Psychopathy - A Psychoanalytic Investigation

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Submitted for the award of PhD

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DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of Ph.D. is entirely my own work, and that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

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Date: September 8\textsuperscript{th} 2016
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my loving wife Cathy, my beautiful daughter, Sarah and my wonderful new son, Hugo.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Finally, I offer particular and considerable gratitude to each participant who lent their time, person and speech to this study.
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ABSTRACT

Psychopathy - A Psychoanalytic Investigation
Emmet Mallon

This study on the psychoanalytic conceptualisation of psychopathy reviews psychoanalytic considerations of anti-social/psychopathic disorders. The researcher questions whether psychopathy is particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, and perversion), an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures. The aim of the study is to gain a theoretical understanding of psychopathy so that psychoanalysts who direct treatments with psychopathic subjects may be better informed.

The researcher screened a population of ex-offenders using the Self-Report Psychopathy Questionnaire - SRP-III (Paulhus, Hemphill & Hare, 2009). High-scoring participants were invited to participate in a psychoanalytically informed interview. Participants were encouraged to speak freely while the researcher listened with a free-floating attention. An adapted thematic analysis was employed for the organisation and management of data which was then subject to a psychoanalytic discourse analysis allowing for the broader assumptions and meanings of Lacanian structural theory to be considered.

The study found that the participants who scored greater or equal to 3.375 on the SRP-III scale had psychotic structures evidenced by their discourse and the positions they assume in relation to others. The researcher considers the cases of psychopathy detailed in this study as non-delusional, un-triggered psychoses: ‘ordinary’ (Miller, 1998) psychoses in which subversive and violent acts serve to stabilise a psychotic structure.

The findings indicate that psychoanalytic work with psychopaths is viable based on a sinthomatic solution.
CHAPTER 1 SETTING THE SCENE

“We are just beginning to understand the brain of the psychopath. His mind is another matter.”
(Meloy, 2007, p.1).

1.1 INTRODUCTION

There is a lack of clarity around psychopathy as a phenomenon from both sociological and mental health perspectives. Hare, a leader in psychological assessments of psychopathy wrote:

“the distinction between psychopathy and ASPD [Anti-social personality disorder (APA, 2013)] is of considerable significance to the mental health and criminal justice systems. Unfortunately, it is a distinction that is often blurred, not only in the minds of many clinicians but in the latest edition of DSM-IV” (Hare, 1996, p.39).

Theories offered by psychoanalytic practitioners are similarly blurred as psychopathy has been considered as (i) a sadistic perversion (Swales, 2011), (ii) an as yet undefined fourth structure (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009) and (iii) a psychosis (De Ganck, 2014; Biagi-Chai, 2012).

This thesis, *Psychopathy - A Psychoanalytic Investigation* presents a psychoanalytic investigation of the phenomenon and the researcher’s argument that the current diagnosis of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and Robert Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist assessment of psychopathy (Hare, 2003) may be supplemented and augmented by psychoanalytic case formulations. These are preliminary formulations as to a subject’s structure (neurosis, perversion or psychosis) and psychoanalysts direct their treatments based on this distinction. Psychoanalytic experience (particularly Freudian and Lacanian) gained from over a hundred years of clinical case studies has shown that the ability to distinguish between the structures is crucial for the direction of the treatment. Hence, accuracy in case formulation ensures that appropriate treatments will be embarked on. As a trained Lacanian psychoanalytic practitioner, the researcher addresses the question of psychopathy from this position.

The researcher conducted psychoanalytically informed interviews with five ex-offenders, who met the criteria for psychopathic tendencies (Self-report psychopathy questionnaire - SRP-III). The data collected from these interviews was used to situate the speech of the participants within the categories of Lacanian structural theory. The psychoanalytic structures may be distinguished from each other by qualities of the subject’s speech and the position the subject assumes in relation to the ‘Other’. The Lacanian concept of ‘Other’ (big Other) represents the significant others in our lives, usually the parental figures. Although it is sometimes written as (m)Other, it also represents the paternal or “law-giving” Other in our lives. Significantly, the ‘Other’ conveys demands and desires by way of
language. Consequently, the ‘Other’ as a Lacanian concept includes the theory that our desire is not without providence and that the language of our significant others can influence our subjectivity.

Neurosis has been recognised as the “most harmless and socially tolerable solution” (Freud, 1920a, p.381) by psychoanalysis since Freud. However, as psychoanalysts gain experience working with the other structures they increasingly argue that psychosis and perversion may also be understood as normative. Being non-neurotic is not therefore considered any impediment to a normative life. These structures, once established, are generally considered fixed although the degree to which a subject may be said to be neurotic, perverse or psychotic can vary. Psychoanalysts formulate cases and give preliminary diagnoses as to structure based on how a subject positions him or herself in relation to an(O)ther and the language used:

“Each clinical structure presupposes a certain relation to knowledge and to what the Other wants of the subject: obsessional neurosis displays stereotypically masculine refusal of dependence; hysteria an accusation addressed to the Other; psychosis a paranoiac sense that there is ‘an Other of the Other’ manipulating things; and perversion an attempt to make oneself the instrument of the enjoyment of the Other (Fink, 1999)” (Parker, 2005, p.173).

Neurosis is the parent group for diverse clinical diagnoses from hysteria to obsessional neurosis while perversion represents a parent group for various diagnoses from sadism to fetishism. Psychosis also has wide-ranging diagnostic categories from autism to schizophrenia. Recent research has extended and expanded this category to include “ordinary” (Miller, 1998) and “quiet” (Leader, 2011) psychoses. Leader presented a clinical case study of Dr. Harold Shipman, the physician from Hyde who killed two hundred and fifty of his elderly patients by lethal injection as exemplifying this “quiet madness” (Leader, 2011, p.273).

Importantly, although the symptomatic expression of diagnoses under the same parent group can differ completely, the same operation was used as a defence against anxiety: foreclosure (psychosis), disavowal (perversion) or repression (neurosis).

The ability to determine a psychopathic structure based on a subject’s use of language and their interpersonal relations has implications and applications in the arenas of forensics, law and therapeutics. The aim of the study is therefore to gain a theoretical understanding of psychopathy so that those who assess, adjudicate and treat psychopaths may be better informed when making their decisions.

Remarkably psychopathy has been absent as a category from The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), including the latest edition, the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Although no psychiatric organization has
sanctioned a diagnosis of ‘psychopathy’, assessments of psychopathy (e.g. Robert Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, 2003) are widely used. The American Psychiatric Association considers psychopathy to be synonymous with ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013):

“The essential feature of antisocial personality disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood. This pattern has also been referred to as psychopathy, sociopathy, or dyssocial personality disorder” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.659).

However, Robert Hare in his PCL-R assessment identifies particular personality features which mark psychopaths apart from those with ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) (Appendix A).

The researcher outlines in Section 2.3 - Psychiatric diagnosis how in the latest iteration of the A.P.A.’s diagnostic manual (DSM-V, 2013) clinicians have been asked to specify if the diagnosis of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ is with “psychopathic features” (Ibid., p.765). Consequently, an individual may have a diagnosis of both ‘Anti-social personality disorder with psychopathic features’ using the DSM-V and be assessed as having a ‘psychopathic personality’ using the PCL-R. The researcher questions what, if any, distinction is being accounted for in each construct. A psychoanalytic reading of the signifier ‘psychopath’ may be that like Pygmalion’s statue, it is brought to life by the very act of its creation: psychopathy exists because the signifier is in place.

In Section 2.5 - The Law and psychopathy the researcher examines the effect that this lack of clarity may have beyond the clinic as the popular use of the term ‘psychopathy’ ceases to conform to any of the clinical concepts and becomes synonymous with criminality and violence.
1.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

Background

In psychoanalytic theory, each person (usually termed a ‘subject’) has thoughts, motivations, and desires that are barred from conscious awareness, which is to say, they are unconscious. There is no way to access the unconscious directly. Instead, psychoanalysis deals with the subject’s language. Where language fails - and, at some point, it always fails - the unconscious joins in the conversations by other means, such as dreams, slips of the tongue, bungled actions, and, particularly, symptoms. These are called formations of the unconscious and are not confined to the therapeutic encounter.

In the early days of psychoanalytic practice, Freud placed great emphasis on the active role of the psychoanalyst. It was the analyst who intervened, interpreted and analysed while the patient was, at least in theory, the person upon whom psychoanalysis was practiced. The patient was the analysed subject of a psychoanalyst who possessed the necessary theoretical knowledge. In 1967, Lacan introduced the term psychoanalysant (psychoanalysand in English) to indicate the active position taken up by the patient in a psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1967a, p.42). In Lacanian praxis it is the analysand who analyses and not the analyst. The analyst directs the treatment and brings formations of the unconscious to the attention of the analysand. The analysand then puts him or herself to work in attempting to place meaning on their experience. Although psychoanalysis has found that language is unable to fully represent experience it has shown that by circling the in-articulable void with language, the anxiety - which the symptom is employed to protect against - may be lessened. With no need for the symptom, the energies previously invested in its continuation may now be sublimated into the professional and personal life of the analysand or into a new changed symptom that serves the subject.

In the application of psychoanalysis to research, those involved must recognize, mark, and make preliminary formulations around formations of the unconscious found in the data. They must, however, also follow the psychoanalytic principle:

“that one interpretation does not preclude others, and one possible interpretation should not aim to fix and limit what may be said by the subject” (Parker, 2005, p.10).

When Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) said that Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) ‘invented’ the unconscious by naming it (Lacan, 1989, p.15), psychoanalytic researchers should be reminded of Lacan’s theory of ‘The Primacy of the Signifier over the Signified’ - by placing a name on something (or someone), the object (or subject) comes to occupy the position or place of the very production itself. The notion of the signifier is attributed to the linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913). For Saussure, language was made up of signs and each sign had two aspects: the signified (the ‘concept’) and the
signifier (the mental impression of the sound). He established the theory of ‘The Arbitrary Nature of the Sign’ and considered the signifier and signified as two sides of the same coin, inseparable. Lacan critiqued Saussure’s theory and put forward his own theory as exemplified below.

If there are two identical doors leading to two identical latrines (Figure 1.1 - Untitled photo of two identical doors). The difference between the two: ‘Ladies’ and ‘Gentlemen’, is created by the signifier on the doors rather than what lies behind them. Consequently the signifier is said to have primacy for Lacan.

![Untitled photo of two identical doors](Untitled photo of two identical doors, n.d.)

We see that each room comes to function as their name suggests only when a name is placed above them.

The theory of ‘The Primacy of the Signifier’ exposes the ethical implications for a psychoanalytically informed researcher. When he interprets the words of the subject it:

“is not simply to attach a name, naming is an act which not only instantiates an element, but gives it consistency and engenders a structure” (Nasio, 1998, p.48).

Although psychoanalysis understands that psychopathy exists because it has been signified, a question remains around what the signifier represents and psychoanalysts seek to reveal the unconscious truths veiled behind the words and deeds of subjects. Psychoanalytic researchers must also account for this if they are to be considered psychoanalytic.

**Rationale**

The public’s conception of the psychopathic person is that they must have lost touch with reality and be ‘mad’ to do the things they do. However, this conception does not always ring true in the clinic and
psychiatrists may have conflicting diagnoses for particular patients. One clinician may diagnose paranoid schizophrenia (psychosis) where another would diagnose narcissistic personality disorder (neurosis/perversion) for the same assessment (Section 2.5 - It’s a question of Structure: Perversion or Psychosis?).

Disciplines, including psychoanalysis have called for a re-formulation in the methods of “criminal analysis” (Declercq, Vandenbroucke & Storme, 2008, p.366). They point to the potential benefits for forensics from the application of advancements in the field:

“Bénézech organised sexual homicide into two distinct categories—psychopathic and psychotic - but warned that this taxonomy has only an indicative value, since certain sexual homicides fall in-between these categories. Therefore forensic experts must determine which of the two components (psychopathic or psychotic) dominate as the risk of recidivism as well as the measures that should be taken are determined by the subjective structure of the perpetrator. Given this need, criminal analysis could benefit greatly from a thorough clinical analysis” (Ibid.).

Psychiatry situates psychopathy in the ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) category of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III, IV, IV-tr, V) and treatment invariably follows a psycho-medico discourse. Where psychotherapy has been available, the treatment offered has been a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Approaches originally developed for neurotic patients take no account of other possible structures. Psychoanalysts who direct the treatment of many and varied psychopathologies describe the limitations of this type of approach:

“One main problem of this treatment model is that it is one-size-fits-all. It assumes that all sexual offenders offend for the same reasons and will respond to the same type of treatments” (Swales, 2012, p.9).

A more appropriate treatment would be a tailored therapy based on the particularity of the individual.

The researcher recognises the possible effects on treatment outcomes from using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. A perverse subject for example positions him or herself as the object of the Other's jouissance. The concept of jouissance was introduced by Lacan in his first seminar of 1953 and evolved throughout his work. Jouissance is the too much of enjoyment and lies at the intersection of the pleasure principle and the death drive:

“It is a concept aligned with Freud’s ideas on the radically mal-adjusted nature of the drive. The drive doesn’t ‘know’ anything about what is good and bad; it just strives for satisfaction. Jouissance indicates man’s enjoyment in transgressing the law by acting out his drives. By its lawless nature, jouissance is to be distinguished from pleasure (Freud: ‘lust’)” (Vanheule, 2003, p.92 [Note 29]).
The analyst must therefore employ specific strategies when directing the treatment to guard against counter-transferential issues. This is not accounted for in cognitive behavioural treatments. Similarly, the psychoanalytic treatment of psychotics demands a way of working that differs from neurotic treatment. A paranoic for example would not be invited to use the couch. When the analyst’s presence, a factor that unifies their fragmented body image, is no longer represented in their visual field, the paranoic analysand may experience the gaze as intrusive. For the paranoic analysand a face-to-face treatment allows them to maintain a sense of wholeness. Alternately, a neurotic may be directed to lie on the couch with the analyst out of sight to encourage associations to take place more freely.

For the psychoanalyst the question of diagnosis is not purely theoretical and the direction of the treatment is guided by the case formulation (the preliminary determination of a person’s structure). The case formulation is therefore of clinical and ethical importance given that the psychoanalyst intervenes on the basis of it and these interventions affect patients directly. Each structure of the mind is addressed differently with regard to treatment and a misinterpretation may have serious consequences:

“Certain attitudes to take towards the patient, which may be necessary in the establishment of the transference in our work with neurotics - for example, taking a certain position or role of authority which physicians often do in dealing with patients - will be quite destructive in our relationships with psychotics” (Svolos, 2001, p.1).

Transference denotes the transfer of feelings, desires and ways of relating that were formerly organised or experienced in connection with persons relating to the subject’s past onto another person. In a psychoanalysis this person is the psychoanalyst:

“Transference (Übertragung; literally, “carrying over”) was first used in Studies on Hysteria (Freud and Breuer, 1895), and it gradually developed a more precise meaning over time” (De Mijolla, 2005).

The psychoanalytic method differs from psychiatry in which the person is “fitted into” an existing category. Psychiatry is a dialectic that moves from the general to the particular whereas psychoanalysis moves from the particular to the general:

“But it [Psychoanalysis] does not allow us to define a personality type or a type of criminal. It does not proceed from the general, but from the particular. Through the particular, psychoanalysis can account for the causal dimension insofar as it is, for a subject, what pushes him to act” (Biagi chai, 2012, p.25).

It is their subjective particularity that is the starting point in psychoanalysis and it leads to the general. Psychoanalysis asks:
How do the established categories relate to the person before us?

Psychiatry and the scientific model start from the general using standardised categories (e.g., ASPD) and then move to the particular by assigning the person to one of these categories. Psychiatry asks:

Where does the person fit into the established categories?

Psychoanalysis does not offer or aim to cure symptoms but rather asks if a subject may find a way to suffer well with their symptom.

The psychiatric community in the United States has only publicly rejected diagnostics based on the clustering of symptoms since the DSM-V (A.P.A., 2013). Perhaps the most significant of these rejections came on April 29, 2013 when National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Director, Thomas Insel announced the NIMH would no longer be using DSM diagnoses in research projects:

“Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure. In the rest of medicine, this would be equivalent to creating diagnostic systems based on the nature of chest pain or the quality of fever. Indeed, symptom-based diagnosis, once common in other areas of medicine, has been largely replaced in the past half century as we have understood that symptoms alone rarely indicate the best choice of treatment” (Insel, 2013, p.1).

A clinician’s inability to remove a symptom allows the classification of particular mental illnesses as treatment resistant. Swales (2012) outlines the process by which the natural sciences resolve that someone is treatment resistant:

- A quantitative study is conducted on the efficacy of a treatment method (usually cognitive-behavioural).
- The study defines treatment success as the removal of the symptomatic act.
- The data finds that there is either a small effect or no statistically significant effect of treatment on the symptom.

When the subject’s symptomatic expression remains relatively unchanged the researchers:

“find various ways of throwing up their hands, including the conclusion that certain people are simply resistant to treatment” (Swales, 2012, p.12).

The researcher proposes that the psychopath is not beyond rehabilitation or a mediated entry into the social bond. Psychoanalysis’ nuanced treatment of temporality through what Lacan termed, the ‘future anterior’ makes this possible. Lacan theorised that the subject could alter their future by taking up a position in the present that re-presented an aspect of their past:

“What is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what was, since it is no more, nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, but the future anterior as what I will have been,
given what I am in the process of becoming” (Lacan, 1953 [2006], p.247 [300]).

The researcher also proposes that there are psychopaths for whom no treatment is recommended. These are socially integrated or ‘good guy’ psychopaths for whom the symptom functions. In the main these psychopaths are non-violent and their often subversive relationship to the law has been sublimated into their working life. Non-violent psychopathy has been recognised (Skeem & Cooke, 2010, p.456) and a measure has been developed, Business-SCAN 360 Research Version (Babiak & Hare, 2005). The B-Scan 360 is an instrument that uses the ratings of others to measure psychopathic features in workplace settings. From his research, Babiak has proposed that certain professions have a higher prevalence of personality disorders than others (Babiak et al., 2010). Psychoanalysts have also noted that certain occupations lend themselves to ‘anti-social’ tendencies. In an interview with Jurist in 2010, Fonagy was asked whether he believed psychoanalysts had a responsibility to be politically active and, whether their expertise should be employed in understanding political decision-making. Fonagy’s reply aligned the personalities of the political establishment with ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013):

“That’s not my métier. It would mean working in policy, working in social policy, where we can influence politicians, I have very little time for this sort of thing. I don’t want to try to influence them—I don’t work with antisocial personality disorder for the most part!” (Jurist, 2010, p.7).

This section explored the researcher’s rationale for beginning this study. The next section examines the rationale behind the methodology and design chosen to see the study through.
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

Rationale for study
A preliminary formulation as to the subject’s structure is essential when directing a psychoanalytic treatment. These formulations have implications for treatment but as yet psychoanalysis has not been clear which structure psychopathy is particular to.

Research Question
Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?

Aim
The aim of this work is to investigate psychopathy as a clinical classification through the lens of Freudian-Lacanian Psychoanalysis.

Objective
The objective is the development a psychoanalytic theory of psychopathy that will inform psychoanalytic practice.

Methodology
A qualitative method using psychoanalytic theory and methodology is proposed. Whilst the popular view is that psychoanalysis is a method of treatment only, Sigmund Freud, its founder, also distinguished it as a method of investigation:

“Psycho-analysis is the name (1) of a procedure for investigating mental processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline” (Freud, 1923a, p.235).

Since Freud’s definition, psychoanalysts have also developed methods for the treatment of non-neurotic patients (Lacan, 1955; Miller, 2002; Caroz 2009; Swales 2011) and so what defines a psychoanalytic method of research is not dealing with neurosis but rather the attribution of meaning to the formations of the unconscious.

The researcher is an accredited psychoanalytic psychotherapist who is also trained to administer and interpret an assessment for psychopathy, the PCL-R (Hare, 2003). The following methodology was employed for this study:
1. Comprehensive literature review.
Material was drawn from a number of sources, Dublin City University Library, purchased text books, online sources and databases (JSTOR, PsycArticles, PsycBooks, PsycINFO, Sage Journals online, and Wiley Online library), government publications and recommended texts by supervisors, colleagues and collaborators. Search terms included psychoanalysis, mental health, psychopathy, personality disorders, psychoanalytic structures, nosology, discourse, Freud and Lacan. Much of the literature discovered was from outside the psychoanalytic field.

Lacan in, ‘The Primacy of the Signifier’ (pp.3-4) proposed that we define concepts via the act of naming. The reviewed literature includes texts from, for example, the field of criminology. Notably authors who self-identify as criminologists may be identified and cited by other academics as psychologists, sociologists or legal academics. Additionally, their theories may be co-opted by other disciplines and subsumed under that discipline’s paradigm. The diverse professional and academic training of criminologists includes amongst other subjects: sociology, psychology and the law, and may account for the ease with which other disciplines identify and incorporate their theories. This diversity in education is not dissimilar to that of psychoanalysts whose work is similarly cited as philosophy, psychology or psychiatry. Boundaries between disciplines can be blurred resulting in claims to the origins of an idea being disputed by different branches of science. Psychoanalysis situates its theories under a belief in the unconscious but is open to learning from and contributing to other disciplines. This is certainly the case in the literature around psychopathy. The researcher considered good theory to be, good theory and has therefore conducted a comprehensive literature review drawing relevant material from multiple disciplines while acknowledging the orientation ascribed to the authors of the literature to take into account the lack of reference to the unconscious in some sources.

Lacan described how the psychoanalyst may come to represent the “subject-supposed-to-know” for the analysand (Lacan, 1953 [2006], p.267 [Note 41]). This emphasises the need to be reliably informed by the extensive psychoanalytic literature. Freud’s published papers alone are contained in twenty-four volumes and consequently the literature reviewed is confined to key authors and key texts, targeting significant material in relation to psychopathy and a psychoanalytic perspective on psychical structure.

2. Interviews.
The researcher conducted a series of interviews as a means of data collection. The data collected was used to address the central research question:
Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an
Participants for interviews were identified by using a screening tool and those who met the criteria for psychopathy were then invited to participate in a psychoanalytically informed interview:

- The Self-report psychopathy questionnaire (SRP-III) (Paulhus, Hemphill & Hare, 2009).

The researcher screened a population of ex-offenders using the Self-report psychopathy questionnaire (SRP-III). The assessment was administered either over the phone or face-to-face to determine whether the participant met the criteria for a psychopathic personality. Those who met these criteria were then invited to participate in a second, psychoanalytically informed interview.

- Psychoanalytically informed interview (Hollway, 2000)

The psychoanalytic interview was an opportunity for the participant to speak freely around the topics introduced while the researcher listened. This method of interview was chosen as it allows the researcher to access to the unconscious motivations of the participants. The psychoanalytic interview has been shown to be appropriate in research interviews as it allows:

“access to a person’s concerns which would probably not be visible using a more traditional method” (Hollway, 2000, p.37).

In a psychoanalytic interview the interviewer listens with a free-floating attention that helps them to recognise formations of the unconscious in the speech of the interviewee. The interviewee for their part is directed to ‘free associate’, which entails speaking freely whatever comes to their mind in relation to the topic:

“Free associations defy narrative conventions and enable the analyst to pick up on incoherence’s (for example, contradictions, elisions, avoidances) and accord them due significance” (Ibid.).

3. Analysis.

Psychoanalytically informed analysis of discourse

The interviews were transcribed verbatim and then typed up using word processing software. The researcher used an adapted thematic analysis to organise and manage the data generated from the speech of participants. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006) (Section 7.2 - Analytic Method). This allowed psychoanalytic concepts as meanings to be recognised and grouped from the data and the researcher discerned the implicit patterns and elementary structures in the data. Every interview was analysed in detail and coded by the researcher via the prism of Lacanian structural theory, producing data for interpretation.
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE

The chapters which follow organise the work into sections. Chapters two, three and four examine diagnostic/nosological categories from the fields of psychiatry and psychoanalysis as they relate to psychopathy.

Chapter two focuses on the history of psychopathy as a phenomenon, the origins of the diagnosis in psychiatry and the opportunity that psychoanalysis missed by not providing a comprehensive theory. The often conflicting understandings of psychopathy are also compared and contrasted including a critical review of the personality features included in Robert Hare’s PCL-R assessment of psychopathy and the original clinical assessment by Hervey Cleckley (1903-1984).

Chapters three and four consider the theory of structure from a psychoanalytic viewpoint and detail previous attempts within the psychoanalytic community to situate the features of psychopathy within existing theories. The chapters are organised in chronological order - chapter three dealing with the work of Freud and Lacan while chapter four concentrates on relevant material from their psychoanalytic successors.

Chapter five describes Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis’ relationship to research. It also questions what it means for psychoanalytic researchers to be governed by an ethics informed by the praxis of psychoanalysis.

Chapter six outlines the design and the procedures of the study. The interview methods, how the sample came to be decided on and the issues in accessing the sample population are all detailed.

Chapter seven describes the analytic method utilised for this study, a psychoanalytic analysis of discourse. The researchers use of an adapted thematic analysis in the organisation and management of data is also presented. Emphasis is placed on Lacanian structural theory which informed both the ethical and theoretical position of the researcher.

Chapters eight, nine and ten present the findings, situate these within the context of modern clinical treatments and theories, and offer recommendations based on them.
This introductory chapter outlined the structure of this thesis by providing contextual and historical data on psychopathy and psychoanalysis. It provided an overview of the purpose, aims and approach of this psychoanalytically informed study and outlined the chapters to follow. It introduced Lacanian structural theory, the theory of ‘The Primacy of the Signifier’ and the ethical and clinical implications of making an interpretation in psychoanalytic work. The researcher recognises that essential aspects of theory must be reviewed in order to address the research question:

*Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?*

Accordingly the following three chapters present theories of psychopathy, ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) and sociopathy from (i) the fields of psychiatry, criminology, evolutionary psychology, genetics, neurology, and sociology (Chapter 2), (ii) Freud (1856-1939) & Lacan (1901-1981) (Chapter 3) and (iii) Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysts (Chapter 4)
“If Richard Burton had been the son of a London butcher instead of the son of an army colonel his ‘monstrous talents’ may have been utilized for criminal purposes instead of those to which he actually put them and he may have ended up with a rope around his neck rather than the sash of knighthood around his shoulders. We are not saying that poorer social circumstances would have caused his Psychopathy, only that they might have led him to express it in less ‘heroic’ ways” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, pp.138-139).

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The next three chapters provide an overview of theory on the phenomenon of psychopathy. Particular emphasis has been placed on diagnostics, providing both the context and the rationale for this study. This chapter will outline the history of the construct of psychopathy, inform on current psychological and psychiatric diagnoses including data on prevalence rates and trends, risk and protective factors and explore the differential diagnoses of sociopathy and psychopathy. Chapters three and four present the psychoanalytic theory of psychopathy from the primary texts of Freud and Lacan and from Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysts who followed. This overview highlights contemporary debates and identifies some of the challenges associated when taking up a position in disciplines with such diagnostic variance.
2.2 THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOPATHY

As clinical diagnostics evolved so too did the features associated with psychopathy. The construct itself has been remoulded in each epoch to fill the space required of it. As Murphy identified, psychopathy was born out of necessity by preliterate cultures (Murphy, 1976). She reports how the Inuit Yupik people describe:

“a class of individual, whom they call ‘kunlangeta’, who lie, steal, freeload, and who ‘takes advantage of many women’ when the other men are out hunting” (Murphy, 1976, p.1026).

In naming this type of person the Inuit were able to identify the danger and so protect the tribe. With the advent of the written word we again find expressed, this time on paper, some people’s fear of this personality type. In Book VII of *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (384-322 BC) wrote of a small minority of individuals with a ‘brutish nature’ arising from three sources:

“through injury or through habit or through congenital depravity” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.).

Simply naming a potential danger was no longer sufficient and as the appetite for knowledge and understanding increased, information was recorded in order to protect future generations.

In the 19th century the descriptions of psychopathologies became more detailed and nuanced as the scientific discourse gained traction. Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) provided the first clinical term for psychopaths, naming the syndrome, “manie sans delire” - insanity without delirium (Pinel, 1806). The diagnosis implied that while these individuals were ‘insane’, they could function normally if not morally in society. James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848) who attributed his understanding of pathology to Pinel’s work re-examined Pinel’s syndrome and considered it a “morbid perversion”:

“a madness, consisting of morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, tempers, habits, moral dispositions and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing or reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane illusion or hallucination” (Prichard, 1835, p.85).

Prichard’s theory positioned the psychopath as deficient in morality. The plea of ‘moral insanity’ has its origins in Prichard’s theory, as jurys are told that the defendant knows not what he does.

By the end of the 19th century Julius Ludwig Koch (1841-1908), the Christian psychiatrist used the term “psychopathic inferiority” to argue that psychopaths were degenerates and so removed the word ‘moral’ from the diagnosis (Koch, 1891). He was also the first to differentiate the syndrome/pathology on the basis of predisposition, stating that while the environment compelled some to crime, others were predisposed to criminality from birth (“constitutional psychopathy”) (Ibid.).

Up until the 19th century psychopathic crimes were considered immoral acts conducted by those who
were cognisant of their actions and knew the difference between right and wrong. Pinel and Prichard shifted the emphasis from a psychopath’s immorality to an amorality; understanding psychopathy as a psychopathology in which the patient had no sense of right or wrong. Society’s relationship to ‘mental illness’ may be traced through paradigmatic shifts like Pinel’s, in which our understanding of the psychopathological subject as a dangerous other is reconsidered, re-situating them as a patient. At each meeting with an unknowable aspect of the human condition we attempt to avoid anxiety by installing a graduated sense that we are in control:

(i) the danger is ignored
(ii) attempts are made to contain the danger (isolate/incarcerate)
(iii) we attempt to cure what we consider pathological (Moral based treatment Pinel))
(iv) diagnostic systems are developed that allow us to judge each person as treatable or untreatable.

The first person to develop a diagnostic system which used the term psychopathic personality was the German psychiatrist, Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926). He argued for psychiatry to be a part of medical science and his systematization was a response to the inhuman treatment he saw of those with mental illness in the asylums (Kraepelin, 1915). Kraepelin’s work was that of an advocate - he raised funds and built new clinics for the treatment of the mentally ill. This contrasted greatly with the policy of incarceration which had existed till then.

Another German psychiatrist, Ernst Krestchmer (1888-1964) who situated his work within Kraeplin’s diagnostic legacy, introduced a diagnostic category of “sensitive paranoia”. This mild form of paranoia however contrasted with Kraeplin’s category which interpreted all persecutionary phenomena as pro-dromal to a paranoia proper:

“In his work, dating back to the 1920s and based on extensively documented case histories, he described a mild form of paranoia where the “evil Other” is not so strongly defined as in the Kraepelinian paranoid delusion of persecution, but rather is insidious, and corresponds mainly to a sensation of being constantly observed” (Guéguen, 2010, p.3).

The diagnosis of “sensitive paranoia” is closest to the researcher’s understanding of psychopathy as a mild, un-triggered or ordinary psychosis (Section 8.6 - Psychopathy and Paternal Impotency).

The next intervention by Sir David Henderson (1884-1965) relates to the treatment, or not, of psychopathy. The Scottish psychiatrist, who defined a ‘psychopath’ as anti-social, proposed that the penal system and medical care showed no preventative or curative effect on them. So began the idea of ‘treatment resistance’ as it relates to psychopathy (Henderson, 1939).

Hervey Cleckley (1903-1984) took up Henderson’s mantle, and in The Mask of Sanity he outlined his
theory of “semantic aphasia” to account for the psychopath’s inability to understand or interpret the emotional lives of others. For Cleckley the psychopath was:

“lacking in the ability to see that others are moved. It is as though he were colour-blind, despite his sharp intelligence, to this aspect of human existence” (Cleckley, 1941 [1988], p.40).

Cleckley listed the symptoms of a psychopath as:

(i) Considerable superficial charm and average or above average intelligence
(ii) Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking
(iii) Absence of anxiety or other “neurotic” symptoms considerable poise, calmness, and verbal facility
(iv) Unreliability, disregard for obligations, no sense of responsibility in matters of little and great import
(v) Untruthfulness and insincerity
(vi) Antisocial behaviour which is inadequately motivated and poorly planned, seeming to stem from an inexplicable impulsiveness
(vii) Inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour
(viii) Poor judgment and failure to learn from experience
(ix) Pathological egocentricity. Marked by a total self-centeredness and being incapable of love and attachment
(x) General poverty of deep and lasting emotions
(xi) Lack of any true insight, inability to see oneself as others do
(xii) Ingratitude for any special considerations, kindness, and trust
(xiii) Fantastic and objectionable behaviour, after drinking and sometimes even when not drinking - vulgarity, rudeness, quick mood shifts, pranks
(xiv) No history of genuine suicide attempts
(xv) An impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated sex life
(xvi) Failure to have a life plan and to live in any ordered way, unless it be one promoting self-defeat (Ibid., pp.338-339).

Cleckley saw in the psychopath’s initial presentation an “agreeable gentleman” who was relatively unaffected by the neuroses of the common man:

“Psychometric tests also very frequently show him of superior intelligence. More than the average person, he is likely to seem free from social or emotional impediments, from the minor distortions, peculiarities, and awkwardnesses so common even among the successful” (Ibid. p.339).

Cleckley’s construct removed any sense that amorality was constitutive of the psychopathic
personality. Instead his inclusion of traits such as deceitfulness, callousness and parasitic behaviour situated the psychopath as again responsible for their actions (*Table 2.1 - Comparison of the features of psychopathy over time*). Even if the psychopath was considered predisposed to act psychopathically due to a deficit in emotional awareness and an increased impulsiveness, they were still responsible for their actions.

After Cleckley’s list there was a relative moratorium in writings concerning psychopaths until Sociopathic Personality Disturbance was included in the first iteration of the DSM in 1952:

“Individuals to be placed in this category are ill primarily in terms of society and of conformity with the prevailing cultural milieu” (APA, 1952, p.38).

It was not until the 1980’s when the committee who developed the third iteration of *The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-III) for the American Psychiatric Association recommended the use of the term ‘anti-social personality syndrome’ to take account of both sociopathy and psychopathy (APA, 1980). In the 1994 DSM revision (DSM-IV) what was a syndrome became a disorder, ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (ASPD/APD) (APA, 1994).

‘Anti-social personality disorder’ was described in the DSM-IV as:

“a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood” (APA, 1994, p.645).

It was an umbrella term that could be applied to both psychopaths and sociopaths, and psychiatrists applied it to someone if he/she consistently showed three or more of the following behavioural patterns since reaching the age of 15:

i. Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest

ii. Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure

iii. Impulsivity or failing to plan ahead

iv. Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults.

v. Reckless disregardful for safety of self or others

vi. Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behaviour or honour financial obligations

vii. Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another (Ibid., pp.645-650).

The DSM-IV stated that ASPD was “associated with low socio-economic status” (Ibid., p.647). It has been noted by researchers (Rutter, Giller & Hagell, 1998; Pitchford, 2001) that those diagnosed with ASPD under the DSM-IV and its later revisions, more closely fit the criteria for sociopathy rather than
psychopathy:

“This confusion of terminology is especially damaging for research because whereas DSM-IV describes APD as ‘associated with low socio-economic status’ (1994, p. 647) psychopathy seems less likely to be associated with social disadvantage or adversity” (Rutter, Giller & Hagell, 1998; cited in Pitchford, 2001, p.28).

The prevalence of psychopathy is relatively stable over time and psychopaths can come from any socio-economic class, racial group, ethnicity or familial constellation. The prevalence of sociopathy however:

“fluctuates with environmental conditions and they tend to come primarily from the lower social classes, from dysfunctional families, and from disadvantaged minority groups” (Lykken, 1995, p.22).

The signifier ‘sociopathy’ represents a disjuncture in understanding between the fields of evolutionary psychology and criminology. Evolutionary psychology differentiates between sociopathy and psychopathy and considers psychopaths as:

“geno-typically, not just phenol-typically, different; that is, a separate discreet, taxon of a species, not simply individuals at one end of a continuum” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.139).

Sociopathy is presented by Walsh and Wu as a response to harsh environmental conditions:

“Do sociopaths develop physiological responses similar to psychopaths? Poverty is soul wrenching; it breeds anger, envy, hopelessness, and despair” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.146).

Additionally, criminology and the legal profession do not define sociopathy. In courtrooms ‘psychopathy’ as a signifier was introduced:

“as a mitigating factor in criminal cases seeking to diminish mens rea (Latin for guilty mind, guilty knowledge, or intention to commit a prohibited act). In this way psychopathy was applied in a manner consistent with how psychotic disorders are conceptualized in modern-day law, mainly to support mens rea defences” (Vitacco, Lishner and Neumann, 2012, p.22).

The use of the term ‘sociopathy’, which is not recognised in courts of law as a valid diagnosis or as a defense for a criminal activity was unavoidable in this thesis. However, it is only reproduced here in reference to other studies where it has had utility.

The researcher points out that the DSM diagnosis of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) is missing certain indicators of psychopathy that were present in Cleckley’s construct. One of these indicators is ‘charm’. The removal of this ‘positive’ psychopathic characteristic from the diagnosis may be considered as the APA’s attempt to position anti-socials/psychopaths as having no redeeming features. The criteria of ‘personal charm’ would later be resurrected by Hare in his Psychopathy
Checklist (PCL) (Hare, 1980). In addition, traits that might be considered as explanatory such as ‘being prone to boredom’ were also absent from the DSM’s diagnosis of ASPD (Table 2.1 - Comparison of the features of psychopathy over time).

Although psychopathy had specific characteristics that differentiated it from the environmentally determined anti-social personality types, it was conspicuously absent as a category in the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1952 (I), 1968 (II), 1980 (III), 1987 (III-R), 1994 (IV), 2000 (IV-TR), 2013(V)). This diagnostic space came to be filled by Robert Hare’s Psychopathy Check-List (PCL), which was developed in the 1970’s and first published in 1980. When first published it consisted of twenty-two personality and behavioural items but has since been revised down to twenty items in the Psychopathy Check-List Revised (PCL-R) (Hare, 2003). The researcher notes that the concept of psychopathy underwent a paradigmatic shift with Hare’s addition of criteria such as criminality, grandiosity and juvenile delinquency, over Cleckley’s construct (Table 2.1 - Comparison of the features of psychopathy over time).

With the publication of the DSM-V (APA, 2013) psychopathy was re-categorized as a “distinct variant” of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’. Clinicians can now specify if the diagnosis of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ is with or without psychopathic features (APA, 2013). The researcher details the DSM-V diagnostic criteria further in the next section.
Robert Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R)

The Hare PCL-R: 2nd Edition (Hare, 2003) is a twenty-item scale that includes a semi-structured interview and a review of file/collateral information (Appendix A). A review of collateral information is mandatory and takes approximately one hour. The clinician can make a rating on the basis of collateral information alone but direct observation of the individual via interview is recommended. The Hare PCL-R measures inferred personality traits and behaviours to determine the presence of psychopathy in an individual.

The twenty item scale is grouped into two main factors and four facets:

“Factor analysis of the PCL-R reveals that Psychopathy is comprised of two factors, one describing a constellation of personality traits that point to insensitivity to the feelings of others, and the second a generally unstable, impulsive, and deviant lifestyle (Forth, Brown, Hart & Hare, 1996)” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.138).

Factor 1 - The 'Classic/True Psychopathy Characteristics'. These are the traits that describe how the individual feels, his emotional make-up and his thought process.

Factor 2 - The 'False Psychopathy Characteristics'. These are the traits that describe an individual's antisocial, criminal and aggressive behaviour.

The four facets are:
1. Interpersonal
2. Affective
3. Lifestyle
4. Antisocial

The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised has been adopted worldwide as the standard instrument for researchers and clinicians and is used as a predictor of recidivism, violence and the individual’s potential response to therapeutic intervention. The PCL-R was reviewed in Buros Mental Measurements Yearbook (1995), as being:

“a reliable and effective instrument for the measurement of psychopathy and is considered the 'gold standard' for measurement of psychopathy” (Fulero, 1995, pp.453-454).

The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised has also been recognised for its validity as an instrument in psychopathy assessment:

“The instrument has been well-validated in a large body of forensic research conducted by Hare
and his associates as well as a variety of independent research teams” (Williams & Paulhus, 2004, p.766).

**PCL-R Scoring**

An interview of approximately ninety minutes is conducted in which the clinician rates the interviewee on a three-point scale as having or not having twenty personality and behavioural traits. In the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) each item is given one of three possible scores:

0 - It doesn't apply to the patient at all
1 - It applies somewhat, meaning the trait is there, but it is not highly dominant in the person
2 - It fits the person perfectly, it defines dominant traits in character &/or behaviour.

A score of 30 or above is the cut-off in North America and Canada for a diagnosis of psychopathy; but this differs for other locations. The highest score possible is 40.

The average neuro-typical (normal) person scores between 3 and 6.
The average non-psychopathic criminal scores between 16 and 22.
The average criminal sociopath/ASPD individual scores between 22 and 26.
The average serious criminal sociopath/ASPD scores between 26 and 29.
The average criminal psychopath scores between 30 and 40.
The average non-criminal psychopath scores between 30 and 34.

The prevalence of ASPD is estimated by the American Psychiatric Association at three percent in males (APA, 1994, p.648) while the prevalence of psychopathy according to Hare is one percent (Hare, 1993, p.74).

**Criticisms of PCL-R**

(i) It is a blunt instrument

The PCL-R may be considered as a blunt instrument. A score of 31 out of 40 and the person is diagnosed a psychopath but a score of 29 and they are not. Interestingly however, variations on these diagnostic limits are allowed based on geography. Cooke’s investigation of these cut-offs concluded that a score of 30 on the PCL-R in North America corresponded to a score of just 25 in Scotland (Cooke and Michie, 1999). What curbed the Scottish prisoners from achieving a score of 30 was not criminal or violent behaviour, which is comparable across countries, but rather they seem to lack the trait of superficial charm:

“Where American psychopaths are more pleasant (glib and superficially charming - “hey you're looking good. Have you been working out?”), Scottish psychopaths just growl at you” (Maruna, 2010).
Maruna states these diagnostic differences imply that:

“if you stick a Scottish psychopath (who scores say 26 on the PCL-R) on a plane to America, at some point in the flight - or perhaps on landing - he is cured completely” (Ibid.).

(ii) It is only accurate for prison populations
The PCL-R differs from Cleckley’s list by way of its concentration on criminality as observed by Macdonald and Iacono (2006):

“a great deal is known about antisocial personality disorder, criminality, and the psychopathic offender as defined by the PCL-R. Much less is known about Psychopathy, especially outside prison populations” (Macdonald and Iacono, 2006, p.383).

(iii) It does not account for the psychopath’s paradoxical experience of both emotional poverty and intense anger:
One particular personality trait or marker for psychopathy whose influence is disputed is aggression. Cleckley describes an “emotional poverty” characteristic of psychopaths (Cleckley, 1941 [1988], p.349) but Steuerwald and Kosson say they experience intense, chronic anger (Steuerwald & Kosson, 2000). Alternatively Hare offers:

“Although psychopaths have a ‘hair trigger’ and readily initiate aggressive displays, their ensuing behaviour is not out of control…. Their aggressive displays are ‘cold’; they lack the intense emotional arousal experienced by others when they lose their temper” (Hare, 1993, p.60).

(iv) It fails to account for rehabilitation
Another criticism of the PCL-R is that because scores are based on prison records as well as interviews, there is no accounting for rehabilitation or change as historical crimes can always skew the score.

(v) It is a moral judgement
Blackburn argues that psychopathy is a social construction that has become politicised by those who come up with assessments and is a:

“a moral judgment masquerading as a clinical diagnosis” (Blackburn, 1988, p.55).

The effect of social mores on the construct of psychopathy has been traced by the researcher in Section 2.2 - The History of Psychopathy. The table below maps the concept over time allowing for comparison through each epoch and pointing to the particular features of psychopathy that were given priority in each period:
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<td>Egocentric</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Anxiety</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Affect</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Guilt</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Empathy</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Inhibition</td>
<td>X (vi)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parasitic</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callous</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandiose</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceitful</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreliable</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irresponsible</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulative</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prone to boredom</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O (vii)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile delinquency</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor judgement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonistic</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2.1 COMPARISON OF THE FEATURES OF PSYCHOPATHY OVER TIME**

(* Notes)

X is affirmative, O indicates the absence of the character trait

i. The structural category of Ordinary Psychosis is a non-delusional or un-triggered psychosis *(Section 4.3 - Extra-Ordinary Psychosis).*

ii. In her psychoanalytic study of a serial-killer, Biagi-chai considers Landru as charming *(Section 4.5 - Psychosis and the serial-killer).*
iii. Hare included criminality, grandiosity and juvenile delinquency in his assessment criteria (Appendix A) whereas Cleckley did not (p.18).

iv. In the 19th century clinicians distinguished between patients on the basis of their perceived morality. The prevalent discourse in hospitals and clinics was that of the church and it informed psychopathological categories. An individual’s position in society was also influenced by this perceived morality. The end of both World War two and the Great Depression brought a paradigmatic shift in society and the clinic was not immune from this. From the 1940’s on clinicians like Cleckley became subject-focused. A physician’s role no longer included a duty to judge a patient’s morality when making a diagnosis. Instead Cleckley and his peers were charged with recording and analysing how their patients functioned in society, a scientific method. This judgement-free era only lasted for about half a century. By the 1990’s both Hare and the APA had included in their diagnoses a state-based morality with criminality as the new focus. Although Freud did not write on psychopathy specifically his writings on criminality have application here. He theorized that there were some criminals who commit crimes as a self-punishment, owing to a sense of guilt, but also those, of which psychopaths might be included, who were free from feelings of guilt.

v. When Pritchard chose the category of ‘moral insanity’ he was expressing an affective deficit he had observed in his patients. However, when his category was used in French and German clinics, ‘moral insanity’ came to denote immorality and criminality (Wetzell, 2000, p.20).

vi. Pritchard’s ‘moral insanity’ referenced eccentricities due to an affective deficit rather than any callousness or criminality.

vii. The DSM does not include indicators that might be construed as positive character traits (E.g. Charm; which is a feature of many other assessments is not included). There are also no traits that might be considered as explanatory (E.g. being prone to boredom does not feature). The PCL-R is not the only assessment of psychopathic personality available to clinicians. One alternative is *The Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP)*. This is a family of instruments under development at Glasgow Caledonian University. The current version of the CAPP is the *CAPP-Institutional Rating Scale (CAPP-IRS)*:

“The CAPP is a clinical measure of Psychopathy: the CAPP model is founded on the lexical approach to personality evaluation. The lexical approach posits that the most salient aspects of human personality are widely represented in the lexicon of a language. Within the CAPP
model the symptoms of Psychopathy are expressed in natural language terms; the meaning of each of the 33 symptoms is clarified and refined through triangulation using sets of three trait descriptive adjectives” (Cooke, 2010).

As this tool was under development the researcher considered it’s use inappropriate for this study.

**Measurement as a defence against the real**

Psychoanalysis has examined society’s compulsion for measurement and associates it with our fear of the unknown/unknowable, what Lacan named the register of the Real. In *Seminar IV* (1956-57), Lacan presented his re-reading of *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy* (Freud, 1909) and proposed a distinction between the actual father and the function of the father in its real, symbolic, and imaginary instances. Where the Real was seen to resist symbolisation or integration into the psychical system (Trauma), the Symbolic was constituted by the very language structures that order and regulate human relations (Metaphor). The Imaginary is seen to be constructed via identifications of the ego with the counterpart in a mirroring process (Transitivism). These identifications are often misrecognitions that veil the Real.

By predicting potential threats to our safety, measurements like the PCL-R function as divination. Here knowledge, even that of a potential danger, protects our psyches from the unknown. Perceived threats, if measurable, can therefore represent safety:

“Thus stress can become ‘reassurance’. Patterns of perception can represent safety” (Fonagy, Cooper & Wallerstein, 1999, p.7).

The researcher aligns society’s increased interest in psychopathy with the modern affinity for safety and the insurance culture.

Another reason why society seems to like psychopathy as a construct relates to the satisfaction gained in the diametrical positioning of ‘them’ (psychopaths) to ‘us’. Believing in psychopaths is comforting for us. By labelling ‘them’ as psychopaths, it situates ‘us’ as not being psychopathic. Our psychopathic characteristics are disavowed as we project all psychopathic personality features onto ‘them’.

As outlined in this section, our fear of the future is assuaged by measurements of potential threats, including risk assessments such as the PCL-R, while divination based on these assessments protects us at an unconscious level from the unknowable real.
2.3 PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 1952 (I), 1968 (II), 1980 (III), 1987 (III-R), 1994 (IV), 2000 (IV-TR), 2013(V)) is the American Psychiatric Associations manual for the classification of mental disorders. The manual is in its seventh iteration and has been subject to many revisions. With each reprint the focus has shifted from psychodynamics through psychotherapeutics to psychometrics.

The influence of the DSM extends beyond diagnosis and is used to:

1. justify research into particular pharmaceuticals
2. authorise the reimbursement of monies by insurance companies
3. make legal decisions involving culpability.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is a multi-axial system of diagnosis that has descriptively classified mental syndromes and provided a profile of factors for the assessment of individual cases. In Section 2.2 - The History of Psychopathy the researcher details the factors used in the assessment of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013). In the five years since this study began, the DSM-V (APA, 2013) has been published. Until this version the APA had rejected attempts of previous diagnostic systems to tie aetiology to nosology. By adopting a primarily descriptive approach it sacrificed much of the data from the psychological professions it replaced, including psychoanalysis. Treatment is tied to descriptive categories where symptomatic expressions are the indicators of pathology. This contrasts with psychoanalysis in which the focus is on aetiology and where symptomatic expressions are considered particular to each subject. From a psychoanalytic perspective, the particularity of a symptom does not allow for standardisation or categorisation. However, the patient or analysand via an analysis can place their own meaning and signifiers on the symptoms.

Prior to the release of the DSM-V in May 2013 it had been predicted that the new manual would likely build on evidence based traditions with a draw toward the biological and neurological. This would have meant a move away from the symptom to an aetiological basis of mental disorders. This new focus on the ‘cause’ that was predicted for the DSM-V would have brought it in line with the psychoanalytic focus, all be it from a biological rather than a psychical perspective. This anticipated shift in emphasis did not happen in relation to psychopathy.

Although an alternative model for personality disorders was presented in the DSM-V, the new model did not replace the existing DSM-IV-tr model, and instead both are included:

“The inclusion of both models in DSM-5 reflects the decision of the APA Board of Trustees to
preserve continuity with current clinical practice, while also introducing a new approach to personality disorders” (APA, 2013, p.761).

The alternative model lists the diagnostic criteria for ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) as:

“A.
Moderate or greater impairment in personality functioning, manifested by characteristic difficulties in two or more of the following four areas:

1. Identity: Egocentrism; self-esteem derived from personal gain, power, or pleasure.
2. Self-direction: Goal setting based on personal gratification; absence of prosocial internal standards, associated with failure to conform to lawful or culturally normative ethical behavior.
3. Empathy: Lack of concern for feelings, needs, or suffering of others; lack of remorse after hurting or mistreating another.
4. Intimacy: Incapacity for mutually intimate relationships, as exploitation is a primary means of relating to others, including by deceit and coercion; use of dominance or intimidation to control others.

B.
Six or more of the following seven pathological personality traits:

1. Manipulativeness (an aspect of Antagonism): Frequent use of subterfuge to influence or control others; use of seduction, charm, glibness, or ingratiatio to achieve one’s ends.
2. Callousness (an aspect of Antagonism): Lack of concern for feelings or problems of others; lack of guilt or remorse about the negative or harmful effects of one’s actions on others; aggression; sadism.
3. Deceitfulness (an aspect of Antagonism): Dishonesty and fraudulence; misrepresentation of self; embellishment or fabrication when relating events.
4. Hostility (an aspect of Antagonism): Persistent or frequent angry feelings; anger or irritability in response to minor slights and insults; mean, nasty, or vengeful behavior.
5. Risk taking (an aspect of Disinhibition): Engagement in dangerous, risky, and potentially self-damaging activities, unnecessarily and without regard for consequences; boredom proneness and thoughtless initiation of activities to counter boredom; lack of concern for one’s limitations and denial of the reality of personal danger.
6. Impulsivity (an aspect of Disinhibition): Acting on the spur of the moment in response to immediate stimuli; acting on a momentary basis without a plan or consideration of
outcomes; difficulty establishing and following plans.

7. Irresponsibility (an aspect of Disinhibition); Disregard for—and failure to honor financial and other obligations or commitments; lack of respect for—and lack of follow-through on—agreements and promises” (Ibid., pp.764-765).

This new approach to personality disorders is characterized by the inclusion of both impairments in functioning and pathological traits and it allows for a diagnosis of Personality Disorder-Trait Specified (PD-TS).

Strikingly psychopathy was not included as a specific trait, although traits common to psychopathic assessments such as grandiosity, callousness and manipulativeness were included (Ibid., pp.779-781). Instead, psychopathy is identified as a “distinct variant” of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ and clinicians are asked to specify when making a diagnosis of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ if it is “with psychopathic features” (Ibid., p.765):

“Specifiers. A distinct variant often termed psychopathy (or “primary” psychopathy) is marked by a lack of anxiety or fear and by a bold interpersonal style that may mask maladaptive behaviour’s (e.g. fraudulence). This psychopathic variant is characterized by low levels of anxiousness (Negative Affectivity domain) and withdrawal (Detachment domain) and high levels of attention seeking (Antagonism domain). High attention seeking and low withdrawal capture the social potency (assertive/dominant) component of psychopathy, whereas low anxiousness captures the stress immunity (emotional stability / resilience) component” (Ibid.).
It is estimated that psychopaths make up about 20% of the American prison population (Weibe, 2004, p.24). There are no published statistics for the incidence of psychopathy in the Irish prison system to date. However the latest figures released by the Irish Prison Service for the 5th November 2015 detail 3,748 prisoners in custody, 451 on temporary release, 555 in remand and 4,348 in total in the system (when ‘lifers in the community’ and those detained in the Central Mental Hospital are taken into account) (Irish Department of Justice and Equality, 2015). As there are no Irish statistics on the incidence of psychopathy in the population the researcher has applied the incidences found in other populations (Weibe, 2004) as a loose guide to the possible incidence of psychopathy in the Irish population. Transposing the United States statistics onto Irish prison numbers equates to a potential population of seven hundred and fifty participants for studies of psychopathy in Irish prisons.

Similarly, based on U.S. data approximately one third of those diagnosed with ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) would fit the criteria for a diagnosis of psychopathy (Hare, 1993, p.74). The most recent data on admissions to psychiatric units and hospitals published by the Health Research Board (H.R.B.) is for 2013 (Daly & Walsh, 2014). The tables below detail the admission numbers for those with personality and behavioural disorders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All admissions</th>
<th>Males with Personality/Behavioural Disorders</th>
<th>Females with Personality/Behavioural Disorders</th>
<th>Total with Personality/Behavioural Disorders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All admissions</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First time admissions</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.2 Admission Numbers for Personality/Behavioural Disorders, Ireland (2013)**

(Daly & Walsh, 2014, p.55)

*Table 2.2* evidences that over twice as many females were admitted to psychiatric hospitals with Personality/Behavioural Disorders than males. This ratio is consistent with studies of borderline personality disorder diagnoses, which are in a ratio of 3:1 female to male (APA, 2013, p.666). Alternately, ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) “is much more common in males than in females” (Ibid., p.662). Therefore the data published by the H.R.B. on personality disorders was inadequate for this study’s requirement and also indicates that these two disorders should not be
grouped and compiled together in statistical data. The consolidation of all personality and behavioural disorders in the Irish data for psychiatric admissions nullified any efficacy in their use for this study.

Therefore using broad criteria and transposing overseas data onto an Irish population, the researcher tentatively offers that the potential number of psychopaths in Irish hospitals and prisons is approximately nine hundred at any one time.

In the DSM-V, both sociopathy and psychopathy fall under the category of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013), thus making the admission data to psychiatric hospitals unfit for the purpose of an analysis or distinction between the prevalence of sociopathy and psychopathy. The researcher considered this distinction crucial to the question of structure from the outset of the study, having noted that the roots of the signifiers: ‘socio’ and ‘psycho’, point to a structural difference. One being related to the social bond, the other relates to the psyche. The researcher examines the differential diagnosis of sociopathy and psychopathy in the next section.
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS - SOCIOPATHY OR PSYCHOPATHY

_Sociopathy_

The behavioural geneticist, Lykken (1928-2006) defined sociopaths as:

“people with broadly normal genetic characteristics, including their temperaments, who have arrived at young adulthood unsocialized because of a collective failure of the usual socializing agents, usually (I think) the parents” (Lykken, 2000, p.578).

He contrasted this with psychopaths whom he defined as:

“people whose genetic tendencies, including their temperaments, make them so difficult to socialize that the kinds of parents and neighborhoods that succeed in socializing the vast majority of youngsters do not succeed with them” (Lykken, 2000, p.578).

Lykken described sociopaths as feral creatures “who have never signed the Social Contract” (Lykken, 1995, p.22). He linked the particularities of the sociopathic personality to:

“impulse peculiarities or habit patterns that are traceable to deviant learning histories” (Ibid., p.23).

Mealey also recognised how the sociopath conditions him or herself psychologically in response to harsh environmental conditions. He found that the sociopath’s way of cheating was “not as clearly tied to genotype” as a psychopaths (Mealey, 1995, p.539). For both Lykken and Mealey, the sociopath learns to be antisocial in response to their environment. Alternately, the psychopath is not a product of their environment. Hare too sees no evidence to link psychopathy with “early social or environmental factors” (Hare, 1993, p.170).

The theoretical stance in relation to sociopathy outlined thus far has been that: under certain environmental conditions a person responds psychologically in order to adapt. An alternative is offered by Walsh and Wu who pose a question around biological response, asking:

“Do sociopaths develop physiological responses similar to psychopaths?” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.146).

Walsh and Wu’s theory offers the possibility that physiological rather than psychological changes are at the core of sociopathy. The researcher notes that a physiological adaptation does not imply that the psychical structure (neurotic, perverse, psychotic) changes too. Therefore a sociopath can remain neurotic even though physiological adaptations to a hostile environment mean that he no longer perspires when confronted with a fear-inducing stimulus.

Lykken considered that psychopathy and sociopathy, when studied in a forensic setting, are a binary
construction and defined sociopaths as those “habitual criminals who do not qualify as psychopaths” (Lykken, 2000, p.572). He found that non-psychopathic prison inmates scored higher than psychopaths on the fear scale and shock avoidance but scored similarly to psychopaths on galvanic skin response anticipation:

“I reported that prison inmates classifiable as Cleckley psychopaths tend to be less fearful than non-psychopathic habitual criminals (“sociopaths”) or normal controls (Lykken, 1957). As shown in Figure 5, they report less fear of common hazards, show less electrodermal (GSR) response while anticipating painful electric shocks, and show less avoidance of shock-punished errors in a learning task” (Lykken, 2000, p.571).

As both sociopaths and psychopaths had the same T-score for galvanic skin response sociopaths may be considered the:

“intermediate between non-offenders and psychopaths on physiological measures that are predictive of antisocial behaviour” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.147).

The prevalence of psychopathy is considered a constant over time and between cultures and socio-economic groups. On the basis of this constancy Walsh and Wu posit that:

“the construct is an evolutionarily stable trait forged by frequency-dependent selection analogous to what biologists call cheater males in non-human animal species. The proximate mechanism apparently forged by this process is the muting of the social emotions made possible by the damping of the autonomic nervous system, which also endows psychopaths
with reduced fear and anxiety” (Ibid., p.148).

This contrasts with the prevalence of sociopathy which:

“fluctuates with changes in socio-culture environments, particularly with the rate of children born into fatherless homes” (Ibid.).

Sociopathy is therefore understood not to be tied to genotype while its origins are linked to adverse environmental conditions (Ibid.).

Walsh and Wu conclude that sociopaths are both physiologically changed as well psychologically by these adverse environmental conditions:

“These kinds of developmental environments tend to produce a physiology (i.e., a hypo-reactive ANS) roughly similar to that of psychopaths as well as an intellectually imbalanced profile (P > V imbalance) that is consistently linked to criminal behaviour” (Ibid.).

Walsh and Wu occupy the median position in this debate. They agree with their predecessors in the field that the stable prevalence rate across time and socio-cultural groups points to a ‘natural’ psychopathic personality type (Cleckley, 1941 [1988]; Mealey, 1995; Pitchford, 2001) while also proposing that the environment can influence the symptomatic expression of that personality type. They offer the example of Richard Burton, the explorer and adventurer:

“We are not saying that poorer social circumstances would have caused his Psychopathy, only that they might have led him to express it in less ‘heroic’ ways” (Ibid., pp.138-139).

The researcher’s review of the literature on sociopathy revealed that although sociopaths have signed up to the social contract (are non-psychotic and have a normative relationship to the law-giving Other) they have then broken that contract whether by aim or accident (consciously or unconsciously). Sociopaths may be considered as criminal due to environmental factors. On the other hand the signifying structure that the psychopath is born into is inadequate for him/her to install the social contract normatively. Psychopaths have not signed the social contract because it has never existed for them; it escapes them.
The good

The introduction of Hare’s PCL-R (Hare, 1980) and its focus on criminality altered the construct of psychopathy. It has been argued that when the PCL-R is applied to individuals outside forensic settings, psychopathy may just as appropriately describe:

“successful entrepreneurs, CEOs, lawyers, cult leaders, or politicians who while they may exploit and manipulate others may never commit any violation of the penal code” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.138).

In response to this argument Babiak and Hare developed a business version of the PCL-R, the Business-SCAN or B-SCAN 360 (Babiak & Hare, 2012). This applied version of the PCL-R removes the focus on criminality from the instrument and in this respect may be considered closer to Cleckley’s conceptualisation of psychopathy. The B-Scan 360 was not however appropriate for this study as the commercial version is not published and is in preparation (Babiak & Hare, 2012).

Babiak and Hare are now considering psychopathy outside forensic populations but it was Lykken who theoretically opened up this space in his 1995 paper when he subverted the paradigm by aligning psychopathy with heroism instead of criminality:

“the hero and the psychopath may be twigs of the same genetic branch” (Lykken, 1995, pp.116-118).

More recently Smith et al. in a series of four studies tested Lykken’s hypothesis and concluded that there is preliminary support for a connection between the psychopathic trait of boldness, and heroism:

“The results of these four studies provide suggestive but somewhat mixed support for Lykken’s (1995) hypothesis that psychopathy and heroism are different fruits from the same tree, and that a disposition towards fearlessness - ostensibly assessed by PPI-I and measures of boldness - may predispose to both” (Smith, Lilienfeld, Coffey & Dabbs, 2013, p.643).

Boldness was a character trait particularly admired in the nineteenth-century when parts of the globe were still yet to be mapped. Expeditions were perilous and a ‘gung-ho’ attitude was required in the adventurers who took part. British explorer Sir Richard Burton (1821-1890) was one such bold adventurer who illustrates the correlation between the psychopathic trait of fearlessness and heroics:

“Adventurer, linguist, scholar, swordsman, rogue, deviant, genius - he possessed wild, monstrous talents and was burdened by defects almost as grave” (Spalding, 2004; cited in Bolen & Walsh, 2013, p.161).
The bad

Ironically it is precisely this ‘hero’ fantasy that has been used by killers like Anders Behring Breivik as their defence (Section 2.5 - It’s a question of Structure: Perversion or Psychosis?).

Dostoevsky (1821-1881) theorised that the heroic personae created by criminals and murderers may serve a societal or familial need rather than just a personal one. He saw it possible that the murderer can in some instances commit the crime to save others from having to. This masochistic criminal intrigued Freud who re-examined Dostoevsky’s position on the criminal:

“A criminal is to him [Dostoevsky] almost a Redeemer, who has taken on himself the guilt, which must else have been borne by others. There is no longer any need for one to murder, since he has already murdered; and one must be grateful to him, for, except for him, one would have been obliged oneself to murder” (Freud, 1928, p.190).

It is noteworthy that guilt is rarely assigned when acts, even barbaric ones, are of heroic endeavour. Metaphorically speaking there has been a subjective sacrifice on the stage by the hero so that the drama may continue.

In the types of crime outlined by Dostoevsky, the pathological structure of the subject is unclear: the murderer says he chose to kill for a political or logical reason, there are no delusions as in a classical psychiatric diagnosis of psychosis, yet the actions taken are not those of a normative character. Psychoanalysis offers another way to consider the serial killer or the multiple-murderer (Section 4.5 - Psychosis and the serial-killer).

The murderer is compelled to kill in order to alleviate anxiety but subjective meaning is also contained in the act. The cause is unconscious and cannot be faced, hence ‘the mask’. Ian Brady, the Scottish serial killer’s testimony from 2013 speaks to this:

“The serial killer called Britain a “psychopathic country”, referring to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and described himself as a ‘comparable petty criminal’. When asked about his own crimes and what ‘value’ he got out of killing, Brady responded: “Existential experience”’ (Moritz, 2013).

What is perhaps more telling was the intervention by Nathalie Lieven Q.C. Lieven disagreed with the psychiatric reports from Ashworth hospital which stated that Ian Brady was a paranoid schizophrenic and delusional. She responded that:

“The evidence is that Brady had a period of severe mental illness in the 1980s, which resolved itself without medication” (Ibid.).
Lieven went on to say that a “misplaced maternalism” may be at the centre of the institutions failure to recognise that Ian Brady had:

“a severe personality disorder but was not mentally ill and could be treated in prison rather than hospital” (Ibid.).

The timeless
Cheating is a behaviour common to both sociopaths and psychopaths as they exploit others for their own benefit. However when anthropologists consider ‘cheating behaviour’ it is as a mating strategy employed to gain copulation opportunities. The result of this mating strategy are:

“organisms that are geno-typically, not just phenol-typically, different; that is, a separate discreet, taxon of a species, not simply individuals at one end of a continuum” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.139).

In Section 2.2 - The History of Psychopathy the researcher presented theorists throughout history who have examined the psychopathic personality. In more recent times studies have shown a correlation between mating behaviour and anti-social personality/criminality:

(i) A review of fifty-one studies on the association between criminality and number of sexual partners found:

“50 of them to be positive, and also that age of onset of sexual behaviour to be negatively related to criminal behaviour (the earlier the age of onset, the greater the criminal activity)” (Ellis & Walsh, 2000; cited in Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.142).

(ii) A study of over a thousand pairs of twins found that:

“the most antisocial 10% of males in the cohort fathered 27% of the children” (Jaffee, Moffitt, Caspi & Taylor, 2003; cited in Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.142).

(iii) A study on the association between gang membership and the number of sexual partners found that:

“members have more sex partners than non-gang members in the same neighbourhoods and that gang leaders have more sex partners than other gang members (Padilla, 1992; Palmer & Tilley, 1995; cited in Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.142).
Studies into the psychopathic brain point to physiological deficits in the area of the brain linked to moral judgement:

“individuals with greater levels of psychopathy demonstrated reduced amygdala activation during an emotional moral decision-making task” (Wilson & Scarpa, 2012, p.374).

Experiments comparing the alpha waves of psychopaths and non-psychopaths via EEG show that psychopaths do not experience the same range of emotions as non-psychopaths:

“When non-psychopaths are presented with emotionally laden words (cancer, death, mom) there is a much higher spike indicating that they have recognized the word and made associations that have led to pairing the cognition with emotions. When psychopaths are presented with those same emotional words, they tend to process them in ways similar to processing apple or cup” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.141).

Weibe summarises psychopaths as tending “not to react autonomically to either faces or words that convey emotions” and, not recognising “fear or disgust as readily, although they can identify other basic emotions” (Weibe, 2004, p.33). He considers that the psychopath can “pursue selfish interests, without being distracted by emotional signals” (Ibid.).

Studies into cheating behaviours show that the absence or dampening of the emotions allows cheats to:

“make social decisions exclusively on the basis of rational calculations of immediate costs or benefits (Mealey, 1995; Trivers, 1991)” (Walsh and Wu, 2008, p.142).

This contrasts with non-cheats whose emotions weigh heavily in social decision making. The researcher considers if this type of cost-benefit based decision making might serve the prevalent business model of our times which seeks to eliminate defects or inefficiencies (E.g. Lean Six-Sigma (Smith, 1986)). He postulates that the prevalence of business models that seek to eliminate defects correlates with the increase in corporate psychopathy found by researchers of psychopathy (Babiak et al., 2010).

The low fear hypothesis

As outlined in Figure 2.1 - Lykken 1957 Study of fear scale/shock avoidance in sociopaths and psychopaths (p.34) Lykken identified that psychopaths have a high threshold for ANS arousal resulting in them being less fearful than non-psychopaths. Patrick (1997) references Raine (1993) in
his critique of Lykken, noting that psycho-physiological differences have been observed in anti-social groups who are not necessarily psychopathic:

“For example, a highly stable finding in laboratory studies is that delinquent individuals exhibit lower resting heart rate levels than nondelinquents, and it appears that diminished electrodermal reactions to emotional stimuli are not confined to primary psychopathic criminals” (Raine, 1993; cited in Patrick, 1997, p.248).

Darwinian Hope

However, Darwinian theory (Darwin, 1859) offers hope. Darwin proposed that the rewards from a character trait (cheating), increase only as long as there are not too many others with this same trait. However, as more people take on the character trait, Darwin saw that there would be diminishing returns associated with being a cheater. On an optimistic note some evolutionary theorists (Mealey, 1995; Raine, 1993) consider that we are at the top of the bell curve today, with a surplus of cheaters and they expect an eventual redistribution toward normative personalities.

Evolutionary theory situates the psychopath as a parasite who requires a viable host. As the number of hosts in society are limited, so too are the number of cheaters (Mealey, 1995; Raine, 1993). Psychopaths are therefore not considered to be mal-functioning when they are psychopathic but instead their actions are the consequence of internal mechanisms functioning properly (Mealey, 1995). In support of his theory, Weibe points to the findings from studies that show psychopathy as stable across cultures, as treatment resistant and as having physiological markers:

“Its resistance to treatment, ubiquity across cultures (Lykken, 1995; Walsh, 2002), physiological correlates, heritability (Cadoret & Stewart, 1991), and apparent benefits to the psychopath (Hare, 1993; but see Cleckley, 1941) suggest to Darwinian researchers that psychopathy may not result from dysfunction, but, insofar as it produces selfish goal-directed behavior, it may result from internal mechanisms functioning properly” (Mealey, 1995; cited in Weibe, 2004, p.24).

It may be argued on this basis that psychopathy is a subjective position on a continuum that makes up all of the personality types of humanity. Psychopathy would then be considered to be at the extreme end of this continuum but not an abnormality or pathology. Treatment of psychopathy in this context could only be understood as a form of social control; a treatment of normality.

In the next section the researcher outlines psychoanalytic theory on psychopathy and the particularities that mark it out from other structures.
Lacan recognised in Freud’s work some stable features in the speech of patients that could be used diagnostically. There is the actuality of a subject’s discourse and the direction of the treatment is based on the preliminary diagnoses made by the analyst. This diagnosis is subject to revision depending on the new material brought by the analysand in the session. The psychoanalyst distinguishes between psychotic and non-psychotic structures based on the presence/absence of the Name-of-the-Father (paternal metaphor). The Name-of-the-Father is inexorably linked to the castration complex and the subject's entry into the social bond.

**THE NAME-OF-THE-FATHER**

The function of the Name-of-the-Father (the one who embodies the law and intervenes in the dualistic relationship between the subject and the big Other) is passed on through language. This ‘symbolic-Father’ is also termed ‘the second Other’ or the ‘law-giving Other’. The researcher chose to use the signifier, ‘law-giving Other’ for this study.

In *Seminar III*, Lacan asks what might happen if there is a deficit for the subject in the “formative function of the father” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.189). He then relates the production of a psychopathic personality to one such deficit, having a monstrous father:

> “Most clinicians will have met with cases of these delinquent or psychotic sons who proliferate in the shadow of a paternal personality of exceptional character, one of these social monsters referred to as venerable…. It's certainly not by chance that a psychopathic personality subversion, in particular, is produced in such a situation” (Ibid.).

Particularly noteworthy is that Lacan uses the signifiers “psychotic” and “subversion” in this extract. These two signifiers relate to the structures of psychosis and perversion respectively, but Lacan aligns both in his consideration of psychopathy. The researcher recognises the difficulty in delineating psychopaths as either psychotic or perverse alone.

In *The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire*, Lacan reveals “the Other’s question”, a question that heralds the entry of the subject into the circuit of desire and has a determining effect on structure:

> “"Chè vuoi?,” “What do you want?,” is the question that best leads the subject to the path of his own desire” (Lacan, 1960 [2006], p.690 [817]).
In *Seminar XI*, he develops a maxim out of this question “man’s desire is the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1964 [1977], p.158). Lacan had already differentiated between the structures based on their response to the question of the Other’s desire (repress, disavow or foreclose) and stated that the psychotic forecloses on the desire of the Other or “phallus”. The choice to repress, disavow or foreclose on the phallus does not determine the subject; just their structure and subjects with the same structure can differ greatly in presentation. In *Section 3.3 - The Name-of-the-Father is missing* the researcher highlights how imaginary identifications colour psychotic presentations and the psychopath is an exemplar of this.

Lacan associated one circumstance in particular with the development of a “psychopathic personality subversion”: having a monstrous father (p.41). This suggests that on the occasion that the (m)Other chooses a monster as both her mate and as the representative of the law in the family, an identification by the infantile subject with this monster is all but unavoidable. The infant’s psyche is not blind to the paradox that they have identified with a law-giver who is beyond the law and acts as if they are a law unto themselves, a “social monster”. When the psychopath meets a representative of the law, the psychical tension stemming from this paradox is experienced as an extreme anxiety and they seek to repel or subvert the interpreted threat (*Section 9.2 - Structure, jouissance and the drives*, p.238).

Lacan associates the “psychopathic personality” with the impossibility of assuming a position symbolically:

“Let's suppose that this situation entails for the subject the impossibility of assuming the realization of the signifier father at the symbolic level. What's he left with? He's left with the image the paternal function is reduced to” (Ibid.).

The young psychopath is unable to incorporate the Name-of-the-Father (the signifier of the Father at a symbolic level) and is left with only the image of the paternal function:

“It's an image which isn’t inscribed in any triangular dialectic, but whose function as model, as specular alienation, nevertheless gives the subject a fastening point and enables him to apprehend himself on the imaginary plane” (Ibid.).

This position is one of “specular alienation” and although entry into the symbolic register is denied there may be an imaginary compensation.

However, an imaginary compensation lacks the stablility of a paternal “pact”: a characteristic of normative negotiation of the castration complex. In the absence of the pact between father and son, a rivalry is created between them characterised by aggression:

“If the captivating image is without limits, if the character in question manifests himself simply in the order of strength and not in that of the pact, then a relation of rivalry, aggressiveness, fear, etc. appear” (Ibid.).
In the next section, the question of a subject’s structure in the absence of the Name-of-the-Father is considered with reference to the case of Anders Behring Breivik, who killed seventy-seven people in Norway on July 22nd, 2011: eight in a bomb attack in Oslo and sixty-nine adolescents on the island of Utoya.
2.5 IT’S A QUESTION OF STRUCTURE: PERVERSION OR PSYCHOSIS?

Anders Behring Breivik was born in Oslo on 13th February 1979, the son of Wenche Behring, a nurse, and Jens David Breivik, a civil economist, who worked as a diplomat for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in London and later Paris. Anders spent the first year of his life in London until his parents divorced. His father, who later married a diplomat, fought for his custody but failed. When Breivik was four years old, two reports were filed expressing concern about his mental health, concluding that Anders ought to be removed from parental care. Breivik lived with his mother and his half-sister in Oslo and regularly visited his father and stepmother in France, until they divorced when he was twelve years old. His mother also remarried, to a Norwegian Army officer (“Anders Behring Breivik”, 2011).

On 25th July 2011, Breivik was charged with “destabilising or destroying basic functions of society” and police attorney, Christian Hatlo stated he was responsible for “creating serious fear in the population” (Ahlander and Moskwa, 2011). His own lawyer, Geir Lippestad said that his client appeared to be a madman:

“This whole case indicated that he is insane” (Ahlander. and Moskwa, 2011).

Breivik has confessed to “atrocious but necessary” actions, but denies he is a criminal. The final entry in Breivik’s 1,500 page manifesto says:

“The old saying: ‘if you want something done, then do it yourself’ is as relevant now as it was then” (Breivik, 2011).

In relation to this, Magnus Ranstorp (Research Director at the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) said:

“Intuitively, it feels like he is alone when you read the document. It's like he's lost in this made-up world and can't distinguish between fantasy and reality.... they (mass killers) are usually alone” (Ahlander. and Moskwa, 2011).

Ragnhild Bjoernebekk, a researcher at Norway's police school said Breivik was disconnected from his victims:

“He has no empathy, he is indifferent to the people he kills, he has no conscience and no remorse” (Ibid.).

A compendium of texts, titled 2083 - A European Declaration of Independence (Breivik, 2011) was distributed electronically by Breivik on the day of the attacks.

His father, Jens David Breivik saw him a couple of times a year until the age of fifteen but after Breivik was arrested for tagging (graffiti) his father cut all contact. His father's response to the media when first contacted on 23rd July 2011:
Breivik seems to have an ego ideal (his imagined ideal self) which drives him to act in an unfeeling and a barbaric way. He has surety that what he is doing is for a greater good. This motif is one in which the divine-like hero must sacrifice him or herself for the good of man in the knowledge that they will be persecuted in their own time. If Breivik were a paranoid schizophrenic (psychotic) clinicians might have expected the development of a delusion with its origins in a denial of sexual difference. Freud, in his examination of the influence that the acquisition of sexuality has on delusional content, presented the case of Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911) (Freud, 1911). He charted the development of Schreber’s delusion from an eroto-mania onto his physician Flechsig, into a belief that he was to bear a child for God through asexual reproduction. Freud also indicated that the use of neologisms or ‘hollow phrases’ might be indicative of a psychotic structure and considered Schreber’s neologism of “soul murderer” in relation to Flechsig to exemplify this (Freud, 1911, p.44).

Similarly to Schreber, Breivik questioned the acquisition of his sexuality. In his writings, Breivik criticised both his parents for supporting the policies of the Norwegian Labour Party, and his mother for being, a moderate feminist. He wrote about his upbringing:

“I do not approve of the super-liberal, matriarchal upbringing as it completely lacked discipline and has contributed to feminising me to a certain degree” (Willsher, 2011).

In Breivik’s trial contradictory diagnoses were offered by the teams of psychiatrists and psychologists who had interviewed him. Johannessen, a psychologist from Ila prison was among those who had spent the most time with Breivik and had found no sign of psychosis. Johannessen concluded that:

“Breivik’s ideas were an expression of extreme right-wing views, and the way in which he presented them could be accounted for by his inflated self-image” (Seierstad, 2015, ebook Ch. Psycho Seminar, p.6).

The psychological team from Ila prison diagnosed Breivik as having a narcissistic personality disorder. Before the trial two court-appointed psychiatrists, Tørrissen and Aspaas also found that Breivik was not psychotic.

However, the first two psychiatrists to diagnose Breivik after the attack, Sørheim and Husby considered Breivik’s references to his role in the Knights Templar as a sign of psychosis and decided that he was not accountable for his actions. They diagnosed him as a paranoid schizophrenic and listed the features that pointed to this diagnosis as:

(i) His sense of omnipotence and grandiose self-worth:
“‘The subject believes he knows what the people he is talking to are thinking. This phenomenon is judged to be founded in psychosis,’ they wrote. ‘He presents himself as unique and the focal point of everything that happens, believing that all psychiatrists in the world envied the experts their task. He compares his situation to the treatment of Nazi traitors after the war. Indicative of grandiose ideas’” (Ibid., p.4).

(ii) His fluidic sense of identity (transitivism) and his use of neologisms:

“‘The subject clearly has no clear perception of his own identity as he shifts between referring to himself in the singular and the plural,’ they concluded. ‘The subject uses words that he stresses he has invented himself, such as “national Darwinist”, “suicidal Marxist” and “suicidal humanism”. This phenomenon is judged to be one of neologism.’ Such ‘new words’ could be part of a psychosis” (Ibid.).

The case of Breivik illustrates the legal implications of making clinical diagnoses and the significance that a distinction between psychotic and non-psychotic structures may have in determining responsibility. The next section examines the relationship between clinical diagnostics and the potential for an individual’s incarceration in an Irish legal context.
Concerns originally raised in the U.K. with regard to psychopathy, have also come under consideration by Irish lawmakers:

“The need to consider the longer term implications of a recommended disposal is particularly important following the introduction of powers under section 45A of the Act (introduced under the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997). This provides a new option, if the offender is diagnosed as suffering from psychopathic disorder within the meaning of Section 1 of the Act (with or without an additional category of mental disorder), for the court to attach a hospital direction and limitation direction to a prison sentence” (Mental Health Commission of Ireland, 2006, p.58).

Section 45A of the United Kingdom, Crime Sentences Act 1997 sees the courts decide whether an offender who has been assessed as psychopathic goes to the hospital or to prison. If he/she is sent to the hospital rather than prison, it is then at the discretion of the responsible medical officer (RMO) to seek/not seek the patient's transfer to prison at a time when “no further treatment is likely to be beneficial” (Ibid.). The researcher here notes that as psychopathy is considered treatment resistant there is little chance that those assessed as psychopathy would be sent to the hospital in the first place.

In Ireland, if an individual is diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder, the 2001 Mental Health Act allows for someone to be involuntarily admitted to an ‘approved centre’. The admission cannot however be solely on the grounds:

“that the person - (a) is suffering from a personality disorder, (b) is socially deviant, or (c) is addicted to drugs or intoxicants” (Government of Ireland, 2001, p.11).

It follows that an offender who meets the DSM criteria for ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) would not be admitted to hospital while an offender who meets the criteria for another disorder may.

The Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 (Government of Ireland, 2006) introduced the verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' to replace the previous verdict of 'guilty but insane'. 'Diminished responsibility' is the other possible verdict from the 2006 act but in practice, these verdicts are not commonly upheld. This is exemplified by the case of Joe Heffernan (33), a county Clare farmer who was sentenced to life for murder after unsuccessfully pleading 'diminished responsibility' in the Central Criminal Court.
Following the death of his father, Heffernan claimed he suffered an adjustment disorder and thought he was killing the devil when he murdered twenty-one-year-old student, Eoin Ryan. Dr. Linehan of the Central Mental Hospital interviewed Heffernan three times. Her diagnosis was of an adjustment disorder complicated by alcohol misuse, including depressive symptoms in the aftermath of the death of his father. Dr. Linehan stated:

“that while adjustment disorder was a mental illness, Heffernan did not satisfy other criteria for the insanity defence. She believed he had understood his actions were wrong, and she was ‘not satisfied the mental disorder rendered him unable to refrain’” (Humphreys, 2013).

She added that Heffernan knew that he was doing wrong:

“noting that he had told Gardaí he was not going to prison, showing an awareness that a crime had been committed” (Clare.fm, 2013).

Although there is no indication that Heffernan was assessed for psychopathy, the Irish Times article still outlined a distinction between psychopathy and psychosis:

(i) Psychopathy: “a behavioural disorder: probably untreated and almost certainly incurable”
(ii) Psychosis: “a mental illness: schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, for which treatments can be found” (Humphreys, 2013).

By aligning an adjustment disorder suffered on the death of one’s father with psychopathy, this article highlights the confusion around clinical concepts and the often inaccurate presentation of these concepts to the public. The researcher notes that by positioning ‘them’ (psychopaths) as dangerous, ‘we’ (society) can gain a sense of control: containing the risk and evading the anxiety associated with the danger.
In this chapter, an overview of the literature on the topic of psychopathy was detailed. The traditions in clinical diagnostics and nosology provided the context for this chapter. It outlined the history of the construct of psychopathy, informed on a current psychological assessment of psychopathy (Hare, 1993) and the associated psychiatric diagnosis of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013). Data on prevalence rates, risk and protective factors were also provided. The differential diagnosis of sociopathy and psychopathy was examined and related to current forensic and psychiatric diagnostics. Psychopathy and insanity as legal terms were examined and criminal cases from Ireland (Heffernan, 2012) and internationally (“Anders Behring Breivik”, 2011) were used to highlight the variance between clinical and legal references to psychopathy, psychosis and personality disorders. Following on from this, chapter three presents texts by Freud and Lacan as they relate to the psychoanalytic theory of psychopathy.
CHAPTER 3 FREUD AND LACAN: STRUCTURAL THEORY AS APPLICABLE TO PSYCHOPATHY

“Two traits are essential in a criminal: boundless egoism and a strong destructive urge. Common to both of these, and a necessary condition for their expression, is absence of love, lack of an emotional appreciation of (human) objects” (Freud, 1928, p.178).

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The focus of this chapter is the theory of psychopathic structure from a psychoanalytic viewpoint. Freud’s nosological classifications are outlined and the researcher examines where psychopathy might be situated in this nosology. Similarly, Lacanian texts on psychical structure as applied to psychopathy are examined. The researcher concentrates on the structures of psychosis and perversion, rather than neurosis with regard to the research topic and draws on the literature of Freud and Lacan to defend this choice. In chapter two the researcher presented how psychiatry uses symptomatic expressions as indicators of pathology. In this chapter the researcher contrasts this with the developmental/structural approaches of Freud and Lacan in which the particularity of a symptom rules out any standardisation or categorisation based on it.
3.2 FREUDIAN NOSOLOGY

The Oedipus complex is a dramatic, normative crisis of childhood development resolved in a structure. Freud theorised that an infant begins his or her life in a dualistic relation to the mother, understanding him or herself as being all the mother will ever need. However the infant comes to find that this is not the case and the dualism with the mother is interrupted by a third person. It is beyond the integrative capacity of the infantile mind to accept that the mother has a desire beyond them and so the infant must defend its pre-developed mind from the impending anxiety. He or she makes a choice: to repress, disavow or deny this knowledge. This choice is unconscious and each defence against anxiety corresponds to a structure. The choice to repress brings about a neurotic structure of the mind; perversion follows a choice to disavow and psychosis follows denial. Freud wrote and presented case histories to illustrate his theories and these cases also came to represent a nosological guide for Freudian practitioners. The Freudian nosological categories are:

**Actual neurosis.** Actual neurosis was a term first used by Freud in his paper, *Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses* of 1898. He distinguished actual neuroses from psychoneuroses, which he regarded as due to psychological conflicts and past events. He further distinguished two types of actual neurosis - neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. Freud later also included hypochondria among the actual neuroses.

**Psychoneurosis.** The symptoms of the psychoneuroses are symbolic expressions of infantile conflicts in which the ego defends itself from disagreeable representations from the sexual sphere. Transference neuroses such as phobias, hysteria and obsessional neurosis are included under this category.

**Transference neurosis.** The transference neuroses include: (a) conversion hysteria, in which the symptoms are physical complaints; (b) anxiety hysteria, in which the patient experiences excessive anxiety in the presence of an external object (phobia); and (c) obsessional neurosis, in which the predominant symptoms are obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviour.

**Character/Narcissistic neurosis.** Freud used these terms to distinguish between conditions inaccessible to psychoanalytic treatment and the transference neuroses. The narcissistic neurosis represents a conflict between the ego and the superego, as opposed to the transference neurosis, which involves a conflict between the ego and id:

“In the transference neuroses we also encountered such barriers of resistance, but we were able to break them down piece by piece. In narcissistic neuroses the resistance is insuperable;
at best we are permitted to cast a curious glance over the wall to spy out what is taking place on the other side” (Freud, 1920b, p.365).

Both psychopathy and the diagnostic category of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) as detailed in Section 2.3 - Psychiatric diagnosis would likely be situated as a character/narcissistic neuroses in Freud’s nosological system.

**Psychosis.** Freud regarded psychosis as a condition characterised by hallucinations, paranoia and hysterical psychosis (which he distinguished from hysterical neurosis):

“Psychoanalytic theory would therefore view a psychotic individual as one whose ego is too weak to handle the vicissitudes of life. Or the psychotic might be a person with an adequate ego who faces such severe adversity as to cause a complete collapse of ego functioning” (Ellis, 2009, p.117).

Although diagnoses under the same parent group appear unrelated, in Freudian theory the same structural choice (to repress or disavow) is made by the subject when confronted with sexual difference. In Freudian nosology, neurosis is the parent group for diverse clinical formulations ranging from neurasthenia to phobia while psychosis has seemingly incongruous formulations ranging from mania to melancholia. Although not specifically a nosological category, perversion was written about extensively by Freud and was associated with the operation of disavowal (Verleugnung).

Freud distinguished between two distinct operations: repression (Verdrängung) and disavowal (Verleugnung). He aligned repression with neurosis and disavowal with perversion/psychosis. Freud did not differentiate between the operation employed by the subject in psychosis and perversion. This gap in the structural theory was later addressed by Lacan in his disquisition on the concept of ‘bejahung’ (affirmation) in the 1950’s. Lacanian structural theory is presented in the next section, emphasising the importance that Lacan’s concept of foreclosure (Verwerfung) has for the clinic of psychosis (Section 3.3- The Name-of-the-Father is missing).
Freud’s writings on psychosis comprise of two papers from the 1920’s, in addition to the paper on Schreber’s memoirs, introduced by the researcher in Section 2.5 - It’s a question of Structure: Perversion or Psychosis? In Neurosis and Psychosis (Freud, 1924a) Freud situates neurosis in “a conflict between the ego and its id” and psychosis in “a similar disturbance in the relations between the ego and the external world” (Freud, 1924a, p.149). He distinguishes between the structures in terms of the libidinal economy and observes that the intensity of libidinal drives determines the psychical structure. Psychosis is seen to result from an excess of drive energy that the subject is unable to repress.

Freud also characterises psychosis as a structure in which the subject creates a delusional “new world” and he ascribes this creation to a “wish fulfilment”. In this way, Freud likens the operation of the delusion to that of the dream (Ibid., p.151). Although Freud failed to name the psychotic defence mechanism in this paper he did differentiate it from the neurotic defence mechanism of repression, indicating that the psychotic subject lacks the ability to repress.

It is in The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis (Freud, 1924b) that Freud first relates the term ‘disavowal’ (verleugnung) to psychosis. He reacquaints the reader with the case of his hysteric patient, Elizabeth von R, who on the occasion of her sister’s death repressed the unpleasant thought that her brother-in-law might want to marry her, that she might accept, and that she would consequently be betraying her dead sister (Freud 1910, pp.24-25). Freud contrasts Elizabeth’s repression of the unpleasant thought with a psychotic’s probable reaction to the same news:

“The psychotic reaction would have been a disavowal of the fact of her sister's death” (Freud, 1924b, p.184).

Freud concludes that:

“Neurosis does not disavow the reality, it only ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries to replace it” (Ibid., p.185).

The clarity of Freud’s demarcation of the defence mechanisms at play in psychosis and neurosis contrasts with his writings on the distinguishing features of psychosis and perversion. In Fetishism (Freud, 1927), Freud presents the infants disavowal of the absence of the mother’s penis. He proposes that this disavowal is the mainspring for the creation of a fetish as substitute for what is missing:

“Yes, in his mind the woman has got a penis in spite of everything; but this penis is no longer the same as it was before. Something else has taken its place, has been appointed its substitute” (Freud, 1927, p.154).
Although Freud did not consider fetishism to be a psychosis, in this paper he associates it with the psychotic defence mechanism of disavowal (verleugnung).

In Negation (Freud, 1925), Freud contrasts negation (verneinung) with affirmation (bejahung):

“The polarity of judgement appears to correspond to the opposition of the two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist. Affirmation—as a substitute for uniting—belongs to Eros; negation—the successor to expulsion—belongs to the instinct of destruction” (Freud, 1925, p.239).

Freud does not apply these concepts to structure except to say that negation may be present in psychosis. In the next section the researcher details Freud’s paper, Fetishism (Freud, 1927) and discusses Freud’s use of the term negation (verneinung) further.

In From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (Freud, 1918), the case study of the ‘Wolf-man’ is presented. There were already indications in this paper that Freud was finding it difficult to distinguish between structures based on the psychical defence mechanism employed by his patients: “In the end there were to be found in him two contrary currents side by side, of which one abominated the idea of castration, while the other was prepared to accept it…. But beyond any doubt a third current, the oldest and deepest, which did not as yet even raise the question of the reality of castration, was still capable of coming into activity” (Freud, 1918, pp.84-85).

In this case history, Freud can only offer us what he recorded in the clinic: a man who exhibited all three structural markers. However, readers of the case (including Lacan) were left confused as to whether castration was repressed, disavowed and foreclosed: “Freud’s text, undeniably brilliant, is far from being satisfactory. It mixes everything up” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.142).

Freudian nosology does not place the defence mechanism of disavowal in the field of perversion alone. In chapter nine the researcher re-opens the theoretical space on the border between psychosis and perversion to investigate psychopathy, just as others have done for the variants of perversion (Clavreul, 1980; Swales, 2011). In this space Miller (2009a) situates ‘un-triggered’ or ‘ordinary psychosis’ and other psychoanalysts have named “unfettered psychoses, undeclared, compensated, closed, white, cold, not delirious psychoses” (Recalcati, 2005).

Another indicator of psychotic structure presented by Freud is language disturbance. He observed from the writings of Schreber certain characteristics in his use of language that were particular to his structure (Freud, 1911). In Section 2.5 - It’s a question of Structure: Perversion or Psychosis? the researcher described how Schreber used the term “soul murderer” in relation to his physician, Flechsig. Freud considered that this neologism pointed to a non-normative relationship with language.
In Section 3.3 - *The Name-of-the-Father is missing* the researcher presents Lacan’s reworking of the Schreber case and his graphical representation of a delusional psychotic structure (*Figure 3.5 - Lacan’s I-Schema*).
In Freudian theory, each individual is born with a “polymorphously perverse… aptitude… innately present in their disposition” (Freud, 1905a, p.191). Only the infant’s successful negotiation of the Oedipal and Castration complexes can assure that normative sexuality is attained. For Freud, any deviation away from this normative sexual position or any fixation at a particular stage in the negotiation is pathological. It is from this perspective that the perversions may be considered to originate in infantile fixations during the developmental stages of sexuality. Freud theorised that the infant is confronted with a psychically non-synthesizable reality in sexual difference. They must choose whether to repress or disavow this knowledge. Informed by analytic experience with patients, Freud considered that the operation at the centre of perversion differed from that of neurotics and was not repression, but rather disavowal. He considered repression to be the normative mechanism of psychical defence when confronted with sexual difference, therefore the perversions were considered pathological (Freud, 1927).

Freud begins his paper *Fetishism* (Freud, 1927) by contrasting the emotional states of the fetishist with those of the neurotic on their arrival at analysis. He reported that unlike the neurotic who suffers from a symptom, the subject with a fetish is usually “quite satisfied with it” (Freud, 1927, p.152). Freud, like present day clinicians rarely met with fetishists in his practice for this reason.

The first case Freud details in *Fetishism* is:

“one in which a young man had exalted a certain sort of “shine on the nose” into a fetishistic precondition” (Ibid.).

Freud’s interpretation and the “surprising explanation” was that for this subject (possibly the patient known as the Rat-Man), a string of signifiers playing across the two languages revealed a fetish based on the homophones of “glanz”, meaning ‘shine’ in German, and the word “glance” in English. Freud found this operation so compelling that he expected the “same solution in all cases of fetishism” (Ibid.).

What is being defended against in a disavowal (verleugnung) is the proven reality of castration as verified for the infant on their discovering the lack of a penis in women. What came to take the place of this moment of proof for Freud’s fetishistic patient was the signifier, “glance”.

In this paper, Freud also distinguishes the operation of disavowal (verleugnung) from negation (verneinung). Freud proposed that in this case of fetishism:
“the perception has persisted, and that a very energistic action has been undertaken to maintain the disavowal” (Ibid., p.154).

Freud contrasts this with the defence mechanism in psychosis in which the perception does not persist and therefore no energistic action is required. He does note however that contained within the operation of the fetishist’s object is the promise of a payment in return for this investment of energy. The fetishist’s object:

“remains a token of triumph over the threat of castration and a protection against it” (Ibid.).

The reason that a particular object is chosen by the fetishist is often not easily discernible. Freud associated the choice of fetish with what normative subjects repressed. He offered the example of the “coprophilic pleasure in smelling” in which what was repulsive to normative subjects became sexualised resulting in a fetish:

“dirty and evil-smelling feet that become sexual objects” (Freud, 1905a, p.155 [footnote]).

However, Freud also questioned if the operation of disavowal was exclusive to perversion. He presented a case of two young men whose fathers’ death served a similar causal role as castration does for the fetishist. In this case Freud noted that it was possible for one of the two young men to disavow (“scotomize”) the death of their father and yet suffer a “moderately severe obsessional neurosis” rather than a psychosis (Ibid., p.156). Freud evidences that although the operation of disavowal is not exclusive to perversion, the disavowal-of-castration alone determines the structure of the perverse subject.

For Freud, the neurotic is compelled to an action beyond his control that he does not enjoy, but the action of splitting itself can become the object of the fetish and its repetition may lessen anxiety. The perverse subject may therefore be considered to have conditioned himself to repeat an action which gives him the illusion of control, when what he veils in the fetishistic act is the reality he can’t accept. The object for the fetishist serves a functional role. Freud exemplifies this with the ‘Coupeur de nattes’, a man who enjoys cutting off the hair of females:

“His action contains in itself the two mutually incompatible assertions: ‘the woman has still got a penis’ and ‘my father castrated the woman’” (Ibid., p.157).

For Freud’s patient, two contradictory latent thoughts could co-exist and find expression in the manifest content of the fetishistic act. The fetish in Freud’s case is not for hair but rather for the act of cutting the hair. The researcher recognises in Freud’s disquisition that the fetish does not rely on the object, and that it is the function which is symptomatic.
Freud outlined two traits necessary for a criminal: “boundless egoism and a strong destructive urge” (Freud, 1928 p.178). These terms are most commonly found in Freud’s writings on the oral and anal stages of infantile development. In Freudian nosology, an egotistical person with destructive urges is pathological owing to an unsuccessful negotiation of the Oedipus complex. Freud’s writings on criminality list personality traits which clinicians still use today:

“We define the psychopath’s personality nearly eighty years later in essentially the same twofold manner: his pathological narcissism and his cruel aggression” (Meloy, 2007, p.1).

Freud also importantly noted that the expression of this destructive urge required a “lack of an emotional appreciation of (human) objects” (Freud, 1928, p.178). Emotional deficits also remain traits of psychopathy in tools such as Hare’s PCL-R (Section 2.2 - Current measures of psychopathy). These indicators of criminality/psychopathy also speak of a failure in the subject’s link to the social bond and Meloy writes that:

“There is also a general recognition that both of these characteristics are fuelled by an absence of emotional attachment to others: the bond that keeps most people from physically violating those whom they love” (Meloy, 2007, p.1).

In *Criminals from a Sense of Guilt* (Freud, 1916) we are introduced to criminals whose feelings of guilt can only be assuaged by a “forbidden action”:

“He was suffering from an oppressive feeling of guilt, of which he did not know the origin, and after he had committed a misdeed this oppression was mitigated” (Freud, 1916, p.332).

Freud presents a neurotic criminal, guilt being the hallmark of neurosis. Freud’s illustration of the criminal in 1916 does not match the “guilt-free” criminal from his 1928 paper, *Dostoevsky and Parricide* (Section 2.3 - Psychopathy - The good, the bad and the timeless). The researcher proposes that Freud was writing about psychopathic criminals when he described this class of ‘guilt-free’ law-breakers.

In the next section the researcher frames Lacan’s writing on psychosis in the context of psychopathy noting that Lacan uses the term “psychopathic personality subversion” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.189) in his portrayal of the psychotic.
In his paper, *Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis*, Lacan linked aggression to a narcissistic phase in the formation or “becoming” of the subject. He stated that it is this correlation between narcissism and aggression that allowed him to formulate:

“All sorts of accidents and atypicalities in that becoming” (Lacan, 1948 [2006], p. 95 [116]).

In *The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function*, Lacan located this “becoming” or ego formation when there is:

“both identification with the imago of one’s semblable and the drama of primordial jealousy” (Lacan, 1949 [2006], p. 79 [98]).

He noted that the phenomenon of transitivism in children as outlined by Charlotte Buhler (1893-1974) represents this confused and jealous identificatory position very well and that it is this position that introduces a “dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations” (Ibid.). Lacan therefore theorised that the subject’s link to the social bond originates in the imaginary identifications.
and associated jealousy of ego formation and the Mirror stage. The researcher notes that Freud considered this link to be lacking in the guilt-free criminal/psychopath.

It is at the Mirror stage that Lacan situated the origins of the ego. He proposed that the “individual fixates on an image that alienates him from himself” (Lacan, 1948 [2006], p.92 [113]). The ego is therefore not formed at the point of looking into the mirror, but instead in the ‘relationship’ when the image from the mirror (experienced as ‘outside’), comes to be layered onto the subject’s intimate understanding of his or her body. Ego formation may be understood as external-yet-intimate or ‘extimate’, in Lacanian terminology.

The infant’s mastery over his/her body is a result of their identification with an external image. Subsequently, this image is always going to be somehow ‘other’ to him/her, and a fundamental aggressivity to this mirrored reflection, or the ‘image of one’s semblable’, is the consequence. The ego is founded on an image that is experienced as alienating.

Lacan detailed the social aspect to the Mirror stage and asserted that an organic under-development is at the core of the subject’s entry into the social at the level of the specular image:

“These reflections lead me to recognize in the spatial capture manifested by the mirror stage, the effect in man, even prior to this social dialectic, of an organic inadequacy of his natural reality” (Lacan, 1949 [2006], p.77 [96]).

Notably, the physical object of a mirror is not required for this mirroring. Instead a mirroring of behaviour may initiate the infant’s entry into the social field. Lacan offered examples from the natural world to evidence how a mirroring effect advance an inadequate organism:

“it is a necessary condition for the maturation of the pigeon's gonad that the pigeon see another member of its species, regardless of its sex; this condition is so utterly sufficient that the same effect may be obtained by merely placing a mirror's reflective field near the individual” (Ibid., p.77 [95]).

Another paper by Lacan that approached a character trait of the guilt-free criminal/psychopath is A Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology from 1950. Here Lacan stated that “first symbolism” or a symbolic template is veiled in language at an unconscious level and that it:

“reverberates in individuals, in their physiology as well as in their conduct” (Lacan, 1950 [2006], p.105 [129]).

This “first symbolism” also came to be known as the primordial signifier or master signifier and was elaborated on by Lacan in his later work on lalangue. The concept of lalangue refers to the dimension
of language that is in itself a form of jouissance. The enunciation of sounds in the mouth and the cutting of those with the tongue and teeth have an associated pleasure. Language is a chain of signifiers that relate to each other but there is a signifier that exists prior to this chain: a master signifier associated with the drive energies and originating prior to our entry into language. Lalangue is evident where the seemingly coherent system of language fails; in the slips which psychoanalysis places unconscious intent and meaning on. Lacan also related feelings of guilt to the pathogenic effects in which first symbolism reverberates: a guilt transmitted at an unconscious level by language.

Lacan understood certain crimes committed by neurotic subjects, as self-punishing and contrasted these with the crimes of psychotic subjects. He recognised that ‘psychotic’ crime does not seek out punishment and argued that labelling someone as criminal when they fail to recognise the law is problematic. He however pointed out that the courts do not allow ignorance as a defence:

“For, according to the legislator’s icy humor, no one is supposed to be ignorant of the law, and thus everyone can foresee its repercussions and must be considered to be seeking out its blows” (Ibid., p.107 [130]).

Lacan also celebrated the French criminologist Tarde (1843-1904) and his theory of criminal motives and motivations. He agreed with Tarde’s two conditions for subjective responsibility: “social similarity” and “personal identity” (Ibid., p.113 [139]). In Penal Philosophy (1890) Tarde indicated that the condition of ‘personal identity’ implies that a person’s sense of self is intact. Someone’s memory was a crucial aspect in this regard and he stated that an individual must be able to remember their moral code and social obligations in order to be responsible for them. If an individual’s memory is damaged or distorted due to physical injury or mental illness they would not be responsible for their criminal acts. The second condition of ‘social similarity’ proposed that subjective responsibility may be effected by an individual’s familiarity with the rules and regulations of the social structure in which he or she finds him or herself. If a member of a tribe from the Amazonian rainforest commits a crime in a European city, Tarde would argue that his lack of familiarity with European life exonerates him from being responsible for his criminal acts. ‘Social similarity’ implies that the person has been raised within and informed of rules or customs particular to that society.

Lacan acknowledged that when accused of a crime, the assertion of one's innocence is normative, and he observed that the first goal speech is to disguise our true intentions:

“We could thus posit that sincerity is the first obstacle encountered by the dialectic in the search for true intentions, the first goal of speech apparently being to disguise them” (Ibid., p.115 [140]).

He considered that the aggression from the Mirror stage stands in stark contrast to this, as not seeking to deceive. In his disquisition on aggression Lacan traces its provenance to the subject’s experience
from the Mirror stage. He conceived that both alienation and the associated lack of identificatory surety at this stage produce aggression in the burgeoning subject. Lacan identified some clinical implications of this aggression and determined that behavioural conditioning, rather than producing normative responses to stimuli, can result in subjective confusion and aggression:

“This phenomenon (alienation) can be exemplified by the grimacing form of it found in experiments in which animals are exposed to an increasingly ambiguous stimulus - for example, one that gradually changes from an ellipse to a circle - when the animals have been conditioned to respond to the two different stimuli in opposite ways” (Ibid., p.115 [141]).

Lacan noted that an experience of ambiguity around the specular image in the mirror may similarly cause an aggressive response from the subject, who may feel threatened.

Lacan also related the choice of ‘criminogenic’ object to the Mirror stage. He associated this object choice with a missed opportunity. Just at the moment when an identification would resolve the aggressive tension of the mirror stage for the subject the Other’s response is absent. He described an interruption in the formation of the ego and saw that a delusion comes to serve a functional role and is correlative of the object chosen:

“As aggressive tension thus becomes part of the drive, whenever the drive is frustrated because the “other's” noncorrespondence [to one's wishes] aborts the resolving identification, and this produces a type of object that becomes criminogenic by interrupting the dialectical formation of one's ego” (Ibid., p.116 [141-142]).

This refusal/denial of correspondence may be experienced by the subject as a nieder-lassen (being dropped). This is of the order of a rejection or refusal and the choice of criminogenic object is made at this moment.

The choice of object was analysed further by Lacan when he presented the case of the Papin sisters (1933) to outline that the object choice correlates with the delusion. French popular opinion at the time of their trial in 1933 was that the killing of the bourgeois employers by their maids was a response to the social context (indicative of the class struggle in French society) in which the sisters lived. Lacan disagreed with this position and considered the act to be outside any social context:

“That fateful evening, under anxiety of an imminent punishment, the sisters mingled the mirage of their illness with the image of their mistresses” (Lacan, 1933).

Lacan stated that with regards to the criminogenic object that he:

“attempted to show the functional role and the correlation with delusion of this object’s structure” (Ibid., p.116 [141]).

The act itself (the double homicide and gouging out of the eyes before retiring to the same bed together naked) was a passage à l’acte instigated by the psychotic sister, Christine but when she was
joined by Lea (the neurotic sister), it took the form of a folie-à-deux (a madness shared by two). The term *passage à l’acte* was originally used by nineteenth century French psychiatrists to describe the violent or impetuous acts that often point to the onset of a serious psychotic episode. However, by the twentieth century Freudian psychoanalysts from the French tradition used this phrase as a translation of the word used by Freud in *A Case of Hysteria*: “agieren” (Freud, 1905, p.119). In this case, Freud aligned Dora’s quitting of her analysis with an ‘*acting out*’ (agieren) of a fantasy for revenge against Herr K.

In *Seminar X*, Lacan made a distinction between *acting out* and *passage à l’acte*. While he considers both as defences against anxiety; the subject who *acts out* remains in the scene, whereas *passage à l’acte* involves the subject leaving the stage:

“*If a passage-a-l’ acte is an exit from the stage, acting-out, in contrast, is very much on the stage. It is demonstrative and is directed towards the other*” (O’ Donnell, 2004, p.76).

Although *passage à l’acte* has been primarily associated with psychosis, and clinical evidence shows it to be more prevalent in the structure. It is not structurally specific and is trans-structural: neurotics and perverse subjects less frequently show *Passages à l’acte*.

All critical judgement was removed from the neurotic sister, Lea who was taken in (seduced) by the delusion of her sister. Lacan saw that both sisters were alienated from reality and therefore considered the act to be outside the social context.

Events from the sister’s childhood are of importance diagnostically. Their father raped their sister Emilia when she was a child which led to their parent’s divorce. Lea and Christine were separated when this happened. Christine and Emilia went to an orphanage while Lea was looked after by an uncle until he died at which point she went into an orphanage too. It is reported that the one constant in the sister’s lives after they reunited was their devotion to each other. This devotion was reported to have included an incestuous homosexual relationship but the sisters always denied this.

The researcher has detailed Lacan’s writing on the Papin sisters’ case, not to aid in any investigation of folie-à-deux, but to exemplify how the object choice of Christine, the psychotic sister came to colour the delusion and *passage à l’acte*. No details are available on the instigating events between the Papin sisters and their employer on that day but it is extrapolated from other examples of *passage à l’acte* that Christine, ‘left the stage’ when she was confronted with the jouissance of the Other. Due to a missed opportunity in her oedipal negotiation and an Other who was experienced as absent, Christine never integrated the identification with the Other that would resolve the aggressive tension of the mirror stage. On being confronted with a reminder of this refusal, the primordial aggressive
tension of the pre-linguistic infant was re-constituted in a delusion that led to a paranoiac homicide and the removal of the victim’s eyes.

The removal of eyes is a motif most commonly associated in psychoanalysis with Sophocles’ (496-406 B.C) play, Oedipus the King in which Oedipus gouges out his own eyes on finding out that he had killed his father and married his mother. Freud used Sophocles’ plays as the motif for his theory of the Oedipus complex and with his analysis of the Papin sister’s case Lacan ‘returned to Freud’ and elaborated on Freud’s writing around the infant’s relationship to the gaze as drive object. The removal of eyes from something that is already dead has also been described clinically (Miller, 1996). In A Little Chanticleer (Ferenczi, 1913 [1953]) a case is presented of a young boy who has a fetish for removing the eyes of dead chickens.

Lacan indicates that the scopic is not the only drive implicated in criminal acts and describes how the anal drive may also influence:

“Anal identifications, which analysis has discovered at the origins of the ego, give meaning to what forensic medicine designates in police jargon by the name of “calling card” (Ibid., p.117 [143]).

He criticised the ease with which some clinicians theorised that crimes were caused by an overflow of instinctual drive energy. Lacan puts forward the opposite theory: that criminals have lower libidinal energy levels and that this reduces the ability of a drive to fix onto an object successfully. However, he also noted that there could be no proof of this, given that the sexual aim and object have infinite possibilities and are inseparable. Lacan recognised that only the symptomatic expressions of these energies are observed in the clinic and not the original energies.

Lacan’s paper, A Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology was published twelve years prior to Seminar X and laid the foundations on which Lacan built his theory of the drive and their associated objects. Although Lacan aligns crime and perversion in this paper he does not go so far as to say that criminality is perverse:

“Assuredly there is a high correlation between many perversions and the subjects who are sent for criminological examinations, but this correlation can only be evaluated psychoanalytically as a function of fixation on an object, developmental stagnation, impact of ego structure and neurotic repressions in each individual case” (Ibid., p.121 [148]).

In this regard, the researcher notes that the two concepts of psychopathy and criminality have been erroneously conflated in modern times (Hare, 2003).
Lacan concluded this paper by returning to the agency that is present from the beginning of this energistic economy, the Id. He associated involuntary repetition with the Id and stated that it operates at a physical bodily level (Ibid., p.122 [148]). Lacan aligned these repetitions with recidivism and stated that they were like those parts of life which seem governed by destiny such as marriage, profession and friendship to be “already weighed out next to the cradle” (Ibid., p.122 [150]).

Until 1955 Lacan investigated psychopathology from the perspective of Freudian drive theory but in Seminar III (Lacan, 1955 [1993]) he shifted the emphasis of his work from the drives to the functional role of the father in subjectivity.
In *Seminar III* Lacan asks:


In his response he links psychosis to the failure of the paternal function and notes that the production of “psychopathic personality subversion” in “psychotic sons” is not at all by chance given that they are in the shadow of monstrous fathers:

“We are all familiar with cases of these delinquent or psychotic sons who proliferate in the shadow of a paternal personality of exceptional character, one of these social monsters referred to as venerable…. It's certainly not by chance that a psychopathic personality subversion, in particular, is produced in such a situation” (*Ibid.*).

By conflating the two signifiers of “subversion” and “psychotic” (each synonymous with a particular clinical structure) to psychopathy, Lacan anticipates his invention of the sinthome in *Seminar XXIII* (1976). This production knots together the registers of Real, Imaginary and Symbolic which threaten to come undone for the psychotic subject.

For Lacan, a subject with a “psychopathic personality” is psychotically structured, stemming from an impossibility in the assumption of the Name-of-the-Father (the signifier of the law-giving Other at a symbolic level):

“Let's suppose that this situation entails for the subject the impossibility of assuming the realization of the signifier father at the symbolic level. What's he left with? He's left with the image the paternal function is reduced to” (*Ibid.*).

The “psychotic son” who is unable to incorporate the Name-of-the-Father is left with only the image of the paternal function rather than any symbolic representation:

“It's an image which isn't inscribed in any triangular dialectic, but whose function as model, as specular alienation, nevertheless gives the subject a fastening point and enables him to apprehend himself on the imaginary plane” (*Ibid.*).

Where symbolic identification with the law-giving Other is absent, the subject can only make an imaginary identification. Lacan saw “specular alienation”, a position he associated with a psychopathic personality, as dehumanizing and as leaving no space for ego formation to be based on “the more complete other” (*Ibid.*).

In psychopathy these identifications are often, although not always, an identification with a violent and aggressive law-giving Other (Father). Although the imaginary identification with the law-giving Other allows the subject to position him or herself in the realm of social relations, there is a deficit.
What is missing is the “pact” with the son and the promise that this entails. A symbolic identification with the law-giving Other creates this symbolic pact as the subject is introduced to a law that they apprehend the law-giving Other as also being subject to. Instead of foregoing pleasure in the promise of future happiness as in a normative negotiation of the castration complex, for these “psychotic sons” a rivalry is created between subject and law-giving Other that is characterised by aggression:

“If the captivating image is without limits, if the character in question manifests himself simply in the order of strength and not in that of the pact, then a relation of rivalry, aggressiveness, fear, etc. appear. Insofar as the relationship remains on the imaginary, dual, and unlimited plane, it doesn't possess the meaning of reciprocal exclusion that is included in specular confrontation, but possesses instead the other function, that of imaginary capture” (Ibid.).

Their solution is to relate to the law-giving Other at the imaginary level as semblable. This imaginary identification has an infinite property because it is not limited by the symbolic and language. Given Lacan’s alignment of the psychopathic personality with psychosis in Seminar III, the researcher conducted a review of Lacan’s theory of psychosis from the same period.
In 1955, the same year as *Seminar III*, Lacan re-worked a case of psychosis previously outlined by Freud. The case of Judge Schreber is revisited by Lacan in *On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis* in which he utilises a formula for metaphor from linguistics to examine structure:

\[
\frac{S}{S'} \cdot \frac{S'}{x} \rightarrow S \left( \frac{1}{s} \right)
\]

**FIGURE 3.2 FORMULA FOR METAPHOR**

As illustrated in *Figure 3.3 - The Paternal metaphor*, Lacan substituted terms related to the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father for the algebraic references in the formula for metaphor. By representing the Name-of-the-Father formulaically Lacan could ‘cancel-out’ the problematic and enigmatic maternal desire:

“the fact that it is crossed out, is the condition of the metaphors success” (Lacan, 1955a [2006], p.465 [557]).

**FIGURE 3.3 THE PATERNAL METAPHOR**

Via this operation of cancellation, all the terms in the formula now related to the ‘Phallus’. Lacan could now define phallicisation and represent the associated mechanism of exchange he considered essential for the subject’s entry into the social field. Lacan’s R-Schema presents this schematically with the phallus located in the top left of the schema and represented by the lowercase phi (φ).
The R-Schema represents phallicisation, but in 1955 Lacan was investigating psychosis: the structure in which phallicisation does not happen. In Seminar III Lacan had already pointed to the psychotic’s failure to install a signifier for the phallus/Name-of-the-Father. Lacan’s qualification for this was that he could find no trace of a phallic signifier in the speech of psychotics and he resolved that had a signifier been installed that an affirmation of the phallus would be evidenced. In the absence of affirmation Lacan says the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed:

“I will thus take Verwerfung to be “foreclosure” of the signifier. At the point at which the Name-of-the-Father is summoned—and we shall see how—a pure and simple hole may thus answer in the Other; due to the lack of the metaphoric effect, this hole will give rise to a corresponding hole in the place of phallic signification” (Ibid., pp.465-6 [558]).

In Seminar III, Lacan theorised that “psychotic sons” with “psychopathic personality subversions” lacked the paternal function or Name-of-the-Father (p.66). In the same year in On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, this same impossibility or “foreclosure of the signifier” is related to a delusional psychosis. What has therefore been detailed by Lacan are two ways-of-being psychotic: psychopath and schizophrenia. In On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis Lacan presents Schreber as psychotic: a schizophrenic with a delusional defence against the Real. In Seminar III the “psychotic sons” presented are psychopathic with imaginary identifications as their defence against the real. As the symbolic order is not at play in the psychopath’s imaginary identifications, they have an infinite quality to them.

There is a “hole” or void where the phallus might be for both the schizophrenic and the psychopath in Lacanian theory. However, what the psychopath veils with imaginary identifications, the psychotic substitutes with infinite no-things: a continuous metonymy to compensate for the failure of the phallic
metaphor. Lacan created the I-Schema to represent this in his reworking of Freud’s Schreber case (*Figure 3.5 - Lacan’s I-Schema*). It is in this void (point R on the I-Schema) that Lacan situated ‘the creatures’ Schreber created as part of his delusion:

“Between the two, a line - which would culminate in the Creatures of speech occupying the place of the child who doesn’t come, dashing the subject’s hopes (see my postscript further on) - would thus be conceived as skirting the hole excavated in the field of the signifier by the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father” (Ibid., p.470 [563]).

The I-Schema is the moebius strip (M,m,I,i) lifted from Lacan’s R-Schema (*Figure 3.4 - Lacan’s R-Schema*)

![Lacan’s I-Schema](image)

**FIGURE 3.5 LACAN’S I-SHEMA**

Lacan’s I-Schema illustrates a foreclosure at symbolic level of the Name-of-the-Father, creating a parabolically shaped reality that has the structure of delusion:

“Can we locate the geometrical points of the R schema on a schema of the subject's structure at the end of the psychotic process? I shall try to do so in the I Schema below” (Ibid., p.476 [571]).

Following Lacan, the researcher seeks to examine the compensatory mechanism of the psychotic psychopathic, what covers over point R on the I-Schema.
Lacan sees the proliferation of imaginary phenomena in Schreber’s case as a consequence of the Name-of-the-Father having not been installed. All becomes mortified in Schreber’s paradoxical description of himself:

“Hence the faithful portrait that the voices, annalists I would say, gave him of himself as a ‘leper corpse leading another leper corpse’ (S. 92), a truly brilliant description, it must be admitted, of an identity reduced to a confrontation with its psychical double but which moreover renders patent the subject’s regression - a topological, not a genetic, regression - to the mirror stage, insofar as the relationship to the specular other is reduced here to its mortal impact” (Lacan, 1955a [2006], p.473 [568]).

The phenomena clinicians are presented with by psychopaths are not Schreberesque delusions but are rather imaginary identifications with people who can show the subject what it is to be a man.

Lacan uses the I-Schema (Figure 3.5) to extrapolate the process by which the delusion was installed by Schreber. He notes that an appeal was made by Schreber at the symbolic level but no answer was returned (P₀). In the absence of any response, the capital phallus (Φ₀) represents the lack of phallic signification in the Imaginary. Schreber, the psychotic may only operate within the Real (points M, m, I and i): a moebius strip with the endless quality that this topological shape represents so well. For psychotics meaning unfolds in the absence of a key signifier and the meaning is particular to the subject: an experience that is often intrusive.

For the psychopath meaning also unfolds in the absence of the key signifier and the consequence is a rivalry that is subjectively experienced as intrusive. In the postscript to this paper, Lacan highlights a fundamental disorder that marks the relationship to the Other when the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed. What comes to take up the place of the Name-of-the-Father is:

“nothing other than a real father, not at all necessarily by the subject’s own father, but by One-father [Un-pere]” (Ibid., p.481 [577]).

The ‘One-father’ is in the register of the Real: castrating, threatening and escaping symbolic representation. The signifier of the Law and the link with the social bond remains absent.

It is Schreber’s love of his wife (point a’) that stabilises him and provides him with a path that avoids falling into the void. By following the Imaginary line and experiencing an alienating effect through speaking about the creatures of his delusion, Schreber installed an ego ideal in this place that propped up his subjectivity:

“alienation of speech in which the ego-ideal has taken the place of the Other” (Ibid., p.477 [572]).
In chapter two the researcher described how current measures of ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) and psychopathy (Hare, 1993) detail the difficulties these subjects have maintaining relationships. However, on reading the stabilising effect Schreber’s wife had on his psychosis, the researcher considered if similar relationships might be possible in which a partner would offer him or herself over to the jouissance of the subject, and stabilise a psychopathy.

Another psychotic characteristic that Lacan details in this paper is a peculiar relationship to temporality and destiny. He indicates that Schreber never gets to fulfil his delusion and is forever waiting for something to happen that never comes to pass. Lacan inexorably links this to reproduction and Schreber’s reproduction of himself through having a child:

“Between the two, a line - which would culminate in the Creatures of speech occupying the place of the child who doesn't come, dashing the subject’s hopes” (Ibid., p.470 [563]).

On meeting this proposition by Lacan, the researcher considered if having children might offer any solution for the psychopathic subject. The researcher postulates that an imaginary identification of ‘father’ might be an alternative to the infinite and intrusive imaginary identifications they make due to the absence of the key signifier of the Name-of-the-Father.

Although Lacan focused on the presence/absence of the Name-of-the-Father with regard to questions of psychical structure from 1955, he did return to Freudian drive theory in relation to anxiety and in the next section the researcher details Lacan’s examination of the objects that come to take the place of the phallus when it is foreclosed.
In *Seminar X* Lacan states that when the phallic object is not functioning, as is the case in psychosis, there are other objects that “anxiety summons up” (Lacan, 1962, p.242).

Although Lacan does not distinguish which of the drive objects anxiety summons when there is no phallicisation, in *Seminar XI* (Lacan, 1964 [1977]) he does elaborate on the operation of each drive. He differentiates between the drives based on their closeness to “the experience of the unconscious” (Lacan, 1964 [1977], p.104), dividing them into four “levels” (Ibid.):

(i) *Weaning* exemplifies the first or “oral level”. Lacan also relates Anorexia Nervosa to this level and states that the anorexic eats “the nothing” (Ibid.). The object related to is “the breast” (Ibid.).

(ii) At the second or “anal level” Lacan identifies "the locus of metaphor - one object for another" (Ibid.). The object related to is “the faeces” and is associated with exchange, materialism and gift-giving (Ibid.).

Lacan situates both the oral and anal levels on the demand-side of subject-object relations while the next two levels (scopic and invocatory) are located on the side of desire:

“At the scopic level, we are no longer at the level of demand, but of desire, of the desire of the Other” (Ibid.).

(iii) The object related to at this “scopic level” is “the gaze” (Ibid.). Lacan associates this level with the lack (-φ) as the subject “is presented as other than he is” (Ibid.).

(iv) The fourth and final drive level Lacan lists is the “invocatory level”. The object related to is “the voice” which Lacan had discussed in *Seminar X* of the previous year. In this seminar Lacan offered the Shofar, a ram's horn sounded in Jewish religious ceremonies, as his example. He considered this archaic example of the invocatory drive as significant because the Other (Yahweh) is appealed to when it is sounded (Lacan, 1962, p.248).

Lacan identifies a correlation between the operation of each drive and the generation of a particular type of anxiety (Lacan, 1962, p.243). Although Lacan acknowledges that this allows for the categorization of anxiety based on drive object, he states that this is a “broad presentation of things” and that at the level of subjective experience the drive objects are intrinsically linked to each other:
“Indeed, it is a matter of ascertaining what the function of desire is at each of these levels, and none of them can be separated from the repercussions they have on each of the others. A tight solidarity unites them” (Ibid.).

Lacan later plays on the ambiguity of the French word ‘tour’ (to turn/to trick) to describe the circumvention of the drive around its object and only settling on erogenous zones or:

“points that are differentiated for us by their rim-like structure” (Lacan, 1964 [1977], p.169).

There are two necessary characteristics of an object that can become related to a drive:

“It must, therefore, be an object that is, firstly, separable and, secondly, that has some relation to the lack” (Ibid.).

These drives are not only inseparable, they are also only ever to be understood as partial:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIAL DRIVE</th>
<th>LINKED TO</th>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>OBJECT</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Lips</td>
<td>Breast</td>
<td>To suck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anal</td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Anus</td>
<td>Faeces</td>
<td>To defecate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scopic</td>
<td>drive</td>
<td>Eyes</td>
<td>Gaze</td>
<td>To see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invocatory</td>
<td>drive</td>
<td>Ears</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>To hear</td>
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TABLE 3.1 THE DRIVES, THEIR OBJECTS, ZONES, ACTIONS AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE OTHER

In Section 7.3 - Structural indicators in relation to the object a, the researcher differentiates between the drive objects linked to demand (Oral/Anal) and those linked to desire (Scopic/Invocatory): the oral and anal drives being considered primitive compared to the scopic and invocatory.

The scopic and invocatory objects come into operation as below:

- The Gaze (scopic): to watch or to get oneself seen
- The Voice (invocatory): “to command or to get oneself commanded” (Fink, 1997; cited in Swales, 2012, p.159).

However, Lacan also identifies the drive; “the lamella” (Lacan, 1964a) that precedes the partial drives and the researcher examines this Lacanian concept in the next section.
Lacan introduced the construct of the 'lamella' in 1960. He published this presentation in *Position of the Unconscious* in 1964 (Lacan, 1964a, p.718 [846]), and also defined the term in *Seminar XI* (Lacan, 1964 [1977]) of the same year:

“It is the libido, *qua* pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, or irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life” (Lacan, 1964 [1977], p.198).

Lacan describes how the lamella: this libido, is later represented by the object *a* in all its forms:

“And it is of this that all the forms of the objet *a* that can be enumerated are the representatives, the equivalents. The objets *a* are merely its representatives, its figures” (Ibid.).

In *Seminar XI* (Lacan, 1964 [1977]) Lacan highlights that lack (synonymous with the object *a*) is not negotiated on a single occasion but rather a double movement takes place: (i) an imaginary-symbolic lack in relation to the phallus and (ii) a real lack of the body:

“Two lacks overlaps here. The first…. the fact that the subject depends on the signifier and that the signifier is first of all in the field of the Other. This lack takes up the other lack, which is the real, earlier lack, to be situated at the advent of the living being” (Ibid., pp.204-205).

In psychosis, imaginary and symbolic lack are not represented but the real and traumatic lack of the body is. Therefore before the object *a* becomes associated with the body’s borderlines and orifices through which losses take place, there is a primordial loss. Lacan names the baby’s first cry and the meconium as primitive templates that represent “originative anxiety” (Lacan, 1962, p.326) and he distinguished between these on the basis of their oral and anal quality respectively.

Lacan points to the newborns powerlessness to illustrate how at the oral stage or 'first level' “the Other's reality is presentified by need” (Ibid.). However, Lacan sees that even without the Other's demand there is still anxiety:

“anxiety already appears there, prior to any articulation of the Other's demand as such” (Ibid.).

The manifestation of anxiety (the infant's first cry) coincides with the emergence of the subject into the world. This cry is not an invocation but is instead something that slips out of him:

“He has yielded something and nothing will ever conjoin him to it again” (Ibid.).

For Lacan, the trauma of birth is not being pushed into the world, rather it is:

“the inhalation into oneself of a fundamentally other environment” (Ibid., p.327).
This is the cession: the cry that slips out and Lacan indicates that if anxiety is a signal of potential danger there can be none greater than being “literally choked, suffocated” (Ibid.).

Lacan points out that this originative anxiety differs from that associated with the drive objects (oral, anal, scopic and invocatory) as even at the “first level” of the oral stage there is subjective choice:

“In the main, it's not true that the child is weaned. He weans himself. He detaches himself from the breast, he plays” (Ibid.).

So Lacan sees the infant's lack of autonomy expressed in their new-born cry as a distinguishing characteristic of this “originative anxiety” (Ibid., p.326). He also notes that the refusal of the breast and the gulping of air instead of milk at weaning is only possible if this template has been experienced:

“If there weren’t already present something active enough for us to be able to articulate it in the sense of a desire for weaning, how could we even conceive of the very primitive facts, which are quite primordial in their appearance, of the refusal of the breast” (Ibid., p.327).

Lacan considers an orientation of orality as more primitive than anal, scopic or invocatory:

“this first object that we call the breast stands short of a full bond with the Other. This is why I've been strongly accentuating how this bond lies closer to the neo-natal subject” (Ibid., p.328).

If the cry is the neo-natal template for the breast as object then the template for the anal object is:

“the peculiar little object that accompanies the child's appearance - the meconium” (Ibid.).

It is one particular property of the anal object that distinguishes it from the oral object: a cession of the object can be effected from the subject:

“It's only at the second level, with the incidence of the Other's demand, that something is detached properly speaking” (Ibid., pp.325-328).

What is at stake is not the object that comes to represent the lack, or the autonomy of the subject but rather, that the detachable nature of the anal object allows for the subject’s lack to be represented:

“it has to do with an object that has been chosen for its quality of being especially yieldable, of being originally a ceded object, and it has to do with a subject who is to be constituted in his function of being represented by a, a function that shall remain essential to the end” (Ibid., p.329).

The researcher notes that the expelling of the first cry and meconium are physical experiences prior to the development of language. How these are subjectively inscribed, recorded and recalled is as affect and if symbolized it is at the level of lalangue (pp.60-61).
A reading of *Seminar X* (1962) and its examination of anxiety informed this study. The object $a$ is the focus of *Seminar X* and Lacan aligns desire and anxiety with the cession (letting go) of the object. He presents a case of an adolescent boy which testifies to the correlation between anxiety and the surrendering of the object by the subject. The case presents a boy, who at the moment of handing up an exam paper, ejaculated. Lacan tells us that the boy experienced the submission of the paper as his object being ripped from him. The boy also described this as the pinnacle of anxiety he experienced around what other people expected of him. The researcher situates this moment as “Embarrass” or ‘Embarrassment’, the top right antipode and the position of least movement (detumescence) and most difficulty on Lacan’s chart of anxiety:

![Anxiety Chart](Lacan. 1962, p.77)

The bottom left antipode of the chart, which is the position of least difficulty and most movement was named “Émoi” or “Turmoil” by Lacan. He elaborated on this in the beginning of the seminar and included another signifier here; “émeute” or “to riot” (Lacan, 1962, p.13). Lacan’s addition of the signifier “riot” expresses a particular characteristic that “turmoil” does not. The researcher notes that when someone riots it is against another whereas turmoil is closer to an intra-psychical experience.

The signifier “émeute” (riot) conjured up notions of both subversion and violence for the researcher who was reminded of the narratives of the psychopathic subject’s from the literature. In the next chapter the researcher presents these narratives (Biagi-Chai, 2012; De Ganck, 2014).
Before Lacan had even conceived of the object $a$, Freud stated that the sexual object is not what is essential in the operation of the sexual drive:

“What is essential and constant in the drive is not the object but something else” (Freud, 1905a, p.149).

This “something else” that is essential in the operation of the drive is the absence that compels the subject to install an object in the first place. The psychical apparatus, which is employed to discharge drive energies and to gain satisfaction, (mis)interprets the absence or void as a lack that ought to be filled. It begins representations however each object it chooses to fill the void is unsuitable for the task. There is therefore a misrecognition which heralds the entry of the subject into the circuit of desire, a circuit which always has a remainder - a too much or too little.

It also follows that if the object is not “essential”, then the drive could be independent of an object. Lacan elaborated on this with his concept of the lamella (Section 3.3 - Primordial versions of the object $a$) and the researcher considers the theoretical importance of a drive that precedes the partial drives in Section 7.4 - Primitive drive orientation.

Prior to Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959) Lacan theorized that the subject was determined by the signifier alone. In Seminar VII he redressed his theory of the subject, and via the concept of das ding (a “thing” or object beyond signification), he presents the subject in his/her non-replicative singularity. Lacan used das ding to examine the intersection of the drive and the object. He considered das ding as the object that might ideally fill the absence or void. He also however recognized the impossibility of this happening as the void, the lamella and das ding are in the register of the real. Thus for Lacan, each of these remain outside any possible representation making any attempt to symbolically represent them, destined to failure.

The notation ‘$a$’ in ‘object $a$’ functions as does an ‘$x$’ in algebraic notation. It allows the signification of this impossibility and three aspects of subjectivity are addressed via the concept:

(i) No object can bring harmony between the subject and the drive
(ii) The real insists and repeats
(iii) The symbolic, being of the nature of semblance, gives us only the belief that we are sufficiently protected from the real.
Prior to phallicisation the subject (of-jouissance) operates as if there is no absence (disavowal/denial) and so it is only when the phallic phase is negotiated that the object is revealed as lacking and the circuit of desire may be entered.

The object $a$ is situated where das ding meets the drive at the limit of language and the symbolic. It does not herald a rapport between the lack and an object that could ideally fill it. Instead object $a$ represents the too-much or too-little that perpetuates the ever-changing circuit of desire. The repercussion is that there can be no generalizable or universal object relation that would bring harmony for the subject or a normative relation to the social.
In this chapter the researcher has given an overview of the literature from two primary theorists, Freud and Lacan on psychical structure as it applies to psychopathy. The researcher placed emphasis on the structures of psychosis and perversion rather than neurosis and he proposed that Freud’s writings on criminality and Lacan’s structural indicators for psychosis most closely align with both current psychoanalytic thinking (Chapter 4 - Since Lacan), and the researcher’s understanding of psychopathy (Chapter 8 - Findings & Chapter 9 - Discussion).

This chapter has identified significant markers for psychopathy:

1. The relationship between aggression and the social bond for the psychopath.
2. The Real as presented in the crimes committed by the psychopath.
3. The precarious installation of subjective responsibility for the psychopath.
4. The difference between criminals who get caught from a sense of guilt and psychopathic criminals who are guilt-free.
5. The ‘criminogenic’ object closely aligns with the oral drive (incorporation/repulsion).
6. The relationship between perversion, psychosis and psychopathy.
7. The psychopath may subvert the law as a way to stabilise an underlying psychotic structure.
8. The psychopath identifies at the imaginary level and this has subjective implications.
9. The psychopath does not experience delusions but other indicators of psychosis are present.
10. The signifier of the Name-of-the-Father and the link with the social bond remains absent in psychopathy understood as an “ordinary” psychosis.
11. The psychopath is situated in a temporality that seems beyond their effect.
12. There are shared characteristics between psychopathy (ordinary psychosis) and schizophrenia (delusional psychosis).

In chapter four the work of the psychoanalytic community since Lacan is examined with a focus on present day Lacanian structural theory.
“Not every stool has four legs. There are some that stand upright on three” (Lacan, 1955, p. 188).

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the psychoanalytic work on structure as it relates to psychopathy since Lacan. Just as chapter two discussed relevant aspects of the theory of psychopathy in the fields of psychiatry, criminology, evolutionary psychology, genetics, neurology, and sociology and chapter three outlined Freud and Lacans’ positions, so this chapter examines psychoanalytic theorists’ understandings of psychopathy since Lacan. The writings detailed in this chapter relate to the theory that has become known as ‘late Lacan’ (from Seminar X in 1962). The researcher frames this epoch historically and charts the evolution of a new structural category, ‘ordinary psychosis’. The implications for the praxis (theory in practice) of psychoanalysis are chronicled and the researcher’s position in relation to psychopathy prior to data collection is stated. The work of Vanheule (2003, 2009, 2011), Miller (2009, 2011a), Biagi-Chai (2012, 2015), Guéguen (2010), De Ganck (2014), Willemsen & Verhaeghe (2009) and Swales (2011, 2012) are introduced in this chapter.
4.2 FRAMING ‘LATE LACAN’

In Section 2.4 - The Name-of-the-Father the researcher demonstrated how Lacan connected psychosis and psychopathy when he portrayed “psychotic sons” as having “psychopathic personality subversion” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.189). In The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective Vanheule proposes that Lacan’s work on psychosis can best be framed in terms of four eras or broad periods (Vanheule, 2011, p.2). For Vanheule the first period, ‘The Age of Imaginary Identification’ took place before 1950 and focused on identification. Lacan’s works before 1950 included his doctoral thesis on the case of a paranoiac patient, Aimée (1932) and his paper Presentation on Psychical Causality (1947). In this period Lacan proposed that psychosis is characterized by:

“an identificatory structure… in which the ego is captured by an ideal image” (Ibid.).

The second period Vanheule identifies, ‘The Age of the Signifier’ spans the 1950’s in which Lacan concentrates on language. In this era Lacan proposed that psychosis is marked by a deficiency in the ability to metaphorise. Lacan’s works in this period were Seminar III: The Psychoses and On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, which included his structural analysis of Schreber’s autobiography as described in Section 3.3 - The Name-of-the-Father is missing.

The third period identified by Vanheule, ‘The Age of the Object a’ begins during Lacan’s seminar on anxiety, Seminar X (1962-1963). Lacan’s focus in this period is around the psychotic’s experience of their body, its associated drives and their inability to capture this in language. Lacan outlines the concepts of ‘jouissance’ and the ‘object a’ in this seminar and distinguishes the psychotic’s experience from that of neurotics and perverse subjects (Section 3.3 - Lacan and the object a).


Vanheule’s framing of Lacan’s opus into four distinct periods has been used by Lacanian psychoanalysts since the book’s publication in 2011. One of these, Rowan, associates the third period outlined by Vanheule with a theoretical shift away from the Name-of-the-Father as structural determinate and recognises that Lacan now considered the psychotic subject’s way of coping with jouissance as:

“mediated differently as object a does not get attributed to the Other but remains attached to, or within the subject” (Rowan, 2012, p.105).
According to Rowan, Lacan’s examination of The Ravishing of Lol Valerie Stein (Duras, 1964) in this period underscores his appreciation that the subject’s entry into the social bond allows for a more successful mediation of jouissance:

“How the psychotic subject can find ways to be in the social bond in ways that successfully mediate a jouissance that other-wise might be experienced as a senseless ravaging force” (Ibid.).

With regard to Lacan’s fourth period, Rowan accents the principle feature: that there is a jouissance contained in the act of speaking itself and not just in the symbolic value of the spoken words:

“In the fourth period Lacan addresses speaking as not purely symbolic or communicative but as itself carrying within it jouissance. These “enjoyed fragments of the Real” in speech are particular to each subject and Lacan calls these lalangue and indicates that these inform each subject’s mode of enjoyment in their life or “jouissance programme” (Ibid., p.106).

The principles from Lacan’s third and fourth periods have been re-worked by psychoanalysis in the last fifteen years (Miller, 1998, 2009), aiding a shift in the theoretical understanding of psychosis.

By framing Lacanian work into distinct periods, Vanheule has greatly increased the psychoanalyst’s ability to situate what they say temporally within the opus of Lacan’s theory. For example: when a psychoanalyst speaks of the ‘late Lacan’, the listener may assume Lacan’s theoretical position to already include the theories such as (i) the unconscious is structured like a language, (ii) the signifier takes primacy over the signified, (iii) desire is the desire of the Other and (iv) the act of speaking (enunciation) contains its own jouissance outside the content of what is spoken.

Psychoanalysis re-considers aspects of the psychoanalytic experience or re-frames, to provoke or evoke members of the field at certain times, often when an impasse is met. One such impasse in Lacanian psychoanalysis was met at the turn of the twenty-first century around structure. Miller’s response and introduction of the signifier ‘ordinary psychosis’ to re-present it, is traced in the next section.
4.3 EXTRA-ORDINARY PSYCHOSIS

The term ‘ordinary psychosis’ was introduced by Miller in 1998 during a programme of research by the clinical section of the Freudian Field. The researcher considers an examination of Miller’s work on psychosis as crucial as other psychoanalytic theorists draw heavily upon it in their descriptions of both psychopathy (Biagi-Chai, 2015) and delusionless psychotic structures (Guéguen, 2010; Leader, 2011). Miller, Leader and Guéguen have since been criticised for their use of terms which distinguish delusion-less from delusion-ful psychoses. O’Donnell questions if new terms such as “quiet” (Leader, 2011) and “ordinary” (Miller, 1998) are required:

“So, it is unclear if introducing adjectives such as ‘quiet’ or ‘ordinary’ add anything. What do they distinguish? Between a period of being well and a period of being unwell? Between a psychotic break and a return to a more stabilised living? Do these distinctions require these new terms? Why would we not then require ‘quiet neurosis’, ‘ordinary perversion’?” (O’Donnell, 2012, p.56).

In Ordinary psychosis revisited (2009a) Miller clarified that ‘ordinary psychosis’ is a concept that existed prior to his placing a signifier on it:

“I gave a very sketchy definition, just to attract the various meanings, the various shades of meaning around the signifier” (Miller, 2009a, p.34).

The signifier became necessary when psychoanalysts met with “the rigid binary character of our clinic - Neurosis or Psychosis” (Ibid., p.35). Perversion is excluded from this operation as “true perverts don’t really analyse themselves” (Ibid.).

Analysands presented as neither neurotic nor perverse structurally, but the absence of delusion also ruled out a psychotic structure:

“In fact, ordinary psychosis was a way of introducing the excluded third, excluded by this binary construction, but at the same time relating it to the right hand side position” (Ibid., p.36).

For Miller, neurosis is “a very definite structure” that is easily distinguished from other structures by a trained psychoanalyst. When there is no evidence of neurosis, the structure is a “dissimulated psychosis” or a “veiled psychosis” (Ibid., p.37).

There are commonalities between all the structures and Miller identifies the Imaginary register as a phenomena common to “a future neurotic, a future normal, a future pervert and a future psychotic” (Ibid., p.38). The register of the Imaginary corresponds to Lacan’s mirror stage: a world that Miller says is a world of transitivism and confused subjective position. The driving force of this world is the:
“un-ordered desire of the mother toward the child-subject… a world of madness” (Ibid.).

All the structures must negotiate the mirror stage and Miller states that with this in mind, we are all “mad” to some degree. Order comes to this mad world via the symbolic register: with the introduction of the structuring Name-of-the-Father, the imaginary jouissance is “driven out”, “subtracted” and “evacuated” (Ibid.).

Miller returns to Lacan’s I-Schema (Figure 3.5) and notes that although the paternal metaphor is not functioning for Schreber, the delusional metaphor does arrange a liveable world. Lacan’s I-Schema presents the lack of the ‘Symbolic’, Name-of-the-Father (P₀) and the lack of the ‘Imaginary’, castrated phallus (Φ₀). Without a phallus to be negativized the jouissance cannot be extracted for the psychotic subject, leaving them overwhelmed. Miller positions Schreber’s delusion in the Symbolic register; albeit a private delusion which others cannot relate to. By equating the function of the delusional metaphor with that of the Name-of-the-Father, Miller altered the status of the Name-of-the-Father in Lacanian structural theory. No longer is there only ‘the’ Name-of-the-Father, a proper name, there are other elements that can order our psychical world in the same way:

“It is not the Name-of-the-Father, but it has the quality, the property of the Name-of-the-Father. And this is very useful for thinking about the fact that Schreber led an apparently normal life for fifty-one years” (Ibid., p.40).

In the case of Schreber’s, Miller suggests that ‘ordinary psychosis’ be used to signify his compensated structure up until fifty-one years of age: a psychosis that has not been triggered:

“The Name-of-the-Father substitutes itself for the desire of the mother, imposes its order on the desire of the mother, and what we call the predicate of the Name-of-the-Father is an element which is a kind of make-believe of the Name-of-the-Father, a Compensatory Make-Believe of the Name-of-the-Father - the CMB” (Ibid.).

Miller’s signifier comes to function in case formulations when the analyst does not recognise the well-defined elements of a neurosis or the extra-ordinary phenomena of psychosis. The psychoanalyst may then say it is a psychosis, but “not a self-evident psychosis, it’s a hidden psychosis” (Ibid., p.41).

Miller praises Fink’s translation of the French word désordre as ‘disturbance’ in On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis:

“a disturbance that occurs at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life” (Lacan, 1955a [2006], p.466 [558]).

It is the localisation of this ‘disturbance’ in ordinary psychosis which is problematic. In hysteria the disturbance is in relation to the subject’s body and in the obsessional the disturbance is in relation to his ideas. Miller asks what the disturbance might be in relation to for the ordinary psychotic, and he
examines this using ‘a threefold externality’ (three ways a psychotic might experience the ‘disturbance’):

“a social externality, a bodily externality and a subjective externality” (Miller, 2009a, p.42).

‘Social externality’ refers to a subject’s identification with their function in society such as a career or profession. A negative identification might manifest in a subject who is unable to function in society:

“when you observe what I called débranchement, 'disconnection', you sometimes see the subject going from social disconnection to social disconnection - disconnecting from the business world, disconnecting from the family, etc. - which is a trip made frequently by schizophrenics” (Ibid.).

Miller compares social disconnection in ordinary psychosis to schizophrenia and he warns against the use of ordinary psychosis as a catch-all category or a refuge for not knowing ('asile de l'ignorance'). The structural category of ordinary psychosis does not therefore remove the analyst’s work of classifying the psychosis in regard to how it would look should it be triggered:

“Once you've said it's an ordinary psychosis, try to classify it in a classical psychiatric way” (Ibid.).

As regards social identification in the ordinary psychotic, Miller also proposes that an overly positive identification can be just as telling as a negative one:

“when they invest too much in their job, in their social position, when they have an over-intense identification with it” (Ibid.).

Where a job functions for the subject as the ‘Compensated-Make-Believe’ (CMB) Name-of-the-Father; it’s loss may trigger a psychosis. Miller states that having a job in today’s society has an extreme symbolic value and that subjects are “being appointed to a function, of être nommé-à” (Ibid., p.43).

The researcher’s investigation of the particularity of psychopathy within Lacanian structural theory demanded an examination of a psychopathic subject’s relation to the Other, including the law-giving Other. In psychopathy, as in all the psychoses, social relations are problematic and the researcher identified a correlation between the psychopath’s uneasy relation to authority as detailed in the literature and the disturbances Miller sees ordinary psychotics experience in relation to their function or role in society.

The second externality offered by Miller is ‘bodily externality’. In Section 3.3 - Primordial versions of the object a the researcher presented the psychotic’s fragmented experience of his body. Miller demonstrates that the ordinary psychotic may find a solution to this real fragmentation in the Imaginary/Symbolic registers:
“The inmost disturbance is a gap [décalage] where the body is un-wedged… where the subject is led to invent some artificial bond to re-appropriate his body” (Ibid.).

Some ordinary psychotics use tattoos or body piercings to create this artificial bond, as a CMB Name-of-the-Father. Hysterics may have a similar experience of fragmentation in relation to their bodies however the ordinary psychotic’s relation has a particular tone of the infinite that exceeds that of hysteria which “is constrained by the limits of neurosis” (Ibid.).

The third of the externalities Miller discusses is ‘subjective externality’: a disturbance for the ordinary psychotic that concerns an experience of emptiness and the void. Miller notes that the peculiarity of the emptiness experienced in ordinary psychosis is its “non-dialectisable quality” and the “fixity” or certainty of this void. This disturbance may take the form of a fixed identification with the object a as waste. The clue that the structure is ordinary psychosis is the absence of metaphorisation around this identification - the subject is not ‘like’ faeces, they ‘are’ the faeces:

“The identification that is not symbolic but real because it is without metaphor” (Ibid., p.44).

Without metaphorisation to provide a scaffolding, the identifications of ordinary psychotics come to be constructed with “bits and pieces”, lacking integration or a sense of wholeness.

Distinguishing a neurosis from a psychosis is crucial to the Lacanian clinic and Miller lists the criteria for neurosis:

- you need a relationship to the Name-of-the-Father - not a Name-of-the-Father
- you need some proof of minus phi (\(\varphi\))
- some proof of a relation to castration
- impotence and impossibility
- you need a clear-cut differentiation between ego and id or between signifiers and drives
- you need a clearly delineated superego.

If these signs are not present “you don't have a neurosis you have something else” (Ibid., p.45). The Name-of-the-Father here may be considered as a “well fitting” delusion. Other delusions may not fit as well but may function none the less (Ibid., p.46). There are also psychoses that will never be triggered according to Miller and all these variations and shades mean it is a “clinic of tonality” (Ibid., p.48). The tone or ‘coloration’ of the ordinary psychotic’s presentation is determined by the compensatory manner in which subjects protect him or herself from the real void and a psychotic break. The ‘Compensated-Make-Believe’ (CMB) Name-of-the-Father referred to by Miller has recently been re-examined by Biagi-Chai under the signifier of suppletion and in contrast to the sinthome.
4.4 PSYCHOTIC SOLUTION: SUPPLETION OR SINTHOME

In her paper, *Sinthome or suppletion as responses to the void* (2015) Biagi-Chai distinguishes between two terms which she notes have been used interchangeably to describe the psychotic’s solution: sinthome and suppletion. Both of these place limits on the psychotic subject’s experience of jouissance. For non-psychotics, language and the effect of the signifier “allows for a condensation of jouissance” (Biagi-Chai, 2015, p.77), but the psychotic has problematic relationship to language (*Section 3.3 - The Name-of-the-Father is missing*). In the next section the researcher highlights the psychopathic subject’s inability to use metaphor and he marks the problematic relationship to language as a shared feature of psychopathy and psychosis. In the absence of the condensating effect on jouissance of the signifier the psychotic/psychopath must find an alternative way to curtail their jouissance.

Neurotics also have recourse to the fantasy as a suppletion to localise or limit their jouissance. Biagi-Chai however notes that the fantasy is never a permanent subjective solution which can only be achieved in neurosis via phallicisation:

> “the father, through his act, gives to the child the possibility of detaching himself from the fantasy as death drive, by indicating sufficiently to the child his libidinal link with the mother” (Ibid., p.78).

In phobia too, a suppletion takes a particular form as evidenced by Freud’s case, *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy* (1909):.

> “In falling, the horse joins together “potency” and “fall” and takes on the value of a suppletion of the Name-of-the-Father, under the form of a signifier” (Ibid., p.79).

Biagi-Chai recognises that the phobic subject has recourse to an imaginary signifier that:

> “can take on the consistency of the object, which anguishes and puts a stop” (Ibid.).

Although psychotic subjects lack a fantasy that can mediate the desire of the Other and their jouissance, Lacan saw a possible solution for the psychotic in compensatory imaginary identifications:

> “a series of purely conformist identifications with characters who will give him the feeling for what one has to do to be a man” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.190).

Biagi-Chai names these identifications “imaginary crutches” and describes how an idealised image comes to cover over the void (Biagi-Chai, 2015, p.80).

She re-visits Lacan’s case of the psychologist, Joseph Hessler which she says can be read as a case of ordinary psychosis. In the absence of a psychotic solution (delusion), or any neurotic suppletion
(fantasy), Biagi-Chai sees that the personality dominates and she describes Hessler as having “a peculiar personality” (Ibid., p.81).

In his 2010 paper, *On the Nature of Semblants* Miller proposes the term “coloration” be used when describing a “compensated psychosis”. Biagi-Chai echoes Miller and considers that the compensation may take the form of a proper name, a signifier that can come to define the subject:

> “His being will respond to the article which defines him, represented by the $S_1$ which names, which “colours” his jouissance, the object caught in the fibre is characterised by not being able to be extracted” (Ibid., pp.81-82).

The sinthome, on the otherhand does not relate to the signifier. Instead it relates to the object $a$ and employs a “savoir-faire” or talent:

> “the creative dimension which is going to supply, to compensate “exactly for the Name-of-the-Father” (Ibid., p.82).

It is an exact compensation for the Name-of-the-Father and creates a fourth knot to bind the three registers of Imaginary, Symbolic and Real which threaten to come undone for the psychotic subject:

> “This fourth knot comes in the place of objet a as a condenser of jouissance. It is a string, a circle around the void, the void of objet a” (Ibid.).

The sinthome is represented by the fourth, darkest ring in the Borromean knot (*Figure 4.1 - Borromean knot with fourth ring*):

![Borromean knot with fourth ring](image)

**FIGURE 4.1 BORROMEO N KNOT WITH FOURTH RING**

Unlike suppletions which are only ever temporary, the sinthome is stable and once this knotting takes place it cannot be undone.

Lacan considered the writings of James Joyce (1882 -1941), the twentieth century novelist and poet to be a synthomatic solution for his psychosis. The emblematic Joycean work in this respect is *Finnegans*
Wake (Joyce, 1939) which is a mixture of stream of consciousness, allusion and pun. According to Lacan, Joyce was able via his sinthome, to be a heretic of the Name-of-the-Father but also paradoxically submit this heresy to the Other. Biagi-Chai notes that the only way to produce the sinthome is through the Other (Ibid., p.84).

In psychopathy and in all the psychoses entry into the social bond is problematic. Lacan revealed that Joyce’s ability to navigate his entry into a mechanism of exchange is an essential element for his sinthomatic solution:

“There is a problem of transmission in the “sinthomatic” solution. Joyce enters into the world of exchange hoping to puzzle academics for three generations. He leave the hic et nunc [here and now] of immediate reparation, he goes beyond: his object is yieldable by becoming an object of transmission” (Ibid.).

The delayed gratification demonstrated in Joyce’s hope to puzzle future academics, represents a functioning future-anterior tense (Section 1.2 - Background and Rationale, p.8). The puzzle that Joyce’s conversation with the world represents is exemplified in the image below: an extract from Finnegans Wake (Joyce, 1939) when a word processor’s spellchecker is used.
Lacan identified that for Joyce the invocatory drive (the voice):

“allows the drive to circle the void, to pass through the Other before returning to the subject, who thus obtains a reflexive trajectory” (Ibid., p.85).

Through the use of onomatopoeic words and by relying on their combination of musicality and incomprehensibility the voice is heard to take on an object-value. This is at the level of lalangue and not language:

“It is because we are in the register of the object and of the work on lalangue that we can say that there is truly a “sinthome”” (Ibid.).

Another vital part of Joyce’s solution is his relationship with Nora, his wife. A husband, wife or partner can play a significant role in the symptomatic expression of a subject’s structure. The researcher considers that Nora (like Schreber’s wife) was implicated in the expression of Joyce’s jouissance and allowed him to signify his lack along the Imaginary axis (Figure 3.5 - Lacan’s I-Schema & Section 3.3 - The Name-of-the-Father is missing).

In the next section the researcher examines a case of psychosis from Biagi-Chai’s 2012 book on the French serial killer, Landru. Her theory is that those labelled ‘narcissistic pervert’ or ‘psychopath’ do not always enjoy what they do, and that in some cases even though there is an outward appearance of normality, these subject’s exist in a ‘neo-reality’:

“a reality reconfigured according to the subject’s anomalous attribution of meaning” (Biagi-Chai, 2012, p.7).
In *Serial Killers: Psychiatry, Criminology, Responsibility*, Biagi-Chai studies the case of Henri Désiré Landru (1869-1922), a French serial killer which came to light in 1919. Biagi-Chai details how Landru seduced women and stole their money before killing them and burning the bodies. Landru was convicted on eleven counts of murder and executed by guillotine in 1922. Biagi-Chai formulates this as a case of psychosis and considers it with regard to the complex judicial and psychoanalytic concepts of criminality and “response-ability” (Voruz, 2012).

Biagi-Chai considers the Oedipus complex as a moment in which the child understands something of the tie between their father and mother. For the psychotic however this is an “untied knot”. Biagi-Chai proposes that Landru’s father became a persecutory other Landru as a consequence of the “complete fusion in delusional jouissance” he experienced with his mother (Biagi-Chai, 2012, p.96). Biagi-Chai here understands psychotic structure not only as a foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father but also as a deficit or lack in the subject’s psychical representation of his father and mothers’ bond:

“The absence of knotting is what, for Landru, radically separated father and mother and had repercussions in the life of the subject…. Landru was the man of exception” (Ibid.).

She observes that Landru’s father came to represent the template of a threatening other for all his subsequent relations with authority figures and also that Landru responded to these threats:

“A sly, covert war was constantly being waged” (Ibid.).

Lacan attributed “psychopathic personality subversions” to a son’s identification with this type with father, whom he named “social monsters” (*Section 2.4 - The Name-of-the-Father*, p.41).

Biagi-Chai is not alone in recognising the importance of the parent’s relationship in the formation of the subject’s psychical structure (Swales, 2012; De Ganck, 2014). Swales (2012) proposes that the way in which the care-giving (maternal) Other speaks of the law-giving (paternal) Other may have repercussions for the child’s structure, particularly in the case of perversion:

“In such cases... the mOther, with her child as audience, persistently pokes fun at the authority of the father, revealing the emptiness beneath the surface of its tricks.... The Law of the father is demonstrated to be insubstantial in the face of the mOther's whims.... the lawgiving Other is found to be seriously lacking in credibility” (Ibid., p.63).

For the perverse subject the result is that the Name-of-the-Father is disavowed and the Symbolic register is precariously installed. The psychotic subject on the other hand forecloses on the Name-of-the-Father and something else must replace the metaphoric paternal function (e.g. a delusion). Biagi-Chai situates psychopathy structurally as a psychosis and states that diagnoses such as narcissistic perversion:
“often conceal an underlying psychotic personality structure the mental processes of which are similar to those in the major psychotic disorders” (Ibid., p.7).

Biagi-Chai also recognises that delusions are not all or nothing phenomena and can manifest to degree:

“But this freedom can take on 1,001 forms; as many forms as there are subjects. It can be barely perceptible, a mere mild peculiarity, justified as a likeable extravagance, or masked by a very thorough conformism” (Ibid., p.24).

The researcher recognises some indicators from the case of Landru that may be generalizable to psychosis and more specifically to psychopathy:

i. Obfuscution
Biagi-Chai describes how Landru was able to dupe the expert witnesses in his trial via “circumlocution” and a particular quality of his speech that seemed to develop endlessly (Ibid., p.122). The researcher notes a parallel here between the infinite dimension to Landru’s language and Lacan’s description of the creatures in Schreber’s delusion. In the last chapter the researcher presented Lacan’s theory that the “hole” or void is not empty and instead a continuous metonymy is employed in psychosis to compensate for the failure of the phallic metaphor (Section 3.3 - The Name-of-the-Father is missing, pp.69-70)

ii. Transitivism
Landru had a fiancée at the time of his trial in 1919, Fernande Segret and having examined their correspondence Biagi-Chai notes that Landru had an eroto-maniacal attachment to Segret that took a peculiar colouring in a transitivism. As outlined in the previous chapter, Lacan considered transitivism as a mode of subjective identification common to infantile relationships and psychosis (Section 3.3 - The Mirror, the ego and aggression). Biagi-Chai quotes from Landru’s letters to Segret in which the subjectivity becomes entangled between the two people and it becomes difficult to distinguish who is speaking (Ibid, p.131).

In her presentation of Landru’s case, Biagi-Chai also examines the concept of responsibility and recommends a collaborative process between psychoanalysis and the judicial system:

“Analysts can help the justice system, in that the subtlety and truth of the judgment would no longer solely concern itself with a conception of the act as separate from the subject, but also with the vacillations of his responsibility” (Ibid., p.182).

Psychoanalysis attempts to surmount what it considers a limiting approach to subjectivity when individuals are defined solely on the basis of symptomatic acts. The researcher concurs with Biagi-Chai who recommends a re-orientation toward the cause and sees that it may aid in the understanding
of subjective responsibility. Responsibility, when understood as not reneging on one’s desire, takes on its rightful gravitas which Lacan put across in a statement in *Science and Truth* (1965 [2006]):

“One is always responsible for one’s position as a subject” (Lacan, 1965 [2006], p.729 [858]).

If a piece of legislation is in conflict with one’s desire, the rules must be broken. A crime may have been committed in the eyes of the state but the refusal to renego on one’s desire acts as subjective justification for the actions taken and removes any sense of guilt.

In her 2012 paper *Crime and Responsibility* Voruz, Biagi-Chai’s translator, examines what it is to be ‘responsible’. She confronts the reader with a neologism that best illustrates the nature of subjective responsibility from a Lacanian standpoint. The signifier is “response-ability” and by adding the hyphen, Voruz cuts the word in two. The homophones of ‘responsibility’ and ‘response-ability’ now both convey a meaning and a question: *Can the subject be held responsible if he does not have the ability to respond?*

Miller defines responsibility as “the possibility of answering for oneself” and notes that the subject’s ability to respond may be helped or hindered by society (Miller, 2011b). Biagi-Chai echoes this by placing a share of ‘responsibility’ not just on the criminals but also on society:

“By the same token, the judgment of psychotic subjects allows us to take the measure of the place granted by a given society to madness in general, the reception that it gives to those who are different, the way in which it participates in the prevention of the worst, which is also its share of responsibility” (Biagi-Chai, 2012, p.183).

Biagi-Chai relates something of psychoanalysis’ unique understanding of responsibility in this context. She highlights that at a subjective level there is a responsibility not to renego on one’s desire:

“the bond between the subject and his symptom, his jouissance, his real” (Ibid.).

Freud too, offered no alibi to the subject and considered them responsible not only for their conscious thoughts, but also for their unconscious wishes and dreams:

“Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one’s dreams. What else is one to do with them” (Freud, 1925, p.132).

From Freud’s position, responsibility must include an attempt by the subject to approach their ‘unknown’, the unconscious motivations behind their actions: to seek the source or cause.

Responsibility is also related to jouissance and the subject’s particular mode of enjoying:

“So for psychoanalysis the concept of responsibility inextricably articulates the subject with his jouissance” (Biagi-Chai, 2012, p.184).

When signifiers like ‘psychopath’ and ‘pervert’ are used without consideration of their origin, it obscures the relationship between these forms of madness and the socio-economic conditions of the time. Biagi-Chai notes that Landru only began to murder after the outbreak of the First World War and that to understand the criminal we must also understand the times:
“knowledge about the criminal links up with knowledge about the whole of humanity” (Ibid., p.26).

Another possible benefit to the judicial system from an engagement with psychoanalysis is a more developed understanding of recidivism. Biagi-Chai offers that the psychoanalytic theory of repetition compulsion may be applicable to recidivism:

“Recidivism would then present itself not so much as something that must be debated urgently when release is being considered, but rather as an integral part of the subject's in-depth treatment” (Ibid., p.183).

She argues that the crimes of schizophrenic subjects have a tendency to be considered as either calculated or enjoyed by the perpetrator. She asks the reader to consider the crimes that do not sit in these categories: crimes in which the subject acts in obedience of some personal law. Biagi-Chai is opening up a theoretical space in which passages to the act by non-delusional subjects may be considered outside the psychopathic or perverse categories, as something else:

“In order to retrieve the category of psychosis for cases in which there is no apparent delusion, Biagi-Chai points to smaller, less noticeable signs of psychosis such as micro-delusions, personal signification, and neo-reality: something that looks like normality but is in fact profoundly reconfigured according to the subject’s personal law” (Voruz, 2012, p.8).

The proposed grading of the psychoses is not a new phenomenon in psychoanalysis and in the next section a ‘quiet’ variant of paranoia is described.
In chapter two the researcher introduced the work of the German psychiatrist, Ernst Krestchmer (1888-1964). The syndrome Krestchmer named “sensitive paranoia” and the diagnostic indicators he devised align closely to the non-delusional psychosis presented by Biagi-Chai:

“he described a mild form of paranoia where the “evil Other” is not so strongly defined as in the Kraepelinian paranoid delusion of persecution, but rather is insidious, and corresponds mainly to a sensation of being constantly observed” (Guéguen, 2010, p.3).

In *Who is mad and who is not? On Differential Diagnosis in Psychoanalysis*, Guéguen recognises that Krestchmer’s “sensitive paranoia” was:

“in opposition to Kraepelin’s belief that paranoia would in all cases sooner or later develop into a full fledged persecutionary delusional state” (Ibid.).

Krestchmer’s “abortive” form of the psychosis was not pro-dromal paranoia but rather an independent and mild form of paranoia that did not necessarily have to develop into a delusion. This “quiet” psychosis as Leader termed it (Leader, 2011) also has parallels with Miller’s “ordinary” psychosis (Miller, 1998).

The question of distinguishing pathological from non-pathological modes of enjoyment in society has been at the forefront of psychoanalytic thought since Freud published *Civilisation and it’s Discontents* (Freud, 1930). Lacanian psychoanalysts have in recent times met with a ‘modern’ subject and their associated symptomatology in the clinic. This has necessitated a reworking of both theory and technique. One of these ‘modern’ symptoms is ‘addiction’: a mediation of jouissance via substances:

“Psychoanalysis in modern times cannot afford not to question itself regarding its theory and technique because it is a well-known fact that the various addictions are an increasing problem worldwide, which in itself is a strong indication that addiction is related to a changing culture and thus to a change in the response of the human subject to their discontent in civilization. This discontent, and indeed the subject's response to it, has since Freud always been a concern for psychoanalysis” (Loose, 2011, p.2).

Miller emphasised the need for psychoanalysts to redress praxis when he presented the theme of the ninth congress of the World Association of Psychoanalysis in 2012:

“It will be a series specifically dedicated to the ‘aggiornamento’, as one says in Italian, to the bringing up to date of our analytic practice, its context, its conditions, its novel co-ordinates in the 21st Century, with the growth of what Freud called the discontents, and what Lacan deciphered as the dead-ends, of civilization” (Miller, 2012, p.1).
Like Freud, Lacan, Miller and Loose, Guéguen recognises society’s influence on the categorisation of subjects as either normative or pathological. He advances Foucault’s series of lectures on the “abnormal” as it exemplifies:

“the existing link between the state of a given society and what is considered to be within or beyond the limits of what can be socially tolerated” (Guéguen, 2010, p.4).

In this regard, the researcher considered if the increased interest in psychopathy over the last fifty years speaks to society’s inability to tolerate psychopathic traits.

Guéguen does not see toleration of difference as typical of the psychiatric clinic of the last fifty years and regards the development of the DSM as:

“an attempt to erase subjectivity in diagnosis in order to reduce discrepancies among practitioners” (Ibid., p.5).

This in his opinion, had the effect of suppressing both the psychiatrist’s judgement and the patient’s subjectivity and limiting the conversation between the two. It is this ‘death of language’ that then makes it:

“impossible to say anything about the phenomena outside of what is included in the scales” (Ibid.).

According to Guéguen, in this system a patient is no longer considered the one who suffers but instead is a “misfit to be “re-educated”” (Ibid.).

Guéguen next examines Lacan’s relationship to diagnostics and sees that:

“For him, phenomena are always language events: the signifying chain is made out of discrete elements which he calls, after Saussure, signifiers” (Ibid., p.6).

He references On a Question prior to any possible treatment of Psychosis and reminds the reader that Lacan recommends that psychosis should be:

“examined in relation to language impairments and disorders in communication” (Ibid.).

After Seminar XX (Lacan, 1972 [1999]), the symbolic is no longer the pre-eminent register for Lacan as each of the three registers has equivalence. The imaginary register now takes centre stage in Lacan’s work as even the object a is considered a semblant:

“On the other hand, from the last sessions of seminar 20/21 (though foreshadowed in Seminars 18 and 19), Lacan takes a new shift towards a clinic that no longer advocates for the preeminence of the Symbolic. He moves on to a clinic of semblants (which means that human beings can never totally separate the imaginary and the symbolic register, the object a being itself a semblant, namely, an imaginary part of the body, symbolically elevated in the fantasy to an equivalent of the real)” (Ibid., p.7).
Lacan’s work in this period is dominated by the ‘clinic of the knot’ but Guéguen notes that Lacan also re-evaluates the Name-of-the-Father in this period. Lacan was able to shift his perspective from the Name-of-the-Father as signifier to its operation as function and the Name-of-the-Father now came to be understood as a variable:

“It thus becomes one among several ways of ensuring a strong hold on what we call “reality”” (Ibid., p.8).

Via his introduction of the variable, Name[s]-of-the-Father, Lacan erases the normative aspect of psychoanalysis as the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father (psychosis) no longer precludes access to another one of the Name[s]-of-the-Father that can function in the same way.

Guéguen asserts that the late Lacan teaches us that there is not a diametrically opposed life drive and death drive but rather a continuum of subjective experiences of jouissance. These subjective modes of jouissance change with the times and Guéguen advances Miller’s recommendation that analysts no longer be traditionalists and that a clinic of irony be applied when the signifier ‘father’ is no longer “the only possible anchor for nomivation” (Ibid., p.9).

Guéguen offers a succinct and accurate definition of the sinthome:

“This Lacanian concept refers to a mixture of fantasy and symbolic, which is the closest the subject can get to the “pieces of real” he is fixated to” (Ibid.).

Lacan’s presentation of the sinthome meant that there was no longer a standard end of treatment to be aimed for. The end could be a particular and non-standard solution that would allow for a connection to the social bond (Ibid., pp.9-10). Alternately even the most normative negotiation of the castration and oedipal complexes were now considered to contain some ‘madness’ particular to the subject. As the paternal metaphor is a ‘not-all’, it always fails to some extent and as Miller outlined: we are all ‘mad’ (p.85):

“The identification to the symptom means that “we are all mad” in the sense that we are all different, all un-natural though still related through our common dependence on language, which informs our relation to the imaginary and the symbolic; never totally separated from others thanks to the mediation of language, but also never completely accomplishing the dream of achieved heterosexual, harmonious sexuality, and even less so that of the loving union” (Ibid., p.10).

The registers are not so easily delimited and distinguishing between waking and dreaming states may be difficult. Lacan refers to the parable of Chuang Tzu’s dream butterfly (Lacan, 1964 [1977], p.76) in Seminar XI in order to illustrate how the registers intersect: On waking from a dream of being a butterfly, Chuang Tzu questioned if he was a man waking from a dream of being a butterfly, or a
butterfly now dreaming of being a man. The registers operate similarly to Chuang Tzu’s conundrum and the experience of wholeness attained from the Mirror stage may here be considered a delusion, a méconnaissance or mis-recognition.

Guéguen has also charted the development of ordinary psychosis in Lacanian theory. He notes that Lacan had already considered the possibility of an un-triggered psychosis but that after Miller introduced ordinary psychosis as a category in 1998 there was an increase in “undecided diagnoses” particularly between 2004 and 2008. Miller addressed this “inflationary bubble” in his 2009 paper, *Ordinary Psychosis Revisited*. Guéguen states that originally ordinary psychosis was supposed to only concern some rare cases but that:

“consensus soon emerged that it was not rare to have to deal with an indeterminacy in the diagnosis of a case, even after lengthy preliminary interviews” (Guéguen, 2010, p.12).

In his 2009 paper Miller recommends a “negative differential approach” in the formulation of a case of ordinary psychosis:

“If it is not a neurosis then it is a psychosis” (Ibid., pp.13-14).

Importantly however, the neurotic is not considered free from the inconsistencies of subject formation. Instead the Other is always inconsistent and Miller indicates that the lack in the Other must be addressed by all subjects.

Lacan’s condensation and conflation of the homophones of vérité (truth) and variété (varity) into the neologism “varité” conveys something of the multiplicities of truth. Guéguen relates Miller’s theory that the particularity of subjective truth is determined by the knotting of body, language and image in the sinthomatic solution. The sinthome is therefore considered the closest to the real as one can get:

“Lacan will go as far as to declare that the sinthome is real because it is as close as one can get to the real, by means of a semblant that knots together body, language and image” (Ibid., p.15).

The sinthome can be approached from two sides:

1. A remainder of the treatment. What is left after jouissance has been washed in analytic work, an incurable excess.
2. A defence against the real and prevention against a triggering of psychosis.

Guéguen proposes that ordinary psychosis be regarded as a ‘natural’ sinthome:

“This invention, put together more or less solidly and acceptable by society, can be “natural” in spite of the elision of a “Name-of-the-Father”; we then consider the case to be a case of
The researcher here notes that if there is a stable sinthomatic solution presented by ordinary psychosis it does not follow that so many have been attending psychoanalytic clinics. The researcher considers the presentation of ordinary psychosis to be closer to a natural suppletion rather than sinthome. Guéguen recognises this aspect too as he explores the interpretative role of the analyst when working with ordinary psychosis. He presents a 2002 paper by Laurent in which the Witz (witterism) is offered as exemplar of the operation at stake in this interpretative role.

Laurent understands the wink as operating at two levels. On the first level there is a rupture or surprise created when there is an encounter between two registers that are usually kept apart. On the second level there is a libidinal surplus and a bodily effect of laughter and Laurent argues that the effect of the wink is due more to the libidinal surplus than to the surprise from the encounter of two opposed registers:

“Both are necessary, but the proof, the partaking of the logic of the assertion is only accepted if a libidinal satisfaction accompanies it. This type of Aufhebung that links together “mind” and “body”, signifying chain and drive, is absolutely specific to the psychoanalytic discourse” (Ibid., p.17).

Psychoanalysis has been witness to the Aufhebung (sublation) that surprises the subject in the encounter of the two non-connected fields of language and libido and its transformative effect on the subject. The subject is returned to ‘lalangue’ as:

“the enunciation cannot be separated from the statement” (Ibid.).

Just as a comedian needs an audience in order to transcend his ‘material’, the subject requires an analyst when making their interpretation:

“Just as with a stand-up comic who takes to the stage with his ‘material’ only to find that the most surprising and funniest moments happen when the routine moves away from this material. It is in the transferential relationship with the audience that the surprise may come but only if it is allowed for” (Mallon, 2014, p.5).  

Guéguen also examines analytic interpretations when working with ordinary psychosis and recommends caution as the effects of interpretations differ between structures:

“this type of interpretation that opens up the subject's division and the fall of identifications is risky in psychosis, especially when it is triggered, since it can unleash a limitless delusional production of signifiers ('the open cast unconscious') and, in particular, put the analyst in the place of the persecutor” (Guéguen, 2010, p.19).
Laurent also warns of the danger of wild interpretations and he outlines how the analyst should interpret when working with psychosis:

“On the one hand we accompany the taking charge of jouissance by language, (...) we install the Locus of the Other, we authorize the place that can enable translation (.....) The work of translation continues but, at the same time, we must know that what we are seeking to obtain is a stabilization, a homeostasis, a punctuation” (Laurent, 2009; cited in Guéguen, 2010, p.19).

With regard to analytic interpretation Miller advocates that the analyst firstly, establish a sound diagnosis and then chose an appropriate interpretation based on the particular analysand:

i. in the case of ordinary psychosis, it is more a diagnosis by elimination: Not neurosis, then it is psychosis.

ii. the kind of interpretation that is possible relies on the capacity of language to take charge of excessive jouissance.

Having determined that the analysand is non-neurotic the analyst should invite the analysand to speak on one or several of the “externalities” (Miller, 2009) that seem to indicate a weakness in the knot between the imaginary, the symbolic and the real so that they might signify something around the disturbance:

i. the goal of this operation is to obtain a stabilization.

ii. the end of analysis is when the subject can accept the impossible and be at peace with a final “this is what I am!”.

Finally, a sinthomatic solution will have been found by the analysand when the part of the jouissance that was previously unnameable comes to be represented symbolically (Guéguen, 2010, pp.19-20).

The question of where psychopathy might be situated in these structural categories: psychosis, ordinary psychosis or perversion, has been addressed by few psychoanalytic researchers. The psychoanalytic department in Ghent University have completed the most extensive work in this area but even here there are contradictory positions as will be outlined in the next two sections.
In her 2014 dissertation, De Ganck highlights society’s assumption that humanity is at risk from the “psychopath’s malevolent intentions” (De Ganck, 2014, p.132). Paradoxically however the participants in her study (juveniles with psychopathic tendencies) described feeling that they were the ones at risk from others they consider “fundamentally distrustful antagonists” (Ibid., p.155). De Ganck elaborates on the “enigmatic, incomprehensible and threatening other” spoken of in therapeutic sessions by her study participants, and she lists three commonalities in their descriptions: (i) the malignant other, (ii) the annoyingly different other and (iii) the taunting other (Ibid.)

(i) The malignant other
De Ganck puts forward three ways in which her participants saw other people as ‘malignant’.

(a) The first relates to other’s gaze which was perceived as ‘evil’ by her participants. In relation to this, Biagi-Chai describes how the gaze is experienced as persecutionary by psychotic subjects who are unable to interpret the desire of the Other (Section 4.4 - Psychotic solution: Suppletion or Sinthome).

(b) The second way that others are considered malignant is when they attempt to get close to the participants. These efforts to relate to the person were construed as having a ‘malevolent’ intent. De Ganck considers this to be due to “an inability to decode others motives” (Ibid., p.156).

(c) The third malignancy relates to societal laws and rules which her participants were mistrustful of. De Ganck reports that her participants did not believe that the rules of society acted as any protection or “safeguard” for those involved (Ibid.). They view laws and rules as attempts to deceive which is why they are mistrustful of those who represent them.

(ii) The annoyingly different other
De Ganck portrays her participants as having identified with an overtly masculine and aggressive ideal ego as a strategy employed “to transcend their experience of fear” (Ibid.). The danger in this identification is that any encounter which differs from this ideal: “proves to be threatening or frustrating…. [and] often results in aggression because the ego is threatened (Ibid., p.157).

(iii) The taunting other.
De Ganck’s participants related the experience of others who taunt or jeer them. They feel insulted and react with anger. She proposes that this is due to:
“the discrepancy that arises between the internal ideal self-image (or the ideal image of the (m)other) and narcissistic humiliation” (Baumeister, Smart & Boden 1996; cited in De Ganck, 2014, p.157).

De Ganck outlines how her participant’s experiences of a ‘threatening other’ evolve from particular parent-child relationship patterns. The researcher links these relationship patterns to the work of Biagi-Chai (2012) and Swales (2011) that reveal the influence of familial relations on a subject’s structural formation. In Section 4.5 - Psychosis and the serial killer the researcher presented Biagi-Chai’s theory that one feature of psychosis is a deficit in the subject’s psychical representation of their father and mothers’ bond. In Section 7.3 - Structural indicators in relation to the object a the researcher traces Swales’ understanding of perverse structure in which she situates the operations of alienation (the law-giving Other prohibits jouissance) and separation (the care-giving Other expresses something of her lack and desire outside of the dualistic relationship with the child) within the economy of familial relationships.

De Ganck notes that although her participant’s initial description of home was as a refuge in a dangerous world, they would later give indications that contradicted this. These paradoxical descriptions of home were most prevalent when discussing their relationships to the paternal (law-giving) Other. On one hand the paternal other was described as ‘righteous’, ‘respectable’ and ‘intelligent’ but on the other they were also ‘gadabout’ (De Ganck, 2014 p.158). De Ganck states that the:

“identification with an aggressive ideal Ego is passed through via an identification with the image of the paternal other” (Ibid.).

The imaginary identifications De Ganck found in her study echo the “imaginary crutches” or psychotic suppletions described by Biagi-Chai (2015).

De Ganck details some strategies the participants from her study use to defend against a world, considered hostile and untrustworthy. They test other people’s reliability by observing how they use information that is put to them as confidential. They also attempt to show that the social fabric and rules are a pretense by challenging and subverting those who represent the law. They show there is no law that guarantees a person’s safety by inducing fear in others and when there are no repercussions from their actions they:

“seem to be able to traverse their own fears and emerge as a subject within the interpersonal scene” (Ibid., p.161).

The researcher recalls Lacan’s use of the descriptor, “psychopathic personality subversion” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.189) when speaking of psychotic sons (Section 2.4 - The Name-of-the-Father). The
researcher notes that the subject’s subversion of the law and its representatives is a feature common to both psychoanalytic and psychiatric understandings of psychopathy.

Another strategy De Ganck’s participants employed was to test for similarities with others. She found that any confrontation with otherness was experienced as threatening to her participants’ egos and therefore as a defence, the sameness or otherness of another person is tested:

“If the other acts according to their own ideal image, they conclude that the other is reliable. In this way, it often happens that friendships are formed through fights or committing crimes together” (De Ganck, 2014, p.161).

Finally, if other strategies fail sufficiently to protect their fragile ego, the participants attempted to destroy/nullify the Other. These attempts to destroy the Other reminded the researcher of Lacan’s use of the term émeute (riot) in relation to the anxiety chart (Section 3.3. - The beginning of the late Lacan) and how apt this term seems in relation to the violent outbursts common in the literature on psychopathy.

De Ganck detailed another way her participants tried to nullify the Other and their influence. She found that the young person would become a ‘lone wolf’: emotionally independent of anyone else. If someone gets too close they “radically end (love) relationships” (Ibid.). Similarly Item 17 on Hare’s PCL-R Check-list reflects the ‘adult’ psychopath’s inconsistency in relationships:

“Many short-term marital relationships - a lack of commitment to a long-term relationship reflected in inconsistent, un Dependable, and unreliable commitments in life, including marital” (Appendix A).

A positive therapeutic experience made possible:

De Ganck is optimistic with regard to treatment of those with psychopathic tendencies and proposes that a distancing from the subject’s identification with the paternal object encourages a non-violent way of being:

“My parents are dangerous, miss, especially my father. Give him a gun and he will shoot you. They don’t reflect on what they do. (…) The moment he put the knife into my mother’s back, I copied him. (…) But I’m not like my father (Max, session 16)” (Ibid., p.165).

She argues that the psychopath’s mistrust and an “underlying anxiety” need to be addressed if recidivism is to be reduced:

“Psychopathic behaviour should be understood as a (deficient) self-protective strategy of managing this fearful position. Most therapies focus on eliminating psychopathic features and reducing of the risk of recidivism. Indeed, the prevention of reoffending is undoubtedly important. However, we argue that this can only be successful if the underlying anxiety and distrust in these adolescents is addressed” (Ibid., p.166).
Conclusions with regard to Structure

De Ganck’s study is robust and her findings are well-considered and far reaching. However her study does not deal directly with structural considerations and she clearly states that the scope of her study leaves the question of structure or symptom unanswered:

“Questions that we had to leave unanswered within the scope of this dissertation include: ‘Is psychopathy a problem of an individual and/or is it a consequence of a certain zeitgeist and/or social context?’” (Ibid., p.139).

Although De Ganck describes Willemsen and Verhaeghes’ work (2009) in relation to the study design she does not respond to Willemsen’s proposal that the psychopathic defence mechanism of retraction is indicative of a fourth structure. De Ganck does however link the family history of one of her case studies, with the structure of psychosis:

“Indeed, no clear position can be attributed to either his mother or his father, and no stable law seems to determine their actions. This undermines the experience of the symbolic order and opens up the realm of the psychotic experience” (Ibid., p.139).

A lack in the symbolic structuring of her participant’s social world sees De Ganck consider:

“a possible relationship between psychopathy and an underlying psychotic functioning” (Ibid., p.234).

De Ganck links psychopathic behaviour in adolescents with anxiety whereas adult psychopathy has predominantly been considered to be without fear or anxiety. De Ganck’s postulation is borne out in the speech of her study participants and she is the only psychoanalytic theorist that the researcher has encountered who proposes anxiety as the germ of a psychopathic way of being:

“Moreover, based on our qualitative studies we venture to postulate that an underlying anxious position is at the heart of the emergence of psychopathic behaviour in adolescents” (Ibid., p.215).

De Ganck lists Biagi-Chai (2012) and Meloy (2001, 2014) as psychoanalysts who make a connection between psychosis and psychopathy and the researcher identifies that Meloy’s theory of the “stranger self-object” (Meloy, 2007) closely aligns with De Ganck’s “enigmatic, incomprehensible and threatening other” (Ibid., p.155). Meloy proposes that when the person was a child, he perceived his parents as being cold, uncaring, and likely to harm him. His introjected template for people (ego ideal) does not include attachment, empathy, or trust and without this, empathy, shame and remorse cannot develop (Meloy, 2007, pp.3-4). Willemsen and Verhaeghe (2009) propose an alternative relationship between psychopathy and Lacanian structure. Instead of psychosis and foreclosure, a fourth structure and associated defence mechanism are proposed. The researcher details these in the next section.
4.8 PSYCHOPATHY: A FOURTH STRUCTURE

The most recent psychoanalytically informed investigation of psychopathy with an adult population discovered by the researcher was conducted by Willemsen and Verhaeghe (2009) who argued that perversion and psychopathy are two distinguishable clinical diagnoses each with relevance for the forensic clinic.

They question the proposition that a perverse subject ‘enjoys their perversion’ and assert that the perverse are never more free by engaging in perverse actions. On the contrary, they are trapped with their desire fixed to a particular libidinal object. Willemsen and Verhaeghe propose that the perverse subject’s motives remain unconscious while they act only to reduce anxiety much like an addict ‘needs their next fix’. A compulsion to repeat becomes symptomatic for the perverse who perpetually attempt to reduce their anxiety but ultimately fail to represent the traumatic Real. They consider neurotic compulsions in kleptomania or pyromania to operate similarly to the perverse subject’s rigid compulsion in his sexual praxis.

Willemsen and Verhaeghe contrast the perverse subject’s “ethic of pleasure” with the psychopath’s symptom: one that is not guided by a fundamental fantasy or fixation on a particular libidinal object. They found no compulsion to repeat for the psychopath who commits a broad range of crimes that are not fixated on one type of victim: anyone can be abused usually based on the ease by which they can be manipulated.

Willemsen and Verhaeghe address the psychogenesis of perversion and psychopathy and set the scene in childhood with two protagonists, the mother and father. The perverse subject and psychopath are again contrasted. The perverse subject is described as having the father “reduced to a powerless observer defined as insignificant by the mother” with the result that “the pervert takes the law into his own hands” (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009, p.243).

Alternately, Willemsen and Verhaeghe state that the psychopath has a family constellation of “indulging mother - idealized father” and they reference Seminar III where the psychopath’s father is described as “le monster sacré” (the sacred monster). They see that the psychopath is presented with a template for the Law (paternal imago) based on violence and control rather than desire. The result is that the psychopath views an initial injustice perpetrated on them as a justification and an entitlement to be an exception to the law.
Willemsen and Verhaeghe also compare the defence mechanisms at work in perversion and psychopathy, beginning with the perverse subject who disavows:

“Through disavowal, the pervert adopts a double stance. He disavows the phallic lack (for himself and for the mother), while at the same time recognizing its existence (for the rest of the world in general and for the father in particular)” (Ibid., p.244).

Being able to simultaneously recognise the Law and yet not apply it to oneself, allows the perverse subject to position him or herself in relation to others in a manner that neurotics find unsettling: The masochist offers himself as the object of enjoyment for the other but only within the confines of a scenario in which he is the director.

The psychopath’s defence mechanism is named by Willemsen and Verhaeghe as retraction:

“It seems that the psychopath is caught in a double and contradictory movement: the movement in which he identifies with the Law will confront him with the illegitimate nature of the lack, and in order to correct this illegitimacy he has to break the Law and retract the lack (e.g. by stealing or swindling the object from the Other)” (Ibid., p.248).

The contradictory position the psychopath takes in relation to the Law is exemplified by Freud’s kettle logic. Freud relates the story of a man accused by his neighbour of having returned a kettle in a damaged condition. The accused man offered three defences to his neighbour:

i. That he had returned the kettle undamaged
ii. That it was already damaged when he borrowed it
iii. That he had never borrowed it in the first place.

The three arguments are inconsistent, and Freud notes that it would have been better if he had only used one (Freud, 1905b, p.62).

The accused man in Freud’s example was unable to recognise that each subsequent argument contradicted the one he had just made. Willemsen and Verhaeghe propose that the psychopath may similarly be seen to take up two or more contradictory positions at the same time:

“The psychopath will present his criminal action as a righteous one or even as a moral obligation. For instance one psychopathic drug dealer claimed that to him ‘dealing drugs was a matter of conscience’. He added that he was addressing the demands of the market, so he was right to do so. These statements are not just a posteriori justifications of behaviour. They testify to the psychopath’s a priori conviction that something illegitimate has happened to him and that he has the right, and even the obligation, to correct this initial injustice” (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009, p.248).
Finally and most relevant to this study are Willemsen and Verhaeghe’s findings around the psychopath’s use of language. From their interviews with psychopaths, Willemsen and Verhaeghe identify a quality in the speech of psychopaths that distinguish them from other structures:

“It appears that psychopaths frequently use retractors, i.e., a word, phrase, or clause which detracts from the statement preceding it” (Ibid., p.249).

Hare also recognises inconsistencies in the psychopath’s language and writes in Without Conscience:

“But there is something else about the speech of psychopaths that is equally puzzling: their frequent use of contradictory and logically inconsistent statements that usually escape detection” (Hare, 1993, p.125)

The extract below is from an interview with serial killer, Elmer Wayne Henley who was an accomplice of Dean Arnold Corll (1939-1973) or ‘The Candy Man’. Henley was given six life sentences and was implicated in the abduction, rape and murder of twenty-eight teenage boys between 1970 and 1973 in Houston, Texas:

“Interviewer: You make it out that you're the victim of a serial killer, but if you look at the record you're a serial killer…. Henley: I'm not a serial killer
Interviewer: You're saying you're not a serial killer now, but you've serially killed
Henley: Well, yeah, that's semantics” (Ibid., p.127).

In Lacanian theory, an understanding of how a subject comes to construct their world through language may allow the development of a thesis around the operations of the unconscious for that subject and how this is resolved in a structure. Swales (2011, 2102), Biagi-Chai (2015), Willemsen and Verhaeghe (2009), Guéguen (2010), Lacan (1955) and Freud (1911) all privilege the subject’s use of language as a clearer indication of their structure than an analysis of their actions.

The psychopathic subject’s use of contradictory statements and their ability to take up two inconsistent positions at once, indicate the operation of the defence mechanism of disavowal. Structurally this mechanism is aligned with perversion. However, the defence of disavowal does not always indicate a perverse structure as perverse traits have been recognised in both psychosis and neurosis (Swales, 2012, p.76). In the next section Swales examines perversion and the mechanism of disavowal.
Swales’ (2011, 2012) extensive work on the relationship of the object a to structure informed the researcher’s method of data analysis in this study. Swales situates perversion closer to desire than demand, and she found that the invocatory and scopic objects dominate in the perverse structure rather than the oral or anal objects. Swales indicates that the scopic drive dominates in exhibitionism and voyeurism while the invocatory drive dominates in sadism and masochism (Swales, 2012, p.158). She traces the circuit of need, demand and desire in her exposition of the structure of perversion.

Need
The breast as object a relates to the primary needs of the living being, sustenance:

“Need implies that there is a lack of something. The notion of lack is central to Lacan’s ontology of the human subject, and need might be considered the lowest “level” at which there is lack. Need requires its satiation, which is accomplished through the attainment of a specific object” (Swales, 2011, p.43).

Swales contrasts orality and its relation to need with the demand based drives “which refers to a need that has been translated into speech” (Ibid.).

Demand
A demand is a communication of the subject’s need to the Other and Swales situates it above the level of need:

“Need may be seen as the motivating force behind demand. Nevertheless, the needs of the living being become irrevocably altered by passing through the apparatus of language as well as through their dependency on the Other for their satisfaction. The notion of the Other is introduced at the level of demand, insofar as the child’s demand is addressed to an Other and is spoken in the Other of language (or in language as Other)” (Ibid., p.44).

The drive
As the Other is now in the subject’s considerations when communicating/speaking, a pleasure becomes associated not only with receiving the demanded object, but also in receiving the attention or a reply to their demand from the Other:

“Language can be said to effect an alienation of the living being, such that the needs of the living being are translated or even replaced by signifiers” (Ibid.).

It is not only the Other’s reply that is evident in the drive circuit, the Other’s demand also becomes intrinsically linked to the drive. A subject’s need at a bodily level (hunger) becomes related to the
Other’s demand (eat up). The subject interprets these demands in the formation of his/her drives which sets limits on jouissance and gives a satisfaction:

“The cuts of castration are formed through the child’s relation to the Other. The mOther makes demands that the child eat (oral zone), listen (aural zone), look (scopic zone), go to the bathroom (anal zone), and so on, and the child’s interpretation of these demands result in the formation of his drives” (Ibid., p.98).

In this study the researcher examined the dominant drive (Oral, Anal, Scopic, and Invocatory) in the speech of psychopathic subjects and, in line with Swales, distinguished variants of the structure on this basis (Swales 2011 & 2012).

With regard to the focus of this study, Swales makes a connection between sadism and psychopathy:

“Correspondingly, I propose that Psychopathy, as a somewhat personality-based diagnosis, is a diagnosis which closely resembles the Lacanian structure of sadistic perversion, and that the connection between the two warrant further study.... I hypothesize that, less frequently, psychopaths might be psychotically structured” (Swales, 2012, p.9).

Although Swales associates psychopathy with sadism she also notes that a psychotic structure may be present in psychopathy.
The aim of this study is to investigate any correlation between psychopathy and the psychical structures as outlined by Lacanian structural theory. Having read, reviewed and considered literature from Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, the researcher noted that both psychotic and perverse structures were considered applicable to psychopathy. He questioned if the subject’s relationship to the object a might best differentiate between structures: the identification of a fetishistic object would indicate perversion. In the next chapter, the researcher introduces the psychoanalytic methodology used in this study and explores how psychoanalysis positions itself in relation to research both historically and recently.
“No amount of ‘evidence’ or research will convince the un-amused that a joke is funny” (Phillips, 1993, p.xix).

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will describe the qualitative psychoanalytic research methodology utilised in the study. As there are many interpretations of the criteria required for a study to be called psychoanalytic, the position taken up by the researcher in this study will be articulated. The locus of this study with regard to psychoanalytic research will be the work of Freud and Lacan and the methodology advocated is a Lacanian psychoanalytic research supported by the works of Parker (2005), Fonagy (2000), Vanheule (2003, 2009, 2011), Verhaeghe (1999, 2004, 2009), Loose (2002), Miller (2009, 2011a), Moore (2012), Biagi-Chai (2012, 2015) and Swales (2011, 2012). The discovery and evolution of the psychoanalytic research method will be outlined and current debates in the field explored. The researcher’s orientation in relation to these debates will be asserted and the chapter investigates how this orientation informed the approach taken. The principles of the methodology will also be elaborated on and will illustrate why this methodology is appropriate to answer the research question: *Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?*
5.2 PSYCHOANALYTIC RESEARCH

DISCOVERY

In psychoanalytic theory a subject is understood to have motivations that are barred from their conscious awareness. In Section 1.2 - Background and Rationale the researcher highlighted how these motivations may find expression where the subject’s language fails: in slips of the tongue, bungled actions, dreams and symptoms. These formations of the unconscious join in the conversation and psychoanalytic research attributes meaning to these formations.

From Freud’s death in 1939 to the 1990’s, little consideration was paid to psychoanalysis as a scientific research methodology. However, in its infancy Freud distinguished psychoanalysis not only as a treatment but also as a method of investigation:

“Psycho-analysis is the name (1) of a procedure for investigating mental processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline” (Freud, 1923a, p.235).

The division of the mind into conscious and unconscious is central to psychoanalytic theory, therefore for a research project to be considered psychoanalytic, this division must be accounted for:

“Freud developed a theory of the mind that has come to dominate modern thought. His notions of the unconscious, of a mind divided against itself, of the meaningfulness of apparently meaningless activity, of the displacement and transference of feelings, of stages of psychosexual development, of the pervasiveness and importance of sexual motivation, as well as of much else, has helped shape modern consciousness” (Audi, 1999, p.331).

Each classification in Freud’s nosological system was arrived at by way of his psychoanalytic work with a particular patient, a case:

- Hysteria is represented by the Dora case - Fragment Of An Analysis Of A Case Of Hysteria, 1905
- Obsessional Neurosis by the Rat-man case - Notes Upon A Case Of Obsessional Neurosis, 1909
- Paranoia [Dementia Paranoïdes] by the Schreber case - Psycho-Analytic Notes On An Autobiographical Account Of A Case Of Paranoia, 1911.
Freud wrote and presented case histories to illustrate his theories, a qualitative approach. In relation to psychopathy, a classical Freudian perspective would consider it a character/narcissistic neurosis and as such was untreatable using a psychoanalytic technique. However, psychoanalysis is not stagnant and work conducted in the United Kingdom and Belgium over the last decade (Parker 2005, 2013; Vanheule 2003; 2009 and Verhaeghe 2003, 2009) illustrates how psychoanalytic treatment has evolved to incorporate modern manifestations of symptoms.

Freudian clinical concepts have not been abandoned and in keeping with Freud’s method, the present day psychoanalyst continues to recognise the formations of the unconscious in the analysand’s speech and actions. Having preliminarily formulated the pathogenesis or mechanism by which the analysand’s subjective position has been arrived at, the analyst then brings these formations of the unconscious to the attention of the analysand. It is then the analysand who provides an interpretation around the aetiology or cause of their subjective position. Similarly the psychoanalytic researcher, having brought the material to the reader’s attention, should encourage them to re-interpret their position in relation to the topic. Psychoanalytic research must allow for an interpretation by the reader, and not only the researcher, if it is to be true to the principles of psychoanalysis:

“the meaning of a text always resides on the side of the receiver. The meaning of the text is always my meaning” (Neill, 2013, p.337).

Recent psychoanalytically informed research studies recognise the importance of interpretation:

“A psychoanalytic session employs an interpretive method, seeking in the interview itself as well as afterward to interpret the multiple, sometimes conflicting meanings of the analysand's speech” (Swales, 2012, p.15).

Psychoanalytic interpretation has been aligned with hermeneutics in this respect however it is closer to “a hermeneutics of suspicion” (Habermas, 1972; cited in Swales, 2012, p.16) as there is always a remainder that remains inarticulable and evades us. Whether considered as structuralist or hermeneutic, Parker sees psychoanalytic interpretation as reflecting a shift of focus in ‘Western’ academia onto language:

“Both hermeneutic interpretations of psychoanalysis and structuralist readings, in turn, reflect a growing concern with language in Western academic life” (Parker, 1992, p.106).

Psychoanalysts for the most part have already situated interpretation as an art:

“Psychoanalysis has largely conceded that interpretation is an art and not a science and therefore psychoanalysts have been prepared to theorise issues like intuition, use of the analyst’s subjectivity, the role of emotion in thinking and the use of unconscious dynamics as a tool for knowledge” (Hollway, 2000, p.78).
A psychoanalytic methodology encorporates the elusiveness of meaning, the structural effect of language and the interpretative art of the analyst. Lacanian theory allows the researcher to position psychoanalytic work in a different register to the scientific discourse. The register of the Real in which the psychoanalyst works with that which evades us:

“We might say that analysis is a search for meaning that takes place entirely differently than hermeneutics. By bringing in the Real as referent for language, we will see how psychoanalysis makes absence, non-knowledge, the void, a function in the interpretation of meaning” (Watson, 2004, p.118).

Watson (2004) argues that the understanding aimed at by the hermeneutic is the hallmark of error for the psychoanalyst who has to suspend all understanding. Hermeneutics tries to place meaning in language, psychoanalysis places meaning in lack, at the limitation of language:

“A modern hermeneutics would have to be based on the impossibility to signify, which is precisely where psychoanalysis dwells” (Ibid., p.120).

Moore recognises that the gap between psychoanalysis and modern science is widening as both fields offer contrasting understandings when they are confronted with the impossibility of signifying everything:

“Meaning emerges from the impossibility, the limit of signification from a paradox where words fail and actions give us an account. Modern science fails by an error in belief, an illusion that everything can be understood and said. Indicating for psychoanalytic research not just speech but gaps, lacks and actions of the subject require analysis” (Moore, 2012, p.133).

This study’s methodology relies on the psychoanalytic principles of Freud and Lacan. The work of current psychoanalytic researchers demonstrates that a contemporary psychoanalytic methodology is viable and worthwhile (Vanheule, 2003; Parker, 2005; Verhaeghe, 2009; Willemsen, 2009; Swales, 2012; Moore, 2012; De Ganck, 2014).
In his aptly titled paper, *Grasping the Nettle*, Fonagy (2000) argues for the application of psychoanalytic principles to academic research and posits the potential benefits to both psychoanalysis and scientific research. He reasons that scientific researchers who choose to address the unconscious may find a new tool to provoke and aid fresh understanding in their readers, while psychoanalysts may find a means to move beyond the clinic in the development of theory, and in so doing, gain sophistication in their understanding of unconscious formations, the object of their study.

Psychoanalysis differs from conventional research methods and Fonagy identified some new ways researchers may consider data when it is applied:

(i) *Ambiguity as representative of the human condition*

Empirical science considers ambiguity in data as a hindrance to meaningful results. Psychoanalytic research offers another way to consider ambiguity. Psychoanalysis has discovered that it is not the accuracy of detail that facilitates understanding. Instead, understanding may be arrived at via the exploration of ambiguities met with in situations or our responses. Although considered a hindrance to understanding by empiricists, ambiguity may speak to us of the complexity of the human condition:

“In psychoanalysis, we accept that something has been understood when the discourse about it is inciting. Elusiveness and ambiguity are not only permissible, they may be critical in order accurately to depict the complexity of human experience” (Fonagy, 2000, p.3).

More recently, Swales re-emphasises that the avowal of ambiguity is necessary for accuracy when reflecting aspects of the human condition:

“Unlike other methods, which view ambiguity and inconsistency as problems to be eliminated, psychoanalysis embraces the complexities of discourse as accurate reflections of what is means to be human” (Swales, 2012, p.15).

Psychoanalytic theories may be considered as acts of imagination and man's unique ability to metaphorise is the key to expressing the ambiguous nature of his experience:

“This is not to say that the theories are not true, rather that they are metaphoric approximations at a subjective level of certain types of deeply unconscious internal experience” (Fonagy, 2000, p.3).

Phillips, in *On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored: Psychoanalytic Essays on the Unexamined Life* (Phillips, 1993), discriminates between the knowledge acquired from the reading of an evidence-
based paper and the understanding which psychoanalytic writers report possible through a reading of their works:

“There is an attempt to return the reader to his own thoughts whatever their majesty, to evoke by provocation. According to this way of doing it, thoroughness is not inciting. No amount of ‘evidence’ or research will convince the un-amused that a joke is funny” (Phillips, 1993, p.xix).

(ii) **Positivism versus Subjectivity**

To the critics of psychoanalysis who say that it is metaphoric and not positivistic Fonagy answers that:

“Science uses metaphor in the absence of detailed knowledge of the underlying process. Provided that metaphor is not confused with a full understanding, or to use Freud’s metaphor, the scaffolding is not mistaken for the building, heuristic considerations outweigh any disadvantages of their use” (Fonagy, 2000, p.4).

Subjectivity should not be disavowed in research if it to be considered psychoanalytic:

“We cannot be pre-Kantian objective observers. Our own discovery of the pervasiveness of countertransference denies us this possibility, even in principle” (Ibid.).

Fonagy also compares someone’s experience of the material world around them with the mental processes that are behind it:

“The representational world is the tune which the violins of mental processes generate” (Ibid.).

(iii) **Research methodology and societal trends**

Psychoanalysis has concentrated on the clinic as the arena from which theory may stem but Fonagy (2000) echoes Freud (1929) and highlights the dependence of theory generation on societal trends:

“History moves via its complex determinants, and psychoanalytic theory tracks along behind” (Ibid., p.5).

As the structures and institutions of society evolve, the research methodologies and theories track along behind also.

If there are to be advantages for researchers who may gain from psychoanalytic concepts, there are also potential gains for psychoanalysts who may come to use the researcher’s tools of measurement. For Fonagy, the payoff for psychoanalysts who engage in the systematic study of phenomena will be:

“Sophistication in the way psychoanalysts talk about remembering, imagining, speaking, thinking, dreaming and so on” (Ibid., p.6).
Even though Freud proposed psychoanalytic research, hostility exists towards those who engage in scientific research from within the psychoanalytic community. For example Green questions the inferences drawn from observations in the field:

“While the method of observing the facts is respectful of scientific methodology, the inferences are fictions” (Green, 2000, p.41).

Fonagy notes a resistance to research and the anxiety it provokes in sections of the psychoanalytic community who fear that a move away from the unconscious formations towards a behaviourist psychology will “undermine our concern with the internal world” (Fonagy, 2000, p.7).

The anxiety appears well-founded as other disciplines increasingly search to find an alternative behavioural or cognitive description for the origins of the formations of the unconscious. Reason exemplified this when he investigated slips of the tongue from both a cognitive and a dynamic perspective (Reason, 2000). He concluded that ‘some’ slips could be accounted for in terms of the mis-functioning of cognitive mechanism, stating that there was no need to investigate them in dynamic terms. Fonagy’s response to Reason was that this left many slips that could be accounted for by something else. He offered that one possible avenue for this investigation was the unconscious as put forward by Freud (Ibid.).

Fonagy gives a warning to psychoanalysts who do not want to engage with scientific research and who prefer to offer a subjective experience with self-awareness as the goal:

“Opting out of outcome research would change the future face of psychoanalysis” (Ibid., p.9).

Combining psychoanalytic principles with formal research methods is challenging. In the next section the researcher describes the process undertaken to finalise the methodology that would address the research question:

Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?
Psychoanalytic research preferences subjectivity, whether that of the researcher or of the participants and it was necessary for the study to reflect this. Furthermore considering the researcher’s immersion in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, a methodology which could investigate the unconscious, the psychopathic subject and the acquisition of their structure was required. The psychoanalytic research methodology chosen was dictated by the research question (*Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?*).

Several forms of discourse analysis were considered: Foucauldian, Critical, Dialogical, Ethno-linguistics and Narrative. These were rejected on the basis that they did not allow the researcher to access unconscious meaning in the data. The researcher settled on a psychoanalytic analysis of discourse which above all the others meet the objectives and aims of the study.

The process of searching for the most appropriate form of analysis began with a consideration of narrative analysis (Plummer, 2011). Plummer’s writing on narrative multiplicities and the subjective position of the author in research influenced the researcher’s decision to investigate this methodology. Plummer advocated a change of focus away from analysis to appreciation in research methodologies. Plummer’s approach introduced the researcher to the work of Thomas (1863-1947), the American sociologist and his, “Thomas Theorem”:

“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, pp.571-572).

A reading of Thomas’ theorem focused the researcher’s attention on the influence his subjectivity could play. The researcher has already argued that subjectivity is central to psychoanalytic work and that from a clinical perspective the analyst has to adopt a particular technique in regards to their relationship with the analysand in order to monitor and moderate this (Section 1.2 - Background and Rationale, p.4). The researcher armed with his research question reflected on this and gave the subjective aspect of qualitative research consideration. Narrative analysis was seen to relate and present the registers of both the Imaginary and the Symbolic appropriately for the study. However, the register of the Real escapes this methodology as the void and gaps are filled in by narrative. Psychoanalytic research requires the Real as represented in formations of the unconscious to be allowed for and narrative analysis did not allow for this.
Summative Analysis (Rapport, 2010) was also considered as a possible methodology. Summative Analysis is a collaborative analytic technique that concentrates on consensus-building by having a number of co-researchers read and summarise a narrative and through consensus come to agreed understandings of that narrative. However, as a psychoanalytically informed researcher the subject’s particularity must be privileged above any concensus and summative analysis was seen to be in conflict with this.

This acknowledgement marked a turning point in the researcher’s approach to the study. Prior to this consideration the researcher aimed at being objective, which he can now recognise as laudable but aspirational. The researcher was cognizant that each step in the process of conducting a study of this type has subjective elements that need to be acknowledged and managed in order to reduce and contain their influence on all the other steps in the process. Objectivity remains as an aspiration of the researcher which is held in place by maintaining a reflective and reflexive approach throughout the work. The researcher revisited a fundamental tenet of psychoanalysis and Freud’s discovery of the influence the unconscious has on our mental lives:

“The ego is not master in its own house” (Freud, 1917, p.143).

Therefore from the outset the choice of research question, institution, supervisors and data collection method all contain subjective bias that a researcher may recognise and trace back to their desire to achieve a PhD or wish to be accepted as an academic.

A subsequent investigation made evident to the researcher that editorial decisions aimed at standardising a work of research also create a bias toward specific types of content. The standardisation of the type of data which is included or ignored in a piece of research may also place limits on the researcher. In a psychoanalytically informed study of this kind, a string of incoherent sounds, a physical reaction or even a silence may be relevant data and require interpretation. As Mead emphasizes in his ‘emergence theory’ (Mead, 1934) of the self: revelatory moments are often overlooked. Paying attention to this type of atypical interview data is something the researcher sought to include in his methodology.

The researcher found that although schools of discourse analysis identified and described unconscious formations including momentary revelations, they did not attribute meaning to these findings. This additional consideration of ascribing meaning to data was examined by the researcher. Common to all discourse analysis methodology is the understanding that:

“Whenever we speak or write, we always and simultaneously construct… meaning” (Gee, 1999, p.12).
It is in relation to meanings that a psychoanalytically informed analysis differs from other discourse analysis methodologies.

For discourse analysts influenced by Gee, two types of meaning can be attached to words and phrases in actual use: situated meanings and cultural models (Gee, 1999). Lacan however proposed that there is no separation between self and society and that all human beings are introduced to language; consequently it can never be said to be just our own:

“Man thus speaks, but it is because the symbol has made him man” (Lacan, 1953 [2006], p.229 [277]).

Gee uses the example of the following two statements to explain situated meanings:

“The coffee spilled, get a mop…. The coffee spilled, get a broom” (Gee, 1999, p.48).

In the example the word “mop” in the context makes most assemble a 'situated meaning' of something like; the “dark liquid we drink” for “coffee”. However, for the word “broom” most assemble a situated meaning of one of either example below:

“grains that we make our coffee from…. beans from which we grind coffee” (Ibid., p.80).

The cultural model of meaning advocated by anthropologists like D’Andrade (1995) and, Strauss and Quinn (1997) see meaning as storylines or theories shared by people belonging to specific social or cultural groups:

“Cultural models “explain”, relative to the standards of the group, why words have the various situated meanings they do” (Ibid., p.81).

To return to Gee’s “coffee” example: The word is understood by some in the following way - berries are picked, dried and shelled, then ground to be prepared as a drink or a flavouring. However Gee asserts that this fails to account for the cultural meaning that:

“different types of coffee, drunk in different ways, have different social and cultural implications, for example, in terms of status” (Ibid.).

Lacan in contrast, argues that human beings become social with the appropriation of language. He argues that it is language that constitutes us as subjects and:

“we should not dichotomize the individual and society. Society inhabits each individual” (Sarup, 1993, p.6).

Lacanian psychoanalytic theory understands this in a particular way and the signifier extimacy (extimité) was coined by Lacan to describe a phenomenon which is at one time both external and intimate. This ex-timate characteristic of language led Lacan to develop a theory that combined
phenomenology and structuralism. Phenomenology stresses that the subject is determined by their experience and structuralism emphasizes language determinism. This unique fusion of subject and structure allows the researcher to address the language and experience of the ‘psychopathic subject’.

Psychoanalytically informed analysis offers researchers a methodology that can access meanings, previously inaccessible in texts. Although anthropologists and other social scientists acknowledge unconscious meaning as existing, they have, until now, been unable to quantify it:

“However, everyday people’s “explanations,” “models,” or “theories” are very often largely unconscious, or, at least, not easily articulated in any very full fashion” (Gee, 1999, p.43).

It is this “full fashion” (ibid.) of speech that is the object of investigation for psychoanalytic researchers.

Gee distinguishes a property of language that it can both create and reflect the context in which it is used. He names this “reflexivity” (Ibid., p.82). As discussed, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory uses the term ex-timate to describe these phenomena both external yet intimate. The simultaneous creation of one's own meaning and the reflection of another’s meaning is part of the paradoxical nature of speech. All human beings are introduced to language and consequently it can never be said to be just our own. Therefore the researcher strives to remain reflective and allow for the speech of participants to be heard alongside the researcher’s analysis of the data.

*Innovation in the Psychoanalytic method*

The psychoanalytic methodology has been open to criticism while also being critical of other methodologies.

i. Psychoanalysis is changing and adapting to address modern symptoms

ii. Psychoanalysis is addressing research in a new way

iii. Psychoanalytic critiques have pointed to flaws in scientific methods.

Innovative work in psychoanalytic research from the Freudian-Lacanian tradition in the last decade has been pioneered by Parker (2005, 2013), Vanheule (2003, 2009) and Verhaeghe (2003, 2009). Verhaeghe is an advocate for a methodology informed by Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis. His 2004 book, *On Being Normal and Other Disorders*, marked a shift of focus away from the psychoneuroses, and onto, the character and actual neuroses. In an interview with Hoens in 2011, he advocated a return to clinical (case-study) based research and questioned the reliability of the data collected solely from the questionnaires used in many doctoral dissertations. He asserts that most of his colleagues in academia recognise:

“that research by means of questionnaires has little to no scientific value” (Hoens, 2011, p.13).
Paradoxically, psychoanalysis may have missed the opportunity to solidify its position in this arena in the second half of the twentieth century by undervaluing empirical research. When they were first asked to show evidence of the efficacy of their treatments they had only their patient’s testimonies to hold up to the scrutiny. Randomised control trials became the only acceptable evidence and while many other disciplines invested decades in their development psychoanalysis was found to be lagging behind. Only now that psychoanalysis is catching up can psychoanalytic researchers (Parker, 2013; Verhaeghe, 2004 and Vanheule, 2009) critique the accepted methodologies that dominated research methodologies at that time.


The research methodology advocated by Vanheule warranted consideration for this study as it had been recently used in a psychoanalytically informed investigation of psychopathy (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009). It was in relation to the analysis of psychopath’s language that this investigation was particularly relevant. From interviews with psychopaths, Willemsen and Verhaeghe identified a quality in the speech of psychopaths that distinguished them from other structures:

“It appears that psychopaths frequently use retractors, i.e., a word, phrase, or clause which detracts from the statement preceding it” (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009, p.249).

In the next section, a paper by Parker (2005) on Lacanian discourse analysis offers an approach for taking account of unconscious formations in a text, illustrating an approach to measurement that is gaining support in Lacanian psychoanalytic circles.
WHAT IS A ‘DISCOURSE’?

Parker outlines seven conditions that are “necessary and sufficient for marking out particular discourses” (Parker, 1992, p.17). These conditions are outlined below with both a brief explanatory note and links to the relevant section of this thesis which demonstrate their existence:

1. *A discourse is realised in texts.* Only pieces of discourse are ever found and are not only contained in speech but also in texts. The work of Lacanian psychoanalysts also highlight the potential of provoking the reader in “a confrontation with a text” (*Section 5.4 - Producing difference*).

2. *A discourse is about objects.* A discourse ‘re-presents’ an object and discourses also:

   “systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, p.49).

3. *A discourse contains subjects:*

   “A discourse makes available a space for particular types of self to step in. It addresses us in a certain type of way” (Parker, 1992, p.9).

   A subjective position is not the same as a persona, but rather is about adopting a position from which to speak and act in a particular way.

4. *A discourse is a coherent system of meanings:*

   “The metaphors, analogies and pictures discourses paint of a reality can be distilled into statements about reality” (Ibid., p.10).

   Statements in a discourse may be grouped and given a certain coherence.

5. *A discourse refers to other discourses.* In order to speak of our reflections on a discourse other discourses are needed:

   “Discourses embed, entail and presuppose other discourses” (Ibid., p.13).

   Parker offers the example: When talking about “repression”, the psychoanalytic discourse may be considered to have been referenced.

6. *A discourse reflects on its own way of speaking.* At a point in the discourse there will be a reflection regarding the terms used in that discourse. For example, someone speaking of psychopathy may say ‘I never considered myself to have psychopathic tendencies’.

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7. A discourse is historically located. Only by considering social and cultural contexts can a discourse be produced or its meaning understood (Section 4.6 - Who is mad and who is not? p.97)

Parker (1992) recommends that research focus on three additional aspects of discourse. These are concerned with institutions, ideology and power. In this study, the research question (Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?) and the participant population (ex-offenders), by nature of their condition and experience potentially have a unique relation to power and the institutions they come into contact with. The researcher presented Willemsen’s theory of retraction in Section 4.8 - Psychopathy: A fourth structure which speaks to this power struggle.

Although the aim of this study is not an the analysis of the power relationships (ideology) as Parker demonstrates in the Lacanian discourse analysis method, the position that Parker takes up in relation to the text was key to how the researcher approached the data. The researcher applied the principles of Lacanian discourse analysis as outlined by Parker (2005) to a psychoanalytic investigation of structure.
Psychoanalytic research papers are front-loaded with elaborations on the difficulty of unifying psychoanalytic theory with a research methodology. Parker’s seminal paper from 2005, describes seven key elements of the psychoanalytic work of Lacan. He states that these have implications for the analytic reading of text:

i. **Formal Qualities of Text - Absolute difference**

“The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain ‘absolute difference’” (Lacan, 1964 [1977], p.276).

The first element that Parker uses is the motif of 'absolute difference'. He uses this to highlight the researcher’s task: to search for the patterns and connections between signifiers that, rather than unify; differentiate them and hold them in tension. A focus on difference is one of the primary principles of discourse analysis:

“the analyst looks to the 'variability' in accounts rather than divining a deeper unitary principle that would bring diverse statements together” (Parker, 2005, p.168).

The implication for psychoanalytically informed research is that in any analysis of the subject’s speech, the researcher must seek out difference and not similarities as the object of investigation.

ii. **Anchoring of representation - points of blockage**

The second element Parker identifies are “points of blockage” in a text:

“fixed points around which one text may revolve, locating a text in broader patterns of discourse, and examining how the temporal logic of a text is constructed” (Ibid., p.169).

Psychoanalytic work has shown that we can identify points in the subject’s speech where signification slips away in the repetition of signifiers or metaphorical substitutes:

“These 'master signifiers' function as anchors of representation in a text through such rhetorical tropes as the insistence that 'this is the way things are', that it is not subject to challenge or dissent” (Ibid., p.170).

Parker explains that analysis of a text will also always be provisional as:

“the meaning is determined not only by the last signifiers to appear but also by signifiers that may appear even later (to reconfigure what will come to serve as the key points that serve as anchors of representation)” (Ibid.).

The implication for psychoanalytically informed research is that ‘points of blockage’ must be allowed for and marked but any formulation by the researcher must be suspended until the end of analytic work.
iii. Agency and determination

The third element are silences and gaps in the text and an analysis of what is unconscious to the subject in a piece of text is an analysis of lack:

“an analysis of the 'gaps' and 'holes' where what is said at any moment presupposes that something else cannot or will not be said” (Ibid., p.171).

This has relevance for psychoanalytic research as it highlights the possibility of identifying unconscious formations in the gaps and silences of the subject’s speech.

iv. The role of knowledge

The fourth element relates to knowledge. The researcher is placed in the position of the subject supposed to know, not only by the reader but also by the study participants. Each clinical structure presupposes a certain relation to knowledge and to what the researcher wants of them:

“obsessional neurosis displays stereotypically masculine refusal of dependence; hysteria an accusation addressed to the Other; psychosis a paranoiac sense that there is 'an Other of the Other' manipulating things; and perversion an attempt to make oneself the instrument of the enjoyment of the Other” (Ibid., p.173).

The relation between psychical structure and knowledge may also indicate the position of the subject within the social bond.

v. Positions in Language

The fifth element Parker lists is the differentiation between the statement and the enunciation. He presents Lacan’s theory that language makes it possible for a:

“communication in which the sender receives his own message back from the receiver in an inverted form” (Lacan, 1977; cited in Parker, 2005, p.174).

The psychoanalytic researcher seeks to identify points in the text that call for a response from another. The psychoanalytic researcher does respond, but not in the moment. Rather his response is contained in the research report via his interpretation and discussion.

vi. Deadlocks of Perspective

For the sixth element Parker returns to the psychoanalytic aim for “absolute difference”. In this instance however, it is in regard to differences of interpretation rather than differences in the text. Parker outlines that the goal of Lacanian discourse theory is not to reach consensus regarding an interpretation. Instead an impasse or a deadlock in speech genres serves to mark the real:

“The Real [sic]... is something that operates at a point of breakdown of representation, at a point of trauma or shock that is then rapidly covered over in order that it can be spoken of” (Parker, 2005, p.176).
To understand the nature of discourse we must show failures of agreement and not disavow them in order to reach consensus:

“it is failure of agreement that needs to be displayed rather than an attempt to cover that disagreement over…. Attending to deadlocks of perspective would be a Lacanian way of doing that, and the space this would open for application of 'criteria' in qualitative research in psychology would then be more constructively permissive than prohibitive” (Ibid.).

vii. Interpretation of Textual Material

The seventh element that Parker advocates is in relation to who takes up the position of interpreter. The reflexivity of discourse analysis does not fit easily with Lacanian theory. Discourse analysis positions the researcher (analyst) as the reflexive interpreter of the data whereas psychoanalysis positions the reader (analysand) in this position:

“A form of discourse analysis that aims to 'educate' readers, rather than to illuminate a text and open up questions about it, would be represented in Lacanian terms as operating within 'the discourse of the university’” (Ibid., p.177).

The techniques outlined by Parker are suggestive, not prescriptive. Each study must seek out the formations of the unconscious particular to the text and:

“need to be explicited and warranted each time for each piece of analysis” (Ibid., p.178).

As proposed by Parker (2005), the researcher will take the principles of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and apply them to a particular data set. The next chapter: Chapter 6 - Design and Procedures, describes the application of these techniques.
5.4 PRODUCING DIFFERENCE

Taking the ‘discourse of the analyst’ from Lacan’s theory of the four discourses (Lacan, 1969) as an ethos, the researcher should orient him or herself in relation to the participant as the ‘subject supposed to know’. Lacan outlined four discourses: Master, University, Hysteric and Analytic. Each discourse is a way of being connected to the social bond and Lacan presents these in the form of a matheme using symbols from algebra:

- \( S_1 = \text{The Master or first signifier} \); represents prohibition, a statement of no, and is responsible for the subject coming into being. This signifier is a trait from the symbolic and causes the subject to exist (Loose, 2002).

- \( S_2 = \text{Knowledge or all other signifier in the chain of signifiers} \).

- \( S = \text{The Divided Subject} \) - The division is brought about by entry into language.

- \( a = \text{Lack} \) - The lack/remainder as it relates to jouissance. There is an enjoyment in repetition even if it is around something that has been lost (Lacan, 1969 [2007]).

Discourse of the Master

\[
\begin{align*}
S_1 &> S_2 \\
S &< a
\end{align*}
\]

The discourse of the master represents a desire to master knowledge. The master demands a knowledge from the subject. The masters demand does not seek a particular production from the subject as the goal but instead is employed to position the master in such a way that the subject is his ‘slave’.

Discourse of the University

\[
\begin{align*}
S_2 &> a \\
S_1 &< S
\end{align*}
\]

The discourse of the university represents a desire to master the object. The generalised knowledge produced fails to represent the particularity of subjective experience:

“the more knowledge is generated to grasp the object, the further this discourse moves away from reaching its aim” (Loose, 2002, p247).
Discourse of the Hysteric

$ > S1
A S2

In this discourse the hysteric demands answers from a master in an attempt to get him/her to produce a knowledge.

Discourse of the Analyst

a > $
S2 S1

The discourse of the analyst represents a desire to produce difference and the knowledge generated is particular to the analysand.

The discourse of the analyst represents a desire to produce difference and is therefore a knowledge that is particular to each subject. The analyst recognises that even though he is the ‘subject supposed to know’ for the subject, he must keep his knowledge separate so that he can listen in a particular manner to the subject’s speech. The analytic position has significance in the data collection phase of this study as the interviewee may use the researcher as a transferential object - supposing a knowledge of them.

It is the treatment that is directed in psychoanalysis, not the analysand and, there is no attempt at mastery or dominance over the patient. This allows a space to open up between the analyst and the subject and, in this space, unconscious processes may be explored:

“The position of the analyst in the discourse of analysis provokes the transference and maintaining that position allows the transference to develop” (Loose, 2002, p.246).

If this analytic position is maintained the subject, who has been encouraged to speak freely, can produce knowledge that is akin to the truth of their subjectivity. However, in research this knowledge is used not to enlighten the subject but to inform or provoke the reader of the research.

Therefore, if a research study is to be considered psychoanalytic, a transferential space must also be opened up. This space allows the reader to presume a knowledge of the researcher and position them as a subject-supposed-to-know. The researcher in this position, may now provoke the reader by their interpretations of the text and this allows the reader to readdress their subjectivity in the light of what has been evoked in them. Importantly it is the audience that may be provoked in a psychoanalytic research study and not necessarily the participants of the study.
The ‘Master’, ‘University’ and ‘Hysteric’ discourses are concerned with conscious knowledge while the ‘Analytic’ discourse is concerned with the unconscious and what has escaped signification (pp. 129-130). Unconscious knowledge is interlaced in the chain of signifiers that have marked the subject’s experience. A psychoanalysis enables the subject to realise that they are divided subjects and that when they speak, an-Other voice both intimate, but external to them, haunts their words:

“The philosophy of the unconscious radically repositions man’s concept of himself as it contains the message that the individual is not the master of himself, placing a question mark over free will” (Moore, 2012, p.115).

“when a discourse analyst interprets a written text using Lacan's work they are, in effect, more like an analysand than an analyst, but an analysand faced with chains of signifiers in a text that are not their own” (Parker, 2005, p.178).

Interpretation may be considered an ethical act and psychoanalytic researchers should communicate this in their work, as what is produced in the act of naming something is the very production itself. This was exemplified by Lacan when he said that Freud 'invented' the unconscious by his very naming of it:

“For it's a fact, after all, that the unconscious is Freud's invention” (Lacan, 1989, p.15).

We are therefore not discovering or unearthing when we analyse rather we are transforming, inventing and reproducing (Mallon, 2014).
5.5 SUMMARY

In this chapter the central principles of a psychoanalytic research methodology informed by the works of Freud, Lacan and contemporary researchers were elaborated. The principles to be adhered to and the analytic position to be adopted were detailed. Aspects of the history of psychoanalytic research methodology and current debates were explored. The researcher’s orientation against the backdrop of these debates was also outlined:

(i) By placing meaning on lack or absence rather than on what is present, psychoanalytic research can approach the limits of language.

(ii) The psychoanalytic researcher works with ambiguity and elusiveness in his data. These are indicators of what cannot be spoken, are at the limit of language and are evidenced in formations of the unconscious. Attempts to generalise experiences of lack fail to address the particularity of the subject.

(iii) Psychoanalytic research must privilege difference and each case must be engaged with on the basis of its particularity, and not its similarity with others.

(iv) Interpretation is an act of invention and the onus and responsibility for this creative art should be shared by the researcher and the reader.

The next chapter describes the researchers implementation of these techniques in the design and procedures of this study and approaches the ethical considerations of a psychoanalytic research study.
CHAPTER 6 DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the research method distilled from the methodology used to address the research question:

Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?

Specifically it details the psychological assessment tool used to screen and recruit participants (SRP-III), the psychological assessment utilised as a comparative tool to ascertain the accuracy of the data from SRP-III (P-SCAN RV) and the subsequent psychoanalytically informed interview used to gather data (Hollway, 2000). Data organisation and management is described with particular attention given to the data management system, NVivo (Nvivo 10 for Windows, 2012) and the development of themes from the data which could then be subjected to an analysis with reference to the pertinent psychoanalytic theory. This sets the scene for a theoretical elaboration in the proceeding chapters. The researcher will describe the specific design and procedures followed, give an overview of theory development and discuss the ethical and methodological considerations relevant to conducting the study, some of which necessitated procedural changes as the study progressed.

The aim of this work was to investigate psychopathy as a clinical classification through the lens of Freudian-Lacanian Psychoanalysis. It was anticipated that this study would add to the psychoanalytic field by enhancing the theoretical understanding of psychopathy. The study was designed with a two-fold objective:

1. to develop a psychoanalytic theory of psychopathy
2. to utilize this theory to inform psychoanalytic practice
This study was conducted between February 2011 and November 2015. The researcher’s original proposal was to conduct a study with an incarcerated sample and ethical approval was received from both school and university research ethics committees. However as the researcher was unsuccessful in negotiating access to this ‘hard-to-reach’ population, an equally suitable group of participants (ex-offenders) was identified in December 2013. A revised ethical proposal was submitted and permission for the study to proceed was granted in February 2014. The difficulties encountered by professionals seeking access to ‘hard-to-reach’ populations for research studies are explored further in Section 6.5 - Methodological and Technical Considerations.

Gaining access and permission for the revised study was negotiated at a number of levels:

i. The researcher approached and met with the service manager of an educational project in Dublin city that worked with ex-offenders. The project also provided career guidance, personal/addiction counselling as well as educational programmes on-site.

ii. The researcher provided written and oral information about the study to service managers and negotiated local arrangements.

iii. Procedures for recruitment, conducting interviews, participant and researcher safety, and liaison between interviewer and service-managers were agreed and the researcher was generously afforded the use of the counselling room for interviews when required.

iv. Poster invitations were displayed in the educational project with the permission of service managers (Appendix B).

v. Potential participants contacted the researcher directly by telephone or email.

vi. The researcher went onsite two days a week at alternating times to maximise the opportunities of meeting and interacting with potential participants.

vii. A screening tool (SRP-III) was administered to interested participants at their convenience either over-the-phone or in person. By offering participants the opportunity to conduct the screening tool over the phone the transitory nature of a population who were recently released from prison was addressed. Although the SRP-III is a self-report, some of the participants found it difficult to answer the questions due to either, a reduced attention span as a side effect of taking methadone or from difficulties in reading and comprehension. In these instances the researcher talked the participant through the questionnaire, reading the questions and possible answers, and recording their response.
viii. Those who met the criteria for psychopathic tendencies (greater than 2.95 on SRP-III) were invited to a psychoanalytically informed interview which was conducted at the participant’s convenience on-site.

Procedures related to recruitment, interviews and participant/researcher safety were agreed and reviewed throughout the duration of the study in order to make appropriate adjustments.
Two key sampling strategies were used to recruit participants for the study: through direct invitation by the researcher while on-site and via a poster invitation (Appendix B). The poster invitation yielded five participants and direct invitations made by the researcher yielded eight participants (thirteen in total). All participants were provided with the same information and afforded the same levels of personal and professional support. Following initial contact, the researcher either administered the screening tool there and then or organised to meet the potential participant on-site at their convenience.

Detailed information was provided about the nature, purpose of and procedures for the study (Appendix C) and potential participants were asked to complete a consent form prior to interview (Appendix D). A total of thirteen screening tools (Appendix E) were administered from February to September 2014 and five participants who met the criteria and were classifiable as having psychopathic tendencies were invited to interview. These five semi-structured psychoanalytic interviews took place between March and November 2014.

**INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA**

Inclusion criteria:
- Age: 18 or over
- Gender: Male or Female
- Been in prison
- Willing and able to consent to and participate in an interview to discuss their experiences.

Exclusion Criteria:
- Aged less than 18
- People with a history of criminality who had not been imprisoned
- People who were deemed by the researcher, a psychotherapist, as unable to give informed consent to participate in the study due to their current mental health status.
Between February and November 2014 thirty service-users attended the project. Given the transitory nature of the population, many of whom were recently released from prison and in early recovery from substance abuse, the number of potential participants who attended and were available to screen were twenty-four. In addition, some of the participants found it difficult to complete the screening tool questions due to either, an impairment in attention as a side-effect of methadone administration, or from difficulties in reading and comprehension. In these instances the researcher talked the participant through the questionnaire, reading the questions and possible answers, and recording their response.

Of the twenty-four potential participants, thirteen were successfully screened and five of these met the criteria for psychopathic tendencies (Section 6.2 - Participant Recruitment). These five were invited to and participated in psychoanalytic interviews. All the participants met the inclusion criteria. The small sample size is in keeping with psychoanalytic studies that focus on depth rather than breadth of data. Although quantitative data was collected (SRP-III screening tool) from this small sample (thirteen assessments), it was not the focus of the study, is not generalisable and no conclusions can be drawn from it.

Despite the intent to have equal numbers of male and female participants, only one potential female participant was screened. This is attributable to the low number of females attending the service during the data collection phase. This also reflects the ratio of male/female prisoners in the Irish penal system:

“The overall daily average number of prisoners in custody in 2014 was 3,915…. The average number of female offenders in custody was 150” (Irish Department of Justice and Equality, 2015a, p.21).
Participants came from a variety of geographical locations across the Republic of Ireland, including rural areas, suburban towns and Dublin city. Although they all came from similar socio-economic backgrounds, their life experiences and living circumstances were varied. They had differing levels of education from primary level to ‘Intermediate certificate’ prior to their returning to education later in life. One participant now has a higher diploma, two are educated to honours degree level and two are currently in degree programmes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Self-identified occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant 2</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Drug dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant 3</td>
<td>Higher Diploma</td>
<td>Professional Drug Taker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant 4</td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Professional Burglar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant 5</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Drug dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant 8</td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Drug dealer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 6.1 EDUCATION LEVEL AND SELF-IDENTIFIED OCCUPATION OF INTERVIEWEES**

With regard to occupation: three of the participants described dealing drugs as their past ‘occupation’, one described himself as a ‘professional drug-taker’, while another identified with having been a professional burglar. The three participants who were not attending university were employed as advocates/educational support staff working with ex-offenders.
Each of the participants had been to prison, had attended a treatment service for substance abuse issues, had been through rehabilitation and now identified as being in recovery. There is extensive research to show a high correlation between psychopathy/‘Anti-social behaviour disorder’ (APA, 2013) and substance abuse (up to 90%) (Regier, 1990; Forrest, 1992; Gerstley, Alterman, McLellan & Woody, 1990; Tims, DeLeon & Jainchill, 1994; Messina, Wish & Nemes, 1999). Some of the participants who completed the screening tool were in methadone treatment programmes at the time it was administered and one of the participants who took part in the psychoanalytic interview had completed a rehabilitation programme in the previous month. A 2005 survey of Irish prisoners found that 59% of male sentenced prisoners had a drug dependency problem, and 45% an alcohol dependency problem (Kennedy et al, 2005). In Section 9.4 - The correlation of psychopathy/ASPD with substance abuse the researcher compares the psychoanalytic understanding of co-morbidity in substance abuse and psychosis, with studies from the fields of psychiatry and neuroscience.

The participants interviewed ranged from thirty-six to fifty-nine years of age, with a mean age of forty-five years. Two participants were older than fifty years of age, one was in his forties and two were in their thirties. Three of the participants were either in co-habiting relationships or married and two were not in relationships at the time of interview. Four participants had children and two described having fractious relationships with them. One participant did not have children and said that although he regretted this, the upside was that he had not damaged someone else. This is consistent with study findings that show that those with ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) or psychopathy have difficulties maintaining stable intimate relationships (Cleckley, 1941 [1988]; Hare, 2003; APA, 2013).

In summary, although participants came from similar socio-economic backgrounds they encountered unique personal experiences and events. However, these particular experiences translated into similar outcomes: substance abuse, criminality and eventually rehabilitation. Psychopathy is differentiated from sociopathy on the basis that as a phenomenon, it is not dependent on poor socio-economic conditions or environment. The psychopathic structure is found in affluent and poor neighbourhoods alike however it is noteworthy that the outcomes for psychopathic individuals raised in similar socio-economic conditions are also similar:

“Whether genes are triggered or not depends on what happens in your childhood. Simply having the warrior gene doesn’t necessarily mean you’ll be violent” (Stockley, 2011).

Where Stockley sees genetics at play, the researcher offers a psychoanalytic explanation. There are social and cultural determinants of psychical structure and as has already been noted, modern pathological presentations in the clinic differ from those of Freud’s era (Section 4.6 - Who is mad and who is not? pp.96-97). Contemporary philosophers and psychoanalysts have associated a decline in
paternal authority and the subsequent “decline in symbolic efficiency” (Žižek, 1999, p.322) with modern symptomatology (Žižek, 1999; Verhaeghe, 1999a).
6.3 DATA COLLECTION

SCREENING TOOL - THE SELF-REPORT PSYCHOPATHY SCALE (SRP-III)

The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP) has gone through several revisions. It was originally developed in the 1980’s as a self-report instrument analogous to the Psychopathy Check-List, PCL (Hare, 1980). Its development was necessary due to the PCL’s non-applicability to wider, non-incarcerated populations: administration of the PCL required a review of collateral file information which was not practicable in non-forensic samples.

The SRP-II (Hare, Hemphill & Harpur, 1989), a two factor model, was developed in 1989 to increase its correlation with the newly revised version of the Psychopathy Check-List, the PCL-R (Hare, 2003). The first factor assessed interpersonal and affective features while the second factor assessed antisocial and impulsive lifestyle.

The SRP-III, a four factor model, was developed by Paulhus et al in the 2000’s and the manual was published in 2009 (Paulhus, Neumann & Hare, 2009). The SRP-III was the most current version when the researcher began data collection and its application in this study is described below. A shorter version of the SRP has since been developed, the SRP - Short Form (SRP-SF) and the latest revision, the SRP-IV is due for publication in 2015 (Paulhus, Neumann & Hare, 2015).

The Self-report psychopathy scale (SRP-III) is a 64-item questionnaire that measures psychopathic personality tendencies across a four-factor model:

- Interpersonal Manipulation (IPM)
- Callous Affect (CA)
- Erratic Life-style (ELS)
- Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB)

(Paulhus, Hemphill & Hare, 2009).

The tool is designed to assess the core features of psychopathy among non-incarcerated populations and each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).

Responses are summated for each subscale and twenty-one of the items across the four subscales are reverse scored. Each subscale is divided by sixteen to get their means delivering four scores:

“The overall SRP-III score is simply the mean of the four subscales on a 5-point scale” (Paulhus, Hemphill & Hare, 2009).
Paulhus et al., found the SRP-III to have good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .81) and it has also been used with incarcerated inmates (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2011).

In this study, the mean SRP-III score was 2.77 with thirteen questionnaires completed and five participants scoring higher than this. This mean score matched the mean score (2.8) from a study conducted with an incarcerated population in the U.S.A. in 2011 (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2011) and was within one standard deviation of the mean score (3.0) from a study conducted with incarcerated populations in Norway in 2014 (Sandvik et al., 2014). The five participants who scored higher than the mean SRP-III score were invited to participate in a second, psychoanalytically informed interview.

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**PSYCHOPATHY-SCAN RESEARCH VERSION (P-SCAN RV)**

The Robert Hare Psychopathy-SCAN Research Version (P-SCAN RV) (Hare & Hervé, 1999) is a research version of Robert Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist or PCL-R (Hare, 2003). It is a 90-item checklist depicting relatively specific behaviours and low-level inferences about individuals. Items are scored on three key facets of psychopathy: Interpersonal, Affective, and Lifestyle. The Hare P-SCAN RV helps individuals in mental health and corrections environments form impressions and draw conclusions on the basis of their knowledge and their experience. This tool serves as an “early warning system” or “rough screening device” for identifying individuals with psychopathic features (Hare & Hervé, 1999, p.1).

This “research version” of the Robert Hare Psychopathy Checklist is a less intrusive test than the full version of the PCL-R (Hare, 2003). The tool takes 10-15 minutes to score and was completed by the researcher immediately after each interview (Appendix G). This questionnaire was used as a comparative tool to ascertain the accuracy of the data from SRP-III.
Within this study, interviews were the primary means of data collection, therefore, it is important to
detail how the interview process was understood in the study. The interview process is an inter-
personal endeavour and the researcher met with each participant twice prior to the psychoanalytic
interview. In this limited time the researcher introduced himself to the participants to reduce any
inhibitions or anxiety they may have felt. The researcher was aware of the privileged position he was
afforded by the participants and the responsibility incumbent upon him to create a safe and secure
space in which they could share the particularity of their stories. To encourage this, all participants
were invited to interview and it was imparted to them both verbally in the first meeting and in an
information document, that they had access to all information and further assistance if necessary
(Appendix C). The participants were reminded before interview that they were in control of the nature
and depth of information shared and that they could end the interview at any time without need for
explanation.

The researcher choose interviews as the means of collecting data as they offer direct and
comprehensive means of accessing the subject’s language. As demonstrated by the psychoanalytic
method of investigation and treatment the unconscious can be accessed where language fails.
Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured and the researcher chose a semi-
structured interview with two distinct questions around (i) the participant’s dealings with authority
and (ii) their experiences of anxiety. Kvale (1996) suggests that the quality of data collected from
interviews is dependent on the quality of interview. He offers the following criteria for measuring
interview quality:

i. short questions from the interviewer
ii. spontaneous, rich, specific, and relevant answers from the interviewee
iii. clarification of the interviewees meaning by the interviewer
iv. on-going interpretation during the interview
v. attempts by the interviewer to verify his interpretations within the interview
vi. that the interview can stand alone without explanation, as ‘self-communicating’
(Kvale, 1996, p.145).

These criteria served as guidelines when preparing the interview protocol (Appendix F) and for
analysing the quality of interviews.

The interviews were conducted based on the principles of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis in
the form of a psychoanalytically-informed interview (Hollway, 2000). This interview was an
opportunity for the participant to speak freely about whatever came to mind with an experienced
psychotherapist. This psychoanalytically informed method of interview was chosen as it allows the researcher:

“access to a person’s concerns which would probably not be visible using a more traditional method” (Hollway, 2000, p.37).

Using this method implies the interviewer listen with a free-floating attention that helps him to recognise formations of the unconscious in the speech of participants:

“Quiet presence and free floating attention, techniques of psychoanalysis, featured as guiding principles for the researcher’s conduct. The amassed data was subjected to a psychoanalytic investigation with reference to the speech and actions of participants” (Moore, 2012, p.142).

In order to address the exigencies of being a researcher using a psychoanalytic interview, the participants were encouraged to speak freely around the topics introduced:

“Free associations defy narrative conventions and enable the analyst to pick up on incoherences (for example, contradictions, elisions, avoidances) and accord them due significance” (Hollway, 2000, p.37).

The format and questions from the semi-structured psychoanalytic interview are presented in Appendix F. In the interest of rigour, the principal supervisor and researcher met after each interview to discuss and correlate any recurring patterns in the data.
Interviews were recorded with participant’s consent and recorded material was transferred for storage and retrieval to a password protected computer package with access limited to the researcher and his principle supervisor. Signed consent forms, interview transcripts, contextual notes and all screening tool materials were stored in a locked filing cabinet designated for project use only. There were no corresponding codes to connect participant details with data provided in interview. Data generated by the study contained no information identifying individuals when included in presentations, reports or other dissemination processes. Participants were advised of procedures to protect their anonymity and confidentiality of data and were asked to give their written consent to same (Appendices C & D).

NVivo, a software program for collecting, organising and analysing content from interviews, focus group discussions, surveys, audio, social media, videos and webpages was utilised in this study (Nvivo 10 for Windows, 2012). NVivo software was utilized to organise categories, themes and subsequent proposition statements from codes. As coding was manually completed by the researcher, the popular ‘auto-coding’ function available in this program was not applicable. The researcher did not consider the ‘auto-coding’ feature appropriate for a study of this nature and he reasons that a psychoanalytic training is a prerequisite for the recognition of formations of the unconscious: a functionality outside the capabilities of computer software. This training is not only theoretical as an analyst has personal experience of analysis and this informs practice and research.

NVivo was however employed to organise and graphically represent the coding and analytic process. The researcher chose to invest time in this process as part of his strategy for the dissemination of the complex analytic processes. The researcher also entered the quantitative data from the questionnaires/screening tool (SRP-III & P-SCAN RV) against each participant in order to be able to run queries of the coded data against differing SRP-III and P-SCAN RV scores. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected however considering the research question and study size, analysis was restricted to a qualitative paradigm.

The researcher refined his notes from the manual coding phase as 'Memos' in NVivo. These memos discuss phenomena, both unconscious and conscious, which the researcher attributed meaning to, based on his psychoanalytic training enabling the creation of themes which are understood as
“a coherent and meaningful pattern in the data relevant to the research question. If codes are the bricks and tiles in a brick and tile house, then themes are the walls and roof panels” (Clarke and Braun, 2013, p.120).

The researcher also used NVivo to avoid shallow reporting and badly constructed conclusions (Bazeley, 2009, p.9). Rather than briefly summarizing a theme and including a quote from an interview as evidence, the researcher used the software to look at the frequencies within themes, identifying particularities or peculiarities in subject’s expression of that theme:

“While one or two quotes might powerfully illustrate a theme, they do not convey how widely this theme might have applied, or for whom, or how it links to other themes. Frequencies are sometimes reported, but there is rarely any attempt to explain those who express this theme differently, or who do not express the theme at all” (Ibid.).

In this regard, Miles and Huberman (1994) place emphasis on the content that is displayed by the researcher:

“You know what you display” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.91).

NVivo augmented the researcher’s ability to display the analytic process and findings by facilitating the comparison of data. By displaying both code frequency and the subject’s verbatim accounts the researcher could survey both thematic patterns and the particularity of the subject’s discourse together.

In line with best practice and ethical approval, raw data will be disposed of safely four years after completion of the study. Findings and recommendations are being disseminated through conference presentations, paper publications and research reports.
The procedures followed for data gathering and analysis in this study were consistent with already established guidelines (Kvale, 1996; Hollway, 2000 and Moore, 2012). Interviews were recorded to enhance the researcher's presence at interview which may have been diminished if he had to take notes. Recordings were then listened to and each interview was transcribed by hand with notes written in the margin (Appendix H). The transcribed interviews created a written account of all verbal and non-verbal utterances (e.g., coughs or laughter). Occurrences of pauses were marked with short and long pauses differentiated. Longer pauses were differentiated to give a more temporally accurate transcript. In this regard, Kendall (2007) offers two transcripts of the same case notes: one with temporal information and one without to demonstrate why temporal information should be included in transcripts. In Kendall’s example each transcription details a deponent flipping through his papers. The temporally accurate transcript however describes that the papers were flipped through for over 30 seconds which changes the context. Kendall concludes:

“the silence in speech masks important actions crucial for the full comprehension of the text” (Kendall, 2007, p.327).

Kendall recommends the inclusion of temporal information in transcripts to help users to interpret transcriptions:

“a fuller adoption of the convention Gibbons (2003: 29) and others discuss - using two periods (« .. ») for a short pause and three periods (« ... ») for a longer pause - would help users interpret transcripts” (Ibid., p.330).

Similarly, instances of language disturbance, repetitions and stunted sentences were also marked in the body of the interview text. This is in-line with the psychoanalytic theory that the “unconscious… is structured like a language” (Lacan, 1965, p.737 [868]) and that meaning can be attributed to language disturbances (Lucas, 2003).

The researcher took his lead from Parker’s 2005 book on ‘radical’ research when transcribing the recorded interview material (Appendix H):

“You need to indicate who is speaking, what emphasis there might be in the speech, points of interruption and overlap, moments of hesitation, a note about the bits of the interview you could not understand, and some explanation about other things going on that the reader might need to know to make sense of the text” (Parker, 2005a, p.65).

Each interview was next converted to a digital format using word processing software. At this phase the researcher began to elaborate on the notes from the previous phase and consider them through the prism of Lacanian Psychoanalytic theory (Appendix I).
This process of data analysis adheres to the principles described by Freud in *Papers on Technique* (Freud, 1911-1915). The key feature of a psychoanalytic approach to data analysis relates to the position of the analyst. The analyst is required to remain true to an analytic discourse to sustain his/her position. Analysis was managed as follows:

1. On meeting the data initially the researcher employed the principle of free-floating attention in line with Moore (p.145).

2. Themes were developed on subsequent meetings with the data and these were refined and related back to the research question and literature, producing a comprehensive report of the analysis in relation to the psychoanalytic theory which guided the study.

3. The primary sources of data were the speech of, and interactions with the participants. This data was considered through the lens of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory: an analysis that took into account the unconscious processes and attributed meaning to them (Kvale, 2009).

4. Indicators of unconscious processes in the speech and actions of participants were marked and analysed by the researcher:

   “The analyst’s ear is tuned in to verbal and affective manifestations of the unconscious such as slips of the tongue, tales of bungled actions, surprise, overemphasis, unfinished sentences, equivocal word usage, negation, and unprovoked denials - all of which indicate a multiplicity of meanings” (Swales, 2012, pp.15-16).

5. The researcher’s analysis also considered the participant’s relationships with others. Lacanian structural theory places meaning on the subject’s position in relation to the Other and the researcher kept this in mind when analysing the data.

Notes were taken before each interview describing the environment and activities particular at the time. These were maintained throughout the process of data collection to give context to each interview. *Appendix J* provides a sample of a note relating to Participant 2’s interview. Memos were recorded and updated throughout the inquiry process in NVivo and in the note taking at both stages of transcription and coding. Analytic memos in NVivo included:
i. Annotations attached to each instance of coded text (*Figure 6.2 - Annotations from NVivo (Appearance and Reality Coded data))*

![Figure 6.2 Annotations from NVivo (Appearance and Reality Coded data)](image)

**FIGURE 6.2 ANNOTATIONS FROM NVIVO (APPEARANCE AND REALITY CODED DATA)**

ii. Node properties for each participant (*Figure 6.3 - Node properties from NVivo (Participant 2))*

![Figure 6.3 Node properties from NVivo (Participant 2)](image)

**FIGURE 6.3 NODE PROPERTIES FROM NVIVO (PARTICIPANT 2)**
Figure 6.4 Extract of coding table from NVivo presents a sample of the coding table in which a code (Mixed or confused metaphor) was incorporated into a theme (Language and formations of the unconscious) which was understood within an over-arching category (Language), to produce a proposition statement (How to determine a subject as psychotic).

![Diagram of coding table]

**FIGURE 6.4 EXTRACT OF CODING TABLE FROM NVIVO**
EVOLUTION OF RESEARCH PROCESS

The researcher focused on the indicators of psychical structure in the participant’s
(i) dealings with authority/the law
(ii) experiences of fear/guilt
(iii) instances of pleasure/satisfaction

By exploring the patterns inherent in this process the researcher was in a position to articulate the proposition statement:

*How to determine a subject as psychotic.*

This proposition statement from phase 6 of the thematic analysis is detailed in NVivo (Appendix K) and provides the indicators of psychosis in the data collected from the psychoanalytically informed interviews for each participant.

METHODOLOGICAL AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The preparation of ethics applications for three committees (School Research Ethics Committee, University Research Ethics Committee and Irish Prison Service Research Ethics Committee) stood the revised study in good stead. The researcher had extensively prepared and reflected on the challenges in conducting a study with ‘hard-to-reach’ populations and possible barriers to access. This preparation was applied when accessing the population of ex-offenders. Interview procedures and safety protocols were also comprehensive, having also been through the same rigorous ethical scrutiny. While some issues were anticipated, the unexpected also emerged as the study unfolded posing some methodological considerations which translated into changes in specific technical procedures. On-going reflection and review of protocols and procedures was therefore necessary.

The researcher’s proposed study of a prison population was unsuccessful due to lack of access. Attaining ethical approval from the Irish Prison Service proved problematic as the institutions primary consideration was to support research “of benefit to the operation of the service” and to “uphold the responsibilities in the mission statement” (Extract from email dated 11/10/2013 from Irish Prison Service Ethics Committee). During the intervening period between application and permission being granted the researcher had (i) travelled to the Netherlands for a workshop on ‘the gold standard’ psychological testing tool for psychopathy and (ii) gained his registered practitioner status/accreditation as a psychotherapist, to improve his researcher profile.
On gaining university ethical approval the researcher sent letters seeking support for the research project. He contacted the Directors of Nursing of three Mental Health Services. Support was not forthcoming from these gatekeepers and the researcher made an application for ethical approval to the Irish Prison Service in April 2013. Unfortunately, an administrative error meant that the initial application failed to be processed having:

“arrived at the same time that the system for research applications changed” (Extract from an email dated 25/07/2013 from the Irish Prison Service Ethics Committee).

The application was resubmitted but ethical approval was declined in December 2013.

The proposed study had been designed for a specific population, utilising a case study method with up to six participants engaged in psychoanalytic psychotherapy of up to a year. Due to time limitations, and with the understanding that ethical approval from the Irish Prison Service could take an additional year, an alternative population was considered. The researcher sought and gained access and full ethical permission for the revised study with a population of ex-offenders attending a educational project in February 2014.

Technical and methodological procedures were revised. These revisions included a change of screening tool. As the proposed tool (PCL-R) relied on access to prison records, the changed population sample also meant that written prison records could no longer be used. The proposed screening tool (PCL-R) was necessarily replaced with a self-report tool (SRP-III) and the tool’s research version (P-SCAN RV) was administered to confirm reliability. Given the transitory nature of the revised population a case study method was no longer viable. The researcher replaced psychoanalytic psychotherapy with prisoners with psychoanalytic interviews.

The methodology was also revised as the case study approach was no longer applicable. The researcher initially chose to analyse transcribed interview material using a Lacanian discourse analysis method described by Parker (2005). He considered this the most appropriate analytic method as it combined the principles of psychoanalysis with the structured analysis of a subject’s speech. The researcher anticipated that this method would allow formations of the unconscious to be identified and that the researcher could then determine if they were indicative of a particular structure. However, on further investigation this analytic method was deemed unsuitable on the basis that it was not able to address the study’s aim of identifying structure. The researcher required an analytic method capable of extracting data from the text of the interviews and making these fragments of text relay-able through the prism of Lacanian structural theory.
The researcher found that Parker’s method of discourse analysis did not allow for the extraction of data from the transcribed interviews but instead analysed power relationships (ideology) revealed in the text. However, the inquiry into Lacanian discourse analysis did not go to waste as the ethical position and Lacanian principles that Parker takes up in relation to a text became key to the analytic approach eventually utilized: the application of psychoanalytic theory to the data following an initial thematic analytic process.

A single psychoanalytic interview is a limited means of data collection when compared to weekly psychoanalytic sessions over a number of years. The latter method would allow for an even greater depth of information to be collected which would in turn facilitate a more complete analysis and formulation of participants structures. However by conducting single interviews with a number of participants who have similar life experiences it is possible to generate data where tentative comparisons on psychical structures can be made.

The researcher also recognised that the limited scope of the interviews he conducted lessened the installation of a positive transference in the analytic sense. This curtailment in the transferential relationship limited the researcher in his ability to evoke in the participant, a chain of signifiers that may not have been fully explored in relation to their symptom. Miller states that the symptom only “acquires its formal envelope in the transference” (Miller, 1997).

Another and unanticipated consideration that arose in relation to the participants was the co-morbidity of psychosis and substance abuse. This is detailed and developed upon in the discussion chapter (Section 9.4 - The correlation of psychopathy/ASPD with substance abuse).
6.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In order to ensure that all participants were treated with dignity and respect at all times and given the topic of inquiry and sample population; the researcher identified a number of ethical concerns with potential risks for physical and psychological harm. The researcher followed the American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines with respect to ethical considerations. Howitt and Cramer consider the APA ethics to be based on five principles:

- Beneficence and nonmaleficence
- Fidelity and responsibility
- Integrity - accuracy, honest and truthfulness
- Justice - equality of access to the benefits of psychology
- Respect for people’s rights and dignity

(Howitt and Cramer, 2008, p.142).

Specific areas warranting consideration centred on participants capacity to provide full consent and the protection of their anonymity. The ethical and psychoanalytic principles outlined in the previous chapter guided the researcher, and a participant risk-benefit analysis was also conducted as part of the ethics application with Dublin City University.

PARTICIPANT CONSIDERATIONS

A number of participant-related issues were considered prior to the study. The researcher recognised that there are psychological risks for participants speaking about their life history and experience. To minimize risk of participant distress all potential interview participants received detailed information about the study, giving those who wished to reconsider their decision to participate the opportunity to withdraw at an early juncture.

Also detailed in the information provided to participants was: should a person become unduly distressed during the interview process, the interview would be terminated and they would be advised of available support structures within the institution (Appendices C & D). Addressing this, the researcher confirmed that a trained counsellor, who was not affiliated with the study, was on-site when interviews were taking place.
The researcher operated under a professional code of conduct (Appendix L) and managed all aspects of the research process accordingly. A monitoring structure was also employed that included both academic and clinical supervision for the researcher.

**Vulnerability**

The researcher considered an atypical vulnerability in relation to the study population, addressing the possibility that a participant might not have the capacity to provide full consent. Some of the participants who completed the screening tool were in treatment programmes for substance abuse at the time the researcher met with them. Also, all those who eventually came for psychoanalytic interview had histories of substance abuse in their recent past, one having relapsed only a few months before. It was therefore important that the participant’s competence be assessed.

For the screening tool (SRP-III) the participant’s capacity was easily determined as the available response to each question is a number from 1 to 5. The SRP-III was chosen by the researcher as it is considered a low-risk protocol and has been used in general populations. In order to address participant competence at the psychoanalytic interview, the informed consent form was read aloud to the participant who was then asked to give a brief explanation of the study. An adequate answer to this question eliminated the necessity for any further evaluation of the decisional capacity and all five men interviewed answered this without issue. All these research protocols were fully discussed with the gatekeepers on-site who were satisfied that they were not putting their service-users at risk by contacting me.

**Stigmatisation**

A risk of stigmatisation could occur if the study participants were identifiable or the data they provided was recognisable as belonging to them. Anonymity and data confidentiality was a priority prior to and following interviews. As part of university ethical approval, the researcher gave assurances regarding personal anonymity and data confidentiality prior to and following interview. This included not interviewing any person who was considered to have had a high profile due to media coverage of their criminal activities. Only one potential participant met these conditions: his case having been reported in the national newspapers, and the researcher did not pursue this person for the study on this basis.

**Traumatisation**

Although the possibility of participant trauma was considered low given the population, ample protections were put in place in any event. The risk of traumatisation centres on the participants recalling of distressing and painful material leading to increased anxiety or shame. This was addressed by debriefing the participants and providing them with a ‘Plain Language Statement’ (Appendix C)
prior to interview. The researcher also offered to end the interview if the participant became distressed with the provision of appropriate support such as counselling if necessary.

**Exploitation**

The multiple roles of the researcher: as clinician, researcher and PhD candidate, warranted some consideration in this regard. The researcher was not there as a psychotherapist and did not make any equivocations or interventions around what was spoken. The researcher’s emphasis was on the participants freedom to speak, or not, and that they retained control of the nature and depth of what was shared. They were also advised that should they feel uncomfortable at any stage in the process, that they could terminate the interview. None of those interviewed terminated the interviews in this manner.

**Summary**

Participant considerations associated with this study included: stigmatisation, the possibility that the participant might ‘relive’ a traumatic event and the potential that participants feel exploited. Risk management procedures were established to address potential participant risks. Briefly, this meant ensuring that adequate information was made available to participants about the nature and purpose of and procedures for the study, the potential risks to them, and the safety protocols that had been established to address emerging concerns. It meant providing space prior to, during and following the interview to discuss the process with participants so that they could voice their concerns and make suggestions: this promoted informed choice about their involvement in the study throughout. It also required close liaison with service-managers and gate-keepers so that any issues that arose could be dealt with the safety and dignity of the participants in mind. This included the safe storage of data and protection of participants’ anonymity when reporting of any data.
RESEARCHER CONSIDERATIONS

(i) The change in sample population at the end of 2013 reduced the potential risks and removed barriers to access.

(ii) A shorter and less intrusive version of the Robert Hare Psychopathy Check-list, the SRP-III was administered as a screening tool.

(iii) Removing the third party referral process within the institution allowed the researcher the opportunity to administer psychological tests and use psychoanalytic interviews at a time agreed between the participant and researcher: a time not dependent on the resource allocation restrictions of a prison.

Physical Safety
The researcher’s physical safety was a significant concern raised by the School of Nursing and Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee and was subsequently addressed in each of the completed ethics applications. In the revised study many of the potential participants had histories that included physical violence perpetrated against those in positions of authority. A safety protocol was developed by the researcher and included that interviews were to be conducted in the counselling room on-site: a space that the participants were familiar with and felt comfortable in and, a space designed for one-to-one meetings, a safe location. The service manager and the counsellor were each informed when the researcher was interviewing a participant should there have been any need for intervention. As detailed in the previous section, the researcher conducted an evaluation of the participant’s competence at the beginning of each psychoanalytic interview and this allowed an evaluation of any threat of physical violence.

Psychological Safety
A potential risk to the researcher was identified: if he were to be confronted with participants’ traumatic stories during interviews. As participants were invited to discuss their experience of anxiety and fear, the researcher anticipated that their narratives might have also included distressing events. The researcher, who is also a trained psychotherapist (Registered Practitioner: Association for Psychoanalysis & Psychotherapy in Ireland) monitored his reactions closely during interview and also had supports in place for his self-care (clinical supervision) should he have needed them. Appropriate boundaries were also held and the researcher did not confuse his position of interviewer with that of clinician. He did this by refraining from any therapeutic intervention with the participants, privileging the speech of those he met without making equivocations or interpretations. The researcher kept notes to aid in the recognition of any boundary issues, particularly when confronted with traumatic stories in interview (Appendix J).
Summary

A researcher’s level of engagement with his or her study is determined by many factors. To maximise the potential for full engagement potential issues prior to, during and after the collection of data were addressed. Protections put in place for the researcher’s safety also indirectly protected the participants; while safety protocols developed for ethics applications were invaluable resources for the researcher when arriving on-site to collect data. In this study, there were both physical and psychological risks to the researcher. These potential risks meant that both self-care and support strategies for the researcher were required and developed.
6.7 SUMMARY

This psychoanalytically informed study was conducted over a five year period and included interviews with thirteen ex-offenders from similar socio-economic backgrounds. A number of technical, ethical and methodological challenges were identified by the researcher during the study. A change in sample population introduced technical challenges which led to the adoption of modified processes. These included the utilisation of an alternative screening tool (SRP-III), determined by the researcher to be more appropriate for the revised population. The researcher also identified potential ethical considerations for participants and the researcher. These considerations prompted the researcher to adopt a balanced approach: creating a safe environment for data collection while encouraging an encounter that addressed the unconscious and the research question. The potential risks given the sample population and the topic of inquiry were given special consideration. Particular procedures were developed to minimise the possibility of these risks emerging and to address them if or when they arose. Having provided the methodological, ethical and procedural context for this study the following chapters describe the emergent thesis and analysis. The next chapter details the analytic process with particular emphasis on Lacanian structural theory which informed both the ethical and theoretical position adopted for this study.
CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The following chapter provides an overview of the analytic process. Particular emphasis has been placed on Lacanian structural theory which informed both the ethical and theoretical position adopted for this study. This chapter will outline the adaptation of a thematic analysis used for the organisation and management of data, to a psychoanalytic analysis of discourse informed by Lacanian structural theory. The analytic process is traced from the coding of data through to the development of themes and proposition statements that ultimately informed the Lacanian analysis of discourse.

7.2 ANALYTIC METHOD

Two processes constituted the analytic method for the study: a thematic discourse analysis and a psychoanalytic discourse analysis.

Thematic Analysis is essentially a method for identifying and analysing patterns in qualitative data. This was first proposed in the 1970’s (Merton, 1975) and since then a number of different versions of thematic analysis have been proposed within the human sciences (e.g., Aronson, 1994, Attride-Stirling, 2001, Boyatzis, 1998, Joffe & Yardley, 2004, Tuckett, 2005 and Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The analytic method proposed by Braun and Clarke has been used in this study. They differentiate their use of thematic analysis from others:

“Some authors demarcate TA as a phenomenological method (e.g., Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012, Joffe, 2011); we, in contrast, emphasise the theoretical flexibility of TA, and identify it as just an analytic method, rather than a methodology” (Clarke and Braun, 2013, p.120).

Braun and Clarke indicate the methods potential application to a wide range of theoretical frameworks whether essentialist or constructionist and refer specifically to Taylor and Ussher’s 2001 study which used a thematic discourse analysis (Taylor & Ussher, 2001) (Ibid.).

The “six phases of thematic analysis” outlined by Braun and Clarke should not however be considered:
“as a linear model, where one cannot proceed to the next phase without completing the prior phase (correctly); rather analysis is a recursive process” (Ibid., p.121).

The six phases when applied in this study were represented as below:

1. **Familiarisation with the data:** The researcher became closely acquainted with the data. Audio-recordings of interviews were listened to, then transcribed initially by hand and later digitized using word-processing software. The transcribed material was read and re-read with analytic notes included when note-worthy.

2. **Coding:** Important features from the data (fragments of a subject’s discourse) were identified as meaningful and of relevance to the research question (*Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?*). Along with these features: pauses, instances of laughter and slips of the tongue were coded as indicators of something unsayable.

3. **Searching for themes:** The researcher identified patterns in the data and attributed meaning to these patterns based on their relevance to the research question. These patterns in the data are themes:

   “If codes are the bricks and tiles in a brick and tile house, then themes are the walls and roof panels” (Ibid.).

   The researcher constructed the first-order themes in this phase of the analytic process and each fragment of coded text became associated with a particular theme. Fifty-three themes were collated from open coding.

4. **Reviewing themes:** The themes were reviewed against the complete data set. While some themes became more highly defined, the relationships between certain themes were also recognised and analysed. Twelve thematic headings (informed by the themes from phase 3) were chosen by the researcher.

5. **Defining and naming themes:** The researcher conducted a detailed analysis on each of the thematic headings from phase four while thinking how the data might fit with the aim of the study. Themes became more clearly defined as they were considered in relation to the factors that influence structure in Lacanian structural theory resulting in four defined and named themes.
6. *Writing up:* Here the themes from phase five (chosen for their relevance to Lacanian structural theory) were analysed in relation to psychopathy in particular. Distinguishing features in the discourse of each participant were considered as:

- Indicators of perversion/neurosis or psychosis (being inside/outside normative discourse)
- Indicators of sociopathy or psychopathy (guilt/shame or lack thereof)
- Indicators of the presentation of psychopathy (orality/anality)

This phase in the thematic analysis contextualised the study against the backdrop of situating psychopathy within Lacanian structural theory:

> “Writing-up involves weaving together the analytic narrative and (vivid) data extracts to tell the reader a coherent and persuasive story about the data, and contextualising it in relation to existing literature” (Ibid., p.122).
The researcher concurs with Boyatzis who observed that thematic analysis is a process that can “be used with most, if not all, qualitative methods” (Boyatzis, 1998, p.4). In the context of this study, the adaptation of thematic analysis to discourse allowed for psychoanalytic concepts as meanings to be recognised and grouped from the data:

“thematic analysis overlaps with some forms of ‘discourse analysis’ (which are sometimes specifically referred to as ‘thematic discourse analysis’” (e.g., Singer & Hunter, 1999; Taylor & Ussher, 2001), where broader assumptions, structures and/or meanings are theorised as underpinning what is actually articulated in the data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.13).

The adaptation of thematic analysis to discourse has previously been outlined by Taylor and Ussher (2001). In their study a thematic analysis method was applied to interview data from “twenty-four self-identified sadomasochists…. to generate a four-factor definition of SM” (Taylor & Ussher, 2001).

The researcher included thematic analysis as a process in his analytic method as it encourages an active role to be taken up in relation to the data:

“An account of themes ‘emerging’ or being ‘discovered’ is a passive account of the process of analysis, and it denies the active role the researcher always plays in identifying patterns/themes, selecting which are of interest, and reporting them to the readers” (Taylor & Ussher, 2001; cited in Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.7).

According to the guidelines by Braun and Clarke (2006) an important decision for those utilising thematic analysis is the decision of whether to use an inductive or theoretical thematic form of analysis. An inductive approach means that the themes are driven by the participants not the researcher, whereas a theoretical approach is driven by the researcher’s theoretical and analytical interest in the area (Braun and Clarke 2006). The theoretical thematic analysis was chosen by the researcher as it facilitated the research question to be addressed via the prism of Lacanian structural theory.

The coding was informed by Lacanian theory and the researcher adopted an ethical position during data collection, analysis and write-up as detailed in the Lacanian discourse analysis method (Parker, 2005). This meant that the broader assumptions and meanings of Lacanian structural theory could be considered as underpinning what was evidenced in the data. Table 7.1 outlines the analytical hierarchy adapted from Braun and Clarke’s six stages of analysis that was used for this study (Braun and Clarke, 2006):
TABLE 7.1 ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY BASED ON BRAUN AND CLARKE (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical Process</th>
<th>Braun and Clarke</th>
<th>Strategic Objective</th>
<th>Iterative process throughout analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Braun &amp; Clarke, 2006).</td>
<td>Practical Application in NVivo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Familiarizing yourself with the data**
   - Transcribed data by hand, reading and re-reading the data, marked verbal / non-verbal utterances, pauses, stutters, repetitions and stunted sentences. Noted initial ideas.

2. **Generating initial codes:**
   - Phase 1 - Open Coding - Converted each interview to a digital format. Coded for structural indicators in a systematic fashion across the entire data set.

3. **Searching for themes:**
   - Phase 2 - Categorisation of Codes - Collated codes into 3 potential categories, gathered data relevant to each and entered data in NVivo data management software.

4. **Reviewing themes:**
   - Phase 3 - Coding on - Revisited the data - Final themes chosen and thematic headings established producing a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis generated.

5. **Defining and naming themes:**
   - Phase 4 - Data Reduction - Refined the specifics of each theme, and the analytic story, generating clear definitions and names for each theme

6. **Producing the report**
   - Phase 5 - Generating Analytical Memos/Proposition Statements
   - Phase 6 - Testing and Validating
   - Phase 7 - Synthesising Analytical Memos/Proposition Statements. Selection of appropriate examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a comprehensive report of the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Management</th>
<th>Assigning data (repetitions) to particular concepts (Psychoanalytic theory) to infer meaning (unconscious formation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Open and hierarchal coding by hand)</td>
<td>Refining and distilling more abstract concepts (Indicators of Structure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive Accounts</td>
<td>Assigning data to concepts (Indicators of Structure) to portray meaning (Psychopaths use language that indicate they are outside discourse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Accounts</td>
<td>Assigning meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generating themes and concepts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As described in Section 6.5 - Developing the Thesis the researcher marked instances of language disturbance in the transcribed interview text. The researcher took his lead from Parker who listed the phenomena that ought to be marked in Qualitative Psychology: Introducing Radical Research:

“You need to indicate who is speaking, what emphasis there might be in the speech, points of interruption and overlap, moments of hesitation, a note about the bits of the interview you could not understand, and some explanation about other things going on that the reader might need to know to make sense of the text” (Parker, 2005a, p.65).

Indicators of structure were coded from the interviews and against each instance an annotation was attached detailing the significance of the data as it applied to Lacanian structural theory:

- Participant 4, Line 166-168, Speaking about his father

“Eh, my father was eh. He would have been an alcoholic, and (pause) one side of him out on the street was this happy go lucky person eh but on the inside when he got home there was an awful lot of roaring and shouting”

[Researchers note: The Other of the law is not consistent].

As detailed in Section 6.3 - Psychoanalytically informed interview the principal supervisor and researcher met, discussed and correlated the recurring patterns in the data for each interview. When all interviews were transcribed and coded a final meeting produced consensus regarding the main categories. This phase of analysis highlighted that the two questions originally asked needed to be reconceptualised using the prism of Lacanian theory.

The question around Anxiety was replaced with a category of the Relationship to the object a.
The question around Authority was replaced with a category of the Relationship to the big Other.
The category of Language was additionally recognised in the data.
The analytic process described in the previous section brought the researcher back to the aim of the study and the determination/differentiation between structures based on these three categories. The interview data was re-visited and a selection of codes was established as below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Relationship to the object a</strong></th>
<th><strong>Relationship to the Other</strong></th>
<th><strong>Language</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to Death/the Real</td>
<td>Makes own rules</td>
<td>Slips of the tongue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avatars of the Object</td>
<td>Seeking justice / Protecting the weak</td>
<td>bungled actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being the Aggressor</td>
<td>Lack of clarity around who represents the Law</td>
<td>surprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jouissance (émeute)</td>
<td>Appearance and Reality (an inconsistent law)</td>
<td>overemphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of feeling</td>
<td>Goading the Law</td>
<td>unfinished sentences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what am I not seeing here?</td>
<td>Machiavellian way of taking advantage of the situation</td>
<td>mixed metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mistrust)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the counterpart</td>
<td>Refusal to represent the Law for others</td>
<td>equivocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having children as entrance into empathic feeling</td>
<td>retraction</td>
<td>negation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mis-recognitions</td>
<td>being recognised by the Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mis-understanding rules</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>splitting (turns the tables)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives with a deficit that is not symbolised.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7.2 SELECTION OF CODES**

Each category was assigned a colour allowing the data to be read more easily and the coded data from transcriptions was updated accordingly. Additional notes were included against each instance of colour coded interview data relating to its categorisation.
At this phase, the researcher became concerned that the dissemination of these complex analytic processes might prove problematic. As described in Section 6.4 - Data Storage, disposal and dissemination, the researcher chose as part of his dissemination strategy to utilise NVivo software to address this: organising and graphically representing the coding and analytic processes.

The codes from Table 7.2 Selection of codes were expanded on resulting in fifty-three themes in Nvivo (Appendix M). These themes came to inform the researcher’s choice of twelve thematic headings. The development of themes and thematic headings based on coding allowed the researcher to re-examine the data in a systematic manner. However, the identification of these themes was not the end, but instead marked the next stage of analysis.

By exploring the patterns in the analytic process the researcher articulated three proposition statements (Section 6.5 - Evolution of Research Process). The researcher, informed by Lacanian structural theory, linked the thematic analysis into a more comprehensive model of what was found. Outliers in the data were recorded and analysed in relation to the rest of the data. For example, the data collected for Participant 3 differed significantly from that of the other four participants who were interviewed. This data was not elided but integrated into the overall model which the researcher explores further in Section 8.5 - Sociopathy or Psychopathy.

By using NVivo software the researcher was able to address his concerns around difficulties in dissemination. In Appendix M he displays a comprehensive thematic analysis of the data set in an output extracted from NVivo software. This graphical representation of the thematic analysis phases from coding of themes through to the development of proposition statements makes the dissemination of the analytic process more straightforward.
7.3 LACANIAN STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

The researcher recorded three indicators of psychical structure in his review of literature on Lacanian structural theory: ‘Language’, ‘Relation to the object a’ and ‘Relation to the Other’. In reviewing this literature some significant aspects of theory stood out for the researcher. Their significance was reinforced by his study of the data amassed from the emergent themes. In particular, a connection between authority, anxiety and violence in psychopathy was observed. Anxiety and Jouissance was therefore chosen as a defined and named theme in phase 5 of the thematic analysis (Appendix M). In Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy the researcher presents participants’ speech around their experiences of Anxiety and Jouissance and he notes two distinct ways they responded to these experiences: physical aggression or subversive resistance.

In Section 3.3. - The beginning of the late Lacan, the researcher presented Lacan’s inclusion the word “émeute” (riot) in his description of the bottom left antipode of the Anxiety chart (Figure 3.6). This position is represented in the chart by the word “émoi” (turmoil) but Lacan’s addition of the signifier “riot” expresses a particular characteristic that “turmoil” does not. The researcher described in this section that rioting is always in relation to another person or institution whereas turmoil relates to the person’s own intra-psychical experience.

When the researcher was confronted by signifier “émeute” (riot) with its subversive and violent connotations he was reminded of the words and narratives of psychopaths from the literature (Lacan, 1955 [1993]; Biagi-Chai, 2012; De Ganck, 2014). The researcher considers psychopathy to relate to the bottom left antipode in Lacan’s Anxiety chart (Figure 3.6) and the signifier “émeute” (riot). He also aligns the violent and subversive acts described in the literature as possible (psychotic) defensive strategies employed by the subject that might have a stabilizing effect.
One difficulty met with during the analysis was distinguishing between perverse and psychotic indicators in the language used by participants. In a single interview transcript there could be just as many instances indicative of perverse discourse (the participant takes up a subversive position in relation to the law-giving Other) as there were of psychotic discourse (language slips away and the participant speaks from a position outside of discourse). This made the situating of a subject’s use of language as solely perverse or psychotic unachievable.

Similarly, a distinction between the psychotic and perverse experiences of jouissance was not easily evidenced in the data. It was not possible to situate the intense experiences of aggression spoken of by participants as uniquely perverse or psychotic. In a single interview transcript there were instances describing both jouissance-laden aggressive outbursts (acting-out) and acts more closely related to the expression of the drives (Passage à l’acte - émeute [riot]).

However, the researcher did find it possible to distinguish between psychotic and non-psychotic (Neurotic/Perverse) indicators in participants’ use of language and relationship to jouissance. In Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy the researcher presents his findings in regard to this binary. Miller signified “ordinary psychosis” in his attempt to address this binary and the researcher identified parallels with this formulation in his findings. In the next three sections the researcher examines the indicators of structure, particularly in perversion and psychosis as recognised in Relation to the object a, Relation to the Other and Language.
As outlined in the previous section, the distinction between psychosis and perversion based on the subject’s experience of jouissance was not easily evidenced in the study’s data. In a bid to differentiate between neurotic and non-neurotic (perverse/psychotic) indicators in the data the researcher approached the data with four indicators of non-neurotic (perverse) structure as outlined by Swales (2011).

1. The subject’s experience of jouissance and anxiety

Swales theorises that the perverse subject has an inadequately installed paternal function and is overwhelmed by anxiety when confronted with the Other:

“The pervert's problem... is that he experiences an unmanageable amount of anxiety or jouissance in his relation to the Other because he lacks a signifier for the Other's desire, S(A)” (Ibid., p.54).

There are two movements in the operation of the paternal metaphor; alienation and separation. In alienation, the law-giving Other prohibits jouissance and as a consequence:

“the person's psychical processes are split into conscious and unconscious (Swales, 2011, p.xviii).

In separation, the care-giving Other expresses something of her lack and desire outside of the dualistic relationship with the child and this:

“opens up a symbolic space for the child to move into his or her own subject position” (Ibid.).

Swales states that the operation of separation does not happen in perversion as the subject:

“is stuck identifying with being the actual object of the Other’s jouissance” (Ibid.).

In the Findings chapter the researcher presents extracts from the speech of some psychopaths that indicate a failure of both movements: alienation and separation (Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to knowledge & Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to jouissance).

2. Choice of structure as a defence against the Real

As he lacks a signifier for the Other’s desire the perverse subject experiences “an unmanageable amount of anxiety…. Perversion is a strategy for... setting limits to jouissance” (Swales, 2012, p.54).

3. Relationship to the Other’s jouissance

In Seminar X (1962), Lacan revealed that the perverse subject seeks to make him or herself into an instrument of the Other's jouissance/enjoyment/anxiety. Swales differentiates between the neurotic relation to the Other’s jouissance and the perverse:
“However, the hysteric (and the neurotic in general) staunchly refuses to be the instrument of
the Other’s jouissance” (Ibid., p.95).

4. The object a
The oral drive object is the most primitive and is associated with a physical need (hunger), whereas
the anal object is the first drive object the infant encounters that is ‘yieldable’. This yieldability is
more applicable to the infant’s entrance into the social. In this respect Freud noted in Character and
Anal Erotism the particular quality of faeces to represent a gift, calling it “the devils gold” (Freud,
1908, p.174). The scopic and invocatory drive objects are even more closely related to the social
realm and operate more closely to desire than to demand or need (Swales, 2012). The researcher
distinguishes the primitive oral object from the other objects further in the Discussion chapter (Section
9.2 - Lack of fear).

In this regard, Lacan identifies a correlation between the operation of each drive object and the
generation of a particular type of anxiety (Lacan, 1962, p.243). The researcher outlined in Section 3.3
- Lacan and the object a that although this might theoretically allow for the categorization of anxiety
based on drive object, Lacan considers that in practice the subjective experience of the drive objects
are inseparable.

Lacan here differentiates between psychoanalytic theory and psychoanalytic practice and the
researcher is further reminded that this study is an applied version of psychoanalytic theory that will
always fail to represent the particularity of the subject’s experience: a limitation of psychoanalytic
research that is expanded on in Section 9.6 - Psychoanalytic validity.

In the chapter eight the researcher details his findings based on this study’s population:
- That no limit was set to the psychopath’s experience of jouissance (Section 8.2 - The
psychopath’s relation to jouissance)
- That an extreme form of anxiety was experienced by psychopaths (Section 8.2 - Anxiety and
the cession of the object)
- That the psychopaths might attempt to make him or herself the object of the Other’s
jouissance (Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy)
- That the drives are experienced as non-phallicised by psychopaths and relate more closely
demand rather that desire (Section 8.7 - The demands of the Other as determining jouissance).
As outlined in chapter 4, Lacanian structural theory theorizes that the subject’s familial constellation has a determining effect on their structure (Biagi-Chai, 2012; Swales 2012; De Ganck, 2014). The researcher was therefore mindful to analyse the subject’s relationship to both the law-giving and the care-giving Other:

1. **Position adopted in relation to the law-giving Other**

   Separation is a logical moment with two related processes
   
   i. Acceptance or disavowal of castration and the Law
   
   ii. Situating the Other's lack in the Other's desire or the Other's jouissance.

Swales evidences in her case studies that although the law-giving Other exists for the perverse subject, it is only installed “precariously”. It is noted that in perversion the subject:

   “fervently tries to make the Other whole and to give it a stable existence” (Swales, 2012, p.55).

The perverse subject’s relationships with their father, mother and other representatives of either the law-giving or care-giving Others are not normative (neurotic) and a perverse structure can be determined on this basis. The father as the law-giving Other and representative of the Law is undermined.

The process of separation involves the fantasy changing from $ <> D (the split subject in relation to the Other's demand) to $<>a (the split subject in relation to the object-cause of the Other's desire). This process does not take place for the perverse subject who remains a $ (split subject) with an object that is an actual object and not a lack (a):

   “Prior to separation, the object that supports the fantasy $ <> D is an actual object, a presence. After separation, the object that supports the fantasy $<>a is a real-order object, an absence, or a lack” (Ibid., p.56).

Another consequence of a “precariously installed lawgiving Other” is that compared to neurotics, the perverse have a small capacity for guilt “because the moral law exists only shakily for them” (Ibid., p.8). It follows that a subject who feels little or no guilt is not neurotic and a lack of guilt is a structural indicator of a perverse or psychotic structure:

   “Guilt is a hallmark of a neurotic structure that corresponds to inhibition of impulses related to the firm instatement of the paternal function and symbolic order” (Ibid., p.82).
Miller points to an irony in Lacan’s theory of psychosis in his 2013 presentation, *The Other without Other*. The mainspring of psychosis is indicated not by foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father but by a law-giving Other that is too present:

“Lacan’s irony on père-version in fact gives a theory of psychosis that is opposite to the one that has remained classic. It is not the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father that is the mainspring of psychosis, but on the contrary, the excessive presence of the Name-of-the-Father. The father must not confuse himself with the Other of the law. It is necessary, on the contrary for him to have a desire attached to and regulated by a fantasy whose object is a structurally lost jouissance” (Miller, 2013, p.8).

From his reading of the theoretical literature, the researcher found a brutal law-giving Other described in relation to psychopaths; a version of the law-giving Other that might well be described as, excessively present or as “social monster” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.189). One of De Ganck’s participants presented his monstrous father:

“My parents are dangerous, miss, especially my father. Give him a gun and he will shoot you” (De Ganck, 2014, p.165).

The literature supports Miller’s theory that, rather than having a weak representation of the law, the law may be installed too well for psychopaths. The researcher explores this in relation to this study’s findings in Section 8.2- *The psychopaths relation to knowledge* (pp.197-199).

2. Position adopted in relation to the care-giving Other

Subjective structure may be indicated by the relationship to the care-giving Other, most often the m(O)ther. The perverse subject for example attempts to make his m(O)ther whole, believing that he completes her.

The literature on psychopathy points to a caring and loving relationship with the care-giving Other. However this care-giving Other still holds the monstrous law-giving Other in high regard and will not betray him. This is problematic for the young psychopath and one of De Ganck’s participants spoke of this paradoxical position:

“I don’t care if my father becomes threatening and things go wrong again. That’s not the only thing that frightens me. (…) I found big and small weapons at home. (…) So my mother is involved again, she has begun to hide my father’s weapons and stuff. That’s what I can’t agree with” (De Ganck, 2014, p.130).

In the chapter eight the researcher details his findings based on this study’s population:

- That the psychopath did not experience guilt normatively (*Section 8.3 - Criminals from a lack of guilt*)
• That the psychopath has an “excessively present” law-giving Other (*Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to knowledge*)

• That the psychopath has a relationship with the care-giving Other that was more libinally invested than that of normative subjects (*Section 8.7 - The demands of the Other as determining jouissance*).
Just as jouissance, the distinction between psychosis and perversion was not easily evidenced in the study’s data based on the subject’s use of language. However the researcher was able to distinguish between non-neurotic and neurotic structures more readily. The work of Swales (2012), Lucas (2003) and Miller (1997, 2002) informed this differentiation:

1. **Formations of the unconscious**

Structural indicators include formations of the unconscious (slips, jokes, parapraxes and symptoms), the position assumed in relation to the (big) Other and what comes to represent their subjective lack (object a).

Swales lists the unconscious manifestations which the psychoanalyst interprets as meaningful:

“The analyst's ear is tuned in to verbal and affective manifestations of the unconscious such as slips of the tongue, tales of bungled actions, surprise, overemphasis, unfinished sentences, equivocal word usage, negation, and unprovoked denials - all of which indicate a multiplicity of meanings” (Swales, 2012, pp.15-16).

Miller also lists the formations of the unconscious as: the slip, the joke, the mistake and the symptom. He does however distinguish the symptom as being of a different nature to the others:

“But the symptom, as such, doesn’t seem to be related to a wanting-to-say” (Miller, 1997).

This researcher considered this distinction significant and as a result did not attempt to identify symptoms in the speech of the participants. Miller remarks:

“[the symptom] acquires its formal envelope in the transference. Only its inclusion in the circuit of speech permits the “wanting-to-say” of the symptom” (Ibid.).

The formations of the unconscious that the researcher did identify in the data were slips, jokes and mistakes where there is a “wanting-to-say” and the subject says something even if they don’t know that they do.

Miller exemplifies this with a demonstration of how jokes work:

“A joke is the triumph of the “wanting-to-say” to the extent that, according to Freud, it’s finally the other that appropriates it and gains a bonus of pleasure greater than that of the sender himself. The mistake is the equivalent of a slip in action” (Ibid.).

2. **Points de Capiton**

Lucas writes of psychosis theoretically by analysing *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (Schreber, 1955). Her writing is of significance to Lacanian research analysis and this study in particular as she offers
an indicator of psychotic structure: the absence of the ‘Master’ signifier as a point de capiton (quilting point). Some participants in this study demonstrated this absence in their speech:

“One of the central postulates - the third tier - is that upon the semiotic collision with the ‘rent’ or ‘abyss’ in place of the foreclosed signifier (the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father), the signifying structure of the latent psychotic shatters, and the connection to the Øther (as barred Other) breaks. To the extent that the link with the Øther is severed, there are no ‘real’ others; only ‘fleeting-improvised-men,’ or evanescent elements of Schreber's shattered signifying structure. With Schreber's signifying structure quite literally in pieces, there is no longer a master signifier, a point de capiton to 'secure' his position in the world (existentially speaking). As such, he occupies various places (various identities) via the continual recombination (the glissement) of these signifying fragments. Insofar as there is nothing to 'hold the world in place,' Schreber and his 'universe' continually shift in a kaleidoscopic manner” (Lucas, 2003).

Miller also emphasises the particular quality of interrupted sentences in psychotic language as evidenced in Schreber’s memoirs:

“It is only when the relation of the signifier to the signifier is interrupted, when there is a broken chain, an interrupted sentence, that the symbol rejoins the real. But it does not rejoin it under the form of representation. The signifier rejoins the real in a fashion which leaves no room for doubt. Just look at President Schreber's interrupted sentences. In the interrupted sentence, the signifier does not represent the least part of the real world. It makes an irruption there; that is to say that a part of the symbolic becomes real. It is in this that “schizophrenia,” such as it is redefined, can be said to be the measure of psychosis” (Miller, 2002).

3. **Negations**

Swales in her work on the Lacanian structure of perversion identified particular linguistic indicators of perverse structure:

a. Then perverse subject refuses to accept that there is something that cannot be said:

“because the perverse subject is a slave to maintaining the fiction that the Other is complete, the pervert refuses to acknowledge that there is something that cannot be said or known” (Swales, 2012, p.100).

b. When the subject meets with languages inability to say everything the perverse subject disavows those limits:

“Confronted with a failure of language, the pervert is motivated to negate - often by way of disavowal - those limits” (Ibid.).
This lack in the Other of language makes the perverse subject anxious; as he also felt anxious on realisation of the lack in the m(O)ther.

In the chapter eight the researcher details his findings based on this study’s population:

- The psychopath mixes or confuses metaphors (Section 8.7 - The demands of the Other as determining jouissance)
- The psychopath can speak from more than one subjective position: a “glissement” or sliding position (Section 8.10 - The psychopath’s relation to Language - Bits and Pieces)
- The real can enter the psychopath’s language and there is a representation of the void instead of any representation. Participant 2 breaks wind and there is a language disturbance as he speaks of breaking the rules of the gang (Section 8.4 - The psychopath and the mentor)
- Negations - disavows the limit of language placing two contradictory statements side by side (Section 8.10 - The psychopath’s relation to Language - Bits and Pieces).

The section has outlined how the subject’s relationships to the object a, to the Other and to language can be indicative of structure. In the next section the researcher examines how these may also be considered as having a causal relationship with structure.
As outlined in chapter four, Lacanian structural theory demonstrates that particular traits or compensations may be employed by the psychotic subject as a way of treating the underlying psychosis (Miller, 2009/2011a; Biagi-Chai, 2012/2015; Guéguen, 2010). These compensations may have a ‘coloration’ and a psychotic may be said to have a perverse trait even though structurally they are psychotic. There is a base psychotic structure but within that there may be neurotic, perverse or psychotic traits grafted on as a temporary compensatory solution. The clinic of late Lacan shows that there are myriad ways to bind and knot the three registers together for the subject in their particularity (Section 4.3 - Extra-Ordinary Psychosis).

In Seminar III, Lacan links psychosis with a failure of the unconscious to function:

“Our starting point is this - the unconscious is present but not functioning. Contrary to what has been thought, the fact that it's present doesn't imply solution but, on the contrary, a very special inertia” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.137).

As described earlier in this chapter, the subject splits their psychical processes into conscious and unconscious during the operation of alienation, which depends on a prohibition of jouissance (Section 7.3 - Structural indicators in relation to the object a). Therefore the subject’s relation to jouissance and the operation of alienation are intrinsically connected. In L'inconscient à ciel ouvert de la psychose, Soler not only proposes that the operations of separation and alienation may determine the presentation in the psychoses, but also that the variants may be distinguished from each other based on the installation or failure of each operation. She links a failure in the operation of alienation to autism and schizophrenia while paranoia is linked to the failure of separation (Soler, 2008, pp.118-121).

The researcher has outlined in Table 7.3 the determinants in relation to jouissance for each psychotic presentation:
### TABLE 7.3 WAYS OF BEING IN PSYCHOSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Way of being psychotic</th>
<th>Type of Jouissance</th>
<th>Who or what enjoys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paranoia</td>
<td>Jouissance of the Other</td>
<td>The Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schizophrenia</td>
<td>Jouissance of the body</td>
<td>The subject’s body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melancholia</td>
<td>Jouissance of being the object/waste</td>
<td>The object (the faeces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erotomania <em>(i)</em></td>
<td>Jouissance of the Other</td>
<td>The Other enjoys the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mania <em>(ii)</em></td>
<td>Jouissance beyond meaning, the Symbolic and Language</td>
<td>The Symbolic/Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autism <em>(iii)</em></td>
<td>Jouissance of the rim</td>
<td>The orifices/edge/rim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychopathy</td>
<td>Jouissance of the law-giving Other</td>
<td>The law-giving Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes (*):

(i) Erotomania may be considered as the other side of paranoia in which the Other enjoys the subject. As Lacan indicated in *Seminar III*, an erotomania can develop into a delusion of persecution. In this context, Lacan highlighted Schreber’s relationship with Flechsig which was amorous until the love object (Flechsig) took a persecutory form in the delusions development:

> “Flechsig had already been elevated for him to the value of an eminent paternal character. The function of paternity had previously already been put on alert or in suspension. We know from his testimony that he had hoped to become a father, that over the period of eight years separating the first from the second crisis his wife had had several spontaneous abortions. Now, Flechsig said to him that since the previous occasion enormous progress has been made in psychiatry and that they are going to give him one of those short sleeps that will be very fertile. Perhaps this was just the thing not to say. From this moment our Schreber no longer slept and that night he tried to hang himself” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], pp.280-281).

(ii) In mania the subject seeks to be “unburden[ed] of the weight of meaning and affinity with jouissance” (Soler, 1991). Whereas the extraction of object a in non-psychotic subjects causes a punctuation, in mania; as the object is not extracted nothing is lacking and they are unburdened. There is a flight of metonymy. Language as the symbolic may be considered to enjoy the subject in mania.

(iii) In Lacanian theory, autism is not reducible to a childhood form of psychosis:

> “There is psychosis in childhood insofar as the clinical form of psychosis as an unconscious structure can be triggered-off in childhood, but there is not an infantile psychosis because the structure itself is atemporal” (Cottes, 2003, p.2).
The researcher notes that with regard to jouissance and who enjoys in psychopathy, it is the law-giving Other (the monstrous father) who is implicated. The psychopath is seen in the literature to seek the destruction/subversion of representatives of the law-giving Other. Biagi-Chai situates psychopathy as a psychosis with the defence mechanism of foreclosure. Therefore no phallicisation has occurred, neither operation of separation nor alienation happens and the psychopath must mediate their experience of jouissance via some other means.
As detailed by the researcher in *Section 3.3 - Primordial versions of the object a* Lacan understood there to be a primitive drive, the “lamella” that precedes the partial drives but never-the-less can have a coloration. Like the partial drives, the lamella is not without lack or loss. However this lack is not representable at the symbolic of imaginary level, it is real. For Verhaeghe, Lacan’s conceptualization of ‘real’ lack and ‘the drive’ indicates a “primal castration” (Verhaeghe, 1999, [Note 51] p.98).

In *Section 3.3 - Primordial versions of the object a* the researcher also highlights that in psychosis a real lack at the level of the body is represented. Verhaeghe calls this a ‘radical lack’ and situates it as:

“anterior to the lack of the signifying chain between mother and child” (Ibid.).

There is a theoretical implication that arises from the concepts of ‘primal castration’ and ‘radical lack’:

The psychotic subject, who is unable to position an analyst as a subject-supposed-to-know may use their primitive experience of this real, libidinal objectality to presume onto the analyst a know-how related to it. The researcher postulates that an anteriority in knowledge of this ‘radical lack’ can be presumed onto the analyst by the psychopathic (psychotic) analysand, making analytic work possible.

There is a double movement necessary for a 'phallisication' and Verhaeghe states that:

“This means that the first, real lack is 'answered' as the second lack, the one in the Symbolic. Thus, the primordial loss on the level of the organism is re-interpreted as a phallic lack in the relation between subject and Other. Object *a* becomes associated with the bodily borderlines, orifices through which other losses take place” (Ibid., p.100).

The psychotic subject does not re-interpret this primordial loss as a phallic loss, but still must address bodily phenomena or ‘lamella’: the primordial form of the libido. The researcher theorises as to the genesis and associated templates for primordial loss in *Section 9.2 - Lack of fear*.

Before the object *a* becomes associated with the bodily borderlines and orifices through which losses take place; there is a primordial loss. As detailed in *Section 9.2 - Lack of fear*, Lacan situates the baby’s first cry and the meconium as primitive templates that represent “originative anxiety” (Lacan, 1962, p.326). Lacan distinguished between these on the basis of their oral and anal quality respectively. The researcher, like Lacan recognizes an orality or anality that precedes the institution of the partial drives and the oral/anal objects.
7.5 INTERVIEW VIGNETTE - PARTICIPANT 5

To protect the participant's identity, the researcher has changed people's names and disguised the locations spoken of by the participant in the following vignette. Biographical details are included to give context. The case is formulated around three theoretical points of reference:

(i) Language disturbance
(ii) Position in relation to authority figures
(iii) Experience of anxiety/jouissance.

**Biography**

Kevin is the middle child of seven brothers who was born and raised in Dublin’s city centre. He describes his childhood self as impulsive and was always “the first to climb, the first to fall and first to you know, do everything”. He spoke of having been a loyal boy (“You never leave anyone behind”) with a sense of justice (“I hated people who took advantage of other people”). In his family life he frequently bore witness to domestic violence perpetrated by his father on his mother and subsequently suffered the projected punishments that his mother meted out onto her children:

“My mam would have been on the receiving end of it. So like... And I suppose like ... I actually was talkin to someone about this. She took out her frustrations on us because she was on the receiving end of me Da, do you know what I mean?”

Kevin also described his neighbourhood as violent:

“like f-first [stutter] thing I remember was eh if they hit you with a stick hit them with a bigger stick”.

He learned a strategy for dealing with these threats from his father, who passed on a mantra which Kevin said he lived his life by:

“Knock him out. You can always apologise later”.

Kevin has six children from three separate relationships and related that his past relationships have been turbulent. He was distant and apathetic when these partners called on him for emotional support. Kevin aligns his apathy to a deficit in his emotional awareness, mistrusting the intentions of others, including his partners.

Kevin has been in recovery for substance misuse (alcohol, heroin and cocaine) for four years and participates in a program that is helping him to find an alternative to the violence that has been integral to his life thus far. Kevin had a heightened mistrust of others when he was using cocaine:

“That’s borderin on sorta paranoia and like at one stage I’d of lived bleedin deep in that cos of being a cocaine user”.

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In recent years Kevin has mitigated the effects of his paranoia by limiting his contact to a small circle of friends and family:

“But since I’ve been clean I just don’t interact with people in the sense that, like ... I can count the friends I have on one hand, that I have, that I trust..., do you know what I mean. Everybody else pays cash, if you catch my drift”.

Kevin’s now adult children, have told him that they were frightened of him growing up and that he was “not like other dads”. Those who have been in relationships with Kevin have similarly recognised aspects of his personality are not normative:

“I’ve been called sorta... “psycho” Do you know what I mean. Like my partner said to me I’m a bit mad. You know. Well I don’t know if she’s me ex-partner now cos I told her to fuck off recently there, so. She was doing my head in so. Em. But she sorta said it to me a couple of times I’m not normal”.

Kevin was sentenced to seventeen years (two years suspended) based on two charges related to drug dealing. However, Kevin disputes the first charge and considers the prosecution that resulted from the second to have been illegal. Kevin has always had difficulty with the decisions of those in authority:

“That’s why I’ve always had a thing with authority cos for me authority doesn’t say, doesn’t do what it says on the tin”.

Kevin was released from prison in 2011, but was rearrested soon after and taken back to prison. Officials stated that he owed them two weeks for loss of remission. Kevin addressed a complaint to the Governor but she “didn’t give a rats” and was “baiting” or goading him, knowing as she did, his previous “run-ins” with governors and how he had “knocked them out”. However in this final “run-in” Kevin managed not to react even though “part of me just wanted to lift her over the counter and strangle her”. He returned to his cell and contacted his solicitor who got him released after a week. He did however miss his son’s birthday in the meantime and regrets this.

Kevin did an access course for university and is now studying for a law degree. Kevin described having gone through “a sort of journey, a process” where he discovered that “the pen is mightier than the sword” and that he has learned that “there’s a time to reap, there’s a time to sorta react and there’s a time not to react”. This has allowed him to have “a better balance” in life whereas before this journey “if someone got in your way, just step over them, just take what you need out of them”.

**Case Formulation**

Kevin scored 4.27 out of 5 on the SRP-III screening tool which was the second highest score of the thirteen participants. The interpretative diagnostic conclusion (case formulation) for Kevin is that he
is structurally psychotic. This is based on three propositions (i) his use of language (language disturbances, neologisms, transitivistic positioning in speech and confused metaphorisation), (ii) his relationship to the Other (specifically the law-giving Other as represented by figures of authority in his life) and (iii) his experience of anxiety (a short-circuited psychotic form of extreme anxiety understood by the researcher as: a short-circuit in the relay of jouissance and desire as detailed in Section 8.2 - Anxiety and the cession of the object). Appendix M demonstrates the interpretative path taken by the researcher in the development of these propositions from the coded data (p.350). On completion of this chart the psychoanalytic analysis of the interview data began.

Use of Language
Kevin had twenty-one instances of language disturbance in total. These included repetitions, negations, neologisms, confused use of metaphors and a fluidic sense of identity expressed in his language (transitivism):

1. A neologism (“them-ings”)
   “Since I’ve got out I’ve been more mindful around things and I’ve taken on a program and I’m sort of, I’m learning themings. [incoherent word - sounds like “them” and “things” combined - “themings”].”

2. Confusion in the use of metaphor
   “The prison officers mean nothing to me in a sense that like there’s no point chopping off, going after the Indians if the chief is here [Researcher’s note in margin: Metaphors confused], you know, if you’re going for - if you want to get your point heard or you wanna get where you want to go there’s no point talking to the organ grinder, or the monkey [mistake and corrected] it’s the organ grinder you want”.

3. A transitivistic position when speaking
   “I don’t feel the same things as normal people ... things don’t affect me the way a normal person affects [Mis-saying - “the way a normal person is affected” - Confusion over who is the active party and who is passive party being affected]. Stupid little things might affect me more so than something that was serious”.

4. Language disturbance
Kevin is able to distinguish and differentiate between fear and anxiety. He explained that he does not experience fear normatively but does become anxious and stressed especially in relationships. This dichotomy was also communicated unconsciously via his language. When Kevin described
his memories of feeling fearful both the personal pronoun and the verb were notably absent in the sentence structure:

“Can’t remember what being in fear [words missing]”.

Alternatively when Kevin spoke about his experience of anxiety there was a language disturbance as he repeated both the personal pronoun and verb:

“but like em anxiety and stress like I, I, like, in the relationships I’d get a bit anxious around relationships”.

**Relationship to the Other as represented by authority figures in his life**

Kevin differentiates between his paternal and maternal relationships based on their expressions of violence toward him:

“So, em..., but she would have been ..., she would’ve hit ya more than me Da would have hit ya, but me Da would have hit ya harder when like... Ya knew when you were going to get a baitin off your Da and ya knew it was going to be a proper baitin. Whereas your Ma would sorta give ya a baitin but it wasn’t a real baitin”.

He carried his experience of violence into adult life and this coloured it with masochism:

“Yes, so like I’ve took a lot. I’ve been in a lot of fights in me day and I’ve took a lot of bangs and all that. Em..., the physical side of things isn’t as bad..., do you know what I mean. Like..., I don’t mind the physical side of things”.

With no aversion to physical violence Kevin laughed as he described a beating he received from the prison guards:

“I can remember taking a baitin off the screws one day and I said..., in the thing..., and I said and..., I was in bits and sorta got onto them and said “Go on outta that me Ma hit me fuckin harder”. Just to annoy them”.

**Psychotic anxiety - a short-circuit in the relay of jouissance and desire**

Kevin is unable to mediate his emotions and he spoke of how this restricts his daily live. He offered his road rage as one example of this:

“No, but I don’t drive actually cos I get too [big breath] frustrated behind the wheel. I get too a...[word missing] I actually went to ... [word missing]. I got out of a car there recently and I was gonna pull your man out of it only he pulled off. Do you know what I mean? So me... road rage is out the window so I’m sort of being told “Look, use public transport””.

Kevin finds it difficult to negotiate ambiguity when communicating with others. He misunderstands what others are saying and this contributes to his mistrust of others:

“Some people don’t say what they mean. They just ..., they say something and then there’s another meaning to it and you’re just like “Hold on a sec! Am I picking this up right?”
Maybe it’s me. I’m..., I just see things in a different way to other people. Things are black and white for me, ya know?.

Kevin has also misinterpreted what people have said to him. However, rather than seeking clarification Kevin has tried to divine their intentions:

“Like if someone says to me..., like we’re sitting in a group there and says: “One of those blokes is an arsehole” and I look around and think “All of them blokes are alright so the arsehole must be me then” do you know what I mean”.

The inverse of this operation is also true for Kevin as he expects everyone else to know what he is thinking. Kevin explained that for him to remain ‘contained’, people must do as he wants, even when he refrains from telling them what that is:

“It’s the fact that people aren’t doing, going the way I want it to go. [Laughs] I’m sitting there and I’m sort of saying “If I was in that car I’d be around that corner and gone. You’re holding up all the bleedin traffic here” you know. “Have they nowhere to go to” and like, I don’t know what it is? I’ve been told manys a time, like, I’d actually be foaming at the mouth.... Only your man pulled off; he was coming out that window cos I was right behind his car and I was just at his door and shush [Interviewee makes noise of pulling someone out of car window] Do you know what I mean. And I was left standing in the street fuckin [pause] frothin”.

Perceived threats are acted against immediately by Kevin:

“If you think someone’s going to hit you, knock them out and sure you can always say ‘Sorry about that, didn’t mean to’”.

**Additional psychotic indicators**

Kevin sees a pre-destined future for himself:

“You’re judged already before you go in, it’s a pre-conceived judgement do you know what I mean and ya go in, ya go into a, a [stumbles over words] facility”.

He considers himself a righteous criminal:

“I wouldn’t say I always got a buzz when I hit out at somebody I think , I think for me like ya know it was always sort of [pause] doing the right thing, ya know what I mean this is the right thing cos I believed in my head like this is the right thing. This is the only way you’re going to get noticed is, this is, when you do this, you”.

Kevin presents that he is a priori justified in his violent actions. He conveyed this by using the word “wrath”, which is synonymous with vengeance, when speaking about his temper:
“Like most people have a step, it’s sort of annoyance or irritation, then sort of, you know, builds up and then to grief but I just go from normal into wrath in milliseconds, You know. ‘Phew’”.

Kevin negates the notion that he is responsible and explains that he lacks conscious control of his action in certain instances, and so by association these instances are allied to the unconscious:

“Once I go into that stage then you know, I’m not saying I’m not responsible for what happens but like I don’t have control over what I do then and when I come out of it”.

Appendix K presents the researcher’s interpretations when the proposition statements were applied to the interview data. The indicators of psychosis for each participant were systematically addressed and compared to the others, allowing the researcher to distinguish between the psychotic (psychopathic) and non-psychotic participants (pp.344-347). Kevin was considered to be psychotic based on the material presented in this section.
7.6 SUMMARY

This chapter gave an overview of the two analytic processes utilised for this study. The researcher outlined the adaptation of a thematic analysis as the means to organise and manage the data. He then detailed how this data management process facilitated a psychoanalytic analysis of the data informed by Lacanian structural theory. The researcher revisited the indicators of structure met with in his review of the literature on Lacanian structural theory and detailed how he employed these in his analytic method. The Lacanian theoretical concept of the lamella (primitive drive) was introduced and the researcher described how this concept could be applied to the question of psychopathic structure using the analytic method. An interview vignette was presented at the end of this chapter to illustrate how cases were formulated around particular points of reference from Freudian-Lacanian theory.

In the next chapter, the researcher presents the study findings that the analytic method helped to reveal from the collected data.
CHAPTER 8 FINDINGS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This research demonstrated that an important clinical relationship between psychopathy and psychosis exists for this study’s population. The researcher formulates that psychopathy is a psychosis with perverse, neurotic and psychotic traits grafted on that function to protect the subject from a confrontation with the real. This chapter presents the study findings that informed the researcher’s position. Data in the form of direct participant quotes from the interviews will be presented to support the findings listed below:

1. Psychopaths experience an extreme, psychotic form of anxiety.
2. Psychopaths experience their future as pre-determined and potentially damaging.
3. The psychopathic subject mistrusts representatives of the law-giving Other.
4. There are two variants of psychopathy based the dominant drive (Oral, Anal, Scopic, and Invocatory):
   i. A Riot-mode with a coloration of orality
   ii. A Machiavellian mode with a coloration of anality.
5. Psychopathy can be distinguished from sociopathy based on indicators of a non-neurotic structure:
   i. extreme anxiety
   ii. confused or forgotten actions
   iii. surety in knowledge
   iv. language disturbances including an inability to metaphorise.
6. Psychopaths are ‘subjects-of-jouissance’ (Swales, 2011) rather than subjects-of-desire. This jouissance can be limited.
7. Psychopaths more successfully engage with the society if they have:
   i. a compensatory imaginary identification (being a father, lawyer…)
   ii. a more sophisticated functional relationship to a drive object (scopic/invocatory) than the primitive drive objects of the oral and anal stage; the subject’s jouissance can be curtailed which facilitates more normative access to the social bond.
8. Psychopaths have a talent for obfuscation that may lend itself to an engagement with the social order.
10. Psychopaths lack a means to metaphorise their experience and in the absence of fantasy as a protection from the real they adopt imaginary compensatory identifications.

11. The psychopath is exposed to the experience of bits and pieces of the language (lalangue): the language of the body.

12. Psychopathy presents as a non-delusional, un-triggered and compensated psychosis, an ‘ordinary psychosis’ (Miller, 1998) in which subversive and violent acts serve to stabilize the subject.

13. There are indications of non-normative relationships in psychopathy:
   i. the parent’s bond is an “untied knot” (Biagi-Chai, 2012)
   ii. the representative of the law-giving Other is impotent
   iii. the psychopath may consider him or herself as different to others; toxic and deficient in emotional awareness.

14. The psychopath, unlike some neurotics does not unconsciously seek out punishment by way of their crimes, they are guilt-free criminals.

15. Although there may be an outward appearance of normality, psychopaths exist in a ‘neo-reality’ (Biagi-Chai, 2012) in which they have an a priori conviction that something has happened to them that gives them the right, and even the duty, to redress an injustice perpetrated upon them.

Of the five participants who were interviewed, four (Participants 2, 4, 5 & 8) are now considered to be psychopathic by the researcher. The researcher found that although the other participant (Participant 3) had engaged in violent and maladaptive behaviours, he was structurally different to the other participants. Participant 3 provided the markers for normative reactions and a base upon which comparisons could be made with the other psychopathic participants. This participant was distinguishable from the others based on his relation to language, knowledge, jouissance and responsibility (Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy).

The researcher analysed the discourse of psychopathic participants through the prism of Lacanian psychoanalytic structural theory which allows the unconscious to be studied. However, the unconscious appears only in brief moments, opening and closing in an instant like ‘a rabbit’s nose’. Although this requires ‘a trained ear’ and limits the amount of analysable data, it also concentrates the analysis on particular extracts of data in which the psychoanalytic researcher has recognised formations of the unconscious. As discussed in Section 1.3 - Methodology and Design this allows the researcher to access the unconscious motivations of participants (p.12) which may not be visible via other research methods (Hollway, 2000). Consequently, in some instances extracts from participant interviews were used in more than one category of the analysis. This repetition is also justified by the researcher on the basis of the differentiation between ‘full’ and ‘empty’ speech. In Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory a person’s speech is said to be ‘empty’ when they communicate with another person at the ego to ego level. Alternately ‘full speech’ is considered is meaning-ful. When the often surprising and enigmatic ‘full speech’ of the subject occurs in an analytic interview it may refer to more than one aspect of the study. It may simultaneously demand interpretation as: a disturbance in language, a positioning in relation to the Other and/or, an experience of anxiety/jouissance.
In *Seminar X* Lacan identifies the gaze as one form of the object $a$ and considers the zero point between the eyes as:


Lacan indicates that anxiety is a signal in the relay between jouissance and desire. He proposes that for the subject to move from a position of jouissance to a position of desire they must experience anxiety. For Lacan, it is the very experience of anxiety that nullifies the central object and he equates this nullification with desire:

“The point of desire and the anxiety-point coincide here. However, desire, which here boils down to the nullification of its central object, is not without this other object that anxiety summons up. It is not without object” (Ibid.).

One generally accepted attribute of the psychopath is that they lack anxiety or fear (Lykken, 2000; Hare, 2003; Weibe, 2004; Walsh and Wu, 2008; APA, 2013). However, what was evidenced in the data from this study was that psychopaths experience an extreme, psychotic form of anxiety. They may not ‘feel fear’ but there is an effect, a jouissance. Lacan situates anxiety as a signal of potential danger; a danger that the object will fall away. This falling away is essential to the constitution of the object $a$; which is chosen for its quality of being yieldable:

“I say that the danger in question is bound to the characteristic of cession specific to the constitutive moment of the object $a$” (Ibid., p.324).

Anxiety cannot be avoided as object $a$ will always come to be constituted in some form by the subject. It is the characteristic of being yieldable that makes the object $a$ so relatable. Ironically, the potential danger the subject envisions in the object falling away and becoming yieldable is the very thing anxiety is a signal of.

It is a closed circuit, but not so for the psychopath. The relay in which anxiety is the signal of potential danger is short-circuited in psychopathy. The researcher extracted from the interview data instances when the participants related their non-normative experience of fear or anxiety:

Participant 2 recognises the physiological effects of anxiety but psychological effects seem to be short-circuited for him:
“No, not really. No, you’d have that initial sort of anxiousness but then when it gets goin, it’s alright. And then your kidneys start hurting cos of the adrenaline that’s going through your system” (Participant 2, Lines 488-490).

Participant 4 experiences no fear and a dulled affect:

“Then we took eh cars and stuff like that and I remember leaving and not feeling a thing” (Participant 4, Line 440).

Participant 5 recognises that his affects are experienced differently to normative people:

“I don’t feel the same things as normal people. Do you know what I mean, things don’t affect me the way a normal person affects. Stupid little things might affect me more so than something that was serious” (Participant 5, Lines 196-204).

Participant 8 relates that he is the only family member who was ever involved in crime. He marks himself as different to others and enjoys being different:

“None of the rest of my family’s involved in crime, whatsoever, whatsoever, I’m the only one who, no-one’s ever even got a speeding ticket. Do you know what I mean [laughs]?” (Participant 8, Lines 571-573).

Each of the psychopathic participants detailed an experience of dulled affect in response to scenarios normatively experienced as fear or anxiety inducing. This is not to say there are no affects. Participant 2 described physiological changes in these situations while Participant 5 described how his triggers are non-normative.
The psychopathic participants in this study spoke of experiencing no anxiety around what people might think of them. They detailed a disdain for even being thought of or considered by someone else. Yet each of them spoke of situations in which they reacted in an aggressive and violent manner towards another person. Participant 4 & Participant 5 spoke of these violent acts as a blind rage while Participant 2 & Participant 8 spoke of them as being calculated acts of violence. Each of the four psychopathic participants showed no concern for their victims who were occasionally spoken of as having brought it on themselves:

Participant 2 is predator-like and keeps his head and doesn’t drink so as to have the upper hand:

“Yeah. It’s about being able to distinguish when someone’s full of shit or not and by and large I wouldn’t be a big drinker or anything so being in them situations you’d be able to [pause] usually have the upper hand. Yeah and usually it’s just, people just mouth off so you just let them” (Participant 2, Lines 604-607).

Participant 2 details how he related to victims. Others are impediments to his enjoyment:

“Didn’t. Em. No. [long pause] That’s it. If you were conscious of the victims sure ... [missing words] Yeah. It would just sorta be another thing into the mix, you just forget about them... Just how they’d be dealt with. Another obstacle” (Participant 2, Lines 476-484).

Participant 4 does not consider the victims of a kidnapping and torture he took part in:

“OK em (lipsmack) (pause) We were owed money and eh couldn’t get any money from this fella so we decided to go up to his house and eh we terrorised his family because he wasn’t there. Tied them up and eh (pause) kinda frightened the life out of them. Em and eh took whatever we wanted from the house - it wasn’t that much, it was just to show. Then we took eh cars and stuff like that and I remember leaving and not feeling a thing” (Participant 4, Lines 434-439).

Participant 4 speaks about attacking his father while he was ill in hospital. He did it because his father was giving out to his mother. In the subject’s opinion, his father deserved it:

“Yeah, Oh Yeah I remember em (He made a noise: “stuh”). I had a row with my father for giving out to my mother; I was married at the time. For giving out to my mother or something. Eh he was in the hospital. He was on one of these oxygen masks and he’s an asthmatic, and he was in an awful state and I knew it, but eh I was just so fucking angry with him about the way he was treating my mother and eh I let him have it and I could see his eyes
pleading and I’d seen that so many times before and I got home and he was dead and couldn’t believe it, you know” (Participant 4, Lines 721-727).

Participant 5 does not show concern when relationships break up:

“I’ve been called sorta ‘psycho’ Do you know what I mean. Like my partner said to me I’m a bit mad. You know. Well I don’t know if she’s my ex-partner now cos I told her to fuck off recently there, so. She was doing my head in, so. Em. But she sorta said it to me a couple of times I’m not normal” (Participant 5, Lines 402-406).

Participant 5 relates to people without getting personally involved and is removed from others emotionally:

“Everybody else pays cash. In other words, its business, that’s all. Nothing personal. Do you know what I mean? That’s the way it is for me anyhow” (Participant 5, Lines 512-513).

Participant 8 tests those in authority. If they take up a position of authority he frustrates them and sabotages the class with a side-kick. He has a plan. It is not simply reactive, it’s a deliberate and orchestrated act of subversion and says “I’d just make it my purpose”:

“If the teacher was alright fair enough I got on with them I’d sit down and talk to them. But if they were a bit dictatorial I’d just make it my purpose in life just to wind them up. I’d have a sidekick in the class and we’d just fucking bounce off her - ‘Where’s your homework?’ ‘Fuck you’ [subject’s voice responds to Authority] ‘You where’s your homework?’” (Participant 8, Lines 307-312).

Participant 8 describes feeling worried for others when the handbrake failed on his car and almost ran down a hill. This contrasts with his lack of concern for others before having children of his own:

“Don’t think so, no, no. It’d of been. I’d of been more worried about my car, do you know” (Participant 8, Line 386).
All subject’s are confronted with the Other’s desire and must make a subjectivity defining choice; to go along with (compliance) the desire of the Other or to go against it (defiance). The real of the future anterior is brought into stark sight in this moment:

“What is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what was, since it is no more, nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, but the future anterior as what I will have been, given what I am in the process of becoming” (Lacan, 1953 [2006], p.247 [300]).

This moment is anxiety inducing (normatively) and a choice or cut is required to wrestle the certainty away from anxiety. The researcher names this an inde-cision: an independent cut. This is of the nature of ‘freedom’ but for the psychopath the future anterior fails to operate and their future is experienced as pre-determined and potentially damaging:

Participant 2 explains that even in college he feels a potential threat and must protect himself from an inevitable future in which violence will catch up with him:

“If I go into an auditorium I take up a position to see everything that’s going on. Em the doctors seem to think that it’s a residual legacy of, do you know; hyper-vigilance. From childhood, from that thing of not knowing what’s going to happen and that coupled with abuse, coupled in with it ... to see everything that’s going on in the room. I really don’t like people sitting behind me. I try to sit where there is nobody behind me” (Participant 2, Lines 408-414).

Participant 5 speaks as if it were inevitable that he would go to jail and even when there is no evidence he still gets sentenced which confirms the sense that this is his destiny:

“I got five years for em, when they use [stumble over word “f” sound], even though I wasn’t coming into my house but they called me a transient in my family home, so I got five years for that and then the second case I got 12 years for, which was consecutive to it: a million pounds worth of drugs but when we got to court there were no drugs there, just photographs, so I got done on that as well so I got a seventeen year sentence when, you know, they’d no evidence” (Participant 5, Lines 304-311).

Participant 8 speaks of breaking into his school when young. He sees the futility in his criminal actions but seems compelled and even destined to follow through with them. When he speaks of his fatalism he also has a language disturbance as signification seems to slip away and he laughs to fill the gap in speech:
“Looking back at it now I was never going to succeed but… [Words missing] [He laughs]”

( Participant 8, Line 665).

The dis-function of the future anterior stems from a failure in the operation of the paternal metaphor at the point where the law-giving Other’s anteriority in knowledge has to be accepted in order to negotiate the complex normatively. The researcher identified other evidence of failure in the operation of the paternal metaphor for the psychopathic participants. As detailed in Section 7.3 - Structural indicators in relation to the object a neither separation nor alienation occurs for some psychopaths and they must rely on the (partial) drives to mediate their experience of jouissance. The failure of the operation of alienation is attributable to a law-giving Other who does not prohibit jouissance. The researcher found described in the speech of the participants a law-giving Other who instead of prohibiting jouissance offers an example of violence in response to their experience of lack:

Participant 2 has an inconsistent, violent and threatening law-giving Other:

“I woulda grown up… Dad woulda had a really bad accident when I was a child. I was only four or five. He was knocked down by a drunk driver on the way home from work .... Bad head injuries more to frontal lobe, left side of his frontal lobe. Em broke his jaws and that. Was more so the bruising on the brain that was the significant thing there. Left him Jeckyll and Hyde, didn’t know what way. Didn’t know what was going to happen.... It was like he couldn’t connect, couldn’t communicate, extreme bouts of violence” (Participant 2, Lines 267-273).

Participant 4 has a law-giving Other that is inconsistent and violent:

“Eh, my father was eh. He would have been an alcoholic, and (pause) one side of him out on the street was this happy go lucky person eh but on the inside when he got home there was an awful lot of roaring and shouting” (Participant 4, Lines 166-168).

Participant 5 distinguishes his father’s violence toward him as particularly intense:

“Ya knew when you were going to get a baitin off your Da and ya know it was going to be a proper baitin. Whereas your Ma would sorta give ya a baitin but it wasn’t a real baitin” (Participant 5, Lines 468-474).

Participant 8 describes a family scenario common to the participants of this study. The addict’s primary relationship is with the drug/alcohol and not with the Other as Loose points out in The Subject Of Addiction (Loose, 2002). Consequently the father has a bond with members of the family which they experience as limited/unsatisfactory:
“Dad was just a functioning alcoholic so was never really [words missing]... If he wasn’t working he’d be in the pub like.... [Yawn -speaks through] I don’t think he really had friends. He’d, he’d [repetition] more associates-come-friends. Do you know that sort of way? Like rather than ... [word missing], drinking buddies as opposed to ... [word missing]. No one real” (Participant 8, Lines 228-240).

Clavreul in his paper The Perverse Couple (Clavreul, 1980) details this relationship to the anteriority of knowledge in perversion and states that the perverse subject misses his chance at reinterpretation of the cause of desire when confronted with the differences between the sexes. In order to make this reinterpretation, it is necessary to accept the law-giving Other (the father) as the one who as an anteriority in knowledge in relation to the subject, a knowledge that escapes the subject him or herself:

“The father's role, the role of his priority or his anteriority in knowledge gives the sense of the avowal... (the avowal that someone knew his [the son's] desire at a time when he [the son] himself did not)” (Clavreul, 1980, p.224).

Clavreul notes that as a child, the perverse subject did not recognize himself as the one who did not know and he refuses his father’s sovereignty on this basis. There is a fixity and surety in relation to knowledge as an outcome of this:

“This leads the pervert to place himself in the position of never again being deprived with regard to knowledge, and most particularly knowledge concerning love and eroticism... this knowledge is rigid and implacable” (Ibid.).

Like the perverse subject, the psychopath has never accepted the law-giving Other’s anteriority in knowledge. Without this acceptance there can be no paternal pact or promise that the subject’s sacrifice of pleasure in the present entails a satisfaction in the future.
The psychopathic subject mistrusted the Other’s credentials at the crucial moment of decision and without the signal of anxiety there is no imperative for them to accept or reject the Other’s desire; they remain governed by jouissance. The interview extracts outlined in the previous section highlight the inconsistent law-giving Other that became a template for the psychopath’s mistrust of others. When the psychopath subsequently meets representatives of the Other and their jouissance, the relay initiated by anxiety that normatively leads to subjective desire is short-circuited. The drive energies have not been dissipated and so, without mediation, they find expression in a passage to the act or “émeute” (riot). Examples of these riotous and unmediated acts from the speech of two participants (Participant 4 & Participant 5) are detailed below:

Participant 4 acts in the moment with rage and attacks his father in his hospital bed:

“Yeah, Oh Yeah I remember em (He made a noise: “stuh”). I had a row with my father for giving out to my mother; I was married at the time. For giving out to my mother or something. Eh he was in the hospital. He was on one of these oxygen masks and he’s an asthmatic, and he was in an awful state and I knew it, but eh I was just so fucking angry with him about the way he was treating my mother and eh I let him have it and I could see his eyes pleading and I’d seen that so many times before and I got home and he was dead and couldn’t believe it, you know” (Participant 4, Lines 721-727).

Participant 4 speaks of a fight he instigates without knowing why he did it:

“I remember another time going to a dance and em and eh I’m not sure why I did it eh but I would have got a bottle and attacked five or six fellas on the dance floor because of some row we had previously em there was uproar and pandemonium” (Participant 4, Line 442-449).

Participant 5 speaks of his introduction to violence and his father’s mantra which subsequently became an insignia worn by the son. His father’s recommendaton is borne out in subject’s adult life as he knocks out the governors when in prison:

“Ah yeah I mean like I c-come [stutter] from F-f... (Dublin housing estate) [stutter] like F-first [stutter] thing I remember was eh if they hit you with a stick hit them with a bigger stick. Eh my Father’s mantra was ‘Knock him out. You can always apologise later’” (Participant 5, Lines 76-78).

Participant 5 speaks of his loss of control and raises a question around responsibility:
“That’s the way it is, cos it’s just [pause - word missing] like whatever and once I go into that stage then you know, I’m not saying I’m not responsible for what happens but like I don’t have control over what I do then and when I come out of it” (Participant 5, Lines 214-216).

Participant 5 speaks of his rage as he finds it difficult to mediate his emotions. He goes straight to riot:

“No, but I don’t drive actually cos I get too [big breath] frustrated behind the wheel. I get too a..a...[word missing] I actually went to ... [word missing]. I got out of a car there recently and I was gonna pull your man out of it only he pulled off. Do you know what I mean? So me ... road rage is out the window so I’m sort of being told “Look, use public transport” I find myself even on the bus with people sitting beside me I get annoyed over someone that’s holding the bus up. I feel like getting off the bus and strangling the fuckers. Do you know what I mean?” (Participant 5, Lines 359-366).

Participant 5 explains that for him to remain contained people must do as he wants (even if he refuses to tell them what this is). If they don’t there is an outburst of extreme emotion. His way is the only way and if he is denied the satisfaction of a violent encounter he is left “frothin”:

“It’s the fact that people aren’t doing, going the way I want it to go. [Laughs] I’m sitting there and I’m sort of saying “If I was in that car I’d be around that corner and gone. You’re holding up all the bleedin traffic here” you know. “Have they nowhere to go to” and like, I don’t know what it is? I’ve been told manys a time, like, I’d actually be foaming at the mouth.... Only your man pulled off; he was coming out that window cos I was right behind his car and I was just at his door and shush [Interviewee makes noise of pulling someone out of car window] Do you know what I mean. And I was left standing in the street fuckin [pause] frothin” (Participant 5, Lines 368-380).

Lacan states that when the paternal metaphor (phallic object) is not functioning; as is the case in psychosis, there are other objects that “anxiety summons up” (Lacan, 1962, p.242). In psychopathy the drives associated with these other objects; the oral, anal, scopic and invocatory objects, may then colour the psychosis.
Lacan understands certain crimes committed by neurotic subjects as self-punishing and contrasts these with the crimes of psychotic subjects. Psychotic crime does not seek out punishment as there is no super-egoic relation to the law for these subjects. Lacan argues that labelling someone as criminal when they fail to recognise the law is problematic, but points out that the courts do not allow this defence:

“For, according to the legislator’s icy humor, no one is supposed to be ignorant of the law, and thus everyone can foresee its repercussions and must be considered to be seeking out its blows” (Lacan, 1950 [2006], p.107 [130]).

Participants 4 and 5 described acting on impulse and being violent without knowing why or as a pre-emptive step to inhibit someone they perceived as a threat.

Participant 4 attacked people but does not know why he did it:

“I remember another time going to a dance and em and eh I’m not sure why I did it. eh but I would have got a bottle and attacked five or six fellas on the dance floor” (Participant 4, Line 442-444).

Participant 5 tells researcher of advice he received from his father:

“If you think someone’s going to hit you, knock them out and sure you can always say ’Sorry about that, didn’t mean to’” (Participant 5, Lines 188-189).

The consequence of taking this advice is that he does not wait to feel threatened before he acts. Harmless situations have been misconstrued and he has hit out. He also described his paranoia which helps to explain why these misunderstandings take place:

“Like if someone says to me..., like we’re sitting in a group there and says: ‘One of those blokes is an arsehole’ and I look around and think ‘All of them blokes are alright so the arsehole must be me then’” (Participant 5, Lines 495-497).
Lacan celebrates the French criminologist, Tarde (1843-1904) and agrees with his two conditions for subjective responsibility; “social similarity” and “personal identity” (Ibid., p.113 [139]). The psychopathic participants in this study recognise that they differ to others, while others close to them say they are different too. This absence of ‘social similarity’ makes psychopaths’ subjective responsibility questionable:

Participant 2 considers that his way of looking at the world as different to others:

“Yeah em I’d know everything that’s going on in the room. That sort of a way. Yeah. I could tell you what they were wearing the week before. It’s just something that comes ... [words missing] it’s like em [pause] it’s like; more or less that it’s second nature” (Participant 2, Lines 469-472).

Participant 4 identifies with his grand-son and his risk-taking behaviour:

“They’ve been through all of that so this lad is much riskier, reminds me an awful lot of myself but in a couple of the others there was eh...problems around the diagnosis of ADHD and things like that and em, the way that reminded them..., reminded me of myself” (Participant 4, Lines 382-386).

Participant 5 recognises how he feels differently to normative people. He also stumbles over his words and mis-speaks ‘the way a normal person affects’. There is ambiguity as the subject of the sentence may be understood as either the active or the passive party:

“I don’t feel the same things as normal people. Do you know what I mean, things don’t affect me the way a normal person affects. Stupid little things might affect me more so than something that was serious” (Participant 5, Lines 196-204).

Participant 8 explains that he is the only member of his family ever to be involved in crime. He laughs at this point as there is and enjoyment expressed in his being different:

“None of the rest of my family’s involved in crime, whatsoever, whatsoever, I’m the only one who, no-one’s ever even got a speeding ticket. Do you know what I mean [laughs]?” (Participant 8, Lines 571-573).

The researcher’s findings support Willemsen and Verhaeghes’ proposal that psychopath’s have an:
“a priori conviction that something illegitimate has happened to him and that he has the right, and even the obligation, to correct this initial injustice” (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009, p.248).

Participant 2 responds to any degree of threat with aggression. He attributes his hyper-sensitivity and aggression to ‘what was going on at home’:

“Yeah definitely but it was also the thing of; and again probably a learned behaviour reinforced by what was going on at home. Em, the thing of fear. You didn’t know what was going to happen. So you’ve got unpre... unpredictability but it’s a double-edged sword. You have to be able to act on it then. You know that sort of a way? Eh cos you’re caught cold then and if you don’t act on it, you’ll be walked all over” (Participant 2, Lines 308-314).

Participant 5 describes hitting people as an example of doing the right thing:

“I wouldn’t say I always got a buzz when I hit out at somebody I think, I think for me, like ya know, it was always sort of [pause] doing the right thing, ya know what I mean this is the right thing cos I believed in my head like this is the right thing” (Participant 5, Lines 174-176).
Lacan acknowledges that the “the assertion of one's innocence” is normative when an individual is accused of a crime. He proposes that the first goal speech is to disguise our true intentions:

“We could thus posit that sincerity is the first obstacle encountered by the dialectic in the search for true intentions, the first goal of speech apparently being to disguise them” (Lacan, 1950 [2006], p.115 [140]).

In these regards, the psychopathic participants interviewed had both confessed to crimes and purposely left evidence behind after a robbery which led to convictions. They also don't disguise their true intentions with language:

Participant 2 considers his arrest to be a case of mistaken identity:

“I was picked from the back of a group of people Em [pause] for, it was robbery with violence Eh was the charge anyway. Em G.B.H. and robbery with violence but I was picked from the back, the back of a group of 8 or 9 people, there was no identification parade, there was nothing like that at all. Em I shouldn’t have been brought to court. I was wearing a jacket ... but there was loads of people wearing the same jacket around” (Participant 2, Lines 240-246).

Participant 4 leaves evidence behind in the getaway car after a kidnapping. He does not protect himself from getting caught. The researcher asks ‘does he want to get caught or is he goading the representatives of the law to try and catch him?’:

“I remember I got out of the car and just left everything there and said I can’t fucking do this anymore and eh because I done that I left evidence of myself being in the car and eh within a short period of time they were onto us and I was charged with aggravated kidnapping, eh, aggravated burglary - a whole lot of shit and eh got seven year for it” (Participant 4, Lines 440-446).

Participant 5 describes his convictions for two crimes. He does not consider that he was sentenced appropriately for either:

“I got five years for em, when they use [stumble over word “f” sound], even though I wasn’t coming into my house but they called me a transient in my family home, so I got five years for that and then the second case I got twelve years for, which was consecutive to it; a million pounds worth of drugs but when we got to court there were no drugs there, just photographs, so I got done on that as well so I got a seventeen year sentence when, you know, they’d no evidence” (Participant 5, Lines 304-311).
Participant 8 chooses to plead guilty to a crime saying “I went guilty on it”. It is as if he chooses whether to accept the law or not:

“There was a trial cos I went guilty on it” (Participant 8, Line 85).
Psychoanalytic treatment may be considered as a means of curtailing jouissance via its filtration through one's subjective desire. Monribot gives a better sense of what this possible end entails for a training analysis in the New Lacanian School (NLS):

“Indeed, it is a matter of obtaining a dis-connection of the ingredients of jouissance that cannot be eliminated from the subject at the terminal point of analysis. Namely: two ingredients. On the one hand, extracting the drive object a that also functions as cause of desire. On the other hand, isolating a signifier that stands alone, an S1 disconnected from any effect of the signifying chain, from any unconscious knowledge, in a word, a signifier that does not mean anything but which nevertheless carries a primitive mark of jouissance on the body” (Monribot, 2009).

The researcher found that those who found societally acceptable ways of being subversive had, to a large extent escaped the émeute (riot) which plagued them prior to this. The two highest scoring participants interviewed by the researcher are currently studying for law degrees and have entered a discourse from which they had hitherto felt excluded. Prior to entering university the position these participants took up when interacting with the law-giving Other was one of mistrust in the face of a deceptive, threatening and often violent Other representing the Law. Becoming part of the same discourse has allowed a subjective shift and an ex-timate (externally-intimate) relationship to develop regarding the law-giving Other. Another subjective solution and curtailing of jouissance is evidenced in the data where the two mid-scoring participants speak of becoming fathers. In becoming a father, each participant spoke of redefining the position in which the law-giving Other was situated in their own families.

This has repercussions for the possibility of psychoanalytic work with so called 'treatment-resistant' psychopaths. Namely, a sinthomatic solution is possible and the psychoanalyst is well-placed to direct a treatment with this in mind.

In analytic work with neurotics, the subject’s desire can be addressed only once the transference is installed and a symptom has emerged. With psychotics treatment is directed in the opposite way to the analytic work with a neurotic: it is not an existing symptom that is worked with, rather a stabilising construction is worked toward. This construction is described by Lacan as a binding of the three registers of Real, Symbolic and Imaginary with a fourth ‘sinthome’ to allow the psychotic to find a solution (Section 4.4 - Psychotic solution: Suppletion or Sinthome).
The researcher places significance on this as his findings show that although those who score highly on the standardised tests for psychopathy show sadistic and subversive traits, the underlying structure is psychotic as evidenced by their:

(i) language
(ii) relationship to the big Other
(iii) relationship to the object a

These sadistic or subversive traits act as a structural support for the subject and prevent a fall into psychosis proper. The researcher notes that these traits do not preclude any potential relapse into émeute (riot).
8.4 THE PSYCHOPATH AND RELATIONSHIPS

THE PARENTS RELATIONSHIP

The researcher examines how the psychopathic participants he interviewed represented their parents bond and notes some parallels with the case of Landru outlined by Biagi-Chai (Section 4.5 - Psychosis and the serial-killer).

Participant 2 describes how his mother is verbally and emotionally abused by the father. Yet the participant is envious of his mother for having escaped the physical abuse he was subjected to:

“Em so yeah there woulda been a lot of em [words missing]. I’m very bitter and resentful towards her for a long time over the fact that; he used to kick the shit out of us but we never once saw him hit her. He never once hit her at all. The way she looked at it the verbal and emotional abuse was just as bad as getting a slap. Em, that yeah. We’ve had it all. We’ve the sexual affair, the emotional, the physical. Em yeah she reckons it was just eh … [words missing]. I’ve had a lot of resentment; why did she stay there? She had a duty of care to us and she neglected it” (Participant 2, Lines 295-304).

Participant 4 details an instance when his father argued with his mother. He is unable to mediate this and attacks his father:

“Yeah, Oh Yeah I remember em (He made a noise: "stuh"). I had a row with my father for giving out to my mother; I was married at the time. For giving out to my mother or something. Eh he was in the hospital. He was on one of these oxygen masks and he’s an asthmatic, and he was in an awful state and I knew it, but eh I was just so fucking angry with him about the way he was treating my mother and eh I let him have it and I could see his eyes pleading and I’d seen that so many times before and I got home and he was dead and couldn’t believe it, you know” (Participant 4, Lines 721-727).

Participant 5 distinguishes between his parents based on the degree of physical violence they subjected him to:

“Ya knew when you were going to get a baitin off your Da and ya know it was going to be a proper baitin. Whereas your Ma would sorta give ya a baitin but it wasn’t a real baitin” (Participant 5, Lines 468-471).

Participant 8 describes a home life in which his parents were always fighting:
“Eh Oh Eh [Guttural noise which went up and down in tone] Em like he never battered me or never thing. Do you know what I mean? It wasn’t. It was always fighting between him and me Ma like but never [word missing]. eh. Maybe he should of fucking battered me [laughed as he said “fucking battered me”] I don’t know. Never, did you know. I think my Ma hit me with a wooden spoon once or twice you know - I probably fucking deserved it [Laughed]” (Participant 8, Lines 247-252).

We do not get to choose our parents but we may choose a partner and Biagi-Chai notes that a vital part in Joyce’s solution is Nora who “fits him like a glove” and “moulded herself to Joyce’s jouissance” (Biagi-Chai, 2015, p.85). The relationship with a partner can play a significant role in the symptomatic expression of our structure. Nora was implicated in the expression of Joyce’s jouissance allowing him to signify his lack along the Imaginary axis (Section 3.3 - The Name-of-the-Father is missing). Similarly, Lea Papin became implicated in her sister Christine’s delusion in a folie-a-deux (Section 3.3 - The Mirror, the ego and aggression). Clavreul wrote in The Perverse Couple of the perverse subject’s partner who is an accomplice:

“It is clear that insofar as he brings a look, the Other will be the partner and above all the accomplice of the perverse act” (Clavreul, 1980, p.226).

Two of the four psychopathic participants spoke of having difficulties in relationships:

Participant 2 considers himself as damaging to others and althought he regrets not having children, he concedes that he may have damaged them if he had them:

“Yeah, definitely. It’s one of the biggest regrets I have from addiction is not … [missing words]. Well there’s an upside to that; I haven’t damaged anybody else” (Participant 2, Lines 388-389).

Participant 5 speaks of his current relationship and how he pushes her away:

“I’ve been called sorta ‘psycho’ Do you know what I mean. Like my partner said to me I’m a bit mad. You know. Well I don’t know if she’s me ex-partner now cos I told her to fuck off recently there, so. She was doing my head in, so. Em. But she sorta said it to me a couple of times I’m not normal” (Participant 5, Lines 402-406).
The psychopathic participants each identified strongly with another person. These imaginary identifications with mentors and father-figures are detailed in this section.

Participant 2 describes having a mentor who introduced him to criminality. He discovered however that there are also rules that must be obeyed in criminal circles. The participant breaks wind and loses language when describing what must have happened to him when he broke the primary rule of his mentor by taking heroin:

“...my primary em male role model was, XXXX and it was through him I got introduced into selling drugs but the golden rules were: you were never a rat and you didn’t touch heroin. [He breaks wind] Yeah excuse me. Yeah them were the two rules. We’ll defend you up to the hilt and back you up but if you go near the gear, that’s it you’re gone. You’re [word missing] Yeah, social pariah - You’re just ostracised” (Participant 2, Lines 535-540).

Participant 4 had a mentor, an older man who taught him how to break into houses:

“Yeah all this thing about school, church - blew the whole lot of it. em Met new friends - an older person and eh he showed me the art of robbing... Yeah, so em we used to rob the houses locally to us. eh pubs, cars any ... thing and what it gave me was eh a sense of entitlement, daredevilness, excitement em (pause) and money” (Participant 4, Lines 195-215).

Participant 5 identified strongly with his father and repeats a piece of advice his father gave to him:

“F-first [stutter] thing I remember was eh if they hit you with a stick, hit them with a bigger stick. Eh my Father’s mantra was ‘Knock him out. You can always apologise later’” (Participant 5, Lines 76-78).

Participant 8 described the death of his friend as the turning point in his life:

“Then I went into jail and it was grand cos I knew people and was looked after... then my mate got stabbed to death in front of me... he bled out... that had me thinkin then. ‘Fuck this’. So I got shifted then down to XXXX [Irish Prison] and that’s when I started going to school” (Participant 8, Lines 130-132).
8.5 A QUESTION OF STRUCTURE

THE VARIANTS OF PSYCHOPATHY

In this study the researcher determined which object was dominant and distinguished two variants of psychopathy based on his analysis:

1. Machiavellian mode (Obsessional variant)

Two drives operate in this variant of psychopathy: the anal and the scopic.

*Anal drive* - The situations described by Participants 2 & 8 involve a power struggle with the law-giving Other; a give and take.

Participant 2 responds to an inconsistent Other and creates a defence mechanism of aggression and a hyper-sensitivity. Violence is the subject’s response to threatening Others. He loses language at signifier “unpredictability”:

“Yeah definitely but it was also the thing of; and again probably a learned behaviour reinforced by what was going on at home. Em, the thing of fear. You didn’t know what was going to happen. So you’ve got unpredictability but it’s a double-edged sword. You have to be able to act on it then. You know that sort of a way? Eh cos you’re caught cold then and if you don’t act on it, you’ll be walked all over” (Participant 2, Lines 308-314).

Participant 8 tells the researcher how he reacted one particular time he was given lines by his teacher:

“I said I’m not fucking doing this so I figured out [spoken with pride] how to do it. I left the latch off this, off one day, the toilet window and came back at about seven that evening crept into the school, went in knocked about a thousand lines off the board “Crime of the fucking century” Whoopedeedoo. Back out anyway .De Do Do .... [Change of tone - Aggressive] The fuckin bitch knew straight away. She says “Did you wipe the lines off - aren’t yehs very funny. I know you’ve 1600. [He laughs and speaks incoherently] Did cha”. And she looks at me” (Participant 8, Lines 263-267).

*Scopic drive* - Another feature of the speech particular to Participants 2 & 8 was the theme of being watched. They detailed surveillance and counter-surveillance of a threatening, dangerous law-giving Other. The gaze was experienced as intrusive but did not take the form of a delusion as in paranoia.
Participant 2 defends against anxiety by being in a state of hyper-vigilance, watching out for the threatening other:

“If I go into an auditorium I take up a position to see everything that’s going on. Em the doctors seem to think that it’s a residual legacy of, do you know; hyper-vigilance. From childhood, from that thing of not knowing what’s going to happen and that coupled with abuse, coupled in with it … to see everything that’s going on in the room. I really don’t like people sitting behind me. I try to sit where there is nobody behind me” (Participant 2, Lines 408-414).

Participant 8 speaks of one of his drug deals. He is not trying to evade the police; rather he is conducting his own counter-surveillance. For him the Other is dangerous and someone that you have to keep an eye on:

“So I done counter surveillance. Turn off the motorway, turn back on, if the car follows you ... [Big intake of breath]” (Participant 8, Lines 51-52).

The subject’s relationship to the anal drive presents as an insistence on emotionless and controlled planning. While other participants spoke of planning it was not ‘colored’ in the same way:

Participant 4 describes an experiment he ran in order to determine what it would be like to catch and kill something, a kind of a rehearsal. His emotions were only experienced at the extreme end of the spectrum and could be confused and misplaced:

“I remember the thought of killing a bird and em I put breadcrumbs or whatever you call it out and I had this Gat. I was waiting for the bird to come up and (pause) and the bird came up and whack and caught the bird, killed it and eh I think for the first time in my life I experienced this awful sadness and that kinda memory stayed with me” (Participant 4, Line 142-145).

Similarly the subject’s relationship to the scopic drive presents as an intrusive sense of being watched. While other participants spoke of their relationship to the scopic drive it was ‘colored’ differently:

Participant 3 (non-psychotic subject) described having to bear witness as a child to the violent acts his father (a loan shark) inflicted on others.

“We’d go up to the Labour and there’d be a guy coming out with his two kids and my Da would knock him over cos he owed him money but his two kids would be crying over him and I didn’t like that. I didn’t like seeing the violence and “what have you got?” and my Dad was always that way as well” (Participant 3, Lines 299-312).
The scopic drive was not experienced as intrusive for Participant 3, but found expression in his sexual life as an adult through an attraction to men with eyes like his father:

“Participant 3: There was an element of that and it was the eyes. [Researcher’s note: The Look as lost object] It was the eyes. I copped on in the end. “What was it about his eyes?” So it’s strange the human condition, but lifelong learning.

Researcher: Did he remind you of anyone?

Participant 3: Em I asked myself that “Does he remind me of me Da?” Maybe me lost Da after not having him growing up” (Participant 3, Lines 293-295).

2. Riot-mode (Psychotic variant)

The drive that dominates in this variant of psychopathy is the oral.

*Oral drive* - The subject experiences a frustration due to the Other withholding something. There is no mediation of the drive and the subject enters a riot-mode (émeute). Participants 4 & 5 both describe situations in which they lose control and there is a passage to the act:

Participant 4 acts in the moment with rage and attacks his father in his hospital bed:

“Yeah, Oh Yeah I remember em (He made a noise: “stuh”). I had a row with my father for giving out to my mother; I was married at the time. For giving out to my mother or something. Eh he was in the hospital. He was on one of these oxygen masks and he’s an asthmatic, and he was in an awful state and I knew it, but eh I was just so fucking angry with him about the way he was treating my mother and eh I let him have it and I could see his eyes pleading and I’d seen that so many times before and I got home and he was dead and couldn’t believe it, you know” (Participant 4, Lines 721-727).

Participant 4 speaks of a fight he instigates without knowing why he did it:

“I remember another time going to a dance and em and eh I’m not sure why I did it eh but I would have got a bottle and attacked five or six fellas on the dance floor because of some row we had previously em there was uproar and pandemonium” (Participant 4, Lines 442-449).

Participant 5 speaks of his conditioned response to violence. This conditioning had consequences for the subject’s adult life as he attacks prison guards and even the governor when in prison:

“Ah yeah I mean like I c-come [stutter] from F-f... (Dublin housing estate) [stutter] like F-first [stutter] thing I remember was eh if they hit you with a stick hit them with a bigger stick” (Participant 5, Lines 76-77).

Participant 5 speaks of his losing control and raises a question around responsibility:
Participant 5 speaks of his rage as he finds it difficult to mediate his emotions. He goes straight to riot:

“No, but I don’t drive actually cos I get too [big breath] frustrated behind the wheel. I get too a...a...[word missing] I actually went to ... [word missing]. I got out of a car there recently and I was gonna pull your man out of it only he pulled off. Do you know what I mean? So me ... road rage is out the window so I’m sort of being told “Look, use public transport” I find myself even on the bus with people sitting beside me I get annoyed over someone that’s holding the bus up. I feel like getting off the bus and strangling the fuckers. Do you know what I mean?” (Participant 5, Lines 359-366).

Participant 5 explains that for him to remain contained people must do as he wants (even if he refuses to tell them what this is). If they don’t there is an outburst of extreme emotion. His way is the only way and if he is denied the satisfaction of a violent encounter he is left “frothin”:

“It’s the fact that people aren’t doing, going the way I want it to go. [Laughs] I’m sitting there and I’m sort of saying “If I was in that car I’d be around that corner and gone. You’re holding up all the bleedin traffic here” you know. “Have they nowhere to go to” and like, I don’t know what it is? I’ve been told manys a time, like, I’d actually be foaming at the mouth.... Only your man pulled off; he was coming out that window cos I was right behind his car and I was just at his door and shush [Interviewee makes noise of pulling someone out of car window] Do you know what I mean. And I was left standing in the street fuckin [pause] frothin” (Participant 5, Lines 368-380).

These extracts from the speech of Riot-mode participants contrast with the Machiavellian-mode participants (Participant 2 & Participant 8) who spoke of violent acts but they remained in control and the violence was strategic:

Participant 2 describes his chasing people who own him money with a machete:

“You know, and then there was another occasion where I had em [pause] chased two fellas with a machete and they ran into a house anyway but we got the door kicked in and we went into the house” (Participant 2, Lines 255-256).

Participant 8 details a car chase in which he breaks through a garda checkpoint:

“Went on eh hit a checkpoint; banged the checkpoint, when through got out of the car, helicopters all the ... [sigh]” (Participant 8, Lines 53-54).
In *A Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology*, Lacan relates the choice of drive object by criminals to the mirror stage and he associates this choice with a missed opportunity. Just at the moment when an identification would resolve the aggressive tension of the mirror stage for the subject, the Other’s response is absent:

“Aggressive tension thus becomes part of the drive, whenever the drive is frustrated because the “other's” noncorrespondence [to one’s wishes] aborts the resolving identification, and this produces a type of object that becomes criminogenic by interrupting the dialectical formation of one’s ego” (Lacan, 1950 [2006], p.116 [141-142]).

This refusal/denial of correspondence may be experienced by the subject as a nieder-lassen (being dropped). This is of the order of a rejection or refusal and the choice of criminogenic object is made at this moment.

As this relates to a rejection or refusal the researcher considers this choice to be most closely aligned with the oral drive. Significantly, when the psychopath is confronted with a refusal in subsequent exchanges, they have no means to negotiate the experience and enter a riot-mode as they counter the Other’s jouissance with their own. If the other person fails to respond immediately to their demand, the psychopath will also interpret this negatively, as a refusal:

Participant 4 describes the events that followed when his brother did not follow his advice not to join the gang he led. His reaction is a public display of physical violence:

“Eh, I remember dissuading him from ... [words missing]. I hit him with a shovel in front of a load of lads and telling him not to... [words missing]... I gave him a few belts over the head and the back” (Participant 4, Lines 750-763).

Participant 5 is enraged when he perceives a refusal by another person:

“It’s the fact that people aren’t doing, going the way I want it to go. [laughs] I’m sitting there and I’m sort of saying ‘If I was in that car I’d be around that corner and gone. You’re holding up all the bleedin traffic here’ you know. ‘Have they nowhere to go to’ and like, I don’t know what it is? I’ve been told manys a time, like, I’d actually be foaming at the mouth” (Participant 5, Lines 368-372).

Participant 5 interprets silence or lack of a response to his demands negatively:

“I don’t mind the physical side of things... The other side is...[pause], ya know. This mental game with ya, do you know? Ya know. This silent treatment and shit like that... [pause], around people and trying to gauge people and understand where they’re comin from and that sorta thing” (Participant 5, Lines 479-483).
Although the researcher did not find a perverse variant of psychopathy, some psychopathic participants had perverse traits.

*Masochistic (Perverse) traits*

Masochistic traits were spoken of by both Participant 5 (Riot-Mode) and Participant 8 (Machiavellian-mode). They each related gaining a satisfaction from being punished and detailed how they sought punishment via acts of self-sabotage. They cannot however be considered “criminals from a sense of guilt” (Freud, 1916) as they offer an a priori justification for their actions and may be more aptly described as “guilt-free” criminals (Freud, 1928).

In *Seminar X* Lacan articulated the function that a ‘Don Juan’ character serves for society by being “always in the stead of someone else” (Lacan, 1962, p.19). However, as dangerous as ‘Don Juan’ characters might like to consider themselves or present to the world they are also farcical as they are never “an anxiety provoking character for women” (Ibid.). The researcher questions if the psychopath, like Dostoevsky’s criminal (*Section 2.3 - Psychopathy - The good, the bad and the timeless*, p.37), and ‘Don Juan’, is serving a societal function. Like ‘Don Juan’ the psychopath is ‘in the stead’ of someone else, as the fall-guy. The confused identificatory position outlined here aligns with a psychotic transidivism proposed by Lacan (*Section 3.3 - The Mirror, the ego and aggression*, pp.59-60), and this was also found in this study:

Participant 5 goads prison officers to hit him harder. There is significance in the choice of words here as “baitin” and “baiting” are two homophonic signifiers with the differing meanings of to bait and to beat:

“I can remember taking a baitin off the screws one day and I said..., in the thing..., and I said and..., I was in bits and sorta got onto them and said ‘Go on outta that me Ma hit me fuckin harder’. Just to annoy them, do you know what I mean?” (Participant 5, Lines 468-474).

Participant 8 got caught as a youngster having broken into his school. Interestingly his teacher also employed his mother as a cleaner. He like ‘Don Juan’, is taking the place of someone else, taking the fall:

“She remembered me. [Still laughing] She was my next door neighbour [Spoken really enthusiastically] A small little thing like, so me Ma used to go and do housework for her and all this [laughs] Do you know what I mean? But [He uses a different voice] I was just thinking. After like, even if she had of come in she went “That’s not fuckin right”. Do you know what I mean, she probably have seen the hand writing like and fucking thing like. But I
was just laughing* [*repetition] at it, the fuckin, I think that was the first [missing words]” (Participant 8, Lines 287-293).

Other study participants spoke of moments of sacrifice but they were ‘colored’ differently:

Participant 2 appears to be sacrificial when he records a garda arresting a woman but he is in control and seeking to engage the garda in a power struggle:

“Basically they had stopped and were searching a girl, two detectives... She was an immigrant... and I started to film what they were doing and they became aware after a few minutes... and then they had caught me filming and em came by and were quite obnoxious wanting my name and address sort of thing. Em and I asked them basically do em they suspect me of committing a crime or being involved in criminality. [Researcher’s note in margin: The Law should answer his questions even when he refuses to answer theirs]. Em and they said ‘Look’; that it’s a high risk area. Em, they didn’t answer the question... and then I got into the thing of I asked was he a peace commissioner. Em, he said yeah. I asked ‘Well then have I committed a breach of the peace or have you a report that there’s been a breach of the peace’ and he couldn’t. Article 40 of the Irish Constitution. ... Em Article 40 - on the rights of the person em inalienable rights, rights that you have that can’t be taken or given away. Em the Criminal Justice Public Order Act 1994 [Note: Knows the Law], Arrest without warrant Section 24, subsection 2; 3 and 2 respectively. It’s only 7 lines, 8 lines of legislation but he couldn’t give me the 8 lines of legislation - why he wanted my name and address so I’m not [pause] duty bound to give my name and address if he doesn’t think that I’ve been involved in crime” (Participant 2, Lines 162-197).

Participant 3 relates how he sacrifices himself for his family:

“I meant really: ‘It feels like I’m trying to fix you [Mother] and fix my sisters’. I’m saying to myself, ‘I can’t’. I’ve learned over the years too that by me throwing myself round in small little slices and there is no one, nothing [subject/object confusion] left for myself and I end up fucking in the bin” (Participant 3, Lines 454-460).
Of the five participants who were interviewed, four (Participants 2, 4, 5 & 8) are now considered to be psychopathic by the researcher. Although the other participant (Participant 3) engaged in what might be considered psychopathic acts by society, he was structurally different to the participants:

i. His language contained none of the markers for psychosis. He associates feelings of guilt with an internal ‘law-giving’, super-egoic voice:

“It would have been in one-to-one counselling that I would have talked about sexual activity and that would make me feel a guilt and shame and then I would use drugs off it. “So you gotta watch that deviant behaviour cos you don’t like yourself in that way” (Participant 3, Lines 612-614).

ii. He felt ashamed for what he had done and recognised his guilt in relation to crimes committed. He feels guilt for the damage he has done to his family:

“I would be sitting in the cell worrying about my girlfriend, my children, my mother, all the damage I had done” (Participant 3, Lines 72-73).

iii. He experienced fear and angst in a normative way. He describes a normative aversion to violence:

“I didn’t like seeing the violence and ‘what have you got?’” (Participant 3, Lines 72-73).

The researcher’s formulation around this participant’s structure was that he was non-psychotic and had perverse traits. Participant 3 explained his crimes as a consequence of:

(i) the influence of others with stronger egos

“I think at the beginning I was someone who didn’t understand what was going on but went along with it” (Participant 3, Lines 116-118).

(ii) a desperate need to feed his addiction to heroin

“In the end I went to prison for [pause] em for em robberies through to... [The rest of the list missing]. Through addiction. So shop lifting em [pause] I... I never got convicted of this but I went as far as putting needles up to people’s face with blood in it, threatening them that I would give them HIV” (Participant 3, Lines 134-137).
The researcher aligns these characteristics with the concept of sociopathy as detailed in Section 2.3 - Differential Diagnosis - Sociopathy or Psychopathy. Although, the researcher recognises that the concept of sociopathy is redundant in the disciplines of criminology and the law (Section 2.2 - The History of Psychopathy, p.20) he acknowledges it’s relevance for the field of evolutionary psychology and questions if it may yet have applicability in Lacanian structural theory.

As discussed in chapter two, the PCL-R and its derivatives including the SRP-III have cut-off points that vary based on geography (Section 2.2 - Current measures of psychopathy, pp.23-24). The researcher notes that in this Irish study with ex-offenders, Participant 3 scored 2.95 on the SRP-III but did not have a psychopathic structure as understood by Lacanian structural theory. A participant with a score of 3.375 on the SRP-III did. Further research is needed to determine the correct SRP-III scores for populations that have been to prison in Ireland. Although a cut-off score of between 2.95 and 3.375 for the SRP-III was shown to be appropriate for this particular study and population the researcher reiterates as already stated in Section 6.2 - The Sample that the amount of quantitative data collected is not sufficient for generalisations (p.138).

In the Section 9.2 - Structure, jouissance and the drives the researcher outlines how psychoanalysis is not exempt from diagnostic difficulties.
The researcher considers the cases of psychopathy he has detailed in this study as non-delusional, un-triggered psychoses; ordinary psychoses in which subversive and violent acts serve to stabilize the subject. These acts are considered by the researcher as manifestations of extreme psychotic anxiety. Lacan associated anxiety and the potential fulfilment of desire with a subsequent impotence or falling away of the object (Section 8.2 - Anxiety and the cession of the object). The psychopathic participants interviewed for this study did not reveal any physiological impotence and instead regaled in stories of their potency. They did however position their representative of the law-giving Other (father/brother) as impotent:

Participant 2 explains how his father suffered brain-damage in an accident:

“I woulda grown up... Dad woulda had a really bad accident when I was a child. I was only four or five. He was knocked down by a drunk driver on the way home from work .... Bad head injuries more to frontal lobe, left side of his frontal lobe. Em broke his jaws and that. Was more so the bruising on the brain that was the significant thing there. Left him Jeckyll and Hyde, didn’t know what way. Didn’t know what was going to happen”(Participant 2, Lines 267-273).

Participant 4 is ashamed of his alcoholic father:

“Yeah Yeah it was awful. And eh watching him pissin in the chair. I remember a couple of people in the house, they came in drunk” (Participant 4, Lines 183-184).

Participant 5 has no sympathy for his brother when he is discharged from the army. He deserves everything he gets:

“One of my brothers was discharged from the army, the other fella left when he done his time - do you know what I mean. and he got out. So ... [word missing]. But the fella who was discharged was a raving alcoholic so -why he got discharged - he says he went in and stole one of the guns out of the army and went around drunk with the gun in his hand - so - do you know what I mean - so [pause] he deserved to get thrown out” (Participant 5, Lines 133-141).

Participant 8 describes the limited relationship he has with an alcoholic father whom he pities:

“Dad was just a functioning alcoholic so was never really [words missing]... If he wasn’t working he’d be in the pub like.... [Yawn -speaks through] I don’t think he really had friends. He’d, he’d [repetition] more associates-come-friends. Do you know that sort of way? Like
rather than ... [word missing], drinking buddies as opposed to ... [word missing]. No one real” (Participant 8, Lines 232-240).

These contrast with the non-psychopathic participant’s (Participant 3) representations of the law-giving Other:

Participant 3 describes his father as being feared in the community:

“But me Da had a big f... [incoherent word.] My Da in my area was: “You don’t mess with his Da”. That always gave me a protection as well as a young child growing up in the flats and always gave me the sense that “I have to be like my Da”. But there were things that my Dad did that I didn’t like” (Participant 3, Lines 299-304).

It is the father or law-giving Other that is represented as impotent by the psychopath. However the researcher found that other familial relations were also negatively represented in the psyches of psychopathic participants (Section 8.4 - The psychopath and relationships).
As illustrated in the analysis chapter a subject’s jouissance is related to the demands of, and the responses given by, the Other (Section 7.3 - Structural indicators in relation to the object a):

Participant 2 gets his phone confiscated by a garda and the sense of pride in having won against the law:

“What’s the point? I had won. I knew. That was his way of getting back at me, was to take the phone off me. So I had to go down to the garda station in the end and got my phone back but I wouldn’t give my name you know that sort of a way. ‘Why, why I haven’t committed a crime, I’ve no outstanding warrants, nothing like that?’” (Participant 2, Lines 216-220).

Participant 4 gets caught speeding. His response to the garda’s enforcement of the law is one of disgust:

“And I was driving home going through XXXX (Dublin suburb). Em. There was this guard hiding behind a bush in one of those yellow jackets, that wasn’t actually very yellow. It was actually filthy dirty and eh he stopped me for speeding and eh (pause) I had a bit of an argument about it with him. eh (pause) and I suppose how I felt very very angry, and em, I felt disgusted eh. One of the reasons why I was that no matter what argument I put to him about the fact that I wasn’t that much over the speed limit that I was in an area that there was very little traffic” (Participant 4, Line 65-71).

Participant 5 speaks of a run in with the governor of the prison and says his first response in these situations has always been aggression:

“R: You felt she was baiting you?
I: Of course she was, like she know, like, like she knew that…well I suppose, like, I can’t say she knew but my opinion was she knew that if I like reacted to it and done something that which I would’ve done in the past in relation to governors and that cos I’ve had a lot of run-ins with governors where I’ve knocked them out and stuff like that” (Participant 5, Lines 42-46).

Participant 8 was caught with drugs. His relationship with the representatives of the Law are recounted with infantile sounds attached - lalangue - jouissance laden:

“Went on eh hit a checkpoint; banged the checkpoint, when through got out of the car, helicopters all the … [sigh] Jaysus, about a week, handed myself in, done the seven day section, charged under 15 (a) legislation, special sitting of the Bridewell, all that, high court
bail la la la [He rolled his tongue as he sighed] Lololooha. Yada Yada. Two year court case” (Participant 8, Lines 53-57).

These descriptions contrast with Participant 3’s, the non-psychotic participant who compares himself to some of the other prisoners he has met:

“Ya know I came across a number of individuals over my life term [echo of “prison term”] and being doubled up with them where I would feel they didn’t have as much compassion for the deed that they had done. I would be sitting in the cell worrying about my girlfriend, my children, my mother, all the damage I had done, where this person would be in bed at nine o’clock. And I couldn’t like [pause]. [words missing]. What is the difference between me and I or [slip: “me and I’’] him and I”? And so I learned over the years that obviously people are made out differently and he had less of a heart or less of a conscious [slip: conscience] to take in the damage that he had done to the people around him” (Participant 3, Lines 68-80).

The first instance of this relationship between need, demand and desire and the template for jouissance is due to the physiological inadequacy of the infant to fend for itself. The infant experiences an agony from hunger, it cries and the mother responds with the bottle or the breast and the child feels a satisfaction. From this moment the child recognises that the response of the Other (the breast) is both meaningful as well as performative. There is both a bodily satisfaction and the subjective experience of an Other who must be considered in relation to this satisfaction (the child begins to connect satiation of hunger with being given the breast by the mother).

The m(O)ther’s demand is contained in their offering of the breast and the encouraging sounds that accompany it. This interpretation communicates to the infant “That is what is wrong with you” whether it is right or not. The mother does not always know if the child is hungry - so she may be said to be performing a meaningful act without the surety that it is the correct one. There is already a disconnection between the infant and mother. There is a marking, a cutting at the very beginning by jouissance which creates pathways for it to later be channelled down. This disconnection between the care-giving Other and the infantile subject was spoken about by study participants:

Participant 2 speaks about his mother and his fractured relationship with her. His mother represents something unmediated and he describes her lacking in self-control. Participant loses language as he speaks of his mother:

“Em, Mam would’ve had [long pause] [words missing]. I have somewhat of a fractured relationship with my Mam. Em, the thing of em [pause] postnatal depression, severe postnatal depression after all her children. Em, selfish bitch should’ve stopped havin children. You know that sort of way. After the like... [words missing] I’d sorta be like the middle. Em,
well I’ve two younger twin sisters. Em, but again why would you keep having kids when you knew what … [words missing] would’ve gone through electric shock treatment all that sort of stuff” (Participant 2, Lines 285-294).

Participant 2 sees his mother as neglecting her duty of care. He is envious of his mother for escaping the physical abuse he experienced from his father:

“Em so yeah there wouldn’t been a lot of em [words missing]. I’m very bitter and resentful towards her for a long time over the fact that; he used to kick the shit out of us but we never once saw him hit her. He never once hit her at all. The way she looked at it the verbal and emotional abuse was just as bad as getting a slap. Em, that yeah. We’ve had it all. We’ve the sexual affair, the emotional, the physical. Em yeah she reckons it was just eh … [words missing]. I’ve had a lot of resentment; why did she stay there? She had a duty of care to us and she neglected it” (Participant 2, Lines 295-304).

Participant 4 relates that the law-giving Other is not esteemed by the care-giving Other:

“Yeah Yeah it was ey came in drunk. Eh. Another time the mother came in with a knife that size, she was going to kill him” (Participant 4, Lines 183-185).

Participant 5 speaks of how his mother redistributed his father’s violence toward her across the family:

“My mam would have been on the receiving end of it. So like… And I suppose like ... I actually was talkin to someone about this. She took out her frustrations on us because she was on the receiving end of me Da” (Participant 5, Lines 463-465).

Participant 8 describes how his parents are “always” fighting with each other and he relates something of his responsibility for this and the punishment he never received but still seeks:

“Eh Oh Eh [Guttural noise which went up and down in tone] Em like he never battered me or never thing. Do you know what I mean? It wasn’t. It was always fighting between him and me Ma like but never [word missing]. eh. Maybe he should of fucking battered me [laughed as he said “fucking battered me”] I don’t know. Never, did you know. I think my Ma hit me with a wooden spoon once or twice you know - I probably fucking deserved it [Laughed]” (Participant 8, Lines 247-252).

As the oral and anal objects are from a developmental stage earlier to the scopic, invocatory and phallic, they do not represent the Other’s lack as well. Consequently the breast and the faeces, as objects which represent lack; do not connect the subject into social bond as stably as the voice or the
gaze. In the scopic and invocatory drives the Other is implicated to a greater degree in the subject’s satisfaction:

Seeing (Bodily function) - The Look (Other’s demand) - A wish to be seen (Subject’s drive) - Is recognised (Subject’s satisfaction)

For this 'subject-of-jouissance' (Swales, 2011, p.101) the imaginary functions as it does in the neurotic fantasy and the mechanism allows the subject to connect into the social bond. Lacan links the infant’s mastery over their own body to an identification with an image outside of them. The ego is founded on an image that is experienced as alienating. Consequently, the subject has aggressivity towards the image of his semblable. This consideration of an-other at the level of the specular image happens prior to language acquisition but must still be considered in the social field. For the 'subject-of-jouissance' it is only possible to connect to the social through the imaginary and never at the symbolic level. The researcher situates the psychopathic subject as a 'subject-of-jouissance'. This was evidenced in the speech of psychopathic participants who were unable to symbolise via language. The use of metaphor was mixed or confused and in the instance outlined below the participant (Participant 2) was unable to separate the words of someone he had identified with, from his own:

Participant 2 offers a metaphor for how the dispossessed may feel. It seemed rehearsed and when the researcher searched online it is attributed to another person. He does not attribute knowledge to the person who came up with it: TedX presentation ‘Overcoming Hopelessness’ by Nick Vujicic:

“Researcher: Would you ever be an advocate?
Subject: I would yeah. Definitely, most definitely. People trapped behind the four walls of oppression with a low ceiling of opportunity. Yeah, definitely.
Researcher: Yeah. Yeah, that’s a good phrase, where did you get that from. What’s that from?
Subject: Em [spoken in an aggressive tone] What do ya mean?
Researcher: A low ceiling of opportunity and behind the four walls of oppression. It’s a nice way of putting it.
Subject: Yeah [pause] definitely. Then you have intergenerational poverty, crime, lack of opportunity.
Researcher: Is that a quote from somebody though?
Subject: Are you going to nick my quotes now, are ya? [Laughs]” (Participant 2, Lines 60-72).

Participant 4’s concern was with the image and not the symbolic. As the garda’s jacket was ‘filthy’ his authority was diminished:
“And I was driving home going through XXXX (Dublin suburb). Em. There was this guard hiding behind a bush in one of those yellow jackets, that wasn’t actually very yellow. It was actually filthy dirty and eh he stopped me for speeding” (Participant 4, Line 65-67).

Participant 5 joins two metaphors - ‘chopping off your nose to spite your face’ and ‘there’s not point giving out to the Indians, when you need to speak to the chief’:

“So like I, I, I [stammer] I’ve, for me it’s always been like; all my prison years I’ve never sort of, [Researcher’s note in margin: disjointed narrative] the prison officers mean nothing to me in a sense that like there’s no point chopping off going after the Indians if the chief is here” (Participant 5, Lines 33-37).

Participant 5 confuses his use of a metaphor. These difficulties with metaphorisation would be indicative of psychotic structure as in a standard psychiatric assessment the interviewee is asked to finish or to define a common metaphoric phrase such ‘a stitch in time… ’ or ‘a rolling stone… ’:

“You know, if you’re going for - if you want to get your point heard or you wanna get where you want to go there’s no point talking to the organ grinder, or the monkey [mistake and corrected] it’s the organ grinder you want” (Participant 5, Lines 37-39).

The participants attempted to symbolise their lack. As metaphor (condensation) does not operate for the psychopath they rely on a more rigid didactic means to represent their lack as described in the next section.
The psychopath’s talent for obfuscation (Section 4.5 - Psychosis and the serial-killer) was found in the speech of the participants:

Participant 2 uses circumlocution as a means of evasion when approached by the Law. He has educated himself in the Law so he can defend himself against it:

“I asked “Well then have I committed a breach of the peace or have you a report that there’s been a breach of the peace and he couldn’t; Article 40 of the Irish Constitution. He was basically saying that I had a right to give my name and address. Em Article 40 - on the rights of the person em inalienable rights, rights that you have that can’t be taken or given away. Em the Criminal Justice Public Order Act 1994, Arrest without warrant Section 24, subsection 2; 3 and 2 respectively. It’s only 7 lines, 8 lines of legislation but he couldn’t give me the 8 lines of legislation - why he wanted my name and address so I’m not [pause] duty bound to give my name and address if he doesn’t think that I’ve been involved in crime” (Participant 2, Lines 187-196).

Participant 5 speaks of a disagreement he had with the governor of the prison. He has learned the rules and will use them against the contradictory lawgiving Other - What the law-giving Other says contradicts his experience so he turns the rules on the Other. He puts it up to the Law in a way that is violent in its subversiveness but he is not physically aggressive:

“I read the rules, the prison rules and all and every, every governor who’s in charge of the prisoner themselves has the ability to make a decision for that prisoner without having to go back to the Irish Prison Service but they’ll tell you that they haven’t … that’s why I’ve always had a thing with authority cos for me authority doesn’t say, doesn’t do what it says on the tin” (Participant 5, Lines 107-108 and 111-113).

This talent for obfuscation although subversive, should be encouraged in psychopaths as it allows for a subjective shift in their relation to the Other via a conversation within a discourse (e.g. Law) that they are also implicated in (Section 4.5 - Psychosis and the serial-killer). Another subjective solution or curtailing of jouissance is evidenced in the data where the two mid-scoring participants (Participants 4 & 8) speak of becoming fathers. They spoke of a re-defining of their position and how this connected them into the social:

Participant 4 speaks of the change fatherhood brought in his life:
“Yeah So that...I got married about 22 and eh (pause) really loved it especially when my first child came along and again that was another really significant moment in my life because it was the first time in my life that I actually felt connected to somebody even though I was married. (Laugh) I didn’t feel connected to her (laugh) you know” (Participant 4, Line 347-352).

Participant 8 speaks of his lack of concern for others before he became a father:

“I: Yeah cos like I’ve a kid now so you can imagine, horror - you’re walking down....., the buggy......, and there’s a fuckin two ton car....., you’re fuckin...., with no-one behind it like [laugh]
R: Before you had a kid was it the same feeling?
I: Don’t think so, no, no. It’d of been... I’d of been more worried about my car, do you know, now it’s a fucking car you know what I mean it’s not...[word missing]” (Participant 8, Line 378-389).

The repercussions for the treatment of so called ‘treatment resistant’ psychopaths is considered in the next chapter (Section 9.5 - The question of treatment resistance), and recommendations on the installation of these imaginary identifications (being-a-father) are outlined in Section 10.2 - Ordinary Psychosis (Connection-Disconnection-Reconnection).
In Section 4.4 - Psychotic solution: Suppletion or Sinthome the researcher detailed Biagi-Chai’s extensive work of differentiation between sinthome and suppletion. She recalls that Lacan said there are two ways a subject may separate him or herself in the Other - in what they say and in what they lack. It is at the level of what he lacks; at the level of object a and drive that the psychopath can separate himself in the Other. The researcher posits that psychopaths lack a stable and trust-worthy representation of the law-giving Other (Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to knowledge).

In psychosis/psychopathy the absence of fantasy leaves the subject open to possibility of the real when confronted with the desire/jouissance of the Other:

“When interpretation does not occur, the subject is faced with the possible real: it is no longer the Other who looks at him metaphorically - thanks to the mediation of the fantasy, the Other actually stalks him” (Biagi-Chai, 2015, pp.79-80).

The researcher found that psychopaths adopt imaginary compensatory identifications as a protection from this real. Lacan also recognised the suppletive effect of this type of “conformist” identification (p.88) and Biagi-Chai names them “imaginary crutches” (Biagi-Chai, 2015). Miller uses the term ‘coloration’ to describe the peculiar personalities of subjects with compensated psychoses (Miller, 2010). Participant 5 spoke of these ‘imaginary crutches’ when he related a nickname which defined him as “the one to have a go” (The nickname is not included in order to protect the anonymity of the participant):

Participant 5 has a nickname that relates to his lack of fear:

“I’d always be first in you know, to sort of like, if there was something going to happen it was my job, my job was always to go first and I gotta sort of nickname for that, as a kid…. So they used to call me ‘XXXX’ cos I’d have a go first and that’s the way it was, do you know what I mean?” (Participant 5, Lines 278-285).

Participant 5 describes his lack of fear and adventurousness as a child:

“That’s like, that’s what I would have done, the first to climb, the first to fall and first to you know, do everything” (Participant 5, Lines 291-292).

Participant 5 describes how he was always the last one out when committing a crime. He was most likely to get caught but this also acts as proof that you are the strongest; the leader of the group. Ultimately this may be used to assert authority over others:
“Like, so you didn’t leave anybody behind. So you were always last out and then if you did leave anybody behind like you know, that wasn’t a good thing either. Cos you can’t leave anybody behind” (Participant 5, Lines 291-292).

This suppletion is based on an imaginary identification (being the One who has a go). The consequences of this identification have been substance-abuse and long prison sentences. However this identification may also be considered a protection, installed to avoid a psychotic break. Participants also employed ‘rehab’ mantras (these protective verses were learned from Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous and from legislation) to support their precarious subjective position:

Participant 2 has rehearsed statements from rehab around responsibility:

“It doesn’t matter if... [long pause] em you’re in the throes of abusing a mood or mild-altering behaviour [mantraesque] you still have to be at some level responsible for your actions. But this thing of being powerless over your addiction. I believe you give your power to your addiction [mantraesque] and in some way of [pause] probably what, what, what carries my opinion is the thing of - for my traumatic childhood experiences I have, by and large the healing process has taken that power back [mantraesque]” (Participant 2, Lines 89-95).

Participant 2 has educated himself in the Law so he can defend himself against the Law with the legislation being quoted as if protective mantras:

“Em the Criminal Justice Public Order Act 1994, Arrest without warrant Section 24, subsection 2; 3 and 2 respectively. It’s only 7 lines, 8 lines of legislation but he couldn’t give me the 8 lines of legislation” (Participant 2, Lines 191-194).

Participant 5 describes his support network from Narcotics Anonymous:

“I don’t know what it is, so... I just know that it works and people keep telling me to do the next right thing and the next right thing will happen so that’s what I keep doing” (Participant 5, Lines 229-230).

The only non-psychotic participant, Participant 3, calls upon these mantras more than the psychotic participants. The researcher proposes that language functions to a greater degree for this participant as the mantras learned from Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous programs successfully set limits to his jouissance:
Participant uses mantras from his rehabilitation as a defence against anxiety. He uses these to institute the Law, installing boundaries and drawing a roadmap of how to live his life. These protective verses are taken from his rehabilitation with AA and NA:

“I just have to say to myself is to go with the flow of it and stay in the here and now, what will be will be and all these things, that if it’s not for ya it won’t pass ya and all that kind of thing [sounded exasperated]” (Participant 3, Lines 60-62).

Participant describes his indoctrination into a way of living through rehab. He describes a regimented way of living that helped him get away from drugs:

“And I’m like: ‘Oh no. The XXXX (Rehabilitation centre) way is you P and Q everything. You know, Pride and Quality, Pride and Quality [Mantra from Rehab]. If I’m not shaving this morning there is something going on with me’” (Participant 3, Lines 429-431).

Participant addresses himself in the third person “You gotta watch that deviant behaviour”. His feelings of guilt and shame are associated with this internal ‘law-giving voice’ (super egoic/neurotic):

“It would have been in one-to-one counselling that I would have talked about sexual activity and that would make me feel a guilt and shame and then I would use drugs off it. “So you gotta watch that deviant behaviour cos you don’t like yourself in that way. [banged the table] You gotta watch that”, that’s what I continue to do” (Participant 3, Lines 612-616).
Lacan’s theory of language evolves over time. In Seminar III the Name-of-the-Father grounds the laws of language and he theorises that when language is functioning, jouissance can be curtailed. However, by Seminar XXIII jouissance is part of language itself and psychosis is no longer considered to be based on the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. He situates it elsewhere. Lacan states that what is primary in terms of language is, lalangue (the language), which is the bits and pieces of enjoyment in language; the Goo-Goo and GaGa. On top of this then is a development of language with its laws, structures and so on. The step between lalangue and the language of laws (metaphor/metonymy) does not happen in psychosis and consequently the psychotic is exposed to the experience of bits and pieces of the language, the language of the body:

Participant 2 loses language as he speaks of bodily phenomena he experiences when in crowds:

“Em yeah all over and then I start to perspirate, it gets really uncomfortable, the fight or flight thing kicks in but em eh eh [incoherent word] is to sort of [pause] a bit of self-soothing” (Participant 2, Lines 418-419).

Participant 4 laughs as language gets away from him when he explains how a car he had stolen broke down on a busy road:

“Great experiences and a couple of near misses. I remember the time we were after robbing a car and em trying to cross the dual carriageway in Clondalkin, and it was the old dual carriageway not the present one - the fuckin thing conked out on us (laughs)in the middle of... [words missing]. Tryin to cross... all these cars coming (Ha ha laughed heartily). So... (serious voice) that was funny” (Participant 4, Lines 664-671).

Participant 5 uses an onomatopoeic word when describing how he would assault another driver if he caught him:

“Only your man pulled off; he was coming out that window cos I was right behind his car and I was just at his door and shush [Interviewee makes noise of pulling someone out of car window] Do you know what I mean. And I was left standing in the street fuckin [pause] frothin” (Participant 5, Lines 374-380).

Participant 8 makes funny noise instead of finishing his sentence describing breaking into his school as a boy:
“That was completely rational [laughs] that to fuck am I writing 1600 lines or whatever it was when I can get in there [makes funny noise - De Do De Do]” (Participant 8, Lines 654-658).

The researcher outlines the instances of language disturbances (an indicator of non-neurotic structure) for each participant below with the corresponding analytic finding.

**Participant 2** had twenty-three instances of language disturbance.

1. Foreclosure in language. Participant said Maths “does not exist” for him.
2. Confusion in which position he was speaking from when talking about a future career in ‘Family Law’:
   “That’s where we’re going but addiction keeps, for some strange reason, coming back; and homelessness and all that sort of thing” (Participant 2, Lines 54-56).
   It was unclear if the participant was referring to his own addiction or an opportunity to work with addicts and the homeless that keeps “coming back”.
3. Retraction/negation - consistent with psychopathic use of language:
   “Oh Law’s brilliant, it’s black and white, there’s no ambiguity. Em and sometimes in the ambiguity is the good thing cos you can find things to tie people up with. But it’s the fact that it is so black and white” (Participant 2, Lines 39-42).
   He contradicts his initial statement.
4. Language disturbances were related to the Other (mother and father) / object a (the gaze).

**Participant 3** had thirty-two instances of language disturbance - the highest number.

1. Slips of the tongue.
2. Repetitions.
3. Sentences going nowhere.

Each instance of language disturbance occurred when he was speaking of a traumatic situation.

**Participant 4** had only eight instances of language disturbance.

1. Laughter

Language seemed to escape the participant as he laughed in relation to violence, crime and being chased.

**Participant 5** had twenty-one instances of language disturbance.

1. Mixed metaphors/neologisms.
2. When speaking in relation to the law-giving/care-giving Other.
3. Confusion over the position that the participant is speaking from: “the way a normal person affects (is affected)” - there was confusion over who is the active party and who is passive party being affected.

4. Speaking of Passage à l’acte.

5. Retraction/Negation.

6. Repetition.

Participant 8 also had twenty-one instances of language disturbance.

1. Confusion around position - Who is in authority?

2. Laughing/yawning/singing/cursing take the place of signifiers of anxiety/fear.

3. Repetition around jouissance.

4. Loses language when speaking about the Other (father/mother) and object a.

5. Denial of crime

Counter-instinctively, Participant 3 was found to have the most instances of language disturbance. However, each time that language fell away it was in relation to a traumatic situation. Alternatively, the other participants had on average thirty percent fewer instances of language disturbance but these were never associated with a trauma. Instead they were in relation to a confrontation with the desire of another person or institution.

The researcher privileges the context in which language disturbances were recorded rather than simply measuring their frequency. The researcher’s analytic interpretation is that although fewer in number, the language disturbances in Participants 2, 4, 5 & 8 indicate a non-neurotic structure whereas Participant 3’s losing language when speaking of traumatic events is normative, even if they occur more frequently.
This chapter presented the findings from the study as they relate to the research question. The researcher outlined the theoretical and clinical considerations introduced in previous chapters and offered extracts from the data in his examination and interpretation of these theoretical positions.

What was evidenced from the data:

1. A psychopath may be distinguished from a sociopath based on structure. The researcher found psychopath’s relationships to language, jouissance and the Other’s desire are psychotically structured: disturbances in language, passage à l’acte and foreclosure of phallus.

2. There are two distinct variants of psychopathy (Riot-mode and Machiavellian-mode). The researcher found each of the variants is dominated by a drive (oral in Riot-mode, anal in Machiavellian-mode). Masochistic (perverse) traits were also found to be identifiable in both variants.

3. Each variant is a psychosis with perverse, neurotic and psychotic traits grafted on that function to protect the subject from a confrontation with the real. This also lends a ‘coloration’ to the presentation.

4. Although obsessional, psychotic and perverse traits were recorded in the data, no hysterical traits were revealed: a gap explored in the next chapter (Section 9.2 - No hysterical variant revealed in the data).

5. A compensation in which the scopic or the invocatory drive is dominant allows for a temporary solution (suppletion) as the subject makes an imaginary identification at the level of ‘being’ (being a lawyer, being a father) that supports their entry into the social bond.

These findings will be discussed and elaborated on in the next chapter. Additionally, the question of ethical/criminal responsibility in relation to the psychopath is examined given that he or she:

(i) sometimes does not remember the crime
(ii) may be sure that he or she was doing the ‘right’ thing
(iii) does not consider him or herself to be the same as others (‘social similarity’ - Tarde)
(iv) is highly suggestible and open to influence (‘personal identity’ - Tarde), identifying readily with those who are like him or her, whether in gangs or with one mentor.

In Section 8.4 - The parents relationship, the researcher presented the study finding that the psychopath understands his parents to have a problematic relationship. This finding is significant with regards to previous research (Swales 2012; De Ganck, 2014 and Biagi-Chai, 2012) that identified the parents’ bond as structurally defining for the subject:
i. Biagi-Chai (2012) considers the Oedipus complex as a moment in which the child understands something of the tie between father and mother. She explains that for the psychotic this is an “untied knot” (p.92)

ii. Swales (2012) proposes that the way in which the care-giving Other speaks of the law-giving Other has repercussions for the child’s structure (p.92)

iii. De Ganck (2014) notes that particular parent-child relationship patterns recurred in her participants accounts. In particular there were contradictions in their descriptions of home and the law-giving Other (p.103).
9.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the researcher elaborates on the study’s findings focusing on the clinical relationship between psychopathy and psychosis as understood through the prism of Lacanian structural theory. He explores the co-morbidity of psychopathy and substance abuse from both psychoanalytic and psychiatric standpoints, comparing and contrasting each disciplines understanding and theory. He also examines the correlation between psychopathy and sadism and addresses the question of treatment resistance with this correlation in mind. In the final three sections of the chapter the researcher discusses the application of psychoanalytic methods to research, diagnosis and treatment and outlines why psychoanalysis is appropriate and effective for each, before concluding with a summary of the entire chapter.

9.2 STRUCTURE, JOUISSANCE AND THE DRIVES

In *Seminar X*, Lacan associates the oral stage with frustration and situates the anxiety point on the side of the Other: the mother fears that the breast will dry up. This contrasts with the phallic stage in which Lacan situates the anxiety point on the side of the subject: the infant fears that he/she will not be good enough. As anxiety is experienced outside the infant at the oral stage it is not considered to be subjectivised. The study findings reveal that the presentation of Riot-mode psychopathy has a coloration of orality (*Section 8.5- The variants of psychopathy, p.214*).

In Riot-mode psychopathy the structure is primarily oriented by the most primitive drive: the oral. It is associated with the oral stage of psychical development and the dyad of incorporation/repulsion. The oral stage is related to the physical need of hunger in the under-developed child who must rely solely on another for sustenance. The Riot-mode psychopaths in this study spoke of repelling what they interpreted as a threatening law-giving Other (*Section 8.5- The variants of psychopathy, pp.214-215*).

In contrast, the Machiavellian-mode of psychopathy is a structure primarily oriented by a drive that is more sophisticated than the oral one: the anal drive. The anal drive is associated with the anal stage of psychical development and the dyad of compliance/defiance. The Machiavellian-mode psychopaths in this study spoke of defying those in positions of authority and subverting the rules and regulations of institutions.
The invocatory and scopic drives were considered by Lacan to be closer to desire than demand (Section 3.3 - Lacan and the object a) which implies that when the subject is oriented by them, a more appropriate relation to the social field is achievable. Fink (1997) formulates the invocatory drive as: “to command or to get oneself commanded” (Fink, 1997; cited in Swales, 2012, p.159). The scopic drive may similarly be formulated as: to watch or to get oneself seen.

The psychopath does not have access to phallicisation as the phallus has neither been inscribed (Φ) nor negativized (-φ). Both variants of psychopathy are therefore psychotic in structure. This has implications for both treatment and for the psychopaths dealings within social structures. The psychopaths inability to metaphorise and their limited relationship to the mechanism of exchange results in problematic transferential relations.

In Section 2.4 - The Name-of-the-Father (p.41), the researcher presented how an imaginary identification with a monstrous law-giving Other results from the psychopathic subject’s question around the desire of the Other. The researcher tentatively questions if the peculiar identificatory process and the transitivistic position the psychopath inhabits stems from an impasse in his or her identification with a law-giving Other who represents too much of the law. When the psychopath hits out to repel or subvert representatives of the law, the researcher questions if they are hitting out at the part of their own psyche - the irreconcilable imago of a monstrous law-giving Other that they have introjected. This may also explicate the masochistic characteristics of the psychopathic personality outlined in Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy (p.217).

Although the researcher found orientations toward both the scopic and invocatory drives, these were evenly distributed in the speech of both variants of psychopathy and so are not considered variant specific. The researcher postulates that additional variants of psychopathy based on the dominance of the scopic and invocatory drives may exist but he theorises that these variants are likely to be less common, given that these drives are more sophisticated than the oral and anal drives and are closer to desire than demand.

Although psychosis is indicated by the foreclosure of the phallic signifier, Lacan reconsidered Freud’s ‘structural model of the psyche’ (Freud, 1923b) proposing a model that no longer dealt in absolutes. This means that an objectality may still operate in psychosis, even if it is not normative or phallicised. The psychotic subject’s structure may be dominated by the oral, anal, scopic or invocatory drive and whichever takes precedence ‘colors’ (Miller, 2010) the psychosis. For example: two melancholic
patients may differ in terms of dominant drive while both remaining melancholic, structurally speaking.

A psychosis can therefore be neuroticised with obsessional compulsive traits (anal drive), perversionalised with masochistic/sadistic traits (scopic/invocatory drive) or remain psychoticised (oral drive):

- **Obsessional neurosis** operates via the subject’s compliance/defiance (anal)
- **Perversion** operates via the subject’s sacrificing him or herself to the Other’s jouissance - masochism (scopic and invocatory)
- **Psychosis** operates via the subject’s incorporation/repulsion (oral).

Certain phenomena that have been associated with psychotic structures, such as passage à l’acte, are now understood to be trans-structural. Instances of passage à l'acte do not occur in psychosis alone. However, they are more prevalent in psychosis than in other structures as evidenced in the clinic. Clavreul recognised the problematic differentiation between psychosis and perversion:

“The danger that the pervert is always bordering on - I must repeat it here - is psychosis” (Clavreul, 1980, p.225).

The researcher however situates psychopathy in Lacan’s theory of psychosis rather than his theory of perversion.

Lacan’s use of the signifiers of “subversion” and “psychotic” (each synonymous with a particular clinical structure) in his description of psychopathy highlights the difficulties in the diagnosis of psychopathy as only a psychosis. Like Lacan, the researcher found evidence of perverse traits in psychopathy which he understands to be suppletions which protect the subject from an underlying psychosis rather than evidence of a perverse structure (*Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy*, pp.217-218).

Noticeable by its absence in the study’s data is hysteria which operates via the provocation of the Other’s desire. This absence is discussed and related to contagion in the next section.
The hysteric’s position relates to the phallic stage of psycho-sexual development when the burgeoning subject implicates him or herself in the Other’s desire:

“At the phallic stage, the child has not yet learned the difference between the male sex and the female sex; the infantile universe is divided into beings who either have the phallus or are deprived of it, or, simply, into powerful and powerless beings, the healthy and the sick, the beautiful and the ugly” (Nasio, 1998a, p.43).

A recent study from Baylor University relates an individual’s psychopathic traits to their susceptibility to contagious yawning:

“Our results, then, fit well into the evolutionary model that contagious yawning in our species is a function of empathy, as we have shown that those who are characteristically lacking in empathy are less susceptible to a contagious yawn when prompted in a paradigm known to induce contagious yawning in normal individuals” (Rundle, Vaughn & Stanford, 2015, p.36).

This study associates contagious yawning with empathy (Ibid., p.33) but psychoanalysis considers psychical contagion differently, associating it with hysteria.

“Hysteria, with the “psychical contagion” and the imitation that characterize it, enabled Freud to access the enigma of unconscious desire and to conceptualize the mechanism of identification. The boarding school for girls was the model he chose to explain this” (Brodsky, 2010, p.1).

Freud considered imitation as the “desire of putting oneself in the same situation” (Freud, 1921a, p.107). Like Freud, Moore associates symptom imitation with a subjective identification and does not relate it to sympathy or empathy:

“The taking on of the other’s symptom is not out of sympathy but out of identification with another” (Moore, 2012, p.91).

The researcher postulates that the failure of phallicisation in psychopathy accounts for the lack of indicators of hysteria in the study data. The result of this failure is that psychopaths may only identify at an imaginary and not a symbolic level. The researcher proposes that these imaginary identificatory operations may not be sufficient for the subject to experience contagion. This may account for the study findings in Baylor University, that psychopaths are less susceptible to contagious yawning.
The psychoanalyst distinguishes between a psychotic and neurotic structure based on the presence/absence of the Name-of-the-Father (paternal metaphor). The Name-of-the-Father is inexorably linked to the castration complex and the subject’s entry into the social bond. Lacan aptly describes the impasse reached by the subject in the castration complex as a “dead end” (Lacan, 1962, p.242) and it is this impasse that is problematic for the psychopath. The impasse forces the subject into a choice to repress, disavow or foreclose the Name-of-the-Father and it is the researcher’s position that the psychopath forecloses the Name-of-the-Father: this is the defence mechanism of the psychotic.

In the postscript to his paper *On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis*, Lacan highlights a fundamental disorder that marks the relationship to the Other when the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed. What comes to take up the place of the Name-of-the-Father is “One-father [Un-pere]” (Lacan, 1955a [2006], p.481 [577]). The ‘One-father’ is in the register of the Real: castrating, threatening and escaping symbolic representation. Consequently, the signifier of the Law and the normative link with the social bond remains absent in psychosis. This is therefore also the case for psychopathy which the researcher formulates as an ‘ordinary’ or compensated psychosis.

In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory the subject’s entry into the social bond is marked by their entry into language. However, the subject does not have any say on the signifying chain they inherit. The signifiers are bequeathed to them; their name and even the language they are born into. Yet they must take responsibility for these signifiers. The researcher proposes that the symbolic order the psychopath is born into is inadequate for the normative installation of the social bond. As a result, they lack a unit of exchange related to the desire of the Other (*Section 3.3 - Psychopaths - The psychotic sons of social monsters*). However, the subject of desire is not the only subjectivity described in Lacanian theory, there is also the ‘subject-of-jouissance’ (*Section 8.7 - The demands of the Other as determining jouissance*):

“For Lacan, there is a —subject in the real (1966/2006a, p. 835)—which might also be called the subject of jouissance or the subject of the drives. The subject of jouissance is caused by the signifier (p. 835) insofar as the symbolic order structures the drives” (Swales, 2011, p.101).

Swales differentiates between the subject’s identity at the level of jouissance and at the level of the sliding signifier. She points to an identificatory “solidity” at the level of jouissance:
“Jouissance is a substance (Lacan, 1975/1998b, p. 26) that is separate from the Other (although it can ex-sist in the Other), and so the subject’s identity at the level of jouissance has more solidity than at the level of the sliding signifier” (Ibid.).

The researcher proposes that this identificatory “solidity” may also relate to the surety and rigidity that the psychopath has in relation to knowledge (Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to knowledge).

The psychopath’s relation to jouissance, understood as the result of an impasse reached in their psychical development, situates the germs of the structure during the same period as other forms of psychosis are crystallised in infantile development. In Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy the researcher notes a particular psychotic characteristic evident in psychopathy: transitivism. Lacan considered transitivism as a mode of subjective identification common to infantile relationships and psychosis (Section 3.3 - The Mirror, the ego and aggression). Biagi-Chai also noticed this trait when she found that Landru had an eroto-maniacal attachment to Segret that took a peculiar colouring in which both of their subjectivities became entangled making it difficult to distinguish who was speaking (Section 4.5 - Psychosis and the serial killer).
The researcher identified an essential element, noticeable by its absence in the psychopath’s experience: fear. In Section 8.2 - Anxiety and the cession of the object the researcher formulated that the psychopathic subject is psychotic and illustrated that they experience little or no fear in stressful situations. However, there is still an effect and the researcher detailed how psychopaths experience an extreme, psychotic form of anxiety.

All subjects are confronted with the desire of the Other at some point and the subsequent choice to accept or reject the Other’s desire is normatively experienced as anxiety inducing (Section 8.2 - Anxiety and the cession of the object). However in psychopathy there is a short-circuit in the operation of anxiety. There is a danger associated with the letting go (cession) of the object and anxiety functions as a signal of this danger. In psychopathy however the object is not extracted and therefore no danger is associated with its loss. Psychopath’s are unable to symbolise their experience of loss/lack and when they are confronted with the desire of the Other, they ‘act’ so that the law-giving Other is repelled, subverted, or ultimately destroyed (Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy, pp.212-216).

Swales (2011, 2012) work is of particular significance in this context. Her position is that a structural presentation is determined by the dominant drive object (object a) and she distinguished these for the perversions. The researcher builds on Swales’ work by relating the dominance of particular drives to variants of psychopathy. Although Swales links psychopathy with sadism she does not exclude the possibility of a connection between the psychopath and psychosis:

“I propose that what the DSM-IV-TR calls Antisocial Personality Disorder—and especially what is known as Psychopathy—often falls under the Lacanian structure of sadistic perversion. I hypothesize that, less frequently, psychopaths might be psychotically structured” (Swales, 2011, p.12).

In Section 3.3 - Primordial versions of the object a the researcher described the cry and meconium as primitive templates for objectalites coloured by the oral and anal drives (pp.75-76). Both of these primitive templates are experienced by the pre-linguistic infant and consequently are not representable in the symbolic via language. They are of the register of the real. The researcher found in the variants of psychopathy a relationship to these real, primitive templates. In the next section the researcher discusses the real as it relates to structure and psychopathy.
Ultimately everything that is of the order of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and their combination is a defence against the Real; a Real that is essentially lawless and cannot be conquered. The Lacanian theory of the 1950’s offered that the Real could be conquered symbolically and that an analysis could see the Symbolic dominate the Real. In the late Lacan it is no longer as binary and he theorises that even if the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed, other possible names-of-the-Father can operate. The researcher theorises that psychopathy is one of the ways of stabilising one’s relationship to the Real, a name-of-the-father. It is not the Name-of-the-Father.

Psychopathy is a delusional defence against the Real. However, the Other is experienced as Real for the psychopath who is unable to represent their desire in the Imaginary or Symbolic registers. When the psychopathic subject meets the Other they experience in that moment a confrontation with the Real and they either enter riot-mode (émeute) seeking to repel the Other, or they enter Machiavellian-mode and seek to subvert and ridicule the Other (Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy).
The finding of two forms of psychopathy is crucial for the direction of the treatment. As discussed in Section 4.4 - Psychotic solution: Suppletion or Sinthome the installation of a suppletion based on the scopic or invocatory drives offers a more stable entry into the social bond for the subject than one governed by the oral or anal. The researcher identified in the participants’ narratives from before ‘rehabilitation’ that their relationship to lack was coloured by either the oral or anal drives. Through “rehabilitation” the participants of this study linked into their subjective experience an imaginary identification that could support their way of being (Sections 8.8 - Speech as a means of deception & 8.9 - Symptom, Suppletion and Sinthome). The replacing of a suppletion oriented by the oral or anal drive with one oriented by the scopic or invocatory via an imaginary identification situates the subject inside the social bond and subjectively closer to desire than demand. As Lacan indicates in Seminar X, the technique of psychoanalysis:

“is a handling, an interference, even bordering on a rectification, of desire” (Lacan, 1962, p.247).

Psychoanalytic treatment rectifies desire by re-approaching the real of detumesence experienced by the subject when he surrenders his object. In relation to this real, Naveau quotes Lacan from Seminar X who determined there to be a danger:

“linked to the deciduous character of the object, to its possible fall, to the character of cession of the constitutive moment of the object a” (Naveau, 2012, p.4).

Naveau is however hopeful, and considers a psychoanalytic treatment as a:

“consent to this cession, to this fall of the most real of the object a cause of desire. Words must come to dress the thing” (Ibid.).

In Section 3.3 - Primordial versions of the object a the researcher pointed to the particular quality of the anal object as the first drive object that is yieldable for the subject. The oral object does not possess this quality as at this stage of psychical development the anxiety point lies on the side of the Other (Section 9.2 - Structure, jouissance and the drives). The researcher’s thesis is that because the oral object dominates in the riot-mode variant of psychopathy any re-approaching of the anxiety associated with the cession of the object is problematic.
The notion of cure is problematic in psychoanalysis as it is not the aim of the treatment. Rather, it is considered enough that the analysand will suffer well at the end of the treatment. Although the aim is not to cure, there may be and often are curative effects associated with psychoanalytic treatment. After all, psychoanalysis came to be called the “talking cure” (a term originally offered by a patient, Bertha Pappenheim (1859-1936) who also known by the pseudonym, Anna O.) Additionally, psychoanalysis may be understood as rehabilitative as, over the course of an analysis temporary subjective solutions or suppletions may be installed by the subject (Section 4.4 - Psychotic solution: Suppletion or Sinthome).

Criticisms have been levelled against psychoanalysis for the length of time that treatments take and for not effecting permanent cures. These criticisms extend beyond living psychoanalysts as cases of Freud and other deceased psychoanalysts have been revisited. In one such instance, Sulloway critiques Freud’s case, Notes Upon A Case of Obsessional Neurosis (Freud, 1909), by raising a question around the length of the Rat-man’s treatment (Sulloway, 1991, p.256). Freud’s response to a colleague who stated that a short term and convenient out-patient treatment for obsessional neurosis was needed seems an appropriate retort:

“specialists in internal diseases, too, would probably be very glad of a treatment for tuberculosis or carcinoma which combined these advantages” (Freud, 1913, p.129).

Sulloway also questions Freud’s treatment of the patient (the Wolf-man) in From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (Freud, 1918). He questions if the Wolf-man was ever ‘cured’ given his relapse in the late 1920's and places some of the blame for this on Freud (Sulloway, 1991, p.258). Sulloway considers professional boundaries to have been broken by Freud who both raised money for the former Russian aristocrat and treated him for free while receiving detailed accounts of the patient’s dreams by letter. Freud for his part, played down the significance of these relapses at the time, associating the Wolf-man’s relapses to fragments of the patient’s unanalysed history which after the analysis, fell away like “sutures after an operation or small pieces of necrotic bone” (Freud, 1937, p.374):

“a short course of treatment has sufficed on each occasion to clear up these attacks” (Freud, 1937, pp.373-374).

What Freud makes clear is that even though we might hope for a fully effective treatment that is also expedient, the reality is that the psychopathologies can be as stubborn and difficult to remove as physical pathologies. Even if a symptom can be lessened or altered to the point that the subject can
lead a relatively successful life, the predisposition to the psychopathology remains. Consequently, given the vicissitudes to life, relapse is not unavoidable.

During the data collection phase of this study many participants described having been through rehabilitation for substance abuse and now self-identified as being ‘in recovery’. However, in the psychoanalytic interview Participant 3 described relapsing upon the death of a family member. This loss (combined with another family member’s serious illness) was the catalyst for his entering a subjective crisis. For the next few months he uncharacteristically showed disregard for his responsibilities and other’s expectations. Hearing this narrative compelled the researcher to investigate the psychoanalytic understanding of the triad: rehabilitation/recovery/relapse.

In *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* Freud offers his understanding of reCOVERY (to cover over (veil) once more). This recovering is not a permanent solution and although treatment can lead to recovery, it also does not remove the possibility of relapse:

“If the patient who has made such a good recovery never produces any more symptoms calling for analysis, it still, of course, remains an open question how much of this immunity is due to a benevolent fate which spares him too searching a test” (Ibid., p.376).

In this context, the Wolf-man may be considered to have relapsed when the vicissitudes of life interrupted recovery. Importantly, Freud taught that there is no chronometer in the unconscious. There is a timeless quality to memory and the attached emotion. A reminder of a traumatic event may cause the subject to re-experience the emotion associated with the original event, even decades after it happened.

Recovery is not synonymous with cure. However it can support a subjective position as a suppletion. As revealed in Section 8.8 - Speech as a means of deception, those who found societally acceptable ways of being subversive had to a large extent suppleted their psychosis and have escaped the émeute (riot) which plagued them prior to this. The two highest scoring participants are studying for law degrees and have entered a discourse from which they had hitherto felt excluded. Prior to entering university these men met the representatives of authority with mistrust and interpreted them as deceptive, threatening and violent. Becoming part of the same discourse has allowed a subjective shift and an ex-timate (externally-intimate) relationship to develop regarding the law-giving Other. The common talent in psychopathy of obfuscation seems to lend itself to the legal profession (*Section 4.5 - Psychosis and the serial-killer*) and Biagi-Chai notes that by employing it:

“Speech can develop endlessly, it will never reveal what is not there to reveal, since everything is included in what is said” (Biagi-Chai, 2012, p.122).
Each of the psychopathic participants spoke of an inconsistent law-giving Other (pp.181-182). However psychopaths are not alone as Lacan points out that the Other is always inconsistent. Recalcati describes the fourth stage of Lacan’s theory or ‘late Lacan’ as “beyond Oedipus” (Recalcati, 2008). From this point on in Lacanian theory there is an aspect of the Other that is always foreclosed. Lacanian psychoanalysis recognises that there is a general madness; that is not to say we are all psychotic, but we all have to deal with the inconsistency or hole in the Other. No matter our structure, we all have to respond to this Real and lack as the Symbolic and Imaginary can no longer protect us sufficiently. From Seminar VI (1958) on, Lacan sees the law-giving Other (father) as subject to the Symbolic order, a lacking order, and that they must transmit something of this lack to their son or daughter. When something of this lack is transmitted, the law-giving Other allows his son or daughter to find their way with this lack without ever promising a universal truth. Lacan saw that what determines a subject's structure is not what they incorporate of the inconsistency of the Other, but rather what they incorporate of the Other's response to the Real and lack.

In Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to knowledge the researcher presents extracts from participant’s interviews detailing how they each had fathers (law-giving Other) who were unable to transmit anything of this lack (pp.198-199). Without this transmission they incorporated into their sense of self, aspects of their fathers’ responses to the Real (whether with substance abuse or physical violence): an imaginary identification. Although the imaginary identification with the law-giving Other allows the subject to position him or herself in the realm of social relations, there is a deficit. What is missing is the “pact” between law-giving Other (father) and child and the promise that this entails. Only a symbolic identification with the law-giving Other creates this pact as the subject is introduced to the Law: a law that they apprehend the law-giving Other also being subject to. Instead of foregoing pleasure with the promise of future happiness, as is the case in a normative negotiation of the castration complex; a rivalry ensues between the psychopath and the law-giving Other. This rivalry is characterised by aggression:

“If the captivating image is without limits, if the character in question manifests himself simply in the order of strength and not in that of the pact, then a relation of rivalry, aggressiveness, fear, etc. appear” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.189).
The rivalrous imaginary solution implies a positioning of the law-giving Other as semblable by the subject. This has an infinite property because it is not limited by the symbolic and language and helps to situate the passages to the act described by participants in this study (Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to jouissance, pp.200-201).

Vanheule also sees that a self-installed identification with social life narratives can provide the subject with a set of rules to follow in relation to others when the Name-of-the-Father is not installed:

“Lacan (1955-6, pp.204-5) illustrates this by referring to the case of a psychopathic criminal who uncritically adopts the law of criminal gangs without experiencing moral conflict about the life he leads. By following the rules of the gang and demonstrating virility through violent behaviour, he can compensate for an experience of ailing masculinity, for example. In this case 'alienation is radical' says Lacan (1955-6, p.205), and a direct consequence of 'the annihilation of the signifier'. This means that when the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed, identification with social life narratives can have a repairing function to the extent that they provide a person with a fixed set of rules to follow in relation to others, hence the idea of radical alienation” (Vanheule, 2011, p.75).

Willemsen and Verhaeghe (2009) argue that perversion and psychopathy are two distinguishable clinical diagnoses each with relevance for the forensic clinic. Their 2009 paper, When Psychoanalysis meets Law and Evil contrasts the psychogenesis of perversion and psychopathy based on the position of the father in the familial economy. They theorize that in perversion the father is “reduced to a powerless observer defined as insignificant by the mother” (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009, p.243) while in contrast:

“the psychopath’s father does not emerge as a powerless observer defined as insignificant by the mother. On the contrary, a significant number of the psychopaths we interviewed spoke with veneration of their father” (Ibid., p.246).

Willemsen and Verhaeghe’s research found that the psychopath’s typical family constellation was that of “indulging mother - idealized father” (Ibid., p.247). This contrasts with the participants in this study who did not represent their fathers as “idealized”. Instead the father was presented as an inconsistent figure, strong outside the home but someone who abused and tortured his family, denigrating himself in the subject’s eyes:

“watching him pissin in the chair” (Participant 4, Line 183).

“Dad woulda had a really bad accident when I was a child…. Bad head injuries more to frontal lobe, left side of his frontal lobe…. Left him Jeckyll and Hyde” (Participant 2, Lines 268-271).
“My mam would have been on the receiving end of it…. She took out her frustrations on us because she was on the receiving end of me Da” (Participant 5, Lines 463-465).

“I don’t think he really had friends. He’d, he’d [repetition] more associates-come-friends” (Participant 8, Lines 228-240).

The theoretical focus should therefore not be on the law-giving Other as inconsistent. The Other is always inconsistent for the subject; radically inconsistent in the sense that there is an aspect of the Other that is foreclosed. Structure instead relates to the subject’s understanding of how the Other deals with the Real (lack) and whether a signifier of a Name-of-the-Father (Law) is transmitted to the subject by a law-giving Other who is also subject to its regulatory function. The participants in this study mostly incorporated their fathers’ responses to the Real and lack, responses that included substance abuse and physical violence.
In obsessional neurosis there is an enjoyment in thought. However the obsessional subject is compelled to have these thoughts, a continuous displacement onto new representations. Although a psychotic may also speak of having obsessive thoughts, the psychotic believes they are being manipulated by an external force. Psychotics express a surety that thoughts are imposed upon them, whereas obsessionals do not.

In light of this “rigid binary” of psychosis and neurosis (p.84) the researcher questions: If the psychopath is psychotic, what in their structure is not subjectified - what do they relate as having been imposed on them?

In answering this question the researcher’s findings concurred with Willemsen’s (2009) that psychopaths have an “a priori conviction” (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009, p.248) that they were wronged in the past by the Other. This ‘conviction’ or surety aligns with Biagi-Chai’s theory that those labelled ‘psychopath’ or ‘narcissistic pervert’ do not always enjoy their structural characteristics and exist in a ‘neo-reality’ (p.91).

The researcher found that the psychopathic participants identified the non-engagement of the law-giving Other in their childhood as an injustice perpetrated on them. In Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to knowledge the researcher presents his finding that the law-giving Other failed to engage and did not prohibit jouissance.

The psychopath has a law-giving Other who is not subject to the law himself, at least not inside the home. Outside the home he is a strong man but inside the home he is “le monster sacré” (Lacan, 1955), the ‘primal father’ from Freud’s Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1913). However this monstrous father does not always induce fear in his psychopathic son who represents his father as an embarrassment and a self-denigrating character to be pitied.

He is like the ‘Schreberian’ father (Lacan, 1955a [2006]), who incarnates the Law rather than being subject to it himself. Schreber’s father did not impart the law to his son and a foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father followed for Schreber (Section 3.3 - The Name-of-the-Father is missing). Schreber’s father, Daniel Gottlob Moritz Schreber (1808-1861) wrote over thirty books on raising children which above all else emphasised discipline. Not much is known of Schreber’s mother, other than that she played a role in her husband’s career including proof reading his manuscripts.
(Niederland, 1963). The researcher found that the psychopath’s relationship to the care-giving Other (mother), and not only the law-giving Other, had a bearing on his structure.

The absence of prohibition goes hand-in-hand with the failure in alienation, an operation essential for a neurotic structure. The researcher therefore situates psychopathy as a non-neurotic structure. He found that in the Riot-mode variant there is also a failure in separation, the operation in which the care-giving Other expresses their desire outside a dualistic relationship with the infant (p.198). The Riot-mode psychopath has not separated successfully from the body and jouissance of the care-giving Other. Consequently, the subject lacks the signifier (the Name-of-the-father) or semblants that allow a distancing from, or mediation of this jouissance. They have no defence against the jouissance of the (m)Other and when confronted with it, they attack. The findings of this study show that Riot-mode psychopaths also do not remember what instigates these attacks or even remember the attacks (Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to jouissance). The researcher therefore situates these attacks as passages to the act - instantaneous reactions by the subject to the jouissance of the Other.

Alternately, the researcher found that Machiavellian-mode psychopaths also spoke of an injustice perpetrated on them, but unlike the Riot-mode psychopaths they implicate the care-giving Other (pp.195-196). Just as is the case with the Riot-mode psychopath, no separation from the body and jouissance of the care-giving Other has happened. However imaginary identifications can prop up the structure. The Machiavellian-mode psychopath subverts and ridicules the Law rather than repelling or destroying it. The researcher considers this to be a compensation via a perverse trait.

The Machiavellian-mode psychopath relates to the care-giving Other (mother) in a particular manner. In the previous chapter the researcher presents how Participant 2 envies his mother for escaping the physical abuse he experienced at the hands of his father (pp.195-196). He also presents his mother as lacking in self-control and he experiences her as unmediated jouissance and too much: “Em, but again why would you keep having kids when you knew what ... [words missing] would’ve gone through electric shock treatment all that sort of stuff” (Participant 2, Lines 291-294).

The other Machiavellian-mode participant Participant 8 also spoke of his relationship to his mother, contrasting his closeness to her with his relationship to his frequently absent father:

“[Big yawn and speaks through it] Fine with me ma yeah. Still my best mate. Sorry [yawns]… So like... [incoherent words - sounds like ‘Drop me Ma in and grand’] Em. Me Da was just a functioning alcoholic so was never really, when he wasn’t working he was at the p... [word unfinished]” (Participant 8, pp.222-229).
For Participant 8 some part of his mother’s subjectivity is also implicated in his crimes. In Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy the researcher presents a story told by this participant in which he seems, to take the fall for his mother (pp.217-218). For both the Machiavellian-mode psychopaths in this study, a peculiar identification with the mother which includes a transitivism was evidenced.

The Machiavellian-mode of psychopathy has a more successful suppletive function than the Riot-mode. In Section 8.4 - The psychopath and the mentor the researcher offers that one particular form this suppletion can take is an imaginary identification with an ideal. This aligns with the theories presented by the researcher in the opening four chapters: Lacan’s “le monster sacré” (1955), Meloy’s “stranger self-object” (2007), Willemsen’s “idealized father” (2009), Miller’s “Compensated-Make-Believe” (2009a), De Ganck’s “righteous, respectable, intelligent, but frequently gadabout man” (2014) and Biagi-Chai’s “imaginary crutches” (2015). These imaginary identifications both create and help to sustain a psychopath’s neo-reality.
As presented in Section 3.3 - Normative adaptation - The antithesis of psychoanalysis, the symbolic register and signification through language are not capable of representing the real:

“The symbolic, being of the nature of semblance, gives us only the belief that we are sufficiently protected from the real” (p.78). The symbolic register operates because of the possibility of difference and hence meaning (meaning only exists by way of difference and via signifiers that differ from each other). This is discourse. Neurotics believe in the semblance of difference and meaning that the symbolic offers whereas psychotics, who are in touch with the nature of language and its real materiality, do not. An example is *Finnegans Wake* (Joyce, 1939) in which the English language is torn apart by a psychotic writer in order to expose the bits and pieces that make it up. Like Joyce, the psychopath is not sufficiently ensconced within discourse: in the realm of difference and meaning. Miller has highlighted the schizophrenic’s ironical relationship to discourse (Miller, 2002) and the researcher recognises a problematic relationship with discourse for the psychopath too.

Just as disavowal is the fundamental operation in perversion, repression in neurosis and foreclosure in psychosis, so Willemsen and Verhaeghe put forward the operation of retraction as the fundamental operation in psychopathy (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009). From their interviews with psychopaths, Willemsen and Verhaeghe identify a quality in the speech of psychopaths that distinguish them from other structures:

“It appears that psychopaths frequently use retractors, i.e., a word, phrase, or clause which detracts from the statement preceding it” (Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009, p.249).

The researcher found similar negations and retractions in the speech of study participants (Section 8.10 - The psychopath’s relation to Language - Bits and Pieces). In Section 10.2 - Poacher turned gamekeeper, the researcher recognises that the study of Law seems particularly amenable for this study population’s entry into the social bond. One possible reason for its amenability is that the operation of retraction is not excluded. This is best represented by Participant 2 who says he likes studying Law as it is unambiguous but then says the Law has ambiguity and that this can be used to “tie people up”.

“*Oh Law’s brilliant, it’s black and white, there’s no ambiguity. Em and sometimes in the ambiguity is the good thing cos you can find things to tie people up with. But it’s the fact that it is so black and white*” (Participant 2, Lines 39-42).

Retractions, contradictions and negations that operate in a similar way to ‘Freud’s Kettle logic’ (p.107) were found in the speech of study participants. While the researcher acknowledges that these
may be more common in non-neurotic structure, he does not understand retraction to be an independent psychical defence mechanism indicative of a fourth structure as outlined by Willemsen and Verhaeghe (2009).

Retractions, contradictions and negations are not specific to one structure but are instead disavowals seen across all the structures. These ‘symptomatic’ disavowals should not to be confused with the disavowal of the phallus: a defense mechanism at a fundamental level in the constitution of the subject: the structure of perversion.
As detailed in the previous chapter psychopaths have non-normative relations to (i) time, (ii) knowledge and (iii) jouissance.

(i) The researcher found that the psychopath is situated in a temporality that seems beyond their influence and they speak of being unable to change their future (Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to knowledge, pp.197-198). In On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis (1955a) Lacan notes the psychotic’s peculiar relationship to temporality and destiny. He indicates that Schreber never gets to fulfil his delusion and is forever waiting for something to happen that never comes to pass (bearing a child for God). Lacan links this to Schreber’s problematic relationship with the reproduction of himself through having a child:

“Between the two, a line - which would culminate in the Creatures of speech occupying the place of the child who doesn't come, dashing the subject’s hopes” (Lacan, 1955a [2006], p.470 [563]).

As described in Section 8.7 - The demands of the Other as determining jouissance, the researcher considers psychopaths to be subjects-of-jouissance who must manage this jouissance without the limiting function of symbolic identification. In Lacanian theory the symbolic is exemplified by the operation of the signifier which is a dialectic of anticipation and retroaction (Lacan, 1958a, p.8). This relationship with time, is not evident in the other registers and Soler differentiates the drives from the signifier as their satisfaction operates instantaneously (Soler, 1995, p.52). The researcher postulates that the psychopath’s future may seem beyond their influence because they manage their jouissance via the drive alone rather than having the limiting and temporal effects of the symbolic.

(ii) The researcher found that psychopaths are mistrusting of others. They interpret the Other as persecutionary and then have to deal with the threatening representatives of this Other and the information they offer (p.200).

(iii) The researcher found that psychopaths remain governed by jouissance rather than desire and have difficulty negotiating confrontations with the Other’s desire (p.200).
For this study the researcher sought a population of psychopaths. However he found that all the participants who met the criteria for psychopathy also had histories of substance abuse. A high comorbidity is seen to exist between substance abuse and antisocial/psychopathic tendencies. Regier’s 1990 study found that 83.6% of individuals who met the DSM-IV criteria for ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) had a comorbid substance abuse (Regier et al, 1990). Messina relates ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA,2013) to treatment outcomes for drug abusers and cites other studies that rate co-morbidity even higher at 90%:


Smith and Newman relate psychopathy; rather than ‘Anti-social personality disorder’ (APA, 2013) to substance abuse and state that psychopaths are at a much higher risk for developing substance abuse problems than the general population:

“Co-occurrence of psychopathy (assessed with the Psychopathy Checklist) and lifetime Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed.) alcohol and drug disorders (assessed with the National Institute of Mental Health Diagnostic Interview Schedule) was examined in a sample of 360 male inmates. Consistent with previous research that used diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder, psychopaths were more likely than nonspsychopaths to have lifetime diagnoses of alcoholism, any drug disorder, and multiple drug disorders” (Smith & Newman, 1990, p.430).

They also point to a positive correlation between substance abuse and Factor 2 symptoms from the PCL-R around poor behavioural controls. Alternately, substance abuse was shown to be weakly correlated with Factor 1 symptoms, which relate to affective dysfunction (Ibid., p.437).

A 2014 neuroscience study differentiated between psychopaths and non-psychopaths on the basis of the function that drugs serve for them:

“Psychopathy and substance use disorders are highly comorbid, but clinical experience suggests that psychopaths abuse drugs for different reasons than non-psychopaths, and that psychopaths do not typically experience withdrawal and craving upon becoming incarcerated. These neurobiological abnormalities may be related to psychopaths’ different motivations for - and symptoms of - drug use” (Cope et al, 2014, p.1).
Psychoanalysis explains a psychotic subject’s relation to drugs/substances as a way of limiting jouissance as opposed to a neurotic or perverse subject seeking pleasure and promoting jouissance in their use of drugs. The researcher found that psychopaths experience extreme anxiety and jouissance when confronted with the desire of the Other (Section 8.2 - Anxiety and the cession of the object). The researcher postulates that psychopaths take substances to limit this jouissance as a self-medication.
This study found that the five interviewed participants self-reported a history of substance abuse, a finding that warrants consideration. Firstly, it is worth noting that participants were drawn from a cohort of ex-offenders. Substance abuse is closely associated with criminality and 59% of male sentenced prisoners in Ireland had a drug dependency problem (Kennedy et al, 2005). Drug taking for the non-psychopathic subject may be considered as a way to become uninhibited; to lessen fear and anxiety. However, for the psychopath, drug taking is conversely about limiting jouissance.

The psychopath’s abuse of substances functions in relation to a psychotic structure (toxicomania). The substance (heroin/cocaine/alcohol) operates as a substitute for the non-functioning of the Name-of-the-Father; it is a manager of jouissance. The repetitive abuse of substances substitutes for the Name-of-the-Father which is not functioning. There is no production of extra jouissance, as in the case of neurotics and the perverse:

“Neurotic, psychotic, or perverse subjects administer their enjoyment (jouissance) in different ways and indeed for different reasons. In neurosis and perversion the administration in addiction is a matter of the supplying or dispensing of an extra jouissance: an attempt to suspend the limits that reality or language puts on pleasure. In psychosis the administration with the effects of drugs and alcohol concerns the management or mastery of an unbearable jouissance and it functions as a substitute for language precisely because language cannot function properly for the subject with a psychotic structure” (Loose, 2011, p.16).

The psychopathic participants interviewed, describe confrontations with the jouissance of the Other and the jouissance of the body. They detailed entering a riot-mode or machiavellian-mode in response to these confrontations. The substance operates to curtail jouissance for the psychopath and is a self-medication to avoid subjective short-circuits:

“In particular the clinic of the so-called “new forms” of the symptom (toxicomania, drug addiction, anorexia, bulimia, depression) makes evident the incidence of closed psychoses, un-triggered, compensated, where these new organizations of jouissance, especially anorexia-bulimia and toxicomania, appear as the psychosis’ subjective modalities of closure and compensation. Through these modalities the subject defers the possibility of triggering or, as Lacan puts it, keeps himself on this side of the hole of psychosis, on the brink of psychosis but without falling into it” (Recalcati, 2005).
The findings from this study are that the acts of violence spoken about by the non-psychopathic participants were described in terms of addiction. These acts were committed under the intense withdrawals from heroin and the need to get money to buy drugs and alleviate the pain. Alternately, the psychopathic participants spoke of acts of violence without the explanation of any mediation of withdrawal and pain from substance abuse. The substance (heroin) appears to be experienced differently by psychopaths and non-psychopaths. The non-psychopathic substance abuser who took part in this study was driven to violence by intense withdrawals while the psychopathic participants were violent prior to forming any physical or psychological dependency on the substance.
Before data collection the researcher’s preliminary formulation was that psychopathy and sadistic perversion were structurally related. He reasoned this based on two shared traits - a subversive position in relation to the Other and a lack of empathy towards others. However the participants descriptions of their social interactions allow for a differenciation between psychopathy and sadism.

Sadism is a perversion in which there is a provocation of the limit by the sadist to the Other. Through the sadistic act they bring the Other to a point of anxiety where they will place a limit on the act. This limit increases the sadist’s anxiety and in the absence of phallic signification another object dominates, the invocatory object (Swales, 2012, p.158). Anxiety is seen to operate for the sadist but its relaying operation as a signal of danger is mis-recognised and interpreted perversely. In psychopathy the relaying operation of anxiety as a signal of danger is short-circuited (Section 9.2 - Lack of fear).

Another differentiation concerns how the law operates for the two structures. Although the law operates in sadism it has to be provoked for it to function. Alternately the law does not function for the psychopath. From their perspective the law-giving Other has nothing that the care-giving Other might desire: the phallus is foreclosed. This is the definition of a psychosis and the researcher details examples he found in Section 8.4 - The parents relationship.

In sadism aggression is used to approach the anxiety of the Other so that they will place a limit. The particular form of psychopathic aggression spoken of by participants allowed the researcher to similarly situate the psychopathic way-of-being within the Lacanian structural framework. In Section 3.3- The Mirror, the ego and aggression the researcher examined aggression and found that Lacan linked it to the mirror stage and prior to the castration complex.

The researcher considers the repetitive nature of the psychopath’s aggression as a function of their psychosis. As outlined in Section 3.3 - The Name-of-the-Father is missing Lacan theorised that the psychotic “hole” or void was anything but empty, having infinite no-things substituted here; a continuous metonymy as a compensation for the failure of the phallic metaphor. Although the psychopathic subject is without Schreber-like florid delusions and hallucinations they compensate repeatedly in a specifically psychopathic way as described in Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy.
Perverse structures including sadism have, like psychopathy, been considered treatment resistant (Clavreul, 1980). In the next section the researcher explores the concept of treatment resistance in psychopathy using Swales critique of treatment resistance in perversion (Swales, 2012) as his springboard.
THE QUESTION OF TREATMENT RESISTANCE

The researcher agrees with Swales’ critique of Clavreul’s paper, *The Perverse Couple* (1980) in which Clavreul questions the treatability of perverse subjects (Swales, 2012). Swales notes that Clavreul does not make a distinction between jouissance and desire. Clavreul’s position on treatment resistance is therefore grounded in his confusion of the perverse subject’s knowledge-of-jouissance and their knowledge-of-desire:

“Clavreul's mistake here is in indicating that it is at the level of desire instead of the level of jouissance that the pervert is not lacking. The pervert, as a subject who is not certain of his desires, can position his therapist as a subject-supposed-to-know because a lack of knowledge in the register of desire is a condition for the possibility of that transference relation” (Swales, 2012, p.237).

While Swales acknowledges that the perverse subject has a complete knowledge-of-jouissance she does not consider them to have a complete knowledge-of-desire. The researcher adds to Swale’s critique by proposing that the pervert’s ability to access jouissance at will, hides or veils the lack that causes desire and that this veiling of the lack that causes desire is not the equivalent of not having desire. In infancy the prospective subject loses a piece of jouissance as a consequence of their drive satisfaction by the m(O)ther (her touch and encouragements). They discover that this little piece is no longer available in subsequent satisfactions. However, they do not stop seeking this little piece which comes to cause desire via it’s interpretation as the object a. *(Section 3.3 - Normative adaptation - The antithesis of psychoanalysis).*

It is the object a that veils the lack in jouissance, the plus-du-jouir (the more to be enjoyed) that is the cause of desire:

“[object a] is a small piece, a piece of body, a little satisfaction … that gets lost …. that is no longer part of you…. when you fulfil yourselves as speaking subjects…. and is the remains of the division in the field of the Other through the presence of the subject” (Brousse, 2007, p.4).

The lack is disavowed by the perverse subject and the perverse act (e.g. the fetish) veils this lack. In analytic treatment lifting this veil will create a crisis for the perverse subject as they glimpse the lack. This allows perverse subjects to position the analyst as the subject-supposed-to-know. The potential for a transference onto the analyst by the perverse subject therefore becomes possible and psychoanalytic work can ensue. Similarly psychopaths are portrayed as treatment-resistant but here too there has been a misrecognition.
The United Kingdom’s Ministry for Justice has asked this question too:

“Is psychopathy treatable? Research would generally suggest that there are some grounds for optimism in thinking about interventions for psychopathic offenders…. Interventions most likely to be effective are those which focus on ‘self interest’ - that is, what the offender wants to get out of life - and works with them to develop the skills to get those things in a pro-social rather than antisocial way” (Craissati et al, 2011, p.45).

The researcher does not consider the psychopath to be alone in their attending therapy out of self-interest. In fact this contributes to the installation of a positive transference. The findings of this study show that the psychopath can install limits on their jouissance and engage with society from a subjective position that both serves them and removes the threat they previously posed to the individuals or institutions of society (pp.230-231). In Section 10.2 - The transference the researcher recommends a psychoanalytic treatment with psychopaths as possible on the basis of their positioning the analyst as a subject with a ‘know-how’ in relation to jouissance.

The researcher also questions how a psychoanalyst might direct analytic treatments with subjects-of-jouissance and how the psychopath might find their way to the analyst's practice. Although he theorises that a perverse variant of psychopathy may exist, the researcher acknowledges that it is unlikely many perverse subjects would participate. The perverse are rare creatures in consulting rooms as their symptom functions for them and they have no incentive to seek therapy or in this case, to participate in research studies. Alternately, the Riot-mode (psychotic structure) and Machiavellian-mode (psychotic structure with obsessional traits) variants in this study sought help in the administration of their jouissance through counselling.

Much of the work with psychopaths takes place in prisons. When working with prison populations the analyst must visit their analysand instead of the other way round. This reversal has implications for the direction of the treatment. Notably, the transference is not installed prior to the first session as the subject does not choose the analyst. However, the researcher does not consider this missing step as unsurmountable and proposes that the transference can be installed at a later stage when trust is built up between subject and analyst. This puts even more emphasis on the consent of the subject to the treatment. Importantly this should begin with the subject being invited to speak by the analyst and the institution of a pact between them on the subject’s acceptance.

A prison-based programme in which both psychoanalytic psychotherapy is combined with educational supports may offer the psychopathic subject an opportunity to place limits on their jouissance and find their way to a subjective solution that serves them, while also reducing the threat they pose to the
individuals or institutions of society. The researcher questions if a direction of the treatment may then follow as proposed by Loose:

“The analyst should aim for a moment of anxiety as it is via anxiety that; the object is cessed, that there is a desire created and it is this desire that then allows the subject to over-reach or surpass anxiety” (Loose, 2015).

Desire can therefore be accessed only via anxiety and when there is a cession or letting go of the object. The researcher postulates that the psychopath’s experience of the primitive templates (the cry/the meconium) would be sufficient for this work.

The researcher acknowledges that without phallicisation, the direction of the treatment must be guided by a different set of principles. These principles are explored in Section 10.2 - Guiding principles for the direction of the treatment/Recommendations for Psychoanalyst.
Section 3.3 - Normative adaptation - The antithesis of psychoanalysis outlined Lacan’s concept of the object a as a discordance born out of the meeting of das ding and the absence it might ideally fill. The researcher illustrated how the circuit of desire is activated when the subject is confronted with the remainder left over from this meeting. Additionally, in Section 9.2 - Structure, jouissance and the drives, that an orientation coloured by scopic and/or invocatory drives had allowed some of the participants of this study to achieve a more appropriate relation to the social field. This finding has no universality and only applies to each participant detailed in this study. Psychoanalysis nor the researcher advocate for the normalisation of patients or for treatments that facilitate the adaptation of those who are different to a social norm.

The researcher’s recommendation that analysts direct treatments so that psychopathic analysands are re-oriented toward less primitive drives (scopic and invocatory) is a recognition that these drives are better suited to the construction of sinthomatic solutions rather than any normative adaptation. Lacan highlighted that it was the invocatory drive and the voice that proved amenable for Joyce in his sinthomatic production:

“As for the use Joyce makes of certainty, it seems to me that he brings it into play in relation to effects of voice. Even if what they say is disputed, spoken words, the words of a father, have effects, it seems to be suggested, in 'personation', in what is behind personation, perhaps in phonetics, and for instance in whatever 'deserves to live', in melody” (Lacan, 1976, p.34).

There can be no guaranteed sinthomatic solution for the psychotic analysand at the end of an analysis. A sinthome is produced from what is available in the analysand’s subjectivity and not every subject can fashion one. The singularity of Joyce’s experience allowed him a particular relationship to language and when this was combined with his desire to make a name for himself, the potential for a sinthomatic production and an exchange at a societal level was realised. A sinthome may facilitate the creation of a conversation with the social based on the analysand’s particular production, coloured by an objectality, as outlined in relation to Joyce (Section 4.4 - Psychotic solution: Suppletion or Sinthome, pp.89-91).
9.6 PSYCHOANALYSIS IS AN APPROPRIATE METHOD FOR RESEARCH

TOUCHES ON THE UNIVERSAL OF LANGUAGE / THE UNCONSCIOUS

In the opening paragraph of this thesis the researcher highlighted the lack of clarity around psychopathy as a phenomenon from both sociological and mental health perspectives and he advocated for a psychoanalytic examination of psychopathy (Section 1.1 - Setting the scene). A psychoanalytic examination was chosen for it’s ability to reach significations which touch on the universal of language: a language that constitutes the very foundation of society. If one takes the term ‘psychopathy’ to be a socially constructed descriptor of a mental state then it follows that psychoanalysis, with its unique ability to reach the universal of language, will be able to trace the origin of this signifier.

In the Methodology chapter (Section 5.2 - Psychoanalytic Research) the researcher highlighted that qualitative researchers from schools of social science and anthropology have both identified and described unconscious formations (Mead, 1934; Gee, 1999). However these disciplines do not offer a means to operationalize or incorporate the unconscious into their method and analysis. Swales (2012) also points to this type of paradox amongst clinical psychologists, who attribute importance to the unconscious while their qualitative research largely ignores it (Swales, 2012, p.14). Psychoanalysis with its unique theory of the unconscious offers the possibility of improved research methodologies.

The researcher acknowledges academic research and psychoanalysis do not make easy bed-fellows (Mallon, 2014). However in Section 10.5 - Recommendations for research, he recognises and describes potential benefits for both fields via their collaboration.
This study is not psychoanalysis. It is an applied psychoanalysis and the data is considered through the prism of psychoanalytic theory. For this study to be considered psychoanalytically valid the researcher had to maintain psychoanalytic principles while still wrestling with the requirements of academic research.

Although the standardised tool (SRP-III) used in this study effectively screened the population, it failed to produce data that could answer the research question:

*Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?*

Conversely, the psychoanalytic interviews did generate data that could be interpreted through the prism of psychoanalytic theory. Despite the apparently incongruous nature of psychoanalysis and standard research methods, the researcher was able to combine both of these into a feasible study.

In psychoanalysis there are generalisations and universalities such as when we are talking about neurosis, psychosis and perversion; but within those there are radical singularities. My study was unable to touch on those singularities, only psychoanalytic discourse can do that and it is not open to the scientific method. As detailed in Section 5.2 - Discovery many psychoanalysts now advocate a return to the case study methodology and the researcher too sees that this is the best fit for psychoanalytic research (Parker, 2005; Verhaeghe, 2009; Vanheule, 2009). While the research scientist seeks a universal statement from the particularity of the subject; the psychoanalyst privileges the very particularity that the scientist seeks to universalise.

Had the researcher only utilised the SRP-III and P-SCAN RV psychological tests in data collection and analysis, the study’s findings would have offered only a limited perspective on the subjective experience of the participants. The researcher agrees with Guéguen that psychoanalytic interviews broaden the scope of a study instead of limiting the conversation between participant and researcher (Section 4.6 - Who is mad and who is not?).
Participant 5 related a nickname which defined him as ‘the one to have a go’, a suppletive imaginary identification. Although this identification has led to him taking risks (ultimately ending up with him having a long prison sentence) it might also be understood as having protected him from a psychotic break (Section 8.9 - Symptom, Suppletion, Sinthome). This researcher understands that this identification protected him from the Real.

However, there is always a danger that this suppletion can become delusional too. The job of the analyst then is to direct the treatment either to limit the delusional aspects of the imaginary identifications by introducing the Symbolic or to encourage the Imaginary identification to allow for an entry into a system of exchange (E.g. Support groups for a particular condition - to put a name on the Real (M.E. fibromyalgia etc.) so that the subject can relate to others like him or her).

Another subjective solution or curtailing of jouissance is evidenced in the data where the two mid-scoring participants speak of becoming fathers (pp.228-229). In becoming a father, each participant spoke of redefining the position in which the law-giving Other was situated in their own families. This has repercussions for the possibility of psychoanalytic work with so called ‘treatment-resistant’ psychopaths. Namely, a sinthomatic solution is possible and the psychoanalyst is well-placed to direct a treatment with this in mind.

For example, two of the study participants were studying law and identified with being lawyers which connected them to the social bond. This works well for these men as it is a case of role reversal of poacher-turned-gamekeeper. The satisfaction these participants gain from subverting the law-giving Other is also considered significant. Although there is nothing contained in the codes of conduct for the Irish legal profession that absolutely and automatically precludes someone with a criminal conviction from becoming a professional; convictions are taken into consideration for admittance to the bar or the roll of solicitors and certain convictions would be taken more seriously. Section 27 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994 makes a requirement for evidence of good character but each applicant with a criminal record is dealt with on a case by case basis. Theoretically a psychopathic ex-prisoner may practice in the legal profession in Ireland but in all probability it will not be in typical
manner. An ex-prisoner can fabricate an activity that serves them and if talented, can create an exchange with the social or be helped to do this in an analysis.

Vanheule recognised that psychopaths similarly identify with being in a gang and other gang-members (p.250). The same mechanism is in operation here; a suppletion. These are not sinthomatic solutions but rather temporary and more precariously self-installed protections from the real. The participants described moments when these suppletions failed on being confronted with the Other’s jouissance. The imaginary protection the suppletion had afforded them, fails and they hit back with their jouissance, riot-mode [émeute]. In Section 8.2 - Anxiety and the cession of the object the researcher offers examples of these passages to the act/émeute.
Biagi-Chai describes the identifications described in the previous section as “imaginary crutches” (Biagi-Chai, 2015) while Miller uses the term ‘coloration’ to describe the peculiar personalities of subjects with compensated psychoses (Miller, 2010). As the researcher outlined in the Findings chapter:

- Participant 2’s talent for obfuscation and his identification with being a student of law allows him to subvert authority while being implicated within the same discourse. (Section 8.8 - Speech as a means of deception)
- Participant 5 identified with a pseudonym/nickname as an ‘imaginary crutch’ (Section 8.9 - Symptom, Suppletion and Sinthome)
- Participants 4 & 8 identified with ‘being a father’ allowing them to enter into an exchange at the social level (Section 8.8 - Speech as a means of deception).

In Section 4.4 - Psychotic solution: Suppletion or Sinthome the researcher detailed Biagi-Chai’s extensive work of differentiation between sinthome and suppletion. She recalls that Lacan said there are two ways a subject may separate him or herself in the Other - in what they say and in what they lack. It is at the level of what he lacks; at the level of object a and drive that the psychopath can separate himself in the Other. The researcher found that psychopaths lack a stable and trust-worthy representation of the law-giving Other (Section 8.2 - The psychopath’s relation to knowledge).

The suppletion is the fall-back when confronted with the real; a way of localising or limiting jouissance. It is not desire proper but a stage prior. For the neurotic, the fantasy is a suppletion but the neurotic requires the introduction of the phallic object to get to desire proper. In psychosis however, the absence of fantasy leaves the subject open to possibility of the real when confronted with the desire/jouissance of the Other:

“When interpretation does not occur, the subject is faced with the possible real: it is no longer the Other who looks at him metaphorically - thanks to the mediation of the fantasy, the Other actually stalks him. The gaze, coming from who knows where, persecutes him. The imaginary dissolves: for want of a fantasy which might hold it, the body detaches itself. The subject loses the consistency of reality” (Biagi-Chai, 2015, pp.79-80).

The invocatory drive

Lacan relates the oral and the anal drives to demand, while the scopic and the invocatory drives are related to desire. He also situates the invocatory drive as closest to the unconscious. This may explain
why the invocatory drive offered Joyce (a psychotic) the most successful coloration for entry into the
social bond through a sinthome:

“At the scopic level, we are no longer at the level of demand, but of desire, of the desire of the
Other. It is the same at the level of the invocatory drive, which is the closest to the experience

Swales quotes Fink (1997) in her discussion of the active and passive positions assumed by the sadist
and masochist respectively in relation to the invocatory object:

“According to Fink (1997, p. 187), a formulation of the invocatory drive is “to command or to
get oneself commanded” (faire commander or se faire commander) - the active voice is
employed by the sadist and the passive reflexive voice is employed by the masochist. The
goal of the perverse act is to prop up the paternal function, and the realization of the
invocatory drive correspondingly involves the enunciation of a temporary law” (Swales,
2012, p.159).

This type of reversal was also evidenced in the study findings when some of the study participants
described studying Law in university: the law-breakers sought to become law-makers. The researcher
discusses this further in Section 10.2 - Poacher turned game-keeper.

This researcher also recorded the enunciation of a temporary law in the speech of the ‘rehabilitated’
participants he interviewed. Swales details why this temporary law is needed and how it functions in
perversion:

“The appearance of the voice as object a, then, coincides with the temporary instatement of a
law which sets limits to the pervert's excess in jouissance, binding his anxiety and resulting in
a subjective experience of satisfaction” (Ibid.).

Just as the voice can function for the sadist or masochist, so too may it operate for the psychotic. The
invocatory may set limits on jouissance and allow for a psychotic subject to experience a satisfaction
through a suppletion. For the psychotic and the psychopath in particular, the enunciation of a law,
albeit temporary, can function very well in limiting jouissance. In Section 9.3 - The inconsistent Other
the researcher presented Vanheule’s theory that the gang can offer a set of rules to follow in relation
to others when the Name-of-the-Father is not installed (p.250). In Section 8.9 - Symptom, Suppletion
and Sinthome the researcher presented his finding that psychopathic participants used mantra’s from
rehabilitation as protective verses which successfully set limits to jouissance (pp.231-232).

Swales states that the enunciation of the law serves as a “bolstering of the paternal function” for the
perversion subject (Ibid.). This law operates differently in psychosis however as the paternal function is
not installed. Instead what is in operation is a semblant, that comes to take the place of the Name-of-
the-Father rather than propping up one that is already installed. This semblant lacks the stability of the normative Name-of-the-Father and the researcher posits that this may explain why riot-mode psychopaths hit out against authority figures more readily than others; as their representation of the law-giving Other fails to support their ego sufficiently.

The Shofar is an archaic example of the invocatory drive in which the Other is appealed to. Lacan outlined how the horn was sounded, not to remind those gathered of an almighty God, but instead to remind the Other (God) of their responsibility to the subject (the Israelites) (Lacan, 1962, p.248).

**Drive formation and its relation to the Other’s demand**

The formation of each (partial) drive relates to a demand placed on the subject by the Other. Swales points to the importance of the child’s body in relation to these demands:

> “The cuts of castration are formed through the child’s relation to the Other. The mOther makes demands that the child eat (oral zone), listen (aural zone), look (scopic zone), go to the bathroom (anal zone), and so on, and the child’s interpretation of these demands result in the formation of his drives” (Swales, 2011, p.98).

In *The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire* Lacan gives the matheme for the drive as ($◊D$) or the split subject in relation to demand:

> “But while my complete graph allows us to situate the drive as the treasure trove of signifiers, its notation, ($◊D$), maintains its structure by linking it to diachrony” (Lacan, 1960 [2006], p.692 [897]).

As in the fantasy, the subject's relation to the drive mirrors how they want to be positioned with respect to the Other’s demand. The researcher proposes that a particular coloration (orality/anality) may reflect a demand made by the Other (*Section 4.9 - Psychopathy: Psychosis and/or Sadistic Perversion*). In *Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy* the researcher outlines the differing colorations of the psychopathic structure that were evidenced in the data.
Psychopathy is the psychical solution to a lacking stable and consistent law-giving Other for the prospective subject. Psychopaths seek to destroy the law-giving Other, a desire that is not conducive to a normative relation in society.

Consequently, psychopaths must install a compensation that allows them to live and exchange in the social realm. These compensatory solutions are not always enough to persuade society that the psychopaths are socially integratable and the participants in this study exemplified this.

In this chapter the researcher discussed how psychoanalysis can be applied to research, diagnostics and treatment and he highlighted the potential benefits and possible tensions this may bring. Psychopathy as a phenomenon was considered in relation to Lacanian structural theory, treatment resistance and dual diagnoses. The next chapter contains the researcher’s recommendations for theory, research and clinical practice built on the study findings and the topics discussed in this chapter.
10.1 INTRODUCTION

This concluding chapter of the thesis contains the researcher’s recommendations for theory, research and practice as he:

i. details a set of guiding principles for the direction of treatment with psychopaths
ii. endorses services that encourage psychopaths toward engagement and participation
iii. offers his theoretical position on psychopathy
iv. advocates for the potential role of psychoanalytic research in academia.

The research question addressed by this study is:
*Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?*

The researcher’s concluding position is that psychopathy is a psychosis that often presents as a ‘compensated’ or ‘ordinary psychosis’ (*Section 4.3 - Extra-Ordinary Psychosis*). The compensations or suppletions are understood as neurotic/perverse traits that protect the subject from the real and color the presentation based on the dominant drive. The Machiavellian variant of psychopathy has obsessional traits and is dominated by anal drive. The Riot-mode variant is a less suppleted variant than the Machiavellian one and is dominated by the oral drive. Perverse traits were evidenced in both variants and were coloured by the scopic and invocatory drives.
In this section the researcher outlines a set of guiding principles for the direction of a psychoanalytic treatment with psychopathic patients and also details some appropriate interventions that can be made. Although this research study did not test treatments for psychopathology it did identify that psychopaths fall under the structural heading of psychosis and psychoanalysis has well-founded treatment principles for this. The research findings also show that psychotherapeutic treatment is not the only factor in a ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘recovery’. The psychopathic participants in this study described feeling on the periphery of society. What was evidenced in the data was that an engagement in education allowed them to enter into the social field and implicated them in a discourse to which they were previously excluded. This had a suppletive function for them.

As presented in the Findings chapter (Section 8.6 - Psychopathy and Paternal Impotency), psychopathy is a psychosis that often presents in an ‘ordinary’ or ‘un-triggered’ form. Significantly however, an ‘ordinary’ or ‘un-triggered’ psychosis is still structurally a psychosis where the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed (Section 7.3 - Structural indicators in Language). Consequently, the researcher’s first recommendation is that the treatment of psychopaths ought to be directed primarily, as a treatment of psychosis.

In work with psychotics, Lacan stated that analysts must be willing to become “secretaries to the insane” (Lacan, 1955 [1993], p.193); conveying the position an analyst must assume in relation to the analysand. The analyst must be as a secretary to an employer and not as a manager to their employee, remembering and structuring the work for the psychotic analysand. While acting as a secretary and prior to any intervention, the clinician’s first consideration must be not to make the subject’s condition any worse. Therefore in a psychanalytic treatment of psychosis the analyst:

i. Avoids an encounter with A-Father (Un Père)
ii. Protects the analysand from the jouissance of the Other
iii. Engages in a transference that Miller describes as “democratic” and with a style that is “conversational”
iv. Refrains from equivocations, half-sayings or silences as these would “enhance the subject’s disconnection” (Caroz, 2009, p.100).
Treatment is therefore directed in the opposite way to the analytic work with a neurotic: it is not an existing symptom that is worked with:

“In psychosis, it is rather a question of constructing a sinthome where it is missing, and of avoiding curing it, or even of consolidating it when there is a sinthome” (Ibid., p.111).

In the next section the researcher expands on the treatment of psychopathy by exploring particular aspects of the treatment that should be considered when psychopathy presents as an ordinary psychosis.
In the presentation of ordinary psychosis specifically, Miller (2009a) describes a fluctuation between ‘connection’ (stability) and ‘disconnection’ (breakdown) (p.86). Caroz (2009) adds the possibility of ‘reconnection’ to Miller’s theory, drawing on an idea of Castanet and de Georges (2008). This is presented as:

“a first orientation for the direction of the treatment in ordinary psychosis” (Caroz, 2009, p.99).

Therefore in a psychoanalytic treatment of ordinary psychosis the analyst must determine what will allow the subject to be ‘reconnected’ and this should be oriented by what was disconnected.

The researcher found that psychopaths are ‘subjects-of-jouissance’ (Swales, 2011) and he highlighted examples of the non-normative imaginary relationships in psychopathy from the data (Section 8.1 - Introduction).

The researcher recommends that treatment for psychopaths should be directed to rebuild the subject’s imaginary scaffolding. The analytic work should concentrate on either the creation of a new imaginary identification, or on reinstating an identification that at one time functioned, but has since failed. Either would allow for ‘reconnection’, albeit in a temporary form or as ‘imaginary crutches’ (Biagi-Chai, 2015). The researcher notes that some identifications serve the subject more than others and he found that participants who identified with ‘being a father’ were able to “re-connect” more successfully to the social bond than those who did not (Section 8.8 - Speech as a means of deception).

Ideally, the researcher recommends that psychoanalysts direct the treatment in order to install a sinthome, a more stable subjective solution than a suppletion. As outlined in the previous chapter this is only possible if one of the drives can be isolated around a specific talent that then allows for an exchange at the level of the social (Section 9.5 - The question of normative adaptation). The most stable of the drives are the scopic and invocatory and Joyce’s writing as sinthome exemplifies this well. The researcher did not find a sinthetic solution installed by any of the participants in this study, but notes that the focus of this study was not psychoanalytic treatment. However, he does postulate that the successful, if temporary, suppletions may be worked with as the scaffolding in an analytic relationship, to build a more stable sinthome. For the population of this study (ex-offenders), an education in Law was particularly amenable. Certain psychopathic personality traits identified by the researcher in this population (E.g. obfuscation) seem well tuned to arguing legal points and positions that normativity precludes (8.9 - Symptom, Suppletion and Sinthome).
Caroz (2009) distinguishes two ways of working with the transference in psychosis. He describes a “diffracted transference” used in treatment of paranoia (Caroz, 2009, p.100). Here the transferential relationship is encouraged onto more than one person, to avoid an erotomania centred on one individual. Conversely, he details a treatment for schizophrenia in which a concentrated transference onto one person may be encouraged (Ibid., pp.100-101). The researcher concurs with Caroz that the analyst’s approach to the transference may be informed by the subject’s structure.

Another consideration with regards to the transference is that the analyst does not represent the subject-supposed-to-know for a psychotic subject (Section 7.4 - Primitive drive orientation). This has implications for the transference as the analysand does not seek a knowledge of their desire or jouissance from the analyst. The researcher proposes that the psychopath may however relate to the analyst as a subject-with-a-know-how. The psychopath can presume the analyst to have a know-how of jouissance allowing for a transferential relationship (p.182).

The researcher proposes that the benefits of the analytic encounter for the psychopathic subject are not confined to a sinthomatic solution. As detailed in the last section the analytic encounter can also support the subject via its suppletive effects. The analyst supports the analysand in the “work of naming and translating which never stops” (Ibid., p.101). A suppletion is a temporary cover over the real that may operate as an “anaesthetic” does in the medicine (Ibid., p.103). This is of the nature of compensation and the researcher recommends three ways the analyst might facilitate compensations in analytic work with psychopaths:

- **Distance** - The analyst directs the treatment so the analysand is introduced to common or shared meanings which keep the real at a distance.
- **Normalise** - Psychopaths have the sense that they are not like everybody else and enjoy differently to others (Section 8.3 - Subjective responsibility, p.203). The analyst directs the treatment as a “reconnection to the Other as a... norm” (Ibid., p.105).
- **Accept** - The analyst should receive the subject's testimony around a delusion and do nothing more. They ought to refrain from any interpretation of the delusion as it may encourage the imaginary identifications. They must however allow the delusion to be spoken.

The researcher also found that language itself can be experienced as intrusive by psychopaths (Section 8.7 - The demands of the Other as determining jouissance). The psychopathic participants in this study were at times inundated with the bits and pieces of language, lalangue (Section 8.10 - The psychopath’s relation to Language - Bits and Pieces). The researcher however proposes that limits
may be placed on the jouissance of language via the translation of the psychopath’s idiosyncratic meanings of lalangue towards a common meaning associated with the social:

“an exchange on the dialectic between codes and messages, an attempt to understand and define the 'personal meaning' of an expression, of an enigmatic word, or of a word invested with jouissance for the subject” (Caroz, 2009, p.102).

The researcher does not consider the idiosyncrasies of the psychopath’s meanings of lalangue to be the only aspect of their linguistic use that can be redressed in an analytic encounter. As they sometimes felt alienated in their interpretations, a shared understanding or shared mis-understanding between the analyst and analysand can hook them into the social structure. The researcher recommends that analysts work with psychopaths to strengthen these shared understandings or mis-understandings as a strategy to counter the psychopath’s experience of alienation (Section 8.2 - The psychopaths relation to knowledge).
The researcher found that psychopaths are 'subjects-of-jouissance' (Swales, 2011) rather than subjects-of-desire. However, this jouissance is not fixed and can be worked on within the analytic treatment in order to limit its effects.

The researcher has discussed how subjects-of-jouissance are without symbolic identification, a way of placing limits on jouissance with language.

The researcher follows Caroz in his recommendations for the direction of the treatment with regards to jouissance:

i. Extraction of jouissance - the analyst acts as a depository, a kind of 'additional organ' for jouissance laden speech (Ibid., p.113)

ii. Localisation of jouissance - the analyst encourages a containment of jouissance through the isolation of the object a

iii. Development of a Savoir-Faire - the analyst encourages a reconciliation with the Other to avoid the passage a l'acte.

Each of these recommendations is an approach to the direction of the treatment that curtails jouissance in the absence of the symbolic order and its limiting operations.

Psychoanalysis is confident that the treatment of psychosis via suppletion/sinthome is appropriate and effective given the extensive work in the last decade (Biagi-Chai, 2015; Miller, 2009a; Caroz, 2009; Laurent, 2008). By orienting the treatment toward a speaking out of the delusion the analyst includes the real in the knotting. The psychoanalyst must also however recognise the danger of an imaginary identification (suppletion) becoming delusional. The work of the analyst is therefore to direct the treatment either (i) to limit the delusional aspects of the imaginary identifications by introducing the symbolic or (ii) to encourage the imaginary identification to allow for an entry into a system of exchange (E.g. Support groups for a particular condition may help to put a name on the real of the body and may allow the subject to relate to others like him/her).

This study found that psychopaths who are supported can find ways to limit their jouissance and that this allows for a connection/re-connection to the social bond (Section 8.13 - Rehabilitation/Treatment/Curtailing Jouissance).
In the context of this finding and in line with Caroz (2009) the researcher recommends that the analyst invites the subject to speak. In work with psychopaths, their acceptance may mark an introduction into the social bond.
What is at stake for the analysand in the analytic relation is their way of enjoying, their jouissance. In this context, the analysand must consent to the treatment and continue even after they realise that it will mean sacrificing jouissance in order to stoop to desire:

“Analytic work is to obtain the appropriate form of consent, consent to the unconscious as repressed” (Miller, 2011a, p.9).

The transference that is essential for analytic work will not be installed if the treatment is forced on the subject. This has implications for psychoanalytic work with incarcerated individuals or those who are encouraged to attend as part of a probation. The service users at the educational project where the study was conducted attended by their own volition. This consent is particularly important for the psychopath and the researcher gives his recommendations for the criminal justice system, policy makers and social services in this regard later in the chapter (Section 10.3 - Social Services - An unintrusive gaze and an invitation to speak).

Lacan understood psychoanalytic treatment as an ‘interference’ at the level of desire (Lacan, 1962). In an analysis the analysand may re-visit experiences from the time of the Oedipus or castration complexes, times when there was a threat of the cession (letting go) of their object (Section 3.3 - The beginning of the late Lacan). In response to the analyst’s invitation to speak, the analysand consents to re-visit this anxiety (Naveau, 2012). The researcher proposes that consent is crucial to the analytic work with the psychopathic subject, just as it is with other structures. The analysand’s consent may institute a pact which was absent from the psychopathic subject’s relationship with the law-giving Other (Section 9.3 - The inconsistent Other).

This study found that orientations coloured by orality and anality dominate in psychopathy (Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy). In the absence of phallicisation these subjects are considered subjects-of-jouissance rather than subjects-of-desire (Section 8.7 - The demands of the Other as determining jouissance). Therefore the findings of this study suggest and recommend a direction of the treatment that extracts, localises or sublimates jouissance for those who are overwhelmed and have passages to the act (p.282).
As described in Section 8.3 - Rehabilitation or reablement and discussed in Section 9.7 - Working with Imaginary identifications, two of the participants interviewed are studying Law in university. This serves as an imaginary identification for them (being a student-lawyer) and their speech was indicative of a reconciliation with the law-giving Other:

“why I probably chose social work. I’ll get a balance” (Participant 2, Lines 41-42).

In Section 9.3 - Psychopathic language the researcher described how Participant 2 contradicts himself when offering his reasons for choosing to study Law:

“Oh Law’s brilliant, it’s black and white, there’s no ambiguity. Em and sometimes in the ambiguity is the good thing cos you can find things to tie people up with. But it’s the fact that it is so black and white” (Participant 2, Lines 39-42).

For the psychopathic subject retracting statements are not uncommon and the researcher quoted Hare in Section 4.8 - Psychopathy: A fourth structure who presents the use of contradictory and logically inconsistent statements as characteristically psychopathic (p.108).

The psychopathic participants have found through the study of Law, a discipline in which retraction is not excluded. They now negotiate with the Law and learn it to the letter so they can engage with it, often in a subversive manner. Participant 2 exemplifies this in his defence of an immigrant woman's constitutional rights (p.218). Consequently, the law-giving Other is no longer excluded as alien and incomprehensible.

The researcher considers that educational supports may act as a potential buffer, suppletion or ‘crutches’ for psychopaths. Although an imaginary identification (being-a-student) is only temporary, their studies may exemplify the sort of talent or savoir-faire that could be worked into a sinthome. Lacan saw that Joyce’s sinthome allowed him to be a heretic of the Name-of-the-Father while also submitting this heresy to the Other. The researcher presented Biagi-chai’s description of Joyce’s sinthome in Section 4.4 - Psychotic solution: Suppletion or Sinthome who concludes that:

“One must in fact go through the Other for the “sinthome” to be produced” (Biagi-Chai, 2015, p.84).

Similarly, the study of the legal system seemed particularly effective in this regard as it allows a subversive position in relation to the law-giving Other to be re-threaded within the very same system of Otherness.
The Other is subsequently considered in the exchange that the sinthomatic production makes possible and a stable relation to the social field is achieved. The subject sacrifices an instantaneous and riotous jouissance for a delayed and mediated satisfaction through their work or production. As discussed in the last chapter, psychopaths are often considered treatment-resistant (Section 9.5 - The question of treatment resistance). Some clinicians consider that psychopath’s manipulative and subversive traits exclude them from forming a positive therapeutic relationship. The researcher however postulates that these subversive traits may allow the psychopath to connect/re-connect to the social bond.
The study found that participants returned to education (Section 9.2 - Rehabilitation as a re-covering and a suppletion) and/or participated in substance abuse treatment programs (Section 9.4 - Psychoanalytic theory around psychosis (psychopathy) and substance abuse) as part of what they consider their rehabilitation. What was evidenced in this study were men with psychopathic tendencies (whom the literature consider to be manipulative and self-serving) actively seeking to regain their good name through engagement with the institutions of society. This narrative is understood as one of redemption and recommends programs that facilitate this for prisoners.

In 2015, the provision of psychological services in the Irish Prison service was assessed as a:

“basic reactive model of practice where the flow of referrals is controlled with a waiting list ‘red light’” (Porporino, 2015, p.14).

The ‘reactivity’ of the psychology service in the IPS follows a risk-need-responsivity (RNR) framework; a model whose efficacy is now being questioned:

“The assess-target-treat paradigm arising out of the predominance of the RNR framework in corrections over the last several decades is now being seriously questioned” (Maruna & Immarigeon, 2004; Porporino, 2010; 2014; Ward et al., 2007; cited in Porporino, 2015, p.15).

The alternative, ‘Good Lives Model’ (GLM) (Willis, Ward & Leveson, 2014) coupled with the theory of offender “desistance signalling” (Maruna, 2012) has created a paradigmatic shift in offender rehabilitation.

Criminologists have been particularly focused on this redemptive process and the reablement of those who have been incarcerated in recent years. In 2012, Bushway & Apel recommended a shift in the understanding of prisoner rehabilitation to allow:

“individuals to identify themselves credibly as desisters, rather than on trying to “cause” desistance explicitly” (Bushway & Apel, 2012, p.30).

Maruna responded to Bushway & Apels’ paper by contrasting two conceptualisations of rehabilitation. He offered two definitions for the word, “habilitation” from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary - (i) to make fit or capable and (ii) to qualify oneself. Following on from this, he understands that re-habilitation in a forensic context may mean either a correctional treatment or a re-credentialing/restoration of a person’s reputation. Maruna notes that the legal system in the United Kingdom, which is similar to the Irish system, is aligned with the second meaning as it details how a person’s full citizenship is returned to them on completion of their sentence. The implication for those who assess prisoner rehabilitation is a paradigm focused on the potential risk of prisoners’ re-entry to
society. Maruna recommends an alternative to this risk paradigm: a shift onto the prisoner’s own capacity for signalling desistance.

Under the current system prisoners are disempowered by ‘experts’ who determine if they are a risk. The prisoners however:

“do not understand or agree with the criteria on which they are being assessed” (Maruna, 2012, p.74-75).

Alternately, by signalling that they are no longer a risk the prisoner may position themselves as the “purposive agent” and be empowered to intentionally desist. Maruna considers the “desistance signaling” approach radical as it:

“gives the ‘rehabilitation’ process back to the desister, not to the expert” (McNeill, 2006; cited in Maruna, 2012, p.75).

The researcher considers the effects of this subjective empowerment of prisoners as comparable to the suppletive effects of imaginary identifications in psychosis as detailed by the researcher in Section 10.2 - Ordinary psychosis (Connection - Disconnection - Reconnection).

Maruna allies himself with Bushway & Apel who attribute the absence of “desistance signaling” policies in prisons to the difficulties authorities have in evaluating its efficacy:

“They cannot be evaluated using the traditional schemes because these policies (like arts projects in prisons, mutual aid fellowships, volunteer work, parenting, and so forth) are based on principles of self-selection and so would make evaluation far more difficult than, say, a modular program on anger management” (Maruna, 2012, p.75).

Maruna states that although the prisoners he has met are sceptical of expert risk assessment, they do seek redemption (Maruna, 2012, p.76). This concept of redemption was spoken about by participants in this study as they sought to prove their worth to society via Alternatives-to-Violence programs and by returning to education. However, Maruna rightly recognises prisoners’ concern that expert assessments around rehabilitation will lack any “symbolic capital” (Pierre Bourdieu, 1977; cited in Maruna, 2012, p.76) - prospective employers will still see a criminal and not a rehabilitated individual who has signalled their desistance to society, even if they have a certificate signed by a psychologist.

In the U.S.A., a prisoner can traditionally signal contrition via apology and act of restitution. These signals are then traditionally recognised via gestures of forgiveness from victims (Maruna, 2012, p.78). However, more formal recognitions of contrition as can be seen other countries may also have a redemptive and rehabilitative value. Maruna exemplifies this via the French ritual of “judicial rehabilitation” that takes place in the same court rooms that sentence individuals to prison. These “resemble citizenship ceremonies” and have a redemptive function (Maruna and LeBel, 2003; cited in...
In addition, given the position of respect that the judiciary holds in society, these rituals benefit from a “imprimatur of official respectability” (Love, 2003, p.127; cited in Maruna, 2012, p.79).

Just as a conviction and sentencing condemns the person and sullies their name:

“the reintegration ritual acts to restore the person’s reputation as ultimately good” (Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994; cited in Maruna, 2012, p.79).

Although Bushway & Apel and Maruna are writing about rehabilitation in the context of a general prison population, it is still relevant to the rehabilitation of those who have been to prison and have psychopathic personalities specifically. In this study four of the thirteen ex-offenders screened were found to have psychopathic tendencies and as is detailed in Section 2.3 - Prevalence Rates and Trends it is estimated that psychopaths make up about 20% of the American prison population (Weibe, 2004, p.24). The researcher however recognises that there is a question as to the applicability of the ‘Good Lives Model’ and “desistance signalling” theory to psychopaths. Specifically, whether psychopaths seek to regain their good name and lead ‘good’ lives for redemptive purposes or whether they are being manipulative and self-serving with a goal to re-establish a position of power remains an open question.

This study found that psychopaths are ‘subjects-of-jouissance’ who, unlike neurotic subjects, are not defined by the Other’s desire (Section 8.7 - The demands of the Other as determining jouissance). Instead the psychopath seeks to serve his or her own enjoyment or jouissance (Section 9.2 - Psychopaths are subjects of jouissance). The implication is that when a psychopath acts in a way deemed positive for society, their motivations are called into question. They are in a ‘catch-22’ (Heller, 1961) situation as whether they act in a positive or negative manner, society considers their motivations to have coloured their actions negatively.

Psychoanalysis has never considered the binary of ‘good versus evil’ to be appropriate for addressing subjectivity. Freud, having examined Saint Augustine of Hippo’s (354-430) concept of the “beautiful soul”, concluded that we are all guilty, even if we are not aware of any crime we have committed. Lacan elaborated on the concept of guilt in Seminar XXI (Lacan, 1973) using a homophonic play on words for the seminar’s title: Les noms du père (The names of the father) / Les non-dupes errant (The non-duped err). Lacan used this pun to express a paradox he noticed in subjectivity: we must take responsibility for something that we has no conscious control over. In order to negotiate the Oedipus complex successfully we must dupe ourselves, and the “non-duped err”. When confronted with sexual difference, which is beyond the integrative capacity of the infant’s psyche (Section 3.2 - Freudian Nosology) neurotics must dupe themselves to negotiate the complex successfully.
However psychotics and particularly, the psychopath (unconsciously) choose to foreclose on this question of sexual difference rather than duping themselves via repression or disavowal.

If a psychopathic criminal signals their desistance so as to restore their good name and regain the enjoyment that was lost to them through their incarceration, the researcher questions why society should deem this of less value than non-psychopathic criminals who signal their desistance in order to restore their good name due to shame and guilt and a wish to redress their desire.

Maruna, as Lacan, Freud and Tarde before him, recognises that the criminal cannot be understood outside of the social context in which he or she finds him or herself:

“Yet the great insight of the labeling theory of signaling is that criminal “propensity” is not an inherent quality of an individual, but rather “risk” exists in the dynamic interplay between persons and our situations (indeed, the person cannot be understood outside of this social context)” (Maruna, 2012, p.80).

In Section 10.3 - Social Services - An unintrusive gaze and an invitation to speak the researcher recognises that the educational project in which this study was conducted offers a space that is more than an education, as a subjective re-positioning inside the social bond may also takes place for the members.
Another implication for the treatment of psychopaths which this study has brought into focus relates to the scopic drive and the intrusiveness psychotics and psychopaths in particular experience around the gaze (Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy). In *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Foucault, 1977) Foucault describes Bentham’s (1748-1832) ‘panopticon’:

“The Panopticon is a Discipline machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen” (Foucault, 1977, pp.201-202).

Using this “machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad”, a single guard can position him or herself so as to see all the prisoners at the same time while the prisoners are unable to see the guard watching them. The institution/prison observes the prisoners in what they understand to be a highly efficient manner. However, for those prisoners who suffer most under the intrusive gaze of the Other (in this case psychopaths) this gaze without materiality in the scopic field is evocative (Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy). The researcher recommends that further research be conducted with prisoners on their experience of the gaze and being observed, with a focus on the gaze without materiality.

In the assessment of a criminal’s mental state, psychiatry has been chosen as the profession with the appropriate knowledge to distinguish between the pathological and the normative. Perhaps, more importantly the question of the determination of responsibility has been bequethed to them too. While psychiatry has a diagnostic system that groups clusters of symptoms into categories and distinguishes between the well and the unwell on this basis, it does not have a similar system to distinguish between the responsible and those who are not responsible. Significantly, this is not a differentiation between the guilty and the innocent as a person may feel guilt for an action for which they are not responsible, and a person may be innocent of a crime and yet feel responsible for it. The researcher recommends that a legal training should include fields that have something to say about subjective responsibility including, but not limited to psychoanalysis.

In western society today each of us is recorded on closed circuit cameras without our knowledge and are traced via facial recognition or via GPS if we carry a mobile phone:

“The increasing use of surveillance technology - including body-worn video, drones and number plate recognition systems - risks changing the “psyche of the community” by
reducing individuals to trackable numbers in a database, the government’s CCTV watchdog has warned” (Weaver, 2015).

In this extract from an interview for The Guardian newspaper, Tony Porter, the UK Surveillance Commissioner highlights how the ‘psyche of the community’ can be effected by surveillance. The researcher asks what lengths do those who already suffer an intrusive sense of the gaze (including psychopaths) have to go to in order to participate or to escape this observation based society. Porter highlights the publics lack of awarenesss and possible ethical implications:

“Do they know with advancing technology, and algorithms, it starts to predict behaviour?” (Weaver, 2015).

Similarly, when prisoners are released they may have to register where they live, check-in at at particular location, be restricted in their movements by an anti-social-behaviour order (A.S.B.O.) or have to wear an ankle bracelet so their location can be pinpointed at any time. The researcher proposes that this is a modern panopticon that extends outside incarceration and onto the streets and he recommends a public debate on digital tracking and mass observation in this context.
MENTAL HEALTH - TREATMENTS BASED ON THE PARTICULARITY OF THE SUBJECT

One of the goals of *A Vision for change* (2006), the report of the expert group on mental health policy for Ireland, was to have multi-disciplinary mental health teams whose members would have a diversity of experience across a number of fields:

“These teams should combine a diverse range of expertise and coordinate care through a number of treatment modalities and service structures” (Department of Health & Children, 2006, p.95).

The researcher argues that psychoanalytic expertise ought to be included in these teams and that members of staff already on the teams may engage in a psychoanalytic training to address any skill shortage. This is argued on the basis of psychoanalysis’ unique ability to distinguish between neurotic and non-neurotic patients (*Section 2.4 - Psychoanalytic nosology*), a distinction not possible in symptom based diagnostic systems such as the DSM-V (APA, 2013). This differentiation allows for specialised treatments for non-neurotic patients informed by the guiding principles for treatment as outlined (*Section 10.2 - Guiding principles for the direction of the treatment/Recommendations for psychoanalysts*).

The psychoanalytically trained members of each team should support the development of treatment and care-plans that take into account a patient's structure and consider the impact of certain actions on particular personality profiles.
The educational project where the researcher conducted his study is a space where attendees can revisit their way of enjoying/jouissance (including a one-to-one talking therapy). This entails more than an education, as a subjective re-positioning inside the social bond also takes place for the members. This position contrasts with their previous experiences of exclusion and of being on the periphery. Paramount to this process of re-positioning is (i) trust in those who give instruction, and (ii) the promise of a better way of life. This is of the nature of the pact.

The researcher therefore advocates for a combination of education, social engagement and psychoanalytic psychotherapy in a re-habilitation or re-covery and he recognises an organisation that is worthy of emulation.

La Maison Verte which was opened in Paris by psychoanalyst, Françoise Dolto (1908-1988) in January 1979 offers a space to carers of young children. Although the goal is not therapeutic work, a psychoanalytic practitioner is available should anyone wish to speak:

“This place is not a day-care, not a creche, not a kindergarten, nor a child health or welfare centre. It is a place of words, of relaxation, where mothers and fathers, grandparents, nannies and babysitters, are welcomed with the child they have in charge and sometimes are worried about” (Hall, Hivernel & Morgan, 2009, p.143).

La Maison Verte offers a place of words and relaxation to carers of young children as they enter society. This is not the goal-oriented and results-driven project that is more commonly encountered in the current social entrepreneurship paradigm. Dolto's prioritisation of the subject's entry into society has particular relevance for this study and the researcher's recommendations. The study findings point to suppletive effects for those who attend the project and who described being able to speak to someone for the first time:

Participant 3 described how therapy works for him:

“And usually when I'm talking I get an understanding of what's going on. Whether it's right or wrong? Cos you can say it in our heads [slip] but it's not until we voice it out” (Participant 3, Lines 357-359).

Similarly to La Maison Verte, the educational project in which this study took place offers a space for reflection and growth as attendees re-enter society. The stated aim of the project is:
“to provide a social-educational guidance and support mechanism for ex-prisoners on release” (WRC Social and Economic Consultants Ltd., 1998, p.37).

However the researcher considers that it's real achievement lies in the not infrequent re-orientation of service-users towards the social sphere. This is best represented by Bollard who attended the project and spoke of it's affect on him:

“The way I see it is that XXXX (Educational project) changed my thinking, and I think that's the way to go. You have to try and change people's thinking and attitudes about prison officers and authority figures. I had a problem with that for a long time. I actually changed my own thinking. But I had people that believed in me, that gave me support, especially in XXXX (Educational project) where I went when I was released” (Bollard, 1998, p.17).

Bollard originally attributes his change to the project, but then recognises his own subjectivity at play as he makes a change. Each of the participants expressed something of this subjective change in their interviews. The educational opportunities, although varied and engaging were only an aside to the participants re-connection to the social. A psychopathic subject may consider him or herself as different to everyone else and will position him or herself on the periphery. Projects and communities like La Maison Verte and the service from this study have the capacity to re-engage the psychopathic subject within the social bond.
10.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THEORY

A UNIQUE STUDY CONDUCTED WITH AN IRISH POPULATION

This thesis adds to the body of knowledge on psychopathy from a psychoanalytic standpoint but may also be of interest to those outside the field of psychoanalysis. Although the sample size was small (thirteen participants screened which resulted in five interview), this study provides a possible template for future researchers to consider.

When conducting his literature search the researcher observed an absence of Irish research in relation to psychopathy. This lack of data impacts on Irish research studies such as this one as we remain dependant on research that is not culturally specific. In Section 2.2 - Current measures of psychopathy the researcher detailed how the Hare PCL family of psychological tests have been shown to be culturally specific. This study is therefore unique in being the first Irish study to use the Hare PCL family of psychological tests, allowing for comparisons however tentatively, with other nationalities. As detailed in Section 2.2 - Current measures of psychopathy the PCL-R cut-off scores for Scottish populations are higher than for those in the U.S.A. The researcher sees the need for a large scale study in Ireland as researchers may be working with cut-off scores that are applicable only to the geographic location in which they were formulated.

The SRP-III cut-off score chosen by the researcher of 2.95 was subsequently found not to be accurate for the particular sample population of this study (Section 6.2 - The Sample). The psychoanalytic analysis of the data revealed that the participant with this score (Participant 3) had structural indicators (neurotic traits) which differentiated him from the other participants, the next of whom scored 3.375 (Participant 4). The researcher found that for this study’s sample population a cut-off score greater than 2.95 but less than 3.375 was appropriate.

Although the attractiveness of psychological screening tests like the PCL-R has increased, in part due to books like The Psychopath Test (Ronson, 2011) and their popularisation in television documentaries like BBC Horizon's, Are you good or Evil? (Stockley, 2011); the public's captivation does not account for any question of their validity.
An identification with 'being a father' or 'being a student' allowed for a re-connection within the social field for psychopaths (Section 8.8 - Speech as a means of deception). The researcher recommends a psychoanalytically informed longitudinal research study to investigate the stability of these imaginary identifications over time.

The researcher distinguished two variants of psychopathy based on his analysis: a Machiavellian-mode and a Riot-mode. He found that these variants has a 'coloration' dependant on the dominant drive (Section 8.5 - The variants of psychopathy). The researcher recommends further research to examine the influence each of the drives has on the coloration of psychopathic presentations.

The researcher considers this research to build upon the existing psychoanalytically orientated research on psychopathy (De Ganck & Vanheule, 2014; Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009; Biagi-Chai, 2015).
The researcher argues for the application of psychoanalytic principles to research and posits the potential benefits to both the fields of psychoanalysis and research. In Section 5.2 - Evolution the researcher outlined Fonagy's position that: researchers who choose to address the unconscious may find a new tool to provoke and aid fresh understanding, while psychoanalysts may move beyond the clinic in the development of theory and gain sophistication in their understanding of phenomena.

Most psychoanalytic research has positioned the researcher as the agent of this invention and situated the analytical moments either when the researcher hears participants' voices or, when they code and analyse the data. The researcher proposes that the reader or audience should not be excluded as a potential agent of transformation. In this context the analytical moment may be situated in the presentation of the material to an audience and in the confrontation of the reader with the text:

“Just as with a stand-up comic who takes to the stage with his “material” only to find that the most surprising and funniest moments happen when the routine moves away from this material. It is in the transferential relationship with the audience that the surprise may come but only if it is allowed for” (Mallon, 2014, pp.5-6).

The analytic method utilised in this study incorporated two processes:

(i) A thematic discourse analysis was employed for the organisation and management of data.
(ii) A psychoanalytic discourse analysis allowed for the broader assumptions and meanings of Lacanian structural theory (neurosis, psychosis or perversion) to be considered as underpinning what was evidenced in the data.

A psychoanalytic training, including a personal analysis is recommended for those researchers who seek to address the unconscious with their research. However, there are researchers who have not been psychoanalytically trained and yet used psychoanalytically informed research as a means of investigation (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). Psychoanalysis is a praxis (theory in practice) and psychoanalytic researchers may inform the theoretical field while not being practitioners. The researcher notes that even though the unique analytic method used in this study does not require a psychoanalyst to conduct it, a training is invaluable when the analysed data is being interpreted and discussed.
Psychoanalysis should not apply a universal meaning to a person's suffering or subsequently offer a standardised treatment. Rather their suffering ought to be considered in terms of language and the signifier(s) particular to the individual. Disagreements and difficulties in differential diagnoses are all too common clinically, especially it seems in relation to psychosis, psychopathy and personality disorders. The researcher takes his direction from Swales in this regard who highlights that:

“Those problems cannot be solved by tweaking the diagnostic criteria, but only by looking at psychological suffering through an ontological, contextual, and interpersonal lens such as the one Lacan constructed” (Swales, 2011, p.xxv).

As detailed in Section 5.2 - Evolution, both Fonagy and Swales highlight psychoanalysis' ability to negotiate ambiguity in the clinic and note that a psychoanalyst:

“embraces the complexities of discourse as accurate reflections of what is means to be human” (Swales, 2012, p.15).

The researcher reiterates his recommendation that a person trained in psychoanalysis should be included in the treatment or care team to help the team negotiate the contradictory positions and impasses they seem to meet.

As explicated in Section 10.5 - Recommendations for Research, an innovative aspect of psychoanalytic research is the provocation of the reader which puts a responsibility on the researcher to speak to the reader's unconscious. The researcher, in agreement with Parker, recommends that (i) the psychoanalytic researcher ought to provoke his readership and, (ii) he or she should not disavow his or her knowledge of the unconscious in an attempt to situate him or herself within the university discourse (Parker, 2005).
WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

Researchers encounter barriers to access when conducting research studies with ‘hard-to-reach’ populations. As detailed by the researcher in Section 6.5 - Methodological and Technical Considerations these barriers stem from institutions whose primary consideration is to only support research which is “of benefit to the operation of the service” (p.152). The researcher considers this to be short sighted as it limits opportunities for the development of new knowledge which may well benefit the operation of the service.

The data commonly published is operational data such as the annual reports of governmental agencies (Irish Department of Justice and Equality, 2015a). In Ireland for example there are no published PCL-R cut-off scores. Researchers could therefore even argue that the psychopath as defined by these tests does not exist in Irish prisons. The researcher recommends that if data is being collected by the Irish Prison Service in relation to these scores (PCL-R family of tests), that it be published and made available to service planners, managers and clinicians.

Although the Irish Prison Service has at its disposal a team of mental health professionals including psychologists, the remit for service providers remains predominantly clinically focused and there is little opportunity for staff to engage in the production and publication of significant research findings. The researcher recommends the revision of this aspect of service provision to both (i) facilitate service providers in the writing and publishing of academic paper and (ii) enable external researchers to access the prison population in order to produce research that may benefit the prison population, service providers and society.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

The study of psychopathy from a psychoanalytic perspective is a relatively new area of research and the researcher noted a scarcity of published studies in his review of literature (De Ganck & Vanheule, 2014; Willemsen & Verhaeghe, 2009; Biagi-Chai, 2015).

The researcher, alongside contemporary psychoanalytic researchers (Parker, 2005; Verhaeghe, 2009; Vanheule, 2009) advocates for a case study approach in psychoanalytic research. He also restates his recommendation from Section 10.4 - New and innovative findings that this approach ought to also be longitudinal, allowing an examination of the stability of the compensatory imaginary identifications over time.

Additionally the researcher recommends for this study that the population be screened for psychopathic tendencies using a psychological tool from the family of tests described in Section 2.2 - Current measures of psychopathy: The Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP). This tool focuses on language and lexical markers for psychopathic personality traits and is considered more appropriate for a psychoanalytically informed study by the researcher.

In Section 10.4 - New and innovative findings the researcher recommended that a future study examine the influence of each drive on the coloration of psychopathic presentations. This examination of the drives (Oral, Anal, Scopic, Invocatory) and their relation to psychopathy builds on the work of this study and that of Swales (2012).

As discussed in Section 9.4 - The correlation of psychopathy/ASPD with substance abuse all the participants who met the criteria for psychopathic tendencies also had histories of substance abuse. This correlation requires further psychoanalytic research to examine if the mediation of jouissance via the consumption of mood-altering substances is particular to this study's population or whether it is common to all psychopaths.
This study set out to investigate the question:

*Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?*

The researcher found that he could situate psychopathy within Lacanian structural theory as a psychosis. The study found that those with psychopathic personality profiles as determined using the SRP-III, demonstrated in psychoanalytic interviews that they seek to destroy the law-giving Other as a defence against the real. The combination of the SRP-III and the psychoanalytic interview was a successful data collection method. Analysis of the data allowed the researcher to propose that there are different variants of psychopathy and that they are distinguishable by particular characteristics in the use of language, experience of jouissance and relation to the Other.

Psychopathy is commonly associated with the protection of the public from dangerous and/or predatory individuals. The researcher considers that this has the potential to narrow clinical perspectives and he advocates for increased study and insight into the psychopaths experience of the social world. Lacanian structural theory facilitates an examination of a subject's relation to others in society and so is ideally placed for this exercise.

The researcher found in the psychoanalytically informed qualitative analysis of interviews with five ex-offenders that each participant was able to articulate their problematic relationship to authority figures and their intense experiences of anxiety in relation to others. This indicates that treatment approaches need to take these two factors into account. The researcher believes that an understanding of the structural logic that lies behind a psychopath's interactions can offer invaluable material for clinicians who formulate psychotherapeutic interventions and care plans.

My conclusion is that psychopathy is treatable, has a logic of its own and that psychopaths are capable of analytic work. Psychopathy exists. If we design treatments, develop policy and institute practices that account for psychopathy we may establish a productive communication between this structural outlier and the rest of society.


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Society. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 57(2), pp.147-166.


Robert Hare's psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R)

Instrument
The Hare PCL-R: 2nd Edition is a 20-item scale that uses a semi-structured interview, a review of file information, and collateral information. A collateral review is mandatory for scoring and typically takes about 60 minutes, but can be longer if file information is extensive and detailed. Reliable and valid ratings can be made solely on the basis of collateral information, without an interview, if the collateral information is of sufficiently high quality. However, direct observation of the individual’s interaction style and demeanor is recommended. The Hare PCL-R measures inferred personality traits and behaviours to determine the presence of psychopathy in an individual. The Hare PCL-R takes into account:

- School adjustment
- Criminal behaviour
- Institutional behaviour
- Psychological test results
- Health and medical history
- Childhood, adolescent, and adult antisocial behaviour
- Substance abuse
- Work history and career goals
- Finances
- Family life
- Sex and relationships

Assessors rate each item using a 3-point ordinal scale (0 = No, 1 = Maybe/in some respects, or 2 = Yes) based on the degree to which the individual’s personality/behaviour matches the item description. Items are grouped into two main factors and four facets. Factor 1 (selfish, callous, and remorseless use of others) describes interpersonal and affective traits for verbal and interaction style. Factor 2 (chronically unstable and antisocial lifestyle) reflects criminal behaviour and a lifestyle that is aimless, impulsive, irresponsible, and parasitic. The four facets are:

1. Interpersonal
2. Affective
3. Lifestyle
4. Antisocial

The Hare psychopathy Checklist-Revised, with demonstrated reliability and validity, is rapidly being adopted worldwide as the standard instrument for researchers and clinicians. The PCL-R and PCL:SV are strong predictors of recidivism, violence and response to therapeutic intervention. They play an
important role in most recent risk-for-violence instruments. The PCL-R was reviewed in Buros Mental Measurements Yearbook (1995), as being the “state of the art” both clinically and in research use. In 2005, the Buros Mental Measurements Yearbook review listed the PCL-R as “a reliable and effective instrument for the measurement of psychopathy and is considered the 'gold standard' for measurement of psychopathy.

http://www.hare.org/scales/

20 Item List

1. GLIB and SUPERFICIAL CHARM -- the tendency to be smooth, engaging, charming, slick, and verbally facile. Psychopathic charm is not in the least shy, self-conscious, or afraid to say anything. A psychopath never gets tongue-tied. They have freed themselves from the social conventions about taking turns in talking, for example.

2. GRANDIOSE SELF-WORTH -- a grossly inflated view of one's abilities and self-worth, self-assured, opinionated, cocky, a braggart. Psychopaths are arrogant people who believe they are superior human beings.

3. NEED FOR STIMULATION or PRONENESS TO BOREDOM -- an excessive need for novel, thrilling, and exciting stimulation; taking chances and doing things that are risky. Psychopaths often have a low self-discipline in carrying tasks through to completion because they get bored easily. They fail to work at the same job for any length of time, for example, or to finish tasks that they consider dull or routine.

4. PATHOLOGICAL LYING -- can be moderate or high; in moderate form, they will be shrewd, crafty, cunning, sly, and clever; in extreme form, they will be deceptive, deceitful, underhanded, unscrupulous, manipulative, and dishonest.

5. CONNING AND MANIPULATIVENESS- the use of deceit and deception to cheat, con, or defraud others for personal gain; distinguished from Item #4 in the degree to which exploitation and callous ruthlessness is present, as reflected in a lack of concern for the feelings and suffering of one's victims.

6. LACK OF REMORSE OR GUILT -- a lack of feelings or concern for the losses, pain, and suffering of victims; a tendency to be unconcerned, dispassionate, coldhearted, and unempathic. This item is usually demonstrated by a disdain for one's victims.
7. SHALLOW AFFECT -- emotional poverty or a limited range or depth of feelings; interpersonal coldness in spite of signs of open gregariousness.

8. CALLOUSNESS and LACK OF EMPATHY -- a lack of feelings toward people in general; cold, contemptuous, inconsiderate, and tactless.

9. PARASITIC LIFESTYLE -- an intentional, manipulative, selfish, and exploitative financial dependence on others as reflected in a lack of motivation, low self-discipline, and inability to begin or complete responsibilities.

10. POOR BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS -- expressions of irritability, annoyance, impatience, threats, aggression, and verbal abuse; inadequate control of anger and temper; acting hastily.

11. PROMISCUOUS SEXUAL BEHAVIOR -- a variety of brief, superficial relations, numerous affairs, and an indiscriminate selection of sexual partners; the maintenance of several relationships at the same time; a history of attempts to sexually coerce others into sexual activity or taking great pride at discussing sexual exploits or conquests.

12. EARLY BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS -- a variety of behaviors prior to age 13, including lying, theft, cheating, vandalism, bullying, sexual activity, fire-setting, glue-sniffing, alcohol use, and running away from home.

13. LACK OF REALISTIC, LONG-TERM GOALS -- an inability or persistent failure to develop and execute long-term plans and goals; a nomadic existence, aimless, lacking direction in life.

14. IMPULSIVITY -- the occurrence of behaviors that are unpremeditated and lack reflection or planning; inability to resist temptation, frustrations, and urges; a lack of deliberation without considering the consequences; foolhardy, rash, unpredictable, erratic, and reckless.

15. IRRESPONSIBILITY -- repeated failure to fulfill or honor obligations and commitments; such as not paying bills, defaulting on loans, performing sloppy work, being absent or late to work, failing to honor contractual agreements.

16. FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR OWN ACTIONS -- a failure to accept responsibility for one's actions reflected in low conscientiousness, an absence of dutifulness, antagonistic manipulation, denial of responsibility, and an effort to manipulate others through this denial.
17. MANY SHORT-TERM MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS -- a lack of commitment to a long-term relationship reflected in inconsistent, undependable, and unreliable commitments in life, including marital.

18. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY -- behavior problems between the ages of 13-18; mostly behaviors that are crimes or clearly involve aspects of antagonism, exploitation, aggression, manipulation, or a callous, ruthless tough-mindedness.

19. REVOCATION OF CONDITION RELEASE -- a revocation of probation or other conditional release due to technical violations, such as carelessness, low deliberation, or failing to appear.

20. CRIMINAL VERSATILITY -- a diversity of types of criminal offenses, regardless if the person has been arrested or convicted for them; taking great pride at getting away with crimes.
Research Study
Participants needed

Do you feel low levels of anxiety or fear when others find them unbearable

We need ex-prisoners for a 10-15 minute questionnaire over the phone

Description of Project: We are researching how people are categorized as being psychopathic and are using psychoanalytic principles to investigate this. Your participation is needed for a 10-15 minute questionnaire over the phone. You may be invited for a follow-up interview of 30 minutes in the School of Nursing and Human Sciences, DCU.

To Participate: You must have been in prison and be aged 18-65.

Participants will be given their scores on the test for psychopathic tendencies.

Contact the researcher, Emmet Mallon on (01)7006865
Email: emmet.mallon3@mail.dcu.ie

This research has been reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee, Dublin City University. If you have any concerns about this study please contact Dr. Gerard Moore, School of Nursing and Human Sciences, Dublin City University, Dublin 9. Ph: (01)7003340
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT

Research Study Title: Situating psychopathy - A psychoanalytic investigation

Conducted by: Emmet Mallon, a PhD student in the School of Nursing and Human Sciences, Dublin City University.

Principal Investigators: Dr. Gerard Moore
Tel: +353-1-7005340

Dr. Rik Loose
Tel: +353-87-9114754

Principal Researcher: Emmet Mallon
Tel: +353-1-7006865

Summary:

This is a four-year study that will examine psychopathy as a diagnostic category in Psychiatry, Forensic Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Emmet Mallon is a PhD student, Dr. Gerard Moore is his academic supervisor and the results will be written up as a doctorate dissertation. Dr. Rik Loose will review theoretical aspects of the study as they relate to Psychoanalytic principles.

I will be conducting telephone interviews with people who have a history of criminality and who associate this with not feeling anxiety. You will be asked to take part in a telephone questionnaire of approximately fifteen minutes. During the conversation you will be asked questions about particular aspects of your life and experience in order determine if you fit the criteria for having psychopathic tendencies.
If you meet the criteria you will then be invited to a face-to-face interview on a later agreed date for a less structured interview. This interview will be an opportunity for you to speak freely about whatever comes to mind while an experienced psychotherapist is present in the room. Your psychoanalytic personality type will be distinguished from the data collected in order to answer the research question: Is psychopathy particular to one psychoanalytic structure (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), is it an undiscovered separate structure with an internal logic of its own or is it a universal symptom that crosses all three possible structures?

Interviews will be held in a quiet location in the Dublin City University campus or in the service you attend at a time agreed between you and the researcher. Participation in these interviews is voluntary therefore you can decide to withdraw at any time during the interview process.

These interviews will be recorded and the data will be analysed using a discourse (language) analysis method - Lacanian Discourse Analysis (Psychoanalytic analysis).

**Benefits and Risks:**

**Potential benefits to Participants Include:**
- The therapeutic effect of voicing your concerns and experiences to an interested party, they being listened to, valued and responded to.
- Being provided with information about research, theories and organisations for support.
- Having a direct influence on developments that will guide professional practice and service provision for those with psychopathic tendencies.

**Potential Risks to Participants Include:**
- Becoming distressed in the interview by the recall of painful personal events and memories,

In the event that you become distressed during your involvement in an interview for this study you may choose to or be advised to discontinue and will be supported to avail of suitable support services.

**Anonymity and Confidentiality:**

Anonymity of participants and confidentiality of interview material will be safeguarded through a number of measures, including:
• Recorded material will be transferred to a password computer package for storage and retrieval.
• Only those working on the research team, and named above, will have access to this material, as they will assist with directing the project in the most useful way on the basis of emerging issues.
• Signed consent forms will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and will not carry any identifying codes that connect individuals to specific recorded data.
• No information identifying an individual person or organization will be used in documentation pertaining to the study.

Study material will be subject to legal limitations, which means that it could be subject to subpoena, a freedom of information claim or mandated reporting by a professional. This would be necessary if a participant was assessed as being at risk of causing harm to him or herself, or if information were disclosed that indicated that a participant presented a potential risk of harm, or had inflicted actual harm to another person.

NB If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent person, please contact:
The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee.
C/o Office of the Vice-President for Research, Dublin City University, D. 9. Tel: 01-7008000
INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Research Study Title:
Situating psychopathy - A psychoanalytic investigation.

Purpose of Study:
The aim of this research is to examine psychopathy as a diagnostic category in Psychiatry, Forensic Psychology and Psychoanalysis. The question addressed by the research is: Should psychopathy be considered a condition particular to one personality type or is it a symptom experienced by all?

Participation Requirements:
I will be invited to participate in a telephone questionnaire of approximately fifteen minutes. During the conversation I will be asked questions about particular aspects of my life and experience in order to determine if I fit the criteria for having psychopathic tendencies.

On completion of the telephone questionnaire and should I wish to continue, a follow up interview will be organised for a time and date agreed between me and the researcher. This interview will be around fifty minutes in length, is recorded and will be an opportunity for me to speak freely about my experience. I will also be asked to complete and sign this consent form.

I can decide on the nature and depth of information I share and I may end the interview at any time without explanation. If I choose to withdraw at any time in the study process I will be supported in this decision and will be given equal access to information and support services.

Legal Limitations:
Study material will be subject to legal limitations, which means that it could be subject to subpoena, a freedom of information claim or mandated reporting by a professional. This would be necessary if a participant was assessed as being at risk of causing harm to him or herself, or if information were disclosed that indicated that a participant presented a potential risk of harm, or had inflicted actual harm to another person.

Participant Confirmation:
(Please answer each question)
Have you read or had read to you the Information Sheet? Yes/No
Do you understand the information provided to you? Yes/No
Have you had any opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study? Yes/No
Have you received satisfactory answers to your questions? Yes/No
Are you agreeable to having your interview recorded? Yes/No

**Participant Signature:**
I have read and understood the information in this form and the attached information sheet. My questions have been adequately answered by the researcher and I have a copy of the consent form. Therefore, I consent to participate in this research project.

Participants Signature: ______________________________________________

Name in Block Capitals: _____________________________________________

Witness: __________________________________________________________

Date:  __________________________________________________________

**NB If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent person, please contact:**
The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee. C/o Office of the Vice-President for Research, Dublin City University, D. 9. Tel: 01-7008000

X
APPENDIX E.

Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements about you. You can be honest because your name will be detached from the answers as soon as they are submitted.

1. I’m a rebellious person.  
2. I’m more tough-minded than other people.  
3. I think I could “beat” a lie detector.  
4. I have taken illegal drugs (e.g., marijuana, ecstasy).  
5. I have never been involved in delinquent gang activity.  
6. I have never stolen a truck, car or motorcycle.  
7. Most people are wimps.  
8. I purposely flatter people to get them on my side.  
9. I’ve often done something dangerous just for the thrill of it.  
10. I have tricked someone into giving me money.  
11. It tortures me to see an injured animal.  
12. I have assaulted a law enforcement official or social worker.  
13. I have pretended to be someone else in order to get something.  
14. I always plan out my weekly activities.  
15. I like to see fist-fights.  
16. I’m not tricky or sly.  
17. I’d be good at a dangerous job because I make fast decisions.  
18. I have never tried to force someone to have sex.  
19. My friends would say that I am a warm person.  
20. I would get a kick out of ‘scamming’ someone.  
21. I have never attacked someone with the idea of injuring them.  
22. I never miss appointments.  
23. I avoid horror movies.  
24. I trust other people to be honest.
Interview Protocol

Before Interview

- The informed consent form to be read to the participant
- Ask: “Can you tell me what this study is about?”

If an adequate answer is given to this question it eliminates the necessity for further evaluation of the decisional capacity?

Introduction

“If I may introduce myself: I am Emmet Mallon, a Psychotherapist and researcher and I am interested in Psychopathy, Psychopaths and their personality types. I’m investigating something in which you have an expertise or knowledge and am interested in hearing all you know”.

Open the interview with easy questions that the interviewee can answer confidently, or even begin with friendly, off-topic conversation - Mention how you became interested in study and name some mutual acquaintances.

In the position of researcher be bold and dig for data. Take a position of an interested listener. Don’t be afraid to evoke and question the position the participant has taken up.

In the position of psychoanalyst be the object - the gaze and the voice. Relate to the participant as the “Subject-supposed-to-know”:

“If I can start by getting your age and your level of education?”
“How long have you been coming to the project?”
“What are you studying?”
“If you want to grab a cup of tea before we start, that’s fine”.

1. Question around authority

“Can you tell me about the last time you had an interaction with someone in authority - how did it begin, what happened and what was the end result of the interaction?”

If no response - ask about their position in the family -
“How about authority figures from your childhood like your parents?”
“Is this a pattern or was it unusual for you? Would there have been other incidents like this in your history?”

Follow-up
E.g., “What do you mean by...?” “Can you tell me more about ...?”

Probes
“Then what happened?” “You mentioned that...” If there is a silence - What comes to mind?

Reframe
if a question causes discomfort, try reframing

2. Question around anxiety
“Can you tell me about a time recently when you experienced fear, stress or anxiety?”

If response is that they feel no fear -
“When did you notice that you experience anxiety and fear differently to others?”

“Can you tell me about the last time you engaged in risk taking behaviour?”

For example
As an adult the best example would possibly be driving a car as fast as possible.
As a child this might have been best exemplified by walking on high walls.

“Were you worried that you would be caught when you committed your last crime?”

3. End with a question allowing respondents to comment on any topic covered in the interview or on the interview itself
This is more like a free association as the interviewee can follow their own train of thought and can bring their own question to the interview.

“Perhaps you can speak a little about what seems to be missing from your account thus far - I’d be interested to hear of your friendships and the relationships you have with others in your family”.

After interview
- Contextual notes
- P-SCAN RV
### APPENDIX G.

**P-SCAN RV Front page**

![P-SCAN RV Front page image]

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**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Presence makes some feel strangely uncomfortable</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Looks for weak spots, buttons to push</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Very opinionated, seldom admits being wrong</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Attempts to portray self in good light</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Lies easily and while looking you in the eye</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Chameleon-like (will real person stand up?)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Uses language (e.g., big words, jargon)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Has gift of gab or is a very smooth talker</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Statements difficult to believe, hard to check</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Condescending, superior attitude, puts others down</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Must be center of attention</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Plays &quot;head games&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Dominates/controls interactions with others</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Instructions:**

Before using this form, ensure that you are thoroughly familiar with the P-SCAN Manual. Use all available information to rate the extent to which you think the following behaviors and characteristics describe the individual's typical functioning. Go through the items quickly but carefully.

Do not worry about being consistent in scoring items that seem similar. Rate as many items as you can. However, if you feel that you do not have enough information to rate an item, circle "C".

If there is insufficient information to score more than 5 items in a factor, or more than 15 items overall, the validity of the P-SCAN may be compromised. If more information subsequently becomes available, the item can then be "rescored." Use the scoring and profile pages to calculate the Factor scores and the Total score.

**User Information:**

- **Name or ID:** [Redacted]
- **Gender:** Male
- **Date of rating:** 11/11/14
- **Education:** PhD student

**Occupation (mark one with an “X”):**
- Psychologist
- Psychiatrist
- Social Worker
- Probation Officer
- Correctional Officer
- Judge
- Prison Administrator
- Lawyer
- **Law Enforcement Officer**
- Other:

**Reason for contact:**
- Interview
- Interrogation
- Profiling
- Risk Assessment
- Supervision
- Treatment Evaluation
- Other:

**Experience in use of PCL-R or PCL-SV:**
- Extensive
- Moderate
- None

**Level of contact with subject:**
- Extensive
- Moderate
- Little

---

Please complete the items on the reverse.
Hare P-SCAN
by Robert D. Hare, Ph.D. & Hugues F. Hervé, M.A.

INTERPERSONAL FACET TOTAL 55

AFFEVTIVE FACET TOTAL 51

LIFESTYLE FACET TOTAL 53

(55 + 51 + 53) ÷ 3 = 53

P-SCAN TOTAL SCORE

LEVEL OF CONCERN — Preliminary Guidelines Only

Very Low — Low — Moderate — High — Very High

P-SCAN Total Score

LEVEL OF CONCERN — Preliminary Guidelines Only

Interpersonal Score

Affective Score

Lifestyle Score

Preliminary Interpretive Guidelines for the P-SCAN Total Score

The Total Score is the sum of the scores on the three Facets. It reflects the overall judgment of the rater, and provides a "best guess" or working hypothesis about the likelihood that the person matches the psychopathic profile or should be of serious concern to the user. Keep in mind that these scores provide only general guidelines about the level of concern. A Total Score that falls at 39 or above should be cause for serious concern. A Total Score that falls between 11 and 38 suggests that the person probably has some of the features of psychopathy. A Total Score that falls between 0 and 10 suggests that it is unlikely that the person fits the description of the psychopath. Of course, there may be other problematic characteristics of concern to the user, but these are beyond the scope of the P-SCAN.

Preliminary Interpretive Guidelines for the P-SCAN Facet Scores

Interpersonal

High scores suggest that the person takes a dominant, controlling, and aggressive stance during interactions with others. He or she is likely to be grandiose, egocentric, manipulative, deceptively charming, and perhaps charming in a superficial way. Views self as the center of the universe, with a well-established sense of entitlement. This individual may be a smooth-talking con artist or a controlling, belligerent, or condescending adversary given to playing "head games."

Affective

High scores suggest that the person's emotional life is shallow and relatively bereft of normal deep-seated feelings and that there is little or no concern for the feelings and welfare of others, except in an abstract, intellectual sense. Emotions tend to be primitive and short-lived ("pro-emotions" such as frustration and anger), and typically occur in response to specific events, such as an argument, a challenge or defiance by others, an obstacle, and so forth. There is little capacity for, or continuing expressions of, empathy, guilt, or remorse. The person's social and emotional connections with others are weak and self-serving. A high score suggests that the person is relatively free from the subjective distress, worry, and apprehensions experienced by others. In short, he or she neither appreciates nor cares what others think or feel.

Lifestyle

A high score suggests that the person has an impulsive, nomadic lifestyle with a tendency to live for the moment, relatively unconcerned about what has happened or might happen. The person probably gets bored easily, is unlikely to remain long in relationships, places, or jobs, and is continually searching for new experiences and sensations. People, ideas, and causes are important only as long as they can provide the person with some benefit, and then causally and quickly are abandoned. Social and legal norms and expectations are irrelevant to the person, and are readily violated.
APPENDIX H.

Extract from hand-written transcription for Participant 2:

Page 7.

R: That there is a payment of such that goes beyond finance.

S: Definitely. It's reward shines theory. You're all sort of... self-interest.

R: They're all narcissistic?

S: Em. I am home at some stage we're all narcissistic. Of course yeah, it just manifests itself differently in different people. Cos if we were all the same wouldn't be a really boring place.

R: Normal is the real disorder.

S: What's normal? It's like dysmorphophobia where it also wears a suit as opposed to a tracksuit.

R: That's it. Ok. That's good. The first question is one around authority. So can you tell me all last time you had an interaction with someone in authority, how did it begin, what happened and what was the end result of that interaction?

S: Em it would've been (pause) (book of phone) I haven't got it on me phone. Em. Last time you say authority. I'm thinking of the guards. Last November or last December, nearly a year ago. Basically they had stopped, and were talking in a girl's bus stop. Em, I was after coming out of where I was living on the edge in just off the Dublin street and they were in an unmarked car, and we knew basically male guards, aren't allowed search female or girls. Female Em. Nearly sure she was Russian. Community (she was an immigrant) but not doing really nothing whereas she was from, Em, (pause) that I was watching, and I started to film that they were doing and they became aware after a few minutes. There was people walking by objects. One just adds that you can't do that sort of thing.
Em and then they had caught me filming and on one by and were quite obvious that it was my name and
my address start of thing. Em and I asked him
basically do you think I'm suspect me of committing
a crime or being involved in criminality,
Em and they said, well, I think it's a bad
crime area. Em. They didn't answer the question. My
question was, do you expect instead of suspecting
not expect me or being involved in a crime
or criminality. And then he thought and then
I got into it. The thing of I asked was with a peace
commissioner. Em, he said yes I asked. Well then, how
I committed a breach of the peace, or have you a
report that there's been a breach of the peace, and
he couldn't. Article 43 of the Irish Constitution
He was basically saying that I had a right to know
the name and address of Em. Article 43 - on the rights
of person for inalienable rights. That you
or have their can't be taken or given away. Em
The Criminal Justice (Police Conduct) Act 1994 - Arrest
without warrant. Section 24 subsection 2 (8 and 2 neglected)
It's only 7 into 8 lines of legislation, but he told
me the 8 lines of legislation. Why he wanted
my name and address. So I'm not cause. Data board to
give my name and address. If he doesn't think
that I've been involved in crime. But the long
and the shorts of it was he just walked off.
and got into the car and drove off. That was

Ok. Ok. So how did you feel when was be walked
away.

Em (long pause). I had won. I had won. I had shown
5 internally. I felt the do not. They have deficiencies
Their Help. 3. Quoting constitutional law means
to uphold the Constitution and they don't
Even now they're legislation under which they're
stopping people and the legislation they give
Using them clear picking pieces out of it for
they're own need. Em. Which only reinforces the negative

XVII
Extract from transcribed interview with Participant 2

Researcher: That’s it ok. That’s grand. The first question is one around authority - so can you tell me the last time you had an interaction with someone in authority, how did it begin, what happened and what was the end result of that interaction?

Subject: Em, it would’ve been [pause] [looks at phone] I haven’t got it on me phone. Em. Last. When you say authority I’m thinking of the guards. Last November or last December, nearly a year ago. Basically they had stopped and were searching a girl, two detectives. Em I was after coming out of where I was living on the XXXX [Dublin city street], just off XXXX [Dublin city street] and they were in an unmarked car and em [pause] basically male guards aren’t allowed search female gir…, girls, females. She was an immigrant. Em, nearly sure she was Romany community but that doesn’t really matter where she was from. Em [pause] And I was watchin and I started to film what they were doing and they became aware after a few minutes. There was people walking by objecting. One girl adds that you can’t do that sort of thing. 

S: Em and then they had caught me filming and em came by and were quite obnoxious wanting my name and address sort of thing. Em and I asked them basically do em they suspect me of committing a crime or being involved in criminality. [Researcher’s note in margin: The Law should answer his questions even when he refuses to answer theirs]. Em and they said Look; that it’s a high risk area. Em, they didn’t answer the question. My question was do you expect me [expect instead of suspect - slip] of being involved in a crime or criminality. [Researcher’s note in margin: Knows the Law] Article 40 of the Irish Constitution. He was basically saying that I had a right [Note: misuse of word - word missing is “responsibility”] to give my name and address. Em Article 40 - on the rights of the person em inalienable rights, rights that you have that can’t be taken or given away. Em the Criminal Justice Public Order Act 1994 [Note: Knows the Law], Arrest without warrant Section 24, subsection 2 (3 and 2 respectively). It’s only 7 lines, 8 lines of legislation but he couldn’t give me the 8 lines of legislation - why he wanted my name and address so I’m not [pause] duty bound to give my name and address if he doesn’t think that I’ve been involved in crime. But the long and the short of it was he just walked off and got into the car. That was it.

R: Ok. Ok. So he walked away.

S: Em [long pause] I’d won. I had won. [Note in margin: jouissance in victory over the law] I had shown. I internally felt the de, de, de, deficiencies [words fail subject] - they they’re quoting constitutional law, meant to uphold the Constitution and they don’t even know their legislation under
which they’re stopping people and the legislation they are using - they’re cherry-picking pieces out of it for their own need. Em which only reinforces the negative. [End page 8]

Researcher Notes on this extract of the interview

- Participant 2, Lines 180-182, Participant sees a garda searching someone and records it on his phone

  “Em and then they had caught me filming and em came by and were quite obnoxious wanting my name and address sort of thing. Em and I asked them basically do em they suspect me of committing a crime or being involved in criminality”.

  [Researcher’s note: Retraction: The Law should answer his questions even when he refuses to answer theirs.]

- Participant 2, Lines 184-185, Participant questions the Law

  “Em, they didn’t answer the question. My question was do you expect me [expect instead of suspect - slip] of being involved in a crime or criminality and he couldn’t answer”.

  [Researcher’s note: Participant has a slip when speaking about the Law]

- Participant 2, Lines 187-196, Participant questions the Law

  “I asked “Well then have I committed a breach of the peace or have you a report that there’s been a breach of the peace and he couldn’t; Article 40 of the Irish Constitution. He was basically saying that I had a right to give my name and address. Em Article 40 - on the rights of the person em inalienable rights, rights that you have that can’t be taken or given away. Em the Criminal Justice Public Order Act 1994, Arrest without warrant Section 24, subsection 2; 3 and 2 respectively. It’s only 7 lines, 8 lines of legislation but he couldn’t give me the 8 lines of legislation - why he wanted my name and address so I’m not [pause] duty bound to give my name and address if he doesn’t think that I’ve been involved in crime”.

  [Researcher’s note: Participant has educated himself so he can defend himself against the Law.]

- Participant 2, Lines 199-203, Speaking about challenging and winning against the Law

  “Em [long pause] I’d won. I had won. I had shown. I internally felt the de, de, de, deficiencies [words fail subject]. They, they’re quoting constitutional law, meant to uphold the Constitution and they don’t even know their legislation under which they’re stopping people and the legislation they are using - they’re cherry-picking pieces out of it for their own need”.

  [Researcher’s note: Participant experiences jouissance in victories over the Law. Also loses language when expressing this jouissance]
Field Notes

Date: 14/11/14
Time: 10 a.m.
Person/Place: Subject 2. [Redacted] - The Chancellor's office

[DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY]
Interview was organized for 10 a.m. but interview did not start till 10.45 a.m. Subject had a chat, then painted off something from the wall for college and then went out for a cigarette.

[REFLECTION / ANALYSIS]
Subject made me wait for him. I was being questioned or someone coming to see him. He had a very autre face. He was bearded and well dressed. Not as chaotic as was made out by others. I asked one of the ladies who does cooking classes with the subject if the had seen Subject, and if he could be anywhere. She replied - 'I don't know if he could be anywhere'. Subject quoted legislation and points of law for the beginning of interview. He almost attacked with the paragraph numbers like a cornered animal.
## APPENDIX K.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstracted Proposition Statements</th>
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<th>Interviews informing</th>
<th>Units of Meaning Coded</th>
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<td><strong>Proposition 1.</strong></td>
<td><strong>How to determine a subject as psychotic</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Language disturbance</strong></td>
<td>When language falls away - point de capiton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 2</td>
<td>Participant had 23 instances of language disturbance. These were 1. Foreclosure in language: He said Maths “does not exist” for him. 2. Confusion in which position he was speaking from - It was unclear if the participant was referring to his own addiction or an opportunity to work with addicts and the homeless that keeps “coming back”. 3. Retraction/Negation - consistent with psychopathic use of language. 4. Language disturbances were related to the Other (mother and father) / object a (the gaze).</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 3</td>
<td>Participant had 32 instances of language disturbance - the highest number. These are slips of the tongue, repetition and sentences going nowhere when speaking of traumatic situations related to the Real - E.g. hurting animals in a group of feral children with an autistic leader. This would be consistent with neurosis.</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 4</td>
<td>Only 8 instances of language slipping away although most of these relate to laughter.</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 5</td>
<td>Participant had 21 instances of language disturbance. These were 1. Mixed metaphors / neologisms. 2. When speaking in relation to the law-giving / care-giving Other. 3. Confusion over the position that the participant is speaking from: “the way a normal person affects (is affected)” - there is confusion over who is the active party and who is passive party being affected. 4. Speaking of Passage à l’acte. 5. Retraction/Negation. 6. Repetition.</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 8</td>
<td>Participant has 21 instances of Language disturbance when 1. There was confusion around his position or who was in authority? 2. Laughing/yawning/singing/cursing take the place of signifiers of anxiety/fear. 3. Repetition around jouissance. 4. Loses language when speaking about the Other (father/mother) and Object a. 5. Disavowal of crime</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstracted Proposition Statements</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Interviews informing</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The ability to take up a new position with ease</strong></td>
<td>A normative subject must overcome anxiety to get to desire and take up a position. The psychopath can take up more than one position. He can be man, woman and watcher just like an infant.</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 2</td>
<td>He can be on both sides of the Law - Studying while also fighting spent convictions. Plagiarism of quote. Can imagine being a social worker, lawyer and psychologist in the space of a sentence.</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 5</td>
<td>Participant can position himself on both sides by studying Law.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transcendism</strong></td>
<td>The fragility of the ego is evidenced when there is confusion for the Participant between himself and an other person. (Freud's paper: <em>A child is being beaten</em>)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 2</td>
<td>Participant identifies with the foreign national who is being questioned by a Garda. A sense of justice includes one's own defence from future injustice - fighting for others may be considered also fighting for oneself. Plagiarism of quote and then the inability to see this.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 4</td>
<td>Participant identifies with a robin, father, brother and his grand children- feels their pain whether he inflicts it on them (as in robin, father and brother) or it comes from another source (grandchildren).</td>
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<td>Participant 5</td>
<td>Subjective confusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant 8</td>
<td>Participant identifies with cell mate and friend who is stabbed and positions himself as both the doing surveillance and being watched in relation to the gardai.</td>
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<td>Abstracted Proposition Statements</td>
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<td><strong>Proposition 2.</strong></td>
<td>How to distinguish between Riot-mode and Machiavellian variants</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Machiavellian (Obsessional variant)</strong></td>
<td>Anal drive (Playing with the Other in a power struggle) Scopic drive (Surveillance and Counter-surveillance - the Other is watching and intrusive). Participant 5 and Participant 8 interviews are coloured with a seeking out of punishment. Participant 4 speaks of minimizing risk when speeding but this is hedonism rather than obsessional. Similarly when he kills the bird it is planned but done as a way of confronting the Real. Participant 3 has to bear witness to violence- the gaze is his not an intrusive one from the Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Masochistic (perverse) trait</strong></td>
<td>Participant 5 (Riot-Mode) and Participant 8 (Machiavellian-mode) related gaining a satisfaction from being punished and detailed how they sought punishment via acts of self-sabotage. They cannot however be considered “criminals from a sense of guilt” (Freud, 1916) as they offer an a priori justification for their actions and may be more aptly described as “guilt-free” criminals (Freud, 1928). Participant 2 has created a solution based on his knowledge of the law. Although it looks like he is sacrificial, he is the one who remains in control - (E.g. Filming of foreign national and Garda). Participant 3 is self-sacrificial out of a sense of guilt. N.B. Masochism is common to to both Riot-mode and Machiavellian-mode.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Riot-mode (Psychotic variant)</strong></td>
<td>Fixation on the Oral drive. Frustration for participant and withholding by the Other. No mediation of the drive -émeute (Autistic or schizophrenic or manic or melancholic or paranoiac). Participant 4 and Participant 5 both lose control and there is a passage to the act. This contrasts with Participant 2 in particular who spoke of riotous acts - chasing people with a machete but he is in control and violence is strategic.</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td><strong>Proposition 3.</strong></td>
<td>How to distinguish between Sociopathy and Psychopathy</td>
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<td><em>The Law is to be destroyed or subverted</em></td>
<td>Psychopathic defense mechanism of turning the Law into the object - the faeces, Participant 2 - the law is out to get him and he must subvert it. Participant 4 - hits out at Father on deathbed He speaks ill of the psychologist. (contrasts with Participant 3 who reveres his G.P.) Participant 5 - the law doesn't care for him so he must hit out to destroy it. (Describes the governors as having no empathy when he has a deficit in emotional awareness.) Participant 8 - subverts and ridicules those in charge.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>The Law is to be revered</em></td>
<td>Non-psychopathic defense mechanism seen in participant - By turning himself into the object (the faeces) he protects himself from the Real. (Participant 3) He gave his friend everything on getting out of prison but this was not given back to him when he returned. Father remains the law for the participant. The mantras from AA and his Father protect him from his “deviant behaviours”. True to form the only person who asked “Am I still psychotic?” was the only one who wasn't.</td>
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The Association for Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy in Ireland Ltd.

Code of Ethics and Practice

http://www.appi.ie/about-appi/code-ethics

1. The Code of Ethics and Practice applies to those Members of the Association whose names appear on the Register of Practitioner Members and the Conditional Register. For ease of reading, the terms Psychotherapist and Psychotherapy specify Psychoanalytic Psychotherapists and Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy respectively. In turn, a psychoanalytic psychotherapist is a therapist whose practice is informed by the works of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. This amounts to defining the psychoanalytic psychotherapist as a specialised listener who gives a particular privilege to the place of the unconscious.

2. There is a central tension in psychotherapy between autonomy and dependency and this latter may be exploited by an unscrupulous psychotherapist. A core moral responsibility involves the promotion of the client’s emotional autonomy, while conscientiously managing the peculiar but necessary psychological dependency of the client on the therapist in the course of treatment.

3. In all his/her work, the psychotherapist shall value integrity, impartiality and respect for all people who come to see him/her professionally. The therapeutic ‘relationship’ shall not be exploitative in any way. The psychotherapist shall hold the interest and welfare of those in receipt of his/her services to be paramount at all times.

4. 
(a) A psychotherapist shall not make claim directly or indirectly to qualifications, affiliations and capabilities which he/she does not possess.
(b) A psychotherapist shall take steps to monitor and develop his/her own competence and to work within the limits of that competence.
(c) All reasonable steps should be taken to ensure the safety of participants in psychotherapy.
(d) A psychotherapist shall ensure the confidentiality of information acquired through his/her practice and protect the privacy of individuals or organisations about whom information is known.
(e) A psychotherapist shall publish information about individuals, in oral or written form, only with their consent or where their identity is adequately disguised.
(f) Psychotherapists shall conduct themselves in their practice in a way that does not damage the interests of the recipients of their services or undermine public confidence in their ability to carry out their duties. Specifically they shall:

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(i) Refrain from practice when their physical or psychological condition seriously impairs their judgement.

(ii) Not exploit the special relationship of trust and confidence to gratify their personal desires.

(iii) Refrain from improper conduct that would be likely to be detrimental to the interests of the recipients of their services.

(iv) Neither attempt to secure or accept from those receiving their services any significant financial or material benefit beyond that which has been agreed.

(v) Not allow their responsibilities or standards of practice to be diminished by consideration of religion, sex, age, nationality, opinion, politics, social standing, class or other extraneous factors.

5. Where they suspect misconduct by a professional colleague which cannot be resolved or remedied after discussion with the colleague concerned, they may take steps to bring that misconduct to the attention of the Ethics Committee in accordance with the Articles of Association, doing so without malice and with no breaches of confidentiality other than necessary to the operation of the proper investigatory procedure.

6. Psychotherapists shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that those working under their direct supervision comply with this Code.

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<th>Phase 4</th>
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<td>Loss of language (laughing, cursing, yawning, snorting or snoring)</td>
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<td>Loss of language (stutter or stammer)</td>
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<td>Loss of language (words missing or unfinished sentences)</td>
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<td>Objects of violence</td>
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<td>Others see subject as fearful</td>
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<td>Others see subject as frightening</td>
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<td>Others see the subject as sexist or narcissistic</td>
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<td>Subject feels lost</td>
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<td>Subject makes their own rules</td>
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<td>Subject needs law installed for them</td>
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<td>Subject objectifies others (dehumanizes)</td>
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<td>Subject objectifies themselves</td>
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<td>Subject refuses to take up position of power</td>
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<td>Subject sees themselves as all-knowing</td>
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<td>Subject sees themselves as lacking</td>
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<td>Subject sees themselves as toxic</td>
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<td>Taking back power</td>
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<td>The lost object (they are)</td>
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<td>The one like me (counterpart or victim)</td>
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<td>Threatening Other</td>
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<td>Unprovoked change of topic</td>
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How to determine a subject as psychotic
- Language Difficulties
- The ability to take up a new position with ease
- Transitivity

How to distinguish between riot-mode and machiavellian variants of psychopathy
- Machiavellian (Obsessional variant)
- Masochistic (Perverse variant)
- Riot-mode (Psychotic variant)

How to distinguish between sociopathy and psychopathy
- The Law is to be destroyed or subverted
- The Law is to be revered

Anxiety and Jouissance

Language

Relationship to big Other

The object a