which suggest a reliance on unpaid female carers, and the high employer contributions. Their economies are relatively agricultural and have weak service sectors, most notably in terms of the low numbers employed in financial services.

The continental European polities are most strikingly identified by centralisation, unicameralism and multi-party or minority-party rule. Their welfare regimes are more extensive and much less reliant on the market than those of the liberals. The European economies are more globalised and disproportionately dependent on industry and agricultural rather than services. They are relatively weak in science-based manufacturing.

CONCLUSIONS

This is the first research to explicitly and systematically investigate the distinctiveness of East-Central European capitalist democracies. Its sample of cases and choice of variables, although not without their limitations, are far wider and more appropriate than those employed in existing studies. The cluster analysis used in this paper is an exploratory and taxonomical procedure. It cannot provide a model or an explanation of the post-communist trajectory. However, good description is prior to good explanation and the results of the analysis have serious implications for several strands of the post-communist and wider comparative-politics literatures.

If the sub-types of democratic capitalism are held to be relatively numerous, there is a clear East-Central European variety. This suggests that post-communist divergence in this region has been minimal. If there are several types of democratic capitalism, East-Central Europe is to be found with the four European “cohesion” countries, suggesting a relatively coherent peripheral status, in spite of radically different histories. If there are only two varieties of democratic capitalism, East-Central Europe has not been defined by the supposedly all-powerful consensus of neo-liberalism. Instead, it seems closer to achieving the aim of a “Return to Europe” in terms of the configuration of its political, social welfare and economic structures, and not just in achieving membership of the European Union. All of which goes to show that the consolidation of capitalist democracy has not made East-Central Europe any less interesting, and unavoidable, for comparativists.

Table 1:

Measures of capitalist democracy

Polity ⁷	Number of parliamentary parties	
	Cabinet type	
	Cabinet duration	
	Electoral disproportionality	
	Interest group pluralism ⁸	
	Federalism	
	Bicameralism	
	Constitutional rigidity	
	Judicial review	
	Central bank independence ⁹	
Social Welfare ¹⁰	Unemployment benefit	Qualifying period ¹¹
		Waiting period ¹²
		Duration ¹³
		Single replacement rate ¹⁴
		Family replacement rate ¹⁵
	Old-age pension	Qualifying period ¹⁶
		Expenditure as % of GDP ¹⁷
		Pension funds as % of GDP ¹⁸
	Gender	Gender gap in employment ¹⁹
		Gender gap in wages ²⁰
		Female labour force participation
	General characteristics	Social security transfers as % of GDP
		Gini index of inequality ²¹
Employers' & employees' social security contributions as % of wages		
Private health spending as % of total health spending		
Economy ²²	Globalisation	Imports as % of GDP
		Exports
		Incoming direct investment
		Outgoing direct investment
	Employment	Part-time employed as % of total employment
		Self-employed
		Agriculture
		Industry
		Trade ²³
		Finance
		Other Services ²⁴
	Value added in the overall economy	Value added by agriculture as % of total value added
		Industry
		Services
	Value added in manufacturing ²⁵	According to 23 sectors

Table 2:

Statistics for selecting the number of clusters (Ward's method only)

No. of clusters	N=22		N=20 (k=2)		N=20 (k=5)	
	Pseudo F	Pseudo T ²	Pseudo F	Pseudo T ²	Pseudo F	Pseudo T ²
9	7.8	1.8	8	2.1	6.7	-
8	8	1.6	8.5	1.8	6.8	1.3
7	7.9	3.5	9	1.8	6.7	2.9
6	7.2	4.8	9	3.5	6.9	3.5
5	7.1	3.3	8.5	3.9	7.3	3.7
4	6.7	3.4	7.8	6.8	7.2	3.6
3	6.9	9.1	7.6	4.4	7.5	4.3
2	6.8	5.2	7.9	7.4	8.1	5.4
1	-	6.8	-	7.9	-	8.1

Notes: Possible selected solutions in bold. K specifies the number of neighbours to use for kth-nearest-neighbour density estimation. The outliers are then defined as the two cases with the lowest densities. K=2 eliminates the Netherlands and Italy, while k=5 eliminates Germany and Spain.

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NOTES

¹ I refer to this school in the wide sense of a research programme stretching back to Shonfield's *Modern Capitalism* (1969) and Goldthorpe's *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (1984), continuing up to Hall and Soskice's *Varieties of Capitalism* (2001). This paper is not necessarily committed to Soskice's specific argument about the institutional foundations of comparative advantage.

² The variables are not further organised into Lijphart's famous two dimensions of consensus and majoritarian democracy

³ Some authors tend to stress the similarities of Polish parties to their Western counterparts and the importance of the socio-economic left-right dimension. However, even these scholars admit that its importance is lesser than that of the socio-cultural dimension and attitudes to the previous regime. (Kitschelt, Mansfeldová, Markowski & Toka 1999: 387; Lewis 2001: 50-59, 80-81)

⁴ The exception is the very simple distinction between presidential and parliamentary regimes.

⁵ Cluster analysis requires data in the form of distances rather than similarity measures. The correlation coefficients were transformed to distances by subtracting them from one.

⁶ The restriction to two-digit categories makes the above analysis cruder than that undertaken by the OECD and others, but it should still give a valid impression of the relative strengths of national manufacturing sectors. As in other parts of the paper, this methodology manages to reproduce the results of other more detailed studies.

⁷ Scores for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland computed by the author. These scores are for the mean from the first full year of post-communist parliamentary democracy until 2002 (Hungary begins in April 1990, Poland in October 1990 and the Czech Republic in January 1993). Principal Sources: National constitutions; *European Journal of Political Research*, various years; *East European Constitutional Review*, various issues; University of Essex 2003. Solidarity Electoral Action has been counted as a factionalised party. I follow Lijphart's treatment of Germany by using only the party-list votes in the computation of electoral disproportionality for Hungary. Scores for other countries from Lijphart 1999, 312-314. These scores are the mean for the period 1945 to 1996.

⁸ This variable demanded a deeper qualitative knowledge than the other political measures. Principal sources: Gardawski, Gąciarz, Mokrzyzewski & Panków 1999; McMenamin 2002; Jasiński 2002: 248-

269; Draus, 2000; Cox & Vass, 2000; Myant, Slocock & Smith, 2000; Hála, Kroupa, Mansfeldová, Kux, Vašková, Pleskot, 2002

⁹ Cukierman, Miller & Neyapti 2002

¹⁰ All figures from OECD 2001b unless otherwise stated. Most figures relate to 1999, some relate to earlier years.

¹¹ Scruggs & Allan 2003, figures for 2000; US Social Security Administration 2002, figures for 2001

¹² As for qualifying period.

¹³ As for qualifying period except that Polish duration is dependent on the level of regional unemployment (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2003) and that the unlimited duration of the Australian benefit has been arbitrarily replaced with a score of a score of 300, Denmark being the next highest with 208.

¹⁴ Figures are for Average Production Worker's Wage. (Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, 2002a: 33)

¹⁵ A family is a married couple with two children.

¹⁶ As for unemployment benefit.

¹⁷ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2002b: 154; Swiss figure from Queisser 2000; Irish and Greek figures from Abramovici, 2000: 2-3. In contrast to the OECD, Eurostat does include private-sector pensions. In Greece, private-sector pensions are of marginal importance (Mylonas & de la Maisonneuve 1999). The Irish figure, by far the lowest, does not include occupational schemes for private-sector employees with constituted reserves.

¹⁸ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2003b. Figures for 2001 and earlier.

¹⁹ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002b: 74

²⁰ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001a:137; Full-time median earnings figures for Greece and Norway from Barth, Røed, Torp 2002: 12

²¹ World Bank, 2003: 236-237

²² All figures from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001b unless otherwise stated. Most figures relate to 1999, some relate to earlier years.

²³ Amalgamates Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels with Transport, storage and communication.

²⁴ Amalgamates Education, health, social work and other services with Public administration and defence. Includes armed forces (figures from Bonn International Centre for Conversion 2001)

²⁵ Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, 2003a. French figures for the food and tobacco industries calculated from the Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU 2003 and Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques 2000. Data on Swiss and Czech tobacco and coke, petrol refining and uranium processing industries received directly from national statistical offices.