FIGHTING POVERTY TO FIGHT TERRORISM: SECURITY IN DfID’s DEVELOPMENT POLICY DURING THE WAR ON TERROR

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Dr. Eamonn McConnon

Postdoctoral Researcher
Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction
Dublin City University
School of Law and Government
Glasnevin
Dublin 9
Ireland

Email: eamonn.mcconnon@dcu.ie
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Abstract
This article builds on existing research on the securitisation of development aid following 9/11. Investigating arguments that the UK’s concern is with security at home and not the security of developing states, the policy discourse of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) is examined through its four major policy documents and two major security documents for the period from the late 1990s to the late 2000s. Two levels of analysis are used; a content analysis, and a discourse analysis. This article argues that DfID has: given increasing space to conflict and security and, after initial restrictions placed on DfID’s involvement in security in the late 1990s, security has become a key development concern during the War on Terror. In the process the goal of Human Security - to place development issues as security concerns - has been reversed and, instead, DfID has included security as a development problem.

Key Words: Security–development nexus, failed states, War on Terror, Human Security, radicalism, security, development
Introduction

It has been argued that there has been a shift in development since 9/11 to meet security concerns. This is evident in attempts to coordinate development and security policies, leading to a closer relationship between development and military actors in the field. In the case of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), development spending has become overtly connected to political considerations (Hills 2006: 630). With the US shifting its development policies to meet security concerns since 9/11, the fear among commentators (Ellis 2004; Carmody 2005; Ingram 2007; Bagoyoko and Gibert 2009; Shannon 2009; Bachman and Hönke 2010) is that development concerns will be subverted by security considerations. However, it remains unclear to what extent this shift in focus has extended to other bilateral players.

The UK is an interesting case in this regard in that its Department for International Development (DfID) operates independently of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, whereas USAID is controlled by the State Department. There is disagreement among commentators over whether DfID has maintained a poverty focus or whether it has shifted to addressing security concerns albeit in a more subtle way than USAID. Whilst some argue that DfID has maintained a firm stance on poverty alleviation over security concerns (Beall et al 2006; Fitz-Gerald 2006; Youngs 2007; Wild and Elhawary 2012), still others claim that UK development policy has become securitised and is geared towards protecting the West from the dangers caused by the underdevelopment of non-Western states (Abrahamsen 2004, 2005; Duffield and Waddell 2006; Carmody 2011). While these contributions add much to our understanding of this issue, they are largely based on analyses of particular moments.
in time rather than over a longer time period. This is the purpose of this article which analyses DfID’s policy discourse through its four major policy documents and two major security documents for the period from the late 1990s to the late 2000s.

This article addresses this gap in the literature by exploring how DfID has changed its position on policy issues from the pre-9/11 period to the late 2000s. Using two levels of analysis - a content analysis and a discourse analysis, it is argued that after initial restrictions placed on DfID’s involvement in security in the late 1990s, security concerns more strongly informed DfID’s work during the so-called War on Terror. The areas that are considered security issues have been expanded to include terrorism, political extremism and failed states. The result of this, it is argued, is an appropriation of the main tenets of Human Security by DfID in order to justify the increased involvement in hard security concerns. This is significant as it increases the understanding of how DfID’s policy has changed following 9/11 in detail not provided by other work in this area. This work has implications for how other states have engaged with the merging of security and development and the broader debates regarding the impact of the concept of Human Security and the hegemonic influence of the US. The argument is developed as follows. In the following section, the literature on the merging of security and development is outlined. Following this, is a brief discussion of the definitional problems around the merging of security and development. The next three sections outline how DfID has: changed its approach to poverty, changed its approach to security and conflict and adopted security concerns related to the WoT in its discourse. Leading on from this is a discussion of DfID’s engagement with Human Security. Lastly is a conclusion discussing the broader implications of this research.
The Securitisation of Development Aid Post-9/11

The Security-Development Nexus as Human Security

The connection between security and development is not a recent phenomenon. The broadening of security discourse to include human development concerns has been apparent since the 1990s. The principle aim of Human Security was to place the individual as the referent object of security and not the state (Newman 2001: 239; UNDP 1994). Fundamental to this was the realisation that war was increasingly taking place within the boundaries of states and that inter-state war was on the decline. These wars could not be confined within their state boundaries and destabilised whole regions through refugee flows and spill-over violence (UN 1999; Kerr 2007: 93). The concept of Human Security arose as a means to address these complex conflicts by dealing with the root causes to human insecurity that eventually lead to violence (Henk 2005; Kerr 2007: 93). The concept is split between those who favour a narrow approach focusing on immediate threats to safety and a broad approach that includes more systemic long term threats to security (King and Murray 2002: 591; McCormack 2011: 101). There is a debate about the usefulness of the concept of human security and the manner in which states have engaged with it (Duffield and Waddell 2006; Ambrosetti 2008; Chandler 2008; McArthur 2008; Owen 2008; Wibben 2008). As the concept is so broad, it can be readily be co-opted by states through a reference to part of this broad agenda (Chandler 2008: 430). By
selectively drawing on certain parts and ignoring other parts of this broad agenda, the impression is created that states now subscribe to a new paradigm of security focusing on the individual. Furthermore, continued involvement in conventional state-centric security issues can be framed as part of a Human Security agenda through this selective engagement with the subject. This paper examines DfID’s engagement with the concept of Human Security in greater detail.

It has been argued that the idea of merging security and development goals found the coherence it previously lacked following 9/11 (Duffield 2006; Howell and Lind 2009). With the attacks on New York and Washington, by al Qaeda, the chaotic environment of a ‘failed state’ was seen as providing a haven for international terrorist organisations and an ideal ground for terrorist recruitment (Tschirgi 2006: 50). As a result, chronic problems of underdevelopment were perceived as a threat to international security. It has been argued by academics and development actors that, rather than attracting greater finance and attention for development issues in their own right, development concerns have been subsumed by security concerns (Waddell 2006; Duffield 2006, 2010). While Human Security sought to acquire a larger budget and greater political attention for development issues by framing them as security issues, it seems that instead development projects have been used for military purposes since 9/11. For example, it is argued that the US’s President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) prioritised treating the military in Nigeria rather than citizens (Ingram 2007: 516). This article seeks to build on this literature through an in-depth study of the UK.
Security in DfID’s Development Policy

There is disagreement in the literature around DfID’s engagement with security post-9/11. On the one hand Fitz-Gerald (2006: 118), Waddell (2006: 543-546) and Youngs (2007: 11) argue that DfID has maintained a firm stance on poverty alleviation over security concerns to the point of clashing with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) over projects that prioritised foreign policy over poverty alleviation. However, as Howell and Lind (2009: 1288) point out, rather than a renewed poverty focus, a clear shift of development spending to meet WoT demands can be seen in the status of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan as DfID’s top recipients, whereas prior to 2001 they were not in the top 20 recipients. Indeed as Table 1 shows, DfID’s engagement in so-called fragile or failed states and strategic states in the war on terror has increased significantly over the period under investigation. The frontline WoT states of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are consistently among DfID’s top 10 recipients following 2001. In addition states identified as conflict affected and fragile such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan are also among DfID’s top 10 recipients over this time.

In addition, both Denny (2011) and Krogstad (2012) are critical of DfID’s engagement with the security sector in Sierra Leone arguing that while state security has been bolstered, the security needs of individuals have on been adequately addressed. Studies on DfID’s policy discourse have produced conflicting results, with some commentators arguing that developing countries are seen as a source of insecurity to the West and that development aid is now used as a conflict resolution tool to shape the behaviour of African states so that they conform to liberal values of
the free market economy and democracy (Abrahamsen 2004; Duffield and Waddell 2006; Stern and Öjendal 2010). Others claim that DfID’s leading principle is that the security of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable is of utmost importance and should be prioritised over the security of Western donor countries (Beall et al 2006: 58; Wild and Elhawary 2012).

None of the existing studies on DfID’s policy discourse examine its key policy documents over an extended period of time. Although the contributions of Abrahamsen (2004, 2005) analysing the public speeches of key state officials, Duffield and Waddell (2006) who draw on interviews with DfID officials and Stern and Öjendal (2010) and Beall et al (2006) who examine excerpts of DfID’s 2005 security document offer interesting insights into the subject, they focus on particular moments in time and so lack the perspective offered by covering an extended period of time. This article complements this work through an analysis of DfID White Paper publications from 1997, 2000, 2006 and 2009 in addition to the aid policy review document from the Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition government from 2011 and DfID’s Security documents from 1999 and 2005. The choice of documents represents all the White Papers published by DfID since it was established, the first major aid policy statement from the coalition government elected in 2010 and DfID’s two security documents to date.

Two levels of analysis are employed. Firstly a content analysis gives a broad picture of patterns of word use within the documents. The terms ‘poor’ and ‘poverty’ are chosen as reflective of a pro-poor development focus, whereas the terms ‘security’ and ‘terrorism’ are taken to imply a conventional hard security focus. The terms
‘human rights’ or ‘stability’ could be considered to reflect either development or security concerns. As the words ‘poverty’ and ‘security’ can be used in multiple contexts, so in order to capture this, different variations of these words are counted. As Tables 2 and 3 show, for ‘poverty’ different variants of ‘poverty elimination’ and the more qualified ‘poverty reduction’ are also counted. Similarly the count for ‘security’ is separated out into conventional security, ‘human security’ and ‘security sector reform’ as a way of capturing the different ways in which security is used. In addition to this, the word ‘security’ is not counted when it refers to something clearly outside of conventional security - for example the term ‘social security’. The term ‘development’ was initially considered as being indicative of a strong poverty focus. However, the word was used in such a high frequency across all documents that it was not considered to be revealing of any patterns or deeper meaning.

On the basis of the results of the content analysis, a discourse analysis is conducted across sections of text that contrast across the documents. These two methods are complementary, with the content analysis allowing precise measurement of changes in words used across documents that the more detailed discourse analysis misses. In turn, the discourse analysis allows a more detailed examination of the way in which words are used in context which a content analysis misses. The sections are laid out with the broader pattern shown by the content analysis discussed first, followed by the more detailed discourse analysis. In total, this analysis covers 536,038 words over 550 pages of text. The findings of this analysis are presented below. Table 2 shows the frequency of key security and development terms across all documents. Table 3 shows these counts as a percentage of the words counted for each document to allow comparison across documents of uneven length.
Defining the Concepts of ‘Security’ and ‘Development’

The terms ‘development’ and ‘security’ both have numerous different meanings (Stern and Öjendal 2010: 6). In its 1997 White Paper, DfID deals with the problem of the contested meaning of development by narrowing it down to poverty elimination. In this way the different interpretations of the concept of development can be narrowed down to whether it benefited the poor or not. Similarly, from 1997 to 2000, security is framed as being focused on the poorest, which is consistent with the concept of Human Security. This focused approach changes post 9/11. The 2005 document places security on an equal footing with other development issues and further includes terrorism, fragile states and radicalism as security, and therefore development issues. As a result, DfID’s definition of security loses clarity. The 2006 White Paper gives significant attention to the relationship between security and development. The overt statement that ‘Without security there cannot be development’ (DfID 2006: 37) is not matched by an explicit statement that the reverse is also true. In other words, development is a precondition for security. Placing the issue of security in the primary position before development shows a significant shift from the poverty focus to security of the first two White Papers from 1997 and 2000. This shift will be demonstrated below.

Redefining the Approach to Poverty

The main title of all four of DfID’s White Papers is Eliminating World Poverty. The term is an unambiguous statement of DfID’s approach to global poverty. As outlined
in Table 2, the 1997 White Paper reflects this. In 52 of 110 instances that poverty is mentioned it is referred to in terms of ‘eliminating’ poverty. The more muted and qualified term ‘poverty reduction’ is only mentioned nine times. However, in the subsequent White Paper published in 2000 there is a shift to talking about poverty in terms of ‘reduction’ and not ‘elimination’. Of the 147 times ‘poverty’ is mentioned only seven refer to ‘elimination’ and 81 refer to ‘reduction’. This change continues post 9/11 with only five and six references to poverty elimination in 2006 and 2009 respectively, as set out in Table 2. Further to this, as Table 3 shows, mention of poverty reduction falls as percentage of words counted from a high of 14 % in 2000 to less than 1 % in 2011. Overall this shows a redefinition of DfID’s ambition towards poverty away from ‘elimination’ to the more limited ‘reduction’ and, following this, a decline in the amount of times poverty is mentioned in the context of any specific goal, be it elimination or reduction.

It is worth noting that the 2006 document mentions ‘poverty elimination’ the same amount of times as ‘terrorism’, and only twice more than ‘radicalisation’. In the 2009 document it is mentioned one time less than ‘terrorism’ and twice more than ‘radicalisation’, as shown in Table 2. The equal attention given to both terrorism and poverty elimination in a development policy document specifically to do with eliminating poverty demonstrates a clear example of the merging of security and development during the WoT.

Beall, Goodfellow and Putzel (2006: 61) argue that the 2005 strategy paper is a proactive attempt to define the relationship by insisting that the only justification for DfID getting involved in security issues is if it is of benefit to the poor. Whilst this is
a valid interpretation of the 2005 document, the benefit of also assessing the White Papers published before and after this strategy paper shows a pattern in DfID’s policy discourse on security. As will be demonstrated further below, over the period of the late 1990s to the late 2000s there has been a widening of what DfID defines as involvement in security to include issues of international security with only an indirect link to poverty. In the 2009 White Paper, poverty is placed as the cause of a number of international security problems such as terrorism, political extremism and fragile states. In this way DfID can claim to be maintaining a poverty focus while at the same time allowing issues such as terrorism to be included in its policy, as the connection has been made with development and poverty.

**Security as a Development Concern**

*Connecting Development to Security before 9/11*

As Table 3 shows, conflict appears as a development issue in the first two White Papers, counting for 8 % and 9 % of the words counted for 1997 and 2000 respectively. However, post 9/11 this increases significantly with 17 % and 18 % in the 2006 and 2009 white papers respectively, before falling slightly to 13 % in the 2011 policy review. This pattern is repeated in the security documents with a count of 14 % in 1999 rising to 22 % in 2005, as can be seen in Table 3. Rather than an abrupt change following 9/11, the increase in space given to conflict in documents can be viewed as a continuation of an earlier trend seen between the 1997 and 2000 documents, as is the case with the decline in the use of the term ‘poverty reduction’.
Analysing the discourse across these documents the increasing space given to security even prior to 9/11 is readily apparent. There is no mention of the merging of security and development in the 1997 White Paper, but the way in which security is mentioned in the 1999 document is very specific and places definite limits on the relationship between development aid and security.

We can only work where there are legitimate civilian authorities with the capacity to control the security forces, who recognise the need for reform and want our assistance and are ready to play an active part in the process. (DfID 1999: 2).

This shows a commitment to working in the area of security, but only in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and on the conditions of civilian oversight and the accountability of armed forces. It is also asserted that SSR programmes must primarily benefit the poor (DfID 1999: 3). The limits for DfID’s involvement in security are set at the poorest being the focus of the policy and sufficient civilian oversight of the armed forces.

In addition, DfID distances itself from getting involved in traditional hard security concerns for fear of development goals being subverted.

The underlying assumption should be that development funds will not be used for such activities, which primarily involve sector-wide programmes of assistance to the uniformed security forces or intelligence services……they carry an especially strong likelihood that development objectives will be seen as secondary or alternatively displaced by other objectives. (DfID 1999: 6).
Taken together this shows that DfID’s pre-9/11 relationship with security is limited specifically to SSR, only on the condition that the poor would benefit most and that there was adequate civilian control of the military, so as to avoid abuses. This can be viewed in the broader context of the creation of Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) by the British government which involved DfID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the MoD collaborating on conflict resolution projects (Fitz-Gerald 2006: 114). As the UK’s development agency was formerly a part of the FCO prior to the founding of DfID there would understandably be tension in a collaboration between them (Young 1999: 263). When viewed in this light the 1999 document could be a case of DfID proactively defining its relationship to security services in a very specific and limited way.

The 2000 White Paper also places limits on DfID’s involvement in security, focuses on SSR and asserts that the poorest and most vulnerable must be the referent object of security. There is recognition that security forces that are not democratically accountable are often a source of insecurity for ordinary people (DfID 2000: 23), and that overspending on security detracts from development (DfID 2000: 30). There is no specific mention of the security of Western states as a justification for DfID’s involvement in security. Taken together this tells us that DfID’s position on security pre-9/11, consistent with Human Security, was clearly defined as supporting SSR for the benefit of poor people in developing countries and was designed to be separate from traditional hard security concerns due to the danger of development goals being subverted. This position changes after 9/11.
Following 9/11 DfID broadens its definition of security to include conventional state-centric security issues as well as Human Security issues. The first document in this sample published after 9/11, the 2005 security document, shows a marked difference from the earlier approach.

Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as they need clean water, schooling or affordable health. In recent years, DFID has begun to bring security into the heart of its thinking and practice. But we need to do more. As the Prime Minister said in his speech to the World Economic Forum this year, “it is absurd to choose between an agenda focusing on terrorism and one on global poverty”. (DfID 2005: 3).

Security is now placed in the same category as clean water, education and healthcare. This significantly broadens DfID’s involvement in security matters beyond the pre-9/11 focus on SSR. It also shows a reversal of the Human Security agenda which seeks to gain more attention for development issues by framing them as security issues, as discussed above. Now, instead of development problems being framed as security problems and therefore deserving of the same urgency and attention, security is instead portrayed as a development issue. The assertion that ‘we need to do more’ suggests an opening up of DfID’s involvement in security which previously had specific limits placed upon it.

In addition there is an overt conflation of the goals of development aid and the WoT, with the fight against poverty being equated with the WoT. This statement is balanced
by restating the commitment to keep the poorest as the focus of security policies; ‘Promoting the security of the poor is, however, not the same thing as promoting the security of states’ (DfID 2005: 5), and reasserting that development goals will not be subsumed into security considerations; ‘But this does not mean that aid should be put at the service of global security. Poverty reduction is a UK and an international goal in its own right’ (DfID 2005: 13). DfID also tries to distance itself from traditional hard security concerns; ‘Security concerns should not be a justification for allowing violations of human rights’ (DfID 2005: 15). This leads to a less coherent approach to security and development than in either the 1999 security document or the 2000 White Paper. Whilst security is placed as a development priority the same as clean water or education, how it will be achieved and in what circumstances DfID can get involved are far less clear.

This theme of merging security and development is continued in the 2006 White Paper. For the first time in a DfID White Paper the relationship is expressed explicitly ‘Security is a precondition for development’, and again, ‘Without security there cannot be development’ (DfID 2006: 45). However, the reverse of this assertion, that development is a precondition for security, is not stated. In addition, the conditions mentioned in the 2005 document are not reiterated in the 2006 White Paper (DfID 2006: 47). There is no mention of conditions regarding adequate civilian oversight, democratic accountability and a clear poverty-focused justification.

The conditions attached to DfID’s involvement in security in the 2005 security document are complex, such as a state strong enough to administer services, but not dictatorial and unaccountable and with sufficient civilian oversight of the armed
forces, and specifically for the benefit of the poorest. From this a contradiction emerges where security is placed at the same level as access to clean water or healthcare, although these are taken as absolutes, security has a number of conditions attached to it. This shows the difficulty of DfID merging development and security concerns; the relationship between security and development is accepted, but there is an awareness of the controversy surrounding it in the development community and the potential for misuse of development funds on military spending at the cost of the most vulnerable. So, on the one hand, the interdependence of security and development is accepted, but on the other, there is an attempt to restrict and limit the conditions where DfID will become involved in security spending. This position changes again in the 2006 White Paper with a definitive statement on the primacy of security in this relationship, without a reiteration of the conditions attached to DfID’s involvement in security. This shows the complexity of DfID trying to bring a broader definition of security, which conflicts with its earlier focus on the well-being of the individual, into its development policy. This removes the contradictions that exist in the 2005 document, but also the more nuanced understanding of security, and results in DfID accepting security as part of its development policy without condition.

This acceptance of security as an absolute coincides with a broadening of what DfID considers to be a security issue and a connection of poverty to international security threats such as terrorism and political extremism. The increasing space given to security in successive DfID policy documents is a reflection of the institutional changes within the UK government over this period. This saw increased collaboration between DfID and the foreign policy (FCO) and military (MoD) institutions of government post-9/11. From assisting postconflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone in
2002 through SSR programmes to direct involvement in military exercises through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Stabilisation Units in Iraq and Afghanistan, DfID’s direct involvement in national security issues has increased dramatically since 9/11. In addition, as highlighted above in Table 1, DfID has also increased its spending on these frontline states in the WoT. Over this period DfID increasingly uses language associated with the WoT. This is reflected in the context in which new terms are used following 9/11.

**Fighting Poverty to fight Terrorism**

The content analysis shows that the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘fragile state’ appear only in the documents published post 9/11. ‘Radicalisation’ appears three and four times in the 2006 and the 2009 White Papers respectively, once in the 2011 policy document and once in the 2005 security document, as can be seen in Table 2. Whilst the numbers are relatively small, their presence in a development policy document is noteworthy. The term ‘fragile state’ is mentioned four times in the 2005 security document 18 times in the 2006 White Paper, 46 times in the 2009 White Paper and twice in the 2011 policy document. The term ‘terrorism’ could be put in this category too as it appears only once before 9/11, in the 2000 White Paper, whereas in the 2005 security document it appears 25 times, in the 2006 and 2009 White Papers it appears five and seven times respectively and once in the 2011 policy document. Taken together ‘radicalisation’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘fragile states’ can be taken to represent increased security concerns in the wake of the WoT. The increasing concern with ‘failed states’, such as Afghanistan following 9/11, the concern with political extremism and radicalisation and the focus on terrorism as a threat to international
security are all part of UK and US foreign policy in the WoT. These concerns are not just confined to policy documents and are reflected in DfID’s development spending. As discussed above, Table 1 shows that DfID’s has prioritised fragile states and frontline states in the WoT in its ODA spending over this period. The presence of these terms in DfID’s documents reflects a change as greater space is now given to foreign policy concerns within development policy documents.

**Terrorism, Failed States and Radicalism as Development Problems in the WoT**

The only mention of terrorism prior to 9/11 is in the 2000 White Paper. As mentioned above, words associated with security and development can have different meanings depending on the context in which they are used. Here ‘terrorism’ is mentioned as one of a number of international security threats such as environmental degradation that are caused or made worse by poverty (DfID 2000: 7). This presents a justification for tackling poverty by providing a solution for numerous international problems. Of these issues, terrorism is portrayed as one of many problems, but not the sole or even main concern.

The way terrorism is framed as a development problem changes significantly after 9/11. As mentioned above, the foreword to the 2005 document states that the fight against global poverty and terrorism are inseparable (DfID 2005: 3). This position is justified by connecting poverty and insecurity to terrorism; ‘Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for conflict and the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism’ (DfID 2005: 5). In this statement the connection is made between poverty, fragile states and
terrorism. Similar to the term ‘terrorism’, ‘fragile/failed states’ are not mentioned in any of the pre-9/11 documents. As the above quote shows, when the term is used it is as a conduit that connects poverty and underdevelopment to terrorism. This is shown again in highlighting Afghanistan, the source of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the focal point for the launch of the WoT, as a fragile state (DfID 2005: 8). DfID’s emphasis on common interest can be seen in the way the 2005 strategy paper highlights the impact of terrorism on developing countries (DfID 2005: 7). In this way the argument is constructed that terrorism is caused by poverty, so therefore fighting poverty will fight terrorism and also terrorism impacts on developing countries directly, so therefore fighting terrorism can help to fight poverty.

There is a reassertion of DfID’s pro-poor focus; ‘This does not mean subordinating poverty reduction to short term political interests or to work on antiterrorism’ (DfID 2005: 6). However, there remains a contradiction in the 2005 document, where the fight against terrorism is framed as being inseparable from the fight against poverty, yet it disregards the political realities of the WoT by stating that DfID will not allow its poverty focused agenda to be subverted by antiterrorism activities. The 2006 document frames the issue of civil conflict as an international security risk because of how it connects to terrorism, ‘And violent conflict and insecurity can spill over into neighbouring countries and provide cover for terrorists or organised criminal groups’ (DfID 2006: 45). Conflict is now not only a development concern but also an international security concern because it can create havens for terrorists. The 2009 White Paper makes the connection between poverty and terrorism once again by stating that ‘More effective states in poorer countries could make it more difficult for
terrorist organisations to recruit from, train in and transit those countries’ (DfID 2009: 17).

Both the 2006 and 2009 White Papers connect poverty to terrorism and other development problems of fragile states and radicalisation. When fragile states are mentioned, in the 2006 White Paper, Somalia and Afghanistan are cited as specific examples, firstly as a source of poverty (DfID 2006: 7), and secondly as providing a haven for terrorists; ‘They (terrorists) exploit poverty and exclusion in order to tap into popular discontent – taking advantage of fragile states such as Somalia, or undemocratic regimes such as in Afghanistan in the 1990s, to plan violence’ (DfID 2006: 47). The use of these two examples; Afghanistan - the source of the 9/11 attacks, and Somalia - where Islamic terrorists in Africa are expected to be operating (Ingram 2007: 520), is revealing. For example, both Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire were ranked higher than Afghanistan and Somalia in a list of the top 10 failed states in 2006 (The Fund for Peace 2006) and both suffer from extreme poverty, yet neither state is mentioned. For a development policy document to reference two strategically important states in the WoT as examples of failed states demonstrates a merging of security and development concerns in DfID’s policy discourse. The 2009 White Paper also makes the connection between fragile states, poverty, political extremism and terrorism: ‘State failure and radicalisation such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan has brought terror to New York and London as well as Mumbai and Islamabad’(DfID 2009: 15-16). This excerpt is revealing as it connects state failure to terrorist attacks both in Western states and in developing countries, making the connection between ‘their’ security and ‘our’ security. The connection is also made between state failure, radicalisation and terrorism. This shows a blurring of the boundaries between hard
security concerns of the WoT and development goals. This is done by connecting:
poverty, to security of the poorest, to state failure, to terrorism to UK national
security.

The use of the term ‘radicalisation’ stands out as curious in a development document.
The first mention is in the 2005 strategy paper with a reference to failures of
governance leading to radicalisation which is dangerous because it can provide a
haven for terrorists (DfID 2005: 12). The 2006 White Paper again connects the fight
against poverty and radicalisation: ‘Fighting poverty and social exclusion through
better governance therefore contributes to security – locally and internationally – and
helps to reduce the potential for radicalisation or extreme political violence’ (DfID
2006: 47). The 2009 White Paper builds on this and frames radicalism as a threat to
international security ‘Weak government and feelings of exclusion become breeding
grounds for resentment and radicalism, threatening peace and security around the
world’ (DfID 2009: 16). In this case, radicalisation is not connected directly to
terrorism, but is a threat to peace and security at a global level. The 2011 document
takes this further by stating that extremism is a development problem that ‘might
otherwise arrive on our streets’ (DfID 2011: 36). This is significant as it shows a shift
from radicalisation not being mentioned as a development problem, to associating it
with terrorism in 2005, to framing it as a problem within states that can be helped by
development policies and SSR in 2006, to expressing radicalisation as an international
security issue in 2009 and 2011. The references to ‘radicalisation’, relatively few
though they are, are revealing of DfID’s development policy. By 2009 it is placed not
just as a threat to development in poorer countries but as a threat to international
security which will ‘bring terror’ to ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Development as National Security

A key question within the merging of security and development is whose security takes priority? One of Rita Abrahamsen’s (2004, 2005) criticisms of the UK’s development policy is that ‘our’ security in the West takes priority over ‘their’ security in the developing world. This approach is evident in the 2009 White Paper. Prior to 2009, connections between security in the developing world and security in the West are expressed in the positive sense with the framing of poverty elimination as a moral duty that will provide a safer future for ‘us all’ (DfID 1997: Introduction, DfID 2000: 6, DfID 2006: 6). The connection of eliminating poverty and a more secure world for future generations is aspirational rather than fearful. The justification of creating a world without mass poverty is that it will create a safer future for us as well.

However, in the 2009 White Paper there is a change to expressing the connection between their security and our security in terms of fear and danger. Here the connection is made between instability and radicalisation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and global security (DfID 2009: 80), specifically terrorist attacks on Western states: ‘State failure and radicalisation such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan has brought terror to New York and London as well as Mumbai and Islamabad’ (DfID 2009: 15-16). The connection of ‘our’ security to instability in the developing world is not in the same aspirational tone of the previous White Papers. The overt portrayal of instability in the developing world as a direct threat to the developed world and the repeated use of Afghanistan as an example both indicate a move away from an approach based on
compassion and humanitarianism towards one based on fear. The emotive use of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks to demonstrate the connection between ‘them’ and ‘us’ shows a marked change in tone from the other documents and represents a further entrenchment of WoT concerns in DfID’s policy discourse in the 2009 White Paper. This continues from the Labour government to the coalition government with the 2011 aid review document making overt connections between development problems and UK national security (DfID 2011: 2; 36). In addition to this a 2010 leaked memo from the newly formed UK National Security Council (NSC) stated that development aid should make a maximum possible contribution to UK national security (Watt 2010). This overt connection made between development and national security shows a dramatic shift from the approach of the pre-911 period and is likely a consequence of broader foreign policy pressures on DfID. Overall, this shift in DfID’s discourse is best understood through the manner in which it engages with the concept of Human Security.

**Turning Human Security on its Head**

David Chandler (2008: 430) argues that Human Security does not represent a direct counterpoint to realist, state-centric security as is often claimed and that the two positions overlap significantly. As a result, he argues, Human Security has been adopted into mainstream policy quite readily and Human Security advocates themselves have portrayed a realist self-interest angle to Human Security as the best strategy to bring security to the international system (Chandler 2008: 430). The broad nature of human security and the contested nature of the concept between the broad and narrow schools means it can easily be co-opted by governments (Chandler 2008:
Human Security appeals to states for three reasons according to Chandler. Firstly, it exaggerates new security threats in the WoT. Secondly, it facilitates short term policy making divorced from policy outcome. And thirdly it locates the source of Western insecurity in the developing world (Chandler 2008: 428). Similarly, Duffield and Waddell describe Human Security as a way in which Western governments and institutions ‘categorise, separate and act upon Southern populations’, rather than an objective achievable policy (Duffield and Waddell 2006: 2). Examining DfID’s relationship to Human Security best explains the increased space given to security issues in DfID’s policy discourse pre-9/11. The goal of placing development issues as security issues was seen as a way for developing states to gain greater attention and urgency for development concerns by placing them in global security discussions post-9/11 (Chandler 2008: 429). DfID’s statement that security is now a development concern the same as access to clean water or education (DfID 2005: 3) sees a complete reversal of this agenda. Instead of development concerns being dealt with as security issues, now security has been accepted by DfID as part of its development agenda.

A closer examination of DfID’s use of the term Human Security reveals a complex relationship between security and development. The sole reference to Human Security in the 1999 security policy statement makes a clear distinction between conventional security and Human Security:

> Activities which provide direct assistance to the uniformed security forces may contain the risk that the support may be used to facilitate or legitimise activities which do not contribute to an improvement in human security but
instead lead to abuses of human rights by strengthening or legitimising the power of the security forces. (DfID 1999: 6).

Here the conditions of providing assistance to the armed forces are conditional upon Human Security needs being met specifically as distinct from the needs of the state, which has in the past been a source of insecurity to its own citizens. The term Human Security does not appear in any of DfID’s White Papers. The only other time it appears in the sample examined is in the 2005 Security Strategy Paper. The first mention is in reference to the need for closer collaboration between security and development actors in order to address threats to human security. This representation of Human Security shows a particular interpretation of the concept - that is the necessity to merge development and security actors - which is very much in accordance with the narrow approach. This is consistent with Chandler’s arguments on the selective use of the concept.

The other reference in the 2005 strategy paper deals with the issue of tension arising from the merging of security and development agendas.

Nor will DFID open programmes in countries on the basis of UK or global security considerations alone – there would have to be a prior and compelling poverty reduction case. But we and other development agencies can support programmes that enhance the human security of the poor in developing countries, and, in so doing, benefit everyone’s safety, whether rich or poor. (DfID 2005:23)

The case is made to separate out DfID’s development concerns from foreign policy
considerations. The justification is the focus on Human Security, which will benefit the lives of all citizens. This is the last reference to Human Security in the chosen sample and does state the primary goal as being the safety of ordinary citizens. However, it does not correspond to the broad school’s focus on long term chronic problems that lead to insecurity; rather it still maintains the narrow focus on immediate threats to safety. The term is put forward as both a justification for a closer relationship between security and development actors and as a restriction on the extent of this relationship.

_Talking Around Human Security without Mentioning it_

Whilst there is no mention of the term Human Security in the subsequent White Papers, the 2009 White Paper does refer to many of the facets of the concept indirectly. When security is mentioned there is a consistent reference to ordinary citizens as the referent object: ‘Above all, we have put ordinary women, men and children first’ (DFID 2009: 7). This can be seen again;

> Delivering access to security and justice for ordinary people is at the heart of ensuring that our aid is both effective and does not ignore some of the most immediate threats to poor people’s lives. (DFID 2009: 75).

Placing the individual rather than the state as the referent object of security exemplifies the Human Security agenda. As with the 2005 document, the emphasis is on immediate threats to individual’s security corresponding to the narrow school, but the referent object of security is ordinary people and not the state. This focus on
ordinary citizens draws on the central principle of Human Security, but without actually mentioning it. Again, the Human Security agenda of focusing on ordinary citizens is used as a restriction on the relationship between security and development and at the same time as a justification for a closer relationship between the two.

This collective reference to Human Security as a restriction on DfID’s involvement in security is undermined by the inclusion of a WoT hard security agenda with the focus on failed states, terrorism and radicalism. The statement that the WoT and the war on poverty are inseparable (DfID 2005: 3) broadens the scope of DfID’s involvement in security to such an extent that the continued assertion of prioritising the poor loses meaning. Rather than security concerns taking into account development issues, DfID – a development agency - has given increased attention to hard security issues such as failed states and radicalism and has framed security and terrorism as development issues.

A look at DfID sectoral spending over this period suggests that the issues discussed in this paper are not just confined to policy discourse. As Table 4 below indicates, a programme dedicated to ‘conflict, peace, and security’ was established by DfID in 2006. While there are limitations in using sectoral spending as an indicator of changed practice, it is worth comparing spending on ‘conflict, peace and security’ with other key sectors identified as on a par with security in DfID policy - ‘basic healthcare’, ‘basic education’, and ‘water and sanitation’. As Table 4 shows, for the years 2008-2010 spending on ‘conflict, peace and security’ was greater than either of these other traditional core development sectors. Whilst this is only a tentative finding, it shows that issues of security are not only prominent in DfID’s policy
discourse, but are present in the sectors that DfID spends in and in the countries that receive aid.

Conclusion

This article argues that DfID has co-opted the main tenets of Human Security in order to justify its increased involvement in hard security concerns. This analysis is congruent with the arguments of Abrahamsen (2004, 2005), Duffield and Waddell (2006) and Stern and Öjendal (2010) that in bringing security into development policy, DfID has prioritised hard security concerns rather than maintaining a firm poverty reduction stance. It is also consistent with the work of Chandler (2008) on how states engage with the concept of Human Security. Instead of gaining greater recognition for development problems by framing them as security problems, the reverse has happened with DfID including hard security issues, such as terrorism and radicalism, as development problems. Pre-9/11 DfID advances a normative case for development as providing a better future for ‘us all’. However, the shift from a humanitarian perspective to one based on fear can be seen in the emotive example of terrorist attacks on London and New York originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan used in the 2009 White Paper to connect instability in the developing world to insecurity in the developed world. By 2011, action in relation to development problems is no longer framed as a moral obligation. Instead, development problems are framed as a source of fear and insecurity for the West. By framing security as a development problem, a range of perceived threats to national security can be addressed through development policies and justified through the discourse of Human
Security focusing on the poorest and most vulnerable. This shift is not just confined to policy discourse and can be seen in the introduction of a spending sector for ‘conflict, peace and security’, in 2006, which has received significant funds and the consistent presence of frontline WoT states in the top 10 recipients of DfID’s aid over this period of time.

This research has implications for understanding the relationship between security and development and how state development agencies engage with it. NGOs and development practitioners support for a closer relationship between security and development rested on the assumption that it would lead to greater attention and resources for core development problems – security-sized budgets to resolve development problems. Advocates for the relationship within the academic literature drew on the same assumption to frame the closer relationship as a ‘virtuous cycle’ that would lead to greater security and development (Stewart 2004, Picciotto 2004). However, this paper demonstrates that in the case of DfID, security has been defined broadly and hard security concerns such as terrorism and religious extremism have now been prioritised as development problems. This research highlights the difficulty for NGOs in engaging with development and security. Without a clear definition what type of security and who it is to benefit, development goals could easily by side-lined.

Likewise, with the concept of Human Security, instead of states’ engagement with the concept being viewed as acceptance that will come to developmentalise security, instead a development agency has adopted some of its main tenets in a manner which securitises development. The abandonment by DfID of its pre-9/11, minimalist involvement in security, where democratic accountability of security forces and the
protection of the poor were paramount, is a regressive step. In a time of increasing
economic and social instability in both the developing and developed world, where
insecurity is often underpinned by economic, social and political marginalisation
(World Bank, 2011), prioritising hard security concerns is unlikely to resolve these
problems. A return to DfID’s original principles on involvement in security is more
likely to bring greater security and development for the most vulnerable in the
developing world.

Endnotes

1 When the term ‘security’ is mentioned in this article it refers to traditional or hard security. Softer
definitions of security such as Security Sector Reform or Human Security will be mentioned
specifically.

2 The White Papers chosen for analysis are; Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st
Century published in 1997, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor
published in 2000, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor published in

3 The policy document from 2011 is entitled UK aid: Changing Lives, delivering results.

4 The security documents chosen for analysis are the 1999 policy statement titled Poverty and the
Security Sector and the 2005 strategy paper on security titled Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World:
A Strategy for Security and Development.
List of References


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1 Source OECD DAC
### Table 2: Frequency of Usage of Key Security and Development Terms in DFID Documents Sampled from 1997-2011

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### Table 3: Frequency of Usage of Key Security and Development Terms in DFIDs Documents from 1997-2011 Shown as a Percentage of Words Counted per Document

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Table 4 Selected DFID Sector Spending 1997-2011

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2 Source OECD DAC