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Credible commitment, political uncertainty, or policy complexity? Explaining variations in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France

Elgie, Robert and McMenamin, Iain (2004) Credible commitment, political uncertainty, or policy complexity? Explaining variations in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France. Working Papers in International Studies Series. (Paper No. 2004-1). Centre for International Studies, Dublin City University.

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Abstract

A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions. Governments may decide to delegate authority to such institutions for reasons relating to credible commitments, political uncertainty, and policy complexity. This article focuses on Independent Administrative Authorities (Autorités administratives indépendantes) in France. We demonstrate that these institutions enjoy varying degree of independence. We find that the degree of independence varies as a function of two factors: the need to make a credible commitment in areas subject to market opening and the complexity of policy in particular areas.

Item Type:Working Paper (No. 2004-1)
Refereed:No
Uncontrolled Keywords:France;
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS) > Working Papers in International Studies Series
Publisher:Centre for International Studies, Dublin City University
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:2123
Deposited On:11 Nov 2008 14:40 by DORAS Administrator. Last Modified 19 Nov 2008 14:24

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