‘Ulster Like Israel can only lose once’: Ulster unionism, security and citizenship from the fall of Stormont to the eve of the 1998 Agreement.

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‘Rebels have no rights’\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{Introduction}

The idea that unionist political elites perceive themselves as representing a community which is ‘under siege’ and that their ideology reflects this position is regularly repeated in the literature.\textsuperscript{2} Unionists are not uncomfortable with this description. Dorothy Dunlop, for example, is certainly not the only unionist politician to have defended herself against accusations of having a siege mentality by countering that ‘we are indeed under siege in Ulster.’\textsuperscript{3} A Belfast Telegraph editorial in 1989 talks of a unionist community ‘which feels under siege, both politically and from terrorism.’\textsuperscript{4} Cedric Wilson UKUP member of the Northern Ireland Forum said ‘with regard to Mr. Mallon’s comments about Unionist’s being in trenches, I can think of no better place to be ... when people are coming at you with guns and bombs, the best place to be is in a trench. I make no apology for being in a trench’.\textsuperscript{5} Yet despite this widespread use of the metaphor there have been few analyses of the specifics of unionism’s position on security, perhaps because the answers appear self-evident and the impact of unionists’ views on security on the prospects for a political settlement are not appreciated.\textsuperscript{6}

This paper examines how the position of unionist political elites on security affects and reflects their broader views on citizenship. It begins by looking at the international literature on political conflict, which points towards a broader context for unionists’ political position. The detail of unionism’s position on security will be examined under three broad headings. It is necessary to begin by asking the basic question - who has laid ‘Ulster’ to siege, who are its enemies? While this may seem

\textsuperscript{1} Part of motion passed at UUUC meeting, \textit{Newtownards Spectator}, 14 Mar. 1975.
\textsuperscript{2} e.g. Aughey (1989).
\textsuperscript{3} UUP Press Release, 29.9.80, Linen Hall Library Collection.
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Belfast Telegraph}, 18 Apr. 1989.
\textsuperscript{5} NI Forum, 4 Oct. 1996, vol. 12, p.44.
\textsuperscript{6} Galliher and DeGregory (1985) do look at the issue but it is limited in its scope and data set. Analysis of newspaper coverage, for example, is limited to 1971.
obvious, unionist elites’ response to this question is actually complex and varied and at times even contradictory. The ‘enemy’ has been variously described as ‘all Catholics’, ‘all Nationalists’, ‘all Republicans’ or simply the active supporters of the IRA (itself not a clear cut group). Yet without a clear picture of who unionists reject as citizens it is impossible to know with whom Ulster unionists are prepared to engage in conflict resolving talks.

Secondly, unionist political elites are practically unanimous in placing themselves within a model of citizenship which insists that it is the duty of every citizen to support the security forces of the state and indeed to accept as a duty service in those forces in certain circumstances. Finally the attitude of unionist political elites towards the British Government as the sovereign power and the controller of security is analysed.

The evidence reviewed in this paper ends in late 1997 as the final move towards the 1998 Agreement took off. Its purpose is to try and set a benchmark, against which post 1998 shifts and continuities may be assessed. That further research project is ungoing.

**An Unsettled State**

The ‘unsettled’ nature of the Northern Ireland state has been identified as a cornerstone of the political conflict by many commentators. This has been a focus of the unionist analysis, across the full spectrum of elite opinion, over the past 25 years. Referring specifically to the annual renewal of Direct Rule, Enoch Powell MP comments ‘what would be the conclusion drawn by an ill-wisher of the Union ... if he saw that the Government’s acts were to insist on keeping the Province on an annual

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7The phrase is from Lustick (1993).
lease.8 Bob McCartney argued in 1982 that ‘the acceptance by successive British Governments that some future majority in Northern Ireland may take us out of the United Kingdom is the root cause of our political instability.’9 Debates on the peace process in the Northern Ireland Forum in 1996/97 regularly returned to this form of analysis. Antony Alcock of the UUP argued: ‘what do we learn from the past and from European experience? First, that when the territorial destiny of an area is in doubt, there will be no peace’.10 Robert McCartney argued that the violence arising from Drumcree had to be seen in a context where the two Governments ‘unrealistically raised the expectations of the minority community by a policy of appeasement and, by the same policy, eroded the confidence of the pro-Union majority that their place within the United Kingdom was safe’.11 This line of argument on the link between the unsettled nature of the state and political violence is often fairly generalised in its focus, but it is also found within two specific contemporary debates.

Proposals by the Fianna Fail-Labour Irish Government in 1994 to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, if a settlement could be reached in the North, in order to clarify that Irish unity would be sought by peaceful means and by consent were rejected by David Trimble as ‘worthless’12 and rejected in similar terms by the Cadogan Group (1995:46).13 They argued that it is the aspiration for Irish unity and not simply the means by which it is pursued which is fundamentally at the heart of the conflict. To end the ‘unsettled’ nature of the state requires more that a commitment to seek a united Ireland only by consent and peaceful means. It requires in Trimble’s terms that the Republic of Ireland and Northern nationalists abandon and forsake all hopes and aspirations for Irish unity entirely.14 The Cadogan Group argue that ‘if a

13Similar sentiments were expressed by Peter Weir, UUP in NI Forum, 7 Mar. 1997, vol. 31, p.44.
genuine and lasting settlement is to be reached, the objective of Irish unity must be shelved. The abandonment of Articles 2 and 3 will symbolise this change, but will not in itself be sufficient. In practical terms this means that diplomatic and other pressures to undermine Northern Ireland’s status must cease’ (1995:46). In a later pamphlet they continue: ‘nationalists in Northern Ireland must face the reality that continuing to campaign for Irish unity, or for joint authority, means there can be no settlement’(1996: 37). Therefore an end to the IRA campaign and a unionist ‘veto’ over constitutional change are insufficient to create the conditions for a political settlement. That can only happen when the boundaries of the state are fixed absolutely.

A second element of this debate is seen in the attempts by the DUP and UKUP in particular (though not exclusively) to establish that the ‘British guarantee’ to unionists, not to force through constitutional change without the support of a majority in Northern Ireland is not limited to the question of the Border. They have argued that a wider range of issues must be covered by the ‘consent’ clause, such as police reform, the court system and equality legislation.15 The basis for this argument is that change in these areas is seen by mainstream unionism as undermining the state and paving the way for further change. So, for example, Bob McCartney opposes economic co-operation by arguing that ‘arrangements are being made to create an economic infrastructure that would ultimately make the giving of ... consent to a united Ireland the only answer to economic destruction’.16 All three mainstream unionist parties focused on this issue in the Northern Ireland Forum17 and it was central to the UUP response to the framework document in 199518 and their entry to the September 1997 talks.

It is this position of linking the issue of sovereignty with issues of justice and governance which makes it difficult to separate rigidly different aspects of citizenship within the unionist viewpoint. Mainstream unionist elites make few distinctions between territorial aspects of sovereignty and the cultural, social and control elements. They insist that there is little point having a veto on the ‘final handover’ of sovereignty if they cannot prevent political decisions which change the character of the state and/or which moves them towards a united Ireland. It is this strong linkage of equality issues and constitutional issues which makes it impossible to premise the framework for a political settlement on the basis that mainstream unionists will compromise on ‘equality’ to secure the constitutional position.

A Hegemonic View

These aspects of the unionist analysis on the idea of an ‘unsettled state’ push the mainstream unionist position beyond simply acknowledging the obvious connection between disputed sovereignty and political conflict, towards a political position which sees the possibility of stability only when unionist elites regain a degree of hegemonic control similar in intensity, if not form, to that during the Stormont period. David Trimble’s statements on Articles 2 and 3, or the DUP’s position on consent, are not simply reflections of uncertainty but can be placed within a unionist discourse which seeks to re-establish the hegemonic position of unionism over nationalism. There are numerous examples of this form of analysis across the spectrum of mainstream unionist opinion.

James Molyneaux argued that ‘the key to success in the battle against terrorism is the denial of the expectation of victory. The so-called guarantee ... is itself a cause of instability because it recognises the possibility of change’, while Trimble added, ‘to hold out the possibility of change is to encourage terrorism.’ 21 Antony Alcock (1994:143) of the UUP said ‘the first principle for action in dealing with terrorism [is] that if the greatest encouragement to terrorists is the prospect of victory, the greatest disincentive is the certainty of defeat’. The possibility of success is not seen just in terms of IRA progress but also constitutional nationalist progress. James Molyneaux attacked the idea of summits between the Irish and British governments on the basis that they ‘raise expectations and arouse fear - summits can kill.’ 22 The Cadogan Group argue that ‘policies which encourage minority aspirations for and expectations of constitutional change are destabilising’ (1996:36). McCartney too argued that even entering talks was dangerous as ‘the Union cannot emerge from these talks stronger than when it entered’. 23

Any attempt to divert nationalism by offering concessions in the area of justice and equality is seen as simply strengthening the nationalist position. For example Craig in 1974 argued that giving in to some of the civil rights demands proved to be disastrous: ‘the leaders of the minority, feeling that they had friends in court escalated their demands for change and this lead to the provocation of the Protestant

David Trimble, House of Commons, 5 July 1990, vol. 175, col. 1204.
William Bleakes (UUP) sees any sign of compromise as an invitation to rebellion. Speaking in March 1985 he said ‘O’Neill ... wanted better community relations. What happened? This country was ablaze ... He took over in 1961, when it was a prosperous country and the IRA had been defeated, and he started using language like that. That is the language of a compromiser.’

Within this context there is little emphasis put on the degree of threat to the state. All threats, all concessions, are fundamentally dangerous, as a united Ireland is more likely to come about by degree that by a single political decision. Harold McCusker in a comment on the Sunningdale Agreement said it ‘was designed not to kick us out of the United Kingdom but to change our attitudes, to swing our gaze slowly from the centre of power we have always recognised as London towards Dublin and by a slow process, to change the attitude of the Loyalist people so that one day they might believe the myth of Irish unity which so bedevils many people in Northern Ireland.’

In a very similar vein 22 years later Robert McCartney, speaking about the peace process, argues that ‘there is no such thing in the Nationalist dictionary of concepts as a permanent settlement. All settlements, all concessions, all agreements are merely staging posts in a process. Nationalists are not interested in a settlement, they are interested only in generating a process that will ensure their ultimate objective of Irish unity.’

The Alliance Party sets itself apart from mainstream unionism on this issue. While in agreement with the proposition that political uncertainty leads to political violence it argues that hegemonic control over nationalists in general is neither necessary or desirable and that nationalists as well as unionists must have some sense of ownership.

if a political settlement is to be built.\textsuperscript{29} Even the Alliance Party has, however, a hierarchical view of the citizen-rights and priorities of majority and minority communities. While the constitutional status quo is seen as central, core and a bottom line for unionists; justice and equality (rather than constitutional change) are promoted as being the core of nationalist demands.\textsuperscript{30} Oliver Napier, presuming to know the mind of Catholics better than those they elect, said: ‘when most Catholics in Northern Ireland talk of an Irish Dimension, \textit{however their politicians may define it}, that is what they mean. Powersharing, equality of citizenship and equality of esteem for their own cultural tradition.’\textsuperscript{31} This has become central to the Alliance Party’s view of the ‘principle of consent’. John Alderdice in 1996 said ‘there are two sides to [consent]. The numerical majority of people in Northern Ireland must consent to its constitutional future. That is \textit{absolutely crucial}. It is also \textit{important} that the minority consent to the form of government that pertains in the province’.\textsuperscript{32}

Indeed it is this hierarchical view of rights and ideologies which frames Alliance’s view of citizenship in this area. The Alliance Party’s promotion of fair treatment for nationalists is rooted in a very strong perception that such moves will reduce the intensity of nationalist alienation from the British state and thereby lead to increasing political stability. Rather than threatening the state, parity of esteem should strengthen British sovereignty over Northern Ireland by developing a model of citizenship sufficiently pluralist to accommodate most individual nationalists. All of this however is based on this fundamental assumption that political ideologies are of different intensities and that the nationalist community’s sense of ‘nationalism’ and their demand for political and ideological parity of esteem is of less importance that demands for justice and fair treatment. The Alliance position is also based on an

\textsuperscript{29} John Cushnahan, Conference Speech 10 Apr. 1987, in \textit{Alliance News}, May 1987; Similar views in \textit{Alliance News}, Feb. 1983
\textsuperscript{30} e.g. Robin Glendinning, \textit{Alliance News}, Nov. 1980
\textsuperscript{32} NI Forum, 4 Oct. 1996, vol. 12, p.22, my emphasis. Similar views were expressed in \textit{Alliance News} Party Manifesto for May 1 Election 1997, [\texttt{www.unite.net/customers/alliance}, 30 April 1997]
assumption that mainstream unionism will allow such a development by drawing a
distinction between the sovereignty issue and the question of status within Northern
Ireland.

**Asymmetric Conflict**

The loss of hegemonic control by unionism in the late 1960s, followed quickly by the
loss of direct political control in 1972, adds another dimension to unionists’ views on
security. Unionist political elites are reliant on the British Government to implement
a security policy favourable to their position.

Essentially since 1972 mainstream unionist elites have viewed the British
Government with suspicion. There have been periodic alliances between the UUP and
British Governments, for example in the last few years of the Major administration,
and periods when unionism was optimistic about British intentions, such as after
Thatcher’s ‘out, out, out’ press conference in November 1984. They have not,
however, counter balanced the overall context of suspicion.

A conflict in this situation has been characterised by Mack (1975) as ‘asymmetric’.
For one side it is an all or nothing conflict while the other side may have options. The
US could pull out of Vietnam with very little threat to their domestic position. The
South Vietnamese Government had no such luxury. If they lost, their position was
terminal. Unionism has quite consciously analysed their position in this context. For
example the Orange Order, comparing Northern Ireland to Israel, said: ‘Having been
betrayed before they [the Ulster people] are very alert now, for as Louis Gardner
wrote, “Ulster, like Israel, can only lose once”’. In a very similar vein Clifford

34 Martin Smyth, Introduction to Orange Order pamphlet *The Twelfth*, 1982
Smyth quotes an Admiral Hugo Hendrik Bierman of the then South African Navy: ‘in the nature of this protracted war our enemies have the opportunity to attack time and again and to lose, whereas we shall have but one opportunity to lose’.35

Mainstream unionists clearly saw successive British Governments as being capable of negotiating a United Ireland without any significant threat to their own position, or to the rest of the British state.36 This view is expressed in various ways but generally emphasises that Northern Ireland is kept at arms length (Aughey: 1995a:14) or is treated differently from England, Scotland or Wales, both in a general sense and on specifics such as legislative procedures, exclusion orders etc.37 Jim Kilfedder MP and the DUP regularly drew attention to the record of the British Government in ‘abandoning’ its supporters in settler colonies when it decided to withdraw.38 Kilfedder always had a good turn of phrase on this issue. For example he said, ‘all over the world where Britain has been kicked in the teeth by violence she has surrendered to the terrorists. Northern Ireland ...is no exception’, and ‘Northern Ireland will not be treated as the Khyber Pass and the North West Frontier of the 1970s, providing reminiscences for Ministers and for military mess dinners.’ In response to guarantees from British ministers about unionists’ position he retorted: ‘were not such assurances given from these Dispatch Boxes to the unfortunate people of Kenya who were humiliated by the Mau-Mau? But subsequently those evil men were welcomed by politicians here who had earlier condemned them.’39

36 British Conservative supporters of the unionist position do generally see a threat to the Union more generally if Northern Ireland leaves. It is presumed that this would encourage moves towards Scottish and possibly Welsh independence, leaving Westminster to rule only a rump English state, with its own North-South divide. Alcock (1994:106) does raise this issue.
37 For example Ian Paisley, House of Commons, 6 Mar. 1972, vol. 832, col. 1040
38 Vanguard also uses this argument e.g. William Wright in East Antrim Times 11 Apr. 1975 refers to Britain’s ‘Vietnam like retreat from Ulster’.
By far the most common analysis of the British Government position from unionist political elites is that the British Government has no will to win, that they either secretly want a united Ireland to rid themselves of an embarrassment, or that they have a ‘guilt complex’ about their treatment of Ireland through the ages, or at the very least they see no compelling reason to stay in the face of continuous international criticism.

The absence of a clear will to win has been regularly expressed over the period. Molyneaux attacks the ‘lack of political will’ of successive British Governments to defeat the threat to the Union. Enoch Powell argued in 1976 that the British Government has never accepted the partition of Ireland; it regards the status quo in Ireland as transitional; the manner in which the United Kingdom continues to conduct its own affairs within its own territory is calculated to convey to those who wish to believe it that in the eyes of Her Majesty’s Government the status of Northern Ireland is equivocal and interim.

Ian Paisley in 1980 said that ‘the vast majority of the people of Northern Ireland no longer have any faith that this Government have the will to win the war against the IRA.’ Ken Maginnis said the British Government could not be trusted to uphold the Union as they sought to ‘reassure’ unionists and then ‘disappear to connive with our committed enemies.’ Ivan Foster argued that: ‘British security policy ... was intended to be a failure ... They never intended to defeat the IRA; rather what they

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have been seeking to do through this corrupt and criminal policy is to substantiate the claim by British Government lackeys that the IRA cannot be defeated.⁴⁶ Antony Alcock (1994:118 &142) said that ‘it is clear that the British Government wants Irish unity’ and that the British Government ‘have consistently feared offending Dublin and that has meant seeking to contain rather than defeat terrorism.’.

Peter Robinson in the aftermath of the IRA cease-fire of 1994 said that he believed that

the British Government’s policy is based on a false premise - the idea that ultimately the people of Northern Ireland will go into a United Ireland. There is no sound reason for believing that. The whole strategy of this Government is based on the idea that some time, somewhere down the road, the people of Northern Ireland will not want to be part of the United Kingdom. That is why Northern Ireland is not governed in the same way as other parts of the United Kingdom are. It is why Northern Ireland is the detachable part of the United Kingdom.⁴⁷

The debates in the Northern Ireland Forum showed further support for this perspective from the mainstream unionist and loyalist parties. Iris Robinson refers to the British Government having the resources but not the will to defeat insurrection.⁴⁸ Ian Paisley jnr. argues that ‘everything that the [British] Government have done, everything they have laid their hand to has been designed to weaken the Union.’⁴⁹ Robert McCartney says that

increasingly one is driven to the conclusion that the British Government do not believe that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom or that its people are in truth British citizens. Being a British citizen is very different from being a British subject. A citizen is one who forms part of the civil and political society of which governments must take note. A subject, on the other hand, is merely one of those who are governed and whose rights a government might in future dispose of, as in Northern Ireland or Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{50}

Derek Hussey of the UUP argues that ‘from Lloyd George to the present successive British Government’s have been intent on uniting Ireland.\textsuperscript{51} Gary McMichael of the UDP says that ‘it is an inclination of British establishment policy to keep Northern Ireland at arms length lest it poison the body politic of Great Britain’ and he also refers to the pressures of ‘international legitimacy’ leading to a greater Irish Government role being conceded by Britain.\textsuperscript{52} Jack McKee (DUP) argues that the ‘British Government have neither the will nor the determination to defeat terrorism in Northern Ireland’.\textsuperscript{53} Robert McCartney, finally, explains this position, saying that ‘the great problem that the British Government have faced for the last 25 years is that they have a political policy directed towards withdrawal and are faced with the position that an effective security policy would frustrate their own political objectives’.\textsuperscript{54}

This view of the British Government leads mainstream unionist elites to define their loyalty to the British state in qualified terms. This has been most famously discussed by David Miller (1978) in \textit{Queens Rebels} and is reflected in Robert Bradford’s famous speech in the House of Commons where he argued that ‘if we [unionists] are


\textsuperscript{52} NI Forum, 29 Nov. 1996, vol. 20, p.15.


to survive at all [we] will have to say that we will become Queens rebels.\textsuperscript{55} However this view was most prominent in unionist discourse in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, when the idea of ‘governing without consent’ was central to a wide range of unionist statements and was as strong within the UUP as the DUP. For example Ken Maginnis said: ‘The [British] Government has placed us in a position where we have no alternative but to confront it head on by withdrawing consent.’\textsuperscript{56} Harold McCusker of the UUP called on unionists to ‘deny the Stormont Castle regime the moral authority to govern us by the withdrawal of our consent and presence from all institutions of the state.’\textsuperscript{57} William McCrea said that unionists ‘may even yet have to fight the British to remain British.’\textsuperscript{58} The joint UUP-DUP manifesto in May 1987 says that ‘the people of this Province gave us a mandate to withdraw our consent from the institutions which betrayed them, thereby denying Government the moral authority to implement the [Anglo-Irish] Agreement’.\textsuperscript{59}

At this time only the Alliance Party disputed this vision of unionism, arguing that the mainstream unionist position put them on a ‘confrontation course with the Sovereign Parliament’\textsuperscript{60} and questioning how they can remain loyal while rejecting the overwhelming will of the British Parliament. Alliance also argue that the unionist withdrawal of consent and protests weakened the Union by alienating support in Britain.\textsuperscript{61}

Aughey (1995a) defends this conditional loyalty as a quite proper extension of the Lockian idea of contract with government. If the British Government breach the contract by failing to defend the citizenry or by involving non-citizens in the affairs of government then citizens can withdraw their consent to be governed. Aughey

\textsuperscript{55}House of Commons, 2 July 1979, vol. 969, col. 1035.
\textsuperscript{56}Newsletter, 13 Feb. 1986.
\textsuperscript{58}Newsletter, 13 Feb. 1986.
\textsuperscript{59}printed in Newsletter, 22 May 1987.
\textsuperscript{60}Alliance News, December 1985.
\textsuperscript{61}John Cushnahan, speech to annual Conference, Alliance News, May 1986.
(1995a:13) argues that ‘it is not Ulster unionists who are conditionally loyal to the British state but British governments themselves that have been only conditionally loyal to the idea of the union’. The difficulty with Aughey’s defence is that his ‘idea’ of the state can only provide an adequate defence of conditional loyalty from unionists if you define citizenship in such a way as not to require allegiance to centralised state sovereignty. This would place support for the constitutional position on the same level as disagreements with the British Government over the poll tax, or the route of a motorway. Yet fundamental to Aughey’s approach is a rejection of any definition of ‘parity of esteem’ to include a recognition of nationalists’ ‘right’ to reject British sovereignty and/or which subscribes to the incorporation of nationalists’ political and ideological position within the state ethos (1995b:50), while defending the right of unionists to withhold consent from the state if the dominance of their power and ethos is challenged. Ultimately, however Aughey frames it, conditional loyalty is fundamentally self-serving for mainstream unionism. It serves to uphold unionism dominance and lend philosophical credibility to a unionist position which opposes the British state when its interests are threatened, as in its opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement or its strategy over Drumcree in July 1996. The view of citizenship being used here is a hierarchical one emphasising the rights of loyal citizens over disloyal nationalists. Consent is withdrawn from the sovereign because the sovereign seeks to weaken the state support for loyal citizens over the disloyal. This argument from Aughey draws on ideas of citizenship which are more in keeping with a Scottish tradition of covenant than the liberal individualism of Locke who Aughey quotes in his defence, and in this at least David Miller’s analysis in Queen’s Rebels is correct.

**Ulsterisation of Security**

The common policy response by unionists to this situation of perceived asymmetric conflict is to demand the return of security to ‘Ulster’ hands thereby creating once again a ‘symmetrical’ conflict. The majority preference would be for control of
security in a new unionist government\textsuperscript{62} but failing this most would see the effective primacy of locally recruited security forces commanded by local officers as a good second best. Trimble for example says ‘the IRA will only be defeated when they see that their ultimate goal is unattainable. That day will only come when the IRA see the control of security in the hands of Ulstermen, because the Provos know Ulstermen cannot afford to run away from the situation.’\textsuperscript{63}

Peter Robinson argued in 1974 for the return of Ulster control over security as Ulstermen would fight to the ‘last ditch’.\textsuperscript{64} Even the pro-power sharing UPNI insisted that ‘security must be controlled by Ulster people.’\textsuperscript{65} Robert Bradford emphasised the hegemonic importance of Ulsterisation of security: ‘the will to win will emerge only when Ulster politicians have the right and the possibility of taking security decisions in their own parliament.’\textsuperscript{66} David Calvert (DUP) argued that ‘it is only when Ulstermen have power over our security forces that we will see a change, for it is only they who have the real determination to win the war against the IRA.’\textsuperscript{67} Ian Paisley said in 1982 that ‘only those who are fighting for their homes can really fight for their country.’\textsuperscript{68} Two years later he returned to this theme, arguing that ‘we did beat terrorism for almost 50 years ... because we had a government that was determined to beat terrorism and because the people fighting terrorism had a stake in this land. When you are fighting for your home, when you are fighting for your

\textsuperscript{63} Newsletter, 17 Aug. 1987.
\textsuperscript{65} Viscount Brookeborough, NI Convention, 23 Oct. 1975, p.773.
\textsuperscript{66} House of Commons, 9 July 1980, vol. 988, col. 647.
\textsuperscript{67} NI Assembly, 22 Nov. 1982, vol. 4, p.73.
\textsuperscript{68} NI Assembly, 7 Dec. 1982, vol. 4, col. 342.
heritage and when you are fighting for your family, by the grace of god you will fight’.69  Raymond Ferguson of the UUP, certainly not a politician in the mould of Paisley, also argued that ordinary unionists would not feel secure until control of security was returned to Ulster hands.70

It has not been an issue in public debate since the late 1980s but there is no reason to believe that mainstream unionists have changed their mind on this issue. It seems more likely that the return of control over security is such a remote possibility at present that other issues have been more pressing and have been pursued on pragmatic grounds. The integrationist argument has been presented, not as an act of faith in the British Government, but rather as a means of re-establishing the unionist hegemonic position on the constitutional future, ruling out any possibility of change, which mainstream unionism believes would demoralise and help defeat the nationalist and republican challenge to the state. This would fit in with Jim Molyneaux’s effective integrationist strategy during his tenure as UUP leader, while never publicly challenging their stated policy position on devolution. Certainly there are no significant unionists statements to contradict their earlier views.

The Alliance Party has opposed the return of the control of security to Northern Ireland for as long as this would lead to the RUC being used as a ‘political football.’71 and this would be the case even in the early period of a power-sharing government.72 Alliance’s perspective on the British Government’s strategy does not place the conflict in an ‘asymmetric’ model. In contrast to the mainstream unionist position they believe the British Government (and indeed usually the Irish Government) to be pursuing a strategy to defeat the IRA. For example they view the Anglo-Irish Agreement as having been constructed ‘not as a capitulation to IRA violence but for

the totally opposite reasons which were to undermine support for IRA violence and to isolate that organisation to a point where it could be more effectively dealt with under the law including the use of increased security co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland’.  

Alliance have regularly attacked mainstream unionist calls for return of security control to unionist hands and for the type of more aggressive security strategies they would presumably use if they got such control as being counter-productive and more likely to lead to increased support for the IRA.  

The mainstream unionist position on security can therefore be placed within a number of international contexts. It is an ‘unsettled state’ and the British Government is seen as an unreliable ally in the defence of unionist interests. Unionists see all concessions to nationalists as working to increase nationalist power and reduce unionist power. Unionists therefore wish to rule out the possibility of constitutional change and to regain effective control over security in order to recreate a symmetry of interests between the state forces and their enemies. It is this context which frames mainstream unionists’ views on citizenship. It is a citizenship model which stresses the protection of the state and loyalty to the constitutional status quo. A clear distinction is drawn between loyal-citizens and disloyal-enemies. The differentiated nature of citizenship is strongly exclusionary. Citizens need to band together to face a common enemy. The enemies of the state need to be excluded from these citizenship rights to protect the state by drawing a clear demarcation between citizen and enemy. It is crucial therefore to define who precisely unionists count among their enemies, what the dividing line is, and how rigid the distinction is.

**Who are the Enemy ?**

74 e.g. *Alliance News*, Sept. 1984
Mainstream unionist opinion on the question of who are seen as subversive to their position is varied and contradictory. There has been a consistent if often vague line of argument that many or even most Catholics are pro-Union, or at least that they do not support the IRA campaign and that they are more ‘moderate’ than the leadership of northern nationalism in the SDLP and Sinn Féin.75 Paisley in 1996 argues that ‘the majority of people [in Northern Ireland] including many Roman Catholic's want to be part of the Union’.76 While David Trimble and Jim Molyneaux have on many occasions said that the ‘greater number’ of people in Northern Ireland, including many Catholics support the Union.77

This vague idea of a silent loyal Roman Catholic grouping is however overwhelmed by the huge number of unionist statements which are clear cut in extending the definition of subversive to the entire nationalist community (or even Catholic community). The Independent Orange Order in 1973 said it had no sympathy for Catholic civilians injured by Loyalist paramilitaries as the entire Catholic community must ‘share the blame equally [for IRA violence].’78 Stanley McMaster (UUP) argues that ‘everyone who lives here [Northern Ireland] must owe allegiance to the Queen. If not, people can only be described as aspiring to ends which are treasonable’.79 Alan Kane of the DUP says Catholics support the IRA ‘to a large extent.’80 Ian Paisley in 1994 said he could not ‘trust the future of Ulster to any Roman Catholic and I say that unashamedly’.81

75 Other examples in addition to those cited in the text include:
77 e.g. Jim Molyneaux, 19 Nov. 1996, speech to Friends of the Union [www.uup.org 20 May 1996].
also Trimble in Ulster Review, Autumn 1996, published by the UUP says that 25-40% of Roman Catholics want to remain part of the UK.
78 Irish Times, 2 Feb. 1973
Ivan Foster further argues that while nationalists support the IRA campaign to different degrees most do in some way,

the Ulster problem in reality is rebellion by a small band of cut-throats whose only skill is in the latest techniques of cowardly murder. These cut-throats are ... supported by a sizeable proportion of the Nationalist minority and because their tactics, aims and objectives strike a sympathetic chord in the hearts of all nationalists the cut throats have never been fully and unequivocally condemned and rejected by the political and religious leaders of the nationalist people. The Ulster problem is a rebellion supported in various degrees by the nationalist people.82

David Trimble outlines a similar line of argument. Describing ‘republican terrorism’ as a ‘high status, low risk occupation’ he goes on to say that ‘we can do nothing to lower its status because its status is conferred on it by the community in which it operates’.83 Ken Maginnis (UUP) focuses on the relatively high rates of transfers under PRSTV between the SDLP and Sinn Féin to argue that 85% of nationalists lend support to the IRA campaign.84 David Brewster (UUP) in a similar argument said that the willingness of nationalists to shift their vote tactically to Martin McGuinness to defeat Willie McCrea of the DUP in the May 1997 election shows an ambiguity in all nationalists towards the IRA.85 David Trimble in 1991 quotes as a form of precedent the practice of treating all ‘enemy aliens’ as suspects during wartime.86 The fact that some ‘aliens’ may sympathise with their host country was outweighed by the strategic and security imperative, and so all enemy aliens are treated as suspect. The implication is that all nationalists are seen as a threat just as all enemy aliens were.

84 Orange Standard, July 1986.
85 RTE Radio One, election coverage 2 May 1997, 3.40 pm.
Occasionally there is a distinction made between Sinn Féin voters and other nationalists which is qualified by unionists in terms of their incapacity to accurately identify the Sinn Féin supporters. Robert McCullough (UUP) for example says ‘three out of every seven nationalists voted for Sinn Féin at the last general election [1983]. It would be very difficult if you met seven of these people to know which three would gun you down’. 87 John Taylor also used this logic when discussing fair employment, saying that since so many nationalists voted for Sinn Féin employers would be reluctant to employ any nationalists. 88 However, mainstream unionists’ treatment of nationalists in a relatively undifferentiated way cannot be explained solely in a context of ‘playing safe’ in order to isolate Sinn Féin supporters. At the level of political elites, where SDLP and Sinn Féin members are clearly known and identifiable, mainstream unionism excludes the SDLP from full citizenship by treating them essentially as ‘enemies’.

The SDLP: Citizens or Enemies?

Clearly in practice unionists do distinguish between the SDLP and Sinn Féin in their rhetoric, their attitude to formal talks, appearances on TV programmes etc. However in terms of their capacity to include nationalists fully within the body politic mainstream unionists emphasise the commonality of all nationalists. From the early 1970s to the present the SDLP have been characterised as ‘republicans’ and subversives 89 and are therefore unacceptable to mainstream unionism as partners in government just as more militant republicans are. 90

89 In addition to the references which follow examples of this type of argument exist at: William Douglas (UUP), 25 Jan 1975, Northern Constitution.
William Ross in 1976 said that the SDLP only refuses to support the IRA because the IRA was losing and if the IRA was winning ‘the SDLP would be riding on their backs’.\textsuperscript{91} Willie McCrea said the SDLP’s hands ‘are soiled by their links with terrorist organisations and by their sympathies for the IRA.’\textsuperscript{92} William Bleakes for the UUP said ‘the Protestant people of this country do not see much difference between Mr Hume’s brand of politics and republicanism and the Sinn Féin brand of republicanism.’\textsuperscript{93} Frank Miller (Ind.) said the SDLP are ‘just as vile a republican element as the Sinn Féin movement’, and that he did not think ‘there is any difference between the SDLP and Sinn Féin’.\textsuperscript{94} William Ross (UUP) too said there is no difference between the SDLP and Sinn Féin.\textsuperscript{95} as did David Calvert for the DUP.\textsuperscript{96} David Trimble said that the complementary activity of the IRA and constitutional nationalists ‘cannot be just a coincidence’ and that ‘violent nationalists and so-called constitutional nationalists are following the same game plan.’\textsuperscript{97} Sammy Wilson, in 1988, said the SDLP have ‘renounced constitutional politics’ by talking to Sinn Féin.\textsuperscript{98} James Speers (UUP) said: ‘there is only one significant difference [between constitutional nationalist politicians and the IRA]. The IRA shoots people whereas the republican politicians try to strangle them. The end result is the same’.\textsuperscript{99}

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\item[91] Irish Times, 24 Jan. 1976.
\item[92] Irish News, 14 Dec. 1985
\item[93] Newsletter, 5 Apr. 1988.
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\item[95] Irish Times, 24 Jan. 1976.
\item[96] Irish Times, 24 Jan. 1976.
\item[97] Irish Times, 24 Jan. 1976.
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Mainstream unionist comment on the peace process of the 1990s has been argued in similar terms in the widespread use of phrases such as ‘the pan-nationalist front’ or pan-nationalist strategy\textsuperscript{100} to emphasise the common threat from the SDLP and Sinn Féin or launch attacks on the two parties. Both Trimble and Molyneaux used the phrase ‘pan-nationalist front’\textsuperscript{101} Antony Alcock (1994:96) said ‘there are no meaningful differences between the various forms of Irish nationalism ... although the SDLP denounces PIRA violence unionists note that moderate nationalists are often the beneficiaries, and to the extent that they gain on the backs of the IRA, there really is a “pan-nationalist” front’. Molyneaux in 1996 uses the phrase to analyse nationalist strategy since 1972.\textsuperscript{102} William Carrick (DUP) said that the SDLP give ‘passive support’ to the IRA campaign.\textsuperscript{103} Peter Weir (UUP) argued that ‘the SDLP has ridden on the backs of the IRA for a quarter of a century and has advanced the nationalist cause by proxy violence. For years, the SDLP strategy was to use violence for its own benefit’.\textsuperscript{104} Eric Smyth of the DUP repeats the claim that there is no difference between the SDLP and Sinn Féin.\textsuperscript{105} Robert McCartney argues that ‘the SDLP, Sinn Féin, the IRA and the Irish Government have a common objective: not only ultimately to obtain Irish unity but to keep Northern Ireland in a state of permanent political instability so that the only conceivable option for ending that instability is Irish unity’.\textsuperscript{106} David Brewster of the UUP returns to the idea of a common strategy by the SDLP and Sinn Féin: ‘his [John Hume’s] game plan requires the sacrifice periodically of the SDLP [Joe Hendron’s seat] so he can go to London and say “help my party, we are suffering. We are about to be overtaken by Sinn Féin” ’. This is dishonest. This is the kind of incestuous relationship that Parnell had with the land leagues in the

\textsuperscript{102} speech to Friends of the Union, 19 Nov. 1996 [www.uup.org 20 May 1997].
\textsuperscript{103} NI Forum, 15 Nov. 1996, vol. 18, p.11.
\textsuperscript{104} NI Forum, 15 Nov. 1996, vol. 18, p.36.
\textsuperscript{105} NI Forum, 15 Nov. 1996, vol. 18, p.45.
nineteenth century. There was a secret relationship between them and he said to them - go ahead so far only not too much'.\textsuperscript{107} Trevor Kirkland (DUP) also argues that there is a commonality of strategy. ‘I believe that neither John Hume or Seamus Mallon is actually dedicated exclusively to democratic procedures. The SDLP, Sinn Féin and the IRA all share the same objective. The question is how is that objective to be achieved? And to achieve that objective they also share the same ideas’.\textsuperscript{108}

The point of including such a wide range of these comments is not to ‘prove’ that mainstream unionism see no distinction between the SDLP and Sinn Féin but rather to show that their view of the SDLP is not such that a model of citizenship can be built drawing a clear distinction between moderate nationalists who could be included as full citizens and militant republicans who would be excluded. Mainstream unionism has a relatively undifferentiated view of northern nationalism as represented overwhelmingly by the SDLP and Sinn Féin. They may morally distinguish between the two parties but when it comes to the key question of who can be admitted to the citizen-body the tendency is to treat both parties as being dangerous to the union. There is perhaps an interesting dynamic in the period after the rise of Sinn Féin, and in particular after the cease-fires. Has the rise of Sinn Féin, led unionists to see the SDLP in a much more sympathetic light? Left with few other choices has the SDLP become more acceptable to unionist than previously? This may appear to be the case but the constant crises in the peace process make definitive conclusions difficult.

\textit{Other ways of defining the enemy}

In addition to party labels there are other forms of ‘enemy’ identification used by mainstream unionism. A focus on geographical areas is sometimes used to label those who are treated as non-citizens. Numerous examples exist, listing most major centres of the nationalist population\textsuperscript{109}. For example the ‘people’ of South Armagh are

\textsuperscript{109} In addition to those quoted below, examples exist at:
described as ‘dedicated terrorists’ by Ken Maginnis. Ivan Foster even includes the Malone Road as a ‘terrorist suburb’. Trimble in 1990 refers to areas with a ‘predisposition’ to support terrorism. All residents of ‘nationalist’ areas are rejected for being active IRA supporters or being under the domination of the IRA and are therefore, for example, unfit to sit on juries according to McCartney.

Occasionally the mainstream unionist definition of the enemy is extended to include almost all those who are part of or seem as sympathetic to the nationalist community. Willie McCrea, in 1983, included Sean Neeson of the Alliance Party among those whose loyalty was suspect, because he was a Catholic. Jim Allister claimed that the Alliance Party was suspect as it was chasing SDLP voters transfers in elections. The Roman Catholic church, including such clearly anti-IRA figures as Fr. Faul have been attacked as IRA supporters, with Cardinal Ó Fiaich singled out as ‘the IRA man from Crossmaglen’ or the ‘Sinn Féin cardinal’. Kilfedder attacks the Catholic Bishops Commission for Justice and Peace, calling it ‘the Irish Roman Catholic Commission for Republican victory in Northern Ireland.’ In the Northern Ireland Forum the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition has been called ‘another arm of the pan-Nationalist front’, while Jack McKee (DUP) went further saying that

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‘the peace people, the women’s coalition, the Alliance Party, Sinn Féin and the SDLP are all in the one pot of soup’.  

Examples of mainstream unionist statements which clearly draw a line between constitutional nationalism and militant republicanism are few and far between. Paisley in 1984 said that it was ‘those people who by their vote have identified themselves with the IRA, whom we would tar with the IRA brush, but no one else.’ Raymond Ferguson says that ‘only Sinn Féin are categoric in their denial to unionists of their right to self-determination. With this philosophy unionists can have no accommodation’, but he said it was worthwhile for unionists to look at the ‘real position’ of the SDLP and the Irish Government. Ken Maginnis in 1988 advocated ‘a responsibility-sharing partnership of strictly constitutional politicians’. However, despite opposition by Maginnis, the UUP annual conference in 1987 passed ‘overwhelmingly’ a strong anti power sharing motion.

These views are clearly in a minority position within mainstream unionist political elites and have been so over the 25 year period under examination. While they do offer some contradictions of the overall position the overwhelming balance of numbers clearly points towards a relatively undifferentiated view of nationalism. Most mainstream unionists reject any possibility of seeing the SDLP as ‘fully legitimate’ as long as they have the ultimate goal of Irish unity. It is the aspiration of the SDLP for Irish unity which puts them beyond the pale. However much they condemn the IRA they cannot create a space for themselves within unionists view of what it is to be a citizen. Occasionally unionists hold out the prospect that ‘ordinary’ Catholics are some sort of silent and loyal majority not represented by the parties they

126 Newsletter, 9 Nov. 1987.
vote for, like the fictional ‘Uncle Tom’ but in their routine statements they treat all nationalists as suspect.

This position forms one of the clear dividing lines between mainstream unionism and more moderate unionists in the Alliance Party or the old UPNI. The Alliance Party repeatedly says that the difference between the SDLP and Sinn Féin is ‘fundamental’127 and ‘an unbridgeable gulf’128 but an aspiration to Irish unity is no barrier to involvement in constitutional politics and citizenship.129 There are within this broad view some qualifications even from moderate unionists. All of them, for example, clearly exclude Sinn Féin from political negotiations despite their considerable electoral support. Sinn Féin voters are put outside the citizen camp, and have no claim to be represented, because of the political choices they have made.130 Morrell was also clear that in the event of another power-sharing executive, and if the RUC was controlled by that executive, then any party refusing to support the RUC would lose the right to be in government and also more drastically ‘forfeit the protection of the state’131. Alliance also links power-sharing to support for the institutions of state, acceptance of the principle of consent and support for the RUC. Oliver Napier for example said ‘no party can legitimately be involved in the government of Northern Ireland, unless it recognises the legality of the state ... They must also give support to all the institutions of government. Failure, for example, to give support to the police, I personally consider to be inconsistent with powersharing ... you cannot govern a country which you do not recognise and to which you refuse to give allegiance’.132

128 Alliance News, May 1984, party leader’s (Napier) conference speech.
The peace process of the 1990s has caused some difficulties for Alliance. It is clearly a challenge to its political position of building a consensus in the ‘centre’, to exclude the ‘extremes’. It has been very critical of what it saw as undue emphasis placed on the inclusion of Sinn Féin. Alderdice in his conference speech of 1996 argued that the ‘extremes’ were excluded in South Africa and the Middle East. ‘Likewise in Northern Ireland we need to get agreement in the centre and exclude and marginalise extremes’. This has led, at least at the rhetorical level to a shift in emphasis and perhaps a slight shift towards a mainstream unionist position with John Alderdice arguing that ‘many members of the SDLP have been let down to discover that his [John Hume’s] almost obsessional commitment to the republican peace agenda means that they might as well have voted for the extremists’. However, fundamentally the Alliance Party’s view of citizenship is still one which includes fully moderate nationalists who accept the view that constitutional change can only come by majority vote, within Northern Ireland.

Support for Security Forces - re-enforcing enemy status

Criticism of the SDLP for their failure to support the RUC unambiguously or to encourage nationalist recruitment is used as another reason to withhold the status of full-citizen from the SDLP. In this case the criticisms spans the entire unionist spectrum from the DUP to Alliance. There is no recognition that the ethos of this force is unionist and that nationalists are alienated from it. Low levels of Catholic recruitment are generally explained away as being due to IRA intimidation or due to the subversive nature of the nationalist community. There certainly is no

evidence of any basis for negotiations which might lead to unionist support for, or acceptance of, fundamental reform of the security forces. Indeed probably the most venomous attacks from unionists on constitutional nationalists are related to SDLP criticism’s of the RUC and UDR.

There are numerous examples of mainstream unionists accusing the SDLP of causing the deaths of members of the security forces by their refusal to lend support. Jim Molyneaux in 1980, attacking SDLP criticisms of the security forces said ‘vindictive accusations against the security forces are treated as an incitement to murder Army, UDR and RUC personnel ... those who engage in such vile propaganda are every bit as guilty as those who pull the trigger.’136 Frank Miller of the UUP said responsibility for the murder of members of the UDR was shared ‘equally by those who pulled the trigger and by those politicians and church leaders who by their constant vilification have endangered the lives of every member of the UDR.’137 There is no recognition that nationalists may have legitimate grievances which prevent them supporting the RUC and UDR/RIR. Their refusal to perform their duty is seen purely in terms of advancing their own political aims.

This position has led unionists to dismiss any requirement even to consider RUC reform as part of the process of a political settlement. Paisley in 1991 listed as one of the key ‘unacceptable elements’ of the Brooke talks process the idea that the RUC was part of the problem.138 Ken Maginnis was very vocal in rejecting any public debate on the reform of the RUC in the aftermath of the 1994 IRA cease-fire,139 as was Jim Molyneaux140 and the DUP.141

137 Irish Press, 2 Feb. 1985. Similar views from:
140 Speech to UUC AGM 18 Mar. 1995;
and also Jim Rodgers (UUP), Belfast Telegraph, 28 Feb. 1995.
141 e.g. Ian Paisley jnr., Newsletter, 2 Feb. 1996.
Unionists have repeatedly said that there can be no power-sharing of any sort without full support for the RUC. In 1973 the UUP in a formal position paper rejected any power-sharing unless the SDLP supported the RUC.\textsuperscript{142} This position was very strongly advocated by ‘pledged’ unionists candidates and not just those opposed to power-sharing in any case.\textsuperscript{143} David Trimble in 1976 said that ‘no one has the right to be in a government unless they can give full allegiance to the Province and publicly support the security forces’.\textsuperscript{144} Peter Robinson in 1989 insisted that ‘any party sharing responsibility for government should offer their full support to the security forces in Northern Ireland and encourage followers to support and even join them’.\textsuperscript{145} There are fewer specific public comments in the more recent period as power-sharing of any type seemed a remote possibility but William Ross returned to this theme shortly after the IRA cease-fire in 1994 saying that unless the SDLP take their seats on the Police Authority and seek to make the RUC acceptable to its supporters it cannot play a ‘responsible part’ in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite their attacks on the nationalist community for refusing to support the RUC, individual Catholics who have broken with their community and joined the RUC are regularly treated with suspicion. While unionists have regularly attacked the SDLP for not taking seats on the Police Authority John McCrea of the Orange Order attacked proposals to have individual nationalists appointed, saying they would be a security risk.\textsuperscript{147} Following controversy over the rerouting of Orange parades attempting to march through nationalist areas of Cookstown in 1985 Alan Kane

\textsuperscript{143} e.g. statement by Herbert White (Armagh) and Duncan Pollok (Mid-Ulster) Belfast Telegraph, 3 Sept. 1973.  
\textsuperscript{144} Co. Down Spectator, 30 Jan. 1976. Similar views from:  
David Trimble, Co. Down Spectator, 18 Sept. 1976 and 20 Nov. 1976  
Glen Barr Derry Sentinel, 8 Dec. 1976.  
\textsuperscript{147} John McCrea, County Grand Master Belfast, Orange Order, Orange Standard, Mar. 1986.
(DUP) attacked one of the most senior Catholic RUC officers, Chief Supt. Leo Dolan, saying that Dolan as ‘a Roman Catholic, a former neighbour of Owen Carron’s family ... is no friend of the Protestant people’.\textsuperscript{148} Willie McCrea said Dolan was ‘an ardent Roman Catholic who has shown his hatred of Protestant parades in the past. His removal should be forthcoming in order to ensure proper relations exist between the RUC and the people of Cookstown’.\textsuperscript{149} Following a similar incident in Portadown in August 1995 the Portadown branch of the UUP issued a formal statement attacking a senior Catholic officer, Bill McCreesh.\textsuperscript{150} In 1996 Peter Robinson, called on Hugh Annesley to weed out ‘Catholic moles’ in the RUC who Robinson accused of making ‘nationalist’ comments to the media following newspaper coverage of sectarian harassment within the RUC.\textsuperscript{151}

The Alliance Party though more temperate in its language is equally strong on the issue of policing. This is the key and crucial issue where mainstream and moderate unionists are in full agreement. The pattern of Alliance comments (with the exception of attacks on individual Catholic officers) follows the pattern of mainstream unionism. Nationalists have a duty to support the RUC. Nationalist criticisms of the RUC have been responsible for the deaths of security force members. There can be no power-sharing with parties who refuse to support the RUC.\textsuperscript{152} John Cushnahan said ‘it is mandatory for all parties who genuinely believe in the democratic process ... to totally and unequivocally support the security forces’.\textsuperscript{153} Alliance also sees little need for fundamental reform of policing. An Alliance Party policy statement in 1995, rejected the idea of major structural changes in the RUC, focusing instead on changes

\textsuperscript{148} NI Assembly, 28 May 1985, vol. 15, p. 397.  
\textsuperscript{149} NI Assembly, 28 May 1985, vol. 15, p. 398.  
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Irish News}, 1 Aug. 1995.  
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Newsletter}, 13 Aug. 1996.  
Local Gov. manifesto issue of \textit{Alliance News}, May 1977.  
Oliver Napier, 23 Nov. 1982, NI Assembly vol. 4, p.110.  
at the governmental level and in dealing with individual complaints.\textsuperscript{154} The Alliance Party Manifesto in 1997 talks of RUC reform in very minimalist language, with no discussion on the overall ethos and ideology of the force.

Unionism, mainstream or moderate, does not accept that there are genuine grounds for grievance by which nationalists could justify their withholding of support from the RUC. They accuse nationalists of failing in a fundamental duty of citizenship and therefore feel justified in withholding full, inclusive citizenship rights from nationalists. Yet reform of policing is absolutely central to any conceivable model of ‘parity of esteem’ which is likely to have any impact on the political situation. Policing is one of the most ‘structural’ of the issues of inequality. It is also, one of the most important from the perspective of the nationalist community. However, there is no evidence whatsoever that any significant grouping of unionist political elites is willing to engage on this issue.

Proposals which assume that the most likely outcome is the creation of some sort of common cause between moderate unionists and moderate nationalists, excluding more militant groups on either side, have seriously underplayed the extent to which mainstream unionism sees constitutional nationalism not just as a rival but as subversive. The relatively undifferentiated approach of mainstream unionism to nationalist political groups means that unionist elites are unlikely to make the sort of calculations implicit in a ‘middle-ground’ solution. Unionists elites still see the SDLP’s political stance as fundamentally dangerous to their position. Including nationalists within the body-politic will not lead them to support the state, rather mainstream unionist believe it would give them a foothold to destroy it.

This is crucial for any analysis of the potential for peace-building. As long as mainstream unionism sees relatively few distinctions between the SDLP and Sinn

\textsuperscript{154} Irish Times, 10 Jan. 1995.
Féin they will not be persuaded to agree terms for a political settlement in opposition to Sinn Féin, on any basis which the SDLP might conceivably agree to. Mainstream unionism in order to engage in any form of meaningful dialogue must reformulate its attitude to the nationalist community either to reach agreement with them as a group - Sinn Féin included - or seek to draw the sort of clear distinctions between Sinn Féin and the SDLP which would allow them to offer the types of compromises necessary to reach agreement with the SDLP, without boosting Sinn Féin’s support at the SDLP’s expense. At present there is little evidence of a move in either direction

Peace Movements and Peace Processes: ‘war by other means’¹⁵⁵

The mainstream unionist view on security and citizenship is a complex product of the unsettled nature of the state, their attitude to the British Government, Irish Government and northern nationalists, their conditional loyalty and their emphasis in common with many settler colonial situations of their own loyalty compared to nationalists’ disloyalty. It is not purely a response to armed action. The mainstream unionist view of citizenship is such that the mere absence of armed political conflict will not in itself be likely to shift their position significantly. The peace process of the 1990s is certainly the most significant and hopeful development of the last 25 years, but there have been other attempts and mainstream unionist elites have been consistently suspicious, if not hostile to each of them. Moves towards IRA cease-fires have invariably been seen as having been purchased at a price and as being likely to hastened moves towards political reform rather than prevent them.

It is hardly surprising, then, with this historical context that unionists saw the 1994 IRA cease-fire and peace process and a threat to their position. David Trimble said just prior to the cease-fire that “many of us regard that process as being entirely bogus

for it involves making political concessions to terrorism’.\textsuperscript{156}  Paisley said: ‘we are not dealing with a pure and meaningful peace process. We are dealing with a strategy that the IRA is using very successfully to achieve its eventual end .. the troubles are, alas, not over. As I have said all sorts of other attacks are being made’.\textsuperscript{157}  Robert McCartney in his first speech in the House of Commons said:

In Northern Ireland the peace process is seen primarily as a mechanism for protecting Great Britain’s economic interests rather than as one designed essentially to secure a democratic and permanent peace in Northern Ireland ...

The peace process is viewed as a disguise for marketing a political settlement acceptable to the two sovereign powers, regardless of how unpalatable it may be to the pro-Union majority.\textsuperscript{158}

The following January, just before the IRA cease-fire broke down, McCartney said: ‘in a reversal of the Clasewitizian principle that war is politics by other means, we are seeing politics utilised as war by other means’.\textsuperscript{159}

Conclusions

Unionist political elites’ views on security highlight key aspects of their models of citizenship. Mainstream unionism’s viewpoint has six crucial elements.

Firstly, debate on security and on political change is seen as a regime threatening (Lustick 1993:42-3).  Discussing the possibility of change increases instability and undermines the state.  The only safe response is to seek to re-establish unionist hegemony.  Secondly, the British Government is seen as an unwilling and

\textsuperscript{156}House of Commons, 24 May 1994, vol. 244, col. 293.
\textsuperscript{157}House of Commons, 12 June 1995, vol. 261, col. 523.
\textsuperscript{158}House of Commons, 5 July 1995, vol. 263, cols. 483-4.
\textsuperscript{159}House of Commons, Standing Committee B, 18 Jan. 1996, col. 47.
undependable ally. They are seen as having no will to defeat the threat from Irish nationalism. Since the British Government has control over the security forces, the unionists see the conflict as asymmetric - with the will of Irish nationalism to win far stronger and more fundamental than the British government’s desire to avoid defeat. Mainstream unionism thus defines their British citizenship in qualified and conditional terms. They are loyal to the British state only for so long as the British state upholds the Union and the unionist position in Northern Ireland. Mainstream unionists reserve the right to withdraw their consent to be governed by the British government, drawing on models of citizenship which emphasise a covenant between people and government. This conditional loyalty reaffirms the importance of the distinction which the state has made, since the original colonial settler-native divide between disloyal nationalists and loyal unionists. Mainstream unionists view this distinction as so fundamental that they would upturn their loyalty to the British state in order to defend their position vis a vis nationalists as they see such shifts in the balance of power and resources between nationalists and unionists as eventually taking them out of the British state in any case.

Thirdly, mainstream unionist elites have a relatively undifferentiated view of nationalists. Both constitutional nationalism and republicanism, SDLP and Sinn Féin are seen as threatening. The model of citizenship therefore becomes very exclusionary: almost all nationalists are excluded from full citizenship, all are seen as fifth columnists or enemy aliens, dangerous by virtue of their group identity and political aspirations.

Fourthly, mainstream unionist elites reject any criticism of the RUC and the security forces generally. There is no acceptance that there is any need for significant reform of the core values and ethos of the force. Therefore nationalists are seen as having no justification whatsoever for withholding support from the RUC. Defending the state, and supporting those who have been entrusted with that job on a day to day basis, is
seen as a fundamental duty of citizenship. As nationalists have failed this duty they will inevitably lose some rights of citizenship too.

The Alliance model of citizenship sets them a significantly different set of security priorities. Alliance rejects the idea of re-establishing unionist hegemony, arguing that constitutional nationalists must be included within the body politic if there is to be a stable peace. Moderate nationalists and unionists are included as citizens while the ‘extremes’ of republicanism and loyalism are excluded. Alliance makes a clear, indeed a fundamental distinction between the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Alliance’s vision of a settlement is based on assumptions about the political priorities of the two communities and the relative rights or majority and minority communities. Unionism sees the Union as fundamental, and as a majority has the right to set the constitutional framework of the state. Nationalists as a minority cannot veto such decisions but do have a right to be governed in ways they find acceptable and would in practice, Alliance believe, prioritise ‘fair treatment’ over constitutional change.

Alliance’s viewpoint on the RUC is, however, virtually indistinguishable in its fundamentals from the mainstream unionist position. There is no acceptance that the RUC is part of the problem. Support for the RUC is seen as a crucial test of citizenship. On a pragmatic level it is seen as crucial to win any UUP support for power-sharing with the SDLP. Nationalists must support the RUC if they are to be admitted to full citizenship or to any form of government.

This paper has highlighted a relatively unchanging viewpoint within both mainstream and moderate unionism over the 25 years from Stormont to the Good Friday Agreement. This is not to deny some changes of style and substance over the period. Mainstream unionism is now in a position where it has to put its case to an international audience. It must seek to persuade US policy makers, British MPs, British public opinion and even the Irish Government and Southern public that they
have a defensible case. Despite this there is little evidence of any fundamental shift in unionist thinking. There was no evident evidence on the eve of the 1998 Agreement that unionist political elites as a bloc were capable, yet, of redefining their view of citizenship to accommodate even constitutional nationalists, not to talk of Sinn Féin voters. Neither is there any evidence of an emerging split within mainstream unionism to create a party with a more inclusive vision. The argument here is not that unionism is unchanging or a monolith but rather that while unionism has and can adapt to new circumstances there is no internal dynamic within unionism or no view of citizenship and security which could form the basis of a settlement at this time. Moderate unionism within unionist political elites is now effectively reduced to the declining Alliance Party: their vision has remained largely unchanged, but there is no evidence that they can win significant further support.

Mainstream unionist political elites entering political negotiations in late 1997 brought with them a view of citizenship which saw almost all reform as threatening to the constitutional status quo. They saw nationalists as a relatively undifferentiated enemy. They saw the duty of defending the state, and the RUC as a force, as utterly central to their position. They reserved the right to withdraw their consent to be governed if a solution is pursued against their will.

The mainstream unionist model of security and citizenship as presented here may not have been the most optimistic starting point for negotiations for a political settlement but perhaps it does explain some of the ongoing crisis since the Agreement was reached in 1998. Attempts to rebuild the institutions and ongoing negotiations about issues of equality and for a political settlement cannot progress unless there is a clear understanding of the unionist position. That does not mean it has to be accepted uncritically, but it does need to be understood.
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