“Sociedade civil? Somos todos nós!”:
Civil Society, Development and Social Transformation in Mozambique

By

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Thesis submitted for the award of the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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external)

March 2017
Declaration

I hereby certify that this material which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) is entirely my own work, and that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

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Date: 09.03.2017
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The submission of this thesis provides the opportunity to thank several people and friends, who have contributed in different ways and to whom I am sincerely grateful.

This thesis has been a long journey involving a lot of reflection and interaction in and between the three countries to which I regularly travelled: Mozambique, Germany and Ireland. I would never have come to an end without the support, encouragement and inspiration of a number of people, in particular my first supervisor, Prof. Ronaldo Munck (Dublin City University). He has been very supportive and motivating throughout and knew well how to work through the challenges and my wish to link practical experience with research and theory. Furthermore I would like to thank the members of the supervisory team, Prof. John Doyle (Dublin City University) and Prof. Ulrich Bartosch (Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, external). Both have been available whenever I needed their support. I also want to thank Natalja Matease for her invaluable assistance and technical support.

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However, I am particularly appreciative for their engagement and readiness to share their experiences and knowledge. I am aware that the critical perspective, analysis and conclusions drawn from my work may challenge and provoke some political actors but wish that the perspectives I describe, would become relevant for them, in order to develop alternative views and envision new strategies for political action.

I am especially grateful to my family who encouraged me and who were incredibly patient. They were always very close to me and encouraged me even via Skype and WhatsApp during long field trips to Mozambique. Abdul furthermore enriched my writing with his deep knowledge about the political and economic development of Mozambique. Thank you for your continuous support.

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I dedicate this thesis to my mum who passed away in the middle of my research. She educated me with her critical social mind that inspired me to examine civil society, development and social transformation in Mozambique in the way I did it.
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### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAAJC</td>
<td>Associação de Apoio e Assistência Jurídica às Comunidades (Association for Legal Support and Advisory to Communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADECRU</td>
<td>Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais (Academic Action for the Development of Rural Communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGP</td>
<td>Acordo Geral de Paz (General Peace Agreement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMETRAMO</td>
<td>Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique (Association of Traditional Healers of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVODEMO</td>
<td>A Voz do Deserto de Moçambique (The Voice of the Desert of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWID</td>
<td>Association for Women in Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDL</td>
<td>Comité de Desenvolvimento Local (Local Development Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREMO</td>
<td>Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDJPN</td>
<td>Comissão Diocesana da Justiça e Paz de Nampula (Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission Nampula)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDL</td>
<td>Conselho de Desenvolvimento Local (Local Development Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAM</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Moçambique (Armed Forces of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade (Foundation for Community Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Fundo Distrital de Desenvolvimento (District Development Fund)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>Força de Intervenção Rápida (Rapid Response Force)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONAGNI</td>
<td>Fórum das Organizações Não Governamentais de Niassa (Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations from Niassa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONGZA</td>
<td>Fórum das ONGs de Zambézia (Forum of NGOs from Zambézia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoM</td>
<td>Government of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>Government Organized NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUMO</td>
<td>Grupo Unido de Moçambique (United Group of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>IESE</td>
<td>Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (Institute for Social and Economic Studies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Finance Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional da Estatística (National Statistic’s Institute)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Instituição de Participação e Consulta Comunitária (Institution for Community Participation and Consultation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japanese Government Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDH</td>
<td>Liga dos Direitos Humanos (Human Rights League)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASC</td>
<td>Mecanismo de Apoio a Sociedade Civil (Civil Society Support Mechanism)</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDM</td>
<td>Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (Democratic Movement of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multi-national Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFEZA</td>
<td>Núcleo de Associações Femininas de Zambézia (Movement of Women’s</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Associations of Zambézia)</td>
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<td>NESAM</td>
<td>Núcleo dos Estudantes Secundários de Moçambique (Movement of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Secondary Students of Mozambique)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>New Policy Agenda</td>
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<td>OMR</td>
<td>Observatório do Meio Rural (Observatory of Rural Areas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Observatório da Pobreza (Poverty Observatory)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza (Action Plan for Poverty</td>
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<td>Reduction)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARPA</td>
<td>Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta (Action Plan for the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reduction of Absolute Poverty)</td>
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<td>PEDD</td>
<td>Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Distrito (Strategic District</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Development Plan)</td>
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<td>PERPU</td>
<td>Programa para a Redução da Pobreza Urbana (Strategic Urban Poverty</td>
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<td>Reduction Programme)</td>
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<td>PPFD</td>
<td>Programa de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas (Programme for</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decentralized Planning and Financing)</td>
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<td>PROSC</td>
<td>Plataforma Provincial das Organizações da Sociedade Civil de Nampula</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Provincial platform of civil society organizations from Nampula)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADEZA</td>
<td>Rede das Organizações para Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Comunitário</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustentável de Zambézia (Network of Environmental and Sustainable</td>
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<td>Community Development Organizations from Zambézia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SISE</td>
<td>Serviço de Informação e Segurança do Estado (State Security Service)</td>
</tr>
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<td>STAE</td>
<td>Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral (Technical Secretariat</td>
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<td>for the Administration of Elections)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCM</td>
<td>Universidade Católica de Mocambique (Catholic University of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>União Nacional dos Camponeses (National Farmers’ Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UPCT</td>
<td>União Provincial de Camponeses de Tete (Provincial Farmer’s Union from</td>
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<td>UPCN</td>
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Abstract
This PhD thesis proposes to problematize from a Southern perspective the dominant discourse and practice around civil society. In order to decolonize knowledge and construct a more contextualized understanding of civil society, grounded theory and a situational analysis approach has been applied. Likewise, an empirical, rather than a normative civil society perspective has been central to this dissertation project. Using Mozambique as a country case study, the way in which the concept of civil society has been deployed in development discourse, is highlighted and interrogated. This underlines its highly normative and North-centric epistemology and shows its limitations in a post-colonial Southern context insofar as it rules out much of the grassroots social interaction, deemed ‘backward’ or ‘uncivil’ and thus not part of internationally recognized civil society. A brief overview of both development and civil society theory as well as the research approach and methods leads on to the major field study which emphasizes the history and complexity of civil society and turns our attention to some of the broader issues surrounding state-society relations and governance in post-colonial Mozambique.

Based on an in-depth case study carried out in the Province of Zambézia with a particular focus on Inhassunge District, the thesis presents an alternative way of mapping civil society dynamics and actors. It describes and analyses fragments of an emerging civil society conceptual construct which, taking into consideration the concrete local political and economic context, provides examples of alternative actors at district level. It also explains the contextual influences of land ownership, religious, spiritual and witchcraft dynamics and as such, uncovers the great complexity of civil society in a local African context, which in mainstream civil society discourse is most often reduced to the world of the intermediary NGO.

My conclusion is that Mozambican civil society is characterized by many ambiguities and even contradictions. The most serious divide observed was between the modern Western-style civil society, with its central actor the legalized NGO, and other forms of spiritual, associational and political civil society. These societies operate in different public spheres and are based on different moral grounds; the more distant they are from each other, the weaker the possibility of developing a new hegemony through the sphere of civil society and collective action. Possible future scenarios, as far as civil society development in Mozambique is concerned, includes the perspective of civil society appropriation and post-civil society. The thesis closes with a final statement on the potential role of civil society within social transformation.
Resumo

Esta tese de doutoramento pretende problematizar, a partir de uma perspectiva do Sul, o discurso e as práticas dominantes em torno da sociedade civil. A fim de descolonizar o conhecimento e construir ideias contextualizadas sobre a sociedade civil foi aplicada uma abordagem de teoria fundamentada nos dados (grounded theory) e análise situacional. Para este projecto de dissertação a perspectiva empírica foi fundamental, ao invés de uma perspectiva normativa da sociedade civil. Usando Moçambique como um estudo de caso, foi destacada a maneira como o conceito de sociedade civil foi implantado no discurso de desenvolvimento. Isto sublinha a sua epistemologia altamente normativa e Norte-centrista e mostra as suas restrições no contexto do Sul pós-colonial na medida em que expressa grande parte da interacção social dos actores no terreno (grassroots), a base, considerada 'retrógrada' e 'incivil' e, por conseguinte, não fazendo parte da sociedade civil devidamente reconhecida. Uma breve síntese do desenvolvimento e teoria da sociedade civil, assim como da abordagem e métodos de pesquisa conduz à parte principal do estudo de campo que enfatiza a história e complexidade da sociedade civil em Moçambique, e dedica a atenção a algumas das questões mais amplas que envolvem as relações estado-sociedade e a governação em Moçambique pós-colonial.

Com base num estudo de caso desenvolvido na Província da Zambézia, com ênfase no Distrito de Inhassunge, a tese apresenta uma forma alternativa de mapeamento de dinâmicas e actores da sociedade civil. Ela produz fragmentos de uma construção conceitual emergente da sociedade civil que, tendo em mente o contexto político e económico local concreto, fornece exemplos de actores alternativos a nível distrital, explica influências contextuais sobre a propriedade da terra e as dinâmicas religiosas, espirituais e a feitiçaria e, como tal, analisa a complexidade da sociedade civil num contexto africano local, que no discurso dominante da sociedade civil é na maioria das vezes reduzido ao mundo da organização não-governamental intermediária.

Pode-se concluir que a sociedade civil moçambicana ainda é caracterizada por várias ambiguidades e até mesmo contradições. A divisão mais grave que se observa é entre a sociedade civil moderna de estilo ocidental, que tem como o seu agente central a ONG legalizada, e outras formas de sociedade civil espiritual, associativa e política. Essas sociedades operam em diferentes esferas públicas e são baseadas em diferentes motivos morais; quanto mais distante elas estão uma das outras, mais fraca é a possibilidade de desenvolvimento de uma nova hegemonia através da esfera da sociedade civil e da acção colectiva. No que se refere ao desenvolvimento da sociedade civil em Moçambique, possíveis cenários futuros incluem a perspectiva de apropriação da sociedade civil e sociedade pós-civil. A tese termina com uma declaração final sobre o papel potencial da sociedade civil na transformação social.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. The introduction

Graça Machel, a high ranking and influential FRELIMO political committee member and an NGO director, gave a talk on 2 December 2015 at the first forum MOZEFO in Maputo. As part of the panel that aimed to build on the so-called Agenda 2025, entitled “Futuro é Agora, Humanizando o Crescimento” (The future is now, humanizing the growth), she gave considerable reference to the role of civil society in Mozambique:

…civil society organizations have to leave their platforms in order to create movements. Platforms are important, but a movement signifies that this agenda will be appropriated and transformed into a grassroots movement. (Graça Machel in O País 2015)

Being announced as a social activist at the forum, Graça Machel decided to act as a civil society representative rather than FRELIMO party member. She also chose not to talk in her role as an NGO director, but rather as a social activist. The key message from her talk targeted the members of civil society platforms. She called on NGOs to leave their offices and create social movements that can bring about social change. Having built up one of the biggest national NGOs in Mozambique, she called for grassroots work, for NGOs to build alliance with local people. In fact, her speech implies that she might have understood that both the NGO that she leads, Fundação para o Desenvolvimento (FDC) as well as her political party, FRELIMO, have lost influence, dominance, leadership and legitimacy within ‘real’ civil society.

She also dismisses the power of institutionalized civil society and those civil society actors that receive most support from the international aid system. At the same time she

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1 Graça Machel was the wife of Samora Machel, independent Mozambique’s first president. She was Minister of Education (1975-1989) and after Samora Machel’s death she married Nelson Mandela in 1998. Graça Machel is a high ranking member of FRELIMO and at the same time, director of the NGO FDC (Fundação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitária – Foundation for Community Development).

2 MOZEFO is an economic and social forum promoted by Soico, a Mozambican private communication company. Jointly with other partners, mainly from the private sector, MOZEFO aims to support inclusive and sustainable economic growth and human development. It does this through the organization of public and academic debates and bigger forums each year.

3 Agenda 2025 outlines the strategic vision for development in Mozambique and has been formulated in a partnership between the Government of Mozambique and civil society actors.

4 “…as organizações da sociedade civil têm que passar de plataformas para a construção de movimentos. As plataformas são importantes, mas um movimento significa que essa agenda seja apropriada e se transforme num movimento ao nível da base.” Note: The original text of this citation is in Portuguese. This and all further translations in this dissertation are mine.
mixes socialist discourse on social movements with the idea of a social contract as described by Jacques Rousseau (Williams 2014). Hence willingly ignoring the fact that after structural adjustment programmes and the building up of an extractive natural resource industry, neoliberal politics are now a shared ideology by high-ranking FRELIMO officials, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with all its consequences in relation to social inequality and the creation of a civil society in Mozambique. In her MOZEFO speech, she further suggests the following:

It is important that we question the issue of growth and the role of civil society organizations. I would like to suggest that they contribute towards the construction of a social contract – at various levels – in which each of the actors (it can be business men, investigators and academics, women and youth, workers, unions, all frequently absent at our debates) converge to the construction of the social contract.⁵ (Graça Machel in O Paí 2015)

Graça Machel, perhaps the most prominent political and civil society leader in Mozambique, has contributed towards political party domination and co-option of civil society, linked to both the anti-colonial liberation movement as well as the current authoritarian FRELIMO regime (Levitsky & Way 2013). The FRELIMO party, functioning under the umbrella of a formal but considerably constrained and incomplete multi-party democracy (Vines, Thompson, Jensen & Azevedo-Harman 2015), has been dominating civil and political society in Mozambique since independence; however, not without intermittent contestation. Graça Machel’s call for a social contract and national cohesion may as such underestimate the ambivalent and conflictive contemporary notion of civil society. State-society relations under authoritarian conditions such as in Mozambique have become very complex. If we are to explain the different outcomes we see across different authoritarian regimes when it comes to their interaction with their respective societies, we have to drop many of the assumptions that underpin studies of civil society. This includes their often exclusive focus on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as the channels through which society expresses itself and relates to the state (Cavatorta 2013, p. 6).

⁵ É importante equacionarmos muito bem essa questão do crescimento, e o papel das organizações da sociedade civil. Gostaria de propor que elas contribuíssem para a construção de pactos sociais – e a diversos níveis –, em que cada um dos agentes (sejam os homens de negócios, os investigadores e académicos, as mulheres, os jovens, os trabalhadores, os sindicatos, muitas vezes ausentes do nosso debate) convergiram para a construção de um pacto.
Post-colonial civil society and political domination in Africa

Africa’s potential for democracy is more convincingly revealed by the creation of small collectives established and controlled by rural or urban groups (such as local associations) than by parliaments and parties, instruments of the state, of accumulation and of alienation. These new political mediations will be evolved by Africans themselves, on their own. The task of the foreign analyst of these societies is simply to contribute to their understanding. (Bayart 1986, p. 125)

Jean-François Bayart articulates a preference for local associations and small collectives to become channels of contemporary politics in Africa and more generally rejects the necessity for African countries to follow a Western liberal model of democracy. However, soon after he had written his popular essay ‘Civil Society in Africa’ (1986), the global distribution of political power changed substantially through the end of the Cold War and in Africa, modern institutionalized civil society was proclaimed as a key development actor. It was around that time, that civil society attracted renewed attention in both social science theory as well as development policy (Bratton 1994).

As part of the global democracy and good governance debates as well as the aid effectiveness conferences in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011), modern civil society’s supposed key actors, the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were seen as a panacea for both improving basic service delivery to the poor as well as strengthening internal state accountability through pro-poor policy monitoring, also called ‘NGO-watchdog’ activities. However, in 2016, the World Bank, a primary advocate in relation to the important role of NGOs within service delivery and policy monitoring, recognizes in one of its recent policy research reports, that non-political citizen engagement, as often enhanced by NGOs, can only have limited benefits when they do not address fundamental failures in the political process. The same report suggests that “even when such forms of non-political citizen engagement improve service delivery outcomes, they may do so by letting political leaders, public officials, and frontline service providers “off the hook” and, in effect, require citizens to provide public goods for themselves” (World Bank 2016, p. 5).

Nevertheless, not only a great number of aid donors but also many aid recipient countries and their respective political elites still embrace the proclaimed modern concept of civil society and underline its importance for enhancing democracy and human rights in their public speeches and policy proposals. The reference to Graça Machel’s speech at the MOZEFO conference in Mozambique, alongside her wide-
ranging engagements in civil society, not just in Mozambique, but also in Southern Africa and globally, from the point of view of a social activist, NGO Director, as well as politician, demonstrates how deeply the concept and its key players are now part of state-society relationships. However, civil society is a Eurocentric idea and its roots can be found in both the liberal and Marxist tradition of European enlightenment.

Contemporary critical writers concerned with civil society in 'developing' countries have problematized the concept (e.g. Fatton 1995, Comaroff & Comaroff 1999, Gledhill 2000, Howell & Pearce 2002, Manji & O’Coill 2002, Chandhoke 2003, Munck 2004, Pfeiffer 2004, Ferguson 2006, Osaghae 2003, Zinecker 2011, Obadara 2014). In particular, post-colonial writers such as Chandhoke (2003, p. 18), ask if civil society has replaced revolution, or in other words, if it has replaced revolutionary theory. The latter was the driving force for many of the socialist oriented pan-African movements after the Second World War, elaborated from and led by thinkers, politicians and activists such as Julius Nyerere, Patrice Lumumba, Frantz Fanon, Amílcar Cabral and Samora Machel. However, since the late 1980s we have seen a decline in revolutionary and pan-African ideas (Martin 2012). Alongside this decline, civil society diversity and conflictual nature diminished, and it has become “a consensual concept…and a matter of tiresome unanimous acclaim” (Chandhoke 2003, p. 8), resulting in a formal and minimalist perception of democracy.

Post-development writers such as Escobar (2012, pp. xvi, xvii) increasingly point to the need to consider post-colonial theory in development, linking together the analysis of bourgeois ethicopolitical projects, state power and modern rationality into a geoculture of development in which subalternity itself is also redefined. He refers to Bebbington’s (2004, p. xvii) claim that development regimes, including NGOs, should be seen as contributing to the creation of uneven geographies of poverty and livelihoods. Escobar (2006) further suggests that local social movements engaged into cultural politics and

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6 The term ‘developing’ country is used a few times in this thesis. However, in my view, the developed-developing relationship in many ways replaces the colonizer-colonized relationship. Hence, as much as possible, I avoid using the term and when I use it in a particular context, it is with apostrophes.

7 Spivac (2002) and other post-colonial writers see potential for social transformation in the Global South if the strategy for transformation is based on a revolutionary theory, that builds on the learning of contemporary political struggles rather than on a Western consensual conception of civil society: “The post-colonial academy must learn to use the Enlightenment from below; strictly speaking, abuse it. If there is one academic lesson to learn from the revolutionary political experiment in South Africa, it is this one.” (Spivac 2002, p. 453)

8 Chandhoke (2003, p. 7), referring to Gideon Baker (1999), makes the ‘discursive closure’, linked to the uncritical acceptance of a liberal democracy, responsible for this.
place-based strategies can be considered as part of a dispute over the recognition of values and as such as part of a cultural distribution conflict.

Bratton (1994) concludes that common elements in the modern civil society discourse are firstly the critique of state domination of public life and a preference for reform over revolution, and secondly a strategy for political change based upon negotiations and elections. He furthermore suggests that there is sufficient evidence of a nascent civil society in certain African countries. However, the universal civil society idea, he adds, needs to be adapted to take into account socio-economic development and cultural specifics of nations and sub-nations.

With the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings beginning around 2011 and major political conflicts in Africa either continuing or re-emerging, it is necessary to ask whether, under the current neoliberal orthodoxy (Hoogvelt 1997), the adaptation of the modern civil society concept will be sufficient to confront the crises of state representation, democracy and increasing social inequality affecting many parts of Africa and beyond. African scholars such as Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco and José Jaime Macuane, both excellent political and economic analysts from Mozambique, experience either legal pressure or even physical harassments and violent attacks if they voice criticisms. Therefore, the key assumption of progressive democratic development linked to modern, rational and peaceful civil society in many countries in Africa needs to be questioned profoundly and be critically investigated (Chandhoke 2003).

Based on my own experiences of working with Western NGOs in ‘developing’ countries (mainly in Nigeria, Niger, Mozambique and Ethiopia), as well as my literature review on civil society in ‘developing’ countries carried out, and the Mozambique case study presented in part II of this thesis, I believe that the consensus-making modern civil society concept (cf. Scholte 2002), frequently referenced in mainstream development practice and theory, needs to be reconsidered is it to be used in a context of social transformation. Chandhoke’s request for a revolutionary, transformative

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9 Escobar (2006) also accepts that there are of course economic and ecological distribution conflicts. For him cultural distribution conflicts are defined as those arising “from the difference in effective power associated with particular cultural meanings and practices…whose norms and meaning-making practices define the terms and values that regulate social life concerning economy, ecology, personhood, body, knowledge, property, and so forth.”

10 I met Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco and José Jaime Macuane during my research in Mozambique. During that time, Castel-Branco was legally accused of having insulted the former president Armando Guebuza based on his Facebook critique about Guebuza’s self-enriching politics, and Macuane was kidnapped and shot in May 2016; that was most likely linked to his critical political analysis (Caldeira 2016).
concept of civil society appears very timely, and hence I join scholars such as Adekson (2004) who engage in celebrating, demystifying and deconstructing the civil society concept in Africa in its own terms “without the obtrusive presupposition that European or American civil society is unquestionably more advanced and coherent.” (Adekson 2004, p. xvi)

The research objective, question, context and approach

Escobar (2012) argues that there is no surplus of meaning at the local level but meanings that have to be read with new senses, tools and theories. It is this search for an alternative meaning of civil society in development that brought me back to Mozambique as a researcher. I wanted to develop new methodological ideas and theoretical concepts that have the potential to question common ‘western’ assumptions that build on a liberal-democratic context; this included a critical reflection about the values and beliefs that I myself brought into the research arena (sub-chapter 3.3.1).

My thesis broadly aims to deconstruct the Western concept of civil society in an African context from a post-colonial perspective. Gramsci’s thoughts on hegemony and civil society (see sub-chapter 2.4) provided the ground for crucial analytical reflection that in turn helped me to link up the categories I identified during empirical research and develop a positional map about civil society discourses in Mozambique (figure 10). Having gone through a reflective process I was then pushed in a next step to develop the frame for defining the theoretical element of my work: from criticising modern Western conceptions of civil society to understanding the importance of a post-colonial perspective as a necessary frame for analysing power relationships and the potential for reproducing subalternity within civil society. During exploratory research at the beginning of 2013, I applied the following research questions in Mozambique a country where I lived from 2000 – 2008 and hence had good access to the field of inquiry and diverse civil society actors at national and provincial level:

Who belongs to civil society?
What is the objective of civil society?
What is the role of civil society in development?
Civil society: a myth or utopia within the aid debate?
Addressing these questions then provided the basis for identifying the central overall research focus: The dominant and contestatory definitions of civil society in a post-colonial situation, focusing on its complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion. This happened alongside the empirical emergence of radical societal responses to economic and political exclusion that revealed ‘seeds of incivility not only in the ‘developing’ world but in ‘developed’ countries as well’ (Adekson 2004, p. 6). This response, which was frequently present in the situation of inquiry, in particular at district level, required a critical engagement with the function of violence and ‘uncivil’ society so to say.

From an initial review of the literature about the concept of civil society in ‘developing’ countries11 and the development of the civil society concept in Mozambique in combination with my own experience, I developed a first discussion paper about civil society in an African context together with Abdul Ilal and Ronaldo Munck. The paper entitled ‘Interrogating Civil Society: A view from Mozambique’ (Ilal, Kleibl & Munck 2014) was well received in particular through social media and when I presented the paper in Maputo in August 2014. The topic and the country so far selected for my civil society research project appeared relevant. In particular, during an expert round table discussion, where I applied my exploratory research questions, participants strongly agreed that a fresh analysis into the civil society concept and its diverse actors using Mozambique as a country case study would have the potential to reveal important new knowledge about post-colonial civil society.

Civil society research in a post-colonial12 context, affected by increasing patterns of social inequality, requires considerable self-reflectivity in order to work through the

11 According to Adekson (2004, pp. 9, 10) there are four theoretical anomalies that affect civil society treatises in Africa: 1) the myth of civility which mistakenly assumes that there is a section of society that is predominantly civil and another that is not 2) the unduly narrow and arbitrary manner in which groups are included or excluded from civil society based on whether their raisons d’être are lauded or despised 3) the normative value that excessively focuses on the many aims it is supposed to achieve and restricts its operationalization in the same breath 4) the Eurocentric bias in the civil society literature that manifests itself in the repeated references to the patent incivility in Africa and the rest of the Global South.

12 According to Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (2006, p. 1) the term “post-colonial” is profoundly linked with all the ambiguity and complexity of the many different cultural experiences it implicates, and it includes all aspects of the colonial process from the beginning of colonial contact. Accordingly, with using the term I don’t suggest restricting the meaning of the term to after-colonialism or after-independence. “All post-colonial societies are still subject in one way or another to direct or indirect forms of neo-colonial domination, and independence has not changed that situation. “The development of new elites within independent societies, often buttressed by neo-colonial institutions; the development of internal divisions based on racial, linguistic or religious discriminations; the continuing unequal treatment of indigenous peoples in settler/invader societies – all these testify to the fact that post-colonialism is a continuing process of resistance and reconstruction.” (ibid, p. 2)
concept’s complexities, different meanings and contradictions. Following the demands of post-development thinkers to ‘decolonize’ knowledge and to support alternative processes of knowledge production, I selected a constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz 2014) and a post-modern situational analysis approach (Clarke 2003), to guide my research process. Initially I conducted interviews at national level and decided to establish a national research advisory committee. Applying theoretical sampling, provincial level research participants were identified and they pointed me towards the development of an in-depth district level case study in Zambézia, a province historically attached to the notion of rebellion (Chichava 2007). This study then became substantial part of identifying new actors and civil society dynamics. It provided important insights into how the peaceful consensus-building normative idea of civil society has been affected by the new political economy resulting out of the international resource boom, global division of labour as well as introduction of new modes of production, in an interplay with post-colonial patterns of exclusion and the creation of subjectivity within civil and traditional society.

The research design incorporates primary and secondary sources of information. Secondary sources provide the historical context for analysing civil society as a political process in Mozambique and constitute the basis of the literature review. Web-based sources of information have been used to a some degree, for acquiring information on the social media, online newspapers, World Bank and IMF, including relevant e-mail exchanges that I was involved in. Primary sources, obtained during periods of fieldwork with a duration of two to four weeks (see annex A) include exploratory and focused in-depth interviews (individual and in groups) with members of civil society organizations in urban (national and provincial) areas as well as with social and religious activists at district and locality levels. District level investigation was done in cooperation with researchers from the Catholic University of Mozambique (UCM). Participant observation was conducted during research in Zambézia Province.

Complementary research was carried out in the Provinces of Nampula (Eráti District) and Tete (Marara District). Many themes and codes identified during interview analysis in those provinces corresponded to codes and themes identified in Zambézia Province (Inhassunge District). Particularly the finding that modern civil society, with its
supposed main actor the legalized NGO, and traditional social structures composed predominantly of traditional and religious leaders, function on different moral grounds and are therefore not only geographically, but also epistemologically very distant from each other, functioning in different public spheres, has been confirmed in all research areas (Kleibl & Sevenich 2015, Kleibl 2016). However, there were also substantial differences in how society was organized, in terms of patriarchy and matriarchy, local influential functions and their interplay with state administration, as well as modes of co-option into the dominant FRELIMO governance system. Findings from the complementary research fields have been included into the social arena map (figure 6) and the positional map (figure 10) and have been mentioned in the main text when they either reinforced or underlined differences to the findings of the main in-depth district level study in Inhassunge.

The country case study Mozambique: Post-colonial conflict and civil society activism

Figure 1: The Map of Mozambique

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13 Beverley (1999, p. 121) refers to Guha (1988) when arguing that in precolonial India forms of customary law and tradition constituted a kind of “civil society avant la letter, and that the colonial state imposed by the British existed above and in some ways against this civil society.” For Beverley, therefore, these forms could function “as a site of resistance to the colonial state, which could neither penetrate nor wholly subsume them. In the colonies, the subaltern exists necessarily at the margin of or outside the boundaries of the state, or in its fissures: the (legal-ethical) category of citizen is not in coextensive with the (moral-communal) category of person.
Mozambique, like many countries in Africa and the so called ‘Global South’, faces a wide range of poverty and governance related problems which cannot be separated from the colonial past that established its current boundaries. They are caused by internal and regional divisions on the one hand and the interplay of national political elites, international finance institutions and multi-national companies on the other. The country is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranked 180 out of 188 countries and territories on the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2015), and since independence has experienced ongoing conflicts, including a brutal 16-year long civil war (1976-1992) that killed about a million of people. In March 2016, I was told that some of the brutal strategies of the first civil war between the governing party FRELIMO and at the time, rebellion-movement RENAMO, such as summary executions and group rapes of women, are again the practice of the current warfare (see also Verdade Editorial, 2016b). However, the FRELIMO government does not recognize that situation, although roughly 12,000 refugees have fled into Malawi (allAfrica 2016, Sambo 2016). It makes the now political party RENAMO responsible for the climate of terror experienced in many rural areas of central Mozambique (Sambo, Kamm & Bowker 2016).
The development of civil society in Mozambique cannot be assessed without considering the post-colonial political landscape of the country, its various fractions, divisive discourses, including the major ones about ‘civil’ FRELIMO and ‘uncivil’ RENAMO, as well as the notion of national citizenship and ‘customary citizenship’ (see also Obarrio 2014, pp. 205-228). Civil society, as elsewhere in the world, is as much a historical-political justification and creation, as it is an inspiration for a just and better world. My research places significant emphasis on understanding the historical development of civil society in Mozambique and the current political situation, societal challenges, as well as vertical and horizontal ties leading to civil society hegemony and forms of emerging counter-hegemony. Informed by the views and positions of those participating in the research civil society in Mozambique is considered as part of the political imagination.

Increasing democracy and citizenship through strengthening civil society has been the key strategic objective for international donors, Western-type NGOs and the academic community in Mozambique. However, as the natural resource boom intensified and the economic growth agenda consolidated around 2008, concerns about state-society relations, the rule of law, credibility of elections as well as increasing social inequality moved into the background of debates as a result of the neoliberal expansion. The market, it was once again believed, would bring about development, and civil society in partnership with private sector would ensure the ‘trickle-down effect’. The BRICS countries strengthened their economic cooperation with Mozambique and together with DAC donors competed for the rich natural resources of the country. Social inequality increased, with a regional dimension (the centre and north of the country being poorer than the south, see chapter 5). The resumption of civil war activities happens predominantly in the areas where the natural resources are located and exploited. Globally, groups that question the economic growth agenda emphasize that social inequality has been increasing since the turn into the neoliberal era, pointing also to the devastating impact this creates on the environment:

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14 As part of this thesis, the term “citizenship” is connotated with the term and concept of civil society, the latter being central to this work. “Citizenship” can have different and just as civil society, contested meanings, and it depends on the theoretical conceptions it is based on. In an African context, some scholars also refer to “particular bifurcation (indigenous vs. settler) of citizenship” (e.g. Aiyede 2000, p. 1).

15 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
We have not done the things that are necessary to lower emissions because those things fundamentally conflict with deregulated capitalism...We are stuck because the actions that would give us the best chance of averting catastrophe — and would benefit the vast majority — are extremely threatening to an elite minority that has a stranglehold over our economy, our political process, and most of our major media outlets. (Klein 2014, p. 18)

When I left Mozambique in 2008, there was little or no internal disagreement about the civil society concept and indeed, the country was proclaimed as a development success story (de Renzio & Hanlon 2007) and a “flagship of neoliberal principles” (Dinerman 2006, p. 19). Civil society appeared to be a consensus-building concept between the state and the market, compiled of intermediary organizations, mainly NGOs, which were broadly engaged in social and economic development, in other words, sustainable development, adding the environmental dimension. However, alongside the global financial crises, the natural resource boom (e.g. around major coal deposits in Tete Province, gas and petrol along the coast, gold, precious stones and minerals in the centre and north) developed further. Mozambique experienced an accelerated economic growth phase and in parallel, re-emerging political tension. Some scholars, based on the experience of the development of extractive economy in Mozambique, asked whether Mozambique was being ‘sold out’ (Hoffmann & de Souza 2012).

Modern civil society and its dominant actors, the NGOs, remain relatively silent about the deep patterns of social inequality, the political tensions as well as the current warfare that has already caused the loss of thousands of lives, so that the rather naive hope for democratic development linked to a vibrant civil society has been seriously disrupted. Accordingly, my research is timely and is a necessary step to refreshing current theorizing and debates about the meaning, role and function of post-colonial civil society, meaning the questioning of the dominant Eurocentric normative assessments of African civil society (cf. Adekson 2004). Indeed, the relationship between the state and its citizens, the development of a civil society, was always a matter of investigation and study from colonial times until today, although clearly based on different ideological perspectives and views about development, visions of civilization and questions of power and societal hegemony. In order to better understand the development of the epistemological complexities linked to the current meaning(s) of civil society in Africa, my analysis of civil society in Mozambique starts at the end of

the 19th century. I investigate the internal and external dynamics of anti-colonial liberation as well as new nation building through the adaptation of a one-party Marxist-Leninist state system, followed by the adoption of a multi-party democracy, structural adjustments policies, and finally the opening to the politics of neoliberal market ideology.

A Mozambican research participant engaged in work with civil society for more than a decade (both at provincial and national level) summarizes his current view of the relationship between the state and civil society as follows:

“The situation of civil society in Mozambique is not at all good. The regime gets more and more repressive, inserting a culture of fear and terror, and organized crime took over the state. The institutions that should investigate and make responsible the relevant actors have been weakened and they are completely inoperative.”17 (Personal e-mail exchange from 25.05.2016)

However, since about 2008 new emancipatory civil society activism developed in the country and just as activism develops outside the party-dominated and co-opted NGO sphere, it is opposed by the current political regime. The chance that individuals or smaller groups of political activists can change the current ‘inexistent and invisible’18 state system is minimal. When I worked in Mozambique, the concept of civil society philosophically linked to participation, bottom-up development and empowerment was still seen as a constitutive element of effective aid cooperation and for many, the view remains. Nevertheless, the concept’s transformation into practice was never easy, as I was able to observe several times. The structural impact of NGOs’ work – in particular on development policies and democracy, was marginal, as the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI 2007) anecdotally echoed at the time. I particularly noticed during project monitoring visits that the Western-style NGOs, although well equipped and resourced, had weak or no links to traditional social structures (see also chapters 5 and 6) and there was little cooperation of secular organisations with faith-based organisations.

Development of modern and traditional civil society in Mozambique

17 “A situação da sociedade civil em Moçambique não está nada boa. O regime está a tornar-se cada vez mais repressivo introduzindo uma cultura de medo e terror e o crime organizado tomou conta do Estado. As instituições que deveriam investigar e responsabilizar os autores foram enfraquecidas e são completamente inoperantes.”

18 The terms ‘inexistent state’ and ‘invisible state’ were informally mentioned during field research at district level several times and became a code through the process of investigator triangulation, supporting the category ‘weak governance’.
The first part of the title of the thesis: “Sociedade civil? Somos todos nós!” (Civil society? That’s all of us!) questions the boundaries between the established positivist, euro-centric, liberal, modern and secular Western civil society model, in which mainly legalized, predominantly service-delivery and watchdog NGOs are considered to be central actors, and one where local people, broadly excluded and silenced from influencing the meaning of civil society in their countries, express their own understanding of the concept. Most citizens at national, provincial and local levels participating in this research have at some point of their lives heard about the term civil society, but apart from their wish that it should be an inclusive sphere of ‘all of us’, those in isolated district areas, had no concrete ideas to further describe it. Many people trying to refer to civil society mentioned that they felt excluded from development; because they felt they were not treated as cidadãos (citizens) from those with political power. During district level research, the question about the participatory nature of the civil society concept moved into the background and the question about the means of exclusion gained relevance.

Despite the various reactions to the exclusionary dialectic of economic, political and social crises, that the great majority of people in Mozambique face nowadays, such as tumult, ‘culture of silence’ linked to witchcraft and sorcery, and related to ‘justice with our own hands’ (see also Jacobs & Schütze 2011) as well as small local riots, often aiming at improving the situation of those affected from land grabbing (see also chapter 6), most people interviewed referred to civil society as an all-inclusive concept that involved professionals, children and ‘todos nós’ (all of us). NGOs were usually not mentioned as relevant civil society actors. Apart from ‘development’ experts, only some staff from the administrative state sector recognized NGOs as actors within civil society. Secular, Western-type NGOs, carry only marginal relevance in all three districts I visited, with Inhassunge District (Zambézia Province) being the most obvious case and Marara District (Tete Province) being the more NGO exposed area. Indeed, associations of religious and traditional spiritual origin appeared as the most respected organized social groups mentioned during interviews in all three districts.

However, there was also an exclusionary discourse linked to NGO’s operations at district level that can be well demonstrated through the following quote:

“Here, I am not civil society because I work with an NGO. In order to be called civil society you need to work with the party (FRELIMO). Those affiliated with
the government devalue citizenship. I am feeling discriminated. Let me tell you one more time, in order to feel like a citizen, you have to be part of the government, this is quite enough!”19 (Interview with a Mozambican INGO employee in Mucopia, 02.04.2015)

This statement seems at first sight to contradict the all-inclusive civil society concept ‘somos todos nós’. Nevertheless, putting both expressions into the political context of many of the isolated districts of Mozambique, it becomes clear that citizens of Mozambique are confronted with discursive patterns of an exclusionary political discourse that on one hand excludes the members and staff of legalized ‘Western’ civil society actors from political decision-making and participation, and on the other hand highlights the importance of ‘diverse actors’ in the construction of a new social contract20. The interrelated role of political society and civil society21 in maintaining societal hegemony, as outlined by Graça Machel in her speech at the MOZEFO conference in Maputo, has been a constant point of analysis throughout my thesis.

Aiming to support a local meaning of the civil society concept, the interface of modern civil society and traditional social systems became a central dynamic analyzed in this thesis. Mamdani (2001) links civil society directly to the colonial trajectory and legal division between races and ethnicities:

Each (races and tribes) lived in a different legal universe. Races were governed through civil war. They were considered as members, actually or potentially, of civil society. Civil society excluded ethnicities. If we understand civil society not as an idealized prescription but as a historical construct, we will recognize that the original sin of civil society under colonialism was racism. (Mamdani 2001, p. 654)

The need to recognize the influence of traditionally powerful families and lineage, as well as the power of local religious and spiritual leaders, and more generally, people’s wish to obtain full citizenship through their engagement with the politics and policies that affect their lives as part of the civil society debate, was strongly articulated during my research (see chapter 6). This points to the importance of family and the politics of

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19 “Aqui, eu não sou sociedade civil porque trabalho com uma ONG. Para ser chamado sociedade civil preciso trabalhar com o partido (FRELIMO). Os afiliados do governo desvalorizam a cidadania. Eu sinto-me discriminado. Vou dizer mais uma vez, para sentir-se cidadão tem de ser-se parte do governo, chega esta parte!”

20 The term “new social contract” has been widely conceptualized in recent literature but is not central to this thesis. The term is mentioned here, as it is linked to Graça Machel’s speech at the referred MOZEFO conference. The term is seen as problematic having in mind Machel’s links to political and civil society.

21 In his Prison Notebooks (1971), Gramsci sees ‘civil society’ as the ensemble of ‘private’ institutions such as the trade unions, churches and the education system which ensured popular consent to the state.
belonging in a globalized world that provokes at times all too rapid economic changes in the lives of already vulnerable communities.

**Alternatives to ‘liberal’ civil society?**

Because poor people in countries such as Mozambique are living on the margins of the globalized modern civil society, many times embedded into a unique social-spiritual world, their social values are devalued and their concept of civil society has been seriously interrupted. For many people living in more isolated areas of the Global South, ‘development’ has meant sub-ordination to modernity and associated new market values and commodification of their land, rather than freedom to have a choice to determine their own future. The practicing of local spiritual cults and traditional beliefs, hence the creation of an own world of contested solidarities and moral values, is a way of delimiting and claiming space by marginalized citizens. Chandhoke (2003, p. 245) claims that “individuals within civil society meet each other not as bearers of shared tradition or as located in common history and language, but as strangers well protected against each other through the language of rights.” She therefore calls attention to the fact that rights can be employed to restrict connectedness rather than to enhance it and challenges understanding of civil society that does not look for deeper understanding.

Different contemporary notions of a more state-centred civil society outside the Western/Southern dichotomy, such as in China, exist. However, mainstream development research carried out by researchers such as Shi (2004) uses Western civil society standards to reveal that civil society in China is still embryonic and both ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’. Yu (2007) looks at the future of civil society in China and sees civil society as fragmented, based on its contradictions with and restrictions from the state. However, Oikawa (2013) provides a more nuanced view of Chinese civil society, pointing towards the possibility of new social activism that rather than going down the path of pro-democracy demonstrations shall target the resolution of concrete social problems.

At the regional urban level in Mozambique, NGO representatives participating in this research saw the dialogical space of modern civil society as already occupied by

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22 According to Seckinelgin (2002, p. 20) the Western liberal codes of conduct and behaviour are transferred into the development context through the creation of a sphere of relations and by conducting business with particular civil society organisations and international institutions.
financially powerful ‘external’ forms of civil society (national and international NGOs) and they were concerned about questions of representation. It seems that discursive dichotomies such as civil/uncivil, formal/informal, legalized/not-legalized, national/local as well as modern/traditional are applied at various levels, from international, national, regional and up to the local, to legitimize the exclusion of certain actors. That dynamic in turn can be described as ‘cultural politics’ (Chatterjee 2011). Nevertheless, as I suggest, these dichotomies do not stop citizens from developing their own modes of mediation with state and private sector actors, using spaces outside the NGO realm (e.g. spiritual and religious activities, protest or organized crime). The precarious critical and curtailed situation they experience demands new forms of political action and resistance that at least for the moment, does not seem to be channelled by the NGO community. However, it is this type of new political action that needs to be recognized as part of the post-colonial civil society struggle.

1.2. Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into three parts:

- **Part I:** Theory and methods
- **Part II:** Civil society in Mozambique
- **Part III:** Conclusions

**Part I** includes chapter 2 which gives an overview of the main civil society and development theoretical debates with a reflection on social transformation, complexity and contradictions within civil society in the poorer countries of the Global South. Chapter 3 provides a detailed insight into the research process, including a digression into research philosophy, methodology and data collection. I explain why I have selected Grounded Theory (Charmaz 2014) combined with Situational Analysis (Clarke 2005, 2015) as the methodological framework for this research and present the opportunities this provides for social justice oriented qualitative research.

**Part II** contains the major empirical chapters. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the historical development of civil society in Mozambique. The discussion of colonial civil society and the analysis of the liberation struggle was necessary to understand current patterns of political disunity, while the concern about the influence of structural adjustment on civil society development has been key to make sense of the wide gap between modern civil society and traditional social structures. The transformation from a focus on humanitarian aid into development work and strategies of strengthening of
democracy and participation through the support of the NGOs sector is the final sub-
chapter of the history of civil society development in Mozambique and concludes with a
reflection about the dilemma of institutionalization and state control affecting civil
society.

Chapter 5 goes on to critically examine the ‘good governance’ agenda, which was
introduced together with the donor led NGO-civil society model in Mozambique. It is
guided by the first social arena map I developed following my situational analysis
approach (Civil society, development and social transformation in Mozambique, figure
6). It primarily describes the social worlds ‘civil society and good governance’ as well
as ‘civil and political society’, the dominant civil society concepts encountered during
research in mainly urban areas. Those definitions are considerably influenced by the
international donor agenda. I describe the elements of the third major social world
encountered during my research at district level – the ‘contesting society’. This social
world contains elements of post-structuralist civil society; it demonstrates collective
action based on witchcraft beliefs, religious revelations and self-defense based on the
necessity of individual, family and community survival. The chapter concludes with a
reflection on the political and economic order in Mozambique and the inter-dynamic of
the various social worlds encountered.

Chapter 6 addresses in particular the ‘contested society’ and reveals a Mozambique in
which social traditional structures and the politics of ordinary people in economic crises
aim to ensure survival through the creation of a unique spiritual-religious world that
observes and oppresses parts of the population but also empowers entire communities in
the self-defense of their land and survival. The district level in-depth case study aims to
describe that world from the point of view of its residents. Describing the district
context, including the economic, political and family structures, the role of NGOs,
associations, religious congregations as well as spiritual systems and witchcraft, the
very limited influence of the modern concept of civil society at district level is being
uncovered.

Part III of the thesis outlines two possible future scenarios for Mozambican civil
society development. Firstly, the possibility of appropriation of the concept is described,
meaning the development of ownership, including the definition of terms and conditions
from various civil society actors and a strong claimed influence on civil society space
from those currently silenced. This perspective might help the concept of modern civil society to survive. The option of post-civil society entails that the preferred Western-style legalized civil society actor NGO loses relevance, and religious and traditional social structures, as well as new forms of networks of sociality and interaction, both peaceful and violent, will dominate the public sphere.

A final statement considers the potential role of civil society in social transformation, based on a positional map (figure 10) with three major positions held down. Within these major positions, some positions outline discourses that might hinder or support the potential for social transformation or break the boundaries between the major positions. There is also a missing position at the level of the dominant major discourse ‘Civil, Consensual, Modern, Democratic’. That missing position, also called ‘site of discursive silence’ (Clarke 2005, p. 126) undermines the possibility of social transformation and shows the lack of political conflict analysis of actors positioned in that sphere.

In summary, the major contestatory discursive civil society positions encountered – or missing – are the following:

1. The dominant structural concept of the single public sphere and third sector definitions (also called ‘Civil, Consensual, Modern, Democratic’ within the position map);
2. The concept of the binary opposition of civil society;
3. The post-structuralist social dynamic of religious beliefs and morality and its underlying values, including ancestral belief, action of witchcraft and spontaneous protest, combined with the extension of civil society actors (also called ‘Uncivil, Traditional, Undemocratic, Hierarchical’ within the positional map);
4. A missing – empty – space at the level of the position ‘Civil, Consensual, Modern, Democratic’. No position has been identified that would fit into that space. However, recurrent war activities that are ongoing in Mozambique are being justified by RENAMO as a fight for self-determination and democracy, so it appears as if war ‘reality’ is overtaking the empty discursive field.

In conclusion, while the post-structuralist position is at odds with the dominant Western discourse on civil society, the public sphere and the third sector, it has helped me gain a better understanding of ‘actually existing civil society’ and its conflicts in Mozambique.
It provides a missing conceptual element; and reintegrates into the story those people constructed through the exclusionary discourse of ‘Uncivil, Traditional, Undemocratic, Hierarchical’. It leads me to the notion of ‘Subaltern’, a concept first described from Gramsci (1971) and later extended by the ‘Subaltern Studies group’ within the broad field of post-colonial studies. If we see the public sphere(s) as the ‘infrastructure’ that provides the subaltern ‘agential identity’ (Spivak 2016, p. 65) changes in that infrastructure are needed to acknowledge the action and resistance of the subaltern. I argue that internationally recognized civil society does not provide for recognition of the Subaltern. My thesis title “Civil society? That’s all of us!” is, in fact, part of the divisive control mechanisms involved in the post-colonial social order and cannot account for the subaltern that do not consider themselves as citizens in the post-colonial state.

What does all this mean for the potential role of civil society in development and social transformation? I argue that civil society needs to be seen as a contestatory field that links culture with political freedom. Both are key concepts for understanding the past and for paving the way forward. Civil society actors, as part of a bottom-up transformative project, can then participate in finding long-term solutions which are not just cosmetic changes but change the very ‘infrastructure’ of the post-colonial social order.
PART I: THEORY AND METHODS

OVERVIEW

Civil society in development reemerged as a paradigmatic concept in policy and practice in the early 1990s. It became a genuine platform for wishful thinking and for enhancing development participation, empowerment and ownership for various development actors such as governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social movements and the private sector. The concept was embraced by people with various ideologies, although based on different moral assumptions and beliefs about who was to be included or excluded as an actor within the sphere, and what the term civility in front of society was all about. The concept always carried with it a sense of ambiguity and diffuseness (Howell & Pearce 2002).

The politics of structural adjustment linked to neoliberalism involved the implementation of the top-down NGO-civil society model, following Western norms and values, in ‘developing’ countries. Local associational life as a source of change was devalued in these countries and the model of legalized NGOs, following Western structural ideas, was supported as the key actor in civil society. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) facilitated the establishment or ‘domestication’ of that idea and ultimately remained as ‘intermediary’ organizations for capacity building and financial transfers or direct implementation of externally funded programmes and projects.

There are alliances between more independent NGOs and social movements that function on the basis of solidarity. However, most of them are in one or another way linked to the ‘development sector’ and financially dependent in terms of their operations. Only a limited number of organizations are membership-based with enough financial resources to make fully independent decisions on their organizations.

23 According to Abbas (2011, adapted by framework and definition created by AWID) a social movement is ‘an organized set of constituents pursuing a common political agenda of change through collective action’. The characteristics are: 1. A visible constituency base or membership; 2. Members collectivised in formal and informal formations; 3. Some continuity over time; 4. Engagement in collective actions and activities in pursuit of the movement’s political goals; 5. Use of a variety of actions and strategies; and 6. Engagement of clear internal or external targets in the change process.
directions. As such, development theory and approaches as well as civil society concepts are interconnected and depend on the policies and practices derived from dominant theories, so that civil society and its actors get easily incorporated into the ‘aid system’. Many supporters and managers of civil society strengthening programmes usually assume that the creation of Western-type social associations and NGOs offers the potential for empowerment and enhancing social justice and they rarely connect it to the neoliberal development system (which they may well criticize) under which civil society strengthening programmes are predominantly being supported.

Epistemologically, civil society is an inherently Western concept, brought forward by European Enlightenment thought. It lacks a locally anchored philosophical grounding in many countries of Africa, Asia or Latin America. This in turn has provoked fundamental ethical reflections about the usefulness and applicability of the concept in ‘developing’ countries and I decided to use critical social theory combined with grounded theory and a post-colonial perspective for the empirical part of my thesis.

Part I of the thesis positions my research within the broad problematics it addresses (without predetermining a theoretical framework): Civil Society, Development and Social Transformation and outlines the research philosophy, methodology and data collection. It provides a brief introduction into the historical patterns linked to the concept of civil society (sub-chapter 2.1) and the mainstream development discourse (sub-chapter 2.2). Subchapter 2.3 focuses on the global liberal concept of civil society and 2.4 on the particular complexities of civil society in the Global South linked to the post-colonial social order. Between and within the different strands of civil society theory various, often contradicting, debates developed. Polanyi’s concept of a social counter-movement and Gramsci’s idea of counter-hegemony are considered in the context of the binary opposition of civil society in Africa where post-colonial realities add additional complexity to the development of a truly transformative concept of civil society.

Based on the need to re-conceptualize understandings of the role of civil society in development in relation to bottom-up, Southern-led approaches that have the potential to lead towards political conditions for social transformation and contest the hegemonic Western definition considerable thought has been put into the methodology of the work. Towards the end of chapter 2 I then propose a shift in perspective in relation to the
methodological and empirical chapters, and Michel Foucault’s theory of power provides further framing for the methodological approach outlined in chapter 3. Following inductive research logic, I look at the topic of interest (civil society and collective action from a post-colonial perspective) not from the position of the hegemonic discourses and practices from ‘above’ (like for example studies which depict civil society from an already defined Western discourse of ‘civilization’), but from the position of those concerned with finding a solution to their common problems and are hence constantly engaged with the concept of finding ‘their civic space’.

Chapter 3 introduces critical theory, grounded theory and situational analysis, provides the arguments for the necessity of adapting a social justice orientated research framework, articulates some personal reflections and ethical considerations and then goes on to further outline the in-depth case study approach selected for studying civil society in Mozambique. The sampling and data collection methods are explained as well as the entire field research process. The chapter ends with an explication of data analysis and an excurse to situational analysis, social and power arenas.

The ambition of this PhD project was about linking practice, research and theory. Accordingly, this process included my practical experience as an NGO worker, identifying and questioning key assumptions that guided my work in the past and fresh empirical research. The latter is based on in-depth case study development and finally, the development of new methodological ideas for civil society assessments within a critical research framework that organically, as the research got more advanced, questioned the effectiveness of the imposed Western concept of civil society in Mozambique and beyond. Indeed, with the renewal of the liberal civil society concept for and in Africa in the early 1990s, critical voices emerged as well, proclaiming the limits of the concept from the beginning:

Expectations that the development of ‘civil society’ in African states will serve as a force for social and political renewal in contemporary Africa are clearly unrealistic. Based on idealized conceptions of Western experience, analyses of civil society tend to focus largely on socio-cultural forms borrowed from the West—churches, professional organizations, labour unions, universities, etc.—and ignore the dense networks of indigenous institutions that surround and pervade them, i.e., precisely those features of historical experience and the socio-cultural landscape that are idiosyncratically African. (Berman, 1998, pp. 339, 340)
CHAPTER 2: CIVIL SOCIETY, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

2.1. Introduction to civil society

The concept of contemporary modern civil society is the product of Greek and Roman thinkers, who in a general attempt established a kind of geometry of human relations. Indeed, it was the tendency to prioritise political matters that oriented them towards the reflection about ‘civility’, the common good and the requirements of effective citizenship. Political commonwealth and the recognition that life is lived in different spheres made a more nuanced notion of social complexity and the limits of political life possible (Ehrenberg 2011, p. 15). For Aristotle (384 B.C. - 322 B.C.) it was the political sphere’s deliberation, self-rule, and mutual recognition that defined civil society. Civil society as an organized commonwealth became the organization of public power that made civilization possible, and justice was its organizing principle (ibid, pp. 16, 17).

For Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) civil society was made possible only by sovereign power constituted by politics, and accordingly he did not distinguish civil society from the state. Only the fracturing of European societies and the spread of markets finally accompanied the development of modern forms of centralized and bureaucratic political organizations. John Locke (1632 - 1704) announced the appearance of modern civil society. He suggested that preconditions for prosperity and peace were present in the state of nature. For him, a resident of civil society is an economic person first and foremost and the state’s task was to protect the rights of acquisition and accumulation. Adam Smith (1723 - 1790) later shared Locke’s sentiment that the activity of people in markets, rather than in politics, is the real glue of civil society (ibid, pp. 20-21). Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831) and Karl Marx (1818 - 1883) eventually developed an alternative theory of modern civil society.

Nowadays, civil society is a hotly contested concept in social sciences and one that is being applied very broadly within development practices, although mainly from a liberal point of view, as part of the so called ‘Good Governance’ debates. Alexander offers the following critical assessment of the concept having in mind its contested origins:
But civil society has not disappeared. It is not everywhere, but it is not nowhere, either. Rather than dancing on its grave, we need to transform the idea of civil society in a critical way. It needs to be recentered on the promise of community of individuals, centered on solidarity of a distinctively civil kind. Civil society is not everywhere except the state. A differentiated sphere of justice, it contends with and often conflicts with the value demands of spheres. (Alexander 2006, p. 551)

It is worth highlighting that there are two very broad strands in the literature about modern civil society. One strand is the literature emerging from the French liberal political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1805 – 1859), who saw civil society characterised by voluntary, non-political associations that strengthen democracy (Ilal, Kleibl & Munck 2014). Bearing in mind the global turn towards neoliberal politics, it is not surprising that de Tocqueville’s ideas linked to democracy and markets are mostly referred to in current mainstream civil society debates. Another strand is linked to the problematizing and politicizing of civil society, emerging from the ideas of Hegel. He saw civil society, the family and the state as the central components of his ‘social theory’ (Neuhouser 2000). Both strands facilitated the formation of a substantive concept that nowadays cannot be excluded from any serious discourse about development, democracy and politics. Whilst both ideas have been developed substantially, it needs to be recognized that they are built on colonial pillars. Both, Hegel and de Tocqueville, legitimized the colonial project of their times in their theories:

The Negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality - all that we call feeling - if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character. The copious and circumstantial accounts of Missionaries completely confirm this, and Mahommedanism appears to be the only thing which in any way brings the Negroes within the range of culture. (Hegel 1956, p. 93)

To be able to colonize with some importance…we have necessarily to implement laws that are not only violent but necessarily unfair. (de Tocqueville in Fattal 2011, p. 40).

The negation of morality and feeling (Hegel) and the call for violence against and unfair treatment of “the Negro” (de Tocqueville) disqualify in my eyes both theorists from providing a framework for analysing civil society from a post-colonial perspective in Africa. Using their frameworks would entail supporting a meaning of ‘civility’ that would be highly problematic. Indeed, Dussel (2010) sees Hegel as the founder of
Eurocentrism in development, because Hegel saw the people of the North (in particular Germans and English), as holding ‘absolute rights’, as ‘bearers’ of the Spirit in its “moment of development”. According to Hegel, no other people can be said to have any rights proper to it, and certainly none that it could post against Europe (Dussel 2010, p. 301). Consequently, from a post-colonial perspective development discourse needs to be deconstructed to understand how the current patterns of civil society are embedded in the dominant Western development discourses and how that ‘embeddedness’ is linked to the prospects of social transformation. The following sub-chapter starts by providing a brief overview of the modern development discourse and then outlines the main development paradigms.

2.2. Introduction to development

Development is fundamentally about mapping and making, about the spatial reach of power and the control and management of other peoples, territories, environments and places. (Crush 1995, p. 7)

Within the broad definition of ‘development’, we may locate many different approaches that have evolved over time, including civil society development. These approaches did not emerge in a linear way but were, rather, influenced by key changes in the international context, such as the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Some approaches have been more central to governmental development cooperation whilst others were mainly discussed within civil society and academia. Depending on the power of some development actors\(^{24}\), certain approaches have been stronger in the public discourse and have influenced political decision-making more than others. Some approaches were discussed and elaborated in parallel and even in opposition to each other and we can also see an increase in discourse analysis within the study of international relations and development (Milliken 1999), often linked to the analysis of political manipulation (Voeten 2011).

The main approaches and discourses around development started to systematically emerge from the early 1950s, as a response to President Truman’s so called ‘Point Four Program’, announced in his inaugural address in 1949 (Truman 1949). For post-development theorists like Esteva: “Under-development began, then, on January 20, 1949 on that day, two billion people became underdeveloped” (Esteva 1992, p. 7). This

\(^{24}\text{E.g. the so called “developing” and “donor” countries, multi-lateral agencies linked to the United Nations and Bretton Woods Institutions, broad social movements, economic alliances and forums, think tanks, etc.}\)
statement has, of course, been contested by those who see a much longer history for development, for example the development of capitalism. Since the 1950s, the modernisation approach has been dominant in the emerging development debates, which as they further evolved, divided the world into a so-called first, second and third world. With the end of the Cold War around 1989, these divisions were further condensed and many development actors started to refer to the ‘developed’ (industrialized and economically more developed countries) and ‘underdeveloped’ world (economically less developed countries occupying lower ranks on the Human Development Index). What is however common to both type of divisions is the fact that the separation of the world is frequently based on quantitative measures in relation to economic growth, which in turn defines a country or region as ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ or ‘backward’ and ‘underdeveloped’. Accordingly, development was from its beginning based on the founding belief of the modern world (Peet & Hartwick 1999), defined by Western standards which are influenced by linear, mainly economic, theories.25

‘Modernization’ is the topic that links most of the development approaches. This trend was established in the United States and soon after theorized by various scientists (e.g. Walt Rostow, Samuel P. Huntington, David McCleland). They believed that the underdeveloped countries have to transform into modern, developed countries following the industrialized Western model. They assumed that economic growth and social change would bring about poverty reduction. These essential goals should be achieved in part through education and technical assistance from the Western world. Indeed, many of the supporters of this theory were highly influenced by the Cold War and the perceived threat of communism, and therefore had a very market liberal point of view (Leys 1996). They believed “that modernization would in any case bring democracy as well as economic growth” (ibid. p. 10). The fact that modernity is the product of societal cohesion and consequently contingent in time and place is being ignored in this conceptualization of ‘the modern’ as the Western standard is been declared as absolute (and the world is being measured against it).

25 Linear ideas concerning stages of growth have a long history, from Marx’s modes of production (1981), and various German historical economists such as Friedlich List (1909), Bruno Hildebrand (1848), Karl Bücher (2009), Gustav von Schmoller (1985) and Werner Sombart (1896) to Walt Rostow, who in his ‘Stages of Economic Growth’ (1960) proposed a ‘non communist’ alternative to Marx’s theory of history (Peet & Hartwick 1999).
For Munck (2017) in his analysis of development and social change from a complexity perspective “development became something that one party could do on another” and “the divide between the coloniser and the colonised of the imperial period now became the development-underdevelopment divide which characterised the post-colonial period.” He argues further that:

...this paradigm suited the economic and political interests of the now rising hegemonic power, the U.S. Taking credit for decolonization and promoting the equality between nations, the U.S moved seamlessly into constructing a neo-colonial order where formal political independence was matched by strong, economic dependence for the ‘developing’ nations. (Munck 2017)

The ‘Dependency Theory’ which emerged in Latin America in the 1950s (cf. Prebisch 1950 and 1959) and evolved in the 1960s and 1970s was considered to be an alternative approach, built on the philosophical and theoretical assumptions of Marxism, combining historical materialist ideas with a number of other critical traditions (Peet & Hartwick 1999, p. 107). It can be seen as a major answer by the intellectuals of the ‘Third’ World to the Northern centric ‘Modernization Theory’. In contrast to supporters of the modernization theory, they did not believe that endogenous factors were responsible for underdevelopment, but rather exogenous factors like colonialism and powerful economic elites. The representatives of this Neo-Marxist approach argue that what in fact they were seeing was not ‘modernisation’ but the ‘development of underdevelopment’. That means development is actually the product of the powerful, Western states. For them, the ‘developing’ countries are dependent on/dominated by the developed countries which is based on unfair trade agreements, the unjust economic system and political power imbalances (Leys 1996, p. 11f.).

Dependency theory counters the notion that European development derives, exclusively or mainly, from European sources. The theory played an important role in the critique of conventional theories – whether the theory of comparative advantage in mainstream economics or modernization theory in mainstream developmental sociology. It accounted for the historical experiences of the peoples of peripheral societies by proposing, in opposition, that contact with capitalism led to underdevelopment rather than development. (Peet & Hartwick 1999, p. 122)

In the 1980s there was a neo-liberal revolution in the development debates, supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both international financing institutions (IFIs) claimed that ‘developing’ country governments are often inefficient and corrupt and therefore part of the problem of underdevelopment. A
market versus state debate followed and in this context the liberalisation of foreign trade and the privatisation of state enterprises for economic growth have been advanced through the implementation of so called structural adjustment programmes (Leys 1996, p. 18f.). The promoted free or unregulated market was not only seen as the source of material wealth but also of freedom and democracy. After the years of the ‘Neoliberalism Approach’, also known as the ‘Lost Decade’ (Escobar 2015), a drastic change took place in the academic development discourse, but only partly within official government politics.

Alternative or critical approaches to development in the 1980s and beyond highlighted social, environmental and sustainability topics and pointed to the need for a paradigmatic change based on a substantial critique on Eurocentrism within mainstream development theory (see Munck & O’Hearn 1999). Around the same time, the focus shifted from the economic growth paradigm to a human development point of view. Examples for this change are the ‘Human Development and Capabilities Approach’, ‘Development from below’ and Amartya Sen’s (1999) view of ‘Development as Freedom’. Global governance and human rights standards were increasingly mentioned. Important conferences organized by the United Nations\(^{26}\) pointed towards key global issues and constituted a platform of discussion and negotiation for all UN member states, accompanied by civil society actors (Nuscheler 2012). However, most of the alternative ideas were not put into practice and the more radical academic discourse of ‘Post-Development’ emerged around 2000. From a post-colonial perspective, the path of post-developmentalism deserves acknowledgement, as one author argues:

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\text{The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crime have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical conditions which catapulted the idea into prominence have vanished: development has become outdated. (Sachs 1992, p. 1)}
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Development was increasingly considered as simply not successful and bringing about much frustration based on repeated mistakes and lack of lessons learned. Accordingly, ‘Post-Development’ is based on the critique of development itself and the critique of modernity as its most important target. Development is seen as “a mechanism for production and management of the Third World” and “organising the production of

\(^{26}\) E.g. the Rio 1992 Earth Summit Conference, the World Conference on Human Rights 1993 or the UN Conference on Women’s Rights 1995.
truth about the Third World” (Escobar 1992, p. 413f.). It is seen as a top-down, one-way process, where the so called ‘developer’ forces the Third World to accept the values of the modern world in an uncritical way. Development is no longer considered as a process, where other cultures and religions have been accepted or even nurtured, it is rather considered as Eurocentric, where everything that was different, was wrong, and forced to change (Escobar 1997, p. 91). As Pieterse puts it:

It involves telling other people what to do – in the name of modernisation, nation building, progress, mobilisation, sustainable development, human rights, poverty alleviation and even empowerment and participation. (Pieterse 2010, p. 117)

Development is now essentially seen as an abuse of power, legitimised through development cooperation; one group exercising power over a so called poor ‘target group’ that had no ability to resist or fight back. Post-development thinkers consider power imbalance as a key issue of poverty and analyse it accordingly. The aim of Post-Development is a transfer of power and a ‘real’ empowerment of people in order for people to become political subjects and not objects of development and to enable societies to define their issues and goals without pressure from the outside (Ziai 2004). Through this transformation, the people should be able to change within their own culture, using their own capabilities. Munck (2017) concludes:

The focus on language, knowledge and power has also helped understand local knowledge as sites of power and also resistance. We now accept much more readily that there are multiple, unstable and permanently reconstructing identities involved in the development and social change processes. (Munck 2017)

Nevertheless, Post-Development is firstly criticized for the fact that its supporters criticize development itself and that they want the development myth to end and secondly, that its definition of development uses a rather homogenous and limited perspective to describe a broad approach. At least, opponents claim that the main problem with the post-development approach is that there is no real alternative programme of action. Post-development supporters are then seen as just criticising the other theories and approaches, analysing their faults rather than developing a practicable alternative concept. The main claim consists of the assumption that the post-development debate is only based on the critique of other approaches but not on practical alternatives (Kippler 2010, p. 7).

However, for me that critique appears rather as a misunderstanding. The intention of Post-Development as I understand it is not to end development, but to end the old,
Eurocentric view of development, and encourage a (bottom-up) transformation of power. I see the call for the ‘end of development’ (Lummis 1994) as close to the view of Rahnema (1997), who argues that transformation must occur at the level of the people and accordingly that the external search for alternatives must come to an end. What Post-Development seeks is a change that will enhance ‘inborn and cultural capacities’ which would allow people to be free to change the content and rules of change according to their culturally defined aspirations (Rahnema 1997, p. 384). A post-development approach demands the reconstruction of key concepts as Munck argues:

…the very meaning of development, democracy and community is being reconstructed before our eyes in the old and new movements of contestation. Post development has clear links to the ‘new’ social movements of the 1960s which broke with the class focus of the modernist paradigm. (Munck 2017)

Looking now at the diversity of state models around the world, and the diverse cultures, needs and aspirations of those living within nation-states, there is still no global or regional system that would ensure or control the agreement or disagreement of people with certain decisions emanating from the supra-national level, affecting individual states and the people living within that territory. Whilst Held (2009) continues to suggest steps for re-forging rules-based politics and the promotion of cosmopolitanism, from the nation state to the global level, local realities in many African countries suggest an increase in anarchic rule, conflict and a crisis of representation. Development cannot be understood in a mechanical way through a simple linear analysis of structure and agency and we need to recognise the impact of complexity.

2.3. Liberal global civil society and development

Historically, Alexis de Tocqueville (see also sub-chapter 2.1), Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott represent a group of conservative theorists. They all view civil society as:

…a repository of the wisdom contained in cumulative experience. Each writer discussed society in terms of those values, traditions, and institutions that have stood the test of time during the course of confronting recurring and enduring challenges and problems. The conservative tends to view these traditional dimensions of society as the critical base for establishing a civil society, which can provide rights and liberties as well as an atmosphere of civic virtue. (DeLue & Dale 2009, p. 267)

De Tocqueville, with his ‘love of liberty’ (Hall 1995, p. 9) was certainly the most enthusiastic thinker of civil society in its role as a defence against despotism, which he
saw as coming from the state, acting against newly realized individual rights and freedoms of self-regulating civil society groups (Edwards 2014). His ideas about civil society were once again made particularly prominent after the breakdown of communism in the Soviet Union. This was the time when East European intellectuals claimed that communism’s crisis could only be understood as a ‘revolt of civil society against the state’ (Ehrenberg 2011, p. 23). What followed was an ethical, moral, romanticised and individualist conceptualization of civil society, based on de Tocqueville’s ideas, positioned against state-orientated or party-based mass politics.

Archer (1994) later placed the revival of de Tocqueville’s concept of civil society in the context of the highly influential debate around the global ‘good governance’ agenda. He argues that the agenda has deployed the concept of civil society within the wider initiatives of supporting the emergence of more competitive market economies, building better-managed states with the capacity to provide more responsive services and just laws, improving democratic institutions and deepening political participation. He also noticed that the support for the emergence and strengthening of NGOs has formed a central part of this overall agenda. It is in the context of the post-Soviet Union ‘globalisation’ debates that the concept of civil society became the new panacea for many development actors, in particular Western donors. Based on this, civil society is seen as the opposite of war and conflict; it becomes a neutral, consensus-building force between the family, the market and the state, enhancing democracy almost ‘automatically’. At the same time, it fits in the context of globalization that is not bound by national borders; it can be as much local as it is global. However, dispersed global civil society takes on different forms and many scholars claim that its features mirror the globally unjust material division of the world. As Scholte argues:

For one thing, residents of the North (the OECD countries) have had a far larger and stronger presence in global civil society than people from the South (the so-called ‘Third World’) and the East (the current and former state-socialist countries). (Scholte 1999, p. 31)

Free market economists saw in civil society the possibility to argue against the strong state ideology and suggested the downsizing of ‘ineffective’ government. They drew attention to the capacity of social groups to regulate themselves and take care of their own business and hence facilitated the return of crucial development functions to the private sector. At the margins, neo-liberals portrayed government and society as a zero-sum game, and blamed government interference for disorganizing society (Elliot 2007,
It was during the so called post-Washington Consensus (cf. Gore 2000), seen as the birth of neo-liberalism, when civil society and the market gained their new identities and were appropriated as politically correct formulae for ‘delegitimizing’ the state and empowering the private sector (Tar 2014, p. 253).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which dominated the official development debates, and the new discourses of global civil society since 2000, need to be understood in terms of the underlying dynamics of the globalisation project. Despite their discursive dominance across the development sector and NGO practice, they were never actually a development strategy. As Samir Amin puts it “the MDGs are part of a series of discourses that are intended to legitimize the policies and practices implemented by dominant capital and those who support it” (Amin 2006, p. 35). Based on European Enlightenment and de Tocqueville’s idea of a good society or ‘enlightened self-interest’ (brought in from his analysis of American democracy), civil society was articulated globally as the sphere for ‘new partnerships’ with private sector associations and NGOs. They were expected to take over public responsibilities, previously under the responsibility of the state. This trend has been strongly articulated in the outcome document of the Busan Aid Effectiveness Conference 2011, entitled: Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation (OECD 2011). From there, most diverse civil society organizations within the development discourse were expected to work hand in hand with powerful private actors in order to implement ‘common goals’.

However, when we refer to civil society today, we have to understand what is at stake. Understanding civil society from a Tocquevillian view, as non-state, dense associations, that organize society towards a ‘common good’ motivated by ‘enlightened self-interest’, as a ‘third sector’ between the state and family, does not differentiate between a local voluntary fire brigade, lobby groups of industrial economists, religious associations, and the NGOs such as the World Wildlife Foundation. We would not differentiate between the powerful and the powerless, so that the idea of civil society and democracy, as proclaimed by Tocqueville, becomes useless for advancing social transformation. Putting it in simple terms, the above-named non-state actors cannot protect equality, or advance democracy in conditions of global historic inequality and huge concentrations of private power. A civil society conceptual framework that opens space for different

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27 The Millennium Development Goals have been replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs).
negotiations between citizens and the post-colonial state is needed when discussing civil society and its potential for social transformation, one that allows for disagreement, resistance, and mobilization. Hence, a notional distinction between civil society and political society is necessary whilst considering the fluid economic and social-cultural context as well as power dynamics in which civil and political society are embedded.

Escobar (1992) and scholars such as Alvarez (2014) and Touraine (1981) are well aware of the above-mentioned tendency and are wary of the promise that the international NGO is the key player in a cosmopolitan world, upholding human rights and mutual respect. They remind us that self-organized local community organizations and grassroots social movements are the most interested in their own local culture, the history of their communities and the place they occupy in global, regional and national social and political contexts. However, Western understandings of civil society have been predominately shadowed in official development cooperation. Aid instruments became the main vehicle for promoting a liberal global civil society through funding civil society strengthening projects and international NGOs play an important role in promoting or at least sustaining that ongoing trend.

The following sub-chapter will locate civil society within the broad debates about the public sphere and provides an introduction to a civil society concept that considers the post-colonial dynamic between civil and political society as shifting between hegemony and coercion. I now turn my attention to those thinkers of civil society that influenced my own critical investigation most: predominately Antonio Gramsci, as well as Peter Ekeh and Neera Chandhoke. Analysing Gramsci’s (1971) concept, I discovered how civil society coercion can at times predominate in certain situations whilst in other contexts, it was the making of hegemony that was crucial for initiating social transformation. The concept of shifting cultural power relations certainly bears superficial similarity with Foucault’s (1972) discussion of power and resistance, which play an important part in my methodological framework (see chapter 3).

Chatterjee (2011), after Gramsci, introduced the binary terms of political society and civil society into post-colonial studies from 2004 onwards. This was linked with a reformulation of the original meaning of the two terms and according to Whitehead (2015), Chatterjee’s understanding of modernity then becomes equated with a naturalised liberal democratic state, hence precluding any appreciation of how
resistance shapes the character of the state. For Chatterjee (2011, p. 87) “practices that activate the forms and methods of mobilization and participation in political society are not always consistent with the principles of association in civil society.” For him (2011), today’s civil society is rather the sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normative models of bourgeois civil society, representing the domain of capitalist hegemony, he sees the majority of populations in the Third World as living “outside the orderly zones of proper civil society” (Chatterjee 2011, p. 136). Whilst appreciating Chatterjee’s critical differentiation of ‘proper’ civil society and political society, my own confrontation with both concepts in Mozambique has been guided more by Gramsci’s original category that “rejects the liberal notion that the state consists solely in a legal and bureaucratic order, which remain neutral and indifferent to class interests while safeguarding the autonomous development of civil society” (Buttiegig 1995, p. 10). Indeed, as Mann (2013, p. 109) has put it “Left to itself, bourgeois civil society makes lived inequality worse”.

2.4. Civil society, the public sphere(s) and hegemony under post-colonial order

Examining more closely the second strand of civil society, its conceptualization appears political rather than apolitical, and is overall more contested. It was Marx who transformed Hegel’s theory of the state into a critique of civil society and of the bourgeois economic order that sustained it. For Marx, Hegel was limited by his own idealism. Even though public life was now thought of as independent from feudal formations of property, religion, class, and others, it was also true that the same formations were now free to develop in isolation from political influence and constraints (cf. Tucker 1978). Marx criticized the state as part of a more general critique of the civil society on which it rested (Ehrenberg 2011, p. 23).

Indeed, it is the conceptual strand of civil society as a bottom-up transformative emancipatory political project that has been most relevant during my research, in order to make sense of my historical analysis of civil society in Mozambique. The same notion was required by my overall methodological approach (see chapter 3) which includes aspects of discourse analysis influenced by Foucault (2010) and his approach to “effective history” and his argument “each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the other” (Foucault 2010, p. 18). Using a Marxist approach, Krader (1976) describes how the development of various modes of production, the creation of social classes and a bourgeois society relate to civil society and concludes
that ‘the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in the political economy’ (Krader 1976, p. 73). According to Marx, it is the economic foundation that determines the social foundation; however, when studying transformation, a distinction is to be made between the material and the ideological:

With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations, a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. (Marx 1977, preface)

Furthermore, Krader points out that for Marx, primitive society is the opposite of civil society, being society without the relations of political economy and the state. Primitive society however, as described by Marx, most probably does not exist anymore in the interconnected world order. Also in more isolated parts of the ‘developing’ world, new forms of social classification and exploitation have emerged as a consequence of colonialism. As such, Post-Marxists have essentially reworked these features of Marx’s legacy and sometimes abandoned the exclusive preoccupation with the economy of capitalism (Meadwell 1995).

Various research directions opened space for new civil society conceptualizations within the ‘political civil society project’, from ‘Civil Society and the Lifeworld’ (Cohen & Arato 1994, Habermas 1984a) to ‘Civil Society and Diversity’ and a ‘Republican Civil Society and New Social Movement’ approach (see also Hall 1995). A few scholars (e.g. Watts 2004, Taussig 2010, Temper & Martinez-Alier 2013, Ayelazuno 2014, Vergara-Camus 2015) have developed a new broad research agenda that focuses on the contextual changes in relation to the political economy of civil

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28 For Habermas (1984a, 1987) civil society constitutes a societal element of the life-world (Lebenswelt), independent from the economy, build outside the state and without political functions. Civil society associations, operating on a voluntary basis, constitute the rational, communicative structures, of the life-world. According to his theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984a), networks of associations institutionalise problem-solving discourses around questions of common interest within the sphere of an organised public that operates in a legitimate and democratic state context. He assumes that a legitimate state listens to the public and translates public opinion into government policies.

29 The concept of ‘Civil Society and Diversity’ is based on the critique of Habermas and two sources of failure in his ideal speech situation and theory of communicative action – distortion and diversity – both topics that Habermas systematically ignores (Meadwell 1995, p. 194). Accordingly, Fraser (1990) in her critique of Habermas’s concept of the bourgeois public sphere suggests the need for a radical restructuring of society as an essential precondition for fair discourses. Indeed, the assumption of a single bourgeois public sphere as suggested by Habermas makes even less sense in a “developing country” context (Ilal, Kleibl & Munck 2014).
society and the formation of Western-type NGOs and local social movements in the global neoliberal world order. Using a broadly post-development framework when looking at civil society in the Global South, this research agenda is concerned with the interface between cultural processes, civil society formation and political economy. In particular, the agenda’s focus on the political economy of civil society and the emergence of new social movements linked to power imbalances, the extension of capitalism and the land question has close ties with my own research approach.

In a Gramscian (1971) sense, the cultural cannot be separated from the political. Consequently, the analysis of state politics and class relations and their linkages to civil society must go hand-in-hand with an analysis of personal and group identity and locally-grounded issues which in many 'developing' countries are linked to the colonial legacy. Consequently, I will now link Antonio Gramsci’s thoughts to post-colonial subaltern studies, explain some of the key Gramscian concepts connected to his theory of civil society and then turn my attention to Peter Ekeh’s (1975) theoretical statement of the Two Publics in Africa and some of Neera Chandhoke’s (2003, 2004 and 2009) critical interrogations of modern civil society.

Capuzzo and Mezzadra (2012) critically deconstruct the Italian Communist Party’s reading of Gramsci, which dominated the relevant academic discourses until the late 1970s in Europe. They underline the considerable contemporary relevance of Gramsci’s thought for understanding global uneven development under the post-colonial neoliberal world order. Referring to Edward Said’s (1979) work, the authors claim that in particular the importance Gramsci attaches to “space” opens up the “possibility of using his concepts in order to reconstruct historical and contemporary dynamics of global capitalism in its multi-scalar hierarchies, relations, and conflicts” (Capuzzo & Mezzadra 2012, p. 48).

Gramsci’s international analysis and perspective about the worsening “hierarchy of exploitation” (Young 2012, p. 19) in the context of global capitalism puts further
emphasis on critical global power dynamics between “colonizers” and “colonized” and facilitates the use of his concepts as part of contemporary post-colonial subaltern studies. This perspective can be best articulated by using Gramsci’s own words:

In this way the colonial population becomes the foundation on which the whole edifice of capitalist exploitation is erected. These populations are required to donate the whole of their lives to the development of industrial civilization. For this they expect no benefit in return; indeed, they see their own countries systematically despoiled of their natural resources. (Gramsci in L’Ordine Nuovo; SPW 1, p. 302 cited in Young 2012, p. 19)

Gramsci’s consequent concerns with the ‘subaltern’ and subaltern social groups, as well as questions of spatial power relationship are further articulated in his exploration of the “Southern Question” as outlined in his “Notes on Italian History” in the Prison Notebooks (1971) and in various references in letters to his family. Young (2012) concludes:

This contemporary emphasis on the subaltern has nevertheless come a long way from Gramsci himself, who remains firmly anchored to the political possibilities offered by the construction of hegemony through the articulation of the subaltern classes. (Young 2012, p. 32)

Frantz Fanon (1967) elaborated a comparable project to Gramsci in his reshaping of Marxist-Leninist thought, assigning a central role to the revalorization of native culture just as Gramsci did. Fanon further allocates importance to the colonized/native intellectual, requesting the intellectual to return to his people and articulate their revolutionary project through the construction of national-popular literature (cf. Srivastava 2012). Gramsci, alongside similar lines of thought, considers social forces such as religious beliefs and practices, language and the establishment of cultural products, including intellectual revolutionary and moral leadership, as well as political alliances and mobile forms of cultural hegemony, as core processes for the production of hegemony within civil society. For Capuzzo and Mezzadra (2012, p. 49) it is “in this

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32 According to Young (2012, p. 31) “the subaltern” appears only once as a singular figure in the Prison Notebooks “where the term describes someone who in historical terms was once an object but has become a historical subject, a protagonist (Quaderni 1388). Consequently Young (2012) concludes that in a sense, it was Gayatri C. Spivak who invented “the subaltern” and not Gramsci. Gramsci, more closer to a Marxist tradition, refers more frequently to subaltern classes and social groups.

33 E.g. Gramsci’s comments on H.G. Wells History of the World, included in a letter to his brother Carlo: “It is interesting because it tends to break with the prevailing habit of thinking that history only existed in Europe, particularly in ancient times; Wells discusses the ancient history of China, India, and the medieval history of the Mongols with the same tone he adopts in speaking of European history. He shows that from a world standpoint Europe should not be regarded as anything more than a province that considered itself the depository of all world civilization (Gramsci in Capuzzo & Mezzadra 2012, p. 49).
framework that the figure of the “subaltern” becomes a subject of history, with a specific gaze on the cultural forms of expression”. Gramsci consequently speaks of “folklore” not as something “picturesque” but as a “conception of the world and of life of certain defined social strata (defined in time and space)” (ibid).

Having outlined the importance of Gramsci’s work for post-colonial studies, I will now consider some of the fundamental concepts underpinning Gramsci’s theory of civil society. His conception of civil society appears more attuned to the reality of the subaltern classes in the Global South: while most often referred to as a model for advanced Western societies, Gramsci was in fact always writing from a ‘Southern’ perspective, i.e. the Italian Mezzogiorno. While Gramsci’s concepts are often buried in the concrete analysis of the Prison Notebooks (Buttigieg 1995) some general points can be made. Gramsci distinguished two superstructural levels, the state or political society and ‘civil society’ which he saw as the ensemble of ‘private’ institutions such as the trade unions, churches and the education system which ensured popular consent to the state. Gramsci sees civil society as a sphere in which subaltern classes forge social alliances and begin to articulate alternative hegemonic projects (Ilal, Kleibl & Munck 2014). The best-known definition of hegemony, a central term in Gramsci’s conception of civil society is described in his Prison Notebooks (1971, page 12):

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural “levels”: the one that can be called “civil society”, that is the ensemble of organism commonly called “private” and that of “political society” or “the State”. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which the dominant group exercise throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or command exercised through the State and “Juridical” government. The functions in question are precisely organisational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group’s “deputies” exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. These comprise:

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34 Antonio Gramsci (1971) introduced the concept of the “subaltern” in his Prison Notebooks. He refers to the “subaltern classes” as persons or a group of people at any “low rank”. According to Gramsci, the “subaltern” suffer from domination of the ruling elite class which denies them participation. At the same time the term is now widely used in contemporary “postcolonial studies”. Prominent representatives of the discipline are Gayatri Spivak (1998) along with Homis Bhabha (1994).

35 According to Gramsci (1971, p. 1) the notion of “intellectuals” as a distinct social category independent from class is a myth. All men (and women) are potentially intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all are intellectuals by social function. Consequently, Gramsci distinguishes between “traditional” professional intellectuals and “organic” intellectuals, which he considers to be the thinking and organising element of a particular fundamental social class. Importantly, the latter are less distinguished by their profession but by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong.
The “spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.

The apparatus of state coercive power which “legally” enforces discipline on those groups who do not “consent” either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.

For Gramsci, the struggle for political power and social transformation is carried out in public with the participation of the “countless multitudes” – concretely within civil society in modern societies (cf. Buttigieg 1995, p. 20). In his Prison Notebooks (1971) Gramsci asserts, that it is through the activities and autonomous organizations in civil society that the subaltern masses must acquire their freedom or independence from the ruling capitalist classes and their allied intellectuals which uphold the ideology of the ruling classes. However, according to Moen (1998), ideology for Gramsci is not only linked to the ruling class interests, but could also by the articulation of the true interests of subordinate classes:

For Gramsci, it was essential that the subordinate classes first achieve hegemony in the ideological-cultural sphere of society before attempting to gain control of the instruments of state power. Unless it first won in this cultural arena, which Gramsci referred to as the "war of position" seizing state power would prove to be calamitous. Thus, the long-range contestation for ideological hegemony was seen to be a gradual process taking place on many fronts. (Moen 1998)

At this point we can see parallels between Gramsci’s (1971) conceptions of the education system, as well as civil and political society, Paulo Freire’s (1970) elaboration of the “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” and Frantz Fanon’s (1967) role allocated to colonized intellectuals in his book “Wretched of the Earth”. Gramsci, just like Freire and Fanon some years later, puts the development of independent political consciousness and ideological leadership of the subaltern or oppressed masses in the centre of his theory of social and political change (based on the critical analysis of the education system and the type of intellectuals it produces):

Education, culture, the widespread organization of knowledge and experience constitute the independence of the masses from the intellectuals. The most intelligent phase of the struggle against the despotism of career intellectuals and against those who exercise authority by divine right consists in the effort to enrich culture and heighten consciousness. And this effort cannot be postponed until tomorrow or until such time as when we are politically free. It is itself
freedom, it is itself the stimulus and the condition for action. (Gramsci cited in Buttigieg 1995, p. 20)

It is, furthermore, important to realize that Gramsci, who favoured a processual theory of change rather than a linear one, thought that organizations such as political parties could be found in both civil and political society, depending on the socio-historical context. Consequently, in my historical analysis of civil society in Mozambique (see sub-chapter 4), I consider FRELIMO for example, as part of a civil society struggle during the anti-colonial war, and after proclamation of independence of the country as part of political society, carrying out a “policing function – that is to say, the function of safeguarding a certain political and legal order” (Gramsci 1971, p. 155). In order to decide if a political party is a member of political or civil society, its purpose needs to be analysed:

Is its purpose one of repression or of dissemination; in other words, does it have a reactionary or a progressive character? (Gramsci 1971, p. 155)

Accordingly, in every specific context of analysis, it is essential to understand that both hegemony and coercion are not fixed categories that include specific arrangements of power relations. The “State” in Gramsci’s conception, should be understood not only as the apparatus of government (including its elected political parties) “but also as the “private” apparatus of “hegemony” or civil society” (Gramsci 1971, p. 261). In short, for Gramsci one might say that “State = political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci 1971, p. 263).

Furthermore, when applying a broadly Gramscian framework for civil society analysis it is important to keep an analytical distinction between political and civil society. Power, therefore, does not emanate from everywhere or anywhere to appear in the micro-physics of personal relationships and neither does resistance, as would be the case in Foucault’s36 conception of power. Power for Gramsci is rather the result of the conflictual or consensual interplay of political and civil society, concentrated in specific locations and historical contexts. It is also important to note that not all “change” can be defined as “resistance” in a Gramscian framework, but only that change which produces improved outcomes for subaltern classes and class fractions (Whitehead 2015). Wider societal change, which Gramsci (1971) describes as a historical bloc, is usually linked to

36 See Foucault (1980, p. 142): “There are no relations of power without resistance.”
the way in which social practices (structure) both are created by and create the values and theories (superstructure) we use to rationalize and explain practices.

In his theory of civil and political society, intellectual leadership was crucial for influencing cultural hegemony and hence, for joining social forces and making alliances. Intellectual leaders involved into creating a new historical bloc, as FRELIMO leaders in Mozambique did during the liberation struggle (see sub-chapter 4.3), are hence building up a new societal consent and social order. According to Gill (2003), with reference to Gramsci, a historical bloc refers to:

An historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements. Moreover, for a new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders must engage in conscious planned struggle. Any new historical bloc must have not only power within the civil society and economy, it also needs persuasive ideas, arguments and initiatives that build on, catalyze and develop its political networks and organization – not political parties as such. (Gill 2003, p. 58)

In conclusion, whilst many theorists build their civil society conceptualizations on the existence of universally constituted philosophical, scientific and democratic norms, hence rejecting contextualism, relativism and nihilism (Flyvbjerg 1998), Gramsci builds his theory of civil society on a political theory of transformative change. He sees within civil society the force to support hegemony and build-up counterhegemony. According to him, civil society carries the power of building and influencing the ‘common sense’, including the cultural norms and the ideology framing it, and developing counterhegemony, meaning the questioning of the superstructure or ‘integral state’ upon which political and civil society rests. Gramsci’s thoughts reject the peaceful consensus-building meaning of civil society (see also reference to Chandhoke in Chapter 1).

Having in mind the importance Gramsci puts on resistance and counter-hegemonic struggle, Foucault and his concept of power might need much more consideration in the study of civil society as it does until today. The concepts of resistance and counter-hegemony are central to examining the relations of power that shape the possibilities and limits for social transformation and hence it is crucial that resistance to power is acknowledged and woven into my research systematically through the methodological framework (see chapter 3). This position is informed by Gramsci’s writing on hegemony and civil society as outlined in this sub-chapter. Foucault refers in his work
to a political task that appears responsive to my earlier distinction made between the consensus building and conflict ridden civil society concept:

…to criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them. (Chomsky & Foucault 1974, p. 171)

Returning now to the influence of colonialism on the construction of a civil society, it is Ekeh’s Theoretical Statement of the Two Publics in Africa (1975) which can add a specific post-colonial African perspective to Gramsci’s concept of civil society or perhaps provide another lens, through which the overall power struggles in many African countries, and at times violent conflicts in the civil society arena, could be better understood conceptually. According to Gramsci (1971) economic, cultural, social, ethical, religious, political and other aspects of life influence the ‘common sense’ within civil society, which essentially creates the operational space of a public, sphere where worldviews get shaped. Ekeh (1975), using a similar concept, which he calls the ‘common moral foundation’, distinguishes on that basis two public realms in African countries:

At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individual’s public behaviour. I shall call this the primordial public because it is closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities, which nevertheless impinge the public interest. The primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm. On the other hand, there is a public realm which is historically associated with the colonial administration and which has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. It is based on civil structures: the military, the civil service, the police, etc. Its chief characteristic is that it has no moral linkages with the private realm. I shall call this the civic public. The civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial public. (Ekeh 1975, p. 92)

Furthermore, the primordial public according to Ekeh:

…is a reservoir of moral obligations, a public entity which one works to preserve and benefit. The Westernized sector has become an amoral civic public from which one seeks to gain, if possible in order to benefit the moral primordial public. (Ekeh 1975, p. 100)

37 According to Chatterjee (2011, p. 119): “The old idea of a Third World sharing a common history of colonial oppression and backwardness is no longer as persuasive as it was in the 1960. The trajectory of economic growth taken by the countries of Asia has diverged radically from that of most African countries.”

38 The bold words are an excerpt from the author.
Osaghae (2003), who uses Ekeh’s statement explicitly to build the bridge for analysing aspects of contemporary civil society in Africa after the millennium, puts it the following:

Colonialism created new demands, and presented new challenges and opportunities which transformed indigenous social structures in fundamental ways. The disjuncture between state and society, and the development of the public realm as two publics rather than one are consequences of that colonial interface. (Osaghae 2003, p. 9)

Ekeh’s theoretical statement of the two publics carries a qualifying notion in relation to the liberation, post-colonial leadership and analysis of historical processes and political spaces of exclusion and inclusion of different civil society actors and social arenas and can be of great value when analysing civil society in Africa. Osaghae (2003) highlights that it is the insights from the analysis of the primordial public on the one hand and its dialectical interface with the civic public on the other, which civil society development studies in Africa should be concerned with and which indeed distinguishes them from studies in the West. Against this backdrop, the use of a post-colonial Gramscian framework for understanding the creation of hegemony as part of social struggles (cf. Laclau & Mouffe 1985), and a Foucauldian influenced methodology, for identifying the systems that produce social disciplines and social inequality, hence appear appropriate for civil society studies in Africa. Chandhoke (2003) raises relevant issues and asks a number of reflective and important conceptual questions that shall be considered when carrying out civil society analysis in the Global South:

The ubiquity of a concept (civil society), we can conclude somewhat regretfully, may prove ultimately to be its undoing. For if it comes onto everyone’s lips with a fair amount of readiness, it must have lost both shape and content. Amidst all this acclaim, ritual invocations of civil society as a panacea for the ills of the modern world sound simply insipid and dreary. Where in all this are the grey areas of civil society that Hegel spoke of? Where are the exploitations and the oppressions of civil society that Marx passionately castigated? Where is the state-inspired project of hegemony that Gramsci unearthed so brilliantly and insightfully? Where do we find the ideological construction of subjectivity in this civil society? Where do we look for struggles over meaning, over form, over content, all of which once made for some exciting debates in all these contemporary formulations? (Chandhoke 2003, p. 13)

The above-mentioned theoretical and methodological approaches and questions accompanied my research and helped me to critically examine the impact of the Western civil society concept, both empirically and theoretically. I started to problematize how worldviews, different languages and key assumptions about the
negotiation space between the individual and legitimate decision-makers, may influence the concept of civil society and consequently the empirical exploration of it. Chandhoke (2004) does not see languages as living in peaceful coexistence but rather points to the fact that some languages acquire hegemony in the domain of civil society while others do not, based on modalities of power. According to her, the tribal person or poor African farmer has consequently lost out not only because he speaks a different language, or because his language of land ownership proves incommensurable with official language, but also because he is powerless. He is powerless because in a basic sense he is powerless in material terms, but he is also powerless because his language is not reflected in, recognized by, or even understood in the modern public sphere. He and his language are both by-passed (Chandhoke 2004, p. 42). Resistance is then the only way to articulate his freedom and demand culturally defined moral obligations. According to Ekeh (1975), moral obligations are expressed in Africa in the primordial and not the modern civic public where the “African bourgeois class did not antagonize the precepts of the colonial state but only its alien personnel which it eventually replaced” (Osaghae 2003, p. 5).

Chandhoke therefore concludes that both language and the understanding of key concepts carry significant notions of civil society as a discursive community and that there can be no dialogue when two languages convey different understandings. At the same time, she underlines that the ‘state official’ has already resolved the conceptual question in favour of a predominantly ‘Western-liberal’ understanding of civil society, based on the dimension of power. The tribal in a modern understanding of state and administration does not even have the right to exit from the exchange and go his own way, for he (the tribal) has no option but to accept the language of the official (Chandhoke 2004). Indigenous peoples therefore find themselves subjected to a monologue that goes in only one direction, that of the state official and of Western ideology which promotes liberal democracy and economic growth.

39 Throughout my research it was important for me to consider the colonial weight of certain terms I used. Considering the fact that terminology is often not neutral but rather politically determined in development discourse I follow Linda Thuhivai Smith’s argument for using the term ‘indigenous peoples’, underlining the ‘s’ at the end: ‘Indigenous peoples’ is a relatively recent term which emerged in the 1970s out of the struggles primarily of the American Indian Movement (AIM), and the Canadian Indian Brotherhood. It is a term that inter- nationalizes the experiences, the issues and the struggles of some of the world’s colonized peoples. The final ‘s’ in ‘indigenous peoples’ has been argued for quite vigorously by indigenous activists because of the right of peoples to self-determination.” (Smith 2008, p. 7)
Based on the analysis of development and civil society theories from a post-colonial perspective, I conclude that contemporary civil society in its current dominant conception within the development discourse is Eurocentric and part of the neoliberal worldview that holds high modernization and economic growth whilst downplaying historical and contemporary power relationships that continue to exclude major parts of the global population (see Munck 2004). Therefore, the search for a local concept and meaning of civil society in today’s ‘Third’ World needs to consider the real tension between a Western consensus-oriented civil society concept (and the historical development that ‘enlightened’ it) and the historical and contemporary conflictual reality in which most civil societies reside having in mind their unique contextuality. Mbembe’s (2001) request for the reinterpretation of the historical and philosophical connotations of civil society in Africa therefore deserves particular attention:

The notion of civil society cannot, therefore, be applied with any relevance to African postcolonial situations without a reinterpretation of the historical and philosophical connotations that it suggests: the indigenous categories used for thinking political about conflictual and violent relations, the special vocabularies in which the political imaginary is expressed and the institutional forms into which that form is translated, the anthropology that underlies both issues of representation and issues of unequal allocation of utilities, the negotiation of heterogeneity, and the refinement of passions. (Mbembe 2001, p. 39)

2.5. Civil society and social transformation

One broad overarching framework for making an argument for the transformative potential within post-colonial civil society is the intuition of Karl Polanyi (2001) in the closing years of the Second World War. Based on the analysis of the devastating impact of market liberalism of the 20th century, and linked to it, of the world economic crisis, as well as the state-led “protective measures”, Polanyi wrote his main book “The Great Transformation”. In fact, Polanyi’s thinking provides a great opportunity to analyse societal reactions to the expansion of the neoliberal market economy as we can see it nowadays through the increasing neoliberal economic globalization (cf. foreword of Stiglitz in Polanyi 2001). During his time, Polanyi already noticed the attempts to create a single global all encompassing self-regulating market. He became the first proponent of Substantivism, which stands against formalism40, suggesting that economic activities are first of all social phenomena:

40 Representatives of formalism underline the limitedness of resources, which according to their assumption confront unlimited needs. The formal meaning, used by today's neoclassical economists,
The economy is therefore embedded and entangled into institutions; let them be of economic or non-economic nature. The latter is no less important. (Polanyi, 1979, p. 218)

According to Polanyi (1979), the concept of “embeddedness”, the integration of the economy into society, has its function against the background of socio-cultural institutions and societal organization. In his critique of capitalism, he underlines the crucial value of the “fictitious commodities”: land, labour and money. He further claims that if these commodities enable the functioning of a self-regulated market, the economy is no longer embedded in social relationships (Polanyi 2001). His theory of transformation suggests that the untrammeled rule of the unregulated market would be contested by a counter-movement whereby society protected itself from the social and environmental devastation caused by an unregulated market.

Many countries in the ‘developing’ world, where the majority of the population makes a living from small-scale agriculture farming, and industrialization is only a marginal part of the national economy, are particularly negatively affected by the impact of the commodification of land and money, including environmental degradation. Most residents of ‘Third’ World countries are also barely socially protected compared with countries in the Global North. They are more likely to develop a counter-movement to capitalist exploitation, which would lead to longer-term societal transformation that could not simply be explained by class interest (Polanyi 2001). He sees the entire society and environment challenged by capitalism if the trading community – nowadays called economic elites – would not:

… sense the dangers involved in the exploitation of the physical strengths of the worker, the destruction of family life, the devastation of neighborhoods, the denudation of forests, the pollution of rivers, the deterioration of craft standards, the disruption of folkways, and the general degradation of existence including...

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refers to economics as the logic of rational action and decision-making, as a choice between the alternative uses of limited (scarce) means, as 'maximizing,' or 'optimizing. Representatives of substantivism reject this basic assumption (cf. Rössler 2005, p. 37).

41 Author’s own translation from German to English.

42 Polanyi refers to institutions as “reciprocity” and “redistribution” – meaning the institutionalization of “symmetrical organized structures” that use “rules of redistribution” (Polanyi 1979, p. 221).

43 For Polanyi (2001), fictitious commodities are land, labour and money. In his theory, these commodities must be “embedded” in social relationships, and subject to moral considerations, religious beliefs and community management.

44 According to Munck (2013, p. 4), the origins of the term social transformation lies in the early twentieth century opposition between revolution and reform and the attempts to build the bridge between the gap. Whilst this binary opposition had argued that the system could either be overthrown or subject to piecemeal reform, there was, arguably, a third option of pursuing ‘revolutionary reform,’ which could act as a framework for broader social transformation (Munck 2013, p. 4).
housing and arts, as well as the innumerable forms of private and public life that do not affect profits. (Polanyi, 2001, p. 139)

In such a context, the various societal groups, affected in different ways, would ultimately come together and challenge the unregulated market system. A double-movement, using Polanyi’s words, involving particularly mass based social movements that aim to assert more democratic control over political life, could then be a force for social transformation (cf. Gill 2003):

For a century, the dynamics of modern society was governed by a double movement: the market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions. Vital though such a countermovement was for the protection of society, in the last analysis it was incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and thus with the market system itself. (Polanyi 2001, p. 136)

Hence, Polanyi (2001) saw the self-regulating market as utopian and a limiting self-regulatory system, coming out of society, as realistic. Capitalism, according to him, produces primarily social problems and only secondarily economic problems (cf. Owen 1817, in Polanyi 2001, p. 134). Counter-movements, accordingly, are “reactions against a dislocation which attack the very fabric of society” (Polanyi 2001, p. 136). The mechanism for transformation, according to Polanyi, derives from internal forces (Polanyi 2001, p. 156). Polanyi (2001) provides several examples of social movements in “The Great Transformation”, e.g. the Luddites and supporters of Owenism.

The “great multitude of movements” (cf. Hardt & Negri 2005) is nowadays represented by the various social movements, which fight for “de-commodification” of their community land in Africa. Internationally organized groups such as 'La Via Campesina’ are as much part of this movement as can be national and provincial farmers’ unions, critical social student’s movements, rights-based more autonomous NGOs as well as spontaneous innumerable protesting local peasant, cultural and spiritual groups. They might still partly act disconnected without traceable links between them – e.g. due to limited access to information and political manipulation (as my case study from Inhassunge District in chapter 6 demonstrates) but collectivist solutions are slowly emerging, based on the magnitude of poverty, economic exploitation, political corruption and armed conflict nowadays encountered in many parts of Africa.
Having analysed Polanyi and Gramsci, I believe both theories provide a common ground for understanding civil society as a bottom-up transformative sphere in which authoritarian governments can be supported as well as contested. Munck has taken a similar perspective and argues further that:

Taken in its broadest sense, Polanyi’s notion of a social counter-movement could be seen as an incipient theory of counter-hegemony... For Gramsci (1971), modern ‘Western’ class orders are able to impose ‘hegemony’ over society as a whole, with consent being as important as direct control or repression. It is through the organs of civil society—such as the churches, schools, trade unions and the media—that capitalist hegemony is constructed and maintained. Gramsci, in practice an orthodox communist, saw the proletarian party as the agent of counter-hegemony. For Polanyi, on the other hand, who had broken with communism and was more influenced by the socialist Guild and Christian socialist traditions, it was a social reaction to the market that would spur a counter-hegemonic movement. Not only the subaltern classes but also powerful capitalist interests would be threatened by the anarchy of the market and would thus react. (Munck 2004, pp. 180 – 181)

The critique of economism and commodification of the life world, provides the ground of the renaissance of ‘the cultural’ element in social dislocation and resistance and provides the basis for understanding the significance of new social movements, including their political and cultural framing. Polanyi argues that it is “not economic exploitations, as often assumed, but the disintegration of the cultural environment of the victim that is then the cause of the degradation” (Polanyi 2001, p. 164). Trying to reduce and end degradation and orientated to political transformation civil society in Africa is then bound to the understanding of how culture affects the creation of hegemony and counter-hegemony in a post-colonial reality in which “inequality and immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities” (Fanon 1967, p. 30).

If as Polanyi suggests, the ‘cultural’ is so central to the victim and the cause of degradation, then the transformation of cultural hegemony, described by Gramsci as the relation between culture and power under capitalism, becomes essential. Cultural imperialism, possibly (but not necessarily) carried forward by civil society organizations originating from the Global North and criticised by post-development thinkers such as Rahnema (1997) and Alvares (1992), can become a cause and source of oppression of the poor. In summary, civil society is as much a political as it can be a cultural hegemonic project. It is not value-neutral but as diverse as the many cultural values and beliefs around the world. It takes its strengths and weakness from
contextualized cultural meanings and transforms them, as both material and cultural values are under attack.

Binary oppositional meanings of civil society, such as Western/Non-western, modern/traditional, societies with history/societies without history, secular/religious and civil/uncivil (cf. Randeria 2007) seem to be increasingly acknowledged and form the basis of distinguishing the civic and primordial public spheres (cf. Ekeh 1975). They also divide the dominant epistemological, political and social theories into domination and subordination. Understanding these dichotomies and the system of sub-ordination, as well as the development of political consciousness, is essential for civil society actors who want to support positive social transformation. However, this is not a given precondition and there are many examples where civil society actors collaborate with powerful actors that entrench progressive or reactionary forces.

Following Polanyi’s concept of ‘counter-movement’ linked to the expansion of the unregulated market (Polanyi 2001), and Gramsci’s construct of civil society, which he sees as forming the foundation for societal hegemony and counter-hegemony, I further use Foucault’s elaboration of tactics and strategies of power to understand the development and current impact of the Eurocentric modern civil society project on social transformation in a ‘developing’ country context. Heller’s interpretation of Foucault’s reference to tactics and strategies is useful as a guide:

‘Tactics’ are the intentional actions carried out in determinate political contexts by individuals and groups; ‘strategies’ are the unintentional—but institutionally and socially regularized—effects produced by the non-subjective articulation of different individual and group tactics. Both tactics and strategies involve power, because both create social change; only strategies, however, involve non-subjective power. (Heller 1996, pp. 87, 88)

Hence, the binary opposition of the ‘modern’ and ‘locally rooted traditional’ civil society in Mozambique can be seen as an example of a strategy of the modern capitalist system to create subjectivity. Within that strategy, I want to understand the politically powerful project of colonization and its current influence on the subjective meaning of residents within civil society. The key challenge, both empirically and theoretically, of this civil society research is the articulation of a narrative rather than a rationalist civil

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45 Beverley (1999, p. 129) referring to Canclini (1995) stresses that “the political as such has been partially displaced by a culturalist notion of social agency located in civil society”. He also sees civil society itself as a space in which subaltern/dominant relations are produced and reproduced, rather than one pole of a subaltern/dominant, good/back dichotomy.
society concept using an inductive process; one that is based on local people’s history and post-colonial reality, rather than predefined Western theories. Sometimes the term “civil society” was not known to people I interviewed at district level and did not exist in the relevant local language. Hence, the term of analysis needed to be constructed in the interview situation before it could be used for further interpretation and analysis.

Some Mozambican academics, although they appeared as a minority during this research, support this type of research:

The confusing signs emitted through the African reality provoked the entrance of many problems on top of the Africanists radar, most probably, in indignation against the terms of analysis. The African crisis is above all a crisis of African studies which has sinned and preferred a certain type of approach which Mamdani (1996) calls the ‘analogue history’: Africa only makes sense as the history of Europe. In other words, if the concept of ‘civil society’ carries a difficult heuristic application in the African context, the solution is to run after external analytical instruments of a European historical context which is coherent with the difficult operationalization of the concept.46 (Macamo 2002, p. 1)

Mamdani (1995) focuses on the sub-ordination and abuse of ‘civil society’ in modernization theory and claims that either from a (political) nation-building or (depoliticized) society-focused perspective, ‘civil society’ – if embedded in the ‘traditional’ – is left in the darkness:

The ‘modernization’ theorists at least recognized and named the residual part of humanity as enveloped in ‘tradition’. The theorists of ‘civil society’, however, refuse this humanity even that residual recognition, turning a blind conceptual eye towards them. It is this uncompromising modernism of ‘civil society’ theorists that reveals them as indeed parochial. (Mamdani 1995, p. 614)

2.6. Conclusion: Civil society and its contradictions

Reflecting on the analysis carried out so far, I would argue that the consensus-orientated modern conception of civil society linked to the dominant economic growth and development discourses has to be seen as the underlying strategy of global power interrelations in the context of capitalism. A concept that perpetuate colonial structures

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46 Os sinais confusos emitidos pela realidade africana e que provocam tantos problemas aos radares africanistas entraram, provavelmente, em rebelião contra os termos de análise. A crise africana é sobretudo uma crise dos estudos africanos que tem pecado por privilegiar um tipo de abordagens que Mamdani (1996) apelida de “história por analogia”: a África só faz sentido como passado da Europa. Noutros termos, se o conceito de “sociedade civil” é de difícil aplicação heurística no contexto africano, a solução é recorrer a instrumentos analíticos extraídos dum contexto histórico europeu congruente com a dificuldade de operacionalização do conceito.
and discourses, which are connected to power, representation and the construction of subjec- 
tivity. NGOs are the preferred intermediary partners of donors (Wallace 2004) in order to bring forward their neoliberal ‘democratization’ agenda. This preference in turn, may constitute a strategy of the Western donor community that aims to control the development of an autonomous local civil society and the relationship between the state and the society. Wallace (2004) provides an interesting discussion on the potential use of NGOs to advance a neoliberal development agenda:

Current funding trends and the influence of business sector management thinking are shaping the way development is conceptualized, analysed and addressed by development NGOs, reflecting agendas and paradigms developed by the rich and powerful countries. While there never was a golden age of NGOs, they are now becoming increasingly tied to global agendas and uniform ways of working. (Wallace 2004, pp. 216-217)

Gramsci (1971), Fanon (1967), Ekeh (1975), Mbembe (2001) and Chandhoke (2003) call for the analysis of the post-colonial social order in order to uncover the contradictory function of civil society within ‘development’. Their theories underline the need to look at the broader cultural and political context in which civil society organizations (and their moral values) operate. For them, civil society clearly goes beyond its Western institutional structures and needs to be understood in relation to the socio-cultural contextual meanings in which it is embedded, with a particular emphasis on those meanings articulated by people who appear to have little influence on the mainstream civil society debates:

We can do that (explore possibilities of constructing civil society) only when we view the concept as well as the sphere of actually existing civil societies from the vantage point of the least privileged. (Chandhoke 2003, p. 249)

This type of exploration about the construction of civil society opens up possibilities to view civil society as a bottom-up transformative sphere, it links civil society to Polanyi’s concept of a counter-movement that protects society from the unregulated market and to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and counter-hegemony. The analysis of the role of NGOs, that often have both a service-delivery and a technical advocacy role, moves then into the background as those roles clearly do not conform with the idea of and motivation behind a counter-movement. In a Gramscian sense, the NGO service-delivery role creates cohesion where resistance would be needed to produce positive results for the subaltern.
Following these thoughts, I believe that social justice orientated civil society studies in Africa must then consider the particularistic power dynamics that impact on the inclusion and exclusion of organizations into civil society and focus on the question which power forces are involved into marginalizing citizens from active participation in civil society. Furthermore, the interface between modern legalized civil society organizations (such as NGOs), social movements and traditional social structure should be studied - avoiding a one-sided focus on NGOs and other legalized civil society organizations. Particularly important, I would argue, is the analysis of the dynamics between the boundaries of civil and political society, bearing in mind the specific post-colonial African context still fashioned by the colonial past. For Ekeh (1975, p. 111) “it is that colonial past that has defined for us the spheres of morality that have come to dominate our politics.”
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

3.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological approach that guides this PhD thesis. On the one hand, it outlines the process which led to the adaptation of a certain research paradigm and its related values and preferences and on the other, it describes the methods and tools which guided data collection and analysis as well as overall research activities in Mozambique. Where doubts emerged during the identification of the methodological framework, they are articulated and discussed. During the entire research process, flexibility was a necessary feature to be applied as the availability or motivation of research participants was continuously affected by the complex social, political and economic context in which they are living. Adaptation to the country context was a permanent priority, in particular when new research projects like the EU civil society actor mapping were initiated and needed to be considered as potential knowledge alliances. This PhD thesis, transdisciplinary in nature, tries to fit the evolving context of development studies, continuously attempting to bridge the gap between development research and practice.

The thematic research focus and the concepts of civil society, development and social transformation were identified at the early stages of PhD proposal development; these are fields in which I had already collected empirical material during my time as a development practitioner with various international development agencies from 2000 until 2011. Early in the process, preliminary research hypotheses and questions were also identified. This was an important stage in the process, as it prepared the ground for contextualization and discussion of the research topic with others interested in the selected fields. These discussions in turn alerted to the many different ontological and epistemological beliefs, ideologies and political interests existing in society and science. Accordingly, I felt the need for clear positioning of the research and for finding a niche. This niche became ‘critical social theory’ underpinned by a postmodern ‘grounded theory’ approach, within the broad framework of social justice inquiry.
3.2. General epistemological and methodological parameters: Critical Theory, Grounded Theory and Situational Analysis

Critical theory in the narrow sense refers to the Frankfurt School stretching from Horkheimer to Habermas (Calhoun 1995). It argues fundamentally that a critical theory needs to be explanatory, practical, and normative at the same time. In other words, it is not enough to only explain what is wrong with a given social reality: it is also necessary to identify the social actors who might address these problems and to chart practical goals for social transformation (Habermas 1984a). To meet the needs of critical and realist inquiry, I adopted ‘grounded theory’ as my methodological orientation, first advanced by Glaser and Strauss (1967).

The grounded theory approach has since been further explored in various books and articles about qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, Clarke 2009, Charmaz 2014, Miles, Hubermann & Saldana 2014) and further developed into situational analysis by Clarke (2005). In a general sense, it represents an alternative to the traditional epistemology of a pre-given theoretical framework that is simply ‘applied’ to the phenomenon to be studied. A constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz 2014) assumes, on the contrary, that neither theory nor data are simply given but are, rather, constructed through an iterative process.

Critical realism and grounded theory then become highly compatible, sharing a focus on abduction and commitment to fallibilism and the interconnectedness of practice and theory. (Oliver 2012, p. 1)

General inductive research logic has been applied during the research process whilst emerging hypotheses have been tested in the field using deductive logic and abductive reasoning. Miles, Huberman & Saldana (2014) conclude that induction and deduction are actually dialectical procedures rather than mutually exclusive research procedures. Nevertheless, the deductive researcher starts with a preliminary causal network and the inductive researcher ends up with one. This research follows an inductive constructivist model that builds-up rather than conceptualizes top-down.

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47 Charmaz (2015) discussed both inductive and deductive reasoning at a DCU research summer school which I attended. In her handout to the workshop she states that abduction and abductive inference means considering all plausible theoretical explanations for the surprising data, forming hypotheses for each explanation, and checking these hypotheses empirically by examining data to arrive at the most plausible explanation.
The application of ‘Situational Analysis’, a postmodern approach to grounded theory advanced by Clarke (2005) was central to the entire research process as it helped to demonstrate how everyday practices of collective citizen action in Mozambique are constrained by the various situational elements shaping the globalized world. Fosket (2014) furthermore highlights that situational analysis supports the shaping of various interpretations of what is political and ethically feasible, what is economically practical, scientifically do-able (Fujimura 1987), and so on. All these interpretive dynamics have not been sufficiently taken into consideration within grounded theory. Situational Analysis also opens the door to include discourse studies \( \textit{à la Foucault} \) into grounded theory processes and helps to move beyond the ‘Knowing Subject’.

Interactionism, if it is to thrive and grow, must incorporate elements of poststructural and postmodern theory (e.g. the works of Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard, etc.) into its underlying views of history, culture and politics. (Denzin 1992, p. xvii)

Accordingly, situational analysis explicitly takes the ‘nonhuman’ into account. In her article ‘From Grounded Theory to Situational Analysis – What’s New? Why? How?’, Clarke provides examples of nonhuman objects such as cultural objects, technologies, media, nonhuman animate and inanimate pieces of material culture and the lively discourses that also constitute the situations I study.

Some (nonhuman objects) are products of human action (and we can study the production process); others are constructed as “natural” (and we can study how they have been constructed as such). (Clarke 2009, p. 201)

For Clarke (2009) it is important to note that ‘nonhuman’ actants are not only present as nodes in the actor network but also have agency. She continues to argue that including the nonhuman challenges posthumanism – the idea that only humans ‘really’ matter or ‘matter most’. Miller (1998) and Hodder (2000) precisely argue that material forms are often of significance precisely because, being disregarded as trivial, they were often a key unchallenged mechanism for social reproduction and ideological dominance. Social Worlds in their view are as much constituted by materiality as the other way around.

The element of ‘implicated’ actors and actants further extends situational analysis deeper into power analysis. The concept of ‘implicated’ actors as explained by Clarke (2009) provides a means of analysing the situatedness of less powerful actors and the consequences of others’ actions for them and raises issues of discursive constructions of actors and ‘nonhuman’ actants. In this context, ‘implicated’ actors can be distinguished
as those physically present but generally silenced/ignored/invisible by those in power
and those not physically present but solely discursively constructed by others in the
situation. Clarke concludes about the key elements of situational analysis,
differentiating them from grounded theory the following way:

In sum, the tap roots of SA (Situational Analysis) lie in Chicago School of
ethnographies and pragmatist philosophy. The new roots include Foucauldian
discourse studies going beyond ‘the knowing subject’, taking the nonhuman
explicitly into account, and implicated actors and actants. These come together
in the shift to situations per se as focal – as units of analysis. (Clarke et al. 2015,
p. 95)

The combined grounded theory and situational analysis model of this research project
fits well within the critical social theory approach. Whilst holding a critical social
theory perspective, ‘situated’ grounded theory knowledge can help to identify new
constructivist and interactionist theories of social change, rather than following the
overall positivist views surrounding critical theory during the early European
enlightenment process, as well as grounded theory in its initial stages and in part until
today (Tolhurst 2012). This study uses ‘the social’ as constituted through discursive
practices and on discourses, as constitutive of subjectivities (Clarke 2009). It follows
Foucault (1972), who initiated the concept of discourse analysis, giving power a central
place within relationships in society expressed through language and practices.
According to Flyvbjerg (1998) social theories and their relation to power need much
more attention in the context of civil society research:

If societies that suppress conflict are oppressive, perhaps social and political
theories that ignore or marginalize conflict are potentially oppressive, too. And
if conflict sustains society, there is good reason to caution against an idealism
that ignores conflict and power. (Flyvbjerg 1998, p. 229)

Following Foucault’s thinking, the sphere of civil society could well be part of the
“disciplinary grid of society” (Foucault 2010, p. 53) and the Western part of civil
society organizations that operate in the Global South might enter “the paradox of the
relations of capacity and power” (ibid, p. 47). Situational analysis as developed by
Clarke can help to understand the disciplinary power potential inherent in the Western
discourse about civil society in a global context where information and discourses seem
to be broadly controlled by the global North.

Indeed, Foucault (2010) underlines that the history of Western societies (different from
the others in its trajectory and generally, universalizing) is formed by the relations
between the growth of (technical and procedural) capabilities and the growth of autonomy and that this relationship is not as simple as someone might believe, indeed, according to him, it involves conveying various technologies:

…disciplines, both collective and individual, procedures of normalization exercised in the name of the power of the state, demands of society or of population zones, are examples. What is at stake, then, is this: How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations? (Foucault 2010, p. 48)

Foucault (1978) also claims that power is always linked to resistance and that this resistance is never in a position of exteriority. Hence, it is necessary to look at power not as a ‘theory’ but to rather include power into the analytical process, accompanied by consciousness that arrangements of power are always multifaceted. Accordingly, for Foucault, as Carlson (2007, pp. 577, 578) outlines, “social justice can have no common definition, it rather “occurs in individual self-fashioning, techniques of the self, and in the care of the self, and not in understanding and incorporating the pseudo-science of psychology. Furthermore, social justice for Foucault involves one’s everyday practices of freedom, where historical contingent practices provide spaces of resistance and alternative ways to govern others and ourselves in the present.”

3.3. Grounded theory in social justice oriented critical development studies

As has been mentioned in sub-chapter 3.2, grounded theory methodology, in particular Glaserian grounded theory, which has been widely adopted as a scientific methodology in recent decades, has been variously characterised as “hermeneutic” and “positivist” (Åge 2011). From each of these schools, it has been criticised for either being too subjectivist or objectivist. However, of late, many researchers, including myself, take grounded theory as a broad methodological framework, the procedures of which are actually compromises between different perspectives and must be adapted to the increasing complexities of a globalized word, using postmodern approaches like Situational Analysis (Clarke 2009). Therefore, I felt that the combination of grounded theory and situational analysis was appropriate to be applied as part of social justice inquiry guided by a critical development studies perspective.

Canella and Lincoln (2015) define ‘critical’ within qualitative research as any research that recognizes power and seeks in its analyses to excavate the archaeology of taken-for-granted perspectives to understand how unjust and oppressive social conditions
came to be reified as historical “givens”. This definition fits quite well with Foucault’s perspective on social justice as described at the end of the previous chapter. According to Canella and Lincoln (2015), fundamental questions are: Who/what is helped/privileged/legitimated? Who/what is harmed/ Oppressed/ disqualified? In addition to post-structural analysis and post-modern challenges to the domination of grand narratives, the range of feminist perspectives, queer theory and its critique of normalization, as well as anti-colonialist assessments of empire, are included in the broad definition of the ‘critical’. Critical qualitative analysis also places special emphasis on the critical power of place and includes different forms of knowledge such as scientific, everyday knowledge, knowledge within different disciplines and between indigenous and non-indigenous knowledges (Somerville 2012).

Canella and Lincoln (2015) continue to state that critical qualitative research, in addition to searing out of historical origins of socially and politically reified social arrangements, also seeks to understand how victims of such social arrangements come to accept and even collaborate in maintaining oppressive aspects of the system. Hence, hidden and invisible structures of power are considered when analysing the social context as well as dynamics that lead to inclusion and exclusion, empowerment and disempowerment. Frequently, as has also been confirmed during this research, power structures are tied to the extension of neo-liberal ideologies and capitalism, which in turn affects the functioning of indigenous social, political and cultural systems. Therefore, it is not surprising that many indigenous scholars approach relations between themselves and imperialist forms of power from the perspective of colonialism, neo-colonialism and post-colonialism.

Relations shaped by conquest and occupation inevitably demand critical interrogation, for the lasting vestiges of cultural, linguistic, and spiritual destruction alter forever the cultural landscape of an indigenous people. (Ghandi 1998 and Spivak 1999, in Canella & Lincoln 2015, p. 246)

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48 According to the powercube website (developed by the Institute of Development Studies in cooperation with John Gaventa and Jethro Pettit) “...hidden forms of power are used by vested interests to maintain their power and privilege by creating barriers to participation, by excluding key issues from the public arena, or by controlling politics ‘backstage’. They may occur not only within political processes, but in organizational and other group contexts as well, such as workplaces, NGOs or community-based organizations” (Gaventa & Pettit).

49 “…Invisible power involves the ways in which awareness of one’s rights and interests are hidden through the adoption of dominating ideologies, values and forms of behaviour by relatively powerless groups themselves. Sometimes this is also referred to as the ‘internalization of powerlessness’ in a way that affects the awareness and consciousness of potential issues and conflicts, even by those directly affected.” (ibid)
New methodological avenues and post-development perspectives, to systematically approach social justice enquiry that fosters the integration of subjective experience (Habermas 1984b) with social conditions for emancipation (Fraser 1990) are required. Grounded theory appears to be well placed to provide new ways of thinking about social change in critical development studies. Ziai (2011) rightly points out the need for radical change in the perception of development, including the discourse around the role of the state, civil society and the market. He underlines that the state can be seen not only as an adversary, but also as a potential ally against neo-liberal globalisation, in particular when it comes to defending local communities as the owners of their land and natural resources, the latter being essential for local communities cultural and material survival.

Foucault’s (1990) concept of ‘biopower’ finally signaled a move away from sovereign power: from the sovereign right to ‘take life or let live’ to ‘make live and let die’. According to Rabinow and Rose (2003) ‘Biopower’ entails

... one or more truth discourses about the ‘vital character of living human beings; an array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth; strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and health; and modes of subjectification, in which individuals work on themselves in the name of individual or collective life or health. We argue that while exceptional ‘paroxysmal’ forms of biopower, linked to the formation of absolutist dictatorship and mobilization of technical resources, can lead and have led to a murderous thanatopolitics, biopower in contemporary states takes a different form. It characteristically entails a relation between ‘letting die’ (laissez mourir) and making live (faire vivre) - that is to say strategies for the governing of life. (Rabinow & Rose 2003, p. 1)

Following Foucault’s concept of ‘Biopower’, disciplining techniques of power are present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police etc.) (cf. Foucault 2010) and this means that the often linear and inter-linked concepts of development and civil society, and social justice of course, as described in the previous sub-chapters, need to be scrutinized against their own politics of (re-) production and their explanatory relevance in relation to conflict and power.

Mohanty (2004) refers to various strategies that revolutionary critical social sciences need to place at the centre of academic research, including networking, collaborative planning as well as conceptualizations grounded in critical ethical challenges to social systems, supports for egalitarian struggle, and revolutionary ethical awareness and
activism from within the context of community. She affirms that research should be relational (often as related to community) and grounded within a critique of systems, egalitarian struggle, and revolutionary ethics. In this context, questions about representation, discourses, and the construction of knowledge, origins of oppression and the definition of values are important and have systematically been put at the centre of this dissertation project.

Kellner\textsuperscript{50} also stresses that critical social theory needs to develop both its analysis of the present situation and a new politics in order to become once again the cutting edge of radical social theory. Rabaka (2009) builds on Kellner’s critique and further applies it to the African post-colonial context:

Contemporary critical theory, as I envision and expatiate it, should not only challenge “conventional” critical theory to be more race and racism conscious, develop a deeper commitment to gender justice and women’s liberation, compassionately concern itself with colonialism (especially racial colonialism) and its interconnections with capitalism (especially racist capitalism), and unequivocally dialogue with cutting-edge anti-heterosexist and queer theory, but it should also unapologetically and generously draw from the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, Aimé Cesaire, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and Amilcar Cabral, as well as innumerable other non-European/non-white critical theorists, who collectively emphasize(d): the importance of avoiding the obsessive economism of many mainstream modern and postmodern Marxists; the power of ideology critique; the primacy of politics; the political economy of race (especially “the black race”) in a white supremacist world; the racist nature of colonialism and capitalism; the political economy of patriarchy and the need for women’s decolonization and women’s liberation; the politics of leadership and liberation; the politics of religion in a racialized and unjustly gendered world; and, the need to constantly deconstruct and reconstruct critical social theory. (Rabaka 2009, xi)

Thinking that goes beyond the Eurocentric development discourse and can facilitate direct engagement with strategies of those excluded by the Western model of development and its related discourses (Ziai 2007), is needed. However, according to Schultz (2014), grounded theory, particularly within development studies, has not yet been widely discussed or disseminated, even though post-colonial and post-development approaches demand much more self-reflection and critique about the ways that development is conceived. New more transparent and reflexive analytical tools are needed to advance and position critical social theory in a time of social and economic crises. In her article ‘Grounded theory in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century: Applications for advancing

social justice studies’ Charmaz (2005) argues that grounded theory offers rich possibilities for advancing critical qualitative research in the 21st century. She further states that social justice enquiry is one of many areas in which researchers can productively apply grounded theory methods created by Glaser and Strauss (1967). However, she also recognizes that most social justice enquiries are still objectivist, flowing from standard positivist approaches to social justice (Charmaz 2005). Many of the current post-development thinkers would agree and thus continue to argue that critical theory has been in crisis since the 1970s (Sparsam et al. 2014).

Looking at the development of and response to the Global Economic Crisis since 2007, there are now new arguments to develop fresh framings of critical social theory, both as analytically and politically oriented concepts. I believe from a post-colonial perspective, social justice orientated critical inquiry needs to take a step away from its almost exclusive occupation with economics and distributive justice, and look much more at the cultural elements that lead to domination on the one side and subalternity on the other. Consequently, the politics of recognition and political representation will automatically gain relevance (cf. Fraser 1995). A grounded theory inquiry process linked to Situational Analysis (which particularly encourages the inclusion of professional and personal experience about the social world and processes under study) recognizes that no analysis is ‘culturally’ neutral – despite many researchers and analysts’ claims of neutrality:

> What we know shapes, but does not necessarily determine, what we “find”. (Charmaz 2005, p. 510)

### 3.3.1. Reflective notes on personal experiences and ethical considerations

As a researcher who has been personally and professionally engaged in social action with various civil society actors, including from 2000 – 2008 in Mozambique, I bring with me some assumptions around the increasing importance of social justice in a globalized world. In particular, during my professional work with the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission in Mozambique (as an advisor for community level human-rights-based work), the Administration of the Limpopo National Park (as an advisor for community development and building up of community representative structures), the international faith-based NGOs CAFOD (Catholic Agency for Overseas Development of England and Wales, as Programme Manager Mozambique), and Trócaire (Caritas Ireland, as the global Governance and Human Rights Programme Leader), those
assumptions have been nourished. Furthermore, my own personal political engagement with social movements and activists, for example linked to La Via Campesina (globally) or ADECRU and faith based groups orientated by Liberation Theology (Mozambique), have increased my critical awareness about the limitations of the depoliticized liberal civil society concept.

Based on my own experiences of living 13 years in various conflict settings in Africa (Nigeria, Niger, Ethiopia, Mozambique) I am dedicated to ideas, concepts and actions that advance human rights, justice, equality, political participation as well as to critical reflection about power, status and hierarchy. Hence, when entering the research field, I brought with me practical experience of working with NGOs, personal engagement with social movements and relationships with social activists in Mozambique, as well as the motivation to deepen my understanding about power relationships between the various civil society actors at local, national and international level in the neoliberal era and how these power relationships affect the key ideas and concepts mentioned above.

Based on my personal and professional experience and motivation the methodological framework got orientated towards grounded theory and social justice oriented critical development studies. This approach facilitated the further development of my research focus and a shift in perspective; from a critical understanding of the mainstream liberal civil society concept embedded in the “good governance” debate to a post-colonial perspective. The latter was mainly informed from reflections about my own political engagement (and its limitations) as well as initial reading of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, overall engagement with critical development studies and a Foucauldian influenced situational analysis methodology (Clarke 2005).

The post-colonial perspective of my research further developed and deepened during field data collection in 2015 when I had already accomplished my literature review about civil society in Mozambique. My interview data soon uncovered the contradictory meaning of civil society (see part II) and the potential misuse of buzz words and concepts such as NGO participation and equality in a context of deep political and civil society exclusion of most research participants from rural district areas. At this stage, my concern to develop a purely normative research project in which I simply compare the ‘bad Western’ civil society project (well known from my own work experience) with a ‘romanticized good’, indigenous and localized concept (influenced from field
research), and consequently promote the latter as the authentic place for resistance against global neoliberalism and the often criticized corrupt and exploitative state, developed. I consequently decided that my research focus should robustly remain on analysing the dominant and contestatory definitions of civil society in a post-colonial situation, focusing on its complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion. I gave up on the initially articulated aim to develop a new normative civil society theory (see also chapter 1).

During data gathering, I tried at all times to be conscious of the fact that my presence in the field influences the situation of enquiry and vice versa; that people might develop ‘new’ expectations but also concerns, about how information will be used to ‘voice’ their problems and to whom. As the interaction between people involved in social movements, NGOs and traditional social structures are not fixed but as many other interrelations, in motion and transformation, are accelerated by the re-emergence of conflict, issues of fear and anger have accompanied field research. Interviews in Inhassunge District (where political-military tension was high) often gained intensity at the end, when recording was over and my notebook closed. This was the moment when people often articulated their distinct experiences and fears of reprisal if they passed on information formally on record. Accordingly, we decided to spend additional time at the beginning of interviews to explain issues related to confidentiality. Consent for taking and publishing pictures was obtained during field research. Upholding the privacy of research participants was always central to the entire research team and consequently data has been stored with caution.

Forms of agency linked to traditional social structures, religious beliefs and sorcery are often silenced and rendered invisible in the debates about civil society and development in Mozambique and as such this constitutes a danger, as the focus is then solely on the effects of power and not on their control or transformations (as my study aims to show). My attempt to integrate witchcraft dynamics into the deconstruction of civil society in Mozambique (cf. sub-chapter 6.2.5) underlines the difficulties of conceptualizing the Western civil society concept in a post-colonial African context. Consequently, ethical concerns and critique were articulated when presenting this part of my research in Maputo in August 2015. Slightly confused by this sudden but not entirely unexpected

\(^{51}\) In particular, the impact of fear, pressure and perceived intimidation, as well as the patriarchal nature of the public and political arena in the society are rarely questioned when research into civil society is carried out in Mozambique (Mattes & Shenga 2007).
criticism, I decided that I needed to pay more attention to the ethical positioning and appraisal of violence and exclusion as part of my civil society research.

I read Fanon’s (1967) book “The Wretched of the Earth” once again as a consequence of that decision on my plane trip back home and the emergence of a new personal consciousness linked to the need to understand the violence affecting and used from poor oppressed citizens on the one hand and the alienation and devalorization of the same violence from the bourgeois’ elite in urban areas on the other. This consciousness then became essential part of my research encounter with civil society and certainly influenced my own positioning within the civil society research field once again. Understanding Fanon’s thoughts were instrumental in facilitating this new encounter:

The atmosphere of myth and magic frightens me and so takes on an undoubted reality. By terrifying me, it integrates me in the traditions and the history of my district or of my tribe, and at the same time it reassures me, it gives me a status, as it were an identification paper. In under-developed countries the occult sphere is a sphere belonging to the community which is entirely under magical jurisdiction. (Fanon 1967, p. 43)

Particular attention has been given to how the objectives of this study were introduced to the research team and informants and to power, as a central aspect to be considered in cross-cultural research relationships. Piquemal (2001) points out that in research with cross-cultural participants, there is often a power imbalance that is rooted in colonialism and Hettne (cf. 1995) underlines, that ‘academic imperialism’ is still a major problem for knowledge production. Conscious of this fact, I have tried to adapt myself to local customs and where appropriate, provided information about my own history of living in Mozambique. I also put particular strong emphasis on the participatory nature of the research process. Both, I felt, helped to reduce the power imbalance that inevitably existed between me as a ‘white’, relatively wealthy, female researcher, the local, mainly male research team, and some of the very poor and marginalized men and women participating in this research. Spivak (1998, p. 271) describes the inevitable power imbalance clearly:

An understanding of contemporary relations of power, and of the Western intellectual's role within them, requires an examination of the intersection of a theory of representation and the political economy of global capitalism. A theory of representation points, on the one hand, to the domain of ideology, meaning, and subjectivity, and, on the other hand, to the domain of politics, the state, and the law.
During my research, I was certainly not able to escape my own subjectivity that is undoubtedly influenced by Western education. However, my experiences of working eight years with civil society in Mozambique, and the engagement with post-colonial theory, has helped me to find a niche, outside the Western dominated theories in order to critique them.

3.3.2. Theoretical sensitivity

Theoretical sensitivity is first cited in Glaser and Strauss’s seminal text (1967) as a two-part concept. Firstly, a researcher’s level of theoretical sensitivity is deeply personal; it reflects their level of insight into both themselves and the area that they are researching. Secondly, a researcher’s level of theoretical sensitivity reflects their intellectual history, the type of theory that they have read, absorbed and now use in their everyday thought. Researchers are a sum of all they have experienced. The concept of theoretical sensitivity acknowledges this fact and accounts for it in the research process. As a grounded theorist becomes immersed in the data, their level of theoretical sensitivity to analytical possibilities will increase. (Birks & Mills 2011, p.11)

As a way to start understanding some of my own professional and personal experiences and to further develop my theoretical sensitivity about the topics under study, a number of development and social transformation theories were studied before entering the field enquiry. Some of the theories I started to engage with included Karl Polanyi’s concept of ‘embeddedness’ as described in his book ‘The great transformation’ as well as Antonio Gramsci’s theory of civil and political hegemony, articulated in his ‘Prison Notebooks’ (1971). The latter having made a strong contribution towards my differentiated understanding of social and political society, alongside my experience about how structural societal change may happen in capitalist societies.

Starting from my own empirical experience, Foucauldian (see also sub-chapter 3.2) influenced situational analysis (Clarke 2005) has been integrative part of the methodological framework of my work, whilst Gramscian ideas were considered as potentially enriching the methodological framework of this thesis rather than bringing in a predefined theoretical framework that would break the inductive logic of this work. In her article ‘Reading Antonio Gramsci as a Methodologist’, Jubas (2010) explains how Gramsci’s work is mostly discussed as social theory, and is much less prominent in discussions about research methodology. This according to Jubas, is curious for two

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52 To use an expression of Karl Polanyi’s daughter Kari Polanyi-Levitt, we can say that the emphasis on “embeddedness” reflects “the fundamental need of people to be sustained by social relations of mutual respect” (Polanyi-Levitt 2006, p. 391).
reasons: First, as Guba and Lincoln (2007) and Denzin (2008) establish, methodological decisions reflect epistemological frameworks. Second, Gramsci himself recognized the connection between theory and methodology (and, for that matter, practice). Embedded in his work are suggestions and implications for social inquiry:

We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity, etc. (Gramsci 1971, p. 446)

Throughout the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci makes an important contribution to critical and qualitative research, strengthening the reason that understanding of the political and cultural context is a prerequisite for good research. Gramsci’s own methodological procedure (cf. Gramsci 1971, pp. 52-55) provides a good insight into how to design critical research in the social system:

Every trace of independent initiative on the part of subaltern groups should therefore be of incalculable value for the integral historian. Consequently, this kind of history can only be dealt with monographically, and each monograph requires an immense quantity of material which is often hard to collect. (Gramsci 1971, p. 55)

Jubas (2010) also stresses that all research is limited in its scope. Ability to produce knowledge and the potential for grounded theory to create only tentative, partial knowledge, instead of new theory about social processes, and the influence of the researcher in constructing qualitative data and knowledge, are two key limitations which should not be underestimated. As a way of dealing with some of these limitations, Jubas suggests the employment of “triangulation” by collecting multiple forms of data. Different forms of data could then maintain the contextual validity of a study, which is considered especially important in case study research (Meyer 2001, Sturman 1999).

One of the methodological challenges lies in the interaction between various research disciplines on the one hand, and the communication with day-to-day knowledge and experiences coming from experts, decision-makers, concerned citizens and myself, on the other. With this in mind, transdisciplinarity is based on a specific organization of knowledge, a governance of knowledge, which not only relies on excellence, but produces socially relevant, contextually adapted new knowledge, going beyond the boundary of a single scientific discipline.

The adage that science is too important to be left to scientists captures the normative challenge of integrating science in society, allowing for societal
participation, but in such a way that its creative power is not subsumed by immediate interests. (European Commission 2009, p. 9)

Accordingly, it was useful for me to develop a continuous level of theoretical sensitivity related to various academic disciplines such as sociology, economics and political science parallel to research design, data collection and analysis. The crossing over between induction and deduction helped me to engage with various conceptual and methodological debates and choices about how theories of truth, knowledge and social life are present in the discourse and practice of development studies. As some theoretical topics became more relevant to the interpretation and understanding of data, both the ‘dominant’ and ‘alternative’ theories of development were studied and are briefly outlined in sub-chapter 2.2. These theories and concepts have been used for ‘abductive’ reasoning towards the end of the data analysis, to understand the emerging discourses about civil society in a ‘developing’ country context and to contest these theories where data opened space for the emergence of new hypotheses.

Accordingly, Kelle’s (2014) ideas of ‘abduction’ have been applied when developing theoretical sensitivity during data collection and analysis. He acknowledges the fact that researchers frequently need to find ways to bring together their surprising field data and established knowledge. However, the objective of ‘abductive’ reasoning in this research remained the revision, re-formulation and at times reintegration of prior knowledge from my own development practice so that it became consistent with field data and observations.

Last, but not least, Freire (1970) argues that research has to begin where people are and thus uses generative themes and codes – i.e. areas of interest and objects from peoples’ actual lives – to begin the political process of making meaning and enabling people to become transformative agents, rather than victims or mere reproducers of existing ideologies. As suggested by Melucci (1996) and Tarrow (1998), this research also starts the endeavour by making linkages to linguistic, cognitive, and cultural studies and turns towards the dialectical relations among language, meaning, identity, structure and change. In order to do so, generative research themes close to the reality of research participants were identified during the course of this research which at times particularly resonated with ideas and concepts articulated by Antonio Gramsci and Paolo Freire.
3.4. Taking an in-depth approach to case study development

The development of an *in-depth case study* to strengthen the notion of contextualized ‘in-depth’ inquiry (Yin 2014, p. 24) and to increase the validity of overall findings was decided during the first year of the PhD, combined with the grounded theory-led inductive approach to developing theoretical categories and concepts. Due to the commitment to work mainly in an inductive way, the methodological framework evolved over time and instead of focusing on literature reviews based on static problem definitions and research questions, attention was given to:

a) The complexity of the key concepts the PhD study would engage in;

b) The relevance of the research topic to the people living in Mozambique;

c) Research process participation, including the roles of participating people as well as my own relationship with them during the research;

d) Sensitive selection of various research tools that enable and empower those participating in the research and would help to develop locally rooted understandings of theories relevant for enhancing social transformation.53

Moreover, whilst grounded theory is mostly mentioned in literature referring to qualitative research, this dissertation project uses at times a mixed method approach and might occasionally apply quantitative tools for data collection, in particular in situations where this might strengthen some of the emerging qualitative research findings. According to Glaser (2010), grounded theory is a general method. It can be used on any data or combination of data:

It was developed partially by me with quantitative data. It is expensive and somewhat hard to obtain quantitative data, especially in comparison to qualitative data. Qualitative data are inexpensive to collect, very rich in meaning and observation, and very rewarding to collect and analyze. So, by default to ease, costs and growing use by many, grounded theory is being linked to qualitative data and is seen as a qualitative method, using symbolic interaction. Qualitative grounded theory accounts for the global spread of its use. (Glaser 2010, pp. 8, 9)

However, when combining methods like case study and grounded theory, utmost care must be exercised to ensure that the canons of case study research do not distort true emergence for theoretical concepts (Glaser, 1998). According to Yin (1994, p. 28)

53 Compare with IDS working paper by Robert Chambers (2010), figure 7.2, Elements in a paradigm of adaptive pluralism.
“theory development prior to the collection of any case study data is an essential step in doing case studies”. 2014 he explicitly referred to qualitative methods such as ethnography and grounded theory and underlined what he had already stated in 1994:

Typically, these related methods may deliberatively avoid specifying any theoretical propositions at the outset of an inquiry (nor do these methods have to cope with the challenge of defining a ‘case’). As a result, students who may consider these methods to be interchangeable with case study research wrongly think that, by having selected the case study method, they can proceed quickly into their field work. (Yin 2014, p. 37)

This statement may be entirely accurate for some case study research. However, it also contests some of the key principles of grounded theory. Accordingly, when combining case study methods and the grounded theory approach, the researcher must clearly specify which methodology is primarily guiding the investigation. In the context of this dissertation project, the decision to be orientated and driven by grounded theory had been taken during the early stages of reflection about research paradigms and methodological approaches and accordingly it can be stated that its logic of ‘theory later’ has been adopted systematically.

Other scholars have followed the same approach. Eisenhardt (1989) in her paper ‘Building theories from case study research’ describes work on qualitative methods (Miles & Huberman 1984), the design of case study research (Yin 1984) and grounded theory building (Glaser & Strauss 1967), and extends that work in areas such as a priori specification of constructs, triangulation of multiple investigators, within case and cross-case analyses, and the role of the literature. In her paper, she provides some roadmap of combining these works whilst following a general inductive grounded theory approach. This appears close to the process that organically emerged during my research project and has been followed through final stage.

3.4.1. The field research process and data collection

During the entire field research process, I felt that my experiences of and related reflections about working with civil society actors in Mozambique from 2000 to 2008 had been very helpful to understand the local context and identify research participants. However, the in-depth research process in both Maputo City and Zambézia Province, in particular when conducting interviews in Inhassunge district, provided the basis for understanding not just some of the complex relationships within and outside civil
society. I gained valuable insight into the silent actors and hidden processes between actors and within civil society, the state, the market and family as well as the context and structure, in which these processes are developing. This way, as will be explained in the following chapters, patterns of hidden instrumentalisation of fear, spiritual values and beliefs have been discovered during research in Inhassunge District (see also sub-chapter 3.3.1).

Whilst the first half year of the my research was broadly used to focus the research topic, to develop theoretical sensitivity and to decide on methodological orientations, the second half of year one, and following months of research in Mozambique, involved a number of field research phases accompanied by theoretical sampling and an analytical process supported by situational analysis (Clarke 2005). In the following section, I will focus on the description of the field research process as this will highlight both the participatory nature of the research and the data-led development of the positional map ‘Civil Society discourses in Mozambique’ (figure 10) underpinned by theoretical sampling.

Accordingly, I will firstly provide some information about the centrality of theoretical sampling in constructivist grounded theory, secondly describe the type of research methods used and thirdly, illustrate how each research trip to Mozambique helped to discover new actors and processes involved in the civil society arena. Overview tables about the type and number of applied methods are given as well as synopses of the data analysis process.

3.4.1.1. Theoretical sampling

Within grounded theory, sampling is a crucial part of theory development. Glaser and Strauss (1967) acknowledge that even during initial sampling, particular experiences and concepts influence the selection of the unit of analysis. The aim during initial sampling as part of this research was to test some of the conceptual questions that were planned to be applied in greater detail with selected participating groups and to decide on geographic areas where additional participants would need to be identified. It was hoped that intensive data collection at selected provincial and district levels could make the diverse civil society discourses outside the capital city Maputo more visible and break the silence of those actors that are usually unheard at national level.
As explained by Charmaz (2014), theoretical sampling is a key process during the recruitment and sampling of research participants, data collection, coding and categorization, leading to the ‘saturation’ of codes and categories.

Turns and twists in your research journey leave you with questions about direction to take, how quickly to proceed, and what you will have when you arrive. Theoretical sampling prompts you to retrace your steps or take a new path when you have some tentative categories and emerging, but incomplete ideas. By going back into the empirical world and collecting more data about the properties of your category, you can saturate its properties with data and write more memos, making them more analytical as you proceed. Afterwards, you are ready to sort and integrate memos on your theoretical categories. You may find it helpful to chart the course with diagrams and maps that explain what you have and where you are going. (Charmaz 2014, p. 192)

During my research phases in Mozambique, there were a number of questions and ideas that research participants pointed into my direction that were very critical in nature and helped me to look at my research topic from different perspectives, including important issues related to dominant ideologies. The statement below is one example for that:

“But I think (questioning ideology) is the most interesting part. This is not about reproducing what all the others have already done. In the case of this study we try to reconstruct. Saying no, and it is about confronting these theories, all of them that have a very strong theoretical component. I, for example, with a study like this, would prefer looking at the importance of the “tambores” (drums), the spirits. At the regulations of the forms of the community attitudes in relation to, for example, the natural resources. When we were doing a study in Southern Africa, we found out that the sacred forests were much better conserved than those regulated through participation of forest management committees and all that. Well, what is more important? Who has created them? How does this function? Who are the actors? How is this being reproduced? What about the dissemination of all this knowledge? Meaning, well, that this is much more interesting to be studied, than for example…” (Contribution from a member of the research advisory group, round table discussion held in Maputo, 10.09.2014)

I came back to the above statement several times during the lifetime of my dissertation project. It appeared somehow marginal at the beginning of the empirical research but
grew in relevance as the research expanded at provincial and predominantly, district level. The same day indeed, an interview with a Mozambican governance expert led to the recommendation to develop three comparative case studies, investigating different events of collective civil society action in the provinces of Zambézia, Tete and Nampula, based on the different historical, political and economic conditions in these provinces.

The methodological question whether I would carry out comparative case studies or a single in-depth study occupied my mind until the second year of the PhD research and certainly the idea of focusing the investigation on (the conditions and context of) collective actions rather than roles and responsibilities of civil society actors became a core element of the research. Indeed, even more additional case study provinces were suggested during focus group discussions and interviews, based on new criteria such as political party dominance or the number and type of NGOs registered.

Finally, a decision had to be made, whether the studies’ particular nature and findings would be measured based on its geographic coverage and number of case studies or the depth of investigation. The question was left open, until the first provincial case study research was initiated in Zambézia Province in February 2015. During first interviews in Inhassunges District (Zambézia Province), I learned that the concept of civil society was not at all embedded into local discourses and that more time than expected would be needed to unfold local meanings in the given context. Consequently, I made the decision to include only one in-depth case study into my thesis; further interview material was used for complementary analysis. According to Charmaz (2014), theoretical sampling involves starting with data, constructing tentative ideas about the data, and then examining these ideas through further empirical inquiry.

Accordingly, it happened that an initial focus group discussion organized in Lichinga, Niassa Province (07.03.2014), provoked thinking about the complexity of roles and objectives of civil society actors whilst interviews and a focus group discussion organized some months later in Maputo (20.08. – 12.09.2014) re-focused the debate around the local meaning of civil society, articulated through a variety of discourses and ideologies. After my research trips it has been exciting to continue my investigation, moving from national, to provincial and district level and to see new social worlds of collective action emerging at these levels. The principle of theoretical sampling as
opposed to purposive or representative sampling was of great help to discover new theoretical categories.

3.4.1.2. Summary of data collection methods and selection of research participants

During data collection, I made use of various, primarily qualitative data collection methods; the validity of some results has been cross checked through triangulation and the general value of this when doing case study research has already been mentioned. Following on from this, I would like to present and briefly explain the data collection methods applied during this research and provide further detailed information about the type of triangulation I have adopted. Denzin (1970) extended the idea of triangulation beyond its conventional association with research methods and designs. He distinguished various forms of triangulation out of which I decided to use the following: investigator triangulation and methodological triangulation.

Initially, the idea was to carry out primarily intensive and semi-structured interviews during data collection. However, this approach was challenged in particular during research at district level where it was much more difficult to interview individuals alone. At times, for example, people joined an interview, which initially had been set up as an individual interview, and in particular, small group interviews ran the risk of turning into wider community debates. Consequently, with more people joining an interview, it then also became more difficult to follow the interview guide and safeguard the principle of privacy. However, on the other hand, new issues emerged during more open community debates, which at times have been very helpful to find new pathways of analysis.

Research participants were initially selected because they were expected to have first-hand experience about the historical development and the current state of civil society in Mozambique and the particular region they were living in. Accordingly, various actors were involved: Community based organizations, national policy and advocacy organizations, faith based organizations, human rights organizations, development and humanitarian oriented organizations, social movements, coordinating bodies and umbrella organizations as well as trade unions. Where accessible and contributory to analysis, political parties were interviewed as well as economic agents. At a slightly

55 In rural areas of Mozambique it is a sign of interest and politeness to join a discussion between a local resident and a foreign visitor.
later stage, the snowball method was used for selecting informants recommended by those already studied.

…the researcher identifies one or more individuals from the population of interest. After they have been interviewed, they are used as informants to identify other members of the population, who are themselves used as informants, and so on. (Robson 2002, p. 265)

However, the snowball method brought with it some side effects regarding the gender balance of research participants. Accordingly, in the middle of data collection and as a response to a disproportionate balance of research participants favouring male informants, particular attention was given to gender aspects and where appropriate, women were purposely selected for interviews. Towards the end of data collection sampling became again more theory-driven.

**Exploratory Interviews**

If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are. (Karl Popper 2002, p. 28)

Exploratory interviews were open and purposely not following an interview guide that could frame the structure of a conversation. These interviews were often conducted spontaneously, in an informal setting, giving space to reflection and dialogue about the meaning of civil society in Mozambique. These interviews worked best when I met people that I already knew from my previous engagement as an NGO director in Mozambique, when particular stories about divisions within civil society, co-option of particular actors or dynamics between politics and civil society discourses were shared. The interviews were especially useful at the beginning of my research as they helped to re-frame some of the initial research questions and inform the focus of the interview guide (see annex B) of the various intensive interviews conducted afterwards. Exploratory interviews aimed to create awareness about previously unthought-of connections and causal mechanisms (Reiter 2013).

**Intensive interviews**

An intensive interview is an investigative interview method, which I felt, suited my research topic and the type of questions I wanted to ask during the research process. According to Charmaz (2014, p. 56), intensive interviews call for a gentle-guided, one-sided conversation that explores research participants’ perspective on their personal
experience on the research topic. The central topic of this PhD project is civil society in Mozambique, from its history and the regional context to its current meaning; this includes discussion of the various roles civil society actors fulfill, how they are perceived and boundaries they experience (e.g. spatial/geographical, political, economic, sociocultural, legal/policy/institutional, popular and other discourses and their construction). As described by Charmaz (2014, pp. 56, 57), interviews take place in a specific culture, social setting and sometimes historical time context. Accordingly, I adapted my word choices and interactional style to the culture and personal situation of the various people being interviewed.

At times, interviews were very short, as they were conducted in very complex and sometimes conflicting family/community situations, e.g. after a violent attack against an older woman accused of witchcraft or during advanced political-military tension. These interviews were surrounded by the so called ‘culture of silence’, which has frequently been mentioned as an explanation why people do not want to talk about systems of violence and exclusion. This culture needed to be respected while sometimes it was possible to organize another interview in a new setting and create conditions for people to talk about their experiences in a more open way. Priorities and life worlds of research participants were respected and taken into account whenever possible during the selection of interview sites and times (see sub-chapter 3.3.1).

As mentioned earlier, some of the intensive individual interviews at district level were at times spontaneously joined by additional family members or neighbours; where this was the case, interviews have been marked as group interviews but the key elements of intensive interviews were still present in the situation. Where interviews turned into community debates because more than six people joined the interview and new dynamics developed, interviews are marked as community debates.

**Semi-structured interviews**

Mainly when conducting interviews in collaboration with the EU-contracted consultants doing civil society actor mapping, semi-structured interviews were conducted. During these interviews, questions were framed around civil society structures and changes as well as civil society actors’ capacity, sustainability, engagement and working environment. During these joint interviews with the EU-contracted consultants, I was able to ask additional questions that were of particular interest to my research. The
consultants and I shared interview notes at the end and I usually wrote additional memos based on observations I made regarding the particular relationship between provincial civil society actors and the international community ‘represented’ through these consultants. Accordingly, these interviews had two objectives: Firstly, to accompany the interview process and ask additional questions at the end and secondly, to observe how civil society actors enter the discourse about civil society with external actors.

**Focus group discussions**

Focus group discussions were used at various stages of the research process, usually at the end of a series of semi-structured or intensive interviews, involving six to ten people. They allowed me to get more elaborated views on certain aspects of the meaning of civil society as people ‘positioned’ their opinions or views within a group of people, usually with a similar socio-cultural background. At times, focus group discussions appeared as an exciting negotiation space, where arguments were presented, tested and some people managed to make joint conclusions, hence validating some of the debate. However, other focus groups ended with disputes and difference of opinion. Crang and Cook (1995, p. 56) refer to a focus group as “a means to set up a negotiation of meanings through intra- and inter- personal debates”.

Interactions within focus groups at times brought forward certain resistances, boundaries as well as clarifications of terms that previously I would have used without deeper reflection. One of these clarifications brought forward during a focus group discussion, for example, related to the differentiating terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions. While in a number of interviews I would have used the two terms to distinguish between legalized and registered NGOs and local traditional organizations, I learned through a research advisory group debate that these terms should not be used without reflecting on its (colonial) origin. Following a statement from a participant at a focus group discussion in Maputo:

“When I left the country, I had a number of battles. Why do we need this classification of ‘informal’? It is informal, but in relation to what? Who classifies here? This is very much within the parameters of the big Western
researchers. Is it anything that operates outside the state, because they never had this type of standard? No, no it is not because they never had. It is because they never studied their own societies before the state was consolidated. Well, half way, they know that within power structures in England, there are many lobby groups involved in informal processes. But they are not being classified. But in Africa, we don’t reproduce this type of discourse. I am saying no! The traditional healer for example, he is not informal. He is part of our values, our lessons. For example, a traditional chief is by no means informal, who made him informal?\n
(C)ontribution from a member of the research advisory group, round table discussion held in Maputo, 10.09.2014)

After the above statement, some people participating in the focus group agreed that the terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ are not appropriate in a Mozambican context as the terms are firmly based on a Western understanding of society in ‘developing’ countries, whilst others continued contesting this idea, pragmatically arguing that research is not about questioning ideologies. The example shows how important it is to discuss some key words and concepts used during research in a focus group discussion so that intersubjective dynamics can be decoded, captured or contested and the meaning of this process can be part of the research and the inductive development of new categories.

*Community debate*

Community debates within this research are where six to twenty or more people participated to discuss major, mainly conflicting common issues, affecting the entire community. These debates always happened at district level in particularly isolated areas, where due to problems of communication, it was difficult to plan individual or group interviews well ahead. Accordingly, the research team entered the field without having a particular local contact person or ‘gate keeper’ and started to introduce the purpose of the visit to the first people met on the way to the centre of a village. Various community debates were held in Olinda Locality, Inhassunge District (see also sub-chapter 6.2.5.2). Olinda is a very isolated locality without access to public transport; using informal trade routes, the locality is about a two-day trip out from the district town of Mucupia. When the research team entered the greater Olinda area, it was

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36 “Mas nessa questão, por exemplo, do informalismo, eu, por acaso, tenho travado muitos combates quando saio fora do país. Porque essa classificação do que é informal? É informal em relação ao quê? Quem os classifica? É muito dentro dos parâmetros dos grandes investigadores ocidentais. E tudo que opera fora do Estado, porque nunca teve este tipo de padrão. Não, não é porque nunca tiveram. É que nunca estudaram suas próprias sociedades antes do Estado se consolidar. Então, meio longe, eles sabem que no poder da Inglaterra, joga-se muito pros grupos lobistas num processo informal. Mas eles não classificam-se. Mas, em África, não reproduzimos esse tipo de discurso. Eu estou dizendo que não! O curandeiro, por exemplo, não é informal. É parte dos valores, das lições, nossas. Por exemplo, um régulo não é nada informal, quem lhe tornou informal?”
always surrounded by people who were keen to find out why we were visiting the locality. This interest was at times connected to fears and mistrust, as some local communities were very concerned about being resettled as a consequence of a Chinese investment project. As noted by Cohen and Arieli (2011), researching in conflict environments is challenging, given the complexity and common attitudes of distrust and suspicion.

**Observation**

Simons (2009, p. 55) identified reasons for observing. The first is linked to seeing the whole ‘picture’ of a situation and obtaining information that you will not get by interviewing only. You should also get a larger base of data for analysis and interpretation and thirdly, observation is a method to discover norms and values. This could be, for example, cultural insights, rules or interactions. Another very important point is that you give people who are less articulate a chance to ‘say’ something or at least to get involved in the research. The last argument for observation as a method of data collection during research is that it is “a cross-check on data obtained in interviews”. Through supplementing interviews with observation, in other words, to use triangulation in your research, you get the chance to complete your data and analysis and through that you will get a deeper insight into your results.

During the various research trips to Mozambique, I tried to immerse myself in the local context, with which I had already developed considerable familiarity when living in the country from 2000 to 2008. Even though, I never stayed longer than six weeks during any of my research missions to Mozambique, I was able to interact constantly with a number of key civil society experts and people based in Quelimane and Maputo, using phone, skype and e-mail communications. At times, relevant information was sent from research participants at district level to collaborating researchers at the Catholic University in Quelimane, who then shared this information with me. In this way, I was able to immerse myself into the context - even from a distance - and apply participant observation during considerable parts of the research process. There were moments when participatory observation was part of this research (e.g. participation in the EU civil society actor mapping study whilst reflecting about the civil society constructive discourses of the international community) but this method was not applied throughout the process.
**Memo writing**

The process of coding and developing categories was supported by writing memos. Memos include a wide range of contents, from reflections about observations to providing a record of thoughts and ideas when identifying codes and developing categories. Memos enable the researcher to reflect about interviews and might at the same time articulate categories. Memos were titled and at times these titles emerged into categories as they were developed straight after conducting interviews and focus groups. These initial thoughts after data collection were of high relevance and they inspired the research to analyse emerging issues deeper or help to develop new relevant research questions. It is important to write memos as soon as possible after interviews or important observations that inspire thinking and reflection. Memo written during the initial stages of this PhD thesis have been of high value for analysis at a later stage and have thus been considered for the overall analysis.

**Investigator triangulation**

Investigator triangulation refers to the use of more than one researcher in the field to gather and interpret data. This strategy was very meaningful for me, as it helped to reduce cultural bias when conducting research in a different culture and increased the number of options available to interpret and explain some processes, which appeared peculiar to me at the beginning but started to make sense as I discussed them within the research team. This approach was also particularly useful when some Portuguese terms needed to be translated into local language and its meaning being understood in greater detail (beyond word to word translation). One of these terms was ‘bandja’ which simply translated means ‘meeting’. However, the term has a wider meaning as it can be particularly connected to a public meeting where community problems are being presented and solutions being sought. Consequently, the term became very relevant when discussing the local concept of civil society, a concept rarely known in more isolated villages of Mozambique.

Working in a team also requires particular attention to group dynamics, ownership and understanding of the research topic. In this regard, the research conducted by Bazeley (2013) suggests that right from the start it is important to build a shared conceptual framework and understanding of the research questions, and to discuss priorities and strategies as well as insights in coding and analysis. This was done during a one-week
research workshop at the Catholic University in Quelimane at the beginning of 2014. This workshop involved all researchers, who then participated in data collection and triangulation immediately after the workshop and further on. This also laid the ground for joint coding up to categorization of codes and visual mapping.

**Methodological triangulation**

Methodological triangulation helps to overcome the concern about “the credibility of what is seen as subjective research techniques” (Sturman 1999, p. 109) and, according to Glaser and Strauss (1968), is “in a way capable of conveying credibility”. Accordingly, methodological triangulation has been given special consideration during field research and a variety of data collection methods, as outlined above, have been considered and the results compared. At the same time, methodological triangulation is most commonly referred to in the literature; it is, in its most general sense, related to the use of more than one method for gathering data.

This method was of particular importance when due to time limitations, I was unable to participate in person in some of the interviews at district level. Having included and trained a student who only focused on observing interviews that I could not be conducting myself into the research team, it was possible to complement the analysis of transcribed interviews with documented observations, looking at photographs, as well as reading some memos that were developed linked to those interviews. In this way, I gained a much more holistic understanding of an entire interview situation instead of only looking at a single interview narrative.

**3.4.1.3. Starting with an exploratory research process**

I started with an open exploratory process that included interviews, a focus group discussion and a rural community debate in March 2014. Initially, various representatives of civil society and the international community in Maputo took part and during the visit to Northern provinces, civil society representatives including grassroots activists, the Mozambican government and one bilateral donor representative participated. After two days in the capital city of Maputo, which included a visit and
presentation of the dissertation project to the Irish Embassy\textsuperscript{57}, the journey continued to Northern Mozambique, first Niassa, followed by Nampula Province.

In Lichinga, the provincial capital of Niassa, eleven exploratory individual interviews were conducted with Mozambican NGO workers, government and private sector representatives. Identifying some contrasting issues during interviews, I decided to invite all interviewees to a follow-up dynamic focus group discussion, the purpose of which was to contest some of the quite different individual responses received in an informal setting, as well as to confirm some arising common issues. The first three questions used during the discussion had already been applied during exploratory interviews, whilst the fourth question emerged out of the various interviews and hence was only applied to the final round table discussion:

- Who belongs to civil society?
- What is the objective of civil society?
- What is the role of civil society in development?
- Civil society: a myth or utopia within the aid debate?

The people interviewed in Lichinga were selected by a civil society activist and NGO worker I have known since 2003; I also knew most of the interviewees from previous visits to the province as an INGO representative. As he was very interested in the research topic, he facilitated and also participated in the exploratory research visit and was of tremendous help for identifying interview partners, fixing dates and logistics of interviews and group discussions. As a result, all participants were very engaged in the debate at an individual and group level and felt comfortable to share even sensitive political thoughts. Accordingly, the first exploratory data collected was rich and substantial and this was taken forward for initial coding as part of qualitative analysis. The following is a summary table of interviews and discussions conducted during the first visit to Mozambique, 2 - 21 March 2014.

**Table 1: Research phase 1**

| Research phase 1: Exploratory engagement with the research theme in Maputo, Niassa and Nampula, Mozambique: 02 – 21 March 2014 |

\textsuperscript{57} As this study would like to bridge the gap between development research and practice, engagement with accessible, opened and interested development actors was an important part of the research process which should lead to increased ownership of research findings at the end.
Maputo City
Number of exploratory interviews: 14 (13 male, 1 female)

Lichinga City, Niassa Province
Number of exploratory interviews: 11 (10 male, 1 female)
Number of focus group discussions: 1 (8 male, 1 female)

Nampula City, Nampula Province
Number of exploratory interviews: 7 (5 male, 2 female)
Number of community debates: 1 (11 male, 7 female)

TOTAL Interviews: 32
TOTAL Focus group discussions: 1
TOTAL Community debates: 1
TOTAL Research participants: 47 (37 male, 10 female)

Debating the complexity of the meaning of civil society with development actors in Maputo City and Northern Mozambique (Niassa and Nampula Provinces) at the very beginning of the entire research process was rewarding. I started to feel comfortable doing research about civil society, being able to develop research questions alongside an emerging thematic focus in an area I was personally very interested and from a practical point of view, considerably engaged in. Retrospectively, I believe that this initial exploratory research phase was fundamental in grounding the research into the local context, prompting first thoughts on emerging thematic categories, and initiating a re-engagement with my own history in the country.

Based on the principle that the research topic should be relevant to the people living in the chosen case study country, and the positive experiences gained in the provinces of Niassa and later on Nampula, the decision was taken to continue serious engagement with local civil society actors, research institutes and universities. In this way, the research gained the participatory character that I was hoping it would develop, as contacts with civil society actors in Mozambique were re-established. From the beginning, I wanted to avoid doing research ‘on others’ and rather engage ‘with others’ in cultural and political reflections and the struggle around them. I was hoping that the people involved would conduct their own studies as a result of this process, which is
what happened with the research team of the Catholic University of Mozambique and beyond.

From end of March until mid-August 2015, my focus was on developing additional theoretical sensitivity through a light literature review about the historical development and current policy context of civil society in Mozambique. I also studied some civil society assessment methodologies to develop further methodological sensitivity. Based on the exploratory field trip to Mozambique and the literature review, I developed a first discussion paper entitled: “Interrogating Civil Society: A view from Mozambique”, jointly with my PhD supervisor Ronaldo Munck and Abdul Ilal, a Mozambican researcher. It was during this time that I made the final decision to take grounded theory and situational analysis as my methodological orientation, underlined by a participatory research approach, which from the beginning was a key principle I wanted to adopt. Barniskis (2013) reflects my methodological choice, stating that embedded participatory techniques, when paired with grounded theory methods, build theoretical categories and concepts from the ground up, based on the real experiences of those involved.

3.4.1.4. From exploration to orientation

During the next research phase, institutional partnerships were developed and the above-mentioned discussion paper was presented at a focus group discussion in Maputo. Interested local civil society experts and activists in Maputo were invited and the lively debate led to the decision to establish a local advisory group, the membership of which was drawn from those who had participated in the focus group discussion. The group members were consulted at key moments during the research process. The paper generated critical reflections for some of the participating Maputo civil society expert community, additional research questions were developed and clarity which data would be analysed in the third research phase started to emerge. During this time, a great number of informal debates were held as well as some additional exploratory individual interviews.

Various meetings with the Mozambique based research Institute for Economic and Social Studies (IESE – Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos) were conducted and ideas about the research process, further partnerships and the methodological framework were exchanged. IESE agreed to accompany the research process and accepted me as an affiliated researcher to their institute during the time of my PhD
studies, as had been previously agreed with the Sociology Department of Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. Through the facilitation of Irish Aid\textsuperscript{58}, the multi-donor civil society support fund MASC (\textit{Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil}) was brought into the research process. The fund is managed by two Mozambican civil society analysts and supported by a number of technical and administrative staff. At the time, it was in the process of changing its organizational status, from a donor outsourced private company management model to a locally registered foundation. Thus, from the MASC management perspective, there was sufficient interest to engage in my research topic and to think about new roles that actors might occupy within a more localized concept of civil society in Mozambique\textsuperscript{59}.

Following table 2 which summarizes interviews and focal group discussion carried out during a second visit to Mozambique, 20 August - 12 September 2014.

\textbf{Table 2: Research phase 2}

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Research Phase 2: Research trip to Maputo, Mozambique: Key informant interviews, IESE conference participation and mixed focal group discussion: 20 August – 12 September 2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maputo City:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of exploratory interviews: 10 (9 male, 1 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of focus group discussions: 1 (8 male, 1 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Interviews: 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\textsuperscript{58} With DFID and USAID, Irish Aid is one of the three major donors supporting MASC since its establishment. As my PhD research is institutionally connected to Dublin City University, Irish Aid showed great interest in its development and eventually decided to financially support a broader research project in the same area.

\textsuperscript{59} INTRAC and DANIDA (2014) concluded in their ‘Study on support for civil society through multi-donor Funds’ p. 25: “Conflict of roles: Independent foundations managing civil society funds are ‘big players’ in the national context. How these powerful new actors in the civil society landscape affect the sector is the focus of some debate. Some foundations, given their size, reach, and influence may be drawn into an advocacy or representational role on behalf of civil society. This may raise their profile and credibility at the expense of national representative bodies and/or partners. This was one area where it was possible to detect some unease about the FCS in Tanzania – that it might become the de facto spokesperson for civil society in the current absence of a representative forum for CSOs. The Foundation is aware that it is not a representative body and tries to tread a narrow line in this regard. Another complication is that some independent foundations may be both grant-making and implementing agencies (e.g. the Manusher Jonno Foundation in Bangladesh) which can place them in direct competition with national partners. Similar concerns were expressed in a recent stakeholder perception survey of MASC becoming an independent foundation (MASC 2012). Donors should consider, as part of their support, establishing parameters on the role of an independent foundation in order to ensure that it contributes to a diverse civil society and a levelling up of status and profile of national CSOs.”
From October 2014 until January 2015, the focus of my work was a reflection about the research process carried forward so far, accompanied by my engagement with research philosophy and critical theory. During this time, parts of this methodological chapter of my PhD work were developed. Exploratory interviews and, in particular, the focus group discussion in Maputo were transcribed, coded and analyzed. Alongside this analysis, decisions about the focus and geographic location of further data collection were taken. During a strategic discussion with IESE and MASC, the recommendation to involve local students during case study development was made and the idea to establish a new partnership and collaboration with the Catholic University of Mozambique (UCM - Universidade Católica de Moçambique), based in the Centre and North of the country, discussed.

According to one of the IESE researchers I interviewed, there is limited experience in using qualitative research methodologies in Mozambique. This means that little robust knowledge about the application of qualitative methods exists in the country and real concerns about the idea of conducting qualitative research with Mozambican researchers were put on the table. It became evident that an introduction about the grounded theory led research process and qualitative methods was needed and that providing support in this regard could be a rewarding and empowering part of the overall research process for all involved. This was an important time of the research process, where the study’s scope and findings, as well as local ownership, sustainability of the particular research approach, in addition to reciprocal relationships were further developed and knowledge alliances built.

Nevertheless, the concern that the robustness of the research could potentially be negatively affected if the methodological framework could not be sufficiently introduced to and shared understanding of the scope of the research not be developed with local research partners was still a reality. I then decided to invest time in joint methodological discussions with the Mozambican research team members, revision and adaption of the research tools, primarily the questionnaire, and in finding ways to make

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Statement made during a meeting with representatives of MASC, IESE and Irish Aid, 12.09.2014.
sure that selected research methods, procedures and processes would be applied according to an embedded participatory grounded theory approach. This approach eventually allowed me to support the development of local knowledge and research diversity, empower participating institutions whilst applying a more locally negotiated approach to the topic under study. In summary, it was decided, that the dissertation project would work with and through local research institutes and manage any related risks proactively.

3.4.1.5. From orientation to joint research action

In March 2015, I visited UCM for the first time and got to know the Coordinator of the Research Department of the UCM Faculty of Political and Social Science in Quelimane, Zambézia Province who became my dedicated UCM focal person. Earlier, in November 2014, the European Union circulated the Terms of Reference of a study called ‘Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in Mozambique’ and a tender process opened. In a meeting organized by the EU delegation at the beginning of December 2014, the study’s Terms of Reference were presented to representatives of embassies and donor agencies of the EU member states in Mozambique. As the EU study and my dissertation project partly engaged into the same broad research field of civil society in Mozambique, although from quite different perspectives, a participating donor representative, with whom I had already been in touch to discuss ways to make my research relevant to real development debates and policy decisions, stressed the matter.

At the same time, the EU study was a matter of personal concern to me. It proved difficult to receive additional information about the methodological approach that the EU study would apply, and to find a person to talk to within the administrative body of the EU. I was also concerned about the potential impact the EU study might have on my own research as the same people might be requested for interviews a number of times, which would affect their availability and motivation. However, with the donor representative stressing the need to coordinate and possibly harmonize research efforts, the EU Delegation in Maputo acted positively and, from that moment onwards, tried to support the coordination and even convergence of both studies.
“Indeed, with him we convened\(^6^1\) that the best way would be to make the two studies converge, by putting the two teams together and/or by dividing the work - each team looking at specific aspects of this broad subject. We are right now in the process of selecting the team that will carry out the work, and asked already the candidates certain flexibility with regards to the need to accommodate the research you started. I think it’ll demand an extra effort of coordination and flexibility from all sides, but in the end, and foremost, it certainly can be a great opportunity to have greater research resources on this subject.” (This is part of an e-mail exchange with a member of the EU Delegation in Maputo. It is also a response to an e-mail I sent to the Delegation at the 24.11.2014, asking for more information about the EU commissioned civil society actor study)

Rather than joining the EU study, I agreed to collaborate with the EU civil society actor mapping team and decided to add this active collaboration as an ethnographic dimension to my PhD studies. The scope of the study was extended and participatory observation, when engaging with the EU delegation and contracted consultants, has been a helpful input when mapping the discourses about civil society in Mozambique. Overall, my direct engagement with bi-lateral\(^6^2\) and multi-lateral donors and the EU-contracted civil society mapping team has been a reflective part of this research. Essentially, the EU policy process of mapping civil society in Mozambique has been considered as a ‘unit of analyses’ of this study and, as my engagement developed, I was writing memos about the discourses I actively engaged in.

This engagement was impossible to foresee at the beginning of the research, as it emerged rather organically through my engagement with and linkages to the civil society policy-making sector in Mozambique. I also realized that this part of the research may be the most politically and socially relevant part in terms of impact and change that might occur as a result of this study and accordingly I felt that this opportunity could not be left aside. I met the EU civil society team as well as the civil society actor mapping consultant’s team in Mozambique during the third research phase in Mozambique.

Following a summary of interviews and focus group discussion carried out from 1 until 14 February 2015.

\(^6^1\) This is a reference to an earlier meeting between a member of the EU Delegation in Maputo and an embassy/donor employee in Maputo.

\(^6^2\) E.g. Irish Aid decided to financially support a civil society research project through DCU in Mozambique and it was agreed that my PhD research could form part of it.
Table 3: Research phase 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research phase 3: Research trip to Maputo and Quelimane, Mozambique: Key informant interviews, focus group discussion, EU civil society actor mapping and case study development: 1 – 14 February 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maputo City:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of intensive interviews: 7 (5 male, 2 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of exploratory interviews: 1 (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of exploratory group interview: 1 (2 female, 1 male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quelimane City, Zambézia Province:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of semi-structured interviews: 1 (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of group interviews: 2 (4 male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of focus group discussions: 3 (26 male, 17 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mocuba Town, Zambézia Province:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of focus group discussions: 4 (20 participants – gender unknown)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL Interviews (individual and group): 12
TOTAL Focus group discussions: 7
TOTAL Research participants: 79 (37 male, 22 female, 20 unknown gender)

However, collaborating with various donors and embassies in Mozambique brought a clear economic dimension and political interest to the research and this obviously needed some reflection and consideration on the way forward. Based on my experiences with the political economy of development63, I assumed that economic and political interests have the potential to influence the research in various direct and powerful ways, even if there was partly some ‘common purpose’, namely understanding the meaning and function of civil society, although using quite different perspectives and research approaches. Certainly, sampling, from this point on, had to be more strategic,

---

63 Political economy analysis aims to situate development interventions within an understanding of the prevailing political and economic processes in society – specifically, the incentives, relationships, distribution and contestation of power between different groups and individuals – all of which greatly impact on development outcomes. Such an analysis can support more effective and politically feasible donor strategies, as well as more realistic expectations of what can be achieved, over what timescales, and the risks involved (Mcloughlin 2012).
specific and systematic\textsuperscript{64}. This was necessary for the research to be able to deal with the added political and economic potential power dimensions.

3.4.1.6. Discovering the meaning of civil society

Between February and April 2015, intensive and semi-structured individual and group interviews, focus group discussions, open village debates and direct observations were conducted in Zambézia, the cities of Quelimane and Mocuba as well as in Inhassunge District. Some of the initial interviews in Quelimane and Mocuba were conducted jointly with two EU commissioned consultants who were doing civil society actor mapping in the province\textsuperscript{65}.

The major part of the overall research in Inhassunge District was done by a team of eight researchers. Apart from myself, six researchers from UCM and one student from the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt (KU) took part\textsuperscript{66}. The student’s task was mainly observation of interviews, particularly those that I could not attend or facilitate in person. Prior to field work, the research topic and methodology have been introduced during a one-week seminar at the UCM faculty of political and social science (Quelimane) and participants were trained in interviewing techniques. Intensive interview guides and other exploratory material about qualitative research were provided. The open and generative research questions were tested before going into the field.

During district level investigations, the research finally gained the needed distance from the usually normative conceptual and academic discussions held with civil society experts based in Maputo and I started to engage with people directly affected by various kinds of direct oppression\textsuperscript{67} regarding their personal freedom of speech and assembly. Grassroots activists and groups of people who participated, took different type of collective action in their efforts for a solution to their precarious situation characterized

\textsuperscript{64} Strategic, specific and systematic are three attributes that Charmaz (2014, p. 199) connects with theoretical sampling.

\textsuperscript{65} This collaboration was agreed with the Delegation of the European Union and Irish Aid (for more information see also sub-chapter 3.2.4) at the end of 2014.

\textsuperscript{66} Catholic University Mozambique (UCM): Joana Salvador, Gaudêncio Material, José António Piletiche, Inácio Arnaldo, Rude Matinada. Catholic University Eichstätt-Ingolstadt (KU): Laura Sevenich.

\textsuperscript{67} There is certainly a high level of oppression affecting people living in Maputo city and urban settings as well. However, during expert interviews carried out in Maputo city and provincial capitals, people generally appeared more open to talk about oppression and limitations of speech compared with people at district level. This in turn might be based on the fact that people in rural areas do not feel like citizens which in turn is related to the denial of their basic rights.
by systematic exclusion and poverty. Many of them had different religious backgrounds and were members of local faith based associations such as AVODEMO, Rede Cristã contra SIDA (Christian Network against AIDS) or the Núcleo dos Pastores (Centre of Priests) (see also subchapter 6.2.4). Individual and collective actors who were not part of any church or government group had developed their own poverty response strategies, which range from witchcraft, magic to violent protest. The latter, as will be argued later in this thesis, is most probably a response to the way that the fast-moving global economic order mercilessly ‘attacks’ indigenous communities, taking away their land and endangering livelihood strategies.

Each day that the research team was in the field, joint reflections were conducted which at times led to the amendment of research questions. As mentioned earlier, extensive interview notes were taken, coded in the field and those codes were compared each evening within the team of researchers. This in turn led to the development of emerging categories. Using visualizing material, codes and categories were mapped out on flip chart paper whilst in the field (cf. annex E: Initial codes and categories developed from interviews notes and observations during field research in Inhassunge District). Applying a combination of data collection tools and the different participants’ interpretations in relation to the data facilitated triangulation, both in the field and later on at home, when the focus shifted into selective coding and research mapping (cf. figures 6, 7 and 10).

Table 4 gives a summary of interviews, focal group discussions, community debates and observations carried out during the provincial and district level research phase in Zambézia.

Table 4: Research phase 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research phase 4: Research trip to Zambézia Province, Mozambique: Intensive individual and group interviews, focus group discussions and observation: 20 March – 18 April 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quelimane City, Zambézia Province:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of intensive individual interviews: 7 (5 male, 2 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mucopia (district town), Inhassunge District, Zambézia Province:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of intensive individual interviews: 11 (9 male, 2 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of group interviews: 4 (26 male, 15 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gonhane locality, Inhassunge District, Zambézia Province:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Number of intensive individual interviews: 5 (2 male, 3 female)
Number of group interviews: 1 (5 male)

**Bingajira locality, Inhassunge District, Zambézia Province:**
Number of intensive individual interviews: 7 (6 male, 1 female)
Number of group interviews: 1 (2 male, 1 female)
Number of focused community debates: 1 (2 male, 1 female)

**Olinda locality, Inhassunge District, Zambézia Province:**
Number of focused community debates: 3 (there was at times a great flux of people joining the group so that it was not possible to take numbers, approximately 20 – 30 people attended each debate whilst the discourse was dominated by community leaders)

TOTAL Interviews (individual and group): 36
TOTAL Focused community debates: 4
TOTAL Observations: 14
TOTAL Research participants: 82 (57 male, 25 female)

Note: The participants of the community debate are not included.

The open coding and comparison of emerging data supported by Mozambican researchers in the field helped to overcome some of my cultural bias as a researcher from Germany and greatly added to the cultural insight obtained while living in Mozambique from 2000 until 2008. Continuous memo writing in the field and between the various field visits strengthened my analytical thoughts and helped to link up emerging codes and categories. Field notes were digitalized both in Germany and in Mozambique. Because there were political and cultural sensitivities attached to my research topic it was not always possible to agree on recording interviews with interview participants. This was not discussed or debated at length but rather peremptorily agreed with research participants to make sure that the interview situation was open and comfortable for all involved. At the end of the field research, the research process was evaluated with the field team and decisions were taken which of the recorded interviews would be transcribed. Most interviews were transcribed by UCM researchers following transcription rules and principles of confidentiality that had been agreed beforehand.
3.4.2. Data analysis: From situational analysis to social and power arena maps

Data collection and analysis were in a continuous reciprocal relationship during the entire research process. As the empirical research phase was divided over several research trips to Mozambique, the data collected during each of the trips was analyzed straight away and influenced the focus of the following phase of data collection. Accordingly, during each of the trips, some data was coded and new categories emerged which influenced the next data collection phase, affecting geographic priorities and the selection of research participants.

My research process resembled the description given by Taylor and Bogdan (1984, p. 126):

…the researcher simultaneously codes and analyses data in order to develop concepts; by continually comparing specific incidents in the data, the researcher refines these concepts, identifies their properties, explores their relationships to one another, and integrates them into a coherent explanatory model.

Apart from the constant comparison of data in the field, several memos and analytical diagrams were developed. From the second year onwards, and then systematically in year three, situational analyses combined with the development of social and power arena maps as well as a positional map were used to conceptualize data and first findings. Following the methodological approach as outlined under sub-chapter 3.2, the mapping process began with the development of a situational map (figure 3) showing the major human, nonhuman, discursive and material elements in the research situation of civil society and collective action in Mozambique.

Through the development of a social arena map, that was thought to provide a discursive overview of the entire data material collected during the research process, including social worlds and sub-worlds as well as examples of its constituting actors and actants, diverse discursive elements were mapped out. This led to an innovative and dynamic data interpretation process that provoked analysis of relations among the various elements. It then happened that research in Zambézia Province, primarily in the capital city of Quelimane and the district of Inhassunge, became the major place for local case study development. Subsequently, the decision was taken to treat the other two initially suggested case study provinces of Nampula and Tete as areas for scoping studies and complementary analysis to enrich the overall contextual knowledge and the
social arena map “Civil society, development and social transformation in Mozambique” (figure 6).

In addition to the social arena map, two power arena maps were developed (figures 7 and 9). One illustrates the various powerful discourses encountered during district level research in Inhassunge (figure 7) whilst the other power arena (figure 9) provides insights into a special situation in a particular locality of the district (Olinda settlement). This situation was quite different from other situations and discourses encountered, and so I decided it represented a special ‘story to be told’ or project map, as Clarke might call it. Power arenas are particular tools for critical qualitative analysis, ‘cartographies of collective commitments, relations, and site of action’ (Perez & Canella 2015, p. 229), they make a special effort to include individuals/groups seemingly absent from the broader discourses (ibid.). Within that broad definition, I take power arenas as spheres of action and influence; they interact with social spheres. Social spheres in turn are produced out of real concerns and problems. Organizations are actors within social spheres. Discourses are produced out of social spheres and their actors.

As a result of the data collection and constant comparison of data, the research focus effectively shifted from de- and reconstructing the meaning of civil society to considering the concept of civil society as something which was essentially negotiated between different actors and organizations placed within various social arenas and worlds. This was done from the perspectives of citizens engaged into the various discourses of civil society and as an emerging priority, giving a particular focus on those actions that happen outside ‘institutionalized’ and/or ‘legalized’ organizations.

Situational maps and analysis do a kind of “social inversion” in making the usually invisible and inchoate social features more visible: all the key elements in the situation and their interrelations; the social worlds and arenas in which the phenomena of interest are embedded; the discursive positions taken and not taken by (human and nonhuman) actors on key issues; and the discourses themselves as constitutive of the situation. This is the post-modernization of a grounded theory founded in symbolic interactionism and Foucaultian analytics. (Clarke 2005, Prologue, p. xxxvii)

The engagement with Situational Analysis analytically supported the research process and helped to deconstruct the Western-influenced concept of civil society as it is frequently applied in ‘developing’ countries. Emerging research questions gained a clearer focus:
- What are the main and overlapping concepts of civil society present in Mozambique? Who participates and who is excluded, and why?
- How do marginalized citizens react in situations where they cannot organize social protest, where state power and control is overwhelming?

Conceptualizing now within a socio-cultural constructivist and post-colonial paradigm, the tension between ‘Western’ concepts of civil society and the ‘Mozambican’ ways of organizing society in and around the political and economic spheres became a focus. Still using grounded theory as the methodological orientation, situational analysis was added as a complementary analytical lens. Towards the end of the analytical process, my research applied a post-colonial perspective whilst using a postmodern and poststructuralist methodology. Both movements do not lead to major contradictions according to Berger (1992) and Tiffin (1993) and can be used simultaneously. However, caution needs to be taken when it comes to their ethical underpinnings (Teimouri 2012).

Clarke, in a conversation with Keller (Forum Qualitative Social Research, 2014), argues that the concept of implicated actors and actants, both elements of Situational Analysis, point explicitly to an analysis of power in social worlds and arenas. Clarke’s postmodern grounded theory approach raises many questions about discourses and power, which in turn are key to post-colonial and social justice studies. The visual mapping outputs helped the research to move from initially very complex maps of the ‘real world’ of the people living in isolated rural areas in the North and Centre of Mozambique to a second stage, where a meso-analysis supported linking up the quite different discourses encountered at national, provincial and district level to an overall civil society (power) arena and finally, a positional map (figure 10). Social arena mapping then facilitated the discovery of patterns of inclusion and exclusion, which were often linked to the visible, discrete, and invisible interventions of the state into civil society (see table 8).

3.5. Visualized research process and limitations

Figure 2 provides an overview of the entire research process, including emerging questions, which led to some decisions taken during the process.
**Figure 2: The visualized research process**

1. How much post-colonial analysis is needed to understand today's realities?
2. How to deal with different concepts of society and civil society as well as the various related discourses?
3. Single in-depth study?
4. Comparative approach?
5. What are the conditions that lead to a vibrant civil society underpinned by ownership?
6. What are the dynamics between legalized and non-formalized/legalized CS actors?
7. What is the role and function of civil society?

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**Write up of research report**

- Categories reaching **SATURATION**
  - Development of theoretical concepts, Publications
  - Situational, social arena and positional mapping
  - Coding, categorization and mind mapping in Inhassunge District with UCM team
  - Identify examples present within the data and from new data

---

**Incomplete understanding: follow up research to fill properties of categories and identify discursive structural elements.**

**CONSTANT COMPARISON OF DATA**

**THEORETICAL SAMPLING TO DEVELOP CATEGORIES**

- Carry out an in-depth case study in Zambezia Province and complementary analysis in Nampula and Tete Provinces.
  - Methods of data collection: interviews, focus groups, observations and community debates;
  - Review of literature, reports and media articles.

- Exploratory consultations, identification of research participants and locations for data collection

**Final research question:**

What are the dominant and contestatory definitions of civil society in a post-colonial situation and its complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion?

---

**Source:** Adapted from Charmaz (2014, p. 18). An earlier version of this figure originally appeared in Tweed and Charmaz (2011, p. 133).
I would like once again to underline some problems I encountered during data collection and research design (see also 3.3.1). The most serious limitation was linked to the challenge of taking records and at times notes of interviews. This was connected to the highly political sensitive and at times conflictual environment in which this research took place, in particular during district level research. Some people did not want their interview to be recorded from the beginning or sometimes the very interesting debates and responses only started to flow after the formal interview had ended. In this case I either wrote a memo straight after the interview or I relied on summary notes which I made later. There were also innumerable informal but very relevant conversations in restaurants, at market places and in public transports that informed my analysis but are equally not recorded.

Most of the data comparison and coding had to be done during field research and so data analysis was carried forward mainly without the use of software. At the same time this also meant that investigator triangulation could contribute significantly to the dynamic data analysis process and that the participatory team process could be maintained. Nvivo computer software was however used later on, to keep a robust centralized overview of the various transcribed interviews, memos and notes taken during field investigation. It was based on the coding, patterns and categories emerging, that the chapters of my thesis were derived. In order not to lose any meaning of interviews or text originally in Portuguese, I have kept some of the original Portuguese text in my thesis footnotes or the main text, and translated it into English myself.

A total number of 90 interviews, 9 focus group discussions, 5 community debates and 14 interview observations were conducted and a total number of 247 people participated in the research, of which 148 people were male and 59 female informants. From the remaining 40 participants who participated in community debates, the gender was not recorded due to some initial movements of people joining and leaving the debate. People interviewed as part of further research carried out in Nampula Province, Eráti District and Tete Province, Marara District, are not included into this research participant summary as data collected in these areas was not used for in-depth district level case study development (chapter 6) included into this dissertation. However, as participants from those areas have been at times quoted in other sections of Part II of the thesis they are part of the overall list of research participants presented in annex A.
PART II: CIVIL SOCIETY IN MOZAMBIQUE

OVERVIEW

The development of civil society in Mozambique cannot be assessed without considering its colonial past and linked to it, the ‘civilizing mission’ of the brutal colonization project led by the Portuguese. It was within this context that first civic associations outside the state, critical of the means of colonization, developed. Following global changes and anti-colonial struggles all around the world Mozambique developed its own armed liberation front, although internally divided. FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) came out as the leading movement and led the country into independence in 1975. This was the beginning of a new historical bloc generated by a civil society struggle for independence (see sub-chapter 2.4 for further explications about Gramsci’s theory of civil society in which the historical bloc is an important aspect).

Newly independent nation-building was done against the backdrop of the Cold War, continued internal disunity between various fractions of the liberation movement, adoption of socialism following a Marxist-Leninist one party model and oppression up to assassination of the ‘opposition’. Considerable external debt, increasing poverty and external funding for the guerrilla group RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) led the country into a 16-year long civil war and humanitarian crises, which killed about a million people. The first socialist president of Mozambique, Samora Machel, died in a mysterious plane crash in 1986 and the new president, Alberto Chissano, at a time of global changes provoked by the breakdown of the Soviet Union, opened the country to multi-party democracy along with the adoption of a new constitution in 1990.

Within the new constitution, space was provided for the institutionalization, legalization and installation of associations or NGOs. After the General Peace Agreement (Acordo Geral de Paz, GPA) in 1992, RENAMO became a political party. The ground was prepared for the ‘modern’ civil society project to flourish in independent Mozambique and FRELIMO, encouraged by its aid donors, proclaimed it was seeking to deepen the country’s democratization process. Constitutionally,
associações (associations) and NGOs were described as service-delivery agents and the bureaucratic hurdles for registering an association were quite high, so that only a few urban, mostly externally aided and funded groups managed to get legalized and initially the scene of associations was dominated by INGOs. Over time, INGOs domesticated or facilitated the creation of local NGOs, although always following a national vision and top-down dynamic. The barriers to institutionalization became a major challenge and limitation for developing a localized civil society model.

Civil society in Mozambique, bound to the democratization and good governance debates around the new millennium, developed into a contested social arena. Major development aid donors linked to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) were hugely committed to making Mozambique a best practice model for post-war development and invested substantially in the operationalization of the principles of the Paris Declaration as well as the progression of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Civil society was seen as a means for extending governmental services and for monitoring the implementation of government policies that in turn followed the politics of economic privatization and social development oriented by the MDGs.

While the externally influenced dual civil society role of service delivery and 'watchdog' was consolidated, the political environment deteriorated, poverty stagnated and the MDG project didn’t reach out to the most isolated communities and in a general sense, failed to bring about sufficient qualitative changes in people’s lives. In provinces like Zambézia and Tete, where the opposition is strong and conflicts increased, NGOs are rarely active and many districts remain very distant from both the state and NGO services. Civil society dynamics take different forms in those places, and actors choose other strategies to articulate and solve their problems. There we can see the germs of self-defence, violent appropriation as well as rituals and ceremonies supporting that. Mozambique appears to be far away from a consensus-building peaceful civil society concept but rather in the forefront of a struggle, that contests the political and economic order.

New dynamics and actors, both visible and invisible in the FRELIMO-RENAMO power arena surrounding citizens every day, are active to defend the survival of individuals and their families. Economic crisis is frequently adjusted through witchcraft.

68 Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Results, Mutual Accountability.
dynamics, meaning the accusation of witchcraft followed by the redistribution of wealth of the victims of accusation, and external private interests are being enchanted using the imaginary power of ancestors, e.g. imprecations of employees of international companies. Churches and religious associations provide the security that corrupt police are not able to provide, in particular for women, and ‘justice with our own hands’ is the ultimate way to control crime as the community courts and state judiciary are made dysfunctional through bribery. While this may all sound mystical and ancient, it is the counter-movement to and ‘exit’ from modern forms of exploitation, political oppression and the impunity of those responsible for it. The network of unjust power relations, channeled through the education system, information control, devaluing discourses of ‘the indigenous religions’ and smear campaigns against rights-based NGOs leaves little space for the emergence of a modern civil society concept based on communicative rationality and consensus-orientated negotiations.

Part II of the thesis contains the literature review Mozambique, various field reports, analyses and empirical findings from field investigations and starts with chapter 4. After a brief introduction, the constitutional framework guiding civil society development in Mozambique (sub-chapter 4.2) will be presented as well as the constitution of a modern civil society in Mozambique towards the end of the 19th century. The establishment of anti-colonial counter-hegemony inside and outside Mozambique is described in sub-chapter 4.3.1 leading into the description of the country’s transformation into independence, although accompanied by disunity, forced conformity and later on, structural adjustment after the end of the socialist Marxist-Leninist one-party state (4.3.2). The establishment of the NGO-civil society model is described in 4.3.3 as well as its difficult interface with traditional social structures (4.3.3) and the turn into the transition from humanitarian aid to development, democratization and participation, namely the promotion of stronger state-society relationships (4.3.4). The chapter concludes with a reflection about the dilemma of institutionalization and state control (4.4).

Chapter 5 embeds the main historical civil society development findings into contemporary civil society discourse constructions and a social arena map entitled ‘Civil Society, development and social transformation in Mozambique’ (figure 6). Outlining a general definition of governance, the Mozambican context is described through reference to the country’s poverty reduction strategy paper (sub-chapter 5.1) as
well as the main civil society conceptualizations influenced by aid donors within that context, namely civil society and good governance (5.2.1) as well as civil and political society (5.2.2). Within these conceptualizations, the roles of civil society actors are described ‘extending government services and control’ as well as ‘advocacy for economic and political change’. In sub-chapter 5.3 a more autonomous movement of contesting society is described with its dynamics of violent protest, ancestral beliefs, witchcraft, crime and self-defense. After that, I discuss whether civil society may redefine identities in a Mozambican context (5.4). This is followed by reflection about discourses of social inequality in post-colonial civil society (5.5).

Chapter 6 builds on the meso-analysis of civil society discourses described in chapter 5 and outlines the context, main discourses and power dynamics related to civil society in the selected in-depth case-study district Inhassunge (Zambézia Province). From the beginning, the selection was accompanied by surprises from my side. In particular because the topic that was suggested for identifying civil society dynamics and actors was the issue of ‘palm tree disappearance linked to witchcraft accusations and assassination of women’. This shows that grounded theory combined with situational analysis was an interesting methodological framework for identifying new dynamics, processes and actors as part of civil society studies.

Political economy has been an influential factor during the overall research process. The disappearance of the palm trees in Inhassunge District was mentioned as the cause of the major economic shock affecting the life of people in Inhassunge. The specific dependency on palm trees is however linked to the colonial period, when the manipulation of the conditions of the modes of production and exchange linked to outside economic intrusion started (6.2.1). This is followed by the description of political society in the district, which until today controls the evolution of a self-determined development of the local communities. Hence in the eyes of people we interviewed, their life had not improved since colonial times, some people even saw it worsening. This can only be the articulation of considerable frustration and disillusion (6.2.2).

Table 7 of sub-chapter 6.2.2 refers to some analytically influential codes identified through the analysis of interviews, underlining the deeply divisive politics encountered in the district, suggesting that local citizens are excluded from participating in any
political, social and economic decision-making that affects their lives. As political economy, seen as the mutual influence of political and economic interests, of central government institutions and actors, still affects the day-to-day life of people in Inhassunge district, local modern civil society has only marginally developed. Based on political tensions between FRELIMO and RENAMO, the civil sphere in the district is a solely political one where modern civil society actors have no space to develop or act. As most free channels of communication within the community are closed, including to the outside, people turn their attention to the family. Accordingly, the attention of my research turned to the family sphere, which in this context becomes a major sphere for the search for survival strategies, in particular as far as young people are concerned (6.2.3).

Looking at the intersection between civil society development and family, it appears that citizens consider two problem solving strategies. Firstly, I observed a trend to join churches and church associations; hence the increased appearance of a number of small faith-based associations (6.2.4). Secondly, I encountered a surprisingly large number of ceremonies and practices linked to witchcraft and sorcery (6.2.5). The latter seems to be linked to the political economy and increased political-military tension between RENAMO and FRELIMO. It also seems to be linked to the fact that some of the faith-based associations are seen as collaborating with the government; hence the turn to sorcery and witchcraft can be seen as the last resort for local citizens to redistribute wealth and power, and hence secure their survival (with major negative impacts on the well-being and survival of vulnerable elderly women).

Looking deeper into the potential and impact of the spiritual system and witchcraft to bring about social change, I encountered two dynamics, one of an obstructing nature (6.2.5) and one of an empowering nature (6.2.5.1 and 6.2.5.2). Based on the empirical findings, the chapter closes with a theoretical reflection about the interface of modern and traditional governance and its implications on civil society development (6.3). The district level case study reveals a number of challenges that are linked to major post-colonial problems that remain unresolved in Mozambique, including the inner-state conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO and the paternalistic and clientilistic government of FRELIMO. Both this particular context and the considerable limitation of people’s capacity to determine their own future, makes the building up of a modern civil society project unlikely. Following an overview, by means of a situational map (for
more explications about situational maps consult sub-chapter 3.4.2), outlining various actors, actants, elements, major issues and events as well as discourses that constitute the complex picture of civil society in Mozambique (see also chapters 4, 5 and 6). I hope that this situational map can provide the needed road map for understanding the different accesses necessary to disassemble the Western concept of civil society and make alternative discourses and social worlds visible.

**Figure 3:** Situational Map: Civil society and boundary construction

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69 The direction for going more deeply into the deconstruction of civil society is an intense focus on boundary construction processes between the different research participants and the discourses they are involved in (see also Clarke 2005, p. 116). The key question orientating the development of the situational map was the following: What boundaries exist within civil society and how are they being constructed?
**Individual Human Elements/Actors**

- Social activists
- Traditional and religious leaders
- NGO workers/members
- Mozambican researchers
- Public policy and decision-makers
- Consultants
- ‘Heroic’ political leaders.

**Non-human Elements**

- Definition of civil society in policy reports, civil society data bases, concepts of civil society and underpinning philosophies, mobility and access, Results-based management.

**Collective Human Elements /Actors**

- **Political Parties**: FRELIMO, RENAMO, MDM
- **Formal CS actors** (NGOs, NGO networks, Social movements, FBOs, farmers’ unions)
- **Universities**: UCM, UEM
- **Private foundations**: MASC
- Donors and GoM.

**Silent actors**

- ‘sociedade civil da noite’, traditional spiritual leaders, magicians, Naparamas.

**Discursive constructions of individual and collective human actors**

- Categories/stereotypes of civil society actors, normative and non-violent civil society distinction, dominant roles of civil society actors (service delivery, policy monitoring).

**Discursive constructions of Nonhuman actants**

- Standardization, local and national, measurability, conflict environment.
Political Economy Elements

- Concepts and definitions of civil society and citizenship, legal frameworks, self-censorship, corruption.

Sociocultural/Symbolic Elements

- Traditional and modern civil society, protests and demonstrations 'greves', meeting culture.

Temporal Elements

- History of the meaning of Civil Society related to liberal and Marxist thought and (post-)colonial development, history of exclusion of women and the poor, crisis of representivity, weak capacity.

Spatial Elements

- Local as traditional and national/international as modern in a global and neoliberal 'modernization' paradigm. Regional differences based on social, political, historical economic development.

Major Issues/Debates (usually contested)

- Quantitative versus qualitative 'measurement' of civil society, its boundaries, capacity and impact, political and social means of civil society, 'economy' of civil society, stabilization versus contestation.

Related Discourses (Historical, Narrative and/or Visual)

- Normative versus non-normative frameworks, formal/informal civil society, structural change, empowerment and participation, social transformation, positivism and constructivism.

Key events/situations

- 2014 elections, assassinations (Citac, journalists)
- Resumption of civil war
- Trial against Castel-Branco and journalists
- EU civil society mapping study
- 'Não a ProSavana' campaign & internal civil society conflict, debt scandal and financial crises.

Source: Author
CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MOZAMBIQUE

4.1. Introduction: The public sphere(s) in Mozambique

The research I have undertaken confirms the contemporary explanatory relevance of Ekeh’s theory of the Two Publics and Osaghae’s further application of the concept to the theory of civil society in Africa\(^{70}\) as described in sub-chapter 2.4. As such, the two authors’ analysis will be used several times during my work to explain post-colonial civil society dynamics in Mozambique. In addition, core categories from Gramsci’s civil society concept will be applied to explain some of the major social changes or historical blocs (see also sub-chapter 2.4) that arose out of civil society and that may direct Mozambican people towards the construction of a new hegemony. Furthermore, Ekeh’s two publics help to explain in part why some of the discourse around civil society at regional or sub-regional level in Mozambique includes a strong dynamic of exclusion of rural, more isolated communities, with the consequence of excluding their traditional religious beliefs and values from public debates.

In the subsequent sections, the constitutional framework and various internal and external historical and political processes, which influence the potential of civil society to enhance social transformation, will be presented. Following the methodological framework of this research, these elements are essential for understanding the current complex situation of civil society in Mozambique and add substantial material to the understanding of the district level case study (chapter 6) and overall empirical data, findings and analysis of future scenarios of civil society development (chapters 4 – 7). Those elements also open the way for setting the case study in the wider context of studies of civil society in ‘developing’ countries (chapter 7).

\(^{70}\) Aiyede (2009), looking critically at Ekeh’s theory of the two publics, identifies some weaknesses in relation to Ekeh’s explanation of the colonial impact on contemporary civil society formations. He claims that Ekeh’s theory misses the element of human agency and recognition of policy decisions that establish arrangements within which political interaction occurs. There have been and will be moments where human agency in the public (civic and primordial) sphere have influenced both government’s action and policy making as well as civil society development in my empirical work. However, as long as there are two public spheres working on different moral and legal grounds, with limited interaction, understanding and mutual respect between the two, those policy changes might only affect a minority of the bourgeois class and in the worst case, reinforce the tendency of plunder and discouraging incidents of corruption to be found in African bureaucracies (Irele 2010).
4.2. The constitutional framework

This sub-chapter will now look at the relevant historical and contemporary constitutional and legal aspects regulating, limiting or facilitating citizen engagement and action as well as legal civil association in Mozambique, all of which affect the development of a vital self-determined civil society. As will be further explained in subsequent sections, a considerable part of the colonial administrative and legal framework has been carried over into the independent Mozambique and accordingly, there was no radical break with the colonial legal culture\(^{71}\) (Meneses 2007). Whilst the colonial regime in Mozambique had used traditional chiefs as auxiliaries in controlling the African population (Virtanen 2005), coding traditional social norms as a static normative framework\(^{72}\) for still to be ‘civilized’ indigenous peoples, colonizers and a limited number of ‘assimilados’\(^{73}\) were granted citizenship and political rights under Portuguese colonial law. However, soon after independence, in the 1978 amended version of the 1975 Constitution, the FRELIMO Central Committee was given the task of creating a systemic unity by defining new principles of legislation and determining progressive development goals of the new state.

As part of defining these new principles of legislation, the FRELIMO leadership started first of all to eliminate all forms of customary power and its representatives were excluded from the desired socialist orientated non-feudal ‘New Society’ (Virtanen 2005) which first of all aimed to dismantle the previous colonial structures. The changes in community representation should have affected the legal framework that people were living in, making sure that all citizens were governed by the same law, thus bringing to an end the unjust dichotomy between citizens (with powerful political rights) and indigenous peoples (with traditional ‘social’ customary rights but no political rights). However, with the onset of the civil war soon after independence, the new legal system,

\(^{71}\) Virtanen (2004) states that FRELIMO – faced with the scarcity of resources available during the independence process – decided to maintain key administrative structures inherited from colonial power and only staffed key positions with loyal FRELIMO cadres. The idea was to gradually move to a new system.

\(^{72}\) This is also called the principle of ‘indirect rule’; it was applied in many British colonies and partly adapted by the colonial Portuguese regime.

\(^{73}\) The politics of ‘assimilation’ introduced from Portugal during colonial times tried to destroy traditional culture of those living in the African colonies by means of introducing European norms and values and create a privileged elite, called the ‘assimilados’, which would than collaborate with the colonizer. For more information, see also Freyre (2001).
including the so-called ‘peoples’ public courts’ (*tribunais populares*), could not be extended into more isolated areas. In practice, traditional law and customary institutions remained the reality for most people, and indeed these were seen as more legitimate institutions in the eyes of many Mozambicans (Weimer 1999).

With more African states gaining independence, the debate about the universality of human rights and their application in culturally diverse contexts gained increasing momentum (Mamdani 2000). Whilst equal citizen’s participation in nation-building has always been a principle of pan-African ideas, these ideas were advanced in the shadow of defending boundaries that have previously been defined by the colonial powers. Accordingly, in 1981 the principle right for people’s self-determined development was included in the African Charter on People’s and Human Rights. Alongside this development, the debate about what constitutes ‘authenticity’ or ‘falsity’ and a legitimate customary authority, with the relationship to colonial authority as the key reference point (Virtanen 2005), remains crucial in Southern Africa until today.

For FRELIMO in its early years after independence, the traditional chieftaincy certainly was a ‘false’ representation of Mozambicans. In the 1978 Constitution, only those who had no colonial or customary structural links were considered one of ‘us’ and could vote and be elected to political office. As a result, a considerable number of people who wanted to run for FRELIMO party positions and internal elections were rejected; many were traditional authorities who would later decide to support the opposition movement RENAMO. Differences between members of the political, modern civil and traditional society, including their moral and legal understandings, were divided early in the post-independence constitution making process of Mozambique. State institutions were transformed into party institutions leading to the one-party Marxist-Leninist state framework governing Mozambique (with minor exceptions) until a new constitution was approved in 1990 (AfriMap & Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 2009). Around the same time, the 16-year devastating civil war between the Government, led

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74 See also República de Moçambique (1978), Lei No. 12/1978. This Law established the Popular Courts led both by professional jurists and lay judges. The latter were elected locally and were called to arbitrate according to common sense and goodwill. Until 1990, the popular courts were an integral part of the judiciary (Meneses 2010).

75 In 1981, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the African Charter on People’s and Human Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter). Article 20 states: “All peoples (…) shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen.”
by FRELIMO, and RENAMO, which has torn the nation apart and has caused widespread economic misery and famine, ended.

An agreement between the Mozambican Government led by FRELIMO and RENAMO concerning the introduction of an extensive and modernized Bill of Rights opened the door for a democratic multi-party political system. The 1990 Constitution provides the framework for the presidential representative democratic republic, whereby the President of Mozambique is also head of the government, and consequently has a wide range of responsibilities. Whilst executive power is exercised only by the Government, legislative power lies with both the Government and the Assembly of the Republic. The 1990 Constitution also established an independent judiciary and, in principle, brought an end to legal institutions previously subordinated to the political organs of state and party (Virtanen 2004).

Until then unofficially operating community courts (which had existed since colonial times) were introduced through a separate law 4/92 (República de Moçambique 1992) and the functions of the elected judges within the ‘public people’s courts’ were reduced gradually. Community courts were only formally recognized in the 2004 Constitution. Whilst not in an uncritical way, a number of scholars would generally consider the law regulating community courts as a positive step towards the recognition of de facto lived legal pluralism (Kyed et al. 2012), Meneses (2007) points to the fact that the incorporation of the multiple experiences of social regulation – mostly unwritten forms of dispute resolution and social control practiced by local institutions into the formal legal court system have been widely unsuccessful:

A careful analysis into the political changes in the legal field (Santos 2003 & 2006a; Meneses et al, 2006) indicates that the constitutional adjustments serve the state aims of extending the official rule of law and state authority into peripheral areas, rather than expressing the efforts of the state to accommodate the claims of sub-state groups towards recognition of the legal diversity present in the country. (Meneses 2007, p. 2)

Joaquim Chissano, head of state after Samora Machel’s death in a plane crash in 1986, and elected President of Mozambique from 1994 to 2005, was certainly the first president of the ‘new’ Republic to enter into dialogue with traditional leaders. This included opening the door to the recognition of their remaining community functions

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76 Meneses (2007) uses the term ‘institutions’ in a wider sense to include bureaucracies as well as religious institutions.
and roles within the customary legal system, in particular in the context of the community courts. The 1990 Constitution also provided space for the establishment of the right to free association, providing space for the institutionalization, legalization and installation of non-government organizations (NGOs). The various types of legalized NGOs that emerged are generally referred to as ‘associações’ (associations) under Law 8/91 (República de Moçambique 1991), which set out the rules for the implementation of this particularly important right related to the establishment of a ‘modern’ civil society in a state seeking to deepen its democratization process. However, Law 8/91 positions associations as service-delivery agents that work close to the state and hence limits their potential for independently influencing political processes:

Associations may request a declaration of public utility if they pursue the interest of the general public or the community, cooperating with the public administration in the provision of services at national or local level and providing the necessary evidence which can help to evaluate its work. (Republica de Moçambique 1991)

Whilst the recent EU commissioned civil society mapping study (Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2015) concludes that most civil society organizations in Mozambique do not consider their registration process as complex, although at times as an unnecessary lengthy process, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2014 and more explicitly a CIVICUS civil society study (Francisco 2015), looking specifically at the enabling legal environment, consider the revision of the Law 8/91 (Republica de Moçambique 1991) as urgent. According to the CIVICUS analysis, the law is detached from the reality that most Mozambican citizens face. The study recommends revising the law so that it more clearly articulates the relationship between the state and the civil society organizations and ultimately simplifies the association registration process at all administrative levels.

During interviews carried out in the Provinces of Nampula (February 2014 and July 2015) and Zambézia (March – May 2015) most citizens confirmed the CIVICUS

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77 The registration of associations is being processed by the Ministry of Justice. Legalized associations have to have a general assembly, a fiscal advisory board and an executive structure. These are the required governance structures of an association aiming to distribute power within an association.

78 As associações poderão requerer a declaração de utilidade pública desde que prossigam fins de interesse geral ou da comunidade, cooperando com a Administração Pública na prestação de serviços a nível central ou local e apresentem todas as provas necessárias ao ajuizamento da sua pretensão.

79 The Mozambique report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2014. It covers the period from 31 January 2011 to 31 January 2013. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries.
findings above. One peasants’ association in Nampula Province added that the time necessary for registration was substantially dependent on the political will of the local administrative post official. Furthermore, most administration officials interviewed in Zambézia and Nampula Provinces, at least in theory, saw the role of civil society organizations as articulating community needs and problems and supporting their resolution through the provision of social services and infrastructure. When talking to NGO representatives at district and provincial levels, it became clear that their advocacy role is not recognized and indeed is undermined through control, intimidation and attempts of co-option and instrumentalization\textsuperscript{80} (see also chapter 5).

Finally, under Article 78 of the Constitution approved in 2004, social organizations are recognized as associations with their own interests and affinities as well as having a role in promoting democracy and citizen participation, including the achievement of citizens’ rights and freedoms and collective awareness in the fulfilment of civic duties. Further civic rights are enshrined in the Constitution, such as the Right of Petition, Complaint and Claim and interestingly, the Right of Resistance (Article 80), under which citizens do not have to comply with orders that are unlawful or that infringe on others’ rights, freedoms and guarantees. As part of the same constitution, the Freedom of Professional Associations and Unions is enshrined, including their independence from the State, political parties and churches or religious denominations. After about nine years of pressure from many NGOs and supported by international donors, the law on the right to Freedom of Information has been approved by Parliament (Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2015).

During my own time living in Mozambique from 2000 – 2008, I observed the transition from one Mozambican President of the Republic to the other. Joaquim Chissano announced during his second presidential term that in line with the constitution, he was not going to run again in the coming elections. Armando Guebuza (FRELIMO) was elected as new President of the Republic in 2004 (taking office in 2005), and he was re-elected five years later. The amended 2004 Constitution only came into force the day after the validation and proclamation of the 2004 General Election results (Rainha &

\textsuperscript{80} The 2014 Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (2014) states that many NGO leaders are FRELIMO party members. This confirms the tendency of political party instrumentalization of NGOs. During many informal conversations as part of my research, people stated that most state and NGO officials may carry a FRELIMO party membership card in order to access services or to escape day-to-day corruption. However, interviewees underlined that these people might ultimately not vote for FRELIMO during elections or may clandestinely work against FRELIMO.
The 2004 Constitution makes provision for the establishment of a consultative State Council. This political body advises the President of the Republic on issues such as the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic; declaration of a state of war, a state of siege or a state of emergency; the holding of referendums, in the terms of article 159 and the calling of a general election (República de Moçambique 2004, Article 166).

In summary, there is now a legal-constitutional framework for the freedom of expression and association, as well as the official commitment of the government for democracy and good governance; however, this is not sufficient for ensuring citizen voice. Situations like the 2008 and 2010 mass protests against government decisions to increase petrol and food prices do not seem to be protected by law, nor were other protests against electoral fraud. These protests have been subdued with heavy-handed police and military violence, which have caused a number of deaths and serious injuries on each occasion. Therefore, whilst citizen action like advocacy and lobbying is not explicitly prohibited by the law, there is certainly a lack of clarity about how civic engagement may be expressed outside the institutionalized realm of NGOs (Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2015). In practice, there are many limitations to public protest and further aspects such as limited access to quality education, sub-ordination and exclusion in the public sphere, hunger and malnutrition: in short, the existing economic and social exclusion are hindering the exercise of citizenship and the expression of citizen voice. The division of society alongside dichotomies such as civilized/non-civilized (colonial language), modern-urban/feudal-traditional-rural (socialist language), as well as political party lines, limit the development of a strong and influential independent, self-determined civil society.

Altogether, there is a lack of well-elaborated analyses about the development and implementation of the legal and constitutional framework of Mozambique, including the widely practiced customary law and how both modern and customary law interact, and at times facilitate or limit, citizen action. The formal recognition of legal pluralism makes Mozambique a rather unique case of a legal framework that recognizes its multicultural society (Kyed et al. 2012) but that in reality, as my research has shown, does not in itself reduce social inequality and cultural or ethnic differentiations, which in combination with political power, may even further marginalize certain groups and
classes in society. This in turn may result in conflict, the impunity of particular people and the questioning of the role of the state and its legitimacy from the broader citizenry.

According to my empirical research at district level in Zambézia, Nampula and Tete Provinces, societal constraints linked to dichotomies and colonial legacies have complicated the further transformation of the civic and primordial public spheres into a single space for advancing human rights and social change. This may be ‘politically’ intended, because in this way political and modern civil society will continue to be positioned above civic action within the primordial public sphere. This subordination facilitates control by the FRELIMO party and the minority bourgeois class over the majority of Mozambicans living within the primordial public sphere. Accordingly, since the end of the one-party system and the approval of the new constitutions in 1990 and 2004, the inclusion of customary law into the Mozambican legal system is a subject for controversial debate. The debate relates to questions about the legitimacy of the state, representation, framing of national and social justices, contested citizenship as well as the narratives Mozambicans are developing in relation to their understanding of civil society. Once again, I find it indispensable to look at the two publics as described by Ekeh (1975), the modern civic public, involved in the constitution making process and law enforcement, and the primordial public, which places its trust in customary law influenced by tradition. Figure 4 summarizes some of the relationships and subordinations that civil society groups encounter in the civic and primordial sphere as well as the results of that in terms of civil society dynamics.

**Figure 4**: Legal pluralism in the civil and primordial spheres
The legal framework governing citizen engagement in Mozambique has more recently adopted legal pluralism (see figure 4 above). However, gross human rights abuses and impunity can be found in both the modern constitution and the customary systems. The question whether the majority of Mozambicans have access to a system of justice that is broadly recognized as legitimate by its citizens will remain unresolved until there is an end to corruption, as well as a more equal distribution of power, and accountability within the overall societal system, embracing both primordial and civic publics. The fact that accusations of witchcraft and various related homicides have not always been dealt with within the formal government justice system guided by the modern constitution (see chapter 6), has created considerable fear and led to local citizens asking very serious questions about the government’s ability to effectively control and administer justice in its territory. This can be demonstrated by the following quote of a citizen working in the public prosecutor’s office of the district. Asked why witchcraft accusations are happening in the district, he stated:

“…there are difficulties with the justice system arriving in this district…there are also cultural differences and governance is another limit, it (governance) doesn’t let people participate. There are also rivalries between zones and tribalism…you need to know that elder women have no value here and this is
linked to witchcraft. Values get lost with increasing health problems. In this situation people contact traditional healers and they receive recommendations to engage into the ‘bad’ (evil)”. (Interview in Inhassunge District, 30.03.2015)

During the course of various interviews and informal conversations in Inhassunge District, in particular with activists of the faith based association AVODEMO (Association of the Voice of the Desert of Mozambican) which is engaged into the fight against domestic violence – including witchcraft accusations – barriers to resolving the problem of witchcraft accusations was seen to be related to both the impunity of the aggressors carrying out the assassinations on one side and the influence of traditional rites and spiritual ceremonies on the other (see also chapter 6). The environment of impunity created by the FELIMO led government in any case demonstrates the government’s inability and corruptive character and hence delegitimizes the governing party FRELIMO in the eyes of the great majority of people interviewed in the three districts covered by this research. In the case of Inhassunge District, I would cautiously say that community courts and state tribunals appeared to collaborate but within that collaboration, each fed on the other’s fears, leading to the tremendous level of anxiety that we encountered during our interviews, focus group discussions and field observations. A respondent linked to the newly established office of the Instituto do Patrocínio e Apoio Jurídico (IPAJ, Free Legal Aid Institute) interviewed in Mucopia (Inhassunge District) circumscribed the consequences of this ostracizing collaboration the following way:

“O direito da própria sociedade é violado e as comunidades ficam nas escuras.” (Technical Officer IPAJ, 2015, Interview in Inhassunge district 30.03.2015)

“The right of the society itself is being violated and the communities remain in the dark.”

In order to better understand the processes that led to the current fragility of the constitutional and legal system, abuse of legal pluralism, corruption and marginalization, as I have encountered it particularly strong in Inhassunge District, a detailed historical analysis of the development of civil society in Mozambique is necessary.

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81 When asking interviewees in Inhassunge how it was possible that assassinators are not being judged and imprisoned, people responded that cases are rarely being investigated, if an aggressor is identified and transferred into prison, they are, according to people interviewed, always released after three or four days, after bribery payments.
4.3. Historical development of civil society in Mozambique

Impoverishment and inequality, rooted at least as far back as the sixteenth century, dramatically increased as a direct consequence of Portugal's imposition of colonial-capitalism during the early years of the last century. In 1891, the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty was signed and Mozambique was established in its current geographic borders. Out of this colonial experience, a definition of its peoples’ ethnic composition, reproduction dynamics as well as language diversity emerged (Newitt 1995). Until now, these formations, along with various political ideologies, have influenced the feelings of belonging and the relationship and dynamics between the modern state, its administration and citizens, the primordial and modern societies (Ekeh 1975) and the much debated and contested ‘public sphere(s)’ in which civil society activities take place (Arendt 1958, Habermas 1962, Ekeh 1975, Fraser 1990, Osaghae 2003).

When looking at the historical development of civil society in Mozambique and the two publics as distinguished by Ekeh (1975), it is important to note that it was during colonial times when the integrative traditional system of reciprocity was replaced with a ‘forced’ market economy. In Mozambique, this transformation was ensured through the support of the traditional authorities (régulos), who were allowed to maintain their territorial influence and hegemony during colonial times but at the same time supported the further rolling out of the exploitive colonial economic market approach (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1998, p. 102). Harrison (2000) points to the fact that régulos were also used as intelligence agents (as is the case nowadays in many of the opposition dominated areas where empirical research for this study was carried out).

The impact of this colonial counter-insurgency also had socio-psychological dimensions, in particular in areas where colonial resistance was strong (Harrison 2000, p. 39). Harrison also puts great emphasis on demystifying and questioning the use of the term ‘tradition’ (and, as such, the régulo as the figure of ‘traditional’ leader and community representative) which according to his analysis assumes a (false) self-contained, non-political cultural system of lineage in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ferguson (2006), examining a number of African countries in the contemporary neoliberal world order, links the turn towards the market economy to changes in the private and public

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82 The term ‘forced’ is being used because the introduced market economy was not a free market economy but rather one that can be characterized by obligatory production forms and forced labour (e.g. the introduced cotton cultivation/farming).
spheres. Accordingly, he adds the analysis of the overwhelming power of the market to the comparison of how the state changes its relationship with society over time and the consequent changes in administrative control.

However, Ferguson also stresses that, particularly in Africa, domination has long been exercised by entities other than the state, namely private colonial companies, a trend which was and is a reality in Mozambique. Indeed, today, Mozambique is still to a large extent ruled by an elite with strong links to external transnational companies and organizations which, when strictly analysed, do not fall under the category of government but interact with both the Mozambican government and its donor and cooperation partners within a global imperialistic system. It is in this context that both the historical and contemporary close ties between the colonial and the present-day Mozambican government with international companies and organizations need to be understood. The same is true for many NGOs, social and political movements.

Rejecting the usefulness of conceptualizing civil society in Africa based on the existence of the ‘private subject’ (as is the case in the dominant concept of civil society), Fatton (1995) explicitly points to the necessary interplay of collective solidarities with ethnical, religious and class formation processes in Africa:

Thus, if civil society is to be a useful heuristic tool in deciphering contemporary African history, it has to be conceptualized as the realm of collective solidarities generated by processes of class formation, ethnic ‘inventions’ and religious ‘revelations’. As such it does not always embody the peaceful harmony of associational pluralism...In fact, civil society in Africa is conflict-ridden...It is the prime repository of...ethnic hierarchies, conflicting class visions, patriarchal domination and irredentist identities fuelling deadly conflicts in many areas of the continent. (Fatton 1995, p. 73)

Both Fatton’s and Ferguson’s arguments can be brought together with Cabrita (2000) who thoroughly investigated the culture of conflict surrounding FRELIMO and concludes that the 16-year-long civil war in Mozambique was inevitable, based on the prevailing economic, political and social inequalities, as well as ethnic conflicts which the country was facing. Internal conflict, according to his analysis, encompassed FRELIMO initially as a peaceful and later on armed liberation movement and still after that, as a ruling party. Without wanting to neglect the considerable external influences and economic interests of the former Rhodesian and South African racist regimes and more generally of the global Cold War scenario during the liberation and civil wars in Mozambique, it is also essential to analyse the various forms of internal disunity,
expulsion and assassination of members and opponents which, to this day, remain connected to FRELIMO’s existence.

Above all, the disputes within FRELIMO indicate the existence of, and are the result of, an active Mozambican civil society that aims to participate in the country’s key social and economic decisions: on issues ranging from the form of democracy governing the country to the distribution of its wealth. In any case, these disputes, many of which initially originated from civil society, should be considered as part of civil society’s struggle for participation and hence some form of co-determination of the political system governing the territory of Mozambique. The following sub-chapters aim to provide more detail and an overview about the interplay of colonialism and post-colonial state building as well as neoliberal politics within the current development paradigm. There is also an ample presentation of civil society actors and their main areas of engagement, meaningful key events/actions, alliances, campaigns and struggles.

4.3.1. Civil society: building a new historic bloc

The critical analysis and interpretation of collected verbal, written and iconographic sources, allow us to demonstrate the existence of a bridge (relationship) between the first civil society initiatives at the beginning of the 20th century and the emergence of the independence movements (in Mozambique) in the early sixties. In conclusion, 1926 to 1962 can be defined as the chronological time which transformed the African cause into a truly national conscience. (Neves 2008, abstract of doctoral thesis, my translation)

The above reference underlines that Mozambican civil society played a crucial role for developing counter-hegemony and a new political consciousness in relation to colonial domination and the regime with its system of oppression. Civil society in Mozambique, as indeed all over the African continent from the late 19th century onwards, was influenced by the international context of pan-African ideals, negritude and socialism. Indeed, the major part of the small Mozambican bourgeois class born out of the colonial experience had itself manifested for reforms within the colonial system, claiming access to education and jobs in the late 19th to early 20th century. However, the conditions for political activities outside the colonial boundaries, in particular since about 1930, were unfavourable, as the first president of FRELIMO, Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, highlights in the following statement:

The conditions for the expansion of nationalist ideas over the entire country have been unfavorable. Because of the ban on political association, the need to
work clandestinely due to this prohibition, the erosion of traditional society and the lack of modern education in rural areas, initially it was only within a very small minority that the idea of national action in contrast to local action developed. This minority was predominantly urban, composed by intellectuals and paid employees, individuals who were essentially unassociated with the tribal system, mostly composed of ‘assimilados’ and ‘mulatos’; in other words, a small marginal sector of the population.\(^{83}\) (Mondlane 1977, p. 11)

Francisco (2010) rightly challenges that much of the contemporary civil society analysis only starts recognizing the appearance of formal civil society actors after independence 1975, while indeed according to his analysis (see also Newitt 1995, Cabrita 2000, Rocha 2002, Neves 2008, Hohlfeldt & Grabauska 2010, Sayaka 2012), a quarter of all organizations already existed before independence. He uses figures from a comprehensive national survey of not-for-profit organizations (INE 2006) which highlighted that about a quarter of all organizations operating in Mozambique in 2004/2005 already existed before independence, and most of these had a religious character. However, the scope for activities under the colonial dictatorship should not be overestimated as Cabrita (2000) notes, referring to the initial stages of the armed liberation war:

Numerous intellectuals linked to FRELIMO, including Luís Bernardo Honwana, José Craveirinha and Domingos Arouca were detained. The Portuguese cracked down on civic organizations perceived to be furthering FRELIMO’s goals. (Cabrita 2010, p. 30)

From this perspective, it is obvious that the understanding of resistance against the authoritarian Portuguese colonial regime and the transformation of Mozambique into an independent nation as well as its post-colonial dynamics are important for understanding contemporary trends. For this reason, I would like to go back to the late 1880s, when some embryonic expressions of civic public action unfolded and first civic public expressions were made in the context of the creation of the first newspapers\(^{84}\) such as *Clamor Africano* (1886), *O Africano*\(^{85}\) (1877 from Quelimane and 1908 from

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\(^{83}\) As condições eram desfavoráveis à expansão das ideias nacionalistas por todo o país. Por causa da proibição de associação política, da necessidade de segredo imposto por esta proibição, da erosão da sociedade tradicional e da falta de educação moderna nas áreas rurais, foi só entre uma minoria diminuta que ao princípio se desenvolveu a ideia de acção nacional em contraposição com acção local. Esta minoria era predominantemente urbana, composta de intelectuais e assalariados, indivíduos essencialmente desenraizados do sistema tribal, na sua maioria africanos assimilados e mulatos; por outras palavras, um pequeno sector marginal da população.

\(^{84}\) According to Hohlfeldt & Grabauska (2010) the journal ‘O Progresso’ was already published in 1868, however it seems that only after only one edition the journal was confronted with censorship from the colonial government.

\(^{85}\) According to Hohlfeldt & Grabauska (2010) there are doubts about the year ‘O Africano’ was first published. Newitt (1995) refers to 1908, indicating that it was the first journal to be published in two
Lourenço Marques), and *O Brado Africano* (1918) and *Voz Africana* (in 1932); these were voices of civic groups such as *O Grémio Africano, Associação Africana da Colônia de Moçambique*\textsuperscript{86}, *Associação Africana, Instituto Negrofílio* and *Núcleo dos Estudantes Secundários Africanos de Moçambique* / NESAM\textsuperscript{87} (Newitt 1995, Rochas 2002, Neves 2008, Hohlfeldt & Grabauska 2010, Sayaka, 2012).

Whilst some of the urban intellectual Afro-Portuguese members of the civic groups mainly called for ‘assimilação, civilização e progresso’ (assimilation, civilization and progress) for Mozambique (Newitt 1995, p. 386), others were keen to build international links with global radical groups linked to William Edward Burghardt Du Bois and Marcus Garvey. In 1910 for example, two civic groups were established in Portugal, mainly composed of ‘mestiços’\textsuperscript{88}: *Liga Africana* and *Partido Nacional Africano* (Newitt 1995, p. 386), linking up the reformist and radical groups within the various Portuguese colonies. João Albasini and his brother José, both considered as very influential ‘mulatos’ in establishing journalism in Mozambique, strongly participated in the establishment of the first civic groups, and in particular of *O Grémio Africano*:

> In summary, it can be said that João Albasini was Mozambique’s first real journalist; he also produced literary work that distinguished various time periods in the development of the Mozambican literature. In the same way, he also helped to develop national literature by publishing the country’s first generation of writers. He was an activist in defending the citizenship rights of indigenous and ‘mulatos’, highlighted women’s social status and recognized education as the dynamic element of civilization (in the development of society).\textsuperscript{89} (Hohlfeldt & Grabauska 2010, p. 208)

\textsuperscript{86} *O Gremio Africano* has been restructured in the late 1930s under Salazar’s (Portuguese government) political orientations and transformed into a semi-government organization which was then called ‘Associação Africana da Colônia de Moçambique’. In 1933, the so called Censorship Act was introduced under the same authoritarian regime. This censorship effectively managed to bring the labour movement under control. Whilst in 1926 there were still 97 newspapers in Mozambique, they halved in number within the coming four years. (Sayaka 2012, p. 151)

\textsuperscript{87} According to Neves (2008) Eduardo Mondlane (first president of FRELIMO) established NESAM around 1949; other members like the ex-president of the Republic Joaquim Chissano were highly influential in the liberation struggle and later FRELIMO government.

\textsuperscript{88} The terms ‘mestiços’ and ‘mulatos’ are frequently used in parallel to describe the mixed skin colour of people.

\textsuperscript{89} Em síntese, pode-se dizer que João Albasini foi verdadeiramente o primeiro jornalista de Moçambique; foi, também, autor de obra literária que divide períodos na formação daquela literatura, da mesma maneira que ajuda a constitui-la, publicando os primeiros escritores do país. Militante, defendeu a cidadania do indígena e do mulato, deu especial atenção à posição social da mulher e reconheceu, na educação, o elemento dinamizador de civilização.
The various civic groups raised anti-colonial voices and de-racialized and Africanised the emerging civic sector in Mozambique. However, at the same time as the de-racialization of some groups in urban areas progressed, the ethnic based tribal structures in rural areas were left intact within Mozambican society, and new class formations and social identities developed. Whilst some of the modern civic groups were inspired by socialism and Pan-Africanism through their access to global social movements, traditional African life started to be devalued due to people’s illiteracy and its so-called ‘feudal’ (lineage-orientated) character. In short, the majority of peasants in Mozambique were looked down upon by some of their own ‘nationalized’ peers as uneducated and/or political and socially unconscious.

In the context of the implementation of the philosophy ‘Estado Novo’ (New State), influenced by the Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar, the colonial regime started to use an authoritarian model when imposing non-governmental entities for conducting state propaganda, aiming to gain acceptance of state policies by the people. However, in the 1950s some civic groups such as Associação dos Naturais de Moçambique, Conselho Cristão de Moçambique and cooperatives of African farmers emerged, while the student’s movement (NESAM) remained influential. With economic ties with South Africa getting stronger, a number of messianic-prophet sects (separatist churches and so called ‘independent’ churches) spread into Mozambique and quite quickly built up a strong membership base which in turn refused to be subordinated to European Christian Churches (Newitt 1995).

All these groups constituted another space for mobilizing resistance against the authoritarian colonial regime. Within these quite diverse organizations, both reformists’ ideas were generated as well as radical perspectives in favour of a violent struggle for independence (Negrão 2003, Francisco 2010). Finally, in 1970, the Catholic Church,

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90 The colonial administration passed a so called ‘Censorship Act’ in 1933 which led to the closing of some newspapers and the re-structuring of influential civic groups such as O Grémio Africano. At the same time state controlled workers’ associations were introduced (Sayaka 2012).

91 Francisco (2010) explains that the name ‘Associação dos Naturais de Moçambique’ didn’t imply that black or mixed coloured Mozambicans could become members of the association: “A discriminação racial era ainda tão activa, nos anos 50, que a chamada Associação dos Naturais de Moçambique considerava como naturais de Moçambique apenas os brancos nascidos no território moçambicano. Os negros e mulatos, apesar de nascidos e naturais de Moçambique, eram excluídos da categoria “naturais”.” (Francisco 2010, p. 65)

92 Ayegboyin & Ishola (1997) developed a basic typology of African Indigenous Churches and conclude that the adjective ‘independent’ may be used for churches that are independent from missionary control. They are African Churches because they were founded in Africa by Africans and primarily for Africans. See also ‘African Indigenous Churches: An Historical Perspective’ (1997). http://irr.org/african-indigenous-churches-chapter-one_(Access 23.11.2015).
which for decades had predominantly supported the brutal colonial administration, changed its position and the Pope met leaders of FRELIMO and the liberation movements from Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (MPLA and PAIGC) in Rome:

We are on the side of those who suffer, we support peace, liberty and national independence of all people, in particular of the people of Africa. (Newitt 1995, p. 459)

With National Independence in 1975, the Mozambican government, led by the liberation movement FRELIMO, with massive support from enthusiastic people and the international solidarity movement, took over the leadership of the state and obtained the absolute control of power, including the spaces for civic political activities. The minority bourgeois class, who formed the membership of the various civic groups, became the vehicle through which Frelimo power was consolidated and expanded. Apart from formally liberating the country from the colonial power, FRELIMO, in the name of modernizing the country, was also instrumental in marginalizing or oppressing both rival elites and the ‘uneducated’ peasantry more generally (Harrison 2000, p. 105). FRELIMO’s interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology linked the peasantry to the ‘feudal system’ of traditional lineage and opponents to the world of imperialism. The distance between part of the political elite and the peasants’ struggle and reality on the ground, as well as the internal ideological divisions (Cahen 1993, Geffray 1991, Cabrita 2000), supported exclusion rather than social integration and national cohesion. Harrison (2000) references Cahen (1993) when building up his argument about how and on which basis Frelimo had gained power in Mozambique:

…a pathological mistrust of all manifestations of rural or urban social movement which it did not know; with the Portuguese language (its own!) as a unifying force and destroyer of ethnic identity; committed to a radical anti-tribalism cloaking the general hostility of the south Creole elites towards the old northern Creole elite, marginalised elements and to ‘traditional structures; and, finally proclaiming the nation. (Cahen 1993, p. 50)

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93 Estamos de lado daqueles que sofrem, somos a favor de paz, da liberdade e da independência nacional de todos os povos, em particular os povos africanos.

94 According to Cabrita (2000) FRELIMO’s taking over of government affairs was not uncontested within Mozambican society, in particular within the Mozambican exile community which formed the Partido da Coligação Nacional (PCN) in 1974. In clear reference to FRELIMO, the PCN said: “The future of Mozambique should not be compromised by any accord negotiated and reached between the Lisbon government and any organization or political group to the exclusion of others. No organization should claim the right to be the sole and legitimate representative of the Mozambican people without being put to the test of democratic process.” (Cabrita 2000, p. 74)
Cahen’s conclusions are supported by a statement FRELIMO leader and first president of the Mozambican republic, Samora Machel, made in his historic speech in Beira in 1980:

*Nós matámos a tribo para fazer nascer a nação.* (Machel 1980 cited in Munslow 1985).

We kill the tribe in order to give birth to the nation.

Furthermore, Matusse (1999) confirms that the “national languages” (the ethnic local languages) were seen with scepticism and suspicion given their links to tribal identity, the proclaimed enemy of national post-colonial unity. He also mentions this some years later, at FRELIMO’s 5th Congress, and accordingly, the final document would advise not to use those languages because they would undermine its nation-building efforts. Consequently, some key decisions made in the name of nation-building substantially excluded the majority of its citizens, mostly illiterate peasants. Nevertheless, according to de Bragança (1980), Frelimo was a peasant movement until the liberalization of Mozambique’s South. After that, FRELIMO’s opinion had changed, as it was confronted with the dilemma of implementing socialism in a society with a meagre working class and a majority of the labour force consisting of rural peasantry. From then on, a worker-peasant alliance was pursued as the foundation of the revolution, whilst the coordination was supposed to be done by the working class:

…the consciousness and ability to lead this struggle exist – in objective class terms – only in the class-consciousness of the proletariat, however embryonic, it alone – as both Cabral and Machel have testified – is capable of being the leading class of social transformation in the struggle for socialism. The political consciousness of the peasantry is incapable, by itself, of reaching a fundamental social critique of the capitalist system. (Nwafor 1983, p. 36)

The nature of the state and its relation to civil society were accepted as unquestionable postulates, this included the status of the state apparatus as “the privileged tool for transforming Mozambican society” and the understanding of the state as an “administrative entity separate from the rest of Mozambican society” and not as “a result of struggles rooted in class conflicts within civil society”, as the maintenance of the revolutionary line would actually require (Depelchin & de Bragança 1986, p. 175). It was perhaps here that FRELIMO’s socialist project was most mistaken and condemned to fail. FRELIMO underestimated the deep tension that had already existed between the state and its ‘citizens’ since colonial times. Accordingly, the gap between
the peasantry and the state created by the colonial regime was reproduced by the anti-colonial liberation movement and later political party FRELIMO, whose key aim had been to unite and modernize the country from the top, rather than building up a new identity, in partnership with the various social, ethnic and political groups active in the country.

For FRELIMO, the ‘traditional’ authorities located in the primordial public as well as the imposed urban non-governmental entities had both played a similar role during colonial times: they have been the links between the population and the colonial state, securing some level of hegemony in favour of the colonial regime (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1998, p. 102). However, in practice, even though not fitting FRELIMO’s picture of a modern non-ethnical nation, in many regions of Mozambique, ‘traditional’ authorities still provided social, religious and spiritual leadership and a moral foundation, in particular where lineage relationships were intact during and after the colonial times. Indeed, the latter was always a space for political activities.\(^{95}\)

It can be said that it was through a combination of rural and urban-based emerging counter-hegemonic civil society dynamics in both the civic and primordial spheres that, using Gramsci’s civil society concept as an exploratory frame, a ‘war of position’\(^{96}\) emerged between Mozambican civil society actors and more radical liberation groups, which ultimately led to a ‘war of manoeuvre’, the violent struggle for independence (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1998, p. 102). The old historic (colonial) bloc\(^{97}\) was finally defeated. This was based on the political and military action of the liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies and support from socialist countries\(^{98}\) and non-aligned countries\(^{99}\), that managed to weaken Portuguese colonial rule, leading to the coup-de-état and the April Revolution in Portugal in April 1974. In September 1974, a Cease-

\(^{95}\) According to Newitt (1995) particularly Maconde’s so called ‘presidents’ – largely accepted traditional leaders from the North of Mozambique - played very influential roles in the liberation struggle but also created serious internal divisions within FRELIMO. Lazaro Nkavandame, the leader of the Maconde ‘presidents’ was a traditionalist and people assume that in collaboration with the influential Portuguese Secret Service (PIDE) was responsible for assassinating Eduardo Mondlane (first FRELIMO president). Indeed, a number people involved in the liberation movements (UDENAMO, UNAMI and MANU) were killed until FRELIMO became the leading liberation movement.

\(^{96}\) See sub-chapter 2.4 for further explanations of the “war of position” within Gramsci’s (1971) concept of civil society.

\(^{97}\) See sub-chapter 2.4 for further explanation of the “historical bloc” in Gramsci’s (1971) concept of civil society.

\(^{98}\) E.g. Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, etc.

\(^{99}\) E.g. Algeria, Libya, Tanzania and Zambia.
Fire was signed between Portugal and the liberation front FRELIMO (*Lusaka Accord*) backed by politically influential extreme left wing groups in Portugal, opening the process for proclamation of the National Independence of Mozambique by FRELIMO at the 25 June 1975, and the building up of a one-party Marxist-Leninist state framework governing Mozambique, as referred to previously.

### 4.3.2. Civil society: political disunity, conformity and structural adjustment

As no democratic process of any kind was contemplated during the transition, the emergence of oppositional movements composed of former colonial civic groups such as GUMO and previous FRELIMO opponents such as Uria Simango and Mateus Pinho Gwenjere and splinter groups such as COREMO, as well as ethnic based movements representing Macuas and Macondes (Newitt 1995, p. 462), emerged from the start. FRELIMO became concerned with building up a new hegemony and was conscious about the need to establish new forms of societal structure, representation and control to build up a new superstructure. Based on Marxist-Leninist ideas, the project of constructing a new national identity started. This effort denied the inclusion of the non-governmental entities developed during colonial times into post-colonial civil society and they were consequently absorbed by the state (Harrison 2000). The same applied to the traditional leaders, who nevertheless retained considerable power over the rural peasantry.

Once in power, Frelimo saw no need to honour its pledges to traditional leaders that the long-standing grievances of Mozambican peasants would be addressed after liberation. In fact, the FRELIMO government took stern measures against traditional chiefs who dared to challenge its policies. Some were interned in re-education camps and later executed. (Cabrita 2000, p. 116)

Soon after the proclamation of national independence, FRELIMO initiated a broadly unpopular rural resettlement programme, the objective of which was to establish ‘communal villages’ and ‘combat against obscurantist, traditional-feudal and capitalist practices’ as regards to the rural areas’ (Cabrita 2000, p. 116). The peasantry from Zambézia Province vigorously resisted the programme, so that in 1981 the provincial government had to acknowledge the failure of the so-called ‘socialisation of the countryside’ policy. FRELIMO’s attempt to control peasantry and transform their social and religious aspirations into a modern socialist lifestyle was unsuccessful. According to Chichava (2013), peasants in Zambézia Province were not against ‘modernisation’ as such, but revolted against “paternalism, arrogance and hostility to local socio-historical
realities that marked the approach to the implementation of this policy” (Chichava 2013, p. 129).

In this context, the party and the state established and consolidated the so-called *organizações democráticas de massa* (people’s democratic organizations)\(^{100}\) and strictly controlled socio-professional organizations\(^ {101}\). However, as has been highlighted above, the project of national identity did not manage to embrace the struggle to democratize power across the various centres of social activities and parts of the primordial public clearly remained outside this framework. Only a few non-governmental entities, mainly faith based organizations, with powerful internal and external links, such as *Concelho Cristão de Moçambique* (CCM, Christian Council of Mozambique) and Caritas (Catholic Church) could undertake some activities outside of the state control. Furthermore, Negrão (2003, p. 2) confirms that the state experienced difficulties controlling the peasant movement, which ultimately merged into the National Union of Peasants (*União Nacional dos Camponeses, UNAC*).

Questioning the development of Mozambique as a ‘united’ state Cahen (Macedo & Maloa 2013)\(^ {102}\) argues that Mozambique constitutes ‘unicidade’ (oneness) rather than ‘unidade’ (unity). He demonstrates that by distinguishing between a plural post-colonial unification processes (involving various anti-colonial movements), as it was the case for example in Angola, and the liberation in Mozambique, led by the unilateral movement FRELIMO. He also problematizes the unilateral Frelimo movement, because other movements, based primarily around the ‘old’ Mozambican capital *Ilha de Moçambique*, were marginalized and silenced as part of the nation building process:

> There has been only one movement in Mozambique, which doesn’t imply that there was a unification process. This is true because, unlike the official story tell us, Frelimo didn’t emerge as the fusion of three regional organizations, but, as I explained referring to the marginalization of the old colonial Mozambique, the other expressions (movements) that weren’t linked to those in the South, didn’t have the cultural and political strength to unify. As such, there was no Mozambican unity, there was rather oneness, from the very beginning.”\(^ {103}\)

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\(^{100}\) E.g. Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (OMM, Mozambican Women’s Organization), Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (OJM, Mozambican Youth Organization), Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos (OTM, Mozambican Workers’ Organization).

\(^{101}\) E.g. Organização Nacional dos Professores (ONP, National Teachers’ Organization) and Organização Nacional dos Jornalistas (ONJ, National Journalists’ Organization).

\(^{102}\) This argument was raised by Michel Cahen in an interview carried out in 2013 by Victor Castillo de Macedo and Joaquim Maloa.

\(^{103}\) *Em Moçambique, só houve um movimento, o que não significa que houve um processo de unificação. Isso porque a Frelimo surge não da fusão de três organizações regionais, como diz a história oficial,*
Ironically, some respondents during my research place the major opposition party RENAMO, which was traditionally seen as the countermovement to the socialist oriented FRELIMO-led one-party state, closer to the left wing. This might have to do with the notion of armed struggle for the ‘old’ values, which some people attribute to RENAMO (and no longer to FRELIMO). There is great confusion about the contemporary political economy and ideology: some people I interviewed at district, provincial and national level mentioned, when being asked about their ideas for solutions to the many social, economic and political problems, that they would like to bring back the colonial times, when according to their memories, some level of order was enforced and corruption was limited. However, this should not be interpreted as a desire of people to live again in the oppressive colonial system, but as a deep frustration, disappointment and disenchantment with the nation-building process led by the new Mozambican social bourgeois classes.

Altogether, there was very little space for the development of a democratic and pluralist process that would both include the ‘modern’ civil society and integrate the primordial public into the development of a legitimate national political framework. In the shadow of the Cold War, 16 years of brutal civil war followed national independence. FRELIMO, initially negating the influence of RENAMO, had to realize that the guerrilla opposition movement was gaining strength and power through its violent actions. As we see once again today, RENAMO was increasingly seen as a protest movement which helped to articulate the complaints of peasants, traditional and religious leaders, marginalized ethnical groups, and ‘the youth’ about their subordination (Newitt 1995, p. 490). Geffray (1991) explains the existence and permanence of RENAMO in his impressive analysis of the reasons of the civil war in Mozambique the following way:

RENAMO is a kind of free, wild army: it doesn’t depend on any superior civil authority that would command and determine the objective of its struggle. Its officers promote a social war that is its only and true motivation: they like the life of war, the source of exhilaration and of social promotion. RENAMO men don’t know anything other than warlike values. This is the only standard of
mutual recognition within the military institution. The absence of subordination of these values to a civil society project that surpasses the army’s is one possible explanation for the brutality of which they are capable during the execution of their collective actions, in particular during the attacks of road convoys\textsuperscript{104} (Geffray 1991, p. 155).

Alongside the two parties at war, RENAMO and FRELIMO, a third movement called Naparama (see also sub-chapter 6.2.5.1) emerged, led by the charismatic leader Manuel António. At the same time, the consolidation strategy of the Frelimo one-party regime and the civil war deteriorated the living conditions of the people in Mozambique, both in rural and urban areas, leading to the need for humanitarian assistance to fight against absolute poverty, hunger and malnutrition. Organized crime led by local ethnic or foreign leaders was widespread within the two existing zones within the country; each zone strictly controlled either by the FRELIMO-led government or by the armed resistance RENAMO. As a result of the brutal civil war in rural areas and widespread crime, it was primarily the poor peasants who were affected by famine, malnutrition and violence. The creation of the communal villages intensified the existing social conflicts between various ethnic groups. Any of the economic measures taken by the government essentially marginalized the local peasants’ further and destroyed their livelihoods (Newitt 1995, p. 491).

The integration into the IMF in 1983 and the introduction of the structural adjustment programme (Programa de Reabilitação Económica, PRE) aiming to liberalize the economy, led not only to the expansion of the informal economy, but also to the formation of organizations in the area of humanitarian assistance. Those were heavily funded by the Global North and primarily working in urban or semi-urban (FRELIMO-controlled) areas where most refugees escaped from the civil war. Humanitarian organizations started to occupy the space where the state could no longer provide services, and where new forms of dependencies affected the embryonic state and its institutions. The table in annex C provides a brief overview of a hundred years of civil society development in Mozambique, from 1890 to 1990.

\textsuperscript{104} A RENAMO é uma espécie de exército selvagem em liberdade: não depende de nenhuma autoridade civil superior, que a comandaria e lhe determinaria os objectivos do combate. Os seus oficiais alimentam um projecto social de guerra, que é a sua única e verdadeira motivação: gostam de vida da guerra, fonte de exaltação e de promoção social. Os homens da RENAMO não conhecem outros valores que não sejam os valores guerreiros, único padrão do seu reconhecimento mútuo no seio da instituição militar. A ausência duma submissão desses valores a um projecto da sociedade civil que ultrapassasse o exército e uma explicação possível para a crueldade de que são capazes no decorrer das suas acções colectivas, particularmente nos ataques as colunas nas estradas.
4.3.3. Civil society: NGOs and the interface with traditional society

The difference between the modern democratic state and its colonial version is this: the modern state ensures equal citizenship in political society while acknowledging difference in civil society, but its colonial counterpart institutionalized difference in both the polity and society. (Mamdani 2012, p. 2)

As has been discussed in sub-chapter 4.2, with the adoption of a new constitution in 1990, Mozambique formally moved from one-party socialism to a multi-party democracy and alongside global paradigmatic changes, this has influenced the relationship between the state and society. Mamdani’s statement above reminds us that the post-colonial modern democratic state in many African countries has not provided equal citizenship within the civil society sphere based on the colonial experience of differentiation but instead only provided formal equal citizenship in political society. We shall explore below the degree to which this is true for Mozambique.

My research in Mozambique highlights that the relationship between the state and its citizens is still affected by a number of dichotomies weakening the potential of stability of the country. This is most visible in areas where FRELIMO, which commanded the Armed Forces of Mozambique (Forças Armadas de Moçambique, FAM) during the civil war, and RENAMO, had each built up their controlled areas through force and violent actions. A number of citizens at district level, in particular opposition affiliated citizens, complained about the absence of the state and the lack of any government services. People interviewed at district level strongly articulated their felt lack of citizenship:

“Os afiliados do governo desvalorizam a cidadania. Eu sinto-me discriminado. Vou dizer mais uma vez, para sentir cidadão tem de ser parte do governo. Basta isto!” (Interview with an NGO worker in Inhassunge District, 02.04.2015)

“The members of government devalue citizenship. I feel discriminated. I am saying it once again, in order to feel like a citizen, you have to be part of the government. It’s enough!”

It can be concluded that both FRELIMO’s nation-building project subordinated civil opponents and alternative political formations (sometimes violently) and RENAMO’s lack of a civil political agenda have impeded the emergence of civil society within one united public sphere. However, the time period from 1990 – 2016 requires particular attention as these years constitute the emergence of a type of modern civil society which, just like the liberation movements, was composed of and led by the bourgeois and political elite. This happened under a new global development paradigm and
involved the ‘imposition’ of new forms of civil society and its actors, namely the world of NGOs. This period will be analysed in the following sub-chapter. Because the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘traditional society’ or ‘traditional social structures’ will be used frequently I will first of all attempt to define and distinguish the terms.

I would like to start with characterizing the term ‘traditional society’ or ‘traditional social structures’ using Karl Polanyi’s (2001) model and different principles\textsuperscript{105} for the distribution of societal resources. Following his theory, one can define ‘traditional’ society as:

…building on non-economic control mechanisms and institutions. It is this that we mean when we talk about traditional society (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1995, p. 178)

Accordingly, the concept of ‘traditional’ society, which is still operating in many African countries, can be called a ‘material civilisation’ (Braudel 1979) including the forms of subsistence farming and exchange of goods that support the people’s livelihoods and survival. However, it needs to be underlined that today in Mozambique, ‘traditional’ society exists in parallel to ‘modern’ civil society and is, as such, no longer the society prevailing before the market economy and industrialization. This fact will be further elaborated and problematized in the sections to follow.

‘Modern’ civil society had already emerged during colonial times. However, given the lack of space for its legal operations during the Salazar dictatorship, it was forced to go underground or to operate from outside the country. Key civil society figures who were instrumental during the liberation of the country were also divided along class and ethnic lines. Politicians have used both divisions for decades to stoke the violence, which has characterized the country and traumatized its people until today. The introduction of Western-type NGOs\textsuperscript{106} in the early 1990s re-introduced the notion of a ‘modern’ and ‘moral’ civil society. However, these NGOs did not develop indigenously; they were (economically) embedded into the structural adjustment

\textsuperscript{105} Karl Polanyi’s different principles are reciprocity, redistribution, householding and barter principles.
\textsuperscript{106} The term non-governmental organization (NGO) is difficult to define, as just like the concept of civil society, its meaning is dependent on the underlying political ideology framing it. However, in the context of this research, I understand Western-type NGO (which also strongly influenced their Southern partners or implementing agencies) to be dominantly influenced by the French liberal political theorist de Tocqueville: For him, civil society was characterized by voluntary, non-political and non-governmental social associations that strengthened democracy. Civil society according to this liberal political philosophy fosters the social norms and trust which are necessary for individuals to work together in democracies. A Western-type NGO additionally follows particular Western organizational logics, e.g. internal democracy and financial accountability.
processes of the late 1980s and (socially) into the global solidarity movement against hunger in the ‘Third’ World. Hanlon (1991), in his book chapter ‘New missionaries’, refers to a number of informal conversations with Mozambican officials who, although they publicly praised the NGOs, in private strongly criticized this new phenomenon:

It’s identical to what happened 100 years ago. After the Berlin Conference, there were wars to establish colonial control of the continent. Then came the missionaries, and they cleared the way for the capitalists. Again we have wars, this time followed by the NGOs. They are the missionaries clearing the way for big foreign capital. (in Hanlon 1991, p. 203)

All ‘non-government agencies’ are really government. They get money from their government and work towards their government goals. (in Hanlon 1991, p. 203)

Indeed, the image of the strong post-colonial state changed for many Mozambican people during that time; the image was partly replaced by a new form of ‘civic’ humanitarian assistance through humanitarian work and service delivery NGOs and a globalizing private sector. At the international level, the strongly promoted development paradigm ‘Nation-Building’ has been substituted by the standard of “State and Society” and linked to that, the notion of a Western-centric type of dialogue-oriented ‘modern’ apolitical civil society that would create the social base and necessary agency to mobilize citizens for the needed democratization process. The following table 5 compares the paradigms ‘Nation-Building’ and ‘State and Society’:

**Table 5: Two Paradigms, Two Analytical Lenses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL</th>
<th>The state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National integration</td>
<td>The state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modernity: +</td>
<td>modernity: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy: +</td>
<td>democracy: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development: +</td>
<td>development: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progress: +</td>
<td>progress: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal, primordial attachments</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modernity: -</td>
<td>modernity: +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy: -</td>
<td>democracy: +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development: -</td>
<td>development: +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progress: -</td>
<td>progress: +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** 

NATIONAL = NATIONAL

LOCAL = LOCAL

progress: -
During the paradigmatic time of nation-building, the ‘traditional’ society (primordial public using Ekeh’s terms) was conceptually linked to the local level, which was also declared as tribal and stagnant, in comparison to the national level which was in turn seen as modern, developmental and progressive. The paradigmatic change towards ‘State and Society’ then meant that the state in the eyes of the international community should come closer to society through decentralization, democratization, and people’s agency at the same time was linked to a successful devolution of power to the local level and the development of a vibrant, localized civil society. Since the 1990s, decentralization policies and programmes as well as civil society strengthening programmes received strong support from the international community in Mozambique (see also sub-chapter 4.5). Harrison (2000) summarizes this trend as follows:

…the question(s) of lineage and state have been placed within a specific framework since 1990: the state needs to recognize the existence of local African rural communities; it needs to do this in order to pursue the concerns of democratization and decentralization; in rural areas, there exists a patchwork of communities which are fairly unproblematic self-contained socio-geographic units, each with a traditional authority at its peak. This chief-figure provides a pivotal conduit through which new forms of state administration in rural areas can realise themselves. The similarities between this way of thinking and that of the colonial state are self-evident. (Harrison 2000, p. 165)

Harrison rightly puts great emphasis on analysing and differentiating the terms ‘traditional’, ‘lineage’ and ‘state-party’ power when writing about the politics of democratization in rural Mozambique. As civil society development is an inherently political process that includes strong ideological discourses I agree that these frequently used terms should be looked at seriously when analysing the impact of development.

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107 In particular the term and role of the so called ‘traditional leader’ or régulo might have different connotations dependent on the cultural, party and state affiliations of a ‘traditional leader’. For example during research in Erató district (Nampula Province) I learned that the role of the traditional leader had influence on the function and influence of the rainha, a local queen, with a particular role in spiritual ceremonies and conflict resolution. In turn, the rainha, has a special role in choosing and accompanying the role and function of the traditional leader. When the new leader of a local community in the district of Erató was selected from the local FRELIMO led government without sufficient participation of the local community, the rainha I interviewed expressed her deep frustration and literally spoke of a deep governance crises the community was facing. This crisis was particular strong as the government selected ‘traditional leader’ was not coming from the local community or district, his orgine was, according to the rainha, the Province of Cabo Delgado.
paradigms in Mozambique. Indeed, the initial paradigmatic change process was filled with neo-liberal arguments that postulate that the state should withdraw from certain areas of the provision of goods and services, hence quite soon after independence, cutting of the embryonal relationship between the post-colonial state apparatus and the people. The structural adjustment programmes have facilitated that.

In fact, the newly emerged NGOs overwhelmingly replaced some of the state functions and the growing number of international and national humanitarian NGOs themselves saw the overall role of civil society actors as service providers that merely implemented projects designed and financed by the government or cooperation partners. Local social structures, that were supposed to be central in strengthening the state-society relationship (see Harrison’s reference above), have been widely ignored, and where necessary, new associations been created (Hanlon 1991). In the early 1990s, the view that civil society’s main role was service provision in areas such as agriculture (rural extension), education, health, water and sanitation was widespread among government, cooperation agencies’ officials and ironically, as well among NGO representatives, staff and members themselves.

Donors are trying to bypass and undermine the Mozambican government. They want foreign private organizations rather than the Mozambican government to be offering food aid as well as health, education, water, and agricultural extension services. And they want to be clear to all Mozambicans that it is not the government but foreign NGOs that keep them alive and help them to develop. (Hanlon 1991, p. 215)

Nugent (2012) notices that Mozambique, as other former Portuguese colonized countries, had undergone major paradigmatic changes since its independence. However, in the 1990s, development in Mozambique occurred in a particular moment, when different foreign connections converged, and closed off possibilities for autonomous local innovation and problem solving:

During the 1990s, Mozambique became the extreme case of a country which was heavily indebted, dependent on foreign aid and over-run by Western Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). (Nugent 2012, p. 290)

Roque (1998, p. 171), generally less critical about the rapid growth of civil society organizations in Mozambique, puts it as follows:

From 1990 to date, organisations and the active participation of civil society in Mozambique have both grown. According to the informative report of Mozambican NGOs, (Kulima 1991) there were only 12 national NGOs at that time. Between 1991 and 1995, the number increased to 100. Until 28 September
1995, the number of NGOs was 200 or 210, although not all were legally registered. This is part of a much broader, global tendency towards citizen participation in political, social, cultural and economic life. This tendency may increase the complexity of a government’s task, particularly where citizens do not know their duties and obligations in relation to state, and vice-versa.

The 1990s were characterized by the end of the sixteen year-long civil war and the broadening of a democratisation process, although very much pushed by the international community. The new Constitution, approved in 1990, resulted in the promotion and development of a Western-type ‘modern’ democratic culture in urban areas and the implementation of a range of international donor supported good governance programmes all over the country. The FRELIMO-led government introduced a multi-party system and also established the right to freedom of association. Many of the donor-supported ‘good governance’ programmes were assisted and also funded through international NGOs, supported until today by a growing number of ‘domesticated’ national NGOs.

Many of the NGOs developed in Mozambique have, however, very little or nothing to do with the majority of the population, except that they address themselves to the population in the implementation of a number of externally funded development projects. These new organizations are structures from above, from the capital’s urban elites, who are seeking roots in broad strata of the population. In this respect they do not differ from Frelimo’s earlier attempt to create “democratic mass organizations for women and youth”. (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1995, p. 181)

Having gone through a longer phase of NGO work followed by critical NGO studies, I have no difficulty agreeing with the above statement. However, whilst mass-based organizations do represent certain population strata, through their broad member base, NGOs in the early 1990s and partly until today, have usually been composed by urban elites without a membership base. Indeed, in post-socialist Mozambique, many of the former leaders of mass-based organizations opted to open an NGO. Hence, at least in the eyes of the international community, they were apparently contributing towards democracy and the image of a ‘light’ state, while before they were seen as the social foundation of an undemocratic one party communist state. One interviewee expressed that quite clearly:

“State officials used to establish NGOs after having left mass-based organizations that had lost some of their financial support. They close their NGO’s offices at the end of the day in order to inform the government about
their civil society work. Nothing has really changed.” (Interview with the director of a Mozambican NGO, 19.08.2015)

4.3.4. Civil society: NGOs, humanitarian aid, development, democracy and participation

The change of the Constitution in 1990, the ‘right to association’ and the country’s opening to a multiparty system created the conditions not only for INGOs working in the field of humanitarian assistance but also for a slowly-emerging local civil society that participated in civic and electoral education campaigns during the various general and municipal elections in Mozambique; however, this was still from a broadly ‘service-provision’ point of view. Indeed, the Mozambican election successes in general elections from 1994 until 1998, and in 1999 municipal elections were seen by the international community to be linked to the direct involvement of civil society (Pereira 2002). It was around this time when many ‘Western’ donors decided to support civil society actors not only as humanitarian agents but also as contributors to the further democratization of Mozambique. Pereira also points towards internal processes within Mozambican civil society:

After capacity building the various religious institutions, theatre and cultural groups, traditional chiefs, unions and different social communication agents decided to develop a mobilization campaign and alongside, a call for communities to participate in the election process. This mobilization has been carried out using a combination of various instruments such as flyers, songs, capulanas, theatre, debates in local languages and religious cults. Having passed two general and one local election, civil society is now looking for new forms to participate in the electoral process. Mozambican civil society aimed to move beyond being a mere actor in civic education to being an agent of transformation of institutions that organize and govern the electoral process.108 (Pereira 2002, p. 4)

Alongside some civil society actors’ attempts to have a stronger transformational role within electoral processes, influential civil society campaigns such as the Land Rights Campaign and the Campaign against Domestic Violence emerged. Each campaign was characterized by the collaboration and coalition of mainly membership-based and

108 Após o trabalho de capacitação, várias instituições religiosas, grupos teatrais e culturais, chefes tradicionais, sindicatos e diferentes órgãos de comunicação social lançaram mãos à obra no trabalho de mobilização e apelo às comunidades para participar no processo eleitoral. Esta mobilização foi feita através de combinação de vários instrumentos tais como panfletos, cânticos, capulanas, peças teatrais, debates em línguas nacionais e cultos religiosos. Passadas duas eleições gerais e uma local, a sociedade civil procura novas formas de participar no processo eleitoral. A sociedade civil moçambicana quer deixar de ser um simples actor de educação cívica para ser um agente de transformação de instituições que organizam e regulam o processo eleitoral.
religious organizations that worked at national, provincial and district levels and thus had considerable potential and power to mobilize their constituencies. Both campaigns managed to influence key policy decisions in Mozambique and as such are examples of successful broad rights-based advocacy processes that not only monitor the implementation of laws and regulations but also influence its content and direction. The spirit of both campaigns is still alive and the implementation of the two influenced laws, ‘Lei da Terra’ (land law) and ‘Lei da Família’ (family law) and their respective regulations are still under close observation of those actors that initiated the campaigns.

The civil society supported Debt Campaign\(^{109}\) (linked to the international Jubilee Campaign) essentially backed the Government of Mozambique’s attempt to get its huge external debt written off. The so-called HIPC\(^{110}\) initiative led by the IMF and the World Bank and later joined by the international donor community, wanted to ensure that debt reduction was designed in a way that no poor country faced a debt burden it could not manage\(^{111}\). Mozambique was one of the least developed countries that benefited from considerable debt relief under the first phase of the HIPC initiative. Again, after the devastating floods in Southern and Central Mozambique in 2000, the World Bank and the IMF, together with many bi-lateral donors, prepared for a second phase of debt relief by pardoning the total debt servicing payment for that year. However, this considerable debt relief was not granted unconditionally and the country had to agree on a number of requirements\(^{112}\), which at the same time facilitated the further expansion of a ‘modern’ civil society.

As a result of the conditionality, the PARPA (Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta) I and later PARPA II were designed, and the ‘Observatório da Pobreza’ (OP, Poverty Observatory) later renamed into ‘Observatório de Desenvolvimento’ (Development Observatory), established. The PARPA was the

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\(^{109}\) Civil Society’s activities related to the debt campaign were coordinated by ‘Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida’ (Mozambican Debt Group).

\(^{110}\) The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative for debt relief.

\(^{111}\) For more information about the HIPC campaign see the IMF Fact Sheet: https://www.imf.org/external/np/ext/facts/hipc.htm.

\(^{112}\) 1) Elaboration of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – PRSP, in Mozambique the strategy was called Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty – PARPA (Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta). This plan had to ensure the active participation of civil society, the private sector and the public in general.

2) The implementation of a set of measures related to social development, public sector reform, and the legal and regulatory framework for economic activities; 3) Maintenance of a stable macroeconomic climate under IMF control; and confirmation of the participation of other creditors in the debt relief. (Negrão 2003)
government’s poverty reduction strategy, while the OP was a platform led by the government of Mozambique in order to oversee the implementation of the PARPA. It comprises three groups of actors: government, donors and civil society. Whilst initially civil society and private sector contributions in the design and monitoring of PARPA were seen as sporadic and ad hoc, the OP helped to institutionalize participation, in particular during the transition from PARPA I (2001 – 2005) to PARPA II (2006 – 2010).

From 2004 onwards, civil society was coordinated through the so-called G20, a group of initially 20 civil society organizations. At that time, the Government of Mozambique and the G20 were broadly united in the rejection of the donor driven economic growth-oriented development model, which came together with PARPA I. According to Negrão (2003) the selection process of civil society representatives that joined the G20 was exemplary:

The nominations of who should represent the whole of civil society were carried out by civil society itself in co-ordination with the government. There is no doubt that the Mozambican government should be praised for affording this opportunity; in Zambian civil society represented in the Poverty Observatory is limited to some NGOs with the exclusive task of supporting the government in the identification and application of some indicators; and in Vietnam it is the NGOs from the North, such as CARE International and Action Aid which participate in the Poverty Observatory. In Mozambique, the government left the selection of its representatives to civil society, prescribing only that the private sector, as well as the trade unions, should have a presence. (Negrão 2003, p. 13)

A broad range of civil society actors were invited to join the G20, ranging from religious institutions, trade union federations, private sector associations, national NGOs and their networks as well as research institutes. At the beginning, the G20 was quite successful in developing joint positions such as the request for considering poverty as a multi-dimensional phenomenon (Fiege 2014). This, according to members of the research’s advisory committee, was to a large extent linked to the process-related leadership and as a result, strengths of the first Annual Poverty Report/RAP (G20 2004)

113 The economic growth development model essentially followed the neo-liberal paradigm applied to many other ‘developing countries’ at the time (compare with tables 6 and 7).

114 The G20 was initially composed of the following civil society representatives: four representatives from religious denominations (two Christian and two Muslim); two representatives of the trade union federations (OTM and Sindicatos Livres); three representatives of private sector associations (commercial association, industrial association and CTA); six representatives of 3rd tier organisations (Land Forum, Women’s Forum, UNAC, GMD, Link and Teia); four representatives of 2nd tier organisations (FDC, Kulima, ORAM, Khindlimuka); one representative of an autonomous research institute (Cruzeiro do Sul IID).
coordinated by the Mozambican research institute *Cruzeiro do Sul* and its director, Jorge Negrão. However, over the years the influence of the G20 started to erode:

“The first report (annual poverty report), I know, cost USD 10,000. Five years later, the G20 started to be institutionalized, with a budget of USD 1,000,000, but they did not manage to do the same (critical analysis) again.” (Member of the research advisory committee, focus groups discussion held in Maputo, 21.09.2016)

For participants taking part in the above mentioned focus group discussion, it was the establishment of the G20 technical secretariat (and linked to it the institutionalization of G20) as well as exaggerated donor funding which started to build up accountability to the donors and the government of Mozambique rather than downwards to civil society organizations’ members, constituency and supporters. Francisco and Matter (2007) as well as Fiege (2014) highlighted capacity gaps of the G20 and its members as an explanation for its decreasing influence. However, bearing in mind that capacity building and funding for the G20 both increased considerably after the first G20 Annual Poverty Report in 2004 its subsequent declining quality and importance as an influential document for policy development can most probably best be explained though the change in leadership linked to the G20 and the OP more generally. The dynamic ‘new characteristics of the public image of Mozambican civil society’¹¹⁵ (Negrão 2003, p. 14) began to transform from one that is capitalizing on policy influence opportunities to one that is instrumentalized by aid donors and co-opted by the government political elites, hence losing their own agency¹¹⁶.

Since around the millennium, an increasing number of critical social researchers in the area of politics and civil society studies (Hearn 2001, Williams & Young 2012) have started to use the term ‘re-engineering’ civil society when analysing Western attempts and strategies to develop civil society beyond the ‘West’. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), in particular Western-type organized and legalized NGOs, are being accused of creating ‘consensus’ between the state, the liberalized market and local communities, in order to build a ‘buffer-zone’ which holds back the legitimate protest of the excluded peasantry living in precarious social and economic conditions and hence, fostering

¹¹⁵ This image was produced by real progress and achievements of civil society in favour of the majority of poor Mozambicans, e.g. the land and family law campaigns, policy influence during the initial stages of the G20.

¹¹⁶ According to many people interviewed during this research it was around 2008 when the civil society arena in Mozambique became more contested, some membership based organizations like UNAC (National Small-Scale Farmers Union) and Forum Mulher (Women’s Forum) as well as the Liga dos Direitos Humanos (Human Rights League) started to take a stand against the instrumentalization and cooption whilst others opted increasingly for a service delivery approach.
exclusion instead of being part of structural change towards a more inclusive society. That may be right in many circumstances, however, at the same time, these claims underestimate or ignore the type of agency some NGOs can develop if they are firmly linked into functioning local community structures.

However, with the introduction of the LOLE (Lei de Órgãos Locais do Estado) in 2003 and OIIL/FDD (Orçamento de Investimento e de Iniciativa Local/Fundo Distrital de Desenvolvimento) in Mozambique in 2005, the instrumentalization of civil society actors continued at the district level. The Conselhos de Desenvolvimento Local (CDLs), officially proclaimed as the continuation of the countries’ administrative decentralization process, were supposed to enhance local administrative, civil society and traditional leaders’ involvement into district planning and economic development and hence strengthen participation in local decision-making. However, they ended up being a vehicle for patronage-client relationships centred around the figure of the district administrator (Forquilha 2010). For most people interviewed during this research in the districts of Inhassunge and Erati, the CDL is a mechanism to secure loyalty of officials and the wider community towards FRELIMO:

“...porque é que aquele dinheiro do FIL (PDD) do combate a pobreza se escolhe entre os membros (da FRELIMO) enquanto todos que está em Moçambique são cidadãos moçambicanos? Mas dizem que é para acabar com a pobreza! Os que estão pobres continuam cada vez mais pobres. Os que são da oposição não tem direito a este dinheiro. Dizem querem desenvolver Moçambique, desenvolve-se assim mesmo escolhendo?” (Interview carried out in Inhassunge117, August 2015)

“...why is the money supposed to combat poverty provided by FIL (FDD), selected within members (of FRELIMO), whilst all people in Mozambique are Mozambican citizens? But they say it is for ending poverty! Those who are poor get poorer. Those that belong to the opposition don’t have a right to this money. They say that they want to develop Mozambique; can a country develop like this, selecting only a selected group?”

Another initiative following the same official objective of creating a participatory space has been the ‘Presidência aberta e inclusiva’ (Open and Inclusive Presidency, PAI). The PAI turned out to be yet another attempt to centralize decision-making, undermining the ‘local’ through new controlled ‘participatory’ spaces (Leininger 2011). The creation of the various participatory spaces from local district councils to the PAI have been accompanied not only by the idealistic hope for more participation and

117 This interview was part of a follow up research phase in Inhassunge district, carried out by a member of the UCM research team.
pluralism from the beginning, but also by major German and Swiss financed decentralization programmes which to a wide extent have been implemented by INGOs such as SNV, Care, Concern and others. Enthusiastic projects have been developed and implemented, but most of them were either power-blind towards the central government’s control or unable to effectively introduce and accompany a locally led political empowerment project. As a consequence, much of the enthusiasm around the new participatory spaces has declined and it has been recognized that the political will for enhancing more political and social participation finds its limits where people start to demand their social, cultural, economic and political rights. The push to bring the state closer to its citizens has accordingly resulted in the ‘decentralization of centralism’ (Weimer et al. 2012) rather than an enhancement of local democratic participation.

In order to enhance research and develop analytical capacity, a growing number of research orientated organizations and institutions such as the ‘Centro de Integridade Pública’ (Centre for Public Integrity, CIP), ‘Instituto de Estudos Económicos e Sociais’ (Institute for Economic and Social Studies, IESE) and ‘Observatório do Meio Rural’ (Rural Observatory, OMR) have been created mainly through European donor support over the last ten years. All organizations are in one way or another thematically concerned with social-economic development, democracy, accountability, and poverty reduction. However, each organization’s reach is limited as they have few or no institutionalized links with sub-national organizations and marginalized social groups. Mozambique’s institutionalized research community is centralized in the capital Maputo and according to even some of its major donors, the potential impact of the academic community on the local development debate reduces as their research findings and conclusions don’t get ‘translated’ for public ‘consumption’:

118 From 2003 – 2008 some INGOs became the leaders of training local district council members in their roles and responsibilities. Technical aspects of planning were central to this approach and local power analysis was rarely carried out. From mid-2000 INGOs created the so called ‘Informal governance group’ which basically reflected about the various challenges INGOs confronted during their engagement into the decentralization process. It was an isolated attempt of INGOs to coordinate themselves around a very sensitive political process. However, it appears that the group no longer exists. I was a founding member of the informal governance group when working in Mozambique as an INGO representative from 2004 – 2008.

119 IESE according to their own leadership focuses on Marxist orientated analysis of the political economy and has more recently provoked rumour in the public realm as one of their most popular senior researchers and former director, Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco criticized the former Mozambican president Armando Guebuza economic governance including corruption in a Facebook post. He was put on trial in August 2015 together with a journalist who published his Facebook post. However, both were found not guilty about a month later.
“It (accessible research) is extremely important now that people are getting more conscious. This was also something that I was thinking again in IESE’s (book) launch. Castel-Branco’s presentation was brilliant, but there he should exactly work on this accessibility aspect. One should speak to the “common” public not with very academic and special economic language. The impact is then not as strong.” (Part of an e-mail exchange with a European donor representative based in Maputo, 01.10.2015)

Bearing in mind the weak linkages of Mozambican research institutes to the province and district level, their research findings rarely lead to concrete civil society action and agency in relation to the problems they investigate at the local level, their work is mainly discussed in the donor, INGO and academic circles and only to a limited extent among the general public in Maputo or beyond. As a result, there is little ‘return on investment’ or in other words, accountability to research participants and impact. This problem was mentioned to me several times by local researchers in Zambézia and Nampula provinces with whom I collaborated and in turn stimulated people to discuss the design of a more localized model of research and policy advocacy work.

In terms of local research areas, only a limited number of Mozambican researchers are currently concerned with post-colonial analyses and the investigation of the dialogue between civil and traditional society or the societal impact of externally funded civil society strengthening projects on societal development and the creation of a Mozambican citizen-owned civil society project. Already in 1998, Roque recognizes the external pressure from both donors and government to structure civil society into provincial forums in his article ‘Mozambique: The growth of civil society organizations’. He raises concerns regarding how NGOs could be selected so that they represented the grassroots (articulating concerns about the increasing divide between the ‘modern’ and ‘primordial’ publics). Furthermore, in a study looking at the links between governance, NGOs and civil society, Bellucci (2002) considers how local NGOs interact with the government and other actors in the public realm, looking as well at the accountability of local NGOs to donors, the government and broader civil society. Using a case study approach, Bellucci found that the project based civil society funding applied in Mozambique had created considerable dependency of local organizations vis-à-vis external donors (see also Ilal 2008); according to his findings, this also affects the local NGOs’ goal setting. Hence, their planning seemed to be heavily influenced by external organizations. He also states that various respondents highlighted NGOs’ problems with local communities as well as with their own staff and directors.
Both articles provided warning signs in relation to the exaggerated NGO upward accountability provoked by donor funding and government control. Consequently, Bellucci concludes that alongside economic restructuring based on neoliberal politics NGOs in Mozambique – caused by their increasing external donor dependency – have adopted a mode of economic behaviour: “NGOs operate like *homo economicus*” (Bellucci 2002, p. 25). According to him, this *modus operandi* supports the assumption that many NGOs follow the notion of Western politics and consequently deprioritize the support for popular local attempts at societal organization. What my research highlights however, in addition to the above-mentioned study findings is that the influence of economic restructuring (Structural Adjustment Programmes, SAPs) on civil society development and the tacit adaptation of neoliberal politics are not only caused by contemporary donor dependence. My historical analysis has demonstrated that there are post-colonial internal mechanisms\(^{120}\), such as the creation of new Mozambican elite structures through civil society, that lead to the formation and development of civil society protest and new political engagement. At present, the political elites themselves are pushing the neoliberal agenda within domestic capital accumulation. There are a number of internal past and present events\(^{121}\) that support this finding.

Fiege (2014) estimates that nowadays about 5,000 legally registered NGOs exist\(^{122}\) in Mozambique; on average they are 85% funded from external sources (Thoshiaki 2011). Furthermore, only about 5% of these organizations receive approximately 50% of the available overall donor funding for civil society (Fiege 2014). These figures show the concentration of funding on a very limited number of organizations which are, as most people participating in this research are rather frustrated about, based in the capital city Maputo and to a lesser extent, in provincial capitals, municipalities or districts. Accordingly, the many local self-help associations, often growing out of religious initiatives or traditional circles and rites, this research identified at district level, remain invisible (Ilal, Kleibl & Munck 2014) and modern civil society actors such as legalized NGOs rarely build up any constituency or reputation. Essentially, civil society actors at

\(^{120}\) E.g. the imprisonment and assassination of Uria Simango, Lazaro Nkavandame, Julio Razão Nihia, Mateus Ngwegere, Joana Simeão, Paulo Gumane (Ordem de Acção n. 5/80), see also: http://www.jpires.org/blog/as-mortes-de-simango-gwenjere-e-outros/ (access 10.11.2015).

\(^{121}\) Poverty reduction strategies have steadily been transformed into economic growth strategies and certainly various civil society organizations are partly benefitting from that through the (paid) participation in consultation forums.

\(^{122}\) This estimate is based on a NGO survey carried out by the National Statistics Institute in 2004/2005.
Given that there is a tendency for struggles in the Third World to link political and economic issues together, we need to understand the Charitable Trusts Act as an invention of the state to juridically and discursively separate these issues. The institution of an apolitical development discourse, specific to the Third World, can be understood as a mechanism to normalize the separation of these spheres. (Kamat 2002, p. 79)

It can be concluded that from the 1990s onwards, Western-type NGOs have been growing in number and their focus as well as impact was diverse, ranging from initial humanitarian assistance and service delivery to electoral education and more rights-based and policy-oriented advocacy work. During the colonial period, civic alliances and informal Mozambican political groups constituted the base of the armed struggle for independence whilst the absence and oppression of civil society and diverse political actors contributed towards the social reproduction of warlike values during the civil war soon after independence, hence making the brutality of the war possible.

Numerous civil society project evaluations and a limited number of academic research, the most cited of which being the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CIVICUS 2007), have been carried out and concluded since the emerging NGO boom of the 1990s. However, most new knowledge that has been produced to date broadly uses an academic perspective that privileges the dominant Western concept of civil society, hence (ironically 40 years after independence) insufficiently reflecting the unique contemporary post-colonial trends and challenges facing Mozambican modern civil society and traditional society in the public and primordial spheres under neoliberalism and globalization. The depoliticization of civil society through the preference of a service-delivery NGO-civil society model, pushed by the SAPS, is rarely reflected in the civil society analysis carried out in the new millennium.

4.4. The dilemma of institutionalization and state control

The legalized NGOs operational environment in Mozambique has been characterized by co-option and infiltration, intimidation and threats. This is particularly true if NGOs do not strictly follow the local administration rules and directives and FRELIMO political directions. This can be exemplified with the following quote from an NGO employee working in Inhassunge district:
“If there are debates (with the government) I am not joining them. Issues of Human Rights cannot be touched on here, here, we cannot enter that debate. No project or organization can in this province talk about these issues. You need a lot of sensitivity to be able to work. You need to give a parcel to the government to calm them. There are no humanitarian bridges (between the government and NGOs)…exaggerated corruption…This here is a political case. I can see how the community loses all credibility in the state and the NGOs only remain occupied with the recurring floods.” (Interview with an NGO employee in Inhassunge, 02.04.2015)

During my time working in Mozambique I observed various situations where the most professional and motivated Mozambican NGO staff were offered a highly paid position in Government bodies and entities at the central and provincial level (such as ministries, national public institutions, provincial government, etc.). They subsequently left their NGO position and contributed to weakening NGO and overall civil society leadership. During informal conversations with Mozambican NGOs at national and provincial level, the most frequent opinion was that FRELIMO was poaching any emerging NGO leaders by offering a high salary elsewhere.

Furthermore, approximately from 2007 onwards, NGO leadership staff has also been frequently ‘absorbed’ by semi-government bodies like the National Election Council (established in 2007) or later the National Human Rights Council (established in 2012). This certainly shows that the ruling party and the Government of Mozambique do not accept any alternative source of power. However, it also highlights up to which extent modern Mozambican civil society and its ‘workers industry’ is bound to economic interests and distant from developing its own moral foundation and internal dynamics; surely, this is the consequence of ‘homo economicus’ increasingly dominating the Mozambican bourgeois and the INGO, bilateral donors and UN poaching of local civil society actors.

The above certainly points to the ‘dilemma of institutionalization’ and the question what happens to the ideals of civil society when they are economically, politically and socially institutionalized and hence vulnerable to external control and influences (Alexander 1998). To what extent does the existing legal and institutionalized NGOs in Mozambique, which certainly represent the ‘ideal’ type of civil society actors for many donors and government representatives (including many NGOs themselves), represent the ‘real’ civil society which according to Gramsci and nicely articulated by Thomas, are bound together in a struggle for a new hegemonic project:
Hegemony is a particular practice of consolidating social forces and condensing them into political power on a mass basis – the mode of production of the modern ‘political’. (Thomas 2012, p.194)

Whilst the civil society development experiences in Mozambique towards the end of Portuguese colonization demonstrate civil society power, influence and significance in relation to the overall socio-political processes affecting the country at the time, it is more difficult to determine national and ‘home-grown’ civil society influence on contemporary socio-political decisions. This might have to do with the way civil society is conceptualized and depoliticized under the post-colonial neoliberal development agenda and more general, globalization processes, but also with the considerable controlling influence that major parts of the international community and the FRELIMO led government imposed on local civil society development processes.

What can be distinctly stated as a result of my research is that a number of citizens interviewed expressed their deep dissatisfaction in relation to the ‘limited scope’ of the concept of civil society currently accepted within the good governance debate, which is still the dominant paradigm within the wider development debate. This can be well exemplified with a quote from an NGO employee based in Quelimane, Zambézia Province:

“We, the NGOs, do not yet have the opportunity and power to make decisions in relation to society. For example, your question, why we are not working in Inhassugne district. I can see an important point here, but what can I do? What is our power to act (as NGOs)? How are we getting concerned and how do we act? There is a lack of resources. We have the big problem of lacking material resources. Hence we cannot make our own decisions…We have many NGOs that intervene in the area of service-delivery but my organization works in the area of advocacy…for example in the area of forest management. During this time and in order to be controlled, I have been called three times to talk to the governor here in Zambézia and once, I have even been asked to travel to Maputo…another NGO involved into advocacy work had many inconveniences, their director has been threatened and consequently left the province.”

(Interview with an NGO employee in Quelimane, Zambézia Province, 09.04.2015)

The expressed frustration has to do with the way NGOs are funded; it is linked to the paradigmatic crisis of the “European Model of the state imposed on African societies, continued by the post-colonial states in Africa” (Kulipossa 1998) and linked to that, people’s mistrust in relation to the state in general. Civil society, reduced to the world of NGOs, is part of that ‘Western, modern state and civil society Model’, ignoring traditional African institutions which from a Southern Perspective, can be part of a
locally rooted civil society. Negrão (2003) states that the selection of civil society representatives for the Poverty Observatory synthesizes the contribution of the Mozambican experience towards the reconstruction of civil society in a non-Western context. However, since Negrão made his valuable and thoughtful analysis, transnational forces have come into play and government politics have accepted, facilitated and the elite widely profited, through its attachment to the now global neoliberal world order. Some of the assumptions underpinning the relationships between the (nation-) state, the market and institutionalized civil society have been seriously interrupted but still, they are the key parameters for analysing civil society for donors, the Mozambican academia and NGOs.

Meanwhile, the civic and primordial publics have not found a common moral ground and a political project within a single public sphere. The contemporary challenge for Mozambican civil society is no longer ‘developing institutional structures’ (Lowe 1999, p. 114) but rather criticising these structures and building up new social movements that carry the potential to engage with the indigenous peoples’ organizations and traditional social structures. For Negrão (2003) and other urban civil society actors, the following diagram, showing a composition of institutionalized civil society within the poverty observatory in Mozambique, has been an ideal picture of Mozambican civil society.

**Figure 5:** Composition of the Mozambican Civil Society and Poverty Observatory
Nowadays, the increased government control of the civil society arena along with the instrumentalization and politicization of participatory spaces, have created new dynamics outside the world of NGOs and new solidarities that are going beyond the actions of legalized civil society actors; some are connected to the primordial public. These dynamics, although not easily countable, may carry the potential for catalysing social transformation. FRELIMO, having consolidated its control over the past years, will not share power easily. The creation of a new hegemony, necessary to bring the majority of Mozambicans out of poverty and away from the “dignity of fear”\(^{123}\) (dignidade de medo) may depend on the interplay of organized civil society organizations and the peasantry, whose logic and moral is not the same as from the majority of ‘Western-type’ NGOs:

Today, apart from the ‘traditional’ constituents like labour, professional, youth and women’s associations, there are several other kinds of non-governmental organizations – environmental, human rights, service delivery, research etc. – that have come with the NGO-isation of the African socio-political landscape. It is obvious that most of the latter-day NGOs (which some erroneously regard as the “real” civil society) are not primordial; yet, it cannot be denied that members of these organizations also belong to various primordial publics. (Osaghae 2003, p. 12)

\(^{123}\) This is a concept expressed from an NGO employee in Inhassunge District (02.04.2015).
CHAPTER 5: GOVERNANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE?

5.1. Introduction: Civil society - a contested social arena

Governance, taken as a specific idea about the conditions necessary for development in the neoliberal era, was strongly introduced into development discourse and practice in the early 1990s (Weiss 2000). Initially the approach followed a narrow view emphasizing technocratic measures to improve government effectiveness while providing a legal framework for market-based development (Hout & Robison 2009). Mozambique, being a considerable aid dependent country, is an excellent example of how this type of governance was introduced from the IMF and the World Bank, through the first Mozambique Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), called Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty, 2001-2005 (PARPA). While the first PARPA was a top down exercise led by the IMF, the second PARPA (2006-2009), following the trend of building stronger linkages between the state and society, was developed with broader participation. The third PRSP, by then called Action Plan for Poverty Reduction (PARP), was approved on 3 May 2011, covering the period of 2011 – 2014.

PARP (2011-2014) highlights the following challenges for better governance: 1) improving the business climate; 2) the quality of the legal framework for economic activities and its effective enforcement; 3) decentralization and deconcentration of functions and resources to the local level, so that local organs of government will have greater capacity to function and provide services to the citizens; 4) a true democratic rule of law under which citizens and enterprises have equal opportunities without discrimination (República de Moçambique 2011, p. 13). The latter two challenges demonstrate a shift of thinking in relation to the importance of power, politics and social conflict in shaping development outcomes and the difficulties of addressing these through existing institutional and governance programmes (Hout & Robison 2009).

As part of this chapter I will start to refer to a social arena, which I entitle ‘Civil Society, development and social transformation in Mozambique’, it contains various social worlds. Social arenas and social worlds are important concepts in Clarke’s (2015) approach to ‘Situational Analysis’ (see also Chapter 3):
Social worlds/arenas maps lay out all of the collective actors and the arena(s) of commitment within which they are engaged in ongoing discourses and negotiations. Such maps offer interpretations of the broader situation, taking up its social organizational, institutional, and discursive dimensions. (Strauss 1978 in Clarke et al. 2015, p. 14)

Social arena mapping became the most useful interpretive research tool during the course of this research for joint analytical discussions with the Mozambican research team and helped me to consider silent actors and invisible actants engaged into the civil society arena. Boundaries within social arenas and social worlds are open and negotiations within them are fluid, embedded into multiple discourses which may turn out to be contradictory or conflictual (Clarke et al. 2015). A tactical civil society approach which this research adapted - following through some of the questions about the relationships between political and civil society and hegemony articulated by Gramsci (1971) (see also sub-chapter 2.4) - allows for contradictions within the public sphere(s) and proposes that conflicts are necessary to bring about structural change (Zinecker 2011).

My analysis of civil society so far describes civil society in Mozambique as the result of many battles, from a liberating anti-colonial civil society project to a top down Western and NGO dominated civil society concept, embedded into the above mentioned governance debate. Civil society struggles have been accompanied by considerable changes in the political and economic context during the past forty years: From a socialist-oriented economy to market-oriented economic restructuring, civil war, multi-party democracy, and return to low-density civil war. In the following chapter, the currently dominant good governance agenda will be introduced. I will start by describing the international donor approaches to civil society development and then refer to the two main NGO strategies supported by the governmental donors, namely service provision and advocacy, they are found in the social words ‘civil society and good governance’ as well as ‘civil and political society’. After that I will refer to a third social world, namely the contesting society. This world has initially been referred to as ‘informal’, then ‘uncivil’ and even ‘irrational’ civil society. However, since I encountered predominantly empowering or obstructing spiritual actors that both contested various forms of contemporary oppression, I chose to name it ‘contesting’

124 The terms ‘uncivil’ society is academically debated but only a few authors deal with the concept and dynamics related to it (see also Fatton 1995, Alexander 2006, Kopecky & Mudde 2008, Clifford 2011, Neocosmos 2011, Bond 2014).
society’. The social arena map also contains a fourth social world, namely ‘academic society’. This arena has little direct influence on civil society action in Mozambique and hence will not be explored intensively. However, academic society has strong influence on the DAC donor discourse and the concept and typologies used in interventions to support and strengthen civil society. As such, it was important to position academic society within the social arena. Following the main social arena map that got shaped during the entire research process.

**Figure 6**: Social Arena Map: Civil society, development and social transformation in Mozambique

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*Source: Author*
5.2. The international donor perspective

Sensitivity to local conditions is also important when trying to support political pluralism. Development assistance aimed at ‘civil society’ can obviously do much good. But it is not without its risks. Organizations which become involved in the political process, whether parties, pressure groups, or NGOs, may be regarded as lacking legitimacy when funded from abroad by foreign governments or multilateral agencies. This is more because the accountability of such groups may appear to be focused more on donor agencies and ‘Northern’ NGOs than on local constituencies or the beneficiaries of their advocacy or service. (Smith 2007, p. 281)

Civil society and NGOs are part of the good governance agenda described in this chapter. Indeed, as outlined in sub-chapter 4.3.3, the donors’ good governance agenda has supported INGOs and the creation of local NGOs in order to firstly substitute the reduced state in its service delivery role and secondly to increase participation in local decision-making. The latter is part of the growing global focus on participatory development led by the World Bank (Mansuri & Rao 2013) and other international institutions. In Mozambique, this trend can be testified by the composition of the Poverty Observatory (see also sub-chapter 4.3.4) and the mushrooming donor supported civil society support programmes since about 2004. Howell and Pearce (2002) underline that globally, donors vary enormously in their objectives, financial potential and strength, as well as organizational structures, administrative procedures, geographical focus, and thematic breadth of programmes and projects, and accordingly they differ in the relative salience they attach to civil society.

In the case of Mozambique, we can broadly distinguish between the DAC and non-DAC donor approaches and not surprisingly I observed that most of the non-DAC donors such as Brazil and China have a different approach to governance and development than the DAC community, which aims to coordinate its civil society strengthening approaches through a sub-working group of their governance working group. Non-DAC donors tend to focus on economic development through the promotion of agro-business (e.g. Brazil’s export oriented participation in the agricultural project ProSavana), involvement in extractive industry (e.g. Brazilian and Indian investments in mining) or infrastructure (e.g. China’s road construction) whilst DAC donors mostly aim at combining economic and social development. The latter is part of the key assumptions linked to the good governance agenda and includes either a specific or mainstreaming approach towards strengthening civil society. However, with increasing economic globalization, boundaries are getting fluid, and there are now an
increasing number of DAC donor interventions into extractive industries (e.g. Ireland, Japan, and United States of America) which at times impact on their commitments towards social development (e.g. Japan’s involvement in the ProSavana programme jointly with Brazil).

Alongside the paradigmatic changes at the global level (see also sub-chapter 4.3.3, table 5) the introduction of ‘good governance’ can be seen as a mainly DAC donor prerequisite for supporting the development and economic growth agenda of recipient countries. In Mozambique, the DAC donor community started to ramp up their support towards the development of ‘local’ civil society as part of their good governance programmes at the beginning of the 1990s and as elsewhere, NGOs were seen as the panacea for all type of ‘development problems’ (Willis 2011). However, as numerous scholars (Edwards 2005, Manji 2000, Howell & Pearce 2002, Fowler 2011, Zinecker 2011, Nuget 2012) concerned with civil society concepts and their application in ‘developing’ countries argue, Western concepts of civil society are problematic when they are applied in post-colonial Africa.

One problem is the fact that the post-colonial North-South power relationships and historical processes of nation-building in Africa not only produced new forms of economic exploitation but also newly emerging social classes and increasing social inequalities which are mirrored within the modern concept of civil society as applied in ‘developed’ countries (see also 4.3). Having in mind the same scenario, Pfeiffer (2004), using the particular case of Mozambique, argues that NGOs within the new civil society paradigm might have contributed towards the increase in social inequality:

> The promotion of an imagined civil society by foreign aid in the midst of rapidly deepening social inequalities may have contributed to further marginalization of the poor, many of whom were flocking into the new churches. Foreign NGOs appear to have channelled their resources primarily into local elites and others poised to seize economic opportunity in a competitive market economy. (Pfeiffer 2004, p. 369)

Indeed, soon after I started working in Mozambique in 2000 I was able to observe the breakdown of the first major heavily donor supported national and international NGO network named ‘LINK’. At the time, this was seen as a case of leadership corruption and a lack of overall capacity and did not lead to a reflection about alternative concepts and support for civil society, and overall ownership of any new societal structures being imposed from the outside.
At an overall global level, a number of INGOs might have contributed towards the increase of unequal power relationships between Western governments and African states and the paradigmatic move from the developmental state to a self-sufficient market based economy favoured this. However, the fact that INGOs were (externally) state funded and linked to powerful so called “back donors”, ignored the fact that these were certainly not ‘below’ the African state they related to. Civil society is thus truncated conceptually and subordinated quite openly to the policies of the foreign governments and international agencies seeking to impose their policies in Africa from the 1990s onwards (see Lewis & Kanji 2009). It thus loses its meaning as a realm of socio-political activity and becomes subordinated to an external political agenda (with its local supporters of course) and a liberal mode of politics where consensus is assumed and conflict is deemed to be outside the realm of modern ‘civilized’ civil society (see Munck 2004).

In addition to the top down support for INGOs and national NGOs and their networks, local spaces for dialogue between government structures and citizens were promoted in Mozambique. This strategy was embedded into the broader idea to support decentralized decision-making and participatory planning (see Burr 2009), thus aiming to get away from backing a strong central and developmental state model. DAC donors in Mozambique consequently started to embrace the formal creation of democratic instruments for civil society participation in public life, including some platforms that aimed to build communicative linkages between the government and civil society, e.g. *Observatórios de Desenvolvimento* (OD, Development Observatories), *Redes Provinciais da Sociedade Civil* (Provincial Civil Society Networks) and *Instituições de Participação e Consulta Comunitária* (IPCCs, Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation) to which the *Conselhos Locais* (Local Councils) at the *distrito* (district), *posto administrativo* (administrative post), *localidade* (locality), *povoação* (settlement/village) and *comunidade* (community) levels belong. However, the actors within the newly created participatory spaces needed to be empowered for enhancing real citizen participation so that this space could be used to boost public and civil society engagement into decisions that affect communities’ lives.

The Province of Nampula was the first province to initiate and pilot various forms of decentralized participatory planning, including the establishment of the above mentioned formal spaces for dialogue between the government and civil society at
provincial, district and municipal level. The process of embedding participatory local governance dynamics into the province started in the mid-1990s and was supported by the donor funded Programa de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas (Programme for Decentralized Planning and Financing, PPFD). The above mentioned local councils (in the context of PPFD local councils were named Comités de Desenvolvimento Local, CDL) were supported and pushed by INGOs, at times in partnership with provincial NGOs.

A comprehensive study analysing governance in Nampula Province (Macuane et al. 2010), focusing on the influence of PPFD on the overall provincial governance agenda, comes up with a mixed picture of the linkages between a donor pushed decentralization programme, local civil society development and participation in political decision-making, as well as poverty reduction in the province. Whilst the openness of government representatives to provide space for public dialogue through civil society organizations has been considered the most positive experience, alongside the replication of some participatory spaces across the entire country, the role of traditional leaders in governance has been regarded as critical (and unsatisfactory), and the co-option of IPCCs by influential personalities and local political elite has been seen as a setback in relation to the potential of participatory planning and decentralized decision-making.

A problem to establish more solid findings about the successes and challenges of two decades of decentralized participatory planning and financing in Nampula Province was seen to be the weak monitoring process. Further difficulties identified were related to a number of communication and coordination challenges between provincial, district and municipal governments, in particular in contexts where an opposition party governed a municipality. This further supports the above argument about challenges related to co-option of formal participatory spaces and adds the dimension of politicization, leading to the presumption that ultimately, there might be a lack of political will, ownership and capacity on the government’s part to truly appreciate and extend democratic development through the use of participatory spaces.

Many evaluations and studies have been carried out about the functioning and effectiveness of the new participation mechanisms introduced as part of the decentralization process (see also Forquilha 2010, 2011 and 2012, Faehndrich & Nhantumbo 2013). Besides structural difficulties of the process of creating these spaces
(e.g. confusion about the role and responsibility of its members, membership nomination, and dominance of the FRELIMO political party), overall political commitment of some stakeholders to make the spaces work as part of the democratization process seems to be lacking. Furthermore, the independence of civil society actors from the FRELIMO led government as well as capacity of actors at district level remains limited, as does the coordination and cooperation among them (Hodges & Tibana 2004, CIVICUS & FDC 2007, Ilal 2008, Forquilha 2010, KEPA 2011).

The political environment in the country eventually deteriorated following the third general elections in 2004. One of the reasons was seen to be the fact that the political scene continued to be dominated by only the two larger parties FRELIMO and RENAMO. Consequently, NGOs’ space for action has been reduced during the past ten years (ITAD & COWI 2013, CIVICUS 2015) and the overall civil society arena, where legalized NGOs had so far only played a marginal role in the political debate, became more politicised. At the same time, there was a stronger perception that Mozambican NGOs are less critical of the government (CIVICUS 2007) and the ruling party FRELIMO, which is unwilling to give up its domination and control of Mozambican society. This meant that in the eyes of many donors, modern civil society’s role and agenda has been predominantly defined by the government, which in turn has used strategies such as instrumentalization and co-option of civil society leaders into government and ruling party structures. However, this consciousness did not lead to fundamental donor policy changes.

More recently, the donors’ country level analyses have rather focused on macro-level political governance and political economy, so that again the donor’s own role in directing and at times instrumentalizing civil society by supporting a particular type of NGO is not sufficiently reflected. The local community systems of self-help, societal values and spiritual beliefs, as well as the particular politicisation of some traditional social structures, are only partially mentioned in specific donor supported civil society studies such as the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (2007) or the Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations (Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2015)125. It appears that while people

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125 The Mozambique Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations started to introduce a more nuanced concept of civil society and included examples of successful community based advocacy campaigns in the final report.
depending on their own social community systems are among the most vulnerable; their own agency is only marginally considered as a source of power for change in itself.

Despite the problematic and inadequate NGO-civil society model supported by donors (Pfeiffer 2004), there are consultation forums both with government and donors, some of them working quite well (at sectoral level in education, health, water and sanitation, and in some provinces). Donors (both governmental and non-governmental) have been especially active in implementing NGO capacity-building and funding programmes, often with limited results, as the Mozambique CIVICUS civil society index (2007) anecdotally articulates several times. The Mozambique civil society actor mapping report, commissioned by the EU (Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2015), reinforces some of the CIVICUS findings from 2007 but also underlines that some donor funded NGO interventions have also contributed towards raising civil society’s political voice.

The successes are certainly linked to some of the numerous projects or common civil society funds the various bi- and multilateral donors provide to both INGOs and Mozambican NGOs. The EU civil society mapping study (Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2015) provides a comprehensive overview and should be consulted when looking for more information about the modern civil society aid architecture in Mozambique. However, from the in-depth district level research I carried out in Inhassunge District (Zambézia Province) and complementary studies in Eráti District (Nampula Province) and Marara District (Tete Province) it became evident that the modern civil society with the Western-type NGO as a central actor has not reached legitimacy within traditional social structures. People interviewed in districts closer to provincial capitals or municipalities have made more references to modern civil society but the further away I went with this research the more irrelevant NGOs appeared to be for local developmental matters.

It seems that areas of activities and strategies of NGOs supported by donors are to a great extent determined by donor priorities and trends, a tendency that keeps NGOs in closer reach of donor’s offices in the capital Maputo. Most of the donor funded NGO programmes are not reaching out to the civil society groups on the ground at district and local levels and this seems to be insufficiently reflected in the NGO-Donor-Government platforms or working groups. When I shared some of my findings from district level research with some NGO and donor staff in Maputo City, both sides appeared surprised that my research did not find evidence about NGO strategic approaches for supporting
local community systems of representation, which seem to be the more legitimate civil society actors in the eyes of mostly rural people I consulted at district level.

From informal conversations with people working within governmental development cooperation and many embassies, bound to the mainstream development theory of modernization and economic growth, community actors seem to be almost invisible; they are also rarely spotted in strategic programmes, evaluations or development research studies, at best they are the target or beneficiary groups, but almost never an actor in itself. This confirms the earlier claim that marginalized citizens at best see NGOs in Mozambique as service providers, in particular those living in more isolated rural districts (see also Ilal, Kleibl & Munck 2014). Indeed, no person interviewed at district level considered NGOs as agents for change or allies for building up a platform of solidarity or policy influence.

5.2.1. **Good Governance: Extending government services and control**

...because welfare programs as instruments of manipulation ultimately serve the end of conquest. They act as an anesthetic, distracting the oppressed from the true causes of their problems and from the concrete solution of these problems. (Freire 2005, p. 152)

The fact that NGOs’ representative and advocacy roles were not mentioned during most interviews carried out at district level needs some further reflection. Whilst the various roles of NGOs are, with some adaptations, globally categorized as being welfare activities and service provision, emergency relief, development education, participation and empowerment, self-sufficiency, advocacy and networking (Willis 2011), the service delivery NGO role has been the most supported by Western donors in the Mozambican context (Negrão 2003, Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2015). Only since the end of the 1990s have NGO roles slowly been expanded. Since the beginning of this expansion, the alleged lack of local NGO and civil society capacity to engage into advocacy and empowerment work has been stressed in the donors discourse. However, this is linked to the way capacity and civil society is defined by major parts of the international community (mainly technically, from a Western modernizing development point of view) and the categories of actors that are included in the civil society arena. This includes the type of activities or sectors, NGOs receive support for (mostly limited to the sectors of bi- or multilateral donors or their strategic interests). In this sense, civil society capacity building can be seen as another way of creating new social structures that are supposed to follow external criteria of effectiveness and functionality.
The depoliticisation of development (Hout & Robison 2009) has further influenced the overall position allocated to civil society actors within the overall development discourse in Mozambique and has contributed towards an imbalance of power between donors, governments and NGOs in general. The system of upwards accountability created through the aid system meant that the GoM was more accountable to the international donor community than to its own citizens, including of course civil society organizations. The state in turn obtained additional arguments through the aid effectiveness agenda to insist on NGO coordination and harmonisation and installed its own system of accountability and control (Ilal 2008). While donors prefer to support NGOs independently from any political affiliations, NGOs themselves manoeuvre within a highly politicised and controlled environment (Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2015).

Whereas INGOs were externally pushed and in some cases created to take on service delivery functions (Fowler 2011), donors’ influence and impact on civil society development ownership within the increasingly contested civil society arena remains broadly without critical reflection. Indeed, the perception about local NGOs’ and associations’ weakness and limited role as service delivery agents is the result of donors search for intermediary organizations - in most cases INGOs or national level NGOs working in partnership with INGOs, that channel humanitarian and ‘good governance’ assistance in a controlled manner directly to the beneficiary citizens in Mozambique, knowingly circumventing and inasmuch weakening state capacity and traditional social structures. Accordingly, NGOs in Mozambique, as elsewhere in the ‘developing’ world, are regarded as the answer to the perceived limitations of the state or the market in facilitating ‘development’ (Lewis & Kanji 2009).

Altogether, as has been mentioned in sub-chapters 4.3.3 and 4.3.4, Mozambique witnessed the accelerated creation and expansion of national NGOs from the 1980s onwards, when financial, human, technical and organizational capacities of the state were extremely limited. Hanlon (1996) underlines that Mozambique became host to perhaps the largest concentration of international NGOs and development agencies in any single African nation (see also sub-chapter 4.3.4) and their presence was mainly linked to humanitarian and service delivery work. Colonial and post-colonial

126 During interviews of Mozambicans working for European Agencies or Embassies (e.g. focus group discussion carried out in Maputo, 10.09.2014 and interview carried out in Lichinga, 06.03.2014), the term ‘intermediary’ organizations was most frequently used to describe the role of INGOs via-a-vis local NGOs or associations.
dependencies and local social and political dynamics were widely ignored during that time. Howell & Pearce (2002) explicitly draw attention to the troublesome situation when donors ignore historical, social, cultural and economic situations:

The dangers range from depoliticising voices for change; creating local organisations in the Western image but that lack local roots and legitimacy; and ignoring local organizational forms that do not fit Western schemas and models; to underestimating the importance of local ownership and autonomy. (Howell & Pearce 2002, p. 233)

In fact, with the NGO discourse at the start of the new millennium came the further expansion of the NGO service delivery role into watchdog and advocacy roles (Kleibl & Munck 2017). However, most donors did not sufficiently reflect about the dependencies they had already contributed to and hence did not substantially change their civil society support model, they simply added a new thematic area and in most cases continued working with the same Western-influenced NGO-civil society model. Today many donors still wonder why NGO capacity for advocacy towards social change is limited, in particular at the provincial and sub-provincial level. At the same time, Mozambican NGOs are considered weak and overall civil society without capacity to bring about structural change. Consequently, more and more arguments are advanced to justify new funding streams, in particular calls for proposals, which in practice put legalized NGOs into competition instead of supporting their work for a common cause.

Nevertheless, a small but increasing number of NGOs (some of them membership based) in Mozambique (e.g. UNAC, ADECRU, LDH, Justiça Ambiental, Fórum Mulher), sometimes in alliance with faith-based organizations and new emerging local land rights movements, do increasingly help to raise the voice of marginalized citizens, aiming to bring about longer term social change and transformation. The next sub-chapter refers to that new motion of civil society that is linked to the social world of civil and political society. Looking at the Social Arena Map produced during this research (figure 6) we can also see that there are certainly overlaps between the social world ‘Civil Society and Good Governance’ and the ‘Civil and Political Society’. This overlap is the result of the shift from the ‘depoliticised’ civil society model within the

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127 There are plenty of examples for civil society strengthening orientated call for proposals in Mozambique, following some references: Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development Thematic Programme (European Union 2013), EIDHR (European Union 2015), Fundação MASC (2015).
good governance agenda to a role whereby civil society actors are seen as agents for structural and political change.

The civil society arena in Mozambique, previously bound to the idealistic democratisation and good governance debates of the 1990s - which often missed out on the complexities and nuances of the politics of state-building and civil society promotion, is being extended into new civil society alliances and social movements, many of them concerned with land rights and social justice issues (Kleibl & Munck 2017). Their action, this might be the dilemma of the donor community which looks for justifiable results based frameworks, is no longer tied to the control of government and donor programmes, but rather carries a new sense of ownership and agency.

5.2.2. Civil society and political society: Advocacy for economic and political change

Picture 1: Poster with key words (war, political violence, kidnapping, murders, thefts, violations) and questions (Until when? Enough) carried around from peaceful demonstrators at the Maputo mass demonstrations 31 October 2013 (picture provided by João Vembane)

Whilst still in 2011 Brandes and Engels argued that the study of African social movements has been neglected, a robust research agenda is taking shape about the increasing public discontent, new directional, conceptual and intellectual ownership
demands within civil society and struggles of social movements in the Global South\textsuperscript{128}, including in Africa (Amoore 2005, Gibson 2006, Honwana 2012, Sylla 2014, Visser et al. 2006). This new agenda is predominantly challenging post-colonial state formations and their relationship with global capitalism. Indeed, recent studies on social movements and contestation of civil society in Africa were to a high degree prompted by demonstrations starting in 2007 and 2008, when the world witnessed the return of one of the oldest forms of collective action, the food riot. In their paper “The political economy of food riots” Patel and McMichael (2009) state that many countries were affected worldwide, arguing that the most obvious cause of these protests was the steep global rise in commodity prices, increases that were passed on directly to consumers, particularly those in urban areas.

Berazneva and Lee (2013) had a closer look at Africa’s food riots in at least 14 countries across the continent. Examining the different socio-economic and political factors facing African countries in the light of the crisis, they selected Mozambique, Egypt and Niger as case studies. Their empirical analysis demonstrates that increased poverty and fewer political freedoms are associated with a higher likelihood of riots occurring. Additionally, Harsch (2008) identifies the lack of political change and the government’s corruption as contributing factors to the economic crisis and the widening gap between the political elites and the poor. A recent poverty evaluation carried out from Johannson (2015, p. 16) in Mozambique comes up with the findings that the incidence of poverty has stagnated in the country at national level, increased in rural areas and decreased in urban areas. Johannson concludes that in many aspects, poverty worsened during the time of accelerated economic growth linked to foreign investment, she also refers to the widening gap between political elites and the poor.

Various donor led analyses also highlight the importance of social protection programmes, job creation as well as effective dialogue between the government and trade unions and other civil organizations as mechanisms to avoid violent street protests and conflicts. Cunha et al. (2013) point out that the Government of Mozambique (GoM) has clearly learned from the past, introducing a new “Strategic Operational Plan for Basic Social Security Programmes” as well as the “Strategic Urban Poverty Reduction Programme, 2010-2014 (PERPU)” in 2011, the year after the 2010 food riots in

\textsuperscript{128} According to Ortiz et al. (2013) influence and numbers of social and protest movements, asking for “real democracy” and “economic justice” are growing.
Mozambique. Both strategic plans received huge support from various stakeholders in Mozambique. The plans were seen as a guarantee of a more inclusive pattern of economic growth and stability of the country and reinforced NGOs service delivery role. At the same time, the NGO service delivery role has increasingly been strategically linked to the new advocacy orientated role towards policy influence. Indeed, most developmental NGOs in Mozambique carry that dual role and can be found as such in the two social worlds within the social arena here referred to (see figure 6); the NGOs Kulima and FDC are a good examples for that trend. De Brito et al. (2014, p. 7) express in their research report covering the food riots in Maputo and Chókwè from 2008 until 2012 the following:

…the picture of Frelimo hegemony has begun to change a little with the growth of a new informal space (mostly urban) for political debate resulting from growing access to social networks (particularly Facebook) and the emergence of a new generation of young people with relatively high levels of education (including a growing number with university training). However, the creation and consolidation of independent civil society organisations remains a slow progress, heavily dependent on funding from foreign donors.

Although in the case of Mozambique, government spokespeople had blamed international markets for food and oil price increases, protesting citizens on the streets insisted that the government itself was responsible for their resulting food and mobility problems. De Brito et al. (2014) also conclude that the riots were reflections of unique local economic dynamics, resulting from the longstanding social and political exclusion to which the poorest urban strata in Mozambique have been condemned. Generally, the report highlights voices that see poor citizens in Mozambique as lacking social capital to engage on the one hand with the state and formal civil society organizations and on the other hand with civil society organizations too close to the government to articulate alternative policy proposals.

Despite the fact that the GoM had gone down the privatization path years ago, resulting in many Mozambican’s becoming involved in informal market activities, protests were referred to as ‘greves’ – strikes. Interestingly, having carried out some discourse

129 In February 2008, violent protests broke out in Mozambique against increased cost of living, in particular rising fuel and bread prices. Again in September 2010, the cities of Maputo and Matola were the scene of violent ad hoc protests by citizen groups, mainly organized through text messages. Similar protests in other Mozambican cities were brought under control quite quickly (see also www.foodriots.org). The riots in 2012, controlled by government forces, meant that a bigger more powerful manifestation was impossible.
analysis, de Brito et al. (2014) suggest that a popular imaginary existed of the
government as an employer refusing to allow its employees to earn a fair wage. Furthermore, the report closed with the finding that FRELIMO has undoubtedly fed this imaginary by trying to become omnipresent in social, political and economic spaces and continuing to appeal to the legacy of the one-party state. My case study research in rural Marara District, Tete Province, confirms that finding strongest (Kleibl 2016).

Examining the Mozambican food riots in 2010, Follèr and Johannson (2012), in their publication ‘Collective action and absent civil society organisations in the Maputo suburbs’, use a number of voices from protesters and interviews with NGO representatives to work out perceptions of protesters about NGOs and NGO’s perceptions about those protesting. Their research highlighted two quite different strands of civil society. Firstly, they see some civil society actors as self-appointed, legitimate representatives of the population, with a mandate to advocate for their rights; and secondly, they also consider civil society actors as being part of the problem, due to a lack of representativity which is related to a different order of priorities than that of the broader population. According to Johannson and Follèr, manifestations had virtually no effect on NGOs daily work, nor was the sharing of reflections between the organizations recommended. During my own field research trips to Mozambique, I came to a similar conclusion (Ilal, Kleibl & Munck 2014). The distance between those bringing their desperation and concerns to the streets, and NGOs based in the major urban centres of Mozambique, who see themselves as representatives of marginalized people, is great, and accordingly questions the assumption that civil society, in particular the promotion of NGOs, is part and parcel of democratic development.

Nevertheless, from 2013 onwards there are also examples where a few NGOs lead the mobilization of people for peaceful demonstrations, in most cases in urban areas. For example, in 2013, prompted by an increasing number of abductions affecting security in major cities of Mozambique, public mass demonstrations took place 130, organized by a wide range of NGOs and supported by major faith-based organizations, with more than 20,000 citizens participating. Likewise, in 2013, people took their concerns to the streets in Lichinga (Niassa Province). Hundreds of citizens carrying homemade placards and wearing sponsored T-shirts supported by province based NGOs went to the streets

130 Ten thousands of citizens have demonstrated against crime and increasing violence in the country. See also http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/31/us-mozambique-protests-idUSBRE99U10P20131031.
to demand the construction of a proper road between the provincial capital Lichinga and the city of Cuamba. This road had long been demanded through dialogue between civil society and the provincial government but as no improvement has been seen, people decided to take their concerns to the street.

However, the mobilizing and politically empowerment of citizens as part of the civil society agenda is not appreciated by the ruling party FRELIMO. Accordingly, during my research I listened to a number of concerns related to the co-option of civil society on one hand and the intimidation and threats received by those organizing the protests on the other hand. A considerable number of civil society leaders who were interviewed articulated the level of stress, which they went through immediately after organizing advocacy events, demonstration or protest, eventually resulting in leaving the province they worked in (cf. quote in sub-chapter 4.4) or even the country, in order to escape government pressure and oppression. The following analysis of reasons behind the release of a young NGO leader who was involved into political sensitive advocacy work has been shared with me after interviewing a provincial NGO director:

“For many of us, the reasons behind his release have been clear, namely: (i) having talked about inconvenient issues during the forest campaign, (ii) having directly and frontly confronted with the power in its diverse positions and (iii) for being with (a member of) Renamo. Members of CS (civil society) have always been convinced that young people should be aware of their future, after all, they can be associated (with Renamo) and their professional development, be forever concerned; only people who are older and "without commitment" may face more delicate situations.”

Fowler (2011) identifies some global major evolutions of development oriented NGO work since the 1990s. According to him, NGO work was initially seen as weak in terms

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131 One provincial NGO director mentioned to me in an interview carried out in February 2014 that he left the country for a couple of weeks after organizing a peaceful street protest, in order to escape threats received from members of the FRELIMO party.
of values and comparative advantage to the private sector. Then there was a growing frustration within the NGO community itself about the willingness and ability of Northern development NGOs to be an authentic partner with their Southern counterparts. Based on this frustration as well as concrete criticism of their Southern partners, INGOs partly started to focus on international policy and advocacy work, reducing their operations at national level. The re-focus of NGO work created some discomfort for the governments, in particular if policy and advocacy work contradicted the political elite’s own economic interest and this in turn created the precursor to some governments’ dismissive behaviour towards NGO work which can be increasingly observed all over the world (Trócaire 2012, Act Alliance & CIDSE 2014).

For example, one of the NGO leaders involved into the organization of peaceful demonstrations, the director of the Mozambican Human Rights League (LDH), Alice Mabota, has been affected by a government media controlled smear campaign against her leadership after participating in the organization of the above mentioned mass demonstrations (cf. Journals Savana, 30.01.2015; Canal de Moçambique, 11.02.2015; TVE 24):

But at the same time that the LDH (and Alice Mabota) presents such a magnificent work to the public, internally, within its own management structure, problems have been sprouting, that today, question Alice Mabota’s (AM) leadership. Who talks about them (the problems) are her own colleagues, some of those responsible for the technical content of the League’s work. In the centre lies an accusation of poor management and a demand that AM dispatches the leadership of the League. (Savana, 30.01.2015, p. 18)

During my various research trips to Mozambique from early 2014, I accessed a number of newspaper articles claiming that Alice Mabota has contracted her own family members into the LDH (nepotism), badly managed the organizational budget (fiscal problems) and as a consequence, stopped paying employees (lack of responsibility). Furthermore, she was attacked for not stepping down in time and handing over the organizational leadership to other members (overall bad management). The pressure on some NGO leaders involved into organizing demonstrations intensified in early 2014, some months after one of the biggest peaceful public mass demonstrations in Mozambique took place. Some donors, who had for example previously supported the work of LDH, stopped their financial contributions after the above mentioned smear campaign and turned a blind eye to the context in which the campaign had been carried
forward (Voa, 02.01.2015). The latter can be exemplified through an informal (reflective) e-mail exchange I had with an expatriate European donor representative:

“And we are not very good in understanding the special signals, we make fast and simplistic conclusions. This was also something that I was thinking yesterday when I met Alice Mabota. I was very affected by her stage. She is not well and I think we (the donors) all have practically abandoned a great human right’s defender…” (Informal e-mail exchange with a European expatriate donor representative, 01.10.2015)

Indeed, no gross mismanagement of funds has ever been confirmed in the case of LDH. This situation also calls into question donors’ commitment to support advocacy outside the formally defined and at times ‘controlled’ participatory spaces. Some Mozambican NGO leaders I interviewed suggested that Mozambican NGOs would need to position themselves much better against external pressure. Indeed, according to Chaimite and Chichava (2015) it is, among other things, a number of INGOs, e.g. Diakonia, that should be criticized for negatively influencing Mozambican NGOs that participated in the (criticised) election observatory and related processes in 2014.

Mozambican NGOs, in particular the leadership levels that are criticising public policy, governance, corruption and human rights abuses are the most threatened organizations from the FRELIMO government, but have little or no protection mechanisms or donor support to confront that challenge. Various interviews with leaders from rights-based organizations in Maputo (03.03.2014, 04.02.2015, 16.04.2015), as well as at provincial levels (Lichinga 06.03.2014, Nampula 08.3.2014 & 12.03.2014, Zambézia 10.02.2015, Nampula 27.07.2015, Tete 08.12.2015) and district levels (Mecubúri 09.03.2014, Inhassunge 01.04.2015, Eráti 04.08.2015, Marara 09.12.2015) provide solid evidence about government attempts to stop rights based capacity building training at district and community levels, directed at local traditional and religious leaders and influential activists. I could particularly verify that through my participation at a provincial meeting in Nampula (February 2014) where plenty of stories were presented about difficulties related to economic advocacy at the grassroots level.

The recent development of a binary opposition within civil society can be exemplified by the following case study that is based on my analysis of skype interviews (24.01.2016, 23.05.2016), internet research132 and email communications (from

132 The rights-based NGO ADECRU (2016) published an online article about the danger of co-option of NGOs: “Depois de desperdiçados mais de 560 milhões de Ienes para Elaboração do Plano Director do
I have been copied in about civil society involvement into the major three government agro-business project (Brazil, Japan, and Mozambique) ProSavana. In this case, state agencies and private sector linked NGOs, together with provincial NGO platforms and networks created an environment of co-option and intimidation in order to confront and reduce the agency of rights-based organizations and local farmer groups concerned with losing their land to multi-national companies.

Box 1: Civil society facilitating and contesting ProSavana

Who belongs to Civil Society and has the power to define civil society?
According to some social and religious activists I interviewed in Nampula Province (05.08.2016-07.08.2016, 08.08.2016), provincial civil society networks (also called GONGOs: Government organized NGOs) appear widely co-opted by government and are regularly used by INGOs and governmental donors to develop new civil society strengthening programmes. This can be exemplified by a meeting organized by the four provincial civil society networks PROSC (Plataforma Provincial das Organizações da Sociedade Civil de Nampula), FONAGNI (Fórum das Organizações Não Governamentais de Niassa), FONGZA (Fórum das ONGs de Zambézia) and RADEZA (Rede das Organizações para Ambiente Desenvolvimento Comunitário Sustentável de Zambézia) in Nampula, 11th and 12th of January 2016. The meeting was the result of an initiative of the Japanese Government Development Agency (JICA), which contracted the consultancy company MAJOL Consultoria e Serviços for the development of a ProSavana related communication strategy and collaboration with civil society networks. Conflict management was necessary in view of the increased tension between private ProSavana-linked investors and local communities affected by land grabbing.

Currently, the networks together with the Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR), an academic research organization, are facilitating the establishment of a dialogue platform and a civil society coordination mechanism (CSCM) between the government, private investors and affected communities in order to manage community conflicts arising out of the much contested agro-business investment project ProSavana, which most

members of farmers’ associations interviewed in Nampula (08.03.2014, 12.03.2014, 27.07.2015, 05.08.2015) and Zambézia (10.02.2015) Provinces reject and accuse of land grabbing and human rights abuses. The creation of the CSCM created an internal divide within civil society as some rights-based NGOs reject collaboration with the ProSavana programme and raised the question who legitimately belongs to civil society.

The power of collective action
Meanwhile, an alliance of rights-based civil society NGOs and faith-based organizations (ADECRU, Comissão Diocesana de Justiça e Paz de Nampula and AAAJC) have decided to support farmers’ associations affecting by various so called Mega-projects and established a campaign entitled ‘Não ao ProSavana’* (No to ProSavana) denouncing that:

Vale e ProSavana simbolizam o saque dos recursos e violação de direitos das comunidades sobre a Terra (ADECRU, CDJPN and AAAJC 2015)

Vale and ProSavana symbolize the plundering of resources and the violation of community rights in relation to land.

Some activists linked to ADECRU and members of the campaign demonstrated against the above-mentioned NGO-Network meeting, articulating their rejection of the continuation of ProSavana. The farmers’ protest provoked the visibility of the tension within Mozambican civil society and a discursive exchange of blows via e-mail. On the 13th January 2016, a member of an e-mail group shared the following conclusion about the coordination meeting:

“We wish that the Mozambican government establishes an inclusive and democratic dialogue mechanism that involves all sectors of Mozambican society, in particular farmers, people form rural areas, communities from the affected corridor, religious and civil society organizations, with the objective to define their real needs, aspirations and priorities as well as their sovereign development agenda.”

However, some weeks later, on 19th February 2016, the civil society coordination mechanism had been institutionalized through the signature of António Lourenco Mutoua (Coordinator of the Nampula NGO platform), António Raul Limbau (Coordinator of ProSavana, Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security),

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133 Between the 12.01.2016 and end of February 2016 I have been copied into daily Email exchanges between NGOs (national and international), donors and consultants aiming to devalue the farmer’s protest and ADECRU’s involvement into organizing it.
Katsuyoshi Sudo (Resident Representative of the Japanese Cooperation Agency) and Wofsi Yuri Guimaraes de Souza (General Coordinator of Technical Bilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil). Since, the disagreements have increased between those NGOs participating in the coordination mechanism and multi-stakeholder meetings, and those facilitating the protest of farmer’s groups. The tension is between those bound in the social world of Good Governance and Service Delivery (NGO networks and some of their members) and those dedicated to a bottom-up political voice of civil society. Numerous e-mails and position papers circulated after the meeting in which various civil society actors accused each other of co-option, anti-development positions, uncivil action and aggression. Finally, MAJOL threatened legal action against two social activists that organized protest around the meeting in Nampula.

**Conclusion**

Mozambique seems to be approaching a bumpy period of social and political change which can lead to social transformation but in the short-term are likely to increase conflict and war activities. A social activist that participated in my research described the situation:

“Our country lives a decisive moment and finds itself at a crossroad, in which the protagonists of the exploitive capitalist system are making a new division and effective occupation of Mozambique and Africa. A new generation of Africans is obliged to act together with the population.” (Statement from an e-mail exchange with a social activist linked to a rights-based NGO, 19.01.2015)

*Because of strategic changes within some civil society organizations, the membership of the ‘Não a ProSavana’ campaign has changed since it was established. In May 2014 the following organizations have been formal members of the campaign: Justiça Ambiental (JA)/Friends of the Earth, Livaningo, Fórum Mulher/Marcha Muncial das Mulheres, Liga dos Direitos Humanos (LDH), ADECRU, UNAC. The Catholic Justice & Peace Commissions of Nampula and Nacala work closely with the campaign and periodically sign up joint position papers.*

In conclusion, civil society in Mozambique (both in its modern and traditional incarnations) has been considerably influenced by colonialism, the anti-colonial liberation movement, and internal power struggles alongside ethnic lines which were reinforced, co-opted and at times instrumentalized by national, regional, and international political actors. Civil society in Mozambique started as an internal political project during colonial times (see also chapter 4). Any major political changes, such as
decolonization and changes in the constitution from a one-party socialist-oriented to multi-party market orientated democracy, started with a ‘war on position’ within civil society. As civil and political rights were curtailed in reaction to an emerging civil society that defined its existence politically, though not necessarily in terms of party politics, civil society started to operate partly underground. As political pressure, poverty and societal fragmentation alongside ethnic lines increased, armed struggle and a ‘war on manoeuvre’ – using once again concepts developed by Antonio Gramsci – were used with the objective to bring about a new political order. These dynamics can also be found in a number of other African countries which were all affected by colonization and confronted with the need to build new nation states after independence using complicated colonial borders set within a multi-cultural environment. The above case study and other examples mentioned in this sub-chapter show that Mozambican citizens are nowadays increasingly open again to use a variety of strategies to voice their concerns in the political arena, and that a new era of mobilizing citizens within the civil society arena has started. An NGO worker I interviewed on 07.03.2014 during the exploratory research phase in Lichinga city (Niassa Province) referred to the new dynamic within civic society as “sociedade civil de dia e da noite” (civil society of the day and the night). All this reminds us that at the heart of civil society is the solidarity and agency of citizens. Civic Engagement is a vital element of civil society, which can hardly be influenced by external aid programmes.

As it is the case in several African countries, from Egypt and Tunisia in the North, to Burkina Faso and Senegal in the West, and Madagascar and Zimbabwe in the South (Berazneva & Lee 2013), public demonstrations in Mozambique have been pushed by an immediate social problem and stress (hunger, abduction, increasing assassinations, violent conflict and war) which affects various social classes. The demonstrations also brought to the surface deep rooted governance-related public concerns, which have not been effectively addressed by Western, type NGOs. Popular rap-songs are composed to mobilize people for claiming their rights and entitlements and for framing new protests:

_Digam: povo no poder, povo no poder, povo no poder, sim! Digam: não temos medo, não temos medo, não temos não! Ladrões, fora! Corruptos, fora! Assassinos, fora! (Azagaia 2013) _134_

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134 This sentence of the popular Mozambican rapper Azagaia was articulated at the 2013 mass demonstration in Maputo and consequently included into several newspaper articles reporting about the demonstrations which brought together tens of thousands of people. Participants articulated their
Speak out: People in power, people in power, people in power yes! Speak out: We do not have fear, we do not have fear, and we do not have fear! Thieves, leave! Murderers, leave!

O povo vai à rua por maior participação política e controle social, seus direitos, e deveres para e com as presentes e futuras gerações!” (Manifesto, October 2013)

People go on the street to increase political participation and social control, for your rights and responsibilities, for and with the present and future generation!

In order to examine if there is an emerging binary opposition of civil society at a local district level and how the civil society concept is perceived there, I chose to develop case studies, looking at civil society actor positioning in the context of a strongly perceived local problem and citizen action in response to it. While I present only one in-depth case study in chapter 6, I use other district level interviews to describe the nature of the third social word ‘contesting society’. This social world can be found in both figure 6 (sub-chapter 5.1) as well as figure 7 (see chapter sub-chapter 6.2) and constitutes the social word less visible in the national development discourse, hence actors active in that social world are those most silenced in the dominant modern civil society discourse.

5.3. Contesting society: Religion, violent protest, witchcraft and self-defence

Mapping all the actors and discourses in the situation regardless of their power also ruptures taken-for-granted hierarchies and promotes epistemic diversity – an enhanced understanding of the varied perspectives present in the situation that are often rooted in different assumptions about epistemology – how we can know and understand (e.g. Pascale 2011). Historically, there have been highly stratified hierarchies in terms of the valuation of different kinds and bases of knowledge. A key feature of poststructuralist and interpretive approaches, as well as postcolonial and indigenous approaches to knowledge, often involves ignoring such tired and exclusive hierarchies and instead seeking to represent the full array of interpretations and understanding present in the situation. This produces epistemic diversity in the analysis. (Clarke et al. 2015, p. 16)

This points towards the path that made it possible to identify a third social arena called ‘contesting society’ that will be introduced in this sub-chapter and further outlined in discontent about the deteriorating conflict and crime situation all over the country. See also online Diário de Notícias, 31.10.2013: http://www.dn.pt/globo/cplp/interior/discursos-extremados-em-manifestacao-contra-raptos-e-guerra-3508734.html (access 06.11.2015).

135 The entire manifesto has been read and presented by the Director of the Mozambican Human Rights League, Alice Mabota, at the Mozambican mass demonstrations 31 October 2013. Full text can be accessed online: http://www.conectas.org/arquivos/editor/files/MANIFESTO%20DO%20MOVIMENTO%20DA%20SO CIEDADE%20CIVIL%20MOCAMBICANA%20INDIGNADA%20PELA%20TENSAO%20POLITICO %20MILITAR%20COM%20OS%20RAPTOS.pdf (accessed 06.11.2016).
chapter 6. My research trips to Mozambique gave me deeper insights into contemporary civil society dynamics, the widespread co-option and political instrumentalization of legalized civil society organizations (in particular those working with an advocacy agenda) and a new world of spiritual and religious defence mechanism as well as witchcraft dynamics, which further diversified the epistemological framework of this research but also brought about some analytical difficulties and new complexities. Therefore, I will start by articulating some questions that emerged soon after district level field investigation started.

Is it the spiritual aspect of religious associations that distinguish them from other secular NGOs within civil society, even though all are supposedly working for the common good? If Catholic and mainstream protestant religious congregations are actors in the social arena, why should not African indigenous religions and spiritual or magical ceremonies also form part? If spirits, as many people believe, can both cause serious harm but also empower, why are African indigenous religions not part of wider societal discourses, and its members or supporters not considered important actors in the public sphere? Have these questions, as Gramsci would perhaps argue, to do with racialized differentiation and subalternity allocated to the poor and their religion, in particular the rural peasantry? (cf. Short 2013).

Indeed, when presenting my decision to extend my social arena into the world of protest groups and spiritual defence mechanism, Mozambican academics and civil society experts in Maputo in September 2015 broadly questioned that decision and at some point I even felt discursively attacked when a researcher compared that decision to the inclusion of Boko Haram, a Nigerian terrorist organization, into civil society. It is this type of intellectual and moral leadership that Gramsci (1971), in his conceptualization of the “Southern Question” and description of hegemony (see also subchapter 2.4), considers as reproducing the unequal representation of the subaltern and more generally, uneven development, which for him, is linked to the demystification of the economic practices sustaining inequalities (cf. Short 2013).

The resistance of some local academics to engage with the topic of spiritual beliefs and religion prompted me to search for other studies carried out in Africa and elsewhere. I looked beyond the legalized actors and the aid system and sensed the need to understand different values, moral and forms of solidarity in parallel to the function of
violence that develop alongside increasing political oppression, party politics and modern forms of economic exploitation. Just as Geschiere (1997) notes in the introduction of his book about the modernity of witchcraft, I initially thought that witchcraft was something ‘traditional’ that became less relevant with time and modernization. However, after field investigation, I agree with Geschiere’s findings that nowadays witchcraft is intertwined with modern changes and commodities (see chapter 6).

The need to control culture and tradition, and not to be controlled by it, is particularly stressed by Taussig (2010). He finds that spiritual dynamics and the fetishization of the evil mediate the conflict between precapitalist and capitalist modes of objectifying the human condition. He further concludes that:

…between the art of the imagination and the art of politics intervenes a vast range of practices, especially political organizing, and the conjuncture in which the collective imagination ferments with the appropriate social circumstances to give rise to liberating practice is notoriously rare. Yet only with this conjuncture can the multiple ambiguities in the collective mentality acquire a socially creative and clear expression, and the forces of repression are vigilant and almost always too powerful. Until that conjuncture takes place, the politics implied in the culture of folk magic works in several directions simultaneously. (Taussig 2010, p. 230)

According to Taussig (2010), spirits and ancestors are everywhere in former colonies, they are above all symbols of contradictions. In the colonial situation, he claims, spirits changed to reflect the new situation rather than the precolonial spirit world. They grew out of precolonial indigenous belief systems, as those systems responded to conquest, Christianity, and capitalist development. According to Lubkemann, who carried out research on socio-spiritual worlds among displaced Mozambicans, ancestral reproach could easily be “triggered” by the contentious relationships of the living. The spirits of the dead were also believed to be the source of more grievous forms of harm, usually through the vehicle of witchcraft (Kleibl & Munck 2017). Also in Zambezia’s Chuabo culture, serious illnesses, misfortune, and death can be attributed to witchcraft or angry ancestors (see also sub-chapter 6.2.3).

In an article about lynching, poverty, witchcraft, the state and ‘justice with own hands’ in Mozambique, Jabobs and Schütze (2011) establish close links between witchcraft, socioeconomic differences and collective action:
In the logics of witchcraft, the prosperity or wellbeing of some members of society are seen to be directly related to the misfortune of others. Witchcraft, then, is “inextricably tied up with moral systems and evaluatory ideas. (Crick 1970 cited in Jacobs & Schütze 2011, p. 230)

In the context of civil society studies, the dynamic of witchcraft linked to socioeconomic disparities, has rarely been taken up by researchers or the development community at large as a relevant consequence of the failing politics of poverty and power abuses. Ironically, the colonial principle of ‘divide and rule’ seems to get translated into ‘define and rule’ (Mamdani 2012) as certain aspects of African life do not appear to be worth studying and understanding. For many of the middle-class and better off people interviewed in Maputo, provincial capitals and to some extent at district level, the majority of poor local people in rural areas considered uneducated, uncivilized and backward. Oppression and economic exploitation are thus still subordinated to a discourse of ‘civilization’.

Within that framework, it is not surprising that those baptised in Christian churches and educated in government schools are seen as more enlightened. However, those less convinced by Western originated institutionalized religious organizations and NGOs may channel their mounting discontent and disillusion through local dances, rites and new spiritual ceremonies (cf. Fanon 1963). In this context, only some spiritual mediums, neo-charismatic African or Pentecostal church leaders or even magicians might be accepted as ‘local advisors’ or ‘intermediaries’. During field research in the village of Cassoca, Marara District (Tete Province, 11.12.-14.12.2015) NGOs were several times called “tranquilizers”, whilst an elderly man, the local spiritual medium called ‘Mbiri’, spread the discourse about an old ancestral spirit called ‘espírito de leão’ (Lion’s Spirit). That spirit, according to him, would come back to wreak revenge for gross human rights abuses, including deaths, affecting his community caused by an

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136 According to Freeman (2012), Pentecostal churches play an increasingly important role in many African countries. Comparing Pentecostal church and NGO interventions in a number of very poor areas of selected African countries, she concludes that Pentecostal churches and NGOs offer contrasting models of development. Furthermore, Pentecostal churches, compared with the mainstream Catholic and Protestant Churches, incorporate an holistic ontology that fits well with the lived experience of many Africans and accords with most African ontologies; in particular it acknowledges the existence and power of spirits and demons (including exuberant rituals, exorcism and gifts of the Spirit).

137 Several people interviewed in the village “Cassoca” (Marara District) felt cheated from provincial and national NGOs which facilitated a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the people of Cassoca and an Indian multi-national company occupying their community land. The MoU brought community members to accept their resettlement based on a set of compensation measures, that during the time of my research, was already clear, wouldn’t be put into practice (see also Kleibl 2016).
Indian multi-national company exploring for coal and gold in the middle of community land (Kleibl 2016):

“O espírito não pode aceitar que a empresa não nos deu nada para ir agradecer o espírito.” (Interview with a local spiritual leader, Cassoca, Marara District, Tete Province, 14.12.2015)

“The spirit cannot accept that the company didn’t give us anything to express our appreciation to the spirit.”

I decided to call the sphere of ancestors and spirits, which during district level research appeared particular important to local people interviewed, the ‘invisible society’. Alexander (2006) in his comprehensive analysis of the civil sphere argues that a satisfactory interpretation of social action needs to consider morality as a dimension rooted in solidarity membership nurtured by emotional and moral identifications and regulated by cultural structures and social influences (Sciortino 2007). Close to Ekeh’s (1975) theory of the two publics in Africa, Alexander argues that the civil sphere contains a set of analytically independent spheres, each having its own logic, moral and functional exigencies. However, according to Alexander, the civil sphere is able to exercise some independent force over other spheres, sometimes enabling what he calls “civil repair” (Sciortino 2007, p. 565). This way, witchcraft and certain aspects of ancestral beliefs, which I encountered as a very influential societal dynamic in all three districts I visited, could be seen as a local attempt to carry out civil repair in a context of extreme poverty, high socioeconomic inequalities and political power struggles.

Rather than resenting civil injustice, they celebrate and idealize the qualities of noncivil life, sometimes as indispensable facilitating inputs to the good society, often as superior forms of justice in themselves, and it is the civil sphere itself that often seems to intrude. There does, in fact, need always to be adjustments in boundary relations between civil and uncivil spheres. Institutions change. Industrial becomes post-industrial, sex becomes more detached from love, women from husbands and men. (Alexander 2006, p. 550)

In 1998, Kulipossa pointed to the need for reconciliation or consensus between civil and traditional society in Mozambique and articulates the hope that together a new social consciousness could be created:

Therefore, whilst the new emerging NGOs are important elements of civil society, they do not constitute it entirely by themselves. Civil society, in the Mozambican context, could encompass traditional forms of societal organizations, the broad ensemble of African institutions such as the power of traditional forms of community life based on family and village; religious and
cultural bodies, spiritual women leaders and other nobility and dignitaries. Through combining elements of African (Mozambican) traditional social life, civil society could create the social consciousness and consensus within which formal government structures and African traditional norms could both operate to foster sustainable development. (Kulipossa 1998, p. 61)

Harrington’s (2014) analysis about the contemporary global trend of a post-secular society in ‘developing’ countries adds explicatory foundations to some of my research findings in Mozambique and links my analysis of recent political-economic processes and the so called “Mega-Projects” (sub-chapter 5.2.2) to the effects of global neoliberal development that in turn produces inequality and provokes new, or the return to, social-religious response systems:

Where persistent rates of belief in more affluent countries of the world seem to be explicable in Inglehart’s analysis in terms of a reorientation toward “post-material values” – building in a kind of supplementary fashion on already achieved conditions of comfort and security – religious mobilization in the developing world seems to be inextricably causally connected to generally negative consequences of processes of economic globalization in recent decades. It seems no coincidence that religious activism and conflict most often appear to flare up in those parts of Africa and the Middle East most linked to geographically strategic global export markets for raw materials – in the first instance oil – where one-sided economies led by super-rich dynastic elites tend to leave behind the mass of the disenfranchised. Where reconstruction in the post-colonial world fifty years ago tended to found itself on predominantly secular-nation and socialist programmes of industrial modernization, the end of the Cold War and the rise of Atlantic-centred global neoliberal economic governance regimes appears to have helped bring about a noticeable shift in the cultural and political self-understanding of large sections of populations in the developing world toward emphatic religious and ethnic identity movements. (Harrington 2014, p. 499)

5.4. Civil society: Redefining national identities?

The above articulated analysis of the ‘contesting society, and the ‘limit case’ of witchcraft and revenge based on ancestral beliefs, or interpreted according to Alexander, attempt of social repair, shows the complexity involved in civil society and social action construction and conceptualization in an African context. That complexity is widely ignored in the usual Eurocentric civil society development approach (Kleibl & Munck 2017) that aims to establish, and in a sense replicate, Western liberal democracies, assuming that the mutual influence of the cohesive nation state, competing market and civil society can be balanced through targeted (external) civil society strengthening programmes mainly carried out by NGOs.
In Mozambique, the organic progressive creation and expansion of the ‘contested society’, means that this social world is supporting the exit of citizen groups’ from the current system of governance while legalized NGOs bound to the social world ‘Civil Society and Good Governance’ (cf. figure 6) are supporting a retreat from or bypass of the state, through their alternative service delivery role. Osaghae (2001) refers to the literature linked to exit/exiting, defined as “disengagement or retreat from the state by disaffected segments of citizenry into alternative and parallel social, cultural, economic and political systems which are constructed in civil society and compete with those of the state” (p. 21). According to his analysis, political exit involves the “construction of parallel political structures” (p. 30) and “entails an element of confrontation with the state and the construction of parallel political and juridical systems” (p. 31) which may take on various forms:

The most extreme of these (forms) include demands for or assertion of local political autonomy, separatist agitation, or secessionist movement, all of which directly challenge the state and invite counter-mobilisation. (Osaghae 2001, p. 31)

Looking at the severity of internal civil conflict affecting Mozambique since independence, the principle to establish a new post-colonial social order does not work well in practice and the exit tendencies of segments within society are observable all over the country138. RENAMO’s widely supported demand for more regional autonomy, presented to the public during a parliamentary session after the party won the majority votes in most of the central and northern provinces of Mozambique, demonstrates citizens’ wish for a different way of making politics and a change in power relationships.

In numerous conversations with local people in the central region of Mozambique the week before the parliamentary session, I could sense the hope for more political participation. However, the proposal was unsurprisingly turned down by the FRELIMO-dominated parliament without indicating a clear way forward to revise or perhaps approve the proposal, leaving de facto RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama in a very difficult position. He had to make a choice between giving up RENAMO’s political participation and going back to guerrilla war. The latter is the current

138 Cahen’s political analysis (Macedo & Maloa 2013) goes into that direction and questions the national unity of Mozambique based on FRELIMO’s single liberation movement. This reminds us of Ekeh’s reference ‘divide et impera’ (Ekeh 1975, p. 98), a principle applied by colonial powers aiming at creating disharmony between groups and justifying their interventions to establish order.
trajectory, as increased military clashes in the Centre and North of the country demonstrate.

Situations where police and military forces have put down demonstrations by local citizen groups for independent monitoring of the October 2014 elections, alongside the boundaries of Quelimane municipalities, are recent examples of how citizens confront the state and how the Frelimo led state reproduces fears within society and reacts to attempts of citizen groups to exit the dysfunctional governance system. Another example which dominated public and social media for a while was the assassination of the prominent constitutional lawyer and Professor of Law, Giles Cistac in Maputo city, 3 October 2015. Cistac, of French origin but with Mozambican citizenship, was a central figure in the sensitive debate about autonomy for Mozambique’s provinces. After announcing that the devolution of power to regional governments could be constitutional, he was assassinated. This reminded many Mozambicans of the execution of political opponents during the liberation war and the killing of critical journalists like Carlos Cardoso.

In an interview with the weekly newspaper Savana given just four days before his assassination, published posthumously on 27 February 2016, Cistac mentioned that he contacted the Attorney General (Procuradoria Geral da República, PGR) after allegations were made on social media that he was a spy, working with foreign interests to support plans by the main opposition party for autonomous regions. The reporters Tom Bowker and Paul Burkhard stated in a follow up online article\(^\text{139}\) that similar allegations were made against the economists Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco and João Mosca, Fernando Lima, a journalist, and Fernando Veloso, editor of the Canal de Moçambique, a FRELIMO critical newspaper. Accordingly, we can see an increased government response to those actors bound in the ‘contesting society’ as well as to those academics proposing alternatives to the current mode of governance.

The analysis of various media articles linked to the assassination of Giles Cistac (BBC 03.03.2015, Verdade 03.03.2015, Moçambique Terra Queimada 13.03.2015), interviews, as well as observations of citizen debates in the time after the October 2014 general elections, provide some evidence that fear as a result of denunciation,

assassinations and related public discourse is being systematically produced to keep the dominant role of FRELIMO alive. The forced perpetuation of this situation seems to be part of the current political framework in Mozambique\textsuperscript{140} as it was part of the dynamics behind the Mozambican 16 year civil war (Geffray 1991). I observed strong citizen attention towards and increased influence of religious-spiritual groups as a means of citizen protection as well as mobilization against injustices (see chapter 6 for more details).

Attempts of current civil society actors to question FRELIMO’s unidade (oneness) are constrained in various ways. This in turn, questions and weakens the state and is based on a number of historical, contemporary political as well as new economic and social formation factors. A historical analysis has been necessary to understand some of the limitations of civic engagement that certainly affect the values, moral and ethics of various civil society organizations in the modern public sphere and limits their potential to bring about positive social change within the given formal political framework and its institutions. Consequently, the citizen’s individual and collective identity with the centralistic nation-state is weakened or vanishes entirely and what Osaghae (2001, p. 36) describes as ‘simultaneous strengthening of sites of counter-hegemonic’ develops. For him, counter-hegemonic sites, including ethnic, religious and regional solidarity, are themselves claimants to rival statehood or alternatively develop into self-defence sites of individuals and groups who build up personal networks of patronage rather than holding the state accountable for systematic failure.

Within the developing citizen discontent, borders between the civil society sector, market and the state increasingly blur, not just at a local, national but also at a global level. Hilger (2006) warns us that a one-sided focus on organizations and a strictly separation of the state, market and civil society spheres disregards the negotiations between the spheres and related discourses about civic engagement and citizenship that affect national identity. He identifies four discourse frames of civic engagement, which fit with the roles allocated to NGOs and civil society within the development debate as identified by Lewis and Kanji (2009), namely implementation, catalyst and partnership roles.

Table 6: Four discursive frames of civic engagement

\textsuperscript{140} For an analysis of the recent developments towards a new civil war in Mozambique see Verdade Editorios (2016a).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discursive Frame</th>
<th>Focus on…</th>
<th>Main fields</th>
<th>Emphasis on…</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Central motive/Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Social, Health</td>
<td>Provision</td>
<td>Food bank, care work</td>
<td>Support, well-being</td>
<td>Altruism, doing-for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>Social movements, NGOs.</td>
<td>Influence, expression</td>
<td>Shared interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic Impact</td>
<td>Economy, Labour Market</td>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Social enterprise, public work</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Material benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Social Integration</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Value, guardian trust</td>
<td>Neighbourhood work</td>
<td>Creating ties</td>
<td>Proximity, doing-with</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hilgers 2006, p. 12

In Mozambique, we can now see how civil society ‘from below’ based on the discursive frame of “community” (cf. discursive frames in table 6 above) and the ‘politics of the informal people’ start to slowly redefine identities, in particular regional identities, hence linking the discursive frames of community and democracy in table 6 above. This redefinition is linked to the increasing economic pressure people experience, the uneven distribution of wealth, social services and infrastructure investments between the South and Centre-North of Mozambique, the consciousness about the linkages between the new economic elites, which in turn are well connected or even the same as the political elites which dominate the political sphere since independence. However, as Osaghae (2001, p. 39) puts it:

…self-help development activities have received various forms of support from federal and state governments…although they address some of the material problems that lead to exit, these measures do not address the more fundamental problems of distrust and lack of confidence in the ability or willingness of the state to protect the interests of ordinary peoples and their resultant disclaimer to ownership of the State. Solutions to these problems would require changes in the character and orientation of the state…. These would hopefully reduce the high incidence of exit attributable to the pathologies of the post-colonial state, leaving intact the positive forms of exit, which derive from indigenous traditions of solidarity and self-help.

5.5. Discourses of inequality in post-colonial civil society

A critical factor, when analysing civil society, is the dominant position of the ruling party FRELIMO and its influence over the civil, traditional and political society (AfriMap & Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 2009). This affects the
relationship between the state and society, the political parties and civil society (both in its modern and traditional incarnations) as well as the overall democratic values and moral wellbeing of citizens. Weimer et al. (2012) underline that FRELIMO’s control over the state is the most crucial factor inside and outside the party, underlying its successful organization of power in a context of deepening social divisions. Accordingly, part of FRELI MO dominance\textsuperscript{141} results from the lack of separation between the state apparatus and the governing party FRELIMO. This is a long holding concern for citizens, opposition parties and part of the international community and has been the subject of a number of political analysis (Sumich & Honwana 2007, Reis 2012, Ofice 2011, Forquilha & Orre 2011, de Brito et al. 2014, 2015). The extension of FRELIMO dominance has been accompanied by unequal distribution of government and state positions within the country, with more influential positions being occupied by people of the Southern provinces (Sumich 2010).

Sumich (2010) argues that, in a historical context of brutal in-fighting and purges during a liberation struggle such as in Mozambique, the victorious faction has tended to value unity above all else. Unity is then seen as the prerequisite for a modern strong state. FRELIMO, he goes on, includes members whose origins can be traced throughout Mozambique, but the top ranks of the leadership have historically been dominated by a relatively small colonial elite, we may call them ‘bourgeois’, of southern, urban or peri-urban ‘assimilados’, with prominent members from racial minorities. More rural, mission-educated aspiring elite from the Northern Province of Cabo Delgado has dominated the military. Maputo was chosen as Mozambican capital based on Portuguese own economic interests which were connected to British interests in the wider Southern Africa region, in particular to the introduction of the sub-system of capitalist production going back to the 19th century. Capital accumulation in the Southern Africa Region is still strongly dominated by South Africa, and this led to the development of migration patterns from Mozambique into South Africa and overall economic dependency of the Southern Region of Mozambique on South Africa\textsuperscript{142} (Munslow 2011, p. 78).

\textsuperscript{141} Referring to the work of Gramsci and Fanon, Noaman (2015) emphasizes both ‘dominance’ and ‘hegemony’ in Mozambique whilst there are also a number of articles that only refer to FRELIMO hegemony. Based my research experiences in Mozambique I agree with Noaman and support the statement that FRELIMO has rather achieved ‘dominance’ but not ‘hegemony.

\textsuperscript{142} After the end of the one-party Marxist-Leninist period and the breakdown of the South African apartheid regime, FRELIMO continued to reinforce the pattern of economic cooperation with South
Uneven social-economic national and regional structures got shaped and consolidated since colonial times and accordingly regional discourses of inequality exist since that time as well. Cahen (in Macedo & Maloa 2013) further argues that one of the major historical mistakes FRELIMO made during the liberation war was its oppression of opponents linked to other liberation movements from the Centre and North of the country. Obarrio (2014) furthermore states that a key mistake made soon after independence was to extirpate tradition and custom from the new nation-state and dismantle the colonial system of customary authority; both mistakes might have substantially weakened FRELIMO’s attempt to establish a new hegemony over the entire national territory. Pitcher (2002) then highlights how high-level FRELIMO cadres have managed to keep control over the national economy during the time of Structural Adjustment and privatization of state companies, keeping shares in their own established private companies whilst using their links to the party and government to create self-beneficiary economic partnerships. This development further deepened the gap between the majority of Mozambicans and FRELIMO elite figures and overall, started to endanger the vulnerable livelihoods of smallholder peasants. This situation was intensified by the new resource boom (FIAN 2014, Wise 2014, and Twomey 2014) and followed by the reinstallation of FRELIMO control into all segments of society, led by the former President and independence fighter Armando Guebuza. This can be seen as an attempt to link glorious historical struggles with contemporary political and civil society during a time when the natural resource boom rose and several land and other resource deals were negotiated between the GoM and multi-national companies such as Rio Tinto, Vale, Jindal Africa, SASOL, The Chinese Great Wall Development Company, Anadarko and Kenmare, leading to major displacements of local communities. Overall, this is the result of FRELIMO’s decision to adopt an economic growth development model, which diverted attention from poverty reduction and drives social unrest.

Africa, which since colonial times has been based on an economic power imbalance in favour of South Africa. De Vletter (2006), drawing on the findings of the Southern African Migration Project, concludes that families in Southern Mozambique are still better off compared with people in the Centre and North of Mozambique because they receive remittances from predominantly male family members working in South Africa’s mines.

Social and economic researchers continue to collect evidence about the uneven distribution of wealth in Mozambique, the failing policies linked to economic growth (Cunguara & Hanlon 2012, Hanlon & Smart 2008, 2014, Castel-Branco 2014) and the political framework with its centrally controled state institutions, incapable of effectively working against increasing social inequality or ensuring democratic development (e.g. IESE 2012, Chaimite & Chichava 2015).
So we can conclude that after a reduction of poverty levels from 70% to 54% from 1996 to 2003, poverty levels have remained stagnant, which, having in mind demographic development during the same period signifies an increase of 2,000,000 people living in poverty. In a situation where social inequality continued to increase, the urban poor (particularly in the bigger cities of Maputo and Matola) have revolted, creating permanent social instability; this can be seen looking at the popular protests in 2008, 2010 and 2012.¹⁴⁴ (De Brito 2015, p. 23)

Weimer et al. (2012), using the term ‘political settlement’¹⁴⁵ to refer to the ‘distribution of power’ (Weimer et al. 2012, p. 32) in Mozambican society, analyse the decentralization process in Mozambique from a political economy perspective. They conclude that the various government initiatives and processes such as the District Development Fund (FDD) and Presidência Aberta e Inclusiva (see also sub-chapter 5.2.2) contribute to the unequal distribution of power and social tension. They add to their contemporary analysis, the overwhelming influential positions of FRELIMO affiliated ‘senior local historical figures’ such as General Alberto Chipande from Cabo Delgado, the deceased General Bonifácio Gruveta from Zambézia and General Nihia from Nampula. Notwithstanding that situation, a number of influential donor countries speculate that their own economies benefit through increased cooperation with Mozambique and put their economic interests first. Some NGO staff I informally talked to in August and September 2015, engaged in economic advocacy work, and government development agency staff in Maputo, noted that this also included European donor countries, which traditionally would have been engaged in policy dialogue on democracy, governance and human rights promotion. From informal conversations with European donor staff in Maputo it appeared that so far, values of development cooperation are being downplayed against the reality of economic pressure to advance the growth agenda. Accordingly, the political framework for civic engagement in Mozambique and the impact of civil society cannot only be analysed at the country level. It is also necessary to consider regional influences, global economic interests and the aims, interests and actions of the aid and economic cooperation sector more generally.

¹⁴⁴ E assim que, depois de uma redução de cerca de 70% para parte de 54% entre 1996 e 2003, a taxa de pobreza se tem mantido estável desde então, o que, considerando o crescimento demográfico no mesmo período, significa um aumento do número de pobres em cerca de dois milhões. Numa situação e que a diferenciação social não tem parado de crescer, a pobreza urbana (particularmente nas grandes cidades de Maputo e Matola) tem-se revelado uma ameaça permanente a estabilidade social, como seu viu com as revoltas populares dos anos 2008, 2010 e 2012.”

¹⁴⁵ According to the Political Settlement Research Programme (website) “Traditional political settlement literature has understood the main route to transformation of political settlements to be that of restructuring elite incentives, rather then ‘fixing’ the democratic failings of political and legal institutions.”

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Land conflicts are leading to increased protests in rural areas all over the country as internationally supported economic mega-projects like the Limpopo Transfrontier Park\textsuperscript{146} or more recently, the bigger project ProSavana (see box 1) start to get off the ground. Land rights campaigns are now supported by local priests and nuns who distribute ‘\textit{capulana}’\textsuperscript{147} with land rights slogans and teach their church choir how to link psalms with liberation philosophy and theology (e.g. Catholic Justice and Peace Commission in Northern Mozambique) up to rights-based NGOs and their international networks (e.g. UNAC, \textit{La Via Campesina} or the “\textit{Não a ProSavana}” campaign, referred to in box 1). Indeed, pushed by perceived spiritual necessities and ancestors’ recommendation, local people take justice and the distribution of wealth ‘into their own hands’ (see also sub-chapter 5.3). Whilst compared with urban protest, the local land conflicts are much less visible to the NGOs, the political elite and diplomatic community based in the urban areas. Nevertheless, cooperation partners are beginning to develop concerns about the stability of the economic development model Mozambique; not just because of the recurring civil war but also because of targeted attacks and boycotts against foreign investors. During a conversation with an EU official (Maputo, 21.08.2015), I was asked if I had noticed violence against government officials and foreign investors related to rural land conflicts during field investigations.

The current FRELIMO administration has further tightened its control of NGOs as well as social movements (KEPA 2011, p. 4) using their re-installed party cells which were established during socialist times. The co-option of civil society organizations through the FRELIMO led government\textsuperscript{148}, as well as the upward accountability regime installed by donors through more narrow results-based management conditionality for NGO

\textsuperscript{146} From 2002 – 2004 I worked as a government advisor in the Limpopo National Park supporting the park and community development programme of the Mozambican Government, Ministry of Tourism. I witnessed a number of peaceful and violent community protests against the planned community resettlement programme. The limitations to the residents’ livelihoods due to the park negatively changed the perceptions of local communities via-a-vis the state and its political and legal framework. The emergence of a Limpopo National Park NGO forum involving mainly religious based national associations (CEDES, ORAM and CARITAS) with provincial/district level presence has at times helped to prevent the situation from deteriorating into open violence and in particular, has hindered the unwanted resettlement process.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Capulana} is a in former times locally produced printed cotton fabric in various styles. Nowadays, most \textit{capulanas} are produced outside the country, mainly in China. During my research in Nampula Province I was impressed by the work of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission which was extremely well accepted by local communities and dedicated to support and jointly defend land rights with affected people in the Nacala Corridor. They used innovative methods like printed \textit{capulanas}, songs and theatre to empower local communities in the defence in particular of their land rights.

\textsuperscript{148} I am not saying that civil society has to be confrontational to the state, the government or political parties. It is however important to look at the power dynamics between civil society actors and the government.
funding, alongside the global political changes since the 09/11 terror attacks in the US, have contributed to the reduction of the potential role of civil society organizations as brokers in the context of social conflicts such as the food riots in 2008, 2010 and February 2013. So far, land conflicts and increasing political-military tension all over Mozambique and in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, lead to more fragmentation within the civil society arena. With NGOs losing political space, ad hoc protesters, spiritual and religious leaders under for example the umbrella of Christian associations, Christian Pentecostal movements or local ceremonial structures are starting to build up their own legitimacy. This situation points to a ‘war of position’ within civil society and potentials for a ‘war of manoeuvre’. Citizens based in the resource rich central and northern regions of Mozambique increasingly distance themselves from the central FRELIMO government and address questions of legitimacy in relation to the party-state governance model:

“The party (FRELIMO) is the problem; the problem is not the state. It is the party that threatens. If you think differently, you will remain poor. We are legal, the government is illegal.” (Interview with an NGO director in Tete City, 08.12.2016)

In 2015, some Mozambican civil society activists were actively searching for alternative political frameworks, not willing to wait much longer for FRELIMO to ‘democratise’, but to liberate the country from land grabs and disintegration, hence exit the current modus operandi:

“Mozambique, Mozambique, where are we coming from, how are we today and where are we going, my people? They created academics but later they frustrated them. They created media but later frustrated them. After all, what do we want? This is one more warning to civil society organizations to be prepared, because we do not know what will be coming… “The struggle continues” to liberate the human being and the land.149, (Part of an E-mail exchange about the trial against Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, from a Mozambican google group to which the author was invited, 02.09.2015)

The questions express uncertainty about the country’s development and how prepared civil society organizations are for supporting the struggle for self-determined development. It is in this context that new forms of community solidarity and online

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149 “Moçambique, Moçambique, de onde viemos, como estamos e para onde vamos, meu povo? Criam Academias e depois frustram os mesmos, criam as Mídias e depois frustram os mesmos. Afinal o que queremos? Este é mais uma alerta às organizações da Sociedade Civil para sua preparação porque não sabemos o que vem…” “A Luta Continua” para libertar os Homens e a Terra.”
communities are seen as a way of discursively addressing the questions about ethnic, regional and political marginalization in a slowly emerging civic public sphere. The new discursive patterns in Mozambique also show how detached some people are from the harsh reality of Mozambican peasants, urban domestic and new industrial workers. For Kulipossa (1998) the search for alternative operations of power is part of the search for alternative political spaces that have the potential to counter local elites. This search begins locally, with the questioning of the present social and cultural hegemony, with a war on position, using Gramsci’s terminology. Foucault’s notion of discourse and Gramsci’s conceptualization of the “Southern Question”, as Said (1979) outlines in his book “Orientalism”, provide a possibility for examining the functioning of power and discipline in a post-colonial context affected by increasing patterns of social inequality.

The people of Mozambique that are nowadays involved in the counter-hegemonic struggle and creation of new regional identities linked to local land ownership, are consciously influenced by neo-colonial realities; they reject any foreign claims on their land and link the land question to the survival of their own culture and humanity. Particularly during interviews with communities in central Mozambique in danger of being resettled (Olinda, Inhassunge district, Zambézia Province, 08.04.2015 and Cassoca, Marara district, Tete Province, 11-16.12.2015), people mentioned that losing their land also means losing their fear. It is in these locations that different types of violent and peaceful protest was organized against government and economic elite structures. The following statement articulates how the political will of people may be constructed:

The political will of the majorities can be constructed in many ways and in many spaces: in the community and in the market, and inside government and multilateral institutions. Strategies for constructing political will may range from lobbying and informed engagement, to protest and constructive resistance. Historically, the political will of the majorities have always been built on the power of strong social movements. (Holt-Giménez & Patel 2009, p. 182)

During interviews at provincial level, people repeatedly expressed their wish for political change accompanied by political discourse about the need for autonomous regions (see also box 2), stating their frustration about the lack of government support
and the unequal distribution of power in the country\textsuperscript{150}. In the words of an NGO director involved in advocacy work with communities affected by the Tete mining projects:

“Here in Tete, we have terrible problems now. Land conflicts. Employment that is not provided to the local people. The communities have lost. They have been sent to the rubbish dump…” (Interview with an NGO director in Tete city, 08.12.2015)

Certainly, it is difficult to determine the future development of the weakened state, societal divisions and overall civil society struggle, as the following statement articulates:

It is too early to assess the effects of the recent discovery of large fields of natural gas in Cabo Delgado in the North. According to estimates, Mozambique can become the 14th largest gas producer. The question is, how to handle such a potential and how to avoid the resource curse affecting many countries in Africa. Ill-managed resource-richness can undermine democratic institutions, foster endemic corruption, lead to violent unrest or even the formation of warlords and insurgent movements among the losers. (Hoffmann & de Souza 2012, cited in Schmidt 2013, p. 102)

Following I want to provide an alternative post-colonial narrative to predominant normative Western ideas of how peaceful civil society is supposed to be constructed and function so to say. It is particularly the social world ‘contesting society’ and the function of violence, which gain relevance in the following study.

\textsuperscript{150} According to the 2014/2015 Mozambican Household Income Survey (National Institute of Statistics, INE) the regional distribution of wealth is very unequal in Mozambique.

“…the incomes increased generally but the income of people from Maputo city and Maputo province is higher than the common incomes of people living in Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Zambézia, Tete, Manica and Sofalla Provinces” (comment of the on-line journal ‘Verdade’, my translation).

CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL, CIVIL AND SPIRITUAL SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC DISORDER: A CASE STUDY FROM INHASSUNGE DISTRICT

6.1. Introduction: The provincial context and selection of district level case study

Zambézia Province has been the agriculturally most productive province during colonial times (Dinerman 2006), is potentially still one of the most productive provinces in Mozambique, and since colonial times, it has attracted significant interest from investors. During colonial times, Zambézia was known for its Afro-Portuguese elite which emerged as a result of numerous marriages between Portuguese settlers and brides from influential local African land owning families. This elite gave the so called prazo system, which in turn was linked to trade, warfare, forced and bonded labour and slave trade, almost autonomous status from the colonial administration (cf. Serra 1980, Bertelsen 2015). After Independence, holding on its aspirations for autonomy, Zambezians were one of the first people of Mozambique to resist FRELIMO dominance and policies.

The first anti-FRELIMO movement, the Revolutionary Party of Mozambique (PRM), which also supported RENAMO during the civil war, originated from Zambézia. Resistance also included the rejection of the 'socialisation of the countryside' programme (see also sub-chapter 4.3.2) introduced by FRELIMO during the Marxist-Leninist era. The programme aimed to establish communal villages for agricultural production following a socialist cooperative model and it was particularly unpopular in the districts of Chinde and Inhassunge, where some palm trees were felled in order to construct communal villages. In addition, the programme forbade initiation rites and the exercise of authority of traditional leaders (Chichava 2013). However, the local Afro-

151 According to Newitt (1969), the meaning and purposes of the prazos changed over time. Initially prazos were thought to be a way to delegate the Portuguese crown’s judicial, administrative and fiscal functions to private enterprises. In the 18th century prazos also became connected to the desire to develop large areas of land agriculturally. From the 19th century, colonial writers referred to prazos as larger plantations. In its final phase, the prazos were once again seen as ‘fiscal units’ where the prazeiros were expected to uphold policy, collect taxes and act as ‘district commissioners’ in the area of their prazos.

152 According to Kjerland & Bertelson (2015) before 1846 some 300,000 slaves were captured from Zambézia Province alone.
Portuguese elite was well connected to traditional lineage chiefs and widely accepted by local people as they applied a form of distributive socialism. Thus, the FRELIMO programme was successfully rejected from the beginning. Historically, witchcraft was widely practiced in the province and the ‘poison test was the most common form of trial’ (Newitt 1969, p. 82). Witchcraft, as my research highlights, is still a practice widely recognized in the province.

The province was seriously affected by the civil war; most of its infrastructure was destroyed and many people were internally displaced. According to Chichava (2007), the people of Zambézia were the most affected by the war in terms of famine and sickness. Any communication links between the districts and the provincial capital were cut off during that time. Even though FRELIMO accused RENAMO of being responsible for that human disaster, the majority of the people of Zambézia voted for RENAMO, when the former guerrilla group transformed into a political party (Chichava 2007). Dinerman (2006, p. 10) underlines that the 1994 polls showed “unambiguously that Mozambique was deeply divided and that regional disparities in economic and educational opportunities, living standards, income and life expectancy were one major source of political division.” This statement applies particularly to contemporary Zambézia Province as my research highlights at several points.

Indeed, Inhassunge District, where research for the following in-depth case study was carried out, is the exception of the Zambezian voter behaviour and therefore not ‘typical”; it is the only district where FRELIMO has always gained the majority of votes, although not without claims of election fraud and violent attacks between FRELIMO and RENAMO supporters. This points to the fact that the people of Inhassunge may experience higher level of oppression than elsewhere in the province. Zambezians were always considered particular rebellious and the entire province as a revolting province (Chichava 2007). Currently, as I have been able to witness on several occasions, entire villages and communities in the province are being forced off their land and this leads to land conflicts and local protests (see also Hanlon & Norfolk 2012). Since about the year 2000, a number of controversial private investment projects have been initiated in the province, most linked to the timber and agro-business market as well as sand extraction; they are frequently led by Chinese companies (Mackenzie 2006). The major Portuguese paper producing company PORTUCEL has recently been
granted 173,000 ha of fertile land, to grow eucalyptus trees for cellulose production (IFC 2016).

At the same time, the budget for school education per student in Zambézia Province is lower than in all other Mozambican provinces; this demonstrates the lack of investment in social sectors in the province which can be regarded as punishment for the way people voted and their rebellious behaviour. The lack of an educated and trained workforce in the province further contributes to the development of income inequality as well as other factors such as lack of investment in public infrastructure. As a result, Zambézia is now the poorest province in the country and has a relatively large population size and density (República de Moçambique 2015).

In the last presidential and parliamentarian elections RENAMO was once again confirmed as the strongest political force in the province and according to most people I interviewed in the province, time is ripe for political change\textsuperscript{153}; political tension is rising. This can be demonstrated through a public citizen debate I attended in Quelimane, in February 2015. The following questions, which constitute direct participant’s statements I noted during the debate, summarize the climate and the concerns of many residents.

**Box 2: Zambezians questioning the central state and discussing regional autonomy**

“Porquê nós temos medo de criar uma nova ordem política? Porquê o parlamento provincial não pode indicar o governador? Porquê temos medo?”

“Why do we have fears to create a new political order? Why could the provincial parliament not appoint the governor? Why do we have fears?”

“Cada dia novas instituições são criadas, porquê nós não podemos mudar o que queremos mudar? Os jovens têm de influenciar as instituições.”

“Each day new institutions are being created, why can’t we change what we want to change? The youth has to influence the institutions.”

“Nós compreendemos a necessidade de inclusão, nós temos de forçar isto e não deveríamos ter medo de conflitos ou instituições.”

“We understand the need for inclusion, we have to force it and we shall not have fears of conflict or institutions.”

“Cada vez em que temos de fazer mais um passo, seria bom andar ao lado da lei. Temos de trazer todos para mesa.”

\textsuperscript{153} In addition to Zambézia Province, RENAMO has also gained majority votes in the Provinces of Manica, Tete, Sofala and Nampula.
“Each time we have to take one more step, it would be good to walk alongside the law. We have to bring all (parties) to the table.”

Many people interviewed at provincial and district levels in Zambézia attribute the lack of infrastructure investment and what they call ‘absence of the government’ to the politicking between FRELIMO and RENAMO, i.e. people feel punished because they vote for RENAMO. The codification of interviews revealed feelings of deep social, political and economic exclusion and on top of all, violent oppression (see table 7). During interviews, people gave a number of examples of violence against local citizens who tried to monitor the counting of votes.

It is than not surprising that RENAMO increasingly aims to consolidate its power and responds in various ways, e.g. mobilization of its supporters, public debates (however, those are frequently disturbed by government armed forces), suggesting the amendment of the Mozambican constitution to allow for more regional autonomy (see also subchapter 5.4 and the case of Giles Cistac who was assassinated after his involvement in the sensitive debates about regional autonomy) and a RENAMO regional government in those regions where the party won the majority. This, in turn, motivated RENAMO to issue further threats against FRELIMO:

The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) announced on 2 September (2015) that its army barracks in Zambézia Province's Morrumbala District, where it intends to train its police force and more guerrilla forces for its army to protect, if need be, the sovereignty of the five [as received] provinces which it wants to govern. (Caldeira 2015)

Since the beginning of 2016, armed political violence between FRELIMO and RENAMO has increased and the new peace process, which started before the 2014 elections, became outdated, as RENAMO did not accept the election results (cf. detailed chronology of the conflict between RENAMO and the Government of Mozambique documented from Deutsche Welle, 11.03.2016). RENAMO now aims to take over by force the governance of the provinces where it gained majority votes. However, exclusion and structural violence, both themes strongly emerging out of interviews conducted in Zambézia Province, have already caused numerous localized conflicts throughout 2015 and the rhetoric of war was always present during field research. An unpublished INGO study of the social, political and economic context of Zambézia Province (Macuane et al. 2013) identified a strong discourse of exclusion articulated by its residents and concludes that this discourse has indeed:
…become an instrument of construction of political identity and action, which occurs in opposition to the central government, with a strong sense of localism. This conflictive localism can be a focus of tensions… (Macuane et al. 2013, p. 27)

The following case study from Inhassunge District aims to deconstruct the meaning of civil society in ‘rebelling’ Zambézia Province by studying a selected concrete local problem and the community based resolution mechanisms with a particular focus on the interaction between Western-type NGOs and local traditional social structures. The District of Inhassunge has been selected as part of a provincial level consultation meeting involving provincial NGOs as well as trade union and farmer union representatives. Accordingly, the problem central to the case study and the geographic area selected was chosen from that particular provincial level civil society perspective. The selected problem has been the severe cases of gender-based violence linked to witchcraft accusations154 in a context of enhanced economic problems linked to the disappearance of palm trees.

The research at district level involved seven researchers, five from the Catholic University of Mozambique (UCM), one from the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, and myself as the team leader. Prior to the field work, I introduced the research topic and methodology during a week-long seminar at the UCM Faculty of Political and Social Science (Quelimane) and participants were trained in intensive interviewing techniques as well as ethical standards. Intensive interview guides and other exploratory material about qualitative research were provided. The open and generative research questions (annex B) were tested before going to the field. The active engagement of UCM researchers in data collection as well as their active participation during coding and analysis of interviews meant that investigator triangulation could bring a real added value to the research process.

6.2. The district context: Inhassunge

Inhassunge transformou-se em Sodoma e Gomorra (Inhassunge transformed into Sodom and Gomorrah). (Diário da Zambézia 2007)

As mentioned in the introduction, the Province of Zambézia is known for the establishment of largest colonial capitalist companies (cf. Serra 1980, Chichava 2012). The district of Inhassunge has been particularly affected from large-scale coconut

154 I was told during the consultation in Quelimane and in individual interviews that it was quite ‘normal’ until about two years ago that about 60 women were killed every year in the study district.
plantations owned by various colonial companies, lastly by Madal. Before arriving in the district for the first time I was informed that the residents of Inhassunge are also very well known for their occult practices. Indeed, as the local newspaper Diário da Zambézia (2007) reports:

…to speak about sorcery and its collateral effects is to talk as well about Inhassunge. At the level of the district this phenomenon is most enrooted in the administrative post of Gonhane, which is considered general headquarters of sorcery\textsuperscript{155}, the art of magic powers.\textsuperscript{156}

Soon after arriving in Inhassunge District, three issues became apparent. Firstly, the residents of the district appeared extraordinarily poor, secondly, the road infrastructure was totally neglected, and thirdly, people openly talked about witchcraft and sorcery during my first informal conversations on the back of one of the called ‘My Love’ minibus trucks\textsuperscript{157}. During first individual interviews, I soon got indications that in the first quarter of 2015 about six women\textsuperscript{158} had been accused of witchcraft in the villages we visited. Indeed, members of the research team visited one woman who had been attacked only some days before; she was extremely weak, covered with bush knife cuts, and could not talk for pain; she died a couple of days later. The first local people we talked to immediately confirmed the centrality of the problem we were about to investigate.

The research team member responsible for participant observation noted in her memo from 31 March 2015, that after visiting a woman violated and accused of witchcraft ‘everybody was tired, because no one was really interested anymore. Piletiche (one research team member) was not focused, Joana (another research team member) slept, and the interviewees seemed to be somewhere else with their thoughts (Memo Laura Sevenich, Bingajira, 31.03.2015). Having reflected on that situation with the research

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\textsuperscript{155} Highlighting by the author.  
\textsuperscript{156} ...falar de feitiçaria e dos seus efeitos colaterais é falar também de Inhassunge. Ao nível do distrito este fenómeno está mais enraizado no posto administrativo de Gonhane, considerado quartel-general da feitiçaria, a arte de poderes mágicos. Note: The bold words are an excerpt from the author.  
\textsuperscript{157} The ‘My Love’ minibus trucks carry so many people on the back that passengers have to embrace each other in order not to fall off.  
\textsuperscript{158} As a surprise to the entire research team, people interviewed in Érati District (Nampula Province) specified that in their district, it were mainly men who were accused of witchcraft and sorcery. People in that district dominantly belong to the Macua tribe which has matrilinear structures. In particular the “rainha” (queen) carries an important ceremonial-spiritual function that, as our interviews revealed, often stands in conflict with the function of the government introduced traditional leaders (for more explanations about the government recognized and introduced traditional leaders see also sub-chapter 6.2.2).
team members we identified the so called ‘culture of silence’ (see also Serra 2006) that according to my Mozambican research colleagues is widespread in Inhassunge District.

Picture 2: An injured woman attacked after witchcraft accusations
(Picture taken by the research team, 31.03.2016)

I chose to include the picture above to illustrate the particular context in which the people participating in this research live\textsuperscript{159} and to show the importance to investigate society’s responses to extreme poverty not only from the perspective of a Western-influenced model of “civil society against the state” but to look at all the elements that influence the practice of people. It also reminds me about the need to look beyond the knowing subject and to consider the particular social and political order in which this research takes place.

In a society, different bodies of learning, philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices and police activities, mores – all refer to a certain implicit knowledge (savoir) special to this society. This knowledge is profoundly different from the bodies of learning that one can find in scientific books, philosophical theories, and religious justifications, but it is what makes possible at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice . . . it’s this knowledge (savoir) that I want to investigate, as the condition of possibility of knowledge (connaissance) of institutions, of practices. (Foucault 1989)

\textsuperscript{159} Permission to publish pictures was obtained when taking pictures of people and their personal living environment.

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It is only after I got back from field research that I found the above comment by Foucault cast light on the district level research process I had been going through. At first, the Zambezian civil society actors who selected witchcraft as a social problem that needed special attention surprised me with their choice and it took me a while to accept their suggestion. Injected with Western ideological thought, I had doubts about the direction the research might take. However, I told myself that I needed to proceed with the methodological process guiding this civil society research and that after all, it was the objective of this study to find new ways to explain the meaning and dynamics affecting the development of a vibrant civil society in post-colonial Mozambique. I was also inspired from Muchie’s (2002) ideas. He argues for an African re-appropriation and re-definition of the state, civil society and the market nexus.

Accordingly, I accepted the challenge to engage with the topic of witchcraft accusations and this was gradually accompanied by curiosity and a new openness, which I learned to adopt using grounded theory and situational analysis as my methodological framework. The following two issues were stressed during interviews and civil society response and collective citizen action discussed in relation to them:

1. High level of crime, mostly related to women rights abuses linked to domestic violence and witchcraft.
2. High poverty levels, linked to the economic shock caused by the disappearance of coconut trees.

Before moving on to the findings of my district level case study I would like to highlight that Inhassunge District, where the data was collected, has some more particularities. The most obvious is the fact that it is a densely populated island, surrounded by the rivers Cuacuá (Bons Sinais) and Abreus, as well as the Indian Ocean, this means that circulation of people and information is more restricted compared with

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160 Beverley (1999, pp.115-122) observed and analysed the struggle between the people of a rural Ecuadorian village and modern civil society actors (in particular women’s rights organizations) about how to adjudicate two female mestiza curanderas (traditional doctors) who were accused of having killed many people by villagers. Just like me during the following sub-chapters, Beverley puts great emphasis on the different values, interests and identities orientating the actions of the village people and those actions suggested by formal civil society actors.

161 On 12 February 2015 I facilitated an NGO meeting in Quelimane City where participants were asked to suggest an event or locality where NGOs came together with traditional local social structures to overcome key problems affecting Zambézia Province.
the mainland\textsuperscript{162}. When we visited Inhassunge District, the only ferryboat available to transport cars to the island was out of order. According to interviewees, this problem commenced just before the 2014 elections started. Since then, to the huge frustration of local residents, the ferryboat had not been repaired and this contributes to the feeling of isolation of the residents.

Sub-chapters 6.2.2 – 6.2.4 include the description of social worlds in the power map entitled ‘Power between the political, civic, family and spiritual spheres in Mucopia, Gonhane and Bingajira, Inhassunge District’ (see figure 7 further below). This power arena is the result of coded and categorized interview material from Inhassunge District. In contrast to the social arena described in figure 6 it does not include interviews carried out in the provincial or national capital and various other provinces and districts I visited. Furthermore, I decided to develop another map, which is specifically described in subsection 6.2.5.2. The special characteristic of this map is that it is the most micro level map developed based on locality level interviews and community debates in Olinda settlement. The developments of both maps are the results of field research which was affected by significant power struggles between different social worlds and various types of actors and actants that were absent in the dominant civil society discourses. Accordingly, they are power maps rather than social arena maps (see also sub-chapter 3.4.2).

The particularities of Zambézia Province, such as the province’s colonial history, the people’s rebellious behavior, as well as the special features of Inhassunge district, e.g. the current extreme economic crises affecting its residents alongside the alternative modes of articulating problems and taking collective action against them, through traditional social structures as well as new religious based forms of organization and spiritual movements, make the further investigation into the central research question in this particular geographic location relevant. At the same time, Western-style NGOs have gained little ground and relevance for their work in the province, particularly in Inhassunge district, and perhaps this is why provincial civil society actors suggested this research should be implemented in Inhassunge. The following sub-chapters address the historical, economic, political and social-cultural context of the district in order to examine the dominant and contestatory definitions of civil society in a post-colonial

\textsuperscript{162} The district’s main boat station is 15 minutes away from the capital of Zambézia Province, the City of Quelimane.
situation, focusing on its complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion. In order to contextualize the following sup-chapters within the social arena map developed and shaped during research in Inhassunge District see the following figure:

**Figure 7**: Power between the political, civic, family and spiritual spheres in Mucopia, Gonhane and Bingajira
6.2.1. Economy: Colonial legacies and modern exploitation

According to the strategic district development plan (Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Distrito de Inhassunge, PEDD) for the period 2011-2015, the territorial area of Inhassunge District is 745 km². It is divided into two administrative posts, namely Inhassunge-Sede (Inhassunge District headquarters), consisting of four
localities, namely Inhassunge-Sede, Chirimane, Bingagira and Ilova, and Gonhane, which is an administrative post and locality at the same time. According to the population projection of INE, the number of inhabitants in Inhassunge District was 96,503\textsuperscript{163} in 2011. The majority of residents live from small-scale agricultural production (e.g. rice, sweet potato, cassava, and beans) and some carry out complementary fishing; products are mainly used for their own consumption. The extreme bad economic situation of the people living in Inhassunge District has been cited as exemplary of many districts in Zambézia Province. As many other districts in Zambézia, Inhassunge is declared as food insecure.

There was only one food security programme implemented by an NGO in the district and I did not find indications of major government programmes or investments to improve food security. During interviews, I was told that the NGO implementing the food security programme is being intimidated in order to stop providing food aid to RENAMO supporters and that the government’s social insurance scheme for elderly and vulnerable people is not being paid out in those areas either. The intimidations against NGO work has been known in Quelimane and might be one reason why there are no more provincial level NGOs active in the district.

At the same time, the last PESOD (Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento Distrital) report highlights a total of 4,286 employed people in the district in 2013, against a total estimated productive population of 36,420 people. The figures above, read with caution, combined with the responses from interviews indicate that the district’s population is experiencing a situation of ‘economic shock’, acute poverty, and under-nutrition. The only mentionable income generating agricultural activity in Inhassunge District has been the cultivation of palm trees, which since colonial times has been done within a semi-feudal prazo, lately managed by the private company Madal (Miers & Roberts 1988). Madal, until recently the only major employer in the district, has just like any other company during colonial times initially held slaves, and later on used bonded peasants to work on their plantations. However, pressured by other European countries, Portugal abolished slavery in stages with a final decree in 1858 that outlawed slavery within twenty years; i.e. by 1878 (Jones 2015). Madal was initially a Monacan company, then Norwegian and later Portuguese, until it was nationalized after

\textsuperscript{163} Data was extracted from the 2007 population census. Nowadays, using official statistical figures, the population of Inhassunge is estimated to have reached more than 102,000 inhabitants.
independence. It gradually reduced its activities due to the lack of productivity of its coconut plantation from 2000 onwards and finally closed down its operations in Inhassunge District entirely some years ago.

The lack of productivity and disappearance of palm trees is linked to the ‘Coconut Lethal Yellowing Disease’. However, already on the way from the boat to Inhassunge headquarter (30.03.2015), local people sitting next to me mentioned that oil beneath the island was responsible for the palm tree disappearance and that rich and powerful people from Maputo, including the former President Armando Guebuza, were linked to that problem. These rich people were aiming to make them leave their homeland. The same young people told me during the conversation that witches are able to fly above the island. These witches were then also made responsible for a broad range of problems, e.g. for the lack of rain and the poor harvest as well as the overall economic problems caused by the disappearance of palm trees. According to the young people I talked to, the witches can tighten up the rain, get rich without working and bring illness and misfortune on others. The system of witchcraft (see also sub-chapter 6.2.5) seems to be a channel for transporting discontent in relation to various unresolved problems. Another reason mentioned for the disappearance of the palm tree was the withdrawal of the Portuguese colonists:

“Together with the pull back of the Portuguese the palm trees disappeared as well.” (statement of a public transport co-passenger in Inhassunge District, 30.03.2015)

![Picture 3: Fields of dried up palm trees in Inhassunge District (research participants called the picture ‘the palm trees’ graveyard’) (Picture taken by the research team, 01.04.2016)](image)
Since the disappearance of the palm trees, as interviewees commented, many of the district’s residents lost their only employment and income opportunity, which worsened already high poverty levels. In particular, the young people have “lost the entire control over their lives” (conversation with a local business man in Mucopia, 31.03.2015), resulting in increased crime and various forms of social and political conflict.

Rønning (2000) already predicted increasing poverty and land conflicts in the areas occupied by the Madal company in Inhassunge. This is based on the fact that large parts of the coastal areas occupied by Madal had already displaced local people a century ago. These people, as the local population has been growing, are now left with less land of poorer quality whilst there is no vacant land in those areas anymore. Additionally, civil war displacements and internal migration from central to coastal areas have further increased land pressure. Nowadays, new forced displacements are about to happen for example in the Olinda settlement. This area is a separate small island within the district’s territory where people are now living within a concession allocated to the Chinese investor ‘Africa Green Wall Mining Development’ (see sub-chapter 6.2.5.2), a joint venture company exploiting heavy mineral sands (mainly for titanium) over a total area of 31,000 hectares (see Mozambique Mining Cadastre Portal).

The people of Inhassunge have historically and contemporarily lost their land to foreign companies (before and after national independence), have been forced to change their livelihoods a number of times and now, in the case of the Olinda settlement, are being forced to leave the land of their ancestors entirely. During the post-colonial development of an independent nation state following Marxist-Leninist principles, the people of Zambézia were continuously marginalized and in their view exploited in order to develop other, poorer regions of Mozambique (as was the case under the colonial regime). This concern can be demonstrated through the following (angry told) statement I noted during a citizen debate:

“Na capital de Moçambique (Maputo) apenas houve-se a música e fala-se da tradição do Sul – o Norte está ausente.” (Quelimane City, 13.02.2015)

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164 Coconut trees have been the basis of survival for local communities since people remember and their disappearance constituted a considerable economic shock to the entire region. As a result, there was a reduction of students in school (Slade 2012) which among other things might be linked to increased undernutrition and health problems provoked by increasing poverty.
“In the capital City of Moçambique (Maputo) you only hear music and talk about the tradition from the South – the North is absent.”

Chichava (2007) concludes that FRELIMO has not managed to change the perceptions of Zambezians in relation to the colonial state but ironically rather reinforced internal tension after independence, leading to the fact that some people I interviewed referred to the colonial times as their better life time:

“During colonial times the regulo (traditional leader) knew who was a sorcerer and the issue of witchcraft has been resolved within the community. During that time, the government didn’t get involved. Later, FRELIMO, removed witchcraft. Today, the community courts are responsible. The regulo has been again recognized from the government, but now, he does no longer enter into witchcraft issues. The regulos, as they did during colonial times, would need to resolve these issues but they no longer have this task. We have been better off during colonial times.” (Interview with a businessman in Mucopia, Inhassunge district, 31.03.2016)

Certainly, the above quote needs to be interpreted in relation to the huge level of dissatisfaction interviewees had developed in relation to the performance of FRELIMO and the state justice system in the district, the ‘economic shock’ as well as increasing “assassinations linked to witchcraft accusations” they experienced. It is however an indication of how disillusioned people are at the moment and how strong their discontent is regarding the government’s failure to provide an adequate response to the disappearance of palm trees and, therefore, the loss of their livelihoods as well as the increasing levels of crimes.

Having partly lost their traditional knowledge and survival strategies, the people of Inhassunge most probably now have fewer coping strategies than ever before. The palm tree disease also harmed community-owned trees, which were used for important domestic purposes such as construction, cooking and healing. However, asking the former manager of Madal, who still lives in Quelimane, why it was not possible to control the plant disease or replant new trees, he responded that the lack of education and civilization of the people living in Inhassunge was the only reason. He appeared convinced that the local people were not interested in employment and were not able to handle any affairs on their own. He told us that new palm trees distributed in the context of reforestation were not cared for by local farmers and had consequently dried up as well. However, in the eyes of the local people we interviewed, trees have never been distributed fairly and only benefited FRELIMO members and co-opted traditional
authorities. And community members blamed the government for burning down healthy indigenous palm trees which were not affected by the palm tree disease at all.

It appears that the economic shock linked to the palm tree disappearance combined with the inadequate government response is a contributing factor towards people’s feeling of societal isolation, unjust treatment, exploitation and illness which in turn affects the way people perceive their own history, family life and society, and how they envision their future. For the majority of very poor marginalised residents of Inhassunge I interviewed, the current economic system was part of an immoral world connected to the political elite, and a means of exclusion from their citizenship entitlements, which started with colonization and impact on their lives until today.

6.2.2. Political society: Dividing politics, the contested role of recognized community leaders, power abuse, impunity and corruption

During district level investigations, I gained the necessary distance from the usually highly normative conceptual and academic discussions held in Maputo which at times included ‘playing down’ the re-emerging political tension and civil conflict which in the eyes of some middle class and elite citizens constituted only a peripheral problem. However, our district level research has brought to the surface various kinds of direct political oppression which have been felt to substantially limit the development of a vibrant, empowering civil society. The following statement from one of our interviews, serves as a reminder that Mozambique is affected by violent political conflict:

“Vale a pena viver sem guerra, e depois só ficar em casa? É uma violência do governo. A população, jovens e outros, não se podem encontrar ou organizar, não é possível, o governo não aceita!” (Interview carried out with a former Naparama commandant, Bingajira locality, March 2015)

“Is it worth living without war, if you can only stay inside your house? This is violence from the government. The population, young people and others, can’t meet or organize, this is not possible, the government doesn’t allow it!”

Separation along political party lines was evident in all the interviews; with the exception of key economic actors such as the former Madal manager, interview responses that carried a notion of modern civil society discourse were in most cases from selected few FRELIMO adherents and the ‘absent state’ was generally made responsible for the immense local suffering from RENAMO supporters. Whilst the local representatives of the two major opposition parties RENAMO and MDM were promptly
available for interviews, the FRELIMO leadership in the district, despite daily requests for an interview, did not talk with us and we took this as an indication that they distrusted outsiders.

Most people not employed within the government administration structure openly expressed their support for Mozambique’s biggest opposition party RENAMO. During the recent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014, some estimates indicate an 80% victory of RENAMO in Zambézia Province; however, according to the district’s director of the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections (STAE) of Inhassunge, the district seems to remain once again the only district in the province where FRELIMO won the majority of votes. Interviewees articulated their deep concerns about government control over their lives, the lack of freedom of assembly and speech, as well as their exclusion from the government social security net. The majority of people interviewed were convinced that the election results in the district had been manipulated:

“Em primeiro lugar deveria-se dizer que a RENAMO tem mais membros aqui no distrito. A informação do STAE sobre as eleições, que a FRELIMO ganhou, é contraditória.” (Interview with a local businessman, 31.03.2015)

“What needs to be said first of all is that RENAMO has more members in the district. The information from STAE (Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections) about the elections, that FRELIMO has won, is contradictory.”

This and other situations make people mistrust the state’s administration system and the overall governance of FRELIMO. In turn, this affects their feeling of dignity and citizenship. One person used the expression ‘dignity of fear’ to explain how people try to survive in an unjust system without losing their self-respect. Frequently, research participants stressed that any food security support coordinated by the government only covered areas where government affiliated people were living to highlight how selective government services were provided along political party lines.

An employee of an NGO working in the district mentioned that the organization had to pay local authorities to be able to include poor RENAMO supporters in their local food

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165 Elections results still needed to be officially confirmed during field research
166 During interviews with members of the RENAMO women’s league (01.04.2015, Mucopia, Inhassunge District) interviewees mentioned that some of their family members listed as social scheme beneficiaries did not receive support and social benefit payments they were entitled to.
167 ‘dignidade de medo’ – expressed from an NGO worker based in Inhassunge District
security programme. The local Bandja – a traditional meeting space where local communities express their problems and search for solutions, is only allowed to be called by the FRELIMO local leader (Secretário do Partido) and according to a catholic priest who had lived in Inhassunge for eight years, is not happening anymore in its traditional form as a problem-solving platform. In former times, calling the Bandja would have been the task of the traditional leader ‘régulo’. However, during colonialism and various stages of independence, the role of the régulo vis-à-vis the government and local communities changed several times, most recently with the introduction in 2003 of the government regulation ‘Lei dos órgãos locais do Estado’, shortly LOLE.

The regulation recognizes the representative role of the régulo as well as the secretário within the community whilst also ‘attaching’ both roles to the government administrative structure, hence making the recognised ‘community authorities’ the only ‘administrative representatives’ below the district level. Decree 15/2000 and LOLE (Law 8/2008) provided the basis for legally institutionalising the interaction between local state organs and forms of civil society groups in the rural and semi-urban areas of Mozambique. The recognized community authorities, could then, in theory, build the bridge between the state apparatus and civil society at a local level (see also Buur & Kyed 2005).

However, this articulation does not happen in practice, as representatives are in many cases not chosen democratically or free by the community. According to the district administrator and people we interviewed in Inhassunge as well as in the districts of Eráti (Nampula Province) and Marara (Tete Province), a régulo can be replaced if he does not adhere to the orders of the FRELIMO-led government. Hence, the bridge between the state apparatus and local civil society, and community members in general, is built upon a power imbalance where the state, led by FRELIMO, decides from the top on community representation and affairs.

A Mozambican NGO worker in Inhassunge mentioned at the end of an interview that there was no human bridge between local communities and state administration. This is a problem in its own right as both the election systems as well as other forms of representation are far from functioning well. It would mean that the community

168 Buur and Kyed (2005) also refer to Bandjas as local courts where conflicts at the community level are resolved.
representative role of the *régulo* would somehow be non-existent in many districts in Mozambique, which would explain the repeated community articulation of ‘absent government’ we identified in all of our study areas. How much does this reality affect the relationship between the state and citizens and the social order in those districts? Does this, along with other factors we identified, explain the rather anarchic situation of crime and lynching in Inhassunge District?

According to most people interviewed, a number of functions of the recognized community authorities are not being fulfilled anymore. In addition to dealing with crime associated with witchcraft accusations, this includes the prevention of early marriage, another widespread problem in the district. One person clearly stated that in colonial times the *régulo* would have been responsible for dealing with crime and witchcraft accusations. Nowadays, having lost his representational role there is nobody or no institution in the community to deal with these and other community concerns, apart from the Mulaula, the most powerful sorcerer and representative of the government affiliated AMETRAMO (Association of Traditional Healers, *Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique*) in the region. However, Bertelsen (2016), who carried out ethnographic research in Mozambique, Manica Province, links the existence of AMETRAMO to the extension of control of the FRELIMO led government.

It can be concluded that the missing function of a legitimate and representative *régulo* is a major cause of the demoralization of people living in the district, and also contributes to the spread and potential instrumentalization of crime as well as witchcraft beliefs and practices. Considering the deeply divisive politics I encountered in the district, demonstrated by the contested role of recognized community authorities, power abuse, impunity, corruption and potential election fraud it is appropriate to conclude that the people of Inhassunge feel excluded from participating in any political, social and economic decision-making that affects their lives. People equally live in an extended crisis of representation that was accelerated during the 16-year long civil war when a growing number of Mozambicans started to increasingly view the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO as “a war between two armies, with neither of them ‘representing’ the people” (O’Laughlin 1996 in Dinerman 2016, p. 30).

This crisis, even though analysed from various perspectives (e.g. O’Laughlin 1996, Dinerman 2006, Buur 2009), does not seem to be addressed by Western-type NGOs.
Following the codes that were identified as part of coding in the field, all are linked to the conceptual category of ‘weak governance’ identified through researchers’ triangulation:

**Table 7: Relationship between weak governance and aspects of partisan division, accumulated frustration, community division and oppression in Inhassunge District**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partisan division</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular up-raising through voter abstinence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation during elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political party ‘cohabitation’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation of the church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accumulated frustration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of collaboration between government and communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of government market interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disconnected government institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent, inexistent and invisible government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community division</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional governance without leader to control witchcraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, rivalry and tribalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church as part of the government during elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oppression</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence, Voting is dangerous, Unaccepted critique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author*

Having identified so many codes linked to the conceptual category of weak governance, it appears that the lack of attention and search of solutions from both government and modern civil society actors for any of the obvious problems in Inhassunge District is based on systematic exclusion. According to a Inhassunge District representative of the Institute for Free Legal Aid (*Instituto de Patrocínio e Assistência e Jurídica, IPAJ*) (interviewed at the 30.03.2016, Mucopia, Inhassunge District), cases of crime and homicide about which we have heard during interviews are being transferred to community tribunals, where according to most people we interviewed, money could be paid so that the accused could be released again. Justice, it seems, is a matter of
corruption\textsuperscript{169} or is taken into the citizen’s own hands through arbitrary actions, as some of the following sub-chapters illuminate:

\textquote{“Agora é o tribunal comunitario que entra na solução dos crimes, incluindo feticaria. Aí o único critério que importa é quem paga mais.”} (Interview with a local businessman in Mocupia, 31.03.2015)

\textquote{“Today it is the community tribunal that enters the resolution of crimes, including witchcraft. The only important criteria here is who pays more.”}

6.2.3. Family: Losing control

Family, the smallest social unit in society, plays an important role in the lives of the people of Inhassunge, as does the access to the families’ and communities’ graveyards. Whilst family does not appear as a social world in the social arena entitled ‘civil society and collective action in Mozambique’ it is an influential system, stronger than civil society or the market, in the social arena developed on the basis of research in Inhassunge District. Certainly in Inhassunge District, the problematic of the public sphere is linked to the unique political situation and oppression affecting the population of the district so that culture, which is an integral part of families and societal socialization, is the main arena for struggle, opposed to only economic or political strategies. Inevitably, culture then delimits and defines the public sphere (Gramsci 1971).

The very high unemployment rate in the district constituted a problem primarily for young people and their families. The problem, which is linked to the disappearance of palm trees, was seen as the major reason why young men were ‘out of control’, and became involved in crime which affected the entire district’s security situation, particularly affecting the elderly women accused of witchcraft. In his online blog \textquote{‘Diário de um sociólogo’}, Serra (2006, 2008) problematizes how witchcraft was regarded as a ‘natural’ occurrence in Inhassunge and that nobody looked at the monetary interests of those attacking women accused of witchcraft. During my research, the same phenomenon was still reality in some of the localities we visited, namely Gonhane, Bingajira and Mocupia.

\textsuperscript{169} People interviewed noted that rarely was someone involved in killing or violating a woman transferred to a state tribunal in Quelimane, and if this had happened, the person was released within three or four days after bribery payments. Through this corrupt system, people’s feeling of living under a system of impunity was substantially increased.
I found that the fight for access to resources (and thus, power) and jealousy within families were the main reasons behind the attacks, that they followed gender dynamics, and that most attacks were carried out by young men against their older family members, most frequently aunties and at times even mothers. There are scholars who analyse witchcraft accusations and related trials as an ongoing attempt by men to maintain their dominance over women (Garrett 1979, Hester 1992) and/or as embedded into broader political-economy processes (Geschiere 1997). Niehaus (2006) argues that

...kinship, morality and sexuality form the foreground for witchcraft but that this shall not be taken as an argument for perceiving witchcraft as a mirror that reveals the culturally disallowed, distorts kinship and neighbourliness, and reverses moral standards. (Crehan 1997 cited in Niehaus 2006, p. 104)

The apathy, crime and homicide related to witchcraft accusations within families, combined with the economic shock experienced by the residents of Inhassunge, seems to have demoralized the entire population. As a consequence, various local public servants based in the district’s headquarter informed me that they do not even stay overnight in the district, their place of work. They are afraid of being attacked by the local population and prefer commuting between Quelimane and Inhassunge and do not move their own family members into the district.

The existing privatization of intra-family violence (Macaringue 2013) combined with an inefficient and corrupt government legal system means that there is systematic impunity of gross human rights abuses such as the physical attacks, including assassination, of elderly women (cf. Women in Law in Southern Africa, 2016). Many times the local customary and traditional beliefs are used as an excuse rather than a means to bring about justice that would systematically incorporate the claims of the affected local people and groups (Meneses 2007). The resulting impunity certainly contributes to the flourishing of vigilante justice and ‘justice with our own hands’ (Jacobs & Schütze 2011) within and between families and with the normative acceptance of that ‘just redistribution’ from many members of the local communities.

Could the local system of witchcraft and vigilante justice be a way to demonstrate power for young people, who feel angriest and marginalized? A Mozambican priest whose family was from Inhassunge District and to whom I talked for many hours back in the provincial capital Quelimane at the 06.04.2015 helped me to understand the strategies embedded into the family systems. He particularly explained to me the
differences between black and white magic and how both related to physical and mental health or illness, as well as the system of ancestral beliefs, and witchcraft, affecting the people of Inhassunge. We furthermore talked about the political influence of the Naparama in Inhassunge and the movement’s origin as well as its current potentials (see 6.2.5.1). As part of his PhD thesis, he wrote about the physical and mental diseases and related traditional healing methods of the Chuabo people (the tribe to which people of Inhassunge belong). With reference to Luneau and Thomas (1992) he concludes:

All misfortune has a direct cause and needs to be discovered. That is why, the chuabo people don’t give up, before that happens, they search for a cause. They will follow a process in order to reestablish order and turn back to normality. This process happens in a climate of symbols and rites. The essential components of society are used – God, ancestors, family and the rest of the society – in order to advocate against the aggression. Help is provided by elements such as nutrition and hygiene, myths (rites, bans, orders and traditions) and tradition (family and society). With all this support, Chuabo people confront disease with certain serenity; at least they don’t feel alone with their suffering.\(^{170}\)

(de Carvalho 2009, PhD thesis, Chapter 1)

What needs to be emphasized is the fact that whenever a disease or misfortune is not known in Chuabo culture and there is no medicine available from traditional healers or doctors against it, people immerse themselves into religion and particularly the spiritual world of ancestors, which as much as those alive, can be made responsible for ‘the bad circumstances’. Ancestors of family members are then considered the ‘maladies’ or original of the ‘bad’ circumstances. Depending on the context, ancestors may also be considered as protective forces against external threats (see 6.2.5.2). According to Mbonyinkebe (1983) African people first of all look for physiological causes in order to find a moral explication. This concept according to de Carvalho (2009) is based on the complicity between cosmic elements and collective responsibility of the family and society:

In order to heal a particular disease, it is absolutely necessary to know the cause of it, that’s why experts like the mulaula (seer, diviner) are being consulted who, using various procedures, enters in contact with the occult world which discloses the cause of the illness and medicine against it. We find in this group of diseases

\(^{170}\) Toda a desgraça tem uma causa directa e deve ser descoberta. Por isso, o chuabo não se resigna, antes vai em demanda da causa. Vai seguir um processo para restabelecer a ordem e voltar à normalidade. Este processo é envolvido num clima simbólico e de ritos. Recorrerá às componentes essenciais da sociedade – Deus, antepassados, família e restante sociedade – para pugnar contra tal agressão. Apoiar-se-á em elementos profanos (alimentação e higiene), místicos (ritos, proibições, prescrições e tradições) e comunitários (família e sociedade). Com todo este apoio, o chuabo enfrenta a doença com certa serenidade, pois não se sentirá só e abandonado no sofrimento.
illnesses caused by the spirits of ancestors, which exist within the family, clan or tribe, caused by sorcerers, by vindictive people\(^{171}\). (de Carvalho 2009, PhD thesis, sub-chapter 2.2)

According to responses received during interviews with both victims of witchcraft accusation (02.04.2015, Caocha, Inhassunge District) and activists engaged in the struggle against witchcraft and domestic violence in Inhassunge District (31.03.2015, Bingagira, Inhassunge District; 31.03.2015 and 01.04.2015 Gonhane), traditional healers can then also carry two functions: black magic (obstructing, negative) and white magic (healing, protective, positive). Black magic is referred to locally as *okuiri*. In this function, the healers usually advise younger men that an older woman from his own family uses witchcraft against him and this way ‘orders’ a young man to accuse a woman from his own family of being responsible for the problem presented to him. However, healers usually remain vague and do not provide concrete names of alleged witches; they rather give indications of the person’s character. Other reasons why people may ask for *okuiri* advice could be related to physical sickness of children or infertility (de Carvalho 2009).

Bearing in mind that traditional structures have been abolished and the function of the *réguio* is one sidedly reduced to the extended arm of the local FRELIMO party secretary (see also 6.2.3), problems that would otherwise be resolved by the government’s executive or in the public sphere are entirely returned to the family. The politically contested context of Inhassunge District makes the public sphere a purely political sphere where civil society can only operate at the margins. With increasing political tension and social inequality, it is no wonder that community-owned strategies such as witchcraft are strengthened rather than weakened in the age of ‘modernity’ in Africa. The alternative was brought to the point by a catholic priest I interviewed:

> “Se não estás na linha do poder não podes viver, tens de sair!” (Interview with a catholic priest in Quelimane, 06.04.2015)

> “If you are not following the line of power you can’t live, you have to leave!”

\(^{171}\) Para curar determinada doença é imperioso conhecer as causas, por isso recorre-se ao especialista, ao mulaula (adivinho) que, através de vários procedimentos, entra em contacto com o mundo oculto que lhe revela a causa da doença e o medicamento. Neste grupo encaixam-se as doenças causadas pelos espíritos dos antepassados e alheios à família, clã ou tribo, pelos feiticeiros, por pessoas vingativas.
Community problems are either resolved within family and tribal boundaries or, in the case of violated women, resolved by migration from the district, as rarely a local government institution would provide legal, social and economic protection for victims of violence, particularly not if affected women live in an area clearly associated with RENAMO supporters. Even locally recognized associations like AVODEMO experience difficulties to enter the profound family conflicts caused by witchcraft accusations:

“Membros das famílias afectadas (pela feitiçaria) realmente ameaçam membros da AVODEMO quando nós tentamos ajudar uma mulher acusada, e as vezes eles já têm ligações estreitas estabelecidas com a polícia corrupta, IPAJ e a procuradoria.” (Interview with a member of AVODEMO in Mucopia, 30.03.2015)

“Members of the (witchcraft affected) families are actually threatening members of AVODEMO when they try to help accused women, and sometimes they have already established direct links to the corrupt local police, IPAJ and the office of the attorney general.”

I conclude that poverty, illnesses, including AIDS, overall economic shock and political oppression affecting the residents of Inhassunge District increasingly since about 2007 (cf. interview with members of AVODEMO, 30.03.3015) provoked the stronger re-emergence of family and lineage based problem solving mechanisms, including sorcery and witchcraft (cf. personal memo from 29.03.2015). National and provincial NGOs are broadly absent from the fight against witchcraft accusations and even local associations experience threats, do they try to help victims of accusations. As the Chuabo culture is patriarchal, it is predominantly women that are being accused of being witches. However, in the Northern Mozambican Macua culture, as my research in Nampula Province, Érati District showed, the matrilineal structures there meant that men became the targets of sorcery accusation.

The possibility of FRELIMO led state intervention into the intimate sphere of the family and its indigenous belief systems and ceremonies used against social and other illnesses seems limited (although made possible through the establishment and instrumentalization of AMETRAMO) whilst its interaction with ‘institutionalized’ religions (see more information about the differentiation between religion and traditional belief systems at the beginning of the following sub-chapter) and churches is more visible and empirically recognizable. In the following two subchapters, the role of religion, spiritual systems and witchcraft will be put into the broader context of the civil
society discourse we investigated in the district. Indeed, the strategies, which link individuals and family with the system of witchcraft and religious beliefs, will be framed within an anxious and contesting society that further delimits the public sphere.

6.2.4. The role of religion

“A tarefa do padre em Inhassunge é ‘tirar este medo!’” (Interview with a catholic priest in Quelimane, 06.04.2015)

“The task of the priest in Inhassunge is ‘taking away this fear’!”

It is not surprising that a catholic priest interviewed in Inhassunge District stated that he saw his most important task in ‘taking away the people’s fear’. Fear has been codified in multiple ways during the analysis of interviews and was linked to many other codes such as ‘loss of citizenship’ or ‘intimidation’ and ‘culture of silence’. When asking the priest who or what he thought was responsible for that fear he referred to the local culture of witchcraft and sorcery but continued to claim strongly that those in power abuse the culture.

Having explored the influence of family and lineage, it is now important to also look deeper into the overall role religion plays in the district. I refer here to religions, which mainly base their teaching on written documents such as the Bible or the Koran, in contrast to indigenous belief systems, and ceremonies that are predominantly based on oral traditions and normative convictions. I take this as a major difference without immersing deeper into the various religious streams in Africa (e.g. the Roman Catholic Church, African Indigenous churches, Zionist movements, Pentecostal movements, Arabic and local Muslim societies, etc.).

From a post-colonial perspective, I find it imperative to avoid any normative preferences in relation to indigenous churches, domesticated and western Christian churches, or Muslim denominations. Western-type NGOs in the district appeared broadly irrelevant as civil society actors or agents for change. In contrast, the strongest collective civil society actor operating in Inhassunge District (Mucopia) described by interviewees is the núcleo dos pastores – a coordination mechanism bringing together different 16 churches and mosques, mainly Muslim, Catholic, Protestant and

172 However, I worked for two years with the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church in Mozambique (2000–2002) and four years with the Catholic Development Agency of England and Wales (CAFOD) (2004–2008) and accordingly I am in particular aware of the way the Catholic Church works at various levels.
Pentecostal – which were represented by various priests, pastors and imams. Its members represented civil society at the district level election commission\(^\text{173}\) as well as the district’s planning committee, all participatory civil society spaces established by the government (see sub-chapter 4.3.4 for more information about participatory civil society spaces). The following information provided from a representative of STAE at Inhassunge District level demonstrates that clearly:

“Aqui em Inhassunge temos cinco membros da sociedade civil na comissão distrital das eleições. Depois temos um adjunto da FRELIMO e um da RENAMO, a MDM não tinha um adjunto. Todos os membros da sociedade civil vêm das entidades religiosas.” (Interview with STAE director in Inhassunge, 31.03.2015)

“Here in Inhassunge we have five civil society members in the district’s election commission. We also have a FRELIMO associate and one from RENAMO, MDM didn’t have an associate. All members from civil society are coming from religious entities.”

Some interviewees referred to religious leaders as businessmen, in particular if they headed a religious association that received the so called ‘7 milhões’\(^\text{174}\) (7 Millions).

Despite the importance of religious actors in the various districts I visited in 2015, relatively few scholars focus on the importance of religious dynamics within development, in particular within social and political movements in Mozambique (e.g. Augusto et al. 2008, Cruz & Silva 2001 and 2008, Pfeiffer 2004, Ndege 2007, Van de Camp 2012). My research confirms that religion is an important integral factor in Mozambican social life and thus should be considered in development research and practice, in particular civil society development oriented research. This clearly contrasts with ‘modernisation theory’, where the irrelevance of religion for development is a cornerstone. However, religion has historically played an important role in many ‘developing’ countries, dependent on the circumstances of the time and interests of those in power. We only need to recall the legitimisation of colonialism through the Catholic Church, the various missionary practices aiming at ‘civilizing’ (in practice

\(^{173}\) The representatives of the following religious congregations represented civil society in the influential district election commission: Igreja Católica, Igreja do Sétimo Dia, Assembleia de Deus África, Muçulmanos Nativos, Igreja Evangélica de Cristo.

\(^{174}\) People interviewed in Mozambique referred to “associações de 7 milhões” when talking about the many associations that were created in order to access funds from a local district investment fund which was established by the government to support local economic development. Usually those associations are led by public service or government administrative personnel who aim to gain more income through the establishment of an association and elaboration of a project to access money from the district investment fund.
enslaving) indigenous peoples and finally, the moral support Christian churches provided to some of the liberation movements (see also Freeman 2012).

In Mozambique, the churches played important roles in the negotiations of the General Peace Agreement, followed by the support of election education campaigns, the provision of services in the areas of health, education and agricultural development as well as civic education, hence covering a wider range of development oriented activities. The rise of the secular Western-type NGOs has not changed that situation but has moved the role of churches as development agents into the background of national civil society discourse. Indeed, secular NGOs became the preferred civil society actor for most development donors. Nevertheless, faith-based organizations (FBOs) have regained considerable support since the spread of HIV and AIDS (Pfeiffer 2011, World Bank 2015).

This trend is notable in Inhassunge District, where a number of church-based associations such as ‘Rede Cristã contra SIDA’ (Christian Network against HIV and AIDS), ‘Nihamdane’ (an association of people living with HIV and AIDS linked to the Christian Network against HIV and AIDS) but also an inter-religious programme against malaria have been mentioned as the only functioning associations alongside the ‘Associação do Voz de Deserto de Moçambique’ (AVODEMO), a faith based association engaged in reducing violence against women, particularly violence linked to witchcraft accusations. Accordingly, a number of AVODEMO members were interviewed during the research, as well as some NGO workers, grassroots activists, religious and spiritual leaders and members of informal citizen groups, many of them with a religious background that took collective action in their efforts to improve their precarious situation, characterized by systematic exclusion and poverty.

Interviewing some activists and members of AVODEMO (30.03.2015 and 28.07.2015 Mucopia, Inhassunge District), I found that most members have themselves been affected by witchcraft accusation that as a consequence, made them active members in a church. It was indeed through AVODEMO members that I learned the most about female strategies against witchcraft accusations. I heard for example that the only ‘escape’ from witchcraft influence and the ‘devil’, as many Pentecostal churches would call it, is to join a church which provides women with an alternative social support network and space to re-position themselves in society (see also Van de Kamp 2012) or
actually migrating out of the district; both strategies are quite common and were observed during my research (see also 6.2.2).

Churches and religious movements, then, have an influential role and have been considered by many interviewees as the only institution or channel of communication outside the state structure, however, with clear links to the government and within the ‘FRELIMO influential framework’ (see also figure 5 below). Bearing in mind the relative absence of functioning local production or secular associations and Western-type NGOs, churches appeared to be the only way local residents, in particular women, could interact without fear of traditional, spiritual and political sanctions. The same has frequently been reported regarding mosques in authoritarian Arab states such as Egypt before the ‘Arab Spring’ or the Hizbullah’s Women in Lebanon (Beinin & Vairel 2011). However, the ways in which religious beliefs authorize inclusion or exclusion or structure behaviour is not simply a matter of enacting self-evident and uncontested meaning. They carry the “symbolic power” (Bourdieu 1991) to authorize action and demarcate community, religious beliefs are critical resources whose meaning are constantly contested.

This can be exemplified by the interview responses received from a female AVODEMO leader during my last visit to Inhassunge in July 2015. She saw the entire problem of witchcraft embedded in the roots of tradition and backwards-oriented morals of those people who believe in oral traditional religions. During an informal conversation in a local restaurant in Mucopia, she strongly articulated her hate of African traditional religion and ceremony and saw salvation coming exclusively from the Bible. Any problems affecting the district, whether the palm tree disappearance or health issues, according to her, are related to the backward local culture and spiritual ceremonies of local residents. Accordingly, she has echoed the former MADAL manager interviewed in Quelimane at the 06.04.2015, who attributed the problem of poverty in Inhassunge to the backwardness and lack of education of its citizens (see also sub-chapter 6.2.1). Hence, we can see how until today colonial influence on discourses of ‘civilization’ carry the potential to divide. Asking an influential pastor and coordinator of the núcleo dos pastores about the involvement of the núcleo in political affairs, he responded as follows:

“Acho que as pessoas não têm capacidade moral. A partir da falta da moral a situação de Inhassunge foi abaixo. De facto, as pessoas podem pensar que as
Igrejas estão ao lado do governo e da FRELIMO quando entraram na educação eleitoral.” (Interview with the coordinator of ‘núcleo dos pastores’ in Mucopia, 31.03.2015)

“I think the people don’t have moral capacity. Because of that missing morals, Inhassunge got worse. In fact, people could think that churches work alongside the government and FRELIMO when they entered into electoral education.”

Members of the women’s league of RENAMO (Liga Feminina da RENAMO) echoed the pastor’s suggestion. In a focus group debate with members of the RENAMO women’s league at the 01.04.2015, women told me that the former socialist and church-critical FRELIMO has already “started to pray” and as a result, religious associations were seen as part of the government’s framework. Indeed, at the end of a lively discussion about the role of civil society the leader of the women’s group outlined her understanding of civil society on a piece of paper. Religious associations and traditional healers were prominent figures in her drawing that received overwhelming support from her fellow group members. She positioned civil society within the government and state framework. NGOs as particular civil society actors had no relevance; they were positioned outside the framework of ‘influence’.

When questioning how civil society could operate entirely inside the government’s framework a REMANO women’s group speaker responded, almost in an amused way, the following: “O cabrito come onde está amarrado” (the goat eats where it is tied up) however she added silently: ‘comer entre familiares provoca problemas’ (eating between relatives provokes problems). Here she referred to the phenomenon of chupa-sangue (sucking of blood). When I asked why people did not organize protests against their precarious living circumstances or at least build-up self-help associations, the leader of the RENAMO women’s league further stated:

“Há muito raiva porque as pessoas não querem ir ao governo, sabem que não vão ser atendidas. Em vez disso, elas vão ao macangueiro.” (Interview with the head of the RENAMO women’s league in Inhassunge, 01.04.2015)

“There is so much anger because the people don’t want to go to the government, they know that they won’t be taken notice of. Instead they go to the macangueiro (sorcerer).”

These statements underline that civil society can function very close to and is strongly influenced by the government. Locally recognized civil society actors might differ

175 What stands behind chupa-sangue is the belief that someone who is sick with no available effective medical relief, is being attacked by a witch (often within the same family or community) who is sucking blood from them, hence taking away their strength and life (Geschiere 1997).
substantially from those recognized in the modern public sphere. Some sorceres, that are being consulted based on the lack of government response to the precarious situation of local people, may prevent people from protesting against that situation, whilst channeling their frustration back into the sphere of family and actions such intra-family conflict and witchcraft accusations. The following figure 8 describes the civil society concept of Inhassunge from the perspective of the RENAMO women’s league, elaborated during interviews and a focus group discussion in Mucopia, 01.04.2015.

**Figure 8:** Civil Society in Inhassunge, a political opposition perspective

![Diagram of Civil Society in Inhassunge](image)

*Source: Author*

### 6.2.5. Spiritual systems and witchcraft

In Inhassunge and certainly other districts in Zambézia Province and further afield, I learned that lineage and ethnicity do not act on their own, they are not inflexible factors, and they rather interact strongly with religion, spiritual ancestral beliefs and societal norms. In addition, forces such as the rural-urban divide, the underlying post-colonial class struggle, the social dialectic between men and women, and the impact of political tension on society influence the formation of the public and civil sphere in which I locate civil society. Indeed, Mazrui (2001, pp. 153-175) claims that the two most
powerful primordial forces operating in contemporary Africa are indeed ethnicity and religion.

According to an NGO worker interviewed in Mucopia (02.04.2015) and as later confirmed from other sources, the failure of the government to find a support strategy for the people affected by the economic shock in the district has been the start of a deep social and leadership crisis. The crisis now shapes new perceptions of injustice with roots in a long conflictual history, from colonial exploitation, massacres during the civil war to post-colonial economic exploitation. This in turn has accelerated and politicized the problem of witchcraft accusation, as reflected in the following quote:

“I think that witchcraft becomes stronger in a political context such as Inhassunge.” (NGO employee interviewed in Quelimane, 06.04.2015)

According to Igreja & Skaar (2013) lynching facilitated the enhanced return of taking justice into own hands through spiritual ceremonies and witchcraft in Mozambique. Accordingly, the increased occurrence of occult practices as a local way to bring about justice in Inhassunge District could be seen as a citizen’s ‘political response’ – outside political party boundaries (although immediately politicized and instrumentalized from the outside) – as it was described from Dinerman (2006) in his book ‘Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism in Postcolonial Africa: The case of Mozambique, 1975-1994’:

…rainmaking ceremonies, divination, witchcraft accusations and exorcism were subjected to repeated official denunciation and, in many localities, to government proscription. Many chiefs, irrespective of their personal and political histories, were ridiculed and politically repressed. When RENAMO arrived on the scene, traditional authorities were often viewed by FRELIMO officials with suspicion or were automatically branded as collaborators. Some were killed. (Dinerman 2006, p. 13)

The fact that people in Inhassunge openly talked to me (a foreigner) about witchcraft from the first day of my stay in the district and its publicizing at public places such as local markets shows how much the strategies are now being accepted in the public. This would not have been the case in Mozambique during the socialist times after independence and more general in earlier times in Africa (cf. Geschiere 2013). On the other hand, Christian churches (in particular Pentecostal churches all over Africa) opposition to people involved in the system of witchcraft (Geschiere 2013), reduces the potential harming impact of witchcraft. However, when trying to investigate how it is
possible that homicides linked to the accusations of witchcraft are carried out systematically, and with impunity, and what civil societies’ response constituted, I learned that the system of witchcraft was indeed widely acknowledged within families and that the intimacy of the family as such protected the aggressor in the final resort (see also sub-chapter 6.2.3).

Geschiere (2013) asks whether the jealousy within the family home needs to be overcome to diminish the dark side of spiritual beliefs linked to witchcraft, so that people can construct new social relationships and a new cultural-spiritual world outside the intimate sphere of the family. Based on some comparison of witchcraft accusations all over Africa, he concludes that within the close link of kinship and witchcraft all sorts of possibilities are observable, nothing is fixed. Indeed, in the case of my interviews and observations in Inhassunge district, the intimate relationship in a family and its fluid relationship of lineage with a wider community that faces similar development trajectories opens space for witchcraft accusations to be levelled against a particular well off family member or alternatively as a protection of an entire community against outside actors and foreigners.

In Inhassunge District, as the following examples of the Naparama movement and after that, the case of violent protest against land grabbing around the Olinda settlement demonstrates, witchcraft dynamics and supernatural powers, are interlinked with both, the family and lineage system as well as the complex local, provincial and national dividing politics in contemporary war affected Mozambique. Nicolini (2006), for example, refers to practices of magic, and in some cases also witchcraft, as useful instruments in political struggles in Africa, sometimes with the objective of violent opposition and revolution, sometimes to preserve the status quo. We can compare these two functions with the functions of civil society as identified by Gramsci (1971, see also sub-chapter 2.4): Maintenance of power through the construction of consent (and cultural politics) on one side and contestation through violent struggle on the other.

The following statements from a focus group discussion with AMETRAMO members in Bingajira Locality (01.04.2015) confirms indirectly the potential linkages of the FRELIMO led government with the system of witchcraft:

“Este problema (feitiçaria) iniciou há bastante tempo e encontramos, por exemplo até hoje. Há pessoas que vendem crianças mas não vendem como cabrito, as vendem como pessoas. Isso para dizer que desde muito vem
acontecendo. Hoje, algumas pensam que o Governo é quem está por detrás disso.”

“This problem (witchcraft) began a long time ago and we find it for example until today. There are people that sell children, but not as goats, they sell them as children. I am telling this because it exists since a long time. Nowadays, some people think that it is the government who stands behind it.”

At the end of the discussion, participating AMETRAMO members made a lot of effort to ensure the research team interviewing that they worked in very close coordination with the FRELIMO led government:

“Nestes últimos momentos, tem havido muita reunião entre nós, os doutores e o governo. Por isso já reduziram bastante estes casos (feitiçaria) de catana...”

“There have been a lot of meetings between us, the traditional doctors and the government, more recently. That is why these cases (of witchcraft) involving bush knives reduced considerably...”

Bertelsen (2016), as part of his recent findings from ethnographic research carried out in central Mozambique, concludes:

From the perspective of state bureaucracy and the elite, if the state through AMETRAMO and organs such as FIR176 manages to redefine the field, this will allow the state to make legible and, thus, manageable the forces of uroi177, the potencies of prophets, as well as the spirits that are appropriated by both n’angas178 and prophets. (Bertelsen 2016, p. 178)

6.2.5.1. Naparama and leadership

A former Naparama commander I interviewed in Bingajira most clearly connected the struggles between political parties with the appearance of witchcraft:

“Começou (acusação de feitiçaria) de novo quando começaram estas coisas de muitos partidos, as pessoas se queixaram e agora a situação fica descontrolada. As pessoas ficam no meio só (entre os partidos políticos).” (Interview with a former Naparama commander, Bingajira locality, Inhassunge District, 02.04.2015)

“It (witchcraft accusation) started again when various political parties started to function, people started to complain and now the situation is out of control. People remain only in the middle (between the political parties).”

The religious-magical ‘Naparama’ army and movement was established during the 16-year-long Mozambican civil war and still influences the people of Inhassunge and their

176 FIR is the Mozambican Government Rapid Response Force.
177 Bertelsen (2016, p. xxiii) translates uroi as “Sorcery, black magic or witchcraft”.
178 Bertelsen (2016), p. xxi) translates n’anga as “Male/female healer-diviner or traditional healer”.

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beliefs in witchcraft and magic (*feitiçaria e bruxaria*). According to a priest interviewed in Quelimane (06.04.2015), the Naparama movement started around 1986 as a response to the increase in brutal violence during the civil war. The movement had several tens of thousands of members in the Provinces of Nampula and Zambézia and their members were quite active in Inhassunge District. Another magic-religious movement, the Khonkos, existed alongside the Naparamas in Zambézia Province (Macuane et al. 2013). But while the Naparama after the end of the civil war in 1992 demanded compensation from the government, the Khonkos re-integrated themselves to their ordinary activities without further claims. The complexity of the various elements of the Zambezian society and the different social, political and economic dynamics of participation in the previous and most probably also the current conflict, across and within the regions, is described in Pereira (1999, pp. 60, 66, 104, 106ff., cited in Macuane et al. 2013, p. 6).

The Naparama movement was initially established in Nampula Province, by Manuel António, who remained the group’s overall leader until the movement’s official dissolution towards the end of the civil war and his assassination. The Mozambican Catholic priest I interviewed in Quelimane (06.04.2015), in his capacity as an expert in Chuabo traditional beliefs and witchcraft, explained to me that in particular young people and children got recruited into the group. He also stated that members of the group were using ‘magic white arms’ during the civil war struggle and that Naparama members were vaccinated with drugs from a very influential traditional healer and sorcerer. Some people I interviewed used to express fears in relation to members of the Naparama movement (e.g. Interview with AVODEMO members 04.04.2015 and with NAVEZA staff 06.04.2015), while others, in particular members of the UCM research team, referred to them as a group bravely fighting for peace and liberation from oppression.

Interviewing an Italian missionary who had lived in Inhassunge District for seven years and the above-mentioned Mozambican priest with family linkages into the district (both interviews were held in Quelimane, 06.04.2015) I was also told that towards the end of the 16-year long civil war, the once politically neutral Naparama movement had

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179 Naparamas fought without modern weapons and used magic medicine which according to those interviewed, made them invulnerable and immortal. At its beginning Naparama was a kind of community self-protection movement, aiming to create peace zones.
approached FRELIMO for collaboration. However, Dinerman (2006) states that the Naparama movement has always been close to FRELIMO and that this demonstrates the “proclivity of state and party representatives to conveniently overlook the role of official institutions in reproducing obscurantist practices – while, at one and the same time, capitalizing on the consequences of these past actions to further ruling political interests in the present” (Dinerman 2006, p. 22). Regardless of the point of time when the Naparama movement started collaboration with FRELIMO it can be said that the civil war provided a platform that made the transformation of the state, through engagement with religious-magical movements such as the Naparama, visible (cf. Bertelsen 2016).

However, Mozambican media have only partially documented the role of the Naparama during the civil war (e.g. Macua blogs 2007, O Pais 2007). Naparama claims for compensation after the war were mainly silenced. During an interview with a former Naparama commandant carried out in Bingajira (Inhassunge District, 02.04.2015), high levels of frustration about the treatment of the Naparama after the war were expressed. He actually showed us a notebook (picture 4) where the various meetings with the government were documented.

![Picture 4: Notebook of a Naparama commandant (Picture taken from research team, 02.04.2015).]
As part of recent research carried out in Mozambique, Kane (2015) concludes that the Naparama movement evoked a synthesis between Catholic practices (resurrection and sermon) with African religious and medicinal beliefs in herbal vaccinations and spirit possession. He states that this messianic and religiously syncretic vision of leading people against violence in a war enabled rural Mozambicans of different religious faiths to contest the culture of violence over which they had little everyday control. Similar mixtures of messianic and religious visions are still encountered as strategies against systematic exclusion and structural violence in Inhassunge district.

Accordingly, Manuel António seems to have used the various traditional spiritual and religious aspirations of local people as a convergent force to mobilize people. After the dissolution of the movement, Naparama members returned to their villages and in principle, lived as ‘ordinary’ citizens, without the ‘mystical medicine’ or a particular political organizational structure. Nowadays, the partisan political divisions in the district can be demonstrated using the concrete information we collected and triangulated about one of the two former Naparama commanders 180.

Supporters and members of FRELIMO, RENAMO and MDM gave us conflicting information about the commanders’ current role in community affairs. People working with local administration and FRELIMO supporters accused the ex-commander of being a paid killer who assassinates witches at night, whilst RENAMO members did not recognize his existence. The denial of knowing the commander from RENAMO members is interesting insofar as the Naparama commander is the only person in his community who is brave enough to openly hold a RENAMO flag in front of his house and clearly stated during the interview that he was a member of the party. MDM supporters recognized the existence of the Naparama commander but did not want to take a clear position in relation to the accusations made against him by government and FRELIMO supporters.

What was obvious when talking to RENAMO members was their reserved faces when denying any knowledge about the existence of the Naparama commander whilst in general they acknowledged the encouragement the Naparama movement provides to

180 According to the two ex-commanders they were vaccinated several times with a magical substance that made them invulnerable in the armed conflicts.
local people until today\textsuperscript{181}. Having heard about the potential involvement of Naparamas in assassinations of witches, I was surprised when interviewing two of them, that both seemed to be well respected community members and somehow influential within the local society. At least for the research team, both men appeared calm, respectful and they were members of Christian churches. From direct observations, we saw children playing around the commander’s compound, people passed by and greeted both men and their wives, they were treated with respect.

What I also noted was the former commander’s considerable knowledge about the district, the political situation and the problem of oppression and corruption. On top of all, he seemed very articulate and well organized, having kept information and notes about Naparama internal meetings with the government (see picture 4). In particular, the Naparama ex-commander accused of being a killer by FRELIMO supporters was probably the most outspoken person I interviewed at the village level showing political analysis rather than suspicion and fear. Human Rights Watch (1992, p. 130) describes the Naparama movement in the book ‘Conspicuous Construction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique’ and refers to an Africa Watch phone interview with the RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama in 1992:

\begin{quote}
I can confirm that once Manuel António was killed, Naparamas realized that they had been tools of the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO regime and so joined my forces to fight for true peace. (Africa Watch telephone interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Nairobi, 20.05.1992)
\end{quote}

Whilst I did not collect any evidence that the Naparama movement may engage once again directly in the currently increasing political conflict between FRELIMO loyal government troops and RENAMO I can confirm that the two former Naparama members I interviewed are now affiliated with RENAMO and that their ‘myth’ is still alive. The trust and hope some interviewees place in religious and spiritual leaders combined with their political engagement shows that there is potential for a revival of Naparama or other spiritual-religious movements. Certainly, the search for new social movements and their potential to affect change continued to accompany my research after discovering the existence of Naparama members in Inhassunge.

\textsuperscript{181} UCM research team members speculated that RENAMO members certainly knew about the Naparama commander’s existence and community role but that they wanted to protect him through denying his existence.
So I kept my eyes and ears open when the local administrative staff talked to me informally about an incident, in which the District Administrator had been attacked violently by a crowd of angry citizens around the Olinda settlement. I decided to find out which dynamics and actors accompanied the protest and if there were any links with either modern civil society or traditional ceremonial or spiritual dynamics. Would I now find the opposite of the ‘culture of silence’ which was so strong around the district’s headquarter? If yes, what constituted that difference? Would I find ‘real\textsuperscript{182}’ civil society there, a kind of Naparama self-protection counter-movement (cf. Polanyi’s concept of a counter-movement as outlined in sub-chapter 2.4) fighting alongside local people to protect their land and survival?

6.2.5.2. The special case of Olinda: Land, ownership, ethnic citizenship and spiritual agency

The below power arena map (figure 9) illustrates that there are spiritual beliefs linked to witchcraft accusations functioning outside the sphere of family in Mozambique, beliefs that may be used to empower entire communal groups rather than harming individual members inside families and hence weakening wider societal reciprocity. The power map, developed during research in Olinda locality, outlines how various discourses of power shape social worlds and locates various influential actors identified during research within and between the various social worlds.

\textsuperscript{182} When adding “real” in front of civil society I am underlining or referring to a locally recognized concept of civil society in Mozambique. Hence with using the term “real” civil society, I am discursively avoiding to use the simple Western, rather alien concept, civil society (only).
Olinda locality, a two-day boat trip away from the district headquarters, was the only settlement during the entire research process in Mozambique, where the so-called recognized traditional authorities ‘Régulo do Primeira Escalão’ and ‘Secretário do Bairro’ had been practically confirmed as legitimate community representatives from those I interviewed. The topography of state and civil society appeared to have been turned in this community and consequently, a quite different power arena map emerged compared to the district power arena or the macro level social arena.

“Sim, é verdade. Nós atirámos pedras contra o Administrador quando ele estava partindo, e dizíamos: vai embora e nunca mais volta!” (Member of the Olinda settlement in Inhassunge district, Group Interview 08.04.2015)
“Yes, it is true. We used stones against the administrator when he left, and we said: Go away and never come back!”

The above quote was taken during a group interview with residents of Olinda locality during a first visit to the community in April 2015. In the statement, residents refer to the visit of the district administrator, together with a group of Chinese investors, in 2013. During the visit, residents were informed about their planned resettlement, which is linked to an investment project of heavy sands mineral extraction. The statement also presents the initial phase of a potential longer-term resistance or local power demonstration against government resettlement plans currently affecting 800 families living in the locality of Olinda (see also Kleibl 2015).

The investment project is implemented by the Chinese company ‘Africa Great Wall Mining Development’ and according to local people’s perceptions involves direct investment from Mozambique’s ex-president Armando Guebuza, who at times appeared as a threatening personality to those I interviewed. Guebuza’s influence in the entire district indeed appeared disproportional, bearing in mind that he holds a permanent luxury sleeping room in the District Administrator’s official residence. Additionally, his photograph was still hanging on the wall of the district police commander’s office, even though Guebuza had handed over the presidency to his successor Filipe Nyusi some two months before interviews were undertaken. The same police commander denied the existence of recent homocides linked to witchcraft accusations in the district when being interviewed at the 13.03.2015, a fact that was severely disproved during several interviews hold in the district.

In Olinda, people live without means of communication, electricity, and running water. Traditional small boats link Olinda with the rest of the district or province while a few industrial ships transport the heavy, mineral rich sands from Olinda to somewhere else, most probably China. The Chinese company, having secured a concession for exploiting the land around Olinda is already on the ground and the government is responsible for resettling the community. Arriving at the protesting settlement for the first time, we quickly met people and talked to them in front of a house. People were initially willing to talk to us after we explained what the purpose of our visit was. However, more and more people joined the meeting and after some minutes, it turned into a negative and violent discursive environment. A drunken person started to talk loudly in local language and others joined so that a bigger loud discussion began. I started to feel that
the discussion was going against our presence and this was confirmed from my Mozambican colleague who translated that some of the people in the meeting accused us that we wanted to take away their land and that we would be in a conspicuous relationship with the Chinese investment company.

Once that accusation was in the air, even though we had repeatedly introduced ourselves as researchers linked to UCM, it was not possible to continue with our community debate and some elder people suggested that we would now need to talk to the village secretary and other local leaders. This reaction surprised me, as many residents from Gonhane or Bingajira were not opened or interested to talk to local state structures and did not orientate us towards them. Arriving at the village secretary’s house, a large group of people had already gathered and there was no choice for us than joining the ongoing community debate. Individual interviews, it seemed, were not possible in the tense climate we encountered.

Raising questions in relation to the 2013 community protest (revolta comunitária), people widely confirmed the protest against the government resettlement decision and underlined several times that they will never give up their land. Having asked the FRELIMO village secretary, as well as traditional and religious leaders present, about their position and role in relation to the government’s resettlement plan, all openly confirmed that they participated in the protest. Given the secretary’s function of state administration, this raised questions to be further reflected on. From the beginning, the situation of Olinda appeared quite different from any settlements we visited closer to the headquarters of the district.

We continued asking if members and representatives of various political parties were present at the meeting. The participants quickly confirmed that FRELIMO and RENAMO were both represented with members. Indeed, on the way to the FRELIMO village secretary’s house, people were keen to persuade us that their village was a RENAMO dominated area. When asking for RENAMO members to join the community debate, some members and a delegate were promptly available. Having joined up the secretary, religious representatives and RENAMO delegates in a separate, although openly observable, group interview, we tried to find out if there were potential conflicting roles or discourses about the government’s resettlement plan within the
community. Our questions about civil society or NGOs proved irrelevant as nobody had an idea about the terms.

In terms of the need to protest against the planned land expropriation, there was no disagreement within the community; all those present were against the government plans, at least during our first visit to Olinda. The entire community appeared unified against the resettlement plan. It rather was important for the traditional authorities to demonstrate their unity against the land grabbing and the fact that they were united against the government’s decision to resettle them. Clearly, in this context, the authorities played a very active representative role in front of at least sixty participants of the wider community debate group. We assumed that this ‘unity’ would indeed bring the local authorities into conflict with their other role indicated in the LOLE law, in particular as much as the FRELIMO secretary and régulo was concerned.

However, the secretário and RENAMO members stated in front of other community members that they participated in the protest against the government decision and as such they provided a completely different picture compared with the roles we understood authorities had in Mucopia, Gonhane and Bingajira and other research fields. Finally, I was allowed to take a picture of key political local leaders, all united against the land grabbing in their resident areas:

![Local political leaders showing unity after the community debate.](image)

**Picture 5:** Local political leaders showing unity after the community debate.
Ironically, my Mozambican research team members later even thought it was possible that the secretary, holding a FRELIMO booklet in his hands, was a RENAMO supporter. Personally, I thought that certainly the people we talked to live in a very isolated area so that the control function coming down from the centre could not be carried out. I also remembered the words of a Catholic priest I interviewed in Quelimane two days before visiting Olinda, who claimed that Olinda was one of the settlements in Inhassunge district that was always under total RENAMO control.

I developed the idea that in Olinda, traditional authorities could be truly functioning as ‘representative civil society’ or at least as legitimate community representatives, giving voice to and addressing the needs of their constituencies. The village secretary according to his own words rejects his role as ‘intermediary’ for the Chinese company and the government, and prefers to be the real spokesperson of the local people. Later I found out that he was also ‘Régulo de Terceiro Escalão’, carrying in addition to his party secretary role the role of the traditional leader in the zone, although sub-ordinate to the ‘Régulos do Primeiro e Segundo Escalão’, both were not present during our first visit.

At 30th July 2015, together with two other members of the research team, I decided to visit Olinda again, in order to carry out some more in-depth interviews and to continue the conversations interrupted due to time constraints in April 2015. This time we wanted to stay a couple of days in Olinda. However, the plan did not work out, because just after arriving in Olinda we were confronted with a community meeting involving ‘Régulos de Primeiro, Segundo e Terceiro Escalão’. I had hoped during the second visit, there would be less community debate and that I could have more informal conversations and in-depth interviews. The opposite was the case.

We had to first pass the ‘door keepers’ (all régulos, the head school teacher and FRELIMO representatives) and have a separate meeting with them, before we could actually talk to the local residents who were already joined up (indeed prepared) in front of the primary school. From the ‘door keepers’ we were informed that the community was satisfied as no resettlement was imminent (the opposite had been confirmed when we talked to administrative staff in Mucopia). After the introductory meeting we were allowed to talk to the local residents gathered outside the school.
There we were almost directly confronted with a struggle over dominance between the local community with its traditional and religious leaders and the régulo do primeiro escalão. The two dynamics of constructed FRELIMO dominance on one side and local community counter-hegemony on the other were obvious through the interpretations of a number of situations and statements. For example, when the community meeting was about to be opened the régulo do primeiro escalão stood up to present himself. Looking at the other régulos, he quickly tried to consolidate his position, articulating his official role:

“Eu controlo estes régulos!” (“I control these traditional leaders!”)

However, as an immediate response one of the régulos do segundo escalão confronted his statement indicating that the first leader was responsible for the area but not for ‘controlling’ the other régulos. This was followed by a couple of suspicious questions from the community to the research team. Why had we come for a second time and why had no one brought any financial support. Eventually I managed to agree with some residents that I could carry out some more interviews, although this was only because the school head master convinced them with the following ambiguous argument:

“Se vocês falam bem eles podem voltar bem e vocês ficam bem.”

“If you talk good, they can get back good and you will also stay good.”

However, we had not even sat down to start a first interview when very loud discussions started again within the community setting and we had to return to the meeting place. A seemingly drunken man (I remembered the man from our first visit when he played a similar ‘role’) had arrived; he started to convince everybody again that the research team was linked to the Chinese company that wanted to resettle them and that it was better not to talk to us. This intervention had led to a very conflictual debate and as we joined the people a serious struggle started to develop between the group of régulos and the rest of the local community and we could observe how the influence of the régulos diminished and some young men, motivated by the drunken man, gained a lot of power in the debate. These young men eventually addressed us directly as well and for the first time in my research in Mozambique I felt seriously threatened:

“Se não fosse por causa de estes chapéus (régulos) nós poderíamos bater vocês!”
“If these heads (traditional leaders) weren’t here, we could beat you up!”

From this point on, the situation went out of control and we decided that we needed to leave Olinda. The régulos, as one of my Mozambican colleagues commented, had been scared in front of their own communities and we felt that the drunken man was once again a ‘game changer’. Indeed later, during investigator triangulation back in Quelimane, my Mozambican colleagues insisted that the man who had such strongly impacted on our ability to collect information had been a member of the secret service, SISE (Serviços de Informação e Segurança do Estado). We concluded that the community, according to the debates we moderated and the observations we were able to make, is confronted with many different power interests which produce mistrust within the various, although somehow united citizen groups. Having talked to some women and school teachers informally, we also found out that assassinations of or attacks against women based on witchcraft accusations were not a problem in that community, but that any outsiders were confronted with all kind of maledictions. We were further told from teachers that local peasants often refuse to sell food products to people not native to the community, or only sell food at high prices. The latter points towards behaviour and attitudes local poor farmers developed during times of food crises and riots in the 18th/19th Century England, a phenomenon further elaborated as ‘Moral Economy’ by E. P. Thompson (1971).

Before we left the community, young people were once again shouting at us, telling us that they did not want any “raça chinesa” (Chinese race), they added:

“Vocês vieram para perguntar-nos como nós tiramos os chineses. Nós não temos armas. Mas tiramos-lhes com a boca e podemos matar agora mesmo com a boca.”

“You came to ask us how we got rid of the Chinese. We have no weapons. But we removed them with our mouth.”

Indeed, the further we went with our investigation from the district headquarter the closer people seemed to be attached to their legitimate traditional authorities and belief systems. The more they also seem to reject any of the already rare government services such as education and schools for children. Isolation, economic pressure and perhaps the fact that Olinda has not been directly affected by the civil war and its terrible massacres from both RENAMO and FRELIMO unified communities with their truly legitimate various leaders and traditional authorities in front of them. This in turn
opened political space so that people openly talked about RENAMO politics to us, in front of the FRELIMO secretary’s house. However, during our second visit to Olinda we were also confronted with the manipulating power and oppressive dynamics resulting out of a government intervention that seemingly had been organized just because of our visit, including possibly a secret service operation, as Mozambican members of the research team suggested. My colleagues concluded at the end of a half-day long investigators triangulation based on data collected in Olinda:

“Em Zambézia os régulos perdem o poder na medida como eles servem o Partido FRELIMO.”

“In Zambézia, the régulos lose power, the more they serve the FRELIMO party.”

People in Olinda did not show any fears, something that was strongly present during all our interviews closer to the district headquarter Mucopia. The residents of Olinda rather showed suspicion against people from the outside alongside what I ended up calling their ethnical citizenship. Even though witchcraft accusations and lynching are often instrumental in (re)producing fear and oppression within communities, hence affecting social trust and well-being, they may also be a means of gaining community power or justice through the creation of a unique spiritual world that may provide supernatural power (Igreja & Skaar 2013) for those usually without voice.

6.3. A theoretical and methodological reflection: The interface of modern and traditional governance and its implications on civil society development in Inhassunge District

As already introduced in chapter 3, Foucault’s concepts of discourse, power and social discipline has been methodologically central for understanding the dominant and contestatory definitions of civil society in Mozambique and its complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion as outlined in the above in-depth district case study. When applying the term governance in this concluding section I refer to a concept of governance described by Foucault (1991): a complex system of power relations that binds sovereignty (the state of domination), discipline (disciplinary power) and the government of others and self (government). Using Foucault’s words, governmentality is defined as:

The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. (Foucault 1991, p. 20).

The data collected in Inhassunge District, through interviews, focus group discussions and community debates as well as observations, allowed me to identify some visible and hidden technical means that are being applied as part of ‘the apparatus of security’. These identified means can on the one hand explain the governance system and civil society concept that seems to predominantly work to consolidate the political power of the FRELIMO party in the district but on the other hand shows clear gaps and niches, where community counter-hegemony (Gramsci 1971) in more isolated areas of the district might further develop. The search for the various civil society discourses and practices and for those actors that are excluded from dominant conceptions can be facilitated by applying a Foucauldian perspective to governance, as my district level case study demonstrates.

An obvious starting point, when analyzing governance and power a la Foucault, is the production of knowledge and the access to information and education. For Gramsci, just as for Foucault, understanding complex power relationships and cultural hegemony in society was central. However, Gramsci saw power as a binary opposition between hegemony and counter-hegemony forces, whilst for Foucault “power is everywhere…power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault 1978, p. 93). Information and education promote and organize power through the creation of knowledge, values and norms as well as social practices (Foucault 1991). Counter-hegemony, according to Gramsci (1971) can only develop within a public sphere where ideas and beliefs can be (re-) shaped (see also sub-chapter 2.4).

Information is being controlled by the state in Inhassunge District; for example, no community-run radio is operating in the district, and newspapers arrive only late or not at all. The only information channels not controlled by the government that communities can use run through the RENAMO structure or local churches. Many people we talked to appeared aware about the lack of access to independent information and the limitations this imposed. In this context it is quite easy for FRELIMO to channel propaganda through the official state administration system (from district
administration to administrative posts, party secretaries and local régulos) and uphold ideological domination e.g. through the education system (see also Gramsci’s understanding of ideology linked to his understanding of the roles of intellectuals and the concept of ‘war of position’ in sub-chapter 2.4).

The education system that, as we were told, is effectively being used to mobilize children and the youth during national days for FRELIMO parades and party celebrations (see also the importance Gramsci gives to the education system in his Prison Notebooks explained in sub-chapter 2.4) interacts with cultural values, norms and in particular social practices. Accordingly, the political conduct as well as discourses are influenced by both the access to information and by education. According to Foucault, (1979) information and education have a particularly strong influence on bio power (‘power over life’, see also sub-chapter 3.3 for further explanations of Foucault’s concept of bio power) as they also provide the entrance into a ‘modern’ life style that brings with it access to energy, employment and a salary, freedom of movement as well as potentially access to a better health system in the case of Inhassunge.

In particular, the education system, according to a teacher interviewed in Olinda at the 30 July 2015 and a research team member who also worked as a secondary school teacher in Mucopia (Inhassunge District), is being used as a governance tool, mostly impeding the progress of members of families that vote for the opposition from entrance or if they manage to enter, success in succeeding classes. The education system as such has been considered by some people interviewed as a system promoting exclusion or assimilation to FRELIMO politics. A teacher in Olinda area told us that only eight children were attending his class in Maulane primary school and I wonder if this is linked to the fact that Olinda is a RENAMO-dominated area. However, my research team colleagues interpreted this as a backwardness of the people living in Olinda.

In effect, education in Mozambique and speaking Portuguese form part of the bio-political power spectrum, which concerns all matters of life, social and political consciousness, access to information and acceptance within society. Having not enjoyed a minimum of education and alphabetization delegitimizes, excludes and sub-ordinates. It simply makes the educated a ‘rational’ and the uneducated a ‘primitive or irrational’. Indeed, as Goody (1986) and Harries (2001) point out, the histories of religions like
Christianity and Islam on the one hand made literacy possible for a greater number of Africans, but the ability to control became an important new form of political and social capital over which competition grew. Shankar (2014) in her article on Civil Society and Religion in Africa refers to Harries (2001) when indicating that the restrictions on literacy did, indeed, produce a vanguard of African leaders of Mozambican struggles for independence. She recognizes that Harries’ historical view of the developing ‘ideology of exclusion’ (Shankar 2014, p. 427) in literacy still seems to be alive in post-colonial Mozambique.

However, the governance over conduct and social practice call for a deeper analysis of the technical tools and means by which the conduct of individuals and entire communities is regulated and shaped. In Mucopia and its surrounding localities fear is used as a tool to govern populated areas and their social as well as political behavior. In one interview in Gonhane (31.03.2015), an activist of the local association AVODEMO mentioned that people in her area do not yet have an idea how to put any questions to the government. Analyzing the entire interview with the activist, it was possible to link that expression to the fear people experience in that locality. Fear was produced through the oppression of political freedom but also linked to the high levels of crime and witchcraft embedded in the system of impunity.

In turn the local ancestral spiritual beliefs and traditions that carry the potential to empower communities have been delegitimized by some AVODEMO activists. As AVODEMO creates awareness in relation to woman rights and witchcraft abuse, they also argue against any application of traditional African cults or religious beliefs that are not based on the Bible or Koran. One interviewed activist (28.07.2015, Mucopia) used particular strong words:

“Para minha parte já não existe a tradição anterior e esta tradição vai desaparecer totalmente no futuro.”

“Ancient tradition doesn’t exist for me any longer. This tradition will disappear completely in the future.”

I would argue that campaigns, aiming at delegitimizing African traditional cults and religion form part of the attempt to ‘moralize’ excluded poorer strata from a superior societal position and integrate them into ‘civil’ Christian churches and the education system. The education system however, in principle supposed to advance human development and fight poverty in Mozambique, is a strong system to integrate young
people into the FRELIMO-dominated political societal system. Depending on the historical and political context of specific areas in Mozambique, this can have varied impacts on the values and social practices of people, as we have witnessed in areas closer to the district town or more isolated areas like Olinda.

By intensifying the fear against the ‘traditional’ and ‘occult’ among church members, the communities living closer to the district town are being divided into those that practice traditional cults and occult rituals and those going to Christian churches and Islamic mosques. However, this divide, as we were told, is not a strict ‘institutional’ one; it rather exists in the ‘heads’ of each community member. During an informal conversation in a local restaurant in Mucopia (30.07.2016), somebody spontaneously joined one of our interviews, mentioning that the most influential pastors are sometimes those that are involved in spiritual lynching. No one disagreed. Dinerman (2006) claims that FRELIMO, historically against collaboration with any traditional spiritual leaders, has indeed on many occasions considered the protection and support of those figures, including spirit mediums such as the Mungói in Gaza Province or through the collaboration with the Naparama movement in Zambézia Province (see also sub-chapter 6.2.5.1).

Consciously or not, it is likely that the religious based awareness campaigns against domestic violence, witchcraft accusations and occult practices act as a discourse field for delegitimizing traditional spiritual practices. This, in the case of Olinda, does actually provide local communities with a feeling of unity and ‘superpower’ without harming women’s well-being and in the case of Mucopia, with a feeling of fear. Olinda, being a marginalized area with very difficult access, is at the same time less dominated by the ‘apparatus of security’ as in Mucopia, where people were surrounded by fear of crime and witchcraft accusations.

As a bio-political technology, fear is productive if each individual consumes fear and is consumed by it; thus, the overall population must be possessed by the impending disaster and its potential consequences on the self. Fear is, therefore, a bio-political technology that creates a stare of permanent (in)security and manipulates individuals who buy into this mode of control. (Gagnon, Jacob & Holmes 2015, p. 279)

‘The disaster’ facing people from the Olinda community is the misappropriation of their land. The several visits from Maputo-based businessmen with links to the former president Armando Guebuza, Chinese workers and the local district administrator give
face to the disaster and together serve as a power mechanism that is being absorbed by
the community, some ready to engage into counter-hegemony struggle and others
consuming fear. Indeed ‘the disaster’ has partly already happened, as mistrust is
building the base for any contact with the external world that for better or for worse
might also bring improved services to the people of Olinda (access roads, hospitals,
 improved livelihood strategies).

The effects of the campaign against domestic violence in the area around Mucopia as
well as the rejection of the ideologically defined education system and the hostilities
against any foreigners in Olinda area are examples of the impact of governance
mechanisms that exclude and disempower the marginalized, from accessing and
exercising their social and political rights and improving their precarious economic and
social situations. In a capitalist world this further contributes to the ‘market value’ of
witchcraft, meaning that according to some people interviewed, magicians
(macangueiros) can apparently ask for higher amounts of money for their ‘services’
 hence pointing towards the ‘commodification’ of witchcraft.

There are also Christian churches operating in the district which leaders ask their
members for financial contributions while promising mental and spiritual well-being, a
better life and most important, security. This way, churches do not necessarily become
defenders of social justice or protectors but rather constitute a bio-political technology
that ties people into a set of social practices. In a permanent state of (in)security as is
historically the case in Mucopia, church membership may no longer be a choice but
rather a response to the fear of witchcraft and political oppression and joining a church
becomes effectively a case of social deviance or compliance.

Analysing the Zambezian case study, I believe that fear, in connection with political
violence, economic exploitation, crime and witchcraft accusations, is a key
characteristic and boundary of the marginal public civic domain in Mozambique (cf.
Ekeh’s theory of the Two Publics in Africa in sub-chapter 2.4). This overall trend
appears systematically linked to the broader political discourses around national unity
on the one hand and the desire for a political change and a new political order on the
other hand as well as to the war currently developing based on very strong discourses
about exclusion. Accordingly, addressing fear, intimidation, the violent political party
discourses as well as economic threats prompted by large-scale land acquisitions in
rural areas of Mozambique becomes imperative for the development of a locally owned civil society.

If these threats to human development remain unacknowledged and silenced, it is unlikely that a community owned participatory bottom up democratic civil society concept could develop. Indeed, a bottom up civil society concept would need to challenge the modern civil society actors, namely legalized Western-type NGOs, which appear ‘de-politicized’ and unable to make the subject of recurrent war and fear a matter of discussion within society. In this context, ‘demonstrations’ (of witchcraft) are products of insecurity and social disequilibrium (Hanlon 2009, Mozambique Newsletter, No. 148). Serra (2003) argues that collective action based on magical or spiritual beliefs, including violence against authorities, should be seen as a call for help and that more support for those marginalized communities is needed. However, this support, according to Khosa (2016) and other critical journalists, does not come from secular civil society organizations that are still strongly promoted as a driver for democratic development by the DAC donor community in Mozambique.

Witchcraft, as it is being applied in various forms in the District of Inhassunge, offers an example of how various religious institutions have organized different patterns of cultural behaviors (e.g. search for protection in churches on one side and devaluing of traditional spiritual practices on the other) and idioms of accumulation – visible and invisible. They restorate social balance in ways that are distinct from other kind of civil discourses strongly carried forward from the secular ‘Western-type NGO’. Indeed, many religious movements all around Africa gain increasingly popular support against secular authority because they offer ‘protection’ against those who misuse ‘power’ (Shankar 2014). My research suggests that as long as the Western-type Civil Society-NGO model that relies on voluntary associations binding private interests cannot also offer the promise of protection and redistribution of power, it will have no meaning to those most excluded from the current capitalistic world order. The following quote taken from an interview in Inhassunge District underlines that argument:

“Nós já tentamos organizar, somos 15 pessoas que tentaram organizar uma manifestação, não entraram ONGs. Do lado da igreja estavam também dois padres. Mas depois a ideia não foi para a frente porque a maioria das pessoas tiveram medo, não queriam realizar a manifestação. Mas quem sabe, talvez ainda vamos realizar. Também gostaria de dizer que o administrador do distrito
“é uma pessoa muito arrogante e isto não ajuda nesta situação.” (Interview with a local businessman in Mucopia, 31.03.2015)

“We have already tried to organize ourselves; we are 15 people that tried to organize a mass demonstration, NGOs didn’t enter. From the churches side there have been two priests. However, the idea did not go ahead because the majority of people had fears, they didn’t want to realize the mass demonstration. But who knows, perhaps we will still organize it. I would also like to say that the district administrator is a very arrogant person and this doesn’t help in this situation.”

In a country like Mozambique, the complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion as demonstrated by this case study is not just bound to the institutions of the state and legalized civil society organizations. It is much more negotiated through various means such as witchcraft, religious belonging and ethnic citizenship, which separate and transform the public sphere(s). The ideologically affected national education system and the lack of access to information in turn limit access to the modern public sphere and Western civil society for the poor, while the closeness of elite NGOs to the FRELIMO government, the discursive separation between religious and spiritual leaders, and the overall intimidation of legalized civil society actors further widen the gap between modern and traditional forms of governance.

Part III of my thesis goes on to look at possible future scenarios of civil society development in Mozambique, relevance of the research and its findings beyond Mozambique and concludes with a final reflection and statement about the role of civil society in social transformation.
PART III: CONCLUSIONS

OVERVIEW

I now return to the central overall research focus: the dominant and conflicting definitions of civil society in a post-colonial situation. I also look at the consequences of the complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion encountered during field research and the core debates around the ‘public sphere(s)’ in which civil society is located.

This points to the need for recognizing counter-publics, social counter-movements and social defence mechanisms, and to the claims of critical scholars, that civil society cannot easily be detached from the state or its post-colonial legacy. It raises the question about the ‘civil’ in front of society, the function of violence and suggests an actor extension, which would enable stakeholders to recognize and listen to an increased number of actors and actants in more isolated areas. Some of the study’s analytical challenges, limitations and methodological learnings are reflected before moving on to the description of possible future scenarios of civil society development in Mozambique. Will there be an appropriation of the marginal modern civil society sphere or rather radical change in Mozambique? How will the boundaries and interplay between the civil society in the governance debate, political society and the contesting society develop?

In sub-chapter 7.2 the possibility for civil society appropriation is discussed as well as some terms and conditions for this to happen, while in 7.3 the more likely perspective of post-civil society will be outlined, namely a situation where modern Western-type civil society organisations lose their relevance. Closing thoughts will concern the potential role of civil society in social transformation in Mozambique. A last positional map, emerging out of my engagement with situational analysis is laid out. The map shows examples of the various positions about civil society and collective action encountered or missing in the research field and closes with a suggestion that social (including spiritual) movements, together with churches, may offer the most potential for supporting collective action and mobilize people for social change and transformation in Mozambique.
CHAPTER 7: CIVIL SOCIETY IN MOZAMBIQUE:
APPROPRIATION, RADICAL CHANGE OR POTENTIAL FOR
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION?

7.1. Deconstructing colonial legacies to pave the way forward

They (the colonized) construct national identities within a different narrative (than that of civil society), that of community. They do not have the option of doing this within the domain of bourgeois civil-society institutions. They create, consequently, a very different domain – a cultural domain – marked by the distinctions of the material and the spiritual, the outer and the inner. This inner domain of culture is declared the sovereign territory of the nation, where the colonial state is not allowed entry, even as the outer domain remains surrendered to the colonial power. The attempt is...to find, against the grand narrative of history itself, the cultural resources to negotiate the terms through which people, living in different, contextually defined, communities, can coexist peacefully, productively, and creatively within large political units. (Chatterjee 1993, pp. 237-238)

Globally, many scholars have tried to look at the “inclusive” competences of civil society actors, from various perspectives, ideologies and with different methodologies and focuses. However, alongside the rebirth of the concept of liberal civil society, and adoption of civil society strengthening, as a key strategy to enhance democracy in ‘developing’ countries, critical scholars (Bayart 1986, Comaroff & Comaroff 1999, Manji 2000, Howell & Pearce 2002, Edwards 2005, Fowler 2011, Zinecker 2011, Nugent 2012, Neocosmos 2011) turned their attention towards the role and impact of Western civil society actors in ‘developing’ countries. Scholars like Bayart (1986) laid the ground for identifying a number of conceptual challenges related to the application of the liberal Western concept of civil society in Africa. For that scholarship, the dominant Western concept, and its declared independence from the state and the market, needs to be interrogated critically and be deconstructed, having in mind its colonial pillars and the need for social-cultural negotiations as described from Chatterjee above.

Following that line of thought, I looked at Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and civil society, embedded into his elaboration of the “Southern Question” (see sub-chapter 2.4) and found it useful to make a distinction between political and civil society. I considered the interconnectedness of the two, rather than their opposition, and located
intermediary institutions\textsuperscript{183} within civil society, as facilitators for the construction of social cohesion and consensus. However, like Bayart (1986) I tend to question the inherent progressivity of NGOs and some social movements. Both types of actors frequently collaborate with each other and make use of each other’s spaces of power to consolidate consensus within an authoritarian government framework, instead of questioning it. Accordingly, the question whether NGOs and contemporary social movements lead to more balanced equal relations between the post-colonial state and political elite on one side, and society on the other, remains relevant and deserves empirical scrutiny.

However, when studying civil society in a ‘developing’ country, we need to consider that the ‘Western developed’ world, made civil society in Africa an object of academic study and as such, an objective for the production of knowledge upon which differences could be measured, and targets could be defined. From a post-colonial perspective, which my work applies, the measurement against Western predefined targets needs to be profoundly problematized and I have done this throughout my work. I now recognize systems for measurement as the product of various waves of Western enlightenment thought (see sub-chapter 2.1) and modern development theory (see sub-chapter 2.2). Consequently, an inductive grounded theory and situational analysis methodological approach has been applied in order to better respond to historical and social complexities and to deconstruct, and in a sense expose, the epistemological assumptions behind those measurements. My study approach underlines the importance of context (colonial, political, economic, social and cultural) and inspired for mapping all actors and discourses of civil society rather than narrowly focusing only on legalized NGOs that are predominant in the official development debates. I especially aimed to locate those actors who are excluded from the modern public sphere, in terms of their geography, moral beliefs and values, as well as political belongings.

My research set out to unfold complex layers of a constructed and constructing civil society with a focus on Africa, using the country example of Mozambique. The literature review about civil society, development and social transformation (chapter 2) points to a number of particularistic power dynamics that may influence the inclusion and exclusion of individuals and organizations in civil society. Furthermore, the review

\textsuperscript{183} During expert interviews in urban areas of Mozambique, NGOs were frequently called intermediary institutions, which in turn were seen as key actors within civil society (see also various other chapters of this thesis).
suggests that the interface between modern legalized civil society organizations (such as NGOs), social movements and traditional social structures should be a more central theme within civil society studies, as well as the analysis of the dynamics between the boundaries of civil and political society and the public sphere(s), having in mind the specific post-colonial context. The review underlines the need to re-theorize the Western mainstream civil society concept as it is being applied in development practice, as a concept related to social transformation, embedded into local dynamics.

Civil society development in Mozambique revealed strong historical influences on contemporary civil society dichotomies and ambiguities. The development of an in-depth district level case study (chapter 6) was necessary to outline in detail the relationship between the economic changes that resulted from colonial and neocolonial dynamics and linked to that, capital accumulation and political processes. Within the overall research process, which was inspired from Foucault’s method of “effective history” (hence several of Foucault’s concepts are referred to in the methodological, chapter 3, and reflective, sub-chapter 6.3, sections of this thesis) I investigated the application of the concept of civil society, from the late 19th century until today. Following Foucault’s (2010, p. 18) argument “each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the other”, my study reveals that the taken-for-granted mainstream consensus-building concept of civil society cannot be examined without its historical threads. This thread is surrounded from the ‘civilization’ mission linked to the colonial project with its major backdrop economic exploitation and ‘violence’, as the oppressive disciplinary regime making the colonial mission possible.

What I encountered in Mozambique during the time I was working with civil society in the country and my research phase, was an urban based NGO elite structure which claimed to represent civil society in a number of donor-government and government-private sector or multi-sector stakeholder policy forums (cf. box 1). The definitions of the concept of civil society from expert interviews and round tables during my research ranged from associational perspectives (a perspective introduced in the late 19th century, cf. annex C), to third sector identifications (the sphere outside the market and the state, the latter was sometimes referred to as government) and definitions related to the structural public sphere. In the latter, either civil society’s ‘communicative rationality’ (Habermas 1984a) or the ‘war on position’ (Gramsci 1971) was seen as essential to articulate citizens’ needs and develop alternative visions (figure 10 provides an
overview of the different discourse levels related to civil society and typical quotes related to them). I also accompanied stimulating and interesting alternative debates about the advanced terms of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ as well as ‘traditional’ civil society and sporadically heard that the place (local, national or international) impacts on the designation of actors within civil society.

Actors participating in the two dominant social worlds ‘civil society and governance’ and ‘civil and political society’ (see figure 6) were often present in both social worlds and mutually reinforced the assumption that civil society was a consensus-building concept which represented and defended the needs of the poor versus the state. This points towards a dynamic relationship between civil and political society as described in Gramsci’s theory of civil society (see sub-chapter 2.4) and questions the assumption that modern civil society is almost ‘naturally’ positioned against the state (see also figure 8). The encounters with colonial legacies, conflictual political realities, violence and global liberal market forces at district level point towards the importance of analysing civil society critically, from a post-colonial perspective, as part of the political economy of expanding capitalism. Having extended the network of actors, the third civil society arena ‘contested society’ emerged and the final research focus became:

The dominant and contestatory definitions of civil society in a post-colonial situation, focusing on its complex dialectic of inclusion and exclusion.

The research focus identification happened alongside the empirical emergence of radical and violent societal responses to economic and political exclusion, these responses are located in ‘contested society’ and many (but not all) belong to the primordial public as defined by Ekeh (1975) (see also sub-chapter 2.4). My research findings run counter to the conventional liberal non-violent civil society conceptualization and call into question the usefulness of the concept as it has been introduced in Africa, together with Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). This became particularly apparent during district level in-depth research in Zambézia Province (and later in Nampula and Tete Provinces). The findings at that level demonstrate that today’s liberal mainstream concept of civil society in Mozambique is widely unknown outside the major urban areas of Mozambique. The term ‘civil society’ was in some cases known, although in the interviewees own words, rarely experienced in practice. Civil society had its unique interpretations at district level. Most people initially simply referred to civil society as
‘all of us’. That is a clear anti-structural conceptualization. It also indicates frustration with the performance of the national NGO elite and an acceptance of the FRELIMO led civil society discourse (e.g. Graça Machel, in O País 2015) on the need for an inclusive ‘social contract’ (see also chapter 1) and ultimately, national unity and cohesion (with the aim of keeping the current status quo and relations of power).

Making additional enquiries into the dynamics of collective action through the in-depth district level case study in Inhassunge, further details were provided by interviewees and observations. From that perspective, actors and dynamics such as traditional social structures, indigenous and religious ceremonies, magicians, traditional healers and ad hoc protest groups needed to be included into civil society. Guided by Gramsci’s concepts I continued to problematize the modern restrictive consensus-building function of civil society actors applied in most of the Mozambican development discourse, literature and development practice, as it simply does not correspond to people’s realities. Ekeh (1975) (see also sub-chapter 2.4), is one of the few scholars who has considered the multiplicity of public spheres in African countries, based on their specific post-colonial context.

Together with Ekeh’s reading, I turned my attention to the African relations of production and exchange, lifestyles and social relations (e.g. African markets and informal economies, collective rituals, discourses of magic and reason) that influence the framing of the various public spheres. These considerations then demanded further investigation into the various strands that ‘weave the fabric’ of the civil beyond the official purview of governance (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999, p. 23). Azarya (1994), departing from the assumption that civil society is indeed a universal concept that should also be analytically applied in Africa, questions the ‘civility’ in front of society and seems interested in research that determines the ‘civil’ categories in specific African contexts affected by both state disengagement and incorporation.

With regard to the primordial bases of association, the situation is even more complicated. Many African voluntary associations are based on ethnic identity or place of origin. Should they be included or excluded? (Azarya 1994, p. 94)

In Mozambique, local indigenous forms of association, often based on ceremonial and cultural necessities and not formally legalized, are excluded from civil society embedded in the modern civic public sphere. However, my district level research in Mozambique revealed that most people we interviewed outside the state administrative
structure, consider the leaders and members of these (local indigenous) associations, sometimes including leaders of churches, as their representatives, and accordingly these leaders voice the politics of the informal people – outside the sphere of legalized civil society and the state. In a Gramscian sense, the latter is the type of civil society, which carries the potential for counter-hegemony, social change and transformation.

One of the key current contextual issues that supports actor extension for the re-theorizing of civil society is the fact that neither service-delivery NGOs nor advocacy oriented NGOs actually respond to the current political-military crises affecting the country and as such they can be called apolitical or are lacking an articulated political conflict analysis. This appears to be the consequence of at least two factors. Firstly, the so-called public sphere is dominated by discourses about political parties that force civil society groups and some representatives of traditional social structures to side with one party, mostly FRELIMO, as a matter for organizational survival. In opposition dominated areas, where most of my research took place, citizens’ groups are strongly intimidated if they publicly position themselves close to an opposition party and traditional leaders, with the potential for civic mobilization. In addition, the latter are constantly co-opted into the FRELIMO led government administration system (see sub-chapter 6.2.2). Secondly, the allocation of a role of purely service delivery or of a watchdog by the international donor community further depoliticised modern civil society actors and kept them within the boundaries of dominant ideology, discouraging the development of robust alternatives to the current system.

Still, of course, people are active in the search for solutions to their precarious situation of poverty. They develop alternative political actions, both visible and invisible to those residents in the marginal civic public sphere. I was able to witness various forms of ‘deviant’ civil society. This civil society appeared as a ‘contested society’, in particular contested by the FRELIMO elite, in its alliance with neo-colonial economic interests, but also by academics who operate within the ideology of growth, wealth creation and capital accumulation. Consequently, research participants at district level often articulated feelings of marginalization and exclusion. These groups, which I decided to include in my social arena map of civil society and collective action, were devalued as ‘uncivil society’, ‘criminal groups’ or ‘backward’ society, in a post-colonial Gramscian sense, they constitute the subaltern classes.
The engagement with systems of the ‘invisible society’ (see also sub-chapter 5.3) of ancestors and witchcraft, ‘invulnerable’ spiritual-political movements such as Naparama, informal ad hoc protest groups and even civil war activities and their power to disrupt the social order during my research were most unexpected. However, rather than considering these dynamics as limitations, they developed into an opportunity. They provided additional strong arguments to take my research findings beyond the Western discourses of civil society and the single public sphere. Critical engagement with the writings of Frantz Fanon helped me to understand the possible justification of violence as an integral part of an oppressed civil society struggle and to consider civil society as a potential transformative practice, linked to a new political consciousness and a post-colonial movement in need to create its own operational logic. Looking at Fanon’s (1963) writings, post-colonial civil society in Mozambique might need to “liberate itself from its liberators” 184:

The militant who faces the colonialist war machine with the bare minimum of arms realizes that while he is breaking down colonial oppression he is building up yet another system of exploitation. This discovery is unpleasant, bitter, and sickening: and yet everything seemed so simple before. (Fanon 1963, p. 145)

Ekeh’s (1975) “Two Publics in Africa” (see sub-chapter 2.4) provide further cause for critical reflection and conceptualization of the dichotomies and ambiguities within contemporary African civil society, hence further refraining from a purely civil society revisionist perspective. Based on the Mozambique case study, the ‘moral’ ground of the mainly Western influenced civil society concept applied in Africa can be questioned and the need to look much more into the intersection between modern forms of civil society and local social traditional structures impose itself. Further reading of Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba (1995) and Mamdani (1996, 2001) has helped me to understand the very deep rooted meaning of societal rules which until today guide some of the perceptions of citizenship in a post-colonial context and consequently influence agency within the public sphere. I now understand better how it is possible that some of the people I interviewed did not feel like citizens more than 40 years after the country was liberated, and that colonialism still has a huge influence on contemporary civil society dynamics.

184 The demand for liberation from former liberators has been mentioned many times by social activists interviewed during the course of this research.
African writes such as Shivji (2007), Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba (1995) follow the tradition of Bayard and argue against the ‘natural’ oppositional role of civil society against the state, something that manifested itself during my grounded theory orientated case study research. Civil society is a much more complex arena containing both democratic and anti-democratic forces; in particular, my situational analysis approach highlights how the state and civil society inter-penetrate one other (cf. Olukoshi 1998). Neocosmos (2012) and Bond (2014) consequently increasingly distinguish between “civil” and “uncivil” society when analysing, for example, the dynamics behind the recent xenophobia in South Africa. Osaghae (1999) points to the important impact of SAPs on the legitimacy of the African post-colonial state and development of ‘new’ civil society. He claims that a more inclusive and critical dimension of civil society is necessary. A dimension that provides more attention to its political functions:

Not only are the autonomy, cohesion and efficacy of civil society wrongly assumed to be given or exaggerated, the point is forgotten that civil society functions as the engine room or theatre of national cohesion, the place where contesting and opposing forces (which tend to increase under adjustment) are played out and resolved. (Osaghae 1999, p. 7)

Looking for alternative concepts and existing theoretical explanations to my field research findings I identified Nancy Fraser’s feminist view as more explanatory as she adds "subaltern counter-publics" to the public sphere; these are "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses¹⁸⁵ to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (Fraser 1990, p 67). This conceptualization comes close to Antonio Gramsci’s understanding of civil society. Alexander (2006) distinguishes between the public and civil sphere and allocates to the civil sphere a ‘civil repair’ function which is responsible for the integration of ethnical particularism, non-civil acts and fragmental dynamics and hence ‘reminds’ the civil sphere of its key function, namely solidarity. Hence, the need to link dynamic, processual civil society studies with the analysis of power and violence.

My research, building on Gramsci’s theory of civil society and Ekeh’s statement of the “Two Publics in Africa”, has confirmed Osaghae’s claim. The support for a single and apolitical top-down civil society-NGO model alongside the SAPs has not supported

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Hannah Arendt’s (1958) explanation of the public sphere as a kind of discursive arena characterized by discursive contestation rather than the ‘rational’ articulation of needs and interests through organized civil society groups.
national cohesion in a sense of being able to link new legalized/formal/modern actors of civil society active in the public sphere with local traditional social structures in the primordial sphere. The delimitation of NGO activities through the political society keeps them distant from the civil society struggle that is concerned with citizenship, deepening of democracy and redistribution of wealth. However, NGOs, the most accepted actors in the marginal modern public sphere and ‘development community’ so to speak, usually claim to represent the ‘needs and voice of the poor’, so they are also part of silencing representative social structures and might even unwittingly contribute towards patterns of exclusion.

Despite some methodological constraints linked to the fieldwork context as described in sub-chapter 3.4.1 the research design followed a processual approach and based on theoretical sampling, several decisions were taken in the field in order to accommodate new analytical directions within the grounded theory led approach. Overall, I now consider this an advantage as it allowed me to be very flexible and innovative and to make the move from what I felt was an initially linear coding and categorization process orientated by grounded theory, to situational analysis and discourse analysis. Whilst situational analysis was very useful to identify silenced actors and actants, including elements of the contextualized contesting civil society, it also constituted a challenge. The challenge was linked to the analysis and inclusion of the in-depth district level case study into the overall research findings.

For the development of the case study, I had various empirical materials of several types (interview notes, records, transcription, memos, summary notes form informal debates, observations and photos, visualized interpretations) and a strong participatory initial coding and categorization process already accomplished in the field. All the material needed to be brought together in order to sufficiently reflect both the context and the particular civil society analysis coming out of the specific research questions and the focus, which constantly developed further. While I felt that the development of social arena and power arena maps were very helpful for bringing all the material together, the further use of computer software for qualitative analysis back in Europe was less suitable. While I started to use Nvivo software for coding and categorizing some of the transcribed interviews after field work, I felt that the coding and categorization in the field, through very dynamic investigator triangulation with the research team, was more innovative and sufficient for developing social and power arena maps and the positional
map included later in this chapter. Accordingly, qualitative data analysis software was used for storing data material but not for analysis as this was primarily done in the field.

The above-mentioned limitations were however unavoidable as my research question from the beginning was kept very broad and even when it was further focused after exploratory research, remained quite open. I ultimately felt that this broadness and openness in relation to potential findings could not be avoided if I wanted to give due attention to the complexity encountered in the ambiguous and dichotomized discursive field (Clarke 2005, p. 23ff.) of civil and uncivil society in a ‘developing’ country context. I further encountered methodological problems developing a positional map in the form suggested by Clarke (2005, 2015). Since civil society, in its origins a positivist normative concept\(^\text{186}\), has been investigated empirically from a post-structuralist and post-colonial perspective, it almost naturally lost its Western-centralized normative meaning. In my final analysis, I found it hard to distinguish between contemporary local African concepts, manipulating global neoliberal discourses, and the empirical world of post-colonial power relationships. However, I attempted to develop a positional map (figure 10).

Overall, my research provided a number of important methodological lessons and learnings for the expanding area of civil society studies in ‘developing’ countries and provided a field for theoretical experimentation, as the interdisciplinary engagement with various theories and concepts included into my thesis evidence. From the transitioned participatory research process, the analysis of power linked to representation and discourse constructions and their influence to include and exclude certain actors (and their social identities and institutions) from the sphere of post-colonial civil society, shall be seen as central, when engaging in the study of civil society. The tension between the consensus-building meaning of civil society (closer to Habermas), the more conflict ridden conceptualization of civil society that links the sphere to social and revolutionary movements (closer to Gramsci), and the subjectivation linked to the modern and primordial public spheres in Africa (closer to Ekeh and Osaghae) needs more attention when studying civil society and its potential for social transformation.

\(^{186}\) Scholars from positivist civil society research schools argue that the concept could only be investigated deductively.
Most importantly, the power and conflict blindness within the modern sphere of civil society, as also critiqued by Fraser (1990) in relation to Habermas’ conception of civil society, needs to be overcome, and an empirical (rather than a Western normative) concept of civil society should be applied to the study of civil society. An inductive empirical engagement with civil society studies in ‘developing’ countries will almost naturally provoke an engagement with the function of violence, as my research clearly demonstrates. It also implies that civil society needs to be defined as a complex dynamic social arena, including various discursive fields and public spheres, rather than a group of legalized organizations within a single public sphere.

Grounded theory led processes carry the potential to de-colonize knowledge that far too often is applied unreflectedly to contexts in post-colonial African countries without considering their epistemological origins. They can also extend current Western theories if they are applied rigidly so that they can realistically reach the complexities of post-colonial social life and action during the expansion of neoliberal globalization. Munck (2017), applying a broadly Foucauldian perspective, concludes:

Taking a broad retrospective view of capitalist development, we might posit complexity as the third analytical priority. Complexity, as John Urry outlines “repudiates the dichotomies of determinism and chance, as well as nature and society being and becoming, stasis and change” (Urry 2000: 22). What this means in terms of development and social change is that we must be wary of binary oppositions between, say, modernization and post-dependency theory. We have seen already how there is no clear dividing line between neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism. Complexity points us towards the end of certainty and, of course, the inherent teleology in many development theories. There is always order and disorder in all development and social change processes.

The Western normative concept of civil society in ‘developing’ countries is misplaced and is in desperate need of transformation from a consensus-building concept to one that allows for diversity, deviation, conflict and most importantly, local ownership. Indeed, constructivist grounded theory, can open an entirely new avenue to critically interrogate modern civil society and its actors impact in an African context. We need to look beyond the normative understanding of civil society and analyze the inter-relationship and cooperation between power (between civil and political society, as Gramsci highlights) as well as the knowledge it consolidates, bearing in mind the global neoliberal world order. Indeed, Foucault’s idea that ‘power is everywhere’ (Foucault 1978, p. 93) makes us aware that there are not only two sides of power (rulers and ruled) but that power comes from innumerable points and tactics (cf. Foucault’s
understanding of governance), that it constitutes a ‘multiple and mobile field of force’ (ibid, p. 102). Therefore, it is necessary to break traditional disciplinary frameworks that impede knowledge of new realities and analysis of power.

Considering the above overview of research findings, the description of limitations of this study as well as the methodological learning that provides lessons beyond the case study country Mozambique, I will now outline scenarios for civil society development in Mozambique. These build on the putative contemporary difficulties encountered by modern civil society organizations in Mozambique when trying to peacefully reform the political realm and advance social transformation, bearing in mind that it is the state and societal superstructure, which ultimately provide the material, organizational and ideological conditions (Bratton 1994) for a new civil society project to flourish.

7.2. Appropriation: Mozambican society defines the terms and conditions of civil society

My research identified a considerable number of civil society interactions where the state and particularly the governing FRELIMO party representatives as well as donor government agencies intervened in the formation, values and moral ground of the civil society sphere. Those interventions aim to control the sphere of civil society and complicate the development of a bottom-up concept. The following table demonstrates some selected dynamics encountered during the research:

Table 8: Government and donor interventions into civil society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visible</th>
<th>Choosing civil society representatives for semi-government commissions, committees and working groups.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alignment of NGO projects to government and donor policies, e.g. the EU civil society support programme (PAANE) - a fund providing support for civil society organizations through the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrete</td>
<td>Infiltration of government staff into NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contracting consultancy companies to recruit civil society actors likely to agree with government and donor policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targeted funding of selected NGOs in order to legitimate government and donor policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invisible (mainly government intervention)</td>
<td>Media campaigns to sway public perceptions about civil society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denigration of social and farmers’ movements as groups of illiterates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grouping protest groups together with rebels, criminals and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above dynamics call into question the autonomy and oppositional role legal civil society actors may play in contemporary societal development. Bellucci (2002) suggests that supporting “ethical and democratic values” (and not only economic and democratic values) are necessary steps in promoting ‘political society’, together with civil society. He suggests that the public realm should be enhanced with this perspective in order to avoid economic and therefore political hegemony of organized - I would rather say legalized - civil society (NGOs) over the entire society or public realm. He underlines that the (unique local) ethical dimension must be given its space, as development should not only be based on Western routed economic and democratic values.

Looking in more detail into how factors such as lineage, spiritual and religious beliefs, and gender norms mediate relations within ‘civil’ society, I had to decide where I could best draw the line between the broad concept of society and civil society in particular. What does the ‘qualifying’ adjunct ‘civil’ mean in a post-colonial context where those most left behind are finding their notion of citizenship being negated? Or as Chandhoke (2003, pp. 25, 26) asks “What can be said of those groups who have been marginalized from the construction and the reproduction of the sphere of civil society?” This question touches a central issue of my research, that of ownership of civil society in Mozambique. It is a question about social complexity in a post-colonial context. The appropriation of the civil society sphere by Western-type NGOs in the 1990s might have widened the gap between citizens and the state and added an additional hierarchy to society rather than channelling real demands to the state.

In order for this top-down civil society concept to be reversed and adapted to local realities, civil society actors from below and above would need to bring the concept of civil society closer to peoples’ ‘real struggles’, meaning that the concept of civil society moves closer to people in rural and urban areas, independent from their party, ethncal and regional origins. Only then, may modern civil society organizations be increasingly accepted as representative and spokespersons of their constituency. Together, society and civil society could then appropriate the concept of ‘real’ civil society to the reality

\footnote{According to Gramsci (1971) civil and political society are interconnected and in a constant exchange, see also sub-chapter 2.4.}
of those currently silenced. This process will need to be based on a new governance of knowledge that carries the power to overcome the violent side of a ‘war on manoeuvre’, hence supporting a ‘war on position’. Based on Chandhoke’s (2003) insightful analysis of post-colonial civil society and my own analysis of historical and contemporary ‘practice’ of civil society in Mozambique, I would like to suggest some conditions, however unlikely to fall into place in the coming 3 – 5 years, for a profound ‘war of position’ (see also sub-chapter 2.4) to develop.

A ‘war of position’ in Mozambique would mean that the current NGO-civil society concept is replaced by a new alliance of extended civil society. This alliance would need to include NGOs and the actors of representative traditional social structures, leaders of indigenous ceremonies and contesting groups that disagree with the current development model (an example of such an alliance is described in the case study about civil society contestations in relation to the ProSavana Project in chapter 5, box 1). This suggestion would be backed from Marshall’s (2016) research which points to the various strikes and protest actions taking place in Mozambique from 2008 and culminates in her article ‘Mozambican Workers and Communities in Resistance (part 2)’. Referring to the power of Pope Francis’s new moral discourse on social and environmental justice for the poor included in the episcopal encyclical Laudato Si, she concludes:

> While the resistance strategies may be triggered by the need to survive, they also carry in them the seeds of a different approach to building more democratic compassionate societies with more popular protagonism and more effective ways to care for the planet. The 21st century strikes, bread riots and blockades in Mozambique can take their place proudly as part of the broader panoply of global resistance at a moment in history characterized by grotesque rich-poor disparities and unregulated corporate power. (Marshall 2016, online article)

For this to transform into a powerful movement for social change, those that are currently silenced, rendered marginal and invisible in the public sphere(s), need increasingly to take political action, they need to ‘storm the ramparts’ (Chandhoke 2003, p. 226), claim space within modern civil society and further democratize the concept. Through this ‘storm’, some of the well-resourced Western-type NGOs active in the ‘civil and political society’ would be forced to change their perspective from looking to the state and their donors, to observing inward dynamics, the power centres within its domain, which may be complicit with the state and battle them (Chandhoke 2002, p. 248). Traditional leaders, some of which are co-opted into the government
administration system (cf. sub-chapter 6.2.2), would actively need to position themselves next to citizens and represent their ‘constituency’ rather than a political party agenda. If this would be to happen, an appropriation of the concept might take place. Mozambican citizens would start to define the terms and conditions of their civil and political action. However, unlike Marshall (2016), who sees the links between global civil society, local resistance and protest as a possible early change in power relationships in Mozambique, I believe that factors such as fragmentation, co-option and lack of trust within civil society, influenced by government and donor interventions (cf. table 8), are still major limitations for more comprehensive action, at least in the medium-term.

Another condition for ‘appropriative’ change will be the convergence of language, or in other words, the appropriation of ‘truth’. When Spivak (1998) and Chandhoke (2004) refer to the subaltern, claiming that they cannot speak, they refer to the fact that what they say has no meaning unless there is a change in power relationships. Unless an equilibrium develops between the interests and solidarity of the elite civil society and academics involved into the production of knowledge and marginalized, social groups, there will be no possibility for a larger social movement and counter hegemonic civil society project188. This solidarity however, depends on the mediation of various complex networks. It can only develop if both sides experience a ‘common threat’, e.g. the expansion of the civil war based on a legitimacy crises of the state, division within ruling elites, complete breakdown of social order and a further increase in crime and corruption, all ultimately affecting both modern civil society groups and the marginalized poor.

However, what we see today in terms of civil society in Mozambique is encroachment and subordination, a passive movement, that so far has only rarely transformed into an active network and collective action based on solidarity. This is the result of an expanding authoritarian, undemocratic political-military system and the tightening of institutionalized civil society actors under a consensus-making peaceful accountability project as promoted by DAC donors, located far away from the day-to-day suffering of ordinary people. If this remains, the modern liberal civil society concept loses more of its relevance and the marginal public sphere will almost disappear. In a recent interview,

188 Gramsci’s differentiation between the traditional and organic intellectual (see sub-chapter 2.4) points to the same need for an alliance and relationship between intellectuals and representatives of subaltern social groups.
Cahen points to the potential – but unlike to develop – advantage, if progressive Mozambican NGOs, would indeed appropriate the public sphere:

…it would have been advantageous if progressive Mozambican NGOs had formed a civil, pacifistic political party to organise demonstrations, etc., however, in the absence of this type of party or form of protest, and hypothesising the end of RENAMO, I don’t think there will be other military rebellions in Mozambique. But this considers RENAMO already dead, which I doubt will happen! (Cahen in Guilengue, Pambazuka 2016)

As such, the here presented scenario is unlikely to become reality soon. Most Western-type NGOs are not open to more radical internal changes and are bound to donor accountability. They may as such rather protect the current status quo and not be part of challenging it. However, some of the smaller strikes and protests are very likely to continue and will at least gradually protect those most affected by the current political and economic crises. To sum up, the contextual conditions for building counter-hegemony and for producing positive outcomes for the poor might not be given as influential actors in both the civic and primordial public spheres are closely linked to the dominant FRELIMO party. The next section will consider the possibility of post-civil society in Mozambique, a time when civil society organizations, in particular NGOs, will have lost their relevance in the public sphere(s) and protest, resistance and war have replaced the language of democracy.

7.3. Post-civil society: civil society organizations lose relevance

Civil society replaced revolution. (Chandhoke 2003, p. 18)

The introduction of the civil society concept that followed the changes in Eastern Europe, has replaced the revolutionary imagination linked to Pan-Africanism, Socialism and the politics of Social Transformation. A bourgeois civil society project was proclaimed and has taken over the academic discourse on civil society, well filled with products of ‘state accountability’, ‘good governance’ and ‘democratic participation’. When imposing the concept in Mozambique the continuous need for national state-building and social cohesion was ignored and the functioning of formally introduced

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189 Under the current conditions in Mozambique, it is difficult to sustain claimed space and make sure that the needs of marginalized groups are registered and represented constantly, including at the national level. Western-type NGOs, highly dependent on project based external funding in Mozambique, may not be interested in listening and accompanying dynamic local demands, claims and contests (see also Follèr & Johannson 2012), and rather follow their predefined and donor approved ‘theory of change’, which is based on the promotion of moderate political participation and social development. They might not look beyond formal mechanisms and as such will not be in a position to understand post-structuralist dynamics that develop outside the public sphere, beyond their monitoring and evaluation spectrum.
democracy was assumed, ignoring the de facto internal divisions and tensions Mozambique experienced during the anti-colonial liberation and later 16-year-long civil war.

The Western-type civil society model that emerged in the form of legalized NGOs in Mozambique was introduced top-down and its impact on national politics is marginal to this day. Unavoidably, it is in a dialectical relationship with the authoritarian state that does not provide space for diversified political debate. Furthermore, the dominant civil society concept in Mozambique, as I have argued throughout this study, has at times consolidated modes of exclusion based on its bourgeois and material post-colonial origin. Chandhoke (2003) profoundly questions this dynamic:

But if arguably material inequality constitutes civil society, what, we can ask at this point, of groups that are the victims of unequal property relations? What of groups who are triply disadvantaged by being materially disprivileged, socially and culturally invisible, and linguistically handicapped? Not for them surely are the forums of civil society, the languages of civil society, the civilities of civil society, the privileges of civil society. If we look hard enough, we may discover that civil societies are alarmingly restricted and restrictive, completely impervious to the needs, the desires, the freedom, and the democratic right of the disadvantaged to be heard as equals. (Chandhoke 2003, pp. 244, 245)

My research confirms that the civil society concept in Mozambique carries all the restrictions and divisive control mechanisms described above. It is ambiguous, and because of the country’s colonial history it is much more binary, than in the West – it is divided into civil and uncivil, moral and amoral. Like Ekeh’s (1975), my research identifies considerable power in relation to the new African political elite, but little trust or even authority. Ekeh’s ‘Theory of the Two Publics’ allocates economic influence to the elite, but highlights that this influence doesn’t meet with acceptance. However, he refuses to use the term ‘African elites’, arguing that it connotes a class of people who enjoy autonomy in the formation of their values and in their decision-making processes, independent of external sources. According to him, the emergent ruling class in Africa clearly lacks such autonomy (due to colonialism!). That’s why the slogan “temos de libertar-nos dos nossos libertadores”¹⁹⁰ (we have to liberate us from our liberators) is so prominent in Mozambique nowadays, it helps to articulate people’s desire for a new wave of liberation, liberation from continuous poverty, political oppression, neo-colonial economic exploitation and social exclusion.

¹⁹⁰ This slogan was mentioned several times by people I interviewed, firstly in Niassa in January 2014, and later in 2015 in the provinces of Zambézia and Nampula.
The slogan also shows the critical point the relationship reached in the relationship between politically engaged citizens and government and the wish for a fundamental change in the political framework. In 1991, Axelle Kabou’s controversial publication ‘Et si l’Afrique refusait le développement? provoked both former colonizers, by then ‘development experts’, and the new political elite, with her demand for a healing social revolution in Africa. This would force African politicians to identify a common dynamic and framework of renewal and restoration. Looking at the process of state and nation building and the marginalization and co-option of alternative social and political movements it is not surprising that various clusters of surrogate discourses and resistance are now developing in Mozambique. I join Foucault (1980) and particularly Amoore (2005), in her assessment that there can be no power without resistance:

Points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial…The points, knots, or focuses or resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behaviour. (Amoore 2005, p. 15)

What is clear, if we look at a country like Mozambique - hugely indebted, authoritarian, in the middle of political-military crises - is that the future will bring no positive social change if the distribution of power remains as it is. The extraction of natural resources such as gas, coal, minerals, petrol and precious stones, without a structural change of the local economy and without strengthened accountability, has only made the country more corrupt, while regional differences and social inequalities have drawn the country back into civil war. Growing modern civil society actors have accompanied that exploitive process and not hindered it. It is thus reasonable that the poor, so far rendered invisible in most civil society forums, develop their own modes of representation (lineage based traditional or religious authorities), re-distribution of power (through witchcraft and crime), and political expression (ad hoc protest and free-form activism). However, depending on the new leadership dynamics, gender relations and the psychological and physical well-being of women might be particularly negatively affected by this dynamic, as parts of my district level case study revealed.

191 “And if Africa refuses development?”
These forms of what I would call post-civil society dynamics are based on the necessity to survive and live a dignified life, and they happen outside the realm of modern civil society structures. Thus, the notion of ‘necessity’ and a quest for dignity – now seen as an equal and fundamental right for all from the poor themselves – justify people’s struggles as ‘moral’, ‘natural’ and ‘logical’ ways to survive and advance their lives. These dynamics, which do not necessarily lead to a direct assault on the state (or a ‘war of manoeuvre in Gramscian terms), could be classified as a ‘passive revolution’. However, according to Gramsci they ultimately target the state power and depending on the force of ‘necessity’ (Bayat, 1997), may also transform into collective violent action and warlike activities, all currently present in Mozambique.

What brings these groups together into this mode of struggle is, first, the initial urge for an alternative mode of life, requiring them to change jobs, places and priorities, and, second, the lack of an institutional mechanism through which they can collectively express their grievances and resolve their problems. (Bayat 1997, p. 58)

In order to capture the social changes that happen outside the control of institutionalized civil society and the state, a new civil society narrative is needed; one that does not consider that discord should be substituted by consensus. Following this sequence of thought, the consensual, modern and rational civil society model could indeed be made irrelevant in Mozambique and be substituted by civil disobedience, resistance and protest:

…the possibilities of heterotopic reasoning emerge when insurgent citizens act as if they are already equal to all other citizens; when they refuse to accept that their position within the social order are natural, or inevitable; and when they refuse to believe that one group of citizens is better equipped to make decisions on their behalf than they are. These possibilities emerge during protests, on the streets, and in challenges to the institutional reasoning of the state, sometimes within the structure of the state itself. These challenges are themselves open-ended: each give rise to new possibilities, and new potentials. (Brown 2015, pp. 163, 164)

Bayat (1997, p. 68) concludes that civil society encroachment is largely the feature of undemocratic political systems, as well as of cultures where traditional institutions serve as an alternative to civic associations and social movements. Looking into the future it is possible that urban, marginal intermediary organizations such as NGOs, that control the public discourse about civil society, will disappear, replaced by more influential categories, currently silenced, like ‘traditional social structures and spiritual actors and actants’ (cf. chapter 6). These categories will then represent the majority of people as
they are based on social practices. The networks of sociality and forms of cooperation embedded in contemporary social and spiritual practices constitute the seeds for a new movement, with new forms of contestation and new conceptions of liberation.

This alternative community of social practices, the autonomous self-organization of informal economy and wealth distribution, can provide the ground for a new social class formation that no longer accepts subalternization. This formation, which could be seen as the start of social transformation and a counter-movement (see sub-chapter 2.5), may however result in different outcomes for the poor. The failing of FRELIMO, to build up national cohesion after independence, and of civil society actors, to “democratize” the central FRELIMO led state, means that the various, often overlapping actors, dominant in political society and civil society, have not managed to stabilize the country. Many people I interviewed in the Centre-North of Mozambique have been conscious of this fact. However, Fanon (1967) early warns us of the situation if social consciousness starts before national cohesion is sufficiently build up and underlines that if this would happen, people in ‘developing’ countries could start to fight for social justice allied with primitive tribalism rather than for a collective solution.

The concept of post-civil society as such will be an ‘interstitial transformation’ (Gudavarthy 2013), involving a network of various types of resistance and through its joint action, the extension of agency. However, this extension of agency needs to go along with the development of political consciousness. If we see ‘political action’ as the ‘disruption of the sensible’ (Rancière 2006) within post-colonial civil society order, namely the challenging of political order and societal hegemony (Gramsci 1971), then the hierarchical power within civil society will be challenged as well. The concept of post-civil society will not only include questioning the leadership of particular civil society organizations or the distribution of authority within the societal system, but the very principle of delegated representation, an important principle within the structure of modern civil society.

7.4. Potential role of civil society in social transformation

We must not therefore be content with delving into the past of a people in order to find coherent elements which will counteract colonialism’s attempt to falsify and harm. We must work and fight with the same rhythm as the people to construct the future and to prepare the ground where vigorous shoots are already springing up. A national culture is not a folklore, not an abstract populism that believes it can discover the people’s true nature. (Fanon 1963, p. 188)
Fanons’s words point to the need of linking culture with political freedom, both seen as key concepts for understanding the past and fighting for a better future. Macamo (1995, p. 91) was critically optimistic about the role civil society actors, in particular social movements such as the student’s movement and the churches, may play in Mozambique, for joining that struggle and hence contributing towards social transformation. However, he also emphasised that social movements needed to remain autonomous and broadly participatory and expand their influence without losing their roots. Twenty years later, his optimism might not have materialized. The country is sliding back into civil war, hugely indebted by apparently boundless self-enrichment of the former president Armando Guebuza192 and other FRELIMO party figures. Modern ‘liberal’ civil society is either co-opted, intimidated or absorbed into state controlled civil society networks or government organized semi-state structures. What remain as strategies of exit is violent crime, street protest, and religious and traditional ceremonies aiming for protection and redistribution. However, in the post-colonial social order civil society (now seen from the perspective of a bottom-up transformative political project) has not disappeared despite its contradictions, challenges and contestations. Accordingly, it is opportune to discuss the potential role of (extended) civil society in social transformation and base this debate on the various historical and contemporary analysis, findings and conclusions in relation to Mozambique presented so far.

Since the liberation of Mozambique from colonialism, regional and ethnical discourses of domination and sub-ordination and inequality have remained strong. They remained after the armed liberation struggle, which was initiated in the north of Mozambique, but culminated in the domination of the Southern elite led by FRELIMO (cf. Sumich 2010). Whilst the heroic post-independence nation-building rhetoric has been replaced with concrete control mechanisms such as party cells down to the locality level, social divisions have been strengthened over the years, together with the search for the rich natural resources of Mozambique in the new millennium. All this development - alongside global changes in the civil society discourse - has constructed a modern civil society elite structure in urban areas.

Indigenous peoples’ self-organization was forced to follow the colonial politics of indirect rule; this rule, linked to the instrumentalization of some traditional leaders from

192 For an anecdotal reference to Armando Guebuza’s richness and involvement into major businesses in Mozambique read the Mail & Guardian article “Mozambique's 'Mr Guebusiness'” (Nhachote 2012).
colonial powers, according to the first generation of FRELIMO leadership post-independence, was the enemy that needed to be destroyed, for a new society to emerge. Destruction took several forms as I have described. Traditional social structures were either incorporated into state administration\textsuperscript{193} or replaced and ‘re-engineered’ by top-down civil society organizations or new community associations. What remains ignored to this day is the fact that some of the traditional leaders had gained their (family and tribal clan related) legitimacy from pre-colonial times. Their moral authority, even though at times co-opted and misused during colonial times and afterwards, still exist - although adjusted to the current context - and are guiding local people’s judgement and lifestyle. At the same time, religious and spiritual cults and ceremonies, usually linked to members of traditionally influential families – continue to be classed as backward occultism by various segments of society whilst nevertheless, they seem to respond to modern types of economic exploitation. However, some of these ‘old’ values, norms and spiritual necessities have consolidated their links to political society and as such, they could be embedded into, rather than excluded from, the nation-building process and civil society construction.

The refusal of the traditional leaders as well as the political role of local spiritual and religious figures and churches in social transformation, pushed many traditional families into opposition to FRELIMO during socialist times and this culminated in their support for the oppositional guerrilla group RENAMO\textsuperscript{194}. The complexity of contemporary post-colonial and post-socialist politics and national cohesion calls into question the “presupposition that the FRELIMO state and the ‘obscurantist’ society it once sought to eliminate are two mutually exclusive, antipathetic entities” (Dinerman 2006, p. 286). Boundaries based on former ideological grounds are blurred as waves of neo-colonial capitalist exploitation provoke people’s physical and cultural displacement and increase inequality. Consequently, civil society analysis needs to consider the various inherited social arenas and discursive patterns; it cannot rely solely on Western liberal thought.

Using a series of interview statements, this research brings to the surface at various moments the lack of trust, the level of disillusionment as well as the deep-rooted governance problems experienced by Mozambican citizens living in physical and economic insecurity. The absence of all kind of state services, including the judiciary,

\textsuperscript{193} Some traditional leaders were sent into re-education camps after independence (see sub-chapter 4.3.1).
\textsuperscript{194} For a detailed and impressive insight into the development of the civil war in Mozambique see Geffray (1991) ‘A causa das armas em Moçambique – uma antropologia da guerra civil’.
and the daily presence of corruption and impunity in territories where the majority of citizens voted for the opposition, that has never had any formal political decision-making role since independence, made people feel that they did not hold any citizenship rights (see chapter 6). On the contrary, looking at some of the indicators being tracked by the international community based in the capital city of Maputo, governance systems seem to have improved technically over the years (World Bank 2014); the 2013 African Peer Review Mechanism Report has also highlighted this. The same report stated that the Parliament had made a very important step towards improving good governance with the approval of a Law on Public Integrity in late 2012, in the context of a so called “anti-corruption legislative package”. Under this topic, it is mentioned that the country had witnessed trials and convictions for corruption of senior government officials at various levels and institutions. Importantly, the report suggested that impunity is no longer the rule in the country.

This claim is clearly out of date as I write. Due to dysfunctional judicial structures and the corrupt administrative system of the Mozambican state, new government debt of US$ 1.4 billion accumulated, bringing the total gross government debt roughly up to over 110 percent of GDP (World Bank Group 2017). This new debt burden was made possible through a joint venture of privately owned Mozambican companies (e.g. EMATUM, Proindicus, Mozambique Asset Management) linked to the former president Armando Guebuza, with government participation in 2013-2014. This situation has also captured the attention of Mozambique’s major bilateral- and multilateral donors, leading to the suspension of direct budget support and cancellation of strategic cooperation talks (IMF 2016). NGOs and think tanks based in the capital city have debated the issues and published a position paper (IESE, CIP & OMR 2016) but have so far not received any response from the state or those responsible for the debt. At the same time, those most affected by the current financial and political state crises have no voice in the debate. In other words, modern, mainly urban civil society elites, replace their voice.

The impact of SAPs that came with the neoliberal market expansion and the commodification of land, labour and money to Mozambique has by now created the devastating impact Polanyi (2001) referred to in his book “The Great Transformation”:

The institutional separation of politics and economics, which proved a deadly danger to substance of society, almost automatically produced freedom at the cost of justice and security…neither freedom nor peace could be institutionalized under that economy, since its purpose was to create profits and welfare, not peace and freedom. (Polanyi 2001, p. 263)

Based on the inductive research process and my own experiences of working with civil society in various countries (not only Mozambique), I strongly recommend that civil society assessments and conceptualizations, that aim to look at the potential of civil society to advance social transformation and peace, need to consider the various discourses of civil society and the actions (violent and non-violent) resulting from them. Civil society can – and I believe should - be supported, as a bottom-up political project. Caution should be exercised if working only alongside the supposedly dominant modern conceptualization of civil society, namely civil society as a liberal consensual concept, which for many people I interviewed in Maputo is constituted by all non-state actors or/and is part of (or even equal to) the public sphere. However, this apolitical public sphere, according to my research findings, is marginal and exclusionary, as it does not correspond to the moral findings and representative necessities of the majority of poor and marginalized people.

Modernity and the consensual civil society concept applied in an African context can only be understood if we consider its “historical ironies, its disjunctive temporalities, its paradoxes of progress, its representational aporia. It would profoundly change the values, and judgements, of such interrogations, if they were open to the argument that metropolitan histories of civitas cannot be conceived without evoking the savage colonial antecedents of the ideals of civility” (Bhabha 1994, p. 175). Accordingly, post-colonial civil society aiming to change the status quo of poverty, inequality and subordination shall be concerned with creating new cultural and political sources and identity and perceive the processes that created subalternity and exclusion. These sources aim to secure survival in a context of post-colonial capital exploitation.

The following discourses and practices on civil society and collective action, included into the positional map (figure 10), aim to visualize the variety of contestatory civil society positions. They include positions that have been invisible in the modern, civil
society discourse, but were empirically apparent during my district level research. The positions identified are based on the data collected at various locations (national, provincial, district), contain no new data and after Clarke (2005), are not associated with particular groups or institutions. At the same time, the map offers a different way of presenting my findings and aims to increase the research’s accountability to “people’s struggle for self-representativity and self-determination” (Visweswaran in Lather 1999, p. 140).
Civil society is the public sphere; it is not influencing political processes.

Civil society is composed of ‘intermediary’ organizations. “Civil society is a non—military society.”

Civil organizations are non-state actors.

Civil society includes all institutions outside the market and the state.

People go to the sorcerer in order to find a solution to their problems.

People have a culture of silence (as a response to witchcraft & assassination)

Civil society includes religious leaders, traditional doctors, spiritual mediums.

Civil society looks for alternatives in interaction with movements

Civil Society Institutions can be formal & informal. They have a common struggle.

“Why are there NGOs, CBOs, associations. Why are they different? Are they not all civil society?”

“Nowadays we have civil society of the day and of the night”

“Civil society is a non—military society.”

“What is formal and informal in our context?”

Protesters are anti-development & rebels

NGOs are tranquilizers

Civil Society? That’s all of us!

Civil society includes all institutions outside the market and the state.

DOMINANT DISCOURSES

SILENCED DISCOURSES

Binary opposition

Civil, Consensual, Modern, Democratic

Uncivil, Traditional, Undemocratic, Hierarchical

Source: Author

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The **missing position**, also called ‘site of discursive silence’ (Clarke 2005, p. 126), at the top right of the map above, deserves particular attention. The discursive silence in relation to the need for social transformation (as a necessary response to the current military-political tension) of actors’ positions linked to the civil, consensual, modern and democratic sphere, undermines the possibilities of social transformation and shows the lack of political conflict analysis in the sphere. What deserves further attention is the fact that some positions are penetrable and can open up new possibilities for unifying historically antagonistic social spheres. Whilst the dominant discourses linked to the ‘civil, consensual, modern and democratic’ sphere are distant from the positions closer to the sphere ‘binary opposition’ and appear only marginally linked to the other spheres through the most dominant position ‘civil society'? That’s all of us!’ the sphere of binary opposition appears impervious and interlinked to the sphere of ‘uncivil, hierarchical, traditional and undemocratic’. For the ‘civil, consensual, modern and democratic’ sphere opposition, contestation, culture and religion become uncomfortable societal dynamics and problematic practices of survival (cf. Bhabha 1994).

The strong belief in a consensus-making civil society model implanted into society in Mozambique appears to overload many citizen’s and civil society organizations’ positions and agency and leads to the denial of legitimate power struggles within civil society as well as revolutionary ideas that may develop the power to change dominance and hegemony within society. Consequently, power struggles are nowadays articulated through civil war activities (war of manoeuvre), so that modern civil society actors are only marginal actors and future civil society appears bound to the possibility of a ‘passive revolution’ (see sub-chapter 7.3). The construction of consent by means of the current development model through dominant discourses such as ‘civil society, that’s all of us’ and the implantation of the top-down NGO-civil society model consolidate unequal relations and do not question them. According to Kamat (2002, p. 160):

> This consent is produced not only through the work of the repressive state (its schools, the repressive apparatus, development apparatus etc.) but also through the work of the numerous voluntary initiatives within civil society, which engage in political work, regardless of whether it is development or collective action.

The insistence that, in a context of post-colonial exploitation and political oppression, violence (and its various articulations) needs to be given space within civil society analysis in ‘developing’ countries constitutes an important moment of this research with
relevance far beyond the case study country Mozambique. African civil society discourses and practices, as demonstrated by my analysis of civil society and (willed) collective action of the excluded and marginalized in Mozambique (the latter seen as the very central dynamic within civil society) must be seen in all its complexity, embedded in various moralities and functioning within different public spheres. In a post-colonial context, formations of identity, subjectivity and representation have to be considered as essential parts of the construction of a contextualized civil society. Social transformation must happen as a result of changing politics within civil society (according to Gramsci a war of position), namely the extension of the concept and inclusion of active and passive actions of resistance, that in its enlargement can build a movement to countervail or even bring down gross power imbalances and an illegitimate oppressive government (according to Gramsci a war on manoeuvre).

The positional map (figure 10) makes visible parts of the complexity of civil society that functions in various public spheres. Bearing in mind the trust and representative status that people allocate to religious leaders and holders of traditional ceremonies, I suggest that it is these actors that may, in complementarity with Western-type (domesticated) rights-based NGOs and formal social movements such as the student’s, farmer’s and religious movements196, have the potential to bring about social transformation. Hence, embedding the political economy into the social fabric of society (Polanyi 1971). However, as long as the ‘Missing Position’ on the top right of the positional map is not a concern of actors in the civil and modern sphere, and they continue to act without having carried out a conflict analysis and establishing alliances to develop links with those most affected by conflict, then social transformation is unlikely to move forward and a social revolution may develop as a consequence of the current crisis of representation:

There is currently a full crisis of political representation in Mozambique. The only good thing that could happen in Mozambique would be a social revolution in the cities. The cities are FRELIMO’s strongholds and if the populace demand peace it could potentially change the situation. (Cahen in Guilengue, Pambazuka 2016)

196 During my research I came across a group of organizations that built an alliance against the major agro-business programme ProSavana (see case study described in box 1); this group includes mainly rights-based organizations and it contested both major government decisions and other civil society organizations that appeared to make coalitions with multi-national companies involved in land grabbing. Those organizations might contribute towards the critical consciousness of a potential future counter-movement.
Mozambican (extended) civil society actors must continue to reflect what the term ‘civility’ means in their own context. The invisible power constituted along the informal vertical channels of relations, e.g. patron-client networks, that link the political elite with the rest of the population, must be understood, including its consequences for bringing about social transformation. In view of the failure of the formal governance system, social and religious movements, still seen as part of the vertical and personalized ties which link state or ‘high’ and informal ‘low’ politics, and the legitimacy of which is accepted by all, may carry the power for leading collective action and change. They have demonstrated that capacity on a number of occasions in the past. Leaders of institutionalized churches and social movements need to understand the new unstructured and ‘invisible’ forms of ambiguous popular action and protest (including those embedded in traditional believes and witchcraft) and not proclaim them as uncivil, as this would distance them from the day-to-day struggle of ordinary people.

Geschiere (1988) argues that a government that finds itself so distant from its own people will hardly be able to combat forms of popular protest and passive resistance. It is then left to civil society leaders, social movements and churches to understand, accept and ‘civilize’ the exercise of people’s power and resistance which, I argue, will be the only source of change with the potential to bring about long-term transformation of power relationships. The liberal non-violent Western consensual civil society concept will not push for change but keep the status quo. Unless this is understood and a new civil society ‘infrastructure’ declared, the reconciliation of traditional social structures with progressive social and religious groups and rights-based NGOs might be hindered and not carry the potential for the creation of a single public sphere where a ‘war of position’ might develop for counter-hegemonic forces pursuing democratic development (Kleibl & Munck 2017). Based on my experiences in working with NGOs and social movements and my research carried out I argue that a new framework for conceptualizing civil society is necessary, one that will see conflict as necessary part of transformation and not deny the reality of the subaltern living in poverty and political oppression. The process of acquiring new knowledge is as precious as its outcomes. From a post-colonial perspective, there will be no such process without contradiction and conflict.

*Washing one's hands of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless, means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral.*
(Paolo Freire 1985, p.122)
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in History. College of Arts and Sciences, Washington University.


República de Moçambique (year unknown): Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Distrito de Inhassunge 2011-2015 (plan received in April 2015 from the Inhassunge district planning department).


Web sites, blogs, online newspapers and videos:


Manifesto do Movimento da Sociedade Civil Moçambicana Indignada pela Tensão Político Militar e com os Raptos: Marcha Pacifica pela Paz e contra os Raptos


APPENDICES

Annex A: Research participants organized by research trips/phases

Note: Participants of expert interviews have been named; all other research participants are anonymous

Research participants, phase 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1: Exploratory engagement with the research theme in Maputo, Niassa and Nampula, Mozambique: 02.03.2014 – 21.03.2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research method and location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maputo, Capital City:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lichinga, Niassa Province:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exploratory interviews and semi-structured focus group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
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**Total Exploratory Interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Group</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 (10 male, 1 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (8 male, 1 female)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nampula City, Nampula Province:**

- **Exploratory individual expert interviews**
  - Calisto Ribeiro (m): ORAM, Mozambican NGO
  - Luísa Hoffmann (f): Forum Terra, Provincial NGO land rights network
  - Saíde Achimo Momade (m): CLUSA (previously), INGO
  - Júlio Paulino (m): UGC, Nampula Provincial Small-Scale Farmers Union
  - Daniel Abaca (m): UGC, Nampula Provincial Small-Scale Farmers Union
  - Eugénia Pastela (f): IAPACA, local peasant’s association (interview conducted at a provincial UNAC meeting)
  - Dionísio André Mepoteis (m): IAPACA, local peasant’s association (interview conducted at a provincial UNAC meeting)

- **Namina locality, Nampula Province:**
  - Anonymous: 18 Leader and activists from UGC/UNAC member associations

**Total Exploratory expert interviews**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Community debate:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 (5 male, 2 female)</td>
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<td>1 (11 male, 7 female)</td>
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**TOTAL Exploratory Interviews (i):**

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community debate:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Total participants:**

47 (37 male, 10 female)
### Research participants, phase 2

#### 2. Research trip to Maputo, Mozambique: Key informant interviews, IESE conference participation & focal group discussion: 20.08. – 12.09.2014

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<th>Participating organization/comments</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Maputo, Capital City:</td>
<td>Kajsa Johansson (f)</td>
<td>Linnaeus University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory interviews</td>
<td>Dr. José Jaime Macuane (m)</td>
<td>MAP consultant, UEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Lars Buur (m)</td>
<td>Roskilde University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diamantino Nhampossa (m)</td>
<td>We effect, INGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luis Muchanga (m)</td>
<td>UNAC, National Small-Scale Farmers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Salvador Forquilha (m)</td>
<td>IESE, Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>António Francisco (m)</td>
<td>IESE, Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leone Tarabusi (m)</td>
<td>PAANE, EU civil society support programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laurence Burckel (f)</td>
<td>PAANE, EU civil society support programme</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Samuel Quive (m)</td>
<td>UEM, Sociology Department, Head of Research Department and National HIV/AIDS council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus group discussion with</td>
<td>José Fernando Machanguana (m)</td>
<td>FBO policy monitoring programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs, Academia and Donors</td>
<td>Diamantino Nhampossa (m)</td>
<td>We Effect, INGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>(discussion and exploration of</td>
<td>Selua Lumbele (f)</td>
<td>IBIS, INGO</td>
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<td>the research topic led to the</td>
<td>Constâncio Nguja (m)</td>
<td>JOINT – League of NGOs in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>creation of a local research</td>
<td>Dr. Salvador Forquilha (m)</td>
<td>IESE</td>
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<td>advisory team)</td>
<td>Inocêncio Macuacua (m)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Phillip Machon (m)</td>
<td>MASC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. João Pereira (m)</td>
<td>MASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luís Muchanga (m)</td>
<td>UNAC</td>
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| Total                        | 10 (8 male, 2 female) |
| Exploratory interviews Focus | 1 (8 male, 1 female)  |

**TOTAL: 19 (16 male, 3 female)**
### Research participants, phase 3

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<td><strong>Maputo, capital city:</strong></td>
<td>Dr. Jose Jaime Macuane (m)</td>
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<td>Intensive interviews</td>
<td>Luís Muchanga (m)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fernanda Farinha (f)</td>
<td>CEP, Citizenship and Participation, Civil society Support Programme</td>
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<td>Petra Aschoff (f)</td>
<td>Brot für die Welt, INGO/FBO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. Francisco Noa (m)</td>
<td>CESAB, Research Institute</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. João Mosca (m)</td>
<td>OMR – Observatório do Meio Rural</td>
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<td>Dr. João Pereira (m)</td>
<td>MASC, UEM</td>
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**Exploratory Interviews (i) and (g)**

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<tr>
<td>Bente Topsøe-Jensen (f)</td>
<td>Consultant Team Leader, EU civil society actor mapping</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anna Revieri (f)</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Union in Mozambique (DEU)</td>
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<td>Piergiorgio Calistri (m)</td>
<td>DEU, interview together with Anna Revieri</td>
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<td>Olivia Gervasoni (f)</td>
<td>DEU, see above</td>
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**Total**

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<td>Intensive interviews</td>
<td>7 (5 male, 2 female)</td>
<td>ITC (Iniciativa Terra Comunitária)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exploratory interviews (i)</td>
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<td>Note: Interview conducted with EU consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory interviews (g)</td>
<td>1 (1 male, 2 female)</td>
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</tr>
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**Quelimane city, Zambézia Province:**

<table>
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<th>Research method and location</th>
<th>Research participant</th>
<th>Participating organization/comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interview (i)</td>
<td>Hilário Patricio (m)</td>
<td>ITC (Iniciativa Terra Comunitária)</td>
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<td>Only organizational names are known, detailed participants list is with the EU consultants</td>
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**Semi-structured interviews (g)**

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<tr>
<td>- UPC (UNAC Zambézia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Terra Amiga</td>
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<tr>
<td>- OTM/CONSILMO</td>
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**Focus group discussions**

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<td></td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Rights-based NGOs: AMME, Parlamento Juvenil, LDC, Namuali, CCM, AMCELA, ADOM, Right to Play, OCZ, LDH</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Development oriented NGOs: NAFEZA, ANALUGELA, Conselho Cristão, RADEZA, ORAM, RASC, Associação Esperança, Associação AEIANAI,</td>
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| OTM-CS, AMCELA, AMME, CECOHAS, G20/FONGZA, FONGZA, Kukumbi  
| Mixed NGO group: UCM, NAFEZA (2 persons), OTM, UPC, RADEZA, Mulania, Liga dos Direitos da Criança, ORAM, Associacao Mucila (Associação das Mulheres Camponesas) and OMM (2 persons), Associação Esperança, Associação Moçambicana Mulher e Educação  
| **Note**: First two focus groups conducted with EU consultants |

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<th><strong>Total</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (male)</td>
<td>2 (4 male)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3 (26 male, 17 female)</td>
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</table>

| **Mocuba town, Zambézia Province:**  
| Semi-structured focus group discussions in workshop format | Anonymous |

| **FBOs:**  
| ANA Gilé, Associação Muçulmana, AMAREMO, 7º dia, Igreja Novo Apostolo Social Protection and Education; OKWELANA, ONP, AMME, AMUDZA, ADEMO, FAMOD  
| Rural Development (1): ACIMO, AMODAS, RASC, NANA, AMME  
| Rural Development (2): AKA C, NANA, PRODEA  
| **Note**: Focus groups conducted with EU consultants |

| **Total:**  
| Number semi-structured focus group discussions | 4 (20 participants – gender unknown, need to request detailed participant list from EU consultants) |

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<tr>
<th><strong>TOTAL</strong></th>
<th><strong>Intensive interviews</strong></th>
<th><strong>Exploratory interviews (i)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Exploratory interviews (g)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Semi-structured interviews (i)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Semi-structured interview (g), Focus groups</strong></th>
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<td></td>
<td>7 (5 male, 2 female)</td>
<td>1 (female)</td>
<td>1 (1 male, 2 female)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
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| **Total participants:**  
| 79 (37 male, 22 female, 20 participant gender unknown) |
Research participants, phase 4

4. Research trip to Zambezia Province, Mozambique:
Intensive individual and group interviews, focus group discussions and observations:
20.03.2015 – 18.04.2015

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<tr>
<td>Quelimane city, Zambézia Province; Intensive interviews (i)</td>
<td>Dom Hilário da Cruz Massinga (m)</td>
<td>Catholic Church, Diocese of Quelimane, Bishop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Manuel de Araújo (m)</td>
<td>Quelimane Municipality, Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lourenço Duvane (m)</td>
<td>ORAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Candida Luís Quintano (f)</td>
<td>NAFEZA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delma Comissário (f)</td>
<td>IBIS Zambézia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Padre Bruno (m)</td>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rogério Henriques (m)</td>
<td>Former MADAL director (wanted to speak as a citizen and not as MADAL director)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensive interviews (i):</th>
<th>7 (5 male, 2 female)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mucopia, Inhassunge District, Zambézia Province; Intensive interviews (i)</td>
<td>anonymous (TK+IA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+IA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+IA)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (GM+JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (GM+JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interviews (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (TK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (IA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (JP+JS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (JP+JS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Intensive interviews (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 (9 male, 2 female)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gonhane locality, Inhassunge District, Zambézia Province: Intensive interviews (i)</th>
<th>anonymous (GM+RM)</th>
<th>Religious leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interviews (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (GM+RM)</td>
<td>Traditional healer, Member of AMETRAMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interviews (i)</td>
<td>anonymous (GM+RM)</td>
<td>Traditional midwife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (GM+RM)</td>
<td>Administrative Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (GM+RM)</td>
<td>Retired teacher, Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Intensive interviews (i)</th>
<th>Intensive interviews (g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (2 male, 3 female)</td>
<td>1 (5 male)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bingajira, Inhassunge District, Zambézia Province: Intensive interviews (i):</th>
<th>anonymous (TK+RM)</th>
<th>Former Naparama, RENAMO member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interviews (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (JP+JS)</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activist</td>
<td>anonymous (JP+JS)</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (JP+JS)</td>
<td>Former Naparama, RENAMO member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (JP+JS)</td>
<td>Community leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (JP+JS)</td>
<td>Technician, Inhassunge district government, Bingajira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (GM+RM)</td>
<td>Former Naparama, RENAMO member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (TK+IA)</td>
<td>Associação Progresso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused community debate</td>
<td>anonymous (JP+JS)</td>
<td>AMETRAMO</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Intensive interviews (i)</th>
<th>Intensive interviews (g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (6 male, 1 female)</td>
<td>1 (2 male, 1 female)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Olinda locality, Inhassunge District, Zambézia Province Focused community debates:</th>
<th>3</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Interviews (i)</th>
<th>Interviews (g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total research participants:**
82 (57 male, 25 female, and unknown number of participants from community debates)
## Research participants, phase 5

### 4. Research trip to Nampula, Mozambique: Key informant interviews, focus group discussions (complementary research)

**Maputo, expert interviews and focus group discussions**

26.07.2015 – 18.09.2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research method and location</th>
<th>Research participant</th>
<th>Participating organization/comments</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nampula Province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erati District, Odinepa locality, Nassua community, Nampula Province Community debate (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (TK+RM+AJ)</td>
<td>Various community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Interview (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>Members of Islamic Church</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>MDM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>Catholic Church, Justice &amp; Peace commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Interview (i)</td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>Rainha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>Rainha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>FRELIMO secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>School teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>Community leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>RENAMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 (2 women, 4 male)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (i)</td>
<td>21 (gender not known)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community debate (g)</td>
<td>14 (8 female, 15 male)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (g)</td>
<td>Namapa, district headquarter, anonymous (TK+RM+AJ)</td>
<td>RENAMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Interview Type</td>
<td>Interviewees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula Province: intensive interview (i)</td>
<td>anonymous (JI+LM)</td>
<td>RENAMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (JI+LM)</td>
<td>Local market business man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (TK+AJ)</td>
<td>Administrative post, FRELIMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Padre Jesus (TK)</td>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total intensive interviews (i)</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 (male)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erati District, Nahopa locality, Nampula Province: intensive interview (i)</td>
<td>anonymous (JI+LM)</td>
<td>M’pewe (spiritual leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (JI+LM)</td>
<td>Local informal businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anonymous (JI+LM)</td>
<td>Local informal businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Intensive interview (i)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 (male)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napila community, Intensive interview (g)</td>
<td>anonymous (JI, GM, LM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Intensive interview (g)</strong></td>
<td><strong>15 (5 women, 10 men)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula city, Nampula Province Intensive expert interviews (i)</td>
<td>Luisa Hoffmann (f)</td>
<td>Forum Terra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antonio Lagres (m)</td>
<td>Provincial civil society platform, Nampula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahanda Antonio (f)</td>
<td>UPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irma Rita Zaninelli (f)</td>
<td>Catholic Church, Justice &amp; Peace Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Intensive interview (i)</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 (3 women, 1 man)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maputo city</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo, Capital City: Intensive interviews (i)</td>
<td>Diamantino Nhamposso</td>
<td>We Effect, INGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adriano Nuvunga</td>
<td>CIP, NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luis Muchanga</td>
<td>UNAC, Farmer’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albino Francisco</td>
<td>Joint – League of NGOs in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused group discussion</td>
<td>Fernando Massarongo, Luís de Brito, Sérgio Chichava, Rosimine Ali, Yasifir Ibraimo, Euclides Goncalves, Ivan Semedo, Oxsana</td>
<td>IESE, Research Institute</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Research Participants, phase 6

5. Research trip to Tete, Mozambique: Key informant interviews, focus group discussions (complementary research)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research method and location</th>
<th>Research participant</th>
<th>Participating organization/comments</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tete, Provincial Capital: Intensive interviews (i)</td>
<td>Rui Vasconcelos Caetano, Dr. Albano Basilio Eliseu, Leonor Andre Loquiha, Sr. Nhantumbo, Nazimo Mussa, Julio Kamlembo</td>
<td>AAAJC, UCM, IPAJ, Lawer, Attorney, Liga dos Direitos Humanos (LDH)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL
Intensive interviews (i)
Intensive interviews (g)
Focused group discussion (g)

22 (5 women, 17 men)
44 (gender unknown)
10 (2 women, 8 men)

Total participants:
76 (25 male, 7 female, 44 participant gender unknown)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>组织实施</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (g)</td>
<td>Dorica Amosse, Lusitano Francisco, Antonio Germano</td>
<td>UPCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group debate (g)</td>
<td>Anonymous (RM)</td>
<td>ASUFA, ARA-Zambeze, ACAMO, UPCT, AJODEMO, ASA, UCM, CAPEMI, AAAJC, ISRI (some organizations were represented various times)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:**
- Intensive interview (i) 6 (6 men)
- Intensive interview (g) 3 (1 woman, 3 men)
- Focus group debate (g) 30 (gender unknown)

**Cassoca locality, Marara district, Tete Province:**
- Intensive interview (i) anonymous
- 2 farmers
- Traditional leader
- Member of OMM
- 9 members of G-12
- Comissão comunitária (comissão comunitária)
- Comissão comunitária & traditional healer
- Comissão comunitária & religious leader
- Activist AAAJC & UPCT, community advisor
- Mbiri, spiritual leader
- FRELIMO 2nd secretary
- President of the soccer team & G-12
- Comissão comunitária
- Activist from UPCT & member of Comissão comunitária
- Community leader
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Interview (g)</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 community leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st secretario, FRELIMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 former liberation fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community policing (policia comunitária)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 persons from the community commission (comissão comunitária)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 members of G-12</td>
</tr>
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<td>TOTAL:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (i)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (g)</td>
<td>23 (6 women, 17 men)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tete Province:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marara, district headquarter,</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>2 persons from FRELIMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intensive interview (g)</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 persons from RENAMO</td>
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<td>TOTAL:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>intensive interviews (g)</td>
<td>8 (3 women, 5 men)</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intensive interviews (i)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interviews (g)</td>
<td>28 (4 women, 24 men)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focused group discussion (g)</td>
<td>30 (gender unknown)</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>Total participants:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87 (10 women, 47 male, 30</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>participant gender unknown)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**List of abbreviations:**

(i)=individual
(g)=group
Annex B: Intensive Interview Guidelines (Translated from the Portuguese)

Zambézia Case Study, Inhassunge District:
Analysis of the context and civil society action in relation to the disappearance of palm trees (and its dialectic with witchcraft accusations)

**Introduction to the research topic:** This interview is conducted in the context of a longer-term study. The study focuses on community strategies that aim to collectively resolve significant common problems. During a seminar in Quelimane your district/community has been suggested for inclusion in the study because it faces considerable economic problems linked to the disappearance of palm trees which in turn provokes various societal responses, e.g. witchcraft accusations. The responses of civil society actors is in the centre of the study, recognizing that they act in a unique context. The objective of this study is to appropriate the concept of civil society (a concept/idea that comes from the West/Europe) to the Mozambican reality. Underline at the beginning of the interview that all responses and further questions will be treated **confidentially.**

**Personal information**
Name of the interviewer:
Date of the interview:
Type of actor (government, association, NGO, political party, activist, traditional leader etc...):
Name of the organization (if relevant):
Position in the organization (if relevant):
Gender:
Age:

**Initial opening questions:**
1. How long have you lived in this district?
2. Please indicate which activity you carry out in the district?
3. What are the most important/critical events affecting the district?
4. How do you engage in these events? What motivates you to engage?
5. If you need any help, who helps or could help you?

**Intermediate questions:**
6. Do you know what civil society is or means?
   - If the participant doesn’t know the term civil society, try to explain the concept (e.g. use the term “bandja” to explain public space/meeting in which civil society operates).
   - If the participant knows the term, try to motivate them to explain the term.
7. Who is part of civil society?
8. Do you think civil society assumes its role in this district/your community? Explain your response.
9. What are the current future plans of civil society in this district/community?
10. What are the challenges that civil society could confront? Please indicate the causes/origins of these challenges.
11. What are and should be the objectives or tasks of civil society?
12. What do you know about the actions and plans of civil society in relation to the disappearance of palm trees (in case there is any action)?

13. Were these actions successful or did they confront any limitations/problems?

14. If there were limitations or successes, when did these start, and how was this experience for you? Have you played any role or did you collaborate?

15. Was there somebody (if at all), that influenced your engagement? Can you tell me how this person (or organization/institution) has influenced you?

16. If you look over the past, is there anything that stands out in your mind in relation to the disappearance of the palm trees?
   - If the issue of elder women/widows being accused of witchcraft and/or assassinated will be mentioned, try to deepen that aspect. If the issue hasn’t been mentioned, try to open the debate.
   - Ask if any person/group/institution benefits from the system of witchcraft accusation.

17. Can you please describe the most important lessons and experiences that you gained through your involvement into community problems?

18. Which person or organization has been most useful during your learning/experience or engagement?

19. What is happening in your life at the moment? How would you describe your way of life or world view before the palm trees disappeared? Has your opinion about civil society changed since?

20. What are the reasons for the disappearance of palm trees?

Concluding questions:

21. Who are the people most involved into the problem of palm tree disappearance in this community?

22. How do these people relate to civil society?

23. Is there anything additional that you think should be considered to understand the current situation of your/this community, the disappearance of palm trees or even the situation of assassinations of elder women/witchcraft accusations?

24. Would you like to ask us anything? Do you have questions?

End of the interview: Express appreciation for the participation and time given, the open interview atmosphere and exchange of information and ideas.

Interviewer’s observations about the flow of the conversation/interview (individual reflection after the interview):
### Annex C: Historical overview of civil society development in Mozambique in the period 1890-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key national civil society developments</th>
<th>National and international context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1890-1929</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- First newspapers established in Mozambique.</td>
<td>- Newspapers were sent to other Lusophone colonies, setting up communication and international civil society linkages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Newspapers raised a political voice, predominantly critical to the colonial regime, civic associations** emerged.</td>
<td>- The joint struggle with white movements (especially socialist parties and trade unions) was the foundation of the solidarity between the anti-establishment whites and FRELIMO (Sayaka 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In 1926, 97 newspapers were distributed in Mozambique (Sayaka 2012).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1930 – 1974</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Salazar and the politics ‘estado novo’, reconstructing civil society.</td>
<td>- Armed resistance and the global pan-African movements including the influential Catholic Church supported the liberation struggle from the late 60s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- New government affiliated non-governmental entities were established.</td>
<td>- Opponents were marginalized, even assassinated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Radical Mozambican civil society groups, led by intellectuals that studied abroad, went underground, exile.</td>
<td>- 1960, Massacre of Mueda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- FRELIMO brought various liberation movements under its command.</td>
<td>- Portuguese economic ties loosened and regional economic connections between Mozambique and South Africa gained importance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- New social class formations developed within Mozambican society.</td>
<td>- 1974, Peace Agreement of Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1975 – 1990</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- FRELIMO limited the development of civic groups and started to control religious groups.</td>
<td>- National Independence 1975, power handed over to FRELIMO, without major conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mass based organizations were established.</td>
<td>- FRELIMO adopts a Marxist-Leninist agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- FRELIMO used colonial ‘aldeamentos’ to establish ‘communal villages’</td>
<td>- FRELIMO, supported from a weak social basis lacked legitimacy in the centre and north of Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The gap between the new social classes – bourgeois (white, mixed and black) and political FRELIMO elite – and the traditional primordial societies, widened.</td>
<td>- A considerable portion of the 85% Mozambicans who lived in rural areas rejected FRELIMO’s socialisation politics that included giving up their traditional values and believes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civic and political opposition groups gained radical momentum.</td>
<td>- Surrounded by hostile South Africa and Rhodesia regimes and remaining political opponents from within, violence and chronic banditry broke out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Humanitarian INGOs provide considerable food aid.</td>
<td>- RENAMO, established outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key national civil society developments</td>
<td>National and international context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mozambique, supported by the South African apartheid regime, turns into a kind of unification of indigenous political movements. | - 1976 – 1992: 16 years of civil war.  
- Economic crisis and start of the change to market-orientation. Mozambique is admitted to the IMF and World Bank. Start of the Structural Adjustment Programme. |

* According to Sayaka (2012) the association movement lived its strongest time between 1910 and 1926 and extended the basis for the later anti-colonial or nationalist movement. Rocha (2002) goes even further and call this time period the ‘social basis of modern nationalism in Mozambique’.

Annex D: Overview of recent civil society development in Mozambique in the period 1990-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key national civil society developments</th>
<th>National and international context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990 – 1999</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Cold War ended with the fall of</td>
<td>- 1992, Signing of the General Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Berlin Wall, neoliberal theories</td>
<td>agreement between the Government of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of civil society prevailed and the</td>
<td>Mozambique led by FRELIMO and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paradigmatic change from ‘Nation-Building’ to ‘State and Society’ took place.</td>
<td>RENAMO in Rome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- An increasing number of INGOs emerged</td>
<td>- 1994, FRELIMO wins first multi-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Mozambique with their ‘domesticated’</td>
<td>parliamentary and presidential elections and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterparts. NGOs were directed</td>
<td>the same year, the Apartheid regime in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>towards service-delivery.</td>
<td>South Africa ended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1990 approval of a new constitution,</td>
<td>- 1998, first municipal elections in 33 cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including the ‘right of association’</td>
<td>(RENAMO did not run in these municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opening the door for legalizing various</td>
<td>elections).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>types of NGOs and associations.</td>
<td>- During the 1999 parliamentary and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- FBOs and some of the newly emerging</td>
<td>presidential elections FRELIMO sharply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs engaged into electoral education</td>
<td>defeated RENAMO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>and started to play a more significant role in the democratization process.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Influential civil society campaigns</td>
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<tr>
<td>on land and woman’s rights were</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>successfully influencing national laws.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Land Law approved in parliament.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- NGO registration and Reporting Degree</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>passed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000 – 2009</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investigating allegations of corruption in</td>
<td>- Approval of global MDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique’s largest bank.</td>
<td>- Monterrey Consensus at the International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Late 2000, local district councils</td>
<td>Conference on Financing for Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Conselhos Distritais Locais, CDL)</td>
<td>- 2003, Rome High Level Forum on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>were established providing official space for</td>
<td>Harmonisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society participation at district level</td>
<td>- Agenda 2025 - Visão e Estratégias da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>planning and development.</td>
<td>Nação (Moçambique) - approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2002, increase of Government control</td>
<td>- 2005, Joachim Chissano leaves presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through the revitalization of local party</td>
<td>and Armando Guebuza comes in, Guebuza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cells (de Brito et al. 2010).</td>
<td>is re-elected in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guidelines and initiatives were introduced</td>
<td>- PARPA II (2006-2010) approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that formally provide civil society spaces for policy influence and advocacy</td>
<td>- Food production decreases and poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Forquilha 2012):</td>
<td>levels are stagnant, in parts of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) 2003, LOLE, (Lei de Órgãos Locais do</td>
<td>even increasing; in parallel, high economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estado), a law regulating various</td>
<td>growth rates of 7 – 8% and promotion of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government functions at provincial,</td>
<td>extractive ‘mega-projects’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>district and lower state administration</td>
<td>- Social researchers and consultants such as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>levels. Traditional leaders were</td>
<td>Ilal (2008), Weimer &amp; Forquilha (2012) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>included into the formal governance system.</td>
<td>Topsøe-Jensen (2012) warn that the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) 2000 - 2004 the poverty observatory was set up, in 2004, the G20 (20 civil society</td>
<td>created participatory spaces are used to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizations) was established in order to</td>
<td>decentralize power and create patronage-client</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relationships.</td>
<td>- 2008, Ghana High Level Forum on Aid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Key national civil society developments

- Participate in PARPA elaboration and monitoring.
- **c)** 2005, PAI (*Presidência aberta e inclusiva*), presidency initiative aiming to bring governance closer to citizens, state officials and civil society.
- **d)** 2006, OIIL/FDD (*Fundo Distrital de Desenvolvimento*) supporting economic local development through the CDLs.
- **e)** 2007, National Election Council (CNE) (in 2012 CNE regulations were reformed) established composed by political parties and civil society representatives.

#### National and international context

- Hegemony of FRELIMO and the consolidation of the party state provoke widespread concern in the international community and resistance on the streets.

#### 2005

- 2005, PAI (*Presidência aberta e inclusiva*), presidency initiative aiming to bring governance closer to citizens, state officials and civil society.

#### 2006

- 2006, OIIL/FDD (*Fundo Distrital de Desenvolvimento*) supporting economic local development through the CDLs.

#### 2007

- 2007, National Election Council (CNE) (in 2012 CNE regulations were reformed) established composed by political parties and civil society representatives.

#### 2008

- 2008, violent protest against increased cost of living causing a number of deaths in urban centres.
- Most NGOs distance themselves from ad hoc protest movements and rather work through government programmes and aid funded projects (Cf. Follér & Johansson 2012, de Brito et al. 2014).

#### 2009

- Hostile and intimidating political environment, including accusations of belonging to the opposition (Topsøe-Jensen, 2012).

#### 2010 – 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7 people die in a riot in Gurue District (Zambézia Province) sparked by false rumors that health workers were spreading cholera. Violent protest in major urban areas with an armed response from Mozambican police (13 demonstrators died, more than 440 injured). Cellphone and SMS messages, (used for organizing protests) are being controlled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Food price riots and protests continue sporadically, civil war veterans demonstrate because they do not receive state pension. Phenomeno of witchcraft accusation increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Mozambican police raid a camp housing 300 supporters of the opposition RENAMO. Sporadic violent youth protest in Maputo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Various violent clashes between government forces and alleged members of REMANO in central Mocambique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>June 2013, tension flares between government authorities and the opposition RENAMO, prompting fears of a return to civil war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Government of Mozambique and donor officials announce that problems related to corruption and democratic development /elections are resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Various multi-national companies storm into Mozambique as natural resources (oil, minerals, precious stones etc…) are being found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>4th Municipal elections in a general peaceful environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>UN says more than 150,000 people have been displaced by flooding in Mozambique (overall death toll approximately 38).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>October 2013, Mozambique ex-rebel group RENAMO declared the end of the peace deal signed 21 years ago (after the...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key national civil society developments</td>
<td>National and international context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2013, NGOs and FBOs organize a mass demonstration in Maputo saying ‘no’ to war, corruption and crime, smaller provincial level mass demonstrations follow. Intimidation of NGO directors and CSO leaders increases.</td>
<td>Mozambican army has seized their military base).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2014, violent political-military tension rises, leading to death and the displacements of hundreds of people.</td>
<td>- September 2014, a new peace agreement is signed between Pres. Armando Guebuza and RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2015, assassination of Gilles Gistac, a constitutional lawer working on a proposal to extend the political decentralization process and strengthen regional autonomy. Other prominent figures are being assassinated. Targeted killing of RENAMO members in urban and rural areas.</td>
<td>- FRELIMO candidate Filipe Nyusi announced as the election winner (57% of votes) and new President of Mozambique. RENAMO won majority of votes in Central and partly Northern Provinces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Western-type NGOs remain relatively silent about the return to civil war in Mozambique; sporadic position papers circulate from think tanks.</td>
<td>- 2016, IMF and major bilateral donors suspend their funding after the discovery of disclosed government debt of more than 1 billion dollars.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex E: Initial codes and categories developed from interview notes and observations during field research in Inhassunge District