

Dublin City University
School of Communications

HITLER'S IRISH VOICES

The Story of German Radio's Irish
Propaganda Service, 1939-1945

A thesis submitted to Dublin City University in
candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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1995

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April 1995

DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy is entirely my own work and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

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Abbreviations, Foreign and Technical Terms

AA....Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office).
Abwehr...German Counterintelligence.
BA....Bundesarchiv, Potsdam (former National Archive of East Germany/DDR).
BBC...British Broadcasting Corporation.
BDC...Berlin Document Center, U.S. Embassy, Berlin.
Black propaganda...Pretence broadcasts purporting to come from behind enemy lines or from third countries.
Büro Concordia...Secret black propaganda radio unit, Berlin.
CSO...Central Statistics Office, Dublin
Deutschlandsender...German Radio's home stations.
DFA...Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin.
DNB...Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (German News Bureau).
DoF...Department of Finance, Dublin.
Domei...Japanese telegraph service.
DRA...Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv (German Broadcasting Archive), Frankfurt.
Europasender...German Radio's wartime European services.
FLK...Franciscan Library, Killiney, Co Dublin.
FWB...Foreign Wireless Broadcasts.
G.....Geheim (secret).
G-sender...Secret radio station.
G2....Irish Army's Intelligence Section.
IGN...Institut Geographique National, Brussels.
Irland-Redaktion...Irish propaganda service of German Radio, 1939-45.
IWM...Imperial War Museum, London.
Kult R...Cultural/political broadcasting unit at German Foreign Office.
LCD...Lord Chancellor's Department, London.
MA....Military Archives, Dublin.
NA....National Archives, Dublin.
NM....National Museum, Dublin.
NSA...National Sound Archive, London.
PoW...Prisoner of War.
PRO...Public Record Office, Kew (unless otherwise stated).
HO: Home Office records.
FO: Foreign Office records.

PRONI...Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast.
CAB 9CD: Cabinet Secretariat.
BBC MR: BBC Monitoring Reports.
RRG...Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft (German Broadcasting Company).
Ru...Rundfunk (radio/broadcasting).
Rundfunkhaus...Radio Centre.
TCD...Trinity College Dublin.
TX...Transmission, date of
UCC...University College Cork.
UCD...University College Dublin.
UCG...University College Galway.
USNA..United States National Archives, Washington, D.C.
VAA-RRG...German Foreign Office section for liaison with radio service.
White propaganda...propaganda which openly discloses its source.

Abstract

This thesis examines the origins, direction and control of German Radio's Irish propaganda unit in World War II. Known as the Irland-Redaktion, this unit was founded by a small group of Germans, some of whom had studied Irish folklore and language in the Gaeltacht regions in the 1920s and 1930s.

Drawing widely on archival sources in Belgium, Britain, Germany, Ireland and the United States - as well as incorporating interviews with key survivors of the Irland-Redaktion - the thesis attempts to define the structures, modus operandi and raison d'être of the radio service.

A detailed analysis, quoting numerous published and unpublished sources, seeks to place the output of the Irland-Redaktion in context by evaluating its structures and content, personnel and target audiences, in addition to its guiding themes and ascertainable effects.

The work endeavours to explore those features of the Irland-Redaktion which, it can be argued, set it apart from other propaganda services of Germany's wartime Europasender. These include the fact that overall control of the service from November 1941 to May 1945 rested with a member of the Irish civil service who had left Dublin for Berlin shortly before the outbreak of war.

The thesis also examines the special position of Ireland as a target for both English-language and Irish-language radio propaganda from Nazi Germany. While German Radio beamed programmes in 30 languages to other states and regions in Europe, Ireland's case was unusual. The newly independent state straddled the Atlantic shipping lanes and shared a disputed land frontier with the United Kingdom which was at war with Germany. The thesis seeks to place these and other factors in their proper context in relation to the radio service.

Finally, having dealt with the pre-war and war periods, the thesis describes the subsequent circumstances of those most directly involved in the operation of the Irland-Redaktion, through the immediate post-war years to the present day.

Foreword

The idea for this work, *Hitler's Irish Voices*, first occurred to me in the late 1980s while I was teaching in England on a postgraduate diploma course in radio journalism. I had planned to write about the work of William Joyce (Lord Haw Haw) and other 'renegade' broadcasters whose voices graced the airwaves from wartime Berlin. My plans were encouraged by a director of the college where I taught, one Gerard Mansell, better known as the former Deputy Director General of the BBC and head of BBC Radio's External Services. I also received encouragement from two other BBC men, Blair Thomson, one time Editor of BBC Radio's flagship current affairs programme *The World Tonight*, and David Smeeton, a former BBC correspondent in Germany.

In 1989 I returned to Ireland as a journalist employed in the newsroom of *Century FM*, the new national radio station. The heavy workload put paid to the Lord Haw Haw project. However, the idea was destined to resurface in another form following discussions with *Century FM*'s Head of News, Mr David Davin-Power, and two acknowledged experts on Ireland in the 1939-45 period: Lt. Col. (retd.) John P. Duggan, author of *Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich*, and the journalist Robert Fisk, author of *In Time of War*. It was on a visit to the Military Archive in Dublin's Cathal Brugha barracks, while reading through the transcripts of Francis Stuart's wartime broadcasts from Berlin, that I decided to focus my research on the Irish dimension of Germany's wartime radio propaganda effort rather than the English service as personified by William Joyce. This project was actually more attractive because, while a number of books had already been written on Haw Haw, little research had been undertaken on German Radio's wartime Irish service, the mysterious *Irland-Redaktion*. Fisk's *In Time of War* is the sole publication to have dealt with the radio operation in any detail. In a chapter spanning just 27 pages of a work devoted to 'Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality', Fisk briefly addresses some of the radio talks by Francis Stuart, Hans Hartmann and John O'Reilly. For its part, Maurice Gorham's *Forty Years of Irish Broadcasting*, covering the period from 1926 to 1966, devotes only 19 pages out of 336 to the 1939-45 'Emergency' period.

It seemed that the time was ripe for the history of the *Irland-Redaktion*

to be written. This was all the more so because, while wartime archives were becoming more accessible with the passage of almost half a century, some key personnel of the Irish service were alive and well, and willing to tell the tale. Even so, I approached the project with some initial apprehension. One of the first people with whom I discussed it was the veteran newspaper editor Liam Bergin. He greeted me at the door of his home in Dalkey with the words: 'A journalist is always welcome in my house.' Mr Bergin, who died in January 1994, told me all he knew of the period as well as pointing me in the right direction with some invaluable addresses in Germany.

In fact, my research was to take me not only to Germany but also Belgium and many parts of Britain and Ireland. I was assembling a jigsaw the pieces of which had been scattered to the four winds with the collapse of the Third Reich in May 1945. My task was not made easier by the fact that transcripts of the Irland-Redaktion's programmes are incomplete and not a single sound recording of the service's output appears to have survived.

The story could never have been told adequately without the help of key members of the Irland-Redaktion. These include the head (from December 1941 to May 1945) of the service, Dr Hans Hartmann. In December 1990 I met Dr Hartmann at his home in Cologne where, for the first time in almost half a century, he agreed to discuss the origins and operation of the service. Also of major assistance in compiling the study was the Irish writer, Francis Stuart, who granted me several interviews at his home in Dundrum. Stuart broadcast for Hartmann's service for almost two years from March 1942 to January 1944. Dr Hartmann's former assistant in the radio service, Dr Hilde Spickernagel, who now lives in retirement in Hanover, wrote many letters to me detailing aspects of the Irland-Redaktion as well as the Irish Desk at the Berlin Foreign Office where she also worked with Ribbentrop's main Irish expert, Dr Adolf Mahr. Another survivor of the Irish service, Nora O'Mara (also known as Róisín Ní Mheara), who lives near Berlin, was reluctant to discuss her role in detail. Nonetheless, some useful historical details are contained in her memoirs which were published in 1992.

Needless to say, the author is most grateful to the above for their help, without which this study would have been unavoidably superficial. Thanks are also due to Adolf Mahr's daughter, Mrs Ingrid Reusswig of

Gelnhausen, and Mahr's son, Dr Gustav Mahr of Berlin who, like his late father, is an archaeologist of note. The daughter of the late Charles Budina, Mrs Joan Medcalf, and the daughter of the late Colonel Fritz Brase, Miss Mona Brase, rendered valuable assistance for the completion of this work as did Mr Edward Sweney, brother of Irland-Redaktion member Mrs Susan Hilton.

The author also wishes to thank the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Gerard Collins TD, MEP, and the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr Noel Dorr, who arranged for hitherto restricted documents to be made available for this study. These files detail the then Department of External Affairs' protests to Germany concerning wartime broadcasts from Berlin by Francis Stuart.

The following persons who either heard the wartime broadcasts or worked before, during or after the war with Professor Mühlhausen or Dr Hartmann, provided detailed recollections to the author: Sean Ó Súilleabháin, Dublin; Sean Ó Heochaidh, Donegal; Hugh Byrne, Donegal; Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, Dublin; Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin; Eimear Ó Broin, Dublin; the late Dr Joseph Raftery, Dublin (a former director of the National Museum, Dublin); Miss Eileen Walsh, Dublin (secretary to Charles Bewley and later to William Warnock at the Irish legation in Berlin, 1933-43); Mr Maurice Irvine, the last surviving member of the BBC's wartime team of Gaelic monitors; Mr Vova Rubinstein and Miss Lorna Swire, both wartime monitors with the BBC.

The author is grateful for help and information received from the following experts in the field of Irish-German relations in the 1930s and 1940s: Lt. Col. (retd.) John P. Duggan; Professor Thomas P. O'Neill, Dublin; and Enno Stephan author of *Spies in Ireland* a book which did much to explain German-Irish links in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the more clandestine connections between both countries in the 1939-1945 period. German military documents relating to an invasion of Ireland (Operation Green) were made available to the author by Monsieur de Winter, Directeur, Institut Geographique National, Brussels, through the good offices of Monsieur Emmanuel de Beer de Laer, Directeur (retd.), Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Brussels, who also helped the author to trace details of the wartime operations of Radio Luxembourg.

The author wishes to acknowledge the help, encouragement and endless

patience of Dr Colum Kenny of Dublin City University who supervised the thesis from its earliest stage. Others who kindly gave of their time to read the draft document, and whose help the author wishes to acknowledge, include: Dr Hans Hartmann, Cologne; Dr Eunan O'Halpin of Dublin City University; the historian and author Mr Donal O'Donovan of Kilbride Books, County Wicklow; and Mr Thomas Turpin of Trinity College, Dublin.

The bulk of the archival material used in this thesis came from the Irish Army's Military Archive whose director, Commandant Peter Young, and staff provided the author with much valuable assistance over a number of years. Other archives containing transcripts of the Irland-Redaktion's programmes and details of its staff are to be found at the BBC's Written Archives Centre in Reading, Berkshire; the Imperial War Museum in London, and the Public Record Offices in Belfast, Chancery Lane and Kew. The assistance of the following is acknowledged: Dr Pat Wallace, director of the National Museum, Dublin; the director of the National Library, Dublin; the directors of the aforementioned Public Record Offices in Britain and Northern Ireland; and the director of the National Archive in Dublin where career records of the Irland-Redaktion broadcaster, John F. O'Reilly, are held. The author also acknowledges the help of the BBC's Written Archives Officer, Jacqueline Kavanagh, in tracing details of the Corporation's wartime Gaelic monitors. The author also wishes to thank the staff of the Lord Chancellor's Department in London which holds records on British subjects who worked for Germany's wartime radio services. Other key records were found at the German Foreign Ministry's political archive in Bonn, the U.S. Embassy's Berlin Document Center, and the Bundesarchiv bureau in Potsdam.

A number of specialised reference books covering broadcasting in Germany during the period of Nazi rule from 1933 to 1945 were provided by the Goethe Institute in Dublin whose library staff, Carola Hogreve and Monika Schlenger, the author wishes to thank. Translations of German texts were undertaken by Andrea Kunze-Galt, Christine Schuhmann, Deirdre Humphreys and Ursula Kopetschek. The author is grateful to the former and likewise to the following for their help with translations of Irish language material used in this thesis: Mr Eoghan Ó hAnluain of the Department of Modern Irish, University College Dublin; the broadcaster and translator Mr Seán Ó Briain, Dublin; and broadcasters John Walsh and Darina Ní Chinnéide. The assistance

of the following persons is also much appreciated: Art O'Leary, Journal Office, Leinster House; Maura Corcoran, Librarian of the Houses of the Oireachtas, and her staff including Dr Pat Melvin, Seamus Haughey and Maedhbh McNamara; Dr Seamus Mac Mathuna, University College Galway; Professor Conn R. O Cleirigh, UCD; Professor F.J. Byrne, UCD; Mr Tomas O Cathasaigh, UCD; Mr Tony Eklof, UCD Law Library; Fr Ignatius, Director of the Franciscan Library, Killiney, Co Dublin; Mr Mark Farrell, researcher; Mr Nicholas Carolan, Administrator of the Irish Traditional Music Archive, Dublin; Valerie Walsh, Dublin City University Library; and Mr Jim Brady, Dublin.

Introduction

When Eamon de Valera and his government colleagues gathered round the cabinet table in Dublin at 11 a.m. on 17 July 1934, they were faced with an agenda comprising four apparently mundane matters: the final item concerned the appointment of a new director of the National Museum which stood just a stone's throw from where the ministers were sitting in cabinet. The minutes of their meeting do not detail the discussions that took place round the table. All that remains on record is the formal cabinet decision which reads as follows:

National Museum: appointment of Director. The appointment by the Minister for Education of Dr Adolf Mahr as Director of the National Museum was approved. The meeting adjourned at 1.40 p.m.¹

Whether they knew it at the time or not, de Valera's government had formally promoted a stalwart member of Hitler's Nazi party to a senior, permanent and pensionable position in the Irish civil service.

Adolf Mahr, the Austrian born archaeologist and expert in prehistory, who had come to Ireland to work at the National Museum in 1927 at the age of 40, had been a card-carrying member of the Nazi party since 1 April 1933, just two months after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany.² After joining the Nazis, Mahr had been put in charge of the Irish branch of the influential Nazi Foreign Organisation (Auslandsorganisation or AO). The AO was created in 1934 to keep an eye on German communities outside the Fatherland. As local head of the AO, Adolf Mahr was the most powerful member of the small Austro-German community in pre-war Ireland. All visiting Germans had to report to him, and he amply demonstrated that his powers outstripped those of the German Legation's personnel in Dublin by getting two German diplomats recalled to Berlin in disgrace during the 1930s.³

A secret profile on Mahr, drawn up for de Valera in 1945, described the Austrian museum director as

an open and blatant Nazi [who] made many efforts to convert Irish graduates and other persons with whom he had associations, to Nazi doctrines and beliefs.⁴

Damning as this assessment of Mahr is, it appears that no security profile of Mahr was sought by the Irish cabinet prior to their 1934 decision to promote him to the top museum job. However, Mahr's extra-curricular activities in Ireland make clear that from 1933 to 1939, when he left for Berlin, the Austrian's principal allegiances lay not to the country of which he was a senior civil servant, but to Hitler's Third Reich. As Director of the National Museum, Mahr was in a key position to travel the country and assess the political climate of a newly independent state whose sentiments were far from pro-British. Mahr got to know his host country well. Visitors to his Dublin home at 37 Waterloo Place included the photographer, Joachim Gerstenberg, and the leading Celtologist and amateur photographer, Ludwig Mühlhausen, who had joined the Nazi party in 1932. Both men took hundreds of photographs around Ireland, and some of Mühlhausen's pictures later appeared in a German military handbook prepared to assist a top secret invasion of Ireland codenamed Operation Green. There is also evidence that, in the late 1930s, Adolf Mahr was supplying sensitive military information to a war maps office run by the SS in Prague.⁵

On 19 July 1939, Mahr left Ireland for the last time. Plans for his departure had been laid as early as December 1938 when a senior AO director visited Dublin to nominate another German, Heinz Mecking, as Mahr's eventual successor as local AO chief in the Irish capital. Mahr was going officially to represent his adopted country at an international archaeology congress in Berlin that August. He also intended holidaying in his native Tyrol region as well as attending the Nazi Party rally planned for Nuremberg in September - the annual rallying point for leading Nazis. But the 1939 rally never took place due to the outbreak of World War II at the beginning of September.

After the devastating war which destroyed the Third Reich, Mahr claimed that he tried unsuccessfully to return to Ireland in 1939. However, after the outbreak of war, he was recruited for government service in Berlin. The war brought a swift transformation for the Austrian archaeologist who had

spent the previous 12 years at the National Museum in Dublin. Mahr was put to work in the Irish section of the German Foreign Office which, among other things, tried, in August 1940, to land IRA leader Sean Russell in Kerry from a U-boat. Mahr also worked at the top secret black propaganda unit called Büro Concordia, as well as launching, in 1941, a new nightly radio service for Irish listeners. In addition, he drew up a top secret radio propaganda blueprint for Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop aimed at converting Irish communities around the world to the Nazi cause.⁶

From the outbreak of the Second World War on 3 September 1939, radio propaganda had a high priority in the capital of the Third Reich. So intent was the Nazi leadership on making sure that its message got through, not only to its opponents but also to neutrals and minorities within states, that by the summer of 1940 Germany's national broadcasting company (the Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft or RRG) was putting out programmes in 31 languages.⁷ These included the three Baltic tongues of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the language of the Faeroe Islands, in addition to Icelandic, Flemish and Irish. Berlin's weekly radio talks in Irish were inaugurated in December 1939 by the noted Celtic scholar, Professor Ludwig Mühlhausen, who had studied the language on various trips to Ireland from the late 1920s to 1937. From 1939 to mid-1941 German radio propaganda to Ireland comprised first weekly then twice-weekly talks in Irish by Mühlhausen and his academic protégé, Hans Hartmann, who had spent two and a half years studying Irish dialects and folklore in Ireland from April 1937 to September 1939.

The initial impetus for this limited service had come from Joseph Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry but the arrangement was considered unsatisfactory by Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office. Although he never broadcast himself, Mahr's role in shaping the Irish service was central. In March 1941 he drew up a blueprint for an extended radio propaganda service to Ireland. Once his proposals had received the official backing of the Foreign Ministry, Mahr set out to improve both the quality and quantity of the Irish service. In the wake of nightly test transmissions at the end of August, Mahr attended a planning meeting of the new 'Irish' team in Berlin on 8 September 1941. The meeting was also attended by Wolfgang Dignowity, who had already been chosen by the Propaganda Ministry as head of the Irland-Redaktion; by James Blair, an English journalist; and by Hilde

Poepping, a Berlin University graduate who worked with Mahr at the Foreign Office during the second half of 1941. The day after the meeting, Mahr wrote to his Foreign Office superiors exposing the fact that the man nominated by the Propaganda Ministry as head of the service, namely Dignowity, knew little or nothing about Ireland, was a Goebbels appointee, and had picked a non-Irish team for the Irish service. In November 1941, as a result of Mahr's protest, Dignowity was removed as head of the service together with two Frenchmen he had recruited. Shortly before Christmas 1941, Hans Hartmann was installed in Dignowity's place.⁸ A team was then assembled by Hartmann, at Mahr's behest, to put out the new nightly radio service from Berlin to Ireland. It included, most notably, the Irish writer Francis Stuart, whose first broadcast was made on 17 March 1942. None of its members was to become very familiar to radio listeners. The chief announcer for the England-Redaktion, William Joyce - who did become a household name in Britain and Ireland - never worked for the Irland-Redaktion. Joyce did offer 'to speak [on the Irland-Redaktion] to his Irish followers' but was turned down by Hartmann who believes that in 1943 Joyce may have been behind a series of anti-semitic radio talks to Ireland which were given under the name of Patrick Joseph Cadogan.⁹

Back in Dublin in the early 1940s, de Valera may have come to regret playing host to, and promoting, Adolf Mahr. At the end of 1942, one of Mahr's broadcasters, Francis Stuart, praised an IRA leader and, some months later, began to advise voters in the run up to the general election of June 1943. De Valera complained formally to Berlin about unwarranted German interference in Ireland's internal affairs.¹⁰ But by mid-1943 Berlin had other things on its mind than the far off protests of a small neutral state like Ireland. Adolf Mahr was firmly in control of the Irish desk at the Foreign Office, and the authorities in Dublin could only listen in growing distain as the propaganda machine run by a senior member of the Irish Civil Service swung into action every night from Berlin.

Berlin's Irish broadcasts were seen by Dublin as an intrusion and had the potential to place de Valera in an embarrassing position. The war had put his neutrality policy firmly under the international spotlight. Many other countries had also chosen a neutral path at the outset of the war but few in Europe were able to maintain this position beyond mid-1940 as the German war machine extended its influence across the continent. In addition

to Ireland these few neutral states were, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and Turkey. On 2 September 1939, de Valera told the Dáil:

...when you have powerful states in a war of this sort, each trying to utilise whatever advantage it can for itself, the neutral state, if it is a small state, is always open to considerable pressure.¹¹

The political environment of the war years was further complicated by the fact that Northern Ireland was not neutral. British, and later American, troops were stationed there. But, although Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom, military conscription was never introduced there. Churchill felt it would be 'more trouble than it is worth to enforce such a policy' in the North.¹² Dublin's neutrality policy meant that German and Italian legations could function alongside a British diplomatic mission although the parties were at war on the European battlefronts.

Underlining the importance the Germans attached to Ireland's neutral stance, Hans Hartmann regularly signed off his Irish language broadcasts from Berlin with the words 'Coinnigh bhur neodracht' (keep your neutrality). As Hartmann pointed out after the war, Irish neutrality 'was a part of the war aims'.¹³ Among other German considerations, a neutral Ireland could not be expected to hand back the westerly ports of Berehaven, Cobh and Lough Swilly to Britain which had relinquished control of them in 1938.¹⁴

So it was that in 1939 the curtain rose on a radio propaganda war that would affect neutral and belligerent states alike. The situation was in stark contrast to friendlier pre-war times when, for example, the *BBC Yearbook* of 1932 contained a fraternal message from the director of the German Broadcasting Company, D.H. Giesecke, reviewing the progress of his country's fledgling wireless service.¹⁵ Almost ten years earlier, in November 1922, the BBC's 2LO transmitter in London had started up and German radio had come on air the following year. In Ireland the BBC's Belfast transmitter 2BE went into service in September 1924. and Dublin's 2RN station began broadcasting on New Year's Day 1926¹⁶ with a speech by Dr Douglas Hyde, 'founder of the Gaelic League, the most respected figure in the Irish language movement, and later President of Ireland'.¹⁷

In his article for the *BBC Yearbook* of 1932, Giesecke proudly spelled


out for his British readers the achievements of German Radio in the period from 1923-31. The article was illustrated with a fine aerial photograph of Berlin's custom-built radio centre, the Rundfunkhaus. Just seven years later, from the same building, Hitler's best known English-language propagandist, William Joyce, would spread disquiet among Britain's civilian population with forecasts of imminent Luftwaffe bombing raids. A diagram of the Reich's broadcasting stations, which appeared alongside Giesecke's article, showed the extent of radio cover in Germany at that time. From Berlin, which would shortly become the centre of the Nazi empire, the transmission system stretched out to Aachen on the Belgian border, Freiburg on the French and Swiss borders, north to Flensburg on the Danish border, south to Munich, and east to Königsberg serving East Prussia. In the early 1930s German Radio seemed to have no limit to its horizons. A performance of Wagner's opera *Tristan*, recorded at the Bayreuth summer festival in 1931, was rebroadcast by 200 stations in three continents.

Anxious no doubt to forestall British claims that Germany might be lagging behind the BBC, having started transmissions a year later than London, Giesecke wrote:

The invention of wireless telephony did not, in Germany, lead at once to the introduction of broadcasting; the political and economic situation at the time pointed to the necessity of placing this new gift first of all - in the form of a system of wireless communication - at the service of trade and commerce. Only when the utilisation of wireless telephony for economic purposes had been sufficiently secured was it possible to liberate some wavelengths for broadcasting.

Germany's Radio Director thus made it clear that the new 'gift' was to benefit the political and business community first, and the general public second. His choice of the word 'political' is a reminder that German Radio was subject to political control even before the Nazis came to power. At the time, each of German Radio's ten regional companies was overseen by a political supervisory committee.

The Nazi takeover of January 1933 set the radio agenda for the following 12 years. With the new Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels anxious, as he put it, to 'boot out the old regime', by mid-1933 Germany's Broadcasting



The above diagram, which appeared in the *BBC Yearbook* of 1932, shows the extent of German Radio's transmission system the year before the Nazis came to power. As well as utilising transmitters in Germany, from mid-1940 to May 1945, the Irland-Redaktion also used transmitters in the Netherlands (Kootwyk and Hilversum), Norway (Oslo), Luxembourg, and France (Rennes and Calais).

Commissioner, Hans Bredow, had been sacked, 136 RRG officials had been dismissed or moved sideways, and three had reportedly committed suicide. Goebbels appointed a former motor mechanic, Eugen Hadamowsky, as his new director of programmes.¹⁸ The changeover was stark. In late 1932, German Radio had broadcast a talk by Leni Riefenstahl on her film trip to Greenland (11 October 1932), U.S. President Roosevelt's election address from Washington (9 November 1932), a talk by writer Thomas Mann (10 November 1932), and Pope Pius XI's Christmas Eve message from the Vatican (24 December 1932). From 30 January 1933 onwards there was national socialism and little else. Listeners to German Radio's domestic service could hear a talk on the national socialist press in America by Kurt Lüdecke (3 February 1933), or a broadcast from Rome about fascism and national socialism by Professor Guido Bortolotto (15 February 1933). Nazi radio's musical diet was dubbed 'Eine Kleine Schlachtmusik' (a little battle music) by BBC monitors. It typically comprised military marches and the Horst Wessel song, along with Richard Wagner and Beethoven, interspersed with speeches by Hitler, Goebbels and Goering.¹⁹

One BBC wartime radio commentator notes that:

The Nazis were quick to recognise the power of the wireless, and they made sure that not only the Führer's rabble-rousing rantings but all the cheers and drums and ecstatic descriptions of the Brownshirts' marches and rallies were sent throbbing into the air from every German broadcasting station. Without public radio, without their cunning exploitation of it to appeal unscrupulously to mass emotions, Hitler and his adherents could not have gained so swiftly and surely their ascendancy and backing in the Fatherland and their fatal stranglehold on the surrounding peoples.²⁰

Through the next twelve years of centralised Nazi control of the radio system, Roosevelt was not heard of again except when portrayed as the 'number one enemy of peace'. Leni Riefenstahl supported the Nazi cause, and her films of Hitler - notably *Triumph of the Will* - approached the level of deification. Thomas Mann, in exile in the United States, broadcast anti-Nazi talks which were relayed to European listeners by the BBC.²¹

Berlin's decision, in December 1939, to launch a series of weekly Irish-

language broadcasts constituted the Nazis' first radio propaganda drive aimed specifically at an Irish audience. In 1941 a second Irish propaganda initiative was launched from Berlin. A third and final initiative was attempted, unsuccessfully, in the 1943-44 period. Its aim was to reach Irish American listeners in the United States.²²

Chapter 1

A Nazi Radio Service For Ireland

The raison d'être of a propaganda campaign

The origins of German Radio's wartime Irish service are to be found, along with the beginnings of the entire Nazi propaganda network, in the words of the party's founding father, Adolf Hitler. In *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle), Hitler laid much of the blame for Germany's defeat in 1918 on enemy propaganda and Germany's failure to develop properly the propaganda weapon for its own ends:

In England...propaganda was regarded as a weapon of the first order, while in our country it was the last resort of unemployed politicians and a comfortable haven for slackers. And, as was to be expected, its results all in all were zero.¹

Hitler also described enemy propaganda as 'seduction' under which 'the [German] army gradually learned to think as the enemy wanted it to'.² The corollary was that, from the start of the Second World War, enemy, occupied and neutral states would gradually learn to think as Hitler's Nazi party wanted them to.

The Nazi party leader's determination that German war propaganda would not fail a second time stemmed not only from his bitter experiences as a corporal in the First World War but also from his work, from 1919, as head of propaganda with the German Workers' party which, in 1920, became the Nazi party.³

As chief propagandist of the new party, Hitler boasted of having 'found the means, not only to render [our opponents'] propaganda ineffective, but in the end to strike its makers with their own weapon'. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler disclosed his admiration for 'the indefatigable and truly enormous propaganda work' of Marxist agitators.⁴

Once the Nazis came to power in 1933, it was predictable that radio would play a central role in their plans since Hitler has decreed that 'the spoken word...alone...is able to bring about really great changes...All great, world-shaking events have been brought about, not by written matter, but by the spoken word'.⁵ According to Shulman, Hitler 'converted radio

into an aggressive weapon of foreign policy. By the end of the 1930s German Radio was on the air over 21 hours a day, working to divide, confuse, and fragment the world'.⁶

For Hitler, 'the function of propaganda is to attract supporters...the supporter is made amenable to the movement by propaganda', and 'propaganda tries to force a doctrine on the whole people'.⁷ The Nazi leader described his own brand of propaganda as 'radical and inflammatory'⁸ and was unequivocal about its tasks: 'the first task of propaganda is to win people for subsequent organisation...the second task of propaganda is the disruption of the existing state of affairs and the permeation of this state of affairs with the new doctrine'.⁹ Hitler also maintained that there was a direct correlation between the success of propaganda and the size of a revolutionary organisation: 'if propaganda has imbued a whole people with an idea, the organisation can draw the consequences with a handful of men...the better the propaganda has worked, the smaller the organisation can be...and vice versa; the poorer the propaganda is, the larger the organisation must be'.¹⁰ Hitler saw the correct use of propaganda as 'a true art'¹¹ and 'a frightful [weapon] in the hand of an expert'.¹² Propaganda, which 'must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses', was too important to be left to 'any old simpleton...the most brilliant psychologists would have been none too good'.¹³

It is clear, however, from Hitler's propaganda formula that he considered his target audience to be closer to the simpleton model than the brilliant psychologist one:

It is a mistake to make propaganda many-sided...the receptivity of the great masses is very limited, their intelligence is small, but their power of forgetting is enormous. In consequence of these facts, all effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must harp on these in slogans until the last member of the public understands.¹⁴

In 1939, Nazi radio propaganda to foreign countries was pitched, according to Grandin, at a different target audience from that of communist radio propaganda: 'whereas the Soviet appeal [i.e. of Radio Moscow's world service] is made principally to workers and peasants, the German radio seeks support abroad among bourgeois elements'.¹⁵

But whatever the differences of approach between the Soviet and Nazi radio systems, a link has been discerned between potential supporters of the extreme left and extreme right on the political spectrum: 'Communism and Fascism or Nazism although poles apart in their intellectual content are similar in this, that both have emotional appeal to the type of personality that takes pleasure in being submerged in a mass movement and submitting to superior authority.'¹⁶

Given Hitler's thoughts on propaganda, it was not surprising that after taking over as Reichkanzler on 30 January 1933 he wasted little time in putting propaganda matters high on the agenda. Forty-three days after coming to power, the Führer established by decree his Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by Joseph Goebbels: 'It is to form the vital contact', Dr Goebbels explained, 'between the national government, as the expression of the popular will, and the people themselves'.¹⁷

Hitler and Goebbels are widely regarded as being among the foremost exponents of propaganda both in print and on the air, though on balance it is said that both 'believed in the primacy of the spoken over the written word as an instrument of thought control'.¹⁸ Their greatest advantage was the psychological condition of their audience, for the German Weimar government had failed to provide the leadership that would have restored German confidence and morale after 1918, and the German people were desperately searching for the answers to their political nightmare.¹⁹ True to the policy of his master's voice, Goebbels instructed the manufacturers to produce a people's radio set whose two valves would be powerful enough to receive the German stations but too weak to catch much of what was said abroad. 'The different things said by Hitler at different times could no longer be contradicted; they would be echoed; the German masses were about to receive the myth of national socialism. By an audible stimulus the people were to be conditioned in the course of years as methodically as the dogs in the laboratories of Pavlov.'²⁰

In practice German radio propaganda was used throughout the 1930s to support Nazi policies, - in the case of the Rhineland occupation in 1935, the Saar plebiscite in 1936, the Berlin Olympics of the same year, and the 1938 Anschluss - the annexation of Austria.²¹

That Nazi radio would in time turn its attentions outwards to the rest of Europe and the world was never in doubt. In 1933, the new Nazi director

of the German Broadcasting system, Eugen Hadamowsky, termed radio a 'sharp and reliable weapon'. He ensured that 'high-powered stations were concentrated on the frontiers - Königsberg for Poland; Hamburg and Bremen for England; Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Saarbrücken for France'.²² The Sudetenland crisis of March 1939 sparked the use of foreign language news services by German radio to large and small states alike. Among the smaller states targetted by Nazi radio were Portugal, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.²³ By May 1939 German radio was also broadcasting in Norwegian, Danish, and Slovakian.²⁴

By the late 1930s the number of radio sets worldwide had grown to over 70 million.²⁵ In Ireland the number of radio licences issued rose sharply in the 1930s from 50,500 in 1935 to 100,000 in 1937. The peak of licences issued in one year was reached in 1941 at 183,000.²⁶ Theoretically, these statistics augured well for German Radio's overseas services, particularly once war had begun.

One effect of international radio propaganda is the influence it has on the standards of all communications media: 'It provides a challenge which cannot be ignored.'²⁷ Britain was not slow to take up the challenge: 'One of the characteristic features of Britain's overseas propaganda between the wars was that it began, almost without exception, as a direct response to the activities of other countries. It was thus, strictly speaking, counter-propagandist in the widest sense.'²⁸ One study of BBC Radio's World Service notes that: 'Only four months after the outbreak of war the BBC had...added seven new languages to the existing nine...By the end of 1939 broadcasting in German had been increased to one and a half hours a day'.²⁹ These services were believed to be effective, a former BBC wartime news editor noting in 1970 that: 'There can be no doubt that the BBC's broadcasts to Europe accelerated the downfall of the Nazi regime.'³⁰

Formation and structure of a propaganda service

From December 1939 to June 1941 Ludwig Mühlhausen was in charge of the German Radio's Irish service - the Irland-Redaktion. From June 1941 to November 1941 the service was run by Wolfgang Dignowity. Both Mühlhausen and Dignowity worked on behalf of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. From November 1941 to May 1945 the Irish service was run by Adolf Mahr and Hans Hartmann on behalf of Ribbentrop's Foreign Office. Throughout the war the

service's primary, discernable objectives remained the same regardless of whether overall control was exercised by the Propaganda Ministry or the Foreign Office. These objectives were as follows:

1. to ensure that Ireland remained neutral.
2. to ensure that Irish listeners understood the Nazi message.
3. to ensure that as few people as possible sided with the Allied cause.
4. to appeal to nationalist aspirations on unity.
5. to appeal to Catholic fears of atheistic Bolshevism and Judaism.
6. to provide a familiar service that would have the potential to play a more important role in the event of (a) a German invasion of Éire; (b) a British or U.S. invasion of Éire; (c) a successful pro-German coup d'état against the Dublin government; (d) a German invasion of Britain.³¹

The Foreign Office's takeover of the Irish service in late 1941 mirrored the rivalry between Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Nazi propaganda in general fell victim to their power struggle, which has been described as 'a battle of authorities characteristic of the Third Reich'.³²

Adolf Mahr and Ribbentrop insisted that the Irish service be used to support Ireland's independence and neutrality but at Ribbentrop's propaganda conference in Berlin in May 1941, which laid the groundwork for the launch of the nightly Irish service three months later, Ireland was described as a country 'standing under the yoke of Great Britain'. Ribbentrop appeared not to accept that, despite being nominally a member of the Commonwealth, the Free State and later Éire had not been under the 'yoke' of Britain since gaining independence in 1922.³³

In addition, the German Foreign Minister seems to have considered Scotland and Wales as being in a similar position to Ireland. Thus, one study of Germany's wartime propaganda to Britain remarks that:

Ribbentrop, despite his time in London [as German ambassador] and ample opportunities to learn better, was convinced that the tyrannical English were holding down the other races in the British Isles by force and that these minorities were awaiting their chance of overthrowing their oppressors.³⁴

Another study maintains that clandestine Welsh and Scottish nationalist stations, operated by the Nazis,

were founded upon Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's incorrect belief that the Scots and Welsh were awaiting the opportunity to depose their English overlords. Ribbentrop equated these regions with Northern Ireland, where the IRA advocated secession from Great Britain. It was beyond Ribbentrop's abilities to understand that Ireland had been an internal colony of Great Britain, whereas Scotland and Wales were not.³⁵

Neutrality the key issue

As war broke out in Europe, Ireland's Minister for Post and Telegraphs, Paddy Little, remarked that 'it is sometimes very much wiser for a small, neutral country to keep silent'.³⁶ He was presumably not suggesting that the state radio service, Radio Éireann, should go off the air as Radio Luxembourg did until the Grand-Duchy was occupied by the Germans on 10 May 1940.³⁷ Radio Éireann continued transmissions throughout the war years, though extreme care was taken to maintain a neutral line and strict censorship, including a ban on weather forecasts, was in force.³⁸

The wartime Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera:

insisted that neutrality was based on prudence, not cowardice; he did fear that Ireland might become a 'cockpit' or a 'side-show' to a German invasion of Britain. He also feared that if the British returned either by invitation or invasion they might not withdraw at the conclusion of the war. De Valera knew well that no policy other than neutrality was politically possible.³⁹

De Valera believed that it would have been 'suicide' to abandon neutrality. There were some who 'appreciated that Irish neutrality might even be the best possible policy from the Allied viewpoint'.⁴⁰ But it suited the Axis too. From December 1939 onwards through the war, German Radio's Irish service praised and supported de Valera's policy of neutrality. Irish neutrality, according to one wartime head of the Irland-Redaktion, was considered important in Berlin because:

It was a part of the war aims. One can start from the assumption that Hitler did not actually want to attack England. He favoured a solution, or a distribution of the world, leaving the east to him and the seas and the west to England and America. Then, when de Valera declared his neutrality, Hitler said to himself that that was the best thing for him too. He really wanted to respect Ireland's neutrality if Ireland was not foolish enough to make some move to make that difficult for him; to force him into another attitude. Irish neutrality was really one of the objectives which was in conformity with German policies.⁴¹

Although Hans Hartmann would claim after the war that there had been 'no danger of a German invasion' of Ireland, the threat of German military action in the event of Ireland's abandoning its neutrality policy was first made by Hartmann in a broadcast from Berlin on 28 December 1941 when he remarked that

The fine edifice of the Republic would collapse immediately if the Irish government did not succeed in avoiding war and maintaining neutrality. In addition, it is likely that in such a case the war would be fought on Irish soil despite the long-standing friendship between Germany and Ireland. This means that there is no other course open to the Irish people, if they have sense and do not wish to commit suicide, but to defend their neutrality at any cost...I should not like to see Ireland completely destroyed and to see everything achieved after the last war brought to nothing again.⁴²

Hartmann's threat may have lent weight to the Taoiseach's fears, as 'what in particular terrified de Valera was the prospect of a German invasion of nationalist areas north of the border'.⁴³ Alarm at Germany's success coupled with fear of a German invasion and a German/IRA link-up, prompted de Valera to sanction top level discussions between the Irish and British armies aimed at soliciting British help in the event of a German invasion.⁴⁴

One historian claims that, apart from the potential military problems involved in launching a successful invasion of the United Kingdom, another restraining factor was 'Hitler's doctrinaire inclination towards his

British enemy, whom he continually tried to win round through offers of peace, having no desire to run the risk of an invasion and an extension of the war with the British'.⁴⁵ Since an invasion of Ireland could have been the prelude to an invasion of Britain, the former could be ruled out by the same criteria. While Hitler himself, in December 1940, claimed that 'possession of Ireland could have the effect of ending the war', he accepted the counsel of his military advisers that, strategically, German 'occupation of the island of Ireland was impossible' if Ireland were not at war with Britain.⁴⁶

The Irland-Redaktion supported Ireland's neutrality, while Nazi Germany's domestic radio service represented it as a form of hostility towards Britain:

German policy does not recognise neutrality, except when it has been 'violated' by Germany's enemy. In the first months of the war, all neutrals were said to suffer from British oppression; the blockade was damaging their economic interests...Information on neutral countries presented to the German listener was focused on this subject, and by the spring of 1940 there was in Nazi propaganda a Germany defending the neutrals against British supremacy and British aggression. In reality, or for propaganda purposes, few countries have retained their neutral status. In propaganda...Ireland was at all times England's implacable enemy.⁴⁷

As noted earlier, there was a particular strategic reason why Germany had every interest in backing a continuation of Irish neutrality. Neutral Ireland was unlikely ever to grant wartime control of its three treaty ports at Lough Swilly, Berehaven and Cobh to the Allies. Britain had withdrawn from them in 1938 and was thus unable to combat U-boats and other enemy shipping from these three most westerly ports. This situation made it easier for German naval power to cut Britain's vital supply lines. The British considered the scenario in a top secret memorandum drafted for the British war cabinet. Dated 30 May 1940, this concluded that: 'A neutral Eire assists Germany in the general prosecution of the war, and denies to us the use of important naval bases.'⁴⁸

While German propaganda supported de Valera's neutral stance, U.S. propaganda later attacked it, as Bowman explains:

American propaganda against Irish neutrality was especially cynical since Ireland's and America's policy was identical. Both disliked the war, both were insistent on neutrality. Both said they would remain neutral unless attacked. America was attacked and joined the war. Ireland was not, and stayed out.⁴⁹

But just how neutral was Ireland? One study of the period notes that 'after America's entry into the war, Ireland became less strategically important and Irish neutrality became more openly benevolent; from 1942 stranded Allied air crews were sent straight to Northern Ireland, while Germans were interned'.⁵⁰

Lee notes that 'in so far as Germany had a coherent Irish policy, it was largely directed at keeping Ireland neutral', but he adds that the Irish attitude to neutrality was not so clear cut:

It was from Britain that the only serious invasion threat could come unless she herself fell. Had Britain's circumstances become so desperate that she considered Southern Irish bases crucial to her survival, she would have inevitably seized them, with unpredictable consequences for Irish domestic politics. It was therefore in de Valera's interest that Britain's case should not reach desperation point. He consequently played, as he had to play, a double game. He rigidly maintained the formality of Irish neutrality right to the end, even to the extent of raising a storm of indignant Allied protest when conveying his condolences to Hempel on the death of Hitler. But he simultaneously took care to co-operate sufficiently with Britain, and later with the United States, to ensure that they did not feel provoked into aggressive action against Irish interests. He had to ensure that Britain could not acquire by conquest much more than she gained through co-operation. He could not, and did not, keep Ireland strictly neutral during the war. He kept Ireland benevolently neutral for Britain.⁵¹

Profile of a propaganda team

The team of propagandists which staffed the Irland-Redaktion from 1939 to 1945 could not be compared with those working at the neighbouring England-Redaktion office. The Irish team was overwhelmingly academic in nature - five of them worked at Berlin University⁵² - while most members of the English team were not professional academics. A number of the latter group had been either fascist sympathisers and/or active in pre-war fascist groups in England.⁵³ Only one person spanned the Nazi radio services beamed to both Ireland and Britain: she was Mrs Susan Hilton (née Sweney) who began broadcasting for the 'black' Scottish service of German Radio - known as Radio Caledonia - in September 1941 after a brief spell with another 'black' unit, the Christian Peace Movement station. Hilton began working for the Irland-Redaktion on 2 January 1942 when she made her first broadcast to Ireland.⁵⁴

The Nazi authorities appear to have taken full advantage of the fact that foreigners based in Berlin could be persuaded or coerced into service on the radio. In such cases it mattered little whether the potential broadcasters had come voluntarily to Berlin before the war (as in the case of Eduard Dietze, the Glasgow-born propagandist who worked in the England-Redaktion), after the war began (as in the case of Francis Stuart who took up a teaching post in Berlin University in January 1940 and John O'Reilly who travelled from the Channel Islands to Germany in July 1941), or had arrived in occupied Europe as prisoners of war (as was the case of Susan Hilton).

Failure to assist the German war effort by carrying out broadcasting duties carried severe penalties. At least five foreign broadcasters are known to have been punished by the Nazis; three from the Irland-Redaktion and two from the England-Redaktion. The Irland-Redaktion's Sonja Kowanko was forced to work in a factory when the Gestapo found 'objectionable' material in one of her letters.⁵⁵ The England-Redaktion's James Gilbert was interned in a camp when he tried to leave the radio service.⁵⁶ Susan Hilton herself was imprisoned by the Gestapo in Vienna in 1944 and spent the final eight months of the war in a women's internment camp in Germany.⁵⁷ Norman Baillie-Stewart, who worked for the English service, narrowly escaped a concentration camp when he fell out with one of his radio employers.⁵⁸ In January 1944 when Francis Stuart refused to broadcast anti-Soviet

propaganda he was sacked, had his passport confiscated and received anonymous threats by telephone.⁵⁹

German Radio used the services of English men and women and Germans with fluent English on its programmes to Britain. For its part, the BBC employed native German speakers like Sefton Delmer.⁶⁰ Both sides used groups that were sheltering abroad to broadcast messages to third countries in the hope of ending German or British occupation there. These included, in London, de Gaulle's Free French, and in Berlin, Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian nationalists. Perhaps mistakenly, one commentator lumps the radio propagandists of wartime Berlin together in one sweeping condemnation as,

a polyglot assembly of speakers of all nations, colours, and diverse creeds wait to go on the air to the glory of Greater Germany - a fantastic assortment of traitors, propaganda mercenaries, confused idealists, fanatics, and plain riffraff.⁶¹

But this definition does not include those working under coercion, those for whom broadcasting was only part-time work, nor those - including journalists from neutral countries - who saw little contradiction in living in wartime Berlin and broadcasting messages to neutral states including Ireland, Turkey, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal and (until December 1941) the USA. Many nationalists in Berlin, including Bretons, Irish, Croats and Indians, perhaps naively - saw in Hitler's plans a chance to seize national independence from a dominant power. As the conflict progressed beyond the 'phoney war' period of 1939 and early 1940, through the sweeping Nazi successes of mid-1940, to the reversal of the Soviet campaign from December 1941, there was no escape for those who had chosen to use the Nazi microphones for whatever reason. The alternatives to continuing to work at the radio might well be death or incarceration.

The position of foreign broadcasters in Berlin was dictated by the nature of the war itself. The Allied leaders had declared their goal as the 'unconditional surrender' of Germany while Goebbels reply was a policy of 'total war'.⁶² The uncompromising nature of the British attitude to Nazi Germany was summed up by Churchill's political intimate and Minister for Information, the Tipperary-born Brendan Bracken who said: 'It's too late for redemption. They're all tarred with the same diabolical brush.'⁶³

The target audience

The German Radio Company, RRG, began broadcasting in 1923 but did not carry foreign language programmes until the Nazis came to power ten years later. English-language material for North America comprised the first such shortwave items in April 1933 and were followed later the same year by Spanish-language transmissions.⁶⁴ Irish-language broadcasts were a continuous feature of German Radio's European services throughout the war years. While other minority languages came and went - Slovenian, for example, had disappeared from the airwaves by the end of 1940 - Irish was always there.⁶⁵ While English-language programmes were also a constant part of the European services, English-language programmes specifically targetted to Ireland were only featured from August 1941 onwards.

From December 1939 to August 1941 German Radio's Irland-Redaktion chose to beam only Irish-language talks to Irish listeners, indicating that the Nazi propoganda machine was not chasing a mass audience in Ireland at that time. Nor was it making any attempt to tap the worldwide Irish emigrant audience, particularly in the United States. The fact that both Ireland and America were neutral during this period may have been one reason for a 'softly, softly' approach by the German broadcasting service. We will see elsewhere in this thesis that Dr Adolf Mahr, the Irish expert in the Berlin Foreign Office, considered these omissions to be mistakes when, in March 1941, he argued for an extension of the radio service to include English-language material for Ireland as well as for Irish audiences around the world.

The impact of Irish-language broadcasts from wartime Berlin was bound to be limited to those who had access to radio sets and who also had a comprehensive understanding of Irish. As Mahr pointed out in his analysis of the early war propoganda from Germany to Ireland, the audience was essentially restricted to those in the Gaeltacht who had radios and were predisposed to listen, as well as those he termed, 'politically important...language enthusiasts amongst the educated sections of society'.⁶⁶

The propogandist's audience, according to one definition, may be divided into three categories: 1. those who are initially predisposed to react as the propogandist wishes; 2. those who are neutral or indifferent; and 3. those who are in opposition or perhaps even hostile.⁶⁷ It may be presumed

that all three categories of listener were present in Ireland in the war years.

The decision by Ribbentrop in May 1941 to expand the radio propaganda services to Ireland can be seen as a significant turning point in Germany's consideration of the importance of Irish neutrality, certainly in propaganda terms and perhaps in strategic terms also. There was every reason to believe that, as Mahr had indicated, a much wider audience could be reached by broadcasting in both English and Irish to Irish audiences, and by increasing the broadcasts from Sunday and Wednesday nights to every night of the week. A survey of European radio listeners published in August 1941 in the German paper *Wirtschaft und Statistik* - coincidentally the same month in which the *Irland-Redaktion* began nightly test transmissions from Berlin to Ireland - stated that there were 179,600 radio listeners in Eire or 60.3 radio listeners per thousand inhabitants.⁶⁸

Although the figures for Irish radio listeners - as a percentage of the population - were well below those of Britain, Germany, France, Scandinavia and the Benelux nations, they were above countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, Romania, Portugal, Bulgaria, Spain and Turkey. In any case, the number of radio listeners in any one country does not appear to have been a major factor in determining German Radio's target audiences since practically every potential audience was exploited. They included listeners in enemy states, occupied territories and neutrals as well as ethnic groups within belligerent and neutral states.

Since audience research did not feature as part of the Irish broadcasting industry until the 1950s it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish whether German Radio reached its intended Irish target-audience in the war years. The consensus would appear to be that the audience was small because: 1. the signal was weak; 2. after the 'phoney war' period to mid-1940 Irish newspapers no longer listed foreign radio programmes and wavelengths;⁶⁹ 3. for the first 23 months of the war, programmes specifically for Ireland were broadcast only in Irish; and 4. once the tide of war had turned in favour of the Allies there was less reason to listen to the losing side. The *Irland-Redaktion's* programmes had a following in Gaeltacht areas, particularly County Donegal, and among Irish Celtic scholars who - like listeners in Donegal - would have known Ludwig Mühlhausen and/or Hans Hartmann.

De Valera's government was kept informed of the broadcasts from Berlin through the Department of External Affairs which received transcripts of German radio programmes from Irish Army Intelligence. The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, Frank Aiken, also received copies of the transcripts. Despite being furnished regularly with transcripts, the government appears to have been largely unconcerned by the content of the broadcasts and only reacted twice, privately through diplomatic channels, when the Berlin broadcasts touched on sensitive Irish issues. The first occasion was in December 1942 when Francis Stuart praised the IRA's northern commander, Hugh McAteer. The second was in May 1943 following a series of talks by Stuart advising Irish voters not to back Fine Gael in the general election set for 22 June 1943.⁷⁰

The propaganda mix

The propaganda which was broadcast to Ireland from Nazi Germany may be divided into two distinct periods. Firstly, that from December 1939 to November 1941 when the Propaganda Ministry was in control and, secondly, from November 1941 to May 1945 when Irish propaganda material was in the hands of the Foreign Office.⁷¹ Certain propaganda themes were common to both periods. These included: German support for Irish neutrality; the inevitability of an Allied defeat; assurances that Nazi Germany was not anti-Catholic; and an anti-Jewish stance. As regards the latter, the value of anti-semitic propaganda to the Nazis appears to have lain mainly in the manner in which it was manipulated to satisfy the psychological needs of the Germans themselves, rather than in any effect it might have had on foreign audiences.⁷² Hitler 'at various periods used Jew baiting as the spear point of his entire propaganda effort and used his anti-semitic programme to create many of the most important elements in his image-projection'.⁷³ Though beamed occasionally to Ireland, anti-Jewish propaganda was primarily for German domestic consumption, and 'on balance, the Nazi anti-semitic drives abroad had more often a repulsive than an attractive effect'.⁷⁴

In the 18-month period prior to 22 June 1941, when Germany invaded Russia, German Radio's Irish service was not in a position to woo Irish Catholic listeners with anti-Bolshevik propaganda. This was because of the

Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed on 23 August 1939. However, after the invasion of Russia the anti-Bolshevik line became part of the staple diet for Irish audiences. The Irish service was even apt to seize on anti-communist statements by the Irish Catholic hierarchy, repeating them word for word with attribution.

Apart from the various themes beamed to Irish listeners, Ireland itself was an important plank in the Nazi propaganda mix which sought internationally to project the component parts of the British Empire as being at odds with one another over the war. Silvey makes the point that German propaganda broadcasts to Britain tried 'to exploit undeniable facts in such a way as to excite alarm and despondency. With Eire neutral, South Africa deeply divided and India concerned above all with achieving freedom, the disunity of "the Empire" as compared with its unity in 1914 was undeniable'.⁷⁵ Balfour states that Britons who tuned into German radio broadcasts were more aware than those who did not 'that the Empire was divided over the war'.⁷⁶

The disunity of the British Empire was a recurrent theme in William Joyce's wartime broadcasts to Britain.⁷⁷ From this it follows that Irish nationalist aspirations to unity might have been expected to provide a major propaganda plank for the Nazi broadcasters. But despite the fact that Eire's neutrality was praised and encouraged by Berlin, the goal of Irish unity was barely mentioned in the Irland-Redaktion's programmes. Adolf Mahr preferred to approach the Irish question from a recent historical perspective. He did this by providing radio scripts which detailed British atrocities committed during the 1919-1921 Irish War of Independence. These so-called 'Flashback' features began in November 1941 when Mahr had just succeeded in taking control of the Irland-Redaktion from the Propaganda Ministry on behalf of the Foreign Office. By then the issues of partition and eventual Irish unification were being played down by the Germans. A former employee of the Irland-Redaktion explains that the relegation of these issues began a year earlier:

From October 1940 [when preparations for an invasion of England were stopped by the German military] German interests were all in favour of: 1. keeping Ireland neutral; 2. not working up problems of what was then called partition; 3. broadcasting news that might interest the Irish

while stressing points of view on international questions as seen by the Germans.⁷⁸

The influence of the Nazi Auslandsorganisation⁷⁹ in shaping propaganda for Ireland and elsewhere cannot be ignored. Even before war broke out it was noted that 'German short-wave...works in close co-operation with the Auslandsorganisation'.⁸⁰ In September 1940, Ernst-Wilhelm Bohle - the head of the AO and a State Secretary at the Foreign Office where Mahr was also working - declared:

The more attention we pay in this way [including local news in radio bulletins] to the mentality of the audience, thus inspiring confidence in our programmes, the more will those parts about which we are really concerned be believed and accepted as trustworthy.⁸¹

Bohle's tactic suggests that local news in the Irland-Redaktion's bulletins was supposed to act as a cover for the real Nazi message to Irish listeners, i.e. encouraging support for Hitler's regime and its international policies. In the event though, censorship of mail, newspapers and radio programmes in Ireland prevented the Irland-Redaktion from gathering items of local interest for inclusion in the bulletins, other than material put out by Allied sources mainly through London. Ludwig Mühlhausen was able, however, to find an alternative means of giving his broadcasts a local dimension: he sent his Irish acquaintances personal greetings over the airwaves which he then followed up with the standard Nazi propaganda of the early war period including denials of Nazi persecution of Catholics in Czechoslovakia and Poland. As time went on, the Irland-Redaktion followed the Propaganda Ministry's basic broadcasting formula. This included: anti-British and anti-Jewish talks (Hans Hartmann says that anti-Jewish material was 'kept to a minimum' at his insistence when he took over the service in December 1941 'although there was pressure to use anti-Jewish propaganda which was supplied to the foreign language services from a central reporting pool')⁸²; laudatory remarks about Hitler; war communiqués from the German Army's High Command; and, from 22 June 1941 onwards, anti-Bolshevik talks.

In the later stages of the war some propaganda themes for Ireland

overlapped with those beamed at the German public. One study⁸³ identifies five central themes which governed Germany's domestic radio propaganda in the final two years of the war. They were: anti-Bolshevism; anti-semitism; The progress of Germany's social policy compared to other countries; Military protection against Bolshevism; and England's economic decline.

German propagandists faced much the same tasks as those confronting public information specialists in other belligerent states. These included: 1. justifying one's own policy as peaceful and defensive; 2. emphasizing enemy losses and one's own expectations of victory; 3. keeping morale high; 4. urging workers on to greater productivity; and 5. promising a better world after the war.⁸⁴

The Nazi régime's concern with reaching audiences in small states and regions as well as large ones - whether belligerent or non-belligerent - is emphasised by the fact that, by 1943, German Radio was putting out 279 foreign news service bulletins per day in 53 languages including Irish.⁸⁵ Although anti-English propaganda was a constant factor in the broadcasts to Ireland, in the mass of material put out by Berlin to audiences worldwide it never appeared to reach the same heights of fanaticism as the invective directed against the Jews and Bolsheviks. Baird comments that 'at its height the motif of "British plutocracy" came to symbolize Germany's love-hate for the English, a curious amalgam of respect and jealousy...Hitler was convinced that the English were of Germanic stock and thus fellow Aryans'.⁸⁶ Goebbels, however, contended that the Scots were the purest Germanic stock in the British Isles, without any Jewish influence.⁸⁷

Herzstein takes a slightly different line, perceiving Britain as more of a 'hate object' than a love-hate object for the German mass media. He allows for Hitler's view of the 'English as Germany's racial brethren and the British empire as a potential ally of the Reich' and adds that 'when Britain became a foe rather than a friend, the Nazis denounced the [British] empire as socially reactionary and oppressive of the masses'.⁸⁸ Other groups or nations such as the Boers, Indian nationalists and the Irish 'offered a more fruitful source of anti-British propaganda to the German ideologues'.⁸⁹ Thus, as well as being beamed to Ireland, Germany's Irish propaganda could also be turned inwards for domestic consumption:

[Ireland] offered German propagandists rich material for demonstrating the perfidy of British rule. The German mass media directed an endless barrage of 'Irish' propaganda at the German people, a campaign intended to stoke the flames of righteous wrath in both Ireland and Germany, but particularly in Germany...The only time during the war when the German media avoided using the Irish theme was in late June and July of 1940, when Hitler hoped that the British would come to terms with him.⁹⁰

During the offensive phase of German military expansion, Nazi radio 'projected a world of invincible German armies confronting degenerate foreign villains'.⁹¹ When two of the Nazis' foreign villains - plutocratic Britain and atheistic Russia - were at the same time identical to the two major bogeymen of Irish Catholic nationalism, it made the work of Berlin's Irish propaganda team that much easier.

As we have already seen, Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office instigated the nightly 'Flashback' feature recounting stories of British atrocities in the Irish War of Independence, but the concept of using atrocity stories in international propaganda was far from new. Sanders and Taylor's study of British propaganda during World War I identifies an 'abundance of crude atrocity stories which circulated during the conflict. The ferocity of atrocity propaganda was most marked in the British press where much of it originated...one of the NWAC's [Britain's National War Aims Committee] most successful enterprises was the "German Crimes" calendar which depicted an enemy atrocity for each month of the year'.⁹²

It was, however, a propaganda tactic which could backfire:

One of the unexpected consequences of the somewhat hysterical anti-German propaganda of World War I was that it made many people, particularly politicians, suspicious of alleged atrocity stories emanating from Germany during the 1930s. The very success of the British propaganda efforts in 1914-1918 proved to be a serious handicap in getting the world to accept the reality of what was happening in Nazi Germany, and this created a disastrous delay in the public's awareness of the horrors of the concentration camps and other Nazi atrocities.⁹³

MacKenzie notes the importance of this link between the First and Second World Wars, stating that: 'A generation tutored in the years before and during the First World War came to hold the levers of propaganda of the inter-war period. It was a legacy that proved enduring.'⁹⁴

For its part, German Radio was beaming anti-British, horror-style propaganda to the United States as early as 1938. A German broadcast of 27 July that year stated: 'In no other historic empire have there been so many murders as in the British Empire.'⁹⁵ This type of propaganda also provided a central theme for Goebbels in 1945 when 'the Nazis charged that the Soviets would not stop with atrocities alone, for their goal was the total destruction of the German race...The atrocity propaganda was calculated to reinforce the Nazis' demand for fanatical resistance in Germany's darkest hour in order to gain total victory'.⁹⁶

Although the German invasion of Russia provided endless anti-Bolshevik material for the German propaganda machine - including, of course, the Irland-Redaktion - it also sowed the seeds of the Third Reich's eventual defeat. According to Kris and Speier's study of Nazi domestic propaganda 'Germany's propagandists expected to be believed because her armies were being victorious'.⁹⁷ But the link between successful propaganda and military achievement was perhaps best summed up by the French socialist, Régis Debray, who remarked that 'the most important form of propaganda is successful military action'.⁹⁸

When General von Paulus and 90,000 men of the German Sixth Army surrendered to Russian forces after the battle of Stalingrad on 30 January 1943 (the 10th anniversary of Hitler's accession to power) the Propaganda Ministry instructed the German media that: 'henceforward the heroic struggle of Stalingrad will become the greatest epic of German history'.⁹⁹ Bulletins put out at the time by the Irland-Redaktion followed this line to the letter and one, by Francis Stuart, even praised the German Army's 'triumph of flesh and blood'.¹⁰⁰

The military fortunes of the Third Reich went into decline after the Stalingrad reversal but the effects of what happened went beyond military defeat as Zeman explains: 'The hopes they [the German propagandists] had raised during the first phase of the campaign were dashed to the ground, and a psychological crisis accompanied the military defeat.' Zeman adds that Stalingrad, coupled with German defeats in North Africa and the

increasing intensity of Allied air raids on Germany, meant that: 'the broadcasting war was also reaching the point from where the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda would begin to decline'.¹⁰¹

According to Hildebrand, Allied bombing raids on Germany 'sometimes degenerated into a senseless exercise in terror for its own sake [and] were used by Nazi propaganda to strengthen morale'.¹⁰² Such propaganda was included in broadcasts to Ireland in the second half of the war when much was made of Catholic bishops' comments on the RAF's bombing of Cologne cathedral, the bombing of the monastery at Monte Cassino and other attacks on historic places of worship. This form of propaganda echoed the complaints of French newspaper editors who, during the First World War, had criticised the German Army's 'proclivity to destroy cathedrals, which has been amply confirmed by the bombardment of Rheims, the burning of Belgian churches and of cathedrals in Lorraine'.¹⁰³

After the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944, 'the entire [Nazi] propaganda effort had to balance on a tightrope between rousing the public from apathy and inducing a mood of capitulation'.¹⁰⁴ Ireland's neutral position precluded Radio Éireann from commenting on the progress of the war but the station did relay communiqués from the warring sides. From an Allied point of view, however, the propaganda task eased with each German defeat. Hugh Carleton Greene, who was head of the BBC's German service from October 1940 to the end of the war, recalls that:

Hitler was perhaps our best propagandist...Day after day his recorded voice could be heard screeching, 'We shall wipe out their cities', as the bombs fell on German cities, or, 'We shall overrun Stalingrad and take it, you can count on that', as the Russian ring tightened round the trapped army of Field-Marshal Paulus - and so on.¹⁰⁵

In 1945 the war's endgame was reflected in an irregular and diminishing number of broadcasts to Ireland. Propaganda directed to German domestic audiences increasingly overlapped with the material beamed to Ireland. According to Bytwerk's study of Nazi propaganda in the closing stages of the war, the Nazi propagandists retreated increasingly into the past as the war continued to be lost, and Goebbels warned that reprisals would be carried out against German civilians or that Germany would be kept in a

pastoral state for several generations.¹⁰⁶ By the second quarter of 1945 there appeared little difference between the Nazi propaganda directed at Germany, Ireland or other areas. Amid warnings of the consequences for Western civilisation of a Jewish-Bolshevik victory, Irish listeners were told that the Allies planned to make Germany a 'potato yard turned soon into a graveyard' and comparisons were drawn with England's historic exploitation of Ireland.¹⁰⁷

In the final year of the war broadcasting time in occupied countries was being shared between the local civilian population and German troops. In April 1944, for example, Radio Tirana, in occupied Albania, was broadcasting for five hours a day in Albanian but two and a half hours of German-language programming were added each day for the benefit of troops stationed there.¹⁰⁸

If any clash of styles existed between German Radio's propaganda to Ireland and other countries towards the end of the war, it was perhaps best reflected musically. The official announcement of Hitler's death, broadcast in German on all RRG frequencies (including the Irland-Redaktion's) on 1 May 1945, was accompanied by excerpts from Wagner, the adagio of Bruckner's Third Symphony, drum rolls, the German national anthem and the Horst Wessel song.¹⁰⁹ By contrast the very last broadcast to Ireland from the Irland-Redaktion, on 2 May 1945, was played out with John McCormack singing *Come Back To Erin*. Throughout the war the Irish service provided its listeners with a mixture of Irish music and song which had nothing in common with German Radio's musical output to other areas.

From 1933 onwards the Nazis had adopted their own musical style on radio while at the same time banning from the airwaves any compositions by 'Jews, negroes and Bolsheviks'.¹¹⁰ Jazz, for instance, was considered to be 'undeutsche Musik'.¹¹¹ From 1939 Nazi radio's choice of music - domestically and to its adversaries, though not to neutral states - was linked to military strategy and each military campaign had its own signature tune: *Die Wacht am Rhein* was used for the Battle of France, *Wir fahren gegen Engelland* for naval victories against England, *Bomben auf England* for air attacks, *Prinz Eugen* for the Balkans, and a combination of Liszt's symphonic poem *Les Préludes*, with part of the Horst Wessel chorus *Kameraden, die Rotfront und Reaktion erschossen*, for the invasion of the USSR.¹¹²

In the Nazi era music was, according to Moller, used as a medium for ideological conversion and pacification, and no composer ranked more highly for the Nazi leadership than Wagner:

Richard Wagner was the real answer to the philosophical void of the NSDAP [Nazi party]. Wagner had written diatribes against Jews and the French...Wagner appeared to be at the focal point of many of the National Socialist race doctrines...His music was invaluable to the propaganda machine and created an overwhelming emotional atmosphere at mass meetings and on the radio.¹¹³

But such an atmosphere was not created on the airwaves by the Irland-Redaktion which, musically, rarely resorted to anything but traditional Irish music and song for its target audience. However, this use of Irish music, the Irish language and talks by Irish announcers was calculated to create a familiar 'Irishness' and was unique among foreign radio stations which could be received in Ireland during the war. The creators of the Irland-Redaktion hoped to elicit, at least, a sympathetic hearing from their audience. In essence, German Radio's Irish service can be seen as a propaganda exercise primarily designed to augment the existing pressures on Ireland to stay out of the Second World War.

Chapter 2

Founding Fathers of the Irland-Redaktion

In the closing weeks of 1939 some radio listeners in Ireland tuned into a strange evening broadcast on the medium wave. While the language was unmistakably Irish, the accent was unmistakably German. Listeners may have scratched their heads as they strained to catch what appeared to be an attack on Allied propaganda. References to the Black and Tans were included by the speaker who signed off with the words 'Go mbeannaí Dia dhaoibh a chairde, agus go saora Dia Éire' (God bless you my friends and may God save Ireland).

The Irish national radio service, Radio Éireann, had commenced broadcasting 13 years earlier in 1926. But this was no Radio Éireann programme from the Henry Street studios in Dublin. The man speaking a mixture of Kerry and Connemara Irish into a microphone that night in Berlin's radio centre was Ludwig Mühlhausen, who had spent some time in the 1920s and 1930s studying Celtic folklore and Irish dialects on the Blasket Islands, in Connemara and in south west Donegal. He was one in a long line of German Celtologists who had taken an interest in Ireland's language and folklore.¹

The Celtology Connection

The German celtology movement dates back over 150 years to 1839 when Franz Bopp wrote his pioneering work on *The Celtic languages from the viewpoint of comparative philology*. A decade later in 1849, F.A. Korner's *Keltische Studien* made its mark as one of the first major contributions to Celtic studies in Prussia. Korner, one of the great German linguistic scholars of his day, did not work in a vacuum. Johan Kaspar Zeuss published his *Grammatica Celtica* in Leipzig in 1853, and the geologist Christian Keferstein was in the course of publishing his *Observations on Celtic Antiquities, the Celts in general, and particularly in Germany, as well as the Celtic origin of the city of Halle*. As the 19th century advanced, Berlin became a more important focal point for the Celtic scholars, notably Hermann Ebel who produced the second edition of Zeuss's *Grammatica Celtica*. He was appointed Professor of Comparative Philology at the University of Berlin in 1872, and was succeeded there six years later by Heinrich Zimmer,

who went on to become the country's first professor of Celtic Studies at Berlin's Friedrich-Wilhelm University.

The early years of the 20th century saw the Celtologists defining a more important role for themselves, and it was inevitable that their attention would focus on Ireland's western seaboard with its vestiges of an ancient language and culture which seven centuries of Anglo-Norman influence had failed to suppress. In 1901, Zimmer's *Pelagius in Irland* was published, and from 1907 his Celtic Studies department became an independent section within Berlin University's Indo-European Seminar. Known as a tough task-master, Zimmer insisted his students speak at least one modern Celtic language as well as having a knowledge of the earlier Brittonic languages which include Welsh, Cornish and Breton as well as Scots, Irish and Manx Gaelic. The German-Irish scholarly links were cemented by Kuno Meyer (1858-1919) who took over the Chair of Celtic Studies at the University of Berlin in 1911. From 1897 Meyer was editor, along with Ludwig Christian Stern, of the *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie* (Celtic Philology Journal) which still appears regularly. In 1903 Meyer founded the School of Irish Learning in Dublin and the following year began publishing its journal *Eriu*. This, together with his work on translating early Irish poetry and researching Irish lexicography and metrics, won him widespread recognition. He was granted the freedom of Dublin and Cork, though his name was erased from the roll of honour in Dublin's City Hall in a vote dominated by pro-British elements on the Corporation during the First World War. Meyer's name has never been reinstated on the roll despite public pressure.²

Probing into the Celtic past, men like Kuno Meyer and his successor Julius Pokorny, who took over the Chair of Celtic Studies at Berlin in 1920, could not fail to be affected by Ireland's quest for independent nationhood.³ Germany's defeat in the First World War gave rise to popular resentment at what was seen as the country's relegation to second-class status by the Treaty of Versailles. Coupled with the effects of widespread unemployment and financial collapse during the Depression, this resentment provided an incubator for Hitler's National Socialist movement. After coming to power in 1933, the Nazi party sought to stamp its influence on the academic world as well as every other section of German society.⁴

Ironically, one of the Nazi's first academic victims turned out to be the pro-Irish, anti-British, Professor Julius Pokorny, who was sacked from

his post in Berlin in October 1935. The pretext for removing Pokorny was that he was part-Jewish. Driven into exile, he sought refuge first in Vienna and later in Zürich. The Nazi party used its all-embracing influence to make sure that Ludwig Mühlhausen - who had joined the party in 1932 - got Pokorny's job in preference to two other candidates. From an Irish point of view, Mühlhausen was an interesting choice. He had founded the Department of Celtic Studies at Hamburg University in 1928, was a fluent Irish speaker and knew Ireland well. More importantly, in the context of war propaganda, Mühlhausen was the man who, in 1939, inaugurated German Radio's Irish-language talks.⁵



Ludwig Mühlhausen
Hamburg, circa 1931

Ludwig Mühlhausen: Scholar and Spy

At the outbreak of the Second World War, Germany's leading Celtic scholar was Professor Rudolf Thurneysen of Bonn University. But for his advanced age and ill health the Swiss-born Thurneysen could well have been called on to launch German Radio's Irish talks. In the event, the role fell to Ludwig Mühlhausen, then 51 years of age. Hans Hartmann, who was at the time Mühlhausen's protégé at Berlin University, remembers that a Nazi party official, 'possibly someone at the Propaganda Ministry', chose Mühlhausen for the job since he knew Irish very well. Mühlhausen thus became the first person ever to broadcast propaganda to Ireland from abroad in the Irish language.⁶

Mühlhausen was a student of Celtic folklore and an accomplished linguist: as well as mastering Irish, he spoke Welsh, Dutch, French and English. But he was also a spy and, according to a profile drawn up by G2 in mid-1943, an 'enthusiastic Nazi'. This unflattering portrait by Irish Military Intelligence claimed he was identified with pre-Nazi fascist groups such as the German National People's Party and the Steel Helmet organisation. In fact, Mühlhausen had joined the Nazi party on 1 May 1932, nine months before Hitler came to power in Germany. Mühlhausen's wife Else, a native of Leipzig whom he married in 1914 after he had taken a doctorate in philosophy at Leipzig University, had herself been active in right-wing political organisations before joining the National Socialists. By 1932 she had become a member of the inner circle of the Nazi party in Hamburg where she and her husband were then living. Hitler's rise to power as Reich Chancellor, in January 1933, gave Mühlhausen's career a boost. Firstly, the Nazis sacked the Jewish director of Hamburg's Commerce Library, Dr Rosenbaum, to make way for Mühlhausen. Then in October 1935, as noted earlier, the Nazis removed Professor Julius Pokorny from the chair of Celtic Studies at Berlin University where he had worked for 15 years. Mühlhausen filled the vacancy in 1937.⁷

Mühlhausen's interest in Ireland and the Irish language had been stimulated by a number of summer visits to Cork and Kerry in the late 1920s. He gave a series of lectures at UCC in the summer of 1929 when he stayed with the parents of a Cork linguist, Joe Healy, at Springfield in Cobh. Healy, who ten years later was to be called in by G2 to monitor Mühlhausen's initial radio talks, stayed with the Mühlhausen family in

Hamburg while studying at the university there from 1927 to 1929. Healy, and his UCC colleague Seamus Kavanagh, spent some time in Germany teaching Mühlhausen Irish, while they perfected their German.⁸

Healy's younger brother Louis remembers the German professor's summertime visits to his parents' home in Cobh, and recalls that the younger Healy children did not get on with him:

Mühlhausen came from Hamburg by liner and my father had to meet him coming off the liner in Cobh. He was a tall, spare, bespectacled man. I suppose in a way he was arrogant and had absolutely no sense of humour, so as youngsters we did not care for him very much. He moved on down to Kerry and spent some time on the Blasket Islands speaking Gaelic to the natives. Joe was still in Germany at that time. The professor spent more time with us on his way back.

The following summer, Mühlhausen was back staying with the Healys again, but relations with the younger children had not improved:

[Mühlhausen] made himself very much at home. The family laid on a nice meal with a good bottle of wine. At the end of the meal Patsy and I brought in a bottle of Joe's homemade wine and said 'Try this, professor'. He held it up to the light, sniffed at it, rolled it around and eventually tasted it, spat, and said 'Das ist cat's piss'. We said, 'We know that, but which one? We have two cats'. My father had an awkward explanation to make in difficult circumstances and we got a mild parental admonition. We could never relax with Professor Mühlhausen. He seemed arrogant and easily offended.⁹

Mühlhausen returned to Ireland in July 1932 where he studied the local Irish dialect and folklore of Cornamóna in Co Galway. There he met Professor James Hamilton Delargy, director of the Folklore Commission. Mühlhausen was accompanied by a German professor of geography who took a great number of photographs of Lough Corrib and the Aran Islands. In 1937 Mühlhausen was back in Ireland again, this time, ostensibly, to study Irish dialects in Donegal. Delargy had put the German in touch with a Donegal folklore enthusiast called Sean Ó Heochaidh. In July 1937, Mühlhausen wrote

to Ó Heochaidh, in Irish, from Berlin: 'I would like to stay in a fisherman's house. The most important thing for me is to be among the people, among the hills and by the sea.'¹⁰

On 25 August 1937 Sean Ó Heochaidh met Mühlhausen in Killybegs as he descended from the Galway train. He had arranged for the German to stay with a Teelin fisherman, Hugh Byrne. Byrne recalls that the German:

spent six weeks in my parents' house and never spoke anything but Irish. His Irish was very good, he had learned it on an earlier visit to the Blaskets. For the first week he was there, Mühlhausen shared a room with León Ó Broin. They had fierce arguments about religion. Mühlhausen kept a large picture of Hitler in his room, while Ó Broin kept a crucifix next to his bed.¹¹

Long after the war Ó Broin recalled the time he shared that room in Teelin with Mühlhausen:

When he woke the first morning we were together, he took out his Nazi song book and sang a verse or two. I responded by kneeling down and provocatively blessing myself. He then put on his dressing gown, walked with me to the pier head nearby and dived into the bleak sea. Not to be outdone I did the same and nearly died of the cold. I gave this morning exercise up; the Nazi, a man of tougher breed, did not.¹²

Ó Broin's son Eimear told the author that his father 'reported Mühlhausen's spying activities to an army friend, but nothing was done since he was not breaking the law in any way'.¹³

Hugh Byrne remembers the German paying for his board in advance. Mühlhausen spent the entire six weeks in Teelin taking photographs and visiting elderly people to record their old folk stories. According to Byrne, Mühlhausen never went out in a fishing boat and never touched a drop of drink:

He idolised Hitler and thought he was a god. I don't think he had any religion. He smoked cigars and spoke of the 1914-18 war which he had fought in. He told me Germany would get the Rhineland back without

firing a shot, and they did. He was very anti-British and said he would not set foot on British soil. When he left Donegal for Dublin, he went through Sligo so he wouldn't have to go through the North.¹⁴

Sean Ó Heochaidh took the German around the area introducing him to the best Irish speakers so Mühlhausen could work on the Donegal dialects. But as well as studying the language, the local man noted that Mühlhausen 'took hundreds of photos'. Later, many photographs of County Donegal, including three taken in Teelin, appeared in a German military handbook produced in occupied Brussels, and published in Berlin in 1941. This was intended to assist with a top secret invasion plan for Ireland code-named Operation Green. When Hugh Byrne was shown copies of the three Teelin photographs by this author, he said he was sure that Mühlhausen had taken them. Both Ó Heochaidh and Byrne say that Mühlhausen was the only German to have taken photographs in the area in the 1930s, and some local people in Teelin still believe that he was a spy. Adolf Mahr's son, Gustav, told this author: 'it would appear that Mühlhausen actually had carried on espionage in Ireland'. As well as containing scores of photographs, the 1941 handbook entitled *Military Geographical data on Ireland* included maritime charts, coastal profiles, and aerial photographs of harbours and inlets, as well as one picture of the County Donegal fishing village of Bunbeg where Hans Hartmann had stayed at the beginning of 1939. Also in the handbook was a list of approximately one hundred Gaelic words and their German equivalents.¹⁵

Both Hugh Byrne and Sean Ó Heochaidh were questioned by the Gardai once Mühlhausen began his radio talks from Berlin two years later. When the German sent Christmas greetings to Ó Heochaidh over the airwaves in 1939, the Donegal man believed the Irish authorities thought he was 'a German fifth columnist'. According to Ó Heochaidh, the Garda surveillance only ended when Professor Delargy intervened and explained to the Department of Justice the innocent relationship between Mühlhausen and the two Donegal men.¹⁶

Returning to Berlin with hundreds of photographs of Ireland, Mühlhausen produced one book of folktales from South Donegal, and an article on house types in Teelin, in which he drew comparisons with houses in Cornamona, County Galway and Dunquin, County Kerry. A 1939 Irish Army memo noted that Mühlhausen was 'an expert photographer, and lectures in Germany on

"Ireland: Land and People", illustrated by his own lantern slides'.¹⁷

At 8.25 p.m. on the night of 10 December 1939, Mühlhausen spoke to Ireland in Irish via RRG's Hamburg transmitter. The talk was heard by his friend, Second Lieutenant Joseph G. Healy at McKee Barracks in Dublin, whose transcription noted:

In good Irish, a mixture of Kerry and Western dialects, he said it was a pleasure to talk over the air to his Irish friends, imagining himself seated 'cois na tine agus boladh na mona im shron' [by the fire and the smell of the turf in my nose]. He characterised as lies statements about the persecution by the Germans of Czechoslovakian and Polish Catholics, and reminded his listeners of the atrocities committed in Ireland by the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries.¹⁸

Healy attached background material to the transcription describing Mühlhausen's links with Ireland but omitting his own pre-war academic links with the German.

Mühlhausen's last radio talk to Ireland was on 24 September 1941, although he did contribute a few words to a special New Year's Eve broadcast from Berlin on 31 December 1941. By then Adolf Mahr had assumed control of the Irish service. In any event, as early as 1940, according to Hans Hartmann, Mühlhausen 'got some other offers from the [Nazi] party or the Propaganda Ministry and did some other jobs which he found more attractive and more prosperous'.¹⁹ Mühlhausen's call to other duties arose from the fact that he had worked as a spy in southern Belgium (Wallonia) during the First World War. His extensive knowledge of both French and Flemish had marked him out at the time as a useful agent for German Intelligence.²⁰ A confidential wartime memo from the Irish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, William Warnock, to Dan Bryan noted that:

Mühlhausen still holds the chair [of Celtic Studies] in Berlin [University], and has been doing some propaganda work and lectures on Ireland. Has large collection of Irish photographs. Volunteered for S.S. after being in S.A. Was given the rank of lieutenant. Sent to work in Brittany, probably propaganda in view of his Celtic knowledge.²¹

Warnock's educated guess at Mühlhausen's propaganda role in Brittany was accurate. Mühlhausen Nazi party membership file indicates he was in charge of radio propaganda for Ireland and Brittany for the first two years of the war. In summer 1942 he took over the management of the Office for Celtic Ethnological Research, an SS-controlled section dealing with Celtic ancestry. He was recruited to the SS in 1943 and, in the 1943-1944 period, worked for the German Commander in France on Celtic research as well as political tasks, particularly in Brittany.²²



Adolf Mahr sitting in the director's chair
at the National Museum, Dublin, circa 1935

Adolf Mahr: Ribbentrop's Irish Expert

One person whom Ludwig Mühlhausen made a point of meeting when he visited Ireland was the National Museum's Austrian-born director, Adolf Mahr. In fact, Mühlhausen, Hans Hartmann, the photographer Joachim Gerstenberg and many other Germans and Austrians were pre-war guests at the Mahr family home in Waterloo Place, Dublin. While Mahr never broadcast during the war he, nevertheless, greatly influenced the shape and content of Germany's wartime radio propaganda to Ireland.²³

Mahr was born on 7 May 1887, at Trent in Austria, when the power and influence of the Austro-Hungarian empire was at its height. His father was a bandmaster to the Emperor Franz Josef. After studying geography and pre-history at the University of Vienna, Adolf Mahr went to work for the Linz Museum in 1913 before joining the Natural History Museum in Vienna two years later. During the First World War he enlisted for military service in Salzburg. In 1919 Mahr, then aged 32, saw his beloved native South Tyrol region ceded to Italy under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The prospect of reintegrating this region into Austria was one of the principal factors that later attracted Mahr to Nazism. In 1927 he was appointed Senior Keeper of Irish Antiquities at the National Museum in Dublin. Although technically an alien, the job meant that Mahr became a permanent and pensionable member of the Irish civil service.²⁴

The Nazis' rise to power in Germany was matched by a corresponding rise in Adolf Mahr's fortunes. Hitler was appointed German Chancellor on 30 January 1933. On 6 March 1933, the Secretary of the Department of Education in Dublin, Seosamh O'Neill, wrote a letter to his opposite number at the Department of Finance noting that:

the personal qualifications of this officer [Mahr] are such as to enable the Minister for Education [Thomas Derrig] to accept him unreservedly as a most suitable person for appointment to the post of Director [of the National Museum].²⁵

As well as advancing up the promotional ladder of the Irish civil service, Mahr was applying for membership of the German Nazi party. His party membership dated from 1 April 1933.²⁶ The Irish government approved his appointment to the top museum post at a cabinet meeting on 17 July

1934, and three days later the President of the Executive Council, Eamon de Valera, personally signed the cabinet minutes which included Mahr's promotion.²⁷ According to Mahr's daughter, Mrs Ingrid Reusswig, de Valera was aware of her father's Nazi party links²⁸, although it is not clear exactly when he became aware of them. In February 1939 the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Joe Walshe, wrote to de Valera that:

the existence of a Nazi organisation in Dublin...having as its chief member and organiser an employee of our State, was not calculated to improve relations between our two Governments [Ireland and Germany]...and the [Irish] Government would be placed in a very awkward situation when the position of Dr Mahr, Director of the National Museum, as head of the Nazi cell in Dublin, became a matter of public controversy.²⁹

In the same memorandum, Walshe revealed that he had frequently complained about the 'Nazi organisation in Dublin' both to Dr Eduard Hempel, the German Minister, and to his predecessor, Dr Erich Schroetter.³⁰

The post of museum director had been vacant for 18 years before Mahr got the job. The previous incumbent was Count G.N. Plunkett whose services were dispensed with after the 1916 Rising in which his son had taken part. From 1916 to 1934 the job had been held in an acting capacity by one of the museum's three keepers.³¹ In those years it was not uncommon for a foreigner to be appointed to a post where a suitable Irish candidate could not be found. Foreign nationals, particularly Germans, held technical, medical and administrative posts in the new Irish Free State, and it appeared to be government practice to avoid filling such positions with British nationals.³²

Mahr had first arrived in Ireland on 15 September 1927 with his 26-year-old wife Maria, their baby daughter Hilde and son Gustav who was later enrolled at Wesley College. From the time he took up his appointment at the museum on 29 September 1927, Mahr threw himself enthusiastically into his new job, reorganising the Irish Antiquities section and purchasing new items to exhibit there. Former and current museum staff acknowledge that Adolf Mahr's contribution to the National Museum was a positive one.³³ Mahr made it his business to know his newly adopted country well. In 1928 he was

elected a member of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, and in 1931 he edited the first volume of *Christian Art in Ancient Ireland*. Two of Mahr's essays appeared in the second volume of the same work, edited by Dr Joseph Raftery and published in 1941 when Mahr was working at the Foreign Office in Berlin. Mahr was also a member of the Royal Irish Academy and wrote for its *Proceedings*, as well as contributing to the English quarterly *Antiquity* and many German publications. As president of the Prehistoric Society, in 1937, Mahr delivered a presidential address on 'New Aspects and Problems in Irish Prehistory'. In 1939, the year he left Ireland, Mahr's book *Ancient Irish Handicraft* was published by the Thomond Archaeological Society and Field Club in Limerick.³⁴

If Mahr had worked solely as a museum director he might never have attracted the publicity which after the war would see him named as a Nazi in heated Dáil exchanges and which led, effectively, to his being barred from resuming his museum work in Dublin. But during the 1930s Mahr had another role in Ireland which gave him an influence far beyond that of a museum director. He was head of the Irish section of the powerful Auslandsorganisation or AO, the Nazi party's foreign organisation. In the latter position, his powers in the small pre-war Austro-German colony exceeded those of the German Minister to Ireland. According to the historian J.P. Duggan, 'Mahr's AO was responsible for getting two diplomats recalled' to Berlin. They were Dr Georg von Dehn (posted to the German legation from 1923-34) and Herr Erich Schroetter (1936-37). Duggan also notes that the AO 'sent agents abroad to propagate Nazi doctrines and to extend party discipline over German nationals. It was also given the task of maintaining contacts with subversive organisations'.³⁵

The AO was not a secret organisation but it was far more than just an umbrella group for Germans living abroad. Its functions spanned everything from the promotion of Irish-German trade links, to keeping an eye on Germans outside the Fatherland, monitoring political developments in the host country, and providing suitable candidates for espionage. Founded in 1931 by Ernst-Wilhelm Bohle, the Auslandsorganisation was, according to one major study of German military intelligence, 'by far the most important Nazi agency for gathering foreign information'.³⁶ By 1939 the AO had over 50,000 members worldwide, and Bohle had been rewarded with a post as State Secretary in the Foreign Office. Whether it was because of his earlier work

for the AO in Ireland or not, Mahr too was to join the Foreign Ministry in 1940, following a brief period of part-time work at Berlin's Prehistory Museum. As AO chief in Ireland, Mahr would have been responsible, as was every AO district leader, for drawing up a monthly report on the local political situation. These reports, which sometimes included economic and military information, were forwarded to Bohle and then scrutinised by senior Nazi party figures like Hess, Bormann and Himmler. Internationally, the AO provided a pool of potential spies and, as early as 1937, was maintaining liaison with the German counterintelligence service, the Abwehr.³⁷

Irish Military Intelligence records for 1938-46 reveal that Adolf Mahr's enthusiasm for his National Museum work was paralleled by his AO activities on behalf of the Nazi party. G2 officers noted that 'Germans arriving in Dublin were supposed to report to Mahr', adding, 'There is record of a man called Plass (an exchange student) being reprimanded for failing to do so'. G2 was convinced that Mahr was using his position in Ireland to rally both Irish and Germans to the Nazi cause. In 1945 a G2 report on Mahr commented that while living in Dublin he had been 'an open and blatant Nazi and made many efforts to convert Irish graduates and other persons with whom he had associations to Nazi doctrines and beliefs'.³⁸

Dr Joseph Raftery, who worked with Mahr in the 1930s, recalled that the Austrian was a good museum director. His recollection of Mahr was not as 'an open and blatant Nazi'. Of his decision to leave Dublin for Germany in July 1939, Dr Raftery said Mahr 'could not have been expected to do otherwise, given his loyalty to the [Nazi] party and the advent of war'. In fact, Mahr had been appointed the official Irish representative to the Sixth International Congress of Archaeology which was due to be held in Berlin in August 1939. If any member of the Mahr family was an active Nazi it was, according to Dr Raftery, his wife Maria. Dr Raftery remembers Maria Mahr at a social occasion in Dublin 'standing like Joan of Arc, reciting a poem about the Munich putsch, and shouting the last line at the top of her voice, "und ihr habt doch gesiegt, und ihr habt doch gesiegt" (you have conquered nevertheless)'. Raftery added that Mahr, though a Nazi supporter, was not anti-Jewish.³⁹

Mrs Elizabeth Clissmann, who met Mahr before and during the war, found him 'a very modest and simple person, and very enthusiastic about his

archaeology'. She doubted if he had used his position in Dublin for spying purposes, if only because of the paltry information about Ireland which she said was subsequently available to the wartime radio propaganda service. But Mrs Clissmann agreed that Mahr was active in the Nazi party in Ireland before the war. She put this down to:

the sort of enthusiasm that we Irish find in our American exiles. A kind of 'the green hills far away'; a kind of exile's enthusiasm where everything has to be right and everything that's done is right. We see reflections of it in a lot of long-time Irish emigrants' attitudes to the North or towards the IRA, or in other respects. He had that kind of idealistic, impractical admiration for the development in Germany - Germany's escape from the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, reunification of Germany and Austria. In fact, he had a great sympathy for Austria, a great feeling for Austria.⁴⁰

Mahr appears to have attracted intense loyalty among those who worked with him in the 1930s. A former colleague, the Scottish archaeologist Howard Kilbride-Jones, recalls Mahr as 'a very generous man. He always thought of other people's welfare...He was a workaholic, sometimes remaining in the museum until 10 p.m.'. According to Kilbride-Jones, Mahr knew the Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, well. In June 1938, the two archaeologists visited de Valera to seek extra funds to complete an excavation at Drimnagh. After a half-hour discussion 'we left with Dev's personal cheque for £400'.⁴¹ As noted above, Adolf Mahr's daughter, Mrs Ingrid Reusswig, confirms her father's links with de Valera and claims that the Fianna Fáil leader knew that Mahr was a Nazi party member. She says the main reason her father was attracted to Nazism was because it sought a political union, or Anschluss, between Germany and Austria.⁴²

By the spring of 1939 Mahr's activities outside the museum had attracted the attention of the Garda special branch and G2. From mid-1939 the authorities ordered the surveillance of mail destined for the Mahr family home at 37, Waterloo Place. This revealed a mixed bag of anti-Jewish newsletters from Germany, an invitation to a Nazi old boys' reunion in Vienna, letters from academic colleagues, and a detailed list of arrivals and departures of German nationals sent to Mahr from the German Legation in

Dublin. One of the last letters Adolf Mahr received before leaving Ireland came from Ludwig Mühlhausen in Berlin. Addressing the note to 'Dear Party Comrade Mahr', Mühlhausen thanked him for sending newspaper clippings about the Irish language and announced he was taking over the editorship of the *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, edited until then by Professor Rudolf Thurneysen in Bonn. Mühlhausen asked Mahr's help to boost the journal's circulation which 'is so ridiculously small as to be not worth mentioning'. Mühlhausen wrote that his work entitled *Ten Irish Folktales* had been sent to the printers that day, 4 July 1939, and he signed off 'Heil Hitler, ever yours'. A letter dated 18 August to her housekeeper in Dublin, from Maria Mahr, then holidaying at the Hotel Lindenhof in Millstadt-am-See, spelled out Adolf Mahr's travel plans: 'my husband is going to Berlin, Stettin, Kiel and then in September to the Parteitag'.⁴³

Adolf Mahr left Cobh for Hamburg on 19 July 1939. His place as local head of the Auslandsorganisation was taken over by Heinz Mecking who was chief engineer with the Turf Development Board. Mecking had been lined up as successor to Mahr during a visit to Ireland by a senior AO director, Admiral Menske, in December 1938. The same month, Mecking attended a Nazi conference in London. In 1936 Heinz Mecking had come to Ireland from the German bog drainage equipment manufacturer Klasmann. But a contemporary account classed his bog drainage advice as 'disastrous' because of the vast differences between the German and Irish boglands. Mecking 'set himself up as a Nazi intelligence agent photographing railway stations, river bridges, sign posts and reservoirs'. He returned to Germany on the outbreak of war. After the German invasion of Russia, in June 1941, Mecking was sent there to advise on turf production during the winter campaigns. He remained there and died a prisoner of the Red Army on 18 December 1945, aged 43.⁴⁴

Mahr had already left Ireland three days when G2 officers were busy copying one of the most suspicious letters ever to be mailed to his Dublin address. Signed by SS officer Friedrich Von Weinertsgruen at the Nazis' topographical office in Wenzelsplatz, Prague, it appeared to indicate that Mahr had supplied information which could have assisted in drawing up part of Germany's battle plans - particularly the top secret Operation Green, the invasion blueprint for Ireland. The letter was dated 11 July 1939 and contained the following remarks:

many thanks for last letter...I have become a head official of the SS since the 1st June and am with the Reserve Command of the R.u.S. Head Office of the Prague Topographical Office. The questions referred to are therefore now of greater importance than ever. At all events, thank you sincerely for your efforts...Heil Hitler. [signed] Friedrich Maier (Edler) Von Weinertsgrün.⁴⁵

The letter may have been one of the factors which, in 1946, permitted G2's Dan Bryan to inform Frederick Boland at External Affairs that:

Mahr approached one of the German intelligence sections which dealt with matters concerning a landing in Ireland, with a long report and was, as a result, employed in that section for a year or two...also employed in this section with Dr Mahr was Dr Otto Reinhard of our Forestry Department.⁴⁶

In the 1930s, Reinhard had fought off 64 other candidates for the job of Forestry Director with the Department of Lands. But at the outbreak of war in 1939, after registering 'only a moderate success' in the post, he left Ireland for Germany.⁴⁷

Some studies of the war period have suggested that Mahr used his position at the National Museum to build up a mass of sketches, photographs, maps and other information for the German Army. However, nothing thus far published has linked him so directly to Germany's invasion plans for Ireland as do Colonel Bryan's secret memos of 1945-1946 and the Prague letter.⁴⁸

The AO men Mahr and Mecking were not the only foreigners taking an interest in Irish affairs or actively gathering information. As noted already, Professor Mühlhausen built up an extensive collection of photographs which could have been of use to wartime Germany. In the summer of 1939, Joachim Gerstenberg toured the country taking scores of pictures for his book *Eire, ein Irlandbuch*, published the following year in Hamburg. It included pictures of Lough Swilly in County Donegal - one of the three Treaty Ports - and Cobh Cathedral across the bay from another Treaty Port, as well as Killary Harbour and Bantry Bay, two of the deepest inlets on the west coast. Photographs of Tramore strand in County Waterford and Killiney

strand in south County Dublin were also featured. Booklets designed to guide German troops in the event of Operation Green going ahead were produced from 1940 to 1941 at the Military Cartographic Institute in occupied Brussels. They contained many photographs of Ireland and the Irish coastline.⁴⁹

Little is known of Adolf Mahr's links with the SS beyond the fact that he was in written contact with an SS bureau in Prague in mid-1939. According to Mahr's daughter Ingrid: 'He worked for part of the war for a Propaganda Ministry department dealing with Jewish literature and files.'⁵⁰ But the fact that Mahr was the Foreign Office's Irish expert is beyond doubt. No one else working there during the war could boast the twelve years' experience that he had accumulated with the National Museum in Dublin. He was thus well placed to direct the Nazi message to Ireland in the war years, and this is what he was called upon to do in his role as head of the small but important Irish propaganda section in the Berlin Foreign Office. His assistant at the Foreign Office annexe near the Anhalter Bahnhof from mid- to end-1941 was Hilde Poepping, a former German exchange student who had spent a year studying Irish literature in Galway.⁵¹

As noted elsewhere in this study, Mahr played a key role in wresting control of German Radio's Irish service from the Propaganda Ministry. In March 1941 he drew up a blueprint for radio propaganda to Ireland which was personally approved by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in May of that year. The blueprint called for an expansion of the existing service, from fifteen minutes every Sunday and Wednesday night in Irish, into a nightly radio service in both Irish and English. In addition, Mahr's proposals envisaged the targeting of Irish radio audiences around the world in places such as the United States and Australia. But Mahr's plan did not succeed immediately. This was due to opposition by Goebbels' personnel at the Propaganda Ministry. In mid-1941, to forestall Mahr's efforts, they appointed their own representative to assemble an Irish team for the nightly broadcasts which would begin that August. Goebbels' appointee was Dr Wolfgang Dignowity.



28. Nov. 1936 Hamburg 24

W. DIGNOWITY

4/9/12

REPRODUCED AT THE BDC



Wolfgang Dignowity

Wolfgang Dignowity: Dr Goebbels' Irishman

Wolfgang Dignowity was born on 4 September 1912 at Chemnitz in Saxony. His Nazi party membership dated from 1 July 1933. Dignowity was a graduate of the Nazis' Reich Presse-Schule (national college of journalism) and was picked by Goebbels to launch the planned expansion of the Irish radio service in the summer of 1941.⁵² As has been noted above, while the impetus for the expanded service came from Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office, Dignowity was appointed by Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry which had learned of the new initiative and was anxious to retain control of the Irish radio section.⁵³

Dignowity presided over the initial test transmissions for the new nightly radio service at the end of August 1941. He had earlier recruited most of his 'Irish' team in Paris, including a Breton nobleman called Keroer, another French man called Piche, and a multi-lingual Russian emigrée called Kowanko whose family had fled the October Revolution of 1917 and settled in France. The nearest Dignowity got to a genuine Irish recruit in Paris was the Dublin-born James Blair whose parents were British and who had been proof-reading for an American newspaper in the French capital. According to Mahr, Dignowity knew little or nothing about Ireland and had never even visited Dublin. When questioned by Mahr, Dignowity told him that he had spent some time on an Irish farm. However, although all foreign visitors were obliged to complete an alien's registration form on arrival, the Irish Military Archive has no record of Dignowity entering Ireland at any time. Mahr noted that while Dignowity had studied languages and economics in Germany and Geneva, his knowledge of French and Swiss affairs far outstripped his admittedly limited knowledge of Irish matters.⁵⁴

During the short period in which Dignowity was running the fledgling nightly Irish service, the only people with Irish connections on his staff were Blair, who had not been to Ireland since he was a child, and John Francis O'Reilly who joined the team in September 1941. In his memoirs, O'Reilly wrote that Dignowity 'was affable and an accomplished linguist. But, like the other members of his staff, his knowledge of Ireland was purely geographic'.⁵⁵ On 9 September 1941, Mahr drafted a strongly worded report for his Foreign Office superiors criticising what he saw as Dignowity's unsuitability for running a radio propaganda operation for Irish listeners. He also pointed out that Dignowity was a Propaganda

Ministry appointee. But it took some time for Mahr's report to be acted upon and Dignowity survived as head of the service until November 1941, when he and the two French men were removed. Shortly before Christmas Hans Hartmann was installed, at Mahr's behest, as the new head of the Irland-Redaktion.⁵⁶ Mahr and Hartmann shared a common interest in Irish affairs. The two had known each other since 1937 when, as noted earlier, Hartmann applied for a student exchange visit to Ireland and had worked briefly with the Austrian at the National Museum in Dublin.



Hans Hartmann at his home in Cologne, 1990

Hans Hartmann: The accidental propagandist

Taking over the reins from Wolfgang Dignowity, Hans Hartmann soon stamped his authority on the Irland-Redaktion. Early on he refused the services of the Reichsrundfunk's chief English-language propagandist, William Joyce. Hartmann believed that Joyce, despite being the radio's 'great star', as he put it, 'was the man to do the British broadcasts to England, and I did not want to have him specifically in the Irish edition'. In any case Hartmann noted that Joyce could already be heard in Ireland on the programmes beamed to England by German Radio's English service.

Hans Hartmann was born on 18 November 1909 in the village of Rustringen, near Oldenburg. At university he opted to study philology, a subject that was to dominate his life. Hartmann's love of folklore and languages would mark him out later as one of Germany's leading linguists.

In 1933 when Hitler took power in Germany, Hartmann, like many others of his generation, was put under pressure to join the Nazi party. He explains:

I became a member of the National Socialist party in 1933. The reason was that my studies had been paid for by the Studienstiftung [student foundation] whose members were told that the Reich had done so much to promote their studies that they should show some gratitude, and that the least they could and should do was to enter the party. That I did in order to be left undisturbed further on.⁵⁷

Hartmann was appointed a lecturer in Celtic Studies at Berlin University in 1942 yet he had deliberately avoided the mainstream of German academic life. The path of chemicals or engineering would have meant a lucrative job in the Third Reich's expanding industrial and armaments sector, but it was not for him. In the 1930s Hartmann was at his happiest wandering the remote boreens of Connemara and Donegal. In those Gaeltacht areas he tried to get to grips with the dialectical maze of a language which had, at that time, few written guidelines for students.⁵⁸

In 1936, at the age of 27, the scholar from Rustringen graduated from Berlin University after completing a paper entitled 'Studies on the stress pattern of adjectives in Russian'. He never visited the Soviet Union but told this author:

I learnt Russian in 1930-31 from a well-educated, bilingual German-Russian emigré evicted from a flourishing estate situated in the area of Saratov, the principal town of the German Volga Republic, who was naturally strongly opposed to Soviet communism.⁵⁹

Within a short time of his graduation Hartmann was to switch his attentions westwards to Ireland and the Celtic world. In 1937, he made his first trip to Ireland to study the Irish language and folklore. Arriving at Cobh on 3 April he made his way to Dublin to work at the National Museum with Mahr. Hartmann initially held a 12-month residence permit issued by the Department of Justice. As with all foreigners, he had to complete an alien registration card⁶⁰ and this shows a young bespectacled scholar with dark hair, cut short at the back and sides. The secret file kept on Hartmann by the Irish Army's intelligence section, G2, indicates that, despite the apparently innocuous nature of his study trip to Ireland, he was kept under close surveillance for the duration of his two and a half year visit.⁶¹

Staying in a flat at Dartmouth Square, Hartmann's attendance at German social functions was noted on his G2 file from the start of 1939. Hartmann enjoyed meeting his fellow Germans, particularly at the Red Bank restaurant in d'Olier Street, Dublin, where on Wednesday nights he would join Helmut Clissmann and Adolf Mahr over pints of Guinness, ignoring the German beer that had been specially imported by the restaurant's owners.⁶² Clissmann was a former student of Trinity College who ran the German Academic Exchange Service in Dublin. The service brought students from Germany to study at Irish universities and sent Irish students in the opposite direction. During the war, as an agent for Abwehr II, the German Counter Intelligence division responsible for contacts with discontented minority groups in foreign countries, Clissmann would be involved in the preparation of operation Sea Lion, Hitler's planned invasion of England. He was also privy to the top-secret, but unsuccessful, plan to land IRA leader Sean Russell on the Dingle peninsula from a U-boat.⁶³

As well as noting Hartmann's visits to Helmut Clissmann, G2 officers followed him on his travels around the country, reporting that in County Donegal he stayed at the Seaview Hotel in Bunbeg and toured the county with the same local folklore specialist who helped Ludwig Mühlhausen, namely

Sean O Heochaidh. They noted that Hartmann lived off a monthly allowance of thirty pounds. But if G2 had hoped to net a leading German spy in the person of Hans Hartmann, they were to be disappointed. Hartmann's mission was purely academic. He wanted to master the Irish language - which he amazed everyone by doing in little over two years - as well as gathering folklore material for a thesis leading to a lecturing post at Berlin University.⁶⁴

In Dublin he was assigned to work under Adolf Mahr at the National Museum, but Mahr soon realised Hartmann was not cut out for museum work and arranged for his transfer to the Folklore Commission, then housed at University College Dublin in Earlsfort Terrace. Professor James Hamilton Delargy was director of the commission which had been set up in 1935. There Hartmann was in his element, working with Máire MacNéill and Sean O Suilleabhain, a native of Kenmare, Co Kerry, who formed a close friendship with the German. Together with O Suilleabhain, Hartmann drew up a questionnaire seeking details of Gaeltacht folklore including superstitions, beliefs and fairytales. Copies of the questionnaire were sent to people in the Kerry, Connemara, and Donegal Gaeltachts, and the results were collated by Hartmann.⁶⁵ Under the direction of Ludwig Mühlhausen, then in charge of the Department of Celtic Studies at Berlin University, Hartmann used the folklore material as the basis for his 1941 thesis entitled 'Sickness, Death, and Concepts of the Hereafter in Ireland'. The work was highly regarded and, the following year, earned him a lecturer's job in Mühlhausen's Department. When part of his study appeared as a book in 1942, Hartmann dedicated it to the President of Ireland, Douglas Hyde.⁶⁶

Ever suspicious of the activities of foreign nationals, G2 noted that Hartmann:

appears to have been accepted as genuine by the folklore [commission] people, eg. he is said to have gone to Donegal on Delargy's advice, and Delargy supported his application for an extension of his stay here.

The Gardai noted Hartmann's continued attendance at gatherings of the German colony at the Red Bank restaurant, as well as his regular visits to Adolf Mahr's house at Waterloo Place. A Garda report added: 'at no time

have they [Hartmann and Mahr] been observed in the company of each other outside'.⁶⁷

On 17 September 1938, the Garda detectives followed Hartmann to a showing at the Olympia of a German film which featured coverage of Hitler's visit to Rome. He was accompanied by a TCD student Hans Garlach. Each day the Gardai followed Hartmann to the Folklore Commission in Earlsfort Terrace where he worked in room 55. The police also noted that Hartmann was often accompanied by the German legation's typist, Helen Neugebauer.⁶⁸

Hartmann says that he would like to have continued his folklore work in Ireland, but the pace of world events dictated otherwise. His departure was decided when Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939. Some forty members of the German colony, including Hartmann, left Ireland on 11 September 1939. Under alarming headlines detailing the German army's advance on Warsaw and clashes with French troops in the Saar region, *The Irish Times* carried a photograph of the German Minister to Ireland, Eduard Hempel, seeing off Charles Budina, a German-born County Wicklow hotelier, and Dr Robert Stumpf, a radiologist at Baggot Street Hospital who was also a junior Nazi party official. The Germans boarded the S.S. *Cambria* at Dún Laoghaire bound for home via Britain and Holland. Three buses, their windows blacked out, transported the German party under military escort from Holyhead to London. After staying there a few nights on the bare boards of the deserted German ambassador's residence, they were put aboard a ship bound for Rotterdam.⁶⁹

Back in Berlin in the autumn of 1939, Hartmann continued working on his Irish folklore material with the help of Ludwig Mühlhausen at Berlin University. The following year he would join Mühlhausen in giving Irish talks on the radio, and in December 1941 he was installed by Mahr as head of German Radio's propaganda service for Ireland. Hartmann's task was to ensure that the programmes, in both Irish and English, would conform to the blueprint drawn up nine months earlier by Mahr for Ribbentrop. Essentially this called for the use of virulently anti-British propaganda, while stressing the wisdom - and from a German standpoint the necessity - of Ireland's remaining neutral in the conflict. To carry out the strategy of his mentor at the Foreign Office, Hartmann took on a diverse English-speaking team of Irish and non-Irish broadcasters who would serve him on and off throughout his three and a half year tenure as head of the Irland-

Redaktion. The story of German Radio's propaganda service to Ireland is very much the story of those individuals.

Chapter 3 Berlin's Irish Team

Of the various Irish people who staffed the Irish service of German Radio from 1941 to 1944, a number led colourful lives. The most distinguished was undoubtedly Francis Stuart, the author whose writings are still widely regarded and who returned to live in Ireland thirteen years after the war. His role is considered in chapter four and that of the non-Irish members of the Irland-Redaktion in chapters five and six. But what of the other Irish members of the team? For Francis Stuart was neither the first nor the only Irish, or Irish-born, person to be employed to broadcast to Ireland from Berlin. Before Stuart arrived, John O'Reilly had been recruited by Wolfgang Dignowity. O'Reilly, described by one Nazi official as 'a pig-headed opportunist', hailed from Kilkee, Co Clare, and was proud of what he described as his 'Irish spirit of independence'. After Stuart, he can be considered as the second most important Irish citizen to have worked for the Irland-Redaktion.

John Francis O'Reilly

John Francis O'Reilly was an improbable broadcaster for the Nazi radio service. He was an inherent adventurer, almost in the mercenary mould. The story of how he came to broadcast from wartime Berlin to Ireland says as much about the haphazard recruitment methods of German Radio as it does about this vaguely enigmatic Clare man. He was the only member of German Radio's wartime Irland-Redaktion who is known to have returned to Ireland on a spying mission. Susan Sweney turned down a similar mission before joining the radio team.¹

John O'Reilly was born in Kilkee, Co Clare on 7 August 1916. His father Bernard was the local Royal Irish Constabulary sergeant who had taken part in the arrest of Roger Casement just three and a half months before John Francis was born. Casement was landed on the Kerry coast by a German U-boat on Good Friday, 21 April 1916 - three days before the Easter Rising. The RIC man was known thereafter as 'Casement' O'Reilly. Given that his father had gained notoriety through the arrest of Casement, there was more than a little irony in the fact that, twenty seven years later, the RIC sergeant's son would be dropped by parachute from a Luftwaffe plane to spy for the

Germans. According to O'Reilly's own memoirs he duped the Germans into taking him on as an agent simply to get back home.²

In 1943, a secret Garda assessment on the younger O'Reilly's background noted he had 'always been regarded as the wild boy of the family'. O'Reilly's taste for adventure, his apparent inability to stick to any one job for any length of time, and his propensity for globe-trotting, proved early on that 'wild boy' was an apt sobriquet for the young Kilkee man. His early career was nothing if not varied. After being educated by the Christian Brothers in Kilrush, he got a job as a customs officer at Rosslare Harbour in 1936, but left - reportedly after failing an Irish language exam - to study for the priesthood at Buckfast Abbey in England. But the priestly life proved not to be the young O'Reilly's true vocation for he left after only two weeks to work as a reception clerk in a London hotel. His temporary move into the hotel business was prophetic in some ways because many years after the war he was to buy the Esplanade Hotel in Dublin.³

O'Reilly was in London when war broke out and in May 1940 he used his savings to travel to Jersey in the Channel Islands for a holiday. When that money was spent, O'Reilly took a job on Jersey's Beaumont Farm helping out with the potato harvest. He chose to stay on there, even when other Irish labourers returned to Britain along with the Dunkirk evacuees, and was still doing casual work when the German Army occupied the Islands on 2 July 1940. A chance meeting with a German sentry landed the Clare man a barracks job at St Peter's airfield, then controlled by the Luftwaffe. Later, he distributed rations from the kitchen of an anti-aircraft battery on Jersey.

O'Reilly's aptitude for learning German made up for his earlier failure to master Irish, and by March 1941 a G2 memorandum noted that he was acting as an interpreter and go-between for Irish labourers and the German commander on Jersey. The Germans regarded him as something of a leader. Having manoevered himself into a position of trust and limited authority, O'Reilly approached the German military commander of Jersey, Prince Van Baldeck, seeking travel papers to get to Germany. O'Reilly later told Irish Intelligence officers that his idea was to make contact with the Irish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, William Warnock, and to get back home to neutral territory. But the Germans had other ideas. Van Baldeck did a deal with O'Reilly, telling him he would get his travel papers for Germany on

condition he brought as many Irishmen with him as he could persuade to work in German factories to assist the war effort. The German commander also insisted that O'Reilly make sure that there were no British agents or Irishmen with pro-British views among them.

With promises of good pay, generous holidays and their return passage to Ireland to be paid for once the war was over, O'Reilly managed to recruit no less than 72 Irishmen. They set off for Germany on 5 July 1941. But one thing the Germans had not bargained for was the ability of Irish labourers to celebrate the end of seasonal work on Jersey coupled with the promise of lucrative work in the Fatherland. The train journey from the North coast of France to Germany degenerated into something close to bedlam with O'Reilly's new recruits spending their savings on a massive drinking spree which caused havoc.

Reconstructing the events two and a half years later, Irish Army Intelligence officers noted that:

on the journey from Jersey through occupied France, the party was anything but well-behaved. They had a fair amount of money saved and proceeded at once to get completely drunk and out of hand...the train was divided into various compartments according to nationality. O'Reilly's party invaded all compartments of the train and on several occasions pulled the communication cords causing an amount of confusion. As accepted leader of the party, he [O'Reilly] had to bear the brunt of the criticism.⁴

On arrival in Germany, the Irish were put to work in the Hermann Göring armaments factory in Watenstedt. O'Reilly wrote to his parents in Kilkee on 27 July 1941 saying he had a job as an interpreter to the German forces at Watenstedt.

Despite Prince Van Baldeck's optimism, O'Reilly's men never quite measured up to the German role model of industrial workers and the train disorder proved not to be an isolated incident. The Irish were kept apart from other nationalities. They disregarded rules, coming back drunk at night, singing and shouting, and - most dangerously from the German point of view - switching on factory lights during the blackout. Tiring of the continuous complaints from the German authorities about his men's drunken

behaviour, O'Reilly decided it was time to leave. In September, just two months after arriving in the Third Reich and two years into the war, he applied for a job in Berlin writing articles for German Radio's new nightly Irish service. At the Radio Centre in Berlin, the Kilkee man was given a microphone test and hired. The fact that he got the job was not altogether surprising as he was then the only Irish national in the Irland-Redaktion, a fact which upset O'Reilly and brought him into conflict with his 'Irish' colleagues who were in fact German, French, English and Russian. When O'Reilly first arrived at the Radio Centre in September 1941 there were only a handful of regular contributors to the Irland-Redaktion. They included James Blair, one Sonja Kowanko who gave talks under the name of Linda Walters, two Frenchmen named Piche and Keroer, and the German director Dignowity.

O'Reilly did not begin broadcasting to Ireland immediately. He was first given the job of scripting short articles of Irish interest for Blair who used the fictitious name Pat O'Brien on air. Later on, both O'Reilly and his friend Liam Mullally would use the same cover name, Pat O'Brien, for their broadcasts. But O'Reilly also used his real name when delivering his first few radio talks in October 1941. Irish Army monitors heard O'Reilly broadcasting on 28 October 1941 and reported that: 'Talk dealt with religion. Ireland in the Penal Laws was compared with Russia under communist rule.'⁵

In January 1942, Dorothea Susan Hilton, who broadcast under her maiden name of Susan Sweney, joined the Irish team.⁶ O'Reilly told G2 officers later that:

Hilton proved unreliable and fond of drink, and Blair's services were not satisfactory as he was believed to be getting stale. Following a scene in which Susan Hilton used endearing terms to Blair while he was in the announcing box and still on the air, their services were dispensed with.⁷

The pair were sacked in March 1942, and John Francis O'Reilly was promoted, not only taking over Blair's 'Pat O'Brien' talks but also putting out three general news bulletins a night. Although O'Reilly had his own ideas about what should be broadcast to Ireland, he was never given a

totally free hand to do as he thought fit. Hartmann considered him a relatively low-key member of staff compared, for example, to Francis Stuart whom Hartmann found 'highly intelligent'. Both Hartmann and Stuart were lecturers at Berlin University. Consequently, Stuart got a freer hand in choosing the subject matter for his broadcasts, although even in his case the texts had to be submitted in advance, first to Hartmann and then the English section. O'Reilly, who was not an academic, did channel his own ideas to Stuart for use in the latter's weekly talks entitled 'Through Irish Eyes'. In fact, O'Reilly, Stuart and the IRA man Frank Ryan met from time to time to discuss the contents of Stuart's broadcasts. However, Stuart found neither man to be of the slightest help to him. Stuart saw O'Reilly as a 'pretty nasty character. He was a sort of mercenary, not that he ever did any fighting'. Stuart notes that O'Reilly 'lived in great style' and adds: 'I was very suspicious of him because he could easily have been a double agent'.⁸

O'Reilly's former career pattern did not augur well for his tenure at the Radio Centre, and a difficult working relationship with Hans Hartmann caused him some unease. O'Reilly had a row with Hartmann when the German academic insisted that O'Reilly read lengthy extracts from Wolfe Tone's diaries on air. Hartmann had purchased Irish and English language versions of the diaries while working as a folklore student in Ireland four years earlier and felt they contained a pertinent message for Irish listeners. He had incorporated them as a regular feature of his Irish talks since taking over the service in December 1941. But, angry at being asked to read what he considered to be 'uninteresting' material, O'Reilly handed the Wolfe Tone scripts back and told Hartmann what he thought of them. However, the Clareman was rapped over the knuckles and told to carry on. O'Reilly was also upset that musical items played on the Irish programmes had no 'actual Irish basis'. Eventually, he decided to look for another job. In June 1942, just nine months after joining the radio service, O'Reilly made contact with an American working for an S.S. unit. The American got him an interview with an S.S. official who sounded O'Reilly out about working in Spain as an agent gathering military intelligence from refugees, shipwrecked Allied sailors and others. O'Reilly, who by this time wanted to get home to Ireland, told the S.S. contact that he would prefer to be sent on a mission to Northern Ireland. The German official said he would need at

least six months' intensive training for such a task. Three days later, O'Reilly was summoned back to the same S.S. bureau and told his application to work as a German intelligence agent had been approved. But it was to be another three months before he found out what the Germans had in mind for him. From June to September 1942 O'Reilly continued working for Hartmann's small radio team. Then suddenly he was summoned back to the S.S. office and informed that the past three months had been spent checking out his credentials and reliability. He was told to leave the radio and prepare for specialised training as a spy.⁹

Back at the Radio Centre, O'Reilly told Hartmann of his decision to leave. After the war he wrote, 'I knew I could trust Dr Hartmann. He appeared to have considerable influence in the Foreign Office. He was a member of the National Socialist party and he was obviously attached to Ireland'. Alarmed at losing a genuine Irish member of his team of announcers, Hartmann contacted Helmut Clissmann who, in 1942, was attached to the German Army's Brandenburg Regiment. Clissmann was not able to intervene. Hartmann agreed to O'Reilly's departure once he had found an Irish substitute. The substitute was O'Reilly's friend Liam Mullally, an English language teacher at the Berlitz school in Berlin. As Mullally began work at the Radio Centre, O'Reilly made his way to Bremen on 17 September 1942 to begin training as an espionage agent. So it was that by the age of twenty six, John Francis O'Reilly had made the transition from customs official to seminarian, from hotel receptionist to potato picker, from interpreter to armaments worker and on to broadcaster and spy. The Kilkee man was now about to embark on what he called 'my great adventure into the Intelligence branch of the German Navy in Bremen'. He still had over a year to wait before the journey home would become a reality. Ahead of him lay a tough training programme in wireless telegraphy as well as the construction and repair of radio sets. He also received instruction in the use of invisible inks, and how to condense intelligence reports to a minimum. As 1942 drew to a close, plans were afoot to send O'Reilly home aboard a U-boat bound for the west coast of Ireland. But when he returned from three weeks leave in January 1943 he was told the U-boat plan had been dropped. The same month, he was transferred from Bremen to Hamburg for further training.¹⁰

The various branches of the Nazi intelligence services could not

apparently agree on what to do with their new recruit. Francis Stuart felt the Clare man wanted to return home to Ireland for purely personal reasons, while some Germans involved felt O'Reilly would be unreliable as a spy. O'Reilly then became the subject of top level discussions within the Nazi spy hierarchy. Edmund Veesenmayer, the Nazi's so-called coup d'état specialist, had been picked by Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, to stir up rebellion in Ireland. His master plan to return IRA leaders Sean Russell and Frank Ryan to Ireland fell through when Russell died aboard a U-boat on 14 August 1940, just 100 miles west of Galway. Despite the setback, Veesenmayer still harboured a desire to get Frank Ryan back home to take over the secret task originally assigned to Russell. He felt the moves to get O'Reilly to Ireland were interfering with the more important Ryan plan, and asked Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr (German counter intelligence) to cancel the O'Reilly plan. Veesenmayer directed his right-hand man Kurt Haller to draw up unflattering assessments of both O'Reilly and Liam Mullally. The latter, it had been planned, might be sent back on the spying mission with O'Reilly. Haller pulled no punches in his report for the Foreign Ministry, describing O'Reilly as a 'pig-headed opportunist', and Mullally as 'an irresponsible, albeit affable, chatterbox'. Veesenmayer's efforts caused O'Reilly's departure by U-boat to be cancelled in January 1943. But O'Reilly was an SS recruit, and the SS wanted to press ahead with their plan to return O'Reilly and another Irishman, John Kenny, to Ireland. Consequently, unknown to either the Foreign Office or Abwehr, O'Reilly was dropped over his home area of County Clare from a German aircraft at 2 a.m. on 16 December 1943. The parachute landing was made four miles from Kilkee, just across the Shannon estuary from the transatlantic flying-boat harbour at Foynes, where the noise of the Luftwaffe plane's engine would attract less attention. O'Reilly was carrying a wireless transmitter/receiver in a brown suitcase, and £300 in cash. But the Telefunken transmitter never sent secret messages back to Berlin and ended its days gathering dust at the military archive in Dublin. Within hours of landing, O'Reilly was arrested and taken to Arbour Hill prison in Dublin. John Kenny was also captured shortly after parachuting over Clare three days later.¹¹

O'Reilly and Kenny's swift discovery was due to the fact that British Intelligence had tipped off G2 that the Luftwaffe planes were on their way

to deliver a 'human cargo'. Liaison between Irish and British Intelligence was well developed by that stage of the war.¹²

The two parachute incidents put a strain on Eamon de Valera's policy of neutrality. The arrival of O'Reilly and Kenny coincided with increasing pressure on de Valera's government by the American Minister to Ireland, David Gray, who wanted Axis diplomats expelled from Dublin. The Dublin government tried to keep the arrest of both men secret but, despite strict press censorship, a newspaper did report that an injured man had been found in a field in Clare. It would also have been difficult for G2 to prevent rumours of the parachute drops spreading since injuries sustained by Kenny on landing had been treated at hospitals in Kilrush, Ennis and Dublin.¹³ A report of the parachute drops also featured in a secret weekly report drawn up for the American Office of War Information in Washington by Dan Terrell, who was a press attaché with the U.S. legation in Dublin.¹⁴

Fearing the parachute incidents would reflect badly on Ireland's delicate policy of neutrality, de Valera instructed Joe Walshe, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, to cable Ireland's representative in Washington, Robert Brennan, with instructions to lobby the State Department.¹⁵ The Kilkee parachute landings continued to cause diplomatic ripples for some time. On 21 February 1944 the U.S. ambassador in Ireland, David Gray mentioned the arrival of O'Reilly and Kenny in a diplomatic note to de Valera requesting that Axis diplomats to be expelled from Dublin. De Valera rejected Gray's demand.¹⁶

The Germans' plan to use O'Reilly as a spy backfired badly because, while the Clareman was imprisoned in Dublin, G2 tricked him into disclosing a secret code he had been trained to use for relaying radio messages back to Germany.¹⁷ During the night of 5/6 July 1944 O'Reilly escaped from Arbour Hill prison in Dublin, but he was quickly recaptured and spent the remainder of the Emergency in custody.¹⁸

GÁRDA SÍOCHÁNA

**£500
REWARD**

The above sum will be paid to any person giving information resulting in the arrest of **JOHN FRANCIS O'REILLY**, internee, who escaped from custody at **Arbour Hill Detention Prison, Dublin**, on the night of 5th-6th July, 1944



Landed by Parachute in Clare, 16th December, 1943, and had been in custody since that date.

DESCRIPTION:—Born Kilkee, Co. Clare, 7th August, 1916; height 5' 11"; weight 152 lbs.; fair hair; blue eyes; fresh complexion; slim build; wore dark brown suit with red stripes; black shoes; rubber soles and heels, belted size 10; bare head; sports shirt. May be wearing a light grey showerproof overcoat.

Information may be given to any Garda Station.

Proportionate rewards will be paid for information concerning this man which will assist the Garda in locating him.

A Garda 'Wanted' poster for John O'Reilly, issued after his escape from Arbour Hill prison in July 1944. O'Reilly was recaptured at the home of his father in Kilkee, Co Clare. He used the £500 reward money, collected by his father, to buy a pub in Dublin after the war.

Liam Mullally

Liam Mullally worked as a Berlitz language teacher in Europe during the 1930s and early 1940s. The war years found him in Berlin sharing a villa with John O'Reilly. When O'Reilly left the radio service in September 1942, as has been stated, he recommended that Liam Mullally be given his job. Mullally was subsequently interviewed by Hans Hartmann, and in mid-September took over O'Reilly's 'Pat O'Brien' broadcasts to Ireland.¹⁹

The Irish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, William Warnock, who kept an eye on the comings and goings of the small ex-patriate Irish community, reported back to Dublin that Mullally was working part-time at the radio and part-time at the Berlitz school.²⁰ According to Francis Stuart, Mullally was:

a bit malleable in the Germans' hands and went in a lot for this anti-atheistic, Bolshevik menace [propaganda]. I remember once in Berlin...towards the end of the war, I said to him 'I wouldn't like to be in your shoes if you're here when the Russians come'...that terrified poor Mullally; between not being able to give it up [his broadcasting job] and dreading what would happen if the Russians came.²¹

With O'Reilly's departure, Stuart notes that he and Mullally were for a period the only Irish left working for the Irland-Redaktion. Stuart claims that Mullally 'lived life on the black market like many of these foreigners did'. Stuart's overall assessment of Liam Mullally was that 'he wasn't a bad sort, but pretty timid, and he didn't know what to do'. Stuart adds that Mullally was 'a sort of black marketeer who had drifted to Germany, and was not any great credit to Ireland'.²²

According to his fellow broadcaster Susan Sweney, Mullally was eventually 'given the sack for inefficiency, although efficient'.²³ But he could well have feigned inefficiency to force the Germans to let him go, as Francis Stuart recalls that Mullally 'managed to leave' before the end of the war. From Berlin, Mullally went to Vienna where he met Susan Sweney in the city's press club. Mullally was employed in Vienna as a valet to Norman Baillie-Stewart, who for a while had worked with William Joyce in the English radio propaganda service in the Reich capital. When Mullally returned on a brief visit to Berlin, Stuart met him and noted that:

He must have been living in great style...he said, 'I have an easy job. Baillie-Stewart gets special rations on the black market, and all I have to do is exercise his dog mornings and evenings'. In the midst of a war, when defeat is looming them in the face you know, this old carry-on.²⁴

Frank Ryan

Frank Ryan, a leading IRA figure in the 1930s, featured in Nazi Germany's plans to engineer a coup d'état against de Valera in 1940. He accompanied the IRA leader, Sean Russell, aboard a U-boat destined to land both men on the Dingle peninsula in August 1940. But Russell died of a perforated ulcer aboard the U-boat and the mission was aborted, with Ryan returning to Berlin.²⁵ Though Ryan had broadcast on Radio Madrid²⁶ for the Republican government during the Spanish civil war - in which he fought with the International Brigade against Franco's forces - he never broadcast for the Nazis who harboured him in wartime Berlin. Even if he had wanted to broadcast to Ireland, the Nazis would not have allowed him to do so since his presence in the Third Reich was supposed to be a highly guarded secret.

Ryan did however contribute indirectly to German Radio's Irish propaganda effort by advising Francis Stuart on the content of his weekly broadcasts.²⁷ In 1943, Ryan advised the German Foreign Office against launching a propaganda service aimed at Irish-Americans. In mid-1944 Ryan was planning to accept an invitation from Hans Hartmann to join the Irland-Redaktion as a translator and advisor. Although he had made arrangements to get travel papers to visit Hartmann in Luxembourg, Ryan fell ill and died in a Dresden sanitorium on 10 June 1944.²⁸

Francis Stuart

The Irish author, Francis Stuart, made his first broadcast to Ireland from Berlin on St Patrick's Day 1942. He continued to work for the Irland-Redaktion for almost two years until January 1944. The major role which he played there is considered in detail in chapter four.

William Joseph Murphy

William Murphy from County Armagh had, like Liam Mullally, worked as a language teacher in Europe before the outbreak of war. He had made several trips home to his native Bessbrook during many years' service with Berlitz

in Germany, Holland, Belgium and Yugoslavia. When war was declared, Murphy was working with Berlitz in the German city of Essen where he was arrested as a British citizen by the police and thrown into prison. But he was freed two days later after protesting that he was Irish and thus a neutral, despite holding a British passport. Murphy continued to teach in Essen, but had to report regularly to the police.

In mid-1942, the Berlitz teacher was contacted by a John Freeman who claimed to be Irish and worked for an Essen publishing company called Verlag Girardet. Freeman tried to recruit him for a spying mission to Ireland. Murphy was taken to an Abwehr office in Bremen where one Hauptmann Steffens gave him details of the mission, which was to report on the effect of German bombing raids in Northern Ireland. Anxious to persuade the Germans to send him home to Ireland on any pretext, even spying, Murphy applied for and got an Irish passport from William Warnock and then surrendered his British passport. But a series of heavy Allied bombing raids on Essen led to confusion and to the abandonment of the spy mission. Murphy lost track of Freeman and resigned his teaching job to take a new one with Berlitz in Berlin. On 22 November 1943, two days after he got to the Reich capital, the Berlitz school in Berlin was destroyed in an air raid, leaving Murphy out of work.

The Bessbrook man managed to trace John Freeman to a house at Florastrasse in Berlin where he tried to reactivate the Irish spy mission. But a chance meeting with an American in a Berlin café got Murphy a meeting with William Joyce, alias Lord Haw Haw. In January 1944 Joyce took Murphy on for a month's studio trial in Berlin, paying him 20 marks a day. Afterwards, Murphy briefly joined Hans Hartmann's Irish service in Luxembourg. Hartmann recorded Murphy's voice to see if he would make suitable announcer material but the test was a failure and Hartmann told Murphy that he also considered him unsuitable as a translator. Since Murphy had got a month's contract, Hartmann had to keep him on for another three weeks. He saw out his time working two hours a day. He described this experience as follows:

Most of my work was thrown into the wastepaper basket...the section of the Luxembourg Rundfunk in which I was employed was engaged solely on broadcasts to the Irish Free State. The work on which I was engaged was

at first the translation of war and general news items from the tape machines. But later, as I was unqualified to translate these with sufficient speed, I was given the job of translating from various German newspapers, articles marked by Hartmann. Most of the articles given to me to translate were hostile to British and Allied interests.²⁹

A week after starting work with the Irish team in Luxembourg, Murphy was surprised when Hartmann's secretary introduced him to another Irishman, Henry Freeman. Henry was a brother of John Freeman³⁰ who had tried to recruit Murphy for the Irish spying mission. Henry, who claimed he was in Luxembourg to do a radio voice test, asked Murphy why the project had fallen through and announced that he had taken the assignment over from his brother John, who was ill. Another meeting with Hauptmann Steffens was organised in Essen at which Murphy was presented with a list of information which the Germans wanted from Northern Ireland and Britain concerning details of factories involved in the Allied war effort.

Murphy was sent to Berlin to get a visa for Ireland from the Irish legation there. On 9 April 1944, he met Con Cremin who was operating from new premises. Cremin had replaced Warnock who returned home after the former legation in Drakestrasse was destroyed in an air raid in September 1943.³¹ Cremin was wary of Murphy's motives for wanting to return home and bluntly told him: 'I hope you have no idea of working for the Germans over there, because if you have you'll be put in gaol'. Murphy assured Cremin he had no intention of spying. The diplomat then pointedly reminded him of John O'Reilly, the broadcaster-turned-spy who had been dropped by parachute over County Clare just four months earlier and who was at that moment detained in prison in Dublin. Murphy recalled that Cremin 'asked me if I knew who had sent O'Reilly over, as it had almost caused a serious diplomatic breach'. In the event Cremin's suspicions were such that Murphy never got his visa.³²

With no job to support himself, Murphy sought out Francis Stuart whom he had met during his brief stay in Luxembourg. According to Murphy, Stuart had said he could get him a job as an English teacher at Berlin University. Calling at Stuart's flat he discovered that Stuart, like himself, had a desire to return to Ireland. Stuart suggested that Murphy return to Bremen and ask the Abwehr to land them both in Ireland by U-boat along with a

secret transmitter for the IRA. But when Murphy put Stuart's proposal to an Abwehr agent called König, in Bremen, the latter dismissed it as 'nonsense'. Murphy returned empty-handed to Berlin. He claimed later that Stuart put him in touch with officials at the Nazi's secret 'black' propaganda unit, Büro Concordia, located at the Reichssportsfeld where the 1936 Olympic Games had been staged. Stuart denies Murphy's version of events and says that he (Stuart) never had any links with Büro Concordia. On 1 August 1944 the Bessbrook man began a month's trial with Concordia, recording talks which were scripted for him. He received 600 marks for the month's trial but did not stay around to hear if he was to be permanently engaged or not. He had decided to leave Germany at the earliest opportunity. On the pretext of returning to Luxembourg to get luggage and personal property which he had left in an hotel, Murphy left Berlin by train on 1 September. He stayed in a Luxembourg hotel and, when the U.S. Army liberated the Grand-Duchy on 10 September 1944, Murphy surrendered to American troops and asked to be put in touch with British Intelligence officers.³³

Elizabeth Clissmann (née Mulcahy)

Neither Elizabeth Clissmann (née Mulcahy) nor her husband, Helmut, ever broadcast to Ireland during the war. She was, however, connected with a propaganda initiative aimed at preventing U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's re-election in 1944. The Clissmanns were consulted about the plan by the German authorities and their advice was sought on the idea of beaming anti-Roosevelt propaganda to Irish communities in the United States. According to the Clissmanns, they decided to derail the initiative before it started. In March 1944 Elizabeth Clissmann travelled from Denmark to Luxembourg where the Irland-Redaktion was then located, in order to investigate the effectiveness of Hans Hartmann's Irish propaganda programmes and whether they could be adapted for Irish American listeners. Her negative report on the situation in Luxembourg, which she sent to the Foreign Office, helped to ensure that the anti-Roosevelt propaganda plan never got off the ground.

Elizabeth Mulcahy was from Sligo and her husband Helmut Clissmann hailed from Aachen in Germany. The two had met while studying in Dublin in the 1930s - she at UCD and he at Trinity. In the late 1930s Helmut Clissmann

was in charge of the German Academic Exchange service which enabled Irish university students to spend a year studying in Germany while their German counterparts travelled to Ireland. These included Hans Hartmann and Hilde Poepping who both worked with German Radio's Irish service during the war. By the outbreak of war in September 1939, Helmut had married Elizabeth and the couple left Ireland for Berlin. In Germany Helmut Clissmann worked for German Counter Intelligence, the Abwehr, and was involved in plans for the invasion of England, codenamed Operation Sea Lion. Later he was attached to the Brandenburg Regiment of the German Army, while his wife sought shelter from Allied bombing attacks on Germany by moving with their children to Copenhagen. After the war the couple again took up residence in Ireland where they still live.³⁴

Chapter 4

Portrait of the writer at war: Francis Stuart

Francis Stuart began writing radio scripts for German Radio's English service as early as February 1940, just a month after starting work as a lecturer in Berlin University. But over two years were to pass before he himself sat in front of a microphone; that was on Saint Patrick's night, 17 March 1942, when his first broadcast went out from the Rundfunkhaus in Berlin. From the end of July 1942 he contributed weekly talks nearly every Wednesday night until leaving the service in January 1944. The talks went out under the general title of 'Through Irish Eyes'.

The five war years in Berlin, out of a career spanning seven decades, were to haunt the writer for the rest of his life. In 1990 a profile of Francis Stuart labelled him as 'ever the outsider, still unrepentant'. Yet, characteristically, Stuart dismissed the fuss created by his wartime role, maintaining he was a writer first and foremost and that all other activities and consequences were peripheral.¹ Half a century after the Second World War, Stuart was capable of stirring a very public row in the press by inviting journalists to 'a celebration to mark the 51st anniversary of a party on St. Patrick's Day 1940 in the Hotel Kaiserhof, Berlin'. But no sooner was Stuart attacked in print for having been linked to the Nazis, than he was defended by someone else.²

Born in Australia in 1902, the son of a Protestant farming family from County Antrim, Stuart was just three and a half months old when his father committed suicide in an asylum. In December that year, Stuart's mother Lily brought her infant son home to Antrim. Later they moved to Dublin. Stuart was sent to boarding schools in England, including the prestigious public school, Rugby. Years later he told an RTE interviewer that:

the public school, of course, put the fear of God into you. If you survived, you know, it was meant I think in those days for the British foreign administration, these people who went out and ruled over the blacks in goodness knows where, Somalia and India. Well, I never went out there but I was in other institutions, various prisons for instance. But in some ways I never went through such real constant harrassment [as at Rugby].³

In 1920, Francis Stuart married Iseult MacBride, the daughter of Maud Gonne MacBride and the French political activist Lucien Millevoeye. Maud Gonne MacBride's first husband was Major John MacBride, later executed for his part in the 1916 Rising, and their son Sean became Irish Minister for External Affairs in 1948. According to Stuart's biographer, Geoffrey Elborn, neither he nor Iseult MacBride wanted to marry, and 'both knew that it was a mistake'. During the Civil War, Stuart was imprisoned at Maryborough (Portlaoise) and later at the Curragh, after taking the Republican side in the conflict.

Over the following fifteen years, Stuart pursued his career as a writer, but eventually he grew disillusioned with Ireland and sought a break from the tension created by his marital difficulties. In fact, it was an approach in 1939 by Iseult to Helmut Clissmann that led to Stuart's being offered a lecture tour in Germany. He left for Berlin in April 1939 on a voyage that was to change his life. The National Socialists had been in power in Germany for six years at that stage. Of his decision to visit Germany, Stuart's biographer wrote: 'No informed person was unaware of what was happening in Germany, but even as late as 1939, Stuart was naive in his judgement of Hitler and the Third Reich'. Elborn quotes Stuart seeing Hitler as 'a kind of blind Samson who was pulling down the pillars of Western Society as we knew it, which I [Stuart] still believed had to come about before any new world could arise...'⁴

Some of Stuart's political naivety was reflected in an interview he gave to Sean Rafferty for BBC Radio:

I don't like the great dictators, they're another form of establishment. I mean I went to Germany, and so on, and had a certain idea I could go, which proved false. It's no good excusing myself. Good gracious, I've made the most disastrous mistakes, and they've worked out reasonably well for me luckily. They could have been even more disastrous. Stalin attracted me very much at one time, and I tried to get to Russia but I couldn't manage it...Suddenly, I saw the new Germany. I crossed to the shady side of the street where the criminals lurk, and I became one of them. Not through choice. In fact, it was a very painful experience. I seem to take it lightly [being] a social outcast, isolated. It's a terrible experience to be a social outcast. It's one thing to be in

prison here in Ireland because you fought on the losing side, but you were a patriot, or were considered such later, and it was nothing to be ashamed of. But to be in prison in Germany, to be imprisoned by the Allies after the war, you became an associate of criminals. You were one of these people who advocated, I don't know what, concentration camps or extermination of Jews, by implication. And that was for me a very salutary experience, to know what it was to be, not only among the defeated, but to be among the condemned. Because if you can't understand the condemned, if you can't enter into the extraordinary situation of condemned people and isolated people, I can't write the sort of novels that I try to write.⁵

Asked if he was aware of the dangers of Nazism, Stuart told the RTE interviewer John Skehan:

I was fully aware of the Nazis. But I had the feeling that anything was better than what I'd come from. I don't mean Ireland. I mean the whole set up, England, Ireland. It seemed to me that we had reached a point of utter drabness, mediocrity. I went to Berlin simply - I won't say simply, my motives were more mixed - but partly because here was a man who seemed to me, he was going to pull down the whole structure, and I believed in that pulling down.

Asked by the interviewer if that man was Hitler, Stuart replied 'yes'.⁶ In another RTE interview, Stuart appeared to admit that going to Germany on the eve of World War II was a mistake:

By going to Nazi Germany I was morally wrong. I was associating myself with, as I've said in my novels, the executioners rather than the victims. As to the Allies, I had and I have still only contempt for them because they were more hypocritical than the Nazis. Hypocrisy to me is worse, I won't say worse now than brutality. The brutality of the Nazis was...it's not for me here now in the studio...we know all that. No, I was associated with some very corrupt people, and I was guilty. But I've never in my mature life tried to have a guiltless posture. I was guilty in many ways.⁷

When asked by this author if he ever felt he had been taking the side of evil against the side of good while in Berlin, Stuart replied:

No, I didn't. I felt I was too closely involved with a brutal and barbarian régime for my own good or for my own liking. That I was opposed to good, I never felt for a moment, because I never felt that the Allied nations were anything but probably equally evil. Although, equally or not, it's a very fine point, but at least probably even more corrupt and more hypocritical. I was oblivious to the fact that I was involved. As long as they looked like - although to me they didn't - as long as they were victorious, I specially felt that. When it was obvious they were going to lose the war, to be on the side of the losers at the end of such a huge war was to me as a writer a very valuable experience. I went to Germany under a misapprehension of course...I thought Hitler would have been some sort of international revolutionary destroying the whole system, which I soon found he was far from.⁸

One observer of the post-war treason trials in Germany and Britain presumably had Stuart and his Irland-Redaktion colleagues in mind when writing, in 1952, that:

On that service [the Irish radio station in Berlin] educated men, some of them writers of standing, simpered pietistic sentiments combined with carneying praises of the régime which was murdering and torturing millions of their fellow-Catholics in Poland.⁹

Once in Berlin, Francis Stuart made contact with Professor Walter F. Schirmer, head of the University's English Department. During the war, Schirmer also worked at the Foreign Office as deputy head of the section controlling German Radio's foreign language transmissions. Stuart completed his lecture tour which, apart from Berlin, took in Munich, Hamburg, Bonn and Cologne. He was then invited by Schirmer to lecture on English and Irish literature at Berlin University starting in the autumn term. He accepted the job and returned to Ireland in July 1939 to wrap up his affairs there.¹⁰

Between Stuart's arrival back in Dublin and his eventual return to

Berlin in January 1940, events were taking a turn which, as well as affecting his own life, would affect the future course of world history. On the bi-lateral Irish-German level, secret contacts had already been established earlier in the year between the IRA and the Abwehr, of which Helmut Clissmann became a member on his return to Germany in 1939. Parallel with these developments, the IRA had launched a bombing campaign in Britain. The campaign reached a peak on 25 August 1939 when five people died in an IRA bombing in Coventry. On 1 September, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later the governments of the United Kingdom and France declared war on the Third Reich. Despite the grave turn of events, Stuart went ahead with his plans to lecture at Berlin University, and left Ireland for the second time in December 1939. Of his decision to go, Stuart says: 'When the war looked like breaking out, I didn't want to be caught here [in Ireland]. I mean, for a writer to have been all those years where nothing had ever happened, it was necessary for me to get away'.¹¹

As well as taking up his university lecturing post, Stuart was also acting as an IRA courier on that trip to Berlin. Before leaving Dublin, he had been summoned to a meeting with IRA chief of staff, Stephen Hayes, and Jim O'Donovan who masterminded the IRA's bombing campaign in England. The IRA wanted Stuart to contact the Abwehr in Berlin and ask for a new radio transmitter, the previous one having been seized in a police raid. They also wanted him to request that a liaison officer be sent to Ireland. Stuart was given half a piece of paper to take to Berlin where the other half would help to identify him as the genuine IRA courier.¹² Dismissing what he saw as the IRA's playacting 'like you read about in the old spy books', Stuart says that he got rid of the torn piece of paper when he reached London. The Irish writer continued on to Berlin, via Switzerland, with no means of identifying himself to German Intelligence:

Either they believed me when I got to Germany or they didn't. I couldn't care less really. They didn't believe me at first but then there was a man, also who'd been here [in Ireland] a long time and spoke Irish, called [Franz] Fromme. They asked me, 'was there nobody here to vouch for you?', so I said, 'If you can get hold of this Fromme, he was in Berlin'. They rang him up and he came round and vouched for me.¹³

Stuart wisely decided not to ask his new employer, Professor Schirmer, to vouch for his identity as this would have tipped off the university authorities that he was something more than a humble Irish lecturer. Yet, despite the apparently secret nature of Stuart's IRA links, according to Hilde Poepping, who met Stuart at the University of Berlin, Stuart 'stressed wherever he went that he had come on a mission of the IRA, though he never explained to which group inside the IRA he belonged'.¹⁴ Contrary to what had happened with the Abwehr, Stuart had no identification problems at the Foreign Office as he had taken the precaution of getting a letter of introduction from Eduard Hempel, the German Minister in Dublin, to Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry. Stuart asked for and got a valuable letter from the State Secretary explaining his role as an Irish neutral lecturing at the university, and adding that Stuart's teaching activities were known and approved of by the German Foreign Office.¹⁵

Stuart's meeting with von Weizsäcker on 4 February proved to be the unintended springboard for his initiation into the Nazi propaganda system. Stuart himself tells the story like this:

Von Weizsäcker asked me had I listened to William Joyce's broadcasts at the beginning of the war when I was at home in Ireland. I said, partly as a joke but partly there was some truth in it... 'He's winning the war for you single handed with his propaganda'. Von Weizsäcker said 'Really?'. I think that remark of mine was repeated to the Propaganda Ministry because shortly after that I was asked would I write some talks for him [William Joyce].¹⁶

In fact, it was the German Foreign Office that requested Stuart to write some talks for Joyce. Stuart's diary entry for 18 February 1940 noted:

Was asked by Dr Haferkorn of the Foreign Office if I would write some talks for William Joyce...I agreed and wrote three, the first of which Joyce will broadcast tonight and, as I have no radio, have arranged with William Warnock to spend the evening with him at our legation and listen to it there. The theme of my contributions, which I know is not exactly what either the Germans nor Joyce want, is a recollection of some

historic acts of aggression on part of the United Kingdom, similar to those which British propaganda is denouncing the Nazis for.¹⁷

Stuart's role as Lord Haw Haw's scriptwriter was destined to be short lived:

As it turned out the talks I wrote were not what Joyce wanted. Above all they were not what the German propaganda [people] wanted - there was naturally nothing anti-semitic, nothing in great praise of Hitler -- because they had no interest in British atrocities throughout the ages'.¹⁸

While settling into his new job at the university, Stuart, then 37, met a 24-year-old student from Danzig named Madeleine Meissner who was studying Arts, English and Philosophy. She attended his English literature lectures, and the two decided to live together the following year. Two and a half years later, Madeleine would regularly introduce Stuart's weekly radio talks, and after Iseult's death in 1954, she would become Stuart's second wife. Having collected back pay from the university which had accumulated since the Autumn of 1939, Stuart decided to throw a party to celebrate St Patrick's Day, 1940. His guests that night at the Hotel Kaiserhof, not far from Hitler's Chancellery, included diplomats; writers; a national newspaper editor; Herr Hauptmann, the head of the German Red Cross; and last but not least, William Warnock, from the Irish legation. Stuart and Warnock became friends, sometimes making up a threesome for golf along with the diplomat's secretary, Eileen Walsh. Unwittingly or otherwise, Walsh later supplied material for Stuart's broadcasts by giving him old Irish newspapers, often months out of date. Stuart was also able to listen to foreign radio broadcasts on Warnock's radio set and his own receiver - something the German public were forbidden to do by law.¹⁹

A month later, Franz Fromme got back in touch with Stuart to introduce him to Hermann Goertz, an Abwehr agent who was in training for a secret spy mission to Ireland to make contact with the IRA. Stuart gave Goertz his wife's address at Laragh in County Wicklow for use as an emergency safe-house. Later, Stuart regretted doing so as Iseult was arrested by the police after Goertz made straight for her house when he parachuted into

Ireland. This was not Stuart's final contact with German intelligence. Abwehr agent Helmut Clissmann introduced Stuart to Kurt Haller, a close associate of Foreign Office operative Edmund Veessenmayer who in 1940 was trying to arrange the return of IRA leader Sean Russell to Ireland by U-boat. Calling at Stuart's Berlin flat one evening in early August, Haller asked the Irish writer if he would sail secretly to Ireland aboard a Breton fishing boat to set up advance links with the IRA prior to Russell's return. Stuart agreed but that part of the plan was abruptly dropped before Russell set sail for Ireland a short time later.²⁰

The winter of 1940 saw Francis Stuart working as a translator at German Radio's Drahtloser Dienst (wireless service), assisted by Madeleine who did secretarial work there in the late afternoons. Stuart explains his role there as follows:

I worked at translating German news bulletins into BBC English, so-called. Well, it passed in a German sense as excellent BBC English. I don't think it was that expert. I put these items into BBC English and they'd be broadcast to England. That was my main job there.²¹

It was while translating the German news bulletins into English that Stuart met William Joyce's wife Margaret. He had also seen Lord Haw Haw himself briefly at the Berlin Press Club, but the two did not get on, and Stuart never exchanged more than a few words with him, because 'something about Joyce I didn't like was perhaps his deeply anti-Irish background, as indeed all these Mosleyites had...he was very anti-Irish in his early days in Galway, and had collaborated with the Black and Tans'. Stuart saw Joyce as a man of 'extraordinary courage', but also 'quite a heavy drinker'. Perhaps understandably, given Stuart's republican credentials, he kept his distance from Joyce during the war, despite broadcasting from the same radio building in Berlin. Stuart got on better with Margaret Joyce whom he described as 'a very pleasant, ordinary Englishwoman'. He recalled sharing cups of tea with Mrs Joyce and Madeleine during bouts of translation work in the editor's office at the Rundfunkhaus. According to Stuart, Madeleine Meissner got to know Mrs Joyce very well and liked her but when Stuart himself was present the two women never discussed politics.²² Madeleine recalled watching a night-time bombing raid with William Joyce from a

window in the Radio Centre after everyone else had fled to an air raid shelter:

He had remained in the office, gone to the window and looked out at the sky with the bombs falling in the distance. I stayed with him after he had assured me that the bombers did not, as yet, drop their bombs over residential districts, but concentrated on the industrial surroundings of Berlin...that night, standing at the dark window, gazing out at the bombs, I was impressed by him and was glad to have shared those few moments with him.²³

Despite the progress of the war and the advent of Allied bombing raids, Stuart was more than ever determined to stay on in Germany and said of this decision later:

I had the opportunity of doing something that would cut me off from all the *bien pensants* in society. I do not regret it. I don't stand over what I did but I don't regret the consequences though they were painful. Without them I could not have become the writer I am now.²⁴

He repeated the line to anyone who would listen, including influential top Nazis like the one he met in a Berlin nightclub in 1941 with Helmut Clissmann and Frank Ryan:

In the club, off the Kufürstendamm, we drank two or three bottles of champagne. We met two of Ryan's friends. One was wearing his party swastika badge on a little gold plaque which meant he was a founder member of the Nazi party. I thought it was funny, because these were rare and extremely influential people, that Frank Ryan, who had come from the International Brigade in Spain, had such a friend. Towards the end of the evening, this friend of Frank Ryan said to me: 'I suppose you'll stay on here in Germany when the war is over?'. He meant, of course, when Germany has won, because in 1941 it looked to most people as if it would. I replied: 'Well, no I won't, because I write in English and I want to live where English is spoken', and he said, 'But, if as I understand, your readers are in England or America, perhaps after being

in Germany you will lose some of them'. And I said: 'Do you know what? When this war is over, wherever I am I hope it will be the losing side, because if it's the winning side it will be intolerable for me. I hope I'll be among the losers and the guilty'. [The top Nazi then turned to Frank Ryan and asked if Stuart was joking. Ryan replied] 'I don't know what he means, but he's certainly not joking'.²⁵

After spending the summer holidays of 1941 in Vienna, Stuart gave up his translation work with the Drahtloser Dienst.²⁶ It was a difficult time for Stuart who had been thinking seriously about leaving Germany before Hitler invaded Russia on 22 June 1941. Stuart says that: 'I would have got out, but there was no getting out after that'. In fact, before Operation Barbarossa, when Germany and the Soviet Union had a peace pact, Stuart had made enquiries about moving to work in Moscow. He describes what happened:

I wanted then to go to Moscow. I made an application. I taught English, not only at the university, but also at a technical college and I had some Soviet students at the time when Germany and Russia had this pact. There were two young Soviet men, they had quite a bit of English. We used to have conversations and I asked them would it be possible for me to lecture in a school or in a university in Russia. They said 'by all means', and they gave me an introduction to somebody at their embassy on Unter den Linden. I went round and was asked, naturally, quite a few questions. I think the sponsorship of this young man [Stuart's student] was a help to me. I left them details. They phoned me a few weeks later to say the application was in Moscow and it was being processed. Then the attack on Russia came and that was that. Later, some White Russians, whom I'd got to know quite well in Berlin, told me 'you were lucky. You wouldn't have lasted any time in Moscow'. I don't know about that. These were White Russians [anti-communists] and they had to put another aspect on it.²⁷

Stuart continued his main work as a lecturer at Berlin university, where he met Hans Hartmann who was writing his doctoral thesis based on the folklore studies he had carried out in the Donegal and Connemara Gaeltachts from 1937 to 1939. After taking charge of the revamped Irland-Redaktion in

December 1941, Hartmann asked Stuart to contribute weekly talks on the Irish service. The two men got on well, with Hartmann considering Stuart to be 'a very intelligent man whom I highly appreciated. He was a sincere man and often didn't hold back with criticism'.²⁸ Stuart for his part thought Hartmann a very scholarly man, and he admired the fact that someone was doing something to counteract the Allied propaganda which Stuart found hypocritical. Stuart described Hartmann's approach to him to do the broadcasts:

He asked me would I do a weekly broadcast. I made some conditions that I would do it, but it would be largely as a neutral to a neutral [country] and, in so far as it had any influence at all, with the emphasis on remaining neutral. There was a flood of Allied propaganda coming into all countries, and Ireland, with not a single voice counteracting that in any way. I had perhaps some naive and ambitious ideas that one or two voices raised might do some good.²⁹

Hartmann was glad to get someone of Stuart's calibre on his new Irish service. There were few Irish nationals in Berlin at the time and Irish people willing or able to broadcast were fewer still. Realising that Stuart was a 'good catch' for the radio service, Hartmann ensured he was given a build-up not afforded to other radio speakers. On the night of 17 March a talk on the life of St Patrick was followed by a special announcement read out by Madeleine Meissner who told listeners that 'the well-known Irish writer Francis Stuart will speak at 9.45 p.m. present Irish time over our usual stations DZD 28.43 metres and Oslo 1154 metres...'

Stuart's first talk spared nothing in hammering home a strong message in support of Irish neutrality and against the presence of American troops in Northern Ireland. He told his Irish audience:

I am not trying to make propaganda. You have had plenty of it and I only hope that you have now a good idea of what is true and what is false. Had I wanted to make propaganda I could have done so during my two years in Germany. I only want to put forward my idea of Ireland's place in the world and her future, which I am perhaps able to view with greater clarity from a distance.³⁰

Yet, Stuart said of his talks after the war:

It was naturally [propaganda]. If the Germans hadn't thought it of some benefit to their war effort I wouldn't have been taking up time. It was anti-propaganda more than propaganda. It was trying to, quite ineffectually I imagine, undo some of the very one-sided propaganda coming from other sources.³¹

Stuart had not planned to broadcast regularly, but Hartmann phoned him on 16 July 1942 to ask if he would contribute talks twice a week. Stuart noted at the time:

It is difficult, though not impossible, to refuse. I do not feel any strong desire for this business. But might do so for a bit. I have not much illusion about its effectiveness, which in the mass of radio broadcasts would be very small.³²

With holidays from university lecturing giving him more free time, Stuart agreed to work with Hartmann, but only once a week. Stuart's St Patrick's Day talk was followed by three others on 29 March, 5 April and 25 May. He began broadcasting regular weekly talks on 24 July 1942, though the title 'Through Irish Eyes' was only adopted beginning with his talk on 5 August 1942. Stuart continued talking to Ireland almost every week until January 1944. His talks were broadcast twice a week from September 1943, at Hartmann's request. It can be argued that 'Through Irish Eyes' did not follow the strict propaganda line of other contributors to German Radio. It did not contain, for example, any military high command dispatches, eulogies of Hitler, nor denunciations of the Jews. It was more in the nature of a fireside chat from one Irish person to another. Stuart made much of his Antrim and Wicklow connections and mentioned both counties regularly to emphasise his own 32-county republican outlook. The talks were, by design, heavily pro-neutrality and anti-Allies.³³

Long after the war, Stuart said of his broadcasts: 'I hardly ever met anyone who heard me. I don't think anyone really listened.'³⁴ But, whatever the size of his wartime audience, his talks were closely monitored in official circles both in Britain and Ireland. BBC monitors listened to

Stuart's every word, while in Dublin, Army intercept branch officer Captain John Smyth commented that Stuart's talks:

were, in the main, what one might expect from an exile with acute nostalgia and an inherent dislike of partition. He always took great trouble to explain that he was not a propaganda medium for German ideas, but only the spokesman for the Irish colony whose one wish was that Ireland should remain neutral. While he frequently denounced partition, the execution of [Thomas] Williams [a 19-year-old IRA man hanged on 2 September 1942 for killing a Catholic policeman in Belfast] and the punishment of IRA men in the Six Counties, he was not sufficiently violent to stir up anti-British feeling effectively.³⁵

Captain Smyth noted that from early 1943, Stuart's broadcasts became more pro-German. He noted: 'On January 30th, 1943, Stuart, with but scant apology, launched into a eulogy on the German 6th Army in Stalingrad and in the course of it said, "I readily admit that, when it comes to finding words, the publicists of the democracies can far outdo us", thus more or less identifying himself with pro-German propaganda. From this date, although still maintaining that he is no propagandist, Stuart has been steadily and openly pro-German'. According to Captain Smyth, before Stuart commenced his weekly talks, 'German broadcasts to Ireland consisted mainly of the Report from the Führer's H.Q., innocuous talks in Gaelic by Hans Hartmann, and the Flashback - a daily extract from Irish history which dealt chiefly with British atrocities in Ireland'.³⁶

But it was Francis Stuart's radio references to Irish affairs, rather than any German matters, that were to cause the greatest upset in government circles in Dublin. Frederick Boland, Assistant Secretary at External Affairs, had called in Hempel to protest about a broadcast on 2 December 1942 in which Stuart criticised the convictions by a Belfast court of the IRA's Northern commander Hugh McAteer. Boland told the German diplomat that:

the holding up of McAteer on the German radio as a hero was likely to be resented by many people here and to furnish a concrete example for use

by those who charged Germany with aiding and abetting the IRA against the government.³⁷

In the run up to the Irish general election on 22 June 1943, Stuart delivered a series of talks advising people not to vote for Fine Gael. On 8 May, Stuart told his listeners:

The overwhelming majority of you are at one in your wish for a free and united country, and as far as I know there isn't one who'd ever threaten this except a handful of so-called Irishmen either belonging to or in touch with the Fine Gael party.³⁸

The talks were attracting the attention not only of Irish Army monitors but also the Department of External Affairs and senior members of the government. On 26 May, G2's Colonel Dan Bryan sent transcripts of five recent Stuart broadcasts to Boland who immediately forwarded two of the scripts, including the broadcast of 8 May, to Frank Aiken, Minister for the Coordination of Defensive Measures.³⁹ Far from gladdening the heart of de Valera, the Taoiseach saw Stuart's call for a vote against his political opponents as unwarranted 'interference' in Irish affairs by a foreign power. De Valera, who was both Taoiseach and Minister for External Affairs at the time, instructed his staff to send a formal protest note to William Warnock at the Irish legation in Berlin for the attention of the German Foreign Office.

To set Dublin's formal protest to Berlin in context, it should be noted that, in the years leading up to and including the war period, political and other potentially controversial topics were either treated cautiously or not at all on the Irish and British airwaves. The news departments and news output of the 1940s contrast sharply with today's 24-hour broadcast news operations. For example, Radio Eireann's news staff for most of the Emergency comprised just three people putting out three bulletins a day, and only two bulletins on Sundays,⁴⁰ although news increased from 9.8% of total hours broadcast in 1939 to 15.2% in 1945.⁴¹ The wartime conditions coupled with Ireland's neutrality increased the tendency towards caution, with Radio Eireann news bulletins having to be read over to Frank Gallagher, the head of the Government Information Bureau, before they were

broadcast. On occasions of critical importance they had to be read over to de Valera as well. All war news had to be given as it came from both sides, which often resulted in 'a wearying series of claims and counter-claims'.⁴² Weather reports were strictly banned from the airwaves in case they could give assistance to war planes. Following an attack on Hitler in one broadcast sermon, Radio Eireann's Director, Séamus Ó Braonáin, 'tried to get advance scripts of sermons', but 'the ecclesiastical authorities refused'.⁴³ The tough controls also applied to Irish newspapers.⁴⁴

Caution in matters political was not confined to broadcasters in Dublin. In Northern Ireland, the BBC was barred from reporting the Dáil election in June 1943, and as early as April 1940, senior BBC staff in Britain and Northern Ireland had been warned that because of the 'extremely delicate...relations between Eire and Northern Ireland...reference to either country in news bulletins and elsewhere should be carefully watched'.⁴⁵ Throughout the United Kingdom, while:

the BBC was subjected to periodic governmental criticism of its news coverage...there was no need for coercive control, apart from censorship applied in the interests of security, which was anyway extended to the press. The BBC saw itself as part of the war effort, and hence the question of its pulling in a very different direction from that deemed officially desirable did not arise.⁴⁶

However, one BBC wartime controller complained in June 1940 that:

The BBC News works under more sanctions, and therefore more slowly, as well as more accurately, than the press. Foreign broadcasters work differently. This means that foreign radio stations, both European and American, are frequently ahead of the BBC. Such priority may, and often does, reach the British public, e.g. through Haw-Haw'.⁴⁷

It appears to be the case that censorship was implemented more comprehensively in Ireland than in either Switzerland or Sweden, despite the objectively greater danger of their position. It is said that 'the contempt frequently expressed for Nazi behaviour in the Swiss and Swedish press provoked furious reactions in Berlin. Nothing comparable was

permitted in Ireland'.⁴⁸ In the circumstances, it is not surprising to read the terms of the protest note which was cabled by Boland to Warnock on 27 May 1943:

Francis Stuart has been making broadcasts to this country discussing the forthcoming elections and advising people to vote against Fine Gael. Such broadcasts are an unwarrantable interference in our internal affairs and are apt to prove most embarrassing and harmful to the government. Please act immediately to ensure that nothing of the kind will be broadcast in future.⁴⁹

However, Boland's cable was too late to stop another election broadcast⁵⁰ by Francis Stuart on 29 May, for Warnock did not visit the German Foreign Office until 31 May when he personally handed the protest note to Herr Hencke. Afterwards, Warnock cabled Dublin:

Saw new Under Secretary of State Hencke this morning. He stated matter would be attended to. There could be no question of intentional interference in Irish internal affairs.⁵¹

The next day, 1 June, Hencke reported to his superiors at the Foreign Office:

The Irish Chargé d'Affaires yesterday handed me this aide-memoire in which objections are made that the Irish citizen Francis Stuart has used the German radio to influence Irish choice in choosing sides in the war. The Chargé d'Affaires added orally that his government had no objections that the German radio talks about Ireland, e.g. even in an anti-English sense. However, when an opposition party in Ireland is attacked by the German radio his government suspects Germany is applying pressure on Ireland to take sides.⁵²

While the incident led to a cooling of relations between Germany and Ireland for a time, Francis Stuart, who had sparked off the protest, thought the whole affair amusing. It backfired on him however, because soon afterwards Warnock refused to renew Stuart's passport which had expired:

I went to our legation, but the Irish government would not renew it because it disapproved of my broadcasting. I know, because Warnock was our Chargé d'Affaires, and I heard this from a secretary [Eileen Walsh] at our legation. He was asked by de Valera to go to the German Foreign Office and make a formal protest because there was a general election here and I had mentioned the elections and the voting. So Warnock put on his top hat and morning suit [laughs] and went to the German Foreign Office and lodged a protest that the Germans were allowing me to interfere in a sovereign state which was neutral. Of course, the German Foreign Office couldn't care less.⁵³

Eileen Walsh told the author that Stuart's suggestion that Warnock wore a top hat and morning suit was 'nonsense', although she confirmed the remaining details.⁵⁴

In the event, de Valera lost his overall majority in the election, but remained in power with the backing of a new farmers' party, Clann na Talmhain. One historian describes Fine Gael's loss of thirteen seats as 'disastrous'.⁵⁵

The Allied bombing campaign against Germany was gaining momentum as the summer of 1943 continued. Hamburg was incinerated in a continual wave of Allied bombing that lasted from 24 July to 3 August.⁵⁶ In Berlin, the air raids were making life difficult for the announcers at the Rundfunkhaus. Francis Stuart remembers that:

actually broadcasting you don't have time to think of your safety. We had rubber masks or mouth-pieces. You weren't speaking directly into a microphone, you were speaking directly into this rubber thing, like when you are under anaesthetic, so that the noise of bombs are presumably excluded. But I think the vibration still interfered with the acoustics.⁵⁷

By August 1943 the bombing had forced some of the radio's staff to relocate from Berlin to Luxembourg, where the occupying German forces had taken over the radio studios. Francis Stuart and Madeleine Meissner went there with the rest of the Irish service on 12 August that year.⁵⁸ In her memoirs Madeleine wrote:

RAF attacks on Berlin increased. Buildings crumbled like sandcastles. More and more gaps yawned in the streets and soon you could see miles and miles of the city flattened out. It was difficult and dangerous to work under these circumstances, so the English and Irish Redaktion moved for safety's sake to Luxembourg. Work was carried on from the Luxembourg Sender (radio station). Francis went as he still gave his weekly talks to Ireland, and I went with him as I introduced his talks.⁵⁹

A month after the move to Luxembourg, the Irish legation in Berlin was destroyed in an air raid, along with all Warnock's records of Irish nationals in Germany at that time and, of course, the protest note sparked by Stuart's election broadcasts.⁶⁰

Stuart and Madeleine appreciated the calmer atmosphere in Luxembourg: 'there were, thank God, no air raids and drink was no problem', she wrote.⁶¹ But three months after moving, in November, they were temporarily back in Berlin, - she to resume her studies at the university, and he to accompany her. Stuart had negotiated leave of absence from the university before going with the radio team to Luxembourg. The couple were lucky to survive a bomb attack which wrecked their rooms in the Wilmersdorf district of Berlin on 22 November 1943. They returned to Luxembourg as soon as possible, but Stuart eventually fell out with the radio directors there and left his job after delivering a final talk to Ireland in January 1944.⁶² He describes his decision to stop broadcasting as follows:

I was pressurised. What I did say on one broadcast, perhaps more than one, was that if I suddenly stop broadcasting it would be because I refused to say certain things, and that's why up to the present I'd never been asked to say things which I wouldn't agree to. But then they began to suggest to me that the Bolsheviks, as they called them, must be extremely unpopular in Catholic Ireland, and wouldn't it be good if I cashed in on this and began talking about the Russian atrocities and the atheistical world view. I immediately refused because of all countries waging war...the only one which was waging what one might call a really honourable war were the Russians. They had been attacked in an extremely vicious and underhand way. They were protecting their country. They weren't carrying out devastating bombing on civilians such as the

Germans and the Allies were. Whether if they'd had the bombers they would have, that's another matter. But they weren't doing it, and therefore I refused to make anti-Russian or anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Then my broadcasts were terminated. I didn't get into a camp, but I was threatened with all sorts of things, and certain facilities I'd had were withdrawn from me. That was the end of my broadcasts.⁶³

Although Hans Hartmann was Stuart's boss in Luxembourg, the Irish writer bore no grudge against the German for his sacking. Stuart considered Hartmann 'extremely sympathetic, he understood the political situation in Ireland'. Stuart adds: 'Hartmann told me he was walking on eggshells, between being sympathetic to the Irish, which he was, and satisfying the authorities who wanted certain topics mentioned'. But Stuart told this author that despite the authorities' demands for more anti-Bolshevik propaganda broadcasts 'which they thought would go down well in Catholic Ireland...towards the end, the Germans never listened to the programmes'.⁶⁴

Out of a job in Luxembourg, Stuart returned to Berlin in February 1944 and resumed his university lectures for a while. According to William Murphy, Stuart also worked at this time for a black propaganda unit of German Radio:

Stuart suggested that I should take up a job with the people with whom he was working, which turned out to be a secret radio station under the control of the German Foreign Office. Stuart and I went to the Reich Sportsfeld, Berlin, where the station was situated...I started work at this station on, I think, 1st August 1944. This station was named Büro Concordia.⁶⁵

Stuart denies that he ever worked with the Büro Concordia. Murphy claimed that Stuart and himself hatched a plot to persuade the Nazis to send them both back to Ireland in a U-boat carrying a secret transmitter for the IRA. But when Murphy put the proposal to an Abwehr agent in Bremen, it was dismissed as 'nonsense'. Murphy also claimed that Stuart purported to have been chosen by the Nazis in 1940 to deliver a shipment of arms to the IRA in the event of the Sean Russell landing being successful.⁶⁶ When asked about these points by this author, Stuart commented, 'As far as I

know and from what I heard from a German Abwehr officer, Kurt Haller, at the time, the William Murphy you mention was, or became, a minor British Intelligence agent. He gave all sorts of testimony to help his own ambiguous position'. Stuart describes Murphy's allegation that he was involved with Büro Concordia as being 'libellous'.⁶⁷ In a subsequent interview with this author, Stuart repeated that William Joseph Murphy had been a British agent. He recalled meeting Murphy in Luxembourg when the latter 'had a lot of forged notes, English money', and thinks he also met him in Berlin. Stuart told the author that Murphy's statement about his [Stuart's] planned role in accompanying a shipment of arms for the IRA following Russell's landing in Ireland, was 'basically correct'. Stuart adds: 'I was to travel with Captain [Christian] Nissen on a Breton fishing boat with arms on board. I asked Haller what would happen if we were stopped. Haller said Nissen would scuttle the ship. I hoped it would not come to anything, which it did not. I had no wish to leave Germany'. Stuart continued: 'Murphy's claims that I worked in Concordia are fantastic. I never worked for Concordia, I had no interest in it. It would have gone against all my principles. That would have been a betrayal of my beliefs'.⁶⁸

The tide of events was now turning against Francis Stuart, just as time was running out for Nazi Germany. In the capital of the Third Reich the situation was deteriorating. The Allies had stepped up the intensity of day and nighttime bombings from late February 1944. On St Patrick's Day, Stuart and Madeleine visited Frank Ryan in Loschwitz sanatorium near Dresden. The man in whom the Nazis had placed such hope was dying, following a stroke. He passed away, aged 42, on 10 June, and his funeral at Loschwitz cemetery was attended by only a handful of people including Stuart and Madeleine, Elizabeth Clissmann, and Hildegard Lübbert, a pharmacist who was Ryan's companion and had looked after him in his final months.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, on 10 May 1944, the English Department of Berlin University had been hit by a bomb and destroyed, putting Stuart again out of a job. He would have had no lecturing post after July anyway because, in the immediate aftermath of the 'July Plot' bomb attempt on Hitler's life, the Nazis ordered the closure of all institutions not directly connected to the 'Total War' effort, including universities.

After enduring more day and night bombings, Francis Stuart and Madeleine

Meissner eventually left Berlin by train for Munich on 10 September 1944 - exactly five years and one week after the outbreak of war. The coming months were filled with uncertainty, anguish and hunger. Following the collapse of Nazi Germany, the couple spent nine months in a detention centre which was controlled by the French Army. Released without charge, they made their way to live in Paris, and later moved to London. In 1958 they returned together to Ireland where Francis Stuart continues to live and work as a writer.⁷⁰



Francis Stuart pictured at his home in Dundrum,
Dublin, 1989

Chapter 5

The Motley Crew

Apart from Ludwig Mühlhausen and Hans Hartmann, whose roles have already been described, eleven others who were not Irish nationals broadcast to varying extents for the Irland-Redaktion. Some, like the Frenchmen Count Keroer and Michel Piche, did not survive once the first head of the nightly radio service, Wolfgang Dignowity, was replaced by Hans Hartmann in December 1941. Others, like Nora O'Mara, Mona Brase and Charles Budina made only a few broadcasts to Ireland. There were some, however, who proved to be more durable. The position of Hilde Spickernagel (née Poepping) was unique in that she worked as an assistant to Adolf Mahr in the Foreign Office while Mahr was organising the launch of the new nightly Irish service. She told the author that the Foreign Office 'tried hard to influence the Irland-Redaktion'. In December 1941, Spickernagel was transferred from Mahr's office to become Hartmann's assistant, a post she retained for 12 months. Sonja Kowanko, the Russian-born secretary to the Irish team, had been educated in France, England and Italy. She contributed talks under the pseudonym 'Linda Walters'. James Blair and Susan Sweney - while having Irish connections - were not Irish nationals. In autumn 1942 they were both sacked from the Irland-Redaktion for a misdemeanour. Madeleine Meissner stayed with the Irish team as a part-time announcer for as long as her lover Francis Stuart did. She introduced most of his weekly talks from March 1942 until he stopped broadcasting them in January 1944.

Count Keroer

Count Keroer was a 24-year-old French nobleman from Brittany, recruited to the service in its infancy by Dr Dignowity. Keroer's presence in an 'Irish' radio team was partly explained by the fact that Dignowity had done most of his recruiting in Paris. In Adolf Mahr's estimation, Keroer had good English but didn't know Ireland at all. When Dignowity was removed from the Irish service, it is believed that Keroer moved to the French broadcasting section in the Rundfunkhaus, and may also have helped to produce Breton nationalist propaganda.¹

Michel Piche

Another Frenchman called Michel Piche was also a member of German Radio's initial 'Irish' team recruited in Paris by Wolfgang Dignowity. Piche had lived in America where he worked as a journalist for several years. He spoke English with an American accent but, according to Adolf Mahr who met him in Berlin in August 1941, Piche did not have a good radio voice. Dignowity groomed the Frenchman as an announcer for a new two-part radio programme beamed nightly to Ireland. The first half of the programme would carry news aimed at an Irish audience, while the second half comprised a short talk linked to what the Germans considered to be the most important propaganda event of the day. Mahr complained that Piche knew nothing at all about Ireland.²

Mahr was not the only one to notice that Dignowity's team did not have a single Irish member. Within weeks of the launch, John O'Reilly joined the staff at the Berlin Radio Centre and had a run in with Piche and Keroer. O'Reilly commented:

Dr Dignowity's knowledge of Ireland, like the other members of his staff, was purely geographic. Resentment was shown to me by the two Frenchmen and the Englishman [James Blair]. They regarded me as an interloper in the Irish section. But within a few weeks, having found my feet, my Irish spirit of independence asserted itself and I did not hesitate to point out that they, in fact, were the intruders. This was the Irish section and I was an Irishman. All the artistry in the world could not make a shamrock out of the fleur-de-lis or the English rose. If they were not prepared to cooperate with me, well, the English section was next door and the French section was just down the corridor.³

By the time Hans Hartmann took control of the Irish section, Piche, Keroer and Dignowity had been moved elsewhere. Keroer - or indeed Piche, though it is not clear if the latter hailed from Brittany - may have provided the model for 'Michel', the Breton character who appears in Francis Stuart's post-war, semi-autobiographical, novel *Blacklist Section H*. Stuart told the author that the Breton, like all the other characters in the book, was based on a real person. Stuart adds: 'There were quite a few

Bretons staying in Berlin in the Schöneberg district. I very briefly met one or two of them'. In *Blacklist*, 'Michel', a French newreader with German Radio, is described as 'a Breton nationalist...here to get the Germans to give Brittany independence if they win the war'.⁴

James Blair

James Blair was recruited to the Irish service in the summer of 1941 by Dr Wolfgang Dignowity. He was born in Dublin on 1 July 1904 of British parents and told Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office that his father was Scottish and his mother of Irish extraction. After spending his early childhood in Dublin, he later moved with his parents to Paris where he worked as a proof reader for an American newspaper published in the French capital.⁵ By 1941, Blair was 'down and out' in Paris and 'running errands for the Irish embassy', according to Susan Sweney who saw him there. William Warnock described Blair as 'a decent sort of fellow...who had drifted to Berlin'. When he could, Blair sent money to his parents who were still living in Paris.⁶

When the nightly Irish service was launched, Blair did not broadcast under his own name. Instead, from September 1941 to March 1942, he used the alias Pat O'Brien. Blair was groomed by Dignowity to represent the Irish 'man in the street', although he had apparently not visited Ireland since his childhood.⁷ When John O'Reilly joined the service in September 1941, as seen earlier, he had a confrontation with Blair 'the Englishman' whom he accused of being an 'intruder' in the Irish section. O'Reilly told Blair that if he wasn't prepared to cooperate with him 'the English section was next door'.⁸ But Blair stayed on with the Irish service and continued working there even after Dignowity had been replaced by Hartmann in December 1941. To make his broadcasts sound more plausible, Mahr insisted Blair visit him at the Foreign Office every day, beginning in September 1941, to be supplied with suitable propaganda scripts.⁹ According to Hilde Spickernagel, Blair was 'an unfortunate creature' who spent part of the day at Mahr's small Irish section in the broadcasting department of the Foreign Ministry. Dr Spickernagel adds: 'James Blair was expected to write short talks on subjects suggested to him by either Dr Mahr or me, which he then took to the Funkhaus [radio centre] to be broadcast there. He [Blair] certainly had no proper journalist's training - none of us had.'¹⁰

In 1942, Blair and his broadcasting colleague Susan Sweney were both sacked from the Irish service by Hartmann because Sweney had used endearing terms to Blair while he was still talking on air. After Blair's dismissal, John O'Reilly took over the Pat O'Brien radio talks. James Blair later found another broadcasting job with the Nazi's Inter Radio company based in Graz, Austria.¹¹

Blair was among a group of people named as collaborating with German Radio's Irish service in a secret memo drawn up at the end of 1942 by William Warnock at the request of Frederick Boland at the Department of External Affairs. Warnock's memo, which was passed to G2 on 4 January 1943, listed the Irland-Redaktion staff as James Blair, Liam Mullally, Nora O'Mara, Hans Hartmann and Hilde Spickernagel.¹²

Immediately after the war Blair helped two of his former radio colleagues, Francis Stuart and Madeleine Meissner, to obtain freedom from French military custody at Dornbirn, Austria, by intervening on their behalf with a French Army General. After his release Stuart went to Paris where Blair again helped the Irish writer, passing on some of his English language students to him for tutorials.¹³

Sophie 'Sonja' Kowanko

Kowanko was a 25-year-old Russian émigrée from Leningrad. Born in 1916, a year before the Bolshevik revolution, her parents fled the chaos to settle in Paris where she grew up. Later, she was also sent to schools in England and Italy, and spoke the languages of her host countries fluently. John O'Reilly noted that Kowanko had an extensive knowledge of German despite the fact that she had been in the Third Reich for only a few months. He thought the Russian girl 'exercised more influence on the running of our section than her position as a typist would seem to warrant'. In fact, Sonja Kowanko's role in the Irish radio service went far beyond that of a humble typist. Once a week the Russian contributed a radio talk beamed at Irish women listeners under the cover name of Linda Walters.¹⁴

When Susan Sweney (below) joined the service she struck up a close friendship with Sonja Kowanko. The two shared a flat in Berlin's Klopstockstrasse, and played billiards and drank together. Francis Stuart, who met both women at the Rundfunkhaus, commented on their relationship:

'They seemed inseparable. We took it they were lesbians, which they very likely were.'¹⁵ Since Kowanko knew far less about Ireland than Sweney, the latter provided ideas for her 'Linda Walters' talks. While working with Hartmann's team, Kowanko attracted the attention of the Gestapo who were monitoring her private mail. On Gestapo orders she was transferred to factory work, although the precise reason for the Gestapo's displeasure is unknown.¹⁶ Sweney lobbied senior Foreign Office officials to get her friend released from the factory. After a month of manual labour, the Russian was given a six-month contract with Inter Radio in Berlin beginning at the end of 1942. Sweney later joined her friend at Inter Radio, also on a six month contract, because 'Sonja and I wanted to be together'. By the time Kowanko's contract ran out in May 1943, both she and Sweney had saved enough for the Russian to be able to return to Paris and rejoin her family there. Remaining in Berlin, Susan Sweney continued to send Sonja Kowanko money in Paris whenever she could spare it.¹⁷

The fact that Kowanko had broadcast under the name Linda Walters did not emerge publicly until John O'Reilly's account of his wartime experiences was published by a London newspaper seven years after the end of the war. During the war the true identity of Linda Walters foxed Colonel Dan Bryan and his men in G2.¹⁸ On 17 September 1941, an Irish army monitor, Commandant Sean Neligan, picked up one of the first 'Linda Walters' talks from Berlin. Notwithstanding her continental background, he thought she 'spoke with a cultured Dublin accent'. Neligan noted that, 'her talk was non-political and related to German women and their activities in the home'. Neligan's memo was incorrectly filed under a German called Erwin C. Kaefer alias R. Walther. The Garda special branch told G2 that Kaefer 'has paid frequent trips to Ireland from 1938-1940'. G2 wrongly assumed at the time that Linda Walters may have been Kaefer's wife.¹⁹

Nora O'Mara (also known as Róisín Ní Mheara-Vinard)

Nora O'Mara played a minor role at the radio station, having been brought to Francis Stuart's attention in 1940 by the German spy Hermann Goertz. Before he left for Ireland on a spying mission, O'Mara had worked as Goertz's secretary. Pregnant and abandoned in Berlin by her Ukrainian lover, O'Mara was taken in by Stuart as a lodger in his flat. They later developed a relationship which lasted through the birth of Nora's baby

daughter but foundered when Stuart fell in love with Madeleine Meissner. While working as a translator for German Radio, Stuart agreed to take on Nora O'Mara as his secretary there.²⁰

Reporting to the Department of External Affairs in Dublin on the make-up of the Irish section in German Radio at the end of 1942, William Warnock noted that 'a Miss Nora O'Mara, born in England of Irish parents, but not an Irish citizen, speaks occasionally, I believe. She has been in Germany for some years'.²¹ When Susan Sweney met O'Mara at the Irland-Redaktion, she 'wrote dialogues for her, especially to help her owing to her domestic circumstances'.²² O'Mara never disclosed her identity on air, using only the first name Róisín. The Irish Army's archive of German broadcasts to Ireland between 1939 and 1945 contains the transcripts of only two broadcasts by Róisín. The first, monitored at 9.45 p.m. on 2 June 1943, was a talk on the 'Broken Treaty of Limerick'. The second talk was monitored at the same time on 14 July 1943 and featured Róisín quoting a long passage from Padraig Pearse's 'The Spirit of a Nation'. Her talk was followed by a band playing the Irish national anthem.²³

When O'Mara published her memoirs²⁴ in 1992 they caused controversy by suggesting, among other things, that photographs of the victims of Nazi concentration camps were actually pictures of victims of the 1945 Allied bombings of Dresden.²⁵ She discloses that she began her radio work in Berlin by broadcasting the news in English to Poland.²⁶ Later she claims that Francis Stuart and herself were 'involved in regular radio broadcasts to Ireland' with Hans Hartmann's team. Of Hartmann she comments: 'It was obviously a great relief to him when I offered my assistance. He proposed that I go ahead and prepare programmes and broadcasts - a chance not to be lost for me to make contact on air with Ireland.'²⁷

As well as her broadcasting work, O'Mara writes about her own varied life. She claims to have been abandoned as a child and to have been adopted by the wealthy Anglo-Scottish family of General Sir Ian Hamilton. Later she moved to Berlin to train as an actress. During the war she met Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess and married in turn two Nazi officers, both of whom were killed in the war.²⁸ Both before and since the publication of her memoirs, O'Mara has refused requests from this author to answer questions about her wartime activities and her relationship with Francis Stuart.²⁹

In her memoirs O'Mara explains that her decision to undertake propaganda

work for the Nazis was motivated by her desire for Ireland not to become involved in the conflict. She writes:

If a war breaks out what part will Ireland have in it?...From my point of view, as a war orphan of the 1914-18 war whose father had been seduced by lies to fight on England's side on the understanding that Ireland would be given its freedom in return, I convinced myself that I would do all in my power to ensure that that never happened again...England would initiate a powerful propaganda campaign to demean this nation [Germany] which was so sympathetic to us. It would be my duty to do my part to stifle this propaganda in time. I expressed these opinions to the Department of Culture of which I was a member and which was under the direction of the Department of Public Affairs and Dr Joseph Goebbels...I assured him that if the worst came to the worst I would be ready to give my services for the sake of Ireland's neutrality.³⁰

Of the effect Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion programmes would have in Ireland, O'Mara notes: 'One could hope and trust in God that these programmes were listened to over there as a counter attack against the lies which England no doubt was directing at Ireland to inveigle her to no purpose into the war.'³¹

In his post war memoirs, John O'Reilly did not refer to all his Rundfunkhaus acquaintances by name. However, by a process of elimination there can be little doubt that he was referring to Nora O'Mara when he wrote:

One person who aroused my interest, probably more than all others combined, was a mysterious young woman whose exact part in the wartime intrigues of the Third Reich I have never been able to fathom. She seemed to have a finger in every political pie, and yet she appeared to remain very much in the background. She was slightly built, pretty but not strikingly so, with very little colour in her cheeks. Her hair was long, jet black, and parted severely in the middle. There was such a depth of sorrow in her large, dark brown eyes, that I always thought of her as 'Deirdre'. Although she appeared to have some Irish background I

never learned what exactly it was or whether she had Irish parentage. Despite her good looks and her enigmatic personality there was very little of the glamorous Mata Hari about 'Deirdre'. What puzzled me most about her was that she appeared to maintain equally friendly contacts with the various espionage groups of the Wehrmacht, the Admiralty, and the S.S. Their Intelligence Departments normally maintained completely separate identities. They exchanged neither agents nor information, though their activities frequently overlapped. Yet here was 'Deirdre', attached to every group but tied to none! Although she never actually broadcast³² she had some inexplicable connection with a weekly musical programme known as 'Irish Half Hour'. She was a frequent visitor to the broadcasting station and we met there often, though never by appointment. Whatever secrets she had, she kept them well, talking but little, listening a lot. But I could see that she was widely travelled, well educated, and of good stock. I have a feeling now that she played an influential part in the shaping of my career from the time I finished broadcasting, in September 1942, until I landed in County Clare from a German bomber in December 1943.³³

Hilde Spickernagel (née Poepping)

Hilde Poepping worked as Hans Hartmann's assistant in the wartime Irish service of German Radio from the time he took charge in December 1941 until the end of 1942. Like Hartmann, Poepping first developed an interest in Ireland as a visiting student in the 1930s. She travelled from Berlin and, on 30 October 1937, enrolled in the Arts faculty at University College Galway. The young German spent the academic year attending English lectures in Second and Third Arts. She resided with the family of UCG's Professor of Chemistry, Thomas Dillon. As a student, Dillon had been a member of the UCD IRA group in Dublin run by Frank Ryan. In Galway, Hilde Poepping wanted to write a thesis on the English author, D.H. Lawrence. However, on the advice of her hostess, Geraldine Dillon, - who considered that D.H. Lawrence's writings were 'rubbish', - she instead began writing a doctoral thesis on the Irish author, James Stephens. Returning to Germany in the autumn of 1938, Poepping 'met Ludwig Mühlhausen and tried to improve my Irish with his help. He ran a department of his own in Berlin University but did not have many students.' Her thesis on Stephens, which also dealt with 'the

interplay of literary, economic and political studies in Ireland from 1900 to 1930', was published by the Institute of Celtic Studies in Berlin in 1940.³⁴

During her stay in Galway, the German woman had developed a lasting friendship with the Dillons. Professor Dillon's daughter, Bláth, travelled to Berlin in 1939 to stay with the Poepping family, and spent the summer holidays walking in Bavaria with her friend Hilde.³⁵

In mid 1941, Hilde Poepping got a job at the Foreign Ministry as one of two assistants to Dr Adolf Mahr who was by then in charge of the ministry's Irish broadcasting desk. Her knowledge of Ireland and ability with languages made her a natural choice for such a position. In December 1941, she was transferred from the Foreign Office to work as assistant to Hans Hartmann who had just been named as new head of the Irland-Redaktion.³⁶ On 31 December 1941, Poepping joined Hartmann and others in broadcasting a special 25-minute New Year's greetings programme to Ireland. The broadcast was picked up by BBC radio monitors at 9.30 p.m., via the Oslo transmitter on 1154 metres. The BBC's transcript of Hilde Poepping's contribution read as follows: 'Fraulein Hilde Poepping, a former exchange student at Galway, said that all her friends who had spent some time in Ireland sent their greetings, except her friend Martin Klot who was killed in action in Russia fighting to protect the women and children of Europe from Bolshevism'.³⁷

A year later, when asked to provide a written profile of the Irland-Redaktion in Berlin for the Department of External Affairs in Dublin, William Warnock wrote:

The Irish Section in the Broadcasting House is run by Dr Hartmann who spent several years with Dr Delargy at the Folklore Institute [Commission], and his principal assistant is Dr Hilde Spickernagel, née Poepping, who was an exchange student in UCG. Neither of them feel very suited to political propaganda, and I think that both of them look forward to the day when they can resume their academic life again'.³⁸

Warnock's assessment of the power structure within the Irish section concurred with information supplied to G2 by John O'Reilly after his return home in December 1943. Having interrogated O'Reilly in Arbour Hill Prison,

Dublin, Colonel Dan Bryan drafted a memo detailing the Kilkee man's activities in Germany. The memo included the following reference:

Shortly prior to [March 1942] the broadcasting had been taken over from the Ministry of Propaganda and was under the control of the Foreign Office, the directors of O'Reilly's particular section being Hartmann, Mahr and Hilde Poepping.³⁹

Poepping, now Mrs Spickernagel, remained working as Dr Hartmann's assistant until December 1942. She summed up for the author her duties at the Irland-Redaktion during the 12 months she worked there:

I more or less ran the office work, suggested subjects for talks to [James] Blair, and saw to it that everything was typed for the reading of 'our' news service, usually read by [John] O'Reilly. I helped out with the reading a few times, five to six times altogether, when O'Reilly was absent. I never wrote talks or commentaries myself'.⁴⁰

She explained her reasons for leaving the Irish service as follows: 'In the second half of 1942, I was expecting a baby and owing to some trouble during this pregnancy I had to stop working in December 1942 already, and did not go back to the Irland-Redaktion after the baby was born in April 1943.'⁴¹ Hilde Poepping had earlier married a fellow student, Karl Spickernagel who perished in the conflict, leaving her to raise a baby son, also named Karl. In the summer of 1943, she was, like many other young mothers at the time, evacuated from the capital to the relative safety of the countryside, in her case 'the wilds of East Pomerania'. She had no further contacts with either the Foreign Office or the Radio service, and 'could not listen in to their broadcasts - our broadcasts - owing to the lack of a suitable radio set!'.⁴² After the war, Dr Hilde Spickernagel returned to the academic world, teaching English in Berlin secondary schools, and was eventually appointed a school principal. Today she lives in retirement in Hanover.⁴³

Madeleine Meissner

A native of Danzig, where she was born in 1916, Meissner was a student at Berlin University when war broke out in 1939. The following year she attended lectures in the English Department given by Irish author Francis Stuart whom she married in 1954. When Stuart began his radio talks for the Irish Service in March 1942, he was regularly introduced on air by Meissner who accompanied him and the rest of Dr Hartmann's team to Luxembourg in August 1943. Meissner and Stuart spent the post-war years together in Paris and London before returning to Ireland in 1958.⁴⁴ Madeleine Stuart (née Meissner) died in Dublin on 18 August 1986.

Mona Brase

Born in Dublin, Mona Brase is the daughter of the late Colonel Fritz Brase, an ex-German Army bandmaster who, from 1923 to 1940, was director of the Irish Army's School of Music. Colonel Brase died in Dublin in 1940, while his daughter was attending secondary school in Berlin. He had been a member of Adolf Mahr's Irish branch of the Auslandsorganisation but left it in the mid-1930s when requested to do so by the Irish Army. In 1934 Colonel Brase wrote to the Army's Chief of Staff, Major-General Michael Brennan, asking permission to set up a local branch of the German National Socialist party in Ireland. Permission was refused.⁴⁵

At the outbreak of war Mona Brase was warned against risking her life by returning to Ireland by sea and so she spent the war years with friends of her parents in Berlin. On 31 December 1941 a special New Year's Eve broadcast beamed to Ireland by German Radio began with a pre-recorded piano recital, a Schubert impromptu, by Mona Brase.⁴⁶ Just over four months later, Mona Brase broadcast the only radio message she would deliver from Berlin during the war. It was directed to her mother in Dublin to mark the anniversary of her late father's birthday, on 4 May 1942. Unknown to Miss Brase, every word of her brief personal message was transcribed by the BBC's secret monitoring unit at Evesham in Worcestershire.⁴⁷

During the war in Berlin, Mona Brase met Adolf Mahr and William Warnock at the Casino on the Landwehrkanal, a favourite rendezvous spot where members of the small Irish community and their German friends gathered to chat and drink beer. Despite knowing her socially, Warnock refused to renew Brase's Irish passport when it expired in 1943, 'being wary of anyone he felt was closely associated with the Germans'. Brase saw the heavy bombing of Berlin commence in November 1943 and recalls horrific incidents,

including the deaths of 68 people burned into their seats in an air raid shelter under the Bayerhaus on Berlin's Kufürstendamm. The couple who had looked after her in Berlin committed suicide together as the Red Army advanced on the city in April 1945. Such suicides were a common occurrence at the time. By then Mona Brase had left school and was working as a nurse in a military hospital near Berlin, having commenced medical studies the previous year in Münster. On 19 April 1945, less than two weeks before the Red Army hoisted the Soviet flag over the Reichstag, Brase and her colleagues from the hospital left the area in a convoy of ten trucks. After spending three months in a displaced persons camp at Lübeck, the British offered to send her back to Ireland since she held an Irish passport, albeit expired. Mona Brase was eventually able to return home to Dublin where she was reunited with her mother.⁴⁸

Charles Budina

Charles Budina was born in Germany on 12 December 1900. His family, originally from Kahla in Thüringia, moved to Ireland in the 1920s in order to escape the economic depression which had hit their hairdressing business. Living in Blackrock, Co Dublin, Budina worked as a ladies' hairdresser with Prost's and built up a large local and German clientele. According to Charles Acton, who knew Budina, the German had 'grandiose ideas' which would take him far beyond the realms of hairdressing. In the late 1920s, Budina became friends with Acton's stepfather, Hugh Dignes La Touche who lived at Kilmacurragh, a magnificent 17th century country house in County Wicklow. They formed a company called Irish Resources to mine manganese (a black mineral used in glass-making) and to quarry granite for a new cathedral in Dublin's Merrion Square. The cathedral was never actually built. In September 1932 Budina leased Kilmacurragh from its owner Mrs Isabel Dignes La Touche to run it as an hotel.⁴⁹

Budina renamed the property the Kilmacurra Park Hotel. He was joined there by his wife Clara and brother Kurt who had trained as a professional butcher in Germany. The family worked hard to build up the hotel business and Charles Budina himself travelled from Kilmacurra daily for the first year or two to work at Prost's hairdressing salon in Dublin. He was one of the first people to run day coach trips at weekends from Dublin to County Wicklow - catering for factory staff outings - and in addition he was well



Charles Budina (right) wearing German military uniform in wartime Berlin, talking to Harry Greiner

supported by the small German colony in Dublin including the German Minister, Herr Hempel.⁵⁰ Members of the German Association - a German-Austrian group that also met regularly in Dublin's Red Bank restaurant, where 'a swastika flag was draped ceremoniously over a table at the top of the dining room' - made tourist excursions to Kilmacurra. Adolf Mahr was prominent in the German Association.⁵¹

Despite the success of his hotel business, the outbreak of war in 1939 changed Budina's plans. According to Charles Acton: 'When the war started, Budina had the idea of going back to Germany and making an enormous amount of money, which he would plough into the business, through English-language broadcasting...he spoke broken English with a strong Dublin accent.' Acton describes Budina's ideas as 'wildly optimistic', and adds that, 'like so many people, he thought the war would be over within a year at the most'. Acton is convinced that the German's motive for going to Berlin was purely financial and adds that, 'I don't think Budina had any political ideas as such. He would not have been a Nazi.'⁵² According to a friend of Budina's, Mrs Margaret Greiner, 'Budina was not a Nazi party member.' Of his decision to go to wartime Berlin, Mrs Greiner says that 'he wanted a change of air and did not think it [the war] would last'.⁵³

On 11 September 1939 Budina left for Germany while his wife Clara remained at Kilmacurra with their four children and nephew Günther.⁵⁴

Charles Budina made two broadcasts to Ireland during the war while serving as a soldier with the German Army. The first was part of the special New Year's Eve programme from Berlin, opened by Mona Brase's piano recital, on 31 December 1941. In that broadcast, Budina sent greetings to his wife and other members of his family, telling them he was a soldier based in occupied Paris. He added that 'Kurweis, Arano and Kurt are well and are at home on leave.'⁵⁵ Budina's second and last broadcast from Berlin was made almost six months later on 13 June 1942. But this time, as well as sending greetings to his wife Clara and children, he included a political message telling listeners that Germany 'will win this war outright'.⁵⁶ While at the Radio Centre to make that broadcast, Budina was introduced to John O'Reilly by Hans Hartmann with the words 'a countryman of yours'. O'Reilly described their meeting:

I looked in disbelief at this alleged Irishman in his uniform of the regular Wehrmacht. On his arm was the P.K. denoting Propaganda Kompanie.⁵⁷ I knew that no foreigners were accepted as members of the German regular army. Aware of my doubt, the soldier then admitted that he was German. He was married to an Irish girl and owned an hotel in Ireland. On the outbreak of the war he had reported for service in the German army, leaving the management of the hotel to a friend.⁵⁸

Charles Budina was later sent to the Eastern front where he was wounded by gunfire and eventually taken prisoner by the Red Army.⁵⁹ He returned to Ireland in 1946 and, according to Mrs Greiner who saw him at that time, 'he was a disillusioned and broken man. He wanted to get back to the hotel business but it never happened because - though Kilmacurragh had been bought in his name during his absence - he did not have the money to get the business going again. His biggest mistake was going to the war but at the time he thought "I need a break"'.⁶⁰ John O'Reilly met Budina again in the Irish midlands in the spring of 1952, and 'found that fate had been cruel in the treatment of the big, hearty, bright-eyed soldier of 1942'.⁶¹ The friend whom he had asked to look after Kilmacurra, accountant Diarmaid O'Connor, had exercised an option to purchase the property in Budina's absence. Budina's wife had, meanwhile, gone to live with a pro-Nazi Croatian hairdresser named Palcic.⁶² Budina himself died, following a heart attack, on 4 January 1954.⁶³ His widow Clara began legal proceedings against Diarmaid O'Connor, making various allegations including mismanagement of Kilmacurra. The long drawn out case was eventually decided in O'Connor's favour. In the 1960s the estate was bought by the Department of Lands. Today, Kilmacurragh House, - originally constructed in 1697 and one of the few surviving Queen Anne-style country mansions in Ireland, - lies empty and in ruins.⁶⁴

Susan Hilton (née Sweney)

Born in India in 1915, Susan Hilton was a British citizen whose father came from Donegal. Using her maiden name of Sweney, she broadcast for Hartmann's Irish service for approximately nine months from January 1942. She also broadcast on Berlin's Scottish service under the name of Ann Tower. Her story is related in the following chapter.

Johann Mikele

This speaker gave regular talks to Ireland from October 1943 to July 1944 when the Irish service was based in Luxembourg. Johann Mikele is thought to have been the speaker's real name, rather than a pseudonym, since most of the cover names used by the Irland-Redaktion were Irish ones.⁶⁵

Greetings from the German Colony

On 31 December 1941, former members of the German colony in Ireland broadcast a special programme of New Year's greetings from Berlin.⁶⁶ They included: Dr Robert Stumpf who had worked as a radiologist in Baggot Street Hospital, Dublin; Karl Kunstler, an engineer; and Dr Hilde Sutter, formerly an exchange student at University College Galway. Also taking part in this broadcast were Hans Hartmann, Charles Budina and Ludwig Mühlhausen. The broadcast, which began with a piano recital by Mona Brase, featured announcements made on behalf of Herr (Karl) Krause, Harry Greiner (a German engineer who, in 1935, had helped to launch the Solus lightbulb factory in Bray), and Mrs Esther O'Sullivan from Kilkenny.

Chapter 6 Suitable Pseudonyms

A number of persons broadcasting to Ireland used pseudonyms. One member of the Irland-Redaktion even used three different names. She was Susan Hilton, née Sweney, otherwise known as Ann Tower. A British subject, Hilton was the only member of the Irland-Redaktion to stand trial after the war. But before considering her circumstances, we will attempt first to identify some of those who broadcast to Ireland under assumed names.

The Phantom Broadcasters

In addition to the Irish section's regular announcers and occasional speakers who used their real names on air, fictitious on-air names were also used either to protect the identity of announcers, or simply because some speakers' real names did not sound Irish enough. Hilde Spickernagel thought some of the pseudonyms were 'rather too romantic to seem likely'.¹ Dr Spickernagel notes that it wasn't only broadcasters' names that were made up: 'life stories were also frequently invented or modified, some of them being quite incredible'.² Dr Spickernagel cannot now throw any light on who might have provided the on-air pseudonyms. One of the best known cover names was 'Pat O'Brien', and predated both Hartmann and Mahr. It may have been chosen by the first head of the Irish service, Wolfgang Dignowity, or more likely by his employee, James Blair, who was the first person to broadcast under the 'Pat O'Brien' title.³ According to Mahr, the sobriquet 'Pat O'Brien' had been chosen 'to imitate the Irish man-in-the-street'.⁴

It was small wonder that Irish Army monitors in Dublin had such difficulty in tracing Pat O'Brien's background. Quite apart from the fact that such a person did not exist, the cover name was used by no less than three different speakers. Beginning with Blair in September 1941, the 'Pat O'Brien' label was later used in turn by John O'Reilly and, when the latter left the radio in September 1942, by Liam Mullally. From Blair's point of view the name had the advantage of conveying a more Irish image than he might otherwise have achieved, having spent most of his life in France as a British citizen.⁵ For a while G2 thought 'Pat O'Brien' was a real person. On 14 September 1941, Commandant Sean Neligan of the Army's intercept

service picked up one of James Blair's first 'Pat O'Brien' talks. He reported to G2's Dan Bryan that 'the announcer introduced to the microphone Pat O'Brien who gave a talk on the BBC. I have not heard this speaker before'.⁶ Bryan was eventually tipped off about the true identity of 'Pat O'Brien' by William Warnock.⁷

Coincidentally, the more famous Lord Haw Haw title also had three 'owners'. One of the English section's speakers, Norman Baillie-Stewart, noted that: 'The first Lord Haw Haw of the Berlin Rundfunk [radio] was not William Joyce or myself, but handsome, six feet two inches tall, Wolff Mittler, a man with both snobbish manners and an aristocratic voice. Mittler was a Polish-German with curly blond hair, who had received his secondary education in Britain.'⁸

There were other, short-lived cover names on the Irish programmes, such as Maureen Petrie, John Costello, Ella Kavanagh and Sheila Ní Kearney (all in the 1942-43 period) which appear to have been used only once or twice on air. Among the female broadcasters at the Irland-Redaktion, Sonja Kowanko used the name Linda Walters on air. Kowanko was a fluent English speaker but had never been to Ireland and knew nothing about the country. Consequently, her talks were scripted by her friend and colleague Susan Sweney.

One of the great mysteries of the band of phantom broadcasters concerns a certain Patrick Joseph Cadogan. This broadcaster spoke regularly on Irish and Irish-American topics for German Radio's transmissions to Ireland. The Cadogan talks, which frequently included anti-semitic references, were first picked up by the BBC and Irish Army monitors at the beginning of May 1943. The talks continued until October 1943. Maurice Irvine, who monitored the Cadogan talks for the BBC, says that Cadogan was the nearest equivalent to Joyce that he had come across on the Irish service, and adds: 'he didn't give the impression of being a man of any great culture or education'. When asked about Cadogan's accent, Irvine said:

It seemed to vary a bit. Predominantly American in his vocalisation and his intonation, but maybe occasionally a certain more Irish element came across. The name Cadogan is not a particularly Irish one, but he may have been born in Ireland and spent some early years there, and was then taken to the States and brought up there.⁹

According to one wartime colleague, Joyce was 'brilliant' at imitating an American accent.¹⁰ In an effort to establish Cadogan's real identity, the author asked four former members of the Irland-Redaktion about the mystery broadcaster. Francis Stuart comments, 'The Irish service did not have any Cadogan in it. There were only three or four of us: myself, Susan Sweney, Liam Mullally and Hartmann. Cadogan must have been a cover name for someone else, perhaps someone in the English service.'¹¹ Hilde Spickernagel knew of no one called Cadogan. She left the Irish service at the end of 1942, over four months before the Cadogan broadcasts began. Dr Spickernagel adds: 'Blair, as far as I can remember, had no American accent but then an American accent is very easy to imitate.'¹² The author also wrote to Róisín Ní Mheara (Nora O'Mara) at her home in Germany to enquire about the identity of Cadogan, but no reply was forthcoming. Hans Hartmann himself told the author that, 'there was no person of that name broadcasting in the Irland-Redaktion and I cannot recall ever hearing of Mr Cadogan'. But Hartmann suspects that William Joyce may have been behind the Cadogan talks, and comments:

Perhaps he [Cadogan] was a figure set up by quarters outside the Irland-Redaktion to convey propaganda to certain Irish listeners. I may call attention to the fact that I had refused, towards the end of the war, to allow William Joyce to speak to his 'Irish followers' in the frame of the Irland-Redaktion as to my mind this field was adequately covered by the contributions of Francis Stuart dealing mainly with cultural aspects.¹³

On the possible link between Cadogan and William Joyce, Maurice Irvine comments: 'I would be very doubtful about the identification of Cadogan with Joyce. Even given that Joyce could put on a convincing American accent, the quality of their voices was in my recollection quite different - Joyce's sharp, cutting, mocking, Cadogan's somewhat rough and earthy.'¹⁴

So who was Cadogan? Given his English public school background, Francis Stuart is unlikely to have been able to effect a convincing American accent and, in any case, he has denied any role in the Cadogan episode.¹⁵ James Blair is a possible candidate for the title. He had been sacked from the Irland-Redaktion in 1942, and later joined the Nazis' Inter-Radio service

in Austria. He could have been integrated into the English service or elsewhere by mid-1943. Despite his lack of an American accent, he could have effected one. Blair had a knowledge of U.S. affairs having worked as a proof-reader on an American newspaper in Paris. Michel Piche is an improbable candidate, despite having worked in America and being able to speak English well, because Maurice Irvine would have picked up his underlying French intonation. The most likely explanation, which Francis Stuart hints at and Dr Hartmann suggests, is that William Joyce himself did the Cadogan talks. Few other people in the English service would have had the capacity to script detailed material of Irish and Irish-American interest.¹⁶ In addition, Joyce never hid his anti-semitism, and neither did the person delivering the Cadogan talks.¹⁷

The Unholy Trinity: Sweney, Hilton and Tower

Not many people could claim to have been shipwrecked twice and thus washed up on the shores of occupied Europe in World War II. But Susan Sweney was one such person. Born into an Anglo-Irish colonial family in Trickinopoly, India, on 2 February 1915, Sweney was destined through a bizarre set of circumstances to become, twenty five years later, a propaganda broadcaster for the Nazi radio service. Her father, Cyril Edward Sweney, was born in Donegal in 1890 and grew up in Wales. Later he worked for the British-controlled Indian Civil Service and became Deputy Inspector General of Police in Madras. Susan Sweney's brother Edward was born in Madras in 1912, and later moved to Ireland where he became a poultry farmer in County Meath.¹⁸

When asked to comment on his sister's wartime role in broadcasting and her anti-Allied stance, Edward Sweney said that, having been born in India, his sister had seen the British treatment of Mahatma Gandhi and his followers. Later, he said, she had received rough treatment at school in England and had reacted against the class divisions of British society.¹⁹

In 1936, at the age of 21, Susan Sweney married George Martin Hilton, a Scottish mining engineer from Dumfries. Also in 1936, she became a member of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), the group founded four years earlier by Sir Oswald Mosley and of which William Joyce was also a member. Two years later she left the BUF, 'because of the public attacks by the Union against the Jews', and moved to Dublin where the Garda Special Branch

noted she was living at number 8, Upper Mount Street. Back in London in January 1940, she rejoined the BUF and edited its newspaper *Voice of the People* until May that year. Her work for Mosley's fascist paper attracted the attention of the police who raided her house and seized belongings. By that time Sweney's health had been affected by the death of her young son and she decided to leave England to join her husband who was working at the Mawchi tin mine in Simla, Burma.²⁰ But her ship, *Kemmendine*, was fated never to reach its destination, being sunk by the German raider *Atlantis* on 13 July 1940 in the Indian Ocean on its way to Rangoon. Sweney along with the other passengers and some crew from *Kemmendine* were put aboard a captured Norwegian vessel-turned-prison-ship, *Tirranna*. With 293 prisoners on board, *Tirranna* headed for German-occupied France but on 22 September 1940 she was torpedoed off Royan by the British submarine *Tuna*. The *Tirranna* took only two minutes to sink with the loss of 87 lives. The survivors, including Hilton and a 'frequently intoxicated' Irish doctor named Thomas McGowan (who had been the *Kemmendine's* medical officer) were taken ashore and housed at the German naval quarters in Royan until December 1940 when Hilton made her way to Paris. In the occupied French capital she earned 500 Reichsmarks for giving what she described as an 'innocuous broadcast' about her maritime adventures.²¹

Mrs Hilton's potential as a propagandist must have been spotted by the Germans in occupied Paris for she was allowed to work as a journalist, based at the Hotel d'Amerique in the rue Rochechouart. According to Eileen Walsh, a secretary at the Irish legation in Berlin, Hilton established very close contacts with high ranking German Army officers in Paris.²² But, according to Mrs Hilton's own account given to MI5 in mid 1945, she helped British merchant seamen to escape from occupied Paris with the assistance of an Irish priest, Father Kenneth Monaghan of St Joseph's Catholic Church on Avenue Hoche, and of an Irish lady called Miss Fitzpatrick. Then, in June 1941, three members of the Deutsche Fichtebund, the German overseas propaganda organisation, visited Hilton in her Paris hotel to sound her out about the possibility of undertaking an overseas mission for them. Hilton later travelled via Brussels to Berlin with the head of the Fichtebund (FB), Theodore Kessemeyr, and Oscar Pfaus, former head of the FB in America and then FB leader in Hamburg. At the beginning of 1939 Pfaus had been chosen by German Intelligence to make contact with the IRA in Dublin. The

Germans asked Hilton if her nerves were strong enough to undertake work for them in Ireland, the United States or Portuguese East Africa. But she refused on the grounds that she 'didn't want to do anything dirty'. In Berlin she undertook a series of jobs starting with telephone intercept work and was later taken to see top secret U-boat centres and other military installations so she could produce a propaganda book on Germany's military strength and capabilities.²³

But radio broadcasting was destined to be her principal occupation for the next couple of years in wartime Berlin, beginning with scripting religious sermons for broadcast on a secret Büro Concordia station (Christian Peace Movement) followed by personal talks for another Concordia station beamed to Scotland called Radio Caledonia. For broadcasting these talks from September 1941, under the name of Ann Tower, she received 300 marks a month. In choosing the name Tower for the Scottish broadcasts, Hilton was not simply using a cover name but part of the maiden name of her mother, Dorothy Tower-Barter. Although never broadcasting under her married name, Mrs Hilton did not attempt to hide her identity, using her maiden name of Susan Sweney for all the broadcasts to Ireland following her recruitment by the Irland-Redaktion where she gave her first talk on 2 January 1942.²⁴

Francis Stuart contributed his first radio talk for the Irish service on 17 March 1942. He saw Susan Sweney at this time and remarked years later that:

she was a nice sort. A great disadvantage for her was that she was evidently a heavy drinker, normally. In those days drink was less [available]. She didn't seem to have access to the black market. She was always seeing where she could get the next drink, poor woman. She was a nice woman mind you. I never saw her outside [the radio centre], but I heard from others who knew her more socially that it was always where would she get the next drink. I never heard any of her broadcasts...I don't know if we could have got them in Germany.²⁵

On 26 March 1942, Susan Sweney used official German Radio notepaper to write a letter to her brother Edward, then living at The Moat House in Oldcastle, Co Meath. The letter read:

My Dear Edward, by now you will have heard that I am here working at the above address [77, Kaiserdamm, Berlin]. Maybe you sometimes hear me. I speak mostly at 8.15 [p.m.] over the station Rennes and some other shortwave, but I never can remember. I suppose you have got the mater's [mother's] address. I haven't, so I am enclosing this letter for you to send on to her. I am well and fortunate to be alive after the fun and games I have had all over the world. Cheerio, your many times drowned sister, Susan.²⁶

As well as being read by the Gestapo, the letter was intercepted by British Intelligence who tipped off their Irish counterparts in G2. It threw the spotlight on Edward Sweney who never received his sister's letter but who became instead the subject of an official investigation. G2 drew up a file on Susan Sweney, delving into her father's Donegal origins.²⁷ British-Irish contacts at military intelligence level were well developed at that stage of the war and so it was a British official, not an Irish one, who was dispatched to check up on Edward Sweney at his poultry farm in Oldcastle. Almost 50 years after the event, the latter recalled it in detail. The official sent to The Moat House was, according to Sweney, John Betjeman, then attached to the British diplomatic representation in Dublin as a press and cultural attaché. Sweney remembers that Betjeman:

called at my place in the 1940s in a car when no one had cars, and asked whether the local church had pews in it or not. I told him I didn't know but suggested he could get a chair to stand on and look through the church windows and see for himself.²⁸

Betjeman's question was presumably intended as a pretext to engage Sweney in conversation, but the poultry farmer did not take the bait. At around the same time Sweney also received a phone call from the German Minister in Dublin, Eduard Hempel, but he says that he can no longer recall what Hempel said.²⁹

Back in Berlin, Susan Sweney was having doubts about the course of the war and was concerned about possible consequences for her after the conflict. On 19 May 1942 she wrote from her flat at Klopstockstrasse in Berlin to her friend Bidy O'Kelly who lived at Pine Hill on the Vico Road

in Dalkey, Co Dublin. Lamenting the war, she told her friend that, 'It is we who will be to blame if there is another war, just as it is our parents' fault that there is a war now. Each generation makes mistakes and God knows we are suffering now'. Explaining her role in the radio service the letter continued:

I write transmissions, perhaps you hear them. Every day there's something or other. At the moment they are running two of my series called 'Have you forgotten?', and 'Places in the News'. Then I speak my own commentaries. I feel such a fool, but then at other times I think I am perhaps speaking to you and to other people I know. Try and tune in and let me know what you think and what other people think. I want to know whether I can show my face in Ireland after the war or not.³⁰

In the letter, Susan Sweney tells of her loneliness in Berlin and asks Biddy O'Kelly to send 'news of that unfortunate husband of mine, who might be dead in the jungles of Burma or a prisoner of the Japanese, or alive in some other part of the world wondering where on earth his wife has got to'. Later, at the Rundfunkhaus, she continued the letter telling her friend of drinking and billiard sessions with a Russian colleague, the secretary of the Irland-Redaktion and part-time broadcaster, Sonja Kowanko. Sweney wrote:

I am sitting in my office now. The radio is playing softly and a Sondermeldung [special announcement] is coming through. There is a green tree looking in at the window. The traffic is rolling along the street. Night is coming and I am smoking my little pipe. I like smoking a pipe, it soothes me. The only thing that disturbs me is that when I raise my eyes I see maps on the wall...map after map. They seem to be part of my life now. I think when I die, a map will be found wrapped round my heart.³¹

When Eileen Walsh of the Irish legation investigated Susan Sweney's circumstances at about this time she reported that the broadcaster had 'sunk to a low level'. But Walsh also noted that Sweney was far from being one hundred per cent pro-German, adding that 'while she was willing to say

what she thought of the British, she did not hesitate to tell the Germans what she thought of them'.³² Almost a month later, on 10 June 1942, Susan Sweney wrote to her friend Biddy O'Kelly again, this time displaying obvious signs of depression:

Never have I felt so utterly homesick and shut away as I do now. Biddy, nothing can ever make up to me for these years of unbelievable, soul-destroying loneliness. I try to shake these morbid thoughts off me. I go to the races and gamble as hard as I can. I work hard so as to forget.³³

Despite her reservations about whether or not she could show her face in Ireland after the war, Sweney continued to do what the German propagandists asked of her, including an anti-Jewish broadcast on 19 July 1942.³⁴ But, as the autumn of 1942 approached, she was to commit a professional error that cost her her job at the Radio Centre in Berlin. According to Eileen Walsh, Sweney had trouble at work and left. The details of what happened emerged over a year later, in December 1943, when John O'Reilly was interrogated by G2 officers in Dublin following his parachute drop into County Clare. In the course of a debriefing on the Irish service of German Radio, O'Reilly told Colonel Dan Bryan that Susan Sweney had proved unreliable on the radio and was fond of drink. In addition, James Blair was proving unsatisfactory and was believed by the radio's bosses to be getting stale. O'Reilly then told Bryan that 'following a scene in which Susan Hilton [Sweney] used endearing terms to Blair while he was in the announcing box and still on the air, their services were dispensed with'.³⁵ This was around September 1942. Sweney disappeared after that and O'Reilly thought she had gone to Spain. However, James Blair moved to another broadcasting job with the Inter Radio company and, in January 1943, Sweney reappeared and also joined Inter Radio.³⁶

In the summer of 1943 Sweney was preparing to embark on a grand tour of some of the Third Reich's main cities with a view to preparing propaganda material for Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. But as she undertook her tour of Germany the Gestapo was voicing concern about Sweney's true loyalties. In June 1943 the Gestapo's Göttingen office detailed her itinerary around the country but, more importantly, it clearly labelled her a suspected Allied spy. The Gestapo document, dated 30 June 1943, was addressed to the

district administration of the National Socialist party and referred to 'the Irish journalist Hilton, who is a spy-suspect'. Her address was given as the Kant Hotel in Berlin's Kant Strasse. The document detailed a wide-ranging trip around the Reich that had been arranged by the Propaganda Ministry, taking in Bayreuth, Passau, Vienna, Salzburg, Munich, Innsbruck, Augsburg, Biberach, Heidelberg, Koblenz, Cologne, and Göttingen. The purpose of the tour was to allow Hilton to gather material on the life of the Roman Catholic Church in the Third Reich and, by producing a propaganda brochure, counter Allied propaganda that the Catholic Church was being crushed in Germany. Hilton was also under instructions to take pictures of churches ruined in British and American air raids, and write about them in her article destined for foreign consumption. The document ended with the Gestapo's Göttingen office chief instructing the local Nazi party administrator that 'when Hilton turns up in Göttingen I want to be informed immediately so we can supervise her'.³⁷

It is not clear exactly what prompted the Gestapo to label Sweney as a spy suspect. Elements in the Gestapo may have thought her on-air blunder was a deliberate attempt to sabotage part of the radio propaganda effort. There was also the question of her refusal two years earlier to undertake a mission for the Fichtebund and the role she had played in helping British sailors to flee occupied Paris. In any case, by mid-1943, the Gestapo was anxious to keep a close eye on her movements and was adamant that she could not depart from the agreed itinerary without the express permission of the Propaganda Ministry.

Later in the war, Susan Sweney was allowed to move from Berlin to Vienna where she broadcast what she termed 'little talks' for RRG's 'Voice of the People' programme. She was paid 50 marks for each broadcast. In Vienna she accepted an invitation to join an SS undercover unit thinking this would give her 'the opportunity of getting out into Yugoslavia'. She was supposed to spy for the SS on resident Americans as well as Germans suspected of helping the Allies. Instead of informing the SS, Sweney claimed after the war that she 'endeavoured to warn them all'. In 1944, Sweney visited the Turkish Consulate in Vienna to try and get a visa to leave the Third Reich. When the Gestapo discovered what she was doing they imprisoned her. On 26 August 1944 she was transferred to Liebenau internment camp, north of Lake Constance near the town of Meckenbeuren. She was still being held at

Three faces of Mrs Susan Hilton,
(née Sweney).



Left, a 1936 passport photograph.

1936

Left, after her discovery in Liebenau
camp, Germany, April 1945.



Below, living in England in 1960.

1945



1960

Liebenau when it was liberated by the Allies at the end of the war, by which time she was suffering from severe malnutrition. Sweney remained in the camp in the custody of the Allies until December 1945 and gave a series of sworn statements to MI5 interrogator Reg Spooner.³⁸

Seven months after the end of the war in Europe, Susan Sweney was taken back to England to face charges of assisting the enemy. Accompanied by a woman MI5 officer she crossed the channel by ferry to Dover on 11 December 1945.³⁹ On arrival on English soil she was formally arrested and charged. The London *Times* carried the story on page two in its 'News in Brief' section as follows:

Scotland Yard announces that Mrs Dorothea May Therese Susan Hilton was detained on her arrival at Victoria Station from the Continent yesterday and charged with an offence under the Defence (General) Regulations 1939, and will appear at Bow Street Court.⁴⁰

When she appeared before Sir Bertrand Watson at Bow Street Magistrates' Court, Sweney was charged, under her married name of Dorothea Hilton, with assisting the enemy by taking employment in the German Radio propaganda service. Her solicitor told the court that everything she had done for the Germans was done with a view to getting out of Germany. She was committed for trial at the Central Criminal Court (the Old Bailey) on 5 February 1946. After a postponement the trial eventually took place on 18 February 1946, when she faced a total of ten counts of assisting the enemy. The prosecution evidence was compiled by special branch Detective Sergeant Albert Gibson who was based at the London Metropolitan Police Commissioner's office and was a witness at the trial.⁴¹

Mrs Hilton was described as a British subject on the charge sheets, though for the Gestapo she had been an 'Irish journalist'. The question of her actual, legal nationality was shrouded in mystery. Though she was born in India thirty two years before that country gained independence from Britain, her father was a Donegal man and she had lived for some time in Ireland in the late 1930s. It was presumably on the strength of the latter two points that she had applied for, and been given, a temporary Irish passport from Count O'Kelly de Gallagher at the legation in Paris early in 1941. However, the document was not renewed on application to the Berlin

legation the following year. Nonetheless, Sweney had kept her passport locked up in a safe at the Concordia studios in the Reichsportsfeld in Berlin. To add to the confusion, Sweney also carried a German passport. Hilde Spickernagel points out that: 'not only were interim passports handed out by the Irish legation to people who claimed to be of Irish origin, but also fully valid German passports with pictures and all the necessary stamps were made out by the German authorities; thus the lady generally known as Susan Hilton once showed me a German passport she also held in the name of Ann Tower'.⁴²

In court, Mrs Hilton faced the following counts, namely that she:

1. Made a record for broadcasting propaganda on behalf of the enemy, between 1 December 1940 and 1 June 1941.
2. Conspired with other British subjects - Donald Palmer, John O'Reilly, John Brown, Gilbert, Dorothy Eckersley, James Clark, Liam Mullally and other persons unknown - to broadcast propaganda on behalf of the enemy.
3. In September 1941, entered the service of the Bureau Concordia, a section of the German Broadcasting System, broadcasting secret propaganda.
4. In December 1941, prepared propaganda on behalf of the enemy, for broadcasting.
5. In January 1942, entered the service of the Irish Redaktion, a section of the German Broadcasting System, broadcasting secret propaganda.
6. In January 1942, prepared, from material provided by the German Foreign Office and by the German Propaganda Ministry, propaganda for broadcasting by the enemy.
7. In September 1942, broadcast propaganda on behalf of the enemy.
8. In January 1943, entered the service of Inter Radio, a station of the German Broadcasting System, broadcasting secret propaganda.
9. In January 1943, prepared propaganda for broadcasting by the enemy.
10. In October 1943, entered the service of the Schutz-Staffel (SS), a German paramilitary organisation engaged in internal security operations.⁴³

Hilton pleaded guilty to count 1, as well as counts 3 to 9 inclusive. She pleaded not guilty to counts 2 and 10. Consequently, the second charge,

of conspiracy, was not proceeded with. The tenth and final charge of SS membership was also dropped, despite her earlier admission to MI5 at Liebenau camp that in 1943 in Vienna she had been recruited by a local SS group to watch Americans and others. The guilty pleas meant that only the minimum of evidence was revealed in court. Hilton put herself at the mercy of the court and was sentenced to 18 months in prison without hard labour.⁴⁴

Edward Sweney describes his sister's imprisonment as 'an injustice' and believes she was 'very badly treated by the British, considering she had played a non-combattant role through radio programmes aimed at women civilians'. He also told the author that his sister 'may have been dragooned into doing it', adding, 'she is innocent of any blameworthy act. Her name should be cleared because what she did was inoffensive and caused no one any trouble. All her sentiments were pacific, in pursuit of peace, humane, and of extreme national value - because it was in the name of peace - at a time of terrible conflict. She was the victim of very cruel circumstances. I do not like to see any being exploited and cruelly treated. Susan was, in point of fact, incarcerated by the Germans and this fact should have been emphasised at her trial instead of which, apparently, it was ignored at great prejudice to a fair trial.'⁴⁵

Susan Sweney's case is certainly unique among wartime propaganda broadcasters in that she managed to be imprisoned by both Nazi Germany and Britain, each considering her to be an enemy collaborator. The facts that she was twice a prisoner of the Nazis, had refused to undertake spying work for them, had tried to flee the Third Reich and had been found half-starved in a Nazi internment camp were apparently never raised at her 1946 Old Bailey trial which was disposed of in less than a day. It is noteworthy that charges against her of conspiracy and SS membership were dropped without explanation by the prosecution team, giving the public impression that the case dealt purely with someone accused of broadcasting enemy propaganda.⁴⁶

As to what motivated Susan Sweney to go to Nazi Germany, it appears to have been a mixture of coercion, naivety and adventurism that turned sour. Her brother told the author that his sister was 'an exhibitionist' who was 'very immature and driven by fame'. He also described her as 'a person who needed a good deal of guidance. She was easily led, highly volatile, a very

impressionable person, generous but hot-tempered'. After her release from prison, Susan Sweney worked as a courier travelling to South America and Australia. She later ran a farm and pet business in England where she died on 30 October 1983, aged 68.⁴⁷

Chapter 7

'God bless and save Ireland': The Broadcasts of 1939-41

The millions of words of propaganda that Germany beamed to Ireland during World War II gave neither a warning of Nazism's brutal excesses nor any hint of defeat for the Axis powers. But one thing the broadcasts did show was that German Radio, for the first time, was paying some sort of lip service to Ireland's nationhood and to her identity. During the sixteen years that German Radio had been in existence up to the outbreak of the Second World War, Ireland had rarely if ever been mentioned. The records of German Radio's output in the 1929-36 period show only one mention of Ireland, - that was on Wednesday, 8 May 1935 when the radio service carried a report of an international football match between Germany and Ireland held that day at Dortmund. The home side was victorious.¹ With the outbreak of hostilities just over four years later, sporting clichés were swapped for straightforward propaganda.

1 9 3 9

As early as 5 September 1939 German Radio's domestic service was praising the neutrality policies of Presidents Vargas in Brazil and de Valera in Ireland.² On 27 September de Valera was asked in the Dáil if he knew about:

a recent broadcast from the Hamburg Radio Station about 12.15 a.m. on the night of the 13th or 14th September, during which an announcement was made that Éire had better come out from under Mr Chamberlain's umbrella; and if he will state whether he has made appropriate representations to the German government...³

De Valera's reply revealed that he was fully aware of the role of propaganda even at that early stage of the conflict:

I have heard talk of such a broadcast, but I am not sure whether, in fact, such a reference to Ireland was made, or whether this is not another sample of the ridiculous rumours which have been passed from



Larry Slattery from Thurles, Co Tipperary (pictured centre, lying on hospital bed) became one of the first British prisoners of war when his RAF plane was shot down over Germany during the first week of September 1939. This photograph shows Slattery being interviewed for German Radio. The interview was used for propaganda purposes in bulletins to Britain to show that prisoners of war were being well treated.

mouth to mouth recently. I have made no effort to secure the text of the reported broadcast, and have made no representations to the German government. In the present circumstances, when wholesale propaganda is used as a method of warfare, I think it would be foolish to take serious notice of incidental remarks like those referred to in the deputy's question.⁴

German Radio's English-language services were already up and running, and William Joyce had made his debut on air from Berlin on 11 September 1939.⁵ The broadcasts from Germany attracted the attention not only of politicians but also Army Intelligence and by the beginning of November they had prompted a concerned letter from G2's Colonel Liam Archer to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Joe Walshe. Under the heading 'German Wireless Broadcasts', and addressing the note to 'Dear Joe', Archer wrote:

It has been stated on good authority that incidents which were not reported in the Irish press and in connection with which it is presumed the censor allowed no messages to pass, were reported on the German Wireless. Further, it is reported that some of those incidents were actually reported on the German Wireless on the evening of the day on which the incidents took place. A case in point is the carrying of the banner by the Kerry football team at an All-Ireland match in Croke Park. If the statement is true that this incident was reported on the German Wireless on the day of the incident it would be a very strong indication that there is some form of illicit wireless communication between this country and Germany. If you are still paying attention to the German Wireless and note any incidents of this kind, I should be glad to have details. The other matter affecting the German Wireless is presumably one more directly affecting your Department. It would seem that misleading or unfounded statements with regard to affairs in this country have been broadcast from German stations. A broadcast from one station, evidently intended for Africa, on one occasion stated the IRA were still carrying on their fight against British Imperialism. It also stated that all posters in connection with ARP [Air Raid Precautions]

had been torn down and that damage had also been done to ARP shelters. Belfast or Northern Ireland were not mentioned in this connection.⁶

Despite Archer's assumption to the contrary, it appears that External Affairs was not listening to German Radio. Consequently, G2 took charge of monitoring foreign radio transmissions at the end of 1939 and kept External Affairs and some other government departments informed of the more relevant broadcasts.⁷

One of the first transmissions monitored by the Irish Army was a talk in Irish by Professor Ludwig Mühlhausen on Sunday 10 December 1939 via the Hamburg transmitter from 8.25 p.m. to 8.40 p.m. Dublin time. The Army monitor noted the German's mixture of Kerry and western dialects, and reported him as saying that:

it was a pleasure to talk over the air to his Irish friends imagining himself seated beside the fire with the smell of turf in his nose. He characterised as lies statements about the persecution by the Germans of Czechoslovak and Polish Catholics, and reminded his listeners of the atrocities committed in Ireland by the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries.⁸

Completing his report the following day, the monitor attached a cutting from the *Irish Press* headed 'Talk in Irish from German radio station' revealing that the Professor of Celtic Studies at Berlin University was 'well known in Irish university circles', and 'has made repeated visits to the Kerry, Galway and Donegal Irish speaking districts'.⁹ In addition to Irish Army monitors, the German Minister to Ireland, Eduard Hempel, was also listening to Mühlhausen's talks. On 13 December 1939 he reported in a telegram to Berlin that:

Here Irish language radio had an outstanding effect. Received widespread recognition. In particular, the government has been pleased because of this 'first international recognition' of the Irish language. With view to the propaganda content, I recommend a careful and gradual approach; initially rather an overall view of our cultural relationship to Ireland, old Irish culture and the altruistic interest and activity of

German research for its revival. Furthermore, descriptions of German lifestyle, through which a better opinion of today's Germany can be fostered by means of unobtrusive direction to known focus points. Avoid the expression Gaelic language rather than Irish language which is preferable here. Mühlhausen's knowledge of the language and expressions which represented the local ethnic character very well, were indeed acknowledged.¹⁰

The impetus for the launch of Mühlhausen's Sunday night broadcasts, as was seen above, originally came from the Propaganda Ministry.¹¹ Neutral Ireland did not escape Goebbels' notice and in his diary of 28 November 1939 he noted the IRA's bombing campaign in London.

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On 8 February 1940, Goebbels recorded in his diary the execution of IRA men Peter Barnes and James Richards (also known as Frank McCormick) in Birmingham the previous day for their part in the Coventry bombings, commenting, 'We seize on this with all our might. This gives us ammunition for several days. I keep impressing my people with one basic truth: repeat everything until the last, most stupid person has understood.'¹²

On 30 April 1940, the question of German Radio broadcasts about Ireland was raised in the Dáil again, this time by a Labour T.D. who asked de Valera:

if he is aware of the unfriendly references to this country by certain German radio stations, and, if so, whether he has made or proposes to make representations to the German Government in the matter.

De Valera replied:

I know there is a report in circulation of alleged unfriendly references to Ireland in recent German broadcasts. But I have not been able to discover anyone who claims to have actually heard the references, and the investigations I have made lead me to believe that the report is unfounded.¹³

In early May 1940, the Dominions Office in London 'asked the BBC if Nazi broadcasts to Ireland could be jammed, and if it was known how many people in Eire listened to BBC broadcasts'. In the event they never were jammed, nor does it appear that an estimate of the BBC's Southern Irish audience was ever produced.¹⁴

Advances by the German armed forces provided the propagandists in Berlin with continuing opportunities. On 9 April 1940 the Germans seized Denmark and invaded Norway capturing the capital, Oslo. A month later on 10 May, Germany invaded the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. With the Dutch Army surrendering on 14 May and Belgium capitulating on 27 May, the German Army continued its advance westwards, entering Paris on 13 June 1940.¹⁵ Despite the wave of conquests which gave Nazi Germany control of most of the European mainland from Poland to the Atlantic coast, the weekly Irish language talks from Berlin had little to say apart from exhorting Irish listeners to 'keep your neutrality'.

On 28 June 1940 an instruction was issued to the German Army High Command 'to the effect that in order to mislead the enemy, all available information media should spread the word that we [the Germans] are preparing a landing in Ireland...'¹⁶ There is no evidence that the Irland-Redaktion complied with this instruction but the following day, 29 June 1940, German Radio's shortwave German-language service to North America carried a commentary on the naval war, by Vice Admiral Friedrich Luetzow, which mentioned Ireland's refusal to join the conflict.¹⁷

In the wake of the Germany's military victories in Western Europe, the BBC began to take an interest in the material that Mühlhausen and Hartmann were broadcasting to Ireland. On 1 July 1940, Angus Matheson of Glasgow University began work as a Gaelic monitor and translator with the BBC monitoring service at Evesham.¹⁸ For the whole of 1940, Mühlhausen and Hartmann together provided the only German Radio commentaries explicitly for Ireland. These were all in Irish. A study of original BBC monitoring reports of both speakers provides a useful comparison of their propaganda styles. For example, on 10 November 1940, Hartmann gave a 15-minute talk beginning with the words 'This is the German Radio in Berlin, Dr Hartmann speaking' followed by a potted history of the Nazi party and Adolf Hitler's rise to power. Hartmann said Hitler had:

remained faithful to his promise to remove the injustice of the disgraceful Treaty of Versailles. He was prepared to do that peaceably but England and France did not allow him. They declared war on Germany in order to carve up Germany completely.

Concluding his talk, Hartmann brought in an Irish angle saying, 'I am sure that you have heard of the great number of English ships that are being sunk by German U-boats to the west of Ireland.' He then summarised the exchanges between Churchill and de Valera over the Treaty Ports and Ireland's neutral stance, signing off his talk with the customary slogan 'May God bless and save Ireland.'¹⁹

Hartmann categorises Mühlhausen's talks as 'aggressive propaganda'.²⁰ Mühlhausen rarely introduced himself by name on the radio. His voice was however easily recognised by Angus Matheson who had worked with the leading European Celtic language experts before the war. A 15-minute talk by Mühlhausen on 20 November 1940 was characterised not so much by pro-German sentiments as by a wealth of anti-British invective. While covering the same ground (the Treaty Ports, Irish neutrality, etc.) as Hartmann had done ten days earlier, Mühlhausen's style was markedly different. Beginning with a list of examples to prove what he saw as England's lack of regard for smaller nations, he said:

The English do not like to place their own precious lives in danger. The English do not like to make use of their own soldiers in war. They prefer to sacrifice other peoples and nations for the glory of the Empire.

Mühlhausen then countered an RAF statement on unlimited warplane production in England saying:

That is of no consequence. A few days ago, Coventry, the great centre for the production of aeroplanes and motors, was reduced to a pile of scrap iron. Bombs weighing altogether hundreds of millions of pounds are dropped every night on the English cities. There is no counting of the number of armaments and munitions factories etc., which have been destroyed in London and other places.

After outlining Germany's seemingly unlimited power, Mühlhausen gradually introduced his Irish angle:

Greece has been the last small country to be dragged into the war by the English. The same fate is in store for them as for Norway, Holland, and Belgium when England managed to get them involved. The English cannot and will not give any effective help to the Greeks. The English cannot in the present position give any help to any of the small nations in Europe. No one today has any faith in or respect for the English. The Turks have understood this better than the Greeks. The whole region from the coast of France to the coasts of Japan are united, and neither England nor any other power can ever break this bloc. The English have not abandoned their claims to the Irish ports. It would be tantamount to a second annexation of Ireland if the English succeeded in obtaining the Irish ports again. I am sure that the Irish nation, though it is indeed a small nation, is sufficiently strong to resist this move. Ireland would never again be free from English control if she willingly handed over her ports to the English. The English already deeply regret that they gave Ireland sufficient liberty to be able now to remain a neutral state. May God bless Ireland, and may Ireland save herself.²¹

The broadcast was made against the background of a British landing in occupied Greece on 3 November 1940, and the Luftwaffe's blitz bombing of Coventry on 15 November 1940.²² A month later, on 15 December 1940, Mühlhausen returned to an Irish theme, this time Ireland's fate in the event of an English victory:

If England succeeded in defeating Germany, Ireland would be lost sooner or later. The English would take revenge on Ireland because she was neutral in this war instead of sacrificing her life for the Empire. There would be then no one in the world who would prevent the English from bringing Ireland once more under subjection and from destroying Irish freedom. On the other hand, if we succeeded in defeating the Empire, Ireland, the whole of Ireland, Ireland from Belfast to Cork, would be free forever from English control. We only smile when we hear the English say that we would swallow up Ireland. There is no doubt

whatever that we will succeed in defeating England this time. Stand firm then against the English now, and the whole of Ireland will at last be free. God bless and save Ireland.²³

Mühlhausen's talk was considered sufficiently strong by the BBC monitors for it to be 'flashed' in condensed form, two hours after transmission, to the relevant authorities in London.²⁴

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The events of 1941 were to prove crucial in determining the outcome of the Second World War and consequently the Germans' Irish propaganda drive as well. Mid-way through the year, Hitler - having turned his attentions away from Western Europe (the plan to invade England was postponed in mid-September 1940) - launched his surprise attack on Russia, Operation Barbarossa, on 22 June 1941. America entered the conflict following Japan's attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941.²⁵

At the start of 1941 German Radio's programmes to Ireland consisted of two talks a week in Irish by Mühlhausen and Hartmann. But by the end of the year the service had expanded to include a nightly programme in both Irish and English, with Hartmann overseeing the operation.²⁶ As seen in chapter 8, the impetus for launching a more in-depth radio service for Ireland came in March 1941 from the German Foreign Office functionary, Dr Adolf Mahr, but test transmissions for the new daily service did not begin until late August 1941.²⁷ It is one of the anomalies of the German propaganda drive that key events of Irish interest, such as the Luftwaffe raids on Belfast in May 1941, the accidental bombing of Dublin's North Strand by the Luftwaffe (31 May 1941), and Frank Aiken's failed arms-buying mission to America (also in May), went without comment on German Radio's Irish service but were mentioned in dozens of languages by German Radio announcers broadcasting to the rest of the world.²⁸

The controversy over Britain's attempt to introduce conscription in Northern Ireland provided German propagandists with valuable material. In fact, Radio Eireann had unwittingly given the Germans all the ammunition they needed on the conscription issue by broadcasting an anti-conscription statement from the Primate of All Ireland, Cardinal MacRory. On 22 May

1941, Radio Eireann carried MacRory's statement in which he quoted a letter from the Irish Catholic bishops in May 1939 saying:

Any attempt to impose conscription here would be disastrous. Our people have been subjected to grievous injustice in being cut off from one of the oldest nations in Europe and being deprived of their fundamental rights as citizens of their own land. In such circumstances, to compel them to fight for their oppressor would be likely to rouse indignation and resistance...an ancient land made by God was partitioned by a foreign power against the vehement protests of its people. Conscription was an old trick to compel those who still lie under this grievous wrong to fight on the side of its perpetrators.²⁹

Six days after the cardinal's statement was broadcast, Hans Hartmann - who regularly monitored Radio Eireann broadcasts for suitable propaganda material³⁰ - jumped on the conscription bandwagon, commenting:

A few days ago, Irishmen gave the governments of the Six Counties and Great Britain to understand that they had resolved to resist conscription in the Six Counties by every means at their disposal. I hope that in the end they will have their reward for their bravery and steadfastness. At any rate Irishmen have proved up to now that they have been able to achieve their objects by their courage and loyalty.

Hartmann then gave his listeners a long lecture on the history of the United Irishmen movement from 1792 onwards, adding:

The United Irishmen failed to achieve their objects because many of their leaders were too weak. The position of the island at present is somewhat similar to its position 150 years ago, but I believe that this time the leaders will be stronger.³¹

On 31 May 1941, the Luftwaffe accidentally bombed the North Strand area of Dublin, killing 28 people and damaging up to a thousand homes.³² At the same time, the conscription controversy, culminating in the British Government's decision not to introduce it compulsorily in Northern

Ireland,³³ gave German propagandists a welcome diversion for listeners in Ireland and elsewhere. Thus, at the beginning of June 1941, German Radio's foreign services were telling the world that 'It is impossible that the Germans bombed Dublin intentionally', as well as reporting that 'London has abandoned the proposal of introducing conscription in Northern Ireland'. In the first week of June, audiences from Hungary to Spain to Norway were kept abreast of Irish affairs by the Germans who reported that 'the U.S. Deputy Naval Attaché in London' had left to visit Ireland', and while Ireland's request for U.S. arms had been refused 'the USA has agreed to ship 500,000 tons of petrol to Eire'.³⁴ These broadcasts were somewhat at odds with Berlin's weekly Irish language talks which did not always comment directly on current news events. At the end of the first week in June, Ludwig Mühlhausen was forecasting that 'The Celtic race will come into its own again if England collapses' and he called on Irishmen to stand united 'to free the island'.³⁵

The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, signed on 23 August 1939, ensured that no anti-Soviet broadcasts were heard on German Radio from that August date until Hitler attacked Russia on 22 June 1941. From then on, the radio propagandists in Berlin got the green-light to play the anti-Communist card. On 29 June 1941, a week after Operation Barbarossa, Mühlhausen countered Allied suggestions that Hitler, like Napoleon before him, would be repulsed:

The present German invasion of Russia cannot rightly be compared with Napoleon's invasion, a comparison which hostile propagandists are fond of making. Many had then been forced to join Napoleon's army. But there is a great difference now. Almost the whole of Europe is on the side of Germany of its own free will. I am sure that the Irish people also are well pleased, for I have had many occasions to learn of the Irish hate [sic] of Bolshevism.

After listing Germany's military successes against Russia in the preceding week, Mühlhausen praised the Führer as follows:

Hitler was the man who succeeded in bringing about German unity and in giving the whole of Europe the hope of unity and happiness. It will be

difficult for many people to forget their own ways and to acquire a common European feeling, just as it took the German people many years to understand the aims of Adolf Hitler.³⁶

On 9 July, it was Hartmann's turn to relay the new anti-Soviet attitude to Irish listeners, repeating the German High Command's line justifying Barbarossa, namely that Russia had been planning an attack on Germany. As well as accusing Stalin of putting hundreds of thousands of homeless children to death, Hartmann compared Bolshevik rule to British rule in Ireland, saying that in Russia:

our soldiers witnessed scenes of misery and oppression which could not be surpassed. The inhabitants were living in squalor which could not be compared with the poorest inhabitants of other European countries. If anyone wants a comparison, one must recall the hard times in Ireland under Cromwell's rule. The fate of Russia under Bolshevik rule is comparable to the fate of Ireland under English sovereignty, and it is to be noticed that these two powers have now entered into an alliance.

Before signing off with his customary phrase 'God bless and save Ireland', Hartmann listed Bolshevik misdeeds against farmers, and even summoned George Bernard Shaw to the defence of Barbarossa, telling his audience:

The Bolsheviks intended to make an attack on Germany and Europe. Bernard Shaw wrote a letter to the *New Statesman* and said he could find no other reason for the war between Germany and Russia, except that Hitler believed that Stalin was about to attack, and that Hitler attacked Russia to forestall Stalin. Bernard Shaw is right in this. Military actions in the East prove that millions of soldiers with thousands of planes and tanks were awaiting Stalin's orders to deal Germany and the whole of Europe a death blow.³⁷

Mühlhausen was on the air again on 10 August, explaining a three week silence on the Russian campaign by the German High Command with the proverb 'A careful devil keeps a closed mouth'. He then gave details of the

fighting, adding: 'Bolshevik Russia will soon lie prostrate before us. There will remain nobody in Europe then to prevent us defeating England, as Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece and Bolshevism were defeated'. Mühlhausen's talks, which had become irregular during 1941, were in fact drawing to a close. At the BBC monitoring centre in Evesham, Angus Matheson recorded Mühlhausen's penultimate broadcast to Ireland on 13 August 1941, just two weeks before the start of test transmissions for Adolf Mahr's new nightly Irish service.³⁸

On 8 September 1941, BBC monitors noted for the first time a talk 'In English for Ireland' on the Zeesen transmitter at 8 p.m. on 28.45 metres. The broadcast quoted a report in *The Times* that more U.S. technicians were arriving in Northern Ireland.³⁹ A week later, monitors at McKee Barracks in Dublin discovered that not only was Berlin devoting nightly English-language talks to Ireland, but that one of the speakers had a name...Pat O'Brien. Sean Neligan of the Army's Intercept Branch informed G2's Dan Bryan: 'the daily broadcast from Germany *To Our Irish Friends*, usually transmitted on 28 metres, was put out on the broadcast band 30-31 metres at 1900 hours GMT last night, 14 September 1941. The announcer introduced to the microphone Pat O'Brien who gave a talk on the BBC. I have not heard this speaker before'. G2 made efforts to discover who Pat O'Brien was, opening a file on a P.J. O'Brien, but by the end of September they were still no wiser, with Dan Bryan informing his staff: 'O'Brien obviously not same man, but should be looked up again'. G2 had no way of knowing that Pat O'Brien was a cover name being used at that stage by James Blair and later by broadcasters John O'Reilly and Liam Mullally.⁴⁰

Professor Ludwig Mühlhausen gave one last regular talk on 24 September 1941 - although he was also to broadcast a brief message on 31 December 1941 as part of a special New Year's Eve programme. Under the heading 'Bolshevik menace to Ireland', he warned his audience in September that Stalin and Churchill had made a pact to destroy Germany, adding:

If they do, Bolshevism will spread through Europe and throughout Ireland. From the monasteries of Ireland, Christianity came to the continent of Europe. There is a close tie between Ireland and Germany, and yet England and America in union with Russia want to bring Ireland into the war against Germany.⁴¹

On 21 October, BBC monitors tuning into the Axis-controlled Rome transmitter (which is not known to have been used by the Irish service) came across a 'talk by an American who frequently contributes views on various subjects'. That night, at 3.10 a.m. the anonymous American delivered a 22-minute talk on 'U.S. interference in Ireland'. The fact that the broadcast was, as the monitors noted, 'In English for North America' (on 30.74 metres), made it almost certain that the target audience comprised the millions of Irish-Americans living in the USA. The speaker accused Churchill and Roosevelt of 'meddling' in Ireland as they had done in Yugoslavia, and added: 'The Irish people know the value of Anglo-Saxon promises, and their character is different from the Serbs'. The speaker then quoted at length from a letter by de Valera's government colleague Frank Aiken - published in the *New Republic* of 23 June 1941 - rejecting a call by Professor Francis E. MacMahon asking Ireland to return the Treaty Ports to England to help the war effort. Then, speaking directly to his Irish American target audience, the speaker concluded:

To Irishmen, to Irish Americans, perhaps the most significant phrases of this letter are those in which the writer reminds us that England, while pretending to fight for the freedom of small nations, still treats Northern Ireland as a hostile and conquered country. As Roman Catholics, true Irishmen are perhaps willing to forgive, but cannot forget that they were held outcast by the English, and were denied their rightful seats in parliament. England now wishes she could expunge the past. Irish Americans are determined that America shall not interfere in Eire as she did in Yugoslavia.⁴²

That broadcast broadly followed Adolf Mahr's guidelines recommending the use of Radio Rome to target Irish audiences.⁴³

On 27 October 1941, Commandant Sean Neligan reported to Dan Bryan that:

In the programme broadcast last night from Germany to 'Irish Friends' a new commentator was introduced. His name was stated to be 'John O'Reilly'. He is definitely Irish and speaks with a southern accent. This commentator has been making short announcements for the past week,

and it appeared to me as if he were undergoing instruction in the art of announcing, etc. The subject of his broadcast, which was the most effective so far directed to this country, was a talk on Russia in respect of religious matters; comparison being drawn between Russian anti-religious activities and the Penal Law era in this country, etc., etc. The commentator spoke with a thorough knowledge of the facts as regards this country and the broadcast was the most effective of the series up to date. The announcer previously referred to as of Indian extraction, and whose name is now given as 'John Costello', appears to have been dropped in favour of the newcomer'.⁴⁴

Contrary to their earlier difficulties in trying to identify the fictitious 'Pat O'Brien', G2 had no such trouble with O'Reilly. The Kilkee man's secret file contains a wealth of personal detail. The announcer 'of Indian extraction' was probably one of a number of Indian nationalists based at the time in Berlin's Rundfunkhaus.⁴⁵

By early November 1941, BBC monitors were picking up the first in what was to become a regular series of items on British atrocities during the Irish War of Independence. While Francis Stuart had pioneered the idea of recollecting 'historic acts of aggression on the part of the United Kingdom' in the small number of scripts he wrote for William Joyce early in 1940, the idea was refined by Adolf Mahr for delivery on air by O'Reilly under the title 'Flashback into Irish History'. BBC monitors recorded the first such example on 6 November 1941 under the heading 'Anniversary item dealing with incidents of 6 November 1919, 1920 and 1921 during the troubles in Ireland'. The 'Flashback' remained a regular feature of the Irland-Redaktion's output until 1944, usually preceding the news bulletins.⁴⁶

With Irish, Indian, Breton, Flemish, Ukrainian and other nationalists gathered in Berlin, and many of them working in close proximity in the Rundfunkhaus, it was natural that propaganda ideas would be exchanged as the broadcasters mixed socially. William Joyce, for example, played chess with Subhas Chandra Bose 'who was living in Berlin as the leader of the so-called Indian freedom fighters' and who broadcast anti-British propaganda to India.⁴⁷ The Indian nationalists' radio propaganda sometimes spurred

comparative themes from the Irland-Redaktion, such as on 19 November 1941 when 'Pat O'Brien' (James Blair) told listeners:

Ireland and India are akin in their relations to England. Both have been robbed and have fought desperately and persistently for independence. In the 18th century the Ulster wool industry was ruined. Identical measures were taken in India to stifle her industries. British products were substituted for Indian ones, and Birmingham and Manchester were built on the ruins of Indian trade. Recurrent famines followed. Ireland was turned into a charnel house during the artificially created famine of 1845-1848. England did nothing to alleviate the hardship. She continued to import food from Ireland and prevented Ireland from importing food from elsewhere. India was subject to terrible periodical famines which swept away millions of the population'.⁴⁸

Only a few months later, Chandra Bose was telling his listeners that: 'if India had been allowed to remain neutral, like Ireland, there would have been no possibility of India coming within the arena of the present war...'⁴⁹

On 30 November 1941, Hans Hartmann contributed a 15-minute talk in Irish titled 'Germany, the Saviour of Europe' in which he said:

While Germany took the lead against the Bolshevik terror, Britain opens her door to Russian propaganda: the democracies will pay for their misdeeds. Meantime, Germany is restoring the Soviet's damage and is recognising private property as the basis for all human institutions, a policy to which she will adhere after the war...As for England, she declared war on Germany and allied herself to the devil. Ribbentrop recently said that England is paying dearly for the war. Her allies have one by one been defeated. Russia, her last friend, is doomed, and her naval blockade has failed while Germany has gained lands, mines, factories, all the raw materials that she and Europe need. It is Hitler who has saved Europe, and England will go on sinking lower.⁵⁰

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, on 7 December 1941, featured in the nightly news items for Ireland and was discussed by 'Pat O'Brien' alias

James Blair who had been supplied with a suitable script by Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office. Throughout December, the Irland-Redaktion's news summary and 'Pat O'Brien' talks were always preceded by 'Flashbacks' to the War of Independence, thus giving the impression that what happened in 1920 was as important for Ireland as what was happening in 1941, if not more so. On 17 December the following 'Flashback' conveyed the general tone of the item read every night by John O'Reilly:

As usual we are beginning our programme this evening with a flashback into the history of British terrorism in Ireland. Exactly twenty one years ago today, that is to say on Thursday, December 17th 1920, British Crown forces waging war upon the civil population of Ireland, committed more acts of savage terrorism. At midnight, British auxiliary police walked into the home of Michael Edmonds of Tipperary town. He was taken from his bed to some hills nearby, where his British abductors shot him through the brain in cold blood. Further to this typically ruthless murder, Black and Tans burned down homes in Tipperary town, where the murder had taken place, and in Swanlinbar, Co Cavan. Twenty one years ago, the British were prepared to stoop to the lowest form of murder and brutal intimidation. They did not care because they thought they were triumphant. Today, however, they would prefer to have these atrocities forgotten because they now realise they are now being beaten themselves, and they fear retribution.⁵¹

On 28 December 1941, Hans Hartmann gave his first talk to Ireland since taking over as head of the Irland-Redaktion. The 15-minute broadcast contained the twin themes of support for Irish neutrality coupled with strong criticism of the USA for abandoning her neutral stance and entering the war:

Ireland stands alone in the midst of great nations who are engaged in war to the bitter end, and it might appear that she would never be able to maintain her neutrality, especially as the USA, on whom she placed all her hopes, is participating in the war. [The USA has] done nothing for years but interfere in the affairs of others and force their own views upon foreign governments or certain groups in opposition to those

governments...As regards Mr Roosevelt and the capitalists and Jews in America, it is difficult to discern any nobility or sense of honour in their conduct...but the man in the street in America, the workers, the poor, the Irish and others, have not changed their opinion. Roosevelt and his friends have led them into a war against their will. They are in it now and there is no remedy.

Forecasting that Roosevelt might now send American troops to Northern Ireland, Hartmann warned his listeners that:

The fine edifice of the Republic would collapse immediately if the Irish government did not succeed in avoiding war and maintaining neutrality. In addition, it is likely that in such a case the war would be fought on Irish soil despite the long-standing friendship between Germany and Ireland. This means that there is no other course open to the Irish people, if they have sense and do not wish to commit suicide, but to defend their neutrality at any cost. As for the Irish living in the USA, I am sure that they fully understand the conduct of Ireland, though a great part of them are at present on the side of the government in the American war. I should not like to see Ireland completely destroyed and to see everything achieved after the last war brought to nothing again...The greatest vigilance is called for. God bless and save Ireland.⁵²

Hartmann's call for Ireland to defend her neutrality was broadcast on 1154 metres via the Oslo transmitter relayed from Zeesen. The first use of the Oslo transmitter for the Irish service had been monitored by the BBC on 9 December 1941.⁵³ As 1941 drew to a close Hartmann's team comprised Kowanko, Blair, O'Reilly and Poepping as well as Hartmann's sister-in-law, Gertrud Neugebauer, who worked as a typist. On 31 December 1941, Hartmann and his team put out an end of year programme for Ireland at 12.30 p.m. The *Irish Press* reported the broadcast as follows:

In a special New Year's Eve broadcast from Germany, over the Oslo Radio, greetings were sent by former members of the German colony here. The broadcast opened with a recital by Fräulein Mona Brase, daughter of the

late Col. Fritz Brase, Director of the Army School of Music. Dr Hans Hartmann, speaking in Irish, referred to the folklore he had collected in Ireland, and Dr Robert Stumpf, formerly a radiologist in the Royal City of Dublin Hospital, followed. Engineer Karl Kunstler said that Herr Krause, who has married since leaving Ireland, and Harry Greiner joined with him in sending greetings. Fräulein Dr Hilde Sutter, who had been an exchange student in Galway, said that all the other exchange students are well, except Martin Fluss who was killed in Russia. Charles Budina, formerly of Kilmacurra Park Hotel, Co Wicklow, who said that he is now a soldier in Paris, sent greetings to his wife, other members of his family, and friends, and added that Kurweis, Arano and Kurt are well and are at home on leave. The announcer then read a message from Mrs Esther O'Sullivan to her father, relatives and friends in Kilkenny, saying that she is well; and the broadcast ended with a message of greeting in Irish from Dr Ludwig Mühlhausen, the well known authority on folklore and phonetics.⁵⁴

The regular nightly programme to Ireland also went out that night on the Zeesen transmitter at 8 p.m. starting with a 'Flashback' feature covering the year 1920 , and for the first time disclosing the source of the 'Flashback' material. BBC monitors reported the item as follows:

Flashback to British terrorism in Ireland. Twenty-one years ago today British Crown forces burnt Irish homes and farm crops in Co Tipperary. We will give the official figures for British acts of murder and other forms of terrorism in Ireland during the year 1920 alone. The figures are official and are to be found in the document entitled 'The Struggle of the Irish People' which was adopted at a January session of Dáil Eireann in 1921, and addressed to the elected representatives of the people of the USA. In 1920, the number of Irish citizens known to have been murdered by the British amounted to 203. Apart from this there were 1,184 armed assaults by the British on unarmed Irish citizens. The British police and military carried out 48,474 raids on Irish houses and institutions. There were 7,287 political arrests. 705 Irish citizens were deported...

That run-down was followed by a detailed talk on 'Neutrality in British Eyes' which noted that England:

has toyed with the idea of occupying the Irish ports for a long time. But even her crazy politicians admit that the idea is too dangerous. It doesn't really matter to England whether she or one of her Allies does the occupying. England would actually prefer that one of her Allies should do the dirty work. What ally would do England's dirty work in this case? England remembers that the USA has a large Irish population who were forced to emigrate there owing to the criminal effects of English policy. England now thinks that were America to occupy Southern Ireland, the native Irish would not object because of their relatives in the States. Ireland would, in fact, welcome Mr Roosevelt's soldiers who would then come, not in the name of England, but in the name of the American Irish. It is all part of the neutrality game as played by England. Were the Irish to object to this skilful procedure, they would of course be in the wrong, since anyone not participating in England's war is immoral and suicidal.⁵⁵

That night's programmes concluded with a 25-minute broadcast of New Year's greetings at 9.30 p.m., which may have been a recording of the earlier transmission along with some additional material broadcast live in the Berlin studio. BBC monitors noted that Hartmann's assistant Hilde Poepping 'said that all her friends who had spent some time in Ireland sent their greetings, except her friend Martin Klot who was killed in action in Russia fighting to protect the women and children of Europe from Bolshevism'.⁵⁶

Chaper 8

The Mahr Propaganda Initiative of 1941

When Adolf Mahr began to draw up his Irish propaganda initiative for the German Foreign Office early in 1941, German Radio had already been broadcasting to Irish listeners for over a year. But the propaganda broadcasts of the previous twelve months could hardly be compared with German Radio's programming for its European service which totalled eleven hours a day in 1939. Berlin's Irish audience had to be content with a weekly 15-minute talk in Irish on Sunday nights.¹ Mahr regarded this situation as most unsatisfactory but his decision to attempt to change it meant that he would have to face down the Propaganda Ministry.

The rivalry between Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop for control of the state broadcasting system came to a head at the end of 1940 when Foreign Office radio officials were physically ejected from rooms in Berlin's radio centre. Balfour notes that:

when SS members of the AA [Foreign Office] were sent to reinstate them, RMVP [Propaganda Ministry] staff in shirts of the same colour were deployed to obstruct. Himmler then intervened to prevent two groups of his subordinates from coming to blows. But the upshot must have been in the RMVP's favour because for the rest of the war that Department did become the main point of liaison [with German Radio/RRG] although the AA were allowed to deal directly with the RRG at the level of individual programmes, on the very real ground that propaganda, where hours were often decisive, could not be conducted by the lengthy exchange of memoranda. Thereafter matters seem to have become more peaceful, at any rate as regards the RRG External Services.²

But if it is the case that the dispute was resolved generally in favour of the Propaganda Ministry, the Foreign Office was to succeed at least in effectively controlling the Irish service. Clearly the Foreign Office still had a major influence in aspects of policy relating to radio broadcasts. This is evident from the circumstances in which consideration was given to a special report prepared by Mahr for Ribbentrop and entitled 'Radio Propaganda to Ireland'. In his report, which was originally drafted in mid-

March but not sent to the German Foreign Minister until May 1941, Mahr explained that:

The time has come to increase propaganda in the direction of Ireland. The Iraq war represents a type of Dunkirk for English prestige. It also affects other satellite states. This upsurge can already be felt by the anti-interventionists in the USA since the Balkan campaign. Thus a large-scale psychological attack would also be called for in the Irish sector. The Irish themselves feel that important decisions are in the air at the moment which could determine their fate too. Indeed, things have calmed down around the military bases but the bombings of Belfast have brought the war closer to home. They emphasise a new aspect of the Ulster problem and hit a sore spot of the first degree. Through Ulster, one part of the island is involved in the war either actively or passively. With England's destiny the Ulster question will be decided too...we should now take this into account in our propaganda.³

While Mahr indicated that the propaganda drive stemmed from current events in the war, his one time assistant at the Foreign Office, Hilde Spickernagel told the author its origins lay with Germany's decision, in late 1940, to halt preparations for the invasion of England, codenamed Operation Sealion. Dr Spickernagel adds:

Though the heavy bombing of English cities went on until 1941, that means that from October 1940 onwards, German interests were all in favour of, 1. keeping Ireland neutral, 2. not working up problems of what was then called partition, and 3. broadcasting news that might interest the Irish, while stressing points of view on international questions as seen by the Germans...The idea was to hand out German points of view to the population of a country which by then everybody hoped would manage to remain neutral.⁴

Mahr's report for Ribbentrop ranks alongside the German Army's invasion handbook for Ireland, *Military and Geographical Specifications on Ireland*,⁵ as one of the most remarkable documents on Ireland to have appeared during the war. Running to fifteen pages of detailed text, the report begins with

a synopsis of the political situation in the country, North and South. It then goes on to cover a wide variety of topics under a number of headings and sub-headings which include: 1. Listenership, 2. Radio reception, 3. The language question, 4. Additional Irish listeners (i.e. outside Ireland), 5. The lack of (German) programmes in English, 6. Cancellation of the reasons for caution [over using strong propaganda which might have impeded Irish neutrality], 7. Expansion of possibilities for propaganda directed to Ireland, 8. Secret (shortwave) stations, 9. The structure of propaganda programmes, 10. Topics for such programmes, 11. Irish neutrality, 12. Blockades and the war of nerves against Irish neutrality, and 13. The Northern Ireland question.⁶

A full English translation of the Mahr report has been prepared for this thesis and is included in Appendix C. Consequently, it is the author's intention here only to summarise the main points, to explain how it was accepted by Ribbentrop, and to outline Mahr's subsequent moves to establish his personal control over the radio's new nightly Irish propaganda service arising from his original report.

It is not known if Mahr consulted any colleagues, or Irish people living in Berlin or elsewhere, when formulating his report for Ribbentrop. However, the report, destined only for a select group of Ribbentrop's advisers and the Foreign Minister himself, leaves little to the imagination. Mahr begins by spelling out some basic facts and figures relating to the country in which he had lived for twelve years. He does so in terms which would suggest he was assuming that anyone reading it would have no prior knowledge of Ireland. He includes information on population and the historical reasons for partition, noting that in Ireland:

there is little understanding of and absolutely no sympathy for National Socialism, mainly for reasons related to the Church. However, our fight against England gains great respect for us in strongly nationalist sections of the population...In today's difficult situation, most circles agree with de Valera's policy of neutrality, even those more sympathetic to England.⁷

In attempting to explain Northern Ireland to his Foreign Office superiors, Mahr summed up: 'Two thirds of the population are more English-

minded than the English themselves. A third, i.e. approximately 350,000 people, are Catholics, mainly nationalists, and ill-disposed towards England'. As regards the number of radio sets in the 26 counties - a crucial statistic if his propaganda drive was to have any effect - Mahr estimated that it 'probably amounts to 250,000'.⁸ In relation to licenced radio sets, Mahr's estimate was well wide of the mark. The number of radio licences held in 1939, the year he left Dublin for Berlin, was 166,275. By 1940 (the most up to date figures he could have obtained) the number had risen to 180,563. However, from 1941 to 1945 the number of radio licences actually fell, and Mahr's 'guesstimate' of a quarter of a million was not, in fact, reached until 1948. Assuming Mahr had the latest statistics from Hempel in Dublin, he was still overestimating the number of radio sets in the country by almost 70,000. Mahr did make provision for the fact that only half his estimated 250,000 sets could receive continental broadcasts, so his estimate of the maximum possible audience would total 125,000 multiplied by the average number of listeners per set.⁹

In attempting to paint a picture of a target radio audience in the 26 counties, Mahr said that up to the outbreak of war in September 1939 'listenership was more or less restricted to urban and rural intelligentsia'. BBC programmes, he added, 'are obviously far superior to the broadcasts from Athlone' which 'farmers in the West, insofar as they were listening at all, only listened to'. The BBC's role in providing 'a desired connection to the outside world' for Irish listeners, coupled with a developing interest in 'English language broadcasts from Germany' 'particularly in nationalist circles' in the North, were for Mahr two good reasons for launching English language propaganda specially tailored for Ireland.¹⁰

On what he called 'the language question', Mahr explained that:

approximately five per cent of the population of Éire speaks Irish as their native tongue. They like to listen to the Gaelic language programmes from Germany (it flatters their linguistic identity), but as an important language in the political sense Gaelic is not relevant. The only Irish native speakers live in the West and are mostly small farmers. Gaelic broadcasts from the continent can hardly be received by them...however, not only native speakers listen to Gaelic broadcasts,

but also a politically much more important element, namely language enthusiasts amongst the educated sections of society throughout the whole country, who initially had to learn the Gaelic language. In Gaelic language policy, which they defend with all their might, they see a nationalist political factor of the first order, and the Gaelic broadcasts from Germany naturally have a very positive effect on them. These must therefore be maintained.¹¹

Mahr was apparently unaware of the fact that both Mühlhausen and Hartmann's weekly Irish talks had a regular following in the Gaeltacht regions, particularly in Donegal. He appears to have played down the number of Irish speakers so that his new English-language service could be launched at the expense of expanding the existing Irish-language service. For one reason or another, he did not include a key statistic from the most recent Census of Ireland, that of 1936, which reported that no less than 23.7 per cent of the population over three years of age (i.e. 666,601 people) could speak Irish.¹²

In asking Ribbentrop to maintain the Irish-language propaganda programmes at their current level of two talks per week, but adding that 'their extension would be pointless', Mahr may have been trying to settle a score with Mühlhausen who had launched the talks in 1939. According to Hilde Spickernagel, Mühlhausen 'was very keen on linguistic problems of the Irish and other Celtic languages, which, for example, did not interest Mahr at all. I do not think there was any love lost between the two of them'.¹³

Adolf Mahr was keen to court Irish listeners beyond Ireland's shores and wrote in his report of a potential audience of millions around the world in such places as London, Glasgow, Liverpool, Australia, the United States and Canada. In Britain, Mahr estimated that at least a third of the one and a half million Irish 'would have nationalist sympathies. In Canada and Australia the situation could hardly be less favourable than this. In the United States, the percentage of consciously pro-Irish people is rather higher'. Mahr put the Irish American population at 5 to 6 million plus 150,000 in Canada and a further 250,000 in Australia, adding: 'all this without consideration of half-breeds totally absorbed in Anglo-Saxon culture'. This target audience of 'approximately ten million people with an Irish ethnic identity' had, Mahr said, 'the possibility of indoctrination

against England, which is of no less quantity and importance than the listenership in the motherland'.¹⁴

Further on in his report, Mahr complained that 'Gaelic nationalists on the entire island [of Ireland] and the emigrants who are unable to speak Gaelic, are not addressed at all by their Irish identity because our programmes in the English language are not aimed in their direction. In those English language programmes, Irish questions have so far been avoided intentionally'. He added that, 'the possibility of anti-English radio propaganda by means of the old Irish culture has not been made use of at all'. Mahr told Ribbentrop, 'the time has come to increase propaganda in the direction of Ireland' and abandon the caution on 'strong propaganda' which, it was feared up to then, could 'have detrimentally influenced the English attitude towards Eire', and impeded 'de Valera's adherence to Irish neutrality'.¹⁵ Thus it may be seen, the Foreign Office in Berlin was keenly aware of Irish sensibilities and deliberately chose to ignore any problems which German broadcasts to Ireland might cause for de Valera's government.

In formulating his propaganda 'menu', Mahr noted that 'the Irish feel the question of reunification, and with that the final and total breaking free of the whole of Ireland from the British system, is entering a last, decisive phase'. Mahr had his own, very specific, ideas of the sort of propaganda that would help steer Irish minds away from the Allied cause. These included news and news commentaries, talks, and programmes 'to appeal to the independent national identity of the Irish around the world, to strengthen the neutral position of the country', and 'elimination of the Ulster injustice'. Other topics to be dealt with included what Mahr termed 'horror propaganda', for example, 'the infringements of law by the English, and their cruelties when conquering and oppressing the country (Cromwell's scandalous deeds, etc.)...persecution of Catholics. A nearly inexhaustible topic. Particularly suitable for Rome [radio station]...the epic Irish War of Independence'.¹⁶

Mahr was against jamming BBC news bulletins for Irish listeners on the basis that it might have the opposite effect, but he wanted German propaganda broadcasts to Irish-Americans in the United States to begin 'urgently', and at least 'three times a week'. Parallel to this white propaganda operation to the States, Mahr advised setting up a secret G-station (G = geheim or secret) designed to 'express the views of the

American Irish'. To reach the Irish-Australian audience, Mahr wanted another secret shortwave radio station located in Japan. He told the Foreign Office that suitable speakers for the American and Australian stations could be recruited among 'Irish inmates of prisoner of war camps'.¹⁷

In targeting Irish-Americans, Mahr wanted to use them to lobby opinion against U.S. entry into the war. He commented: 'a strong Ireland propaganda drive serves the cause of the anti-interventionists in the USA. The Irish-Americans are an important element from the point of view of U.S. domestic politics, and the interventionists have made great efforts to win them over in favour of the war, so far without much success'. Germany, Mahr said, had to 'give the Irish-Americans active support in their fight for [American] neutrality', and he wanted the propaganda programmes to refer to 'the significance of the Irish for America. Emigrated to the land of freedom because of England. Should they bleed under the American flag for England? (Germany no threat to America). That would mean denial of the American ideal, and even if there were Americans prepared to do this, the American-Irish are not'.¹⁸

Playing the religious propaganda card, Mahr made it clear that the programmes to Ireland were destined for Irish Catholics only. Programmes would mention 'intolerance by Ulster Protestants, past and present', while emphasising 'the courageous adherence to the Catholic religion by the Irish despite all the suppression', and 'Ireland's spiritual achievements in missionary work past and present'. But, Mahr displayed his own indifference to Catholicism when suggesting that Radio Rome should broadcast programmes of Irish interest in English (with strong German influence on the programme format): 'the name Rome (the Papal city) will always find a certain receptive spiritual atmosphere in Ireland. This can be beneficial for talks on Catholic-religious tendencies, which have little conviction from our point of view'.¹⁹

Irish neutrality, according to Mahr, 'can also be considered as the sharpest condemnation of the English-Jewish war. All the Irish in the whole world should follow this attitude of their motherland. The self-righteousness, hypocrisy and cruelty of English politics are shared by the malicious agitators [i.e. interventionists] in the USA'. He described Ireland as 'this poor country [which] has become victim to military actions

by the English power in Northern Ireland. If many of the inhabitants had their say, particularly the nationalists, the country would be part of neutral Eire. The separatists [i.e. Protestant loyalists] in Belfast must take the greatest blame for things getting out of hand. The nationalists now have to suffer with them the bombardments in this English-Jewish war, which continues despite repeated peace offers on behalf of Germany'.²⁰

Mahr advised that the radio should accuse England of 'withholding cargo space' on vessels, thus 'artificially tightening' the economic blockade of Ireland and creating food, fuel and other shortages as part of a 'war of nerves'. He also urged that 'declarations by Catholic bishops from the recent past' and 'statements by de Valera' be used on air to bolster claims to Irish unity. Under the heading 'Conclusion', Mahr wrote:

The overthrow of British Imperialism is unavoidable since it has afflicted Ireland with so many crimes. With it, it will bring Ireland's reunification so that it can sever all remaining connections to the British Empire. Then Ireland will see the fulfilment of its indefeasible right to total sovereignty. Only then will the reconstituted sovereign Irish nation be able to fully contribute, in friendship with all peoples and without link to other powers, to the rebuilding of the true international community of peoples which has been destroyed by England's plutocraic and un-Christian imperialism.²¹

When Mahr's propaganda report was eventually discussed at a top level Foreign Office conference in Berlin, presided over by Ribbentrop himself, on 22 May 1941, the Dublin museum director had his way. The main thrust of his proposals was accepted by the German Foreign Minister, which in effect meant work could begin immediately on implementing them. In fact, Mahr's report was only one of several considered for action at the Wilhelmstrasse conference, the official report of which was titled 'Meeting about propaganda for countries standing under the yoke of Great Britain'.²² Those attending the one and a half hour conference considered not only Ireland but also propaganda initiatives for India, the Arab world, South Africa, Canada and Australia. The conference minutes show that while Mahr was not in attendance, his immediate Foreign Office superiors - to whom he had sent his report - were. These included Gerhard Rühle who, as well as being a

member of the Reichstag, was head of the radio section (Rundfunkabteilung) at the Foreign Office.²³ Also present was Markus Timmler who was in charge of Section Ru Xb at the Foreign Office dealing with radio propaganda to the British colonies.²⁴

The high powered nature of the conference was evidenced not only by the presence of Ribbentrop, but also by his Under Secretary of State, Paul Woermann, who opened by indicating that some preparatory work on the propaganda plan had already been done in Berlin. Woermann's attendance at the conference was significant, not just because he was Director of the Political Division in the Foreign Office but also because of his inside knowledge of secret German attempts to influence events in neutral Ireland. These included the attempted landing in Ireland of IRA leader Seán Russell from a German U-boat in August 1940, in addition to the dispatching of agents to Ireland including Hermann Goertz who remained at large for eighteen months.²⁵ As early as 10 February 1940, Woermann had backed the idea of covert operations in Ireland, telling Ribbentrop that 'by reason of its militant attitude towards England, the IRA is a natural ally of Germany'.²⁶ Germany's diplomatic representative in Dublin, Eduard Hempel, had opposed the Russell landing plan, warning Woermann 'of the consequences of German interference in Ireland'.²⁷ Woermann and Ribbentrop both believed in covert intervention in Ireland, with the Foreign Minister even going so far as to select a coup d'état specialist, Edmund Veessenmayer, 'to foment rebellion in Ireland'.²⁸

In addition to Ribbentrop, the propaganda conference in Wilhelmstrasse was attended by ten officials including a Dr Stahlecker, described as a SS Brigade Leader. The conference minutes reveal that Ribbentrop supported the propaganda initiatives presented for all six areas under discussion. Ireland was the third region considered, after India and Arabia. The meeting decided that while no declaration would be made in Ireland regarding the propaganda plan, 'from now on, the Irish should be addressed particularly in English language broadcasts, whereas the Ulster question should not be touched upon. In consideration of the restricted spread of the language, Gaelic broadcasts are not to be increased. On the other hand, a special station (probably Rennes) should be solely employed for propaganda for Ireland (English-language)'.²⁹

Mahr had got what he wanted; a green light from Ribbentrop to launch

regular English-language broadcasts to Ireland. However, the minutes of the 22 May conference make no mention of Mahr's suggestions for a secret transmitter in Japan to beam programmes to Irish-Australians, nor another one to target Irish-American listeners.

Adolf Mahr was not alone in wishing to court Irish and Irish-American radio listeners. In the late Spring of 1940, the Dominions Office in London 'was seriously looking into' the question of improving relations with Eire' and asked the BBC for the size of its audience in the 26 counties. The Dominions Office had even asked the BBC to investigate the possibility of winning 'a greater audience' in Ireland by broadcasting 'items of special Irish or Catholic interest', and 'a Gaelic period'. But when these ideas were sent to the BBC's Northern Ireland Director, George Marshall, on 4 May 1940, he flatly rejected them. Marshall predicted that Irish language programmes from Belfast would 'bring a great deal of criticism from listeners in this region', and he pointed out that the BBC's 'Scottish items in Gaelic certainly fall on deaf ears as far as this area is concerned'.³⁰

Where the Dominions Office had failed, however, the Ministry of Information in London was destined to have more success. According to Cathcart, the BBC was put 'under strong pressure from the Ministry of Information to produce programmes designed to encourage listening in Eire'.³¹ In February 1941, just a month before Adolf Mahr began drafting his propaganda report for Ribbentrop, a meeting took place in London of top officials of the Ministry of Information and senior BBC executives. The Ministry began 'to press even more determinedly for programmes for Eire'.³² The result was that objections from both the Northern Ireland government and the BBC in Belfast were by-passed, and a new BBC radio programme called *Irish Half Hour* was launched.³³

The Irish government was also at this time considering ways of making its perspective known beyond its national boundaries. As early as 1937, de Valera's government had been anxious to establish 'an independent means of communicating Ireland's stance on political issues and of making direct contact with friendly powers in the event of an emergency'. To this end, the installation of a low-powered, shortwave transmitter at Athlone was completed in February 1939, and Radio Eireann made its first shortwave transmission (relaying the day's normal output) on St Patrick's Day, 17

March 1939.³⁴ The 1.5-kW shortwave transmitter in Athlone was partly intended to remedy the 'defect' whereby all radio-telephone communications with the outside world had to go through London. However, the transmitter proved ineffectual and Gorham noted that 'a last attempt was made during the three months from December 1940 to March 1941, when the shortwave transmitter went on the air for an additional half hour between 4 a.m. and 4.30 a.m. - a good listening hour in America, allowing for the time difference between the two countries, though a bad time so far as reception conditions were concerned. When it too failed, shortwave transmissions from Athlone were reduced to daily relays of the 6.40 p.m. and 10.10 p.m. Radio Eireann news - hardly the brightest jewel in Radio Eireann's crown'.³⁵

The Irish shortwave experiment was dogged by reception difficulties in America, coupled with the fact that beaming programmes to the United States during normal Irish broadcasting hours missed the peak listening period in North America. By January 1940 only 200 reception reports had been received from North America by Radio Eireann. Even during 1941, when Radio Eireann continued relaying two news bulletins a day via shortwave to America, the reception reports from the Irish legations noted 'a fading and erratic signal'.³⁶

There was, of course, a huge contrast between Athlone's small 1.5-kW transmitter, through which de Valera hoped to reach American audiences, and Germany's comparatively giant resources which included seven 50-kW transmitters at Zeesen, one of which was later occasionally put at Mahr's disposal to reach the same audiences.³⁷ Despite Mahr's sense of urgency about starting English-language broadcasts to Ireland and to Irish-Americans, Ribbentrop had made it clear at his Berlin conference on 22 May 1941 that 'the action plan will have to be put back by some time, two to four weeks'. The reason for the delay appeared to be a lack of technical preparedness, as the conference report noted that Ribbentrop 'gave instructions that the preparations have to be speeded up and efficiency improved so that not only will there be no technical difficulties but also Germany will be fully prepared to deal with any counter measures'³⁸ - presumably radio jamming and counter-propaganda from the Allies.

Even with the backing of the Foreign Office, Mahr's propaganda initiative took another three months to take shape. The first transmissions for the new daily Irish service did not begin until the end of August 1941.

In the interim, 28-year-old Wolfgang Dignowity was appointed as first head of the service. The circumstances surrounding Dignowity's appointment, by the rival Propaganda Ministry, came to light in a memorandum written by Adolf Mahr for his Foreign Office superiors on 9 September 1941.³⁹ In the memo, Mahr reveals that another meeting, concerning the setting up of an expanded Irish radio service, was held under the aegis of the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin on 27 May 1941, just five days after Ribbentrop's conference. That meeting was attended by representatives of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry, German Radio's shortwave service (DKW), and Kult R - the Foreign Office's cultural/political division dealing with broadcasting matters.⁴⁰

As soon as he found out that the 27 May meeting had taken place, Mahr arranged a meeting with Walter Kamm, who was in charge of German Radio's European programmes section. Mahr already knew Kamm from his daily visits to the secret Concordia propaganda unit. On 5 June, Mahr sought an assurance from Kamm that the Foreign Office's broadcasting section would be involved in establishing the new Irish radio service. But Kamm told Mahr that the Propaganda Ministry was appointing Dr Dignowity as head of the Irland-Redaktion. Mahr then arranged to meet Dignowity 'as quickly as possible' but Dignowity appears to have kept him at bay, since the earliest appointment date arrived at was 16 July. On 15 July, Dignowity cancelled the meeting, telling Mahr he was ill. On 17 July, Dignowity travelled to Paris to put together his 'Irish' team comprising a Russian, two Frenchmen and an Englishman. The new 'Irish' team got together for the first time in Berlin on 22 August 1941 at a meeting also attended by Dr Kurt Georg Kiesinger.⁴¹ According to Mahr, the nightly Irish programmes began on either 26 or 28 August 1941 (his records were incomplete). Mahr finally met Dignowity on 5 September when he had a 'working session' with him. Another working session followed on 8 September. This was also attended by James Blair, the English journalist whom Dignowity had recruited in Paris, and Mahr's assistant, Hilde Poepping.⁴²

Mahr was unimpressed with the team Wolfgang Dignowity put together to broadcast to Ireland. The day after their second meeting Mahr drafted his memo which spared little in criticising what he saw as the shortcomings and unsuitability of the entire staff. With a detectable tinge of sarcasm, Mahr told his Foreign Office bosses that 'this international team contains only

one person who knows Ireland a bit from his own experience, namely Dr Dignowity himself'.⁴³ As far as Mahr was concerned his memo eventually had the desired result. Dignowity lasted only five months as head of the Irland-Redaktion, being removed in early November 1941. The two Frenchmen, Piche and Keroer, were removed also. There can have been little surprise in the choice of Dignowity's successor to run the Irish service. Hans Hartmann was well qualified for the job having spent two and a half years in Ireland before the war, in addition to which he had been broadcasting regularly in Irish to Ireland for over a year, though when Dignowity had set up his team Hartmann was not included in it.⁴⁴ Most importantly from Mahr's point of view, Hartmann was known to Mahr having worked with him for a time at the National Museum in Dublin and having been a regular visitor to Mahr's Dublin home in the late 1930s.

By Christmas 1941 Mahr had installed as head of the Irland-Redaktion a man who could not only be expected to do his bidding but who would also ensure that for the remainder of the war Ribbentrop, and not Goebbels, would dictate Germany's propaganda policy for Ireland. Given the stormy background to the fight for control of the various propaganda services, Goebbels' attempt to take over the new Irish propaganda initiative while keeping the Foreign Office at arm's length, was predictable. Less predictable was Mahr's success, with the help of Kiesinger, in seizing the Irland-Redaktion for Ribbentrop and holding onto it until the end of the war.

Chapter 9

'To see England broken one day':

The broadcasts of 1942-43

1 9 4 2

Consolidating his position as head of the Irland-Redaktion during 1942, Hans Hartmann added a number of new members to his team of announcers. In particular, Hartmann scored a major propaganda coup in persuading the writer Francis Stuart to contribute a weekly radio talk. Frank Ryan advised Stuart on the content of some of the talks. Also recruited to the team was Susan Sweney who had refused to undertake a spying mission to Ireland for the Germans in 1941. In September, Hartmann lost the services of his announcer John O'Reilly, who volunteered for a spying mission to Ireland. His place at the Radio Centre was taken by Liam Mullally. On the war front in November, the Axis retreat at El Alamein, and the Russian counter-offensive and encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, presented the propagandists with a major dilemma, - how to present such defeats as victories?

Susan Sweney began broadcasting for the Irland-Redaktion on 2 January 1942. Her first talk in the series 'Germany speaks to Ireland' warned Irish listeners against the dangers of allowing their country to be turned into a battlefield following America's entry into the war. She said Roosevelt's words about using bases in the 'British Isles' carried a peculiar significance for the 26 counties. She recounted her experiences of destroyed towns and cities in war-torn France, and appealed to all Irishmen to be on their guard, adding that,

Many millions of Irishmen in America will be with Irishmen at home in resisting Roosevelt's aggression, should it come openly or through Britain as the back door to Ireland.¹

Sweney was back on the air four days later with a similar broadcast strongly linked to neutrality, and warning that:

Irish bases given to the USA would be bases given to England and would be, quite justifiably, targets for German bombers. The Irish are turning

once more to those in America for help, but, this time, not for aid to fight for freedom but aid not to fight, to preserve such freedom as they have attained.²

The following day, 7 January 1942, just a month after Pearl Harbour, Hans Hartmann assured his listeners of Japan's naval supremacy in the Pacific:

Mr Roosevelt drove Japan to war by every sort of threat and by economic means. He believed as the result of his knowledge of naval warfare that it would only take the U.S. navy a short time to defeat Japan.

According to Hartmann, Japan was succeeding militarily, while the British Empire was:

falling to pieces and I am certain that many of the dead generations of Irishmen would envy the lot of those living at present because they may be fortunate enough to see England broken one day. God bless and save Ireland.³

Ten days before American soldiers were posted to Northern Ireland, the BBC's Indian service was hinting at a German invasion of Ireland, commenting: 'It is very unlikely that the Germans could succeed in a sea-borne invasion of Britain, and if attempting an airborne invasion they are more likely to aim at Ireland, which, even if it succeeded, would be embarrassing for Britain, but not fatal.'⁴

The arrival of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland on 26 January 1942 provided a prime propaganda topic for German Radio whose 'black' station Workers' Challenge broadcast the following:

Well, workers, there's great news for us today. The Yankees have come. Now we're on the hog's back. All we have to do is to cheer like hell. But it seems that not many yankees have come after all, and, just by a sort of funny misunderstanding, they haven't gone on to Europe. They aren't in France yet. In fact, they're in Northern Ireland. Just a few of them...to show that the good old Stars and Stripes are doing

something. Stick them in Ulster. Against who? Good Lord, surely they don't think that Ulster needs defending against the Southern Irishmen today! It's all very queer. They seem to have gone to a place where there isn't any war going on. Now that's a remarkable thing, because in most wars the great and wise generals like to send their troops where they can meet the enemy. But, perhaps cunning politicians like Mr Franklin D. Roosevelt don't. Anyhow, don't be taken in with any propaganda about the Yanks who are in Northern Ireland. Roosevelt didn't mean them to be soldiers. He meant them to be tallymen, to make sure we pay as much as we can to the American capitalists.⁵

BBC wartime monitor Lorna Swire, who recorded some of the Workers' Challenge broadcasts, recalls them as 'a ghastly attempt to ingratiate themselves with the "working classes"...with all the dreadful swearing which they thought the workers would like. They didn't, and in any case the station was badly received'.⁶

Five days after the arrival of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland, Susan Sweney delivered a detailed reaction from the Irland-Redaktion. She told Irish listeners that 'the question of the American expeditionary force having been landed on Irish soil' was forcing people 'to say and do certain things which are absolutely the antithesis of what they might really think and feel', and she continued:

The English choose to refer to the place of disembarkation of the American troops as the United Kingdom. At the same time the Americans choose to refer to that part of the world as Little America. Between the two of them they ought to make up their minds, but the point is that American troops are now on Irish soil. It has been reported that millions of Irish in America have sent messages to President Roosevelt affirming their loyalty to the United States...What is far more to the point however is that the Irish in America should not be false to their mother country...Ireland has managed to remain strictly neutral up to now in this war, and it certainly would be tragic if through selfish and brutal interference from Roosevelt or anyone else, that neutrality, which has been guarded so jealously, should be lost. Unlike America, Ireland clearly has steered a neutral course. The people most closely

concerned are the Irish who live in other parts of the world. They are the ambassadors of their country and if Ireland desires to remain neutral, in every sense of the word, then it is up to these very people to do everything in their power to support her...The Irish people do not for one moment think that Roosevelt has any altruistic motives in landing troops in Ireland. He wants to make sure that he can follow up his actions of smash and grab against the British, and having taken due note of his gangster methods up to now, it is hardly to be considered improbable that he would stoop to anything in order to achieve his ends. Smash and grab is his motto, but Ireland does not want to see herself first smashed and then grabbed by any nation, let alone by one which has no interest at heart except to cash in where there might be big business...The Irish in America cannot but remember that those left behind expect from them loyalty and understanding in these days when the things for which the patriots fought may so easily be lost through the selfish greed of one warmongering individual and his evil crowd of reckless followers on either side of the ocean. Never before has it been more necessary to keep calm and watchful.⁷

With so much emphasis placed by the Irland-Redaktion on Ireland's struggle for independence, it was natural for the service to focus at Eastertime on the 1916 Rising. Hans Hartmann celebrated the anniversary on 5 March 1942 with a special talk in Irish on 'The spirit of Easter Sunday, 1916', telling his listeners:

There is an old custom in Ireland to climb to the top of the hills on Easter Sunday to watch the rising of the sun, and the day is still sometimes called the 'Sunday of the sun'. For many centuries, they no doubt associated the rising of the Easter sun with the coming freedom of Ireland and the banishing of the foreigner from their land. They certainly kept the spirit of freedom alive, although it nearly died under English oppression, and in 1916, on the morning of Easter Sunday or the 'Sunday of the sun', they made an attempt to break the bitter darkness of English tyranny and to reach the light of the sun. Instead of going to seek the rising of the sun on the top of the hills, as was the custom of their forefathers, the Irish rose early on Easter Sunday

morning and gathered in the streets to make another attempt to smash the bond between England and themselves. They were ready to give their lives for the cause of Irish freedom, and from that uprising came the freedom and independence of the Irish nation.⁸

After translating the 13-minute programme, the BBC monitor, Jane Charleton (who had just taken over from Angus Matheson, then transferred to code-breaking work) noted: 'This was a special broadcast to the people of Ireland for Easter Sunday and consisted of a short talk by Dr Hartmann (in Gaelic), followed by the reading of three poems in English and of the proclamation made on Easter Sunday 1916 by the Irish Republican Army, interspersed with selections from Bach.'⁹

By contrast, the following day's broadcast to Ireland contained an anti-Jewish talk based on William Bulfin's tale of a Jewish pedlar in Ireland in *Rambles in Eirinn*. The commentator, who remained anonymous, noted Bulfin's 'reference to the connection between British aristocracy and the Jews. This reference is all the more remarkable as it was made in the year 1907 when the link up between British Imperialists and Jewry was by no means so apparent as it is today'. Part of Bulfin's story was quoted as follows:

I was given to understand that these Jewish pedlars are to be met with in many parts of Ireland. I was sorry to hear about it. I was told that some of them, out of the profits of their trade, have already established themselves in Dublin and other cities as wholesale merchants and moneylenders, and, added the Ballymahon man who gave me the information, they have two patron saints, Moses and the Duke of Norfolk. 'The Duke of Norfolk?', I asked in some surprise, 'what has he got to do with the Hebrew race?' 'Oh you see', he explained, 'the Duke is a soft hearted man and his pity always goes out to the landlords and the Jews and the police and the Lord Lieutenants of Ireland, and all the other poor downtrodden [wretches]'.¹⁰

From 1942 to 1945, Hartmann made an effort to put out special programmes to Ireland on St Patrick's Day. The talks were linked by Irish records, some of which Hartmann had brought with him from Ireland and some he had found in the Rundfunkhaus music library.¹¹ One wartime listener recalls

hearing: 'A German male voice choir singing Irish songs phonetically. They had obviously been drilled thoroughly although they didn't understand a word of what they were singing. It was amazing to listen to, and showed the dedication of the programme makers. The theme music chosen to introduce the Irish section's normal programming was a Fritz Brase arrangement of the traditional jig "The Frost Is All Over"'.¹² Apart from serving to identify the station to listeners, the repeated use of the same songs - many by John McCormack - was due to a shortage of Irish records in the Rundfunkhaus as one Irish service contributor, Nora O'Mara (Róisín Ní Mheara) recalls:

I reluctantly inveigled a shy Irish housewife who was married to a German to participate in Riders to the Sea. She agreed for Ireland's sake but her effort failed when she broke down in tears upon hearing the beautiful melody Sliabh na mBan played as background to Yeats's play, The Pot of Broth. There were six or seven old 78s of Irish music to choose from.¹³

For his first St Patrick's Day programme as head of the Irland-Redaktion, Hartmann persuaded his Berlin University colleague, Francis Stuart, to contribute a special talk. Although Stuart had written some talks for Joyce at the English service in 1940, this was the first time he had broadcast anything himself. Stuart told the author he had only agreed to do the talk on the basis that he would have a free hand in writing it and would not be under any influence as to its contents.¹⁴ Despite this, his talk reflected the Irland Redaktion's twin themes of early 1942: support for Irish neutrality and opposition to the arrival of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland. The BBC recorded Stuart's talk as follows under the heading 'Ireland's place in the new Europe':

I am not trying to make propaganda. You have had plenty of it and I only hope that you have now a good idea of what is true and what is false. Had I wanted to make propaganda I could have done so during my two years in Germany. I only want to put forward my idea of Ireland's place in the world and her future, which I am perhaps able to view with greater clarity from a distance. What a blessing it is that we are celebrating this day at peace, not having escaped war by dishonourable and cowardly

means, but by refusing - as far as lay within our power - to waver from a strict and fearless neutrality. As an Ulsterman it is galling to me that a large number of foreign troops are today occupying that corner of our country. But though we have escaped the war, and I hope may be able to do so until the end without sacrificing anything of our national integrity, we cannot nor do we desire to escape taking our share in building the new Europe. There are two points to consider. Whether we like it or not, and personally I do not dislike it, there will be no such thing as complete isolation, political, economic or cultural. Nations will have to live as members of a group or family, with as much individual freedom as members of a family have but with certain duties and responsibilities towards the family. We do not fall clearly to any group, but I believe it is of the utmost importance that we follow our early tradition and turn towards Europe. I believe we can rebuild our country only by belonging to the great European tree, and neither to the British Commonwealth nor to the American sphere. We have been far too much cut off, have had too little contact with countries that have something to give us, and on the other hand, have been surrounded by communities whose life is based on money and the power of money. Whether we turn to England or the United States we see the god of money, and in the case of America we were sometimes forced to appeal to this god, but all the same it was and always will be an alien god to us - just as it is a completely alien god to Europe, and when one European country, France, ceased to begin to believe in that modern heresy, then the light went out of her and she collapsed. Ireland belongs to Europe and England does not belong to it. Our future must lie with the future of Europe and no other.¹⁵

The same day, 17 March 1942, members of the Irland-Redaktion including John O'Reilly, joined Adolf Mahr and other former members of the German colony in Dublin, as guests of William Warnock at the Irish legation in Drakestrasse.¹⁶ Two days later an anonymous talk entitled 'American Catholics and the war', summed up Mahr and Hartmann's chosen angle on Irish neutrality:

American Catholics realise the dangers and possible complications which may arise for the American people when Uncle Sam sends his soldiers overseas. They know very well that the president is playing a very dangerous game with dynamite. They know furthermore that every soldier on Irish soil for instance, may be the yet slumbering spark to the fuse which may blow Ireland's so long safeguarded neutrality and independence to bits. Remembering the fact that the cradle of an overwhelming majority of America's Catholics stood in Donegal, Cork and Mayo, we understand their anxieties to keep America out of the war, and their opposition to President Roosevelt's hypocritical imperialistic war aims.¹⁷

Francis Stuart gave his second talk, 'Ireland and the new Europe', on 29 March and his third, 'Easter 1916: Ireland's safety in 1942', on 5 April in the course of which he said:

As this evening I walked about the Berlin streets as a neutral, I remember the country [Ireland] has nothing to do with the war being forced by Britain. I know that had those few men not barricaded themselves into a few buildings in Dublin that day 26 years ago our position now would be a very different one. The spirit of Easter Week is the one thing which will bring us safely through this crisis. Please God, we shall be able to remain neutral to the end, but if we were to fight, it would certainly not be for any so-called ideal. We, knowing what lies behind them, have had enough of those to make us sick. God preserve us from all such cant; for us Irish there is only one reality, our own life on our own soil free from the tyranny of money. I hope and believe that the end of this war will give us back our national unity, and that the struggle which began in its latter phase on that Easter morning in Dublin will then be, at last, at an end.¹⁸

Stuart delivered his fourth talk, 'Ireland's obligation to Europe', on 25 May. By the end of March 1942 the Irland-Redaktion had moved house from two rooms at the rear of the Rundfunkhaus in Berlin to two smaller rooms nearby at 77, Kaiserdamm. The Kaiserdamm premises had no studios, so broadcasters from the Irish team had to cross the narrow

Brettschneiderstrasse to broadcast their material from the Rundfunkhaus.¹⁹

The Irish service occasionally departed from its regular programme formula to allow personal messages like the one Mona Brase relayed to her mother in Dublin on 4 May 1942. BBC monitors noted Brase 'played three of her father's compositions for piano forte' to mark the anniversary of his birth.²⁰

As the year went on, Allied bombers stepped up their raids on German cities. On 30 May the RAF mounted a 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne,²¹ but even before that Hartmann was admitting to Irish listeners: 'it is true that they [the British] can destroy a certain number of German towns'. On 10 May, Hartmann commented:

The British are trying to terrorise the German people by bombing their towns in preference to carrying out any major war operations against the German Army. But the German people are not to be frightened so easily. They understand that they have behind them a fine army which has fought effectively on various battlefronts from Narvik to Crete in Europe, and under Rommel in North Africa. For a whole Winter too, the German generals have held their lines against incessant Russian attacks on the Eastern front. The performance of the German army on every front has been something to be proud of, and their leaders have won fame throughout the world.²²

Hartmann then read out a list of British and American military retreats, and concluded that British air attacks on non-military and residential areas, which had cost over 500 lost planes, were 'of no military value at all.'²³ On 16 May 1942, the Irish service introduced 'a new Saturday feature entitled "The British character"'. An extract ran:

And now for a valued opinion on the subject of British administration, this time from a member of the British ruling class, Sir Walter Strickland. Sir Walter Strickland ought to be particularly well informed on this subject because his brother, Major General Strickland, was responsible for a number of atrocities in Ireland, among which was the burning of seven Irish homes in Cork city on New Year's Day 1921.²⁴

Hartmann continued his talks in Irish throughout the month, telling listeners on 17 May that the Six Counties was:

an armed camp, filled with American and British soldiers, tanks and aeroplanes out of the province of O'Neill. It is time that the Protestants of the province and, indeed, the whole people of Ireland, realised that no prosperity or peace is in store for them except through union with their Catholic brethren.²⁵

Two days later, German home stations reported that U.S. troops stationed in Northern Ireland 'have been further reinforced. The part of the island stolen from the Irish, which was terrorised by the Britons until a year ago, is now under U.S. control. Among the Americans in Northern Ireland there are many Jews dressed up as officers'.²⁶ On 20 May Hartmann said:

Irish partisans must have watched with bitterness and rancour as America sent millions of soldiers to the Six Counties...some partisans do not agree with their government, and would be glad to be rid of foreign troops, for I am sure that in recent years their esteem for their Catholic countrymen in the South has increased...but, alas there is still in the Six Counties a party as hard as nails, who are afraid of losing some of their hoarded wealth if they yield to general Irish opinion. They would rather send the whole country to hell than surrender a single privilege.²⁷

The latter two talks by Hartmann were beamed at North America as well as Ireland. After taking charge of the Irland-Redaktion, Hartmann had begun quoting extracts from Wolfe Tone's diary in Irish. His first recorded use of the diary was on 28 January 1942.²⁸ On 24 May, he prefaced a diary quotation by disclosing the source of the material as follows:

I have had to give my talk in Irish this time. I apologise to listeners who may not know Irish. On the other hand I hope that those people who have known Gaelic from the cradle or who learned it at school will be glad to hear this language broadcast sometimes from Germany instead of our English news. Personally I should be very glad if I could in this

way persuade those people who do not know Irish to begin learning it. A few weeks ago in the Gresham Hotel in Dublin, there assembled some of the men who had fought during the Rising of 1916 and in the fight for freedom up to 1921. It was an occasion for renewing old friendships and reviving the memories of old struggles in the cause of freedom. One speaker said that he hoped there would be unity soon between North and South. Great changes have come about in the state of affairs in Ireland since the days of Wolfe Tone, especially in the position of the Catholics, but we must admit that it is a sad thing to speak of the United Irishmen. They failed to win freedom for their country. Listen now to Wolfe Tone's account of events in Ireland; it has been translated into Irish by Padraig O Siochfhradha...²⁹

When Hartmann asked John O'Reilly to broadcast 'lengthy extracts from the life of Wolfe Tone', the Clare man handed them back to Hartmann saying they would be of no interest to Irish listeners. But O'Reilly 'got rapped over the knuckles for doing this and was told to carry on'.³⁰ While Hartmann and O'Reilly were relating segments of Wolfe Tone's diary to Irish listeners, fierce battles were continuing on the Eastern front. On 12 May the Russians began the Kharkov offensive, with the Germans counter attacking five days later. By 28 May, the battle of Kharkov had ended in a Soviet defeat. On 31 May, Hartmann took Irish newspapers to task for repeating 'lies originating in English papers' regarding the military campaign in Russia. He described Russian losses in the battle of Kharkov amounting to '250,000 Soviet soldiers taken prisoner, and the capture of 1,200 armoured cars, 2,000 large guns, aeroplanes and other war materials'. He continued:

This was the fiercest battle fought in this war so far on the Eastern front, and the Russian soldiers were better equipped with arms and war materials than the Germans at Kiev last year [the Germans took the city of Kiev on 17 August 1941]. The Soviets, and more particularly the British and Americans, were so scared as a result of this defeat that they had not the courage to admit the catastrophe. It would be difficult to surpass the nonsense that is at present being broadcast by the London and New York radios, and I wonder if there is any person in either

country still ready to believe those lies. The British and their allies must be so ignorant concerning military affairs that they cannot distinguish between victory and defeat. There is a prevalent opinion that the German Radio and Press are strictly censored. All I can say is, that if nonsense of a similar sort were being published by the German radio and press, the people would break their radios and have no other use for the newspapers than to bring them to a certain place. It is a great pity that so many of these lies originating in English papers should also appear in the Irish papers. But apparently that cannot be helped. Therefore listen to our English and Gaelic news. Believe me when I say that the Soviets have suffered a great defeat in this latest battle.³¹

In mid-June 1942, the Irland-Redaktion granted air-time for another personal message introduced as follows: 'Mr Charles Budina of Kilmacurra Park Hotel, County Wicklow, will send a greeting to his wife and children in Eire'. Budina's talk was recorded by the BBC:

Charles Budina speaking. Hello everyone. I am on leave for a few days in Berlin and, as a resident of Eire, I would like to say a few words to my family and friends across the water. First I want to thank most sincerely my friends in Eire who passed the New Year's Greeting I broadcast on to my wife who is still in Eire. I have since received the good news that my wife received my message. And now may I ask any of my friends who may hear me the same favour this time, if they would be so kind as to pass this message on to my wife in case she does not happen to be listening in. I am keeping well and fit, but except for this opportunity to talk to you, my dear Clara, and to you my darling Helga, Esther, June and Dermott, my furlough means little without you. The time will come when I shall be with you again. I hear that the British are talking about invading the Continent, and their preparations that we know they are making indicate that Churchill is all set for the new Dunkirk. Well, if the British are going to start another fight on the Continent, I can tell you they will get a very hot reception, and our boys are very keen on trying to improve on what they did to the B.E.F. [British Expeditionary Force] at Dunkirk as this may repay the bombs on

Paris and food for India, bombs on Berlin and the British forces in Ireland. We have well cultivated fields growing food for the home front, and in the fields there are happy young boys and girls helping. What a striking difference in everything now to what I remember in 1918. What a different spirit when everyone knows what the job is that has to be done, and they go right to it. There is no wavering, no doubt about what to do. The British have told us what they intend to do to Germany and the rest of Europe if they win. We take men like Vansittart, Captain Balfour and others seriously. There is no necessity for them to tell us what they intend to do. We know them well, and we know their mentality. This was the real source of the Versailles Treaty. We will win this war outright. There is not a manjack in Germany who thinks two ways about it. Whatever sacrifices we may have to make, we have got to see this thing through. We are pretty confident in the future and what it will bring. The British can bomb our civilians, but they can't prevent us from building up the new European order. In fact we are now in a position to do exactly what we like, and the British can do nothing. Moreover, bombing German civilians won't help to save British and American ships from being sunk. Last month our U-boats sent almost 1,000,000 tons to the bottom. The time is coming when the after effects of this are going to be felt.³²

At about the same time, O'Reilly became involved in an extraordinary incident in studio in which a dramatic announcement of a planned coup d'état in Dublin by British sympathisers was first scheduled for delivery on air, and then dropped on Hartmann's orders at the last moment. O'Reilly described the incident in his memoirs:

One evening when I was preparing the last transmission [of the day] for Ireland, Dr Hartmann handed me a script to be broadcast. On reading this I was astounded to see the names of prominent Irish and Anglo-Irish personalities who, it was stated in the script, were engaged in a plot to overthrow the Irish government and form a provisional pro-English government until British occupation forces arrived. This report, or script, came from the German Foreign Office. It was divided into two sections. The first part was to be broadcast that night and the

remaining portion on the following night. The first part was, in fact, broadcast to Ireland by me. It consisted of a warning to the Irish people to be ready for an important disclosure on the following night. As I sat before the microphone on the following night with this document before me, and ready to broadcast, I heard a tap at the window of my cubicle. It was Dr Hartmann. He opened the door of the cubicle and, without comment, picked up the document from the table before me. He then substituted for it an innocuous commentary whose contents I cannot now recall. After the transmission I went to Dr Hartmann's office to find out the reason for the withdrawal of the sensational announcement at the last moment. He told me that a few minutes before I was due to broadcast the second half of the document, he had received an urgent telephone call from the Foreign Office to stop the broadcast 'at all costs'. I never learned the reason for this surprising action, nor what happened to make the Foreign Office authorities change their decision so suddenly. I was astonished. But I felt that if there were any truth in the allegation contained in the document, the Irish people and the Irish government should be fully warned.³³

At 8 p.m. on the night of 19 July 1942, Irish Army monitors picked up a broadcast by Susan Sweney, part of which ran:

In America there were and are millions of Jews. In the U.S. the Jewish population, which was only 937,800 in 1897, was estimated in 1927 to be 4,228,029 and this figure must have been doubled during the past 15 years. Suppose then that there are eight million Jews in the U.S., and that is only a minimum estimate, it means that the population of the 26 counties is only one third of the Jews in the U.S. In New York alone there were 1,873,390 Jews in 1927, now a safe estimate would be three million, almost the entire population of Ireland.³⁴

Although there had been occasional anti-Jewish references on programmes to Ireland before this one, Sweney's talk was the most blatant to date. The technique of giving listeners Jewish population statistics, with the inference that the exploding numbers were out of control, tied in perfectly with Hitler's so-called 'final solution' to exterminate the Jews, whom he

looked on as Untermensch (sub-humans). When questioned by the author about anti-Jewish comments in Irland-Redaktion programmes, Hartmann said that while he was under pressure to broadcast such material, which was supplied from a central reporting pool, he strenuously resisted it.³⁵ In addition, as head of the Irish service, Hartmann was obliged to attend the daily conference of radio managers at which the Sprachregelung (broadcasting directives) were handed down.³⁶ Susan Sweney herself told British military investigators in 1945: 'All my talks were sheer propaganda directed against the war and the Irish coming into the war, saying that it would do Ireland no good. Hartmann wanted me to attack England, and I was furnished with items of German news and typed material from the Foreign Office and Propaganda Ministry setting out the tendency of the days's propaganda I was to follow.'³⁷

On 24 July 1942, Francis Stuart broadcast another commentary to Ireland. He may have welcomed the intellectual stimulation of preparing these talks as a diversion from the pressures of teaching, as he wrote in his diary: 'My work at the university is often a nervous strain. The debate class means trying to get a few silent girl students to open their mouths about some God-forsaken subject and keeping this up for three-quarters of an hour.'³⁸ Stuart's broadcast was monitored in Dublin and included the following:

We should calculate on nothing but our own power of endurance as a nation. If we remain true to Ireland's great tradition during the present conflict we shall not lose any real friends by it. Do not be afraid of that. The only friends we will lose are friends not worth keeping of which there are some in America and as many more in England. But in the long run we shall only gain by our refusal to be interested by the whole conflict which is raging in the Anglo-Saxon countries. A little more patience and endurance, especially for those of you in the North, and our place in the world will be securer than ever before.³⁹

Stuart's broadcast of 24 July heralded the series of weekly talks entitled 'Through Irish Eyes'. His diary entry for 1 August 1942 noted:

Wrote the first of weekly talks to broadcast to Ireland. Had lunch with Frank Ryan and discussed these with him. He agreed that they must not be propaganda in the sense that the flood of war journalism from all sides has become, and that of course they must support our neutrality. He suggested, and I fully agreed, that there must be no anti-Russian bias.⁴⁰

On 5 August 1942, Stuart told his listeners:

This talk is a kind of introduction to a series that I hope to broadcast to you at weekly intervals. It is certainly not that I have any desire to join the ranks of the propagandists, but I believe that neither you nor I have the right to cut ourselves off from the storm that is raging around us, no matter how much we may feel inclined to do so. Being neutral does not mean to remain unaffected by, or insensitive to, events that are going to determine the sort of civilisation that is about to develop in Europe. In this series of talks I hope to comment on some of these events and tell you some of my ideas as they effect Ireland...I am heartily sick and disgusted with the old order under which we've been existing and which had come to be from the great financial powers in whose shadows we lived. If there had to be a war, then I wanted to be among these people who had also had enough of the old system and who, moreover, claimed that they had a new and better one...I had begun to see that no internal policy for Ireland could ever be completely successful unless joined to an external one that would not shed our ancient links with Europe and European culture...I not only want to bring something of Germany and German ideas to you but I also try, in Berlin University and elsewhere, to make people here, and especially young Germans, conscious of Ireland and interested in her problems and outlook.

Indulging in a bout of homesickness - understandable, perhaps, since it was over two and a half years since he had seen Ireland - Stuart told his audience:

At times I get such a longing for home, for that peculiar atmosphere that is symbolised in different ways for each of us. I see again the Antrim boglands where I spent my boyhood, a small farmhouse and a row of trees around one side of it for shelter, and a bicycle leaning up against a whitewashed wall. I feel now that the very mud on the tyres of that bike is sacred and at such times even to speak to you at home - some of you perhaps listening to me from that very bogland - is something...It is true that only a comparative few of us at home had a clear vision of Ireland as a nation. Most of us have simply not that gift; most of us are too busy farming or shopkeeping or being politicians to have much conscious idea of our national destiny. All that matters is that there are always a few with enough vision and energy to plan for the whole nation. But it is not to this section of that that I want to address these talks. It is to as many of you as will listen to me, whether you have much interest or not in the problems of Europe, there is only one thing that I take for granted in you, and that is that you think strongly about Ireland even if it is only a few small fields or a line of hills. I want to speak to all of you who have that feeling for some corner of our country. As to those comparative few who not only love Ireland but who are ready to sacrifice all for the freedom of Irish soil, I do not flatter myself that I can teach you anything. I will only say this, that you may now feel isolated and alone, but have patience. The past has belonged to the politicians and the financiers, the future is going to be yours.⁴¹

While a study of Stuart's talks in the 1942-44 period reveals that he stuck to his pledge not to include anti-Russian bias in his commentaries, Hartmann and Mahr ensured there would be no pro-Russian bias either. According to Stuart, his own refusal to incorporate anti-Russian material in his talks was the key issue on which he later split with Hartmann and left the radio service in January 1944.⁴²

At the same time as Stuart was beginning his weekly talks, the Nazi Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) was reporting that in Ireland 'the BBC propaganda has no influence. German broadcasts are preferred'. Some observers have described such SD reports as 'misinformation' since they included inaccurate predictions of an American occupation of the 26

Counties in spring 1943, as well as predicting cooperation, albeit unofficial, between the IRA and de Valera's government.⁴³

In Dublin meanwhile, Eduard Hempel, the German Minister, was monitoring the broadcasts from Berlin and advising the Foreign Office on reception strength and the suitability of programme content. As early as Christmas 1939 Hempel had advised the English service of German Radio to play up the fact that people in Ireland were sending 'cigarettes and Christmas gifts to German POWs in England'. In mid-1940, when Hempel feared a British invasion of Ireland, he 'urged Berlin to cut down propoganda that played up the British threat and suggested German assistance in reunifying the island'. Hempel then drafted his own radio script with a request that it be broadcast on the English service immediately, though there is no evidence that it ever was. It read:

The English have up till now tried without success to undermine Irish neutrality. They are now planning, though rather late and under pressure, to promise concessions on Northern Ireland. By doing so they hope to win over the totally disinterested Irish people and to prepare them for an end to neutrality and involvement in the British war...but Ireland knows the value of English promises from the [First] World War. The infamous Ireland-hater Churchill wants to do the same as was done to John Redmond.⁴⁴

Early on in the propoganda war, Hempel had complained that German 'propaganda techniques were at times flat-footed and he criticised the research and analysis that went into the broadcasts. He told Stuart to make a plea to the proper authorities in Berlin to show more sensitivity in their transmissions'.⁴⁵ Hempel had also advised against anti-English propoganda on the radio but this was disregarded by the Irland-Redaktion.⁴⁶

On 30 August 1942, Stuart attacked the death sentences passed in Belfast on six IRA men found guilty of murdering an RUC constable. He conveyed to his listeners:

the sympathy of the many Germans who have spoken to me of the fate of the six Irishmen condemned to be hung in Belfast. It is the first time that I have ever been asked to say something in these talks to you and I

do it very gladly because I know the people who have asked me, and I know that their feeling comes from their hearts. I am not going into the question of the trial. The accused men all denied the only charge which would have given their captors the slightest excuse on legality to do what they intend to do. Perhaps the facts are possibly simple. These Ulstermen, whose corner of Ireland is overrun with foreign troops, whatever views there may be about the diplomacy of their action, [it] was a natural one.

Stuart then appealed to Churchill to lift the death sentences, adding:

For its size, Ireland has poured out more blood, tears and sweat than any other nation. We do not know whether, having asked your own people for such endurance, you believe you can give a final recompense. That is not our affair. What is our affair is that Irish blood, sweat and tears should not have been spilt in vain. And we tell you now that the blood of those six Irishmen will be about the last that you and your fellow statesmen will have the opportunity to spill within the seclusion of prison walls.⁴⁷

One of the six IRA men, 19-year-old Thomas Williams, was executed in Belfast on 2 September 1942 prompting the following commentary from the Irish service the next day:

German public opinion has reacted very keenly to the tragic news of the Belfast execution yesterday, and the stirring reports of anti-British and anti-American demonstrations all over Ireland which came in today. Horror and indignation at this newest act of British terrorism have given room to a sincere feeling of admiration for the indomitable Irish spirit which revealed itself in these acts of protest and rebellion.⁴⁸

On 17 September 1942, Francis Stuart noted in his Berlin diary that: 'A message came through from Hempel saying my radio comments on the Belfast death sentences had "Gute Wirkung" (a good effect). If my talks have even a minute influence in helping to keep our neutrality they aren't just waste, as I often think.'⁴⁹

After a year working for Hartmann's team, John O'Reilly 'had become a little tired of the routine work of broadcasting every night'. The Kilkee man was soon to offer his services for a spying mission to Ireland, but another factor that led him to quit the radio was what he described as 'his keen resentment [concerning] the unwarranted interference of the English section in our Irish section broadcasting'. In his post-war memoirs O'Reilly recalled that while William Joyce was 'supremely indifferent to all competition', another English service staffer whom O'Reilly identified only as 'X, an Anglo-German' (probably either the Glasgow-born Eduard Dietze or the English-educated Wolff Mittler) 'resented the presence of our Irish section. On more than one occasion he tried to curtail our broadcasting. Eventually he succeeded in persuading the authorities to have our scripts brought under the control of the English section'.⁵⁰

Hans Hartmann confirmed to the author that all scripts prepared by his Irland-Redaktion had to be submitted for approval to the England-Redaktion before being broadcast. He added: 'The Irish department was no more than an appendix to the English department, and the censorship was done by the English department.'⁵¹ The extent of the English service's interference in Irland-Redaktion affairs is disputed by Hartmann's wartime assistant, Hilde Spickernagel, who told the author: 'The English section handed the translation of the daily Wehrmachtsbericht [defence forces report] to the Irland-Redaktion, but to my knowledge there was no other attempt of the English section to influence the programme of the Irland-Redaktion.' However, Dr Spickernagel 'never took part' in the radio managers' daily conferences which Hartmann attended, and so could 'only guess' at who handed down the broadcasting directives there, and 'whatever may have been discussed at those daily conferences'.⁵²

As 1942 drew to a close, Francis Stuart was being closely listened to in Dublin, not so much by a loyal audience as by officials at the Department of External Affairs and G2. In one of his December 'Through Irish Eyes' talks Stuart commented on prison sentences passed on three IRA men including the IRA's Northern commander Hugh McAteer:

These three members of the IRA, sentenced for so-called high treason...belong to the same great tradition as the soldiers of the past who made it possible for a part of our country to stay out of this

war...These men who have just been sentenced by a British court belong to the advance guard of our nation. Most of you who are listening to me have other work in the life of the community, but all of us are Irish with the same interests and the same goal in the end. McAteer and his comrades in a British prison, you on your farms or in your shops doing this dour but necessary work. The time is past when any of you can look on the men without sympathy or understanding...The time is past for these small internal hostilities. We must stand firm in the face of all that threatens us as one people.⁵³

For the first time since starting his weekly talks Stuart had, unknown to himself, forced the Department of External Affairs to protest to Dr Hempel about the Irish writer's propaganda line. Drawing up a report of his meeting with the German Minister, a senior official at External Affairs recorded:

I told Herr Hempel that, while it was quite true to say that large sections of opinion in this country resented and protested against the imprisonment by the Six County authorities of men for activities arising out of the crime of partition, it might be regarded, even by the same sections of opinion, as quite a different thing for Germany to champion the cases of such men. Hugh McAteer was said to be a member of the IRA. In a recent IRA leaflet he was described as Chief of Staff of that organisation and his name was on the list of men wanted by the police here in connection with the murder of Detective Sergeant O'Brien. That being so, the holding up of McAteer on the German radio as a hero was likely to be resented by many people here and to furnish a concrete example for use by those who charged Germany with aiding and abetting the IRA against the Government. Herr Hempel said he quite saw the point and agreed with what I said. He thought it very probable that neither Francis Stuart nor anybody else in Germany knew who Hugh McAteer was. I gathered he would draw Berlin's attention to the point.⁵⁴

While diplomats in Dublin argued the toss over Francis Stuart's comments on the sentencing of three IRA men in Belfast, it seems that no one in the Irland-Redaktion was overly concerned about the main thrust of the war. For

example, Rommel's retreat from El Alamein (2-3 November 1942) as well as the mammoth battles involving the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad⁵⁵ appear to have gone unreported by Hartmann's team. The Stalingrad commentaries for Ireland only began once the Germans had lost the battle, and El Alamein appears not to have been mentioned at all. Similarly, Stuart's diary for the period just before Christmas 1942 reveals that he was more concerned with press criticism of his broadcasts than anything else: 'Was shown an April number of the illustrated English weekly *Picture Post*, in which it said the Irish were not impressed by my promises. What promises, for heaven's sake? But I shall have to get used to worse than that and from more serious critics.' His diary for 19 December 1942 shows that Hartmann was continuing to screen Stuart's talks carefully: '[I] mentioned the fact of the refusal by Irish government to renew my passport in my weekly broadcast talk [script], and showed it to Hartmann who rang just now and said it would have to be taken out because the British must not get to know of it. For all I know it may have been done on the advice of the British.'⁵⁶

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In many ways 1943 proved to be the turning point of the war, heralding the tide that turned against the Third Reich and in favour of the Allies. As a result, German Radio's small Irish service had fewer military victories to trumpet. Hitler had launched the attack on Russia, Operation Barbarossa, on 22 June 1941. Eighteen months later the fate of his eastern campaign hinged on the fighting at Stalingrad, one of the epic battles of World War II. In mid-September 1942, the German Army Group B had entered the suburbs of Stalingrad but their advance was checked in mid-November when the Russians opened their counter offensive to defend the city. By 22 November, units of the Red Army had met up at Kalach thus encircling the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad. In mid-December 1942 the German General, Erich von Manstein, opened a counter attack to relieve the Sixth Army. By February 1943, however, the battle was over with General von Paulus surrendering the remains of the German Sixth Army to Soviet troops. The actual surrender, on 2 February, merely confirmed what had been known in Germany for some time: that the eastern campaign was foundering along with Hitler's hopes of winning the wider war.

Despite the setbacks, normal programming continued on the Irland-Redaktion. Liam Mullally took over from John O'Reilly at the offices in Berlin's Kaiserdamm. In May, Francis Stuart provoked an official rebuke from Dublin due to his comments in the run-up to the Irish general election of June. In the summer of 1943 increasing Allied air attacks forced a large part of the German broadcasting services, including the Irish team, to leave Berlin. The Irland-Redaktion went off the air in the last week of July, its staff moved to Luxembourg in mid-August and recommenced programmes from there in mid-September.⁵⁷

In the early months of 1943, German Radio's programmes for Ireland described the defeat at Stalingrad in terms of German bravery and triumph. An Irish Army monitor noted that 'on 30 January 1943, Stuart, with but scant apology, launched into a eulogy on the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad and in the course of it said: "I readily admit that, when it comes to finding words, the publicists of the democracies can far outdo us" - thus more or less identifying himself with pro-German propaganda. From this date, although still maintaining that he is no propagandist, Stuart has been steadily and openly pro-German'.⁵⁸ For some reason the monitor

chose not to quote an even more pro-German part of the same speech by Stuart, which said: 'What the men, officers and generals of the German Sixth Army are doing at Stalingrad is altogether beyond the ordinary standards of bravery.'⁵⁹

The talk which, perhaps more than any other, prompted G2 to conclude that Francis Stuart had become 'openly pro-German' was broadcast from Berlin on 6 February. BBC monitors heard it too and reported it as follows:

Last Wednesday the German people received news of the end at Stalingrad. If I were a German I would be proud to belong to a nation which could produce such men. As it is, I am glad to be among them. If Ireland is to come nearer Europe, two things are necessary, a better understanding in Ireland of Europe, especially of Germany, and a better understanding of Ireland on the Continent. Besides speaking to Ireland about Germany, I speak to Berlin University students every week about Ireland. Today I spoke of Liam Lynch and Cathal Brugha, of Yeats and Synge and Pearse, for a nation's soul is revealed in its soldiers and poets. I would refer again to Stalingrad. The Irish would understand what the German people felt. This had moved Germany more than any other event of the war, for while such victories as the fall of Paris might be attributed to the perfection of the German war machine, this is a triumph of flesh and blood.⁶⁰

On 1 February 1943 Hartmann told his Irish-speaking listeners that:

the German Sixth Army, with their Rumanian and Croat allies, had succeeded in frustrating one of the Soviets' main objects. Their bravery enabled the German Command to withdraw in good order and prepare strong positions against the Russian tanks. But owing to their stand, the German lines were unbroken. The army in the south of Stalingrad under General Paulus was now destroyed, but in the north of the city forces still held out. However, no one could say how long they would be able to do so. Nevertheless, for two months they had held down hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers, and their bravery would never be forgotten.⁶¹

The following day, Hartmann evoked 'the spirit of the Stalingrad defenders', saying, 'when nothing else was left these men defended themselves with knives against Soviet guns and aircraft. The bravery of these men was saving Europe from Bolshevism'.⁶² On 6 February, Hartmann admitted that Stalingrad had been 'a severe blow':

There is no denying that the Soviets have succeeded in advancing. They have not broken the German lines everywhere but they have inflicted heavy losses. It is too early yet to give a complete account of what happened at Stalingrad. It is interesting to note that German transport planes succeeded in evacuating 47,000 wounded soldiers. Nonetheless, Germany has suffered a severe blow. What is the opinion of Europe on the situation now? Some people are still blind to the danger confronting them. They imagine they could defend their own little countries if it were necessary. But other people are more sensible. It can be said that great uneasiness is spreading in Europe. And this uneasiness will certainly increase, although Mr Churchill is doing his best to weaken the minds of people who feel it. But words cannot alter the laws of history. There is a natural law in the unfolding of history, and it will be seen in due time how fruitless it is for anyone to rebel against it.⁶³

The broadcasts by Hartmann and Stuart broadly followed Goebbels' directives at the time. On 3 February 1943 the Propaganda Minister had instructed the German press that, 'Henceforward, the heroic struggle of Stalingrad will become the greatest epic of German history. The task of the press is to establish the link with world history and make Stalingrad into a myth which will fortify and dedicate all future generations of our people.'⁶⁴

In March 1943 special talks for St Patrick's Day were again prepared, including this one by Francis Stuart:

Here in Germany, and in other parts of the Continent, cut off from our own country, we decided that this was not a time for sentiment, that you would not want us to talk about the harp, the shamrock or the green fields of Erin. We therefore speak only a few words which will be

simple, sincere, and from the heart. To begin with, it is you, of course, who should be speaking to us, and not us to you. There is so much we would like to know that we cannot hear from newspapers, or the speeches of politicians. A special privilege would be a few words from one of you Irish nationalists in the North. We know well what you felt when the first news of the American occupation of the Six Counties came through; and during those terrible weeks when six men were condemned to death and one hanged in Belfast gaol. We have shared all these emotions with you, and we have shared the other events of this war which have particularly affected our country. In all this we are one family. But even though we are far from home, we know there will be many of you who for a few hours will forget everything in the excitement of a game of hurley, the first flat racing of the season, or whatever other sport you may decide on to celebrate the holiday. And, my God, that is what we would like to be doing too - to forget this war and all the rest of it, at Croke Park, or Baldoyle, or wherever it might be. And one day we will. One day we will have a great hurley match, or a great race meeting to celebrate peace, and we will hold it outside Belfast, to celebrate the return of the Six Counties.⁶⁵

Later that St Patrick's Day, the Irland-Redaktion sought to assure neutral countries of Germany's respect for their rights:

The fear of Bolshevism grows in proportion to its proximity. The New Order is already established in the hearts of those determined to preserve their homes and culture. Some agitators have been referring to the position of neutral countries, especially Spain and Ireland, and saying that they would prove good jumping-off grounds for an Allied expedition in Europe. Germany has always respected the rights of neutrals and will always do so in future. Britain and America do not hesitate to violate the rights of small nations in their endeavours to widen the sphere of the war. The position of Ireland on the outer rim of Europe is unique. The Irish resolve to keep out of the war has been categorically stated by de Valera. Everyone in Germany understands this viewpoint. The hardships imposed by the war on Ireland are serious; our sympathies for Ireland are deep, for we realise that for centuries her

people have been suffering from brutal British oppression. Today, on St Patrick's Day, we can assure the sons and daughters of Eire that they have a definite spot in every German heart.⁶⁶

Throughout April, Hartmann kept up a steady stream of talks in Irish on a variety of subjects. On 13 April, he scoffed at Allied attempts to open up a second front, reminding Irish listeners that 'German soldiers stand ready to repel any attack, and ready too, to attack England'.⁶⁷ On 17 April, he accused 'the Jewish Bolsheviks and their English friends' of remaining silent about the Katyn massacre of Polish Army officers, adding:

London and Moscow have put their heads together to concoct a plausible excuse, but the only thing they can think of is to blame it on the Germans, or to say that there were prehistoric graveyards in the vicinity, and that it is these which the Germans have found. No one has ever heard of prehistoric corpses shot through the necks or with Polish army uniforms. Nothing more cynical has ever been uttered. It is a cynicism of which only Jewish Bolsheviks could be capable.⁶⁸

On 19 April, Hartmann put a brave face on military developments telling his audience 'the Russians are worn out by the heavy losses sustained during the winter' and 'in Tunisia, the Axis forces have evaded the attempt to encircle them at Mareth and again at Sfax'.⁶⁹ The following day, Hartmann used the occasion of Hitler's birthday to eulogise the German leader:

This is the Führer's 54th birthday, and this is an occasion for us to return him thanks for all he has done for us, and to pray to God to give him health and strength during the coming year to work for his people. With most great men, people see only their glory. They tend to forget all the hardship and suffering they may have endured. You in Ireland have had many great men, perhaps more than any other nation on earth. Therefore I believe you will regard the struggle of the German nation and the work of the Führer with understanding...The whole German nation is engaged in a desperate struggle under the leadership of the Führer, but everyone in Germany has absolute trust in his power to clear away

all difficulties in the way of Germany and of Europe.⁷⁰

At the same time, Francis Stuart began a series of talks to coincide with the run up to the Irish general election scheduled for 22 June 1943. Of the many talks he had broadcast in the previous 12 months, only his comments on Hugh McAteer had prompted a mild protest by External Affairs. But when the writer committed - what the Irish government saw as - an 'unwarrantable interference in our internal affairs', things took a more serious turn culminating in a formal diplomatic protest to Berlin.⁷¹ Stuart launched his election offensive on 10 April:

Tonight I'm going to say a few words about the coming elections. I have never in these talks taken any sides in party politics, and I'm certainly not going to do so now. As a matter of fact until we are a free and united nation I don't see how we can have anyway these party politics in Ireland because there can only be one aim of any party and that is the return of the Six Counties and the independence of our whole island from foreign domination. If there is any party or any individual candidate whose aim is less than this or different to this then I hope and believe that you will show the true spirit of Ireland by rejecting these people. That must be, and I believe will be, the first consideration before you in the coming election. The second will, I think, be your desire to remain out of this war, and I share that desire with you...It is not my business to go into detail about who you will vote for but in general I will only say that those who during the last years have shown themselves most determined to keep the 26 Counties of Ireland outside the influence of the great financial powers are those best fitted to guide you through the rest of this world crisis. We must not forget that an election confined to the 26 counties cannot be the full and free expression of the people of Ireland. It's only a makeshift and not a very satisfactory one at that. And secondly I think that in voting you should also give special preferences to those men who have shown themselves sincerely concerned for the welfare of the whole people of Ireland, and reject those who seem to look on the question of unemployment as a decree of destiny which is outside their power to do anything about. But above all don't think I am taking it on myself to

try to dictate to you how to vote. I have no such idea. It is simply that the very fact of my having been at what I may call the centre of Europe during most of this war has given me a kind of bird's eye view of Ireland and events at home that may have a certain interest and value for you. I am far from Ireland and beyond the reach of all the opposing camps, the party cries, and I see clearly that in reality we have only need of one party, a party that stands for a free and united Ireland.⁷²

On 8 May, Stuart had further advice for Irish voters. Though part of his speech was inaudible to Irish Army monitors, they reported that in a reference to Fine Gael, Stuart said:

It is no good believing that party protesting that they too have always advocated neutrality...the small section that believe in a close cooperation between us and the great Atlantic powers should give Fine Gael their one vote. And the handful of Dáil members with this outlook are or have been members of this party. It is as well that this should be made quite clear. It may not be so easy to make it clear inside Ireland, therefore I take this opportunity of stating it.

Stuart added: 'I do not for a moment anticipate any such gains [for Fine Gael], but on the contrary I think that this party will dwindle into insignificance.' Just before the monitors in Dublin noted 'broadcast abandoned at this stage owing to noise', they were able to hear Stuart say:

The overwhelming majority of you are at one in your wish for a free and united country and as far as I know there isn't one who'd ever threaten this except a handful of so-called Irishmen either belonging to or in touch with the Fine Gael party.⁷³

In mid May, Stuart changed tack, advising Ulstermen serving with the British Army to mutiny. Prompted by fresh hints of conscription in Northern Ireland following the election of Sir Basil Brooke as Prime Minister there, Stuart broadcast the following advice:

It is just possible, though unlikely, that they will force you into their army, but it is quite impossible to make you fight their battles for them. They cannot make you fight for the continued occupation of your own corner of Ireland. For that is what, among other things, any military success for the British and American forces means. Therefore if the worst should come to the worst and any of you be conscripted and be sent to one of the battlefields, you have only to wait for a suitable opportunity and go over to the Germans. That has been proved to be not a very difficult thing to do in the latest form of warfare where there are no very determined lines and where there is rapid movement. As I say, you have simply to submit to the training and all the rest and wait patiently until you are actually at the front and then, having arranged a suitable plan among your fellows, even if you happen to be only two or three who will probably be split up among different regiments, you can go over to the Germans or to the Italians as the case may be, and I can promise you that you will be received as friends and well treated as soon as you've explained who you are. For the case of the Six Counties is well known here in Germany. It is true of course that you will be separated from your families and friends at home, but at least that is better than that you should get killed in fighting for the continuance of the enslavement of those families and friends under the government of Sir Basil Brooke. And I say you will be treated with every consideration, both during the war and as long after it as you would have to remain away from your home.⁷⁴

On 29 May, just over three weeks before the Irish election, Stuart returned to the attack on Fine Gael:

Even if these elections were to result in our most reactionary party getting into power, which however will certainly not be the case, it would not mean that Ireland as a nation would renounce her struggle towards unity and independence. It would simply mean that the struggle would become even more difficult and the ends be delayed. Most of our politicians have made election speeches in which one might think that our existence as a nation depended on them remaining in power. That is certainly not so. The most that any political party can do is to remain

faithful in all their legislative activities to the spirit of Irish nationalism, as expressed both for and suffered for, through the centuries until today. They are not inventors of this spirit, they are not even the custodians, so to speak, of it, for you are that. The most that they can do is to see that the official policy of the 26 counties, internal and external, does not contradict it.⁷⁵

On 31 May 1943 the government in Dublin made a formal protest about these broadcasts directly to Berlin. The protest was not made public at the time, possibly because the government had no wish to boost Francis Stuart's audience through controversy. Neither was the protest revealed to the Dáil. The Oireachtas had been dissolved on 26 May, pending the June election, and the new Dáil did not sit until 1 July 1943.⁷⁶

Stuart was right about Fine Gael's prospects in the election. In the event, the party lost 13 seats. De Valera's Fianna Fáil party lost its overall majority but remained in office thanks to support from the new farmers' party, Clann na Talmhain.⁷⁷

In the wake of the election, Hempel 'advised the German radio and press to take the line that de Valera, by his clear, energetic and successful policy, had earned the trust of the people'.⁷⁸ Hempel's propaganda advice was ignored. The Irish diplomatic protest had achieved the desired effect in that neither G2 nor the BBC heard any more Irish 'election' talks from Germany between 31 May and the election on 22 June.

Stuart's talks in April and May 1943 were not the only occasions on which German Radio had commented on elections or advised people how to vote. On 12 October 1942, the black propaganda unit Station Debunk appealed to listeners in the USA 'to avoid voting for Franklin's party at the coming [congressional] election'.⁷⁹ On 14 January 1943, the Irish Service had welcomed the defeat of the Unionist candidate Sir Knox Cunningham in the West Belfast by-election, saying 'while this one by-election won't bring about the liberation of the Six Counties from the Anglo-American yoke, it is undeniably a step in the right direction'.⁸⁰ Neither was German Radio alone in giving electoral advice during the war. In March 1943, the BBC's Danish service urged listeners, prior to their election, to 'vote Danish...choose a Rigsdag [parliament] of men who will say no to any further concessions to the Germans'.⁸¹ BBC policy varied from service to

service however. In June 1943, the BBC was barred from covering the Irish general election by Churchill's Tipperary-born Minister for Information, Brendan Bracken, who commented: 'The public would be horrified if they heard anything from the BBC about de Valera and those lousy neutrals: people of Irish stock overseas are heartily ashamed of Eire's attitude...'⁸²

On 2 May, monitors in Dublin's McKee Barracks reported the following announcement from German Radio: 'We will now present our listeners in Ireland, Mr Patrick Joseph Cadogan who comes to us from New York where he has made his home for the last twenty years. Mr Cadogan will give you a few comments on current events.' Cadogan:

It seems to me that the sufferings of the peoples of Ireland, Newfoundland and India, in fact of anywhere that cursed, blood-spattered and so-called democratic flag of Brittania flies, should stand out as a warning to all; 'abandon hope all ye who enter here', as the only slogan that can be adopted by any nation foolish enough to enter into any alliance with Britain. Having travelled extensively throughout the British Empire and having seen the loving care England bestows upon her colonies, especially India, and at one time Ireland, it is not surprising to see wide awake nations shun the English government like a plague.⁸³

Although only on air for five months from 2 May to 1 October 1943, Cadogan's talks are notable in that they contained far more anti-Jewish material than other speakers. Fifty years after the war, none of the survivors of the Irland-Redaktion could remember anyone named Cadogan ever having worked there. This suggests that the name was a cover for someone else, perhaps William Joyce.⁸⁴ Two nights after his first broadcast, Cadogan was back again reminding Irish listeners of the two and a half million Irish people who died or were forced to emigrate by the famine between 1841 and 1851, commenting:

The death or emigration of these two million and a half souls, an irreparable loss to Ireland, can be laid to England's door. She alone is to blame for she could have prevented both famine and emigration.⁸⁵

On 5 May 1943, Cadogan began a series of anti-Jewish talks, commenting on: 'The demand of the English Jews that Anglo-Saxon broadcasting corporations refrain from broadcasting any plays with a Christian theme or tendency, the reason being of course that the reawakening of Christianity in England might provoke anti-Jewish feeling.' Cadogan ended his talk 'with a fervent prayer that Saint Patrick may smile on Erin's Green Isle and keep her free from this Jew-instigated war. I say good night to you all my Irish and Catholic brothers and sisters'.⁸⁶ On 18 May, Cadogan felt moved to lecture his Irish listeners again on the 'evils of Jewry and Bolshevism', commenting:

These two terrible evils, Judaism and Bolshevism, are so real, that I must bring home to you my fellow Irishmen, the great danger to our country, to our holy faith, that lies in the Jewish plans...Be on your guard for the protection of our holy Catholic faith and for the salvation of Ireland.⁸⁷

On 20 May, Cadogan said that while he had voted for Roosevelt in 1932, the U.S. President had:

surrounded himself with a Jewish brains trust from whom he took his orders...Since Roosevelt's first election, there has been a steady influx of Jewish influence into every stratum of life in America. Even in the city of New York where once upon a time we Irish proudly and capably ruled in politics, the police force, and the fire department, the Jews have gained complete control, and the good names of the Irish cops, such as Kelly, Murphy and McDermott, have been replaced by Cohen, Goldwyn and Sax.⁸⁸

On 23 May, Cadogan revealed more about himself, saying:

Today I attended Holy Mass in a beautiful church in the suburbs of Berlin. Somehow this little church reminded me of another little church in Bundoran, Co Donegal where my family used to spend the summer vacation.⁸⁹

In later talks, Cadogan quoted lengthy extracts from the speeches of the Canadian-born Catholic priest, Father Charles E. Coughlin, who had been banned from major American radio networks for 'attracting an anti-Semitic following'.⁹⁰ By the end of May, Cadogan's talks had attracted the attention of the Department of External Affairs in Dublin, which was supplied with transcripts of them by G2.⁹¹

On 1 June, Cadogan was on air at 7.15 p.m. refuting Allied claims that 'German achievements in the East...have only been possible by slave methods and by starving the local population'. He told listeners:

These assertions are entirely false and vicious. The German methods differ very much from the methods adopted by England in her colonies. A sample of English organisation and controlling methods has been stamped in the memory of all Irishmen in such a way that it is impossible to ever forget. The peoples of those territories occupied by Germany have been granted, as far as possible, self administration.⁹²

An Irish Army monitor added the following note to the transcript: 'Speaker goes on to speak of wonderful conditions under which people live in German-controlled territory.'⁹³ An hour and a half later, Cadogan was on the air again launching into yet another anti-Jewish tirade:

It is obvious that in England and America the spirit of Jewry has triumphed over the spirit of Christ. Perhaps some of us have been slow to perceive the least connection between Jewry and Godless Bolshevism...In all countries who have not effectively protected themselves and their national life from the menace of organised Jewry, the Jews have axed and elbowed their way to first of all places of influence and then finally to offices of paramount power. So safeguard your neutrality in Ireland by safeguarding Ireland from Jewry. Safeguard your holy Catholic faith by combating by all means anti-Christ, and the anti-Christ today is Judo-Bolshevism.⁹⁴

On 22 June - polling day in Ireland and, coincidentally, the second anniversary of Hitler's invasion of Russia - Hartmann was still predicting a Soviet defeat:

Today, after two years of war [in Russia] we can say that we are far stronger in men and material than when war broke out. It is noteworthy that, during the same time as were built the astonishing defensive works from Norway to France and on the Mediterranean coast, the Soviet Union has lost up to the present about 20 million men, killed, wounded, and taken prisoner; almost 50,000 big guns, over 40,000 planes and at least 26,000 tanks...the supply position of both soldiers and civilians in the Soviet Union is very bad and gets worse daily. Severe famine seems likely from the end of this Summer.⁹⁵

The next day, 23 June, Hartmann was admitting that:

very heavy damage has been caused to the beautiful [German] city of Krefeld. Whole districts have been destroyed. When workers returned from one of the factories outside the city they could not find their houses. Many of them lost their wives and children in a single night, but one of the workers said that in future they would live by their machines.⁹⁶

On 25 June, Hartmann spelled out Germany's preparedness to repel any Allied invasion:

England has been talking and threatening invasion of Europe so much that everyone thinks it is time she did something to show she is in earnest. It is a matter of indifference to us in Germany. We know England has enough ships and men to make landings at different places. We are waiting for them. Our defences are completed and we have hosts of experienced soldiers to man them, and to drive back into the seas any of the enemy who do succeed in landing.⁹⁷

On 29 June, Hartmann was trying to turn an RAF attack on Cologne Cathedral to propaganda advantage:

Today will be remembered as a black day in the history of mankind. An English air raid has destroyed the great and beautiful cathedral church of Cologne. I need not say that it is a terrible loss, not only for Germany but for the whole of Europe. Few people have not heard of this

lovely and marvellous church; people from many lands, including Ireland, have visited and heard Mass in it. It will be difficult for anyone, and especially for any Catholic, to restrain his tears on hearing that the greater part of the aisles no longer exist. It is for England a lasting shame. Hundreds of years will not suffice to efface the crimes they are committing over Germany. Berlin political circles say that the cruelty being displayed by England is one of her most deeply ingrained qualities. It is true, and to anyone who doubts it, one need only point to the terrible things done by the same gentlemen in Ireland - the Penal Laws, the churches destroyed or burnt, the lonely rocks where Mass was celebrated by hunted priests, the thousands of gravestones and cairns throughout the land where someone was done to death by the English. But it is becoming evident that all the English have not easy consciences. Some of them are becoming anxious. They fear that some day they will have to pay a terrible price for what they have done.⁹⁸

On 1 July, Hartmann returned to the same topic, telling his listeners:

The anger of Europe at the bombing of Cologne Cathedral increases day by day. This evil deed has aroused in the heart of everyone in Germany a cold hatred for England. The cathedral is a national monument, quite apart from its importance as a shrine of the Catholic faith...the English knew it was a national monument, and they bombed it in an attempt to weaken the morale of the German people. We hear however that many people have asked the bishop not to clear away the ruins, but to leave them as an eternal monument to the cruelty of the English air raids.⁹⁹

But as well as commenting on the increasing Allied air attacks, Irland-Redaktion staffers were falling victim to them. Because of the bombing a decision was taken to move the service out of Berlin to the relative safety of Luxembourg. Hartmann's regular listeners heard him deliver one of his last talks from Berlin on 7 July 1943, in which he said:

And now friends, here is a note about my daily talks in Gaelic. I shall not be able to give these talks for some time to come, but I hope that

we shall have Gaelic on our programme again before the day of the Gaelic League commemoration [31 July]. Until then my best wishes to you all.¹⁰⁰

Francis Stuart delivered his final broadcast from Berlin on 24 July, still emphasising the neutrality angle:

By our passive opposition to American policy in this war we may sacrifice a certain immediate popularity in that country. We may not be included amongst those small nations to be saved by Mr Roosevelt and his gang, but one thing is certain; in a few years there is going to come a reaction, both in England and America, to this war, to the whole policy behind it and to the whole hypocritical spirit in which it was waged. It will be a reaction even more violent than the one after the last war, that produced amongst other things, a flood of pacifist literature. Roosevelt and his gang of warmongers are going to be swept into obscurity and discredited a good deal more thoroughly than even Wilson was. People in America, and especially our own people in America, are going to see very clearly that there was after all a great deal to be said for our neutrality.¹⁰¹

The Irland-Redaktion then went off the air for nearly two months. Just how bad the situation had become for the broadcasters in Berlin, was described by radio announcer Madeleine Meissner who wrote of buildings in the capital crumbling 'like sandcastles'. The Irland-Redaktion team - including Hartmann, Stuart and Meissner - moved to Luxembourg on 12 August 1943 although some of the radio's other European services remained in Berlin where the Rundfunkhaus was eventually hit by bombs on 22 November.¹⁰²

When Hartmann and his colleagues arrived at the Radio Luxembourg studios it was not the first time German Radio had used the facilities. The Luxembourg transmitter had been incorporated into the Reichsrundfunk network four weeks after the German invasion of the Grand-Duchy on 10 May 1940. The former Director-General of Radio-Télé Luxembourg, Gust Graas, described the German - and later American - control of the radio station as 'five years of humiliation'.¹⁰³

The first sign that the Irish service had resumed broadcasting (although

listeners were not made aware of the relocation) came on 18 September 1943 when Francis Stuart announced he would be giving his talks twice a week from then on. Hartmann had persuaded him to double his on-air contributions, having by then lost the services of most of his team including John O'Reilly, Susan Sweney, James Blair, Liam Mullally, Sonja Kowanko, and Hilde Poepping. Patrick Joseph Cadogan was back on the air too, on 1 October 1943, delivering one of his last talks.¹⁰⁴ Throughout the Irland-Redaktion's year-long stay in Luxembourg the Irish Army picked up regular talks to Ireland by a broadcaster named Johann Mikele.¹⁰⁵

Stuart was on the air again on 16 October seemingly anxious to convince listeners that he was still living in, and broadcasting from, Germany:

I came here to Germany in 1940 because I saw it was essential that at least one or two Irishmen should be here in Germany while there were thousands in England and America. But I am certainly not sorry that I came. But here from Germany I can say what no Irishman would be allowed to say anywhere else, neither in England, America, nor in Ireland itself. I can speak to you here from Germany and tell you the truth about this war, and I shall go on doing so as long as the hospitality of the German Wireless is given me, even although there may be a group at home who would do whatever they can to stop me speaking to you and to impute to me motives of personal gain or ambition.

Stuart's side-swipe at the 'group at home' was presumably aimed at de Valera's government which had succeeded in silencing his series of 'election advice' broadcasts in the three weeks before the June 1943 general election. In case the Dublin authorities did not get the message, Stuart added:

I have the greatest suspicion and dislike for all politicians, and, so far as I come under their notice at all, they have the same suspicion and dislike for me.¹⁰⁶

Hartmann's resumption of talks in Irish was noticed by the BBC - on 514.6 metres, the Calais transmitter - on 25 October 1943 when he commented on the 'war in the Pacific and Far East, and Mountbatten's visit to see

Chiang Kai Shek'.¹⁰⁷ On average, Hartmann's talks were being picked up every two days by the BBC in the closing months of 1943. The general tenor of Hartmann's talks in November and December 1943 was overwhelmingly anti-Soviet, displaying German disquiet that, pending the opening up of a second front, the main threat would come from the East.¹⁰⁸ From the studios of Radio Luxembourg, Hartmann told his listeners on 23 November that 'the Anglo-Saxon intention of abandoning Europe to Bolshevism if they should succeed in winning the war, is becoming more and more apparent'.¹⁰⁹ After reporting the ejection of British troops from the Aegean islands on 24 November (the battle took place 12-16 November)¹¹⁰ Hartmann told his audience the next day that:

while living in Dublin and at Carna and at Gweedore he had come to love the Irish people and to have a deep admiration for their ancient Gaelic culture. Ireland has given much to Europe in the past and could give a great deal in the future. He thought it unlikely that Irish culture would die out, but there was one danger against which he would warn the Irish people. Bolshevik ideas were very prevalent in England, and they might find a fertile breeding ground among the Irish workers now in England whose poor living conditions rendered them very susceptible. Such people could do grave harm to the native culture on their return.¹¹¹

On 26 November, Hartmann applied the same theme to moslems in the Arab countries of the Near East. The Soviets, he said, were trying 'to spread Bolshevik ideas' in Arab cities and ports where the inhabitants 'are susceptible to foreign ideas'.¹¹² On 20 December, the Irish service was telling its listeners that 'Germany was strong enough not only to defend Europe from North, South, East and West, but also to adopt the offensive. Whatever happened, England would be an unimportant country after the war'.¹¹³ On Christmas Eve, Hartmann stressed the neutrality line, recalling times past in Dublin. The monitor's report read:

He was thinking today of the time he had spent in Ireland, and especially his last Christmas there in 1938. He described a party for Irish and German children in the Gresham Hotel, Dublin, at which he

played the part of Father Christmas. After the distribution of presents a concert was held, and it would be difficult to find anywhere a merrier or more peaceful scene. But then came the war, first starting in a corner of Europe and then spreading till now it enveloped almost the whole world. He was very glad however that the Irish government had been able to preserve the peace in Ireland, or at least in the greater part of the country. Men were not forced to shed their blood for the British Empire. The English and their allies had caused immense sufferings to the people of Germany; so that Christmas this year could not be as peaceful and happy as it was before the war. But it would be a Christian Christmas; Germans at home and at the front could celebrate it, and all would at least have some hours of pleasure, and would derive from them solace and strength and renewed vigour to continue the war more determinedly than ever. In conclusion he again congratulated Ireland on her escape from the horrors of war and hoped she would continue in her present course until all danger was past.¹¹⁴

On 26 December, Hartmann said Eisenhower's appointment as supreme commander of all Anglo-Saxon forces in Europe meant that:

the famous British Navy would be for the first time under American command. This merely confirmed the opinion he had often expressed, that England's power was rapidly decreasing and that it was the American intention gradually to absorb the British Empire. He referred to the United States [naval] base in Londonderry and said that it would not tend to increase the friendship between the people of Ireland and America; indeed this friendship was getting weaker, especially as it was becoming evident that the Americans would never willingly abandon the positions they had acquired.¹¹⁵

By the end of 1943, programme output to Ireland had been reduced from a maximum of one hour a night in the first half of the year, while based in Berlin, to a simpler format of only one nightly talk at 7.15 p.m. after the move to Luxembourg, though during 1944 the output was increased to three bulletins per night. From Berlin, Hartmann's service had been able to use a number of transmitters to broadcast to Ireland. These ranged from the

powerful shortwave ones at Zeesen (on 28.45, 31.35 and 41.44 metres) - also used by the England-Redaktion - to alternative transmitters in Rennes (431.7 m) and Calais (514.6 m). The Oslo transmitter (1154 m) was used from the end of 1941 until mid-1943, while all Irland-Redaktion talks for North America used Zeesen's shortwave facilities.¹¹⁶

Chapter 10

The Nazis' Irish-American Propaganda Initiative

In March 1941, as we have seen, Adolf Mahr proposed to Ribbentrop the idea of setting up a secret transmitter or G-sender to reach the Irish-American audience in the United States. Mahr wanted the station to 'express the views of the American Irish'.¹ Mahr's proposal was, in fact, a variation of one made by Goebbels on 30 October 1939 when the Propaganda Minister had ordered discussions with the Foreign Office and the Army's High Command about setting up two secret stations, one purporting to broadcast from inside France and the other from Ireland.² But Goebbels' secret Irish station never got going. According to one account this was 'probably because there was no one available who could speak as if he were a native of Dublin or Cork'. A bogus French station called La Voix de la Paix (the Voice of Peace) was launched in February 1940. Although operated from Germany, the station pretended to be transmitting from French soil.³

In the same month, a new secret station beamed at Britain, the New British Broadcasting Station, began operations in Berlin with William Joyce producing many of its scripts.⁴ Other black propaganda stations followed. They included Radio Caledonia (for Scotland), Workers' Challenge (aimed at working class listeners in London's East End), Lenin's Old Guard (for Russia), the Christian Peace Movement Station (for Britain), the Nutcracker (for the Netherlands), Radio Humanité (for France), as well as Radios Free America, Free India, and the Voice of Free Arabia. In late 1942, another German black unit, named Station Debunk, was beaming anti-Allied propaganda to the United States, purportedly from Northern Ireland.⁵

At one time or another during the war the Germans ran a total of 19 black propaganda stations all pretending to broadcast from their target areas but emanating, in fact, from Germany or her occupied territories. 'White' stations, on the other hand, were those which did not attempt to conceal their real sympathies or place of origin. Each of Germany's black stations was run under the umbrella of Büro Concordia whose nominal head was Adolf Raskin but whose day-to-day running was in the hands of Erich Hetzler. Hetzler had lived in England for thirteen years and had studied at the London School of Economics. Later he was recruited as an England specialist on Ribbentrop's staff in Berlin and remained as a personal

assistant to the Foreign Minister until the start of 1940.⁶ Adolf Mahr was a daily visitor to the Concordia offices at Berlin's Sportsfeld where he represented the Foreign Office and, as already stated, was in touch with Walther Kamm who was variously in charge of overseas shortwave services and the European service's medium and long wave sectors.⁷

Given his regular contact with the Concordia operation, it is not difficult to see where and how Adolf Mahr came by his idea of a secret station aimed at Irish-Americans. In the event, however, the idea was not immediately adopted by Ribbentrop though white propaganda programmes were occasionally relayed to North America by the Irland-Redaktion in 1942 and 1943.⁸ Mahr wanted to use the Irish-American lobby to swing public opinion in America against U.S. entry into the war. Yet, by the time Mahr had fought off a challenge from the Propaganda Ministry for control of the Irland-Redaktion, and had succeeded in getting his nominee, Hans Hartmann, named as head of the new Irish service, it was almost Christmas 1941. By that time America had already entered the war, following the Japanese attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour on 7 December. Thus the major objective of the G-sender was already lost.⁹ Other German Radio services had, however, been broadcasting to the United States from the very beginning of the war, and by February 1941, German shortwave transmitters were beaming eight hours and ten minutes of programmes per 24-hours to North America.¹⁰

In the early months of the war, an estimate of Americans 'interested' in listening to German shortwave radio programmes put the number at half a million. A survey of shortwave radio listening in America carried out in January 1941 by the American Institute of Public Opinion for the Princeton University Listening Centre, showed that almost one person in three had a radio set which could receive shortwave transmissions from Europe. Of these, 5.94% had listened at least once in the previous month (i.e. December 1940) to programmes from Germany. The survey's findings were later revised downwards because of confusion among those polled over radio programmes coming directly from Europe and programmes relayed from Europe by American radio stations. Consequently, the Princeton Listening Centre concluded that 'the total audience for any and all European shortwave broadcasts must lie between 5% and 10% of the adult population, that is between three million and seven million listeners. The German radio's

audience on any given day was estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 150,000'.¹¹

Given these figures, Adolf Mahr was probably being over-optimistic in attempting to influence the substantial Irish-American population against U.S. intervention in the war. But, given that there was an audience there, he may have been justified in believing that his initiative was worth trying. Dr T. Ryle Dwyer puts the Irish-Americans at 'about 15% of the population of the United States' in the 1939-45 period.¹² With a total U.S. population of 132,457,000 in 1940,¹³ Dr Dwyer's estimate means that the Irish-American population, at the time Mahr was writing, was just below twenty million. Mahr himself put the number at only five to six million. Whatever the real number of Irish-Americans, Dr Dwyer notes that 'their political importance far outweighed their numerical strength. For one thing their concentration in the most populous states and their tendency to support Democratic candidates made them a very potent force within the Democratic Party'.¹⁴

The Irish-Americans' traditional support for the Democratic Party would, in fact, have made more difficult Mahr's task of swinging the lobby against Roosevelt, a Democratic President. Mahr may not have been aware that, as early as 25 September 1939, the Propaganda Ministry had issued a directive to German newspaper editors advising that the isolationists (i.e. the non-interventionists) in America 'have little chance of success'. Goebbels' directive also noted that the Americans as a whole were pronouncedly hostile to Germany, adding: 'The whole American people want the English to win...The only issue in dispute between Roosevelt and the isolationists is whether or not America should take an active part in the war.'¹⁵

When the American CBS Radio reporter, Harry Flannery, took over from his predecessor in Berlin, William Shirer, at the end of 1940, he noted that Propaganda Ministry officials were sounding him out about American Catholic opinion on the war. The officials included Otto Dietrich, head of the Propaganda Ministry's press division. Flannery wrote:

The Nazi papers said opposition to involvement in the war was increasing in the United States and that organisations were being formed to prevent entry. I did not believe these stories and told the Nazis so. They pointed to Gallup poll reports. I said they were misrepresented.

Dietrich, Krause and Frölich [Propaganda Ministry personnel] asked often about the attitude of Catholics toward the war and called attention to speeches made by some Catholic leaders. 'The Catholics', I replied, 'are not united as a group on any such matters.'¹⁶

Barnouw reflects the division in U.S. public opinion over the war:

The isolationists accused Roosevelt of wanting to lead America into a re-enactment of the 1914-18 bloodbath - and one that would, once more, settle nothing...Some businessmen felt that Hitler would win the war and that America should be prepared to do business with him.¹⁷

Whatever the intricacies of the internal U.S. debate on participation in the war at that early stage, Adolf Mahr could have gained more satisfaction from a later U.S. poll. This was reported to London by Britain's representative in Dublin, Sir John Maffey. On 20 January 1941, Maffey noted 'that the American Institute of Public Opinion had announced that more than 63% of Americans questioned in a recent poll wanted Eire to give up her neutrality and let the British use the Treaty ports. But in a special poll conducted among first and second generation Irish-Americans, 52% had opposed any abandonment of Irish neutrality'.¹⁸ Such poll results lent credence to Mahr's initiative to target the Irish-Americans and use them not only to swing opinion against American participation in the war, but also to frustrate any British attempt to repossess the Treaty ports at Lough Swilly, Berehaven and Cobh.

While the attack on Pearl Harbour at the end of 1941 had put an end to Mahr's ambitious plan to mobilise Irish-American opinion against U.S. entry in the war, another related propaganda challenge was to present itself to the Germans; namely preventing the re-election of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in November 1944. Presumably the hope in Berlin was that a less hawk-like candidate for the White House would seek an early end to the war and so help Germany to retain her original borders. As already indicated, Roosevelt had been the target of Nazi propaganda in the run up to the 1940 election when German Radio broadcast 'diatribes against the President, the press and the Administration'.¹⁹

While Irish-Americans had 'voted almost en masse for Roosevelt in both 1932 and 1936', the situation was different in 1940 because of the war in Europe. In early November 1939, in order to aid Britain and France, Roosevelt succeeded in having the U.S. arms export embargo lifted despite 'a shower of isolationist criticism, much of which emanated from Irish-American circles'.²⁰ Roosevelt's Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, though 'backed by most isolationists...had little to gain from isolationist themes'. On 5 November 1940 Roosevelt won comfortably by 449 electoral college votes to Willkie's 82.²¹

Even after his election, 'the Nazis continued to try to influence opposition to Roosevelt in the United States'. In January 1941, German newspapers accused the U.S. President of 'moving towards dictatorship', and labelled him 'Enemy of Peace Number 1, War Prolonger Number 1, and War Profiteer Number 1'.²² As early as 1942 it was clear that the German Foreign Office was considering what propaganda tactics to use against Roosevelt in the run up to the 1944 election for the White House, as well as any role the Irish-American lobby could play in this context. On a visit to Berlin in 1942, Charles Bewley, who had been Irish Minister to Berlin from 1933 to 1939, was approached by a senior Foreign Office official who asked his advice on how to deprive Roosevelt of the Irish vote through propaganda. Hans Dieckhoff, the former German ambassador to Washington who was now head of the department for Anglo-American affairs in the German Foreign Office, invited Bewley to his office in the Wilhelmstrasse:

The object of the visit was not clear to me. However, Dieckhoff at once put an end to my curiosity with the words, 'We believe you to be a friend of Germany and we think your knowledge of Irish opinion may be of use to us.' I assured him that any knowledge I might possess was at his disposal. 'What we want to know', continued Dieckhoff, 'is whether there is any propaganda which might help us to detach the Irish vote from Roosevelt in the coming election. It is of the greatest importance that Roosevelt should be defeated.' I considered for a moment, then I said, 'There are two possible lines of propaganda which might influence the Irish vote, but I am convinced that you will not adopt either of them.' Dieckhoff smiled. 'That's possible', he said, 'but I would like to know what they are.' 'Well', I said, 'in the first place you could lay

emphasis on the fact that the German Army has liberated the Christian churches in the Baltic states from communism and restored freedom of worship.' He shook his head. 'I see your point', he said, 'but we are not allowed to use that propaganda.' 'I expected nothing else', I told him. 'Is it worthwhile mentioning the other possible line?' 'I would like to hear it', said Dieckhoff. 'You could secure at least a portion of the Irish vote for an anti-Roosevelt candidate if you promised that in the event of a German victory Germany would create an Irish Republic for the whole island including Ulster.' He shook his head again. 'It is contrary to the policy of the German government to make any declaration during the progress of the war on its intentions after the victory.'²³

While the two propaganda lines suggested by Bewley were ruled out by the Foreign Office official, they could easily have been broadcast on a secret station - as Mahr had proposed the year before - purporting to be either the voice of the Irish-American population inside the United States or the voice of Ireland appealing to Irish-Americans.

In the summer of 1943, the Foreign Office again sought advice on propaganda tactics to prevent Roosevelt's re-election. This time it was from the IRA man Frank Ryan, then living in Berlin. His biographer, Seán Cronin, notes that Ryan:

wrote a memorandum, which was supposed to be highly secret, strongly disagreeing with any such plan. Since Ireland was not at war with America and the success of the plan depended on convincing the listener that the broadcast was from Irish soil, the scheme might well have provoked a violent American response. In this situation and perhaps in others, Ryan's consultative role helped Irish neutrality.²⁴

On 26 August 1943 a meeting of the German Foreign Office's North America [broadcasting] Committee was held to discuss the status of various black propaganda stations. Foreign Office official Dr Kurt Georg Kiesinger told the meeting that while:

a Polish secret station was already in its early stages of existence...to address mainly Polish [army] officers...the Croatian

station was disrupted by sabotage. Finns and Hungarians were not reachable by any programmes at the moment...now a suitable person for the Irish station was available. Irish people in the USA could be addressed twice weekly through this station.²⁵

The identity of the 'suitable person' was not revealed to the meeting but the Foreign Office may have been under the initial impression that Frank Ryan (after he was asked but before he wrote his refusal) would agree to broadcast, or write scripts for broadcasting, to the target Irish American audience. In his 1941 outline for the U.S. propaganda plan Mahr wrote that:

One requirement would be co-operation with the American services [of German Radio]. The newscaster must speak with an American accent...such programmes would certainly be followed with great interest in Ireland...it should be endeavoured to recruit suitable speakers, even collaborators amongst the Irish inmates of prisoner of war camps.²⁶

If the North America Committee was following Mahr's advice, then the 'suitable person' could have been recruited from a wide field of candidates and may not even have been Irish. It would seem that the Foreign Office did not intend using anyone from Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion for the secret American broadcasts. Hartmann had already left Berlin for Luxembourg with Francis Stuart two weeks before the North America Committee's meeting and he had not been consulted on the question.²⁷

In addition to Bewley and Ryan, Helmut Clissmann - then an Army cadet in Hanover - and his wife Elizabeth were also asked for their opinions on the propaganda plan.²⁸ Whoever revived the Irish-American G-sender plan in 1943, it was Mahr who, in 1941, had originated it albeit for another objective. He was also involved in the later project and it was hardly coincidental that when Elizabeth Clissmann was sent to Radio Luxembourg in March 1944 to investigate the feasibility of the G-sender proposal, Mahr happened to be there.²⁹ However, according to Mrs Clissmann, Mahr was 'trying to halt the project because he knew it would not work'.³⁰ She adds that: 'Dr Mahr happened to be there for some of the days that I was there. But he came only for a visit maybe once a month. But [there was] no

regularity, he turned up now and again.³¹

Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann told the author that 'the German political machine, and especially Ribbentrop the Foreign Minister, wished at all costs to stop Roosevelt getting elected for a fourth term'. Posters had appeared in Berlin describing the American President as 'Public Enemy Number One'. The order 'came down from Ribbentrop to launch an anti-Roosevelt campaign on radio. Veessenmayer at the Foreign Office was given the job of carrying the order through. It was decided that the message would be to try and persuade the Irish, Polish and Italian minorities in America that the U.S. should get out of the war in Europe'. The Clissmanns say they 'saw at once that this would not work with the American Irish'.³²

Elizabeth Clissmann described the background to the G-sender plan:

It was 1944, the year in which Roosevelt was seeking election for the fourth time in the United States, and Goebbels for his propaganda purposes had chosen as a theme...that Roosevelt should be created as a kind of a horror image; Public Enemy Number One, using the expression of course from Chicago long before. He was to be pictured in the minds of everybody as Public Enemy Number One, and if possible this picture was to be transmitted to ethnic groups in the United States in order to prevent him being re-elected. I don't know what that was meant to achieve had they even succeeded, which of course was completely impossible really. If it hadn't been Roosevelt it would have been somebody else. It is inconceivable that it would have made the slightest difference to the war effort...It was decided to divide the ethnic groups - Polish, Italian, Irish - people who, for one reason or another, might possibly be against America's war effort. The Italians, of course, and Irish were the most likely. The Irish since they were looked upon as having a traditional conflict with England, or vice versa, and the Italians of course. I don't know anything about what was done on any other front, but vis-à-vis the Irish in America, the concept was that an Irish [radio] station should be set up in Germany, or within the German orbit, purporting to come from Ireland, which would carry propaganda supposedly from Ireland against Roosevelt. The Propaganda Ministry had really nobody who would be capable of advising them as to whether such a thing could be done or not. They searched around for people who knew

Ireland and could be asked for their advice and they came, among others, on my husband Helmut. He was a cadet in army school, training to be an officer, and his commanding officer saw no reason to let him go, apart from the fact that Helmut of course didn't want to go anyway. So, in order to deflect any emphasis on Helmut, and at the same time to be sure that whoever was asked for advice would give negative advice, it was suggested that I should be fetched from Copenhagen, should be warned as to what was afoot so that I would inevitably take the proper negative attitude, and to go through the motions. Part of the motions was going to Luxembourg to see how the Irish transmitter in Luxembourg (which was the only one that was transmitting Irish affairs to Ireland, and might know something about Irish affairs) worked, and specifically also what they knew, where they got their Irish news from. So I went there for a week.³³

Because of the importance of her mission to Luxembourg, Elizabeth Clissmann was granted travel permits, which were rare at that time, to leave Copenhagen for Hanover where her husband was in barracks. She arrived by boat and train in Hanover to find 'the house of a friend bombed, and the moon shining through where the roof should be, and dozens of cats wandering around mewling. It was very strange. Another friend's house was unoccupied with two milk bottles and a newspaper outside the door'. She finally took refuge in an air raid shelter. Later, she was briefed on the Irish radio station project by her husband who had been granted special leave from the barracks. Next stop was Luxembourg.³⁴ Mrs Clissmann's account of her one week visit to Radio Luxembourg in March 1944 provides an insight into the chaotic conditions prevailing in the displaced headquarters of German Radio's European services. Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion, along with other sections, had moved to the Grand-Duchy in August 1943 to escape the increasing Allied bombing raids over Berlin.³⁵ The studios were (and still are) situated at Villa Louvigny in a Luxembourg city park. Mrs Clissmann describes her visit as follows:

It was a very funny week because the purpose of my visit was strictly secret, as the Germans call it *strenggeheim*. So, there was to be no explanation as to what I was doing there. I was to just appear, be given

a desk and a chair in an office, and find my way round, try to find out tactfully what was happening. Of course, I immediately became the centre of suspicion. Everybody saw his job being at risk. At that time, at that late stage in the war, the loss of a job could be fatal because you'd be drafted. Therefore, it wasn't just a question of losing your job, it might be a question of losing your life. So, there was intense interest in my presence there, and resentment. But, on the whole, I managed to get over that and made some nice friends, and began to find out what they knew. I discovered that, in fact, they had very little information. They listened to Radio Eireann when they could. Mostly the reception was defective. They got synopses of news from foreign newspapers delivered to them, having been translated into German in order to be censored, from the central Propaganda Ministry to the various stations. It was then busily retranslated back into English which kept everybody happily occupied for hours and hours every day. Then out of these synopses of newspaper reports they could deduct a certain amount of what was happening in Ireland. But, of course, as most Irish people themselves realised at the time, I suppose, very little was happening. There was the fuel scarcity and the black bread, the death of a parish priest in Ballina. Since the news was also censored from Dublin there was practically nothing else, which wasn't much help for a German station that was going to try to pretend that it was an Irish station. Where would you get any information? It was quite clear that there was no information in Luxembourg.³⁶

At the studios Mrs Clissmann met Adolf Mahr whom she had known in Dublin before the war. She adds that Mahr:

brought us all from the Irish transmitter on a Sunday to Trier to see a memorial monument erected in the 4th century by the Romans who had a large woollen industry on the banks of the river [Mosel] there. They recorded all the activities of their families on the different sides. It's about the height of four or five men, a very imposing thing to look at. I never had heard of it, and he brought us all there in the very cold, bitter weather and gave us a lecture on it.³⁷

The continuing conflict between the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry, particularly over foreign transmissions, put Mahr in a difficult position in Luxembourg, as Mrs Clissmann explains:

If, on a transmitter to Ireland, there should be great rejoicing about Japanese victories over Americans, it was perfectly obvious that that was going to be very counter productive in Ireland. But, it was part of the policy of the Propaganda Ministry and more than likely was agreed at the highest levels in the anti-Comintern pact. Therefore, it was a matter of policy that it had to be pushed through. It was very difficult and Dr Mahr was, in these circumstances, the representative for the Foreign Office and was the man who tried, without conflict and without a loud noise, very quietly, to achieve that certain fixed doctrines would not be pushed through on the Irish transmitter...he lived here [in Ireland] for many years and he reared his children here. He would, of course, know that no Irishman was going to rejoice about Japanese victories over Americans.³⁸

The war had been going on for four and a half years at that stage, and Mrs Clissmann found the radio team:

pleased to be in Luxembourg because it was relatively quiet. There were no big air raids. The food was much the same as in Germany itself. One of the advantages was that there was still some wine, whereas in Germany there was practically no wine at all left. I think they felt they were in a good place and it was very important to try and stay there. Everybody was very worried about how the war was going, naturally, so there wasn't any sense of complete relaxation, but in a bad world they were not in the worst place.³⁹

Mrs Clissmann discovered Hartmann and his team 'working in difficult conditions' with inadequate resources. Some of the difficulties appeared to be self inflicted though, as she explains: 'I met a German girl who was responsible for recording Radio Eireann, who, in fact, was off duty [at 10 p.m.] ten minutes before the news programme came through, and who, therefore, constantly marked the book "impossible reception", and went

home.'⁴⁰ The girl told Mrs Clissmann that when she had monitored the Radio Éireann news and typed it up, 'no one had paid any attention to it'.⁴¹ Mrs Clissmann discovered to her amazement that the Irland-Redaktion did not even have a map of Ireland. She told the author:

I wanted to trace where the Bishop of Kilmore sat because I couldn't remember. In that connection I haphazardly said 'can you show me the map and I might be able to find it?'. They said, 'well, there isn't any map'. So they had no news, they had no geographical information or reference books. It was very difficult. The Bishop of Kilmore had cropped up in connection with Monte Cassino [the famous monastery had been destroyed by American bombers on 15 February 1944]. He had made a statement that the Allies should be ashamed of themselves, destroying this invaluable historic and cultural centre. This, of course, was a comment at which the Germans rejoiced and, knowing how susceptible the Irish were to the utterances of bishops, they wanted to give this full value. As it turned out the Bishop sat in Cavan.⁴²

As well as Adolf Mahr there were two other pre-war friends of Elizabeth Clissmann's in Luxembourg: 'Dr [Hans] Hartmann and his wife [Helen] I had known in Ireland and I felt very at home with. They were very hospitable and I had my evening meal with them most evenings. Otherwise I stayed in an hotel.'⁴³ Hartmann, in fact, knew of Elizabeth Clissmann's planned visit to Luxembourg a full two months before it took place. He had also discovered Frank Ryan's memo disagreeing with the plan for a secret Irish-American transmitter. According to Cronin:

Hartmann got a copy of Ryan's memorandum, which carried the initials F.R. He wanted to know who F.R. was and, on being told, asked for him as an adviser to the service. Ryan was annoyed but saw a ray of light in the offer. He [Ryan] told Clissmann on 8 January: 'Hartmann was afraid of a rival station and asked [Francis] Stuart would I come to Luxembourg as an adviser there. I told Stuart to tell him that he (Stuart) had heard from Haller (or someone in Berlin) that the whole scheme of a geheimsender [secret radio station] is dropped. I thought then that the matter ended there. Now Stuart tells me that Hartmann is most anxious to

meet me and is going to apply for permission to that effect. I see just one possible good point in the affair. If Hartmann can give me translation work in Luxembourg I've no objection to giving him my opinion whenever he wants it. So far as I can see, he is the last hope for me to find something to do. I'm doing nothing about the matter yet. I'd like to talk it out with you first and get your advice.'⁴⁴

Cronin speculates that Frank Ryan may have 'thought that he could get to Ireland more easily from Luxembourg than from Berlin'.⁴⁵ Five days later, on 13 January 1944, Ryan wrote to Clissmann again:

In a recent letter I mentioned to you about Hartmann. The matter has now gone further - more so than I like. The following I have from Haller: Hartmann rang him. Hartmann also rang Vau (Veesenmayer). Vau and Haller are enthusiastic about the proposal and say it would be very nice for me there in Luxembourg. (When I hear that I begin to have doubts naturally. However, Vau will throw light on it when he comes back). I didn't ask Haller how Hartmann knew Vau was at the Führer Hauptquartier [Hitler's field headquarters], nor how he could ring him there. I believe there's a 'slight' inaccuracy in Haller's statement to me.⁴⁶

During February and March Ryan's health deteriorated as he underwent treatment for pneumonia in a Dresen sanatorium. On 2 April 1944 he raised the Luxembourg issue again in a letter to Clissmann which is paraphrased by Cronin:

He wondered about Luxembourg. Since he knew fewer people than ever in Germany it was ridiculous to decline to meet Hartmann. 'He has books - especially in my own language.' He could get news and a room. He could kill three or four weeks in Luxembourg waiting for summer. As long as it was 'clearly understood' he was going there for a holiday 'there'd be no cause for misunderstandings on business or political matters'.⁴⁷

At the beginning of May 1944 Ryan had made up his mind to go and see Hartmann at Radio Luxembourg. On 2 May he wrote to Clissman: 'By the way, it might be good if you dropped a line to Hartmann and told him I'll visit

him early June.⁴⁸ Cronin notes that Ryan left the Dresden sanitorium and 'returned to Berlin at the end of May. He needed a passport to travel to Denmark [to see Mrs Clissmann] or Luxembourg [to see Hartmann] so he had his picture taken'. But within days he had fallen ill again and died in Dresden on 10 June 1944.⁴⁹

Following her visit to the Irland-Redaktion in Luxembourg, Mrs Clissmann went to the Netherlands to investigate the operation of Concordia's Indian transmitter:

When I left Luxembourg it had already been arranged that I should go to Hilversum where the Indians had a transmitter for India. There were about 23 Indians there and they were transmitting on shortwave. The transmissions were being received in India while purporting to come from Burma. The British never found out where they came from. It was a most successful operation. The success of that operation was what inspired, I think, this concept that Goebbels had that one could perhaps fool the Americans as to where the transmissions were coming from. But the Indian operation was an entirely different one to anything that Goebbels had in mind. The most important factor in it was that, when the Indians made their agreement with the Germans to set it up, it was a strict condition that there should be absolutely no interference. The Indians would run it one hundred per cent as they chose and nobody was to interfere.⁵⁰

But what happened to the G-sender project, the feasibility of which Elizabeth Clissmann had been sent to investigate? The following is a key extract from the author's second interview with Mrs Clissmann:

Question: So, when you left Luxembourg, you had made up your mind that there would be no secret Irish station?

Mrs Clissmann: I never had to make up my mind at all. I was only sent there by my friends to make sure that this thing died as fast as possible. It wasn't difficult therefore to find reasons why it should, they were ready made.

Q. But you had to report back to somebody in Berlin?

A. Yes. I wrote out a thing to say how hopeless this all was. There was no basic information available, there were no people who had the necessary knowledge, nothing.

Q. Who did you have to report to? Was it Mahr?

A. No. I think it possibly was to Dr Veesenmayer. Dr Veesenmayer was the man for the Foreign Office who was in charge of most Irish things. Most Irish things went through him. But I'm not sure that he was still there, because afterwards he went to Budapest. So I wouldn't have the slightest idea in fact who was there [at the Foreign Office] at the time. But, Dr Veesenmayer had been the man I knew best.

Q. So the whole idea died a death. Nobody was disappointed that it didn't get off the ground?

A. No, because nobody had been involved. Nothing had ever been set up, and those few people who knew about Ireland - who had been asked about it and were so convinced from the first moment that it could only be a mess - were only delighted that it didn't start.⁵¹

As Mrs Clissmann rightly assumed, Veesenmayer would hardly have been in a position to consider her anti G-sender report since, in March 1944, he was named Reich Minister in Budapest - a title which, in effect, put him in total control of German-occupied Hungary. By the time the Red Army captured Budapest on 13 February 1945, 570,000 of Hungary's 825,000 Jews had perished.⁵² According to Francis Stuart, Veesenmayer was 'a Jew exterminator',⁵³ and the military historian Lt. Col. John Duggan notes that Veesenmayer 'had proved his ruthless efficiency in liquidating Jews in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for which he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment by the Nürnberg tribunal'.⁵⁴ In July 1977, in a rare post-war interview at his home in Darmstadt, Germany, Veesenmayer told Duggan of his 'vast admiration' for Mrs Clissmann, saying: 'She was a great Irishwoman, such fire, such zest and a mother to boot. If only [Frank] Ryan and [Seán] Russell had her head or her zeal and initiative things could have been far different in Ireland with a better prospect of bringing about a coincidence

of Irish and German interests.⁵⁵ Duggan also notes that Veesebmayer was 'prepared to use' Frank Ryan whom he regarded 'as a communist who wanted a united Ireland in a communist sense. He had links with Moscow and was far left'.⁵⁶

Ultimately, the Germans' Irish-American propaganda initiative of 1943-44 foundered for the same reasons that the initiative of 1941 had failed: Nazi in-fighting coupled with bad timing caused by the rapidly shifting tides of war. It will be remembered that one of the main objectives of Adolf Mahr's initiative in 1941 - the use of Irish and Irish-American opinion to prevent America from entering the war - had already been lost with America's declaration of war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. At that stage, Mahr had barely succeeded in gaining control of the Irland-Redaktion on behalf of the Foreign Office following months of in-fighting with the Propaganda Ministry. Similarly, in 1944, precious time was wasted as Mahr struggled to counter the thrust of a Propaganda Ministry initiative he knew was unworkable. Even if the G-sender initiative had gone ahead in a form acceptable to Mahr, the plan would have suffered because of the forced retreat of the broadcasters from Luxembourg ahead of an advancing American army. This was in early September 1944, - two months before the U.S. presidential election. On 7 November 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected to a fourth consecutive term in the White House.⁵⁷

Chapter 11
A Faltering Voice:
The Broadcasts of 1944-45

1 9 4 4

The period from January 1944 to May 1945 saw the decline and fall of German Radio's Irish service along with the demise of the Third Reich. As Allied victories grew in number during 1944 Axis propagandists found themselves fighting an uphill battle. The Allies invaded Normandy on 6 June 1944 (D-Day), the Red Army opened its summer offensive on 23 June, German Army officers tried to assassinate Hitler on 20 July, and Paris was liberated on 25 August. Hans Hartmann remained in charge of the Irland-Redaktion but in January 1944 lost his key speaker, Francis Stuart, in a row over anti-Soviet broadcasts. Despite anonymous threats on the telephone, Stuart refused to resume his talks to Ireland. In late August U.S. forces closed in on Luxembourg. The remaining Irish team - by then reduced to Hartmann, a secretary and a translator - moved northwards along with German Radio's other European services to Apen, near Oldenburg. From there they continued to operate in increasingly difficult conditions before disbanding at the beginning of May 1945.¹

The year 1944 got off to a bad start for Hans Hartmann. The first of many crises arose when Francis Stuart decided he would no longer broadcast to Ireland. According to Stuart, he had been asked to talk to Ireland 'about the Russian atrocities and the atheistical world view', but refused.² Before ceasing his broadcasts Stuart had warned listeners:

if I don't speak any more it will be because I can no longer say what I want, what I think is the truth. I will be asked to say things I don't believe, so if I stop talking you'll know why.³

One of Stuart's final talks included the following references:

It is of no importance at all that the Tricolour should fly from the City Hall in Belfast instead of the Union Jack, if Belfast workers are to find it as hard to live and support their families as before. Such freedom is merely illusion and such nationalism a farce and a

danger...The first thing to do is to face the truth. Until Dublin becomes a much better place for the average working family to live in than Belfast, we lose more than half the force of our claim to Belfast. This may not be a very palatable statement, but I think that to most of you it is quite obvious.⁴

No one now recalls who tried to pressurise Francis Stuart into making anti-Bolshevik comments on air but it was hardly Hans Hartmann, who valued the Irish writer's contributions and did not consider Stuart's personal pro-Russian stance to be objectionable. Hartmann told the author that Stuart:

was a sincere man and often didn't hold back with criticism, but what I realised was that he particularly liked the Russians. As far as I knew, or remember, he didn't speak about Stalin or anything else. He just spoke about the Russians which was not objectionable because there must be a major difference between Stalin and the Russian people. But he apparently liked the Russians, which is not objectionable.⁵

The two people most likely to have forced Stuart to break with the Irish service were Hartmann's boss, the ex-Foreign Office official and then head of foreign radio services, Erich Hetzler,⁶ and Adolf Mahr, then still with the Foreign Office's political broadcasting division and a regular visitor to Luxembourg where he kept an eye on the Irish radio propaganda effort he had set up just over two years earlier. There may have been more than one reason for Stuart's decision to leave Luxembourg at that time. Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann told the author that Stuart 'could not succeed in having his German girlfriend [Madeleine Meissner] hired to work in the Irland-Redaktion' even though she initially travelled to Luxembourg with him in August 1943 'to introduce his talks'.⁷ The Clissmanns did add that Stuart 'had vowed to leave if they changed his scripts again. That had already happened once when the words "due to the interference of the Red Army" had been inserted into a script at short notice, and he had inadvertently read it out on air. Stuart was vehemently opposed to being forced to take a political position in his weekly talks'.⁸ Francis Stuart eventually left Luxembourg for Berlin in February. By the time Mrs

Clissmann got there in March she found Hartmann 'working in difficult conditions. He was doing a nightly broadcast in Irish at six or seven each evening and had no direct Irish news of any kind'.⁹

According to BBC monitoring reports, the Irish service at that time was restricted to using the Luxembourg (1293 metres) and Hilversum (301.5 and 415.5 m) transmitters for its broadcasts. From early 1944, the Irland-Redaktion appears to have pooled its broadcast items with other language services.¹⁰ Thus, on 22 February, the Dutch home service carried Cardinal McRory's 'pastoral letter to young Irishmen not to become infected with communist ideologies in the United Kingdom'¹¹ and closely paralleled Hartmann's theme broadcast on 25 November 1943.¹² The Irish Catholic Hierarchy was unwittingly providing useful propaganda material for German Radio's European services at this stage of the war. As well as Cardinal McRory's comments, other bishops figured in the broadcast material. On 12 March, the England-Redaktion reported that:

the Roman Catholic Bishop of Cavan approved de Valera's reply to the U.S. demand to break off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Bishop O'Callaghan stated that de Valera had made a sensible, cautious and statesmanlike speech, which had met with the approval of the entire population of Eire. In future, continued the bishop, Eire would have to rely mainly on her own efforts as regards supplies of essential utility goods, as shipping would be more difficult than ever.¹³

The same day, the Irland-Redaktion reported no change:

in the prevailing situation in a Belfast prison, where Hugh McAteer, the IRA chief of staff, is on hunger strike with a number of other imprisoned IRA members. The Minister of Home Affairs was asked in the Commons if he would set up an inquiry to investigate the cause of the [hunger] strike, but replied in the negative.¹⁴

On 17 March, Cardinal McRory was back again, this time on the German Home service, 'condemning the Anglo-U.S. campaign against Irish neutrality', and quoted as saying that:

the British have always treated Eire in a cruel and unjust manner. The Irish people will maintain their right to independence and freedom, and will have nothing to do with England.¹⁵

Meanwhile, Francis Stuart's decision to stop broadcasting to Ireland was beginning to have serious repercussions for him. In his diary entry for 23 March, he wrote: 'Just lately, some threats on the telephone, presumably because I would not give more radio talks.'¹⁶ Stuart's biographer, Geoffrey Elborn, noted that the writer was allowed to leave Luxembourg in February on condition that he reported to the Rundfunkhaus in Berlin. His refusal to do this 'was punished by a visit from the police in May who removed his identity papers and passport. He was telephoned in the middle of the night and told if he did not continue with the talks he would be arrested and sent to a camp...Pressure had come from the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, but Stuart's friends who could help were based in the Foreign Office, especially Weizsäcker'.¹⁷ Foreign Office pressure saved Stuart who wrote in his diary of 4 May: 'When I called to the police headquarters near the Alexanderplatz, was given my passport (such as it is) back. A relief! Not that, I think, I was in any great danger.'¹⁸

German Radio's European services continued to broadcast from Luxembourg. Items of Irish news were used not only by Hartmann's service but also by all the other language services. Some of the propaganda material, like the following sent in English to the Far East via Transocean the German Telegraph Service, indicated what must have been uppermost in the broadcasters' minds, an Allied invasion of the Continent:

The telephone service between England and Eire has now been suspended. Ireland is thus almost completely cut off from the outside world. Telegrams may still be sent and will be subject to drastic censorship. The PMG [British Postmaster General]...explained that the measures had been taken to prevent any leakage of military information about the Allied preparations for the invasion of the Continent which might reach the Germans via Ireland, since telephone and telegraph services between Eire and Northern Ireland will continue to function normally. It will be recalled that it was recently reported that the U.S. government had

requested the government of Eire to break diplomatic relations with Germany, but that the Irish government had refused.¹⁹

This item was repeated on the German home service and the English service later the same day²⁰ and was picked up the next day by Free India Radio in Hilversum which added:

In neutral opinion this latest measure is directed to prevent news about the widespread social unrest in England leaking abroad, rather than towards guarding military secrets.²¹

To prove its point, Free India Radio's Hindu language service carried a report on the Belfast dockers' strike the same day.²² Irish stories were also featured on Büro Concordia's clandestine station Radio National which falsely claimed to broadcast from within Britain. The BBC recorded a Radio National broadcast on 7 April 1944 entitled 'The situation in Ireland':

Ireland is the nearest neutral country to us, and the question of whether she is better off comes up when we consider that in England in wartime everything previously devoted to pleasure and social benefits has been turned over to armament manufacture. Conservation of manpower should in itself be conducive to neutrality, when we consider how many of our boys are being destroyed for this Jew-made war. We are inclined to despise the neutrals out of jealousy that they are out of it. I know Ireland is despised more than any other neutral, but we must remember her struggle to maintain her newly found freedom and independence, and that she is a very poor country whose ambition is to put herself on a level with the richer countries of Europe. Owing to her undeveloped industries, we could have obtained nothing from her in the way of armaments, and we could hardly have expected her to enter the war just to supply us with cannon fodder. Ireland is cut off from the rest of the world for imports, and dependent on her own imperfect self sufficiency. (Reference to Eire's food problems, increase in price of bread, and low butter ration). Many people have had to leave the country to find employment. Pork products have virtually disappeared, paraffin has been cut by more than 50 per cent and candles by 70 per cent. Coal is banned

for domestic use and electricity and gas are cut by 80 per cent. Clothes are rationed to the extreme of having to give up coupons for second hand goods, and footwear is so scarce that an appeal had to be made to the USA and to Switzerland. The government admits that the present soap ration is inadequate. Most of us are inclined to think a country remains neutral in order to make money, but this is not so in Ireland's case. There are a few countries left who can see a little farther than the ends of their noses and so they are wisely staying out of this nightmare. Although they are suffering at the moment and we are looking down on them, there will come a day when we shall see who were the bloody fools to go to war and risk everything for the sake of the Lion of Judah.²³

The invasion everyone had been anticipating eventually materialised when Allied troops landed on the Normandy beaches on 6 June. Germany's propaganda services had to put a brave face on the event they had earlier predicted could either never happen or be easily repulsed. In his diary entry for 8 June, Goebbels wrote:

The scene we are all obsessed with now is invasion. I am drawing up guidelines on how to handle this matter as far as domestic and foreign propaganda are concerned. With foreign propaganda it is important that we present the news as quickly as possible. For domestic propaganda, however, stoicism is needed, giving no inkling of defeatism. Up to now we've been successful. Initially our domestic news coverage was somewhat brazen, but I put a stop to that. It must be made clear to the enemy just how great are the losses they are incurring. That will work best in England and the USA.²⁴

Elsewhere in Berlin, Francis Stuart was visiting the dying Frank Ryan and found that he still took 'an interest in the news that we brought him. It was the days of the Allied landings on the Normandy coast and I remember that his last comment on the military operation was to point out to me what direction the American drive across the peninsula would probably take. But he was no longer, I knew, deeply involved in it'.²⁵

Little is known about the contents of Hartmann's talks for the remainder of the war. This is principally because the BBC's Maurice Irvine was invalidated out of the monitoring service with tuberculosis on 25 July 1944 and a decision was taken not to replace him with another Gaelic monitor. Irvine himself thinks that MI5 saw no further value in translating German Radio's Irish language talks because the course of the war had irreversibly changed in favour of the Allies.²⁶ Added to this was the fact that, according to Irvine and his fellow monitor Lorna Swire, Hartmann's talks had become repetitive and added nothing new in terms of military intelligence. Swire told the author that Hartmann was 'a crashing bore', adding, 'I remember looking at specimens of Dr Hans Hartmann's broadcasts and every one dealt with the same topic, viz. the evils of Bolshevism. I don't think he ever talked about anything else.'²⁷ All Irvine remembers up to mid-1944 were talks in Irish by Hartmann and anonymous talks in English on Irish topics. The Irish Army's monitors did, however, continue to tune into Hartmann until the end of the war though detailed transcripts were rarely typed up. In the final nine months of the war brief subject headings were, for the most part, all that the monitors in McKee barracks reproduced.²⁸

With American troops closing in on the Grand-Duchy in early September 1944, German Radio's European services were forced to move again having lost the crucial Calais transmitter to the Allies in August.²⁹ Relocating northwards to the small town of Apen, they reassembled in Bremers Hotel.³⁰ Hans Hartmann recalls having to leave the Luxembourg studios 'in a hurry and I think all the material which was there was captured by the Americans'.³¹ Before leaving, the Germans tried to dynamite the premises but failed to detonate the charges.³² A Radio Luxembourg engineer 'encouraged them to shoot holes in the transmitter tubes - apparently to divert them from more catastrophic sabotage. With the arrival of the Americans, he dug up from the garden a complete set of tubes he had buried there four years earlier for such a day'.³³

Irish Army monitors had noticed the upheaval in the Irland-Redaktion's broadcasting hours and wavelengths. On 1 August 1944 the service was still based in Luxembourg and putting out three bulletins a night at 5.15 p.m., 6.15 p.m., and 7.45 p.m. Irish time on 41.44 metres. The broadcasters fled Luxembourg shortly before it was liberated by American troops on 10

September. A talk by Hartmann on 'Anglo-American supply problems' was picked up in Dublin on 23 August 1944 but there followed a gap of over a month before Hartmann was picked up again on 26 September. By 3 October the Irish service was broadcasting nightly at 6.45 p.m. and again at 8 p.m. via the Bremen transmitter on 396 metres and Hilversum on 301.6 metres.³⁴

On 17 November 1944, Dublin picked up one of the last Hartmann talks reproduced in detail by G2:

Hello Ireland, this is Germany calling you for the second and last time tonight over the stations Bremen and Holland. Dr Hans Hartmann will now give you a commentary in Irish entitled 'Views on Neutrality'; Go mbeannaigh Dia dhibh a cháirde, when the convention was held in Dumbarton Oaks the new machinery was outlined by means of which the world of smaller nations is to come under the dictation of the three great powers, Russia, England and America. Whatever organisation is devised to deal with the affairs of the world after the war, it is clear that the smaller nations are to have no voice, even in those matters affecting their own destinies. Full power is to be reserved to the three great powers mentioned. In their colossal vanity and insolence they see no need to consult the right of any state but their own, and for other countries there is to be a slavish acceptance of the decisions of these self-appointed arbiters of the world's destiny. If they think that peace can be established on injustice they are grievously mistaken. There is no chance for any country in Europe to save its own culture and religion except through Germany who has been, and is still, fighting to establish a complete and just peace.³⁵

As well as Hartmann, the radio team in Apen comprised the acting head of the foreign radio services, Erich Hetzler, William Joyce and his wife Margaret, plus other members of the English service, in addition to Poles, Arabs and Indians working with Büro Concordia.³⁶ Adolf Mahr was also there, as his son Gustav told the author: 'Father had remained with...Büro Concordia all through the endless bombing of 1943-45, finishing up somewhere in the bogs of Oldenburg, west of Bremen, where they disbanded.'³⁷ The Apen team managed to put out propaganda programmes against all odds, thanks mainly to Hetzler's organisational abilities and

some Rundfunk engineers who provided the necessary technical back-up.³⁸ Throughout the final three months of 1944, G2 monitors in Dublin noted that the Free India Committee was broadcasting on the same wavelength as the Irish service immediately after Hartmann's news bulletins in Irish and English. On 14 December, during a commentary entitled 'More haste less speed', an Irland-Redaktion announcer said that 'amidst what one might almost say a chorus of Allied voices, the voice of our well-known journal the *Irish Independent*, points out that German war conduct was remarkably successful everywhere in the face of Allied attacks'.³⁹

No Irland-Redaktion programmes were picked up in Dublin between 14 December and Christmas but Hartmann was heard on 26 December giving a commentary on 'Hunger and Communism'.⁴⁰

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Through December 1944 and January 1945 the Irish output from Germany was down to only one occasional evening broadcast at 8 p.m. Irish time. This was changed to 8.45 p.m from 25 January.⁴¹ On 11 February a German broadcast to Ireland announced that the Fehmegerichte (courts with powers of summary execution) 'had been revived and had already taken action against collaborationists in Anglo-Irish War style'.⁴²

In March 1945, Hartmann was back on air twice a night at 6.45 p.m. and 8.45 p.m. On 17 March the Irland-Redaktion put out its last St Patrick's Day programme. The 6.45 p.m broadcast was 'completely blotted out by noise' according to G2 monitors, but the 8.45 p.m. transmission was picked up. The programme began with a song 'The Hills of Donegal' followed by a special commentary on St Patrick by Hans Hartmann. There followed another song 'The Emigrant', and the programme ended with the Irish national anthem 'The Soldiers Song'.⁴³ For the rest of March the format beamed to Ireland comprised German war communiqués, news in English, news in Irish read by Hartmann, and music. On 29 March G2 monitors noted the Bremen transmitter was off the air but the 8.45 p.m. Irish programme was picked up on 301.6 metres 'but fades out after nine minutes at 8.54 p.m.'. ⁴⁴ On 2 April 1945 the broadcasting hours to Ireland were changed again, this time to three times each evening at 5.45 p.m., 8.45 p.m. and 10.45 p.m. This format, followed for the first week of April, included Hartmann's news in Irish at 8.45 p.m. and a commentary in Irish by Hartmann at 10.45 p.m. followed by a

summary of military news, a musical interlude and political news from various countries.⁴⁵

By April 1945 the situation for the Germans had become so desperate that the German News Agency was reporting transmissions by a secret radio station in 'enemy-occupied Germany by the German Freedom Movement which bears the name Werewolf'.⁴⁶ Goebbels had authorised the use of an old long-wave transmitter at Nauen for the Werewolves, a Nazi group set up to carry out an underground war of sabotage against the invading Allied armies. The secret transmitter was on the air from 1 to 24 April 1945.⁴⁷

On 3 April 1945 Goebbels issued fresh guidelines for the press and radio services to devote themselves 'exclusively to re-establishing and increasing the power of resistance, the war effort and fighting morale both at the front and at home'. The Propaganda Minister wrote: 'The main task of the press and radio is to make clear to the German people that our Western enemies are pursuing the same infamous purposes and the same devilish annihilation plans against the German people as are our Eastern enemies.'⁴⁸ At 10.45 p.m. on 5 April, the Irish service was again quoting a member of the Catholic hierarchy to support Goebbels' line:

The Bishop of Clonfert in Ireland declared recently there will be a wilder struggle in future than at present for the human souls - a struggle of the powers of Light and Darkness. Atheism is coming forward once again.⁴⁹

With the military situation becoming hopeless for the Germans, a plan was hatched to get William Joyce to Ireland aboard a U-boat but even this was considered too risky. Goebbels issued a top priority order on 7 April which read: 'The Joyces are at all costs to be kept out of Allied hands.' Within days Joyce was moved from Apen to Hamburg where he recorded his final broadcasts, the last one being transmitted on 30 April.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, on 16 April Hartmann's service was putting out a commentary on 'The brutal methods of the Bolsheviks'. On 17 April at 5.45 p.m. the Irish service carried an extract from the day's German war communiqué, music, a general talk about the fighting in Germany, followed by more music. At 8.45 p.m., Hartmann's commentary was followed by highlights of the world's news. Then came music followed by a talk on the San Francisco conference to establish

the United Nations. At 10.45 p.m. Hartmann gave another commentary in Irish which was followed by news, music and a talk entitled 'What is going on in Soviet Russia?' On 18 April, the service broadcast 'a talk on Bolshevik life quoted from *Readers Digest* of December and January last'. G2 noted that 'about ten days ago, the German legation [in Dublin] were very anxious to obtain copies of the *Readers Digest*'.⁵¹ On 20 April, the three nightly broadcasts were cut to two, one at 8.45 p.m. and a second at 9.45 p.m.⁵²

With defeat staring them in the face, the German Radio team was still able to put out two programmes per night to Ireland, though Hartmann himself was not broadcasting every night. On 22 April - just two weeks before the end of the war, and less than a week after the Red Army began its final Berlin offensive and the U.S. Army had taken 300,000 prisoners in the Ruhr⁵³ - the Irland-Redaktion programmes went out as normal. The 8.45 p.m. bulletin contained a German war communiqué, music, military news, more music, and political news. At 9.45 p.m. there was military news and flashes followed by news from the fronts, music, political flashes from various countries and more music. An anonymous commentary entitled 'Autarchy' managed to include several Irish references:

Public utterances of British and American statesmen and propagandists have made it abundantly clear that one of the very first things the western powers, if victorious, want to abolish is the German conception of autarchy, meaning economic self sufficiency. They say that in the interest of world peace, Germany must be denied the means of an independent livelihood. The primary function, of course, is that Britain and the USA enjoy the sacred prerogative to rule the world by economic power and, if necessary, by hunger and bombs. Ireland was depopulated and turned into a cattle ranch not because she wanted to be free but because it was in the best interest of the Irish themselves. The farms of the Poles were destroyed, their women and children perished by the thousands in the concentration camps. We heard from General Eisenhower that the Germans will be allowed to grow solely potatoes as the only means of subsistence. That Germany is to be transformed into what Ireland was a hundred years ago, a country hopelessly overpopulated, not because she could not support her people but because the established economic order condemned half of them to famine and starvation. We quote

from a contemporary English source, the *Quarterly Review* in London, September 1835, what Ireland looked like even before the great potato blight sounded the death-knell of British colonization in Ireland: 'Whenever the potato crop becomes even in the slightest degree deficient, which occurs once every five or six years. the scourge of famine and disease is felt in every corner of the country. Those who have never travelled in Ireland can form but a very imperfect idea of the distress that generally pervades that unhappy country. Often have I seen in one miserable nearly unroofed dwelling, with scarcely a window remaining, from ten to twelve and in some instances more families pent up together with not an article of household furniture save the shattered remains of an old table or a solitary chair without a back. As for culinary utensils, an iron pot serves the threefold purposes of tea kettle, if they are able to buy tea, a pot to boil the potatoes in or the stirabout if they have none, and a vessel to wash the scattered remains of their garments. These with perhaps a broken cup and saucer make up the sum of the whole of their moveable effects.' So this is what the so called Allied Nations hold out as the future of the European continent. In the centre a German potato yard turned soon into a graveyard, and surrounding it an enormous Kurtal [probably Kugel = sphere] under the sway of Moscow, from Lisbon to Istanbul and from Narvik to Sicily.⁵⁴

As the Irland-Redaktion put out its final programmes, the Second World War in Europe was entering its closing days. On 23 April Heinrich Himmler, then head of the Volkssturm or People's Army, made a surrender offer to the Western Allies. This infuriated Hitler who, from his bunker in Berlin, immediately ordered Himmler's arrest. The fighting continued with U.S. and Soviet forces meeting near Torgau on 25 April and effectively dividing Germany in two. On 28 April the Italian dictator Mussolini was executed by partisans, and on 30 April Hitler committed suicide along with his mistress Eva Braun in the Führer's bunker in Berlin. The two had been married in a brief ceremony beforehand.⁵⁵ Later the same day, G2 monitors in Dublin noted something amiss with the evening's broadcasts from Germany. On both the 8.45 p.m. and 9.45 p.m. bulletins the monitors noted: 'Broadcast still announced as coming from Bremen. Usual announcer not on tonight,

announcer's voice not familiar.⁵⁶ On 1 May 1945 Goebbels committed suicide in Berlin. The regular programme from Germany to Ireland was not transmitted on that date but monitors in Dublin noted that 'at 8.45 p.m. instead of the usual broadcast to Ireland, the announcer, speaking in English, asked listeners to stand by for a special announcement. At 9.45 p.m. it was announced in German that Hitler had died'.⁵⁷

On 2 May 1945, as the Red Army completed the capture of Berlin and German forces surrendered in Italy, Hans Hartmann took the microphone in Apen for the last time. G2 monitors heard him read a news bulletin in Irish which lasted ten minutes, from 8.45 p.m. to 8.55 p.m. Hartmann's contribution was followed by a song entitled 'Come back to Erin'. After that came extracts from the German war communiqué. The monitor's transcript report read: 'Speaker announced at end of 8.45 p.m. broadcast that this was the only transmission tonight to Ireland. They would be back on the air at 8.45 p.m. tomorrow.'⁵⁸

At Bremers Hotel in Apen, Erich Hetzler - then still in charge of what remained of German Radio's European services - was busy organizing bogus Dutch identity cards for his foreign staff and 'advised everyone to disperse and do the best they could for themselves'. With American troops already in the area, Hetzler 'made a bonfire in the hotel yard of all the discs, tapes, scripts and paper' and then made his escape by bicycle.⁵⁹ Hans Hartmann was also on his way, heading for the nearby town of Westerstede where he had some relations. He recalls: 'The last thing I heard, when the radio service closed down, was that de Valera declared that he was sorry that Hitler was dead, and he conveyed his condolences. That was the last thing I heard from Ireland and from de Valera in the war.'⁶⁰

As night fell on McKee Barracks in Dublin on 3 May 1945, Army monitors began tuning into the normal wavelength for Germany's Irish programmes. But that night there was no one at the microphone in Apen. The monitor's transcription sheet read simply: 'German broadcasts, 3 May 1945. 8.45 p.m. Not heard. 9.45 p.m. Not heard.'⁶¹

Chapter 12

Berlin's Irish Audience

The size of German Radio's Irish audience during the Second World War, and in particular the audience for its Irish service programmes, is difficult to estimate as no precise figures are available for the period. Radio Éireann did not begin official audience research until 1953, though in 1939 Radio Éireann's Director, Thomas Kiernan, made the first attempt at some listener research but a questionnaire sent to 2,575 householders only drew an 11 per cent response.¹ In the late 1930s 'many Irish people saw little reason to purchase a licence in order to enjoy the new benefits of radio ownership, for in 1938 the Post Office in a drive against pirates found 25,000 such. There were probably many more'.² Nevertheless, the number of radio licences held in the 26 Counties provides some indication of the overall potential listening strength. At the end of 1939 there were 166,275 radio licences, or 1 in 17 of the population. Some 40 per cent of these were issued in the Dublin area, while Connacht and Donegal 'were only sparsely sprinkled with radio sets, if the licence figures were to be believed'.³

Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, who lived in Connemara for two years at Cois Ferraige, west of Spiddal, from September 1939, told the author:

It was difficult to hear the Irish talks [of German Radio] because there were practically no radios. People in the Gaeltacht were desperately poor and could not afford to buy radio sets. You would have to be a parish priest or a teacher to afford one. I remember women walking barefoot along the road, and the parish priest saying women should not come to Mass barefoot, but they could not buy shoes. People would gather outside the window of the local post office, trying to listen to one of the few radios in the locality. I heard Mühlhausen, I knew the thing was going on.⁴

Radio Éireann's annual report for 1941 - the year German Radio launched its nightly Irish service - revealed that there were 183,303 current radio licences, a rise of 2.1 per cent on 1940. The report put the statistics in their historical context, noting that:

radio licences had increased abnormally from 1933 when there were only 45,008, due partly to the popularising of the superheterodyne receiver. But new licences were only two per cent up in 1941, due partly to the difficulty in getting batteries...

According to the figures for 1941, one in nine people in Dublin had a radio licence, but the ratio fell to only 1:12 in Waterford, 1:15 in Limerick and 1:16 in Cork. In the Gaeltacht regions, where Mühlhausen and Hartmann could expect to have some following, there were even fewer licenced radios. The figures show a 1:26 ratio for County Donegal, 1:30 for Galway and 1:32 for Kerry. In fact, the 1941 radio licence total of 183,303 was a peak which fell off for the remainder of the Emergency when batteries were unobtainable, and that figure was not reached again until 1947.⁵

In 1939 Radio Éireann was 'completely ignored by a proportion of the population which, either from political sympathy or from sheer snobbery, listened only to the BBC'.⁶ But Irish listeners were not only tuning their sets to Radio Éireann and the BBC. William Joyce was a big attraction too. Fisk notes that 'Irish listeners who tuned into Germany generally recall only Joyce's thin and drawling voice on the English service', adding that Joyce was popular with Catholics in Belfast who regularly listened to him 'on the radio, and sometimes turned up their receivers when RUC patrols passed their homes'.⁷ The government of Northern Ireland did not share this enthusiasm for Joyce, and the Prime Minister Lord Craigavon:

was concerned about the effects on working men of the Haw Haw broadcasts and stressed that any counter attack should emanate from Downing Street. Such a reply would carry much greater weight than any personal views by an individual. These broadcasts should be supplemented by speakers recruited from the ranks of the labouring classes such as young farmers, shipyard workers, etc.⁸

In April 1940, *Life* magazine reported that 50 per cent of all English radio listeners were tuned to Lord Haw Haw. However, Joyce's biographer, J.A. Cole, noted that BBC calculations for the same period gave Joyce only 15.7 per cent of the English audience. According to Cole, the Galwayman had a similar following in neutral Ireland:

Interest spread beyond the United Kingdom. No listener research was undertaken in Southern Ireland, but it would be a reasonable guess that the proportion of listeners was not less than that on the other side of the Irish Sea. Those Irish who enjoyed the anti-British jibes for a time, until England stood in acute danger and the Germans had once more demonstrated their lack of respect for the rights of small nations, were unaware of Joyce's views on Irish independence.⁹

In the 1930s Joyce had been a leading member of Sir Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists. Cole notes that in Galway in 1920, the Joyce family welcomed the arrival of the Black and Tans and the RIC Auxiliaries, and William Joyce himself - then only 14 years of age - acted as an informer for the British.¹⁰ One person who had no illusions about Joyce's views on Irish independence was Hans Hartmann who had spent two and a half years in Ireland and had a good grasp of local politics and history. As far as Ireland was concerned Joyce was anti-republican and anti-nationalist. This would explain Hartmann's swift rejection of Joyce's offer to contribute talks to the Irish service.¹¹

But what of individual listeners' reactions to the Irland-Redaktion's programmes? Eimear Ó Broin - whose father León briefly shared a holiday cottage with Ludwig Mühlhausen in Co Donegal in 1937 - regularly listened to German Radio as a teenager in Dublin throughout the Emergency. He believes the Irish-language broadcasts were 'just a matter of German thoroughness. It was probably very wasteful because very few people, even in this country, listened to them in Irish. We listened to them more as a matter of curiosity'. Ó Broin says the audience was 'not a very regular one. Maybe more people here spoke Irish then than they do now, it's hard to know. We weren't listening to them as devoted Nazis or anything of that kind, far from it'. Ó Broin adds:

People who spoke Irish mentioned those particular programmes. We had friends from the Gaeltacht, the O'Brien family from Connemara. They heard these broadcasts. My father would have known people in the Folklore Commission. I remember him talking to the former Director, Professor Delargy, who knew a lot about this. He knew Mühlhausen. He would have been listening in to see what they were up to. It wasn't very

subtle or very well prepared propaganda really, it was more a projection of the presence of Germany into Irish-speaking Ireland. Most people here listened to Joyce and the other English speakers on German Radio.¹²

Hans Hartmann told the author that he personally had never received any reaction from people in Ireland to his broadcasts, adding: 'but the German Ambassador [to Ireland, Eduard Hempel] reported to the Foreign Office several times and I was told there was a fair number of listeners'.¹³ Francis Stuart got the opposite impression of the Irish service's audience when he eventually returned home to Ireland in the late 1950s. According to Fisk, the details of Stuart's broadcasts were 'not only forgotten but almost unknown'.¹⁴ Stuart told this author that 'the signal was feeble and difficult to hear in Ireland'.¹⁵ Elizabeth Clissmann's impression is that Hartmann had a very big audience for his Irish talks:

From what I heard after the war I think he had a very big audience in the Gaeltacht areas. I have never actually seen an analysis of what he said all during that period but I should imagine that he had the opportunity to be a little bit freer than somebody that was speaking in a language that would have been better known to the authorities.¹⁶

When ex-BBC monitor Maurice Irvine was asked by this author if there was any evidence the German broadcasts had been widely listened to or had any effect in Ireland, he replied:

I never saw any investigation of that at all. In fact, presumably the broadcasts were going on while I was still living in Dublin in 1941 and the first half of 1942, but I don't remember ever hearing anybody mention them or discuss them at all. So I don't think they had any very wide impact.

Irvine returned to Belfast in the summer of 1944 and can't remember anyone there ever saying anything about the German propaganda broadcasts to Ireland. He told the author:

On the whole I don't think people either North or South were aware of it [the Irland-Redaktion] very much. If they were, they didn't pay a lot of attention to it. People in general did sometimes mention Lord Haw Haw. He was a very pervasive influence throughout the whole of the British Isles. Probably more people in the South of Ireland were aware of his broadcasts than they were of the broadcasts specifically directed to Ireland. Whatever feelings one might have had about him, he was a very memorable character. His delivery and his somewhat bitter attitudes did bring him notoriety.

After listening to Germany's Irish output for 18 months at the BBC, Irvine felt Hans Hartmann's broadcast material:

was quite clever and probably did gauge possible reactions of support among people who were strongly influenced both by the Irish nationalist, and traditional Catholic social, teachings. It was quite cleverly slanted to that effect. As far as I personally was concerned, I wasn't fanatically pro-British. I tended to be more pro-British than pro-German, but Irish people on the whole at that time were fairly genuinely neutral in their feelings. They had no very strong commitment to either side. I think the propoganda, if it had been at all widely listened to, would have tended to ensure that Irish sympathies did not veer too much to the Allied cause.

Irvine also felt that German Radio's Flashback series served a purpose from the German viewpoint:

It was about Black and Tan atrocities and so on. They put in something like that most days if they could find a suitable event to commemorate. With the extreme Irish nationalists it could have been moderately effective. It tended to link up the misdeeds of the British in the past with their current activities, and to alienate any sympathy which there might have been for the British cause in Ireland.¹⁷

Alf Mac Lochlainn remembers hearing the Flashback broadcasts and Dr Hartmann's Irish talks which he considered 'conventional propoganda'.¹⁸

Another listener was Gearóid Mac Eoin, now Professor of Old and Middle Irish at University College Galway. He told the author:

I remember during the early years of the war hearing broadcasts from Germany directed to Ireland in Irish and in English. I was very young then and I cannot remember anything of what was said except the 'Twenty Years Ago Today' slot in English.¹⁹

Also listening in the Gaeltacht were UCG students Tomás de Bháldraithe and Seán Mac Réamoinn. The latter recalls hearing:

broadcasts in Irish by Mühlhausen while I was a student at University College Galway in 1939. During a student rag week I did a skit on the professor sending him up and calling him Doctor Fullhausen. But Lord Haw Haw was listened to with greater interest locally as a Galway man.²⁰

De Bháldraithe adds that he met Hans Hartmann:

on a train going to Galway before the war, he was going to Carna to study folklore. In those days you were not encouraged to speak to your academic superiors. [After the war] I never mentioned them [the propaganda broadcasts] to him. I thought he would not want to talk about them.²¹

In the 1960s, when de Bhaldrathe was Professor of Irish at UCD, he collaborated with Hartmann who came to record hundreds of hours of local Irish dialects in Gaeltacht areas along the West coast. Hartmann was then Professor of Celtic Philology at the University of Hamburg where his collection of taped Irish speech is kept, and is recognised as one of the most important archives of Irish language material in the world.

Another occasional listener to German Radio's Irish talks was the author Padraig Ó Siochfhradha whose translation of Wolfe Tone's diaries was used on air by Hartmann, though Ó Siochfhradha himself was unaware of this fact. Ó Siochfhradha's son told the author that his father 'considered these wartime broadcasts in Irish to be just exactly what they were, i.e. German propaganda'.²²

Seán Ó Lúing remembers hearing one of the first Mühlhausen broadcasts at the end of 1939 while in the Kerry Gaeltacht:

I was in the house of a neighbour, Pádraig Búlaeir of Gortmore, Ballyferriter. This was a social centre for young people of the parish who held card sessions there. The radio was turned on in anticipation and the young people, all locals who would enjoy the English language broadcasts of Lord Haw Haw, expected something in style. We were all disappointed. Mühlhausen was anything but an effective speaker. He was laborious, ineffective, with slow and poor delivery of words, giving out official German propoganda. He was dreary. After a few minutes, interest vanished and someone said "Sea, roinn amach na cártaí" [right, deal out the cards].²³

One small group of radio listeners in Ireland during the Emergency could perhaps not be classed as being in the mainstream; these were the German internees in Custume Barracks, Athlone. Some of them had been sent to Ireland as spies for the Third Reich including Günther Schütz - parachuted into Co Wexford on 12 March 1941 - who told the author:

We listened to all the news programmes in English from German stations. Every Friday night there was a transmission based on a newspaper edited by Dr Goebbels including his leading article. That was the event on Friday nights. We switched on William Joyce, Lord Haw Haw, and I think that was one of the most delightful transmissions to listen to. He was witty and, in German we would say, geistreich [clever], sharp, intelligent and sophisticated. A brilliant mind, Lord Haw Haw. I despise still what the British did to Lord Haw Haw, they executed him, they hanged him, and it is something despicable that they could have done that to a brilliant man like Haw Haw. He was an Irishman but they maintained that he was a British subject and therefore a traitor. We listened to the BBC and Radio Éireann too, mainly the news, nothing else.

When Schütz tuned into the BBC a fellow detainee, Hermann Goertz, threatened to report him back in Germany where, Goertz told Schütz, he

would face the death penalty. Schütz refused to go into detail about the incident telling the author that 'one should not speak ill of the dead'. However, without naming Goertz, Schütz said of him:

We had one fanatic in the camp. He was such a fanatic that he committed suicide when the war was lost. I can't say much good about that gentleman. We were antagonists. We disliked each other because whatever he tried to do he failed, and most of the things I tried I succeeded in. He threatened that he would see to it that we would be brought before a court in Germany when we would all return home. Some of us couldn't care less, we just ridiculed him.²⁴

Despite the uncertainty over audience figures it appears that both Mühlhausen and Hartmann had a steady following in the Donegal Gaeltacht. This may have been because both men stayed in Donegal while studying the local dialects; Mühlhausen in Teelin from August to October 1937, Hartmann in Bunbeg from mid-January to mid-February 1939, and in Teelin in April the same year.²⁵ Local man, Seán Ó Heochaidh, knew the Germans well having met them both in Donegal at that time. Ó Heochaidh, who also worked with Hartmann after the war recording dialects in North West Donegal, told the author that Mühlhausen and Hartmann 'were really good Irish speakers and I assure you that they had a great audience in these Gaeltacht areas'.²⁶

One element which put German Radio's Irish service at a distinct disadvantage to the English service when it came to attracting Irish listeners was the more restricted broadcasting time it was allocated. Beginning with a series of weekly talks in Irish every Sunday night by Ludwig Mühlhausen in late 1939, the nightly bi-lingual (English and Irish) service did not get under way until 1941 with test transmissions beginning at the end of August that year. Under the direction of Dr Hans Hartmann, from December 1941, the service developed from 30 minutes a night to 45 minutes of programming per night. From 21 January 1943, an extra 15 minutes was added bringing the time devoted to Ireland up to one hour.²⁷ This, however, was still quite small compared to the 15 hours a day devoted to English-language programmes from Germany to Britain. In fact, the hourly Irish ration was dwarfed by the total of 204 hours of programmes broadcast

daily in 1943-44 by German Radio's European services in no less than 29 languages.²⁸

Secrets of the Airwaves

One aspect of Germany's wartime broadcasts to Ireland must remain in the realm of conjecture due to the lack of any firm evidence; it is, whether or not the Irland-Redaktion's programmes were used to transmit coded messages. At the BBC, Maurice Irvine listened daily to the Irland-Redaktion's output from mid-1943 to mid-1944. When asked if he thought it would have been possible for the Germans to hide secret or otherwise coded messages in their broadcasts to Ireland, he replied:

It is a difficult question to answer. I suppose it would, theoretically, have been possible but it never occurred to me to think about that or to speculate about it at all. It certainly wasn't as overt as, say, some of the British broadcasts to France which sent messages like, 'The black goat has eaten the red roses', this sort of thing, which meant something to the people in the French maquis [underground resistance] that they were to go to a certain place to pick up arms or expect a landing of some other agents. But I don't think even Enno Stephan's book *Spies in Ireland* suggested that secret communications were made through propaganda broadcasts.²⁹

Stephan's 1961 book refers to secret radio codes for use in establishing contact between Germany and clandestine radio sets (with the capacity to both transmit and receive messages) held by the IRA and German agents in Ireland. The existence of such secret transceivers would seem to have obviated the need for coded messages via German Radio's programmes to Ireland.³⁰ In addition to the secret radio sets, the German legation in Dublin's Northumberland Road had a legally held transceiver which was eventually surrendered to the authorities, at the latter's request, in December 1943.³¹

In an interview with this author, Dr Hans Hartmann was adamant that his radio service had never been used to carry secret messages.³² In Dublin, however, G2 was suspicious of unconnected phrases slipping into certain broadcasts to Ireland. One Army monitor reported that: 'Some unusual

broadcasts have been made to Ireland since 30 January 1943, quite irrelevant from a propaganda point of view. In one, on 14 February, a monologue by a man called Jerry, with little or no point whatever, was introduced by the announcer with the words "And you my dear listeners for one moment, this moment, you have made me so happy", apropos of nothing that came before or after. Another broadcast on 24 February 1943, was a comedy sketch entitled "The Lady Interviewer" in which the following passage occurred':

Maid: I have a young man.

Lady: What is the name of this prince?

Maid: Jobson.

Lady: Not one of the Jobsons of North Dublin?

Maid: No, he comes from Arlen way.

Lady: Do you read much?

Maid: Not much. Mostly the *Irish Independent* and *Tit Bits*.

The monitor noted that 'this passage was, apparently, completely out of tune with the rest of the script'. G2 officers did not, however, take the trouble to check that day's *Irish Independent* which carried an unusual advertisement for the Red Bank restaurant in Dublin - a favourite haunt of the small German colony.³³

In November 1942 MI5 informed the Stormont government that since the war began:

There have been very few occasions on which items of news incorporated in the German broadcasts [concerning Ireland] could not be traced to normal channels of information, e.g. press agents, newspapers, wireless, etc. There has been no occasion on which information has been included in the German broadcasts when it was possible to establish the source as an enemy agent.³⁴

Dr Richard Hayes was drafted into G2 as their top code breaker for the duration of the Emergency. Alf MacLochlainn, who worked with Hayes at the National Library after the war, told the author:

Hayes spoke to me often enough of his counter-intelligence work during the war, but never mentioned any monitoring of German broadcasts to Ireland...It would strike me as very odd indeed for the German intelligence services to use propaganda broadcasts to Ireland as a vehicle for secret messages to agents in Ireland. It would have been so obvious, and something the Irish authorities would have been sure to monitor anyway for diplomatic and political reasons. There were lots of other German broadcasts freely heard here, including their domestic [German language] news bulletins. Secret messages to agents in Ireland, if there were such, could have been much more discreetly embedded in that kind of thing.³⁵

The author of another study of German espionage in Ireland, Carolle J. Carter, comments that: 'As far as codes in radio programmes were concerned, what I wrote was as far as I got. In other words there were references and/or hints but nothing more.'³⁶

The Abwehr agent Gunther Schütz sounded a dissenting note, however. When asked if he thought that messages may have been sent in code by German Radio, he replied: 'Yes, that is very likely but I didn't have any [such] arrangements with my army intelligence section.'³⁷

A wartime BBC monitor, Lorna Swire, says it was her impression 'that the Germans were trying to create a fifth column' of people sympathetic to Nazi aims with the broadcasts beamed to Ireland.³⁸ This view was shared by the Garda Síochána's Special Branch which investigated those named in the German broadcasts, as Seán O Heochaidh recalls:

Mühlhausen sent me a special greeting over the air which got me into a spot of trouble. The authorities were wondering what my connection with this gentleman was. Of course, until the matter was explained to the department in question by the late Professor Delargy [then head of the Folklore Commission, and a friend of Mühlhausen's] they took it for granted that I was a fifth columnist.³⁹

The Monitoring Services

As the war of words gathered pace from the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, belligerents and neutrals alike took steps to listen to each other's propaganda. Most countries had official listening posts as well as broadcasting services, with the former sometimes acting to supply the latter with propaganda material. In neutral Ireland the Army was charged with monitoring foreign broadcasts, while in Britain that job was undertaken by the BBC monitoring service. In Germany, monitoring was carried out at the Seehaus in Berlin.

Neutral Ireland: the Army's monitoring role

In Ireland, responsibility for monitoring foreign wireless broadcasts at the outbreak of war lay with the Army's intercept branch which came under the control of G2. The intercept branch was headed up by Commandant Sean Neligan who reported to G2's chief Colonel Liam Archer and, from June 1941, to his successor Colonel Dan Bryan. G2 supplied transcripts of material, which was judged to be of interest, to the following: Minister for Defence (Oscar Traynor), Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures (Frank Aiken), Army Chief of Staff (Major-General Michael Brennan to January 1940 when replaced by Lieutenant General Dan McKenna), Assistant Chief of Staff (Major-General Hugo MacNeill from August 1940 to June 1941 when replaced by Colonel Liam Archer), Secretary of Department of External Affairs (Joe Walshe).⁴⁰

Neligan and his team of monitors, who included personnel with foreign language abilities, were required not only to scan the airwaves but also to coordinate wireless intercept reports from both Army and civilian sources sent to Army headquarters from around the country. Some of these sounded more like the result of practical jokes than genuine monitoring reports, such as an obscure transmission picked up by G2's Command HQ at the Curragh in Co Kildare on 4 October 1941, on 300 metres at 8.15pm, as follows: 'Calling 175, calling 175. Villages appear innocent until little white men appear. End of message.'⁴¹

Army monitors also scanned morse code transmissions and in the early hours of 11 January 1942 stumbled on a confidential U.S. State Department message lasting two hours and containing details of low to medium level

American diplomatic postings to various parts of the globe. Eight days after the transmission, Dan Bryan notified Joe Walshe that 'the only appointment in Ireland was John C. Fuess, now serving Department, assigned vice-consul Belfast'.⁴²

Of the thousands of foreign broadcasts monitored and filed by the Irish Army from 1939 to 1945, the vast majority came from the Irland-Redaktion. However, transcripts of Irish language broadcasts by Ludwig Mühlhausen and Hans Hartmann are few and far between. This is in stark contrast to the wealth of material from these two speakers translated and transcribed by the BBC, which employed three Gaelic monitors at the behest of MI5.

Despite the menace of global war there were moments of light relief at McKee Barracks in Dublin. On 31 March 1942 at 7.15 p.m. monitors logged the following from Berlin: 'Economic warfare had been the traditional weapon of England throughout history. Peoples who she could not subdue through force of arms, she tried to subdue by systematic starvation. She was nearly successful in Ireland in 1921, she was not nearly as successful against G. Boothy in 1941.' A quick-thinking monitor later scored out Mr Boothy's name and substituted the African city of Jibouti.⁴³

Irish monitors were not alone in making such errors in difficult circumstances. BBC wartime monitor Vladimir Rubinstein notes the following gaffe: 'A Y-Unit monitor was watching Deutschlandsender, when a speaker declaimed: "Vom Eise befreit sind Strom und Baeche...", a famous passage from Goethe's *Faust*. The monitor in question promptly typed: "Weather report: The Reich is free of ice". Ernst Gombrich - by then a supervisor - chanced to be listening in with the monitor. When he saw the typed-out flash message, he angrily tore the paper out of the machine and gave vent to his outraged feelings. The monitor, quite unabashed, retorted calmly: "We cannot all be as clever as you are, Herr Doktor".'⁴⁴

Rubinstein outlines the magnitude of the task facing monitors: 'Accuracy, which many of us came to idolise, had two great enemies: the need for speed and poor reception conditions. There was little one could do about the former. Some of the information intercepted during the war was of urgent interest and often minutes counted. Whenever possible we would check doubtful words or passages, but there were always occasions when a few additional minutes would have been more than welcome to monitors searching for perfection. As to poor reception conditions our engineers never gave up

their struggle to improve interception techniques. Advances were made during the years, but the problems facing them as the military situation changed were formidable. Transmitters altered frequencies without previous announcements, reduced power, went off the air owing to enemy action, and were subjected to jamming or other interference. General noise levels and poor diction could also be problems, taxing monitors' ears to the utmost, but the quest for accuracy was never abandoned.⁴⁵

In Dublin, Army monitors had to abandon many broadcasts and wrote the words 'hopelessly noisy' on transcription sheets. In Berlin, radio engineers attempted to ensure that aerial bombardments did not halt transmissions, as Francis Stuart recalls: 'We had rubber masks or mouth-pieces. You weren't speaking directly into a microphone, you were speaking directly into this rubber thing, like when you are under anaesthetic, so that the noise of bombs is presumably excluded. But I think the vibration still interfered with the acoustics.'⁴⁶ When Stuart announced in one broadcast that he had seen U.S. prisoners of war in transit at a Berlin railway station, his comments were heavily circled in red ink by G2 staff. While there is no evidence that such information found its way to either British or American Intelligence, the close links between G2 and MI5 would suggest that it did.⁴⁷

Sean Neligan's team included Captain John Smyth, Captain Ryan and John P. O'Sullivan from Chapelizod in Dublin who specialised in listening to German radio transmissions. The monitoring team was supported by two female stenographers who took shorthand notes of the broadcasts before typing them up.⁴⁸ The intercept branch was complemented by the Army's Director of Signals, Major M.F. Gantly, who supplied G2 with regular intercept logs including foreign stations' call signs, names and transmitter locations. Gantly's team was also responsible for checking wavelengths for illegal stations operating within the State.⁴⁹

Second Lieutenant Joseph G. Healy

While most G2 staff had no idea who was putting out the Sunday night Irish talks from Berlin, one Army officer had inside information. He was Second Lieutenant Joseph G. Healy who had been seconded as a linguistic expert to the Army's Reserve Officer Corps from University College Cork in 1939.⁵⁰ Before the war Healy had developed a close working relationship

with the Irland-Redaktion's first speaker, Ludwig Mühlhausen, whom he had first met in Hamburg in the late 1920s. Healy was born in Cobh in 1905, the son of a local builder. His gift for foreign languages stemmed from his Italian mother who was also a noted linguist. Healy spoke Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, Italian and Irish, as well as being an expert in medieval Latin literature. Graduating from UCC in 1926, he won a scholarship which took him to Hamburg to study German as well as Celtic philology from 1927 to 1929. Staying with the Mühlhausen family, he became a close friend of the German professor who was then lecturing in Celtic Studies at Hamburg University. Mühlhausen became Professor of Celtic Studies at Hamburg in 1928, and regularly stayed with Healy's family in Cobh on his summer visits to Cork, and Kerry where he studied Irish on the Blaskets.⁵¹

In the 1930s, Healy and Mühlhausen went their separate ways. The UCC man went to study in Spain and Portugal and, in 1936, carried out extensive research into Irish-Spanish historical links at the Simancas archives. Healy took his Ph.D. in Hispanic Studies at Cork in 1936 and was appointed as lecturer in Spanish at UCC the same year. Meanwhile, the rise of Hitler boosted Mühlhausen's career, assuring the Nazi academic's promotion to a professorship at Berlin University in 1937.⁵² By July 1937, Mühlhausen was settling into his new job as Professor of Celtic Studies at Berlin and wrote, in German, to Healy telling him he would be studying Irish during a two month visit to Teelin in South West Donegal from August to October that year, adding: 'I am trying, at a distance, to get some way down the road towards feeling at home with Donegal Irish, and that really is not easy.'⁵³

According to a two-page report Healy drew up for Dan Bryan in December 1939, Mühlhausen had been identified with the German National People's Party as well as the Steel Helmet organisation and later the Nazi party. Healy's profile - which did not mention his own links with Mühlhausen - described the German as an 'enthusiastic Nazi who has corresponded with and visited Dr [Adolf] Mahr, Miss Cunningham (Trinity Hall), Dr [James] Delargy, Prof. MacNeill, Seamus Kavanagh (UCC) etc., and has at present living with him one Jimmy O'Toole employed at Siemens Schuckert, Berlin'.⁵⁴ Despite their close academic contacts in the late 1920s and early 1930s, there is no evidence that Healy was ever attracted to the German's fascist beliefs. Indeed, the detailed nature of the report on Mühlhausen that Healy

wrote for G2 would indicate the contrary position. Healy interrogated most of the German spies sent to Ireland during the war, and on one occasion he is said to have posed as a uniformed Luftwaffe officer in order to extract mission details from the imprisoned crew of a crashed German plane.⁵⁵

Britain: the BBC takes charge

The BBC's monitoring service was created in 1938 but the advent of war with Germany in September 1939 led to a fresh wave of recruitment of new monitors, many of them refugees from Hitler's Nazi regime.⁵⁶ Wartime monitor Lorna Swire told the author that 'two weeks before the war started, the BBC chartered a London bus after grabbing all the language experts it could lay its hands on and sent it to Evesham and they got to work. The BBC service was the mother of all monitoring and tutored the American system. Those who travelled on the bus were known as the Mayflowers'.⁵⁷ The monitoring unit was based at Wood Norton Hall, near Evesham in Worcestershire.⁵⁸

Amongst those recruited by the fledgling BBC monitoring unit was the Estonian-born Vladimir Rubinstein who, as a Jewish immigrant in Berlin, witnessed the Nazi takeover in 1933 before fleeing to Palestine. In August 1940 he joined the BBC where his linguistic abilities, particularly his mastery of Russian, were highly valued.⁵⁹

From the start, the BBC monitoring service had its work cut out to cope with the wave of foreign language broadcasts emanating from Britain's wartime adversaries and elsewhere. On the eve of the Second World War German Radio's foreign services were broadcasting in 36 languages compared to the BBC's ten. By the end of 1943, the Germans were broadcasting in 52 languages, including Irish, compared to the BBC's total of 45.⁶⁰

The BBC successively engaged three Gaelic monitors at Evesham and Caversham, from July 1940 to July 1944, to record the Irish language talks from Berlin. The first such monitor was Scottish, the remaining two were from Belfast. Lorna Swire recalls that initial attempts to monitor the Irish talks at Evesham were unsuccessful: 'The BBC managed to get a very shy girl from the South of Ireland, - no easy job in those days to import anybody. She was introduced to monitoring and someone held her hand for the first few days. Then she was left to do Hans Hartmann by herself, whereat she promptly fainted! After about another week, she said she needed a

holiday so the BBC let her go back to Eire and she never returned.'⁶¹ No one now remembers the identity of the 'shy girl from the South of Ireland'. Vladimir Rubinstein told the author that 'one of the English monitors, Joan Lyneham, may have listened to broadcasts in Gaelic as well as monitoring English-language broadcasts' before the appointment of a full-time Gaelic monitor. Another wartime BBC employee recalls that Joan Lyneham 'was very patriotically Irish'.⁶²

In her time at the listening service Lorna Swire saw 'quite a few phantom figures' pass through: 'The first male English monitor we had was a man called Blackwell. He put up with a morning's monitoring, went to rest on a sofa and departed the same night! There were quite a few like him.'⁶³ She also recalls another monitor's brush with a gang of Irish workers in Liverpool: 'A German language monitor, Max Benedict, came to the BBC as a 17-year-old refugee. His mother had smuggled him out of Czechoslovakia via Austria and had a pathetic faith he'd be okay in Britain because she had been kept alive by British milk supplied by the Red Cross after World War I. He got here with scarcely a penny and his first stop was at a doss-house in Liverpool which was full of Irishmen. On hearing where he was from, his doss-house mates chorused "Ah, Herr Hitler, he's a grand man", thereby filling Max with alarm and despondency. He thought he'd escaped from the frying pan into the fire!'⁶⁴

The BBC's Three Gaelic Monitors

1. Angus Matheson

The BBC's first full-time Gaelic monitor took up duty on 1 July 1940. He was the accomplished Scottish academic, Angus Matheson, who was head of the Department of Celtic at Glasgow University, a post he held from 1938 until 1962. Matheson was born in 1912. His parents were from the Isle of Lewis and he was brought up on the staunchly Protestant island of North Uist in the Western Isles. His interests lay in languages and history and, in 1934, after graduating from Edinburgh University with first class honours in Celtic, he spent a year studying in Dublin followed by a year in Bonn with Professor Rudolph Thurneysen. Pursuing a distinguished career at Edinburgh and Glasgow, he edited the fifth and sixth volumes of Alexander Carmichael's *Carmina Gadelica*, a compendium of runes, prayers and songs



Angus Matheson

collected from oral tradition in the second half of the 19th century. According to the current head of Glasgow University's Department of Celtic, Professor Derick Thomson - who worked with him from 1949 to 1956 - Matheson had a good knowledge of German and would have met German Celtologists like Hartmann and Mühlhausen whose talks he later translated for the BBC.⁶⁵

Joining the Evesham monitoring unit in the summer of 1940, just two weeks after the German Army entered Paris, the Celtic scholar from Scotland found himself in the thick of monitoring what Vladimir Rubinstein described as 'field days for the Nazi propaganda machine: special announcements reporting German military successes and illustrating the disintegration of the French Army together with lengthy descriptions of the shameful manner in which Germany was treated during the armistice negotiations in 1918'.⁶⁶ Rubinstein recalls Matheson as 'a quiet, roundly man with a nice, mischievous sense of humour. He was popular with his colleagues'.⁶⁷

Original BBC monitoring reports (i.e. full translations before editing) of German broadcasts in Irish Gaelic, held by Britain's Imperial War Museum, show that through 1940 and 1941 Angus Matheson was monitoring and translating the series of 15-minute talks by Mühlhausen and Hartmann.⁶⁸ Many of the translations of these talks were edited by Cecil Walsh who worked with the BBC monitoring unit from 1941 to 1947. For a brief period in September 1941, Matheson's work was undertaken by a stand-in monitor named McDonagh.⁶⁹

In early 1942 Matheson was joined at the BBC by a Belfast woman, Jane Charleton. Their work overlapped in February that year so the newcomer could get used to the routine. Charleton began monitoring the Gaelic broadcasts from Germany on her own once Matheson had left the BBC - to undertake special military service - on 12 March 1942.⁷⁰ A profile of Matheson, published in 1968, noted that 'during the later stages of the war he was on army service with the Intelligence Corps. Because of his knowledge of German much of his work was concerned with the decipherment of enemy signals in code. He saw service in France and Belgium following the invasion of Europe in 1944, and the end of the war found him on his way to India'.⁷¹

After the war Matheson did not discuss his monitoring work in detail. His colleague for seven years, Professor Thomson, recalls that 'he referred to it in general terms'. Peacetime saw a resumption of Angus Matheson's

distinguished academic career. He was the first holder of the Chair of Celtic at Glasgow, remaining in that position from 1956 until his death at the early age of 50 in 1962.⁷²

2. *Jane Charleton*

Born in Belfast in 1916, Jane 'Jeanie' Charleton had always been a keen student of the Irish language ever since first learning it at St John's primary school on the Falls Road. Charleton was a devout Catholic who had grown up in the working class district of Hawthorn Street in West Belfast. She studied Irish and French at St Dominic's High School on the Falls and supplemented her Irish language studies by taking summer holidays in the Donegal Gaeltacht where she and her elder sister Mary (known as Molly) stayed at Gillespie's Hotel in Derrybeg. In October 1933 Jane Charleton attended Queen's University, Belfast, studying French under Professor Douglas Savory, and Irish under Professor M.A. O'Brien. She was awarded a B.A. degree with first class honours in French and Celtic on 9 July 1937, and for a short time after her graduation she worked as a junior lecturer in Professor O'Brien's department. It was Charleton's high standard of achievement in Irish that gained her a job as Angus Matheson's successor at the BBC's wartime monitoring service.⁷³ On 1 February 1942 Jane Charleton began work at Evesham, monitoring and translating a talk by Hans Hartmann. The broadcast consisted of Hartmann reading an extract from the Irish translation of Wolfe Tone's diaries. She handled all the Irish language broadcasts from Berlin from then until January 1943 when she was replaced by the BBC's third and final wartime Gaelic monitor, Maurice Irvine.⁷⁴ Irvine told the author that Charleton 'left the BBC abruptly because she was homesick for Belfast'. Another acquaintance recalls that Charleton found the monitoring work to be 'rather boring'. After the war Jane Charleton continued to apply herself to the Irish language and was an active member of Belfast's Gaelic Choir. She became a schools inspector with the Northern Ireland Department of Education, a job she held from 1947 until her retirement at the age of 60 in 1976. She died in 1981.⁷⁵

3. *Maurice Irvine*

Born in 1918, Maurice Bernard Irvine grew up in a three-storey terrace house in North Belfast overlooked by Crumlin Road prison. His father ran a

business repairing typewriters and other office equipment. Maurice was sent to school with the Christian Brothers in Belfast, where he was taught Irish, as well as French, by Brother Nagle from Cork. Irvine recalls that 'the Brothers put a good deal of emphasis on the study of the language'. Like Jane Charleton, who was two years his senior, Irvine spent summer holidays in the Donegal Gaeltacht at Rann na Feirste where he improved his Irish with Father Larry Murray from Dundalk and a Belfast priest called Father Bradley.

After passing the Leaving Certificate in 1936, Irvine spent five years working with the Department of Local Government and Public Health in Dublin. After becoming disillusioned with what he felt was a 'dull and unproductive' job in neutral Eire, Irvine was visiting Belfast when he met Jane Charleton who had been at school with his sister Maureen. Charleton was then on the point of departing from the monitoring service and, armed with this information, Irvine secured a translation test with the BBC. He told the author: 'They gave me this test in Broadcasting House in Belfast, which was not very rigorous, just to listen to the news in Irish broadcast from Radio Eireann and translate it. It dealt with the main news events of the day, and because I was usually interested in current affairs I knew more or less what was in it anyway. It wasn't a very searching test at all but they were obviously satisfied with it and offered me the job.'

Irvine was 24 years old when he began working at Evesham on 9 January 1943. It was his first experience outside Ireland. Despite passing the BBC's translation test he had not actively spoken or used Irish much for the previous six years since leaving St Mary's CBS grammar school in Belfast.⁷⁶ Some of Irvine's wartime BBC colleagues remember him well. Lorna Swire recalls him as 'a very pleasant young man. He was so tall and slim that we called him "The Wavelength"'. Vladimir Rubinstein also remembers the Irishman: 'For a brief period he was billeted in the same house with me. He was very tall and found his bed far too short. So, he moved a bookcase to the foot of it, resting his feet on one of the shelves when he went to sleep.'⁷⁷

One of the first translations Irvine undertook was a talk in Irish by Hans Hartmann on 12 March 1943. The subject was the North African campaign.⁷⁸ Irvine monitored Hartmann's talks from January 1943 to July 1944. What impression did he get of the German academic turned



Maurice Irvine

propagandist? 'He struck me as being an average, typical loyal German. He did not give the impression of being a fanatical Nazi but going along, as most Germans did at the time, with the struggle in which their country was engaged. Even if he had any doubts about the validity of the National Socialist ideology he did not reveal anything of that.' Irvine found Hartmann's Irish 'clear, well constructed, correct and with quite a good accent. Not from Donegal, probably more Connaught or Munster or a mixture of the two'.

During his 18 months with the monitoring service, Maurice Irvine only recalls one broadcast by Hartmann causing any excitement among his supervisors. 'Quite early in my career there, Hartmann spoke about the transfer of part of the [Soviet] Army in Siberia to the Western front which he took as an indication of German success in annihilating some of the Russian forces in the West. There was no other source for this allegation so it caused a certain amount of excitement and one was asked to type it out immediately'.

Irvine also monitored other Irland-Redaktion speakers, and remembers Francis Stuart's weekly talks: 'He struck me then as a person who was rather preoccupied with his own thoughts and a desire to come to terms with events of the time. Trying to shelter himself from the impact of the terrible events that were going on but also lending himself (at the time I felt in a rather unscrupulous fashion) to being used as a tool of German propaganda, even though he didn't feel himself to be so. This rather demeaned his credentials as a writer and artist.'⁷⁹

Irvine was occasionally asked to monitor Vatican Radio broadcasts, and adds: 'It was assumed that being Irish I was probably a Catholic and able to understand the background of what the Vatican was saying.' He was never asked to monitor Radio Éireann broadcasts although records held by the Imperial War Museum show that Radio Éireann's English language output was monitored from 7 September 1939 right through the war.⁸⁰

Irvine had only been working at Evesham for a bare three months when, in April 1943, the entire monitoring centre was moved to Caversham Park near Reading in Berkshire where it remains to this day. The staff were never told the reason for the move which was prompted by Allied fears that the Germans would develop a nuclear bomb thus threatening London and necessitating the evacuation of BBC Headquarters' staff from the capital.⁸¹

According to Irvine, he and his colleagues at Caversham Park sensed the tide of war turning in favour of the Allies when 'around the summer of 1943 there was a feeling of greater optimism among the British population as a whole, political groups and the press, that the worst was over as far as Britain was concerned'.⁸²

On 25 July 1944 Irvine was invalided out of the BBC with tuberculosis on 25 July 1944. The high pressure work in cramped conditions and a poor diet (e.g. one fresh egg per person per fortnight) had taken its toll on the Belfast man who spent some time in hospital in England before being transferred home for treatment at White Abbey sanatorium outside Belfast.⁸³

Irvine was not replaced by another Gaelic monitor and he suspects that by the end of July 1944 - with the D-Day landings successfully completed and the establishment of a second front under way - MI5 no longer regarded the monitoring of German broadcasts to Ireland as serving any practical purpose. His suspicions that MI5 controlled the BBC's monitoring role appear well-founded according to one study which notes that there was direct MI5 involvement in checking BBC monitors' wartime reports.⁸⁴ However, wartime monitor Vova Rubinstein told the author: 'I have certainly not come across any MI5 involvement at Evesham or Caversham.'⁸⁵

Home in Northern Ireland in 1946, Maurice Irvine was operated on for a collapsed lung and his health gradually improved. When his father died two years later he worked for a time in the family machine repair business before moving to London as a social worker. From 1958 to 1960 he taught English with Berlitz in Germany before returning to London where he married. Afterwards he moved with his family to Cambridge where he and his wife taught English to foreign students. Now retired, Maurice Irvine lives with his wife in Brighton on the south coast of England. He is the author of *Northern Ireland: Faith and Faction*, published in 1991.⁸⁶

Germany: Dr Hartmann at the Seehaus

While Ireland and Britain listened to Germany during the conflict, the Third Reich was listening too. However, according to one study of broadcasting in the period, the British made far more use of monitored material as a source of news and intelligence than the Germans did. In his history of BBC Radio's World Service, Gerard Mansell notes that 'even though the German Foreign Ministry carried out a certain amount of

monitoring, its activities in this field were disapproved of by Goebbels who regarded them as treasonable'.⁸⁷ As early as 2 September 1939, the Nazi party's newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter* 'announced a complete ban on listening to foreign (and not merely to enemy) broadcasts, infraction of which could at the maximum incur the death penalty'. As the war continued, German newspapers reported that 'radio criminals' were fined, imprisoned and, in some cases, executed.⁸⁸

While monitoring by the Irish Army began in earnest in 1939, the British Foreign Office had been monitoring Italian and German broadcasts since the summer of 1937. Germany, however, did not begin monitoring foreign radio broadcasts until July 1940 and, as with other services, the German monitoring service - based at the Seehaus in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee - was the subject of intense rivalry between the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry.⁸⁹

Radio Éireann was included on the list of foreign radio services to be monitored and the person chosen for the task was Hans Hartmann who comments: 'I was asked to listen to Radio Éireann broadcasts at the Seehaus [monitoring centre] and to translate them from Irish to German. However, the reception was frequently bad and I was not always able to accomplish the translations.' Radio Éireann's output, when available, proved useful to Hartmann in putting together topical programme ideas for the *Irland-Redaktion*.⁹⁰

According to one study, 'the Seehaus in late 1941 listened daily to 1.75 million words in 36 languages'. It employed over 500 people and 14% of its staff were non-German. By comparison 50% of BBC monitors were non-British.⁹¹ Despite reception difficulties Hartmann's task of monitoring broadcasts from Ireland was not made easier by the fact that Radio Éireann's transmitters went off the air simultaneously during air raids on Britain and Northern Ireland. This was to prevent German bombers using them for direction finding. The BBC had earlier supplied Radio Éireann with drive units so the Dublin, Athlone and Cork transmitters could be synchronised as a protection against the Germans using direction finding beams during night raids. The BBC used the same system on all its transmitters from the outbreak of war.⁹²

One man who might have been chosen to work at the Seehaus was Ludwig Mühlhausen. In the event he was not asked but was instead being groomed for

S.S. work in France. According to Elizabeth Clissmann, the German linguist read and censored letters in Irish which were destined for [British Army] prisoners of war.⁹³

The German monitoring service had a more advanced sound recording system than its British and Irish counterparts. Irish monitors were backed up by shorthand note-takers who produced typed transcripts of broadcasts but there was no sound recording equipment at McKee Barracks in Dublin.⁹⁴ BBC monitors took their own written notes of broadcasts as well as recording them on wax *Ediphone* cylinders.⁹⁵ Germany's technology was far more advanced and trial recordings using magnetic tape had begun as early as 1932.⁹⁶ By 1939, RRG studios had tape recording equipment as well as portable tape recorders. However, wartime supplies of the relatively new magnetic recording tape, used mainly by the German Army and German Radio, were badly hit by a fire at the main production plant in Ludwigshafen in July 1943.⁹⁷ No recordings of *Irland-Redaktion* programmes appear to have survived the war.

Chapter 13

'Having Backed The Wrong Horse'

The end of hostilities in Europe in May 1945 saw the disbandment of German Radio's Irish team. Some of those who had worked for the Irland-Redaktion were able to revert to their pre-war occupations. They included Francis Stuart who, as we have seen, eventually returned to Ireland to resume his work as a writer. On his release from Arbour Hill prison, John O'Reilly - the parachutist from Kilkee - bought a pub in Dublin. Among those who chose to live in Ireland after the war were Liam Mullally, Madeleine Meissner, Charles Budina, Mona Brase, and Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann. Nora O'Mara remained in Germany where she still lives, and Sonja Kowanko returned to her family in Paris. Hilde Spickernagel pursued a distinguished post-war teaching career in Germany and was later appointed as a secondary school principal.

As we have also seen, Susan Hilton was discovered in a Nazi camp in Germany at the end of the war. She was brought back to London to face trial for 'assisting the enemy' and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Hilton was the only member of the Irland-Redaktion to face trial and imprisonment, although others - like Murphy, Meissner, O'Reilly, Stuart, Mahr and Mühlhausen - were interned without trial.¹

Members of the England-Redaktion faced tougher sanctions from the authorities in London. Norman Baillie-Stewart was sentenced to five years imprisonment. John Amery was hanged at Wandsworth prison on 29 December 1945. As well as facing charges arising from his broadcasting work, Amery was on trial because he had recruited an SS unit from among British prisoners of war. On 3 January 1946, five days after Amery's execution, William Joyce, the England-Redaktion's chief announcer, was hanged at Wandsworth. One of Joyce's biographers makes the point that while 'it seemed necessary that a few should be hanged...with the deaths of Joyce and Amery, the Labour government felt that it had let enough blood to satisfy what the press represented as public anger at wartime treason'.²

After the war, those who had been the most committed Nazi party members of the Irland-Redaktion - Mühlhausen and Mahr - were broken men who never managed to put the pieces back together again. The remainder of this

chapter examines the post-war circumstances of Adolf Mahr, Heinz Mecking, Ludwig Mühlhausen and Hans Hartmann.

Adolf Mahr: The Final Years

Adolf Mahr - the man who created the daily Irish service of German Radio - was never to return to Ireland despite the fact that he was, technically, a senior member of the Irish Civil Service technically on leave of absence from his post as Director of the National Museum in Dublin. Shortly after the collapse of German Radio's European services at the beginning of May 1945, Mahr was captured by British troops. According to his son Gustav: 'Father was interned by the British Military Government, being released in late spring [1946] probably for reasons of severe bad health.'³

Apart from the fact that he was an internee for a year, two other things appear to have blocked Mahr's return to his post at the National Museum. The first was a very public - and, for the government, embarrassing - row in the Dáil in December 1945. The second was a damning report on Mahr drawn up by G2 for the attention of senior government ministers. The row in the Dáil erupted on 6 December 1945 when the former deputy-leader of the opposition, James Dillon,⁴ raised the Mahr issue with the Minister for Education, Thomas Derrig. In July 1934 Derrig had secured the approval of de Valera's cabinet to promote Mahr to the top museum job.⁵ The Dáil exchange was as follows:

Mr Dillon asked the Minister for Education if he will state for how long the Director of the National Museum of Ireland has been absent from his position; whether he is the same person as Dr A. Mahr, Keeper of Irish Antiquities Division; for how long his absence from duty will be excused; and when and by what method a successor will be appointed in the event of these positions being declared vacant.

Minister for Education (Mr Derrig): The Director of the National Museum has been absent from his position since July 1939. He is the same person as Dr A. Mahr, Keeper of the Irish Antiquities Division. I am not in a position to make any statement regarding the duration of Dr Mahr's absence, and as the positions which he held in the museum have not been

declared vacant, the question of appointing a successor has not yet been considered.

Mr Dillon: Am I to understand that this gentleman returned to Nazi Germany in time to take part in the nefarious activities of the Nazis in that country and now, having backed the wrong horse, he is sitting there waiting to come back and land here as soon as the opportunity offers? Does the Minister think that such a person is a suitable person to reinstate as director of Ireland's museum, and, if he does not, will he terminate his employment with equitable compensation and get some respectable citizen of this country to discharge the important duties of the two offices mentioned in my question?

Mr Derrig: Dr Mahr was appointed the official Irish representative to the Sixth International Congress of Archaeology to be held in Berlin in August 1939, and he left Ireland in the preceding month to attend that congress, bringing his family with him to spend a holiday in his native home in Austria. When war became imminent, he tried to return to Dublin but was unable to do so, owing to the delay in bringing his family from Austria. He then reported to the Irish Chargé d'Affaires, with a view to getting a 'safe conduct' to return to Ireland, but it was not possible to have this done and he was granted leave of absence without pay until circumstances permitted him to resume his position. I am not in a position to say anything further at the moment, nor can I say when Dr Mahr will be in a position to resume.

Mr Dillon: If this gentleman turns up tomorrow with the battle-stained flag of Nazi Germany wrapped around him, will he be reinstated in this position? Will we go on retaining a gentleman seated in Germany for the last six years so long as the going was good?

Mr L. J. Walsh: How do you know he is a Nazi? Are all Germans Nazis?

Mr Dillon: I am putting a supplementary question. Will we retain this gentleman, or will we say to him: 'Your position is now vacated. If there is any compensation equitably due to you under your original

agreement, we will give it to you and advertise the position so that some competent Irish scholar can discharge the duties of this job', or will we install him indefinitely as the Director of the National Museum?

Mr Derrig: The matter is being considered. No definite decision has been come to, pending a clarification of the position as to whether Dr Mahr will be in a position to return to his post. The Government may come to a decision in the matter. No decision has been come to so far. As I have said, the position has not been declared vacant and the question of appointing a successor does not arise. I do not think the House would expect me to answer the statement that Deputy Dillon has made, nor do I consider it within my province. I think the Deputy has rather exceeded the privileges which apply to him as a member of the House in the statement he has made regarding a person who is still, technically at any rate, an officer of the Irish Civil Service.

Mr Dillon: 'Technically' is good. When will you make up your mind about it, one way or the other?⁶

This exchange signalled publicly for the first time the fact that someone who had served the Nazi cause during the war had held, and continued to hold, a senior post with the Irish Civil Service. Not unnaturally, the government demanded a profile of Adolf Mahr from G2's Colonel Dan Bryan. Bryan's report was sent to the government on 19 December 1945 and told de Valera and Derrig all they needed to know about the Austrian archaeologist they had promoted eleven years earlier. It read:

Mahr was born in 1887 and would, therefore, be 60 and will attain the minimum limit for retiring in 1947. He was the Group Leader of the Nazi organisation in Dublin and as such was closely in touch with the German Legation and the Nazi organisation in London, and also with the German Press Agency in Dublin. He appears to have cooperated with, or possibly directed, Helmut Clissmann in at least cultural and propaganda activities. Just before the war Mahr was succeeded as Group Leader by Mecking. Evidence at my disposal from two sources indicates that Mahr, in the later years of the war, directed or controlled the radio section

which was sending German propaganda to Ireland. This section was evidently at this period under the control of the Foreign Office and not the Ministry of Propaganda. There are also some indications that Mahr was in charge of what was called the Irish Section in the Foreign Office. His name has also been mentioned in connection with his radio activities at one of the treason trials. Mahr, while resident in Ireland, was an open and blatant Nazi and made many efforts to convert Irish graduates and other persons with whom he had associations, to Nazi doctrines and beliefs. Apart from his pre-war and war activities, which brand him as a Nazi of some importance in relation to Ireland and make, in my opinion, any question of his immediate return unwise, there is no guarantee that further discoveries may not establish that his activities in connection with Ireland went further than propaganda. In the circumstances I recommend that no consideration be given to his return until the situation in regard to Germany and German nationals is much clearer.⁷

Bryan's report, coupled with the bruising Dáil exchange between Dillon and Derrig, effectively blocked whatever chance Mahr had of resuming his role as Director of the National Museum. Gustav Mahr sums up the events as follows: 'As a result of a campaign launched by certain colleagues of happier days, claiming that he [Adolf Mahr] had been a Nazi spy in Dublin and therefore entirely unsuitable for resuming his post there, the Irish government pensioned him off at short notice and only twelve years of active service to his credit.'⁸

James Dillon was to raise the spectre of Adolf Mahr one last time in the Dáil almost a year later on 13 November 1946. During a Committee on Finance debate,⁹ the Minister for Finance, Frank Aiken, asked the House to approve a supplementary estimate of £1,000 for:

temporary professorships in the Irish Academy...intended for certain distinguished foreign scholars who, for reasons arising out of the altered conditions on the Continent of Europe, are unable for the time being to resume their careers in their home countries.

Sensing that such a temporary professorship could be a back door into the country for Mahr, Dillon went on the offensive again, commenting:

I remember at one time there was a 'wangle' to restore to public employment in this country a gentleman who was at one time leader of the Hitler Youth in this country and a colleague of the head of the Gestapo in this city. I am happy to think that some references which I made here helped to scotch that plan and to ensure that the gentleman in question having gone back to Hamburg has been left in Hamburg.

An Ceann Comhairle: There is no money for him in this vote.

Mr Dillon: Wait a minute.

An Ceann Comhairle: I have been waiting for several minutes.

Mr Dillon: I wonder is there no money for him in this vote? That is just the very thing I am working around to. Is Dr Mahr going to represent to us that he is a great authority on Celtic remains in and around Hamburg and to sit down again in the Royal Irish Academy? If he got wind of the word, he would be coming like a tornado. He has been trying it for the last twelve months. I have no grudge against him but he took his hook out of this country on the eve of the war and thought that he would come back with a Brown Shirt and a Swastika -

An Ceann Comhairle: The Deputy is travelling very far outside the terms of the Estimate.

Mr Dillon: Will the Minister give us a guarantee that Dr Mahr who is at present holding office, on leave of absence without pay, as Director of our Museum, is not coming back under this scheme? Is he or any of his ilk going to come here under this scheme? I should like a guarantee from the Minister on that point.

Replying to Dillon, Aiken told the Dáil:

I take it that if the gentleman who was in charge of the National Museum were to come back to Ireland to work, it would be in the Museum and not in the [Royal Irish] Academy, that he would work. I have no brief for him. I do not know whether he will ever come back to this country or not. Deputy Dillon wants to take advantage of this Dáil to abuse everybody, right, left and centre, to kick people who are down, but I say this for that gentleman, that he went towards the fighting, unlike Deputy Dillon.

Mr Dillon: That is an offensive and impudent observation for you to make.

Mr Aiken: No more offensive than the Deputy's.

Mr Dillon: And the Minister is an impudent and offensive man.

Mr Aiken: The Deputy thinks he has the sole licence to be offensive in this House. On every occasion on which he can throw dirt on the government and on his country, which he hopes will be used to get him patted on the back by the enemies of this country abroad, he comes in here and throws the dirt.

The chronological sequence of events would suggest that the government made its mind up not to allow Mahr back to Ireland soon after it considered Colonel Bryan's memo in December 1945. The decision to bar his return would most likely have been taken after Mahr's release from internment in April 1946. The Dáil debate of 13 November 1946 makes clear, however, that as of that date no public announcement readvertising the post of Director of the National Museum had been made.

Gustav Mahr concludes the story of his father's post war years:

He had moved to Bonn where he had friends and the chance to carry on with his work as a prehistorian, making a scant living on lecture fees and research funds and trying to launch out on a new career as director of an institute for mining history which had been his special field of interest ever since his early career in Austria. He succeeded in getting

'denazified', so that he could have taken up the job with official approval. I, as his son, was to be his assistant and librarian, he was to be returned his magnificent library stored at the National Museum [in Dublin]. This happy development in his early sixties was too much for his ailing heart. He died in May 1951 at Bonn.¹⁰

Heinz Mecking: Death in the Soviet Union

Heinz Mecking, the man who in July 1939 had taken over the leadership of the Auslandsorganisation in Dublin from Mahr, had been an adviser to the Turf Development Board. Like other members of the German colony he left Ireland for Berlin on the outbreak of war in September 1939. According to Klasmann, the company that had supplied him to the TDB, Mecking became an officer in the German Army. In 1941, after the invasion of Russia, Mecking was sent there to take charge of turf production. He was later taken prisoner and died in detention at Tiraspol in Soviet Moldavia on 18 December 1945.¹¹

Ludwig Mühlhausen: Internment of an SS officer

Ludwig Mühlhausen was taken prisoner by the Americans near Ulm in the Spring of 1945.¹² The first that Irish Military Intelligence knew about his detention was a memo written by the former G2 2nd Lieutenant Joe Healy to Army Headquarters on 27 September 1945. By that time Healy had resumed duties as a lecturer at University College Cork. He told G2 that he had received a letter from Professor Mühlhausen written in July 1945 stating he was a prisoner of war in Naples. Healy noted that Mühlhausen held the rank of an Untersturmführer (2nd Lieutenant) in the SS.¹³ In fact, Mühlhausen remained in detention as a prisoner of war for almost three years, from May 1945 until March 1948.¹⁴ On his release, one of his daughters described him as being 'physically and spiritually destroyed'. Subsequently, the professor who had travelled the Gaeltacht areas from the Blaskets to Donegal, 'could work scientifically only in a limited capacity'.¹⁵ After the war, Mühlhausen's name appeared only once on a scholarly work as editor of a collection of fairy tales.¹⁶ Paralysed by a stroke, Mühlhausen died of a heart attack on 15 April 1956. His library went to the University of Tübingen.¹⁷

Hans Hartmann: The Homecoming

Hans Hartmann's final broadcast to Ireland went out from Bremers Hotel on 2 May 1945, just 24 hours after the formal announcement of Hitler's death.¹⁸ The news of Eamon de Valera's visit to Hempel, on 2 May 1945, to convey his condolences on the death of Hitler came too late to be used by Hartmann's service which had then gone off the air. With American troops already in the area¹⁹ Hartmann fled Apen along with the other broadcasters and radio technicians. It was every man for himself. Hartmann told the author:

I spent the period from 1945 to 1948 in a village near Apen, called Westerstede, where I had some relations. In 1945, I was visited there by two British secret service officers who interrogated me on the subject of British members of the staff of the Irland-Redaktion. At the beginning of the interrogation they pointed out to me that they were not interested in me personally nor the work I had done during the war.²⁰

While it appears that Mühlhausen was shunned by his former Celtic Studies colleagues after the war, Hartmann's friends rallied round him and his family. Seán Ó Heochaidh, who had worked on Irish dialects with Mühlhausen in Teelin - and later with Hartmann in the north west Donegal areas of Gweedore and Cloughaneely - recalls that:

Mühlhausen was a real Nazi, but to my mind Dr Hartmann was the opposite, which I think helped to save him in the end...He was fortunate enough to end up in the American zone at the end of the war, and the Celtic scholars of the world vouched for it that Celtic scholarship could not do without him. So, I believe it was then that he was freed. Poor Mühlhausen was thrown into a camp and, after suffering a stroke, he died.²¹

Seán Ó Súilleabháin, who had studied with Hartmann at the Folklore Commission from 1937 to 1939, was concerned about his friend's fate. He told the author:

When the war came to an end and Germany was defeated, people like Hartmann, or anybody who had been against the Western Allies, were arrested and put into detention camps. I got a letter from Hartmann at the end of the war. He wrote to me from wherever the camp was telling me how badly off he and his wife and the children were, for clothes, for food and everything. So, I had a very small salary at that time, in 1945 or 1946, and I went down to the Red Cross office here in Dublin and gave them a sum of money, which was a large amount in those days, to be sent on to Hartmann and his family. Afterwards, he came specially to Ireland to thank me and he said that I had saved their lives. Things were very bad in Germany at that time. I was fond of Hartmann, I knew him, and when you hear of somebody in trouble you try to help. We escaped the war here. I don't know what he said on the radio but there he was, a prisoner being held with his wife and children. I did that because it was the only way I could get through to help him.²²

However, contrary to the impression formed by Ó Súilleabháin and other friends of Hartmann's in Ireland, the German never became a prisoner of the Allies. Hartmann told the author:

I was never arrested, taken prisoner or put into a detention camp. I lived from the outset as a free man in the British zone where the living conditions at the beginning were hard in the extreme, causing many anxieties and fears which I communicated to my friends abroad. But I managed, with the aid of my wife, to make a living by doing translations, working in a nearby bog to obtain fuel for heating and cooking, and by securing most valuable help from friends in Ireland.²³

In 1948 Hartmann joined the lecturing staff of the University of Göttingen where his *venia legendi* (authorisation to lecture) for Celtic Philology, obtained at Berlin's Humboldt University, was integrated into a more comprehensive *venia legendi* for 'Comparative Philology with special regard to Celtic Philology'. In 1953 he obtained the chair of Comparative Philology at the University of Hamburg where Ludwig Mühlhausen had worked up to 1937. The new post gave Hartmann a free hand to continue his work in the Celtic Studies area until his retirement.²⁴ In the 1960s Hartmann

returned to Ireland to continue his work on Gaeltacht dialects, as Seán Ó Heochaidh recalls:

Dr Hartmann came back to Ireland after the war with a van full of recording equipment. Again we worked on this recording, and he went back to Germany with a vast amount of wonderful material from some of the best speakers in North West Donegal.²⁵

Hartmann was also assisted by UCD's Professor of Irish, Tomás de Bháldraithe, and many Irish language students made the trip to Hamburg during the 1960s and 1970s to work on analysing and cataloguing the recordings that Hartmann had collected.²⁶

Not everyone forgave Hartmann for his wartime role as a propaganda broadcaster for the Nazis. One one occasion at a social function in Dublin, someone introduced the German to Professor Dan Binchy, with the words 'Have you met Dr Hartmann?' Turning on his heel, Binchy replied: 'No, but I heard his voice.'²⁷ For the most part though, Hartmann was welcomed back into circulation by the Celtic Studies fraternity. His acceptance was in marked contrast to that of the SS officer Ludwig Mühlhausen whom one UCD scholar termed 'a shadowy person, not much was known about him'.²⁸ According to Eimear Ó Broin: 'Professor Mühlhausen's broadcasts were a particular embarrassment to Celtic Studies academic circles in Dublin, because his work with the Irish language was highly regarded and was in such contrast to his activities as a blatant Nazi propagandist.'²⁹

Reflecting on his role with the Nazi radio service 45 years later on, Hartmann described his involvement as 'absolutely accidental', adding:

I had no intention to make propaganda and made no preparations to do so. I even lacked the vocabulary I had to use for that. I remember that once, when I had to write my first talks, I went to the Irish legation to see Mr Warnock with whom I was on very good terms, and I asked him to give me some Irish newspapers. From these I got the vocabulary needed to translate Wehrmachtberichte [German Armed Forces reports], etc. That was all I had, all that I could do. It was purely accidental that I went into the propaganda business. I don't consider it to my credit that I did it at all.³⁰

Hans Hartmann now lives in retirement in Cologne, Germany.

Lord Haw Haw: A Footnote

After his execution at Wandsworth, on 3 January 1946, William Joyce was buried in the prison cemetery. This, however, was not the end of the Lord Haw Haw story. Some 30 years later, on 20 August 1976, William Joyce's remains were reinterred at Galway's New Cemetery. The reinterment followed a ten-year campaign by Joyce's daughter, Mrs Heather Iandolo, who commented at the ceremony: 'It had been my father's wish to return to Galway some day, and I am glad I was able to do this much for him.'³¹



William Joyce (Lord Haw Haw) following his capture by British troops, on 28 May 1945, near the Danish border at Flensburg, Germany.

Conclusion

As regards the role of Irish people in the Irland-Redaktion, it should be observed that they were in a clear minority - just six of the twenty two individuals identified as having been directly or indirectly involved. It must also be noted that of these twenty two people at least one, Mrs Susan Hilton, had arrived in occupied France as a prisoner of war - a status that could hardly be described as voluntary.

Examining the role of those Irish citizens who were involved, Francis Stuart must rank as the most important recruit to German Radio's wartime Irish service. His decision to begin lecturing at Berlin University in January 1940 clearly indicates that he had no conscientious objections to working in Nazi Germany. His decision to begin broadcasting for the Irland-Redaktion in March 1942 further indicates that his original stance had not altered substantially from that which first caused him to travel to Berlin over two years before. Stuart's university lecturing work, along with his early broadcasts, could have marked him out as a rather woolly-headed adventurer who had waded rather too deeply into the waters of the Third Reich. But a closer look at the available facts would tend to cast him in a somewhat different light. The fact that Stuart arrived in Berlin in 1940 as, among other things, an official courier for the IRA - as well as his known contacts with the spy Hermann Goertz - clearly indicates that he was far from being an innocent abroad. In addition, some of Stuart's wartime talks from the Berlin Rundfunkhaus can be considered as having gone beyond even his own definition of 'neutral' broadcasting. The Dublin government did not share Stuart's view of himself as a neutral commentator when the writer praised the IRA's Northern commander, Hugh McAteer, on 2 December 1942, nor when Stuart began dispensing advice to Irish voters before the June 1943 general election. De Valera indicated his displeasure by formally protesting to Berlin about both these matters.

While Stuart himself would claim not to have breached his own code of neutral broadcasting in raising the topics about which de Valera had protested, the same could not be said of two other important talks by Stuart. These were, his description of the German Sixth Army's defeat at Stalingrad as 'a triumph of flesh and blood' (6 February 1943) and his appeal to British soldiers from Ulster to mutiny (15 May 1943). On his own

admission Stuart recognised that the latter broadcast could have brought about his execution by the British. For that very reason, he claims that he arranged to fall into the hands of the French Army at the end of the war.

John O'Reilly's role is notable less for his broadcasting abilities than for the fact that he volunteered for a spying mission to Ireland. O'Reilly's radio contributions were not comparable with Stuart's either in content or duration. O'Reilly's talks were mostly written for him, while Stuart made an effort to originate his own material. In addition, Stuart stayed twice as long with the radio service as O'Reilly did - 23 months compared with 12 months. Despite the seriousness attached by the Americans to O'Reilly's spying mission, one must, on balance, be inclined to accept O'Reilly's own version of events: that, having realised the inevitability of Germany's defeat, he duped the Germans into flying him home.

Can any of those who broadcast for the Irland-Redaktion be considered as traitors? Since the target audience for most of the transmissions to Ireland - apart from a small number of broadcasts which, in mid-1942, were simultaneously beamed to North America - was in neutral territory, the answer to this question must remain in the negative. British subjects who broadcast for the England-Redaktion were considered to be traitors who had 'assisted the enemy', and two of them, William Joyce and John Amery, were hanged in London's Wandsworth prison after the war. But those who had given their services to the Irland-Redaktion were never considered as traitors, or even law breakers, by the Irish authorities. However, the situation with regard to the Irland-Redaktion's staff was complicated by the fact that, according to Stuart and Hartmann, William Joyce may have been behind a series of 1943 broadcasts on the Irland-Redaktion's wavelength which were made under the cover name 'Patrick Joseph Cadogan'. A further complication arises from the fact that Mrs Dorothea Susan Hilton had broadcast on German Radio to England and Scotland before January 1942 when she joined the Irland-Redaktion and broadcast to Ireland under her maiden name of Susan Sweney. One of the ten counts that Mrs Hilton faced at her treason trial in London in 1946 charged her with having 'entered the service of the Irish Redaktion, a section of the German Broadcasting System'. But it appears that MI5 was only interested in bringing British citizens to trial because, with the exception of Mrs Hilton, the British never sought to prosecute other members of Hartmann and Mahr's radio team. Four other members of the

team were, however, interned without trial at the end of the war: Mühlhausen, for three years by the Americans; Mahr, for one year by the British; and Stuart and Meissner for nine months by the French. Two others were interned without trial while the war was still on: John O'Reilly, for 18 months by the Irish authorities; and William Murphy, for nine months by the British.

Co-operation or coup d'état?

At the end of 1941 Hitler considered that 'the occupation of Ireland might lead to the end of the war', although this notion of a German occupation was in the context of a possible Irish request for such help consequent on a British attack on Eire.¹ Overall, Hitler's interest in Ireland never appears to have been more than peripheral. Similarly, Goebbels welcomed the propaganda opportunities offered by IRA activities on the one hand and de Valera's neutrality policy on the other but this is as far as his interest in Irish affairs appears to have gone.² Goebbels Ministry of Propaganda did, however, approve the establishment of the limited Irish-language radio service started by Mühlhausen three months after the war began.

What is certain is that Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, - perhaps because of his years as ambassador in London from 1936 to 1938 - took a far closer interest in Irish affairs than either Hitler or Goebbels. As we have already seen, Ribbentrop considered the Celtic races in Ireland, Scotland and Wales to be labouring 'under the yoke' of England and, presumably, awaiting the chance to liberate themselves from the common enemy in London. Thus, while part of Ribbentrop's team, including Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Adolf Mahr, were actively using propaganda to support Irish neutrality - a stance which was intended to help German U-boats by keeping Ireland's Treaty Ports out of British hands - other aides of the German Foreign Minister were plotting either to overthrow de Valera's government or foment rebellion in Northern Ireland, or possibly both.³ Both Edmund Veessenmayer and Paul Woermann were involved in the top secret, but ultimately abortive, plan to send the IRA leaders Sean Russell and Frank Ryan from Germany to Ireland.⁴ Ireland, in fact, was to prove one of the few failed missions undertaken by Veessenmayer who was Ribbentrop's coup d'état specialist.⁵ In 1939, Veessenmayer had encouraged Slovakia to secede

from Czechoslovakia.⁶ In 1941 Veessenmayer engineered a coup d'état in Croatia; by mid-1942 he had eliminated the Jewish male population from Serbia, and in 1943 he set about taking similar measures in Slovakia; in 1944 he organised a coup d'état in Hungary.⁷

Mahr's plan to use radio propaganda to turn Irish audiences around the world against the Allied cause was, in common with Veessenmayer's intervention strategy, far from being in tandem with the overt approach of the German Foreign Office in supporting de Valera's policy on neutrality. It can be concluded that Ribbentrop's attitude towards Ireland - and, by extention, the attitude of the Nazi hierarchy collectively - was dictated as much by duplicity as it was by opportunism and expediency.

The Berlin Troika

The Nazi authorities could count themselves lucky to have had the services of people like Mühlhausen, Mahr and Hartmann because few others, if any, in wartime Berlin would have possessed the same knowledge of Ireland, its people and language. Of these three, Hartmann was the least committed to Nazi ideology, being a language enthusiast first and foremost. Mühlhausen joined the Nazi party in 1932 and used it to further his own career, while Mahr joined up in 1933 in the hope that a strong Germany would force the return of his native South Tyrol region from Italian to Austrian control. Hartmann also joined the Nazi party in 1933 but for reasons which were far from ideological. He was, in fact, obliged to join in order to get state funding for his university studies and to qualify for extra funding for his student exchange visit to Ireland from 1937 to 1939. Hartmann was also the junior member of the trio. He was only 30 years of age when war broke out in 1939 compared with Mühlhausen's 51 years and Mahr's 52.

Hartmann's claim to have been an 'accidental' propagandist is largely borne out by the known facts. In 1940, as a student at Berlin University, he would have found it difficult - if not impossible in the climate of the times - to refuse the request by Mühlhausen, his professor, to help out with a weekly radio talk in Irish. Uppermost in Hartmann's mind, later on, was the fact that radio work would save him from military service and probable death at the Russian front.

Unlike Mahr and Mühlhausen, Hartmann had a genuine regard for the Irish

along with their traditions, culture and language. On his visit to Donegal in 1937, Mühlhausen repeatedly told local people that they would be better off under German rule rather than British or even Irish native rule. While Mühlhausen founded the Irland-Redaktion in December 1939, he left it two years later to work with the SS in France. He was also in charge of German propaganda to Brittany for a period before the fall of France in June 1940, and was well aware of the pro-Nazi Breton nationalist movement's desire for independence from France. As for Adolf Mahr, although he had lived in Ireland from 1927 to 1939, his primary loyalty appears to have been not to the state of which he was a senior civil servant but to Nazi Germany. The Irish people, their language and aspirations were of secondary importance to Mahr, a committed national socialist, who chose to spend the war years in the service of the German Foreign Office.

It is also noteworthy that while Hartmann's friends in Ireland rallied to help him after the war, neither Mahr nor Mühlhausen attracted the same support. In 1946 Mahr was effectively barred from resuming his post as director of the National Museum in Dublin, and Mühlhausen - a broken man by the time of his release from internment in 1948 - never resumed teaching. Hartmann went on to enjoy a distinguished academic career in post-war Germany. He continued to visit Ireland to record regional Irish dialects. In 1990, when the author met Hartmann at his home in Cologne, he found that the German's study was filled with books about Ireland.

A Failure of Timing

If German Radio's Irish propaganda initiative failed both to win big audiences and to persuade Irish listeners of the righteousness of the Nazi cause, then the reasons were not hard to find. The initial propaganda programmes, starting in December 1939, consisted only of 15-minute talks in Irish given on Sunday nights by Ludwig Mühlhausen. In 1940 Mühlhausen was joined by Hans Hartmann following which talks were broadcast twice weekly. But, as Adolf Mahr pointed out to Ribbentrop in May 1941, the English-speaking Irish were not being addressed at all by Berlin. This continued to be the case until the end of August 1941 when nightly test transmissions in English began. Having, in Mahr's estimation, failed to address most Irish listeners during the first two years of the war, the Irland-Redaktion was then given the almost impossible job of trying to catch up on lost time and

to regain the propaganda initiative.

By the time Mahr had installed Hartmann as head of the Irland-Redaktion in December 1941, the *raison d'être* of the Irish service had been overtaken by events. Firstly, the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 took the focus off Operation Sea Lion, the invasion plan for England. The Germans had also contemplated invading Ireland under the plan known as Operation Green. This was now similarly disregarded militarily as German panzer divisions headed east towards Moscow. Secondly, by the time Hartmann began assembling his propaganda team in Berlin shortly before Christmas 1941, America had already entered the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Thus, Mahr's idea of using propaganda to persuade the American Irish to oppose U.S. entry into the conflict was already a dead letter.

Germany's propaganda problems were compounded by the fact that it was, according to one study, faced 'with a military situation worsening gradually from late 1941 onwards to a point of despair [thus] the task of upholding morale in these circumstances was incomparably greater than that of British propaganda'.⁸ For one observer 'the greatest success of the Goebbels propaganda apparatus was reflected in the continuation of the struggle by the German people into 1945'.⁹

It is clear that comparing British and Nazi propaganda, or comparing Nazi propaganda to Britain with that to Ireland in World War II, is not comparing like with like. Thus, the researcher's difficulty is to determine the criteria by which to measure best the effectiveness of propaganda. A more valid comparison might be achieved by taking the Irland-Redaktion's output vis-à-vis propaganda beamed to other neutral states like Switzerland, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and - up to 7 December 1941 - the USA. But, as indicated in a study published in 1944, neutrality through German eyes varied depending on a country's value to the German war effort¹⁰, and the propaganda style used in broadcasts to Ireland defies strict comparison with propaganda to other states or regions. For example, while the use of Irish-language broadcasts was, in a sense, similar in intent to programmes for minority groups within states (eg. the Slovaks, Flemings and Slovenians) Ireland was, unlike these regions, never occupied by the Germans. Another important difference in Ireland's case was that the country shared a disputed land frontier with the United Kingdom which was at war with Germany. And Ireland's strategic position as an island nation

with westerly ports that Churchill wanted to repossess - to patrol the North Atlantic shipping lanes more effectively - was yet one more difference between Ireland and other neutral states.

Perhaps the only common thread in Nazi propaganda to small regions or divided countries was that Germany appeared to be holding out the prospect of independence or unification for them at the war's end if they sided with the Nazis in the meantime. In reality, however, Germany's presence in such regions never progressed from the stage of occupation until the German Army was eventually dislodged by Allied forces.

Comparisons between Germany's domestic and foreign propaganda may also have little validity, since Goebbels 'knew that propaganda for home consumption and propaganda for overseas had to be thought out independently and that in neither case was the best propaganda necessarily that which set out to convince or convert'.¹¹

Domestic propaganda has been depicted as being successful in wartime Germany but only when coupled with other factors: 'The propaganda weapon [had] a real effect in prolonging the war, but so, to at least an equal extent, did the régime's use of terror.'¹² 'The limited propaganda success which Goebbels enjoyed in 1945 was due only in part to his ingenuity. Instead, it resulted from the fact that traditional Nazi propaganda overlapped and merged with traditional German patriotism and the people's intuitive response to defend the Fatherland in danger.'¹³ Goebbels once remarked that 'in propaganda, as in love, anything is permissible which is successful...propaganda has nothing to do with the truth - we serve the truth in that we serve a German victory'.¹⁴ But Balfour and Briggs believe that propaganda had little effect on the outcome of the war in Europe.¹⁵

As we know, Goebbels controlled the propaganda service to Ireland from December 1939 to November 1941. For most of that period, as we have already seen, the broadcasts were only made once a week for 15 minutes and in the Irish language, so it can be reasonably deduced that their effect was limited. All they can be said to have achieved with certainty is (a) to have attracted a small audience in the Gaeltacht, mostly in Donegal, (b) to have attracted also a small, yet not insignificant, group of listeners whom Adolf Mahr identified as 'language enthusiasts amongst the educated sections of [Irish] society'¹⁶, (c) to have attracted the attention of official monitors in Dublin, thus alerting senior government ministers to

the official German propaganda line on Irish affairs, and (d) to have similarly attracted the attention of the BBC monitoring service and thus, indirectly, of the authorities in London and Belfast who were notified of the more important broadcasts.

As to whether any of the specific objectives of the Irland-Redaktion were achieved in part or in whole, it is necessary to examine them individually. These were identified in Chapter 1 as being:

1. *To ensure that Ireland remained neutral:*

Since de Valera upheld his policy of neutrality for the entire Emergency or war period, the Irish service of German Radio was never, in practice, doing anything more than preaching to the converted. Furthermore, de Valera's formal adoption of a neutrality policy pre-dated by three and a half years the commencement of Germany's wartime broadcasts to Ireland.¹⁷ It is unlikely that anything, short of a German or British invasion, would have forced de Valera to abandon his neutral stance. Certainly, the radio pleas from Berlin for Ireland to maintain her neutrality could be considered as being superfluous in the circumstances.

2. *To ensure that Irish listeners understood the Nazi message:*

The broadcasts, if widely heard, would have ensured that the Nazi message was sufficiently comprehended, in as much as it was relevant to a nation not directly involved in the conflict. Insofar as the Irland-Redaktion only managed to attract a small listenership, the Nazi message - both in the form of straightforward propaganda from Berlin and in the sense of providing a counter-thrust to Allied propaganda - was thus restricted to a narrow audience. This objective can be considered a failure in radio terms since the service appears to have reached only a small segment of the population.

3. *To ensure that as few people as possible sided with the Allied cause:*

For the most part, Irish people had made up their minds whether or not to enlist in the British armed forces by the time German Radio's Irish service went on the air in December 1939. Some 165,000 people with next-of-kin Irish addresses volunteered for service with the British Army despite the lack of conscription, and the number of people from the 26 Counties who

went to work in Britain's factories and farms during the war is put at around 100,000.¹⁸ It should be noted also that German Radio's Irish programmes did not specifically or directly exhort Irish listeners not to side with the Allied cause. The tone was discernibly more indirect, citing, for example, British atrocities against the Irish civilian population in the 1919-1921 War of Independence. Francis Stuart's appeal, broadcast on 15 May 1943, inciting Ulster-born soldiers in the British Army to mutiny and defect to either the German or Italian lines, was exceptional. Thus the goal of deterring Irish people from joining the Allied camp can be regarded as largely irrelevant since citizens of Eire who wished to side with the Allies would, for the most part, have made their decision before December 1939 when the *Irland-Redaktion* went on air.

4. *To appeal to nationalist aspirations on unity:*

The earlier broadcasts to Ireland occasionally held out the possibility of a unified Irish state evolving from the destruction of the British Empire at the hands of Germany (e.g. Mühlhausen's talk on 15 December 1940). Generally though, the talks fell short of giving any German guarantee on unity in the event of a Nazi victory and, in fact, the partition question was played down after plans to invade Britain were shelved. Whether or not a victorious Nazi Germany would have delivered a united Ireland - or, for that matter, greater autonomy for Brittany, Flanders, Wallonia and other regions - is a question that must remain in the realm of conjecture. It is, however, worth noting that on 13 November 1940 Ribbentrop's State Secretary, Ernst von Weizsäcker, commented that 'after England was finally crushed by us, Ireland could then expect...to realize her national goals'.¹⁹ But, forty years later, Helmut Clissmann - who was involved in the planning for Operation Sea Lion - maintained that 'Hitler would have sold the Irish down the river'.²⁰

In terms of extreme Irish nationalism the Nazi radio message, in so far as it promised the annihilation of England, must be said to have provided a certain amount of succour in such circles, particularly for the small number of IRA activists with whom the Nazis were in contact in Ireland, the USA and Germany itself. However, the goals of appealing to Irish nationalist aspirations on unity, ensuring that Ireland remained neutral and appealing to Irish Catholic fears of communism reflected attitudes

which were widespread in Ireland at the time. The fact that German Radio's Irish output concurred with those attitudes does not prove any measure of success on the part of the propagandists in Berlin. What it does tend to indicate, however, is that those propagandists were following - rather than attempting to form - Irish attitudes to such issues.

5. *To appeal to Catholic fears of atheistic Bolshevism and Judaism:*
The likelihood is that anti-Bolshevik messages would have been more relevant than anti-Jewish ones. Both types were broadcast, but anti-semitic talks to a far lesser degree. While wartime anti-semitism even found a sounding board in Dáil Éireann²¹, the Nazis' anti-Bolshevik propaganda was more apposite if only because it echoed what members of the Irish Catholic hierarchy were saying publicly. The determination of German Radio's Irish service to exploit Catholic fears of atheistic communism may have been reflected in the fact that, in January 1944, the service controllers sacked their top broadcaster Francis Stuart. According to Stuart this was because he would not give anti-communist talks on the radio. In the period from end-June 1941 to end-April 1945 the Irland-Redaktion's anti-Bolshevik broadcasts appealed to sentiments that were already well established among the target audience.

6. *To provide a familiar service that would have the potential to play a more important role in the event of, (a) a German invasion of Eire; (b) a British or U.S. invasion of Eire; (c) a successful pro-German coup d'état against the Dublin government; (d) a German invasion of Britain:*
In the event of any or all of the above coming about, then the Irland-Redaktion - by virtue of its having been established relatively early in the war - could be said to have laid the groundwork for, and created the nucleus of, an important element of any German military or political initiative on Ireland. If British or American troops invaded Eire, German Radio had the potential to boost its output to Ireland - both in broadcast hours and signal strength - thus building on an established format, although it is by no means certain that the audience would have grown, particularly if the broadcasts had only been in the Irish language. A German invasion of Eire - with or without a concurrent, and successful, pro-German coup d'état against the Dublin government - would almost

certainly have brought about an increase in Irish listeners to German Radio's Irish service. It is probable that in such circumstances the Irland-Redaktion would have been closed down and its output replaced by Radio Eireann programmes under German control. This would have been similar to what happened in the case of German Radio's service for Brittany which went off the air as soon as France fell to the Germans. Programmes for the whole of France were put out subsequently by Radio Paris under German control. In the event of a German invasion of Britain, the Irland-Redaktion could have been employed to target Irish audiences in British cities as well as republican elements in Northern Ireland. It can be assumed that in the event of the German invasion plan for England (Operation Sea Lion) going ahead in 1940 or 1941, Germany would have been grateful for any support from Irish nationalists in English cities, not to mention from Welsh and Scottish nationalists. Although the groundwork for establishing a familiar radio propaganda service for Irish listeners had been laid, its ultimate potential was contingent on various sets of circumstances occurring that never, in fact, came to pass.

From mid-1941 onwards the focus of the war in Europe moved to the east. Had the thrust of the European conflict remained in the west - and had the German Army's role in it been victorious - the effectiveness of the Irland-Redaktion could, arguably, have been quite different. However, as the war unfolded in Russia and elsewhere, the Irland-Redaktion became focused on a military backwater. Although Ireland was considered worthy of attention by the German propagandists for most of the war, it must be concluded that the Irish service did not succeed in achieving its aims in so far as they were, mostly if not exclusively, beyond both its scope and sphere of influence.

APPENDICES

Note: the originals of some of the German wartime documents cited have deteriorated during more than 50 years in storage. A number of them are barely legible as is evident from the copies in this section.

Appendix A: Key Players (a summary of the role of key personalities involved in the Irland-Redaktion).

Appendix B: Walshe memorandum to de Valera regarding Nazi activities in Ireland, 22 February 1939.

Appendix C: Mahr report for German Foreign Office, 'Radio propaganda to Ireland', 18 March 1941. (Sections of this report which were underlined by Mahr for emphasis in the original German language text, appear in capitals in the English translation. The original page breaks are included to guide the reader. e.g. - 2 -, - 3 -, etc.).

Appendix D: Minutes of German Foreign Office meeting, Berlin, 22 May 1941, attended by the Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Full original German text, followed by English summary including translation of section c) on Ireland.

Appendix E: Mahr memorandum for Foreign Office, 'English-language programmes to Ireland', 9 September 1941. Original German text and full English translation. (N.B. This document, which has never been published, was found in the German Federal Archives, Potsdam, in April 1991. It appears to be a draft rather than a final version.).

Appendix F: Minutes of meeting of German Foreign Office's North America Committee, Berlin, 26 August 1943. Original German text plus English translation of section 5 including Dr Kiesinger's comments on Irish radio station plan (Source: Schnabel, pp. 468-71).

Appendix G: Technical data concerning broadcasts to Ireland by German Radio, 1939-45.

Appendix H: Profile of Franz Fromme.

Appendix A

KEY PLAYERS

Adolf Mahr (1887-1951)

An Austrian archaeologist, Mahr left the Vienna Museum of Prehistory in 1927 to join the National Museum in Dublin as Senior Keeper of Irish Antiquities. He joined the Nazi Party in April 1933 and was promoted to the post of museum director by de Valera's cabinet in July 1934. As head of the Nazis' Auslandorganisation (foreign organisation) in Ireland, Mahr was the most powerful member of the small pre-war Austro-German community. As Irish Military Intelligence stepped up their surveillance on him and intercepted his mail, Mahr left Ireland aboard a liner from Cobh to Hamburg on 19 July 1939 for what turned out to be the last time. He spent the war years in Berlin working on the Irish desk at the Foreign Office. He effectively controlled all Germany's radio propaganda to Ireland from November 1941 to May 1945.

Ludwig Mühlhausen (1888-1956)

An accomplished language scholar whose post-war career foundered through his overt links to the Nazi Party and activities as an SS officer in occupied France, Mühlhausen joined the Nazis in 1932 and used his membership to advance his academic career. In 1937 he moved from Hamburg to take over the Chair of Celtic Studies at Berlin University where other propagandists such as Hans Hartmann, Hilde Pöpping, Francis Stuart, Madeleine Meissner and Norman Baillie-Stewart also studied and taught. Mühlhausen began his Irish language broadcasts at the end of 1939. He continued them every Sunday night until 1941. From 1942 he worked with the SS in France where it is believed he forged links with pro-Nazi elements in the Breton nationalist movement.

Hans Hartmann (1909-)

A rising star in pre-war European language and folklore study circles, Hartmann started off by mastering Russian and in 1937 switched his attention to Celtic studies. In common with other German university students in the 1930s, he was obliged to join the Nazi Party to get funding. In 1937 he travelled to Ireland on a student exchange scholarship.

Hartmann fell in love with Ireland and its people, mastering the Irish language in less than two years. What began for him as a one year visit, turned into a two and a half year stay, and only ended when the German legation in Dublin arranged for German nationals to leave Ireland for the Fatherland on 11 September 1939. Back in Germany, Hartmann continued studying at Berlin University where he was appointed a lecturer in 1942. In December 1941 Hartmann was put in charge of the Irish service of German Radio by his old Dublin museum acquaintance, Adolf Mahr.

Hilde Spickernagel, née Poepping (1916-)

Hilde Poepping was another German exchange student whose interest in Ireland brought her to UCG for a year's studies in 1937-38. Poepping later married a fellow student at Berlin University and, after completing her studies, as Mrs Spickernagel, joined Adolf Mahr on the Irish desk at the Foreign Office. Her main duties involved the preparation of propaganda material for broadcast to Ireland. In December 1941, after six months with Mahr, she was transferred to join Hartmann's newly formed, nightly Irish radio service where she occasionally read the news. She left Hartmann's team after a year to give birth to her son, and played no further role in the wartime Foreign Office or radio service.

Francis Stuart (1902-)

Even in his nineties, Stuart still has the capacity to stir controversy over his wartime broadcasts for Nazi radio, a role he described as "a neutral writer addressing a neutral audience". Stuart made his first broadcast from Berlin to Ireland on St Patrick's Day 1942 at the request of Hans Hartmann. Both men were then lecturers at Berlin University. Stuart continued his radio talks until January 1944 when he fell out with Hartmann and Mahr over their demand that he broadcast anti-Russian propaganda. For a time his passport was withheld and he was threatened, via anonymous phone calls, with imprisonment in a concentration camp. However, he avoided trouble with the help of friends at the Foreign Office. Irish Army monitors decided that Stuart's radio talks amounted to pro-Nazi propaganda. Among other things, Stuart praised the bravery of German troops at Stalingrad, and called on British troops from Ulster to mutiny and defect to the German

side. He also upset de Valera in the run up to the June 1943 general election by giving advice to Irish voters.

John O'Reilly (1916-1971)

This flamboyant County Clare man was the only member of the Irland-Redaktion to have volunteered for a spying mission. He joined the radio propaganda unit in Berlin in September 1941 but left a year later to train as a spy with German naval intelligence in Bremen, and later in Hamburg. Equipped with a radio transmitter, O'Reilly was parachuted back to his native Kilkee by the Luftwaffe in December 1943 and was arrested almost immediately. The Irish authorities were convinced he had duped the Germans into flying him home but O'Reilly was, in turn, duped by G2 into revealing a secret radio code the Germans had taught him. He was interned for the remainder of the war.

Susan Hilton, née Sweney (1915-1983)

Hilton broadcast to Ireland under her maiden name of Susan Sweney. Although born in India, her father had Donegal connections and had risen through the ranks of the British-controlled Indian civil service to become chief inspector of police in Madras. In England in the 1930s, Sweney joined Mosley's fascists and edited the British Union of Fascists' paper *Voice of the People* from January to May 1940. After a police raid on her London flat she left Britain on 28 May 1940 aboard a ship bound for Burma where she was due to be reunited with her husband. Her ship was, however, sunk by a German raider in the Indian Ocean on 13 July 1940. Along with other survivors, Hilton was taken aboard a prison ship bound for occupied France where she was put ashore in September 1940. Working as a journalist in occupied Paris, Hilton was asked by the Nazis to undertake a spying mission to Ireland or the USA. She refused, but in 1942 moved to Berlin to work first on propaganda broadcasts to Britain and, from January 1942, with Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion. After leaving the Irish team in autumn 1942, she worked for Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. By mid-1943 she was being shadowed by the Gestapo who suspected her of being an Allied spy. Hilton had the unenviable distinction of being imprisoned by both the Nazis (from August 1944 to April 1945) and the British (from April 1945 to 1947). In 1944 she was arrested by the Gestapo in Vienna where she had joined an SS

unit (after the war she claimed to have infiltrated the unit to tip off intended SS victims). The Gestapo were apparently alerted when Susan Hilton applied to the Turkish consulate for a visa to flee the Third Reich. She was transferred from prison in Vienna to Liebenau internment camp in Germany where she almost starved to death during nine months' incarceration. Despite finding her in a Nazi camp, MI5 detained Hilton for a further seven months in the same camp before transferring her to London for trial on charges of assisting the enemy with propaganda broadcasts. She was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.

Wolfgang Dignowity (1912- ?)

While Ludwig Mühlhausen began German Radio's weekly propaganda talks to Ireland in December 1939, Wolfgang Dignowity was appointed first head of the nightly propaganda service in June 1941. Both men worked at the behest of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. Dignowity knew nothing about Ireland and recruited his 'Irish' radio team in Paris. His reign was short lived. He was ousted as section head after only five months. At the instigation of Adolf Mahr in the Foreign Office, Hans Hartmann took over Dignowity's place as head of the Irland-Redaktion in December 1941 and held the post until the end of the war in May 1945.

Elizabeth Clissmann (née Mulcahy) and Helmut Clissmann (1911-)

Elizabeth Mulcahy, from Sligo, met her German husband-to-be, Helmut Clissmann, when both were students in Dublin in the 1930s - she at UCD and he at Trinity College. In his role as head of the German Academic Exchange Service, Helmut Clissmann arranged most of the study trips to Ireland by German university students in the 1930s including those of Hans Hartmann and Hilde Poepping. All visiting exchange students were required to report to Adolf Mahr in his capacity as head of the Auslandsorganisation. In addition, the visiting Germans had to join the Nazi Party to qualify for travel funding. Helmut Clissmann himself joined the Nazis on 1 May 1934. Elizabeth Clissmann spent the war years in Copenhagen, while her husband was a member of the German Army's Brandenburg Regiment. He was reputedly involved in drawing up top secret plans for the invasion of England codenamed Operation Sea Lion. This invasion plan was dropped after the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, as was the invasion plan for

Ireland codenamed Operation Green. Elizabeth Clissmann's involvement in the radio propaganda war was peripheral yet important. At the beginning of 1944 she was asked to investigate a plan to beam anti-Roosevelt programmes to Irish Americans in the United States. While originally mentioned by Mahr in March 1941, this idea had been revived by the Foreign Office's North America Broadcasting Committee in August 1943. The IRA man Frank Ryan, who was then resident in Berlin, was also sounded out about its feasibility. The propaganda plan was aimed at turning Irish-American voters against the war effort thus preventing Roosevelt's November 1944 re-election to the White House. Mrs Clissmann claimed after the war that she had agreed to investigate the prospect of launching the plan, which she discussed with her husband, only because she wanted to make sure the idea never got off the ground. To this end she visited Hans Hartmann's team in Luxembourg (the broadcasters had left Berlin in August 1943 due to Allied bombings) in March 1944 where she met Adolf Mahr. Mrs Clissmann eventually sent her report to Berlin advising against the propaganda project (Frank Ryan had given the same advice over six months earlier) which never materialised. In any case, the Irland-Redaktion was forced to flee Luxembourg ahead of advancing U.S. troops in September 1944, just two months before the U.S. presidential election which Roosevelt won. Hartmann continued to put out his Irish radio programmes from Apen in northern Germany for another seven months until 2 May 1945.

FLK
de Valera Papers
file 753



ROINN GNÓTHAI EACHTRACHA
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH
DUBLIN

23/2/29

Dear Miss O'Connell,

The Taoiseach has asked
me for a note on ~~the~~ conversation
with the German Charge
d'Affaires yesterday. Would
you mind handing it to him

Yours sincerely
J. P. Walshe



ROINN GNÓTHAÍ EACHTRACHA
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH
DUBLIN

SECRET

22nd February, 1939.

The Taoiseach, Minister for External Affairs.

Protest by German Chargé d'Affaires.

The German Chargé d'Affaires, Herr Thomsen, came to see me by appointment this morning (Wednesday, 22nd February). He began by remarking that, although he liked the nice Spring weather, he found the people not so congenial as the Norwegian people amongst whom he had just been living. The reason for that was that the Norwegians were a Protestant people, and the Irish were almost exclusively Catholic, and, for that reason, dominated by the Clergy.

After this somewhat surprising and impudent beginning, he showed me a newspaper report of the Pastoral of Dr. Brown, Bishop of Galway, with a sentence marked in which the latter accuses Germany of violence, lying, murder and the contemning of other races and people. He proceeded to say that Dr. Brown had no right to discuss Germany's affairs. Moreover, it should be remembered that any measures taken against the Catholic Clergy in Germany were very largely due to the immorality of the priests. Germany's aim was to confine the Church to its own sphere, and to prevent the Clergy interfering in matters affecting the State exclusively.

The Chargé d'Affaires then produced a copy of the "Irish Press" of Tuesday, 21st February, containing a leader attacking the anti-Christian element in German

State doctrine and practice. As this paper was controlled by the Government Party, the Government would have to accept some responsibility for these attacks on Germany. The Government should remember that there were a great many things in Ireland which could be criticised by Germany, e.g., the extreme poverty of large numbers of the people, and the absence of any organised effort to remedy it.

I gave all the usual replies, and a little more, to this outburst, but I was careful to let him run his full length before replying, as it seemed to my mind important to get to know the type we have to deal with in Herr Thomsen. He is a complete contrast to Dr. Hempel, the German Minister, who - although sometimes lacking in a sense of humour - never allows you to forget that he is a cultured gentleman. Herr Thomsen is insolent, bombastic, and apparently devoid of any sense of the real values of life. He is the first German I have met who seems to combine in himself all the worst ideas behind the Nazi regime.

At the end of our conversation, I suggested to him, as I have frequently done to his Minister and his Minister's predecessor, that the ~~setting up~~^{existence} of a Nazi organisation in Dublin, no doubt representing the views he had expressed to me in the course of our interview and having as its chief member and organiser an employee of our State, was not calculated to improve relations between our two Governments. I could hardly imagine his Government tolerating a similar organisation in Germany. He answered, not quite in so many words, that the Nazi organisation in Dublin was really none of our business.

In my previous talks with the German representatives during the last three years, I endeavoured to convince them in the most friendly fashion that, as the measures against the Catholic Clergy in Germany increased in severity, antagonism was bound to develop here. In time our Catholic people and Clergy would begin to make public protests and the Government would be placed in a very awkward situation when the position of Dr. Mahr, Director of the National Museum, as head of the Nazi Cell in Dublin, became a matter of public controversy. Dr. Hempel told me, in July, 1938, that Dr. Mahr was resigning from his leadership of the Cell, and I understand that Dr. Mahr so informed the Minister for Education about the same time. However, so recently as December last, Dr. Hempel told me that Dr. Mahr had not yet resigned his position in the organisation owing to unforeseen difficulties, but was about to do so immediately, and that he was to be replaced in that position by Herr Mecking, who is an employee of the State (at least indirectly) under the Turf Board.

After Dr. Brown's Pastoral, we may expect an increase in anti-Nazi feeling and protests, and Dr. Mahr's position cannot fail to be brought into question at an early date. No ordinary Civil Servant is allowed to be a member of a political organisation, and it could not be regarded as an injustice if Dr. Mahr were ordered to cease his membership of the Nazi Cell.

J.P. Walsh
22/2/39

15

Appendix C

24/80

Politisches Archiv
Auswärtiges Amt

Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung

Äußerer
Bereich

betreffend:

Verbindungsraum R 674

Ausländisches Rundfunkwesen

Deutsche Auslandsrundfunkpropaganda

Bd. 2 : Finnland - Türkei

vom April

bis Oktober 1950

Politisches Archiv des
Auswärtigen Amtes

R 67483

18.5.41

Anzeigezeichnung
betr.
Sendefunkpropaganda nach Irland

I. Hörerkreis

A. Irland selbst.

1) Bevölkerungsverhältnisse.

Hier ist stets sorgfältig zwischen dem (neutralen) Eire und dem britischen Nordirland zu unterscheiden. Die Grenzen der Beeinflussungsmöglichkeiten decken sich jedoch nicht mit der politischen Grenze.

Die Bevölkerung Irlands zählt etwas über 4 Millionen Menschen. Davon leben rund 3 Millionen in Eire und knapp 1 1/4 Million in Nordirland.

Die Bewohner Eires sind grösstenteils Katholiken und haben ein lebhaftes Nationalbewusstsein. Die demokratische Ideologie ist stark, ebenso der Respekt für Amerika. Schon aus kirchlichen Gründen herrscht wenig Verständnis und gar keine Sympathie für den Nationalsozialismus. Aber unser Kampf gegen England erwirbt uns trotzdem in den stark national fühlenden Schichten einen grossen Respekt, nach dem alten Wort "Englands Verlegenheit ist Irlands Gelegenheit".

Erinnerungen aus der Weltkriegszeit und die Leistungen der deutschen Wissenschaft auf dem Gebiet der keltischen Forschung tragen auch dazu bei, dass eine Feindschaft für das deutsche Volk nicht besteht, mag auch ein grosser Teil der Iren nicht geradezu eine vernichtende Niederlage Englands wünschen.

In der heutigen schwierigen Lage findet die Neutralitätspolitik des Valeras die Zustimmung aller Kreise, auch der englandfreundlichen.

247496 - 2 -

In Nordirland sind zwei Drittel der Bevölkerung englischer gesinnt als die Engländer selbst. Ein Drittel, also etwa 350.000 Menschen, sind Katholiken, grossenteils nationalistisch und englandfeindlich gesinnt.

Die irischen Nationalisten in beiden Landes-teilen (und darüber hinaus) erhoffen vom Ausgang des gegenwärtigen Krieges die Wiedervereinigung ganz Irlands und seine volle Souveränität und internationale Stellung. De Valera teilt diese Hoffnungen und hat seine Neutralitätspolitik nicht zuletzt auf sie aufgebaut.

2) Rundfunkempfang.

Die Zahl der Empfangsgeräte in Eire dürfte ungefähr 250.000 betragen (Irland war hinsichtlich Rundfunk lange rückständig). Etwa die Hälfte dürfte für den Empfang kontinentaler Sendungen geeignet sein. Der Hörerkreis war bis Kriegsausbruch im grossen und ganzen auf die städtische und ländliche Intelligenz beschränkt. Die Bauern des Westens, soweit sie überhaupt hörten, beschränkten sich auf den Landessender Athlone, der fast immer hörbar ist.

Darben kamen für das ganze Land schon aus sprachlichen Gründen nur die Sendungen der BBC in Betracht, die sehr gut empfangen werden. Da sie in der Programmgestaltung den Sendungen von Athlone natürlich weit überlegen sind, geben sie dem irischen Hörer auch den erwünschten Anschluss an die grosse Welt.

In Nordirland wurden von den Unionisten nur die Sendungen der BBC gehört, z.T. in Gestalt der Sendungen des Senders Northern Ireland. Dieser wurde nach Kriegsausbruch stillgelegt. Seither hören die Unionisten nur die BBC-Programme aus England. An den englischen Sendungen aus Deutschland dürfte weniger Interesse bestehen als in englischen Publikum. Die Nationalisten des Nordens waren vor dem Krieg ebenfalls auf die BBC angewiesen, hörten aber auch sehr gerne Athlone. Da sie meist den Erwerbslosen Schichten angehören, nahmen sie an Rundfunkempfang überhaupt relativ wenig Anteil.

Dies war die Lage vor dem Krieg. Seither haben sich natürlich Veränderungen vollzogen. Besonders muss sich in den nationalistischen Kreisen (weniger in den unionistischen) ein Interesse an den englischsprachigen Sendungen aus Deutschland entwickelt haben. Für die gälischen Sendungen aus Deutschland siehe den folgenden Abschnitt.

3) Die Sprachenfrage.

Etwa 5 Prozent der Bevölkerung von Eire spricht als Muttersprache irisch (= gälisch). Sie hören gerne die gälischen Sendungen aus Deutschland (es schmeichelt ihrem Sprachbewusstsein), aber als politisch wichtige Sprache fällt Gälisch so gut wie gänzlich aus. Die nur Irisch redende Bevölkerung ("Native Speakers") wohnen in Westen und sind meist Kleinbauern. Gälische Sendungen von Festland können von ihnen kaum empfangen werden. Sie hören also fast nur Athlone (gälisch und englisch), daneben wohl auch BBC.

Die gälischen Sendungen werden aber nicht nur von den "native speakers" abgehört, sondern auch von den politisch viel wichtigeren Element der Sprachenthusiasten in den gebildeten Schichten des ganzen Landes, die Gälisch erst erlernt haben. Sie erblicken in der gälischen Sprachpolitik, für die sie mit allen Kräften eintreten, einen nationalpolitischen Faktor ersten Ranges und auf sie wirkten die gälischen Sendungen aus Deutschland natürlich sehr vorteilhaft. Diese müssen also erhalten bleiben. Es fragt sich nur, wie es mit dem Empfang steht.

B. Der weitere irische Hörerkreis.

Der irische Hörerkreis ist indes nicht in vollem Umfang gesehen, wenn man dabei nur an Irland selbst denkt. Neben den 3 1/3 Millionen national fühlender Iren auf der Insel selbst, gibt es die Ausgewanderten, bzw. die Nachkommen von Auswanderern.

So leben in Grossbritannien (London, Glasgow, Liverpool und in vielen anderen Städten, sowie natürlich über das ganze Land verstreut) mindestens 1 1/2 Millionen Menschen, die sich ihrer irischen Herkunft bewusst sind. In Australien

sind es etwa 250.000, in Kanada etwa 150.000, in den Vereinigten Staaten 5 - 6 Millionen (alles ohne Berücksichtigung der vollkommen in Angelsächsentum aufgegangenen Mischblütigen).

Die in Grossbritannien lebenden Nachkommen von Iren mögen zu etwa zwei Dritteln in der angelsächsischen politischen Ideologie befangen sein, aber mindestens ein Drittel fühlt sich nationalisistisch. In Kanada und Australien dürfte es kaum ungünstiger liegen. In den USA ist der Hundertsatz der bewusst irisch Fühlenden eher noch höher. Die amerikanischen Iren sind das Valeros nationalpolitische Prestige-Trompfbarte.

Alle die aufgezählten Elemente, auch wenn sie nazi-feindlich, sogar wenn sie englandfreundlich denken, sind doch sehr empfindlich gegen jede Benachteiligung und Kränkung irischer Interessen und der irischen Nation. Sie stellen, zusammengenommen, einen potentiellen, gegen England beeinflussbaren Hörerkreis dar, der dem des Mutterlandes an Zahl und Bedeutung nicht nachsteht.

II. Bisherige Sendungen nach Irland

A. Gälische Sendungen

Von deutscher Seite wurde nach Irland seit Kriegsausbruch zunächst einmal wöchentlich auf Gälisch gesendet. Seit Beginn der Westoffensive ist der Umfang der Sendungen verdoppelt worden. Sie laufen jetzt am Mittwoch und Sonntag von 22.30 bis 22.45 Uhr (Kurzwellen RSD). Da auch diese erweiterten Sendungen nur in gälischer Sprache laufen, wenden sie sich praktisch also nur an die Nationalisten Eires. Sie erfassen nicht einmal die ältere Generation der Nationalisten (welche kein Gälisch erlernen konnte) und sie erfassen überhaupt nicht die Nationalisten Nordirlands.

Das rein technische Problem der Möglichkeit des Empfanges bedarf dringend einer Untersuchung durch Rundfunk-sachverständige. Es besteht der Verdacht, dass die Sendungen

oft gar nicht durchkommen. Beim Amt lief vor einiger Zeit ein Telegramm des deutschen Gesandten in Dublin ein, worin er fragte, ob Deutschland überhaupt noch auf Gälisch sende. Er nannte die richtige Wellenlänge, hat also offenbar auf dieser (tatsächlich benützten) Wellenlänge keinen Empfang gehabt.

Die Umlegung der Sendungen Irland von den Sendern Hamburg-Bremen auf Kurwellensendern hat den Empfang in Irland zweifellos verschlechtert.

Das Programm der gälischen Sendungen bestand bisher hauptsächlich aus Nachrichten und Kommentaren, sowie gelegentlichen talks.

B. Das Fehlen von Sendungen auf englisch.

Englischsprachige Sendungen unsererseits nach Irland finden nicht statt; die des Gälischen unhandigen Nationalisten der ganzen Insel und der Emigration werden von uns also in ihrer Eigenschaft als Iren überhaupt nicht angesprochen, denn unsere Sendungen in englischer Sprache sind nicht an ihre Adresse gerichtet. In diesen englischsprachigen Sendungen sind irische Fragen bisher absichtlich vermieden worden.

Diese letzteren Sendungen laufen im Europa-Dienst von Deutschlandsender, Breslau, Bremen, Friesland, Hilversum, Calais, Luxemburg und Rennes.

Von Rom wird täglich 20mal auf Englisch gesendet (gälische Sendungen bringt an Kontinent nur Deutschland zuwege). Auch Rom hat es bisher vermieden, besonders, auf irische Hörer abgestimmte Sendungen auf englisch zu schicken. Es laufen aber, dem Vernehmen nach, Vorbereitungen zu einem Ausbau in dieser Richtung.

Zusammenfassend kann also gesagt werden, dass die Möglichkeit einer anti-englischen Rundfunkpropaganda vermittels des Hit-Irentums bisher überhaupt nicht angedenkt wurde. Die Staaten der Achse wenden sich in ihren englischsprachigen Sendungen nur an das Angelsachsenstum selbst und die darin völlig aufgegangenen von Haus aus andersstämmigen Elemente, nicht aber an rund 10 Millionen Menschen irischen

Volksbewusstseins, von denen 99 Prozent das Englische als Muttersprache reden und die in sämtlichen angelsächsischen Ländern eine wichtige, oft eine höchst wichtige, Rolle spielen.

C. Gründe für die bisherige Zurückhaltung.

Sie sind einleuchtend. Eine starke Propaganda hätte de Valera die Aufrechterhaltung der für uns vorteilhaften irischen Neutralität noch erschwert. Sie hätte auch wohl die englische Haltung gegenüber Eire ungünstig beeinflusst. Gegen diese Zurückhaltung sprach, dass eine stärkere Irlandpropaganda dem Kampf der Anti-Interventionisten in USA dienlich ist. Die Iro-Amerikaner sind innerpolitisch ein wichtiges Element und die Interventionisten haben grosse Anstrengungen gemacht, sie für den Krieg zu gewinnen. Bisher ohne nennenswerten Erfolg. De Valeras grösster Aktivposten ist der Nimbus seines Rückhaltes an den Amerika-Iren. Dieser soll unterminiert werden. Dann hofft man, auch mit der irischen Neutralität leichtes Spiel zu haben. Es ist also ein Nachteil unserer Zurückhaltung in der irischen Propaganda, dass wir den Amerika-Iren in ihrem Kampf um die Neutralität keine aktive Hilfe geben.

D. Wegfall der Gründe für Zurückhaltung.

Allmählich ist wohl die Zeit gekommen, die Propaganda in irischer Richtung zu verstärken. Der Irak-Krieg ist ein Dünkirchen des englischen Prestiges im Nahen Osten. Seine Wirkung erfasst auch andere Satellitenstaaten. Die Anti-Interventionisten in USA verspüren diesen Auftrieb bereits seit dem Balkanfeldzug. So ist ein psychologischer Grossangriff auch im irischen Sektor wohl angebracht.

Die Iren selbst fühlen, dass jetzt wichtige Entscheidungen in der Luft hängen, die auch ihr Schicksal bestimmen. Wohl ist es um die Stützpunkte ruhiger geworden, aber die Bombardierungen von Belfast haben den Krieg näher gebracht. Sie zeigen einen neuen Aspekt des Ulsterproblems und treffen einen nervösen Reizpunkt erster Ordnung. Durch

Ulster ist ein Teil der Insel aktiv und passiv in den Krieg verwickelt. Mit dem Schicksal Englands entscheidet sich auch die Ulsterfrage. Dazu kommen die erhöhten Blockadeschwierigkeiten und der Nervenkrieg. Kurz : die Iren fühlen, dass die Frage der irischen Wiedervereinigung und damit der endgültigen und vollständigen Lösung ganz Irlands aus dem britischen System in eine letzte, entscheidende Phase eintritt.

Dem sollten wir propagandistisch ~~mit~~ Beachtung tragen.

III. Ausbaumöglichkeiten einer Propaganda in irischer Richtung

Eine verstärkte Rundfunkpropaganda dieser Art gliedert sich am besten wie folgt :

A. Offizielle deutsche Sendungen.

1. nach Irland

a) In gälischer Sprache

Die gälischen Sendungen wären im bisherigen Umfang unbedingt beizubehalten. Ihre Erweiterung ist aber zwecklos.

b) in englischer Sprache

Der gesamte Ausbau hätte sich in Englisch zu vollziehen. Etwa 15 % des Quantums der ganzen bisherigen Dienste auf Englisch ist für die irischen Probleme nicht zuviel. Von diesem Sendeprogramm wären zwei Drittel von den bisherigen englischen Sendungen abzuzweigen ; ein Drittel wäre zusätzlich aufzunehmen.

(Diese Schätzungen berücksichtigen auch die untenstehend sub 2 und C vorgeschlagenen Erweiterungsdienste.)

c) Stationen

Hier sind drei Forderungen zu berücksichtigen :

- aa. Die Hauptmenge der Sendungen muss auf Mittelwellen laufen ; Kurzsender allein genügen nicht.
- bb. Der Mittelwellensender muss ein Gross-Sender sein ; am besten Rennes (), Friesland ().
- cc. Daneben ist ein Fanalsender erwünscht (am besten Rennes), nicht gerade aus "pan-keltischen" Erwägungen, die für diesen bretonischen Sender sprechen mögen, als aus rein technischen Gründen (guter Empfang).

d. Sendezeiten

Zwischen 17,30 und 18 Uhr und dann wieder zwischen 21 und 22 Uhr (der Empfang bessert sich an den langen irischen Sommerabenden mit der Dämmerung.)

Die Sendungen sollen nicht mit denen der eigentlichen Propaganda nach England überschneiden.

Auch wäre es verfehlt, etwa die News Bulletins der BBC blockieren zu wollen. Denn dann ziehen die irischen Hörer sehr wahrscheinlich London vor.

2. nach Amerika

Sendungen an die amerikanischen Iren, mit Richtstrahlen, wären dringend erwünscht, am besten über den Sender Rennes. Dreimal wöchentlich ist nicht zu viel, Das Ausmass der Sendungen fielle unter die oben sub 1 b angegebene Gesamtmenge.

B. Ausländische Sender.

Der Ausbau der Sendungen in englischer Sprache aus Rom, die sich an die Iren richten, wäre sehr zu begrüssen.

Voraussetzung ist allerdings eine starke deutsche Ingerenz auf die Programmgestaltung (siehe Abschnitt IV) und gute Zusammenarbeit. Denn die Unterrichtung der italienischen Öffentlichkeit über irische Fragen ist stark durch geistliche Informationskürzle gehindert. Dieser manchmal trüben Quelle gegenüber ist Vorsicht am Platz.

Andererseits findet der Name Rom (Stadt des Papstes) in Irland stets eine gewisse aufnahmebereite seelische Grundstimmung. Dies kann katholisch-religiös gefärbten Talks zugutekommen, denen unsererseits wenig Überzeugungskraft innewohnt.

C. G-Sender (Kurzwellen).

(Das Ausmass dieser Sendungen fielle unter die oben sub 1 b angegebenen Gesamtmenge.)

- 1) Ein G-Sender soll die Ansichten amerikanischer Iren zum Ausdruck bringen. Zusammenarbeit mit den Amerikadiensten wäre Voraussetzung. Der Sprecher muss amerikanisch reden. Solche Sendungen würden in Irland zweifellos mit grosser Aufmerksamkeit verfolgt werden.
- 2) Ein japanischer G-Sender könnte gegebenenfalls für die Iren in Australien eingesetzt werden.

Bemerkung : Für alle Sendungen unter A und C müsste getrachtet werden, unter den irischen Insassen der Kriegsgefangenenlager geeignete Sprecher, bzw. sogar Mitarbeiter zu finden.

IV. Aufbau der Programme

Es kommen folgende Hauptlinien in Betracht :

A. Regelmässiger Nachrichtendienst : Unter III A 1 b, III A 2, III B und III C 1.

B. Kommentierte Nachrichten : in allen im Abschnitt III angeführten Diensten.

C. Talks : Die Auswahl der Themen muss sich nach der Eigenart der Sender richten.

Die Sendungen sollen an das eigenständige Nationalbewusstsein der Iren in aller Welt appellieren, die neutrale Haltung des Landes dadurch seelisch stärken und sie zugleich in eine Konbelligerenz umzubiegen trachten. Dabei kann durchaus die Linie eingehalten werden, dass die Anfrecht-

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erhaltung dieser Neutralität nicht nur im eigenen irischen Interesse liegt, sondern auch in dem des Wiederaufbaus der Welt nach dem Kriege. Beseitigung des Ulster-Unrechtes ist eine grundlegende Forderung aller Iren und dient der wirtschaftlichen Zukunft des Landes, der Befriedung England gegenüber und damit einer neuen, besseren Weltordnung.

Themen :

1. Geschichtliche (einschliesslich Grauelpropaganda historischen Inhalts).

a) Die englischen Rechtsbrüche und Grausamkeiten bei Eroberung und Wiederhaltung des Landes. Ein fast unerschöpfliches Thema (Schandtaten Cromwells usw.) Siehe auch IV 4 a.

b) Die sozialen Zerstörungen an irischen Volkskörper durch Landkonfiskationen, Hunger, Austreibung unzähliger Menschen, Verschleppung in die Sklaverei usw.

c) Katholikenverfolgungen. Ein fast unerschöpfliches Thema. Besonders für Rom geeignet. Siehe auch IV 4 a und IV 4 b.

d) der absolute Bankerott der englischen Kolonialpolitik in dieser seiner Ältesten Kolonie.

e) Das Epos des irischen Freiheitskampfes seit der Eroberung. Beispiele heroischen Opfermuts der Iren und bestialischer Behandlung der Besiegten durch England. Siehe auch IV 5 a.

2. Irland als Blut- und Kulturspender.

a) Die Bedeutung Irlands als Ausbeutungsobjekt des Imperiums. Sein Aufbau ohne militärische und kolonisatorische Leistungen der Kelten undenkbar ("Vampirismus England an Irland").

b) Die Bedeutung der Iren für Amerika. Flohen vor England ins Land der Freiheit. Sollen sie unter amerikanischer Flagge für England bluten? (Deutschland keine Bedrohung Amerikas). Das wäre Verleugnung des amerikanischen Ideals und

und wenn es Amerikaner gibt, die dazu bereit sind, die amerikanischen Iren sind es nicht. Siehe auch IV 6 d.

c) die geistige Leistung Irlands in der Missionierung einst und jetzt.

d) der Beitrag Irlands zur neueren englischen Literatur (die ohne Iren nicht bestünde) und auf vielen anderen Gebieten.

e) das irische Bewusstsein der Ausgewanderten und ihrer Nachkommen in aller Welt, besonders in USA.

Grundnote von 1 und 2 :

In der europäischen Geschichte gibt es kein Gegenstück zu der Behandlung Irlands durch England. Sie war ein 700 jähriges Verbrechen an einem ebenwürtigen, vielfach sogar höherstehenden Nachbarvolk.

3. Soziales.

Das christlich-soziale Staatsideal der Iren. Die plutokratische Weltanschauung als Gegner des Bauerntums und als Ausbeuter der städtischen Arbeiterschaft (letzteres wichtig wegen der irischen Arbeitermasse in Glasgow, Liverpool, London usw.)

4. Religionsfragen.

a) die tapfere Aufrechterhaltung der katholischen Religion durch die Iren trotz aller Unterdrückungen. Uralte freundschaftliche Beziehungen mit Rom, Spanien, Belgien usw. Irland eines der ältesten christlichen Länder Europas. Siehe auch IV 1a, IV 1 c.

b) Intoleranz der Ulsterprotestanten einst und jetzt (sehr ergiebig). Siehe auch IV 1 c, IV 5 b, IV 8 a.

c) die Aufrechterhaltung der irischen Neutralität als Akt bewussten Christentums gegenüber den kulturerstörenden Absichten der Plutokratie, die christlich tut, dabei aber den Materialismus und Egoismus einer bankrotten Weltordnung vertritt. Dem wirklich christlichen Gedanken einer internationalen Wiederversöhnung dient am besten, wer neutral bleibt.

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5. Der irische Staat.

a) Seine Wiederaufrichtung gegen den Föderstand Englands. Siehe IV 1 a, IV 1 e.

b) Seine sozialen und religiösen Ideale. Siehe IV 3, IV 4 a-c.

c) Die Aufteilung des Landes im englischen Interesse. Siehe auch IV 4 b, IV 8 a-e.

6. Die irische Neutralität.

a) Eire gebraucht nur sein verfassungsmässiges (von Westminsterstatut garantiertes) Recht, wenn es neutral blieb. Dieser Krieg dient englischen Geldsackinteressen. Kein irisches Interesse steht auf dem Spiel. Im Gegenteil: Irland könnte von einer englischen, aber nicht von einer deutschen, Niederlage nur profitieren. Trotzdem bleibt Eire neutral.

b) Die Dominionen sollten daraus lernen, auch ihre eigenen Rechte zu wahren. Wollen sie England retten, so sollten sie es durch Rücktritt vom Krieg erst recht zum Frieden zwingen, ehe es zu spät ist.

c) Die Iren sind die besten Feinde englischer politischer Methoden. Ihre Neutralität ist also die denkbar schärfste Verurteilung dieses englisch-jüdischen Krieges. Die Iren in aller Welt sollen dieser Geisteshaltung des Mutterlandes folgen. Selbstgerechtigkeit, Scheinheiligkeit und Grausamkeit der englischen Politik werden von den Kriegshetzern in USA geteilt. So war es schon im Weltkrieg. Was haben diese Elemente aus dem Völkerbundideal gemacht? Weiter:

d) Die Amerika-Iren sind von der ganzen Diaspora die berufensten, für die irische Neutralität zu kämpfen. Damit schützen sie auch ihre eigene Neutralität. Die "deutsche Bedrohung" Amerikas lächerlich. Siehe auch IV 2 b und den vorangegangenen Punkt.

e) Eire wird seine Freiheit und Neutralität weder für Kehl, Schiffe, Geld oder Stützpunkte verschachern, noch für vage Versprechungen hinsichtlich Nordirlands aufgeben. Der Honorable-Schwandel zur Zeit Redmonds und Carsons wird sich nicht wiederholen lassen. Eire wird nie englische Soldaten oder die einer anderen kriegführenden Macht gutwillig ins Land lassen, auch keine amerikanische, seien selbst Iren darunter. Dies entspricht der nationalen Würde Eires. Sind erst einmal englische Soldaten in Eire, dann beginnt England wieder sein altes Gewaltspiel.

f) Die Neutralität dient also dem begreiflichen Ziel, den Schrecken eines neuen englischen Krieges, der die Iren nichts angeht, von Eire fernzuhalten.

Ihn von der ganzen Insel fernzuhalten, ist Eire leider nicht möglich gewesen. Die englische Macht in Nordirland hat dieses arme Land zum Opfer von Kriegshandlungen gemacht. Ginge es nach vielen seiner Bewohner, besonders der Nationalisten, so wäre das Land ein Teil des neutralen Eire. Die grösste Schuld daran, dass es soweit kommen konnte, haben die Separatisten in Belfast. Mit ihnen leiden jetzt auch die Nationalisten unter den Bombardements dieses englisch-jüdischen Krieges, der trotz der wiederholten Friedensangebote Deutschlands weitergeht.

Trotzdem fühlt Eire für seinen leidenden Nachbarn in Nordirland, Katholiken und Protestanten, und wird nach Kräften helfen, ihr Los zu lindern.

Dies ist auch nötig, angesichts des Versagens der Belfastser englischen Behörden nach Bombardierungen bei der dann herrschenden Flüchtlingsnot.

g) Die Neutralität Eires ist also nicht pro-deutsch, oder pro-italienisch. Sie ist auch nicht anti-britisch. Sie ist einfach pro-irisch. Sie ist eine echte Neutralität und wünscht, zur Verkürzung der Leiden beizutragen. Damit hilft Eire auch die Leiden seiner nordirischen Brüder abkürzen.

h) Ein geeintes und freies Irland wünscht, unter dem Schutze der Welt eine dauernde völkerrechtlich verankerte Neutralität zu halten. Vgl. IV 8 f.

7. Der Blockade- und Herverkrieg gegen die irische Neutralität.

Grundtendenz :

Der Ire erkennt, dass die englische, von USA geförderte Seerblockade den Zweck verfolgt, Eire gegen seinen Willen "kriegsreif" zu machen. Aber Eire wird dieser Blockade widerstehen, so wie die Iren bisher alle englischen Vergewaltigungsversuchen siegreich überwunden haben. Der Ire denkt nicht materialistisch und das Hungern hat ihm England selbst beigebracht. Vgl. auch IV 6 e.

Schilderung der künstlich verschärften Blockadeschwierigkeiten Eires :

- a) Lebens- und Gemismittelknappheit : Brot, Tee, Kaffee.
- b) Knappheit an Kohle, Treibstoffen, Holz, usw.
- c) Knappheit an Industrierohstoffen, Halbfabrikaten usw.
- d) Daraus resultierende Arbeitslosigkeit.
- e) Vorenthaltung von Schiffsraum.
- f) Der Herverkrieg.

Zwischen ist all das leichter zu ertragen als Bombardements, Land- und Luftkrieg, vielleicht sogar Bürgerkrieg. Die Iren in aller Welt können viel dazu beitragen, dem Volk von Eire diesen Schrecken zu ersparen und die Nordiren davon wieder zu befreien.

8. Die nordirische Frage. Siehe auch IV 5 c.

- a) Die Iren werden niemals auf die Vereinigung mit den durch Gewalt und List abgetrennten Brüdern in Nordirland verzichten.
- b) Erst nach dem Aufhören der Teilung ist ein vertrauensvolles Verhältnis zwischen England und Irland möglich.
- c) Berufung auf dahingehende Äusserungen de Valeras usw.
- d) Schilderung des neuerlichen Terrors der englischen Behörden usw. gegen die Nationalisten Nordirlands.

e) Schilderung der damit verbundenen religiösen Unterdrückung und Benachteiligung. Siehe auch IV 4 b und Kundgebungen der katholischen Bischöfe aus jüngster Zeit.

f) Ein geeintes Irland wird frei sein und dann dauernd neutral. Vgl. IV 6 h.

Schlussfolgerung :

Der Sturz des britischen Imperialismus, der so viel an Irlandverbrochen hat, ist unabwendbar. Er wird die Wiedervereinigung Irlands, damit seine Lösung aus den letzten Bindungen an das Britische Imperium mit sich bringen. Dann wird Irland sein unveräußerliches Recht auf volle Souveränität erfüllt sehen.

Erst dann wird die wiederhergestellte souveräne irische Nation, in Freundschaft mit allen Völkern und ohne jede Bindung an andere Mächte, ihren vollen Beitrag zum Wiederaufbau der durch den plutokratischen und unchristlichen Imperialismus Englands zerstörten wahren internationalen Gemeinschaft der Völker leisten können.

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TRANSLATION (Appendix C)

24/80 Political Archive
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Political Broadcasting Department

FILES
regarding:

Contact person for Reich Foreign Minister (RAM)

Nature of radio abroad

German foreign radio propaganda

Volume 2: Finland - Turkey

from: April

To: October 1941

Political Archive
Department of Foreign Affairs
R 67483

Report
re: Radio propaganda to Ireland

I. Listenership

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A. Ireland as a country

1) Circumstances of the population

Here it is essential to distinguish carefully between (neutral) EIRE and British NORTHERN IRELAND. However, the border does not coincide with political differences.

The population of Ireland is slightly more than 4 million people. Approximately 3 million live in Eire and slightly less than 1.25 million in Northern Ireland.

The majority of inhabitants of Eire are Catholics and have a vivid national identity. Democratic ideologies are strong, as well as respect for America. There is little understanding of and absolutely no sympathy for National Socialism, mainly for reasons related to the Church. However, our fight against England gains great respect for us in strongly nationalist sections of the population, as the old saying goes "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity".

Memories of the World War and Germany's achievements in the field of Celtic research are both contributing factors to the fact that enmity for the German people does not exist, even though the majority of Irish people would not wish a devastating defeat of England.

In today's difficult situation, most circles agree with de Valera's policy of neutrality, even those more sympathetic to England.

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In NORTHERN IRELAND, two thirds of the population are more English minded than the English themselves. A third, i.e. approximately 350,000 people, are Catholics, mainly nationalists

and ill disposed towards England.

In BOTH PARTS OF THE COUNTRY (and beyond), Irish nationalists set their hopes on the reunification of Ireland as a whole along with full internationally recognised sovereignty as the outcome of the present war. De Valera shares these hopes and, last but not least, has founded his policy of neutrality on them.

2) Radio Reception

The number of wireless receivers in EIRE probably amounts to 250,000 (concerning radio, Ireland was backward for a long time). Approximately half might be suited for receiving continental broadcasts. Up until the outbreak of the war, the listenership was more or less restricted to the urban and rural intelligentsia. Farmers in the West, insofar as they were listening at all, only listened to the local Athlone station which is nearly always audible.

Apart from this, only BBC programmes were suitable for the whole country, not only for language reasons but also because of their very good reception. For Irish listeners, they also provide a desired connection to the outside world because the programmes are obviously far superior to the broadcasts from Athlone.

In NORTHERN IRELAND, unionists only listened to BBC programmes, partly broadcast from the Northern Ireland station. This station has been closed down since the outbreak of war. Since then, unionists only listen to BBC programmes from England. The interest in English language broadcasts from Germany should be smaller than amongst the audience in England. Before the war, nationalists in the North also had to rely on the BBC, but nonetheless quite liked listening to Athlone, too. Since most were not well off, they spent relatively little time listening to radio.

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This was the situation before the war. Naturally, since then a lot of changes have taken place. Particularly in nationalist circles (less so the unionists), an interest seems to have developed for English language broadcasts from Germany. Regarding the Gaelic broadcasts from Germany see the following paragraph.

3) The Language Question

Approximately 5% of the population of Eire speaks Irish (Gaelic) as their native tongue. They like to listen to the Gaelic language programmes from Germany (it flatters their linguistic identity), but as an important language in the political sense Gaelic is not relevant. The only Irish native speakers live in the West and are mostly small farmers. Gaelic broadcasts from the Continent can hardly be received by them. Therefore, they mainly listen to Athlone (Gaelic and English), and besides that perhaps the BBC.

However, not only native speakers listen to Gaelic broadcasts, but also a politically much more important element, namely language enthusiasts amongst the educated sections of society throughout the whole country, who initially had to learn the Gaelic language. In Gaelic language policy, which they defend with all their might, they see a nationalist political factor of the first order, and the Gaelic broadcasts from Germany naturally have a very positive effect on them. These must therefore be maintained. The only question remains the reception quality.

B. Additional Irish Listeners

The full extent of Irish listenership cannot be recognized however, when considering Ireland by itself. Apart from the 3-1/3 million Irish with nationalist sentiments on the island itself, there are the emigrants or the descendants of emigrants.

Thus at least 1-1/2 million people living in Great Britain (London, Glasgow, Liverpool and in many other centres, as well as being spread throughout the whole country) would be conscious of their Irish extraction. In Australia,

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there are approximately 250,000; in Canada approximately 150,000; in the United States 5 to 6 million (all this WITHOUT consideration of half-breeds totally absorbed in Anglo-Saxon culture).

Approximately two thirds of Irish descendants living in Great Britain might be caught up in Anglo-Saxon political ideology, but at least a third would have nationalist sympathies. In Canada and Australia the situation could hardly be less favourable than this. In the United States, the percentage of consciously pro-Irish people is rather higher. The American-Irish are de Valera's prestige trump card, nationally and politically.

Yet all these elements, even if they are anti-Nazi and friendly towards England, are highly sensitive to any insults or moves against Irish interests and the Irish nation. Together, they represent a potential listenership with the possibility of indoctrination against England, which is of no less quantity and importance than the listenership in the motherland.

II. Present Broadcasting to Ireland

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A. Gaelic programmes

After the outbreak of war, there was initially one programme in Gaelic per week broadcast to Ireland. Since the beginning of the offensive the amount of programmes has been doubled. They are on air now on Wednesdays and Sundays from 22.30 to 22.45 hrs (short wave DZD). Since those extended programmes only run in Gaelic, they practically only address the nationalists in Eire. They do not reach the older generation of nationalists (who were unable to learn Gaelic) and they do not reach the nationalists in Northern Ireland at all.

An investigation into the purely technical problem of radio reception is urgently required by the experts. It is

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suspected that the programmes often do not get through to the target audience. A while ago, a telegram was received by the Foreign Office from the German ambassador in Dublin, in which he asked whether Germany was still broadcasting in Gaelic. He mentioned the correct wavelength, therefore he obviously had no reception on this wavelength (which was in fact being used).

The changeover of Irish programmes from the Hamburg-Bremen transmitter to short wave stations has undoubtedly impaired the reception in Ireland.

The Gaelic broadcasts have so far mainly consisted of news and commentaries, as well as the occasional talk.

B. The lack of programmes in English

English language programmes do NOT take place from our

side to Ireland. The Gaelic nationalists on the entire island and the emigrants who are unable to speak Gaelic ARE NOT ADDRESSED AT ALL BY THEIR IRISH IDENTITY, because our programmes in the English language are not aimed in their direction. In those English language programmes, Irish questions have so far been avoided intentionally.

The latter programmes are broadcast within the European service from the following German radio transmitters: Deutschlandsender, Breslau, Bremen, Friesland, Hilversum, Calais, Luxembourg and Rennes.

ROME broadcasts 20 times a day in English (on the Continent, only Germany puts Gaelic programmes together). In addition, Rome has avoided to date, to broadcast programmes in English specifically aimed at Irish listeners. There are, however, according to the grapevine, preparations for an expansion in this direction.

In summary, one can therefore say that the possibility of anti-English radio propaganda by means of the old-Irish culture has not been made use of at all. The Axis states mainly address Anglo-Saxons themselves with their English language programmes, and have not yet addressed those elements originally of other extraction but now totally integrated i.e. approximately

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10 million people with an Irish ethnic identity, of which 99 percent speak English as their mother tongue and who play an important, often highly important, part in all Anglo-Saxon countries.

C. Reasons For Caution To Date

They are clear. De Valera's adherence to Irish neutrality, which is of advantage to us, would have been impeded by strong propaganda. It would also have detrimentally influenced the English attitude towards Eire.

Reasons AGAINST this caution might have been, that a strong Ireland propaganda drive serves the cause of the anti-interventionists in the USA. The Irish-Americans are an important element from the point of view of U.S. domestic politics and the interventionists have made great efforts to win them over in favour of the war, so far without much success. De Valera's biggest asset is the glorification of his support among Irish-Americans. There are moves to undermine this. They could then hope to have an easy game with Irish neutrality, too.

Therefore it is a disadvantage of our caution on Irish propaganda that we do not give the Irish-Americans active support in their fight for neutrality.

D. Cancellation of the Reasons for Caution

The time has come to increase propaganda in the direction of Ireland. The Iraq war represents a type of Dunkirk for English prestige. It also affects other satellite states. This upsurge can already be felt by the anti-interventionists in the USA since the Balkan campaign. Thus a large-scale psychological attack would also be called for in the Irish sector.

The Irish themselves feel, that important decisions are in the air at the moment which could determine their fate too. Indeed, things have calmed down around the military bases but the bombings of Belfast have brought the war closer to home. They emphasise a new aspect of the Ulster problem and hit a sore spot

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of the first degree. Through Ulster, one part of the island is involved in the war either actively or passively. With England's destiny the Ulster question will be decided too. In addition to that there are increased difficulties in shipping blockades and the war of nerves. In short: the Irish feel the question of reunification, and with that the final and total breaking free of the whole of Ireland from the British system, is entering a last, decisive phase.

We should now take this into account in our propaganda.

III. Expansion Possibilities for Propaganda Directed to Ireland

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For increased radio propaganda of this kind the following is the best structure:

1. To Ireland

a) In the Gaelic Language

The present extent of Gaelic programmes must absolutely be maintained. However, their extension would be pointless.

b) In the English Language

The ENTIRE expansion would have to take place in English. Approximately 15% of the total quantity of English language services is not too much for Irish problems. Two thirds of this would have to be provided for by the current English programmes; one third would have to be newly created.

(These estimates also take into consideration the proposals for extended services listed below sub 2 and C.)

c) Stations

Here three demands are to be taken into consideration:

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- aa. The major part of the programmes must be transmitted over medium wave; short wave stations alone are not sufficient.
- bb. The medium wave station must be a MAJOR STATION; preferably BREMEN, FRIESLAND.
- cc. Besides that a CHANNEL STATION would be desirable (best would be Rennes, not just because of pan-celtic considerations which would be favourable for this Breton station, but also for simply technical reasons (good reception).

d) Transmission Times

Between 17.30 and 18.00 hours and then again between 21.00 and 22.00 hours (the reception improves with dusk in the long Irish summer evenings.)

The programmes should not overlap with those of original propaganda to England.

It would also be inappropriate to attempt to block the news bulletins from the BBC. In that case, the Irish listeners most probably would prefer London.

2. To America

Broadcasting for the Irish-Americans by means of directional beams would URGENTLY be desirable, preferably via the Rennes station. Three times per week would not be too often. The

amount of programmes would be included in the total amount under para. 1 b.

B. Foreign Station

An expansion of programmes in the English language from Rome, which would address the Irish, would be very welcome.

However, one condition for this would be strong German influence on the programme format (see para. IV) and good cooperation. The reason for this is the fact that reporting on Irish matters to the Italian public is intensely coloured by ecclesiastical information channels. We should do without this sometimes cloudy source.

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On the other hand, the name Rome (the Papal city) will always find a certain receptive spiritual atmosphere in Ireland. This can be beneficial for talks on Catholic-religious tendencies, which have little conviction from our point of view.

C. G-Stations (Shortwave)

(The extent of these programmes would be included in the total under para. 1 b above).

1) A G-STATION should express the views of the American Irish. One requirement would be cooperation with the America services. The newscaster must speak with an American accent. Such programmes would certainly be followed with great interest in Ireland.

2) A JAPANESE G-STATION could in certain circumstances be deployed for the Irish in Australia.

NOTE: For all programmes under A and C it should be endeavoured to recruit suitable speakers, i.e. even collaborators amongst the Irish inmates of prisoner of war camps.

IV. Structure of the Programmes

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The following main streams are under consideration:

A. REGULAR NEWS SERVICE: Under III A 1 b, III A 2, III B and III C 1.

B. NEWS COMMENTARIES: in all services listed in paragraph III

C. TALKS: The choice of topics has to be determined according to the type of station.

The programmes are supposed to appeal to the independent national identity of the Irish around the world, to strengthen the neutral position of the country spiritually and to encourage reform into a NON-BELLIGERENT STANCE, while the line can be

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maintained, that upkeep of this neutrality is not only in their own interest but also in the interest of world reconstruction after the war. Elimination of the Ulster injustice is a basic demand of all Irishmen, it serves the economic future of the country, as well as the satisfaction against England and support for a new, better world order.

TOPICS:

1. HISTORICAL (including horror propaganda of historical content)

a) The infringements of law by the English and their cruelties when conquering and oppressing the country. A nearly inexhaustable topic (Cromwell's scandalous deeds etc.) Also see IV 4 a.

b) The social destruction of the Irish people by means of confiscation of land, hunger, expulsion of countless people, abduction to slavery etc.

c) Persecution of Catholics. A nearly inexhaustable topic. Particularly suitable for Rome. Also see IV 4 a and IV 4 b.

d) Absolute bankruptcy of England's policy of colonialism in this, its oldest colony.

e) The epic Irish freedom struggle since the Conquest. Examples of heroic self-sacrifice of the Irish and the awful treatment of the conquered by England. Also see IV 5 a.

2. IRELAND AS A CONTRIBUTOR OF BLOOD AND CULTURE

a) The significance of Ireland as an object of

exploitation by the Empire. Its formation without military and colonising achievements by the Celts unimaginable ("England's vampirism of Ireland").

b) The significance of the Irish for America. Emigrated to the land of freedom from England. Should they bleed under the American flag for England? (Germany no threat to America). That would mean denial of the American ideal and

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even if there were Americans prepared to do this, the American-Irish are not. Also see IV 6 d.

c) Ireland's spiritual achievements in missionary work past and present.

d) Ireland's contribution to modern English literature (which would be non-existent without the Irish) and in many other areas.

e) Irish awareness of the exiles and their descendants around the world, particularly in the USA.

Note to 1 and 2:

In European history there is no equivalent to England's treatment of the Irish. It was a crime against an equal, often even superior, neighbouring people lasting 700 years.

3. SOCIAL MATTERS

The Irish ideal of the Christian-Social state. The plutocratic philosophy as opponent of farmers and exploiter of urban workers (the latter important because of the large numbers of Irish workers in Glasgow, Liverpool, London etc.)

4. RELIGIOUS ISSUES

a) The courageous adherence to the Catholic religion by the Irish despite all the suppression. Ancient friendly relations with Rome, Spain, Belgium etc. Ireland one of Europe's oldest Christian countries. Also see IV 1a, IV 1 c.

b) Intolerance by Ulster protestants in past and present. Also see IV 1 c, IV 5 b, IV 8 e.

c) Maintenance of Irish neutrality as an act of convinced Christianity against the destructive forces of plutocracy, pretending to be Christian, yet representing the materialism and egotism of a bankrupt world order. He who stays neutral serves the truly Christian spirit of national reunification best.

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5. THE IRISH STATE

a) Its resurgence against England's resistance. Also see IV 1 a, IV 1 e.

b) Its social and religious ideals. Also see IV 3, IV 4 a-c.

c) The segregation of the country according to English interests. Also see IV 4 b, IV 8 a-e.

6. IRISH NEUTRALITY

a) Eire merely makes use of its constitutional right (guaranteed by the Westminster statute) if it remains neutral. This war serves the interests of English money bags. No Irish interest is at stake. On the contrary: Ireland could only profit from an English defeat, yet not from a German one. Nevertheless, Eire remains neutral.

b) The DOMINIONS should learn their lesson to guard their own rights, too. Should they want to save England, then they should force it to the cause of peace, before it is too late, by retreating from the war.

c) The Irish are most well acquainted with English political methods. Their neutrality can also be considered as the sharpest condemnation of the English-Jewish war. All the Irish in the whole world should follow this attitude of their motherland. English politics' self-righteousness, hypocrisy and cruelty are shared by the malicious agitators in the USA. This was already the situation in the World War. What did those elements do with the ideal of the People's Federation? Further:

d) Of the entire diaspora, the American-Irish have the greatest vocation to fight for Irish neutrality. With that they also protect their own neutrality. America "threatened by Germany" ridiculous. Also see IV 2 b and the previous point.

e) Eire will neither sell off its freedom and neutrality for flour, ships, money or military bases, nor give them up for vague promises with regard to Northern Ireland. The Home Rule swindle during Redmond's and Carson's time can not be repeated. Eire will never allow English soldiers or those of another warring power willingly into the country, or Americans, even if there are Irish among them. This is in keeping with the national dignity of Eire. If English soldiers alone were stationed in Eire, then England would yet again begin its old game of violence.

f) Neutrality thus serves the understandable aim of keeping the terror of a new English war, which is of no concern to the Irish, away from Eire.

To keep it away from the entire island has unfortunately been impossible for Eire. This poor country has become victim to military actions by the English power in Northern Ireland. If many of the inhabitants had their say, particularly the nationalists, the country would be part of neutral Eire. The separatists in Belfast must take the greatest blame for things getting out of hand. The nationalists now have to suffer with them the bombardments in this English-Jewish war, which continues despite repeated peace offers on behalf of Germany.

Nevertheless, Eire is sympathetic with her suffering neighbours in the North, Catholics AND Protestants, and will help within her powers to ease their fate.

Indeed, this is highly necessary in view of the failure to deal with the refugee problem, resulting from bombings, by the English authorities in Belfast.

g) Eire's neutrality is therefore not pro-German or pro-Italian. Neither is it anti-British. It is simply pro-Irish. It is genuine neutrality and strives to shorten all the suffering. With that Eire also helps to alleviate the suffering of her Northern Irish brothers.

h) A united and free country amongst the states of the world desires to maintain permanent neutrality established under international law. Compare IV 8 f.

7. THE BLOCKADE AND WAR OF NERVES AGAINST IRISH NEUTRALITY

Basic tendency:

The Irish recognize that the suffocating English blockade supported by the USA, aims to make Eire "ready for war" against her will. But Eire will resist this blockade, just like the Irish have up to now victoriously overcome all other English attempts of rape. The Irish do not think materialistically and they were taught starvation by England herself. Compare also IV 6 e.

Description of Eire's artificially tightened blockade

difficulties:

- a) food shortages: bread, tea, coffee.
- b) fuel shortages: coal, wood etc.
- c) scarcity of industrial raw materials, semi-finished products etc.
- d) unemployment resulting from these.
- e) withholding of cargo space.
- f) war of nerves.

NEVERTHELESS all this is easier to endure than bombings, land and air raids, perhaps even civil war. The Irish around the world can contribute a lot to save the people of Eire from this terror and to rid the Northern Irish from it again.

8. THE NORTHERN IRISH QUESTION. Also see IV 5 c.

a) The Irish will NEVER relinquish their claim to unification with their brothers in the North, separated from them by violence and cunning.

b) Only after partition ceases, is a trusting relationship between England and Ireland possible.

c) With reference to related statements by de Valera etc.

d) Description of the most recent terror by the English authorities etc. against Northern Irish nationalists.

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e) Description of related religious suppression and discrimination. Also see IV 4 b and declarations by Catholic bishops from the recent past.

f) A unified Ireland will be free and then permanently neutral. Comp. IV 6 h.

Conclusion:

The overthrow of British imperialism is unavoidable since it has afflicted Ireland with so many crimes. It will bring with it Ireland's reunification so that it can sever all remaining connections to the British Empire. Then Ireland will see the fulfillment of its inalienable right to total sovereignty.

Only then will the reconstituted sovereign Irish nation be able to fully contribute, in friendship with all peoples and without link to other powers, to the rebuilding of the true international community of peoples which has been destroyed by England's plutocratic and un-Christian imperialism.

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Politisches Archiv
Auswärtiges Amt

Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung

Akten

betreffend:

Verbindungsmann RAM

Ausländisches Rundfunkwesen

Deutsche Auslandsrundfunkpropaganda

Bd. 1: Afrika-England

vom April

bis September 1941

Politisches Archiv des
Auswärtigen Amtes

R 67482

Bd. 7

a. Bd. 8

Dr. H. Tiesler Die Sitzung v. FUCHT, den 22. V. 1941

Aufzeichnung

Beitr.: Sitzung beim Herrn RAN über die Propaganda nach den unter dem Joche Großbritanniens stehenden Ländern.

Die Sitzung wird um 17.00 Uhr vom Herrn RAN eröffnet.

Teilnehmer: Unterstaatssekretär Dr. Koermann, Gesandter v. Rintelen, Gesandter Dr. Schmidt (Presse), Gesandter Luther, VLR Rühle, Generalkonsul Wüster, Gesandtschaftsrat Dr. Hesse, SS-Brigadeführer Dr. Stahlecker, LS Raykowski, Dr. Tiesler.

Einleitend gibt UStS Dr. Koermann einen kurzen Bericht über die in Berlin geleistete vorbereitende Arbeit. Dabei stellt er die Gesichtspunkte heraus, unter denen die Propaganda erfolgen müsse. Seine Ausführungen enden mit den Fragen, ob eine Erklärung der Absicht abzugeben werden soll und ob eine Aktion gegen alle Länder gleichzeitig eingesetzt oder einzeln

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durchgeführt werden soll.

Der Herr RAK entscheidet, daß die Propaganda nach den einzelnen Ländern getrennt erfolgen soll. Der Zeitpunkt für den Beginn der Aktion wird von dem Herrn RAK bekanntgegeben werden.

Diese Aktion soll nur von Deutschland und Italien durchgeführt werden.

Japan wird unterrichtet werden, teilweise ist dies bereits geschehen.

Die zum Dreieckspakt beigetretenen Staaten werden zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt in Kenntnis gesetzt werden. Es wird ihnen dann freigestellt, sich an dieser Aktion zu beteiligen.

Betreffend die Mittel, mit denen die Propaganda durchgeführt werden soll, ist man sich darüber einig, daß der Rundfunk als vornehmstes Instrument angewendet werden soll.

Die Presse wird durch die Zeitungen, die sie in den betreffenden Ländern beeinflusst und durch Lancieren von Nachrichten eingesetzt werden.

Schließlich kommen zur Verwirklichung der propagandistischen Pläne das Flugblatt, Flüsterparolen, Aulette und dergleichen in Frage, die durch ausgesuchte Agenten verbreitet, bzw. ver-

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teilt oder abgeworfen werden.

Der Herr RAM betont noch einmal, daß der Beginn der Aktion noch einige Zeit (2 - 4 Wochen) hinausgeschoben werden muß. Das Stichwort wird von ihm gegeben.

Gleichzeitig gibt er Weisung, die Vorbereitungen beschleunigt und so gründlich zu treffen, daß nicht nur technisch keine Schwierigkeiten entstehen können, sondern Deutschland auch stofflich in der Lage ist, jeden Gegenstoß aufzufangen und sich jeder Situation gewachsen zu zeigen.

In einzelnen gab der Herr RAM zur Durchführung der Propaganda-Aktion nach den verschiedenen Ländern folgende Weisungen:

a) I n d i e n

Die Aktion wird mit einer gemeinsamen Erklärung Deutschlands und Italiens begonnen.

Gose soll ein "Free India Centre" bilden. Zur Durchführung seiner Arbeiten sind ihm eine Million Mark und so schnell wie möglich geeignete Räume zur Verfügung zu stellen.

Das "Free India Centre" hat als eine indische und nicht als eine deutsche Einrichtung aufzutreten.

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Mit der Arbeit eines indischen Freiheits-senders soll in Anbetracht der Tatsache, daß etwa 14 Tage benötigt werden, bis er bekannt wird, begonnen werden.

Zur Zwecke einer stärkeren Beeinflussung Indiens auf dem Wege des Rundfunks soll, wie von VLR Rühle vorgeschlagen, ein Kurzwellen-Sender nach Afghanistan gebracht werden. Er wird dort entsprechend dem Vorschlag von Bose eingesetzt werden.

Die Anzahl der ordentlichen Sendungen des deutschen Rundfunks nach Indien soll, soweit technisch möglich, verstärkt werden.

Mit den Missionen bzw. Sonderbeauftragten ist zwecks Beschaffung aktuellen Materials engste Fühlung zu halten. Es wird nachdrücklich betont, daß niemand anderes als die Missionen bzw. die Sonderbeauftragten des Amtes für die Durchführung dieser Aktionen verantwortlich und zuständig sind.

Die gemeinsame Erklärung der Achse für Indien, zu der ein Entwurf Boses vorgelegt wird, soll ab sofort hauptsächlich auf dem Wege des Rundfunks und durch Lancierung von Hochrufen propagandistisch verbreitet werden, um zu ver-

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weisen, daß diese Aktion durch ihr plötzliches Einsetzen verächtigt und in ihrer Schlagkraft von vornherein gehehrt wird.

b) Fer arabische Raum

Es wird auf die Gefahr hingewiesen, die sich daraus ergibt, daß jede Propaganda nach dem arabischen Raum sich auch gegen die Verhältnisse in Syrien wenden und damit den Franzosen Schwierigkeiten bereiten würde, die im Augenblick politisch unerwünscht sind. KL Kühle stellt fest, daß man Syrien in den Sendungen nicht ausheizen könne: Es muß daher bei der gesamten Propaganda die besondere Behandlung der Araber in Syrien berücksichtigt werden.

In diesem Rahmen gibt der Herr RAN Zeitung, die Propaganda nach dem arabischen Raum einstreifen nur so zu verstärken, daß nur von Freiheit ganz allgemein gesprochen wird.

Ferner sollen über den Kurzwellensender Athen Sendungen in arabischer Sprache aufgenommen werden.

Die Arbeit eines ägyptischen Schwarzsenders kann begonnen werden.

Eine offizielle Regierungserklärung wird nach dem arabischen Raum unterbleiben.

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c) I r l a n d

Nach Irland wird keine Erklärung abgegeben werden. Sie ist für später vorgesehen.

Es sollen von jetzt ab jedoch die Iran in den englischen Sendungen besonders angesprochen werden, wobei die Ulster-Frage nicht zu berühren ist.

In Anbetracht der geringen Verbreitung der Sprache sollen die gälischen Sendungen nicht verstärkt werden, dagegen soll ein besonderer Sender (wahrscheinlich Rennes) allein für die Propaganda nach Irland (englische Sprache) eingesetzt werden.

d) S ü d a f r i k a

Die Rundfunkpropaganda soll gesteigert werden.

Leitmotiv dieser Propaganda ist die Auspielung der Buren gegen die Engländer.

Es wird zu gegebener Zeit eine Erklärung der Achse abgegeben werden, die von UStS Hoermann ausgearbeitet werden ist.

e) K a n a d a

UStS Hoermann wird beauftragt, genaue Informationen über Ansatzmöglichkeiten der Pro-

paganda nach Kanada vor allem bei der französi-
schen Bevölkerung einzuholen. VLR Mühe erhält
Seisung, einseitigen auf Grund der bekannten
Möglichkeiten die Propaganda auch nach diesem
Gebieten zu steigern.

f) A u s t r a l i e n

Auch über Australien wurden noch nähere
Erkundigungen eingeholt. Einsetzen wird die
zersetzende und defätistische Propaganda fort-
gesetzt.

Schluß der Sitzung: 13.35 Uhr

TRANSLATION (Appendix D)

Dr Timmler; Meeting of 22 May 1941.

Minutes

Re: Foreign Office meeting concerning propaganda for countries standing under the yoke of Great Britain.

Meeting was convened at 17.00 by the Foreign Minister.

Also present: Under Secretary of State, Dr Woermann; Envoy, von Rintelen; Envoy, Dr Schmidt (Press); Envoy, Luther; VLR Ruehle; Consul General, Muester; Legation Counsellor, Dr Hesse; SS Brigade Leader, Dr Stahlecker; LS Raykowski; Dr Timmler.

As an introduction, Dr Woermann gave a short report about the preparation work done in Berlin. He emphasised the points under which the propaganda would have to be carried out. His report ended with the questions whether an explanation to the Axis powers should be given and whether an action plan should be instigated against all countries at the same time or conducted one by one.

The Foreign Minister decided that the propaganda should proceed separately in individual countries.

The time for the start of the action plan will be announced by the Foreign Minister.

Action plan to be carried out only in Germany and Italy. Japan will be informed, this has partly already happened. The states who joined the tri-partite pact will be informed. They will then have the choice to take on the action plan. Regarding the medium with which the propaganda plan is to be carried out, the meeting unanimously agreed that radio will be used as the most refined instrument.

The press will be involved through newspapers to influence the relevant countries by launching the news.

Finally, the propaganda plan will include leaflets dropped by air, as well as whispering propaganda and medals with messages to be spread by chosen agents.

The Foreign Minister emphasised once more that the start of the action plan would have to be put back by some time (two to four weeks). The go-ahead will be given by the Foreign Minister. At the same time, he gave instructions that the preparations have to be speeded up and efficiency improved so that not only will there be no technical difficulties but also Germany will be fully prepared to deal with any counter measures, and able to deal with any given situation.

In particular, the Foreign Minister gave the following instructions for the instigation of the propaganda action plan in the following countries: a) India, b) the Arab regions, c) Ireland, d) South Africa, e) Canada, and f) Australia.

c) Ireland:

No declaration will be made in Ireland. That will be reserved for later. However, from now on, the Irish should be addressed particularly in English language broadcasts, whereby the Ulster question should not be touched upon. In consideration of the restricted spread of the language, Gaelic broadcasts are not to be increased. On the other hand, a special station (probably Rennes) should be solely employed for (English language) propaganda to Ireland.

The meeting ended at 18.35

A. A. Franklin

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IC. [unclear]
(VA) L. 62407

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Abt. Ru

Sonderreferat Irland

150 23/9
29/9
Abschrift
25A
Berlin, den 9.9. 1941

Aufzeichnung.

Betr.: *Englischsprachige Sendungen nach Irland.*

Nachdem ich über die Besprechung am 27. Mai 1941 unterrichtet worden war, in welcher die Vertreter von Kult R, des DEW und des Propagandaministeriums die baldige Einrichtung solcher Sendungen beschlossen hatten, trachtete ich, so bald als möglich mit dem zuständigen Sachbearbeiter des Europasenders, Herrn Kamm, die Fühlung aufzunehmen, um die Ingerenz der Abteilung Ru bei der Einrichtung der Irland-Redaktion sicherzustellen. (Herrn Kamm kannte ich durch meine täglichen dienstlichen Besuche bei „Concordia“.)

Mein Besuch bei Herrn Kamm fand am 5. Juni statt. Damals erfuhr ich, dass vom Propagandaministerium ein Herr Dr. Dignowity als Redakteur bestellt werde. Ich drückte den Wunsch aus, so schnell als möglich mit diesem Herrn in Kontakt zu gelangen. Irgendein praktisches Ergebnis hatte dieser Besuch nicht.

Über Betreiben von Herrn Kiesinger sollte endlich am 16. Juli eine Zusammenkunft mit Dr. Dignowity stattfinden. Dieser sagte aber am ~~Vor~~tag wegen einer leichten Erkrankung ab und fuhr zwei Tage später nach Paris, um dort seine Redaktion zusammensustellen.

Erst am 22. August fand die Begegnung der Beteiligten statt, worüber eine Aufzeichnung von Dr. Kiesinger vorliegt.

Die Sendungen liefen um etwa den 26. oder 28. August an. Das genaue Datum ist mir noch nicht bekannt, da die mir von Dr.

Dignowity zugesagten Abschriften der Sendungen ^{Texte} noch nicht hier eingetroffen sind.

Seither hatte ich zwei Arbeitsbesprechungen mit Dr. Dignowity: am 5. und am 8.9. (das zweitemal in Anwesenheit von Mr. Blair, einem Mitglied von Dr. Dignowitys Stab, und Frl. Dr. Pöpping, von Abteilung Ru).

Die Sendungen.

Die Sendungen laufen täglich von 21.⁰⁰ - 21.¹⁵ Uhr und von 22.⁴⁵ bis 23.⁰⁰ Uhr. Ursprünglich ging die erste Sendung über den Sender Rennes 431.7 (Mittelwelle), die zweite über Rennes und zugleich über Kurzwelle DDD 28.43. Seit einigen Tagen gehen aber beide Sendungen nur über die Kurzwelle. Ein für die Mittelwelle geeigneter norwegischer Sender wird zur Zeit gesucht.

Es gelang mir zweimal, die erste Sendung abzuhören. Weder mir, noch meinen Mitarbeitern wollte es aber gelingen, die zweite zu erfassen.

Aufbau der Sendungen: Die erste Sendung bringt A) zunächst einen Nachrichtendienst, der, wie es heisst, auf eine irische Zuhörerschaft zugeschnitten ist. Dann folgt B) ein kurzer Talk, der an das wichtigste Ereignis des Tages anknüpft. Die zweite Sendung enthält, dem Vernehmen nach, C) eine Übersicht internationaler Pressestimmen und überhaupt der Reaktion der öffentlichen Meinung auf die Ereignisse.

Die Redaktion: Dr. Dignowity hat in Deutschland und fünf Sprachen und Volkswirtschaft studiert. Er war mehreremale auf einem Gut im südlichen Irland eingeladen, wo er sich einmal auch ziemlich lange aufhielt. Es hat aber anscheinend nicht zu einem Besuch in Dublin gelangt. Im Gespräch verhehlt er nicht, dass seine Kenntnis irischer Probleme beschränkt ist. Seine Stärke ist

auf dem Gebiet französischer Probleme, sein Englisch ist aber recht gut.

Als Sprecher für die Sendungen A) und C) fungiert ein Franzose namens Piche, der längere Jahre als Journalist in Amerika gelebt hat und angeblich Englisch mit amerikanischem Anklang spricht. Es lässt sich nicht behaupten, dass er eine gute Stimme hat.

Die Sendung B) wird kompiliert und gesprochen von einem Mr. Blair, der von väterlicher Seite Schotte und von mütterlicher Seite Ire zu sein angibt. Er lebte seit dem Waffenstillstand 1918 in Paris als Korrespondent amerikanischer Blätter. Er gibt zu, dass sein letzter Aufenthalt in Irland "viele Jahre zurückliegt". Er hat sich in Paris einen irischen Pass ausfolgen lassen (wann?). Deutsch kann er kaum, kann also das Originalnachrichtensmaterial nicht lesen.

Dieser Mr. Blair soll unter dem Namen "Pat O'Brien" zu einer Radiopersönlichkeit gemacht und als solche herausgestellt werden; er soll den irischen "man in the street" vortäuschen, so dass ein irisches Auditorium glaubt, so reagiert ein typischer Ire auf die Weltereignisse.

Die Sendung C) wird von Dr. Dignowity und einem 24 jährigen Bretonen, Graf Keroer, redigiert (Sprecher Piche), der gute Sprachkenntnisse haben soll, aber Irland nicht kennt.

Als Sekretärin fungiert eine Ukrainerin namens Kowanko.

Dieser international zusammengesetzte Stab enthält also nur eine Person, die Irland einigermaßen aus eigener Anschauung kennt, nämlich Dr. Dignowity selbst.

Es wurde mit dem letzteren vereinbart, dass sein Mr. Blair täglich um 12 Uhr ins Moltkehaus kommen wird, um von uns Informationen und Ideen für Talks zu erhalten. Den Grafen

Keroer habe ich noch nicht zu Gesicht bekommen.

Auf meine Anfrage, ob und wie oft Talks unsererseits gewünscht werden, schlug Herr Dr. Dignowity vor, "jeden zweiten Sonntag einen Talk"; er werde aber noch mit Herrn Ramm Rücksprache pflegen.

Hiermit über

Herrn LR Dr. Schirmer

Herrn Gesandten Mühle

zur gefälligen Kenntnismahme vorgelegt.

(A. Mehr)

Durchschrift:

Prof. Haferkorn

Dr. Timmler

Dr. Kiesinger

Broadcasting Section

Berlin, 9 September 1941

Note concerning
English language programmes to Ireland.

I was told about the meeting on 27 May 1941, where representatives of Kult R, the DKW and the Propaganda Ministry decided to establish those programmes soon. I wanted to get in touch with Mr Kamm, the official in charge of European programmes, to ensure the participation of section Ru in setting up the Irland-Redaktion. (I know Mr Kamm from my daily, official visits to Concordia).

My visit to Mr Kamm took place on 5 June. I was told then that the Propaganda Ministry will name a Dr Dignowity as editor. I wish to contact this gentleman as quickly as possible. With the assistance of Mr Kiesinger, there should at last have been a meeting with Dr Dignowity on 16 July. But he cancelled it the day before due to a slight illness, and two days later he went to Paris to assemble his editorial staff.

The first meeting of all the members took place on 22 August, and Dr Kiesinger was there. The programmes commenced around 26 or 28 August. I do not know the exact date as I did not yet receive copies of the programme scripts from Dr Dignowity. Since then I have had two working sessions with Dr Dignowity, on 5 and 8 September (the second meeting was also attended by Mr Blair, a member of Dr Dignowity's staff, and Dr Poepping from the Foreign Office's broadcasting section).

The Programmes

The programmes run daily from 21.00 to 21.15, and from 22.45 to 23.00. Originally, the first programme was broadcast by the Rennes transmitter on 431.7 (medium wave), the second by Rennes and, at the same time, on the shortwave transmitter DZD 28.43. A few days ago, both programmes were only being broadcast on shortwave. A Norwegian station, suitable for medium wave transmissions, is being sought at the moment. I twice managed to listen to the first of the two programmes, but neither my colleagues nor myself succeeded in getting the second one.

Programme structure: The first programme provides A) Firstly, a news bulletin which, they say, has been tailored for an Irish audience. Then follows B) a short talk linked to the most important event of the day. The second programme contains, so I have heard, C) an international press review and public reaction to the main events of the day.

The editorial staff: Dr Dignowity has studied languages and economics in Germany and Geneva. He has been invited to a farm in Southern Ireland several times, and once stayed there for quite a long time. But, apparently, he could not manage to visit Dublin. When talking to him, he does not deny that his knowledge of Irish problems is limited. His strength is in the field of French problems, but his English is quite good.

The announcer for programmes A) and C) is a French man called Piche who lived as a journalist in America for several years and allegedly speaks English with an American accent. One cannot say if he has a good voice.

Programme B) is compiled and presented by a Mr Blair who claims to be Scottish on his father's side and Irish on his mother's side. Since the 1918 armistice he has been living in Paris as a correspondent for American newspapers. He admits that his last visit to Ireland was 'many years ago'. In Paris he obtained an Irish passport (when?). He can hardly speak German, which means he cannot read original news material.

This Mr Blair is to be made into a radio personality under the name of 'Pat O'Brien', imitating the Irish 'man in the street', so an Irish audience will believe that a typical Irish man would react to world events in this way.

Programme C) is edited by Dr Dignowity and a 24 year old Breton, Count Keroer, (speaker Piche) who is supposed to have a good knowledge of the language but knows nothing about Ireland.

The secretary is a Ukrainian woman named Kowanko.

This international team contains only one person who knows Ireland a bit from his own experience, namely Dr Dignowity himself.

It has been agreed with the latter that his Mr Blair will come every day at 12 noon to the Moltkehaus to get information and ideas for talks from us. I have not met Count Keroer yet.

When I asked if, and how often, they would like talks from our side, Dr Dignowity suggested 'a talk every second Sunday'; but he has to confirm it with Mr Kamm.

For the attention of :
Dr Schirmer, and
Envoy Ruehle.

(A. Mahr)

Copies to:
Professor Haferkorn
Dr Timmler
Dr Kiesinger

Geheime Reichsache

Nordamerika-Komitee

Niederschrift über die
Sitzung am 28. August 1943.
(Anwesenheitsliste liegt bei)

N.A.K.Nr.25 gRs
Gefertigt in 15 Expl.
Dies ist Expl. Nr. 7.

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1. *Dr. Colin Ross berichtet über seinen Aufenthalt in der Schweiz.* Die Stimmung in der Schweiz ist nicht durchweg feindselig. Man ist sich weitgehend darüber klar, daß auch ein Zusammenbruch Deutschlands keine Lösung der Nachkriegsprobleme bringen würde. Man fängt an, die Amerikaner in einem anderen Licht zu sehen: brutal und handfest. Amerikaner bereiten offenbar eine große Propagandaoffensive vor, um die Bedenken und Besorgnisse gegen sie in neutralen Ländern zu zerstreuen. Sie arbeiten vor allem erfolgreich mit Filmen und gehen dabei äußerst skrupellos vor. Mit Jazz und Swing wollen sie ihre "frohe, freie Welt" zeigen. Dieser Propaganda müssen wir entgegensetzen: 1. daß weder Sieg oder Niederlage einer Partei Nachkriegsprobleme löst, 2. daß Amerika weder willens noch in der Lage ist, europäische Fragen zu lösen. Die Schweiz ist mit feindlicher Literatur überschwemmt. Buchhändler behaupten, sie bekämen keine deutschen Bücher. Dr. Ross schlägt vor, Übersetzungen geeigneter ausländischer Bücher und in Ermangelung eigener Propagandafilme entsprechend überarbeitete feindliche Filme zu vertreiben, die als Gegenpropaganda wirken würden, (wie z. B. "Yankee Doodle Dandy" und "Marinka").

Das Komitee beschließt, die Frage zu prüfen, ob von den 150 in Genua unter Zollverschluß lagernden USA-Filmen einige entnommen, entsprechend geschnitten und wieder an Ort und Stelle geschafft werden können, ohne daß dies der Schweizer Filmverleihgesellschaft bekannt wird. Gesandter Reinebeck wird mit dem zuständigen Sachbearbeiter, Herrn Schatter diesbezüglich in Verbindung treten.

Dr. Megerle weist darauf hin, daß bisher Propaganda gegen USA erörtert wurde, jedoch die eigentliche Aufgabe des Ausschusses Propaganda nach und in USA sei, und fragte Dr. Colin Ross, ob nach seinen Beobachtungen in der Schweiz auch heute noch die Bekanntgabe eines Europaprogramms mit etwa sechs bis acht allgemeinen Grundsätzen propagandistisch erfolgreich abzusetzen sei. Colin Ross bejaht. Man müsse den Schweizern auch klar machen, was ein alliierter Sieg bedeuten würde. Viele Leute fürchteten einen solchen. Er weist auf eine günstige Predigt hin, die Kardinal Faulhaber gehalten habe. Dr. Megerle bittet um Beschaffung des Textes.

2. Der Ausschuß bespricht dann die mögliche Auswertung des *Phosphorkrieges*. Colin Ross meint, daß der Unterschied zwischen deutscher und englischer Luftkriegführung nicht genügend herausgearbeitet wird. Dr. Werth berichtet, der Angriff auf Hamburg konnte nicht ausgewertet werden, weil militärische Stellen dagegen. Dr. Megerle hält subtile Behandlung für möglich und erwähnt erfolgreiche Auswertung in Schweden. Dr. Kiesinger betont, daß die grundsätzliche Barbarei des Auslöschens einer Zivilbevölkerung herausgestellt werden müsse. Dr. Sallet schlägt vor, durch Nennen vieler Namen von Bombenopfern in USA-Funksendungen den Hörerkreis in USA zu erweitern. Dr. Kiesinger glaubt, daß gewünschte Wirkung allein durch Schilderung der ungewöhnlich grausamen Angriffsweise erzielt wird. Dr. Megerle bittet um Ausarbeitung von ein oder zwei entsprechenden Talks zur Vorlage bei RAM. Dr. Kiesinger wird Professor Koischwitz hierzu veranlassen.

Die Frage Dr. Megerles, ob man mit dem Problem der kleinen europäischen Nationen in Amerika Eindruck machen könne, wird von Colin Ross verneint.

3. Dr. Werth berichtet über die *Auswertung kritischer Stimmen aus Amerika und England gegen das bolschewistische Rußland*. *Eastman-Artikel* ist zur

Verbreitung den Missionen übersandt, desgl. der *Artikel von Voigt in "19th Century"*. Zusammenfassung verwertbarer Seiten von "Life" vom 5. Juli in Sondernummer wird versucht. Colin Ross schlägt Herausgabe einer ähnlichen Zusammenfassung propagandistisch verwertbarer Aufsätze aus "Reader's Digest" in spanischer Sprache vor. Dr. Werth berichtet, daß etwas Ähnliches durch die von uns herausgegebene Zeitschrift "Common Sense" geschieht. Colin Ross tritt jedoch für seinen Vorschlag ein, da dabei der allbekannte "Reader's Digest" ausgenutzt werden könnte. Zusammenstellung und Druck sollte in Madrid erfolgen.

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4. Dr. Grünbeck erwähnt das Interesse für eine Abhandlung von Röpcke über Währungspläne und schlägt vor, daß eine führende Persönlichkeit, etwa Reichsminister Funk, in einem Vortrag vor einer Akademie dieses Thema anschneidet, wobei zum Ausdruck kommen müßte: 1. wie weit die Gegner auf diesem Gebiet Gedankengut von uns übernommen haben; 2. was wir eigentlich wollen. Eine Diskussion hierüber würde auf die neutralen Länder wirken, die sich zurzeit überfahren fühlen. Dr. Megerle erklärt, daß beabsichtigt ist, mehr als bisher dem Gegner nachzuweisen, daß er unser Gedankengut übernimmt.

Anschließend bittet Dr. Megerle, in jeder Sitzung programmäßig ein bis zwei Punkte des Amerikaprogramms zu erledigen. RAM möchte auch genau über die innere Lage in USA unterrichtet sein. Gesandter Reinebeck erwähnt die neuerdings angeordnete tägliche Meldung hierüber an RAM.

5. Dr. Kiesinger teilt mit, daß ein polnischer *Geheim-sender* bereits im Anlaufen sei. Dr. Kiesinger, Dr. Sallet und Her Kramarz sollen alle diesen Sender betreffenden Fragen (Dr. Podetzki etc.) besprechen. Dr. Kiesinger erwähnt die Sendungen nach Nahost über den Metropolsender, durch den hauptsächlich polnische Offiziere angesprochen werden sollen. Dr.

Megerle weist darauf hin, daß Nachrichten aus dem Generalgouvernement über Herrn Kramarz beschafft werden können.

Dr. Kiesinger berichtet ferner, daß jetzt eine geeignete Persönlichkeit für den irischen Sender zur Verfügung steht, durch den Iren in USA zweimal wöchentlich angesprochen werden könnten. Der kroatische Sender sei zurzeit durch Sabotage gestört. Finnern und Ungarn seien zurzeit für Sendungen unzugänglich.

Es wird beschlossen, daß auf der folgenden Sitzung die innerpolitische Lage in USA erörtert werden soll.

Berlin, den 26. August 1943.
gez. Reinebeck

Anwesenheitsliste für die
Sitzung des Nordamerika-
Komitees am 26. August 1943.

Gesandter Reinebeck	Stellvertr. Generalsekretär
Dr. Colin Ross	
GK Dr. Gyssling	Pol IX
LS Dr. Sallet	Pol IX
Dr. Megerle	Stab RAM
Dr. Kiesinger	Ru
Dr. Ahrens	Ru IX
Dr. Werth	Kult Pol
WHA Richter	Kult Pol
K Reichel	P IX a
RR Dr. Grünbeck	Ha Pol
LR Kramarz	
GK Reinhardt	England-Ausschuß

Translation: (Appendix F)

DOCUMENT 227, Paragraph 5

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5. Dr. Kiesinger informed the meeting that a Polish secret radio station was already in its early stages of existence. Dr. Kiesinger, Dr. Sallet and Mr. Kramarz should discuss all relevant questions (Dr. Podetzki etc.) related to this station. Dr. Kiesinger mentioned the programmes transmitted through the Metropol Station to the Near East, which are supposed to address mainly Polish Officers. Dr. Megerle pointed out that news from the Generals' Government could be obtained via Dr. Kramarz.

Dr. Kiesinger reported further that now a suitable person for the Irish Station was available. Irish people in the USA could be addressed twice weekly through this station. At this point in time, the Croatian Station was disrupted by sabotage. Finns and Hungarians were not reachable by any programmes at the moment.

The meeting decided that the following meeting should consider the situation of internal affairs in the United States.

Berlin, 26th August 1943,
(signed) Reinebeck

Appendix G

Technical data concerning broadcasts to Ireland
by German Radio from 1939 to 1945.

Period month/year	Wavelength metres (kc)	Irish Time all p.m.	Station name/no.	Studio location	Source
end-1939	332	8.25 to 8.40	Hamburg	Berlin	AA
	395.9	Sundays only	Bremen	Berlin	AA
	31.22		DXB Zeesen	Berlin	AA
early 1940	332	same as above	Hamburg	Berlin	BBC
	395.9		Bremen	Berlin	BBC
	31.38		DJA Langenberg	Berlin	BBC
mid-1940	19.74	9.30 to 9.45	DJB Zeesen	Berlin	DNA
	1875	Sun.& Wed.	Kootwyk	Berlin	DNA
9-11/1941	28.45	8.00	Zeesen	Berlin	BBC
	30/31-m band	7.00	Zeesen	Berlin	BBC
12/1941	1154	8-10 various	Oslo	Berlin	BBC
1942	1154	7-11 various	Oslo	Berlin	BBC
to	431.7		Rennes	Berlin	BBC
7/1943	28.43		DZD Zeesen	Berlin	IAMS
9/1943	1293	same as above	Luxembourg	Luxembourg	BBC
10/1943	514.6	7.15	Calais	Luxembourg	BBC
2-3/1944	1293	various	Luxembourg	Luxembourg	BBC
	301.5/415.5		Hilversum	Luxembourg	BBC
8-9/1944	41.44	5.15/6.15/7.45	DXJ	Luxembourg	IAMS
	514 (582)	same as above	Calais I	Luxembourg	DNA
	301 (995)		Calais II	Luxembourg	DNA
	296 (758)		Bremen	Luxembourg	DNA
	1875 (160)		Friesland	Luxembourg	DNA
	41.4	6.15	DXJ	Luxembourg	DNA
	48.23	7.45	DXR-7	Luxembourg	DNA
10/1944	396	6.45/8.00	Bremen	Apen	IAMS
	301.6	same	Hilversum	Apen	IAMS
3/1945	301.6	8.45	Hilversum	Apen	IAMS
early 4/45	n.a.	5.45/8.45/10.45	Hilversum	Apen	IAMS
mid 4/1945	n.a.	8.45/9.45	Hilversum	Apen	IAMS
end 4/1945	n.a.	same as above	Bremen	Apen	IAMS
1 May 1945	n.a.	8.45/9.45	n.a.	Apen	IAMS
2 May 1945	n.a.	8.45 to 8.55	n.a.	Apen	IAMS

Transmitter details

Short wave transmitters: DXJ, DXR-7, DXB, DJA, DJB and DZD (all located at Zeesen except DJA at Langenberg).

Medium wave transmitters: Calais I, Calais II (both lost to Allied troops in October 1944), Bremen, Hamburg, Rennes, Hilversum.

Long wave transmitters: Friesland, Luxembourg, Kootwyk, Oslo.

Abbreviations used in main table:

m = metres

kc = kilocycles

n.a. = data not available

IAMS = Irish Army Monitoring Service

BBC = BBC Monitoring Service

AA = Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) Political Archive, Bonn

DNA = German News Agency (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, Berlin)

Note: German programmes beamed to Ireland from April to May 1945 were mostly announced as coming from Bremen. When the Bremen transmitter was off the air its substitute was not identified. Although the last programmes of the war were broadcast to Ireland from makeshift studios in Bremers Hotel in Apen, emergency transmitters at Oebisfelde and Helmstedt were used to relay the signals. These transmitters were located near the city of Braunschweig, east of Hanover.

Appendix H

Profile of Franz Fromme

Professor Franz Fromme visited Ireland in 1932, doing research for a book which was published in Berlin the following year. Entitled *Irland's Kampf um die Freiheit*, Fromme's book featured maps and photographs of Ireland. It drew heavily for source material on Roger Casement's diaries, Dan Breen's book *My Fight for Irish Freedom*, Irish newspaper cuttings, and articles from the republican weekly paper *An Phoblacht*.¹

Fromme's book established him during the 1930s as the Abwehr's expert on Irish affairs. When researching the work he spoke to the widows of War of Independence leaders Cathal Brugha, Tom Clarke, and Arthur Griffith. He also sought the advice of government officials including Sean O Cuiv of the Government Information Bureau.²

Fromme never broadcast to Ireland or anywhere else. His Irish expertise was instead put to work for the shadowy world of the Abwehr, Germany's counter intelligence network. The Abwehr directed Fromme to provide a detailed briefing on Irish affairs to Oscar Pfaus, the man chosen to be Germany's first spy sent to Ireland to establish contacts with the IRA. Pfaus arrived in Dun Laoghaire on 2 February 1939 aboard the mailboat *Cambria*. Six months later, Fromme was best man at Pfaus' wedding in Hamburg.³

Fromme paid a second visit to Ireland in 1939, spending two months being closely followed by the special branch. Arriving at Cobh, from Hamburg, on 22 April, he gave his address as the home of M. W. O'Reilly at Roebuck in Dublin. O'Reilly was managing director of the New Ireland Assurance Company, and Fromme had met the Irishman's daughter Irene while she was on a singing tour of Germany. In fact, Fromme never stayed with the O'Reilly family, although he visited them, choosing to take up residence for his two month stay in the Mayfair Hotel in Lower Baggot Street, Dublin. There, the only visitor noted by his police shadow was the German professor of sculpture at the National College of Art, Friedrich Herkner.⁴

Fromme, like other Germans visiting Dublin in those years, availed himself of the hospitality at the German Club evenings in the Red Bank restaurant. Acutely aware of pre-war propaganda from London, Fromme wrote from the Mayfair Hotel to his family in Göttingen, complaining about the influence of the BBC in Ireland. Just ten days before he sailed home from



Franz Fromme

Cobh to Hamburg on 20 June 1939, Fromme's wife wrote to him in Dublin saying she 'was sorry that the English press and also the radio have such a strong influence there [in Ireland], because in the abstract, there was always a friendly feeling to Germany there.'⁵

A revealing pen-picture of Fromme appears in Róisín Ní Mheara's memoirs where she recalls that the German professor

made contact with me, in some way which I've now forgotten, during those beautiful, bitter, quiet periods of the autumn at the beginning of the war. I remember the phone call from him when he asked me to have an evening meal with him in the city. That old professor was a particularly wonderful person. He was a small, lithe, athletic man, his eyes flashing with humour behind his frameless glasses. And his presence, as he strode down the street, freely and primly... Fromme's only interest and satisfaction lay in linguistics but his deep study of ethnology had aroused in him a profound sympathetic interest in downtrodden peoples. That German scholar was a resolute defender who never tired of discussing the distressing cases of the unjustly treated small nations. Later on, Fromme's life was dedicated to the fight for the rights of minorities, particularly in Europe. Fromme had been an important executive in the counter intelligence department of the Ministry of War during the First World War. When war was again predicted and the same problems were pressing on the government, the old professor was asked to function as an advisor on minority affairs in the department of the War Ministry in the Third Reich. Fromme set about his duties. But he was strongly critical of those in Abwehr II as the counter intelligence department was now called. He cast a doubtful eye on the way this new generation was handling its affairs, and he vented his anger disparagingly on them. "What a mistake! And no one bothers listening to me. What the hell are they doing? They're always making a mess of things." With that, you'd see Fromme fingering his hair with his two hands until it was like a cock's comb. "Didn't I tell them", he'd go on shouting, "not to give authorisation to people like that. I'll raise hell with them. The minority have nothing left but their pride. What a mistake. It's we who'll pay for it." But despite everything and every tonguelashing that was given, Fromme stayed and he continued with his

efforts. He couldn't but keep his hand in the business to stand up for the small nations. Needless to say, he took special care to help the Irish. He was with us as he had been before when he had charge of Roger Casement in the first [world] war. He showed kindness to us as he did to the Bretons, the Flemish, the Montenegrans and others. He spoke different languages, such as Basque and Irish fluently. "By the way", Fromme said nonchalantly as he paid the bill, "I've a good friend who'll be going to Ireland shortly and he'd like to meet you." We set a day. Dr Hermann Goertz, a lieutenant-gGeneral in the German army at the time, saw eye to eye with Professor Fromme in his idealistic and enthusiastic outlook. He set his two eyes on me, the moment of testing, then held my hands firmly and said, "This is a true person I can trust." Quite clearly, that warmed the cockles of Fromme's heart. He ordered one of the bottles of wine of his choice for us, sat down to table with it and, in keeping with the practice of middle class old stagers still in vogue, fixed his napkin under his chin. There was still a little wine to be had in some of the special taverns like this one on the fashionable city boulevard called Kurfürstendamm. On this kind of occasion Professor Franz Fromme used to be seen, after a few glasses of wine, jumping up on a table to dance a stave of an Irish jig, or a mazurka perhaps, with his napkin still under his chin.⁶

Fromme's services were employed by the Abwehr in early 1940 when he resurfaced as a secret courier to Genoa to deliver propaganda leaflets (probably produced by Ludwig Mühlhausen) en route for Breton nationalists, as well as contacting an IRA courier to arrange the voyage of IRA leader Seán Russell from New York to Berlin via Genoa aboard a trans Atlantic liner.⁷ Ni Mheara notes that

Russell had already come ashore. On that unfortunate May day in 1940 he reached Genoa. He had travelled from the USA on his way to Germany, at his own request it should be said. Professor Fromme was on the quayside to welcome him on behalf of the Abwehr II section, and after providing him with a German passport in the Genoa Consulate, he directed him to the German capital. Russell reached Berlin together with Fromme in due time.⁸

In January 1940 Fromme had also been called in by the Abwehr to identify the writer Francis Stuart who had arrived in Berlin to begin work as a lecturer at Berlin University. Stuart was later asked to follow Russell to Ireland with a shipment of arms.⁹

Edmund Veesenmayer, the Nazi's coup d'état specialist who had masterminded the abortive plan to send Sean Russell back to Ireland, did not think highly of Franz Fromme. In a post war interview¹⁰ Veesenmayer recalled 'the comic ineptitude' of Professor Fromme whom he described as 'a romanticist allotted to the imbroglio of getting Russell to Genoa', adding that Fromme 'was neither a politician, a proper professor, a soldier nor an Abwehr man.'

References

Introduction

1. Minutes of the 7th Cabinet, pp. 339-41 (NA 1/5, S6631). Thomas Derrig, the Minister for Education who, in 1933, had accepted Mahr 'unreservedly as a most suitable person for appointment to the post of Director', did not attend the cabinet meeting of 17 July 1934 at which Mahr's promotion was approved. De Valera signed the minutes of that cabinet meeting three days later on 20 July 1934. Derrig's proposal to promote Mahr is contained in a letter - dated 6 March 1933, a month before Mahr became a member of the Nazi party - from Seosamh O'Neill, Secretary of the Department of Education, to the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DoF E53/3/33, document no. 348-32F. Up to 1991 Mahr's Irish civil service career files were held at Agriculture House, Kildare Street, Dublin). The Secretary of the Department of Finance is not named in the aforementioned letter; he was James J. McElligott. The Minister for Finance at the time was Seán MacEntee (see Fanning, pp. 685-7).
2. See Adolf Mahr profile in Chapter 2, pp.
3. Duggan, pp. 22-4.
4. Profile of Mahr, 19 December 1945 (MA G2/0130). The unsigned profile was most probably drawn up for the cabinet by Colonel Dan Bryan, then head of G2.
5. See profiles of Mühlhausen and Mahr in Chapter 2, pp. 36-50.
6. See Chapter 8, 'The Mahr Propaganda Initiative of 1941', pp.148-60.
7. Schwipps, p. 16.
8. For details of Mahr's takeover of the radio service, see Chapter 8, pp.148-60.
9. Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990; Letter to author from Hartmann, 28 June 1992.
10. See chapter 4, pp.
11. Mac Aonghusa, p. 64.
12. Fisk, p. 521.
13. Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990.
14. For details of Britain's handover of the Treaty Ports to Eire in 1938 see Fisk, pp. 1-13.
15. D.H. Giesecke, 'Broadcasting in Germany', in *BBC Yearbook 1932*, pp. 50-4.

16. Clarke, pp. 12 and 42.
17. Gorham, p. 23.
18. Balfour, p. 18.
19. Catalogue of German Radio Recordings 1929-1936 (NSA 4151 2152/1-15 DS 396); Renier and Rubinstein, p. 52. Eine Kleine Schlachtmusik translates as 'a little battle music' and is a word-play on Mozart's famous Eine Kleine Nachtmusik (A Little Night Music).
20. Talbot, p. 170.
21. Flannery, pp. 104-5; Fisher, p. 1; Talk by Thomas Mann entitled 'Ten years of national socialism', transmitted 26 January 1943 on BBC's German service (NSA, BBC Sound Archive Catalogue, January 1943 to December 1945).
22. The origins of Berlin's first Irish propaganda initiative are discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. The second and third propaganda initiatives are dealt with in Chapters 8 and 10 respectively.

References, Chapter 1

A Nazi radio service for Ireland.

1. Hitler, p. 169. Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle) was published in Munich in two volumes, the first in 1925 and the second in 1927. An English translation by James Murphy was published in London in 1939. After the war, *Mein Kampf* was banned from sale in many countries. In 1974, however, a second English translation, by Ralph Manheim, was published in London and is the work quoted in this thesis.

2. Hitler, p. 170.

3. Snyder, pp. 243-5.

4. Hitler, p. 424.

5. Hitler, p. 426.

6. Shulman, p. 4.

7. Hitler, p. 529.

8. Hitler, p. 533.

9. Hitler, p. 530.

10. Hitler, p. 530.

11. Hitler, p. 161.

12. Hitler, p. 163.

13. Hitler, p. 166.

14. Hitler, p. 165.

15. Grandin, p. 46.

16. James Brown, p. 105.

17. Grandin, pp. 11-12.

18. Keegan in Taylor, foreword, p. x.

19. Jowett and O'Donnell, p. 186. In early 1919, following Germany's defeat in World War I, a national constituent assembly was convened in Weimar. This German city was the home of Goethe and was noted for its liberal traditions. Political confusion, economic collapse and mass unemployment dictated that the Weimar Republic would only last until Hitler's accession to power in January 1933 (see Snyder, pp. 376-7 and Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, USA, 1962).

20. Lean p. 20. See also Ellul, pp. 5-6.

21. W.J. West, pp. 67-79.

22. Lean, p. 19.

23. Pohle, p. 449.
24. Grandin, pp. 99-116.
25. Grandin, pp. 96-8.
26. Terence Brown, p. 153.
27. Hale, p.167.
28. P.M. Taylor, p. 293.
29. Mansell, pp. 100-1.
30. Edwards, p. 50.
31. The six objectives listed are based on the author's interviews with survivors of the Irland-Redaktion and the BBC's wartime monitor, Maurice Irvine, as well as on a detailed study of programme transcripts produced by the Irish Army and the BBC.
32. Briggs (1), p. 8.
33. See Chapter 8, pp.155-6.
34. Cole, p. 162. Ribbentrop was appointed as German ambassador to Great Britain on 11 August 1936 and remained in London until he was appointed Reich Foreign Minister by Hitler on 4 February 1938 (Snyder, pp. 295-6).
35. Soley and Nichols, p. 36.
36. Gorham, pp. 133-4.
37. Graas, pp. 41-2, writes: 'On 21 September 1939, by order of the Luxembourg government - anxious to respect the strictest neutrality in time of war - the station went off the air.' Graas adds that the Germans had Radio Luxembourg back on the air again in early June 1940, four weeks after occupying the country on 10 May.
38. Carroll, p. 22; G.A. Hayes-McCoy 'Irish Defence Policy, 1938-51' in Nowlan and Williams, p. 45.
39. Bowman, p. 207.
40. Bowman, p. 208.
41. Hartmann interview with author, 21 October 1990.
42. Hartmann broadcast, 28 December 1941 (IWM E88).
43. Bowman, pp. 210-1.
44. Bowman, p. 220.
45. Hildebrand (1), p. 103.
46. Bowman, pp. 240-1.
47. Kris and Speier, p. 279.
48. 'Strategical importance of Éire to Germany' in 'Éire: report by the

- Chiefs of Staff Committee', 30 May 1940, p. 53 (PRO CAB 66/8).
49. Bowman, Saturday 8.30, RTE Radio 1 broadcast, 9 September 1989.
 50. R.F. Foster, p. 561.
 51. Lee, p. 244.
 52. They were: Mühlhausen, Hartmann and Stuart (all lecturers), in addition to Poepping and Meissner (both students).
 53. Cole, pp. 43-4, 72, 81, 111, 160, 206.
 54. See Chapter 9, pp. 161-2.
 55. Hilton statement at Liebenau camp, 30 June 1945, p. 5, par. 41 (LCD CRIM 1/1745).
 56. James Gilbert file (LCD CRIM 1/1783).
 57. See Chapter 6, pp. 122-4.
 58. Baillie-Stewart, pp. 166-70.
 59. Stuart (2), pp. 40-1.
 60. Mansell, p. 153. Born in Berlin in 1904, Sefton Delmer was the son of an Australian lecturer at Berlin University. The younger Delmer was in charge of Britain's 'black' radio propaganda programmes to Germany from 1941 to 1945. Delmer's 'black' unit was not a BBC operation but the work of the top secret Psychological Warfare Executive. The PWE is described in detail in both Balfour and Delmer.
 61. Rolo, p. 50.
 62. Roosevelt and Churchill announced their policy of unconditional surrender for Germany at the Casablanca conference held from 14-24 January 1943 (Snyder, p. 357). Goebbels' reply came in his 'total war' speech at the Berlin Sportspalast on 18 February 1943 (Campbell, p. 16).
 63. Boyle, p. 307.
 64. Balfour, p. 37.
 65. Boelcke, p. 316.
 66. Mahr report 'Rundfunkpropaganda nach Irland' (radio propaganda to Ireland), 18 March 1941, pp. 2-3 (AA R67483).
 67. Bruce L. Smith, p. 172.
 68. Lean, p. 240.
 69. For the first nine months of the war, in addition to domestic programmes, Irish newspapers carried details of foreign radio programmes in English but not German Radio's Sunday night programmes in Irish. From mid-1940, radio listings in Irish newspapers were restricted to the programmes

of Radio Éireann, the BBC and the BBC's Forces Programme.

70. See Chapter 9, pp. 180-1, 188-91.

71. The changeover appears to have happened in early November 1941 with the sacking of Goebbels' appointee, Wolfgang Dignowity. The first 'Flashback' broadcast from Berlin to Ireland, instigated by Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office, was monitored by the BBC on 6 November 1941. This indicates that Mahr had taken control of the Irland-Redaktion at that point. Although Hans Hartmann had been contributing regular radio talks in Irish since 1940, he was not installed - by Mahr - as head of the Irland-Redaktion until shortly before Christmas 1941. Thus it can be said that by Christmas of that year the Foreign Office had completed its takeover of the service from the Propaganda Ministry.

72. Zeman, p. 77.

73. Thomson, p. 21.

74. Zeman, p. 78.

75. Silvey, p. 108.

76. Balfour, pp. 140-1.

77. Silvey, p. 107.

78. Letter to author from Hilde Spickernagel, 9 February 1992. Dr Spickernagel was Dr Hartmann's assistant at the Irland-Redaktion for a year, starting in December 1941.

79. Founded in 1931, the AO or Nazi Foreign Organisation supervised Germans living abroad (Snyder, p. 14).

80. Grandin, pp. 46-7.

81. Balfour, p. 135.

82. Author's interview with Hartmann, Cologne, 28 December 1990.

83. Boelcke, p. 315.

84. Herzstein, pp. 15-6.

85. Pohle, pp. 449-50, 455.

86. Baird, pp. 9-10.

87. Balfour, p. 32.

88. Herzstein, p. 325.

89. Herzstein, pp. 340-50.

90. Herzstein, p. 342.

91. Lean, p. 34.

92. Sanders and Taylor, pp. 141, 263.

93. Jowett and O'Donnell, p. 185.
94. MacKenzie, p. 257.
95. Grandin, p. 47.
96. Baird, pp. 247-9.
97. Kris and Speier, p. 92.
98. Debray, p. 56. As a journalist in the 1960s, Régis Debray tracked down the Cuban revolutionary leader, Ché Guevara, who was then plotting a communist takeover in Bolivia. In the 1980s Debray became an official adviser to the French President François Mitterrand.
99. Balfour, p. 286.
100. Broadcast by Francis Stuart, 6 February 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
101. Zeman, pp. 174-5.
102. Hildebrand (2), p. 90.
103. Lasswell, p. 81.
104. Balfour, p. 398.
105. Greene, pp. 24-5.
106. Bytwerk, pp. 48-9.
107. Anonymous German broadcast to Ireland, 22 April 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
108. Boelcke, p. 349.
109. Baird, pp. 256-7.
110. Pohle, p. 325.
111. Wulf, p. 205.
112. Lean, p. 30.
113. Moller, pp. 40-2.

References

Chapter 2: Founding Fathers of the Irland-Redaktion

1. Report on Dr Ludwig Mühlhausen by Second Lieutenant Joseph G. Healy, 10 December 1939 (MA G2/2473); Clarke, p. 42.
2. Rockel, pp. 26-9; F. Bopp, *Die keltischen Sprachen vom Gesichtspunkt der vergleichenden Sprachforschung* (Halle, 1839); C. Keferstein, *Ansichten ueber die keltischen Alterthumer, die Kelten ueberhaupt und besonders in Deutschland, sowie den kelthische ursprung der Stadt Halle* (Halle, 1846-51); Author's interview with Lt. Col. John P. Duggan, Dublin, 8 June 1991; Kuno Meyer's biographer, Seán Ó Lúing, told the author that while the German scholar never lived in Ireland for any extended period 'Meyer and his sister [Toni] holidayed in the West of Ireland in Achill and, mainly, on Aran for some weeks'. Ó Lúing has no knowledge of any links between Kuno Meyer and Mühlhausen but states that 'Toni Meyer met Mühlhausen socially in Hamburg in the mid-1920s. It appears he was interested in Irish music.' (Seán Ó Lúing's letters to author, 9 March 1993 and 16 March 1993); Additional information on Kuno Meyer from the *50th anniversary report, 1940-1990, School of Celtic Studies*, p. 62 (Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, Dublin, 1990). See also, J.P. Duggan, 'Kuno Meyer: Time to make amends?' in *The Irish Times*, 12 April 1990, p. 11.
3. Martin Rockel of Berlin's Humboldt University, notes that Pokorny's book *Irland*, which appeared in 1916 during the First World War, 'was not free from anti-English sentiment. Some of his statements show that elitist and racist theories were already influencing the teachings of some Celticists in Germany under the Kaisers' (Rockel, p. 30).
4. Rockel, p. 30; Interview with Mrs Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin, 19 October 1990.
5. Rockel, p. 31; Mühlhausen's Nazi party membership file (BDC 1153327); According to Professor F.J. Byrne of UCD, Pokorny always denied any Jewish connections but he was kept under surveillance by the Gestapo during the war (Professor Byrne's interview with author, 30 December 1991). According to Professor Conn R. Ó Cléirigh, who was a student of Pokorny's, the German professor had partial Jewish ancestry through a maternal grandparent (letter to author from Professor Ó Cléirigh, UCD, 4 May 1993).
6. Rudolf Thurneysen file (BDC T 240). Thurneysen died on 9 August 1940,

aged 83; Ludwig Mühlhausen was born on 16 December 1888 in Kassel, Central Germany; Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, 21 October 1990.

7. G2 memorandum on Mühlhausen, 17 June 1943 (MA G2/2473); Mühlhausen's Nazi party file (BDC 1153327); Rockel, pp. 30-1.

8. Author's interview with Liam Ó Muirthile, Dublin, 9 October 1991. According to Ó Muirthile, Seamus Kavanagh, who left Germany for Ireland at the outbreak of war, heard Mühlhausen announce the results of his German university exam finals over the radio; Author's interview with Michael Healy, Dublin, 15 October 1991; Author's interview with Jean Sheridan Healy, Cork, 4 January 1992.

9. Letter to author from Dr Louis D. Healy, Mandurah, Western Australia, 14 January 1992.

10. In an undated memo (thought to have been written in early 1940) for G2, Professor Delargy says he stayed with the Mühlhausen family in Hamburg in January 1937 at which time the German professor showed him 'the thousands of photographs, plans and drawings' he made in Ireland. In early October 1937 Mühlhausen stayed at Delargy's home in Dublin on his way back from a six week stay in Teelin, Co Donegal. Delargy told G2 that Mühlhausen 'has a very sincere regard for Ireland and its people, but thinks that German culture would be good for us, and our country better run by Germans than by either the British or ourselves' (Delargy memo, undated, MA G2/2473); Mühlhausen to Ó Heochaidh, 29 July 1937 (copy of letter supplied to author by Seán Ó Heochaidh); Letter to author from S. Ó Heochaidh, Gortahork, Co Donegal, 20 June 1991.

11. Author's interview with Hugh Byrne, Teelin, Co Donegal, 15 January 1992.

12. Ó Broin, p. 132.

13. Author's interview with Eimear Ó Broin, Dublin, 10 June 1992.

14. Byrne interview, 15 January 1992. Byrne told the author that despite living in neutral Éire, Donegal people had many reminders of the war, particularly when bodies from the *Arandora Star* were washed ashore in large numbers (see Fisk, p. 155).

15. The list is principally comprised of Scots Gaelic words which may have been transferred, accidentally or otherwise, from the German Army's invasion handbook for Scotland. The Scottish and Irish invasion handbooks, along with others covering most European countries, were produced in 1940-

41 in occupied Brussels. Belgian civilians working on the handbooks apparently attempted to sabotage the project by introducing as many errors as possible (author's interview with M. de Winter, Director, Institut Geographique National, Brussels, 25 November 1991). The author acknowledges the help of Mr John Walsh, Dublin, in analysing the origin of words on the list.

16. *Militärgeographische Angaben über Irland, West- und Nordküste*, Berlin 1941 (IGN 91 (417)=3 document 25 P9/3); Fisk, pp. 220-33; Author's interview with Seán Ó Heochaidh, Gortahork, Co Donegal, 14 January 1992; Hugh Byrne interview, Teelin, Co Donegal, 15 January 1992; Letter to author from Gustav Mahr, Berlin, 28 November 1990.

17. Mühlhausen, *Zehn irische Volkserzählungen aus süd-Donegal* (Halle, 1939); L. Mühlhausen, *Haus und Hausbau in Teilinn, Co Donegal* (Berlin, 1941); J. Healy to Bryan, 11 December 1939 (MA G2/2473).

18. Healy's notes on Mühlhausen's 10 December 1939 broadcast, 11 December 1939 (MA G2/2473 Ludwig Mühlhausen file).

19. Author's interview with Hartmann, 21 October 1990.

20. Undated memo (MA G2/2473).

21. Warnock to Bryan, undated (MA G2/2473). Warnock was posted to Berlin in 1938 as First Secretary of the Irish Legation. In 1939 he was promoted to Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in which capacity he remained until returning to Dublin in 1943 (Warnock *curriculum vitae* supplied to author by Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 18 October 1993).

22. Dr Ludwig Mühlhausen's Nazi party file (BDC 1153327); Mühlhausen, *Die Vier Zweige Des Mabinogi* (The four branches of the Mabinogi, an old Welsh folktale), pp. 146-7 (appreciation of Mühlhausen by Stefan Zimmer in 1988 edition. This work by Mühlhausen was first published in Halle, 1925); In early June 1940 the Germans were operating a radio station called La Voix de la Bretagne (the voice of Brittany) which was believed to be run from a mobile transmitter (Howe, p. 65). According to his Nazi party file, Mühlhausen would have been in charge of this Breton propaganda operation. The SS-run Amtes für Keltische Volksforschung (Office for Celtic Ethnological Research), where Mühlhausen worked from mid-1942, stemmed from the Nazis' belief in Aryan superiority encompassing Teutonism in Germany, Anglo-Saxonism in England and the United States, and Celticism in France (Snyder, p. 277).

23. According to his daughter, Mrs Ingrid Reusswig, Mahr 'wrote material for the radio service including some of Francis Stuart's material, but did not broadcast to Ireland himself because of his foreign accent' (Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994).
24. Mahr curriculum vitae supplied to author by German Foreign Office, Bonn, 7 August 1991; Author's interview with Dr Pat Wallace, Director, National Museum, Dublin, 5 December 1999; Letter to author from Gustav Mahr, Berlin, 28 November 1990; Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994; Kilbride-Jones, p. 29.
25. O Neill letter 348-32F of 6 March 1933 (DoF E53/3/33).
26. Adolf Mahr's Nazi party file (BDC 1483 301).
27. Details of the Irish government's decision to promote Mahr are contained in the cabinet minute book for 1934 (NA 1/5 Minutes of the 7th cabinet, 17 July 1934); Mahr appears to have been tipped off about getting the top museum job a week before the cabinet decision. His diary entry for 11 July 1934 reads: 'Zum Director ernannt' [appointed as Director] (NM Mahr diaries 1927-35).
28. Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994.
29. Walshe to de Valera, 22 February 1939 (FLK, de Valera Papers, file no. 953 'Anglo-Irish Relations' in J.P. Walshe's Memoranda, 1932-39).
30. Ibid.; Mahr was instrumental in having Schroetter recalled to Berlin (Duggan (1), pp. 23-4). Hempel took over from Schroetter in 1937 (Duggan, TCD thesis, pp. 24-7) which indicates that Joe Walshe had already known about Mahr's Nazi activities for two years when he wrote to de Valera about them in February 1939. It is not known whether Walshe advised de Valera of Mahr's Nazi party connections before his 1939 memorandum.
31. Mahr was an obvious candidate for the post of director because, of the museum's other keepers, one was approaching retirement age and the other was less experienced than Mahr (DoF E53/3/33).
32. Author's interview with Dr Joseph Raftery, Dublin 20 May 1991; Duggan (1), pp. 63, 260-1; Carroll, p. 36, notes that in 1939 the German community in Ireland numbered approximately 400.
33. Bryan to Boland, 4 May 1946 (MA G2/0245); Wallace interview; Raftery interview.
34. Mahr, *Ancient Irish Handicraft* (Limerick, 1939); Letter to author from Siobhain de hOir, Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, Dublin, 10

September 1991.

35. Dáil Debates, 6 December 1945, Vol. 98, cols. 1549-1551, and 13 November 1946, Vol. 103, cols. 792-798; Duggan (1), pp. 22-4, 63. According to Lt. Col. Duggan, Mahr and his Nazi colleagues in pre-war Dublin were 'nothing more than bullies' (Duggan interview, 12 June 1991); Mahr file (MA G2/0130).

36. Duggan (1), pp. 14, 63; Kahn, pp. 98-9.

37. Kahn, pp. 98-100; Hoehne, pp. 230-1; The AO's influence was demonstrated by the fact that its agents were instrumental in securing Hitler's backing for Franco in the Spanish civil war.

38. Unsigned report on Mahr, 21 March 1939 (MA G2/0130); D. Bryan memo, 19 December 1945 (MA G2/0130). Mahr's personal diaries for the period 1927-35 (the diaries for 1936-39 are missing) show that he had ample opportunity to use his museum post as a cover for Nazi activities. A diary entry for 30 July 1930 reads: 'Botschafts Rat. [embassy counsellor] V. Dieckhoff, London, mit [with Dr Georg von] Dehn [of German Legation, Dublin]. Newgr[ange], Dowth, Monasterbois' (sic). The references are to archaeological sites visited by Mahr that day with the two German diplomats). Another diary entry for 20 December 1933 notes: 'Army Air Corps made aerial photos' [of excavation site at Duleek, Co Meath]. Mahr's diaries also disclose that he was a regular traveller to Britain and continental Europe (NM Mahr diaries, 1927-35). Mahr's daughter, Ingrid, recalls that, in 1937, her parents were official guests at the coronation of King George VI. Mahr frequently visited London to see Ribbentrop who was German ambassador there from August 1936 to February 1938 (Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994). Mahr's close working relationship with Ribbentrop continued during the Second World War.

39. Raftery interview, 20 May 1991. Joseph Raftery based his opinion partly on a belief that Mahr's housekeeper was Jewish. Raftery had been encouraged by Mahr to study in Germany. In 1935 the Irish student was awarded a prestigious Humboldt Fellowship by the German government. In 1937 Raftery took his PhD at Marburg University with a thesis on the Early Stone Age in Ireland; Mahr's plan to attend the international archaeology congress in Berlin in August 1939 was mentioned by Frau Maria Mahr in a letter (MA G2/130) to her housekeeper, Gretel Spiegelfeld, dated 18 August 1939, and was confirmed in a Dáil debate on 6 December 1945 (Dáil Debates, 6 December

1945, Vol. 98, col. 1549); Maria Mahr was a Dutch woman whose father, Professor Van Bemmelin, taught zoology at Leiden University; Mahr's daughter Ingrid concurs with Raftery's comments: 'My father was pro-Nazi but not anti-Jewish. He had many Jewish friends whom he warned to flee Austria in the 1930s.' She says Raftery was wrong, however, about the housekeeper, Gretel Spiegelfeld, being a Jewess: 'Although she had curly hair and a hook nose, she was not Jewish. She was, in fact, an Austrian countess who had lost her estate in the carve-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire after World War I.' (Interview with Mrs Ingrid Reusswig, Dublin, 28 July 1994). However, according to Adolf Mahr's friend, H.E. Kilbride-Jones, Gretel Spiegelfeld was 'a Jewess who had fled her native Austria' (Kilbride-Jones, 'Adolf Mahr' in *Archaeology Ireland*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Issue No. 25, Autumn 1993, p. 30)

40. Author's interview with Mrs Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin, 19 October 1990; Mahr's Nazi party file (BDC 1483 301).

41. Kilbride-Jones, pp. 29-30. In August 1994 values, de Valera's £400 cheque would be worth £14,400.

42. Ingrid Reusswig interview, Dublin, 28 July 1994.

43. Mühlhausen to Mahr, 4 July 1939, letter 10/A19/39, Mahr correspondence file (MA G2/130); Maria Mahr to Fraulein G[retel] Spiegelfeld, 18 August 1939 (MA G2/130). The parteitag was the annual Nazi rally and a major focal point for the party. The first such rally was held in Munich on 28 January 1923, and the last at Nuremberg from 5-12 September 1938 (Snyder, pp. 252-4). The rally scheduled for 2-11 September 1939, which Adolf Mahr had planned to attend, was cancelled on 26 August 1939 (Burden, pp. 164-5); Carter, p. 96; Fisk, p. 335.

44. Adolf Mahr's aliens registration card (MA G2/0130); Bryan memos 10 April 1945 and 19 December 1945 (MA G2/0130); Garda Síochána memo 3C/468/251/38 on Heinz Mecking, 5 December 1938 (MA G2/0130). Mecking was born in Germany on 22 September 1902 and joined the Nazi party on 1 June 1931 (BDC 546679 Heinz Mecking file); After the war it was claimed in the Dáil that Mahr tried unsuccessfully to return to Dublin 'when war became imminent' (Dáil Debates, 6 December 1945, Vol. 98, cols. 1549-51); Andrews, pp. 162-3; Fisk, p. 336; Letter to author from Klasmann-Deilmann-Gruppe, Germany, 22 July 1991; Cronin (1), pp. 252-3; Letter to author from German Foreign Office, Bonn, 7 August 1991; Letter to author from Gustav Mahr,

Berlin, 28 November 1990.

45. Von Weinertsgrün to Mahr, 11 July 1939 (MA G2/130. Letter no. 10/A 136/39). The initials RuS in the letter, though not translated, most probably stand for Rasse- und Siedlung (race and resettlement) one of five branches of the SS 'responsible for organising the settlement and welfare of SS colonists in the conquered and occupied countries in the east' (Snyder, p. 281).

46. Bryan to Boland, 4 May 1946 (MA G2/0245 Reinhard file). According to his Nazi party file (BDC 7112352) Otto Reinhard was posted to the Rumanian capital Bucharest on 20 February 1942, and remained there until May 1943.

47. MacLysaght, pp. 222-4; Otto Reinhard was born in Wildungen on 14 January 1898. His Nazi party file describes him as a forest manager (Forstverwalter) with an address at Rossmore, Silchester Road, Dublin. Reinhard applied for Nazi membership on 30 June 1939 and became a party member on 1 September 1939 (BDC 7112352).

48. Carter, p. 96; Fisk, pp. 89, 335. See above, note 35 on Mahr's diaries.

49. Fisk, pp. 1-13, 226-33; Author's interview with M. Dewinter, Institut Geographique National, Brussels, 22 November 1991; J. Gerstenberg, *Eire, ein Irlandbuch* (Hamburg, 1940).

50. Ingrid Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994.

51. Mahr's secretary in the second half of 1941 was called Von Binzer (letter to author from Dr Hilde Spickernagel, Hanover, 31 January 1993); From 1942 to 1943 Mahr had the services of a foreign language assistant named Jacoba-Maria Grünschke and, in 1942, a secretary named Ursula Konopath (letter to author from German Foreign Office, Bonn, 7 August 1991).

52. Dignowity's Nazi party file (BDC 1345 1061) also discloses that he was paid a monthly salary of 900 marks as head of the Irland-Redaktion.

53. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941 (BA Potsdam, file VA 62407, document no. 168).

54. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941; Mahr's alien registration card (MA G2/0130); Letter to author from German Foreign Office, Bonn, 7 August 1991; Diller, pp. 324-5.

55. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941; O'Reilly, 'I was a spy in Ireland' in *Sunday Dispatch* (London), 13 July 1952, p. 2.

56. O'Reilly article, 13 July 1952; German Propaganda Ministry memo, 17 August 1942 (BDC 1345 1 061).

57. Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, 21 October 1990.
58. Rockel, p. 32; Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990; Author's interview with Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, Dublin, 15 November 1990.
59. Rockel, p. 32; H. Hartmann, *Über die Betonung der Adjektiva im Russischen* (Berlin, 1936); Hartmann's letter to author, 16 August 1993. Whether or not the emigré teacher's strong opposition to Soviet communism rubbed off on the young student, ten years later Hartmann was indulging in virulently anti-Bolshevik radio propaganda. In any event, such broadcasts were in line with one of the main themes of Nazi propaganda following the German invasion of Russia in June 1941.
60. Garda Síochána alien registration card no. 12477 of 13 May 1937 (MA G2/0071). The alien registration card permitted foreigners to reside in Ireland for 12 months. Hartmann's card was renewed twice, in 1938 and 1939, before he eventually left Ireland for Berlin on 11 September 1939, a week after the outbreak of World War II.
61. Hartmann's Military Intelligence file, no. G2/0071, is held at the Military Archive, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin.
62. Hartmann interviews of 21 October 1990 and 28 December 1990, Cologne.
63. Stephan, pp. 144-8, 154.
64. Hartmann file (MA G2/0071); Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990.
65. Duggan (1), p.63; Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990; Ó Súilleabháin interview, Dublin, 24 April 1991.
66. Rockel, p. 32; H. Hartmann, *Über Krankheit, Tod und Jenseitsvorstellungen in Irland* (Halle, 1942); Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990.
67. Hartmann file (MA G2/0071). A G2 memo (dated 25 January 1943, three and a half years after he had left Ireland) in this file details Hartmann's activities in Ireland in 1939 and names his close associates as Adolf Mahr, Helmut Clissmann, Hans Gerlach (an exchange student at TCD) and Helen Neugebauer (a typist at the German Legation in Dublin); Hartmann interview, 28 December 1990; Ó Súilleabháin interview, 24 April 1991.
68. On his return to Germany, Hartmann married Helen Neugebauer. Details of the Garda Special Branch and Military Intelligence surveillance of Hartmann, covering both his official and social activities, are contained in G2 file (MA G2/0071). The suggestion that Hartmann and Mahr did not want to be seen together in public is not supported by the G2 file's disclosure

that on 27 December 1938 detectives followed Hartmann and Mahr to a German colony dance at the Portmarnock Hotel.

69. Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990; Hartmann file (MA G2/0071); *The Irish Times*, 12 September 1939, p. 6; Fisk, p. 336; Author's interview with Mrs Margaret Greiner, Dublin, 25 May 1993. According to Mrs Greiner, the German party sailed to Rotterdam (Hook of Holland) from the port of Gravesend in Kent. However, because the train used to transport the party from London had blacked out windows, she may have confused Gravesend with the nearby Kent port of Rochester which is also on the Thames estuary. The wartime archives of Rotterdam City Council show no arrivals from Gravesend for the period in question, but a vessel named *Servus* did arrive from Rochester on 14 September 1939, three days after the Germans left Dublin. Although no passenger list is now available for the *Servus*, this vessel is almost certainly the one taken by the German colony to return to the Continent (letter to author from D. van Wingerden, Archivist, Gemeente Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 16 August 1993).

References

Chapter 3: Berlin's Irish Team

1. Duggan (1), p. 198.
2. 'Landing of parachutists John F. O'Reilly and John Kenny', file dated December 1947 (NA DFA A52 I); Duggan (1), p. 268; Stephan, p. 256; Fisk, p. 128; Coogan (1), pp. 34-8; Carter, p. 139; O'Reilly, 'I was a Spy in Ireland' in *Sunday Dispatch*, 27 July 1952, p. 2.
3. Undated Garda memo on O'Reilly (NA DFA A52 I); O'Reilly's own memoirs differ slightly from the Garda Special Branch assessment. He claimed to have left the customs service after three years because a promised transfer to Dublin did not materialise. He left Buckfast Abbey after only two weeks (see *Sunday Dispatch*, 29 June 1952, p. 2). Buckfast Abbey has no record of O'Reilly's brief stay there (letter to author from Dom Placid Hooper OSB, archivist, Buckfast Abbey, 16 March 1993); Carter, p. 139.
4. G2 memorandum G2/3824 entitled 'Notes on John Fras. O'Reilly's activities in the Channel Islands and Germany', 31 December 1943 (NA DFA A52 I); According to O'Reilly's friend, John Kenny, the German commander of Jersey, Prince Van Baldeck, had liked the Irish ever since his visit to the Eucharistic Congress in Dublin in 1932 (see 'They Fell from the Sky on Eire' in *Cork Examiner*, 2 June 1952, p. 5); Undated Garda memo on O'Reilly quoting intercepted letter of 27 July 1941 (NA DFA A52 I).
5. G2/3824 memo (NA DFA A52 I); *Sunday Dispatch*, 27 July 1952.
6. G2 memo G2/3824 (NA DFA A52 I); Elborn, pp. 145, 151; Author's interview with Francis Stuart, Dublin, 24 February 1990.
7. Irish Army memo G2/3824 (NA DFA A52 I).
8. G2/3824 memo (NA DFA A52 I); Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, 21 October 1990; Stuart interview, 24 February 1990. Stuart began lecturing in Berlin in 1940 and Hartmann in 1942 (see Elborn, p. 121, and Rockel, p. 32); Elborn, p. 156; Frank Ryan was an IRA man whom the Nazis had helped to free from a Spanish prison in 1940 in order to help with their secret Irish invasion plans. Ryan had been imprisoned since his arrest in 1938 while fighting on the Republican side with the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War.
9. Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990; FWB closed file, parts 2 and 3 in Military Archive, Dublin; G2/3824 memo (NA DFA A52 I).

10. Stephan, p. 257; G2/3824 memo (NA DFA A52 I); *Sunday Dispatch*, 27 July 1952; Stuart interview, 24 February 1990.
11. Cronin (1), p. 275; Carter, pp. 138-9; Duggan (1), preface, XV; Cronin (1), pp. 188-9, 191; G2/3824 memo (NA DFA A52 I); Information on O'Reilly's transmitter supplied to author by Commandant Peter Young, Military Archive, Dublin; 29-year-old John Kenny was dropped three days after O'Reilly, at 3 a.m. in the morning of 19 December 1943, two and a half miles North of Kilkee. He was lucky to survive the parachute drop being dragged by high winds a quarter of a mile through hedges and fences before losing consciousness. Kenny eventually crawled to a farmhouse and was rushed by Gardai and a local doctor to hospital. Kenny never worked as a broadcaster for the Germans, but while attached to the Military School in Berlin he regularly met William Joyce and Hans Hartmann at the Rundfunkhaus. Earlier he had worked as a chauffeur for a German officer before joining the German Army himself early in 1943 and seeing action with the Waffen S.S. transport corps in Russia (see 'They fell from the sky on Éire', *Cork Examiner*, 2 June 1945, p. 5).
12. Ibid.; G2/3824 memo (NA DFA A52 I); Carter, pp. 136-7, 257; Duggan, *Neutral Ireland*, pp. 156-7, 224; Fisk, p. 531; 'Substantial level of wartime cooperation with British revealed', *Irish Times*, 2 January 1991, p. 5; O'Halpin, pp. 64-8; By the end of 1943, liaison between Irish and British Intelligence was well developed and included monthly meetings between the Dublin and London authorities as well as contacts with the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS, the forerunner of the CIA). Details of O'Reilly's interrogation by G2 were swiftly relayed to MI5 in London (see Bryan-Liddell correspondence in NA DFA A60 Secretary's Office files); The Germans sent a total of 13 agents to Ireland in the 1939-43 period. Oscar Pfaus was the first such agent. He was dispatched to Dublin in 1939 to establish links with the IRA. O'Reilly and Kenny were preceded by another Irish agent, Joseph Lenihan, who parachuted into County Meath on 18 July 1941. The remaining agents assigned to Ireland were Henry Obed (Indian), Herbert Tributh and Dieter Gärtner (both South African), Ernst Weber-Drohl (German), Hermann Goertz (German), Günther Schütz (German), Willy Preetz (German), Walter Simon (German), and Jan Van Loon (Dutch). See Duggan (1), pp. 149-57.
13. Ryle Dwyer, pp. 182-5, 190-3; Carter, p. 139; Cronin (2), pp. 151, 158,

337. Cronin says the significance of the O'Reilly-Kenny landings 'was that they might have been used as an excuse for an Anglo-American invasion [of Ireland] before D-Day.' (letter to author from Seán Cronin, Washington D.C., 26 November 1990).

14. Terrell to Kuhn, 20 January 1944 (USNA CL-1566-BG). In tongue-in-cheek style, Terrell reported to Washington that, 'One month after it happened, the Irish public was informed this week about the two parachutists who were dropped from German planes. Both Irish, of course. Our favorite angle; John F. O'Reilly, 28-year-old Irish Haw Haw, left Berlin with papers permitting him both to leave Germany and land in Eire - even down to an exit permit visaed by the Irish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin! (Such detail, of course, was censored by our old friend, censor Thomas Coyne). One thing parachutists will not get in Dublin next week is a clean shirt - a laundry strike has been announced'.

15. Walshe to Brennan, 27 January 1944 (NA DFA A52 I). The contents of the cable show that the Dublin government was in no doubt that both O'Reilly and Kenny had duped the Germans into returning them home. In terms reminiscent of Kurt Haller's assessment of the two parachutists, Joe Walshe told Brennan that it was 'impossible for two raw, ignorant youths to have received such a mission. Incapable of exercising influence on anybody. Obvious purpose was to get home by fooling Germans that they could get information and send it on their portable [radio] sets. Both arrested within few hours of landing. Both American and British governments know that Ireland is not a centre for any kind of German activities. You should talk to State Department to prevent new campaign for which this may be signal'.

16. Dáil Debates, 17 February 1944, Vol. 92, Cols. 1237-1240, and 23 February 1944, Vol. 92, Cols. 1509-1510; Duggan (1), pp. 226-7; See also, Walshe aide memoire on meeting with Hempel, dated 28 March 1944 (NA DFA A52 I); By mid March 1944, in the wake of the parachute incidents and the American note, banner headlines such as 'How Ireland harbours Nazi spies' were appearing in the U.S. press (see Ryle Dwyer, pp. 182-5).

17. Alf Mac Lochlainn recalls that O'Reilly had claimed that the code 'was unbreakable and rashly accepted a challenge to test his captors. But they cheated by going to his cell when he was on exercise and taking from the fireplace the ashes of the papers on which he had done his homework before

burning them. The ashes were brought to the Garda technical office in Kilmainham and laboriously mounted on glass and photographed so that the steps between clear and cipher could be followed' (letter to author from Alf Mac Lochlainn, Galway, 11 June 1991). After the war, Mac Lochlainn worked with the Director of the National Library, Dr Richard Hayes, who was G2's top code breaker in the war years and had decyphered O'Reilly's radio code keys. O'Reilly himself remained unaware that he had been tricked by G2 (see O'Reilly, 'How the secret of the codes was kept', in *Sunday Dispatch*, London, 2 November 1952, p. 2).

18. The *Irish Press* reported O'Reilly's escape in its editions of 7 July, at the same time as gardaí were putting up wanted posters around the country offering a £500 reward for his recapture. But the escaped prisoner was not at liberty for long. He was rearrested just three days later on 9 July in his father's house at Brendan Villas, Kilkee, Co Clare. Bernard O'Reilly, the retired RIC sergeant, had reported his son's arrival at the family home to local gardaí. He is said to have claimed the reward for his son's capture and invested it for John Francis. After his release from Arbour Hill prison on 24 May 1945, O'Reilly is believed to have put the £500 reward money, together with the £300 the Nazi security service had given him for his spying mission, towards buying a pub in Dublin's Parkgate Street, a short walk from both Army and Garda headquarters. Contrary to popular legend his pub was never called the Parachute Inn, just O'Reilly's, though John Francis himself was known locally as 'the Parachutist'. Afterwards, he emigrated to Nigeria. Returning to Ireland some years later, he bought the Esplanade Hotel near his old pub in Parkgate Street. The parachutist from Kilkee spent the final months of his life at the Middlesex Hospital near London, following a road accident. He died on 4 May 1971, aged 54. Nine days later, as Ireland's leaders gathered at Deansgrange cemetery to bury the former Taoiseach, Seán Lemass, O'Reilly was quietly laid to rest at Glasnevin cemetery. (*Irish Press*, 7 July 1944 and 10 July 1944; Duggan (1), p. 268; Carter, p. 139; *Irish Press*, 25 May 1945; Stephan, p. 258; Information on O'Reilly's public house supplied to author by William Ryan, Dublin, 26 February 1991. In 1994 values, O'Reilly's £800 would be worth £17,000; *Irish Press*, 14 May 1971, p. 9).

19. G2 memo on O'Reilly, 31 December 1943 (NA DFA A52 I G2/3824).

20. Warnock to Boland, undated, sent to G2 on 4 January 1943 (MA G2/007

Hartmann file).

21. Author's interview with Francis Stuart, Dublin, 17 November 1989.
22. Author's interview with Francis Stuart, Dublin, 24 February 1990.
23. Hilton statement at Liebenau Camp, 1 July 1945 (LCD CRIM 1/1745).
24. Stuart interview, 24 February 1990.
25. Cronin (1), pp. 188-91.
26. Cronin (1), p. 10.
27. Elborn, p. 156.
28. Cronin (1), pp. 228-31.
29. W.J. Murphy statements to MI5 at Brixton Prison, London, 19 January, 1 February, 2 February and 6 February 1945 (PRO HO 45/25839).
30. John or Johann Freeman was not Irish though his father, a telegraph operator in Emden, was. His father later became a naturalised German citizen. John Freeman was born in Emden, Germany, on 21 October 1886 and became active as a journalist for the Nazi party through his membership of the Reich Literary Chamber (Reichsschrifttumskammer) which he joined in 1936. His younger brother Henry George Freeman was also born in Emden, on 11 September 1902. He joined the Nazi party on 1 May 1937 and worked as a lecturer in technical English (BDC 7161 John Freeman file, and BDC 5622986 Henry Freeman file).
31. Warnock to Natterstad, 14 January 1971, in restricted Francis Stuart file (DFA A72).
32. Murphy statements to MI5 at Brixton Prison.
33. Murphy statements to MI5 at Brixton Prison. William Murphy was one of several teachers who worked at one time or another for the Irland- and England-Redaktions. Liam Mullally was also a Berlitz teacher, as was an England-Redaktion speaker called Barry Jones. The following broadcasters all lectured at Berlin University: Ludwig Mühlhausen, Hans Hartmann, Francis Stuart and Norman Baillie-Stewart. Madeleine Meissner and Hilde Poepping were both wartime students at the university.
34. Author's interview with Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin, 11 September 1990; Author's interview with Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin, 19 October 1990.

References Chapter 4

Portrait of the writer at war: Francis Stuart

1. Elborn, pp. 145, 151, 164-5; Stuart interview with Eileen Battersby in *Sunday Tribune*, 11 February 1990, p. B1; Stuart interviews with author, Dublin, 17 November 1989 and 24 February 1990.
2. Kevin Myers, 'An Irishman's Diary' in *The Irish Times*, 19 March 1991, p. 9; 'Pillars of Society: Francis Stuart' in *The Phoenix*, 5 April 1991, p. 13.
3. Elborn, pp. 11-22; Stuart interview with Colum Kenny for RTE Radio One's 'Appraisal' programme, 28 July 1982.
4. Elborn, pp. 23, 36-7, 58-9, 111, 114.
5. Stuart interview with Sean Rafferty for BBC Radio Four's 'Public Versus Private' series, 29 August 1979.
6. Stuart interview with John Skehan rebroadcast on RTE Radio Two's 'Bowman Saturday 8.30' programme, 9 September 1989.
7. Stuart's 'Appraisal' interview, 28 July 1982.
8. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989.
9. Rebecca West, pp. 137-8.
10. Elborn, pp. 112-7; Diller, p. 324.
11. Cronin (1), pp. 182-4; Elborn, pp. 117-21; Stuart interview with author, 24 February 1990. In the late 1930s, a contemporary of Stuart's, Samuel Beckett, also left Ireland for mainland Europe and for much the same reasons: 'I didn't like living in Ireland. You know the kind of thing - theocracy, censorship of books, that kind of thing. I preferred to live abroad' (Bair, p. 269). But a dislike for Ireland was about all these two Irish writers had in common. While Stuart was broadcasting for the Nazis, Beckett was working for the French Resistance. At the end of the war, while Stuart was interned by the French Army, Beckett was honoured by de Gaulle for his role in the Resistance (Bair, pp. 319-20).
12. Stephan, p. 68; Carter, pp. 105-8; Elborn, pp. 119-123.
13. Stuart interviews with author 17 November 1989 and 24 February 1990. See profile of Franz Fromme, appendix H, pp. 344-8.
14. Letter to author from Dr Hilde Spickernagel, Hanover, 9 February 1992.
15. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989. Ernst von Weizsäcker's son, Dr Richard von Weizsäcker, was Federal President of Germany from 1

July 1984 to 30 June 1994.

16. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989. While talking to von Weizäcker, Stuart appears to have borrowed a phrase from his friend Liam O'Flaherty who commented to Stuart in the Royal Hotel, Glendalough, Co Wicklow that William Joyce 'was winning the war for Germany single-handed'. See Stuart (2), p. 31.

17. Stuart (2), p. 31.

18. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989. In an RTE Radio interview, broadcast in January 1995, Francis Stuart stated: 'Never have I written a single anti-semitic sentence. There have been abusive rumours and accusations that I have been anti-Jewish or anti-semitic. I challenge anybody to produce a sentence in perhaps half a million words that is anti-semitic. I have never done so' (Stuart interviewed by Theo Dorgan for RTE Radio One's *Imprint* programme, tx 14 January 1995).

19. Stuart interviews with author, 17 November 1989 and 24 February 1990; Elborn, pp. 122, 126, 134, 138-9, 241-2; Francis Stuart, 'Berlin in the Rare Oul' Times', in *Irish Press*, 1 September 1989, pp. XII-XIII.

20. Elborn, pp. 126, 134; Cronin (1), pp. 188-191, 252-3.

21. Stuart interview with author, 24 February 1990. The Drahtloser Dienst had supplied German Radio with its news service from the early days of German broadcasting. In 1933 it was taken over by the Propaganda Ministry but was transferred back to German Radio/RRG in 1939 (see Balfour, p. 134). The Drahtloser Dienst news service was supplied to all RRG's domestic and foreign outlets, including the Irland-Redaktion.

22. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989; Stuart (1), pp. 338-40.

23. Madeleine Stuart, pp. 19-20, 23.

24. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989.

25. Stuart interview, 17 November 1989. Clissmann, Stuart and Ryan had all been involved with the plan to get IRA leader Sean Russell back to Ireland a year earlier, although G2 did not know Stuart was linked to the plan. By early 1941 G2 had discovered that Stuart was able to send letters to his wife Iseult via an address in the United States. In one of the letters he hinted that he might see his wife before she received the letter. The courier used for these communications was Francis Flaherty who worked aboard an American Export Lines vessel, *Excambion*, on the New York-Lisbon run. The U.S. addressee used for forwarding Stuart's communications was Mrs

- J.R. (Vera) McWilliams, 959 Oneonta, Strevport, Louisiana (MA G2/X/0676 Irish-German-American notes, containing letter from G2's Liam Archer to Joe Walshe of External Affairs, 18 March 1941).
26. Elborn, p. 143.
 27. Stuart interview, 17 November 1989.
 28. Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, 21 October 1990; Rockel, p. 32.
 29. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989. Francis Stuart was one of a number of writers who broadcast for either the Allied or Axis sides in World War II. Others included P.G. Wodehouse who also broadcast on German Radio, Ezra Pound who spoke on the Axis-controlled Rome Radio, and Thomas Mann who broadcast to Europe via the BBC from exile in America. J.B. Priestley and George Bernard Shaw both broadcast on BBC Radio during the war, while George Orwell wrote scripts for the BBC's Indian service (see W.J. West, *Orwell: The War Commentaries*, and *Orwell: The War Broadcasts*). P.G. Wodehouse claimed that his wartime broadcasts were 'misunderstood' (see 'P.G. Wodehouse Denies Berlin Luxury' in *The Irish Times*, 9 September 1944, p. 1, and Sproat, *Wodehouse at War*).
 30. Stuart in English for Ireland, 17 March 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
 31. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989. Stuart told Ulick O'Connor: 'My main purpose in my broadcasts was to defend Irish neutrality and also to raise the question of partition.' (*Sunday Independent*, 13 November 1994, p. 11)
 32. Elborn, pp. 148-9.
 33. Elborn, pp. 148-52; Various Stuart talks (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
 34. Fisk, p. 407.
 35. Captain J. Smyth memo 'German broadcasts to Ireland', 1 April 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 3).
 36. Ibid.
 37. Boland memo, 30 December 1942, in DFA file 'German broadcasts to Ireland' (DFA 205/108).
 38. Stuart broadcast, 8 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4). Stuart's first talk on the Irish election was broadcast from Berlin on 10 April 1943.
 39. Bryan memo to Boland, including handwritten footnote by Boland, dated 26 May 1943 (DFA 205/108); During the Civil War, Frank Aiken and Stuart had been interned together in the Curragh Camp where Aiken was Stuart's

- commanding officer in the IRA (*Sunday Independent*, 13 November 1994, p. 11).
40. Gorham, pp. 122-3.
 41. Kealy, p. 61.
 42. Gorham, p. 132.
 43. Gorham, pp. 130-1.
 44. Carroll, pp. 35-6, 136; Gray, pp. 152-161.
 45. Cathcart, pp. 110-1, 127-8.
 46. Schlesinger, p. 27.
 47. Briggs (1), p. 48; While American broadcasters may have scooped the BBC in London, back home they were subject to a 1939 code adopted by the National Association of Broadcasters which, among other things, dictated that news broadcasts should not be editorial, elucidation of the news should be free of bias, and time for the presentation of controversial views should not be sold, except for political broadcasts (see Barnouw, p. 137).
 48. Lee, p. 265.
 49. Boland to Warnock, 27 May 1943 (DFA A72 Francis Stuart restricted file).
 50. Stuart broadcast, 29 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
 51. Warnock to Boland, 1 June 1943 (DFA 205/108 German broadcasts to Ireland).
 52. Hencke memo, 1 June 1943 (DFA A72 Francis Stuart restricted file).
 53. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989.
 54. Author's interview with Eileen Walsh, Dublin, 10 July 1992.
 55. Carroll, p. 129.
 56. Campbell, p. 17.
 57. Stuart interviews with author, 17 November 1989 and 24 February 1990.
 58. Elborn, p. 163.
 59. Madeleine Stuart, pp. 33-4.
 60. Author's interview with Noel Dorr, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 13 June 1991; Warnock to Natterstad, Southern Illinois University, 14 January 1971. (DFA A72).
 61. Madeleine Stuart, pp. 34-5.
 62. Elborn, pp. 165-6.
 63. Stuart interview with author, 17 November 1989.

64. Stuart interview with author, 10 February 1992.
65. Statement of William Joseph Murphy to MI5 at Brixton Prison, London, 2 February 1945, p. 11 (PRO HO 45/25839).
66. Murphy statement, pp. 10-11.
67. Letter to author from Francis Stuart, 15 January 1992.
68. Stuart interview with author, 10 February 1992.
69. Madeleine Stuart, pp. 37-40; Cronin, pp. 232-5. Frank Ryan's remains were reinterred at Dublin's Glasnevin cemetery on 22 June 1979.
70. Elborn, p. 166; Author's interview with Mona Brase, Dublin, 8 October 1991; Madeleine Stuart, pp. 42-3. Madeleine Stuart (née Meissner) died in Dublin on 18 August 1986.

References

Chapter 5: The Motley Crew

1. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941 (BA Potsdam, VA 62407, document no. 168); J. O'Reilly, 'I was a spy in Ireland' in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952.
2. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941 (BA VA 62407).
3. O'Reilly article in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952.
4. Stuart (1), p. 322; Stuart interview, 10 February 1992.
5. Dan Bryan memo, 14 September 1944 (MA G2/5129 James Blair alias Pat O'Brien file).
6. Susan Hilton statement at Liebenau Camp, Germany, 1 July 1945 (LCD CRIM 1/1745); Bryan memo, 14 September 1944, containing information supplied by Warnock on 15 July 1944 (MA G2/5129).
7. Ibid.
8. O'Reilly article in *Sunday Dispatch*, 27 July 1952, p. 2.
9. Mahr memo 9 September 1941.
10. Spickernagel letter, 9 February 1992.
11. G2 report entitled 'Notes on John Fras. O'Reilly's activities in the Channel Islands and Germany', 31 December 1943 (NA DFA A52 I G2/3824).
12. Warnock to Boland, December 1942, in Hans Hartmann file (MA G2/007).
13. Elborn, pp. 182, 195.
14. O'Reilly article in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p. 2; According to Dr Hilde Spickernagel (letter to author, 31 December 1993) the Russian woman's real name was 'Sopha Kovanka, known as "Kovanko", [who] had been brought up in France as the daughter of a Russian emigré who fled from Russia after the October Revolution of 1917...she certainly had been given the conventional education of the "well-brought-up" French girl. She spoke French, Russian and English, and was thoroughly reliable in typing English texts. Apart from acting as secretary of the Irland-Redaktion, she worked with the nightly music service of the German broadcasting network'. According to the Russian woman's nephew, her name was Sophie Kovanko. She died in France in September 1993 (letter to author from Mr Pierre Kowanko, Paris, 8 May 1994).
15. Francis Stuart interview, 24 February 1990.
16. According to Hilton's statement at Liebenau Camp (1 July 1945, section 41) Kowanko 'got into some trouble with the Gestapo over a letter she had

written' (LCD CRIM 1/1745 Rex vs. Hilton).

17. Series of statements by Hilton to MI5 at Liebenau Camp, Germany, 30 May, 30 June, 1 July and 3 July 1945 (LCD CRIM 1/1745).

18. O'Reilly in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p. 2.

19. Neligan to Bryan, 18 September 1941 (MA G2/2541).

20. Elborn, pp. 133-143.

21. Warnock to Boland, undated, passed to G2 on 4 January 1943 (MA G2/007 Hartmann file).

22. Hilton statement at Liebenau camp, 1 July 1945 (LCD CRIM 1/1745).

23. 'Róisín' talks of 2 June 1943 and 14 July 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).

24. *Cé hí seo amuigh?* by Róisín Ní Mheara-Vinard, Dublin, 1992. The Irish language title may be translated a number of ways into English, e.g. Who is that woman out there?, or, Whoever could she be?

25. For reaction to Ní Mheara's book see: Proinsias Mac Aonghusa 'Ní cóir riamh dearmad a dhéanamh ar na huafáis a tharla faoi réim Hitler' (One should never forget the horrors that happened under the Hitler régime) in *Anois*, 19-20 December 1992, p. 11; Eddie Doyle 'Publisher of "pro-Nazi" book may get State grant' in *Sunday Business Post*, 3 January 1993, p. 1; Cathal Mac Coille 'Lessons not yet learned' in *The Sunday Tribune*, 24 January 1993, p. B6; Diarmuid Doyle 'Taylor says it would be "scandalous" if Irish language book gets grant-aid' in the *The Sunday Tribune*, 31 January 1993, p. A9; Proinsias Ó Drisceoil 'A monarchial republican' in *The Irish Times*, 13 February 1993, p. 9.

26. Ní Mheara, p. 125.

27. Ní Mheara, p. 193.

28. *Sunday Business Post*, 3 January 1993, p. 1; The current Duke of Hamilton told this author that: '*Jean: a memoir by Ian Hamilton* was published in 1942 and is a charming and sentimental tribute to Lady [Jean] Hamilton née Muir who died on 23 February 1941. [In this book] there is a photograph of a boy, who appears to be aged about 10, dated 1923. He is referred to as Harry, who was adopted when he was 16 months old by Jean Hamilton, rather than by them both. If I am correct about his age, he must have been adopted around the beginning of the First World War. Slightly later [in the book] there is reference to "a little girl adopted within the following year as company for Harry". As far as I can see, she is not named

and there is no further reference to her. Harry, of whom the old man was clearly proud, joined the army and rose to the rank of captain before dying of his wounds in Libya on 17 June 1941, less than four months after the death of his adoptive mother. A press cutting in the book described Sir Ian's 93rd birthday in 1946 when he was still living at 1, Hyde Park Gardens [London]', (letter to author from the Duke of Hamilton, East Lothian, Scotland, 28 January 1995). The Duke's younger brother, Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, M.P., informed the author that Sir Ian Hamilton was no relation, and added 'In 1948 my parents bought Lennoxlove [castle in Scotland] from the Baird family and I understand that General Sir Ian Hamilton rented Lennoxlove before the Second World War. I think he may have been there for up to two years but he never owned Lennoxlove', (letter to author from Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, M.P., 30 December 1994). In O'Mara/Ní Mheara's autobiography (between pp. 148-9) General Sir Ian Hamilton is portrayed in a 1938 photograph standing next to the sundial at Lennoxlove Castle.

O'Mara's own accounts of her origins are vague. In one wartime document dated Berlin, 13 March 1942, she signs her name Nora James O'Mara and gives her date and place of birth as 2 July 1918 in Philadelphia. In another document, dated 9 August 1944, she signs as Nora O'Mara and gives her birthplace as London. She also discloses her religion as Catholic and the fact that she gave birth to a daughter, Nadejda Agnes, on 16 July 1940 (BDC I 28044 O'Mara file).

29. When this author contacted Miss O'Mara by phone on 23 December 1991, while she was on a visit to Dublin, she refused to comment either on her forthcoming book or her wartime broadcasting role in Germany. After the publication of her memoirs in 1992, the author wrote to Miss O'Mara (on 24 January 1993) at her home in Bernau, Germany. She replied by letter on 2 February 1993 commenting: 'Sorry, do not wish to enter into further discussions: Francis Stuart writes "novels" - and has asked for my understanding.' Her written reply was signed with the initials R O'M.

30. Ní Mheara, pp. 117-8.

31. Ní Mheara, p. 194.

32. Since O'Reilly left his Rundfunkhaus job in September 1942 he would have been unaware of Nora O'Mara's talks as 'Róisín' in June and July 1943.

33. O'Reilly article in *Sunday Dispatch*, 20 July 1952, p. 2.

34. Letter to author from Seámus MacMathúna, University College Galway, 23 September 1991; Author's interview with Mrs Bláth Ó Brolcháin, Dublin, 10 October 1991. Professor Thomas Dillon's daughter, Moya, made up the other half of the exchange with Hilde Poepping, staying with the Poepping family in Berlin where she completed her third year as a medical student; Letters to author from Hilde Spickernagel (née Poepping), Hanover, 11 November 1991, 9 February 1992 and 10 August 1992; A study of the period records that Hilde Poepping's thesis on James Stephens was one of twenty works devoted to Irish topics which were published in Germany from 1939 to 1941 (Dickel, p. 173).

35. In August 1939, a month before the Second World War began, Bláth Dillon found herself stranded in Berlin with no return ticket home. She went to the Irish legation: '[Charles] Bewley had gone and, according to the staff, had taken all the ashtrays. Warnock was there and did not seem to know what side Ireland should be on. Also, he did not speak any German. Eventually, Warnock gave me a personal cheque for ten pounds after I explained that my mother was a personal friend of de Valera', (Ó Brolcháin interview, 10 October 1991).

36. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941 (BA VA 62407); Spickernagel letter, 11 November 1991; O'Reilly in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p. 2.

37. Poepping broadcast, 31 December 1941 (IWM BBC Original Monitoring Reports, file E88 'Germany in Irish Gaelic', 22 September 1940 to 6 July 1943).

38. Warnock to Boland, undated, passed to G2 on 4 January 1943 (MA G2/007 Hartmann file).

39. Bryan memo, 31 December 1943 (NA DFA A/52 I G2/3824).

40. Spickernagel letter, 9 February 1992

41. Spickernagel letter, 11 November 1991.

42. Spickernagel letter, 10 August 1992.

43. Ó Brolcháin interview, 10 October 1991; Spickernagel letter, 11 November 1991.

44. Author's interviews with Francis Stuart, Dublin, 17 November 1989 and 24 February 1990; Elborn, pp. 138-9, 241-2; M. Stuart, p. 34.

45. Author's interview with Mona Brase, Dublin, 8 October 1991; Duggan (1), p. 63; Author's interview with Commandant Peter Young, 9 December 1991, for information on Colonel Fritz Brase's request to Major-General Michael

Brennan. Brennan was the Irish Army's Chief of Staff from October 1931 to January 1940. He was succeeded by Lieutenant General Daniel McKenna who held the post until January 1949 (See Duggan (2), p. 297).

46. 'Former German Colonists Send Greetings' in *The Irish Press*, 2 January 1942; 'New Year's Greetings', in *Irish Gaelic and English to Éire*, 31 December 1941 (NIPRO CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

47. 'Irish Pianist's Message to "Dear Mummy"', Brase in *English to Éire*, 4 May 1942 (NIPRO CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR). As well as being studied by MI5 in London, the transcript of Mona Brase's broadcast was relayed to the Cabinet Office in Northern Ireland. MI5's suspicions may have been aroused by the following remarks in Brase's talk: 'From the photos which a friendly stranger has passed, you have already seen that I am no more the small child of former days. From my voice and words you will also recognise that I have made progress also in every other respect...Moreover we are assured that separation will not last long and we may feel again the happiness of each other's presence.' After studying the BBC's transcript of her remarks, Brase told the author: 'I was not a pianist, only a schoolgirl who happened to have got stuck in Germany when the war broke out. I was there only for the summer school holidays, staying with friends of my mother in Berlin and too young to be let try and return on my own back to Ireland. My parents never believed a war would come and were not worried, so they let me stay on until it was too late. As regards the broadcast...the talk I gave sounds just like the style my foster father used, so he must have set it out in German for me to translate into English.' Mona Brase cannot recall the identity of the 'friendly stranger' who delivered photographs to her mother in Dublin but she thinks it may have been Jimmy O'Toole, an Irishman working for Siemens in Berlin. After war broke out, O'Toole called to Brase's home in Berlin and offered to accompany her back to Ireland by sea: 'He told my foster parents that the Channel was mined but that if the ship went down he was able to swim and could save me! That put my foster parents off completely and they did not let me go. But I would have made it back to Ireland because he did.' Brase also recalls that she sent photos home via German friends living in Switzerland, and mail was also sent via Portugal to Ireland (Brase interview, 4 March 1995, and Brase letter, 19 March 1995).

48. Author's interview with Mona Brase, Dublin, 8 October 1991.

49. Author's interview with Joan Medcalf, Dublin, 15 December 1992; Author's interview with Charles Acton, Dublin, 2 July 1992. According to Acton, whose mother owned Kilmacurragh, the leasing agreement was to run for twelve years until 1944 at which time Chalres Budina would have an option to purchase the house and estate for £4,000 (approximately £80,000 in 1994 values).
50. Letter to author from Charles Acton, 27 August 1992.
51. Fisk, p. 336. According to photographic evidence shown to the author by Mahr's daughter, Mrs Ingrid Reusswig, portraits of Hitler were exhibited at German colony gatherings in Dublin hotels in the 1930s (Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994); According to Acton, 'Budina built a 300-seat dining room at Kilmacurra which doubled as a dance hall. He also had a swimming pool built, and arranged to get a 7-day bar licence despite strong local opposition' (Acton letter, 27 August 1992).
52. Acton letter, 27 August 1992.
53. Greiner interview, 25 May 1993. Charles Acton and Margaret Greiner appear to be correct in their assumption that Budina never joined the Nazi party. The Berlin Document Center has no record of Charles Budina ever having joined the Nazis.
54. Greiner interview, 25 May 1993; 'Fifty Germans leave for Fatherland' in *The Irish Times*, 12 September 1939, p. 7; Fisk, p. 336.
55. 'Former German Colonists Send Greetings' in *The Irish Press*, 2 January 1942; 'New Year's Greetings', in Irish Gaelic and English to Eire, 31 December 1941 (NIPRO CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
56. 'Husband's talk from Berlin', in English for Ireland, 13 June 1942 (NIPRO CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
57. The Wehrmacht's Propaganda Kompanien (Propaganda Companies) comprised war correspondents who 'during the opening years of Nazi victories, wrote glamorous reports of magnificent victories. In the last year of the war, the PK units were ordered to send in stories to raise morale on the home front' (Snyder, pp. 274-5).
58. O'Reilly in *Sunday Dispatch*, 27 July 1952, p. 2.
59. Fisk, p. 336; Greiner interview, 26 June 1993.
60. Greiner interview, 26 June 1993.
61. O'Reilly in *Sunday Dispatch*, 27 July 1952, p. 2.
62. Acton letter, 27 August 1992.

63. Medcalf interview, 15 December 1992.
64. Acton interview, 2 July 1992.
65. Various broadcasts to Ireland by Johann Mikele, October 1943 to July 1944 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB parts 4 and 5).
66. 'Former German Colonists Send Greetings' in *The Irish Press*, 2 January 1942; 'New Year's Greetings', in Irish Gaelic and English to Eire, 31 December 1941 (NIPRO CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

References Chapter 6

Suitable Pseudonyms

1. Spickernagel letter to author, 9 February 1992.
2. Spickernagel letter to author, 10 August 1992.
3. James Blair alias Pat O'Brien file (MA G2/5129); O'Reilly, 'I was a spy in Ireland' in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p. 2.
4. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941 (BA Potsdam, VA 62407).
5. James Blair file (MA G2/5129).
6. Neligan to Bryan, 15 September 1941 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).
7. Warnock to Bryan, 15 July 1944 (MA G2/5129).
8. Baillie-Stewart, pp. 148-9.
9. Author's interview with Maurice Irvine, Brighton, 31 January 1992.
William Joyce was born in Brooklyn, USA, on 24 April 1906 and moved with his parents to Ballinrobe, Co Mayo at the age of three. From the age of six Joyce lived in Galway where he was later educated by the Jesuits at St Ignatius College. 1920, as a 14-year-old, Joyce worked as an informer for the British against what he termed 'the Irish guerrillas'. A year later in 1921 - and prior to the foundation of the Irish Free State - Joyce, then aged 15, moved to live in England (Cole, pp. 20-25); For an example of such anti-semitic broadcasting, see Cadogan talk entitled 'Spirit of Jewry', 1 June 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
10. Baillie-Stewart, p. 157.
11. Stuart interview, 19 June 1992.
12. Spickernagel letter to author, 10 August 1992.
13. Hartmann letter to author, 28 June 1992.
14. Irvine letter to author, 3 November 1992.
15. Stuart interview, 19 June 1992.
16. The Cadogan broadcasts spanned the period from 2 May 1943 to 1 October 1943, the final talk being monitored on that date at 6.15 p.m. Dublin time, - seven weeks after Stuart and Hartmann had left Berlin for Luxembourg. Though based in Berlin, Joyce actually visited Luxembourg in October 1943 (Cole, p. 213). However, the Cadogan talks could still have emanated from Berlin or an alternative location using the same wavelength as the Irland-Redaktion in Luxembourg, thus allowing Joyce to piggy-back onto the Irish service without Hartmann's knowledge. During a talk broadcast at 7.15 p.m.

on 18 July 1943, Cadogan mentioned a visit he had made to a prisoner of war camp. Of those directly or indirectly connected with the English and Irish services of German Radio, the following are known to have visited PoW camps: Frank Ryan (Cronin, p. 221); Francis Stuart (Stuart, *States of Mind*, p. 33); Norman Baillie-Stewart (Baillie-Stewart, p. 186); William Joyce (Cole, pp. 159-60); and John Amery who 'tried to recruit British soldiers from prisoner of war camps to fight against the Russians' (see *The Independent*, London, 8 February 1995, p. 8).

17. Cole, p. 311 for numerous references; Shortly before being executed at Wandsworth prison in London, on 3 January 1946, William Joyce wrote a final public message commenting: 'In death, as in this life, I defy the Jews who caused this last war, and I defy the power of darkness which they represent' (Selwyn, p. 7, and Cole, p. 302); Various Cadogan talks from 2 May 1943 to 1 October 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).

18. 'Woman for Trial' in *Irish Press*, 13 December 1945; Mrs Susan Hilton 'secret' file (MA G2/4102); Various talks by Susan Sweney (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR); Author's interview with Edward Sweney, 14 September 1992.

19. Author's interview with Edward Sweney, Oldcastle, Co Meath, 9 June 1991.

20. Sweney file (MA G2/4102); Rex v Hilton exhibit 1, 1936 passport application (LCD CRIM 1/1745); *Irish Press*, 13 December 1945; Cole, p. 40; Hilton to O'Kelly, 10 June 1942 (MA G2/4102); Hilton statements to MI5 at Liebenau camp, Germany, on 30 May, 30 June, 1 July and 3 July 1945 (LCD CRIM 1/1745).

21. *Irish Press*, 13 December 1945; J. O'Reilly, 'I was a Spy in Ireland' in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p.2; Hilton statements at Liebenau camp 1945 (LCD CRIM 1/1745).

22. Extract from report of undated interview with Miss Eileen Walsh, then secretary to William Warnock (MA G2/4535, 4102).

23. Hilton statements at Liebenau camp 1945 (LCD CRIM 1/1745); Stephan, pp. 17-19; O'Callaghan, p. 67; Fisk, pp. 338-9.

24. *Irish Press*, 3 January 1942 and 13 December 1945; Hilton statements at Liebenau (LCD CRIM 1/1745); E. Sweney interview, 9 June 1991.

25. Author's interview with Francis Stuart, Dublin, 24 February 1990.

26. Sweney to Edward Sweney, 26 March 1942 (MA G2/4102).

27. G2 background note on Susan Sweney, undated (MA G2/4102).

28. E. Sweney interview, 14 September 1992.
29. E. Sweney interviews, 9 June 1991 and 14 September 1992; Letter to author from British Embassy, Dublin, 12 August 1991; Fisk, p. 441. Twenty years after the war Betjeman was appointed British poet laureate and was knighted.
30. S. Sweney to B. O'Kelly, 19 May 1942 (MA G2/4102).
31. Ibid.
32. Report of Eileen Walsh interview, undated (MA G2/4535, 4102).
33. Sweney to O'Kelly, 10 June 1942 (MA G2/4102).
34. S. Sweney broadcast 19 July 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 2).
35. Notes on O'Reilly's activities in Germany (NA DFA 52 I G2/3824).
36. Rex v Hilton, count no. 8 (PRO CRIM 4/1730).
37. Gestapo letter on Hilton, Göttingen, 30 June 1943 (BDC document III-2232/43 Bo).
38. Hilton statements at Liebenau (LCD CRIM 1/1745); N. West, pp. 110, 198.
39. The MI5 woman accompanying Hilton from Germany to London was Iris Marsden. She told the author: 'From what little I know of that lot [Britons working for Nazi radio] they were all weak characters except William Joyce who was the one who, quite wrongly I believe, got hanged. Mrs Hilton was lucky we caught her rather late on when the great British public had had their scapegoat' (Letter to author from Mrs Iris Cawley (née Marsden), Hindhead, Surrey, 12 November 1994).
40. *London Times*, 12 December 1945, p. 2.
41. *London Times*, 13 December 1945, p. 2; *Irish Press*, 13 December 1945; D. Hilton file (PRO CRIM 4/1730); Additional information from Greater London Record Office and History Library, British Library's Newspaper Library (London), Lord Chancellor's Department (London) and Bow Street Magistrates' Court (London).
42. Letter to author from Dr Hilde Spickernagel, Hanover, 10 August 1992.
43. Criminal charges against D. Hilton (PRO CRIM 4/1730). Of the persons named in the charge sheets, John O'Reilly is the John Francis O'Reilly from Kilkee, Co Clare referred to in Chapter 3. Dorothy Eckersley was a member of Mosley's British Union of Fascists who moved to Berlin in summer 1939 and was responsible for getting William Joyce a job there in the Radio Centre (Cole, pp. 81, 97-8, 128). James Clark was Dorothy Eckersley's son by her first marriage. Liam Mullally, also referred to in Chapter Three,

took over O'Reilly's 'Pat O'Brien' broadcasts when O'Reilly left the radio in September 1942 to work for German Naval Intelligence. Charge 3 refers to Hilton's 'Ann Tower' talks on Radio Caledonia. Charge 5 refers to what the Germans called the Irland-Redaktion or Irish service of German Radio's European services.

44. D. Hilton file (PRO CRIM 4/1730); Letters to author from Public Record Office, London, 14 August 1991 and 13 January 1994; Statement by Captain R.W. Spooner, British Intelligence Corps (MI5), 4 December 1945 (LCD CRIM 1/1745); Roberts, p. 181; Professor James J. Barnes of Wabash College, Indiana, notes that Hilton's prison sentence was in line with other terms handed down at the time. For example, Margaret Frances Bothamley, who also broadcast from Berlin to Britain during the war, was tried on like charges a month later in the same court and received a one year sentence (Barnes letter to author, 5 August 1991).

45. E. Sweney interviews, 9 June 1991, 14 September 1992 and 18 November 1992.

46. Two members of the Irland-Redaktion, Sonja Kowanko and Susan Sweney, were imprisoned by the Nazis during the war, while Francis Stuart was threatened with imprisonment in 1944. At least one member of the England-Redaktion, Charles Gilbert, was imprisoned. His colleague Norman Baillie-Stewart was threatened with a similar fate; Hilton trial report in *The Irish Times*, 19 February 1946, p. 2.

47. E. Sweney interview, 14 September 1992.

References, Chapter 7

'God Bless and Save Ireland': The Broadcasts of 1939-41

1. Catalogue of German Radio Recordings 1929-1936 (NSA 4151 2152/1-15 DS 396). It was only Ireland's thirteenth international soccer game. (Germany won, 3-1. Ireland's lone goal was scored by Jimmy Dunne - details supplied to author by sports historian Robert Reid, Dublin).
2. Roller, p. 63, item 152 (Deutschen Rundfunks news broadcast, 5 September 1939).
3. 'Broadcast from Hamburg Radio Station' in *Dáil Debates*, 27 September 1939, vol. 77, col. 195. Peadar Seán Doyle, who asked the Dáil question, was a Fine Gael T.D. for Dublin South (see Flynn, pp. 114-5).
4. *Dáil Debates*, 27 September 1939, vol. 77, col. 195.
5. Cole, p. 113.
6. Archer to Walshe, unsigned letter titled 'German Wireless Broadcasts', 2 November 1939 (MA G2/X/127, Foreign Wireless Broadcasts, part 1, 1939 - 13 June 1942).
7. 'German Broadcasts to Ireland' (DFA 205/108). No Irland-Redaktion recordings, in either English or Irish, appear to have survived the war. However, edited English translations of Mühlhausen and Hartmann's Irish talks - as well as transcripts of the Irland-Redaktion's English-language output - are held at the BBC's Written Archives Centre in Reading, the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast and the Irish Military Archive in Dublin. The original, unedited translations (produced by the BBC's Gaelic monitors Angus Matheson, Jane Charleton and Maurice Irvine) of many of Mühlhausen and Hartmann's Irish talks are held by the Imperial War Museum in Duxford; Mahr report entitled 'Radio Propaganda to Ireland', 18 March 1941, p. 4 (AA R 67483).
8. Healy to Bryan, memo on Mühlhausen broadcast, 11 December 1939 (MA G2/2473 Dr Ludwig Mühlhausen).
9. 'Talk in Irish from German Radio Station' in *The Irish Press*, 11 December 1939, p. 9.
10. Sturm, p. A111.
11. Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, 21 October 1990.
12. F. Taylor, pp. 56, 111 and 117.
13. *Dáil Debates*, 30 April 1940, Vol. 79, col. 1945, 'Alleged Radio

- References'. James Hickey, a Labour T.D. for Cork Borough, asked the Dáil question on behalf of the Labour party leader William Norton.
14. Cathcart, p. 111.
 15. Campbell, pp. 5-6.
 16. Fisk, p. 224.
 17. Roller, p. 222.
 18. Letter to author from Jacqueline Kavanagh, BBC Written Archives Officer, Reading, 24 August 1990. According to one BBC wartime Gaelic monitor (author's interview with Maurice Irvine, 31 January 1992) MI5 may have been behind the decision to appoint Matheson. Up until 1 July 1940 the BBC had not bothered to monitor Mühlhausen and Hartmann's talks in Irish, but following the fall of France, MI5 may have thought the time was ripe to tune into Berlin's Irish radio service.
 19. Hartmann, in Irish for Ireland, 10 November 1940 (IWM E88 Germany in Irish Gaelic, 22 September 1940 to 6 July 1943). As well as monitoring Radio Éireann, Hartmann appears to have taken his cue from the BBC which would have been the first to carry Churchill's speech to the House of Commons five days earlier, on 5 November 1940, in which he stated: 'The fact that we cannot use the south and west coasts of Ireland to refuel our flotillas and aircraft, and thus protect the trade by which Ireland as well as Great Britain lives, is a most heavy and grievous burden...' On 7 November 1940, de Valera told the Dáil that 'there can be no question of the handing over of these ports so long as this State remains neutral' (Fisk, pp. 287-8).
 20. Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990.
 21. Mühlhausen, in Irish for Ireland, 20 November 1940 (IWM E88).
 22. Campbell, p. 7.
 23. Mühlhausen, in Irish/Gaelic for Éire, 15 December 1940 (IWM E88). Unknown to Mühlhausen, the British cabinet was at that time considering a programme of economic sanctions against Éire (Fisk, pp. 294-5).
 24. Mühlhausen talk, 15 December 1940. The IWM file includes the original BBC monitoring report by Angus Matheson, and copy of the cabled precis sent to London.
 25. Campbell, pp. 7-10.
 26. For sources of transcripts see note 7 above.
 27. Mahr report, 18 March 1941; Ribbentrop conference report on 'German

Foreign Radio Propaganda', 22 May 1941, p. 6 (AA R 67482 24/80); Mahr report 'English-speaking broadcasts to Ireland', 9 September 1941 (BA Potsdam, VA 62407).

28. BBC monitoring reports of German Radio Broadcasts for domestic and foreign audiences, 8 May 1941 to 4 July 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

29. Athlone in Irish Gaelic and English for Eire, 22 May 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

30. Hartmann interview, 9 July 1991.

31. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Eire, 28 May 1941 (IWM E88 and PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR). Hartmann may have pre-recorded this talk or else failed to monitor the BBC on 28 May. In any case, by the time his talk was broadcast it had been overtaken by events since Churchill had already told the House of Commons the day before, 27 May, that conscription would not be introduced in Ulster (Fisk, p. 521). The lack of a daily radio service from Berlin to Ireland at this stage of the war made it difficult, if not impossible, for Hartmann and Mühlhausen to counter Allied propaganda effectively.

32. Lt. Col. Padraic O'Farrell, 'The North Strand Bombing' in *An Cosantoir*, September 1981, pp. 283-4.

33. Fisk, p. 521.

34. BBC monitoring reports of German and German-controlled radio broadcasts, 1-8 June 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

35. Mühlhausen in Irish Gaelic for Eire, 8 June 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

36. Mühlhausen in Irish Gaelic for Eire, 29 June 1941 (IWM E88).

37. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Eire, 9 July 1941 (IWM E88).

38. Mühlhausen, in Irish Gaelic for Eire, 10 and 13 August 1941 (IWM E88).

39. Broadcast in English for Ireland, 8 September 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR). Although test transmissions in English from Berlin to Ireland were made in late August 1941, this is the first such talk (in English specifically for Eire) to have been monitored and thus the first of which there remains a record.

40. Neligan to Bryan, 15 September 1941 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1); 'James Blair alias Pat O'Brien' file (MA G2/5129); O'Reilly article in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p. 2.

41. Mühlhausen, in Irish Gaelic for Eire, 24 September 1941 (PRONI CAB

9CD/207 BBC MR).

42. Broadcast in English for North America, 21 October 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

43. Mahr report, 18 March 1941, pp. 3-8.

44. Neligan to Bryan, 28 October 1941 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).

45. O'Reilly file (NA DFA A52 I); O'Reilly article in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p. 2; Cole, pp. 146, 199, 234.

46. Stuart (2), p. 31; O'Reilly article in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p. 2; Mahr report, 18 March 1941, p. 10; Broadcast in English for Ireland, 6 November 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

47. Hermann Goertz, 'Mission to Ireland - IV' in *Irish Times*, 1 September 1947; Schwipps, pp. 74-5; Cole, pp. 146, 199. Bose spent part of the war in Berlin from where he broadcast to India. On 28 March 1944 in a 'Message to the Irish nation', Bose said he had visited Éire and 'had the privilege of knowing President de Valera and his Cabinet Ministers personally' (Domei, in English for Europe, 28 March 1944, PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

48. Talk by Pat O'Brien (summary) in English for Ireland, 19 November 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

49. Radio Berlin rebroadcast speech by India's Chandra Bose, 18 March 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).

50. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Éire, 30 November 1941 (IWM E88).

51. German 'Flashback' broadcast, 17 December 1941 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).

52. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Éire, 28 December 1941 (IWM E88).

53. Oslo Radio had been in Nazi hands since the German invasion of Norway on 9 April 1940. The Oslo transmitter was occasionally used to relay Irland-Redaktion programmes from Berlin to Ireland in the 1941-42 period. On 15 September 1941, Norway's domestic radio service broadcast an 'anti-British and anti-semitic radio play' with an Irish theme featuring an actor playing the role of 'the Irish freedom fighter' Sir Roger Casement (letter to author from Andrew Glasse, Radio Norway International, Oslo, 15 December 1994).

54. 'Former German Colonists Send Greetings' in *Irish Press*, 2 January 1942; Mona Brase told the author she had no recollection of taking part in the New Year's Eve broadcast and suggested that her piano recital must have been a recording (Author's interview with Mona Brase, Dublin, 8 October

1991); the Martin Fluss referred to is most probably Martin Plass, an exchange student whose thesis on George Russell (AE) was published in Berlin in 1940 (Dickel, p. 173).

55. Broadcast in English for Ireland, 31 December 1941 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR). *The Struggle of the Irish People* was an official U.S. Senate document (no. 8 of the 67th Congress) which was printed by the Government Printing Office in Washington in May 1921. It was presented as an address to the U.S. Congress by Mr Borah, having first been adopted at the January 1921 session of Dáil Éireann. William E. Borah was a 'pro-Irish' Republican member of the U.S. Senate (Coogan, *De Valera*, pp. 156, 171). In the hands of Adolf Mahr at the Berlin Foreign Office 20 years later, the document proved to be a useful propaganda tool detailing British outrages in Ireland from September 1919 to February 1921. The document provided a précis of events originally reported in the *Irish Bulletin* which was the daily organ of the provisional Irish Government during the War of Independence. There was a certain irony in the fact that this propaganda was being used by Nazi radio since its source, the *Irish Bulletin*, had been mainly compiled by Frank Gallagher who, during the Second World War, was in charge of de Valera's Government Information Service and, as such, responsible for censoring Radio Éireann's news programmes. Gallagher appears to have known what the Irland-Redaktion was up to, according to his daughter Ann who told the author, 'I am sure my father was aware of the German Radio propaganda, and over the years used to say "Never believe in propaganda"' (letter to author from Ann Gallagher, TCD, 26 April 1994). The author is grateful to Tony Eklof of UCD Library's United States Collection for a copy of *The Struggle of the Irish People*. Original issues of the *Irish Bulletin* are held at the National Library, Dublin, file no. Ir 94109 i15. Transcripts of German Radio's 'Flashback' items for Ireland are held at the Military Archive, Dublin (file G2/X/0127) and the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast (CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

56. 'New Year's Greetings', in English for Eire, 31 December 1941 (IWM E88).

References

Chapter 8: The Mahr Propaganda Initiative of 1941

1. Schwipps, p. 74; German Foreign Office report titled 'Foreign language news service of German Radio', 1 December 1939, p. 4, item 5 (AA R 27188); Ludwig Mühlhausen's Sunday night Irish-language talks were usually broadcast via the Hamburg, Bremen (both medium wave) or DXB (shortwave) transmitters from 9.25 p.m. to 9.40 p.m Berlin time, immediately following William Joyce's regular Sunday night broadcast to Britain on the same wavelengths.
2. Balfour, p. 135.
3. Mahr report, 'Rundfunkpropaganda nach Irland' (radio propaganda to Ireland), 18 March 1941, pp. 6-7 (AA R 67483). In this last sentence, Mahr is clearly hinting that England's defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany would lead to Irish unity. Ribbentrop's top official, Ernst von Weizsäcker, had, four months earlier on 13 November 1940, asked Hempel to convey the same message to de Valera (Fisk, pp. 363-4). On 29 January 1942, Veessenmayer was telling the Foreign Office that 'Only a German victory could bring about the return of the Six Counties and the complete sovereignty of the island' (Cronin, p. 250); Although Mahr's report is dated 18 March 1941 it mentions events like the Iraq war (April-May 1941) and the Luftwaffe bombings of Belfast (8 and 15 April 1941, and 5 and 6 May 1941) which occurred subsequently. Consequently, it would appear that the report was drafted in March and finalised in late April or early May. It was considered by Ribbentrop at his foreign propaganda conference in Berlin on 22 May 1941.
4. Letter to author from Dr Hilde Spickernagel, Hanover, 9 February 1992. According to Campbell (p. 7), Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion on 15 September 1940. Stephan (p. 158) notes that on 12 October 1940 the invasion of England was formally fixed for Spring 1941 but on 13 February 1942 Operation Sea Lion was finally abandoned, eight months after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. For a detailed explanation of the origin and fate of Operation Sea Lion see Cooper, pp. 246-9, 254-6.
5. Germany's invasion handbook for Ireland titled *Militärgeographische Angaben über Irland* (military geographical data on Ireland) was produced in five volumes in occupied Brussels from 1940-41 at the Institut Cartographique Militaire (ICM). Military historians have been puzzled by

the fact that the documents on Ireland are full of errors and were not published in Berlin until October 1941, more than a year after they might have been most needed following the fall of France and a seemingly imminent invasion of the British Isles. However, according to M. Dewinter, Director of Belgium's Institut Geographique National (the ICM became the Institut Geographique Militaire in 1947, and the IGN in 1976) Belgian ICM staff were forced to work for the occupying German forces. Dewinter says that the Belgians worked as slowly as possible, deliberately inserting errors into the German military documents. Dewinter adds that shortly before Brussels was liberated in September 1944, the German general in charge of the ICM received orders to blow up the buildings. Being a more scholarly than a military man the general ordered the explosives to be dumped in a nearby forest to save the historic Abbaye de la Cambre which included the ICM (author's interview with M. Dewinter, Brussels, 22 November 1991). The invasion handbooks for Ireland and many other countries were discovered by Allied troops when they entered Brussels in September 1944 (Cox, p. 83). The documents are still housed at the IGN in Brussels, and examples are held at the Military Archive, Dublin and the Imperial War Museum, London.

6. Mahr report, 18 March 1941.
7. Ibid., p. 1.
8. Ibid., p. 2. Mahr may have lumped licenced and unlicenced radio sets together for the purposes of his estimate.
9. Ibid.; A. Kealy, *Irish Radio Data*, p. 57; The number of unlicenced radio sets held in Eire in the 1939-45 period is not known, so Mahr's total potential audience could, in theory, have exceeded the estimate.
10. Mahr report, 18 March 1941, pp. 2-3.
11. Ibid.
12. Census of Population 1936, Irish language, Vol. VIII, p. 1, table 1 number of Irish speakers, and table 2 Irish speakers as a percentage of total persons. (CSO, Dublin, 1936).
13. Mahr report, 18 March 1941, p. 7; Spickernagel letter, 10 August 1992.
14. Mahr report, 18 March 1941, pp. 3-4, 6.
15. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
16. Ibid., pp. 7, 9-10. Rome Radio was in Axis hands at the time.
17. Ibid., pp. 8-9. While Mahr proposed 'a secret station located in Japan', the Foreign Office also considered using a radio station in

Japanese-occupied Shanghai, China, to reach the Irish-Australian population (see Sturm, p. 293); Secret or black propaganda stations - used by both the Allied and Axis powers in the war - deliberately did not disclose their origin. They aimed at convincing civilian and/or military listeners that their messages emanated from the target audience's own territory.

18. Ibid., pp. 6, 10-11.
19. Ibid., pp. 8-9, 11.
20. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
21. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
22. Minutes of Foreign Office conference, 22 May 1941, p. 1 (AA R 67482).
23. Schwipps, p. 83.
24. Diller, pp. 324-5.
25. Duggan (1), pp. 151, 214-5; Fisk, pp. 351-2.
26. Fisk, pp. 340-1.
27. Fisk, pp. 337-8, 340-1.
28. Duggan (1), preface XV.
29. Minutes of Foreign Office conference, 22 May 1941, pp. 1, 6 (AA R 67482).
30. Cathcart, p. 111.
31. Ibid., p. 114.
32. Ibid., p. 116.
33. Ibid., pp. 116-20.
34. Cullen, pp. 13-14.
35. Gorham, pp. 123-4.
36. Cullen, pp. 16-18. Cullen (p. 31) notes that the Athlone shortwave transmitter was still relaying two news bulletins a day to America in 1952. The shortwave project was abandoned in 1953.
37. Schwipps, p. 105; Balfour, pp. 464-5. Balfour notes that Zeesen's seven 50-kW transmitters were installed for the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936. In 1939, Germany also had two 150-kW transmitters at Bremen and Donau.
38. Minutes of Foreign Office conference, 22 May 1941, p. 3 (AA R 67482).
39. Mahr memo entitled 'English-speaking Programmes to Ireland', 9 September 1941 (BA Potsdam, file VA 62407, document no. 168).
40. Diller, p. 475; Kult R was a sub-division within the German Foreign Office (AA R27188).
41. Diller, p. 324; Balfour, pp. 133-5, 512; Schwipps, p. 83. In August

1941, Kiesinger was in charge of general propaganda at the Foreign Office's radio section Ru B, as well as being deputy head of the F.O.'s liaison unit with German Radio, known by its initials VAA-RRG. Schwipps notes that in 1943, Kiesinger became acting head of the Foreign Office's broadcasting section. From 1966 to 1969 Kiesinger was Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

42. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941, pp. 1-2. In a letter to the author dated 31 December 1993, Dr Hilde Spickernagel (née Poepping) commented: 'I do not remember any conference dated 8-9-41. If I was present, then [it was] certainly in a very minor capacity and probably quite mute.' Commenting on Adolf Mahr's memorandum of 9 September 1941, Dr Spickernagel added: 'The situation described was just one part in the well known and long drawn out struggle between Ru/Auswärtiges Amt [Foreign Office broadcasting section] and Promi [Propaganda Ministry]. The conferences of 27-5-1941 and 22-8-41 were obviously won by Promi. I daresay nobody at Ru/AA was happy about that. I suppose Mahr felt that he should have been included earlier in the proceedings, and that - if he did not utter loud protests - he might be left out of more proceedings to come. He therefore tries hard to make a laughing stock of Dignowity, all Dignowity had arranged, and of the people he picked up...I am sure Mahr felt he had to prove that he could find more suitable people for running the Irland-Redaktion. But I do not think that he could have managed a change (if only a partial one, after all) without the pressure of the Auswärtiges Amt [Foreign Office] to back him up. The whole story goes to prove that his personal influence was not as far reaching as he would have liked.'

43. Mahr memo, 9 September 1941, p. 3. Mahr sent the memo outlining his misgivings about the shape of the new Irland-Redaktion to Gerhard Rühle and Walter Schirmer, respectively head and deputy head of the broadcasting section in the Foreign Office. He also sent a copy of his memo to Harold Haferkorn who, as head of propaganda programmes to England and Ireland, was Mahr's immediate boss in the Foreign Office (see Baillie-Stewart, pp. 159 and 183). Copies of Mahr's memo were also sent to Markus Timmler, in charge of propaganda for the British colonies (see Diller, p. 325), and to Dr Kiesinger.

44. John O'Reilly 'I was a spy in Ireland' in *Sunday Dispatch*, 13 July 1952, p. 2.

References, Chapter 9

'To See England Broken One Day': The Broadcasts of 1942-43

1. Sweney, in English for Ireland, 2 January 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
2. Sweney, in English for Ireland, 6 January 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
3. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Eire, 7 January 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
4. BBC broadcast in English for India, 17 January 1942. This talk was written, though not broadcast, by the author George Orwell who worked at the BBC from August 1941 to November 1943 (see W.J. West, *Orwell: the War Commentaries*, pp. 9, 37).
5. Workers' Challenge, in English for England, 27 January 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR). Despite the Irish content of this particular talk, Workers' Challenge was aimed not at an Irish audience but at the working class population of London's East End.
6. Letter to author from Lorna Swire, Reading, 15 July 1991.
7. Talk by Susan Sweney, 1 February 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).
8. Special Easter broadcast, in Irish Gaelic and English for Ireland, 5 March 1942 (IWM E88).
9. Ibid.
10. German broadcast to Ireland (third transmission), 6 March 1942 (DFA 205/108); See also Bulfin, p. 309. Coincidentally or otherwise, the *Rambles in Eirinn* extract was broadcast just eleven days before Francis Stuart's first talk for the Irland-Redaktion. The author of *Rambles in Eirinn* was William Bulfin whose daughter Catalina was married to Seán MacBride. MacBride was a step-brother of Francis Stuart's first wife Iseult. When this author put it to Francis Stuart that he (Stuart) may have supplied the *Rambles in Eirinn* extract to the radio service himself in order to embarrass MacBride - since the two men had fallen out over Stuart's adulterous affair with Madeleine Meissner - Stuart replied: 'That talk, based on Bulfin's *Rambles in Eirinn*, had nothing to do with me. I did not suggest it and have never hidden behind anonymity. Though related by marriage to Bulfin, I don't know where this scurrilous piece came from. As for wishing to score off Seán MacBride, my own situation was far too

precarious to take time off for personal scoring. Anyhow, his [MacBride's] deploring what you call, with charming oldfashionedness, my adulterous relationship with another woman, was very understandable' (letter to author from Francis Stuart, 14 July 1994).

11. Author's interview with Hartmann, Cologne, 28 December 1990.

12. Author's interview with Éimear Ó Broin, Dublin, 10 June 1992. Sixteen years earlier, on 1 January 1926, Colonel Brase had conducted the Irish Army No. 1 Band on the opening night of 2RN in Dublin (Gorham, p. 23). Adolf Mahr may have chosen Brase's music for the Irland-Redaktion's signature tune because Mahr's father, like Brase (before he became head of the Irish Army's school of music), was a bandmaster (Kilbride-Jones, p. 29).

13. Ní Mheara, p. 194; In addition to *The Frost Is All Over*, the Irish Army's wartime monitoring reports identify the following songs as having been broadcast from Germany to Ireland: *The Hills of Donegal* (sung by G. Sanderson), *Mother Machree*, *Danny Boy*, *There's No Place Like Home*, *A Tiny Sprig of Shamrock*, *It Was Springtime in County Clare*, *The Kerry Dances*, *Kitty of Coleraine*, *I Know Where I'm Going* (sung by Sally O'Brien), *Ireland Mother Ireland*, *The Hills of Donegal*, *The Irish Emigrant and Come Back To Erin*. A speaker named as Sheila McCarney was monitored reciting a poem entitled *Everlasting Voices*. A number of the songs played on the Irland-Redaktion were John McCormack favourites which would have appealed to Irish listeners. While McCormack's recordings were being played over the airwaves from Berlin to Ireland, the famous tenor himself was coming out of retirement for a tour of London and the provinces 'to help our common cause of freedom, and to express my sympathetic admiration for the motherland [Poland] of Koziusko, Chopin and Paderewski' (Ledbetter, p. 141). During the war McCormack also sang on the BBC's *Irish Half Hour* programme (Ledbetter, p. 141) and broadcast on the BBC to South African troops fighting in the North African campaign (McCormack, p. 180). The singer died in September 1945 and after the war his widow Lily hinted that McCormack's American citizenship coupled with his pro-Allied stance in the war, may have been behind the fact that he was not invited to the inauguration of President Seán T. O'Kelly at Dublin Castle in June 1945. McCormack considered the affair to be a personal 'rebuff' (McCormack, p. 185).

14. Author's interview with Francis Stuart, 24 February 1990.

15. Stuart, in English for Ireland, 17 March 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
16. O'Reilly, 'I was a spy in Ireland' in *Sunday Dispatch*, 20 July 1952, p. 2.
17. Talk on 'American Catholics and the War', 19 March 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).
18. Stuart's talk, 5 April 1942, (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
19. Letters to author from Hilde Spickernagel, Hanover, 9 February 1992 and 31 January 1993.
20. Brase, in English for Ireland, 4 May 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR); Author's interview with Mona Brase, Dublin, 8 October 1991.
21. Campbell, p. 13.
22. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Ireland, 10 May 1942 (IWM E88).
23. Ibid.
24. Radio Berlin feature on 'The British Character', 16 May 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).
25. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Éire and N. America, 17 May 1942 and 20 May 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
26. Deutschlandsender (German Home Stations), 19 May 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
27. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Éire and N. America's, 20 May 1942. BBC monitors noted that Hartmann's talks on 17, 20 and 31 May 1942 were beamed, via Zeesen, to North America as well as Ireland.
28. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Ireland, 28 January 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
29. Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Ireland, 24 May 1942 (IWM E88). According to his son, Ó Siochfhradha was unaware that his translation of Wolfe Tone's diary was being used for propaganda purposes on German Radio. He had apparently never met either Hartmann or Mühlhausen (letter to author from Ken Ó Siochfhradha, Sandycove, Co Dublin, 8 May 1993); Author's interview with Hartmann, 21 October 1990. Hartmann told the author that he had purchased Ó Siochfhradha's *Beatha Theobald Wolfe Tone*, and the English version, while living as a student in Ireland from 1937 to 1939. He took the diaries back to Berlin with him, along with some other reference books and a number of traditional Irish music records. Ó Siochfhradha also wrote under the pseudonym An Seabhac (the hawk). His 36-chapter translation of

Wolfe Tone's diaries had been published by the Government Publications Office in Dublin in 1932, with a cover price of five shillings.

30. G2 report entitled 'Notes on John Francis O'Reilly's activities in the Channel Islands and Germany', 31 December 1943, p. 2 (NA DFA A52 I G2/3824).

31. Campbell, pp. 10, 13; Hartmann, in Irish Gaelic for Eire and North America, 31 May 1942 (IWM E88).

32. 'Husband's talk from Berlin', in English for Ireland, 13 June 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

33. O'Reilly article in *Sunday Dispatch*, 27 July 1952, p. 2. O'Reilly added that when he related the coup d'état episode to G2 officers in Dublin's Arbour Hill prison in December 1943, 'they scoffed at my story'.

34. Part of a talk by Susan Sweney, 19 July 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 2).

35. Author's interview with Hartmann, 28 December 1990.

36. Letters to author from Hilde Spickernagel, 9 February 1992 and 10 August 1992.

37. Susan Hilton statement to British authorities at Liebenau internment camp, Germany, 30 June 1945, p. 5, section 37 (LCD CRIM 1/1745).

38. Stuart (2), p. 35.

39. Stuart, German broadcast to Ireland, 24 July 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 2).

40. Stuart (2), p. 35.

41. Stuart, German broadcast to Ireland, 5 August 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 2).

42. Stuart's broadcasts to Ireland 1942-44 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB parts 2, 3, 4 and 5); Captain John Smyth memo 'German broadcasts to Ireland', 1 April 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 3); Author's interview with Stuart, 17 November 1989.

43. Carter, p. 97.

44. Carter, pp. 34, 55 and 61.

45. Duggan (1), p. 209.

46. Mahr report, 18 March 1941. pp. 4-5; Fisk, pp. 403-4.

47. Stuart, German broadcast to Ireland, 30 August 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 2).

48. Fisk, pp. 378-9; German broadcast to Ireland, 3 September 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 2).

49. Stuart (2), p. 37.
50. O'Reilly articles in *Sunday Disptach*, 20 July 1952, p. 2, and 27 July 1952, p. 2.
51. Author's interview with Hartmann, 21 October 1990.
52. Letters to author from Hilde Spickernagel, 9 February 1992 and 10 August 1992.
53. Stuart, German broadcast to Ireland, 2 December 1942 (DFA 205/108).
54. F. Boland's minutes of meeting with Hempel, 30 December 1942 (DFA 205/108); Details of McAteer's status in Coogan (1), p. 231, and Fisk, p. 378.
55. Campbell, p. 15.
56. Stuart (2), p.38.
57. Campbell, pp. 9, 14-16.
58. Captain J. Smyth, 'German Broadcasts to Ireland', 1 April 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 3).
59. Francis Stuart talk, German broadcast, 11 p.m., 30 January 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 3).
60. Stuart, in English for Ireland, 6 February 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
61. Talk in Gaelic by Dr Hans Hartmann, 1 February 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
62. Talk in Gaelic by Dr Hans Hartmann, 2 February 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
63. Talk in Gaelic by Dr Hans Hartmann, 6 February 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
64. Balfour, p. 309.
65. Stuart, in English for Ireland, 16 March 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
66. Anonymous talk, 'The Position of the Small Nation', in English for Ireland, 17 March 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
67. BBC monitoring report: 'Talks in Gaelic by Dr Hans Hartmann', 13 April 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
68. BBC monitoring report: 'Talks in Gaelic by Dr Hans Hartmann', 17 April 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR). Recent German publications on Katyn include, G. Kaiser and A.L. Szcześniak, *Katyn: Der Massenmord an polnischen Offizieren* (Katyn: the mass murder of Polish officers) Berlin, 1992, and C.

- Madajczyk, *Das Drama von Katyn* (The Katyn drama) Berlin, 1992.
69. BBC monitoring report: 'Talks in Gaelic by Dr Hans Hartmann', 19 April 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
70. BBC monitoring report: 'Talks in Gaelic by Dr Hans Hartmann', 20 April 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
71. Details of Dublin's formal diplomatic protest to Berlin over the Francis Stuart election broadcasts in April and May 1943 are contained in chapter 4, pp. 88-91.
72. Francis Stuart talk, 10 April 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
73. Francis Stuart talk, 8 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
74. Francis Stuart talk, 15 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4). Though this talk - calling on British soldiers from Ulster to mutiny - was monitored by the Irish Army there is no record of its having been monitored by the BBC. On 6 July 1994 the author sent Francis Stuart the text of his talk, with the (author's) question 'If the British had recorded the speech they might, in the atmosphere of retribution in the immediate post-war period, have tried to conjure up a Haw-Haw type of case against you. In the circumstances perhaps you would agree it was lucky that you found yourself in the hands of the French and not the British at the end of the war?' Stuart replied: 'Yes, but that was not accidental. I arranged it so' (Letter to author from Francis Stuart, 7 July 1994).
75. Francis Stuart talk, 29 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
76. Letter to author from Art O'Leary, Journal Office, Houses of the Oireachtas, Dublin, 4 February 1991.
77. Carroll, p. 129.
78. Duggan (1), p. 219.
79. Station Debunk (Axis origin), in English for USA, 12 October 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
80. 'Belfast by-election result', comment in English for Ireland, 14 January 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
81. Bennett, p. 103.
82. Cathcart, pp. 127-8.
83. German Broadcast to Ireland, 2 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
84. According to Hartmann, William Joyce may have been behind the Cadogan talks (Hartmann letter to author, 28 June 1992).

85. German Broadcast to Ireland, 4 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
86. German Broadcast to Ireland, 5 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
87. German Broadcast to Ireland, 18 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
88. German Broadcast to Ireland, 20 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
89. German Broadcast to Ireland, 23 May 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
90. Barnouw, pp. 47, 133-5, 221.
91. Smyth to Gantly, memo dated 2 June 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
92. German Broadcast to Ireland, 7.15 p.m., 1 June 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
93. Ibid.
94. German Broadcast to Ireland, 8.45 p.m., 1 June 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
95. Talk by Dr Hans Hartmann, 22 June 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
96. Talk by Dr Hans Hartmann, 23 June 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
97. Talk by Dr Hans Hartmann, 25 June 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
98. Talk by Dr Hans Hartmann, 29 June 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
99. Talk by Dr Hans Hartmann, 1 July 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
100. Hartmann, in Gaelic for Éire, 7 July 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
The 50th anniversary of the Gaelic League, or Conradh na Gaeilge, fell on 31 July 1943. However, Hartmann was over-optimistic in thinking that he would be back on the air that soon. He and his team left Berlin for Luxembourg on 12 August and did not resume broadcasts to Ireland until mid-September.
101. German Broadcast to Ireland by Francis Stuart, 24 July 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4).
102. Madeleine Stuart, pp. 33-4; Cole, p. 213; In August 1943, while the Irland-Redaktion's staff moved to Luxembourg, other personnel and technicians of German Radio's overseas and European services moved from temporary accommodation behind the Berlin Rundfunkhaus to what was formerly a home for the blind at Königs-Wusterhausen on the south-eastern outskirts of Berlin (letter to author from Hans Wirth, Berlin, 18 October 1990. Wirth was a technician at the wartime Rundfunkhaus in Berlin).
103. Prior to the Germans' seizure of the station on 10 May 1940, Radio Luxembourg (at 120-kW, one of the most powerful transmitters in Europe at the time) had been off the air since 21 September 1939 'by order of the Luxembourg government, anxious to respect the strictest neutrality in time

of war'. On 11 September 1944 American troops took control of Radio Luxembourg after more than four years of Nazi occupation. The studios were used in turn by SHAEF, the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and the U.S. Office of War Information, until being handed back to the Luxembourg authorities on 11 November 1945. The following day, the Luxembourg national anthem heralded the re-start of the first programmes to be broadcast free of foreign interference for over six years (Graas, pp. 41-2; Barnouw, pp. 201-3).

104. German Broadcast by Mr Cadogan, 6.15 p.m., 1 October 1943, 'very faint' (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4). According to Cole (p. 213) 'In October [1943] Joyce had another trip, this time to Luxembourg, where he stayed at the Hotel Alfa with his current girl-friend. While there he recorded his "Views on the News" as usual.'

105. Various talks to Ireland by Johann Mikele, October 1943 to July 1944 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB parts 4 and 5).

106. German Broadcast to Ireland by Francis Stuart, 8.45 p.m., 16 October 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 4). No broadcasts by the Irland-Redaktion from Luxembourg ever alluded to their place of origin. The impression was thus created that, apart from a 54-day break in transmissions (from 25 July to 17 September 1943 inclusive), the team had never left Berlin and nothing was amiss.

107. Hartmann, in Gaelic for Ireland, 25 October 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

108. Synopsis of BBC monitoring reports of Hans Hartmann's broadcasts in Gaelic for Ireland, 23, 24, 25 and 26 November 1943, and 24 and 26 December 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR); Campbell, p. 19; In broadcasting standard anti-Bolshevik propaganda, Hartmann may also have been reflecting Irish fears of a sweeping victory by Stalin's Red Army. At around the same time as these broadcasts were made, an American legation official in Dublin, Daniel Terrell, was reporting to Washington that 'More and more, as the war goes on, there is talk in Ireland of the horrible things Russia will do to all of us after Germany's downfall. Dr [Richard] Hayes [Director of the National Library, Dublin], for instance, all but made a flat statement that Ireland had less to fear from a German victory than a Russian triumph' (Terrell to Kuhn, 16 September 1943, USNA CL-1566-BG).

109. Hartmann, in Gaelic for Ireland, 23 November 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207

BBC MR) .

110. Hartmann, in Gaelic for Ireland, 24 November 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR); Campbell, p. 19.

111. Hartmann, in Gaelic for Ireland, 25 November 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR); Campbell, p. 19.

112. Hartmann, in Gaelic for Ireland, 26 November 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR); Campbell, p. 19.

113. German Broadcast to Ireland, 20 December 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR) .

114. Hartmann, in Gaelic for Ireland, 24 December 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR) .

115. Hartmann, in Gaelic for Ireland, 26 December 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR) .

116. Captain J. Smyth report 'German broadcasts to Ireland', 1 April 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 3); BBC monitoring reports 1942-43 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR) .

References

Chapter 10: The Nazis' Irish-American Propaganda Initiative

1. Mahr report entitled 'Rundfunkpropaganda nach Irland' (radio propaganda to Ireland), 18 March 1941, p. 9 (AA R 67483).
2. Balfour, p. 465; Howe, p. 62.
3. Howe, p. 64.
4. Balfour, p. 138; Cole, pp. 135-9.
5. Balfour, p. 138; Schwipps, pp. 24-5; Station Debunk (Axis origin), broadcasting in English for USA, was monitored by the BBC in October 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
6. Howe, p. 69; Balfour, p. 134. Hetzler managed to run what remained of German Radio's European services, including Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion, from Bremers Hotel in Apen up to and including 2 May 1945 (see chapter 11, pp. 224-6).
7. Cole, p. 111; Balfour, p. 471.
8. The material beamed to America by unnamed Irland-Redaktion speakers dealt mostly with the need to preserve Irish neutrality in the war. A small number of Hans Hartmann's Irish language talks were also broadcast to America. One of Zeesen's seven 50-kW shortwave transmitters was used to beam the aforementioned material to the United States.
9. see Chapter 8, pp. 149, 154, 159-60.
10. Schwipps, pp. 45, 70, 73-4. The programme content for America broke down as follows: news (broadcast in both English and German for German emigrants) 30.6%, politics 20.5%, culture 7.5%, and music 41.4%. By the end of 1943, German Radio's North American service was putting out eight 1-hour long magazine programmes at 2.30 p.m. (Berlin time), 8 p.m., Midnight, 1 a.m., 2 a.m., 3 a.m., 5 a.m. and 6 a.m.
11. Rolo, pp. 96-7.
12. Ryle Dwyer, p. 24.
13. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1991, 111th edition, p. 7, table 2: U.S. resident population 1900-1990 (U.S. Department of Commerce).
14. Ryle Dwyer, p. 24.
15. Balfour, p. 165.
16. Flannery, p. 92.
17. Barnouw, p. 133.

18. Fisk, p. 297; According to Steele (p. 212), by mid-November 1941, American opinion was still generally divided on sending U.S. troops to Europe: 47% in favour, 44% against and 9% undecided. 61% opposed a U.S. declaration of war on Germany.
19. Rolo, pp. 92-3.
20. Dwyer, pp. 25-9. Although in more recent times U.S. Presidents have been restricted to holding no more than two 4-year terms in the White House, no such restriction operated in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, Roosevelt was elected to a third term as President in 1940, and a fourth term in 1944.
21. Barnouw, pp. 144-6.
22. Flannery, p. 104.
23. Bewley, pp. 197-8. According to his autobiography (p. 189) Bewley refused an offer of a job at the German Foreign Office in wartime Berlin.
24. Cronin (1), p. 228. Mahr's 1941 G-sender plan was apparently designed to give the impression that the programmes were emanating from U.S. soil. By 1943 the plan appears to have been modified, but the ultimate target audience was still Irish-American. Mrs Elizabeth Clissmann told Seán Cronin and this author that the German-based broadcasts, carrying anti-Roosevelt propaganda, were to appear as if they originated from Irish soil.
25. Schnabel, pp. 470-1. It is clear that by August 1943, Mahr's plan to beam propaganda to Irish-Australians had been dropped.
26. Mahr report, 18 March 1941 (AA R 67483). Whether or not Frank Ryan was the 'suitable person' whom the Foreign Office had in mind, in August 1943, for its secret Irish-American radio station, it is noteworthy that when Hartmann discovered the plan four and a half months later, he immediately tried to recruit Ryan for his team in Luxembourg and 'was afraid of a rival station' (see reference no. 44 below).
27. Letter to author from Hans Hartmann, Cologne, 12 July 1993. When he was shown a copy of the minutes of the North America Committee's meeting of 26 August 1943, Hartmann replied, 'Regarding [this] document, no information has come to my notice.'
28. Author's interview with Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin, 19 October 1990.
29. Mahr's Foreign Office curriculum vitae notes that in 1942 Mahr was in charge of radio programming to Ireland. By 1944, however, he was head of Ru II (covering England, Ireland and English-language programmes for the

British Empire) and Ru XI (dealing with special information matters). The latter section, created in 1942, was most probably dealing with the Foreign Office's secret transmitters (letter to author from Foreign Office, Bonn, 7 August 1991, and letter from Dr Ansgar Diller, German Broadcasting Archive, Frankfurt-am-Main, 16 May 1993).

30. Clissmann interviews, 11 September 1990 and 19 October 1990; Mahr report, 18 March 1941, p. 9.

31. Clissmann interview, 19 October 1990.

32. Interview with Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin, 11 September 1990.

33. Interview with Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin, 19 October 1990. The apparent involvement of both the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry can be explained by the fact that both ministries regularly fought for control of propaganda initiatives. On Mrs Clissmann's evidence though, there may also have been a conflict within the Foreign Office over the Irish-American G-sender proposal.

34. Clissmann interview, 11 September 1990.

35. Madeleine Stuart, pp. 33-4.

36. Clissmann interview, 19 October 1990.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid. It is not known if Mahr, while in Luxembourg, was trying to alter the G-sender plan or to kill it off completely.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Clissmann interview, 11 September 1990.

42. Campbell, p. 20; Clissmann interview, 19 October 1990.

43. Ibid.

44. Cronin (1), p. 229. Kurt Haller is described as Edmund Veesenmayer's right-hand man at the Foreign Office, while Veesenmayer was Ribbentrop's right-hand man (Cronin, p. 191).

45. Cronin (1), p. 275.

46. Cronin (1), p. 229. Haller had either embellished his statement to Ryan, as Ryan suspected, or Hartmann did indeed have a hot-line to Veesenmayer at Hitler's field headquarters, perhaps via Mahr. According to Mahr's daughter, Ingrid, her father visited the Wolfsschanze (Wolf's Lair, the codename for Hitler's field headquarters at Rastenburg, East Prussia)

in 1944, although she does not know why (interview with Mrs Ingrid Reusswig, 28 July 1994). Another explanation for Haller's comments to Ryan is that Haller - realising which way the war was going - wanted Ryan to reach the relative safety of Luxembourg.

47. Cronin (1), p. 231.

48. Ibid., p. 231.

49. Ibid., pp. 231-2.

50. Clissmann interview, 19 October 1990.

51. Ibid.

52. Cronin (1), pp. 252-3; Elizabeth Clissmann was back in touch with Veessenmayer in June 1944 regarding the death of Frank Ryan (Cronin, pp. 255-6); Veessenmayer first went to Budapest in the autumn of 1943 to try and topple Hungary's leader, Admiral Horthy, and succeeded in bringing about a coup d'état the following spring. Veessenmayer's wartime activities in Croatia, Serbia, Slovakia and Hungary are detailed in vol. ii of Rich's *Hitler's War Aims* entitled 'The Establishment of the New Order'; Stephan (p. 261) notes that Kurt Haller accompanied Veessenmayer to Budapest in the spring of 1944. Stephan told this author that, after the war, Haller verified the contents of the manuscript for *Spies in Ireland* while on his death bed (Stephan interview, Cologne, 28 December 1990).

53. Stuart interview, 17 November 1989.

54. Duggan (1), preface XV.

55. Duggan, *Herr Hempel at the German Legation in Dublin 1937-45*, appendix XXIV, p. 423 (TCD thesis, 1979).

56. Ibid., p. 422.

57. Campbell, p. 24. Roosevelt died in office on 12 April 1945 just weeks before the German surrender on 7 May. Harry S. Truman was sworn in as the new U.S. President.

Chapter 11

A Faltering Voice: The Broadcasts of 1944-45

1. Campbell, pp. 21-3; Elborn, pp. 164-5; Author's interview with Elizabeth Clissmann, 19 October 1990; Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, 21 October 1990; Cole, pp. 233-5.
2. Author's interview with Francis Stuart, 17 November 1989.
3. Elborn, pp. 164-5.
4. Stuart, in *English for Éire*, 8 January 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
5. Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990.
6. Cole, pp. 135-8.
7. Elizabeth Clissmann visited the Luxembourg studios in March 1944 just after Francis Stuart had left for Berlin; Madeleine Stuart, p. 34.
8. Author's interview with Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann, 11 September 1990.
9. Elizabeth Clissmann interview, 19 October 1990.
10. BBC monitoring reports for February, March and April 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
11. Dutch Home service broadcast, 22 February 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
12. Hartmann, in *Gaelic for Éire*, 25 November 1943 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
13. German European service in English, 12 March 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
14. German European service in English for Éire, 12 March 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
15. German Home service, 'McRory speech', 17 March 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
16. Stuart (2), p. 40.
17. Elborn, p. 165. Ernst von Weizsäcker, Under Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office, had written a formal letter of authorisation for Stuart when he arrived in Berlin to work as a university lecturer in January 1940.
18. Stuart (2), p. 41.
19. German telegraph service (Transocean), in *English for Far East*, 6 April 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).

20. German Home service, 6 April 1944; German European service in English, 6 April 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
21. Free India Radio, in English for India, 7 April 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
22. Free India Radio, in Hindi for India, 7 April 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
23. Radio National (enemy origin), in English, 7 April 1944 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR).
24. 'Goebbels - The Missing Diaries' in *Irish Independent*, 13 July 1992, p. 8.
25. Francis Stuart, 'Frank Ryan in Germany' in *The Bell* (Dublin), December 1950, pp. 39-40.
26. Author's interview with Maurice Irvine, Brighton, 31 January 1992.
27. Letters to author from Lorna Swire, 17 October 1990 and 19 November 1990.
28. Various Hartmann talks, August 1944 to March 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
29. Balfour, p. 467.
30. Cole, pp. 224-35; The author is grateful to Mr Hermann Töbermann of Augustfehn, Germany, for photographs, maps and technical details of the wartime studio and transmitter locations in and around Apen.
31. Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990.
32. Briggs (2), p. 235.
33. Barnouw, p. 201.
34. Irish Army monitoring reports of German radio broadcasts to Ireland, August, September and October 1944 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
35. German broadcast to Éire, 17 November 1944 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6). The Dumbarton Oaks conference on the formation of the United Nations was held from 21 August 1944 to 9 October 1944.
36. Cole, pp. 224-35; Selwyn, pp. 150-1.
37. Letter to author from Gustav Mahr, Berlin, 28 November 1990.
38. Cole, pp. 224-6.
39. German broadcast to Ireland, 14 December 1944 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
40. German broadcast to Ireland, 26 December 1944 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).

41. German broadcasts to Ireland, December 1944 and January 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
42. J.W. (unidentified) to Captain de Buitléar, 12 February 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6). Historically, the Fehmegerichte were medieval 'courts that dispensed a brutal form of justice'. The secret courts re-emerged in the early 1920s 'composed of rightist members of paramilitary organisations' who meted out punishments to 'those suspected of denouncing rightist nationalists' to the Weimar authorities. The Fehme courts were used by the Nazis in the closing months of World War II to stop Germans from collaborating with the arriving Allied forces (see Snyder, pp. 91-2). In the broadcast of 11 February 1945, the phrase 'Anglo-Irish war style' was presumably a reference by Hartmann to the killing of pro-British informers by republicans during the Irish War of Independence.
43. German broadcast to Ireland, 17 March 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
44. German broadcast to Ireland, 29 March 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
45. German broadcasts to Ireland, 2, 4 and 5 April 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
46. 'German Freedom Movement: proclamation by secret radio station' in *Weekly Review of the German News Agency*, no. 13, 9 April 1945, p.2 (NA D/JUS C 766).
47. Balfour, pp. 408-10.
48. Trevor-Roper, pp. 306-7.
49. German broadcast to Ireland, 5 April 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
50. Cole, pp. 224-35; Selwyn, pp. 151-2, 162. William Joyce was arrested by British soldiers near the German border with Denmark on 28 May 1945; F. Taylor, p. 471.
51. German broadcasts to Ireland, 16, 17 and 18 April 1945, with unsigned monitor's note attached (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
52. German broadcast to Ireland, 20 April 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
53. Campbell, p. 26.
54. German broadcasts to Ireland, 22 April 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6). Only Mahr or Hartmann, with their knowledge of Irish history, could have written the 'Autarchy' commentary.
55. Campbell, p. 26; Snyder, p. 147.
56. German broadcasts to Ireland, 30 April 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
57. German broadcasts to Ireland, 1 May 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).

58. German broadcast to Ireland, 2 May 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
59. Cole, pp. 234-5.
60. Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, 21 October 1990. De Valera visited Hempel on 2 May 1945, - see Dermot Keogh, 'The day Dev offered condolences to Nazi Germany' in *The Irish Times*, 11 January 1990, p. 15; Coogan (2), p. 610.
61. Monitor's report entitled 'German broadcasts', 3 May 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).

References, Chapter 12

Berlin's Irish Audience

1. Letter to author from Tony Fahy, RTE Audience Research Service, Dublin, 12 March 1992; Gorham, pp. 115-6; In 1939 Thomas J. Kiernan was considered for the post of Irish Minister in Germany to replace Charles Bewley. The appointment was never ratified, however, because technically it would have required the approval of the British monarch which was impossible since the United Kingdom was then at war with Germany and both sides' diplomats had been recalled. In the event, William Warnock carried on running the Irish legation in wartime Berlin, as Chargé d'Affaires, for most of the war (Author's interview with Warnock's former secretary in Berlin, Eileen Walsh, Blackrock, Co Dublin, 10 July 1992). See also, Duggan (1), pp. 74-5.
2. T. Brown, p. 153.
3. Gorham, p. 181.
4. Author's interview with Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, Dublin, 15 November 1990.
5. 'Geographical distribution of radio licences, 1941' in *Radio Eireann Annual Report* (Dublin, 1941) appendix A, table III.
6. Gorham, p. 116.
7. Fisk, pp. 379, 407.
8. Briggs (1), p. 154.
9. Cole, p. 149.
10. Cole, pp. 23, 40-6.
11. Author's interviews with Hans Hartmann, 21 October 1990 and 28 December 1990.
12. Author's interviews with Éimear Ó Broin, 10 June 1992 and 15 June 1992.
13. Author's interview with Hartmann, 9 July 1990.
14. Fisk, p. 407.
15. Author's interview with Francis Stuart, 17 November 1989.
16. Author's interview with Elizabeth Clissmann, 19 October 1990. In the 1940-41 period, Mühlhausen would have been able to check Hartmann's weekly talks in Irish. When, in December 1941, Hartmann took over the Irland-Redaktion, he had complete control of his Irish language talks because Mühlhausen had left to join an SS unit in France. Irish speakers in wartime Berlin were few and far between, - in addition to Mühlhausen and Hartmann,

they included William Warnock at the Irish legation; Frank Ryan, the senior IRA figure; Franz Fromme, the one-time Abwehr operative; and Nora O'Mara who worked occasionally for Hartmann. Because Irish was a little known language in European terms, Hartmann would theoretically have had greater freedom to express his own views on air than most of his radio colleagues in the other language services had. However, Hartmann's talks in Irish broadly mirrored the material being put out on German Radio's European services.

17. Irvine interview, 31 January 1992.

18. Letter to author from Alf Mac Lochlainn, Galway, 11 June 1991.

19. Letter to author from Professor Gearóid Mac Eoin, UCG, 5 March 1991.

20. Author's interview with Seán Mac Reamoinn, Dublin, 8 August 1991.

21. Author's interview with Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, 1 April 1993.

22. Letter to author from Dr Ken Ó Siochfhradha, Sandycove, Co Dublin, 8 May 1993; Dr Hartmann himself says he read the Wolfe Tone diaries on air 'because they were far back in history, had no direct contact with present day politics but, on the whole, conveyed the idea that Ireland was entitled to be a free and independent nation, and particularly that the Catholic part of the country had the right to self-determination. I selected mostly those parts of the diaries in which Wolfe Tone urged, supported these views. I can say that there was no hint whatsoever on politics, no concealed messages in it' (Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990).

23. Letter to author from Seán Ó Luing, Dublin, 9 March 1993.

24. Author's interview with Günther Schütz, Shankill, Co Dublin, 6 September 1990. As explained earlier in this chapter, under Nazi law 'radio crime' (i.e. listening to foreign broadcasts) carried a variety of sanctions including the death penalty.

25. Mühlhausen travel data contained in letter to author from Seán Ó Heochaidh, Gortahork, Co Donegal, 20 June 1991, and Mühlhausen's own letter to Joe Healy, Cork, 26 July 1937 (supplied to author by Mrs Jean Sheridan-Healy); Hartmann travel data contained in Hartmann's G2 file (MA G2/0071, memo of 25 January 1943 on Hartmann's visits to Donegal).

26. Author's interview with Seán Ó Heochaidh, Gortahork, 14 January 1992.

27. The transcripts of various radio talks by Mühlhausen in the 1939-41 period are held in the following archives: MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1 (covering 1939 to 13 June 1942), in IWM E88 'Germany in Irish Gaelic'

(period from 22 September 1940 to 6 July 1943), and in PRONI CAB 9CD/207 (BBC monitoring digests from 1941-44); Captain John Smyth, 'German Broadcasts to Ireland', memo of 1 April 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 3).

28. Schwipps, p. 75. Besides broadcasting in English and Irish, German Radio's European services also put out programmes in German, French, Spanish, Portugese, Italian, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Finnish, Icelandic, Faroese, Flemish, Dutch, Hungarian, Slovakian, Croatian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, Russian, Ukranian, Belorussian, Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian and Polish.

29. Irvine interview, 31 January 1992.

30. Stephan, pp. 39, 59-68, 101-2, 112, 121, 124, 129, 140, 179-81, 185-6, 202, 250-2.

31. Stephan, pp. 43, 69-70, 112; Duggan (1), p. 226; The German transmitter was locked in the vaults of the Munster & Leinster Bank in Dame Street, Dublin for the remainder of the Emergency. That particular branch of the bank was chosen because Eamon de Valera had his account there and knew the manager personally. The transmitter was eventually retrieved after the war by officials acting on behalf of the Allied administration in Germany (Author's interview with Mr Ned Butler, former head of securities at the bank, 23 August 1990).

32. Hartmann interview, Cologne, 28 December 1990.

33. Captain John Smyth, 'German Broadcasts to Ireland', memo of 1 April 1943 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 3). Captain Smyth and his G2 colleagues do not appear to have found anything unusual in this reference to the *Irish Independent*, but the 'Lady Interviewer' radio sketch of 24 February 1943 could have been a coded attempt to summon a meeting of pro-Nazi elements in Ireland. The front page of the *Irish Independent* of 24 February 1943 carried an advertisement for the Red Bank restaurant which had been a favourite haunt of members of Dublin's pre-war Austro-German community including Mahr, Hartmann and Clissmann. The advertisement read: 'Red Bank Restaurant, Sunday 1 - 9. New Lounge.' What made the 'coincidence' of the radio announcement and the Red Bank advertisement particularly striking was the fact that the restaurant was not a regular advertiser in that newspaper. Prior to 24 February 1943, an advertisement for the Red Bank had not appeared since 2 December 1942 - a period of almost three months. So, it is conceivable that the 'Lady Interviewer' broadcast was designed to

alert certain people about a meeting at the Red Bank on Sunday, 28 February 1943. If not, the coincidence is an extraordinary one.

34. Wells to Gransden, 5 November 1942 (PRONI CAB 9CD/207). Robert Gransden was the Northern Ireland Cabinet Secretary. See also, Fisk, p. 385.

35. Letter to author from Alf Mac Lochlainn, Galway, 11 June 1991. In 1949 Mac Lochlainn joined the staff of the National Library in Dublin. He became its Director in 1976.

36. Letter to author from Mrs Carolle J. Carter, California, 13 January 1991.

37. Schütz interview, 6 September 1990.

38. Letter to author from Lorna Swire, 19 November 1990.

39. Letter to author from Seán Ó Heochaidh, 20 June 1991.

40. The chain-of-command and distribution lists for foreign broadcast transcripts are contained, along with the transcripts themselves, in MA file G2/X/0127 Foreign Wireless Broadcasts (FWB) 1939-45 in six parts.

41. G2 Command HQ Curragh to G2 HQ, 6 October 1941 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).

42. Bryan to Walshe, 19 January 1942, concerning extract from WEC (Westinghouse) broadcast 11 January 1942, 0100-0300 approximately (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).

43. Anonymous broadcast from Berlin, 31 March 1942 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).

44. Renier and Rubinstein, p. 93.

45. Ibid., pp. 74-5.

46. Author's interview with Francis Stuart, 17 November 1989.

47. 'Substantial level of wartime co-operation with British revealed', in *The Irish Times*, 2 January 1991, p. 5; O'Halpin, pp. 64-8.

48. Information on O'Sullivan and stenographers supplied to author by Commandant Peter Young, Director, Military Archive, Dublin; Carter, p. 38.

49. Gantly to Bryan, 26 February 1940, memo GS/304 'Wireless Intercept' (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).

50. 'Translations and translators', G2 memorandum, 18 April 1942 (MA G2/X/0099).

51. Author's interview with Mrs Jean Sheridan-Healy, 2 March 1992.

52. Rockel, p. 31; Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, Cologne, 28 December 1990.

53. Mühlhausen to Healy, 26 July 1937. Letter supplied to author by Mrs Jean Sheridan-Healy.
54. Healy to Bryan, 11 December 1939 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 1).
55. Healy's papers, held by his widow Mrs Jean Sheridan-Healy, contain detailed debriefings of German agents, a translation of Hermann Goertz's coded notebook, and a report on Healy's Red Cross mission to Portugal and Spain in April 1943. The author is grateful to Mrs Sheridan-Healy for permission to view the documents; Letter to author from Joe Healy's brother, Dr Louis D. Healy, Mandurah, Western Australia, 14 January 1992; Carter, pp. 83-4; Joe Healy's official report on his interrogation of the German aircrew does not mention any stool-pigeon role (J.G. Healy to CSO i/c G2 branch, 2 December 1940 (MA SI/306 G2/X/0584); Joe Healy worked with UCC's Department of Spanish for 27 years. In 1961 he was appointed Professor of Spanish at UCC. He died on 25 August 1963, aged 58 (see Obituary of Dr Joseph G. Healy in *UCC Record*, no. 39 of 1964, pp. 38-9).
56. Briggs (1), pp. 619, 720.
57. Letter to author from Lorna Swire, 17 October 1990. The Mayflowers were named after the vessel which, in 1620, brought the Pilgrim Fathers from England to Plymouth, Massachusetts, where they founded a Puritan colony.
58. Briggs (1), p. 29. Wood Norton Hall had once been the home of the Duke of Orleans. The BBC bought the mansion in April 1939.
59. Renier and Rubinstein, pp. 13-23, 113-4. In 1971 Rubinstein was appointed head of the reception department at the BBC's Monitoring Service.
60. Briggs (1), p. 18.
61. Letter to author from Lorna Swire, 17 October 1990.
62. Letter to author from Vladimir 'Vova' Rubinstein, 2 October 1990; Letter to author from Martin Esslin, London, 15 December 1993.
63. Letter to author from Lorna Swire, 8 January 1992.
64. Letters to author from Lorna Swire, 3 May 1991 and 15 July 1991.
65. Letters to author from Professor Derick Thomson, University of Glasgow, 27 November 1990 and 16 June 1991; Author's interview with Bob Wylie, BBC Scotland, 10 September 1991.
66. Renier and Rubinstein, pp. 53-4.
67. Letter to author from V. Rubinstein, 2 October 1990.
68. 'Germany in Irish Gaelic', 22 September 1940 to 6 July 1943 (IWM E88).
69. Ibid.; Letter to author from Jacqueline Kavanagh, Written Archives

Officer, BBC Caversham Park, 24 December 1991; Letter to author from Joan Newman (BBC wartime monitor), Fort William, Scotland, 2 July 1992; The BBC Monitoring Service's wartime personnel files are incomplete and contain no record either of McDonagh or Jane Charleton.

70. 'Germany in Irish Gaelic' (IWM E88); Letter to author from J. Kavanagh, BBC, 24 August 1990.

71. Carney and Greene, preface.

72. Letter to author from Professor D. Thomson, 27 November 1990.

73. Letter to author from Mary Charleton, Belfast, 27 July 1991; Author's interview with Mary Charleton, 1 February 1993; Jane Charleton was not the only member of her family to join the war effort. Her brother Bobby joined the RAF and died as a result of injuries sustained during a bombing mission over Germany (author's interview with Floyd McGuire, Crumlin, Co Antrim, 28 January 1995, and letter from Norman E. Hoey, Crumlin, Co Antrim, 4 February 1995); Letter to author from Queen's University alumni officer, Gerry Power, Belfast, 23 January 1993.

74. 'Germany in Irish Gaelic' (IWM E88); Letter to author from J. Kavanagh, BBC, 24 August 1990.

75. Letter to author from Mary Charleton, 27 July 1991; Letter to author from Northern Ireland Department of Education, Bangor, 22 October 1991; The author is grateful for additional information on Jane Charleton received from Norman E. Hoey, Crumlin, Co Antrim (letters 27 January 1995 and 4 February 1995).

76. Author's interview with Maurice Irvine, 31 January 1992; Letter to author from J. Kavanagh, BBC, 24 August 1990.

77. Letter to author from Lorna Swire, 17 October 1990; Letter to author from V. Rubinstein, 2 October 1990.

78. Hartmann in Irish Gaelic to Ireland, 12 March 1943 (IWM E88).

79. Irvine interview, 31 January 1992.

80. Irvine interview, 31 January 1992; In fact, the BBC continued to monitor Radio Éireann's output until 1959. The relevant BBC original monitoring reports (i.e. full translations before editing) are held by the Imperial War Museum as follows: C88 Éire in English 7 September 1939 to 2 February 1941, C89 Éire in English 3 February 1941 to 6 February 1942, C90 Éire in English 1942 to 1959. The BBC's translations of German Radio's Irish language broadcasts are held in IWM file E88.

81. Mansell, p. 117.
82. Irvine interview, 31 January 1992.
83. Letter to author from J. Kavanagh, BBC, 24 August 1990; Letter to author from Lorna Swire, 19 November 1990; Irvine interview, 31 January 1992.
84. W.J. West (1), pp. 204-5, 245.
85. Letter to author from V. Rubinstein, 17 March 1993. Whether or not MI5 was represented at Evesham and/or Caversham, it could have influenced events from outside the BBC monitoring service. In any case, the BBC's daily digest of monitoring reports was circulated to the War Office, the Joint Broadcasting Committee, the Ministry of Information and, among others, 'a certain officer in Wormwood Scrubs' where MI5's B Division was based for part of the war (see Renier and Rubinstein, p. 41, and Nigel West, pp. 157, 173 and 178).
86. Irvine interview, 31 January 1992.
87. Mansell, pp. 98-9.
88. Balfour, p. 149; Smith, p. 80; Lean, p. 46; Statistics on death sentences handed down by German courts for 'radio crime' are given in Diller, pp. 313-6. Dr Diller states, however, that it is not possible to determine the number of such death sentences actually carried out and the number commuted to lesser penalties.
89. MA files G2/X/0127 Foreign Wireless Broadcasts 1939-45 in six parts; Mansell, pp. 98-9; Diller, pp. 321-5; Schwipps, pp. 85-9; Briggs (1), p. 8; The story of Germany's wartime monitoring service is told by Boelcke, 'Das Seehaus in Berlin-Wannsee' in *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands* (Berlin, 1974).
90. Author's interview with Hans Hartmann, 12 May 1991.
91. Balfour, p. 472.
92. Letter to author from ex-Radio Éireann engineer Tom Collins, Athlone, 30 July 1990.
93. Author's interview with Elizabeth Clissmann, 19 October 1990.
94. Author's interview with Commandant Peter Young, Director, Military Archive, Dublin, 29 January 1991.
95. Renier and Rubinstein, pp. 65-6.
96. Engel, pp. 606, 612.
97. Thiele, p. 1.

References, Chapter 13

'Having Backed The Wrong Horse'

1. Post-war details concerning most of the Irland-Redaktion's members are contained in the biographical material in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.
2. Selwyn, pp. 216-8; For details of recently released British Public Record Office papers on Joyce and Amery, see the following: 'Public urged King to spare life of Lord Haw-Haw' in *The London Times*, 8 February 1995, p. 9; 'Duke joined campaign to spare Haw Haw' and 'Amery executed against advice' in *Daily Telegraph*, 8 February 1995, p. 11; 'Ministers expected Haw-Haw to go free' in *The Independent* (London), 8 February 1995, p. 8.
3. Letter to author from Gustav Mahr, Berlin, 28 November 1990; Adolf Mahr's daughter, Ingrid, recalls that when her father was released from the British internment camp at Falling Bärstal, Germany, on 10 April 1946, 'he was so thin and sensitive that he could not even bear to be touched. In the camp he had to sleep while lying on a paved stone floor. He was badly treated but said, "I am not giving them [the British] the fun of dying here"' (Mrs Ingrid Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994).
4. James Dillon had been forced to resign as deputy leader of Fine Gael in February 1942 over his call for Ireland to aid the war Allies (Carroll, pp. 115-6).
5. Minutes of the 7th Cabinet, 17 July 1934, p. 341 (NA, 1/5 Minutes of the 7th Cabinet, S6631).
6. Dáil Debates, 6 December 1945, Vol. 98, Cols. 1549-1551. Laurence Joseph Walsh was a Fianna Fail T.D. for Louth (see Flynn, pp. 143-4). According to Maria Mahr's letter of 18 August 1939 to her housekeeper in Dublin (MA G2/130), Adolf Mahr had planned to attend the Nazi Party rally at Nuremberg scheduled for 2-11 September 1939. The rally was cancelled on 26 August 1939 (Burden, pp. 164-5). Once Mahr left Dublin in July 1939 he was succeeded as Ortsgruppenleiter (local Nazi party branch leader) by Heinz Mecking. Mecking had been lined up as Mahr's eventual successor as far back as December 1938 (Bryan memos of 10 April 1945 and 19 December 1945 in Mahr's G2 'personal' file MA G2/0130) though this move may have been as a result of pressure from Joe Walshe at the Department of External Affairs who was concerned about 'the existence of a Nazi organisation in Dublin...having as its chief member and organiser an employee [Mahr] of our

State' (Walshe to de Valera 22 February 1939, FLK, de Valera papers, file 953). According to Mahr's daughter, Ingrid, her father refused an offer to return to Ireland via Spain and the USA, after war had broken out, because 'it would damage Irish neutrality' (Ingrid Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994).

7. G2 report on Adolf Mahr, unsigned, 19 December 1945 (MA G2/130 Adolf Mahr file). The section of this report relating to Mahr's Nazi activities in Ireland would not have been news to de Valera since the Taoiseach had been informed of Mahr's fascist links almost seven years earlier (Walshe to de Valera 22 February 1939, FLK, de Valera papers, file 953).

8. G. Mahr letter, 28 November 1990. Adolf Mahr's daughter, Ingrid, claims that some of her father's colleagues at the National Museum conspired to prevent his return to Ireland after the war in order to further their own promotion prospects (Ingrid Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994). Her claim is not, however, supported by subsequent events since the only contemporary of Mahr's to be appointed as director of the museum was Dr Joseph Raftery who did not get the job until 1976, some 30 years later. In the intervening period the museum was run by the following: Paddy O'Connor, acting director 1940-45; Dr Michael Quane, seconded from the Department of Education to the museum as administrator, 1945-54; and Dr Anthony T. Lucas, director 1954-76 (information supplied to author by Dr Pat Wallace, Director, National Museum, Dublin); In 1948, Adolf Mahr wrote to Dr Quane describing the claims that he (Mahr) had been a Nazi spy as 'the most preposterous slander' (Mahr to Quane, 26 January 1948, NM, Director's file no. 490). The latter file also reveals that there was uncertainty over whether books and other possessions at the museum belonged to Mahr or to the museum. After Mahr's death in May 1951, some items were handed over to the Mahr family. Mrs Maria Mahr died in Germany in 1975.

9. Dáil Debates, 13 November 1946, Vol. 103, Cols. 792-797.

10. G. Mahr letter, 28 November 1990; Commenting on the war period Adolf Mahr told his daughter, Ingrid: 'I am sorry I have ruined your life. They were wasted years' (Mrs Ingrid Reusswig interview, 28 July 1994).

11. Letter to author from Klasmann-Deilmann-Gruppe, Friesoythe, Germany, 22 July 1991.

12. Rockel, p. 32.

13. Healy to Bryan, 27 September 1945 (MA G2/2473 Dr Ludwig Mühlhausen

file).

14. The Deutsche Dienststelle, which keeps records of German POWs, notes that Mühlhausen was held in a series of internment camps in Italy and Germany following his capture on 11 May 1945 at St. Jacub, Austria (letter to author from Frau Jung, Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin, 29 April 1993).
15. Mühlhausen, *Die Vier Zweige des Mabinogi* (the four branches of the Mabinogi), 1988 edition, p. 147 including appendix by Stefan Zimmer entitled Ludwig Mühlhausen, *Leben und Werk* (life and work).
16. Rockel, p. 32.
17. Mühlhausen, p. 147.
18. Hartmann, German broadcast to Ireland, 2 May 1945 (MA G2/X/0127 FWB part 6).
19. Cole, p. 235.
20. Author's interview with Hartmann, 21 October 1990. Hartmann's letter to author, 12 July 1993.
21. Letter to author from Seán Ó Heochaidh, 20 June 1991.
22. Author's interview with Seán Ó Súilleabháin, Dublin, 24 April 1991.
23. Letter to author from Hans Hartmann, 12 July 1993.
24. Hartmann interviews, 21 October 1990 and 28 December 1990; Hartmann letter, 12 July 1993.
25. Ó Heochaidh letter, 20 June 1991.
26. Author's interview with Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, Dublin, 15 November 1990.
27. Author's interview with Tomás Ó Cathásaigh, Department of Early Irish, UCD, 11 December 1991. Daniel A. Binchy (1899-1989) was an expert in early Irish law and Celtic Studies. From 1929 to 1932 he was Ireland's Minister Plenipotentiary to Germany during which time he studied under the reknowned Celtologist, Professor Rudolf Thurneysen, at the University of Bonn. Later, he worked on a translation of Thurneysen's *Handbook of Old Irish* with Dr Cabot Bergin. In Berlin, Binchy witnessed the rise of fascism and, according to one account, 'had nothing but contempt for the opportunism of Adolf Hitler' (Keogh, pp. 29-33). Additional material on Binchy from the *Irish Independent*, 18 February 1946, p. 5 and the *50th Anniversary Report 1940-1990 of the School of Celtic Studies*, p. 74 (published by the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1990).
28. Ó Cathásaigh interview, 11 December 1991.

29. Letter to author from Eimear Ó Broin, Dublin, 2 July 1992.
30. Hartmann interview, 21 October 1990.
31. 'Former Nazi Broadcaster Reburied in Galway', in *Galway Advertiser*, 26 August 1976, p. 1.

References, Conclusion

1. Fisk, p. 225.
2. F. Taylor, pp. 56, 117, 169.
3. Duggan (1), p. 121; Stephan, pp. 139-52. Despite quoting from an official Abwehr (German Counterintelligence) war diary, Stephan is unclear about the reasons for Russell's planned return to Ireland in August 1940, apart from noting that the Germans had trained him in the use of sabotage materials (pp. 139-40, 145). Speculation about the nature of Russell's mission is complicated by the fact that the IRA leader refused to take orders from the Germans (p. 147). The importance of the Russell/Ryan landing plan is reflected by the fact that Ribbentrop himself met Russell at the Berlin Foreign Office on 5 August 1940 (pp. 146-7).
4. Fisk, pp. 340-1.
5. Duggan (1), p. 80.
6. Fisk, p. 342.
7. Cronin (1), pp. 252-3.
8. Kershaw, pp. 181-2.
9. Herzstein, p. 22.
10. Kris and Speier, p. 279.
11. Briggs (1), pp. 7-8.
12. Hildebrand (2), p. 82.
13. Baird, p. 258.
14. Balfour, p. 428.
15. Balfour (p. 438) notes that 'British propaganda to Germany...failed [and] German propaganda to Britain had little practical effect...Germany's defeat however was a military one. The mistakes by her Government which brought it about lay in the fields of strategy and politics, not of propaganda'. According to Briggs ((1), p. 8) Germany's overseas propaganda had 'relatively little effect, indeed, except when it was closely geared to the operational needs of military campaigns, when words and deeds were in step...German propaganda to Britain was largely a failure. "Haw Haw" quickly built up a large audience, but as the war went on, he proved a diminishing asset'.
16. Mahr report, 18 March 1941, pp. 2-3 (AA R67483).
17. Mac Aonghusa, pp. 63-4.

18. Duggan (1), p. 162; Lee, p. 226.
19. Fisk, p. 364.
20. Fisk, p. 380.
21. Fisk, p. 431.

References: Franz Fromme (Appendix H)

1. Fromme, *Irlands Kampf um die Freiheit: Darstellung und beispiel einer voelkischen bewegung bis in die neueste zeit* (Ireland's Struggle for Freedom; Description and study of the people's movement in recent times), Berlin, 1933.
- 2, Ibid.
3. Stephan, pp. 20-21, 26.
4. Garda Síochána memorandum 3C/289/39 (MA G2/0054 file on Franz Fromme).
5. Colonel Dan Bryan memorandum, 15 February 1945 (MA G2/0054).
6. Ní Mheara, pp. 138-140.
7. Stephan, p. 92.
8. Ní Mheara, p. 162.
9. Author's interview with Francis Stuart, Dublin, 17 November 1989.
10. Duggan, 'Herr Hempel at the German Legation in Dublin 1937-45', TCD thesis, 1979, includes interview with Edmund Veessenmayer, Darmstadt, July 1977 (thesis appendix XXIV, p. 421). Duggan's interview with Veessenmayer is believed to be the only one the German ever granted after the war. Veessenmayer, who was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment by the Nuremberg Tribunal, died in 1978.

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Archival sources by country

Ireland

Military Archives, Dublin

File G2/X/0127 Foreign Wireless broadcasts, in six parts covering broadcasts from Germany and elsewhere to Ireland from 1939 to 1945 as follows:

- Part 1: 1939 to 13 June 1942
- Part 2: 13 June 1942 to 27 October 1942
- Part 3: 27 October 1942 to 31 March 1943
- Part 4: 1 April 1943 to 31 October 1943
- Part 5: 1 November 1943 to 30 July 1944
- Part 6: 1 August 1944 to 1945

The Military Archive also holds files on individuals involved, directly or indirectly, with German radio broadcasts to Ireland in World War II, as follows:

- G2/2473 Ludwig Mühlhausen
- G2/0130 Adolf Mahr, personal file, and
- G2/130 Adolf Mahr, intercepted letters file.
- G2/0071 Hans Hartmann, and
- G2/007 Hans Hartmann
- G2/4102 Susan Hilton
- G2/5129 James Blair
- G2/0054 Franz Fromme
- G2/0245 Otto Reinhard

Other files from the Military Archive, Dublin, quoted in this work:

- G2/X/0099 Translations and Translators, contains details of G2 personnel doing translation work, including translations of foreign broadcasts.
- G2/X/0676 Irish-German-American Notes, containing details of courier system used by Francis Stuart to communicate between Berlin and Ireland via the United States during 1940 and 1941.

Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin

DFA A72 Francis Stuart restricted file

DFA 205/108 German Broadcasts to Ireland (contains records of diplomatic protests over one Stuart broadcast in December 1942, and others in April and May 1943).

Department of Finance, Dublin

E53/3/33 National Museum: appointment of Dr Mahr as director (containing details of Mahr's appointment to head the National Museum in 1934).

Franciscan Library, Killiney, Co Dublin

De Valera Papers, file 953, 'Anglo-Irish Relations. J.P. Walshe: Memoranda, 1932-39'.

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1/5 Minutes of the 7th Cabinet, S6631 p. 341 (contains minute of Mahr promotion signed by Eamon de Valera).

DFA restricted file 201/36/12 Irish citizenship application at Vichy 1941, Susan Hilton.

DFA A60 Secretary's Office files, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin.

D/JUS C766 containing examples of the *Weekly Review of the German News Agency*.

National Library, Dublin

The *Irish Bulletin* (file ref. Ir 94109 i15), an underground pamphlet circulated by the provisional government during the Irish War of Independence, 1919-21. Its contents formed the basis of the U.S. Senate document, *The Struggle of the Irish People*, which was quoted by German Radio's Irish service in the 1941-44 period.

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Volume 1: 16 September 1927 to 14 February 1931.

Volume 2: 15 February 1931 to 31 December 1933.

Volume 3: 1 January 1934 to 31 July 1935.

Journal Office, Houses of the Oireachtas, Dublin

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Parachute Landing, 17 February 1944, Vol. 92, Cols. 1237-1240.

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Committee on Finance - Supplementary Estimate, 13 November 1946, Vol. 103, Cols. 792-797.

University College Dublin, Main Library

U.S. Senate document *The Struggle of the Irish People* is held in the library's United States collection (No. 8 SD 67-1 vol. 9-4).

Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast

CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR, contains summary of German and other broadcasts referring to Ireland in the 1941-44 period. The files were originally passed from London to the Northern Ireland Cabinet.

Germany

Berlin Document Center, U.S. Embassy, Berlin

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1153327 M 32 Ludwig Mühlhausen
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1784939 Wolfgang Dignowity
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I 28044 Nora O'Mara

Auswärtiges Amt, Politisches Archiv, Bonn (Political archive of German Foreign Office)

R 27188 Fremdsprachiger Nachrichtendienst des Deutschen Rundfunks (Foreign language news service of German Radio), 1 December 1939.
R 67477 Adolf Mahr, containing details of Mahr's career at wartime Foreign Office from 1940 to 1944.
R 67483 Rundfunkpropaganda nach Irland (Radio propaganda to Ireland) report

by Adolf Mahr for Foreign Office dated 18 March 1941.

R 67482 Sitzung beim Herrn RAM über die Propaganda nach den unter dem Joche Grossbritanniens stehenden Ländern (Meeting convened by Foreign Minister concerning propaganda to countries standing under the yoke of Great Britain), 22 May 1941, Berlin.

Bundesarchiv, Potsdam (former East German/DDR national archive)

VA 62407, document no. 168, Englischsprachige Sendungen nach Irland (English-speaking programmes to Ireland), memo by Adolf Mahr for German Foreign Office, dated 9 September 1941.

Belgium

Institut Geographique National, Brussels

91 (417)-3 document 25 P9/3 Militärgeographische Angaben über Irland (Military Geographical Data on Ireland). 5-volume document prepared and printed in occupied Brussels 1940-41, published Berlin 15 October 1941 by German Army's department of war maps and surveys.

Britain

Lord Chancellor's Department, London

CRIM 1/1745 Rex V Hilton. This file, which has not yet been released to the Public Record Office, contains details of the case brought against Dorothea Susan Hilton (née Sweney) for 'assisting the enemy' by making propaganda broadcasts. It also contains details of statements taken from Hilton by MI5

at Liebenau Camp in Germany on 30 May, 30 June, 1 July and 3 July 1945.
CRIM 1/1783 Rex v James Gilbert. This file contains an unsigned and undated statement by Gilbert to British military authorities c.1945, detailing his Gestapo interrogation and subsequent imprisonment in Grossbeeren workcamp for refusing to work for the radio propaganda service. It also details a meeting in Berlin with Adolf Mahr after Gilbert's release.

Imperial War Museum, Duxford, Oxfordshire

E88 BBC original monitoring reports 'Germany in Irish Gaelic', 22 September 1940 to 6 July 1943.

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BT 27/1553, passenger list of SS Kemmendine, 27/28 May 1940 (including Mrs S. Hilton).

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United States

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C.

Register no. CL-1566-BG: secret dispatches from U.S. Embassy, Dublin, to
Office of War Information, Washington, 1943-1945.

Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service logs (contain 35,000 international
shortwave broadcasts to North America which were monitored from 1941-45).
The FBIS also holds a collection of captured German sound recordings.

Princeton University Archives, New Jersey

The university's Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library contains details on the
Princeton Listening Center which pioneered American monitoring of foreign
broadcasts from 1939 to 1941. The monitoring work was taken over by the
Federal Communications Commission in October 1941.

Interviews conducted by the author (* by telephone)

Mr Charles Acton, Dublin, 2 July 1992.*
Miss Mona Brase, Dublin, 8 October 1991, 4 March 1995.*
Mr Ned Butler, Dublin, 23 August 1990.
Professor F.J. Byrne, University College, Dublin, 30 December 1991.*
Mr Hugh Byrne, Teelin, Co Donegal, 15 January 1992
Miss Mary Charleton, Belfast, 1 February 1993.*
Mr Helmut Clissmann, Dublin, 11 September 1990.
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Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, Dublin, 15 November 1990 and 1 April 1993.
Mr M. Dewinter, Brussels, 22 November 1991.
Mr Noel Dorr, Secretary, Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 13 June 1991.
Lt. Col. John P. Duggan (retd.), Dublin, 8 June 1991.
Miss Ina Foley, Dublin, 19 June 1992.*
Mrs Margaret Greiner, Dublin, 25 May 1993 and 26 June 1993.
Miss Agnes Hannigan, Dublin, 29 April 1993.
Dr Hans Hartmann, Cologne, 9 July 1990*, 21 October 1990*, 28 December 1990, and 12 May 1991.*
Mr Michael Healy, Dublin, 15 October 1991.*
Mr Maurice Irvine, Brighton, 31 January 1992.
Seán Mac Reamoinn, Dublin, 8 August 1991.*
Joan Medcalf (née Budina), Dublin, 15 December 1992.*
Éimear Ó Broin, Dublin, 10 June 1992 and 15 June 1992.
Bláth Ó Brolcháin, Dublin, 10 October 1991.
Tomás Ó Cathásaigh, Dept. of Early Irish, UCD, 11 December 1991.
Seán Ó Heochaidh, Gortahork, Co Donegal, 14 January 1992.
Liam Ó Muirthile, Dublin, 9 October 1991.
Seán Ó Súilleabháin, Dublin, 24 April 1991.
Dr Joseph Raftery, Dublin, 20 May 1991.
Ingrid Reusswig (née Mahr), Dublin, 28 July 1994.
William Ryan, Dublin, 26 February 1991.*
Miss Margaret Schaffhauser, Liphook, Hampshire, 9 November 1992.*
Günther Schütz, Shankill, Co Dublin, 6 September 1990.
Mrs Jean Sheridan-Healy, Cork, 4 January 1992*, and 2 March 1992.*
Mrs Edward Slowey, Dublin, 15 November 1990.

Enno Stephan, Cologne, 28 December 1990.

Francis Stuart, Dublin, 17 November 1989, 24 February 1990, 10 February 1992 and 19 June 1992.

Edward Sweney, Oldcastle, Co Meath, 9 June 1991*, 14 September 1992, 18 November 1992 and 28 August 1993.

Dr Pat Wallace, Director, National Museum, Dublin, 5 December 1990.

Eileen Walsh, Dublin, 10 July 1992.

Bob Wylie, Strasbourg, 10 September 1991.

Commandant Peter Young, Dublin, 29 January 1991 and 9 December 1991.

Letters elicited by the author from

Charles Acton, Dublin, 27 August 1992.

Professor Bo Almqvist, UCD, Dublin, 24 May 1991.

Professor James J. Barnes, Wabash College, Indiana, 5 August 1991.

Dr Rolf Baumgarten, Dept. of Celtic Studies, Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 8 July 1991.

Dr Wolf Bierbach, Studienkreis Rundfunk und Geschichte, Cologne, 22 October 1990.

Mrs Carolle J. Carter, Menlo College, California, 13 January 1991.

John Cassidy, Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London, 13 January 1994.

Mrs Iris Cawley (née Marsden), Hindhead, Surrey, 12 November 1994 and 22 November 1994.

Mary Charleton, Belfast, 27 July 1991.

Terence C. Charman, Imperial War Museum, London, 13 September 1990, 19 October 1990, 3 December 1990, 8 August 1991, 4 October 1991 and 5 May 1992.

Miss J. Coburn, Greater London Record Office and History Library, 27 June 1991 and 24 July 1991.

Tom Collins, Athlone, 30 July 1990.

Seán Cronin, Washington D.C., 26 November 1990.

Mrs Siobhán de hOir, Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, Dublin, 10 September 1991.

Dr Ansgar Diller, Frankfurt, 23 August 1990 and 16 May 1993.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton M.P., House of Commons, London, 30 December 1994.

Colonel J.M. Doyle (retd.), Dublin, 14 July 1994.

Lt. Col. John P. Duggan (retd.), Dublin, 17 August 1992.

Friedrich Engel, BASF, Mannheim, 8 February 1991.

Martin Esslin, London, 15 December 1993.

Tony Fahy, RTE, 12 March 1992.

George Fleischmann, Ontario, Canada, 6 May 1991.

M. Flynn, City Librarian, Limerick, 12 June 1991.

Dr Ann Gallagher, TCD, Dublin, 26 April 1994.

Ms Tracy Gallagher, British Embassy, Dublin, 12 August 1991.

The Duke of Hamilton, East Lothian, Scotland, 24 December 1994 and 28

January 1995.

Miss Agnes Hannigan, Paris, 8 March 1993.

J. Harrison, Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London, 14 August 1991.

Dr Hans Hartmann, Cologne, 28 June 1992, 12 July 1993 and 16 August 1993.

Billy Hawkes, Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 18 June 1991 and 18 October 1993.

Dr Louis D. Healy, Mandurah, Australia, 14 January 1992.

Dom Placid Hooper OSB, Buckfast Abbey, England, 16 March 1993.

Fr Ignatius C.P., Broadway, Worcestershire, 28 January 1993 and 18 April 1993.

Maurice Irvine, Brighton, 29 April 1991, 31 July 1991, 10 January 1992, 3 November 1992 and 28 December 1993.

Kate Johnson, Imperial War Museum, London, 18 November 1992.

Frau Jung, Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin, 29 April 1993.

Jacqueline Kavanagh, BBC, Reading, 20 June 1990, 13 July 1990, 24 August 1990, 26 July 1991, 4 September 1991 and 24 December 1991.

Dr Maria Keipert, Foreign Office, Bonn, 9 July 1990 and 2 May 1991.

Douglas King, Berlin, 1 March 1991.

Heike Klauss, Foreign Office, Bonn, 7 August 1991 and 17 June 1993.

Pierre Kowanko, Paris, 8 May 1994.

Dr David Lammey, Public Record Office, Belfast, 14 February 1990.

Anke Leenings, DRA, Frankfurt am Main, 4 March 1991.

Professor Gearóid MacEoin, Dept. of Old and Middle Irish, UCG, 5 March 1991.

Tony McKenna, Bord na Móna, Newbridge, Co Kildare, 5 June 1991.

Dr Alf Mac Lochlainn, Galway, 11 June 1991.

Dr Séamus MacMathúna, UCG, Galway, 23 September 1991.

John Magennis, N.I. Dept. of Education, Bangor, 22 October 1991.

Gustav Mahr, Berlin, 28 November 1990.

Gerard Mansell, London, 13 November 1989.

Dr David G. Marwell, Berlin Document Center, 17 September 1991, 24 May 1993 and 30 July 1993.

Dr Ian Maxwell, Public Record Office, Belfast, 24 June 1994.

Hans Heinz Mecking, Friesoythe, Germany, 22 July 1991.

Joan Newman, Fort William, Scotland, 2 July 1992.

Miss Ísold Ní Dheirg, Dublin, 10 February 1994.

Róisín Ní Mheara, Berenau, Germany, 2 February 1993.

Dr Burkhard Nowotny, Deutsche Welle, Cologne, 28 August 1990.

Eimear Ó Broin, Dublin, 2 July 1992.

Professor Conn R. Ó Cléirigh, Dept. of Linguistics, UCD, 4 May 1993.

John O'Connell, Dept. of Finance, Dublin, 18 November 1994.

Deborah O'Donoghue, British Library, London, 8 August 1991.

Dr Seán Ó Heochaidh, Gortahork, Co Donegal, 20 June 1991.

Dr Oldenbage, Bunesarchiv, Potsdam, 26 April 1991.

Art O'Leary, Dublin, 4 February 1991.

Seán Ó Lúing, Dublin, 9 March 1993 and 16 March 1993.

L. Ó Ronain, Donegal County Library, Letterkenny, 8 May 1991.

Ken Ó Siochfhradha, Dublin, 8 May 1993.

Gerry Power, Queen's University, Belfast, 23 January 1993.

Ben Primer, Princeton University, New Jersey, 4 September 1991.

Mrs Ingrid Reusswig (née Mahr), Gelnhausen, Germany, 9 May 1994 and 10 July 1994.

Dr Heide Riedel, Deutschesrundfunk Museum, Berlin, 5 June 1991.

Dr Ritter, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 14 March 1991.

Don Roe, National Archives, Washington D.C., 2 November 1990.

Walter Roller, DRA, Frankfurt am Main, 8 March 1991 and 10 May 1991.

S. Roser, German Embassy, Dublin, 25 July 1991.

Vladimir Rubinstein, Reading, 24 July 1990, 2 October 1990, 22 January 1992, 19 January 1993, 17 March 1993 and 18 November 1993.

Michael Ryan, Director, Chester Beatty Library and Gallery of Oriental Art, Dublin, 4 November 1994.

Miss Margaret Schaffhauser, Liphook, Hampshire, 26 November 1992 and 29 January 1993.

Werner Schwipps, Berlin, 17 February 1991, 29 March 1991 and 21 April 1991.

Mrs E. Smith, Lord Chancellor's Department, London, 27 August 1991.

Dr Hilde Spickernagel, Hanover, 11 November 1991, 9 February 1992, 10 August 1992, 31 January 1993 and 31 December 1993.

Enno Stephan, Wachtberg-Villip, Germany, 16 September 1990.

Francis Stuart, Dublin, 9 November 1989, 15 January 1992, 7 July 1994 and 14 July 1994.

Edward Sweney, Oldcastle, Co Meath, 28 August 1993.

Lorna Swire, Reading, 17 October 1990, 19 November 1990, 20 January 1991, 3

May 1991, 15 July 1991, 8 January 1992, 5 February 1993, 4 November 1993,
25 November 1993.

Mrs V.A. Swyers, Lord Chancellor's Department, London, 24 September 1991,
25 October 1991 and 1 December 1991.

Professor Derick Thomson, University of Glasgow, 27 November 1990 and 16
June 1991.

Ms Ríonach uí Ógáin, Dept. of Irish Folklore, UCD, 26 November 1992.

Lucia van der Linde, Foreign Office, Bonn, 27 January 1992 and 27 February
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Dr Pat Wallace, Dublin, 30 May 1990.

John Walsh, Dublin, 25 January 1992.

A. Wehmeyer, Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, 10 December 1992.

Elizabeth Wells, National Sound Archive, London, 26 September 1990.

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