10. Ireland. The Rise of Populism on the Left and Among Independents

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Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the state of scholarship on political populism in Ireland, examines relevant research that explores definitional issues, and identifies Irish populist political actors. Although little research exists on populism and the role of the media or its impact on voters, the chapter takes a quick look at the increasing coverage of populism in the media, which was especially pronounced following the economic crisis in 2008. In the Irish literature, Fianna Fáil, the once-dominant party, is the political actor that has most commonly been associated with populism, at least until the mid-2000s. Since then, much focus has been on Sinn Féin, widely perceived as the new populist party, which emerged with an anti-austerity agenda following the economic crisis.

Research on Populism in Ireland
There is a small but growing literature on populism in Ireland and some consensus that, historically, populism has been largely empty populism with traces of anti-elitism, with the latter strengthening in the wake of the financial crisis (see Chapter 2 in this volume for an explanation of types of populism). It should be noted that Ireland has been excluded from classification in previous research on populism—an exclusion that has been contested (see, for example, Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Swank & Betz, 2003). Kitschelt and McGann (1995) excluded the case of Ireland on the grounds that it is not a post-industrial society, and more recently, Kitschelt (2007, p. 1193) has claimed that the socioeconomic conditions and weakness of this welfare state should exclude Ireland from any analysis of populism. However, this claim is contested by Irish scholars (McDonnell, 2008; McGuickian, 2014; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015), who argue that while Ireland may never have been an industrial country, it certainly has the characteristics of a post-industrial one (O’Malley, 2008).

For many authors, the traditional puzzle is that populism has been mild, and most parties, when they ascend to government, tend toward responsibility rather than responsiveness (Mair, 2013). Traditionally, the larger parties have long been characterized as catch-all parties, prone to a degree of populism that is deployed in order to build and secure broad-based coalitions of support (Mair & Marsh, 2004, pp. 234–263); in other words, these parties implement a form of empty populism with references and appeals to the people rather than focused anti-elitism or exclusion of out-groups. In short, the consensus view is that, until recently, politics in the Republic has always been characterized by what Canovan (1981, pp. 12–13) terms politicians’ populism, meaning “broad, non-ideological, coalition-building that draws on the unificatory appeal of ‘the people.'”

Some authors stress the presence of anti-elitist populism more than others, often referring to rhetoric that is broadly anti-political and anti-mediaelites (based in the capital), or to older
anti-imperial rhetoric against Britain. McDonnell (2008) argues, for example, that if we take the definition of populism to include claims about “the other,” then Ireland was “nearly unimpeachable with its twin pillars of the worthy plain Catholic people of Ireland on one side and the common enemy (and easy scapegoat for the nation’s ills) of Britain and its liberal culture on the other” (p. 200). In a similar vein, Varley and Curtin (2006) examine the “small man” strand of populism, where state agents are prepared to intervene on behalf of the small man, or the “little guy.” Though much attenuated today (Varley & Curtin, 2002), this strand of populism has never entirely disappeared in Ireland. Thus, in their case study on populist-type state interventions—such as area partnerships (local and community enterprise groups)—Varley and Curtin argue that these present themselves as capable of generating the “power to” negotiate relationships of domination and exploitation for the benefit of those historically left disadvantaged by the play of dominating and exploiting “power over” forces. In other areas, Varley (2009) returns to this narrative, arguing that the populist frame is useful for understanding the “underdog,” or anti-elitist, narrative around agricultural and rural politics.

McDonnell (2008, p. 210) argues that if we define populism as do Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008, p. 3)—an approach which “pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice”—then much of 20th century Irish politics might be conceived as populist.

There is less agreement on whether any of the Irish parties can be categorized as anti-out-group. Kitching (2013) suggests that the “punitive” policies on asylum put forward by the government parties, Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats, during a referendum campaign on the withdrawal of citizenship rights in 2004 contained anti-asylum populism (Fanning, 2002; Fanning & Mutwarasibo, 2007; Garner, 2007). This analysis is disputed by others such as O’Malley (2008); he argues that mainstream parties are actively pro-immigration and none has made the issue party political.

In general, until recently, the focus for many scholars was the absence of a far-right anti-out-group party (McDonnell, 2008; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015). Due partly to a lack of clarity in the definition of populism, with many assuming that it included anti-out-group rhetoric, some argued that populism did not exist in Ireland. More recently, this view has been undergoing a change, as will be discussed later in the chapter.

Few authors claim complete populism is present in Ireland, but one exception is O’Connell (2003), who theorizes from a social psychological perspective that Irish conservatism is shifting—indeed, has shifted—from a traditional Catholic clericalism to a complete-type populism. He argues that this populism is (a) radical, in that its advocates often reject important elements of consensus politics; (b) right-wing, in that it includes a component of hostility to foreigners or outsiders; and (c) populist, in the sense that its rhetoric seeks to exploit an alleged chasm between an unrepresentative political elite and an unrepresented general public.

In terms of the broad structure of the literature, much of the work on populism in Ireland has been broadly theoretical or descriptive in nature, with arguments centered around which elements of populism do, or do not, apply to Ireland. A small number of papers are broadly empirical (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2010; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015). Much of the literature is based in political science, communications, and legal studies (Campbell, 2008; FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2010; Kitching, 2013; McGuickian, 2014;
O’Mahony, 2009; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015), and all build on the theoretical work of Canovan (1981), Taggart (2000), and Mudde (2010). Others approach the subject from a sociological perspective (Fanning & Mutwarasibo, 2007; Garner, 2007; Maillot, 2005; Varley, 2009; Varley & Curtin, 2002) or from a social psychological perspective (O’Connell, 2003).

Regarding method, almost all the papers are built on case studies. The exception is a comparative country study (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2010) that investigates the emergence of populism as a possible side effect of the Europeanization of political competition by using a different system of case study analysis and, as examples, the Republics of Ireland and Poland. There are also a few chapters in explicitly comparative books (McDonnell, 2008; O’Malley and FitzGibbon, 2015), while survey data, based on the Irish National Election Study, is the basis of O’Malley’s work (2008).

The typology of populism set out by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) is a useful tool for analysis (see Chapter 2 in this volume). Utilizing the complete, excluding, anti-elitist, and empty populism framework, we can see variety. As already mentioned, the tradition in Ireland has consisted of forms of empty populism with copious reference to the people. Empty populism was honed by Fianna Fáil but also emulated by other smaller parties and independents. In addition, elements of anti-elitist populism were manifested in two distinct ways. One was the rhetoric directed at the British, and the other, at those in power in Dublin’s center, thus appealing to local rural voters. No real attempts have been made at excluding populism, with all parties avoiding this type at an institutional level—with the exception of the citizenship referendum, which sought to deny citizenship to Irish-born children of parents who were both foreign nationals (see below).

The literature focuses on a number of structural factors that facilitate populism, most particularly political culture and the party system. History and political culture are intertwined in some accounts (O’Malley, 2008; Varley, 2009; Varley & Curtin, 2006), with a good deal of emphasis placed on the position of Ireland as a small, post-colonial island, and this identity underpins populist, often anti-British, rhetoric. McGuickian (2014) has argued that populist politics are dispersed across society; the origins of the party system are unabashedly populist. O’Malley and FitzGibbon (2015), McDonnell (2008), and Dowling (1997) also pointed in this direction. FitzGibbon and Guerra (2010) focused on the Europeanization of party competition and argued that it is just part of the explanation for the emergence of populism.

McDonnell (2008) drew attention to the “anti-political climate,” or a widespread sense of “political malaise” that is the loss of trust in, and developing cynicism about, political institutions and actors, or what Brandenburg (2005, p. 297) described as “a rather homogeneous anti-politics bias.” In many ways, the history of Ireland’s party system is synonymous with the long-dominant party Fianna Fáil; from 1948 through 2002, the party averaged a 45% share of the vote, and as a result, it spent 65 of the 79 years from 1932 to 2011 in government, making it one of the most dominant parties in Western Europe. Its status as a populist party is generally uncontested up until 2011. Fianna Fáil’s large following has traditionally cut across class divisions, justifying its image as a national movement. As a result, it is perhaps unsurprising that the literature, until very recent years, has focused on Fianna Fáil and its leaders.

Mair (1979) identified Fianna Fáil as a relevant anti-system party in terms of Sartori’s classification of polarized pluralism (Sartori, 1976, pp. 131–145). Others have also referred to
the party’s populist characteristics. McDonnell (2008) pointed to Garvin (1977), who referred to the party as a “nationalist-populist” party, and to Murphy (2003, p. 1), who termed it “a classically populist party”.

O’Malley and FitzGibbon (2015) argued that there is also a distinctly anti-party sentiment in much of public discourse and point to the rising success of independent or non-party politicians. In the 2011 election, independents (including some micro-parties) received 13% of the vote, compared with seven percent in 2007. At the 2014 European Parliament and local elections, independents and small parties received 30% of the vote. O’Malley and FitzGibbon argued that independents often portray themselves and campaign in populist tones. The rhetoric from independents (which seems to resonate with many people) tries to portray parties as somehow craven and without principle. Independents say that they will put people before party and ask to move democracy on without parties (O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015).

Indeed, there is broad agreement that a clearer populist narrative began to emerge after the 2008 financial crisis and during and after the 2011 general election that sought to characterize Ireland’s economic woes as an unjust action brought about by a corrupt Irish political elite beholden to a cabal of bankers and European Union politicians (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2010; Kitching, 2013; McDonnell, 2008; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015).

The party most associated with this line of thought is Sinn Féin. For example, Sinn Féin’s main ideologue and strategist, Ó Broin (2014), wrote an article, “In Defence of Populism,” in the Irish Left Review in response to a piece by a leading political editor of The Sunday Business Post. While acknowledging that populism can be progressive or reactionary, democratic or authoritarian, Sinn Féin’s brand is “democratic, egalitarian and progressive.” Ó Broin argued that Sinn Féin’s entire political project—including its opposition to austerity—is populist, and unashamedly so, but he stressed that the Sunday Business Post editor had a wrong understanding of populism. That understanding was based on an unstated prejudice, and it betrayed a worldview that is deeply distrustful of popular opinion and the ability of people to know what is in their own best interests (Ó Brion, 2014).

Sinn Féin displays significant Euroskepticism, urging a rejection of all recent EU treaties. FitzGibbon and Guerra (2010) argue that Sinn Féin has used Euroskepticism for ruthlessly strategic reasons that can easily be misconstrued as populism. McDonnell stresses that while Fianna Fáil continued to use Irish nationalism to attack Fine Gael and Labor, it became less populist, and by the 2000s, Fianna Fáil was “merely dipping into the populist toolbox with occasional forays into Euroskepticism” (McDonnell, 2008, p. 210). Their mantel had instead been taken on by Sinn Féin and the independents.

Another relatively unusual element of the Irish political system is the reasonably frequent use of referenda, which must be held at the time of every EU treaty change and every change in the Constitution. Kitching (2013) has pointed to the mobilization of populist anti-EU actors in referenda campaigns, as have FitzGibbon and Guerra (2010). Kitching (2013, p. 125) identified “hostage takers,” who mainly participate indirectly in the electoral system but who mobilize around referenda and hold politicians to ransom on specific issues. In a thorough review of the dynamics in referenda on changes to the European Treaties that could have an impact on sovereignty implicit in the Irish constitution, O’Mahony (2009) investigated the
emergence of a dynamic in Irish referenda on EU treaties that had two key elements: elite withdrawal and populist capture.

One referendum on the withdrawal of Irish citizenship rights for “non-national” children is particularly cited in this regard. This 2004 referendum distinguished existing citizens of the nation-state from Irish-born children of immigrants hitherto entitled to citizenship (Fanning & Mutwarasibo, 2007). In popular parlance, it was a distinction between “nationals” and “non-nationals” and was backed by all of the main political parties. The referendum as a political response to immigration was also bound up with the politics of economic growth and distributional conflict. Here, a radicalized conception of citizenship was articulated within populist political responses to immigration and “maternity tourism” (Fanning & Mutwarasibo, 2007).

**Populist Actors as Communicators**

A small part of the literature has focused on populist actors as communicators—in particular, on leaders and individual independents in terms of their charisma and particular styles. McDonnell (2008) pointed out that in typically populist rhetoric, Fianna Fáil leaders such as De Valera and Lynch explicitly defined Fianna Fáil as a “national movement” that was representative of all people rather than as a “political party” (Mair, 1987, p. 178). He pointed to De Valera’s vision of Ireland, which was explicitly communicated in populist terms akin to Taggart’s concept of the populist “heartland.”

For O’Malley and FitzGibbon (2015), Fianna Fáil spent much of its time communicating Irishness in terms of Gaelic (Irish-speaking, cultural) Catholicism in opposition to Britishness, which was seen as Protestant, English-speaking, and colonial. In early election literature, Fianna Fáil tried to frame the choice facing the electorate as “the masses against the classes,” arguing that the existing government was “by the rich … for the rich.” According to one commentator on Fianna Fáil, it used “a large dollop of populist politics” with an emphasis on high pay for politicians and “jobbery” (corrupt handing out of state jobs) (Whelan, 2012, p. 47).

O’Malley and FitzGibbon (2015) argued that Sinn Féin is tightly controlled by Adams, its long-time leader. One Sinn Féin representative has said of Adams that he “has the charisma of a pop star” (Rafter, 2005, p. 6). Attempts were made to deify Adams as a “Leader, Visionary, Peacemaker” when he was arrested in connection with the kidnapping and murder of a woman in the early 1970s. Murals were painted on walls in Belfast.

O’Malley (2014) argued that the party’s strong anti-austerity populist messaging suits the party’s narrative of Irish nationalism—the downtrodden Irish as a victim of British imperialism. He argued that Sinn Féin is a populist nationalist party that claims to be to the left. In this way it is similar to the French Front National in economic policy (though not with regard to immigration). However, there has been no systematic examination of unique strategies that distinguish populist from mainstream communication or of differences in the language deployed by populists of the left and the right.

**The Media and Populism**

There is little explicit literature on the media and populism in Ireland. One exception is Curran’s 1994 Ph.D thesis, which documented the role of the now-defunct Irish Press in Fianna Fáil’s hegemony over an extended period of time and in mediating the party’s populist...
ideology. That newspaper was founded by Fianna Fáil leader de Valera and was always a strong, partisan supporter of the party. Reflecting the party’s populism was a core editorial strategy. In addition, McMenamin, Flynn, O’Malley, and Rafter (2013) presented a content analysis of the coverage of 12 national newspapers during the 2011 Irish general election. They tested whether (and why) politics is framed as a game between competing teams or as a debate about issues and policies, presenting a choice between political parties and ideologies. They did not find a homogeneous frame, although the crisis election did increase the proportion of coverage given to issues compared with 2002 and 2007.

However, the authors did not engage with questions on how populist actors and their communicative strategies resonate with journalistic media, nor did they engage in an examination of populist discourse or how individual media outlets deal with populist discourse. In addition, no work has yet been published on how populist actors and communications resonate in non-journalistic online media like blogs, forums, and social networks. These areas are ripe for study; figures garnered from LexisNexis demonstrate that mentions of populism almost trebled from 22 to 60 from 2012 to 2014. Thus, an examination of the content and framing of populist communication would be timely.

Citizens and Populism
The most explicit study on voters most likely respond to populist rhetoric (O’Malley, 2008) focused primarily on Sinn Féin voters. The party has been in existence since the foundation of the state but has only been in the national electoral arena in the Republic in more recent years. The first Sinn Féin representative entered Parliament in 1997, to be joined by four more in 2002, rising to 14 in 2011. Prior to the 2008 crisis, it was generally puzzling that although Sinn Féin had the most typical populist voters of all Irish voters, the party itself did not succumb to anti-out-group rhetoric. McDonnell (2008) pointed to Laver (2005), who found that at the 2002 election voters were predominately young (average age 36), male (58%), and more likely to be low-income than voters of all other parties, except Fianna Fáil. Moreover, as Garry, Hardiman, & Payne (2006) found, they are more likely to have low levels of political knowledge, low trust of the existing parties, and a low sense of their political efficacy. In other words, they are the most alienated voters in the Republic (McDonnell, 2008) and appear to hold the most obvious anti out-group sentiments (O’Malley, 2008).

To unravel the puzzle, scholars have generally examined why Sinn Féin does not espouse these views despite the profile of many of its supporters. O’Malley (2008) argued that the nature of Irish nationalism makes it difficult for such a party to engage in anti-immigrant rhetoric commonly associated with far-right parties, despite the fact that some of its supporters hold views consistent with this form of nationalism.

Others such as McDonnell (2008), argued that Sinn Féin, rather than presenting a major risk of developing into a populist radical right party, acts as a bulwark against others entering the system. He argued: The main obstacle impeding the emergence of a new populist party is the recent success of the left-wing nationalist party Sinn Féin, which, while unwilling (and unable) to embrace anti-minority or anti-pluralist positions, not only displays many of the characteristics of populism, but has occupied much of the political and electoral space where a populist challenger (of the Right or Left) would seek to locate itself. (McDonnell, 2008, p. 198) For example, Sinn Féin’s Members Training Programme, as Maillot (2005) has noted, differentiates between “ideology” and “principles.” While the latter constitute immutable “fundamental truths,” such as the sovereignty of a 32-county, united Irish Republic, the
former can be flexible—which works because “21st century populism is a constantly evolving concept,” thus playing to the populist tendency to pick and choose from different ideologies according to the needs of the moment (Maillot, 2005, p. 4).

Kitching (2013, p. 125) identified Sinn Féin members as “gatekeepers” who attract the votes of the populist radical right but who have not behaved like them thus far. He argued that Sinn Féin occupies the position of potential populist radical-right challengers. Sinn Féin would completely deny any relationship to the radical right on the basis of its avowedly left-wing economic positions. However, some have argued that it is not unusual for populist radical-right parties to espouse instrumentalist left-wing economics for temporary gain, sometimes even using economics as a tool to attain support among their perceived “in-group” while excluding outsiders (Kitching, 2013).

However, there is no systematic research on inter-individual differences in reactions to populist messages or on the effects of populist messages on citizens’ emotions toward political actors or society and the political system. Nor is there yet any research on the effects of populist messages on citizens’ knowledge, opinions and attitudes, or political behaviors.

Summary and Recent Developments
In general, the literature argues that support for empty and anti-elite populism is strong, and voters tend to reward parties that engage in it. Recent support has developed following the 2011 general election, and little discussion has yet made its way into the scholarly literature. In 2012–2013, the rise of SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain galvanized the debate about populism, with the term “populism” becoming increasingly conspicuous. An increasing amount of attention has been paid to the phenomenon in the media. This salience has coincided with a rise in the opinion polls of both Sinn Féin and the independents.

Indeed, public support for Sinn Féin has grown steadily over the years since the 2011 general election, almost doubling from 10% to a high of 24% in December 2014. The other clear pattern is the rise in support for independents, a peculiarly Irish phenomenon. As Bolleyer and Weeks (2009) have argued, independents can do and say what they want on the campaign trail, adopting all sorts of populist doctrines without having to preach responsible politics. Independents, too, have almost doubled support, from 15% at the last general election to 27% in early 2015. In short, there is general scholarly agreement largely based on case studies that anti-elitist populism is common, was honed in the 20th century by Fianna Fáil, and is now carried on by Sinn Féin and the independents. In general, while there has been some research into populism in Ireland, most has focused on the actors themselves and deals little with citizens and even less with the media. Further work in these areas would no doubt be illuminating.

References


